Leibniz’s New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding
{"WorkMasterId":6296,"WpPageId":281283,"ParentWpPageId":193822,"Slug":"leibniz-new-essays","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/leibniz-new-essays/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/leibniz-new-essays/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":537847,"CleanHtmlLength":481737,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"Leibniz\u0027s New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding","Deck":"Dewey studies Leibniz on knowledge, reason, experience, and metaphysical method while developing his early philosophical formation.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to John Dewey","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"John Dewey","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/john-dewey-01-portrait-by-underwood-underwood.jpg","ImageAlt":"Underwood and Underwood portrait of John Dewey","FilterTerra":"North America","ClickText":"John Dewey","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/","Copies":["1859 CE – 1952 CE","Burlington, Vermont","American pragmatist philosopher of instrumentalism, democratic experimentalism, progressive education, inquiry, experience, logic, ethics, aesthetics, public life, science, and naturalistic religion."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:4","Title":"Modern History","DateText":"1800 CE – 1944 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:11","Title":"Long 19th Century","DateText":"1870 CE – 1913 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/philosophers-of-the-long-19th-century/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"1888 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Displayed as 1888 CE for the published Leibniz study.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:6"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:25"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:USA:6"}],"OriginalTitle":"Leibniz\u0027s New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding","Language":"English","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:metaphysics"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:epistemology"}],"Tradition":"American pragmatism; instrumentalism; pragmatic naturalism; democratic experimentalism; progressive education","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #40957 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Dewey studies Leibniz on knowledge, reason, experience, and metaphysical method while developing his early philosophical formation."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"Leibniz New Essays; Dewey on Leibniz","KeyConcepts":"Leibniz; rationalism; understanding; metaphysics; knowledge; experience","Methodology":"Direct Dewey work-cluster record based on SEP, IEP, Britannica, Center for Dewey Studies, Dewey scholarship, catalog records, and public edition evidence. No full text is imported.","Structure":"One work-cluster page with explicit integer display year, date note, evidence note, discipline mapping, and public source evidence."},"Arguments":["Dewey studies Leibniz on knowledge, reason, experience, and metaphysical method while developing his early philosophical formation."],"Influence":{"InfluencedBy":"William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, G. W. F. Hegel, Darwinian naturalism, experimental science, Jane Addams and social reform, American democratic institutions, and educational practice.","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Accepted as a direct Dewey monograph via catalog and scholarship evidence.","Dewey remains central for inquiry, democratic life, public problem-solving, education, experience, habits, art, values, religion as human faith, and experimental social intelligence."],"EvidenceNote":["Accepted as a direct Dewey monograph via catalog and scholarship evidence."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Versions","BodyHtml":"\u003cdiv class=\"dz-philo__full-version-grid\"\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-version-card\"\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-provider\"\u003eProject Gutenberg\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3 class=\"dz-philo__full-version-title\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #40957\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-meta\"\u003eHtmlText · Imported\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ca class=\"dz-philo__full-version-link\" href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40957\"\u003eOpen full version\u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["Dewey studies Leibniz on knowledge, reason, experience, and metaphysical method while developing his early philosophical formation."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":"Leibniz New Essays; Dewey on Leibniz"},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"Leibniz; rationalism; understanding; metaphysics; knowledge; experience"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Direct Dewey work-cluster record based on SEP, IEP, Britannica, Center for Dewey Studies, Dewey scholarship, catalog records, and public edition evidence. No full text is imported."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"One work-cluster page with explicit integer display year, date note, evidence note, discipline mapping, and public source evidence."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Dewey studies Leibniz on knowledge, reason, experience, and metaphysical method while developing his early philosophical formation."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, G. W. F. Hegel, Darwinian naturalism, experimental science, Jane Addams and social reform, American democratic institutions, and educational practice."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"Pragmatism, analytic and continental social philosophy, democratic theory, progressive education, inquiry theory, aesthetics, public philosophy, deliberative democracy, philosophy of science, and American philosophy."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct Dewey monograph via catalog and scholarship evidence.","Dewey remains central for inquiry, democratic life, public problem-solving, education, experience, habits, art, values, religion as human faith, and experimental social intelligence."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct Dewey monograph via catalog and scholarship evidence."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003ePublic-domain full text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40957\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #40957\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"transcribers-note\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003cb\u003eTranscriber’s Notes:\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eEvery effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully\r\nas possible, including inconsistencies in spelling and hyphenation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSome corrections of spelling and punctuation have been made.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"screen\"\u003eThey are marked \u003cins title=\"transcriber\u0027s note\"\u003elike\r\nthis\u003c/ins\u003e in the text. The original text appears when hovering the cursor\r\nover the marked text.\u003c/span\u003e A \u003ca href=\"#tn-bottom\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003elist of amendments\u003c/a\u003e is\r\nat the end of the text.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center page-break spaced\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"xhtml_big\"\u003eGERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL CLASSICS\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eFOR\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\nENGLISH READERS AND STUDENTS.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center space-above spaced\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003eEDITED BY\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\nGEORGE S. MORRIS.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center spaced\"\u003eLEIBNIZ’S NEW ESSAYS CONCERNING\u003cbr\u003e\r\nTHE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch1\u003e\u003cspan class=\"xhtml_big\"\u003eLEIBNIZ’S\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\nNEW ESSAYS CONCERNING THE\u003cbr\u003e\r\nHUMAN UNDERSTANDING.\u003c/h1\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eA CRITICAL EXPOSITION.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center space-above\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"small-caps\"\u003eBy JOHN DEWEY, Ph.D.\u003c/span\u003e,\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMICHIGAN, AND PROFESSOR (ELECT) OF MENTAL AND\u003cbr\u003e\r\nMORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY\u003cbr\u003e\r\nOF MINNESOTA\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center spaced\"\u003eCHICAGO:\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSCOTT, FORESMAN AND COMPANY\u003cbr\u003e\r\n1902\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center page-break spaced\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"copyright\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eCopyright, 1888\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/a\u003e,\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"small-caps\"\u003eBy S. \u003cins title=\"C\"\u003eC.\u003c/ins\u003e Griggs and Company\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"v\" id=\"Page_v\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003ePREFACE.\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"upper-case\"\u003eThe\u003c/span\u003e purpose of the series of which the\r\npresent volume is one, is not, as will be\r\nseen by reference to the statement in the initial\r\nvolume, to sum up \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein toto\u003c/i\u003e the system\r\nof any philosopher, but to give a “critical exposition”\r\nof some one masterpiece. In treating\r\nthe “Nouveaux Essais” of Leibniz, I have\r\nfound myself obliged, at times, to violate the\r\nletter of this expressed intention, in order to\r\nfulfil its spirit. The “Nouveaux Essais,” in\r\nspite of its being one of the two most extended\r\nphilosophical writings of Leibniz, is a compendium\r\nof comments, rather than a connected\r\nargument or exposition. It has all the suggestiveness\r\nand richness of a note-book, but\r\nwith much also of its fragmentariness. I have\r\ntherefore been obliged to supplement my account\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"vi\" id=\"Page_vi\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nof it by constant references to the other\r\nwritings of Leibniz, and occasionally to take\r\nconsiderable liberty with the order of the treatment\r\nof topics. Upon the whole, this book\r\nwill be found, I hope, to be a faithful reflex\r\nnot only of Leibniz’s thought, but also of his\r\ndiscussions in the “Nouveaux Essais.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the main, the course of philosophic thought\r\nsince the time of Leibniz has been such as\r\nto render almost self-evident his limitations,\r\nand to suggest needed corrections and amplifications.\r\nIndeed, it is much easier for those\r\nwhose thoughts follow the turn that Kant\r\nhas given modern thinking to appreciate the\r\ndefects of Leibniz than to realize his greatness.\r\nI have endeavored, therefore, in the body\r\nof the work, to identify my thought with that\r\nof Leibniz as much as possible, to assume\r\nhis standpoint and method, and, for the most\r\npart, to confine express criticism upon his limitations\r\nto the final chapter. In particular, I\r\nhave attempted to bring out the relations\r\nof philosophy to the growing science of his\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"vii\" id=\"Page_vii\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ntimes, to state the doctrine of pre-established\r\nharmony as he himself meant it, and to give\r\nsomething like consistency and coherency to\r\nhis doctrine of material existence and of nature.\r\nThis last task seemed especially to require\r\ndoing. I have also endeavored to keep\r\nin mind, throughout, Leibniz’s relations to\r\nLocke, and to show the “Nouveaux Essais”\r\nas typical of the distinction between characteristic\r\nBritish and German thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"right\"\u003eJOHN DEWEY.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003csmall\u003e\u003ci\u003eMay\u003c/i\u003e, 1888.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"ix\" id=\"Page_ix\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eCONTENTS.\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003ctable id=\"toc\" data-summary=\"Contents\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-title\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Chapter_I\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER I.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-description\" colspan=\"2\"\u003eThe Man.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\" style=\"font-size: smaller;\"\u003ePAGE\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eHis Parents\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_1\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eHis Early Education\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_2\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eHis University Training at Leipsic\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_4\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eAt Jena\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_8\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eAt the University of Altdorf\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_10\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eHis Removal to Frankfurt\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_10\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eHis Mission to Paris\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_11\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eDiscovery of the Calculus\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_12\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLibrarian at Hanover\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_13\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e13\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eHis Activities\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_14\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eHis Philosophic Writings\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_15\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eHis Ecclesiastic and Academic Projects\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_17\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eHis Later Years and Death\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_18\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-title\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Chapter_II\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER II.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-description\" colspan=\"2\"\u003eSources of his Philosophy.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eCharacter of the Epoch into which Leibniz was born\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_20\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Thought of the Unity of the World\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_23\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe two Agencies which formed Leibniz’s Philosophy\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_24\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Cartesian Influences\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_26\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e26\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eRationalistic Method\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_28\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eMechanical Explanation of Nature\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_30\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"x\" id=\"Page_x\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eApplication of Mathematics\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_32\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eIdea of Evolution\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_33\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eInterpretation of these Ideas\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_35\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e35\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eIdea of Activity or Entelechy\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_39\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e39\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eIdea of Rationality\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_40\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eIdea of Organism\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_42\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-title\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Chapter_III\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER III.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-description\" colspan=\"2\"\u003eThe Problem and its Solution.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eUnity of Leibniz’s Thought\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_43\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eRelation of Universal and Individual\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_44\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e44\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eDescartes’ Treatment of this Question\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_46\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eSpinoza’s Treatment of it\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_48\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e48\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLeibniz’s Solution\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_50\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e50\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eAll Unity is Spiritual\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_53\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eAnd Active\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_54\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eIs a Representative Individual\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_56\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e56\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eContrast of Monad and Atom\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_58\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003ePre-established Harmony reconciles Universal and Individual\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_59\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eMeaning of this Doctrine\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_62\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-title\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Chapter_IV\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER IV.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-description\" colspan=\"2\"\u003eLocke and Leibniz.—Innate Ideas.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eNecessity of Preliminary Account of Leibniz’s Philosophy\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_66\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLocke’s Empiricism\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_67\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLeibniz’s Comments upon Locke\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_69\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Controversies of Leibniz\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_72\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Essay on the Human Understanding\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_73\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLocke’s Denial of Innate Ideas\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_75\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd colspan=\"2\"\u003eDepending upon\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent1\"\u003e(1) His Mechanical Conception of Innate Ideas\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_77\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"xi\" id=\"Page_xi\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eLeibniz undermines this by substituting an Organic Conception\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_80\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd colspan=\"2\"\u003eAnd upon\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent1\"\u003e(2) His Mechanical Conception of Consciousness\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_84\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLeibniz refutes this by his Theory of Unconscious Intelligence\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_85\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-title\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Chapter_V\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER V.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-description\" colspan=\"2\"\u003eSensation and Experience.