Toward Perpetual Peace
{"WorkMasterId":6066,"WpPageId":277752,"ParentWpPageId":189326,"Slug":"perpetual-peace","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/immanuel-kant/perpetual-peace/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/immanuel-kant/perpetual-peace/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":482113,"CleanHtmlLength":426003,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"Toward Perpetual Peace","Deck":"Kant argues for republican constitutions, federation of free states, cosmopolitan right, and juridical conditions of lasting peace.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to Immanuel Kant","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/immanuel-kant/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"Immanuel Kant","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/immanuel-kant/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/kant-01-becker-portrait-1768-4.jpg","ImageAlt":"Johann Gottlieb Becker portrait of Immanuel Kant","FilterTerra":"Western Europe","ClickText":"Immanuel Kant","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/immanuel-kant/","Copies":["1724 CE – 1804 CE","Königsberg, Prussia","Prussian Enlightenment philosopher whose critical philosophy of transcendental idealism, autonomy, public reason, aesthetic judgment, natural science, religion, and right reshaped modern metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, politics, and aesthetics."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:3","Title":"Early Modern History","DateText":"1500 CE – 1799 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-early-modern-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:9","Title":"Enlightenment and Proto-Industrial","DateText":"1700 CE – 1799 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-early-modern-history/philosophers-of-the-enlightenment-and-proto-industrial/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"1795 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Displayed as 1795 CE because the essay was published in 1795.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:3"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:RUS:1"}],"OriginalTitle":"Zum ewigen Frieden","Language":"German or Latin, with major German critical editions and later English translations","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:political-philosophy"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:ethics"}],"Tradition":"Prussian Enlightenment critical philosophy; transcendental idealism; Kantian ethics; critical metaphysics","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #50922 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Kant argues for republican constitutions, federation of free states, cosmopolitan right, and juridical conditions of lasting peace."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"Perpetual Peace; Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch","KeyConcepts":"perpetual peace; republicanism; cosmopolitan right; international law; federation; hospitality; public right","Methodology":"Direct work-cluster record based on SEP, IEP, Britannica, Akademieausgabe, Bonner Kant-Korpus, public text indexes, catalog records, and modern scholarship. 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autonomy, normativity, and objectivity."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct Kant political work by SEP, Wikipedia, Wikisource, Open Library, WorldCat, and scholarship evidence.","The work remains relevant to metaphysics, epistemology, logic, moral philosophy, political philosophy, aesthetics, philosophy of science, philosophy of religion, and the modern understanding of critique."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct Kant political work by SEP, Wikipedia, Wikisource, Open Library, WorldCat, and scholarship evidence."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003ePublic-domain full text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/50922\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #50922\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"front\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca href=\"#tnote\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eTranscriber\u0027s note\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca href=\"#ToC\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eTable of Contents\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Index\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eIndex\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"screenonly\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"Book cover\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-perpetual-peace-cover.jpg\" id=\"img_images_cover.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"aftit\"\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_i\"\u003e[p. i]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch1\u003ePERPETUAL PEACE\u003c/h1\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figright\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"Publisher logotype\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-perpetual-peace-logo.jpg\" id=\"img_images_logo.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"aftit\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"p3\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_ii\"\u003e[p. ii]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003e“For I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eSaw the Vision of the world, and all the wonder that would be;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eSaw the heavens fill with commerce, argosies of magic sails,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003ePilots of the purple twilight, dropping down with costly bales;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eHeard the heavens fill with shouting, and there rain’d a ghastly dew\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eFrom the nations’ airy navies grappling in the central blue;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eFar along the world-wide whisper of the south-wind rushing warm,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eWith the standards of the peoples plunging thro’ the thunder-storm;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eTill the war-drum throbb’d no longer, and the battle-flags were furl’d\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eIn the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eThere the common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm in awe,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAnd the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"dr\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTennyson\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ci\u003eLocksley Hall\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tit\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_iii\"\u003e[p. iii]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"xxl\"\u003ePERPETUAL PEACE\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"large\"\u003eA PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"large p2\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"xs\"\u003eBY\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n IMMANUEL KANT\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e1795\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"p2\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003eTRANSLATED WITH INTRODUCTION\u003cbr\u003e\r\n AND NOTES BY\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n M. CAMPBELL SMITH, M.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"small p3\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eWITH A PREFACE BY PROFESSOR LATTA\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"p3\"\u003eLONDON: GEORGE ALLEN \u0026amp; UNWIN LTD.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n RUSKIN HOUSE 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"aftit\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_iv\"\u003e[p. iv]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eFirst Edition\u003c/i\u003e, 1903\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eSecond Impression, February\u003c/i\u003e 1915\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eThird ” February\u003c/i\u003e 1917\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_v\"\u003e[p. v]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 class=\"nobreak g1\"\u003ePREFACE\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThis\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntranslation of Kant’s essay on \u003ci\u003ePerpetual Peace\u003c/i\u003e was undertaken by\r\nMiss Mary Campbell Smith at the suggestion of the late Professor\r\nRitchie of St. Andrews, who had promised to write for it a preface,\r\nindicating the value of Kant’s work in relation to recent discussions\r\nregarding the possibility of “making wars to cease.” In view of the\r\ngeneral interest which these discussions have aroused and of the\r\nvague thinking and aspiration which have too often characterised\r\nthem, it seemed to Professor Ritchie that a translation of this\r\nwise and sagacious essay would be both opportune and valuable.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_1\" id=\"FNanchor_1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e His\r\nuntimely death has prevented the fulfilment of his promise, and I\r\nhave been asked, in his stead, to introduce the translator’s work.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is, I think, the only complete translation into English of\r\nKant’s essay, including all the notes as well as the text, and the\r\ntranslator has added a full historical Introduction, along with\r\nnumerous notes of her own, so as (in Professor Ritchie’s words) “to\r\nmeet the needs (1) of the student of Political\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_vi\"\u003e[p. vi]\u003c/span\u003e Science who wishes to understand the\r\nrelation of Kant’s theories to those of Grotius, Hobbes, Locke,\r\nRousseau etc., and (2) of the general reader who wishes to understand\r\nthe significance of Kant’s proposals in connection with the ideals of\r\nPeace Congresses, and with the development of International Law from\r\nthe end of the Middle Ages to the Hague Conference.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAlthough it is more than 100 years since Kant’s essay was written,\r\nits substantial value is practically unimpaired. Anyone who is\r\nacquainted with the general character of the mind of Kant will\r\nexpect to find in him sound common-sense, clear recognition of the\r\nessential facts of the case and a remarkable power of analytically\r\nexhibiting the conditions on which the facts necessarily depend.\r\nThese characteristics are manifest in the essay on \u003ci\u003ePerpetual\r\nPeace\u003c/i\u003e. Kant is not pessimist enough to believe that a perpetual\r\npeace is an unrealisable dream or a consummation devoutly to be\r\nfeared, nor is he optimist enough to fancy that it is an ideal which\r\ncould easily be realised if men would but turn their hearts to one\r\nanother. For Kant perpetual peace is an ideal, not merely as a\r\nspeculative Utopian idea, with which in fancy we may play, but as a\r\nmoral principle, which ought to be, and therefore can be, realised.\r\nYet he makes it perfectly clear that we cannot hope to approach the\r\nrealisation\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_vii\"\u003e[p. vii]\u003c/span\u003e of\r\nit unless we honestly face political facts and get a firm grasp of\r\nthe indispensable conditions of a lasting peace. To strive after the\r\nideal in contempt or in ignorance of these conditions is a labour\r\nthat must inevitably be either fruitless or destructive of its own\r\nends. Thus Kant demonstrates the hopelessness of any attempt to\r\nsecure perpetual peace between independent nations. Such nations may\r\nmake treaties; but these are binding only for so long as it is not\r\nto the interest of either party to denounce them. To enforce them\r\nis impossible while the nations remain independent. “There is,” as\r\nProfessor Ritchie put it (\u003ci\u003eStudies in Political and Social Ethics\u003c/i\u003e,\r\np. 169), “only one way in which war between independent nations can\r\nbe prevented; and that is by the nations ceasing to be independent.”\r\nBut this does not necessarily mean the establishment of a despotism,\r\nwhether autocratic or democratic. On the other hand, Kant maintains\r\nthat just as peace between individuals within a state can only be\r\npermanently secured by the institution of a “republican” (that is\r\nto say, a representative) government, so the only real guarantee\r\nof a permanent peace between nations is the establishment of a\r\nfederation of free “republican” states. Such a federation he regards\r\nas practically possible. “For if Fortune ordains that a powerful\r\nand enlightened people should form a republic\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_viii\"\u003e[p. viii]\u003c/span\u003e—which by its very nature is inclined\r\nto perpetual peace—this would serve as a centre of federal union for\r\nother states wishing to join, and thus secure conditions of freedom\r\namong the states in accordance with the idea of the law of nations.\r\nGradually, through different unions of this kind, the federation\r\nwould extend further and further.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eReaders who are acquainted with the general philosophy of Kant\r\nwill find many traces of its influence in the essay on \u003ci\u003ePerpetual\r\nPeace\u003c/i\u003e. Those who have no knowledge of his philosophy may find some\r\nof his forms of statement rather difficult to understand, and it\r\nmay therefore not be out of place for me to indicate very briefly\r\nthe meaning of some terms which he frequently uses, especially in\r\nthe Supplements and Appendices. Thus at the beginning of the First\r\nSupplement, Kant draws a distinction between the mechanical and the\r\nteleological view of things, between “nature” and “Providence”, which\r\ndepends upon his main philosophical position. According to Kant, pure\r\nreason has two aspects, theoretical and practical. As concerning\r\nknowledge, strictly so called, the \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e principles of reason\r\n(\u003ci\u003ee.g.\u003c/i\u003e substance and attribute, cause and effect etc.) are valid\r\nonly within the realm of possible sense-experience. Such ideas, for\r\ninstance, cannot be extended to God, since He is not a possible\r\nobject of sense-experience. They are limited\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_ix\"\u003e[p. ix]\u003c/span\u003e to the world of phenomena. This world of\r\nphenomena (“nature” or the world of sense-experience) is a purely\r\nmechanical system. But in order to understand fully the phenomenal\r\nworld, the pure theoretical reason must postulate certain ideas\r\n(the ideas of the soul, the world and God), the objects of which\r\ntranscend sense-experience. These ideas are not theoretically valid,\r\nbut their validity is practically established by the pure practical\r\nreason, which does not yield speculative truth, but prescribes its\r\nprinciples “dogmatically” in the form of imperatives to the will. The\r\nwill is itself practical reason, and thus it imposes its imperatives\r\nupon itself. The fundamental imperative of the practical reason is\r\nstated by Kant in Appendix I. (p. 175):—“Act so that thou canst will\r\nthat thy maxim should be a universal law, be the end of thy action\r\nwhat it will.” If the end of perpetual peace is a duty, it must be\r\nnecessarily deduced from this general law. And Kant does regard it as\r\na duty. “We must desire perpetual peace not only as a material good,\r\nbut also as a state of things resulting from our recognition of the\r\nprecepts of duty” (\u003ci\u003eloc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e). This is further expressed in the\r\nmaxim (p. 177):—“Seek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason\r\nand its righteousness, and the object of your endeavour, the blessing\r\nof perpetual peace, will be added unto you.” The distinction between\r\nthe\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_x\"\u003e[p. x]\u003c/span\u003e moral politician\r\nand the political moralist, which is developed in Appendix I., is an\r\napplication of the general distinction between duty and expediency,\r\nwhich is a prominent feature of the Kantian ethics. Methods of\r\nexpediency, omitting all reference to the pure practical reason, can\r\nonly bring about re-arrangements of circumstances in the mechanical\r\ncourse of nature. They can never guarantee the attainment of their\r\nend: they can never make it more than a speculative ideal, which may\r\nor may not be practicable. But if the end can be shown to be a duty,\r\nwe have, from Kant’s point of view, the only reasonable ground for a\r\nconviction that it is realisable. We cannot, indeed, theoretically\r\n\u003ci\u003eknow\u003c/i\u003e that it is realisable. “Reason is not sufficiently enlightened\r\nto survey the series of predetermining causes which would make it\r\npossible for us to predict with certainty the good or bad results\r\nof human action, as they follow from the mechanical laws of nature;\r\nalthough we may hope that things will turn out as we should desire”\r\n(p. 163). On the other hand, since the idea of perpetual peace\r\nis a moral ideal, an “idea of duty”, we are entitled to believe\r\nthat it is practicable. “Nature guarantees the coming of perpetual\r\npeace, through the natural course of human propensities; not indeed\r\nwith sufficient certainty to enable us to prophesy the future of\r\nthis ideal theoretically, but yet clearly\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_xi\"\u003e[p. xi]\u003c/span\u003e enough for practical purposes” (p. 157).\r\nOne might extend this discussion indefinitely; but what has been said\r\nmay suffice for general guidance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe “wise and sagacious” thought of Kant is not expressed in\r\na simple style, and the translation has consequently been a very\r\ndifficult piece of work. But the translator has shown great skill in\r\nmanipulating the involutions, parentheses and prodigious sentences\r\nof the original. In this she has had the valuable help of Mr. David\r\nMorrison, M.A., who revised the whole translation with the greatest\r\ncare and to whom she owes the solution of a number of difficulties.\r\nHer work will have its fitting reward if it succeeds in familiarising\r\nthe English-speaking student of politics with a political essay of\r\nenduring value, written by one of the master thinkers of modern\r\ntimes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"firma\"\u003eR. LATTA.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"p1\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eUniversity of Glasgow\u003c/i\u003e, May 1903.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\" id=\"ToC\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_xiii\"\u003e[p. xiii]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 class=\"nobreak g1\"\u003eCONTENTS\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003ctable class=\"toc\" data-summary=\"table of contents\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003ePAGE\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003ePREFACE BY PROFESSOR LATTA\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_v\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ev\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl1\"\u003eTRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_1\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003ePERPETUAL PEACE\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_106\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003eFIRST SECTION CONTAINING THE PRELIMINARY\r\n ARTICLES OF PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_107\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003eSECOND SECTION CONTAINING THE DEFINITIVE\r\n ARTICLES OF PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_117\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e117\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003eFIRST SUPPLEMENT CONCERNING THE GUARANTEE\r\n OF PERPETUAL PEACE\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_143\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e143\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003eSECOND SUPPLEMENT—A SECRET ARTICLE FOR\r\n PERPETUAL PEACE\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_158\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e158\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003eAPPENDIX I.—ON THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN\r\n MORALS AND POLITICS WITH REFERENCE TO PERPETUAL PEACE\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_161\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e161\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003eAPPENDIX II.—CONCERNING THE HARMONY OF POLITICS\r\n WITH MORALS ACCORDING TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEA OF PUBLIC RIGHT\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_184\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e184\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl1\"\u003eINDEX\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_197\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e197\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_1\"\u003e[p. 1]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 class=\"nobreak\"\u003eTRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThis\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis an age of unions. Not merely in the economic sphere, in\r\nthe working world of unworthy ends and few ideals do we find\r\ngreat practical organizations; but law, medicine, science, art,\r\ntrade, commerce, politics and political economy—we might add\r\nphilanthropy—standing institutions, mighty forces in our social\r\nand intellectual life, all have helped to swell the number of our\r\nnineteenth century Conferences and Congresses. It is an age of\r\nPeace Movements and Peace Societies, of peace-loving monarchs and\r\npeace-seeking diplomats. This is not to say that we are preparing\r\nfor the millennium. Men are working together, there is a newborn\r\nsolidarity of interest, but rivalries between nation and nation,\r\nthe bitternesses and hatreds inseparable from competition are\r\nnot less keen; prejudice and misunderstanding not less frequent;\r\nsubordinate conflicting interests are not fewer, are perhaps, in view\r\nof changing political conditions and an ever-growing international\r\ncommerce, multiplying with every year. The talisman is, perhaps,\r\nself-interest, but, none the less, the spirit of union is there;\r\nit is impossible to ignore a clearly marked\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_2\"\u003e[p. 2]\u003c/span\u003e tendency towards international federation,\r\ntowards political peace. This slow movement was not born with Peace\r\nSocieties; its consummation lies perhaps far off in the ages to come.\r\nHistory at best moves slowly. But something of its past progress\r\nwe shall do well to know. No political idea seems to have so great\r\na future before it as this idea of a federation of the world. It\r\nis bound to realise itself some day; let us consider what are the\r\nchances that this day come quickly, what that it be long delayed.\r\nWhat obstacles lie in the way, and how may they be removed? What\r\nhistorical grounds have we for hoping that they may ever be removed?\r\nWhat, in a word, is the origin and history of the idea of a perpetual\r\npeace between nations, and what would be the advantage, what is the\r\nprospect of realising it?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe international relations of states find their expression, we\r\nare told, in war and peace. What has been the part played by these\r\ngreat counteracting forces in the history of nations? What has it\r\nbeen in prehistoric times, in the life of man in what is called\r\nthe “state of nature”? “It is no easy enterprise,” says Rousseau,\r\nin more than usually careful language, “to disentangle that which\r\nis original from that which is artificial in the actual state of\r\nman, and to make ourselves well acquainted with a state which no\r\nlonger exists, which perhaps\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_3\"\u003e[p.\r\n3]\u003c/span\u003e never has existed and which probably never will exist in\r\nthe future.” (Preface to the \u003ci\u003eDiscourse on the Causes of Inequality\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1753, publ. 1754.) This is a difficulty which Rousseau surmounts\r\nonly too easily. A knowledge of history, a scientific spirit may\r\nfail him: an imagination ever ready to pour forth detail never\r\ndoes. Man lived, says he, “without industry, without speech,\r\nwithout habitation, without war, without connection of any kind,\r\nwithout any need of his fellows or without any desire to harm them\r\n… sufficing to himself.”\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_2\" id=\"FNanchor_2\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e (\u003ci\u003eDiscourse on the Sciences and Arts\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1750.) Nothing, we are now certain, is less probable. We cannot\r\npaint the life of man at this stage of his development with any\r\ndefiniteness, but the conclusion is forced upon us that our\r\nrace had no golden age,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_3\" id=\"FNanchor_3\"\u003e[3]\u003c/a\u003e no peaceful beginning, that this early state\r\nwas indeed, as\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_4\"\u003e[p. 4]\u003c/span\u003e Hobbes\r\nheld, a state of war, of incessant war between individuals, families\r\nand, finally, tribes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"heading\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe Early Conditions of Society.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the barbarian, war is the rule; peace the exception. His\r\ngods, like those of Greece, are warlike gods; his spirit, at death,\r\nflees to some Valhalla. For him life is one long battle; his arms go\r\nwith him even to the grave. Food and the means of existence he seeks\r\nthrough plunder and violence. Here right is with might; the battle is\r\nto the strong. Nature has given all an equal claim to all things, but\r\nnot everyone can have them. This state of fearful insecurity is bound\r\nto come to an end. “Government,” says Locke, (\u003ci\u003eOn Civil Government\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nChap. VIII., § 105) “is hardly to be\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_5\"\u003e[p. 5]\u003c/span\u003e avoided amongst men that live together.”\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_4\" id=\"FNanchor_4\"\u003e[4]\u003c/a\u003e A\r\nconstant dread of attack and a growing consciousness of the necessity\r\nof presenting a united front against it result in the choice of some\r\nleader—the head of a family perhaps—who acts, it may be, only as\r\ncaptain of the hosts, as did Joshua in Israel, or who may discharge\r\nthe simple duties of a primitive governor or king.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_5\" id=\"FNanchor_5\"\u003e[5]\u003c/a\u003e Peace within is found\r\nto be strength without. The civil state is established, so that\r\n“if there needs must be war, it may not yet\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_6\"\u003e[p. 6]\u003c/span\u003e be against all men, nor yet without some\r\nhelps.” (Hobbes: \u003ci\u003eOn Liberty\u003c/i\u003e, Chap. I., § 13.) This foundation\r\nof the state is the first establishment in history of a peace\r\ninstitution. It changes the character of warfare, it gives it method\r\nand system; but it does not bring peace in its train. We have now,\r\nindeed, no longer a wholesale war of all against all, a constant\r\nirregular raid and plunder of one individual by another; but we\r\nhave the systematic, deliberate war of community against community,\r\nof nation against nation.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_6\" id=\"FNanchor_6\"\u003e[6]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"heading\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eWar in Classical Times.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn early times, there were no friendly neighbouring nations:\r\nbeyond the boundaries of every\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_7\"\u003e[p.\r\n7]\u003c/span\u003e nation’s territory, lay the land of a deadly foe. This\r\nwas the way of thinking, even of so highly cultured a people as the\r\nGreeks, who believed that a law of nature had made every outsider,\r\nevery barbarian their inferior and their enemy.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_7\" id=\"FNanchor_7\"\u003e[7]\u003c/a\u003e Their treaties of peace,\r\nat the time of the Persian War, were frankly of the kind denounced\r\nby Kant, mere armistices concluded for the purpose of renewing\r\ntheir fighting strength. The ancient world is a world of perpetual\r\nwar in which defeat meant annihilation. In the East no right was\r\nrecognised in the enemy; and even in Greece and Rome the fate of the\r\nunarmed was death or slavery.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_8\" id=\"FNanchor_8\"\u003e[8]\u003c/a\u003e The\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_8\"\u003e[p.\r\n8]\u003c/span\u003e barbaric or non-Grecian states had, according to Plato\r\nand Aristotle, no claim upon humanity, no\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_9\"\u003e[p. 9]\u003c/span\u003e rights in fact of any kind. Among the\r\nRomans things were little better. According to Mr. T. J. Lawrence—see\r\nhis \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of International Law\u003c/i\u003e, III., §§ 21, 22—they were\r\nworse. For Rome stood alone in the world: she was bound by ties of\r\nkinship to no other state. She was, in other words, free from a\r\nsense of obligation to other races. War, according to Roman ideas,\r\nwas made by the gods, apart altogether from the quarrels of rulers\r\nor races. To disobey the sacred command, expressed in signs and\r\nauguries would have been to hold in disrespect the law and religion\r\nof the land. When, in the hour of victory, the Romans refrained from\r\npressing their rights against the conquered—rights recognised by all\r\nRoman jurists—it was from no spirit of leniency, but in the pursuit\r\nof a prudent and far-sighted policy, aiming at the growth of Roman\r\nsupremacy and the establishment of a world-embracing empire, shutting\r\nout all war as it blotted out natural boundaries, reducing all rights\r\nto the one right of imperial citizenship. There was no real \u003ci\u003ejus\r\nbelli\u003c/i\u003e, even here in the cradle of international law; the only limits\r\nto the fury of war were of a religious character.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe treatment of a defeated enemy among the Jews rested upon\r\na similar religious foundation. In the East, we find a special\r\ncruelty in the conduct of war. The wars of the Jews and Assyrians\r\nwere\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_10\"\u003e[p. 10]\u003c/span\u003e wars of\r\nextermination. The whole of the \u003ci\u003eOld Testament\u003c/i\u003e, it has been said,\r\nresounds with the clash of arms.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_9\" id=\"FNanchor_9\"\u003e[9]\u003c/a\u003e “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth!”\r\nwas the command of Jehovah to his chosen people. Vengeance was\r\nbound up in their very idea of the Creator. The Jews, unlike the\r\nfollowers of Mahomet, attempted, and were commanded to attempt\r\nno violent conversion\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_10\" id=\"FNanchor_10\"\u003e[10]\u003c/a\u003e; they were then too weak a nation; but they\r\nfought, and fought with success against the heathen of neighbouring\r\nlands, the Lord of Hosts leading them forth to battle. The God\r\nof Israel stood to his chosen people in a unique and peculiarly\r\nlogical relation. He had made a covenant with them; and, in return\r\nfor their obedience and allegiance, cared for their interests and\r\nadvanced their national prosperity. The blood of this elect people\r\ncould not be suffered to intermix with that of idolaters. Canaan\r\nmust be cleared of the heathen, on the coming\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_11\"\u003e[p. 11]\u003c/span\u003e of the children of Israel to their\r\npromised land; and mercy to the conquered enemy, even to women,\r\nchildren or animals was held by the Hebrew prophets to be treachery\r\nto Jehovah. (\u003ci\u003eSam.\u003c/i\u003e XV.; \u003ci\u003eJosh.\u003c/i\u003e VI. 21.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHence the attitude of the Jews to neighbouring nations\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_11\" id=\"FNanchor_11\"\u003e[11]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwas still more hostile than that of the Greeks. The cause of this\r\ndifference is bound up with the transition from polytheism to\r\nmonotheism. The most devout worshipper of the national gods of\r\nancient times could endure to see other gods than his worshipped\r\nin the next town or by a neighbouring nation. There was no reason\r\nwhy all should not exist side by side. Religious conflicts in\r\npolytheistic countries, when they arose, were due not to the rivalry\r\nof conflicting faiths, but to an occasional attempt to put one god\r\nabove the others in importance. There could be no interest here in\r\nthe propagation of belief through the sword. But, under the Jews,\r\nthese relations were entirely altered. Jehovah, their Creator, became\r\nthe one invisible God. Such an one can suffer no others near him;\r\ntheir existence is a continual insult to him. Monotheism is, in its\r\nvery nature, a religion of intolerance. Its spirit among the Jews\r\nwas warlike: it commanded\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_12\"\u003e[p.\r\n12]\u003c/span\u003e the subjugation of other nations, but its instrument was\r\nrather extermination than conversion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"heading\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe Attitude of Christianity and the Early Church\r\nto War.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom the standpoint of the peace of nations, we may say that\r\nthe Christian faith, compared with other prominent monotheistic\r\nreligious systems, occupies an intermediate position between two\r\nextremes—the fanaticism of Islam, and to a less extent of Judaism,\r\nand the relatively passive attitude of the Buddhist who thought\r\nhimself bound to propagate his religion, but held himself justified\r\nonly in the employment of peaceful means. Christianity, on the other\r\nhand, contains no warlike principles: it can in no sense be called\r\na religion of the sword, but circumstances gave the history of the\r\nChurch, after the first few centuries of its existence, a character\r\nwhich cannot be called peace-loving.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis apparent contradiction between the spirit of the new religion\r\nand its practical attitude to war has led to some difference of\r\nopinion as to the actual teaching of Christ. The \u003ci\u003eNew Testament\u003c/i\u003e\r\nseems, at a superficial glance, to furnish support as readily to the\r\nchampions of war as to its denouncers. The Messiah is the Prince of\r\nPeace (\u003ci\u003eIs.\u003c/i\u003e IX. 6, 7; \u003ci\u003eHeb.\u003c/i\u003e VI.), and here lies the way of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_13\"\u003e[p. 13]\u003c/span\u003e righteousness (\u003ci\u003eRom.\u003c/i\u003e\r\nIII. 19): but Christ came not to bring peace, but a sword (\u003ci\u003eMatth.\u003c/i\u003e\r\nX. 34). Such statements may be given the meaning which we wish them\r\nto bear—the quoting of Scripture is ever an unsatisfactory form of\r\nevidence; but there is no direct statement in the \u003ci\u003eNew Testament\u003c/i\u003e in\r\nfavour of war, no saying of Christ which, fairly interpreted, could\r\nbe understood too regard this proof of human imperfection as less\r\ncondemnable than any other.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_12\" id=\"FNanchor_12\"\u003e[12]\u003c/a\u003e When men shall be without sin, nation shall\r\nrise up against nation no more. But man the individual can attain\r\npeace only when he has overcome the world, when, in the struggle\r\nwith his lower self, he has come forth victorious. This is the\r\nspiritual sword which Christ brought into the world—strife, not with\r\nthe unbeliever, but with the lower self: meekness and the spirit of\r\nthe Word of God are the weapons with which man must fight for the\r\nFaith.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAn elect people there was no longer: Israel had rejected its\r\nMessiah. Instead there was a complete brotherhood of all men, the\r\nbond and the free, as children of one God. The aim of the Church\r\nwas a world-empire, bound together by a universal religion. In\r\nthis sense, as sowing the first seeds of a universal peace, we\r\nmay speak\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_14\"\u003e[p. 14]\u003c/span\u003e of\r\nChristianity as a re-establishment of peace among mankind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe later attitude of Christians to war, however, by no means\r\ncorresponds to the earliest tenets of the Church. Without doubt,\r\ncertain sects, from the beginning of our era and through the ages\r\nup to the present time, held, like the Mennonites and Quakers in\r\nour day, that the divine command, “Love your enemies,” could not be\r\nreconciled with the profession of a soldier. The early Christians\r\nwere reproached under the Roman Emperors, before the time of\r\nConstantine, with avoiding the citizen’s duty of military service.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_13\" id=\"FNanchor_13\"\u003e[13]\u003c/a\u003e “To\r\nthose enemies of our faith,” wrote Origen (\u003ci\u003eContra Celsum\u003c/i\u003e, VIII.,\r\nCh. LXXIII., Anti-Nicene Christian Library), “who require us to\r\nbear arms for the commonwealth, and to slay men, we can reply:\r\n‘Do not those who are priests at certain shrines, and those who\r\nattend on certain gods, as you account them, keep their hands free\r\nfrom blood, that they may with hands unstained and free from human\r\nblood offer the appointed sacrifices to your\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_15\"\u003e[p. 15]\u003c/span\u003e gods; and even when war is upon you, you\r\nnever enlist the priests in the army. If that, then, is a laudable\r\ncustom, how much more so, that while others are engaged in battle,\r\nthese too should engage as the priests and ministers of God, keeping\r\ntheir hands pure, and wrestling in prayers to God on behalf of those\r\nwho are fighting in a righteous cause, and for the king who reigns\r\nrighteously, that whatever is opposed to those who act righteously\r\nmay be destroyed!’ … And we do take our part in public affairs,\r\nwhen along with righteous prayers we join self-denying exercises and\r\nmeditations, which teach us to despise pleasures, and not to be led\r\naway by them. And none fight better for the king than we do. We do\r\nnot indeed fight under him, although he require it; but we fight on\r\nhis behalf, forming a special army—an army of piety—by offering our\r\nprayers to God.” The Fathers of the Church, Justin Martyr, Clement\r\nof Alexandria, Tertullian, Ambrose and the rest gave the same\r\ntestimony against war. The pagan rites connected with the taking of\r\nthe military oath had no doubt some influence in determining the\r\nfeeling of the pious with regard to this life of bloodshed; but the\r\nreasons lay deeper. “Shall it be held lawful,” asked Tertullian,\r\n(\u003ci\u003eDe Corona\u003c/i\u003e, p. 347) “to make an occupation of the sword, when\r\nthe Lord proclaims that he who uses the sword shall perish\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_16\"\u003e[p. 16]\u003c/span\u003e by the sword? And shall\r\nthe son of peace take part in the battle when it does not become him\r\neven to sue at law? And shall he apply the chain, and the prison, and\r\nthe torture, and the punishment, who is not the avenger even of his\r\nown wrongs?”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe doctrine of the Church developed early in the opposite\r\ndirection. It was its fighting spirit and not a love of peace that\r\nmade Christianity a state religion under Constantine. Nor was\r\nAugustine the first of the Church Fathers to regard military service\r\nas permissible. To come to a later time, this change of attitude has\r\nbeen ascribed partly to the rise of Mahometan power and the wave of\r\nfanaticism which broke over Europe. To destroy these unbelievers\r\nwith fire and sword was regarded as a deed of piety pleasing to\r\nGod. Hence the wars of the Crusades against the infidel were holy\r\nwars, and appear as a new element in the history of civilisation.\r\nThe nations of ancient times had known only civil and foreign war.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_14\" id=\"FNanchor_14\"\u003e[14]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThey had rebelled at home, and they had fought mainly for material\r\ninterests abroad. In the Middle Ages there were, besides, religious\r\nwars and, with the rise of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_17\"\u003e[p.\r\n17]\u003c/span\u003e Feudalism, private war:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_15\" id=\"FNanchor_15\"\u003e[15]\u003c/a\u003e among all the powers\r\nof the Dark Ages and for centuries later, none was more aggressive\r\nthan the Catholic Church, nor a more active and untiring defender of\r\nits rights and claims, spiritual or temporal. It was in some respects\r\na more warlike institution than the states of Greece and Rome. It\r\nstruggled through centuries with the Emperor:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_16\" id=\"FNanchor_16\"\u003e[16]\u003c/a\u003e it pronounced its\r\nban against disobedient states and disloyal cities: it pursued\r\nwith its vengeance each heretical or rebellious prince: unmindful\r\nof its early traditions about peace, it showed in every crisis a\r\nfiercely military spirit.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_17\" id=\"FNanchor_17\"\u003e[17]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor more than a thousand years the Church\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_18\"\u003e[p. 18]\u003c/span\u003e counted fighting clergy\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_18\" id=\"FNanchor_18\"\u003e[18]\u003c/a\u003e among\r\nits most active supporters. This strange anomaly was, it must be\r\nsaid, at first rather suffered in deference to public opinion than\r\nencouraged by ecclesiastical canons and councils, but it gave rise to\r\ngreat discontent at the time of the Reformation.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_19\" id=\"FNanchor_19\"\u003e[19]\u003c/a\u003e The whole question of\r\nthe lawfulness of military service for Christians was then raised\r\nagain. “If there be anything in the affairs of mortals,” wrote\r\nErasmus at this time (\u003ci\u003eOpera\u003c/i\u003e, II., \u003ci\u003eProv.\u003c/i\u003e, 951 C) “which it\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_19\"\u003e[p. 19]\u003c/span\u003e becomes us deliberately\r\nto attack, which we ought indeed to shun by every possible means,\r\nto avert and to abolish, it is certainly war, than which there is\r\nnothing more wicked, more mischievous or more widely destructive\r\nin its effects, nothing harder to be rid of, or more horrible and,\r\nin a word, more unworthy of a man, not to say of a Christian.”\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_20\" id=\"FNanchor_20\"\u003e[20]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe mediæval Church indeed succeeded, by the establishment of\r\nsuch institutions as the Truce of God, in setting some limits\r\nto the fury of the soldier: but its endeavours (and it made\r\nseveral to promote peace)\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_21\" id=\"FNanchor_21\"\u003e[21]\u003c/a\u003e were only to a trifling extent successful.\r\nPerhaps custom and public opinion in feudal Europe were too strong,\r\nperhaps the Church showed a certain apathy in denouncing the evils of\r\na military society: no doubt the theoretical tenets of its doctrine\r\ndid less to hinder war than its own strongly military tendency,\r\nits\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_20\"\u003e[p. 20]\u003c/span\u003e lust for power\r\nand the force of its example did to encourage it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHence, in spite of Christianity and its early vision of a\r\nbrotherhood of men, the history of the Middle Ages came nearer to a\r\nrealization of the idea of perpetual war than was possible in ancient\r\ntimes. The tendency of the growth of Roman supremacy was to diminish\r\nthe number of wars, along with the number of possible causes of\r\nracial friction. It united many nations in one great whole, and gave\r\nthem, to a certain extent, a common culture and common interests;\r\neven, when this seemed prudent, a common right of citizenship. The\r\nfewer the number of boundaries, the less the likelihood of war. The\r\nestablishment of great empires is of necessity a force, and a great\r\nand permanent force working on the side of peace. With the fall of\r\nRome this guarantee was removed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"heading\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe Development of the New Science of\r\nInternational Law.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOut of the ruins of the old feudal system arose the modern\r\nstate as a free independent unity. Private war between\r\nindividuals or classes of society was now branded as a breach\r\nof the peace: it became the exclusive right of kings to appeal\r\nto\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_21\"\u003e[p. 21]\u003c/span\u003e force.\r\nWar, wrote Gentilis\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_22\" id=\"FNanchor_22\"\u003e[22]\u003c/a\u003e towards the end of sixteenth century,\r\nis the just or unjust conflict between states. Peace was now\r\nregarded as the normal condition of society. As a result of these\r\ngreat developments in which the name “state” acquired new meaning,\r\njurisprudence freed itself from the trammelling conditions of\r\nmediæval Scholasticism. Men began to consider the problem of the\r\nrightfulness or wrongfulness of war, to question even the possibility\r\nof a war on rightful grounds. Out of theses new ideas—partly\r\ntoo as one of the fruits of the Reformation,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_23\" id=\"FNanchor_23\"\u003e[23]\u003c/a\u003e—arose the first\r\nconsciously formulated principles of the science of international\r\nlaw, whose fuller, but not yet complete, development belongs to\r\nmodern times.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom the beginning of history every age, every\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_22\"\u003e[p. 22]\u003c/span\u003e people has something\r\nto show here, be it only a rudimentary sense of justice in their\r\ndealings with one another. We may instance the Amphictyonic League\r\nin Greece which, while it had a merely Hellenic basis and was mainly\r\na religious survival, shows the germ of some attempt at arbitration\r\nbetween Greek states. Among the Romans we have the \u003ci\u003ejus feciale\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_24\" id=\"FNanchor_24\"\u003e[24]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand the \u003ci\u003ejus gentium\u003c/i\u003e, as distinguished from the civil law of\r\nRome, and certain military regulations about the taking of booty\r\nin war. Ambassadors were held inviolate\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_23\"\u003e[p. 23]\u003c/span\u003e in both countries; the formal declaration\r\nof war was never omitted. Many Roman writers held the necessity of\r\na just cause for war. But nowhere do these considerations form the\r\nsubject matter of a special science.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the Middle Ages the development of these ideas received\r\nlittle encouragement. All laws are silent in the time of war,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_25\" id=\"FNanchor_25\"\u003e[25]\u003c/a\u003e and\r\nthis was a period of war, both bloody and constant. There was no time\r\nto think of the right or wrong of anything. Moreover, the Church\r\nemphasised the lack of rights in unbelievers, and gave her blessing\r\non their annihilation.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_26\" id=\"FNanchor_26\"\u003e[26]\u003c/a\u003e The whole Christian world was filled with\r\nthe idea of a spiritual universal monarchy. Not such as that in\r\nthe minds of Greek and Jew and Roman who had been able to picture\r\ninternational peace only under the form of a great national and\r\nexclusive empire. In this great Christian state there were to be no\r\ndistinctions between nations; its sphere was bounded by the universe.\r\nBut, here, there was no room or recognition for independent national\r\nstates with equal and personal rights. This recognition, opposed by\r\nthe Roman\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_24\"\u003e[p. 24]\u003c/span\u003e Church,\r\nis the real basis of international law. The Reformation was the means\r\nby which the personality of the peoples, the unity and independence\r\nof the state were first openly admitted. On this foundation, mainly\r\nat first in Protestant countries, the new science developed rapidly.\r\nLike the civil state and the Christian religion, international law\r\nmay be called a peace institution.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"heading\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eGrotius, Puffendorf and Vattel.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the beginning of the seventeenth century, Grotius laid the\r\nfoundations of a code of universal law (\u003ci\u003eDe Jure Belli et Pacis\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1625) independent of differences of religion, in the hope that its\r\nrecognition might simplify the intercourse between the newly formed\r\nnations. The primary object of this great work, written during the\r\nmisery and horrors of the Thirty Years’ war, was expressly to draw\r\nattention to these evils and suggest some methods by which the\r\nseverity of warfare might be mitigated. Grotius originally meant to\r\nexplain only one chapter of the law of nations:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_27\" id=\"FNanchor_27\"\u003e[27]\u003c/a\u003e his book was to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_25\"\u003e[p. 25]\u003c/span\u003e be called \u003ci\u003eDe Jure\r\nBelli\u003c/i\u003e, but there is scarcely any subject of international law which\r\nhe leaves untouched. He obtained, moreover, a general recognition\r\nfor the doctrine of the Law of Nature which exerted so strong an\r\ninfluence upon succeeding centuries; indeed, between these two\r\nsciences, as between international law and ethics, he draws no very\r\nsharp line of demarcation, although, on the whole, in spite of an\r\nunscientific, scholastic use of quotation from authorities, his\r\ntreatment of the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_26\"\u003e[p. 26]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnew field is clear and comprehensive. Grotius made the attempt to\r\nset up an ethical principle of right, in the stead of such doctrines\r\nof self-interest as had been held by many of the ancient writers.\r\nThere was a law, he held, established in each state purely with a\r\nview to the interests of that state, but, besides this, there was\r\nanother higher law in the interest of the whole society of nations.\r\nIts origin was divine; the reason of man commanded his obedience.\r\nThis was what we call international law.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_28\" id=\"FNanchor_28\"\u003e[28]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eGrotius distinctly holds, like Kant and Rousseau, and unlike\r\nHobbes, that the state can never be regarded as a unity or\r\ninstitution separable from the people; the terms \u003ci\u003ecivitas\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003ecommunitas\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ecoetus\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003epopulus\u003c/i\u003e, he uses indiscriminately. But\r\nthese nations, these independent units of society cannot live\r\ntogether side by side just as they like; they must recognise\r\none another as members of a European society of states.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_29\" id=\"FNanchor_29\"\u003e[29]\u003c/a\u003e Law,\r\nhe said, stands above force even in war, “which may only be begun\r\nto pursue the right;” and the beginning and manner of conduct of\r\nwar rests on fixed laws and can be justified only in certain cases.\r\nWar is not to be\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_27\"\u003e[p. 27]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndone away with: Grotius accepts it as fact,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_30\" id=\"FNanchor_30\"\u003e[30]\u003c/a\u003e (as Hobbes did later)\r\nas the natural method for settling the disputes which were bound\r\nconstantly to arise between so many independent and sovereign\r\nnations. A terrible scourge it must ever remain, but as the only\r\navailable form of legal procedure, it is sanctioned by the practice\r\nof states and not less by the law of nature and of nations. Grotius\r\ndid not advance beyond this position. Every violation of the law\r\nof nations can be settled but in one way—by war, the force of the\r\nstronger.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe necessary distinction between law and ethics was\r\ndrawn by Puffendorf,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_31\" id=\"FNanchor_31\"\u003e[31]\u003c/a\u003e a successor of Grotius who gave an\r\noutwardly systematic form to the doctrine of the great jurist,\r\nwithout adding to it\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_28\"\u003e[p.\r\n28]\u003c/span\u003e either strength or completeness. His views, when they\r\nwere not based upon the system of Grotius, were strongly influenced\r\nby the speculation of Hobbes, his chronological predecessor, to whom\r\nwe shall have later occasion to refer. In the works of Vattel,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_32\" id=\"FNanchor_32\"\u003e[32]\u003c/a\u003e who\r\nwas, next to Rousseau, the most celebrated of Swiss publicists, we\r\nfind the theory of the customs and practice in war widely developed,\r\nand the necessity for humanising its methods and limiting its\r\ndestructive effects upon neutral countries strongly emphasised.\r\nGrotius and Puffendorf, while they recommend acts of mercy, hold that\r\nthere is legally no right which requires that a conquered enemy shall\r\nbe spared. This is a matter of humanity alone. It is to the praise\r\nof Vattel that he did much to popularise among the highest and most\r\npowerful classes of society, ideas of humanity in warfare, and of\r\nthe rights and obligations of nations. He is, moreover, the first to\r\nmake a clear separation between this science and the Law of Nature.\r\nWhat, he asks, is international law as distinguished from the Law\r\nof Nature? What are the powers of a state and the duties of nations\r\nto one another? What are the causes of quarrel among nations, and\r\nwhat the means by which they can be settled without any sacrifice of\r\ndignity?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_29\"\u003e[p. 29]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThey are, in the first place, a friendly conciliatory attitude;\r\nand secondly, such means of settlement as mediation, arbitration and\r\nPeace Congresses. These are the refuges of a peace-loving nation, in\r\ncases where vital interests are not at stake. “Nature gives us no\r\nright to use force, except where mild and conciliatory measures are\r\nuseless.” (\u003ci\u003eLaw of Nations\u003c/i\u003e, II. Ch. xviii. § 331.) “Every power owes\r\nit in this matter to the happiness of human society to show itself\r\nready for every means of reconciliation, in cases where the interests\r\nat stake are neither vital nor important.” (\u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e § 332.) At the\r\nsame time, it is never advisable that a nation should forgive an\r\ninsult which it has not the power to resent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"heading\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe Dream of a Perpetual Peace.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut side by side with this development and gradual popularisation\r\nof the new science of International Law, ideas of a less practical,\r\nbut not less fruitful kind had been steadily making their way\r\nand obtaining a strong hold upon the popular mind. The Decree of\r\nEternal Pacification of 1495 had abolished private war, one of the\r\nheavy curses of the Middle Ages. Why should it not be extended\r\nto banish warfare between states as well? Gradually one proposal\r\nafter another was made\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_30\"\u003e[p.\r\n30]\u003c/span\u003e to attain this end, or, at least, to smooth the way for\r\nits future realisation. The first of these in point of time is to\r\nbe found in a somewhat bare, vague form in Sully’s \u003ci\u003eMemoirs\u003c/i\u003e,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_33\" id=\"FNanchor_33\"\u003e[33]\u003c/a\u003e said\r\nto have been published in 1634. Half a century later the Quaker\r\nWilliam Penn suggested an international tribunal of arbitration\r\nin the interests of peace.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_34\" id=\"FNanchor_34\"\u003e[34]\u003c/a\u003e But it was by the French Abbé St. Pierre\r\nthat the problem of perpetual peace was fairly introduced into\r\npolitical literature: and this, in an age of cabinet and dynastic\r\nwars, while the dreary cost of the war of the Spanish succession was\r\nyet unpaid. St. Pierre was the first who really clearly realised and\r\nendeavoured to prove that the establishment of a permanent state of\r\npeace is not only in the interest of the weaker, but is required\r\nby the European society of nations and by the reason of man. From\r\nthe beginning of the history of humanity, poets and prophets had\r\ncherished the “sweet dream” of a peaceful civilisation: it is in the\r\nform of a practical project that this idea is new.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe ancient world actually represented a state\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_31\"\u003e[p. 31]\u003c/span\u003e of what was almost\r\nperpetual war. This was the reality which confronted man, his\r\ninevitable doom, it seemed, as it had been pronounced to the fallen\r\nsinners of Eden. Peace was something which man had enjoyed once, but\r\nforfeited. The myth- and poetry-loving Greeks, and, later, the poets\r\nof Rome delighted to paint a state of eternal peace, not as something\r\nto whose coming they could look forward in the future, but as a\r\ngolden age of purity whose records lay buried in the past, a paradise\r\nwhich had been, but which was no more. Voices, more scientific, were\r\nraised even in Greece in attempts, such as Aristotle’s, to show\r\nthat the evolution of man had been not a course of degeneration\r\nfrom perfection, but of continual progress upwards from barbarism\r\nto civilisation and culture. But the change in popular thinking on\r\nthis matter was due less to the arguments of philosophy than to a\r\npractical experience of the causes which operate in the interests\r\nof peace. The foundation of a universal empire under Alexander the\r\nGreat gave temporary rest to nations heretofore incessantly at war.