Ethics
{"WorkMasterId":5187,"WpPageId":249691,"ParentWpPageId":193802,"Slug":"ethics","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/baruch-spinoza/ethics/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/baruch-spinoza/ethics/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":603087,"CleanHtmlLength":546977,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"Ethics","Deck":"Spinoza presents substance monism, God-or-Nature, mind-body parallelism, conatus, the affects, bondage, freedom, and blessedness in geometric order.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to Baruch Spinoza","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/baruch-spinoza/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"Baruch Spinoza","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/baruch-spinoza/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/baruch-spinoza-01-engraving-of-spinoza-captioned-in-latin-a-jew-and-an-atheist-he.jpg","ImageAlt":"Portrait Engraving of Baruch Spinoza","FilterTerra":"Western Europe","ClickText":"Baruch Spinoza","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/baruch-spinoza/","Copies":["1632 CE – 1677 CE","Amsterdam","Dutch-Jewish rationalist philosopher from Amsterdam whose substance monism, God-or-Nature metaphysics, geometric method, theory of adequate ideas, mind-body parallelism, ethics of freedom through understanding, biblical criticism, and democratic political thought reshaped early modern philosophy."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:3","Title":"Early Modern History","DateText":"1500 CE – 1799 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-early-modern-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:8","Title":"Scientific Revolution and State Formation","DateText":"1600 CE – 1699 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-early-modern-history/philosophers-of-the-scientific-revolution-and-state-formation/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"1675 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Displayed year is a proxy for completion and withheld circulation; the work was published posthumously in the 1677 Opera Posthuma.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:1"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:NLD:1"}],"OriginalTitle":"Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata","Language":"Latin","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:metaphysics"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:ethics"}],"Tradition":"Early modern rationalism, Dutch republican thought, biblical criticism, and geometric metaphysics","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #3800 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Spinoza presents substance monism, God-or-Nature, mind-body parallelism, conatus, the affects, bondage, freedom, and blessedness in geometric order."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order","KeyConcepts":"Ethics; Baruch Spinoza; substance; God-or-Nature; adequate ideas; conatus; freedom; necessity; Scripture; democracy; reason","Methodology":"Geometric demonstration, rational reconstruction, philological criticism, conceptual analysis, naturalistic explanation, and political-theological argument.","Structure":"Accepted work page for Spinoza under the authenticated full corpus scope; complete-work editions, translations, individual letters, mathematical fragments, and source/testimony pages are excluded."},"Arguments":["Connects Spinoza\u0027s rationalist metaphysics, theory of knowledge, ethics of freedom through understanding, biblical criticism, and republican political philosophy."],"Influence":{"InfluencedBy":"Descartes, Hobbes, Maimonides, Stoicism, Jewish philosophical tradition, Dutch republican debate, and seventeenth-century science.","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Part of the authenticated Spinoza corpus that made him a central early modern rationalist, biblical critic, political philosopher, and theorist of freedom under necessity.","Used in debates over naturalism, democracy, religious criticism, mind and body, emotion, freedom, ecology, secularism, and the relation between metaphysics and ethics."],"EvidenceNote":["Accepted as Spinoza\u0027s central mature philosophical work."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Versions","BodyHtml":"\u003cdiv class=\"dz-philo__full-version-grid\"\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-version-card\"\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-provider\"\u003eProject Gutenberg\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3 class=\"dz-philo__full-version-title\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #3800\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-meta\"\u003eHtmlText · Imported\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ca class=\"dz-philo__full-version-link\" href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/3800\"\u003eOpen full version\u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["Spinoza presents substance monism, God-or-Nature, mind-body parallelism, conatus, the affects, bondage, freedom, and blessedness in geometric order."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":"Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order"},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"Ethics; Baruch Spinoza; substance; God-or-Nature; adequate ideas; conatus; freedom; necessity; Scripture; democracy; reason"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Geometric demonstration, rational reconstruction, philological criticism, conceptual analysis, naturalistic explanation, and political-theological argument."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"Accepted work page for Spinoza under the authenticated full corpus scope; complete-work editions, translations, individual letters, mathematical fragments, and source/testimony pages are excluded."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Connects Spinoza\u0027s rationalist metaphysics, theory of knowledge, ethics of freedom through understanding, biblical criticism, and republican political philosophy."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"Descartes, Hobbes, Maimonides, Stoicism, Jewish philosophical tradition, Dutch republican debate, and seventeenth-century science."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"Leibniz, German Idealism, Enlightenment radicalism, biblical criticism, secular political thought, naturalism, modern metaphysics, and democratic theory."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Part of the authenticated Spinoza corpus that made him a central early modern rationalist, biblical critic, political philosopher, and theorist of freedom under necessity.","Used in debates over naturalism, democracy, religious criticism, mind and body, emotion, freedom, ecology, secularism, and the relation between metaphysics and ethics."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Accepted as Spinoza\u0027s central mature philosophical work."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003ePublic-domain full text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/3800\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #3800\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\n\u003cH1 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nThe Ethics\r\n\u003c/H1\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH2 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\n(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)\r\n\u003c/H2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nby\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH2 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nBenedict de Spinoza\r\n\u003c/H2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nTranslated from the Latin by R. H. M. Elwes\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cTABLE ALIGN=\"center\" WIDTH=\"60%\"\u003e\r\n\u003cTR\u003e\r\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"left\" VALIGN=\"top\" WIDTH=\"20%\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#chap01\"\u003ePART I\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003c/TD\u003e\r\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"left\" VALIGN=\"top\" WIDTH=\"20%\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#chap02\"\u003ePART II\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003c/TD\u003e\r\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"left\" VALIGN=\"top\" WIDTH=\"20%\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#chap03\"\u003ePART III\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003c/TD\u003e\r\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"left\" VALIGN=\"top\" WIDTH=\"20%\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#chap04\"\u003ePART IV\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003c/TD\u003e\r\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"left\" VALIGN=\"top\" WIDTH=\"20%\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#chap05\"\u003ePART V\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003c/TD\u003e\r\n\u003c/TR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/TABLE\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap01\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cH2 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nPART I. CONCERNING GOD.\r\n\u003c/H2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nDEFINITIONS.\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI. By that which is self\u0026mdash;caused, I mean that of which the\r\nessence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only\r\nconceivable as existent.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nII. A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be\r\nlimited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a\r\nbody is called finite because we always conceive another greater\r\nbody. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a\r\nbody is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIII. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is\r\nconceived through itself: in other words, that of which a\r\nconception can be formed independently of any other conception.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIV. By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as\r\nconstituting the essence of substance.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nV. By mode, I mean the modifications[1] of substance, or that\r\nwhich exists in, and is conceived through, something other than\r\nitself.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[1] \"Affectiones\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nVI. By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite\u0026mdash;that is, a\r\nsubstance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each\r\nexpresses eternal and infinite essentiality.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its\r\nkind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite\r\nattributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite,\r\ncontains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves\r\nno negation.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nVII. That thing is called free, which exists solely by the\r\nnecessity of its own nature, and of which the action is\r\ndetermined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is\r\nnecessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by\r\nsomething external to itself to a fixed and definite method of\r\nexistence or action.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nVIII. By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is\r\nconceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of\r\nthat which is eternal.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal\r\ntruth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be\r\nexplained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may\r\nbe conceived without a beginning or end.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4\u003e\r\nAXIOMS.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in\r\nsomething else.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nII. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be\r\nconceived through itself.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIII. From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows;\r\nand, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is\r\nimpossible that an effect can follow.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIV. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the\r\nknowledge of a cause.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nV. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the\r\none by means of the other; the conception of one does not\r\ninvolve the conception of the other.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nVI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nVII. If a thing can be conceived as non\u0026mdash;existing, its essence\r\ndoes not involve existence.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4\u003e\r\nPROPOSITIONS.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have\r\nnothing in common.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Also evident from Def. iii. For each must exist in\r\nitself, and be conceived through itself; in other words, the\r\nconception of one does not imply the conception of the other.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the\r\ncause of the other.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;If they have nothing in common, it follows that one\r\ncannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and,\r\ntherefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.).\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from\r\nthe other, either by the difference of the attributes of the\r\nsubstances, or by the difference of their modifications.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in\r\nsomething else (Ax. i.),\u0026mdash;that is (by Deff. iii. and v.), nothing\r\nis granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and\r\nits modifications. Nothing is, therefore, given besides the\r\nunderstanding, by which several things may be distinguished one\r\nfrom the other, except the substances, or, in other words (see\r\nAx. iv.), their attributes and modifications. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more\r\nsubstances having the same nature or attribute.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;If several distinct substances be granted, they must\r\nbe distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of\r\ntheir attributes, or by the difference of their modifications\r\n(Prop. iv.). If only by the difference of their attributes, it\r\nwill be granted that there cannot be more than one with an\r\nidentical attribute. If by the difference of their\r\nmodifications\u0026mdash;as substance is naturally prior to its\r\nmodifications (Prop. i.),\u0026mdash;it follows that setting the\r\nmodifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is\r\ntruly, (Deff. iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one\r\nsubstance different from another,\u0026mdash;that is (by Prop. iv.), there\r\ncannot be granted several substances, but one substance only.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another substance.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;It is impossible that there should be in the universe\r\ntwo substances with an identical attribute, i.e. which have\r\nanything common to them both (Prop. ii.), and, therefore (Prop.\r\niii.), one cannot be the cause of the other, neither can one be\r\nproduced by the other. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows that a substance cannot be\r\nproduced by anything external to itself. For in the universe\r\nnothing is granted, save substances and their modifications (as\r\nappears from Ax. i. and Deff. iii. and v.). Now (by the last\r\nProp.) substance cannot be produced by another substance,\r\ntherefore it cannot be produced by anything external to itself.\r\nQ.E.D. This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the\r\ncontradictory. For, if substance be produced by an external\r\ncause, the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its\r\ncause (Ax. iv.), and (by Def. iii.) it would itself not be\r\nsubstance.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substances.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Substance cannot be produced by anything external\r\n(Corollary, Prop vi.), it must, therefore, be its own cause\u0026mdash;that\r\nis, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence\r\nbelongs to its nature.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;There can only be one substance with an identical\r\nattribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.);\r\nits nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite or\r\ninfinite. It does not exist as finite, for (by Def. ii.) it\r\nwould then be limited by something else of the same kind, which\r\nwould also necessarily exist (Prop. vii.); and there would be\r\ntwo substances with an identical attribute, which is absurd\r\n(Prop. v.). It therefore exists as infinite. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote I.\u0026mdash;As finite existence involves a partial negation, and\r\ninfinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given\r\nnature, it follows (solely from Prop. vii.) that every substance\r\nis necessarily infinite.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote II.\u0026mdash;No doubt it will be difficult for those who think\r\nabout things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them\r\nby their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstration of Prop.\r\nvii.: for such persons make no distinction between the\r\nmodifications of substances and the substances themselves, and\r\nare ignorant of the manner in which things are produced; hence\r\nthey may attribute to substances the beginning which they observe\r\nin natural objects. Those who are ignorant of true causes, make\r\ncomplete confusion\u0026mdash;think that trees might talk just as well as\r\nmen\u0026mdash;that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed;\r\nand imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So,\r\nalso, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human,\r\nreadily attribute human passions to the deity, especially so long\r\nas they do not know how passions originate in the mind. But, if\r\npeople would consider the nature of substance, they would have no\r\ndoubt about the truth of Prop. vii. In fact, this proposition\r\nwould be a universal axiom, and accounted a truism. For, by\r\nsubstance, would be understood that which is in itself, and is\r\nconceived through itself\u0026mdash;that is, something of which the\r\nconception requires not the conception of anything else; whereas\r\nmodifications exist in something external to themselves, and a\r\nconception of them is formed by means of a conception of the\r\nthing in which they exist. Therefore, we may have true ideas of\r\nnon\u0026mdash;existent modifications; for, although they may have no\r\nactual existence apart from the conceiving intellect, yet their\r\nessence is so involved in something external to themselves that\r\nthey may through it be conceived. Whereas the only truth\r\nsubstances can have, external to the intellect, must consist in\r\ntheir existence, because they are conceived through themselves.\r\nTherefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and\r\ndistinct\u0026mdash;that is, a true\u0026mdash;idea of a substance, but that he is not\r\nsure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he\r\nsaid that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it\r\nwas false (a little consideration will make this plain); or if\r\nanyone affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same\r\nas saying that a false idea was true\u0026mdash;in short, the height of\r\nabsurdity. It must, then, necessarily be admitted that the\r\nexistence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth. And\r\nwe can hence conclude by another process of reasoning\u0026mdash;that there\r\nis but one such substance. I think that this may profitably be\r\ndone at once; and, in order to proceed regularly with the\r\ndemonstration, we must premise:\u0026mdash;\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n1. The true definition of a thing neither involves nor\r\nexpresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined. From\r\nthis it follows that\u0026mdash;\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n2. No definition implies or expresses a certain number of\r\nindividuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature\r\nof the thing defined. For instance, the definition of a triangle\r\nexpresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle: it\r\ndoes not imply any fixed number of triangles.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n3. There is necessarily for each individual existent thing a\r\ncause why it should exist.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n4. This cause of existence must either be contained in the\r\nnature and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulated\r\napart from such definition.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt therefore follows that, if a given number of individual\r\nthings exist in nature, there must be some cause for the\r\nexistence of exactly that number, neither more nor less. For\r\nexample, if twenty men exist in the universe (for simplicity\u0027s\r\nsake, I will suppose them existing simultaneously, and to have\r\nhad no predecessors), and we want to account for the existence of\r\nthese twenty men, it will not be enough to show the cause of\r\nhuman existence in general; we must also show why there are\r\nexactly twenty men, neither more nor less: for a cause must be\r\nassigned for the existence of each individual. Now this cause\r\ncannot be contained in the actual nature of man, for the true\r\ndefinition of man does not involve any consideration of the\r\nnumber twenty. Consequently, the cause for the existence of\r\nthese twenty men, and, consequently, of each of them, must\r\nnecessarily be sought externally to each individual. Hence we may\r\nlay down the absolute rule, that everything which may consist of\r\nseveral individuals must have an external cause. And, as it has\r\nbeen shown already that existence appertains to the nature of\r\nsubstance, existence must necessarily be included in its\r\ndefinition; and from its definition alone existence must be\r\ndeducible. But from its definition (as we have shown, notes ii.,\r\niii.), we cannot infer the existence of several substances;\r\ntherefore it follows that there is only one substance of the same\r\nnature. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. IX. The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the\r\nnumber of its attributes (Def. iv.).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be\r\nconceived through itself.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of\r\nsubstance, as constituting its essence (Def. iv.), and,\r\ntherefore, must be conceived through itself (Def. iii.). Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote\u0026mdash;It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in\r\nfact, conceived as distinct\u0026mdash;that is, one without the help of the\r\nother\u0026mdash;yet we cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitute two\r\nentities, or two different substances. For it is the nature of\r\nsubstance that each of its attributes is conceived through\r\nitself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed\r\nsimultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other;\r\nbut each expresses the reality or being of substance. It is,\r\nthen, far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one\r\nsubstance: for nothing in nature is more clear than that each\r\nand every entity must be conceived under some attribute, and that\r\nits reality or being is in proportion to the number of its\r\nattributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity.\r\nConsequently it is abundantly clear, that an absolutely infinite\r\nbeing must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite\r\nattributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and\r\ninfinite essence.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf anyone now ask, by what sign shall he be able to\r\ndistinguish different substances, let him read the following\r\npropositions, which show that there is but one substance in the\r\nuniverse, and that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such a\r\nsign would be sought in vain.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XI. God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes,\r\nof which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality,\r\nnecessarily exists.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God\r\ndoes not exist: then his essence does not involve existence.\r\nBut this (Prop. vii.) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily\r\nexists.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnother proof.\u0026mdash;Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason\r\nmust be assigned, either for its existence, or for its\r\nnon\u0026mdash;existence\u0026mdash;e.g. if a triangle exist, a reason or cause must be\r\ngranted for its existence; if, on the contrary, it does not\r\nexist, a cause must also be granted, which prevents it from\r\nexisting, or annuls its existence. This reason or cause must\r\neither be contained in the nature of the thing in question, or be\r\nexternal to it. For instance, the reason for the non\u0026mdash;existence\r\nof a square circle is indicated in its nature, namely, because it\r\nwould involve a contradiction. On the other hand, the existence\r\nof substance follows also solely from its nature, inasmuch as its\r\nnature involves existence. (See Prop. vii.)\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle\r\ndoes not follow from the nature of those figures, but from the\r\norder of universal nature in extension. From the latter it must\r\nfollow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is\r\nimpossible that it should exist. So much is self\u0026mdash;evident. It\r\nfollows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause or\r\nreason be granted which prevents its existence.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the\r\nexistence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must\r\ncertainly conclude that he necessarily does exist. If such a\r\nreason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the\r\nvery nature of God, or be external to him\u0026mdash;that is, drawn from\r\nanother substance of another nature. For if it were of the same\r\nnature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist. But\r\nsubstance of another nature could have nothing in common with God\r\n(by Prop. ii.), and therefore would be unable either to cause or\r\nto destroy his existence.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAs, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine\r\nexistence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine\r\nnature, such cause must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawn\r\nfrom God\u0027s own nature, which would involve a contradiction. To\r\nmake such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and\r\nsupremely perfect is absurd; therefore, neither in the nature of\r\nGod, nor externally to his nature, can a cause or reason be\r\nassigned which would annul his existence. Therefore, God\r\nnecessarily exists. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnother proof.\u0026mdash;The potentiality of non\u0026mdash;existence is a\r\nnegation of power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existence\r\nis a power, as is obvious. If, then, that which necessarily\r\nexists is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings are more\r\npowerful than a being absolutely infinite, which is obviously\r\nabsurd; therefore, either nothing exists, or else a being\r\nabsolutely infinite necessarily exists also. Now we exist either\r\nin ourselves, or in something else which necessarily exists (see\r\nAxiom. i. and Prop. vii.). Therefore a being absolutely\r\ninfinite\u0026mdash;in other words, God (Def. vi.)\u0026mdash;necessarily exists.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;In this last proof, I have purposely shown God\u0027s\r\nexistence à posteriori, so that the proof might be more easily\r\nfollowed, not because, from the same premises, God\u0027s existence\r\ndoes not follow à priori. For, as the potentiality of existence\r\nis a power, it follows that, in proportion as reality increases\r\nin the nature of a thing, so also will it increase its strength\r\nfor existence. Therefore a being absolutely infinite, such as\r\nGod, has from himself an absolutely infinite power of existence,\r\nand hence he does absolutely exist. Perhaps there will be many\r\nwho will be unable to see the force of this proof, inasmuch as\r\nthey are accustomed only to consider those things which flow from\r\nexternal causes. Of such things, they see that those which\r\nquickly come to pass\u0026mdash;that is, quickly come into existence\u0026mdash;quickly\r\nalso disappear; whereas they regard as more difficult of\r\naccomplishment\u0026mdash;that is, not so easily brought into\r\nexistence\u0026mdash;those things which they conceive as more complicated.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHowever, to do away with this misconception, I need not here\r\nshow the measure of truth in the proverb, \"What comes quickly,\r\ngoes quickly,\" nor discuss whether, from the point of view of\r\nuniversal nature, all things are equally easy, or otherwise: I\r\nneed only remark that I am not here speaking of things, which\r\ncome to pass through causes external to themselves, but only of\r\nsubstances which (by Prop. vi.) cannot be produced by any\r\nexternal cause. Things which are produced by external causes,\r\nwhether they consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoever\r\nperfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy of\r\ntheir external cause; and therefore their existence arises\r\nsolely from the perfection of their external cause, not from\r\ntheir own. Contrariwise, whatsoever perfection is possessed by\r\nsubstance is due to no external cause; wherefore the existence\r\nof substance must arise solely from its own nature, which is\r\nnothing else but its essence. Thus, the perfection of a thing\r\ndoes not annul its existence, but, on the contrary, asserts it.\r\nImperfection, on the other hand, does annul it; therefore we\r\ncannot be more certain of the existence of anything, than of the\r\nexistence of a being absolutely infinite or perfect\u0026mdash;that is, of\r\nGod. For inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection, and\r\ninvolves absolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his\r\nexistence is done away, and the utmost certainty on the question\r\nis given. This, I think, will be evident to every moderately\r\nattentive reader.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XII. No attribute of substance can be conceived from which\r\nit would follow that substance can be divided.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The parts into which substance as thus conceived would\r\nbe divided either will retain the nature of substance, or they\r\nwill not. If the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part will\r\nnecessarily be infinite, and (by Prop. vi.) self\u0026mdash;caused, and (by\r\nProp. v.) will perforce consist of a different attribute, so\r\nthat, in that case, several substances could be formed out of one\r\nsubstance, which (by Prop. vi.) is absurd. Moreover, the parts\r\n(by Prop. ii.) would have nothing in common with their whole, and\r\nthe whole (by Def. iv. and Prop. x.) could both exist and be\r\nconceived without its parts, which everyone will admit to be\r\nabsurd. If we adopt the second alternative\u0026mdash;namely, that the\r\nparts will not retain the nature of substance\u0026mdash;then, if the whole\r\nsubstance were divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature\r\nof substance, and would cease to exist, which (by Prop. vii.) is\r\nabsurd.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;If it could be divided, the parts into which it was\r\ndivided would either retain the nature of absolutely infinite\r\nsubstance, or they would not. If the former, we should have\r\nseveral substances of the same nature, which (by Prop. v.) is\r\nabsurd. If the latter, then (by Prop. vii.) substance absolutely\r\ninfinite could cease to exist, which (by Prop. xi.) is also\r\nabsurd.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;It follows, that no substance, and consequently no\r\nextended substance, in so far as it is substance, is divisible.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;The indivisibility of substance may be more easily\r\nunderstood as follows. The nature of substance can only be\r\nconceived as infinite, and by a part of substance, nothing else\r\ncan be understood than finite substance, which (by Prop. viii)\r\ninvolves a manifest contradiction.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XIV. Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;As God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no\r\nattribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied\r\n(by Def. vi.), and he necessarily exists (by Prop. xi.); if any\r\nsubstance besides God were granted, it would have to be explained\r\nby some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the same\r\nattribute would exist, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd; therefore,\r\nbesides God no substance can be granted, or, consequently, be\r\nconceived. If it could be conceived, it would necessarily have\r\nto be conceived as existent; but this (by the first part of this\r\nproof) is absurd. Therefore, besides God no substance can be\r\ngranted or conceived. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary I.\u0026mdash;Clearly, therefore: 1. God is one, that is (by\r\nDef. vi.) only one substance can be granted in the universe, and\r\nthat substance is absolutely infinite, as we have already\r\nindicated (in the note to Prop. x.).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary II.\u0026mdash;It follows: 2. That extension and thought\r\nare either attributes of God or (by Ax. i.) accidents\r\n(affectiones) of the attributes of God.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can\r\nbe, or be conceived.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Besides God, no substance is granted or can be\r\nconceived (by Prop. xiv.), that is (by Def. iii.) nothing which\r\nis in itself and is conceived through itself. But modes (by Def.\r\nv.) can neither be, nor be conceived without substance;\r\nwherefore they can only be in the divine nature, and can only\r\nthrough it be conceived. But substances and modes form the sum\r\ntotal of existence (by Ax. i.), therefore, without God nothing\r\ncan be, or be conceived. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and\r\nmind, and is susceptible of passions. How far such persons have\r\nstrayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been\r\nsaid. But these I pass over. For all who have in anywise\r\nreflected on the divine nature deny that God has a body. Of this\r\nthey find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body\r\na definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a\r\ncertain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate\r\nsuch a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite. But meanwhile\r\nby other reasons with which they try to prove their point, they\r\nshow that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart\r\nfrom the divine nature, and say it was created by God. Wherefrom\r\nthe divine nature can have been created, they are wholly ignorant;\r\nthus they clearly show, that they do not know the meaning of\r\ntheir own words. I myself have proved sufficiently clearly, at\r\nany rate in my own judgment (Coroll. Prop. vi, and note 2, Prop.\r\nviii.), that no substance can be produced or created by anything\r\nother than itself. Further, I showed (in Prop. xiv.), that\r\nbesides God no substance can be granted or conceived. Hence we\r\ndrew the conclusion that extended substance is one of the\r\ninfinite attributes of God. However, in order to explain more\r\nfully, I will refute the arguments of my adversaries, which all\r\nstart from the following points:\u0026mdash;\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExtended substance, in so far as it is substance, consists,\r\nas they think, in parts, wherefore they deny that it can be\r\ninfinite, or consequently, that it can appertain to God. This\r\nthey illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one or\r\ntwo. If extended substance, they say, is infinite, let it be\r\nconceived to be divided into two parts; each part will then be\r\neither finite or infinite. If the former, then infinite\r\nsubstance is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If\r\nthe latter, then one infinite will be twice as large as another\r\ninfinite, which is also absurd.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFurther, if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths,\r\nit will consist of an infinite number of such parts; it would\r\nequally consist of an infinite number of parts, if each part\r\nmeasured only an inch: therefore, one infinity would be twelve\r\ntimes as great as the other.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nLastly, if from a single point there be conceived to be drawn\r\ntwo diverging lines which at first are at a definite distance\r\napart, but are produced to infinity, it is certain that the\r\ndistance between the two lines will be continually increased,\r\nuntil at length it changes from definite to indefinable. As\r\nthese absurdities follow, it is said, from considering quantity\r\nas infinite, the conclusion is drawn, that extended substance\r\nmust necessarily be finite, and, consequently, cannot appertain\r\nto the nature of God.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe second argument is also drawn from God\u0027s supreme\r\nperfection. God, it is said, inasmuch as he is a supremely\r\nperfect being, cannot be passive; but extended substance,\r\ninsofar as it is divisible, is passive. It follows, therefore,\r\nthat extended substance does not appertain to the essence of God.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSuch are the arguments I find on the subject in writers, who\r\nby them try to prove that extended substance is unworthy of the\r\ndivine nature, and cannot possibly appertain thereto. However, I\r\nthink an attentive reader will see that I have already answered\r\ntheir propositions; for all their arguments are founded on the\r\nhypothesis that extended substance is composed of parts, and such\r\na hypothesis I have shown (Prop. xii., and Coroll. Prop. xiii.)\r\nto be absurd. Moreover, anyone who reflects will see that all\r\nthese absurdities (if absurdities they be, which I am not now\r\ndiscussing), from which it is sought to extract the conclusion\r\nthat extended substance is finite, do not at all follow from the\r\nnotion of an infinite quantity, but merely from the notion that\r\nan infinite quantity is measurable, and composed of finite parts\r\ntherefore, the only fair conclusion to be drawn is that:\r\ninfinite quantity is not measurable, and cannot be composed of\r\nfinite parts. This is exactly what we have already proved (in\r\nProp. xii.). Wherefore the weapon which they aimed at us has in\r\nreality recoiled upon themselves. If, from this absurdity of\r\ntheirs, they persist in drawing the conclusion that extended\r\nsubstance must be finite, they will in good sooth be acting like\r\na man who asserts that circles have the properties of squares,\r\nand, finding himself thereby landed in absurdities, proceeds to\r\ndeny that circles have any center, from which all lines drawn to\r\nthe circumference are equal. For, taking extended substance,\r\nwhich can only be conceived as infinite, one, and indivisible\r\n(Props. viii., v., xii.) they assert, in order to prove that it\r\nis finite, that it is composed of finite parts, and that it can\r\nbe multiplied and divided.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSo, also, others, after asserting that a line is composed of\r\npoints, can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot be\r\ninfinitely divided. Assuredly it is not less absurd to assert\r\nthat extended substance is made up of bodies or parts, than it\r\nwould be to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces, a surface\r\nof lines, and a line of points. This must be admitted by all who\r\nknow clear reason to be infallible, and most of all by those who\r\ndeny the possibility of a vacuum. For if extended substance\r\ncould be so divided that its parts were really separate, why\r\nshould not one part admit of being destroyed, the others\r\nremaining joined together as before? And why should all be so\r\nfitted into one another as to leave no vacuum? Surely in the\r\ncase of things, which are really distinct one from the other, one\r\ncan exist without the other, and can remain in its original\r\ncondition. As, then, there does not exist a vacuum in nature\r\n(of which anon), but all parts are bound to come together to\r\nprevent it, it follows from this that the parts cannot really be\r\ndistinguished, and that extended substance in so far as it is\r\nsubstance cannot be divided.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf anyone asks me the further question, Why are we naturally\r\nso prone to divide quantity? I answer, that quantity is\r\nconceived by us in two ways; in the abstract and superficially,\r\nas we imagine it; or as substance, as we conceive it solely by\r\nthe intellect. If, then, we regard quantity as it is represented\r\nin our imagination, which we often and more easily do, we shall\r\nfind that it is finite, divisible, and compounded of parts; but\r\nif we regard it as it is represented in our intellect, and\r\nconceive it as substance, which it is very difficult to do, we\r\nshall then, as I have sufficiently proved, find that it is\r\ninfinite, one, and indivisible. This will be plain enough to all\r\nwho make a distinction between the intellect and the imagination,\r\nespecially if it be remembered, that matter is everywhere the\r\nsame, that its parts are not distinguishable, except in so far as\r\nwe conceive matter as diversely modified, whence its parts are\r\ndistinguished, not really, but modally. For instance, water, in\r\nso far as it is water, we conceive to be divided, and its parts\r\nto be separated one from the other; but not in so far as it is\r\nextended substance; from this point of view it is neither\r\nseparated nor divisible. Further, water, in so far as it is\r\nwater, is produced and corrupted; but, in so far as it is\r\nsubstance, it is neither produced nor corrupted.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI think I have now answered the second argument; it is, in\r\nfact, founded on the same assumption as the first\u0026mdash;namely, that\r\nmatter, in so far as it is substance, is divisible, and composed\r\nof parts. Even if it were so, I do not know why it should be\r\nconsidered unworthy of the divine nature, inasmuch as besides God\r\n(by Prop. xiv.) no substance can be granted, wherefrom it could\r\nreceive its modifications. All things, I repeat, are in God, and\r\nall things which come to pass, come to pass solely through the\r\nlaws of the infinite nature of God, and follow (as I will shortly\r\nshow) from the necessity of his essence. Wherefore it can in\r\nnowise be said, that God is passive in respect to anything other\r\nthan himself, or that extended substance is unworthy of the\r\nDivine nature, even if it be supposed divisible, so long as it is\r\ngranted to be infinite and eternal. But enough of this for the\r\npresent.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow\r\nan infinite number of things in infinite ways\u0026mdash;that is, all things\r\nwhich can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This proposition will be clear to everyone, who\r\nremembers that from the given definition of any thing the\r\nintellect infers several properties, which really necessarily\r\nfollow therefrom (that is, from the actual essence of the thing\r\ndefined); and it infers more properties in proportion as the\r\ndefinition of the thing expresses more reality, that is, in\r\nproportion as the essence of the thing defined involves more\r\nreality. Now, as the divine nature has absolutely infinite\r\nattributes (by Def. vi.), of which each expresses infinite\r\nessence after its kind, it follows that from the necessity of its\r\nnature an infinite number of things (that is, everything which\r\ncan fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect) must\r\nnecessarily follow. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary I.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows, that God is the efficient\r\ncause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite\r\nintellect.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary II.\u0026mdash;It also follows that God is a cause in himself,\r\nand not through an accident of his nature.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary III.\u0026mdash;It follows, thirdly, that God is the\r\nabsolutely first cause.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and\r\nis not constrained by anyone.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;We have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from\r\nthe necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing,\r\nsolely from the laws of his nature, an infinite number of things\r\nabsolutely follow in an infinite number of ways; and we proved\r\n(in Prop. xv.), that without God nothing can be nor be conceived\r\nbut that all things are in God. Wherefore nothing can exist;\r\noutside himself, whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to\r\nact. Wherefore God acts solely by the laws of his own nature,\r\nand is not constrained by anyone. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary I.\u0026mdash;It follows: 1. That there can be no cause\r\nwhich, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the\r\nperfection of his own nature, moves God to act.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary II.\u0026mdash;It follows: 2. That God is the sole free\r\ncause. For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature\r\n(by Prop. xi. and Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.), and acts by the sole\r\nnecessity of his own nature, wherefore God is (by Def. vii.) the\r\nsole free cause. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Others think that God is a free cause, because he can,\r\nas they think, bring it about, that those things which we have\r\nsaid follow from his nature\u0026mdash;that is, which are in his power,\r\nshould not come to pass, or should not be produced by him. But\r\nthis is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about,\r\nthat it should follow from the nature of a triangle that its\r\nthree interior angles should not be equal to two right angles;\r\nor that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is\r\nabsurd.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nMoreover, I will show below, without the aid of this\r\nproposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to God\u0027s\r\nnature. I know that there are many who think that they can show,\r\nthat supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God\u0027s nature;\r\nfor they say they know of nothing more perfect, which they can\r\nattribute to God, than that which is the highest perfection in\r\nourselves. Further, although they conceive God as actually\r\nsupremely intelligent, they yet do not believe that he can bring\r\ninto existence everything which he actually understands, for they\r\nthink that they would thus destroy God\u0027s power. If, they\r\ncontend, God had created everything which is in his intellect, he\r\nwould not be able to create anything more, and this, they think,\r\nwould clash with God\u0027s omnipotence; therefore, they prefer to\r\nasset that God is indifferent to all things, and that he creates\r\nnothing except that which he has decided, by some absolute\r\nexercise of will, to create. However, I think I have shown\r\nsufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.), that from God\u0027s supreme\r\npower, or infinite nature, an infinite number of things\u0026mdash;that is,\r\nall things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of\r\nways, or always flow from the same necessity; in the same way as\r\nfrom the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for\r\neternity, that its three interior angles are equal to two right\r\nangles. Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been displayed from\r\nall eternity, and will for all eternity remain in the same state\r\nof activity. This manner of treating the question attributes to\r\nGod an omnipotence, in my opinion, far more perfect. For,\r\notherwise, we are compelled to confess that God understands an\r\ninfinite number of creatable things, which he will never be able\r\nto create, for, if he created all that he understands, he would,\r\naccording to this showing, exhaust his omnipotence, and render\r\nhimself imperfect. Wherefore, in order to establish that God is\r\nperfect, we should be reduced to establishing at the same time,\r\nthat he cannot bring to pass everything over which his power\r\nextends; this seems to be a hypothesis most absurd, and most\r\nrepugnant to God\u0027s omnipotence.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFurther (to say a word here concerning the intellect and the\r\nwill which we attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain\r\nto the eternal essence of God, we must take these words in some\r\nsignificance quite different from those they usually bear. For\r\nintellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God,\r\nwould perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human\r\nintellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in common with\r\nthem but the name; there would be about as much correspondence\r\nbetween the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly\r\nconstellation, and a dog, an animal that barks. This I will\r\nprove as follows. If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it\r\ncannot be in nature, as ours is generally thought to be,\r\nposterior to, or simultaneous with the things understood,\r\ninasmuch as God is prior to all things by reason of his causality\r\n(Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.). On the contrary, the truth and formal\r\nessence of things is as it is, because it exists by\r\nrepresentation as such in the intellect of God. Wherefore the\r\nintellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute\r\nGod\u0027s essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of their\r\nessence and of their existence. This seems to have been\r\nrecognized by those who have asserted, that God\u0027s intellect,\r\nGod\u0027s will, and God\u0027s power, are one and the same. As,\r\ntherefore, God\u0027s intellect is the sole cause of things, namely,\r\nboth of their essence and existence, it must necessarily differ\r\nfrom them in respect to its essence, and in respect to its\r\nexistence. For a cause differs from a thing it causes, precisely\r\nin the quality which the latter gains from the former.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFor example, a man is the cause of another man\u0027s existence,\r\nbut not of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and,\r\ntherefore, the two men may be entirely similar in essence, but\r\nmust be different in existence; and hence if the existence of\r\none of them cease, the existence of the other will not\r\nnecessarily cease also; but if the essence of one could be\r\ndestroyed, and be made false, the essence of the other would be\r\ndestroyed also. Wherefore, a thing which is the cause both of\r\nthe essence and of the existence of a given effect, must differ\r\nfrom such effect both in respect to its essence, and also in\r\nrespect to its existence. Now the intellect of God is the cause\r\nboth of the essence and the existence of our intellect;\r\ntherefore, the intellect of God in so far as it is conceived to\r\nconstitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both in\r\nrespect to essence and in respect to existence, nor can it in\r\nanywise agree therewith save in name, as we said before. The\r\nreasoning would be identical in the case of the will, as anyone\r\ncan easily see.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause\r\nof all things.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;All things which are, are in God, and must be\r\nconceived through God (by Prop. xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi.,\r\nCoroll. i.) God is the cause of those things which are in him.\r\nThis is our first point. Further, besides God there can be no\r\nsubstance (by Prop. xiv.), that is nothing in itself external to\r\nGod. This is our second point. God, therefore, is the\r\nindwelling and not the transient cause of all things. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XIX. God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;God (by Def. vi.) is substance, which (by Prop. xi.)\r\nnecessarily exists, that is (by Prop. vii.) existence appertains\r\nto its nature, or (what is the same thing) follows from its\r\ndefinition; therefore, God is eternal (by Def. viii.). Further,\r\nby the attributes of God we must understand that which (by Def.\r\niv.) expresses the essence of the divine substance\u0026mdash;in other\r\nwords, that which appertains to substance: that, I say, should\r\nbe involved in the attributes of substance. Now eternity\r\nappertains to the nature of substance (as I have already shown in\r\nProp. vii.); therefore, eternity must appertain to each of the\r\nattributes, and thus all are eternal. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;This proposition is also evident from the manner in\r\nwhich (in Prop. xi.) I demonstrated the existence of God; it is\r\nevident, I repeat, from that proof, that the existence of God,\r\nlike his essence, is an eternal truth. Further (in Prop. xix. of\r\nmy \"Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy\"), I have proved the\r\neternity of God, in another manner, which I need not here repeat.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XX. The existence of God and his essence are one and the\r\nsame.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;God (by the last Prop.) and all his attributes are\r\neternal, that is (by Def. viii.) each of his attributes expresses\r\nexistence. Therefore the same\r\nattributes of God which explain his eternal essence, explain at\r\nthe same time his eternal existence\u0026mdash;in other words, that which\r\nconstitutes God\u0027s essence constitutes at the same time his\r\nexistence. Wherefore God\u0027s existence and God\u0027s essence are one\r\nand the same. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCoroll. I.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows that God\u0027s existence, like his\r\nessence, is an eternal truth.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCoroll. II\u0026mdash;Secondly, it follows that God, and all the\r\nattributes of God, are unchangeable. For if they could be\r\nchanged in respect to existence, they must also be able to be\r\nchanged in respect to essence\u0026mdash;that is, obviously, be changed from\r\ntrue to false, which is absurd.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXI. All things which follow from the absolute nature of\r\nany attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, in\r\nother words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Conceive, if it be possible (supposing the proposition\r\nto be denied), that something in some attribute of God can follow\r\nfrom the absolute nature of the said attribute, and that at the\r\nsame time it is finite, and has a conditioned existence or\r\nduration; for instance, the idea of God expressed in the\r\nattribute thought. Now thought, in so far as it is supposed to\r\nbe an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Prop. xi.) in its\r\nnature infinite. But, in so far as it possesses the idea of God,\r\nit is supposed finite. It cannot, however, be conceived as\r\nfinite, unless it be limited by thought (by Def. ii.); but it is\r\nnot limited by thought itself, in so far as it has constituted\r\nthe idea of God (for so far it is supposed to be finite);\r\ntherefore, it is limited by thought, in so far as it has not\r\nconstituted the idea of God, which nevertheless (by Prop. xi.)\r\nmust necessarily exist.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWe have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the\r\nidea of God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally\r\nfollow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for\r\nit is conceived as constituting, and also as not constituting,\r\nthe idea of God), which is against our hypothesis. Wherefore, if\r\nthe idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed,\r\nanything else in any attribute of God (for we may take any\r\nexample, as the proof is of universal application) follows from\r\nthe necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, the\r\nsaid thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our first\r\npoint.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFurthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of\r\nthe nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration. For\r\nif it can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of\r\nthe nature of some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God,\r\nfor instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought,\r\nand let it be supposed at some time not to have existed, or to be\r\nabout not to exist.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow thought being an attribute of God, must necessarily exist\r\nunchanged (by Prop. xi., and Prop. xx., Coroll. ii.); and beyond\r\nthe limits of the duration of the idea of God (supposing the\r\nlatter at some time not to have existed, or not to be going to\r\nexist) thought would perforce have existed without the idea of\r\nGod, which is contrary to our hypothesis, for we supposed that,\r\nthought being given, the idea of God necessarily flowed\r\ntherefrom. Therefore the idea of God expressed in thought, or\r\nanything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of\r\nsome attribute of God, cannot have a limited duration, but\r\nthrough the said attribute is eternal, which is our second point.\r\nBear in mind that the same proposition may be affirmed of\r\nanything, which in any attribute necessarily follows from God\u0027s\r\nabsolute nature.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXII. Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in so\r\nfar as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily\r\nand as infinite, through the said attribute, must also exist\r\nnecessarily and as infinite.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The proof of this proposition is similar to that of\r\nthe preceding one.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXIII. Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as\r\ninfinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature\r\nof some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a\r\nmodification which exists necessarily, and as infinite.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;A mode exists in something else, through which it must\r\nbe conceived (Def. v.), that is (Prop. xv.), it exists solely in\r\nGod, and solely through God can be conceived. If therefore a mode\r\nis conceived as necessarily existing and infinite, it must\r\nnecessarily be inferred or perceived through some attribute of\r\nGod, in so far as such attribute is conceived as expressing the\r\ninfinity and necessity of existence, in other words (Def. viii.)\r\neternity; that is, in so far as it is considered absolutely. A\r\nmode, therefore, which necessarily exists as infinite, must\r\nfollow from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, either\r\nimmediately (Prop. xxi.) or through the means of some\r\nmodification, which follows from the absolute nature of the said\r\nattribute; that is (by Prop. xxii.), which exists necessarily\r\nand as infinite.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXIV. The essence of things produced by God does not\r\ninvolve existence.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This proposition is evident from Def. i. For that of\r\nwhich the nature (considered in itself) involves existence is\r\nself\u0026mdash;caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows that God is not only the cause of\r\nthings coming into existence, but also of their continuing in\r\nexistence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of\r\nthe being of things (essendi rerum). For whether things exist,\r\nor do not exist, whenever we contemplate their essence, we see\r\nthat it involves neither existence nor duration; consequently,\r\nit cannot be the cause of either the one or the other. God must\r\nbe the sole cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existence\r\nappertain. (Prop. xiv. Coroll. i.) Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXV. God is the efficient cause not only of the existence\r\nof things, but also of their essence.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;If this be denied, then God is not the cause of the\r\nessence of things; and therefore the essence of things can (by\r\nAx. iv.) be conceived without God. This (by Prop. xv.) is\r\nabsurd. Therefore, God is the cause of the essence of things.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi.\r\nFor it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the\r\nessence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their\r\nexistence\u0026mdash;in a word, God must be called the cause of all things,\r\nin the same sense as he is called the cause of himself. This\r\nwill be made still clearer by the following corollary.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Individual things are nothing but modifications of\r\nthe attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God\r\nare expressed in a fixed and definite manner. The proof appears\r\nfrom Prop. xv. and Def. v.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXVI. A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular\r\nmanner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and that\r\nwhich has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to\r\nact.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;That by which things are said to be conditioned to act\r\nin a particular manner is necessarily something positive (this is\r\nobvious); therefore both of its essence and of its existence God\r\nby the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause (Props.\r\nxxv. and xvi.); this is our first point. Our second point is\r\nplainly to be inferred therefrom. For if a thing, which has not\r\nbeen conditioned by God, could condition itself, the first part\r\nof our proof would be false, and this, as we have shown is\r\nabsurd.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act\r\nin a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This proposition is evident from the third axiom.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which is\r\nfinite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be\r\nconditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and\r\naction by a cause other than itself, which also is finite, and\r\nhas a conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in\r\nits turn exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be\r\nconditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also\r\nis finite, and has a conditioned existence, and so on to\r\ninfinity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has been\r\nthus conditioned by God (by Prop. xxvi. and Prop. xxiv.,\r\nCoroll.).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence,\r\ncannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God;\r\nfor whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any\r\nattribute of God is infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi.). It\r\nmust, therefore, follow from some attribute of God, in so far as\r\nthe said attribute is considered as in some way modified; for\r\nsubstance and modes make up the sum total of existence (by Ax. i.\r\nand Def. iii., v.), while modes are merely modifications of the\r\nattributes of God. But from God, or from any of his attributes,\r\nin so far as the latter is modified by a modification infinite\r\nand eternal, a conditioned thing cannot follow. Wherefore it\r\nmust follow from, or be conditioned for, existence and action by\r\nGod or one of his attributes, in so far as the latter are\r\nmodified by some modification which is finite, and has a\r\nconditioned existence. This is our first point. Again, this\r\ncause or this modification (for the reason by which we\r\nestablished the first part of this proof) must in its turn be\r\nconditioned by another cause, which also is finite, and has a\r\nconditioned existence, and, again, this last by another (for the\r\nsame reason); and so on (for the same reason) to infinity.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;As certain things must be produced immediately by God,\r\nnamely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute\r\nnature, through the means of these primary attributes, which,\r\nnevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without God, it\r\nfollows:\u0026mdash;1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of those\r\nthings immediately produced by him. I say absolutely, not after\r\nhis kind, as is usually stated. For the effects of God cannot\r\neither exist or be conceived without a cause (Prop. xv. and Prop.\r\nxxiv. Coroll.). 2. That God cannot properly be styled the remote\r\ncause of individual things, except for the sake of distinguishing\r\nthese from what he immediately produces, or rather from what\r\nfollows from his absolute nature. For, by a remote cause, we\r\nunderstand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the effect.\r\nBut all things which are, are in God, and so depend on God, that\r\nwithout him they can neither be nor be conceived.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all\r\nthings are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular\r\nmanner by the necessity of the divine nature.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Whatsoever is, is in God (Prop. xv.). But God cannot\r\nbe called a thing contingent. For (by Prop. xi.) he exists\r\nnecessarily, and not contingently. Further, the modes of the\r\ndivine nature follow therefrom necessarily, and not contingently\r\n(Prop. xvi.); and they thus follow, whether we consider the\r\ndivine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any way\r\nconditioned to act (Prop. xxvii.). Further, God is not only the\r\ncause of these modes, in so far as they simply exist (by Prop.\r\nxxiv, Coroll.), but also in so far as they are considered as\r\nconditioned for operating in a particular manner (Prop. xxvi.).\r\nIf they be not conditioned by God (Prop. xxvi.), it is\r\nimpossible, and not contingent, that they should condition\r\nthemselves; contrariwise, if they be conditioned by God, it is\r\nimpossible, and not contingent, that they should render\r\nthemselves unconditioned. Wherefore all things are conditioned by\r\nthe necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also\r\nto exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothing\r\nthat is contingent. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what\r\nwe should understand by nature viewed as active (natura\r\nnaturans), and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata). I say\r\nto explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that,\r\nfrom what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by nature\r\nviewed as active we should understand that which is in itself,\r\nand is conceived through itself, or those attributes of\r\nsubstance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other\r\nwords (Prop. xiv., Coroll. i., and Prop. xvii., Coroll. ii) God,\r\nin so far as he is considered as a free cause.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBy nature viewed as passive I understand all that which\r\nfollows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the\r\nattributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of\r\nGod, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God,\r\nand which without God cannot exist or be conceived.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXX. Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function\r\ninfinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the\r\nmodifications of God, and nothing else.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.); in\r\nother words (obviously), that which is contained in the intellect\r\nin representation must necessarily be granted in nature. But in\r\nnature (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) there is no substance save\r\nGod, nor any modifications save those (Prop. xv.) which are in\r\nGod, and cannot without God either be or be conceived. Therefore\r\nthe intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must\r\ncomprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God,\r\nand nothing else. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXI. The intellect in function, whether finite or\r\ninfinite, as will, desire, love, \u0026amp;c., should be referred to\r\npassive nature and not to active nature.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;By the intellect we do not (obviously) mean absolute\r\nthought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing from\r\nother modes, such as love, desire, \u0026amp;c., and therefore (Def. v.)\r\nrequiring to be conceived through absolute thought. It must (by\r\nProp. xv. and Def. vi.), through some attribute of God which\r\nexpresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, be so\r\nconceived, that without such attribute it could neither be nor be\r\nconceived. It must therefore be referred to nature passive\r\nrather than to nature active, as must also the other modes of\r\nthinking. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;I do not here, by speaking of intellect in function,\r\nadmit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality:\r\nbut, wishing to avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only of\r\nwhat is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the very act of\r\nunderstanding, than which nothing is more clearly perceived. For\r\nwe cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of\r\nthe act of understanding.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXII. Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a\r\nnecessary cause.