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eImportance of Doctrine regarding Sensation\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_87\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e87\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Two Elements of Locke’s Notion of Sensation\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_89\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eIts Relation to the Object producing it: Primary and Secondary Qualities\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_91\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd colspan=\"2\"\u003eLocke criticized as to his Account\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent1\"\u003e(1) Of the Production of Sensation\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_92\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent1\"\u003e(2) Of its Function in Knowledge\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_95\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Meaning of Physical Causation\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_97\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eBearing of this Doctrine upon Relation of Soul and Body\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_98\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e98\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eCriticism of Locke’s Dualism\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_98\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e98\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLeibniz’s Monism\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_101\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e101\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eSummary of Discussion\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_103\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLeibniz on the Relation of Sensations to Objects occasioning them\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_105\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e105\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eNature of Experience\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_106\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eDistinction of Empirical from Rational Knowledge\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_107\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-title\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Chapter_VI\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER VI.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-description\" colspan=\"2\"\u003eThe Impulses and the Will.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Doctrine of Will depends upon that of Intelligence\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_109\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Character of Impulse\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_111\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e111\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"xii\" id=\"Page_xii\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eOf Desire\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_112\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eHalf-Pains and Pleasures\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_113\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e113\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Outcome of Desire\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_115\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e115\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eNature of Moral Action\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_117\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e117\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eOf Freedom\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_118\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e118\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent1\"\u003e(1) Freedom as Contingency\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_119\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e119\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent2\"\u003eLimitation of this Principle\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_121\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e121\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent1\"\u003e(2) Freedom as Spontaneity\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_123\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e123\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent2\"\u003eThis Principle is too Broad to be a Moral Principle\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_125\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e125\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent1\"\u003e(3) True Freedom is Rational Action\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_125\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e125\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eOur Lack of Freedom is due to our Sensuous Nature\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_128\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e128\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eInnate Practical Principles\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_129\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e129\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eMoral Science is Demonstrative\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_130\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e130\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-title\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Chapter_VII\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER VII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-description\" colspan=\"2\"\u003eMatter and its Relation to Spirit.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLocke’s Account of Matter and Allied Ideas the Foundation of the Philosophy of Nature Characteristic of British Empiricism\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_132\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e132\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eSpace and Matter wholly Distinct Ideas\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_134\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLeibniz gives Matter a Metaphysical Basis\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_137\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e137\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eOrdinary Misunderstanding of Leibniz’s Ideas of Matter\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_138\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e138\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eMatter is not composed of Monads\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_139\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e139\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eMatter is the Passive or Conditioned Side of Monads\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_140\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e140\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003ePassivity equals “Confused Representations,” \u003ci\u003ei. e.\u003c/i\u003e Incomplete Development of Reason\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_144\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e144\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eMatter is logically Necessary from Leibniz’s Principles\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_145\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e145\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eBearing of Discussion upon Doctrine of Pre-established Harmony\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_146\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e146\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eSummary\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_147\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-title\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"xiii\" id=\"Page_xiii\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Chapter_VIII\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER VIII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-description\" colspan=\"2\"\u003eMaterial Phenomena and their Reality.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eWhat is the Connection between Matter as Metaphysical and as Physical?\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_151\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e151\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Latter is the “Image” of the Former\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_151\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e151\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLeibniz’s Reaction from Cartesian Theory\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_152\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eHis Objections are (1) Physical and (2) Logical\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_153\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e153\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e(1) Motion is Source of Physical Qualities of Bodies\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_155\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e155\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eHence there are no Atoms\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_158\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e158\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eSecondary Qualities as well as Primary depend upon Motion\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_160\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e160\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e(2) What is the Subject to which the Quality of Extension belongs?\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_161\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e161\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eIt is the Monad \u003cem\u003eas Passive\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_162\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e162\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eSpace and Time connect the Spiritual and the Sensible\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_164\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e164\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eDistinction between Space and Time, and Extension and Duration\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_166\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e166\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eSpace and Time are Relations\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_167\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e167\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLeibniz’s Controversy with Clarke\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_168\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e168\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLeibniz denies that Space and Time are Absolute\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_170\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e170\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eWhat is the Reality of Sensible Phenomena?\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_173\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e173\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd colspan=\"2\"\u003eIt consists\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent1\"\u003e(1) In their Regularity\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_174\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e174\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent1\"\u003e(2) In their Dependence upon Intelligence and Will\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_175\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e175\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLeibniz and Berkeley\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_177\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e177\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-title\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Chapter_IX\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER IX.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-description\" colspan=\"2\"\u003eSome Fundamental Conceptions.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLocke’s Account of Substance as Static\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_179\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e179\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Distinction between Reality and Phenomena\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_180\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e180\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLeibniz’s Conception of Substance as Dynamic\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_181\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e181\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"xiv\" id=\"Page_xiv\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eHis Specific Criticisms upon Locke\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_182\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e182\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Categories of Identity and Difference Locke also explains in a Mechanical Way\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_183\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e183\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLeibniz regards them as Internal and as Organic to each other\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_184\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e184\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLocke gives a Quantitative Notion of Infinity\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_188\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e188\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eAnd hence makes our Idea of it purely Negative\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_189\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e189\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLeibniz denies that the True Notion of Infinity is Quantitative\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_189\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e189\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eHe also denies Locke’s Account of the Origin of the Indefinite\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_192\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e192\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eIn General, Locke has a Mechanical Idea, Leibniz a Spiritual, of these Categories\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_193\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e193\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-title\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Chapter_X\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER X.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-description\" colspan=\"2\"\u003eThe Nature and Extent of Knowledge.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLocke’s Definition and Classification of Knowledge\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_196\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e196\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLeibniz’s Criticism\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_197\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e197\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLeibniz, Berkeley, and Kant regarding Knowledge of Objects\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_198\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e198\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Degrees of Knowledge,—Intuitive, Demonstrative, and Sensitive\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_199\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e199\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLocke’s Contradictory Theories regarding the Origin of Knowledge\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_202\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e202\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLocke starts both with the Individual as given to Consciousness and with the Unrelated Sensation\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_204\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e204\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eEither Theory makes Relations or “Universals” Unreal\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_205\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e205\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eAs to the Extent of Knowledge, that of Identity is Wide, but Trifling\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_205\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e205\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThat of Real Being includes God, Soul, and Matter, but only as to their Existence\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_206\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e206\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eAnd even this at the Expense of contradicting his Definition of Knowledge\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_206\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e206\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"xv\" id=\"Page_xv\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eKnowledge of Co-existence is either Trifling or Impossible\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_207\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e207\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLeibniz rests upon Distinction of Contingent and Rational Truth\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_209\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e209\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Former may become the Latter, and is then Demonstrative\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_210\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e210\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Means of this Transformation are Mathematics and Classification\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_215\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e215\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThere are Two Principles,—One of Contradiction\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_217\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e217\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Other of Sufficient Reason\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_218\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e218\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Latter leads us to God as the Supreme Intelligence and the Final Condition of Contingent Fact\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_219\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e219\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Four Stages of Knowledge\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_222\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e222\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-title\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Chapter_XI\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER XI.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-description\" colspan=\"2\"\u003eThe Theology of Leibniz.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLeibniz’s Three Arguments for the Existence of God\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_224\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e224\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Value of the Ontological\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_225\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e225\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Cosmological\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_226\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e226\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Teleological\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_226\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e226\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Attributes of God\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_227\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e227\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Relation of God to the World, his Creating Activity\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_228\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e228\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eCreation involves Wisdom and Goodness as well as Power\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_229\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e229\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Relation of God to Intelligent Spirits: they form a Moral Community\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_230\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e230\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLeibniz as the Founder of Modern German Ethical Systems\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_231\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e231\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe End of Morality is Happiness as Self-realization\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_232\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e232\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Three Stages of Natural Right\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_234\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e234\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Basis of Both Leibniz’s Ethics and Political Philosophy is Man’s Relation to God\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_236\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e236\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eHis Æsthetics have the Same Basis\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_237\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e237\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eMan’s Spirit as Architectonic\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_238\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e238\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-title\" colspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"xvi\" id=\"Page_xvi\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Chapter_XII\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCHAPTER XII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"chapter-description\" colspan=\"2\"\u003eCriticism and Conclusion.