\r\nHere was a proof that the Divine Will had not decreed that man was\r\nto work out his punishment under unchanging conditions of perpetual\r\nwarfare. This idea of a universal empire became the Greek ideal of a\r\nperpetual peace. Such an empire was, in the language of the Stoics,\r\na world\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_32\"\u003e[p. 32]\u003c/span\u003e-state in\r\nwhich all men had rights of citizenship, in which all other nations\r\nwere absorbed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eParallel to this ideal among the Greeks, we find the hope in\r\nIsrael of a Messiah whose coming was to bring peace, not only to\r\nthe Jewish race, but to all the nations of the earth. This idea\r\nstands out in the sharpest contrast to the early nationalism of the\r\nHebrew people, who regarded every stranger as an idolater and an\r\nenemy. The prophecies of Judaism, combined with the cosmopolitan\r\nideas of Greece, were the source of the idea, which is expressed in\r\nthe teaching of Christ, of a spiritual world-empire, an empire held\r\ntogether solely by the tie of a common religion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis hope of peace did not actually die during the first thousand\r\nyears of our era, nor even under the morally stagnating influences\r\nof the Middle Ages. When feudalism and private war were abolished\r\nin Europe, it wakened to a new life. Not merely in the mouths of\r\npoets and religious enthusiasts was the cry raised against war, but\r\nby scholars like Thomas More and Erasmus, jurists like Gentilis\r\nand Grotius, men high in the state and in the eyes of Europe like\r\nHenry IV. of France and the Duc de Sully or the Abbé de St. Pierre\r\nwhose \u003ci\u003eProjet de Paix Perpétuelle\u003c/i\u003e (1713)\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_35\" id=\"FNanchor_35\"\u003e[35]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_33\"\u003e[p. 33]\u003c/span\u003e obtained immediate popularity and\r\nwide-spread fame. The first half of the eighteenth century was\r\nalready prepared to receive and mature a plan of this kind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"heading\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eHenry IV. and St. Pierre.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003eGrand Dessein\u003c/i\u003e of Henry IV. is supposed to have been formed\r\nby that monarch and reproduced in Sully’s \u003ci\u003eMemoirs\u003c/i\u003e, written in 1634\r\nand discovered nearly a century later by St. Pierre. The story goes\r\nthat the Abbé found the book buried in an old garden. It has been\r\nshewn, however, that there is little likelihood that this project\r\nactually originated with the king, who probably corresponded fairly\r\nwell to Voltaire’s picture of him as war hero of the \u003ci\u003eHenriade\u003c/i\u003e. The\r\nplan was more likely conceived by Sully, and ascribed to the popular\r\nking for the sake of the better hearing and greater influence it\r\nmight in this way be likely to have, and also because, thereby, it\r\nmight be less likely to create offence in political circles. St.\r\nPierre himself may or may not have been acquainted with the facts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe so-called \u003ci\u003eGrand Dessein\u003c/i\u003e of Henry IV. was, shortly,\r\nas follows.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_36\" id=\"FNanchor_36\"\u003e[36]\u003c/a\u003e It proposed to divide Europe\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_34\"\u003e[p. 34]\u003c/span\u003e between fifteen Powers,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_37\" id=\"FNanchor_37\"\u003e[37]\u003c/a\u003e in\r\nsuch a manner that the balance of power should be established and\r\npreserved. These were to form a Christian republic on the basis\r\nof the freedom and equality of its members, the armed forces of\r\nthe federation being supported by fixed contribution. A general\r\ncouncil, consisting of representatives from the fifteen states,\r\nwas to make all laws necessary for cementing the union thus formed\r\nand for maintaining the order once established. It would also be\r\nthe business of this senate to “deliberate on questions that might\r\narise, to occupy themselves with discussing different interests, to\r\nsettle quarrels amicably, to throw light upon and arrange all the\r\ncivil, political and religious affairs of Europe, whether internal or\r\nforeign.” (\u003ci\u003eMémoires\u003c/i\u003e, vol. VI., p. 129 \u003ci\u003eseq.\u003c/i\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis scheme of the king or his minister was expanded with great\r\nthoroughness and clear-sightedness by the Abbé St. Pierre: none of\r\nthe many later plans for a perpetual peace has been so perfect in\r\ndetails. He proposes that there should be a permanent and perpetual\r\nunion between, if possible, all Christian sovereigns—of whom he\r\nsuggests nineteen, excluding the Czar—“to preserve unbroken peace\r\nin Europe,” and that a permanent Congress\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_35\"\u003e[p. 35]\u003c/span\u003e or senate should be formed by deputies\r\nof the federated states. The union should protect weak sovereigns,\r\nminors during a regency, and so on, and should banish civil as well\r\nas international war—it should “render prompt and adequate assistance\r\nto rulers and chief magistrates against seditious persons and\r\nrebels.” All warfare henceforth is to be waged between the troops\r\nof the federation—each nation contributing an equal number—and\r\nthe enemies of European security, whether outsiders or rebellious\r\nmembers of the union. Otherwise, where it is possible, all disputes\r\noccurring within the union are to be settled by the arbitration of\r\nthe senate, and the combined military force of the federation is\r\nto be applied to drive the Turks out of Europe. There is to be a\r\nrational rearrangement of boundaries, but after this no change is to\r\nbe permitted in the map of Europe. The union should bind itself to\r\ntolerate the different forms of faith.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe objections to St. Pierre’s scheme are, many of them, obvious.\r\nHe himself produces sixty-two arguments likely to be raised against\r\nhis plan, and he examines these in turn with acuteness and eloquence.\r\nBut there are other criticisms which he was less likely to be able\r\nto forestall. Of the nineteen states he names as a basis of the\r\nfederation, some have disappeared and the governments of others\r\nhave completely changed. Indeed St. Pierre’s\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_36\"\u003e[p. 36]\u003c/span\u003e scheme did not look far beyond the\r\npresent. But it has besides a too strongly political character.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_38\" id=\"FNanchor_38\"\u003e[38]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nFrom this point of view, the Abbé’s plan amounts practically to\r\na European coalition against the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, we\r\nnotice with a smile that the French statesman and patriot is not\r\nlost in the cosmopolitan political reformer. “The kingdom of Spain\r\nshall not go out of the House of Bourbon!”\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_39\" id=\"FNanchor_39\"\u003e[39]\u003c/a\u003e France is to enjoy more\r\nthan the privileges of honour; she is to reap distinct material and\r\npolitical advantages from the union. Humanity is to be a brotherhood,\r\nbut, in the federation of nations, France is to stand first.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_40\" id=\"FNanchor_40\"\u003e[40]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nWe see that these “rêves d’un homme de bien,” as Cardinal Dubois\r\ncalled them, are not without their practical element. But the\r\ngreat mistake of St. Pierre is this: he actually thought that\r\nhis plan could be put into execution in the near future, that an\r\nideal of this kind was realisable at once.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_41\" id=\"FNanchor_41\"\u003e[41]\u003c/a\u003e “I, myself,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_37\"\u003e[p. 37]\u003c/span\u003e form’d it,” he says in\r\nthe preface, “in full expectation to see it one Day executed.” As\r\nHobbes, says, “there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in\r\nthe books of philosophers.”\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_42\" id=\"FNanchor_42\"\u003e[42]\u003c/a\u003e St. Pierre was not content to make his\r\ninfluence felt on the statesmen of his time and prepare the way for\r\nthe abolition of all arbitrary forms of government. This was the flaw\r\nwhich drew down upon the good Abbé Voltaire’s sneering epigram\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_43\" id=\"FNanchor_43\"\u003e[43]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand the irony of Leibniz.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_44\" id=\"FNanchor_44\"\u003e[44]\u003c/a\u003e Here, above all, in this unpractical\r\nenthusiasm his scheme differs from that of Kant.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"heading\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_38\"\u003e[p.\r\n38]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ci\u003eRousseau’s Criticism of St. Pierre.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eRousseau took St. Pierre’s project\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_45\" id=\"FNanchor_45\"\u003e[45]\u003c/a\u003e much more seriously\r\nthan either Leibniz or Voltaire. But sovereigns, he thought, are deaf\r\nto the voice of justice; the absolutism of princely power would never\r\nallow a king to submit to a tribunal of nations. Moreover war was,\r\naccording to Rousseau’s experience, a matter not between nations, but\r\nbetween princes and cabinets. It was one of the ordinary pleasures\r\nof royal existence and one not likely to be voluntarily given up.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_46\" id=\"FNanchor_46\"\u003e[46]\u003c/a\u003e We\r\nknow that history has not supported Rousseau’s contention. Dynastic\r\nwars are now no more. The Great Powers have shown themselves able\r\nto impose their\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_39\"\u003e[p. 39]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nown conditions, where the welfare and security of Europe have seemed\r\nto demand it. Such a development seemed impossible enough in the\r\neighteenth century. In the military organisation of the nations of\r\nEurope and in the necessity of making their internal development\r\nsubordinate to the care for their external security, Rousseau saw the\r\ncause of all the defects in their administration.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_47\" id=\"FNanchor_47\"\u003e[47]\u003c/a\u003e The formation of\r\nunions on the model of the Swiss Confederation or the German \u003ci\u003eBund\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwould, he thought, be in the interest of all rulers. But great\r\nobstacles seemed to him to lie in the way of the realisation of such\r\na project as that of St. Pierre. “Without doubt,” says Rousseau in\r\nconclusion, “the proposal of a perpetual peace is at present an\r\nabsurd one…. It can only be put into effect by methods which are\r\nviolent in themselves and dangerous to humanity. One cannot conceive\r\nof the possibility of a federative union being established, except\r\nby a revolution.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_40\"\u003e[p. 40]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nAnd, that granted, who among us would venture to say whether this\r\nEuropean federation is to be desired or to be feared? It would work,\r\nperhaps, more harm in a moment than it would prevent in the course of\r\ncenturies.” (\u003ci\u003eJugement sur la Paix Perpétuelle.\u003c/i\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"heading\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe Position of Hobbes.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe most profound and searching analysis of this problem comes\r\nfrom Immanuel Kant, whose indebtedness in the sphere of politics\r\nto Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau it is difficult to\r\noverestimate. Kant’s doctrine of the sovereignty of the people comes\r\nto him from Locke through Rousseau. His explanation of the origin\r\nof society is practically that of Hobbes. The direct influence on\r\npolitics of this philosopher, apart from his share in moulding the\r\nKantian theory of the state, is one we cannot afford to neglect. His\r\nwas a great influence on the new science just thrown on the world by\r\nGrotius, and his the first clear and systematic statement we have of\r\nthe nature of society and the establishment of the state. The natural\r\nstate of man, says Hobbes, is a state of war,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_48\" id=\"FNanchor_48\"\u003e[48]\u003c/a\u003e a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_41\"\u003e[p. 41]\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003ebellum omnium contra omnes\u003c/i\u003e, where all\r\nstruggle for honour and for preferment and the prizes to which every\r\nindividual is by natural right equally entitled, but which can of\r\nnecessity fall only to the few, the foremost in the race. Men hate\r\nand fear the society of their kind, but through this desire\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_42\"\u003e[p. 42]\u003c/span\u003e to excel are forced to\r\nseek it: only where there are many can there be a first. This state\r\nof things, this apparent sociability which is brought about by and\r\ncoupled with the least sociable of instincts, becomes unendurable.\r\n“It is necessary to peace,” writes Hobbes (\u003ci\u003eOn Dominion\u003c/i\u003e, Ch. VI.\r\n3) “that a man be so far forth protected against the violence of\r\nothers, that he may live securely; that is, that he may have no just\r\ncause to fear others, so long as he doth them no injury. Indeed, to\r\nmake men altogether safe from mutual harms, so as they cannot be\r\nhurt or injuriously killed, is impossible; and, therefore, comes not\r\nwithin deliberation.” But to protect them so far as is possible the\r\nstate is formed. Hobbes has no great faith in human contracts or\r\npromises. Man’s nature is malicious and untrustworthy. A coercive\r\npower is necessary to guarantee this long-desired security within the\r\ncommunity. “We must therefore,” he adds, “provide for our security,\r\nnot by compacts, but by punishments; and there is then sufficient\r\nprovision made, when there are so great punishments appointed for\r\nevery injury, as apparently it prove a greater evil to have done it,\r\nthan not to have done it. For all men, by a necessity of nature,\r\nchoose that which to them appears to be the less evil.” (\u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nCh. VI. 4.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese precautions secure that relative peace\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_43\"\u003e[p. 43]\u003c/span\u003e within the state which is one of the\r\nconditions of the safety of the people. But it is, besides, the duty\r\nof a sovereign to guarantee an adequate protection to his subjects\r\nagainst foreign enemies. A state of defence as complete and perfect\r\nas possible is not only a national duty, but an absolute necessity.\r\nThe following statement of the relation of the state to other states\r\nshows how closely Hobbes has been followed by Kant. “There are\r\ntwo things necessary,” says Hobbes, (\u003ci\u003eOn Dominion\u003c/i\u003e, Ch. XIII. 7)\r\n“for the people’s defence; to be warned and to be forearmed. \u003ci\u003eFor\r\nthe state of commonwealths considered in themselves, is natural,\r\nthat is to say, hostile.\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_49\" id=\"FNanchor_49\"\u003e[49]\u003c/a\u003e Neither, if they cease from fighting, is it\r\ntherefore to be called peace; but rather a breathing time, in which\r\none enemy observing the motion and countenance of the other, values\r\nhis security not according to pacts, but the forces and counsels of\r\nhis adversary.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHobbes is a practical philosopher: no man was less a dreamer, a\r\nfollower after ideals than he. He is, moreover, a pessimist, and his\r\ndoctrine of the state is a political absolutism,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_50\" id=\"FNanchor_50\"\u003e[50]\u003c/a\u003e the form of\r\ngovern\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_44\"\u003e[p. 44]\u003c/span\u003ement which\r\nabove all has been, and is, favourable to war. He would no doubt have\r\nridiculed the idea of a perpetual peace between nations, had such\r\na project as that of St. Pierre—a practical project, counting upon\r\na realisation in the near future—been brought before him. He might\r\nnot even have accepted it in the very much modified form which Kant\r\nadopts, that of an ideal—an unattainable ideal—towards which humanity\r\ncould not do better than work. He expected the worst possible from\r\nman the individual. \u003ci\u003eHomo homini lupus.\u003c/i\u003e The strictest absolutism,\r\namounting almost to despotism, was required to keep the vicious\r\npropensities of the human animal in check. States he looked upon as\r\nunits of the same kind, members also of a society. They had, and\r\nopenly exhibited, the same faults as individual men. They too might\r\nbe driven with a strong enough coercive force behind them, but not\r\nwithout it; and such a coercive force as this did not exist in a\r\nsociety of nations. Federation and federal troops are terms which\r\nrepresent ideas of comparatively recent origin.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_45\"\u003e[p. 45]\u003c/span\u003e Without something of this kind, any\r\nenduring peace was not to be counted upon. International relations\r\nwere and must remain at least potentially warlike in character. Under\r\nno circumstances could ideal conditions be possible either between\r\nthe members of a state or between the states themselves. Human nature\r\ncould form no satisfactory basis for a counsel of perfection.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHence Hobbes never thought of questioning the necessity of war.\r\nIt was in his eyes the natural condition of European society; but\r\ncertain rules were necessary both for its conduct and, where this\r\nwas compatible with a nation’s dignity and prosperity, for its\r\nprevention. He held that international law was only a part of the\r\nLaw of Nature, and that this Law of Nature laid certain obligations\r\nupon nations and their kings. Mediation must be employed between\r\ndisputants as much as possible, the person of the mediators of\r\npeace being held inviolate; an umpire ought to be chosen to decide\r\na controversy, to whose judgment the parties in dispute agree to\r\nsubmit themselves; such an arbiter must be impartial. These are all\r\nwhat Hobbes calls precepts of the Law of Nature. And he appeals to\r\nthe Scriptures in confirmation of his assertion that peace is the\r\nway of righteousness and that the laws of nature of which these\r\nare a few are also laws of the heavenly kingdom. But peace is like\r\nthe\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_46\"\u003e[p. 46]\u003c/span\u003e straight path\r\nof Christian endeavour, difficult to find and difficult to keep.\r\nWe must seek after it where it may be found; but, having done this\r\nand sought in vain, we have no alternative but to fall back upon\r\nwar. Reason requires “that every man ought to endeavour peace,”\r\n(\u003ci\u003eLev.\u003c/i\u003e I. Ch. XIV.) “as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and\r\nwhen he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps,\r\nand advantages of war.”\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_51\" id=\"FNanchor_51\"\u003e[51]\u003c/a\u003e This, says Hobbes elsewhere, (\u003ci\u003eOn Liberty\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nCh. I. 15) is the dictate of right reason, the first and fundamental\r\nlaw of nature.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"heading\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eKant’s Idea of a Perpetual Peace.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith regard to the problems of international law, Kant is of\r\ncourse a hundred and fifty years ahead of Hobbes. But he starts from\r\nthe same point: his theory of the beginning of society is practically\r\nidentical with that of the older philosopher. Men are by nature\r\nimperfect creatures, unsociable and untrustworthy, cursed by a love\r\nof glory, of possession, and of power, passions which make happiness\r\nsomething for ever unattainable by them. Hobbes is content to leave\r\nthem here with their imperfections, and let a strong government\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_47\"\u003e[p. 47]\u003c/span\u003e help them out as it may.\r\nBut not so Kant. He looks beyond man the individual, developing\r\nslowly by stages scarcely measurable, progressing at one moment,\r\nand the next, as it seems, falling behind: he looks beyond the\r\nindividual, struggling and never attaining, to the race. Here Kant\r\nis no pessimist. The capacities implanted in man by nature are not\r\nall for evil: they are, he says, “destined to unfold themselves\r\ncompletely in the course of time, and in accordance with the end\r\nto which they are adapted.” (\u003ci\u003eIdea of a Universal History from a\r\nCosmopolitan Point of View\u003c/i\u003e, 1784. Prop. 1.) This end of humanity is\r\nthe evolution of man from the stage of mere self-satisfied animalism\r\nto a high state of civilisation. Through his own reason man is to\r\nattain a perfect culture, intellectual and moral. In this long period\r\nof struggle, the potential faculties which nature or Providence has\r\nbestowed upon him reach their full development. The process in which\r\nthis evolution takes place is what we call history.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo man nature has given none of the perfect animal equipments\r\nfor self-preservation and self-defence which she has bestowed\r\non others of her creatures. But she has given to him reason and\r\nfreedom of will, and has determined that through these faculties\r\nand without the aid of instinct he shall win for himself a complete\r\ndevelopment of his capacities and natural endowments. It is,\r\nsays\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_48\"\u003e[p. 48]\u003c/span\u003e Kant, no happy\r\nlife that nature has marked out for man. He is filled with desires\r\nwhich he can never satisfy. His life is one of endeavour and not of\r\nattainment: not even the consciousness of the well-fought battle is\r\nhis, for the struggle is more or less an unconscious one, the end\r\nunseen. Only in the race, and not in the individual, can the natural\r\ncapacities of the human species reach full development. Reason, says\r\nKant, (Prop. 2, \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e) “does not itself work by instinct, but\r\nrequires experiments, exercise and instruction in order to advance\r\ngradually from one stage of insight to another. Hence each individual\r\nman would necessarily have to live an enormous length of time, in\r\norder to learn by himself how to make a complete use of all his\r\nnatural endowments. Or, if nature should have given him but a short\r\nlease of life, as is actually the case, reason would then require an\r\nalmost interminable series of generations, the one handing down its\r\nenlightenment to the other, in order that the seeds she has sown in\r\nour species may be brought at last to a stage of development which\r\nis in perfect accordance with her design.” Man the individual shall\r\ntravel towards the land of promise and fight for its possession,\r\nbut not he, nor his children, nor his children’s children shall\r\ninherit the land. “Only the latest comers can have the good fortune\r\nof inhabiting\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_49\"\u003e[p. 49]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe dwelling which the long series of their predecessors have\r\ntoiled—though,” adds Kant, “without any conscious intent—to build up\r\nwithout even the possibility of participating in the happiness which\r\nthey were preparing.” (Proposition 3.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe means which nature employs to bring about this development of\r\nall the capacities implanted in men is their mutual antagonism in\r\nsociety—what Kant calls the “unsocial sociableness of men, that is to\r\nsay, their inclination to enter into society, an inclination which\r\nyet is bound up at every point with a resistance which threatens\r\ncontinually to break up the society so formed.” (Proposition 4.) Man\r\nhates society, and yet there alone he can develop his capacities; he\r\ncannot live there peaceably, and yet cannot live without it. It is\r\nthe resistance which others offer to his inclinations and will—which\r\nhe, on his part, shows likewise to the desires of others—that awakens\r\nall the latent powers of his nature and the determination to conquer\r\nhis natural propensity to indolence and love of material comfort\r\nand to struggle for the first place among his fellow-creatures, to\r\nsatisfy, in outstripping them, his love of glory and possession and\r\npower. “Without those, in themselves by no means lovely, qualities\r\nwhich set man in social opposition to man, so that each finds his\r\nselfish claims resisted by the selfishness of all the others, men\r\nwould have lived\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_50\"\u003e[p. 50]\u003c/span\u003e\r\non in an Arcadian shepherd life, in perfect harmony, contentment,\r\nand mutual love; but all their talents would forever have remained\r\nhidden and undeveloped. Thus, kindly as the sheep they tended, they\r\nwould scarcely have given to their existence a greater value than\r\nthat of their cattle. And the place among the ends of creation which\r\nwas left for the development of rational beings would not have been\r\nfilled. Thanks be to nature for the unsociableness, for the spiteful\r\ncompetition of vanity, for the insatiate desires of gain and power!\r\nWithout these, all the excellent natural capacities of humanity\r\nwould have slumbered undeveloped. Man’s will is for harmony; but\r\nnature knows better what is good for his species: her will is for\r\ndissension. He would like a life of comfort and satisfaction, but\r\nnature wills that he should be dragged out of idleness and inactive\r\ncontent and plunged into labour and trouble, in order that he may be\r\nmade to seek in his own prudence for the means of again delivering\r\nhimself from them. The natural impulses which prompt this effort,—the\r\ncauses of unsociableness and mutual conflict, out of which so many\r\nevils spring,—are also in turn the spurs which drive him to the\r\ndevelopment of his powers. Thus, they really betray the providence\r\nof a wise Creator, and not the interference of some evil spirit\r\nwhich has meddled with the world which God has\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_51\"\u003e[p. 51]\u003c/span\u003e nobly planned, and enviously overturned\r\nits order.” (Proposition 4: Caird’s translation in \u003ci\u003eThe Critical\r\nPhilosophy of Kant\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II., pp. 550, 551.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe problem now arises, How shall men live together, each free to\r\nwork out his own development, without at the same time interfering\r\nwith a like liberty on the part of his neighbour? The solution\r\nof this problem is the state. Here the liberty of each member is\r\nguaranteed and its limits strictly defined. A perfectly just civil\r\nconstitution, administered according to the principles of right,\r\nwould be that under which the greatest possible amount of liberty\r\nwas left to each citizen within these limits. This is the ideal\r\nof Kant, and here lies the greatest practical problem which has\r\npresented itself to humanity. An ideal of this kind is difficult of\r\nrealisation. But nature imposes no such duty upon us. “Out of such\r\ncrooked material as man is made,” says Kant, “nothing can be hammered\r\nquite straight.” (Proposition 6.) We must make our constitution as\r\ngood as we can and, with that, rest content.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe direct cause of this transition from a state of nature\r\nand conditions of unlimited freedom to civil society with its\r\ncoercive and restraining forces is found in the evils of that\r\nstate of nature as they are painted by Hobbes. A wild lawless\r\nfreedom becomes impossible for man: he is compelled to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_52\"\u003e[p. 52]\u003c/span\u003e seek the protection\r\nof a civil society. He lives in uncertainty and insecurity: his\r\nliberty is so far worthless that he cannot peacefully enjoy\r\nit. For this peace he voluntarily yields up some part of his\r\nindependence. The establishment of the state is in the interest of\r\nhis development to a higher civilisation. It is more—the guarantee\r\nof his existence and self-preservation. This is the sense, says\r\nProfessor Paulsen, in which Kant like Hobbes regards the state as\r\n“resting on a contract,”\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_52\" id=\"FNanchor_52\"\u003e[52]\u003c/a\u003e that\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_53\"\u003e[p.\r\n53]\u003c/span\u003e is to say, on the free will of all.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_53\" id=\"FNanchor_53\"\u003e[53]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eVolenti non fit\r\ninjuria.\u003c/i\u003e Only, adds Paulsen, we must remember that this contract\r\nis not a historical fact, as it seemed to some writers of the\r\neighteenth century, but an “idea of reason”: we are speaking here not\r\nof the history of the establishment of the state, but of the reason\r\nof its existence. (Paulsen’s \u003ci\u003eKant\u003c/i\u003e, p. 354.)\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_54\" id=\"FNanchor_54\"\u003e[54]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_54\"\u003e[p. 54]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this civil union, self-sought, yet sought reluctantly, man is\r\nable to turn his most unlovable qualities to a profitable use. They\r\nbind this society together. They are the instrument by which he wins\r\nfor himself self-culture. It is here with men, says Kant, as it is\r\nwith the trees in a forest: “just because each one strives to deprive\r\nthe other of air and sun, they compel each other to seek both above,\r\nand thus they grow beautiful and straight. Whereas those that, in\r\nfreedom and isolation from one another, shoot out their branches at\r\nwill, grow stunted and crooked and awry.” (Proposition 5, \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e)\r\nCulture, art, and all that is best in the social order are the fruits\r\nof that self-loving unsociableness in man.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe problem of the establishment of a perfect civil constitution\r\ncannot be solved, says this treatise (\u003ci\u003eIdea for a Universal\r\nHistory\u003c/i\u003e), until the external relations of states are regulated\r\nin accordance with principles of right. For, even if the ideal\r\ninternal constitution were attained, what end would it serve in the\r\nevolution of humanity, if commonwealths themselves were to remain\r\nlike individuals in a state of nature, each existing in uncontrolled\r\nfreedom, a law unto himself? This condition of things again cannot\r\nbe permanent. Nature uses the same means as before to bring about\r\na state of law and order. War, present or near at hand, the\r\nstrain\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_55\"\u003e[p. 55]\u003c/span\u003e of constant\r\npreparation for a possible future campaign or the heavy burden of\r\ndebt and devastation left by the last,—these are the evils which must\r\ndrive states to leave a lawless, savage state of nature, hostile to\r\nman’s inward development, and seek in union the end of nature, peace.\r\nAll wars are the attempts nature makes to bring about new political\r\nrelations between nations, relations which, in their very nature,\r\ncannot be, and are not desired to be, permanent. These combinations\r\nwill go on succeeding each other, until at last a federation of all\r\npowers is formed for the establishment of perpetual peace. This is\r\nthe end of humanity, demanded by reason. Justice will reign, not only\r\nin the state, but in the whole human race when perpetual peace exists\r\nbetween the nations of the world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is the point of view of the \u003ci\u003eIdea for a Universal History\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nBut equally, we may say, law and justice will reign between\r\nnations, when a legally and morally perfect constitution adorns the\r\nstate. External perpetual peace presupposes internal peace—peace\r\ncivil, social, economic, religious. Now, when men are perfect—and\r\nwhat would this be but perfection—how can there be war? Cardinal\r\nFleury’s only objection—no light one—to St. Pierre’s project was\r\nthat, as even the most peace-loving could not avoid war, all men\r\nmust first be men of noble character. This seems to be what is\r\nrequired\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_56\"\u003e[p. 56]\u003c/span\u003e in the\r\ntreatise on \u003ci\u003ePerpetual Peace\u003c/i\u003e. Kant demands, to a certain extent,\r\nthe moral regeneration of man. There must be perfect honesty in\r\ninternational dealings, good faith in the interpretation and\r\nfulfilment of treaties and so on (Art. 1)\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_55\" id=\"FNanchor_55\"\u003e[55]\u003c/a\u003e: and again, every\r\nstate must have a republican constitution—a term by which Kant\r\nunderstands a constitution as nearly as possible in accordance with\r\nthe spirit of right. (Art. 1.)\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_56\" id=\"FNanchor_56\"\u003e[56]\u003c/a\u003e This is to say that we have to start with\r\nour reformation at home, look first to the culture and education\r\nand morals of our citizens, then to our foreign relations. This is\r\na question of self-interest as well as of ethics. On the civil and\r\nreligious liberty of a state depends its commercial success. Kant\r\nsaw the day coming, when industrial superiority was to be identified\r\nwith political pre-eminence. The state which does not look to the\r\nenlightenment and liberty of its subjects must fail in the race. But\r\nthe advantages of a high state of civilisation are not all negative.\r\nThe more highly developed the individuals who form a state, the more\r\nhighly developed is its consciousness of its obligations to other\r\nnations. In the ignorance and barbarism of races lies the great\r\nobstacle to a reign of law among states. Uncivilised states cannot be\r\nconceived as members of a federation of Europe.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_57\"\u003e[p. 57]\u003c/span\u003e First, the perfect civil constitution\r\naccording to right: then the federation of these law-abiding Powers.\r\nThis is the path which reason marks out. The treatise on \u003ci\u003ePerpetual\r\nPeace\u003c/i\u003e seems to be in this respect more practical than the \u003ci\u003eIdea\r\nfor a Universal History\u003c/i\u003e. But it matters little which way we take\r\nit. The point of view is the same in both cases: the end remains\r\nthe development of man towards good, the order of his steps in this\r\ndirection is indifferent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"heading\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe Political and Social Conditions of Kant’s\r\nTime.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe history of the human race, viewed as a whole, Kant regards\r\nas the realisation of a hidden plan of nature to bring about a\r\npolitical constitution internally and externally perfect—the only\r\ncondition under which the faculties of man can be fully developed.\r\nDoes experience support this theory? Kant thought that, to a certain\r\ndegree, it did. This conviction was not, however, a fruit of his\r\nexperience of citizenship in Prussia, an absolute dynastic state,\r\na military monarchy waging perpetual dynastic wars of the kind he\r\nmost hotly condemned. Kant had no feeling of love to Prussia,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_57\" id=\"FNanchor_57\"\u003e[57]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand little of a citizen’s patriotic pride, or even in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_58\"\u003e[p. 58]\u003c/span\u003eterest, in its political\r\nachievements. This was partly because of his sympathy with republican\r\ndoctrines: partly due to his love of justice and peculiar hatred of\r\nwar,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_58\" id=\"FNanchor_58\"\u003e[58]\u003c/a\u003e\r\na hatred based, no doubt, not less on principle than on a close\r\npersonal experience of the wretchedness it brings with it. It was\r\nnot the political and social conditions in which he lived which\r\nfostered Kant’s love of liberty and gave him inspiration, unless\r\nin the sense in which the mind reacts upon surrounding influences.\r\nLooking beyond\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_59\"\u003e[p. 59]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nPrussia to America, in whose struggle for independence he took a keen\r\ninterest, and looking to France where the old dynastic monarchy had\r\nbeen succeeded by a republican state, Kant seemed to see the signs of\r\na coming democratisation of the old monarchical society of Europe. In\r\nthis growing influence on the state of the mass of the people who had\r\neverything to lose in war and little to gain by victory, he saw the\r\nguarantee of a future perpetual peace. Other forces too were at work\r\nto bring about this consummation. There was a growing consciousness\r\nthat war, this costly means of settling a dispute, is not even a\r\nsatisfactory method of settlement. Hazardous and destructive in its\r\neffect, it is also uncertain in its results. Victory is not always\r\ngain; it no longer signifies a land to be plundered, a people to\r\nbe sold to slavery. It brings fresh responsibilities to a nation,\r\nat a time when it is not always strong enough to bear them. But,\r\nabove all, Kant saw, even at the end of the eighteenth century, the\r\nnations of Europe so closely bound together by commercial interests\r\nthat a war—and especially a maritime war where the scene of conflict\r\ncannot be to the same extent localised as on land—between any two of\r\nthem could not but seriously affect the prosperity of the others.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_59\" id=\"FNanchor_59\"\u003e[59]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nHe\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_60\"\u003e[p. 60]\u003c/span\u003e clearly realised\r\nthat the spirit of commerce was the strongest force in the service of\r\nthe maintenance of peace, and that in it lay a guarantee of future\r\nunion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis scheme of a federation of the nations of the world, in\r\naccordance with principles which would put an end to war between\r\nthem, was one whose interest for Kant seemed to increase during the\r\nlast twenty years of his life.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_60\" id=\"FNanchor_60\"\u003e[60]\u003c/a\u003e It was according to him an idea of reason,\r\nand, in his first essay on the subject—that of 1784—we see the\r\nplace this ideal of a perpetual peace held in the Kantian system\r\nof philosophy. Its realisation is the realisation of the highest\r\ngood—the ethical and political \u003ci\u003esummum bonum\u003c/i\u003e, for here the aims\r\nof morals and politics coincide: only in a perfect development of\r\nhis faculties in culture and in morals can man at last find true\r\nhappiness. History is working towards the consummation of this end. A\r\nmoral obligation lies on man to strive to establish conditions which\r\nbring its realisation nearer. It is the duty of statesmen to form a\r\nfederative union as it was formerly the duty of individuals to enter\r\nthe state. The moral law points the way here as clearly as in the\r\nsphere of pure ethics:—“Thou can’st, therefore thou ought’st.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_61\"\u003e[p. 61]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLet us\r\nbe under no misapprehension as to Kant’s attitude to the problem of\r\nperpetual peace. It is an ideal. He states plainly that he so regards\r\nit\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_61\" id=\"FNanchor_61\"\u003e[61]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand that as such it is unattainable. But this is the essence of\r\nall ideals: they have not the less value in shaping the life and\r\ncharacter of men and nations on that account. They are not ends to\r\nbe realised but ideas according to which we must live, regulative\r\nprinciples. We cannot, says Kant, shape our life better than in\r\nacting as if such ideas of reason have objective validity and there\r\nbe an immortal life in which man shall live according to the laws of\r\nreason, in peace with his neighbour and in freedom from the trammels\r\nof sense.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHence we are concerned here, not with an end, but with the means\r\nby which we might best set about attaining it, if it were attainable.\r\nThis is the subject matter of the \u003ci\u003eTreatise on Perpetual Peace\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(1795), a less eloquent and less purely philosophical essay than that\r\nof 1784, but throughout more systematic and practical. We have to do,\r\nnot with the favourite dream of philanthropists like St. Pierre and\r\nRousseau, but with a statement of the conditions on the fulfilment of\r\nwhich the transition to a reign of peace and law depends.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"heading\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_62\"\u003e[p.\r\n62]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe Conditions of the Realisation of the Kantian\r\nIdeal.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese means are of two kinds. In the first place, what evils\r\nmust we set about removing? What are the negative conditions? And,\r\nsecondly, what are the general positive conditions which will make\r\nthe realisation of this idea possible and guarantee the permanence\r\nof an international peace once attained? These negative and\r\npositive conditions Kant calls Preliminary and Definitive Articles\r\nrespectively, the whole essay being carefully thrown into the form of\r\na treaty. The Preliminary Articles of a treaty for perpetual peace\r\nare based on the principle that anything that hinders or threatens\r\nthe peaceful co-existence of nations must be abolished. These\r\nconditions have been classified by Kuno Fischer. Kant, he points\r\nout,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_62\" id=\"FNanchor_62\"\u003e[62]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nexamines the principles of right governing the different sets of\r\ncircumstances in which nations find themselves—namely, (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) while\r\nthey are actually at war; (\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) when the time comes to conclude a\r\ntreaty of peace; (\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) when they are living in a state of peace.\r\nThe six Preliminary Articles fall naturally into these groups. War\r\nmust not be conducted in such a manner as to increase national\r\nhatred and embitter a future\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_63\"\u003e[p.\r\n63]\u003c/span\u003e peace. (Art. 6.)\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_63\" id=\"FNanchor_63\"\u003e[63]\u003c/a\u003e The treaty which brings hostilities to an\r\nend must be concluded in an honest desire for peace. (Art. 1.)\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_64\" id=\"FNanchor_64\"\u003e[64]\u003c/a\u003e Again\r\na nation, when in a state of peace, must do nothing to threaten the\r\npolitical independence of another nation or endanger its existence,\r\nthereby giving the strongest of all motives for a fresh war. A nation\r\nmay commit this injury in two ways: (1) indirectly, by causing\r\ndanger to others through the growth of its standing army (Art. 3)\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_65\" id=\"FNanchor_65\"\u003e[65]\u003c/a\u003e—always\r\na menace to the state of peace—or by any unusual war preparations:\r\nand (2) through too great a supremacy of another kind, by\r\namassing money, the most powerful of all weapons in warfare. The\r\nNational Debt (Art. 4)\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_66\" id=\"FNanchor_66\"\u003e[66]\u003c/a\u003e is another standing danger to the peaceful\r\nco-existence of nations. But, besides, we have the danger of actual\r\nattack. There is no right of intervention between nations. (Art.\r\n5.)\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_67\" id=\"FNanchor_67\"\u003e[67]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nNor can states be inherited or conquered (Art. 2),\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_68\" id=\"FNanchor_68\"\u003e[68]\u003c/a\u003e or in any way treated\r\nin a manner subversive of their independence and sovereignty as\r\nindividuals. For a similar reason, armed troops cannot be hired and\r\nsold as things.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_64\"\u003e[p. 64]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese then are the negative conditions of peace.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_69\" id=\"FNanchor_69\"\u003e[69]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThere are, besides, three positive conditions:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_65\"\u003e[p. 65]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e)\r\nThe intercourse of nations is to be confined to a right of\r\nhospitality. (Art. 3.)\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_70\" id=\"FNanchor_70\"\u003e[70]\u003c/a\u003e There is nothing new to us in this\r\nassertion of a right of way. The right to free means of international\r\ncommunication has in the last hundred years become a commonplace of\r\nlaw. And the change has been brought about, as Kant anticipated,\r\nnot through an abstract respect for the idea of right, but through\r\nthe pressure of purely commercial interests. Since Kant’s time\r\nthe nations of Europe have all been more or less transformed from\r\nagricultural to commercial states whose interests run mainly in the\r\nsame direction, whose existence and development depend necessarily\r\nupon “conditions of universal hospitality.” Commerce depends upon\r\nthis freedom of international intercourse, and on commerce mainly\r\ndepends our hope of peace.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) The first Definitive Article\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_71\" id=\"FNanchor_71\"\u003e[71]\u003c/a\u003e requires that the\r\nconstitution of every state should be republican. What Kant\r\nunderstands by this term is that, in the state, law should rule\r\nabove force and that its\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_66\"\u003e[p.\r\n66]\u003c/span\u003e constitution should be a representative one, guaranteeing\r\npublic justice and based on the freedom and equality of its members\r\nand their mutual dependence on a common legislature. Kant’s demand\r\nis independent of the \u003ci\u003eform\u003c/i\u003e of the government. A constitutional\r\nmonarchy like that of Prussia in the time of Frederick the Great,\r\nwho regarded himself as the first servant of the state and ruled\r\nwith the wisdom and forethought which the nation would have had\r\nthe right to demand from such an one—such a monarchy is not in\r\ncontradiction to the idea of a true republic. That the state should\r\nhave a constitution in accordance with the principles of right\r\nis the essential point.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_72\" id=\"FNanchor_72\"\u003e[72]\u003c/a\u003e To make\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_67\"\u003e[p. 67]\u003c/span\u003e this possible, the law-giving power\r\nmust lie with the representatives of the people: there must be a\r\ncomplete separation, such as Locke and Rousseau demand, between\r\nthe legislature and executive. Otherwise we have despotism. Hence,\r\nwhile Kant admitted absolutism under certain conditions, he rejected\r\ndemocracy where, in his opinion, the mass of the people was\r\ndespot.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAn internal constitution, firmly established on the principles of\r\nright, would not only serve to kill the seeds of national hatred and\r\ndiminish the likelihood of foreign war. It would do more: it would\r\ndestroy sources of revolution and discontent within the state. Kant,\r\nlike many writers on this subject, does not directly allude to civil\r\nwar\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_73\" id=\"FNanchor_73\"\u003e[73]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_68\"\u003e[p. 68]\u003c/span\u003e the means by\r\nwhich it may be prevented or abolished. Actually to achieve this\r\nwould be impossible: it is beyond the power of either arbitration or\r\ndisarmament. But in a representative government and the liberty of a\r\npeople lie the greatest safeguards against internal discontent. Civil\r\npeace and international peace must to a certain extent go hand in\r\nhand.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe come now to the central idea of the treatise: (\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) the law\r\nof nations must be based upon a federation of free states. (Art.\r\n2.)\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_74\" id=\"FNanchor_74\"\u003e[74]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThis must be regarded as the end to which mankind is advancing. The\r\nproblem here is not out of many nations to make one. This would\r\nbe perhaps the surest way to attain peace, but it is scarcely\r\npracticable, and, in certain forms, it is undesirable. Kant is\r\ninclined to approve of the separation of nations by language and\r\nreligion, by historical and social tradition and physical boundaries:\r\nnature seems to condemn the idea of a universal monarchy.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_75\" id=\"FNanchor_75\"\u003e[75]\u003c/a\u003e The\r\nonly footing\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_69\"\u003e[p. 69]\u003c/span\u003e\r\non which a thorough-going, indubitable system of international\r\nlaw is in practice possible is that of the society of nations:\r\nnot the world-republic\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_76\" id=\"FNanchor_76\"\u003e[76]\u003c/a\u003e the Greeks dreamt of, but a federation of\r\nstates. Such a union in the interests of perpetual peace between\r\nnations would be the “highest political good.” The relation of the\r\nfederated states to one another and to the whole would be fixed by\r\ncosmopolitan law: the link of self-interest which would bind them\r\nwould again be the spirit of commerce.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis scheme of a perpetual peace had not escaped ridicule\r\nin the eighteenth century: the name of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_70\"\u003e[p. 70]\u003c/span\u003e Kant protected it henceforth. The facts\r\nof history, even more conclusively than the voices of philosophers,\r\nsoldiers and princes, show how great has been the progress of this\r\nidea in recent years. But it has not gained its present hold upon the\r\npopular mind without great and lasting opposition. Indeed we have\r\nhere what must still be regarded as a controversial question. There\r\nhave been, and are still, men who regard perpetual peace as a state\r\nof things as undesirable as it is unattainable. For such persons,\r\nwar is a necessity of our civilisation: it is impossible that it\r\nshould ever cease to exist. All that we can do, and there is no\r\nharm, nor any contradiction in the attempt, is to make wars shorter,\r\nfewer and more humane: the whole question, beyond this, is without\r\npractical significance. Others, on the other hand,—and these perhaps\r\nmore thoughtful—regard war as hostile to culture, an evil of the\r\nworst kind, although a necessary evil. In peace, for them, lies the\r\ntrue ideal of humanity, although in any perfect form this cannot be\r\nrealised in the near future. The extreme forms of these views are to\r\nbe sought in what has been called in Germany “the philosophy of the\r\nbarracks” which comes forward with a glorification of war for its own\r\nsake, and in the attitude of modern Peace Societies which denounce\r\nall war wholesale, without respect of causes or conditions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"heading\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_71\"\u003e[p.\r\n71]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ci\u003eHegel, Schiller and Moltke.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHegel, the greatest of the champions of war, would have nothing\r\nto do with Kant’s federation of nations formed in the interests\r\nof peace. The welfare of a state, he held, is its own highest\r\nlaw; and he refused to admit that this welfare was to be sought\r\nin an international peace. Hegel lived in an age when all power\r\nand order seemed to lie with the sword. Something of the charm of\r\nNapoleonism seems to hang over him. He does not go the length of\r\nwriters like Joseph de Maistre, who see in war the finger of God\r\nor an arrangement for the survival of the fittest—a theory, as\r\nfar as regards individuals, quite in contradiction with the real\r\nfacts, which show that it is precisely the physically unfit whom\r\nwar, as a method of extermination, cannot reach. But, like Schiller\r\nand Moltke, Hegel sees in war an educative instrument, developing\r\nvirtues in a nation which could not be fully developed otherwise,\r\n(much as pain and suffering bring patience and resignation and other\r\nsuch qualities into play in the individual), and drawing the nation\r\ntogether, making each citizen conscious of his citizenship, as no\r\nother influence can. War, he holds, leaves a nation always stronger\r\nthan it was before; it buries causes of inner dissension, and\r\nconsolidates the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_72\"\u003e[p. 72]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninternal power of the state.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_77\" id=\"FNanchor_77\"\u003e[77]\u003c/a\u003e No other trial can, in the same way, show\r\nwhat is the real strength and weakness of a nation, what it \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e, not\r\nmerely materially, but physically, intellectually and morally.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith this last statement most people will be inclined to agree.\r\nThere is only a part of the truth in Napoleon’s dictum that “God is\r\non the side of the biggest battalions”; or in the old saying that war\r\nrequires three necessaries—in the first place, money; in the second\r\nplace, money; and in the third, money. Money is a great deal: it is a\r\nnecessity; but what we call national back-bone and character is more.\r\nSo far we are with Hegel. But he goes further. In peace, says he,\r\nmankind would grow effeminate and degenerate in luxury. This opinion\r\nwas expressed in forcible language in his own time by Schiller,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_78\" id=\"FNanchor_78\"\u003e[78]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand in more\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_73\"\u003e[p. 73]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nrecent years by Count Moltke. “Perpetual peace,” says a letter\r\nof the great general,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_79\" id=\"FNanchor_79\"\u003e[79]\u003c/a\u003e “is a dream and not a beautiful dream\r\neither: war is part of the divine order of the world. During war\r\nare developed the noblest virtues which belong to man—courage and\r\nself-denial, fidelity to duty and the spirit of self-sacrifice:\r\nthe soldier is called upon to risk his life. Without war the world\r\nwould sink in materialism.”\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_80\" id=\"FNanchor_80\"\u003e[80]\u003c/a\u003e “Want and misery, disease, suffering\r\nand war,” he says elsewhere, “are all\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_74\"\u003e[p. 74]\u003c/span\u003e given elements in the Divine order\r\nof the universe.” Moltke’s eulogy of war, however, is somewhat\r\nmodified by his additional statement that “the greatest kindness in\r\nwar lies in its being quickly ended.” (Letter to Bluntschli, 11th\r\nDec.,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_75\"\u003e[p. 75]\u003c/span\u003e 1880.)\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_81\" id=\"FNanchor_81\"\u003e[81]\u003c/a\u003e The\r\ngreat forces which we recognise as factors in the moral regeneration\r\nof mankind are always slow of action as they are sure. War, if too\r\nquickly over, could not have the great moral influence which has been\r\nattributed to it. The explanation may be that it is not all that it\r\nnaturally appears to a great and successful general. Hegel, Moltke,\r\nTrendelenburg, Treitschke\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_82\" id=\"FNanchor_82\"\u003e[82]\u003c/a\u003e and the others—not Schiller\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_83\" id=\"FNanchor_83\"\u003e[83]\u003c/a\u003e who\r\nwas able to sing the blessings of peace as eloquently as of war—were\r\napt to forget that war is as efficient a school for forming vices\r\nas virtues; and that, moreover, those virtues which military life\r\nis said to cultivate—courage, self-sacrifice and the rest—can be at\r\nleast as perfectly developed in other trials. There are in human\r\nlife dangers every day bravely met and overcome which are not less\r\nterrible than those which face the soldier, in whom patriotism may\r\nbe less a sentiment than a duty, and whose cowardice must be dearly\r\npaid.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"heading\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eWar under Altered Conditions.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Peace Societies of our century, untiring supporters of a point\r\nof view diametrically opposite\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_76\"\u003e[p.\r\n76]\u003c/span\u003e to that of Hegel, owe their existence in the first\r\nplace to new ideas on the subject of the relative advantages and\r\ndisadvantages of war, which again were partly due to changes in the\r\ncharacter of war itself, partly to a new theory that the warfare\r\nof the future should be a war of free competition for industrial\r\ninterests, or, in Herbert Spencer’s language, that the warlike type\r\nof mankind should make room for an industrial type. This theory,\r\namounting in the minds of some thinkers to a fervid conviction,\r\nand itself, in a sense, the source of what has been contemptuously\r\nstyled our British “shopkeeper’s policy” in Europe, was based on\r\nsomething more solid than mere enthusiasm. The years of peace which\r\nfollowed the downfall of Napoleon had brought immense increase in\r\nmaterial wealth to countries like France and Britain. Something of\r\nthe glamour had fallen away from the sword of the great Emperor. The\r\nillusive excitement of a desire for conquest had died: the glory of\r\nwar had faded with it, but the burden still remained: its cost was\r\nstill there, something to be calmly reckoned up and not soon to be\r\nforgotten. Europe was seen to be actually moving towards ruin. “We\r\nshall have to get rid of war in all civilised countries,” said Louis\r\nPhilippe in 1843. “Soon no nation will be able to afford it.” War\r\nwas not only becoming more costly. New conditions had altered it in\r\nother directions.