An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
{"WorkMasterId":5513,"WpPageId":263326,"ParentWpPageId":189587,"Slug":"an-enquiry-concerning-the-principles-of-morals","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/david-hume/an-enquiry-concerning-the-principles-of-morals/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/david-hume/an-enquiry-concerning-the-principles-of-morals/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":378729,"CleanHtmlLength":322619,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals","Deck":"Hume argues that moral judgment rests in sentiment, utility, sympathy, and human social life rather than in abstract rational deduction alone.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to David Hume","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/david-hume/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"David Hume","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/david-hume/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/david-hume-01-ramsay-1754-1.jpg","ImageAlt":"David Hume by Allan Ramsay, 1754","FilterTerra":"Western Europe","ClickText":"David Hume","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/david-hume/","Copies":["1711 CE – 1776 CE","Edinburgh","Scottish Enlightenment philosopher who transformed empiricism, skepticism, moral psychology, aesthetics, political economy, natural religion, and the philosophy of science through a systematic science of human nature."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:3","Title":"Early Modern History","DateText":"1500 CE – 1799 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-early-modern-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:9","Title":"Enlightenment and Proto-Industrial","DateText":"1700 CE – 1799 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-early-modern-history/philosophers-of-the-enlightenment-and-proto-industrial/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"1751 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Displayed year follows the 1751 first publication.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:2"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:GBR:1"}],"OriginalTitle":"An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals","Language":"English","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:ethics"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:philosophy-of-mind"}],"Tradition":"Scottish Enlightenment","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #4320 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Hume argues that moral judgment rests in sentiment, utility, sympathy, and human social life rather than in abstract rational deduction alone."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"Enquiry concerning Morals; EPM","KeyConcepts":"sentiment; utility; sympathy; virtue; justice; benevolence; moral psychology","Methodology":"Empirical psychology, skeptical argument, historical explanation, literary essay, naturalistic moral analysis, and close attention to how belief, custom, sympathy, language, and institutions work in human life.","Structure":"The public page presents the work title, date note, disciplinary placement, philosophical focus, direct Hume authorship, and an explicit note that public text resources are evidence rather than a full-text badge."},"Arguments":["Hume argues that moral judgment rests in sentiment, utility, sympathy, and human social life rather than in abstract rational deduction alone."],"Influence":{"InfluencedBy":"John Locke, George Berkeley, Isaac Newton, Francis Hutcheson, Pierre Bayle, classical skepticism, British moralists, and early modern natural philosophy.","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Accepted as Hume\u0027s mature statement of moral philosophy and one of his central works.","The work remains central because Hume reframes philosophy around human psychology, evidence, probability, social practice, and the limits of reason."],"EvidenceNote":["Accepted as Hume\u0027s mature statement of moral philosophy and one of his central works."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Versions","BodyHtml":"\u003cdiv class=\"dz-philo__full-version-grid\"\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-version-card\"\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-provider\"\u003eProject Gutenberg\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3 class=\"dz-philo__full-version-title\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #4320\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-meta\"\u003eHtmlText · Imported\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ca class=\"dz-philo__full-version-link\" href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4320\"\u003eOpen full version\u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["Hume argues that moral judgment rests in sentiment, utility, sympathy, and human social life rather than in abstract rational deduction alone."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":"Enquiry concerning Morals; EPM"},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"sentiment; utility; sympathy; virtue; justice; benevolence; moral psychology"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Empirical psychology, skeptical argument, historical explanation, literary essay, naturalistic moral analysis, and close attention to how belief, custom, sympathy, language, and institutions work in human life."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"The public page presents the work title, date note, disciplinary placement, philosophical focus, direct Hume authorship, and an explicit note that public text resources are evidence rather than a full-text badge."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Hume argues that moral judgment rests in sentiment, utility, sympathy, and human social life rather than in abstract rational deduction alone."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"John Locke, George Berkeley, Isaac Newton, Francis Hutcheson, Pierre Bayle, classical skepticism, British moralists, and early modern natural philosophy."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, J. S. Mill, logical positivism, analytic philosophy, naturalized epistemology, moral sentimentalism, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, and political economy."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Accepted as Hume\u0027s mature statement of moral philosophy and one of his central works.","The work remains central because Hume reframes philosophy around human psychology, evidence, probability, social practice, and the limits of reason."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Accepted as Hume\u0027s mature statement of moral philosophy and one of his central works."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003ePublic-domain full text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4320\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #4320\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch1\u003e\r\n AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING\u003cbr\u003eTHE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS\r\n\u003c/h1\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\nBy David Hume\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ccenter\u003e\r\nA 1912 Reprint Of The Edition Of 1777\r\n\u003c/center\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"mynote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nInformation About This E-Text Edition\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe following is an e-text of a 1912 reprint of the 1777 edition of\r\nDavid Hume\u0027s An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Each page\r\nwas cut out of the original book with an X-acto knife and fed into an\r\nAutomatic Document Feeder Scanner to make this e-text, so the original\r\nbook was disbinded in order to save it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSome adaptations from the original text were made while formatting it\r\nfor an e-text. Italics in the original book are capitalized in\r\nthis e-text. The original spellings of words are preserved, such as\r\n\"connexion\" for \"connection,\" \"labour\" for \"labor,\" etc. Original\r\nfootnotes are put in brackets at the points where they are cited in\r\nthe text.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003eContents\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ccenter\u003e\r\n\u003ctable summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_APPE\"\u003e\r\nAPPENDIX.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_4_0003\"\u003e\r\nAN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_SECT1\"\u003e\r\nSECTION I. OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MORALS.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_SECT2\"\u003e\r\nSECTION II. OF BENEVOLENCE.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_PART21\"\u003e\r\nPART I.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_PART22\"\u003e\r\nPART II.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_SECT3\"\u003e\r\nSECTION III. OF JUSTICE.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_PART31\"\u003e\r\nPART I.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_PART32\"\u003e\r\nPART II.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_SECT4\"\u003e\r\nSECTION IV.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_SECT5\"\u003e\r\nSECTION V. WHY UTILITY PLEASES.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_PART51\"\u003e\r\nPART I.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_PART52\"\u003e\r\nPART II.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_SECT6\"\u003e\r\nSECTION VI. OF QUALITIES USEFUL TO OURSELVES.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_PART61\"\u003e\r\nPART I.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_PART62\"\u003e\r\nPART II.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_SECT7\"\u003e\r\nSECTION VII.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_SECT8\"\u003e\r\nSECTION VIII.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_SECT9\"\u003e\r\nSECTION IX. CONCLUSION.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_PART91\"\u003e\r\nPART I.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_PART92\"\u003e\r\nPART II.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_APPE1\"\u003e\r\nAPPENDIX I. CONCERNING MORAL SENTIMENT\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_APPE2\"\u003e\r\nAPPENDIX II. OF SELF-LOVE.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_APPE3\"\u003e\r\nAPPENDIX III. SOME FARTHER CONSIDERATIONS WITH REGARD TO JUSTICE.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#2H_APPE4\"\u003e\r\nAPPENDIX IV. OF SOME VERBAL DISPUTES.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\u003c/center\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ccenter\u003e\r\nAUTHOR\u0027S ADVERTISEMENT.\r\n\u003c/center\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMost of the principles, and reasonings, contained in this volume,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: Volume II. of the posthumous edition of Hume\u0027s works\r\npublished in 1777 and containing, besides the present ENQUIRY,\r\nA DISSERTATION ON THE PASSIONS, and AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN\r\nUNDERSTANDING. A reprint of this latter treatise has already appeared in\r\nThe Religion of Science Library (NO. 45)]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nwere published in a work in three volumes, called A TREATISE OF HUMAN\r\nNATURE: A work which the Author had projected before he left College,\r\nand which he wrote and published not long after. But not finding it\r\nsuccessful, he was sensible of his error in going to the press too\r\nearly, and he cast the whole anew in the following pieces, where some\r\nnegligences in his former reasoning and more in the expression, are,\r\nhe hopes, corrected. Yet several writers who have honoured the Author\u0027s\r\nPhilosophy with answers, have taken care to direct all their batteries\r\nagainst that juvenile work, which the author never acknowledged, and\r\nhave affected to triumph in any advantages, which, they imagined, they\r\nhad obtained over it: A practice very contrary to all rules of candour\r\nand fair-dealing, and a strong instance of those polemical artifices\r\nwhich a bigotted zeal thinks itself authorized to employ. Henceforth,\r\nthe Author desires, that the following Pieces may alone be regarded as\r\ncontaining his philosophical sentiments and principles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_CONT\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n CONTENTS PAGE\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n I. Of the General Principles of Morals\r\n II. Of Benevolence\r\n III. Of Justice\r\n IV. Of Political Society\r\n V. Why Utility Pleases\r\n VI. Of Qualities Useful to Ourselves\r\n VII. Of Qualities Immediately Agreeable to Ourselves\r\n VIII. Of Qualities Immediately Agreeable to Others\r\n IX. Conclusion\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_APPE\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n APPENDIX.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n I. Concerning Moral Sentiment\r\n II. Of Self-love\r\n III. Some Farther Considerations with Regard to Justice\r\n IV. Of Some Verbal Disputes\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_4_0003\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_SECT1\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n SECTION I. OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MORALS.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nDISPUTES with men, pertinaciously obstinate in their principles, are,\r\nof all others, the most irksome; except, perhaps, those with persons,\r\nentirely disingenuous, who really do not believe the opinions they\r\ndefend, but engage in the controversy, from affectation, from a spirit\r\nof opposition, or from a desire of showing wit and ingenuity, superior\r\nto the rest of mankind. The same blind adherence to their own arguments\r\nis to be expected in both; the same contempt of their antagonists; and\r\nthe same passionate vehemence, in inforcing sophistry and falsehood.\r\nAnd as reasoning is not the source, whence either disputant derives his\r\ntenets; it is in vain to expect, that any logic, which speaks not to the\r\naffections, will ever engage him to embrace sounder principles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThose who have denied the reality of moral distinctions, may be ranked\r\namong the disingenuous disputants; nor is it conceivable, that any human\r\ncreature could ever seriously believe, that all characters and actions\r\nwere alike entitled to the affection and regard of everyone. The\r\ndifference, which nature has placed between one man and another, is\r\nso wide, and this difference is still so much farther widened, by\r\neducation, example, and habit, that, where the opposite extremes come at\r\nonce under our apprehension, there is no scepticism so scrupulous,\r\nand scarce any assurance so determined, as absolutely to deny all\r\ndistinction between them. Let a man\u0027s insensibility be ever so great,\r\nhe must often be touched with the images of Right and Wrong; and let\r\nhis prejudices be ever so obstinate, he must observe, that others are\r\nsusceptible of like impressions. The only way, therefore, of converting\r\nan antagonist of this kind, is to leave him to himself. For, finding\r\nthat nobody keeps up the controversy with him, it is probable he will,\r\nat last, of himself, from mere weariness, come over to the side of\r\ncommon sense and reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere has been a controversy started of late, much better worth\r\nexamination, concerning the general foundation of Morals; whether\r\nthey be derived from Reason, or from Sentiment; whether we attain\r\nthe knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an\r\nimmediate feeling and finer internal sense; whether, like all sound\r\njudgement of truth and falsehood, they should be the same to every\r\nrational intelligent being; or whether, like the perception of beauty\r\nand deformity, they be founded entirely on the particular fabric and\r\nconstitution of the human species.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe ancient philosophers, though they often affirm, that virtue is\r\nnothing but conformity to reason, yet, in general, seem to consider\r\nmorals as deriving their existence from taste and sentiment. On the\r\nother hand, our modern enquirers, though they also talk much of the\r\nbeauty of virtue, and deformity of vice, yet have commonly endeavoured\r\nto account for these distinctions by metaphysical reasonings, and by\r\ndeductions from the most abstract principles of the understanding. Such\r\nconfusion reigned in these subjects, that an opposition of the greatest\r\nconsequence could prevail between one system and another, and even in\r\nthe parts of almost each individual system; and yet nobody, till very\r\nlately, was ever sensible of it. The elegant Lord Shaftesbury, who first\r\ngave occasion to remark this distinction, and who, in general, adhered\r\nto the principles of the ancients, is not, himself, entirely free from\r\nthe same confusion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt must be acknowledged, that both sides of the question are susceptible\r\nof specious arguments. Moral distinctions, it may be said, are\r\ndiscernible by pure reason: else, whence the many disputes that reign in\r\ncommon life, as well as in philosophy, with regard to this subject: the\r\nlong chain of proofs often produced on both sides; the examples cited,\r\nthe authorities appealed to, the analogies employed, the fallacies\r\ndetected, the inferences drawn, and the several conclusions adjusted to\r\ntheir proper principles. Truth is disputable; not taste: what exists\r\nin the nature of things is the standard of our judgement; what each\r\nman feels within himself is the standard of sentiment. Propositions in\r\ngeometry may be proved, systems in physics may be controverted; but the\r\nharmony of verse, the tenderness of passion, the brilliancy of wit, must\r\ngive immediate pleasure. No man reasons concerning another\u0027s beauty; but\r\nfrequently concerning the justice or injustice of his actions. In every\r\ncriminal trial the first object of the prisoner is to disprove the facts\r\nalleged, and deny the actions imputed to him: the second to prove, that,\r\neven if these actions were real, they might be justified, as innocent\r\nand lawful. It is confessedly by deductions of the understanding, that\r\nthe first point is ascertained: how can we suppose that a different\r\nfaculty of the mind is employed in fixing the other? On the other hand,\r\nthose who would resolve all moral determinations into sentiment,\r\nmay endeavour to show, that it is impossible for reason ever to draw\r\nconclusions of this nature. To virtue, say they, it belongs to be\r\namiable, and vice odious. This forms their very nature or essence. But\r\ncan reason or argumentation distribute these different epithets to any\r\nsubjects, and pronounce beforehand, that this must produce love,\r\nand that hatred? Or what other reason can we ever assign for these\r\naffections, but the original fabric and formation of the human mind,\r\nwhich is naturally adapted to receive them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe end of all moral speculations is to teach us our duty; and, by\r\nproper representations of the deformity of vice and beauty of virtue,\r\nbeget correspondent habits, and engage us to avoid the one, and\r\nembrace the other. But is this ever to be expected from inferences and\r\nconclusions of the understanding, which of themselves have no hold of\r\nthe affections or set in motion the active powers of men? They discover\r\ntruths: but where the truths which they discover are indifferent, and\r\nbeget no desire or aversion, they can have no influence on conduct and\r\nbehaviour. What is honourable, what is fair, what is becoming, what is\r\nnoble, what is generous, takes possession of the heart, and animates us\r\nto embrace and maintain it. What is intelligible, what is evident,\r\nwhat is probable, what is true, procures only the cool assent of the\r\nunderstanding; and gratifying a speculative curiosity, puts an end to\r\nour researches.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nExtinguish all the warm feelings and prepossessions in favour of virtue,\r\nand all disgust or aversion to vice: render men totally indifferent\r\ntowards these distinctions; and morality is no longer a practical study,\r\nnor has any tendency to regulate our lives and actions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThese arguments on each side (and many more might be produced) are so\r\nplausible, that I am apt to suspect, they may, the one as well as the\r\nother, be solid and satisfactory, and that reason and sentiment concur\r\nin almost all moral determinations and conclusions. The final sentence,\r\nit is probable, which pronounces characters and actions amiable or\r\nodious, praise-worthy or blameable; that which stamps on them the mark\r\nof honour or infamy, approbation or censure; that which renders morality\r\nan active principle and constitutes virtue our happiness, and vice our\r\nmisery; it is probable, I say, that this final sentence depends on some\r\ninternal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole\r\nspecies. For what else can have an influence of this nature? But\r\nin order to pave the way for such a sentiment, and give a proper\r\ndiscernment of its object, it is often necessary, we find, that\r\nmuch reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions be made, just\r\nconclusions drawn, distant comparisons formed, complicated relations\r\nexamined, and general facts fixed and ascertained. Some species of\r\nbeauty, especially the natural kinds, on their first appearance, command\r\nour affection and approbation; and where they fail of this effect, it is\r\nimpossible for any reasoning to redress their influence, or adapt\r\nthem better to our taste and sentiment. But in many orders of beauty,\r\nparticularly those of the finer arts, it is requisite to employ much\r\nreasoning, in order to feel the proper sentiment; and a false relish\r\nmay frequently be corrected by argument and reflection. There are just\r\ngrounds to conclude, that moral beauty partakes much of this latter\r\nspecies, and demands the assistance of our intellectual faculties, in\r\norder to give it a suitable influence on the human mind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut though this question, concerning the general principles of morals,\r\nbe curious and important, it is needless for us, at present, to employ\r\nfarther care in our researches concerning it. For if we can be so happy,\r\nin the course of this enquiry, as to discover the true origin of morals,\r\nit will then easily appear how far either sentiment or reason enters\r\ninto all determinations of this nature [Footnote: See Appendix I]. In\r\norder to attain this purpose, we shall endeavour to follow a very simple\r\nmethod: we shall analyse that complication of mental qualities, which\r\nform what, in common life, we call Personal Merit: we shall consider\r\nevery attribute of the mind, which renders a man an object either\r\nof esteem and affection, or of hatred and contempt; every habit or\r\nsentiment or faculty, which, if ascribed to any person, implies either\r\npraise or blame, and may enter into any panegyric or satire of his\r\ncharacter and manners. The quick sensibility, which, on this head, is so\r\nuniversal among mankind, gives a philosopher sufficient assurance, that\r\nhe can never be considerably mistaken in framing the catalogue, or incur\r\nany danger of misplacing the objects of his contemplation: he needs only\r\nenter into his own breast for a moment, and consider whether or not he\r\nshould desire to have this or that quality ascribed to him, and whether\r\nsuch or such an imputation would proceed from a friend or an enemy.\r\nThe very nature of language guides us almost infallibly in forming a\r\njudgement of this nature; and as every tongue possesses one set of words\r\nwhich are taken in a good sense, and another in the opposite, the least\r\nacquaintance with the idiom suffices, without any reasoning, to direct\r\nus in collecting and arranging the estimable or blameable qualities of\r\nmen. The only object of reasoning is to discover the circumstances\r\non both sides, which are common to these qualities; to observe that\r\nparticular in which the estimable qualities agree on the one hand,\r\nand the blameable on the other; and thence to reach the foundation of\r\nethics, and find those universal principles, from which all censure or\r\napprobation is ultimately derived. As this is a question of fact, not\r\nof abstract science, we can only expect success, by following the\r\nexperimental method, and deducing general maxims from a comparison\r\nof particular instances. The other scientific method, where a general\r\nabstract principle is first established, and is afterwards branched out\r\ninto a variety of inferences and conclusions, may be more perfect in\r\nitself, but suits less the imperfection of human nature, and is a common\r\nsource of illusion and mistake in this as well as in other subjects.\r\nMen are now cured of their passion for hypotheses and systems in natural\r\nphilosophy, and will hearken to no arguments but those which are derived\r\nfrom experience. It is full time they should attempt a like reformation\r\nin all moral disquisitions; and reject every system of ethics, however\r\nsubtle or ingenious, which is not founded on fact and observation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe shall begin our enquiry on this head by the consideration of the\r\nsocial virtues, Benevolence and Justice. The explication of them will\r\nprobably give us an opening by which the others may be accounted for.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_SECT2\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n SECTION II. OF BENEVOLENCE.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_PART21\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n PART I.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt may be esteemed, perhaps, a superfluous task to prove, that the\r\nbenevolent or softer affections are estimable; and wherever they appear,\r\nengage the approbation and good-will of mankind. The epithets\r\nSOCIABLE, GOOD-NATURED, HUMANE, MERCIFUL, GRATEFUL, FRIENDLY, GENEROUS,\r\nBENEFICENT, or their equivalents, are known in all languages, and\r\nuniversally express the highest merit, which HUMAN NATURE is capable\r\nof attaining. Where these amiable qualities are attended with birth\r\nand power and eminent abilities, and display themselves in the good\r\ngovernment or useful instruction of mankind, they seem even to raise\r\nthe possessors of them above the rank of HUMAN NATURE, and make them\r\napproach in some measure to the divine. Exalted capacity, undaunted\r\ncourage, prosperous success; these may only expose a hero or politician\r\nto the envy and ill-will of the public: but as soon as the praises are\r\nadded of humane and beneficent; when instances are displayed of lenity,\r\ntenderness or friendship; envy itself is silent, or joins the general\r\nvoice of approbation and applause.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen Pericles, the great Athenian statesman and general, was on his\r\ndeath-bed, his surrounding friends, deeming him now insensible, began to\r\nindulge their sorrow for their expiring patron, by enumerating his great\r\nqualities and successes, his conquests and victories, the unusual length\r\nof his administration, and his nine trophies erected over the enemies of\r\nthe republic. YOU FORGET, cries the dying hero, who had heard all, YOU\r\nFORGET THE MOST EMINENT OF MY PRAISES, WHILE YOU DWELL SO MUCH ON THOSE\r\nVULGAR ADVANTAGES, IN WHICH FORTUNE HAD A PRINCIPAL SHARE. YOU HAVE\r\nNOT OBSERVED THAT NO CITIZEN HAS EVER YET WORNE MOURNING ON MY ACCOUNT.\r\n[Plut. in Pericle]\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn men of more ordinary talents and capacity, the social virtues become,\r\nif possible, still more essentially requisite; there being nothing\r\neminent, in that case, to compensate for the want of them, or preserve\r\nthe person from our severest hatred, as well as contempt. A high\r\nambition, an elevated courage, is apt, says Cicero, in less perfect\r\ncharacters, to degenerate into a turbulent ferocity. The more social and\r\nsofter virtues are there chiefly to be regarded. These are always good\r\nand amiable [Cic. de Officiis, lib. I].\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe principal advantage, which Juvenal discovers in the extensive\r\ncapacity of the human species, is that it renders our benevolence also\r\nmore extensive, and gives us larger opportunities of spreading our\r\nkindly influence than what are indulged to the inferior creation [Sat.\r\nXV. 139 and seq.]. It must, indeed, be confessed, that by doing good\r\nonly, can a man truly enjoy the advantages of being eminent. His exalted\r\nstation, of itself but the more exposes him to danger and tempest.\r\nHis sole prerogative is to afford shelter to inferiors, who repose\r\nthemselves under his cover and protection.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut I forget, that it is not my present business to recommend generosity\r\nand benevolence, or to paint, in their true colours, all the genuine\r\ncharms of the social virtues. These, indeed, sufficiently engage every\r\nheart, on the first apprehension of them; and it is difficult to abstain\r\nfrom some sally of panegyric, as often as they occur in discourse or\r\nreasoning. But our object here being more the speculative, than the\r\npractical part of morals, it will suffice to remark, (what will readily,\r\nI believe, be allowed) that no qualities are more intitled to the\r\ngeneral good-will and approbation of mankind than beneficence and\r\nhumanity, friendship and gratitude, natural affection and public spirit,\r\nor whatever proceeds from a tender sympathy with others, and a generous\r\nconcern for our kind and species. These wherever they appear seem to\r\ntransfuse themselves, in a manner, into each beholder, and to call\r\nforth, in their own behalf, the same favourable and affectionate\r\nsentiments, which they exert on all around.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_PART22\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n PART II.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe may observe that, in displaying the praises of any humane, beneficent\r\nman, there is one circumstance which never fails to be amply insisted\r\non, namely, the happiness and satisfaction, derived to society from\r\nhis intercourse and good offices. To his parents, we are apt to say, he\r\nendears himself by his pious attachment and duteous care still more than\r\nby the connexions of nature. His children never feel his authority,\r\nbut when employed for their advantage. With him, the ties of love are\r\nconsolidated by beneficence and friendship. The ties of friendship\r\napproach, in a fond observance of each obliging office, to those of\r\nlove and inclination. His domestics and dependants have in him a sure\r\nresource; and no longer dread the power of fortune, but so far as she\r\nexercises it over him. From him the hungry receive food, the naked\r\nclothing, the ignorant and slothful skill and industry. Like the sun, an\r\ninferior minister of providence he cheers, invigorates, and sustains the\r\nsurrounding world.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf confined to private life, the sphere of his activity is narrower;\r\nbut his influence is all benign and gentle. If exalted into a higher\r\nstation, mankind and posterity reap the fruit of his labours.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAs these topics of praise never fail to be employed, and with success,\r\nwhere we would inspire esteem for any one; may it not thence be\r\nconcluded, that the utility, resulting from the social virtues, forms,\r\nat least, a PART of their merit, and is one source of that approbation\r\nand regard so universally paid to them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen we recommend even an animal or a plant as USEFUL and BENEFICIAL, we\r\ngive it an applause and recommendation suited to its nature. As, on the\r\nother hand, reflection on the baneful influence of any of these inferior\r\nbeings always inspires us with the sentiment of aversion. The eye is\r\npleased with the prospect of corn-fields and loaded vine-yards;\r\nhorses grazing, and flocks pasturing: but flies the view of briars and\r\nbrambles, affording shelter to wolves and serpents.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA machine, a piece of furniture, a vestment, a house well contrived\r\nfor use and conveniency, is so far beautiful, and is contemplated with\r\npleasure and approbation. An experienced eye is here sensible to many\r\nexcellencies, which escape persons ignorant and uninstructed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCan anything stronger be said in praise of a profession, such as\r\nmerchandize or manufacture, than to observe the advantages which it\r\nprocures to society; and is not a monk and inquisitor enraged when we\r\ntreat his order as useless or pernicious to mankind?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe historian exults in displaying the benefit arising from his labours.\r\nThe writer of romance alleviates or denies the bad consequences ascribed\r\nto his manner of composition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn general, what praise is implied in the simple epithet USEFUL! What\r\nreproach in the contrary!\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nYour Gods, says Cicero [De Nat. Deor. lib. i.], in opposition to the\r\nEpicureans, cannot justly claim any worship or adoration, with whatever\r\nimaginary perfections you may suppose them endowed. They are totally\r\nuseless and inactive. Even the Egyptians, whom you so much ridicule,\r\nnever consecrated any animal but on account of its utility.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe sceptics assert [Sext. Emp. adrersus Math. lib. viii.], though\r\nabsurdly, that the origin of all religious worship was derived from the\r\nutility of inanimate objects, as the sun and moon, to the support\r\nand well-being of mankind. This is also the common reason assigned by\r\nhistorians, for the deification of eminent heroes and legislators [Diod.\r\nSic. passim.].\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo plant a tree, to cultivate a field, to beget children; meritorious\r\nacts, according to the religion of Zoroaster.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn all determinations of morality, this circumstance of public utility\r\nis ever principally in view; and wherever disputes arise, either in\r\nphilosophy or common life, concerning the bounds of duty, the question\r\ncannot, by any means, be decided with greater certainty, than by\r\nascertaining, on any side, the true interests of mankind. If any false\r\nopinion, embraced from appearances, has been found to prevail; as soon\r\nas farther experience and sounder reasoning have given us juster notions\r\nof human affairs, we retract our first sentiment, and adjust anew the\r\nboundaries of moral good and evil.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGiving alms to common beggars is naturally praised; because it seems\r\nto carry relief to the distressed and indigent: but when we observe the\r\nencouragement thence arising to idleness and debauchery, we regard that\r\nspecies of charity rather as a weakness than a virtue.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTyrannicide, or the assassination of usurpers and oppressive princes,\r\nwas highly extolled in ancient times; because it both freed mankind from\r\nmany of these monsters, and seemed to keep the others in awe, whom the\r\nsword or poniard could not reach. But history and experience having\r\nsince convinced us, that this practice increases the jealousy and\r\ncruelty of princes, a Timoleon and a Brutus, though treated with\r\nindulgence on account of the prejudices of their times, are now\r\nconsidered as very improper models for imitation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLiberality in princes is regarded as a mark of beneficence, but when\r\nit occurs, that the homely bread of the honest and industrious is often\r\nthereby converted into delicious cates for the idle and the prodigal, we\r\nsoon retract our heedless praises. The regrets of a prince, for having\r\nlost a day, were noble and generous: but had he intended to have spent\r\nit in acts of generosity to his greedy courtiers, it was better lost\r\nthan misemployed after that manner.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLuxury, or a refinement on the pleasures and conveniences of life, had\r\nnot long been supposed the source of every corruption in government, and\r\nthe immediate cause of faction, sedition, civil wars, and the total loss\r\nof liberty. It was, therefore, universally regarded as a vice, and was\r\nan object of declamation to all satirists, and severe moralists. Those,\r\nwho prove, or attempt to prove, that such refinements rather tend to the\r\nincrease of industry, civility, and arts regulate anew our MORAL as well\r\nas POLITICAL sentiments, and represent, as laudable or innocent, what\r\nhad formerly been regarded as pernicious and blameable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nUpon the whole, then, it seems undeniable, THAT nothing can bestow more\r\nmerit on any human creature than the sentiment of benevolence in an\r\neminent degree; and THAT a PART, at least, of its merit arises from its\r\ntendency to promote the interests of our species, and bestow happiness\r\non human society. We carry our view into the salutary consequences\r\nof such a character and disposition; and whatever has so benign an\r\ninfluence, and forwards so desirable an end, is beheld with complacency\r\nand pleasure. The social virtues are never regarded without their\r\nbeneficial tendencies, nor viewed as barren and unfruitful. The\r\nhappiness of mankind, the order of society, the harmony of families, the\r\nmutual support of friends, are always considered as the result of their\r\ngentle dominion over the breasts of men.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHow considerable a PART of their merit we ought to ascribe to their\r\nutility, will better appear from future disquisitions; [Footnote: Sect.\r\nIII. and IV.] as well as the reason, why this circumstance has such a\r\ncommand over our esteem and approbation. [Footnote: Sect. V.]\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_SECT3\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n SECTION III. OF JUSTICE.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_PART31\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n PART I.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTHAT Justice is useful to society, and consequently that PART of its\r\nmerit, at least, must arise from that consideration, it would be a\r\nsuperfluous undertaking to prove. That public utility is the SOLE origin\r\nof justice, and that reflections on the beneficial consequences of this\r\nvirtue are the SOLE foundation of its merit; this proposition, being\r\nmore curious and important, will better deserve our examination and\r\nenquiry.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLet us suppose that nature has bestowed on the human race such profuse\r\nABUNDANCE of all EXTERNAL conveniencies, that, without any uncertainty\r\nin the event, without any care or industry on our part, every individual\r\nfinds himself fully provided with whatever his most voracious appetites\r\ncan want, or luxurious imagination wish or desire. His natural beauty,\r\nwe shall suppose, surpasses all acquired ornaments: the perpetual\r\nclemency of the seasons renders useless all clothes or covering: the\r\nraw herbage affords him the most delicious fare; the clear fountain,\r\nthe richest beverage. No laborious occupation required: no tillage: no\r\nnavigation. Music, poetry, and contemplation form his sole business:\r\nconversation, mirth, and friendship his sole amusement. It seems evident\r\nthat, in such a happy state, every other social virtue would flourish,\r\nand receive tenfold increase; but the cautious, jealous virtue of\r\njustice would never once have been dreamed of. For what purpose make a\r\npartition of goods, where every one has already more than enough? Why\r\ngive rise to property, where there cannot possibly be any injury? Why\r\ncall this object MINE, when upon the seizing of it by another, I need\r\nbut stretch out my hand to possess myself to what is equally valuable?\r\nJustice, in that case, being totally useless, would be an idle\r\nceremonial, and could never possibly have place in the catalogue of\r\nvirtues.