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eLeibniz’s Fundamental Contradiction is between his Method and his Subject Matter\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_240\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e240\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Use which Leibniz makes of the Principle of Sufficient Reason reveals this Contradiction\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_242\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e242\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Contradiction is between the Ideas of Formal and of Concrete Unity\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_243\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e243\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd colspan=\"2\"\u003eFrom this Contradiction flow\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent1\"\u003e(1) The Contradiction in the Notion of Individuality\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_246\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e246\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent2\"\u003eWhich becomes purely Negative\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_247\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e247\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent2\"\u003eThe Negative he interprets as merely Privative\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_249\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e249\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent1\"\u003e(2) The Contradiction in his Conception of God has the Same Source\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_250\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e250\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent2\"\u003eHe really has Three Definitions of God\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_250\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e250\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent2\"\u003eOne results in Atomism, another in Pantheism\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_251\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e251\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent2\"\u003eThe Third in a Conception of the Organic Harmony of the Infinite and Finite\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_252\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e252\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent1\"\u003e(3) The Contradiction between the Real and the Ideal in the Monads has the Same Source\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_253\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e253\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent1\"\u003e(4) As have also the Contradictions in the Treatment of the Relations of Matter and Spirit\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_254\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e254\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent1\"\u003e(5) And finally, his Original Contradiction leads to a Contradictory Treatment of Knowledge\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_257\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e257\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eSummary as to the Positive Value of Leibniz\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_259\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e259\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eThe Influence of Leibniz’s Philosophy\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_261\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e261\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eEspecially upon Kant\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_262\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e262\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eKant claims to be the True Apologist for Leibniz\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_263\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e263\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent1\"\u003e(1) As to the Doctrine of Sufficient Reason and Contradiction\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_263\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e263\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent2\"\u003eWhich finds its Kantian Analogue in the Distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Judgment\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_266\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e266\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent1\"\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"xvii\" id=\"Page_xvii\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e(2) As to the Relation of Monads and Matter\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_268\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e268\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent2\"\u003eWhich finds its Kantian Analogue in the Relation of the Sensuous and Supersensuous\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_268\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e268\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent1\"\u003e(3) And finally, as to the Doctrine of Pre-established Harmony\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_269\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e269\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent2\"\u003eWhich Kant transforms into Harmony between Understanding and Sense\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_269\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e269\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"indent2\"\u003eAnd between the Categories of the Understanding and the Ideas of Reason\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_270\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e270\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003eConclusion\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"right\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_272\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e272\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center page-break spaced big\"\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"1\" id=\"Page_1\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eLEIBNIZ’S NEW ESSAYS\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eCONCERNING\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 class=\"no-page-break\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Chapter_I\"\u003eCHAPTER I.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eTHE MAN.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"upper-case\"\u003e“He\u003c/span\u003e who knows me only by my writings does\r\nnot know me,” said Leibniz. These words—true,\r\nindeed, of every writer, but true of Leibniz\r\nin a way which gives a peculiar interest and\r\ncharm to his life—must be our excuse for prefacing\r\nwhat is to be said of his “New Essays concerning\r\nthe Human Understanding” with a brief\r\nbiographical sketch.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eGottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was born in Leipzig\r\nJune 21, 1646. His father, who died when Leibniz\r\nwas only six years old, was a professor in the university\r\nand a notary of considerable practice. From\r\nhim the future philosopher seems to have derived his\r\nextraordinary industry and love of detail. Such accounts\r\nas we have of him show no traces of the\r\nwonderful intellectual genius of his son, but only a\r\ndiligent, plodding, faithful, and religious man, a\r\nthoroughly conscientious husband, jurist, and professor.\r\nNor in the lines of physical heredity can\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"2\" id=\"Page_2\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nwe account for the unique career of Leibniz by his\r\nmother’s endowments. The fact, however, that she\r\nwas patient in all trial, living in peace with her neighbors,\r\nanxious for unity and concord with all people,\r\neven with those not well disposed to her, throws great\r\nlight upon the fundamental trait of Leibniz’s ethical\r\nnature. As in so many cases, it is the inherited\r\nmoral characteristics which form the basis of the\r\nintellectual nature. The love of unity which was a\r\nmoral trait in Leibniz’s mother became in him the\r\nhunger for a harmonious and unified mental world;\r\nthe father’s devotion to detail showed itself as the\r\ndesire for knowledge as minute and comprehensive\r\nas it was inter-related.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeft without his father, he was by the advice of a\r\ndiscerning friend allowed free access to the library.\r\nLeibniz never ceased to count this one of the greatest\r\nfortunes of his life. Writing in after years to a\r\nfriend, he says:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e“When I lost my father, and was left without\r\nany direction in my studies, I had the luck\r\nto get at books in all languages, of all religions,\r\nupon all sciences, and to read them without any\r\nregular order, just as my own impulse led me.\r\nFrom this I obtained the great advantage that I\r\nwas freed from ordinary prejudices, and introduced\r\nto many things of which I should otherwise never\r\nhave thought.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn a philosophical essay, in which he describes\r\nhimself under the name of Gulielmus Pacidius, he\r\nsays:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"3\" id=\"Page_3\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e“Wilhelm Friedlieb, a German by birth, who\r\nlost his father in his early years, was led to\r\nstudy through the innate tendency of his spirit;\r\nand the freedom with which he moved about in\r\nthe sciences was equal to this innate impulse.\r\nHe buried himself, a boy eight years old, in a\r\nlibrary, staying there sometimes whole days, and,\r\nhardly stammering Latin, he took up every book\r\nwhich pleased his eyes. Opening and shutting them\r\nwithout any choice, he sipped now here, now there,\r\nlost himself in one, skipped over another, as the\r\nclearness of expression or of content attracted him.\r\nHe seemed to be directed by the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eTolle et lege\u003c/i\u003e of a\r\nhigher voice. As good fortune would have it, he\r\ngave himself up to the ancients, in whom he at first\r\nunderstood nothing, by degrees a little, finally all\r\nthat was really necessary, until he assumed not only\r\na certain coloring of their expression, but also of\r\ntheir thought,—just as those who go about in the\r\nsun, even while they are occupied with other things,\r\nget sun-browned.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd he goes on to tell us that their influence\r\nalways remained with him. Their human, their\r\nimportant, their comprehensive ideas, grasping the\r\nwhole of life in one image, together with their\r\nclear, natural, and transparent mode of expression,\r\nadapted precisely to their thoughts, seemed to him\r\nto be in the greatest contrast with the writings of\r\nmoderns, without definiteness or order in expression,\r\nand without vitality or purpose in thought,—“written\r\nas if for another world.” Thus Leibniz\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"4\" id=\"Page_4\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nlearned two of the great lessons of his life,—to\r\nseek always for clearness of diction and for pertinence\r\nand purpose of ideas.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHistorians and poets first occupied him; but when\r\nin his school-life, a lad of twelve or thirteen years,\r\nhe came to the study of logic, he was greatly struck,\r\nhe says, by the “ordering and analysis of thoughts\r\nwhich he found there.” He gave himself up to\r\nmaking tables of categories and predicaments, analyzing\r\neach book that he read into suitable topics,\r\nand arranging these into classes and sub-classes.\r\nWe can imagine the astonishment of his playmates\r\nas he burst upon them with a demand to classify\r\nthis or that idea, to find its appropriate predicament.\r\nThus he was led naturally to the philosophic\r\nbooks in his father’s library,—to Plato and to\r\nAristotle, to the Scholastics. Suarez, in particular,\r\namong the latter, he read; and traces of his influences\r\nare to be found in the formulation of his own\r\nphilosophic system. At about this same time he\r\ntook great delight in the theological works with\r\nwhich his father’s library abounded, reading with\r\nequal ease and pleasure the writings of the Lutherans\r\nand of the Reformed Church, of the Jesuits and\r\nthe Jansenists, of the Thomists and the Arminians.\r\nThe result was, he tells us, that he was strengthened\r\nin the Lutheran faith of his family, but, as we may\r\neasily imagine from his after life, made tolerant of\r\nall forms of faith.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn 1661 the boy Leibniz, fifteen years old, entered\r\nthe University of Leipzig. If we glance back upon\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"5\" id=\"Page_5\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nhis attainments, we find him thoroughly at home in\r\nLatin, having made good progress in Greek, acquainted\r\nwith the historians and poets of antiquity,\r\nacquainted with the contemporary range of science,\r\nexcept in mathematics and physics, deeply read\r\nand interested in ancient and scholastic philosophy\r\nand in the current theological discussions. Of himself\r\nhe says:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e“Two things were of extraordinary aid to me: in\r\nthe first place, I was self-taught; and in the second,\r\nas soon as I entered upon any science I sought for\r\nsomething new, even though I did not as yet thoroughly\r\nunderstand the old. I thus gained two\r\nthings: I did not fill my mind with things empty and\r\nto be unlearned afterwards,—things resting upon\r\nthe assertion of the teacher, and not upon reason;\r\nand secondly, I never rested till I got down to the\r\nvery roots of the science and reached its principles.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhile there is always a temptation to force\r\nthe facts which we know of a man’s early life,\r\nso as to make them seem to account for what\r\nappears in mature years, and to find symbolisms\r\nand analogies which do not exist, we are not going\r\nastray, I think, if we see foreshadowed in this\r\nearly education of Leibniz the two leading traits of\r\nhis later thought,—universality and individuality.\r\nThe range of Leibniz’s investigations already marks\r\nhim as one who will be content with no fundamental\r\nprinciple which does not mirror the universe. The\r\nfreedom with which he carried them on is testimony\r\nto the fact that even at this age the idea of self-development,\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"6\" id=\"Page_6\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nof individual growth from within, was\r\nworking upon him. In the fact, also, that he was\r\nself-taught we find doubtless the reason that he\r\nalone of the thinkers of this period did not have to\r\nretrace his steps, to take a hostile attitude towards\r\nthe ideas into which he was educated, and to start\r\nanew upon a foundation then first built. The development\r\nof the thought of Leibniz is so gradual,\r\ncontinuous, and constant that it may serve as a\r\nmodel of the law by which the “monad” acts. Is\r\nnot his early acquaintance with ancient literature\r\nand mediæval philosophy the reason that he could\r\nafterwards write that his philosophical system “connects\r\nPlato with Democritus, Aristotle with Descartes,\r\nthe Scholastics with the moderns, theology\r\nand morals with reason”? And who can fail to see\r\nin the impartiality, the comprehensiveness, of his\r\nself-education the prophecy of the time when he can\r\nwrite of his ideas that “there are united in them, as\r\nin a centre of perspective, the ideas of the Sceptics\r\nin attributing to sensible things only a slight degree\r\nof reality; of the Pythagoreans and Platonists, who\r\nreduce all to harmonies, numbers, and ideas; of\r\nParmenides and Plotinus, with their One and All;\r\nof the Stoics, with their notion of necessity, compatible\r\nwith the spontaneity of other schools; of the\r\nvital philosophy of the Cabalists, who find feeling\r\neverywhere; of the forms and entelechies of Aristotle\r\nand the Schoolmen, united with the mechanical\r\nexplanation of phenomena according to Democritus\r\nand the moderns”?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"7\" id=\"Page_7\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eBut we must hurry along over the succeeding\r\nyears of his life. In the university the study of\r\nlaw was his principal occupation, as he had decided\r\nto follow in the footsteps of his father. It cannot\r\nbe said that the character of the instruction or of\r\nthe instructors at Leipzig was such as to give much\r\nnutriment or stimulus to a mind like that of Leibniz.\r\nHe became acquainted there, however, with\r\nthe Italian philosophy of the sixteenth century,—a\r\nphilosophy which, as formulated by Cardanus\r\nand Campanella, formed the transition from Scholastic\r\nphilosophy to the “mechanical” mode of\r\nviewing the universe. He had here also his first\r\nintroduction to Descartes. The consequences of\r\nthe new vision opened to Leibniz must be told in his\r\nown words: “I was but a child when I came to\r\nknow Aristotle; even the Scholastics did not frighten\r\nme; and I in no way regret this now. Plato and\r\nPlotinus gave me much delight, not to speak of\r\nother philosophers of antiquity. Then I fell in\r\nwith the writings of modern philosophy, and I recall\r\nthe time when, a boy of fifteen years, I went\r\nwalking in a little wood near Leipzig, the Rosenthal,\r\nin order to consider whether I should hold to the\r\ndoctrine of substantial forms. Finally the mechanical\r\ntheory conquered, and thus I was led to the\r\nstudy of the mathematical sciences.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo the study of the mathematical sciences!\r\nSurely words of no mean import for either the future\r\nof Leibniz or of mathematics. But his Leipzig\r\nstudies did not take him very far in this new direction.\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"8\" id=\"Page_8\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nOnly the elements of Euclid were taught\r\nthere, and these by a lecturer of such confused style\r\nthat Leibniz seems alone to have understood them.\r\nIn Jena, however, where he went for a semester,\r\nthings were somewhat better. Weigel, a mathematician\r\nof some fame, an astronomer, a jurist, and a\r\nphilosopher, taught there, and introduced Leibniz\r\ninto the lower forms of analysis. But the Thirty\r\nYears’ War had not left Germany in a state of high\r\nculture, and in after years Leibniz lamented the\r\nlimitations of his early mathematical training, remarking\r\nthat if he had spent his youth in Paris, he\r\nwould have enriched science earlier. By 1666 Leibniz\r\nhad finished his university career, having in\r\nprevious years attained the degrees of bachelor of\r\nphilosophy and master of philosophy. It is significant\r\nthat for the first he wrote a thesis upon the\r\nprinciple of individuation,—the principle which in\r\nlater years became the basis of his philosophy.\r\nThis early essay, however, is rather an exhibition\r\nof learning and of dexterity in handling logical\r\nmethods than a real anticipation of his afterthought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor his second degree, he wrote a thesis upon the\r\napplication of philosophic ideas to juridic procedure,—considerations\r\nwhich never ceased to occupy\r\nhim. At about the same time appeared his earliest\r\nindependent work, “De Arte Combinatoria.” From\r\nhis study of mathematics, and especially of algebraic\r\nmethods, Leibniz had become convinced that\r\nthe source of all science is,—first, analysis; second,\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"9\" id=\"Page_9\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nsymbolic representation of the fundamental concepts,\r\nthe symbolism avoiding the ambiguities and\r\nvagueness of language; and thirdly, the synthesis\r\nand interpretation of the symbols. It seemed to\r\nLeibniz that it ought to be possible to find the simplest\r\nnotions in all the sciences, to discover general\r\nrules for calculating all their varieties of combination,\r\nand thus to attain the same certainty and\r\ngenerality of result that characterize mathematics.\r\nLeibniz never gave up this thought. Indeed, in\r\nspirit his philosophy is but its application, with the\r\nomission of symbols, on the side of the general notions\r\nfundamental to all science. It was also the idea\r\nof his age,—the idea that inspired Spinoza and the\r\n\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eAufklärung\u003c/i\u003e, the idea that inspired philosophical\r\nthinking until Kant gave it its death-blow by\r\ndemonstrating the distinction between the methods\r\nof philosophy and of mathematical and physical\r\nscience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn 1666 Leibniz should have received his double\r\ndoctorate of philosophy and of law; but petty jealousies\r\nand personal fears prevented his presenting\r\nhimself for the examination. Disgusted with his\r\ntreatment, feeling that the ties that bound him to\r\nLeipzig were severed by the recent death of his\r\nmother, anxious to study mathematics further, and,\r\nas he confesses, desiring, with the natural eagerness\r\nof youth, to see more of the world, he left\r\nLeipzig forever, and entered upon his \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eWanderjahre\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nHe was prepared to be no mean citizen of the world.\r\nIn his education he had gone from the historians to\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"10\" id=\"Page_10\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe poets, from the poets to the philosophers and\r\nthe Scholastics, from them to the theologians and\r\nChurch Fathers; then to the jurists, to the mathematicians,\r\nand then again to philosophy and to law.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHe first directed his steps to the University of\r\nAltdorf; here he obtained his doctorate in law, and\r\nwas offered a professorship, which he declined,—apparently\r\nbecause he felt that his time was not yet\r\ncome, and that when it should come, it would not\r\nbe in the narrow limits of a country village. From\r\nAltdorf he went to Nürnberg; here all that need\r\nconcern us is the fact that he joined a society of\r\nalchemists (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003efraternitas roseæcrucis\u003c/i\u003e), and was made\r\ntheir secretary. Hereby he gained three things,—a\r\nknowledge of chemistry; an acquaintance with a\r\nnumber of scientific men of different countries, with\r\nwhom, as secretary, he carried on correspondence;\r\nand the friendship of Boineburg, a diplomat of the\r\ncourt of the Elector and Archbishop of Mainz.