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_77\"\u003e[p. 77]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nWith the development of technical science and its application to the\r\nperfecting of methods and instruments of destruction every new war\r\nwas found to be bloodier than the last; and the day seemed to be in\r\nsight, when this very development would make war (with instruments of\r\nextermination) impossible altogether. The romance and picturesqueness\r\nwith which it was invested in the days of hand-to-hand combat was\r\ngone. But, above all, war was now waged for questions fewer and more\r\nimportant than in the time of Kant. Napoleon’s successful appeal\r\nto the masses had suggested to Prussia the idea of consciously\r\nnationalising the army. Our modern national wars exact a sacrifice,\r\nnecessarily much more heavy, much more reluctantly made than those\r\nof the past which were fought with mercenary troops. Such wars have\r\nnot only greater dignity: they are more earnest, and their issue, as\r\nin a sense the issue of conflict between higher and lower types of\r\ncivilisation, is speedier and more decisive.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the hundred years since Kant’s death, much that he prophesied\r\nhas come to pass, although sometimes by different paths than he\r\nanticipated. The strides made in recent years by commerce and\r\nthe growing power of the people in every state have had much of\r\nthe influence which he foretold. There is a greater reluctance\r\nto wage\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_78\"\u003e[p. 78]\u003c/span\u003e war.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_84\" id=\"FNanchor_84\"\u003e[84]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nBut, unfortunately, as Professor Paulsen points out, the progress\r\nof democracy and the nationalisation of war have not worked merely\r\nin the direction of progress towards peace. War has now become\r\npopular for the first time. “The progress of democracy in states,”\r\nhe says, (\u003ci\u003eKant\u003c/i\u003e, p. 364\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_85\" id=\"FNanchor_85\"\u003e[85]\u003c/a\u003e) “has not only not done away with war,\r\nbut has very greatly changed the feeling of people towards it. With\r\nthe universal military service, introduced by the Revolution, war\r\nhas become the people’s affair and popular, as it could not be in\r\nthe case of dynastic wars carried on with mercenary troops.” In the\r\npeople the love of peace is strong, but so too is the love of a\r\nfight, the love of victory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is in the contemplation of facts and conflicting\r\ntendencies like these that Peace Societies\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_86\" id=\"FNanchor_86\"\u003e[86]\u003c/a\u003e have been formed.\r\nThe peace party is, we may say, an eclectic body: it embraces many\r\ndifferent sections of political opinion. There are those who hold,\r\nfor instance, that peace is to be established on a basis of communism\r\nof property. There are others who insist on the establishment\r\nthroughout Europe of a republican form of government, or again, on\r\na\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_79\"\u003e[p. 79]\u003c/span\u003e redistribution\r\nof European territory in which Alsace-Lorraine is restored to\r\nFrance—changes of which at least the last two would be difficult to\r\ncarry out, unless through international warfare. But these are not\r\nthe fundamental general principles of peace workers. The members\r\nof this party agree in rejecting the principle of intervention, in\r\ndemanding a complete or partial disarmament of the nations of Europe,\r\nand in requiring that all disputes between nations—and they admit the\r\nprospects of dispute—should be settled by means of arbitration. In\r\nhow far are these principles useful or practicable?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"heading\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe Value of Arbitration.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is a strong feeling in favour of arbitration on the part\r\nof all classes of society. It is cheaper under all circumstances\r\nthan war. It is a judgment at once more certain and more complete,\r\nexcluding as far as possible the element of chance, leaving\r\nirritation perhaps behind it, but none of the lasting bitterness\r\nwhich is the legacy of every war. Arbitration has an important place\r\nin all peace projects except that of Kant, whose federal union\r\nwould naturally fulfil the function of a tribunal of arbitration.\r\nSt. Pierre, Jeremy Bentham,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_87\" id=\"FNanchor_87\"\u003e[87]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_80\"\u003e[p.\r\n80]\u003c/span\u003e Bluntschli\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_88\" id=\"FNanchor_88\"\u003e[88]\u003c/a\u003e the German publicist, Professor Lorimer\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_89\" id=\"FNanchor_89\"\u003e[89]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand others among political writers,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_90\" id=\"FNanchor_90\"\u003e[90]\u003c/a\u003e and among rulers,\r\nLouis Napoleon and the Emperor Alexander I. of Russia, have all made\r\nproposals more or less ineffectual for the peaceful settlement of\r\ninternational disputes. A number of cases have already been decided\r\nby this means. But let us examine the questions which have been\r\nat issue. Of a hundred and thirty matters of dispute settled by\r\narbitration since 1815 (cf. \u003ci\u003eInternational Tribunals\u003c/i\u003e, published\r\nby the Peace Society, 1899) it will be seen that all, with the\r\nexception of one or two trifling cases of doubt as to the succession\r\nto certain titles or principalities, can be classified roughly\r\nunder two heads—disputes as to the determination of boundaries or\r\nthe possession of certain territory, and questions of claims for\r\ncompensation and indemnities due either to individuals or states,\r\narising from the seizure of fleets or merchant vessels, the insult\r\nor injury to private persons and so on—briefly, questions of money\r\nor of territory.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_81\"\u003e[p. 81]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThese may fairly be said to be trifling causes, not touching\r\nnational honour or great political questions. That they should have\r\nbeen settled in this way, however, shows a great advance. Smaller\r\ncauses than these have made some of the bloodiest wars in history.\r\nThat arbitration should have been the means of preventing even one\r\nwar which would otherwise have been waged is a strong reason why\r\nwe should fully examine its claims. “Quand l’institution d’une\r\nhaute cour,” writes Laveleye, (\u003ci\u003eDes causes actuelles de guerre en\r\nEurope et de l’arbitrage\u003c/i\u003e) “n’éviterait qu’une guerre sur vingt,\r\nil vaudrait encore la peine de l’établir.” But history shows us\r\nthat there is no single instance of a supreme conflict having been\r\nsettled otherwise than by war. Arbitration is a method admirably\r\nadapted to certain cases: to those we have named, where it has been\r\nsuccessfully applied, to the interpretation of contracts, to offences\r\nagainst the Law of Nations—some writers say to trivial questions of\r\nhonour—in all cases where the use of armed force would be impossible,\r\nas, for instance, in any quarrel in which neutralised countries\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_91\" id=\"FNanchor_91\"\u003e[91]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nlike Belgium or Luxembourg should take a principal part, or in a\r\ndifference between two nations, such as (to take an extreme case) the\r\nUnited States and Switzerland,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_82\"\u003e[p.\r\n82]\u003c/span\u003e which could not easily engage in actual combat. These\r\ncases, which we cannot too carefully examine, show that what is here\r\nessential is that it should be possible to formulate a juridical\r\nstatement of the conflicting claims. In Germany the \u003ci\u003eBundestag\u003c/i\u003e had\r\nonly power to decide questions of law. Other disputes were left to be\r\nfought out. Questions on which the existence and vital honour of a\r\nstate depend—any question which nearly concerns the disputants—cannot\r\nbe reduced to any cut and dry legal formula of right and wrong.\r\nWe may pass over the consideration that in some cases (as in the\r\nFranco-Prussian War) the delay caused by seeking mediation of any\r\nkind would deprive a nation of the advantage its state of military\r\npreparation deserved. And we may neglect the problem of finding an\r\nimpartial judge on some questions of dispute, although its solution\r\nmight be a matter of extreme difficulty, so closely are the interests\r\nof modern nations bound up in one another. How could the Eastern\r\nQuestion, for example, be settled by arbitration? It is impossible\r\nthat such a means should be sufficient for every case. Arbitration in\r\nother words may prevent war, but can never be a substitute for war.\r\nWe cannot wonder that this is so. So numerous and conflicting are\r\nthe interests of states, so various are the grades of civilisation\r\nto which they have attained and the directions\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_83\"\u003e[p. 83]\u003c/span\u003e along which they are developing, that\r\ndifferences of the most vital kind are bound to occur and these can\r\nnever be settled by any peaceful means at present known to Europe.\r\nThis is above all true where the self-preservation\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_92\" id=\"FNanchor_92\"\u003e[92]\u003c/a\u003e or independence of\r\na people are concerned. Here the “good-will” of the nations who\r\ndisagree would necessarily be wanting: there could be no question of\r\nthe arbitration of an outsider.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut, indeed, looking away from questions so vital and on which\r\nthere can be little difference of opinion, we are apt to forget,\r\nwhen we allow ourselves to talk extravagantly of the future of\r\narbitration, that every nation thinks, or at least pretends to think,\r\nthat it is in the right in every dispute in which it appears (cf.\r\nKant: \u003ci\u003ePerpetual Peace\u003c/i\u003e, p. 120.): and, as a matter of history,\r\nthere\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_84\"\u003e[p. 84]\u003c/span\u003e has never\r\nbeen a conflict between civilised states in which an appeal to this\r\n“right” on the part of each has not been made. We talk glibly of\r\nthe right and wrong of this question or of that, of the justice of\r\nthis war, the iniquity of that. But what do these terms really mean?\r\n\u003ci\u003eDo\u003c/i\u003e we know, in spite of the labour which has been spent on this\r\nquestion by the older publicists, which are the causes that justify\r\na war? Is it not true that the same war might be just in one set\r\nof circumstances and unjust in another? Practically all writers on\r\nthis subject, exclusive of those who apply the biblical doctrine of\r\nnon-resistance, agree in admitting that a nation is justified in\r\ndefending its own existence or independence, that this is even a\r\nmoral duty as it is a fundamental right of a state. Many, especially\r\nthe older writers, make the confident assertion that all wars of\r\ndefence are just. But will this serve as a standard? Gibbon tells\r\nus somewhere, that Livy asserts that the Romans conquered the world\r\nin self-defence. The distinction between wars of aggression and\r\ndefence is one very difficult to draw. The cause of a nation which\r\nwaits to be actually attacked is often lost: the critical moment\r\nin its defence may be past. The essence of a state’s defensive\r\npower may lie in a readiness to strike the first blow, or its whole\r\ninterests may be bound up in the necessity of fighting the matter\r\nout in its\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_85\"\u003e[p. 85]\u003c/span\u003e enemy’s\r\ncountry, rather than at home. It is not in the strictly military\r\ninterpretation of the term “defensive”, but in its wider ethical\r\nand political sense that we can speak of wars of defence as just.\r\nBut, indeed, we cannot judge these questions abstractly. Where a\r\nwar is necessary, it matters very little whether it is just or not.\r\nOnly the judgment of history can finally decide; and generally it\r\nseems at the time that both parties have something of right on\r\ntheir side, something perhaps too of wrong.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_93\" id=\"FNanchor_93\"\u003e[93]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_86\"\u003e[p. 86]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA consideration\r\nof difficulties like these brings us to a realisation of the fact\r\nthat the chances are small that a nation, in the heat of a dispute,\r\nwill admit the likelihood of its being in the wrong. To refuse\r\nto admit this is generally tantamount to a refusal to submit the\r\ndifficulty to arbitration. And neither international law, nor the\r\nmoral force of public opinion can induce a state to act contrary to\r\nwhat it believes to be its own interest. Moreover, as international\r\nlaw now stands, it is not a duty to have recourse to arbitration.\r\nThis was made quite clear in the proceedings of the Peace Conference\r\nat the Hague in 1899.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_94\" id=\"FNanchor_94\"\u003e[94]\u003c/a\u003e It was strongly recommended that\r\narbitration should be sought wherever it was possible, but, at the\r\nsame time definitely stated, that this course could in no case\r\nbe compulsory. In this respect things have not advanced beyond\r\nthe position of the Paris Congress of 1856.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_95\" id=\"FNanchor_95\"\u003e[95]\u003c/a\u003e The wars waged in\r\nEurope subsequent to that date, have all been begun without previous\r\nattempt at mediation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the work of the peace party regarding the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_87\"\u003e[p. 87]\u003c/span\u003e humaner methods of\r\nsettlement is not to be neglected. The popular feeling which they\r\nhave been partly the means of stimulating has no doubt done something\r\nto influence the action of statesmen towards extreme caution in\r\nthe treatment of questions likely to arouse national passions and\r\nprejudices. Arbitration has undoubtedly made headway in recent\r\nyears. Britain and America, the two nations whose names naturally\r\nsuggest themselves to us as future centres of federative union, both\r\ncountries whose industrial interests are numerous and complicated,\r\nhave most readily, as they have most frequently, settled disputes\r\nin this practical manner. It has shown itself to be a policy as\r\neconomical as it is business-like. Its value, in its proper place,\r\ncannot be overrated by any Peace Congress or by any peace pamphlet;\r\nbut we have endeavoured to make it clear that this sphere is but a\r\nlimited one. The “good-will” may not be there when it ought perhaps\r\nto appear: it will certainly not be there when any vital interest\r\nis at stake. But, even if this were not so and arbitration were\r\nthe natural sequence of every dispute, no coercive force exists\r\nto enforce the decree of the court. The moral restraint of public\r\nopinion is here a poor substitute. Treaties, it is often said, are in\r\nthe same position; but treaties have been broken, and will no doubt\r\nbe broken again. We\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_88\"\u003e[p. 88]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nare moved to the conclusion that a thoroughly logical peace programme\r\ncannot stop short of the principle of federation. Federal troops are\r\nnecessary to carry out the decrees of a tribunal of arbitration, if\r\nthat court is not to run a risk of being held feeble and ineffectual.\r\nExcept on some such basis, arbitration, as a substitute for war,\r\nstands on but a weak footing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"heading\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eDisarmament.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe efforts of the Peace Society are directed with even less hope\r\nof complete success against another evil of our time, the crushing\r\nburden of modern armaments. We have peace at this moment, but at\r\na daily increasing cost. The Peace Society is rightly concerned\r\nin pressing this point. It is not enough to keep off actual war:\r\nthere is a limit to the price we can afford to pay even for peace.\r\nProbably no principle has cost Europe so much in the last century\r\nas that handed down from Rome:—“Si vis pacem, para bellum.” It is\r\nnow a hundred and fifty years since Montesquieu\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_96\" id=\"FNanchor_96\"\u003e[96]\u003c/a\u003e protested\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_89\"\u003e[p. 89]\u003c/span\u003e against this “new\r\ndistemper” which was spreading itself over Europe; but never, in\r\ntime of peace, has complaint been so loud or so general as now:\r\nand this, not only against the universal burden of taxation which\r\nweighs upon all nations alike, but, in continental countries,\r\nagainst the waste of productive force due to compulsory military\r\nservice, a discontent which seems to strike at the very foundations\r\nof society. Vattel relates that in early times a treaty of peace\r\ngenerally stipulated that both parties should afterwards disarm. And\r\nthere is no doubt that Kant was right in regarding standing armies\r\nas a danger to peace, not only as openly expressing the rivalry and\r\ndistrust between nation and nation which Hobbes regards as the basis\r\nof international relations, but also as putting a power into the\r\nhand of a nation which it may some day have the temptation to abuse.\r\nA war-loving, overbearing spirit in a people thrives none the worse\r\nfor a consciousness that its army or navy can hold its own with any\r\nother in Europe. Were it not the case that the essence of armed peace\r\nis that a high state of efficiency should be\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_90\"\u003e[p. 90]\u003c/span\u003e general, the danger to peace would be\r\nvery great indeed. No doubt it is due to this fact that France has\r\nkept quietly to her side of the Rhine during the last thirty years.\r\nThe annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was an immediate stimulus to the\r\nincrease of armaments; but otherwise, just because of this greater\r\nefficiency and the slightly stronger military position of Germany, it\r\nhas been an influence on the side of peace.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Czar’s Rescript of 1898 gave a new stimulus to an interest\r\nin this question which the subsequent conference at the Hague was\r\nunable fully to satisfy. We are compelled to consider carefully\r\nhow a process of simultaneous disarmament can actually be carried\r\nout, and what results might be anticipated from this step, with a\r\nview not only to the present but the future. Can this be done in\r\naccordance with the principles of justice? Organisations like a\r\ngreat navy or a highly disciplined army have been built up, in the\r\ncourse of centuries, at great cost and at much sacrifice to the\r\nnation. They are the fruit of years of wise government and a high\r\nrecord of national industry. Are such visible tokens of the culture\r\nand character and worth of a people to be swept away and Britain,\r\nFrance, Germany, Italy, Spain, Turkey to stand on the same level?\r\nAnd, even if no such ethical considerations should arise, on what\r\nmethod are\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_91\"\u003e[p. 91]\u003c/span\u003e we to\r\nproceed? The standard as well as the nature of armament depends\r\nin every state on its geographical conditions and its historical\r\nposition. An ocean-bound empire like Britain is comparatively immune\r\nfrom the danger of invasion: her army can be safely despatched to\r\nthe colonies, her fleet protects her at home, her position is one of\r\nnatural defence. But Germany and Austria find themselves in exactly\r\nopposite circumstances, with the hard necessity imposed upon them of\r\nguarding their frontiers on every side. The safety of a nation like\r\nGermany is in the hands of its army: its military strength lies in an\r\nalmost perfect mastery of the science of attack.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Peace Society has hitherto made no attempt to face the\r\ndifficulties inseparable from any attempt to apply a uniform method\r\nof treatment to peculiarities and conditions so conflicting and\r\nvarious as these. Those who have been more conscientious have not\r\nbeen very successful in solving them. Indeed, so constantly is\r\nmilitary technique changing that it is difficult to prophesy wherein\r\nwill lie, a few years hence, the essence of a state’s defensive\r\npower or what part the modern navy will play in this defence. No\r\ncareful thinker would suggest, in the face of dangers threatening\r\nfrom the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_92\"\u003e[p. 92]\u003c/span\u003e East,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_97\" id=\"FNanchor_97\"\u003e[97]\u003c/a\u003e a\r\ncomplete disarmament. The simplest of many suggestions made—but\r\nthis on the basis of universal conscription—seems to be that the\r\nnumber of years or months of compulsory military service should\r\nbe reduced to some fixed period. But this does not touch the\r\ndifficulty of colonial empires\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_98\" id=\"FNanchor_98\"\u003e[98]\u003c/a\u003e like Britain which might to a certain\r\nextent disarm, like their neighbours, in Europe, but would be\r\ncompelled to keep an army for the defence of their colonies\r\nelsewhere. It is, in the meantime, inevitable that Europe should keep\r\nup a high standard of armament—this is, (and even if we had European\r\nfederation, would remain) an absolute necessity as a protection\r\nagainst the yellow races, and in Europe itself there are at present\r\nelements hostile to the cause of peace. Alsace-Lorraine, Polish\r\nPrussia, Russian Poland and Finland are still, to a considerable\r\ndegree, sources of discontent and dissatisfaction. But in Russia\r\nitself lies the great obstacle to a future European peace or\r\nEuropean federation: we can scarcely picture Russia as a reliable\r\nmember of such a union. That Russia should disarm is scarcely\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_93\"\u003e[p. 93]\u003c/span\u003e feasible, in view of its\r\nown interest: it has always to face the danger of rebellion in Poland\r\nand anarchy at home. But that Europe should disarm, before Russia has\r\nattained a higher civilisation, a consciousness of its great future\r\nas a north-eastern, inter-oceanic empire, and a government more\r\nfavourable to the diffusion of liberty, is still less practicable.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_99\" id=\"FNanchor_99\"\u003e[99]\u003c/a\u003e We\r\nhave here to fall back upon federation again. It is not impossible\r\nthat, in the course of time, this problem may be solved and that\r\nthe contribution to the federal troops of a European union may be\r\nregulated upon some equitable basis the form of which we cannot now\r\nwell prophesy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eEuropean federation would likewise meet all difficulties where a\r\nrisk might be likely to occur of one nation intervening to protect\r\nanother. As we have said (above, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 64,\r\n\u003ci\u003enote\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/a\u003e) nations are now-a-days slow to intervene in the interests\r\nof humanity: they are in general constrained to do so only by strong\r\nmotives of self-interest, and when these are not at hand they are\r\nsaid to refrain from respect for another’s right of independent\r\naction. Actually a state which is actuated by less selfish impulses\r\nis apt to lose considerably more than it\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_94\"\u003e[p. 94]\u003c/span\u003e gains, and the feeling of the people\r\nexpresses itself strongly against any quixotic or sentimental policy.\r\nIt is not impossible that the Powers may have yet to intervene to\r\nprotect Turkey against Russia. Such a step might well be dictated\r\npurely by a proper care for the security of Europe; but wars of this\r\nkind seem not likely to play an important part in the near future.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have said that the causes of difference which may be expected\r\nto disturb the peace of Europe are now fewer. A modern sovereign\r\nno longer spends his leisure time in the excitement of slaying or\r\nseeing slain. He could not, if he would. His honour and his vanity\r\nare protected by other means: they play no longer an important part\r\nin the affairs of nations. The causes of war can no more be either\r\ntrifling or personal. Some crises there are, which are ever likely to\r\nbe fatal to peace. There present themselves, in the lives of nations,\r\nideal ends for which everything must be sacrificed: there are rights\r\nwhich must at all cost be defended. The question of civil war we\r\nmay neglect: liberty and wise government are the only medicine for\r\nsocial discontent, and much may be hoped from that in the future.\r\nBut now, looking beyond the state to the great family of civilised\r\nnations, we may say that the one certain cause of war between them\r\nor of rebellion within a future federated union will be a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_95\"\u003e[p. 95]\u003c/span\u003e menace to the sovereign\r\nrights, the independence and existence of any member of that\r\nfederation. Other causes of quarrel offer a more hopeful prospect.\r\nSome questions have been seen to be specially fitted for the legal\r\nprocedure of a tribunal of arbitration, others to be such as a\r\nfederal court would quickly settle. The preservation of the balance\r\nof power which Frederick the Great regarded as the talisman of peace\r\nin Europe—a judgment surely not borne out by experience—is happily\r\none of the causes of war which are of the past. Wars of colonisation,\r\nsuch as would be an attempt on the part of Russia to conquer India,\r\nseem scarcely likely to recur except between higher and lower races.\r\nThe cost is now-a-days too great. Political wars, wars for national\r\nunion and unity, of which there were so many during the past century,\r\nseem at present not to be near at hand; and the integration of\r\nEuropean nations—what may be called the great mission of war—is, for\r\nthe moment, practically complete; for it is highly improbable that\r\neither Alsace-Lorraine or Poland—still less Finland—will be the cause\r\nof a war of this kind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur hope lies in a federated Europe. Its troops would serve to\r\npreserve law and order in the country from which they were drawn and\r\nto protect its colonies abroad; but their higher function would\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_96\"\u003e[p. 96]\u003c/span\u003e be to keep peace in\r\nEurope, to protect the weaker members of the Federation and to\r\nenforce the decision of the majority, either, if necessary, by actual\r\nwar, or by the mere threatening demonstrations of fleets, such as\r\nhave before proved effectual.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have carefully considered what has been attempted by peace\r\nworkers, and we have now to take note that all the results of the\r\nlast fifty years are not to be attributed to their conscientious\r\nbut often ill-directed labour. The diminution of the causes of war\r\nis to be traced less to the efforts of the Peace Society, (except\r\nindirectly, in so far as they have influenced the minds of the\r\nmasses) than to the increasing power of the people themselves.\r\nThe various classes of society are opposed to violent methods of\r\nsettlement, not in the main from a conviction as to the wrongfulness\r\nof war or from any fanatical enthusiasm for a brotherhood of\r\nnations, but from self-interest. War is death to the industrial\r\ninterests of a nation. It is vain to talk, in the language of past\r\ncenturies, of trade between civilised countries being advanced and\r\nmarkets opened up or enlarged by this means.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_100\" id=\"FNanchor_100\"\u003e[100]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_97\"\u003e[p. 97]\u003c/span\u003e Kings give up the dream of military glory\r\nand accept instead the certainty of peaceful labour and industrial\r\nprogress, and all this (for we may believe that to some monarchs it\r\nis much) from no enthusiastic appreciation of the efforts of Peace\r\nSocieties, from no careful examination of the New Testament nor\r\ninspired interpretation of its teaching. It is self-interest, the\r\nprosperity of the country—patriotism, if you will—that seems better\r\nthan war.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"heading\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eWhat may be expected from Federation.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFederation and federation alone can help out the programme of the\r\nPeace Society. It cannot be pretended that it will do everything.\r\nTo state the worst at once, it will not prevent war. Even the\r\nfederations of the states of Germany and America, bound together by\r\nties of blood and language and, in the latter case, of sentiment,\r\nwere not strong enough within to keep out dissension and disunion.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_101\" id=\"FNanchor_101\"\u003e[101]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nWars would not cease, but they would become much less frequent.\r\n“Why is there no longer war between England and Scotland? Why did\r\nPrussian and Hanoverian fight side by side in 1870, though they had\r\nfought\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_98\"\u003e[p. 98]\u003c/span\u003e against\r\neach other only four years before?… If we wish to know how war is\r\nto cease, we should ask ourselves how it \u003ci\u003ehas\u003c/i\u003e ceased” (Professor\r\nD. G. Ritchie, \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 169). Wars between different grades\r\nof civilisation are bound to exist as long as civilisation itself\r\nexists. The history of culture and of progress has been more or less\r\na history of war. A calm acceptance of this position may mean to\r\ncertain short-sighted, enthusiastic theorists an impossible sacrifice\r\nof the ideal; but, the sacrifice once made, we stand on a better\r\nfooting with regard to at least one class of arguments against a\r\nfederation of the world. Such a union will lead, it is said, to an\r\nequality in culture, a sameness of interests fatal to progress;\r\nall struggle and conflict will be cast out of the state itself;\r\nnational characteristics and individuality will be obliterated;\r\nthe lamb and the wolf will lie down together: stagnation will\r\nresult, intellectual progress will be at an end, politics will be\r\nno more, history will stand still. This is a sweeping assertion, an\r\nalarming prophecy. But a little thought will assure us that there\r\nis small cause for apprehension. There can be no such standstill,\r\nno millennium in human affairs. A gradual smoothing down of sharply\r\naccentuated national characteristics there might be: this is a result\r\nwhich a freer, more friendly intercourse between nations would be\r\nvery\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_99\"\u003e[p. 99]\u003c/span\u003e likely to\r\nproduce. But conflicting interests, keen rivalry in their pursuit,\r\ndifference of culture and natural aptitude, and all or much of\r\nthe individuality which language and literature, historical and\r\nreligious traditions, even climatic and physical conditions produce\r\nare bound to survive until the coming of some more overwhelming and\r\nfar-spreading revolution than this. It would not be well if it were\r\notherwise, if those “unconscious and invisible peculiarities” in\r\nwhich Fichte sees the hand of God and the guarantee of a nation’s\r\nfuture dignity, virtue and merit should be swept away. (\u003ci\u003eReden an\r\ndie deutsche Nation\u003c/i\u003e,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_102\" id=\"FNanchor_102\"\u003e[102]\u003c/a\u003e 1807.) Nor is stagnation to be feared.\r\n“Strife,” said the old philosopher, “is the father of all things.”\r\nThere can be no lasting peace in the processes of nature and\r\nexistence. It has been in the constant rivalry between classes within\r\nthemselves, and in the struggle for existence with other races that\r\ngreat nations have reached the highwater mark of their development.\r\nA perpetual peace in international relations we may—nay, surely\r\nwill—one day have, but eternity will not see the end to the feverish\r\nunrest within the state and the jealous competition and distrust\r\nbetween individuals, groups and classes of society. Here there must\r\never be perpetual war.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt was only of this political peace between civil\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_100\"\u003e[p. 100]\u003c/span\u003eised nations\r\nthat Kant thought.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_103\" id=\"FNanchor_103\"\u003e[103]\u003c/a\u003e In this form it is bound to come. The\r\nfederation of Europe will follow the federation of Germany and\r\nof Italy, not only because it offers a solution of many problems\r\nwhich have long taxed Europe, but because great men and careful\r\nthinkers believe in it.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_104\" id=\"FNanchor_104\"\u003e[104]\u003c/a\u003e It may not come quickly, but such men can\r\nafford to wait. “If I were legislator,” cried Jean Jacques Rousseau,\r\n“I should not say what ought to be done, but I would do it.” This is\r\nthe attitude of the unthinking, unpractical enthusiast. The wish is\r\nnot enough: the will is not enough. The mills of God must take their\r\nown time: no hope or faith of ours, no struggle or labour even can\r\nhurry them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is a misfortune that the Peace Society has identified\r\nitself with so narrow and uncritical an attitude towards war,\r\nand that the copious elo\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_101\"\u003e[p.\r\n101]\u003c/span\u003equence of its members is not based upon a consideration\r\nof the practical difficulties of the case. This well-meaning, hard\r\nworking and enthusiastic body would like to do what is impossible\r\nby an impossible method. The end which it sets for itself is an\r\nunattainable one. But this need not be so. To make unjustifiable\r\naggression difficult, to banish unworthy pretexts for making war\r\nmight be a high enough ideal for any enthusiasm and offer scope wide\r\nenough for the labours of any society. But the Peace Society has not\r\ncontented itself with this great work. Through its over-estimation\r\nof the value of peace,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_105\" id=\"FNanchor_105\"\u003e[105]\u003c/a\u003e its cause has been injured and much of\r\nits influence has been weakened or lost. Our age is one which sets\r\na high value upon human life; and to this change of thinking may be\r\ntraced our modern reform in the methods of war and all that has been\r\ndone for the alleviation of suffering by the great Conventions of\r\nrecent years. For the eyes of most people war is merely a hideous\r\nspectacle of bloodshed and deliberate destruction of life: this is\r\nits obvious side. But it is possible to exaggerate this confessedly\r\ngreat evil. Peace has its sacrifices as well as war: the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_102\"\u003e[p. 102]\u003c/span\u003e progress of humanity\r\nrequires that the individual should often be put aside for the sake\r\nof lasting advantage to the whole. An opposite view can only be\r\nreckoned individualistic, perhaps materialistic. “The reverence for\r\nhuman life,” says Martineau, (\u003ci\u003eStudies of Christianity\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 352,\r\n354) “is carried to an immoral idolatry, when it is held more sacred\r\nthan justice and right, and when the spectacle of blood becomes\r\nmore horrible than the sight of desolating tyrannies and triumphant\r\nhypocrisies…. We have, therefore, no more doubt that a war may be\r\nright, than that a policeman may be a security for justice, and we\r\nobject to a fortress as little as to a handcuff.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Peace Society are not of this opinion: they greatly doubt that\r\na war may be right, and they rarely fail to take their doubts to the\r\ntribunal of Scripture. Their efforts are well meant, this piety may\r\nbe genuine enough; but a text is rarely a proof of anything, and in\r\nany case serves one man in as good stead as another. We remember that\r\n“the devil can cite Scripture for his purpose.” This unscientific\r\nmethod of proof or persuasion has ever been widely popular. It is\r\na serious examination of the question that we want, a more careful\r\nstudy of its actual history and of the possibilities of human nature;\r\nless vague, exaggerated language about what ought to be done, and a\r\nrealisation of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_103\"\u003e[p. 103]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhat has been actually achieved; above all, a clear perception of\r\nwhat may fairly be asked from the future.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt used to be said—is perhaps asserted still by the\r\nwar-lovers—that there was no path to civilisation which had not\r\nbeen beaten by the force of arms, no height to which the sword\r\nhad not led the way. The inspiration of war was upon the great\r\narts of civilisation: its hand was upon the greatest of the\r\nsciences. These obligations extended even to commerce. War not\r\nonly created new branches of industry, it opened new markets and\r\nenlarged the old. These are great claims, according to which\r\nwar might be called the moving principle of history. If we keep\r\nour eyes fixed upon the history of the past, they seem not only\r\nplausible: they are in a great sense true. Progress did tread at\r\nthe heels of the great Alexander’s army: the advance of European\r\nculture stands in the closest connection with the Crusades. But\r\nwas this happy compensation for a miserable state of affairs not\r\ndue to the peculiarly unsocial conditions of early times and the\r\nabsence of every facility for the interchange of ideas or material\r\nadvantages? It is inconceivable that now-a-days\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_106\" id=\"FNanchor_106\"\u003e[106]\u003c/a\u003e any aid to the\r\ndevelopment of thought in Europe should come from war. The\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_104\"\u003e[p. 104]\u003c/span\u003e old adage, in more than\r\na literal sense, has but too often been proved true:—“Inter arma,\r\nMusae silent.” Peace is for us the real promoter of culture.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have to endeavour to take an intermediate course between\r\nuncritical praise and wholesale condemnation, between extravagant\r\nexpectation and unjustifiable pessimism. War used to be the rule: it\r\nis now an overwhelming and terrible exception—an interruption to the\r\npeaceful prosperous course of things, inflicting unlimited suffering\r\nand temporary or lasting loss. Its evils are on the surface, apparent\r\nto the most unthinking observer. The day may yet dawn, when Europeans\r\nwill have learned to regard the force of arms as an instrument for\r\nthe civilisation of savage or half-savage races, and war within\r\ntheir continent as civil war, necessary and justifiable sometimes\r\nperhaps, but still a blot upon their civilisation and brotherhood\r\nas men. Such a suggestion rings strangely. But the great changes,\r\nwhich the roll of centuries has marked, once came upon the world not\r\nless unexpectedly. How far off must the idea of a civil peace have\r\nseemed to small towns and states of Europe in the fifteenth century!\r\nHow strange, only a century\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_105\"\u003e[p.\r\n105]\u003c/span\u003e ago, would the idea of applying steam power or electrical\r\nforce have seemed to ourselves! Let us not despair. War has played a\r\ngreat part in the history of the world: it has been ever the great\r\narchitect of nations, the true mother of cities. It has justified\r\nitself to-day in the union of kindred peoples, the making of great\r\nempires. It may be that one decisive war may yet be required to unite\r\nEurope. May Europe survive that struggle and go forward fearlessly to\r\nher great future! A peaceful future that may not be. It must never\r\nbe forgotten that war is sometimes a moral duty, that it is ever the\r\nnatural sequence of human passion and human prejudice. An unbroken\r\npeace we cannot and do not expect; but it is this that we must work\r\nfor. As Kant says, we must keep it before us as an ideal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_106\"\u003e[p. 106]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 class=\"nobreak\" title=\"PERPETUAL PEACE\"\u003eTRANSLATION\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_107\" id=\"FNanchor_107\"\u003e[107]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003e“PERPETUAL PEACE”\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_108\" id=\"FNanchor_108\"\u003e[108]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWe\u003c/span\u003e need not try to decide whether this\r\nsatirical inscription, (once found on a Dutch innkeeper’s sign-board\r\nabove the picture of a churchyard) is aimed at mankind in general, or\r\nat the rulers of states in particular, unwearying in their love of\r\nwar, or perhaps only at the philosophers who cherish the sweet dream\r\nof perpetual peace. The author of the present sketch would make one\r\nstipulation, however. The practical politician stands upon a definite\r\nfooting with the theorist: with great self-complacency he looks down\r\nupon him as a mere pedant whose empty ideas can threaten no danger\r\nto the state (starting as it does from principles derived from\r\nexperience), and who may always be permitted to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_107\"\u003e[p. 107]\u003c/span\u003e knock down his eleven skittles at once\r\nwithout a worldly-wise statesman needing to disturb himself. Hence,\r\nin the event of a quarrel arising between the two, the practical\r\nstatesman must always act consistently, and not scent danger to the\r\nstate behind opinions ventured by the theoretical politician at\r\nrandom and publicly expressed. With which saving clause (\u003ci\u003eclausula\r\nsalvatoria\u003c/i\u003e) the author will herewith consider himself duly and\r\nexpressly protected against all malicious misinterpretation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 title=\"FIRST SECTION CONTAINING THE PRELIMINARY ARTICLES OF PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES\"\u003e \u003ci\u003eFIRST SECTION\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"subh3\"\u003eCONTAINING THE PRELIMINARY ARTICLES OF PERPETUAL\r\nPEACE BETWEEN STATES\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e1.—“No treaty of peace shall be regarded as\r\nvalid, if made with the secret reservation of material\r\nfor a future war.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"p1\"\u003eFor then it would be a mere truce, a mere suspension\r\nof hostilities, not peace. A peace signifies the end of all\r\nhostilities and to attach to it the epithet “eternal” is not\r\nonly a verbal pleonasm, but matter of suspicion. The causes of a\r\nfuture war existing, although perhaps not yet known to the high\r\ncontracting parties themselves, are entirely\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_108\"\u003e[p. 108]\u003c/span\u003e annihilated by the conclusion of\r\npeace, however acutely they may be ferreted out of documents in the\r\npublic archives. There may be a mental reservation of old claims to\r\nbe thought out at a future time, which are, none of them, mentioned\r\nat this stage, because both parties are too much exhausted to\r\ncontinue the war, while the evil intention remains of using the\r\nfirst favourable opportunity for further hostilities. Diplomacy\r\nof this kind only Jesuitical casuistry can justify: it is beneath\r\nthe dignity of a ruler, just as acquiescence in such processes of\r\nreasoning is beneath the dignity of his minister, if one judges the\r\nfacts as they really are.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_109\" id=\"FNanchor_109\"\u003e[109]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf, however, according to present enlightened ideas of political\r\nwisdom, the true glory of a state lies in the uninterrupted\r\ndevelopment of its power by every possible means, this judgment must\r\ncertainly strike one as scholastic and pedantic.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"p2\"\u003e2.—“No state having an independent existence—whether\r\nit be great or small—shall be acquired by another through\r\ninheritance, exchange, purchase or donation.”\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_110\" id=\"FNanchor_110\"\u003e[110]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_109\"\u003e[p. 109]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"p1\"\u003eFor a state is not a property (\u003ci\u003epatrimonium\u003c/i\u003e), as may\r\nbe the ground on which its people are settled. It is a society of\r\nhuman beings over whom no one but itself has the right to rule and\r\nto dispose. Like the trunk of a tree, it has its own roots, and to\r\ngraft it on to another state is to do away with its existence as a\r\nmoral person, and to make of it a thing. Hence it is in contradiction\r\nto the idea of the original contract without which no right over\r\na people is thinkable.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_111\" id=\"FNanchor_111\"\u003e[111]\u003c/a\u003e Everyone knows to what danger the bias in\r\nfavour of these modes of acquisition has brought Europe (in other\r\nparts of the world it has never been known). The custom of marriage\r\nbetween states, as if they were individuals, has survived even up\r\nto the most recent times,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_112\" id=\"FNanchor_112\"\u003e[112]\u003c/a\u003e and is regarded partly as a new kind\r\nof industry by which ascendency may be acquired through family\r\nalliances, without any expenditure of strength; partly\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_110\"\u003e[p. 110]\u003c/span\u003e as a device for\r\nterritorial expansion. Moreover, the hiring out of the troops of one\r\nstate to another to fight against an enemy not at war with their\r\nnative country is to be reckoned in this connection; for the subjects\r\nare in this way used and abused at will as personal property.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"p2\"\u003e3.—“Standing armies (\u003ci\u003emiles perpetuus\u003c/i\u003e) shall be\r\nabolished in course of time.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"p1\"\u003eFor they are always threatening other states with\r\nwar by appearing to be in constant readiness to fight. They incite\r\nthe various states to outrival one another in the number of their\r\nsoldiers, and to this number no limit can be set. Now, since owing\r\nto the sums devoted to this purpose, peace at last becomes even more\r\noppressive than a short war, these standing armies are themselves the\r\ncause of wars of aggression, undertaken in order to get rid of this\r\nburden. To which we must add that the practice of hiring men to kill\r\nor to be killed seems to imply a use of them as mere machines and\r\ninstruments in the hand of another (namely, the state) which cannot\r\neasily be reconciled with the right of humanity in our own person.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_113\" id=\"FNanchor_113\"\u003e[113]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_111\"\u003e[p. 111]\u003c/span\u003e matter stands\r\nquite differently in the case of voluntary periodical military\r\nexercise on the part of citizens of the state, who thereby seek to\r\nsecure themselves and their country against attack from without.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe accumulation of treasure in a state would in the same way be\r\nregarded by other states as a menace of war, and might compel them to\r\nanticipate this by striking the first blow. For of the three forces,\r\nthe power of arms, the power of alliance and the power of money, the\r\nlast might well become the most reliable instrument of war, did not\r\nthe difficulty of ascertaining the amount stand in the way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"p2\"\u003e4.—“No national debts shall be contracted in connection\r\nwith the external affairs of the state.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"p1\"\u003eThis source of help is above suspicion, where\r\nassistance is sought outside or within the state, on behalf of the\r\neconomic administration of the country (for instance, the improvement\r\nof the roads, the settlement and support of new colonies, the\r\nestablishment of granaries to provide against seasons of scarcity,\r\nand so on). But, as a common weapon used by the Powers against\r\none another, a credit system under which debts go on indefinitely\r\nin\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_112\"\u003e[p. 112]\u003c/span\u003ecreasing and\r\nare yet always assured against immediate claims (because all the\r\ncreditors do not put in their claim at once) is a dangerous money\r\npower. This ingenious invention of a commercial people in the\r\npresent century is, in other words, a treasure for the carrying on\r\nof war which may exceed the treasures of all the other states taken\r\ntogether, and can only be exhausted by a threatening deficiency in\r\nthe taxes—an event, however, which will long be kept off by the very\r\nbriskness of commerce resulting from the reaction of this system on\r\nindustry and trade. The ease, then, with which war may be waged,\r\ncoupled with the inclination of rulers towards it—an inclination\r\nwhich seems to be implanted in human nature—is a great obstacle in\r\nthe way of perpetual peace. The prohibition of this system must be\r\nlaid down as a preliminary article of perpetual peace, all the more\r\nnecessarily because the final inevitable bankruptcy of the state in\r\nquestion must involve in the loss many who are innocent; and this\r\nwould be a public injury to these states. Therefore other nations are\r\nat least justified in uniting themselves against such an one and its\r\npretensions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"p2\"\u003e5.—“No state shall violently interfere with the\r\nconstitution and administration of another.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"p1\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_113\"\u003e[p. 113]\u003c/span\u003eFor\r\nwhat can justify it in so doing? The scandal which is here presented\r\nto the subjects of another state? The erring state can much more\r\nserve as a warning by exemplifying the great evils which a nation\r\ndraws down on itself through its own lawlessness. Moreover, the\r\nbad example which one free person gives another, (as \u003ci\u003escandalum\r\nacceptum\u003c/i\u003e) does no injury to the latter. In this connection, it is\r\ntrue, we cannot count the case of a state which has become split up\r\nthrough internal corruption into two parts, each of them representing\r\nby itself an individual state which lays claim to the whole. Here\r\nthe yielding of assistance to one faction could not be reckoned as\r\ninterference on the part of a foreign state with the constitution of\r\nanother, for here anarchy prevails. So long, however, as the inner\r\nstrife has not yet reached this stage the interference of other\r\npowers would be a violation of the rights of an independent nation\r\nwhich is only struggling with internal disease.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_114\" id=\"FNanchor_114\"\u003e[114]\u003c/a\u003e It would\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_114\"\u003e[p. 114]\u003c/span\u003e therefore itself cause\r\na scandal, and make the autonomy of all states insecure.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"p2\"\u003e6.—“No state at war with another shall countenance\r\nsuch modes of hostility as would make mutual confidence impossible\r\nin a subsequent state of peace: such are the employment of\r\nassassins (\u003ci\u003epercussores\u003c/i\u003e) or of poisoners (\u003ci\u003evenefici\u003c/i\u003e), breaches\r\nof capitulation, the instigating and making use of treachery\r\n(\u003ci\u003eperduellio\u003c/i\u003e) in the hostile state.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"p1\"\u003eThese are dishonourable stratagems. For some kind\r\nof confidence in the disposition of the enemy must exist even in\r\nthe midst of war, as otherwise peace could not be concluded, and\r\nthe hostilities would pass into a war of extermination (\u003ci\u003ebellum\r\ninternecinum\u003c/i\u003e). War, however, is only our wretched expedient of\r\nasserting a right by force, an expedient adopted in the state of\r\nnature, where no court of justice exists which could settle the\r\nmatter in dispute. In circumstances like these, neither of the two\r\nparties can be called an unjust enemy, because this form of speech\r\npresupposes a legal decision: the issue of the conflict—just as in\r\nthe\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_115\"\u003e[p. 115]\u003c/span\u003e case of the\r\nso-called judgments of God—decides on which side right is. Between\r\nstates, however, no punitive war (\u003ci\u003ebellum punitivum\u003c/i\u003e) is thinkable,\r\nbecause between them a relation of superior and inferior does not\r\nexist. Whence it follows that a war of extermination, where the\r\nprocess of annihilation would strike both parties at once and all\r\nright as well, would bring about perpetual peace only in the great\r\ngraveyard of the human race. Such a war then, and therefore also the\r\nuse of all means which lead to it, must be absolutely forbidden.\r\nThat the methods just mentioned do inevitably lead to this result\r\nis obvious from the fact that these infernal arts, already vile in\r\nthemselves, on coming into use, are not long confined to the sphere\r\nof war. Take, for example, the use of spies (\u003ci\u003euti exploratoribus\u003c/i\u003e).\r\nHere only the dishonesty of others is made use of; but vices such\r\nas these, when once encouraged, cannot in the nature of things be\r\nstamped out and would be carried over into the state of peace, where\r\ntheir presence would be utterly destructive to the purpose of that\r\nstate.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAlthough the laws stated are, objectively regarded, (\u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e in\r\nso far as they affect the action of rulers) purely prohibitive laws\r\n(\u003ci\u003eleges prohibitivæ\u003c/i\u003e), some of them (\u003ci\u003eleges strictæ\u003c/i\u003e) are strictly\r\nvalid without regard to circumstances and urgently require to be\r\nenforced. Such are Nos. 1, 5, 6. Others, again, (like Nos. 2,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_116\"\u003e[p. 116]\u003c/span\u003e 3, 4) although not\r\nindeed exceptions to the maxims of law, yet in respect of the\r\npractical application of these maxims allow subjectively of a certain\r\nlatitude to suit particular circumstances. The enforcement of these\r\n\u003ci\u003eleges latæ\u003c/i\u003e may be legitimately put off, so long as we do not lose\r\nsight of the ends at which they aim. This purpose of reform does not\r\npermit of the deferment of an act of restitution (as, for example,\r\nthe restoration to certain states of freedom of which they have been\r\ndeprived in the manner described in article 2) to an infinitely\r\ndistant date—as Augustus used to say, to the “Greek Kalends”, a day\r\nthat will never come. This would be to sanction non-restitution.\r\nDelay is permitted only with the intention that restitution should\r\nnot be made too precipitately and so defeat the purpose we have\r\nin view. For the prohibition refers here only to the \u003ci\u003emode of\r\nacquisition\u003c/i\u003e which is to be no longer valid, and not to the \u003ci\u003efact of\r\npossession\u003c/i\u003e which, although indeed it has not the necessary title\r\nof right, yet at the time of so-called acquisition was held legal\r\nby all states, in accordance with the public opinion of the time.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_115\" id=\"FNanchor_115\"\u003e[115]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 title=\"SECOND SECTION CONTAINING THE DEFINITIVE ARTICLES OF A PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES\"\u003e \u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_117\"\u003e[p. 117]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ci\u003eSECOND SECTION\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"subh3\"\u003eCONTAINING THE DEFINITIVE ARTICLES OF A PERPETUAL\r\nPEACE BETWEEN STATES\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eA state of peace among men who live side by side is not the\r\nnatural state (\u003ci\u003estatus naturalis\u003c/i\u003e), which\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_118\"\u003e[p. 118]\u003c/span\u003e is rather to be described as\r\na state of war:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_116\" id=\"FNanchor_116\"\u003e[116]\u003c/a\u003e that is to say, although there is not\r\nperhaps always actual open hostility, yet there is a constant\r\nthreatening that an outbreak may occur. Thus the state of peace\r\nmust be \u003ci\u003eestablished\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_117\" id=\"FNanchor_117\"\u003e[117]\u003c/a\u003e For the mere\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_119\"\u003e[p. 119]\u003c/span\u003e cessation of hostilities is no\r\nguarantee of continued peaceful relations, and unless this guarantee\r\nis given by every individual to his neighbour—which can only be\r\ndone in a state of society regulated by law—one man is at liberty\r\nto challenge another and treat him as an enemy.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_118\" id=\"FNanchor_118\"\u003e[118]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"centra p2\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_120\"\u003e[p.\r\n120]\u003c/span\u003e\u003csmall\u003eFIRST DEFINITIVE ARTICLE OF PERPETUAL\r\nPEACE\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"centra p1\"\u003eI.—“The civil constitution of each state shall be\r\nrepublican.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"p1\"\u003eThe only constitution which has its origin in the\r\nidea of the original contract, upon which the lawful legislation of\r\nevery nation must be based, is the republican.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_119\" id=\"FNanchor_119\"\u003e[119]\u003c/a\u003e It is a constitution,\r\nin the first place,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_121\"\u003e[p.\r\n121]\u003c/span\u003e founded in accordance with the principle of the freedom\r\nof the members of society as human beings: secondly, in accordance\r\nwith the principle of the dependence of all, as subjects, on a common\r\nlegislation: and, thirdly, in accordance with the law of the equality\r\nof the members as citizens. It is then, looking at the question of\r\nright, the only constitution whose fundamental principles lie at the\r\nbasis of every form of civil constitution. And the only question for\r\nus now is, whether it is also the one constitution which can lead to\r\nperpetual peace.