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe see, even in the present necessitous condition of mankind, that,\r\nwherever any benefit is bestowed by nature in an unlimited abundance,\r\nwe leave it always in common among the whole human race, and make no\r\nsubdivisions of right and property. Water and air, though the most\r\nnecessary of all objects, are not challenged as the property of\r\nindividuals; nor can any man commit injustice by the most lavish use and\r\nenjoyment of these blessings. In fertile extensive countries, with few\r\ninhabitants, land is regarded on the same footing. And no topic is so\r\nmuch insisted on by those, who defend the liberty of the seas, as the\r\nunexhausted use of them in navigation. Were the advantages, procured\r\nby navigation, as inexhaustible, these reasoners had never had any\r\nadversaries to refute; nor had any claims ever been advanced of a\r\nseparate, exclusive dominion over the ocean.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt may happen, in some countries, at some periods, that there be\r\nestablished a property in water, none in land [Footnote: Genesis, chaps.\r\nxiii. and xxi.]; if the latter be in greater abundance than can be used\r\nby the inhabitants, and the former be found, with difficulty, and in\r\nvery small quantities.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAgain; suppose, that, though the necessities of human race continue the\r\nsame as at present, yet the mind is so enlarged, and so replete with\r\nfriendship and generosity, that every man has the utmost tenderness for\r\nevery man, and feels no more concern for his own interest than for that\r\nof his fellows; it seems evident, that the use of justice would, in\r\nthis case, be suspended by such an extensive benevolence, nor would the\r\ndivisions and barriers of property and obligation have ever been thought\r\nof. Why should I bind another, by a deed or promise, to do me any\r\ngood office, when I know that he is already prompted, by the strongest\r\ninclination, to seek my happiness, and would, of himself, perform the\r\ndesired service; except the hurt, he thereby receives, be greater than\r\nthe benefit accruing to me? in which case, he knows, that, from my\r\ninnate humanity and friendship, I should be the first to oppose myself\r\nto his imprudent generosity. Why raise landmarks between my neighbour\u0027s\r\nfield and mine, when my heart has made no division between our\r\ninterests; but shares all his joys and sorrows with the same force and\r\nvivacity as if originally my own? Every man, upon this supposition,\r\nbeing a second self to another, would trust all his interests to the\r\ndiscretion of every man; without jealousy, without partition, without\r\ndistinction. And the whole human race would form only one family; where\r\nall would lie in common, and be used freely, without regard to property;\r\nbut cautiously too, with as entire regard to the necessities of each\r\nindividual, as if our own interests were most intimately concerned.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the present disposition of the human heart, it would, perhaps, be\r\ndifficult to find complete instances of such enlarged affections; but\r\nstill we may observe, that the case of families approaches towards it;\r\nand the stronger the mutual benevolence is among the individuals, the\r\nnearer it approaches; till all distinction of property be, in a great\r\nmeasure, lost and confounded among them. Between married persons, the\r\ncement of friendship is by the laws supposed so strong as to abolish all\r\ndivision of possessions; and has often, in reality, the force ascribed\r\nto it. And it is observable, that, during the ardour of new enthusiasms,\r\nwhen every principle is inflamed into extravagance, the community of\r\ngoods has frequently been attempted; and nothing but experience of its\r\ninconveniencies, from the returning or disguised selfishness of men,\r\ncould make the imprudent fanatics adopt anew the ideas of justice and of\r\nseparate property. So true is it, that this virtue derives its existence\r\nentirely from its necessary USE to the intercourse and social state of\r\nmankind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo make this truth more evident, let us reverse the foregoing\r\nsuppositions; and carrying everything to the opposite extreme, consider\r\nwhat would be the effect of these new situations. Suppose a society to\r\nfall into such want of all common necessaries, that the utmost frugality\r\nand industry cannot preserve the greater number from perishing, and the\r\nwhole from extreme misery; it will readily, I believe, be admitted, that\r\nthe strict laws of justice are suspended, in such a pressing\r\nemergence, and give place to the stronger motives of necessity and\r\nself-preservation. Is it any crime, after a shipwreck, to seize whatever\r\nmeans or instrument of safety one can lay hold of, without regard to\r\nformer limitations of property? Or if a city besieged were perishing\r\nwith hunger; can we imagine, that men will see any means of preservation\r\nbefore them, and lose their lives, from a scrupulous regard to what, in\r\nother situations, would be the rules of equity and justice? The use\r\nand tendency of that virtue is to procure happiness and security, by\r\npreserving order in society: but where the society is ready to perish\r\nfrom extreme necessity, no greater evil can be dreaded from violence and\r\ninjustice; and every man may now provide for himself by all the means,\r\nwhich prudence can dictate, or humanity permit. The public, even in less\r\nurgent necessities, opens granaries, without the consent of proprietors;\r\nas justly supposing, that the authority of magistracy may, consistent\r\nwith equity, extend so far: but were any number of men to assemble,\r\nwithout the tie of laws or civil jurisdiction; would an equal partition\r\nof bread in a famine, though effected by power and even violence, be\r\nregarded as criminal or injurious?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSuppose likewise, that it should be a virtuous man\u0027s fate to fall\r\ninto the society of ruffians, remote from the protection of laws and\r\ngovernment; what conduct must he embrace in that melancholy situation?\r\nHe sees such a desperate rapaciousness prevail; such a disregard\r\nto equity, such contempt of order, such stupid blindness to future\r\nconsequences, as must immediately have the most tragical conclusion,\r\nand must terminate in destruction to the greater number, and in a total\r\ndissolution of society to the rest. He, meanwhile, can have no other\r\nexpedient than to arm himself, to whomever the sword he seizes, or\r\nthe buckler, may belong: To make provision of all means of defence and\r\nsecurity: And his particular regard to justice being no longer of use\r\nto his own safety or that of others, he must consult the dictates of\r\nself-preservation alone, without concern for those who no longer merit\r\nhis care and attention.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen any man, even in political society, renders himself by his crimes,\r\nobnoxious to the public, he is punished by the laws in his goods and\r\nperson; that is, the ordinary rules of justice are, with regard to him,\r\nsuspended for a moment, and it becomes equitable to inflict on him, for\r\nthe BENEFIT of society, what otherwise he could not suffer without wrong\r\nor injury.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe rage and violence of public war; what is it but a suspension of\r\njustice among the warring parties, who perceive, that this virtue is now\r\nno longer of any USE or advantage to them? The laws of war, which then\r\nsucceed to those of equity and justice, are rules calculated for the\r\nADVANTAGE and UTILITY of that particular state, in which men are\r\nnow placed. And were a civilized nation engaged with barbarians, who\r\nobserved no rules even of war, the former must also suspend their\r\nobservance of them, where they no longer serve to any purpose; and must\r\nrender every action or recounter as bloody and pernicious as possible to\r\nthe first aggressors.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus, the rules of equity or justice depend entirely on the particular\r\nstate and condition in which men are placed, and owe their origin and\r\nexistence to that utility, which results to the public from their strict\r\nand regular observance. Reverse, in any considerable circumstance,\r\nthe condition of men: Produce extreme abundance or extreme necessity:\r\nImplant in the human breast perfect moderation and humanity, or perfect\r\nrapaciousness and malice: By rendering justice totally USELESS, you\r\nthereby totally destroy its essence, and suspend its obligation upon\r\nmankind. The common situation of society is a medium amidst all these\r\nextremes. We are naturally partial to ourselves, and to our friends; but\r\nare capable of learning the advantage resulting from a more equitable\r\nconduct. Few enjoyments are given us from the open and liberal hand of\r\nnature; but by art, labour, and industry, we can extract them in great\r\nabundance. Hence the ideas of property become necessary in all civil\r\nsociety: Hence justice derives its usefulness to the public: And hence\r\nalone arises its merit and moral obligation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThese conclusions are so natural and obvious, that they have not escaped\r\neven the poets, in their descriptions of the felicity attending the\r\ngolden age or the reign of Saturn. The seasons, in that first period of\r\nnature, were so temperate, if we credit these agreeable fictions, that\r\nthere was no necessity for men to provide themselves with clothes and\r\nhouses, as a security against the violence of heat and cold: The\r\nrivers flowed with wine and milk: The oaks yielded honey; and nature\r\nspontaneously produced her greatest delicacies. Nor were these the\r\nchief advantages of that happy age. Tempests were not alone removed from\r\nnature; but those more furious tempests were unknown to human breasts,\r\nwhich now cause such uproar, and engender such confusion. Avarice,\r\nambition, cruelty, selfishness, were never heard of: Cordial affection,\r\ncompassion, sympathy, were the only movements with which the mind was\r\nyet acquainted. Even the punctilious distinction of MINE and THINE was\r\nbanished from among the happy race of mortals, and carried with it the\r\nvery notion of property and obligation, justice and injustice.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis POETICAL fiction of the GOLDEN AGE, is in some respects, of a piece\r\nwith the PHILOSOPHICAL fiction of the STATE OF NATURE; only that the\r\nformer is represented as the most charming and most peaceable condition,\r\nwhich can possibly be imagined; whereas the latter is painted out as\r\na state of mutual war and violence, attended with the most extreme\r\nnecessity. On the first origin of mankind, we are told, their ignorance\r\nand savage nature were so prevalent, that they could give no mutual\r\ntrust, but must each depend upon himself and his own force or cunning\r\nfor protection and security. No law was heard of: No rule of justice\r\nknown: No distinction of property regarded: Power was the only measure\r\nof right; and a perpetual war of all against all was the result of men\u0027s\r\nuntamed selfishness and barbarity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: This fiction of a state of nature, as a state of war,\r\nwas not first started by Mr. Hobbes, as is commonly imagined. Plato\r\nendeavours to refute an hypothesis very like it in the second, third,\r\nand fourth books de republica. Cicero, on the contrary, supposes it\r\ncertain and universally acknowledged in the following passage. \u0027Quis\r\nenim vestrum, judices, ignorat, ita naturam rerum tulisse, ut quodam\r\ntempore homines, nondum neque naturali neque civili jure descripto,\r\nfusi per agros ac dispersi vagarentur tantumque haberent quantum manu ac\r\nviribus, per caedem ac vulnera, aut eripere aut retinere potuissent?\r\nQui igitur primi virtute \u0026amp; consilio praestanti extiterunt, ii perspecto\r\ngenere humanae docilitatis atque ingenii, dissipatos unum in locum\r\ncongregarunt, eosque ex feritate illa ad justitiam ac mansuetudinem\r\ntransduxerunt. Tum res ad communem utilitatem, quas publicas appellamus,\r\ntum conventicula hominum, quae postea civitates nominatae sunt, tum\r\ndomicilia conjuncta, quas urbes dicamus, invento \u0026amp; divino \u0026amp; humano jure\r\nmoenibus sepserunt. Atque inter hanc vitam, perpolitam humanitate, \u0026amp;\r\nllam immanem, nihil tam interest quam JUS atque VIS. Horum utro uti\r\nnolimus, altero est utendum. Vim volumus extingui. Jus valeat necesse\r\nest, idi est, judicia, quibus omne jus continetur. Judicia displicent,\r\nant nulla sunt. Vis dominetur necesse est. Haec vident omnes.\u0027 Pro Sext.\r\nsec. 42.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhether such a condition of human nature could ever exist, or if it\r\ndid, could continue so long as to merit the appellation of a STATE,\r\nmay justly be doubted. Men are necessarily born in a family-society, at\r\nleast; and are trained up by their parents to some rule of conduct and\r\nbehaviour. But this must be admitted, that, if such a state of mutual\r\nwar and violence was ever real, the suspension of all laws of\r\njustice, from their absolute inutility, is a necessary and infallible\r\nconsequence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe more we vary our views of human life, and the newer and more unusual\r\nthe lights are in which we survey it, the more shall we be convinced,\r\nthat the origin here assigned for the virtue of justice is real and\r\nsatisfactory.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWere there a species of creatures intermingled with men, which, though\r\nrational, were possessed of such inferior strength, both of body and\r\nmind, that they were incapable of all resistance, and could never, upon\r\nthe highest provocation, make us feel the effects of their resentment;\r\nthe necessary consequence, I think, is that we should be bound by the\r\nlaws of humanity to give gentle usage to these creatures, but should\r\nnot, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard\r\nto them, nor could they possess any right or property, exclusive of such\r\narbitrary lords. Our intercourse with them could not be called society,\r\nwhich supposes a degree of equality; but absolute command on the one\r\nside, and servile obedience on the other. Whatever we covet, they must\r\ninstantly resign: Our permission is the only tenure, by which they hold\r\ntheir possessions: Our compassion and kindness the only check, by which\r\nthey curb our lawless will: And as no inconvenience ever results from\r\nthe exercise of a power, so firmly established in nature, the restraints\r\nof justice and property, being totally USELESS, would never have place\r\nin so unequal a confederacy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis is plainly the situation of men, with regard to animals; and\r\nhow far these may be said to possess reason, I leave it to others to\r\ndetermine. The great superiority of civilized Europeans above barbarous\r\nIndians, tempted us to imagine ourselves on the same footing with regard\r\nto them, and made us throw off all restraints of justice, and even of\r\nhumanity, in our treatment of them. In many nations, the female sex are\r\nreduced to like slavery, and are rendered incapable of all property, in\r\nopposition to their lordly masters. But though the males, when united,\r\nhave in all countries bodily force sufficient to maintain this severe\r\ntyranny, yet such are the insinuation, address, and charms of their fair\r\ncompanions, that women are commonly able to break the confederacy, and\r\nshare with the other sex in all the rights and privileges of society.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWere the human species so framed by nature as that each individual\r\npossessed within himself every faculty, requisite both for his own\r\npreservation and for the propagation of his kind: Were all society and\r\nintercourse cut off between man and man, by the primary intention of the\r\nsupreme Creator: It seems evident, that so solitary a being would be\r\nas much incapable of justice, as of social discourse and conversation.\r\nWhere mutual regards and forbearance serve to no manner of purpose,\r\nthey would never direct the conduct of any reasonable man. The headlong\r\ncourse of the passions would be checked by no reflection on future\r\nconsequences. And as each man is here supposed to love himself alone,\r\nand to depend only on himself and his own activity for safety and\r\nhappiness, he would, on every occasion, to the utmost of his power,\r\nchallenge the preference above every other being, to none of which he\r\nis bound by any ties, either of nature or of interest. But suppose\r\nthe conjunction of the sexes to be established in nature, a family\r\nimmediately arises; and particular rules being found requisite for\r\nits subsistence, these are immediately embraced; though without\r\ncomprehending the rest of mankind within their prescriptions. Suppose\r\nthat several families unite together into one society, which is totally\r\ndisjoined from all others, the rules, which preserve peace and order,\r\nenlarge themselves to the utmost extent of that society; but becoming\r\nthen entirely useless, lose their force when carried one step farther.\r\nBut again suppose, that several distinct societies maintain a kind of\r\nintercourse for mutual convenience and advantage, the boundaries of\r\njustice still grow larger, in proportion to the largeness of men\u0027s\r\nviews, and the force of their mutual connexions. History, experience,\r\nreason sufficiently instruct us in this natural progress of human\r\nsentiments, and in the gradual enlargement of our regards to justice,\r\nin proportion as we become acquainted with the extensive utility of that\r\nvirtue.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_PART32\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n PART II.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf we examine the PARTICULAR laws, by which justice is directed,\r\nand property determined; we shall still be presented with the same\r\nconclusion. The good of mankind is the only object of all these laws\r\nand regulations. Not only is it requisite, for the peace and interest\r\nof society, that men\u0027s possessions should be separated; but the rules,\r\nwhich we follow, in making the separation, are such as can best be\r\ncontrived to serve farther the interests of society.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe shall suppose that a creature, possessed of reason, but unacquainted\r\nwith human nature, deliberates with himself what rules of justice or\r\nproperty would best promote public interest, and establish peace and\r\nsecurity among mankind: His most obvious thought would be, to assign the\r\nlargest possessions to the most extensive virtue, and give every one\r\nthe power of doing good, proportioned to his inclination. In a perfect\r\ntheocracy, where a being, infinitely intelligent, governs by particular\r\nvolitions, this rule would certainly have place, and might serve to the\r\nwisest purposes: But were mankind to execute such a law; so great is\r\nthe uncertainty of merit, both from its natural obscurity, and from the\r\nself-conceit of each individual, that no determinate rule of conduct\r\nwould ever result from it; and the total dissolution of society must\r\nbe the immediate consequence. Fanatics may suppose, THAT DOMINION IS\r\nFOUNDED ON GRACE, and THAT SAINTS ALONE INHERIT THE EARTH; but the civil\r\nmagistrate very justly puts these sublime theorists on the same footing\r\nwith common robbers, and teaches them by the severest discipline, that a\r\nrule, which, in speculation, may seem the most advantageous to society,\r\nmay yet be found, in practice, totally pernicious and destructive.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThat there were RELIGIOUS fanatics of this kind in England, during\r\nthe civil wars, we learn from history; though it is probable, that the\r\nobvious TENDENCY of these principles excited such horror in mankind, as\r\nsoon obliged the dangerous enthusiasts to renounce, or at least conceal\r\ntheir tenets. Perhaps the LEVELLERS, who claimed an equal distribution\r\nof property, were a kind of POLITICAL fanatics, which arose from the\r\nreligious species, and more openly avowed their pretensions; as carrying\r\na more plausible appearance, of being practicable in themselves, as well\r\nas useful to human society. It must, indeed, be confessed, that nature\r\nis so liberal to mankind, that, were all her presents equally divided\r\namong the species, and improved by art and industry, every individual\r\nwould enjoy all the necessaries, and even most of the comforts of life;\r\nnor would ever be liable to any ills but such as might accidentally\r\narise from the sickly frame and constitution of his body. It must also\r\nbe confessed, that, wherever we depart from this equality, we rob the\r\npoor of more satisfaction than we add to the rich, and that the slight\r\ngratification of a frivolous vanity, in one individual, frequently costs\r\nmore than bread to many families, and even provinces. It may appear\r\nwithal, that the rule of equality, as it would be highly USEFUL, is not\r\naltogether IMPRACTICABLE; but has taken place, at least in an imperfect\r\ndegree, in some republics; particularly that of Sparta; where it was\r\nattended, it is said, with the most beneficial consequences. Not to\r\nmention that the Agrarian laws, so frequently claimed in Rome, and\r\ncarried into execution in many Greek cities, proceeded, all of them,\r\nfrom a general idea of the utility of this principle.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut historians, and even common sense, may inform us, that, however\r\nspecious these ideas of PERFECT equality may seem, they are really,\r\nat bottom, IMPRACTICABLE; and were they not so, would be extremely\r\nPERNICIOUS to human society. Render possessions ever so equal, men\u0027s\r\ndifferent degrees of art, care, and industry will immediately break that\r\nequality. Or if you check these virtues, you reduce society to the most\r\nextreme indigence; and instead of preventing want and beggary in a\r\nfew, render it unavoidable to the whole community. The most rigorous\r\ninquisition too is requisite to watch every inequality on its first\r\nappearance; and the most severe jurisdiction, to punish and redress it.\r\nBut besides, that so much authority must soon degenerate into tyranny,\r\nand be exerted with great partialities; who can possibly be possessed\r\nof it, in such a situation as is here supposed? Perfect equality\r\nof possessions, destroying all subordination, weakens extremely the\r\nauthority of magistracy, and must reduce all power nearly to a level, as\r\nwell as property.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe may conclude, therefore, that, in order to establish laws for the\r\nregulation of property, we must be acquainted with the nature and\r\nsituation of man; must reject appearances, which may be false, though\r\nspecious; and must search for those rules, which are, on the whole, most\r\nUSEFUL and BENEFICIAL. Vulgar sense and slight experience are sufficient\r\nfor this purpose; where men give not way to too selfish avidity, or too\r\nextensive enthusiasm.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWho sees not, for instance, that whatever is produced or improved by a\r\nman\u0027s art or industry ought, for ever, to be secured to him, in order to\r\ngive encouragement to such USEFUL habits and accomplishments? That the\r\nproperty ought also to descend to children and relations, for the same\r\nUSEFUL purpose? That it may be alienated by consent, in order to beget\r\nthat commerce and intercourse, which is so BENEFICIAL to human society?\r\nAnd that all contracts and promises ought carefully to be fulfilled,\r\nin order to secure mutual trust and confidence, by which the general\r\nINTEREST of mankind is so much promoted?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nExamine the writers on the laws of nature; and you will always find,\r\nthat, whatever principles they set out with, they are sure to terminate\r\nhere at last, and to assign, as the ultimate reason for every rule which\r\nthey establish, the convenience and necessities of mankind. A concession\r\nthus extorted, in opposition to systems, has more authority than if it\r\nhad been made in prosecution of them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhat other reason, indeed, could writers ever give, why this must be\r\nMINE and that YOURS; since uninstructed nature surely never made any\r\nsuch distinction? The objects which receive those appellations are, of\r\nthemselves, foreign to us; they are totally disjoined and separated\r\nfrom us; and nothing but the general interests of society can form the\r\nconnexion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSometimes the interests of society may require a rule of justice in\r\na particular case; but may not determine any particular rule, among\r\nseveral, which are all equally beneficial. In that case, the slightest\r\nanalogies are laid hold of, in order to prevent that indifference and\r\nambiguity, which would be the source of perpetual dissension. Thus\r\npossession alone, and first possession, is supposed to convey property,\r\nwhere no body else has any preceding claim and pretension. Many of the\r\nreasonings of lawyers are of this analogical nature, and depend on very\r\nslight connexions of the imagination.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nDoes any one scruple, in extraordinary cases, to violate all regard to\r\nthe private property of individuals, and sacrifice to public interest\r\na distinction which had been established for the sake of that interest?\r\nThe safety of the people is the supreme law: All other particular laws\r\nare subordinate to it, and dependent on it: And if, in the COMMON course\r\nof things, they be followed and regarded; it is only because the\r\npublic safety and interest COMMONLY demand so equal and impartial an\r\nadministration.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSometimes both UTILITY and ANALOGY fail, and leave the laws of justice\r\nin total uncertainty. Thus, it is highly requisite, that prescription\r\nor long possession should convey property; but what number of days or\r\nmonths or years should be sufficient for that purpose, it is impossible\r\nfor reason alone to determine. CIVIL LAWS here supply the place of the\r\nnatural CODE, and assign different terms for prescription, according to\r\nthe different UTILITIES, proposed by the legislator. Bills of exchange\r\nand promissory notes, by the laws of most countries, prescribe sooner\r\nthan bonds, and mortgages, and contracts of a more formal nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn general we may observe that all questions of property are subordinate\r\nto the authority of civil laws, which extend, restrain, modify,\r\nand alter the rules of natural justice, according to the particular\r\nCONVENIENCE of each community. The laws have, or ought to have, a\r\nconstant reference to the constitution of government, the manners, the\r\nclimate, the religion, the commerce, the situation of each society. A\r\nlate author of genius, as well as learning, has prosecuted this subject\r\nat large, and has established, from these principles, a system of\r\npolitical knowledge, which abounds in ingenious and brilliant thoughts,\r\nand is not wanting in solidity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: The author of L\u0027ESPRIT DES LOIX, This illustrious\r\n writer, however, sets out with a different theory, and\r\n supposes all right to be founded on certain RAPPORTS or\r\n relations; which is a system, that, in my opinion, never\r\n will be reconciled with true philosophy. Father Malebranche,\r\n as far as I can learn, was the first that started this\r\n abstract theory of morals, which was afterwards adopted by\r\n Cudworth, Clarke, and others; and as it excludes all\r\n sentiment, and pretends to found everything on reason, it\r\n has not wanted followers in this philosophic age. See\r\n Section I, Appendix I. With regard to justice, the virtue\r\n here treated of, the inference against this theory seems\r\n short and conclusive. Property is allowed to be dependent on\r\n civil laws; civil laws are allowed to have no other object,\r\n but the interest of society: This therefore must be allowed\r\n to be the sole foundation of property and justice. Not to\r\n mention, that our obligation itself to obey the magistrate\r\n and his laws is founded on nothing but the interests of\r\n society. If the ideas of justice, sometimes, do not follow\r\n the dispositions of civil law; we shall find, that these\r\n cases, instead of objections, are confirmations of the\r\n theory delivered above. Where a civil law is so perverse as\r\n to cross all the interests of society, it loses all its\r\n authority, and men judge by the ideas of natural justice,\r\n which are conformable to those interests. Sometimes also\r\n civil laws, for useful purposes, require a ceremony or form\r\n to any deed; and where that is wanting, their decrees run\r\n contrary to the usual tenour of justice; but one who takes\r\n advantage of such chicanes, is not commonly regarded as an\r\n honest man. Thus, the interests of society require, that\r\n contracts be fulfilled; and there is not a more material\r\n article either of natural or civil justice: But the omission\r\n of a trifling circumstance will often, by law, invalidate a\r\n contract, in foro humano, but not in foro conscientiae, as\r\n divines express themselves. In these cases, the magistrate\r\n is supposed only to withdraw his power of enforcing the\r\n right, not to have altered the right. Where his intention\r\n extends to the right, and is conformable to the interests of\r\n society; it never fails to alter the right; a clear proof of\r\n the origin of justice and of property, as assigned above.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWHAT IS A MAN\u0027S PROPERTY? Anything which it is lawful for him, and for\r\nhim alone, to use. BUT WHAT RULE HAVE WE, BY WHICH WE CAN DISTINGUISH\r\nTHESE OBJECTS? Here we must have recourse to statutes, customs,\r\nprecedents, analogies, and a hundred other circumstances; some of\r\nwhich are constant and inflexible, some variable and arbitrary. But the\r\nultimate point, in which they all professedly terminate, is the\r\ninterest and happiness of human society. Where this enters not into\r\nconsideration, nothing can appear more whimsical, unnatural, and even\r\nsuperstitious, than all or most of the laws of justice and of property.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThose who ridicule vulgar superstitions, and expose the folly of\r\nparticular regards to meats, days, places, postures, apparel, have an\r\neasy task; while they consider all the qualities and relations of the\r\nobjects, and discover no adequate cause for that affection or antipathy,\r\nveneration or horror, which have so mighty an influence over a\r\nconsiderable part of mankind. A Syrian would have starved rather than\r\ntaste pigeon; an Egyptian would not have approached bacon: But if these\r\nspecies of food be examined by the senses of sight, smell, or taste,\r\nor scrutinized by the sciences of chemistry, medicine, or physics, no\r\ndifference is ever found between them and any other species, nor\r\ncan that precise circumstance be pitched on, which may afford a just\r\nfoundation for the religious passion. A fowl on Thursday is lawful\r\nfood; on Friday abominable: Eggs in this house and in this diocese,\r\nare permitted during Lent; a hundred paces farther, to eat them is a\r\ndamnable sin. This earth or building, yesterday was profane; to-day,\r\nby the muttering of certain words, it has become holy and sacred. Such\r\nreflections as these, in the mouth of a philosopher, one may safely\r\nsay, are too obvious to have any influence; because they must always,\r\nto every man, occur at first sight; and where they prevail not, of\r\nthemselves, they are surely obstructed by education, prejudice, and\r\npassion, not by ignorance or mistake.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt may appear to a careless view, or rather a too abstracted reflection,\r\nthat there enters a like superstition into all the sentiments of\r\njustice; and that, if a man expose its object, or what we call property,\r\nto the same scrutiny of sense and science, he will not, by the most\r\naccurate enquiry, find any foundation for the difference made by moral\r\nsentiment. I may lawfully nourish myself from this tree; but the fruit\r\nof another of the same species, ten paces off, it is criminal for me to\r\ntouch. Had I worn this apparel an hour ago, I had merited the severest\r\npunishment; but a man, by pronouncing a few magical syllables, has now\r\nrendered it fit for my use and service. Were this house placed in the\r\nneighbouring territory, it had been immoral for me to dwell in it;\r\nbut being built on this side the river, it is subject to a different\r\nmunicipal law, and by its becoming mine I incur no blame or censure.\r\nThe same species of reasoning it may be thought, which so successfully\r\nexposes superstition, is also applicable to justice; nor is it possible,\r\nin the one case more than in the other, to point out, in the object,\r\nthat precise quality or circumstance, which is the foundation of the\r\nsentiment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut there is this material difference between SUPERSTITION and JUSTICE,\r\nthat the former is frivolous, useless, and burdensome; the latter is\r\nabsolutely requisite to the well-being of mankind and existence of\r\nsociety. When we abstract from this circumstance (for it is too apparent\r\never to be overlooked) it must be confessed, that all regards to right\r\nand property, seem entirely without foundation, as much as the grossest\r\nand most vulgar superstition. Were the interests of society nowise\r\nconcerned, it is as unintelligible why another\u0027s articulating certain\r\nsounds implying consent, should change the nature of my actions with\r\nregard to a particular object, as why the reciting of a liturgy by a\r\npriest, in a certain habit and posture, should dedicate a heap of brick\r\nand timber, and render it, thenceforth and for ever, sacred.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: It is evident, that the will or consent alone never\r\ntransfers property, nor causes the obligation of a promise (for the same\r\nreasoning extends to both), but the will must be expressed by words or\r\nsigns, in order to impose a tie upon any man. The expression being once\r\nbrought in as subservient to the will, soon becomes the principal part\r\nof the promise; nor will a man be less bound by his word, though he\r\nsecretly give a different direction to his intention, and withhold the\r\nassent of his mind. But though the expression makes, on most occasions,\r\nthe whole of the promise, yet it does not always so; and one who should\r\nmake use of any expression, of which he knows not the meaning, and which\r\nhe uses without any sense of the consequences, would not certainly be\r\nbound by it. Nay, though he know its meaning, yet if he use it in jest\r\nonly, and with such signs as evidently show, that he has no serious\r\nintention of binding himself, he would not lie under any obligation of\r\nperformance; but it is necessary, that the words be a perfect expression\r\nof the will, without any contrary signs. Nay, even this we must\r\nnot carry so far as to imagine, that one, whom, by our quickness of\r\nunderstanding, we conjecture, from certain signs, to have an intention\r\nof deceiving us, is not bound by his expression or verbal promise, if\r\nwe accept of it; but must limit this conclusion to those cases where\r\nthe signs are of a different nature from those of deceit. All these\r\ncontradictions are easily accounted for, if justice arise entirely from\r\nits usefulness to society; but will never be explained on any other\r\nhypothesis.\r\n\r\n It is remarkable that the moral decisions of the JESUITS and other\r\nrelaxed casuists, were commonly formed in prosecution of some such\r\nsubtilties of reasoning as are here pointed out, and proceed as much\r\nfrom the habit of scholastic refinement as from any corruption of\r\nthe heart, if we may follow the authority of Mons. Bayle. See his\r\nDictionary, article Loyola. And why has the indignation of mankind risen\r\nso high against these casuists; but because every one perceived, that\r\nhuman society could not subsist were such practices authorized, and that\r\nmorals must always be handled with a view to public interest, more than\r\nphilosophical regularity? If the secret direction of the intention, said\r\nevery man of sense, could invalidate a contract; where is our security?\r\nAnd yet a metaphysical schoolman might think, that, where an intention\r\nwas supposed to be requisite, if that intention really had not place,\r\nno consequence ought to follow, and no obligation be imposed. The\r\ncasuistical subtilties may not be greater than the snbtilties of\r\nlawyers, hinted at above; but as the former are PERNICIOUS, and the\r\nlatter INNOCENT and even NECESSARY, this is the reason of the very\r\ndifferent reception they meet with from the world.\r\n\r\n It is a doctrine of the Church of Rome, that the priest, by a secret\r\ndirection of his intention, can invalidate any sacrament. This position\r\nis derived from a strict and regular prosecution of the obvious truth,\r\nthat empty words alone, without any meaning or intention in the speaker,\r\ncan never be attended with any effect. If the same conclusion be not\r\nadmitted in reasonings concerning civil contracts, where the affair is\r\nallowed to be of so much less consequence than the eternal salvation\r\nof thousands, it proceeds entirely from men\u0027s sense of the danger and\r\ninconvenience of the doctrine in the former case: And we may\r\nthence observe, that however positive, arrogant, and dogmatical any\r\nsuperstition may appear, it never can convey any thorough persuasion\r\nof the reality of its objects, or put them, in any degree, on a balance\r\nwith the common incidents of life, which we learn from daily observation\r\nand experimental reasoning.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThese reflections are far from weakening the obligations of justice, or\r\ndiminishing anything from the most sacred attention to property. On\r\nthe contrary, such sentiments must acquire new force from the present\r\nreasoning. For what stronger foundation can be desired or conceived for\r\nany duty, than to observe, that human society, or even human nature,\r\ncould not subsist without the establishment of it; and will still arrive\r\nat greater degrees of happiness and perfection, the more inviolable the\r\nregard is, which is paid to that duty?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe dilemma seems obvious: As justice evidently tends to promote public\r\nutility and to support civil society, the sentiment of justice is either\r\nderived from our reflecting on that tendency, or like hunger, thirst,\r\nand other appetites, resentment, love of life, attachment to offspring,\r\nand other passions, arises from a simple original instinct in the human\r\nbreast, which nature has implanted for like salutary purposes. If the\r\nlatter be the case, it follows, that property, which is the object of\r\njustice, is also distinguished by a simple original instinct, and is not\r\nascertained by any argument or reflection. But who is there that ever\r\nheard of such an instinct? Or is this a subject in which new discoveries\r\ncan be made? We may as well expect to discover, in the body, new senses,\r\nwhich had before escaped the observation of all mankind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut farther, though it seems a very simple proposition to say, that\r\nnature, by an instinctive sentiment, distinguishes property, yet in\r\nreality we shall find, that there are required for that purpose ten\r\nthousand different instincts, and these employed about objects of the\r\ngreatest intricacy and nicest discernment. For when a definition of\r\nPROPERTY is required, that relation is found to resolve itself into\r\nany possession acquired by occupation, by industry, by prescription, by\r\ninheritance, by contract, \u0026amp;c. Can we think that nature, by an original\r\ninstinct, instructs us in all these methods of acquisition?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThese words too, inheritance and contract, stand for ideas infinitely\r\ncomplicated; and to define them exactly, a hundred volumes of laws, and\r\na thousand volumes of commentators, have not been found sufficient. Does\r\nnature, whose instincts in men are all simple, embrace such complicated\r\nand artificial objects, and create a rational creature, without trusting\r\nanything to the operation of his reason?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut even though all this were admitted, it would not be satisfactory.