\r\nThis friendship was the means of his removing to\r\nFrankfurt. Here, under the direction of the Elector,\r\nhe engaged in remodelling Roman law so as to\r\nadapt it for German use, in writing diplomatic\r\ntracts, letters, and essays upon theological matters,\r\nand in editing an edition of Nizolius,—a now forgotten\r\nphilosophical writer. One of the most noteworthy\r\nfacts in connection with this edition is that\r\nLeibniz pointed out the fitness of the German language\r\nfor philosophical uses, and urged its employment,—a\r\nmemorable fact in connection with\r\nthe later development of German thought. Another\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"11\" id=\"Page_11\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nimportant tract which he wrote was one urging the\r\nalliance of all German States for the purpose\r\nof advancing their internal and common interests.\r\nHere, as so often, Leibniz was almost two centuries\r\nin advance of his times. But the chief thing in\r\nconnection with the stay of Leibniz at Mainz was\r\nthe cause for which he left it. Louis XIV. had\r\nbroken up the Triple Alliance, and showed signs of\r\nattacking Holland and the German Empire. It was\r\nthen proposed to him that it would be of greater\r\nglory to himself and of greater advantage to France\r\nthat he should move against Turkey and Egypt.\r\nThe mission of presenting these ideas to the great\r\nking was intrusted to Leibniz, and in 1672 he went\r\nto Paris.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe plan failed completely,—so completely that\r\nwe need say no more about it. But the journey\r\nto Paris was none the less the turning-point in the\r\ncareer of Leibniz. It brought him to the centre\r\nof intellectual civilization,—to a centre compared\r\nwith which the highest attainments of disrupted\r\nand disheartened Germany were comparative barbarism.\r\nMolière was still alive, and Racine was at\r\nthe summit of his glory. Leibniz became acquainted\r\nwith Arnaud, a disciple of Descartes, who initiated\r\nhim into the motive and spirit of his master. Cartesianism\r\nas a system, with its scientific basis and\r\nits speculative consequences, thus first became to\r\nhim an intellectual reality. And, perhaps most\r\nimportant of all, he met Huygens, who became his\r\nteacher and inspirer both in the higher forms of\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"12\" id=\"Page_12\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nmathematics and in their application to the interpretation\r\nand expression of physical phenomena.\r\nHis diplomatic mission took him also to London,\r\nwhere the growing world of mathematical science\r\nwas opened yet wider to him. The name of Sir\r\nIsaac Newton need only be given to show what this\r\nmeant. From this time one of the greatest glories\r\nof Leibniz’s life dates,—a glory, however, which\r\nduring his lifetime was embittered by envy and\r\nunappreciation, and obscured by detraction and\r\nmalice,—the invention of the infinitesimal calculus.\r\nIt would be interesting, were this the place,\r\nto trace the history of its discovery,—the gradual\r\nsteps which led to it, the physical facts as well as\r\nmathematical theories which made it a necessity;\r\nbut it must suffice to mention that these were such\r\nthat the discovery of some general mode of expressing\r\nand interpreting the newly discovered facts\r\nof Nature was absolutely required for the further\r\nadvance of science, and that steps towards the introduction\r\nof the fundamental ideas of the calculus\r\nhad already been taken,—notably by Keppler, by\r\nCavalieri, and by Wallis. It would be interesting\r\nto follow also the course of the controversy with\r\nNewton,—a controversy which in its method of\r\nconduct reflects no credit upon the names of either.\r\nBut this can be summed up by saying that it is now\r\ngenerally admitted that absolute priority belongs to\r\nNewton, but that entire independence and originality\r\ncharacterize none the less the work of Leibniz, and\r\nthat the method of approach and statement of the\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"13\" id=\"Page_13\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nlatter are the more philosophical and general, and,\r\nto use the words of the judicious summary of Merz,\r\n“Newton cared more for the results than the principle,\r\nwhile Leibniz was in search of fundamental\r\nprinciples, and anxious to arrive at simplifications\r\nand generalizations.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe death of Boineburg removed the especial reasons\r\nfor the return of Leibniz to Frankfurt, and in\r\n1676 he accepted the position of librarian and private\r\ncouncillor at the court of Hanover. It arouses\r\nour interest and our questionings to know that on\r\nhis journey back he stopped at the Hague, and there\r\nmet face to face the other future great philosopher\r\nof the time, Spinoza. But our questionings meet\r\nno answer. At Hanover, the industries of Leibniz\r\nwere varied. An extract from one of his own letters,\r\nthough written at a somewhat later date, will\r\ngive the best outline of his activities.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e“It is incredible how scattered and divided are\r\nmy occupations. I burrow through archives, investigate\r\nold writings, and collect unprinted manuscripts,\r\nwith a view to throwing light on the history\r\nof Brunswick. I also receive and write a countless\r\nnumber of letters. I have so much that is new in\r\nmathematics, so many thoughts in philosophy, so\r\nmany literary observations which I cannot get into\r\nshape, that in the midst of my tasks I do not know\r\nwhere to begin, and with Ovid am inclined to cry\r\nout: ‘My riches make me poor.’ I should like to\r\ngive a description of my calculating-machine; but\r\ntime fails. Above all else I desire to complete my\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"14\" id=\"Page_14\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nDynamics, as I think that I have finally discovered\r\nthe true laws of material Nature, by whose means\r\nproblems about bodies which are out of reach of\r\nrules now known may be solved. Friends are\r\nurging me to publish my Science of the Infinite,\r\ncontaining the basis of my new analysis. I have\r\nalso on hand a new Characteristic, and many general\r\nconsiderations about the art of discovery. But all\r\nthese works, the historical excepted, have to be\r\ndone at odd moments. Then at the court all sorts\r\nof things are expected. I have to answer questions\r\non points in international law; on points\r\nconcerning the rights of the various princes in the\r\nEmpire: so far I have managed to keep out of\r\nquestions of private law. With all this I have had\r\nto carry on negotiations with the bishops of Neustadt\r\nand of Meaux [Bossuet], and with Pelisson and\r\nothers upon religious matters.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is interesting to note how the philosophic spirit,\r\nthe instinct for unity and generality, showed itself\r\neven in the least of Leibniz’s tasks. The Duke of\r\nBrunswick imposed upon Leibniz the task of drawing\r\nup a genealogical table of his House. Under\r\nLeibniz’s hands this expanded into a history of the\r\nHouse, and this in turn was the centre of an important\r\nstudy of the German Empire. It was impossible\r\nthat the philosopher, according to whom every real\r\nbeing reflected the whole of the universe from its\r\npoint of view, should have been able to treat even a\r\nslight phase of local history without regarding it in\r\nits relations to the history of the world. Similarly\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"15\" id=\"Page_15\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nsome mining operations in the Harz Mountains\r\ncalled the attention of Leibniz to geological matters.\r\nThe result was a treatise called “Protogäa,” in\r\nwhich Leibniz gave a history of the development of\r\nthe earth. Not content with seeing in a Brunswick\r\nmountain an epitome of the world’s physical formation,\r\nit was his intention to make this an introduction\r\nto his political history as a sort of geographical\r\nbackground and foundation. It is interesting to\r\nnote that the historical studies of Leibniz took him\r\non a three years’ journey, from 1687 to 1690,\r\nthrough the various courts of Europe,—a fact which\r\nnot only had considerable influence upon Leibniz\r\nhimself, but which enabled him to give stimulus to\r\nscientific development in more ways and places than\r\none.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHis philosophical career as an author begins for\r\nthe most part with his return to Hanover in 1690.\r\nThis lies outside of the scope of the present chapter,\r\nbut here is a convenient place to call attention to the\r\nfact that for Leibniz the multitude of his other\r\nduties was so great that his philosophical work was\r\nthe work “of odd moments.” There is no systematic\r\nexposition; there are a vast number of letters,\r\nof essays, of abstracts and memoranda published in\r\nvarious scientific journals. His philosophy bears\r\nnot only in form, but in substance, traces of its haphazard\r\nand desultory origin. Another point of\r\ninterest in this connection is the degree to which, in\r\nform, at least, his philosophical writings bear the\r\nimpress of his cosmopolitan life. Leibniz had seen\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"16\" id=\"Page_16\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ntoo much of the world, too much of courts, for his\r\nthoughts to take the rigid and unbending form of\r\ngeometrical exposition suited to the lonely student\r\nof the Hague. Nor was the regular progression and\r\nelucidation of ideas adapted to the later Germans,\r\nalmost without exception university professors,\r\nsuited to the man of affairs. There is everywhere\r\nin Leibniz the attempt to adapt his modes of statement,\r\nnot only to the terminology, but even to the\r\nideas, of the one to whom they are addressed. There\r\nis the desire to magnify points of agreement, to minimize\r\ndisagreements, characteristic of the courtier and\r\nthe diplomat. His comprehensiveness is not only\r\na comprehensiveness of thought, but of ways of exposition,\r\ndue very largely, we must think, to his cosmopolitan\r\neducation. The result has been to the\r\ngreat detriment of Leibniz’s influence as a systematic\r\nthinker, although it may be argued that it has\r\naided his indirect and suggestive influence, the absorption\r\nof his ideas by men of literature, by Goethe,\r\nabove all by Lessing, and his stimulating effect\r\nupon science and philosophy. It is certain that the\r\nattempt to systematize his thoughts, as was done by\r\nWolff, had for its result the disappearance of all\r\nthat was profound and thought-exciting.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf his philosophy thus reflects the manner of his\r\ndaily life, the occupations of the latter were informed\r\nby the spirit of his philosophy. Two of the dearest\r\ninterests of Leibniz remain to be mentioned,—one,\r\nthe founding of academies; the other, the reconciling\r\nof religious organizations. The former testifies to\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"17\" id=\"Page_17\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nhis desire for comprehensiveness, unity, and organization\r\nof knowledge; the latter to his desire for\r\npractical unity, his dislike of all that is opposed and\r\nisolated. His efforts in the religions direction were\r\ntwofold. The first was to end the theological and\r\npolitical controversies of the time by the reunion of\r\nthe Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches. It\r\nwas a plan which did the greatest honor to the pacific\r\nspirit of Leibniz, but it was predestined to failure.\r\nBoth sides made concessions,—more concessions\r\nthan we of to-day should believe possible. But the\r\none thing the Roman Catholic Church would not concede\r\nwas the one thing which the Protestant Church\r\ndemanded,—the notion of authority and hierarchy.\r\nIndeed, it may be questioned whether the terms on\r\nwhich Leibniz conceived of their reunion do not\r\npoint to the greatest weakness in his philosophy,—the\r\ntendency to overlook oppositions and to resolve\r\nall contradiction into differences of degree. Hardly\r\nhad this plan fallen through when Leibniz turned\r\nto the project of a union of the Lutheran and Reformed\r\nbranches of the Protestant Church. This\r\nscheme was more hopeful, and while unrealized during\r\nthe life of our philosopher, was afterwards\r\naccomplished.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is noteworthy that even before Leibniz went to\r\nParis and to London he had conceived the idea of\r\na society of learned men for the investigation, the\r\nsystematization, and the publication of scientific\r\ntruth in all its varied forms,—a society which\r\nshould in breadth include the whole sphere of\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"18\" id=\"Page_18\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nsciences, but should not treat them as so many isolated\r\ndisciplines, but as members of one system.\r\nThis idea was quickened when Leibniz saw the\r\ndegree in which it had already been realized in the\r\ntwo great world-capitals. He never ceased to try to\r\nintroduce similar academies wherever he had influence.\r\nIn 1700 his labors bore their fruit in one\r\ninstance. The Academy at Berlin was founded,\r\nand Leibniz was its first, and indeed life-long,\r\npresident. But disappointment met him at Vienna,\r\nDresden, and St. Petersburg, where he proposed\r\nsimilar societies.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAny sketch of Leibniz’s life, however brief, would\r\nbe imperfect which did not mention the names at\r\nleast of two remarkable women,—remarkable in\r\nthemselves, and remarkable in their friendship\r\nwith Leibniz. These were Sophia, grand-daughter\r\nof James I. of England (and thus the link by\r\nwhich the House of Brunswick finally came to\r\nrule over Great Britain) and wife of the Duke of\r\nBrunswick, and her daughter Sophia Charlotte,\r\nwife of the first king of Prussia. The latter,\r\nin particular, gave Leibniz every encouragement.\r\nShe was personally deeply interested in all theological\r\nand philosophical questions. Upon her\r\ndeath-bed, in 1705, she is said to have told those\r\nabout her that they were not to mourn for her, as\r\nshe should now be able to satisfy her desire to\r\nlearn about things which Leibniz had never sufficiently\r\nexplained.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHer death marks the beginning of a period in\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"19\" id=\"Page_19\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nLeibniz’s life which it is not pleasant to dwell\r\nupon. New rulers arose that knew not Leibniz.\r\nIt cannot be said that from this time till his death\r\nin Hanover in 1716 Leibniz had much joy or satisfaction.\r\nHis best friends were dead; his political\r\nambitions were disappointed; he was suspected\r\nof coldness and unfriendliness by the courts\r\nboth of Berlin and Hanover; Paris and Vienna\r\nwere closed to him, so far as any wide influence\r\nwas concerned, by his religious faith; the controversy\r\nwith the friends of Newton still followed\r\nhim. He was a man of the most remarkable intellectual\r\ngifts, of an energy which could be satisfied\r\nonly with wide fields of action; and he found\r\nhimself shut in by narrow intrigue to a petty round\r\nof courtly officialism. It is little wonder that the\r\nfollowing words fell from his lips: “Germany is\r\nthe only country in the world that does not know\r\nhow to recognize the fame of its children and to\r\nmake that fame immortal. It forgets itself; it forgets\r\nits own, unless foreigners make it mindful of\r\nits own treasures.” A Scotch friend of Leibniz,\r\nwho happened to be in Hanover when he died, wrote\r\nthat Leibniz “was buried more like a robber than\r\nwhat he really was,—the ornament of his country.”\r\nSuch was the mortal end of the greatest intellectual\r\ngenius since Aristotle. But genius is not a matter\r\nto be bounded in life or in death by provincial\r\ncourts. Leibniz remains a foremost citizen in that\r\n“Kingdom of Spirits” in whose formation he found\r\nthe meaning of the world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"20\" id=\"Page_20\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\u003ca id=\"Chapter_II\"\u003eCHAPTER II.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eTHE SOURCES OF HIS PHILOSOPHY.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"upper-case\"\u003eWhat\u003c/span\u003e is true of all men is true of philosophers,\r\nand of Leibniz among them.\r\nSpeaking generally, what they are unconsciously\r\nand fundamentally, they are through absorption of\r\ntheir antecedents and surroundings. What they\r\nare consciously and reflectively, they are through\r\ntheir reaction upon the influence of heredity and\r\nenvironment. But there is a spiritual line of descent\r\nand a spiritual atmosphere; and in speaking\r\nof a philosopher, it is with this intellectual heredity\r\nand environment, rather than with the physical,\r\nthat we are concerned. Leibniz was born into a\r\nperiod of intellectual activity the most teeming\r\nwith ideas, the most fruitful in results, of any,\r\nperhaps, since the age of Pericles. We pride\r\nourselves justly upon the activity of our own century,\r\nand in diffusion of intellectual action and\r\nwide-spread application of ideas the age of Leibniz\r\ncould not compare with it. But ours \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e the age\r\nof diffusion and application, while his was one of\r\nfermentation and birth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch a period in its earlier days is apt to be\r\nturbid and unsettled. There is more heat of friction\r\nthan calm light. And such had been the case\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"21\" id=\"Page_21\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nin the hundred years before Leibniz. But when he\r\narrived at intellectual maturity much of the crudity\r\nhad disappeared. The troubling of the waters of\r\nthought had ceased; they were becoming clarified.\r\nBacon, Hobbes, Descartes, each had crystallized\r\nsomething out of that seething and chaotic mass of\r\nnew ideas which had forced itself into European\r\nconsciousness. Men had been introduced into a\r\nnew world, and the natural result had been feelings\r\nof strangeness, and the vagaries of intellectual\r\nwanderings. But by the day of Leibniz the intellectual\r\nbearings had been made out anew, the\r\nnew mental orientation had been secured.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe marks of this “new spiritual picture of the\r\nuniverse” are everywhere to be seen in Leibniz.\r\nHis philosophy is the dawning consciousness of the\r\nmodern world. In it we see the very conception\r\nand birth of the modern interpretation of the world.\r\nThe history of thought is one continuous testimony\r\nto the ease with which we become hardened to ideas\r\nthrough custom. Ideas are constantly precipitating\r\nthemselves out of the realm of ideas into that of\r\nways of thinking and of viewing the universe. The\r\nproblem of one century is the axiom of another.\r\nWhat one generation stakes its activity upon investigating\r\nis quietly taken for granted by the\r\nnext. And so the highest reach of intellectual\r\ninspiration in the sixteenth century is to-day the\r\nordinary food of thought, accepted without an\r\ninquiry as to its source, and almost without a suspicion\r\nthat it has a recent historic origin. We have\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"22\" id=\"Page_22\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nto go to Bacon or to Leibniz to see the genesis and\r\ngrowth of those ideas which to-day have become\r\nmaterialized into axiomatic points of view and into\r\nhard-and-fast categories of thought. In reading\r\nLeibniz the idea comes over us in all its freshness\r\nthat there was a time when it was a discovery that\r\nthe world is a universe, made after one plan and\r\nof one stuff. The ideas of inter-relation, of the\r\nharmony of law, of mutual dependence and correspondence,\r\nwere not always the assumed starting-points\r\nof thought; they were once the crowning\r\ndiscoveries of a philosophy aglow and almost intoxicated\r\nwith the splendor of its far-reaching\r\ngeneralizations. I take these examples of the unity\r\nof the world, the continuity and interdependence of\r\nall within it, because these are the ideas which come\r\nto their conscious and delighted birth in the philosophy\r\nof Leibniz. We do not put ourselves into\r\nthe right attitude for understanding his thought\r\nuntil we remember that these ideas—the commonest\r\ntools of our thinking—were once new and fresh,\r\nand in their novelty and transforming strangeness\r\nwere the products of a philosophic interpretation\r\nof experience. Except in that later contemporary\r\nof Leibniz, the young and enthusiastic Irish idealist,\r\nBerkeley, I know of no historic thinker in whom the\r\nbirth-throes (joyous, however) of a new conception\r\nof the world are so evident as in Leibniz. But\r\nwhile in Berkeley what we see is the young man\r\ncarried away and astounded by the grandeur and\r\nsimplicity of a “new way of ideas” which he has\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"23\" id=\"Page_23\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ndiscovered, what we see in Leibniz is the mature\r\nman penetrated throughout his being with an idea\r\nwhich in its unity answers to the unity of the world,\r\nand which in its complexity answers, tone to tone,\r\nto the complex harmony of the world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe familiarity of the ideas which we use hides\r\ntheir grandeur from us. The unity of the world is\r\na matter of course with us; the dependent order\r\nof all within it a mere starting-point upon which\r\nto base our investigations. But if we will put ourselves\r\nin the position of Leibniz, and behold, not\r\nthe new planet, but the new universe, so one, so\r\nlinked together, swimming into our ken, we shall\r\nfeel something of the same exultant thrill that\r\nLeibniz felt,—an exultation not indeed personal\r\nin its nature, but which arises from the expansion\r\nof the human mind face to face with an expanding\r\nworld. The spirit which is at the heart of the\r\nphilosophy of Leibniz is the spirit which speaks\r\nin the following words: “Quin imo qui unam partem\r\nmateriæ comprehenderet, idem comprehenderet\r\ntotum universum ob eandem \u003cspan class=\"greek\" title=\"perichôrêsin\" lang=\"grc\"\u003eπεριχώρησιν\u003c/span\u003e quam dixi.