On Interpretation
{"WorkMasterId":4931,"WpPageId":243289,"ParentWpPageId":189130,"Slug":"on-interpretation","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/aristotle-of-stagira/on-interpretation/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/aristotle-of-stagira/on-interpretation/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":156090,"CleanHtmlLength":98749,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"On Interpretation","Deck":"Explains names, verbs, propositions, affirmation, negation, opposition, modality, and truth-bearing speech.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to Aristotle","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/aristotle-of-stagira/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"Aristotle","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/aristotle-of-stagira/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/aristotle-01-palazzo-altemps-bust-3.jpg","ImageAlt":"Aristotle Bust in the Palazzo Altemps","FilterTerra":"Eastern Mediterranean","ClickText":"Aristotle","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/aristotle-of-stagira/","Copies":["384 BCE – 322 BCE","Stagira, Chalcidice","Greek philosopher from Stagira, student of Plato, tutor of Alexander, and founder of the Lyceum whose logic, metaphysics, psychology, ethics, politics, rhetoric, poetics, biology, and philosophy of science shaped later philosophy."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:1","Title":"Ancient History","DateText":"3000 BCE – 499 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-ancient-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:3","Title":"Classical Antiquity","DateText":"500 BCE – 499 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-ancient-history/philosophers-of-classical-antiquity/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"355 BCE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Proxy chronology year for ordering the Aristotelian core corpus; it is not a documented composition date, and several treatises are composite lecture materials revised across Aristotle\u0027s career.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:2"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:8"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:GRC:2"}],"OriginalTitle":"Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας","Language":"Ancient Greek","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:philosophy-of-language"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:logic"}],"Tradition":"Aristotelian philosophy","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Full text from MIT Internet Classics Archive: On Interpretation .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Explains names, verbs, propositions, affirmation, negation, opposition, modality, and truth-bearing speech."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"De Interpretatione","KeyConcepts":"signification; proposition; truth; modality; contradiction","Methodology":"Aristotelian analysis, definition, division, dialectical testing, causal explanation, and ordered inquiry.","Structure":"Treatise or lecture-material text within the traditional Aristotelian corpus."},"Arguments":["Develops a focused part of Aristotle\u0027s system through distinctions, examples, aporiai, definitions, and explanatory principles."],"Influence":{"InfluencedBy":"Plato; Socrates; Presocratic natural philosophy; Greek mathematics, rhetoric, medicine, and biological observation.","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Core text in the Aristotelian corpus and a major source for later ancient, medieval, and modern philosophy.","Still used in research on logic, metaphysics, ethics, politics, psychology, language, science, rhetoric, poetics, and intellectual history."],"EvidenceNote":["Accepted for this Core Corpus pass as an Aristotle-authored or standard Aristotelian corpus work. Fragment-only works, pseudo-Aristotle, source/testimony pages, and excluded disputed works remain evidence rows rather than work pages."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Versions","BodyHtml":"\u003cdiv class=\"dz-philo__full-version-grid\"\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-version-card\"\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-provider\"\u003eMIT Internet Classics Archive\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3 class=\"dz-philo__full-version-title\"\u003eOn Interpretation\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-meta\"\u003eHtmlText · LinkOnlyReady\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ca class=\"dz-philo__full-version-link\" href=\"https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/interpretation.html\"\u003eOpen full version\u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["Explains names, verbs, propositions, affirmation, negation, opposition, modality, and truth-bearing speech."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":"De Interpretatione"},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"signification; proposition; truth; modality; contradiction"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Aristotelian analysis, definition, division, dialectical testing, causal explanation, and ordered inquiry."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"Treatise or lecture-material text within the traditional Aristotelian corpus."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Develops a focused part of Aristotle\u0027s system through distinctions, examples, aporiai, definitions, and explanatory principles."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"Plato; Socrates; Presocratic natural philosophy; Greek mathematics, rhetoric, medicine, and biological observation."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"Peripatetic philosophy; late antique commentary; Islamic, Jewish, and Christian Aristotelianism; scholastic philosophy; modern philosophical vocabulary."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Core text in the Aristotelian corpus and a major source for later ancient, medieval, and modern philosophy.","Still used in research on logic, metaphysics, ethics, politics, psychology, language, science, rhetoric, poetics, and intellectual history."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Accepted for this Core Corpus pass as an Aristotle-authored or standard Aristotelian corpus work. Fragment-only works, pseudo-Aristotle, source/testimony pages, and excluded disputed works remain evidence rows rather than work pages."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003eFull text from \u003ca href=\"https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/interpretation.html\"\u003eMIT Internet Classics Archive: On Interpretation\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cTABLE BORDER=\"0\" CELLSPACING=\"15\"\u003e\n\u003cTR ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"CENTER\"\u003e\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"BOTTOM\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003ca href=\"/index.html\"Go to home page\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"-1\"\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003ca href=\"/index.html\"Go to home page\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003eHome\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"BOTTOM\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Browse/index-Aristotle.html\"Browse a list of titles\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"-1\"\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Browse/index-Aristotle.html\"Browse a list of titles\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003eBrowse and\u003cBR\u003eComment\u003c/A\u003e\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"BOTTOM\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Search/index.html\"Search texts\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"-1\"\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Search/index.html\"Search texts\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003eSearch\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"BOTTOM\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Buy/Aristotle.html\"Buy books and CD-ROMs\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"-1\"\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Buy/Aristotle.html\"Buy books and CD-ROMs\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003eBuy Books and\u003cBR\u003eCD-ROMs\u003c/A\u003e\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"BOTTOM\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Help/general.html\"Get help\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"-1\"\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Help/general.html\"Get help\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003eHelp\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\n\u003c/TR\u003e\n\u003c/TABLE\u003e\n\n\u003cHR SIZE=\"1\" COLOR=\"990033\" NOSHADE WIDTH=\"30%\"\u003e\n\u003cBR\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"+2\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eOn Interpretation\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/FONT\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"+1\"\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eBy Aristotle\u003c/FONT\u003e\n\n\u003cBLOCKQUOTE\u003e\u003cB\u003eCommentary:\u003c/B\u003e A few comments have been posted about\n\u003cU\u003eOn Interpretation\u003c/U\u003e.\n\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cB\u003eDownload:\u003c/B\u003e A \ntext-only version is \u003cA HREF=\"interpretation.mb.txt\"Download text-only version\u0027; return true;\"\u003eavailable for download\u003c/A\u003e.\n\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cHR SIZE=\"1\" COLOR=\"990033\" NOSHADE\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cFONT SIZE=\"+1\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eOn Interpretation\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/FONT\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eBy Aristotle\n\u003cA NAME=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eWritten 350 B.C.E\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eTranslated by E. M. Edghill\n\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cTABLE WIDTH=\"60%\" BORDER=\"0\"\u003e\n\u003cTR VALIGN=\"TOP\"\u003e\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"LEFT\" WIDTH=\"30%\" NOWRAP\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/TD\u003e\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"interpretation.html\"Go to table of contents\u0027; return true;\"\u003eTable of Contents\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cFONT SIZE=\"+1\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eSection 1\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"RIGHT\" WIDTH=\"30%\" NOWRAP\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u003cA HREF=\"interpretation.2.2.html\"Section 2\u0027; return true;\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\n\u003c/TD\u003e\n\u003c/TR\u003e\n\u003c/TABLE\u003e\n\u003cBR\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"start\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"10\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cB\u003ePart 1\u003c/B\u003e\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"11\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eFirst we must define the terms \u0027noun\u0027 and \u0027verb\u0027, then the terms \u0027denial\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"12\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand \u0027affirmation\u0027, then \u0027proposition\u0027 and \u0027sentence.\u0027\n\u003cA NAME=\"13\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eSpoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words \n\u003cA NAME=\"14\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eare the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, \n\u003cA NAME=\"15\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eso all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, \n\u003cA NAME=\"16\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhich these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those \n\u003cA NAME=\"17\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethings of which our experiences are the images. This matter has, however, \n\u003cA NAME=\"18\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebeen discussed in my treatise about the soul, for it belongs to an investigation \n\u003cA NAME=\"19\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003edistinct from that which lies before us.\n\u003cA NAME=\"20\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eAs there are in the mind thoughts which do not involve truth or \n\u003cA NAME=\"21\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003efalsity, and also those which must be either true or false, so it is in \n\u003cA NAME=\"22\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003espeech. For truth and falsity imply combination and separation. Nouns and \n\u003cA NAME=\"23\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003everbs, provided nothing is added, are like thoughts without combination \n\u003cA NAME=\"24\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eor separation; \u0027man\u0027 and \u0027white\u0027, as isolated terms, are not yet either \n\u003cA NAME=\"25\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003etrue or false. In proof of this, consider the word \u0027goat-stag.\u0027 It has \n\u003cA NAME=\"26\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esignificance, but there is no truth or falsity about it, unless \u0027is\u0027 or \n\u003cA NAME=\"27\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027is not\u0027 is added, either in the present or in some other \n\u003cA NAME=\"28\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003etense.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"29\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cB\u003ePart 2\u003c/B\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"30\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eBy a noun we mean a sound significant by convention, which has \n\u003cA NAME=\"31\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eno reference to time, and of which no part is significant apart from the \n\u003cA NAME=\"32\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003erest. In the noun \u0027Fairsteed,\u0027 the part \u0027steed\u0027 has no significance in \n\u003cA NAME=\"33\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand by itself, as in the phrase \u0027fair steed.\u0027 Yet there is a difference \n\u003cA NAME=\"34\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebetween simple and composite nouns; for in the former the part is in no \n\u003cA NAME=\"35\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eway significant, in the latter it contributes to the meaning of the whole, \n\u003cA NAME=\"36\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ealthough it has not an independent meaning. Thus in the word \u0027pirate-boat\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"37\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe word \u0027boat\u0027 has no meaning except as part of the whole \n\u003cA NAME=\"38\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eword.\n\u003cA NAME=\"39\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThe limitation \u0027by convention\u0027 was introduced because nothing is \n\u003cA NAME=\"40\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eby nature a noun or name-it is only so when it becomes a symbol; inarticulate \n\u003cA NAME=\"41\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esounds, such as those which brutes produce, are significant, yet none of \n\u003cA NAME=\"42\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethese constitutes a noun.\n\u003cA NAME=\"43\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThe expression \u0027not-man\u0027 is not a noun. There is indeed no recognized \n\u003cA NAME=\"44\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eterm by which we may denote such an expression, for it is not a sentence \n\u003cA NAME=\"45\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eor a denial. Let it then be called an indefinite noun.\n\u003cA NAME=\"46\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThe expressions \u0027of Philo\u0027, \u0027to Philo\u0027, and so on, constitute not \n\u003cA NAME=\"47\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enouns, but cases of a noun. The definition of these cases of a noun is \n\u003cA NAME=\"48\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ein other respects the same as that of the noun proper, but, when coupled \n\u003cA NAME=\"49\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewith \u0027is\u0027, \u0027was\u0027, or will be\u0027, they do not, as they are, form a proposition \n\u003cA NAME=\"50\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eeither true or false, and this the noun proper always does, under these \n\u003cA NAME=\"51\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003econditions. Take the words \u0027of Philo is\u0027 or \u0027of or \u0027of Philo is not\u0027; these \n\u003cA NAME=\"52\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewords do not, as they stand, form either a true or a false \n\u003cA NAME=\"53\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eproposition.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"54\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cB\u003ePart 3\u003c/B\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"55\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eA verb is that which, in addition to its proper meaning, carries \n\u003cA NAME=\"56\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewith it the notion of time. No part of it has any independent meaning, \n\u003cA NAME=\"57\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand it is a sign of something said of something else.\n\u003cA NAME=\"58\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eI will explain what I mean by saying that it carries with it the \n\u003cA NAME=\"59\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enotion of time. \u0027Health\u0027 is a noun, but \u0027is healthy\u0027 is a verb; for besides \n\u003cA NAME=\"60\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eits proper meaning it indicates the present existence of the state in \n\u003cA NAME=\"61\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003equestion.