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow the republican constitution apart from the soundness\r\nof its origin, since it arose from the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_122\"\u003e[p. 122]\u003c/span\u003e pure source of the concept of right,\r\nhas also the prospect of attaining the desired result, namely,\r\nperpetual peace. And the reason is this. If, as must be so under this\r\nconstitution, the consent of the subjects is required to determine\r\nwhether there shall be war or not, nothing is more natural than that\r\nthey should weigh the matter well, before undertaking such a bad\r\nbusiness. For in decreeing war, they would of necessity be resolving\r\nto bring down the miseries of war upon their country. This implies:\r\nthey must fight themselves; they must hand over the costs of the war\r\nout of their own\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_123\"\u003e[p. 123]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nproperty; they must do their poor best to make good the devastation\r\nwhich it leaves behind; and finally, as a crowning ill, they have\r\nto accept a burden of debt which will embitter even peace itself,\r\nand which they can never pay off on account of the new wars which\r\nare always impending. On the other hand, in a government where the\r\nsubject is not a citizen holding a vote, (\u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e in a constitution\r\nwhich is not republican), the plunging into war is the least serious\r\nthing in the world. For the ruler is not a citizen, but the owner\r\nof the state, and does not lose a whit by the war, while he goes\r\non enjoying the delights of his table or sport, or of his pleasure\r\npalaces and gala days. He can therefore decide on war for the\r\nmost trifling reasons, as if it were a kind of pleasure party.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_120\" id=\"FNanchor_120\"\u003e[120]\u003c/a\u003e Any\r\njustification of it that is necessary for the sake of decency he can\r\nleave without concern to the diplomatic corps who are always only too\r\nready with their services.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tb\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_124\"\u003e[p. 124]\u003c/span\u003e* * *\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe following remarks must be made in order that we may not fall\r\ninto the common error of confusing the republican with the democratic\r\nconstitution. The forms of the state (\u003ci\u003ecivitas\u003c/i\u003e)\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_121\" id=\"FNanchor_121\"\u003e[121]\u003c/a\u003e may be classified\r\naccording to either of two principles of division:—the difference\r\nof the persons who hold the supreme authority in the state, and the\r\nmanner in which the people are governed by their ruler whoever he\r\nmay be. The first is properly called the form of sovereignty (\u003ci\u003eforma\r\nimperii\u003c/i\u003e), and there can be only three constitutions differing\r\nin this respect: where, namely, the supreme authority belongs to\r\nonly one, to several individuals working together, or to the whole\r\npeople constituting the civil society. Thus we have autocracy\r\nor the sovereignty of a monarch, aristocracy or the sovereignty\r\nof the nobility, and democracy or the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_125\"\u003e[p. 125]\u003c/span\u003e sovereignty of the people. The\r\nsecond principle of division is the form of government (\u003ci\u003eforma\r\nregiminis\u003c/i\u003e), and refers to the way in which the state makes use of\r\nits supreme power: for the manner of government is based on the\r\nconstitution, itself the act of that universal will which transforms\r\na multitude into a nation. In this respect the form of government\r\nis either republican or despotic. Republicanism is the political\r\nprinciple of severing the executive power of the government from the\r\nlegislature. Despotism is that principle in pursuance of which the\r\nstate arbitrarily puts into effect laws which it has itself made:\r\nconsequently it is the administration of the public will, but this is\r\nidentical with the private will of the ruler. Of these three forms of\r\na state, democracy, in the proper sense of the word, is of necessity\r\ndespotism, because it establishes an executive power, since all\r\ndecree regarding—and, if need be, against—any individual who dissents\r\nfrom them. Therefore the “whole people”, so-called, who carry their\r\nmeasure are really not all, but only a majority: so that here the\r\nuniversal will is in contradiction with itself and with the principle\r\nof freedom.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eEvery form of government in fact which is not representative\r\nis really no true constitution at all, because a law-giver may\r\nno more be, in one and the same person, the administrator of his\r\nown\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_126\"\u003e[p. 126]\u003c/span\u003e will, than\r\nthe universal major premise of a syllogism may be, at the same time,\r\nthe subsumption under itself of the particulars contained in the\r\nminor premise. And, although the other two constitutions, autocracy\r\nand aristocracy, are always defective in so far as they leave the\r\nway open for such a form of government, yet there is at least\r\nalways a possibility in these cases, that they may take the form\r\nof a government in accordance with the spirit of a representative\r\nsystem. Thus Frederick the Great used at least to \u003ci\u003esay\u003c/i\u003e that he\r\nwas “merely the highest servant of the state.”\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_122\" id=\"FNanchor_122\"\u003e[122]\u003c/a\u003e The democratic\r\nconstitution, on the other hand, makes this impossible, because\r\nunder such a government every one wishes to be master. We may\r\ntherefore say that the smaller the staff of the executive—that\r\nis to say, the number of rulers—and the more real, on the other\r\nhand, their representation of the people, so much the more is the\r\ngovernment of the state in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_127\"\u003e[p.\r\n127]\u003c/span\u003e accordance with a possible republicanism; and it may\r\nhope by gradual reforms to raise itself to that standard. For this\r\nreason, it is more difficult under an aristocracy than under a\r\nmonarchy—while under a democracy it is impossible except by a violent\r\nrevolution—to attain to this, the one perfectly lawful constitution.\r\nThe kind of government,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_123\" id=\"FNanchor_123\"\u003e[123]\u003c/a\u003e however, is of infinitely more importance\r\nto the people than the kind of constitution, although the greater or\r\nless aptitude of a people for this ideal greatly depends upon such\r\nexternal form. The form of government, however, if it is to be in\r\naccordance with the idea of right, must embody the representative\r\nsystem in which alone a republican form of administration is\r\npos\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_128\"\u003e[p. 128]\u003c/span\u003esible and\r\nwithout which it is despotic and violent, be the constitution what\r\nit may. None of the ancient so-called republics were aware of\r\nthis, and they necessarily slipped into absolute despotism which,\r\nof all despotisms, is most endurable under the sovereignty of one\r\nindividual.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"centra p2\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003eSECOND DEFINITIVE ARTICLE OF PERPETUAL\r\nPEACE\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"centra p1\"\u003eII.—“The law of nations shall be founded on a\r\nfederation of free states.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"p1\"\u003eNations, as states, may be judged like individuals who,\r\nliving in the natural state of society—that is to say, uncontrolled\r\nby external law—injure one another through their very proximity.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_124\" id=\"FNanchor_124\"\u003e[124]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nEvery state, for the sake of its own security, may—and ought\r\nto—demand that its neighbour should submit itself to conditions,\r\nsimilar to those of the civil society where the right of every\r\nindividual is guaranteed.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_129\"\u003e[p.\r\n129]\u003c/span\u003e This would give rise to a federation of nations which,\r\nhowever, would not have to be a State of nations.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_125\" id=\"FNanchor_125\"\u003e[125]\u003c/a\u003e That would involve\r\na contradiction. For the term “state” implies the relation of one\r\nwho rules to those who obey—that is to say, of law-giver to the\r\nsubject people: and many nations in one state would constitute only\r\none nation, which contradicts our hypothesis, since here we have to\r\nconsider the right of one nation against another, in so far as they\r\nare so many separate states and are not to be fused into one.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_130\"\u003e[p. 130]\u003c/span\u003eThe attachment\r\nof savages to their lawless liberty, the fact that they would rather\r\nbe at hopeless variance with one another than submit themselves to a\r\nlegal authority constituted by themselves, that they therefore prefer\r\ntheir senseless freedom to a reason-governed liberty, is regarded by\r\nus with profound contempt as barbarism and uncivilisation and the\r\nbrutal degradation of humanity. So one would think that civilised\r\nraces, each formed into a state by itself, must come out of such an\r\nabandoned condition as soon as they possibly can. On the contrary,\r\nhowever, every state thinks rather that its majesty (the “majesty”\r\nof a people is an absurd expression) lies just in the very fact that\r\nit is subject to no external legal authority; and the glory of the\r\nruler consists in this, that, without his requiring to expose himself\r\nto danger, thousands stand at his command ready to let themselves be\r\nsacrificed for a matter of no concern to them.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_126\" id=\"FNanchor_126\"\u003e[126]\u003c/a\u003e The difference\r\nbetween the savages of Europe and those of America lies chiefly\r\nin this, that, while many tribes of the latter have been entirely\r\ndevoured by their enemies, Europeans know a better way of using the\r\nvanquished than by eating\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_131\"\u003e[p.\r\n131]\u003c/span\u003e them; and they prefer to increase through them the number\r\nof their subjects, and so the number of instruments at their command\r\nfor still more widely spread war.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe depravity of human nature\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_127\" id=\"FNanchor_127\"\u003e[127]\u003c/a\u003e shows itself without\r\ndisguise in the unrestrained relations of nations to each other,\r\nwhile in the law-governed civil state much of this is hidden by\r\nthe check of government. This being so, it is astonishing that the\r\nword “right” has not yet been entirely banished from the politics\r\nof war as pedantic, and that no state has yet ventured to publicly\r\nadvocate this point of view. For Hugo Grotius, Puffendorf, Vattel\r\nand others—Job’s comforters, all of them—are always quoted in good\r\nfaith to justify an attack, although their codes, whether couched\r\nin philosophical or diplomatic terms, have not—nor can have—the\r\nslightest legal force, because states, as such, are under no common\r\nexternal authority; and there is no instance of a state having\r\never\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_132\"\u003e[p. 132]\u003c/span\u003e been moved\r\nby argument to desist from its purpose, even when this was backed\r\nup by the testimony of such great men. This homage which every\r\nstate renders—in words at least—to the idea of right, proves that,\r\nalthough it may be slumbering, there is, notwithstanding, to be found\r\nin man a still higher natural moral capacity by the aid of which\r\nhe will in time gain the mastery over the evil principle in his\r\nnature, the existence of which he is unable to deny. And he hopes\r\nthe same of others; for otherwise the word “right” would never be\r\nuttered by states who wish to wage war, unless to deride it like\r\nthe Gallic Prince who declared:—“The privilege which nature gives\r\nthe strong is that the weak must obey them.”\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_128\" id=\"FNanchor_128\"\u003e[128]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe method by which states prosecute their rights can never be\r\nby process of law—as it is where there is an external tribunal—but\r\nonly by war. Through this means, however, and its favourable issue,\r\nvictory, the question of right is never decided. A treaty of peace\r\nmakes, it may be, an end to the war of the moment, but not to the\r\nconditions\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_133\"\u003e[p. 133]\u003c/span\u003e of war\r\nwhich at any time may afford a new pretext for opening hostilities;\r\nand this we cannot exactly condemn as unjust, because under these\r\nconditions everyone is his own judge. Notwithstanding, not quite\r\nthe same rule applies to states according to the law of nations\r\nas holds good of individuals in a lawless condition according to\r\nthe law of nature, namely, “that they ought to advance out of this\r\ncondition.” This is so, because, as states, they have already\r\nwithin themselves a legal constitution, and have therefore advanced\r\nbeyond the stage at which others, in accordance with their ideas\r\nof right, can force them to come under a wider legal constitution.\r\nMeanwhile, however, reason, from her throne of the supreme\r\nlaw-giving moral power, absolutely condemns war\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_129\" id=\"FNanchor_129\"\u003e[129]\u003c/a\u003e as a morally lawful\r\nproceeding,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_134\"\u003e[p. 134]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand makes a state of peace, on the other hand, an immediate duty.\r\nWithout a compact between the nations, however, this state of peace\r\ncannot be established or assured. Hence there must be an alliance\r\nof a particular kind which we may call a covenant of peace (\u003ci\u003efoedus\r\npacificum\u003c/i\u003e), which would differ from a treaty of peace (\u003ci\u003epactum\r\npacis\u003c/i\u003e) in this respect, that the latter merely puts an end to one\r\nwar, while the former would seek to put an end to war for ever. This\r\nalliance does not aim at the gain of any power whatsoever of the\r\nstate, but merely at the preservation and security of the freedom of\r\nthe state for itself and of other allied states at the same time.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_130\" id=\"FNanchor_130\"\u003e[130]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe latter do not, however, require, for this reason, to submit\r\nthemselves like individuals in the state of nature to public laws\r\nand coercion. The practicability or objective reality of this idea\r\nof federation which is to extend gradually over all states and so\r\nlead to perpetual peace can be shewn. For, if Fortune ordains that\r\na powerful and enlightened people should form a republic,—which by\r\nits very nature is inclined to perpetual peace—this would serve as a\r\ncentre of federal union for other states wishing to join, and thus\r\nsecure conditions of freedom\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_135\"\u003e[p.\r\n135]\u003c/span\u003e among the states in accordance with the idea of the law\r\nof nations. Gradually, through different unions of this kind, the\r\nfederation would extend further and further.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is quite comprehensible that a people should say:—“There\r\nshall be no war among us, for we shall form ourselves into a state,\r\nthat is to say, constitute for ourselves a supreme legislative,\r\nadministrative and judicial power which will settle our disputes\r\npeaceably.” But if this state says:—“There shall be no war between me\r\nand other states, although I recognise no supreme law-giving power\r\nwhich will secure me my rights and whose rights I will guarantee;”\r\nthen it is not at all clear upon what grounds I could base my\r\nconfidence in my right, unless it were the substitute for that\r\ncompact on which civil society is based—namely, free federation which\r\nreason must necessarily connect with the idea of the law of nations,\r\nif indeed any meaning is to be left in that concept at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is no intelligible meaning in the idea of the law of\r\nnations as giving a right to make war; for that must be a right to\r\ndecide what is just, not in accordance with universal, external\r\nlaws limiting the freedom of each individual, but by means of\r\none-sided maxims applied by force. We must then understand by\r\nthis that men of such ways of thinking are quite justly served,\r\nwhen they\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_136\"\u003e[p. 136]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndestroy one another, and thus find perpetual peace in the wide\r\ngrave which covers all the abominations of acts of violence as\r\nwell as the authors of such deeds. For states, in their relation\r\nto one another, there can be, according to reason, no other way of\r\nadvancing from that lawless condition which unceasing war implies,\r\nthan by giving up their savage lawless freedom, just as individual\r\nmen have done, and yielding to the coercion of public laws. Thus\r\nthey can form a State of nations (\u003ci\u003ecivitas gentium\u003c/i\u003e), one, too,\r\nwhich will be ever increasing and would finally embrace all the\r\npeoples of the earth. States, however, in accordance with their\r\nunderstanding of the law of nations, by no means desire this, and\r\ntherefore reject \u003ci\u003ein hypothesi\u003c/i\u003e what is correct \u003ci\u003ein thesi\u003c/i\u003e. Hence,\r\ninstead of the positive idea of a world-republic, if all is not\r\nto be lost, only the negative substitute for it, a federation\r\naverting war, maintaining its ground and ever extending over the\r\nworld may stop the current of this tendency to war and shrinking\r\nfrom the control of law. But even then there will be a constant\r\ndanger that this propensity may break out.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_131\" id=\"FNanchor_131\"\u003e[131]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_137\"\u003e[p. 137]\u003c/span\u003e “Furor impius intus—fremit horridus\r\nore cruento.” (Virgil.)\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_132\" id=\"FNanchor_132\"\u003e[132]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"centra p2\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003eTHIRD DEFINITIVE ARTICLE OF PERPETUAL\r\nPEACE\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"centra p1\"\u003eIII.—“The rights of men, as citizens of the world,\r\nshall be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"p1\"\u003eWe are speaking here, as in the previous articles,\r\nnot of philanthropy, but of right; and in this sphere hospitality\r\nsignifies the claim of a stranger entering foreign territory to be\r\ntreated by its owner without hostility. The latter may send him\r\naway again, if this can be done without causing his death; but, so\r\nlong as he conducts himself peaceably, he must not be treated as\r\nan enemy. It is not a right to be treated as a guest to which the\r\nstranger can lay\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_138\"\u003e[p. 138]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nclaim—a special friendly compact on his behalf would be required\r\nto make him for a given time an actual inmate—but he has a right\r\nof visitation. This right\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_133\" id=\"FNanchor_133\"\u003e[133]\u003c/a\u003e to present themselves to society belongs\r\nto all mankind in virtue of our common right of possession on\r\nthe surface of the earth on which, as it is a globe, we cannot\r\nbe infinitely scattered, and must in the end reconcile ourselves\r\nto existence side by side: at the same time, originally no one\r\nindividual had more right than another to live in any one particular\r\nspot. Uninhabitable portions of the surface, ocean and desert,\r\nsplit up the human community, but in such a way that ships and\r\ncamels—“the ship of the desert”—make it possible for men to come\r\ninto touch with one another across these unappropriated regions\r\nand to take advantage of our common claim to the face of the earth\r\nwith a view to a possible intercommunication. The inhospitality of\r\nthe inhabitants of certain sea coasts—as, for example, the coast of\r\nBarbary—in plundering ships in neighbouring seas or making slaves\r\nof shipwrecked mariners; or the behaviour of the Arab Bedouins in\r\nthe deserts, who think that\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_139\"\u003e[p.\r\n139]\u003c/span\u003e proximity to nomadic tribes constitutes a right to rob,\r\nis thus contrary to the law of nature. This right to hospitality,\r\nhowever—that is to say, the privilege of strangers arriving on\r\nforeign soil—does not amount to more than what is implied in a\r\npermission to make an attempt at intercourse with the original\r\ninhabitants. In this way far distant territories may enter into\r\npeaceful relations with one another. These relations may at last\r\ncome under the public control of law, and thus the human race may be\r\nbrought nearer the realisation of a cosmopolitan constitution.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us look now, for the sake of comparison, at the inhospitable\r\nbehaviour of the civilised nations, especially the commercial\r\nstates of our continent. The injustice which they exhibit on\r\nvisiting foreign lands and races—this being equivalent in their\r\neyes to conquest—is such as to fill us with horror. America, the\r\nnegro countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape etc. were, on being\r\ndiscovered, looked upon as countries which belonged to nobody; for\r\nthe native inhabitants were reckoned as nothing. In Hindustan, under\r\nthe pretext of intending to establish merely commercial depots, the\r\nEuropeans introduced foreign troops; and, as a result, the different\r\nstates of Hindustan were stirred up to far-spreading wars. Oppression\r\nof the natives followed, famine, insurrection, perfidy and all\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_140\"\u003e[p. 140]\u003c/span\u003e the rest of the litany\r\nof evils which can afflict mankind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eChina\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_134\" id=\"FNanchor_134\"\u003e[134]\u003c/a\u003e and Japan (Nipon) which had made\r\nan attempt at receiving guests of this kind, have now\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_141\"\u003e[p. 141]\u003c/span\u003e taken a prudent step.\r\nOnly to a single European people, the Dutch, has China given the\r\nright of access to her shores (but not of entrance into the country),\r\nwhile Japan has granted both these concessions; but at the same\r\ntime they exclude the Dutch who enter, as if they were prisoners,\r\nfrom social intercourse with the inhabitants. The worst, or from\r\nthe standpoint of ethical judgment the best, of all this is that\r\nno satisfaction is derived from all this violence, that all these\r\ntrading companies stand on the verge of ruin, that the Sugar Islands,\r\nthat seat of the most horrible and delib\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_142\"\u003e[p. 142]\u003c/span\u003eerate slavery, yield no real profit,\r\nbut only have their use indirectly and for no very praiseworthy\r\nobject—namely, that of furnishing men to be trained as sailors for\r\nthe men-of-war and thereby contributing to the carrying on of war in\r\nEurope. And this has been done by nations who make a great ado about\r\ntheir piety, and who, while they are quite ready to commit injustice,\r\nwould like, in their orthodoxy, to be considered among the elect.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe intercourse, more or less close, which has been everywhere\r\nsteadily increasing between the nations of the earth, has now\r\nextended so enormously that a violation of right in one part of the\r\nworld is felt all over it. Hence the idea of a cosmopolitan right\r\nis no fantastical, high-flown notion of right, but a complement of\r\nthe unwritten code of law—constitutional as well as international\r\nlaw—necessary for the public rights of mankind in general and thus\r\nfor the realisation of perpetual peace. For only by endeavouring\r\nto fulfil the conditions laid down by this cosmopolitan law can we\r\nflatter ourselves that we are gradually approaching that ideal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_143\"\u003e[p. 143]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 class=\"nobreak\" title=\"FIRST SUPPLEMENT CONCERNING THE GUARANTEE OF PERPETUAL PEACE\"\u003eFIRST SUPPLEMENT\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"subh3\"\u003eCONCERNING THE GUARANTEE OF PERPETUAL PEACE\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThis\u003c/span\u003e\r\nguarantee is given by no less a power than the great artist nature\r\n(\u003ci\u003enatura dædala rerum\u003c/i\u003e) in whose mechanical course is clearly\r\nexhibited a predetermined design to make harmony spring from human\r\ndiscord, even against the will of man. Now this design, although\r\ncalled Fate when looked upon as the compelling force of a cause, the\r\nlaws of whose operation are unknown to us, is, when considered as\r\nthe purpose manifested in the course of nature, called Providence,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_135\" id=\"FNanchor_135\"\u003e[135]\u003c/a\u003e as\r\nthe deep\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_144\"\u003e[p. 144]\u003c/span\u003e-lying\r\nwisdom of a Higher Cause, directing itself towards the ultimate\r\npractical end of the human race and predetermining the course of\r\nthings with a view to its realisation. This Providence we do\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_145\"\u003e[p. 145]\u003c/span\u003e not, it is true,\r\nperceive in the cunning contrivances [\u003ci\u003eKunstanstalten\u003c/i\u003e] of nature;\r\nnor can we even conclude from the fact of their existence that it\r\nis there; but, as in every relation between the form of things\r\nand their final cause, we can, and must, supply the thought of a\r\nHigher Wisdom, in order that we may be able to form an idea of the\r\npossible existence of these products after the analogy of human\r\nworks of art [\u003ci\u003eKunsthand\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_146\"\u003e[p.\r\n146]\u003c/span\u003elungen\u003c/i\u003e].\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_136\" id=\"FNanchor_136\"\u003e[136]\u003c/a\u003e The representation to ourselves of\r\nthe relation and agreement of these formations of nature to the\r\nmoral purpose for which they were made and which reason directly\r\nprescribes to us, is an Idea, it is true, which is in theory\r\nsuperfluous; but in practice it is dogmatic, and its objective\r\nreality is well established.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_137\" id=\"FNanchor_137\"\u003e[137]\u003c/a\u003e Thus we see, for example, with regard to\r\nthe ideal [\u003ci\u003ePflichtbegriff\u003c/i\u003e] of perpetual peace, that it is our duty\r\nto make use of the mechanism of nature for the realisation of that\r\nend. Moreover, in a case like this where we are interested merely in\r\nthe theory and not in the religious question, the use of the word\r\n“nature” is more appropriate than that of “providence”, in view of\r\nthe limitations of human reason, which, in considering the relation\r\nof effects to their causes, must keep within the limits of possible\r\nexperience. And the term “nature” is also less presumptuous than the\r\nother. To speak of a Providence knowable by us would be boldly to put\r\non the wings of Icarus in order to draw near to the mystery of its\r\nunfathomable purpose.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBefore we determine the surety given by nature more exactly, we\r\nmust first look at what ultimately makes this guarantee of peace\r\nnecessary—the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_147\"\u003e[p. 147]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncircumstances in which nature has carefully placed the actors in her\r\ngreat theatre. In the next place, we shall proceed to consider the\r\nmanner in which she gives this surety.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe provisions she has made are as follow: (1) she has taken\r\ncare that men \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e live in all parts of the world; (2) she has\r\nscattered them by means of war in all directions, even into the most\r\ninhospitable regions, so that these too might be populated; (3) by\r\nthis very means she has forced them to enter into relations more or\r\nless controlled by law. It is surely wonderful that, on the cold\r\nwastes round the Arctic Ocean, there is always to be found moss\r\nfor the reindeer to scrape out from under the snow, the reindeer\r\nitself either serving as food or to draw the sledge of the Ostiak or\r\nSamoyedes. And salt deserts which would otherwise be left unutilised\r\nhave the camel, which seems as if created for travelling in such\r\nlands. This evidence of design in things, however, is still more\r\nclear when we come to know that, besides the fur-clad animals of the\r\nshores of the Arctic Ocean, there are seals, walruses and whales\r\nwhose flesh furnishes food and whose oil fire for the dwellers in\r\nthese regions. But the providential care of nature excites our wonder\r\nabove all, when we hear of the driftwood which is carried—whence\r\nno one knows—to these treeless shores: for without the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_148\"\u003e[p. 148]\u003c/span\u003e aid of this material\r\nthe natives could neither construct their craft, nor weapons, nor\r\nhuts for shelter. Here too they have so much to do, making war\r\nagainst wild animals, that they live at peace with one another. But\r\nwhat drove them originally into these regions was probably nothing\r\nbut war.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf animals, used by us as instruments of war, the horse was the\r\nfirst which man learned to tame and domesticate during the period of\r\nthe peopling of the earth; the elephant belongs to the later period\r\nof the luxury of states already established. In the same way, the art\r\nof cultivating certain grasses called cereals—no longer known to us\r\nin their original form—and also the multiplication and improvement,\r\nby transplanting and grafting, of the original kinds of fruit—in\r\nEurope, probably only two species, the crab-apple and wild pear—could\r\nonly originate under the conditions accompanying established states\r\nwhere the rights of property are assured. That is to say it would be\r\nafter man, hitherto existing in lawless liberty, had advanced beyond\r\nthe occupations of a hunter,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_138\" id=\"FNanchor_138\"\u003e[138]\u003c/a\u003e a fisherman\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_149\"\u003e[p. 149]\u003c/span\u003e or a shepherd to the life of a tiller\r\nof the soil, when salt and iron were discovered,—to become, perhaps,\r\nthe first articles of commerce between different peoples,—and were\r\nsought far and near. In this way the peoples would be at first\r\nbrought into peaceful relation with one another, and so come to an\r\nunderstanding and the enjoyment of friendly intercourse, even with\r\ntheir most distant neighbours.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow while nature provided that men could live on all parts of\r\nthe earth, she also at the same time despotically willed that\r\nthey \u003ci\u003eshould\u003c/i\u003e live everywhere on it, although against their own\r\ninclination and even although this imperative did not presuppose\r\nan idea of duty which would compel obedience to nature with the\r\nforce of a moral law. But, to attain this end, she has chosen war.\r\nSo we see certain peoples, widely separated, whose common\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_150\"\u003e[p. 150]\u003c/span\u003e descent is made\r\nevident by affinity in their languages. Thus, for instance, we find\r\nthe Samoyedes on the Arctic Ocean, and again a people speaking\r\na similar language on the Altai Mts., 200 miles [\u003ci\u003eMeilen\u003c/i\u003e]\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_139\" id=\"FNanchor_139\"\u003e[139]\u003c/a\u003e\r\noff, between whom has pressed in a mounted tribe, warlike in\r\ncharacter and of Mongolian origin, which has driven one branch of\r\nthe race far from the other, into the most inhospitable regions\r\nwhere their own inclination would certainly not have carried them.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_140\" id=\"FNanchor_140\"\u003e[140]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIn the same way, through the intrusion of the Gothic and Sarmatian\r\ntribes, the Finns in the most northerly regions of Europe, whom we\r\ncall Laplanders, have been separated by as great a distance from the\r\nHungarians, with whose language their own is allied. And what but war\r\ncan have brought the Esquimos to the north of America, a race quite\r\ndistinct from those of that country and probably European adventurers\r\nof\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_151\"\u003e[p. 151]\u003c/span\u003e prehistoric\r\ntimes? And war too, nature’s method of populating the earth, must\r\nhave driven the Pescherais\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_141\" id=\"FNanchor_141\"\u003e[141]\u003c/a\u003e in South America as far as Patagonia. War\r\nitself, however, is in need of no special stimulating cause, but\r\nseems engrafted in human nature, and is even regarded as something\r\nnoble in itself to which man is inspired by the love of glory apart\r\nfrom motives of self-interest. Hence, among the savages of America as\r\nwell as those of Europe in the age of chivalry, martial courage is\r\nlooked upon as of great value itself, not merely when a war is going\r\non, as is reasonable enough, but in order that there should be war:\r\nand thus war is often entered upon merely to exhibit this quality.\r\nSo that an intrinsic dignity is held to attach to war in itself, and\r\neven philosophers eulogise it as an ennobling, refining influence on\r\nhumanity, unmindful of the Greek proverb, “War is evil, in so far as\r\nit makes more bad people than it takes away.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo much, then, of what nature does for her own ends with regard\r\nto the human race as members of the animal world. Now comes the\r\nquestion which touches the essential points in this design of a\r\nperpetual peace:—“What does nature do in this respect with reference\r\nto the end which man’s own\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_152\"\u003e[p.\r\n152]\u003c/span\u003e reason sets before him as a duty? and consequently what\r\ndoes she do to further the realisation of his moral purpose? How does\r\nshe guarantee that what man, by the laws of freedom, ought to do and\r\nyet fails to do, he will do, without any infringement of his freedom\r\nby the compulsion of nature and that, moreover, this shall be done\r\nin accordance with the three forms of public right—constitutional or\r\npolitical law, international law and cosmopolitan law?” When I say\r\nof nature that she \u003ci\u003ewills\u003c/i\u003e that this or that should take place, I\r\ndo not mean that she imposes upon us the duty to do it—for only the\r\nfree, unrestrained, practical reason can do that—but that she does\r\nit herself, whether we will or not. “\u003ci\u003eFata volentem ducunt, nolentem\r\ntrahunt.\u003c/i\u003e”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. Even if a people were not compelled through internal discord to\r\nsubmit to the restraint of public laws, war would bring this about,\r\nworking from without. For, according to the contrivance of nature\r\nwhich we have mentioned, every people finds another tribe in its\r\nneighbourhood, pressing upon it in such a manner that it is compelled\r\nto form itself internally into a state to be able to defend itself as\r\na power should. Now the republican constitution is the only one which\r\nis perfectly adapted to the rights of man, but it is also the most\r\ndifficult to establish and still more to maintain. So generally is\r\nthis recognised that people\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_153\"\u003e[p.\r\n153]\u003c/span\u003e often say the members of a republican state would\r\nrequire to be angels,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_142\" id=\"FNanchor_142\"\u003e[142]\u003c/a\u003e because men, with their self-seeking\r\npropensities, are not fit for a constitution of so sublime a form.\r\nBut now nature comes to the aid of the universal, reason-derived\r\nwill which, much as we honour it, is in practice powerless. And this\r\nshe does, by means of these very self-seeking propensities, so that\r\nit only depends—and so much lies within the power of man—on a good\r\norganisation of the state for their forces to be so pitted against\r\none another, that the one may check the destructive activity of the\r\nother or neutralise its effect. And hence, from the standpoint of\r\nreason, the result will be the same as if both forces did not exist,\r\nand each individual is compelled to be, if not a morally good man,\r\nyet at least a good citizen. The problem of the formation of the\r\nstate, hard as it may sound, is not insoluble, even for a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_154\"\u003e[p. 154]\u003c/span\u003e race of devils, granted\r\nthat they have intelligence. It may be put thus:—“Given a multitude\r\nof rational beings who, in a body, require general laws for their\r\nown preservation, but each of whom, as an individual, is secretly\r\ninclined to exempt himself from this restraint: how are we to order\r\ntheir affairs and how establish for them a constitution such that,\r\nalthough their private dispositions may be really antagonistic,\r\nthey may yet so act as a check upon one another, that, in their\r\npublic relations, the effect is the same as if they had no such evil\r\nsentiments.” Such a problem must be capable of solution. For it\r\ndeals, not with the moral reformation of mankind, but only with the\r\nmechanism of nature; and the problem is to learn how this mechanism\r\nof nature can be applied to men, in order so to regulate the\r\nantagonism of conflicting interests in a people that they may even\r\ncompel one another to submit to compulsory laws and thus necessarily\r\nbring about the state of peace in which laws have force. We can see,\r\nin states actually existing, although very imperfectly organised,\r\nthat, in externals, they already approximate very nearly to what\r\nthe Idea of right prescribes, although the principle of morality is\r\ncertainly not the cause. A good political constitution, however, is\r\nnot to be expected as a result of progress in morality; but rather,\r\nconversely, the good moral condition of a nation is to be looked for,\r\nas one of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_155\"\u003e[p. 155]\u003c/span\u003e the\r\nfirst fruits of such a constitution. Hence the mechanism of nature,\r\nworking through the self-seeking propensities of man (which of course\r\ncounteract one another in their external effects), may be used by\r\nreason as a means of making way for the realisation of her own\r\npurpose, the empire of right, and, as far as is in the power of the\r\nstate, to promote and secure in this way internal as well as external\r\npeace. We may say, then, that it is the irresistible will of nature\r\nthat right shall at last get the supremacy. What one here fails to\r\ndo will be accomplished in the long run, although perhaps with much\r\ninconvenience to us. As Bouterwek says, “If you bend the reed too\r\nmuch it breaks: he who would do too much does nothing.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. The idea of international law presupposes the separate\r\nexistence of a number of neighbouring and independent states; and,\r\nalthough such a condition of things is in itself already a state\r\nof war, (if a federative union of these nations does not prevent\r\nthe outbreak of hostilities) yet, according to the Idea of reason,\r\nthis is better than that all the states should be merged into one\r\nunder a power which has gained the ascendency over its neighbours\r\nand gradually become a universal monarchy.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_143\" id=\"FNanchor_143\"\u003e[143]\u003c/a\u003e For the wider the\r\nsphere of their jurisdic\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_156\"\u003e[p.\r\n156]\u003c/span\u003etion, the more laws lose in force; and soulless despotism,\r\nwhen it has choked the seeds of good, at last sinks into anarchy.\r\nNevertheless it is the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to\r\nattain to a permanent condition of peace in this very way; that is to\r\nsay, by subjecting the whole world as far as possible to its sway.\r\nBut nature wills it otherwise. She employs two means to separate\r\nnations, and prevent them from intermixing: namely, the differences\r\nof language and of religion.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_144\" id=\"FNanchor_144\"\u003e[144]\u003c/a\u003e These differences bring with them a\r\ntendency to mutual hatred, and furnish pretexts for waging war. But,\r\nnone the less, with the growth of culture and the gradual advance\r\nof men to greater unanimity of principle, they lead to concord in a\r\nstate of peace which, unlike the despotism we have spoken of, (the\r\nchurchyard of freedom) does not arise from the weakening of all\r\nforces, but is brought into being and secured through the equilibrium\r\nof these forces in their most active rivalry.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_157\"\u003e[p. 157]\u003c/span\u003e3. As nature\r\nwisely separates nations which the will of each state, sanctioned\r\neven by the principles of international law, would gladly unite under\r\nits own sway by stratagem or force; in the same way, on the other\r\nhand, she unites nations whom the principle of a cosmopolitan right\r\nwould not have secured against violence and war. And this union\r\nshe brings about through an appeal to their mutual interests. The\r\ncommercial spirit cannot co-exist with war, and sooner or later it\r\ntakes possession of every nation. For, of all the forces which lie\r\nat the command of a state, the power of money is probably the most\r\nreliable. Hence states find themselves compelled—not, it is true,\r\nexactly from motives of morality—to further the noble end of peace\r\nand to avert war, by means of mediation, wherever it threatens to\r\nbreak out, just as if they had made a permanent league for this\r\npurpose. For great alliances with a view to war can, from the nature\r\nof things, only very rarely occur, and still more seldom succeed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this way nature guarantees the coming of perpetual peace,\r\nthrough the natural course of human propensities: not indeed with\r\nsufficient certainty to enable us to prophesy the future of this\r\nideal theoretically, but yet clearly enough for practical purposes.\r\nAnd thus this guarantee of nature makes it a duty that we should\r\nlabour for this end, an end which is no mere chimera.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_158\"\u003e[p. 158]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 class=\"nobreak\" title=\"SECOND SUPPLEMENT—A SECRET ARTICLE FOR PERPETUAL PEACE\"\u003eSECOND SUPPLEMENT\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"subh3\"\u003eA SECRET ARTICLE FOR PERPETUAL PEACE\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA secret\u003c/span\u003e\r\narticle in negotiations concerning public right is, when looked\r\nat objectively or with regard to the meaning of the term, a\r\ncontradiction. When we view it, however, from the subjective\r\nstandpoint, with regard to the character and condition of the person\r\nwho dictates it, we see that it might quite well involve some private\r\nconsideration, so that he would regard it as hazardous to his dignity\r\nto acknowledge such an article as originating from him.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe only article of this kind is contained in the following\r\nproposition:—“The opinions of philosophers, with regard to the\r\nconditions of the possibility of a public peace, shall be taken into\r\nconsideration by states armed for war.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt seems, however, to be derogatory to the dignity of the\r\nlegislative authority of a state—to which we must of course\r\nattribute all wisdom—to ask advice from subjects (among whom stand\r\nphilosophers) about the rules of its behaviour to other states. At\r\nthe same time, it is very advisable that this should be done. Hence\r\nthe state will silently invite suggestion for this purpose, while\r\nat the same time keeping the fact secret. This amounts to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_159\"\u003e[p. 159]\u003c/span\u003e saying that the state\r\nwill allow philosophers to discuss freely and publicly the universal\r\nprinciples governing the conduct of war and establishment of peace;\r\nfor they will do this of their own accord, if no prohibition\r\nis laid upon them.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_145\" id=\"FNanchor_145\"\u003e[145]\u003c/a\u003e The arrangement between states, on this\r\npoint, does not require that a special agreement should be made,\r\nmerely for this purpose; for it is already involved in the obligation\r\nimposed by the universal reason of man which gives the moral law. We\r\nwould not be understood to say that the state must give a preference\r\nto the principles of the philosopher, rather than to the opinions\r\nof the jurist, the representative of state authority; but only\r\nthat he should be heard. The latter, who has chosen for a symbol\r\nthe scales of right and the sword of justice,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_146\" id=\"FNanchor_146\"\u003e[146]\u003c/a\u003e generally uses that\r\nsword not merely to keep off all outside influences from the scales;\r\nfor, when one pan of the balance will not go down, he throws his\r\nsword into it; and then \u003ci\u003eVæ victis\u003c/i\u003e! The jurist, not being\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_160\"\u003e[p. 160]\u003c/span\u003e a moral philosopher, is\r\nunder the greatest temptation to do this, because it is his business\r\nonly to apply existing laws and not to investigate whether these\r\nare not themselves in need of improvement; and this actually lower\r\nfunction of his profession he looks upon as the nobler, because it\r\nis linked to power (as is the case also in both the other faculties,\r\ntheology and medicine). Philosophy occupies a very low position\r\ncompared with this combined power. So that it is said, for example,\r\nthat she is the handmaid of theology; and the same has been said of\r\nher position with regard to law and medicine. It is not quite clear,\r\nhowever, “whether she bears the torch before these gracious ladies,\r\nor carries the train.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat kings should philosophise, or philosophers become kings,\r\nis not to be expected. But neither is it to be desired; for the\r\npossession of power is inevitably fatal to the free exercise of\r\nreason. But it is absolutely indispensable, for their enlightenment\r\nas to the full significance of their vocations, that both kings and\r\nsovereign nations, which rule themselves in accordance with laws of\r\nequality, should not allow the class of philosophers to disappear,\r\nnor forbid the expression of their opinions, but should allow\r\nthem to speak openly. And since this class of men, by their very\r\nnature, are incapable of instigating rebellion or forming unions for\r\npurposes of political agitation, they should not be suspected of\r\npropagandism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_161\"\u003e[p. 161]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 class=\"nobreak\" title=\"APPENDIX I—ON THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN MORALS AND POLITICS WITH REFERENCE TO PERPETUAL PEACE\"\u003eAPPENDIX I\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"subh3\"\u003eON THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN MORALS AND POLITICS WITH\r\n REFERENCE TO PERPETUAL PEACE\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eIn\u003c/span\u003e\r\nan objective sense, morals is a practical science, as the sum of\r\nlaws exacting unconditional obedience, in accordance with which we\r\n\u003ci\u003eought\u003c/i\u003e to act. Now, once we have admitted the authority of this\r\nidea of duty, it is evidently inconsistent that we should think of\r\nsaying that we \u003ci\u003ecannot\u003c/i\u003e act thus. For, in this case, the idea of duty\r\nfalls to the ground of itself; “\u003ci\u003eultra posse nemo obligatur\u003c/i\u003e.” Hence\r\nthere can be no quarrel between politics, as the practical science of\r\nright, and morals, which is also a science of right, but theoretical.\r\nThat is, theory cannot come into conflict with practice. For, in that\r\ncase, we would need to understand under the term “ethics” or “morals”\r\na universal doctrine of expediency, or, in other words, a theory of\r\nprecepts which may guide us in choosing the best means for attaining\r\nends calculated for our advantage. This is to deny that a science of\r\nmorals exists.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_162\"\u003e[p. 162]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ePolitics says, “Be wise as serpents”; morals adds the limiting\r\ncondition, “and guileless as doves.” If these precepts cannot stand\r\ntogether in one command, then there is a real quarrel between\r\npolitics and morals.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_147\" id=\"FNanchor_147\"\u003e[147]\u003c/a\u003e But if they can be completely brought into\r\naccord, then the idea of any antagonism between them is absurd, and\r\nthe question of how best to make a compromise between the two points\r\nof view ceases to be even raised. Although the saying, “Honesty is\r\nthe best policy,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_163\"\u003e[p. 163]\u003c/span\u003e”\r\nexpresses a theory which, alas, is often contradicted in practice,\r\nyet the likewise theoretical maxim, “Honesty is better than any\r\npolicy,” is exalted high above every possible objection, is indeed\r\nthe necessary condition of all politics.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Terminus of morals does not yield to Jupiter, the Terminus\r\nof force; for the latter remains beneath the sway of Fate. In other\r\nwords, reason is not sufficiently enlightened to survey the series\r\nof predetermining causes which would make it possible for us to\r\npredict with certainty the good or bad results of human action, as\r\nthey follow from the mechanical laws of nature; although we may hope\r\nthat things will turn out as we should desire. But what we have to\r\ndo, in order to remain in the path of duty guided by the rules of\r\nwisdom, reason makes everywhere perfectly clear, and does this for\r\nthe purpose of furthering her ultimate ends.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe practical man, however, for whom morals is mere theory, even\r\nwhile admitting that what ought to be can be, bases his dreary\r\nverdict against our well-meant hopes really on this: he pretends\r\nthat he can foresee from his observation of human nature, that men\r\nwill never be willing to do what is required in order to bring about\r\nthe wished-for results leading to perpetual peace. It is true that\r\nthe will of all individual men to live under a legal constitution\r\naccording to the principles of liberty\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_164\"\u003e[p. 164]\u003c/span\u003e—that is to say, the distributive\r\nunity of the wills of all—is not sufficient to attain this end. We\r\nmust have the collective unity of their united will: all as a body\r\nmust determine these new conditions. The solution of this difficult\r\nproblem is required in order that civil society should be a whole.\r\nTo all this diversity of individual wills there must come a uniting\r\ncause, in order to produce a common will which no distributive will\r\nis able to give. Hence, in the practical realisation of that idea, no\r\nother beginning of a law-governed society can be counted upon than\r\none that is brought about by force: upon this force, too, public law\r\nafterwards rests. This state of things certainly prepares us to meet\r\nconsiderable deviation in actual experience from the theoretical\r\nidea of perpetual peace, since we cannot take into account the moral\r\ncharacter and disposition of a law-giver in this connection, or\r\nexpect that, after he has united a wild multitude into one people, he\r\nwill leave it to them to bring about a legal constitution by their\r\ncommon will.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt amounts to this. Any ruler who has once got the power in his\r\nhands will not let the people dictate laws for him. A state which\r\nenjoys an independence of the control of external law will not\r\nsubmit to the judgment of the tribunals of other states, when it has\r\nto consider how to obtain\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_165\"\u003e[p.\r\n165]\u003c/span\u003e its rights against them. And even a continent, when\r\nit feels its superiority to another, whether this be in its way\r\nor not, will not fail to take advantage of an opportunity offered\r\nof strengthening its power by the spoliation or even conquest of\r\nthis territory. Hence all theoretical schemes, connected with\r\nconstitutional, international or cosmopolitan law, crumble away into\r\nempty impracticable ideals. While, on the other hand, a practical\r\nscience, based on the empirical principles of human nature, which\r\ndoes not disdain to model its maxims on an observation of actual\r\nlife, can alone hope to find a sure foundation on which to build up a\r\nsystem of national policy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow certainly, if there is neither freedom nor a moral law\r\nfounded upon it, and every actual or possible event happens in\r\nthe mere mechanical course of nature, then politics, as the\r\nart of making use of this physical necessity in things for the\r\ngovernment of men, is the whole of practical wisdom and the idea\r\nof right is an empty concept. If, on the other hand, we find that\r\nthis idea of right is necessarily to be conjoined with politics\r\nand even to be raised to the position of a limiting condition of\r\nthat science, then the possibility of reconciling them must be\r\nadmitted. I can thus imagine a moral politician, that is to say, one\r\nwho understands the principles of statesmanship to be such as do\r\nnot\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_166\"\u003e[p. 166]\u003c/span\u003e conflict with\r\nmorals; but I cannot conceive of a political moralist who fashions\r\nfor himself such a system of ethics as may serve the interest of\r\nstatesmen.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe moral politician will always act upon the following\r\nprinciple:—“If certain defects which could not have been avoided\r\nare found in the political constitution or foreign relations of a\r\nstate, it is a duty for all, especially for the rulers of the state,\r\nto apply their whole energy to correcting them as soon as possible,\r\nand to bringing the constitution and political relations on these\r\npoints into conformity with the Law of Nature, as it is held up as a\r\nmodel before us in the idea of reason; and this they should do even\r\nat a sacrifice of their own interest.” Now it is contrary to all\r\npolitics—which is, in this particular, in agreement with morals—to\r\ndissever any of the links binding citizens together in the state\r\nor nations in cosmopolitan union, before a better constitution is\r\nthere to take the place of what has been thus destroyed. And hence\r\nit would be absurd indeed to demand that every imperfection in\r\npolitical matters must be violently altered on the spot. But, at the\r\nsame time, it may be required of a ruler at least that he should\r\nearnestly keep the maxim in mind which points to the necessity of\r\nsuch a change; so that he may go on constantly approaching the end\r\nto be realised,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_167\"\u003e[p. 167]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnamely, the best possible constitution according to the laws of\r\nright. Even although it is still under despotic rule, in accordance\r\nwith its constitution as then existing, a state may govern itself\r\non republican lines, until the people gradually become capable of\r\nbeing influenced by the mere idea of the authority of law, just as\r\nif it had physical power. And they become accordingly capable of\r\nself-legislation, their faculty for which is founded on original\r\nright. But if, through the violence of revolution, the product of\r\na bad government, a constitution more in accord with the spirit of\r\nlaw were attained even by unlawful means, it should no longer be\r\nheld justifiable to bring the people back to the old constitution,\r\nalthough, while the revolution was going on, every one who took\r\npart in it by use of force or stratagem, may have been justly\r\npunished as a rebel. As regards the external relations of nations,\r\na state cannot be asked to give up its constitution, even although\r\nthat be a despotism (which is, at the same time, the strongest\r\nconstitution where foreign enemies are concerned), so long as it\r\nruns the risk of being immediately swallowed up by other states.\r\nHence, when such a proposal is made, the state whose constitution is\r\nin question must at least be allowed to defer acting upon it until\r\na more convenient time.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_148\" id=\"FNanchor_148\"\u003e[148]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_168\"\u003e[p. 168]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIt is always possible that\r\nmoralists who rule despotically, and are at a loss in practical\r\nmatters, will come into collision with the rules of political wisdom\r\nin many ways, by adopting measures without sufficient deliberation\r\nwhich show themselves afterwards to have been overestimated. When\r\nthey thus offend against nature, experience must gradually lead them\r\ninto a better track. But, instead of this being the case, politicians\r\nwho are fond of moralising do all they can to make moral improvement\r\nimpossible and to perpetuate violations of law, by extenuating\r\npolitical principles which are antagonistic to the idea of right, on\r\nthe pretext that human nature is not capable of good, in the sense of\r\nthe ideal which reason prescribes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese politicians, instead of adopting an open, straightforward\r\nway of doing things (as they boast), mix themselves up in intrigue.\r\nThey get at the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_169\"\u003e[p. 169]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nauthorities in power and say what will please them; their sole\r\nbent is to sacrifice the nation, or even, if they can, the whole\r\nworld, with the one end in view that their own private interest\r\nmay be forwarded. This is the manner of regular jurists (I mean\r\nthe journeyman lawyer not the legislator), when they aspire to\r\npolitics. For, as it is not their business to reason too nicely over\r\nlegislation, but only to enforce the laws of the country, every\r\nlegal constitution in its existing form and, when this is changed\r\nby the proper authorities, the one which takes its place, will\r\nalways seem to them the best possible. And the consequence is that\r\neverything is purely mechanical. But this adroitness in suiting\r\nthemselves to any circumstances may lead them to the delusion that\r\nthey are also capable of giving an opinion about the principles of\r\npolitical constitutions in general, in so far as they conform to\r\nideas of right, and are therefore not empirical, but \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e. And\r\nthey may therefore brag about their knowledge of men,—which indeed\r\none expects to find, since they have to deal with so many—without\r\nreally knowing the nature of man and what can be made of it, to gain\r\nwhich knowledge a higher standpoint of anthropological observation\r\nthan theirs is required. Filled with ideas of this kind, if they\r\ntrespass outside their own sphere on the boundaries of political\r\nand international law,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_170\"\u003e[p.