The Consolation of Philosophy
{"WorkMasterId":5309,"WpPageId":257636,"ParentWpPageId":193760,"Slug":"the-consolation-of-philosophy","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/boethius-anicius-manlius-severinus-boethius/the-consolation-of-philosophy/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/boethius-anicius-manlius-severinus-boethius/the-consolation-of-philosophy/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":352560,"CleanHtmlLength":296450,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"The Consolation of Philosophy","Deck":"Boethius stages a prison dialogue with Lady Philosophy on fortune, happiness, providence, eternity, free will, and the healing of grief by reason.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to Boethius","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/boethius-anicius-manlius-severinus-boethius/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"Boethius","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/boethius-anicius-manlius-severinus-boethius/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/boethius-01-medieval-miniature-detail.jpg","ImageAlt":"Boethius, Detail from a Medieval Miniature","FilterTerra":"Eastern Mediterranean","ClickText":"Boethius","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/boethius-anicius-manlius-severinus-boethius/","Copies":["480 CE – 524 CE","Rome","late antique Roman philosopher, statesman, translator, and Christian theologian from Rome whose logical translations and commentaries, theory of universals, account of providence, eternity, free will, participation, and philosophical consolation transmitted Greek philosophy to the medieval Latin West."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:1","Title":"Ancient History","DateText":"3000 BCE – 499 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-ancient-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:3","Title":"Classical Antiquity","DateText":"500 BCE – 499 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-ancient-history/philosophers-of-classical-antiquity/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"524 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Displayed year follows the traditional prison-period setting around Boethius\u0027 final years and death; it is treated as a researched composition anchor rather than a precise documented publication date.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:2"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:6"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:ITA:2"}],"OriginalTitle":"De consolatione philosophiae","Language":"Latin","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:ethics"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:philosophy-of-religion"}],"Tradition":"Late antique Latin philosophy, Aristotelian logic, Neoplatonic metaphysics, Roman Christian theology, quadrivial education, and medieval Latin scholastic transmission","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #14328 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Boethius stages a prison dialogue with Lady Philosophy on fortune, happiness, providence, eternity, free will, and the healing of grief by reason."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"Consolation of Philosophy","KeyConcepts":"The Consolation of Philosophy; 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Boethius; late antique logic; Aristotle; Porphyry; universals; providence; eternity; free will; participation; quadrivium; Latin scholastic transmission"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Translation and commentary, logical analysis, scholastic classification, mathematical exposition, theological argument, Neoplatonic metaphysics, and prison dialogue."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"Accepted work page for Boethius under the Major Authenticated scope; pure translation-only pages, lost or spurious geometry texts, De definitione, source/testimony pages, modern editions, and works merely about Boethius are excluded."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Connects Boethian logic, mathematical order, participation, predication, divine eternity, providence, free choice, consolation, and the transmission of Greek philosophy into the Latin West."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"Plato, Aristotle, Porphyry, Cicero, Nicomachus, Augustine, Greek logical commentary, Neoplatonism, and Roman Christian theological debate."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"Alcuin, John Scotus Eriugena, Anselm of Canterbury, Peter Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, Dante, medieval Latin logic, scholastic theology, and the quadrivium curriculum."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Part of the major Boethian corpus that transmitted Greek logic, mathematical learning, theological analysis, and philosophical consolation to medieval Latin readers.","Used in work on universals, modality, providence and freedom, eternity, logic, philosophical therapy, medieval curriculum, and the continuity between late antique and medieval thought."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Accepted as Boethius\u0027 central philosophical masterpiece and the major late antique text of consolation, providence, eternity, and free will."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003ePublic-domain full text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/14328\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #14328\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e[Greek:\u003cbr /\u003ehom\u0026#244;s de kai en toutois dialampei to kalon,\u003cbr /\u003eepeidan pher\u0026#234; tis eukol\u0026#244;s pollas kai megalas\u003cbr /\u003eatychias, m\u0026#234; di analg\u0026#234;sian, alla gennadas\u003cbr /\u003e\u0026#244;n kai megalopsychos.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAristotle\u0026#39;s \u0026#39;Ethics,\u0026#39; I., xi. 12.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e[Illustration: Diptych representing Narius Manlius Boethius, father of\u003cbr /\u003eAnicius Manlius Severinus Boethius. The inscription in full would run\u003cbr /\u003ethus:–\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNARIVS MANLIVS BOETHIVS VIR CLARISSIMVS ET INLVSTRIS\u003cbr /\u003eEXPRAEFECTVS PRAETORIO PRAEFECTVS VRBIS ET\u003cbr /\u003eCOMES CONSVL ORDINARIVS ET PARTICIVS\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(_For description vid. Preface, p. vi_)]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTHE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY OF BOETHIUS.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTranslated into English Prose and Verse\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eby\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eH.R. JAMES, M.A., CH. CH. OXFORD.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eQuantumlibet igitur s\u0026#230;viant mali, sapienti tamen corona non\u003cbr /\u003e decidet, non arescet.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMelioribus animum conformaveris, nihil opus est judice pr\u0026#230;mium\u003cbr /\u003e deferente, tu te ipse excellentioribus addidisti; studium ad pejora\u003cbr /\u003e deflexeris, extra ne qu\u0026#230;sieris ultorem, tu te ipse in deteriora\u003cbr /\u003e trusisti.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLONDON:\u003cbr /\u003eELLIOT STOCK, 62, PATERNOSTER ROW.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e1897.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ePREFACE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe book called \u0026#39;The Consolation of Philosophy\u0026#39; was throughout the\u003cbr /\u003eMiddle Ages, and down to the beginnings of the modern epoch in the\u003cbr /\u003esixteenth century, the scholar\u0026#39;s familiar companion. Few books have\u003cbr /\u003eexercised a wider influence in their time. It has been translated into\u003cbr /\u003eevery European tongue, and into English nearly a dozen times, from King\u003cbr /\u003eAlfred\u0026#39;s paraphrase to the translations of Lord Preston, Causton,\u003cbr /\u003eRidpath, and Duncan, in the eighteenth century. The belief that what\u003cbr /\u003eonce pleased so widely must still have some charm is my excuse for\u003cbr /\u003eattempting the present translation. The great work of Boethius, with its\u003cbr /\u003ealternate prose and verse, skilfully fitted together like dialogue and\u003cbr /\u003echorus in a Greek play, is unique in literature, and has a pathetic\u003cbr /\u003einterest from the time and circumstances of its composition. It ought\u003cbr /\u003enot to be forgotten. Those who can go to the original will find their\u003cbr /\u003ereward. There may be room also for a new translation in English after an\u003cbr /\u003einterval of close on a hundred years.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSome of the editions contain a reproduction of a bust purporting to\u003cbr /\u003erepresent Boethius. Lord Preston\u0026#39;s translation, for example, has such a\u003cbr /\u003eportrait, which it refers to an original in marble at Rome. This I have\u003cbr /\u003ebeen unable to trace, and suspect that it is apocryphal. The Hope\u003cbr /\u003eCollection at Oxford contains a completely different portrait in a\u003cbr /\u003eprint, which gives no authority. I have ventured to use as a\u003cbr /\u003efrontispiece a reproduction from a plaster-cast in the Ashmolean Museum,\u003cbr /\u003etaken from an ivory diptych preserved in the Bibliotheca Quiriniana at\u003cbr /\u003eBrescia, which represents Narius Manlius Boethius, the father of the\u003cbr /\u003ephilosopher. Portraiture of this period is so rare that it seemed that,\u003cbr /\u003efailing a likeness of the author himself, this authentic representation\u003cbr /\u003eof his father might have interest, as giving the consular dress and\u003cbr /\u003einsignia of the time, and also as illustrating the decadence of\u003cbr /\u003econtemporary art. The consul wears a richly-embroidered cloak; his right\u003cbr /\u003ehand holds a staff surmounted by the Roman eagle, his left the _mappa\u003cbr /\u003ecircensis,_ or napkin used for starting the races in the circus; at his\u003cbr /\u003efeet are palms and bags of money–prizes for the victors in the games.\u003cbr /\u003eFor permission to use this cast my thanks are due to the authorities of\u003cbr /\u003ethe Ashmolean Museum, as also to Mr. T.W. Jackson, Curator of the Hope\u003cbr /\u003eCollection, who first called my attention to its existence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have to thank my brother, Mr. L. James, of Radley College, for much\u003cbr /\u003evaluable help and for correcting the proof-sheets of the translation.\u003cbr /\u003eThe text used is that of Peiper, Leipsic, 1874.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ePROEM.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnicus Manlius Severinus Boethius lived in the last quarter of the fifth\u003cbr /\u003ecentury A.D., and the first quarter of the sixth. He was growing to\u003cbr /\u003emanhood, when Theodoric, the famous Ostrogoth, crossed the Alps and made\u003cbr /\u003ehimself master of Italy. Boethius belonged to an ancient family, which\u003cbr /\u003eboasted a connection with the legendary glories of the Republic, and was\u003cbr /\u003estill among the foremost in wealth and dignity in the days of Rome\u0026#39;s\u003cbr /\u003eabasement. His parents dying early, he was brought up by Symmachus, whom\u003cbr /\u003ethe age agreed to regard as of almost saintly character, and afterwards\u003cbr /\u003ebecame his son-in-law. His varied gifts, aided by an excellent\u003cbr /\u003eeducation, won for him the reputation of the most accomplished man of\u003cbr /\u003ehis time. He was orator, poet, musician, philosopher. It is his peculiar\u003cbr /\u003edistinction to have handed on to the Middle Ages the tradition of Greek\u003cbr /\u003ephilosophy by his Latin translations of the works of Aristotle. Called\u003cbr /\u003eearly to a public career, the highest honours of the State came to him\u003cbr /\u003eunsought. He was sole Consul in 510 A.D., and was ultimately raised by\u003cbr /\u003eTheodoric to the dignity of Magister Officiorum, or head of the whole\u003cbr /\u003ecivil administration. He was no less happy in his domestic life, in the\u003cbr /\u003evirtues of his wife, Rusticiana, and the fair promise of his two sons,\u003cbr /\u003eSymmachus and Boethius; happy also in the society of a refined circle of\u003cbr /\u003efriends. Noble, wealthy, accomplished, universally esteemed for his\u003cbr /\u003evirtues, high in the favour of the Gothic King, he appeared to all men a\u003cbr /\u003esignal example of the union of merit and good fortune. His felicity\u003cbr /\u003eseemed to culminate in the year 522 A.D., when, by special and\u003cbr /\u003eextraordinary favour, his two sons, young as they were for so exalted an\u003cbr /\u003ehonour, were created joint Consuls and rode to the senate-house\u003cbr /\u003eattended by a throng of senators, and the acclamations of the multitude.\u003cbr /\u003eBoethius himself, amid the general applause, delivered the public speech\u003cbr /\u003ein the King\u0026#39;s honour usual on such occasions. Within a year he was a\u003cbr /\u003esolitary prisoner at Pavia, stripped of honours, wealth, and friends,\u003cbr /\u003ewith death hanging over him, and a terror worse than death, in the fear\u003cbr /\u003elest those dearest to him should be involved in the worst results of his\u003cbr /\u003edownfall. It is in this situation that the opening of the \u0026#39;Consolation\u003cbr /\u003eof Philosophy\u0026#39; brings Boethius before us. He represents himself as\u003cbr /\u003eseated in his prison distraught with grief, indignant at the injustice\u003cbr /\u003eof his misfortunes, and seeking relief for his melancholy in writing\u003cbr /\u003everses descriptive of his condition. Suddenly there appears to him the\u003cbr /\u003eDivine figure of Philosophy, in the guise of a woman of superhuman\u003cbr /\u003edignity and beauty, who by a succession of discourses convinces him of\u003cbr /\u003ethe vanity of regret for the lost gifts of fortune, raises his mind once\u003cbr /\u003emore to the contemplation of the true good, and makes clear to him the\u003cbr /\u003emystery of the world\u0026#39;s moral government.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eINDEX\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOF\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVERSE INTERLUDES.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBOOK I.\u003cbr /\u003eTHE SORROWS OF BOETHIUS.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG PAGE\u003cbr /\u003e I. BOETHIUS\u0026#39; COMPLAINT 3\u003cbr /\u003e II. HIS DESPONDENCY 9\u003cbr /\u003eIII. THE MISTS DISPELLED 12\u003cbr /\u003e IV. NOTHING CAN SUBDUE VIRTUE 16\u003cbr /\u003e V. BOETHIUS\u0026#39; PRAYER 27\u003cbr /\u003e VI. ALL THINGS HAVE THEIR NEEDFUL ORDER 33\u003cbr /\u003eVII. THE PERTURBATIONS OF PASSION 38\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBOOK II.\u003cbr /\u003eTHE VANITY OF FORTUNE\u0026#39;S GIFTS.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI. FORTUNE\u0026#39;S MALICE 47\u003cbr /\u003e II. MAN\u0026#39;S COVETOUSNESS 51\u003cbr /\u003e III. ALL PASSES 55\u003cbr /\u003e IV. THE GOLDEN MEAN 62\u003cbr /\u003e V. THE FORMER AGE 70\u003cbr /\u003e VI. NERO\u0026#39;S INFAMY 76\u003cbr /\u003e VII. GLORY MAY NOT LAST 82\u003cbr /\u003eVIII. LOVE IS LORD OF ALL 85\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBOOK III.\u003cbr /\u003eTRUE HAPPINESS AND FALSE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI. THE THORNS OF ERROR 93\u003cbr /\u003e II. THE BENT OF NATURE 99\u003cbr /\u003e III. THE INSATIABLENESS OK AVARICE 105\u003cbr /\u003e IV. DISGRACE OF HONOURS CONFERRED BY A TYRANT 109\u003cbr /\u003e V. SELF-MASTERY 113\u003cbr /\u003e VI. TRUE NOBILITY 116\u003cbr /\u003e VII. PLEASURE\u0026#39;S STING 118\u003cbr /\u003eVIII. HUMAN FOLLY 121\u003cbr /\u003e IX. INVOCATION 130\u003cbr /\u003e X. THE TRUE LIGHT 141\u003cbr /\u003e XI. REMINISCENCE 150\u003cbr /\u003e XII. ORPHEUS AND EURYDICE 158\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBOOK IV.\u003cbr /\u003eGOOD AND ILL FORTUNE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI. THE SOUL\u0026#39;S FLIGHT 166\u003cbr /\u003e II. THE BONDAGE OF PASSION 177\u003cbr /\u003eIII. CIRCE\u0026#39;S CUP 182\u003cbr /\u003e IV. THE UNREASONABLENESS OF HATRED 194\u003cbr /\u003e V. WONDER AND IGNORANCE 197\u003cbr /\u003e VI. THE UNIVERSAL AIM 212\u003cbr /\u003eVII. THE HERO\u0026#39;S PATH 219\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBOOK V.\u003cbr /\u003eFREE WILL AND GOD\u0026#39;S FOREKNOWLEDGE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI. CHANCE 229\u003cbr /\u003e II. THE TRUE SUN 233\u003cbr /\u003eIII. TRUTH\u0026#39;S PARADOXES 241\u003cbr /\u003e IV. A PSYCHOLOGICAL FALLACY 250\u003cbr /\u003e V. THE UPWARD LOOK 255\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBOOK I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTHE SORROWS OF BOETHIUS.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSUMMARY.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBoethius\u0026#39; complaint (Song I.).–CH. I. Philosophy appears to\u003cbr /\u003e Boethius, drives away the Muses of Poetry, and herself laments\u003cbr /\u003e (Song II.) the disordered condition of his mind.–CH. II. Boethius\u003cbr /\u003e is speechless with amazement. Philosophy wipes away the tears that\u003cbr /\u003e have clouded his eyesight.–CH. III. Boethius recognises his\u003cbr /\u003e mistress Philosophy. To his wondering inquiries she explains her\u003cbr /\u003e presence, and recalls to his mind the persecutions to which\u003cbr /\u003e Philosophy has oftentimes from of old been subjected by an ignorant\u003cbr /\u003e world. CH. IV. Philosophy bids Boethius declare his griefs. He\u003cbr /\u003e relates the story of his unjust accusation and ruin. He concludes\u003cbr /\u003e with a prayer (Song V.) that the moral disorder in human affairs\u003cbr /\u003e may be set right.–CH. V. Philosophy admits the justice of\u003cbr /\u003e Boethius\u0026#39; self-vindication, but grieves rather for the unhappy\u003cbr /\u003e change in his mind. She will first tranquillize his spirit by\u003cbr /\u003e soothing remedies.–CH. VI. Philosophy tests Boethius\u0026#39; mental\u003cbr /\u003e state by certain questions, and discovers three chief causes of his\u003cbr /\u003e soul\u0026#39;s sickness: (1) He has forgotten his own true nature; (2) he\u003cbr /\u003e knows not the end towards which the whole universe tends; (3) he\u003cbr /\u003e knows not the means by which the world is governed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBOOK I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBOETHIUS\u0026#39; COMPLAINT.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWho wrought my studious numbers\u003cbr /\u003e Smoothly once in happier days,\u003cbr /\u003e Now perforce in tears and sadness\u003cbr /\u003e Learn a mournful strain to raise.\u003cbr /\u003e Lo, the Muses, grief-dishevelled,\u003cbr /\u003e Guide my pen and voice my woe;\u003cbr /\u003e Down their cheeks unfeigned the tear drops\u003cbr /\u003e To my sad complainings flow!\u003cbr /\u003e These alone in danger\u0026#39;s hour\u003cbr /\u003e Faithful found, have dared attend\u003cbr /\u003e On the footsteps of the exile\u003cbr /\u003e To his lonely journey\u0026#39;s end.\u003cbr /\u003e These that were the pride and pleasure\u003cbr /\u003e Of my youth and high estate\u003cbr /\u003e Still remain the only solace\u003cbr /\u003e Of the old man\u0026#39;s mournful fate.\u003cbr /\u003e Old? Ah yes; swift, ere I knew it,\u003cbr /\u003e By these sorrows on me pressed\u003cbr /\u003e Age hath come; lo, Grief hath bid me\u003cbr /\u003e Wear the garb that fits her best.\u003cbr /\u003e O\u0026#39;er my head untimely sprinkled\u003cbr /\u003e These white hairs my woes proclaim,\u003cbr /\u003e And the skin hangs loose and shrivelled\u003cbr /\u003e On this sorrow-shrunken frame.\u003cbr /\u003e Blest is death that intervenes not\u003cbr /\u003e In the sweet, sweet years of peace,\u003cbr /\u003e But unto the broken-hearted,\u003cbr /\u003e When they call him, brings release!\u003cbr /\u003e Yet Death passes by the wretched,\u003cbr /\u003e Shuts his ear and slumbers deep;\u003cbr /\u003e Will not heed the cry of anguish,\u003cbr /\u003e Will not close the eyes that weep.\u003cbr /\u003e For, while yet inconstant Fortune\u003cbr /\u003e Poured her gifts and all was bright,\u003cbr /\u003e Death\u0026#39;s dark hour had all but whelmed me\u003cbr /\u003e In the gloom of endless night.\u003cbr /\u003e Now, because misfortune\u0026#39;s shadow\u003cbr /\u003e Hath o\u0026#39;erclouded that false face,\u003cbr /\u003e Cruel Life still halts and lingers,\u003cbr /\u003e Though I loathe his weary race.\u003cbr /\u003e Friends, why did ye once so lightly\u003cbr /\u003e Vaunt me happy among men?\u003cbr /\u003e Surely he who so hath fallen\u003cbr /\u003e Was not firmly founded then.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhile I was thus mutely pondering within myself, and recording my\u003cbr /\u003esorrowful complainings with my pen, it seemed to me that there appeared\u003cbr /\u003eabove my head a woman of a countenance exceeding venerable. Her eyes\u003cbr /\u003ewere bright as fire, and of a more than human keenness; her complexion\u003cbr /\u003ewas lively, her vigour showed no trace of enfeeblement; and yet her\u003cbr /\u003eyears were right full, and she plainly seemed not of our age and time.\u003cbr /\u003eHer stature was difficult to judge. At one moment it exceeded not the\u003cbr /\u003ecommon height, at another her forehead seemed to strike the sky; and\u003cbr /\u003ewhenever she raised her head higher, she began to pierce within the very\u003cbr /\u003eheavens, and to baffle the eyes of them that looked upon her. Her\u003cbr /\u003egarments were of an imperishable fabric, wrought with the finest threads\u003cbr /\u003eand of the most delicate workmanship; and these, as her own lips\u003cbr /\u003eafterwards assured me, she had herself woven with her own hands. The\u003cbr /\u003ebeauty of this vesture had been somewhat tarnished by age and neglect,\u003cbr /\u003eand wore that dingy look which marble contracts from exposure. On the\u003cbr /\u003elower-most edge was inwoven the Greek letter [Greek: P], on the topmost\u003cbr /\u003ethe letter [Greek: Th],[A] and between the two were to be seen steps,\u003cbr /\u003elike a staircase, from the lower to the upper letter. This robe,\u003cbr /\u003emoreover, had been torn by the hands of violent persons, who had each\u003cbr /\u003esnatched away what he could clutch.[B] Her right hand held a note-book;\u003cbr /\u003ein her left she bore a staff. And when she saw the Muses of Poesie\u003cbr /\u003estanding by my bedside, dictating the words of my lamentations, she was\u003cbr /\u003emoved awhile to wrath, and her eyes flashed sternly. \u0026#39;Who,\u0026#39; said she,\u003cbr /\u003e\u0026#39;has allowed yon play-acting wantons to approach this sick man–these\u003cbr /\u003ewho, so far from giving medicine to heal his malady, even feed it with\u003cbr /\u003esweet poison? These it is who kill the rich crop of reason with the\u003cbr /\u003ebarren thorns of passion, who accustom men\u0026#39;s minds to disease, instead\u003cbr /\u003eof setting them free. Now, were it some common man whom your allurements\u003cbr /\u003ewere seducing, as is usually your way, I should be less indignant. On\u003cbr /\u003esuch a one I should not have spent my pains for naught. But this is one\u003cbr /\u003enurtured in the Eleatic and Academic philosophies. Nay, get ye gone, ye\u003cbr /\u003esirens, whose sweetness lasteth not; leave him for my muses to tend and\u003cbr /\u003eheal!\u0026#39; At these words of upbraiding, the whole band, in deepened\u003cbr /\u003esadness, with downcast eyes, and blushes that confessed their shame,\u003cbr /\u003edolefully left the chamber.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut I, because my sight was dimmed with much weeping, and I could not\u003cbr /\u003etell who was this woman of authority so commanding–I was dumfoundered,\u003cbr /\u003eand, with my gaze fastened on the earth, continued silently to await\u003cbr /\u003ewhat she might do next. Then she drew near me and sat on the edge of my\u003cbr /\u003ecouch, and, looking into my face all heavy with grief and fixed in\u003cbr /\u003esadness on the ground, she bewailed in these words the disorder of my\u003cbr /\u003emind:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e[A] [Greek: P] (P) stands for the Political life, the life of action;\u003cbr /\u003e[Greek: Th] (Th) for the Theoretical life, the life of thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e[B] The Stoic, Epicurean, and other philosophical sects, which Boethius\u003cbr /\u003eregards as heterodox. See also below, ch. iii., p. 14.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG II.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHIS DESPONDENCY.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAlas! in what abyss his mind\u003cbr /\u003e Is plunged, how wildly tossed!\u003cbr /\u003e Still, still towards the outer night\u003cbr /\u003e She sinks, her true light lost,\u003cbr /\u003e As oft as, lashed tumultuously\u003cbr /\u003e By earth-born blasts, care\u0026#39;s waves rise high.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet once he ranged the open heavens,\u003cbr /\u003e The sun\u0026#39;s bright pathway tracked;\u003cbr /\u003e Watched how the cold moon waxed and waned;\u003cbr /\u003e Nor rested, till there lacked\u003cbr /\u003e To his wide ken no star that steers\u003cbr /\u003e Amid the maze of circling spheres.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe causes why the blusterous winds\u003cbr /\u003e Vex ocean\u0026#39;s tranquil face,\u003cbr /\u003e Whose hand doth turn the stable globe,\u003cbr /\u003e Or why his even race\u003cbr /\u003e From out the ruddy east the sun\u003cbr /\u003e Unto the western waves doth run:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat is it tempers cunningly\u003cbr /\u003e The placid hours of spring,\u003cbr /\u003e So that it blossoms with the rose\u003cbr /\u003e For earth\u0026#39;s engarlanding:\u003cbr /\u003e Who loads the year\u0026#39;s maturer prime\u003cbr /\u003e With clustered grapes in autumn time:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll this he knew–thus ever strove\u003cbr /\u003e Deep Nature\u0026#39;s lore to guess.\u003cbr /\u003e Now, reft of reason\u0026#39;s light, he lies,\u003cbr /\u003e And bonds his neck oppress;\u003cbr /\u003e While by the heavy load constrained,\u003cbr /\u003e His eyes to this dull earth are chained.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;But the time,\u0026#39; said she, \u0026#39;calls rather for healing than for\u003cbr /\u003elamentation.\u0026#39; Then, with her eyes bent full upon me, \u0026#39;Art thou that\u003cbr /\u003eman,\u0026#39; she cries, \u0026#39;who, erstwhile fed with the milk and reared upon the\u003cbr /\u003enourishment which is mine to give, had grown up to the full vigour of a\u003cbr /\u003emanly spirit? And yet I had bestowed such armour on thee as would have\u003cbr /\u003eproved an invincible defence, hadst thou not first cast it away. Dost\u003cbr /\u003ethou know me? Why art thou silent? Is it shame or amazement that hath\u003cbr /\u003estruck thee dumb? Would it were shame; but, as I see, a stupor hath\u003cbr /\u003eseized upon thee.\u0026#39; Then, when she saw me not only answering nothing, but\u003cbr /\u003emute and utterly incapable of speech, she gently touched my breast with\u003cbr /\u003eher hand, and said: \u0026#39;There is no danger; these are the symptoms of\u003cbr /\u003elethargy, the usual sickness of deluded minds. For awhile he has\u003cbr /\u003eforgotten himself; he will easily recover his memory, if only he first\u003cbr /\u003erecognises me. And that he may do so, let me now wipe his eyes that are\u003cbr /\u003eclouded with a mist of mortal things.\u0026#39; Thereat, with a fold of her robe,\u003cbr /\u003eshe dried my eyes all swimming with tears.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG III.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTHE MISTS DISPELLED.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen the gloom of night was scattered,\u003cbr /\u003e Sight returned unto mine eyes.\u003cbr /\u003e So, when haply rainy Caurus\u003cbr /\u003e Rolls the storm-clouds through the skies,\u003cbr /\u003e Hidden is the sun; all heaven\u003cbr /\u003e Is obscured in starless night.\u003cbr /\u003e But if, in wild onset sweeping,\u003cbr /\u003e Boreas frees day\u0026#39;s prisoned light,\u003cbr /\u003e All suddenly the radiant god outstreams,\u003cbr /\u003e And strikes our dazzled eyesight with his beams.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eEven so the clouds of my melancholy were broken up. I saw the clear sky,\u003cbr /\u003eand regained the power to recognise the face of my physician.\u003cbr /\u003eAccordingly, when I had lifted my eyes and fixed my gaze upon her, I\u003cbr /\u003ebeheld my nurse, Philosophy, whose halls I had frequented from my youth\u003cbr /\u003eup.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Ah! why,\u0026#39; I cried, \u0026#39;mistress of all excellence, hast thou come down\u003cbr /\u003efrom on high, and entered the solitude of this my exile? Is it that\u003cbr /\u003ethou, too, even as I, mayst be persecuted with false accusations?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Could I desert thee, child,\u0026#39; said she, \u0026#39;and not lighten the burden\u003cbr /\u003ewhich thou hast taken upon thee through the hatred of my name, by\u003cbr /\u003esharing this trouble? Even forgetting that it were not lawful for\u003cbr /\u003ePhilosophy to leave companionless the way of the innocent, should I,\u003cbr /\u003ethinkest thou, fear to incur reproach, or shrink from it, as though\u003cbr /\u003esome strange new thing had befallen? Thinkest thou that now, for the\u003cbr /\u003efirst time in an evil age, Wisdom hath been assailed by peril? Did I not\u003cbr /\u003eoften in days of old, before my servant Plato lived, wage stern warfare\u003cbr /\u003ewith the rashness of folly? In his lifetime, too, Socrates, his master,\u003cbr /\u003ewon with my aid the victory of an unjust death. And when, one after the\u003cbr /\u003eother, the Epicurean herd, the Stoic, and the rest, each of them as far\u003cbr /\u003eas in them lay, went about to seize the heritage he left, and were\u003cbr /\u003edragging me off protesting and resisting, as their booty, they tore in\u003cbr /\u003epieces the garment which I had woven with my own hands, and, clutching\u003cbr /\u003ethe torn pieces, went off, believing that the whole of me had passed\u003cbr /\u003einto their possession. And some of them, because some traces of my\u003cbr /\u003evesture were seen upon them, were destroyed through the mistake of the\u003cbr /\u003elewd multitude, who falsely deemed them to be my disciples. It may be\u003cbr /\u003ethou knowest not of the banishment of Anaxagoras, of the poison draught\u003cbr /\u003eof Socrates, nor of Zeno\u0026#39;s torturing, because these things happened in\u003cbr /\u003ea distant country; yet mightest thou have learnt the fate of Arrius, of\u003cbr /\u003eSeneca, of Soranus, whose stories are neither old nor unknown to fame.\u003cbr /\u003eThese men were brought to destruction for no other reason than that,\u003cbr /\u003esettled as they were in my principles, their lives were a manifest\u003cbr /\u003econtrast to the ways of the wicked. So there is nothing thou shouldst\u003cbr /\u003ewonder at, if on the seas of this life we are tossed by storm-blasts,\u003cbr /\u003eseeing that we have made it our chiefest aim to refuse compliance with\u003cbr /\u003eevil-doers. And though, maybe, the host of the wicked is many in number,\u003cbr /\u003eyet is it contemptible, since it is under no leadership, but is hurried\u003cbr /\u003ehither and thither at the blind driving of mad error. And if at times\u003cbr /\u003eand seasons they set in array against us, and fall on in overwhelming\u003cbr /\u003estrength, our leader draws off her forces into the citadel while they\u003cbr /\u003eare busy plundering the useless baggage. But we from our vantage ground,\u003cbr /\u003esafe from all this wild work, laugh to see them making prize of the most\u003cbr /\u003evalueless of things, protected by a bulwark which aggressive folly may\u003cbr /\u003enot aspire to reach.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG IV.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNOTHING CAN SUBDUE VIRTUE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhoso calm, serene, sedate,\u003cbr /\u003e Sets his foot on haughty fate;\u003cbr /\u003e Firm and steadfast, come what will,\u003cbr /\u003e Keeps his mien unconquered still;\u003cbr /\u003e Him the rage of furious seas,\u003cbr /\u003e Tossing high wild menaces,\u003cbr /\u003e Nor the flames from smoky forges\u003cbr /\u003e That Vesuvius disgorges,\u003cbr /\u003e Nor the bolt that from the sky\u003cbr /\u003e Smites the tower, can terrify.\u003cbr /\u003e Why, then, shouldst thou feel affright\u003cbr /\u003e At the tyrant\u0026#39;s weakling might?\u003cbr /\u003e Dread him not, nor fear no harm,\u003cbr /\u003e And thou shall his rage disarm;\u003cbr /\u003e But who to hope or fear gives way–\u003cbr /\u003e Lost his bosom\u0026#39;s rightful sway–\u003cbr /\u003e He hath cast away his shield,\u003cbr /\u003e Like a coward fled the field;\u003cbr /\u003e He hath forged all unaware\u003cbr /\u003e Fetters his own neck must bear!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIV.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Dost thou understand?\u0026#39; she asks. Do my words sink into thy mind? Or art\u003cbr /\u003ethou dull \u0026quot;as the ass to the sound of the lyre\u0026quot;? Why dost thou weep? Why\u003cbr /\u003edo tears stream from thy eyes?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;\u0026quot;Speak out, hide it not in thy heart.\u0026quot;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf thou lookest for the physician\u0026#39;s help, thou must needs disclose thy\u003cbr /\u003ewound.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen I, gathering together what strength I could, began: \u0026#39;Is there still\u003cbr /\u003eneed of telling? Is not the cruelty of fortune against me plain enough?\u003cbr /\u003eDoth not the very aspect of this place move thee? Is this the library,\u003cbr /\u003ethe room which thou hadst chosen as thy constant resort in my home, the\u003cbr /\u003eplace where we so often sat together and held discourse of all things in\u003cbr /\u003eheaven and earth? Was my garb and mien like this when I explored with\u003cbr /\u003ethee nature\u0026#39;s hid secrets, and thou didst trace for me with thy wand\u003cbr /\u003ethe courses of the stars, moulding the while my character and the whole\u003cbr /\u003econduct of my life after the pattern of the celestial order? Is this the\u003cbr /\u003erecompense of my obedience? Yet thou hast enjoined by Plato\u0026#39;s mouth the\u003cbr /\u003emaxim, \u0026quot;that states would be happy, either if philosophers ruled them,\u003cbr /\u003eor if it should so befall that their rulers would turn philosophers.\u0026quot; By\u003cbr /\u003ehis mouth likewise thou didst point out this imperative reason why\u003cbr /\u003ephilosophers should enter public life, to wit, lest, if the reins of\u003cbr /\u003egovernment be left to unprincipled and profligate citizens, trouble and\u003cbr /\u003edestruction should come upon the good. Following these precepts, I have\u003cbr /\u003etried to apply in the business of public administration the principles\u003cbr /\u003ewhich I learnt from thee in leisured seclusion. Thou art my witness and\u003cbr /\u003ethat divinity who hath implanted thee in the hearts of the wise, that I\u003cbr /\u003ebrought to my duties no aim but zeal for the public good. For this cause\u003cbr /\u003eI have become involved in bitter and irreconcilable feuds, and, as\u003cbr /\u003ehappens inevitably, if a man holds fast to the independence of\u003cbr /\u003econscience, I have had to think nothing of giving offence to the\u003cbr /\u003epowerful in the cause of justice. How often have I encountered and\u003cbr /\u003ebalked Conigastus in his assaults on the fortunes of the weak? How often\u003cbr /\u003ehave I thwarted Trigguilla, steward of the king\u0026#39;s household, even when\u003cbr /\u003ehis villainous schemes were as good as accomplished? How often have I\u003cbr /\u003erisked my position and influence to protect poor wretches from the false\u003cbr /\u003echarges innumerable with which they were for ever being harassed by the\u003cbr /\u003egreed and license of the barbarians? No one has ever drawn me aside from\u003cbr /\u003ejustice to oppression. When ruin was overtaking the fortunes of the\u003cbr /\u003eprovincials through the combined pressure of private rapine and public\u003cbr /\u003etaxation, I grieved no less than the sufferers. When at a season of\u003cbr /\u003egrievous scarcity a forced sale, disastrous as it was unjustifiable, was\u003cbr /\u003eproclaimed, and threatened to overwhelm Campania with starvation, I\u003cbr /\u003eembarked on a struggle with the pr\u0026#230;torian prefect in the public\u003cbr /\u003einterest, I fought the case at the king\u0026#39;s judgment-seat, and succeeded\u003cbr /\u003ein preventing the enforcement of the sale. I rescued the consular\u003cbr /\u003ePaulinus from the gaping jaws of the court bloodhounds, who in their\u003cbr /\u003ecovetous hopes had already made short work of his wealth. To save\u003cbr /\u003eAlbinus, who was of the same exalted rank, from the penalties of a\u003cbr /\u003eprejudged charge, I exposed myself to the hatred of Cyprian, the\u003cbr /\u003einformer.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Thinkest thou I had laid up for myself store of enmities enough? Well,\u003cbr /\u003ewith the rest of my countrymen, at any rate, my safety should have been\u003cbr /\u003eassured, since my love of justice had left me no hope of security at\u003cbr /\u003ecourt. Yet who was it brought the charges by which I have been struck\u003cbr /\u003edown? Why, one of my accusers is Basil, who, after being dismissed from\u003cbr /\u003ethe king\u0026#39;s household, was driven by his debts to lodge an information\u003cbr /\u003eagainst my name. There is Opilio, there is Gaudentius, men who for many\u003cbr /\u003eand various offences the king\u0026#39;s sentence had condemned to banishment;\u003cbr /\u003eand when they declined to obey, and sought to save themselves by taking\u003cbr /\u003esanctuary, the king, as soon as he heard of it, decreed that, if they\u003cbr /\u003edid not depart from the city of Ravenna within a prescribed time, they\u003cbr /\u003eshould be branded on the forehead and expelled. What would exceed the\u003cbr /\u003erigour of this severity? And yet on that same day these very men lodged\u003cbr /\u003ean information against me, and the information was admitted. Just\u003cbr /\u003eHeaven! had I deserved this by my way of life? Did it make them fit\u003cbr /\u003eaccusers that my condemnation was a foregone conclusion? Has fortune no\u003cbr /\u003eshame–if not at the accusation of the innocent, at least for the\u003cbr /\u003evileness of the accusers? Perhaps thou wonderest what is the sum of the\u003cbr /\u003echarges laid against me? I wished, they say, to save the senate. But\u003cbr /\u003ehow? I am accused of hindering an informer from producing evidence to\u003cbr /\u003eprove the senate guilty of treason. Tell me, then, what is thy counsel,\u003cbr /\u003eO my mistress. Shall I deny the charge, lest I bring shame on thee? But\u003cbr /\u003eI did wish it, and I shall never cease to wish it. Shall I admit it?\u003cbr /\u003eThen the work of thwarting the informer will come to an end. Shall I\u003cbr /\u003ecall the wish for the preservation of that illustrious house a crime?\u003cbr /\u003eOf a truth the senate, by its decrees concerning me, has made it such!\u003cbr /\u003eBut blind folly, though it deceive itself with false names, cannot alter\u003cbr /\u003ethe true merits of things, and, mindful of the precept of Socrates, I do\u003cbr /\u003enot think it right either to keep the truth concealed or allow falsehood\u003cbr /\u003eto pass. But this, however it may be, I leave to thy judgment and to the\u003cbr /\u003everdict of the discerning. Moreover, lest the course of events and the\u003cbr /\u003etrue facts should be hidden from posterity, I have myself committed to\u003cbr /\u003ewriting an account of the transaction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;What need to speak of the forged letters by which an attempt is made to\u003cbr /\u003eprove that I hoped for the freedom of Rome? Their falsity would have\u003cbr /\u003ebeen manifest, if I had been allowed to use the confession of the\u003cbr /\u003einformers themselves, evidence which has in all matters the most\u003cbr /\u003econvincing force. Why, what hope of freedom is left to us? Would there\u003cbr /\u003ewere any! I should have answered with the epigram of Canius when\u003cbr /\u003eCaligula declared him to have been cognisant of a conspiracy against\u003cbr /\u003ehim. \u0026quot;If I had known,\u0026quot; said he, \u0026quot;thou shouldst never have known.\u0026quot; Grief\u003cbr /\u003ehath not so blunted my perceptions in this matter that I should complain\u003cbr /\u003ebecause impious wretches contrive their villainies against the virtuous,\u003cbr /\u003ebut at their achievement of their hopes I do exceedingly marvel. For\u003cbr /\u003eevil purposes are, perchance, due to the imperfection of human nature;\u003cbr /\u003ethat it should be possible for scoundrels to carry out their worst\u003cbr /\u003eschemes against the innocent, while God beholdeth, is verily monstrous.\u003cbr /\u003eFor this cause, not without reason, one of thy disciples asked, \u0026quot;If God\u003cbr /\u003eexists, whence comes evil? Yet whence comes good, if He exists not?