\n\u003cA NAME=\"62\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eMoreover, a verb is always a sign of something said of something \n\u003cA NAME=\"63\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eelse, i.e. of something either predicable of or present in some other \n\u003cA NAME=\"64\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ething.\n\u003cA NAME=\"65\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eSuch expressions as \u0027is not-healthy\u0027, \u0027is not, ill\u0027, I do not describe \n\u003cA NAME=\"66\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eas verbs; for though they carry the additional note of time, and always \n\u003cA NAME=\"67\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eform a predicate, there is no specified name for this variety; but let \n\u003cA NAME=\"68\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethem be called indefinite verbs, since they apply equally well to that \n\u003cA NAME=\"69\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhich exists and to that which does not.\n\u003cA NAME=\"70\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eSimilarly \u0027he was healthy\u0027, \u0027he will be healthy\u0027, are not verbs, \n\u003cA NAME=\"71\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebut tenses of a verb; the difference lies in the fact that the verb indicates \n\u003cA NAME=\"72\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003epresent time, while the tenses of the verb indicate those times which lie \n\u003cA NAME=\"73\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eoutside the present.\n\u003cA NAME=\"74\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eVerbs in and by themselves are substantival and have significance, \n\u003cA NAME=\"75\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003efor he who uses such expressions arrests the hearer\u0027s mind, and fixes his \n\u003cA NAME=\"76\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eattention; but they do not, as they stand, express any judgement, either \n\u003cA NAME=\"77\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003epositive or negative. For neither are \u0027to be\u0027 and \u0027not to be\u0027 the participle \n\u003cA NAME=\"78\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027being\u0027 significant of any fact, unless something is added; for they do \n\u003cA NAME=\"79\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enot themselves indicate anything, but imply a copulation, of which we cannot \n\u003cA NAME=\"80\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eform a conception apart from the things coupled.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"81\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cB\u003ePart 4\u003c/B\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"82\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eA sentence is a significant portion of speech, some parts of which \n\u003cA NAME=\"83\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ehave an independent meaning, that is to say, as an utterance, though not \n\u003cA NAME=\"84\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eas the expression of any positive judgement. Let me explain. The word \u0027human\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"85\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ehas meaning, but does not constitute a proposition, either positive or \n\u003cA NAME=\"86\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enegative. It is only when other words are added that the whole will form \n\u003cA NAME=\"87\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ean affirmation or denial. But if we separate one syllable of the word \u0027human\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"88\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003efrom the other, it has no meaning; similarly in the word \u0027mouse\u0027, the part \n\u003cA NAME=\"89\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027ouse\u0027 has no meaning in itself, but is merely a sound. In composite words, \n\u003cA NAME=\"90\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eindeed, the parts contribute to the meaning of the whole; yet, as has been \n\u003cA NAME=\"91\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003epointed out, they have not an independent meaning.\n\u003cA NAME=\"92\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eEvery sentence has meaning, not as being the natural means by which \n\u003cA NAME=\"93\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ea physical faculty is realized, but, as we have said, by convention. Yet \n\u003cA NAME=\"94\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eevery sentence is not a proposition; only such are propositions as have \n\u003cA NAME=\"95\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ein them either truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is a sentence, but is neither \n\u003cA NAME=\"96\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003etrue nor false.\n\u003cA NAME=\"97\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eLet us therefore dismiss all other types of sentence but the proposition, \n\u003cA NAME=\"98\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003efor this last concerns our present inquiry, whereas the investigation of \n\u003cA NAME=\"99\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe others belongs rather to the study of rhetoric or of \n\u003cA NAME=\"100\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003epoetry.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"101\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cB\u003ePart 5\u003c/B\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"102\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThe first class of simple propositions is the simple affirmation, \n\u003cA NAME=\"103\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe next, the simple denial; all others are only one by \n\u003cA NAME=\"104\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003econjunction.\n\u003cA NAME=\"105\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eEvery proposition must contain a verb or the tense of a verb. The \n\u003cA NAME=\"106\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ephrase which defines the species \u0027man\u0027, if no verb in present, past, or \n\u003cA NAME=\"107\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003efuture time be added, is not a proposition. It may be asked how the expression \n\u003cA NAME=\"108\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027a footed animal with two feet\u0027 can be called single; for it is not the \n\u003cA NAME=\"109\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ecircumstance that the words follow in unbroken succession that effects \n\u003cA NAME=\"110\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe unity. This inquiry, however, finds its place in an investigation foreign \n\u003cA NAME=\"111\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eto that before us.\n\u003cA NAME=\"112\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eWe call those propositions single which indicate a single fact, \n\u003cA NAME=\"113\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eor the conjunction of the parts of which results in unity: those propositions, \n\u003cA NAME=\"114\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eon the other hand, are separate and many in number, which indicate many \n\u003cA NAME=\"115\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003efacts, or whose parts have no conjunction.\n\u003cA NAME=\"116\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eLet us, moreover, consent to call a noun or a verb an expression \n\u003cA NAME=\"117\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eonly, and not a proposition, since it is not possible for a man to speak \n\u003cA NAME=\"118\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ein this way when he is expressing something, in such a way as to make a \n\u003cA NAME=\"119\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003estatement, whether his utterance is an answer to a question or an act of \n\u003cA NAME=\"120\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ehis own initiation.\n\u003cA NAME=\"121\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eTo return: of propositions one kind is simple, i.e. that which \n\u003cA NAME=\"122\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003easserts or denies something of something, the other composite, i.e. that \n\u003cA NAME=\"123\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhich is compounded of simple propositions. A simple proposition is a statement, \n\u003cA NAME=\"124\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewith meaning, as to the presence of something in a subject or its absence, \n\u003cA NAME=\"125\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ein the present, past, or future, according to the divisions of \n\u003cA NAME=\"126\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003etime.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"127\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cB\u003ePart 6\u003c/B\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"128\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eAn affirmation is a positive assertion of something about something, \n\u003cA NAME=\"129\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ea denial a negative assertion.\n\u003cA NAME=\"130\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eNow it is possible both to affirm and to deny the presence of something \n\u003cA NAME=\"131\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhich is present or of something which is not, and since these same affirmations \n\u003cA NAME=\"132\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand denials are possible with reference to those times which lie outside \n\u003cA NAME=\"133\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe present, it would be possible to contradict any affirmation or denial. \n\u003cA NAME=\"134\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eThus it is plain that every affirmation has an opposite denial, and similarly \n\u003cA NAME=\"135\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eevery denial an opposite affirmation.\n\u003cA NAME=\"136\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eWe will call such a pair of propositions a pair of contradictories. \n\u003cA NAME=\"137\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eThose positive and negative propositions are said to be contradictory which \n\u003cA NAME=\"138\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ehave the same subject and predicate. The identity of subject and of predicate \n\u003cA NAME=\"139\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003emust not be \u0027equivocal\u0027. Indeed there are definitive qualifications besides \n\u003cA NAME=\"140\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethis, which we make to meet the casuistries of sophists.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"141\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cB\u003ePart 7\u003c/B\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"142\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eSome things are universal, others individual. By the term \u0027universal\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"143\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eI mean that which is of such a nature as to be predicated of many subjects, \n\u003cA NAME=\"144\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eby \u0027individual\u0027 that which is not thus predicated. Thus \u0027man\u0027 is a universal, \n\u003cA NAME=\"145\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027Callias\u0027 an individual.\n\u003cA NAME=\"146\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eOur propositions necessarily sometimes concern a universal subject, \n\u003cA NAME=\"147\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esometimes an individual.\n\u003cA NAME=\"148\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIf, then, a man states a positive and a negative proposition of \n\u003cA NAME=\"149\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003euniversal character with regard to a universal, these two propositions \n\u003cA NAME=\"150\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eare \u0027contrary\u0027. By the expression \u0027a proposition of universal character \n\u003cA NAME=\"151\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewith regard to a universal\u0027, such propositions as \u0027every man is white\u0027, \n\u003cA NAME=\"152\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027no man is white\u0027 are meant. When, on the other hand, the positive and \n\u003cA NAME=\"153\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enegative propositions, though they have regard to a universal, are yet \n\u003cA NAME=\"154\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enot of universal character, they will not be contrary, albeit the meaning \n\u003cA NAME=\"155\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eintended is sometimes contrary. As instances of propositions made with \n\u003cA NAME=\"156\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eregard to a universal, but not of universal character, we may take the \n\u003cA NAME=\"157\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027propositions \u0027man is white\u0027, \u0027man is not white\u0027. \u0027Man\u0027 is a universal, \n\u003cA NAME=\"158\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebut the proposition is not made as of universal character; for the word \n\u003cA NAME=\"159\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027every\u0027 does not make the subject a universal, but rather gives the proposition \n\u003cA NAME=\"160\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ea universal character. If, however, both predicate and subject are distributed, \n\u003cA NAME=\"161\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe proposition thus constituted is contrary to truth; no affirmation will, \n\u003cA NAME=\"162\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eunder such circumstances, be true. The proposition \u0027every man is every \n\u003cA NAME=\"163\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eanimal\u0027 is an example of this type.\n\u003cA NAME=\"164\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eAn affirmation is opposed to a denial in the sense which I denote \n\u003cA NAME=\"165\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eby the term \u0027contradictory\u0027, when, while the subject remains the same, \n\u003cA NAME=\"166\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe affirmation is of universal character and the denial is not. The affirmation \n\u003cA NAME=\"167\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027every man is white\u0027 is the contradictory of the denial \u0027not every man \n\u003cA NAME=\"168\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis white\u0027, or again, the proposition \u0027no man is white\u0027 is the contradictory \n\u003cA NAME=\"169\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eof the proposition \u0027some men are white\u0027. But propositions are opposed as \n\u003cA NAME=\"170\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003econtraries when both the affirmation and the denial are universal, as in \n\u003cA NAME=\"171\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe sentences \u0027every man is white\u0027, \u0027no man is white\u0027, \u0027every man is just\u0027, \n\u003cA NAME=\"172\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027no man is just\u0027.\n\u003cA NAME=\"173\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eWe see that in a pair of this sort both propositions cannot be \n\u003cA NAME=\"174\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003etrue, but the contradictories of a pair of contraries can sometimes both \n\u003cA NAME=\"175\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebe true with reference to the same subject; for instance \u0027not every man \n\u003cA NAME=\"176\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis white\u0027 and some men are white\u0027 are both true. Of such corresponding \n\u003cA NAME=\"177\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003epositive and negative propositions as refer to universals and have a universal \n\u003cA NAME=\"178\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003echaracter, one must be true and the other false. This is the case also \n\u003cA NAME=\"179\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhen the reference is to individuals, as in the propositions \u0027Socrates \n\u003cA NAME=\"180\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis white\u0027, \u0027Socrates is not white\u0027.\n\u003cA NAME=\"181\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eWhen, on the other hand, the reference is to universals, but the \n\u003cA NAME=\"182\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003epropositions are not universal, it is not always the case that one is true \n\u003cA NAME=\"183\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand the other false, for it is possible to state truly that man is white \n\u003cA NAME=\"184\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand that man is not white and that man is beautiful and that man is not \n\u003cA NAME=\"185\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebeautiful; for if a man is deformed he is the reverse of beautiful, also \n\u003cA NAME=\"186\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eif he is progressing towards beauty he is not yet beautiful.\n\u003cA NAME=\"187\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThis statement might seem at first sight to carry with it a contradiction, \n\u003cA NAME=\"188\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eowing to the fact that the proposition \u0027man is not white\u0027 appears to be \n\u003cA NAME=\"189\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eequivalent to the proposition \u0027no man is white\u0027. This, however, is not \n\u003cA NAME=\"190\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe case, nor are they necessarily at the same time true or \n\u003cA NAME=\"191\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003efalse.