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Will is only a particular mode of thinking, like\r\nintellect; therefore (by Prop. xxviii.) no volition can exist,\r\nnor be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned by some cause\r\nother than itself, which cause is conditioned by a third cause,\r\nand so on to infinity. But if will be supposed infinite, it must\r\nalso be conditioned to exist and act by God, not by virtue of his\r\nbeing substance absolutely infinite, but by virtue of his\r\npossessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal\r\nessence of thought (by Prop. xxiii.). Thus, however it be\r\nconceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by\r\nwhich it should be conditioned to exist and act. Thus (Def.\r\nvii.) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or\r\nconstrained cause. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCoroll. I.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows, first, that God does not act\r\naccording to freedom of the will.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCoroll. II.\u0026mdash;It follows, secondly, that will and intellect\r\nstand in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion, and\r\nrest, and absolutely all natural phenomena, which must be\r\nconditioned by God (Prop. xxix.) to exist and act in a particular\r\nmanner. For will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by\r\nwhich it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner.\r\nAnd although, when will or intellect be granted, an infinite\r\nnumber of results may follow, yet God cannot on that account be\r\nsaid to act from freedom of the will, any more than the infinite\r\nnumber of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying\r\nthat motion and rest act by free will. Wherefore will no more\r\nappertains to God than does anything else in nature, but stands\r\nin the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like, which\r\nwe have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature,\r\nand to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular\r\nmanner.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXIII. Things could not have been brought into being by\r\nGod in any manner or in any order different from that which has\r\nin fact obtained.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof\u0026mdash;All things necessarily follow from the nature of God\r\n(Prop. xvi.), and by the nature of God are conditioned to exist\r\nand act in a particular way (Prop. xxix.). If things, therefore,\r\ncould have been of a different nature, or have been conditioned\r\nto act in a different way, so that the order of nature would have\r\nbeen different, God\u0027s nature would also have been able to be\r\ndifferent from what it now is; and therefore (by Prop. xi.) that\r\ndifferent nature also would have perforce existed, and\r\nconsequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods.\r\nThis (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) is absurd. Therefore things\r\ncould not have been brought into being by God in any other\r\nmanner, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote I.\u0026mdash;As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at\r\nnoonday, that there is nothing to justify us in calling things\r\ncontingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall\r\nattach to the word contingent; but I will first explain the\r\nwords necessary and impossible.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nA thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence\r\nor in respect to its cause; for the existence of a thing\r\nnecessarily follows, either from its essence and definition, or\r\nfrom a given efficient cause. For similar reasons a thing is\r\nsaid to be impossible; namely, inasmuch as its essence or\r\ndefinition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause\r\nis granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect; but\r\na thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relation\r\nto the imperfection of our knowledge.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nA thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or\r\ndoes not involve a contradiction, or of which, knowing that it\r\ndoes not involve a contradiction, we are still in doubt\r\nconcerning the existence, because the order of causes escapes\r\nus,\u0026mdash;such a thing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary or\r\nimpossible. Wherefore we call it contingent or possible.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote II.\u0026mdash;It clearly follows from what we have said, that\r\nthings have been brought into being by God in the highest\r\nperfection, inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from a\r\nmost perfect nature. Nor does this prove any imperfection in\r\nGod, for it has compelled us to affirm his perfection. From its\r\ncontrary proposition, we should clearly gather (as I have just\r\nshown), that God is not supremely perfect, for if things had been\r\nbrought into being in any other way, we should have to assign to\r\nGod a nature different from that, which we are bound to attribute\r\nto him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect being.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and\r\nwill refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply\r\nbecause they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very\r\ndifferent from that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced. They\r\nassign to him, in short, absolute free will. However, I am also\r\nconvinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and duly\r\nweigh in their minds our series of propositions, they will reject\r\nsuch freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory,\r\nbut also as a great impediment to organized knowledge. There is\r\nno need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to Prop.\r\nxvii. But, for the sake of my opponents, I will show further,\r\nthat although it be granted that will pertains to the essence of\r\nGod, it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that things\r\ncould not have been by him created other than they are, or in a\r\ndifferent order; this is easily proved, if we reflect on what\r\nour opponents themselves concede, namely, that it depends solely\r\non the decree and will of God, that each thing is what it is. If\r\nit were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things.\r\nFurther, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from all\r\neternity by God himself. If it were otherwise, God would be\r\nconvicted of imperfection or change. But in eternity there is no\r\nsuch thing as when, before, or after; hence it follows solely\r\nfrom the perfection of God, that God never can decree, or never\r\ncould have decreed anything but what is; that God did not exist\r\nbefore his decrees, and would not exist without them. But, it is\r\nsaid, supposing that God had made a different universe, or had\r\nordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature and\r\nher order, we could not therefore conclude any imperfection in\r\nGod. But persons who say this must admit that God can change his\r\ndecrees. For if God had ordained any decrees concerning nature\r\nand her order, different from those which he has ordained\u0026mdash;in\r\nother words, if he had willed and conceived something different\r\nconcerning nature\u0026mdash;he would perforce have had a different\r\nintellect from that which he has, and also a different will. But\r\nif it were allowable to assign to God a different intellect and a\r\ndifferent will, without any change in his essence or his\r\nperfection, what would there be to prevent him changing the\r\ndecrees which he has made concerning created things, and\r\nnevertheless remaining perfect? For his intellect and will\r\nconcerning things created and their order are the same, in\r\nrespect to his essence and perfection, however they be conceived.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFurther, all the philosophers whom I have read admit that\r\nGod\u0027s intellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential; as\r\nthey also admit that God\u0027s intellect, and God\u0027s will, and God\u0027s\r\nessence are identical, it follows that, if God had had a\r\ndifferent actual intellect and a different will, his essence\r\nwould also have been different; and thus, as I concluded at\r\nfirst, if things had been brought into being by God in a\r\ndifferent way from that which has obtained, God\u0027s intellect and\r\nwill, that is (as is admitted) his essence would perforce have\r\nbeen different, which is absurd.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAs these things could not have been brought into being by God\r\nin any but the actual way and order which has obtained; and as\r\nthe truth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection\r\nof God; we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves to\r\nbelieve that God did not wish to create all the things which were\r\nin his intellect, and to create them in the same perfection as he\r\nhad understood them.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut, it will be said, there is in things no perfection nor\r\nimperfection; that which is in them, and which causes them to be\r\ncalled perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on the\r\nwill of God. If God had so willed, he might have brought it\r\nabout that what is now perfection should be extreme imperfection,\r\nand vice versâ. What is such an assertion, but an open\r\ndeclaration that God, who necessarily understands that which he\r\nwishes, might bring it about by his will, that he should\r\nunderstand things differently from the way in which he does\r\nunderstand them? This (as we have just shown) is the height of\r\nabsurdity. Wherefore, I may turn the argument against its\r\nemployers, as follows:\u0026mdash;All things depend on the power of God.\r\nIn order that things should be different from what they are,\r\nGod\u0027s will would necessarily have to be different. But God\u0027s\r\nwill cannot be different (as we have just most clearly\r\ndemonstrated) from God\u0027s perfection. Therefore neither can\r\nthings be different. I confess, that the theory which subjects\r\nall things to the will of an indifferent deity, and asserts that\r\nthey are all dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truth\r\nthan the theory of those, who maintain that God acts in all\r\nthings with a view of promoting what is good. For these latter\r\npersons seem to set up something beyond God, which does not\r\ndepend on God, but which God in acting looks to as an exemplar,\r\nor which he aims at as a definite goal. This is only another\r\nname for subjecting God to the dominion of destiny, an utter\r\nabsurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be the first\r\nand only free cause of the essence of all things and also of\r\ntheir existence. I need, therefore, spend no time in refuting\r\nsuch wild theories.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXIV. God\u0027s power is identical with his essence.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;From the sole necessity of the essence of God it\r\nfollows that God is the cause of himself (Prop. xi.) and of all\r\nthings (Prop. xvi. and Coroll.). Wherefore the power of God, by\r\nwhich he and all things are and act, is identical with his\r\nessence. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXV. Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God,\r\nnecessarily exists.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Whatsoever is in God\u0027s power, must (by the last Prop.)\r\nbe comprehended in his essence in such a manner, that it\r\nnecessarily follows therefrom, and therefore necessarily exists.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXVI. There is no cause from whose nature some effect\r\ndoes not follow.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Whatsoever exists expresses God\u0027s nature or essence in\r\na given conditioned manner (by Prop. xxv., Coroll.); that is,\r\n(by Prop. xxxiv.), whatsoever exists, expresses in a given\r\nconditioned manner God\u0027s power, which is the cause of all things,\r\ntherefore an effect must (by Prop. xvi.) necessarily follow.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4\u003e\r\nAPPENDIX:\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties\r\nof God. I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one:\r\nthat he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature;\r\nthat he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so;\r\nthat all things are in God, and so depend on him, that without\r\nhim they could neither exist nor be conceived; lastly, that all\r\nthings are predetermined by God, not through his free will or\r\nabsolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power.\r\nI have further, where occasion afforded, taken care to remove the\r\nprejudices, which might impede the comprehension of my\r\ndemonstrations. Yet there still remain misconceptions not a few,\r\nwhich might and may prove very grave hindrances to the\r\nunderstanding of the concatenation of things, as I have explained\r\nit above. I have therefore thought it worth while to bring these\r\nmisconceptions before the bar of reason.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAll such opinions spring from the notion commonly\r\nentertained, that all things in nature act as men themselves act,\r\nnamely, with an end in view. It is accepted as certain, that God\r\nhimself directs all things to a definite goal (for it is said\r\nthat God made all things for man, and man that he might worship\r\nhim). I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking first,\r\nwhy it obtains general credence, and why all men are naturally so\r\nprone to adopt it? secondly, I will point out its falsity; and,\r\nlastly, I will show how it has given rise to prejudices about\r\ngood and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order and\r\nconfusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like. However, this is\r\nnot the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of\r\nthe human mind: it will be sufficient here, if I assume as a\r\nstarting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely,\r\nthat all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that all\r\nhave the desire to seek for what is useful to them, and that they\r\nare conscious of such desire. Herefrom it follows, first, that\r\nmen think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their\r\nvolitions and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance,\r\nof the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire.\r\nSecondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, for that\r\nwhich is useful to them, and which they seek. Thus it comes to\r\npass that they only look for a knowledge of the final causes of\r\nevents, and when these are learned, they are content, as having\r\nno cause for further doubt. If they cannot learn such causes\r\nfrom external sources, they are compelled to turn to considering\r\nthemselves, and reflecting what end would have induced them\r\npersonally to bring about the given event, and thus they\r\nnecessarily judge other natures by their own. Further, as they\r\nfind in themselves and outside themselves many means which assist\r\nthem not a little in the search for what is useful, for instance,\r\neyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for\r\nyielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding\r\nfish, \u0026amp;c., they come to look on the whole of nature as a means\r\nfor obtaining such conveniences. Now as they are aware, that\r\nthey found these conveniences and did not make them, they think\r\nthey have cause for believing, that some other being has made\r\nthem for their use. As they look upon things as means, they\r\ncannot believe them to be self\u0026mdash;created; but, judging from the\r\nmeans which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they\r\nare bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe\r\nendowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted\r\neverything for human use. They are bound to estimate the nature\r\nof such rulers (having no information on the subject) in\r\naccordance with their own nature, and therefore they assert that\r\nthe gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to bind\r\nman to themselves and obtain from him the highest honor. Hence\r\nalso it follows, that everyone thought out for himself, according\r\nto his abilities, a different way of worshipping God, so that God\r\nmight love him more than his fellows, and direct the whole course\r\nof nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity and\r\ninsatiable avarice. Thus the prejudice developed into\r\nsuperstition, and took deep root in the human mind; and for this\r\nreason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explain\r\nthe final causes of things; but in their endeavor to show that\r\nnature does nothing in vain, i.e. nothing which is useless to\r\nman, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods,\r\nand men are all mad together. Consider, I pray you, the result:\r\namong the many helps of nature they were bound to find some\r\nhindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, \u0026amp;c.: so they\r\ndeclared that such things happen, because the gods are angry at\r\nsome wrong done to them by men, or at some fault committed in\r\ntheir worship. Experience day by day protested and showed by\r\ninfinite examples, that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of\r\npious and impious alike; still they would not abandon their\r\ninveterate prejudice, for it was more easy for them to class such\r\ncontradictions among other unknown things of whose use they were\r\nignorant, and thus to retain their actual and innate condition of\r\nignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning\r\nand start afresh. They therefore laid down as an axiom, that\r\nGod\u0027s judgments far transcend human understanding. Such a\r\ndoctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the\r\nhuman race for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnished\r\nanother standard of verity in considering solely the essence and\r\nproperties of figures without regard to their final causes.\r\nThere are other reasons (which I need not mention here) besides\r\nmathematics, which might have caused men\u0027s minds to be directed\r\nto these general prejudices, and have led them to the knowledge\r\nof the truth.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI have now sufficiently explained my first point. There is\r\nno need to show at length, that nature has no particular goal in\r\nview, and that final causes are mere human figments. This, I\r\nthink, is already evident enough, both from the causes and\r\nfoundations on which I have shown such prejudice to be based, and\r\nalso from Prop. xvi., and the Corollary of Prop. xxxii., and, in\r\nfact, all those propositions in which I have shown, that\r\neverything in nature proceeds from a sort of necessity, and with\r\nthe utmost perfection. However, I will add a few remarks, in\r\norder to overthrow this doctrine of a final cause utterly. That\r\nwhich is really a cause it considers as an effect, and vice versâ:\r\nit makes that which is by nature first to be last, and that\r\nwhich is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect. Passing\r\nover the questions of cause and priority as self\u0026mdash;evident, it is\r\nplain from Props. xxi., xxii., xxiii. that the effect is most\r\nperfect which is produced immediately by God; the effect which\r\nrequires for its production several intermediate causes is, in\r\nthat respect, more imperfect. But if those things which were\r\nmade immediately by God were made to enable him to attain his\r\nend, then the things which come after, for the sake of which the\r\nfirst were made, are necessarily the most excellent of all.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFurther, this doctrine does away with the perfection of God:\r\nfor, if God acts for an object, he necessarily desires something\r\nwhich he lacks. Certainly, theologians and metaphysicians draw a\r\ndistinction between the object of want and the object of\r\nassimilation; still they confess that God made all things for\r\nthe sake of himself, not for the sake of creation. They are\r\nunable to point to anything prior to creation, except God\r\nhimself, as an object for which God should act, and are therefore\r\ndriven to admit (as they clearly must), that God lacked those\r\nthings for whose attainment he created means, and further that he\r\ndesired them.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWe must not omit to notice that the followers of this\r\ndoctrine, anxious to display their talent in assigning final\r\ncauses, have imported a new method of argument in proof of their\r\ntheory\u0026mdash;namely, a reduction, not to the impossible, but to\r\nignorance; thus showing that they have no other method of\r\nexhibiting their doctrine. For example, if a stone falls from a\r\nroof on to someone\u0027s head, and kills him, they will demonstrate\r\nby their new method, that the stone fell in order to kill the man;\r\nfor, if it had not by God\u0027s will fallen with that object, how\r\ncould so many circumstances (and there are often many concurrent\r\ncircumstances) have all happened together by chance? Perhaps you\r\nwill answer that the event is due to the facts that the wind was\r\nblowing, and the man was walking that way. \"But why,\" they will\r\ninsist, \"was the wind blowing, and why was the man at that very\r\ntime walking that way?\" If you again answer, that the wind had\r\nthen sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the day\r\nbefore, the weather being previously calm, and that the man had\r\nbeen invited by a friend, they will again insist: \"But why was\r\nthe sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time?\"\r\nSo they will pursue their questions from cause to cause, till at\r\nlast you take refuge in the will of God\u0026mdash;in other words, the\r\nsanctuary of ignorance. So, again, when they survey the frame of\r\nthe human body, they are amazed; and being ignorant of the\r\ncauses of so great a work of art, conclude that it has been\r\nfashioned, not mechanically, but by divine and supernatural\r\nskill, and has been so put together that one part shall not hurt\r\nanother.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHence anyone who seeks for the true causes of miracles, and\r\nstrives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being,\r\nand not to gaze at them like a fool, is set down and denounced as\r\nan impious heretic by those, whom the masses adore as the\r\ninterpreters of nature and the gods. Such persons know that,\r\nwith the removal of ignorance, the wonder which forms their only\r\navailable means for proving and preserving their authority would\r\nvanish also. But I now quit this subject, and pass on to my\r\nthird point.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAfter men persuaded themselves, that everything which is\r\ncreated is created for their sake, they were bound to consider as\r\nthe chief quality in everything that which is most useful to\r\nthemselves, and to account those things the best of all which\r\nhave the most beneficial effect on mankind. Further, they were\r\nbound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the nature\r\nof things, such as goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth,\r\ncold, beauty, deformity, and so on; and from the belief that\r\nthey are free agents arose the further notions of praise and\r\nblame, sin and merit.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI will speak of these latter hereafter, when I treat of human\r\nnature; the former I will briefly explain here.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nEverything which conduces to health and the worship of God\r\nthey have called good, everything which hinders these objects\r\nthey have styled bad; and inasmuch as those who do not\r\nunderstand the nature of things do not verify phenomena in any\r\nway, but merely imagine them after a fashion, and mistake their\r\nimagination for understanding, such persons firmly believe that\r\nthere is an order in things, being really ignorant both of things\r\nand their own nature. When phenomena are of such a kind, that\r\nthe impression they make on our senses requires little effort of\r\nimagination, and can consequently be easily remembered, we say\r\nthat they are well\u0026mdash;ordered; if the contrary, that they are\r\nill\u0026mdash;ordered or confused. Further, as things which are easily\r\nimagined are more pleasing to us, men prefer order to\r\nconfusion\u0026mdash;as though there were any order in nature, except in\r\nrelation to our imagination\u0026mdash;and say that God has created all\r\nthings in order; thus, without knowing it, attributing\r\nimagination to God, unless, indeed, they would have it that God\r\nforesaw human imagination, and arranged everything, so that it\r\nshould be most easily imagined. If this be their theory, they\r\nwould not, perhaps, be daunted by the fact that we find an\r\ninfinite number of phenomena, far surpassing our imagination, and\r\nvery many others which confound its weakness. But enough has\r\nbeen said on this subject. The other abstract notions are\r\nnothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination is\r\ndifferently affected: though they are considered by the ignorant\r\nas the chief attributes of things, inasmuch as they believe that\r\neverything was created for the sake of themselves; and,\r\naccording as they are affected by it, style it good or bad,\r\nhealthy or rotten and corrupt. For instance, if the motion which\r\nobjects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health,\r\nthe objects causing it are styled beautiful; if a contrary\r\nmotion be excited, they are styled ugly.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThings which are perceived through our sense of smell are\r\nstyled fragrant or fetid; if through our taste, sweet or bitter,\r\nfull\u0026mdash;flavored or insipid; if through our touch, hard or soft,\r\nrough or smooth, \u0026amp;c.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise,\r\nsound, or harmony. In this last case, there are men lunatic\r\nenough to believe, that even God himself takes pleasure in\r\nharmony; and philosophers are not lacking who have persuaded\r\nthemselves, that the motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to\r\nharmony\u0026mdash;all of which instances sufficiently show that everyone\r\njudges of things according to the state of his brain, or rather\r\nmistakes for things the forms of his imagination. We need no\r\nlonger wonder that there have arisen all the controversies we\r\nhave witnessed, and finally skepticism: for, although human\r\nbodies in many respects agree, yet in very many others they\r\ndiffer; so that what seems good to one seems bad to another;\r\nwhat seems well ordered to one seems confused to another; what\r\nis pleasing to one displeases another, and so on. I need not\r\nfurther enumerate, because this is not the place to treat the\r\nsubject at length, and also because the fact is sufficiently well\r\nknown. It is commonly said: \"So many men, so many minds;\r\neveryone is wise in his own way; brains differ as completely as\r\npalates.\" All of which proverbs show, that men judge of things\r\naccording to their mental disposition, and rather imagine than\r\nunderstand: for, if they understood phenomena, they would, as\r\nmathematicians attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what I\r\nhave urged.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWe have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly\r\ngiven of nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate\r\nthe true nature of anything, but only the constitution of the\r\nimagination; and, although they have names, as though they were\r\nentities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them\r\nentities imaginary rather than real; and, therefore, all\r\narguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily\r\nrebutted.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nMany argue in this way. If all things follow from a\r\nnecessity of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there\r\nso many imperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things\r\ncorrupt to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity,\r\nconfusion, evil, sin, \u0026amp;c. But these reasoners are, as I have\r\nsaid, easily confuted, for the perfection of things is to be\r\nreckoned only from their own nature and power; things are not\r\nmore or less perfect, according as they delight or offend human\r\nsenses, or according as they are serviceable or repugnant to\r\nmankind. To those who ask why God did not so create all men,\r\nthat they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer but\r\nthis: because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of\r\nevery degree of perfection from highest to lowest; or, more\r\nstrictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast, as to\r\nsuffice for the production of everything conceivable by an\r\ninfinite intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSuch are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note; if\r\nthere are any more of the same sort, everyone may easily\r\ndissipate them for himself with the aid of a little reflection.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap02\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cH2 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nPART II.\r\n\u003c/H2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4\u003e\r\nPREFACE\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI now pass on to explaining the results, which must\r\nnecessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal and\r\ninfinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in Part\r\ni., Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in an\r\ninfinite number of ways), but only those which are able to lead\r\nus, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind\r\nand its highest blessedness.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4\u003e\r\nDEFINITIONS\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nDEFINITION I. By body I mean a mode which expresses in a certain\r\ndeterminate manner the essence of God, in so far as he is\r\nconsidered as an extended thing. (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv.,\r\nCoroll.)\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nDEFINITION II. I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing\r\nthat, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also,\r\nand, which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also;\r\nin other words, that without which the thing, and which itself\r\nwithout the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nDEFINITION III. By idea, I mean the mental conception which is\r\nformed by the mind as a thinking thing.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation.\u0026mdash;I say conception rather than perception, because\r\nthe word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in\r\nrespect to the object; whereas conception seems to express an\r\nactivity of the mind.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nDEFINITION IV. By an adequate idea, I mean an idea which, in so\r\nfar as it is considered in itself, without relation to the\r\nobject, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation.\u0026mdash;I say intrinsic, in order to exclude that mark\r\nwhich is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and\r\nits object (ideatum).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nDEFINITION V. Duration is the indefinite continuance of\r\nexisting.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation.\u0026mdash;I say indefinite, because it cannot be\r\ndetermined through the existence itself of the existing thing, or\r\nby its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence of\r\nthe thing, but does not take it away.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nDEFINITION VI. Reality and perfection I use as synonymous terms.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nDEFINITION VII. By particular things, I mean things which are\r\nfinite and have a conditioned existence; but if several\r\nindividual things concur in one action, so as to be all\r\nsimultaneously the effect of one cause, I consider them all, so\r\nfar, as one particular thing.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4\u003e\r\nAXIOMS\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI. The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that\r\nis, it may, in the order of nature, come to pass that this or\r\nthat man does or does not exist.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nII. Man thinks.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIII. Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of\r\nthe passions, do not take place, unless there be in the same\r\nindividual an idea of the thing loved, desired, \u0026amp;c. But the idea\r\ncan exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIV. We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nV. We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and\r\nmodes of thought.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nN.B. The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop.\r\nxiii.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4\u003e\r\nPROPOSITIONS\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking\r\nthing.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are\r\nmodes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature\r\nof God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.). God therefore possesses\r\nthe attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved\r\nin all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby.\r\nThought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God,\r\nwhich express God\u0027s eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def.\r\nvi.). In other words, God is a thinking thing. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;This proposition is also evident from the fact, that we\r\nare able to conceive an infinite thinking being. For, in\r\nproportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more\r\nthoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or\r\nperfection. Therefore a being, which can think an infinite\r\nnumber of things in an infinite number of ways, is, necessarily,\r\nin respect of thinking, infinite. As, therefore, from the\r\nconsideration of thought alone, we conceive an infinite being,\r\nthought is necessarily (Pt. i., Deff. iv. and vi.) one of the\r\ninfinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an\r\nextended thing.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The proof of this proposition is similar to that of\r\nthe last.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. III. In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his\r\nessence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his\r\nessence.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;God (by the first Prop. of this Part) can think an\r\ninfinite number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the same\r\nthing, by Prop. xvi., Part i.) can form the idea of his essence,\r\nand of all things which necessarily follow therefrom. Now all\r\nthat is in the power of God necessarily is (Pt. i., Prop. xxxv.).\r\nTherefore, such an idea as we are considering necessarily is, and\r\nin God alone. Q.E.D. (Part i., Prop. xv.)\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;The multitude understand by the power of God the free\r\nwill of God, and the right over all things that exist, which\r\nlatter are accordingly generally considered as contingent. For\r\nit is said that God has the power to destroy all things, and to\r\nreduce them to nothing. Further, the power of God is very often\r\nlikened to the power of kings. But this doctrine we have refuted\r\n(Pt. i., Prop. xxxii., Corolls. i. and ii.), and we have shown\r\n(Part i., Prop. xvi.) that God acts by the same necessity, as\r\nthat by which he understands himself; in other words, as it\r\nfollows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit),\r\nthat God understands himself, so also does it follow by the same\r\nnecessity, that God performs infinite acts in infinite ways. We\r\nfurther showed (Part i., Prop. xxxiv.), that God\u0027s power is\r\nidentical with God\u0027s essence in action; therefore it is as\r\nimpossible for us to conceive God as not acting, as to conceive\r\nhim as non\u0026mdash;existent. If we might pursue the subject further, I\r\ncould point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to\r\nGod is not only human (as showing that God is conceived by the\r\nmultitude as a man, or in the likeness of a man), but involves a\r\nnegation of power. However, I am unwilling to go over the same\r\nground so often. I would only beg the reader again and again, to\r\nturn over frequently in his mind what I have said in Part I from\r\nProp. xvi. to the end. No one will be able to follow my meaning,\r\nunless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the power of\r\nGod with the human power and right of kings.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. IV. The idea of God, from which an infinite number of\r\nthings follow in infinite ways, can only be one.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the\r\nattributes of God and his modifications (Part i., Prop. xxx.).\r\nNow God is one (Part i., Prop. xiv., Coroll.). Therefore the\r\nidea of God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in\r\ninfinite ways, can only be one. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. V. The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only\r\nin so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far\r\nas he is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas\r\nboth of the attributes of God and of particular things do not own\r\nas their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things\r\nperceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this\r\nPart. We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea\r\nof his essence, and of all things which follow necessarily\r\ntherefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because\r\nhe is the object of his own idea. Wherefore the actual being of\r\nideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing.\r\nIt may be differently proved as follows: the actual being of\r\nideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i., Prop.\r\nxxv., Coroll.) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the\r\nnature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore\r\n(Part i., Prop. x.) involves the conception of no other attribute\r\nof God, and consequently (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effect\r\nof any attribute save thought. Therefore the actual being of\r\nideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a\r\nthinking thing, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. VI. The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in\r\nso far as he is considered through the attribute of which they\r\nare modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any\r\nother attribute.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Each attribute is conceived through itself, without\r\nany other (Part i., Prop. x.); wherefore the modes of each\r\nattribute involve the conception of that attribute, but not of\r\nany other. Thus (Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, only\r\nin so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modes\r\nthey are, and not in so far as he is considered through any\r\nother. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Hence the actual being of things, which are not\r\nmodes of thought, does not follow from the divine nature, because\r\nthat nature has prior knowledge of the things. Things\r\nrepresented in ideas follow, and are derived from their\r\nparticular attribute, in the same manner, and with the same\r\nnecessity as ideas follow (according to what we have shown) from\r\nthe attribute of thought.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the\r\norder and connection of things.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv. For\r\nthe idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of\r\nthe cause, whereof it is an effect.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Hence God\u0027s power of thinking is equal to his\r\nrealized power of action\u0026mdash;that is, whatsoever follows from the\r\ninfinite nature of God in the world of extension (formaliter),\r\nfollows without exception in the same order and connection from\r\nthe idea of God in the world of thought (objective).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what\r\nhas been pointed out above\u0026mdash;namely, that whatsoever can be\r\nperceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence\r\nof substance, belongs altogether only to one substance:\r\nconsequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one\r\nand the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute,\r\nnow through the other. So, also, a mode of extension and the\r\nidea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in\r\ntwo ways. This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by\r\nthose Jews who maintained that God, God\u0027s intellect, and the\r\nthings understood by God are identical. For instance, a circle\r\nexisting in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is\r\nalso in God, are one and the same thing displayed through\r\ndifferent attributes. Thus, whether we conceive nature under the\r\nattribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or\r\nunder any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one\r\nand the same chain of causes\u0026mdash;that is, the same things following\r\nin either case.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI said that God is the cause of an idea\u0026mdash;for instance, of the\r\nidea of a circle,\u0026mdash;in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a\r\ncircle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the\r\nactual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a\r\nproximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again\r\nthrough another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as we\r\nconsider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order\r\nof the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the\r\nattribute of thought only. And, in so far as we consider things\r\nas modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of\r\nnature through the attributes of extension only; and so on, in\r\nthe case of the other attributes. Wherefore of things as they\r\nare in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he\r\nconsists of infinite attributes. I cannot for the present\r\nexplain my meaning more clearly.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do\r\nnot exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in\r\nthe same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes\r\nare contained in the attributes of God.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This proposition is evident from the last; it is\r\nunderstood more clearly from the preceding note.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Hence, so long as particular things do not exist,\r\nexcept in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of\r\nGod, their representations in thought or ideas do not exist,\r\nexcept in so far as the infinite idea of God exists; and when\r\nparticular things are said to exist, not only in so far as they\r\nare involved in the attributes of God, but also in so far as they\r\nare said to continue, their ideas will also involve existence,\r\nthrough which they are said to continue.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;If anyone desires an example to throw more light on\r\nthis question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any,\r\nwhich adequately explains the thing of which I here speak,\r\ninasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavour to\r\nillustrate it as far as possible. The nature of a circle is such\r\nthat if any number of straight lines intersect within it, the\r\nrectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another;\r\nthus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle. Yet\r\nnone of these rectangles can be said to exist, except in so far\r\nas the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of these\r\nrectangles be said to exist, except in so far as they are\r\ncomprehended in the idea of the circle. Let us grant that, from\r\nthis infinite number of rectangles, two only exist. The ideas of\r\nthese two not only exist, in so far as they are contained in the\r\nidea of the circle, but also as they involve the existence of\r\nthose rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished from the\r\nremaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. IX. The idea of an individual thing actually existing is\r\ncaused by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as\r\nhe is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually\r\nexisting, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected\r\nby a third idea, and so on to infinity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The idea of an individual thing actually existing is\r\nan individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes\r\n(by the Corollary and note to Prop. viii. of this part); thus\r\n(by Prop. vi. of this part) it is caused by God, in so far only\r\nas he is a thinking thing. But not (by Prop. xxviii. of Part i.)\r\nin so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely, only in so far as\r\nhe is considered as affected by another mode of thinking; and he\r\nis the cause of this latter, as being affected by a third, and so\r\non to infinity. Now, the order and connection of ideas is (by\r\nProp. vii. of this book) the same as the order and connection of\r\ncauses. Therefore of a given individual idea another individual\r\nidea, or God, in so far as he is considered as modified by that\r\nidea, is the cause; and of this second idea God is the cause, in\r\nso far as he is affected by another idea, and so on to infinity.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Whatsoever takes place in the individual object of\r\nany idea, the knowledge thereof is in God, in so far only as he\r\nhas the idea of the object.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its\r\nidea is in God (by Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far as he\r\nis infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by\r\nanother idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop.); but (by\r\nProp. vii. of this part) the order and connection of ideas is the\r\nsame as the order and connection of things. The knowledge,\r\ntherefore, of that which takes place in any individual object\r\nwill be in God, in so far only as he has the idea of that object.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. X. The being of substance does not appertain to the\r\nessence of man\u0026mdash;in other words, substance does not constitute the\r\nactual being[2] of man.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[2] \"Forma\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The being of substance involves necessary existence\r\n(Part i., Prop. vii.). If, therefore, the being of substance\r\nappertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, man\r\nwould necessarily be granted also (II. Def. ii.), and,\r\nconsequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd\r\n(II. Ax. i.). Therefore, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;This proposition may also be proved from I.v., in which\r\nit is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same\r\nnature; for as there may be many men, the being of substance is\r\nnot that which constitutes the actual being of man. Again, the\r\nproposition is evident from the other properties of\r\nsubstance\u0026mdash;namely, that substance is in its nature infinite,\r\nimmutable, indivisible, \u0026amp;c., as anyone may see for himself.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows, that the essence of man is\r\nconstituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God.\r\nFor (by the last Prop.) the being of substance does not belong to\r\nthe essence of man. That essence therefore (by i. 15) is\r\nsomething which is in God, and which without God can neither be\r\nnor be conceived, whether it be a modification (i. 25. Coroll.),\r\nor a mode which expresses God\u0027s nature in a certain conditioned\r\nmanner.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be\r\nconceived without God. All men agree that God is the one and\r\nonly cause of all things, both of their essence and of their\r\nexistence; that is, God is not only the cause of things in\r\nrespect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also in respect\r\nto their being (secundum esse).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAt the same time many assert, that that, without which a\r\nthing cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that\r\nthing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God\r\nappertains to the essence of created things, or else that created\r\nthings can be or be conceived without God; or else, as is more\r\nprobably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines. I think the\r\ncause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to the\r\nproper order of philosophic thinking. The nature of God, which\r\nshould be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the\r\norder of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to be\r\nlast in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place\r\nwhat they call the objects of sensation; hence, while they are\r\nconsidering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to\r\nthe divine nature, and, when afterwards they apply their mind to\r\nthe study of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear in\r\nmind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid the\r\nknowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are\r\nno help towards understanding the divine nature. So that it is\r\nhardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict\r\nthemselves freely.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHowever, I pass over this point. My intention her was only\r\nto give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing\r\ncannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing:\r\nindividual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God\r\ndoes not appertain to their essence. I said that \"I considered\r\nas belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given,\r\nthe thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the\r\nthing is necessarily removed also; or that without which the\r\nthing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be\r\nconceived.\" (II. Def. ii.)\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XI. The first element, which constitutes the actual being\r\nof the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually\r\nexisting.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The essence of man (by the Coroll. of the last Prop.)\r\nis constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely\r\n(by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II.\r\nAx. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is\r\ngiven, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior\r\nin nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom).\r\nTherefore an idea is the first element constituting the human\r\nmind. But not the idea of a non\u0026mdash;existent thing, for then (II.\r\nviii. Coroll.) the idea itself cannot be said to exist; it must\r\ntherefore be the idea of something actually existing. But not of\r\nan infinite thing. For an infinite thing (I. xxi., xxii.), must\r\nalways necessarily exist; this would (by II. Ax. i.) involve an\r\nabsurdity. Therefore the first element, which constitutes the\r\nactual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actually\r\nexisting. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of\r\nthe infinite intellect of God; thus when we say, that the human\r\nmind perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God has\r\nthis or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far\r\nas he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so\r\nfar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; and when we\r\nsay that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he\r\nconstitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as\r\nhe, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea of\r\nanother thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a thing in\r\npart or inadequately.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and\r\nwill call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate;\r\nI therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and\r\nnot to pronounce on my statements, till they have read to the\r\nend.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XII. Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea,\r\nwhich constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the human\r\nmind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of\r\nthe said occurrence. That is, if the object of the idea\r\nconstituting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in\r\nthat body without being perceived by the mind.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea,\r\nthe knowledge thereof is necessarily in God (II. ix. Coroll.), in\r\nso far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the said\r\nobject, that is (II. xi.), in so far as he constitutes the mind\r\nof anything. Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the object\r\nconstituting the idea of the human mind, the knowledge thereof is\r\nnecessarily in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of\r\nthe human mind; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.) the knowledge of\r\nthe said thing will necessarily be in the mind, in other words\r\nthe mind perceives it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly\r\nto be understood from II. vii., which see.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind\r\nis the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which\r\nactually exists, and nothing else.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;If indeed the body were not the object of the human\r\nmind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in\r\nGod (II. ix. Coroll.) in virtue of his constituting our mind, but\r\nin virtue of his constituting the mind of something else; that\r\nis (II. xi. Coroll.) the ideas of the modifications of the body\r\nwould not be in our mind: now (by II. Ax. iv.) we do possess the\r\nidea of the modifications of the body. Therefore the object of\r\nthe idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body as\r\nit actually exists (II. xi.). Further, if there were any other\r\nobject of the idea constituting the mind besides body, then, as\r\nnothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I.\r\nxxxvi.) there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea,\r\nwhich would be the effect of that other object (II. xi.); but\r\n(I. Ax. v.) there is no such idea. Wherefore the object of our\r\nmind is the body as it exists, and nothing else. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is\r\nunited to the body, but also the nature of the union between mind\r\nand body. However, no one will be able to grasp this adequately\r\nor distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge of the\r\nnature of our body. The propositions we have advanced hitherto\r\nhave been entirely general, applying not more to men than to\r\nother individual things, all of which, though in different\r\ndegrees, are animated.[3] For of everything there is necessarily\r\nan idea in God, of which God is the cause, in the same way as\r\nthere is an idea of the human body; thus whatever we have\r\nasserted of the idea of the human body must necessarily also be\r\nasserted of the idea of everything else. Still, on the other\r\nhand, we cannot deny that ideas, like objects, differ one from\r\nthe other, one being more excellent than another and containing\r\nmore reality, just as the object of one idea is more excellent\r\nthan the object of another idea, and contains more reality.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[3] \"Animata\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind\r\ndiffers from other things, and wherein it surpasses them, it is\r\nnecessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is, of\r\nthe human body. What this nature is, I am not able here to\r\nexplain, nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance,\r\nthat I should do so. I will only say generally, that in\r\nproportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing\r\nmany actions or receiving many impressions at once, so also is\r\nthe mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others for\r\nforming many simultaneous perceptions; and the more the actions\r\nof the body depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies\r\nconcur with it in action, the more fitted is the mind of which it\r\nis the object for distinct comprehension. We may thus recognize\r\nthe superiority of one mind over others, and may further see the\r\ncause, why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body,\r\nand also many kindred questions, which I will, in the following\r\npropositions, deduce from what has been advanced. Wherefore I\r\nhave thought it worth while to explain and prove more strictly my\r\npresent statements. In order to do so, I must premise a few\r\npropositions concerning the nature of bodies.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAXIOM I. All bodies are either in motion or at rest.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAXIOM II. Every body is moved sometimes more slowly,\r\nsometimes more quickly.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nLEMMA I. Bodies are distinguished from one another in\r\nrespect of motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in\r\nrespect of substance.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The first part of this proposition is, I take it,\r\nself\u0026mdash;evident. That bodies are not distinguished in respect of\r\nsubstance, is plain both from I. v. and I. viii. It is brought\r\nout still more clearly from I. xv, note.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nLEMMA II. All bodies agree in certain respects.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the\r\nconception of one and the same attribute (II., Def. i.).\r\nFurther, in the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly,\r\nand may be absolutely in motion or at rest.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nLEMMA III. A body in motion or at rest must be determined to\r\nmotion or rest by another body, which other body has been\r\ndetermined to motion or rest by a third body, and that third\r\nagain by a fourth, and so on to infinity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Bodies are individual things (II., Def. i.), which\r\n(Lemma I.) are distinguished one from the other in respect to\r\nmotion and rest; thus (I. xxviii.) each must necessarily be\r\ndetermined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely\r\n(II. vi.), by another body, which other body is also (Ax. i.) in\r\nmotion or at rest. And this body again can only have been set in\r\nmotion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body to\r\nmotion or rest. This third body again by a fourth, and so on to\r\ninfinity. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows, that a body in motion keeps in\r\nmotion, until it is determined to a state of rest by some other\r\nbody; and a body at rest remains so, until it is determined to a\r\nstate of motion by some other body. This is indeed self\u0026mdash;evident.\r\nFor when I suppose, for instance, that a given body, A, is at\r\nrest, and do not take into consideration other bodies in motion,\r\nI cannot affirm anything concerning the body A, except that it is\r\nat rest. If it afterwards comes to pass that A is in motion,\r\nthis cannot have resulted from its having been at rest, for no\r\nother consequence could have been involved than its remaining at\r\nrest. If, on the other hand, A be given in motion, we shall, so\r\nlong as we only consider A, be unable to affirm anything\r\nconcerning it, except that it is in motion. If A is\r\nsubsequently found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the result\r\nof A\u0027s previous motion, for such motion can only have led to\r\ncontinued motion; the state of rest therefore must have resulted\r\nfrom something, which was not in A, namely, from an external\r\ncause determining A to a state of rest.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAxiom I.\u0026mdash;All modes, wherein one body is affected by another\r\nbody, follow simultaneously from the nature of the body affected\r\nand the body affecting; so that one and the same body may be\r\nmoved in different modes, according to the difference in the\r\nnature of the bodies moving it; on the other hand, different\r\nbodies may be moved in different modes by one and the same body.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAxiom II.\u0026mdash;When a body in motion impinges on another body at\r\nrest, which it is unable to move, it recoils, in order to\r\ncontinue its motion, and the angle made by the line of motion in\r\nthe recoil and the plane of the body at rest, whereon the moving\r\nbody has impinged, will be equal to the angle formed by the line\r\nof motion of incidence and the same plane.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSo far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies,\r\nwhich are only distinguished one from the other by motion and\r\nrest, quickness and slowness. We now pass on to compound bodies.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nDefinition.\u0026mdash;When any given bodies of the same or different\r\nmagnitude are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact, or\r\nif they be moved at the same or different rates of speed, so that\r\ntheir mutual movements should preserve among themselves a certain\r\nfixed relation, we say that such bodies are in union, and that\r\ntogether they compose one body or individual, which is\r\ndistinguished from other bodies by the fact of this union.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAxiom III.\u0026mdash;In proportion as the parts of an individual, or a\r\ncompound body, are in contact over a greater or less superficies,\r\nthey will with greater or less difficulty admit of being moved\r\nfrom their position; consequently the individual will, with\r\ngreater or less difficulty, be brought to assume another form.\r\nThose bodies, whose parts are in contact over large superficies,\r\nare called hard; those, whose parts are in contact over small\r\nsuperficies, are called soft; those, whose parts are in motion\r\namong one another, are called fluid.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nLEMMA IV. If from a body or individual, compounded of\r\nseveral bodies, certain bodies be separated, and if, at the same\r\ntime, an equal number of other bodies of the same nature take\r\ntheir place, the individual will preserve its nature as before,\r\nwithout any change in its actuality (forma).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Bodies (Lemma i.) are not distinguished in respect of\r\nsubstance: that which constitutes the actuality (formam) of an\r\nindividual consists (by the last Def.) in a union of bodies; but\r\nthis union, although there is a continual change of bodies, will\r\n(by our hypothesis) be maintained; the individual, therefore,\r\nwill retain its nature as before, both in respect of substance\r\nand in respect of mode. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nLEMMA V. If the parts composing an individual become greater\r\nor less, but in such proportion, that they all preserve the same\r\nmutual relations of motion and rest, the individual will still\r\npreserve its original nature, and its actuality will not be\r\nchanged.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The same as for the last Lemma.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nLEMMA VI. If certain bodies composing an individual be\r\ncompelled to change the motion, which they have in one direction,\r\nfor motion in another direction, but in such a manner, that they\r\nbe able to continue their motions and their mutual communication\r\nin the same relations as before, the individual will retain its\r\nown nature without any change of its actuality.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This proposition is self\u0026mdash;evident, for the individual\r\nis supposed to retain all that, which, in its definition, we\r\nspoke of as its actual being.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nLEMMA VII. Furthermore, the individual thus composed\r\npreserves its nature, whether it be, as a whole, in motion or at\r\nrest, whether it be moved in this or that direction; so long as\r\neach part retains its motion, and preserves its communication\r\nwith other parts as before.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This proposition is evident from the definition of an\r\nindividual prefixed to Lemma iv.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;We thus see, how a composite individual may be affected\r\nin many different ways, and preserve its nature notwithstanding.\r\nThus far we have conceived an individual as composed of bodies\r\nonly distinguished one from the other in respect of motion and\r\nrest, speed and slowness; that is, of bodies of the most simple\r\ncharacter. If, however, we now conceive another individual\r\ncomposed of several individuals of diverse natures, we shall find\r\nthat the number of ways in which it can be affected, without\r\nlosing its nature, will be greatly multiplied. Each of its parts\r\nwould consist of several bodies, and therefore (by Lemma vi.)\r\neach part would admit, without change to its nature, of quicker\r\nor slower motion, and would consequently be able to transmit its\r\nmotions more quickly or more slowly to the remaining parts. If\r\nwe further conceive a third kind of individuals composed of\r\nindividuals of this second kind, we shall find that they may be\r\naffected in a still greater number of ways without changing their\r\nactuality. We may easily proceed thus to infinity, and conceive\r\nthe whole of nature as one individual, whose parts, that is, all\r\nbodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change in the\r\nindividual as a whole. I should feel bound to explain and\r\ndemonstrate this point at more length, if I were writing a\r\nspecial treatise on body. But I have already said that such is\r\nnot my object; I have only touched on the question, because it\r\nenables me to prove easily that which I have in view.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4\u003e\r\nPOSTULATES\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI. The human body is composed of a number of individual\r\nparts, of diverse nature, each one of which is in itself\r\nextremely complex.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nII. Of the individual parts composing the human body some\r\nare fluid, some soft, some hard.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIII. The individual parts composing the human body, and\r\nconsequently the human body itself, are affected in a variety of\r\nways by external bodies.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIV. The human body stands in need for its preservation of a\r\nnumber of other bodies, by which it is continually, so to speak,\r\nregenerated.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nV. When the fluid part of the human body is determined by an\r\nexternal body to impinge often on another soft part, it changes\r\nthe surface of the latter, and, as it were, leaves the impression\r\nthereupon of the external body which impels it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nVI. The human body can move external bodies, and arrange\r\nthem in a variety of ways.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XIV. The human mind is capable of perceiving a great\r\nnumber of things, and is so in proportion as its body is capable\r\nof receiving a great number of impressions.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected in\r\nvery many ways by external bodies, and is capable in very many\r\nways of affecting external bodies. But (II. xii.) the human\r\nmind must perceive all that takes place in the human body; the\r\nhuman mind is, therefore, capable of perceiving a great number of\r\nthings, and is so in proportion, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XV. The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the\r\nhuman mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of\r\nideas.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The idea constituting the actual being of the human\r\nmind is the idea of the body (II. xiii.), which (Post. i.) is\r\ncomposed of a great number of complex individual parts. But\r\nthere is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part\r\nwhereof the body is composed (II. viii. Coroll.); therefore\r\n(II. vii.), the idea of the human body is composed of these\r\nnumerous ideas of its component parts. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XVI. The idea of every mode, in which the human body is\r\naffected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the human\r\nbody, and also the nature of the external body.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;All the modes, in which any given body is affected,\r\nfollow from the nature of the body affected, and also from the\r\nnature of the affecting body (by Ax. i., after the Coroll. of\r\nLemma iii.), wherefore their idea also necessarily (by I. Ax.\r\niv.) involves the nature of both bodies; therefore, the idea of\r\nevery mode, in which the human body is affected by external\r\nbodies, involves the nature of the human body and of the external\r\nbody. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary I.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows, first, that the human mind\r\nperceives the nature of a variety of bodies, together with the\r\nnature of its own.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary II.\u0026mdash;It follows, secondly, that the ideas, which we\r\nhave of external bodies, indicate rather the constitution of our\r\nown body than the nature of external bodies. I have amply\r\nillustrated this in the Appendix to Part I.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XVII. If the human body is affected in a manner which\r\ninvolves the nature of any external body, the human mind will\r\nregard the said external body as actually existing, or as present\r\nto itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to\r\nexclude the existence or the presence of the said external body.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This proposition is self\u0026mdash;evident, for so long as the\r\nhuman body continues to be thus affected, so long will the human\r\nmind (II. xii.) regard this modification of the body\u0026mdash;that is (by\r\nthe last Prop.), it will have the idea of the mode as actually\r\nexisting, and this idea involves the nature of the external body.