\r\nMea principia talia sunt, ut vix a se invicem develli\r\npossint. Qui unum bene novit, omnia novit.” It\r\nis a spirit which feels that the secret of the universe\r\nhas been rendered up to it, and which breathes\r\na buoyant optimism. And if we of the nineteenth\r\ncentury have chosen to bewail the complexity of\r\nthe problem of life, and to run hither and thither\r\nmultiplying “insights” and points of view till this\r\nenthusiastic confidence in reason seems to us the\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"24\" id=\"Page_24\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nrashness of an ignorance which does not comprehend\r\nthe problem, and the unity in which Leibniz\r\nrested appears cold and abstract beside the manifold\r\nrichness of the world, we should not forget that\r\nafter all we have incorporated into our very mental\r\nstructure the fundamental thoughts of Leibniz,—the\r\nthoughts of the rationality of the universe and\r\nof the “reign of law.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat was the origin of these ideas in the mind\r\nof Leibniz? What influences in the philosophic succession\r\nof thinkers led him in this direction? What\r\nagencies acting in the intellectual world about him\r\nshaped his ideal reproduction of reality? Two\r\ncauses above all others stand out with prominence,—one,\r\nthe discoveries and principles of modern\r\nphysical science; the other, that interpretation of\r\nexperience which centuries before had been formulated\r\nby Aristotle. Leibniz has a double interest\r\nfor those of to-day who reverence science and who\r\nhold to the historical method. His philosophy was\r\nan attempt to set in order the methods and principles\r\nof that growing science of nature which even\r\nthen was transforming the emotional and mental\r\nlife of Europe; and the attempt was guided everywhere\r\nby a profound and wide-reaching knowledge\r\nof the history of philosophy. On the first point\r\nLeibniz was certainly not alone. Bacon, Hobbes,\r\nDescartes, Spinoza, each felt in his own way the\r\nfructifying touch of the new-springing science, and\r\nhad attempted under its guidance to interpret the\r\nfacts of nature and of man. But Leibniz stood\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"25\" id=\"Page_25\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nalone in his interest in the history of thought. He\r\nstands alone indeed till he is greeted by his compeers\r\nof the nineteenth century. To Bacon previous\r\nphilosophy—the Greek, the scholastic—was\r\nan “eidol of the theatre.” The human mind must be\r\nfreed from its benumbing influence. To Descartes\r\nit was useless rubbish to be cleared away, that we\r\nmight get a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003etabula rasa\u003c/i\u003e upon which to make a fresh\r\nstart. And shall Locke and the empirical English\r\nschool, or Reid and the Scotch school, or even Kant,\r\nbe the first to throw a stone at Bacon and Descartes?\r\nIt was reserved to Leibniz, with a genius almost\r\ntwo centuries in advance of his times, to penetrate\r\nthe meaning of the previous development of reflective\r\nthought. It would be going beyond our\r\nbrief to claim that Leibniz was interested in this \u003cem\u003eas\u003c/em\u003e\r\na historical movement, or that he specially concerned\r\nhimself with the genetic lines which connected the\r\nvarious schools of thought. But we should come\r\nshort of our duty to Leibniz if we did not recognize\r\nhis conscious and largely successful attempt to apprehend\r\nthe core of truth in all systems, however\r\nalien to his own, and to incorporate it into his\r\nown thinking.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNothing could be more characteristic of Leibniz\r\nthan his saying, “I find that most systems are\r\nright in a good share of that which they advance,\r\nbut not so much in what they deny;” or than this\r\nother statement of his, “We must not hastily believe\r\nthat which the mass of men, or even of authorities,\r\nadvance, but each must demand for himself the\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"26\" id=\"Page_26\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nproofs of the thesis sustained. Yet long research\r\ngenerally convinces that the old and received opinions\r\nare good, provided they be interpreted justly.”\r\nIt is in the profound union in Leibniz of the principles\r\nwhich these quotations image that his abiding\r\nworth lies. Leibniz was interested in affirmations,\r\nnot in denials. He was interested in securing the\r\nunion of the modern \u003cem\u003emethod\u003c/em\u003e, the spirit of original\r\nresearch and independent judgment, with the conserved\r\n\u003cem\u003eresults\u003c/em\u003e of previous thought. Leibniz was a\r\nman of his times; that is to say, he was a scientific\r\nman,—the contemporary, for example, of men\r\nas different as Bernouilli, Swammerdam, Huygens,\r\nand Newton, and was himself actively engaged in\r\nthe prosecution of mathematics, mechanics, geology,\r\ncomparative philology, and jurisprudence. But he\r\nwas also a man of Aristotle’s times,—that is to say,\r\na philosopher, not satisfied until the facts, principles,\r\nand methods of science had received an interpretation\r\nwhich should explain and unify them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz’s acquaintance with the higher forms of\r\nmathematics was due, as we have seen, to his acquaintance\r\nwith Huygens. As he made the acquaintance\r\nof the latter at the same time that he made\r\nthe acquaintance of the followers of Descartes, it\r\nis likely that he received his introduction to the\r\nhigher developments of the scientific interpretation\r\nof nature and of the philosophic interpretation of\r\nscience at about the same time. For a while, then,\r\nLeibniz was a Cartesian; and he never ceased to\r\ncall the doctrine of Descartes the antechamber of\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"27\" id=\"Page_27\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ntruth. What were the ideas which he received from\r\nDescartes? Fundamentally they were two,—one\r\nabout the method of truth, the other about the\r\nsubstance of truth. He received the idea that the\r\nmethod of philosophy consists in the analysis of any\r\ncomplex group of ideas down to simple ideas which\r\nshall be perfectly clear and distinct; that all such\r\nclear and distinct ideas are true, and may then be\r\nused for the synthetic reconstruction of any body\r\nof truth. Concerning the substance of philosophic\r\ntruth, he learned that nature is to be interpreted\r\nmechanically, and that the instrument of this mechanical\r\ninterpretation is mathematics. I have used\r\nthe term “received” in speaking of the relation of\r\nLeibniz to these ideas. Yet long before this time\r\nwe might see him giving himself up to dreams about\r\na vast art of combination which should reduce all\r\nthe ideas concerned in any science to their simplest\r\nelements, and then combine them to any degree of\r\ncomplexity. We have already seen him giving us a\r\npicture of a boy of fifteen gravely disputing with\r\nhimself whether he shall accept the doctrine of forms\r\nand final causes, or of physical causes, and as gravely\r\ndeciding that he shall side with the “moderns;”\r\nand that boy was himself. In these facts we have\r\nrenewed confirmation of the truth that one mind\r\nnever receives from another anything excepting the\r\nstimulus, the reflex, the development of ideas which\r\nhave already possessed it. But when Leibniz, with\r\nhis isolated and somewhat ill-digested thoughts,\r\ncame in contact with that systematized and connected\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"28\" id=\"Page_28\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nbody of doctrines which the Cartesians\r\npresented to him in Paris, his ideas were quickened,\r\nand he felt the necessity—that final mark\r\nof the philosophic mind—of putting them in\r\norder.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAbout the method of Descartes, which Leibniz\r\nadopted from him, or rather formulated for himself\r\nunder the influence of Descartes, not much need be\r\nsaid. It was the method of Continental thought till\r\nthe time of Kant. It was the mother of the philosophic\r\nsystems of Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza.\r\nIt was equally the mother of the German \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eAufklärung\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand the French \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eéclaircissement\u003c/i\u003e. Its fundamental\r\nidea is the thought upon which Rationalism everywhere\r\nbases itself. It says: Reduce everything to\r\nsimple notions. Get clearness; get distinctness.\r\nAnalyze the complex. Shun the obscure. Discover\r\naxioms; employ these axioms in connection\r\nwith the simple notions, and build up from them.\r\nWhatever can be treated in this way is capable of\r\nproof, and only this. Leibniz, I repeat, possessed\r\nthis method in common with Descartes and Spinoza.\r\nThe certainty and demonstrativeness of mathematics\r\nstood out in the clearest contrast to the uncertainty,\r\nthe obscurity, of all other knowledge. And to them,\r\nas to all before the days of Kant, it seemed beyond\r\ndoubt that the method of mathematics consists in\r\nthe analysis of notions, and in their synthesis through\r\nthe medium of axioms, which are true because identical\r\nstatements; while the notions are true because\r\nclear and distinct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"29\" id=\"Page_29\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eAnd yet the method led Leibniz in a very different\r\ndirection. One of the fundamental doctrines, for\r\nexample, of Leibniz is the existence everywhere\r\nof minute and obscure perceptions,—which are of\r\nthe greatest importance, but of which we, at least,\r\ncan never have distinct consciousness. How is\r\nthis factor of his thought, which almost approaches\r\nmysticism, to be reconciled with the statements just\r\nmade? It is found in the different application\r\nwhich is made of the method. The object of Descartes\r\nis the \u003cem\u003eerection of a new structure of truth\u003c/em\u003e upon\r\na \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003etabula rasa\u003c/i\u003e of all former doctrines. The object\r\nof Leibniz is the \u003cem\u003einterpretation of an old body of\r\ntruth\u003c/em\u003e by a method which shall reveal it in its clearest\r\nlight. Descartes and Spinoza are “rationalists”\r\nboth in their method and results. Leibniz is a\r\n“rationalist” in his method; but his application of\r\nthe method is everywhere controlled by historic considerations.\r\nIt is, I think, impossible to over-emphasize\r\nthis fact. Descartes was profoundly\r\nconvinced that past thought had gone wrong, and\r\nthat its results were worthless. Leibniz was as\r\nprofoundly convinced that its instincts had been\r\nright, and that the general idea of the world which\r\nit gave was correct. Leibniz would have given the\r\nheartiest assent to Goethe’s saying, “\u003cspan lang=\"de\"\u003eDas Wahre\r\nwar schon längst gefunden.\u003c/span\u003e” It was out of the question,\r\nthen, that he should use the new method in any\r\nother than an interpreting way to bring out in a\r\nconnected system and unity the true meaning of the\r\nsubject-matter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"30\" id=\"Page_30\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eSo much of generality for the method of Leibniz.\r\nThe positive substance of doctrine which he developed\r\nunder scientific influence affords matter for\r\nmore discussion. Of the three influences which\r\nmeet us here, two are still Cartesian; the third is\r\nfrom the new science of biology, although not yet\r\nanswering to that name. These three influences are,\r\nin order: the idea that nature is to be explained\r\nmechanically; that this is to be brought about\r\nthrough the application of mathematics; and, from\r\nbiology, the idea that all change is of the nature of\r\ncontinuous growth or unfolding. Let us consider\r\neach in this order.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat is meant by the mechanical explanation of\r\nnature? To answer a question thus baldly put, we\r\nmust recall the kind of explanations which had satisfied\r\nthe scholastic men of science. They had been\r\nexplanations which, however true, Leibniz says, as\r\ngeneral principles, do not touch the details of the\r\nmatter. The explanations of natural facts had been\r\nfound in general principles, in substantial forces, in\r\noccult essences, in native faculties. Now, the first\r\ncontention of the founders of the modern scientific\r\nmovement was that such general considerations are\r\nnot verifiable, and that if they are, they are entirely\r\naside from the point,—they fail to explain any\r\ngiven fact. Explanation must always consist in\r\ndiscovering an immediate connection between some\r\nfact and some co-existing or preceding fact. Explanation\r\ndoes not consist in referring a fact to a\r\ngeneral power, it consists in referring it to an antecedent\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"31\" id=\"Page_31\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhose existence is its necessary condition.\r\nIt was not left till the times of Mr. Huxley to poke\r\nfun at those who would explain some concrete phenomenon\r\nby reference to an abstract principle ending\r\nin —ity. Leibniz has his word to say about those\r\nwho would account for the movements of a watch\r\nby reference to a principle of horologity, and of\r\nmill-stones by a fractive principle.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMechanical explanation consists, accordingly, in\r\nmaking out an actual connection between two existing\r\nfacts. But this does not say very much. A\r\nconnection of what kind? In the first place, a connection\r\nof the same order as the facts observed.\r\nIf we are explaining corporeal phenomena, we must\r\nfind a corporeal link; if we are explaining phenomena\r\nof motion, we must find a connection of motion.\r\nIn one of his first philosophical works Leibniz, in\r\ntaking the mechanical position, states what he means\r\nby it. In the “Confession of Nature against the\r\nAtheists” he says that it must be confessed to those\r\nwho have revived the corpuscular theory of Democritus\r\nand Epicurus, to Galileo, Bacon, Gassendi,\r\nHobbes, and Descartes, that in explaining material\r\nphenomena recourse is to be had neither to God nor\r\nto any other incorporeal thing, form, or quality,\r\nbut that all things are to be explained from the\r\nnature of matter and its qualities, especially from\r\ntheir magnitude, figure, and motion. The physics\r\nof Descartes, to which was especially due the spread\r\nof mechanical notions, virtually postulated the problem:\r\ngiven a homogeneous quantity of matter,\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"32\" id=\"Page_32\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nendowed only with extension and mobility, to account\r\nfor all material phenomena. Leibniz accepts\r\nthis mechanical view without reserve.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat has been said suggests the bearing of mathematics\r\nin this connection. Extension and mobility\r\nmay be treated by mathematics. It is indeed the\r\nbusiness of the geometer to give us an analysis of\r\nfigured space, to set before us all possible combinations\r\nwhich can arise, assuming extension only.\r\nThe higher analysis sets before us the results which\r\ninevitably follow if we suppose a moving point or\r\nany system of movements. Mathematics is thus\r\nthe essential tool for treating physical phenomena\r\nas just defined. But it is more. The mechanical\r\nexplanation of Nature not only requires such a development\r\nof mathematics as will make it applicable\r\nto the interpretation of physical facts, but the\r\nemployment of mathematics is necessary for the\r\nvery discovery of these facts. Exact observation\r\nwas the necessity of the growing physical science;\r\nand exact observation means such as will answer\r\nthe question, \u003cem\u003eHow much?\u003c/em\u003e Knowledge of nature depends\r\nupon our ability to \u003cem\u003emeasure\u003c/em\u003e her processes,—that\r\nis, to reduce distinctions of quality to those of\r\nquantity. The only assurance that we can finally\r\nhave that two facts are connected in such a way as\r\nto fulfil the requirements of scientific research, is\r\nthat there is a complete quantitative connection\r\nbetween them, so that one can be regarded as the\r\nother transformed. The advance of physical science\r\nfrom the days of Copernicus to the present\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"33\" id=\"Page_33\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nhas consisted, therefore, on one hand, in a development\r\nof mathematics which has made it possible to\r\napply it in greater and greater measure to the discussion\r\nand formulation of the results of experiment,\r\nand to deduce laws which, when interpreted\r\nphysically, will give new knowledge of fact; and,\r\non the other, to multiply, sharpen, and make precise\r\nall sorts of devices by which the processes of\r\nnature may be measured. The explanation of nature\r\nby natural processes; the complete application\r\nof mathematics to nature,—these are the two\r\nthoughts which, so far, we have seen to be fundamental\r\nto the development of the philosophy of\r\nLeibniz.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe third factor, and that which brings Leibniz\r\nnearer, perhaps, our own day than either of the others,\r\nis the growth of physiological science. Swammerdam,\r\nMalpighi, Leewenhoek,—these are names\r\nwhich occur and recur in the pages of Leibniz.\r\nIndeed, he appears to be the first of that now long\r\nline of modern philosophers to be profoundly influenced\r\nby the conception of life and the categories\r\nof organic growth. Descartes concerned himself\r\nindeed with physiological problems, but it was only\r\nwith a view to applying mechanical principles. The\r\nidea of the vital unity of all organs of the body\r\nmight seem to be attractive to one filled with the\r\nnotion of the unity of all in God, and yet Spinoza\r\nshows no traces of the influence of the organic\r\nconception. Not until Kant’s famous definition of\r\norganism do we see another philosopher moved by\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"34\" id=\"Page_34\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nan attempt to comprehend the categories of living\r\nstructure.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut it is the idea of organism, of life, which is\r\nradical to the thought of Leibniz. I do not think,\r\nhowever, that it can truly be said that he was led to\r\nthe idea simply from the state of physiological investigation\r\nat that time. Rather, he had already\r\nlearned to think of the world as organic through\r\nand through, and found in the results of biology\r\nconfirmations, apt illustrations of a truth of which\r\nhe was already thoroughly convinced. His writings\r\nshow that there were two aspects of biological science\r\nwhich especially interested him. One was the\r\nsimple fact of organism itself,—the fact of the various\r\nactivities of different organs occurring in complete\r\nharmony for one end. This presented three\r\nnotions very dear to the mind of Leibniz, or rather\r\nthree moments of the same idea,—the factors of\r\nactivity, of unity brought about by co-ordinated\r\naction, and of an end which reveals the meaning of\r\nthe activity and is the ideal expression of the unity.\r\nThe physiologists of that day were also occupied\r\nwith the problem of growth. The generalization\r\nthat all is developed \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eab ovo\u003c/i\u003e was just receiving universal\r\nattention. The question which thrust itself\r\nupon science for solution was the mode by which ova,\r\napparently homogeneous in structure, developed\r\ninto the various forms of the organic kingdom.\r\nThe answer given was “evolution.” But evolution\r\nhad not the meaning which the term has\r\nto-day. By evolution was meant that the whole\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"35\" id=\"Page_35\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ncomplex structure of man, for example, was virtually\r\ncontained in the germ, and that the apparent\r\nphenomenon of growth was not the addition of anything\r\nfrom without, but simply the unfolding and\r\nmagnifying of that already existing. It was the\r\ndoctrine which afterwards gave way to the epigenesis\r\ntheory of Wolff, according to which growth is\r\nnot mere unfolding or unwrapping, but progressive\r\ndifferentiation. The “evolution” theory was the\r\nscientific theory of the times, however, and was\r\nwarmly espoused by Leibniz. To him, as we shall\r\nsee hereafter, it seemed to give a key which would\r\nunlock one of the problems of the universe.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch, then, were the three chief generalizations\r\nwhich Leibniz found current, and which most deeply\r\naffected him. But what use did he make of them?