\n\u003cA NAME=\"192\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIt is evident also that the denial corresponding to a single affirmation \n\u003cA NAME=\"193\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis itself single; for the denial must deny just that which the affirmation \n\u003cA NAME=\"194\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eaffirms concerning the same subject, and must correspond with the affirmation \n\u003cA NAME=\"195\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eboth in the universal or particular character of the subject and in the \n\u003cA NAME=\"196\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003edistributed or undistributed sense in which it is understood.\n\u003cA NAME=\"197\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eFor instance, the affirmation \u0027Socrates is white\u0027 has its proper \n\u003cA NAME=\"198\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003edenial in the proposition \u0027Socrates is not white\u0027. If anything else be \n\u003cA NAME=\"199\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enegatively predicated of the subject or if anything else be the subject \n\u003cA NAME=\"200\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethough the predicate remain the same, the denial will not be the denial \n\u003cA NAME=\"201\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eproper to that affirmation, but on that is distinct.\n\u003cA NAME=\"202\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThe denial proper to the affirmation \u0027every man is white\u0027 is \u0027not \n\u003cA NAME=\"203\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eevery man is white\u0027; that proper to the affirmation \u0027some men are white\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"204\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis \u0027no man is white\u0027, while that proper to the affirmation \u0027man is white\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"205\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis \u0027man is not white\u0027.\n\u003cA NAME=\"206\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eWe have shown further that a single denial is contradictorily opposite \n\u003cA NAME=\"207\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eto a single affirmation and we have explained which these are; we have \n\u003cA NAME=\"208\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ealso stated that contrary are distinct from contradictory propositions \n\u003cA NAME=\"209\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand which the contrary are; also that with regard to a pair of opposite \n\u003cA NAME=\"210\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003epropositions it is not always the case that one is true and the other false. \n\u003cA NAME=\"211\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eWe have pointed out, moreover, what the reason of this is and under what \n\u003cA NAME=\"212\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ecircumstances the truth of the one involves the falsity of the \n\u003cA NAME=\"213\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eother.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"214\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cB\u003ePart 8\u003c/B\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"215\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eAn affirmation or denial is single, if it indicates some one fact \n\u003cA NAME=\"216\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eabout some one subject; it matters not whether the subject is universal \n\u003cA NAME=\"217\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand whether the statement has a universal character, or whether this is \n\u003cA NAME=\"218\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enot so. Such single propositions are: \u0027every man is white\u0027, \u0027not every \n\u003cA NAME=\"219\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eman is white\u0027;\u0027man is white\u0027,\u0027man is not white\u0027; \u0027no man is white\u0027, \u0027some \n\u003cA NAME=\"220\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003emen are white\u0027; provided the word \u0027white\u0027 has one meaning. If, on the other \n\u003cA NAME=\"221\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ehand, one word has two meanings which do not combine to form one, the affirmation \n\u003cA NAME=\"222\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis not single. For instance, if a man should establish the symbol \u0027garment\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"223\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eas significant both of a horse and of a man, the proposition \u0027garment is \n\u003cA NAME=\"224\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhite\u0027 would not be a single affirmation, nor its opposite a single denial. \n\u003cA NAME=\"225\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eFor it is equivalent to the proposition \u0027horse and man are white\u0027, which, \n\u003cA NAME=\"226\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eagain, is equivalent to the two propositions \u0027horse is white\u0027, \u0027man is \n\u003cA NAME=\"227\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhite\u0027. If, then, these two propositions have more than a single significance, \n\u003cA NAME=\"228\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand do not form a single proposition, it is plain that the first proposition \n\u003cA NAME=\"229\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eeither has more than one significance or else has none; for a particular \n\u003cA NAME=\"230\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eman is not a horse.\n\u003cA NAME=\"231\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThis, then, is another instance of those propositions of which \n\u003cA NAME=\"232\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eboth the positive and the negative forms may be true or false \n\u003cA NAME=\"233\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esimultaneously.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"234\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cB\u003ePart 9\u003c/B\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"235\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIn the case of that which is or which has taken place, propositions, \n\u003cA NAME=\"236\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhether positive or negative, must be true or false. Again, in the case \n\u003cA NAME=\"237\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eof a pair of contradictories, either when the subject is universal and \n\u003cA NAME=\"238\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe propositions are of a universal character, or when it is individual, \n\u003cA NAME=\"239\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eas has been said,\u0027 one of the two must be true and the other false; whereas \n\u003cA NAME=\"240\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhen the subject is universal, but the propositions are not of a universal \n\u003cA NAME=\"241\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003echaracter, there is no such necessity. We have discussed this type also \n\u003cA NAME=\"242\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ein a previous chapter.\n\u003cA NAME=\"243\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eWhen the subject, however, is individual, and that which is predicated \n\u003cA NAME=\"244\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eof it relates to the future, the case is altered. For if all propositions \n\u003cA NAME=\"245\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhether positive or negative are either true or false, then any given predicate \n\u003cA NAME=\"246\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003emust either belong to the subject or not, so that if one man affirms that \n\u003cA NAME=\"247\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ean event of a given character will take place and another denies it, it \n\u003cA NAME=\"248\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis plain that the statement of the one will correspond with reality and \n\u003cA NAME=\"249\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethat of the other will not. For the predicate cannot both belong and not \n\u003cA NAME=\"250\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebelong to the subject at one and the same time with regard to the \n\u003cA NAME=\"251\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003efuture.\n\u003cA NAME=\"252\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThus, if it is true to say that a thing is white, it must necessarily \n\u003cA NAME=\"253\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebe white; if the reverse proposition is true, it will of necessity not \n\u003cA NAME=\"254\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebe white. Again, if it is white, the proposition stating that it is white \n\u003cA NAME=\"255\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewas true; if it is not white, the proposition to the opposite effect was \n\u003cA NAME=\"256\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003etrue. And if it is not white, the man who states that it is making a false \n\u003cA NAME=\"257\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003estatement; and if the man who states that it is white is making a false \n\u003cA NAME=\"258\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003estatement, it follows that it is not white. It may therefore be argued \n\u003cA NAME=\"259\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethat it is necessary that affirmations or denials must be either true or \n\u003cA NAME=\"260\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003efalse.\n\u003cA NAME=\"261\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eNow if this be so, nothing is or takes place fortuitously, either \n\u003cA NAME=\"262\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ein the present or in the future, and there are no real alternatives; everything \n\u003cA NAME=\"263\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003etakes place of necessity and is fixed. For either he that affirms that \n\u003cA NAME=\"264\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eit will take place or he that denies this is in correspondence with fact, \n\u003cA NAME=\"265\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhereas if things did not take place of necessity, an event might just \n\u003cA NAME=\"266\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eas easily not happen as happen; for the meaning of the word \u0027fortuitous\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"267\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewith regard to present or future events is that reality is so constituted \n\u003cA NAME=\"268\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethat it may issue in either of two opposite directions. Again, if a thing \n\u003cA NAME=\"269\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis white now, it was true before to say that it would be white, so that \n\u003cA NAME=\"270\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eof anything that has taken place it was always true to say \u0027it is\u0027 or \u0027it \n\u003cA NAME=\"271\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewill be\u0027. But if it was always true to say that a thing is or will be, \n\u003cA NAME=\"272\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eit is not possible that it should not be or not be about to be, and when \n\u003cA NAME=\"273\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ea thing cannot not come to be, it is impossible that it should not come \n\u003cA NAME=\"274\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eto be, and when it is impossible that it should not come to be, it must \n\u003cA NAME=\"275\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ecome to be. All, then, that is about to be must of necessity take place. \n\u003cA NAME=\"276\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eIt results from this that nothing is uncertain or fortuitous, for if it \n\u003cA NAME=\"277\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewere fortuitous it would not be necessary.\n\u003cA NAME=\"278\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eAgain, to say that neither the affirmation nor the denial is true, \n\u003cA NAME=\"279\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003emaintaining, let us say, that an event neither will take place nor will \n\u003cA NAME=\"280\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enot take place, is to take up a position impossible to defend. In the first \n\u003cA NAME=\"281\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eplace, though facts should prove the one proposition false, the opposite \n\u003cA NAME=\"282\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewould still be untrue. Secondly, if it was true to say that a thing was \n\u003cA NAME=\"283\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eboth white and large, both these qualities must necessarily belong to it; \n\u003cA NAME=\"284\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand if they will belong to it the next day, they must necessarily belong \n\u003cA NAME=\"285\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eto it the next day. But if an event is neither to take place nor not to \n\u003cA NAME=\"286\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003etake place the next day, the element of chance will be eliminated. For \n\u003cA NAME=\"287\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eexample, it would be necessary that a sea-fight should neither take place \n\u003cA NAME=\"288\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enor fail to take place on the next day.\n\u003cA NAME=\"289\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThese awkward results and others of the same kind follow, if it \n\u003cA NAME=\"290\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis an irrefragable law that of every pair of contradictory propositions, \n\u003cA NAME=\"291\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhether they have regard to universals and are stated as universally applicable, \n\u003cA NAME=\"292\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eor whether they have regard to individuals, one must be true and the other \n\u003cA NAME=\"293\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003efalse, and that there are no real alternatives, but that all that is or \n\u003cA NAME=\"294\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003etakes place is the outcome of necessity. There would be no need to deliberate \n\u003cA NAME=\"295\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eor to take trouble, on the supposition that if we should adopt a certain \n\u003cA NAME=\"296\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ecourse, a certain result would follow, while, if we did not, the result \n\u003cA NAME=\"297\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewould not follow. For a man may predict an event ten thousand years beforehand, \n\u003cA NAME=\"298\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand another may predict the reverse; that which was truly predicted at \n\u003cA NAME=\"299\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe moment in the past will of necessity take place in the fullness of \n\u003cA NAME=\"300\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003etime.\n\u003cA NAME=\"301\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eFurther, it makes no difference whether people have or have not \n\u003cA NAME=\"302\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eactually made the contradictory statements. For it is manifest that the \n\u003cA NAME=\"303\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ecircumstances are not influenced by the fact of an affirmation or denial \n\u003cA NAME=\"304\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eon the part of anyone. For events will not take place or fail to take place \n\u003cA NAME=\"305\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebecause it was stated that they would or would not take place, nor is this \n\u003cA NAME=\"306\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eany more the case if the prediction dates back ten thousand years or any \n\u003cA NAME=\"307\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eother space of time. Wherefore, if through all time the nature of things \n\u003cA NAME=\"308\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewas so constituted that a prediction about an event was true, then through \n\u003cA NAME=\"309\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eall time it was necessary that that should find fulfillment; and with regard \n\u003cA NAME=\"310\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eto all events, circumstances have always been such that their occurrence \n\u003cA NAME=\"311\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis a matter of necessity. For that of which someone has said truly that \n\u003cA NAME=\"312\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eit will be, cannot fail to take place; and of that which takes place, it \n\u003cA NAME=\"313\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewas always true to say that it would be.