\r\nIn other words, it will have the idea which does not exclude, but\r\npostulates the existence or presence of the nature of the\r\nexternal body; therefore the mind (by II. xvi., Coroll. i.) will\r\nregard the external body as actually existing, until it is\r\naffected, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;The mind is able to regard as present external\r\nbodies, by which the human body has once been affected, even\r\nthough they be no longer in existence or present.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the\r\nhuman body, so that they often impinge on the softer parts, they\r\nchange the surface of the last named (Post. v.); hence (Ax. ii.,\r\nafter the Coroll. of Lemma iii.) they are refracted therefrom in\r\na different manner from that which they followed before such\r\nchange; and, further, when afterwards they impinge on the new\r\nsurfaces by their own spontaneous movement, they will be\r\nrefracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelled\r\ntowards those surfaces by external bodies; consequently, they\r\nwill, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the human\r\nbody in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. xii.) will again\r\ntake cognizance\u0026mdash;that is (II. xvii.), the mind will again regard\r\nthe external body as present, and will do so, as often as the\r\nfluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid surfaces\r\nby their own spontaneous motion. Wherefore, although the\r\nexternal bodies, by which the human body has once been affected,\r\nbe no longer in existence, the mind will nevertheless regard them\r\nas present, as often as this action of the body is repeated.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case,\r\nthat we regard as present many things which are not. It is\r\npossible that the same result may be brought about by other\r\ncauses; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated\r\none possible explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out\r\nthe true cause. Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the\r\ntruth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, which\r\nrest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be\r\ncontroverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the human\r\nbody, as we feel it, exists (Coroll. after II. xiii.).\r\nFurthermore (II. vii. Coroll., II. xvi. Coroll. ii.), we clearly\r\nunderstand what is the difference between the idea, say, of\r\nPeter, which constitutes the essence of Peter\u0027s mind, and the\r\nidea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul. The\r\nformer directly answers to the essence of Peter\u0027s own body, and\r\nonly implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter\r\nindicates rather the disposition of Paul\u0027s body than the nature\r\nof Peter, and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul\u0027s body\r\nlasts, Paul\u0027s mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even\r\nthough he no longer exists. Further, to retain the usual\r\nphraseology, the modifications of the human body, of which the\r\nideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call\r\nthe images of things, though they do not recall the figure of\r\nthings. When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say\r\nthat it imagines. I will here draw attention to the fact, in\r\norder to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of the\r\nmind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error. The mind\r\ndoes not err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as\r\nit is regarded as being without the idea, which excludes the\r\nexistence of such things as it imagines to be present to it. If\r\nthe mind, while imagining non\u0026mdash;existent things as present to it,\r\nis at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, this\r\npower of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its\r\nnature, and not to a fault, especially if this faculty of\r\nimagination depend solely on its own nature\u0026mdash;that is (I. Def.\r\nvii.), if this faculty of imagination be free.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XVIII. If the human body has once been affected by two or\r\nmore bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines\r\nany of them, it will straightway remember the others also.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The mind (II. xvii. Coroll.) imagines any given body,\r\nbecause the human body is affected and disposed by the\r\nimpressions from an external body, in the same manner as it is\r\naffected when certain of its parts are acted on by the said\r\nexternal body; but (by our hypothesis) the body was then so\r\ndisposed, that the mind imagined two bodies at once; therefore,\r\nit will also in the second case imagine two bodies at once, and\r\nthe mind, when it imagines one, will straightway remember the\r\nother. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;We now clearly see what Memory is. It is simply a\r\ncertain association of ideas involving the nature of things\r\noutside the human body, which association arises in the mind\r\naccording to the order and association of the modifications\r\n(affectiones) of the human body. I say, first, it is an\r\nassociation of those ideas only, which involve the nature of\r\nthings outside the human body: not of ideas which answer to the\r\nnature of the said things: ideas of the modifications of the\r\nhuman body are, strictly speaking (II. xvi.), those which involve\r\nthe nature both of the human body and of external bodies. I say,\r\nsecondly, that this association arises according to the order and\r\nassociation of the modifications of the human body, in order to\r\ndistinguish it from that association of ideas, which arises from\r\nthe order of the intellect, whereby the mind perceives things\r\nthrough their primary causes, and which is in all men the same.\r\nAnd hence we can further clearly understand, why the mind from\r\nthe thought of one thing, should straightway arrive at the\r\nthought of another thing, which has no similarity with the first;\r\nfor instance, from the thought of the word pomum (an apple), a\r\nRoman would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit apple,\r\nwhich has no similitude with the articulate sound in question,\r\nnor anything in common with it, except that the body of the man\r\nhas often been affected by these two things; that is, that the\r\nman has often heard the word pomum, while he was looking at the\r\nfruit; similarly every man will go on from one thought to\r\nanother, according as his habit has ordered the images of things\r\nin his body. For a soldier, for instance, when he sees the\r\ntracks of a horse in sand, will at once pass from the thought of\r\na horse to the thought of a horseman, and thence to the thought\r\nof war, \u0026amp;c.; while a countryman will proceed from the thought of\r\na horse to the thought of a plough, a field, \u0026amp;c. Thus every man\r\nwill follow this or that train of thought, according as he has\r\nbeen in the habit of conjoining and associating the mental images\r\nof things in this or that manner.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XIX. The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does\r\nnot know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications\r\nwhereby the body is affected.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the\r\nhuman body (II. xiii.), which (II. ix.) is in God, in so far as\r\nhe is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing\r\nactually existing: or, inasmuch as (Post. iv.) the human body\r\nstands in need of very many bodies whereby it is, as it were,\r\ncontinually regenerated; and the order and connection of ideas\r\nis the same as the order and connection of causes (II. vii.);\r\nthis idea will therefore be in God, in so far as he is regarded\r\nas affected by the ideas of very many particular things. Thus\r\nGod has the idea of the human body, or knows the human body, in\r\nso far as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not in so\r\nfar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by\r\nII. xi. Coroll.), the human mind does not know the human body.\r\nBut the ideas of the modifications of body are in God, in so far\r\nas he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human\r\nmind perceives those modifications (II. xii.), and consequently\r\n(II. xvi.) the human body itself, and as actually existing;\r\ntherefore the mind perceives thus far only the human body.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XX. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in\r\nGod, following in God in the same manner, and being referred to\r\nGod in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human\r\nbody.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Thought is an attribute of God (II. i.); therefore\r\n(II. iii.) there must necessarily be in God the idea both of\r\nthought itself and of all its modifications, consequently also of\r\nthe human mind (II. xi.). Further, this idea or knowledge of the\r\nmind does not follow from God, in so far as he is infinite, but\r\nin so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual\r\nthing (II. ix.). But (II. vii.) the order and connection of\r\nideas is the same as the order and connection of causes;\r\ntherefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and is\r\nreferred to God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of\r\nthe body. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the\r\nsame way as the mind is united to the body.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;That the mind is united to the body we have shown from\r\nthe fact, that the body is the object of the mind (II. xii. and\r\nxiii.); and so for the same reason the idea of the mind must be\r\nunited with its object, that is, with the mind in the same manner\r\nas the mind is united to the body. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;This proposition is comprehended much more clearly from\r\nwhat we have said in the note to II. vii. We there showed that\r\nthe idea of body and body, that is, mind and body (II. xiii.),\r\nare one and the same individual conceived now under the attribute\r\nof thought, now under the attribute of extension; wherefore the\r\nidea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing,\r\nwhich is conceived under one and the same attribute, namely,\r\nthought. The idea of the mind, I repeat, and the mind itself are\r\nin God by the same necessity and follow from him from the same\r\npower of thinking. Strictly speaking, the idea of the mind, that\r\nis, the idea of an idea, is nothing but the distinctive quality\r\n(forma) of the idea in so far as it is conceived as a mode of\r\nthought without reference to the object; if a man knows\r\nanything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows it, and at\r\nthe same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on to\r\ninfinity. But I will treat of this hereafter.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXII. The human mind perceives not only the modifications\r\nof the body, but also the ideas of such modifications.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in God\r\nin the same manner, and are referred to God in the same manner,\r\nas the ideas of the said modifications. This is proved in the\r\nsame way as II. xx. But the ideas of the modifications of the\r\nbody are in the human mind (II. xii.), that is, in God, in so far\r\nas he constitutes the essence of the human mind; therefore the\r\nideas of these ideas will be in God, in so far as he has the\r\nknowledge or idea of the human mind, that is (II. xxi.), they\r\nwill be in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not\r\nonly the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such\r\nmodifications. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so far as\r\nit perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The idea or knowledge of the mind (II. xx.) follows in\r\nGod in the same manner, and is referred to God in the same\r\nmanner, as the idea or knowledge of the body. But since (II.\r\nxix.) the human mind does not know the human body itself, that is\r\n(II. xi. Coroll.), since the knowledge of the human body is not\r\nreferred to God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the\r\nhuman mind; therefore, neither is the knowledge of the mind\r\nreferred to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the\r\nhuman mind; therefore (by the same Coroll. II. xi.), the human\r\nmind thus far has no knowledge of itself. Further the ideas of\r\nthe modifications, whereby the body is affected, involve the\r\nnature of the human body itself (II. xvi.), that is (II. xiii.),\r\nthey agree with the nature of the mind; wherefore the knowledge\r\nof these ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the mind; but\r\n(by the last Prop.) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human\r\nmind itself; wherefore the human mind thus far only has\r\nknowledge of itself. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXIV. The human mind does not involve an adequate\r\nknowledge of the parts composing the human body.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The parts composing the human body do not belong to\r\nthe essence of that body, except in so far as they communicate\r\ntheir motions to one another in a certain fixed relation (Def.\r\nafter Lemma iii.), not in so far as they can be regarded as\r\nindividuals without relation to the human body. The parts of the\r\nhuman body are highly complex individuals (Post. i.), whose\r\nparts (Lemma iv.) can be separated from the human body without in\r\nany way destroying the nature and distinctive quality of the\r\nlatter, and they can communicate their motions (Ax. i., after\r\nLemma iii.) to other bodies in another relation; therefore (II.\r\niii.) the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God,\r\ninasmuch (II. ix.) as he is regarded as affected by another idea\r\nof a particular thing, which particular thing is prior in the\r\norder of nature to the aforesaid part (II. vii.). We may affirm\r\nthe same thing of each part of each individual composing the\r\nhuman body; therefore, the knowledge of each part composing the\r\nhuman body is in God, in so far as he is affected by very many\r\nideas of things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the\r\nhuman body only, in other words, the idea which constitutes the\r\nnature of the human mind (II. xiii); therefore (II. xi.\r\nCoroll.), the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge\r\nof the human body. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXV. The idea of each modification of the human body does\r\nnot involve an adequate knowledge of the external body.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;We have shown that the idea of a modification of the\r\nhuman body involves the nature of an external body, in so far as\r\nthat external body conditions the human body in a given manner.\r\nBut, in so far as the external body is an individual, which has\r\nno reference to the human body, the knowledge or idea thereof is\r\nin God (II. ix.), in so far as God is regarded as affected by the\r\nidea of a further thing, which (II. vii.) is naturally prior to\r\nthe said external body. Wherefore an adequate knowledge of the\r\nexternal body is not in God, in so far as he has the idea of the\r\nmodification of the human body; in other words, the idea of the\r\nmodification of the human body does not involve an adequate\r\nknowledge of the external body. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXVI. The human mind does not perceive any external body\r\nas actually existing, except through the ideas of the\r\nmodifications of its own body.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;If the human body is in no way affected by a given\r\nexternal body, then (II. vii.) neither is the idea of the human\r\nbody, in other words, the human mind, affected in any way by the\r\nidea of the existence of the said external body, nor does it in\r\nany manner perceive its existence. But, in so far as the human\r\nbody is affected in any way by a given external body, thus far\r\n(II. xvi. and Coroll.) it perceives that external body. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;In so far as the human mind imagines an external\r\nbody, it has not an adequate knowledge thereof.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;When the human mind regards external bodies through\r\nthe ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say that it\r\nimagines (see II. xvii. note); now the mind can only imagine\r\nexternal bodies as actually existing. Therefore (by II. xxv.),\r\nin so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has not an\r\nadequate knowledge of them. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXVII. The idea of each modification of the human body\r\ndoes not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Every idea of a modification of the human body\r\ninvolves the nature of the human body, in so far as the human\r\nbody is regarded as affected in a given manner (II. xvi.). But,\r\ninasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected\r\nin many other ways, the idea of the said modification, \u0026amp;c.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXVIII. The ideas of the modifications of the human body,\r\nin so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not\r\nclear and distinct, but confused.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The ideas of the modifications of the human body\r\ninvolve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies\r\n(II. xvi.); they must involve the nature not only of the human\r\nbody but also of its parts; for the modifications are modes\r\n(Post. iii.), whereby the parts of the human body, and,\r\nconsequently, the human body as a whole are affected. But (by\r\nII. xxiv., xxv.) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as\r\nalso of the parts composing the human body, is not in God, in so\r\nfar as he is regarded as affected by the human mind, but in so\r\nfar as he is regarded as affected by other ideas. These ideas of\r\nmodifications, in so far as they are referred to the human mind\r\nalone, are as consequences without premisses, in other words,\r\nconfused ideas. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;The idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind\r\nis, in the same manner, proved not to be, when considered in\r\nitself alone, clear and distinct; as also is the case with the\r\nidea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the\r\nmodifications of the human body, in so far as they are referred\r\nto the mind only, as everyone may easily see.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXIX. The idea of the idea of each modification of the\r\nhuman body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human\r\nmind.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The idea of a modification of the human body (II.\r\nxxvii.) does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body,\r\nin other words, does not adequately express its nature; that is\r\n(II. xiii.) it does not agree with the nature of the mind\r\nadequately; therefore (I. Ax. vi) the idea of this idea does not\r\nadequately express the nature of the human mind, or does not\r\ninvolve an adequate knowledge thereof.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows that the human mind, when it\r\nperceives things after the common order of nature, has not an\r\nadequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself,\r\nof its own body, and of external bodies. For the mind does not\r\nknow itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the\r\nmodifications of body (II. xxiii.). It only perceives its own\r\nbody (II. xix.) through the ideas of the modifications, and only\r\nperceives external bodies through the same means; thus, in so\r\nfar as it has such ideas of modification, it has not an adequate\r\nknowledge of itself (II. xxix.), nor of its own body (II.\r\nxxvii.), nor of external bodies (II. xxv.), but only a\r\nfragmentary and confused knowledge thereof (II. xxviii. and\r\nnote). Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;I say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate but\r\nonly a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and of\r\nexternal bodies, whenever it perceives things after the common\r\norder of nature; that is, whenever it is determined from\r\nwithout, namely, by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to\r\nregard this or that; not at such times as it is determined from\r\nwithin, that is, by the fact of regarding several things at once,\r\nto understand their points of agreement, difference, and\r\ncontrast. Whenever it is determined in anywise from within, it\r\nregards things clearly and distinctly, as I will show below.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXX. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the\r\nduration of our body.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The duration of our body does not depend on its\r\nessence (II. Ax. i.), nor on the absolute nature of God (I.\r\nxxi.). But (I. xxviii.) it is conditioned to exist and operate\r\nby causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist and\r\noperate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes, these\r\nlast again being conditioned by others, and so on to infinity.\r\nThe duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of\r\nnature, or the constitution of things. Now, however a thing may\r\nbe constituted, the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God,\r\nin so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so far as\r\nhe has the idea of the human body only. (II. ix. Coroll.)\r\nWherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in God\r\nvery inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constituting\r\nthe nature of the human mind; that is (II. xi. Coroll.), this\r\nknowledge is very inadequate to our mind. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the\r\nduration of particular things external to ourselves.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Every particular thing, like the human body, must be\r\nconditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in a\r\nfixed and definite relation; this other particular thing must\r\nlikewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity. (I.\r\nxxviii.) As we have shown in the foregoing proposition, from\r\nthis common property of particular things, we have only a very\r\ninadequate knowledge of the duration of our body; we must draw a\r\nsimilar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular\r\nthings, namely, that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge\r\nof the duration thereof. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows that all particular things are\r\ncontingent and perishable. For we can have no adequate idea of\r\ntheir duration (by the last Prop.), and this is what we must\r\nunderstand by the contingency and perishableness of things. (I.\r\nxxxiii., Note i.) For (I. xxix.), except in this sense, nothing\r\nis contingent.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God,\r\nare true.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;All ideas which are in God agree in every respect with\r\ntheir objects (II. vii. Coroll.), therefore (I. Ax. vi.) they are\r\nall true. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXIII. There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes\r\nthem to be called false.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive\r\nmode of thinking, which should constitute the distinctive quality\r\nof falsehood. Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God (II.\r\nxxxii.); external to God it cannot be or be conceived (I. xv.).\r\nTherefore there is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to\r\nbe called false. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXIV. Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and\r\nperfect, is true.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;When we say that an idea in us is adequate and\r\nperfect, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that the idea\r\nis adequate and perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes the\r\nessence of our mind; consequently (II. xxxii.), we say that such\r\nan idea is true. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXV. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge,\r\nwhich inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them\r\nto be called false (II. xxxiii.); but falsity cannot consist in\r\nsimple privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err and to\r\nbe mistaken), neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, for\r\nignorance and error are not identical; wherefore it consists in\r\nthe privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or\r\nconfused ideas involve. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;In the note to II. xvii. I explained how error consists\r\nin the privation of knowledge, but in order to throw more light\r\non the subject I will give an example. For instance, men are\r\nmistaken in thinking themselves free; their opinion is made up\r\nof consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of the\r\ncauses by which they are conditioned. Their idea of freedom,\r\ntherefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for their\r\nactions. As for their saying that human actions depend on the\r\nwill, this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond\r\nthereto. What the will is, and how it moves the body, they none\r\nof them know; those who boast of such knowledge, and feign\r\ndwellings and habitations for the soul, are wont to provoke\r\neither laughter or disgust. So, again, when we look at the sun,\r\nwe imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet;\r\nthis error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact\r\nthat, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun\u0027s true\r\ndistance or the cause of the fancy. For although we afterwards\r\nlearn, that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of\r\nthe earth\u0027s diameters, we none the less shall fancy it to be near;\r\nfor we do not imagine the sun as near us, because we are\r\nignorant of its true distance, but because the modification of\r\nour body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our said\r\nbody is affected thereby.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXVI. Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same\r\nnecessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;All ideas are in God (I. xv.), and in so far as they\r\nare referred to God are true (II. xxxii.) and (II. vii. Coroll.)\r\nadequate; therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate,\r\nexcept in respect to a particular mind (cf. II. xxiv. and\r\nxxviii.); therefore all ideas, whether adequate or inadequate,\r\nfollow by the same necessity (II. vi.). Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXVII. That which is common to all (cf. Lemma II.,\r\nabove), and which is equally in a part and in the whole, does not\r\nconstitute the essence of any particular thing.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that it\r\nconstitutes the essence of some particular thing; for instance,\r\nthe essence of B. Then (II. Def. ii.) it cannot without B either\r\nexist or be conceived; but this is against our hypothesis.\r\nTherefore it does not appertain to B\u0027s essence, nor does it\r\nconstitute the essence of any particular thing. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXVIII. Those things, which are common to all, and which\r\nare equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived\r\nexcept adequately.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Let A be something, which is common to all bodies, and\r\nwhich is equally present in the part of any given body and in the\r\nwhole. I say A cannot be conceived except adequately. For the\r\nidea thereof in God will necessarily be adequate (II. vii.\r\nCoroll.), both in so far as God has the idea of the human body,\r\nand also in so far as he has the idea of the modifications of the\r\nhuman body, which (II. xvi., xxv., xxvii.) involve in part the\r\nnature of the human body and the nature of external bodies; that\r\nis (II. xii., xiii.), the idea in God will necessarily be\r\nadequate, both in so far as he constitutes the human mind, and in\r\nso far as he has the ideas, which are in the human mind.\r\nTherefore the mind (II. xi. Coroll.) necessarily perceives A\r\nadequately, and has this adequate perception, both in so far as\r\nit perceives itself, and in so far as it perceives its own or any\r\nexternal body, nor can A be conceived in any other manner.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary\u0026mdash;Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or\r\nnotions common to all men; for (by Lemma ii.) all bodies agree\r\nin certain respects, which (by the foregoing Prop.) must be\r\nadequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXIX. That, which is common to and a property of the\r\nhuman body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human\r\nbody, and which is present equally in each part of either, or in\r\nthe whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;If A be that, which is common to and a property of the\r\nhuman body and external bodies, and equally present in the human\r\nbody and in the said external bodies, in each part of each\r\nexternal body and in the whole, there will be an adequate idea of\r\nA in God (II. vii. Coroll.), both in so far as he has the idea of\r\nthe human body, and in so far as he has the ideas of the given\r\nexternal bodies. Let it now be granted, that the human body is\r\naffected by an external body through that, which it has in common\r\ntherewith, namely, A; the idea of this modification will involve\r\nthe property A (II. xvi.), and therefore (II. vii. Coroll.) the\r\nidea of this modification, in so far as it involves the property\r\nA, will be adequate in God, in so far as God is affected by the\r\nidea of the human body; that is (II. xiii.), in so far as he\r\nconstitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore (II. xi.\r\nCoroll.) this idea is also adequate in the human mind. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows that the mind is fitted to\r\nperceive adequately more things, in proportion as its body has\r\nmore in common with other bodies.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XL. Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which\r\nare therein adequate, are also themselves adequate.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This proposition is self\u0026mdash;evident. For when we say\r\nthat an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are\r\ntherein adequate, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that\r\nan idea is in the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause, not\r\nin so far as he is infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by\r\nthe ideas of very many particular things, but only in so far as\r\nhe constitutes the essence of the human mind.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote I.\u0026mdash;I have thus set forth the cause of those notions,\r\nwhich are common to all men, and which form the basis of our\r\nratiocination. But there are other causes of certain axioms or\r\nnotions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this\r\nmethod of ours; for it would thus appear what notions are more\r\nuseful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at\r\nall. Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all\r\nmen, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who\r\nare unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those which are\r\nill\u0026mdash;founded. Again we should discern whence the notions called\r\nsecondary derived their origin, and consequently the axioms on\r\nwhich they are founded, and other points of interest connected\r\nwith these questions. But I have decided to pass over the\r\nsubject here, partly because I have set it aside for another\r\ntreatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by\r\ntoo great prolixity. Nevertheless, in order not to omit anything\r\nnecessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes, whence\r\nare derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being,\r\nThing, Something. These terms arose from the fact, that the\r\nhuman body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming\r\na certain number of images (what an image is I explained in the\r\nII. xvii. note) within itself at the same time; if this number\r\nbe exceeded, the images will begin to be confused; if this\r\nnumber of images, of which the body is capable of forming\r\ndistinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all will become\r\nentirely confused one with another. This being so, it is evident\r\n(from II. Prop. xvii. Coroll., and xviii.) that the human mind\r\ncan distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as its body\r\ncan form images simultaneously. When the images become quite\r\nconfused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies\r\nconfusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as\r\nit were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of\r\nBeing, Thing, \u0026amp;c. The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact\r\nthat images are not always equally vivid, and from other\r\nanalogous causes, which there is no need to explain here; for\r\nthe purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to\r\nconsider one only. All may be reduced to this, that these terms\r\nrepresent ideas in the highest degree confused. From similar\r\ncauses arise those notions, which we call general, such as man,\r\nhorse, dog, \u0026amp;c. They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many\r\nimages, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the\r\nhuman mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not indeed\r\nutterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small\r\ndifferences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, \u0026amp;c.) and\r\ntheir definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in\r\nwhich all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by\r\nthem, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the said\r\nindividuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses\r\nby the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of\r\nparticular individuals. For, as we have said, it is unable to\r\nimagine the definite number of individuals. We must, however,\r\nbear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all\r\nmen in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the\r\npoint varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and\r\nwhich the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For instance,\r\nthose who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of\r\nman, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect\r\nstature; those who have been accustomed to regard some other\r\nattribute, will form a different general image of man, for\r\ninstance, that man is a laughing animal, a two\u0026mdash;footed animal\r\nwithout feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases,\r\neveryone will form general images of things according to the\r\nhabit of his body.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers,\r\nwho seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed\r\nof them, so many controversies should have arisen.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote II.\u0026mdash;From all that has been said above it is clear, that\r\nwe, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions:\u0026mdash;(1.)\r\nFrom particular things represented to our intellect\r\nfragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses\r\n(II. xxix. Coroll.); I have settled to call such perceptions by\r\nthe name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience.[4]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[4] A Baconian phrase. Nov. Org. Aph. 100. [Pollock, p. 126, n.]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n(2.) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard\r\ncertain words we remember things and form certain ideas\r\nconcerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things\r\n(II. xviii. note). I shall call both these ways of regarding\r\nthings knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination.\r\n(3.) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and\r\nadequate ideas of the properties of things (II. xxxviii. Coroll.,\r\nxxxix. and Coroll. and xl.); this I call reason and knowledge of\r\nthe second kind. Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is,\r\nas I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which we\r\nwill call intuition. This kind of knowledge proceeds from an\r\nadequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of\r\nGod to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I will\r\nillustrate all three kinds of knowledge by a single example.\r\nThree numbers are given for finding a fourth, which shall be to\r\nthe third as the second is to the first. Tradesmen without\r\nhesitation multiply the second by the third, and divide the\r\nproduct by the first; either because they have not forgotten the\r\nrule which they received from a master without any proof, or\r\nbecause they have often made trial of it with simple numbers, or\r\nby virtue of the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the\r\nseventh book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the general property\r\nof proportionals.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut with very simple numbers there is no need of this. For\r\ninstance, one, two, three, being given, everyone can see that the\r\nfourth proportional is six; and this is much clearer, because we\r\ninfer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio,\r\nwhich the first bears to the second.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLI. Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of\r\nfalsity, knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily\r\ntrue.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;To knowledge of the first kind we have (in the\r\nforegoing note) assigned all those ideas, which are inadequate\r\nand confused; therefore this kind of knowledge is the only\r\nsource of falsity (II. xxxv.). Furthermore, we assigned to the\r\nsecond and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are\r\nadequate; therefore these kinds are necessarily true (II.\r\nxxxiv.). Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLII. Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not\r\nknowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true\r\nfrom the false.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This proposition is self\u0026mdash;evident. He, who knows how\r\nto distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate idea\r\nof true and false. That is (II. xl., note ii.), he must know the\r\ntrue and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLIII. He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that\r\nhe has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing\r\nperceived.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in God,\r\nin so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind\r\n(II. xi. Coroll.). Let us suppose that there is in God, in so\r\nfar as he is displayed through the human mind, an adequate idea,\r\nA. The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God, and be\r\nreferred to him in the same way as the idea A (by II. xx.,\r\nwhereof the proof is of universal application). But the idea A\r\nis supposed to be referred to God, in so far as he is displayed\r\nthrough the human mind; therefore, the idea of the idea A must\r\nbe referred to God in the same manner; that is (by II. xi.\r\nCoroll.), the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the mind,\r\nwhich has the adequate idea A; therefore he, who has an adequate\r\nidea or knows a thing truly (II. xxxiv.), must at the same time\r\nhave an adequate idea or true knowledge of his knowledge; that\r\nis, obviously, he must be assured. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;I explained in the note to II. xxi. what is meant by\r\nthe idea of an idea; but we may remark that the foregoing\r\nproposition is in itself sufficiently plain. No one, who has a\r\ntrue idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest\r\ncertainty. For to have a true idea is only another expression\r\nfor knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible. No one,\r\nindeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is\r\nsomething lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of\r\nthinking\u0026mdash;namely, the very act of understanding. And who, I ask,\r\ncan know that he understands anything, unless he do first\r\nunderstand it? In other words, who can know that he is sure of a\r\nthing, unless he be first sure of that thing? Further, what can\r\nthere be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a\r\nstandard of truth? Even as light displays both itself and\r\ndarkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI think I have thus sufficiently answered these\r\nquestions\u0026mdash;namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a false\r\nidea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a\r\ntrue idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea\r\n(since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark);\r\nconsequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have any\r\nadvantage over him who has only false ideas. Further, how comes\r\nit that men have false ideas? Lastly, how can anyone be sure,\r\nthat he has ideas which agree with their objects? These\r\nquestions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently\r\nanswered. The difference between a true idea and a false idea is\r\nplain: from what was said in II. xxxv., the former is related to\r\nthe latter as being is to not\u0026mdash;being. The causes of falsity I\r\nhave set forth very clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv. with the\r\nnote. From what is there stated, the difference between a man\r\nwho has true ideas, and a man who has only false ideas, is made\r\napparent. As for the last question\u0026mdash;as to how a man can be sure\r\nthat he has ideas that agree with their objects, I have just\r\npointed out, with abundant clearness, that his knowledge arises\r\nfrom the simple fact, that he has an idea which corresponds with\r\nits object\u0026mdash;in other words, that truth is its own standard. We\r\nmay add that our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is\r\npart of the infinite intellect of God (II. xi. Coroll.);\r\ntherefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as\r\nnecessarily true as the ideas of God.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things\r\nas contingent, but as necessary.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly\r\n(II. xli.), namely (I. Ax. vi.), as they are in themselves\u0026mdash;that\r\nis (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but as necessary. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary I.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows, that it is only through our\r\nimagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the\r\nfuture or the past, as contingent.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;How this way of looking at things arises, I will\r\nbriefly explain. We have shown above (II. xvii. and Coroll.)\r\nthat the mind always regards things as present to itself, even\r\nthough they be not in existence, until some causes arise which\r\nexclude their existence and presence. Further (II. xviii.), we\r\nshowed that, if the human body has once been affected by two\r\nexternal bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards\r\nimagines one of the said external bodies, will straightway\r\nremember the other\u0026mdash;that is, it will regard both as present to\r\nitself, unless there arise causes which exclude their existence\r\nand presence. Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from\r\nthe fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than\r\nothers, some more quickly, some at equal speed. Thus, let us\r\nsuppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in\r\nthe morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening; then, that\r\ntoday he again sees Peter in the morning. It is evident, from\r\nII. Prop. xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he\r\nwill imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the\r\nsky, as it did when he saw it on the preceding day; in other\r\nwords, he will imagine a complete day, and, together with his\r\nimagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, he\r\nwill imagine Paul; and with evening, he will imagine Simon\u0026mdash;that\r\nis, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation\r\nto a future time; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the\r\nevening, he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time, by\r\nimagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a past\r\ntime. If it should at any time happen, that on some other\r\nevening the child should see James instead of Simon, he will, on\r\nthe following morning, associate with his imagination of evening\r\nsometimes Simon, sometimes James, not both together: for the\r\nchild is supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them,\r\nnot both together. His imagination will therefore waver; and,\r\nwith the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first\r\none, then the other\u0026mdash;that is, he will imagine them in the future,\r\nneither of them as certain, but both as contingent. This\r\nwavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination\r\nbe concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing in\r\nrelation to time past or time present: consequently, we may\r\nimagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time\r\npresent, past, or future.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary II.\u0026mdash;It is in the nature of reason to perceive\r\nthings under a certain form of eternity (sub quâdam æternitatis\r\nspecie).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as\r\ncontingent, but as necessary (II. xliv.). Reason perceives this\r\nnecessity of things (II. xli.) truly\u0026mdash;that is (I. Ax. vi.), as it\r\nis in itself. But (I. xvi.) this necessity of things is the very\r\nnecessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it is in the\r\nnature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity.\r\nWe may add that the bases of reason are the notions (II.\r\nxxxviii.), which answer to things common to all, and which (II.\r\nxxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any particular thing:\r\nwhich must therefore be conceived without any relation to time,\r\nunder a certain form of eternity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLV. Every idea of every body, or of every particular\r\nthing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and\r\ninfinite essence of God.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The idea of a particular thing actually existing\r\nnecessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the\r\nsaid thing (II. viii.). Now particular things cannot be\r\nconceived without God (I. xv.); but, inasmuch as (II. vi.) they\r\nhave God for their cause, in so far as he is regarded under the\r\nattribute of which the things in question are modes, their ideas\r\nmust necessarily involve (I. Ax. iv.) the conception of the\r\nattributes of those ideas\u0026mdash;that is (I. vi.), the eternal and\r\ninfinite essence of God. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;By existence I do not here mean duration\u0026mdash;that is,\r\nexistence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as a\r\ncertain form of quantity. I am speaking of the very nature of\r\nexistence, which is assigned to particular things, because they\r\nfollow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal\r\nnecessity of God\u0027s nature (I. xvi.). I am speaking, I repeat, of\r\nthe very existence of particular things, in so far as they are in\r\nGod. For although each particular thing be conditioned by\r\nanother particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force\r\nwhereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from\r\nthe eternal necessity of God\u0027s nature (cf. I. xxiv. Coroll.).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLVI. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of\r\nGod which every idea involves is adequate and perfect.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The proof of the last proposition is universal; and\r\nwhether a thing be considered as a part or a whole, the idea\r\nthereof, whether of the whole or of a part (by the last Prop.),\r\nwill involve God\u0027s eternal and infinite essence. Wherefore,\r\nthat, which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence\r\nof God, is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the\r\nwhole; therefore (II. xxxviii.) this knowledge will be adequate.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the\r\neternal and infinite essence of God.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The human mind has ideas (II. xxii.), from which (II.\r\nxxiii.) it perceives itself and its own body (II. xix.) and\r\nexternal bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. i. and II. xvii.) as actually\r\nexisting; therefore (II. xlv. and xlvi.) it has an adequate\r\nknowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the\r\neternity of God are known to all. Now as all things are in God,\r\nand are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer\r\nmany things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that\r\nthird kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II. xl.,\r\nand of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to\r\nspeak in Part V. Men have not so clear a knowledge of God as\r\nthey have of general notions, because they are unable to imagine\r\nGod as they do bodies, and also because they have associated the\r\nname God with images of things that they are in the habit of\r\nseeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing, being, as they\r\nare, men, and continually affected by external bodies. Many\r\nerrors, in truth, can be traced to this head, namely, that we do\r\nnot apply names to things rightly. For instance, when a man says\r\nthat the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its\r\ncircumference are not equal, he then, at all events, assuredly\r\nattaches a meaning to the word circle different from that\r\nassigned by mathematicians. So again, when men make mistakes in\r\ncalculation, they have one set of figures in their mind, and\r\nanother on the paper. If we could see into their minds, they do\r\nnot make a mistake; they seem to do so, because we think, that\r\nthey have the same numbers in their mind as they have on the\r\npaper. If this were not so, we should not believe them to be in\r\nerror, any more than I thought that a man was in error, whom I\r\nlately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into a\r\nneighbour\u0027s hen, for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear.\r\nVery many controversies have arisen from the fact, that men do\r\nnot rightly explain their meaning, or do not rightly interpret\r\nthe meaning of others. For, as a matter of fact, as they flatly\r\ncontradict themselves, they assume now one side, now another, of\r\nthe argument, so as to oppose the opinions, which they consider\r\nmistaken and absurd in their opponents.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLVIII. In the mind there is no absolute or free will;\r\nbut the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which\r\nhas also been determined by another cause, and this last by\r\nanother cause, and so on to infinity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (II.\r\nxi.), therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions (I.\r\nxvii. Coroll. ii.); in other words, it cannot have an absolute\r\nfaculty of positive or negative volition; but (by I. xxviii.) it\r\nmust be determined by a cause, which has also been determined by\r\nanother cause, and this last by another, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;In the same way it is proved, that there is in the mind\r\nno absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, \u0026amp;c.\r\nWhence it follows, that these and similar faculties are either\r\nentirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms,\r\nsuch as we are accustomed to put together from particular things.\r\nThus the intellect and the will stand in the same relation to\r\nthis or that idea, or this or that volition, as \"lapidity\" to\r\nthis or that stone, or as \"man\" to Peter and Paul. The cause\r\nwhich leads men to consider themselves free has been set forth in\r\nthe Appendix to Part I. But, before I proceed further, I would\r\nhere remark that, by the will to affirm and decide, I mean the\r\nfaculty, not the desire. I mean, I repeat, the faculty, whereby\r\nthe mind affirms or denies what is true or false, not the desire,\r\nwherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given thing.\r\nAfter we have proved, that these faculties of ours are general\r\nnotions, which cannot be distinguished from the particular\r\ninstances on which they are based, we must inquire whether\r\nvolitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things.\r\nWe must inquire, I say, whether there is in the mind any\r\naffirmation or negation beyond that, which the idea, in so far as\r\nit is an idea, involves. On which subject see the following\r\nproposition, and II. Def. iii., lest the idea of pictures should\r\nsuggest itself. For by ideas I do not mean images such as are\r\nformed at the back of the eye, or in the midst of the brain, but\r\nthe conceptions of thought.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLIX. There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and\r\nnegation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea,\r\ninvolves.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive\r\nor negative volition, but only particular volitions, namely, this\r\nor that affirmation, and this or that negation. Now let us\r\nconceive a particular volition, namely, the mode of thinking\r\nwhereby the mind affirms, that the three interior angles of a\r\ntriangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmation\r\ninvolves the conception or idea of a triangle, that is, without\r\nthe idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived. It is the same\r\nthing to say, that the concept A must involve the concept B, as\r\nit is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B. Further,\r\nthis affirmation cannot be made (II. Ax. iii.) without the idea\r\nof a triangle. Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor be\r\nconceived, without the idea of a triangle. Again, this idea of a\r\ntriangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, that its\r\nthree interior angles are equal to two right angles. Wherefore,\r\nand vice versâ, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be\r\nconceived without this affirmation, therefore, this affirmation\r\nbelongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle, and is nothing\r\nbesides. What we have said of this volition (inasmuch as we have\r\nselected it at random) may be said of any other volition, namely,\r\nthat it is nothing but an idea. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Will and understanding are one and the same.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Will and understanding are nothing beyond the\r\nindividual volitions and ideas (II. xlviii. and note). But a\r\nparticular volition and a particular idea are one and the same\r\n(by the foregoing Prop.); therefore, will and understanding are\r\none and the same. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;We have thus removed the cause which is commonly\r\nassigned for error. For we have shown above, that falsity\r\nconsists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas\r\nwhich are fragmentary and confused. Wherefore, a false idea,\r\ninasmuch as it is false, does not involve certainty. When we\r\nsay, then, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he\r\nhas no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain,\r\nbut only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is\r\nfalse, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which should cause his\r\nimagination to waver (see II. xliv. note). Thus, although the\r\nman be assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never say\r\nthat he is certain. For by certainty we mean something positive\r\n(II. xliii. and note), not merely the absence of doubt.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHowever, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully\r\nexplained, I will draw attention to a few additional points, and\r\nI will furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced\r\nagainst our doctrine. Lastly, in order to remove every scruple,\r\nI have thought it worth while to point out some of the\r\nadvantages, which follow therefrom. I say \"some,\" for they will\r\nbe better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth\r\npart.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to\r\nmake an accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of\r\nthe mind, and the images of things which we imagine. It is\r\nfurther necessary that they should distinguish between idea and\r\nwords, whereby we signify things. These three\u0026mdash;namely, images,\r\nwords, and ideas\u0026mdash;are by many persons either entirely confused\r\ntogether, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care,\r\nand hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely\r\nnecessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both for\r\nphilosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life. Those\r\nwho think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by\r\ncontact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas\r\nof those things, whereof we can form no mental picture, are not\r\nideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of\r\nour will; they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate\r\npictures on a panel, and, filled with this misconception, do not\r\nsee that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an\r\naffirmation or negation. Again, those who confuse words with\r\nideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, think that\r\nthey can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm, or\r\ndeny. This misconception will easily be laid aside by one, who\r\nreflects on the nature of knowledge, and seeing that it in no\r\nwise involves the conception of extension, will therefore clearly\r\nunderstand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does not\r\nconsist in the image of anything, nor in words. The essence of\r\nwords and images is put together by bodily motions, which in no\r\nwise involve the conception of thought.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThese few words on this subject will suffice: I will\r\ntherefore pass on to consider the objections, which may be raised\r\nagainst our doctrine. Of these, the first is advanced by those,\r\nwho think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding,\r\nand that therefore it is different therefrom. The reason for\r\ntheir holding the belief, that the will has wider scope than the\r\nunderstanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of an\r\nincrease in their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or\r\nnegation, in order to assent to an infinity of things which we do\r\nnot perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their\r\nfaculty of understanding. The will is thus distinguished from\r\nthe intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite.\r\nSecondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us\r\nespecially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment\r\nbefore assenting to things which we perceive; this is confirmed\r\nby the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as he\r\nperceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or dissents.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFor instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not\r\ntherefore admit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not\r\ndeceived, unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does\r\nexist. Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by\r\nexperience, than that the will or faculty of assent is free and\r\ndifferent from the faculty of understanding. Thirdly, it may be\r\nobjected that one affirmation does not apparently contain more\r\nreality than another; in other words, that we do not seem to\r\nneed for affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power\r\nthan for affirming, that what is false is true. We have,\r\nhowever, seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than\r\nanother, for as objects are some more excellent than others, so\r\nalso are the ideas of them some more excellent than others; this\r\nalso seems to point to a difference between the understanding and\r\nthe will. Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from\r\nfree will, what will happen if the incentives to action are\r\nequally balanced, as in the case of Buridan\u0027s ass? Will he\r\nperish of hunger and thirst? If I say that he would, I shall\r\nseem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather\r\nthan an actual man. If I say that he would not, he would then\r\ndetermine his own action, and would consequently possess the\r\nfaculty of going and doing whatever he liked. Other objections\r\nmight also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence\r\neverything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the\r\ntask of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as\r\npossible.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTo the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will\r\nhas a wider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding\r\nbe meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will\r\nhas a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of\r\nforming conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition\r\nshould be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling:\r\nfor, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an\r\ninfinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot\r\naffirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by the\r\nsame faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an\r\ninfinite number of bodies. If it be said that there is an\r\ninfinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer,\r\nthat we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor,\r\nconsequently, by any faculty of volition. But, it may still be\r\nurged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive\r\nthem, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of\r\nperception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have\r\nalready. This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring\r\nit about that we should understand an infinite number of other\r\nentities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater\r\nunderstanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that\r\nwhich we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities.\r\nWe have shown that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby we\r\nexplain all particular volitions\u0026mdash;in other words, that which is\r\ncommon to all such volitions.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAs, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or\r\nuniversal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be\r\nwondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself\r\ninto the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding: for\r\nwhat is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an\r\ninfinite number of individuals.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTo the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a\r\nfree power of suspending our judgment: for, when we say that\r\nanyone suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that\r\nhe does not perceive the matter in question adequately.\r\nSuspension of judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a\r\nperception, and not free will. In order to illustrate the point,\r\nlet us suppose a boy imagining a horse, and perceive nothing\r\nelse. Inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of the\r\nhorse (II. xvii. Coroll.), and the boy does not perceive anything\r\nwhich would exclude the existence of the horse, he will\r\nnecessarily regard the horse as present: he will not be able to\r\ndoubt of its existence, although he be not certain thereof. We\r\nhave daily experience of such a state of things in dreams; and I\r\ndo not suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that,\r\nwhile he is dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his\r\njudgment concerning the things in his dream, and bringing it\r\nabout that he should not dream those things, which he dreams that\r\nhe sees; yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we\r\nsuspend our judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFurther, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as\r\nactual perception extends\u0026mdash;that is, I grant that the mind\u0027s\r\nimaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II.\r\nxvii. note); but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of\r\nperception, make any affirmation. For what is the perception of\r\na winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings? If the\r\nmind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would\r\nregard the same as present to itself: it would have no reasons\r\nfor doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless\r\nthe imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which\r\nprecludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mind\r\nperceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is\r\ninadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the\r\nexistence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on the\r\nsubject.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI think that I have anticipated my answer to the third\r\nobjection, namely, that the will is something universal which is\r\npredicated of all ideas, and that it only signifies that which is\r\ncommon to all ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate\r\nessence must, therefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in the\r\nabstract, be in every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the\r\nsame in all, not in so far as it is considered as constituting\r\nthe idea\u0027s essence: for, in this respect, particular\r\naffirmations differ one from the other, as much as do ideas. For\r\ninstance, the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle,\r\ndiffers from that which involves the idea of a triangle, as much\r\nas the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFurther, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal\r\npower of thinking, to affirm that that which is true is true, and\r\nto affirm that that which is false is true. These two\r\naffirmations, if we regard the mind, are in the same relation to\r\none another as being and not\u0026mdash;being; for there is nothing\r\npositive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of\r\nfalsehood (II. xxxv. note, and xlvii. note).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWe must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when\r\nwe confuse universals with singulars, and the entities of reason\r\nand abstractions with realities. As for the fourth objection, I\r\nam quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium\r\ndescribed (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst,\r\na certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant from\r\nhim) would die of hunger and thirst. If I am asked, whether such\r\nan one should not rather be considered an ass than a man; I\r\nanswer, that I do not know, neither do I know how a man should be\r\nconsidered, who hangs himself, or how we should consider\r\nchildren, fools, madmen, \u0026amp;c.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this\r\ndoctrine as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered\r\nfrom what has been said. The doctrine is good,\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the\r\ndecree of God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so\r\nmuch the more, as we perform more perfect actions and more and\r\nmore understand God. Such a doctrine not only completely\r\ntranquilizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highest\r\nhappiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of\r\nGod, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid\r\nus. We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true\r\nestimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God\r\nwith high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as\r\nfor having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and the\r\nservice of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct\r\nourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which\r\nare not in our power, and do not follow from our nature. For it\r\nshows us, that we should await and endure fortune\u0027s smiles or\r\nfrowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the\r\neternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from\r\nthe essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two\r\nright angles.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches\r\nus to hate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to\r\nbe angry with any. Further, as it tells us that each should be\r\ncontent with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, not from any\r\nwomanish pity, favour, or superstition, but solely by the\r\nguidance of reason, according as the time and occasion demand, as\r\nI will show in Part III.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the\r\ncommonwealth; for it teaches how citizens should be governed and\r\nled, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may freely do\r\nwhatsoever things are best.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of\r\nthis note, and I thus bring the second part of my treatise to a\r\nclose. I think I have therein explained the nature and\r\nproperties of the human mind at sufficient length, and,\r\nconsidering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficient\r\nclearness. I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many\r\nexcellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary\r\nto be known, as will, in what follows, be partly made plain.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap03\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cH2 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nPART III.