\u0026quot;\u003cbr /\u003eHowever, it might well be that wretches who seek the blood of all honest\u003cbr /\u003emen and of the whole senate should wish to destroy me also, whom they\u003cbr /\u003esaw to be a bulwark of the senate and all honest men. But did I deserve\u003cbr /\u003esuch a fate from the Fathers also? Thou rememberest, methinks–since\u003cbr /\u003ethou didst ever stand by my side to direct what I should do or say–thou\u003cbr /\u003erememberest, I say, how at Verona, when the king, eager for the general\u003cbr /\u003edestruction, was bent on implicating the whole senatorial order in the\u003cbr /\u003echarge of treason brought against Albinus, with what indifference to my\u003cbr /\u003eown peril I maintained the innocence of its members, one and all. Thou\u003cbr /\u003eknowest that what I say is the truth, and that I have never boasted of\u003cbr /\u003emy good deeds in a spirit of self-praise. For whenever a man by\u003cbr /\u003eproclaiming his good deeds receives the recompense of fame, he\u003cbr /\u003ediminishes in a measure the secret reward of a good conscience. What\u003cbr /\u003eissues have overtaken my innocency thou seest. Instead of reaping the\u003cbr /\u003erewards of true virtue, I undergo the penalties of a guilt falsely laid\u003cbr /\u003eto my charge–nay, more than this; never did an open confession of guilt\u003cbr /\u003ecause such unanimous severity among the assessors, but that some\u003cbr /\u003econsideration, either of the mere frailty of human nature, or of\u003cbr /\u003efortune\u0026#39;s universal instability, availed to soften the verdict of some\u003cbr /\u003efew. Had I been accused of a design to fire the temples, to slaughter\u003cbr /\u003ethe priests with impious sword, of plotting the massacre of all honest\u003cbr /\u003emen, I should yet have been produced in court, and only punished on due\u003cbr /\u003econfession or conviction. Now for my too great zeal towards the senate I\u003cbr /\u003ehave been condemned to outlawry and death, unheard and undefended, at a\u003cbr /\u003edistance of near five hundred miles away.[C] Oh, my judges, well do ye\u003cbr /\u003edeserve that no one should hereafter be convicted of a fault like mine!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yet even my very accusers saw how honourable was the charge they\u003cbr /\u003ebrought against me, and, in order to overlay it with some shadow of\u003cbr /\u003eguilt, they falsely asserted that in the pursuit of my ambition I had\u003cbr /\u003estained my conscience with sacrilegious acts. And yet thy spirit,\u003cbr /\u003eindwelling in me, had driven from the chamber of my soul all lust of\u003cbr /\u003eearthly success, and with thine eye ever upon me, there could be no\u003cbr /\u003eplace left for sacrilege. For thou didst daily repeat in my ear and\u003cbr /\u003einstil into my mind the Pythagorean maxim, \u0026quot;Follow after God.\u0026quot; It was\u003cbr /\u003enot likely, then, that I should covet the assistance of the vilest\u003cbr /\u003espirits, when thou wert moulding me to such an excellence as should\u003cbr /\u003econform me to the likeness of God. Again, the innocency of the inner\u003cbr /\u003esanctuary of my home, the company of friends of the highest probity, a\u003cbr /\u003efather-in-law revered at once for his pure character and his active\u003cbr /\u003ebeneficence, shield me from the very suspicion of sacrilege.\u003cbr /\u003eYet–atrocious as it is–they even draw credence for this charge from\u003cbr /\u003e_thee_; I am like to be thought implicated in wickedness on this very\u003cbr /\u003eaccount, that I am imbued with _thy_ teachings and stablished in _thy_\u003cbr /\u003eways. So it is not enough that my devotion to thee should profit me\u003cbr /\u003enothing, but thou also must be assailed by reason of the odium which I\u003cbr /\u003ehave incurred. Verily this is the very crown of my misfortunes, that\u003cbr /\u003emen\u0026#39;s opinions for the most part look not to real merit, but to the\u003cbr /\u003eevent; and only recognise foresight where Fortune has crowned the issue\u003cbr /\u003ewith her approval. Whereby it comes to pass that reputation is the first\u003cbr /\u003eof all things to abandon the unfortunate. I remember with chagrin how\u003cbr /\u003eperverse is popular report, how various and discordant men\u0026#39;s judgments.\u003cbr /\u003eThis only will I say, that the most crushing of misfortune\u0026#39;s burdens is,\u003cbr /\u003ethat as soon as a charge is fastened upon the unhappy, they are believed\u003cbr /\u003eto have deserved their sufferings. I, for my part, who have been\u003cbr /\u003ebanished from all life\u0026#39;s blessings, stripped of my honours, stained in\u003cbr /\u003erepute, am punished for well-doing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;And now methinks I see the villainous dens of the wicked surging with\u003cbr /\u003ejoy and gladness, all the most recklessly unscrupulous threatening a new\u003cbr /\u003ecrop of lying informations, the good prostrate with terror at my danger,\u003cbr /\u003eevery ruffian incited by impunity to new daring and to success by the\u003cbr /\u003eprofits of audacity, the guiltless not only robbed of their peace of\u003cbr /\u003emind, but even of all means of defence. Wherefore I would fain cry out:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e[C] The distance from Rome to Pavia, the place of Boethius\u0026#39;\u003cbr /\u003eimprisonment, is 455 Roman miles.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG V.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBOETHIUS\u0026#39; PRAYER.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Builder of yon starry dome,\u003cbr /\u003e Thou that whirlest, throned eternal,\u003cbr /\u003e Heaven\u0026#39;s swift globe, and, as they roam,\u003cbr /\u003e Guid\u0026#39;st the stars by laws supernal:\u003cbr /\u003e So in full-sphered splendour dight\u003cbr /\u003e Cynthia dims the lamps of night,\u003cbr /\u003e But unto the orb fraternal\u003cbr /\u003e Closer drawn,[D] doth lose her light.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Who at fall of eventide,\u003cbr /\u003e Hesper, his cold radiance showeth,\u003cbr /\u003e Lucifer his beams doth hide,\u003cbr /\u003e Paling as the sun\u0026#39;s light groweth,\u003cbr /\u003e Brief, while winter\u0026#39;s frost holds sway,\u003cbr /\u003e By thy will the space of day;\u003cbr /\u003e Swift, when summer\u0026#39;s fervour gloweth,\u003cbr /\u003e Speed the hours of night away.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Thou dost rule the changing year:\u003cbr /\u003e When rude Boreas oppresses,\u003cbr /\u003e Fall the leaves; they reappear,\u003cbr /\u003e Wooed by Zephyr\u0026#39;s soft caresses.\u003cbr /\u003e Fields that Sirius burns deep grown\u003cbr /\u003e By Arcturus\u0026#39; watch were sown:\u003cbr /\u003e Each the reign of law confesses,\u003cbr /\u003e Keeps the place that is his own.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Sovereign Ruler, Lord of all!\u003cbr /\u003e Can it be that Thou disdainest\u003cbr /\u003e Only man? \u0026#39;Gainst him, poor thrall,\u003cbr /\u003e Wanton Fortune plays her vainest.\u003cbr /\u003e Guilt\u0026#39;s deserved punishment\u003cbr /\u003e Falleth on the innocent;\u003cbr /\u003e High uplifted, the profanest\u003cbr /\u003e On the just their malice vent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Virtue cowers in dark retreats,\u003cbr /\u003e Crime\u0026#39;s foul stain the righteous beareth,\u003cbr /\u003e Perjury and false deceits\u003cbr /\u003e Hurt not him the wrong who dareth;\u003cbr /\u003e But whene\u0026#39;er the wicked trust\u003cbr /\u003e In ill strength to work their lust,\u003cbr /\u003e Kings, whom nations\u0026#39; awe declareth\u003cbr /\u003e Mighty, grovel in the dust.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Look, oh look upon this earth,\u003cbr /\u003e Thou who on law\u0026#39;s sure foundation\u003cbr /\u003e Framedst all! Have we no worth,\u003cbr /\u003e We poor men, of all creation?\u003cbr /\u003e Sore we toss on fortune\u0026#39;s tide;\u003cbr /\u003e Master, bid the waves subside!\u003cbr /\u003e And earth\u0026#39;s ways with consummation\u003cbr /\u003e Of Thy heaven\u0026#39;s order guide!\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e[D] The moon is regarded as farthest from the sun at the full, and, as\u003cbr /\u003eshe wanes, approaching gradually nearer.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eV.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen I had poured out my griefs in this long and unbroken strain of\u003cbr /\u003elamentation, she, with calm countenance, and in no wise disturbed at my\u003cbr /\u003ecomplainings, thus spake:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;When I saw thee sorrowful, in tears, I straightway knew thee wretched\u003cbr /\u003eand an exile. But how far distant that exile I should not know, had not\u003cbr /\u003ethine own speech revealed it. Yet how far indeed from thy country hast\u003cbr /\u003ethou, not been banished, but rather hast strayed; or, if thou wilt have\u003cbr /\u003eit banishment, hast banished thyself! For no one else could ever\u003cbr /\u003elawfully have had this power over thee. Now, if thou wilt call to mind\u003cbr /\u003efrom what country thou art sprung, it is not ruled, as once was the\u003cbr /\u003eAthenian polity, by the sovereignty of the multitude, but \u0026quot;one is its\u003cbr /\u003eRuler, one its King,\u0026quot; who takes delight in the number of His citizens,\u003cbr /\u003enot in their banishment; to submit to whose governance and to obey\u003cbr /\u003ewhose ordinances is perfect freedom. Art thou ignorant of that most\u003cbr /\u003eancient law of this thy country, whereby it is decreed that no one\u003cbr /\u003ewhatsoever, who hath chosen to fix there his dwelling, may be sent into\u003cbr /\u003eexile? For truly there is no fear that one who is encompassed by its\u003cbr /\u003eramparts and defences should deserve to be exiled. But he who has ceased\u003cbr /\u003eto wish to dwell therein, he likewise ceases to deserve to do so. And so\u003cbr /\u003eit is not so much the aspect of this place which moves me, as thy\u003cbr /\u003easpect; not so much the library walls set off with glass and ivory which\u003cbr /\u003eI miss, as the chamber of thy mind, wherein I once placed, not books,\u003cbr /\u003ebut that which gives books their value, the doctrines which my books\u003cbr /\u003econtain. Now, what thou hast said of thy services to the commonweal is\u003cbr /\u003etrue, only too little compared with the greatness of thy deservings. The\u003cbr /\u003ethings laid to thy charge whereof thou hast spoken, whether such as\u003cbr /\u003eredound to thy credit, or mere false accusations, are publicly known. As\u003cbr /\u003efor the crimes and deceits of the informers, thou hast rightly deemed\u003cbr /\u003eit fitting to pass them over lightly, because the popular voice hath\u003cbr /\u003ebetter and more fully pronounced upon them. Thou hast bitterly\u003cbr /\u003ecomplained of the injustice of the senate. Thou hast grieved over my\u003cbr /\u003ecalumniation, and likewise hast lamented the damage to my good name.\u003cbr /\u003eFinally, thine indignation blazed forth against fortune; thou hast\u003cbr /\u003ecomplained of the unfairness with which thy merits have been\u003cbr /\u003erecompensed. Last of all thy frantic muse framed a prayer that the peace\u003cbr /\u003ewhich reigns in heaven might rule earth also. But since a throng of\u003cbr /\u003etumultuous passions hath assailed thy soul, since thou art distraught\u003cbr /\u003ewith anger, pain, and grief, strong remedies are not proper for thee in\u003cbr /\u003ethis thy present mood. And so for a time I will use milder methods, that\u003cbr /\u003ethe tumours which have grown hard through the influx of disturbing\u003cbr /\u003epassion may be softened by gentle treatment, till they can bear the\u003cbr /\u003eforce of sharper remedies.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG VI.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eALL THINGS HAVE THEIR NEEDFUL ORDER\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHe who to th\u0026#39; unwilling furrows\u003cbr /\u003e Gives the generous grain,\u003cbr /\u003e When the Crab with baleful fervours\u003cbr /\u003e Scorches all the plain;\u003cbr /\u003e He shall find his garner bare,\u003cbr /\u003e Acorns for his scanty fare.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eGo not forth to cull sweet violets\u003cbr /\u003e From the purpled steep,\u003cbr /\u003e While the furious blasts of winter\u003cbr /\u003e Through the valleys sweep;\u003cbr /\u003e Nor the grape o\u0026#39;erhasty bring\u003cbr /\u003e To the press in days of spring.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor to each thing God hath given\u003cbr /\u003e Its appointed time;\u003cbr /\u003e No perplexing change permits He\u003cbr /\u003e In His plan sublime.\u003cbr /\u003e So who quits the order due\u003cbr /\u003e Shall a luckless issue rue.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVI.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;First, then, wilt thou suffer me by a few questions to make some\u003cbr /\u003eattempt to test the state of thy mind, that I may learn in what way to\u003cbr /\u003eset about thy cure?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Ask what thou wilt,\u0026#39; said I, \u0026#39;for I will answer whatever questions thou\u003cbr /\u003echoosest to put.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen said she: \u0026#39;This world of ours–thinkest thou it is governed\u003cbr /\u003ehaphazard and fortuitously, or believest thou that there is in it any\u003cbr /\u003erational guidance?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Nay,\u0026#39; said I, \u0026#39;in no wise may I deem that such fixed motions can be\u003cbr /\u003edetermined by random hazard, but I know that God, the Creator, presideth\u003cbr /\u003eover His work, nor will the day ever come that shall drive me from\u003cbr /\u003eholding fast the truth of this belief.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yes,\u0026#39; said she; \u0026#39;thou didst even but now affirm it in song, lamenting\u003cbr /\u003ethat men alone had no portion in the divine care. As to the rest, thou\u003cbr /\u003ewert unshaken in the belief that they were ruled by reason. Yet I\u003cbr /\u003emarvel exceedingly how, in spite of thy firm hold on this opinion, thou\u003cbr /\u003eart fallen into sickness. But let us probe more deeply: something or\u003cbr /\u003eother is missing, I think. Now, tell me, since thou doubtest not that\u003cbr /\u003eGod governs the world, dost thou perceive by what means He rules it?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;I scarcely understand what thou meanest,\u0026#39; I said, \u0026#39;much less can I\u003cbr /\u003eanswer thy question.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Did I not say truly that something is missing, whereby, as through a\u003cbr /\u003ebreach in the ramparts, disease hath crept in to disturb thy mind? But,\u003cbr /\u003etell me, dost thou remember the universal end towards which the aim of\u003cbr /\u003eall nature is directed?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;I once heard,\u0026#39; said I, \u0026#39;but sorrow hath dulled my recollection.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;And yet thou knowest whence all things have proceeded.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yes, that I know,\u0026#39; said I, \u0026#39;and have answered that it is from God.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yet how is it possible that thou knowest not what is the end of\u003cbr /\u003eexistence, when thou dost understand its source and origin? However,\u003cbr /\u003ethese disturbances of mind have force to shake a man\u0026#39;s position, but\u003cbr /\u003ecannot pluck him up and root him altogether out of himself. But answer\u003cbr /\u003ethis also, I pray thee: rememberest thou that thou art a man?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;How should I not?\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, canst thou say what man is?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Is this thy question: Whether I know myself for a being endowed with\u003cbr /\u003ereason and subject to death? Surely I do acknowledge myself such.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen she: \u0026#39;Dost know nothing else that thou art?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Nothing.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Now,\u0026#39; said she, \u0026#39;I know another cause of thy disease, one, too, of\u003cbr /\u003egrave moment. Thou hast ceased to know thy own nature. So, then, I have\u003cbr /\u003emade full discovery both of the causes of thy sickness and the means of\u003cbr /\u003erestoring thy health. It is because forgetfulness of thyself hath\u003cbr /\u003ebewildered thy mind that thou hast bewailed thee as an exile, as one\u003cbr /\u003estripped of the blessings that were his; it is because thou knowest not\u003cbr /\u003ethe end of existence that thou deemest abominable and wicked men to be\u003cbr /\u003ehappy and powerful; while, because thou hast forgotten by what means the\u003cbr /\u003eearth is governed, thou deemest that fortune\u0026#39;s changes ebb and flow\u003cbr /\u003ewithout the restraint of a guiding hand. These are serious enough to\u003cbr /\u003ecause not sickness only, but even death; but, thanks be to the Author of\u003cbr /\u003eour health, the light of nature hath not yet left thee utterly. In thy\u003cbr /\u003etrue judgment concerning the world\u0026#39;s government, in that thou believest\u003cbr /\u003eit subject, not to the random drift of chance, but to divine reason, we\u003cbr /\u003ehave the divine spark from which thy recovery may be hoped. Have, then,\u003cbr /\u003eno fear; from these weak embers the vital heat shall once more be\u003cbr /\u003ekindled within thee. But seeing that it is not yet time for strong\u003cbr /\u003eremedies, and that the mind is manifestly so constituted that when it\u003cbr /\u003ecasts off true opinions it straightway puts on false, wherefrom arises a\u003cbr /\u003ecloud of confusion that disturbs its true vision, I will now try and\u003cbr /\u003edisperse these mists by mild and soothing application, that so the\u003cbr /\u003edarkness of misleading passion may be scattered, and thou mayst come to\u003cbr /\u003ediscern the splendour of the true light.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG VII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTHE PERTURBATIONS OF PASSION.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eStars shed no light\u003cbr /\u003e Through the black night,\u003cbr /\u003e When the clouds hide;\u003cbr /\u003e And the lashed wave,\u003cbr /\u003e If the winds rave\u003cbr /\u003e O\u0026#39;er ocean\u0026#39;s tide,–\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThough once serene\u003cbr /\u003e As day\u0026#39;s fair sheen,–\u003cbr /\u003e Soon fouled and spoiled\u003cbr /\u003e By the storm\u0026#39;s spite,\u003cbr /\u003e Shows to the sight\u003cbr /\u003e Turbid and soiled.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOft the fair rill,\u003cbr /\u003e Down the steep hill\u003cbr /\u003e Seaward that strays,\u003cbr /\u003e Some tumbled block\u003cbr /\u003e Of fallen rock\u003cbr /\u003e Hinders and stays.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen art thou fain\u003cbr /\u003e Clear and most plain\u003cbr /\u003e Truth to discern,\u003cbr /\u003e In the right way\u003cbr /\u003e Firmly to stay,\u003cbr /\u003e Nor from it turn?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eJoy, hope and fear\u003cbr /\u003e Suffer not near,\u003cbr /\u003e Drive grief away:\u003cbr /\u003e Shackled and blind\u003cbr /\u003e And lost is the mind\u003cbr /\u003e Where these have sway.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBOOK II.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTHE VANITY OF FORTUNE\u0026#39;S GIFTS\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSummary\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCH. I. Philosophy reproves Boethius for the foolishness of his\u003cbr /\u003e complaints against Fortune. Her very nature is caprice.–CH. II.\u003cbr /\u003e Philosophy in Fortune\u0026#39;s name replies to Boethius\u0026#39; reproaches, and\u003cbr /\u003e proves that the gifts of Fortune are hers to give and to take\u003cbr /\u003e away.–CH. III. Boethius falls back upon his present sense of\u003cbr /\u003e misery. Philosophy reminds him of the brilliancy of his former\u003cbr /\u003e fortunes.–CH. IV. Boethius objects that the memory of past\u003cbr /\u003e happiness is the bitterest portion of the lot of the unhappy.\u003cbr /\u003e Philosophy shows that much is still left for which he may be\u003cbr /\u003e thankful. None enjoy perfect satisfaction with their lot. But\u003cbr /\u003e happiness depends not on anything which Fortune can give. It is to\u003cbr /\u003e be sought within.–CH. V. All the gifts of Fortune are external;\u003cbr /\u003e they can never truly be our own. Man cannot find his good in\u003cbr /\u003e worldly possessions. Riches bring anxiety and trouble.–CH. VI.\u003cbr /\u003e High place without virtue is an evil, not a good. Power is an empty\u003cbr /\u003e name.–CH. VII. Fame is a thing of little account when compared\u003cbr /\u003e with the immensity of the Universe and the endlessness of\u003cbr /\u003e Time.–CH. VIII. One service only can Fortune do, when she reveals\u003cbr /\u003e her own nature and distinguishes true friends from false.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBOOK II.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThereafter for awhile she remained silent; and when she had restored my\u003cbr /\u003eflagging attention by a moderate pause in her discourse, she thus began:\u003cbr /\u003e\u0026#39;If I have thoroughly ascertained the character and causes of thy\u003cbr /\u003esickness, thou art pining with regretful longing for thy former fortune.\u003cbr /\u003eIt is the change, as thou deemest, of this fortune that hath so wrought\u003cbr /\u003eupon thy mind. Well do I understand that Siren\u0026#39;s manifold wiles, the\u003cbr /\u003efatal charm of the friendship she pretends for her victims, so long as\u003cbr /\u003eshe is scheming to entrap them–how she unexpectedly abandons them and\u003cbr /\u003eleaves them overwhelmed with insupportable grief. Bethink thee of her\u003cbr /\u003enature, character, and deserts, and thou wilt soon acknowledge that in\u003cbr /\u003eher thou hast neither possessed, nor hast thou lost, aught of any worth.\u003cbr /\u003eMethinks I need not spend much pains in bringing this to thy mind,\u003cbr /\u003esince, even when she was still with thee, even while she was caressing\u003cbr /\u003ethee, thou usedst to assail her in manly terms, to rebuke her, with\u003cbr /\u003emaxims drawn from my holy treasure-house. But all sudden changes of\u003cbr /\u003ecircumstances bring inevitably a certain commotion of spirit. Thus it\u003cbr /\u003ehath come to pass that thou also for awhile hast been parted from thy\u003cbr /\u003emind\u0026#39;s tranquillity. But it is time for thee to take and drain a\u003cbr /\u003edraught, soft and pleasant to the taste, which, as it penetrates within,\u003cbr /\u003emay prepare the way for stronger potions. Wherefore I call to my aid the\u003cbr /\u003esweet persuasiveness of Rhetoric, who then only walketh in the right way\u003cbr /\u003ewhen she forsakes not my instructions, and Music, my handmaid, I bid to\u003cbr /\u003ejoin with her singing, now in lighter, now in graver strain.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;What is it, then, poor mortal, that hath cast thee into lamentation and\u003cbr /\u003emourning? Some strange, unwonted sight, methinks, have thine eyes seen.\u003cbr /\u003eThou deemest Fortune to have changed towards thee; thou mistakest. Such\u003cbr /\u003eever were her ways, ever such her nature. Rather in her very mutability\u003cbr /\u003ehath she preserved towards thee her true constancy. Such was she when\u003cbr /\u003eshe loaded thee with caresses, when she deluded thee with the\u003cbr /\u003eallurements of a false happiness. Thou hast found out how changeful is\u003cbr /\u003ethe face of the blind goddess. She who still veils herself from others\u003cbr /\u003ehath fully discovered to thee her whole character. If thou likest her,\u003cbr /\u003etake her as she is, and do not complain. If thou abhorrest her perfidy,\u003cbr /\u003eturn from her in disdain, renounce her, for baneful are her delusions.\u003cbr /\u003eThe very thing which is now the cause of thy great grief ought to have\u003cbr /\u003ebrought thee tranquillity. Thou hast been forsaken by one of whom no one\u003cbr /\u003ecan be sure that she will not forsake him. Or dost thou indeed set value\u003cbr /\u003eon a happiness that is certain to depart? Again I ask, Is Fortune\u0026#39;s\u003cbr /\u003epresence dear to thee if she cannot be trusted to stay, and though she\u003cbr /\u003ewill bring sorrow when she is gone? Why, if she cannot be kept at\u003cbr /\u003epleasure, and if her flight overwhelms with calamity, what is this\u003cbr /\u003efleeting visitant but a token of coming trouble? Truly it is not enough\u003cbr /\u003eto look only at what lies before the eyes; wisdom gauges the issues of\u003cbr /\u003ethings, and this same mutability, with its two aspects, makes the\u003cbr /\u003ethreats of Fortune void of terror, and her caresses little to be\u003cbr /\u003edesired. Finally, thou oughtest to bear with whatever takes place within\u003cbr /\u003ethe boundaries of Fortune\u0026#39;s demesne, when thou hast placed thy head\u003cbr /\u003ebeneath her yoke. But if thou wishest to impose a law of staying and\u003cbr /\u003edeparting on her whom thou hast of thine own accord chosen for thy\u003cbr /\u003emistress, art thou not acting wrongfully, art thou not embittering by\u003cbr /\u003eimpatience a lot which thou canst not alter? Didst thou commit thy sails\u003cbr /\u003eto the winds, thou wouldst voyage not whither thy intention was to go,\u003cbr /\u003ebut whither the winds drave thee; didst thou entrust thy seed to the\u003cbr /\u003efields, thou wouldst set off the fruitful years against the barren. Thou\u003cbr /\u003ehast resigned thyself to the sway of Fortune; thou must submit to thy\u003cbr /\u003emistress\u0026#39;s caprices. What! art thou verily striving to stay the swing\u003cbr /\u003eof the revolving wheel? Oh, stupidest of mortals, if it takes to\u003cbr /\u003estanding still, it ceases to be the wheel of Fortune.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFORTUNE\u0026#39;S MALICE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMad Fortune sweeps along in wanton pride,\u003cbr /\u003e Uncertain as Euripus\u0026#39; surging tide;\u003cbr /\u003e Now tramples mighty kings beneath her feet;\u003cbr /\u003e Now sets the conquered in the victor\u0026#39;s seat.\u003cbr /\u003e She heedeth not the wail of hapless woe,\u003cbr /\u003e But mocks the griefs that from her mischief flow.\u003cbr /\u003e Such is her sport; so proveth she her power;\u003cbr /\u003e And great the marvel, when in one brief hour\u003cbr /\u003e She shows her darling lifted high in bliss,\u003cbr /\u003e Then headlong plunged in misery\u0026#39;s abyss.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Now I would fain also reason with thee a little in Fortune\u0026#39;s own words.\u003cbr /\u003eDo thou observe whether her contentions be just. \u0026quot;Man,\u0026quot; she might say,\u003cbr /\u003e\u0026quot;why dost thou pursue me with thy daily complainings? What wrong have I\u003cbr /\u003edone thee? What goods of thine have I taken from thee? Choose an thou\u003cbr /\u003ewilt a judge, and let us dispute before him concerning the rightful\u003cbr /\u003eownership of wealth and rank. If thou succeedest in showing that any one\u003cbr /\u003eof these things is the true property of mortal man, I freely grant those\u003cbr /\u003ethings to be thine which thou claimest. When nature brought thee forth\u003cbr /\u003eout of thy mother\u0026#39;s womb, I took thee, naked and destitute as thou wast,\u003cbr /\u003eI cherished thee with my substance, and, in the partiality of my favour\u003cbr /\u003efor thee, I brought thee up somewhat too indulgently, and this it is\u003cbr /\u003ewhich now makes thee rebellious against me. I surrounded thee with a\u003cbr /\u003eroyal abundance of all those things that are in my power. Now it is my\u003cbr /\u003epleasure to draw back my hand. Thou hast reason to thank me for the use\u003cbr /\u003eof what was not thine own; thou hast no right to complain, as if thou\u003cbr /\u003ehadst lost what was wholly thine. Why, then, dost bemoan thyself? I have\u003cbr /\u003edone thee no violence. Wealth, honour, and all such things are placed\u003cbr /\u003eunder my control. My handmaidens know their mistress; with me they come,\u003cbr /\u003eand at my going they depart. I might boldly affirm that if those things\u003cbr /\u003ethe loss of which thou lamentest had been thine, thou couldst never have\u003cbr /\u003elost them. Am I alone to be forbidden to do what I will with my own?\u003cbr /\u003eUnrebuked, the skies now reveal the brightness of day, now shroud the\u003cbr /\u003edaylight in the darkness of night; the year may now engarland the face\u003cbr /\u003eof the earth with flowers and fruits, now disfigure it with storms and\u003cbr /\u003ecold. The sea is permitted to invite with smooth and tranquil surface\u003cbr /\u003eto-day, to-morrow to roughen with wave and storm. Shall man\u0026#39;s insatiate\u003cbr /\u003egreed bind _me_ to a constancy foreign to my character? This is my art,\u003cbr /\u003ethis the game I never cease to play. I turn the wheel that spins. I\u003cbr /\u003edelight to see the high come down and the low ascend. Mount up, if thou\u003cbr /\u003ewilt, but only on condition that thou wilt not think it a hardship to\u003cbr /\u003ecome down when the rules of my game require it. Wert thou ignorant of my\u003cbr /\u003echaracter? Didst not know how Croesus, King of the Lydians, erstwhile\u003cbr /\u003ethe dreaded rival of Cyrus, was afterwards pitiably consigned to the\u003cbr /\u003eflame of the pyre, and only saved by a shower sent from heaven? Has it\u003cbr /\u003e\u0026#39;scaped thee how Paullus paid a meed of pious tears to the misfortunes\u003cbr /\u003eof King Perseus, his prisoner? What else do tragedies make such woeful\u003cbr /\u003eoutcry over save the overthrow of kingdoms by the indiscriminate strokes\u003cbr /\u003eof Fortune? Didst thou not learn in thy childhood how there stand at the\u003cbr /\u003ethreshold of Zeus \u0026#39;two jars,\u0026#39; \u0026#39;the one full of blessings, the other of\u003cbr /\u003ecalamities\u0026#39;? How if thou hast drawn over-liberally from the good jar?\u003cbr /\u003eWhat if not even now have I departed wholly from thee? What if this very\u003cbr /\u003emutability of mine is a just ground for hoping better things? But listen\u003cbr /\u003enow, and cease to let thy heart consume away with fretfulness, nor\u003cbr /\u003eexpect to live on thine own terms in a realm that is common to all.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG II.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMAN\u0026#39;S COVETOUSNESS.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat though Plenty pour her gifts\u003cbr /\u003e With a lavish hand,\u003cbr /\u003e Numberless as are the stars,\u003cbr /\u003e Countless as the sand,\u003cbr /\u003e Will the race of man, content,\u003cbr /\u003e Cease to murmur and lament?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNay, though God, all-bounteous, give\u003cbr /\u003e Gold at man\u0026#39;s desire–\u003cbr /\u003e Honours, rank, and fame–content\u003cbr /\u003e Not a whit is nigher;\u003cbr /\u003e But an all-devouring greed\u003cbr /\u003e Yawns with ever-widening need.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen what bounds can e\u0026#39;er restrain\u003cbr /\u003e This wild lust of having,\u003cbr /\u003e When with each new bounty fed\u003cbr /\u003e Grows the frantic craving?\u003cbr /\u003e He is never rich whose fear\u003cbr /\u003e Sees grim Want forever near.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;If Fortune should plead thus against thee, assuredly thou wouldst not\u003cbr /\u003ehave one word to offer in reply; or, if thou canst find any\u003cbr /\u003ejustification of thy complainings, thou must show what it is. I will\u003cbr /\u003egive thee space to speak.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen said I: \u0026#39;Verily, thy pleas are plausible–yea, steeped in the\u003cbr /\u003ehoneyed sweetness of music and rhetoric. But their charm lasts only\u003cbr /\u003ewhile they are sounding in the ear; the sense of his misfortunes lies\u003cbr /\u003edeeper in the heart of the wretched. So, when the sound ceases to\u003cbr /\u003evibrate upon the air, the heart\u0026#39;s indwelling sorrow is felt with renewed\u003cbr /\u003ebitterness.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen said she: \u0026#39;It is indeed as thou sayest, for we have not yet come to\u003cbr /\u003ethe curing of thy sickness; as yet these are but lenitives conducing to\u003cbr /\u003ethe treatment of a malady hitherto obstinate. The remedies which go deep\u003cbr /\u003eI will apply in due season. Nevertheless, to deprecate thy\u003cbr /\u003edetermination to be thought wretched, I ask thee, Hast thou forgotten\u003cbr /\u003ethe extent and bounds of thy felicity? I say nothing of how, when\u003cbr /\u003eorphaned and desolate, thou wast taken into the care of illustrious men;\u003cbr /\u003ehow thou wast chosen for alliance with the highest in the state–and\u003cbr /\u003eeven before thou wert bound to their house by marriage, wert already\u003cbr /\u003edear to their love–which is the most precious of all ties. Did not all\u003cbr /\u003epronounce thee most happy in the virtues of thy wife, the splendid\u003cbr /\u003ehonours of her father, and the blessing of male issue? I pass over–for\u003cbr /\u003eI care not to speak of blessings in which others also have shared–the\u003cbr /\u003edistinctions often denied to age which thou enjoyedst in thy youth. I\u003cbr /\u003echoose rather to come to the unparalleled culmination of thy good\u003cbr /\u003efortune. If the fruition of any earthly success has weight in the scale\u003cbr /\u003eof happiness, can the memory of that splendour be swept away by any\u003cbr /\u003erising flood of troubles? That day when thou didst see thy two sons ride\u003cbr /\u003eforth from home joint consuls, followed by a train of senators, and\u003cbr /\u003ewelcomed by the good-will of the people; when these two sat in curule\u003cbr /\u003echairs in the Senate-house, and thou by thy panegyric on the king didst\u003cbr /\u003eearn the fame of eloquence and ability; when in the Circus, seated\u003cbr /\u003ebetween the two consuls, thou didst glut the multitude thronging around\u003cbr /\u003ewith the triumphal largesses for which they looked–methinks thou didst\u003cbr /\u003ecozen Fortune while she caressed thee, and made thee her darling. Thou\u003cbr /\u003edidst bear off a boon which she had never before granted to any private\u003cbr /\u003eperson. Art thou, then, minded to cast up a reckoning with Fortune? Now\u003cbr /\u003efor the first time she has turned a jealous glance upon thee. If thou\u003cbr /\u003ecompare the extent and bounds of thy blessings and misfortunes, thou\u003cbr /\u003ecanst not deny that thou art still fortunate. Or if thou esteem not\u003cbr /\u003ethyself favoured by Fortune in that thy then seeming prosperity hath\u003cbr /\u003edeparted, deem not thyself wretched, since what thou now believest to be\u003cbr /\u003ecalamitous passeth also. What! art thou but now come suddenly and a\u003cbr /\u003estranger to the scene of this life? Thinkest thou there is any stability\u003cbr /\u003ein human affairs, when man himself vanishes away in the swift course of\u003cbr /\u003etime? It is true that there is little trust that the gifts of chance\u003cbr /\u003ewill abide; yet the last day of life is in a manner the death of all\u003cbr /\u003eremaining Fortune. What difference, then, thinkest thou, is there,\u003cbr /\u003ewhether thou leavest her by dying, or she leave thee by fleeing away?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG III.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eALL PASSES.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen, in rosy chariot drawn,\u003cbr /\u003e Phoebus \u0026#39;gins to light the dawn,\u003cbr /\u003e By his flaming beams assailed,\u003cbr /\u003e Every glimmering star is paled.\u003cbr /\u003e When the grove, by Zephyrs fed,\u003cbr /\u003e With rose-blossom blushes red;–\u003cbr /\u003e Doth rude Auster breathe thereon,\u003cbr /\u003e Bare it stands, its glory gone.\u003cbr /\u003e Smooth and tranquil lies the deep\u003cbr /\u003e While the winds are hushed in sleep.\u003cbr /\u003e Soon, when angry tempests lash,\u003cbr /\u003e Wild and high the billows dash.\u003cbr /\u003e Thus if Nature\u0026#39;s changing face\u003cbr /\u003e Holds not still a moment\u0026#39;s space,\u003cbr /\u003e Fleeting deem man\u0026#39;s fortunes; deem\u003cbr /\u003e Bliss as transient as a dream.\u003cbr /\u003e One law only standeth fast:\u003cbr /\u003e Things created may not last.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIV.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen said I: \u0026#39;True are thine admonishings, thou nurse of all excellence;\u003cbr /\u003enor can I deny the wonder of my fortune\u0026#39;s swift career. Yet it is this\u003cbr /\u003ewhich chafes me the more cruelly in the recalling. For truly in adverse\u003cbr /\u003efortune the worst sting of misery is to _have been_ happy.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Well,\u0026#39; said she, \u0026#39;if thou art paying the penalty of a mistaken belief,\u003cbr /\u003ethou canst not rightly impute the fault to circumstances. If it is the\u003cbr /\u003efelicity which Fortune gives that moves thee–mere name though it\u003cbr /\u003ebe–come reckon up with me how rich thou art in the number and\u003cbr /\u003eweightiness of thy blessings. Then if, by the blessing of Providence,\u003cbr /\u003ethou hast still preserved unto thee safe and inviolate that which,\u003cbr /\u003ehowsoever thou mightest reckon thy fortune, thou wouldst have thought\u003cbr /\u003ethy most precious possession, what right hast thou to talk of\u003cbr /\u003eill-fortune whilst keeping all Fortune\u0026#39;s better gifts? Yet Symmachus,\u003cbr /\u003ethy wife\u0026#39;s father–a man whose splendid character does honour to the\u003cbr /\u003ehuman race–is safe and unharmed; and while he bewails thy wrongs, this\u003cbr /\u003erare nature, in whom wisdom and virtue are so nobly blended, is himself\u003cbr /\u003eout of danger–a boon thou wouldst have been quick to purchase at the\u003cbr /\u003eprice of life itself. Thy wife yet lives, with her gentle disposition,\u003cbr /\u003eher peerless modesty and virtue–this the epitome of all her graces,\u003cbr /\u003ethat she is the true daughter of her sire–she lives, I say, and for thy\u003cbr /\u003esake only preserves the breath of life, though she loathes it, and pines\u003cbr /\u003eaway in grief and tears for thy absence, wherein, if in naught else, I\u003cbr /\u003ewould allow some marring of thy felicity. What shall I say of thy sons\u003cbr /\u003eand their consular dignity–how in them, so far as may be in youths of\u003cbr /\u003etheir age, the example of their father\u0026#39;s and grandfather\u0026#39;s character\u003cbr /\u003eshines out? Since, then, the chief care of mortal man is to preserve his\u003cbr /\u003elife, how happy art thou, couldst thou but recognise thy blessings, who\u003cbr /\u003epossessest even now what no one doubts to be dearer than life!\u003cbr /\u003eWherefore, now dry thy tears. Fortune\u0026#39;s hate hath not involved all thy\u003cbr /\u003edear ones; the stress of the storm that has assailed thee is not beyond\u003cbr /\u003emeasure intolerable, since there are anchors still holding firm which\u003cbr /\u003esuffer thee not to lack either consolation in the present or hope for\u003cbr /\u003ethe future.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;I pray that they still may hold. For while they still remain, however\u003cbr /\u003ethings may go, I shall ride out the storm. Yet thou seest how much is\u003cbr /\u003eshorn of the splendour of my fortunes.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;We are gaining a little ground,\u0026#39; said she, \u0026#39;if there is something in\u003cbr /\u003ethy lot wherewith thou art not yet altogether discontented. But I cannot\u003cbr /\u003estomach thy daintiness when thou complainest with such violence of grief\u003cbr /\u003eand anxiety because thy happiness falls short of completeness. Why, who\u003cbr /\u003eenjoys such settled felicity as not to have some quarrel with the\u003cbr /\u003ecircumstances of his lot? A troublous matter are the conditions of human\u003cbr /\u003ebliss; either they are never realized in full, or never stay\u003cbr /\u003epermanently. One has abundant riches, but is shamed by his ignoble\u003cbr /\u003ebirth. Another is conspicuous for his nobility, but through the\u003cbr /\u003eembarrassments of poverty would prefer to be obscure. A third, richly\u003cbr /\u003eendowed with both, laments the loneliness of an unwedded life. Another,\u003cbr /\u003ethough happily married, is doomed to childlessness, and nurses his\u003cbr /\u003ewealth for a stranger to inherit. Yet another, blest with children,\u003cbr /\u003emournfully bewails the misdeeds of son or daughter. Wherefore, it is not\u003cbr /\u003eeasy for anyone to be at perfect peace with the circumstances of his\u003cbr /\u003elot. There lurks in each several portion something which they who\u003cbr /\u003eexperience it not know nothing of, but which makes the sufferer wince.\u003cbr /\u003eBesides, the more favoured a man is by Fortune, the more fastidiously\u003cbr /\u003esensitive is he; and, unless all things answer to his whim, he is\u003cbr /\u003eoverwhelmed by the most trifling misfortunes, because utterly unschooled\u003cbr /\u003ein adversity. So petty are the trifles which rob the most fortunate of\u003cbr /\u003eperfect happiness! How many are there, dost thou imagine, who would\u003cbr /\u003ethink themselves nigh heaven, if but a small portion from the wreck of\u003cbr /\u003ethy fortune should fall to them? This very place which thou callest\u003cbr /\u003eexile is to them that dwell therein their native land. So true is it\u003cbr /\u003ethat nothing is wretched, but thinking makes it so, and conversely every\u003cbr /\u003elot is happy if borne with equanimity. Who is so blest by Fortune as not\u003cbr /\u003eto wish to change his state, if once he gives rein to a rebellious\u003cbr /\u003espirit? With how many bitternesses is the sweetness of human felicity\u003cbr /\u003eblent! And even if that sweetness seem to him to bring delight in the\u003cbr /\u003eenjoying, yet he cannot keep it from departing when it will. How\u003cbr /\u003emanifestly wretched, then, is the bliss of earthly fortune, which lasts\u003cbr /\u003enot for ever with those whose temper is equable, and can give no perfect\u003cbr /\u003esatisfaction to the anxious-minded!