\n\u003cA NAME=\"314\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eYet this view leads to an impossible conclusion; for we see that \n\u003cA NAME=\"315\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eboth deliberation and action are causative with regard to the future, and \n\u003cA NAME=\"316\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethat, to speak more generally, in those things which are not continuously \n\u003cA NAME=\"317\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eactual there is potentiality in either direction. Such things may either \n\u003cA NAME=\"318\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebe or not be; events also therefore may either take place or not take place. \n\u003cA NAME=\"319\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eThere are many obvious instances of this. It is possible that this coat \n\u003cA NAME=\"320\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003emay be cut in half, and yet it may not be cut in half, but wear out first. \n\u003cA NAME=\"321\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eIn the same way, it is possible that it should not be cut in half; unless \n\u003cA NAME=\"322\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethis were so, it would not be possible that it should wear out first. So \n\u003cA NAME=\"323\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eit is therefore with all other events which possess this kind of potentiality. \n\u003cA NAME=\"324\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eIt is therefore plain that it is not of necessity that everything is or \n\u003cA NAME=\"325\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003etakes place; but in some instances there are real alternatives, in which \n\u003cA NAME=\"326\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ecase the affirmation is no more true and no more false than the denial; \n\u003cA NAME=\"327\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhile some exhibit a predisposition and general tendency in one direction \n\u003cA NAME=\"328\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eor the other, and yet can issue in the opposite direction by \n\u003cA NAME=\"329\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eexception.\n\u003cA NAME=\"330\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eNow that which is must needs be when it is, and that which is not \n\u003cA NAME=\"331\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003emust needs not be when it is not. Yet it cannot be said without qualification \n\u003cA NAME=\"332\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethat all existence and non-existence is the outcome of necessity. For there \n\u003cA NAME=\"333\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis a difference between saying that that which is, when it is, must needs \n\u003cA NAME=\"334\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebe, and simply saying that all that is must needs be, and similarly in \n\u003cA NAME=\"335\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe case of that which is not. In the case, also, of two contradictory \n\u003cA NAME=\"336\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003epropositions this holds good. Everything must either be or not be, whether \n\u003cA NAME=\"337\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ein the present or in the future, but it is not always possible to distinguish \n\u003cA NAME=\"338\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand state determinately which of these alternatives must necessarily come \n\u003cA NAME=\"339\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eabout.\n\u003cA NAME=\"340\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eLet me illustrate. A sea-fight must either take place to-morrow \n\u003cA NAME=\"341\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eor not, but it is not necessary that it should take place to-morrow, neither \n\u003cA NAME=\"342\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis it necessary that it should not take place, yet it is necessary that \n\u003cA NAME=\"343\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eit either should or should not take place to-morrow. Since propositions \n\u003cA NAME=\"344\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ecorrespond with facts, it is evident that when in future events there is \n\u003cA NAME=\"345\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ea real alternative, and a potentiality in contrary directions, the corresponding \n\u003cA NAME=\"346\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eaffirmation and denial have the same character.\n\u003cA NAME=\"347\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThis is the case with regard to that which is not always existent \n\u003cA NAME=\"348\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eor not always nonexistent. One of the two propositions in such instances \n\u003cA NAME=\"349\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003emust be true and the other false, but we cannot say determinately that \n\u003cA NAME=\"350\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethis or that is false, but must leave the alternative undecided. One may \n\u003cA NAME=\"351\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eindeed be more likely to be true than the other, but it cannot be either \n\u003cA NAME=\"352\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eactually true or actually false. It is therefore plain that it is not necessary \n\u003cA NAME=\"353\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethat of an affirmation and a denial one should be true and the other false. \n\u003cA NAME=\"354\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eFor in the case of that which exists potentially, but not actually, the \n\u003cA NAME=\"355\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003erule which applies to that which exists actually does not hold good. The \n\u003cA NAME=\"356\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ecase is rather as we have indicated.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"357\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cB\u003ePart 10\u003c/B\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"358\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eAn affirmation is the statement of a fact with regard to a subject, \n\u003cA NAME=\"359\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand this subject is either a noun or that which has no name; the subject \n\u003cA NAME=\"360\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand predicate in an affirmation must each denote a single thing. I have \n\u003cA NAME=\"361\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ealready explained\u0027 what is meant by a noun and by that which has no name; \n\u003cA NAME=\"362\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003efor I stated that the expression \u0027not-man\u0027 was not a noun, in the proper \n\u003cA NAME=\"363\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esense of the word, but an indefinite noun, denoting as it does in a certain \n\u003cA NAME=\"364\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esense a single thing. Similarly the expression \u0027does not enjoy health\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"365\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis not a verb proper, but an indefinite verb. Every affirmation, then, \n\u003cA NAME=\"366\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand every denial, will consist of a noun and a verb, either definite or \n\u003cA NAME=\"367\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eindefinite.\n\u003cA NAME=\"368\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThere can be no affirmation or denial without a verb; for the expressions \n\u003cA NAME=\"369\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027is\u0027, \u0027will be\u0027, \u0027was\u0027, \u0027is coming to be\u0027, and the like are verbs according \n\u003cA NAME=\"370\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eto our definition, since besides their specific meaning they convey the \n\u003cA NAME=\"371\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enotion of time. Thus the primary affirmation and denial are \u0027as follows: \n\u003cA NAME=\"372\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027man is\u0027, \u0027man is not\u0027. Next to these, there are the propositions: \u0027not-man \n\u003cA NAME=\"373\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis\u0027, \u0027not-man is not\u0027. Again we have the propositions: \u0027every man is, \u0027every \n\u003cA NAME=\"374\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eman is not\u0027, \u0027all that is not-man is\u0027, \u0027all that is not-man is not\u0027. The \n\u003cA NAME=\"375\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esame classification holds good with regard to such periods of time as lie \n\u003cA NAME=\"376\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eoutside the present.\n\u003cA NAME=\"377\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eWhen the verb \u0027is\u0027 is used as a third element in the sentence, \n\u003cA NAME=\"378\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethere can be positive and negative propositions of two sorts. Thus in the \n\u003cA NAME=\"379\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esentence \u0027man is just\u0027 the verb \u0027is\u0027 is used as a third element, call it \n\u003cA NAME=\"380\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003everb or noun, which you will. Four propositions, therefore, instead of \n\u003cA NAME=\"381\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003etwo can be formed with these materials. Two of the four, as regards their \n\u003cA NAME=\"382\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eaffirmation and denial, correspond in their logical sequence with the propositions \n\u003cA NAME=\"383\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhich deal with a condition of privation; the other two do not correspond \n\u003cA NAME=\"384\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewith these.\n\u003cA NAME=\"385\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eI mean that the verb \u0027is\u0027 is added either to the term \u0027just\u0027 or \n\u003cA NAME=\"386\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eto the term \u0027not-just\u0027, and two negative propositions are formed in the \n\u003cA NAME=\"387\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esame way. Thus we have the four propositions. Reference to the subjoined \n\u003cA NAME=\"388\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003etable will make matters clear:\n\u003cA NAME=\"389\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cB\u003eA. Affirmation B. Denial\u003c/B\u003e \u003cB\u003eMan is just Man \n\u003cA NAME=\"390\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis not just\u003c/B\u003e \u003cB\u003e\\ /\u003c/B\u003e \u003cB\u003eX\u003c/B\u003e \u003cB\u003e/ \\\u003c/B\u003e \u003cB\u003eD. Denial \n\u003cA NAME=\"391\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e C. Affirmation\u003c/B\u003e \u003cB\u003eMan is not not-just Man is not-just\u003c/B\u003e \n\u003cA NAME=\"392\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eHere \u0027is\u0027 and \u0027is not\u0027 are added either to \u0027just\u0027 or to \u0027not-just\u0027. This \n\u003cA NAME=\"393\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethen is the proper scheme for these propositions, as has been said in the \n\u003cA NAME=\"394\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eAnalytics. The same rule holds good, if the subject is distributed. Thus \n\u003cA NAME=\"395\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewe have the table:\n\u003cA NAME=\"396\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cB\u003eA\u0027. Affirmation B\u0027. Denial\u003c/B\u003e \u003cB\u003eEvery man is \n\u003cA NAME=\"397\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ejust Not every man is just\u003c/B\u003e \u003cB\u003e\\ /\u003c/B\u003e \u003cB\u003eX\u003c/B\u003e \u003cB\u003eD\u0027. Denial \n\u003cA NAME=\"398\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e / \\ C\u0027. Affirmation\u003c/B\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"399\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003eNot every man is not-just Every man is not-just Yet here it \n\u003cA NAME=\"400\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis not possible, in the same way as in the former case, that the propositions \n\u003cA NAME=\"401\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ejoined in the table by a diagonal line should both be true; though under \n\u003cA NAME=\"402\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ecertain circumstances this is the case.\n\u003cA NAME=\"403\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eWe have thus set out two pairs of opposite propositions; there \n\u003cA NAME=\"404\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eare moreover two other pairs, if a term be conjoined with \u0027not-man\u0027, the \n\u003cA NAME=\"405\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003elatter forming a kind of subject. Thus:\n\u003cA NAME=\"406\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cB\u003eA.\" B.\"\u003c/B\u003e \u003cB\u003eNot-man is just \n\u003cA NAME=\"407\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Not-man is not just\u003c/B\u003e \u003cB\u003e\\ /\u003c/B\u003e – \n\u003cA NAME=\"408\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e X\n\u003cA NAME=\"409\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cB\u003eD.\" / \\ C.\"\u003c/B\u003e \u003cB\u003eNot-man is not not-just \n\u003cA NAME=\"410\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Not-man is not-just\u003c/B\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"411\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThis is an exhaustive enumeration of all the pairs of opposite \n\u003cA NAME=\"412\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003epropositions that can possibly be framed. This last group should remain \n\u003cA NAME=\"413\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003edistinct from those which preceded it, since it employs as its subject \n\u003cA NAME=\"414\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe expression \u0027not-man\u0027.\n\u003cA NAME=\"415\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eWhen the verb \u0027is\u0027 does not fit the structure of the sentence (for \n\u003cA NAME=\"416\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003einstance, when the verbs \u0027walks\u0027, \u0027enjoys health\u0027 are used), that scheme \n\u003cA NAME=\"417\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eapplies, which applied when the word \u0027is\u0027 was added.\n\u003cA NAME=\"418\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThus we have the propositions: \u0027every man enjoys health\u0027, \u0027every \n\u003cA NAME=\"419\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eman does-not-enjoy-health\u0027, \u0027all that is not-man enjoys health\u0027, \u0027all that \n\u003cA NAME=\"420\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis not-man does-not-enjoy-health\u0027. We must not in these propositions use \n\u003cA NAME=\"421\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe expression \u0027not every man\u0027. The negative must be attached to the word \n\u003cA NAME=\"422\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027man\u0027, for the word \u0027every\u0027 does not give to the subject a universal significance, \n\u003cA NAME=\"423\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebut implies that, as a subject, it is distributed. This is plain from the \n\u003cA NAME=\"424\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003efollowing pairs: \u0027man enjoys health\u0027, \u0027man does not enjoy health\u0027; \u0027not-man \n\u003cA NAME=\"425\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eenjoys health\u0027, \u0027not man does not enjoy health\u0027. These propositions differ \n\u003cA NAME=\"426\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003efrom the former in being indefinite and not universal in character. Thus \n\u003cA NAME=\"427\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe adjectives \u0027every\u0027 and no additional significance except that the subject, \n\u003cA NAME=\"428\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhether in a positive or in a negative sentence, is distributed. The rest \n\u003cA NAME=\"429\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eof the sentence, therefore, will in each case be the \n\u003cA NAME=\"430\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esame.\n\u003cA NAME=\"431\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eSince the contrary of the proposition \u0027every animal is just\u0027 is \n\u003cA NAME=\"432\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027no animal is just\u0027, it is plain that these two propositions will never \n\u003cA NAME=\"433\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eboth be true at the same time or with reference to the same subject. Sometimes, \n\u003cA NAME=\"434\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ehowever, the contradictories of these contraries will both be true, as \n\u003cA NAME=\"435\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ein the instance before us: the propositions \u0027not every animal is just\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"436\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand \u0027some animals are just\u0027 are both true.\n\u003cA NAME=\"437\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eFurther, the proposition \u0027no man is just\u0027 follows from the proposition \n\u003cA NAME=\"438\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027every man is not just\u0027 and the proposition \u0027not every man is not just\u0027, \n\u003cA NAME=\"439\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhich is the opposite of \u0027every man is not-just\u0027, follows from the proposition \n\u003cA NAME=\"440\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027some men are just\u0027; for if this be true, there must be some just \n\u003cA NAME=\"441\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003emen.\n\u003cA NAME=\"442\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIt is evident, also, that when the subject is individual, if a \n\u003cA NAME=\"443\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003equestion is asked and the negative answer is the true one, a certain positive \n\u003cA NAME=\"444\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eproposition is also true. Thus, if the question were asked Socrates wise?