\r\n170]\u003c/span\u003e looked upon as ideals which reason holds before us, they\r\ncan do so only in the spirit of chicanery. For they will follow their\r\nusual method of making everything conform mechanically to compulsory\r\nlaws despotically made and enforced, even here, where the ideas of\r\nreason recognise the validity of a legal compulsory force, only when\r\nit is in accordance with the principles of freedom through which a\r\npermanently valid constitution becomes first of all possible. The\r\nwould-be practical man, leaving out of account this idea of reason,\r\nthinks that he can solve this problem empirically by looking to the\r\nway in which those constitutions which have best survived the test\r\nof time were established, even although the spirit of these may have\r\nbeen generally contrary to the idea of right. The principles which\r\nhe makes use of here, although indeed he does not make them public,\r\namount pretty much to the following sophistical maxims.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. \u003cb\u003eFac et excusa.\u003c/b\u003e Seize the most favourable opportunity for\r\narbitrary usurpation—either of the authority of the state over its\r\nown people or over a neighbouring people; the justification of the\r\nact and extenuation of the use of force will come much more easily\r\nand gracefully, when the deed is done, than if one has to think\r\nout convincing reasons for taking this step and first hear through\r\nall the objections which can be made against it. This is\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_171\"\u003e[p. 171]\u003c/span\u003e especially true in\r\nthe first case mentioned, where the supreme power in the state also\r\ncontrols the legislature which we must obey without any reasoning\r\nabout it. Besides, this show of audacity in a statesman even lends\r\nhim a certain semblance of inward conviction of the justice of\r\nhis action; and once he has got so far the god of success (\u003ci\u003ebonus\r\neventus\u003c/i\u003e) is his best advocate.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. \u003cb\u003eSi fecisti, nega.\u003c/b\u003e As for any crime you have committed,\r\nsuch as has, for instance, brought your people to despair and thence\r\nto insurrection, deny that it has happened owing to any fault of\r\nyours. Say rather that it is all caused by the insubordination of\r\nyour subjects, or, in the case of your having usurped a neighbouring\r\nstate, that human nature is to blame; for, if a man is not ready to\r\nuse force and steal a march upon his neighbour, he may certainly\r\ncount on the latter forestalling him and taking him prisoner.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. \u003cb\u003eDivide et impera.\u003c/b\u003e That is to say, if there are certain\r\nprivileged persons, holding authority among the people, who have\r\nmerely chosen you for their sovereign as \u003ci\u003eprimus inter pares\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nbring about a quarrel among them, and make mischief between them\r\nand the people. Now back up the people with a dazzling promise of\r\ngreater freedom; everything will now depend unconditionally on your\r\nwill. Or again, if there is a difficulty with\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_172\"\u003e[p. 172]\u003c/span\u003e foreign states, then to stir up\r\ndissension among them is a pretty sure means of subjecting first one\r\nand then the other to your sway, under the pretext of aiding the\r\nweaker.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is true that now-a-days no body is taken in by these political\r\nmaxims, for they are all familiar to everyone. Moreover, there is\r\nno need of being ashamed of them, as if their injustice were too\r\npatent. For the great Powers never feel shame before the judgment of\r\nthe common herd, but only before one another; so that as far as this\r\nmatter goes, it is not the revelation of these guiding principles of\r\npolicy that can make rulers ashamed, but only the unsuccessful use\r\nof them. For as to the morality of these maxims, politicians are all\r\nagreed. Hence there is always left political prestige on which they\r\ncan safely count; and this means the glory of increasing their power\r\nby any means that offer.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_149\" id=\"FNanchor_149\"\u003e[149]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tb\"\u003e* * *\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn all these twistings and turnings of an immoral doctrine of\r\nexpediency which aims at substituting a state of peace for the\r\nwarlike conditions in which men are placed by nature, so much at\r\nleast is clear;—that men cannot get away from\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_173\"\u003e[p. 173]\u003c/span\u003e the idea of right in their private any\r\nmore than in their public relations; and that they do not dare (this\r\nis indeed most strikingly seen in the concept of an international\r\nlaw) to base politics\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_174\"\u003e[p.\r\n174]\u003c/span\u003e merely on the manipulations of expediency and therefore\r\nto refuse all obedience to the idea of a public right. On the\r\ncontrary, they pay all fitting honour to the idea of right in itself,\r\neven although they should, at the same time, devise a hundred\r\nsubterfuges and excuses to avoid it in practice, and should regard\r\nforce, backed up by cunning, as having the authority which comes\r\nfrom being the source and unifying principle of all right. It will\r\nbe well to put an end to this sophistry, if not to the injustice it\r\nextenuates, and to bring the false advocates of the mighty of the\r\nearth to confess that it is not right but might in whose interest\r\nthey speak, and that it is the worship of might from which they take\r\ntheir cue, as if in this matter they had a right to command. In order\r\nto do this, we must first expose the delusion by which they deceive\r\nthem\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_175\"\u003e[p. 175]\u003c/span\u003eselves and\r\nothers; then discover the ultimate principle from which their plans\r\nfor a perpetual peace proceed; and thence show that all the evil\r\nwhich stands in the way of the realisation of that ideal springs\r\nfrom the fact that the political moralist begins where the moral\r\npolitician rightly ends and that, by subordinating principles to an\r\nend or putting the cart before the horse, he defeats his intention of\r\nbringing politics into harmony with morals.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn order to make practical philosophy consistent with itself,\r\nwe must first decide the following question:—In dealing with the\r\nproblems of practical reason must we begin from its material\r\nprinciple—the end as the object of free choice—or from its formal\r\nprinciple which is based merely on freedom in its external\r\nrelation?—from which comes the following law:—“Act so that thou\r\ncanst will that thy maxim should be a universal law, be the end of\r\nthy action what it will.”\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_150\" id=\"FNanchor_150\"\u003e[150]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWithout doubt, the latter determining principle of action must\r\nstand first; for, as a principle of right, it carries unconditional\r\nnecessity with it, whereas the former is obligatory only if we\r\nassume the empirical conditions of the end set before us,—that is\r\nto say, that it is an end capable of being\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_176\"\u003e[p. 176]\u003c/span\u003e practically realised. And if this\r\nend—as, for example, the end of perpetual peace—should be also a\r\nduty, this same duty must necessarily have been deduced from the\r\nformal principle governing the maxims which guide external action.\r\nNow the first principle is the principle of the political moralist;\r\nthe problems of constitutional, international and cosmopolitan law\r\nare mere technical problems (\u003ci\u003eproblema technicum\u003c/i\u003e). The second or\r\nformal principle, on the other hand, as the principle of the moral\r\npolitician who regards it as a moral problem (\u003ci\u003eproblema morale\u003c/i\u003e),\r\ndiffers widely from the other principle in its methods of bringing\r\nabout perpetual peace, which we desire not only as a material good,\r\nbut also as a state of things resulting from our recognition of\r\nthe precepts of duty.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_151\" id=\"FNanchor_151\"\u003e[151]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo solve the first problem—that, namely, of political\r\nexpediency—much knowledge of nature is required, that her mechanical\r\nlaws may be employed for the end in view. And yet the result of all\r\nknowledge of this kind is uncertain, as far as perpetual peace is\r\nconcerned. This we find to be so, whichever of the three departments\r\nof public law we take. It is uncertain whether a people could be\r\nbetter kept in obedience and at the same time prosperity by severity\r\nor by baits held out to their\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_177\"\u003e[p.\r\n177]\u003c/span\u003e vanity; whether they would be better governed under the\r\nsovereignty of a single individual or by the authority of several\r\nacting together; whether the combined authority might be better\r\nsecured merely, say, by an official nobility or by the power of the\r\npeople within the state; and, finally, whether such conditions could\r\nbe long maintained. There are examples to the contrary in history\r\nin the case of all forms of government, with the exception of the\r\nonly true republican constitution, the idea of which can occur only\r\nto a moral politician. Still more uncertain is a law of nations,\r\nostensibly established upon statutes devised by ministers; for this\r\namounts in fact to mere empty words, and rests on treaties which,\r\nin the very act of ratification, contain a secret reservation of\r\nthe right to violate them. On the other hand, the solution of the\r\nsecond problem—the problem of political wisdom—forces itself, we may\r\nsay, upon us; it is quite obvious to every one, and puts all crooked\r\ndealings to shame; it leads, too, straight to the desired end, while\r\nat the same time, discretion warns us not to drag in the conditions\r\nof perpetual peace by force, but to take time and approach this ideal\r\ngradually as favourable circumstances permit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis may be expressed in the following maxim:—“Seek ye first\r\nthe kingdom of pure practical reason and its righteousness, and\r\nthe object of your en\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_178\"\u003e[p.\r\n178]\u003c/span\u003edeavour, the blessing of perpetual peace, will be\r\nadded unto you.” For the science of morals generally has this\r\npeculiarity,—and it has it also with regard to the moral principles\r\nof public law, and therefore with regard to a science of politics\r\nknowable \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e,—that the less it makes a man’s conduct depend\r\non the end he has set before him, his purposed material or moral\r\ngain, so much the more, nevertheless, does it conform in general\r\nto this end. The reason for this is that it is just the universal\r\nwill, given \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e, which exists in a people or in the relation\r\nof different peoples to one another, that alone determines what is\r\nlawful among men. This union of individual wills, however, if we\r\nproceed consistently in practice, in observance of the mechanical\r\nlaws of nature, may be at the same time the cause of bringing about\r\nthe result intended and practically realizing the idea of right.\r\nHence it is, for example, a principle of moral politics that a people\r\nshould unite into a state according to the only valid concepts\r\nof right, the ideas of freedom and equality; and this principle\r\nis not based on expediency, but upon duty. Political moralists,\r\nhowever, do not deserve a hearing, much and sophistically as they\r\nmay reason about the existence, in a multitude of men forming a\r\nsociety, of certain natural tendencies which would weaken those\r\nprinciples and defeat their intention. They\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_179\"\u003e[p. 179]\u003c/span\u003e may endeavour to prove their assertion\r\nby giving instances of badly organised constitutions, chosen both\r\nfrom ancient and modern times, (as, for example, democracies without\r\na representative system); but such arguments are to be treated with\r\ncontempt, all the more, because a pernicious theory of this kind\r\nmay perhaps even bring about the evil which it prophesies. For, in\r\naccordance with such reasoning, man is thrown into a class with all\r\nother living machines which only require the consciousness that they\r\nare not free creatures to make them in their own judgment the most\r\nmiserable of all beings.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eFiat justitia, pereat mundus.\u003c/i\u003e This saying has become proverbial,\r\nand although it savours a little of boastfulness, is also true. We\r\nmay translate it thus:—“Let justice rule on earth, although all the\r\nrogues in the world should go to the bottom.” It is a good, honest\r\nprinciple of right cutting off all the crooked ways made by knavery\r\nor violence. It must not, however, be misunderstood as allowing\r\nanyone to exercise his own rights with the utmost severity, a course\r\nin contradiction to our moral duty; but we must take it to signify an\r\nobligation, binding upon rulers, to refrain from refusing to yield\r\nanyone his rights or from curtailing them, out of personal feeling\r\nor sympathy for others. For this end, in particular, we require,\r\nfirstly, that a state\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_180\"\u003e[p.\r\n180]\u003c/span\u003e should have an internal political constitution,\r\nestablished according to the pure principles of right; secondly,\r\nthat a union should be formed between this state and neighbouring or\r\ndistant nations for a legal settlement of their differences, after\r\nthe analogy of the universal state. This proposition means nothing\r\nmore than this:—Political maxims must not start from the idea of a\r\nprosperity and happiness which are to be expected from observance\r\nof such precepts in every state; that is, not from the end which\r\neach nation makes the object of its will as the highest empirical\r\nprinciple of political wisdom; but they must set out from the pure\r\nconcept of the duty of right, from the “\u003ci\u003eought\u003c/i\u003e” whose principle\r\nis given \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e through pure reason. This is the law, whatever\r\nthe material consequences may be. The world will certainly not\r\nperish by any means, because the number of wicked people in it is\r\nbecoming fewer. The morally bad has one peculiarity, inseparable from\r\nits nature;—in its purposes, especially in relation to other evil\r\ninfluences, it is in contradiction with itself, and counteracts its\r\nown natural effect, and thus makes room for the moral principle of\r\ngood, although advance in this direction may be slow.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHence objectively, in theory, there is no quarrel between morals\r\nand politics. But subjectively, in the self-seeking tendencies of men\r\n(which we cannot\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_181\"\u003e[p. 181]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nactually call their morality, as we would a course of action based\r\non maxims of reason,) this disagreement in principle exists and may\r\nalways survive; for it serves as a whetstone to virtue. According\r\nto the principle, \u003ci\u003eTu ne cede malis, sed contra audentior ito\u003c/i\u003e, the\r\ntrue courage of virtue in the present case lies not so much in facing\r\nthe evils and self-sacrifices which must be met here as in firmly\r\nconfronting the evil principle in our own nature and conquering its\r\nwiles. For this is a principle far more dangerous, false, treacherous\r\nand sophistical which puts forward the weakness in human nature as a\r\njustification for every transgression.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn fact the political moralist may say that a ruler and people,\r\nor nation and nation do \u003ci\u003eone another\u003c/i\u003e no wrong, when they enter on\r\na war with violence or cunning, although they do wrong, generally\r\nspeaking, in refusing to respect the idea of right which alone could\r\nestablish peace for all time. For, as both are equally wrongly\r\ndisposed to one another, each transgressing the duty he owes to his\r\nneighbour, they are both quite rightly served, when they are thus\r\ndestroyed in war. This mutual destruction stops short at the point of\r\nextermination, so that there are always enough of the race left to\r\nkeep this game going on through all the ages, and a far-off posterity\r\nmay take warning\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_182\"\u003e[p. 182]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nby them. The Providence that orders the course of the world is\r\nhereby justified. For the moral principle in mankind never becomes\r\nextinguished, and human reason, fitted for the practical realisation\r\nof ideas of right according to that principle, grows continually in\r\nfitness for that purpose with the ever advancing march of culture;\r\nwhile at the same time, it must be said, the guilt of transgression\r\nincreases as well. But it seems that, by no theodicy or vindication\r\nof the justice of God, can we justify Creation in putting such a\r\nrace of corrupt creatures into the world at all, if, that is, we\r\nassume that the human race neither will nor can ever be in a happier\r\ncondition than it is now. This standpoint, however, is too high a\r\none for us to judge from, or to theorise, with the limited concepts\r\nwe have at our command, about the wisdom of that supreme Power which\r\nis unknowable by us. We are inevitably driven to such despairing\r\nconclusions as these, if we do not admit that the pure principles of\r\nright have objective reality—that is to say, are capable of being\r\npractically realised—and consequently that action must be taken on\r\nthe part of the people of a state and, further, by states in relation\r\nto one another, whatever arguments empirical politics may bring\r\nforward against this course. Politics in the real sense cannot take\r\na step forward without first paying homage\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_183\"\u003e[p. 183]\u003c/span\u003e to the principles of morals. And,\r\nalthough politics, \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e, is a difficult art,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_152\" id=\"FNanchor_152\"\u003e[152]\u003c/a\u003e in its union with\r\nmorals no art is required; for in the case of a conflict arising\r\nbetween the two sciences, the moralist can cut asunder the knot\r\nwhich politics is unable to untie. Right must be held sacred by man,\r\nhowever great the cost and sacrifice to the ruling power. Here is no\r\nhalf-and-half course. We cannot devise a happy medium between right\r\nand expediency, a right pragmatically conditioned. But all politics\r\nmust bend the knee to the principle of right, and may, in that way,\r\nhope to reach, although slowly perhaps, a level whence it may shine\r\nupon men for all time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_184\"\u003e[p. 184]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 class=\"nobreak\" title=\"APPENDIX II—CONCERNING THE HARMONY OF POLITICS WITH MORALS ACCORDING TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEA OF PUBLIC RIGHT\"\u003eAPPENDIX II\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"subh3\"\u003eCONCERNING THE HARMONY OF POLITICS WITH MORALS\r\n ACCORDING TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEA OF PUBLIC RIGHT\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eIf\u003c/span\u003e\r\nI look at public right from the point of view of most professors\r\nof law, and abstract from its \u003ci\u003ematter\u003c/i\u003e or its empirical elements,\r\nvarying according to the circumstances given in our experience of\r\nindividuals in a state or of states among themselves, then there\r\nremains the \u003ci\u003eform\u003c/i\u003e of publicity. The possibility of this publicity,\r\nevery legal title implies. For without it there could be no justice,\r\nwhich can only be thought as before the eyes of men; and, without\r\njustice, there would be no right, for, from justice only, right can\r\ncome.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis characteristic of publicity must belong to every legal\r\ntitle. Hence, as, in any particular case that occurs, there is no\r\ndifficulty in deciding whether this essential attribute is present\r\nor not, (whether, that is, it is reconcilable with the principles of\r\nthe agent or not), it furnishes an easily applied criterion\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_185\"\u003e[p. 185]\u003c/span\u003e which is to be found \u003ci\u003ea\r\npriori\u003c/i\u003e in the reason, so that in the particular case we can at once\r\nrecognise the falsity or illegality of a proposed claim (\u003ci\u003epraetensio\r\njuris\u003c/i\u003e), as it were by an experiment of pure reason.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHaving thus, as it were, abstracted from all the empirical\r\nelements contained in the concept of a political and international\r\nlaw, such as, for instance, the evil tendency in human nature which\r\nmakes compulsion necessary, we may give the following proposition as\r\nthe \u003ci\u003etranscendental formula\u003c/i\u003e of public right:—“All actions relating\r\nto the rights of other men are wrong, if the maxims from which they\r\nfollow are inconsistent with publicity.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis principle must be regarded not merely as ethical, as\r\nbelonging to the doctrine of virtue, but also as juridical, referring\r\nto the rights of men. For there is something wrong in a maxim of\r\nconduct which I cannot divulge without at once defeating my purpose,\r\na maxim which must therefore be kept secret, if it is to succeed, and\r\nwhich I could not publicly acknowledge without infallibly stirring up\r\nthe opposition of everyone. This necessary and universal resistance\r\nwith which everyone meets me, a resistance therefore evident \u003ci\u003ea\r\npriori\u003c/i\u003e, can be due to no other cause than the injustice with which\r\nsuch a maxim threatens everyone. Further, this testing principle is\r\nmerely negative; that is, it serves only as a means by which we may\r\nknow\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_186\"\u003e[p. 186]\u003c/span\u003e when an\r\naction is unjust to others. Like axioms, it has a certainty incapable\r\nof demonstration; it is besides easy of application as appears from\r\nthe following examples of public right.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e1.—\u003cb\u003eConstitutional Law.\u003c/b\u003e Let us take in the first place\r\nthe public law of the state (\u003ci\u003ejus civitatis\u003c/i\u003e), particularly in its\r\napplication to matters within the state. Here a question arises\r\nwhich many think difficult to answer, but which the transcendental\r\nprinciple of publicity solves quite readily:—“Is revolution a\r\nlegitimate means for a people to adopt, for the purpose of throwing\r\noff the oppressive yoke of a so-called tyrant (\u003ci\u003enon titulo, sed\r\nexercitio talis\u003c/i\u003e)?” The rights of a nation are violated in a\r\ngovernment of this kind, and no wrong is done to the tyrant in\r\ndethroning him. Of this there is no doubt. None the less, it is in\r\nthe highest degree wrong of the subjects to prosecute their rights in\r\nthis way; and they would be just as little justified in complaining,\r\nif they happened to be defeated in their attempt and had to endure\r\nthe severest punishment in consequence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eA great many reasons for and against both sides of this\r\nquestion may be given, if we seek to settle it by a dogmatic\r\ndeduction of the principles of right. But the transcendental\r\nprinciple of the publicity of public right can spare itself this\r\ndiffuse argumentation. For, according to that principle, the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_187\"\u003e[p. 187]\u003c/span\u003e people would ask\r\nthemselves, before the civil contract was made, whether they could\r\nventure to publish maxims, proposing insurrection when a favourable\r\nopportunity should present itself. It is quite clear that if, when\r\na constitution is established, it were made a condition that force\r\nmay be exercised against the sovereign under certain circumstances,\r\nthe people would be obliged to claim a lawful authority higher than\r\nhis. But in that case, the so-called sovereign would be no longer\r\nsovereign: or, if both powers, that of the sovereign and that of\r\nthe people, were made a condition of the constitution of the state,\r\nthen its establishment (which was the aim of the people) would be\r\nimpossible. The wrongfulness of revolution is quite obvious from\r\nthe fact that openly to acknowledge maxims which justify this step\r\nwould make attainment of the end at which they aim impossible. We are\r\nobliged to keep them secret. But this secrecy would not be necessary\r\non the part of the head of the state. He may say quite plainly\r\nthat the ringleaders of every rebellion will be punished by death,\r\neven although they may hold that it was he who first transgressed\r\nthe fundamental law. For, if a ruler is conscious of possessing\r\nirresistible sovereign power (and this must be assumed in every civil\r\nconstitution, because a sovereign who has not power to protect any\r\nindividual member\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_188\"\u003e[p. 188]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the nation against his neighbour has also not the right to\r\nexercise authority over him), then he need have no fear that making\r\nknown the maxims which guide him will cause the defeat of his plans.\r\nAnd it is quite consistent with this view to hold that, if the people\r\nare successful in their insurrection, the sovereign must return to\r\nthe rank of a subject, and refrain from inciting rebellion with a\r\nview to regaining his lost sovereignty. At the same time he need have\r\nno fear of being called to account for his former administration.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_153\" id=\"FNanchor_153\"\u003e[153]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_189\"\u003e[p. 189]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e2.—\u003cb\u003eInternational Law.\u003c/b\u003e There can be no question of an\r\ninternational law, except on the assumption of some kind of a\r\nlaw-governed state of things, the external condition under which any\r\nright can belong to man. For the very idea of international law, as\r\npublic right, implies the publication of a universal will determining\r\nthe rights and property of each individual nation; and this \u003ci\u003estatus\r\njuridicus\u003c/i\u003e must spring out of a contract of some sort which may not,\r\nlike the contract to which the state owes its origin, be founded\r\nupon compulsory laws, but may be, at the most, the agreement of a\r\npermanent free association such as the federation of the different\r\nstates, to which we have alluded above. For, without the control\r\nof law to some extent, to serve as an active bond of union among\r\ndifferent merely natural or moral individuals,—that is to say, in\r\na state of nature,—there can only be private law. And here we find\r\na disagreement between morals, regarded as the science of right,\r\nand politics. The criterion, obtained by observing the effect of\r\npublicity on maxims, is just as easily applied, but only when we\r\nunderstand that this agreement binds the contracting states solely\r\nwith the object that peace may be preserved among them, and between\r\nthem and other states; in no sense with a view to the acquisition of\r\nnew territory or power. The following instances of antinomy occur\r\nbetween\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_190\"\u003e[p. 190]\u003c/span\u003e politics\r\nand morals, which are given here with the solution in each case.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ea.\u003c/i\u003e “When either of these states has promised something to\r\nanother, (as, for instance, assistance, or a relinquishment of\r\ncertain territory, or subsidies and such like), the question may\r\narise whether, in a case where the safety of the state thus bound\r\ndepends on its evading the fulfilment of this promise, it can do so\r\nby maintaining a right to be regarded as a double person:—firstly,\r\nas sovereign and accountable to no one in the state of which that\r\nsovereign power is head; and, secondly, merely as the highest\r\nofficial in the service of that state, who is obliged to answer to\r\nthe state for every action. And the result of this is that the state\r\nis acquitted in its second capacity of any obligation to which it has\r\ncommitted itself in the first.” But, if a nation or its sovereign\r\nproclaimed these maxims, the natural consequence would be that every\r\nother would flee from it, or unite with other states to oppose such\r\npretensions. And this is a proof that politics, with all its cunning,\r\ndefeats its own ends, if the test of making principles of action\r\npublic, which we have indicated, be applied. Hence the maxim we have\r\nquoted must be wrong.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eb.\u003c/i\u003e “If a state which has increased its power to a formidable\r\nextent (\u003ci\u003epotentia tremenda\u003c/i\u003e) excites anxiety in its neighbours, is it\r\nright to assume\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_191\"\u003e[p. 191]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat, since it has the means, it will also have the will to oppress\r\nothers; and does that give less powerful states a right to unite and\r\nattack the greater nation without any definite cause of offence?” A\r\nstate which would here answer openly in the affirmative would only\r\nbring the evil about more surely and speedily. For the greater power\r\nwould forestall those smaller nations, and their union would be but\r\na weak reed of defence against a state which knew how to apply the\r\nmaxim, \u003ci\u003edivide et impera\u003c/i\u003e. This maxim of political expediency then,\r\nwhen openly acknowledged, necessarily defeats the end at which it\r\naims, and is therefore wrong.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ec.\u003c/i\u003e “If a smaller state by its geographical position breaks\r\nup the territory of a greater, so as to prevent a unity necessary\r\nto the preservation of that state, is the latter not justified in\r\nsubjugating its less powerful neighbour and uniting the territory\r\nin question with its own?” We can easily see that the greater state\r\ndare not publish such a maxim beforehand; for either all smaller\r\nstates would without loss of time unite against it, or other powers\r\nwould contend for this booty. Hence the impracticability of such a\r\nmaxim becomes evident under the light of publicity. And this is a\r\nsign that it is wrong, and that in a very great degree; for, although\r\nthe victim of an act of injustice may be\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_192\"\u003e[p. 192]\u003c/span\u003e of small account, that does not prevent\r\nthe injustice done from being very great.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e3.—\u003cb\u003eCosmopolitan Law.\u003c/b\u003e We may pass over this department of\r\nright in silence, for, owing to its analogy with international law,\r\nits maxims are easily specified and estimated.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tb\"\u003e* * *\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this principle of the incompatibility of the maxims of\r\ninternational law with their publicity, we have a good indication\r\nof the non-agreement between politics and morals, regarded as a\r\nscience of right. Now we require to know under what conditions these\r\nmaxims do agree with the law of nations. For we cannot conclude that\r\nthe converse holds, and that all maxims which can bear publicity\r\nare therefore just. For anyone who has a decided supremacy has\r\nno need to make any secret about his maxims. The condition of a\r\nlaw of nations being possible at all is that, in the first place,\r\nthere should be a law-governed state of things. If this is not so,\r\nthere can be no public right, and all right which we can think of\r\noutside the law-governed state,—that is to say, in the state of\r\nnature,—is mere private right. Now we have seen\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_193\"\u003e[p. 193]\u003c/span\u003e above that something of the nature of\r\na federation between nations, for the sole purpose of doing away\r\nwith war, is the only rightful condition of things reconcilable\r\nwith their individual freedom. Hence the agreement of politics and\r\nmorals is only possible in a federative union, a union which is\r\nnecessarily given \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e, according to the principles of right.\r\nAnd the lawful basis of all politics can only be the establishment\r\nof this union in its widest possible extent. Apart from this end,\r\nall political sophistry is folly and veiled injustice. Now this sham\r\npolitics has a casuistry, not to be excelled in the best Jesuit\r\nschool. It has its mental reservation (\u003ci\u003ereservatio mentalis\u003c/i\u003e): as\r\nin the drawing up of a public treaty in such terms as we can, if we\r\nwill, interpret when occasion serves to our advantage; for example,\r\nthe distinction between the \u003ci\u003estatus quo\u003c/i\u003e in fact (\u003ci\u003ede fait\u003c/i\u003e) and\r\nin right (\u003ci\u003ede droit\u003c/i\u003e). Secondly, it has its probabilism; when it\r\npretends to discover evil intentions in another, or makes, the\r\nprobability of their possible future ascendency a lawful reason\r\nfor bringing about the destruction of other peaceful states.\r\nFinally, it has its philosophical sin (\u003ci\u003epeccatum philosophicum\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003epeccatillum\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ebaggatelle\u003c/i\u003e) which is that of holding it a trifle\r\neasily pardoned that a smaller state should be swallowed up, if this\r\nbe to the gain of a nation much more powerful; for such an increase\r\nin power is\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_194\"\u003e[p. 194]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsupposed to tend to the greater prosperity of the whole world.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_154\" id=\"FNanchor_154\"\u003e[154]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eDuplicity gives politics the advantage of using one branch or\r\nthe other of morals, just as suits its own ends. The love of our\r\nfellowmen is a duty: so too is respect for their rights. But the\r\nformer is only conditional: the latter, on the other hand, an\r\nunconditional, absolutely imperative duty; and anyone who would\r\ngive himself up to the sweet consciousness of well-doing must be\r\nfirst perfectly assured that he has not transgressed its commands.\r\nPolitics has no difficulty in agreeing with morals in the first sense\r\nof the term, as ethics, to secure that men should give to superiors\r\ntheir rights. But when it comes to morals, in its second aspect,\r\nas the science of right before which politics must bow the knee,\r\nthe politician finds it prudent to have nothing to do with compacts\r\nand rather to deny all reality to morals in this sense, and reduce\r\nall duty to mere benevolence. Philosophy could easily frustrate the\r\nartifices of a politics like\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_195\"\u003e[p.\r\n195]\u003c/span\u003e this, which shuns the light of criticism, by publishing\r\nits maxims, if only statesmen would have the courage to grant\r\nphilosophers the right to ventilate their opinions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith this end in view, I propose another principle of public\r\nright, which is at once transcendental and affirmative. Its formula\r\nwould be as follows:—“All maxims which require publicity, in order\r\nthat they may not fail to attain their end, are in agreement both\r\nwith right and politics.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor, if these maxims can only attain the end at which they aim\r\nby being published, they must be in harmony with the universal end\r\nof mankind, which is happiness; and to be in sympathy with this (to\r\nmake the people contented with their lot) is the real business of\r\npolitics. Now, if this end should be attainable only by publicity, or\r\nin other words, through the removal of all distrust of the maxims of\r\npolitics, these must be in harmony with the right of the people; for\r\na union of the ends of all is only possible in a harmony with this\r\nright.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI must postpone the further development and discussion of this\r\nprinciple till another opportunity. That it is a transcendental\r\nformula is quite evident from the fact that all the empirical\r\nconditions of a doctrine of happiness, or the \u003ci\u003ematter\u003c/i\u003e of law, are\r\nabsent, and that it has regard only to the \u003ci\u003eform\u003c/i\u003e of universal\r\nconformity to law.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tb\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_196\"\u003e[p. 196]\u003c/span\u003e*\r\n * *\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf it is our duty to realise a state of public right, if at the\r\nsame time there are good grounds for hope that this ideal may be\r\nrealised, although only by an approximation advancing \u003ci\u003ead infinitum\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthen perpetual peace, following hitherto falsely so-called\r\nconclusions of peace, which have been in reality mere cessations of\r\nhostilities, is no mere empty idea. But rather we have here a problem\r\nwhich gradually works out its own solution and, as the periods in\r\nwhich a given advance takes place towards the realisation of the\r\nideal of perpetual peace will, we hope, become with the passing\r\nof time shorter and shorter, we must approach ever nearer to this\r\ngoal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\" id=\"Index\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 class=\"nobreak\" title=\"INDEX\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_197\"\u003e[p. 197]\u003c/span\u003eINDEX\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003eA\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eAbsolutism; of Hobbes, \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_44\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e44\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eof Schopenhauer, \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eaccording to Kant, \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_44\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e44\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_125\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e125\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_128\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e128\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eto Locke, \u003ca href=\"#Page_44\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e44\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eAlexander I. of Russia; \u003ca href=\"#Page_80\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eAlexander the Great; \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_103\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eAlsace-Lorraine; annexation of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_90\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e90\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_92\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_95\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eAmbrose, Saint; \u003ca href=\"#Page_15\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eAmphictyonic League; \u003ca href=\"#Page_16\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_22\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e22\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eAquinas, Thomas; on fighting clergy, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon war, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_19\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e19\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eArbitration; as a substitute for war, \u003ca href=\"#Page_79\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e79\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_81\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_87\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e87\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003edifficulties settled by, \u003ca href=\"#Page_80\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ewhere it is useless, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_83\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e83\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_86\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e86\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eAristotle; on war, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_8\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eand rights of an enemy, \u003ca href=\"#Page_8\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eib.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon the relation between politics and ethics, \u003ca href=\"#Page_162\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e162\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eAssyrians; war among the, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eAugustine, Saint; \u003ca href=\"#Page_16\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003eB\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eBalance of power; \u003ca href=\"#Page_26\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e26\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_95\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eBentham, Jeremy; \u003ca href=\"#Page_26\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e26\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_79\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e79\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_92\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eBluntschli, J. K.; \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_74\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_80\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003eC\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eCaird, Edward; \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eCalvin, John; \u003ca href=\"#Page_19\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e19\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eCarnegie, Andrew; \u003ca href=\"#Page_100\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e100\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eChina; a danger to Europe, \u003ca href=\"#Page_92\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_93\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e93\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_140\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e140\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_141\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e141\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_198\"\u003e[p. 198]\u003c/span\u003eCicero; on the conduct of war, \u003ca href=\"#Page_22\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e22\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eClement of Alexandria; \u003ca href=\"#Page_15\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eClergy, fighting; Origen on, \u003ca href=\"#Page_14\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_15\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eWycliffe, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eErasmus, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eib.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eAquinas, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eib.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eCobden, Richard; \u003ca href=\"#Page_64\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eCorvinus, Matthias; \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eCowper, William; \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_38\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e38\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_123\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e123\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eCrusades, wars of the; \u003ca href=\"#Page_16\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_103\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003eD\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eDante, Alighieri; on mediation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_46\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon universal monarchy, \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eDisarmament; \u003ca href=\"#Page_88\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e88\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_93\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e93\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eCzar’s proposal of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_90\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e90\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003epracticability of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_90\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e90\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_93\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e93\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eDubois, Cardinal; \u003ca href=\"#Page_36\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e36\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003eE\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eEmpire; of Rome, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_20\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eworld-, spiritual, \u003ca href=\"#Page_23\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eof Alexander the Great, \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eFrankish, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eHoly Roman \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eof Napoleon I., \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eErasmus, Desiderius; and European peace, \u003ca href=\"#Page_17\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon war, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_19\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e19\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon fighting clergy, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003eF\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eFarrar, J. A.; \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eFederation; Kant’s idea of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_60\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_128\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e128\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_137\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e137\u003c/a\u003e; \u003ca href=\"#Page_88\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e88\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_92\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_93\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e93\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_95\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eprobable results of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_98\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e98\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_99\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e99\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_100\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e100\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eFichte, J. G.; \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_99\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e99\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eFinland; \u003ca href=\"#Page_92\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_95\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eFischer, Kuno; \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_67\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eFleury, Cardinal; \u003ca href=\"#Page_55\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eFrederick the Great; \u003ca href=\"#Page_66\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_126\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e126\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_199\"\u003e[p. 199]\u003c/span\u003eG\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eGentilis, Albericus; \u003ca href=\"#Page_21\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e21\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eGolden Age; \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eGovernment; origin of, according to Plato, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eaccording to Hume, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eto Cowper, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_6\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e6\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eto Hobbes, \u003ca href=\"#Page_40\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_42\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_118\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e118\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_119\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e119\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eto Kant, \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_54\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_152\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_154\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eto Rousseau, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eto Locke, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003erepresentative, \u003ca href=\"#Page_65\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_68\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_120\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e120\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_121\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e121\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_124\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e124\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_128\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e128\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eGreeks; their attitude to other nations, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eto an enemy, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eib.