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Why, then, ye children of mortality, seek ye from without that\u003cbr /\u003ehappiness whose seat is only within us? Error and ignorance bewilder\u003cbr /\u003eyou. I will show thee, in brief, the hinge on which perfect happiness\u003cbr /\u003eturns. Is there anything more precious to thee than thyself? Nothing,\u003cbr /\u003ethou wilt say. If, then, thou art master of thyself, thou wilt possess\u003cbr /\u003ethat which thou wilt never be willing to lose, and which Fortune cannot\u003cbr /\u003etake from thee. And that thou mayst see that happiness cannot possibly\u003cbr /\u003econsist in these things which are the sport of chance, reflect that, if\u003cbr /\u003ehappiness is the highest good of a creature living in accordance with\u003cbr /\u003ereason, and if a thing which can in any wise be reft away is not the\u003cbr /\u003ehighest good, since that which cannot be taken away is better than it,\u003cbr /\u003eit is plain that Fortune cannot aspire to bestow happiness by reason of\u003cbr /\u003eits instability. And, besides, a man borne along by this transitory\u003cbr /\u003efelicity must either know or not know its unstability. If he knows not,\u003cbr /\u003ehow poor is a happiness which depends on the blindness of ignorance! If\u003cbr /\u003ehe knows it, he needs must fear to lose a happiness whose loss he\u003cbr /\u003ebelieves to be possible. Wherefore, a never-ceasing fear suffers him not\u003cbr /\u003eto be happy. Or does he count the possibility of this loss a trifling\u003cbr /\u003ematter? Insignificant, then, must be the good whose loss can be borne so\u003cbr /\u003eequably. And, further, I know thee to be one settled in the belief that\u003cbr /\u003ethe souls of men certainly die not with them, and convinced thereof by\u003cbr /\u003enumerous proofs; it is clear also that the felicity which Fortune\u003cbr /\u003ebestows is brought to an end with the death of the body: therefore, it\u003cbr /\u003ecannot be doubted but that, if happiness is conferred in this way, the\u003cbr /\u003ewhole human race sinks into misery when death brings the close of all.\u003cbr /\u003eBut if we know that many have sought the joy of happiness not through\u003cbr /\u003edeath only, but also through pain and suffering, how can life make men\u003cbr /\u003ehappy by its presence when it makes them not wretched by its loss?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG IV.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTHE GOLDEN MEAN.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWho founded firm and sure\u003cbr /\u003e Would ever live secure,\u003cbr /\u003e In spite of storm and blast\u003cbr /\u003e Immovable and fast;\u003cbr /\u003e Whoso would fain deride\u003cbr /\u003e The ocean\u0026#39;s threatening tide;–\u003cbr /\u003e His dwelling should not seek\u003cbr /\u003e On sands or mountain-peak.\u003cbr /\u003e Upon the mountain\u0026#39;s height\u003cbr /\u003e The storm-winds wreak their spite:\u003cbr /\u003e The shifting sands disdain\u003cbr /\u003e Their burden to sustain.\u003cbr /\u003e Do thou these perils flee,\u003cbr /\u003e Fair though the prospect be,\u003cbr /\u003e And fix thy resting-place\u003cbr /\u003e On some low rock\u0026#39;s sure base.\u003cbr /\u003e Then, though the tempests roar,\u003cbr /\u003e Seas thunder on the shore,\u003cbr /\u003e Thou in thy stronghold blest\u003cbr /\u003e And undisturbed shalt rest;\u003cbr /\u003e Live all thy days serene,\u003cbr /\u003e And mock the heavens\u0026#39; spleen.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eV.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;But since my reasonings begin to work a soothing effect within thy\u003cbr /\u003emind, methinks I may resort to remedies somewhat stronger. Come,\u003cbr /\u003esuppose, now, the gifts of Fortune were not fleeting and transitory,\u003cbr /\u003ewhat is there in them capable of ever becoming truly thine, or which\u003cbr /\u003edoes not lose value when looked at steadily and fairly weighed in the\u003cbr /\u003ebalance? Are riches, I pray thee, precious either through thy nature or\u003cbr /\u003ein their own? What are they but mere gold and heaps of money? Yet these\u003cbr /\u003efine things show their quality better in the spending than in the\u003cbr /\u003ehoarding; for I suppose \u0026#39;tis plain that greed Alva\u0026#39;s makes men hateful,\u003cbr /\u003ewhile liberality brings fame. But that which is transferred to another\u003cbr /\u003ecannot remain in one\u0026#39;s own possession; and if that be so, then money is\u003cbr /\u003eonly precious when it is given away, and, by being transferred to\u003cbr /\u003eothers, ceases to be one\u0026#39;s own. Again, if all the money in the world\u003cbr /\u003ewere heaped up in one man\u0026#39;s possession, all others would be made poor.\u003cbr /\u003eSound fills the ears of many at the same time without being broken into\u003cbr /\u003eparts, but your riches cannot pass to many without being lessened in the\u003cbr /\u003eprocess. And when this happens, they must needs impoverish those whom\u003cbr /\u003ethey leave. How poor and cramped a thing, then, is riches, which more\u003cbr /\u003ethan one cannot possess as an unbroken whole, which falls not to any one\u003cbr /\u003eman\u0026#39;s lot without the impoverishment of everyone else! Or is it the\u003cbr /\u003eglitter of gems that allures the eye? Yet, how rarely excellent soever\u003cbr /\u003emay be their splendour, remember the flashing light is in the jewels,\u003cbr /\u003enot in the man. Indeed, I greatly marvel at men\u0026#39;s admiration of them;\u003cbr /\u003efor what can rightly seem beautiful to a being endowed with life and\u003cbr /\u003ereason, if it lack the movement and structure of life? And although such\u003cbr /\u003ethings do in the end take on them more beauty from their Maker\u0026#39;s care\u003cbr /\u003eand their own brilliancy, still they in no wise merit your admiration\u003cbr /\u003esince their excellence is set at a lower grade than your own.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Does the beauty of the fields delight you? Surely, yes; it is a\u003cbr /\u003ebeautiful part of a right beautiful whole. Fitly indeed do we at times\u003cbr /\u003eenjoy the serene calm of the sea, admire the sky, the stars, the moon,\u003cbr /\u003ethe sun. Yet is any of these thy concern? Dost thou venture to boast\u003cbr /\u003ethyself of the beauty of any one of them? Art _thou_ decked with\u003cbr /\u003espring\u0026#39;s flowers? is it _thy_ fertility that swelleth in the fruits of\u003cbr /\u003eautumn? Why art thou moved with empty transports? why embracest thou an\u003cbr /\u003ealien excellence as thine own? Never will fortune make thine that which\u003cbr /\u003ethe nature of things has excluded from thy ownership. Doubtless the\u003cbr /\u003efruits of the earth are given for the sustenance of living creatures.\u003cbr /\u003eBut if thou art content to supply thy wants so far as suffices nature,\u003cbr /\u003ethere is no need to resort to fortune\u0026#39;s bounty. Nature is content with\u003cbr /\u003efew things, and with a very little of these. If thou art minded to force\u003cbr /\u003esuperfluities upon her when she is satisfied, that which thou addest\u003cbr /\u003ewill prove either unpleasant or harmful. But, now, thou thinkest it\u003cbr /\u003efine to shine in raiment of divers colours; yet–if, indeed, there is\u003cbr /\u003eany pleasure in the sight of such things–it is the texture or the\u003cbr /\u003eartist\u0026#39;s skill which I shall admire.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Or perhaps it is a long train of servants that makes thee happy? Why,\u003cbr /\u003eif they behave viciously, they are a ruinous burden to thy house, and\u003cbr /\u003eexceeding dangerous to their own master; while if they are honest, how\u003cbr /\u003ecanst thou count other men\u0026#39;s virtue in the sum of thy possessions? From\u003cbr /\u003eall which \u0026#39;tis plainly proved that not one of these things which thou\u003cbr /\u003ereckonest in the number of thy possessions is really thine. And if there\u003cbr /\u003eis in them no beauty to be desired, why shouldst thou either grieve for\u003cbr /\u003etheir loss or find joy in their continued possession? While if they are\u003cbr /\u003ebeautiful in their own nature, what is that to thee? They would have\u003cbr /\u003ebeen not less pleasing in themselves, though never included among thy\u003cbr /\u003epossessions. For they derive not their preciousness from being counted\u003cbr /\u003ein thy riches, but rather thou hast chosen to count them in thy riches\u003cbr /\u003ebecause they seemed to thee precious.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, what seek ye by all this noisy outcry about fortune? To chase\u003cbr /\u003eaway poverty, I ween, by means of abundance. And yet ye find the result\u003cbr /\u003ejust contrary. Why, this varied array of precious furniture needs more\u003cbr /\u003eaccessories for its protection; it is a true saying that they want most\u003cbr /\u003ewho possess most, and, conversely, they want very little who measure\u003cbr /\u003etheir abundance by nature\u0026#39;s requirements, not by the superfluity of vain\u003cbr /\u003edisplay. Have ye no good of your own implanted within you, that ye seek\u003cbr /\u003eyour good in things external and separate? Is the nature of things so\u003cbr /\u003ereversed that a creature divine by right of reason can in no other way\u003cbr /\u003ebe splendid in his own eyes save by the possession of lifeless chattels?\u003cbr /\u003eYet, while other things are content with their own, ye who in your\u003cbr /\u003eintellect are God-like seek from the lowest of things adornment for a\u003cbr /\u003enature of supreme excellence, and perceive not how great a wrong ye do\u003cbr /\u003eyour Maker. His will was that mankind should excel all things on earth.\u003cbr /\u003eYe thrust down your worth beneath the lowest of things. For if that in\u003cbr /\u003ewhich each thing finds its good is plainly more precious than that whose\u003cbr /\u003egood it is, by your own estimation ye put yourselves below the vilest of\u003cbr /\u003ethings, when ye deem these vile things to be your good: nor does this\u003cbr /\u003efall out undeservedly. Indeed, man is so constituted that he then only\u003cbr /\u003eexcels other things when he knows himself; but he is brought lower than\u003cbr /\u003ethe beasts if he lose this self-knowledge. For that other creatures\u003cbr /\u003eshould be ignorant of themselves is natural; in man it shows as a\u003cbr /\u003edefect. How extravagant, then, is this error of yours, in thinking that\u003cbr /\u003eanything can be embellished by adornments not its own. It cannot be. For\u003cbr /\u003eif such accessories add any lustre, it is the accessories that get the\u003cbr /\u003epraise, while that which they veil and cover remains in its pristine\u003cbr /\u003eugliness. And again I say, That is no _good_, which injures its\u003cbr /\u003epossessor. Is this untrue? No, quite true, thou sayest. And yet riches\u003cbr /\u003ehave often hurt those that possessed them, since the worst of men, who\u003cbr /\u003eare all the more covetous by reason of their wickedness, think none but\u003cbr /\u003ethemselves worthy to possess all the gold and gems the world contains.\u003cbr /\u003eSo thou, who now dreadest pike and sword, mightest have trolled a carol\u003cbr /\u003e\u0026quot;in the robber\u0026#39;s face,\u0026quot; hadst thou entered the road of life with empty\u003cbr /\u003epockets. Oh, wondrous blessedness of perishable wealth, whose\u003cbr /\u003eacquisition robs thee of security!\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG V.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTHE FORMER AGE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eToo blest the former age, their life\u003cbr /\u003e Who in the fields contented led,\u003cbr /\u003e And still, by luxury unspoiled,\u003cbr /\u003e On frugal acorns sparely fed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo skill was theirs the luscious grape\u003cbr /\u003e With honey\u0026#39;s sweetness to confuse;\u003cbr /\u003e Nor China\u0026#39;s soft and sheeny silks\u003cbr /\u003e T\u0026#39; empurple with brave Tyrian hues.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe grass their wholesome couch, their drink\u003cbr /\u003e The stream, their roof the pine\u0026#39;s tall shade;\u003cbr /\u003e Not theirs to cleave the deep, nor seek\u003cbr /\u003e In strange far lands the spoils of trade.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe trump of war was heard not yet,\u003cbr /\u003e Nor soiled the fields by bloodshed\u0026#39;s stain;\u003cbr /\u003e For why should war\u0026#39;s fierce madness arm\u003cbr /\u003e When strife brought wound, but brought not gain?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAh! would our hearts might still return\u003cbr /\u003e To following in those ancient ways.\u003cbr /\u003e Alas! the greed of getting glows\u003cbr /\u003e More fierce than Etna\u0026#39;s fiery blaze.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWoe, woe for him, whoe\u0026#39;er it was,\u003cbr /\u003e Who first gold\u0026#39;s hidden store revealed,\u003cbr /\u003e And–perilous treasure-trove–dug out\u003cbr /\u003e The gems that fain would be concealed!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVI.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;What now shall I say of rank and power, whereby, because ye know not\u003cbr /\u003etrue power and dignity, ye hope to reach the sky? Yet, when rank and\u003cbr /\u003epower have fallen to the worst of men, did ever an Etna, belching forth\u003cbr /\u003eflame and fiery deluge, work such mischief? Verily, as I think, thou\u003cbr /\u003edost remember how thine ancestors sought to abolish the consular power,\u003cbr /\u003ewhich had been the foundation of their liberties, on account of the\u003cbr /\u003eoverweening pride of the consuls, and how for that self-same pride they\u003cbr /\u003ehad already abolished the kingly title! And if, as happens but rarely,\u003cbr /\u003ethese prerogatives are conferred on virtuous men, it is only the virtue\u003cbr /\u003eof those who exercise them that pleases. So it appears that honour\u003cbr /\u003ecometh not to virtue from rank, but to rank from virtue. Look, too, at\u003cbr /\u003ethe nature of that power which ye find so attractive and glorious! Do ye\u003cbr /\u003enever consider, ye creatures of earth, what ye are, and over whom ye\u003cbr /\u003eexercise your fancied lordship? Suppose, now, that in the mouse tribe\u003cbr /\u003ethere should rise up one claiming rights and powers for himself above\u003cbr /\u003ethe rest, would ye not laugh consumedly? Yet if thou lookest to his body\u003cbr /\u003ealone, what creature canst thou find more feeble than man, who\u003cbr /\u003eoftentimes is killed by the bite of a fly, or by some insect creeping\u003cbr /\u003einto the inner passage of his system! Yet what rights can one exercise\u003cbr /\u003eover another, save only as regards the body, and that which is lower\u003cbr /\u003ethan the body–I mean fortune? What! wilt thou bind with thy mandates\u003cbr /\u003ethe free spirit? Canst thou force from its due tranquillity the mind\u003cbr /\u003ethat is firmly composed by reason? A tyrant thought to drive a man of\u003cbr /\u003efree birth to reveal his accomplices in a conspiracy, but the prisoner\u003cbr /\u003ebit off his tongue and threw it into the furious tyrant\u0026#39;s face; thus,\u003cbr /\u003ethe tortures which the tyrant thought the instrument of his cruelty the\u003cbr /\u003esage made an opportunity for heroism. Moreover, what is there that one\u003cbr /\u003eman can do to another which he himself may not have to undergo in his\u003cbr /\u003eturn? We are told that Busiris, who used to kill his guests, was himself\u003cbr /\u003eslain by his guest, Hercules. Regulus had thrown into bonds many of the\u003cbr /\u003eCarthaginians whom he had taken in war; soon after he himself submitted\u003cbr /\u003ehis hands to the chains of the vanquished. Then, thinkest thou that man\u003cbr /\u003ehath any power who cannot prevent another\u0026#39;s being able to do to him what\u003cbr /\u003ehe himself can do to others?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Besides, if there were any element of natural and proper good in rank\u003cbr /\u003eand power, they would never come to the utterly bad, since opposites are\u003cbr /\u003enot wont to be associated. Nature brooks not the union of contraries.\u003cbr /\u003eSo, seeing there is no doubt that wicked wretches are oftentimes set in\u003cbr /\u003ehigh places, it is also clear that things which suffer association with\u003cbr /\u003ethe worst of men cannot be good in their own nature. Indeed, this\u003cbr /\u003ejudgment may with some reason be passed concerning all the gifts of\u003cbr /\u003efortune which fall so plentifully to all the most wicked. This ought\u003cbr /\u003ealso to be considered here, I think: No one doubts a man to be brave in\u003cbr /\u003ewhom he has observed a brave spirit residing. It is plain that one who\u003cbr /\u003eis endowed with speed is swift-footed. So also music makes men musical,\u003cbr /\u003ethe healing art physicians, rhetoric public speakers. For each of these\u003cbr /\u003ehas naturally its own proper working; there is no confusion with the\u003cbr /\u003eeffects of contrary things–nay, even of itself it rejects what is\u003cbr /\u003eincompatible. And yet wealth cannot extinguish insatiable greed, nor has\u003cbr /\u003epower ever made him master of himself whom vicious lusts kept bound in\u003cbr /\u003eindissoluble fetters; dignity conferred on the wicked not only fails to\u003cbr /\u003emake them worthy, but contrarily reveals and displays their\u003cbr /\u003eunworthiness. Why does it so happen? Because ye take pleasure in calling\u003cbr /\u003eby false names things whose nature is quite incongruous thereto–by\u003cbr /\u003enames which are easily proved false by the very effects of the things\u003cbr /\u003ethemselves; even so it is; these riches, that power, this dignity, are\u003cbr /\u003enone of them rightly so called. Finally, we may draw the same conclusion\u003cbr /\u003econcerning the whole sphere of Fortune, within which there is plainly\u003cbr /\u003enothing to be truly desired, nothing of intrinsic excellence; for she\u003cbr /\u003eneither always joins herself to the good, nor does she make good men of\u003cbr /\u003ethose to whom she is united.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG VI.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNERO\u0026#39;S INFAMY.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe know what mischief dire he wrought–\u003cbr /\u003e Rome fired, the Fathers slain–\u003cbr /\u003e Whose hand with brother\u0026#39;s slaughter wet\u003cbr /\u003e A mother\u0026#39;s blood did stain.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo pitying tear his cheek bedewed,\u003cbr /\u003e As on the corse he gazed;\u003cbr /\u003e That mother\u0026#39;s beauty, once so fair,\u003cbr /\u003e A critic\u0026#39;s voice appraised.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet far and wide, from East to West,\u003cbr /\u003e His sway the nations own;\u003cbr /\u003e And scorching South and icy North\u003cbr /\u003e Obey his will alone.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eDid, then, high power a curb impose\u003cbr /\u003e On Nero\u0026#39;s phrenzied will?\u003cbr /\u003e Ah, woe when to the evil heart\u003cbr /\u003e Is joined the sword to kill!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen said I: \u0026#39;Thou knowest thyself that ambition for worldly success\u003cbr /\u003ehath but little swayed me. Yet I have desired opportunity for action,\u003cbr /\u003elest virtue, in default of exercise, should languish away.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen she: \u0026#39;This is that \u0026quot;last infirmity\u0026quot; which is able to allure minds\u003cbr /\u003ewhich, though of noble quality, have not yet been moulded to any\u003cbr /\u003eexquisite refinement by the perfecting of the virtues–I mean, the love\u003cbr /\u003eof glory–and fame for high services rendered to the commonweal. And yet\u003cbr /\u003econsider with me how poor and unsubstantial a thing this glory is! The\u003cbr /\u003ewhole of this earth\u0026#39;s globe, as thou hast learnt from the demonstration\u003cbr /\u003eof astronomy, compared with the expanse of heaven, is found no bigger\u003cbr /\u003ethan a point; that is to say, if measured by the vastness of heaven\u0026#39;s\u003cbr /\u003esphere, it is held to occupy absolutely no space at all. Now, of this so\u003cbr /\u003einsignificant portion of the universe, it is about a fourth part, as\u003cbr /\u003ePtolemy\u0026#39;s proofs have taught us, which is inhabited by living creatures\u003cbr /\u003eknown to us. If from this fourth part you take away in thought all that\u003cbr /\u003eis usurped by seas and marshes, or lies a vast waste of waterless\u003cbr /\u003edesert, barely is an exceeding narrow area left for human habitation.\u003cbr /\u003eYou, then, who are shut in and prisoned in this merest fraction of a\u003cbr /\u003epoint\u0026#39;s space, do ye take thought for the blazoning of your fame, for\u003cbr /\u003ethe spreading abroad of your renown? Why, what amplitude or magnificence\u003cbr /\u003ehas glory when confined to such narrow and petty limits?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Besides, the straitened bounds of this scant dwelling-place are\u003cbr /\u003einhabited by many nations differing widely in speech, in usages, in mode\u003cbr /\u003eof life; to many of these, from the difficulty of travel, from\u003cbr /\u003ediversities of speech, from want of commercial intercourse, the fame not\u003cbr /\u003eonly of individual men, but even of cities, is unable to reach. Why, in\u003cbr /\u003eCicero\u0026#39;s days, as he himself somewhere points out, the fame of the Roman\u003cbr /\u003eRepublic had not yet crossed the Caucasus, and yet by that time her\u003cbr /\u003ename had grown formidable to the Parthians and other nations of those\u003cbr /\u003eparts. Seest thou, then, how narrow, how confined, is the glory ye take\u003cbr /\u003epains to spread abroad and extend! Can the fame of a single Roman\u003cbr /\u003epenetrate where the glory of the Roman name fails to pass? Moreover, the\u003cbr /\u003ecustoms and institutions of different races agree not together, so that\u003cbr /\u003ewhat is deemed praise worthy in one country is thought punishable in\u003cbr /\u003eanother. Wherefore, if any love the applause of fame, it shall not\u003cbr /\u003eprofit him to publish his name among many peoples. Then, each must be\u003cbr /\u003econtent to have the range of his glory limited to his own people; the\u003cbr /\u003esplendid immortality of fame must be confined within the bounds of a\u003cbr /\u003esingle race.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Once more, how many of high renown in their own times have been lost in\u003cbr /\u003eoblivion for want of a record! Indeed, of what avail are written records\u003cbr /\u003eeven, which, with their authors, are overtaken by the dimness of age\u003cbr /\u003eafter a somewhat longer time? But ye, when ye think on future fame,\u003cbr /\u003efancy it an immortality that ye are begetting for yourselves. Why, if\u003cbr /\u003ethou scannest the infinite spaces of eternity, what room hast thou left\u003cbr /\u003efor rejoicing in the durability of thy name? Verily, if a single\u003cbr /\u003emoment\u0026#39;s space be compared with ten thousand years, it has a certain\u003cbr /\u003erelative duration, however little, since each period is definite. But\u003cbr /\u003ethis same number of years–ay, and a number many times as great–cannot\u003cbr /\u003eeven be compared with endless duration; for, indeed, finite periods may\u003cbr /\u003ein a sort be compared one with another, but a finite and an infinite\u003cbr /\u003enever. So it comes to pass that fame, though it extend to ever so wide a\u003cbr /\u003espace of years, if it be compared to never-lessening eternity, seems not\u003cbr /\u003eshort-lived merely, but altogether nothing. But as for you, ye know not\u003cbr /\u003ehow to act aright, unless it be to court the popular breeze, and win the\u003cbr /\u003eempty applause of the multitude–nay, ye abandon the superlative worth\u003cbr /\u003eof conscience and virtue, and ask a recompense from the poor words of\u003cbr /\u003eothers. Let me tell thee how wittily one did mock the shallowness of\u003cbr /\u003ethis sort of arrogance. A certain man assailed one who had put on the\u003cbr /\u003ename of philosopher as a cloak to pride and vain-glory, not for the\u003cbr /\u003epractice of real virtue, and added: \u0026quot;Now shall I know if thou art a\u003cbr /\u003ephilosopher if thou bearest reproaches calmly and patiently.\u0026quot; The other\u003cbr /\u003efor awhile affected to be patient, and, having endured to be abused,\u003cbr /\u003ecried out derisively: \u0026quot;_Now_, do you see that I am a philosopher?\u0026quot; The\u003cbr /\u003eother, with biting sarcasm, retorted: \u0026quot;I should have hadst thou held thy\u003cbr /\u003epeace.\u0026quot; Moreover, what concern have choice spirits–for it is of such\u003cbr /\u003emen we speak, men who seek glory by virtue–what concern, I say, have\u003cbr /\u003ethese with fame after the dissolution of the body in death\u0026#39;s last hour?\u003cbr /\u003eFor if men die wholly–which our reasonings forbid us to believe–there\u003cbr /\u003eis no such thing as glory at all, since he to whom the glory is said to\u003cbr /\u003ebelong is altogether non-existent. But if the mind, conscious of its own\u003cbr /\u003erectitude, is released from its earthly prison, and seeks heaven in free\u003cbr /\u003eflight, doth it not despise all earthly things when it rejoices in its\u003cbr /\u003edeliverance from earthly bonds, and enters upon the joys of heaven?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG VII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eGLORY MAY NOT LAST.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOh, let him, who pants for glory\u0026#39;s guerdon,\u003cbr /\u003e Deeming glory all in all,\u003cbr /\u003e Look and see how wide the heaven expandeth,\u003cbr /\u003e Earth\u0026#39;s enclosing bounds how small!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eShame it is, if your proud-swelling glory\u003cbr /\u003e May not fill this narrow room!\u003cbr /\u003e Why, then, strive so vainly, oh, ye proud ones!\u003cbr /\u003e To escape your mortal doom?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThough your name, to distant regions bruited,\u003cbr /\u003e O\u0026#39;er the earth be widely spread,\u003cbr /\u003e Though full many a lofty-sounding title\u003cbr /\u003e On your house its lustre shed,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eDeath at all this pomp and glory spurneth\u003cbr /\u003e When his hour draweth nigh,\u003cbr /\u003e Shrouds alike th\u0026#39; exalted and the humble,\u003cbr /\u003e Levels lowest and most high.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhere are now the bones of stanch Fabricius?\u003cbr /\u003e Brutus, Cato–where are they?\u003cbr /\u003e Lingering fame, with a few graven letters,\u003cbr /\u003e Doth their empty name display.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut to know the great dead is not given\u003cbr /\u003e From a gilded name alone;\u003cbr /\u003e Nay, ye all alike must lie forgotten,\u003cbr /\u003e \u0026#39;Tis not _you_ that fame makes known.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFondly do ye deem life\u0026#39;s little hour\u003cbr /\u003e Lengthened by fame\u0026#39;s mortal breath;\u003cbr /\u003e There but waits you–when this, too, is taken–\u003cbr /\u003e At the last a second death.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVIII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;But that thou mayst not think that I wage implacable warfare against\u003cbr /\u003eFortune, I own there is a time when the deceitful goddess serves men\u003cbr /\u003ewell–I mean when she reveals herself, uncovers her face, and confesses\u003cbr /\u003eher true character. Perhaps thou dost not yet grasp my meaning. Strange\u003cbr /\u003eis the thing I am trying to express, and for this cause I can scarce\u003cbr /\u003efind words to make clear my thought. For truly I believe that Ill\u003cbr /\u003eFortune is of more use to men than Good Fortune. For Good Fortune, when\u003cbr /\u003eshe wears the guise of happiness, and most seems to caress, is always\u003cbr /\u003elying; Ill Fortune is always truthful, since, in changing, she shows her\u003cbr /\u003einconstancy. The one deceives, the other teaches; the one enchains the\u003cbr /\u003eminds of those who enjoy her favour by the semblance of delusive good,\u003cbr /\u003ethe other delivers them by the knowledge of the frail nature of\u003cbr /\u003ehappiness. Accordingly, thou mayst see the one fickle, shifting as the\u003cbr /\u003ebreeze, and ever self-deceived; the other sober-minded, alert, and wary,\u003cbr /\u003eby reason of the very discipline of adversity. Finally, Good Fortune, by\u003cbr /\u003eher allurements, draws men far from the true good; Ill Fortune ofttimes\u003cbr /\u003edraws men back to true good with grappling-irons. Again, should it be\u003cbr /\u003eesteemed a trifling boon, thinkest thou, that this cruel, this odious\u003cbr /\u003eFortune hath discovered to thee the hearts of thy faithful friends–that\u003cbr /\u003eother hid from thee alike the faces of the true friends and of the\u003cbr /\u003efalse, but in departing she hath taken away _her_ friends, and left thee\u003cbr /\u003e_thine_? What price wouldst thou not have given for this service in the\u003cbr /\u003efulness of thy prosperity when thou seemedst to thyself fortunate?\u003cbr /\u003eCease, then, to seek the wealth thou hast lost, since in true friends\u003cbr /\u003ethou hast found the most precious of all riches.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG VIII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLOVE IS LORD OF ALL.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhy are Nature\u0026#39;s changes bound\u003cbr /\u003e To a fixed and ordered round?\u003cbr /\u003e What to leagu\u0026#232;d peace hath bent\u003cbr /\u003e Every warring element?\u003cbr /\u003e Wherefore doth the rosy morn\u003cbr /\u003e Rise on Phoebus\u0026#39; car upborne?\u003cbr /\u003e Why should Phoebe rule the night,\u003cbr /\u003e Led by Hesper\u0026#39;s guiding light?\u003cbr /\u003e What the power that doth restrain\u003cbr /\u003e In his place the restless main,\u003cbr /\u003e That within fixed bounds he keeps,\u003cbr /\u003e Nor o\u0026#39;er earth in deluge sweeps?\u003cbr /\u003e Love it is that holds the chains,\u003cbr /\u003e Love o\u0026#39;er sea and earth that reigns;\u003cbr /\u003e Love–whom else but sovereign Love?–\u003cbr /\u003e Love, high lord in heaven above!\u003cbr /\u003e Yet should he his care remit,\u003cbr /\u003e All that now so close is knit\u003cbr /\u003e In sweet love and holy peace,\u003cbr /\u003e Would no more from conflict cease,\u003cbr /\u003e But with strife\u0026#39;s rude shock and jar\u003cbr /\u003e All the world\u0026#39;s fair fabric mar.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTribes and nations Love unites\u003cbr /\u003e By just treaty\u0026#39;s sacred rites;\u003cbr /\u003e Wedlock\u0026#39;s bonds he sanctifies\u003cbr /\u003e By affection\u0026#39;s softest ties.\u003cbr /\u003e Love appointeth, as is due,\u003cbr /\u003e Faithful laws to comrades true–\u003cbr /\u003e Love, all-sovereign Love!–oh, then,\u003cbr /\u003e Ye are blest, ye sons of men,\u003cbr /\u003e If the love that rules the sky\u003cbr /\u003e In your hearts is throned on high!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBOOK III.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTRUE HAPPINESS AND FALSE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSUMMARY\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCH. I. Boethius beseeches Philosophy to continue. She promises to\u003cbr /\u003e lead him to true happiness.–CH. II. Happiness is the one end which\u003cbr /\u003e all created beings seek. They aim variously at (_a_) wealth, or\u003cbr /\u003e (_b_) rank, or (_c_) sovereignty, or (_d_) glory, or (_e_)\u003cbr /\u003e pleasure, because they think thereby to attain either (_a_)\u003cbr /\u003e contentment, (_b_) reverence, (_c_) power, (_d_) renown, or (_e_)\u003cbr /\u003e gladness of heart, in one or other of which they severally imagine\u003cbr /\u003e happiness to consist.–CH. III. Philosophy proceeds to consider\u003cbr /\u003e whether happiness can really be secured in any of these ways, (_a_)\u003cbr /\u003e So far from bringing contentment, riches only add to men\u0026#39;s\u003cbr /\u003e wants.–CH. IV. (_b_) High position cannot of itself win respect.\u003cbr /\u003e Titles command no reverence in distant and barbarous lands. They\u003cbr /\u003e even fall into contempt through lapse of time.–CH. V. (_c_)\u003cbr /\u003e Sovereignty cannot even bestow safety. History tells of the\u003cbr /\u003e downfall of kings and their ministers. Tyrants go in fear of their\u003cbr /\u003e lives. –CH. VI. (_d_) Fame conferred on the unworthy is but\u003cbr /\u003e disgrace. The splendour of noble birth is not a man\u0026#39;s own, but his\u003cbr /\u003e ancestors\u0026#39;.–CH. VII. (_e_) Pleasure begins in the restlessness of\u003cbr /\u003e desire, and ends in repentance. Even the pure pleasures of home may\u003cbr /\u003e turn to gall and bitterness.–CH. VIII. All fail, then, to give\u003cbr /\u003e what they promise. There is, moreover, some accompanying evil\u003cbr /\u003e involved in each of these aims. Beauty and bodily strength are\u003cbr /\u003e likewise of little worth. In strength man is surpassed by the\u003cbr /\u003e brutes; beauty is but outward show.–CH. IX. The source of men\u0026#39;s\u003cbr /\u003e error in following these phantoms of good is that _they break up\u003cbr /\u003e and separate that which is in its nature one and indivisible_.\u003cbr /\u003e Contentment, power, reverence, renown, and joy are essentially\u003cbr /\u003e bound up one with the other, and, if they are to be attained at\u003cbr /\u003e all, must be attained _together_. True happiness, if it can be\u003cbr /\u003e found, will include them all. But it cannot be found among the\u003cbr /\u003e perishable things hitherto considered.–CH. X. Such a happiness\u003cbr /\u003e necessarily exists. Its seat is in God. Nay, God is very happiness,\u003cbr /\u003e and in a manner, therefore, the happy man partakes also of the\u003cbr /\u003e Divine nature. All other ends are relative to this good, since they\u003cbr /\u003e are all pursued only for the sake of good; it is _good_ which is\u003cbr /\u003e the sole ultimate end. And since the sole end is also happiness, it\u003cbr /\u003e is plain that this good and happiness are in essence the same.–CH.\u003cbr /\u003e XI. Unity is another aspect of goodness. Now, all things subsist so\u003cbr /\u003e long only as they preserve the unity of their being; when they lose\u003cbr /\u003e this unity, they perish. But the bent of nature forces all things\u003cbr /\u003e (plants and inanimate things, as well as animals) to strive to\u003cbr /\u003e continue in life. Therefore, all things desire unity, for unity is\u003cbr /\u003e essential to life. But unity and goodness were shown to be the\u003cbr /\u003e same. Therefore, good is proved to be the end towards which the\u003cbr /\u003e whole universe tends.[E]–CH. XII. Boethius acknowledges that he is\u003cbr /\u003e but recollecting truths he once knew. Philosophy goes on to show\u003cbr /\u003e that it is goodness also by which the whole world is governed.[F]\u003cbr /\u003e Boethius professes compunction for his former folly. But the\u003cbr /\u003e paradox of evil is introduced, and he is once more perplexed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e[E] This solves the second of the points left in doubt at the end of bk.\u003cbr /\u003ei., ch. vi.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e[F] This solves the third. No distinct account is given of the first,\u003cbr /\u003ebut an answer may be gathered from the general argument of bks. ii.,\u003cbr /\u003eiii., and iv.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBOOK III.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eShe ceased, but I stood fixed by the sweetness of the song in wonderment\u003cbr /\u003eand eager expectation, my ears still strained to listen. And then after\u003cbr /\u003ea little I said: \u0026#39;Thou sovereign solace of the stricken soul, what\u003cbr /\u003erefreshment hast thou brought me, no less by the sweetness of thy\u003cbr /\u003esinging than by the weightiness of thy discourse! Verily, I think not\u003cbr /\u003ethat I shall hereafter be unequal to the blows of Fortune. Wherefore, I\u003cbr /\u003eno longer dread the remedies which thou saidst were something too severe\u003cbr /\u003efor my strength; nay, rather, I am eager to hear of them and call for\u003cbr /\u003ethem with all vehemence.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen said she: \u0026#39;I marked thee fastening upon my words silently and\u003cbr /\u003eintently, and I expected, or–to speak more truly–I myself brought\u003cbr /\u003eabout in thee, this state of mind. What now remains is of such sort that\u003cbr /\u003eto the taste indeed it is biting, but when received within it turns to\u003cbr /\u003esweetness. But whereas thou dost profess thyself desirous of hearing,\u003cbr /\u003ewith what ardour wouldst thou not burn didst thou but perceive whither\u003cbr /\u003eit is my task to lead thee!\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Whither?\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;To true felicity,\u0026#39; said she, \u0026#39;which even now thy spirit sees in dreams,\u003cbr /\u003ebut cannot behold in very truth, while thine eyes are engrossed with\u003cbr /\u003esemblances.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen said I: \u0026#39;I beseech thee, do thou show to me her true shape without\u003cbr /\u003ea moment\u0026#39;s loss.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Gladly will I, for thy sake,\u0026#39; said she. \u0026#39;But first I will try to sketch\u003cbr /\u003ein words, and describe a cause which is more familiar to thee, that,\u003cbr /\u003ewhen thou hast viewed this carefully, thou mayst turn thy eyes the other\u003cbr /\u003eway, and recognise the beauty of true happiness.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTHE THORNS OF ERROR.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWho fain would sow the fallow field,\u003cbr /\u003e And see the growing corn,\u003cbr /\u003e Must first remove the useless weeds,\u003cbr /\u003e The bramble and the thorn.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAfter ill savour, honey\u0026#39;s taste\u003cbr /\u003e Is to the mouth more sweet;\u003cbr /\u003e After the storm, the twinkling stars\u003cbr /\u003e The eyes more cheerly greet.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen night hath past, the bright dawn comes\u003cbr /\u003e In car of rosy hue;\u003cbr /\u003e So drive the false bliss from thy mind,\u003cbr /\u003e And thou shall see the true.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor a little space she remained in a fixed gaze, withdrawn, as it were,\u003cbr /\u003einto the august chamber of her mind; then she thus began:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;All mortal creatures in those anxious aims which find employment in so\u003cbr /\u003emany varied pursuits, though they take many paths, yet strive to reach\u003cbr /\u003eone goal–the goal of happiness. Now, _the good_ is that which, when a\u003cbr /\u003eman hath got, he can lack nothing further. This it is which is the\u003cbr /\u003esupreme good of all, containing within itself all particular good; so\u003cbr /\u003ethat if anything is still wanting thereto, this cannot be the supreme\u003cbr /\u003egood, since something would be left outside which might be desired. \u0026#39;Tis\u003cbr /\u003eclear, then, that happiness is a state perfected by the assembling\u003cbr /\u003etogether of all good things. To this state, as we have said, all men try\u003cbr /\u003eto attain, but by different paths. For the desire of the true good is\u003cbr /\u003enaturally implanted in the minds of men; only error leads them aside out\u003cbr /\u003eof the way in pursuit of the false. Some, deeming it the highest good to\u003cbr /\u003ewant for nothing, spare no pains to attain affluence; others, judging\u003cbr /\u003ethe good to be that to which respect is most worthily paid, strive to\u003cbr /\u003ewin the reverence of their fellow-citizens by the attainment of official\u003cbr /\u003edignity. Some there are who fix the chief good in supreme power; these\u003cbr /\u003eeither wish themselves to enjoy sovereignty, or try to attach themselves\u003cbr /\u003eto those who have it. Those, again, who think renown to be something of\u003cbr /\u003esupreme excellence are in haste to spread abroad the glory of their name\u003cbr /\u003eeither through the arts of war or of peace. A great many measure the\u003cbr /\u003eattainment of good by joy and gladness of heart; these think it the\u003cbr /\u003eheight of happiness to give themselves over to pleasure. Others there\u003cbr /\u003eare, again, who interchange the ends and means one with the other in\u003cbr /\u003etheir aims; for instance, some want riches for the sake of pleasure and\u003cbr /\u003epower, some covet power either for the sake of money or in order to\u003cbr /\u003ebring renown to their name. So it is on these ends, then, that the aim\u003cbr /\u003eof human acts and wishes is centred, and on others like to these–for\u003cbr /\u003einstance, noble birth and popularity, which seem to compass a certain\u003cbr /\u003erenown; wife and children, which are sought for the sweetness of their\u003cbr /\u003epossession; while as for friendship, the most sacred kind indeed is\u003cbr /\u003ecounted in the category of virtue, not of fortune; but other kinds are\u003cbr /\u003eentered upon for the sake of power or of enjoyment. And as for bodily\u003cbr /\u003eexcellences, it is obvious that they are to be ranged with the above.