\r\nPositive laws can certainly transfer property. It is by another original\r\ninstinct, that we recognize the authority of kings and senates, and mark\r\nall the boundaries of their jurisdiction? Judges too, even though their\r\nsentence be erroneous and illegal, must be allowed, for the sake of\r\npeace and order, to have decisive authority, and ultimately to determine\r\nproperty. Have we original innate ideas of praetors and chancellors and\r\njuries? Who sees not, that all these institutions arise merely from the\r\nnecessities of human society?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll birds of the same species in every age and country, built their\r\nnests alike: In this we see the force of instinct. Men, in different\r\ntimes and places, frame their houses differently: Here we perceive\r\nthe influence of reason and custom. A like inference may be drawn from\r\ncomparing the instinct of generation and the institution of property.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHow great soever the variety of municipal laws, it must be confessed,\r\nthat their chief outlines pretty regularly concur; because the purposes,\r\nto which they tend, are everywhere exactly similar. In like manner, all\r\nhouses have a roof and walls, windows and chimneys; though diversified\r\nin their shape, figure, and materials. The purposes of the latter,\r\ndirected to the conveniencies of human life, discover not more plainly\r\ntheir origin from reason and reflection, than do those of the former,\r\nwhich point all to a like end.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI need not mention the variations, which all the rules of property\r\nreceive from the finer turns and connexions of the imagination, and from\r\nthe subtilties and abstractions of law-topics and reasonings. There is\r\nno possibility of reconciling this observation to the notion of original\r\ninstincts.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhat alone will beget a doubt concerning the theory, on which I insist,\r\nis the influence of education and acquired habits, by which we are\r\nso accustomed to blame injustice, that we are not, in every instance,\r\nconscious of any immediate reflection on the pernicious consequences of\r\nit. The views the most familiar to us are apt, for that very reason,\r\nto escape us; and what we have very frequently performed from certain\r\nmotives, we are apt likewise to continue mechanically, without\r\nrecalling, on every occasion, the reflections, which first determined\r\nus. The convenience, or rather necessity, which leads to justice is so\r\nuniversal, and everywhere points so much to the same rules, that the\r\nhabit takes place in all societies; and it is not without some scrutiny,\r\nthat we are able to ascertain its true origin. The matter, however,\r\nis not so obscure, but that even in common life we have every moment\r\nrecourse to the principle of public utility, and ask, WHAT MUST BECOME\r\nOF THE WORLD, IF SUCH PRACTICES PREVAIL? HOW COULD SOCIETY SUBSIST\r\nUNDER SUCH DISORDERS? Were the distinction or separation of possessions\r\nentirely useless, can any one conceive, that it ever should have\r\nobtained in society?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus we seem, upon the whole, to have attained a knowledge of the force\r\nof that principle here insisted on, and can determine what degree\r\nof esteem or moral approbation may result from reflections on public\r\ninterest and utility. The necessity of justice to the support of society\r\nis the sole foundation of that virtue; and since no moral excellence\r\nis more highly esteemed, we may conclude that this circumstance of\r\nusefulness has, in general, the strongest energy, and most entire\r\ncommand over our sentiments. It must, therefore, be the source of\r\na considerable part of the merit ascribed to humanity, benevolence,\r\nfriendship, public spirit, and other social virtues of that stamp; as it\r\nis the sole source of the moral approbation paid to fidelity, justice,\r\nveracity, integrity, and those other estimable and useful qualities and\r\nprinciples. It is entirely agreeable to the rules of philosophy, and\r\neven of common reason; where any principle has been found to have a\r\ngreat force and energy in one instance, to ascribe to it a like\r\nenergy in all similar instances. This indeed is Newton\u0027s chief rule of\r\nphilosophizing [Footnote: Principia. Lib. iii.].\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_SECT4\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n SECTION IV.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\r\n OF POLITICAL SOCIETY.\r\n\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHad every man sufficient SAGACITY to perceive, at all times, the strong\r\ninterest which binds him to the observance of justice and equity, and\r\nSTRENGTH OF MIND sufficient to persevere in a steady adherence to a\r\ngeneral and a distant interest, in opposition to the allurements of\r\npresent pleasure and advantage; there had never, in that case, been any\r\nsuch thing as government or political society, but each man, following\r\nhis natural liberty, had lived in entire peace and harmony with all\r\nothers. What need of positive law where natural justice is, of itself,\r\na sufficient restraint? Why create magistrates, where there never arises\r\nany disorder or iniquity? Why abridge our native freedom, when, in every\r\ninstance, the utmost exertion of it is found innocent and beneficial?\r\nIt is evident, that, if government were totally useless, it never could\r\nhave place, and that the sole foundation of the duty of allegiance is\r\nthe ADVANTAGE, which it procures to society, by preserving peace and\r\norder among mankind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen a number of political societies are erected, and maintain a great\r\nintercourse together, a new set of rules are immediately discovered to\r\nbe USEFUL in that particular situation; and accordingly take place under\r\nthe title of Laws of Nations. Of this kind are, the sacredness of the\r\nperson of ambassadors, abstaining from poisoned arms, quarter in war,\r\nwith others of that kind, which are plainly calculated for the ADVANTAGE\r\nof states and kingdoms in their intercourse with each other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe rules of justice, such as prevail among individuals, are not\r\nentirely suspended among political societies. All princes pretend a\r\nregard to the rights of other princes; and some, no doubt, without\r\nhypocrisy. Alliances and treaties are every day made between independent\r\nstates, which would only be so much waste of parchment, if they were not\r\nfound by experience to have SOME influence and authority. But here is\r\nthe difference between kingdoms and individuals. Human nature cannot\r\nby any means subsist, without the association of individuals; and that\r\nassociation never could have place, were no regard paid to the laws of\r\nequity and justice. Disorder, confusion, the war of all against all, are\r\nthe necessary consequences of such a licentious conduct. But nations\r\ncan subsist without intercourse. They may even subsist, in some degree,\r\nunder a general war. The observance of justice, though useful among\r\nthem, is not guarded by so strong a necessity as among individuals;\r\nand the moral obligation holds proportion with the USEFULNESS. All\r\npoliticians will allow, and most philosophers, that reasons of state\r\nmay, in particular emergencies, dispense with the rules of justice, and\r\ninvalidate any treaty or alliance, where the strict observance of\r\nit would be prejudicial, in a considerable degree, to either of the\r\ncontracting parties. But nothing less than the most extreme necessity,\r\nit is confessed, can justify individuals in a breach of promise, or an\r\ninvasion of the properties of others.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn a confederated commonwealth, such as the Achaean republic of old, or\r\nthe Swiss Cantons and United Provinces in modern times; as the league\r\nhas here a peculiar UTILITY, the conditions of union have a peculiar\r\nsacredness and authority, and a violation of them would be regarded as\r\nno less, or even as more criminal, than any private injury or injustice.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe long and helpless infancy of man requires the combination of parents\r\nfor the subsistence of their young; and that combination requires the\r\nvirtue of chastity or fidelity to the marriage bed. Without such a\r\nUTILITY, it will readily be owned, that such a virtue would never have\r\nbeen thought of.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: The only solution, which Plato gives to all the\r\nobjections that might be raised against the community of women,\r\nestablished in his imaginary commonwealth, is, [Greek quotation here].\r\nScite enim istud et dicitur et dicetur, Id quod utile sit honestum esse,\r\nquod autem inutile sit turpe esse. [De Rep lib v p 457 ex edit Ser]. And\r\nthis maxim will admit of no doubt, where public utility is concerned,\r\nwhich is Plato\u0027s meaning. And indeed to what other purpose do all the\r\nideas of chastity and modesty serve? \"Nisi utile est quod facimus,\r\nfrustra est gloria,\" says Phaedrus. [Greek quotation here], says\r\nPlutarch, de vitioso pudore. \"Nihil eorum quae damnosa sunt, pulchrum\r\nest.\" The same was the opinion of the Stoics [Greek quotation here; from\r\nSept. Emp lib III cap 20].\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAn infidelity of this nature is much more PERNICIOUS in WOMEN than in\r\nMEN. Hence the laws of chastity are much stricter over the one sex than\r\nover the other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThese rules have all a reference to generation; and yet women past\r\nchild-bearing are no more supposed to be exempted from them than\r\nthose in the flower of their youth and beauty. GENERAL RULES are often\r\nextended beyond the principle whence they first arise; and this in all\r\nmatters of taste and sentiment. It is a vulgar story at Paris, that,\r\nduring the rage of the Mississippi, a hump-backed fellow went every\r\nday into the Rue de Quincempoix, where the stock-jobbers met in great\r\ncrowds, and was well paid for allowing them to make use of his hump as a\r\ndesk, in order to sign their contracts upon it. Would the fortune, which\r\nhe raised by this expedient, make him a handsome fellow; though it be\r\nconfessed, that personal beauty arises very much from ideas of utility?\r\nThe imagination is influenced by associations of ideas; which, though\r\nthey arise at first from the judgement, are not easily altered by every\r\nparticular exception that occurs to us. To which we may add, in\r\nthe present case of chastity, that the example of the old would be\r\npernicious to the young; and that women, continually foreseeing that a\r\ncertain time would bring them the liberty of indulgence, would naturally\r\nadvance that period, and think more lightly of this whole duty, so\r\nrequisite to society.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThose who live in the same family have such frequent opportunities of\r\nlicence of this kind, that nothing could prevent purity of manners, were\r\nmarriage allowed, among the nearest relations, or any intercourse of\r\nlove between them ratified by law and custom. Incest, therefore, being\r\nPERNICIOUS in a superior degree, has also a superior turpitude and moral\r\ndeformity annexed to it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhat is the reason, why, by the Athenian laws, one might marry a\r\nhalf-sister by the father, but not by the mother? Plainly this:\r\nThe manners of the Athenians were so reserved, that a man was never\r\npermitted to approach the women\u0027s apartment, even in the same family,\r\nunless where he visited his own mother. His step-mother and her children\r\nwere as much shut up from him as the woman of any other family, and\r\nthere was as little danger of any criminal correspondence between them.\r\nUncles and nieces, for a like reason, might marry at Athens; but neither\r\nthese, nor half-brothers and sisters, could contract that alliance at\r\nRome, where the intercourse was more open between the sexes. Public\r\nutility is the cause of all these variations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo repeat, to a man\u0027s prejudice, anything that escaped him in private\r\nconversation, or to make any such use of his private letters, is highly\r\nblamed. The free and social intercourse of minds must be extremely\r\nchecked, where no such rules of fidelity are established.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nEven in repeating stories, whence we can foresee no ill consequences\r\nto result, the giving of one\u0027s author is regarded as a piece of\r\nindiscretion, if not of immorality. These stories, in passing from hand\r\nto hand, and receiving all the usual variations, frequently come about\r\nto the persons concerned, and produce animosities and quarrels among\r\npeople, whose intentions are the most innocent and inoffensive.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo pry into secrets, to open or even read the letters of others, to\r\nplay the spy upon their words and looks and actions; what habits more\r\ninconvenient in society? What habits, of consequence, more blameable?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis principle is also the foundation of most of the laws of good\r\nmanners; a kind of lesser morality, calculated for the ease of company\r\nand conversation. Too much or too little ceremony are both blamed, and\r\neverything, which promotes ease, without an indecent familiarity, is\r\nuseful and laudable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nConstancy in friendships, attachments, and familiarities, is\r\ncommendable, and is requisite to support trust and good correspondence\r\nin society. But in places of general, though casual concourse, where\r\nthe pursuit of health and pleasure brings people promiscuously together,\r\npublic conveniency has dispensed with this maxim; and custom there\r\npromotes an unreserved conversation for the time, by indulging the\r\nprivilege of dropping afterwards every indifferent acquaintance, without\r\nbreach of civility or good manners.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nEven in societies, which are established on principles the most immoral,\r\nand the most destructive to the interests of the general society, there\r\nare required certain rules, which a species of false honour, as well as\r\nprivate interest, engages the members to observe. Robbers and pirates,\r\nit has often been remarked, could not maintain their pernicious\r\nconfederacy, did they not establish a pew distributive justice among\r\nthemselves, and recall those laws of equity, which they have violated\r\nwith the rest of mankind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI hate a drinking companion, says the Greek proverb, who never forgets.\r\nThe follies of the last debauch should be buried in eternal oblivion, in\r\norder to give full scope to the follies of the next.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAmong nations, where an immoral gallantry, if covered with a thin veil\r\nof mystery, is, in some degree, authorized by custom, there immediately\r\narise a set of rules, calculated for the conveniency of that attachment.\r\nThe famous court or parliament of love in Provence formerly decided all\r\ndifficult cases of this nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn societies for play, there are laws required for the conduct of the\r\ngame; and these laws are different in each game. The foundation, I own,\r\nof such societies is frivolous; and the laws are, in a great measure,\r\nthough not altogether, capricious and arbitrary. So far is there a\r\nmaterial difference between them and the rules of justice, fidelity, and\r\nloyalty. The general societies of men are absolutely requisite for the\r\nsubsistence of the species; and the public conveniency, which regulates\r\nmorals, is inviolably established in the nature of man, and of the\r\nworld, in which he lives. The comparison, therefore, in these respects,\r\nis very imperfect. We may only learn from it the necessity of rules,\r\nwherever men have any intercourse with each other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThey cannot even pass each other on the road without rules. Waggoners,\r\ncoachmen, and postilions have principles, by which they give the way;\r\nand these are chiefly founded on mutual ease and convenience. Sometimes\r\nalso they are arbitrary, at least dependent on a kind of capricious\r\nanalogy like many of the reasonings of lawyers.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: That the lighter machine yield to the heavier, and, in\r\nmachines of the same kind, that the empty yield to the loaded; this rule\r\nis founded on convenience. That those who are going to the capital take\r\nplace of those who are coming from it; this seems to be founded on some\r\nidea of dignity of the great city, and of the preference of the future\r\nto the past. From like reasons, among foot-walkers, the right-hand\r\nentitles a man to the wall, and prevents jostling, which peaceable\r\npeople find very disagreeable and inconvenient.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo carry the matter farther, we may observe, that it is impossible for\r\nmen so much as to murder each other without statutes, and maxims, and an\r\nidea of justice and honour. War has its laws as well as peace; and\r\neven that sportive kind of war, carried on among wrestlers, boxers,\r\ncudgel-players, gladiators, is regulated by fixed principles. Common\r\ninterest and utility beget infallibly a standard of right and wrong\r\namong the parties concerned.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_SECT5\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n SECTION V. WHY UTILITY PLEASES.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_PART51\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n PART I.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt seems so natural a thought to ascribe to their utility the praise,\r\nwhich we bestow on the social virtues, that one would expect to meet\r\nwith this principle everywhere in moral writers, as the chief foundation\r\nof their reasoning and enquiry. In common life, we may observe, that the\r\ncircumstance of utility is always appealed to; nor is it supposed, that\r\na greater eulogy can be given to any man, than to display his usefulness\r\nto the public, and enumerate the services, which he has performed to\r\nmankind and society. What praise, even of an inanimate form, if the\r\nregularity and elegance of its parts destroy not its fitness for any\r\nuseful purpose! And how satisfactory an apology for any disproportion\r\nor seeming deformity, if we can show the necessity of that particular\r\nconstruction for the use intended! A ship appears more beautiful to an\r\nartist, or one moderately skilled in navigation, where its prow is wide\r\nand swelling beyond its poop, than if it were framed with a precise\r\ngeometrical regularity, in contradiction to all the laws of mechanics. A\r\nbuilding, whose doors and windows were exact squares, would hurt the\r\neye by that very proportion; as ill adapted to the figure of a human\r\ncreature, for whose service the fabric was intended.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhat wonder then, that a man, whose habits and conduct are hurtful to\r\nsociety, and dangerous or pernicious to every one who has an intercourse\r\nwith him, should, on that account, be an object of disapprobation, and\r\ncommunicate to every spectator the strongest sentiment of disgust and\r\nhatred.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: We ought not to imagine, because an inanimate object\r\nmay be useful as well as a man, that therefore it ought also, according\r\nto this system, to merit he appellation of VIRTUOUS. The sentiments,\r\nexcited by utility, are, in the two cases, very different; and the one\r\nis mixed with affection, esteem, approbation, \u0026amp;c., and not the other. In\r\nlike manner, an inanimate object may have good colour and proportions\r\nas well as a human figure. But can we ever be in love with the former?\r\nThere are a numerous set of passions and sentiments, of which thinking\r\nrational beings are, by the original constitution of nature, the only\r\nproper objects: and though the very same qualities be transferred to an\r\ninsensible, inanimate being, they will not excite the same sentiments.\r\nThe beneficial qualities of herbs and minerals are, indeed, sometimes\r\ncalled their VIRTUES; but this is an effect of the caprice of language,\r\nwhich out not to be regarded in reasoning. For though there be a species\r\nof approbation attending even inanimate objects, when beneficial, yet\r\nthis sentiment is so weak, and so different from that which is directed\r\nto beneficent magistrates or statesman; that they ought not to be ranked\r\nunder the same class or appellation.\r\n\r\n A very small variation of the object, even where the same qualities are\r\npreserved, will destroy a sentiment. Thus, the same beauty, transferred\r\nto a different sex, excites no amorous passion, where nature is not\r\nextremely perverted.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut perhaps the difficulty of accounting for these effects of\r\nusefulness, or its contrary, has kept philosophers from admitting them\r\ninto their systems of ethics, and has induced them rather to employ any\r\nother principle, in explaining the origin of moral good and evil. But it\r\nis no just reason for rejecting any principle, confirmed by experience,\r\nthat we cannot give a satisfactory account of its origin, nor are able\r\nto resolve it into other more general principles. And if we would\r\nemploy a little thought on the present subject, we need be at no loss to\r\naccount for the influence of utility, and to deduce it from principles,\r\nthe most known and avowed in human nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFrom the apparent usefulness of the social virtues, it has readily\r\nbeen inferred by sceptics, both ancient and modern, that all moral\r\ndistinctions arise from education, and were, at first, invented, and\r\nafterwards encouraged, by the art of politicians, in order to render\r\nmen tractable, and subdue their natural ferocity and selfishness, which\r\nincapacitated them for society. This principle, indeed, of precept and\r\neducation, must so far be owned to have a powerful influence, that it\r\nmay frequently increase or diminish, beyond their natural standard,\r\nthe sentiments of approbation or dislike; and may even, in particular\r\ninstances, create, without any natural principle, a new sentiment of\r\nthis kind; as is evident in all superstitious practices and observances:\r\nBut that ALL moral affection or dislike arises from this origin, will\r\nnever surely be allowed by any judicious enquirer. Had nature made no\r\nsuch distinction, founded on the original constitution of the mind, the\r\nwords, HONOURABLE and SHAMEFUL, LOVELY and ODIOUS, NOBLE and DESPICABLE,\r\nhad never had place in any language; nor could politicians, had they\r\ninvented these terms, ever have been able to render them intelligible,\r\nor make them convey any idea to the audience. So that nothing can be\r\nmore superficial than this paradox of the sceptics; and it were well,\r\nif, in the abstruser studies of logic and metaphysics, we could as\r\neasily obviate the cavils of that sect, as in the practical and more\r\nintelligible sciences of politics and morals.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe social virtues must, therefore, be allowed to have a natural\r\nbeauty and amiableness, which, at first, antecedent to all precept or\r\neducation, recommends them to the esteem of uninstructed mankind, and\r\nengages their affections. And as the public utility of these virtues is\r\nthe chief circumstance, whence they derive their merit, it follows,\r\nthat the end, which they have a tendency to promote, must be some\r\nway agreeable to us, and take hold of some natural affection. It must\r\nplease, either from considerations of self-interest, or from more\r\ngenerous motives and regards.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt has often been asserted, that, as every man has a strong connexion\r\nwith society, and perceives the impossibility of his solitary\r\nsubsistence, he becomes, on that account, favourable to all those habits\r\nor principles, which promote order in society, and insure to him the\r\nquiet possession of so inestimable a blessing, As much as we value\r\nour own happiness and welfare, as much must we applaud the practice\r\nof justice and humanity, by which alone the social confederacy can\r\nbe maintained, and every man reap the fruits of mutual protection and\r\nassistance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis deduction of morals from self-love, or a regard to private\r\ninterest, is an obvious thought, and has not arisen wholly from the\r\nwanton sallies and sportive assaults of the sceptics. To mention no\r\nothers, Polybius, one of the gravest and most judicious, as well as most\r\nmoral writers of antiquity, has assigned this selfish origin to all our\r\nsentiments of virtue. [Footnote: Undutifulness to parents is disapproved\r\nof by mankind, [Greek quotation inserted here]. Ingratitude for a like\r\nreason (though he seems there to mix a more generous regard) [Greek\r\nquotation inserted here] Lib. vi cap. 4. (Ed. Gronorius.) Perhaps the\r\nhistorian only meant, that our sympathy and humanity was more enlivened,\r\nby our considering the similarity of our case with that of the person\r\nsuffering; which is a just sentiment.] But though the solid practical\r\nsense of that author, and his aversion to all vain subtilties, render\r\nhis authority on the present subject very considerable; yet is not\r\nthis an affair to be decided by authority, and the voice of nature and\r\nexperience seems plainly to oppose the selfish theory.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe frequently bestow praise on virtuous actions, performed in very\r\ndistant ages and remote countries; where the utmost subtilty of\r\nimagination would not discover any appearance of self-interest, or\r\nfind any connexion of our present happiness and security with events so\r\nwidely separated from us.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA generous, a brave, a noble deed, performed by an adversary, commands\r\nour approbation; while in its consequences it may be acknowledged\r\nprejudicial to our particular interest.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhere private advantage concurs with general affection for virtue, we\r\nreadily perceive and avow the mixture of these distinct sentiments,\r\nwhich have a very different feeling and influence on the mind. We\r\npraise, perhaps, with more alacrity, where the generous humane action\r\ncontributes to our particular interest: But the topics of praise, which\r\nwe insist on, are very wide of this circumstance. And we may attempt to\r\nbring over others to our sentiments, without endeavouring to convince\r\nthem, that they reap any advantage from the actions which we recommend\r\nto their approbation and applause.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFrame the model of a praiseworthy character, consisting of all the most\r\namiable moral virtues: Give instances, in which these display themselves\r\nafter an eminent and extraordinary manner: You readily engage the esteem\r\nand approbation of all your audience, who never so much as enquire\r\nin what age and country the person lived, who possessed these noble\r\nqualities: A circumstance, however, of all others, the most material\r\nto self-love, or a concern for our own individual happiness. Once on a\r\ntime, a statesman, in the shock and contest of parties, prevailed so far\r\nas to procure, by his eloquence, the banishment of an able adversary;\r\nwhom he secretly followed, offering him money for his support during his\r\nexile, and soothing him with topics of consolation in his misfortunes.\r\nALAS! cries the banished statesman, WITH WHAT REGRET MUST I LEAVE MY\r\nFRIENDS IN THIS CITY, WHERE EVEN ENEMIES ARE SO GENEROUS! Virtue, though\r\nin an enemy, here pleased him: And we also give it the just tribute\r\nof praise and approbation; nor do we retract these sentiments, when we\r\nhear, that the action passed at Athens, about two thousand years ago,\r\nand that the persons\u0027 names were Eschines and Demosthenes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWHAT IS THAT TO ME? There are few occasions, when this question is not\r\npertinent: And had it that universal, infallible influence supposed,\r\nit would turn into ridicule every composition, and almost every\r\nconversation, which contain any praise or censure of men and manners.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is but a weak subterfuge, when pressed by these facts and arguments,\r\nto say, that we transport ourselves, by the force of imagination, into\r\ndistant ages and countries, and consider the advantage, which we should\r\nhave reaped from these characters, had we been contemporaries, and\r\nhad any commerce with the persons. It is not conceivable, how a REAL\r\nsentiment or passion can ever arise from a known IMAGINARY interest;\r\nespecially when our REAL interest is still kept in view, and is often\r\nacknowledged to be entirely distinct from the imaginary, and even\r\nsometimes opposite to it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA man, brought to the brink of a precipice, cannot look down without\r\ntrembling; and the sentiment of IMAGINARY danger actuates him, in\r\nopposition to the opinion and belief of REAL safety. But the imagination\r\nis here assisted by the presence of a striking object; and yet prevails\r\nnot, except it be also aided by novelty, and the unusual appearance of\r\nthe object. Custom soon reconciles us to heights and precipices, and\r\nwears off these false and delusive terrors. The reverse is observable in\r\nthe estimates which we form of characters and manners; and the more we\r\nhabituate ourselves to an accurate scrutiny of morals, the more delicate\r\nfeeling do we acquire of the most minute distinctions between vice and\r\nvirtue. Such frequent occasion, indeed, have we, in common life, to\r\npronounce all kinds of moral determinations, that no object of this kind\r\ncan be new or unusual to us; nor could any FALSE views or prepossessions\r\nmaintain their ground against an experience, so common and familiar.\r\nExperience being chiefly what forms the associations of ideas, it is\r\nimpossible that any association could establish and support itself, in\r\ndirect opposition to that principle.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nUsefulness is agreeable, and engages our approbation. This is a matter\r\nof fact, confirmed by daily observation. But, USEFUL? For what? For\r\nsomebody\u0027s interest, surely. Whose interest then? Not our own only: For\r\nour approbation frequently extends farther. It must, therefore, be the\r\ninterest of those, who are served by the character or action approved\r\nof; and these we may conclude, however remote, are not totally\r\nindifferent to us. By opening up this principle, we shall discover one\r\ngreat source of moral distinctions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_PART52\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n PART II.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSelf-love is a principle in human nature of such extensive energy, and\r\nthe interest of each individual is, in general, so closely connected\r\nwith that of the community, that those philosophers were excusable, who\r\nfancied that all our concern for the public might be resolved into a\r\nconcern for our own happiness and preservation. They saw every moment,\r\ninstances of approbation or blame, satisfaction or displeasure\r\ntowards characters and actions; they denominated the objects of these\r\nsentiments, VIRTUES, or VICES; they observed, that the former had\r\na tendency to increase the happiness, and the latter the misery of\r\nmankind; they asked, whether it were possible that we could have any\r\ngeneral concern for society, or any disinterested resentment of the\r\nwelfare or injury of others; they found it simpler to consider all\r\nthese sentiments as modifications of self-love; and they discovered a\r\npretence, at least, for this unity of principle, in that close union of\r\ninterest, which is so observable between the public and each individual.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut notwithstanding this frequent confusion of interests, it is easy\r\nto attain what natural philosophers, after Lord Bacon, have affected to\r\ncall the experimentum crucis, or that experiment which points out the\r\nright way in any doubt or ambiguity. We have found instances, in\r\nwhich private interest was separate from public; in which it was\r\neven contrary: And yet we observed the moral sentiment to continue,\r\nnotwithstanding this disjunction of interests. And wherever these\r\ndistinct interests sensibly concurred, we always found a sensible\r\nincrease of the sentiment, and a more warm affection to virtue, and\r\ndetestation of vice, or what we properly call, GRATITUDE and REVENGE.\r\nCompelled by these instances, we must renounce the theory, which\r\naccounts for every moral sentiment by the principle of self-love. We\r\nmust adopt a more public affection, and allow, that the interests of\r\nsociety are not, even on their own account, entirely indifferent to\r\nus. Usefulness is only a tendency to a certain end; and it is a\r\ncontradiction in terms, that anything pleases as means to an end, where\r\nthe end itself no wise affects us. If usefulness, therefore, be a source\r\nof moral sentiment, and if this usefulness be not always considered with\r\na reference to self; it follows, that everything, which contributes to\r\nthe happiness of society, recommends itself directly to our approbation\r\nand good-will. Here is a principle, which accounts, in great part, for\r\nthe origin of morality: And what need we seek for abstruse and remote\r\nsystems, when there occurs one so obvious and natural?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n[FOOTNOTE: It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask, why\r\nwe have humanity or a fellow-feeling with others. It is sufficient,\r\nthat this is experienced to be a principle in human nature. We must stop\r\nsomewhere in our examination of causes; and there are, in every science,\r\nsome general principles, beyond which we cannot hope to find any\r\nprinciple more general. No man is absolutely indifferent to the\r\nhappiness and misery of others. The first has a natural tendency to give\r\npleasure; the second, pain. This every one may find in himself. It is\r\nnot probable, that these principles can be resolved into principles\r\nmore simple and universal, whatever attempts may have been made to that\r\npurpose. But if it were possible, it belongs not to the present subject;\r\nand we may here safely consider these principles as original; happy, if\r\nwe can render all the consequences sufficiently plain and perspicuous!]\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHave we any difficulty to comprehend the force of humanity and\r\nbenevolence? Or to conceive, that the very aspect of happiness,\r\njoy, prosperity, gives pleasure; that of pain, suffering, sorrow,\r\ncommunicates uneasiness? The human countenance, says Horace [\u0027Uti\r\nridentibus arrident, ita flentibus adflent Humani vultus,\u0027\u0026mdash;Hor.],\r\nborrows smiles or tears from the human countenance. Reduce a person to\r\nsolitude, and he loses all enjoyment, except either of the sensual or\r\nspeculative kind; and that because the movements of his heart are not\r\nforwarded by correspondent movements in his fellow-creatures. The signs\r\nof sorrow and mourning, though arbitrary, affect us with melancholy; but\r\nthe natural symptoms, tears and cries and groans, never fail to infuse\r\ncompassion and uneasiness. And if the effects of misery touch us in so\r\nlively a manner; can we be supposed altogether insensible or indifferent\r\ntowards its causes; when a malicious or treacherous character and\r\nbehaviour are presented to us?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe enter, I shall suppose, into a convenient, warm, well-contrived\r\napartment: We necessarily receive a pleasure from its very survey;\r\nbecause it presents us with the pleasing ideas of ease, satisfaction,\r\nand enjoyment. The hospitable, good-humoured, humane landlord appears.\r\nThis circumstance surely must embellish the whole; nor can we easily\r\nforbear reflecting, with pleasure, on the satisfaction which results to\r\nevery one from his intercourse and good-offices.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHis whole family, by the freedom, ease, confidence, and calm enjoyment,\r\ndiffused over their countenances, sufficiently express their happiness.\r\nI have a pleasing sympathy in the prospect of so much joy, and can never\r\nconsider the source of it, without the most agreeable emotions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHe tells me, that an oppressive and powerful neighbour had attempted\r\nto dispossess him of his inheritance, and had long disturbed all his\r\ninnocent and social pleasures. I feel an immediate indignation arise in\r\nme against such violence and injury.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut it is no wonder, he adds, that a private wrong should proceed from a\r\nman, who had enslaved provinces, depopulated cities, and made the field\r\nand scaffold stream with human blood. I am struck with horror at the\r\nprospect of so much misery, and am actuated by the strongest antipathy\r\nagainst its author.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn general, it is certain, that, wherever we go, whatever we reflect on\r\nor converse about, everything still presents us with the view of human\r\nhappiness or misery, and excites in our breast a sympathetic movement\r\nof pleasure or uneasiness. In our serious occupations, in our careless\r\namusements, this principle still exerts its active energy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA man who enters the theatre, is immediately struck with the view of\r\nso great a multitude, participating of one common amusement; and\r\nexperiences, from their very aspect, a superior sensibility or\r\ndisposition of being affected with every sentiment, which he shares with\r\nhis fellow-creatures.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHe observes the actors to be animated by the appearance of a full\r\naudience, and raised to a degree of enthusiasm, which they cannot\r\ncommand in any solitary or calm moment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nEvery movement of the theatre, by a skilful poet, is communicated, as\r\nit were by magic, to the spectators; who weep, tremble, resent, rejoice,\r\nand are inflamed with all the variety of passions, which actuate the\r\nseveral personages of the drama.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhere any event crosses our wishes, and interrupts the happiness of the\r\nfavourite characters, we feel a sensible anxiety and concern. But where\r\ntheir sufferings proceed from the treachery, cruelty, or tyranny of an\r\nenemy, our breasts are affected with the liveliest resentment against\r\nthe author of these calamities. It is here esteemed contrary to the\r\nrules of art to represent anything cool and indifferent. A distant\r\nfriend, or a confident, who has no immediate interest in the\r\ncatastrophe, ought, if possible, to be avoided by the poet; as\r\ncommunicating a like indifference to the audience, and checking the\r\nprogress of the passions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFew species of poetry are more entertaining than PASTORAL; and every\r\none is sensible, that the chief source of its pleasure arises from those\r\nimages of a gentle and tender tranquillity, which it represents in its\r\npersonages, and of which it communicates a like sentiment to the reader.\r\nSannazarius, who transferred the scene to the sea-shore, though he\r\npresented the most magnificent object in nature, is confessed to have\r\nerred in his choice. The idea of toil, labour, and danger, suffered by\r\nthe fishermen, is painful; by an unavoidable sympathy, which attends\r\nevery conception of human happiness or misery.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen I was twenty, says a French poet, Ovid was my favourite: Now I am\r\nforty, I declare for Horace. We enter, to be sure, more readily into\r\nsentiments, which resemble those we feel every day: But no passion, when\r\nwell represented, can be entirely indifferent to us; because there is\r\nnone, of which every man has not, within him, at least the seeds and\r\nfirst principles. It is the business of poetry to bring every affection\r\nnear to us by lively imagery and representation, and make it look like\r\ntruth and reality: A certain proof, that, wherever that reality is\r\nfound, our minds are disposed to be strongly affected by it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAny recent event or piece of news, by which the fate of states,\r\nprovinces, or many individuals is affected, is extremely interesting\r\neven to those whose welfare is not immediately engaged. Such\r\nintelligence is propagated with celerity, heard with avidity, and\r\nenquired into with attention and concern. The interest of society\r\nappears, on this occasion, to be in some degree the interest of each\r\nindividual. The imagination is sure to be affected; though the passions\r\nexcited may not always be so strong and steady as to have great\r\ninfluence on the conduct and behaviour.