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003etheir Sacred Wars, \u003ca href=\"#Page_16\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ethe Amphictyonic League, \u003ca href=\"#Page_16\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eGrotius, Hugo; his \u003ci\u003eDe Jure Belli et Pacis\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_27\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e27\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eand the \u003ci\u003eJus Gentium\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_25\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eand the Law of Nature, \u003ca href=\"#Page_25\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon peace, \u003ca href=\"#Page_27\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e27\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_40\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_131\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e131\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003eH\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eHague Conference (1899); \u003ca href=\"#Page_86\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e86\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_90\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e90\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eHegel, G. W. F.; \u003ca href=\"#Page_57\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e57\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon war, \u003ca href=\"#Page_71\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eHenry IV. of France; \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_36\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e36\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eHobbes, Thomas; his theory of the state of nature and origin of government, \u003ca href=\"#Page_4\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_40\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_42\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_118\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e118\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_119\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e119\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_133\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e133\u003c/a\u003e; \u003ca href=\"#Page_6\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e6\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_26\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e26\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_27\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e27\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_28\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ehis influence on Kant, \u003ca href=\"#Page_40\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_46\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ehis views on revolution, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_188\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e188\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eof the relations between states, \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_46\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_128\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e128\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_131\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e131\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon the conduct of war, \u003ca href=\"#Page_45\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e45\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_89\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_120\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e120\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_124\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e124\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_159\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e159\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eHolls, Fred. W.; \u003ca href=\"#Page_86\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e86\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eHooker, Richard; \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon the depravity of man, \u003ca href=\"#Page_173\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e173\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eHume, David; on the origin of government, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon the state of nature, \u003ca href=\"#Page_40\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon the original contract, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_108\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_162\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e162\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003eI\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eInternational Law; the development of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_20\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_24\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eits connection with the Reformation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_21\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e21\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ein Greece and Rome, \u003ca href=\"#Page_22\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e22\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_23\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eIntervention; \u003ca href=\"#Page_64\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_93\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e93\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e94\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_113\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e113\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003eJ\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eJews; war among the, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_11\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003etheir dream of peace, \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eJustin; \u003ca href=\"#Page_15\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_200\"\u003e[p. 200]\u003c/span\u003eK\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eKant, Immanuel; \u003ca href=\"#Page_26\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e26\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ehis indebtedness to earlier political writers, \u003ca href=\"#Page_40\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_46\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ehis theory of human development, \u003ca href=\"#Page_47\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e47\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_49\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e49\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eand how this is possible, \u003ca href=\"#Page_49\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e49\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_51\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_54\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon the foundation of the state, \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_54\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_152\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_154\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ethe relations between states and individuals, \u003ca href=\"#Page_54\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_55\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_117\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e117\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_120\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e120\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_128\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e128\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_173\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e173\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_174\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e174\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ethe necessity for reform within the state, \u003ca href=\"#Page_55\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_56\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e56\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_168\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e168\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ethe political and social conditions of his time, \u003ca href=\"#Page_57\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e57\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_59\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ehis attitude to war, \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_133\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e133\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_135\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e135\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_136\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e136\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_137\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e137\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_149\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e149\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_151\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e151\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon the growing power of commerce, \u003ca href=\"#Page_59\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_65\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_142\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e142\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_157\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ehis idea of federation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_60\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_128\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e128\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_137\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e137\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_192\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e192\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eand ideal of perpetual peace, \u003ca href=\"#Page_61\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_129\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e129\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_196\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e196\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ethe conditions of its realization, \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon representative and other constitutions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_65\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_68\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_120\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e120\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_128\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e128\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_152\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_153\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e153\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_167\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e167\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ehis opinion of the English constitution, \u003ca href=\"#Page_66\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ehis disapproval of universal monarchy, \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_155\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e155\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_156\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e156\u003c/a\u003e; \u003ca href=\"#Page_79\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e79\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_83\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e83\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_89\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_100\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e100\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_105\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e105\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon the right of way, \u003ca href=\"#Page_137\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e137\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_142\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e142\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon nature’s guarantee of a perpetual peace, \u003ca href=\"#Page_143\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e143\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_157\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon the relation between politics and morals, \u003ca href=\"#Page_161\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e161\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_196\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e196\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon revolution, \u003ca href=\"#Page_167\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e167\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_168\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e168\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_186\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e186\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_188\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e188\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003eL\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eLaveleye, Émile de; \u003ca href=\"#Page_81\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eLawrence, T. J.; \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_78\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_81\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eLeibniz, Gottfried W.; \u003ca href=\"#Page_36\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e36\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ehis criticism of St. Pierre, \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_38\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e38\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_106\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eLocke, John; and the golden age, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_4\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon the original contract, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon revolution, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_188\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e188\u003c/a\u003e; \u003ca href=\"#Page_67\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_133\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e133\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eLorimer, James; \u003ca href=\"#Page_34\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e34\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_80\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eLouis Philippe; \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eLuther, Martin; on war, \u003ca href=\"#Page_19\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e19\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003eM\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eMachiavelli, Nicolo; \u003ca href=\"#Page_162\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e162\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eMaine, Henry; on Grotius and the \u003ci\u003eJus Gentium\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_25\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eMaistre, Joseph de; \u003ca href=\"#Page_71\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eMartineau, James; \u003ca href=\"#Page_102\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e102\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eMennonites; and war, \u003ca href=\"#Page_14\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_201\"\u003e[p. 201]\u003c/span\u003eMilitary service; of Christians, \u003ca href=\"#Page_14\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_16\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_19\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e19\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ecompulsory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_89\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003evoluntary, \u003ca href=\"#Page_111\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e111\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eMill, John Stuart; \u003ca href=\"#Page_80\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eMoltke, Graf von; \u003ca href=\"#Page_71\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_75\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eMonarchy, universal; the ideal of Dante, \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003edisapproved by Kant, \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_155\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e155\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_156\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e156\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eand Fichte, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eMontesquieu, Baron de; on self-preservation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_83\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e83\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon armed peace, \u003ca href=\"#Page_88\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e88\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_159\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e159\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eMore, Thomas; \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eMorley, John; \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003eN\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eNapoleon Bonaparte; Empire of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_71\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_77\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eNapoleon, Louis; \u003ca href=\"#Page_80\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eNational Debt; \u003ca href=\"#Page_63\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_64\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_111\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e111\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003eO\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eOrigen; on military service, \u003ca href=\"#Page_14\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_15\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eOriginal Contract; \u003ca href=\"#Page_40\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eas understood by Rousseau, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eby Hobbes, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eby Hooker, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eby Hume, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eib.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eby Kant, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eib.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eby Locke, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003eP\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eParis Congress (1856); \u003ca href=\"#Page_86\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e86\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ePaulsen, Friedrich; \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_66\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_78\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ePeace, perpetual; the dream of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_29\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e29\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_33\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eprojects of, by Penn, \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eby Henry IV., \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_34\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e34\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eby St. Pierre, \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_34\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e34\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_37\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eRousseau’s attitude to, \u003ca href=\"#Page_38\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e38\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_40\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_106\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003efor Kant an ideal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_61\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_129\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e129\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ethe articles of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_142\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e142\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_158\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e158\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_160\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e160\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ethe guarantee of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_143\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e143\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_157\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ePeace Societies; \u003ca href=\"#Page_70\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_78\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_79\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e79\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_80\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_86\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e86\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_87\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e87\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eand disarmament, \u003ca href=\"#Page_88\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e88\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_96\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e96\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_100\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e100\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_101\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e101\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_102\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e102\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ePenn, William; \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ePlato; on the origin of the state, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon war, \u003ca href=\"#Page_8\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon the relation between ethics and politics, \u003ca href=\"#Page_162\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e162\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ePoland; \u003ca href=\"#Page_92\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_93\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e93\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_95\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_202\"\u003e[p. 202]\u003c/span\u003ePolitics; and morals, according to Kant, \u003ca href=\"#Page_161\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e161\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_196\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e196\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eto Plato, \u003ca href=\"#Page_162\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e162\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eto Aristotle, \u003ca href=\"#Page_162\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eib.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eto Hume, \u003ca href=\"#Page_162\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eib.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003esophistical maxims of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_170\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e170\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_172\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e172\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ePope, Alexander; \u003ca href=\"#Page_4\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_127\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e127\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ePuffendorf, Samuel; \u003ca href=\"#Page_27\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e27\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon intervention, \u003ca href=\"#Page_64\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_131\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e131\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003eQ\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eQuakers; and war, \u003ca href=\"#Page_14\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003eR\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eReformation; and military service, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eand international law, \u003ca href=\"#Page_21\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e21\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eReligion; Roman, and war, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eJewish, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_11\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eMohammedan, \u003ca href=\"#Page_10\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eBuddhist, and conversion, \u003ca href=\"#Page_12\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eChristian, and war, \u003ca href=\"#Page_12\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_20\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eRevolution, right of; according to Hobbes, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eand Spinoza, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eaccording to Locke, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eto Rousseau, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eib.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eto Kant, \u003ca href=\"#Page_167\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e167\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_186\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e186\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_188\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e188\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eRight of way; Vattel on, \u003ca href=\"#Page_65\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_138\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e138\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eKant on, \u003ca href=\"#Page_65\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_137\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e137\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_142\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e142\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eRitchie, D. G.; on Rousseau, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon Locke and the golden age, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eib.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_85\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_98\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e98\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eRobertson, William; \u003ca href=\"#Page_6\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e6\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_17\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_19\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e19\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eRomans; and war, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_8\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_22\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e22\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_23\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eand international law, \u003ca href=\"#Page_22\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e22\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_23\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eRousseau, J. J.; and the state of nature, \u003ca href=\"#Page_2\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e; \u003ca href=\"#Page_26\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e26\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_28\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ehis criticism of St. Pierre, \u003ca href=\"#Page_38\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e38\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_40\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ehis views on militarism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_39\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e39\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon the original contract, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon revolution, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_188\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e188\u003c/a\u003e; \u003ca href=\"#Page_61\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_67\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_100\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e100\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_132\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e132\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon democratic and republican governments, \u003ca href=\"#Page_153\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e153\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon the depravity of man, \u003ca href=\"#Page_173\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e173\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eRussia; Alexander I. of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_80\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ethe Czar of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_90\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e90\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ethe backward civilization of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_92\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_93\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e93\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e94\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_95\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003eS\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eSchiller, Friedrich von; on war and peace, \u003ca href=\"#Page_71\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eSchopenhauer, Arthur; \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eSpencer, Herbert; \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eSpinoza, Benedict; on the state of nature, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eand revolution, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eib.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eStanding armies; \u003ca href=\"#Page_63\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_64\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_89\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_110\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e110\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_203\"\u003e[p. 203]\u003c/span\u003eState of nature; according to Rousseau, \u003ca href=\"#Page_2\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eand the golden age, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eHobbes’ theory of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_4\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_40\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_118\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e118\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eaccording to Hume a philosophical fiction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eaccording to Kant, \u003ca href=\"#Page_117\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e117\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_120\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e120\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eStates; transference of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_63\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_108\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003emarriage between, \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eSt. Pierre, Castel de; \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ehis \u003ci\u003eProjet\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_34\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e34\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_37\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eand Leibniz, \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_38\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e38\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eand Rousseau, \u003ca href=\"#Page_38\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e38\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_40\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_61\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_67\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_79\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e79\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_92\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_106\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eSully, Duke of; \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003eT\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eTennyson, Lord; \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_74\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eTertullian; \u003ca href=\"#Page_14\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_15\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eTreaties of peace; in Greece, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_63\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_64\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_108\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eTreitschke, H. von; \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eTrendelenburg, F. A.; \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003eV\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eVattel, Emerich; his \u003ci\u003eDroit des Gens\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_28\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_29\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e29\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon intervention, \u003ca href=\"#Page_64\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_113\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e113\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_114\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e114\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon the right of way, \u003ca href=\"#Page_65\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eof self-preservation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_83\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e83\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_89\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_103\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eon treaties, \u003ca href=\"#Page_108\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e; \u003ca href=\"#Page_131\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e131\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eVoltaire, François de; \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_38\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e38\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003eW\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eWar; religious, \u003ca href=\"#Page_16\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n \u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eprivate, \u003ca href=\"#Page_17\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_20\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_29\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e29\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003edynastic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_38\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e38\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_57\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e57\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_123\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e123\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eKant’s attitude to, \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_133\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e133\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_135\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e135\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_136\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e136\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_137\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e137\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_149\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e149\u003c/a\u003e-\u003ca href=\"#Page_151\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e151\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eits influence on progress, \u003ca href=\"#Page_70\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_96\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e96\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_103\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eviews of Hegel on, \u003ca href=\"#Page_71\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eof Schiller, \u003ca href=\"#Page_71\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eof Moltke, \u003ca href=\"#Page_71\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_74\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eunder altered conditions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_77\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_78\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ewhen just, \u003ca href=\"#Page_84\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_85\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003efuture probable causes of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e94\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_95\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003ehonorable conduct of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_114\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e114\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_115\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e115\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eWycliffe, John; and fighting clergy, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ndx\"\u003eZ\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul class=\"IX\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eZwingli, Huldreich, \u003ca href=\"#Page_19\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e19\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"aftit\"\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"pi\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\" id=\"Page_204\"\u003e[p. 204]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ci\u003ePrinted\r\n in Great Britain by\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eUNWIN BROTHERS, LIMITED\u003cbr\u003e\r\n WOKING AND LONDON\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"xl centra\"\u003eFOOTNOTES\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_1\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_1\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Cf. his \u003ci\u003eStudies in Political and\r\nSocial Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 169, 170.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_2\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_2\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e For the inconsistency between the\r\nviews expressed by Rousseau on this subject in the \u003ci\u003eDiscourses\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand in the \u003ci\u003eContrat Social\u003c/i\u003e (Cf. I. Chs. VI., VIII.) see Ritchie’s\r\n\u003ci\u003eNatural Right\u003c/i\u003e, Ch. III., pp. 48, 49; Caird’s essay on Rousseau in\r\nhis \u003ci\u003eEssays on Literature and Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I.; and Morley’s\r\n\u003ci\u003eRousseau\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., Ch. V.; Vol. II., Ch. XII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_3\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_3\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[3]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e The theory that the golden age was\r\nidentical with the state of nature, Professor D. G. Ritchie ascribes\r\nto Locke (see \u003ci\u003eNatural Right\u003c/i\u003e, Ch. II., p. 42). Locke, he says, “has\r\nan idea of a golden age” existing even after government has come into\r\nexistence—a time when people did not need “to examine the original\r\nand rights of government.” [\u003ci\u003eCivil Government\u003c/i\u003e, II., § 111.] A little\r\nconfusion on the part of his readers (perhaps in his own mind) makes\r\nit possible to regard the state of nature as itself the golden age,\r\nand the way is prepared for the favourite theory of the eighteenth\r\ncentury:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003e“Nor think in nature’s state they blindly trod;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eThe state of nature was the reign of God:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eSelf-love and social at her birth began,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eUnion the bond of all things and of man.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003ePride then was not, nor arts that pride to aid;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eMan walk’d with beast, joint tenant of the shade;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eThe same his table, and the same his bed;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eNo murder cloath’d him, and no murder fed.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"dr\"\u003e[\u003ci\u003eEssay on Man\u003c/i\u003e, III., 147 \u003ci\u003eseq.\u003c/i\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eIn these lines of Pope’s the state of nature is\r\nidentified with the golden age of the Greek and Latin poets; and\r\n“the reign of God” is an equivalent for Locke’s words, “has a law of\r\nnature to govern it.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_4\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_4\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[4]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Cf. \u003ci\u003eRepublic\u003c/i\u003e, II. 369. “A state,”\r\nsays Socrates, “arises out of the needs of mankind: no one is\r\nself-sufficing, but all of us have many wants.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_5\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_5\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[5]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See Hume’s account of the origin\r\nof government (\u003ci\u003eTreatise\u003c/i\u003e, III., Part II., Sect. VIII.). There\r\nare, he says, American tribes “where men live in concord and amity\r\namong themselves without any established government; and never pay\r\nsubmission to any of their fellows, except in time of war, when\r\ntheir captain enjoys a shadow of authority, which he loses after\r\ntheir return from the field, and the establishment of peace with the\r\nneighbouring tribes. This authority, however, instructs them in the\r\nadvantages of government, and teaches them to have recourse to it,\r\nwhen either by the pillage of war, by commerce, or by any fortuitous\r\ninventions, their riches and possessions have become so considerable\r\nas to make them forget, on every emergence, the interest they have\r\nin the preservation of peace and justice…. Camps are the true\r\nmothers of cities; and as war cannot be administered, by reason of\r\nthe suddenness of every exigency, without some authority in a single\r\nperson, the same kind of authority naturally takes place in that\r\ncivil government, which succeeds the military.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eCf. Cowper: \u003ci\u003eThe Winter Morning Walk\u003c/i\u003e:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003e“\u003cspan class=\"g4\"\u003e………..\u003c/span\u003eand ere long,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eWhen man was multiplied and spread abroad\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eIn tribes and clans, and had begun to call\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eThese meadows and that range of hills his own,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eThe tasted sweets of property begat\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eDesire of more;\u003cspan class=\"g4\"\u003e ………\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"g4\"\u003e……………\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eThus wars began on earth. These fought for spoil,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAnd those in self-defence. Savage at first\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eThe onset, and irregular. At length\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eOne eminent above the rest, for strength,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eFor stratagem, or courage, or for all,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eWas chosen leader. Him they served in war,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAnd him in peace for sake of warlike deeds\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eRev’renced no less\u003cspan class=\"g4\"\u003e………\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"g4\"\u003e……………\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eThus kings were first invented.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_6\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_6\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[6]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e “Among uncivilised nations, there\r\nis but one profession honourable, that of arms. All the ingenuity and\r\nvigour of the human mind are exerted in acquiring military skill or\r\naddress.” Cf. Robertson’s \u003ci\u003eHistory of Charles V.\u003c/i\u003e, (\u003ci\u003eWorks\u003c/i\u003e, 1813,\r\nvol. V.) Sect. I. vii.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_7\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_7\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[7]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Similarly we find that the original\r\nmeaning of the Latin word “\u003ci\u003ehostis\u003c/i\u003e” was “a stranger.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_8\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_8\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[8]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e In Aristotle we find the high-water\r\nmark of Greek thinking on this subject. “The object of military\r\ntraining,” says he, (\u003ci\u003ePolitics\u003c/i\u003e, Bk. IV. Ch. XIV., Welldon’s\r\ntranslation—in older editions Bk. VII.) “should be not to enslave\r\npersons who do not deserve slavery, but firstly to secure ourselves\r\nagainst becoming the slaves of others; secondly, to seek imperial\r\npower not with a view to a universal despotic authority, but for\r\nthe benefit of the subjects whom we rule, and thirdly, to exercise\r\ndespotic power over those who are deserving to be slaves. That\r\nthe legislator should rather make it his object so to order his\r\nlegislation upon military and other matters as to promote leisure\r\nand peace is a theory borne out by the facts of history.” … (\u003ci\u003eloc.\r\ncit.\u003c/i\u003e Ch. XV.). “War, as we have remarked several times, has its end\r\nin peace.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eAristotle strongly condemns the Lacedæmonians and\r\nCretans for regarding war and conquest as the sole ends to which all\r\nlaw and education should be directed. Also in non-Greek tribes like\r\nthe Scythians, Persians, Thracians and Celts he says, only military\r\npower is admired by the people and encouraged by the state. “There\r\nwas formerly too a law in Macedonia that any one who had never slain\r\nan enemy should wear the halter about his neck.” Among the Iberians\r\ntoo, a military people, “it is the custom to set around the tomb of\r\na deceased warrior a number of obelisks corresponding to the number\r\nof enemies he has killed…. Yet … it may well appear to be a\r\nstartling paradox that it should be the function of a Statesman to\r\nsucceed in devising the means of rule and mastery over neighbouring\r\npeoples whether with or against their own will. How can such action\r\nbe worthy of a statesman or legislator, when it has not even the\r\nsanction of law?” (\u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, IV. Ch. 2.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eWe see that Aristotle disapproves of a glorification\r\nof war for its own sake, and regards it as justifiable only in\r\ncertain circumstances. Methods of warfare adopted and proved in the\r\nEast would not have been possible in Greece. An act of treachery, for\r\nexample, such as that of Jael, (\u003ci\u003eJudges\u003c/i\u003e IV. 17) which was extolled\r\nin songs of praise by the Jews, (\u003ci\u003eloc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e V. 24) the Greek\r\npeople would have been inclined to repudiate. The stories of Roman\r\nhistory, the behaviour of Fabricius, for instance, or Regulus and\r\nthe honourable conduct of prisoners on various occasions released on\r\nparole, show that this consciousness of certain principles of honour\r\nin warfare was still more highly developed in Rome.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eSocrates in the \u003ci\u003eRepublic\u003c/i\u003e (V. 469, 470) gives\r\nexpression to a feeling which was gradually gaining ground in Greece,\r\nthat war between Hellenic tribes was much more serious than war\r\nbetween Greeks and barbarians. In such civil warfare, he considered,\r\nthe defeated ought not to be reduced to slavery, nor the slain\r\ndespoiled, nor Hellenic territory devastated. For any difference\r\nbetween Greek and Greek is to “be regarded by them as discord only—a\r\nquarrel among friends, which is not to be called war”…. “Our\r\ncitizens [\u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e in the ideal republic] should thus deal with their\r\nHellenic enemies; and with barbarians as the Hellenes now deal with\r\none another.” (V. 471.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eThe views of Plato and Aristotle on this and other\r\nquestions were in advance of the custom and practice of their\r\ntime.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_9\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_9\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[9]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e “The Lord is a man of war,” said\r\nMoses (\u003ci\u003eExodus\u003c/i\u003e XV. 3). Cf. \u003ci\u003ePsalms\u003c/i\u003e XXIV. 8. He is “mighty in\r\nbattle.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_10\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_10\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[10]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e This was bound up with the very\r\nessence of Islam; the devout Mussulman could suffer the existence of\r\nno unbeliever. Tolerance or indifference was an attitude which his\r\nfaith made impossible. “When ye encounter the unbelievers,” quoth the\r\nprophet (\u003ci\u003eKoran\u003c/i\u003e, ch. 47), “strike off their heads, until ye have\r\nmade a great slaughter among them…. Verily if God pleased he could\r\ntake vengeance on them without your assistance; but he commandeth you\r\nto fight his battles.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eThe propagation of the faith by the sword was not only\r\ncommanded by the Mohammedan religion: it was that religion itself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_11\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_11\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[11]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See \u003ci\u003eActs\u003c/i\u003e X. 28:—“Ye know that\r\nit is an unlawful thing for a man that is a Jew to keep company, or\r\ncome unto one of another nation.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_12\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_12\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[12]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Neither, however, is there any\r\nwhich regards the soldier as a murderer.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_13\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_13\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[13]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e In the early centuries of our era\r\nChristians seem to have occasionally refused to serve in the army\r\nfrom religious scruples. But soldiers were not always required to\r\nchange their profession after baptism. And in \u003ci\u003eActs\u003c/i\u003e X., for example,\r\nnothing is said to indicate that the centurion, Cornelius, would have\r\nto leave the Roman army. See Tertullian: \u003ci\u003eDe Corona\u003c/i\u003e (Anti-Nicene\r\nChristian Library), p. 348.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_14\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_14\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[14]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e There were so-called “Sacred\r\nWars” in Greece, but these were due mainly to disputes caused by the\r\nAmphictyonic League. They were not religious, in the sense in which\r\nwe apply the epithet to the Thirty Years’ war.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_15\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_15\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[15]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e “The administration of justice\r\namong rude illiterate people, was not so accurate, or decisive, or\r\nuniform, as to induce men to submit implicitly to its determinations.\r\nEvery offended baron buckled on his armour, and sought redress at\r\nthe head of his vassals. His adversary met him in like hostile\r\narray. Neither of them appealed to impotent laws which could afford\r\nthem no protection. Neither of them would submit points, in which\r\ntheir honour and their passions were warmly interested, to the slow\r\ndetermination of a judicial inquiry. Both trusted to their swords for\r\nthe decision of the contest.” Robertson’s \u003ci\u003eHistory of Charles V.\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n(\u003ci\u003eWorks\u003c/i\u003e, vol. V.) Sect. I., p. 38.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_16\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_16\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[16]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Erasmus in the “Ἰχθυοφαγία”\r\n(\u003ci\u003eColloquies\u003c/i\u003e, Bailey’s ed., Vol. II., pp. 55, 56) puts forward the\r\nsuggestion that a general peace might be obtained in the Christian\r\nworld, if the Emperor would remit something of his right and the Pope\r\nsome part of his.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_17\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_17\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[17]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Cf. Robertson, \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, Sect.\r\nIII., p. 106, \u003ci\u003eseq.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_18\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_18\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[18]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Robertson (\u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, Note\r\nXXI., p. 483) quotes the following statement: “flamma, ferro, caede,\r\npossessiones ecclesiarum praelati defendebant.” (Guido Abbas ap. Du\r\nCange, p. 179.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_19\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_19\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[19]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e J. A. Farrar, in a pamphlet,\r\n(reprinted from the \u003ci\u003eGentleman’s Magazine\u003c/i\u003e, vol. 257, 1884) on \u003ci\u003eWar\r\nand Christianity\u003c/i\u003e, quotes the following passage from Wycliffe in\r\nwhich he protests against this blot upon the Church and Christian\r\nprofessions.—“Friars now say that bishops can fight best of all men,\r\nand that it falleth most properly to them, since they are lords of\r\nall this world. They say Christ bade His disciples sell their coats,\r\nand buy them swords; but whereto, if not to fight? Thus friars make a\r\ngreat array, and stir up many men to fight. But Christ taught not His\r\napostles to fight with a sword of iron, but with the sword of God’s\r\nWord, and which standeth in meekness of heart and in the prudence of\r\nman’s tongue…. If man-slaying in others be odious to God, much more\r\nin priests, who should be vicars of Christ.” See also the passage\r\nwhere Erasmus points out that King David was not permitted to build\r\na temple to God, because he was a man of blood. “Nolo clericos ullo\r\nsanguine contaminari. Gravis impietas!” (\u003ci\u003eOpera\u003c/i\u003e, IX., 370 B.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eThis question had already been considered by Thomas\r\nAquinas, who decided that the clergy ought not to be allowed\r\nto fight, because the practices of warfare, although right and\r\nmeritorious in themselves, were not in accordance with a holy\r\ncalling. (\u003ci\u003eSumma\u003c/i\u003e, II. 2: Qu. 40.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eAquinas held that war—excluding private war—is\r\njustifiable in a just cause. So too did Luther, (cf. his pamphlet:\r\n\u003ci\u003eOb Kriegsleute auch in seligem Stande sein können?\u003c/i\u003e) Calvin and\r\nZwingli, the last of whom died sword in hand.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eWith regard to the question of a fighting clergy,\r\nthe passage quoted from Origen (pp. 14, 15, above) has considerable\r\ninterest, Origen looks upon the active participation of priests in\r\nwarfare as something which everyone would admit to be impossible.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_20\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_20\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[20]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See also the \u003ci\u003eQuerela Pacis\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n630 B., (\u003ci\u003eOpera\u003c/i\u003e, IV.):—“Whosoever preaches Christ, preaches peace.”\r\nErasmus even goes the length of saying that the most iniquitous peace\r\nis better than the most just war (\u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, 636 C).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_21\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_21\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[21]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Cf. Robertson, \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, Note\r\nXXI. p. 483 and Sect. I., p. 39.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_22\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_22\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[22]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e It is uncertain in what year the\r\n\u003ci\u003eDe Jure Belli\u003c/i\u003e of Gentilis was published—a work to which Grotius\r\nacknowledges considerable indebtedness. Whewell, in the preface to\r\nhis translation of Grotius, gives the date 1598, but some writers\r\nsuppose it to have been ten years earlier.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_23\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_23\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[23]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e This came about in two ways. The\r\nChurch of Rome discouraged the growth of national sentiment. At the\r\nReformation the independence and unity of the different nations were\r\nfor the first time recognised. That is to say, the Reformation laid\r\nthe foundation for a science of international law. But, from another\r\npoint of view, it not only made such a code of rules possible, it\r\nmade it necessary. The effect of the Reformation was not to diminish\r\nthe number of wars in which religious belief could play a part.\r\nMoreover, it displaced the Pope from his former position as arbiter\r\nin Europe without setting up any judicial tribunal in his stead.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_24\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_24\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[24]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Cf. Cicero: \u003ci\u003eDe Officiis\u003c/i\u003e, I.\r\nxi. “Belli quidem aequitas sanctissime feciali populi Romani jure\r\nperscripta est.” (See the reference to Lawrence’s comments on this\r\nsubject, p. 9 above.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003e“Wars,” says Cicero, “are to be undertaken for this\r\nend, that we may live in peace without being injured; but when we\r\nobtain the victory, we must preserve those enemies who behaved\r\nwithout cruelty or inhumanity during the war: for example, our\r\nforefathers received, even as members of their state, the Tuscans,\r\nthe Æqui, the Volscians, the Sabines and the Hernici, but utterly\r\ndestroyed Carthage and Numantia…. And, while we are bound to\r\nexercise consideration toward those whom we have conquered by force,\r\nso those should be received into our protection who throw themselves\r\nupon the honour of our general, and lay down their arms,” (\u003ci\u003eop.\r\ncit.\u003c/i\u003e, I. xi., Bohn’s Translation)…. “In engaging in war we ought\r\nto make it appear that we have no other view but peace.” (\u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nI. xxiii.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eIn fulfilling a treaty we must not sacrifice the\r\nspirit to the letter (\u003ci\u003eDe Officiis\u003c/i\u003e, I. x). “There are also rights\r\nof war, and the faith of an oath is often to be kept with an enemy.”\r\n(\u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, III. xxix.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eThis is the first statement by a classical writer in\r\nwhich the idea of justice being due to an enemy appears. Cicero goes\r\nfurther. Particular states, he says, (\u003ci\u003eDe Legibus\u003c/i\u003e, I. i.) are only\r\nmembers of a whole governed by reason.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_25\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_25\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[25]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e The saying is attributed to\r\nPompey:—“Shall I, when I am preparing for war, think of the laws?”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_26\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_26\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[26]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e This implied, however, the idea\r\nof a united Christendom as against the infidel, with which we may\r\ncompare the idea of a united Hellas against Persia. In such things\r\nwe have the germ not only of international law, but of the ideal of\r\nfederation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_27\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_27\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[27]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See Maine’s \u003ci\u003eAncient Law\u003c/i\u003e, pp.\r\n50-53: pp. 96-101. Grotius wrongly understood “Jus Gentium,” (“a\r\ncollection of rules and principles, determined by observation to be\r\ncommon to the institutions which prevailed among the various Italian\r\ntribes”) to mean “Jus \u003ci\u003einter\u003c/i\u003e gentes.” The Roman expression for\r\nInternational Law was not “Jus Gentium,” but “Jus Feciale.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003e“Having adopted from the Antonine jurisconsults,” says\r\nMaine, “the position that the Jus Gentium and the Jus Naturæ were\r\nidentical, Grotius, with his immediate predecessors and his immediate\r\nsuccessors, attributed to the Law of Nature an authority which\r\nwould never perhaps have been claimed for it, if “Law of Nations”\r\nhad not in that age been an ambiguous expression. They laid down\r\nunreservedly that Natural Law is the code of states, and thus put in\r\noperation a process which has continued almost down to our own day,\r\nthe process of engrafting on the international system rules which are\r\nsupposed to have been evolved from the unassisted contemplation of\r\nthe conception of Nature. There is, too, one consequence of immense\r\npractical importance to mankind which, though not unknown during the\r\nearly modern history of Europe, was never clearly or universally\r\nacknowledged till the doctrines of the Grotian school had prevailed.\r\nIf the society of nations is governed by Natural Law, the atoms\r\nwhich compose it must be absolutely equal. Men under the sceptre\r\nof Nature are all equal, and accordingly commonwealths are equal\r\nif the international state be one of nature. The proposition that\r\nindependent communities, however different in size and power, are\r\nall equal in the view of the Law of Nations, has largely contributed\r\nto the happiness of mankind, though it is constantly threatened by\r\nthe political tendencies of each successive age. It is a doctrine\r\nwhich probably would never have obtained a secure footing at all if\r\nInternational Law had not been entirely derived from the majestic\r\nclaims of Nature by the Publicists who wrote after the revival of\r\nletters.” (\u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 100.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_28\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_28\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[28]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e The name “International Law” was\r\nfirst given to the law of nations by Bentham. (\u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Morals\r\nand Legislation, XIX.\u003c/i\u003e § xxv.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_29\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_29\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[29]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e In the Peace of Westphalia, 1648,\r\nthe balance of power in Europe was recognised on the basis of terms\r\nsuch as these.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_30\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_30\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[30]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Grotius, however, is a\r\npainstaking student of Scripture, and is willing to say something\r\nin favour of peace—not a permanent peace, that is to say, the idea\r\nof which would scarcely be likely to occur to anyone in the early\r\nyears of the seventeenth century—but a plea for fewer, shorter wars.\r\n“If therefore,” he says, “a peace sufficiently safe can be had, it\r\nis not ill secured by the condonation of offenses, and damages, and\r\nexpenses: especially among Christians, to whom the Lord has given his\r\npeace as his legacy. And so St. Paul, his best interpreter, exhorts\r\nus to live at peace with all men…. May God write these lessons—He\r\nwho alone can—on the hearts of all those who have the affairs of\r\nChristendom in their hands.” (\u003ci\u003eDe Jure Belli et Pacis\u003c/i\u003e, III. Ch.\r\nXXV., Whewell’s translation.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eSee also \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, II., Ch. XXIII., Sect. VIII.,\r\nwhere Grotius recommends that Congresses of Christian Powers should\r\nbe held with a view to the peaceful settlement of international\r\ndifferences.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_31\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_31\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[31]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Puffendorf’s best known work, \u003ci\u003eDe\r\nJure Naturæ et Gentium\u003c/i\u003e, was published in 1672.