\u003cbr /\u003eFor strength and stature surely manifest power; beauty and fleetness of\u003cbr /\u003efoot bring celebrity; health brings pleasure. It is plain, then, that\u003cbr /\u003ethe only object sought for in all these ways is _happiness_. For that\u003cbr /\u003ewhich each seeks in preference to all else, that is in his judgment the\u003cbr /\u003esupreme good. And we have defined the supreme good to be happiness.\u003cbr /\u003eTherefore, that state which each wishes in preference to all others is\u003cbr /\u003ein his judgment happy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Thou hast, then, set before thine eyes something like a scheme of human\u003cbr /\u003ehappiness–wealth, rank, power, glory, pleasure. Now Epicurus, from a\u003cbr /\u003esole regard to these considerations, with some consistency concluded the\u003cbr /\u003ehighest good to be pleasure, because all the other objects seem to bring\u003cbr /\u003esome delight to the soul. But to return to human pursuits and aims:\u003cbr /\u003eman\u0026#39;s mind seeks to recover its proper good, in spite of the mistiness\u003cbr /\u003eof its recollection, but, like a drunken man, knows not by what path to\u003cbr /\u003ereturn home. Think you they are wrong who strive to escape want? Nay,\u003cbr /\u003etruly there is nothing which can so well complete happiness as a state\u003cbr /\u003eabounding in all good things, needing nothing from outside, but wholly\u003cbr /\u003eself-sufficing. Do they fall into error who deem that which is best to\u003cbr /\u003ebe also best deserving to receive the homage of reverence? Not at all.\u003cbr /\u003eThat cannot possibly be vile and contemptible, to attain which the\u003cbr /\u003eendeavours of nearly all mankind are directed. Then, is power not to be\u003cbr /\u003ereckoned in the category of good? Why, can that which is plainly more\u003cbr /\u003eefficacious than anything else be esteemed a thing feeble and void of\u003cbr /\u003estrength? Or is renown to be thought of no account? Nay, it cannot be\u003cbr /\u003eignored that the highest renown is constantly associated with the\u003cbr /\u003ehighest excellence. And what need is there to say that happiness is not\u003cbr /\u003ehaunted by care and gloom, nor exposed to trouble and vexation, since\u003cbr /\u003ethat is a condition we ask of the very least of things, from the\u003cbr /\u003epossession and enjoyment of which we expect delight? So, then, these are\u003cbr /\u003ethe blessings men wish to win; they want riches, rank, sovereignty,\u003cbr /\u003eglory, pleasure, because they believe that by these means they will\u003cbr /\u003esecure independence, reverence, power, renown, and joy of heart.\u003cbr /\u003eTherefore, it is _the good_ which men seek by such divers courses; and\u003cbr /\u003eherein is easily shown the might of Nature\u0026#39;s power, since, although\u003cbr /\u003eopinions are so various and discordant, yet they agree in cherishing\u003cbr /\u003e_good_ as the end.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG II.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTHE BENT OF NATURE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHow the might of Nature sways\u003cbr /\u003e All the world in ordered ways,\u003cbr /\u003e How resistless laws control\u003cbr /\u003e Each least portion of the whole–\u003cbr /\u003e Fain would I in sounding verse\u003cbr /\u003e On my pliant strings rehearse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLo, the lion captive ta\u0026#39;en\u003cbr /\u003e Meekly wears his gilded chain;\u003cbr /\u003e Yet though he by hand be fed,\u003cbr /\u003e Though a master\u0026#39;s whip he dread,\u003cbr /\u003e If but once the taste of gore\u003cbr /\u003e Whet his cruel lips once more,\u003cbr /\u003e Straight his slumbering fierceness wakes,\u003cbr /\u003e With one roar his bonds he breaks,\u003cbr /\u003e And first wreaks his vengeful force\u003cbr /\u003e On his trainer\u0026#39;s mangled corse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd the woodland songster, pent\u003cbr /\u003e In forlorn imprisonment,\u003cbr /\u003e Though a mistress\u0026#39; lavish care\u003cbr /\u003e Store of honeyed sweets prepare;\u003cbr /\u003e Yet, if in his narrow cage,\u003cbr /\u003e As he hops from bar to bar,\u003cbr /\u003e He should spy the woods afar,\u003cbr /\u003e Cool with sheltering foliage,\u003cbr /\u003e All these dainties he will spurn,\u003cbr /\u003e To the woods his heart will turn;\u003cbr /\u003e Only for the woods he longs,\u003cbr /\u003e Pipes the woods in all his songs.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo rude force the sapling bends,\u003cbr /\u003e While the hand its pressure lends;\u003cbr /\u003e If the hand its pressure slack,\u003cbr /\u003e Straight the supple wood springs back.\u003cbr /\u003e Phoebus in the western main\u003cbr /\u003e Sinks; but swift his car again\u003cbr /\u003e By a secret path is borne\u003cbr /\u003e To the wonted gates of morn.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus are all things seen to yearn\u003cbr /\u003e In due time for due return;\u003cbr /\u003e And no order fixed may stay,\u003cbr /\u003e Save which in th\u0026#39; appointed way\u003cbr /\u003e Joins the end to the beginning\u003cbr /\u003e In a steady cycle spinning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Ye, too, creatures of earth, have some glimmering of your origin,\u003cbr /\u003ehowever faint, and though in a vision dim and clouded, yet in some wise,\u003cbr /\u003enotwithstanding, ye discern the true end of happiness, and so the aim of\u003cbr /\u003enature leads you thither–to that true good–while error in many forms\u003cbr /\u003eleads you astray therefrom. For reflect whether men are able to win\u003cbr /\u003ehappiness by those means through which they think to reach the proposed\u003cbr /\u003eend. Truly, if either wealth, rank, or any of the rest, bring with them\u003cbr /\u003eanything of such sort as seems to have nothing wanting to it that is\u003cbr /\u003egood, we, too, acknowledge that some are made happy by the acquisition\u003cbr /\u003eof these things. But if they are not able to fulfil their promises, and,\u003cbr /\u003emoreover, lack many good things, is not the happiness men seek in them\u003cbr /\u003eclearly discovered to be a false show? Therefore do I first ask thee\u003cbr /\u003ethyself, who but lately wert living in affluence, amid all that\u003cbr /\u003eabundance of wealth, was thy mind never troubled in consequence of some\u003cbr /\u003ewrong done to thee?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Nay,\u0026#39; said I, \u0026#39;I cannot ever remember a time when my mind was so\u003cbr /\u003ecompletely at peace as not to feel the pang of some uneasiness.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Was it not because either something was absent which thou wouldst not\u003cbr /\u003ehave absent, or present which thou wouldst have away?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yes,\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, thou didst want the presence of the one, the absence of the\u003cbr /\u003eother?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Admitted.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;But a man lacks that of which he is in want?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;He does.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;And he who lacks something is not in all points self-sufficing?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;No; certainly not,\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;So wert thou, then, in the plenitude of thy wealth, supporting this\u003cbr /\u003einsufficiency?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;I must have been.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Wealth, then, cannot make its possessor independent and free from all\u003cbr /\u003ewant, yet this was what it seemed to promise. Moreover, I think this\u003cbr /\u003ealso well deserves to be considered–that there is nothing in the\u003cbr /\u003especial nature of money to hinder its being taken away from those who\u003cbr /\u003epossess it against their will.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;I admit it.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Why, of course, when every day the stronger wrests it from the weaker\u003cbr /\u003ewithout his consent. Else, whence come lawsuits, except in seeking to\u003cbr /\u003erecover moneys which have been taken away against their owner\u0026#39;s will by\u003cbr /\u003eforce or fraud?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;True,\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, everyone will need some extraneous means of protection to keep\u003cbr /\u003ehis money safe.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Who can venture to deny it?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yet he would not, unless he possessed the money which it is possible to\u003cbr /\u003elose.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;No; he certainly would not.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, we have worked round to an opposite conclusion: the wealth which\u003cbr /\u003ewas thought to make a man independent rather puts him in need of further\u003cbr /\u003eprotection. How in the world, then, can want be driven away by riches?\u003cbr /\u003eCannot the rich feel hunger? Cannot they thirst? Are not the limbs of\u003cbr /\u003ethe wealthy sensitive to the winter\u0026#39;s cold? \u0026quot;But,\u0026quot; thou wilt say, \u0026quot;the\u003cbr /\u003erich have the wherewithal to sate their hunger, the means to get rid of\u003cbr /\u003ethirst and cold.\u0026quot; True enough; want can thus be soothed by riches,\u003cbr /\u003ewholly removed it cannot be. For if this ever-gaping, ever-craving want\u003cbr /\u003eis glutted by wealth, it needs must be that the want itself which can be\u003cbr /\u003eso glutted still remains. I do not speak of how very little suffices for\u003cbr /\u003enature, and how for avarice nothing is enough. Wherefore, if wealth\u003cbr /\u003ecannot get rid of want, and makes new wants of its own, how can ye\u003cbr /\u003ebelieve that it bestows independence?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG III.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTHE INSATIABLENESS OF AVARICE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThough the covetous grown wealthy\u003cbr /\u003e See his piles of gold rise high;\u003cbr /\u003e Though he gather store of treasure\u003cbr /\u003e That can never satisfy;\u003cbr /\u003e Though with pearls his gorget blazes,\u003cbr /\u003e Rarest that the ocean yields;\u003cbr /\u003e Though a hundred head of oxen\u003cbr /\u003e Travail in his ample fields;\u003cbr /\u003e Ne\u0026#39;er shall carking care forsake him\u003cbr /\u003e While he draws this vital breath,\u003cbr /\u003e And his riches go not with him,\u003cbr /\u003e When his eyes are closed in death.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIV.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Well, but official dignity clothes him to whom it comes with honour and\u003cbr /\u003ereverence! Have, then, offices of state such power as to plant virtue in\u003cbr /\u003ethe minds of their possessors, and drive out vice? Nay, they are rather\u003cbr /\u003ewont to signalize iniquity than to chase it away, and hence arises our\u003cbr /\u003eindignation that honours so often fall to the most iniquitous of men.\u003cbr /\u003eAccordingly, Catullus calls Nonius an \u0026quot;ulcer-spot,\u0026quot; though \u0026quot;sitting in\u003cbr /\u003ethe curule chair.\u0026quot; Dost not see what infamy high position brings upon\u003cbr /\u003ethe bad? Surely their unworthiness will be less conspicuous if their\u003cbr /\u003erank does not draw upon them the public notice! In thy own case, wouldst\u003cbr /\u003ethou ever have been induced by all these perils to think of sharing\u003cbr /\u003eoffice with Decoratus, since thou hast discerned in him the spirit of a\u003cbr /\u003erascally parasite and informer? No; we cannot deem men worthy of\u003cbr /\u003ereverence on account of their office, whom we deem unworthy of the\u003cbr /\u003eoffice itself. But didst thou see a man endued with wisdom, couldst thou\u003cbr /\u003esuppose him not worthy of reverence, nor of that wisdom with which he\u003cbr /\u003ewas endued?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;No; certainly not.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;There is in Virtue a dignity of her own which she forthwith passes over\u003cbr /\u003eto those to whom she is united. And since public honours cannot do this,\u003cbr /\u003eit is clear that they do not possess the true beauty of dignity. And\u003cbr /\u003ehere this well deserves to be noticed–that if a man is the more scorned\u003cbr /\u003ein proportion as he is despised by a greater number, high position not\u003cbr /\u003eonly fails to win reverence for the wicked, but even loads them the more\u003cbr /\u003ewith contempt by drawing more attention to them. But not without\u003cbr /\u003eretribution; for the wicked pay back a return in kind to the dignities\u003cbr /\u003ethey put on by the pollution of their touch. Perhaps, too, another\u003cbr /\u003econsideration may teach thee to confess that true reverence cannot come\u003cbr /\u003ethrough these counterfeit dignities. It is this: If one who had been\u003cbr /\u003emany times consul chanced to visit barbaric lands, would his office win\u003cbr /\u003ehim the reverence of the barbarians? And yet if reverence were the\u003cbr /\u003enatural effect of dignities, they would not forego their proper function\u003cbr /\u003ein any part of the world, even as fire never anywhere fails to give\u003cbr /\u003eforth heat. But since this effect is not due to their own efficacy, but\u003cbr /\u003eis attached to them by the mistaken opinion of mankind, they disappear\u003cbr /\u003estraightway when they are set before those who do not esteem them\u003cbr /\u003edignities. Thus the case stands with foreign peoples. But does their\u003cbr /\u003erepute last for ever, even in the land of their origin? Why, the\u003cbr /\u003eprefecture, which was once a great power, is now an empty name–a burden\u003cbr /\u003emerely on the senator\u0026#39;s fortune; the commissioner of the public corn\u003cbr /\u003esupply was once a personage–now what is more contemptible than this\u003cbr /\u003eoffice? For, as we said just now, that which hath no true comeliness of\u003cbr /\u003eits own now receives, now loses, lustre at the caprice of those who have\u003cbr /\u003eto do with it. So, then, if dignities cannot win men reverence, if they\u003cbr /\u003eare actually sullied by the contamination of the wicked, if they lose\u003cbr /\u003etheir splendour through time\u0026#39;s changes, if they come into contempt\u003cbr /\u003emerely for lack of public estimation, what precious beauty have they in\u003cbr /\u003ethemselves, much less to give to others?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG IV.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eDISGRACE OF HONOURS CONFERRED BY A TYRANT.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThough royal purple soothes his pride,\u003cbr /\u003e And snowy pearls his neck adorn,\u003cbr /\u003e Nero in all his riot lives\u003cbr /\u003e The mark of universal scorn.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet he on reverend heads conferred\u003cbr /\u003e Th\u0026#39; inglorious honours of the state.\u003cbr /\u003e Shall we, then, deem them truly blessed\u003cbr /\u003e Whom such preferment hath made great?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eV.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Well, then, does sovereignty and the intimacy of kings prove able to\u003cbr /\u003econfer power? Why, surely does not the happiness of kings endure for\u003cbr /\u003eever? And yet antiquity is full of examples, and these days also, of\u003cbr /\u003ekings whose happiness has turned into calamity. How glorious a power,\u003cbr /\u003ewhich is not even found effectual for its own preservation! But if\u003cbr /\u003ehappiness has its source in sovereign power, is not happiness\u003cbr /\u003ediminished, and misery inflicted in its stead, in so far as that power\u003cbr /\u003efalls short of completeness? Yet, however widely human sovereignty be\u003cbr /\u003eextended, there must still be more peoples left, over whom each several\u003cbr /\u003eking holds no sway. Now, at whatever point the power on which happiness\u003cbr /\u003edepends ceases, here powerlessness steals in and makes wretchedness; so,\u003cbr /\u003eby this way of reckoning, there must needs be a balance of wretchedness\u003cbr /\u003ein the lot of the king. The tyrant who had made trial of the perils of\u003cbr /\u003ehis condition figured the fears that haunt a throne under the image of a\u003cbr /\u003esword hanging over a man\u0026#39;s head.[G] What sort of power, then, is this\u003cbr /\u003ewhich cannot drive away the gnawings of anxiety, or shun the stings of\u003cbr /\u003eterror? Fain would they themselves have lived secure, but they cannot;\u003cbr /\u003ethen they boast about their power! Dost thou count him to possess power\u003cbr /\u003ewhom thou seest to wish what he cannot bring to pass? Dost thou count\u003cbr /\u003ehim to possess power who encompasses himself with a body-guard, who\u003cbr /\u003efears those he terrifies more than they fear him, who, to keep up the\u003cbr /\u003esemblance of power, is himself at the mercy of his slaves? Need I say\u003cbr /\u003eanything of the friends of kings, when I show royal dominion itself so\u003cbr /\u003eutterly and miserably weak–why ofttimes the royal power in its\u003cbr /\u003eplenitude brings them low, ofttimes involves them in its fall? Nero\u003cbr /\u003edrove his friend and preceptor, Seneca, to the choice of the manner of\u003cbr /\u003ehis death. Antoninus exposed Papinianus, who was long powerful at\u003cbr /\u003ecourt, to the swords of the soldiery. Yet each of these was willing to\u003cbr /\u003erenounce his power. Seneca tried to surrender his wealth also to Nero,\u003cbr /\u003eand go into retirement; but neither achieved his purpose. When they\u003cbr /\u003etottered, their very greatness dragged them down. What manner of thing,\u003cbr /\u003ethen, is this power which keeps men in fear while they possess it–which\u003cbr /\u003ewhen thou art fain to keep, thou art not safe, and when thou desirest to\u003cbr /\u003elay it aside thou canst not rid thyself of? Are friends any protection\u003cbr /\u003ewho have been attached by fortune, not by virtue? Nay; him whom good\u003cbr /\u003efortune has made a friend, ill fortune will make an enemy. And what\u003cbr /\u003eplague is more effectual to do hurt than a foe of one\u0026#39;s own household?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e[G] The sword of Damocles.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG V.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSELF-MASTERY.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWho on power sets his aim,\u003cbr /\u003e First must his own spirit tame;\u003cbr /\u003e He must shun his neck to thrust\u003cbr /\u003e \u0026#39;Neath th\u0026#39; unholy yoke of lust.\u003cbr /\u003e For, though India\u0026#39;s far-off land\u003cbr /\u003e Bow before his wide command,\u003cbr /\u003e Utmost Thule homage pay–\u003cbr /\u003e If he cannot drive away\u003cbr /\u003e Haunting care and black distress,\u003cbr /\u003e In his power, he\u0026#39;s powerless.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVI.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Again, how misleading, how base, a thing ofttimes is glory! Well does\u003cbr /\u003ethe tragic poet exclaim:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;\u0026quot;Oh, fond Repute, how many a time and oft\u003cbr /\u003e Hast them raised high in pride the base-born churl!\u0026quot;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor many have won a great name through the mistaken beliefs of the\u003cbr /\u003emultitude–and what can be imagined more shameful than that? Nay, they\u003cbr /\u003ewho are praised falsely must needs themselves blush at their own\u003cbr /\u003epraises! And even when praise is won by merit, still, how does it add to\u003cbr /\u003ethe good conscience of the wise man who measures his good not by popular\u003cbr /\u003erepute, but by the truth of inner conviction? And if at all it does seem\u003cbr /\u003ea fair thing to get this same renown spread abroad, it follows that any\u003cbr /\u003efailure so to spread it is held foul. But if, as I set forth but now,\u003cbr /\u003ethere must needs be many tribes and peoples whom the fame of any single\u003cbr /\u003eman cannot reach, it follows that he whom thou esteemest glorious seems\u003cbr /\u003eall inglorious in a neighbouring quarter of the globe. As to popular\u003cbr /\u003efavour, I do not think it even worthy of mention in this place, since it\u003cbr /\u003enever cometh of judgment, and never lasteth steadily.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, again, who does not see how empty, how foolish, is the fame of\u003cbr /\u003enoble birth? Why, if the nobility is based on renown, the renown is\u003cbr /\u003eanother\u0026#39;s! For, truly, nobility seems to be a sort of reputation coming\u003cbr /\u003efrom the merits of ancestors. But if it is the praise which brings\u003cbr /\u003erenown, of necessity it is they who are praised that are famous.\u003cbr /\u003eWherefore, the fame of another clothes thee not with splendour if thou\u003cbr /\u003ehast none of thine own. So, if there is any excellence in nobility of\u003cbr /\u003ebirth, methinks it is this alone–that it would seem to impose upon the\u003cbr /\u003enobly born the obligation not to degenerate from the virtue of their\u003cbr /\u003eancestors.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG VI.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTRUE NOBILITY.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll men are of one kindred stock, though scattered far and wide;\u003cbr /\u003e For one is Father of us all–one doth for all provide.\u003cbr /\u003e He gave the sun his golden beams, the moon her silver horn;\u003cbr /\u003e He set mankind upon the earth, as stars the heavens adorn.\u003cbr /\u003e He shut a soul–a heaven-born soul–within the body\u0026#39;s frame;\u003cbr /\u003e The noble origin he gave each mortal wight may claim.\u003cbr /\u003e Why boast ye, then, so loud of race and high ancestral line?\u003cbr /\u003e If ye behold your being\u0026#39;s source, and God\u0026#39;s supreme design,\u003cbr /\u003e None is degenerate, none base, unless by taint of sin\u003cbr /\u003e And cherished vice he foully stain his heavenly origin.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, what shall I say of the pleasures of the body? The lust thereof\u003cbr /\u003eis full of uneasiness; the sating, of repentance. What sicknesses, what\u003cbr /\u003eintolerable pains, are they wont to bring on the bodies of those who\u003cbr /\u003eenjoy them–the fruits of iniquity, as it were! Now, what sweetness the\u003cbr /\u003estimulus of pleasure may have I do not know. But that the issues of\u003cbr /\u003epleasure are painful everyone may understand who chooses to recall the\u003cbr /\u003ememory of his own fleshly lusts. Nay, if these can make happiness, there\u003cbr /\u003eis no reason why the beasts also should not be happy, since all their\u003cbr /\u003eefforts are eagerly set upon satisfying the bodily wants. I know,\u003cbr /\u003eindeed, that the sweetness of wife and children should be right comely,\u003cbr /\u003eyet only too true to nature is what was said of one–that he found in\u003cbr /\u003ehis sons his tormentors. And how galling such a contingency would be, I\u003cbr /\u003emust needs put thee in mind, since thou hast never in any wise suffered\u003cbr /\u003esuch experiences, nor art thou now under any uneasiness. In such a case,\u003cbr /\u003eI agree with my servant Euripides, who said that a man without children\u003cbr /\u003ewas fortunate in his misfortune.\u0026#39;[H]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e[H] Paley translates the lines in Euripides\u0026#39; \u0026#39;Andromache\u0026#39;: \u0026#39;They [the\u003cbr /\u003echildless] are indeed spared from much pain and sorrow, but their\u003cbr /\u003esupposed happiness is after all but wretchedness.\u0026#39; Euripides\u0026#39; meaning is\u003cbr /\u003etherefore really just the reverse of that which Boethius makes it. See\u003cbr /\u003eEuripides, \u0026#39;Andromache,\u0026#39; Il. 418-420.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG VII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ePLEASURE\u0026#39;S STING.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is the way of Pleasure:\u003cbr /\u003e She stings them that despoil her;\u003cbr /\u003e And, like the wing\u0026#233;d toiler\u003cbr /\u003e Who\u0026#39;s lost her honeyed treasure,\u003cbr /\u003e She flies, but leaves her smart\u003cbr /\u003e Deep-rankling in the heart.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVIII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;It is beyond doubt, then, that these paths do not lead to happiness;\u003cbr /\u003ethey cannot guide anyone to the promised goal. Now, I will very briefly\u003cbr /\u003eshow what serious evils are involved in following them. Just consider.\u003cbr /\u003eIs it thy endeavour to heap up money? Why, thou must wrest it from its\u003cbr /\u003epresent possessor! Art thou minded to put on the splendour of official\u003cbr /\u003edignity? Thou must beg from those who have the giving of it; thou who\u003cbr /\u003ecovetest to outvie others in honour must lower thyself to the humble\u003cbr /\u003eposture of petition. Dost thou long for power? Thou must face perils,\u003cbr /\u003efor thou wilt be at the mercy of thy subjects\u0026#39; plots. Is glory thy aim?\u003cbr /\u003eThou art lured on through all manner of hardships, and there is an end\u003cbr /\u003eto thy peace of mind. Art fain to lead a life of pleasure? Yet who does\u003cbr /\u003enot scorn and contemn one who is the slave of the weakest and vilest of\u003cbr /\u003ethings–the body? Again, on how slight and perishable a possession do\u003cbr /\u003ethey rely who set before themselves bodily excellences! Can ye ever\u003cbr /\u003esurpass the elephant in bulk or the bull in strength? Can ye excel the\u003cbr /\u003etiger in swiftness? Look upon the infinitude, the solidity, the swift\u003cbr /\u003emotion, of the heavens, and for once cease to admire things mean and\u003cbr /\u003eworthless. And yet the heavens are not so much to be admired on this\u003cbr /\u003eaccount as for the reason which guides them. Then, how transient is the\u003cbr /\u003elustre of beauty! how soon gone!–more fleeting than the fading bloom of\u003cbr /\u003espring flowers. And yet if, as Aristotle says, men should see with the\u003cbr /\u003eeyes of Lynceus, so that their sight might pierce through obstructions,\u003cbr /\u003ewould not that body of Alcibiades, so gloriously fair in outward\u003cbr /\u003eseeming, appear altogether loathsome when all its inward parts lay open\u003cbr /\u003eto the view? Therefore, it is not thy own nature that makes thee seem\u003cbr /\u003ebeautiful, but the weakness of the eyes that see thee. Yet prize as\u003cbr /\u003eunduly as ye will that body\u0026#39;s excellences; so long as ye know that this\u003cbr /\u003ethat ye admire, whatever its worth, can be dissolved away by the feeble\u003cbr /\u003eflame of a three days\u0026#39; fever. From all which considerations we may\u003cbr /\u003econclude as a whole, that these things which cannot make good the\u003cbr /\u003eadvantages they promise, which are never made perfect by the assemblage\u003cbr /\u003eof all good things–these neither lead as by-ways to happiness, nor\u003cbr /\u003ethemselves make men completely happy.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG VIII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHUMAN FOLLY.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAlas! how wide astray\u003cbr /\u003e Doth Ignorance these wretched mortals lead\u003cbr /\u003e From Truth\u0026#39;s own way!\u003cbr /\u003e For not on leafy stems\u003cbr /\u003e Do ye within the green wood look for gold,\u003cbr /\u003e Nor strip the vine for gems;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eYour nets ye do not spread\u003cbr /\u003e Upon the hill-tops, that the groaning board\u003cbr /\u003e With fish be furnish\u0026#232;d;\u003cbr /\u003e If ye are fain to chase\u003cbr /\u003e The bounding goat, ye sweep not in vain search\u003cbr /\u003e The ocean\u0026#39;s ruffled face.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe sea\u0026#39;s far depths they know,\u003cbr /\u003e Each hidden nook, wherein the waves o\u0026#39;erwash\u003cbr /\u003e The pearl as white as snow;\u003cbr /\u003e Where lurks the Tyrian shell,\u003cbr /\u003e Where fish and prickly urchins do abound,\u003cbr /\u003e All this they know full well.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut not to know or care\u003cbr /\u003e Where hidden lies the good all hearts desire–\u003cbr /\u003e This blindness they can bear;\u003cbr /\u003e With gaze on earth low-bent,\u003cbr /\u003e They seek for that which reacheth far beyond\u003cbr /\u003e The starry firmament.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat curse shall I call down\u003cbr /\u003e On hearts so dull? May they the race still run\u003cbr /\u003e For wealth and high renown!\u003cbr /\u003e And when with much ado\u003cbr /\u003e The false good they have grasped–ah, then too late!–\u003cbr /\u003e May they discern the true!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIX.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;This much may well suffice to set forth the form of false happiness; if\u003cbr /\u003ethis is now clear to thine eyes, the next step is to show what true\u003cbr /\u003ehappiness is.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Indeed,\u0026#39; said I, \u0026#39;I see clearly enough that neither is independence to\u003cbr /\u003ebe found in wealth, nor power in sovereignty, nor reverence in\u003cbr /\u003edignities, nor fame in glory, nor true joy in pleasures.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Hast thou discerned also the causes why this is so?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;I seem to have some inkling, but I should like to learn more at large\u003cbr /\u003efrom thee.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Why, truly the reason is hard at hand. _That which is simple and\u003cbr /\u003eindivisible by nature human error separates_, and transforms from the\u003cbr /\u003etrue and perfect to the false and imperfect. Dost thou imagine that\u003cbr /\u003ewhich lacketh nothing can want power?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Certainly not.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Right; for if there is any feebleness of strength in anything, in this\u003cbr /\u003ethere must necessarily be need of external protection.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;That is so.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Accordingly, the nature of independence and power is one and the same.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;It seems so.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Well, but dost think that anything of such a nature as this can be\u003cbr /\u003elooked upon with contempt, or is it rather of all things most worthy of\u003cbr /\u003eveneration?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Nay; there can be no doubt as to that.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Let us, then, add reverence to independence and power, and conclude\u003cbr /\u003ethese three to be one.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;We must if we will acknowledge the truth.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Thinkest thou, then, this combination of qualities to be obscure and\u003cbr /\u003ewithout distinction, or rather famous in all renown? Just consider: can\u003cbr /\u003ethat want renown which has been agreed to be lacking in nothing, to be\u003cbr /\u003esupreme in power, and right worthy of honour, for the reason that it\u003cbr /\u003ecannot bestow this upon itself, and so comes to appear somewhat poor in\u003cbr /\u003eesteem?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;I cannot but acknowledge that, being what it is, this union of\u003cbr /\u003equalities is also right famous.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;It follows, then, that we must admit that renown is not different from\u003cbr /\u003ethe other three.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;It does,\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;That, then, which needs nothing outside itself, which can accomplish\u003cbr /\u003eall things in its own strength, which enjoys fame and compels reverence,\u003cbr /\u003emust not this evidently be also fully crowned with joy?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;In sooth, I cannot conceive,\u0026#39; said I, \u0026#39;how any sadness can find\u003cbr /\u003eentrance into such a state; wherefore I must needs acknowledge it full\u003cbr /\u003eof joy–at least, if our former conclusions are to hold.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, for the same reasons, this also is necessary–that independence,\u003cbr /\u003epower, renown, reverence, and sweetness of delight, are different only\u003cbr /\u003ein name, but in substance differ no wise one from the other.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;It is,\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;This, then, which is one, and simple by nature, human perversity\u003cbr /\u003eseparates, and, in trying to win a part of that which has no parts,\u003cbr /\u003efails to attain not only that portion (since there are no portions), but\u003cbr /\u003ealso the whole, to which it does not dream of aspiring.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;How so?\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;He who, to escape want, seeks riches, gives himself no concern about\u003cbr /\u003epower; he prefers a mean and low estate, and also denies himself many\u003cbr /\u003epleasures dear to nature to avoid losing the money which he has gained.\u003cbr /\u003eBut at this rate he does not even attain to independence–a weakling\u003cbr /\u003evoid of strength, vexed by distresses, mean and despised, and buried in\u003cbr /\u003eobscurity. He, again, who thirsts alone for power squanders his wealth,\u003cbr /\u003edespises pleasure, and thinks fame and rank alike worthless without\u003cbr /\u003epower. But thou seest in how many ways his state also is defective.\u003cbr /\u003eSometimes it happens that he lacks necessaries, that he is gnawed by\u003cbr /\u003eanxieties, and, since he cannot rid himself of these inconveniences,\u003cbr /\u003eeven ceases to have that power which was his whole end and aim. In like\u003cbr /\u003emanner may we cast up the reckoning in case of rank, of glory, or of\u003cbr /\u003epleasure. For since each one of these severally is identical with the\u003cbr /\u003erest, whosoever seeks any one of them without the others does not even\u003cbr /\u003elay hold of that one which he makes his aim.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Well,\u0026#39; said I, \u0026#39;what then?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Suppose anyone desire to obtain them together, he does indeed wish for\u003cbr /\u003ehappiness as a whole; but will he find it in these things which, as we\u003cbr /\u003ehave proved, are unable to bestow what they promise?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Nay; by no means,\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, happiness must certainly not be sought in these things which\u003cbr /\u003eseverally are believed to afford some one of the blessings most to be\u003cbr /\u003edesired.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;They must not, I admit. No conclusion could be more true.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;So, then, the form and the causes of false happiness are set before\u003cbr /\u003ethine eyes. Now turn thy gaze to the other side; there thou wilt\u003cbr /\u003estraightway see the true happiness I promised.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yea, indeed, \u0026#39;tis plain to the blind.\u0026#39; said I. \u0026#39;Thou didst point it out\u003cbr /\u003eeven now in seeking to unfold the causes of the false. For, unless I am\u003cbr /\u003emistaken, that is true and perfect happiness which crowns one with the\u003cbr /\u003eunion of independence, power, reverence, renown, and joy. And to prove\u003cbr /\u003eto thee with how deep an insight I have listened–since all these are\u003cbr /\u003ethe same–that which can truly bestow one of them I know to be without\u003cbr /\u003edoubt full and complete happiness.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Happy art thou, my scholar, in this thy conviction; only one thing\u003cbr /\u003eshouldst thou add.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;What is that?\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Is there aught, thinkest thou, amid these mortal and perishable things\u003cbr /\u003ewhich can produce a state such as this?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Nay, surely not; and this thou hast so amply demonstrated that no word\u003cbr /\u003emore is needed.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Well, then, these things seem to give to mortals shadows of the true\u003cbr /\u003egood, or some kind of imperfect good; but the true and perfect good they\u003cbr /\u003ecannot bestow.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Even so,\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Since, then, thou hast learnt what that true happiness is, and what men\u003cbr /\u003efalsely call happiness, it now remains that thou shouldst learn from\u003cbr /\u003ewhat source to seek this.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yes; to this I have long been eagerly looking forward.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Well, since, as Plato maintains in the \u0026quot;Tim\u0026#230;us,\u0026quot; we ought even in the\u003cbr /\u003emost trivial matters to implore the Divine protection, what thinkest\u003cbr /\u003ethou should we now do in order to deserve to find the seat of that\u003cbr /\u003ehighest good?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;We must invoke the Father of all things,\u0026#39; said I; \u0026#39;for without this no\u003cbr /\u003eenterprise sets out from a right beginning.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Thou sayest well,\u0026#39; said she; and forthwith lifted up her voice and\u003cbr /\u003esang:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG IX.[I]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eINVOCATION.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMaker of earth and sky, from age to age\u003cbr /\u003e Who rul\u0026#39;st the world by reason; at whose word\u003cbr /\u003e Time issues from Eternity\u0026#39;s abyss:\u003cbr /\u003e To all that moves the source of movement, fixed\u003cbr /\u003e Thyself and moveless. Thee no cause impelled\u003cbr /\u003e Extrinsic this proportioned frame to shape\u003cbr /\u003e From shapeless matter; but, deep-set within\u003cbr /\u003e Thy inmost being, the form of perfect good,\u003cbr /\u003e From envy free; and Thou didst mould the whole\u003cbr /\u003e To that supernal pattern. Beauteous\u003cbr /\u003e The world in Thee thus imaged, being Thyself\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMost beautiful. So Thou the work didst fashion\u003cbr /\u003e In that fair likeness, bidding it put on\u003cbr /\u003e Perfection through the exquisite perfectness\u003cbr /\u003e Of every part\u0026#39;s contrivance. Thou dost bind\u003cbr /\u003e The elements in balanced harmony,\u003cbr /\u003e So that the hot and cold, the moist and dry,\u003cbr /\u003e Contend not; nor the pure fire leaping up\u003cbr /\u003e Escape, or weight of waters whelm the earth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThou joinest and diffusest through the whole,\u003cbr /\u003e Linking accordantly its several parts,\u003cbr /\u003e A soul of threefold nature, moving all.\u003cbr /\u003e This, cleft in twain, and in two circles gathered,\u003cbr /\u003e Speeds in a path that on itself returns,\u003cbr /\u003e Encompassing mind\u0026#39;s limits, and conforms\u003cbr /\u003e The heavens to her true semblance. Lesser souls\u003cbr /\u003e And lesser lives by a like ordinance\u003cbr /\u003e Thou sendest forth, each to its starry car\u003cbr /\u003e Affixing, and dost strew them far and wide\u003cbr /\u003e O\u0026#39;er earth and heaven. These by a law benign\u003cbr /\u003e Thou biddest turn again, and render back\u003cbr /\u003e To thee their fires. Oh, grant, almighty Father,\u003cbr /\u003e Grant us on reason\u0026#39;s wing to soar aloft\u003cbr /\u003e To heaven\u0026#39;s exalted height; grant us to see\u003cbr /\u003e The fount of good; grant us, the true light found,\u003cbr /\u003e To fix our steadfast eyes in vision clear\u003cbr /\u003e On Thee. Disperse the heavy mists of earth,\u003cbr /\u003e And shine in Thine own splendour. For Thou art\u003cbr /\u003e The true serenity and perfect rest\u003cbr /\u003e Of every pious soul–to see Thy face,\u003cbr /\u003e The end and the beginning–One the guide,\u003cbr /\u003e The traveller, the pathway, and the goal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e[I] The substance of this poem is taken from Plato\u0026#39;s \u0026#39;Tim\u0026#230;us,\u0026#39; 29-42.\u003cbr /\u003eSee Jowett, vol. iii., pp. 448-462 (third edition).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eX.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Since now thou hast seen what is the form of the imperfect good, and\u003cbr /\u003ewhat the form of the perfect also, methinks I should next show in what\u003cbr /\u003emanner this perfection of felicity is built up. And here I conceive it\u003cbr /\u003eproper to inquire, first, whether any excellence, such as thou hast\u003cbr /\u003elately defined, can exist in the nature of things, lest we be deceived\u003cbr /\u003eby an empty fiction of thought to which no true reality answers. But it\u003cbr /\u003ecannot be denied that such does exist, and is, as it were, the source of\u003cbr /\u003eall things good. For everything which is called imperfect is spoken of\u003cbr /\u003eas imperfect by reason of the privation of some perfection; so it comes\u003cbr /\u003eto pass that, whenever imperfection is found in any particular, there\u003cbr /\u003emust necessarily be a perfection in respect of that particular also. For\u003cbr /\u003ewere there no such perfection, it is utterly inconceivable how that\u003cbr /\u003eso-called _im_perfection should come into existence. Nature does not\u003cbr /\u003emake a beginning with things mutilated and imperfect; she starts with\u003cbr /\u003ewhat is whole and perfect, and falls away later to these feeble and\u003cbr /\u003einferior productions. So if there is, as we showed before, a happiness\u003cbr /\u003eof a frail and imperfect kind, it cannot be doubted but there is also a\u003cbr /\u003ehappiness substantial and perfect.