\r\n\u003c/H2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nMost writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be\r\ntreating rather of matters outside nature than of natural\r\nphenomena following nature\u0027s general laws. They appear to\r\nconceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a\r\nkingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows\r\nnature\u0027s order, that he has absolute control over his actions,\r\nand that he is determined solely by himself. They attribute\r\nhuman infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature in\r\ngeneral, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man, which\r\naccordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or, as usually happens,\r\nabuse: he, who succeeds in hitting off the weakness of the human\r\nmind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows, is looked\r\nupon as a seer. Still there has been no lack of very excellent\r\nmen (to whose toil and industry I confess myself much indebted),\r\nwho have written many noteworthy things concerning the right way\r\nof life, and have given much sage advice to mankind. But no one,\r\nso far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of the\r\nemotions, and the power of the mind against them for their\r\nrestraint.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he\r\nbelieved, that the mind has absolute power over its actions,\r\nstrove to explain human emotions by their primary causes, and, at\r\nthe same time, to point out a way, by which the mind might attain\r\nto absolute dominion over them. However, in my opinion, he\r\naccomplishes nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own\r\ngreat intellect, as I will show in the proper place. For the\r\npresent I wish to revert to those, who would rather abuse or\r\nderide human emotions than understand them. Such persons will,\r\ndoubtless think it strange that I should attempt to treat of\r\nhuman vice and folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth\r\nwith rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as\r\nrepugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful. However,\r\nsuch is my plan. Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can be\r\nset down to a flaw therein; for nature is always the same, and\r\neverywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action;\r\nthat is, nature\u0027s laws and ordinances, whereby all things come to\r\npass and change from one form to another, are everywhere and\r\nalways the same; so that there should be one and the same method\r\nof understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely,\r\nthrough nature\u0027s universal laws and rules. Thus the passions of\r\nhatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow\r\nfrom this same necessity and efficacy of nature; they answer to\r\ncertain definite causes, through which they are understood, and\r\npossess certain properties as worthy of being known as the\r\nproperties of anything else, whereof the contemplation in itself\r\naffords us delight. I shall, therefore, treat of the nature and\r\nstrength of the emotions according to the same method, as I\r\nemployed heretofore in my investigations concerning God and the\r\nmind. I shall consider human actions and desires in exactly the\r\nsame manner, as though I were concerned with lines, planes, and\r\nsolids.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4\u003e\r\nDEFINITIONS\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI. By an adequate cause, I mean a cause through which its effect\r\ncan be clearly and distinctly perceived. By an inadequate or\r\npartial cause, I mean a cause through which, by itself, its\r\neffect cannot be understood.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nII. I say that we act when anything takes place, either within\r\nus or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause; that\r\nis (by the foregoing definition) when through our nature\r\nsomething takes place within us or externally to us, which can\r\nthrough our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood.\r\nOn the other hand, I say that we are passive as regards something\r\nwhen that something takes place within us, or follows from our\r\nnature externally, we being only the partial cause.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIII. By emotion I mean the modifications of the body, whereby\r\nthe active power of the said body is increased or diminished,\r\naided or constrained, and also the ideas of such modifications.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nN.B. If we can be the adequate cause of any of these\r\nmodifications, I then call the emotion an activity, otherwise I\r\ncall it a passion, or state wherein the mind is passive.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4\u003e\r\nPOSTULATES\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI. The human body can be affected in many ways, whereby its\r\npower of activity is increased or diminished, and also in other\r\nways which do not render its power of activity either greater or\r\nless.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nN.B. This postulate or axiom rests on Postulate i. and\r\nLemmas v. and vii., which see after II. xiii.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nII. The human body can undergo many changes, and, nevertheless,\r\nretain the impressions or traces of objects (cf. II. Post. v.),\r\nand, consequently, the same images of things (see note II.\r\nxvii.).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. I. Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain\r\ncases passive. In so far as it has adequate ideas it is\r\nnecessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it\r\nis necessarily passive.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;In every human mind there are some adequate ideas, and\r\nsome ideas that are fragmentary and confused (II. xl. note).\r\nThose ideas which are adequate in the mind are adequate also in\r\nGod, inasmuch as he constitutes the essence of the mind (II. xl.\r\nCoroll.), and those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise\r\n(by the same Coroll.) adequate in God, not inasmuch as he\r\ncontains in himself the essence of the given mind alone, but as\r\nhe, at the same time, contains the minds of other things. Again,\r\nfrom any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (I. 36);\r\nof this effect God is the adequate cause (III. Def. i.), not\r\ninasmuch as he is infinite, but inasmuch as he is conceived as\r\naffected by the given idea (II. ix.). But of that effect whereof\r\nGod is the cause, inasmuch as he is affected by an idea which is\r\nadequate in a given mind, of that effect, I repeat, the mind in\r\nquestion is the adequate cause (II. xi. Coroll.). Therefore our\r\nmind, in so far as it has adequate ideas (III. Def. ii.), is in\r\ncertain cases necessarily active; this was our first point.\r\nAgain, whatsoever necessarily follows from the idea which is\r\nadequate in God, not by virtue of his possessing in himself the\r\nmind of one man only, but by virtue of his containing, together\r\nwith the mind of that one man, the minds of other things also, of\r\nsuch an effect (II. xi. Coroll.) the mind of the given man is not\r\nan adequate, but only a partial cause; thus (III. Def. ii.) the\r\nmind, inasmuch as it has inadequate ideas, is in certain cases\r\nnecessarily passive; this was our second point. Therefore our\r\nmind, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows that the mind is more or less\r\nliable to be acted upon, in proportion as it possesses inadequate\r\nideas, and, contrariwise, is more or less active in proportion as\r\nit possesses adequate ideas.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. II. Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind\r\ndetermine body to motion or rest or any state different from\r\nthese, if such there be.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;All modes of thinking have for their cause God, by\r\nvirtue of his being a thinking thing, and not by virtue of his\r\nbeing displayed under any other attribute (II. vi.). That,\r\ntherefore, which determines the mind to thought is a mode of\r\nthought, and not a mode of extension; that is (II. Def. i.), it\r\nis not body. This was our first point. Again, the motion and\r\nrest of a body must arise from another body, which has also been\r\ndetermined to a state of motion or rest by a third body, and\r\nabsolutely everything which takes place in a body must spring\r\nfrom God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by some mode of\r\nextension, and not by some mode of thought (II. vi.); that is,\r\nit cannot spring from the mind, which is a mode of thought. This\r\nwas our second point. Therefore body cannot determine mind, \u0026amp;c.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;This is made more clear by what was said in the note to\r\nII. vii., namely, that mind and body are one and the same thing,\r\nconceived first under the attribute of thought, secondly, under\r\nthe attribute of extension. Thus it follows that the order or\r\nconcatenation of things is identical, whether nature be conceived\r\nunder the one attribute or the other; consequently the order of\r\nstates of activity and passivity in our body is simultaneous in\r\nnature with the order of states of activity and passivity in the\r\nmind. The same conclusion is evident from the manner in which we\r\nproved II. xii.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNevertheless, though such is the case, and though there be no\r\nfurther room for doubt, I can scarcely believe, until the fact is\r\nproved by experience, that men can be induced to consider the\r\nquestion calmly and fairly, so firmly are they convinced that it\r\nis merely at the bidding of the mind, that the body is set in\r\nmotion or at rest, or performs a variety of actions depending\r\nsolely on the mind\u0027s will or the exercise of thought. However,\r\nno one has hitherto laid down the limits to the powers of the\r\nbody, that is, no one has as yet been taught by experience what\r\nthe body can accomplish solely by the laws of nature, in so far\r\nas she is regarded as extension. No one hitherto has gained such\r\nan accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism, that he can\r\nexplain all its functions; nor need I call attention to the fact\r\nthat many actions are observed in the lower animals, which far\r\ntranscend human sagacity, and that somnambulists do many things\r\nin their sleep, which they would not venture to do when awake:\r\nthese instances are enough to show, that the body can by the sole\r\nlaws of its nature do many things which the mind wonders at.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAgain, no one knows how or by what means the mind moves the\r\nbody, nor how many various degrees of motion it can impart to the\r\nbody, nor how quickly it can move it. Thus, when men say that\r\nthis or that physical action has its origin in the mind, which\r\nlatter has dominion over the body, they are using words without\r\nmeaning, or are confessing in specious phraseology that they are\r\nignorant of the cause of the said action, and do not wonder at\r\nit.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut, they will say, whether we know or do not know the means\r\nwhereby the mind acts on the body, we have, at any rate,\r\nexperience of the fact that unless the human mind is in a fit\r\nstate to think, the body remains inert. Moreover, we have\r\nexperience, that the mind alone can determine whether we speak or\r\nare silent, and a variety of similar states which, accordingly,\r\nwe say depend on the mind\u0027s decree. But, as to the first point,\r\nI ask such objectors, whether experience does not also teach,\r\nthat if the body be inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted\r\nfor thinking? For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind\r\nsimultaneously is in a state of torpor also, and has no power of\r\nthinking, such as it possesses when the body is awake. Again, I\r\nthink everyone\u0027s experience will confirm the statement, that the\r\nmind is not at all times equally fit for thinking on a given\r\nsubject, but according as the body is more or less fitted for\r\nbeing stimulated by the image of this or that object, so also is\r\nthe mind more or less fitted for contemplating the said object.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut, it will be urged, it is impossible that solely from the\r\nlaws of nature considered as extended substance, we should be\r\nable to deduce the causes of buildings, pictures, and things of\r\nthat kind, which are produced only by human art; nor would the\r\nhuman body, unless it were determined and led by the mind, be\r\ncapable of building a single temple. However, I have just\r\npointed out that the objectors cannot fix the limits of the\r\nbody\u0027s power, or say what can be concluded from a consideration\r\nof its sole nature, whereas they have experience of many things\r\nbeing accomplished solely by the laws of nature, which they would\r\nnever have believed possible except under the direction of mind:\r\nsuch are the actions performed by somnambulists while asleep, and\r\nwondered at by their performers when awake. I would further call\r\nattention to the mechanism of the human body, which far surpasses\r\nin complexity all that has been put together by human art, not to\r\nrepeat what I have already shown, namely, that from nature, under\r\nwhatever attribute she be considered, infinite results follow.\r\nAs for the second objection, I submit that the world would be\r\nmuch happier, if men were as fully able to keep silence as they\r\nare to speak. Experience abundantly shows that men can govern\r\nanything more easily than their tongues, and restrain anything\r\nmore easily than their appetites; when it comes about that many\r\nbelieve, that we are only free in respect to objects which we\r\nmoderately desire, because our desire for such can easily be\r\ncontrolled by the thought of something else frequently\r\nremembered, but that we are by no means free in respect to what\r\nwe seek with violent emotion, for our desire cannot then be\r\nallayed with the remembrance of anything else. However, unless\r\nsuch persons had proved by experience that we do many things\r\nwhich we afterwards repent of, and again that we often, when\r\nassailed by contrary emotions, see the better and follow the\r\nworse, there would be nothing to prevent their believing that we\r\nare free in all things. Thus an infant believes that of its own\r\nfree will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely\r\ndesires vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desires\r\nto run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from\r\nthe free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he\r\nwould willingly have withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a\r\ngarrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe\r\nthat they speak from the free decision of their mind, when they\r\nare in reality unable to restrain their impulse to talk.\r\nExperience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men\r\nbelieve themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious\r\nof their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those\r\nactions are determined; and, further, it is plain that the\r\ndictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites, and\r\ntherefore vary according to the varying state of the body.\r\nEveryone shapes his actions according to his emotion, those who\r\nare assailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish;\r\nthose who are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed this\r\nway or that. All these considerations clearly show that a mental\r\ndecision and a bodily appetite, or determined state, are\r\nsimultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, which we call\r\ndecision, when it is regarded under and explained through the\r\nattribute of thought, and a conditioned state, when it is\r\nregarded under the attribute of extension, and deduced from the\r\nlaws of motion and rest. This will appear yet more plainly in\r\nthe sequel. For the present I wish to call attention to another\r\npoint, namely, that we cannot act by the decision of the mind,\r\nunless we have a remembrance of having done so. For instance, we\r\ncannot say a word without remembering that we have done so.\r\nAgain, it is not within the free power of the mind to remember or\r\nforget a thing at will. Therefore the freedom of the mind must\r\nin any case be limited to the power of uttering or not uttering\r\nsomething which it remembers. But when we dream that we speak,\r\nwe believe that we speak from a free decision of the mind, yet we\r\ndo not speak, or, if we do, it is by a spontaneous motion of the\r\nbody. Again, we dream that we are concealing something, and we\r\nseem to act from the same decision of the mind as that, whereby\r\nwe keep silence when awake concerning something we know. Lastly,\r\nwe dream that from the free decision of our mind we do something,\r\nwhich we should not dare to do when awake.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow I should like to know whether there be in the mind two\r\nsorts of decisions, one sort illusive, and the other sort free?\r\nIf our folly does not carry us so far as this, we must\r\nnecessarily admit, that the decision of the mind, which is\r\nbelieved to be free, is not distinguishable from the imagination\r\nor memory, and is nothing more than the affirmation, which an\r\nidea, by virtue of being an idea, necessarily involves (II.\r\nxlix.). Wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind\r\nby the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing.\r\nTherefore those who believe, that they speak or keep silence or\r\nact in any way from the free decision of their mind, do but dream\r\nwith their eyes open.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. III. The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate\r\nideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely on\r\ninadequate ideas.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The first element, which constitutes the essence of\r\nthe mind, is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent\r\nbody (II. xi. and xiii.), which (II. xv.) is compounded of many\r\nother ideas, whereof some are adequate and some inadequate (II.\r\nxxix. Coroll., II. xxxviii. Coroll.). Whatsoever therefore\r\nfollows from the nature of mind, and has mind for its proximate\r\ncause, through which it must be understood, must necessarily\r\nfollow either from an adequate or from an inadequate idea. But\r\nin so far as the mind (III. i.) has inadequate ideas, it is\r\nnecessarily passive: wherefore the activities of the mind follow\r\nsolely from adequate ideas, and accordingly the mind is only\r\npassive in so far as it has inadequate ideas. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Thus we see, that passive states are not attributed to\r\nthe mind, except in so far as it contains something involving\r\nnegation, or in so far as it is regarded as a part of nature,\r\nwhich cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself\r\nwithout other parts: I could thus show, that passive states are\r\nattributed to individual things in the same way that they are\r\nattributed to the mind, and that they cannot otherwise be\r\nperceived, but my purpose is solely to treat of the human mind.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. IV. Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external\r\nto itself.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This proposition is self\u0026mdash;evident, for the definition\r\nof anything affirms the essence of that thing, but does not\r\nnegative it; in other words, it postulates the essence of the\r\nthing, but does not take it away. So long therefore as we regard\r\nonly the thing itself, without taking into account external\r\ncauses, we shall not be able to find in it anything which could\r\ndestroy it. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. V. Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in\r\nthe same object, in so far as one is capable of destroying the\r\nother.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;If they could agree together or co\u0026mdash;exist in the same\r\nobject, there would then be in the said object something which\r\ncould destroy it; but this, by the foregoing proposition, is\r\nabsurd, therefore things, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. VI. Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours\r\nto persist in its own being.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Individual things are modes whereby the attributes of\r\nGod are expressed in a given determinate manner (I. xxv. Coroll.);\r\nthat is, (I. xxxiv.), they are things which express in a given\r\ndeterminate manner the power of God, whereby God is and acts;\r\nnow no thing contains in itself anything whereby it can be\r\ndestroyed, or which can take away its existence (III. iv.); but\r\ncontrariwise it is opposed to all that could take away its\r\nexistence (III. v.). Therefore, in so far as it can, and in so\r\nfar as it is in itself, it endeavours to persist in its own\r\nbeing. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. VII. The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to\r\npersist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence\r\nof the thing in question.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;From the given essence of any thing certain\r\nconsequences necessarily follow (I. xxxvi.), nor have things any\r\npower save such as necessarily follows from their nature as\r\ndetermined (I. xxix.); wherefore the power of any given thing,\r\nor the endeavour whereby, either alone or with other things, it\r\nacts, or endeavours to act, that is (III. vi.), the power or\r\nendeavour, wherewith it endeavours to persist in its own being,\r\nis nothing else but the given or actual essence of the thing in\r\nquestion. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. VIII. The endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to persist\r\nin its own being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite\r\ntime.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;If it involved a limited time, which should determine\r\nthe duration of the thing, it would then follow solely from that\r\npower whereby the thing exists, that the thing could not exist\r\nbeyond the limits of that time, but that it must be destroyed;\r\nbut this (III. iv.) is absurd. Wherefore the endeavour wherewith\r\na thing exists involves no definite time; but, contrariwise,\r\nsince (III. iv.) it will by the same power whereby it already\r\nexists always continue to exist, unless it be destroyed by some\r\nexternal cause, this endeavour involves an indefinite time.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. IX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct\r\nideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to\r\npersist in its being for an indefinite period, and of this\r\nendeavour it is conscious.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and\r\ninadequate ideas (III. iii.), therefore (III. vii.), both in so\r\nfar as it possesses the former, and in so far as it possesses the\r\nlatter, it endeavours to persist in its own being, and that for\r\nan indefinite time (III. viii.). Now as the mind (II. xxiii.) is\r\nnecessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the\r\nmodifications of the body, the mind is therefore (III. vii.)\r\nconscious of its own endeavour.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;This endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, is\r\ncalled will, when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it\r\nis called appetite; it is, in fact, nothing else but man\u0027s\r\nessence, from the nature of which necessarily follow all those\r\nresults which tend to its preservation; and which man has thus\r\nbeen determined to perform.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFurther, between appetite and desire there is no difference,\r\nexcept that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so\r\nfar as they are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly\r\nbe thus defined: Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof.\r\nIt is thus plain from what has been said, that in no case do we\r\nstrive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we\r\ndeem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be\r\ngood, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or\r\ndesire it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. X. An idea, which excludes the existence of our body,\r\ncannot be postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Whatsoever can destroy our body, cannot be postulated\r\ntherein (III. v.). Therefore neither can the idea of such a\r\nthing occur in God, in so far as he has the idea of our body (II.\r\nix. Coroll.); that is (II. xi., xiii.), the idea of that thing\r\ncannot be postulated as in our mind, but contrariwise, since (II.\r\nxi., xiii.) the first element, that constitutes the essence of\r\nthe mind, is the idea of the human body as actually existing, it\r\nfollows that the first and chief endeavour of our mind is the\r\nendeavour to affirm the existence of our body: thus, an idea,\r\nwhich negatives the existence of our body, is contrary to our\r\nmind, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XI. Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders\r\nthe power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or\r\ndiminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This proposition is evident from II. vii. or from II.\r\nxiv.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes,\r\nand can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection,\r\nsometimes to a state of lesser perfection. These passive states\r\nof transition explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain.\r\nBy pleasure therefore in the following propositions I shall\r\nsignify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater\r\nperfection. By pain I shall signify a passive state wherein the\r\nmind passes to a lesser perfection. Further, the emotion of\r\npleasure in reference to the body and mind together I shall call\r\nstimulation (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas), the emotion of\r\npain in the same relation I shall call suffering or melancholy.\r\nBut we must bear in mind, that stimulation and suffering are\r\nattributed to man, when one part of his nature is more affected\r\nthan the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts are alike\r\naffected. What I mean by desire I have explained in the note to\r\nProp. ix. of this part; beyond these three I recognize no other\r\nprimary emotion; I will show as I proceed, that all other\r\nemotions arise from these three. But, before I go further, I\r\nshould like here to explain at greater length Prop. x of this\r\npart, in order that we may clearly understand how one idea is\r\ncontrary to another. In the note to II. xvii. we showed that the\r\nidea, which constitutes the essence of mind, involves the\r\nexistence of body, so long as the body itself exists. Again, it\r\nfollows from what we pointed out in the Corollary to II. viii.,\r\nthat the present existence of our mind depends solely on the\r\nfact, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body.\r\nLastly, we showed (II. xvii., xviii. and note) that the power of\r\nthe mind, whereby it imagines and remembers things, also depends\r\non the fact, that it involves the actual existence of the body.\r\nWhence it follows, that the present existence of the mind and its\r\npower of imagining are removed, as soon as the mind ceases to\r\naffirm the present existence of the body. Now the cause, why the\r\nmind ceases to affirm this existence of the body, cannot be the\r\nmind itself (III. iv.), nor again the fact that the body ceases\r\nto exist. For (by II. vi.) the cause, why the mind affirms the\r\nexistence of the body, is not that the body began to exist;\r\ntherefore, for the same reason, it does not cease to affirm the\r\nexistence of the body, because the body ceases to exist; but\r\n(II. xvii.) this result follows from another idea, which excludes\r\nthe present existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind,\r\nand which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the\r\nessence of our mind.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XII. The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive\r\nthose things, which increase or help the power of activity in the\r\nbody.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;So long as the human body is affected in a mode, which\r\ninvolves the nature of any external body, the human mind will\r\nregard that external body as present (II. xvii.), and\r\nconsequently (II. vii.), so long as the human mind regards an\r\nexternal body as present, that is (II. xvii. note), conceives it,\r\nthe human body is affected in a mode, which involves the nature\r\nof the said external body; thus so long as the mind conceives\r\nthings, which increase or help the power of activity in our body,\r\nthe body is affected in modes which increase or help its power of\r\nactivity (III. Post. i.); consequently (III. xi.) the mind\u0027s\r\npower of thinking is for that period increased or helped. Thus\r\n(III. vi., ix.) the mind, as far as it can, endeavours to imagine\r\nsuch things. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XIII. When the mind conceives things which diminish or\r\nhinder the body\u0027s power of activity, it endeavours, as far as\r\npossible, to remember things which exclude the existence of the\r\nfirst\u0026mdash;named things.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;So long as the mind conceives anything of the kind\r\nalluded to, the power of the mind and body is diminished or\r\nconstrained (cf. III. xii. Proof); nevertheless it will continue\r\nto conceive it, until the mind conceives something else, which\r\nexcludes the present existence thereof (II. xvii.); that is (as\r\nI have just shown), the power of the mind and of the body is\r\ndiminished, or constrained, until the mind conceives something\r\nelse, which excludes the existence of the former thing conceived:\r\ntherefore the mind (III. ix.), as far as it can, will endeavour\r\nto conceive or remember the latter. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows that the mind shrinks from\r\nconceiving those things, which diminish or constrain the power of\r\nitself and of the body.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;From what has been said we may clearly understand the\r\nnature of Love and Hate. Love is nothing else but pleasure\r\naccompanied by the idea of an external cause: Hate is nothing\r\nelse but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause. We\r\nfurther see, that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have,\r\nand to keep present to him, the object of his love; while he who\r\nhates endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred.\r\nBut I will treat of these matters at more length hereafter.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XIV. If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at\r\nthe same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one\r\nof these two, be also affected by the other.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;If the human body has once been affected by two bodies\r\nat once, whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of them, it\r\nwill straightway remember the other also (II. xviii.). But the\r\nmind\u0027s conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body than\r\nthe nature of external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.); therefore,\r\nif the body, and consequently the mind (III. Def. iii.) has been\r\nonce affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever\r\nit is afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by\r\nthe other.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XV. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure,\r\npain, or desire.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously\r\naffected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor\r\ndiminishes its power of activity, and the other does either\r\nincrease or diminish the said power (III. Post. i.). From the\r\nforegoing proposition it is evident that, whenever the mind is\r\nafterwards affected by the former, through its true cause, which\r\n(by hypothesis) neither increases nor diminishes its power of\r\naction, it will be at the same time affected by the latter, which\r\ndoes increase or diminish its power of activity, that is (III.\r\nxi. note) it will be affected with pleasure or pain. Thus the\r\nformer of the two emotions will, not through itself, but\r\naccidentally, be the cause of pleasure or pain. In the same way\r\nalso it can be easily shown, that a thing may be accidentally the\r\ncause of desire. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing\r\nwith the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing be not\r\nthe efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate\r\nit.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;For from this fact alone it arises (III. xiv.), that\r\nthe mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with\r\nthe emotion of pleasure or pain, that is (III. xi. note),\r\naccording as the power of the mind and body may be increased or\r\ndiminished, \u0026amp;c.; and consequently (III. xii.), according as the\r\nmind may desire or shrink from the conception of it (III. xiii.\r\nCoroll.), in other words (III. xiii. note), according as it may\r\nlove or hate the same. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love or\r\nhate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us;\r\nmerely, as a phrase is, from sympathy or antipathy. We should\r\nrefer to the same category those objects, which affect us\r\npleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other\r\nobjects which affect us in the same way. This I will show in the\r\nnext Prop. I am aware that certain authors, who were the first\r\nto introduce these terms \"sympathy\" and \"antipathy,\" wished to\r\nsignify thereby some occult qualities in things; nevertheless I\r\nthink we may be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known\r\nor manifest qualities.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XVI. Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given\r\nobject has some point of resemblance with another object which is\r\nwont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the\r\npoint of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said\r\nemotions, we shall still regard the first\u0026mdash;named object with love\r\nor hate.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The point of resemblance was in the object (by\r\nhypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus\r\n(III. xiv.), when the mind is affected by the image thereof, it\r\nwill straightway be affected by one or the other emotion, and\r\nconsequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same point\r\nof resemblance, will be accidentally (III. xv.) a cause of\r\npleasure or pain. Thus (by the foregoing Corollary), although\r\nthe point in which the two objects resemble one another be not\r\nthe efficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard the\r\nfirst\u0026mdash;named object with love or hate. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XVII. If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect\r\nus painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing\r\nwhich is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of\r\npleasure, we shall hate the first\u0026mdash;named thing, and at the same\r\ntime we shall love it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The given thing is (by hypothesis) in itself a cause\r\nof pain, and (III. xiii. note), in so far as we imagine it with\r\nthis emotion, we shall hate it: further, inasmuch as we conceive\r\nthat it has some point of resemblance to something else, which is\r\nwont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we\r\nshall with an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it\r\n(III. xvi.); thus we shall both hate and love the same thing.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;This disposition of the mind, which arises from two\r\ncontrary emotions, is called vacillation; it stands to the\r\nemotions in the same relation as doubt does to the imagination\r\n(II. xliv. note); vacillation and doubt do not differ one from\r\nthe other, except as greater differs from less. But we must bear\r\nin mind that I have deduced this vacillation from causes, which\r\ngive rise through themselves to one of the emotions, and to the\r\nother accidentally. I have done this, in order that they might\r\nbe more easily deduced from what went before; but I do not deny\r\nthat vacillation of the disposition generally arises from an\r\nobject, which is the efficient cause of both emotions. The human\r\nbody is composed (II. Post. i.) of a variety of individual parts\r\nof different nature, and may therefore (Ax.i. after Lemma iii.\r\nafter II. xiii.) be affected in a variety of different ways by\r\none and the same body; and contrariwise, as one and the same\r\nthing can be affected in many ways, it can also in many different\r\nways affect one and the same part of the body. Hence we can\r\neasily conceive, that one and the same object may be the cause of\r\nmany and conflicting emotions.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully\r\nby the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing\r\npresent.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;So long as a man is affected by the image of anything,\r\nhe will regard that thing as present, even though it be\r\nnon\u0026mdash;existent (II. xvii. and Coroll.), he will not conceive it as\r\npast or future, except in so far as its image is joined to the\r\nimage of time past or future (II. xliv. note). Wherefore the\r\nimage of a thing, regarded in itself alone, is identical, whether\r\nit be referred to time past, time future, or time present; that\r\nis (II. xvi. Coroll.), the disposition or emotion of the body is\r\nidentical, whether the image be of a thing past, future, or\r\npresent. Thus the emotion of pleasure or pain is the same,\r\nwhether the image be of a thing past or future. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote I.\u0026mdash;I call a thing past or future, according as we either\r\nhave been or shall be affected thereby. For instance, according\r\nas we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it has\r\nrecreated us, or will recreate us, according as it has harmed us,\r\nor will harm us. For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm its\r\nexistence; that is, the body is affected by no emotion which\r\nexcludes the existence of the thing, and therefore (II. xvii.)\r\nthe body is affected by the image of the thing, in the same way\r\nas if the thing were actually present. However, as it generally\r\nhappens that those, who have had many experiences, vacillate, so\r\nlong as they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in\r\ndoubt about its issue (II. xliv. note); it follows that the\r\nemotions which arise from similar images of things are not so\r\nconstant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other\r\nthings, until men become assured of the issue.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote II.\u0026mdash;From what has just been said, we understand what is\r\nmeant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, and\r\nDisappointment.[5] Hope is nothing else but an inconstant\r\npleasure, arising from the image of something future or past,\r\nwhereof we do not yet know the issue. Fear, on the other hand,\r\nis an inconstant pain also arising from the image of something\r\nconcerning which we are in doubt. If the element of doubt be\r\nremoved from these emotions, hope becomes Confidence and fear\r\nbecomes Despair. In other words, Pleasure or Pain arising from\r\nthe image of something concerning which we have hoped or feared.\r\nAgain, Joy is Pleasure arising from the image of something past\r\nwhereof we have doubted the issue. Disappointment is the Pain\r\nopposed to Joy.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[5] Conscientiæ morsus\u0026mdash;thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XIX. He who conceives that the object of his love is\r\ndestroyed will feel pain; if he conceives that it is preserved\r\nhe will feel pleasure.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The mind, as far as possible, endeavours to conceive\r\nthose things which increase or help the body\u0027s power of activity\r\n(III. xii.); in other words (III. xii. note), those things which\r\nit loves. But conception is helped by those things which\r\npostulate the existence of a thing, and contrariwise is hindered\r\nby those which exclude the existence of a thing (II. xvii.);\r\ntherefore the images of things, which postulate the existence of\r\nan object of love, help the mind\u0027s endeavour to conceive the\r\nobject of love, in other words (III. xi. note), affect the mind\r\npleasurably; contrariwise those things, which exclude the\r\nexistence of an object of love, hinder the aforesaid mental\r\nendeavour; in other words, affect the mind painfully. He,\r\ntherefore, who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed\r\nwill feel pain, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XX. He who conceives that the object of his hate is\r\ndestroyed will also feel pleasure.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The mind (III. xiii.) endeavours to conceive those\r\nthings, which exclude the existence of things whereby the body\u0027s\r\npower of activity is diminished or constrained; that is (III.\r\nxiii. note), it endeavours to conceive such things as exclude the\r\nexistence of what it hates; therefore the image of a thing,\r\nwhich excludes the existence of what the mind hates, helps the\r\naforesaid mental effort, in other words (III. xi. note), affects\r\nthe mind pleasurably. Thus he who conceives that the object of\r\nhis hate is destroyed will feel pleasure. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXI. He who conceives, that the object of his love is\r\naffected pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected\r\npleasurably or painfully; and the one or the other emotion will\r\nbe greater or less in the lover according as it is greater or\r\nless in the thing loved.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The images of things (as we showed in III. xix.) which\r\npostulate the existence of the object of love, help the mind\u0027s\r\nendeavour to conceive the said object. But pleasure postulates\r\nthe existence of something feeling pleasure, so much the more in\r\nproportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater; for it is\r\n(III. xi. note) a transition to a greater perfection; therefore\r\nthe image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mental\r\nendeavour of the lover; that is, it affects the lover\r\npleasurably, and so much the more, in proportion as this emotion\r\nmay have been greater in the object of love. This was our first\r\npoint. Further, in so far as a thing is affected with pain, it\r\nis to that extent destroyed, the extent being in proportion to\r\nthe amount of pain (III. xi. note); therefore (III. xix.) he who\r\nconceives, that the object of his love is affected painfully,\r\nwill himself be affected painfully, in proportion as the said\r\nemotion is greater or less in the object of love. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects\r\nsome object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards\r\nthat thing. Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an\r\nobject of our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred\r\ntowards it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;He, who affects pleasurably or painfully the object of\r\nour love, affects us also pleasurably or painfully\u0026mdash;that is, if we\r\nconceive the loved object as affected with the said pleasure or\r\npain (III. xxi.). But this pleasure or pain is postulated to come\r\nto us accompanied by the idea of an external cause; therefore\r\n(III. xiii. note), if we conceive that anyone affects an object\r\nof our love pleasurably or painfully, we shall be affected with\r\nlove or hatred towards him. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Prop. xxi. explains to us the nature of Pity, which we\r\nmay define as pain arising from another\u0027s hurt. What term we can\r\nuse for pleasure arising from another\u0027s gain, I know not.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWe will call the love towards him who confers a benefit on\r\nanother, Approval; and the hatred towards him who injures\r\nanother, we will call Indignation. We must further remark, that\r\nwe not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved (as shown\r\nin III. xxi.), but also for a thing which we have hitherto\r\nregarded without emotion, provided that we deem that it resembles\r\nourselves (as I will show presently). Thus, we bestow approval\r\non one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves, and,\r\ncontrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXIII. He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is\r\npainfully affected, will feel pleasure. Contrariwise, if he\r\nthinks that the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feel\r\npain. Each of these emotions will be greater or less, according\r\nas its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;In so far as an object of hatred is painfully\r\naffected, it is destroyed, to an extent proportioned to the\r\nstrength of the pain (III. xi. note). Therefore, he (III. xx.)\r\nwho conceives, that some object of his hatred is painfully\r\naffected, will feel pleasure, to an extent proportioned to the\r\namount of pain he conceives in the object of his hatred. This\r\nwas our first point. Again, pleasure postulates the existence of\r\nthe pleasurably affected thing (III. xi. note), in proportion as\r\nthe pleasure is greater or less. If anyone imagines that an\r\nobject of his hatred is pleasurably affected, this conception\r\n(III. xiii.) will hinder his own endeavour to persist; in other\r\nwords (III. xi. note), he who hates will be painfully affected.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, and\r\nwithout any mental conflict. For (as I am about to show in Prop.\r\nxxvii.), in so far as a man conceives that something similar to\r\nhimself is affected by pain, he will himself be affected in like\r\nmanner; and he will have the contrary emotion in contrary\r\ncircumstances. But here we are regarding hatred only.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an\r\nobject of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also. If we\r\nconceive that he painfully affects that said object, we shall\r\nfeel love towards him.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This proposition is proved in the same way as III.\r\nxxii., which see.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable\r\nto envy, which, accordingly, is nothing else but hatred, in so\r\nfar as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another\u0027s\r\nhurt, and to grieve at another\u0027s advantage.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and\r\nconcerning what we love, everything that we can conceive to\r\naffect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object. Contrariwise,\r\nwe endeavour to negative everything, which we conceive to affect\r\npainfully ourselves or the loved object.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;That, which we conceive to affect an object of our\r\nlove pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasurably or\r\npainfully (III. xxi.). But the mind (III. xii.) endeavours, as\r\nfar as possible, to conceive those things which affect us\r\npleasurably; in other words (II. xvii. and Coroll.), it\r\nendeavours to regard them as present. And, contrariwise (III.\r\nxiii.), it endeavours to exclude the existence of such things as\r\naffect us painfully; therefore, we endeavour to affirm\r\nconcerning ourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever\r\nwe conceive to affect ourselves, or the love object pleasurably.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we\r\nhate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and,\r\ncontrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything\r\nwhich we conceive to affect it pleasurably.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as the\r\nforegoing proposition followed from III. xxi.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a man may\r\neasily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, and,\r\ncontrariwise, too meanly of a hated object. This feeling is\r\ncalled pride, in reference to the man who thinks too highly of\r\nhimself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams with\r\nhis eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things that\r\nfall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon accounting\r\nthem real, and exulting in them, so long as he is unable to\r\nconceive anything which excludes their existence, and determines\r\nhis own power of action. Pride, therefore, is pleasure springing\r\nfrom a man thinking too highly of himself. Again, the pleasure\r\nwhich arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called\r\nover\u0026mdash;esteem. Whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too\r\nlittle of a man is called disdain.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is\r\nlike ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion,\r\nto be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a\r\nlike emotion (affectus).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The images of things are modifications of the human\r\nbody, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to\r\nus (II. xvii.); in other words (II. x.), whereof the ideas\r\ninvolve the nature of our body, and, at the same time, the nature\r\nof the external bodies as present. If, therefore, the nature of\r\nthe external body be similar to the nature of our body, then the\r\nidea which we form of the external body will involve a\r\nmodification of our own body similar to the modification of the\r\nexternal body. Consequently, if we conceive anyone similar to\r\nourselves as affected by any emotion, this conception will\r\nexpress a modification of our body similar to that emotion.\r\nThus, from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to be\r\naffected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like\r\nemotion. If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we\r\nshall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not\r\nsimilar, emotion. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote I.\u0026mdash;This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to\r\npain, is called compassion (cf. III. xxii. note); when it is\r\nreferred to desire, it is called emulation, which is nothing else\r\nbut the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that we\r\nconceive that others have the like desire.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary I.\u0026mdash;If we conceive that anyone, whom we have\r\nhitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects something\r\nsimilar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him.\r\nIf, on the other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects the\r\nsame, we shall be affected with hatred towards him.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This is proved from the last proposition in the same\r\nmanner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary II.\u0026mdash;We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because\r\nits misery affects us painfully.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice\r\nin its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary III.\u0026mdash;We seek to free from misery, as far as we can,\r\na thing which we pity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;That, which painfully affects the object of our pity,\r\naffects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing proposition);\r\ntherefore, we shall endeavour to recall everything which\r\nremoves its existence, or which destroys it (cf. III. xiii.); in\r\nother words (III. ix. note), we shall desire to destroy it, or we\r\nshall be determined for its destruction; thus, we shall\r\nendeavour to free from misery a thing which we pity. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote II.\u0026mdash;This will or appetite for doing good, which arises\r\nfrom pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit, is\r\ncalled benevolence, and is nothing else but desire arising from\r\ncompassion. Concerning love or hate towards him who has done\r\ngood or harm to something, which we conceive to be like\r\nourselves, see III. xxii. note.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXVIII. We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive\r\nto conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour to remove or destroy\r\nwhatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to\r\nconduce to pain.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;We endeavour, as far as possible, to conceive that\r\nwhich we imagine to conduce to pleasure (III. xii.); in other\r\nwords (II. xvii.) we shall endeavour to conceive it as far as\r\npossible as present or actually existing. But the endeavour of\r\nthe mind, or the mind\u0027s power of thought, is equal to, and\r\nsimultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body\u0027s power\r\nof action. (This is clear from II. vii. Coroll. and II. xi.\r\nCoroll.). Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its\r\nexistence, in other words (which by III. ix. note, come to the\r\nsame thing) we desire and strive for it; this was our first\r\npoint. Again, if we conceive that something, which we believed\r\nto be the cause of pain, that is (III. xiii. note), which we\r\nhate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (III. xx.). We shall,\r\ntherefore (by the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroy\r\nthe same, or (III. xiii.) to remove it from us, so that we may\r\nnot regard it as present; this was our second point. Wherefore\r\nwhatsoever conduces to pleasure, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXIX. We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive\r\nmen[6] to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrink\r\nfrom doing that which we conceive men to shrink from.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[6] By \"men\" in this and the following propositions, I mean men\r\nwhom we regard without any particular emotion.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;From the fact of imagining, that men love or hate\r\nanything, we shall love or hate the same thing (III. xxvii.).\r\nThat is (III. xiii. note), from this mere fact we shall feel\r\npleasure or pain at the thing\u0027s presence. And so we shall\r\nendeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with\r\npleasure, etc. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone, solely\r\nin order to please men, we call ambition, especially when we so\r\neagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we do or omit\r\ncertain things to our own or another\u0027s hurt: in other cases it\r\nis generally called kindliness. Furthermore I give the name of\r\npraise to the pleasure, with which we conceive the action of\r\nanother, whereby he has endeavoured to please us; but of blame\r\nto the pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXX. If anyone has done something which he conceives as\r\naffecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure,\r\naccompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other words, he\r\nwill regard himself with pleasure. On the other hand, if he has\r\ndone anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully,\r\nhe will regard himself with pain.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;He who conceives, that he affects others with pleasure\r\nor pain, will, by that very fact, himself be affected with\r\npleasure or pain (III. xxvii.), but, as a man (II. xix. and\r\nxxiii.) is conscious of himself through the modifications whereby\r\nhe is determined to action, it follows that he who conceives,\r\nthat he affects others pleasurably, will be affected with\r\npleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other\r\nwords, he will regard himself with pleasure. And so mutatis\r\nmutandis in the case of pain. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;As love (III. xiii.) is pleasure accompanied by the\r\nidea of an external cause, and hatred is pain accompanied by the\r\nidea of an external cause; the pleasure and pain in question\r\nwill be a species of love and hatred. But, as the terms love and\r\nhatred are used in reference to external objects, we will employ\r\nother names for the emotions now under discussion: pleasure\r\naccompanied by the idea of an external cause[7] we will style\r\nHonour, and the emotion contrary thereto we will style Shame: I\r\nmean in such cases as where pleasure or pain arises from a man\u0027s\r\nbelief, that he is being praised or blamed: otherwise pleasure\r\naccompanied by the idea of an external cause[8] is called\r\nself\u0026mdash;complacency, and its contrary pain is called repentance.\r\nAgain, as it may happen (II. xvii. Coroll.) that the pleasure,\r\nwherewith a man conceives that he affects others, may exist\r\nsolely in his own imagination, and as (III. xxv.) everyone\r\nendeavours to conceive concerning himself that which he conceives\r\nwill affect him with pleasure, it may easily come to pass that a\r\nvain man may be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all,\r\nwhen in reality he may be an annoyance to all.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[7] So Van Vloten and Bruder. The Dutch version and Camerer read,\r\n\"an internal cause.\" \"Honor\" = Gloria.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[8] See previous endnote.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXI. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates\r\nanything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall\r\nthereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love,\r\n\u0026amp;c. On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks from\r\nsomething that we love, we shall undergo vacillations of soul.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;From the mere fact of conceiving that anyone loves\r\nanything we shall ourselves love that thing (III. xxvii.): but\r\nwe are assumed to love it already; there is, therefore, a new\r\ncause of love, whereby our former emotion is fostered; hence we\r\nshall thereupon love it more steadfastly. Again, from the mere\r\nfact of conceiving that anyone shrinks from anything, we shall\r\nourselves shrink from that thing (III. xxvii.). If we assume\r\nthat we at the same time love it, we shall then simultaneously\r\nlove it and shrink from it; in other words, we shall be subject\r\nto vacillation (III. xvii. note). Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;From the foregoing, and also from III. xxviii. it\r\nfollows that everyone endeavours, as far as possible, to cause\r\nothers to love what he himself loves, and to hate what he himself\r\nhates: as the poet says: \"As lovers let us share every hope\r\nand every fear: ironhearted were he who should love what the\r\nother leaves.\"[9]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[9] Ovid, \"Amores,\" II. xix. 4,5. Spinoza transposes the verses.\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\"Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat.\"\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;This endeavour to bring it about, that our own likes\r\nand dislikes should meet with universal approval, is really\r\nambition (see III. xxix. note); wherefore we see that everyone\r\nby nature desires (appetere), that the rest of mankind should\r\nlive according to his own individual disposition: when such a\r\ndesire is equally present in all, everyone stands in everyone\r\nelse\u0027s way, and in wishing to be loved or praised by all, all\r\nbecome mutually hateful.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXII. If we conceive that anyone takes delight in\r\nsomething, which only one person can possess, we shall endeavour\r\nto bring it about that the man in question shall not gain\r\npossession thereof.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;From the mere fact of our conceiving that another\r\nperson takes delight in a thing (III. xxvii. and Coroll.) we\r\nshall ourselves love that thing and desire to take delight\r\ntherein. But we assumed that the pleasure in question would be\r\nprevented by another\u0027s delight in its object; we shall,\r\ntherefore, endeavour to prevent his possession thereof (III.\r\nxxviii.). Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;We thus see that man\u0027s nature is generally so\r\nconstituted, that he takes pity on those who fare ill, and envies\r\nthose who fare well with an amount of hatred proportioned to his\r\nown love for the goods in their possession. Further, we see that\r\nfrom the same property of human nature, whence it follows that\r\nmen are merciful, it follows also that they are envious and\r\nambitious. Lastly, if we make appeal to Experience, we shall\r\nfind that she entirely confirms what we have said; more\r\nespecially if we turn our attention to the first years of our\r\nlife. We find that children, whose body is continually, as it\r\nwere, in equilibrium, laugh or cry simply because they see others\r\nlaughing or crying; moreover, they desire forthwith to imitate\r\nwhatever they see others doing, and to possess themselves of\r\nwhatever they conceive as delighting others: inasmuch as the\r\nimages of things are, as we have said, modifications of the human\r\nbody, or modes wherein the human body is affected and disposed by\r\nexternal causes to act in this or that manner.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXIII. When we love a thing similar to ourselves we\r\nendeavour, as far as we can, to bring about that it should love\r\nus in return.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;That which we love we endeavour, as far as we can, to\r\nconceive in preference to anything else (III. xii.). If the\r\nthing be similar to ourselves, we shall endeavour to affect it\r\npleasurably in preference to anything else (III. xxix.). In\r\nother words, we shall endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it\r\nabout, that the thing should be affected with pleasure\r\naccompanied by the idea of ourselves, that is (III. xiii. note),\r\nthat it should love us in return. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we conceive a\r\nloved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be our\r\ncomplacency.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;We endeavour (III. xxxiii.), as far as we can, to\r\nbring about, that what we love should love us in return: in\r\nother words, that what we love should be affected with pleasure\r\naccompanied by the idea of ourself as cause. Therefore, in\r\nproportion as the loved object is more pleasurably affected\r\nbecause of us, our endeavour will be assisted.\u0026mdash;that is (III. xi.\r\nand note) the greater will be our pleasure. But when we take\r\npleasure in the fact, that we pleasurably affect something\r\nsimilar to ourselves, we regard ourselves with pleasure (III. 30);\r\ntherefore the greater the emotion with which we conceive a\r\nloved object to be affected, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXV. If anyone conceives, that an object of his love\r\njoins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he\r\nhimself has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards\r\nthe loved object and with envy towards his rival.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;In proportion as a man thinks, that a loved object is\r\nwell affected towards him, will be the strength of his\r\nself\u0026mdash;approval (by the last Prop.), that is (III. xxx. note), of\r\nhis pleasure; he will, therefore (III. xxviii.), endeavour, as\r\nfar as he can, to imagine the loved object as most closely bound\r\nto him: this endeavour or desire will be increased, if he thinks\r\nthat someone else has a similar desire (III. xxxi.). But this\r\nendeavour or desire is assumed to be checked by the image of the\r\nloved object in conjunction with the image of him whom the loved\r\nobject has joined to itself; therefore (III. xi. note) he will\r\nfor that reason be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea of\r\nthe loved object as a cause in conjunction with the image of his\r\nrival; that is, he will be (III. xiii.) affected with hatred\r\ntowards the loved object and also towards his rival (III. xv.\r\nCoroll.), which latter he will envy as enjoying the beloved\r\nobject. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;This hatred towards an object of love joined with envy\r\nis called Jealousy, which accordingly is nothing else but a\r\nwavering of the disposition arising from combined love and\r\nhatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who is envied.\r\nFurther, this hatred towards the object of love will be greater,\r\nin proportion to the pleasure which the jealous man had been wont\r\nto derive from the reciprocated love of the said object; and\r\nalso in proportion to the feelings he had previously entertained\r\ntowards his rival. If he had hated him, he will forthwith hate\r\nthe object of his love, because he conceives it is pleasurably\r\naffected by one whom he himself hates: and also because he is\r\ncompelled to associate the image of his loved one with the image\r\nof him whom he hates. This condition generally comes into play\r\nin the case of love for a woman: for he who thinks, that a woman\r\nwhom he loves prostitutes herself to another, will feel pain, not\r\nonly because his own desire is restrained, but also because,\r\nbeing compelled to associate the image of her he loves with the\r\nparts of shame and the excreta of another, he therefore shrinks\r\nfrom her.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWe must add, that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved\r\nwith the same joyful countenance as before, and this also gives\r\nhim pain as a lover, as I will now show.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXVI. He who remembers a thing, in which he has once\r\ntaken delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances\r\nas when he first took delight therein.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Everything, which a man has seen in conjunction with\r\nthe object of his love, will be to him accidentally a cause of\r\npleasure (III. xv.); he will, therefore, desire to possess it,\r\nin conjunction with that wherein he has taken delight; in other\r\nwords, he will desire to possess the object of his love under the\r\nsame circumstances as when he first took delight therein. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;A lover will, therefore, feel pain if one of the\r\naforesaid attendant circumstances be missing.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;For, in so far as he finds some circumstance to be\r\nmissing, he conceives something which excludes its existence. As\r\nhe is assumed to be desirous for love\u0027s sake of that thing or\r\ncircumstance (by the last Prop.), he will, in so far as he\r\nconceives it to be missing, feel pain (III. xix.). Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;This pain, in so far as it has reference to the absence\r\nof the object of love, is called Regret.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXVII. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or\r\nlove, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Pain diminishes or constrains a man\u0027s power of\r\nactivity (III. xi. note), in other words (III. vii.), diminishes\r\nor constrains the effort, wherewith he endeavours to persist in\r\nhis own being; therefore (III. v.) it is contrary to the said\r\nendeavour: thus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain are\r\ndirected to removing that pain. But (by the definition of pain),\r\nin proportion as the pain is greater, so also is it necessarily\r\nopposed to a greater part of man\u0027s power of activity; therefore\r\nthe greater the pain, the greater the power of activity employed\r\nto remove it; that is, the greater will be the desire or\r\nappetite in endeavouring to remove it. Again, since pleasure\r\n(III. xi. note) increases or aids a man\u0027s power of activity, it\r\nmay easily be shown in like manner, that a man affected by\r\npleasure has no desire further than to preserve it, and his\r\ndesire will be in proportion to the magnitude of the pleasure.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nLastly, since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain\r\nand pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavour,\r\nappetite, or desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be\r\ngreater in proportion to the hatred or love. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXVIII. If a man has begun to hate an object of his love,\r\nso that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being\r\nequal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it,\r\nand his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his\r\nformer love.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;If a man begins to hate that which he had loved, more\r\nof his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never\r\nloved it. For love is a pleasure (III. xiii. note) which a man\r\nendeavours as far as he can to render permanent (III. xxviii.);\r\nhe does so by regarding the object of his love as present, and by\r\naffecting it as far as he can pleasurably; this endeavour is\r\ngreater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is the\r\nendeavour to bring about that the beloved should return his\r\naffection (III. xxxiii.). Now these endeavours are constrained\r\nby hatred towards the object of love (III. xiii. Coroll. and III.\r\nxxiii.); wherefore the lover (III. xi. note) will for this cause\r\nalso be affected with pain, the more so in proportion as his love\r\nhas been greater; that is, in addition to the pain caused by\r\nhatred, there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the\r\nobject; wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater\r\npain, or in other words, will hate it more than if he had never\r\nloved it, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former\r\nlove was greater. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an\r\ninjury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue\r\nto himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the\r\nsame law, seek to benefit him.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;To hate a man is (III. xiii. note) to conceive him as\r\na cause of pain; therefore he who hates a man will endeavour to\r\nremove or destroy him. But if anything more painful, or, in\r\nother words, a greater evil, should accrue to the hater\r\nthereby\u0026mdash;and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by not\r\ncarrying out the injury, which he planned against the object of\r\nhis hate\u0026mdash;he will desire to abstain from inflicting that injury\r\n(III. xxviii.), and the strength of his endeavour (III. xxxvii.)