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_32\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_32\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[32]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eLe Droit des Gens\u003c/i\u003e was published\r\nin 1758 and translated into English by Joseph Chitty in 1797, (2nd\r\ned., 1834).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_33\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_33\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[33]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eMémoires ou Œconomies Royales\r\nD’Estat, Domestiques, Politiques et Militaires de Henri le Grand, par\r\nMaximilian de Bethune, Duc de Sully.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_34\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_34\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[34]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See \u003ci\u003eInternational Tribunals\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(1899), p. 20 \u003ci\u003eseq.\u003c/i\u003e Penn’s \u003ci\u003eEssay towards the Present and Future\r\nPeace of Europe\u003c/i\u003e was written about 1693, but is not included in all\r\neditions of his works.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_35\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_35\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[35]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eProjet de traité pour rendre\r\nla paix perpétuelle entre les souverains chrétiens.\u003c/i\u003e The first two\r\nvolumes of this work were published in 1713 (trans. London, 1714); a\r\nthird volume followed in 1717.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_36\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_36\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[36]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e The main articles of this and\r\nother peace projects are to be found in \u003ci\u003eInternational Tribunals\u003c/i\u003e,\r\npublished by the Peace Society.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_37\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_37\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[37]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Professor Lorimer points out\r\nthat Prussia, then the Duchy of Brandenburg, is not mentioned.\r\n(\u003ci\u003eInstitutes of the Law of Nations\u003c/i\u003e, II. Ch. VII., p. 219.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_38\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_38\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[38]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e The same objection was raised\r\nby Leibniz (see his \u003ci\u003eObservations\u003c/i\u003e on St. Pierre’s \u003ci\u003eProjet\u003c/i\u003e) to the\r\nscheme of Henry IV., who, says Leibniz, thought more of overthrowing\r\nthe house of Austria than of establishing a society of sovereigns.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_39\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_39\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[39]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eProject\u003c/i\u003e, Art. VI., Eng. trans.\r\n(1714), p. 119.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_40\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_40\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[40]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e St. Pierre was not blind to\r\nthis aspect of the question. Among the critical objections which\r\nhe anticipates to his plan is this,—that it promises too great an\r\nincrease of strength to the house of France, and that therefore the\r\nauthor would have been wiser to conceal his nationality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_41\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_41\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[41]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e St. Pierre, in what may be called\r\nan apology for the wording of the title of his book (above, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_35\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 32, \u003ci\u003enote\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/a\u003e), justifies his confidence in\r\nthese words:—“The Pilot who himself seems uncertain of the Success of\r\nhis Voyage is not likely to persuade the Passenger to embark…. I am\r\npersuaded, that it is not impossible to find out Means sufficient and\r\npracticable to settle an Everlasting Peace among Christians; and even\r\nbelieve, that the Means which I have thought of are of that Nature.”\r\n(Preface to \u003ci\u003eProject\u003c/i\u003e, Eng. trans., 1714.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_42\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_42\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[42]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eLeviathan\u003c/i\u003e, I. Ch. V.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_43\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_43\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[43]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See too Voltaire’s allusion to\r\nSt. Pierre in his \u003ci\u003eDictionary\u003c/i\u003e, under “Religion.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_44\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_44\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[44]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Leibniz regarded the project\r\nof St. Pierre with an indifference, somewhat tinged with contempt.\r\nIn a letter to Grimarest, (\u003ci\u003eLeibnit. Opera\u003c/i\u003e, Dutens’ ed., 1768,\r\nVol. V., pp. 65, 66: in \u003ci\u003eEpist.\u003c/i\u003e, ed. Kortholt., Vol. III., p.\r\n327) he writes:—“I have seen something of M. de St. Pierre’s plan\r\nfor maintaining perpetual peace in Europe. It reminds me of an\r\ninscription outside of a churchyard which ran, ‘\u003ci\u003ePax Perpetua\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nFor the dead, it is true, fight no more. But the living, are of\r\nanother mind, and the mightiest among them have little respect for\r\ntribunals.’” This is followed by the ironical suggestion that a\r\ncourt of arbitration should be established at Rome of which the Pope\r\nshould be made president; while at the same time the old spiritual\r\nauthority should be restored to the Church, and excommunication be\r\nthe punishment of non-compliance with the arbitral decree. “Such\r\nplans,” he adds, “are as likely to succeed as that of M. de St.\r\nPierre. But as we are allowed to write novels, why should we find\r\nfault with fiction which would bring back the golden age?” But see\r\nalso \u003ci\u003eObservations sur le Projet d’une Paix Perpétuelle de M. l’Abbé\r\nde St. Pierre\u003c/i\u003e (Dutens, V., esp. p. 56) and the letter to Remond de\r\nMontmort (\u003ci\u003eibid.\u003c/i\u003e pp. 20, 21) where Leibniz considers this project\r\nrather more seriously.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_45\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_45\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[45]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e “C’est un livre solide et sensé,”\r\nsays Rousseau (\u003ci\u003eJugement sur la Paix Perpétuelle\u003c/i\u003e), “et il est très\r\nimportant qu’il existe.” [This \u003ci\u003eJugement\u003c/i\u003e is appended to Rousseau’s\r\n\u003ci\u003eExtrait du Projet de Paix Perpétuelle de Monsieur l’Abbé de\r\nSaint-Pierre\u003c/i\u003e, 1761.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_46\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_46\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[46]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Cf. Cowper: \u003ci\u003eThe Winter Morning\r\nWalk\u003c/i\u003e:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003e“Great princes have great playthings. Some have play’d\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAt hewing mountains into men, and some\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAt building human wonders mountain high.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"g4\"\u003e……………\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"g4\"\u003e……………\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eSome seek diversion in the tented field,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAnd make the sorrows of mankind their sport.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eBut war’s a game, which, were their subjects wise,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eKings should not play at. Nations would do well\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eT’extort their truncheons from the puny hands\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eOf heroes, whose infirm and baby minds\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAre gratified with mischief, and who spoil,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eBecause men suffer it, their toy the world.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_47\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_47\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[47]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e “Les troupes réglées, peste et\r\ndépopulation de l’Europe, ne sont bonnes qu’a deux fins: ou pour\r\nattaquer et conquérir les voisins, ou pour enchâiner et asservir les\r\ncitoyens.” (\u003ci\u003eGouvernement de Pologne\u003c/i\u003e, Ch. XII.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_48\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_48\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[48]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Hobbes realises clearly that\r\nthere probably never was such a state of war all over the world nor\r\na state of nature conforming to a common type. The case is parallel\r\nto the use of the term “original contract” as an explanation of\r\nthe manner in which the civil state came to be formed. (Cf. p. 52,\r\n\u003ci\u003enote\u003c/i\u003e.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eSee also Hume (\u003ci\u003eInquiry concerning the Principles of\r\nMorals,\u003c/i\u003e Sect. III. Part I.). “This \u003ci\u003epoetical\u003c/i\u003e fiction of the \u003ci\u003egolden\r\nage\u003c/i\u003e is, in some respects, of a piece with the \u003ci\u003ephilosophical\u003c/i\u003e\r\nfiction of the \u003ci\u003estate of nature\u003c/i\u003e; only that the former is represented\r\nas the most charming and most peaceable condition, which can possibly\r\nbe imagined; whereas the latter is painted out as a state of mutual\r\nwar and violence, attended with the most extreme necessity.” This\r\nfiction of a state of nature as a state of war, says Hume, (in a note\r\nto this passage) is not the invention of Hobbes. Plato (\u003ci\u003eRepublic\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nII. III. IV.) refutes a hypothesis very like it, and Cicero (\u003ci\u003ePro\r\nSext.\u003c/i\u003e l. 42) regards it as a fact universally acknowledged.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eCf. also Spinoza (\u003ci\u003eTract. Pol.\u003c/i\u003e c. ii. § 14): “Homines\r\nex natura hostes.” And (c. v. § 2): “Homines civiles non nascuntur\r\nsed fiunt.” These expressions are to be understood, says Bluntschli\r\n(\u003ci\u003eTheory of the State\u003c/i\u003e, IV. Ch. vi., p. 284, \u003ci\u003enote\u003c/i\u003e a), “rather as a\r\nlogical statement of what \u003ci\u003ewould be\u003c/i\u003e the condition of man apart from\r\ncivil society, than as distinctly implying a historical theory.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eWhile starting from the same premises, Spinoza\r\ncarries Hobbes’ political theories to their logical conclusion. If\r\nwe admit that right lies with might, then right is with the people\r\nin any revolution successfully carried out. (But see Hobbes’ Preface\r\nto the \u003ci\u003ePhilosophical Rudiments\u003c/i\u003e and Kant’s \u003ci\u003ePerpetual Peace\u003c/i\u003e, p.\r\n188, \u003ci\u003enote\u003c/i\u003e.) Spinoza, in a letter, thus alludes to this point of\r\ndifference:—“As regards political theories, the difference which you\r\ninquire about between Hobbes and myself, consists in this, that I\r\nalways preserve natural right intact, and only allot to the chief\r\nmagistrates in every state a right over their subjects commensurate\r\nwith the excess of their power over the power of the subjects. This\r\nis what always takes place in the state of nature.” (Epistle 50,\r\n\u003ci\u003eWorks\u003c/i\u003e, Bohn’s ed., Vol. II.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_49\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_49\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[49]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e The italics are mine.—[Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_50\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_50\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[50]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Professor Paulsen (\u003ci\u003eImmanuel\r\nKant\u003c/i\u003e, 2nd ed., 1899, p. 359—Eng. trans., p. 353) points out that\r\npessimism and absolutism usually go together in the doctrines of\r\nphilosophers. He gives as instances Hobbes, Kant and Schopenhauer.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eHobbes (\u003ci\u003eOn Dominion\u003c/i\u003e, Ch. X. 3, \u003ci\u003eseq.\u003c/i\u003e) regarded an\r\nabsolute monarchy as the only proper form of government, while in the\r\nopinion of Locke, (\u003ci\u003eOn Civil Government\u003c/i\u003e, II. Ch. VII. §§ 90, 91)\r\nit was no better than a state of nature. Kant would not have gone\r\nquite so far. As a philosopher, he upheld the sovereignty of the\r\npeople and rejected a monarchy which was not governed in accordance\r\nwith republican principles; as a citizen, he denied the right of\r\nresistance to authority. (Cf. \u003ci\u003ePerpetual Peace\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 126, 188,\r\n\u003ci\u003enote\u003c/i\u003e.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_51\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_51\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[51]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e We find the same rule laid down\r\nas early as the time of Dante. Cf. \u003ci\u003eDe Monarchia\u003c/i\u003e, Bk. II. 9:—“When\r\ntwo nations quarrel they are bound to try in every possible way to\r\narrange the quarrel by means of discussion: it is only when this is\r\nhopeless that they may declare war.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_52\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_52\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[52]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Rousseau (\u003ci\u003eContrat Social\u003c/i\u003e: I.\r\nvi.) regards the social contract as tacitly implied in every actual\r\nsociety: its articles “are the same everywhere, and are everywhere\r\ntacitly admitted and recognised, even though they may never have\r\nfound formal expression” in any constitution. In the same way he\r\nspeaks of a state of nature “which no longer exists, which perhaps\r\nnever has existed.” (Preface to the \u003ci\u003eDiscourse on the Causes of\r\nInequality\u003c/i\u003e.) But Rousseau’s interpretation of these terms is, on\r\nthe whole, literal in spite of these single passages. He speaks\r\nthroughout the \u003ci\u003eContrat Social\u003c/i\u003e, as if history could actually record\r\nthe signing and drawing up of such documents. Hobbes, Hooker,\r\n(\u003ci\u003eEcclesiastical Polity\u003c/i\u003e, I. sect. 10—see also Ritchie: \u003ci\u003eDarwin and\r\nHegel\u003c/i\u003e, p. 210 \u003ci\u003eseq.\u003c/i\u003e) Hume and Kant use more careful language. “It\r\ncannot be denied,” writes Hume, (\u003ci\u003eOf the Original Contract\u003c/i\u003e) “that\r\nall government is, at first, founded on a contract and that the most\r\nancient rude combinations of mankind were formed chiefly by that\r\nprinciple. In vain are we asked in what records this charter of our\r\nliberties is registered. It was not written on parchment, nor yet on\r\nleaves or barks of trees. It preceded the use of writing and all the\r\nother civilised arts of life. But we trace it plainly in the nature\r\nof man, and in the equality, or something approaching equality, which\r\nwe find in all the individuals of that species.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eThis fine passage expresses admirably the views of\r\nKant on this point. Cf. \u003ci\u003eWerke\u003c/i\u003e, (Rosenkranz) IX. 160. The original\r\ncontract is merely an idea of reason, one of those ideas which we\r\nthink into things in order to explain them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eHobbes does not professedly make the contract\r\nhistorical, but in Locke’s \u003ci\u003eCivil Government\u003c/i\u003e (II. Ch. VIII. §\r\n102) there is some attempt made to give it a historical basis.—By\r\nconsent all were equal, “till by the same consent they set rulers\r\nover themselves. So that their politic societies all began from a\r\nvoluntary union, and the mutual agreement of men freely acting in the\r\nchoice of their governors, and forms of government.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eBluntschli points out (\u003ci\u003eTheory of the State\u003c/i\u003e, IV.\r\nix., p. 294 and \u003ci\u003enote\u003c/i\u003e) that the same theory of contract on which\r\nHobbes’ doctrine of an absolute government was based was made the\r\njustification of violent resistance to the government at the time of\r\nthe French Revolution. The theory was differently applied by Hobbes,\r\nLocke and Rousseau. According to the first, men leave the “state of\r\nnature” when they surrender their rights to a sovereign, and return\r\nto that state during revolution. But, for Rousseau, this sovereign\r\nauthority is the people: a revolution would be only a change of\r\nministry. (See \u003ci\u003eCont. Soc.\u003c/i\u003e, III. Ch. xviii.) Again Locke holds\r\nrevolution to be justifiable in all cases where the governments have\r\nnot fulfilled the trust reposed by the people in them. (Cf. Kant’s\r\n\u003ci\u003ePerpetual Peace\u003c/i\u003e, p. 188, \u003ci\u003enote\u003c/i\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_53\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_53\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[53]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e “If you unite many men,” writes\r\nRousseau, (\u003ci\u003eCont. Soc.\u003c/i\u003e, IV. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eI.\u003c/span\u003e) “and\r\nconsider them as one body, they will have but one will; and that will\r\nmust be to promote the common safety and general well-being of all.”\r\nThis \u003ci\u003evolonté générale\u003c/i\u003e, the common element of all particular wills,\r\ncannot be in conflict with any of them. (\u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, II. iii.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_54\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_54\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[54]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e In Eng. trans., see p. 348.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_55\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_55\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[55]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep.\r\n107\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_56\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_56\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[56]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See \u003ca href=\"#Page_120\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep.\r\n120\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_57\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_57\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[57]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Unlike Hegel whose ideal was the\r\nPrussian state, as it was under Frederick the Great. An enthusiastic\r\nsupporter of the power of monarchy, he showed himself comparatively\r\nindifferent to the progress of constitutional liberty.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_58\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_58\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[58]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Isolated passages are sometimes\r\nquoted from Kant in support of a theory that the present treatise\r\nis at least half ironical\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_A\" id=\"FNanchor_A\"\u003e[A]\u003c/a\u003e and that his views on the question of\r\nperpetual peace did not essentially differ from those of Leibniz.\r\n“Even war,” he says, (\u003ci\u003eKritik d. Urteilskraft\u003c/i\u003e, I. Book ii. § 28.)\r\n“when conducted in an orderly way and with reverence for the rights\r\nof citizens has something of the sublime about it, and the more\r\ndangers a nation which wages war in this manner is exposed to and can\r\ncourageously overcome, the nobler does its character grow. While, on\r\nthe other hand, a prolonged peace usually has the effect of giving\r\nfree play to a purely commercial spirit, and side by side with this,\r\nto an ignoble self-seeking, to cowardice and effeminacy; and the\r\nresult of this is generally a degradation of national character.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eThis is certainly an admission that war which does\r\nnot violate the Law of Nations has a good side as well as a bad.\r\nWe could look for no less in so clear-sighted and unprejudiced a\r\nthinker. Kant would have been the first to admit that under certain\r\nconditions a nation can have no higher duty than to wage war. War\r\nis necessary, but it is in contradiction to reason and the spirit\r\nof right. The “scourge of mankind,” “making more bad men than it\r\ntakes away,” the “destroyer of every good,” Kant calls it elsewhere.\r\n(\u003ci\u003eTheory of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Abbott’s trans., 4th ed., p. 341, \u003ci\u003enote\u003c/i\u003e.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"p1\" id=\"Footnote_A\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_A\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[A]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Cf. K. v. Stengel: \u003ci\u003eDer Ewige\r\nFriede\u003c/i\u003e, Munich, 1899; also Vaihinger: \u003ci\u003eKantstudien\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. IV., p.\r\n58.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_59\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_59\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[59]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Cf. \u003ci\u003eIdea for a Universal\r\nHistory\u003c/i\u003e, Prop. 8; \u003ci\u003ePerpetual Peace\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 142, 157.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_60\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_60\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[60]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e The immediate stimulus to Kant’s\r\nactive interest in this subject as a practical question was the Peace\r\nof Basle (1795) which ended the first stage in the series of wars\r\nwhich followed the French Revolution.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_61\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_61\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[61]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e It is \u003ci\u003eeine unausführbare Idee\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nSee the passage quoted from the \u003ci\u003eRechtslehre\u003c/i\u003e, p. 129, \u003ci\u003enote\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_62\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_62\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[62]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eGeschichte der neueren\r\nPhilosophie\u003c/i\u003e, (4th ed., 1899), Vol. V., I. Ch. 12, p. 168 \u003ci\u003eseq.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_63\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_63\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[63]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See \u003ca href=\"#Page_114\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep.\r\n114\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_64\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_64\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[64]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep.\r\n107\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_65\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_65\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[65]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See \u003ca href=\"#Page_110\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep.\r\n110\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_66\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_66\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[66]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See \u003ca href=\"#Page_111\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep.\r\n111\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_67\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_67\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[67]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep.\r\n112\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_68\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_68\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[68]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See \u003ca href=\"#Page_108\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep.\r\n108\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_69\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[69]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e A large part of Kant’s\r\nrequirements as they are expressed in these Preliminary Articles\r\nhas already been fulfilled. The first (Art. 1) is recognised in\r\ntheory at least by modern international law. More cannot be said.\r\nA treaty of this kind is of necessity more or less forced by the\r\nstronger on the weaker. The formal ratification of peace in 1871\r\ndid not prevent France from longing for the day when she might win\r\nback Alsace-Lorraine and be revenged on Prussia. Not the treaty nor\r\na consciousness of defeat has kept the peace west of the Rhine, but\r\na reluctant respect for the fortress of Metz and the mighty army of\r\nunited Germany.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eArticles 2 and 6 are already commonplaces of\r\ninternational law. Article 2 refers to practices which have not\r\nsurvived the gradual disappearance of dynastic war. Art. 6 is the\r\nbasis of our modern law of war. Art. 3 has been fulfilled in the\r\nliteral sense that the standing armies composed of mercenary troops\r\nto which Kant alludes exist no longer. But it is to be feared that\r\nKant would not think that we have made things much better, nor\r\nregard our present system of progressive armaments as a step in the\r\ndirection of perpetual peace. Art. 4 is not likely to be fulfilled in\r\nthe near future. It is long since Cobden denounced the institution\r\nof National Debts—an institution which, as Kant points out, owes its\r\norigin to the English, the “commercial people” referred to in the\r\ntext. Art. 5 no doubt came to Kant through Vattel. “No nation,” says\r\nthe Swiss publicist, (\u003ci\u003eLaw of Nations\u003c/i\u003e, II. Ch. iv. § 54) “has the\r\nleast right to interfere with the government of another,” unless, he\r\nadds, (Ch. v. § 70) in a case of anarchy or where the well-being of\r\nthe human race demands it. This is a recognised principle of modern\r\ninternational law. Intervention is held to be justifiable only where\r\nthe obligation to respect another’s freedom of action comes into\r\nconflict with the duty of self-preservation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003ePuffendorf leaves much more room for the exercise of\r\nbenevolence. The natural affinity and kinship between men is, says\r\nhe, (\u003ci\u003eLes Devoirs de l’homme et du citoien\u003c/i\u003e, II. Ch. xvi. § xi.) “a\r\nsufficient reason to authorise us to take up defence of every person\r\nwhom one sees unjustly oppressed, when he implores our aid \u003ci\u003eand when\r\nwe can do it conveniently\u003c/i\u003e.” (The italics are mine.—[Tr.])\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_70\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_70\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[70]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See \u003ca href=\"#Page_137\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep.\r\n137\u003c/a\u003e. The main principle involved in this passage comes from\r\nVattel (\u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, II. Ch. viii. §§ 104, 105: Ch. ix. §§ 123, 125).\r\nA sovereign, he says, cannot object to a stranger entering his state\r\nwho at the same time respects its laws. No one can be quite deprived\r\nof the right of way which has been handed down from the time when the\r\nwhole earth was common to all men.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_71\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_71\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[71]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See \u003ca href=\"#Page_120\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep.\r\n120\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_72\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_72\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[72]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Kant believed that, in the newly\r\nformed constitution of the United States, his ideal with regard\r\nto the external forms of the state as conforming to the spirit of\r\njustice was most nearly realised. Professor Paulsen draws attention,\r\nin the following passage, to the fact that Kant held the English\r\ngovernment of the eighteenth century in very low esteem. (\u003ci\u003eKant\u003c/i\u003e,\r\np. 357, \u003ci\u003enote\u003c/i\u003e. See Eng. trans., p. 352, \u003ci\u003enote\u003c/i\u003e.) It was not the\r\nEnglish state, he says, which furnished Kant with an illustration of\r\nhis theory:—“Rather in it he sees a form of despotism only slightly\r\nveiled, not Parliamentary despotism, as some people have thought, but\r\nmonarchical despotism. Through bribery of the Commons and the Press,\r\nthe King had actually absolute power, as was evident, above all, from\r\nthe fact that he had often waged war without, and in defiance of,\r\nthe will of the people. Kant has a very unfavourable opinion of the\r\nEnglish state in every way. Among the collected notes written by him\r\nin the last ten years of the century and published by Reicke (\u003ci\u003eLose\r\nBlätter\u003c/i\u003e, I. 129) the following appears:—‘The English nation (\u003ci\u003egens\u003c/i\u003e)\r\nregarded as a people (\u003ci\u003epopulus\u003c/i\u003e) and looked upon side by side with\r\nother races is, as a collection of individuals, of all mankind the\r\nmost highly to be esteemed. But as a state, compared with other\r\nstates, it is the most destructive, high-handed and tyrannical, and\r\nthe most provocative of war among them all.’”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eKuno Fischer (\u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. V., I. Ch. 11, pp. 150,\r\n151) to whom Professor Paulsen’s reference may here perhaps allude,\r\nstates that Kant’s objection to the English constitution is that it\r\nwas an oligarchy, Parliament being not only a legislative body, but\r\nthrough its ministers also executive in the interests of the ruling\r\nparty or even of private individuals in that party. It seems more\r\nlikely that what most offended a keen observer of the course of the\r\nAmerican War of Independence was the arbitrary and ill-directed\r\npower of the king. But see the passage quoted by Fischer (pp. 152,\r\n153) from the \u003ci\u003eRechtslehre\u003c/i\u003e (Part II. Sect. I.) which is, he says,\r\nunmistakeably directed against the English constitution and certain\r\ntemporary conditions in the political history of the country.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_73\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_73\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[73]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e St. Pierre actually thought that\r\nhis federation would prevent civil war. See \u003ci\u003eProject\u003c/i\u003e (1714), p.\r\n16.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_74\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_74\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[74]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See \u003ca href=\"#Page_128\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep.\r\n128\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_75\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_75\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[75]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e This was the ideal of Dante. Cf.\r\n\u003ci\u003eDe Monarchia\u003c/i\u003e, Bk. I. 54:—“We shall not find at any time except\r\nunder the divine monarch Augustus, when a perfect monarchy existed,\r\nthat the world was everywhere quiet.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eBluntschli (\u003ci\u003eTheory of the State\u003c/i\u003e, I. Ch. ii., p. 26\r\n\u003ci\u003eseq.\u003c/i\u003e) gives an admirable account of the different attempts made\r\nto realise a universal empire in the past—the Empire of Alexander\r\nthe Great, based upon a plan of uniting the races of east and west;\r\nthe Roman Empire which sought vainly to stamp its national character\r\nupon mankind; the Frankish Monarchy; the Holy Roman Empire which\r\nfell to pieces through the want of a central power strong enough to\r\novercome the tendency to separation and nationalisation; and finally\r\nthe attempt of Napoleon I., whose mistake was the same as that\r\nwhich wrecked the Roman Empire—a neglect of the strength of foreign\r\nnational sentiment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_76\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_76\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[76]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Reason requires a State of\r\nnations. This is the ideal, and Kant’s proposal of a federation of\r\nstates is a practical substitute from which we may work to higher\r\nthings. Kant, like Fichte, (\u003ci\u003eWerke\u003c/i\u003e, VII. 467) strongly disapproves\r\nof a universal monarchy such as that of which Dante dreamed—a modern\r\nRoman Empire. The force of necessity, he says, will bring nations at\r\nlast to become members of a cosmopolitan state, “or if such a state\r\nof universal peace proves (as has often been the case with too great\r\nstates) a greater danger to freedom from another point of view, in\r\nthat it introduces despotism of the most terrible kind, then this\r\nsame necessity must compel the nations to enter a state which indeed\r\nhas the form not of a cosmopolitan commonwealth under one sovereign,\r\nbut of a federation regulated by legal principles determined by a\r\ncommon code of international law.” (\u003ci\u003eDas mag in d. Theorie richtig\r\nsein\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eWerke\u003c/i\u003e, (Rosenkranz) VII., p. 225). Cf. also \u003ci\u003eTheory of\r\nEthics\u003c/i\u003e, (Abbott), p. 341, \u003ci\u003enote\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003ePerpetual Peace\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 155,\r\n156.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_77\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_77\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[77]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See the \u003ci\u003ePhilosophie d. Rechts\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n(\u003ci\u003eWerke\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. VIII.) Part iii. § 324 and appendix.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_78\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_78\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[78]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Cf. \u003ci\u003eDie Braut von Messina\u003c/i\u003e:—\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003e“Denn der Mensch verkümmert im Frieden,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eMüssige Ruh’ ist das Grab des Muths.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eDas Gesetz ist der Freund des Schwachen,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAlles will es nur eben machen,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eMöchte gerne die Welt verflachen;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAber der Krieg lässt die Kraft erscheinen,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAlles erhebt er zum Ungemeinen,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eSelber dem Feigen erzeugt er den Muth.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eThis passage perhaps scarcely gives a fair\r\nrepresentation of Schiller’s views on the question, which, if we\r\njudge from \u003ci\u003eWilhelm Tell\u003c/i\u003e, must have been very moderate. War, he\r\nsays, in this oft-quoted passage, is sometimes a necessity. There\r\nis a limit to the power of tyranny and, when the burden becomes\r\nunbearable, an appeal to Heaven and the sword.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eWilhelm Tell\u003c/i\u003e: Act. II. Sc. 2.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003e“Nein, eine Grenze hat Tyrannenmacht.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eWenn der Gedrückte nirgends Recht kann finden,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eWenn unerträglich wird die Last greift er\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eHinauf getrosten Muthes in den Himmel\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eUnd holt herunter seine ew’gen Rechte,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eDie droben hangen unveräusserlich\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eUnd unzerbrechlich, wie die Sterne selbst—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eDer alte Urstand der Natur kehrt wieder,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eWo Mensch dem Menschen gegenüber steht—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eZum letzten Mittel, wenn kein andres mehr\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eVerfangen will, ist ihm das Schwert gegeben.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_79\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_79\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[79]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Letter to Bluntschli, dated\r\nBerlin, 11th Dec., 1880 (published in Bluntschli’s \u003ci\u003eGesammelte Kleine\r\nSchriften\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II., p. 271).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_80\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_80\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[80]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Cf. Tennyson’s \u003ci\u003eMaud\u003c/i\u003e: Part I.,\r\nvi. and xiii.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003e“Why do they prate of the blessings of Peace? we have made them a curse,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003ePickpockets, each hand lusting for all that is not its own;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAnd lust of gain, in the spirit of Cain, is it better or worse\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eThan the heart of the citizen hissing in war on his own hearthstone?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eFor I trust if an enemy’s fleet came yonder round by the hill,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAnd the rushing battle-bolt sang from the three-decker out of the foam,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eThat the smooth-faced snub-nosed rogue would leap from his counter and till,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAnd strike, if he could, were it but with his cheating yardwand, home.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eSee too Part III., ii. and iv.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003e“And it was but a dream, yet it lighten’d my despair\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eWhen I thought that a war would arise in defence of the right,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eThat an iron tyranny now should bend or cease,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eThe glory of manhood stand on his ancient height,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eNor Britain’s one sole God be the millionaire:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eNo more shall commerce be all in all, and Peace\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003ePipe on her pastoral hillock a languid note,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAnd watch her harvest ripen, her herd increase,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eNor the cannon-bullet rest on a slothful shore,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAnd the cobweb woven across the cannon’s throat\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eShall shake its threaded tears in the wind no more.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0 p05\"\u003eLet it go or stay, so I wake to the higher aims\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eOf a land that has lost for a little her lust of gold,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAnd love of a peace that was full of wrongs and shames,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eHorrible, hateful, monstrous, not to be told;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAnd hail once more to the banner of battle unroll’d!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eTho’ many a light shall darken, and many shall weep\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eFor those that are crush’d in the clash of jarring claims,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eFor God’s just wrath shall be wreak’d on a giant liar;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAnd many a darkness into the light shall leap,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAnd shine in the sudden making of splendid names,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAnd noble thought be freer under the sun,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAnd the heart of a people beat with one desire.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_81\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_81\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[81]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Moltke strangely enough was,\r\nat an earlier period, of the opinion that war, even when it is\r\nsuccessful, is a national misfortune. Cf. Kehrbach’s preface to\r\nKant’s essay, \u003ci\u003eZum Ewigen Frieden\u003c/i\u003e, p. XVII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_82\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_82\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[82]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See his discussion on\r\nconstitutional monarchy in Germany. (\u003ci\u003eHist. u. Pol. Aufsätze\u003c/i\u003e, Bd.\r\nIII., p. 533 \u003ci\u003eseq.\u003c/i\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_83\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_83\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[83]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See \u003ci\u003eDie Piccolomini\u003c/i\u003e: Act. I.\r\nSc. 4.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_84\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_84\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[84]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e An admirable short account\r\nof popular feeling on this matter is to be found in Lawrence’s\r\n\u003ci\u003ePrinciples of International Law\u003c/i\u003e, § 240.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_85\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_85\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[85]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e The first Peace Society was\r\nfounded in London in 1816, and the first International Peace Congress\r\nheld in 1843.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_86\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_86\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[86]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e In Eng. trans. see p. 358.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_87\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_87\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[87]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See “A Plan for a Universal and\r\nPerpetual Peace” in the \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of International Law\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci\u003eWorks\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nVol. II). One of the main principles advocated by Bentham in this\r\nessay (written between 1787 and 1789) is that every state should give\r\nup its colonies.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_88\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_88\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[88]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See his \u003ci\u003eKleine Schriften\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_89\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_89\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[89]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eInstitutes of the Law of\r\nNations\u003c/i\u003e (1884), Vol. II., Ch. XIV.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_90\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_90\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[90]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e John Stuart Mill holds that the\r\nmultiplication of federal unions would be a benefit to the world.\r\n[See his \u003ci\u003eConsiderations on Representative Government\u003c/i\u003e (1865), Ch.\r\nXVII., where he discusses the conditions necessary to render such\r\nunions successful.] But the Peace Society is scarcely justified, on\r\nthe strength of what is here, in including Mill among writers who\r\nhave made definite proposals of peace or federation. (See \u003ci\u003eInter.\r\nTrib.\u003c/i\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_91\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_91\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[91]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See what Lawrence says (\u003ci\u003eop.\r\ncit.\u003c/i\u003e, § 241) of neutralisation and the limits of its usefulness as a\r\nremedy for war.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_92\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_92\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[92]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Montesquieu: \u003ci\u003eEsprit des Lois\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nX. Ch. 2. “The life of governments is like that of man. The latter\r\nhas a right to kill in case of natural defence: the former have a\r\nright to wage war for their own preservation.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eSee also Vattel (\u003ci\u003eLaw of Nations\u003c/i\u003e, II. Ch. XVIII.\r\n§ 332):—“But if anyone would rob a nation of one of her essential\r\nrights, or a right without which she could not hope to support her\r\nnational existence,—if an ambitious neighbour threatens the liberty\r\nof a republic, if he attempts to subjugate and enslave her,—she will\r\ntake counsel only from her own courage. She will not even attempt\r\nthe method of conferences, in the case of a contention so odious as\r\nthis. She will, in such a quarrel, exert her utmost efforts, exhaust\r\nevery resource and lavish her blood to the last drop if necessary. To\r\nlisten to the slightest proposal in a matter of this kind is to risk\r\neverything.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_93\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_93\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[93]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e The difficulties in the way\r\nof hard and fast judgments on a complicated problem of this kind\r\nare convincingly demonstrated in a recent essay by Professor D. G.\r\nRitchie (\u003ci\u003eStudies in Political and Social Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Sonnenschein,\r\n1902). Professor Ritchie considers in detail a number of concrete\r\ncases which occurred in the century between 1770 and 1870. “Let any\r\none take the judgments he would pass on these or any similarly varied\r\ncases, and I think he will find that we do not restrict our approval\r\nto wars of self-defence, that we do not approve self-defence under\r\nall circumstances, that there are some cases in which we approve\r\nof absorption of smaller states by larger, that there are cases\r\nin which we excuse intervention of third parties in quarrels with\r\nwhich at first they had nothing to do, and that we sometimes approve\r\nwar even when begun without the authority of any already existing\r\nsovereign. Can any principles be found underlying such judgments? In\r\nthe first place we ought not to disguise from ourselves the fact that\r\nour judgments after the result are based largely on success. … I\r\nthink it will be found that our judgments on the wars of the century\r\nfrom 1770 to 1870 turn very largely on the question, Which of the\r\nconflicting forces was making for constitutional government and for\r\nsocial progress? or, to put it in wider terms, Which represented the\r\nhigher civilisation? And thus it is that we may sometimes approve the\r\nrise of a new state and sometimes the absorption of an old.” (\u003ci\u003eOp.\r\ncit.\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 152, 155.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_94\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_94\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[94]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See Fred. W. Holls: \u003ci\u003eThe Peace\r\nConference at the Hague\u003c/i\u003e, Macmillan, 1900.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_95\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_95\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[95]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e The feeling of the Congress\r\nexpressed itself thus cautiously:—“Messieurs les plénipotentiaires\r\nn’hésitent pas à exprimer, au nom de leur gouvernements, le voeu,\r\nque les Etats entre lesquels s’éléverait un dissentiment sérieux,\r\navant d’en appeler aux armes, eussent recours, en tant que les\r\ncirconstances l’admettraient, aux bons offices d’une puissance\r\namie.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_96\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_96\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[96]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eEsprit des Lois\u003c/i\u003e, XIII. Chap.\r\n17. “A new distemper has spread itself over Europe: it has infected\r\nour princes, and induces them to keep up an exorbitant number of\r\ntroops. It has its redoublings, and of necessity becomes contagious.\r\nFor as soon as one prince augments what he calls his troops, the\r\nrest of course do the same: so that nothing is gained thereby but\r\nthe public ruin. Each monarch keeps as many armies on foot as if his\r\npeople were in danger of being exterminated: and they give the name\r\nof Peace to this general effort of all against all.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eMontesquieu is of course writing in the days of\r\nmercenary troops; but the cost to the nation of our modern armies,\r\nboth in time of peace and of war, is incomparably greater.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_97\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_97\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[97]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Even St. Pierre was alive to\r\nthis danger (\u003ci\u003eProjet\u003c/i\u003e, Art. VIII: in the English translation of\r\n1714, p. 160):—“The \u003ci\u003eEuropean\u003c/i\u003e Union shall endeavour to obtain in\r\n\u003ci\u003eAsia\u003c/i\u003e, a \u003ci\u003epermanent\u003c/i\u003e society like that of \u003ci\u003eEurope\u003c/i\u003e, that Peace may\r\nbe maintain’d There also; and especially that it may have no cause to\r\nfear any \u003ci\u003eAsiatic\u003c/i\u003e Sovereign, either as to its tranquillity, or its\r\nCommerce in \u003ci\u003eAsia\u003c/i\u003e.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_98\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_98\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[98]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Bentham’s suggestion would be\r\nuseful here! See above, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_87\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 79, \u003ci\u003enote\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_99\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_99\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[99]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e The best thing for Europe might\r\nbe that Russia (perhaps including China) should be regarded as a\r\nserious danger by all the civilised powers of the West. \u003ci\u003eThat\u003c/i\u003e would\r\nbring us nearer to the United States of Europe \u003ci\u003eand\u003c/i\u003e America (for\r\nthe United States, America, is Russia’s neighbour on the East) than\r\nanything else.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_100\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_100\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[100]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Trade in barbarous or savage\r\ncountries is still increased by war, especially on the French and\r\nGerman plan which leaves no open door to other nations. Here the\r\ntrade follows the flag. And war, of course, among civilised races\r\ncauses small nations to disappear and their tariffs with them. \u003ci\u003eThis\u003c/i\u003e\r\nis beneficial to trade, but to a degree so trifling that it may here\r\nbe neglected.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_101\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_101\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[101]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Cf. also the civil war of 1847\r\nin Switzerland.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_102\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_102\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[102]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See \u003ci\u003eWerke\u003c/i\u003e, VII., p. 467.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_103\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_103\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[103]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e The other he knew was\r\nimpossible. Peace within the state meant decay and death. In the\r\nantagonism of nations, he saw nature’s means of educating the\r\nrace: it was a law of existence, a law of progress, and, as such,\r\neternal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_104\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_104\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[104]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e For a vivid picture of the\r\nmaterial advantages offered by such a union and of the dismal future\r\nthat may lie before an unfederated Europe, we cannot do better\r\nthan read Mr. Andrew Carnegie’s recent Rectorial Address to the\r\nstudents of St. Andrews University (Oct 1902). Unfortunately, Mr.\r\nCarnegie’s enthusiasm stops here: he does not tell us by what means\r\nthe difficulties at present in the way of a federation, industrial or\r\npolitical, are to be overcome.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_105\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_105\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[105]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Professor D. G. Ritchie remarks\r\nthat it is less an over-estimation of the value of peace than a too\r\neasy-going acceptance of abstract and unanalysed phrases about the\r\nrights of nations that injures the work of the Peace Society. Cf.\r\nhis note on the principles of the Peace Congresses (\u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, p.\r\n172).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_106\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_106\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[106]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e The day is past, when a nation\r\ncould enjoy the exclusive advantages of its own inventions. Vattel\r\nnaively recommends that we should keep the knowledge of certain kinds\r\nof trade, the building of war-ships and the like, to ourselves.\r\nPrudence, he says, prevents us from making an enemy stronger and the\r\ncare of our own safety forbids it. (\u003ci\u003eLaw of Nations\u003c/i\u003e, II. Ch. I. §\r\n16.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_107\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_107\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[107]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e The text used in this\r\ntranslation is that edited by Kehrbach. [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_108\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_108\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[108]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e I have seen something of M.\r\nde St. Pierre’s plan for maintaining perpetual peace in Europe. It\r\nreminds me of an inscription outside of a churchyard, which ran “\u003ci\u003ePax\r\nPerpetua.\u003c/i\u003e For the dead, it is true, fight no more. But the living\r\nare of another mind, and the mightiest among them have little respect\r\nfor tribunals.” (Leibniz: \u003ci\u003eLetter to Grimarest\u003c/i\u003e, quoted above, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_44\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 37, note 44\u003c/a\u003e.) [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_109\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_109\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[109]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e On the honourable\r\ninterpretation of treaties, see Vattel (\u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, II. Ch. XVII.,\r\nesp. §§ 263-296, 291). See also what he says of the validity of\r\ntreaties and the necessity for holding them sacred (II. Ch. XII. §§\r\n157, 158: II. Ch. XV). [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_110\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_110\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[110]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e “Even the smoothest way,” says\r\nHume, (\u003ci\u003eOf the Original Contract\u003c/i\u003e) “by which a nation may receive a\r\nforeign master, by marriage or a will, is not extremely honourable\r\nfor the people; but supposes them to be disposed of, like a dowry or\r\na legacy, according to the pleasure or interest of their rulers.”\r\n[Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_111\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_111\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[111]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e An hereditary kingdom is not\r\na state which can be inherited by another state, but one whose\r\nsovereign power can be inherited by another physical person. The\r\nstate then acquires a ruler, not the ruler as such (that is, as one\r\nalready possessing another realm) the state.