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe perusal of a history seems a calm entertainment; but would be\r\nno entertainment at all, did not our hearts beat with correspondent\r\nmovements to those which are described by the historian.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThucydides and Guicciardin support with difficulty our attention; while\r\nthe former describes the trivial encounters of the small cities of\r\nGreece, and the latter the harmless wars of Pisa. The few persons\r\ninterested and the small interest fill not the imagination, and engage\r\nnot the affections. The deep distress of the numerous Athenian army\r\nbefore Syracuse; the danger which so nearly threatens Venice; these\r\nexcite compassion; these move terror and anxiety.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe indifferent, uninteresting style of Suetonius, equally with the\r\nmasterly pencil of Tacitus, may convince us of the cruel depravity of\r\nNero or Tiberius: But what a difference of sentiment! While the former\r\ncoldly relates the facts; and the latter sets before our eyes the\r\nvenerable figures of a Soranus and a Thrasea, intrepid in their fate,\r\nand only moved by the melting sorrows of their friends and kindred. What\r\nsympathy then touches every human heart! What indignation against the\r\ntyrant, whose causeless fear or unprovoked malice gave rise to such\r\ndetestable barbarity!\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf we bring these subjects nearer: If we remove all suspicion of fiction\r\nand deceit: What powerful concern is excited, and how much superior,\r\nin many instances, to the narrow attachments of self-love and private\r\ninterest! Popular sedition, party zeal, a devoted obedience to factious\r\nleaders; these are some of the most visible, though less laudable\r\neffects of this social sympathy in human nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe frivolousness of the subject too, we may observe, is not able to\r\ndetach us entirely from what carries an image of human sentiment and\r\naffection.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen a person stutters, and pronounces with difficulty, we even\r\nsympathize with this trivial uneasiness, and suffer for him. And it is a\r\nrule in criticism, that every combination of syllables or letters, which\r\ngives pain to the organs of speech in the recital, appears also from a\r\nspecies of sympathy harsh and disagreeable to the ear. Nay, when we\r\nrun over a book with our eye, we are sensible of such unharmonious\r\ncomposition; because we still imagine, that a person recites it to us,\r\nand suffers from the pronunciation of these jarring sounds. So delicate\r\nis our sympathy!\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nEasy and unconstrained postures and motions are always beautiful: An\r\nair of health and vigour is agreeable: Clothes which warm, without\r\nburthening the body; which cover, without imprisoning the limbs, are\r\nwell-fashioned. In every judgement of beauty, the feelings of the person\r\naffected enter into consideration, and communicate to the spectator\r\nsimilar touches of pain or pleasure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: \u0027Decentior equus cujus astricta suntilia; sed idem\r\nvelocior. Pulcher aspectu sit athleta, cujus lacertos execitatio\r\nexpressit; idem certamini paratior nunquam enim SPECIES ab UTILITATE\r\ndividitur. Sed hoc quidem discernere modici judicii est.\u0027\u0026mdash;Quintilian,\r\nInst. lib. viii. cap. 3.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhat wonder, then, if we can pronounce no judgement concerning the\r\ncharacter and conduct of men, without considering the tendencies of\r\ntheir actions, and the happiness or misery which thence arises to\r\nsociety? What association of ideas would ever operate, were that\r\nprinciple here totally unactive.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: In proportion to the station which a man possesses,\r\naccording to the relations in which he is placed; we always expect from\r\nhim a greater or less degree of good, and when disappointed, blame his\r\ninutility; and much more do we blame him, if any ill or prejudice\r\narise from his conduct and behaviour. When the interests of one country\r\ninterfere with those of another, we estimate the merits of a statesman\r\nby the good or ill, which results to his own country from his measures\r\nand councils, without regard to the prejudice which he brings on its\r\nenemies and rivals. His fellow-citizens are the objects, which lie\r\nnearest the eye, while we determine his character. And as nature has\r\nimplanted in every one a superior affection to his own country, we never\r\nexpect any regard to distant nations, where a competition arises. Not to\r\nmention, that, while every man consults the good of his own community,\r\nwe are sensible, that the general interest of mankind is better\r\npromoted, than any loose indeterminate views to the good of a species,\r\nwhence no beneficial action could ever result, for want of a duly\r\nlimited object, on which they could exert themselves.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf any man from a cold insensibility, or narrow selfishness of temper,\r\nis unaffected with the images of human happiness or misery, he must be\r\nequally indifferent to the images of vice and virtue: As, on the other\r\nhand, it is always found, that a warm concern for the interests of our\r\nspecies is attended with a delicate feeling of all moral distinctions;\r\na strong resentment of injury done to men; a lively approbation of their\r\nwelfare. In this particular, though great superiority is observable\r\nof one man above another; yet none are so entirely indifferent to the\r\ninterest of their fellow-creatures, as to perceive no distinctions\r\nof moral good and evil, in consequence of the different tendencies of\r\nactions and principles. How, indeed, can we suppose it possible in any\r\none, who wears a human heart, that if there be subjected to his censure,\r\none character or system of conduct, which is beneficial, and another\r\nwhich is pernicious to his species or community, he will not so much\r\nas give a cool preference to the former, or ascribe to it the smallest\r\nmerit or regard? Let us suppose such a person ever so selfish; let\r\nprivate interest have ingrossed ever so much his attention; yet in\r\ninstances, where that is not concerned, he must unavoidably feel SOME\r\npropensity to the good of mankind, and make it an object of choice, if\r\neverything else be equal. Would any man, who is walking along, tread as\r\nwillingly on another\u0027s gouty toes, whom he has no quarrel with, as on\r\nthe hard flint and pavement? There is here surely a difference in the\r\ncase. We surely take into consideration the happiness and misery of\r\nothers, in weighing the several motives of action, and incline to the\r\nformer, where no private regards draw us to seek our own promotion or\r\nadvantage by the injury of our fellow-creatures. And if the principles\r\nof humanity are capable, in many instances, of influencing our actions,\r\nthey must, at all times, have some authority over our sentiments, and\r\ngive us a general approbation of what is useful to society, and blame of\r\nwhat is dangerous or pernicious. The degrees of these sentiments may\r\nbe the subject of controversy; but the reality of their existence, one\r\nshould think, must be admitted in every theory or system.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA creature, absolutely malicious and spiteful, were there any such in\r\nnature, must be worse than indifferent to the images of vice and virtue.\r\nAll his sentiments must be inverted, and directly opposite to those,\r\nwhich prevail in the human species. Whatever contributes to the good of\r\nmankind, as it crosses the constant bent of his wishes and desires, must\r\nproduce uneasiness and disapprobation; and on the contrary, whatever is\r\nthe source of disorder and misery in society, must, for the same reason,\r\nbe regarded with pleasure and complacency. Timon, who probably from\r\nhis affected spleen more than an inveterate malice, was denominated the\r\nmanhater, embraced Alcibiades with great fondness. GO ON, MY BOY! cried\r\nhe, ACQUIRE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE: YOU WILL ONE DAY, I FORESEE,\r\nBE THE CAUSE OF GREAT CALAMITIES TO THEM [Footnote: Plutarch fit vita\r\nAle.]. Could we admit the two principles of the Manicheans, it is an\r\ninfallible consequence, that their sentiments of human actions, as well\r\nas of everything else, must be totally opposite, and that every instance\r\nof justice and humanity, from its necessary tendency, must please the\r\none deity and displease the other. All mankind so far resemble the good\r\nprinciple, that, where interest or revenge or envy perverts not our\r\ndisposition, we are always inclined, from our natural philanthropy, to\r\ngive the preference to the happiness of society, and consequently to\r\nvirtue above its opposite. Absolute, unprovoked, disinterested malice\r\nhas never perhaps place in any human breast; or if it had, must there\r\npervert all the sentiments of morals, as well as the feelings of\r\nhumanity. If the cruelty of Nero be allowed entirely voluntary, and not\r\nrather the effect of constant fear and resentment; it is evident that\r\nTigellinus, preferably to Seneca or Burrhus, must have possessed his\r\nsteady and uniform approbation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA statesman or patriot, who serves our own country in our own time, has\r\nalways a more passionate regard paid to him, than one whose beneficial\r\ninfluence operated on distant ages or remote nations; where the good,\r\nresulting from his generous humanity, being less connected with us,\r\nseems more obscure, and affects us with a less lively sympathy. We may\r\nown the merit to be equally great, though our sentiments are not raised\r\nto an equal height, in both cases. The judgement here corrects the\r\ninequalities of our internal emotions and perceptions; in like manner,\r\nas it preserves us from error, in the several variations of images,\r\npresented to our external senses. The same object, at a double distance,\r\nreally throws on the eye a picture of but half the bulk; yet we imagine\r\nthat it appears of the same size in both situations; because we know\r\nthat on our approach to it, its image would expand on the eye, and that\r\nthe difference consists not in the object itself, but in our\r\nposition with regard to it. And, indeed, without such a correction of\r\nappearances, both in internal and external sentiment, men could\r\nnever think or talk steadily on any subject; while their fluctuating\r\nsituations produce a continual variation on objects, and throw them into\r\nsuch different and contrary lights and positions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: For a little reason, the tendencies of actions and\r\ncharacters, not their real accidental consequences, are alone regarded\r\nin our more determinations or general judgements; though in our real\r\nfeeling or sentiment, we cannot help paying greater regard to one whose\r\nstation, joined to virtue, renders him really useful to society, then\r\nto one, who exerts the social virtues only in good intentions and\r\nbenevolent affections. Separating the character from the furtone, by an\r\neasy and necessary effort of thought, we pronounce these persons alike,\r\nand give them the appearance: But is not able entirely to prevail our\r\nsentiment.\r\n\r\n Why is this peach-tree said to be better than that other; but because\r\nit produces more or better fruit? And would not the same praise be given\r\nit, though snails or vermin had destroyed the peaches, before they came\r\nto full maturity? In morals too, is not THE TREE KNOWN BY THE FRUIT?\r\nAnd cannot we easily distinguish between nature and accident, in the one\r\ncase as well as in the other?]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe more we converse with mankind, and the greater social intercourse we\r\nmaintain, the more shall we be familiarized to these general preferences\r\nand distinctions, without which our conversation and discourse could\r\nscarcely be rendered intelligible to each other. Every man\u0027s interest\r\nis peculiar to himself, and the aversions and desires, which result\r\nfrom it, cannot be supposed to affect others in a like degree. General\r\nlanguage, therefore, being formed for general use, must be moulded on\r\nsome more general views, and must affix the epithets of praise or blame,\r\nin conformity to sentiments, which arise from the general interests of\r\nthe community. And if these sentiments, in most men, be not so strong as\r\nthose, which have a reference to private good; yet still they must make\r\nsome distinction, even in persons the most depraved and selfish; and\r\nmust attach the notion of good to a beneficent conduct, and of evil to\r\nthe contrary. Sympathy, we shall allow, is much fainter than our concern\r\nfor ourselves, and sympathy with persons remote from us much fainter\r\nthan that with persons near and contiguous; but for this very reason it\r\nis necessary for us, in our calm judgements and discourse concerning\r\nthe characters of men, to neglect all these differences, and render\r\nour sentiments more public and social. Besides, that we ourselves often\r\nchange our situation in this particular, we every day meet with persons\r\nwho are in a situation different from us, and who could never converse\r\nwith us were we to remain constantly in that position and point of\r\nview, which is peculiar to ourselves. The intercourse of sentiments,\r\ntherefore, in society and conversation, makes us form some general\r\nunalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of\r\ncharacters and manners. And though the heart takes not part entirely\r\nwith those general notions, nor regulates all its love and hatred by\r\nthe universal abstract differences of vice and virtue, without regard\r\nto self, or the persons with whom we are more intimately connected;\r\nyet have these moral differences a considerable influence, and being\r\nsufficient, at least for discourse, serve all our purposes in company,\r\nin the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: It is wisely ordained by nature, that private\r\nconnexions should commonly prevail over univeral views and\r\nconsiderations; otherwise our affections and actions would be dissopated\r\nand lost, for want of a proper limited object. Thus a small benefit done\r\nto ourselves, or our near friends, excites more lively sentiments\r\nof love and approbation than a great benefit done to a distant\r\ncommonwealth: But still we know here, as in all the senses, to correct\r\nthese inequalities by reflection, and retain a general standard of vice\r\nand virtue, founded chiefly on a general usefulness.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus, in whatever light we take this subject, the merit, ascribed to\r\nthe social virtues, appears still uniform, and arises chiefly from that\r\nregard, which the natural sentiment of benevolence engages us to pay to\r\nthe interests of mankind and society. If we consider the principles of\r\nthe human make, such as they appear to daily experience and observation,\r\nwe must, A PRIORI, conclude it impossible for such a creature as man to\r\nbe totally indifferent to the well or ill-being of his fellow-creatures,\r\nand not readily, of himself, to pronounce, where nothing gives him any\r\nparticular bias, that what promotes their happiness is good, what tends\r\nto their misery is evil, without any farther regard or consideration.\r\nHere then are the faint rudiments, at least, or outlines, of a GENERAL\r\ndistinction between actions; and in proportion as the humanity of the\r\nperson is supposed to increase, his connexion with those who are injured\r\nor benefited, and his lively conception of their misery or happiness;\r\nhis consequent censure or approbation acquires proportionable vigour.\r\nThere is no necessity, that a generous action, barely mentioned in an\r\nold history or remote gazette, should communicate any strong feelings\r\nof applause and admiration. Virtue, placed at such a distance, is like a\r\nfixed star, which, though to the eye of reason it may appear as luminous\r\nas the sun in his meridian, is so infinitely removed as to affect the\r\nsenses, neither with light nor heat. Bring this virtue nearer, by our\r\nacquaintance or connexion with the persons, or even by an eloquent\r\nrecital of the case; our hearts are immediately caught, our sympathy\r\nenlivened, and our cool approbation converted into the warmest\r\nsentiments of friendship and regard. These seem necessary and infallible\r\nconsequences of the general principles of human nature, as discovered in\r\ncommon life and practice.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAgain; reverse these views and reasonings: Consider the matter a\r\nposteriori; and weighing the consequences, enquire if the merit of\r\nsocial virtue be not, in a great measure, derived from the feelings of\r\nhumanity, with which it affects the spectators. It appears to be matter\r\nof fact, that the circumstance of UTILITY, in all subjects, is a source\r\nof praise and approbation: That it is constantly appealed to in all\r\nmoral decisions concerning the merit and demerit of actions: That it is\r\nthe SOLE source of that high regard paid to justice, fidelity, honour,\r\nallegiance, and chastity: That it is inseparable from all the other\r\nsocial virtues, humanity, generosity, charity, affability, lenity,\r\nmercy, and moderation: And, in a word, that it is a foundation of\r\nthe chief part of morals, which has a reference to mankind and our\r\nfellow-creatures.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt appears also, that, in our general approbation of characters and\r\nmanners, the useful tendency of the social virtues moves us not by any\r\nregards to self-interest, but has an influence much more universal\r\nand extensive. It appears that a tendency to public good, and to the\r\npromoting of peace, harmony, and order in society, does always, by\r\naffecting the benevolent principles of our frame, engage us on the side\r\nof the social virtues. And it appears, as an additional confirmation,\r\nthat these principles of humanity and sympathy enter so deeply into all\r\nour sentiments, and have so powerful an influence, as may enable them\r\nto excite the strongest censure and applause. The present theory is the\r\nsimple result of all these inferences, each of which seems founded on\r\nuniform experience and observation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWere it doubtful, whether there were any such principle in our nature\r\nas humanity or a concern for others, yet when we see, in numberless\r\ninstances, that whatever has a tendency to promote the interests of\r\nsociety, is so highly approved of, we ought thence to learn the force of\r\nthe benevolent principle; since it is impossible for anything to please\r\nas means to an end, where the end is totally indifferent. On the other\r\nhand, were it doubtful, whether there were, implanted in our nature, any\r\ngeneral principle of moral blame and approbation, yet when we see, in\r\nnumberless instances, the influence of humanity, we ought thence to\r\nconclude, that it is impossible, but that everything which promotes the\r\ninterest of society must communicate pleasure, and what is pernicious\r\ngive uneasiness. But when these different reflections and observations\r\nconcur in establishing the same conclusion, must they not bestow an\r\nundisputed evidence upon it?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is however hoped, that the progress of this argument will bring a\r\nfarther confirmation of the present theory, by showing the rise of other\r\nsentiments of esteem and regard from the same or like principles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_SECT6\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n SECTION VI. OF QUALITIES USEFUL TO OURSELVES.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_PART61\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n PART I.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIT seems evident, that where a quality or habit is subjected to our\r\nexamination, if it appear in any respect prejudicial to the person\r\npossessed of it, or such as incapacitates him for business and action,\r\nit is instantly blamed, and ranked among his faults and imperfections.\r\nIndolence, negligence, want of order and method, obstinacy, fickleness,\r\nrashness, credulity; these qualities were never esteemed by any one\r\nindifferent to a character; much less, extolled as accomplishments or\r\nvirtues. The prejudice, resulting from them, immediately strikes our\r\neye, and gives us the sentiment of pain and disapprobation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNo quality, it is allowed, is absolutely either blameable or\r\npraiseworthy. It is all according to its degree. A due medium, says\r\nthe Peripatetics, is the characteristic of virtue. But this medium is\r\nchiefly determined by utility. A proper celerity, for instance, and\r\ndispatch in business, is commendable. When defective, no progress is\r\never made in the execution of any purpose: When excessive, it engages\r\nus in precipitate and ill-concerted measures and enterprises: By such\r\nreasonings, we fix the proper and commendable mediocrity in all moral\r\nand prudential disquisitions; and never lose view of the advantages,\r\nwhich result from any character or habit. Now as these advantages\r\nare enjoyed by the person possessed of the character, it can never\r\nbe SELF-LOVE which renders the prospect of them agreeable to us,\r\nthe spectators, and prompts our esteem and approbation. No force of\r\nimagination can convert us into another person, and make us fancy, that\r\nwe, being that person, reap benefit from those valuable qualities,\r\nwhich belong to him. Or if it did, no celerity of imagination could\r\nimmediately transport us back, into ourselves, and make us love and\r\nesteem the person, as different from us. Views and sentiments, so\r\nopposite to known truth and to each other, could never have place, at\r\nthe same time, in the same person. All suspicion, therefore, of selfish\r\nregards, is here totally excluded. It is a quite different principle,\r\nwhich actuates our bosom, and interests us in the felicity of the person\r\nwhom we contemplate. Where his natural talents and acquired abilities\r\ngive us the prospect of elevation, advancement, a figure in life,\r\nprosperous success, a steady command over fortune, and the execution of\r\ngreat or advantageous undertakings; we are struck with such agreeable\r\nimages, and feel a complacency and regard immediately arise towards him.\r\nThe ideas of happiness, joy, triumph, prosperity, are connected with\r\nevery circumstance of his character, and diffuse over our minds a\r\npleasing sentiment of sympathy and humanity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: One may venture to affirm, that there is no human\r\nnature, to whom the appearance of happiness (where envy or revenge has\r\nno place) does not give pleasure, that of misery, uneasiness. This\r\nseems inseparable from our make and constitution. But they are only more\r\ngenerous minds, that are thence prompted to seek zealously the good of\r\nothers, and to have a real passion for their welfare. With men of narrow\r\nand ungenerous spirits, this sympathy goes not beyond a slight\r\nfeeling of the imagination, which serves only to excite sentiments\r\nof complacency or ensure, and makes them apply to the object either\r\nhonorable or dishonorable appellations. A griping miser, for instance,\r\npraises extremely INDUSTRY and FRUGALITY even in others, and sets them,\r\nin his estimation, above all the other virtues. He knows the good that\r\nresults from them, and feels that species of happiness with a more\r\nlively sympathy, than any other you could represent to him; though\r\nperhaps he would not part with a shilling to make the fortune of the\r\nindustrious man, whom he praises so highly.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLet us suppose a person originally framed so as to have no manner of\r\nconcern for his fellow-creatures, but to regard the happiness and\r\nmisery of all sensible beings with greater indifference than even two\r\ncontiguous shades of the same colour. Let us suppose, if the prosperity\r\nof nations were laid on the one hand, and their ruin on the other, and\r\nhe were desired to choose; that he would stand like the schoolman\u0027s ass,\r\nirresolute and undetermined, between equal motives; or rather, like the\r\nsame ass between two pieces of wood or marble, without any inclination\r\nor propensity to either side. The consequence, I believe, must be\r\nallowed just, that such a person, being absolutely unconcerned, either\r\nfor the public good of a community or the private utility of others,\r\nwould look on every quality, however pernicious, or however beneficial,\r\nto society, or to its possessor, with the same indifference as on the\r\nmost common and uninteresting object.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut if, instead of this fancied monster, we suppose a MAN to form\r\na judgement or determination in the case, there is to him a plain\r\nfoundation of preference, where everything else is equal; and however\r\ncool his choice may be, if his heart be selfish, or if the persons\r\ninterested be remote from him; there must still be a choice or\r\ndistinction between what is useful, and what is pernicious. Now this\r\ndistinction is the same in all its parts, with the MORAL DISTINCTION,\r\nwhose foundation has been so often, and so much in vain, enquired after.\r\nThe same endowments of the mind, in every circumstance, are agreeable\r\nto the sentiment of morals and to that of humanity; the same temper is\r\nsusceptible of high degrees of the one sentiment and of the other;\r\nand the same alteration in the objects, by their nearer approach or\r\nby connexions, enlivens the one and the other. By all the rules of\r\nphilosophy, therefore, we must conclude, that these sentiments are\r\noriginally the same; since, in each particular, even the most minute,\r\nthey are governed by the same laws, and are moved by the same objects.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhy do philosophers infer, with the greatest certainty, that the moon is\r\nkept in its orbit by the same force of gravity, that makes bodies fall\r\nnear the surface of the earth, but because these effects are, upon\r\ncomputation, found similar and equal? And must not this argument bring\r\nas strong conviction, in moral as in natural disquisitions?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo prove, by any long detail, that all the qualities, useful to\r\nthe possessor, are approved of, and the contrary censured, would be\r\nsuperfluous. The least reflection on what is every day experienced in\r\nlife, will be sufficient. We shall only mention a few instances, in\r\norder to remove, if possible, all doubt and hesitation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe quality, the most necessary for the execution of any useful\r\nenterprise, is discretion; by which we carry on a safe intercourse with\r\nothers, give due attention to our own and to their character, weigh each\r\ncircumstance of the business which we undertake, and employ the\r\nsurest and safest means for the attainment of any end or purpose. To a\r\nCromwell, perhaps, or a De Retz, discretion may appear an alderman-like\r\nvirtue, as Dr. Swift calls it; and being incompatible with those vast\r\ndesigns, to which their courage and ambition prompted them, it might\r\nreally, in them, be a fault or imperfection. But in the conduct of\r\nordinary life, no virtue is more requisite, not only to obtain success,\r\nbut to avoid the most fatal miscarriages and disappointments. The\r\ngreatest parts without it, as observed by an elegant writer, may be\r\nfatal to their owner; as Polyphemus, deprived of his eye, was only the\r\nmore exposed, on account of his enormous strength and stature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe best character, indeed, were it not rather too perfect for\r\nhuman nature, is that which is not swayed by temper of any kind; but\r\nalternately employs enterprise and caution, as each is useful to the\r\nparticular purpose intended. Such is the excellence which St. Evremond\r\nascribes to Mareschal Turenne, who displayed every campaign, as he grew\r\nolder, more temerity in his military enterprises; and being now, from\r\nlong experience, perfectly acquainted with every incident in war, he\r\nadvanced with greater firmness and security, in a road so well known to\r\nhim. Fabius, says Machiavel, was cautious; Scipio enterprising: And\r\nboth succeeded, because the situation of the Roman affairs, during the\r\ncommand of each, was peculiarly adapted to his genius; but both would\r\nhave failed, had these situations been reversed. He is happy, whose\r\ncircumstances suit his temper; but he is more excellent, who can suit\r\nhis temper to any circumstances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhat need is there to display the praises of industry, and to extol its\r\nadvantages, in the acquisition of power and riches, or in raising what\r\nwe call a FORTUNE in the world? The tortoise, according to the fable, by\r\nhis perseverance, gained the race of the hare, though possessed of\r\nmuch superior swiftness. A man\u0027s time, when well husbanded, is like a\r\ncultivated field, of which a few acres produce more of what is useful to\r\nlife, than extensive provinces, even of the richest soil, when over-run\r\nwith weeds and brambles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut all prospect of success in life, or even of tolerable subsistence,\r\nmust fail, where a reasonable frugality is wanting. The heap, instead\r\nof increasing, diminishes daily, and leaves its possessor so much more\r\nunhappy, as, not having been able to confine his expences to a large\r\nrevenue, he will still less be able to live contentedly on a small one.\r\nThe souls of men, according to Plato [Footnote: Phaedo.], inflamed with\r\nimpure appetites, and losing the body, which alone afforded means of\r\nsatisfaction, hover about the earth, and haunt the places, where their\r\nbodies are deposited; possessed with a longing desire to recover the\r\nlost organs of sensation. So may we see worthless prodigals, having\r\nconsumed their fortune in wild debauches, thrusting themselves into\r\nevery plentiful table, and every party of pleasure, hated even by the\r\nvicious, and despised even by fools.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe one extreme of frugality is avarice, which, as it both deprives a\r\nman of all use of his riches, and checks hospitality and every social\r\nenjoyment, is justly censured on a double account. PRODIGALITY, the\r\nother extreme, is commonly more hurtful to a man himself; and each of\r\nthese extremes is blamed above the other, according to the temper of the\r\nperson who censures, and according to his greater or less sensibility to\r\npleasure, either social or sensual.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nQualities often derive their merit from complicated sources. Honesty,\r\nfidelity, truth, are praised for their immediate tendency to promote the\r\ninterests of society; but after those virtues are once established upon\r\nthis foundation, they are also considered as advantageous to the person\r\nhimself, and as the source of that trust and confidence, which can alone\r\ngive a man any consideration in life. One becomes contemptible, no less\r\nthan odious, when he forgets the duty, which, in this particular, he\r\nowes to himself as well as to society.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPerhaps, this consideration is one CHIEF source of the high blame, which\r\nis thrown on any instance of failure among women in point of CHASTITY.\r\nThe greatest regard, which can be acquired by that sex, is derived from\r\ntheir fidelity; and a woman becomes cheap and vulgar, loses her rank,\r\nand is exposed to every insult, who is deficient in this particular. The\r\nsmallest failure is here sufficient to blast her character. A female\r\nhas so many opportunities of secretly indulging these appetites, that\r\nnothing can give us security but her absolute modesty and reserve; and\r\nwhere a breach is once made, it can scarcely ever be fully repaired.\r\nIf a man behave with cowardice on one occasion, a contrary conduct\r\nreinstates him in his character. But by what action can a woman, whose\r\nbehaviour has once been dissolute, be able to assure us, that she has\r\nformed better resolutions, and has self-command enough to carry them\r\ninto execution?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll men, it is allowed, are equally desirous of happiness; but few\r\nare successful in the pursuit: One considerable cause is the want of\r\nstrength of mind, which might enable them to resist the temptation of\r\npresent ease or pleasure, and carry them forward in the search of more\r\ndistant profit and enjoyment. Our affections, on a general prospect of\r\ntheir objects, form certain rules of conduct, and certain measures of\r\npreference of one above another: and these decisions, though really\r\nthe result of our calm passions and propensities, (for what else can\r\npronounce any object eligible or the contrary?) are yet said, by a\r\nnatural abuse of terms, to be the determinations of pure REASON and\r\nreflection. But when some of these objects approach nearer to us, or\r\nacquire the advantages of favourable lights and positions, which\r\ncatch the heart or imagination; our general resolutions are frequently\r\nconfounded, a small enjoyment preferred, and lasting shame and sorrow\r\nentailed upon us. And however poets may employ their wit and eloquence,\r\nin celebrating present pleasure, and rejecting all distant views to\r\nfame, health, or fortune; it is obvious, that this practice is the\r\nsource of all dissoluteness and disorder, repentance and misery. A man\r\nof a strong and determined temper adheres tenaciously to his general\r\nresolutions, and is neither seduced by the allurements of pleasure, nor\r\nterrified by the menaces of pain; but keeps still in view those distant\r\npursuits, by which he, at once, ensures his happiness and his honour.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSelf-satisfaction, at least in some degree, is an advantage, which\r\nequally attends the fool and the wise man: But it is the only one; nor\r\nis there any other circumstance in the conduct of life, where they are\r\nupon an equal footing. Business, books, conversation; for all of these,\r\na fool is totally incapacitated, and except condemned by his station\r\nto the coarsest drudgery, remains a useless burthen upon the earth.\r\nAccordingly, it is found, that men are extremely jealous of their\r\ncharacter in this particular; and many instances are seen of profligacy\r\nand treachery, the most avowed and unreserved; none of bearing patiently\r\nthe imputation of ignorance and stupidity. Dicaearchus, the Macedonian\r\ngeneral, who, as Polybius tells us [Footnote: Lib. xvi. Cap. 35.],\r\nopenly erected one altar to impiety, another to injustice, in order to\r\nbid defiance to mankind; even he, I am well assured, would have started\r\nat the epithet of FOOL, and have meditated revenge for so injurious an\r\nappellation. Except the affection of parents, the strongest and most\r\nindissoluble bond in nature, no connexion has strength sufficient to\r\nsupport the disgust arising from this character. Love itself, which\r\ncan subsist under treachery, ingratitude, malice, and infidelity, is\r\nimmediately extinguished by it, when perceived and acknowledged; nor\r\nare deformity and old age more fatal to the dominion of that passion.\r\nSo dreadful are the ideas of an utter incapacity for any purpose or\r\nundertaking, and of continued error and misconduct in life!\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen it is asked, whether a quick or a slow apprehension be most\r\nvaluable? Whether one, that, at first view, penetrates far into a\r\nsubject, but can perform nothing upon study; or a contrary character,\r\nwhich must work out everything by dint of application? Whether a\r\nclear head or a copious invention? Whether a profound genius or a sure\r\njudgement? In short, what character, or peculiar turn of understanding,\r\nis more excellent than another? It is evident, that we can answer\r\nnone of these questions, without considering which of those qualities\r\ncapacitates a man best for the world, and carries him farthest in any\r\nundertaking.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf refined sense and exalted sense be not so USEFUL as common sense,\r\ntheir rarity, their novelty, and the nobleness of their objects make\r\nsome compensation, and render them the admiration of mankind: As gold,\r\nthough less serviceable than iron, acquires from its scarcity a value\r\nwhich is much superior.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe defects of judgement can be supplied by no art or invention; but\r\nthose of memory frequently may, both in business and in study, by method\r\nand industry, and by diligence in committing everything to writing;\r\nand we scarcely ever hear a short memory given as a reason for a man\u0027s\r\nfailure in any undertaking. But in ancient times, when no man could make\r\na figure without the talent of speaking, and when the audience were too\r\ndelicate to bear such crude, undigested harangues as our extemporary\r\norators offer to public assemblies; the faculty of memory was then of\r\nthe utmost consequence, and was accordingly much more valued than at\r\npresent. Scarce any great genius is mentioned in antiquity, who is not\r\ncelebrated for this talent; and Cicero enumerates it among the other\r\nsublime qualities of Caesar himself. [Footnote: Fruit in Illo Ingenium,\r\nratio, memoria, literae, cura, cogitatio, diligentia \u0026amp;c. Phillip. 2.].\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nParticular customs and manners alter the usefulness of qualities: they\r\nalso alter their merit. Particular situations and accidents have, in\r\nsome degree, the same influence. He will always be more esteemed, who\r\npossesses those talents and accomplishments, which suit his station and\r\nprofession, than he whom fortune has misplaced in the part which she has\r\nassigned him. The private or selfish virtues are, in this respect,\r\nmore arbitrary than the public and social. In other respects they are,\r\nperhaps, less liable to doubt and controversy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn this kingdom, such continued ostentation, of late years, has\r\nprevailed among men in ACTIVE life with regard to PUBLIC SPIRIT, and\r\namong those in SPECULATIVE with regard to BENEVOLENCE; and so many false\r\npretensions to each have been, no doubt, detected, that men of the world\r\nare apt, without any bad intention, to discover a sullen incredulity\r\non the head of those moral endowments, and even sometimes absolutely to\r\ndeny their existence and reality. In like manner I find, that, of old,\r\nthe perpetual cant of the STOICS and CYNICS concerning VIRTUE, their\r\nmagnificent professions and slender performances, bred a disgust in\r\nmankind; and Lucian, who, though licentious with regard to pleasure,\r\nis yet in other respects a very moral writer, cannot sometimes talk of\r\nvirtue, so much boasted without betraying symptoms of spleen and irony.\r\nBut surely this peevish delicacy, whence-ever it arises can never be\r\ncarried so far as to make us deny the existence of every species of\r\nmerit, and all distinction of manners and behaviour. Besides DISCRETION,\r\nCAUTION, ENTERPRISE, INDUSTRY, ASSIDUITY, FRUGALITY, ECONOMY,\r\nGOOD-SENSE, PRUDENCE, DISCERNMENT; besides these endowments, I say,\r\nwhose very names force an avowal of their merit, there are many others,\r\nto which the most determined scepticism cannot for a moment refuse\r\nthe tribute of praise and approbation. TEMPERANCE, SOBRIETY, PATIENCE,\r\nCONSTANCY, PERSEVERANCE, FORETHOUGHT, CONSIDERATENESS, SECRECY, ORDER,\r\nINSINUATION, ADDRESS, PRESENCE OF MIND, QUICKNESS OF CONCEPTION,\r\nFACILITY OF EXPRESSION, these, and a thousand more of the same kind, no\r\nman will ever deny to be excellencies and perfections. As their merit\r\nconsists in their tendency to serve the person, possessed of them,\r\nwithout any magnificent claim to public and social desert, we are the\r\nless jealous of their pretensions, and readily admit them into the\r\ncatalogue of laudable qualities. We are not sensible that, by this\r\nconcession, we have paved the way for all the other moral excellencies,\r\nand cannot consistently hesitate any longer, with regard to\r\ndisinterested benevolence, patriotism, and humanity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt seems, indeed, certain, that first appearances are here, as usual,\r\nextremely deceitful, and that it is more difficult, in a speculative\r\nway, to resolve into self-love the merit which we ascribe to the selfish\r\nvirtues above mentioned, than that even of the social virtues, justice\r\nand beneficence. For this latter purpose, we need but say, that whatever\r\nconduct promotes the good of the community is loved, praised, and\r\nesteemed by the community, on account of that utility and interest, of\r\nwhich every one partakes; and though this affection and regard be,\r\nin reality, gratitude, not self-love, yet a distinction, even of this\r\nobvious nature, may not readily be made by superficial reasoners; and\r\nthere is room, at least, to support the cavil and dispute for a moment.