\r\nHe did not become a philosopher by letting them\r\nlie dormant in his mind, nor by surrendering himself\r\npassively to them till he could mechanically\r\napply them everywhere. He was a philosopher\r\nonly in virtue of the active attitude which his mind\r\ntook towards them. He could not simply accept\r\nthem at their face-value; he must ask after the\r\nsource of their value, the royal stamp of meaning\r\nwhich made them a circulatory medium. That is to\r\nsay, he had to interpret these ideas, to see what\r\nthey mean, and what is the basis of their validity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNot many men have been so conscious of just the\r\nbearings of their own ideas and of their source as\r\nwas he. He often allows us a direct glimpse into\r\nthe method of his thinking, and nowhere more than\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"36\" id=\"Page_36\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhen he says: “Those who give themselves up to\r\nthe details of science usually despise abstract and\r\ngeneral researches. Those who go into universal\r\nprinciples rarely care for particular facts. But I\r\nequally esteem both.” Leibniz, in other words, was\r\nequally interested in the application of scientific\r\nprinciples to the explanation of the details of natural\r\nphenomena, and in the bearing and meaning of\r\nthe principles themselves,—a rare combination, indeed,\r\nbut one, which existing, stamps the genuine\r\nphilosopher. Leibniz substantially repeats this idea\r\nwhen he says: “Particular effects must be explained\r\nmechanically; but the general principles of\r\nphysics and mathematics depend upon metaphysics.”\r\nAnd again: “All occurs mechanically; but\r\nthe mechanical principle is not to be explained from\r\nmaterial and mathematical considerations, but it\r\nflows from a higher and a metaphysical source.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs a man of science, Leibniz might have stopped\r\nshort with the ideas of mechanical law, of the application\r\nof mathematics, and of the continuity of\r\ndevelopment. As a philosopher he could not.\r\nThere are some scientific men to whom it always\r\nseems a perversion of their principles to attempt to\r\ncarry them any beyond their application to the details\r\nof the subject. They look on in a bewildered\r\nand protesting attitude when there is suggested the\r\nnecessity of any further inquiry. Or perhaps they\r\ndogmatically deny the possibility of any such investigation,\r\nand as dogmatically assume the sufficiency\r\nof their principles for the decision of all possible\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"37\" id=\"Page_37\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nproblems. But bewildered fear and dogmatic assertion\r\nare equally impotent to fix arbitrary limits\r\nto human thought. Wherever there is a subject\r\nthat has meaning, there is a field which appeals to\r\nmind, and the mind will not cease its endeavors till\r\nit has made out what that meaning is, and has made\r\nit out in its entirety. So the three principles already\r\nspoken of were but the starting-points, the stepping-stones\r\nof Leibniz’s philosophic thought. While to\r\nphysical science they are solutions, to philosophy\r\nthey are problems; and as such Leibniz recognized\r\nthem. What solution did he give?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo far as the principle of mechanical explanation\r\nis concerned, the clew is given by considering the\r\nfactor upon which he laid most emphasis, namely,\r\nmotion. Descartes had said that the essence of the\r\nphysical world is extension. “Not so,” replied\r\nLeibniz; “It is motion.” These answers mark two\r\ntypical ways of regarding nature. According to\r\none, nature is something essentially rigid and static;\r\nwhatever change in it occurs, is a change of form,\r\nof arrangement, an external modification. According\r\nto the other, nature is something essentially\r\ndynamic and active. Change according to law is\r\nits very essence. Form, arrangement are only the\r\nresults of this internal principle. And so to Leibniz,\r\nextension and the spatial aspects of physical existence\r\nwere only secondary, they were phenomenal.\r\nThe primary, the real fact was motion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe considerations which led him to this conclusion\r\nare simple enough. It is the fact already mentioned,\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"38\" id=\"Page_38\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthat explanation always consists in reducing\r\nphenomena to a law of motion which connects them.\r\nDescartes himself had not succeeded in writing his\r\nphysics without everywhere using the conception of\r\nmotion. But motion cannot be got out of the idea\r\nof extension. Geometry will not give us activity.\r\nWhat is this, except virtually to admit the insufficiency\r\nof purely statical conceptions? Leibniz found\r\nhimself confirmed in this position by the fact that\r\nthe more logical of the followers of Descartes had\r\nrecognized that motion is a superfluous intruder, if\r\nextension be indeed the essence of matter, and therefore\r\nhad been obliged to have recourse to the immediate\r\nactivity of God as the cause of all changes.\r\nBut this, as Leibniz said, was simply to give up\r\nthe very idea of mechanical explanation, and to\r\nfall back into the purely general explanations of\r\nscholasticism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is not the place for a detailed exposition of\r\nthe ideas of Leibniz regarding matter, motion, and\r\nextension. We need here only recognize that he\r\nsaw in motion the final reality of the physical universe.\r\nBut what about motion? To many, perhaps\r\nthe majority, of minds to-day it seems useless or\r\nabsurd, or both, to ask any question about motion.\r\nIt is simply an ultimate \u003cem\u003efact\u003c/em\u003e, to which all other facts\r\nare to be reduced. We are so familiar with it as a\r\nsolution of all physical problems that we are confused,\r\nand fail to recognize it when it appears in\r\nthe guise of a problem. But, I repeat, philosophy\r\ncannot stop with facts, however ultimate. It must\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"39\" id=\"Page_39\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nalso know something about the meaning, the significance,\r\nin short the ideal bearing, of facts. From\r\nthe point of view of philosophy, motion has a certain\r\nfunction in the economy of the universe; it is,\r\nas Aristotle saw, something ideal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe name of Aristotle suggests the principles\r\nwhich guided Leibniz in his interpretation of the\r\nfact of motion. The thought of Aristotle moves\r\nabout the two poles of potentiality and actuality.\r\nPotentiality is not \u003cem\u003emere\u003c/em\u003e capacity; it is being in an\r\nundeveloped, imperfect stage. Actuality is, as the\r\nword suggests, activity. Anything is potential in\r\nso far as it does not manifest itself in action; it is\r\nactual so far as it does thus show forth its being.\r\nNow, movement, or change in its most general sense,\r\nis that by which the potential comes to the realization\r\nof its nature, and functions as an activity.\r\nMotion, then, is not an ultimate fact, but is subordinate.\r\nIt exists for an end. It is that by which\r\nexistence realizes its idea; that is, its proper type\r\nof action.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow Leibniz does not formally build upon these\r\ndistinctions; and yet he is not very far removed\r\nfrom Aristotle. Motion, he is never weary of repeating,\r\nmeans force, means energy, means activity.\r\nTo say that the essence of nature is motion, is to\r\nsay that the natural world finally introduces us to\r\nthe supremacy of action. Reality is activity. \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eSubstance\r\nc’est l’action.\u003c/i\u003e That is the key-note and the\r\nbattle-cry of the Leibnizian philosophy. Motion is\r\nthat by which being expresses its nature, fulfils its\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"40\" id=\"Page_40\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\npurpose, reveals its idea. In short, the specific\r\nscientific conception of motion is by Leibniz transformed\r\ninto the philosophic conception of force, of\r\nactivity. In motion he sees evidence of the fact\r\nthat the universe is radically dynamic.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the applicability of mathematics to the interpretation\r\nof nature Leibniz finds witness to the\r\ncontinuity and order of the world. We have become\r\nso accustomed to the fact that mathematics\r\nmay be directly employed for the discussion and\r\nformulation of physical investigations that we forget\r\nwhat is implied in it. It involves the huge assumption\r\nthat the world answers to reason; so that\r\nwhatever the mind finds to be ideally true may be\r\ntaken for granted to be physically true also. But\r\nin those days, when the correlation of the laws of\r\nthe world and the laws of mathematical reasoning\r\nwas a fresh discovery, this aspect of the case could\r\nnot be easily lost sight of.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn fact it was this correlation which filled the\r\n\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eZeitgeist\u003c/i\u003e of the sixteenth century with the idea that\r\nit had a new organ for the penetration of nature, a\r\nnew sense for learning its meaning. Descartes gives\r\nthe following as the origin of his philosophy: “The\r\nlong chains of simple and easy reasons which geometers\r\nemploy, even in their most complex demonstrations,\r\nmade me fancy that all things which are\r\nthe objects of human knowledge are \u003cem\u003esimilarly interdependent\u003c/em\u003e.”\r\nTo Leibniz also mathematics seemed\r\nto give a clew to the order, the interdependence, the\r\nharmonious relations, of the world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"41\" id=\"Page_41\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eIn this respect the feeling of Plato that God\r\ngeometrizes found an echoing response in Leibniz.\r\nBut the latter would hardly have expressed it in the\r\nsame way. He would have preferred to say that\r\nGod everywhere uses the infinitesimal calculus. In\r\nthe applicability of the calculus to the discussion\r\nof physical facts, Leibniz saw two truths reflected,—that\r\neverything that occurs has its reason, its\r\ndependent connection upon something else, and that\r\nall is continuous and without breaks. While the\r\nformal principles of his logic are those of identity\r\nand contradiction, his real principles are those of\r\nsufficient reason and of continuity. Nature never\r\nmakes leaps; everything in nature has a sufficient\r\nreason why it is as it is: these are the philosophic\r\ngeneralizations which Leibniz finds hidden in the\r\napplicability of mathematics to physical science.\r\nReason finds itself everywhere expressed in nature;\r\nand the law of reason is unity in diversity,\r\ncontinuity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us say, in a word, that the correlation between\r\nthe laws of mathematics and of physics is the evidence\r\nof the rational character of nature. Nature\r\nmay be reduced to motions; and motions can be\r\nunderstood only as force, activity. But the laws\r\nwhich connect motions are fundamentally mathematical\r\nlaws,—laws of reason. Hence force, activity,\r\ncan be understood only as rational, as\r\nspiritual. Nature is thus seen to mean Activity,\r\nand Activity is seen to mean Intelligence. Furthermore,\r\nas the fundamental law of intelligence is the\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"42\" id=\"Page_42\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nproduction of difference in unity, the primary law\r\nof physical change must be the manifestation of this\r\nunity in difference,—or, as Leibniz interpreted it,\r\ncontinuity. In nature there are no breaks, neither\r\nof quantity nor of quality nor of relationship. The\r\nfull force of this law we shall see later.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch an idea can hardly be distinguished from\r\nthe idea of growth or development; one passes\r\nnaturally into the other. Thus it is equally proper\r\nto say that the third scientific influence, the conception\r\nof organism and growth, is dominant in the\r\nLeibnizian thought, or that this is swallowed up\r\nand absorbed in the grand idea of continuity. The\r\nlaw of animal and vegetable life and the law of the\r\nuniverse are identified. The substance of the universe\r\nis activity; the law of the universe is interdependence.\r\nWhat is this but to say that the\r\nuniverse is an organic whole? Its activity is the\r\nmanifestation of life,—nay, it is life. The laws of\r\nits activity reveal that continuity of development,\r\nthat harmony of inter-relation, which are everywhere\r\nthe marks of life. The final and fundamental notion,\r\ntherefore, by which Leibniz interprets the laws of\r\nphysics and mathematics is that of Life. This is\r\nhis regnant category. It is “that higher and metaphysical\r\nsource” from which the very existence and\r\nprinciples of mechanism flow. The perpetual and\r\nubiquitous presence of motion reveals the pulsations\r\nof Life; the correlation, the rationality, of these\r\nmotions indicate the guiding presence of Life. This\r\nidea is the alpha and omega of his philosophy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"43\" id=\"Page_43\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\u003ca id=\"Chapter_III\"\u003eCHAPTER III.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eTHE PROBLEM, AND ITS SOLUTION.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"upper-case\"\u003eLeibniz\u003c/span\u003e, like every great man, absorbed into\r\nhimself the various thoughts of his time,\r\nand in absorbing transformed them. He brought\r\ninto a focus of brilliancy the diffused lights of\r\ntruth shining here and there. He summed up in a\r\npregnant and comprehensive category the scattered\r\nprinciples of his age. Yet we are not to suppose\r\nthat Leibniz considered these various ideas one by\r\none, and then patched them into an artificial unity\r\nof thought. Philosophies are not manufactured\r\npiecemeal out of isolated and fragmentary thoughts;\r\nthey grow from a single root, absorbing from their\r\nenvironment whatever of sustenance offers itself,\r\nand maturing in one splendid fruit of spiritual\r\ntruth. It is convenient, indeed, to isolate various\r\nphases of truth, and consider them as distinct\r\nforces working to shape one final product, and as a\r\nconvenient artifice it is legitimate. But it answers\r\nto no process actually occurring. Leibniz never\r\nsurrendered his personal unity, and out of some\r\none root-conception grew all his ideas. The principles\r\nof his times were not separate forces acting\r\nupon him, they were the foods of which he selected\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"44\" id=\"Page_44\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nand assimilated such as were fitted to nourish his\r\none great conception.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut it is more than a personal unity which holds\r\ntogether the thinking of a philosopher. There is\r\nthe unity of the problem, which the philosopher\r\nhas always before him, and in which all particular\r\nideas find their unity. All else issues from this\r\nand merges into it. The various influences which\r\nwe have seen affecting Leibniz, therefore, got their\r\neffectiveness from the relation which he saw them\r\nbear to the final problem of all thought. This is\r\nthe inquiry after the unity of experience, if we\r\nlook at it from the side of the subject; the unity\r\nof reality, if we put it from the objective side.\r\nYet each age states this problem in its own way,\r\nbecause it sees it in the light of some difficulty\r\nwhich has recently arisen in consciousness. At\r\none time, the question is as to the relation of the\r\none to the many; at another, of the relation of\r\nthe sensible to the intelligible world; at another,\r\nof the relation of the individual to the universal.\r\nAnd this last seems to have been the way in which\r\nit specifically presented itself to Leibniz. This\r\nway of stating it was developed, though apparently\r\nwithout adequate realization of its meaning, by\r\nthe philosophy of scholasticism. It stated the\r\nproblem as primarily a logical question,—the relation\r\nof genera, of species, of individuals to each\r\nother. And the school-boy, made after the stamp\r\nof literary tradition, knows that there were two\r\nparties among the Schoolmen,—the Realists, and\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"45\" id=\"Page_45\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe Nominalists; one asserting, the other denying,\r\nthe objective reality of universals. To regard this\r\ndiscussion as useless, is to utter the condemnation of\r\nphilosophy, and to relegate the foundation of science\r\nto the realm of things not to be inquired into.\r\nTo say that it is an easy matter to decide, is to assume\r\nthe decision with equal ease of all the problems\r\nthat have vexed the thought of humanity. To\r\nus it seems easy because we have bodily incorporated\r\ninto our thinking the results of both the\r\nrealistic and the nominalistic doctrines, without attempting\r\nto reconcile them, or even being conscious\r\nof the necessity of reconciliation. We assert in\r\none breath that the individual is alone real, and in\r\nthe next assert that only those forms of consciousness\r\nwhich represent something in the universe are\r\nto be termed knowledge. At one moment we say\r\nthat universals are creations of the individual mind,\r\nand at the next pass on to talk of laws of nature,\r\nor even of a reign of law. In other words, we have\r\nlearned to regard both the individual and the universal\r\nas real, and thus ignoring the problem, think\r\nwe have solved it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut to Leibniz the problem presented itself neither\r\nas a logical question, nor yet as one whose solution\r\nmight be taken for granted. On the contrary, it\r\nwas just this question: How shall we conceive the\r\nindividual to be related to the universe? which\r\nseemed to him to be the nerve of the philosophic\r\nproblem, the question whose right answer would\r\nsolve the problems of religion, of morals, of the\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"46\" id=\"Page_46\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nbasis of science, as well as of the nature of reality.\r\nThe importance of just this way of putting the\r\nquestion had been rendered evident by the predecessors\r\nand contemporaries of Leibniz, especially by\r\nDescartes, Spinoza, and Locke. His more specific\r\nrelations to the last-named will occupy us hereafter;\r\nat present we must notice how the question stood\r\nat the hands of Descartes and Spinoza.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eDescartes had separated the individual from the\r\nuniversal. His philosophy began and ended with\r\na dualism. I have just said that the problem of philosophy\r\nis the unity of experience. Yet we find that\r\nthere have been thinkers, and those of the first rank,\r\nwho have left the matter without discovering any\r\nultimate unity, or rather who have made it the burden\r\nof their contention that we cannot explain the\r\nworld without at least two disparate principles. But\r\nif we continue to look at the matter in this historical\r\nway, we shall see that this dualism has always been\r\ntreated by the successors of such a philosopher, not\r\nas a solution, but as a deeper statement of the problem.\r\nIt is the function of dualistic philosophies to\r\nre-state the question in a new and more significant\r\nway. There are times when the accepted unity of\r\nthought is seen to be inadequate and superficial.\r\nMen are thrashing old straw, and paying themselves\r\nwith ideas which have lost their freshness and their\r\ntimeliness. There then arises a philosopher who\r\ngoes deep, beyond the superficial unity, and who\r\ndiscovers the untouched problem. His it is to assert\r\nthe true meaning of the question, which has been\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"47\" id=\"Page_47\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nunseen or evaded. The attitude of dualism is thus\r\nalways necessary, but never final. Its value is not\r\nin any solution, but in the generality and depth of the\r\nproblem which it proposes, and which incites thought\r\nto the discovery of a unity of equal depth and comprehensiveness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eExcept for Descartes, then, we should not be conscious\r\nof the gulf that yawns between the individual\r\nmind and the universe in front of it. He presented\r\nthe opposition as between mind and matter. The\r\nessence of the former is thought; of the latter, extension.\r\nThe conceptions are disparate and opposed.\r\nNo interaction is possible. His disciples, more\r\nconsistent than their master, called in a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003edeus ex\r\nmachina\u003c/i\u003e,—the miraculous intervention of God,—in\r\norder to account for the appearance of reciprocal\r\naction between the universe of matter and the\r\nthinking individual. Thus they in substance admitted\r\nthe relation between them to be scientifically\r\ninexplicable, and had recourse to the supernatural.\r\nThe individual does not act upon the universe to\r\nproduce, destroy, or alter the arrangement of anything.\r\nBut upon the \u003cem\u003eoccasion\u003c/em\u003e of his volition God\r\nproduces a corresponding material change. The\r\nworld does not act upon the soul of the individual\r\nto produce thoughts or sensations. God, upon \u003cem\u003eoccasion\u003c/em\u003e\r\nof the external affection, brings them into\r\nbeing. With such thoroughness Descartes performed\r\nhis task of separation. Yet the introduction\r\nof the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003edeus ex machina\u003c/i\u003e only complicated the problem;\r\nit introduced a third factor where two were\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"48\" id=\"Page_48\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nalready too many. What is the relation of God to\r\nMind and to Matter? Is it simply a third somewhat,\r\nequally distinct from both, or does it contain both\r\nwithin itself?