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Most true is thy conclusion, and most sure,\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Next to consider where the dwelling-place of this happiness may be. The\u003cbr /\u003ecommon belief of all mankind agrees that God, the supreme of all things,\u003cbr /\u003eis good. For since nothing can be imagined better than God, how can we\u003cbr /\u003edoubt Him to be good than whom there is nothing better? Now, reason\u003cbr /\u003eshows God to be good in such wise as to prove that in Him is perfect\u003cbr /\u003egood. For were it not so, He would not be supreme of all things; for\u003cbr /\u003ethere would be something else more excellent, possessed of perfect good,\u003cbr /\u003ewhich would seem to have the advantage in priority and dignity, since it\u003cbr /\u003ehas clearly appeared that all perfect things are prior to those less\u003cbr /\u003ecomplete. Wherefore, lest we fall into an infinite regression, we must\u003cbr /\u003eacknowledge the supreme God to be full of supreme and perfect good. But\u003cbr /\u003ewe have determined that true happiness is the perfect good; therefore\u003cbr /\u003etrue happiness must dwell in the supreme Deity.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;I accept thy reasonings,\u0026#39; said I; \u0026#39;they cannot in any wise be\u003cbr /\u003edisputed.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;But, come, see how strictly and incontrovertibly thou mayst prove this\u003cbr /\u003eour assertion that the supreme Godhead hath fullest possession of the\u003cbr /\u003ehighest good.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;In what way, pray?\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Do not rashly suppose that He who is the Father of all things hath\u003cbr /\u003ereceived that highest good of which He is said to be possessed either\u003cbr /\u003efrom some external source, or hath it as a natural endowment in such\u003cbr /\u003esort that thou mightest consider the essence of the happiness possessed,\u003cbr /\u003eand of the God who possesses it, distinct and different. For if thou\u003cbr /\u003edeemest it received from without, thou mayst esteem that which gives\u003cbr /\u003emore excellent than that which has received. But Him we most worthily\u003cbr /\u003eacknowledge to be the most supremely excellent of all things. If,\u003cbr /\u003ehowever, it is in Him by nature, yet is logically distinct, the thought\u003cbr /\u003eis inconceivable, since we are speaking of God, who is supreme of all\u003cbr /\u003ethings. Who was there to join these distinct essences? Finally, when one\u003cbr /\u003ething is different from another, the things so conceived as distinct\u003cbr /\u003ecannot be identical. Therefore that which of its own nature is distinct\u003cbr /\u003efrom the highest good is not itself the highest good–an impious thought\u003cbr /\u003eof Him than whom, \u0026#39;tis plain, nothing can be more excellent. For\u003cbr /\u003euniversally nothing can be better in nature than the source from which\u003cbr /\u003eit has come; therefore on most true grounds of reason would I conclude\u003cbr /\u003ethat which is the source of all things to be in its own essence the\u003cbr /\u003ehighest good.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;And most justly,\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;But the highest good has been admitted to be happiness.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yes.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then,\u0026#39; said she, \u0026#39;it is necessary to acknowledge that God is very\u003cbr /\u003ehappiness.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yes,\u0026#39; said I; \u0026#39;I cannot gainsay my former admissions, and I see clearly\u003cbr /\u003ethat this is a necessary inference therefrom.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Reflect, also,\u0026#39; said she, \u0026#39;whether the same conclusion is not further\u003cbr /\u003econfirmed by considering that there cannot be two supreme goods distinct\u003cbr /\u003eone from the other. For the goods which are different clearly cannot be\u003cbr /\u003eseverally each what the other is: wherefore neither of the two can be\u003cbr /\u003eperfect, since to either the other is wanting; but since it is not\u003cbr /\u003eperfect, it cannot manifestly be the supreme good. By no means, then,\u003cbr /\u003ecan goods which are supreme be different one from the other. But we have\u003cbr /\u003econcluded that both happiness and God are the supreme good; wherefore\u003cbr /\u003ethat which is highest Divinity must also itself necessarily be supreme\u003cbr /\u003ehappiness.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;No conclusion,\u0026#39; said I, \u0026#39;could be truer to fact, nor more soundly\u003cbr /\u003ereasoned out, nor more worthy of God.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, further,\u0026#39; said she, \u0026#39;just as geometricians are wont to draw\u003cbr /\u003einferences from their demonstrations to which they give the name\u003cbr /\u003e\u0026quot;deductions,\u0026quot; so will I add here a sort of corollary. For since men\u003cbr /\u003ebecome happy by the acquisition of happiness, while happiness is very\u003cbr /\u003eGodship, it is manifest that they become happy by the acquisition of\u003cbr /\u003eGodship. But as by the acquisition of justice men become just, and wise\u003cbr /\u003eby the acquisition of wisdom, so by parity of reasoning by acquiring\u003cbr /\u003eGodship they must of necessity become gods. So every man who is happy is\u003cbr /\u003ea god; and though in nature God is One only, yet there is nothing to\u003cbr /\u003ehinder that very many should be gods by participation in that nature.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;A fair conclusion, and a precious,\u0026#39; said I, \u0026#39;deduction or corollary, by\u003cbr /\u003ewhichever name thou wilt call it.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;And yet,\u0026#39; said she, \u0026#39;not one whit fairer than this which reason\u003cbr /\u003epersuades us to add.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Why, what?\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Why, seeing happiness has many particulars included under it, should\u003cbr /\u003eall these be regarded as forming one body of happiness, as it were, made\u003cbr /\u003eup of various parts, or is there some one of them which forms the full\u003cbr /\u003eessence of happiness, while all the rest are relative to this?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;I would thou wouldst unfold the whole matter to me at large.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;We judge happiness to be good, do we not?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yea, the supreme good.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;And this superlative applies to all; for this same happiness is\u003cbr /\u003eadjudged to be the completest independence, the highest power,\u003cbr /\u003ereverence, renown, and pleasure.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;What then?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Are all these goods–independence, power, and the rest–to be deemed\u003cbr /\u003emembers of happiness, as it were, or are they all relative to good as to\u003cbr /\u003etheir summit and crown?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;I understand the problem, but I desire to hear how thou wouldst solve\u003cbr /\u003eit.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Well, then, listen to the determination of the matter. Were all these\u003cbr /\u003emembers composing happiness, they would differ severally one from the\u003cbr /\u003eother. For this is the nature of parts–that by their difference they\u003cbr /\u003ecompose one body. All these, however, have been proved to be the same;\u003cbr /\u003etherefore they cannot possibly be members, otherwise happiness will seem\u003cbr /\u003eto be built up out of one member, which cannot be.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;There can be no doubt as to that,\u0026#39; said I; \u0026#39;but I am impatient to hear\u003cbr /\u003ewhat remains.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Why, it is manifest that all the others are relative to the good. For\u003cbr /\u003ethe very reason why independence is sought is that it is judged good,\u003cbr /\u003eand so power also, because it is believed to be good. The same, too, may\u003cbr /\u003ebe supposed of reverence, of renown, and of pleasant delight. Good,\u003cbr /\u003ethen, is the sum and source of all desirable things. That which has not\u003cbr /\u003ein itself any good, either in reality or in semblance, can in no wise be\u003cbr /\u003edesired. Contrariwise, even things which by nature are not good are\u003cbr /\u003edesired as if they were truly good, if they seem to be so. Whereby it\u003cbr /\u003ecomes to pass that goodness is rightly believed to be the sum and hinge\u003cbr /\u003eand cause of all things desirable. Now, that for the sake of which\u003cbr /\u003eanything is desired itself seems to be most wished for. For instance, if\u003cbr /\u003eanyone wishes to ride for the sake of health, he does not so much wish\u003cbr /\u003efor the exercise of riding as the benefit of his health. Since, then,\u003cbr /\u003eall things are sought for the sake of the good, it is not these so much\u003cbr /\u003eas good itself that is sought by all. But that on account of which all\u003cbr /\u003eother things are wished for was, we agreed, happiness; wherefore thus\u003cbr /\u003ealso it appears that it is happiness alone which is sought. From all\u003cbr /\u003ewhich it is transparently clear that the essence of absolute good and of\u003cbr /\u003ehappiness is one and the same.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;I cannot see how anyone can dissent from these conclusions.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;But we have also proved that God and true happiness are one and the\u003cbr /\u003esame.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yes,\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then we can safely conclude, also, that God\u0026#39;s essence is seated in\u003cbr /\u003eabsolute good, and nowhere else.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG X.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTHE TRUE LIGHT.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHither come, all ye whose minds\u003cbr /\u003e Lust with rosy fetters binds–\u003cbr /\u003e Lust to bondage hard compelling\u003cbr /\u003e Th\u0026#39; earthy souls that are his dwelling–\u003cbr /\u003e Here shall be your labour\u0026#39;s close;\u003cbr /\u003e Here your haven of repose.\u003cbr /\u003e Come, to your one refuge press;\u003cbr /\u003e Wide it stands to all distress!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNot the glint of yellow gold\u003cbr /\u003e Down bright Hermus\u0026#39; current rolled;\u003cbr /\u003e Not the Tagus\u0026#39; precious sands,\u003cbr /\u003e Nor in far-off scorching lands\u003cbr /\u003e All the radiant gems that hide\u003cbr /\u003e Under Indus\u0026#39; storied tide–\u003cbr /\u003e Emerald green and glistering white–\u003cbr /\u003e Can illume our feeble sight;\u003cbr /\u003e But they rather leave the mind\u003cbr /\u003e In its native darkness blind.\u003cbr /\u003e For the fairest beams they shed\u003cbr /\u003e In earth\u0026#39;s lowest depths were fed;\u003cbr /\u003e But the splendour that supplies\u003cbr /\u003e Strength and vigour to the skies,\u003cbr /\u003e And the universe controls,\u003cbr /\u003e Shunneth dark and ruined souls.\u003cbr /\u003e He who once hath seen _this_ light\u003cbr /\u003e Will not call the sunbeam bright.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXI.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;I quite agree,\u0026#39; said I, \u0026#39;truly all thy reasonings hold admirably\u003cbr /\u003etogether.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen said she: \u0026#39;What value wouldst thou put upon the boon shouldst thou\u003cbr /\u003ecome to the knowledge of the absolute good?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Oh, an infinite,\u0026#39; said I, \u0026#39;if only I were so blest as to learn to know\u003cbr /\u003eGod also who is the good.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yet this will I make clear to thee on truest grounds of reason, if only\u003cbr /\u003eour recent conclusions stand fast.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;They will.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Have we not shown that those things which most men desire are not true\u003cbr /\u003eand perfect good precisely for this cause–that they differ severally\u003cbr /\u003eone from another, and, seeing that one is wanting to another, they\u003cbr /\u003ecannot bestow full and absolute good; but that they become the true good\u003cbr /\u003ewhen they are gathered, as it were, into one form and agency, so that\u003cbr /\u003ethat which is independence is likewise power, reverence, renown, and\u003cbr /\u003epleasant delight, and unless they are all one and the same, they have no\u003cbr /\u003eclaim to be counted among things desirable?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yes; this was clearly proved, and cannot in any wise be doubted.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Now, when things are far from being good while they are different, but\u003cbr /\u003ebecome good as soon as they are one, is it not true that these become\u003cbr /\u003egood by acquiring unity?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;It seems so,\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;But dost not thou allow that all which is good is good by participation\u003cbr /\u003ein goodness?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;It is.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, thou must on similar grounds admit that unity and goodness are\u003cbr /\u003ethe same; for when the effects of things in their natural working differ\u003cbr /\u003enot, their essence is one and the same.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;There is no denying it.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Now, dost thou know,\u0026#39; said she, \u0026#39;that all which is abides and subsists\u003cbr /\u003eso long as it continues one, but so soon as it ceases to be one it\u003cbr /\u003eperishes and falls to pieces?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;In what way?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Why, take animals, for example. When soul and body come together, and\u003cbr /\u003econtinue in one, this is, we say, a living creature; but when this unity\u003cbr /\u003eis broken by the separation of these two, the creature dies, and is\u003cbr /\u003eclearly no longer living. The body also, while it remains in one form by\u003cbr /\u003ethe joining together of its members, presents a human appearance; but if\u003cbr /\u003ethe separation and dispersal of the parts break up the body\u0026#39;s unity, it\u003cbr /\u003eceases to be what it was. And if we extend our survey to all other\u003cbr /\u003ethings, without doubt it will manifestly appear that each several thing\u003cbr /\u003esubsists while it is one, but when it ceases to be one perishes.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yes; when I consider further, I see it to be even as thou sayest.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Well, is there aught,\u0026#39; said she, \u0026#39;which, in so far as it acts\u003cbr /\u003econformably to nature, abandons the wish for life, and desires to come\u003cbr /\u003eto death and corruption?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Looking to living creatures, which have some faults of choice, I find\u003cbr /\u003enone that, without external compulsion, forego the will to live, and of\u003cbr /\u003etheir own accord hasten to destruction. For every creature diligently\u003cbr /\u003epursues the end of self-preservation, and shuns death and destruction!\u003cbr /\u003eAs to herbs and trees, and inanimate things generally, I am altogether\u003cbr /\u003ein doubt what to think.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;And yet there is no possibility of question about this either, since\u003cbr /\u003ethou seest how herbs and trees grow in places suitable for them, where,\u003cbr /\u003eas far as their nature admits, they cannot quickly wither and die. Some\u003cbr /\u003espring up in the plains, others in the mountains; some grow in marshes,\u003cbr /\u003eothers cling to rocks; and others, again, find a fertile soil in the\u003cbr /\u003ebarren sands; and if you try to transplant these elsewhere, they wither\u003cbr /\u003eaway. Nature gives to each the soil that suits it, and uses her\u003cbr /\u003ediligence to prevent any of them dying, so long as it is possible for\u003cbr /\u003ethem to continue alive. Why do they all draw their nourishment from\u003cbr /\u003eroots as from a mouth dipped into the earth, and distribute the strong\u003cbr /\u003ebark over the pith? Why are all the softer parts like the pith deeply\u003cbr /\u003eencased within, while the external parts have the strong texture of\u003cbr /\u003ewood, and outside of all is the bark to resist the weather\u0026#39;s\u003cbr /\u003einclemency, like a champion stout in endurance? Again, how great is\u003cbr /\u003enature\u0026#39;s diligence to secure universal propagation by multiplying seed!\u003cbr /\u003eWho does not know all these to be contrivances, not only for the present\u003cbr /\u003emaintenance of a species, but for its lasting continuance, generation\u003cbr /\u003eafter generation, for ever? And do not also the things believed\u003cbr /\u003einanimate on like grounds of reason seek each what is proper to itself?\u003cbr /\u003eWhy do the flames shoot lightly upward, while the earth presses downward\u003cbr /\u003ewith its weight, if it is not that these motions and situations are\u003cbr /\u003esuitable to their respective natures? Moreover, each several thing is\u003cbr /\u003epreserved by that which is agreeable to its nature, even as it is\u003cbr /\u003edestroyed by things inimical. Things solid like stones resist\u003cbr /\u003edisintegration by the close adhesion of their parts. Things fluid like\u003cbr /\u003eair and water yield easily to what divides them, but swiftly flow back\u003cbr /\u003eand mingle with those parts from which they have been severed, while\u003cbr /\u003efire, again, refuses to be cut at all. And we are not now treating of\u003cbr /\u003ethe voluntary motions of an intelligent soul, but of the drift of\u003cbr /\u003enature. Even so is it that we digest our food without thinking about it,\u003cbr /\u003eand draw our breath unconsciously in sleep; nay, even in living\u003cbr /\u003ecreatures the love of life cometh not of conscious will, but from the\u003cbr /\u003eprinciples of nature. For oftentimes in the stress of circumstances will\u003cbr /\u003echooses the death which nature shrinks from; and contrarily, in spite of\u003cbr /\u003enatural appetite, will restrains that work of reproduction by which\u003cbr /\u003ealone the persistence of perishable creatures is maintained. So entirely\u003cbr /\u003edoes this love of self come from drift of nature, not from animal\u003cbr /\u003eimpulse. Providence has furnished things with this most cogent reason\u003cbr /\u003efor continuance: they must desire life, so long as it is naturally\u003cbr /\u003epossible for them to continue living. Wherefore in no way mayst thou\u003cbr /\u003edoubt but that things naturally aim at continuance of existence, and\u003cbr /\u003eshun destruction.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;I confess,\u0026#39; said I, \u0026#39;that what I lately thought uncertain, I now\u003cbr /\u003eperceive to be indubitably clear.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Now, that which seeks to subsist and continue desires to be one; for if\u003cbr /\u003eits oneness be gone, its very existence cannot continue.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;True,\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;All things, then, desire to be one.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;I agree.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;But we have proved that one is the very same thing as good.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;We have.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;All things, then, seek the good; indeed, you may express the fact by\u003cbr /\u003edefining good as that which all desire.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Nothing could be more truly thought out. Either there is no single end\u003cbr /\u003eto which all things are relative, or else the end to which all things\u003cbr /\u003euniversally hasten must be the highest good of all.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen she: \u0026#39;Exceedingly do I rejoice, dear pupil; thine eye is now fixed\u003cbr /\u003eon the very central mark of truth. Moreover, herein is revealed that of\u003cbr /\u003ewhich thou didst erstwhile profess thyself ignorant.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;What is that?\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;The end and aim of the whole universe. Surely it is that which is\u003cbr /\u003edesired of all; and, since we have concluded the good to be such, we\u003cbr /\u003eought to acknowledge the end and aim of the whole universe to be \u0026quot;the\u003cbr /\u003egood.\u0026quot;\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG XI.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eREMINISCENCE.[J]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWho truth pursues, who from false ways\u003cbr /\u003e His heedful steps would keep,\u003cbr /\u003e By inward light must search within\u003cbr /\u003e In meditation deep;\u003cbr /\u003e All outward bent he must repress\u003cbr /\u003e His soul\u0026#39;s true treasure to possess.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen all that error\u0026#39;s mists obscured\u003cbr /\u003e Shall shine more clear than light,\u003cbr /\u003e This fleshly frame\u0026#39;s oblivious weight\u003cbr /\u003e Hath quenched not reason quite;\u003cbr /\u003e The germs of truth still lie within,\u003cbr /\u003e Whence we by learning all may win.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eElse how could ye the answer due\u003cbr /\u003e Untaught to questions give,\u003cbr /\u003e Were\u0026#39;t not that deep within the soul\u003cbr /\u003e Truth\u0026#39;s secret sparks do live?\u003cbr /\u003e If Plato\u0026#39;s teaching erreth not,\u003cbr /\u003e We learn but that we have forgot.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e[J] The doctrine of Reminiscence–_i.e._, that all learning is really\u003cbr /\u003erecollection–is set forth at length by Plato in the \u0026#39;Meno,\u0026#39; 81-86, and\u003cbr /\u003ethe \u0026#39;Ph\u0026#230;do,\u0026#39; 72-76. See Jowett, vol. ii., pp. 40-47 and 213-218.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen said I: \u0026#39;With all my heart I agree with Plato; indeed, this is now\u003cbr /\u003ethe second time that these things have been brought back to my\u003cbr /\u003emind–first I lost them through the clogging contact of the body; then\u003cbr /\u003eafter through the stress of heavy grief.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen she continued: \u0026#39;If thou wilt reflect upon thy former admissions, it\u003cbr /\u003ewill not be long before thou dost also recollect that of which erstwhile\u003cbr /\u003ethou didst confess thyself ignorant.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;What is that?\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;The principles of the world\u0026#39;s government,\u0026#39; said she.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yes; I remember my confession, and, although I now anticipate what thou\u003cbr /\u003eintendest, I have a desire to hear the argument plainly set forth.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Awhile ago thou deemedst it beyond all doubt that God doth govern the\u003cbr /\u003eworld.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;I do not think it doubtful now, nor shall I ever; and by what reasons\u003cbr /\u003eI am brought to this assurance I will briefly set forth. This world\u003cbr /\u003ecould never have taken shape as a single system out of parts so diverse\u003cbr /\u003eand opposite were it not that there is One who joins together these so\u003cbr /\u003ediverse things. And when it had once come together, the very diversity\u003cbr /\u003eof natures would have dissevered it and torn it asunder in universal\u003cbr /\u003ediscord were there not One who keeps together what He has joined. Nor\u003cbr /\u003ewould the order of nature proceed so regularly, nor could its course\u003cbr /\u003eexhibit motions so fixed in respect of position, time, range, efficacy,\u003cbr /\u003eand character, unless there were One who, Himself abiding, disposed\u003cbr /\u003ethese various vicissitudes of change. This power, whatsoever it be,\u003cbr /\u003ewhereby they remain as they were created, and are kept in motion, I call\u003cbr /\u003eby the name which all recognise–God.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen said she: \u0026#39;Seeing that such is thy belief, it will cost me little\u003cbr /\u003etrouble, I think, to enable thee to win happiness, and return in safety\u003cbr /\u003eto thy own country. But let us give our attention to the task that we\u003cbr /\u003ehave set before ourselves. Have we not counted independence in the\u003cbr /\u003ecategory of happiness, and agreed that God is absolute happiness?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Truly, we have.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, He will need no external assistance for the ruling of the world.\u003cbr /\u003eOtherwise, if He stands in need of aught, He will not possess complete\u003cbr /\u003eindependence.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;That is necessarily so,\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, by His own power alone He disposes all things.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;It cannot be denied.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Now, God was proved to be absolute good.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yes; I remember.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, He disposes all things by the agency of good, if it be true that\u003cbr /\u003e_He_ rules all things by His own power whom we have agreed to be good;\u003cbr /\u003eand He is, as it were, the rudder and helm by which the world\u0026#39;s\u003cbr /\u003emechanism is kept steady and in order.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Heartily do I agree; and, indeed, I anticipated what thou wouldst say,\u003cbr /\u003ethough it may be in feeble surmise only.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;I well believe it,\u0026#39; said she; \u0026#39;for, as I think, thou now bringest to\u003cbr /\u003ethe search eyes quicker in discerning truth; but what I shall say next\u003cbr /\u003eis no less plain and easy to see.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;What is it?\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Why,\u0026#39; said she, \u0026#39;since God is rightly believed to govern all things\u003cbr /\u003ewith the rudder of goodness, and since all things do likewise, as I have\u003cbr /\u003etaught, haste towards good by the very aim of nature, can it be doubted\u003cbr /\u003ethat His governance is willingly accepted, and that all submit\u003cbr /\u003ethemselves to the sway of the Disposer as conformed and attempered to\u003cbr /\u003eHis rule?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Necessarily so,\u0026#39; said I; \u0026#39;no rule would seem happy if it were a yoke\u003cbr /\u003eimposed on reluctant wills, and not the safe-keeping of obedient\u003cbr /\u003esubjects.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;There is nothing, then, which, while it follows nature, endeavours to\u003cbr /\u003eresist good.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;No; nothing.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;But if anything should, will it have the least success against Him whom\u003cbr /\u003ewe rightly agreed to be supreme Lord of happiness?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;It would be utterly impotent.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;There is nothing, then, which has either the will or the power to\u003cbr /\u003eoppose this supreme good.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;No; I think not.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;So, then,\u0026#39; said she, \u0026#39;it is the supreme good which rules in strength,\u003cbr /\u003eand graciously disposes all things.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen said I: \u0026#39;How delighted am I at thy reasonings, and the conclusion\u003cbr /\u003eto which thou hast brought them, but most of all at these very words\u003cbr /\u003ewhich thou usest! I am now at last ashamed of the folly that so sorely\u003cbr /\u003evexed me.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Thou hast heard the story of the giants assailing heaven; but a\u003cbr /\u003ebeneficent strength disposed of them also, as they deserved. But shall\u003cbr /\u003ewe submit our arguments to the shock of mutual collision?–it may be\u003cbr /\u003efrom the impact some fair spark of truth may be struck out.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;If it be thy good pleasure,\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;No one can doubt that God is all-powerful.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;No one at all can question it who thinks consistently.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Now, there is nothing which One who is all-powerful cannot do.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Nothing.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;But can God do evil, then?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Nay; by no means.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, evil is nothing,\u0026#39; said she, \u0026#39;since He to whom nothing is\u003cbr /\u003eimpossible is unable to do evil.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Art thou mocking me,\u0026#39; said I, \u0026#39;weaving a labyrinth of tangled\u003cbr /\u003earguments, now seeming to begin where thou didst end, and now to end\u003cbr /\u003ewhere thou didst begin, or dost thou build up some wondrous circle of\u003cbr /\u003eDivine simplicity? For, truly, a little before thou didst begin with\u003cbr /\u003ehappiness, and say it was the supreme good, and didst declare it to be\u003cbr /\u003eseated in the supreme Godhead. God Himself, too, thou didst affirm to be\u003cbr /\u003esupreme good and all-complete happiness; and from this thou didst go on\u003cbr /\u003eto add, as by the way, the proof that no one would be happy unless he\u003cbr /\u003ewere likewise God. Again, thou didst say that the very form of good was\u003cbr /\u003ethe essence both of God and of happiness, and didst teach that the\u003cbr /\u003eabsolute One was the absolute good which was sought by universal nature.\u003cbr /\u003eThou didst maintain, also, that God rules the universe by the governance\u003cbr /\u003eof goodness, that all things obey Him willingly, and that evil has no\u003cbr /\u003eexistence in nature. And all this thou didst unfold without the help of\u003cbr /\u003eassumptions from without, but by inherent and proper proofs, drawing\u003cbr /\u003ecredence one from the other.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen answered she: \u0026#39;Far is it from me to mock thee; nay, by the blessing\u003cbr /\u003eof God, whom we lately addressed in prayer, we have achieved the most\u003cbr /\u003eimportant of all objects. For such is the form of the Divine essence,\u003cbr /\u003ethat neither can it pass into things external, nor take up anything\u003cbr /\u003eexternal into itself; but, as Parmenides says of it,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;\u0026quot;In body like to a sphere on all sides perfectly rounded,\u0026quot;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eit rolls the restless orb of the universe, keeping itself motionless the\u003cbr /\u003ewhile. And if I have also employed reasonings not drawn from without,\u003cbr /\u003ebut lying within the compass of our subject, there is no cause for thee\u003cbr /\u003eto marvel, since thou hast learnt on Plato\u0026#39;s authority that words ought\u003cbr /\u003eto be akin to the matter of which they treat.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG XII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eORPHEUS AND EURYDICE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBlest he whose feet have stood\u003cbr /\u003e Beside the fount of good;\u003cbr /\u003e Blest he whose will could break\u003cbr /\u003e Earth\u0026#39;s chains for wisdom\u0026#39;s sake!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Thracian bard, \u0026#39;tis said,\u003cbr /\u003e Mourned his dear consort dead;\u003cbr /\u003e To hear the plaintive strain\u003cbr /\u003e The woods moved in his train,\u003cbr /\u003e And the stream ceased to flow,\u003cbr /\u003e Held by so soft a woe;\u003cbr /\u003e The deer without dismay\u003cbr /\u003e Beside the lion lay;\u003cbr /\u003e The hound, by song subdued,\u003cbr /\u003e No more the hare pursued,\u003cbr /\u003e But the pang unassuaged\u003cbr /\u003e In his own bosom raged.\u003cbr /\u003e The music that could calm\u003cbr /\u003e All else brought him no balm.\u003cbr /\u003e Chiding the powers immortal,\u003cbr /\u003e He came unto Hell\u0026#39;s portal;\u003cbr /\u003e There breathed all tender things\u003cbr /\u003e Upon his sounding strings,\u003cbr /\u003e Each rhapsody high-wrought\u003cbr /\u003e His goddess-mother taught–\u003cbr /\u003e All he from grief could borrow\u003cbr /\u003e And love redoubling sorrow,\u003cbr /\u003e Till, as the echoes waken,\u003cbr /\u003e All T\u0026#230;narus is shaken;\u003cbr /\u003e Whilst he to ruth persuades\u003cbr /\u003e The monarch of the shades\u003cbr /\u003e With dulcet prayer. Spell-bound,\u003cbr /\u003e The triple-headed hound\u003cbr /\u003e At sounds so strangely sweet\u003cbr /\u003e Falls crouching at his feet.\u003cbr /\u003e The dread Avengers, too,\u003cbr /\u003e That guilty minds pursue\u003cbr /\u003e With ever-haunting fears,\u003cbr /\u003e Are all dissolved in tears.\u003cbr /\u003e Ixion, on his wheel,\u003cbr /\u003e A respite brief doth feel;\u003cbr /\u003e For, lo! the wheel stands still.\u003cbr /\u003e And, while those sad notes thrill,\u003cbr /\u003e Thirst-maddened Tantalus\u003cbr /\u003e Listens, oblivious\u003cbr /\u003e Of the stream\u0026#39;s mockery\u003cbr /\u003e And his long agony.\u003cbr /\u003e The vulture, too, doth spare\u003cbr /\u003e Some little while to tear\u003cbr /\u003e At Tityus\u0026#39; rent side,\u003cbr /\u003e Sated and pacified.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAt length the shadowy king,\u003cbr /\u003e His sorrows pitying,\u003cbr /\u003e \u0026#39;He hath prevail\u0026#232;d!\u0026#39; cried;\u003cbr /\u003e \u0026#39;We give him back his bride!\u003cbr /\u003e To him she shall belong,\u003cbr /\u003e As guerdon of his song.\u003cbr /\u003e One sole condition yet\u003cbr /\u003e Upon the boon is set:\u003cbr /\u003e Let him not turn his eyes\u003cbr /\u003e To view his hard-won prize,\u003cbr /\u003e Till they securely pass\u003cbr /\u003e The gates of Hell.\u0026#39; Alas!\u003cbr /\u003e What law can lovers move?\u003cbr /\u003e A higher law is love!\u003cbr /\u003e For Orpheus–woe is me!–\u003cbr /\u003e On his Eurydice–\u003cbr /\u003e Day\u0026#39;s threshold all but won–\u003cbr /\u003e Looked, lost, and was undone!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eYe who the light pursue,\u003cbr /\u003e This story is for you,\u003cbr /\u003e Who seek to find a way\u003cbr /\u003e Unto the clearer day.\u003cbr /\u003e If on the darkness past\u003cbr /\u003e One backward look ye cast,\u003cbr /\u003e Your weak and wandering eyes\u003cbr /\u003e Have lost the matchless prize.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBOOK IV.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eGOOD AND ILL FORTUNE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSUMMARY.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCH. I. The mystery of the seeming moral confusion. Philosophy\u003cbr /\u003e engages to make this plain, and to fulfil her former promise to the\u003cbr /\u003e full.–CH. II. Accordingly, (a) she first expounds the paradox that\u003cbr /\u003e the good alone have power, the bad are altogether powerless.–CH.\u003cbr /\u003e III. (b) The righteous never lack their reward, nor the wicked\u003cbr /\u003e their punishment.–CH. IV. (c) The wicked are more unhappy when\u003cbr /\u003e they accomplish their desires than when they fail to attain them.\u003cbr /\u003e (d) Evil-doers are more fortunate when they expiate their crimes by\u003cbr /\u003e suffering punishment than when they escape unpunished. (e) The\u003cbr /\u003e wrong-doer is more wretched than he who suffers injury.–CH. V.\u003cbr /\u003e Boethius still cannot understand why the distribution of happiness\u003cbr /\u003e and misery to the righteous and the wicked seems the result of\u003cbr /\u003e chance. Philosophy replies that this only seems so because we do\u003cbr /\u003e not understand the principles of God\u0026#39;s moral governance.–CH. VI.\u003cbr /\u003e The distinction of Fate and Providence. The apparent moral\u003cbr /\u003e confusion is due to our ignorance of the secret counsels of God\u0026#39;s\u003cbr /\u003e providence. If we possessed the key, we should see how all things\u003cbr /\u003e are guided to good.–CH. VII. Thus all fortune is good fortune; for\u003cbr /\u003e it either rewards, disciplines, amends, or punishes, and so is\u003cbr /\u003e either useful or just.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBOOK IV.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSoftly and sweetly Philosophy sang these verses to the end without\u003cbr /\u003elosing aught of the dignity of her expression or the seriousness of her\u003cbr /\u003etones; then, forasmuch as I was as yet unable to forget my deeply-seated\u003cbr /\u003esorrow, just as she was about to say something further, I broke in and\u003cbr /\u003ecried: \u0026#39;O thou guide into the way of true light, all that thy voice hath\u003cbr /\u003euttered from the beginning even unto now has manifestly seemed to me at\u003cbr /\u003eonce divine contemplated in itself, and by the force of thy arguments\u003cbr /\u003eplaced beyond the possibility of overthrow. Moreover, these truths have\u003cbr /\u003enot been altogether unfamiliar to me heretofore, though because of\u003cbr /\u003eindignation at my wrongs they have for a time been forgotten. But, lo!\u003cbr /\u003eherein is the very chiefest cause of my grief–that, while there exists\u003cbr /\u003ea good ruler of the universe, it is possible that evil should be at all,\u003cbr /\u003estill more that it should go unpunished. Surely thou must see how\u003cbr /\u003edeservedly this of itself provokes astonishment. But a yet greater\u003cbr /\u003emarvel follows: While wickedness reigns and flourishes, virtue not only\u003cbr /\u003elacks its reward, but is even thrust down and trampled under the feet of\u003cbr /\u003ethe wicked, and suffers punishment in the place of crime. That this\u003cbr /\u003eshould happen under the rule of a God who knows all things and can do\u003cbr /\u003eall things, but wills only the good, cannot be sufficiently wondered at\u003cbr /\u003enor sufficiently lamented.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen said she: \u0026#39;It would indeed be infinitely astounding, and of all\u003cbr /\u003emonstrous things most horrible, if, as thou esteemest, in the\u003cbr /\u003ewell-ordered home of so great a householder, the base vessels should be\u003cbr /\u003eheld in honour, the precious left to neglect. But it is not so. For if\u003cbr /\u003ewe hold unshaken those conclusions which we lately reached, thou shall\u003cbr /\u003elearn that, by the will of Him of whose realm we are speaking, the good\u003cbr /\u003eare always strong, the bad always weak and impotent; that vices never go\u003cbr /\u003eunpunished, nor virtues unrewarded; that good fortune ever befalls the\u003cbr /\u003egood, and ill fortune the bad, and much more of the sort, which shall\u003cbr /\u003ehush thy murmurings, and stablish thee in the strong assurance of\u003cbr /\u003econviction. And since by my late instructions thou hast seen the form of\u003cbr /\u003ehappiness, hast learnt, too, the seat where it is to be found, all due\u003cbr /\u003epreliminaries being discharged, I will now show thee the road which will\u003cbr /\u003elead thee home. Wings, also, will I fasten to thy mind wherewith thou\u003cbr /\u003emayst soar aloft, that so, all disturbing doubts removed, thou mayst\u003cbr /\u003ereturn safe to thy country, under my guidance, in the path I will show\u003cbr /\u003ethee, and by the means which I furnish.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTHE SOUL\u0026#39;S FLIGHT.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWings are mine; above the pole\u003cbr /\u003e Far aloft I soar.\u003cbr /\u003e Clothed with these, my nimble soul\u003cbr /\u003e Scorns earth\u0026#39;s hated shore,\u003cbr /\u003e Cleaves the skies upon the wind,\u003cbr /\u003e Sees the clouds left far behind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSoon the glowing point she nears,\u003cbr /\u003e Where the heavens rotate,\u003cbr /\u003e Follows through the starry spheres\u003cbr /\u003e Phoebus\u0026#39; course, or straight\u003cbr /\u003e Takes for comrade \u0026#39;mid the stars\u003cbr /\u003e Saturn cold or glittering Mars;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus each circling orb explores\u003cbr /\u003e Through Night\u0026#39;s stole that peers;\u003cbr /\u003e Then, when all are numbered, soars\u003cbr /\u003e Far beyond the spheres,\u003cbr /\u003e Mounting heaven\u0026#39;s supremest height\u003cbr /\u003e To the very Fount of light.