\r\nBut as qualities, which tend only to the utility of their possessor,\r\nwithout any reference to us, or to the community, are yet esteemed and\r\nvalued; by what theory or system can we account for this sentiment from\r\nself-love, or deduce it from that favourite origin? There seems here a\r\nnecessity for confessing that the happiness and misery of others are not\r\nspectacles entirely indifferent to us; but that the view of the former,\r\nwhether in its causes or effects, like sunshine or the prospect\r\nof well-cultivated plains (to carry our pretensions no higher),\r\ncommunicates a secret joy and satisfaction; the appearance of the\r\nlatter, like a lowering cloud or barren landscape, throws a melancholy\r\ndamp over the imagination. And this concession being once made, the\r\ndifficulty is over; and a natural unforced interpretation of the\r\nphenomena of human life will afterwards, we may hope, prevail among all\r\nspeculative enquirers.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_PART62\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n PART II.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt may not be improper, in this place, to examine the influence of\r\nbodily endowments, and of the goods of fortune, over our sentiments of\r\nregard and esteem, and to consider whether these phenomena fortify\r\nor weaken the present theory. It will naturally be expected, that the\r\nbeauty of the body, as is supposed by all ancient moralists, will be\r\nsimilar, in some respects, to that of the mind; and that every kind\r\nof esteem, which is paid to a man, will have something similar in\r\nits origin, whether it arise from his mental endowments, or from the\r\nsituation of his exterior circumstances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is evident, that one considerable source of BEAUTY in all animals\r\nis the advantage which they reap from the particular structure of their\r\nlimbs and members, suitably to the particular manner of life, to which\r\nthey are by nature destined. The just proportions of a horse, described\r\nby Xenophon and Virgil, are the same that are received at this day by\r\nour modern jockeys; because the foundation of them is the same, namely,\r\nexperience of what is detrimental or useful in the animal.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBroad shoulders, a lank belly, firm joints, taper legs; all these are\r\nbeautiful in our species, because signs of force and vigour. Ideas of\r\nutility and its contrary, though they do not entirely determine what is\r\nhandsome or deformed, are evidently the source of a considerable part of\r\napprobation or dislike.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn ancient times, bodily strength and dexterity, being of greater USE\r\nand importance in war, was also much more esteemed and valued, than\r\nat present. Not to insist on Homer and the poets, we may observe,\r\nthat historians scruple not to mention FORCE OF BODY among the other\r\naccomplishments even of Epaminondas, whom they acknowledge to be the\r\ngreatest hero, statesman, and general of all the Greeks. [Footnote: CUM\r\nALACRIBUS, SALTU; CUMM VELOCIBUS, CURSU; CUM VALIDIS RECTE CERTABATA.\r\nSallust apud Veget.] A like praise is given to Pompey, one of the\r\ngreatest of the Romans. [Footnote: Diodorus Siculus, lib. xv. It may\r\nbe improper to give the character of Epaminondas, as drawn by the\r\nhistorian, in order to show the idea of perfect merit, which prevailed\r\nin those ages. In other illustrious men, say he, you will observe, that\r\neach possessed some one shining quality, which was the foundation of his\r\nfame: In Epaminondas all the VIRTUES are found united; force of body.\r\neloquence of expression, vigour of mind, contempt of riches, gentleness\r\nof disposition, and what is chiefly to be regarded, courage and conduct\r\nof war.] This instance is similar to what we observed above with regard\r\nto memory.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhat derision and contempt, with both sexes, attend IMPOTENCE; while the\r\nunhappy object is regarded as one deprived of so capital a pleasure in\r\nlife, and at the same time, as disabled from communicating it to others.\r\nBARRENNESS in women, being also a species of INUTILITY, is a reproach,\r\nbut not in the same degree: of which the reason is very obvious,\r\naccording to the present theory.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere is no rule in painting or statuary more indispensible than that of\r\nbalancing the figures, and placing them with the greatest exactness on\r\ntheir proper centre of gravity. A figure, which is not justly balanced,\r\nis ugly; because it conveys the disagreeable ideas of fall, harm, and\r\npain.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n[Footenote: All men are equally liable to pain and disease and sickness;\r\nand may again recover health and ease. These circumstances, as they make\r\nno distinction between one man and another, are no source of pride or\r\nhumility, regard or contempt. But comparing our own species to superior\r\nones, it is a very mortifying consideration, that we should all be so\r\nliable to diseases and infirmities; and divines accordingly employ this\r\ntopic, in order to depress self-conceit and vanity. They would have more\r\nsuccess, if the common bent of our thoughts were not perpetually turned\r\nto compare ourselves with others.\r\n\r\n The infirmities of old age are mortifying; because a comparison with\r\nthe young may take place. The king\u0027s evil is industriously concealed,\r\nbecause it affects others, and is often transmitted to posterity. The\r\ncase is nearly the same with such diseases as convey any nauseous or\r\nfrightful images; the epilepsy, for instance, ulcers, sores, scabs, \u0026amp;c.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA disposition or turn of mind, which qualifies a man to rise in the\r\nworld and advance his fortune, is entitled to esteem and regard, as has\r\nalready been explained. It may, therefore, naturally be supposed, that\r\nthe actual possession of riches and authority will have a considerable\r\ninfluence over these sentiments.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLet us examine any hypothesis by which we can account for the regard\r\npaid to the rich and powerful; we shall find none satisfactory, but that\r\nwhich derives it from the enjoyment communicated to the spectator by\r\nthe images of prosperity, happiness, ease, plenty, authority, and the\r\ngratification of every appetite. Self-love, for instance, which some\r\naffect so much to consider as the source of every sentiment, is plainly\r\ninsufficient for this purpose. Where no good-will or friendship appears,\r\nit is difficult to conceive on what we can found our hope of advantage\r\nfrom the riches of others; though we naturally respect the rich, even\r\nbefore they discover any such favourable disposition towards us.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe are affected with the same sentiments, when we lie so much out of the\r\nsphere of their activity, that they cannot even be supposed to possess\r\nthe power of serving us. A prisoner of war, in all civilized nations,\r\nis treated with a regard suited to his condition; and riches, it is\r\nevident, go far towards fixing the condition of any person. If birth\r\nand quality enter for a share, this still affords us an argument to our\r\npresent purpose. For what is it we call a man of birth, but one who is\r\ndescended from a long succession of rich and powerful ancestors, and who\r\nacquires our esteem by his connexion with persons whom we esteem? His\r\nancestors, therefore, though dead, are respected, in some measure,\r\non account of their riches; and consequently, without any kind of\r\nexpectation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut not to go so far as prisoners of war or the dead, to find instances\r\nof this disinterested regard for riches; we may only observe, with\r\na little attention, those phenomena which occur in common life and\r\nconversation. A man, who is himself, we shall suppose, of a competent\r\nfortune, and of no profession, being introduced to a company of\r\nstrangers, naturally treats them with different degrees of respect, as\r\nhe is informed of their different fortunes and conditions; though it\r\nis impossible that he can so suddenly propose, and perhaps he would\r\nnot accept of, any pecuniary advantage from them. A traveller is always\r\nadmitted into company, and meets with civility, in proportion as his\r\ntrain and equipage speak him a man of great or moderate fortune. In\r\nshort, the different ranks of men are, in a great measure, regulated\r\nby riches; and that with regard to superiors as well as inferiors,\r\nstrangers as well as acquaintance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhat remains, therefore, but to conclude, that, as riches are desired\r\nfor ourselves only as the means of gratifying our appetites, either at\r\npresent or in some imaginary future period, they beget esteem in others\r\nmerely from their having that influence. This indeed is their very\r\nnature or offence: they have a direct reference to the commodities,\r\nconveniences, and pleasures of life. The bill of a banker, who is broke,\r\nor gold in a desert island, would otherwise be full as valuable. When we\r\napproach a man who is, as we say, at his ease, we are presented with the\r\npleasing ideas of plenty, satisfaction, cleanliness, warmth; a cheerful\r\nhouse, elegant furniture, ready service, and whatever is desirable in\r\nmeat, drink, or apparel. On the contrary, when a poor man appears,\r\nthe disagreeable images of want, penury, hard labour, dirty furniture,\r\ncoarse or ragged clothes, nauseous meat and distasteful liquor,\r\nimmediately strike our fancy. What else do we mean by saying that one\r\nis rich, the other poor? And as regard or contempt is the natural\r\nconsequence of those different situations in life, it is easily seen\r\nwhat additional light and evidence this throws on our preceding theory,\r\nwith regard to all moral distinctions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: There is something extraordinary, and seemingly\r\nunaccountable in the operation of our passions, when we consider the\r\nfortune and situation of others. Very often another\u0027s advancement and\r\nprosperity produces envy, which has a strong mixture of hatred, and\r\narises chiefly from the comparison of ourselves with the person. At the\r\nvery same time, or at least in very short intervals, we may feel the\r\npassion of respect, which is a species of affection or good-will, with\r\na mixture of humility. On the other hand, the misfortunes of our fellows\r\noften cause pity, which has in it a strong mixture of good-will. This\r\nsentiment of pity is nearly allied to contempt, which is a species of\r\ndislike, with a mixture of pride. I only point out these phenomena, as\r\na subject of speculation to such as are curious with regard to moral\r\nenquiries. It is sufficient for the present purpose to observe in\r\ngeneral, that power and riches commonly cause respect, poverty and\r\nmeanness contempt, though particular views and incidents may sometimes\r\nraise the passions of envy and of pity.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA man who has cured himself of all ridiculous pre-possessions, and is\r\nfully, sincerely, and steadily convinced, from experience as well as\r\nphilosophy, that the difference of fortune makes less difference in\r\nhappiness than is vulgarly imagined; such a one does not measure out\r\ndegrees of esteem according to the rent-rolls of his acquaintance. He\r\nmay, indeed, externally pay a superior deference to the great lord above\r\nthe vassal; because riches are the most convenient, being the most fixed\r\nand determinate, source of distinction. But his internal sentiments are\r\nmore regulated by the personal characters of men, than by the accidental\r\nand capricious favours of fortune.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn most countries of Europe, family, that is, hereditary riches, marked\r\nwith titles and symbols from the sovereign, is the chief source of\r\ndistinction. In England, more regard is paid to present opulence and\r\nplenty. Each practice has its advantages and disadvantages. Where birth\r\nis respected, unactive, spiritless minds remain in haughty indolence,\r\nand dream of nothing but pedigrees and genealogies: the generous and\r\nambitious seek honour and authority, and reputation and favour. Where\r\nriches are the chief idol, corruption, venality, rapine prevail: arts,\r\nmanufactures, commerce, agriculture flourish. The former prejudice,\r\nbeing favourable to military virtue, is more suited to monarchies.\r\nThe latter, being the chief spur to industry, agrees better with a\r\nrepublican government. And we accordingly find that each of these forms\r\nof government, by varying the utility of those customs, has commonly a\r\nproportionable effect on the sentiments of mankind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_SECT7\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n SECTION VII.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\r\n OF QUALITIES IMMEDIATELY AGREEABLE TO OURSELVES.\r\n\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhoever has passed an evening with serious melancholy people, and\r\nhas observed how suddenly the conversation was animated, and what\r\nsprightliness diffused itself over the countenance, discourse, and\r\nbehaviour of every one, on the accession of a good-humoured, lively\r\ncompanion; such a one will easily allow that cheerfulness carries great\r\nmerit with it, and naturally conciliates the good-will of mankind. No\r\nquality, indeed, more readily communicates itself to all around; because\r\nno one has a greater propensity to display itself, in jovial talk and\r\npleasant entertainment. The flame spreads through the whole circle; and\r\nthe most sullen and morose are often caught by it. That the melancholy\r\nhate the merry, even though Horace says it, I have some difficulty\r\nto allow; because I have always observed that, where the jollity is\r\nmoderate and decent, serious people are so much the more delighted,\r\nas it dissipates the gloom with which they are commonly oppressed, and\r\ngives them an unusual enjoyment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFrom this influence of cheerfulness, both to communicate itself and to\r\nengage approbation, we may perceive that there is another set of mental\r\nqualities, which, without any utility or any tendency to farther good,\r\neither of the community or of the possessor, diffuse a satisfaction\r\non the beholders, and procure friendship and regard. Their immediate\r\nsensation, to the person possessed of them, is agreeable. Others enter\r\ninto the same humour, and catch the sentiment, by a contagion or natural\r\nsympathy; and as we cannot forbear loving whatever pleases, a kindly\r\nemotion arises towards the person who communicates so much satisfaction.\r\nHe is a more animating spectacle; his presence diffuses over us more\r\nserene complacency and enjoyment; our imagination, entering into his\r\nfeelings and disposition, is affected in a more agreeable manner than\r\nif a melancholy, dejected, sullen, anxious temper were presented to us.\r\nHence the affection and probation which attend the former: the aversion\r\nand disgust with which we regard the latter.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: There is no man, who, on particular occasions, is not\r\naffected with all the disagreeable passions, fear, anger, dejection,\r\ngrief, melancholy, anxiety, \u0026amp;c. But these, so far as they are natural,\r\nand universal, make no difference between one man and another, and can\r\nnever be the object of blame. It is only when the disposition gives a\r\nPROPENSITY to any of these disagreeable passions, that they disfigure\r\nthe character, and by giving uneasiness, convey the sentiment of\r\ndisapprobation to the spectator.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFew men would envy the character which Caesar gives of Cassius:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n He loves no play,\r\n As thou do\u0027st, Anthony: he hears no music:\r\n Seldom he smiles; and smiles in such a sort,\r\n As if he mock\u0027d himself, and scorn\u0027d his spirit\r\n That could be mov\u0027d to smile at any thing.\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNot only such men, as Caesar adds, are commonly DANGEROUS, but also,\r\nhaving little enjoyment within themselves, they can never become\r\nagreeable to others, or contribute to social entertainment. In all\r\npolite nations and ages, a relish for pleasure, if accompanied with\r\ntemperance and decency, is esteemed a considerable merit, even in the\r\ngreatest men; and becomes still more requisite in those of inferior rank\r\nand character. It is an agreeable representation, which a French writer\r\ngives of the situation of his own mind in this particular, VIRTUE I\r\nLOVE, says he, WITHOUT AUSTERITY: PLEASURE WITHOUT EFFEMINACY: AND LIFE,\r\nWITHOUT FEARING ITS END. [Footnote: \u0027J\u0027aime la vertu, sans rudesse;\r\nJ\u0027aime le plaisir, sans molesse; J\u0027aime la vie, et n\u0027en crains point la\r\nfin.\u0027-ST. EVREMONT.]\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWho is not struck with any signal instance of greatness of mind or\r\ndignity of character; with elevation of sentiment, disdain of slavery,\r\nand with that noble pride and spirit, which arises from conscious\r\nvirtue? The sublime, says Longinus, is often nothing but the echo or\r\nimage of magnanimity; and where this quality appears in any one,\r\neven though a syllable be not uttered, it excites our applause and\r\nadmiration; as may be observed of the famous silence of Ajax in the\r\nOdyssey, which expresses more noble disdain and resolute indignation\r\nthan any language can convey [Footnote: Cap. 9.].\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWERE I Alexander, said Parmenio, I WOULD ACCEPT OF THESE OFFERS MADE BY\r\nDARIUS. SO WOULD I TOO, replied Alexander, WERE I PARMENIO. This saying\r\nis admirable, says Longinus, from a like principle. [Footnote: Idem.]\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGO! cries the same hero to his soldiers, when they refused to follow\r\nhim to the Indies, GO TELL YOUR COUNTRYMEN, THAT YOU LEFT Alexander\r\nCOMPLETING THE CONQUEST OF THE WORLD. \u0027Alexander,\u0027 said the Prince of\r\nConde, who always admired this passage, \u0027abandoned by his soldiers,\r\namong barbarians, not yet fully subdued, felt in himself such a dignity\r\nand right of empire, that he could not believe it possible that any one\r\nwould refuse to obey him. Whether in Europe or in Asia, among Greeks or\r\nPersians, all was indifferent to him: wherever he found men, he fancied\r\nhe should find subjects.\u0027\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe confident of Medea in the tragedy recommends caution and submission;\r\nand enumerating all the distresses of that unfortunate heroine, asks\r\nher, what she has to support her against her numerous and implacable\r\nenemies. MYSELF, replies she; MYSELF I SAY, AND IT IS ENOUGH. Boileau\r\njustly recommends this passage as an instance of true sublime [Footnote:\r\nReflexion 10 sur Longin.].\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen Phocion, the modest, the gentle Phocion, was led to execution, he\r\nturned to one of his fellow-sufferers, who was lamenting his own\r\nhard fate, IS IT NOT GLORY ENOUGH FOR YOU, says he, THAT YOU DIE WITH\r\nPHOCION? [Footnote: Plutarch in Phoc.]\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPlace in opposition the picture which Tacitus draws of Vitellius, fallen\r\nfrom empire, prolonging his ignominy from a wretched love of life,\r\ndelivered over to the merciless rabble; tossed, buffeted, and kicked\r\nabout; constrained, by their holding a poniard under his chin, to raise\r\nhis head, and expose himself to every contumely. What abject infamy!\r\nWhat low humiliation! Yet even here, says the historian, he discovered\r\nsome symptoms of a mind not wholly degenerate. To a tribune, who\r\ninsulted him, he replied, I AM STILL YOUR EMPEROR.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: Tacit. hist. lib. iii. The author entering upon the\r\nnarration, says, LANIATA VESTE, FOEDUM SPECACULUM DUCEBATUR, MULTIS\r\nINCREPANTIBUS, NULLO INLACRIMANTE: deformatitas exitus misericordiam\r\nabstulerat. To enter thoroughly into this method of thinking, we must\r\nmake allowance for the ancient maxims, that no one ought to prolong his\r\nlife after it became dishonourable; but, as he had always a right to\r\ndispose of it, it then became a duty to part with it.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe never excuse the absolute want of spirit and dignity of character, or\r\na proper sense of what is due to one\u0027s self, in society and the common\r\nintercourse of life. This vice constitutes what we properly call\r\nMEANNESS; when a man can submit to the basest slavery, in order to\r\ngain his ends; fawn upon those who abuse him; and degrade himself by\r\nintimacies and familiarities with undeserving inferiors. A certain\r\ndegree of generous pride or self-value is so requisite, that the absence\r\nof it in the mind displeases, after the same manner as the want of a\r\nnose, eye, or any of the most material feature of the face or member of\r\nthe body.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: The absence of virtue may often be a vice; and that of\r\nthe highest kind; as in the instance of ingratitude, as well as\r\nmeanness. Where we expect a beauty, the disappointment gives an uneasy\r\nsensation, and produces a real deformity. An abjectness of character,\r\nlikewise, is disgustful and contemptible in another view. Where a man\r\nhas no sense of value in himself, we are not likely to have any higher\r\nesteem of him. And if the same person, who crouches to his superiors,\r\nis insolent to his inferiors (as often happens), this contrariety\r\nof behaviour, instead of correcting the former vice, aggravates it\r\nextremely by the addition of a vice still more odious. See Sect. VIII.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe utility of courage, both to the public and to the person possessed\r\nof it, is an obvious foundation of merit. But to any one who duly\r\nconsiders of the matter, it will appear that this quality has a peculiar\r\nlustre, which it derives wholly from itself, and from that noble\r\nelevation inseparable from it. Its figure, drawn by painters and by\r\npoets, displays, in each feature, a sublimity and daring confidence;\r\nwhich catches the eye, engages the affections, and diffuses, by\r\nsympathy, a like sublimity of sentiment over every spectator.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nUnder what shining colours does Demosthenes [Footnote: De\r\nCorona.] represent Philip; where the orator apologizes for his own\r\nadministration, and justifies that pertinacious love of liberty, with\r\nwhich he had inspired the Athenians. \u0027I beheld Philip,\u0027 says he, \u0027he\r\nwith whom was your contest, resolutely, while in pursuit of empire\r\nand dominion, exposing himself to every wound; his eye gored, his neck\r\nwrested, his arm, his thigh pierced, what ever part of his body fortune\r\nshould seize on, that cheerfully relinquishing; provided that, with what\r\nremained, he might live in honour and renown. And shall it be said\r\nthat he, born in Pella, a place heretofore mean and ignoble, should\r\nbe inspired with so high an ambition and thirst of fame: while you,\r\nAthenians, \u0026amp;c.\u0027 These praises excite the most lively admiration; but\r\nthe views presented by the orator, carry us not, we see, beyond the hero\r\nhimself, nor ever regard the future advantageous consequences of his\r\nvalour.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe material temper of the Romans, inflamed by continual wars, had\r\nraised their esteem of courage so high, that, in their language, it was\r\ncalled VIRTUE, by way of excellence and of distinction from all other\r\nmoral qualities. THE Suevi, in the opinion of Tacitus, tus, [Footnote:\r\nDe moribus Germ.] DRESSED THEIR HAIR WITH A LAUDIBLE INTENT: NOT\r\nFOR THE PURPOSE OF LOVING OR BEING LOVES; THEY DORNED THEMSELVES ONLY\r\nFOR THEIR ENEMIES, AND IN ORDER TO APPEAR MORE TERRIBLE. A sentiment\r\nof the historian, which would sound a little oddly in other nations and\r\nother ages.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe Scythians, according to Herodotus, [Footnote: Lib. iv.] after\r\nscalping their enemies, dressed the skin like leather, and used it as a\r\ntowel; and whoever had the most of those towels was most esteemed among\r\nthem. So much had martial bravery, in that nation, as well as in many\r\nothers, destroyed the sentiments of humanity; a virtue surely much more\r\nuseful and engaging.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is indeed observable, that, among all uncultivated nations, who have\r\nnot as yet had full experience of the advantages attending beneficence,\r\njustice, and the social virtues, courage is the predominant excellence;\r\nwhat is most celebrated by poets, recommended by parents and\r\ninstructors, and admired by the public in general. The ethics of Homer\r\nare, in this particular, very different from those of Fenelon, his\r\nelegant imitator; and such as were well suited to an age, when one hero,\r\nas remarked by Thucydides [Lib.i.], could ask another, without offence,\r\nwhether he were a robber or not. Such also very lately was the system\r\nof ethics which prevailed in many barbarous parts of Ireland; if we may\r\ncredit Spencer, in his judicious account of the state of that kingdom.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote from Spencer: It is a common use, says he, amongst\r\ntheir gentlemen\u0027s sons, that, as soon as they are able to use their\r\nweapons, they strait gather to themselves three or four stragglers or\r\nkern, with whom wandering a while up and down idly the country, taking\r\nonly meat, he at last falleth into some bad occasion, that shall be\r\noffered; which being once made known, he is thenceforth counted a man of\r\nworth, in whom there is courage.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOf the same class of virtues with courage is that undisturbed\r\nphilosophical tranquillity, superior to pain, sorrow, anxiety, and\r\neach assault of adverse fortune. Conscious of his own virtue, say the\r\nphilosophers, the sage elevates himself above every accident of life;\r\nand securely placed in the temple of wisdom, looks down on inferior\r\nmortals engaged in pursuit of honours, riches, reputation, and every\r\nfrivolous enjoyment. These pretentious, no doubt, when stretched to\r\nthe utmost, are by far too magnificent for human nature. They carry,\r\nhowever, a grandeur with them, which seizes the spectator, and strikes\r\nhim with admiration. And the nearer we can approach in practice to this\r\nsublime tranquillity and indifference (for we must distinguish it from a\r\nstupid insensibility), the more secure enjoyment shall we attain within\r\nourselves, and the more greatness of mind shall we discover to the\r\nworld. The philosophical tranquillity may, indeed, be considered only as\r\na branch of magnanimity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWho admires not Socrates; his perpetual serenity and contentment, amidst\r\nthe greatest poverty and domestic vexations; his resolute contempt of\r\nriches, and his magnanimous care of preserving liberty, while he refused\r\nall assistance from his friends and disciples, and avoided even the\r\ndependence of an obligation? Epictetus had not so much as a door to his\r\nlittle house or hovel; and therefore, soon lost his iron lamp, the only\r\nfurniture which he had worth taking. But resolving to disappoint all\r\nrobbers for the future, he supplied its place with an earthen lamp, of\r\nwhich he very peacefully kept possession ever after.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAmong the ancients, the heroes in philosophy, as well as those in war\r\nand patriotism, have a grandeur and force of sentiment, which\r\nastonishes our narrow souls, and is rashly rejected as extravagant and\r\nsupernatural. They, in their turn, I allow, would have had equal\r\nreason to consider as romantic and incredible, the degree of humanity,\r\nclemency, order, tranquillity, and other social virtues, to which, in\r\nthe administration of government, we have attained in modern times, had\r\nany one been then able to have made a fair representation of them. Such\r\nis the compensation, which nature, or rather education, has made in the\r\ndistribution of excellencies and virtues, in those different ages.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe merit of benevolence, arising from its utility, and its tendency\r\nto promote the good of mankind has been already explained, and is, no\r\ndoubt, the source of a CONSIDERABLE part of that esteem, which is so\r\nuniversally paid to it. But it will also be allowed, that the very\r\nsoftness and tenderness of the sentiment, its engaging endearments, its\r\nfond expressions, its delicate attentions, and all that flow of mutual\r\nconfidence and regard, which enters into a warm attachment of love\r\nand friendship: it will be allowed, I say, that these feelings,\r\nbeing delightful in themselves, are necessarily communicated to the\r\nspectators, and melt them into the same fondness and delicacy. The tear\r\nnaturally starts in our eye on the apprehension of a warm sentiment of\r\nthis nature: our breast heaves, our heart is agitated, and every humane\r\ntender principle of our frame is set in motion, and gives us the purest\r\nand most satisfactory enjoyment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen poets form descriptions of Elysian fields, where the blessed\r\ninhabitants stand in no need of each other\u0027s assistance, they yet\r\nrepresent them as maintaining a constant intercourse of love and\r\nfriendship, and sooth our fancy with the pleasing image of these soft\r\nand gentle passions. The idea of tender tranquillity in a pastoral\r\nArcadia is agreeable from a like principle, as has been observed above.\r\n[Footnote: Sect. v. Part 2.]\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWho would live amidst perpetual wrangling, and scolding, and mutual\r\nreproaches? The roughness and harshness of these emotions disturb and\r\ndisplease us: we suffer by contagion and sympathy; nor can we remain\r\nindifferent spectators, even though certain that no pernicious\r\nconsequences would ever follow from such angry passions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAs a certain proof that the whole merit of benevolence is not derived\r\nfrom its usefulness, we may observe, that in a kind way of blame, we\r\nsay, a person is TOO GOOD; when he exceeds his part in society, and\r\ncarries his attention for others beyond the proper bounds. In\r\nlike manner, we say, a man is too HIGH-SPIRITED, TOO INTREPID, TOO\r\nINDIFFERENT ABOUT FORTUNE: reproaches, which really, at bottom, imply\r\nmore esteem than many panegyrics. Being accustomed to rate the merit and\r\ndemerit of characters chiefly by their useful or pernicious tendencies,\r\nwe cannot forbear applying the epithet of blame, when we discover a\r\nsentiment, which rises to a degree, that is hurtful; but it may happen,\r\nat the same time, that its noble elevation, or its engaging tenderness\r\nso seizes the heart, as rather to increase our friendship and concern\r\nfor the person.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: Cheerfulness could scarce admit of blame from its\r\nexcess, were it not that dissolute mirth, without a proper cause or\r\nsubject, is a sure symptom and characteristic of folly, and on that\r\naccount disgustful.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe amours and attachments of Harry the IVth of France, during the civil\r\nwars of the league, frequently hurt his interest and his cause; but all\r\nthe young, at least, and amorous, who can sympathize with the tender\r\npassions, will allow that this very weakness, for they will readily call\r\nit such, chiefly endears that hero, and interests them in his fortunes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe excessive bravery and resolute inflexibility of Charles the XIIth\r\nruined his own country, and infested all his neighbours; but have\r\nsuch splendour and greatness in their appearance, as strikes us with\r\nadmiration; and they might, in some degree, be even approved of, if they\r\nbetrayed not sometimes too evident symptoms of madness and disorder.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe Athenians pretended to the first invention of agriculture and of\r\nlaws: and always valued themselves extremely on the benefit thereby\r\nprocured to the whole race of mankind. They also boasted, and with\r\nreason, of their war like enterprises; particularly against those\r\ninnumerable fleets and armies of Persians, which invaded Greece during\r\nthe reigns of Darius and Xerxes. But though there be no comparison in\r\npoint of utility, between these peaceful and military honours; yet we\r\nfind, that the orators, who have writ such elaborate panegyrics on\r\nthat famous city, have chiefly triumphed in displaying the warlike\r\nachievements. Lysias, Thucydides, Plato, and Isocrates discover, all of\r\nthem, the same partiality; which, though condemned by calm reason and\r\nreflection, appears so natural in the mind of man.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is observable, that the great charm of poetry consists in lively\r\npictures of the sublime passions, magnanimity, courage, disdain of\r\nfortune; or those of the tender affections, love and friendship; which\r\nwarm the heart, and diffuse over it similar sentiments and emotions. And\r\nthough all kinds of passion, even the most disagreeable, such as\r\ngrief and anger, are observed, when excited by poetry, to convey a\r\nsatisfaction, from a mechanism of nature, not easy to be explained: Yet\r\nthose more elevated or softer affections have a peculiar influence, and\r\nplease from more than one cause or principle. Not to mention that\r\nthey alone interest us in the fortune of the persons represented, or\r\ncommunicate any esteem and affection for their character.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd can it possibly be doubted, that this talent itself of poets, to\r\nmove the passions, this pathetic and sublime of sentiment, is a very\r\nconsiderable merit; and being enhanced by its extreme rarity, may exalt\r\nthe person possessed of it, above every character of the age in which\r\nhe lives? The prudence, address, steadiness, and benign government of\r\nAugustus, adorned with all the splendour of his noble birth and imperial\r\ncrown, render him but an unequal competitor for fame with Virgil, who\r\nlays nothing into the opposite scale but the divine beauties of his\r\npoetical genius.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe very sensibility to these beauties, or a delicacy of taste, is\r\nitself a beauty in any character; as conveying the purest, the most\r\ndurable, and most innocent of all enjoyments.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThese are some instances of the several species of merit, that are\r\nvalued for the immediate pleasure which they communicate to the\r\nperson possessed of them. No views of utility or of future beneficial\r\nconsequences enter into this sentiment of approbation; yet is it of\r\na kind similar to that other sentiment, which arises from views of a\r\npublic or private utility. The same social sympathy, we may observe, or\r\nfellow-feeling with human happiness or misery, gives rise to both; and\r\nthis analogy, in all the parts of the present theory, may justly be\r\nregarded as a confirmation of it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_SECT8\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n SECTION VIII.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\r\n OF QUALITIES IMMEDIATELY AGREEABLE TO OTHERS.\r\n\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: It is the nature and, indeed, the definition of\r\nvirtue, that it is A QUALITY OF THE MIND AGREEABLE TO OR APPROVED OF BY\r\nEVERY ONE WHO CONSIDERS OR CONTEMPLATES IT. But some qualities produce\r\npleasure, because they are useful to society, or useful or agreeable\r\nto the person himself; others produce it more immediately, which is the\r\ncase with the class of virtues here considered.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAS the mutual shocks, in SOCIETY, and the oppositions of interest and\r\nself-love have constrained mankind to establish the laws of JUSTICE, in\r\norder to preserve the advantages of mutual assistance and protection: in\r\nlike manner, the eternal contrarieties, in COMPANY, of men\u0027s pride and\r\nself-conceit, have introduced the rules of Good Manners or Politeness,\r\nin order to facilitate the intercourse of minds, and an undisturbed\r\ncommerce and conversation. Among well-bred people, a mutual deference is\r\naffected; contempt of others disguised; authority concealed; attention\r\ngiven to each in his turn; and an easy stream of conversation\r\nmaintained, without vehemence, without interruption, without eagerness\r\nfor victory, and without any airs of superiority. These attentions\r\nand regards are immediately AGREEABLE to others, abstracted from any\r\nconsideration of utility or beneficial tendencies: they conciliate\r\naffection, promote esteem, and extremely enhance the merit of the person\r\nwho regulates his behaviour by them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMany of the forms of breeding are arbitrary and casual; but the thing\r\nexpressed by them is still the same. A Spaniard goes out of his own\r\nhouse before his guest, to signify that he leaves him master of all.\r\nIn other countries, the landlord walks out last, as a common mark of\r\ndeference and regard.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut, in order to render a man perfect GOOD COMPANY, he must have Wit and\r\nIngenuity as well as good manners. What wit is, it may not be easy\r\nto define; but it is easy surely to determine that it is a quality\r\nimmediately AGREEABLE to others, and communicating, on its first\r\nappearance, a lively joy and satisfaction to every one who has any\r\ncomprehension of it. The most profound metaphysics, indeed, might be\r\nemployed in explaining the various kinds and species of wit; and many\r\nclasses of it, which are now received on the sole testimony of taste and\r\nsentiment, might, perhaps, be resolved into more general principles. But\r\nthis is sufficient for our present purpose, that it does affect taste\r\nand sentiment, and bestowing an immediate enjoyment, is a sure source of\r\napprobation and affection.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn countries where men pass most of their time in conversation, and\r\nvisits, and assemblies, these COMPANIONABLE qualities, so to speak,\r\nare of high estimation, and form a chief part of personal merit. In\r\ncountries where men live a more domestic life, and either are employed\r\nin business, or amuse themselves in a narrower circle of acquaintance,\r\nthe more solid qualities are chiefly regarded. Thus, I have often\r\nobserved, that, among the French, the first questions with regard to a\r\nstranger are, IS HE POLITE? HAS HE WIT? In our own country, the chief\r\npraise bestowed is always that of a GOOD-NATURED, SENSIBLE FELLOW.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn conversation, the lively spirit of dialogue is AGREEABLE, even to\r\nthose who desire not to have any share in the discourse: hence the\r\nteller of long stories, or the pompous declaimer, is very little\r\napproved of. But most men desire likewise their turn in the\r\nconversation, and regard, with a very evil eye, that LOQUACITY which\r\ndeprives them of a right they are naturally so jealous of.