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSpinoza attempted to solve the problem in the\r\nlatter sense. He conceived God to be the one substance\r\nof the universe, possessing the two known\r\nattributes of thought and matter. These attributes\r\nare one in God; indeed, he is their unity. This is\r\nthe sole legitimate outcome of the Cartesian problem\r\nstated as Descartes would have it stated. It\r\novercomes the absoluteness of the dualism by discovering\r\na common and fundamental unity, and at\r\nthe same time takes the subject out of the realm\r\nof the miraculous. For the solution works both\r\nways. It affects the nature of God, as well as of\r\nextension and thought. It presents him to us,\r\nnot as a supernatural being, but as the unity of\r\nthought and extension. In knowing these as they\r\nare, we know God as he is. Spinoza, in other\r\nwords, uses the conception of God in a different\r\nway from the Cartesians. The latter had treated\r\nhim as the God of theology,—a being supernatural;\r\nSpinoza uses the conception as a scientific\r\none, and speaks of \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eDeus sive Natura\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz recognized the unphilosophic character\r\nof the recourse to a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003edeus ex machina\u003c/i\u003e as clearly as\r\nSpinoza, and yet did not accept his solution. To\r\nfind out why he did not is the problem of the historian\r\nof thought. The one cause which stands out\r\nabove all others is that in the unity of Spinoza all\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"49\" id=\"Page_49\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ndifference, all distinction, is lost. All particular\r\nexistences, whether things or persons, are \u003cem\u003emodes\u003c/em\u003e of\r\nextension and thought. Their \u003cem\u003eapparent\u003c/em\u003e existence\r\nis due to the imagination, which is the source of belief\r\nin particular things. When considered as they\r\nreally are,—that is, by the understanding,—they\r\nvanish. The one substance, with its two unchanging\r\nattributes of thought and extension, alone remains.\r\nIf it is a philosophic error to give a solution which\r\npermits of no unity, is it not equally a philosophic\r\nerror to give one which denies difference? So it\r\nseemed to Leibniz. The problem is to reconcile\r\ndifference in unity, not to swallow up difference in\r\na blank oneness,—to reconcile the individual with\r\nthe universe, not to absorb him.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe unsatisfactoriness of the solution appears\r\nif we look at it from another side. Difference\r\nimplies change, while a unity in which all variety\r\nis lost implies quiescence. Change is as much an\r\nillusion of imagination to Spinoza as is variety.\r\nThe One Reality is permanent. How repugnant the\r\nconception of a static universe was to Leibniz we\r\nhave already learned. Spinoza fails to satisfy\r\nLeibniz, therefore, because he does not allow the\r\nconceptions of individuality and of activity. He\r\npresents a unity in which all distinction of individuals\r\nis lost, and in which there is no room for\r\nchange. But Spinoza certainly presented the problem\r\nmore clearly to Leibniz, and revealed more\r\ndefinitely the conditions of its solution. The search\r\nis henceforth for a unity which shall avoid the irresolvable\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"50\" id=\"Page_50\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ndualism of Descartes, and yet shall allow\r\nfree play to the principles of individuality and of\r\nactivity. There must be, in short, a universe to\r\nwhich the individual bears a real yet independent\r\nrelation. What is this unity? The answer, in the\r\nphraseology of Leibniz, is the \u003cem\u003emonad\u003c/em\u003e. Spinoza\r\nwould be right, said Leibniz, were it not for the\r\nexistence of monads. I know there are some who\r\nhave done Leibniz the honor of supposing that this\r\nis his way of saying, “Spinoza is wrong because\r\nI am right;” but I cannot help thinking that the\r\nsaying has a somewhat deeper meaning. What,\r\nthen, is the nature of the monad? The answer to\r\nthis question takes us back to the point where the\r\ndiscussion of the question was left at the end of\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Chapter_II\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003echapter second\u003c/a\u003e. The nature of the monad is life.\r\nThe monad is the spiritual activity which lives in\r\nabsolute harmony with an infinite number of other\r\nmonads.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us first consider the reasons of Leibniz for\r\nconceiving the principle of unity as spiritual. Primarily\r\nit is because it is impossible to conceive of a\r\nunity which is material. In the sensible world there\r\nis no unity. There are, indeed, aggregations, collections,\r\nwhich seem like unities; but the very fact\r\nthat these are aggregations shows that the unity is\r\nfactitious. It is the very nature of matter to be infinitely\r\ndivisible: to say this is to deny the existence\r\nof any true principle of unity. The world of nature\r\nis the world of space and time; and where in space\r\nor time shall we find a unity where we may rest?\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"51\" id=\"Page_51\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nEvery point in space, every moment in time, points\r\nbeyond itself. It refers to a totality of which it is\r\nbut a part, or, rather, a limitation. If we add resistance,\r\nwe are not better situated. We have to\r\nthink of something which resists; and to this something\r\nwe must attribute extension,—that is to say,\r\ndifference, plurality. Nor can we find any resistance\r\nwhich is absolute and final. There may be a body\r\nwhich is undivided, and which resists all energy now\r\nacting upon it; but we cannot frame an intelligible\r\nidea of a body which is absolutely indivisible. To\r\ndo so is to think of a body out of all relation to existing\r\nforces, something absolutely isolated; while the\r\nforces of nature are always relative to one another.\r\nThat which resists does so in comparison with some\r\nopposing energy. The absolutely indivisible, on\r\nthe other hand, would be that which could not be\r\nbrought into comparison with other forces; it would\r\nnot have any of the attributes of force as we know\r\nit. In a word, whatever exists in nature is relative\r\nin space, in time, and in qualities to all else. It is\r\nmade what it is by virtue of the totality of its relations\r\nto the universe; it has no ultimate principle of\r\nself-subsistent unity in it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNor do we fare better if we attempt to find\r\nunity in the world of nature as a whole. Nature\r\nhas its existence as a whole in space and time. Indeed,\r\nit is only a way of expressing the totality of\r\nphenomena of space and time. It is a mere aggregate,\r\na collection. Its very essence is plurality,\r\ndifference. It is divisible without limit, and each\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"52\" id=\"Page_52\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nof its divisions has as good a right to be called one\r\nas the whole from which it is broken off. We shall\r\nconsider hereafter Leibniz’s idea of infinity; but it\r\nis easy to see that he must deny any true infinity to\r\nnature. An ultimate whole made up of parts is a\r\ncontradictory conception; and the idea of a quantitative\r\ninfinite is equally so. Quantity means number,\r\nmeasure, limitation. We may not be able to assign\r\nnumber to the totality of occurrences in nature, nor\r\nto measure her every event. This shows that nature\r\nis indefinitely greater than any \u003cem\u003eassignable\u003c/em\u003e quantity;\r\nbut it does not remove her from the category of\r\nquantity. As long as the world is conceived as\r\nthat existing in space and time, it is conceived as\r\nthat which has to be measured. As we saw in the\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Chapter_II\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003elast chapter\u003c/a\u003e, the heart of the mechanical theory of\r\nthe world is in the application of mathematics to it.\r\nSince quantity and mathematics are correlative terms,\r\nthe natural world cannot be conceived as infinite or\r\nas an ultimate unity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn short, Leibniz urges and suggests in one form\r\nand another those objections to the mechanical\r\ntheory of reality which later German philosophers\r\nhave made us so familiar with. The objections are\r\nindeed varied in statement, but they all come to the\r\nimpossibility of finding any unity, any wholeness,\r\nanything except plurality and partiality in that\r\nwhich is externally conditioned,—as everything is\r\nin nature.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the reasons as thus stated are rather negative\r\nthan positive. They show why the ultimate unity\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"53\" id=\"Page_53\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ncannot be conceived as material, rather than why it\r\nmust be conceived as spiritual. The immediate evidence\r\nof its spiritual nature Leibniz finds in the\r\nperception of the one unity directly known to us,—the\r\n“me,” the conscious principle within, which reveals\r\nitself as an active force, and as truly one, since\r\nnot a spatial or temporal existence. And this evidence\r\nhe finds confirmed by the fact that whatever\r\nunity material phenomena appear to have comes to\r\nthem through their perception by the soul. Whatever\r\nthe mind grasps in one act, is manifested as\r\none.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut it is not in any immediate certainty of fact\r\nthat Leibniz finds the best or completest demonstration\r\nof the spiritual nature of the ultimate unity.\r\nThis is found in the use which can be made of the\r\nhypothesis. The truest witness to the spiritual\r\ncharacter of reality is found in the capacity of this\r\nprinciple to comprehend and explain the facts of experience.\r\nWith this conception the reason of things\r\ncan be ascertained, and light introduced into what\r\nwere otherwise a confused obscurity. And, indeed,\r\nthis is the only sufficient proof of any doctrine. It\r\nis not what comes before the formulation of a theory\r\nwhich proves it; it is not the facts which suggest\r\nit, or the processes which lead up to it: it is what\r\ncomes after the formation of the theory,—the uses\r\nthat it can be put to; the facts which it will render\r\nsignificant. The whole philosophy of Leibniz in its\r\nsimplicity, width, and depth, is the real evidence of\r\nthe truth of his philosophical principle.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"54\" id=\"Page_54\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eThe monad, then, is a spiritual unity; it is individualized\r\nlife. Unity, activity, individuality are synonymous\r\nterms in the vocabulary of Leibniz. Every\r\nunity is a true substance, containing within itself the\r\nsource and law of its own activity. It is that which\r\nis internally determined to action. It is to be conceived\r\nafter the analogy of the soul. It is an indivisible\r\nunity, like “that particular something in us\r\nwhich thinks, apperceives and wills, and distinguishes\r\nus in a way of its own from whatever else\r\nthinks and wills.” Against Descartes, therefore,\r\nLeibniz stands for the principle of unity; against\r\nSpinoza, he upholds the doctrine of individuality, of\r\ndiversity, of multiplicity. And the latter principle\r\nis as important in his thought as the former. Indeed,\r\nthey are inseparable. The individual is the true\r\nunity. There is an infinite number of these individuals,\r\neach distinct from every other. The law\r\nof specification, of distinction, runs through the\r\nuniverse. Two beings cannot be alike. They are\r\nnot individualized merely by their different positions\r\nin space or time; duration and extension, on the\r\ncontrary, are, as we have seen, principles of relativity,\r\nof connection. Monads are specified by an\r\ninternal principle. Their distinct individuality is\r\nconstituted by their distinct law of activity. Leibniz\r\nwill not have a philosophy of abstract unity, representing\r\nthe universe as simple only, he will have a\r\nphilosophy equal to the diversity, the manifold wealth\r\nof variety, in the universe. This is only to say that\r\nhe will be faithful to his fundamental notion,—that\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"55\" id=\"Page_55\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nof Life. Life does not mean a simple unity like a\r\nmathematical one, it means a unity which is the\r\nharmony of the interplay of diverse organs, each\r\nfollowing its own law and having its own function.\r\nWhen Leibniz says, God willed to have more monads\r\nrather than fewer, the expression is indeed one of\r\n\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003enaïveté\u003c/i\u003e, but the thought is one of unexplored depth.\r\nIt is the thought that Leibniz repeats when he says,\r\n“Those who would reduce all things to modifications\r\nof one universal substance do not have sufficient regard\r\nto the \u003cem\u003eorder\u003c/em\u003e, the \u003cem\u003eharmony\u003c/em\u003e of reality.” Leibniz\r\napplies here, as everywhere, the principle of continuity,\r\nwhich is unity in and through diversity, not the\r\nprinciple of bare oneness. There is a kingdom of\r\nmonads, a realm truly infinite, composed of individual\r\nunities or activities in an absolute continuity.\r\nLeibniz was one of the first, if not the first, to use\r\njust the expression “uniformity of nature;” but\r\neven here he explains that it means “uniform in\r\nvariety, one in principle, but varied in manifestation.”\r\nThe world is to be as rich as possible.\r\nThis is simply to say that distinct individuality as\r\nwell as ultimate unity is a law of reality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut has not Leibniz fallen into a perilous position?\r\nIn avoiding the monotone of unity which\r\ncharacterizes the thought of Spinoza, has he not\r\nfallen into a lawless variety of multiplicity, infinitely\r\nless philosophic than even the dualism of Descartes,\r\nsince it has an infinity of ultimate principles instead\r\nof only two? If Spinoza sacrificed the individual\r\nto the universe, has not Leibniz, in his desire to\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"56\" id=\"Page_56\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nemphasize the individual, gone to the other extreme?\r\nApparently we are introduced to a universe that is\r\na mere aggregate of an infinite multiplicity of\r\nrealities, each independent of every other. Such\r\na universe would not be a universe. It would be\r\na chaos of disorder and conflict. We come, therefore,\r\nto a consideration of the relation between\r\nthese individual monads and the universe. We\r\nhave to discover what lifts the monads out of their\r\nisolation and bestows upon them that stamp of universality\r\nwhich makes it possible for them to enter\r\ninto the coherent structure of reality: in a word,\r\nwhat is the universal content which the monad in\r\nits formal individuality bears and manifests?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe way in which the question has just been\r\nstated suggests the Leibnizian answer. The monad,\r\nindeed, in its form is thoroughly individual,\r\nhaving its own unique mode of activity; but its\r\ncontent, that which this activity manifests, is not\r\npeculiar to it as an individual, but is the substance\r\nor law of the universe. It is the very nature of\r\nthe monad to be representative. Its activity consists\r\nin picturing or reproducing those relations\r\nwhich make up the world of reality. In a conscious\r\nsoul, the ability thus to represent the world is\r\ncalled “perception,” and thus Leibniz attributes\r\nperception to all the monads. This is not to be\r\nunderstood as a conscious representation of reality\r\nto itself (for this the term “apperception” is reserved),\r\nbut it signifies that the very essence of the\r\nmonad is to produce states which are not its own\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"57\" id=\"Page_57\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\npeculiar possessions, but which reflect the facts and\r\nrelations of the universe. Leibniz never wearies\r\nin finding new ways to express this purely representative\r\ncharacter of the monad. The monads are\r\nlittle souls; they are mirrors of the world; they\r\nare concentrations of the universe, each expressing\r\nit in its own way; borrowing a term from scholasticism,\r\nthey are “substantial forms.” They are\r\nsubstantial, for they are independent unities; they\r\nare forms, because the term “form” expresses, in\r\nAristotelian phraseology, the type or law of some\r\nclass of phenomena. The monad is an individual,\r\nbut its whole content, its objectivity or reality, is\r\nthe summation of the universe which it represents.\r\nIt is individual, but whatever marks it as actual\r\nis some reproduction of the world. His reconciliation\r\nof the principles of individuality and\r\nuniversality is contained in the following words:\r\n“Each monad contains within itself an order\r\ncorresponding to that of the universe,—indeed, the\r\nmonads represent the universe in an infinity of\r\nways, all different, and all true, thus multiplying\r\nthe universe as many times as is possible, approaching\r\nthe divine as near as may be, and giving the\r\nworld all the perfection of which it is capable.”\r\nThe monad is individual, for it represents reality in\r\nits own way, from its own point of view. It is\r\nuniversal, for its whole content is the order of the\r\nuniverse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNew light is thus thrown upon the former statement\r\nthat reality is activity, that the measure of\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"58\" id=\"Page_58\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\na being is the action which it puts forth. That\r\nstatement is purely formal. It leaves the kind of\r\nactivity and its law wholly undetermined. But\r\nthis relation of “representativeness” which we have\r\ndiscovered gives definiteness. It is the law of the\r\nmonad’s action to mirror, to reflect, the universe;\r\nits changes follow each other so as to bring about\r\nthis reflection in the completest degree possible.\r\nThe monad is literally the many in the one; it is\r\nthe answer to the inquiry of Greek philosophy.\r\nThe many are not present by way of participation\r\nin some underlying essence, not yet as statically\r\npossessed by the one, as attributes are sometimes\r\nsupposed to inhere in a substratum. The “many”\r\nis the manifestation of the activity of the “one.”\r\nThe one and the many are related as form and\r\ncontent in an organic unity, which is activity. The\r\nessence of a substance, says Leibniz, consists in\r\nthat regular tendency of action by which its phenomena\r\nfollow one another in a certain order; and\r\nthat order, as he repeatedly states, is the order in\r\nwhich the universe itself is arranged.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe activity of a monad may be advantageously\r\ncompared to that of a supposed atom, granting, for\r\nthe sake of the illustration, that there is such a thing.\r\nEach is in a state of change: the atom changes its\r\nplace, the monad its representation, and each in the\r\nsimplest and most uniform way that its conditions\r\npermit. How, then, is there such a similarity, such\r\na monotony, in the change of an atom, and such\r\nvariety and complexity in the change of a monad?\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"59\" id=\"Page_59\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nIt is because the atom has merely parts, or external\r\nvariety, while the monad has an internal\r\nvariety. Multiplicity is organically wrought into\r\nits very being. It has an \u003cem\u003eessential\u003c/em\u003e relation to all\r\nthings in the universe; and to say that this relation\r\nis essential, is to say that it is one which constitutes\r\nits very content, its being. Hence the cause\r\nof the changes of the monad, of their variety and\r\ncomplexity, is one with the cause of the richness,\r\nthe profusion, the regulated variety of change in the\r\nuniverse itself. While we have employed a comparison\r\nwith atoms, this very comparison may serve\r\nto show us the impossibility of atoms as they are\r\ngenerally defined by the physicist turned philosopher.\r\nAtoms have no internal and essential relation to the\r\nworld; they have no internal connection with any\r\none thing in the world: and what is this but to say\r\nthat they do not enter anywhere into the structure\r\nof the world? By their very conception they are forever\r\naliens, banished from any share or lot in the\r\nrealm of reality. The idea which Leibniz never\r\nlets go, the idea which he always accentuates, is,\r\nthen, the idea of an individual activity which in\r\nits continual change manifests as its own internal\r\ncontent and reality that reality and those laws of\r\nconnection which make up the world itself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe are thus introduced naturally to the conception\r\nwhich plays so large a part in the Leibnizian\r\nphilosophy, that of pre-established harmony. This\r\nterm simply names the fact, which we see to be\r\nfundamental with Leibniz,—the fact that, while\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"60\" id=\"Page_60\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe form of every monad is individuality, a unique\r\nprinciple of action, its content is universal, the very\r\nbeing and laws of the world. For we must now\r\nnotice more explicitly what has been wrapped up in\r\nthe idea all along. There is no direct influence of\r\nmonads upon each other. One cannot affect another\r\ncausally. There is no actual interaction of one upon\r\nanother. Expressed in that figurative language\r\nwhich was ever natural to Leibniz, the monads have\r\nno windows by which anything can get in or out.\r\nThis follows, of course, from the mutual independence\r\nand individuality of the monads. They\r\nare a true democracy, in which each citizen has sovereignty.\r\nTo admit external influences acting upon\r\nthem is to surrender their independence, to deny\r\ntheir sovereignty. But we must remember the other\r\nhalf. This democracy is not after the Platonic conception\r\nof democracy, in which each does as it\r\npleases, and in which there is neither order nor\r\nlaw, but the extremest assertion of individuality.