\r\nwill be greater than his former endeavour to do injury, and will\r\ntherefore prevail over it, as we asserted. The second part of\r\nthis proof proceeds in the same manner. Wherefore he who hates\r\nanother, etc. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;By good I here mean every kind of pleasure, and all\r\nthat conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our\r\nlongings, whatsoever they may be. By evil, I mean every kind of\r\npain, especially that which frustrates our longings. For I have\r\nshown (III. ix. note) that we in no case desire a thing because\r\nwe deem it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good because\r\nwe desire it: consequently we deem evil that which we shrink\r\nfrom; everyone, therefore, according to his particular emotions,\r\njudges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better,\r\nwhat is worse, lastly, what is best, and what is worst. Thus a\r\nmiser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want of\r\nmoney the worst; an ambitious man desires nothing so much as\r\nglory, and fears nothing so much as shame. To an envious man\r\nnothing is more delightful than another\u0027s misfortune, and nothing\r\nmore painful than another\u0027s success. So every man, according to\r\nhis emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or\r\nuseless. The emotion, which induces a man to turn from that\r\nwhich he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, is\r\ncalled timidity, which may accordingly be defined as the fear\r\nwhereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as\r\nfuture by encountering a lesser evil (III. xxviii.). But if the\r\nevil which he fears be shame, timidity becomes bashfulness.\r\nLastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the\r\nfear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose,\r\nfear becomes consternation, especially if both the evils feared\r\nbe very great.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XL. He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and\r\nbelieves that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate\r\nthat other in return.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;He who conceives another as affected with hatred, will\r\nthereupon be affected himself with hatred (III. xxvii.), that is,\r\nwith pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause. But, by\r\nthe hypothesis, he conceives no cause for this pain except him\r\nwho is his enemy; therefore, from conceiving that he is hated by\r\nsome one, he will be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea\r\nof his enemy; in other words, he will hate his enemy in return.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;He who thinks that he has given just cause for hatred\r\nwill (III. xxx. and note) be affected with shame; but this case\r\n(III. xxv.) rarely happens. This reciprocation of hatred may\r\nalso arise from the hatred, which follows an endeavour to injure\r\nthe object of our hate (III. xxxix.). He therefore who conceives\r\nthat he is hated by another will conceive his enemy as the cause\r\nof some evil or pain; thus he will be affected with pain or\r\nfear, accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause; in other\r\nwords, he will be affected with hatred towards his enemy, as I\r\nsaid above.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary I.\u0026mdash;He who conceives, that one whom he loves hates\r\nhim, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. For, in so\r\nfar as he conceives that he is an object of hatred, he is\r\ndetermined to hate his enemy in return. But, by the hypothesis,\r\nhe nevertheless loves him: wherefore he will be a prey to\r\nconflicting hatred and love.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary II.\u0026mdash;If a man conceives that one, whom he has\r\nhitherto regarded without emotion, has done him any injury from\r\nmotives of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in\r\nkind.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;He who conceives, that another hates him, will (by the\r\nlast proposition) hate his enemy in return, and (III. xxvi.) will\r\nendeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully;\r\nhe will moreover endeavour to do him an injury (III. xxxix.).\r\nNow the first thing of this sort which he conceives is the injury\r\ndone to himself; he will, therefore, forthwith endeavour to\r\nrepay it in kind. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;The endeavour to injure one whom we hate is called\r\nAnger; the endeavour to repay in kind injury done to ourselves\r\nis called Revenge.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLI. If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and\r\nbelieves that he has given no cause for such love, he will love\r\nthat other in return. (Cf. III. xv. Coroll., and III. xvi.)\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This proposition is proved in the same way as the\r\npreceding one. See also the note appended thereto.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;If he believes that he has given just cause for the\r\nlove, he will take pride therein (III. xxx. and note); this is\r\nwhat most often happens (III. xxv.), and we said that its\r\ncontrary took place whenever a man conceives himself to be hated\r\nby another. (See note to preceding proposition.) This\r\nreciprocal love, and consequently the desire of benefiting him\r\nwho loves us (III. xxxix.), and who endeavours to benefit us, is\r\ncalled gratitude or thankfulness. It thus appears that men are\r\nmuch more prone to take vengeance than to return benefits.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;He who imagines that he is loved by one whom he\r\nhates, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. This is\r\nproved in the same way as the first corollary of the preceding\r\nproposition.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;If hatred be the prevailing emotion, he will endeavour\r\nto injure him who loves him; this emotion is called cruelty,\r\nespecially if the victim be believed to have given no ordinary\r\ncause for hatred.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLII. He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from\r\nmotives of love or honour will feel pain, if he sees that the\r\nbenefit is received without gratitude.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;When a man loves something similar to himself, he\r\nendeavours, as far as he can, to bring it about that he should be\r\nloved thereby in return (III. xxxiii.). Therefore he who has\r\nconferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire, which\r\nhe feels of being loved in return; that is (III. xxxiv.) from\r\nthe hope of honour or (III. xxx. note) pleasure; hence he will\r\nendeavour, as far as he can, to conceive this cause of honour, or\r\nto regard it as actually existing. But, by the hypothesis, he\r\nconceives something else, which excludes the existence of the\r\nsaid cause of honour: wherefore he will thereat feel pain (III.\r\nxix.). Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLIII. Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can\r\non the other hand be destroyed by love.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;He who conceives, that an object of his hatred hates\r\nhim in return, will thereupon feel a new hatred, while the former\r\nhatred (by hypothesis) still remains (III. xl.). But if, on the\r\nother hand, he conceives that the object of hate loves him, he\r\nwill to this extent (III. xxxviii.) regard himself with pleasure,\r\nand (III. xxix.) will endeavour to please the cause of his\r\nemotion. In other words, he will endeavour not to hate him (III.\r\nxli.), and not to affect him painfully; this endeavour (III.\r\nxxxvii.) will be greater or less in proportion to the emotion\r\nfrom which it arises. Therefore, if it be greater than that\r\nwhich arises from hatred, and through which the man endeavours to\r\naffect painfully the thing which he hates, it will get the better\r\nof it and banish the hatred from his mind. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLIV. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes\r\ninto love: and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not\r\npreceded it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The proof proceeds in the same way as Prop. xxxviii.\r\nof this Part: for he who begins to love a thing, which he was\r\nwont to hate or regard with pain, from the very fact of loving\r\nfeels pleasure. To this pleasure involved in love is added the\r\npleasure arising from aid given to the endeavour to remove the\r\npain involved in hatred (III. xxxvii.), accompanied by the idea\r\nof the former object of hatred as cause.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Though this be so, no one will endeavour to hate\r\nanything, or to be affected with pain, for the sake of enjoying\r\nthis greater pleasure; that is, no one will desire that he\r\nshould be injured, in the hope of recovering from the injury, nor\r\nlong to be ill for the sake of getting well. For everyone will\r\nalways endeavour to persist in his being, and to ward off pain as\r\nfar as he can. If the contrary is conceivable, namely, that a\r\nman should desire to hate someone, in order that he might love\r\nhim the more thereafter, he will always desire to hate him. For\r\nthe strength of love is in proportion to the strength of the\r\nhatred, wherefore the man would desire, that the hatred be\r\ncontinually increased more and more, and, for a similar reason,\r\nhe would desire to become more and more ill, in order that he\r\nmight take a greater pleasure in being restored to health: in\r\nsuch a case he would always endeavour to be ill, which (III. vi.)\r\nis absurd.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLV. If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself\r\nhates anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will\r\nhate that person.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards him\r\nwho hates it (III. xl.); therefore the lover, in conceiving that\r\nanyone hates the beloved object, conceives the beloved thing as\r\naffected by hatred, in other words (III. xiii.), by pain;\r\nconsequently he is himself affected by pain accompanied by the\r\nidea of the hater of the beloved thing as cause; that is, he\r\nwill hate him who hates anything which he himself loves (III.\r\nxiii. note). Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLVI. If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully\r\nby anyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and if\r\nthe pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said\r\nstranger as cause, under the general category of the class or\r\nnation: the man will feel love or hatred, not only to the\r\nindividual stranger, but also to the whole class or nation\r\nwhereto he belongs.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This is evident from III. xvi.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLVII. Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate is\r\ndestroyed, or suffers other injury, is never unaccompanied by a\r\ncertain pain in us.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This is evident from III. xxvii. For in so far as we\r\nconceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain,\r\nwe ourselves feel pain.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;This proposition can also be proved from the Corollary\r\nto II. xvii. Whenever we remember anything, even if it does not\r\nactually exist, we regard it only as present, and the body is\r\naffected in the same manner; wherefore, in so far as the\r\nremembrance of the thing is strong, a man is determined to regard\r\nit with pain; this determination, while the image of the thing\r\nin question lasts, is indeed checked by the remembrance of other\r\nthings excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing, but is not\r\ndestroyed: hence, a man only feels pleasure in so far as the\r\nsaid determination is checked: for this reason the joy arising\r\nfrom the injury done to what we hate is repeated, every time we\r\nremember that object of hatred. For, as we have said, when the\r\nimage of the thing in question, is aroused, inasmuch as it\r\ninvolves the thing\u0027s existence, it determines the man to regard\r\nthe thing with the same pain as he was wont to do, when it\r\nactually did exist. However, since he has joined to the image of\r\nthe thing other images, which exclude its existence, this\r\ndetermination to pain is forthwith checked, and the man rejoices\r\nafresh as often as the repetition takes place. This is the cause\r\nof men\u0027s pleasure in recalling past evils, and delight in\r\nnarrating dangers from which they have escaped. For when men\r\nconceive a danger, they conceive it as still future, and are\r\ndetermined to fear it; this determination is checked afresh by\r\nthe idea of freedom, which became associated with the idea of the\r\ndanger when they escaped therefrom: this renders them secure\r\nafresh: therefore they rejoice afresh.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLVIII. Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is\r\ndestroyed, if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain\r\ninvolved in the latter emotion, be associated with the idea of\r\nanother cause: and will be diminished in proportion as we\r\nconceive Peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This Prop. is evident from the mere definition of love\r\nand hatred (III. xiii. note). For pleasure is called love\r\ntowards Peter, and pain is called hatred towards Peter, simply in\r\nso far as Peter is regarded as the cause of one emotion or the\r\nother. When this condition of causality is either wholly or\r\npartly removed, the emotion towards Peter also wholly or in part\r\nvanishes. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLIX. Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive to\r\nbe free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than if\r\nit were felt towards a thing acting by necessity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;A thing which we conceive as free must (I. Def. vii.)\r\nbe perceived through itself without anything else. If,\r\ntherefore, we conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain, we\r\nshall therefore (III. xiii. note) love it or hate it, and shall\r\ndo so with the utmost love or hatred that can arise from the\r\ngiven emotion. But if the thing which causes the emotion be\r\nconceived as acting by necessity, we shall then (by the same Def.\r\nvii. Part I.) conceive it not as the sole cause, but as one of\r\nthe causes of the emotion, and therefore our love or hatred\r\ntowards it will be less. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows, that men, thinking themselves to be\r\nfree, feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards\r\nanything else: to this consideration we must add the imitation\r\nof emotions treated of in III. xxvii., xxxiv., xl. and xliii.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. L. Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope\r\nor fear.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This proposition is proved in the same way as III.\r\nxv., which see, together with the note to III. xviii.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Things which are accidentally the causes of hope or\r\nfear are called good or evil omens. Now, in so far as such omens\r\nare the cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitions of\r\nhope and fear given in III. xviii. note) the causes also of\r\npleasure and pain; consequently we, to this extent, regard them\r\nwith love or hatred, and endeavour either to invoke them as means\r\ntowards that which we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles,\r\nor causes of that which we fear. It follows, further, from III.\r\nxxv., that we are naturally so constituted as to believe readily\r\nin that which we hope for, and with difficulty in that which we\r\nfear; moreover, we are apt to estimate such objects above or\r\nbelow their true value. Hence there have arisen superstitions,\r\nwhereby men are everywhere assailed. However, I do not think it\r\nworth while to point out here the vacillations springing from\r\nhope and fear; it follows from the definition of these emotions,\r\nthat there can be no hope without fear, and no fear without hope,\r\nas I will duly explain in the proper place. Further, in so far\r\nas we hope for or fear anything, we regard it with love or hatred;\r\nthus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear what we\r\nhave said concerning love and hatred.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LI. Different men may be differently affected by the same\r\nobject, and the same man may be differently affected at different\r\ntimes by the same object.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The human body is affected by external bodies in a\r\nvariety of ways (II. Post. iii.). Two men may therefore be\r\ndifferently affected at the same time, and therefore (by Ax. i.\r\nafter Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) may be differently affected by\r\none and the same object. Further (by the same Post.) the human\r\nbody can be affected sometimes in one way, sometimes in another;\r\nconsequently (by the same Axiom) it may be differently affected\r\nat different times by one and the same object. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;We thus see that it is possible, that what one man\r\nloves another may hate, and that what one man fears another may\r\nnot fear; or, again, that one and the same man may love what he\r\nonce hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on.\r\nAgain, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good,\r\nwhat bad, what better, and what worse (III. xxxix. note), it\r\nfollows that men\u0027s judgments may vary no less than their\r\nemotions[10], hence when we compare some with others, we\r\ndistinguish them solely by the diversity of their emotions, and\r\nstyle some intrepid, others timid, others by some other epithet.\r\nFor instance, I shall call a man intrepid, if he despises an evil\r\nwhich I am accustomed to fear; if I further take into\r\nconsideration, that, in his desire to injure his enemies and to\r\nbenefit those whom he loves, he is not restrained by the fear of\r\nan evil which is sufficient to restrain me, I shall call him\r\ndaring. Again, a man will appear timid to me, if he fears an\r\nevil which I am accustomed to despise; and if I further take\r\ninto consideration that his desire is restrained by the fear of\r\nan evil, which is not sufficient to restrain me, I shall say that\r\nhe is cowardly; and in like manner will everyone pass judgment.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine\r\nintellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nLastly, from this inconstancy in the nature of human\r\njudgment, inasmuch as a man often judges things solely by his\r\nemotions, and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause\r\npleasure or pain, and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent,\r\nare often purely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty of\r\nthings alluded to in III. xxviii.; we may readily conceive that\r\na man may be at one time affected with pleasure, and at another\r\nwith pain, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause. Thus we\r\ncan easily understand what are Repentance and Self\u0026mdash;complacency.\r\nRepentance is pain, accompanied by the idea of one\u0027s self as\r\ncause; Self\u0026mdash;complacency is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of\r\none\u0027s self as cause, and these emotions are most intense because\r\nmen believe themselves to be free (III. xlix.).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LII. An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction\r\nwith others, and which we do not conceive to have any property\r\nthat is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so\r\nlong, as an object which we conceive to have some property\r\npeculiar to itself.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;As soon as we conceive an object which we have seen in\r\nconjunction with others, we at once remember those others (II.\r\nxviii. and note), and thus we pass forthwith from the\r\ncontemplation of one object to the contemplation of another\r\nobject. And this is the case with the object, which we conceive\r\nto have no property that is not common to many. For we thereupon\r\nassume that we are regarding therein nothing, which we have not\r\nbefore seen in conjunction with other objects. But when we\r\nsuppose that we conceive an object something special, which we\r\nhave never seen before, we must needs say that the mind, while\r\nregarding that object, has in itself nothing which it can fall to\r\nregarding instead thereof; therefore it is determined to the\r\ncontemplation of that object only. Therefore an object, \u0026amp;c.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;This mental modification, or imagination of a\r\nparticular thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called\r\nWonder; but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called\r\nConsternation, because wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossed\r\nin the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no power to\r\nthink of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil. If,\r\nhowever, the object of wonder be a man\u0027s prudence, industry, or\r\nanything of that sort, inasmuch as the said man, is thereby\r\nregarded as far surpassing ourselves, wonder is called Veneration;\r\notherwise, if a man\u0027s anger, envy, \u0026amp;c., be what we wonder at,\r\nthe emotion is called Horror. Again, if it be the prudence,\r\nindustry, or what not, of a man we love, that we wonder at, our\r\nlove will on this account be the greater (III. xii.), and when\r\njoined to wonder or veneration is called Devotion. We may in\r\nlike manner conceive hatred, hope, confidence, and the other\r\nemotions, as associated with wonder; and we should thus be able\r\nto deduce more emotions than those which have obtained names in\r\nordinary speech. Whence it is evident, that the names of the\r\nemotions have been applied in accordance rather with their\r\nordinary manifestations than with an accurate knowledge of their\r\nnature.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTo wonder is opposed Contempt, which generally arises from\r\nthe fact that, because we see someone wondering at, loving, or\r\nfearing something, or because something, at first sight, appears\r\nto be like things, which we ourselves wonder at, love, fear, \u0026amp;c.,\r\nwe are, in consequence (III. xv. Coroll. and III. xxvii.),\r\ndetermined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing. But if from\r\nthe presence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing,\r\nwe are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause\r\nof wonder, love, fear, \u0026amp;c., the mind then, by the presence of the\r\nthing, remains determined to think rather of those qualities\r\nwhich are not in it, than of those which are in it; whereas, on\r\nthe other hand, the presence of the object would cause it more\r\nparticularly to regard that which is therein. As devotion\r\nsprings from wonder at a thing which we love, so does Derision\r\nspring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear, and Scorn\r\nfrom contempt of folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence.\r\nLastly, we can conceive the emotions of love, hope, honour, \u0026amp;c.,\r\nin association with contempt, and can thence deduce other\r\nemotions, which are not distinguished one from another by any\r\nrecognized name.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LIII. When the mind regards itself and its own power of\r\nactivity, it feels pleasure: and that pleasure is greater in\r\nproportion to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and\r\nits own power of activity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;A man does not know himself except through the\r\nmodifications of his body, and the ideas thereof (II. xix. and\r\nxxiii.). When, therefore, the mind is able to contemplate\r\nitself, it is thereby assumed to pass to a greater perfection, or\r\n(III. xi. note) to feel pleasure; and the pleasure will be\r\ngreater in proportion to the distinctness, wherewith it is able\r\nto conceive itself and its own power of activity. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;This pleasure is fostered more and more, in\r\nproportion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others.\r\nFor the more he conceives himself as praised by others, the more\r\nhe will imagine them to be affected with pleasure, accompanied by\r\nthe idea of himself (III. xxix. note); thus he is (III. xxvii.)\r\nhimself affected with greater pleasure, accompanied by the idea\r\nof himself. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LIV. The mind endeavours to conceive only such things as\r\nassert its power of activity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The endeavour or power of the mind is the actual\r\nessence thereof (III. vii.); but the essence of the mind\r\nobviously only affirms that which the mind is and can do; not\r\nthat which it neither is nor can do; therefore the mind\r\nendeavours to conceive only such things as assert or affirm its\r\npower of activity. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LV. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels\r\npain thereat.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The essence of the mind only affirms that which the\r\nmind is, or can do; in other words, it is the mind\u0027s nature to\r\nconceive only such things as assert its power of activity (last\r\nProp.). Thus, when we say that the mind contemplates its own\r\nweakness, we are merely saying that while the mind is attempting\r\nto conceive something which asserts its power of activity, it is\r\nchecked in its endeavour\u0026mdash;\u0026mdash;in other words (III. xi. note), it\r\nfeels pain. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;This pain is more and more fostered, if a man\r\nconceives that he is blamed by others; this may be proved in the\r\nsame way as the corollary to III. liii.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;This pain, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness,\r\nis called humility; the pleasure, which springs from the\r\ncontemplation of ourselves, is called self\u0026mdash;love or\r\nself\u0026mdash;complacency. And inasmuch as this feeling is renewed as\r\noften as a man contemplates his own virtues, or his own power of\r\nactivity, it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his own\r\nexploits, and displaying the force both of his body and mind, and\r\nalso that, for this reason, men are troublesome to one another.\r\nAgain, it follows that men are naturally envious (III. xxiv.\r\nnote, and III. xxxii. note), rejoicing in the shortcomings of\r\ntheir equals, and feeling pain at their virtues. For whenever a\r\nman conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure (III.\r\nliii.), in proportion as his actions display more perfection, and\r\nhe conceives them more distinctly\u0026mdash;that is (II. xl. note), in\r\nproportion as he can distinguish them from others, and regard\r\nthem as something special. Therefore, a man will take most\r\npleasure in contemplating himself, when he contemplates some\r\nquality which he denies to others. But, if that which he affirms\r\nof himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals in\r\ngeneral, he will not be so greatly pleased: he will, on the\r\ncontrary, feel pain, if he conceives that his own actions fall\r\nshort when compared with those of others. This pain (III.\r\nxxviii.) he will endeavour to remove, by putting a wrong\r\nconstruction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far as he\r\ncan, embellishing his own.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred\r\nand envy, which latter is fostered by their education. For\r\nparents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely\r\nby the spur of honour and envy. But, perhaps, some will scruple\r\nto assent to what I have said, because we not seldom admire men\u0027s\r\nvirtues, and venerate their possessors. In order to remove such\r\ndoubts, I append the following corollary.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;No one envies the virtue of anyone who is not his\r\nequal.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Envy is a species of hatred (III. xxiv. note) or (III.\r\nxiii. note) pain, that is (III. xi. note), a modification whereby\r\na man\u0027s power of activity, or endeavour towards activity, is\r\nchecked. But a man does not endeavour or desire to do anything,\r\nwhich cannot follow from his nature as it is given; therefore a\r\nman will not desire any power of activity or virtue (which is the\r\nsame thing) to be attributed to him, that is appropriate to\r\nanother\u0027s nature and foreign to his own; hence his desire cannot\r\nbe checked, nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue\r\nin some one unlike himself, consequently he cannot envy such an\r\none. But he can envy his equal, who is assumed to have the same\r\nnature as himself. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;When, therefore, as we said in the note to III. lii.,\r\nwe venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude,\r\n\u0026amp;c., we do so, because we conceive those qualities to be peculiar\r\nto him, and not as common to our nature; we, therefore, no more\r\nenvy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall, or lions\r\nfor being courageous.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LVI. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of\r\ndesire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as\r\nvacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love,\r\nhatred, hope, fear, \u0026amp;c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we\r\nare affected.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotions\r\ncompounded thereof, or derived therefrom, are passions, or\r\npassive states (III. xi. note); now we are necessarily passive\r\n(III. i.), in so far as we have inadequate ideas; and only in so\r\nfar as we have such ideas are we passive (III. iii.); that is,\r\nwe are only necessarily passive (II. xl. note), in so far as we\r\nconceive, or (II. xvii. and note) in so far as we are affected by\r\nan emotion, which involves the nature of our own body, and the\r\nnature of an external body. Wherefore the nature of every\r\npassive state must necessarily be so explained, that the nature\r\nof the object whereby we are affected be expressed. Namely, the\r\npleasure, which arises from, say, the object A, involves the\r\nnature of that object A, and the pleasure, which arises from the\r\nobject B, involves the nature of the object B; wherefore these\r\ntwo pleasurable emotions are by nature different, inasmuch as the\r\ncauses whence they arise are by nature different. So again the\r\nemotion of pain, which arises from one object, is by nature\r\ndifferent from the pain arising from another object, and,\r\nsimilarly, in the case of love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation,\r\n\u0026amp;c.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThus, there are necessarily as many kinds of pleasure, pain,\r\nlove, hatred, \u0026amp;c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are\r\naffected. Now desire is each man\u0027s essence or nature, in so far\r\nas it is conceived as determined to a particular action by any\r\ngiven modification of itself (III. ix. note); therefore,\r\naccording as a man is affected through external causes by this or\r\nthat kind of pleasure, pain, love, hatred, \u0026amp;c., in other words,\r\naccording as his nature is disposed in this or that manner, so\r\nwill his desire be of one kind or another, and the nature of one\r\ndesire must necessarily differ from the nature of another desire,\r\nas widely as the emotions differ, wherefrom each desire arose.\r\nThus there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of\r\npleasure, pain, love, \u0026amp;c., consequently (by what has been shown)\r\nthere are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of objects\r\nwhereby we are affected. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the last\r\nproposition, must be very numerous, the chief are luxury,\r\ndrunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition, being merely species of\r\nlove or desire, displaying the nature of those emotions in a\r\nmanner varying according to the object, with which they are\r\nconcerned. For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition,\r\n\u0026amp;c., we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking,\r\nvenery, riches, and fame. Furthermore, these emotions, in so far\r\nas we distinguish them from others merely by the objects\r\nwherewith they are concerned, have no contraries. For\r\ntemperance, sobriety, and chastity, which we are wont to oppose\r\nto luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions or passive\r\nstates, but indicate a power of the mind which moderates the\r\nlast\u0026mdash;named emotions. However, I cannot here explain the\r\nremaining kinds of emotions (seeing that they are as numerous as\r\nthe kinds of objects), nor, if I could, would it be necessary.\r\nIt is sufficient for our purpose, namely, to determine the\r\nstrength of the emotions, and the mind\u0027s power over them, to have\r\na general definition of each emotion. It is sufficient, I\r\nrepeat, to understand the general properties of the emotions and\r\nthe mind, to enable us to determine the quality and extent of the\r\nmind\u0027s power in moderating and checking the emotions. Thus,\r\nthough there is a great difference between various emotions of\r\nlove, hatred, or desire, for instance between love felt towards\r\nchildren, and love felt towards a wife, there is no need for us\r\nto take cognizance of such differences, or to track out further\r\nthe nature and origin of the emotions.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LVII. Any emotion of a given individual differs from the\r\nemotion of another individual, only in so far as the essence of\r\nthe one individual differs from the essence of the other.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This proposition is evident from Ax. i. (which see\r\nafter Lemma iii. Prop. xiii., Part II.). Nevertheless, we will\r\nprove it from the nature of the three primary emotions.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAll emotions are attributable to desire, pleasure, or pain,\r\nas their definitions above given show. But desire is each man\u0027s\r\nnature or essence (III. ix. note); therefore desire in one\r\nindividual differs from desire in another individual, only in so\r\nfar as the nature or essence of the one differs from the nature\r\nor essence of the other. Again, pleasure and pain are passive\r\nstates or passions, whereby every man\u0027s power or endeavour to\r\npersist in his being is increased or diminished, helped or\r\nhindered (III. xi. and note). But by the endeavour to persist in\r\nits being, in so far as it is attributable to mind and body in\r\nconjunction, we mean appetite and desire (III. ix. note);\r\ntherefore pleasure and pain are identical with desire or\r\nappetite, in so far as by external causes they are increased or\r\ndiminished, helped or hindered, in other words, they are every\r\nman\u0027s nature; wherefore the pleasure and pain felt by one man\r\ndiffer from the pleasure and pain felt by another man, only in so\r\nfar as the nature or essence of the one man differs from the\r\nessence of the other; consequently, any emotion of one\r\nindividual only differs, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animals\r\nwhich are called irrational (for after learning the origin of\r\nmind we cannot doubt that brutes feel) only differ from man\u0027s\r\nemotions, to the extent that brute nature differs from human\r\nnature. Horse and man are alike carried away by the desire of\r\nprocreation; but the desire of the former is equine, the desire\r\nof the latter is human. So also the lusts and appetites of\r\ninsects, fishes, and birds must needs vary according to the\r\nseveral natures. Thus, although each individual lives content\r\nand rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has his\r\nbeing, yet the life, wherein each is content and rejoices, is\r\nnothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said individual, and\r\nhence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of\r\nanother, to the extent that the essence of one differs from the\r\nessence of another. Lastly, it follows from the foregoing\r\nproposition, that there is no small difference between the joy\r\nwhich actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by a\r\nphilosopher, as I just mention here by the way. Thus far I have\r\ntreated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far as he is\r\npassive. It remains to add a few words on those attributable to\r\nhim in so far as he is active.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LVIII. Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities\r\nor passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and\r\ndesire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;When the mind conceives itself and its power of\r\nactivity, it feels pleasure (III. liii.): now the mind\r\nnecessarily contemplates itself, when it conceives a true or\r\nadequate idea (II. xliii.). But the mind does conceive certain\r\nadequate ideas (II. xl. note 2.). Therefore it feels pleasure in\r\nso far as it conceives adequate ideas; that is, in so far as it\r\nis active (III. i.). Again, the mind, both in so far as it has\r\nclear and distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas,\r\nendeavours to persist in its own being (III. ix.); but by such\r\nan endeavour we mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.);\r\ntherefore, desire is also attributable to us, in so far as we\r\nunderstand, or (III. i.) in so far as we are active. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LIX. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as\r\nactive, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or\r\ndesire.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;All emotions can be referred to desire, pleasure, or\r\npain, as their definitions, already given, show. Now by pain we\r\nmean that the mind\u0027s power of thinking is diminished or checked\r\n(III. xi. and note); therefore, in so far as the mind feels\r\npain, its power of understanding, that is, of activity, is\r\ndiminished or checked (III. i.); therefore, no painful emotions\r\ncan be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active, but\r\nonly emotions of pleasure and desire, which (by the last Prop.)\r\nare attributable to the mind in that condition. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;All actions following from emotion, which are\r\nattributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set\r\ndown to strength of character (fortitudo), which I divide into\r\ncourage (animositas) and highmindedness (generositas). By\r\ncourage I mean the desire whereby every man strives to preserve\r\nhis own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason.\r\nBy highmindedness I mean the desire whereby every man endeavours,\r\nsolely under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to\r\nunite them to himself in friendship. Those actions, therefore,\r\nwhich have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down to\r\ncourage, those which aim at the good of others I set down to\r\nhighmindedness. Thus temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind\r\nin danger, \u0026amp;c., are varieties of courage; courtesy, mercy, \u0026amp;c.,\r\nare varieties of highmindedness.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI think I have thus explained, and displayed through their\r\nprimary causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit,\r\nwhich arise from the combination of the three primary emotions,\r\nto wit, desire, pleasure, and pain. It is evident from what I\r\nhave said, that we are in many ways driven about by external\r\ncauses, and that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds\r\nwe toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate. But I\r\nhave said, that I have only set forth the chief conflicting\r\nemotions, not all that might be given. For, by proceeding in the\r\nsame way as above, we can easily show that love is united to\r\nrepentance, scorn, shame, \u0026amp;c. I think everyone will agree from\r\nwhat has been said, that the emotions may be compounded one with\r\nanother in so many ways, and so many variations may arise\r\ntherefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation. However,\r\nfor my purpose, it is enough to have enumerated the most\r\nimportant; to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would be\r\nmore curious than profitable. It remains to remark concerning\r\nlove, that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a\r\nthing which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment,\r\nacquires a new disposition, whereby it is determined in another\r\nway, other images of things are aroused in it, and the mind\r\nbegins to conceive and desire something fresh. For example, when\r\nwe conceive something which generally delights us with its\r\nflavour, we desire to enjoy, that is, to eat it. But whilst we\r\nare thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body is\r\notherwise disposed. If, therefore, when the body is thus\r\notherwise disposed, the image of the food which is present be\r\nstimulated, and consequently the endeavour or desire to eat it be\r\nstimulated also, the new disposition of the body will feel\r\nrepugnance to the desire or attempt, and consequently the\r\npresence of the food which we formerly longed for will become\r\nodious. This revulsion of feeling is called satiety or\r\nweariness. For the rest, I have neglected the outward\r\nmodifications of the body observable in emotions, such, for\r\ninstance, as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, \u0026amp;c., for these\r\nare attributable to the body only, without any reference to the\r\nmind. Lastly, the definitions of the emotions require to be\r\nsupplemented in a few points; I will therefore repeat them,\r\ninterpolating such observations as I think should here and there\r\nbe added.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4\u003e\r\nDEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI. Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is\r\nconceived, as determined to a particular activity by some given\r\nmodification of itself.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation.\u0026mdash;We have said above, in the note to Prop. ix. of\r\nthis part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness thereof;\r\nfurther, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far as it is\r\ndetermined to act in a way tending to promote its own\r\npersistence. But, in the same note, I also remarked that,\r\nstrictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite\r\nand desire. For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or\r\nnot, it remains one and the same appetite. Thus, in order to\r\navoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained from\r\nexplaining desire by appetite; but I have take care to define it\r\nin such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, all those\r\nendeavours of human nature, which we distinguish by the terms\r\nappetite, will, desire, or impulse. I might, indeed, have said,\r\nthat desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is conceived\r\nas determined to a particular activity; but from such a\r\ndefinition (cf. II. xxiii.) it would not follow that the mind can\r\nbe conscious of its desire or appetite. Therefore, in order to\r\nimply the cause of such consciousness, it was necessary to add,\r\nin so far as it is determined by some given modification, \u0026amp;c.\r\nFor, by a modification of man\u0027s essence, we understand every\r\ndisposition of the said essence, whether such disposition be\r\ninnate, or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of\r\nthought, or solely under the attribute of extension, or whether,\r\nlastly, it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes.\r\nBy the term desire, then, I here mean all man\u0027s endeavours,\r\nimpulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary according to each\r\nman\u0027s disposition, and are, therefore, not seldom opposed one to\r\nanother, according as a man is drawn in different directions, and\r\nknows not where to turn.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nII. Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater\r\nperfection.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIII. Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less\r\nperfection.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;I say transition: for pleasure is not perfection\r\nitself. For, if man were born with the perfection to which he\r\npasses, he would possess the same, without the emotion of\r\npleasure. This appears more clearly from the consideration of\r\nthe contrary emotion, pain. No one can deny, that pain consists\r\nin the transition to a less perfection, and not in the less\r\nperfection itself: for a man cannot be pained, in so far as he\r\npartakes of perfection of any degree. Neither can we say, that\r\npain consists in the absence of a greater perfection. For\r\nabsence is nothing, whereas the emotion of pain is an activity;\r\nwherefore this activity can only be the activity of transition\r\nfrom a greater to a less perfection\u0026mdash;in other words, it is an\r\nactivity whereby a man\u0027s power of action is lessened or\r\nconstrained (cf. III. xi. note). I pass over the definitions of\r\nmerriment, stimulation, melancholy, and grief, because these\r\nterms are generally used in reference to the body, and are merely\r\nkinds of pleasure or pain.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIV. Wonder is the conception (imaginatio) of anything, wherein\r\nthe mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in\r\nquestion has no connection with other concepts (cf. III. lii. and\r\nnote).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;In the note to II. xviii. we showed the reason,\r\nwhy the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, straightway\r\nfalls to the contemplation of another thing, namely, because the\r\nimages of the two things are so associated and arranged, that one\r\nfollows the other. This state of association is impossible, if\r\nthe image of the thing be new; the mind will then be at a stand\r\nin the contemplation thereof, until it is determined by other\r\ncauses to think of something else.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThus the conception of a new object, considered in itself, is\r\nof the same nature as other conceptions; hence, I do not include\r\nwonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I should so include\r\nit, inasmuch as this distraction of the mind arises from no\r\npositive cause drawing away the mind from other objects, but\r\nmerely from the absence of a cause, which should determine the\r\nmind to pass from the contemplation of one object to the\r\ncontemplation of another.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary\r\nemotions (as I said in the note to III. xi.), namely, pleasure,\r\npain, and desire. I have spoken of wonder simply because it is\r\ncustomary to speak of certain emotions springing from the three\r\nprimitive ones by different names, when they are referred to the\r\nobjects of our wonder. I am led by the same motive to add a\r\ndefinition of contempt.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nV. Contempt is the conception of anything which touches the mind\r\nso little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine those\r\nqualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it (cf.\r\nIII. lii. note).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe definitions of veneration and scorn I here pass over, for\r\nI am not aware that any emotions are named after them.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nVI. Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external\r\ncause.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;This definition explains sufficiently clearly the\r\nessence of love; the definition given by those authors who say\r\nthat love is the lover\u0027s wish to unite himself to the loved\r\nobject expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and,\r\nas such authors have not sufficiently discerned love\u0027s essence,\r\nthey have been unable to acquire a true conception of its\r\nproperties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted\r\nto be very obscure. It must, however, be noted, that when I say\r\nthat it is a property of love, that the lover should wish to\r\nunite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by wish\r\nconsent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind (for I\r\nhave shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious); neither do I\r\nmean a desire of being united to the loved object when it is\r\nabsent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand; for\r\nlove can be conceived without either of these desires; but by\r\nwish I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on account of\r\nthe presence of the beloved object, whereby the pleasure of the\r\nlover is strengthened, or at least maintained.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nVII. Hatred is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external\r\ncause.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;These observations are easily grasped after what\r\nhas been said in the explanation of the preceding definition (cf.\r\nalso III. xiii. note).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nVIII. Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of\r\nsomething which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIX. Aversion is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which\r\nis accidentally the cause of pain (cf. III. xv. note).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nX. Devotion is love towards one whom we admire.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;Wonder (admiratio) arises (as we have shown, III.\r\nlii.) from the novelty of a thing. If, therefore, it happens\r\nthat the object of our wonder is often conceived by us, we shall\r\ncease to wonder at it; thus we see, that the emotion of devotion\r\nreadily degenerates into simple love.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXI. Derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving the\r\npresence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which we\r\nhate.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;In so far as we despise a thing which we hate, we\r\ndeny existence thereof (III. lii. note), and to that extent\r\nrejoice (III. xx.). But since we assume that man hates that\r\nwhich he derides, it follows that the pleasure in question is not\r\nwithout alloy (cf. III. xlvii. note).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXII. Hope is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of\r\nsomething past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt\r\nthe issue.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXIII. Fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of\r\nsomething past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt\r\nthe issue (cf. III. xviii. note).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;From these definitions it follows, that there is\r\nno hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingled with hope.\r\nFor he, who depends on hope and doubts concerning the issue of\r\nanything, is assumed to conceive something, which excludes the\r\nexistence of the said thing in the future; therefore he, to this\r\nextent, feels pain (cf. III. xix.); consequently, while\r\ndependent on hope, he fears for the issue. Contrariwise he, who\r\nfears, in other words doubts, concerning the issue of something\r\nwhich he hates, also conceives something which excludes the\r\nexistence of the thing in question; to this extent he feels\r\npleasure, and consequently to this extent he hopes that it will\r\nturn out as he desires (III. xx.).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXIV. Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something\r\npast or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXV. Despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or\r\nfuture, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;Thus confidence springs from hope, and despair\r\nfrom fear, when all cause for doubt as to the issue of an event\r\nhas been removed: this comes to pass, because man conceives\r\nsomething past or future as present and regards it as such, or\r\nelse because he conceives other things, which exclude the\r\nexistence of the causes of his doubt. For, although we can never\r\nbe absolutely certain of the issue of any particular event (II.\r\nxxxi. Coroll.), it may nevertheless happen that we feel no doubt\r\nconcerning it. For we have shown, that to feel no doubt\r\nconcerning a thing is not the same as to be quite certain of it\r\n(II. xlix. note). Thus it may happen that we are affected by the\r\nsame emotion of pleasure or pain concerning a thing past or\r\nfuture, as concerning the conception of a thing present; this I\r\nhave already shown in III. xviii., to which, with its note, I\r\nrefer the reader.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXVI. Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past,\r\nwhich has had an issue beyond our hope.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXVII. Disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea of\r\nsomething past, which has had an issue contrary to our hope.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXVIII. Pity is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which has\r\nbefallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves (cf.\r\nIII. xxii. note, and III. xxvii. note).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;Between pity and sympathy (misericordia) there\r\nseems to be no difference, unless perhaps that the former term is\r\nused in reference to a particular action, and the latter in\r\nreference to a disposition.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXIX. Approval is love towards one who has done good to another.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXX. Indignation is hatred towards one who has done evil to\r\nanother.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;I am aware that these terms are employed in\r\nsenses somewhat different from those usually assigned. But my\r\npurpose is to explain, not the meaning of words, but the nature\r\nof things. I therefore make use of such terms, as may convey my\r\nmeaning without any violent departure from their ordinary\r\nsignification. One statement of my method will suffice. As for\r\nthe cause of the above\u0026mdash;named emotions see III. xxvii. Coroll. i.,\r\nand III. xxii. note.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXI. Partiality is thinking too highly of anyone because of the\r\nlove we bear him.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXII. Disparagement is thinking too meanly of anyone because we\r\nhate him.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;Thus partiality is an effect of love, and\r\ndisparagement an effect of hatred: so that partiality may also\r\nbe defined as love, in so far as it induces a man to think too\r\nhighly of a beloved object. Contrariwise, disparagement may be\r\ndefined as hatred, in so far as it induces a man to think too\r\nmeanly of a hated object. Cf. III. xxvi. note.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXIII. Envy is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be\r\npained by another\u0027s good fortune, and to rejoice in another\u0027s\r\nevil fortune.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;Envy is generally opposed to sympathy, which, by\r\ndoing some violence to the meaning of the word, may therefore be\r\nthus defined:\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXIV. Sympathy (misericordia) is love, in so far as it induces a\r\nman to feel pleasure at another\u0027s good fortune, and pain at\r\nanother\u0027s evil fortune.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;Concerning envy see the notes to III. xxiv. and\r\nxxxii. These emotions also arise from pleasure or pain\r\naccompanied by the idea of something external, as cause either in\r\nitself or accidentally. I now pass on to other emotions, which\r\nare accompanied by the idea of something within as a cause.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXV. Self\u0026mdash;approval is pleasure arising from a man\u0027s\r\ncontemplation of himself and his own power of action.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXVI. Humility is pain arising from a man\u0027s contemplation of his\r\nown weakness of body or mind.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;Self\u0026mdash;complacency is opposed to humility, in so\r\nfar as we thereby mean pleasure arising from a contemplation of\r\nour own power of action; but, in so far as we mean thereby\r\npleasure accompanied by the idea of any action which we believe\r\nwe have performed by the free decision of our mind, it is opposed\r\nto repentance, which we may thus define:\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXVII. Repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of some\r\naction, which we believe we have performed by the free decision\r\nof our mind.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;The causes of these emotions we have set forth in\r\nIII. li. note, and in III. liii., liv., lv. and note. Concerning\r\nthe free decision of the mind see II. xxxv. note. This is\r\nperhaps the place to call attention to the fact, that it is\r\nnothing wonderful that all those actions, which are commonly\r\ncalled wrong, are followed by pain, and all those, which are\r\ncalled right, are followed by pleasure. We can easily gather\r\nfrom what has been said, that this depends in great measure on\r\neducation. Parents, by reprobating the former class of actions,\r\nand by frequently chiding their children because of them, and\r\nalso by persuading to and praising the latter class, have brought\r\nit about, that the former should be associated with pain and the\r\nlatter with pleasure. This is confirmed by experience. For\r\ncustom and religion are not the same among all men, but that\r\nwhich some consider sacred others consider profane, and what some\r\nconsider honourable others consider disgraceful. According as\r\neach man has been educated, he feels repentance for a given\r\naction or glories therein.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXVIII. Pride is thinking too highly of one\u0027s self from\r\nself\u0026mdash;love.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;Thus pride is different from partiality, for the\r\nlatter term is used in reference to an external object, but pride\r\nis used of a man thinking too highly of himself. However, as\r\npartiality is the effect of love, so is pride the effect or\r\nproperty of self\u0026mdash;love, which may therefore be thus defined, love\r\nof self or self\u0026mdash;approval, in so far as it leads a man to think\r\ntoo highly of himself. To this emotion there is no contrary.\r\nFor no one thinks too meanly of himself because of self\u0026mdash;hatred;\r\nI say that no one thinks too meanly of himself, in so far as he\r\nconceives that he is incapable of doing this or that. For\r\nwhatsoever a man imagines that he is incapable of doing, he\r\nimagines this of necessity, and by that notion he is so disposed,\r\nthat he really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot\r\ndo. For, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so long\r\nis he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is it\r\nimpossible for him to do it. However, if we consider such\r\nmatters as only depend on opinion, we shall find it conceivable\r\nthat a man may think too meanly of himself; for it may happen,\r\nthat a man, sorrowfully regarding his own weakness, should\r\nimagine that he is despised by all men, while the rest of the\r\nworld are thinking of nothing less than of despising him. Again,\r\na man may think too meanly of himself, if he deny of himself in\r\nthe present something in relation to a future time of which he is\r\nuncertain. As, for instance, if he should say that he is unable\r\nto form any clear conceptions, or that he can desire and do\r\nnothing but what is wicked and base, \u0026amp;c. We may also say, that a\r\nman thinks too meanly of himself, when we see him from excessive\r\nfear of shame refusing to do things which others, his equals,\r\nventure. We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pride an\r\nemotion which I will call self\u0026mdash;abasement, for as from\r\nself\u0026mdash;complacency springs pride, so from humility springs\r\nself\u0026mdash;abasement, which I will accordingly thus define:\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXIX. Self\u0026mdash;abasement is thinking too meanly of one\u0027s self by\r\nreason of pain.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;We are nevertheless generally accustomed to\r\noppose pride to humility, but in that case we pay more attention\r\nto the effect of either emotion than to its nature. We are wont\r\nto call proud the man who boasts too much (III. xxx. note), who\r\ntalks of nothing but his own virtues and other people\u0027s faults,\r\nwho wishes to be first; and lastly who goes through life with a\r\nstyle and pomp suitable to those far above him in station. On\r\nthe other hand, we call humble the man who too often blushes, who\r\nconfesses his faults, who sets forth other men\u0027s virtues, and\r\nwho, lastly, walks with bent head and is negligent of his attire.\r\nHowever, these emotions, humility and self\u0026mdash;abasement, are\r\nextremely rare. For human nature, considered in itself, strives\r\nagainst them as much as it can (see III. xiii., liv.); hence\r\nthose, who are believed to be most self\u0026mdash;abased and humble, are\r\ngenerally in reality the most ambitious and envious.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXX. Honour[11] is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action\r\nof our own, which we believe to be praised by others.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[11] Gloria.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXXI. Shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of\r\nour own, which we believe to be blamed by others.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;On this subject see the note to III. xxx. But we\r\nshould here remark the difference which exists between shame and\r\nmodesty. Shame is the pain following the deed whereof we are\r\nashamed. Modesty is the fear or dread of shame, which restrains\r\na man from committing a base action. Modesty is usually opposed\r\nto shamelessness, but the latter is not an emotion, as I will\r\nduly show; however, the names of the emotions (as I have\r\nremarked already) have regard rather to their exercise than to\r\ntheir nature.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI have now fulfilled the task of explaining the emotions\r\narising from pleasure and pain. I therefore proceed to treat of\r\nthose which I refer to desire.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXXII. Regret is the desire or appetite to possess something,\r\nkept alive by the remembrance of the said thing, and at the same\r\ntime constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude\r\nthe existence of it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;When we remember a thing, we are by that very\r\nfact, as I have already said more than once, disposed to\r\ncontemplate it with the same emotion as if it were something\r\npresent; but this disposition or endeavour, while we are awake,\r\nis generally checked by the images of things which exclude the\r\nexistence of that which we remember. Thus when we remember\r\nsomething which affected us with a certain pleasure, we by that\r\nvery fact endeavour to regard it with the same emotion of\r\npleasure as though it were present, but this endeavour is at once\r\nchecked by the remembrance of things which exclude the existence\r\nof the thing in question. Wherefore regret is, strictly\r\nspeaking, a pain opposed to that of pleasure, which arises from\r\nthe absence of something we hate (cf. III. xlvii. note). But, as\r\nthe name regret seems to refer to desire, I set this emotion\r\ndown, among the emotions springing from desire.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXXIII. Emulation is the desire of something, engendered in us\r\nby our conception that others have the same desire.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;He who runs away, because he sees others running\r\naway, or he who fears, because he sees others in fear; or again,\r\nhe who, on seeing that another man has burnt his hand, draws\r\ntowards him his own hand, and moves his body as though his own\r\nwere burnt; such an one can be said to imitate another\u0027s\r\nemotion, but not to emulate him; not because the causes of\r\nemulation and imitation are different, but because it has become\r\ncustomary to speak of emulation only in him, who imitates that\r\nwhich we deem to be honourable, useful, or pleasant. As to the\r\ncause of emulation, cf. III. xxvii. and note. The reason why\r\nthis emotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen from III.\r\nxxxii. and note.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXXIV. Thankfulness or Gratitude is the desire or zeal springing\r\nfrom love, whereby we endeavour to benefit him, who with similar\r\nfeelings of love has conferred a benefit on us. Cf. III. xxxix.\r\nnote and xl.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXXV. Benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity.\r\nCf. III. xxvii. note.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXXVI. Anger is the desire, whereby through hatred we are\r\ninduced to injure one whom we hate, III. xxxix.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXXVII. Revenge is the desire whereby we are induced, through\r\nmutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar feelings, has\r\ninjured us. (See III. xl. Coroll. ii and note.)\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXXVIII. Cruelty or savageness is the desire, whereby a man is\r\nimpelled to injure one whom we love or pity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;To cruelty is opposed clemency, which is not a\r\npassive state of the mind, but a power whereby man restrains his\r\nanger and revenge.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXXIX. Timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil, which we\r\ndread, by undergoing a lesser evil. Cf. III. xxxix. note.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXL. Daring is the desire, whereby a man is set on to do\r\nsomething dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXLI. Cowardice is attributed to one, whose desire is checked by\r\nthe fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;Cowardice is, therefore, nothing else but the\r\nfear of some evil, which most men are wont not to fear; hence I\r\ndo not reckon it among the emotions springing from desire.\r\nNevertheless, I have chosen to explain it here, because, in so\r\nfar as we look to the desire, it is truly opposed to the emotion\r\nof daring.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXLII. Consternation is attributed to one, whose desire of\r\navoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;Consternation is, therefore, a species of\r\ncowardice. But, inasmuch as consternation arises from a double\r\nfear, it may be more conveniently defined as a fear which keeps a\r\nman so bewildered and wavering, that he is not able to remove the\r\nevil. I say bewildered, in so far as we understand his desire of\r\nremoving the evil to be constrained by his amazement. I say\r\nwavering, in so far as we understand the said desire to be\r\nconstrained by the fear of another evil, which equally torments\r\nhim: whence it comes to pass that he knows not, which he may\r\navert of the two. On this subject, see III. xxxix. note, and\r\nIII. lii. note. Concerning cowardice and daring, see III. li.\r\nnote.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXLIII. Courtesy, or deference (Humanitas seu modestia), is the\r\ndesire of acting in a way that should please men, and refraining\r\nfrom that which should displease them.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXLIV. Ambition is the immoderate desire of power.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;Ambition is the desire, whereby all the emotions\r\n(cf. III. xxvii. and xxxi.) are fostered and strengthened;\r\ntherefore this emotion can with difficulty be overcome. For, so\r\nlong as a man is bound by any desire, he is at the same time\r\nnecessarily bound by this. \"The best men,\" says Cicero, \"are\r\nespecially led by honour. Even philosophers, when they write a\r\nbook contemning honour, sign their names thereto,\" and so on.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXLV. Luxury is excessive desire, or even love of living\r\nsumptuously.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXLVI. Intemperance is the excessive desire and love of drinking.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXLVII. Avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXLVIII. Lust is desire and love in the matter of sexual\r\nintercourse.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;Whether this desire be excessive or not, it is\r\nstill called lust. These last five emotions (as I have shown in\r\nIII. lvi.) have on contraries. For deference is a species of\r\nambition. Cf. III. xxix. note.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAgain, I have already pointed out, that temperance, sobriety,\r\nand chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of the\r\nmind. It may, nevertheless, happen, that an avaricious, an\r\nambitious, or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating,\r\ndrinking, or sexual indulgence, yet avarice, ambition, and fear\r\nare not contraries to luxury, drunkenness, and debauchery. For\r\nan avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself with food and\r\ndrink at another man\u0027s expense. An ambitious man will restrain\r\nhimself in nothing, so long as he thinks his indulgences are\r\nsecret; and if he lives among drunkards and debauchees, he will,\r\nfrom the mere fact of being ambitious, be more prone to those\r\nvices. Lastly, a timid man does that which he would not. For\r\nthough an avaricious man should, for the sake of avoiding death,\r\ncast his riches into the sea, he will none the less remain\r\navaricious; so, also, if a lustful man is downcast, because he\r\ncannot follow his bent, he does not, on the ground of abstention,\r\ncease to be lustful. In fact, these emotions are not so much\r\nconcerned with the actual feasting, drinking, \u0026amp;c., as with the\r\nappetite and love of such. Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to\r\nthese emotions, but high\u0026mdash;mindedness and valour, whereof I will\r\nspeak presently.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind I\r\npass over in silence, first, because they arise from the\r\ncompounding of the emotions already described; secondly, because\r\nmany of them have no distinctive names, which shows that it is\r\nsufficient for practical purposes to have merely a general\r\nknowledge of them. However, it is established from the\r\ndefinitions of the emotions, which we have set forth, that they\r\nall spring from desire, pleasure, or pain, or, rather, that there\r\nis nothing besides these three; wherefore each is wont to be\r\ncalled by a variety of names in accordance with its various\r\nrelations and extrinsic tokens. If we now direct our attention\r\nto these primitive emotions, and to what has been said concerning\r\nthe nature of the mind, we shall be able thus to define the\r\nemotions, in so far as they are referred to the mind only.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4\u003e\r\nGENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nEmotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a\r\nconfused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, or\r\nany part thereof, a force for existence (existendi vis) greater\r\nor less than before, and by the presence of which the mind is\r\ndetermined to think of one thing rather than another.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nExplanation\u0026mdash;I say, first, that emotion or passion of the soul\r\nis a confused idea. For we have shown that the mind is only\r\npassive, in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas. (III.\r\niii.) I say, further, whereby the mind affirms concerning its\r\nbody or any part thereof a force for existence greater than\r\nbefore. For all the ideas of bodies, which we possess, denote\r\nrather the actual disposition of our own body (II. xvi. Coroll.\r\nii.) than the nature of an external body. But the idea which\r\nconstitutes the reality of an emotion must denote or express the\r\ndisposition of the body, or of some part thereof, because its\r\npower of action or force for existence is increased or\r\ndiminished, helped or hindered. But it must be noted that, when\r\nI say a greater or less force for existence than before, I do not\r\nmean that the mind compares the present with the past disposition\r\nof the body, but that the idea which constitutes the reality of\r\nan emotion affirms something of the body, which, in fact,\r\ninvolves more or less of reality than before.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact (II.\r\nxi., xiii.), that it affirms the actual existence of its own\r\nbody, and inasmuch as we understand by perfection the very\r\nessence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to greater or\r\nless perfection, when it happens to affirm concerning its own\r\nbody, or any part thereof, something involving more or less\r\nreality than before.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhen, therefore, I said above that the power of the mind is\r\nincreased or diminished, I merely meant that the mind had formed\r\nof its own body, or of some part thereof, an idea involving more\r\nor less of reality, than it had already affirmed concerning its\r\nown body. For the excellence of ideas, and the actual power of\r\nthinking are measured by the excellence of the object. Lastly, I\r\nhave added by the presence of which the mind is determined to\r\nthink of one thing rather than another, so that, besides the\r\nnature of pleasure and pain, which the first part of the\r\ndefinition explains, I might also express the nature of desire.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap04\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cH2 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nPART IV:\r\n\u003c/H2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nOf Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4\u003e\r\nPREFACE\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHuman infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I\r\nname bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is\r\nnot his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: so much\r\nso, that he is often compelled, while seeing that which is better\r\nfor him, to follow that which is worse. Why this is so, and what\r\nis good or evil in the emotions, I propose to show in this part\r\nof my treatise. But, before I begin, it would be well to make a\r\nfew prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection, good\r\nand evil.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhen a man has purposed to make a given thing, and has\r\nbrought it to perfection, his work will be pronounced perfect,\r\nnot only by himself, but by everyone who rightly knows, or thinks\r\nthat he knows, the intention and aim of its author. For\r\ninstance, suppose anyone sees a work (which I assume to be not\r\nyet completed), and knows that the aim of the author of that work\r\nis to build a house, he will call the work imperfect; he will,\r\non the other hand, call it perfect, as soon as he sees that it is\r\ncarried through to the end, which its author had purposed for it.\r\nBut if a man sees a work, the like whereof he has never seen\r\nbefore, and if he knows not the intention of the artificer, he\r\nplainly cannot know, whether that work be perfect or imperfect.\r\nSuch seems to be the primary meaning of these terms.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut, after men began to form general ideas, to think out\r\ntypes of houses, buildings, towers, \u0026amp;c., and to prefer certain\r\ntypes to others, it came about, that each man called perfect that\r\nwhich he saw agree with the general idea he had formed of the\r\nthing in question, and called imperfect that which he saw agree\r\nless with his own preconceived type, even though it had evidently\r\nbeen completed in accordance with the idea of its artificer.\r\nThis seems to be the only reason for calling natural phenomena,\r\nwhich, indeed, are not made with human hands, perfect or\r\nimperfect: for men are wont to form general ideas of things\r\nnatural, no less than of things artificial, and such ideas they\r\nhold as types, believing that Nature (who they think does nothing\r\nwithout an object) has them in view, and has set them as types\r\nbefore herself. Therefore, when they behold something in Nature,\r\nwhich does not wholly conform to the preconceived type which they\r\nhave formed of the thing in question, they say that Nature has\r\nfallen short or has blundered, and has left her work incomplete.\r\nThus we see that men are wont to style natural phenomena perfect\r\nor imperfect rather from their own prejudices, than from true\r\nknowledge of what they pronounce upon.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow we showed in the Appendix to Part I., that Nature does\r\nnot work with an end in view. For the eternal and infinite\r\nBeing, which we call God or Nature, acts by the same necessity as\r\nthat whereby it exists. For we have shown, that by the same\r\nnecessity of its nature, whereby it exists, it likewise works (I.\r\nxvi.). The reason or cause why God or Nature exists, and the\r\nreason why he acts, are one and the same. Therefore, as he does\r\nnot exist for the sake of an end, so neither does he act for the\r\nsake of an end; of his existence and of his action there is\r\nneither origin nor end. Wherefore, a cause which is called final\r\nis nothing else but human desire, in so far as it is considered\r\nas the origin or cause of anything. For example, when we say\r\nthat to be inhabited is the final cause of this or that house, we\r\nmean nothing more than that a man, conceiving the conveniences of\r\nhousehold life, had a desire to build a house. Wherefore, the\r\nbeing inhabited, in so far as it is regarded as a final cause, is\r\nnothing else but this particular desire, which is really the\r\nefficient cause; it is regarded as the primary cause, because\r\nmen are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires. They\r\nare, as I have often said already, conscious of their own actions\r\nand appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby they are\r\ndetermined to any particular desire. Therefore, the common\r\nsaying that Nature sometimes falls short, or blunders, and\r\nproduces things which are imperfect, I set down among the glosses\r\ntreated of in the Appendix to Part I. Perfection and\r\nimperfection, then, are in reality merely modes of thinking, or\r\nnotions which we form from a comparison among one another of\r\nindividuals of the same species; hence I said above (II. Def.\r\nvi.), that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing. For\r\nwe are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one\r\ngenus, which is called the highest genus, namely, to the category\r\nof Being, whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong.\r\nThus, in so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this\r\ncategory, and comparing them one with another, find that some\r\npossess more of being or reality than others, we, to this extent,\r\nsay that some are more perfect than others. Again, in so far as\r\nwe attribute to them anything implying negation\u0026mdash;as term, end,\r\ninfirmity, etc., we, to this extent, call them imperfect, because\r\nthey do not affect our mind so much as the things which we call\r\nperfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency, or\r\nbecause Nature has blundered. For nothing lies within the scope\r\nof a thing\u0027s nature, save that which follows from the necessity\r\nof the nature of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from\r\nthe necessity of the nature of its efficient cause necessarily\r\ncomes to pass.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAs for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive\r\nquality in things regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of\r\nthinking, or notions which we form from the comparison of things\r\none with another. Thus one and the same thing can be at the same\r\ntime good, bad, and indifferent. For instance, music is good for\r\nhim that is melancholy, bad for him that mourns; for him that is\r\ndeaf, it is neither good nor bad.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNevertheless, though this be so, the terms should still be\r\nretained. For, inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a\r\ntype of human nature which we may hold in view, it will be useful\r\nfor us to retain the terms in question, in the sense I have\r\nindicated.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn what follows, then, I shall mean by, \"good\" that, which we\r\ncertainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the\r\ntype of human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by\r\n\"bad,\" that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in\r\napproaching the said type. Again, we shall that men are more\r\nperfect, or more imperfect, in proportion as they approach more\r\nor less nearly to the said type. For it must be specially\r\nremarked that, when I say that a man passes from a lesser to a\r\ngreater perfection, or vice versâ, I do not mean that he is\r\nchanged from one essence or reality to another; for instance, a\r\nhorse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a\r\nman, as by being changed into an insect. What I mean is, that we\r\nconceive the thing\u0027s power of action, in so far as this is\r\nunderstood by its nature, to be increased or diminished. Lastly,\r\nby perfection in general I shall, as I have said, mean reality\u0026mdash;in\r\nother words, each thing\u0027s essence, in so far as it exists, and\r\noperates in a particular manner, and without paying any regard to\r\nits duration. For no given thing can be said to be more perfect,\r\nbecause it has passed a longer time in existence. The duration\r\nof things cannot be determined by their essence, for the essence\r\nof things involves no fixed and definite period of existence;\r\nbut everything, whether it be more perfect or less perfect, will\r\nalways be able to persist in existence with the same force\r\nwherewith it began to exist; wherefore, in this respect, all\r\nthings are equal.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4\u003e\r\nDEFINITIONS.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI. By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to\r\nus.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nII. By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a\r\nhindrance\r\nto us in the attainment of any good.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n(Concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards the\r\nend.)\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIII. Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while\r\nregarding their essence only, we find nothing therein, which\r\nnecessarily asserts their existence or excludes it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIV. Particular things I call possible in so far as, while\r\nregarding the causes whereby they must be produced, we know not,\r\nwhether such causes be determined for producing them.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n(In I. xxxiii. note. i., I drew no distinction between\r\npossible and contingent, because there was in that place no need\r\nto distinguish them accurately.)\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nV. By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in\r\ndifferent directions, though they are of the same kind, such as\r\nluxury and avarice, which are both species of love, and are\r\ncontraries, not by nature, but by accident.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nVI. What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing, future,\r\npresent, and past, I explained in III. xviii., notes. i. and ii.,\r\nwhich see.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n(But I should here also remark, that we can only distinctly\r\nconceive distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit;\r\nthat is, all objects distant from us more than two hundred\r\nfeet, or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds that\r\nwhich we can distinctly conceive, seem to be an equal distance\r\nfrom us, and all in the same plane; so also objects, whose time\r\nof existing is conceived as removed from the present by a longer\r\ninterval than we can distinctly conceive, seem to be all equally\r\ndistant from the present, and are set down, as it were, to the\r\nsame moment of time.)\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nVII. By an end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean a\r\ndesire.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nVIII. By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing; that\r\nis (III. vii), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a\r\nman\u0027s nature or essence, in so far as it has the power of\r\neffecting what can only be understood by the laws of that nature.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4\u003e\r\nAXIOM.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThere is no individual thing in nature, than which there is\r\nnot another more powerful and strong. Whatsoever thing be given,\r\nthere is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4\u003e\r\nPROPOSITIONS.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. I. No positive quality possessed by a false idea is\r\nremoved by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being\r\ntrue.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge\r\nwhich inadequate ideas involve (II. xxxv.), nor have they any\r\npositive quality on account of which they are called false (II.\r\nxxxiii.); contrariwise, in so far as they are referred to God,\r\nthey are true (II. xxxii.). Wherefore, if the positive quality\r\npossessed by a false idea were removed by the presence of what is\r\ntrue, in virtue of its being true, a true idea would then be\r\nremoved by itself, which (IV. iii.) is absurd. Therefore, no\r\npositive quality possessed by a false idea, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;This proposition is more clearly understood from II.\r\nxvi. Coroll. ii. For imagination is an idea, which indicates\r\nrather the present disposition of the human body than the nature\r\nof the external body; not indeed distinctly, but confusedly;\r\nwhence it comes to pass, that the mind is said to err. For\r\ninstance, when we look at the sun, we conceive that it is distant\r\nfrom us about two hundred feet; in this judgment we err, so long\r\nas we are in ignorance of its true distance; when its true\r\ndistance is known, the error is removed, but not the imagination;\r\nor, in other words, the idea of the sun, which only explains\r\ntho nature of that luminary, in so far as the body is affected\r\nthereby: wherefore, though we know the real distance, we shall\r\nstill nevertheless imagine the sun to be near us. For, as we\r\nsaid in II. xxxv. note, we do not imagine the sun to be so near\r\nus, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the\r\nmind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the\r\nbody is affected thereby. Thus, when the rays of the sun falling\r\non the surface of water are reflected into our eyes, we imagine\r\nthe sun as if it were in the water, though we are aware of its\r\nreal position; and similarly other imaginations, wherein the\r\nmind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural disposition\r\nof the body, or that its power of activity is increased or\r\ndiminished, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish at\r\nits presence. It happens indeed that, when we mistakenly fear an\r\nevil, the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings; but the\r\ncontrary also happens, namely, that we fear an evil which will\r\ncertainly come, and our fear vanishes when we hear false tidings;\r\nthus imaginations do not vanish at the presence of the truth,\r\nin virtue of its being true, but because other imaginations,\r\nstronger than the first, supervene and exclude the present\r\nexistence of that which we imagined, as I have shown in II. xvii.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. II. We are only passive, in so far as we are apart of\r\nNature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;We are said to be passive, when something arises in\r\nus, whereof we are only a partial cause (III. Def. ii.), that is\r\n(III. Def. i.), something which cannot be deduced solely from the\r\nlaws of our nature. We are passive therefore, in so far as we\r\nare a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without\r\nother parts. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. III. The force whereby a man persists in existing is\r\nlimited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external\r\ncauses.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This is evident from the axiom of this part. For,\r\nwhen man is given, there is something else\u0026mdash;say A\u0026mdash;more powerful;\r\nwhen A is given, there is something else\u0026mdash;say B\u0026mdash;more powerful than\r\nA, and so on to infinity; thus the power of man is limited by\r\nthe power of some other thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the\r\npower of external causes. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. IV. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of\r\nNature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes,\r\nsave such as can be understood through his nature only as their\r\nadequate cause.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The power, whereby each particular thing, and\r\nconsequently man, preserves his being, is the power of God or of\r\nNature (I. xxiv. Coroll.); not in so far as it is infinite, but\r\nin so far as it can be explained by the actual human essence\r\n(III. vii.). Thus the power of man, in so far as it is explained\r\nthrough his own actual essence, is a part of the infinite power\r\nof God or Nature, in other words, of the essence thereof (I.\r\nxxxiv.). This was our first point. Again, if it were possible,\r\nthat man should undergo no changes save such as can be understood\r\nsolely through the nature of man, it would follow that he would\r\nnot be able to die, but would always necessarily exist; this\r\nwould be the necessary consequence of a cause whose power was\r\neither finite or infinite; namely, either of man\u0027s power only,\r\ninasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself all\r\nchanges which could spring from external causes; or of the\r\ninfinite power of Nature, whereby all individual things would be\r\nso ordered, that man should be incapable of undergoing any\r\nchanges save such as tended towards his own preservation. But\r\nthe first alternative is absurd (by the last Prop., the proof of\r\nwhich is universal, and can be applied to all individual things).\r\nTherefore, if it be possible, that man should not be capable of\r\nundergoing any changes, save such as can be explained solely\r\nthrough his own nature, and consequently that he must always (as\r\nwe have shown) necessarily exist; such a result must follow from\r\nthe infinite power of God, and consequently (I. xvi.) from the\r\nnecessity of the divine nature, in so far as it is regarded as\r\naffected by the idea of any given man, the whole order of nature\r\nas conceived under the attributes of extension and thought must\r\nbe deducible. It would therefore follow (I. xxi.) that man is\r\ninfinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd. It\r\nis, therefore, impossible, that man should not undergo any\r\nchanges save those whereof he is the adequate cause. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows, that man is necessarily always a\r\nprey to his passions, that he follows and obeys the general order\r\nof nature, and that he accommodates himself thereto, as much as\r\nthe nature of things demands.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. V. The power and increase of every passion, and its\r\npersistence in existing are not defined by the power, whereby we\r\nourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but by the power of\r\nan external cause compared with our own.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The essence of a passion cannot be explained through\r\nour essence alone (III. Deff. i. and ii.), that is (III. vii.),\r\nthe power of a passion cannot be defined by the power, whereby we\r\nourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but (as is shown in\r\nII. xvi.) must necessarily be defined by the power of an external\r\ncause compared with our own. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. VI. The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the\r\nrest of a man\u0027s activities or power, so that the emotion becomes\r\nobstinately fixed to him.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The force and increase of any passion and its\r\npersistence in existing are defined by the power of an external\r\ncause compared with our own (by the foregoing Prop.); therefore\r\n(IV. iii.) it can overcome a man\u0027s power, \u0026amp;e. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. VII. An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by\r\nanother emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for\r\ncontrolling emotion.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is\r\nan idea, whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less\r\nforce of existence than before (cf. the general Definition of the\r\nEmotions at the end of Part III.). When, therefore, the mind is\r\nassailed by any emotion, the body is at the same time affected\r\nwith a modification whereby its power of activity is increased or\r\ndiminished. Now this modification of the body (IV. v.) receives\r\nfrom its cause the force for persistence in its being; which\r\nforce can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause (II.\r\nvi.), in virtue of the body being affected with a modification\r\ncontrary to (III. v.) and stronger than itself (IV. Ax.);\r\nwherefore (II. xii.) the mind is affected by the idea of a\r\nmodification contrary to, and stronger than the former\r\nmodification, in other words, (by the general definition of the\r\nemotions) the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and\r\nstronger than the former emotion, which will exclude or destroy\r\nthe existence of the former emotion; thus an emotion cannot be\r\ndestroyed nor controlled except by a contrary and stronger\r\nemotion. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;An emotion, in so far as it is referred to the\r\nmind, can only be controlled or destroyed through an idea of a\r\nmodification of the body contrary to, and stronger than, that\r\nwhich we are undergoing. For the emotion which we undergo can\r\nonly be checked or destroyed by an emotion contrary to, and\r\nstronger than, itself, in other words, (by the general Definition\r\nof the Emotions) only by an idea of a modification of the body\r\ncontrary to, and stronger than, the modification which we\r\nundergo.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. VIII. The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but\r\nthe emotions of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious\r\nthereof.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;We call a thing good or evil, when it is of service or\r\nthe reverse in preserving our being (IV. Deff. i. and ii.), that\r\nis (III. vii.), when it increases or diminishes, helps or\r\nhinders, our power of activity. Thus, in so far as we perceive\r\nthat a thing affects us with pleasure or pain, we call it good or\r\nevil; wherefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else\r\nbut the idea of the pleasure or pain, which necessarily follows\r\nfrom that pleasurable or painful emotion (II. xxii.). But this\r\nidea is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is united\r\nto body (II. xxi.); that is, there is no real distinction\r\nbetween this idea and the emotion or idea of the modification of\r\nthe body, save in conception only. Therefore the knowledge of\r\ngood and evil is nothing else but the emotion, in so far as we\r\nare conscious thereof. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. IX. An emotion, whereof we conceive the cause to be with\r\nus at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceive\r\nthe cause to be with us.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Imagination or conception is the idea, by which the\r\nmind regards a thing as present (II. xvii. note), but which\r\nindicates the disposition of the mind rather than the nature of\r\nthe external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.). An emotion is\r\ntherefore a conception, in so far as it indicates the disposition\r\nof the body. But a conception (by II. xvii.) is stronger, so\r\nlong as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existence\r\nof the external object; wherefore an emotion is also stronger or\r\nmore intense, when we conceive the cause to be with us at the\r\npresent time, than when we do not conceive the cause to be with\r\nus. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;When I said above in III. xviii. that we are affected\r\nby the image of what is past or future with the same emotion as\r\nif the thing conceived were present, I expressly stated, that\r\nthis is only true in so far as we look solely to the image of the\r\nthing in question itself; for the thing\u0027s nature is unchanged,\r\nwhether we have conceived it or not; I did not deny that the\r\nimage becomes weaker, when we regard as present to us other\r\nthings which exclude the present existence of the future object:\r\nI did not expressly call attention to the fact, because I\r\npurposed to treat of the strength of the emotions in this part of\r\nmy work.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;The image of something past or future, that is, of\r\na thing which we regard as in relation to time past or time\r\nfuture, to the exclusion of time present, is, when other\r\nconditions are equal, weaker than the image of something present;\r\nconsequently an emotion felt towards what is past or future is\r\nless intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion felt\r\ntowards something present.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. X. Towards something future, which we conceive as close at\r\nhand, we are affected more intensely, than if we conceive that\r\nits time for existence is separated from the present by a longer\r\ninterval; so too by the remembrance of what we conceive to have\r\nnot long passed away we are affected more intensely, than if we\r\nconceive that it has long passed away.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand, or\r\nnot long passed away, we conceive that which excludes the\r\npresence of the object less, than if its period of future\r\nexistence were more distant from the present, or if it had long\r\npassed away (this is obvious) therefore (by the foregoing Prop.)\r\nwe are, so far, more intensely affected towards it. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;From the remarks made in Def. vi. of this part it\r\nfollows that, if objects are separated from the present by a\r\nlonger period than we can define in conception, though their\r\ndates of occurrence be widely separated one from the other, they\r\nall affect us equally faintly.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XI. An emotion towards that which we conceive as necessary\r\nis, when other conditions are equal, more intense than an emotion\r\ntowards that which possible, or contingent, or non\u0026mdash;necessary.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary, we,\r\nto that extent, affirm its existence; on the other hand we deny\r\na thing\u0027s existence, in so far as we conceive it not to be\r\nnecessary (I. xxxiii. note. i.); wherefore (IV. ix.) an emotion\r\ntowards that which is necessary is, other conditions being equal,\r\nmore intense than an emotion that which is non\u0026mdash;necessary. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XII. An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to\r\nexist at the present time, and which we conceive as possible, is\r\nmore intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion\r\ntowards a thing contingent.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are\r\naffected by the conception of some further thing, which would\r\nassert the existence of the former (IV. Def. iii.); but, on the\r\nother hand, we (by hypothesis) conceive certain things, which\r\nexclude its present existence. But, in so far as we conceive a\r\nthing to be possible in the future, we there by conceive things\r\nwhich assert its existence (IV. iv.), that is (III. xviii.),\r\nthings which promote hope or fear: wherefore an emotion towards\r\nsomething possible is more vehement. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to\r\nexist in the present, and which we conceive as contingent, is far\r\nfainter, than if we conceive the thing to be present with us.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to exist,\r\nis more intense than it would be, if we conceived the thing as\r\nfuture (IV. ix. Coroll.), and is much more vehement, than if the\r\nfuture time be conceived as far distant from the present (IV.\r\nx.). Therefore an emotion towards a thing, whose period of\r\nexistence we conceive to be far distant from the present, is far\r\nfainter, than if we conceive the thing as present; it is,\r\nnevertheless, more intense, than if we conceived the thing as\r\ncontingent, wherefore an emotion towards a thing, which we regard\r\nas contingent, will be far fainter, than if we conceived the\r\nthing to be present with us. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XIII. Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know\r\nnot to exist in the present, is, other conditions being equal,\r\nfainter than an emotion towards a thing past.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are\r\nnot affected by the image of any other thing, which asserts the\r\nexistence of the said thing (IV. Def. iii.), but, on the other\r\nhand (by hypothesis), we conceive certain things excluding its\r\npresent existence. But, in so far as we conceive it in relation\r\nto time past, we are assumed to conceive something, which recalls\r\nthe thing to memory, or excites the image thereof (II. xviii. and\r\nnote), which is so far the same as regarding it as present (II.\r\nxvii. Coroll.). Therefore (IV. ix.) an emotion towards a thing\r\ncontingent, which we know does not exist in the present, is\r\nfainter, other conditions being equal, than an emotion towards a\r\nthing past. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XIV. A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any\r\nemotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it is\r\nconsidered as an emotion.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;An emotion is an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its\r\nbody a greater or less force of existing than before (by the\r\ngeneral Definition of the Emotions); therefore it has no\r\npositive quality, which can be destroyed by the presence of what\r\nis true; consequently the knowledge of good and evil cannot, by\r\nvirtue of being true, restrain any emotion. But, in so far as\r\nsuch knowledge is an emotion (IV. viii.) if it have more strength\r\nfor restraining emotion, it will to that extent be able to\r\nrestrain the given emotion. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XV. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and bad can\r\nbe quenched or checked by many of the other desires arising from\r\nthe emotions whereby we are assailed.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as\r\nit is an emotion, necessarily arises desire (Def. of the\r\nEmotions, i.), the strength of which is proportioned to the\r\nstrength of the emotion wherefrom it arises (III. xxxvii.). But,\r\ninasmuch as this desire arises (by hypothesis) from the fact of\r\nour truly understanding anything, it follows that it is also\r\npresent with us, in so far as we are active (III. i.), and must\r\ntherefore be understood through our essence only (III. Def. ii.);\r\nconsequently (III. vii.) its force and increase can be defined\r\nsolely by human power. Again, the desires arising from the\r\nemotions whereby we are assailed are stronger, in proportion as\r\nthe said emotions are more vehement; wherefore their force and\r\nincrease must be defined solely by the power of external causes,\r\nwhich, when compared with our own power, indefinitely surpass it\r\n(IV. iii.); hence the desires arising from like emotions may be\r\nmore vehement, than the desire which arises from a true knowledge\r\nof good and evil, and may, consequently, control or quench it.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XVI. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil,\r\nin so far as such knowledge regards what is future, may be more\r\neasily controlled or quenched, than the desire for what is\r\nagreeable at the present moment.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive as future,\r\nis fainter than emotion towards a thing that is present (IV. ix.\r\nCoroll.). But desire, which arises from the true knowledge of\r\ngood and evil, though it be concerned with things which are good\r\nat the moment, can be quenched or controlled by any headstrong\r\ndesire (by the last Prop., the proof whereof is of universal\r\napplication). Wherefore desire arising from such knowledge, when\r\nconcerned with the future, can be more easily controlled or\r\nquenched, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XVII. Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and\r\nevil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is\r\ncontingent, can be controlled far more easily still, than desire\r\nfor things that are present.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This Prop. is proved in the same way as the last Prop.\r\nfrom IV. xii. Coroll.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;I think I have now shown the reason, why men are moved\r\nby opinion more readily than by true reason, why it is that the\r\ntrue knowledge of good and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul,\r\nand often yields to every kind of passion. This state of things\r\ngave rise to the exclamation of the poet:[12]\u0026mdash;\u0026mdash;\r\n\"The better path I gaze at and approve,\r\nThe worse\u0026mdash;I follow.\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[12] Ov. Met. vii.20, \"Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nEcclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind,\r\nwhen he says, \"He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.\" I\r\nhave not written the above with the object of drawing the\r\nconclusion, that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge, or\r\nthat a wise man is on a par with a fool in controlling his\r\nemotions, but because it is necessary to know the power and the\r\ninfirmity of our nature, before we can determine what reason can\r\ndo in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power. I\r\nhave said, that in the present part I shall merely treat of human\r\ninfirmity. The power of reason over the emotions I have settled\r\nto treat separately.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XVIII. Desire arising from pleasure is, other conditions\r\nbeing equal, stronger than desire arising from pain.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Desire is the essence of a man (Def. of the Emotions,\r\ni.), that is, the endeavour whereby a man endeavours to persist\r\nin his own being. Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is, by\r\nthe fact of pleasure being felt, increased or helped; on the\r\ncontrary, desire arising from pain is, by the fact of pain being\r\nfelt, diminished or hindered; hence the force of desire arising\r\nfrom pleasure must be defined by human power together with the\r\npower of an external cause, whereas desire arising from pain must\r\nbe defined by human power only. Thus the former is the stronger\r\nof the two. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;In these few remarks I have explained the causes of\r\nhuman infirmity and inconstancy, and shown why men do not abide\r\nby the precepts of reason. It now remains for me to show what\r\ncourse is marked out for us by reason, which of the emotions are\r\nin harmony with the rules of human reason, and which of them are\r\ncontrary thereto. But, before I begin to prove my Propositions\r\nin detailed geometrical fashion, it is advisable to sketch them\r\nbriefly in advance, so that everyone may more readily grasp my\r\nmeaning.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAs reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands,\r\nthat every man should love himself, should seek that which is\r\nuseful to him\u0026mdash;I mean, that which is really useful to him, should\r\ndesire everything which really brings man to greater perfection,\r\nand should, each for himself, endeavour as far as he can to\r\npreserve his own being. This is as necessarily true, as that a\r\nwhole is greater than its part. (Cf. III. iv.)\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAgain, as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance\r\nwith the laws of one\u0027s own nature (IV. Def. viii.), and as no one\r\nendeavours to preserve his own being, except in accordance with\r\nthe laws of his own nature, it follows, first, that the\r\nfoundation of virtue is the endeavour to preserve one\u0027s own\r\nbeing, and that happiness consists in man\u0027s power of preserving\r\nhis own being; secondly, that virtue is to be desired for its\r\nown sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful\r\nto us, for the sake of which we should desire it; thirdly and\r\nlastly, that suicides are weak\u0026mdash;minded, and are overcome by\r\nexternal causes repugnant to their nature. Further, it follows\r\nfrom Postulate iv., Part II., that we can never arrive at doing\r\nwithout all external things for the preservation of our being or\r\nliving, so as to have no relations with things which are outside\r\nourselves. Again, if we consider our mind, we see that our\r\nintellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and could\r\nunderstand nothing besides itself. There are, then, many things\r\noutside ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, to\r\nbe desired. Of such none can be discerned more excellent, than\r\nthose which are in entire agreement with our nature. For if, for\r\nexample, two individuals of entirely the same nature are united,\r\nthey form a combination twice as powerful as either of them\r\nsingly.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTherefore, to man there is nothing more useful than\r\nman\u0026mdash;nothing, I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being\r\ncan be wished for by men, than that all should so in all points\r\nagree, that the minds and bodies of all should form, as it were,\r\none single mind and one single body, and that all should, with\r\none consent, as far as they are able, endeavour to preserve their\r\nbeing, and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all.\r\nHence, men who are governed by reason\u0026mdash;that is, who seek what is\r\nuseful to them in accordance with reason, desire for themselves\r\nnothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind,\r\nand, consequently, are just, faithful, and honourable in their\r\nconduct.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSuch are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thus\r\nbriefly to indicate, before beginning to prove them in greater\r\ndetail. I have taken this course, in order, if possible, to gain\r\nthe attention of those who believe, that the principle that every\r\nman is bound to seek what is useful for himself is the foundation\r\nof impiety, rather than of piety and virtue.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTherefore, after briefly showing that the contrary is the\r\ncase, I go on to prove it by the same method, as that whereby I\r\nhave hitherto proceeded.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XIX. Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessarily\r\ndesires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The knowledge of good and evil is (IV. viii.) the\r\nemotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious\r\nthereof; therefore, every man necessarily desires what he thinks\r\ngood, and shrinks from what he thinks bad. Now this appetite is\r\nnothing else but man\u0027s nature or essence (Cf. the Definition of\r\nAppetite, III. ix. note, and Def. of the Emotions, i.).\r\nTherefore, every man, solely by the laws of his nature, desires\r\nthe one, and shrinks from the other, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XX. The more every man endeavours, and is able to seek\r\nwhat is useful to him\u0026mdash;in other words, to preserve his own\r\nbeing\u0026mdash;the more is he endowed with virtue; on the contrary, in\r\nproportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, that\r\nis, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Virtue is human power, which is defined solely by\r\nman\u0027s essence (IV. Def. viii.), that is, which is defined solely\r\nby the endeavour made by man to persist in his own being.\r\nWherefore, the more a man endeavours, and is able to preserve his\r\nown being, the more is he endowed with virtue, and, consequently\r\n(III. iv. and vi.), in so far as a man neglects to preserve his\r\nown being, he is wanting in power. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good, or\r\npreserving his own being, unless he be overcome by causes\r\nexternal and foreign to his nature. No one, I say, from the\r\nnecessity of his own nature, or otherwise than under compulsion\r\nfrom external causes, shrinks from food, or kills himself: which\r\nlatter may be done in a variety of ways. A man, for instance,\r\nkills himself under the compulsion of another man, who twists\r\nround his right hand, wherewith he happened to have taken up a\r\nsword, and forces him to turn the blade against his own heart;\r\nor, again, he may be compelled, like Seneca, by a tyrant\u0027s\r\ncommand, to open his own veins\u0026mdash;that is, to escape a greater evil\r\nby incurring, a lesser; or, lastly, latent external causes may\r\nso disorder his imagination, and so affect his body, that it may\r\nassume a nature contrary to its former one, and whereof the idea\r\ncannot exist in the mind (III. x.) But that a man, from the\r\nnecessity of his own nature, should endeavour to become\r\nnon\u0026mdash;existent, is as impossible as that something should be made\r\nout of nothing, as everyone will see for himself, after a little\r\nreflection.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXI. No one can desire to be blessed, to act rightly, and\r\nto live rightly, without at the same time wishing to be, act, and\r\nto live\u0026mdash;in other words, to actually exist.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The proof of this proposition, or rather the\r\nproposition itself, is self\u0026mdash;evident, and is also plain from the\r\ndefinition of desire. For the desire of living, acting, \u0026amp;c.,\r\nblessedly or rightly, is (Def. of the Emotions, i.) the essence\r\nof man\u0026mdash;that is (III. vii.), the endeavour made by everyone to\r\npreserve his own being. Therefore, no one can desire, \u0026amp;c.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXII. No virtue can be conceived as prior to this\r\nendeavour to preserve one\u0027s own being.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The effort for self\u0026mdash;preservation is the essence of a\r\nthing (III. vii.); therefore, if any virtue could be conceived\r\nas prior thereto, the essence of a thing would have to be\r\nconceived as prior to itself, which is obviously absurd.\r\nTherefore no virtue, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;The effort for self\u0026mdash;preservation is the first and\r\nonly foundation of virtue. For prior to this principle nothing\r\ncan be conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXIII. Man, in so far as he is determined to a particular\r\naction because he has inadequate ideas, cannot be absolutely said\r\nto act in obedience to virtue; he can only be so described, in\r\nso far as he is determined for the action because he understands.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;In so far as a man is determined to an action through\r\nhaving inadequate ideas, he is passive (III. i.), that is (III.\r\nDeff. i., and iii.), he does something, which cannot be perceived\r\nsolely through his essence, that is (by IV. Def. viii.), which\r\ndoes not follow from his virtue. But, in so far as he is\r\ndetermined for an action because he understands, he is active;\r\nthat is, he does something, which is perceived through his\r\nessence alone, or which adequately follows from his virtue.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXIV. To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in us\r\nthe same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve one\u0027s being\r\n(these three terms are identical in meaning) in accordance with\r\nthe dictates of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to\r\none\u0027s self.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing\r\nelse but to act according to the laws of one\u0027s own nature. But\r\nwe only act, in so far as we understand (III. iii.): therefore\r\nto act in obedience to virtue is in us nothing else but to act,\r\nto live, or to preserve one\u0027s being in obedience to reason, and\r\nthat on the basis of seeking what is useful for us (IV. xxii.\r\nCoroll.). Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXV. No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of\r\nanything else.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to\r\npersist in its being, is defined solely by the essence of the\r\nthing itself (III. vii.); from this alone, and not from the\r\nessence of anything else, it necessarily follows (III. vi.) that\r\neveryone endeavours to preserve his being. Moreover, this\r\nproposition is plain from IV. xxii. Coroll., for if a man should\r\nendeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else,\r\nthe last\u0026mdash;named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue,\r\nwhich, by the foregoing corollary, is absurd. Therefore no one,\r\n\u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXVI. Whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is\r\nnothing further than to understand; neither does the mind, in so\r\nfar as it makes use of reason, judge anything to be useful to it,\r\nsave such things as are conducive to understanding.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The effort for self\u0026mdash;preservation is nothing else but\r\nthe essence of the thing in question (III. vii.), which, in so\r\nfar as it exists such as it is, is conceived to have force for\r\ncontinuing in existence (III. vi.) and doing such things as\r\nnecessarily follow from its given nature (see the Def. of\r\nAppetite, III. ix. note). But the essence of reason is nought\r\nelse but our mind, in so far as it clearly and distinctly\r\nunderstands (see the definition in II. xl. note. ii.); therefore\r\n(II. xl.) whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is\r\nnothing else but to understand. Again, since this effort of the\r\nmind wherewith the mind endeavours, in so far as it reasons, to\r\npreserve its own being is nothing else but understanding; this\r\neffort at understanding is (IV. xxii. Coroll.) the first and\r\nsingle basis of virtue, nor shall we endeavour to understand\r\nthings for the sake of any ulterior object (IV. xxv.); on the\r\nother hand, the mind, in so far as it reasons, will not be able\r\nto conceive any good for itself, save such things as are\r\nconducive to understanding.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXVII. We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save\r\nsuch things as really conduce to understanding, or such as are\r\nable to hinder us from understanding.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing\r\nbeyond understanding, and judges nothing to be useful to itself,\r\nsave such things as conduce to understanding (by the foregoing\r\nProp.). But the mind (II. xli., xliii. and note) cannot possess\r\ncertainty concerning anything, except in so far as it has\r\nadequate ideas, or (what by II. xl. note, is the same thing) in\r\nso far as it reasons. Therefore we know nothing to be good or\r\nevil save such things as really conduce, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXVIII. The mind\u0027s highest good is the knowledge of God,\r\nand the mind\u0027s highest virtue is to know God.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The mind is not capable of understanding anything\r\nhigher than God, that is (I. Def. vi.), than a Being absolutely\r\ninfinite, and without which (I. xv.) nothing can either be or be\r\nconceived; therefore (IV. xxvi. and xxvii.), the mind\u0027s highest\r\nutility or (IV. Def. i.) good is the knowledge of God. Again,\r\nthe mind is active, only in so far as it understands, and only to\r\nthe same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously. The\r\nmind\u0027s absolute virtue is therefore to understand. Now, as we\r\nhave already shown, the highest that the mind can understand is\r\nGod; therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to understand\r\nor to know God. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXIX. No individual thing, which is entirely different\r\nfrom our own nature, can help or check our power of activity, and\r\nabsolutely nothing can do us good or harm, unless it has\r\nsomething in common with our nature.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The power of every individual thing, and consequently\r\nthe power of man, whereby he exists and operates, can only be\r\ndetermined by an individual thing (I. xxviii.), whose nature (II.\r\nvi.) must be understood through the same nature as that, through\r\nwhich human nature is conceived. Therefore our power of\r\nactivity, however it be conceived, can be determined and\r\nconsequently helped or hindered by the power of any other\r\nindividual thing, which has something in common with us, but not\r\nby the power of anything, of which the nature is entirely\r\ndifferent from our own; and since we call good or evil that\r\nwhich is the cause of pleasure or pain (IV. viii.), that is (III.\r\nxi. note), which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our\r\npower of activity; therefore, that which is entirely different\r\nfrom our nature can neither be to us good nor bad. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXX. A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality\r\nwhich it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us in\r\nso far as it is contrary to our nature.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV.\r\nviii.), that is (by the Def., which see in III. xi. note), when\r\nit diminishes or checks our power of action. Therefore, if\r\nanything were bad for us through that quality which it has in\r\ncommon with our nature, it would be able itself to diminish or\r\ncheck that which it has in common with our nature, which (III.\r\niv.) is absurd. Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through that\r\nquality which it has in common with us, but, on the other hand,\r\nin so far as it is bad for us, that is (as we have just shown),\r\nin so far as it can diminish or check our power of action, it is\r\ncontrary to our nature.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXI. In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature,\r\nit is necessarily good.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it\r\ncannot be bad for it. It will therefore necessarily be either\r\ngood or indifferent. If it be assumed that it be neither good\r\nnor bad, nothing will follow from its nature (IV. Def. i.), which\r\ntends to the preservation of our nature, that is (by the\r\nhypothesis), which tends to the preservation of the thing itself;\r\nbut this (III. vi.) is absurd; therefore, in so far as a thing\r\nis in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows, that, in proportion as a thing\r\nis in harmony with our nature, so is it more useful or better for\r\nus, and vice versâ, in proportion as a thing is more useful for\r\nus, so is it more in harmony with our nature. For, in so far as\r\nit is not in harmony with our nature, it will necessarily be\r\ndifferent therefrom or contrary thereto. If different, it can\r\nneither be good nor bad (IV. xxix.); if contrary, it will be\r\ncontrary to that which is in harmony with our nature, that is,\r\ncontrary to what is good\u0026mdash;in short, bad. Nothing, therefore, can\r\nbe good, except in so far as it is in harmony with our nature;\r\nand hence a thing is useful, in proportion as it is in harmony\r\nwith our nature, and vice versâ. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXII. In so far as men are a prey to passion, they\r\ncannot, in that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Things, which are said to be in harmony naturally, are\r\nunderstood to agree in power (III. vii.), not in want of power or\r\nnegation, and consequently not in passion (III. iii. note);\r\nwherefore men, in so far as they are a prey to their passions,\r\ncannot be said to be naturally in harmony. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;This is also self\u0026mdash;evident; for, if we say that white\r\nand black only agree in the fact that neither is red, we\r\nabsolutely affirm that the do not agree in any respect. So, if\r\nwe say that a man and a stone only agree in the fact that both\r\nare finite\u0026mdash;wanting in power, not existing by the necessity of\r\ntheir own nature, or, lastly, indefinitely surpassed by the power\r\nof external causes\u0026mdash;we should certainly affirm that a man and a\r\nstone are in no respect alike; therefore, things which agree\r\nonly in negation, or in qualities which neither possess, really\r\nagree in no respect.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXIII. Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are\r\nassailed by those emotions, which are passions, or passive states;\r\nand to this extent one and the same man is variable and\r\ninconstant.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be\r\nexplained solely through our essence or nature (III. Deff. i.,\r\nii.), but it must be defined by the power, that is (III. vii.),\r\nby the nature of external causes\r\nin comparison with our own; hence it follows, that there are as\r\nmany kinds of each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are\r\naffected (III. lvi.), and that men may be differently affected by one and\r\nthe same object (III. li.), and to this extent differ in nature; lastly,\r\nthat one and the same man may be differently affected towards the same object,\r\nand may therefore be variable and inconstant. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXIV. In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are\r\npassions, they can be contrary one to another.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;A man, for instance Peter, can be the cause of Paul\u0027s\r\nfeeling pain, because he (Peter) possesses something similar to\r\nthat which Paul hates (III. xvi.), or because Peter has sole\r\npossession of a thing which Paul also loves (III. xxxii. and\r\nnote), or for other causes (of which the chief are enumerated in\r\nIII. lv. note); it may therefore happen that Paul should hate\r\nPeter (Def. of Emotions, vii.), consequently it may easily happen\r\nalso, that Peter should hate Paul in return, and that each should\r\nendeavour to do the other an injury, (III. xxxix.), that is (IV.\r\nxxx.), that they should be contrary one to another. But the\r\nemotion of pain is always a passion or passive state (III. lix.);\r\nhence men, in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are\r\npassions, can be contrary one to another. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;I said that Paul may hate Peter, because he conceives\r\nthat Peter possesses something which he (Paul) also loves; from\r\nthis it seems, at first sight, to follow, that these two men,\r\nthrough both loving the same thing, and, consequently, through\r\nagreement of their respective natures, stand in one another\u0027s way;\r\nif this were so, Props. xxx. and xxxi. of this part would be\r\nuntrue. But if we give the matter our unbiased attention, we\r\nshall see that the discrepancy vanishes. For the two men are not\r\nin one another\u0027s way in virtue of the agreement of their natures,\r\nthat is, through both loving the same thing, but in virtue of one\r\ndiffering from the other. For, in so far as each loves the same\r\nthing, the love of each is fostered thereby (III. xxxi.), that is\r\n(Def. of the Emotions, vi.) the pleasure of each is fostered\r\nthereby. Wherefore it is far from being the case, that they are\r\nat variance through both loving the same thing, and through the\r\nagreement in their natures. The cause for their opposition lies,\r\nas I have said, solely in the fact that they are assumed to\r\ndiffer. For we assume that Peter has the idea of the loved\r\nobject as already in his possession, while Paul has the idea of\r\nthe loved object as lost. Hence the one man will be affected\r\nwith pleasure, the other will be affected with pain, and thus\r\nthey will be at variance one with another. We can easily show in\r\nlike manner, that all other causes of hatred depend solely on\r\ndifferences, and not on the agreement between men\u0027s natures.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXV. In so far only as men live in obedience to reason,\r\ndo they always necessarily agree in nature.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are\r\npassions, they can be different in nature (IV. xxxiii.), and at\r\nvariance one with another. But men are only said to be active,\r\nin so far as they act in obedience to reason (III. iii.);\r\ntherefore, what so ever follows from human nature in so far as it\r\nis defined by reason must (III. Def. ii.) be understood solely\r\nthrough human nature as its proximate cause. But, since every\r\nman by the laws of his nature desires that which he deems good,\r\nand endeavours to remove that which he deems bad (IV. xix.); and\r\nfurther, since that which we, in accordance with reason, deem\r\ngood or bad, necessarily is good or bad (II. xli.); it follows\r\nthat men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason,\r\nnecessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for human\r\nnature, and consequently for each individual man (IV. xxxi.\r\nCoroll.); in other words, such things as are in harmony with\r\neach man\u0027s nature. Therefore, men in so far as they live in\r\nobedience to reason, necessarily live always in harmony one with\r\nanother. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary I.\u0026mdash;There is no individual thing in nature, which is\r\nmore useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason.\r\nFor that thing is to man most useful, which is most in harmony\r\nwith his nature (IV. xxxi. Coroll.); that is, obviously, man.\r\nBut man acts absolutely according to the laws of his nature, when\r\nhe lives in obedience to reason (III. Def. ii.), and to this\r\nextent only is always necessarily in harmony with the nature of\r\nanother man (by the last Prop.); wherefore among individual\r\nthings nothing is more useful to man, than a man who lives in\r\nobedience to reason. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary II.\u0026mdash;As every man seeks most that which is useful to\r\nhim, so are men most useful one to another. For the more a man\r\nseeks what is useful to him and endeavours to preserve himself,\r\nthe more is he endowed with virtue (IV. xx.), or, what is the\r\nsame thing (IV. Def. viii.), the more is he endowed with power to\r\nact according to the laws of his own nature, that is to live in\r\nobedience to reason. But men are most in natural harmony, when\r\nthey live in obedience to reason (by the last Prop.); therefore\r\n(by the foregoing Coroll.) men will be most useful one to\r\nanother, when each seeks most that which is useful to him.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;What we have just shown is attested by experience so\r\nconspicuously, that it is in the mouth of nearly everyone: \"Man\r\nis to man a God.\" Yet it rarely happens that men live in\r\nobedience to reason, for things are so ordered among them, that\r\nthey are generally envious and troublesome one to another.\r\nNevertheless they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life, so\r\nthat the definition of man as a social animal has met with\r\ngeneral assent; in fact, men do derive from social life much\r\nmore convenience than injury. Let satirists then laugh their\r\nfill at human affairs, let theologians rail, and let misanthropes\r\npraise to their utmost the life of untutored rusticity, let them\r\nheap contempt on men and praises on beasts; when all is said,\r\nthey will find that men can provide for their wants much more\r\neasily by mutual help, and that only by uniting their forces can\r\nthey escape from the dangers that on every side beset them: not\r\nto say how much more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is,\r\nto study the actions of men than the actions of beasts. But I\r\nwill treat of this more at length elsewhere.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXVI. The highest good of those who follow virtue is\r\ncommon to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;To act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason\r\n(IV. xxiv.), and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to\r\nreason is to understand (IV. xxvi.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the\r\nhighest good for those who follow after virtue is to know God;\r\nthat is (II. xlvii. and note) a good which is common to all and\r\ncan be possessed by all men equally, in so far as they are of\r\nthe same nature. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Someone may ask how it would be, if the highest good of\r\nthose who follow after virtue were not common to all? Would it\r\nnot then follow, as above (IV. xxxiv.), that men living in\r\nobedience to reason, that is (IV. xxxv.), men in so far as they\r\nagree in nature, would be at variance one with another? To such\r\nan inquiry, I make answer, that it follows not accidentally but\r\nfrom the very nature of reason, that main\u0027s highest good is\r\ncommon to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of\r\nman, in so far as defined by reason; and that a man could\r\nneither be, nor be conceived without the power of taking pleasure\r\nin this highest good. For it belongs to the essence of the human\r\nmind (II. xlvii.), to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal\r\nand infinite essence of God.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXVII. The good which every man, who follows after\r\nvirtue, desires for himself he will also desire for other men,\r\nand so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater knowledge\r\nof God.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason,\r\nare most useful to their fellow men (IV. xxxv; Coroll. i.);\r\ntherefore (IV. xix.), we shall in obedience to reason necessarily\r\nendeavour to bring about that men should live in obedience to\r\nreason. But the good which every man, in so far as he is guided\r\nby reason, or, in other words, follows after virtue, desires for\r\nhimself, is to understand (IV. xxvi.); wherefore the good, which\r\neach follower of virtue seeks for himself, he will desire also\r\nfor others. Again, desire, in so far as it is referred to the\r\nmind, is the very essence of the mind (Def. of the Emotions, i.);\r\nnow the essence of the mind consists in knowledge (II. xi.),\r\nwhich involves the knowledge of God (II. xlvii.), and without it\r\n(I. xv.), can neither be, nor be conceived; therefore, in\r\nproportion as the mind\u0027s essence involves a greater knowledge of\r\nGod, so also will be greater the desire of the follower of\r\nvirtue, that other men should possess that which he seeks as good\r\nfor himself. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnother Proof.\u0026mdash;The good, which a man desires for himself and\r\nloves, he will love more constantly, if he sees that others love\r\nit also (III. xxxi.); he will therefore endeavour that others\r\nshould love it also; and as the good in question is common to\r\nall, and therefore all can rejoice therein, he will endeavour,\r\nfor the same reason, to bring about that all should rejoice\r\ntherein, and this he will do the more (III. xxxvii.), in\r\nproportion as his own enjoyment of the good is greater.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote I.\u0026mdash;He who, guided by emotion only, endeavours to cause\r\nothers to love what he loves himself, and to make the rest of the\r\nworld live according to his own fancy, acts solely by impulse,\r\nand is, therefore, hateful, especially, to those who take delight\r\nin something different, and accordingly study and, by similar\r\nimpulse, endeavour, to make men live in accordance with what\r\npleases themselves. Again, as the highest good sought by men\r\nunder the guidance of emotion is often such, that it can only be\r\npossessed by a single individual, it follows that those who love\r\nit are not consistent in their intentions, but, while they\r\ndelight to sing its praises, fear to be believed. But he, who\r\nendeavours to lead men by reason, does not act by impulse but\r\ncourteously and kindly, and his intention is always consistent.\r\nAgain, whatsoever we desire and do, whereof we are the cause in\r\nso far as we possess the idea of God, or know God, I set down to\r\nReligion. The desire of well\u0026mdash;doing, which is engendered by a\r\nlife according to reason, I call piety. Further, the desire,\r\nwhereby a man living according to reason is bound to associate\r\nothers with himself in friendship, I call honour[13]; by\r\nhonourable I mean that which is praised by men living according\r\nto reason, and by base I mean that which is repugnant to the\r\ngaining of friendship. I have also shown in addition what are\r\nthe foundations of a state; and the difference between true\r\nvirtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what I have\r\nsaid; namely, that true virtue is nothing else but living in\r\naccordance with reason; while infirmity is nothing else but\r\nman\u0027s allowing himself to be led by things which are external to\r\nhimself, and to be by them determined to act in a manner demanded\r\nby the general disposition of things rather than by his own\r\nnature considered solely in itself.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[13] Honestas\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSuch are the matters which I engaged to prove in Prop. xviii.\r\nof this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the\r\nslaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition\r\nand womanish pity than on sound reason. The rational quest of\r\nwhat is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of\r\nassociating ourselves with our fellow men, but not with beasts,\r\nor things, whose nature is different from our own; we have the\r\nsame rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us.\r\nNay, as everyone\u0027s right is defined by his virtue, or power, men\r\nhave far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men.\r\nStill I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we\r\nmay not consult our own advantage and use them as we please,\r\ntreating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature\r\nis not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from\r\nhuman emotions (III. lvii. note). It remains for me to explain\r\nwhat I mean by just and unjust, sin and merit. On these points\r\nsee the following note.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote II.\u0026mdash;In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explain\r\npraise and blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nConcerning praise and blame I have spoken in III. xxix. note:\r\nthe time has now come to treat of the remaining terms. But I\r\nmust first say a few words concerning man in the state of nature\r\nand in society.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nEvery man exists by sovereign natural right, and,\r\nconsequently, by sovereign natural right performs those actions\r\nwhich follow from the necessity of his own nature; therefore by\r\nsovereign natural right every man judges what is good and what is\r\nbad, takes care of his own advantage according to his own\r\ndisposition (IV. xix. and IV. xx.), avenges the wrongs done to\r\nhim (III. xl. Coroll. ii.), and endeavours to preserve that which\r\nhe loves and to destroy that which he hates (III. xxviii.). Now,\r\nif men lived under the guidance of reason, everyone would remain\r\nin possession of this his right, without any injury being done to\r\nhis neighbour (IV. xxxv. Coroll. i.). But seeing that they are a\r\nprey to their emotions, which far surpass human power or virtue\r\n(IV. vi.), they are often drawn in different directions, and\r\nbeing at variance one with another (IV. xxxiii. xxxiv.), stand in\r\nneed of mutual help (IV. xxxv. note). Wherefore, in order that\r\nmen may live together in harmony, and may aid one another, it is\r\nnecessary that they should forego their natural right, and, for\r\nthe sake of security, refrain from all actions which can injure\r\ntheir fellow\u0026mdash;men. The way in which this end can be obtained, so\r\nthat men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions (IV. iv.