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere is a sort of harmless LIARS, frequently to be met with in company,\r\nwho deal much in the marvellous. Their usual intention is to please and\r\nentertain; but as men are most delighted with what they conceive to be\r\ntruth, these people mistake extremely the means of pleasing, and incur\r\nuniversal blame. Some indulgence, however, to lying or fiction is\r\ngiven in HUMOROUS stories; because it is there really agreeable and\r\nentertaining, and truth is not of any importance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nEloquence, genius of all kinds, even good sense, and sound reasoning,\r\nwhen it rises to an eminent degree, and is employed upon subjects of\r\nany considerable dignity and nice discernment; all these endowments seem\r\nimmediately agreeable, and have a merit distinct from their usefulness.\r\nRarity, likewise, which so much enhances the price of every thing, must\r\nset an additional value on these noble talents of the human mind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nModesty may be understood in different senses, even abstracted from\r\nchastity, which has been already treated of. It sometimes means that\r\ntenderness and nicety of honour, that apprehension of blame, that dread\r\nof intrusion or injury towards others, that Pudor, which is the proper\r\nguardian of every kind of virtue, and a sure preservative against vice\r\nand corruption. But its most usual meaning is when it is opposed\r\nto IMPUDENCE and ARROGANCE, and expresses a diffidence of our own\r\njudgement, and a due attention and regard for others. In young men\r\nchiefly, this quality is a sure sign of good sense; and is also the\r\ncertain means of augmenting that endowment, by preserving their ears\r\nopen to instruction, and making them still grasp after new attainments.\r\nBut it has a further charm to every spectator; by flattering every man\u0027s\r\nvanity, and presenting the appearance of a docile pupil, who receives,\r\nwith proper attention and respect, every word they utter.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMen have, in general, a much greater propensity to overvalue than\r\nundervalue themselves; notwithstanding the opinion of Aristotle\r\n[Footnote: Ethic. ad Nicomachum.]. This makes us more jealous of the\r\nexcess on the former side, and causes us to regard, with a peculiar\r\nindulgence, all tendency to modesty and self-diffidence; as esteeming\r\nthe danger less of falling into any vicious extreme of that nature. It\r\nis thus in countries where men\u0027s bodies are apt to exceed in corpulency,\r\npersonal beauty is placed in a much greater degree of slenderness, than\r\nin countries where that is the most usual defect. Being so often struck\r\nwith instances of one species of deformity, men think they can never\r\nkeep at too great a distance from it, and wish always to have a\r\nleaning to the opposite side. In like manner, were the door opened to\r\nself-praise, and were Montaigne\u0027s maxim observed, that one should say as\r\nfrankly, I HAVE SENSE, I HAVE LEARNING, I HAVE COURAGE, BEAUTY, OR WIT,\r\nas it is sure we often think so; were this the case, I say, every one\r\nis sensible that such a flood of impertinence would break in upon us,\r\nas would render society wholly intolerable. For this reason custom\r\nhas established it as a rule, in common societies, that men should not\r\nindulge themselves in self-praise, or even speak much of themselves;\r\nand it is only among intimate friends or people of very manly behaviour,\r\nthat one is allowed to do himself justice. Nobody finds fault with\r\nMaurice, Prince of Orange, for his reply to one who asked him, whom he\r\nesteemed the first general of the age, THE MARQUIS OF SPINOLA, said he,\r\nIS THE SECOND. Though it is observable, that the self-praise implied is\r\nhere better implied, than if it had been directly expressed, without any\r\ncover or disguise.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHe must be a very superficial thinker, who imagines that all instances\r\nof mutual deference are to be understood in earnest, and that a man\r\nwould be more esteemable for being ignorant of his own merits and\r\naccomplishments. A small bias towards modesty, even in the internal\r\nsentiment, is favourably regarded, especially in young people; and a\r\nstrong bias is required in the outward behaviour; but this excludes not\r\na noble pride and spirit, which may openly display itself in its full\r\nextent, when one lies under calumny or oppression of any kind. The\r\ngenerous contumacy of Socrates, as Cicero calls it, has been highly\r\ncelebrated in all ages; and when joined to the usual modesty of his\r\nbehaviour, forms a shining character. Iphicrates, the Athenian, being\r\naccused of betraying the interests of his country, asked his accuser,\r\nWOULD YOU, says he, HAVE, ON A LIKE OCCASION, BEEN GUILTY OF THAT CRIME?\r\nBY NO MEANS, replied the other. AND CAN YOU THEN IMAGINE, cried the\r\nhero, that Iphicrates WOULD BE GUILTY? [Footnote: Quinctil. lib. v. cap.\r\n12.]\u0026mdash;In short, a generous spirit and self-value, well founded, decently\r\ndisguised, and courageously supported under distress and calumny, is a\r\ngreat excellency, and seems to derive its merit from the noble elevation\r\nof its sentiment, or its immediate agreeableness to its possessor. In\r\nordinary characters, we approve of a bias towards modesty, which is\r\na quality immediately agreeable to others: the vicious excess of\r\nthe former virtue, namely, insolence or haughtiness, is immediately\r\ndisagreeable to others; the excess of the latter is so to the possessor.\r\nThus are the boundaries of these duties adjusted.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA desire of fame, reputation, or a character with others, is so far\r\nfrom being blameable, that it seems inseparable from virtue, genius,\r\ncapacity, and a generous or noble disposition. An attention even to\r\ntrivial matters, in order to please, is also expected and demanded by\r\nsociety; and no one is surprised, if he find a man in company to observe\r\na greater elegance of dress and more pleasant flow of conversation, than\r\nwhen he passes his time at home, and with his own family. Wherein, then,\r\nconsists Vanity, which is so justly regarded as a fault or imperfection.\r\nIt seems to consist chiefly in such an intemperate display of our\r\nadvantages, honours, and accomplishments; in such an importunate and\r\nopen demand of praise and admiration, as is offensive to others, and\r\nencroaches too far on their secret vanity and ambition. It is besides a\r\nsure symptom of the want of true dignity and elevation of mind, which is\r\nso great an ornament in any character. For why that impatient desire\r\nof applause; as if you were not justly entitled to it, and might not\r\nreasonably expect that it would for ever at tend you? Why so anxious to\r\ninform us of the great company which you have kept; the obliging things\r\nwhich were said to you; the honours, the distinctions which you met\r\nwith; as if these were not things of course, and what we could readily,\r\nof ourselves, have imagined, without being told of them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nDecency, or a proper regard to age, sex, character, and station in the\r\nworld, may be ranked among the qualities which are immediately agreeable\r\nto others, and which, by that means, acquire praise and approbation. An\r\neffeminate behaviour in a man, a rough manner in a woman; these are ugly\r\nbecause unsuitable to each character, and different from the qualities\r\nwhich we expect in the sexes. It is as if a tragedy abounded in comic\r\nbeauties, or a comedy in tragic. The disproportions hurt the eye, and\r\nconvey a disagreeable sentiment to the spectators, the source of blame\r\nand disapprobation. This is that INDECORUM, which is explained so much\r\nat large by Cicero in his Offices.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAmong the other virtues, we may also give Cleanliness a place; since\r\nit naturally renders us agreeable to others, and is no inconsiderable\r\nsource of love and affection. No one will deny, that a negligence in\r\nthis particular is a fault; and as faults are nothing but smaller vices,\r\nand this fault can have no other origin than the uneasy sensation which\r\nit excites in others; we may, in this instance, seemingly so trivial,\r\nclearly discover the origin of moral distinctions, about which the\r\nlearned have involved themselves in such mazes of perplexity and error.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut besides all the AGREEABLE qualities, the origin of whose beauty\r\nwe can, in some degree, explain and account for, there still remains\r\nsomething mysterious and inexplicable, which conveys an immediate\r\nsatisfaction to the spectator, but how, or why, or for what reason,\r\nhe cannot pretend to determine. There is a manner, a grace, an ease, a\r\ngenteelness, an I-know-not-what, which some men possess above others,\r\nwhich is very different from external beauty and comeliness, and which,\r\nhowever, catches our affection almost as suddenly and powerfully. And\r\nthough this MANNER be chiefly talked of in the passion between the\r\nsexes, where the concealed magic is easily explained, yet surely much\r\nof it prevails in all our estimation of characters, and forms no\r\ninconsiderable part of personal merit. This class of accomplishments,\r\ntherefore, must be trusted entirely to the blind, but sure testimony of\r\ntaste and sentiment; and must be considered as a part of ethics, left by\r\nnature to baffle all the pride of philosophy, and make her sensible of\r\nher narrow boundaries and slender acquisitions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe approve of another, because of his wit, politeness, modesty, decency,\r\nor any agreeable quality which he possesses; although he be not of our\r\nacquaintance, nor has ever given us any entertainment, by means of\r\nthese accomplishments. The idea, which we form of their effect on his\r\nacquaintance, has an agreeable influence on our imagination, and gives\r\nus the sentiment of approbation. This principle enters into all the\r\njudgements which we form concerning manners and characters.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_SECT9\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n SECTION IX. CONCLUSION.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_PART91\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n PART I.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIT may justly appear surprising that any man in so late an age, should\r\nfind it requisite to prove, by elaborate reasoning, that Personal Merit\r\nconsists altogether in the possession of mental qualities, USEFUL or\r\nAGREEABLE to the PERSON HIMSELF or to OTHERS. It might be expected that\r\nthis principle would have occurred even to the first rude, unpractised\r\nenquirers concerning morals, and been received from its own evidence,\r\nwithout any argument or disputation. Whatever is valuable in any kind,\r\nso naturally classes itself under the division of USEFUL or AGREEABLE,\r\nthe UTILE or the DULCE, that it is not easy to imagine why we should\r\never seek further, or consider the question as a matter of nice research\r\nor inquiry. And as every thing useful or agreeable must possess these\r\nqualities with regard either to the PERSON HIMSELF or to OTHERS, the\r\ncomplete delineation or description of merit seems to be performed as\r\nnaturally as a shadow is cast by the sun, or an image is reflected upon\r\nwater. If the ground, on which the shadow is cast, be not broken and\r\nuneven; nor the surface from which the image is reflected, disturbed\r\nand confused; a just figure is immediately presented, without any art\r\nor attention. And it seems a reasonable presumption, that systems and\r\nhypotheses have perverted our natural understanding, when a theory,\r\nso simple and obvious, could so long have escaped the most elaborate\r\nexamination.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut however the case may have fared with philosophy, in common life\r\nthese principles are still implicitly maintained; nor is any other topic\r\nof praise or blame ever recurred to, when we employ any panegyric or\r\nsatire, any applause or censure of human action and behaviour. If we\r\nobserve men, in every intercourse of business or pleasure, in every\r\ndiscourse and conversation, we shall find them nowhere, except the\r\nschools, at any loss upon this subject. What so natural, for instance,\r\nas the following dialogue? You are very happy, we shall suppose one to\r\nsay, addressing himself to another, that you have given your daughter\r\nto Cleanthes. He is a man of honour and humanity. Every one, who has\r\nany intercourse with him, is sure of FAIR and KIND treatment. [Footnote:\r\nQualities useful to others.] I congratulate you too, says another,\r\non the promising expectations of this son-in-law; whose assiduous\r\napplication to the study of the laws, whose quick penetration and early\r\nknowledge both of men and business, prognosticate the greatest honours\r\nand advancement. [Footnote: Qualities useful to the person himself.]\r\nYou surprise me, replies a third, when you talk of Cleanthes as a man\r\nof business and application. I met him lately in a circle of the gayest\r\ncompany, and he was the very life and soul of our conversation: so much\r\nwit with good manners; so much gallantry without affectation; so much\r\ningenious knowledge so genteelly delivered, I have never before observed\r\nin any one. [Footnote: Qualities immediately agreeable to others,]\r\nYou would admire him still more, says a fourth, if you knew him more\r\nfamiliarly. That cheerfulness, which you might remark in him, is not a\r\nsudden flash struck out by company: it runs through the whole tenor of\r\nhis life, and preserves a perpetual serenity on his countenance, and\r\ntranquillity in his soul. He has met with severe trials, misfortunes as\r\nwell as dangers; and by his greatness of mind, was still superior to\r\nall of them [Footnote: Qualities immediately agreeable to the person\r\nhimself]. The image, gentlemen, which you have here delineated of\r\nCleanthes, cried I, is that of accomplished merit. Each of you has given\r\na stroke of the pencil to his figure; and you have unawares exceeded all\r\nthe pictures drawn by Gratian or Castiglione. A philosopher might select\r\nthis character as a model of perfect virtue.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd as every quality which is useful or agreeable to ourselves or others\r\nis, in common life, allowed to be a part of personal merit; so no other\r\nwill ever be received, where men judge of things by their natural,\r\nunprejudiced reason, without the delusive glosses of superstition and\r\nfalse religion. Celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial,\r\nhumility, silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues; for\r\nwhat reason are they everywhere rejected by men of sense, but because\r\nthey serve to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man\u0027s fortune in\r\nthe world, nor render him a more valuable member of society; neither\r\nqualify him for the entertainment of company, nor increase his power of\r\nself-enjoyment? We observe, on the contrary, that they cross all these\r\ndesirable ends; stupify the understanding and harden the heart, obscure\r\nthe fancy and sour the temper. We justly, therefore, transfer them to\r\nthe opposite column, and place them in the catalogue of vices; nor has\r\nany superstition force sufficient among men of the world, to pervert\r\nentirely these natural sentiments. A gloomy, hair-brained enthusiast,\r\nafter his death, may have a place in the calendar; but will scarcely\r\never be admitted, when alive, into intimacy and society, except by those\r\nwho are as delirious and dismal as himself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt seems a happiness in the present theory, that it enters not into that\r\nvulgar dispute concerning the DEGREES of benevolence or self-love, which\r\nprevail in human nature; a dispute which is never likely to have any\r\nissue, both because men, who have taken part, are not easily convinced,\r\nand because the phenomena, which can be produced on either side, are so\r\ndispersed, so uncertain, and subject to so many interpretations, that it\r\nis scarcely possible accurately to compare them, or draw from them any\r\ndeterminate inference or conclusion. It is sufficient for our present\r\npurpose, if it be allowed, what surely, without the greatest absurdity\r\ncannot be disputed, that there is some benevolence, however small,\r\ninfused into our bosom; some spark of friendship for human kind; some\r\nparticle of the dove kneaded into our frame, along with the elements of\r\nthe wolf and serpent. Let these generous sentiments be supposed ever\r\nso weak; let them be insufficient to move even a hand or finger of our\r\nbody, they must still direct the determinations of our mind, and where\r\neverything else is equal, produce a cool preference of what is useful\r\nand serviceable to mankind, above what is pernicious and dangerous. A\r\nMORAL DISTINCTION, therefore, immediately arises; a general sentiment of\r\nblame and approbation; a tendency, however faint, to the objects of the\r\none, and a proportionable aversion to those of the other. Nor will those\r\nreasoners, who so earnestly maintain the predominant selfishness of\r\nhuman kind, be any wise scandalized at hearing of the weak sentiments of\r\nvirtue implanted in our nature. On the contrary, they are found as ready\r\nto maintain the one tenet as the other; and their spirit of satire (for\r\nsuch it appears, rather than of corruption) naturally gives rise to\r\nboth opinions; which have, indeed, a great and almost an indissoluble\r\nconnexion together.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAvarice, ambition, vanity, and all passions vulgarly, though improperly,\r\ncomprised under the denomination of SELF-LOVE, are here excluded from\r\nour theory concerning the origin of morals, not because they are too\r\nweak, but because they have not a proper direction for that purpose.\r\nThe notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind, which\r\nrecommends the same object to general approbation, and makes every man,\r\nor most men, agree in the same opinion or decision concerning it. It\r\nalso implies some sentiment, so universal and comprehensive as to extend\r\nto all mankind, and render the actions and conduct, even of the persons\r\nthe most remote, an object of applause or censure, according as they\r\nagree or disagree with that rule of right which is established. These\r\ntwo requisite circumstances belong alone to the sentiment of humanity\r\nhere insisted on. The other passions produce in every breast, many\r\nstrong sentiments of desire and aversion, affection and hatred; but\r\nthese neither are felt so much in common, nor are so comprehensive, as\r\nto be the foundation of any general system and established theory of\r\nblame or approbation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen a man denominates another his ENEMY, his RIVAL, his ANTAGONIST, his\r\nADVERSARY, he is understood to speak the language of self-love, and to\r\nexpress sentiments, peculiar to himself, and arising from his particular\r\ncircumstances and situation. But when he bestows on any man the epithets\r\nof VICIOUS or ODIOUS or DEPRAVED, he then speaks another language, and\r\nexpresses sentiments, in which he expects all his audience are to\r\nconcur with him. He must here, therefore, depart from his private and\r\nparticular situation, and must choose a point of view, common to him\r\nwith others; he must move some universal principle of the human frame,\r\nand touch a string to which all mankind have an accord and symphony. If\r\nhe mean, therefore, to express that this man possesses qualities, whose\r\ntendency is pernicious to society, he has chosen this common point of\r\nview, and has touched the principle of humanity, in which every man, in\r\nsome degree, concurs. While the human heart is compounded of the same\r\nelements as at present, it will never be wholly indifferent to public\r\ngood, nor entirely unaffected with the tendency of characters and\r\nmanners. And though this affection of humanity may not generally be\r\nesteemed so strong as vanity or ambition, yet, being common to all men,\r\nit can alone be the foundation of morals, or of any-general system of\r\nblame or praise. One man\u0027s ambition is not another\u0027s ambition, nor will\r\nthe same event or object satisfy both; but the humanity of one man is\r\nthe humanity of every one, and the same object touches this passion in\r\nall human creatures.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut the sentiments, which arise from humanity, are not only the same in\r\nall human creatures, and produce the same approbation or censure; but\r\nthey also comprehend all human creatures; nor is there any one whose\r\nconduct or character is not, by their means, an object to every one of\r\ncensure or approbation. On the contrary, those other passions,\r\ncommonly denominated selfish, both produce different sentiments in each\r\nindividual, according to his particular situation; and also contemplate\r\nthe greater part of mankind with the utmost indifference and unconcern.\r\nWhoever has a high regard and esteem for me flatters my vanity; whoever\r\nexpresses contempt mortifies and displeases me; but as my name is known\r\nbut to a small part of mankind, there are few who come within the sphere\r\nof this passion, or excite, on its account, either my affection or\r\ndisgust. But if you represent a tyrannical, insolent, or barbarous\r\nbehaviour, in any country or in any age of the world, I soon carry my\r\neye to the pernicious tendency of such a conduct, and feel the sentiment\r\nof repugnance and displeasure towards it. No character can be so remote\r\nas to be, in this light, wholly indifferent to me. What is beneficial\r\nto society or to the person himself must still be preferred. And every\r\nquality or action, of every human being, must, by this means, be ranked\r\nunder some class or denomination, expressive of general censure or\r\napplause.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhat more, therefore, can we ask to distinguish the sentiments,\r\ndependent on humanity, from those connected with any other passion, or\r\nto satisfy us, why the former are the origin of morals, not the latter?\r\nWhatever conduct gains my approbation, by touching my humanity, procures\r\nalso the applause of all mankind, by affecting the same principle in\r\nthem; but what serves my avarice or ambition pleases these passions\r\nin me alone, and affects not the avarice and ambition of the rest of\r\nmankind. There is no circumstance of conduct in any man, provided\r\nit have a beneficial tendency, that is not agreeable to my humanity,\r\nhowever remote the person; but every man, so far removed as neither\r\nto cross nor serve my avarice and ambition, is regarded as wholly\r\nindifferent by those passions. The distinction, therefore, between these\r\nspecies of sentiment being so great and evident, language must soon be\r\nmoulded upon it, and must invent a peculiar set of terms, in order to\r\nexpress those universal sentiments of censure or approbation, which\r\narise from humanity, or from views of general usefulness and its\r\ncontrary. Virtue and Vice become then known; morals are recognized;\r\ncertain general ideas are framed of human conduct and behaviour; such\r\nmeasures are expected from men in such situations. This action is\r\ndetermined to be conformable to our abstract rule; that other, contrary.\r\nAnd by such universal principles are the particular sentiments of\r\nself-love frequently controlled and limited.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: It seems certain, both from reason and experience,\r\nthat a rude, untaught savage regulates chiefly his love and hatred by\r\nthe ideas of private utility and injury, and has but faint conceptions\r\nof a general rule or system of behaviour. The man who stands opposite\r\nto him in battle, he hates heartedly, not only for the present moment,\r\nwhich is almost unavoidable, but for ever after; nor is he satisfied\r\nwithout the most extreme punishment and vengeance. But we, accustomed\r\nto society, and to more enlarged reflections, consider, that this man\r\nis serving his own country and community; that any man, in the same\r\nsituation, would do the same; that we ourselves, in like circumstances,\r\nobserve a like conduct; that; in general, human society is best\r\nsupported on such maxims: and by these suppositions and views, we\r\ncorrect, in some measure, our ruder and narrower positions. And though\r\nmuch of our friendship and enemity be still regulated by private\r\nconsiderations of benefit and harm, we pay, at least, this homage to\r\ngeneral rules, which we are accustomed to respect, that we commonly\r\nperver our adversary\u0027s conduct, by imputing malice or injustice to him,\r\nin order to give vent to those passions, which arise from self-love\r\nand private interest. When the heart is full of rage, it never wants\r\npretences of this nature; though sometimes as frivolous, as those from\r\nwhich Horace, being almost crushed by the fall of a tree, effects to\r\naccuse of parricide the first planter of it.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFrom instances of popular tumults, seditions, factions, panics, and\r\nof all passions, which are shared with a multitude, we may learn the\r\ninfluence of society in exciting and supporting any emotion; while the\r\nmost ungovernable disorders are raised, we find, by that means, from the\r\nslightest and most frivolous occasions. Solon was no very cruel, though,\r\nperhaps, an unjust legislator, who punished neuters in civil wars; and\r\nfew, I believe, would, in such cases, incur the penalty, were their\r\naffection and discourse allowed sufficient to absolve them. No\r\nselfishness, and scarce any philosophy, have there force sufficient to\r\nsupport a total coolness and indifference; and he must be more or less\r\nthan man, who kindles not in the common blaze. What wonder then, that\r\nmoral sentiments are found of such influence in life; though springing\r\nfrom principles, which may appear, at first sight, somewhat small\r\nand delicate? But these principles, we must remark, are social and\r\nuniversal; they form, in a manner, the PARTY of humankind against vice\r\nor disorder, its common enemy. And as the benevolent concern for others\r\nis diffused, in a greater or less degree, over all men, and is the same\r\nin all, it occurs more frequently in discourse, is cherished by society\r\nand conversation, and the blame and approbation, consequent on it, are\r\nthereby roused from that lethargy into which they are probably lulled,\r\nin solitary and uncultivated nature. Other passions, though perhaps\r\noriginally stronger, yet being selfish and private, are often\r\noverpowered by its force, and yield the dominion of our breast to those\r\nsocial and public principles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnother spring of our constitution, that brings a great addition of\r\nforce to moral sentiments, is the love of fame; which rules, with such\r\nuncontrolled authority, in all generous minds, and is often the grand\r\nobject of all their designs and undertakings. By our continual and\r\nearnest pursuit of a character, a name, a reputation in the world, we\r\nbring our own deportment and conduct frequently in review, and consider\r\nhow they appear in the eyes of those who approach and regard us. This\r\nconstant habit of surveying ourselves, as it were, in reflection,\r\nkeeps alive all the sentiments of right and wrong, and begets, in noble\r\nnatures, a certain reverence for themselves as well as others, which\r\nis the surest guardian of every virtue. The animal conveniencies and\r\npleasures sink gradually in their value; while every inward beauty and\r\nmoral grace is studiously acquired, and the mind is accomplished in\r\nevery perfection, which can adorn or embellish a rational creature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHere is the most perfect morality with which we are acquainted: here is\r\ndisplayed the force of many sympathies. Our moral sentiment is itself\r\na feeling chiefly of that nature, and our regard to a character with\r\nothers seems to arise only from a care of preserving a character with\r\nourselves; and in order to attain this end, we find it necessary to prop\r\nour tottering judgement on the correspondent approbation of mankind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut, that we may accommodate matters, and remove if possible every\r\ndifficulty, let us allow all these reasonings to be false. Let us allow\r\nthat, when we resolve the pleasure, which arises from views of utility,\r\ninto the sentiments of humanity and sympathy, we have embraced a wrong\r\nhypothesis. Let us confess it necessary to find some other explication\r\nof that applause, which is paid to objects, whether inanimate, animate,\r\nor rational, if they have a tendency to promote the welfare and\r\nadvantage of mankind. However difficult it be to conceive that an object\r\nis approved of on account of its tendency to a certain end, while the\r\nend itself is totally indifferent: let us swallow this absurdity,\r\nand consider what are the consequences. The preceding delineation\r\nor definition of Personal Merit must still retain its evidence and\r\nauthority: it must still be allowed that every quality of the mind,\r\nwhich is USEFUL or AGREEABLE to the PERSON HIMSELF or to OTHERS,\r\ncommunicates a pleasure to the spectator, engages his esteem, and is\r\nadmitted under the honourable denomination of virtue or merit. Are not\r\njustice, fidelity, honour, veracity, allegiance, chastity, esteemed\r\nsolely on account of their tendency to promote the good of society?\r\nIs not that tendency inseparable from humanity, benevolence, lenity,\r\ngenerosity, gratitude, moderation, tenderness, friendship, and all\r\nthe other social virtues? Can it possibly be doubted that industry,\r\ndiscretion, frugality, secrecy, order, perseverance, forethought,\r\njudgement, and this whole class of virtues and accomplishments, of which\r\nmany pages would not contain the catalogue; can it be doubted, I\r\nsay, that the tendency of these qualities to promote the interest and\r\nhappiness of their possessor, is the sole foundation of their merit?\r\nWho can dispute that a mind, which supports a perpetual serenity and\r\ncheerfulness, a noble dignity and undaunted spirit, a tender affection\r\nand good-will to all around; as it has more enjoyment within itself,\r\nis also a more animating and rejoicing spectacle, than if dejected with\r\nmelancholy, tormented with anxiety, irritated with rage, or sunk into\r\nthe most abject baseness and degeneracy? And as to the qualities,\r\nimmediately AGREEABLE to OTHERS, they speak sufficiently for themselves;\r\nand he must be unhappy, indeed, either in his own temper, or in his\r\nsituation and company, who has never perceived the charms of a facetious\r\nwit or flowing affability, of a delicate modesty or decent genteelness\r\nof address and manner.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI am sensible, that nothing can be more unphilosophical than to be\r\npositive or dogmatical on any subject; and that, even if excessive\r\nscepticism could be maintained, it would not be more destructive to all\r\njust reasoning and inquiry. I am convinced that, where men are the most\r\nsure and arrogant, they are commonly the most mistaken, and have there\r\ngiven reins to passion, without that proper deliberation and suspense,\r\nwhich can alone secure them from the grossest absurdities. Yet, I must\r\nconfess, that this enumeration puts the matter in so strong a light,\r\nthat I cannot, at PRESENT, be more assured of any truth, which I learn\r\nfrom reasoning and argument, than that personal merit consists entirely\r\nin the usefulness or agreeableness of qualities to the person himself\r\npossessed of them, or to others, who have any intercourse with him. But\r\nwhen I reflect that, though the bulk and figure of the earth have been\r\nmeasured and delineated, though the motions of the tides have been\r\naccounted for, the order and economy of the heavenly bodies subjected to\r\ntheir proper laws, and Infinite itself reduced to calculation; yet men\r\nstill dispute concerning the foundation of their moral duties. When I\r\nreflect on this, I say, I fall back into diffidence and scepticism, and\r\nsuspect that an hypothesis, so obvious, had it been a true one, would,\r\nlong ere now, have been received by the unanimous suffrage and consent\r\nof mankind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_PART92\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n PART II.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHaving explained the moral APPROBATION attending merit or virtue, there\r\nremains nothing but briefly to consider our interested OBLIGATION to\r\nit, and to inquire whether every man, who has any regard to his own\r\nhappiness and welfare, will not best find his account in the practice of\r\nevery moral duty. If this can be clearly ascertained from the foregoing\r\ntheory, we shall have the satisfaction to reflect, that we have\r\nadvanced principles, which not only, it is hoped, will stand the test\r\nof reasoning and inquiry, but may contribute to the amendment of men\u0027s\r\nlives, and their improvement in morality and social virtue. And though\r\nthe philosophical truth of any proposition by no means depends on its\r\ntendency to promote the interests of society; yet a man has but a bad\r\ngrace, who delivers a theory, however true, which, he must confess,\r\nleads to a practice dangerous and pernicious. Why rake into those\r\ncorners of nature which spread a nuisance all around? Why dig up the\r\npestilence from the pit in which it is buried? The ingenuity of your\r\nresearches may be admired, but your systems will be detested; and\r\nmankind will agree, if they cannot refute them, to sink them, at least,\r\nin eternal silence and oblivion. Truths which are pernicious to society,\r\nif any such there be, will yield to errors which are salutary and\r\nADVANTAGEOUS.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut what philosophical truths can be more advantageous to society, than\r\nthose here delivered, which represent virtue in all her genuine and most\r\nengaging charms, and makes us approach her with ease, familiarity, and\r\naffection? The dismal dress falls off, with which many divines, and\r\nsome philosophers, have covered her; and nothing appears but gentleness,\r\nhumanity, beneficence, affability; nay, even at proper intervals, play,\r\nfrolic, and gaiety. She talks not of useless austerities and rigours,\r\nsuffering and self-denial. She declares that her sole purpose is to make\r\nher votaries and all mankind, during every instant of their existence,\r\nif possible, cheerful and happy; nor does she ever willingly part with\r\nany pleasure but in hopes of ample compensation in some other period\r\nof their lives. The sole trouble which she demands, is that of just\r\ncalculation, and a steady preference of the greater happiness. And if\r\nany austere pretenders approach her, enemies to joy and pleasure, she\r\neither rejects them as hypocrites and deceivers; or, if she admit them\r\nin her train, they are ranked, however, among the least favoured of her\r\nvotaries.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd, indeed, to drop all figurative expression, what hopes can we\r\never have of engaging mankind to a practice which we confess full of\r\nausterity and rigour? Or what theory of morals can ever serve any useful\r\npurpose, unless it can show, by a particular detail, that all the duties\r\nwhich it recommends, are also the true interest of each individual?\r\nThe peculiar advantage of the foregoing system seems to be, that it\r\nfurnishes proper mediums for that purpose.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThat the virtues which are immediately USEFUL or AGREEABLE to the person\r\npossessed of them, are desirable in a view to self-interest, it would\r\nsurely be superfluous to prove. Moralists, indeed, may spare themselves\r\nall the pains which they often take in recommending these duties.\r\nTo what purpose collect arguments to evince that temperance is\r\nadvantageous, and the excesses of pleasure hurtful, when it appears that\r\nthese excesses are only denominated such, because they are hurtful;\r\nand that, if the unlimited use of strong liquors, for instance, no more\r\nimpaired health or the faculties of mind and body than the use of air or\r\nwater, it would not be a whit more vicious or blameable?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt seems equally superfluous to prove, that the COMPANIONABLE virtues of\r\ngood manners and wit, decency and genteelness, are more desirable than\r\nthe contrary qualities. Vanity alone, without any other consideration,\r\nis a sufficient motive to make us wish for the possession of these\r\naccomplishments. No man was ever willingly deficient in this particular.\r\nAll our failures here proceed from bad education, want of capacity, or a\r\nperverse and unpliable disposition. Would you have your company coveted,\r\nadmired, followed; rather than hated, despised, avoided? Can any one\r\nseriously deliberate in the case? As no enjoyment is sincere, without\r\nsome reference to company and society; so no society can be agreeable,\r\nor even tolerable, where a man feels his presence unwelcome, and\r\ndiscovers all around him symptoms of disgust and aversion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut why, in the greater society or confederacy of mankind, should not\r\nthe case be the same as in particular clubs and companies? Why is\r\nit more doubtful, that the enlarged virtues of humanity, generosity,\r\nbeneficence, are desirable with a view of happiness and self-interest,\r\nthan the limited endowments of ingenuity and politeness? Are we\r\napprehensive lest those social affections interfere, in a greater and\r\nmore immediate degree than any other pursuits, with private utility,\r\nand cannot be gratified, without some important sacrifice of honour and\r\nadvantage? If so, we are but ill-instructed in the nature of the human\r\npassions, and are more influenced by verbal distinctions than by real\r\ndifferences.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhatever contradiction may vulgarly be supposed between the SELFISH and\r\nSOCIAL sentiments or dispositions, they are really no more opposite than\r\nselfish and ambitious, selfish and revengeful, selfish and vain. It is\r\nrequisite that there be an original propensity of some kind, in order\r\nto be a basis to self-love, by giving a relish to the objects of\r\nits pursuit; and none more fit for this purpose than benevolence\r\nor humanity. The goods of fortune are spent in one gratification or\r\nanother: the miser who accumulates his annual income, and lends it out\r\nat interest, has really spent it in the gratification of his avarice.\r\nAnd it would be difficult to show why a man is more a loser by a\r\ngenerous action, than by any other method of expense; since the utmost\r\nwhich he can attain by the most elaborate selfishness, is the indulgence\r\nof some affection.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow if life, without passion, must be altogether insipid and tiresome;\r\nlet a man suppose that he has full power of modelling his own\r\ndisposition, and let him deliberate what appetite or desire he would\r\nchoose for the foundation of his happiness and enjoyment. Every\r\naffection, he would observe, when gratified by success, gives a\r\nsatisfaction proportioned to its force and violence; but besides this\r\nadvantage, common to all, the immediate feeling of benevolence and\r\nfriendship, humanity and kindness, is sweet, smooth, tender, and\r\nagreeable, independent of all fortune and accidents. These virtues are\r\nbesides attended with a pleasing consciousness or remembrance, and keep\r\nus in humour with ourselves as well as others; while we retain the\r\nagreeable reflection of having done our part towards mankind and\r\nsociety. And though all men show a jealousy of our success in the\r\npursuits of avarice and ambition; yet are we almost sure of their\r\ngood-will and good wishes, so long as we persevere in the paths of\r\nvirtue, and employ ourselves in the execution of generous plans and\r\npurposes. What other passion is there where we shall find so many\r\nadvantages united; an agreeable sentiment, a pleasing consciousness, a\r\ngood reputation? But of these truths, we may observe, men are, of\r\nthemselves, pretty much convinced; nor are they deficient in their duty\r\nto society, because they would not wish to be generous, friendly, and\r\nhumane; but because they do not feel themselves such.