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_112\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_112\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[112]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e This has been one of the causes\r\nof the extraordinary admixture of races in the modern Austrian\r\nempire. Cf. the lines of Matthias Corvinus of Hungary (quoted in Sir\r\nW. Stirling Maxwell’s \u003ci\u003eCloister Life of Charles the Fifth\u003c/i\u003e, Ch. I.,\r\n\u003ci\u003enote\u003c/i\u003e):—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003e“Bella gerant alii, tu, felix Austria, nube!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eNam quae Mars aliis, dat tibi regna Venus.” [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_113\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_113\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[113]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e A Bulgarian Prince thus\r\nanswered the Greek Emperor who magnanimously offered to settle a\r\nquarrel with him, not by shedding the blood of his subjects, but by a\r\nduel:—“A smith who has tongs will not take the red-hot iron from the\r\nfire with his hands.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003e(This note is a-wanting in the second Edition of 1796.\r\nIt is repeated in Art. II., see p. 130.) [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_114\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_114\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[114]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See Vattel: \u003ci\u003eLaw of Nations\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nII. Ch. IV. § 55. No foreign power, he says, has a right to judge the\r\nconduct and administration of any sovereign or oblige him to alter\r\nit. “If he loads his subjects with taxes, or if he treats them with\r\nseverity, the nation alone is concerned; and no other is called upon\r\nto offer redress for his behaviour, or oblige him to follow more\r\nwise and equitable maxims…. But (\u003ci\u003eloc. cit.\u003c/i\u003e § 56) when the bands\r\nof the political society are broken, or at least suspended, between\r\nthe sovereign and his people, the contending parties may then be\r\nconsidered at two distinct powers; and, since they are both equally\r\nindependent of all foreign authority, nobody has a right to judge\r\nthem. Either may be in the right; and each of those who grant their\r\nassistance may imagine that he is giving his support to the better\r\ncause.” [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_115\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_115\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[115]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e It has been hitherto doubted,\r\nnot without reason, whether there can be laws of permission (\u003ci\u003eleges\r\npermissivæ\u003c/i\u003e) of pure reason as well as commands (\u003ci\u003eleges præceptivæ\u003c/i\u003e)\r\nand prohibitions (\u003ci\u003eleges prohibitivæ\u003c/i\u003e). For law in general has a\r\nbasis of objective practical necessity: permission, on the other\r\nhand, is based upon the contingency of certain actions in practice.\r\nIt follows that a law of permission would enforce what cannot be\r\nenforced; and this would involve a contradiction, if the object of\r\nthe law should be the same in both cases. Here, however, in the\r\npresent case of a law of permission, the presupposed prohibition\r\nis aimed merely at the future manner of acquisition of a right—for\r\nexample, acquisition through inheritance: the exemption from this\r\nprohibition (\u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e the permission) refers to the present state of\r\npossession. In the transition from a state of nature to the civil\r\nstate, this holding of property can continue as a \u003ci\u003ebona fide\u003c/i\u003e, if\r\nusurpatory, ownership, under the new social conditions, in accordance\r\nwith a permission of the Law of Nature. Ownership of this kind, as\r\nsoon as its true nature becomes known, is seen to be mere nominal\r\npossession (\u003ci\u003epossessio putativa\u003c/i\u003e) sanctioned by opinion and customs\r\nin a natural state of society. After the transition stage is passed,\r\nsuch modes of acquisition are likewise forbidden in the subsequently\r\nevolved civil state: and this power to remain in possession would\r\nnot be admitted if the supposed acquisition had taken place in the\r\ncivilized community. It would be bound to come to an end as an injury\r\nto the right of others, the moment its illegality became patent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eI have wished here only by the way to draw the\r\nattention of teachers of the Law of Nature to the idea of a \u003ci\u003elex\r\npermissiva\u003c/i\u003e which presents itself spontaneously in any system of\r\nrational classification. I do so chiefly because use is often made\r\nof this concept in civil law with reference to statutes; with this\r\ndifference, that the law of prohibition stands alone by itself,\r\nwhile permission is not, as it ought to be, introduced into that\r\nlaw as a limiting clause, but is thrown among the exceptions.\r\nThus “this or that is forbidden”,—say, Nos. 1, 2, 3, and so on in\r\nan infinite progression,—while permissions are only added to the\r\nlaw incidentally: they are not reached by the application of some\r\nprinciple, but only by groping about among cases which have actually\r\noccurred. Were this not so, qualifications would have had to be\r\nbrought into the formula of laws of prohibition which would have\r\nimmediately transformed them into laws of permission. Count von\r\nWindischgrätz, a man whose wisdom was equal to his discrimination,\r\nurged this very point in the form of a question propounded by him for\r\na prize essay. One must therefore regret that this ingenious problem\r\nhas been so soon neglected and left unsolved. For the possibility of\r\na formula similar to those of mathematics is the sole real test of\r\na legislation that would be consistent. Without this, the so-called\r\n\u003ci\u003ejus certum\u003c/i\u003e will remain forever a mere pious wish: we can have only\r\ngeneral laws valid on the whole; no general laws possessing the\r\nuniversal validity which the concept law seems to demand.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_116\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_116\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[116]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e “From this diffidence of\r\none another, there is no way for any man to secure himself, so\r\nreasonable, as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master\r\nthe persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power\r\ngreat enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his own\r\nconservation requireth, and is generally allowed.” (Hobbes: \u003ci\u003eLev.\u003c/i\u003e I.\r\nCh. XIII.) [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_117\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_117\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[117]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Hobbes thus describes the\r\nestablishment of the state. “A \u003ci\u003ecommonwealth\u003c/i\u003e is said to be\r\n\u003ci\u003einstituted\u003c/i\u003e, when a \u003ci\u003emultitude\u003c/i\u003e of men do agree, and \u003ci\u003ecovenant,\r\nevery one, with every one\u003c/i\u003e, that to whatsoever \u003ci\u003eman\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci\u003eassembly\r\nof men\u003c/i\u003e, shall be given by the major part, the \u003ci\u003eright\u003c/i\u003e to \u003ci\u003epresent\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthe person of them all, that is to say, to be their \u003ci\u003erepresentative\u003c/i\u003e;\r\neveryone, as well he that \u003ci\u003evoted for it\u003c/i\u003e, as he that \u003ci\u003evoted against\r\nit\u003c/i\u003e, shall \u003ci\u003eauthorize\u003c/i\u003e all the actions and judgments, of that man, or\r\nassembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the\r\nend, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against\r\nother men.” (\u003ci\u003eLev.\u003c/i\u003e II. Ch. XVIII.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eThere is a covenant between them, “as if every man\r\nshould say to every man, \u003ci\u003eI authorise and give up my right of\r\ngoverning myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this\r\ncondition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his\r\nactions in like manner\u003c/i\u003e.” (\u003ci\u003eLev.\u003c/i\u003e II. Ch. XVII.) [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_118\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_118\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[118]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e It is usually accepted that a\r\nman may not take hostile steps against any one, unless the latter\r\nhas already injured him by act. This is quite accurate, if both are\r\ncitizens of a law-governed state. For, in becoming a member of this\r\ncommunity, each gives the other the security he demands against\r\ninjury, by means of the supreme authority exercising control over\r\nthem both. The individual, however, (or nation) who remains in a mere\r\nstate of nature deprives me of this security and does me injury, by\r\nmere proximity. There is perhaps no active (\u003ci\u003efacto\u003c/i\u003e) molestation,\r\nbut there is a state of lawlessness, (\u003ci\u003estatus injustus\u003c/i\u003e) which, by\r\nits very existence, offers a continual menace to me. I can therefore\r\ncompel him, either to enter into relations with me under which we are\r\nboth subject to law, or to withdraw from my neighbourhood. So that\r\nthe postulate upon which the following articles are based is:—“All\r\nmen who have the power to exert a mutual influence upon one another\r\nmust be under a civil government of some kind.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eA legal constitution is, according to the nature of\r\nthe individuals who compose the state:— \u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003e(1) A constitution formed in accordance with the right\r\nof citizenship of the individuals who constitute a nation (\u003ci\u003ejus\r\ncivitatis\u003c/i\u003e). \u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003e(2) A constitution whose principle is international\r\nlaw which determines the relations of states (\u003ci\u003ejus gentium\u003c/i\u003e). \u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003e(3) A constitution formed in accordance with\r\ncosmopolitan law, in as far as individuals and states, standing in an\r\nexternal relation of mutual reaction, may be regarded as citizens of\r\none world-state (\u003ci\u003ejus cosmopoliticum\u003c/i\u003e).\r\n\r\n\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eThis classification is not an arbitrary one, but\r\nis necessary with reference to the idea of perpetual peace. For, if\r\neven one of these units of society were in a position physically\r\nto influence another, while yet remaining a member of a primitive\r\norder of society, then a state of war would be joined with these\r\nprimitive conditions; and from this it is our present purpose to free\r\nourselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_119\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_119\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[119]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Lawful, that is to say,\r\nexternal freedom cannot be defined, as it so often is, as the\r\nright [\u003ci\u003eBefugniss\u003c/i\u003e] “to do whatever one likes, so long as this\r\ndoes not wrong anyone else.”\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_B\" id=\"FNanchor_B\"\u003e[B]\u003c/a\u003e For what is this right? It is the\r\npossibility of actions which do not lead to the injury of others. So\r\nthe explanation of a “right” would be something like this:—“Freedom\r\nis the possibility of actions which do not injure anyone. A man does\r\nnot wrong another—whatever his action—if he does not wrong another”:\r\nwhich is empty tautology. My external (lawful) freedom is rather to\r\nbe explained in this way: it is the right through which I require not\r\nto obey any external laws except those to which I could have given\r\nmy consent. In exactly the same way, external (legal) equality in a\r\nstate is that relation of the subjects in consequence of which no\r\nindividual can legally bind or oblige another to anything, without\r\nat the same time submitting himself to the law which ensures that\r\nhe can, in his turn, be bound and obliged in like manner by this\r\nother.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eThe principle of lawful independence requires\r\nno explanation, as it is involved in the general concept of a\r\nconstitution. The validity of this hereditary and inalienable right,\r\nwhich belongs of necessity to mankind, is affirmed and ennobled by\r\nthe principle of a lawful relation between man himself and higher\r\nbeings, if indeed he believes in such beings. This is so, because he\r\nthinks of himself, in accordance with these very principles, as a\r\ncitizen of a transcendental world as well as of the world of sense.\r\nFor, as far as my freedom goes, I am bound by no obligation even\r\nwith regard to Divine Laws—which are apprehended by me only through\r\nmy reason—except in so far as I could have given my assent to them;\r\nfor it is through the law of freedom of my own reason that I first\r\nform for myself a concept of a Divine Will. As for the principle of\r\nequality, in so far as it applies to the most sublime being in the\r\nuniverse next to God—a being I might perhaps figure to myself as a\r\nmighty emanation of the Divine spirit,—there is no reason why, if\r\nI perform my duty in the sphere in which I am placed, as that aeon\r\ndoes in his, the duty of obedience alone should fall to my share, the\r\nright to command to him. That this principle of equality, (unlike\r\nthe principle of freedom), does not apply to our relation to God is\r\ndue to the fact that, to this Being alone, the idea of duty does not\r\nbelong.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eAs for the right to equality which belongs to\r\nall citizens as subjects, the solution of the problem of the\r\nadmissibility of an hereditary nobility hinges on the following\r\nquestion:—“Does social rank—acknowledged by the state to be higher\r\nin the case of one subject than another—stand above desert, or does\r\nmerit take precedence of social standing?” Now it is obvious that,\r\nif high position is combined with good family, it is quite uncertain\r\nwhether merit, that is to say, skill and fidelity in office, will\r\nfollow as well. This amounts to granting the favoured individual a\r\ncommanding position without any question of desert; and to that, the\r\nuniversal will of the people—expressed in an original contract which\r\nis the fundamental principle of all right—would never consent. For it\r\ndoes not follow that a nobleman is a man of noble character. In the\r\ncase of the official nobility, as one might term the rank of higher\r\nmagistracy—which one must acquire by merit—the social position is not\r\nattached like property to the person but to his office, and equality\r\nis not thereby disturbed; for, if a man gives up office, he lays\r\ndown with it his official rank and falls back into the rank of his\r\nfellows.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"p1\" id=\"Footnote_B\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_B\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[B]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Hobbes’ definition of\r\nfreedom is interesting. See \u003ci\u003eLev.\u003c/i\u003e II. Ch. XXI.:—“A \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFreeman\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eis he, that in those things, which by\r\nhis strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he\r\nhas a will to\u003c/i\u003e.” [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_120\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_120\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[120]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Cf. Cowper: \u003ci\u003eThe Winter Morning\r\nWalk\u003c/i\u003e:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003e“But is it fit, or can it bear the shock\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eOf rational discussion, that a man,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eCompounded and made up like other men\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eOf elements tumultuous, \u003cspan class=\"g4\"\u003e…….\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"g4\"\u003e……………\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eShould when he pleases, and on whom he will,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eWage war, with any or with no pretence\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eOf provocation giv’n or wrong sustain’d,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAnd force the beggarly last doit, by means\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eThat his own humour dictates, from the clutch\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eOf poverty, that thus he may procure\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eHis thousands, weary of penurious life,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eA splendid opportunity to die?”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"g4\"\u003e……………\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"g4\"\u003e……………\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003e“He deems a thousand or ten thousand lives\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eSpent in the purchase of renown for him,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eAn easy reckoning.” [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_121\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_121\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[121]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Cf. Hobbes: \u003ci\u003eOn Dominion\u003c/i\u003e, Ch.\r\nVII. § 1. “As for the difference of cities, it is taken from the\r\ndifference of the persons to whom the supreme power is committed.\r\nThis power is committed either to \u003ci\u003eone man\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci\u003ecouncil\u003c/i\u003e, or some\r\n\u003ci\u003eone court\u003c/i\u003e consisting of many men.” [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_122\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_122\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[122]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e The lofty appellations\r\nwhich are often given to a ruler—such as the Lord’s Anointed, the\r\nAdministrator of the Divine Will upon earth and Vicar of God—have\r\nbeen many times censured as flattery gross enough to make one giddy.\r\nBut it seems to me without cause. Far from making a prince arrogant,\r\nnames like these must rather make him humble at heart, if he has any\r\nintelligence—which we take for granted he has—and reflects that he\r\nhas undertaken an office which is too great for any human being. For,\r\nindeed, it is the holiest which God has on earth—namely, the right\r\nof ruling mankind: and he must ever live in fear of injuring this\r\ntreasure of God in some respect or other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_123\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_123\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[123]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Mallet du Pan boasts in his\r\nseemingly brilliant but shallow and superficial language that,\r\nafter many years experience, he has come at last to be convinced of\r\nthe truth of the well known saying of Pope [\u003ci\u003eEssay on Man\u003c/i\u003e, III.\r\n303]:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003e“For Forms of Government let fools contest;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eWhate’er is best administered is best.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf this means that the best administered government is best\r\nadministered, then, in Swift’s phrase, he has cracked a nut to find a\r\nworm in it. If it means, however, that the best conducted government\r\nis also the best kind of government,—that is, the best form\r\nof political constitution,—then it is utterly false: for examples of\r\nwise administration are no proof of the kind of government. Who\r\never ruled better than Titus and Marcus Aurelius, and yet the one\r\nleft Domitian, the other Commodus, as his successor? This could\r\nnot have happened where the constitution was a good one, for\r\ntheir absolute unfitness for the position was early enough known,\r\nand the power of the emperor was sufficiently great to exclude them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_124\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_124\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[124]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e “For as amongst masterless\r\nmen, there is perpetual war, of every man against his neighbour; no\r\ninheritance, to transmit to the son, nor to expect from the father;\r\nno propriety of goods, or lands; no security; but a full and absolute\r\nliberty in every particular man: so in states, and commonwealths\r\nnot dependent on one another, every commonwealth, not every man,\r\nhas an absolute liberty, to do what it shall judge, that is to say,\r\nwhat that man, or assembly that representeth it, shall judge most\r\nconducing to their benefit. But withal, they live in the condition\r\nof a perpetual war, and upon the confines of battle, with their\r\nfrontiers armed, and cannons planted against their neighbours round\r\nabout.” (Hobbes: \u003ci\u003eLeviathan\u003c/i\u003e, II. Ch. XXI.) [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_125\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_125\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[125]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e But see \u003ca href=\"#Page_136\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep.\r\n136\u003c/a\u003e, where Kant seems to speak of a State of nations as the\r\nideal. Kant expresses himself, on this point, more clearly in the\r\n\u003ci\u003eRechtslehre\u003c/i\u003e, Part. II. § 61:—“The natural state of nations,”\r\nhe says here, “like that of individual men, is a condition which\r\nmust be abandoned, in order that they may enter a state regulated\r\nby law. Hence, before this can take place, every right possessed\r\nby these nations and every external “mine” and “thine” [\u003ci\u003eid est\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nsymbol of possession] which states acquire or preserve through\r\nwar are merely \u003ci\u003eprovisional\u003c/i\u003e, and can become \u003ci\u003eperemptorily\u003c/i\u003e valid\r\nand constitute a true state of peace only in a universal \u003ci\u003eunion\r\nof states\u003c/i\u003e, by a process analogous to that through which a people\r\nbecomes a state. Since, however, the too great extension of such a\r\nState of nations over vast territories must, in the long run, make\r\nthe government of that union—and therefore the protection of each of\r\nits members—impossible, a multitude of such corporations will lead\r\nagain to a state of war. So that \u003ci\u003eperpetual peace\u003c/i\u003e, the final goal of\r\ninternational law as a whole, is really an impracticable idea [\u003ci\u003eeine\r\nunausführbare Idee\u003c/i\u003e]. The political principles, however, which are\r\ndirected towards this end, (that is to say, towards the establishment\r\nof such unions of states as may serve as a continual approximation\r\nto that ideal), are not impracticable; on the contrary, as this\r\napproximation is required by duty and is therefore founded also upon\r\nthe rights of men and of states, these principles are, without doubt,\r\ncapable of practical realization.” [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_126\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_126\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[126]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e A Greek Emperor who\r\nmagnanimously volunteered to settle by a duel his quarrel with a\r\nBulgarian Prince, got the following answer:—“A smith who has tongs\r\nwill not pluck the glowing iron from the fire with his hands.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_127\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_127\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[127]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e “Both sayings are very true:\r\nthat \u003ci\u003eman to man is a kind of God\u003c/i\u003e; and that \u003ci\u003eman to man is an arrant\r\nwolf\u003c/i\u003e. The first is true, if we compare citizens amongst themselves;\r\nand the second, if we compare cities. In the one, there is some\r\nanalogy of similitude with the Deity; to wit, justice and charity,\r\nthe twin sisters of peace. But in the other, good men must defend\r\nthemselves by taking to them for a sanctuary the two daughters of\r\nwar, deceit and violence: that is, in plain terms, a mere brutal\r\nrapacity.” (Hobbes: Epistle Dedicatory to the \u003ci\u003ePhilosophical\r\nRudiments concerning Government and Society\u003c/i\u003e.) [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_128\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_128\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[128]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e “The strongest are still never\r\nsufficiently strong to ensure them the continual mastership, unless\r\nthey find means of transforming force into right, and obedience into\r\nduty.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eFrom the right of the strongest, right takes an\r\nironical appearance, and is rarely established as a principle.”\r\n(\u003ci\u003eContrat Social\u003c/i\u003e, I. Ch. III.) [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_129\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_129\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[129]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e “The natural state,” says\r\nHobbes, (\u003ci\u003eOn Dominion\u003c/i\u003e, Ch. VII. § 18) “hath the same proportion to\r\nthe civil, (I mean, liberty to subjection), which passion hath to\r\nreason, or a beast to a man.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eLocke speaks thus of man, when he puts himself into\r\nthe state of war with another:—“having quitted reason, which God hath\r\ngiven to be the rule betwixt man and man, and the common bond whereby\r\nhuman kind is united into one fellowship and society; and having\r\nrenounced the way of peace which that teaches, and made use of the\r\nforce of war, to compass his unjust ends upon another, where he has\r\nno right; and so revolting from his own kind to that of beasts, by\r\nmaking force, which is theirs, to be his rule of right, he renders\r\nhimself liable to be destroyed by the injured person, and the rest\r\nof mankind that will join with him in the execution of justice, as\r\nany other wild beast, or noxious brute, with whom mankind can have\r\nneither society nor security.” (\u003ci\u003eCivil Government\u003c/i\u003e, Ch. XV. § 172.)\r\n[Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_130\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_130\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[130]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Cf. Rousseau: \u003ci\u003eGouvernement de\r\nPologne\u003c/i\u003e, Ch. V. Federate government is “the only one which unites in\r\nitself all the advantages of great and small states.” [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_131\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_131\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[131]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e On the conclusion of peace at\r\nthe end of a war, it might not be unseemly for a nation to appoint\r\na day of humiliation, after the festival of thanksgiving, on which\r\nto invoke the mercy of Heaven for the terrible sin which the human\r\nrace are guilty of, in their continued unwillingness to submit (in\r\ntheir relations with other states) to a law-governed constitution,\r\npreferring rather in the pride of their independence to use the\r\nbarbarous method of war, which after all does not really settle what\r\nis wanted, namely, the right of each state in a quarrel. The feasts\r\nof thanksgiving during a war for a victorious battle, the hymns\r\nwhich are sung—to use the Jewish expression—“to the Lord of Hosts”\r\nare not in less strong contrast to the ethical idea of a father of\r\nmankind; for, apart from the indifference these customs show to\r\nthe way in which nations seek to establish their rights—sad enough\r\nas it is—these rejoicings bring in an element of exultation that a\r\ngreat number of lives, or at least the happiness of many, has been\r\ndestroyed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_132\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_132\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[132]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Cf. \u003ci\u003eAeneidos\u003c/i\u003e, I. 294\r\n\u003ci\u003eseq.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i28\"\u003e“Furor impius intus,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003eSaeva sedens super arma, et centum vinctus aënis\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"i0\"\u003ePost tergum nodis, fremet horridus ore cruento.” [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_133\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_133\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[133]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Cf. Vattel (\u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, II.\r\nch. IX. § 123):—“The right of passage is also a remnant of the\r\nprimitive state of communion, in which the entire earth was common to\r\nall mankind, and the passage was everywhere free to each individual\r\naccording to his necessities. Nobody can be entirely deprived of this\r\nright.” See also above, p. 65, \u003ci\u003enote\u003c/i\u003e. [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_134\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_134\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[134]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e In order to call this great\r\nempire by the name which it gives itself—namely, China, not Sina or\r\na word of similar sound—we have only to look at Georgii: \u003ci\u003eAlphab.\r\nTibet.\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 651-654, particularly \u003ci\u003enote\u003c/i\u003e b., below. According to the\r\nobservation of Professor Fischer of St. Petersburg, there is really\r\nno particular name which it always goes by: the most usual is the\r\nword \u003ci\u003eKin\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e gold, which the inhabitants of Tibet call \u003ci\u003eSer\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nHence the emperor is called the king of gold, \u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e the king of the\r\nmost splendid country in the world. This word \u003ci\u003eKin\u003c/i\u003e may probably be\r\n\u003ci\u003eChin\u003c/i\u003e in the empire itself, but be pronounced \u003ci\u003eKin\u003c/i\u003e by the Italian\r\nmissionaries on account of the gutturals. Thus we see that the\r\ncountry of the Seres, so often mentioned by the Romans, was China:\r\nthe silk, however, was despatched to Europe across Greater Tibet,\r\nprobably through Smaller Tibet and Bucharia, through Persia and\r\nthen on. This leads to many reflections as to the antiquity of this\r\nwonderful state, as compared with Hindustan, at the time of its union\r\nwith Tibet and thence with Japan. On the other hand, the name Sina\r\nor Tschina which is said to be given to this land by neighbouring\r\npeoples leads to nothing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003ePerhaps we can explain the ancient intercourse of\r\nEurope with Tibet—a fact at no time widely known—by looking at what\r\nHesychius has preserved on the matter. I refer to the shout, Κουξ\r\nΟμπαξ (\u003ci\u003eKonx Ompax\u003c/i\u003e), the cry of the Hierophants in the Eleusinian\r\nmysteries (cf. \u003ci\u003eTravels of Anacharsis the Younger\u003c/i\u003e, Part V., p. 447,\r\n\u003ci\u003eseq.\u003c/i\u003e). For, according to Georgii \u003ci\u003eAlph. Tibet.\u003c/i\u003e, the word \u003ci\u003eConcioa\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwhich bears a striking resemblance to \u003ci\u003eKonx\u003c/i\u003e means God. \u003ci\u003ePak-cio\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(\u003ci\u003eib.\u003c/i\u003e p. 520) which might easily be pronounced by the Greeks like\r\n\u003ci\u003epax\u003c/i\u003e means \u003ci\u003epromulgator legis\u003c/i\u003e, the divine principle permeating\r\nnature (called also, on p. 177, \u003ci\u003eCencresi\u003c/i\u003e). \u003ci\u003eOm\u003c/i\u003e, however, which\r\nLa Croze translates by \u003ci\u003ebenedictus\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e blessed, can when\r\napplied to the Deity mean nothing but beatified (p. 507). Now P.\r\nFranc. Horatius, when he asked the Lhamas of Tibet, as he often did,\r\nwhat they understood by God (\u003ci\u003eConcioa\u003c/i\u003e) always got the answer:—“it\r\nis the assembly of all the saints,” \u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e the assembly of those\r\nblessed ones who have been born again according to the faith of the\r\nLama and, after many wanderings in changing forms, have at last\r\nreturned to God, to Burchane: that is to say, they are beings to\r\nbe worshipped, souls which have undergone transmigration (p. 223).\r\nSo the mysterious expression \u003ci\u003eKonx Ompax\u003c/i\u003e ought probably to mean\r\nthe holy (\u003ci\u003eKonx\u003c/i\u003e), blessed, (\u003ci\u003eOm\u003c/i\u003e) and wise (\u003ci\u003ePax\u003c/i\u003e) supreme Being\r\npervading the universe, the personification of nature. Its use in the\r\nGreek mysteries probably signified monotheism for the Epoptes, in\r\ndistinction from the polytheism of the people, although elsewhere P.\r\nHoratius scented atheism here. How that mysterious word came by way\r\nof Tibet to the Greeks may be explained as above; and, on the other\r\nhand, in this way is made probable an early intercourse of Europe\r\nwith China across Tibet, earlier perhaps than the communication\r\nwith Hindustan. (There is some difference of opinion as to the\r\nmeaning of the words κόγξ ὄμπαξ—according to Liddell and Scott, a\r\ncorruption of κόγξ, ὁμοίως πάξ. Kant’s inferences here seem to be\r\nmore than far-fetched. Lobeck, in his \u003ci\u003eAglaophamus\u003c/i\u003e (p. 775), gives\r\na quite different interpretation which has, he says, been approved\r\nby scholars. And Whately (\u003ci\u003eHistoric Doubts relative to Napoleon\r\nBonaparte\u003c/i\u003e, 3rd. ed., Postscript) uses Konx Ompax as a pseudonym.\r\n[Tr.])\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_135\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_135\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[135]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e In the mechanical system of\r\nnature to which man belongs as a sentient being, there appears, as\r\nthe underlying ground of its existence, a certain \u003ci\u003eform\u003c/i\u003e which we\r\ncannot make intelligible to ourselves except by thinking into the\r\nphysical world the idea of an end preconceived by the Author of\r\nthe universe: this predetermination of nature on the part of God\r\nwe generally call Divine Providence. In so far as this providence\r\nappears in the origin of the universe, we speak of Providence\r\nas founder of the world (\u003ci\u003eprovidentia conditrix; semel jussit,\r\nsemper parent.\u003c/i\u003e Augustine). As it maintains the course of nature,\r\nhowever, according to universal laws of adaptation to preconceived\r\nends, [\u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e teleological laws] we call it a ruling providence\r\n(\u003ci\u003eprovidentia gubernatrix\u003c/i\u003e). Further, we name it the guiding\r\nprovidence (\u003ci\u003eprovidentia directrix\u003c/i\u003e), as it appears in the world for\r\nspecial ends, which we could not foresee, but suspect only from the\r\nresult. Finally, regarding particular events as divine purposes,\r\nwe speak no longer of providence, but of dispensation (\u003ci\u003edirectio\r\nextraordinaria\u003c/i\u003e). As this term, however, really suggests the idea of\r\nmiracles, although the events are not spoken of by this name, the\r\ndesire to fathom dispensation, as such, is a foolish presumption\r\nin men. For, from one single occurrence, to jump at the conclusion\r\nthat there is a particular principle of efficient causes and that\r\nthis event is an end and not merely the natural [\u003ci\u003enaturmechanische\u003c/i\u003e]\r\nsequence of a design quite unknown to us is absurd and presumptuous,\r\nin however pious and humble a spirit we may speak of it. In the same\r\nway to distinguish between a universal and a particular providence\r\nwhen regarding it \u003ci\u003ematerialiter\u003c/i\u003e, in its relation to actual objects\r\nin the world (to say, for instance, that there may be, indeed, a\r\nprovidence for the preservation of the different species of creation,\r\nbut that individuals are left to chance) is false and contradictory.\r\nFor providence is called universal for the very reason that no single\r\nthing may be thought of as shut out from its care. Probably the\r\ndistinction of two kinds of providence, \u003ci\u003eformaliter\u003c/i\u003e or subjectively\r\nconsidered, had reference to the manner in which its purposes are\r\nfulfilled. So that we have ordinary providence (\u003ci\u003ee.g.\u003c/i\u003e the yearly\r\ndecay and awakening to new life in nature with change of season) and\r\nwhat we may call unusual or special providence (\u003ci\u003ee.g.\u003c/i\u003e the bringing\r\nof timber by ocean currents to Arctic shores where it does not\r\ngrow, and where without this aid the inhabitants could not live).\r\nHere, although we can quite well explain the physico-mechanical\r\ncause of these phenomena—in this case, for example, the banks of\r\nthe rivers in temperate countries are over-grown with trees, some\r\nof which fall into the water and are carried along, probably by\r\nthe Gulf Stream—we must not overlook the teleological cause which\r\npoints to the providential care of a ruling wisdom above nature.\r\nBut the concept, commonly used in the schools of philosophy, of a\r\nco-operation on the part of the Deity or a concurrence (\u003ci\u003econcursus\u003c/i\u003e)\r\nin the operations going on in the world of sense, must be dropped.\r\nFor it is, firstly, self-contradictory to couple the like and the\r\nunlike together (\u003ci\u003egryphes jungere equis\u003c/i\u003e) and to let Him who is\r\nHimself the entire cause of the changes in the universe make good\r\nany shortcomings in His own predetermining providence (which to\r\nrequire this must be defective) during the course of the world; for\r\nexample, to say that the physician has restored the sick with the\r\nhelp of God—that is to say that He has been present as a support. For\r\n\u003ci\u003ecausa solitaria non juvat\u003c/i\u003e. God created the physician as well as his\r\nmeans of healing; and we must ascribe the result wholly to Him, if\r\nwe will go back to the supreme First Cause which, theoretically, is\r\nbeyond our comprehension. Or we can ascribe the result entirely to\r\nthe physician, in so far as we follow up this event, as explicable\r\nin the chain of physical causes, according to the order of nature.\r\nSecondly, moreover, such a way of looking at this question destroys\r\nall the fixed principles by which we judge an effect. But, from\r\nthe ethico-practical point of view which looks entirely to the\r\ntranscendental side of things, the idea of a divine concurrence is\r\nquite proper and even necessary: for example, in the faith that God\r\nwill make good the imperfection of our human justice, if only our\r\nfeelings and intentions are sincere; and that He will do this by\r\nmeans beyond our comprehension, and therefore we should not slacken\r\nour efforts after what is good. Whence it follows, as a matter of\r\ncourse, that no one must attempt to explain a good action as a mere\r\nevent in time by this \u003ci\u003econcursus\u003c/i\u003e; for that would be to pretend a\r\ntheoretical knowledge of the supersensible and hence be absurd.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_136\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_136\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[136]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eId est\u003c/i\u003e, which we cannot\r\ndissever from the idea of a creative skill capable of producing them.\r\n[Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_137\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_137\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[137]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See preface, \u003ca href=\"#Page_ix\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. ix\u003c/a\u003e. above.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_138\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_138\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[138]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Of all modes of livelihood the\r\nlife of the hunter is undoubtedly most incompatible with a civilised\r\ncondition of society. Because, to live by hunting, families must\r\nisolate themselves from their neighbours, soon becoming estranged and\r\nspread over widely scattered forests, to be before long on terms of\r\nhostility, since each requires a great deal of space to obtain food\r\nand raiment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eGod’s command to Noah not to shed blood (I. \u003ci\u003eGenesis\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nIX. 4-6)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e[4. “But flesh with the life thereof, which is the blood\r\n thereof, shall ye not eat.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e5. And surely your blood of your lives will I require;\r\n at the hand of every beast will I require it, and at the\r\n hand of man; at the hand of every man’s brother will I\r\n require the life of man.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e6. Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be\r\n shed: for in the image of God made he man.”]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eis frequently quoted, and was afterwards—in another\r\nconnection it is true—made by the baptised Jews a condition to\r\nwhich Christians, newly converted from heathendom, had to conform.\r\nCf. \u003ci\u003eActs\u003c/i\u003e XV. 20; XXI. 25. This command seems originally to have\r\nbeen nothing else than a prohibition of the life of the hunter; for\r\nhere the possibility of eating raw flesh must often occur, and, in\r\nforbidding the one custom, we condemn the other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_139\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_139\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[139]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e About 1000 English miles.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_140\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_140\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[140]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e The question might be put:—“If\r\nit is nature’s will that these Arctic shores should not remain\r\nunpopulated, what will become of their inhabitants, if, as is to be\r\nexpected, at some time or other no more driftwood should be brought\r\nto them? For we may believe that, with the advance of civilisation,\r\nthe inhabitants of temperate zones will utilise better the wood which\r\ngrows on the banks of their rivers, and not let it fall into the\r\nstream and so be swept away.” I answer: the inhabitants of the shores\r\nof the River Obi, the Yenisei, the Lena will supply them with it\r\nthrough trade, and take in exchange the animal produce in which the\r\nseas of Arctic shores are so rich—that is, if nature has first of all\r\nbrought about peace among them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_141\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_141\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[141]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Cf. \u003ci\u003eEnc. Brit.\u003c/i\u003e (9th ed.),\r\nart. “Indians”, in which there is an allusion to “Fuegians, the\r\n\u003ci\u003ePescherais\u003c/i\u003e” of some writers. [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_142\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_142\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[142]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Rousseau uses these terms in\r\nspeaking of democracy. (\u003ci\u003eCont. Soc.\u003c/i\u003e, III. Ch. 4.) “If there were a\r\nnation of Gods, they might be governed by a democracy: but so perfect\r\na government will not agree with men.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eBut he writes elsewhere of republican governments\r\n(\u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, II. Ch. 6):—“All lawful governments are republican.”\r\nAnd in a footnote to this passage:—“I do not by the word ‘republic’\r\nmean an aristocracy or democracy only, but in general all governments\r\ndirected by the public will which is the law. If a government is to\r\nbe lawful, it must not be confused with the sovereign power, but be\r\nconsidered as the administrator of that power: and then monarchy\r\nitself is a republic.” This language has a close affinity with that\r\nused by Kant. (Cf. above, \u003ca href=\"#Page_126\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 126\u003c/a\u003e.) [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_143\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_143\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[143]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See above, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_76\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 69, \u003ci\u003enote\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/a\u003e, esp. reference to \u003ci\u003eTheory of\r\nEthics\u003c/i\u003e. [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_144\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_144\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[144]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Difference of religion! A\r\nstrange expression, as if one were to speak of different kinds\r\nof morality. There may indeed be different historical forms of\r\nbelief,—that is to say, the various means which have been used in\r\nthe course of time to promote religion,—but they are mere subjects\r\nof learned investigation, and do not really lie within the sphere\r\nof religion. In the same way there are many religious works—the\r\n\u003ci\u003eZendavesta\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eVeda\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eKoran\u003c/i\u003e etc.—but there is only one religion,\r\nbinding for all men and for all times. These books are each no more\r\nthan the accidental mouthpiece of religion, and may be different\r\naccording to differences in time and place.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_145\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_145\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[145]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Montesquieu speaks thus in\r\npraise of the English state:—“As the enjoyment of liberty, and even\r\nits support and preservation, consists in every man’s being allowed\r\nto speak his thoughts and to lay open his sentiments, a citizen in\r\nthis state will say or write whatever the laws do not expressly\r\nforbid to be said or written.” (\u003ci\u003eEsprit des Lois\u003c/i\u003e, XIX. Ch. 27.)\r\nHobbes is opposed to all free discussion of political questions and\r\nto freedom as a source of danger to the state. [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_146\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_146\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[146]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Kant is thinking here not of\r\nthe sword of justice, in the moral sense, but of a sword which is\r\nsymbolical of the executive power of the actual law. [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_147\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_147\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[147]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Cf. Aristotle: \u003ci\u003ePolitics\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n(Welldon’s trans.) IV. Ch. XIV. “The same principles of morality are\r\nbest both for individuals and States.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eAmong the ancients the connection between politics\r\nand morals was never questioned, although there were differences of\r\nopinion as to which science stood first in importance. Thus, while\r\nPlato put politics second to morals, Aristotle regarded politics as\r\nthe chief science and ethics as a part of politics. This connection\r\nbetween the sciences was denied by Machiavelli, who lays down the\r\ndictum that, in the relations of sovereigns and states, the ordinary\r\nrules of morality do not apply. See \u003ci\u003eThe Prince\u003c/i\u003e, Ch. XVIII. “A\r\nPrince,” he says, “and most of all a new Prince, cannot observe all\r\nthose rules of conduct in respect of which men are accounted good,\r\nbeing frequently obliged, in order to preserve his Princedom, to act\r\nin opposition to good faith, charity, humanity, and religion. He must\r\ntherefore keep his mind ready to shift as the winds and tides of\r\nFortune turn, and, as I have already said, he ought not to quit good\r\ncourses if he can help it, but should know how to follow evil courses\r\nif he must.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eHume thought that laxer principles might be allowed\r\nto govern states than private persons, because intercourse between\r\nthem was not so “necessary and advantageous” as between individuals.\r\n“There is a system of morals,” he says, “calculated for princes,\r\nmuch more free than that which ought to govern private persons,”\r\n(\u003ci\u003eTreatise\u003c/i\u003e, III., Part II., Sect. IX.) [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_148\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_148\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[148]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e These are \u003ci\u003epermissive\u003c/i\u003e laws\r\nof reason which allow us to leave a system of public law, when it\r\nis tainted by injustice, to remain just as it is, until everything\r\nis entirely revolutionised through an internal development, either\r\nspontaneous, or fostered and matured by peaceful influences. For\r\nany legal constitution whatsoever, even although it conforms only\r\nslightly with the spirit of law is better than none at all—that is\r\nto say, anarchy, which is the fate of a precipitate reform. Hence,\r\nas things now are, the wise politician will look upon it as his duty\r\nto make reforms on the lines marked out by the ideal of public law.\r\nHe will not use revolutions, when these have been brought about by\r\nnatural causes, to extenuate still greater oppression than caused\r\nthem, but will regard them as the voice of nature, calling upon him\r\nto make such thorough reforms as will bring about the only lasting\r\nconstitution, a lawful constitution based on the principles of\r\nfreedom.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_149\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_149\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[149]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e It is still sometimes\r\ndenied that we find, in members of a civilised community, a\r\ncertain depravity rooted in the nature of man;\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_C\" id=\"FNanchor_C\"\u003e[C]\u003c/a\u003e and it might, indeed,\r\nbe alleged with some show of truth that not an innate corruptness\r\nin human nature, but the barbarism of men, the defect of a not yet\r\nsufficiently developed culture, is the cause of the evident antipathy\r\nto law which their attitude indicates. In the external relations of\r\nstates, however, human wickedness shows itself incontestably, without\r\nany attempt at concealment. Within the state, it is covered over by\r\nthe compelling authority of civil laws. For, working against the\r\ntendency every citizen has to commit acts of violence against his\r\nneighbour, there is the much stronger force of the government which\r\nnot only gives an appearance of morality to the whole state (\u003ci\u003ecausae\r\nnon causae\u003c/i\u003e), but, by checking the outbreak of lawless propensities,\r\nactually aids the moral qualities of men considerably, in their\r\ndevelopment of a direct respect for the law. For every individual\r\nthinks that he himself would hold the idea of right sacred and\r\nfollow faithfully what it prescribes, if only he could expect that\r\neveryone else would do the same. This guarantee is in part given\r\nto him by the government; and a great advance is made by this step\r\nwhich is not deliberately moral, towards the ideal of fidelity to\r\nthe concept of duty for its own sake without thought of return. As,\r\nhowever, every man’s good opinion of himself presupposes an evil\r\ndisposition in everyone else, we have an expression of their mutual\r\njudgment of one another, namely, that when it comes to hard facts,\r\nnone of them are worth much; but whence this judgment comes remains\r\nunexplained, as we cannot lay the blame on the nature of man, since\r\nhe is a being in the possession of freedom. The respect for the idea\r\nof right, of which it is absolutely impossible for man to divest\r\nhimself, sanctions in the most solemn manner the theory of our power\r\nto conform to its dictates. And hence every man sees himself obliged\r\nto act in accordance with what the idea of right prescribes, whether\r\nhis neighbours fulfil their obligation or not.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"p1\" id=\"Footnote_C\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_C\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[C]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e This depravity of human nature\r\nis denied by Rousseau, who held that the mind of man was naturally\r\ninclined to virtue, and that good civil and social institutions\r\nare all that is required. (\u003ci\u003eDiscourse on the Sciences and Arts\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1750.) Kant here takes sides with Hobbes against Rousseau. See\r\nKant’s \u003ci\u003eTheory of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Abbott’s trans. (4th ed., 1889), p. 339\r\n\u003ci\u003eseq.\u003c/i\u003e—esp. p. 341 and \u003ci\u003enote\u003c/i\u003e. Cf. also Hooker’s \u003ci\u003eEcclesiastical\r\nPolity\u003c/i\u003e, I. § 10:—“Laws politic, ordained for external order and\r\nregiment amongst men, are never framed as they should be, unless\r\npresuming the will of man to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious,\r\nand averse from all obedience to the sacred laws of his nature;\r\nin a word, unless presuming man to be, in regard of his depraved\r\nmind, little better than a wild beast, they do accordingly provide,\r\nnotwithstanding, so to frame his outward actions, that they be no\r\nhindrance unto the common good, for which societies are instituted.”\r\n[Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_150\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_150\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[150]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e With regard to the meaning of\r\nthe moral law and its significance in the Kantian system of ethics,\r\nsee Abbott’s translation of the \u003ci\u003eTheory of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e (1889), pp. 38,\r\n45, 54, 55, 119, 282. [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_151\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_151\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[151]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e See Abbott’s trans., pp. 33,\r\n34. [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_152\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_152\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[152]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Matthew Arnold defines\r\npolitics somewhere as the art of “making reason and the will of God\r\nprevail”—an art, one would say, difficult enough. [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_153\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_153\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[153]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e “When a king has dethroned\r\nhimself,” says Locke, (\u003ci\u003eOn Civil Government\u003c/i\u003e, Ch. XIX. § 239) “and\r\nput himself in a state of war with his people, what shall hinder them\r\nfrom prosecuting him who is no king, as they would any other man, who\r\nhas put himself into a state of war with them?” … “The legislative\r\nbeing only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains\r\nstill \u003ci\u003ein the people a supreme power to remove or alter the\r\nlegislative\u003c/i\u003e.” (\u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, Ch. XIII. § 149.) And again, (\u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nCh. XI. § 134.) we find the words, “… over whom [\u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e society] no\r\nbody can have a power to make laws, but by their own consent, and by\r\nauthority received from them.” Cf. also Ch. XIX. § 228 \u003ci\u003eseq.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ti1\"\u003eHobbes represents the opposite point of view. “How\r\nmany kings,” he wrote, (Preface to the \u003ci\u003ePhilosophical Rudiments\r\nconcerning Government and Society\u003c/i\u003e) “and those good men too, hath\r\nthis one error, that a tyrant king might lawfully be put to death,\r\nbeen the slaughter of! How many throats hath this false position cut,\r\nthat a prince for some causes may by some certain men be deposed! And\r\nwhat bloodshed hath not this erroneous doctrine caused, that kings\r\nare not superiors to, but administrators for the multitude!” This\r\n“erroneous doctrine” Kant received from Locke through Rousseau. He\r\nadvocated, or at least practised as a citizen, a doctrine of passive\r\nobedience to the state. A free press, he held, offered the only\r\nlawful outlet for protest against tyranny. But, in theory, he was an\r\nenemy to absolute monarchy. [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp id=\"Footnote_154\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_154\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e[154]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e We can find the voucher for\r\nmaxims such as these in Herr Hofrichter Garve’s essay, \u003ci\u003eOn the\r\nConnection of Morals with Politics\u003c/i\u003e, 1788. This worthy scholar\r\nconfesses at the very beginning that he is unable to give a\r\nsatisfactory answer to this question. But his sanction of such\r\nmaxims, even when coupled with the admission that he cannot\r\naltogether clear away the arguments raised against them, seems to\r\nbe a greater concession in favour of those who shew considerable\r\ninclination to abuse them, than it might perhaps be wise to admit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"chap\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"transnote\" id=\"tnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tnotetit\"\u003eTranscriber\u0027s note\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eOriginal spelling was kept, but variant spellings were made consistent when a predominant usage was found.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eObvious printer errors have been silently corrected.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eBlank pages have been skipped.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eFootnotes have been renumbered and moved to the end of the book.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}