\r\nCoroll.), inconstant, and diverse, should be able to render each\r\nother mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from IV.\r\nvii. and III. xxxix. It is there shown, that an emotion can only\r\nbe restrained by an emotion stronger than, and contrary to\r\nitself, and that men avoid inflicting injury through fear of\r\nincurring a greater injury themselves.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nOn this law society can be established, so long as it keeps\r\nin its own hand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging\r\ninjury, and pronouncing on good and evil; and provided it also\r\npossesses the power to lay down a general rule of conduct, and to\r\npass laws sanctioned, not by reason, which is powerless in\r\nrestraining emotion, but by threats (IV. xvii. note). Such a\r\nsociety established with laws and the power of preserving itself\r\nis called a State, while those who live under its protection are\r\ncalled citizens. We may readily understand that there is in the\r\nstate of nature nothing, which by universal consent is pronounced\r\ngood or bad; for in the state of nature everyone thinks solely\r\nof his own advantage, and according to his disposition, with\r\nreference only to his individual advantage, decides what is good\r\nor bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; it\r\ncan only exist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced on\r\nby common consent, and where everyone is bound to obey the State\r\nauthority. Sin, then, is nothing else but disobedience, which is\r\ntherefore punished by the right of the State only. Obedience, on\r\nthe other hand, is set down as merit, inasmuch as a man is\r\nthought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the advantages\r\nwhich a State provides.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAgain, in the state of nature, no one is by common consent\r\nmaster of anything, nor is there anything in nature, which can be\r\nsaid to belong to one man rather than another: all things are\r\ncommon to all. Hence, in the state of nature, we can conceive no\r\nwish to render to every man his own, or to deprive a man of that\r\nwhich belongs to him; in other words, there is nothing in the\r\nstate of nature answering to justice and injustice. Such ideas\r\nare only possible in a social state, when it is decreed by common\r\nconsent what belongs to one man and what to another.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFrom all these considerations it is evident, that justice and\r\ninjustice, sin and merit, are extrinsic ideas, and not attributes\r\nwhich display the nature of the mind. But I have said enough.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXVIII. Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to\r\nrender it capable of being affected in an increased number of\r\nways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of\r\nways, is useful to man; and is so, in proportion as the body is\r\nthereby rendered more capable of being affected or affecting\r\nother bodies in an increased number of ways; contrariwise,\r\nwhatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is\r\nhurtful to man.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body\r\nincreases also the mind\u0027s capability of perception (II. xiv.);\r\ntherefore, whatsoever thus disposes the body and thus renders it\r\ncapable, is necessarily good or useful (IV. xxvi. xxvii.); and\r\nis so in proportion to the extent to which it can render the body\r\ncapable; contrariwise (II. xiv., IV. xxvi. xxvii.), it is\r\nhurtful, if it renders the body in this respect less capable.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXIX. Whatsoever brings about the preservation of the\r\nproportion of motion and rest, which the parts of the human body\r\nmutually possess, is good; contrariwise, whatsoever causes a\r\nchange in such proportion is bad.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The human body needs many other bodies for its\r\npreservation (II. Post. iv.). But that which constitutes the\r\nspecific reality (forma) of a human body is, that its parts\r\ncommunicate their several motions one to another in a certain\r\nfixed proportion (Def. before Lemma iv. after II. xiii.).\r\nTherefore, whatsoever brings about the preservation of the\r\nproportion between motion and rest, which the parts of the human\r\nbody mutually possess, preserves the specific reality of the\r\nhuman body, and consequently renders the human body capable of\r\nbeing affected in many ways and of affecting external bodies in\r\nmany ways; consequently it is good (by the last Prop.). Again,\r\nwhatsoever brings about a change in the aforesaid proportion\r\ncauses the human body to assume another specific character, in\r\nother words (see Preface to this Part towards the end, though the\r\npoint is indeed self\u0026mdash;evident), to be destroyed, and consequently\r\ntotally incapable of being affected in an increased numbers of\r\nways; therefore it is bad. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;The extent to which such causes can injure or be of\r\nservice to the mind will be explained in the Fifth Part. But I\r\nwould here remark that I consider that a body undergoes death,\r\nwhen the proportion of motion and rest which obtained mutually\r\namong its several parts is changed. For I do not venture to deny\r\nthat a human body, while keeping the circulation of the blood and\r\nother properties, wherein the life of a body is thought to\r\nconsist, may none the less be changed into another nature totally\r\ndifferent from its own. There is no reason, which compels me to\r\nmaintain that a body does not die, unless it becomes a corpse;\r\nnay, experience would seem to point to the opposite conclusion.\r\nIt sometimes happens, that a man undergoes such changes, that I\r\nshould hardly call him the same. As I have heard tell of a\r\ncertain Spanish poet, who had been seized with sickness, and\r\nthough he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his\r\npast life, that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he\r\nhad written to be his own: indeed, he might have been taken for\r\na grown\u0026mdash;up child, if he had also forgotten his native tongue. If\r\nthis instance seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? A\r\nman of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own, that he can\r\nonly be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the analogy\r\nof other men. However, I prefer to leave such questions\r\nundiscussed, lest I should give ground to the superstitious for\r\nraising new issues.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XL. Whatsoever conduces to man\u0027s social life, or causes\r\nmen to live together in harmony, is useful, whereas whatsoever\r\nbrings discord into a State is bad.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;For whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony\r\nalso causes them to live according to reason (IV. xxxv.), and is\r\ntherefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.) good, and (for the same reason)\r\nwhatsoever brings about discord is bad. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLI. Pleasure in itself is not bad but good:\r\ncontrariwise, pain in itself is bad.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Pleasure (III. xi. and note) is emotion, whereby the\r\nbody\u0027s power of activity is increased or helped; pain is\r\nemotion, whereby the body\u0027s power of activity is diminished or\r\nchecked; therefore (IV. xxxviii.) pleasure in itself is good,\r\n\u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLII. Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good;\r\ncontrariwise, Melancholy is always bad.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Mirth (see its Def. in III. xi. note) is pleasure,\r\nwhich, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in all\r\nparts of the body being affected equally: that is (III. xi.),\r\nthe body\u0027s power of activity is increased or aided in such a\r\nmanner, that the several parts maintain their former proportion\r\nof motion and rest; therefore Mirth is always good (IV. xxxix.),\r\nand cannot be excessive. But Melancholy (see its Def. in the\r\nsame note to III. xi.) is pain, which, in so far as it is\r\nreferred to the body, consists in the absolute decrease or\r\nhindrance of the body\u0027s power of activity; therefore (IV.\r\nxxxviii.) it is always bad. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLIII. Stimulation may be excessive and bad; on the other\r\nhand, grief may be good, in so far as stimulation or pleasure is\r\nbad.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Localized pleasure or stimulation (titillatio) is\r\npleasure, which, in so far as it is referred to the body,\r\nconsists in one or some of its parts being affected more than the\r\nrest (see its Definition, III. xi. note); the power of this\r\nemotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of the body\r\n(IV. vi.), and may remain obstinately fixed therein, thus\r\nrendering it incapable of being affected in a variety of other\r\nways: therefore (IV. xxxviii.) it may be bad. Again, grief,\r\nwhich is pain, cannot as such be good (IV. xli.). But, as its\r\nforce and increase is defined by the power of an external cause\r\ncompared with our own (IV. v.), we can conceive infinite degrees\r\nand modes of strength in this emotion (IV. iii.); we can,\r\ntherefore, conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation, and\r\npreventing its becoming excessive, and hindering the body\u0027s\r\ncapabilities; thus, to this extent, it will be good. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLIV. Love and desire may be excessive.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an\r\nexternal cause (Def. of Emotions, vi.); therefore stimulation,\r\naccompanied by the idea of an external cause is love (III. xi.\r\nnote); hence love maybe excessive. Again, the strength of\r\ndesire varies in proportion to the emotion from which it arises\r\n(III. xxxvii.). Now emotion may overcome all the rest of men\u0027s\r\nactions (IV. vi.); so, therefore, can desire, which arises from\r\nthe same emotion, overcome all other desires, and become\r\nexcessive, as we showed in the last proposition concerning\r\nstimulation.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Mirth, which I have stated to be good, can be conceived\r\nmore easily than it can be observed. For the emotions, whereby\r\nwe are daily assailed, are generally referred to some part of the\r\nbody which is affected more than the rest; hence the emotions\r\nare generally excessive, and so fix the mind in the contemplation\r\nof one object, that it is unable to think of others; and\r\nalthough men, as a rule, are a prey to many emotions\u0026mdash;and very few\r\nare found who are always assailed by one and the same\u0026mdash;yet there\r\nare cases, where one and the same emotion remains obstinately\r\nfixed. We sometimes see men so absorbed in one object, that,\r\nalthough it be not present, they think they have it before them;\r\nwhen this is the case with a man who is not asleep, we say he is\r\ndelirious or mad; nor are those persons who are inflamed with\r\nlove, and who dream all night and all day about nothing but their\r\nmistress, or some woman, considered as less mad, for they are\r\nmade objects of ridicule. But when a miser thinks of nothing but\r\ngain or money, or when an ambitious man thinks of nothing but\r\nglory, they are not reckoned to be mad, because they are\r\ngenerally harmful, and are thought worthy of being hated. But,\r\nin reality, Avarice, Ambition, Lust, \u0026amp;c., are species of madness,\r\nthough they may not be reckoned among diseases.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLV. Hatred can never be good.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;When we hate a man, we endeavour to destroy him (III.\r\nxxxix.), that is (IV. xxxvii.), we endeavour to do something that\r\nis bad. Therefore, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nN.B. Here, and in what follows, I mean by hatred only hatred\r\ntowards men.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary I.\u0026mdash;Envy, derision, contempt, anger, revenge, and\r\nother emotions attributable to hatred, or arising therefrom, are\r\nbad; this is evident from III. xxxix. and IV. xxxvii.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary II.\u0026mdash;Whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is\r\nbase, and in a State unjust. This also is evident from III.\r\nxxxix., and from the definitions of baseness and injustice in IV.\r\nxxxvii. note.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. stated to\r\nbe bad) and laughter I recognize a great difference. For\r\nlaughter, as also jocularity, is merely pleasure; therefore, so\r\nlong as it be not excessive, it is in itself good (IV. xli.).\r\nAssuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself, save grim and\r\ngloomy superstition. For why is it more lawful to satiate one\u0027s\r\nhunger and thirst than to drive away one\u0027s melancholy? I reason,\r\nand have convinced myself as follows: No deity, nor anyone else,\r\nsave the envious, takes pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort,\r\nnor sets down to my virtue the tears, sobs, fear, and the like,\r\nwhich axe signs of infirmity of spirit; on the contrary, the\r\ngreater the pleasure wherewith we are affected, the greater the\r\nperfection whereto we pass; in other words, the more must we\r\nnecessarily partake of the divine nature. Therefore, to make use\r\nof what comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible\r\n(not to the point of satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is\r\nthe part of a wise man. I say it is the part of a wise man to\r\nrefresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and\r\ndrink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of growing\r\nplants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres,\r\nand the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to\r\nhis neighbour. For the human body is composed of very numerous\r\nparts, of diverse nature, which continually stand in need of\r\nfresh and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be\r\nequally capable of performing all the actions, which follow from\r\nthe necessity of its own nature; and, consequently, so that the\r\nmind may also be equally capable of understanding many things\r\nsimultaneously. This way of life, then, agrees best with our\r\nprinciples, and also with general practice; therefore, if there\r\nbe any question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned is\r\nthe best, and in every way to be commended. There is no need for\r\nme to set forth the matter more clearly or in more detail.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLVI. He, who lives under the guidance of reason,\r\nendeavours, as far as possible, to render back love, or kindness,\r\nfor other men\u0027s hatred, anger, contempt, \u0026amp;c., towards him.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;All emotions of hatred are bad (IV. xlv. Coroll. i.);\r\ntherefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will\r\nendeavour, as far as possible, to avoid being assailed by such\r\nemotions (IV. xix.); consequently, he will also endeavour to\r\nprevent others being so assailed (IV. xxxvii.). But hatred is\r\nincreased by being reciprocated, and can be quenched by love\r\n(III. xliii.), so that hatred may pass into love (III. xliv.);\r\ntherefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will\r\nendeavour to repay hatred with love, that is, with kindness.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is\r\nassuredly wretched. But he, who strives to conquer hatred with\r\nlove, fights his battle in joy and confidence; he withstands\r\nmany as easily as one, and has very little need of fortune\u0027s aid.\r\nThose whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, but\r\nthrough increase in their powers; all these consequences follow\r\nso plainly from the mere definitions of love and understanding,\r\nthat I have no need to prove them in detail.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLVII. Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves\r\ngood.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain.\r\nFor fear is pain (Def. of the Emotions, xiii.), and hope (Def. of\r\nthe Emotions, Explanation xii. and xiii.) cannot exist without\r\nfear; therefore (IV. xli.) these emotions cannot be good in\r\nthemselves, but only in so far as they can restrain excessive\r\npleasure (IV. xliii.). Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;We may add, that these emotions show defective\r\nknowledge and an absence of power in the mind; for the same\r\nreason confidence, despair, joy, and disappointment are signs of\r\na want of mental power. For although confidence and joy are\r\npleasurable emotions, they nevertheless imply a preceding pain,\r\nnamely, hope and fear. Wherefore the more we endeavour to be\r\nguided by reason, the less do we depend on hope; we endeavour to\r\nfree ourselves from fear, and, as far as we can, to dominate\r\nfortune, directing our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLVIII. The emotions of over\u0026mdash;esteem and disparagement are\r\nalways bad.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;These emotions (see Def. of the Emotions, xxi. xxii.)\r\nare repugnant to reason; and are therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.)\r\nbad. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLIX. Over\u0026mdash;esteem is apt to render its object proud.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;If we see that any one rates us too highly, for love\u0027s\r\nsake, we are apt to become elated (III. xli.), or to be\r\npleasurably affected (Def. of the Emotions, xxx.); the good\r\nwhich we hear of ourselves we readily believe (III. xxv.); and\r\ntherefore, for love\u0027s sake, rate ourselves too highly; in other\r\nwords, we are apt to become proud. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. L. Pity, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason,\r\nis in itself bad and useless.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Pity (Def. of the Emotions, xviii.) is a pain, and\r\ntherefore (IV. xli.) is in itself bad. The good effect which\r\nfollows, namely, our endeavour to free the object of our pity\r\nfrom misery, is an action which we desire to do solely at the\r\ndictation of reason (IV. xxxvii.); only at the dictation of\r\nreason are we able to perform any action, which we know for\r\ncertain to be good (IV. xxvii.); thus, in a man who lives under\r\nthe guidance of reason, pity in itself is useless and bad.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;He who rightly realizes, that all things follow from\r\nthe necessity of the divine nature, and come to pass in\r\naccordance with the eternal laws and rules of nature, will not\r\nfind anything worthy of hatred, derision, or contempt, nor will\r\nhe bestow pity on anything, but to the utmost extent of human\r\nvirtue he will endeavour to do well, as the saying is, and to\r\nrejoice. We may add, that he, who is easily touched with\r\ncompassion, and is moved by another\u0027s sorrow or tears, often does\r\nsomething which he afterwards regrets; partly because we can\r\nnever be sure that an action caused by emotion is good, partly\r\nbecause we are easily deceived by false tears. I am in this\r\nplace expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of\r\nreason. He who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by\r\ncompassion, is rightly styled inhuman, for (III. xxvii.) he seems\r\nunlike a man.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LI. Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree\r\ntherewith and arise therefrom.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Approval is love towards one who has done good to\r\nanother (Def. of the Emotions, xix.); therefore it may be\r\nreferred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active (III.\r\nlix.), that is (III. iii.), in so far as it understands;\r\ntherefore, it is in agreement with reason, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnother Proof.\u0026mdash;He, who lives under the guidance of reason,\r\ndesires for others the good which he seeks for himself (IV.\r\nxxxvii.); wherefore from seeing someone doing good to his fellow\r\nhis own endeavour to do good is aided; in other words, he will\r\nfeel pleasure (III. xi. note) accompanied by the idea of the\r\nbenefactor. Therefore he approves of him. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Indignation as we defined it (Def. of the Emotions,\r\nxx.) is necessarily evil (IV. xlv.); we may, however, remark\r\nthat, when the sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace\r\npunishes a citizen who has injured another, it should not be said\r\nto be indignant with the criminal, for it is not incited by\r\nhatred to ruin him, it is led by a sense of duty to punish him.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LII. Self\u0026mdash;approval may arise from reason, and that which\r\narises from reason is the highest possible.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Self\u0026mdash;approval is pleasure arising from a man\u0027s\r\ncontemplation of himself and his own power of action (Def. of the\r\nEmotions, xxv.). But a man\u0027s true power of action or virtue is\r\nreason herself (III. iii.), as the said man clearly and\r\ndistinctly contemplates her (II. xl. xliii.); therefore\r\nself\u0026mdash;approval arises from reason. Again, when a man is\r\ncontemplating himself, he only perceived clearly and distinctly\r\nor adequately, such things as follow from his power of action\r\n(III. Def. ii.), that is (III. iii.), from his power of\r\nunderstanding; therefore in such contemplation alone does the\r\nhighest possible self\u0026mdash;approval arise. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Self\u0026mdash;approval is in reality the highest object for\r\nwhich we can hope. For (as we showed in IV. xxv.) no one\r\nendeavours to preserve his being for the sake of any ulterior\r\nobject, and, as this approval is more and more fostered and\r\nstrengthened by praise (III. liii. Coroll.), and on the contrary\r\n(III. lv. Coroll.) is more and more disturbed by blame, fame\r\nbecomes the most powerful of incitements to action, and life\r\nunder disgrace is almost unendurable.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LIII. Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from\r\nreason.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Humility is pain arising from a man\u0027s contemplation of\r\nhis own infirmities (Def. of the Emotions, xxvi.). But, in so\r\nfar as a man knows himself by true reason, he is assumed to\r\nunderstand his essence, that is, his power (III. vii.).\r\nWherefore, if a man in self\u0026mdash;contemplation perceives any infirmity\r\nin himself, it is not by virtue of his understanding himself, but\r\n(III. lv.) by virtue of his power of activity being checked.\r\nBut, if we assume that a man perceives his own infirmity by\r\nvirtue of understanding something stronger than himself, by the\r\nknowledge of which he determines his own power of activity, this\r\nis the same as saying that we conceive that a man understands\r\nhimself distinctly (IV. xxvi.), because[14] his power of activity\r\nis aided. Wherefore humility, or the pain which arises from a\r\nman\u0027s contemplation of his own infirmity, does not arise from the\r\ncontemplation or reason, and is not a virtue but a passion.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[14] Land reads: \"Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur\"\u0026mdash;which I\r\nhave translated above. He suggests as alternative readings to\r\n\u0027quod\u0027, \u0027quo\u0027 (= whereby) and \u0027quodque\u0027 (= and that).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LIV. Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from\r\nreason; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or\r\ninfirm.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The first part of this proposition is proved like the\r\nforegoing one. The second part is proved from the mere\r\ndefinition of the emotion in question (Def. of the Emotions,\r\nxxvii.). For the man allows himself to be overcome, first, by\r\nevil desires; secondly, by pain.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these\r\ntwo emotions, namely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and\r\nFear, bring more good than harm; hence, as we must sin, we had\r\nbetter sin in that direction. For, if all men who are a prey to\r\nemotion were all equally proud, they would shrink from nothing,\r\nand would fear nothing; how then could they be joined and linked\r\ntogether in bonds of union? The crowd plays the tyrant, when it\r\nis not in fear; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who\r\nconsulted the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously\r\ncommended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence. Indeed those who\r\nare a prey to these emotions may be led much more easily than\r\nothers to live under the guidance of reason, that is, to become\r\nfree and to enjoy the life of the blessed.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LV. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance\r\nof self.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and\r\nxxix.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LVI. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme\r\ninfirmity of spirit.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The first foundation of virtue is self\u0026mdash;preservation\r\n(IV. xxii. Coroll.) under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.).\r\nHe, therefore, who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the\r\nfoundation of all virtues, and consequently of all virtues.\r\nAgain, to act virtuously is merely to act under the guidance of\r\nreason (IV. xxiv.): now he, that acts under the guidance of\r\nreason, must necessarily know that he so acts (II. xliii.).\r\nTherefore he who is in extreme ignorance of himself, and\r\nconsequently of all virtues, acts least in obedience to virtue;\r\nin other words (IV. Def. viii.), is most infirm of spirit. Thus\r\nextreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and\r\nthe dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride;\r\nfor the latter being a pleasurable emotion, and the former a\r\npainful emotion, the pleasurable is stronger than the painful\r\n(IV. xviii.).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LVII. The proud man delights in the company of flatterers\r\nand parasites, but hates the company of the high\u0026mdash;minded.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Pride is pleasure arising from a man\u0027s over estimation\r\nof himself (Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and vi.); this\r\nestimation the proud man will endeavour to foster by all the\r\nmeans in his power (III. xiii. note); he will therefore delight\r\nin the company of flatterers and parasites (whose character is\r\ntoo well known to need definition here), and will avoid the\r\ncompany of high\u0026mdash;minded men, who value him according to his\r\ndeserts. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the\r\nevil results of pride, inasmuch as the proud are a prey to all\r\nthe emotions, though to none of them less than to love and pity.\r\nI cannot, however, pass over in silence the fact, that a man may\r\nbe called proud from his underestimation of other people; and,\r\ntherefore, pride in this sense may be defined as pleasure arising\r\nfrom the false opinion, whereby a man may consider himself\r\nsuperior to his fellows. The dejection, which is the opposite\r\nquality to this sort of pride, may be defined as pain arising\r\nfrom the false opinion, whereby a man may think himself inferior\r\nto his fellows. Such being the ease, we can easily see that a\r\nproud man is necessarily envious (III. xli. note), and only takes\r\npleasure in the company, who fool his weak mind to the top of his\r\nbent, and make him insane instead of merely foolish.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThough dejection is the emotion contrary to pride, yet is the\r\ndejected man very near akin to the proud man. For, inasmuch as\r\nhis pain arises from a comparison between his own infirmity and\r\nother men\u0027s power or virtue, it will be removed, or, in other\r\nwords, he will feel pleasure, if his imagination be occupied in\r\ncontemplating other men\u0027s faults; whence arises the proverb,\r\n\"The unhappy are comforted by finding fellow\u0026mdash;sufferers.\"\r\nContrariwise, he will be the more pained in proportion as he\r\nthinks himself inferior to others; hence none are so prone to\r\nenvy as the dejected, they are specially keen in observing men\u0027s\r\nactions, with a view to fault\u0026mdash;finding rather than correction, in\r\norder to reserve their praises for dejection, and to glory\r\ntherein, though all the time with a dejected air. These effects\r\nfollow as necessarily from the said emotion, as it follows from\r\nthe nature of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two\r\nright angles. I have already said that I call these and similar\r\nemotions bad, solely in respect to what is useful to man. The\r\nlaws of nature have regard to nature\u0027s general order, whereof man\r\nis but a part. I mention this, in passing, lest any should think\r\nthat I have wished to set forth the faults and irrational deeds\r\nof men rather than the nature and properties of things. For, as\r\nI said in the preface to the third Part, I regard human emotions\r\nand their properties as on the same footing with other natural\r\nphenomena. Assuredly human emotions indicate the power and\r\ningenuity, of nature, if not of human nature, quite as fully as\r\nother things which we admire, and which we delight to\r\ncontemplate. But I pass on to note those qualities in the\r\nemotions, which bring advantage to man, or inflict injury upon\r\nhim.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LVIII. Honour (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but may\r\narise therefrom.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxx., and\r\nalso from the definition of an honourable man (IV. xxxvii. note.\r\ni.).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote\u0026mdash;Empty honour, as it is styled, is self\u0026mdash;approval,\r\nfostered only by the good opinion of the populace; when this\r\ngood opinion ceases there ceases also the self\u0026mdash;approval, in other\r\nwords, the highest object of each man\u0027s love (IV. lii. note);\r\nconsequently, he whose honour is rooted in popular approval must,\r\nday by day, anxiously strive, act, and scheme in order to retain\r\nhis reputation. For the populace is variable and inconstant, so\r\nthat, if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers away.\r\nEveryone wishes to catch popular applause for himself, and\r\nreadily represses the fame of others. The object of the strife\r\nbeing estimated as the greatest of all goods, each combatant is\r\nseized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals in every\r\npossible way, till he who at last comes out victorious is more\r\nproud of having done harm to others than of having done good to\r\nhimself. This sort of honour, then, is really empty, being\r\nnothing.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe points to note concerning shame may easily be inferred\r\nfrom what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance. I\r\nwill only add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue,\r\nis yet good, in so far as it shows, that the feeler of shame is\r\nreally imbued with the desire to live honourably; in the same\r\nway as suffering is good, as showing that the injured part is not\r\nmortified. Therefore, though a man who feels shame is sorrowful,\r\nhe is yet more perfect than he, who is shameless, and has no\r\ndesire to live honourably.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSuch are the points which I undertook to remark upon\r\nconcerning the emotions of pleasure and pain; as for the\r\ndesires, they are good or bad according as they spring from good\r\nor evil emotions. But all, in so far as they are engendered in\r\nus by emotions wherein the mind is passive, are blind (as is\r\nevident from what was said in IV. xliv. note), and would be\r\nuseless, if men could easily, be induced to live by the guidance\r\nof reason only, as I will now briefly, show.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LIX. To all the actions, whereto we are determined by\r\nemotion wherein the mind is passive; we can be determined\r\nwithout emotion by reason.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;To act rationally, is nothing else (III. iii. and Def.\r\nii.) but to perform those actions, which follow from the\r\nnecessity, of our nature considered in itself alone. But pain is\r\nbad, in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action\r\n(IV. xli.); wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any\r\naction, which we should be unable to perform under the guidance\r\nof reason. Again, pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders a\r\nman\u0027s capability for action (IV. xli. xliii.); therefore to this\r\nextent we could not be determined by it to any action, which we\r\ncould not perform under the guidance of reason. Lastly,\r\npleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for\r\nit consists in the fact that a man\u0027s capability for action is\r\nincreased or aided); nor is the mind passive therein, except in\r\nso far as a man\u0027s power of action is not increased to the extent\r\nof affording him an adequate conception of himself and his\r\nactions (III. iii., and note).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to\r\nsuch a state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception\r\nof himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more,\r\ncapable of those actions, to which he is determined by emotion\r\nwherein the mind is passive. But all emotions are attributable\r\nto pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the Emotions, iv.\r\nexplanation); and desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) is nothing\r\nelse but the attempt to act; therefore, to all actions, \u0026amp;c.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnother Proof.\u0026mdash;A given action is called bad, in so far as it\r\narises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion.\r\nBut no action, considered in itself alone, is either good or bad\r\n(as we pointed out in the preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same\r\naction being sometimes good, sometimes bad; wherefore to the\r\naction which is sometimes bad, or arises from some evil emotion,\r\nwe may be led by reason (IV. xix.). Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;An example will put this point in a clearer light. The\r\naction of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and\r\nin so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his\r\narm, clenches his fist, and moves his whole arm violently\r\ndownwards, is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper\r\nto the structure of the human body. If, then, a man, moved by\r\nanger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm,\r\nthis result takes place (as we showed in Pt. II.), because one\r\nand the same action can be associated with various mental images\r\nof things; therefore we may be determined to the performance of\r\none and the same action by confused ideas, or by clear and\r\ndistinct ideas. Hence it is evident that every desire which\r\nsprings from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, would become\r\nuseless, if men could be guided by reason. Let us now see why\r\ndesire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, is\r\ncalled by us blind.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LX. Desire arising from a pleasure or pain, that is not\r\nattributable to the whole body, but only to one or certain parts\r\nthereof, is without utility in respect to a man as a whole.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Let it be assumed, for instance, that A, a part of a\r\nbody, is so strengthened by some external cause, that it prevails\r\nover the remaining parts (IV. vi.). This part will not endeavour\r\nto do away with its own powers, in order that the other parts of\r\nthe body may perform its office; for this it would be necessary\r\nfor it to have a force or power of doing away with its own\r\npowers, which (III. vi.) is absurd. The said part, and,\r\nconsequently, the mind also, will endeavour to preserve its\r\ncondition. Wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind\r\naforesaid has no utility in reference to a man as a whole. If it\r\nbe assumed, on the other hand, that the part, A, be checked so\r\nthat the remaining parts prevail, it may be proved in the same\r\nmanner that desire arising from pain has no utility in respect to\r\na man as a whole. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;As pleasure is generally (IV. xliv. note) attributed to\r\none part of the body, we generally desire to preserve our being\r\nwith out taking into consideration our health as a whole: to\r\nwhich it may be added, that the desires which have most hold over\r\nus (IV. ix.) take account of the present and not of the future.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LXI. Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) considered\r\nabsolutely is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is\r\nconceived as in any way determined to a particular activity by\r\nsome given modification of itself. Hence desire, which arises\r\nfrom reason, that is (III. iii.), which is engendered in us in so\r\nfar as we act, is the actual essence or nature of man, in so far\r\nas it is conceived as determined to such activities as are\r\nadequately conceived through man\u0027s essence only (III. Def. ii.).\r\nNow, if such desire could be excessive, human nature considered\r\nin itself alone would be able to exceed itself, or would be able\r\nto do more than it can, a manifest contradiction. Therefore,\r\nsuch desire cannot be excessive. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LXII. In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the\r\ndictates of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea be\r\nof a thing future, past, or present.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of\r\nreason, it conceives under the form of eternity or necessity (II.\r\nxliv. Coroll. ii.), and is therefore affected with the same\r\ncertitude (II. xliii. and note). Wherefore, whether the thing be\r\npresent, past, or future, the mind conceives it under the same\r\nnecessity and is affected with the same certitude; and whether\r\nthe idea be of something present, past, or future, it will in all\r\ncases be equally true (II. xli.); that is, it will always\r\npossess the same properties of an adequate idea (II. Def. iv.);\r\ntherefore, in so far as the mind conceives things under the\r\ndictates of reason, it is affected in the same manner, whether\r\nthe idea be of a thing future, past, or present. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the\r\nduration of things, and could determine by reason their periods\r\nof existence, we should contemplate things future with the same\r\nemotion as things present; and the mind would desire as though\r\nit were present the good which it conceived as future;\r\nconsequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser good in the\r\npresent for the sake of a greater good in the future, and would\r\nin no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source\r\nof evil in the future, as we shall presently show. However, we\r\ncan have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of\r\nthings (II. xxxi.); and the periods of their existence (II.\r\nxliv. note.) we can only determine by imagination, which is not\r\nso powerfully affected by the future as by the present. Hence\r\nsuch true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merely\r\nabstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order\r\nof things and the connection of causes, with a view to\r\ndetermining what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather\r\nimaginary than real. Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the\r\ndesire arising from such knowledge of good and evil, in so far as\r\nit looks on into the future, be more readily checked than the\r\ndesire of things which are agreeable at the present time. (Cf.\r\nIV. xvi.)\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LXIII. He who is led by fear, and does good in order to\r\nescape evil, is not led by reason.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as\r\nactive, or in other words to reason, are emotions of pleasure and\r\ndesire (III. lix.); therefore, he who is led by fear, and does\r\ngood in order to escape evil, is not led by reason.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Superstitions persons, who know better how to rail at\r\nvice than how to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men by\r\nreason, but so to restrain them that they would rather escape\r\nevil than love virtue, have no other aim but to make others as\r\nwretched as themselves; wherefore it is nothing wonderful, if\r\nthey be generally troublesome and odious to their fellow\u0026mdash;men.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Under desire which springs from reason, we seek\r\ngood directly, and shun evil indirectly.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Desire which springs from reason can only spring from\r\na pleasurable emotion, wherein the mind is not passive (III.\r\nlix.), in other words, from a pleasure which cannot be excessive\r\n(IV. lxi.), and not from pain; wherefore this desire springs\r\nfrom the knowledge of good, not of evil (IV. viii.); hence under\r\nthe guidance of reason we seek good directly and only by\r\nimplication shun evil. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a\r\nsick and a healthy man. The sick man through fear of death eats\r\nwhat he naturally shrinks from, but the healthy man takes\r\npleasure in his food, and thus gets a better enjoyment out of\r\nlife, than if he were in fear of death, and desired directly to\r\navoid it. So a judge, who condemns a criminal to death, not from\r\nhatred or anger but from love of the public well\u0026mdash;being, is guided\r\nsolely by reason.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LXIV. The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The knowledge of evil (IV. viii.) is pain, in so far\r\nas we are conscious thereof. Now pain is the transition to a\r\nlesser perfection (Def. of the Emotions, iii.) and therefore\r\ncannot be understood through man\u0027s nature (III. vi., and vii.);\r\ntherefore it is a passive state (III. Def. ii.) which (III. iii.)\r\ndepends on inadequate ideas; consequently the knowledge thereof\r\n(II. xxix.), namely, the knowledge of evil, is inadequate.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows that, if the human mind possessed\r\nonly adequate ideas, it would form no conception of evil.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LXV. Under the guidance of reason we should pursue the\r\ngreater of two goods and the lesser of two evils.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good\r\nis in reality an evil; for we apply the terms good and bad to\r\nthings, in so far as we compare them one with another (see\r\npreface to this Part); therefore, evil is in reality a lesser\r\ngood; hence under the guidance of reason we seek or pursue only\r\nthe greater good and the lesser evil. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the\r\nlesser evil as though it were the greater good, and we may shun\r\nthe lesser good, which would be the cause of the greater evil.\r\nFor the evil, which is here called the lesser, is really good,\r\nand the lesser good is really evil, wherefore we may seek the\r\nformer and shun the latter. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LXVI. We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater\r\ngood in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present,\r\nand we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a\r\ngreater evil in the future.[15]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[15] \"Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro.\" (Van Vloten).\r\nBruder reads: \"Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi\r\nalicujus mali.\" The last word of the latter is an obvious\r\nmisprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into \"majoris\r\nboni.\" (Pollock, p. 268, note.)\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things\r\nfuture, it would be affected towards what is future in the same\r\nway as towards what is present (IV. lxii.); wherefore, looking\r\nmerely to reason, as in this proposition we are assumed to do,\r\nthere is no difference, whether the greater good or evil be\r\nassumed as present, or assumed as future; hence (IV. lxv.) we\r\nmay seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser\r\ngood in the present, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a\r\nlesser evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greater\r\ngood in the future, and we may shun a lesser good in the present,\r\nbecause it is the cause of a greater evil in the future. This\r\nCorollary is related to the foregoing Proposition as the\r\nCorollary to IV. lxv. is related to the said IV. lxv.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;If these statements be compared with what we have\r\npointed out concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part\r\nup to Prop. xviii., we shall readily see the difference between a\r\nman, who is led solely by emotion or opinion, and a man, who is\r\nled by reason. The former, whether will or no, performs actions\r\nwhereof he is utterly ignorant; the latter is his own master and\r\nonly performs such actions, as he knows are of primary importance\r\nin life, and therefore chiefly desires; wherefore I call the\r\nformer a slave, and the latter a free man, concerning whose\r\ndisposition and manner of life it will be well to make a few\r\nobservations.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LXVII. A free man thinks of death least of all things;\r\nand his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;A free man is one who lives under the guidance of\r\nreason, who is not led by fear (IV. lxiii.), but who directly\r\ndesires that which is good (IV. lxiii. Coroll.), in other words\r\n(IV. xxiv.), who strives to act, to live, and to preserve his\r\nbeing on the basis of seeking his own true advantage; wherefore\r\nsuch an one thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom\r\nis a meditation of life. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LXVIII. If men were born free, they would, so long as they\r\nremained free, form no conception of good and evil.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;I call free him who is led solely by reason; he,\r\ntherefore, who is born free, and who remains free, has only\r\nadequate ideas; therefore (IV. lxiv. Coroll.) he has no\r\nconception of evil, or consequently (good and evil being\r\ncorrelative) of good. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;It is evident, from IV. iv., that the hypothesis of\r\nthis Proposition is false and inconceivable, except in so far as\r\nwe look solely to the nature of man, or rather to God; not in so\r\nfar as the latter is infinite, but only in so far as he is the\r\ncause of man\u0027s existence.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThis, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to\r\nhave been signifieded by Moses in the history of the first man.\r\nFor in that narrative no other power of God is conceived, save\r\nthat whereby he created man, that is the power wherewith he\r\nprovided solely for man\u0027s advantage; it is stated that God\r\nforbade man, being free, to eat of the tree of the knowledge of\r\ngood and evil, and that, as soon as man should have eaten of it,\r\nhe would straightway fear death rather than desire to live.\r\nFurther, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was in\r\nentire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be\r\nnothing in nature which could be more useful to him; but that\r\nafter he believed the beasts to be like himself, he straightway\r\nbegan to imitate their emotions (III. xxvii.), and to lose his\r\nfreedom; this freedom was afterwards recovered by the\r\npatriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the idea of\r\nGod, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire\r\nfor others the good which he desires for himself, as we have\r\nshown above (IV. xxxvii.).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great,\r\nwhen it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion\r\ncontrary to itself, and possessing more power in restraining\r\nemotion (IV. vii.). But blind daring and fear are emotions,\r\nwhich can be conceived as equally great (IV. v. and iii.):\r\nhence, no less virtue or firmness is required in checking daring\r\nthan in checking fear (III. lix. note); in other words (Def. of\r\nthe Emotions, xl. and xli.), the free man shows as much virtue,\r\nwhen he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as\r\nin combat; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of\r\nmind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby,\r\nI explained in III. lix. note. By danger I mean everything,\r\nwhich can give rise to any evil, such as pain, hatred, discord,\r\n\u0026amp;c.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LXX. The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives,\r\nas far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Everyone judges what is good according to his\r\ndisposition (III. xxxix. note); wherefore an ignorant man, who\r\nhas conferred a benefit on another, puts his own estimate upon\r\nit, and, if it appears to be estimated less highly by the\r\nreceiver, will feel pain (III. xlii.). But the free man only\r\ndesires to join other men to him in friendship (IV. xxxvii.), not\r\nrepaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like value,\r\nbut guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason,\r\nand doing only such things as he knows to be of primary\r\nimportance. Therefore the free man, lest he should become\r\nhateful to the ignorant, or follow their desires rather than\r\nreason, will endeavour, as far as he can, to avoid receiving\r\ntheir favours.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;I say, as far as he can. For though men be ignorant,\r\nyet are they men, and in cases of necessity could afford us human\r\naid, the most excellent of all things: therefore it is often\r\nnecessary to accept favours from them, and consequently to repay\r\nsuch favours in kind; we must, therefore, exercise caution in\r\ndeclining favours, lest we should have the appearance of\r\ndespising those who bestow them, or of being, from avaricious\r\nmotives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for\r\noffence by the very fact of striving to avoid it. Thus, in\r\ndeclining favours, we must look to the requirements of utility\r\nand courtesy.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LXXI. Only free men are thoroughly grateful one to\r\nanother.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another,\r\nand associated among themselves by the closest necessity of\r\nfriendship (IV. xxxv., and Coroll. i.), only such men endeavour,\r\nwith mutual zeal of love, to confer benefits on each other (IV.\r\nxxxvii.), and, therefore, only they are thoroughly grateful one\r\nto another. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;The goodwill, which men who are led by blind desire\r\nhave for one another, is generally a bargaining or enticement,\r\nrather than pure goodwill. Moreover, ingratitude is not an\r\nemotion. Yet it is base, inasmuch as it generally shows, that a\r\nman is affected by excessive hatred, anger, pride, avarice, \u0026amp;c.\r\nHe who, by reason of his folly, knows not how to return benefits,\r\nis not ungrateful, much less he who is not gained over by the\r\ngifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to conceal\r\nhis thefts, or by any similar persons. Contrariwise, such an one\r\nshows a constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by any gifts be\r\ncorrupted, to his own or the general hurt.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LXXII. The free man never acts fraudulently, but always in\r\ngood faith.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;If it be asked: What should a man\u0027s conduct be in a\r\ncase where he could by breaking faith free himself from the\r\ndanger of present death? Would not his plan of self\u0026mdash;preservation\r\ncompletely persuade him to deceive? This may be answered by\r\npointing out that, if reason persuaded him to act thus, it would\r\npersuade all men to act in a similar manner, in which case reason\r\nwould persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their\r\nforces, or to have laws in common, that is, not to have any\r\ngeneral laws, which is absurd.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. LXXIII. The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in\r\na State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in\r\nsolitude, where he is independent.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The man, who is guided by reason, does not obey\r\nthrough fear (IV. lxiii.): but, in so far as he endeavours to\r\npreserve his being according to the dictates of reason, that is\r\n(IV. lxvi. note), in so far as he endeavours to live in freedom,\r\nhe desires to order his life according to the general good (IV.\r\nxxxvii.), and, consequently (as we showed in IV. xxxvii. note.\r\nii.), to live according to the laws of his country. Therefore\r\nthe free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom, desires to\r\npossess the general rights of citizenship. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;These and similar observations, which we have made on\r\nman\u0027s true freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to\r\ncourage and nobility of character (III. lix. note). I do not\r\nthink it worth while to prove separately all the properties of\r\nstrength; much less need I show, that he that is strong hates no\r\nman, is angry with no man, envies no man, is indignant with no\r\nman, despises no man, and least of all things is proud. These\r\npropositions, and all that relate to the true way of life and\r\nreligion, are easily proved from IV. xxxvii. and IV. xlvi.;\r\nnamely, that hatred should be overcome with love, and that every\r\nman should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself.\r\nWe may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note to IV.\r\nl., and in other places; namely, that the strong man has ever\r\nfirst in his thoughts, that all things follow from the necessity\r\nof the divine nature; so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful\r\nand evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him impious,\r\nhorrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his\r\nown disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe.\r\nWherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they\r\nreally are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such\r\nas are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar\r\nemotions, which I have mentioned above. Thus he endeavours, as\r\nwe said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on\r\nhis way rejoicing. How far human virtue is capable of attaining\r\nto such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove in\r\nthe following Part.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4\u003e\r\nAPPENDIX.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhat have said in this Part concerning the right way of life\r\nhas not been arranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view,\r\nbut has been set forth piece\u0026mdash;meal, according as I thought each\r\nProposition could most readily be deduced from what preceded it.\r\nI propose, therefore, to rearrange my remarks and to bring them\r\nunder leading heads.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI. All our endeavours or desires so follow from the\r\nnecessity of our nature, that they can be understood either\r\nthrough it alone, as their proximate cause, or by virtue of our\r\nbeing a part of nature, which cannot be adequately conceived\r\nthrough itself without other individuals.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nII. Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner,\r\nthat they can be understood through it alone, are those which are\r\nreferred to the mind, in so far as the latter is conceived to\r\nconsist of adequate ideas: the remaining desires are only\r\nreferred to the mind, in so far as it conceives things\r\ninadequately, and their force and increase are generally defined\r\nnot by the power of man, but by the power of things external to\r\nus: wherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latter\r\npassions, for the former always indicate our power, the latter,\r\non the other hand, show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIII. Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined\r\nby man\u0027s power or reason, are always good. The rest may be\r\neither good or bad.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIV. Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect\r\nthe understanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone\r\nman\u0027s highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed\r\nblessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit, which\r\narises from the intuitive knowledge of God: now, to perfect the\r\nunderstanding is nothing else but to understand God, God\u0027s\r\nattributes, and the actions which follow from the necessity of\r\nhis nature. Wherefore of a man, who is led by reason, the\r\nultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern all\r\nhis fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate\r\nconception of himself and of all things within the scope of his\r\nintelligence.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nV. Therefore, without intelligence there is not rational\r\nlife: and things are only good, in so far as they aid man in his\r\nenjoyment of the intellectual life, which is defined by\r\nintelligence. Contrariwise, whatsoever things hinder man\u0027s\r\nperfecting of his reason, and capability to enjoy the rational\r\nlife, are alone called evil.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nVI. As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are\r\nnecessarily good, no evil can befall man except through external\r\ncauses; namely, by virtue of man being a part of universal\r\nnature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to\r\nconform to in almost infinite ways.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nVII. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of\r\nnature, or that he should not follow her general order; but if\r\nhe be thrown among individuals whose nature is in harmony with\r\nhis own, his power of action will thereby be aided and fostered,\r\nwhereas, if he be thrown among such as are but very little in\r\nharmony with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate\r\nhimself to them without undergoing a great change himself.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nVIII. Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be\r\ncapable of injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the\r\nrational life, we may endeavour to remove in whatever way seems\r\nsafest to us; on the other hand, whatsoever we deem to be good\r\nor useful for preserving our being, and enabling us to enjoy the\r\nrational life, we may appropriate to our use and employ as we\r\nthink best. Everyone without exception may, by sovereign right\r\nof nature, do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIX. Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any\r\ngiven thing than other individuals of the same species;\r\ntherefore (cf. vii.) for man in the preservation of his being and\r\nthe enjoyment of the rational life there is nothing more useful\r\nthan his fellow\u0026mdash;man who is led by reason. Further, as we know\r\nnot anything among individual things which is more excellent than\r\na man led by reason, no man can better display the power of his\r\nskill and disposition, than in so training men, that they come at\r\nlast to live under the dominion of their own reason.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nX. In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of\r\nhatred, one towards another, they are at variance, and are\r\ntherefore to be feared in proportion, as they are more powerful\r\nthan their fellows.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXI. Yet minds are not conquered by force, but by love and\r\nhigh\u0026mdash;mindedness.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXII. It is before all things useful to men to associate\r\ntheir ways of life, to bind themselves together with such bonds\r\nas they think most fitted to gather them all into unity, and\r\ngenerally to do whatsoever serves to strengthen friendship.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXIII. But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness.\r\nFor men are diverse (seeing that those who live under the\r\nguidance of reason are few), yet are they generally envious and\r\nmore prone to revenge than to sympathy. No small force of\r\ncharacter is therefore required to take everyone as he is, and to\r\nrestrain one\u0027s self from imitating the emotions of others. But\r\nthose who carp at mankind, and are more skilled in railing at\r\nvice than in instilling virtue, and who break rather than\r\nstrengthen men\u0027s dispositions, are hurtful both to themselves and\r\nothers. Thus many from too great impatience of spirit, or from\r\nmisguided religious zeal, have preferred to live among brutes\r\nrather than among men; as boys or youths, who cannot peaceably\r\nendure the chidings of their parents, will enlist as soldiers and\r\nchoose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in\r\npreference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their\r\nfather: suffering any burden to be put upon them, so long as\r\nthey may spite their parents.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXIV. Therefore, although men are generally governed in\r\neverything by their own lusts, yet their association in common\r\nbrings many more advantages than drawbacks. Wherefore it is\r\nbetter to bear patiently the wrongs they may do us, and to strive\r\nto promote whatsoever serves to bring about harmony and\r\nfriendship.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXV. Those things, which beget harmony, are such as are\r\nattributable to justice, equity, and honourable living. For men\r\nbrook ill not only what is unjust or iniquitous, but also what is\r\nreckoned disgraceful, or that a man should slight the received\r\ncustoms of their society. For winning love those qualities are\r\nespecially necessary which have regard to religion and piety (cf.\r\nIV. xxxvii. notes. i. ii.; xlvi. note; and lxxiii. note).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXVI. Further, harmony is often the result of fear: but such\r\nharmony is insecure. Further, fear arises from infirmity of\r\nspirit, and moreover belongs not to the exercise of reason: the\r\nsame is true of compassion, though this latter seems to bear a\r\ncertain resemblance to piety.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXVII. Men are also gained over by liberality, especially\r\nsuch as have not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain\r\nlife. However, to give aid to every poor man is far beyond the\r\npower and the advantage of any private person. For the riches of\r\nany private person are wholly inadequate to meet such a call.\r\nAgain, an individual man\u0027s resources of character are too limited\r\nfor him to be able to make all men his friends. Hence providing\r\nfor the poor is a duty, which falls on the State as a whole, and\r\nhas regard only to the general advantage.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXVIII. In accepting favours, and in returning gratitude our\r\nduty must be wholly different (cf. IV. lxx. note; lxxi. note).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXIX. Again, meretricious love, that is, the lust of\r\ngeneration arising from bodily beauty, and generally every sort\r\nof love, which owns anything save freedom of soul as its cause,\r\nreadily passes into hate; unless indeed, what is worse, it is a\r\nspecies of madness; and then it promotes discord rather than\r\nharmony (cf. III. xxxi. Coroll.).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXX. As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is in\r\nharmony with reason, if the desire for physical union be not\r\nengendered solely by bodily beauty, but also by the desire to\r\nbeget children and to train them up wisely; and moreover, if the\r\nlove of both, to wit, of the man and of the woman, is not caused\r\nby bodily beauty only, but also by freedom of soul.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXI. Furthermore, flattery begets harmony; but only by\r\nmeans of the vile offence of slavishness or treachery. None are\r\nmore readily taken with flattery than the proud, who wish to be\r\nfirst, but are not.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXII. There is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety\r\nand religion. Although abasement is the opposite to pride, yet\r\nis he that abases himself most akin to the proud (IV. lvii.\r\nnote).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXIII. Shame also brings about harmony, but only in such\r\nmatters as cannot be hid. Further, as shame is a species of\r\npain, it does not concern the exercise of reason.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXIV. The remaining emotions of pain towards men are\r\ndirectly opposed to justice, equity, honour, piety, and religion;\r\nand, although indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance\r\nto equity, yet is life but lawless, where every man may pass\r\njudgment on another\u0027s deeds, and vindicate his own or other men\u0027s\r\nrights.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXV. Correctness of conduct (modestia), that is, the desire\r\nof pleasing men which is determined by reason, is attributable to\r\npiety (as we said in IV. xxxvii. note. i.). But, if it spring\r\nfrom emotion, it is ambition, or the desire whereby, men, under\r\nthe false cloak of piety, generally stir up discords and\r\nseditions. For he who desires to aid his fellows either in word\r\nor in deed, so that they may together enjoy the highest good, he,\r\nI say, will before all things strive to win them over with love:\r\nnot to draw them into admiration, so that a system may be called\r\nafter his name, nor to give any cause for envy. Further, in his\r\nconversation he will shrink from talking of men\u0027s faults, and\r\nwill be careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity: but\r\nhe will dwell at length on human virtue or power, and the way\r\nwhereby it may be perfected. Thus will men be stirred not by\r\nfear, nor by aversion, but only by the emotion of joy, to\r\nendeavour, so far as in them lies, to live in obedience to\r\nreason.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXVI. Besides men, we know of no particular thing in nature\r\nin whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with\r\nourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore,\r\nwhatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our\r\nadvantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or\r\ndestroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to\r\nour use as best we may.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXVII. The advantage which we derive from things external to\r\nus, besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire from\r\nobserving them, and from recombining their elements in different\r\nforms, is principally the preservation of the body; from this\r\npoint of view, those things are most useful which can so feed and\r\nnourish the body, that all its parts may rightly fulfil their\r\nfunctions. For, in proportion as the body is capable of being\r\naffected in a greater variety of ways, and of affecting external\r\nbodies in a great number of ways, so much the more is the mind\r\ncapable of thinking (IV. xxxviii., xxxix.). But there seem to be\r\nvery few things of this kind in nature; wherefore for the due\r\nnourishment of the body we must use many foods of diverse nature.\r\nFor the human body is composed of very many parts of different\r\nnature, which stand in continual need of varied nourishment, so\r\nthat the whole body may be equally capable of doing everything\r\nthat can follow from its own nature, and consequently that the\r\nmind also may be equally capable of forming many perceptions.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXVIII. Now for providing these nourishments the strength of\r\neach individual would hardly suffice, if men did not lend one\r\nanother mutual aid. But money has furnished us with a token for\r\neverything: hence it is with the notion of money, that the mind\r\nof the multitude is chiefly engrossed: nay, it can hardly\r\nconceive any kind of pleasure, which is not accompanied with the\r\nidea of money as cause.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXIX. This result is the fault only of those, who seek\r\nmoney, not from poverty or to supply their necessary wants, but\r\nbecause they have learned the arts of gain, wherewith they bring\r\nthemselves to great splendour. Certainly they nourish their\r\nbodies, according to custom, but scantily, believing that they\r\nlose as much of their wealth as they spend on the preservation of\r\ntheir body. But they who know the true use of money, and who fix\r\nthe measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs,\r\nlive content with little.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXX. As, therefore, those things are good which assist the\r\nvarious parts of the body, and enable them to perform their\r\nfunctions; and as pleasure consists in an increase of, or aid\r\nto, man\u0027s power, in so far as he is composed of mind and body;\r\nit follows that all those things which bring pleasure are good.