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTreating vice with the greatest candour, and making it all possible\r\nconcessions, we must acknowledge that there is not, in any instance, the\r\nsmallest pretext for giving it the preference above virtue, with a view\r\nof self-interest; except, perhaps, in the case of justice, where a man,\r\ntaking things in a certain light, may often seem to be a loser by his\r\nintegrity. And though it is allowed that, without a regard to property,\r\nno society could subsist; yet according to the imperfect way in which\r\nhuman affairs are conducted, a sensible knave, in particular incidents,\r\nmay think that an act of iniquity or infidelity will make a considerable\r\naddition to his fortune, without causing any considerable breach in the\r\nsocial union and confederacy. That HONESTY IS THE BEST POLICY, may be\r\na good general rule, but is liable to many exceptions; and he, it may\r\nperhaps be thought, conducts himself with most wisdom, who observes the\r\ngeneral rule, and takes advantage of all the exceptions. I must confess\r\nthat, if a man think that this reasoning much requires an answer,\r\nit would be a little difficult to find any which will to him appear\r\nsatisfactory and convincing. If his heart rebel not against such\r\npernicious maxims, if he feel no reluctance to the thoughts of villainy\r\nor baseness, he has indeed lost a considerable motive to virtue; and we\r\nmay expect that this practice will be answerable to his speculation. But\r\nin all ingenuous natures, the antipathy to treachery and roguery is\r\ntoo strong to be counter-balanced by any views of profit or pecuniary\r\nadvantage. Inward peace of mind, consciousness of integrity, a\r\nsatisfactory review of our own conduct; these are circumstances, very\r\nrequisite to happiness, and will be cherished and cultivated by every\r\nhonest man, who feels the importance of them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSuch a one has, besides, the frequent satisfaction of seeing knaves,\r\nwith all their pretended cunning and abilities, betrayed by their own\r\nmaxims; and while they purpose to cheat with moderation and secrecy, a\r\ntempting incident occurs, nature is frail, and they give into the snare;\r\nwhence they can never extricate themselves, without a total loss of\r\nreputation, and the forfeiture of all future trust and confidence with\r\nmankind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut were they ever so secret and successful, the honest man, if he has\r\nany tincture of philosophy, or even common observation and reflection,\r\nwill discover that they themselves are, in the end, the greatest dupes,\r\nand have sacrificed the invaluable enjoyment of a character, with\r\nthemselves at least, for the acquisition of worthless toys and gewgaws.\r\nHow little is requisite to supply the necessities of nature? And in a\r\nview to pleasure, what comparison between the unbought satisfaction of\r\nconversation, society, study, even health and the common beauties of\r\nnature, but above all the peaceful reflection on one\u0027s own conduct; what\r\ncomparison, I say, between these and the feverish, empty amusements of\r\nluxury and expense? These natural pleasures, indeed, are really without\r\nprice; both because they are below all price in their attainment, and\r\nabove it in their enjoyment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_APPE1\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n APPENDIX I. CONCERNING MORAL SENTIMENT\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIF the foregoing hypothesis be received, it will now be easy for us to\r\ndetermine the question first started, [FOOTNOTE: Sect. 1.] concerning\r\nthe general principles of morals; and though we postponed the\r\ndecision of that question, lest it should then involve us in intricate\r\nspeculations, which are unfit for moral discourses, we may resume it at\r\npresent, and examine how far either REASON or SENTIMENT enters into all\r\ndecisions of praise or censure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOne principal foundation of moral praise being supposed to lie in the\r\nusefulness of any quality or action, it is evident that REASON must\r\nenter for a considerable share in all decisions of this kind; since\r\nnothing but that faculty can instruct us in the tendency of qualities\r\nand actions, and point out their beneficial consequences to society\r\nand to their possessor. In many cases this is an affair liable to great\r\ncontroversy: doubts may arise; opposite interests may occur; and a\r\npreference must be given to one side, from very nice views, and a small\r\noverbalance of utility. This is particularly remarkable in questions\r\nwith regard to justice; as is, indeed, natural to suppose, from that\r\nspecies of utility which attends this virtue [Footnote: See App. II.].\r\nWere every single instance of justice, like that of benevolence, useful\r\nto society; this would be a more simple state of the case, and seldom\r\nliable to great controversy. But as single instances of justice are\r\noften pernicious in their first and immediate tendency, and as the\r\nadvantage to society results only from the observance of the general\r\nrule, and from the concurrence and combination of several persons in\r\nthe same equitable conduct; the case here becomes more intricate and\r\ninvolved. The various circumstances of society; the various consequences\r\nof any practice; the various interests which may be proposed; these,\r\non many occasions, are doubtful, and subject to great discussion and\r\ninquiry. The object of municipal laws is to fix all the questions\r\nwith regard to justice: the debates of civilians; the reflections of\r\npoliticians; the precedents of history and public records, are all\r\ndirected to the same purpose. And a very accurate REASON or JUDGEMENT is\r\noften requisite, to give the true determination, amidst such intricate\r\ndoubts arising from obscure or opposite utilities.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut though reason, when fully assisted and improved, be sufficient\r\nto instruct us in the pernicious or useful tendency of qualities and\r\nactions; it is not alone sufficient to produce any moral blame or\r\napprobation. Utility is only a tendency to a certain end; and were the\r\nend totally indifferent to us, we should feel the same indifference\r\ntowards the means. It is requisite a SENTIMENT should here display\r\nitself, in order to give a preference to the useful above the pernicious\r\ntendencies. This SENTIMENT can be no other than a feeling for the\r\nhappiness of mankind, and a resentment of their misery; since these are\r\nthe different ends which virtue and vice have a tendency to promote.\r\nHere therefore REASON instructs us in the several tendencies of actions,\r\nand HUMANITY makes a distinction in favour of those which are useful and\r\nbeneficial.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis partition between the faculties of understanding and sentiment, in\r\nall moral decisions, seems clear from the preceding hypothesis. But I\r\nshall suppose that hypothesis false: it will then be requisite to look\r\nout for some other theory that may be satisfactory; and I dare venture\r\nto affirm that none such will ever be found, so long as we suppose\r\nreason to be the sole source of morals. To prove this, it will be proper\r\nt o weigh the five following considerations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI. It is easy for a false hypothesis to maintain some appearance of\r\ntruth, while it keeps wholly in generals, makes use of undefined terms,\r\nand employs comparisons, instead of instances. This is particularly\r\nremarkable in that philosophy, which ascribes the discernment of\r\nall moral distinctions to reason alone, without the concurrence of\r\nsentiment. It is impossible that, in any particular instance, this\r\nhypothesis can so much as be rendered intelligible, whatever specious\r\nfigure it may make in general declamations and discourses. Examine the\r\ncrime of INGRATITUDE, for instance; which has place, wherever we observe\r\ngood-will, expressed and known, together with good-offices performed, on\r\nthe one side, and a return of ill-will or indifference, with ill-offices\r\nor neglect on the other: anatomize all these circumstances, and examine,\r\nby your reason alone, in what consists the demerit or blame. You never\r\nwill come to any issue or conclusion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nReason judges either of MATTER OF FACT or of RELATIONS. Enquire then,\r\nfirst, where is that matter of fact which we here call crime; point\r\nit out; determine the time of its existence; describe its essence or\r\nnature; explain the sense or faculty to which it discovers itself. It\r\nresides in the mind of the person who is ungrateful. He must, therefore,\r\nfeel it, and be conscious of it. But nothing is there, except the\r\npassion of ill-will or absolute indifference. You cannot say that these,\r\nof themselves, always, and in all circumstances, are crimes. No, they\r\nare only crimes when directed towards persons who have before expressed\r\nand displayed good-will towards us. Consequently, we may infer, that the\r\ncrime of ingratitude is not any particular individual FACT; but arises\r\nfrom a complication of circumstances, which, being presented to the\r\nspectator, excites the SENTIMENT of blame, by the particular structure\r\nand fabric of his mind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis representation, you say, is false. Crime, indeed, consists not in\r\na particular FACT, of whose reality we are assured by reason; but it\r\nconsists in certain MORAL RELATIONS, discovered by reason, in the same\r\nmanner as we discover by reason the truths of geometry or algebra.\r\nBut what are the relations, I ask, of which you here talk? In the case\r\nstated above, I see first good-will and good-offices in one person;\r\nthen ill-will and ill-offices in the other. Between these, there is a\r\nrelation of CONTRARIETY. Does the crime consist in that relation? But\r\nsuppose a person bore me ill-will or did me ill-offices; and I, in\r\nreturn, were indifferent towards him, or did him good offices. Here is\r\nthe same relation of CONTRARIETY; and yet my conduct is often highly\r\nlaudable. Twist and turn this matter as much as you will, you can never\r\nrest the morality on relation; but must have recourse to the decisions\r\nof sentiment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen it is affirmed that two and three are equal to the half of ten,\r\nthis relation of equality I understand perfectly. I conceive, that if\r\nten be divided into two parts, of which one has as many units as the\r\nother; and if any of these parts be compared to two added to three, it\r\nwill contain as many units as that compound number. But when you draw\r\nthence a comparison to moral relations, I own that I am altogether at a\r\nloss to understand you. A moral action, a crime, such as ingratitude, is\r\na complicated object. Does the morality consist in the relation of its\r\nparts to each other? How? After what manner? Specify the relation: be\r\nmore particular and explicit in your propositions, and you will easily\r\nsee their falsehood.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNo, say you, the morality consists in the relation of actions to the\r\nrule of right; and they are denominated good or ill, according as they\r\nagree or disagree with it. What then is this rule of right? In what does\r\nit consist? How is it determined? By reason, you say, which examines the\r\nmoral relations of actions. So that moral relations are determined\r\nby the comparison of action to a rule. And that rule is determined by\r\nconsidering the moral relations of objects. Is not this fine reasoning?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll this is metaphysics, you cry. That is enough; there needs nothing\r\nmore to give a strong presumption of falsehood. Yes, reply I, here\r\nare metaphysics surely; but they are all on your side, who advance an\r\nabstruse hypothesis, which can never be made intelligible, nor quadrate\r\nwith any particular instance or illustration. The hypothesis which we\r\nembrace is plain. It maintains that morality is determined by sentiment.\r\nIt defines virtue to be WHATEVER MENTAL ACTION OR QUALITY GIVES TO A\r\nSPECTATOR THE PLEASING SENTIMENT OF APPROBATION; and vice the contrary.\r\nWe then proceed to examine a plain matter of fact, to wit, what actions\r\nhave this influence. We consider all the circumstances in which these\r\nactions agree, and thence endeavour to extract some general observations\r\nwith regard to these sentiments. If you call this metaphysics, and find\r\nanything abstruse here, you need only conclude that your turn of mind is\r\nnot suited to the moral sciences.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nII. When a man, at any time, deliberates concerning his own conduct (as,\r\nwhether he had better, in a particular emergence, assist a brother or\r\na benefactor), he must consider these separate relations, with all the\r\ncircumstances and situations of the persons, in order to determine the\r\nsuperior duty and obligation; and in order to determine the proportion\r\nof lines in any triangle, it is necessary to examine the nature of that\r\nfigure, and the relation which its several parts bear to each other. But\r\nnotwithstanding this appearing similarity in the two cases, there is,\r\nat bottom, an extreme difference between them. A speculative reasoner\r\nconcerning triangles or circles considers the several known and given\r\nrelations of the parts of these figures; and thence infers some unknown\r\nrelation, which is dependent on the former. But in moral deliberations\r\nwe must be acquainted beforehand with all the objects, and all their\r\nrelations to each other; and from a comparison of the whole, fix our\r\nchoice or approbation. No new fact to be ascertained; no new relation to\r\nbe discovered. All the circumstances of the case are supposed to be laid\r\nbefore us, ere we can fix any sentence of blame or approbation. If any\r\nmaterial circumstance be yet unknown or doubtful, we must first employ\r\nour inquiry or intellectual faculties to assure us of it; and must\r\nsuspend for a time all moral decision or sentiment. While we are\r\nignorant whether a man were aggressor or not, how can we determine\r\nwhether the person who killed him be criminal or innocent? But after\r\nevery circumstance, every relation is known, the understanding has no\r\nfurther room to operate, nor any object on which it could employ itself.\r\nThe approbation or blame which then ensues, cannot be the work of the\r\njudgement, but of the heart; and is not a speculative proposition or\r\naffirmation, but an active feeling or sentiment. In the disquisitions of\r\nthe understanding, from known circumstances and relations, we infer some\r\nnew and unknown. In moral decisions, all the circumstances and relations\r\nmust be previously known; and the mind, from the contemplation of the\r\nwhole, feels some new impression of affection or disgust, esteem or\r\ncontempt, approbation or blame.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHence the great difference between a mistake of FACT and one of RIGHT;\r\nand hence the reason why the one is commonly criminal and not the other.\r\nWhen Oedipus killed Laius, he was ignorant of the relation, and from\r\ncircumstances, innocent and involuntary, formed erroneous opinions\r\nconcerning the action which he committed. But when Nero killed\r\nAgrippina, all the relations between himself and the person, and all the\r\ncircumstances of the fact, were previously known to him; but the motive\r\nof revenge, or fear, or interest, prevailed in his savage heart over the\r\nsentiments of duty and humanity. And when we express that detestation\r\nagainst him to which he himself, in a little time, became insensible,\r\nit is not that we see any relations, of which he was ignorant; but that,\r\nfor the rectitude of our disposition, we feel sentiments against which\r\nhe was hardened from flattery and a long perseverance in the most\r\nenormous crimes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn these sentiments then, not in a discovery of relations of any kind,\r\ndo all moral determinations consist. Before we can pretend to form any\r\ndecision of this kind, everything must be known and ascertained on the\r\nside of the object or action. Nothing remains but to feel, on our part,\r\nsome sentiment of blame or approbation; whence we pronounce the action\r\ncriminal or virtuous.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIII. This doctrine will become still more evident, if we compare moral\r\nbeauty with natural, to which in many particulars it bears so near a\r\nresemblance. It is on the proportion, relation, and position of parts,\r\nthat all natural beauty depends; but it would be absurd thence to\r\ninfer, that the perception of beauty, like that of truth in geometrical\r\nproblems, consists wholly in the perception of relations, and was\r\nperformed entirely by the understanding or intellectual faculties. In\r\nall the sciences, our mind from the known relations investigates the\r\nunknown. But in all decisions of taste or external beauty, all the\r\nrelations are beforehand obvious to the eye; and we thence proceed to\r\nfeel a sentiment of complacency or disgust, according to the nature of\r\nthe object, and disposition of our organs.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nEuclid has fully explained all the qualities of the circle; but has not\r\nin any proposition said a word of its beauty. The reason is evident. The\r\nbeauty is not a quality of the circle. It lies not in any part of the\r\nline, whose parts are equally distant from a common centre. It is only\r\nthe effect which that figure produces upon the mind, whose peculiar\r\nfabric of structure renders it susceptible of such sentiments. In vain\r\nwould you look for it in the circle, or seek it, either by your senses\r\nor by mathematical reasoning, in all the properties of that figure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAttend to Palladio and Perrault, while they explain all the parts and\r\nproportions of a pillar. They talk of the cornice, and frieze, and base,\r\nand entablature, and shaft, and architrave; and give the description and\r\nposition of each of these members. But should you ask the description\r\nand position of its beauty, they would readily reply, that the beauty\r\nis not in any of the parts or members of a pillar, but results from the\r\nwhole, when that complicated figure is presented to an intelligent mind,\r\nsusceptible to those finer sensations. Till such a spectator appear,\r\nthere is nothing but a figure of such particular dimensions and\r\nproportions: from his sentiments alone arise its elegance and beauty.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAgain; attend to Cicero, while he paints the crimes of a Verres or a\r\nCatiline. You must acknowledge that the moral turpitude results, in the\r\nsame manner, from the contemplation of the whole, when presented to a\r\nbeing whose organs have such a particular structure and formation. The\r\norator may paint rage, insolence, barbarity on the one side; meekness,\r\nsuffering, sorrow, innocence on the other. But if you feel no\r\nindignation or compassion arise in you from this complication of\r\ncircumstances, you would in vain ask him, in what consists the crime or\r\nvillainy, which he so vehemently exclaims against? At what time, or\r\non what subject it first began to exist? And what has a few months\r\nafterwards become of it, when every disposition and thought of all the\r\nactors is totally altered or annihilated? No satisfactory answer can be\r\ngiven to any of these questions, upon the abstract hypothesis of morals;\r\nand we must at last acknowledge, that the crime or immorality is\r\nno particular fact or relation, which can be the object of the\r\nunderstanding, but arises entirely from the sentiment of disapprobation,\r\nwhich, by the structure of human nature, we unavoidably feel on the\r\napprehension of barbarity or treachery.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIV. Inanimate objects may bear to each other all the same relations\r\nwhich we observe in moral agents; though the former can never be the\r\nobject of love or hatred, nor are consequently susceptible of merit or\r\niniquity. A young tree, which over-tops and destroys its parent, stands\r\nin all the same relations with Nero, when he murdered Agrippina; and\r\nif morality consisted merely in relations, would no doubt be equally\r\ncriminal.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nV. It appears evident that\u0026mdash;the ultimate ends of human actions can\r\nnever, in any case, be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves\r\nentirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind, without any\r\ndependance on the intellectual faculties. Ask a man WHY HE USES\r\nEXERCISE; he will answer, BECAUSE HE DESIRES TO KEEP HIS HEALTH. If\r\nyou then enquire, WHY HE DESIRES HEALTH, he will readily reply, BECAUSE\r\nSICKNESS IS PAINFUL. If you push your enquiries farther, and desire a\r\nreason WHY HE HATES PAIN, it is impossible he can ever give any. This is\r\nan ultimate end, and is never referred to any other object.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPerhaps to your second question, WHY HE DESIRES HEALTH, he may also\r\nreply, that IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE EXERCISE OF HIS CALLING. If you ask,\r\nWHY HE IS ANXIOUS ON THAT HEAD, he will answer, BECAUSE HE DESIRES TO\r\nGET MONEY. If you demand WHY? IT IS THE INSTRUMENT OF PLEASURE, says he.\r\nAnd beyond this it is an absurdity to ask for a reason. It is impossible\r\nthere can be a progress IN INFINITUM; and that one thing can always be a\r\nreason why another is desired. Something must be desirable on its own\r\naccount, and because of its immediate accord or agreement with human\r\nsentiment and affection.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow as virtue is an end, and is desirable on its own account, without\r\nfee and reward, merely for the immediate satisfaction which it conveys;\r\nit is requisite that there should be some sentiment which it touches,\r\nsome internal taste or feeling, or whatever you may please to call it,\r\nwhich distinguishes moral good and evil, and which embraces the one and\r\nrejects the other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus the distinct boundaries and offices of REASON and of TASTE are\r\neasily ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of truth and\r\nfalsehood: the latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice\r\nand virtue. The one discovers objects as they really stand in nature,\r\nwithout addition and diminution: the other has a productive faculty, and\r\ngilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from\r\ninternal sentiment, raises in a manner a new creation. Reason being cool\r\nand disengaged, is no motive to action, and directs only the impulse\r\nreceived from appetite or inclination, by showing us the means of\r\nattaining happiness or avoiding misery: Taste, as it gives pleasure or\r\npain, and thereby constitutes happiness or misery, becomes a motive to\r\naction, and is the first spring or impulse to desire and volition. From\r\ncircumstances and relations, known or supposed, the former leads us to\r\nthe discovery of the concealed and unknown: after all circumstances and\r\nrelations are laid before us, the latter makes us feel from the whole\r\na new sentiment of blame or approbation. The standard of the one, being\r\nfounded on the nature of things, is eternal and inflexible, even by the\r\nwill of the Supreme Being: the standard of the other arising from the\r\neternal frame and constitution of animals, is ultimately derived from\r\nthat Supreme Will, which bestowed on each being its peculiar nature, and\r\narranged the several classes and orders of existence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_APPE2\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n APPENDIX II. OF SELF-LOVE.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTHERE is a principle, supposed to prevail among many, which is utterly\r\nincompatible with all virtue or moral sentiment; and as it can proceed\r\nfrom nothing but the most depraved disposition, so in its turn it tends\r\nstill further to encourage that depravity. This principle is, that\r\nall BENEVOLENCE is mere hypocrisy, friendship a cheat, public spirit a\r\nfarce, fidelity a snare to procure trust and confidence; and that while\r\nall of us, at bottom, pursue only our private interest, we wear these\r\nfair disguises, in order to put others off their guard, and expose them\r\nthe more to our wiles and machinations. What heart one must be possessed\r\nof who possesses such principles, and who feels no internal sentiment\r\nthat belies so pernicious a theory, it is easy to imagine: and also what\r\ndegree of affection and benevolence he can bear to a species whom he\r\nrepresents under such odious colours, and supposes so little susceptible\r\nof gratitude or any return of affection. Or if we should not ascribe\r\nthese principles wholly to a corrupted heart, we must at least account\r\nfor them from the most careless and precipitate examination. Superficial\r\nreasoners, indeed, observing many false pretences among mankind, and\r\nfeeling, perhaps, no very strong restraint in their own disposition,\r\nmight draw a general and a hasty conclusion that all is equally\r\ncorrupted, and that men, different from all other animals, and indeed\r\nfrom all other species of existence, admit of no degrees of good or bad,\r\nbut are, in every instance, the same creatures under different disguises\r\nand appearances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere is another principle, somewhat resembling the former; which has\r\nbeen much insisted on by philosophers, and has been the foundation of\r\nmany a system; that, whatever affection one may feel, or imagine he\r\nfeels for others, no passion is, or can be disinterested; that the most\r\ngenerous friendship, however sincere, is a modification of self-love;\r\nand that, even unknown to ourselves, we seek only our own gratification,\r\nwhile we appear the most deeply engaged in schemes for the liberty\r\nand happiness of mankind. By a turn of imagination, by a refinement of\r\nreflection, by an enthusiasm of passion, we seem to take part in the\r\ninterests of others, and imagine ourselves divested of all selfish\r\nconsiderations: but, at bottom, the most generous patriot and most\r\nniggardly miser, the bravest hero and most abject coward, have, in every\r\naction, an equal regard to their own happiness and welfare.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhoever concludes from the seeming tendency of this opinion, that those,\r\nwho make profession of it, cannot possibly feel the true sentiments\r\nof benevolence, or have any regard for genuine virtue, will often find\r\nhimself, in practice, very much mistaken. Probity and honour were no\r\nstrangers to Epicurus and his sect. Atticus and Horace seem to have\r\nenjoyed from nature, and cultivated by reflection, as generous and\r\nfriendly dispositions as any disciple of the austerer schools. And\r\namong the modern, Hobbes and Locke, who maintained the selfish system of\r\nmorals, lived irreproachable lives; though the former lay not under any\r\nrestraint of religion which might supply the defects of his philosophy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAn epicurean or a Hobbist readily allows, that there is such a thing as\r\na friendship in the world, without hypocrisy or disguise; though he may\r\nattempt, by a philosophical chymistry, to resolve the elements of this\r\npassion, if I may so speak, into those of another, and explain every\r\naffection to be self-love, twisted and moulded, by a particular turn\r\nof imagination, into a variety of appearances. But as the same turn of\r\nimagination prevails not in every man, nor gives the same direction to\r\nthe original passion; this is sufficient even according to the selfish\r\nsystem to make the widest difference in human characters, and denominate\r\none man virtuous and humane, another vicious and meanly interested. I\r\nesteem the man whose self-love, by whatever means, is so directed as to\r\ngive him a concern for others, and render him serviceable to society:\r\nas I hate or despise him, who has no regard to any thing beyond his\r\nown gratifications and enjoyments. In vain would you suggest that these\r\ncharacters, though seemingly opposite, are at bottom the same, and that\r\na very inconsiderable turn of thought forms the whole difference between\r\nthem. Each character, notwithstanding these inconsiderable differences,\r\nappears to me, in practice, pretty durable and untransmutable. And\r\nI find not in this more than in other subjects, that the natural\r\nsentiments arising from the general appearances of things are easily\r\ndestroyed by subtile reflections concerning the minute origin of these\r\nappearances. Does not the lively, cheerful colour of a countenance\r\ninspire me with complacency and pleasure; even though I learn from\r\nphilosophy that all difference of complexion arises from the most minute\r\ndifferences of thickness, in the most minute parts of the skin; by\r\nmeans of which a superficies is qualified to reflect one of the original\r\ncolours of light, and absorb the others?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut though the question concerning the universal or partial selfishness\r\nof man be not so material as is usually imagined to morality and\r\npractice, it is certainly of consequence in the speculative science of\r\nhuman nature, and is a proper object of curiosity and enquiry. It\r\nmay not, therefore, be unsuitable, in this place, to bestow a few\r\nreflections upon it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: Benevolence naturally divides into two kinds, the\r\nGENERAL and the PARTICULAR. The first is, where we have no friendship\r\nor connexion or esteem for the person, but feel only a general sympathy\r\nwith him or a compassion for his pains, and a congratulation with his\r\npleasures. The other species of benevolence is founded on an opinion\r\nof virtue, on services done us, or on some particular connexions. Both\r\nthese sentiments must be allowed real in human nature: but whether they\r\nwill resolve into some nice considerations of self-love, is a question\r\nmore curious than important. The former sentiment, to wit, that of\r\ngeneral benevolence, or humanity, or sympathy, we shall have occasion\r\nfrequently to treat of in the course of this inquiry; and I assume it as\r\nreal, from general experience, without any other proof.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe most obvious objection to the selfish hypothesis is, that, as it is\r\ncontrary to common feeling and our most unprejudiced notions, there is\r\nrequired the highest stretch of philosophy to establish so extraordinary\r\na paradox. To the most careless observer there appear to be such\r\ndispositions as benevolence and generosity; such affections as love,\r\nfriendship, compassion, gratitude. These sentiments have their causes,\r\neffects, objects, and operations, marked by common language and\r\nobservation, and plainly distinguished from those of the selfish\r\npassions. And as this is the obvious appearance of things, it must\r\nbe admitted, till some hypothesis be discovered, which by penetrating\r\ndeeper into human nature, may prove the former affections to be nothing\r\nbut modifications of the latter. All attempts of this kind have hitherto\r\nproved fruitless, and seem to have proceeded entirely from that love\r\nof SIMPLICITY which has been the source of much false reasoning in\r\nphilosophy. I shall not here enter into any detail on the present\r\nsubject. Many able philosophers have shown the insufficiency of these\r\nsystems. And I shall take for granted what, I believe, the smallest\r\nreflection will make evident to every impartial enquirer.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut the nature of the subject furnishes the strongest presumption, that\r\nno better system will ever, for the future, be invented, in order to\r\naccount for the origin of the benevolent from the selfish affections,\r\nand reduce all the various emotions of the human mind to a perfect\r\nsimplicity. The case is not the same in this species of philosophy as\r\nin physics. Many an hypothesis in nature, contrary to first appearances,\r\nhas been found, on more accurate scrutiny, solid and satisfactory.\r\nInstances of this kind are so frequent that a judicious, as well as\r\nwitty philosopher, [Footnote: Mons. Fontenelle.] has ventured to affirm,\r\nif there be more than one way in which any phenomenon may be produced,\r\nthat there is general presumption for its arising from the causes which\r\nare the least obvious and familiar. But the presumption always lies on\r\nthe other side, in all enquiries concerning the origin of our passions,\r\nand of the internal operations of the human mind. The simplest and\r\nmost obvious cause which can there be assigned for any phenomenon, is\r\nprobably the true one. When a philosopher, in the explication of his\r\nsystem, is obliged to have recourse to some very intricate and refined\r\nreflections, and to suppose them essential to the production of any\r\npassion or emotion, we have reason to be extremely on our guard against\r\nso fallacious an hypothesis. The affections are not susceptible of any\r\nimpression from the refinements of reason or imagination; and it\r\nis always found that a vigorous exertion of the latter faculties,\r\nnecessarily, from the narrow capacity of the human mind, destroys all\r\nactivity in the former. Our predominant motive or intention is, indeed,\r\nfrequently concealed from ourselves when it is mingled and confounded\r\nwith other motives which the mind, from vanity or self-conceit, is\r\ndesirous of supposing more prevalent: but there is no instance that a\r\nconcealment of this nature has ever arisen from the abstruseness and\r\nintricacy of the motive. A man that has lost a friend and patron may\r\nflatter himself that all his grief arises from generous sentiments,\r\nwithout any mixture of narrow or interested considerations: but a\r\nman that grieves for a valuable friend, who needed his patronage and\r\nprotection; how can we suppose, that his passionate tenderness arises\r\nfrom some metaphysical regards to a self-interest, which has no\r\nfoundation or reality? We may as well imagine that minute wheels and\r\nsprings, like those of a watch, give motion to a loaded waggon, as\r\naccount for the origin of passion from such abstruse reflections.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnimals are found susceptible of kindness, both to their own species and\r\nto ours; nor is there, in this case, the least suspicion of disguise or\r\nartifice. Shall we account for all THEIR sentiments, too, from refined\r\ndeductions of self-interest? Or if we admit a disinterested benevolence\r\nin the inferior species, by what rule of analogy can we refuse it in the\r\nsuperior?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLove between the sexes begets a complacency and good-will, very distinct\r\nfrom the gratification of an appetite. Tenderness to their offspring,\r\nin all sensible beings, is commonly able alone to counter-balance the\r\nstrongest motives of self-love, and has no manner of dependance on that\r\naffection. What interest can a fond mother have in view, who loses\r\nher health by assiduous attendance on her sick child, and afterwards\r\nlanguishes and dies of grief, when freed, by its death, from the slavery\r\nof that attendance?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIs gratitude no affection of the human breast, or is that a word merely,\r\nwithout any meaning or reality? Have we no satisfaction in one man\u0027s\r\ncompany above another\u0027s, and no desire of the welfare of our friend,\r\neven though absence or death should prevent us from all participation in\r\nit? Or what is it commonly, that gives us any participation in it, even\r\nwhile alive and present, but our affection and regard to him?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThese and a thousand other instances are marks of a general benevolence\r\nin human nature, where no REAL interest binds us to the object. And how\r\nan IMAGINARY interest known and avowed for such, can be the origin of\r\nany passion or emotion, seems difficult to explain. No satisfactory\r\nhypothesis of this kind has yet been discovered; nor is there the\r\nsmallest probability that the future industry of men will ever be\r\nattended with more favourable success.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut farther, if we consider rightly of the matter, we shall find that\r\nthe hypothesis which allows of a disinterested benevolence, distinct\r\nfrom self-love, has really more SIMPLICITY in it, and is more\r\nconformable to the analogy of nature than that which pretends to resolve\r\nall friendship and humanity into this latter principle. There are bodily\r\nwants or appetites acknowledged by every one, which necessarily precede\r\nall sensual enjoyment, and carry us directly to seek possession of the\r\nobject. Thus, hunger and thirst have eating and drinking for their end;\r\nand from the gratification of these primary appetites arises a pleasure,\r\nwhich may become the object of another species of desire or inclination\r\nthat is secondary and interested. In the same manner there are mental\r\npassions by which we are impelled immediately to seek particular\r\nobjects, such as fame or power, or vengeance without any regard to\r\ninterest; and when these objects are attained a pleasing enjoyment\r\nensues, as the consequence of our indulged affections. Nature must,\r\nby the internal frame and constitution of the mind, give an original\r\npropensity to fame, ere we can reap any pleasure from that acquisition,\r\nor pursue it from motives of self-love, and desire of happiness. If I\r\nhave no vanity, I take no delight in praise: if I be void of ambition,\r\npower gives me no enjoyment: if I be not angry, the punishment of an\r\nadversary is totally indifferent to me. In all these cases there is a\r\npassion which points immediately to the object, and constitutes it\r\nour good or happiness; as there are other secondary passions which\r\nafterwards arise, and pursue it as a part of our happiness, when once it\r\nis constituted such by our original affections. Were there no appetite\r\nof any kind antecedent to self-love, that propensity could scarcely ever\r\nexert itself; because we should, in that case, have felt few and slender\r\npains or pleasures, and have little misery or happiness to avoid or to\r\npursue.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow where is the difficulty in conceiving, that this may likewise be the\r\ncase with benevolence and friendship, and that, from the original frame\r\nof our temper, we may feel a desire of another\u0027s happiness or good,\r\nwhich, by means of that affection, becomes our own good, and is\r\nafterwards pursued, from the combined motives of benevolence and\r\nself-enjoyments? Who sees not that vengeance, from the force alone of\r\npassion, may be so eagerly pursued, as to make us knowingly neglect\r\nevery consideration of ease, interest, or safety; and, like some\r\nvindictive animals, infuse our very souls into the wounds we give an\r\nenemy; [Footnote: Animasque in vulnere ponunt. VIRG, Dum alteri noceat,\r\nsui negligens says Seneca of Anger. De Ira, I. i.] and what a malignant\r\nphilosophy must it be, that will not allow to humanity and friendship\r\nthe same privileges which are undisputably granted to the darker\r\npassions of enmity and resentment; such a philosophy is more like a\r\nsatyr than a true delineation or description of human nature; and may\r\nbe a good foundation for paradoxical wit and raillery, but is a very bad\r\none for any serious argument or reasoning.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_APPE3\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n APPENDIX III. SOME FARTHER CONSIDERATIONS WITH REGARD TO JUSTICE.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe intention of this Appendix is to give some more particular\r\nexplication of the origin and nature of Justice, and to mark some\r\ndifferences between it and the other virtues.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe social virtues of humanity and benevolence exert their influence\r\nimmediately by a direct tendency or instinct, which chiefly keeps in\r\nview the simple object, moving the affections, and comprehends not any\r\nscheme or system, nor the consequences resulting from the concurrence,\r\nimitation, or example of others. A parent flies to the relief of his\r\nchild; transported by that natural sympathy which actuates him, and\r\nwhich affords no leisure to reflect on the sentiments or conduct of\r\nthe rest of mankind in like circumstances. A generous man cheerfully\r\nembraces an opportunity of serving his friend; because he then feels\r\nhimself under the dominion of the beneficent affections, nor is he\r\nconcerned whether any other person in the universe were ever before\r\nactuated by such noble motives, or will ever afterwards prove their\r\ninfluence. In all these cases the social passions have in view a single\r\nindividual object, and pursue the safety or happiness alone of the\r\nperson loved and esteemed. With this they are satisfied: in this they\r\nacquiesce. And as the good, resulting from their benign influence, is\r\nin itself complete and entire, it also excites the moral sentiment of\r\napprobation, without any reflection on farther consequences, and without\r\nany more enlarged views of the concurrence or imitation of the other\r\nmembers of society. On the contrary, were the generous friend or\r\ndisinterested patriot to stand alone in the practice of beneficence,\r\nthis would rather enhance his value in our eyes, and join the praise of\r\nrarity and novelty to his other more exalted merits.