\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"445\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand the negative answer were the true one, the positive inference \u0027Then \n\u003cA NAME=\"446\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eSocrates is unwise\u0027 is correct. But no such inference is correct in the \n\u003cA NAME=\"447\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ecase of universals, but rather a negative proposition. For instance, if \n\u003cA NAME=\"448\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eto the question \u0027Is every man wise?\u0027 the answer is \u0027no\u0027, the inference \n\u003cA NAME=\"449\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027Then every man is unwise\u0027 is false. But under these circumstances the \n\u003cA NAME=\"450\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003einference \u0027Not every man is wise\u0027 is correct. This last is the contradictory, \n\u003cA NAME=\"451\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe former the contrary. Negative expressions, which consist of an indefinite \n\u003cA NAME=\"452\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enoun or predicate, such as \u0027not-man\u0027 or \u0027not-just\u0027, may seem to be denials \n\u003cA NAME=\"453\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003econtaining neither noun nor verb in the proper sense of the words. But \n\u003cA NAME=\"454\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethey are not. For a denial must always be either true or false, and he \n\u003cA NAME=\"455\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethat uses the expression \u0027not man\u0027, if nothing more be added, is not nearer \n\u003cA NAME=\"456\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebut rather further from making a true or a false statement than he who \n\u003cA NAME=\"457\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003euses the expression \u0027man\u0027.\n\u003cA NAME=\"458\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThe propositions \u0027everything that is not man is just\u0027, and the \n\u003cA NAME=\"459\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003econtradictory of this, are not equivalent to any of the other propositions; \n\u003cA NAME=\"460\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eon the other hand, the proposition \u0027everything that is not man is not just\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"461\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis equivalent to the proposition \u0027nothing that is not man is \n\u003cA NAME=\"462\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ejust\u0027.\n\u003cA NAME=\"463\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThe conversion of the position of subject and predicate in a sentence \n\u003cA NAME=\"464\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003einvolves no difference in its meaning. Thus we say \u0027man is white\u0027 and \u0027white \n\u003cA NAME=\"465\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis man\u0027. If these were not equivalent, there would be more than one contradictory \n\u003cA NAME=\"466\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eto the same proposition, whereas it has been demonstrated\u0027 that each proposition \n\u003cA NAME=\"467\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ehas one proper contradictory and one only. For of the proposition \u0027man \n\u003cA NAME=\"468\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis white\u0027 the appropriate contradictory is \u0027man is not white\u0027, and of the \n\u003cA NAME=\"469\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eproposition \u0027white is man\u0027, if its meaning be different, the contradictory \n\u003cA NAME=\"470\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewill either be \u0027white is not not-man\u0027 or \u0027white is not man\u0027. Now the former \n\u003cA NAME=\"471\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eof these is the contradictory of the proposition \u0027white is not-man\u0027, and \n\u003cA NAME=\"472\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe latter of these is the contradictory of the proposition \u0027man is white\u0027; \n\u003cA NAME=\"473\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethus there will be two contradictories to one proposition.\n\u003cA NAME=\"474\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIt is evident, therefore, that the inversion of the relative position \n\u003cA NAME=\"475\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eof subject and predicate does not affect the sense of affirmations and \n\u003cA NAME=\"476\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003edenials.\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"end\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cHR SIZE=\"1\" COLOR=\"990033\" NOSHADE\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\n\n\u003cTABLE WIDTH=\"60%\" BORDER=\"0\"\u003e\n\u003cTR VALIGN=\"TOP\"\u003e\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"LEFT\" WIDTH=\"30%\" NOWRAP\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/TD\u003e\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"interpretation.html\"Go to table of contents\u0027; return true;\"\u003eTable of Contents\u003c/A\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"RIGHT\" WIDTH=\"30%\" NOWRAP\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u003cA HREF=\"interpretation.2.2.html\"Section 2\u0027; return true;\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\n\u003c/TD\u003e\n\u003c/TR\u003e\n\u003c/TABLE\u003e\u003c/BLOCKQUOTE\u003e\n\n\u003cTABLE BORDER=\"0\" CELLSPACING=\"15\"\u003e\n\u003cTR ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"CENTER\"\u003e\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"BOTTOM\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003ca href=\"/index.html\"Go to home page\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"-1\"\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003ca href=\"/index.html\"Go to home page\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003eHome\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"BOTTOM\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Browse/index-Aristotle.html\"Browse a list of titles\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"-1\"\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Browse/index-Aristotle.html\"Browse a list of titles\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003eBrowse and\u003cBR\u003eComment\u003c/A\u003e\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"BOTTOM\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Search/index.html\"Search texts\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"-1\"\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Search/index.html\"Search texts\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003eSearch\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"BOTTOM\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Buy/Aristotle.html\"Buy books and CD-ROMs\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"-1\"\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Buy/Aristotle.html\"Buy books and CD-ROMs\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003eBuy Books and\u003cBR\u003eCD-ROMs\u003c/A\u003e\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"BOTTOM\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Help/general.html\"Get help\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"-1\"\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Help/general.html\"Get help\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003eHelp\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\n\u003c/TR\u003e\n\u003c/TABLE\u003e\n\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cFONT SIZE=\"-1\"\u003e\u003cNOBR\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Help/permissions.html\"View information on copyright and permissions\u0027; return true;\"\u003e\u0026copy; 1994-2009\u003c/A\u003e\u003c/NOBR\u003e\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/FONT\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cTABLE BORDER=\"0\" CELLSPACING=\"15\"\u003e\n\u003cTR ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"CENTER\"\u003e\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"BOTTOM\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003ca href=\"/index.html\"Go to home page\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"-1\"\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003ca href=\"/index.html\"Go to home page\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003eHome\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"BOTTOM\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Browse/index-Aristotle.html\"Browse a list of titles\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"-1\"\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Browse/index-Aristotle.html\"Browse a list of titles\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003eBrowse and\u003cBR\u003eComment\u003c/A\u003e\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"BOTTOM\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Search/index.html\"Search texts\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"-1\"\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Search/index.html\"Search texts\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003eSearch\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"BOTTOM\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Buy/Aristotle.html\"Buy books and CD-ROMs\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"-1\"\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Buy/Aristotle.html\"Buy books and CD-ROMs\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003eBuy Books and\u003cBR\u003eCD-ROMs\u003c/A\u003e\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"BOTTOM\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Help/general.html\"Get help\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"-1\"\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Help/general.html\"Get help\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003eHelp\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\n\u003c/TR\u003e\n\u003c/TABLE\u003e\n\n\u003cHR SIZE=\"1\" COLOR=\"990033\" NOSHADE WIDTH=\"30%\"\u003e\n\u003cBR\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"+2\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eOn Interpretation\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/FONT\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"+1\"\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eBy Aristotle\u003c/FONT\u003e\n\n\u003cBLOCKQUOTE\u003e\u003cB\u003eCommentary:\u003c/B\u003e A few comments have been posted about\n\u003cU\u003eOn Interpretation\u003c/U\u003e.\n\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cB\u003eDownload:\u003c/B\u003e A \ntext-only version is \u003cA HREF=\"interpretation.mb.txt\"Download text-only version\u0027; return true;\"\u003eavailable for download\u003c/A\u003e.\n\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cHR SIZE=\"1\" COLOR=\"990033\" NOSHADE\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cFONT SIZE=\"+1\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eOn Interpretation\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/FONT\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eBy Aristotle\n\u003cA NAME=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eWritten 350 B.C.E\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eTranslated by E. M. Edghill\n\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cTABLE WIDTH=\"60%\" BORDER=\"0\"\u003e\n\u003cTR VALIGN=\"TOP\"\u003e\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"LEFT\" WIDTH=\"30%\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"interpretation.1.1.html\"Section 1\u0027; return true;\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\n\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/TD\u003e\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"interpretation.html\"Go to table of contents\u0027; return true;\"\u003eTable of Contents\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cFONT SIZE=\"+1\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eSection 2\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"RIGHT\" WIDTH=\"30%\" NOWRAP\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/TD\u003e\n\u003c/TR\u003e\n\u003c/TABLE\u003e\n\u003cBR\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"start\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"10\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cB\u003ePart 11\u003c/B\u003e\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"11\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eThere is no unity about an affirmation or denial which, either positively \n\u003cA NAME=\"12\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eor negatively, predicates one thing of many subjects, or many things of \n\u003cA NAME=\"13\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe same subject, unless that which is indicated by the many is really \n\u003cA NAME=\"14\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esome one thing. do not apply this word \u0027one\u0027 to those things which, though \n\u003cA NAME=\"15\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethey have a single recognized name, yet do not combine to form a unity. \n\u003cA NAME=\"16\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eThus, man may be an animal, and biped, and domesticated, but these three \n\u003cA NAME=\"17\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003epredicates combine to form a unity. On the other hand, the predicates \u0027white\u0027, \n\u003cA NAME=\"18\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027man\u0027, and \u0027walking\u0027 do not thus combine. Neither, therefore, if these \n\u003cA NAME=\"19\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethree form the subject of an affirmation, nor if they form its predicate, \n\u003cA NAME=\"20\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis there any unity about that affirmation. In both cases the unity is linguistic, \n\u003cA NAME=\"21\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebut not real.\n\u003cA NAME=\"22\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIf therefore the dialectical question is a request for an answer, \n\u003cA NAME=\"23\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ei.e. either for the admission of a premiss or for the admission of one \n\u003cA NAME=\"24\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eof two contradictories-and the premiss is itself always one of two contradictories-the \n\u003cA NAME=\"25\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eanswer to such a question as contains the above predicates cannot be a \n\u003cA NAME=\"26\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esingle proposition. For as I have explained in the Topics, question is \n\u003cA NAME=\"27\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enot a single one, even if the answer asked for is true.\n\u003cA NAME=\"28\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eAt the same time it is plain that a question of the form \u0027what \n\u003cA NAME=\"29\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis it?\u0027 is not a dialectical question, for a dialectical questioner must \n\u003cA NAME=\"30\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eby the form of his question give his opponent the chance of announcing \n\u003cA NAME=\"31\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eone of two alternatives, whichever he wishes. He must therefore put the \n\u003cA NAME=\"32\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003equestion into a more definite form, and inquire, e.g.. whether man has \n\u003cA NAME=\"33\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esuch and such a characteristic or not.\n\u003cA NAME=\"34\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eSome combinations of predicates are such that the separate predicates \n\u003cA NAME=\"35\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eunite to form a single predicate. Let us consider under what conditions \n\u003cA NAME=\"36\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethis is and is not possible. We may either state in two separate propositions \n\u003cA NAME=\"37\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethat man is an animal and that man is a biped, or we may combine the two, \n\u003cA NAME=\"38\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand state that man is an animal with two feet. Similarly we may use \u0027man\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"39\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand \u0027white\u0027 as separate predicates, or unite them into one. Yet if a man \n\u003cA NAME=\"40\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis a shoemaker and is also good, we cannot construct a composite proposition \n\u003cA NAME=\"41\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand say that he is a good shoemaker. For if, whenever two separate predicates \n\u003cA NAME=\"42\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003etruly belong to a subject, it follows that the predicate resulting from \n\u003cA NAME=\"43\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003etheir combination also truly belongs to the subject, many absurd results \n\u003cA NAME=\"44\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eensue. For instance, a man is man and white. Therefore, if predicates may \n\u003cA NAME=\"45\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ealways be combined, he is a white man. Again, if the predicate \u0027white\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"46\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebelongs to him, then the combination of that predicate with the former \n\u003cA NAME=\"47\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ecomposite predicate will be permissible. Thus it will be right to say that \n\u003cA NAME=\"48\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ehe is a white man so on indefinitely. Or, again, we may combine the predicates \n\u003cA NAME=\"49\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027musical\u0027, \u0027white\u0027, and \u0027walking\u0027, and these may be combined many times. \n\u003cA NAME=\"50\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eSimilarly we may say that Socrates is Socrates and a man, and that therefore \n\u003cA NAME=\"51\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ehe is the man Socrates, or that Socrates is a man and a biped, and that \n\u003cA NAME=\"52\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003etherefore he is a two-footed man. Thus it is manifest that if man states \n\u003cA NAME=\"53\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eunconditionally that predicates can always be combined, many absurd consequences \n\u003cA NAME=\"54\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eensue.