\r\nBut seeing that things do not work with the object of giving us\r\npleasure, and that their power of action is not tempered to suit\r\nour advantage, and, lastly, that pleasure is generally referred\r\nto one part of the body more than to the other parts; therefore\r\nmost emotions of pleasure (unless reason and watchfulness be at\r\nhand), and consequently the desires arising therefrom, may become\r\nexcessive. Moreover we may add that emotion leads us to pay most\r\nregard to what is agreeable in the present, nor can we estimate\r\nwhat is future with emotions equally vivid. (IV. xliv. note, and\r\nlx. note.)\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXXI. Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account as\r\ngood all that brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure.\r\nHowever, as we said above (IV. xlv. note), none but the envious\r\ntake delight in my infirmity and trouble. For the greater the\r\npleasure whereby we are affected, the greater is the perfection\r\nwhereto we pass, and consequently the more do we partake of the\r\ndivine nature: no pleasure can ever be evil, which is regulated\r\nby a true regard for our advantage. But contrariwise he, who is\r\nled by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by\r\nreason.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nXXXII. But human power is extremely limited, and is\r\ninfinitely surpassed by the power of external causes; we have\r\nnot, therefore, an absolute power of shaping to our use those\r\nthings which are without us. Nevertheless, we shall bear with an\r\nequal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims\r\nof our own advantage, so long as we are conscious, that we have\r\ndone our duty, and that the power which we possess is not\r\nsufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely;\r\nremembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that we\r\nfollow her order. If we have a clear and distinct understanding\r\nof this, that part of our nature which is defined by\r\nintelligence, in other words the better part of ourselves, will\r\nassuredly acquiesce in what befalls us, and in such acquiescence\r\nwill endeavour to persist. For, in so far as we are intelligent\r\nbeings, we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary,\r\nnor yield absolute acquiescence to anything, save to that which\r\nis true: wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding\r\nof these things, the endeavour of the better part of ourselves is\r\nin harmony with the order of nature as a whole.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap05\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cH4 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nPART V:\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nOf the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4\u003e\r\nPREFACE\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAt length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which\r\nis concerned with the way leading to freedom. I shall therefore\r\ntreat therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the\r\nreason can control the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental\r\nFreedom or Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much\r\nmore powerful the wise man is than the ignorant. It is no part\r\nof my design to point out the method and means whereby the\r\nunderstanding may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the\r\nbody may be so tended, as to be capable of the due performance of\r\nits functions. The latter question lies in the province of\r\nMedicine, the former in the province of Logic. Here, therefore,\r\nI repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of\r\nreason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its\r\ndominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation.\r\nThat we do not possess absolute dominion over them, I have\r\nalready shown. Yet the Stoics have thought, that the emotions\r\ndepended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely\r\ngovern them. But these philosophers were compelled, by the\r\nprotest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess,\r\nthat no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and\r\nmoderate them: and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the\r\nexample (if I remember rightly) of two dogs, the one a house\u0026mdash;dog\r\nand the other a hunting\u0026mdash;dog. For by long training it could be\r\nbrought about, that the house\u0026mdash;dog should become accustomed to\r\nhunt, and the hunting\u0026mdash;dog to cease from running after hares. To\r\nthis opinion Descartes not a little inclines. For he maintained,\r\nthat the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of\r\nthe brain, namely, to that part called the pineal gland, by the\r\naid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which\r\nare set going in the body, and also external objects, and which\r\nthe mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various\r\nways. He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the midst\r\nof the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of\r\nthe animal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in the\r\nmidst of the brain in as many different manners, as the animal\r\nspirits can impinge thereon; and, again, that as many different\r\nmarks are impressed on the said gland, as there are different\r\nexternal objects which impel the animal spirits towards it;\r\nwhence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspends the\r\ngland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once\r\nbefore by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the\r\ngland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving and\r\ndetermining them to the condition wherein they were, when\r\nrepulsed before by a similar position of the gland. He further\r\nasserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature\r\nto a certain given motion of the gland. For instance, whenever\r\nanyone desires to look at a remote object, the act of volition\r\ncauses the pupil of the eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in\r\nquestion had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil, the\r\nmere wish to dilate it would not have brought about the result,\r\ninasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves to impel the\r\nanimal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would\r\ndilate or contract the pupil, is not associated in nature with\r\nthe wish to dilate or contract the pupil, but with the wish to\r\nlook at remote or very near objects. Lastly, he maintained that,\r\nalthough every motion of the aforesaid gland seems to have been\r\nunited by nature to one particular thought out of the whole\r\nnumber of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life, yet\r\nit can nevertheless become through habituation associated with\r\nother thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de\r\nl\u0027âme, I.50. He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak,\r\nthat it cannot, under proper direction, acquire absolute power\r\nover its passions. For passions as defined by him are\r\n\"perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are\r\nreferred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression)\r\nare produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement\r\nof the spirits.\" (Passions de l\u0027âme, I.27). But, seeing that we\r\ncan join any motion of the gland, or consequently of the spirits,\r\nto any volition, the determination of the will depends entirely\r\non our own powers; if, therefore, we determine our will with\r\nsure and firm decisions in the direction to which we wish our\r\nactions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions which\r\nwe wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an\r\nabsolute dominion over our passions. Such is the doctrine of\r\nthis illustrious philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his\r\nown words); it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I could\r\nhardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man. Indeed, I\r\nam lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted,\r\nthat he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from\r\nself\u0026mdash;evident premisses, and would affirm nothing which he did not\r\nclearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to\r\ntask the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through\r\noccult qualities, could maintain a hypothesis, beside which\r\noccult qualities are commonplace. What does he understand, I\r\nask, by the union of the mind and the body? What clear and\r\ndistinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union\r\nwith a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like\r\nhim to explain this union through its proximate cause. But he\r\nhad so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from body,\r\nthat he could not assign any particular cause of the union\r\nbetween the two, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have\r\nrecourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is to God.\r\nFurther, I should much like to know, what degree of motion the\r\nmind can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force can it\r\nhold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this gland can\r\nbe agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the\r\nanimal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we\r\nhave closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again\r\ndisjoined therefrom by physical causes; in which case it would\r\nfollow that, although the mind firmly intended to face a given\r\ndanger, and had united to this decision the motions of boldness,\r\nyet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended\r\nin a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything\r\nexcept running away. In truth, as there is no common standard of\r\nvolition and motion, so is there no comparison possible between\r\nthe powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body;\r\nconsequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined\r\nby the strength of the other. We may also add, that there is no\r\ngland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so placed that it\r\ncan thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also that\r\nall the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the\r\nbrain. Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes\r\nconcerning the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I have\r\nabundantly proved that his premisses are false. Therefore, since\r\nthe power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by the\r\nunderstanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of\r\nthe mind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all\r\nhave had experience of, but do not accurately observe or\r\ndistinctly see, and from the same basis we shall deduce all those\r\nconclusions, which have regard to the mind\u0027s blessedness.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4\u003e\r\nAXIOMS.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI. If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a\r\nchange must necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of\r\nthe two, and continue until they cease to be contrary.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nII. The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause,\r\nin so far as its essence is explained or defined by the essence\r\nof its cause.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n(This axiom is evident from III. vii.)\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH4\u003e\r\nPROPOSITIONS.\r\n\u003c/H4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. I. Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged\r\nand associated in the mind, so are the modifications of body or\r\nthe images of things precisely in the same way arranged and\r\nassociated in the body.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The order and connection of ideas is the same (II.\r\nvii.) as the order and connection of things, and vice versâ the\r\norder and connection of things is the same (II. vi. Coroll. and\r\nvii.) as the order and connection of ideas. Wherefore, even as\r\nthe order and connection of ideas in the mind takes place\r\naccording to the order and association of modifications of the\r\nbody (II. xviii.), so vice versâ (III. ii.) the order and\r\nconnection of modifications of the body takes place in accordance\r\nwith the manner, in which thoughts and the ideas of things are\r\narranged and associated in the mind. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. II. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion,\r\nfrom the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other\r\nthoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external\r\ncause, and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these\r\nemotions, be destroyed.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred,\r\nis pleasure or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause\r\n(Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.); wherefore, when this cause is\r\nremoved, the reality of love or hatred is removed with it;\r\ntherefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom are\r\ndestroyed. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. III. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a\r\npassion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by\r\nthe general Def. of the Emotions). If, therefore, we form a\r\nclear and distinct idea of a given emotion, that idea will only\r\nbe distinguished from the emotion, in so far as it is referred to\r\nthe mind only, by reason (II. xxi., and note); therefore (III.\r\niii.), the emotion will cease to be a passion. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary\u0026mdash;An emotion therefore becomes more under our\r\ncontrol, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in\r\nproportion as it is more known to us.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. IV. There is no modification of the body, whereof we\r\ncannot form some clear and distinct conception.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Properties which are common to all things can only be\r\nconceived adequately (II. xxxviii.); therefore (II. xii. and\r\nLemma ii. after II. xiii.) there is no modification of the body,\r\nwhereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof\r\nwe cannot form some clear and distinct conception. For an\r\nemotion is the idea of a modification of the body (by the general\r\nDef. of the Emotions), and must therefore (by the preceding\r\nProp.) involve some clear and distinct conception.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by\r\nan effect (I. xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly\r\nunderstand whatever follows from an idea, which in us is adequate\r\n(II. xl.), it follows that everyone has the power of clearly and\r\ndistinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if not\r\nabsolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of bringing it\r\nabout, that he should become less subject to them. To attain\r\nthis result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to\r\nacquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of\r\nevery emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion,\r\nbe determined to think of those things which it clearly and\r\ndistinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus\r\nthat the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an\r\nexternal cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence\r\nit will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, \u0026amp;c. will be\r\ndestroyed (V. ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which\r\nare wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of\r\nbeing excessive (IV. lxi.). For it must be especially remarked,\r\nthat the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and\r\nthat through which he is said to be passive is one and the same.\r\nFor instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted,\r\nthat everyone desires his fellow\u0026mdash;men to live after his own\r\nfashion (III. xxxi. note); in a man, who is not guided by\r\nreason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and\r\ndoes not greatly differ from pride; whereas in a man, who lives\r\nby the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is\r\ncalled piety (IV. xxxvii. note. i. and second proof). In like\r\nmanner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as\r\nthey spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are\r\naccredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by\r\nadequate ideas. For all desires, whereby we are determined to\r\nany given action, may arise as much from adequate as from\r\ninadequate ideas (IV. lix.). Than this remedy for the emotions\r\n(to return to the point from which I started), which consists in\r\na true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within\r\nour power, can be devised. For the mind has no other power save\r\nthat of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as we have shown\r\nabove (III. iii.).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. V. An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive simply,\r\nand not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other\r\nconditions being equal, greater than any other emotion.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be\r\nfree, is greater than one towards what we conceive to be\r\nnecessary (III. xlix.), and, consequently, still greater than one\r\ntowards what we conceive as possible, or contingent (IV. xi.).\r\nBut to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to\r\nconceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes\r\nwhereby it has been determined to action (II. xxxv. note);\r\ntherefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply\r\nis, other conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feel\r\ntowards what is necessary, possible, or contingent, and,\r\nconsequently, it is the greatest of all. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. VI. The mind has greater power over the emotions and is\r\nless subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as\r\nnecessary.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The mind understands all things to be necessary (I.\r\nxxix.) and to be determined to existence and operation by an\r\ninfinite chain of causes; therefore (by the foregoing\r\nProposition), it thus far brings it about, that it is less\r\nsubject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III. xlviii.)\r\nfeels less emotion towards the things themselves. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is\r\napplied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctly\r\nand vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the\r\nemotions, as experience also testifies. For we see, that the\r\npain arising from the loss of any good is mitigated, as soon as\r\nthe man who has lost it perceives, that it could not by any means\r\nhave been preserved. So also we see that no one pities an\r\ninfant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly,\r\nbecause it passes so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness.\r\nWhereas, if most people were born full\u0026mdash;grown and only one here\r\nand there as an infant, everyone would pity the infants; because\r\ninfancy would not then be looked on as a state natural and\r\nnecessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature; and we may\r\nnote several other instances of the same sort.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. VII. Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if\r\nwe take account of time, are stronger than those, which are\r\nattributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the\r\nemotion wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body,\r\nbeing affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the\r\nsaid thing (II. xvii.). Wherefore, the emotion, which is\r\nreferred to the thing which we regard as absent, is not of a\r\nnature to overcome the rest of a man\u0027s activities and power (IV.\r\nvi.), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sort\r\ncontrolled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its\r\nexternal cause (IV. ix.). But an emotion which springs from\r\nreason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things\r\n(see the def. of reason in II. xl. note. ii.), which we always\r\nregard as present (for there can be nothing to exclude their\r\npresent existence), and which we always conceive in the same\r\nmanner (II. xxxviii.). Wherefore an emotion of this kind always\r\nremains the same; and consequently (V. Ax. i.) emotions, which\r\nare contrary thereto and are not kept going by their external\r\ncauses, will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more,\r\nuntil they are no longer contrary to it; to this extent the\r\nemotion which springs from reason is more powerful. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. VIII. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number\r\nof simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few\r\n(III. vii.): therefore (IV. v.), in proportion to the increased\r\nnumber of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion\r\nbecomes stronger. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote\u0026mdash;This proposition is also evident from V. Ax. ii.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. IX. An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse\r\ncauses which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion\r\nitself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less\r\naffected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different\r\nand equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a\r\nsingle cause.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it\r\nhinders the mind from being able to think (IV. xxvi. xxvii.);\r\ntherefore, an emotion, whereby the mind is determined to the\r\ncontemplation of several things at once, is less hurtful than\r\nanother equally powerful emotion, which so engrosses the mind in\r\nthe single contemplation of a few objects or of one, that it is\r\nunable to think of anything else; this was our first point.\r\nAgain, as the mind\u0027s essence, in other words, its power (III.\r\nvii.), consists solely in thought (II. xi.), the mind is less\r\npassive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to think of\r\nseveral things at once, than in regard to an equally strong\r\nemotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few\r\nor of a single object: this was our second point. Lastly, this\r\nemotion (III. xlviii.), in so far as it is attributable to\r\nseveral causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to\r\nour nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the\r\nmodifications of our body according to the intellectual order.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that\r\nis (IV. xxx.), which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede\r\nthe mind from understanding (IV. xxvii.). So long, therefore, as\r\nwe are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, the\r\nmind\u0027s power, whereby it endeavours to understand things (IV.\r\nxxvi.), is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear\r\nand distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (II. xl.\r\nnote. ii. and II. xlvii. note); consequently we have in such\r\ncases the power of arranging and associating the modifications of\r\nthe body according to the intellectual order. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;By this power of rightly arranging and associating the\r\nbodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily\r\naffected by evil emotions. For (V. vii.) a greater force is\r\nneeded for controlling the emotions, when they are arranged and\r\nassociated according to the intellectual order, than when they,\r\nare uncertain and unsettled. The best we can do, therefore, so\r\nlong as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is\r\nto frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts,\r\nto commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith[16] to the\r\nparticular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so\r\nthat our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that\r\nit may be always ready to our hand. For instance, we have laid\r\ndown among the rules of life (IV. xlvi. and note), that hatred\r\nshould be overcome with love or high\u0026mdash;mindedness, and not required\r\nwith hatred in return. Now, that this precept of reason may be\r\nalways ready to our hand in time of need, we should often think\r\nover and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and\r\nin what manner and way they may be best warded off by\r\nhigh\u0026mdash;mindedness: we shall thus associate the idea of wrong with\r\nthe idea of this precept, which accordingly will always be ready\r\nfor use when a wrong is done to us (II. xviii.). If we keep also\r\nin readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the good\r\nwhich follows from mutual friendships, and common fellowships;\r\nfurther, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result\r\nof the right way of life ( IV. lii.), and that men, no less than\r\neverything else, act by the necessity of their nature: in such\r\ncase I say the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises\r\ntherefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagination and\r\nwill be easily overcome; or, if the anger which springs from a\r\ngrievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will nevertheless be\r\novercome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far sooner\r\nthan if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand. As\r\nis indeed evident from V. vi. vii. viii. We should, in the same\r\nway, reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear; the\r\nordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and\r\nimagined, together with the means whereby through readiness of\r\nresource and strength of mind we can avoid and overcome them.\r\nBut we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and conceptions\r\nwe should always bear in mind that which is good in every\r\nindividual thing (IV. lxiii. Coroll. and III. lix.), in order\r\nthat we may always be determined to action by an emotion of\r\npleasure. For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in the\r\npursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end for\r\nwhich it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attain\r\nit. Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the\r\nfickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except\r\nthrough a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do\r\nthe most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of\r\ngaining the distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving\r\nvent to their anger would fain appear wise. Wherefore it is\r\ncertain that those, who cry out the loudest against the misuse of\r\nhonour and the vanity of the world, are those who most greedily\r\ncovet it. This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is common\r\nto all who are ill\u0026mdash;used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit.\r\nFor a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the\r\nmisuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely\r\ntorments himself, and shows the world that he is intolerant, not\r\nonly of his own poverty, but also of other people\u0027s riches. So,\r\nagain, those who have been ill received by a woman they love\r\nthink of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other stock\r\nfaults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion,\r\ndirectly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart.\r\nThus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the\r\nlove of freedom strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of\r\nthe virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy\r\nwhich arises from the true knowledge of them: he will in no wise\r\ndesire to dwell on men\u0027s faults, or to carp at his fellows, or to\r\nrevel in a false show of freedom. Whosoever will diligently\r\nobserve and practise these precepts (which indeed are not\r\ndifficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for\r\nthe most part, to direct his actions according to the\r\ncommandments of reason.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[16] Continuo. Rendered \"constantly\" by Mr. Pollock on the ground\r\nthat the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XI. In proportion as a mental image is referred to more\r\nobjects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and\r\noccupies the mind more.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;In proportion as a mental image or an emotion is\r\nreferred to more objects, so are there more causes whereby it can\r\nbe aroused and fostered, all of which (by hypothesis) the mind\r\ncontemplates simultaneously in association with the given emotion;\r\ntherefore the emotion is more frequent, or is more often in\r\nfull vigour, and (V. viii.) occupies the mind more. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XII. The mental images of things are more easily\r\nassociated with the images referred to things which we clearly\r\nand distinctly understand, than with others.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Things, which we clearly and distinctly understand,\r\nare either the common properties of things or deductions\r\ntherefrom (see definition of Reason, II. xl. note ii.), and are\r\nconsequently (by the last Prop.) more often aroused in us.\r\nWherefore it may more readily happen, that we should contemplate\r\nother things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with\r\nsomething else, and consequently (II. xviii.) that the images of\r\nthe said things should be more often associated with the images\r\nof these than with the images of something else. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XIII. A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion as\r\nit is associated with a greater number of other images.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;In proportion as an image is associated with a greater\r\nnumber of other images, so (II. xviii.) are there more causes\r\nwhereby it can be aroused. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodily\r\nmodifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of\r\nGod.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind\r\nmay not form some clear and distinct conception (V. iv.);\r\nwherefore it can bring it about, that they should all be referred\r\nto the idea of God (I. xv.). Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and\r\nhis emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he\r\nmore understands himself and his emotions.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and\r\nhis emotions feels pleasure (III. liii.), and this pleasure is\r\n(by the last Prop.) accompanied by the idea of God; therefore\r\n(Def. of the Emotions, vi.) such an one loves God, and (for the\r\nsame reason) so much the more in proportion as he more\r\nunderstands himself and his emotions. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XVI. This love towards God must hold the chief place in\r\nthe mind.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;For this love is associated with all the modifications\r\nof the body (V. xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V. xv.);\r\ntherefore (V. xi.), it must hold the chief place in the mind.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XVII. God is without passions, neither is he affected by\r\nany emotion of pleasure or pain.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are\r\ntrue (II. xxxii.), that is (II. Def. iv.) adequate; and\r\ntherefore (by the general Def. of the Emotions) God is without\r\npassions. Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to a\r\nlesser perfection (I. xx. Coroll. ii.); therefore (by Def. of\r\nthe Emotions, ii. iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of\r\npleasure or pain.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate\r\nanyone. For God (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any\r\nemotion of pleasure or pain, consequently (Def. of the Emotions,\r\nvi. vii.) he does not love or hate anyone.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XVIII. No one can hate God.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect\r\n(II. xlvi. xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God,\r\nwe are active (III. iii.); consequently (III. lix.) there can be\r\nno pain accompanied by the idea of God, in other words (Def. of\r\nthe Emotions, vii.), no one can hate God. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;It may be objected that, as we understand God as the\r\ncause of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause\r\nof pain. But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand the\r\ncauses of pain, it to that extent (V. iii.) ceases to be a\r\npassion, that is, it ceases to be pain (III. lix.); therefore,\r\nin so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain, we to\r\nthat extent feel pleasure.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XIX. He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should\r\nlove him in return.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V.\r\nxvii. Coroll.) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and\r\nconsequently he would desire to feel pain (III. xix.); which is\r\nabsurd (III. xxviii.). Therefore, he who loves God, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XX. This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion\r\nof envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in\r\nproportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to\r\nGod by the same bond of love.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This love towards God is the highest good which we can\r\nseek for under the guidance of reason (IV. xxviii.), it is common\r\nto all men (IV. xxxvi.), and we desire that all should rejoice\r\ntherein (IV. xxxvii.); therefore (Def. of the Emotions, xxiii.),\r\nit cannot be stained by the emotion envy, nor by the emotion of\r\njealousy (V. xviii. see definition of Jealousy, III. xxxv. note);\r\nbut, contrariwise, it must needs be the more fostered, in\r\nproportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice\r\ntherein. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;We can in the same way show, that there is no emotion\r\ndirectly contrary to this love, whereby this love can be\r\ndestroyed; therefore we may conclude, that this love towards God\r\nis the most constant of all the emotions, and that, in so far as\r\nit is referred to the body, it cannot be destroyed, unless the\r\nbody be destroyed also. As to its nature, in so far as it is\r\nreferred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI have now gone through all the remedies against the\r\nemotions, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can\r\ndo against them. Whence it appears that the mind\u0027s power over\r\nthe emotions consists:\u0026mdash;\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI. In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V. iv. note).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nII. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the\r\nthought of an external cause, which we conceive confusedly (V.\r\nii. and V. iv. note).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIII. In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions\r\nreferred to things, which we distinctly understand, surpass those\r\nreferred to what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner\r\n(V. vii.).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIV. In the number of causes whereby those modifications[17]\r\nare fostered, which have regard to the common properties of\r\nthings or to God (V. ix. xi.).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[17] Affectiones. Camerer reads affectus\u0026mdash;\u0026mdash;emotions.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nV. Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and\r\nassociate, one with another, its own emotions (V. x. note and\r\nxii. xiii. xiv.).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut, in order that this power of the mind over the emotions\r\nmay be better understood, it should be specially observed that\r\nthe emotions are called by us strong, when we compare the emotion\r\nof one man with the emotion of another, and see that one man is\r\nmore troubled than another by the same emotion; or when we are\r\ncomparing the various emotions of the same man one with another,\r\nand find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion than\r\nby another. For the strength of every emotion is defined by a\r\ncomparison of our own power with the power of an external cause.\r\nNow the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its\r\ninfirmity or passion is defined by the privation of knowledge\r\nonly: it therefore follows, that that mind is most passive,\r\nwhose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it\r\nmay be characterized more readily by its passive states than by\r\nits activities: on the other hand, that mind is most active,\r\nwhose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that,\r\nalthough it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former\r\nmind, it may yet be more easily characterized by ideas\r\nattributable to human virtue, than by ideas which tell of human\r\ninfirmity. Again, it must be observed, that spiritual\r\nunhealthiness and misfortunes can generally be traced to\r\nexcessive love for something which is subject to many variations,\r\nand which we can never become masters of. For no one is\r\nsolicitous or anxious about anything, unless he loves it;\r\nneither do wrongs, suspicions, enmities, \u0026amp;c. arise, except in\r\nregard to things whereof no one can be really master.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWe may thus readily conceive the power which clear and\r\ndistinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge\r\n(II. xlvii. note), founded on the actual knowledge of God,\r\npossesses over the emotions: if it does not absolutely destroy\r\nthem, in so far as they are passions (V. iii. and iv. note); at\r\nany rate, it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind\r\n(V. xiv.). Further, it begets a love towards a thing immutable\r\nand eternal (V. xv.), whereof we may really enter into possession\r\n(II. xlv.); neither can it be defiled with those faults which\r\nare inherent in ordinary love; but it may grow from strength to\r\nstrength, and may engross the greater part of the mind, and\r\ndeeply penetrate it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd now I have finished with all that concerns this present\r\nlife: for, as I said in the beginning of this note, I have\r\nbriefly described all the remedies against the emotions. And\r\nthis everyone may readily have seen for himself, if he has\r\nattended to what is advanced in the present note, and also to the\r\ndefinitions of the mind and its emotions, and, lastly, to\r\nPropositions i. and iii. of Part III. It is now, therefore, time\r\nto pass on to those matters, which appertain to the duration of\r\nthe mind, without relation to the body.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXI. The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what\r\nis past, while the body endures.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The mind does not express the actual existence of its\r\nbody, nor does it imagine the modifications of the body as\r\nactual, except while the body endures (II. viii. Coroll.); and,\r\nconsequently (II. xxvi.), it does not imagine\r\nany body as actually existing, except while its own body endures.\r\nThus it\r\ncannot imagine anything (for definition of Imagination, see II.\r\nxvii. note),\r\nor remember things past, except while the body endures (see\r\ndefinition of Memory, II. xviii. note). Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXII. Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea,\r\nwhich expresses the essence of this or that human body under the\r\nform of eternity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or\r\nthat human body, but also of its essence (I. xxv.). This\r\nessence, therefore, must necessarily be conceived through the\r\nvery essence of God (I. Ax. iv.), and be thus conceived by a\r\ncertain eternal necessity (I. xvi.); and this conception must\r\nnecessarily exist in God (II. iii.). Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with\r\nthe body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;There is necessarily in God a concept or idea, which\r\nexpresses the essence of the human body (last Prop.), which,\r\ntherefore, is necessarily something appertaining to the essence\r\nof the human mind (II. xiii.). But we have not assigned to the\r\nhuman mind any duration, definable by time, except in so far as\r\nit expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained\r\nthrough duration, and may be defined by time\u0026mdash;that is (II. viii.\r\nCoroll.), we do not assign to it duration, except while the body\r\nendures. Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which is\r\nconceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence\r\nof God (last Prop.); this something, which appertains to the\r\nessence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;This idea, which expresses the essence of the body\r\nunder the form of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode\r\nof thinking, which belongs to the essence of the mind, and is\r\nnecessarily eternal. Yet it is not possible that we should\r\nremember that we existed before our body, for our body can bear\r\nno trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined in\r\nterms of time, or have any relation to time. But,\r\nnotwithstanding, we feel and know that we are eternal. For the\r\nmind feels those things that it conceives by understanding, no\r\nless than those things that it remembers. For the eyes of the\r\nmind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than\r\nproofs. Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before\r\nthe body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the\r\nessence of the body, under the form of eternity, is eternal, and\r\nthat thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time, or\r\nexplained through duration. Thus our mind can only be said to\r\nendure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time, in\r\nso far as it involves the actual existence of the body. Thus far\r\nonly has it the power of determining the existence of things by\r\ntime, and conceiving them under the category of duration.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXIV. The more we understand particular things, the more\r\ndo we understand God.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This is evident from I. xxv. Coroll.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXV. The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest\r\nvirtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate\r\nidea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the\r\nessence of things (see its definition II. xl. note. ii.); and,\r\nin proportion as we understand things more in this way, we better\r\nunderstand God (by the last Prop.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the\r\nhighest virtue of the mind, that is (IV. Def. viii.) the power, or\r\nnature, or (III. vii.) highest endeavour of the mind, is to\r\nunderstand things by the third kind of knowledge. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXVI. In proportion as the mind is more capable of\r\nunderstanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desires\r\nmore to understand things by that kind.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof\u0026mdash;This is evident. For, in so far as we conceive the\r\nmind to be capable of conceiving things by this kind of\r\nknowledge, we, to that extent, conceive it as determined thus to\r\nconceive things; and consequently (Def. of the Emotions, i.),\r\nthe mind desires so to do, in proportion as it is more capable\r\nthereof. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXVII. From this third kind of knowledge arises the\r\nhighest possible mental acquiescence.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (IV.\r\nxxviii.), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge\r\n(V. xxv.), and this virtue is greater in proportion as the mind\r\nknows things more by the said kind of knowledge (V. xxiv.):\r\nconsequently, he who knows things by this kind of knowledge\r\npasses to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore (Def.\r\nof the Emotions, ii.) affected by the highest pleasure, such\r\npleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own\r\nvirtue; thus (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.), from this kind of\r\nknowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXVIII. The endeavour or desire to know things by the\r\nthird kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the\r\nsecond kind of knowledge.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This proposition is self\u0026mdash;evident. For whatsoever we\r\nunderstand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through\r\nitself, or through that which is conceived through itself; that\r\nis, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are\r\nreferred to the third kind of knowledge (II. xl. note. ii.)\r\ncannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, and\r\nare referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from\r\nadequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of\r\nknowledge; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the desire of\r\nknowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from\r\nthe first, but from the second kind. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of\r\neternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the\r\npresent actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving\r\nthe essence of the body under the form of eternity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;In so far as the mind conceives the present existence\r\nof its body, it to that extent conceives duration which can be\r\ndetermined by time, and to that extent only has it the power of\r\nconceiving things in relation to time (V. xxi. II. xxvi.). But\r\neternity cannot be explained in terms of duration (I. Def. viii.\r\nand explanation). Therefore to this extent the mind has not the\r\npower of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but it\r\npossesses such power, because it is of the nature of reason to\r\nconceive things under the form of eternity (II. xliv. Coroll.\r\nii.), and also because it is of the nature of the mind to\r\nconceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity (V.\r\nxxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to\r\nthe essence of mind (II. xiii.). Therefore this power of\r\nconceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the\r\nmind in virtue of the mind\u0027s conceiving the essence of the body\r\nunder the form of eternity. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either as\r\nexisting in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in\r\nGod and following from the necessity of the divine nature.\r\nWhatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real, we\r\nconceive under the form of eternity, and their ideas involve the\r\neternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in II. xlv. and\r\nnote, which see.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXX. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body\r\nunder the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a\r\nknowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived\r\nthrough God.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this\r\ninvolves necessary existence (I. Def. viii.). Therefore to\r\nconceive things under the form of eternity, is to conceive things\r\nin so far as they are conceived through the essence of God as\r\nreal entities, or in so far as they involve existence through the\r\nessence of God; wherefore our mind, in so far as it conceives\r\nitself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that\r\nextent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, \u0026amp;c. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as\r\nits formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The mind does not conceive anything under the form of\r\neternity, except in so far as it conceives its own body under the\r\nform of eternity (V. xxix.); that is, except in so far as it is\r\neternal (V. xxi. xxiii.); therefore (by the last Prop.), in so\r\nfar as it is eternal, it possesses the knowledge of God, which\r\nknowledge is necessarily adequate (II. xlvi.); hence the mind,\r\nin so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing everything\r\nwhich can follow from this given knowledge of God (II. xl.), in\r\nother words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge\r\n(see Def. in II. xl. note. ii.), whereof accordingly the mind\r\n(III. Def. i.), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or\r\nformal cause of such knowledge. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in\r\nthis kind of knowledge, he will be more completely conscious of\r\nhimself and of God; in other words, he will be more perfect and\r\nblessed, as will appear more clearly in the sequel. But we must\r\nhere observe that, although we are already certain that the mind\r\nis eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the form of\r\neternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be more\r\nreadily explained and better understood, we will consider the\r\nmind itself, as though it had just begun to exist and to\r\nunderstand things under the form of eternity, as indeed we have\r\ndone hitherto; this we may do without any danger of error, so\r\nlong as we are careful not to draw any conclusion, unless our\r\npremisses are plain.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXII. Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of\r\nknowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by\r\nthe idea of God as cause.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;From this kind of knowledge arises the highest\r\npossible mental acquiescence, that is (Def of the Emotions,\r\nxxv.), pleasure, and this acquiescence is accompanied by the idea\r\nof the mind itself (V. xxvii.), and consequently (V. xxx.) the\r\nidea also of God as cause. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;From the third kind of knowledge necessarily\r\narises the intellectual love of God. From this kind of knowledge\r\narises pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is\r\n(Def. of the Emotions, vi.), the love of God; not in so far as\r\nwe imagine him as present (V. xxix.), but in so far as we\r\nunderstand him to be eternal; this is what I call the\r\nintellectual love of God.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God, which arises from\r\nthe third kind of knowledge, is eternal.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The third kind of knowledge is eternal (V. xxxi. I.\r\nAx. iii.); therefore (by the same Axiom) the love which arises\r\ntherefrom is also necessarily eternal. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Although this love towards God has (by the foregoing\r\nProp.) no beginning, it yet possesses all the perfections of\r\nlove, just as though it had arisen as we feigned in the Coroll.\r\nof the last Prop. Nor is there here any difference, except that\r\nthe mind possesses as eternal those same perfections which we\r\nfeigned to accrue to it, and they are accompanied by the idea of\r\nGod as eternal cause. If pleasure consists in the transition to\r\na greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in the\r\nmind being endowed with perfection itself.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXIV. The mind is, only while the body endures, subject\r\nto those emotions which are attributable to passions.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind\r\ncontemplates a thing as present (II. xvii. note); yet this idea\r\nindicates rather the present disposition of the human body than\r\nthe nature of the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.).\r\nTherefore emotion (see general Def. of Emotions) is imagination,\r\nin so far as it indicates the present disposition of the body;\r\ntherefore (V. xxi.) the mind is, only while the body endures,\r\nsubject to emotions which are attributable to passions. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows that no love save intellectual\r\nlove is eternal.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;If we look to men\u0027s general opinion, we shall see that\r\nthey are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that\r\nthey confuse eternity with duration, and ascribe it to the\r\nimagination or the memory which they believe to remain after\r\ndeath.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXV. God loves himself with an infinite intellectual\r\nlove.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;God is absolutely infinite (I. Def. vi.), that is (II.\r\nDef. vi.), the nature of God rejoices in infinite perfection;\r\nand such rejoicing is (II. iii.) accompanied by the idea of\r\nhimself, that is (I. xi. and Def. i.), the idea of his own cause:\r\nnow this is what we have (in V. xxxii. Coroll.) described as\r\nintellectual love.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXVI. The intellectual love of the mind towards God is\r\nthat very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as\r\nhe is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the\r\nessence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity;\r\nin other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is\r\npart of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This love of the mind must be referred to the\r\nactivities of the mind (V. xxxii. Coroll. and III. iii.); it is\r\nitself, indeed, an activity whereby the mind regards itself\r\naccompanied by the idea of God as cause (V. xxxii. and Coroll.);\r\nthat is (I. xxv. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.), an activity\r\nwhereby God, in so far as he can be explained through the human\r\nmind, regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself;\r\ntherefore (by the last Prop.), this love of the mind is part of\r\nthe infinite love wherewith God loves himself. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves\r\nhimself, loves man, and, consequently, that the love of God\r\ntowards men, and the intellectual love of the mind towards God\r\nare identical.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein\r\nour salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, in\r\nthe constant and eternal love towards God, or in God\u0027s love\r\ntowards men. This love or blessedness is, in the Bible, called\r\nGlory, and not undeservedly. For whether this love be referred\r\nto God or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence of\r\nspirit, which (Def. of the Emotions, xxv. xxx.) is not really\r\ndistinguished from glory. In so far as it is referred to God, it\r\nis (V. xxxv.) pleasure, if we may still use that term,\r\naccompanied by the idea of itself, and, in so far as it is\r\nreferred to the mind, it is the same (V. xxvii.).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAgain, since the essence of our mind consists solely in\r\nknowledge, whereof the beginning and the foundation is God (I.\r\nxv., and II. xlvii. note), it becomes clear to us, in what manner\r\nand way our mind, as to its essence and existence, follows from\r\nthe divine nature and constantly depends on God. I have thought\r\nit worth while here to call attention to this, in order to show\r\nby this example how the knowledge of particular things, which I\r\nhave called intuitive or of the third kind (II. xl. note. ii.),\r\nis potent, and more powerful than the universal knowledge, which\r\nI have styled knowledge of the second kind. For, although in\r\nPart I. I showed in general terms, that all things (and\r\nconsequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their essence\r\nand existence on God, yet that demonstration, though legitimate\r\nand placed beyond the chances of doubt, does not affect our mind\r\nso much, as when the same conclusion is derived from the actual\r\nessence of some particular thing, which we say depends on God.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to\r\nthis intellectual love, or which can take it away.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;This intellectual love follows necessarily from the\r\nnature of the mind, in so far as the latter is regarded through\r\nthe nature of God as an eternal truth (V. xxxiii. and xxix.).\r\nIf, therefore, there should be anything which would be contrary\r\nto this love, that thing would be contrary to that which is true;\r\nconsequently, that, which should be able to take away this\r\nlove, would cause that which is true to be false; an obvious\r\nabsurdity. Therefore there is nothing in nature which, \u0026amp;c.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;The Axiom of Part IV. has reference to particular\r\nthings, in so far as they are regarded in relation to a given\r\ntime and place: of this, I think, no one can doubt.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXVIII. In proportion as the mind understands more things\r\nby the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to\r\nthose emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The mind\u0027s essence consists in knowledge (II. xi.);\r\ntherefore, in proportion as the mind understands more things by\r\nthe second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the\r\npart of it that endures (V. xxix. and xxiii.), and, consequently\r\n(by the last Prop.), the greater will be the part that is not\r\ntouched by the emotions, which are contrary to our nature, or in\r\nother words, evil (IV. xxx.). Thus, in proportion as the mind\r\nunderstands more things by the second and third kinds of\r\nknowledge, the greater will be the part of it, that remains\r\nunimpaired, and, consequently, less subject to emotions, \u0026amp;c.\r\nQ.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Hence we understand that point which I touched on in\r\nIV. xxxix. note, and which I promised to explain in this Part;\r\nnamely, that death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as the\r\nmind\u0027s clear and distinct knowledge is greater, and,\r\nconsequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more. Again,\r\nsince from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest\r\npossible acquiescence (V. xxvii.), it follows that the human mind\r\ncan attain to being of such a nature, that the part thereof which\r\nwe have shown to perish with the body (V. xxi.) should be of\r\nlittle importance when compared with the part which endures. But\r\nI will soon treat of the subject at greater length.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XXXIX. He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest\r\nnumber of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part\r\nis eternal.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest\r\nnumber of activities, is least agitated by those emotions which\r\nare evil (IV. xxxviii.)\u0026mdash;that is (IV. xxx.), by those emotions\r\nwhich are contrary to our nature; therefore (V. x.), he\r\npossesses the power of arranging and associating the\r\nmodifications of the body according to the intellectual order,\r\nand, consequently, of bringing it about, that all the\r\nmodifications of the body should be referred to the idea of God;\r\nwhence it will come to pass that (V. xv.) he will be affected\r\nwith love towards God, which (V. xvi.) must occupy or constitute\r\nthe chief part of the mind; therefore (V. xxxiii.), such a man\r\nwill possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number\r\nof activities, there is no doubt but that they may be of such a\r\nnature, that they may be referred to minds possessing a great\r\nknowledge of themselves and of God, and whereof the greatest or\r\nchief part is eternal, and, therefore, that they should scarcely\r\nfear death. But, in order that this may be understood more\r\nclearly, we must here call to mind, that we live in a state of\r\nperpetual variation, and, according as we are changed for the\r\nbetter or the worse, we are called happy or unhappy.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFor he, who, from being an infant or a child, becomes a\r\ncorpse, is called unhappy; whereas it is set down to happiness,\r\nif we have been able to live through the whole period of life\r\nwith a sound mind in a sound body. And, in reality, he, who, as\r\nin the case of an infant or a child, has a body capable of very\r\nfew activities, and depending, for the most part, on external\r\ncauses, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is scarcely\r\nconscious of itself, or of God, or of things; whereas, he, who\r\nhas a body capable of very many activities, has a mind which,\r\nconsidered in itself alone, is highly conscious of itself, of\r\nGod, and of things. In this life, therefore, we primarily\r\nendeavour to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so far\r\nas its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into\r\nsomething else capable of very many activities, and referable to\r\na mind which is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things;\r\nand we desire so to change it, that what is referred to its\r\nimagination and memory may become insignificant, in comparison\r\nwith its intellect, as I have already said in the note to the\r\nlast Proposition.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XL. In proportion as each thing possesses more of\r\nperfection, so is it more active, and less passive; and, vice\r\nversâ, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;In proportion as each thing is more perfect, it\r\npossesses more of reality (II. Def. vi.), and, consequently (III.\r\niii. and note), it is to that extent more active and less\r\npassive. This demonstration may be reversed, and thus prove\r\nthat, in proportion as a thing is more active, so is it more\r\nperfect. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCorollary.\u0026mdash;Hence it follows that the part of the mind which\r\nendures, be it great or small, is more perfect than the rest.\r\nFor the eternal part of the mind (V. xxiii. xxix.) is the\r\nunderstanding, through which alone we are said to act (III. iii.);\r\nthe part which we have shown to perish is the imagination (V.\r\nxxi.), through which only we are said to be passive (III. iii.\r\nand general Def. of the Emotions); therefore, the former, be it\r\ngreat or small, is more perfect than the latter. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;Such are the doctrines which I had purposed to set\r\nforth concerning the mind, in so far as it is regarded without\r\nrelation to the body; whence, as also from I. xxi. and other\r\nplaces, it is plain that our mind, in so far as it understands,\r\nis an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another\r\neternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to\r\ninfinity; so that all taken together at once constitute the\r\neternal and infinite intellect of God.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLI. Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we\r\nshould still consider as of primary importance piety and\r\nreligion, and generally all things which, in Part IV., we showed\r\nto be attributable to courage and high\u0026mdash;mindedness.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;The first and only foundation of virtue, or the rule\r\nof right living is (IV. xxii. Coroll. and xxiv.) seeking one\u0027s\r\nown true interest. Now, while we determined what reason\r\nprescribes as useful, we took no account of the mind\u0027s eternity,\r\nwhich has only become known to us in this Fifth Part. Although\r\nwe were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal, we\r\nnevertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courage\r\nand high\u0026mdash;mindedness are of primary importance. Therefore, even\r\nif we were still ignorant of this doctrine, we should yet put the\r\naforesaid precepts of reason in the first place. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;The general belief of the multitude seems to be\r\ndifferent. Most people seem to believe that they are free, in so\r\nfar as they may obey their lusts, and that they cede their\r\nrights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the\r\ncommandments of the divine law. They therefore believe that\r\npiety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to\r\nfirmness of mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to\r\nlay aside, and to receive the reward for their bondage, that is,\r\nfor their piety and religion; it is not only by this hope, but\r\nalso, and chiefly, by the fear of being horribly punished after\r\ndeath, that they are induced to live according to the divine\r\ncommandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carry\r\nthem.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the\r\nmind perishes with the body, and that no hope of prolonged life\r\nremains for the wretches who are broken down with the burden of\r\npiety, they would return to their own inclinations, controlling\r\neverything in accordance with their lusts, and desiring to obey\r\nfortune rather than themselves. Such a course appears to me not\r\nless absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that he\r\ncan by wholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to\r\ncram himself with poisons and deadly fare; or if, because he\r\nsees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should prefer\r\nto be out of his mind altogether, and to live without the use of\r\nreason; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth\r\nrefuting.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPROP. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue\r\nitself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our\r\nlusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able\r\nto control our lusts.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nProof.\u0026mdash;Blessedness consists in love towards God (V. xxxvi and\r\nnote), which love springs from the third kind of knowledge (V.\r\nxxxii. Coroll.); therefore this love (III. iii. lix.) must be\r\nreferred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active;\r\ntherefore (IV. Def. viii.) it is virtue itself. This was our\r\nfirst point. Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in\r\nthis divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand\r\n(V. xxxii.); that is (V. iii. Coroll.), so much the more power\r\nhas it over the emotions, and (V. xxxviii.) so much the less is\r\nit subject to those emotions which are evil; therefore, in\r\nproportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or\r\nblessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts. And,\r\nsince human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in\r\nthe understanding, it follows that no one rejoices in\r\nblessedness, because he has controlled his lusts, but,\r\ncontrariwise, his power of controlling his lusts arises from this\r\nblessedness itself. Q.E.D.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNote.\u0026mdash;I have thus completed all I wished to set forth\r\ntouching the mind\u0027s power over the emotions and the mind\u0027s\r\nfreedom. Whence it appears, how potent is the wise man, and how\r\nmuch he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by his\r\nlusts. For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various\r\nways by external causes without ever gaining the true\r\nacquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were\r\nunwitting of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as\r\nhe ceases to suffer, ceases also to be.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is\r\nscarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of\r\nhimself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal\r\nnecessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true\r\nacquiescence of his spirit.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result\r\nseems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. Needs\r\nmust it be hard, since it is so seldom found. How would it be\r\npossible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without\r\ngreat labour be found, that it should be by almost all men\r\nneglected? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are\r\nrare.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"finis\"\u003e\r\nEnd of the Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[1] \"Affectiones\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[2] \"Forma\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[3] \"Animata\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[4] A Baconian phrase. Nov. Org. Aph. 100. [Pollock, p. 126, n.]\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[5] Conscientiæ morsus\u0026mdash;thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[6] By \"men\" in this and the following propositions, I mean men\r\nwhom we regard without any particular emotion.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[7] So Van Vloten and Bruder. The Dutch version and Camerer read,\r\n\"an internal cause.\" \"Honor\" = Gloria.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[8] See previous endnote.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[9] Ovid, \"Amores,\" II. xix. 4,5. Spinoza transposes the verses.\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n \"Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat.\"\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine\r\nintellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[11] Gloria.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[12] Ov. Met. vii.20, \"Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[13] Honestas\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[14] Land reads: \"Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur\"\u0026mdash;which I\r\nhave translated above. He suggests as alternative readings to\r\n\u0027quod\u0027, \u0027quo\u0027 (= whereby) and \u0027quodque\u0027 (= and that).\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[15] \"Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro.\" (Van Vloten).\r\nBruder reads: \"Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi\r\nalicujus mali.\" The last word of the latter is an obvious\r\nmisprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into \"majoris\r\nboni.\" (Pollock, p. 268, note.)\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[16] Continuo. Rendered \"constantly\" by Mr. Pollock on the ground\r\nthat the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context.\r\nI venture to think, however, that a tolerable sense may be\r\nobtained without doing violence to Spinoza\u0027s scholarship.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n[17] Affectiones. Camerer reads affectus\u0026mdash;\u0026mdash;emotions.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}