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere the Sovereign of the world\u003cbr /\u003e His calm sway maintains;\u003cbr /\u003e As the globe is onward whirled\u003cbr /\u003e Guides the chariot reins,\u003cbr /\u003e And in splendour glittering\u003cbr /\u003e Reigns the universal King.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHither if thy wandering feet\u003cbr /\u003e Find at last a way,\u003cbr /\u003e Here thy long-lost home thou\u0026#39;lt greet:\u003cbr /\u003e \u0026#39;Dear lost land,\u0026#39; thou\u0026#39;lt say,\u003cbr /\u003e \u0026#39;Though from thee I\u0026#39;ve wandered wide,\u003cbr /\u003e Hence I came, here will abide.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet if ever thou art fain\u003cbr /\u003e Visitant to be\u003cbr /\u003e Of earth\u0026#39;s gloomy night again,\u003cbr /\u003e Surely thou wilt see\u003cbr /\u003e Tyrants whom the nations fear\u003cbr /\u003e Dwell in hapless exile here.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen said I: \u0026#39;Verily, wondrous great are thy promises; yet I do not\u003cbr /\u003edoubt but thou canst make them good: only keep me not in suspense after\u003cbr /\u003eraising such hopes.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Learn, then, first,\u0026#39; said she, \u0026#39;how that power ever waits upon the\u003cbr /\u003egood, while the bad are left wholly destitute of strength.[K] Of these\u003cbr /\u003etruths the one proves the other; for since good and evil are contraries,\u003cbr /\u003eif it is made plain that good is power, the feebleness of evil is\u003cbr /\u003eclearly seen, and, conversely, if the frail nature of evil is made\u003cbr /\u003emanifest, the strength of good is thereby known. However, to win ampler\u003cbr /\u003ecredence for my conclusion, I will pursue both paths, and draw\u003cbr /\u003econfirmation for my statements first in one way and then in the other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;The carrying out of any human action depends upon two things–to wit,\u003cbr /\u003ewill and power; if either be wanting, nothing can be accomplished. For\u003cbr /\u003eif the will be lacking, no attempt at all is made to do what is not\u003cbr /\u003ewilled; whereas if there be no power, the will is all in vain. And so,\u003cbr /\u003eif thou seest any man wishing to attain some end, yet utterly failing to\u003cbr /\u003eattain it, thou canst not doubt that he lacked the power of getting what\u003cbr /\u003ehe wished for.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Why, certainly not; there is no denying it.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Canst thou, then, doubt that he whom thou seest to have accomplished\u003cbr /\u003ewhat he willed had also the power to accomplish it?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Of course not.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, in respect of what he can accomplish a man is to be reckoned\u003cbr /\u003estrong, in respect of what he cannot accomplish weak?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Granted,\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, dost thou remember that, by our former reasonings, it was\u003cbr /\u003econcluded that the whole aim of man\u0026#39;s will, though the means of pursuit\u003cbr /\u003evary, is set intently upon happiness?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;I do remember that this, too, was proved.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Dost thou also call to mind how happiness is absolute good, and\u003cbr /\u003etherefore that, when happiness is sought, it is good which is in all\u003cbr /\u003ecases the object of desire?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Nay, I do not so much call to mind as keep it fixed in my memory.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, all men, good and bad alike, with one indistinguishable purpose\u003cbr /\u003estrive to reach good?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yes, that follows.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;But it is certain that by the attainment of good men become good?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;It is.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, do the good attain their object?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;It seems so.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;But if the bad were to attain the good which is _their_ object, they\u003cbr /\u003ecould not be bad?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;No.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, since both seek good, but while the one sort attain it, the other\u003cbr /\u003eattain it not, is there any doubt that the good are endued with power,\u003cbr /\u003ewhile they who are bad are weak?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;If any doubt it, he is incapable of reflecting on the nature of things,\u003cbr /\u003eor the consequences involved in reasoning.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Again, supposing there are two things to which the same function is\u003cbr /\u003eprescribed in the course of nature, and one of these successfully\u003cbr /\u003eaccomplishes the function by natural action, the other is altogether\u003cbr /\u003eincapable of that natural action, instead of which, in a way other than\u003cbr /\u003eis agreeable to its nature, it–I will not say fulfils its function, but\u003cbr /\u003efeigns to fulfil it: which of these two would in thy view be the\u003cbr /\u003estronger?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;I guess thy meaning, but I pray thee let me hear thee more at large.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Walking is man\u0026#39;s natural motion, is it not?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Certainly.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Thou dost not doubt, I suppose, that it is natural for the feet to\u003cbr /\u003edischarge this function?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;No; surely I do not.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Now, if one man who is able to use his feet walks, and another to whom\u003cbr /\u003ethe natural use of his feet is wanting tries to walk on his hands,\u003cbr /\u003ewhich of the two wouldst thou rightly esteem the stronger?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Go on,\u0026#39; said I; \u0026#39;no one can question but that he who has the natural\u003cbr /\u003ecapacity has more strength than he who has it not.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Now, the supreme good is set up as the end alike for the bad and for\u003cbr /\u003ethe good; but the good seek it through the natural action of the\u003cbr /\u003evirtues, whereas the bad try to attain this same good through all manner\u003cbr /\u003eof concupiscence, which is not the natural way of attaining good. Or\u003cbr /\u003edost thou think otherwise?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Nay; rather, one further consequence is clear to me: for from my\u003cbr /\u003eadmissions it must needs follow that the good have power, and the bad\u003cbr /\u003eare impotent.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Thou anticipatest rightly, and that as physicians reckon is a sign that\u003cbr /\u003enature is set working, and is throwing off the disease. But, since I see\u003cbr /\u003ethee so ready at understanding, I will heap proof on proof. Look how\u003cbr /\u003emanifest is the extremity of vicious men\u0026#39;s weakness; they cannot even\u003cbr /\u003ereach that goal to which the aim of nature leads and almost constrains\u003cbr /\u003ethem. What if they were left without this mighty, this well-nigh\u003cbr /\u003eirresistible help of nature\u0026#39;s guidance! Consider also how momentous is\u003cbr /\u003ethe powerlessness which incapacitates the wicked. Not light or\u003cbr /\u003etrivial[L] are the prizes which they contend for, but which they cannot\u003cbr /\u003ewin or hold; nay, their failure concerns the very sum and crown of\u003cbr /\u003ethings. Poor wretches! they fail to compass even that for which they\u003cbr /\u003etoil day and night. Herein also the strength of the good conspicuously\u003cbr /\u003eappears. For just as thou wouldst judge him to be the strongest walker\u003cbr /\u003ewhose legs could carry him to a point beyond which no further advance\u003cbr /\u003ewas possible, so must thou needs account him strong in power who so\u003cbr /\u003eattains the end of his desires that nothing further to be desired lies\u003cbr /\u003ebeyond. Whence follows the obvious conclusion that they who are wicked\u003cbr /\u003eare seen likewise to be wholly destitute of strength. For why do they\u003cbr /\u003eforsake virtue and follow vice? Is it from ignorance of what is good?\u003cbr /\u003eWell, what is more weak and feeble than the blindness of ignorance? Do\u003cbr /\u003ethey know what they ought to follow, but lust drives them aside out of\u003cbr /\u003ethe way? If it be so, they are still frail by reason of their\u003cbr /\u003eincontinence, for they cannot fight against vice. Or do they knowingly\u003cbr /\u003eand wilfully forsake the good and turn aside to vice? Why, at this rate,\u003cbr /\u003ethey not only cease to have power, but cease to be at all. For they who\u003cbr /\u003eforsake the common end of all things that are, they likewise also cease\u003cbr /\u003eto be at all. Now, to some it may seem strange that we should assert\u003cbr /\u003ethat the bad, who form the greater part of mankind, do not exist. But\u003cbr /\u003ethe fact is so. I do not, indeed, deny that they who are bad are bad,\u003cbr /\u003ebut that they _are_ in an unqualified and absolute sense I deny. Just as\u003cbr /\u003ewe call a corpse a dead man, but cannot call it simply \u0026quot;man,\u0026quot; so I would\u003cbr /\u003eallow the vicious to be bad, but that they _are_ in an absolute sense I\u003cbr /\u003ecannot allow. That only _is_ which maintains its place and keeps its\u003cbr /\u003enature; whatever falls away from this forsakes the existence which is\u003cbr /\u003eessential to its nature. \u0026quot;But,\u0026quot; thou wilt say, \u0026quot;the bad have an\u003cbr /\u003eability.\u0026quot; Nor do I wish to deny it; only this ability of theirs comes\u003cbr /\u003enot from strength, but from impotence. For their ability is to do evil,\u003cbr /\u003ewhich would have had no efficacy at all if they could have continued in\u003cbr /\u003ethe performance of good. So this ability of theirs proves them still\u003cbr /\u003emore plainly to have no power. For if, as we concluded just now, evil is\u003cbr /\u003enothing, \u0026#39;tis clear that the wicked can effect nothing, since they are\u003cbr /\u003eonly able to do evil.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;\u0026#39;Tis evident.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;And that thou mayst understand what is the precise force of this power,\u003cbr /\u003ewe determined, did we not, awhile back, that nothing has more power than\u003cbr /\u003esupreme good?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;We did,\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;But that same highest good cannot do evil?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Certainly not.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Is there anyone, then, who thinks that men are able to do all things?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;None but a madman.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yet they are able to do evil?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Ay; would they could not!\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Since, then, he who can do only good is omnipotent, while they who can\u003cbr /\u003edo evil also are not omnipotent, it is manifest that they who can do\u003cbr /\u003eevil have less power. There is this also: we have shown that all power\u003cbr /\u003eis to be reckoned among things desirable, and that all desirable things\u003cbr /\u003eare referred to good as to a kind of consummation of their nature. But\u003cbr /\u003ethe ability to commit crime cannot be referred to the good; therefore it\u003cbr /\u003eis not a thing to be desired. And yet all power is desirable; it is\u003cbr /\u003eclear, then, that ability to do evil is not power. From all which\u003cbr /\u003econsiderations appeareth the power of the good, and the indubitable\u003cbr /\u003eweakness of the bad, and it is clear that Plato\u0026#39;s judgment was true; the\u003cbr /\u003ewise alone are able to do what they would, while the wicked follow their\u003cbr /\u003eown hearts\u0026#39; lust, but can _not_ accomplish what they would. For they go\u003cbr /\u003eon in their wilfulness fancying they will attain what they wish for in\u003cbr /\u003ethe paths of delight; but they are very far from its attainment, since\u003cbr /\u003eshameful deeds lead not to happiness.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e[K] The paradoxes in this chapter and chapter iv. are taken from Plato\u0026#39;s\u003cbr /\u003e\u0026#39;Gorgias.\u0026#39; See Jowett, vol. ii., pp. 348-366, and also pp. 400, 401\u003cbr /\u003e(\u0026#39;Gorgias,\u0026#39; 466-479, and 508, 509).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e[L]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;No trivial game is here; the strife Is waged for Turnus\u0026#39; own dear\u003cbr /\u003elife.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e_Conington_.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSee Virgil, \u0026#198;neid,\u0026#39; xii. 764, 745: _cf_. \u0026#39;Iliad,\u0026#39; xxii. 159-162.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG II.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTHE BONDAGE OF PASSION.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen high-enthroned the monarch sits, resplendent in the pride\u003cbr /\u003e Of purple robes, while flashing steel guards him on every side;\u003cbr /\u003e When baleful terrors on his brow with frowning menace lower,\u003cbr /\u003e And Passion shakes his labouring breast–how dreadful seems his power!\u003cbr /\u003e But if the vesture of his state from such a one thou tear,\u003cbr /\u003e Thou\u0026#39;lt see what load of secret bonds this lord of earth doth wear.\u003cbr /\u003e Lust\u0026#39;s poison rankles; o\u0026#39;er his mind rage sweeps in tempest rude;\u003cbr /\u003e Sorrow his spirit vexes sore, and empty hopes delude.\u003cbr /\u003e Then thou\u0026#39;lt confess: one hapless wretch, whom many lords oppress,\u003cbr /\u003e Does never what he would, but lives in thraldom\u0026#39;s helplessness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Thou seest, then, in what foulness unrighteous deeds are sunk, with\u003cbr /\u003ewhat splendour righteousness shines. Whereby it is manifest that\u003cbr /\u003egoodness never lacks its reward, nor crime its punishment. For, verily,\u003cbr /\u003ein all manner of transactions that for the sake of which the particular\u003cbr /\u003eaction is done may justly be accounted the reward of that action, even\u003cbr /\u003eas the wreath for the sake of which the race is run is the reward\u003cbr /\u003eoffered for running. Now, we have shown happiness to be that very good\u003cbr /\u003efor the sake of which all things are done. Absolute good, then, is\u003cbr /\u003eoffered as the common prize, as it were, of all human actions. But,\u003cbr /\u003etruly, this is a reward from which it is impossible to separate the good\u003cbr /\u003eman, for one who is without good cannot properly be called good at all;\u003cbr /\u003ewherefore righteous dealing never misses its reward. Rage the wicked,\u003cbr /\u003ethen, never so violently, the crown shall not fall from the head of the\u003cbr /\u003ewise, nor wither. Verily, other men\u0026#39;s unrighteousness cannot pluck from\u003cbr /\u003erighteous souls their proper glory. Were the reward in which the soul of\u003cbr /\u003ethe righteous delighteth received from without, then might it be taken\u003cbr /\u003eaway by him who gave it, or some other; but since it is conferred by his\u003cbr /\u003eown righteousness, then only will he lose his prize when he has ceased\u003cbr /\u003eto be righteous. Lastly, since every prize is desired because it is\u003cbr /\u003ebelieved to be good, who can account him who possesses good to be\u003cbr /\u003ewithout reward? And what a prize, the fairest and grandest of all! For\u003cbr /\u003eremember the corollary which I chiefly insisted on a little while back,\u003cbr /\u003eand reason thus: Since absolute good is happiness, \u0026#39;tis clear that all\u003cbr /\u003ethe good must be happy for the very reason that they are good. But it\u003cbr /\u003ewas agreed that those who are happy are gods. So, then, the prize of the\u003cbr /\u003egood is one which no time may impair, no man\u0026#39;s power lessen, no man\u0026#39;s\u003cbr /\u003eunrighteousness tarnish; \u0026#39;tis very Godship. And this being so, the wise\u003cbr /\u003eman cannot doubt that punishment is inseparable from the bad. For since\u003cbr /\u003egood and bad, and likewise reward and punishment, are contraries, it\u003cbr /\u003enecessarily follows that, corresponding to all that we see accrue as\u003cbr /\u003ereward of the good, there is some penalty attached as punishment of\u003cbr /\u003eevil. As, then, righteousness itself is the reward of the righteous, so\u003cbr /\u003ewickedness itself is the punishment of the unrighteous. Now, no one who\u003cbr /\u003eis visited with punishment doubts that he is visited with evil.\u003cbr /\u003eAccordingly, if they were but willing to weigh their own case, could\u003cbr /\u003e_they_ think themselves free from punishment whom wickedness, worst of\u003cbr /\u003eall evils, has not only touched, but deeply tainted?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;See, also, from the opposite standpoint–the standpoint of the\u003cbr /\u003egood–what a penalty attends upon the wicked. Thou didst learn a little\u003cbr /\u003esince that whatever is is one, and that unity itself is good.\u003cbr /\u003eAccordingly, by this way of reckoning, whatever falls away from goodness\u003cbr /\u003eceases to be; whence it comes to pass that the bad cease to be what they\u003cbr /\u003ewere, while only the outward aspect is still left to show they have been\u003cbr /\u003emen. Wherefore, by their perversion to badness, they have lost their\u003cbr /\u003etrue human nature. Further, since righteousness alone can raise men\u003cbr /\u003eabove the level of humanity, it must needs be that unrighteousness\u003cbr /\u003edegrades below man\u0026#39;s level those whom it has cast out of man\u0026#39;s estate.\u003cbr /\u003eIt results, then, that thou canst not consider him human whom thou seest\u003cbr /\u003etransformed by vice. The violent despoiler of other men\u0026#39;s goods,\u003cbr /\u003eenflamed with covetousness, surely resembles a wolf. A bold and restless\u003cbr /\u003espirit, ever wrangling in law-courts, is like some yelping cur. The\u003cbr /\u003esecret schemer, taking pleasure in fraud and stealth, is own brother to\u003cbr /\u003ethe fox. The passionate man, phrenzied with rage, we might believe to be\u003cbr /\u003eanimated with the soul of a lion. The coward and runaway, afraid where\u003cbr /\u003eno fear is, may be likened to the timid deer. He who is sunk in\u003cbr /\u003eignorance and stupidity lives like a dull ass. He who is light and\u003cbr /\u003einconstant, never holding long to one thing, is for all the world like a\u003cbr /\u003ebird. He who wallows in foul and unclean lusts is sunk in the pleasures\u003cbr /\u003eof a filthy hog. So it comes to pass that he who by forsaking\u003cbr /\u003erighteousness ceases to be a man cannot pass into a Godlike condition,\u003cbr /\u003ebut actually turns into a brute beast.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG III.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCIRCE\u0026#39;S CUP.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTh\u0026#39; Ithacan discreet,\u003cbr /\u003e And all his storm-tossed fleet,\u003cbr /\u003e Far o\u0026#39;er the ocean wave\u003cbr /\u003e The winds of heaven drave–\u003cbr /\u003e Drave to the mystic isle,\u003cbr /\u003e Where dwelleth in her guile\u003cbr /\u003e That fair and faithless one,\u003cbr /\u003e The daughter of the Sun.\u003cbr /\u003e There for the stranger crew\u003cbr /\u003e With cunning spells she knew\u003cbr /\u003e To mix th\u0026#39; enchanted cup.\u003cbr /\u003e For whoso drinks it up,\u003cbr /\u003e Must suffer hideous change\u003cbr /\u003e To monstrous shapes and strange.\u003cbr /\u003e One like a boar appears;\u003cbr /\u003e This his huge form uprears,\u003cbr /\u003e Mighty in bulk and limb–\u003cbr /\u003e An Afric lion–grim\u003cbr /\u003e With claw and fang. Confessed\u003cbr /\u003e A wolf, this, sore distressed\u003cbr /\u003e When he would weep, doth howl;\u003cbr /\u003e And, strangely tame, these prowl\u003cbr /\u003e The Indian tiger\u0026#39;s mates.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd though in such sore straits,\u003cbr /\u003e The pity of the god\u003cbr /\u003e Who bears the mystic rod\u003cbr /\u003e Had power the chieftain brave\u003cbr /\u003e From her fell arts to save;\u003cbr /\u003e His comrades, unrestrained,\u003cbr /\u003e The fatal goblet drained.\u003cbr /\u003e All now with low-bent head,\u003cbr /\u003e Like swine, on acorns fed;\u003cbr /\u003e Man\u0026#39;s speech and form were reft,\u003cbr /\u003e No human feature left;\u003cbr /\u003e But steadfast still, the mind,\u003cbr /\u003e Unaltered, unresigned,\u003cbr /\u003e The monstrous change bewailed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHow little, then, availed\u003cbr /\u003e The potencies of ill!\u003cbr /\u003e These herbs, this baneful skill,\u003cbr /\u003e May change each outward part,\u003cbr /\u003e But cannot touch the heart.\u003cbr /\u003e In its true home, deep-set,\u003cbr /\u003e Man\u0026#39;s spirit liveth yet.\u003cbr /\u003e _Those_ poisons are more fell,\u003cbr /\u003e More potent to expel\u003cbr /\u003e Man from his high estate,\u003cbr /\u003e Which subtly penetrate,\u003cbr /\u003e And leave the body whole,\u003cbr /\u003e But deep infect the soul.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIV.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen said I: \u0026#39;This is very true. I see that the vicious, though they\u003cbr /\u003ekeep the outward form of man, are rightly said to be changed into beasts\u003cbr /\u003ein respect of their spiritual nature; but, inasmuch as their cruel and\u003cbr /\u003epolluted minds vent their rage in the destruction of the good, I would\u003cbr /\u003ethis license were not permitted to them.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Nor is it,\u0026#39; said she, \u0026#39;as shall be shown in the fitting place. Yet if\u003cbr /\u003ethat license which thou believest to be permitted to them were taken\u003cbr /\u003eaway, the punishment of the wicked would be in great part remitted. For\u003cbr /\u003everily, incredible as it may seem to some, it needs must be that the bad\u003cbr /\u003eare more unfortunate when they have accomplished their desires than if\u003cbr /\u003ethey are unable to get them fulfilled. If it is wretched to will evil,\u003cbr /\u003eto have been able to accomplish evil is more wretched; for without the\u003cbr /\u003epower the wretched will would fail of effect. Accordingly, those whom\u003cbr /\u003ethou seest to will, to be able to accomplish, and to accomplish crime,\u003cbr /\u003emust needs be the victims of a threefold wretchedness, since each one of\u003cbr /\u003ethese states has its own measure of wretchedness.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yes,\u0026#39; said I; \u0026#39;yet I earnestly wish they might speedily be quit of this\u003cbr /\u003emisfortune by losing the ability to accomplish crime.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;They will lose it,\u0026#39; said she, \u0026#39;sooner than perchance thou wishest, or\u003cbr /\u003ethey themselves think likely; since, verily, within the narrow bounds of\u003cbr /\u003eour brief life there is nothing so late in coming that anyone, least of\u003cbr /\u003eall an immortal spirit, should deem it long to wait for. Their great\u003cbr /\u003eexpectations, the lofty fabric of their crimes, is oft overthrown by a\u003cbr /\u003esudden and unlooked-for ending, and this but sets a limit to their\u003cbr /\u003emisery. For if wickedness makes men wretched, he is necessarily more\u003cbr /\u003ewretched who is wicked for a longer time; and were it not that death, at\u003cbr /\u003eall events, puts an end to the evil doings of the wicked, I should\u003cbr /\u003eaccount them wretched to the last degree. Indeed, if we have formed true\u003cbr /\u003econclusions about the ill fortune of wickedness, that wretchedness is\u003cbr /\u003eplainly infinite which is doomed to be eternal.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen said I: \u0026#39;A wonderful inference, and difficult to grant; but I see\u003cbr /\u003ethat it agrees entirely with our previous conclusions.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Thou art right,\u0026#39; said she; \u0026#39;but if anyone finds it hard to admit the\u003cbr /\u003econclusion, he ought in fairness either to prove some falsity in the\u003cbr /\u003epremises, or to show that the combination of propositions does not\u003cbr /\u003eadequately enforce the necessity of the conclusion; otherwise, if the\u003cbr /\u003epremises be granted, nothing whatever can be said against the inference\u003cbr /\u003eof the conclusion. And here is another statement which seems not less\u003cbr /\u003ewonderful, but on the premises assumed is equally necessary.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;What is that?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;The wicked are happier in undergoing punishment than if no penalty of\u003cbr /\u003ejustice chasten them. And I am not now meaning what might occur to\u003cbr /\u003eanyone–that bad character is amended by retribution, and is brought\u003cbr /\u003einto the right path by the terror of punishment, or that it serves as an\u003cbr /\u003eexample to warn others to avoid transgression; but I believe that in\u003cbr /\u003eanother way the wicked are more unfortunate when they go unpunished,\u003cbr /\u003eeven though no account be taken of amendment, and no regard be paid to\u003cbr /\u003eexample.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Why, what other way is there beside these?\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen said she: \u0026#39;Have we not agreed that the good are happy, and the evil\u003cbr /\u003ewretched?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yes,\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Now, if,\u0026#39; said she, \u0026#39;to one in affliction there be given along with his\u003cbr /\u003emisery some good thing, is he not happier than one whose misery is\u003cbr /\u003emisery pure and simple without admixture of any good?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;It would seem so.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;But if to one thus wretched, one destitute of all good, some further\u003cbr /\u003eevil be added besides those which make him wretched, is he not to be\u003cbr /\u003ejudged far more unhappy than he whose ill fortune is alleviated by some\u003cbr /\u003eshare of good?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;It could scarcely be otherwise.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Surely, then, the wicked, when they are punished, have a good thing\u003cbr /\u003eadded to them–to wit, the punishment which by the law of justice is\u003cbr /\u003egood; and likewise, when they escape punishment, a new evil attaches to\u003cbr /\u003ethem in that very freedom from punishment which thou hast rightly\u003cbr /\u003eacknowledged to be an evil in the case of the unrighteous.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;I cannot deny it.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, the wicked are far more unhappy when indulged with an unjust\u003cbr /\u003efreedom from punishment than when punished by a just retribution. Now,\u003cbr /\u003eit is manifest that it is just for the wicked to be punished, and for\u003cbr /\u003ethem to escape unpunished is unjust.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Why, who would venture to deny it?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;This, too, no one can possibly deny–that all which is just is good,\u003cbr /\u003eand, conversely, all which is unjust is bad.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen I answered: \u0026#39;These inferences do indeed follow from what we lately\u003cbr /\u003econcluded; but tell me,\u0026#39; said I, \u0026#39;dost thou take no account of the\u003cbr /\u003epunishment of the soul after the death of the body?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Nay, truly,\u0026#39; said she, \u0026#39;great are these penalties, some of them\u003cbr /\u003einflicted, I imagine, in the severity of retribution, others in the\u003cbr /\u003emercy of purification. But it is not my present purpose to speak of\u003cbr /\u003ethese. So far, my aim hath been to make thee recognise that the power of\u003cbr /\u003ethe bad which shocked thee so exceedingly is no power; to make thee see\u003cbr /\u003ethat those of whose freedom from punishment thou didst complain are\u003cbr /\u003enever without the proper penalties of their unrighteousness; to teach\u003cbr /\u003ethee that the license which thou prayedst might soon come to an end is\u003cbr /\u003enot long-enduring; that it would be more unhappy if it lasted longer,\u003cbr /\u003emost unhappy of all if it lasted for ever; thereafter that the\u003cbr /\u003eunrighteous are more wretched if unjustly let go without punishment than\u003cbr /\u003eif punished by a just retribution–from which point of view it follows\u003cbr /\u003ethat the wicked are afflicted with more severe penalties just when they\u003cbr /\u003eare supposed to escape punishment.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen said I: \u0026#39;While I follow thy reasonings, I am deeply impressed with\u003cbr /\u003etheir truth; but if I turn to the common convictions of men, I find few\u003cbr /\u003ewho will even listen to such arguments, let alone admit them to be\u003cbr /\u003ecredible.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;True,\u0026#39; said she; \u0026#39;they cannot lift eyes accustomed to darkness to the\u003cbr /\u003elight of clear truth, and are like those birds whose vision night\u003cbr /\u003eillumines and day blinds; for while they regard, not the order of the\u003cbr /\u003euniverse, but their own dispositions of mind, they think the license to\u003cbr /\u003ecommit crime, and the escape from punishment, to be fortunate. But mark\u003cbr /\u003ethe ordinance of eternal law. Hast thou fashioned thy soul to the\u003cbr /\u003elikeness of the better, thou hast no need of a judge to award the\u003cbr /\u003eprize–by thine own act hast thou raised thyself in the scale of\u003cbr /\u003eexcellence; hast thou perverted thy affections to baser things, look not\u003cbr /\u003efor punishment from one without thee–thine own act hath degraded thee,\u003cbr /\u003eand thrust thee down. Even so, if alternately thou turn thy gaze upon\u003cbr /\u003ethe vile earth and upon the heavens, though all without thee stand\u003cbr /\u003estill, by the mere laws of sight thou seemest now sunk in the mire, now\u003cbr /\u003esoaring among the stars. But the common herd regards not these things.\u003cbr /\u003eWhat, then? Shall we go over to those whom we have shown to be like\u003cbr /\u003ebrute beasts? Why, suppose, now, one who had quite lost his sight\u003cbr /\u003eshould likewise forget that he had ever possessed the faculty of vision,\u003cbr /\u003eand should imagine that nothing was wanting in him to human perfection,\u003cbr /\u003eshould we deem those who saw as well as ever blind? Why, they will not\u003cbr /\u003eeven assent to this, either–that they who do wrong are more wretched\u003cbr /\u003ethan those who suffer wrong, though the proof of this rests on grounds\u003cbr /\u003eof reason no less strong.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Let me hear these same reasons,\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Wouldst thou deny that every wicked man deserves punishment?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;I would not, certainly.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;And that those who are wicked are unhappy is clear in manifold ways?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yes,\u0026#39; I replied.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Thou dost not doubt, then, that those who deserve punishment are\u003cbr /\u003ewretched?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Agreed,\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;So, then, if thou wert sitting in judgment, on whom wouldst thou decree\u003cbr /\u003ethe infliction of punishment–on him who had done the wrong, or on him\u003cbr /\u003ewho had suffered it?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Without doubt, I would compensate the sufferer at the cost of the doer\u003cbr /\u003eof the wrong.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, the injurer would seem more wretched than the injured?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Yes; it follows. And so for this and other reasons resting on the same\u003cbr /\u003eground, inasmuch as baseness of its own nature makes men wretched, it is\u003cbr /\u003eplain that a wrong involves the misery of the doer, not of the\u003cbr /\u003esufferer.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;And yet,\u0026#39; says she, \u0026#39;the practice of the law-courts is just the\u003cbr /\u003eopposite: advocates try to arouse the commiseration of the judges for\u003cbr /\u003ethose who have endured some grievous and cruel wrong; whereas pity is\u003cbr /\u003erather due to the criminal, who ought to be brought to the judgment-seat\u003cbr /\u003eby his accusers in a spirit not of anger, but of compassion and\u003cbr /\u003ekindness, as a sick man to the physician, to have the ulcer of his fault\u003cbr /\u003ecut away by punishment. Whereby the business of the advocate would\u003cbr /\u003eeither wholly come to a standstill, or, did men prefer to make it\u003cbr /\u003eserviceable to mankind, would be restricted to the practice of\u003cbr /\u003eaccusation. The wicked themselves also, if through some chink or cranny\u003cbr /\u003ethey were permitted to behold the virtue they have forsaken, and were to\u003cbr /\u003esee that by the pains of punishment they would rid themselves of the\u003cbr /\u003euncleanness of their vices, and win in exchange the recompense of\u003cbr /\u003erighteousness, they would no longer think these sufferings pains; they\u003cbr /\u003ewould refuse the help of advocates, and would commit themselves wholly\u003cbr /\u003einto the hands of their accusers and judges. Whence it comes to pass\u003cbr /\u003ethat for the wise no place is left for hatred; only the most foolish\u003cbr /\u003ewould hate the good, and to hate the bad is unreasonable. For if vicious\u003cbr /\u003epropensity is, as it were, a disease of the soul like bodily sickness,\u003cbr /\u003eeven as we account the sick in body by no means deserving of hate, but\u003cbr /\u003erather of pity, so, and much more, should they be pitied whose minds are\u003cbr /\u003eassailed by wickedness, which is more frightful than any sickness.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG IV.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTHE UNREASONABLENESS OF HATRED.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhy all this furious strife? Oh, why\u003cbr /\u003e With rash and wilful hand provoke death\u0026#39;s destined day?\u003cbr /\u003e If death ye seek–lo! Death is nigh,\u003cbr /\u003e Not of their master\u0026#39;s will those coursers swift delay!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe wild beasts vent on man their rage,\u003cbr /\u003e Yet \u0026#39;gainst their brothers\u0026#39; lives men point the murderous steel;\u003cbr /\u003e Unjust and cruel wars they wage,\u003cbr /\u003e And haste with flying darts the death to meet or deal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo right nor reason can they show;\u003cbr /\u003e \u0026#39;Tis but because their lands and laws are not the same.\u003cbr /\u003e Wouldst _thou_ give each his due; then know\u003cbr /\u003e Thy love the good must have, the bad thy pity claim.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eV.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn this I said: \u0026#39;I see how there is a happiness and misery founded on\u003cbr /\u003ethe actual deserts of the righteous and the wicked. Nevertheless, I\u003cbr /\u003ewonder in myself whether there is not some good and evil in fortune as\u003cbr /\u003ethe vulgar understand it. Surely, no sensible man would rather be\u003cbr /\u003eexiled, poor and disgraced, than dwell prosperously in his own country,\u003cbr /\u003epowerful, wealthy, and high in honour. Indeed, the work of wisdom is\u003cbr /\u003emore clear and manifest in its operation when the happiness of rulers is\u003cbr /\u003esomehow passed on to the people around them, especially considering that\u003cbr /\u003ethe prison, the law, and the other pains of legal punishment are\u003cbr /\u003eproperly due only to mischievous citizens on whose account they were\u003cbr /\u003eoriginally instituted. Accordingly, I do exceedingly marvel why all this\u003cbr /\u003eis completely reversed–why the good are harassed with the penalties due\u003cbr /\u003eto crime, and the bad carry off the rewards of virtue; and I long to\u003cbr /\u003ehear from thee what reason may be found for so unjust a state of\u003cbr /\u003edisorder. For assuredly I should wonder less if I could believe that all\u003cbr /\u003ethings are the confused result of chance. But now my belief in God\u0026#39;s\u003cbr /\u003egovernance doth add amazement to amazement. For, seeing that He\u003cbr /\u003esometimes assigns fair fortune to the good and harsh fortune to the bad,\u003cbr /\u003eand then again deals harshly with the good, and grants to the bad their\u003cbr /\u003ehearts\u0026#39; desire, how does this differ from chance, unless some reason is\u003cbr /\u003ediscovered for it all?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Nay; it is not wonderful,\u0026#39; said she, \u0026#39;if all should be thought random\u003cbr /\u003eand confused when the principle of order is not known. And though thou\u003cbr /\u003eknowest not the causes on which this great system depends, yet forasmuch\u003cbr /\u003eas a good ruler governs the world, doubt not for thy part that all is\u003cbr /\u003erightly done.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG V.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWONDER AND IGNORANCE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWho knoweth not how near the pole\u003cbr /\u003e Bootes\u0026#39; course doth go,\u003cbr /\u003e Must marvel by what heavenly law\u003cbr /\u003e He moves his Wain so slow;\u003cbr /\u003e Why late he plunges \u0026#39;neath the main,\u003cbr /\u003e And swiftly lights his beams again.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen the full-orb\u0026#232;d moon grows pale\u003cbr /\u003e In the mid course of night,\u003cbr /\u003e And suddenly the stars shine forth\u003cbr /\u003e That languished in her light,\u003cbr /\u003e Th\u0026#39; astonied nations stand at gaze,\u003cbr /\u003e And beat the air in wild amaze.[M]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNone marvels why upon the shore\u003cbr /\u003e The storm-lashed breakers beat,\u003cbr /\u003e Nor why the frost-bound glaciers melt\u003cbr /\u003e At summer\u0026#39;s fervent heat;\u003cbr /\u003e For here the cause seems plain and clear,\u003cbr /\u003e Only what\u0026#39;s dark and hid we fear.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWeak-minded folly magnifies\u003cbr /\u003e All that is rare and strange,\u003cbr /\u003e And the dull herd\u0026#39;s o\u0026#39;erwhelmed with awe\u003cbr /\u003e At unexpected change.\u003cbr /\u003e But wonder leaves enlightened minds,\u003cbr /\u003e When ignorance no longer blinds.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e[M] To frighten away the monster swallowing the moon. The superstition\u003cbr /\u003ewas once common. See Tylor\u0026#39;s \u0026#39;Primitive Culture,\u0026#39; pp. 296-302.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVI.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;True,\u0026#39; said I; \u0026#39;but, since it is thy office to unfold the hidden cause\u003cbr /\u003eof things, and explain principles veiled in darkness, inform me, I pray\u003cbr /\u003ethee, of thine own conclusions in this matter, since the marvel of it is\u003cbr /\u003ewhat more than aught else disturbs my mind.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eA smile played one moment upon her lips as she replied: \u0026#39;Thou callest me\u003cbr /\u003eto the greatest of all subjects of inquiry, a task for which the most\u003cbr /\u003eexhaustive treatment barely suffices. Such is its nature that, as fast\u003cbr /\u003eas one doubt is cut away, innumerable others spring up like Hydra\u0026#39;s\u003cbr /\u003eheads, nor could we set any limit to their renewal did we not apply the\u003cbr /\u003emind\u0026#39;s living fire to suppress them. For there come within its scope the\u003cbr /\u003equestions of the essential simplicity of providence, of the order of\u003cbr /\u003efate, of unforeseen chance, of the Divine knowledge and predestination,\u003cbr /\u003eand of the freedom of the will. How heavy is the weight of all this\u003cbr /\u003ethou canst judge for thyself. But, inasmuch as to know these things also\u003cbr /\u003eis part of the treatment of thy malady, we will try to give them some\u003cbr /\u003econsideration, despite the restrictions of the narrow limits of our\u003cbr /\u003etime. Moreover, thou must for a time dispense with the pleasures of\u003cbr /\u003emusic and song, if so be that thou findest any delight therein, whilst I\u003cbr /\u003eweave together the connected train of reasons in proper order.