\n\u003cA NAME=\"55\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eWe will now explain what ought to be laid down.\n\u003cA NAME=\"56\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThose predicates, and terms forming the subject of predication, which \n\u003cA NAME=\"57\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eare accidental either to the same subject or to one another, do not combine \n\u003cA NAME=\"58\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eto form a unity. Take the proposition \u0027man is white of complexion and musical\u0027. \n\u003cA NAME=\"59\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eWhiteness and being musical do not coalesce to form a unity, for they belong \n\u003cA NAME=\"60\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eonly accidentally to the same subject. Nor yet, if it were true to say \n\u003cA NAME=\"61\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethat that which is white is musical, would the terms \u0027musical\u0027 and \u0027white\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"62\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eform a unity, for it is only incidentally that that which is musical is \n\u003cA NAME=\"63\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhite; the combination of the two will, therefore, not form a \n\u003cA NAME=\"64\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eunity.\n\u003cA NAME=\"65\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThus, again, whereas, if a man is both good and a shoemaker, we \n\u003cA NAME=\"66\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ecannot combine the two propositions and say simply that he is a good shoemaker, \n\u003cA NAME=\"67\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewe are, at the same time, able to combine the predicates \u0027animal\u0027 and \u0027biped\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"68\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand say that a man is an animal with two feet, for these predicates are \n\u003cA NAME=\"69\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enot accidental.\n\u003cA NAME=\"70\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThose predicates, again, cannot form a unity, of which the one \n\u003cA NAME=\"71\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis implicit in the other: thus we cannot combine the predicate \u0027white\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"72\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eagain and again with that which already contains the notion \u0027white\u0027, nor \n\u003cA NAME=\"73\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis it right to call a man an animal-man or a two-footed man; for the notions \n\u003cA NAME=\"74\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027animal\u0027 and \u0027biped\u0027 are implicit in the word \u0027man\u0027. On the other hand, \n\u003cA NAME=\"75\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eit is possible to predicate a term simply of any one instance, and to say \n\u003cA NAME=\"76\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethat some one particular man is a man or that some one white man is a white \n\u003cA NAME=\"77\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eman.\n\u003cA NAME=\"78\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eYet this is not always possible: indeed, when in the adjunct there \n\u003cA NAME=\"79\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis some opposite which involves a contradiction, the predication of the \n\u003cA NAME=\"80\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esimple term is impossible. Thus it is not right to call a dead man a man. \n\u003cA NAME=\"81\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eWhen, however, this is not the case, it is not impossible.\n\u003cA NAME=\"82\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eYet the facts of the case might rather be stated thus: when some \n\u003cA NAME=\"83\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esuch opposite elements are present, resolution is never possible, but when \n\u003cA NAME=\"84\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethey are not present, resolution is nevertheless not always possible. Take \n\u003cA NAME=\"85\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe proposition \u0027Homer is so-and-so\u0027, say \u0027a poet\u0027; does it follow that \n\u003cA NAME=\"86\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eHomer is, or does it not? The verb \u0027is\u0027 is here used of Homer only incidentally, \n\u003cA NAME=\"87\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe proposition being that Homer is a poet, not that he is, in the independent \n\u003cA NAME=\"88\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esense of the word.\n\u003cA NAME=\"89\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThus, in the case of those predications which have within them \n\u003cA NAME=\"90\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eno contradiction when the nouns are expanded into definitions, and wherein \n\u003cA NAME=\"91\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe predicates belong to the subject in their own proper sense and not \n\u003cA NAME=\"92\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ein any indirect way, the individual may be the subject of the simple propositions \n\u003cA NAME=\"93\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eas well as of the composite. But in the case of that which is not, it is \n\u003cA NAME=\"94\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enot true to say that because it is the object of opinion, it is; for the \n\u003cA NAME=\"95\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eopinion held about it is that it is not, not that it \n\u003cA NAME=\"96\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"97\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cB\u003ePart 12\u003c/B\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"98\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eAs these distinctions have been made, we must consider the mutual \n\u003cA NAME=\"99\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003erelation of those affirmations and denials which assert or deny possibility \n\u003cA NAME=\"100\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eor contingency, impossibility or necessity: for the subject is not without \n\u003cA NAME=\"101\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003edifficulty.\n\u003cA NAME=\"102\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eWe admit that of composite expressions those are contradictory \n\u003cA NAME=\"103\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eeach to each which have the verb \u0027to be\u0027 its positive and negative form \n\u003cA NAME=\"104\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003erespectively. Thus the contradictory of the proposition \u0027man is\u0027 is \u0027man \n\u003cA NAME=\"105\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis not\u0027, not \u0027not-man is\u0027, and the contradictory of \u0027man is white\u0027 is \u0027man \n\u003cA NAME=\"106\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis not white\u0027, not \u0027man is not-white\u0027. For otherwise, since either the \n\u003cA NAME=\"107\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003epositive or the negative proposition is true of any subject, it will turn \n\u003cA NAME=\"108\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eout true to say that a piece of wood is a man that is not \n\u003cA NAME=\"109\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhite.\n\u003cA NAME=\"110\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eNow if this is the case, in those propositions which do not contain \n\u003cA NAME=\"111\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe verb \u0027to be\u0027 the verb which takes its place will exercise the same \n\u003cA NAME=\"112\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003efunction. Thus the contradictory of \u0027man walks\u0027 is \u0027man does not walk\u0027, \n\u003cA NAME=\"113\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enot \u0027not-man walks\u0027; for to say \u0027man walks\u0027 merely equivalent to saying \n\u003cA NAME=\"114\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027man is walking\u0027.\n\u003cA NAME=\"115\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIf then this rule is universal, the contradictory of \u0027it may be\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"116\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis may not be\u0027, not \u0027it cannot be\u0027.\n\u003cA NAME=\"117\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eNow it appears that the same thing both may and may not be; for \n\u003cA NAME=\"118\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003einstance, everything that may be cut or may walk may also escape cutting \n\u003cA NAME=\"119\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand refrain from walking; and the reason is that those things that have \n\u003cA NAME=\"120\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003epotentiality in this sense are not always actual. In such cases, both the \n\u003cA NAME=\"121\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003epositive and the negative propositions will be true; for that which is \n\u003cA NAME=\"122\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ecapable of walking or of being seen has also a potentiality in the opposite \n\u003cA NAME=\"123\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003edirection.\n\u003cA NAME=\"124\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eBut since it is impossible that contradictory propositions should \n\u003cA NAME=\"125\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eboth be true of the same subject, it follows that\u0027 it may not be\u0027 is not \n\u003cA NAME=\"126\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe contradictory of \u0027it may be\u0027. For it is a logical consequence of what \n\u003cA NAME=\"127\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewe have said, either that the same predicate can be both applicable and \n\u003cA NAME=\"128\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003einapplicable to one and the same subject at the same time, or that it is \n\u003cA NAME=\"129\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enot by the addition of the verbs \u0027be\u0027 and \u0027not be\u0027, respectively, that \n\u003cA NAME=\"130\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003epositive and negative propositions are formed. If the former of these alternatives \n\u003cA NAME=\"131\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003emust be rejected, we must choose the latter.\n\u003cA NAME=\"132\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThe contradictory, then, of \u0027it may be\u0027 is \u0027it cannot be\u0027. The \n\u003cA NAME=\"133\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esame rule applies to the proposition \u0027it is contingent that it should be\u0027; \n\u003cA NAME=\"134\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe contradictory of this is \u0027it is not contingent that it should be\u0027. \n\u003cA NAME=\"135\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eThe similar propositions, such as \u0027it is necessary\u0027 and \u0027it is impossible\u0027, \n\u003cA NAME=\"136\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003emay be dealt with in the same manner. For it comes about that just as in \n\u003cA NAME=\"137\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe former instances the verbs \u0027is\u0027 and \u0027is not\u0027 were added to the subject-matter \n\u003cA NAME=\"138\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eof the sentence \u0027white\u0027 and \u0027man\u0027, so here \u0027that it should be\u0027 and \u0027that \n\u003cA NAME=\"139\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eit should not be\u0027 are the subject-matter and \u0027is possible\u0027, \u0027is contingent\u0027, \n\u003cA NAME=\"140\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eare added. These indicate that a certain thing is or is not possible, just \n\u003cA NAME=\"141\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eas in the former instances \u0027is\u0027 and \u0027is not\u0027 indicated that certain things \n\u003cA NAME=\"142\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewere or were not the case.\n\u003cA NAME=\"143\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThe contradictory, then, of \u0027it may not be\u0027 is not \u0027it cannot be\u0027, \n\u003cA NAME=\"144\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebut \u0027it cannot not be\u0027, and the contradictory of \u0027it may be\u0027 is not \u0027it \n\u003cA NAME=\"145\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003emay not be\u0027, but cannot be\u0027. Thus the propositions \u0027it may be\u0027 and \u0027it \n\u003cA NAME=\"146\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003emay not be\u0027 appear each to imply the other: for, since these two propositions \n\u003cA NAME=\"147\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eare not contradictory, the same thing both may and may not be. But the \n\u003cA NAME=\"148\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003epropositions \u0027it may be\u0027 and \u0027it cannot be\u0027 can never be true of the same \n\u003cA NAME=\"149\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esubject at the same time, for they are contradictory. Nor can the propositions \n\u003cA NAME=\"150\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027it may not be\u0027 and \u0027it cannot not be\u0027 be at once true of the same \n\u003cA NAME=\"151\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esubject.\n\u003cA NAME=\"152\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThe propositions which have to do with necessity are governed by \n\u003cA NAME=\"153\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe same principle. The contradictory of \u0027it is necessary that it should \n\u003cA NAME=\"154\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebe\u0027, is not \u0027it is necessary that it should not be,\u0027 but \u0027it is not necessary \n\u003cA NAME=\"155\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethat it should be\u0027, and the contradictory of \u0027it is necessary that it should \n\u003cA NAME=\"156\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enot be\u0027 is \u0027it is not necessary that it should not be\u0027.\n\u003cA NAME=\"157\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eAgain, the contradictory of \u0027it is impossible that it should be\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"158\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis not \u0027it is impossible that it should not be\u0027 but \u0027it is not impossible \n\u003cA NAME=\"159\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethat it should be\u0027, and the contradictory of \u0027it is impossible that it \n\u003cA NAME=\"160\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eshould not be\u0027 is \u0027it is not impossible that it should not \n\u003cA NAME=\"161\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebe\u0027.\n\u003cA NAME=\"162\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eTo generalize, we must, as has been stated, define the clauses \n\u003cA NAME=\"163\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027that it should be\u0027 and \u0027that it should not be\u0027 as the subject-matter of \n\u003cA NAME=\"164\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe propositions, and in making these terms into affirmations and denials \n\u003cA NAME=\"165\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewe must combine them with \u0027that it should be\u0027 and \u0027that it should not be\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"166\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003erespectively.\n\u003cA NAME=\"167\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eWe must consider the following pairs as contradictory \n\u003cA NAME=\"168\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003epropositions:\n\u003cA NAME=\"169\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIt may be. It cannot be.\n\u003cA NAME=\"170\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIt is contingent. It is not contingent.\n\u003cA NAME=\"171\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIt is impossible. It is not impossible.\n\u003cA NAME=\"172\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIt is necessary. It is not necessary.\n\u003cA NAME=\"173\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIt is true. It is not true.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"174\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cB\u003ePart 13\u003c/B\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"175\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eLogical sequences follow in due course when we have arranged the \n\u003cA NAME=\"176\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003epropositions thus. From the proposition \u0027it may be\u0027 it follows that it \n\u003cA NAME=\"177\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis contingent, and the relation is reciprocal. It follows also that it \n\u003cA NAME=\"178\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis not impossible and not necessary.