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe case is not the same with the social virtues of justice and\r\nfidelity. They are highly useful, or indeed absolutely necessary to the\r\nwell-being of mankind: but the benefit resulting from them is not the\r\nconsequence of every individual single act; but arises from the whole\r\nscheme or system concurred in by the whole, or the greater part of the\r\nsociety. General peace and order are the attendants of justice or a\r\ngeneral abstinence from the possessions of others; but a particular\r\nregard to the particular right of one individual citizen may frequently,\r\nconsidered in itself, be productive of pernicious consequences. The\r\nresult of the individual acts is here, in many instances, directly\r\nopposite to that of the whole system of actions; and the former may\r\nbe extremely hurtful, while the latter is, to the highest degree,\r\nadvantageous. Riches, inherited from a parent, are, in a bad man\u0027s\r\nhand, the instrument of mischief. The right of succession may, in one\r\ninstance, be hurtful. Its benefit arises only from the observance of the\r\ngeneral rule; and it is sufficient, if compensation be thereby made for\r\nall the ills and inconveniences which flow from particular characters\r\nand situations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCyrus, young and unexperienced, considered only the individual case\r\nbefore him, and reflected on a limited fitness and convenience, when he\r\nassigned the long coat to the tall boy, and the short coat to the other\r\nof smaller size. His governor instructed him better, while he pointed\r\nout more enlarged views and consequences, and informed his pupil of the\r\ngeneral, inflexible rules, necessary to support general peace and order\r\nin society.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe happiness and prosperity of mankind, arising from the social virtue\r\nof benevolence and its subdivisions, may be compared to a wall, built by\r\nmany hands, which still rises by each stone that is heaped upon it,\r\nand receives increase proportional to the diligence and care of each\r\nworkman. The same happiness, raised by the social virtue of justice and\r\nits subdivisions, may be compared to the building of a vault, where each\r\nindividual stone would, of itself, fall to the ground; nor is the whole\r\nfabric supported but by the mutual assistance and combination of its\r\ncorresponding parts.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll the laws of nature, which regulate property, as well as all civil\r\nlaws, are general, and regard alone some essential circumstances of the\r\ncase, without taking into consideration the characters, situations, and\r\nconnexions of the person concerned, or any particular consequences which\r\nmay result from the determination of these laws in any particular case\r\nwhich offers. They deprive, without scruple, a beneficent man of all his\r\npossessions, if acquired by mistake, without a good title; in order to\r\nbestow them on a selfish miser, who has already heaped up immense stores\r\nof superfluous riches. Public utility requires that property should be\r\nregulated by general inflexible rules; and though such rules are adopted\r\nas best serve the same end of public utility, it is impossible for them\r\nto prevent all particular hardships, or make beneficial consequences\r\nresult from every individual case. It is sufficient, if the whole plan\r\nor scheme be necessary to the support of civil society, and if the\r\nbalance of good, in the main, do thereby preponderate much above that of\r\nevil. Even the general laws of the universe, though planned by infinite\r\nwisdom, cannot exclude all evil or inconvenience in every particular\r\noperation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt has been asserted by some, that justice arises from Human\r\nConventions, and proceeds from the voluntary choice, consent, or\r\ncombination of mankind. If by CONVENTION be here meant a PROMISE (which\r\nis the most usual sense of the word) nothing can be more absurd than\r\nthis position. The observance of promises is itself one of the most\r\nconsiderable parts of justice, and we are not surely bound to keep our\r\nword because we have given our word to keep it. But if by convention be\r\nmeant a sense of common interest, which sense each man feels in his\r\nown breast, which he remarks in his fellows, and which carries him, in\r\nconcurrence with others, into a general plan or system of actions, which\r\ntends to public utility; it must be owned, that, in this sense, justice\r\narises from human conventions. For if it be allowed (what is, indeed,\r\nevident) that the particular consequences of a particular act of justice\r\nmay be hurtful to the public as well as to individuals; it follows that\r\nevery man, in embracing that virtue, must have an eye to the whole plan\r\nor system, and must expect the concurrence of his fellows in the same\r\nconduct and behaviour. Did all his views terminate in the consequences\r\nof each act of his own, his benevolence and humanity, as well as\r\nhis self-love, might often prescribe to him measures of conduct very\r\ndifferent from those which are agreeable to the strict rules of right\r\nand justice.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus, two men pull the oars of a boat by common convention for common\r\ninterest, without any promise or contract; thus gold and silver are made\r\nthe measures of exchange; thus speech and words and language are fixed\r\nby human convention and agreement. Whatever is advantageous to two or\r\nmore persons, if all perform their part; but what loses all advantage\r\nif only one perform, can arise from no other principle There would\r\notherwise be no motive for any one of them to enter into that scheme of\r\nconduct.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: This theory concerning the origin of property, and\r\nconsequently of justice, is, in the main, the same with that hinted at\r\nand adopted by Grotius, \u0027Hinc discimus, quae fuerit causa, ob quam a\r\nprimaeva communione rerum primo mobilium, deinde et immobilinm discessum\r\nest: nimirum quod cum non contenti homines vesci sponte natis, antra\r\nhabitare, corpore aut nudo agere, aut corticibus arborum ferarumve\r\npellibus vestito, vitae genus exquisitius delegissent, industria opus\r\nfuit, quam singuli rebus singulls adhiberent. Quo minus autem fructus\r\nin commune conferrentur, primum obstitit locorum, in quae homines\r\ndiscesserunt, distantia, deinde justitiae et amoris defectus, per quem\r\nfiebat, ut nee in labore, nee in consumtione fructuum, quae debebat,\r\naequalitas servaretur. Simul discimus, quomodo res in proprietatem\r\niverint; non animi actu solo, neque enim scire alii poterant, quid alil\r\nsuum esse vellent, ut eo abstinerent, et idem velle plures poterant;\r\nsed pacto quodam aut expresso, ut per divisionem, aut tacito, ut per\r\noccupationem.\u0027 De jure belli et pacis. Lib. ii. cap. 2. sec. 2. art. 4\r\nand 5.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe word NATURAL is commonly taken in so many senses and is of so\r\nloose a signification, that it seems vain to dispute whether justice\r\nbe natural or not. If self-love, if benevolence be natural to man; if\r\nreason and forethought be also natural; then may the same epithet\r\nbe applied to justice, order, fidelity, property, society. Men\u0027s\r\ninclination, their necessities, lead them to combine; their\r\nunderstanding and experience tell them that this combination is\r\nimpossible where each governs himself by no rule, and pays no regard\r\nto the possessions of others: and from these passions and reflections\r\nconjoined, as soon as we observe like passions and reflections in\r\nothers, the sentiment of justice, throughout all ages, has infallibly\r\nand certainly had place to some degree or other in every individual of\r\nthe human species. In so sagacious an animal, what necessarily arises\r\nfrom the exertion of his intellectual faculties may justly be esteemed\r\nnatural.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: Natural may be opposed, either to what is UNUSUAL,\r\nMIRACULOUS or ARTIFICIAL. In the two former senses, justice and property\r\nare undoubtedly natural. But as they suppose reason, forethought,\r\ndesign, and a social union and confederacy among men, perhaps that\r\nepithet cannot strictly, in the last sense, be applied to them. Had\r\nmen lived without society, property had never been known, and neither\r\njustice nor injustice had ever existed. But society among human\r\ncreatures had been impossible without reason and forethought. Inferior\r\nanimals, that unite, are guided by instinct, which supplies the place\r\nfor reason. But all these disputes are merely verbal.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAmong all civilized nations it has been the constant endeavour to remove\r\neverything arbitrary and partial from the decision of property, and to\r\nfix the sentence of judges by such general views and considerations as\r\nmay be equal to every member of society. For besides, that nothing\r\ncould be more dangerous than to accustom the bench, even in the smallest\r\ninstance, to regard private friendship or enmity; it is certain,\r\nthat men, where they imagine that there was no other reason for the\r\npreference of their adversary but personal favour, are apt to entertain\r\nthe strongest ill-will against the magistrates and judges. When natural\r\nreason, therefore, points out no fixed view of public utility by which\r\na controversy of property can be decided, positive laws are often\r\nframed to supply its place, and direct the procedure of all courts\r\nof judicature. Where these too fail, as often happens, precedents are\r\ncalled for; and a former decision, though given itself without any\r\nsufficient reason, justly becomes a sufficient reason for a new\r\ndecision. If direct laws and precedents be wanting, imperfect and\r\nindirect ones are brought in aid; and the controverted case is ranged\r\nunder them by analogical reasonings and comparisons, and similitudes,\r\nand correspondencies, which are often more fanciful than real. In\r\ngeneral, it may safely be affirmed that jurisprudence is, in this\r\nrespect, different from all the sciences; and that in many of its nicer\r\nquestions, there cannot properly be said to be truth or falsehood on\r\neither side. If one pleader bring the case under any former law or\r\nprecedent, by a refined analogy or comparison; the opposite pleader\r\nis not at a loss to find an opposite analogy or comparison: and the\r\npreference given by the judge is often founded more on taste and\r\nimagination than on any solid argument. Public utility is the general\r\nobject of all courts of judicature; and this utility too requires a\r\nstable rule in all controversies: but where several rules, nearly equal\r\nand indifferent, present themselves, it is a very slight turn of thought\r\nwhich fixes the decision in favour of either party.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: That there be a separation or distinction of\r\n possessions, and that this separation be steady and\r\n constant; this is absolutely required by the interests of\r\n society, and hence the origin of justice and property. What\r\n possessions are assigned to particular persons; this is,\r\n generally speaking, pretty indifferent; and is often\r\n determined by very frivolous views and considerations. We\r\n shall mention a few particulars.\r\n\r\n Were a society formed among several independent members, the\r\n most obvious rule, which could be agreed on, would be to\r\n annex property to PRESENT possession, and leave every one a\r\n right to what he at present enjoys. The relation of\r\n possession, which takes place between the person and the\r\n object, naturally draws on the relation of property.\r\n\r\n For a like reason, occupation or first possession becomes\r\n the foundation of property.\r\n\r\n Where a man bestows labour and industry upon any object,\r\n which before belonged to no body; as in cutting down and\r\n shaping a tree, in cultivating a field, \u0026amp;c., the\r\n alterations, which he produces, causes a relation between\r\n him and the object, and naturally engages us to annex it to\r\n him by the new relation of property. This cause here concurs\r\n with the public utility, which consists in the encouragement\r\n given to industry and labour.\r\n\r\n Perhaps too, private humanity towards the possessor concurs,\r\n in this instance, with the other motives, and engages us to\r\n leave with him what he has acquired by his sweat and labour;\r\n and what he has flattered himself in the constant enjoyment\r\n of. For though private humanity can, by no means, be the\r\n origin of justice; since the latter virtue so often\r\n contradicts the former; yet when the rule of separate and\r\n constant possession is once formed by the indispensable\r\n necessities of society, private humanity, and an aversion to\r\n the doing a hardship to another, may, in a particular\r\n instance, give rise to a particular rule of property.\r\n\r\n I am much inclined to think, that the right succession or\r\n inheritance much depends on those connexions of the\r\n imagination, and that the relation to a former proprietor\r\n begetting a relation to the object, is the cause why the\r\n property is transferred to a man after the death of his\r\n kinsman. It is true; industry is more encouraged by the\r\n transference of possession to children or near relations:\r\n but this consideration will only have place in a cultivated\r\n society; whereas the right of succession is regarded even\r\n among the greatest Barbarians.\r\n\r\n Acquisition of property by accession can be explained no way\r\n but by having recourse to the relations and connexions of\r\n the imaginations.\r\n\r\n The property of rivers, by the laws of most nations, and by\r\n the natural turn of our thoughts, is attributed to the\r\n proprietors of their banks, excepting such vast rivers as\r\n the Rhine or the Danube, which seem too large to follow as\r\n an accession to the property of the neighbouring fields. Yet\r\n even these rivers are considered as the property of that\r\n nation, through whose dominions they run; the idea of a\r\n nation being of a suitable bulk to correspond with them, and\r\n bear them such a relation in the fancy.\r\n\r\n The accessions, which are made to land, bordering upon\r\n rivers, follow the land, say the civilians, provided it be\r\n made by what they call alluvion, that is, insensibly and\r\n imperceptibly; which are circumstances, that assist the\r\n imagination in the conjunction.\r\n\r\n Where there is any considerable portion torn at once from\r\n one bank and added to another, it becomes not his property,\r\n whose land it falls on, till it unite with the land, and\r\n till the trees and plants have spread their roots into both.\r\n Before that, the thought does not sufficiently join them.\r\n\r\n In short, we must ever distinguish between the necessity of\r\n a separation and constancy in men\u0027s possession, and the\r\n rules, which assign particular objects to particular\r\n persons. The first necessity is obvious, strong, and\r\n invincible: the latter may depend on a public utility more\r\n light and frivolous, on the sentiment of private humanity\r\n and aversion to private hardship, on positive laws, on\r\n precedents, analogies, and very fine connexions and turns of\r\n the imagination.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe may just observe, before we conclude this subject, that after the\r\nlaws of justice are fixed by views of general utility, the injury, the\r\nhardship, the harm, which result to any individual from a violation of\r\nthem, enter very much into consideration, and are a great source of that\r\nuniversal blame which attends every wrong or iniquity. By the laws of\r\nsociety, this coat, this horse is mine, and OUGHT to remain perpetually\r\nin my possession: I reckon on the secure enjoyment of it: by depriving\r\nme of it, you disappoint my expectations, and doubly displease me, and\r\noffend every bystander. It is a public wrong, so far as the rules of\r\nequity are violated: it is a private harm, so far as an individual is\r\ninjured. And though the second consideration could have no place, were\r\nnot the former previously established: for otherwise the distinction of\r\nMINE and THINE would be unknown in society: yet there is no question\r\nbut the regard to general good is much enforced by the respect to\r\nparticular. What injures the community, without hurting any individual,\r\nis often more lightly thought of. But where the greatest public wrong\r\nis also conjoined with a considerable private one, no wonder the highest\r\ndisapprobation attends so iniquitous a behaviour.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"2H_APPE4\"\u003e\u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\n APPENDIX IV. OF SOME VERBAL DISPUTES.\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNothing is more usual than for philosophers to encroach upon the\r\nprovince of grammarians; and to engage in disputes of words, while they\r\nimagine that they are handling controversies of the deepest importance\r\nand concern. It was in order to avoid altercations, so frivolous and\r\nendless, that I endeavoured to state with the utmost caution the object\r\nof our present enquiry; and proposed simply to collect, on the one hand,\r\na list of those mental qualities which are the object of love or esteem,\r\nand form a part of personal merit; and on the other hand, a catalogue of\r\nthose qualities which are the object of censure or reproach, and which\r\ndetract from the character of the person possessed of them; subjoining\r\nsome reflections concerning the origin of these sentiments of praise or\r\nblame. On all occasions, where there might arise the least hesitation,\r\nI avoided the terms VIRTUE and VICE; because some of those qualities,\r\nwhich I classed among the objects of praise, receive, in the English\r\nlanguage, the appellation of TALENTS, rather than of virtues; as some of\r\nthe blameable or censurable qualities are often called defects, rather\r\nthan vices. It may now, perhaps, be expected that before we conclude\r\nthis moral enquiry, we should exactly separate the one from the other;\r\nshould mark the precise boundaries of virtues and talents, vices and\r\ndefects; and should explain the reason and origin of that distinction.\r\nBut in order to excuse myself from this undertaking, which would,\r\nat last, prove only a grammatical enquiry, I shall subjoin the four\r\nfollowing reflections, which shall contain all that I intend to say on\r\nthe present subject.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFirst, I do not find that in the English, or any other modern tongue,\r\nthe boundaries are exactly fixed between virtues and talents, vices\r\nand defects, or that a precise definition can be given of the one as\r\ncontradistinguished from the other. Were we to say, for instance, that\r\nthe esteemable qualities alone, which are voluntary, are entitled to\r\nthe appellations of virtues; we should soon recollect the qualities of\r\ncourage, equanimity, patience, self-command; with many others, which\r\nalmost every language classes under this appellation, though they depend\r\nlittle or not at all on our choice. Should we affirm that the qualities\r\nalone, which prompt us to act our part in society, are entitled to that\r\nhonourable distinction; it must immediately occur that these are indeed\r\nthe most valuable qualities, and are commonly denominated the SOCIAL\r\nvirtues; but that this very epithet supposes that there are also virtues\r\nof another species. Should we lay hold of the distinction between\r\nINTELLECTUAL and MORAL endowments, and affirm the last alone to be the\r\nreal and genuine virtues, because they alone lead to action; we should\r\nfind that many of those qualities, usually called intellectual virtues,\r\nsuch as prudence, penetration, discernment, discretion, had also a\r\nconsiderable influence on conduct. The distinction between the heart and\r\nthe head may also be adopted: the qualities of the first may be defined\r\nsuch as in their immediate exertion are accompanied with a feeling\r\nof sentiment; and these alone may be called the genuine virtues: but\r\nindustry, frugality, temperance, secrecy, perseverance, and many other\r\nlaudable powers or habits, generally stilled virtues are exerted without\r\nany immediate sentiment in the person possessed of them, and are only\r\nknown to him by their effects. It is fortunate, amidst all this seeming\r\nperplexity, that the question, being merely verbal, cannot possibly be\r\nof any importance. A moral, philosophical discourse needs not enter\r\ninto all these caprices of language, which are so variable in different\r\ndialects, and in different ages of the same dialect. But on the whole,\r\nit seems to me, that though it is always allowed, that there are virtues\r\nof many different kinds, yet, when a man is called virtuous, or is\r\ndenominated a man of virtue, we chiefly regard his social qualities,\r\nwhich are, indeed, the most valuable. It is, at the same time, certain,\r\nthat any remarkable defect in courage, temperance, economy, industry,\r\nunderstanding, dignity of mind, would bereave even a very good-natured,\r\nhonest man of this honourable appellation. Who did ever say, except\r\nby way of irony, that such a one was a man of great virtue, but an\r\negregious blockhead?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut, Secondly, it is no wonder that languages should not be very\r\nprecise in marking the boundaries between virtues and talents, vices\r\nand defects; since there is so little distinction made in our internal\r\nestimation of them. It seems indeed certain, that the SENTIMENT of\r\nconscious worth, the self-satisfaction proceeding from a review of a\r\nman\u0027s own conduct and character; it seems certain, I say, that this\r\nsentiment, which, though the most common of all others, has no proper\r\nname in our language,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: The term, pride, is commonly taken in a bad sense; but\r\nthis sentiment seems indifferent, and may be either good or bad,\r\naccording as it is well or ill founded, and according to the other\r\ncircumstances which accompany it. The French express this sentiment by\r\nthe term, AMOUR PROPRE, but as they also express self-love as well\r\nas vanity by the same term, there arises thence a great confusion in\r\nRochefoucault, and many of their moral writers.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\narises from the endowments of courage and capacity, industry and\r\ningenuity, as well as from any other mental excellencies. Who, on the\r\nother hand, is not deeply mortified with reflecting on his own folly and\r\ndissoluteness, and feels not a secret sting or compunction whenever his\r\nmemory presents any past occurrence, where he behaved with stupidity of\r\nill-manners? No time can efface the cruel ideas of a man\u0027s own foolish\r\nconduct, or of affronts, which cowardice or impudence has brought\r\nupon him. They still haunt his solitary hours, damp his most aspiring\r\nthoughts, and show him, even to himself, in the most contemptible and\r\nmost odious colours imaginable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhat is there too we are more anxious to conceal from others than such\r\nblunders, infirmities, and meannesses, or more dread to have exposed by\r\nraillery and satire? And is not the chief object of vanity, our bravery\r\nor learning, our wit or breeding, our eloquence or address, our taste or\r\nabilities? These we display with care, if not with ostentation; and\r\nwe commonly show more ambition of excelling in them, than even in the\r\nsocial virtues themselves, which are, in reality, of such superior\r\nexcellence. Good-nature and honesty, especially the latter, are so\r\nindispensably required, that, though the greatest censure attends\r\nany violation of these duties, no eminent praise follows such common\r\ninstances of them, as seem essential to the support of human society.\r\nAnd hence the reason, in my opinion, why, though men often extol so\r\nliberally the qualities of their heart, they are shy in commending the\r\nendowments of their head: because the latter virtues, being supposed\r\nmore rare and extraordinary, are observed to be the more usual objects\r\nof pride and self-conceit; and when boasted of, beget a strong suspicion\r\nof these sentiments.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is hard to tell, whether you hurt a man\u0027s character most by calling\r\nhim a knave or a coward, and whether a beastly glutton or drunkard be\r\nnot as odious and contemptible, as a selfish, ungenerous miser. Give me\r\nmy choice, and I would rather, for my own happiness and self-enjoyment,\r\nhave a friendly, humane heart, than possess all the other virtues of\r\nDemosthenes and Philip united: but I would rather pass with the world\r\nfor one endowed with extensive genius and intrepid courage, and should\r\nthence expect stronger instances of general applause and admiration. The\r\nfigure which a man makes in life, the reception which he meets with in\r\ncompany, the esteem paid him by his acquaintance; all these advantages\r\ndepend as much upon his good sense and judgement, as upon any other part\r\nof his character. Had a man the best intentions in the world, and were\r\nthe farthest removed from all injustice and violence, he would never\r\nbe able to make himself be much regarded, without a moderate share, at\r\nleast, of parts and understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhat is it then we can here dispute about? If sense and courage,\r\ntemperance and industry, wisdom and knowledge confessedly form a\r\nconsiderable part of PERSONAL MERIT: if a man, possessed of these\r\nqualities, is both better satisfied with himself, and better entitled\r\nto the good-will, esteem, and services of others, than one entirely\r\ndestitute of them; if, in short, the SENTIMENTS are similar which arise\r\nfrom these endowments and from the social virtues; is there any reason\r\nfor being so extremely scrupulous about a WORD, or disputing whether\r\nthey be entitled to the denomination of virtues? It may, indeed,\r\nbe pretended, that the sentiment of approbation, which those\r\naccomplishments produce, besides its being INFERIOR, is also somewhat\r\nDIFFERENT from that which attends the virtues of justice and humanity.\r\nBut this seems not a sufficient reason for ranking them entirely under\r\ndifferent classes and appellations. The character of Caesar and that of\r\nCato, as drawn by Sallust, are both of them virtuous, in the strictest\r\nand most limited sense of the word; but in a different way: nor are the\r\nsentiments entirely the same which arise from them. The one produces\r\nlove, the other esteem: the one is amiable, the other awful: we should\r\nwish to meet the one character in a friend; the other we should be\r\nambitious of in ourselves. In like manner the approbation, which attends\r\ntemperance or industry or frugality, may be somewhat different from that\r\nwhich is paid to the social virtues, without making them entirely of a\r\ndifferent species. And, indeed, we may observe, that these endowments,\r\nmore than the other virtues, produce not, all of them, the same kind\r\nof approbation. Good sense and genius beget esteem and regard: wit and\r\nhumour excite love and affection.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: Love and esteem are nearly the same passion, and arise\r\nfrom similar causes. The qualities, which produce both, are such as\r\ncommunicate pleasures. But where this pleasure is severe and serious;\r\nor where its object is great, and makes a strong impression, or where\r\nit produces any degree of humility and awe; in all these cases, the\r\npassion, which arises from the pleasure, is more properly denominated\r\nesteem than love. Benevolence attends both; but is connected with love\r\nin a more eminent degree. There seems to be still a stronger mixture of\r\npride in contempt than of humility in esteem; and the reason would not\r\nbe difficulty to one, who studied accurately the passions. All these\r\nvarious mixtures and compositions and appearances of sentiment from\r\na very curious subject of speculation, but are wide for our present\r\npurpose. Throughout this enquiry, we always consider in general, what\r\nqualities are a subject of praise or of censure, without entering\r\ninto all the minute differences of sentiment, which they excite. It is\r\nevident, that whatever is contemned, is also disliked, as well as what\r\nis hated; and we here endeavour to take objects, according to their most\r\nsimple views and appearances. These sciences are but too apt to appear\r\nabstract to common readers, even with all the precautions which we can\r\ntake to clear them from superfluous speculations, and bring them down to\r\nevery capacity.]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMost people, I believe, will naturally, without premeditation, assent to\r\nthe definition of the elegant and judicious poet:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nVirtue (for mere good-nature is a fool) Is sense and spirit with\r\nhumanity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: The Art of preserving Health. Book 4]\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhat pretensions has a man to our generous assistance or good offices,\r\nwho has dissipated his wealth in profuse expenses, idle vanities,\r\nchimerical projects, dissolute pleasures or extravagant gaming? These\r\nvices (for we scruple not to call them such) bring misery unpitied, and\r\ncontempt on every one addicted to them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAchaeus, a wise and prudent prince, fell into a fatal snare, which cost\r\nhim his crown and life, after having used every reasonable precaution to\r\nguard himself against it. On that account, says the historian, he is a\r\njust object of regard and compassion: his betrayers alone of hatred and\r\ncontempt [Footnote: Polybius, lib. iii. cap. 2].\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe precipitate flight and improvident negligence of Pompey, at the\r\nbeginning of the civil wars, appeared such notorious blunders to Cicero,\r\nas quite palled his friendship towards that great man. In the same\r\nmanner, says he, as want of cleanliness, decency, or discretion in\r\na mistress are found to alienate our affections. For so he expresses\r\nhimself, where he talks, not in the character of a philosopher, but in\r\nthat of a statesman and man of the world, to his friend Atticus. [Lib.\r\nix. epist. 10]. But the same Cicero, in imitation of all the ancient\r\nmoralists, when he reasons as a philosopher, enlarges very much his\r\nideas of virtue, and comprehends every laudable quality or endowment\r\nof the mind, under that honourable appellation. This leads to the\r\nTHIRD reflection, which we proposed to make, to wit, that the ancient\r\nmoralists, the best models, made no material distinction among the\r\ndifferent species of mental endowments and defects, but treated\r\nall alike under the appellation of virtues and vices, and made them\r\nindiscriminately the object of their moral reasonings. The prudence\r\nexplained in Cicero\u0027s Offices [Footnote: Lib. i. cap. 6.] is that\r\nsagacity, which leads to the discovery of truth, and preserves us from\r\nerror and mistake. MAGNANIMITY, TEMPERANCE, DECENCY, are there also at\r\nlarge discoursed of. And as that eloquent moralist followed the common\r\nreceived division of the four cardinal virtues, our social duties form\r\nbut one head, in the general distribution of his subject.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n [Footnote: The following passage of Cicero is worth quoting, as\r\nbeing the most clear and express to our purpose, that any thing can be\r\nimagined, and, in a dispute, which is chiefly verbal, must, on account\r\nof the author, carry an authority, from which there can be no appeal.\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0027Virtus autem, quae est per se ipsa laudabilis, et sine qua nihil\r\nlaudari potest, tamen habet plures partes, quarum alia est alia ad\r\nlaudationem aptior. Sunt enim aliae virtutes, quae videntur in moribus\r\nhominum, et quadam comitate ac beneficentia positae: aliae quae\r\nin ingenii aliqua facultate, aut animi magnitudine ac robore. Nam\r\nclementia, justitia, benignitas, fides, fortitudo in periculis\r\ncommunibus, jucunda est auditu in laudationibus. Omnes enim hae virtutes\r\nnon tam ipsis, qui eas in se habent, quam generi hominum fructuosae\r\nputantur. Sapientia et magnitude animi, qua omnes res humanae tenues\r\net pro nihilo putantur, et in cogitando vis quaedam ingenii, et ipsa\r\neloquentia admirationis habet non minus, jucunditatis minus. Ipsos enim\r\nmagis videntur, quos laudamus, quam illos, apud quos laudamus ornare ac\r\ntueri: sed tamen in laudenda jungenda sunt eliam haec genera virtutum.\r\nFerunt enim aures bominum, cum ilia quae jucunda et grata, tum etiam\r\nilia, quae mirabilia sunt in virtute, laudari.\u0027 De orat. lib. ii. cap.\r\n84.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI suppose, if Cicero were now alive, it would be found difficult to\r\nfetter his moral sentiments by narrow systems; or persuade him, that no\r\nqualities were to be admitted as virtues, or acknowledged to be a part\r\nof PERSONAL MERIT, but what were recommended by The Whole Duty of Man.]\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe need only peruse the titles of chapters in Aristotle\u0027s Ethics to be\r\nconvinced that he ranks courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity,\r\nmodesty, prudence, and a manly openness, among the virtues, as well as\r\njustice and friendship.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo SUSTAIN and to ABSTAIN, that is, to be patient and continent,\r\nappeared to some of the ancients a summary comprehension of all morals.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nEpictetus has scarcely ever mentioned the sentiment of humanity and\r\ncompassion, but in order to put his disciples on their guard against it.\r\nThe virtue of the Stoics seems to consist chiefly in a firm temper and\r\na sound understanding. With them, as with Solomon and the eastern\r\nmoralists, folly and wisdom are equivalent to vice and virtue.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMen will praise thee, says David, [Footnote: Psalm 49th.] when thou dost\r\nwell unto thyself. I hate a wise man, says the Greek poet, who is\r\nnot wise to himself [Footnote: Here, Hume quotes Euripedes in Greek].\r\nPlutarch is no more cramped by systems in his philosophy than in his\r\nhistory. Where he compares the great men of Greece and Rome, he fairly\r\nsets in opposition all their blemishes and accomplishments of whatever\r\nkind, and omits nothing considerable, which can either depress or exalt\r\ntheir characters. His moral discourses contain the same free and natural\r\ncensure of men and manners.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe character of Hannibal, as drawn by Livy, [Footnote: Lib. xxi. cap.\r\n4] is esteemed partial, but allows him many eminent virtues. Never\r\nwas there a genius, says the historian, more equally fitted for those\r\nopposite offices of commanding and obeying; and it were, therefore,\r\ndifficult to determine whether he rendered himself DEARER to the general\r\nor to the army. To none would Hasdrubal entrust more willingly the\r\nconduct of any dangerous enterprize; under none did the soldiers\r\ndiscover more courage and confidence. Great boldness in facing danger;\r\ngreat prudence in the midst of it. No labour could fatigue his body or\r\nsubdue his mind. Cold and heat were indifferent to him: meat and\r\ndrink he sought as supplies to the necessities of nature, not as\r\ngratifications of his voluptuous appetites. Waking or rest he used\r\nindiscriminately, by night or by day.\u0026mdash;These great Virtues were balanced\r\nby great Vices; inhuman cruelty; perfidy more than punic; no truth, no\r\nfaith, no regard to oaths, promises, or religion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe character of Alexander the Sixth, to be found in Guicciardin,\r\n[Footnote: Lib. i.] is pretty similar, but juster; and is a proof that\r\neven the moderns, where they speak naturally, hold the same language\r\nwith the ancients. In this pope, says he, there was a singular capacity\r\nand judgement: admirable prudence; a wonderful talent of persuasion; and\r\nin all momentous enterprizes a diligence and dexterity incredible. But\r\nthese VIRTUES were infinitely overbalanced by his VICES; no faith,\r\nno religion, insatiable avarice, exorbitant ambition, and a more than\r\nbarbarous cruelty.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPolybius, [Footnote: Lib. xii.] reprehending Timaeus for his partiality\r\nagainst Agathocles, whom he himself allows to be the most cruel and\r\nimpious of all tyrants, says: if he took refuge in Syracuse, as asserted\r\nby that historian, flying the dirt and smoke and toil of his former\r\nprofession of a potter; and if proceeding from such slender beginnings,\r\nhe became master, in a little time, of all Sicily; brought the\r\nCarthaginian state into the utmost danger; and at last died in old age,\r\nand in possession of sovereign dignity: must he not be allowed something\r\nprodigious and extraordinary, and to have possessed great talents and\r\ncapacity for business and action? His historian, therefore, ought not to\r\nhave alone related what tended to his reproach and infamy; but also what\r\nmight redound to his Praise and Honour.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn general, we may observe, that the distinction of voluntary or\r\ninvoluntary was little regarded by the ancients in their moral\r\nreasonings; where they frequently treated the question as very doubtful,\r\nWHETHER VIRTUE COULD BE TAUGHT OR NOT [Vid. Plato in Menone, Seneca de\r\notio sap. cap. 31. So also Horace, Virtutem doctrina paret, naturane\r\ndonet, Epist. lib. I. ep. 18. Aeschines Socraticus, Dial. I.]? They\r\njustly considered that cowardice, meanness, levity, anxiety, impatience,\r\nfolly, and many other qualities of the mind, might appear ridiculous and\r\ndeformed, contemptible and odious, though independent of the will. Nor\r\ncould it be supposed, at all times, in every man\u0027s power to attain every\r\nkind of mental more than of exterior beauty.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd here there occurs the FOURTH reflection which I purposed to make,\r\nin suggesting the reason why modern philosophers have often followed a\r\ncourse in their moral enquiries so different from that of the ancients.\r\nIn later times, philosophy of all kinds, especially ethics, have been\r\nmore closely united with theology than ever they were observed to be\r\namong the heathens; and as this latter science admits of no terms of\r\ncomposition, but bends every branch of knowledge to its own purpose,\r\nwithout much regard to the phenomena of nature, or to the unbiassed\r\nsentiments of the mind, hence reasoning, and even language, have been\r\nwarped from their natural course, and distinctions have been endeavoured\r\nto be established where the difference of the objects was, in a manner,\r\nimperceptible. Philosophers, or rather divines under that disguise,\r\ntreating all morals as on a like footing with civil laws, guarded by the\r\nsanctions of reward and punishment, were necessarily led to render this\r\ncircumstance, of VOLUNTARY or INVOLUNTARY, the foundation of their whole\r\ntheory. Every one may employ TERMS in what sense he pleases: but\r\nthis, in the mean time, must be allowed, that SENTIMENTS are every day\r\nexperienced of blame and praise, which have objects beyond the dominion\r\nof the will or choice, and of which it behoves us, if not as moralists,\r\nas speculative philosophers at least, to give some satisfactory theory\r\nand explication.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA blemish, a fault, a vice, a crime; these expressions seem to denote\r\ndifferent degrees of censure and disapprobation; which are, however, all\r\nof them, at the bottom, pretty nearly all the same kind of species. The\r\nexplication of one will easily lead us into a just conception of the\r\nothers; and it is of greater consequence to attend to things than to\r\nverbal appellations. That we owe a duty to ourselves is confessed even\r\nin the most vulgar system of morals; and it must be of consequence to\r\nexamine that duty, in order to see whether it bears any affinity to that\r\nwhich we owe to society. It is probable that the approbation attending\r\nthe observance of both is of a similar nature, and arises from similar\r\nprinciples, whatever appellation we may give to either of these\r\nexcellencies.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv style=\"height: 6em;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}