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;As thou wilt,\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen, as if making a new beginning, she thus discoursed: \u0026#39;The coming\u003cbr /\u003einto being of all things, the whole course of development in things that\u003cbr /\u003echange, every sort of thing that moves in any wise, receives its due\u003cbr /\u003ecause, order, and form from the steadfastness of the Divine mind. This\u003cbr /\u003emind, calm in the citadel of its own essential simplicity, has decreed\u003cbr /\u003ethat the method of its rule shall be manifold. Viewed in the very purity\u003cbr /\u003eof the Divine intelligence, this method is called _providence_; but\u003cbr /\u003eviewed in regard to those things which it moves and disposes, it is\u003cbr /\u003ewhat the ancients called _fate_. That these two are different will\u003cbr /\u003eeasily be clear to anyone who passes in review their respective\u003cbr /\u003eefficacies. Providence is the Divine reason itself, seated in the\u003cbr /\u003eSupreme Being, which disposes all things; fate is the disposition\u003cbr /\u003einherent in all things which move, through which providence joins all\u003cbr /\u003ethings in their proper order. Providence embraces all things, however\u003cbr /\u003edifferent, however infinite; fate sets in motion separately individual\u003cbr /\u003ethings, and assigns to them severally their position, form, and time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;So the unfolding of this temporal order unified into the foreview of\u003cbr /\u003ethe Divine mind is providence, while the same unity broken up and\u003cbr /\u003eunfolded in time is fate. And although these are different, yet is there\u003cbr /\u003ea dependence between them; for the order of destiny issues from the\u003cbr /\u003eessential simplicity of providence. For as the artificer, forming in his\u003cbr /\u003emind beforehand the idea of the thing to be made, carries out his\u003cbr /\u003edesign, and develops from moment to moment what he had before seen in a\u003cbr /\u003esingle instant as a whole, so God in His providence ordains all things\u003cbr /\u003eas parts of a single unchanging whole, but carries out these very\u003cbr /\u003eordinances by fate in a time of manifold unity. So whether fate is\u003cbr /\u003eaccomplished by Divine spirits as the ministers of providence, or by a\u003cbr /\u003esoul, or by the service of all nature–whether by the celestial motion\u003cbr /\u003eof the stars, by the efficacy of angels, or by the many-sided cunning of\u003cbr /\u003edemons–whether by all or by some of these the destined series is woven,\u003cbr /\u003ethis, at least, is manifest: that providence is the fixed and simple\u003cbr /\u003eform of destined events, fate their shifting series in order of time, as\u003cbr /\u003eby the disposal of the Divine simplicity they are to take place. Whereby\u003cbr /\u003eit is that all things which are under fate are subjected also to\u003cbr /\u003eprovidence, on which fate itself is dependent; whereas certain things\u003cbr /\u003ewhich are set under providence are above the chain of fate–viz., those\u003cbr /\u003ethings which by their nearness to the primal Divinity are steadfastly\u003cbr /\u003efixed, and lie outside the order of fate\u0026#39;s movements. For as the\u003cbr /\u003einnermost of several circles revolving round the same centre approaches\u003cbr /\u003ethe simplicity of the midmost point, and is, as it were, a pivot round\u003cbr /\u003ewhich the exterior circles turn, while the outermost, whirled in ampler\u003cbr /\u003eorbit, takes in a wider and wider sweep of space in proportion to its\u003cbr /\u003edeparture from the indivisible unity of the centre–while, further,\u003cbr /\u003ewhatever joins and allies itself to the centre is narrowed to a like\u003cbr /\u003esimplicity, and no longer expands vaguely into space–even so whatsoever\u003cbr /\u003edeparts widely from primal mind is involved more deeply in the meshes of\u003cbr /\u003efate, and things are free from fate in proportion as they seek to come\u003cbr /\u003enearer to that central pivot; while if aught cleaves close to supreme\u003cbr /\u003emind in its absolute fixity, this, too, being free from movement, rises\u003cbr /\u003eabove fate\u0026#39;s necessity. Therefore, as is reasoning to pure intelligence,\u003cbr /\u003eas that which is generated to that which is, time to eternity, a circle\u003cbr /\u003eto its centre, so is the shifting series of fate to the steadfastness\u003cbr /\u003eand simplicity of providence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;It is this causal series which moves heaven and the stars, attempers\u003cbr /\u003ethe elements to mutual accord, and again in turn transforms them into\u003cbr /\u003enew combinations; _this_ which renews the series of all things that are\u003cbr /\u003eborn and die through like successions of germ and birth; it is _its_\u003cbr /\u003eoperation which binds the destinies of men by an indissoluble nexus of\u003cbr /\u003ecausality, and, since it issues in the beginning from unalterable\u003cbr /\u003eprovidence, these destinies also must of necessity be immutable.\u003cbr /\u003eAccordingly, the world is ruled for the best if this unity abiding in\u003cbr /\u003ethe Divine mind puts forth an inflexible order of causes. And this\u003cbr /\u003eorder, by its intrinsic immutability, restricts things mutable which\u003cbr /\u003eotherwise would ebb and flow at random. And so it happens that, although\u003cbr /\u003eto you, who are not altogether capable of understanding this order, all\u003cbr /\u003ethings seem confused and disordered, nevertheless there is everywhere an\u003cbr /\u003eappointed limit which guides all things to good. Verily, nothing can be\u003cbr /\u003edone for the sake of evil even by the wicked themselves; for, as we\u003cbr /\u003eabundantly proved, they seek good, but are drawn out of the way by\u003cbr /\u003eperverse error; far less can this order which sets out from the supreme\u003cbr /\u003ecentre of good turn aside anywhither from the way in which it began.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;\u0026quot;Yet what confusion,\u0026quot; thou wilt say, \u0026quot;can be more unrighteous than that\u003cbr /\u003eprosperity and adversity should indifferently befall the good, what\u003cbr /\u003ethey like and what they loathe come alternately to the bad!\u0026quot; Yes; but\u003cbr /\u003ehave men in real life such soundness of mind that their judgments of\u003cbr /\u003erighteousness and wickedness must necessarily correspond with facts?\u003cbr /\u003eWhy, on this very point their verdicts conflict, and those whom some\u003cbr /\u003edeem worthy of reward, others deem worthy of punishment. Yet granted\u003cbr /\u003ethere were one who could rightly distinguish the good and bad, yet would\u003cbr /\u003ehe be able to look into the soul\u0026#39;s inmost constitution, as it were, if\u003cbr /\u003ewe may borrow an expression used of the body? The marvel here is not\u003cbr /\u003eunlike that which astonishes one who does not know why in health sweet\u003cbr /\u003ethings suit some constitutions, and bitter others, or why some sick men\u003cbr /\u003eare best alleviated by mild remedies, others by severe. But the\u003cbr /\u003ephysician who distinguishes the precise conditions and characteristics\u003cbr /\u003eof health and sickness does not marvel. Now, the health of the soul is\u003cbr /\u003enothing but righteousness, and vice is its sickness. God, the guide and\u003cbr /\u003ephysician of the mind, it is who preserves the good and banishes the\u003cbr /\u003ebad. And He looks forth from the lofty watch-tower of His providence,\u003cbr /\u003eperceives what is suited to each, and assigns what He knows to be\u003cbr /\u003esuitable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;This, then, is what that extraordinary mystery of the order of destiny\u003cbr /\u003ecomes to–that something is done by one who knows, whereat the ignorant\u003cbr /\u003eare astonished. But let us consider a few instances whereby appears what\u003cbr /\u003eis the competency of human reason to fathom the Divine unsearchableness.\u003cbr /\u003eHere is one whom thou deemest the perfection of justice and scrupulous\u003cbr /\u003eintegrity; to all-knowing Providence it seems far otherwise. We all know\u003cbr /\u003eour Lucan\u0026#39;s admonition that it was the winning cause that found favour\u003cbr /\u003ewith the gods, the beaten cause with Cato. So, shouldst thou see\u003cbr /\u003eanything in this world happening differently from thy expectation, doubt\u003cbr /\u003enot but events are rightly ordered; it is in thy judgment that there is\u003cbr /\u003eperverse confusion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Grant, however, there be somewhere found one of so happy a character\u003cbr /\u003ethat God and man alike agree in their judgments about him; yet is he\u003cbr /\u003esomewhat infirm in strength of mind. It may be, if he fall into\u003cbr /\u003eadversity, he will cease to practise that innocency which has failed to\u003cbr /\u003esecure his fortune. Therefore, God\u0026#39;s wise dispensation spares him whom\u003cbr /\u003eadversity might make worse, will not let him suffer who is ill fitted\u003cbr /\u003efor endurance. Another there is perfect in all virtue, so holy and nigh\u003cbr /\u003eto God that providence judges it unlawful that aught untoward should\u003cbr /\u003ebefall him; nay, doth not even permit him to be afflicted with bodily\u003cbr /\u003edisease. As one more excellent than I[N] hath said:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;\u0026quot;The very body of the holy saint\u003cbr /\u003e Is built of purest ether.\u0026quot;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOften it happens that the governance is given to the good that a\u003cbr /\u003erestraint may be put upon superfluity of wickedness. To others\u003cbr /\u003eprovidence assigns some mixed lot suited to their spiritual nature; some\u003cbr /\u003eit will plague lest they grow rank through long prosperity; others it\u003cbr /\u003ewill suffer to be vexed with sore afflictions to confirm their virtues\u003cbr /\u003eby the exercise and practice of patience. Some fear overmuch what they\u003cbr /\u003ehave strength to bear; others despise overmuch that to which their\u003cbr /\u003estrength is unequal. All these it brings to the test of their true self\u003cbr /\u003ethrough misfortune. Some also have bought a name revered to future ages\u003cbr /\u003eat the price of a glorious death; some by invincible constancy under\u003cbr /\u003etheir sufferings have afforded an example to others that virtue cannot\u003cbr /\u003ebe overcome by calamity–all which things, without doubt, come to pass\u003cbr /\u003erightly and in due order, and to the benefit of those to whom they are\u003cbr /\u003eseen to happen.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;As to the other side of the marvel, that the bad now meet with\u003cbr /\u003eaffliction, now get their hearts\u0026#39; desire, this, too, springs from the\u003cbr /\u003esame causes. As to the afflictions, of course no one marvels, because\u003cbr /\u003eall hold the wicked to be ill deserving. The truth is, their punishments\u003cbr /\u003eboth frighten others from crime, and amend those on whom they are\u003cbr /\u003einflicted; while their prosperity is a powerful sermon to the good, what\u003cbr /\u003ejudgments they ought to pass on good fortune of this kind, which often\u003cbr /\u003eattends the wicked so assiduously.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;There is another object which may, I believe, be attained in such\u003cbr /\u003ecases: there is one, perhaps, whose nature is so reckless and violent\u003cbr /\u003ethat poverty would drive him more desperately into crime. _His_ disorder\u003cbr /\u003eprovidence relieves by allowing him to amass money. Such a one, in the\u003cbr /\u003euneasiness of a conscience stained with guilt, while he contrasts his\u003cbr /\u003echaracter with his fortune, perchance grows alarmed lest he should come\u003cbr /\u003eto mourn the loss of that whose possession is so pleasant to him. He\u003cbr /\u003ewill, then, reform his ways, and through the fear of losing his fortune\u003cbr /\u003ehe forsakes his iniquity. Some, through a prosperity unworthily borne,\u003cbr /\u003ehave been hurled headlong to ruin; to some the power of the sword has\u003cbr /\u003ebeen committed, to the end that the good may be tried by discipline, and\u003cbr /\u003ethe bad punished. For while there can be no peace between the righteous\u003cbr /\u003eand the wicked, neither can the wicked agree among themselves. How\u003cbr /\u003eshould they, when each is at variance with himself, because his vices\u003cbr /\u003erend his conscience, and ofttimes they do things which, when they are\u003cbr /\u003edone, they judge ought not to have been done. Hence it is that this\u003cbr /\u003esupreme providence brings to pass this notable marvel–that the bad make\u003cbr /\u003ethe bad good. For some, when they see the injustice which they\u003cbr /\u003ethemselves suffer at the hands of evil-doers, are inflamed with\u003cbr /\u003edetestation of the offenders, and, in the endeavour to be unlike those\u003cbr /\u003ewhom they hate, return to the ways of virtue. It is the Divine power\u003cbr /\u003ealone to which things evil are also good, in that, by putting them to\u003cbr /\u003esuitable use, it bringeth them in the end to some good issue. For order\u003cbr /\u003ein some way or other embraceth all things, so that even that which has\u003cbr /\u003edeparted from the appointed laws of the order, nevertheless falleth\u003cbr /\u003ewithin _an_ order, though _another_ order, that nothing in the realm of\u003cbr /\u003eprovidence may be left to haphazard. But\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;\u0026quot;Hard were the task, as a god, to recount all, nothing omitting.\u0026quot;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNor, truly, is it lawful for man to compass in thought all the mechanism\u003cbr /\u003eof the Divine work, or set it forth in speech. Let us be content to\u003cbr /\u003ehave apprehended this only–that God, the creator of universal nature,\u003cbr /\u003elikewise disposeth all things, and guides them to good; and while He\u003cbr /\u003estudies to preserve in likeness to Himself all that He has created, He\u003cbr /\u003ebanishes all evil from the borders of His commonweal through the links\u003cbr /\u003eof fatal necessity. Whereby it comes to pass that, if thou look to\u003cbr /\u003edisposing providence, thou wilt nowhere find the evils which are\u003cbr /\u003ebelieved so to abound on earth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;But I see thou hast long been burdened with the weight of the subject,\u003cbr /\u003eand fatigued with the prolixity of the argument, and now lookest for\u003cbr /\u003esome refreshment of sweet poesy. Listen, then, and may the draught so\u003cbr /\u003erestore thee that thou wilt bend thy mind more resolutely to what\u003cbr /\u003eremains.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e[N] Parmenides. Boethius seems to forget for the moment that Philosophy\u003cbr /\u003eis speaking.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG VI.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTHE UNIVERSAL AIM.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWouldst thou with unclouded mind\u003cbr /\u003e View the laws by God designed,\u003cbr /\u003e Lift thy steadfast gaze on high\u003cbr /\u003e To the starry canopy;\u003cbr /\u003e See in rightful league of love\u003cbr /\u003e All the constellations move.\u003cbr /\u003e Fiery Sol, in full career,\u003cbr /\u003e Ne\u0026#39;er obstructs cold Phoebe\u0026#39;s sphere;\u003cbr /\u003e When the Bear, at heaven\u0026#39;s height,\u003cbr /\u003e Wheels his coursers\u0026#39; rapid flight,\u003cbr /\u003e Though he sees the starry train\u003cbr /\u003e Sinking in the western main,\u003cbr /\u003e He repines not, nor desires\u003cbr /\u003e In the flood to quench his fires.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn true sequence, as decreed,\u003cbr /\u003e Daily morn and eve succeed;\u003cbr /\u003e Vesper brings the shades of night,\u003cbr /\u003e Lucifer the morning light.\u003cbr /\u003e Love, in alternation due,\u003cbr /\u003e Still the cycle doth renew,\u003cbr /\u003e And discordant strife is driven\u003cbr /\u003e From the starry realm of heaven.\u003cbr /\u003e Thus, in wondrous amity,\u003cbr /\u003e Warring elements agree;\u003cbr /\u003e Hot and cold, and moist and dry,\u003cbr /\u003e Lay their ancient quarrel by;\u003cbr /\u003e High the flickering flame ascends,\u003cbr /\u003e Downward earth for ever tends.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo the year in spring\u0026#39;s mild hours\u003cbr /\u003e Loads the air with scent of flowers;\u003cbr /\u003e Summer paints the golden grain;\u003cbr /\u003e Then, when autumn comes again,\u003cbr /\u003e Bright with fruit the orchards glow;\u003cbr /\u003e Winter brings the rain and snow.\u003cbr /\u003e Thus the seasons\u0026#39; fixed progression,\u003cbr /\u003e Tempered in a due succession,\u003cbr /\u003e Nourishes and brings to birth\u003cbr /\u003e All that lives and breathes on earth.\u003cbr /\u003e Then, soon run life\u0026#39;s little day,\u003cbr /\u003e All it brought it takes away.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut One sits and guides the reins,\u003cbr /\u003e He who made and all sustains;\u003cbr /\u003e King and Lord and Fountain-head,\u003cbr /\u003e Judge most holy, Law most dread;\u003cbr /\u003e Now impels and now keeps back,\u003cbr /\u003e Holds each waverer in the track.\u003cbr /\u003e Else, were once the power withheld\u003cbr /\u003e That the circling spheres compelled\u003cbr /\u003e In their orbits to revolve,\u003cbr /\u003e This world\u0026#39;s order would dissolve,\u003cbr /\u003e And th\u0026#39; harmonious whole would all\u003cbr /\u003e In one hideous ruin fall.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut through this connected frame\u003cbr /\u003e Runs one universal aim;\u003cbr /\u003e Towards the Good do all things tend,\u003cbr /\u003e Many paths, but one the end.\u003cbr /\u003e For naught lasts, unless it turns\u003cbr /\u003e Backward in its course, and yearns\u003cbr /\u003e To that Source to flow again\u003cbr /\u003e Whence its being first was ta\u0026#39;en.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Dost thou, then, see the consequence of all that we have said?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Nay; what consequence?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;That absolutely every fortune is good fortune.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;And how can that be?\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Attend,\u0026#39; said she. \u0026#39;Since every fortune, welcome and unwelcome alike,\u003cbr /\u003ehas for its object the reward or trial of the good, and the punishing or\u003cbr /\u003eamending of the bad, every fortune must be good, since it is either just\u003cbr /\u003eor useful.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;The reasoning is exceeding true,\u0026#39; said I, \u0026#39;the conclusion, so long as I\u003cbr /\u003ereflect upon the providence and fate of which thou hast taught me, based\u003cbr /\u003eon a strong foundation. Yet, with thy leave, we will count it among\u003cbr /\u003ethose which just now thou didst set down as paradoxical.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;And why so?\u0026#39; said she.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Because ordinary speech is apt to assert, and that frequently, that\u003cbr /\u003esome men\u0026#39;s fortune is bad.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Shall we, then, for awhile approach more nearly to the language of the\u003cbr /\u003evulgar, that we may not seem to have departed too far from the usages of\u003cbr /\u003emen?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;At thy good pleasure,\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;That which advantageth thou callest good, dost thou not?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Certainly.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;And that which either tries or amends advantageth?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Granted.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Is good, then?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Of course.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Well, this is _their_ case who have attained virtue and wage war with\u003cbr /\u003eadversity, or turn from vice and lay hold on the path of virtue.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;I cannot deny it.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;What of the good fortune which is given as reward of the good–do the\u003cbr /\u003evulgar adjudge it bad?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Anything but that; they deem it to be the best, as indeed it is.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;What, then, of that which remains, which, though it is harsh, puts the\u003cbr /\u003erestraint of just punishment on the bad–does popular opinion deem it\u003cbr /\u003egood?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Nay; of all that can be imagined, it is accounted the most miserable.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Observe, then, if, in following popular opinion, we have not ended in a\u003cbr /\u003econclusion quite paradoxical.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;How so?\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Why, it results from our admissions that of all who have attained, or\u003cbr /\u003eare advancing in, or are aiming at virtue, the fortune is in every case\u003cbr /\u003egood, while for those who remain in their wickedness fortune is always\u003cbr /\u003eutterly bad.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;It is true,\u0026#39; said I; \u0026#39;yet no one dare acknowledge it.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Wherefore,\u0026#39; said she, \u0026#39;the wise man ought not to take it ill, if ever\u003cbr /\u003ehe is involved in one of fortune\u0026#39;s conflicts, any more than it becomes a\u003cbr /\u003ebrave soldier to be offended when at any time the trumpet sounds for\u003cbr /\u003ebattle. The time of trial is the express opportunity for the one to win\u003cbr /\u003eglory, for the other to perfect his wisdom. Hence, indeed, virtue gets\u003cbr /\u003eits name, because, relying on its own efficacy, it yieldeth not to\u003cbr /\u003eadversity. And ye who have taken your stand on virtue\u0026#39;s steep ascent,\u003cbr /\u003eit is not for you to be dissolved in delights or enfeebled by pleasure;\u003cbr /\u003eye close in conflict–yea, in conflict most sharp–with all fortune\u0026#39;s\u003cbr /\u003evicissitudes, lest ye suffer foul fortune to overwhelm or fair fortune\u003cbr /\u003eto corrupt you. Hold the mean with all your strength. Whatever falls\u003cbr /\u003eshort of this, or goes beyond, is fraught with scorn of happiness, and\u003cbr /\u003emisses the reward of toil. It rests with you to make your fortune what\u003cbr /\u003eyou will. Verily, every harsh-seeming fortune, unless it either\u003cbr /\u003edisciplines or amends, is punishment.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG VII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTHE HERO\u0026#39;S PATH.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTen years a tedious warfare raged,\u003cbr /\u003e Ere Ilium\u0026#39;s smoking ruins paid\u003cbr /\u003e For wedlock stained and faith betrayed,\u003cbr /\u003e And great Atrides\u0026#39; wrath assuaged.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut when heaven\u0026#39;s anger asked a life,\u003cbr /\u003e And baffling winds his course withstood,\u003cbr /\u003e The king put off his fatherhood,\u003cbr /\u003e And slew his child with priestly knife.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen by the cavern\u0026#39;s glimmering light\u003cbr /\u003e His comrades dear Odysseus saw\u003cbr /\u003e In the huge Cyclops\u0026#39; hideous maw\u003cbr /\u003e Engulfed, he wept the piteous sight.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut blinded soon, and wild with pain–\u003cbr /\u003e In bitter tears and sore annoy–\u003cbr /\u003e For that foul feast\u0026#39;s unholy joy\u003cbr /\u003e Grim Polyphemus paid again.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHis labours for Alcides win\u003cbr /\u003e A name of glory far and wide;\u003cbr /\u003e He tamed the Centaur\u0026#39;s haughty pride,\u003cbr /\u003e And from the lion reft his skin.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe foul birds with sure darts he slew;\u003cbr /\u003e The golden fruit he stole–in vain\u003cbr /\u003e The dragon\u0026#39;s watch; with triple chain\u003cbr /\u003e From hell\u0026#39;s depths Cerberus he drew.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith their fierce lord\u0026#39;s own flesh he fed\u003cbr /\u003e The wild steeds; Hydra overcame\u003cbr /\u003e With fire. \u0026#39;Neath his own waves in shame\u003cbr /\u003e Maimed Achelous hid his head.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHuge Cacus for his crimes was slain;\u003cbr /\u003e On Libya\u0026#39;s sands Ant\u0026#230;us hurled;\u003cbr /\u003e The shoulders that upheld the world\u003cbr /\u003e The great boar\u0026#39;s dribbled spume did stain.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLast toil of all–his might sustained\u003cbr /\u003e The ball of heaven, nor did he bend\u003cbr /\u003e Beneath; this toil, his labour\u0026#39;s end,\u003cbr /\u003e The prize of heaven\u0026#39;s high glory gained.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBrave hearts, press on! Lo, heavenward lead\u003cbr /\u003e These bright examples! From the fight\u003cbr /\u003e Turn not your backs in coward flight;\u003cbr /\u003e Earth\u0026#39;s conflict won, the stars your meed!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBOOK V.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFREE WILL AND GOD\u0026#39;S FOREKNOWLEDGE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSUMMARY.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCH. I. Boethius asks if there is really any such thing as chance.\u003cbr /\u003e Philosophy answers, in conformity with Aristotle\u0026#39;s definition\u003cbr /\u003e (Phys., II. iv.), that chance is merely relative to human purpose,\u003cbr /\u003e and that what seems fortuitous really depends on a more subtle form\u003cbr /\u003e of causation.–CH. II. Has man, then, any freedom, if the reign of\u003cbr /\u003e law is thus absolute? Freedom of choice, replies Philosophy, is a\u003cbr /\u003e necessary attribute of reason. Man has a measure of freedom, though\u003cbr /\u003e a less perfect freedom than divine natures.–CH. III. But how can\u003cbr /\u003e man\u0026#39;s freedom be reconciled with God\u0026#39;s absolute foreknowledge? If\u003cbr /\u003e God\u0026#39;s foreknowledge be certain, it seems to exclude the possibility\u003cbr /\u003e of man\u0026#39;s free will. But if man has no freedom of choice, it\u003cbr /\u003e follows that rewards and punishments are unjust as well as useless;\u003cbr /\u003e that merit and demerit are mere names; that God is the cause of\u003cbr /\u003e men\u0026#39;s wickednesses; that prayer is meaningless.–CH. IV. The\u003cbr /\u003e explanation is that man\u0026#39;s reasoning faculties are not adequate to\u003cbr /\u003e the apprehension of the ways of God\u0026#39;s foreknowledge. If we could\u003cbr /\u003e know, as He knows, all that is most perplexing in this problem\u003cbr /\u003e would be made plain. For knowledge depends not on the nature of the\u003cbr /\u003e thing known, but on the faculty of the knower.–CH. V. Now, where\u003cbr /\u003e our senses conflict with our reason, we defer the judgment of the\u003cbr /\u003e lower faculty to the judgment of the higher. Our present perplexity\u003cbr /\u003e arises from our viewing God\u0026#39;s foreknowledge from the standpoint of\u003cbr /\u003e human reason. We must try and rise to the higher standpoint of\u003cbr /\u003e God\u0026#39;s immediate intuition.–CH. VI. To understand this higher form\u003cbr /\u003e of cognition, we must consider God\u0026#39;s nature. God is eternal.\u003cbr /\u003e Eternity is more than mere everlasting duration. Accordingly, His\u003cbr /\u003e knowledge surveys past and future in the timelessness of an eternal\u003cbr /\u003e present. His foreseeing is seeing. Yet this foreseeing does not in\u003cbr /\u003e itself impose necessity, any more than our seeing things happen\u003cbr /\u003e makes their happening necessary. We may, however, if we please,\u003cbr /\u003e distinguish two necessities–one absolute, the other conditional on\u003cbr /\u003e knowledge. In this conditional sense alone do the things which God\u003cbr /\u003e foresees necessarily come to pass. But this kind of necessity\u003cbr /\u003e affects not the nature of things. It leaves the reality of free\u003cbr /\u003e will unimpaired, and the evils feared do not ensue. Our\u003cbr /\u003e responsibility is great, since all that we do is done in the sight\u003cbr /\u003e of all-seeing Providence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBOOK V.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eShe ceased, and was about to pass on in her discourse to the exposition\u003cbr /\u003eof other matters, when I break in and say: \u0026#39;Excellent is thine\u003cbr /\u003eexhortation, and such as well beseemeth thy high authority; but I am\u003cbr /\u003eeven now experiencing one of the many difficulties which, as thou saidst\u003cbr /\u003ebut now, beset the question of providence. I want to know whether thou\u003cbr /\u003edeemest that there is any such thing as chance at all, and, if so, what\u003cbr /\u003eit is.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen she made answer: \u0026#39;I am anxious to fulfil my promise completely, and\u003cbr /\u003eopen to thee a way of return to thy native land. As for these matters,\u003cbr /\u003ethough very useful to know, they are yet a little removed from the path\u003cbr /\u003eof our design, and I fear lest digressions should fatigue thee, and thou\u003cbr /\u003eshouldst find thyself unequal to completing the direct journey to our\u003cbr /\u003egoal.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Have no fear for that,\u0026#39; said I. \u0026#39;It is rest to me to learn, where\u003cbr /\u003elearning brings delight so exquisite, especially when thy argument has\u003cbr /\u003ebeen built up on all sides with undoubted conviction, and no place is\u003cbr /\u003eleft for uncertainty in what follows.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eShe made answer: \u0026#39;I will accede to thy request;\u0026#39; and forthwith she thus\u003cbr /\u003ebegan: \u0026#39;If chance be defined as a result produced by random movement\u003cbr /\u003ewithout any link of causal connection, I roundly affirm that there is no\u003cbr /\u003esuch thing as chance at all, and consider the word to be altogether\u003cbr /\u003ewithout meaning, except as a symbol of the thing designated. What place\u003cbr /\u003ecan be left for random action, when God constraineth all things to\u003cbr /\u003eorder? For \u0026quot;ex nihilo nihil\u0026quot; is sound doctrine which none of the\u003cbr /\u003eancients gainsaid, although they used it of material substance, not of\u003cbr /\u003ethe efficient principle; this they laid down as a kind of basis for all\u003cbr /\u003etheir reasonings concerning nature. Now, if a thing arise without\u003cbr /\u003ecauses, it will appear to have arisen from nothing. But if this cannot\u003cbr /\u003ebe, neither is it possible for there to be chance in accordance with the\u003cbr /\u003edefinition just given.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Well,\u0026#39; said I, \u0026#39;is there, then, nothing which can properly be called\u003cbr /\u003echance or accident, or is there something to which these names are\u003cbr /\u003eappropriate, though its nature is dark to the vulgar?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Our good Aristotle,\u0026#39; says she, \u0026#39;has defined it concisely in his\u003cbr /\u003e\u0026quot;Physics,\u0026quot; and closely in accordance with the truth.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;How, pray?\u0026#39; said I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Thus,\u0026#39; says she: \u0026#39;Whenever something is done for the sake of a\u003cbr /\u003eparticular end, and for certain reasons some other result than that\u003cbr /\u003edesigned ensues, this is called chance; for instance, if a man is\u003cbr /\u003edigging the earth for tillage, and finds a mass of buried gold. Now,\u003cbr /\u003esuch a find is regarded as accidental; yet it is not \u0026quot;ex nihilo,\u0026quot; for it\u003cbr /\u003ehas its proper causes, the unforeseen and unexpected concurrence of\u003cbr /\u003ewhich has brought the chance about. For had not the cultivator been\u003cbr /\u003edigging, had not the man who hid the money buried it in that precise\u003cbr /\u003espot, the gold would not have been found. These, then, are the reasons\u003cbr /\u003ewhy the find is a chance one, in that it results from causes which met\u003cbr /\u003etogether and concurred, not from any intention on the part of the\u003cbr /\u003ediscoverer. Since neither he who buried the gold nor he who worked in\u003cbr /\u003ethe field _intended_ that the money should be found, but, as I said, it\u003cbr /\u003e_happened_ by coincidence that one dug where the other buried the\u003cbr /\u003etreasure. We may, then, define chance as being an unexpected result\u003cbr /\u003eflowing from a concurrence of causes where the several factors had some\u003cbr /\u003edefinite end. But the meeting and concurrence of these causes arises\u003cbr /\u003efrom that inevitable chain of order which, flowing from the\u003cbr /\u003efountain-head of Providence, disposes all things in their due time and\u003cbr /\u003eplace.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCHANCE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the rugged Persian highlands,\u003cbr /\u003e Where the masters of the bow\u003cbr /\u003e Skill to feign a flight, and, fleeing,\u003cbr /\u003e Hurl their darts and pierce the foe;\u003cbr /\u003e There the Tigris and Euphrates\u003cbr /\u003e At one source[O] their waters blend,\u003cbr /\u003e Soon to draw apart, and plainward\u003cbr /\u003e Each its separate way to wend.\u003cbr /\u003e When once more their waters mingle\u003cbr /\u003e In a channel deep and wide,\u003cbr /\u003e All the flotsam comes together\u003cbr /\u003e That is borne upon the tide:\u003cbr /\u003e Ships, and trunks of trees, uprooted\u003cbr /\u003e In the torrent\u0026#39;s wild career,\u003cbr /\u003e Meet, as \u0026#39;mid the swirling waters\u003cbr /\u003e Chance their random way may steer.\u003cbr /\u003e Yet the shelving of the channel\u003cbr /\u003e And the flowing water\u0026#39;s force\u003cbr /\u003e Guides each movement, and determines\u003cbr /\u003e Every floating fragment\u0026#39;s course.\u003cbr /\u003e Thus, where\u0026#39;er the drift of hazard\u003cbr /\u003e Seems most unrestrained to flow,\u003cbr /\u003e Chance herself is reined and bitted,\u003cbr /\u003e And the curb of law doth know.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e[O] This is not, of course, literally true, though the Tigris and\u003cbr /\u003eEuphrates rise in the same mountain district.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;I am following needfully,\u0026#39; said I, \u0026#39;and I agree that it is as thou\u003cbr /\u003esayest. But in this series of linked causes is there any freedom left to\u003cbr /\u003eour will, or does the chain of fate bind also the very motions of our\u003cbr /\u003esouls?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;There is freedom,\u0026#39; said she; \u0026#39;nor, indeed, can any creature be\u003cbr /\u003erational, unless he be endowed with free will. For that which hath the\u003cbr /\u003enatural use of reason has the faculty of discriminative judgment, and of\u003cbr /\u003eitself distinguishes what is to be shunned or desired. Now, everyone\u003cbr /\u003eseeks what he judges desirable, and avoids what he thinks should be\u003cbr /\u003eshunned. Wherefore, beings endowed with reason possess also the faculty\u003cbr /\u003eof free choice and refusal. But I suppose this faculty not equal alike\u003cbr /\u003ein all. The higher Divine essences possess a clear-sighted judgment, an\u003cbr /\u003euncorrupt will, and an effective power of accomplishing their wishes.\u003cbr /\u003eHuman souls must needs be comparatively free while they abide in the\u003cbr /\u003econtemplation of the Divine mind, less free when they pass into bodily\u003cbr /\u003eform, and still less, again, when they are enwrapped in earthly members.\u003cbr /\u003eBut when they are given over to vices, and fall from the possession of\u003cbr /\u003etheir proper reason, then indeed their condition is utter slavery. For\u003cbr /\u003ewhen they let their gaze fall from the light of highest truth to the\u003cbr /\u003elower world where darkness reigns, soon ignorance blinds their vision;\u003cbr /\u003ethey are disturbed by baneful affections, by yielding and assenting to\u003cbr /\u003ewhich they help to promote the slavery in which they are involved, and\u003cbr /\u003eare in a manner led captive by reason of their very liberty. Yet He who\u003cbr /\u003eseeth all things from eternity beholdeth these things with the eyes of\u003cbr /\u003eHis providence, and assigneth to each what is predestined for it by its\u003cbr /\u003emerits:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;\u0026quot;All things surveying, all things overhearing.\u0026#39;\u0026quot;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG II.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTHE TRUE SUN.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHomer with mellifluous tongue\u003cbr /\u003e Phoebus\u0026#39; glorious light hath sung,\u003cbr /\u003e Hymning high his praise;\u003cbr /\u003e Yet _his_ feeble rays\u003cbr /\u003e Ocean\u0026#39;s hollows may not brighten,\u003cbr /\u003e Nor earth\u0026#39;s central gloom enlighten.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the might of Him, who skilled\u003cbr /\u003e This great universe to build,\u003cbr /\u003e Is not thus confined;\u003cbr /\u003e Not earth\u0026#39;s solid rind,\u003cbr /\u003e Nor night\u0026#39;s blackest canopy,\u003cbr /\u003e Baffle His all-seeing eye.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll that is, hath been, shall be,\u003cbr /\u003e In one glance\u0026#39;s compass, He\u003cbr /\u003e Limitless descries;\u003cbr /\u003e And, save His, no eyes\u003cbr /\u003e All the world survey–no, none!\u003cbr /\u003e _Him_, then, truly name the Sun.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen said I: \u0026#39;But now I am once more perplexed by a problem yet more\u003cbr /\u003edifficult.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;And what is that?\u0026#39; said she; \u0026#39;yet, in truth, I can guess what it is\u003cbr /\u003ethat troubles you.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;It seems,\u0026#39; said I, \u0026#39;too much of a paradox and a contradiction that God\u003cbr /\u003eshould know all things, and yet there should be free will. For if God\u003cbr /\u003eforesees everything, and can in no wise be deceived, that which\u003cbr /\u003eprovidence foresees to be about to happen must necessarily come to pass.\u003cbr /\u003eWherefore, if from eternity He foreknows not only what men will do, but\u003cbr /\u003ealso their designs and purposes, there can be no freedom of the will,\u003cbr /\u003eseeing that nothing can be done, nor can any sort of purpose be\u003cbr /\u003eentertained, save such as a Divine providence, incapable of being\u003cbr /\u003edeceived, has perceived beforehand. For if the issues can be turned\u003cbr /\u003easide to some other end than that foreseen by providence, there will not\u003cbr /\u003ethen be any sure foreknowledge of the future, but uncertain conjecture\u003cbr /\u003einstead, and to think this of God I deem impiety.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Moreover, I do not approve the reasoning by which some think to solve\u003cbr /\u003ethis puzzle. For they say that it is not because God has foreseen the\u003cbr /\u003ecoming of an event that _therefore_ it is sure to come to pass, but,\u003cbr /\u003econversely, because something is about to come to pass, it cannot be\u003cbr /\u003ehidden from Divine providence; and accordingly the necessity passes to\u003cbr /\u003ethe opposite side, and it is not that what is foreseen must necessarily\u003cbr /\u003ecome to pass, but that what is about to come to pass must necessarily be\u003cbr /\u003eforeseen. But this is just as if the matter in debate were, which is\u003cbr /\u003ecause and which effect–whether foreknowledge of the future cause of the\u003cbr /\u003enecessity, or the necessity of the future of the foreknowledge. But we\u003cbr /\u003eneed not be at the pains of demonstrating that, whatsoever be the order\u003cbr /\u003eof the causal sequence, the occurrence of things foreseen is necessary,\u003cbr /\u003eeven though the foreknowledge of future events does not in itself\u003cbr /\u003eimpose upon them the necessity of their occurrence. For example, if a\u003cbr /\u003eman be seated, the supposition of his being seated is necessarily true;\u003cbr /\u003eand, conversely, if the supposition of his being seated is true, because\u003cbr /\u003ehe is really seated, he must necessarily be sitting. So, in either case,\u003cbr /\u003ethere is some necessity involved–in this latter case, the necessity of\u003cbr /\u003ethe fact; in the former, of the truth of the statement. But in both\u003cbr /\u003ecases the sitter is not therefore seated because the opinion is true,\u003cbr /\u003ebut rather the opinion is true because antecedently he was sitting as a\u003cbr /\u003ematter of fact. Thus, though the cause of the truth of the opinion comes\u003cbr /\u003efrom the other side,[P] yet there is a necessity on both sides alike. We\u003cbr /\u003ecan obviously reason similarly in the case of providence and the future.\u003cbr /\u003eEven if future events are foreseen because they are about to happen, and\u003cbr /\u003edo not come to pass because they are foreseen, still, all the same,\u003cbr /\u003ethere is a necessity, both that they should be foreseen by God as about\u003cbr /\u003eto come to pass, and that when they are foreseen they should happen, and\u003cbr /\u003ethis is sufficient for the destruction of free will. However, it is\u003cbr /\u003epreposterous to speak of the occurrence of events in time as the cause\u003cbr /\u003eof eternal foreknowledge. And yet if we believe that God foresees future\u003cbr /\u003eevents because they are about to come to pass, what is it but to think\u003cbr /\u003ethat the occurrence of events is the cause of His supreme providence?