\n\u003cA NAME=\"179\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eFrom the proposition \u0027it may not be\u0027 or \u0027it is contingent that \n\u003cA NAME=\"180\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eit should not be\u0027 it follows that it is not necessary that it should not \n\u003cA NAME=\"181\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebe and that it is not impossible that it should not be. From the proposition \n\u003cA NAME=\"182\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027it cannot be\u0027 or \u0027it is not contingent\u0027 it follows that it is necessary \n\u003cA NAME=\"183\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethat it should not be and that it is impossible that it should be. From \n\u003cA NAME=\"184\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe proposition \u0027it cannot not be\u0027 or \u0027it is not contingent that it should \n\u003cA NAME=\"185\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enot be\u0027 it follows that it is necessary that it should be and that it is \n\u003cA NAME=\"186\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eimpossible that it should not be.\n\u003cA NAME=\"187\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eLet us consider these statements by the help of a \n\u003cA NAME=\"188\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003etable:\n\u003cA NAME=\"189\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cB\u003eA. B.\u003c/B\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"190\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIt may be. It cannot be.\n\u003cA NAME=\"191\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIt is contingent. It is not contingent.\n\u003cA NAME=\"192\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIt is not impossible It is impossible that \n\u003cA NAME=\"193\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eit\n\u003cA NAME=\"194\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cB\u003ethat it should be. should be.\u003c/B\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"195\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIt is not necessary It is necessary that \n\u003cA NAME=\"196\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eit\n\u003cA NAME=\"197\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cB\u003ethat it should be. should not be.\u003c/B\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"198\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cB\u003eC. D.\u003c/B\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"199\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIt may not be. It cannot not be.\n\u003cA NAME=\"200\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIt is contingent that it It is not contingent \n\u003cA NAME=\"201\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethat\n\u003cA NAME=\"202\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cB\u003eshould not be. it should not \n\u003cA NAME=\"203\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebe.\u003c/B\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"204\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIt is not impossible It is impossible thatit\n\u003cA NAME=\"205\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cB\u003ethat it should not be. should not be.\u003c/B\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"206\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIt is not necessary that It is necessary that \n\u003cA NAME=\"207\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eit\n\u003cA NAME=\"208\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cB\u003eit should not be. should be.\u003c/B\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"209\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eNow the propositions \u0027it is impossible that it should be\u0027 and \u0027it \n\u003cA NAME=\"210\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis not impossible that it should be\u0027 are consequent upon the propositions \n\u003cA NAME=\"211\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027it may be\u0027, \u0027it is contingent\u0027, and \u0027it cannot be\u0027, \u0027it is not contingent\u0027, \n\u003cA NAME=\"212\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe contradictories upon the contradictories. But there is inversion. The \n\u003cA NAME=\"213\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enegative of the proposition \u0027it is impossible\u0027 is consequent upon the proposition \n\u003cA NAME=\"214\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027it may be\u0027 and the corresponding positive in the first case upon the negative \n\u003cA NAME=\"215\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ein the second. For \u0027it is impossible\u0027 is a positive proposition and \u0027it \n\u003cA NAME=\"216\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis not impossible\u0027 is negative.\n\u003cA NAME=\"217\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eWe must investigate the relation subsisting between these propositions \n\u003cA NAME=\"218\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand those which predicate necessity. That there is a distinction is clear. \n\u003cA NAME=\"219\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eIn this case, contrary propositions follow respectively from contradictory \n\u003cA NAME=\"220\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003epropositions, and the contradictory propositions belong to separate sequences. \n\u003cA NAME=\"221\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eFor the proposition \u0027it is not necessary that it should be\u0027 is not the \n\u003cA NAME=\"222\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enegative of \u0027it is necessary that it should not be\u0027, for both these propositions \n\u003cA NAME=\"223\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003emay be true of the same subject; for when it is necessary that a thing \n\u003cA NAME=\"224\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eshould not be, it is not necessary that it should be. The reason why the \n\u003cA NAME=\"225\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003epropositions predicating necessity do not follow in the same kind of sequence \n\u003cA NAME=\"226\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eas the rest, lies in the fact that the proposition \u0027it is impossible\u0027 is \n\u003cA NAME=\"227\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eequivalent, when used with a contrary subject, to the proposition \u0027it is \n\u003cA NAME=\"228\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enecessary\u0027. For when it is impossible that a thing should be, it is necessary, \n\u003cA NAME=\"229\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enot that it should be, but that it should not be, and when it is impossible \n\u003cA NAME=\"230\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethat a thing should not be, it is necessary that it should be. Thus, if \n\u003cA NAME=\"231\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe propositions predicating impossibility or non-impossibility follow \n\u003cA NAME=\"232\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewithout change of subject from those predicating possibility or non-possibility, \n\u003cA NAME=\"233\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethose predicating necessity must follow with the contrary subject; for \n\u003cA NAME=\"234\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe propositions \u0027it is impossible\u0027 and \u0027it is necessary\u0027 are not equivalent, \n\u003cA NAME=\"235\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebut, as has been said, inversely connected.\n\u003cA NAME=\"236\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eYet perhaps it is impossible that the contradictory propositions \n\u003cA NAME=\"237\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003epredicating necessity should be thus arranged. For when it is necessary \n\u003cA NAME=\"238\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethat a thing should be, it is possible that it should be. (For if not, \n\u003cA NAME=\"239\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe opposite follows, since one or the other must follow; so, if it is \n\u003cA NAME=\"240\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enot possible, it is impossible, and it is thus impossible that a thing \n\u003cA NAME=\"241\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eshould be, which must necessarily be; which is absurd.)\n\u003cA NAME=\"242\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eYet from the proposition \u0027it may be\u0027 it follows that it is not \n\u003cA NAME=\"243\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eimpossible, and from that it follows that it is not necessary; it comes \n\u003cA NAME=\"244\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eabout therefore that the thing which must necessarily be need not be; which \n\u003cA NAME=\"245\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis absurd. But again, the proposition \u0027it is necessary that it should be\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"246\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003edoes not follow from the proposition \u0027it may be\u0027, nor does the proposition \n\u003cA NAME=\"247\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027it is necessary that it should not be\u0027. For the proposition \u0027it may be\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"248\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eimplies a twofold possibility, while, if either of the two former propositions \n\u003cA NAME=\"249\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis true, the twofold possibility vanishes. For if a thing may be, it may \n\u003cA NAME=\"250\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ealso not be, but if it is necessary that it should be or that it should \n\u003cA NAME=\"251\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enot be, one of the two alternatives will be excluded. It remains, therefore, \n\u003cA NAME=\"252\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethat the proposition \u0027it is not necessary that it should not be\u0027 follows \n\u003cA NAME=\"253\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003efrom the proposition \u0027it may be\u0027. For this is true also of that which must \n\u003cA NAME=\"254\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enecessarily be.\n\u003cA NAME=\"255\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eMoreover the proposition \u0027it is not necessary that it should not \n\u003cA NAME=\"256\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebe\u0027 is the contradictory of that which follows from the proposition \u0027it \n\u003cA NAME=\"257\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ecannot be\u0027; for \u0027it cannot be\u0027 is followed by \u0027it is impossible that it \n\u003cA NAME=\"258\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eshould be\u0027 and by \u0027it is necessary that it should not be\u0027, and the contradictory \n\u003cA NAME=\"259\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eof this is the proposition \u0027it is not necessary that it should not be\u0027. \n\u003cA NAME=\"260\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eThus in this case also contradictory propositions follow contradictory \n\u003cA NAME=\"261\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ein the way indicated, and no logical impossibilities occur when they are \n\u003cA NAME=\"262\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethus arranged.\n\u003cA NAME=\"263\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIt may be questioned whether the proposition \u0027it may be\u0027 follows \n\u003cA NAME=\"264\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003efrom the proposition \u0027it is necessary that it should be\u0027. If not, the contradictory \n\u003cA NAME=\"265\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003emust follow, namely that it cannot be, or, if a man should maintain that \n\u003cA NAME=\"266\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethis is not the contradictory, then the proposition \u0027it may not \n\u003cA NAME=\"267\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebe\u0027.\n\u003cA NAME=\"268\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eNow both of these are false of that which necessarily is. At the \n\u003cA NAME=\"269\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esame time, it is thought that if a thing may be cut it may also not be \n\u003cA NAME=\"270\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ecut, if a thing may be it may also not be, and thus it would follow that \n\u003cA NAME=\"271\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ea thing which must necessarily be may possibly not be; which is false. \n\u003cA NAME=\"272\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eIt is evident, then, that it is not always the case that that which may \n\u003cA NAME=\"273\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebe or may walk possesses also a potentiality in the other direction. There \n\u003cA NAME=\"274\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eare exceptions. In the first place we must except those things which possess \n\u003cA NAME=\"275\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ea potentiality not in accordance with a rational principle, as fire possesses \n\u003cA NAME=\"276\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe potentiality of giving out heat, that is, an irrational capacity. Those \n\u003cA NAME=\"277\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003epotentialities which involve a rational principle are potentialities of \n\u003cA NAME=\"278\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003emore than one result, that is, of contrary results; those that are irrational \n\u003cA NAME=\"279\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eare not always thus constituted. As I have said, fire cannot both heat \n\u003cA NAME=\"280\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand not heat, neither has anything that is always actual any twofold potentiality. \n\u003cA NAME=\"281\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eYet some even of those potentialities which are irrational admit of opposite \n\u003cA NAME=\"282\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eresults. However, thus much has been said to emphasize the truth that it \n\u003cA NAME=\"283\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis not every potentiality which admits of opposite results, even where \n\u003cA NAME=\"284\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe word is used always in the same sense.\n\u003cA NAME=\"285\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eBut in some cases the word is used equivocally. For the term \u0027possible\u0027 \n\u003cA NAME=\"286\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis ambiguous, being used in the one case with reference to facts, to that \n\u003cA NAME=\"287\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhich is actualized, as when a man is said to find walking possible because \n\u003cA NAME=\"288\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ehe is actually walking, and generally when a capacity is predicated because \n\u003cA NAME=\"289\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eit is actually realized; in the other case, with reference to a state in \n\u003cA NAME=\"290\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhich realization is conditionally practicable, as when a man is said to \n\u003cA NAME=\"291\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003efind walking possible because under certain conditions he would walk. This \n\u003cA NAME=\"292\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003elast sort of potentiality belongs only to that which can be in motion, \n\u003cA NAME=\"293\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe former can exist also in the case of that which has not this power. \n\u003cA NAME=\"294\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eBoth of that which is walking and is actual, and of that which has the \n\u003cA NAME=\"295\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ecapacity though not necessarily realized, it is true to say that it is \n\u003cA NAME=\"296\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enot impossible that it should walk (or, in the other case, that it should \n\u003cA NAME=\"297\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebe), but while we cannot predicate this latter kind of potentiality of \n\u003cA NAME=\"298\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethat which is necessary in the unqualified sense of the word, we can predicate \n\u003cA NAME=\"299\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe former.\n\u003cA NAME=\"300\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eOur conclusion, then, is this: that since the universal is consequent \n\u003cA NAME=\"301\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eupon the particular, that which is necessary is also possible, though not \n\u003cA NAME=\"302\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ein every sense in which the word may be used.\n\u003cA NAME=\"303\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eWe may perhaps state that necessity and its absence are the initial \n\u003cA NAME=\"304\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eprinciples of existence and non-existence, and that all else must be regarded \n\u003cA NAME=\"305\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eas posterior to these.\n\u003cA NAME=\"306\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIt is plain from what has been said that that which is of necessity \n\u003cA NAME=\"307\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis actual. Thus, if that which is eternal is prior, actuality also is prior \n\u003cA NAME=\"308\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eto potentiality. Some things are actualities without potentiality, namely, \n\u003cA NAME=\"309\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe primary substances; a second class consists of those things which are \n\u003cA NAME=\"310\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eactual but also potential, whose actuality is in nature prior to their \n\u003cA NAME=\"311\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003epotentiality, though posterior in time; a third class comprises those things \n\u003cA NAME=\"312\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhich are never actualized, but are pure potentialities.