\u003cbr /\u003eFurther, just as when I _know_ that anything is, that thing\u003cbr /\u003e_necessarily_ is, so when I know that anything will be, it will\u003cbr /\u003e_necessarily_ be. It follows, then, that things foreknown come to pass\u003cbr /\u003einevitably.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Lastly, to think of a thing as being in any way other than what it is,\u003cbr /\u003eis not only not knowledge, but it is false opinion widely different from\u003cbr /\u003ethe truth of knowledge. Consequently, if anything is about to be, and\u003cbr /\u003eyet its occurrence is not certain and necessary, how can anyone foreknow\u003cbr /\u003ethat it will occur? For just as knowledge itself is free from all\u003cbr /\u003eadmixture of falsity, so any conception drawn from knowledge cannot be\u003cbr /\u003eother than as it is conceived. For this, indeed, is the cause why\u003cbr /\u003eknowledge is free from falsehood, because of necessity each thing must\u003cbr /\u003ecorrespond exactly with the knowledge which grasps its nature. In what\u003cbr /\u003eway, then, are we to suppose that God foreknows these uncertainties as\u003cbr /\u003eabout to come to pass? For if He thinks of events which possibly may not\u003cbr /\u003ehappen at all as inevitably destined to come to pass, He is deceived;\u003cbr /\u003eand this it is not only impious to believe, but even so much as to\u003cbr /\u003eexpress in words. If, on the other hand, He sees them in the future as\u003cbr /\u003ethey are in such a sense as to know that they may equally come to pass\u003cbr /\u003eor not, what sort of foreknowledge is this which comprehends nothing\u003cbr /\u003ecertain nor fixed? What better is this than the absurd vaticination of\u003cbr /\u003eTeiresias?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;\u0026quot;Whate\u0026#39;er I say\u003cbr /\u003e Shall either come to pass–or not.\u0026quot;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn that case, too, in what would Divine providence surpass human opinion\u003cbr /\u003eif it holds for uncertain things the occurrence of which is uncertain,\u003cbr /\u003eeven as men do? But if at that perfectly sure Fountain-head of all\u003cbr /\u003ethings no shadow of uncertainty can possibly be found, then the\u003cbr /\u003eoccurrence of those things which He has surely foreknown as coming is\u003cbr /\u003ecertain. Wherefore there can be no freedom in human actions and designs;\u003cbr /\u003ebut the Divine mind, which foresees all things without possibility of\u003cbr /\u003emistake, ties and binds them down to one only issue. But this admission\u003cbr /\u003eonce made, what an upset of human affairs manifestly ensues! Vainly are\u003cbr /\u003erewards and punishments proposed for the good and bad, since no free and\u003cbr /\u003evoluntary motion of the will has deserved either one or the other; nay,\u003cbr /\u003ethe punishment of the wicked and the reward of the righteous, which is\u003cbr /\u003enow esteemed the perfection of justice, will seem the most flagrant\u003cbr /\u003einjustice, since men are determined either way not by their own proper\u003cbr /\u003evolition, but by the necessity of what must surely be. And therefore\u003cbr /\u003eneither virtue nor vice is anything, but rather good and ill desert are\u003cbr /\u003econfounded together without distinction. Moreover, seeing that the whole\u003cbr /\u003ecourse of events is deduced from providence, and nothing is left free to\u003cbr /\u003ehuman design, it comes to pass that our vices also are referred to the\u003cbr /\u003eAuthor of all good–a thought than which none more abominable can\u003cbr /\u003epossibly be conceived. Again, no ground is left for hope or prayer,\u003cbr /\u003esince how can we hope for blessings, or pray for mercy, when every\u003cbr /\u003eobject of desire depends upon the links of an unalterable chain of\u003cbr /\u003ecausation? Gone, then, is the one means of intercourse between God and\u003cbr /\u003eman–the communion of hope and prayer–if it be true that we ever earn\u003cbr /\u003ethe inestimable recompense of the Divine favour at the price of a due\u003cbr /\u003ehumility; for this is the one way whereby men seem able to hold\u003cbr /\u003ecommunion with God, and are joined to that unapproachable light by the\u003cbr /\u003every act of supplication, even before they obtain their petitions. Then,\u003cbr /\u003esince these things can scarcely be believed to have any efficacy, if the\u003cbr /\u003enecessity of future events be admitted, what means will there be whereby\u003cbr /\u003ewe may be brought near and cleave to Him who is the supreme Head of all?\u003cbr /\u003eWherefore it needs must be that the human race, even as thou didst\u003cbr /\u003eerstwhile declare in song, parted and dissevered from its Source, should\u003cbr /\u003efall to ruin.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e[P] _I.e._, the necessity of the truth of the statement from the fact.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG III.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTRUTH\u0026#39;S PARADOXES.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhy does a strange discordance break\u003cbr /\u003e The ordered scheme\u0026#39;s fair harmony?\u003cbr /\u003e Hath God decreed \u0026#39;twixt truth and truth\u003cbr /\u003e There may such lasting warfare be,\u003cbr /\u003e That truths, each severally plain,\u003cbr /\u003e We strive to reconcile in vain?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOr is the discord not in truth,\u003cbr /\u003e Since truth is self consistent ever?\u003cbr /\u003e But, close in fleshly wrappings held,\u003cbr /\u003e The blinded mind of man can never\u003cbr /\u003e Discern–so faint her taper shines–\u003cbr /\u003e The subtle chain that all combines?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAh! then why burns man\u0026#39;s restless mind\u003cbr /\u003e Truth\u0026#39;s hidden portals to unclose?\u003cbr /\u003e Knows he already what he seeks?\u003cbr /\u003e Why toil to seek it, if he knows?\u003cbr /\u003e Yet, haply if he knoweth not,\u003cbr /\u003e Why blindly seek he knows not what?[Q]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWho for a good he knows not sighs?\u003cbr /\u003e Who can an unknown end pursue?\u003cbr /\u003e How find? How e\u0026#39;en when haply found\u003cbr /\u003e Hail that strange form he never knew?\u003cbr /\u003e Or is it that man\u0026#39;s inmost soul\u003cbr /\u003e Once knew each part and knew the whole?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, though by fleshly vapours dimmed,\u003cbr /\u003e Not all forgot her visions past;\u003cbr /\u003e For while the several parts are lost,\u003cbr /\u003e To the one whole she cleaveth fast;\u003cbr /\u003e Whence he who yearns the truth to find\u003cbr /\u003e Is neither sound of sight nor blind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor neither does he know in full,\u003cbr /\u003e Nor is he reft of knowledge quite;\u003cbr /\u003e But, holding still to what is left,\u003cbr /\u003e He gropes in the uncertain light,\u003cbr /\u003e And by the part that still survives\u003cbr /\u003e To win back all he bravely strives.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e[Q] Compare Plato, \u0026#39;Meno,\u0026#39; 80; Jowett, vol. ii., pp. 39, 40.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIV.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen said she: \u0026#39;This debate about providence is an old one, and is\u003cbr /\u003evigorously discussed by Cicero in his \u0026quot;Divination\u0026quot;; thou also hast long\u003cbr /\u003eand earnestly pondered the problem, yet no one has had diligence and\u003cbr /\u003eperseverance enough to find a solution. And the reason of this obscurity\u003cbr /\u003eis that the movement of human reasoning cannot cope with the simplicity\u003cbr /\u003eof the Divine foreknowledge; for if a conception of its nature could in\u003cbr /\u003eany wise be framed, no shadow of uncertainty would remain. With a view\u003cbr /\u003eof making this at last clear and plain, I will begin by considering the\u003cbr /\u003earguments by which thou art swayed. First, I inquire into the reasons\u003cbr /\u003ewhy thou art dissatisfied with the solution proposed, which is to the\u003cbr /\u003eeffect that, seeing the fact of foreknowledge is not thought the cause\u003cbr /\u003eof the necessity of future events, foreknowledge is not to be deemed any\u003cbr /\u003ehindrance to the freedom of the will. Now, surely the sole ground on\u003cbr /\u003ewhich thou arguest the necessity of the future is that things which are\u003cbr /\u003eforeknown cannot fail to come to pass. But if, as thou wert ready to\u003cbr /\u003eacknowledge just now, the fact of foreknowledge imposes no necessity on\u003cbr /\u003ethings future, what reason is there for supposing the results of\u003cbr /\u003evoluntary action constrained to a fixed issue? Suppose, for the sake of\u003cbr /\u003eargument, and to see what follows, we assume that there is no\u003cbr /\u003eforeknowledge. Are willed actions, then, tied down to any necessity in\u003cbr /\u003e_this_ case?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Certainly not.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Let us assume foreknowledge again, but without its involving any actual\u003cbr /\u003enecessity; the freedom of the will, I imagine, will remain in complete\u003cbr /\u003eintegrity. But thou wilt say that, even although the foreknowledge is\u003cbr /\u003enot the necessity of the future event\u0026#39;s occurrence, yet it is a sign\u003cbr /\u003ethat it will necessarily happen. Granted; but in this case it is plain\u003cbr /\u003ethat, even if there had been no foreknowledge, the issues would have\u003cbr /\u003ebeen inevitably certain. For a sign only indicates something which is,\u003cbr /\u003edoes not bring to pass that of which it is the sign. We require to show\u003cbr /\u003ebeforehand that all things, without exception, happen of necessity in\u003cbr /\u003eorder that a preconception may be a sign of this necessity. Otherwise,\u003cbr /\u003eif there is no such universal necessity, neither can any preconception\u003cbr /\u003ebe a sign of a necessity which exists not. Manifestly, too, a proof\u003cbr /\u003eestablished on firm grounds of reason must be drawn not from signs and\u003cbr /\u003eloose general arguments, but from suitable and necessary causes. But how\u003cbr /\u003ecan it be that things foreseen should ever fail to come to pass? Why,\u003cbr /\u003ethis is to suppose us to believe that the events which providence\u003cbr /\u003eforesees to be coming were not about to happen, instead of our supposing\u003cbr /\u003ethat, although they should come to pass, yet there was no necessity\u003cbr /\u003einvolved in their own nature compelling their occurrence. Take an\u003cbr /\u003eillustration that will help to convey my meaning. There are many things\u003cbr /\u003ewhich we see taking place before our eyes–the movements of charioteers,\u003cbr /\u003efor instance, in guiding and turning their cars, and so on. Now, is any\u003cbr /\u003eone of these movements compelled by any necessity?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;No; certainly not. There would be no efficacy in skill if all motions\u003cbr /\u003etook place perforce.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Then, things which in taking place are free from any necessity as to\u003cbr /\u003etheir being in the present must also, before they take place, be about\u003cbr /\u003eto happen without necessity. Wherefore there are things which will come\u003cbr /\u003eto pass, the occurrence of which is perfectly free from necessity. At\u003cbr /\u003eall events, I imagine that no one will deny that things now taking place\u003cbr /\u003ewere about to come to pass before they were actually happening. Such\u003cbr /\u003ethings, however much foreknown, are in their occurrence _free_. For even\u003cbr /\u003eas knowledge of things present imports no necessity into things that are\u003cbr /\u003etaking place, so foreknowledge of the future imports none into things\u003cbr /\u003ethat are about to come. But this, thou wilt say, is the very point in\u003cbr /\u003edispute–whether any foreknowing is possible of things whose occurrence\u003cbr /\u003eis not necessary. For here there seems to thee a contradiction, and, if\u003cbr /\u003ethey are foreseen, their necessity follows; whereas if there is no\u003cbr /\u003enecessity, they can by no means be foreknown; and thou thinkest that\u003cbr /\u003enothing can be grasped as known unless it is certain, but if things\u003cbr /\u003ewhose occurrence is uncertain are foreknown as certain, this is the very\u003cbr /\u003emist of opinion, not the truth of knowledge. For to think of things\u003cbr /\u003eotherwise than as they are, thou believest to be incompatible with the\u003cbr /\u003esoundness of knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Now, the cause of the mistake is this–that men think that all\u003cbr /\u003eknowledge is cognized purely by the nature and efficacy of the thing\u003cbr /\u003eknown. Whereas the case is the very reverse: all that is known is\u003cbr /\u003egrasped not conformably to its own efficacy, but rather conformably to\u003cbr /\u003ethe faculty of the knower. An example will make this clear: the\u003cbr /\u003eroundness of a body is recognised in one way by sight, in another by\u003cbr /\u003etouch. Sight looks upon it from a distance as a whole by a simultaneous\u003cbr /\u003ereflection of rays; touch grasps the roundness piecemeal, by contact and\u003cbr /\u003eattachment to the surface, and by actual movement round the periphery\u003cbr /\u003eitself. Man himself, likewise, is viewed in one way by Sense, in another\u003cbr /\u003eby Imagination, in another way, again, by Thought, in another by pure\u003cbr /\u003eIntelligence. Sense judges figure clothed in material substance,\u003cbr /\u003eImagination figure alone without matter. Thought transcends this again,\u003cbr /\u003eand by its contemplation of universals considers the type itself which\u003cbr /\u003eis contained in the individual. The eye of Intelligence is yet more\u003cbr /\u003eexalted; for overpassing the sphere of the universal, it will behold\u003cbr /\u003eabsolute form itself by the pure force of the mind\u0026#39;s vision. Wherein the\u003cbr /\u003emain point to be considered is this: the higher faculty of comprehension\u003cbr /\u003eembraces the lower, while the lower cannot rise to the higher. For Sense\u003cbr /\u003ehas no efficacy beyond matter, nor can Imagination behold universal\u003cbr /\u003eideas, nor Thought embrace pure form; but Intelligence, looking down, as\u003cbr /\u003eit were, from its higher standpoint in its intuition of form,\u003cbr /\u003ediscriminates also the several elements which underlie it; but it\u003cbr /\u003ecomprehends them in the same way as it comprehends that form itself,\u003cbr /\u003ewhich could be cognized by no other than itself. For it cognizes the\u003cbr /\u003euniversal of Thought, the figure of Imagination, and the matter of\u003cbr /\u003eSense, without employing Thought, Imagination, or Sense, but surveying\u003cbr /\u003eall things, so to speak, under the aspect of pure form by a single flash\u003cbr /\u003eof intuition. Thought also, in considering the universal, embraces\u003cbr /\u003eimages and sense-impressions without resorting to Imagination or Sense.\u003cbr /\u003eFor it is Thought which has thus defined the universal from its\u003cbr /\u003econceptual point of view: \u0026quot;Man is a two-legged animal endowed with\u003cbr /\u003ereason.\u0026quot; This is indeed a universal notion, yet no one is ignorant that\u003cbr /\u003ethe _thing_ is imaginable and presentable to Sense, because Thought\u003cbr /\u003econsiders it not by Imagination or Sense, but by means of rational\u003cbr /\u003econception. Imagination, too, though its faculty of viewing and forming\u003cbr /\u003erepresentations is founded upon the senses, nevertheless surveys\u003cbr /\u003esense-impressions without calling in Sense, not in the way of\u003cbr /\u003eSense-perception, but of Imagination. See\u0026#39;st thou, then, how all things\u003cbr /\u003ein cognizing use rather their own faculty than the faculty of the things\u003cbr /\u003ewhich they cognize? Nor is this strange; for since every judgment is the\u003cbr /\u003eact of the judge, it is necessary that each should accomplish its task\u003cbr /\u003eby its own, not by another\u0026#39;s power.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG IV.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eA PSYCHOLOGICAL FALLACY.[R]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom the Porch\u0026#39;s murky depths\u003cbr /\u003e Comes a doctrine sage,\u003cbr /\u003e That doth liken living mind\u003cbr /\u003e To a written page;\u003cbr /\u003e Since all knowledge comes through\u003cbr /\u003e Sense,\u003cbr /\u003e Graven by Experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;As,\u0026#39; say they, \u0026#39;the pen its marks\u003cbr /\u003e Curiously doth trace\u003cbr /\u003e On the smooth unsullied white\u003cbr /\u003e Of the paper\u0026#39;s face,\u003cbr /\u003e So do outer things impress\u003cbr /\u003e Images on consciousness.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut if verily the mind\u003cbr /\u003e Thus all passive lies;\u003cbr /\u003e If no living power within\u003cbr /\u003e Its own force supplies;\u003cbr /\u003e If it but reflect again,\u003cbr /\u003e Like a glass, things false and vain–\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhence the wondrous faculty\u003cbr /\u003e That perceives and knows,\u003cbr /\u003e That in one fair ordered scheme\u003cbr /\u003e Doth the world dispose;\u003cbr /\u003e Grasps each whole that Sense presents,\u003cbr /\u003e Or breaks into elements?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo divides and recombines,\u003cbr /\u003e And in changeful wise\u003cbr /\u003e Now to low descends, and now\u003cbr /\u003e To the height doth rise;\u003cbr /\u003e Last in inward swift review\u003cbr /\u003e Strictly sifts the false and true?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf these ample potencies\u003cbr /\u003e Fitter cause, I ween,\u003cbr /\u003e Were Mind\u0026#39;s self than marks impressed\u003cbr /\u003e By the outer scene.\u003cbr /\u003e Yet the body through the sense\u003cbr /\u003e Stirs the soul\u0026#39;s intelligence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen light flashes on the eye,\u003cbr /\u003e Or sound strikes the ear,\u003cbr /\u003e Mind aroused to due response\u003cbr /\u003e Makes the message clear;\u003cbr /\u003e And the dumb external signs\u003cbr /\u003e With the hidden forms combines.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e[R] A criticism of the doctrine of the mind as a blank sheet of paper on\u003cbr /\u003ewhich experience writes, as held by the Stoics in anticipation of Locke.\u003cbr /\u003eSee Zeller, \u0026#39;Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics,\u0026#39; Reichel\u0026#39;s translation,\u003cbr /\u003ep. 76.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eV.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Now, although in the case of bodies endowed with sentiency the\u003cbr /\u003equalities of external objects affect the sense-organs, and the activity\u003cbr /\u003eof mind is preceded by a bodily affection which calls forth the mind\u0026#39;s\u003cbr /\u003eaction upon itself, and stimulates the forms till that moment lying\u003cbr /\u003einactive within, yet, I say, if in these bodies endowed with sentiency\u003cbr /\u003ethe mind is not inscribed by mere passive affection, but of its own\u003cbr /\u003eefficacy discriminates the impressions furnished to the body, how much\u003cbr /\u003emore do intelligences free from all bodily affections employ in their\u003cbr /\u003ediscrimination their own mental activities instead of conforming to\u003cbr /\u003eexternal objects? So on these principles various modes of cognition\u003cbr /\u003ebelong to distinct and different substances. For to creatures void of\u003cbr /\u003emotive power–shell-fish and other such creatures which cling to rocks\u003cbr /\u003eand grow there–belongs Sense alone, void of all other modes of gaining\u003cbr /\u003eknowledge; to beasts endowed with movement, in whom some capacity of\u003cbr /\u003eseeking and shunning seems to have arisen, Imagination also. Thought\u003cbr /\u003epertains only to the human race, as Intelligence to Divinity alone;\u003cbr /\u003ehence it follows that that form of knowledge exceeds the rest which of\u003cbr /\u003eits own nature cognizes not only its proper object, but the objects of\u003cbr /\u003ethe other forms of knowledge also. But what if Sense and Imagination\u003cbr /\u003ewere to gainsay Thought, and declare that universal which Thought deems\u003cbr /\u003eitself to behold to be nothing? For the object of Sense and Imagination\u003cbr /\u003ecannot be universal; so that either the judgment of Reason is true and\u003cbr /\u003ethere is no sense-object, or, since they know full well that many\u003cbr /\u003eobjects are presented to Sense and Imagination, the conception of\u003cbr /\u003eReason, which looks on that which is perceived by Sense and particular\u003cbr /\u003eas if it were a something \u0026quot;universal,\u0026quot; is empty of content. Suppose,\u003cbr /\u003efurther, that Reason maintains in reply that it does indeed contemplate\u003cbr /\u003ethe object of both Sense and Imagination under the form of\u003cbr /\u003euniversality, while Sense and Imagination cannot aspire to the\u003cbr /\u003eknowledge of the universal, since their cognizance cannot go beyond\u003cbr /\u003ebodily figures, and that in the cognition of reality we ought rather to\u003cbr /\u003etrust the stronger and more perfect faculty of judgment. In a dispute of\u003cbr /\u003ethis sort, should not we, in whom is planted the faculty of reasoning as\u003cbr /\u003ewell as of imagining and perceiving, espouse the cause of Reason?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;In like manner is it that human reason thinks that Divine Intelligence\u003cbr /\u003ecannot see the future except after the fashion in which its own\u003cbr /\u003eknowledge is obtained. For thy contention is, if events do not appear to\u003cbr /\u003einvolve certain and necessary issues, they cannot be foreseen as\u003cbr /\u003ecertainly about to come to pass. There is, then, no foreknowledge of\u003cbr /\u003esuch events; or, if we can ever bring ourselves to believe that there\u003cbr /\u003eis, there can be nothing which does not happen of necessity. If,\u003cbr /\u003ehowever, we could have some part in the judgment of the Divine mind,\u003cbr /\u003eeven as we participate in Reason, we should think it perfectly just that\u003cbr /\u003ehuman Reason should submit itself to the Divine mind, no less than we\u003cbr /\u003ejudged that Imagination and Sense ought to yield to Reason. Wherefore\u003cbr /\u003elet us soar, if we can, to the heights of that Supreme Intelligence; for\u003cbr /\u003ethere Reason will see what in itself it cannot look upon; and that is in\u003cbr /\u003ewhat way things whose occurrence is not certain may yet be seen in a\u003cbr /\u003esure and definite foreknowledge; and that this foreknowledge is not\u003cbr /\u003econjecture, but rather knowledge in its supreme simplicity, free of all\u003cbr /\u003elimits and restrictions.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONG V.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTHE UPWARD LOOK.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn what divers shapes and fashions do the creatures great and small\u003cbr /\u003e Over wide earth\u0026#39;s teeming surface skim, or scud, or walk, or crawl!\u003cbr /\u003e Some with elongated body sweep the ground, and, as they move,\u003cbr /\u003e Trail perforce with writhing belly in the dust a sinuous groove;\u003cbr /\u003e Some, on light wing upward soaring, swiftly do the winds divide,\u003cbr /\u003e And through heaven\u0026#39;s ample spaces in free motion smoothly glide;\u003cbr /\u003e These earth\u0026#39;s solid surface pressing, with firm paces onward rove,\u003cbr /\u003e Ranging through the verdant meadows, crouching in the woodland grove.\u003cbr /\u003e Great and wondrous is their variance! Yet in all the head low-bent\u003cbr /\u003e Dulls the soul and blunts the senses, though their forms be different.\u003cbr /\u003e Man alone, erect, aspiring, lifts his forehead to the skies,\u003cbr /\u003e And in upright posture steadfast seems earth\u0026#39;s baseness to despise.\u003cbr /\u003e If with earth not all besotted, to this parable give ear,\u003cbr /\u003e Thou whose gaze is fixed on heaven, who thy face on high dost rear:\u003cbr /\u003e Lift thy soul, too, heavenward; haply lest it stain its heavenly worth,\u003cbr /\u003e And thine eyes alone look upward, while thy mind cleaves to the earth!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVI.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Since, then, as we lately proved, everything that is known is cognized\u003cbr /\u003enot in accordance with its own nature, but in accordance with the nature\u003cbr /\u003eof the faculty that comprehends it, let us now contemplate, as far as\u003cbr /\u003elawful, the character of the Divine essence, that we may be able to\u003cbr /\u003eunderstand also the nature of its knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;God is eternal; in this judgment all rational beings agree. Let us,\u003cbr /\u003ethen, consider what eternity is. For this word carries with it a\u003cbr /\u003erevelation alike of the Divine nature and of the Divine knowledge. Now,\u003cbr /\u003eeternity is the possession of endless life whole and perfect at a single\u003cbr /\u003emoment. What this is becomes more clear and manifest from a comparison\u003cbr /\u003ewith things temporal. For whatever lives in time is a present proceeding\u003cbr /\u003efrom the past to the future, and there is nothing set in time which can\u003cbr /\u003eembrace the whole space of its life together. To-morrow\u0026#39;s state it\u003cbr /\u003egrasps not yet, while it has already lost yesterday\u0026#39;s; nay, even in the\u003cbr /\u003elife of to-day ye live no longer than one brief transitory moment.\u003cbr /\u003eWhatever, therefore, is subject to the condition of time, although, as\u003cbr /\u003eAristotle deemed of the world, it never have either beginning or end,\u003cbr /\u003eand its life be stretched to the whole extent of time\u0026#39;s infinity, it yet\u003cbr /\u003eis not such as rightly to be thought eternal. For it does not include\u003cbr /\u003eand embrace the whole space of infinite life at once, but has no present\u003cbr /\u003ehold on things to come, not yet accomplished. Accordingly, that which\u003cbr /\u003eincludes and possesses the whole fulness of unending life at once, from\u003cbr /\u003ewhich nothing future is absent, from which nothing past has escaped,\u003cbr /\u003ethis is rightly called eternal; this must of necessity be ever present\u003cbr /\u003eto itself in full self-possession, and hold the infinity of movable time\u003cbr /\u003ein an abiding present. Wherefore they deem not rightly who imagine that\u003cbr /\u003eon Plato\u0026#39;s principles the created world is made co-eternal with the\u003cbr /\u003eCreator, because they are told that he believed the world to have had\u003cbr /\u003eno beginning in time,[S] and to be destined never to come to an end. For\u003cbr /\u003eit is one thing for existence to be endlessly prolonged, which was what\u003cbr /\u003ePlato ascribed to the world, another for the whole of an endless life to\u003cbr /\u003ebe embraced in the present, which is manifestly a property peculiar to\u003cbr /\u003ethe Divine mind. Nor need God appear earlier in mere duration of time to\u003cbr /\u003ecreated things, but only prior in the unique simplicity of His nature.\u003cbr /\u003eFor the infinite progression of things in time copies this immediate\u003cbr /\u003eexistence in the present of the changeless life, and when it cannot\u003cbr /\u003esucceed in equalling it, declines from movelessness into motion, and\u003cbr /\u003efalls away from the simplicity of a perpetual present to the infinite\u003cbr /\u003eduration of the future and the past; and since it cannot possess the\u003cbr /\u003ewhole fulness of its life together, for the very reason that in a manner\u003cbr /\u003eit never ceases to be, it seems, up to a certain point, to rival that\u003cbr /\u003ewhich it cannot complete and express by attaching itself indifferently\u003cbr /\u003eto any present moment of time, however swift and brief; and since this\u003cbr /\u003ebears some resemblance to that ever-abiding present, it bestows on\u003cbr /\u003eeverything to which it is assigned the semblance of existence. But since\u003cbr /\u003eit cannot abide, it hurries along the infinite path of time, and the\u003cbr /\u003eresult has been that it continues by ceaseless movement the life the\u003cbr /\u003ecompleteness of which it could not embrace while it stood still. So, if\u003cbr /\u003ewe are minded to give things their right names, we shall follow Plato in\u003cbr /\u003esaying that God indeed is eternal, but the world everlasting.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Since, then, every mode of judgment comprehends its objects conformably\u003cbr /\u003eto its own nature, and since God abides for ever in an eternal present,\u003cbr /\u003eHis knowledge, also transcending all movement of time, dwells in the\u003cbr /\u003esimplicity of its own changeless present, and, embracing the whole\u003cbr /\u003einfinite sweep of the past and of the future, contemplates all that\u003cbr /\u003efalls within its simple cognition as if it were now taking place. And\u003cbr /\u003etherefore, if thou wilt carefully consider that immediate presentment\u003cbr /\u003ewhereby it discriminates all things, thou wilt more rightly deem it not\u003cbr /\u003eforeknowledge as of something future, but knowledge of a moment that\u003cbr /\u003enever passes. For this cause the name chosen to describe it is not\u003cbr /\u003eprevision, but providence, because, since utterly removed in nature from\u003cbr /\u003ethings mean and trivial, its outlook embraces all things as from some\u003cbr /\u003elofty height. Why, then, dost thou insist that the things which are\u003cbr /\u003esurveyed by the Divine eye are involved in necessity, whereas clearly\u003cbr /\u003emen impose no necessity on things which they see? Does the act of vision\u003cbr /\u003eadd any necessity to the things which thou seest before thy eyes?\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Assuredly not.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;And yet, if we may without unfitness compare God\u0026#39;s present and man\u0026#39;s,\u003cbr /\u003ejust as ye see certain things in this your temporary present, so does He\u003cbr /\u003esee all things in His eternal present. Wherefore this Divine\u003cbr /\u003eanticipation changes not the natures and properties of things, and it\u003cbr /\u003ebeholds things present before it, just as they will hereafter come to\u003cbr /\u003epass in time. Nor does it confound things in its judgment, but in the\u003cbr /\u003eone mental view distinguishes alike what will come necessarily and what\u003cbr /\u003ewithout necessity. For even as ye, when at one and the same time ye see\u003cbr /\u003ea man walking on the earth and the sun rising in the sky, distinguish\u003cbr /\u003ebetween the two, though one glance embraces both, and judge the former\u003cbr /\u003evoluntary, the latter necessary action: so also the Divine vision in its\u003cbr /\u003euniversal range of view does in no wise confuse the characters of the\u003cbr /\u003ethings which are present to its regard, though future in respect of\u003cbr /\u003etime. Whence it follows that when it perceives that something will come\u003cbr /\u003einto existence, and yet is perfectly aware that this is unbound by any\u003cbr /\u003enecessity, its apprehension is not opinion, but rather knowledge based\u003cbr /\u003eon truth. And if to this thou sayest that what God sees to be about to\u003cbr /\u003ecome to pass cannot fail to come to pass, and that what cannot fail to\u003cbr /\u003ecome to pass happens of necessity, and wilt tie me down to this word\u003cbr /\u003enecessity, I will acknowledge that thou affirmest a most solid truth,\u003cbr /\u003ebut one which scarcely anyone can approach to who has not made the\u003cbr /\u003eDivine his special study. For my answer would be that the same future\u003cbr /\u003eevent is necessary from the standpoint of Divine knowledge, but when\u003cbr /\u003econsidered in its own nature it seems absolutely free and unfettered.\u003cbr /\u003eSo, then, there are two necessities–one simple, as that men are\u003cbr /\u003enecessarily mortal; the other conditioned, as that, if you know that\u003cbr /\u003esomeone is walking, he must necessarily be walking. For that which is\u003cbr /\u003eknown cannot indeed be otherwise than as it is known to be, and yet this\u003cbr /\u003efact by no means carries with it that other simple necessity. For the\u003cbr /\u003eformer necessity is not imposed by the thing\u0026#39;s own proper nature, but by\u003cbr /\u003ethe addition of a condition. No necessity compels one who is voluntarily\u003cbr /\u003ewalking to go forward, although it is necessary for him to go forward at\u003cbr /\u003ethe moment of walking. In the same way, then, if Providence sees\u003cbr /\u003eanything as present, that must necessarily be, though it is bound by no\u003cbr /\u003enecessity of nature. Now, God views as present those coming events which\u003cbr /\u003ehappen of free will. These, accordingly, from the standpoint of the\u003cbr /\u003eDivine vision are made necessary conditionally on the Divine\u003cbr /\u003ecognizance; viewed, however, in themselves, they desist not from the\u003cbr /\u003eabsolute freedom naturally theirs. Accordingly, without doubt, all\u003cbr /\u003ethings will come to pass which God foreknows as about to happen, but of\u003cbr /\u003ethese certain proceed of free will; and though these happen, yet by the\u003cbr /\u003efact of their existence they do not lose their proper nature, in virtue\u003cbr /\u003eof which before they happened it was really possible that they might not\u003cbr /\u003ehave come to pass.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;What difference, then, does the denial of necessity make, since,\u003cbr /\u003ethrough their being conditioned by Divine knowledge, they come to pass\u003cbr /\u003eas if they were in all respects under the compulsion of necessity? This\u003cbr /\u003edifference, surely, which we saw in the case of the instances I formerly\u003cbr /\u003etook, the sun\u0026#39;s rising and the man\u0026#39;s walking; which at the moment of\u003cbr /\u003etheir occurrence could not but be taking place, and yet one of them\u003cbr /\u003ebefore it took place was necessarily obliged to be, while the other was\u003cbr /\u003enot so at all. So likewise the things which to God are present without\u003cbr /\u003edoubt exist, but some of them come from the necessity of things, others\u003cbr /\u003efrom the power of the agent. Quite rightly, then, have we said that\u003cbr /\u003ethese things are necessary if viewed from the standpoint of the Divine\u003cbr /\u003eknowledge; but if they are considered in themselves, they are free from\u003cbr /\u003ethe bonds of necessity, even as everything which is accessible to sense,\u003cbr /\u003eregarded from the standpoint of Thought, is universal, but viewed in its\u003cbr /\u003eown nature particular. \u0026quot;But,\u0026quot; thou wilt say, \u0026quot;if it is in my power to\u003cbr /\u003echange my purpose, I shall make void providence, since I shall perchance\u003cbr /\u003echange something which comes within its foreknowledge.\u0026quot; My answer is:\u003cbr /\u003eThou canst indeed turn aside thy purpose; but since the truth of\u003cbr /\u003eprovidence is ever at hand to see that thou canst, and whether thou\u003cbr /\u003edost, and whither thou turnest thyself, thou canst not avoid the Divine\u003cbr /\u003eforeknowledge, even as thou canst not escape the sight of a present\u003cbr /\u003espectator, although of thy free will thou turn thyself to various\u003cbr /\u003eactions. Wilt thou, then, say: \u0026quot;Shall the Divine knowledge be changed at\u003cbr /\u003emy discretion, so that, when I will this or that, providence changes its\u003cbr /\u003eknowledge correspondingly?\u0026quot;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;Surely not.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;True, for the Divine vision anticipates all that is coming, and\u003cbr /\u003etransforms and reduces it to the form of its own present knowledge, and\u003cbr /\u003evaries not, as thou deemest, in its foreknowledge, alternating to this\u003cbr /\u003eor that, but in a single flash it forestalls and includes thy mutations\u003cbr /\u003ewithout altering. And this ever-present comprehension and survey of all\u003cbr /\u003ethings God has received, not from the issue of future events, but from\u003cbr /\u003ethe simplicity of His own nature. Hereby also is resolved the objection\u003cbr /\u003ewhich a little while ago gave thee offence–that our doings in the\u003cbr /\u003efuture were spoken of as if supplying the cause of God\u0026#39;s knowledge. For\u003cbr /\u003ethis faculty of knowledge, embracing all things in its immediate\u003cbr /\u003ecognizance, has itself fixed the bounds of all things, yet itself owes\u003cbr /\u003enothing to what comes after.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026#39;And all this being so, the freedom of man\u0026#39;s will stands unshaken, and\u003cbr /\u003elaws are not unrighteous, since their rewards and punishments are held\u003cbr /\u003eforth to wills unbound by any necessity. God, who foreknoweth all\u003cbr /\u003ethings, still looks down from above, and the ever-present eternity of\u003cbr /\u003eHis vision concurs with the future character of all our acts, and\u003cbr /\u003edispenseth to the good rewards, to the bad punishments. Our hopes and\u003cbr /\u003eprayers also are not fixed on God in vain, and when they are rightly\u003cbr /\u003edirected cannot fail of effect. Therefore, withstand vice, practise\u003cbr /\u003evirtue, lift up your souls to right hopes, offer humble prayers to\u003cbr /\u003eHeaven. Great is the necessity of righteousness laid upon you if ye will\u003cbr /\u003enot hide it from yourselves, seeing that all your actions are done\u003cbr /\u003ebefore the eyes of a Judge who seeth all things.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e[S] Plato expressly states the opposite in the \u0026#39;Tim\u0026#230;us\u0026#39; (28B), though\u003cbr /\u003epossibly there the account of the beginning of the world in time is to\u003cbr /\u003ebe understood figuratively, not literally. See Jowett, vol. iii., pp.\u003cbr /\u003e448, 449 (3rd edit.).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eEPILOGUE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWithin a short time of writing \u0026#39;The Consolation of Philosophy,\u0026#39; Boethius\u003cbr /\u003edied by a cruel death. As to the manner of his death there is some\u003cbr /\u003euncertainty. According to one account, he was cut down by the swords of\u003cbr /\u003ethe soldiers before the very judgment-seat of Theodoric; according to\u003cbr /\u003eanother, a cord was first fastened round his forehead, and tightened\u003cbr /\u003etill \u0026#39;his eyes started\u0026#39;; he was then killed with a club.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e_Elliot Stock, Paternoster Row, London_\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eREFERENCES TO QUOTATIONS IN THE TEXT.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBk. I., ch. iv., p. 17, l. 6: \u0026#39;Iliad,\u0026#39; I. 363.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026quot; ch. iv., p. 18, l. 7: Plato, \u0026#39;Republic,\u0026#39;\u003cbr /\u003e V. 473, D; Jowett, vol. iii., pp. 170, 171\u003cbr /\u003e (3rd edit.).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026quot; ch. iv., p. 22, l. 6: Plato, \u0026#39;Republic,\u0026#39;\u003cbr /\u003e I. 347, C; Jowett, III., p. 25.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026quot; ch. v., p. 30, l. 19: \u0026#39;Iliad,\u0026#39; II., 204, 205.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBk. II., ch. ii., p. 50, l. 21: \u0026#39;Iliad.\u0026#39; XXIV.\u003cbr /\u003e 527, 528.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026quot; ch. vii., p. 78, l. 25: Cicero, \u0026#39;De\u003cbr /\u003e Republic\u0026#226;,\u0026#39; VI. 20, in the \u0026#39;Somnium\u003cbr /\u003e Scipionis.\u0026#39;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBk. III., ch. iv., p. 106, l. 10: Catullus, LII., 2.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026quot; ch. vi., p. 114, l. 4: Euripides, \u0026#39;Andromache,\u0026#39;\u003cbr /\u003e 319, 320.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026quot; ch. ix., p. 129, l. 3: Plato, \u0026#39;Tim\u0026#230;us,\u0026#39;\u003cbr /\u003e 27, C; Jowett, vol. iii., p. 448.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026quot; ch. xii., p. 157, l. 14: Quoted Plato,\u003cbr /\u003e \u0026#39;Sophistes,\u0026#39; 244, E; Jowett, vol. iv.,\u003cbr /\u003e p. 374.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026quot; ch. xii., p. 157, l. 22: Plato, \u0026#39;Tim\u0026#230;us,\u0026#39;\u003cbr /\u003e 29, B; Jowett, vol. iii., p. 449.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBk. IV., ch. vi., p. 206, l. 17: Lucan, \u0026#39;Pharsalia,\u0026#39;\u003cbr /\u003e I. 126.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026quot; ch. vi., p. 210, l. 23: \u0026#39;Iliad,\u0026#39; XII. 176.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBk. V., ch. i., p. 227,l. 16: Aristotle, \u0026#39;Physics,\u0026#39;\u003cbr /\u003e II. v. 5.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026quot; ch. iii., p. 238, l. 20: Horace, \u0026#39;Satires,\u0026#39;\u003cbr /\u003e II. v. 59.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026quot; ch. iv., p. 243, l. 3: Cicero, \u0026#39;De Divinatione,\u0026#39;\u003cbr /\u003e II. 7, 8.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026quot; ch. vi., p. 258, l. 8: Aristotle, \u0026#39;De\u003cbr /\u003e C\u0026#230;lo,\u0026#39; II. 1.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eEnd of Project Gutenberg\u0026#39;s The Consolation of Philosophy, by Boethius\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}