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"313\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cB\u003ePart 14\u003c/B\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"314\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThe question arises whether an affirmation finds its contrary in \n\u003cA NAME=\"315\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ea denial or in another affirmation; whether the proposition \u0027every man \n\u003cA NAME=\"316\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis just\u0027 finds its contrary in the proposition \u0027no man is just\u0027, or in \n\u003cA NAME=\"317\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe proposition \u0027every man is unjust\u0027. Take the propositions \u0027Callias is \n\u003cA NAME=\"318\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ejust\u0027, \u0027Callias is not just\u0027, \u0027Callias is unjust\u0027; we have to discover \n\u003cA NAME=\"319\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhich of these form contraries.\n\u003cA NAME=\"320\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eNow if the spoken word corresponds with the judgement of the mind, \n\u003cA NAME=\"321\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand if, in thought, that judgement is the contrary of another, which pronounces \n\u003cA NAME=\"322\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ea contrary fact, in the way, for instance, in which the judgement \u0027every \n\u003cA NAME=\"323\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eman is just\u0027 pronounces a contrary to that pronounced by the judgement \n\u003cA NAME=\"324\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u0027every man is unjust\u0027, the same must needs hold good with regard to spoken \n\u003cA NAME=\"325\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eaffirmations.\n\u003cA NAME=\"326\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eBut if, in thought, it is not the judgement which pronounces a \n\u003cA NAME=\"327\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003econtrary fact that is the contrary of another, then one affirmation will \n\u003cA NAME=\"328\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enot find its contrary in another, but rather in the corresponding denial. \n\u003cA NAME=\"329\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eWe must therefore consider which true judgement is the contrary of the \n\u003cA NAME=\"330\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003efalse, that which forms the denial of the false judgement or that which \n\u003cA NAME=\"331\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eaffirms the contrary fact.\n\u003cA NAME=\"332\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eLet me illustrate. There is a true judgement concerning that which \n\u003cA NAME=\"333\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis good, that it is good; another, a false judgement, that it is not good; \n\u003cA NAME=\"334\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand a third, which is distinct, that it is bad. Which of these two is contrary \n\u003cA NAME=\"335\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eto the true? And if they are one and the same, which mode of expression \n\u003cA NAME=\"336\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eforms the contrary?\n\u003cA NAME=\"337\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIt is an error to suppose that judgements are to be defined as \n\u003cA NAME=\"338\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003econtrary in virtue of the fact that they have contrary subjects; for the \n\u003cA NAME=\"339\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ejudgement concerning a good thing, that it is good, and that concerning \n\u003cA NAME=\"340\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ea bad thing, that it is bad, may be one and the same, and whether they \n\u003cA NAME=\"341\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eare so or not, they both represent the truth. Yet the subjects here are \n\u003cA NAME=\"342\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003econtrary. But judgements are not contrary because they have contrary subjects, \n\u003cA NAME=\"343\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebut because they are to the contrary effect.\n\u003cA NAME=\"344\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eNow if we take the judgement that that which is good is good, and \n\u003cA NAME=\"345\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eanother that it is not good, and if there are at the same time other attributes, \n\u003cA NAME=\"346\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhich do not and cannot belong to the good, we must nevertheless refuse \n\u003cA NAME=\"347\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eto treat as the contraries of the true judgement those which opine that \n\u003cA NAME=\"348\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esome other attribute subsists which does not subsist, as also those that \n\u003cA NAME=\"349\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eopine that some other attribute does not subsist which does subsist, for \n\u003cA NAME=\"350\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eboth these classes of judgement are of unlimited content.\n\u003cA NAME=\"351\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eThose judgements must rather be termed contrary to the true judgements, \n\u003cA NAME=\"352\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ein which error is present. Now these judgements are those which are concerned \n\u003cA NAME=\"353\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewith the starting points of generation, and generation is the passing from \n\u003cA NAME=\"354\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eone extreme to its opposite; therefore error is a like \n\u003cA NAME=\"355\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003etransition.\n\u003cA NAME=\"356\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eNow that which is good is both good and not bad. The first quality \n\u003cA NAME=\"357\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis part of its essence, the second accidental; for it is by accident that \n\u003cA NAME=\"358\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eit is not bad. But if that true judgement is most really true, which concerns \n\u003cA NAME=\"359\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe subject\u0027s intrinsic nature, then that false judgement likewise is most \n\u003cA NAME=\"360\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ereally false, which concerns its intrinsic nature. Now the judgement that \n\u003cA NAME=\"361\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethat is good is not good is a false judgement concerning its intrinsic \n\u003cA NAME=\"362\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003enature, the judgement that it is bad is one concerning that which is accidental. \n\u003cA NAME=\"363\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eThus the judgement which denies the true judgement is more really false \n\u003cA NAME=\"364\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethan that which positively asserts the presence of the contrary quality. \n\u003cA NAME=\"365\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eBut it is the man who forms that judgement which is contrary to the true \n\u003cA NAME=\"366\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewho is most thoroughly deceived, for contraries are among the things which \n\u003cA NAME=\"367\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ediffer most widely within the same class. If then of the two judgements \n\u003cA NAME=\"368\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eone is contrary to the true judgement, but that which is contradictory \n\u003cA NAME=\"369\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis the more truly contrary, then the latter, it seems, is the real contrary. \n\u003cA NAME=\"370\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eThe judgement that that which is good is bad is composite. For presumably \n\u003cA NAME=\"371\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe man who forms that judgement must at the same time understand that \n\u003cA NAME=\"372\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethat which is good is not good.\n\u003cA NAME=\"373\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eFurther, the contradictory is either always the contrary or never; \n\u003cA NAME=\"374\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003etherefore, if it must necessarily be so in all other cases, our conclusion \n\u003cA NAME=\"375\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ein the case just dealt with would seem to be correct. Now where terms have \n\u003cA NAME=\"376\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eno contrary, that judgement is false, which forms the negative of the true; \n\u003cA NAME=\"377\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003efor instance, he who thinks a man is not a man forms a false judgement. \n\u003cA NAME=\"378\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eIf then in these cases the negative is the contrary, then the principle \n\u003cA NAME=\"379\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eis universal in its application.\n\u003cA NAME=\"380\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eAgain, the judgement that that which is not good is not good is \n\u003cA NAME=\"381\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eparallel with the judgement that that which is good is good. Besides these \n\u003cA NAME=\"382\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethere is the judgement that that which is good is not good, parallel with \n\u003cA NAME=\"383\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe judgement that that that is not good is good. Let us consider, therefore, \n\u003cA NAME=\"384\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhat would form the contrary of the true judgement that that which is not \n\u003cA NAME=\"385\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003egood is not good. The judgement that it is bad would, of course, fail to \n\u003cA NAME=\"386\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003emeet the case, since two true judgements are never contrary and this judgement \n\u003cA NAME=\"387\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003emight be true at the same time as that with which it is connected. For \n\u003cA NAME=\"388\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esince some things which are not good are bad, both judgements may be true. \n\u003cA NAME=\"389\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eNor is the judgement that it is not bad the contrary, for this too might \n\u003cA NAME=\"390\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebe true, since both qualities might be predicated of the same subject. \n\u003cA NAME=\"391\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eIt remains, therefore, that of the judgement concerning that which is not \n\u003cA NAME=\"392\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003egood, that it is not good, the contrary judgement is that it is good; for \n\u003cA NAME=\"393\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethis is false. In the same way, moreover, the judgement concerning that \n\u003cA NAME=\"394\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ewhich is good, that it is not good, is the contrary of the judgement that \n\u003cA NAME=\"395\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eit is good.\n\u003cA NAME=\"396\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIt is evident that it will make no difference if we universalize \n\u003cA NAME=\"397\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe positive judgement, for the universal negative judgement will form \n\u003cA NAME=\"398\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe contrary. For instance, the contrary of the judgement that everything \n\u003cA NAME=\"399\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethat is good is good is that nothing that is good is good. For the judgement \n\u003cA NAME=\"400\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethat that which is good is good, if the subject be understood in a universal \n\u003cA NAME=\"401\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esense, is equivalent to the judgement that whatever is good is good, and \n\u003cA NAME=\"402\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethis is identical with the judgement that everything that is good is good. \n\u003cA NAME=\"403\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eWe may deal similarly with judgements concerning that which is not \n\u003cA NAME=\"404\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003egood.\n\u003cA NAME=\"405\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIf therefore this is the rule with judgements, and if spoken affirmations \n\u003cA NAME=\"406\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand denials are judgements expressed in words, it is plain that the universal \n\u003cA NAME=\"407\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003edenial is the contrary of the affirmation about the same subject. Thus \n\u003cA NAME=\"408\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe propositions \u0027everything good is good\u0027, \u0027every man is good\u0027, have for \n\u003cA NAME=\"409\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003etheir contraries the propositions \u0027nothing good is good\u0027, \u0027no man is good\u0027. \n\u003cA NAME=\"410\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eThe contradictory propositions, on the other hand, are \u0027not everything \n\u003cA NAME=\"411\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003egood is good\u0027, \u0027not every man is good\u0027.\n\u003cA NAME=\"412\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003eIt is evident, also, that neither true judgements nor true propositions \n\u003cA NAME=\"413\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ecan be contrary the one to the other. For whereas, when two propositions \n\u003cA NAME=\"414\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eare true, a man may state both at the same time without inconsistency, \n\u003cA NAME=\"415\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003econtrary propositions are those which state contrary conditions, and contrary \n\u003cA NAME=\"416\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003econditions cannot subsist at one and the same time in the same \n\u003cA NAME=\"417\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esubject.\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"end\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cB\u003eTHE END\u003c/B\u003e\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cHR SIZE=\"1\" COLOR=\"990033\" NOSHADE\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\n\n\u003cTABLE WIDTH=\"60%\" BORDER=\"0\"\u003e\n\u003cTR VALIGN=\"TOP\"\u003e\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"LEFT\" WIDTH=\"30%\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"interpretation.1.1.html\"Section 1\u0027; return true;\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\n\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/TD\u003e\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"interpretation.html\"Go to table of contents\u0027; return true;\"\u003eTable of Contents\u003c/A\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"RIGHT\" WIDTH=\"30%\" NOWRAP\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/TD\u003e\n\u003c/TR\u003e\n\u003c/TABLE\u003e\u003c/BLOCKQUOTE\u003e\n\n\u003cTABLE BORDER=\"0\" CELLSPACING=\"15\"\u003e\n\u003cTR ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"CENTER\"\u003e\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"BOTTOM\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003ca href=\"/index.html\"Go to home page\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"-1\"\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003ca href=\"/index.html\"Go to home page\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003eHome\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"BOTTOM\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Browse/index-Aristotle.html\"Browse a list of titles\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"-1\"\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Browse/index-Aristotle.html\"Browse a list of titles\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003eBrowse and\u003cBR\u003eComment\u003c/A\u003e\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"BOTTOM\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Search/index.html\"Search texts\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"-1\"\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Search/index.html\"Search texts\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003eSearch\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"BOTTOM\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Buy/Aristotle.html\"Buy books and CD-ROMs\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"-1\"\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Buy/Aristotle.html\"Buy books and CD-ROMs\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003eBuy Books and\u003cBR\u003eCD-ROMs\u003c/A\u003e\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"CENTER\" VALIGN=\"BOTTOM\" NOWRAP\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Help/general.html\"Get help\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003e \u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cFONT SIZE=\"-1\"\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Help/general.html\"Get help\u0027; return true;\" TARGET=\"_top\"\u003eHelp\u003c/A\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/TD\u003e\n\n\u003c/TR\u003e\n\u003c/TABLE\u003e\n\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cFONT SIZE=\"-1\"\u003e\u003cNOBR\u003e\u003ca href=\"/Help/permissions.html\"View information on copyright and permissions\u0027; return true;\"\u003e\u0026copy; 1994-2009\u003c/A\u003e\u003c/NOBR\u003e\u003c/FONT\u003e\u003c/FONT\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}