\r\nWhat each sovereign citizen of the realm of reality\r\nexpresses is precisely law. Each is an embodiment\r\nin its own way of the harmony, the order, of the\r\nwhole kingdom. Each is sovereign because it is\r\ndynamic law,—law which is no longer abstract,\r\nbut has realized itself in life. Thus another way of\r\nstating the doctrine of pre-established harmony is\r\nthe unity of freedom and necessity. Each monad\r\nis free because it is individual, because it follows\r\nthe law of its own activity unhindered, unretarded,\r\nby others; it is self-determined. But it is self-determined\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"61\" id=\"Page_61\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nto show forth the order, the harmony,\r\nof the universe. There is nothing of caprice, of\r\npeculiarity, in the content of the monad. It shows\r\nforth order; it is organized by law; it reveals\r\nthe necessary connections which constitute the universe.\r\nThe pre-established harmony is the unity of\r\nthe individual and the universe; it is the organic\r\noneness of freedom and necessity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe see still further what it means when we learn\r\nthat it is by this conception that Leibniz reconciles\r\nthe conceptions of physical and final causation.\r\nThere is no principle closer to the thought of Leibniz\r\nthan that of the equal presence and efficiency everywhere\r\nof both physical and final causes. Every fact\r\nwhich occurs is susceptible of a mechanical and of\r\na rational explanation. It is necessarily connected\r\nwith preceding states, and it has a necessary end\r\nwhich it is fulfilling. The complete meaning of this\r\nprinciple will meet us hereafter; at present we must\r\nnotice that it is one form of the doctrine of pre-established\r\nharmony. All things have an end because\r\nthey form parts of one system; everything\r\nthat occurs looks forward to something else and\r\nprepares the way for it, and yet it is itself mechanically\r\nconditioned by its antecedents. This is only\r\nanother way of saying that there is complete harmony\r\nbetween all beings in the universe; so that\r\neach monad in fulfilling the law of its own existence\r\ncontributes to the immanent significance of the universe.\r\nThe monads are co-ordinated in such a way\r\nthat they express a common idea. There is a plan\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"62\" id=\"Page_62\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ncommon to all, in which each has its own place.\r\nAll are making towards one goal, expressing one\r\npurpose. The universe is an organism; and Leibniz\r\nwould have applied to it the words which Milne-Edwards\r\napplied to the human organism, as I find\r\nthem quoted by Lewes: “In the organism everything\r\nseems to be calculated with one determined\r\nresult in view; and the harmony of the parts does\r\nnot result from the influence which they exert upon\r\none another, but from their co-ordination under the\r\nrule of a common force, a preconceived plan, a\r\npre-existent force.” That is to say, the universe\r\nis teleological, both as a whole and in its parts;\r\nfor there is a common idea animating it and expressed\r\nby it; it is mechanical, for this idea is\r\nrealized and manifested by the outworking of\r\nforces.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt ought to be evident even from this imperfect\r\nsketch that the Leibnizian theory of pre-established\r\nharmony is not that utterly artificial and grotesque\r\ndoctrine which it is sometimes represented to be.\r\nThe phrase “pre-established harmony” is, strictly\r\nspeaking, tautologous. The term “pre-established”\r\nis superfluous. It means “existent.” There is no\r\nreal harmony which is not existent or pre-established.\r\nAn accidental harmony is a contradiction in terms.\r\nIt means a chaotic cosmos, an unordered order, a\r\nlawless law, or whatever else is nonsensical.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHarmony, in short, means relation, means connection,\r\nmeans subordination and co-ordination,\r\nmeans adjustment, means a variety, which yet is\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"63\" id=\"Page_63\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\none. The Leibnizian doctrine is not a factitious\r\nproduct of his imagination, nor is it a mechanical\r\nscheme for reconciling a problem which has no existence\r\noutside of the bewildered brains of philosophers.\r\nIt is an expression of the fact that the\r\nuniverse is one of order, of continuity, of unity; it\r\nis the accentuating of this doctrine so that the very\r\nessence of reality is found in this ordered combination;\r\nit is the special application of this principle\r\nto the solution of many of the problems which “the\r\nmind of man is apt to run into,”—the questions of\r\nthe relation of the individual and the universal, of\r\nfreedom and necessity, of the physical and material,\r\nof the teleological and mechanical. We may\r\nnot be contented with the doctrine as he presents\r\nit, we may think it to be rather a summary and\r\nhighly concentrated statement of the problem than\r\nits solution, or we may object to details in the carrying\r\nout of the doctrine. But we cannot deny that\r\nit is a genuine attempt to meet a genuine problem,\r\nand that it contains some, if not all, of the factors\r\nrequired for its adequate solution. To Leibniz must\r\nremain the glory of being the thinker to seize upon\r\nthe perfect unity and order of the universe as its\r\nessential characteristic, and of arranging his thoughts\r\nwith a view to discovering and expressing it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have but to notice one point more, and our\r\ntask is done so far as it serves to make plain the\r\nstandpoint from which Leibniz criticised Locke.\r\nThere is, we have seen, the greatest possible continuity\r\nand complexity in the realm of monads.\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"64\" id=\"Page_64\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nThere is no break, quantitative nor qualitative. It\r\nfollows that the human soul has no gulf set between\r\nit and what we call nature. It is only the highest,\r\nthat is to say the most active and the most representative,\r\nof all monads. It stands, indeed, at\r\nthe head of the scale, but not outside it. From\r\nthe monad which reveals its presence in that stone\r\nwhich with blinded eyes we call dead, through that\r\nwhich acts in the plant, in the animal, up to that of\r\nman, there is no chasm, no interruption. Nay, man\r\nhimself is but one link in the chain of spiritual\r\nbeings which ends only in God. All monads are\r\nsouls; the soul of man is a monad which represents\r\nthe universe more distinctly and adequately. The\r\nlaw which is enfolded in the lower monads is developed\r\nin it and forms a part of its conscious\r\nactivity. The universe, which is confusedly mirrored\r\nby the perception of the lower monad, is clearly\r\nbrought out in the conscious apperception of man.\r\nThe stone is representative of the whole world. An\r\nall-knowing intelligence might read in it relations\r\nto every other fact the world, might see exemplified\r\nthe past history of the world, and prefigured\r\nthe events to come. For the stone is not an isolated\r\nexistence, it is an inter-organic member of a system.\r\nChange the slightest fact in the world, and in some\r\nway it is affected. The law of the universe is one\r\nof completed reciprocity, and this law must be\r\nmirrored in every existence of the universe. Increase\r\nthe activity, the representative power, until\r\nit becomes turned back, as it were, upon itself,\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"65\" id=\"Page_65\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nuntil the monad not only is a mirror, but knows\r\nitself as one, and you have man. The soul of man\r\nis the world come to consciousness of itself. The\r\nrealm of monads in what we call the inorganic world\r\nand the lower organic realm shows us the monad\r\nlet and hindered in its development. These realms\r\nattempt to speak forth the law of their being, and\r\nreveal the immanent presence of the universe; but\r\nthey do not hear their own voice, their utterance is\r\nonly for others. In man the universe is manifested,\r\nand is manifested to man himself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"66\" id=\"Page_66\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\u003ca id=\"Chapter_IV\"\u003eCHAPTER IV.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eLOCKE AND LEIBNIZ.—INNATE IDEAS.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"upper-case\"\u003eThe\u003c/span\u003e reader, impatient of what may have seemed\r\nan over-long introduction, has perhaps been\r\nasking when he was to be brought to the subject\r\nunder consideration,—the relations of Leibniz to\r\nLocke. But it has been impossible to come to this\r\nquestion until we had formed for ourselves an outline\r\nof the philosophical position of Leibniz. Nowhere\r\nin the “Nouveaux Essais” does Leibniz\r\ngive a connected and detailed exposition of his philosophy,\r\neither as to his standpoint, his fundamental\r\nprinciples, or his method.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSome preliminary view of his position is therefore\r\na necessity. The demand for this preliminary\r\nexposition becomes more urgent as we recognize\r\nthat Leibniz’s remarks upon Locke are not a critique\r\nof Locke from the standpoint of the latter, but are\r\nthe application of his own philosophical conclusions.\r\nCriticism from within, an examination of a system\r\nof thought with relation to the consistency and coherency\r\nof its results, the connection between these\r\nresults and the method professedly employed, investigation\r\nwhich depends not at all upon the position\r\nof the critic, but occupies itself with the internal\r\nrelations of the system under discussion,—such\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"67\" id=\"Page_67\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ncriticism is a product of the present century. What\r\nwe find in the “Nouveaux Essais” is a comparison\r\nof the ideas of Locke with those of Leibniz himself,\r\na testing of the former by the latter as a standard,\r\ntheir acceptance when they conform, their rejection\r\nwhen they are opposed, their completion when they\r\nare in partial harmony.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe value of this sort of criticism is likely to be\r\nsmall and evanescent. If the system used as a\r\nstandard is meagre and narrow, if it is without\r\ncomprehensiveness and flexibility, it does not repay\r\nafter-examination. The fact that the “Nouveaux\r\nEssais” of Leibniz have escaped the oblivion of the\r\nphilosophical criticism of his day is proof, if proof\r\nstill be needed, of the reasoned basis, the width of\r\ngrasp, the fertility of suggestion which characterize\r\nthe thought of Leibniz. But the fact that the criticism\r\nis, after all, external and not internal has\r\nmade necessary the foregoing extended account of\r\nhis method and general results.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand, what of Locke? How about\r\nhim who is the recipient of the criticism? I assume\r\nthat no extended account of his ideas is here necessary,\r\nand conceive myself to be justified in this\r\nassumption by the fact that we are already better\r\nacquainted with Locke. This acquaintance, indeed,\r\nis not confined to those who have expressly studied\r\nLocke. His thought is an inheritance into which\r\nevery English-speaking person at least is born.\r\nOnly he who does not think escapes this inheritance.\r\nLocke did the work which he had to do so thoroughly\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"68\" id=\"Page_68\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthat every Englishman who will philosophize must\r\neither build upon Locke’s foundations, or, with conscious\r\npurpose, clear the ground before building for\r\nhimself. And it would be difficult to say that the\r\nacceptance of Locke’s views would influence one’s\r\nthought more than their rejection. This must not,\r\nof course, be taken too literally. It may be that one\r\nwho is a lineal descendant of Locke in the spiritual\r\ngenerations of thought would not state a single important\r\ntruth as Locke stated it, or that those who\r\nseek their method and results elsewhere have not\r\nrepudiated the thought of Locke as expressly belonging\r\nto him.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the fundamental principles of empiricism: its\r\nconception of intelligence as an individual possession;\r\nits idea of reality as something over\r\nagainst and distinct from mind; its explanation\r\nof knowledge as a process of action and reaction\r\nbetween these separate things; its account of our\r\ninability to know things as they really are,—these\r\nprinciples are congenital with our thinking. They\r\nare so natural that we either accept them as axiomatic,\r\nand accuse those who reject them of metaphysical\r\nsubtlety, or, staggered perchance by some of\r\ntheir results, give them up with an effort. But it is\r\nan effort, and a severe one; and there is none of us\r\nwho can tell when some remnant of the conception\r\nof intelligence as purely particular and finite will\r\ncatch him tripping. On the other hand, we realize\r\nmuch better than those who have behind them a\r\nLeibniz and a Kant, rather than a Locke and a Hume,\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"69\" id=\"Page_69\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe meaning and the thorough-going necessity of the\r\nuniversality of intelligence. Idealism must be in\r\nsome ways arbitrary and superficial to him who has\r\nnot had a pretty complete course of empiricism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz seems to have been impressed with the\r\nEssay on the Human Understanding at its first appearance.\r\nAs early as 1696 we find him writing a\r\nfew pages of comment upon the book. Compared\r\nwith his later critique, these early “reflections” seem\r\ncolorless, and give the impression that Leibniz desired\r\nto minimize his differences from Locke rather than\r\nto set them forth in relief. Comparatively slight as\r\nwere his expressions of dissent, they appear to have\r\nstung Locke when they reached him. Meantime\r\nLocke’s book was translated into French, and made\r\nits way to a wider circle of readers. This seems to\r\nhave suggested to Leibniz the advisability of pursuing\r\nhis comments somewhat further; and in the\r\nsummer of 1703 he produced the work which now\r\noccupies us. A letter which Leibniz wrote at about\r\nthis time is worth quoting at large for the light which\r\nit throws upon the man, as well as for suggesting\r\nthe chief points in which he differed from Locke.\r\nLeibniz writes:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e“I have forgotten to tell you that my comments\r\nupon the work of Locke are nearly done. As he\r\nhas spoken in a chapter of his second book about\r\nfreedom, he has given me an opportunity to discuss\r\nthat; and I hope that I may have done it in\r\nsuch a way as will please you. Above all, I have\r\nlaid it upon myself to save the immateriality of the\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"70\" id=\"Page_70\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nsoul, which Locke leaves doubtful. I justify also\r\nthe existence of innate ideas, and show that the soul\r\nproduces their perception out of itself. Axioms,\r\ntoo, I approve, while Locke has a low opinion of\r\nthem. In contradiction to him, I show that the\r\nindividuality of man, through which he preserves\r\nhis identity, consists in the duration of the simple\r\nor immaterial substance which animates him; that\r\nthe soul is never without representations; that there\r\nis neither a vacuum nor atoms; that matter, or the\r\npassive principle, cannot be conscious, excepting\r\nas God unites with it a conscious substance. We\r\ndisagree, indeed, in numerous other points, for I\r\nfind that he rates too low the noble philosophy of\r\nthe Platonic school (as Descartes did in part), and\r\nsubstitutes opinions which degrade us, and which\r\nmay become hurtful to morals, though I am persuaded\r\nthat Locke’s intention was thoroughly good.\r\nI have made these comments in leisure hours, when\r\nI have been journeying or visiting, and could not\r\noccupy myself with investigations requiring great\r\npains. The work has continued to grow under my\r\nhands, for in almost every chapter, and to a greater\r\nextent than I had thought possible, I have found\r\nmatter for remark. You will be astonished when I\r\ntell you that I have worked upon this as upon something\r\nwhich requires no great pains. But the fact\r\nis, that I long ago established the general principles\r\nof philosophic subjects in my mind in a demonstrative\r\nway, or pretty nearly so, and that they do\r\nnot require much new consideration from me.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"71\" id=\"Page_71\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eLeibniz goes on to add that he has put these\r\nreflections in the form of a dialogue that they may\r\nbe more attractive; has written them in the popular\r\nlanguage, rather than in Latin, that they may\r\nreach as wide a circle as the work of Locke; and\r\nthat he hopes to publish them soon, as Locke is\r\nalready an old man, and he wishes to get them\r\nbefore the public while Locke may still reply.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut unfortunately this last hope was destined to\r\nremain unrealized. Before the work of revision\r\nwas accomplished, Locke died. Leibniz, in a letter\r\nwritten in 1714, alludes to his controversy with\r\nLocke as follows: “I do not like the thought of\r\npublishing refutations of authors who are dead.\r\nThese should appear during their life, and be communicated\r\nto them.” Then, referring to his earlier\r\ncomments, he says: “A few remarks escaped me,\r\nI hardly know how, and were taken to England.\r\nMr. Locke, having seen them, spoke of them slightingly\r\nin a letter to Molineux. I am not astonished\r\nat it. We were somewhat too far apart in principle,\r\nand that which I suggested seemed paradoxical\r\nto him.” Leibniz, according to his conviction\r\nhere expressed, never published his “Nouveaux\r\nEssais sur l’Entendement Humain.” Schaarschmidt\r\nremarks that another reason may have restrained\r\nhim, in that he did not wish to carry on too many controversies\r\nat once with the English people. He had\r\ntwo on his hands then,—one with the Newtonians\r\nregarding the infinitesimal calculus; the other with\r\nBishop Clarke regarding the nature of God, of time\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"72\" id=\"Page_72\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nand space, of freedom, and cognate subjects.\r\nHowever, in 1765, almost fifty years after the\r\ndeath of Leibniz, his critique upon Locke finally\r\nappeared.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is somewhat significant that one whose tendency\r\nwas conciliatory, who was eminently what\r\nthe Germans delight to call him, a “mediator,”\r\nattempting to unite the varied truths which he found\r\nscattered in opposed systems, should have had so\r\nmuch of his work called forth by controversy.\r\nAside from the cases just mentioned, his other chief\r\nwork, the Theodicy, is, in form, a reply to Bayle.\r\nMany of his minor pieces are replies to criticism or\r\nare developments of his own thought with critical\r\nreference to Descartes, Malebranche, and others.\r\nBut Leibniz has a somewhat different attitude\r\ntowards his British and towards his Continental\r\nopponents. With the latter he was always in sympathy,\r\nwhile they in turn gave whatever he uttered\r\na respectful hearing. Their mutual critiques begin\r\nand end in compliments. But the Englishmen\r\nfound the thought of Leibniz “paradoxical” and\r\nforced. It seemed to them wildly speculative, and\r\nindeed arbitrary guess-work, without any special\r\nreason for its production, and wholly unverifiable in\r\nits results. Such has been the fate of much of the\r\nbest German thought since that time in the land of\r\nthe descendants of Newton and Locke. But Leibniz,\r\non the other hand, felt as if he were dealing,\r\nin philosophical matters at least, with foemen hardly\r\nworthy of his steel. Locke, he says, had subtlety\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"73\" id=\"Page_73\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nand address, and a sort of \u003cem\u003esuperficial\u003c/em\u003e metaphysics;\r\nbut he was ignorant of the method of mathematics,—that\r\nis to say, from the standpoint of Leibniz, of\r\nthe method of all science. We have already seen\r\nthat he thought the examination of a work which\r\nhad been the result of the continued labor of Locke\r\nwas a matter for the leisure hours of his courtly\r\nvisits. Indeed, he would undoubtedly have felt\r\nabout it what he actually expressed regarding his\r\ncontroversy with Clarke,—that he engaged in it\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poetry-container\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poetry\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"line\"\u003e“Ludus et jocus, quia in philosophia\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"line\"\u003eOmnia percepi atque animo mecum ante peregi.”\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"no-indent\"\u003eHe regarded the English as superficial and without\r\ngrasp of principles, as they thought him over-deep\r\nand over-theoretical.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom this knowledge of the external circumstances\r\nof the work of Leibniz and its relation to\r\nLocke, it is necessary that we turn to its internal\r\ncontent, to the thought of Leibniz as related to the\r\nideas of Locke. The Essay on the Human Understanding\r\nis, as the name implies, an account of the\r\nnature of knowledge. Locke tells us that it originated\r\nin the fact that often, when he had been engaged\r\nin discussions with his friends, they found\r\nthemselves landed in insoluble difficulties. This\r\noccurred so frequently that it seemed probable that\r\nthey had been going at matters from the wrong side,\r\nand that before they attempted to come to conclusions\r\nabout questions they ought to examine the capacity\r\nof intelligence, and see whether it is fitted\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"74\" id=\"Page_74\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nto deal with such questions. Locke, in a word, is\r\nanother evidence of that truth which lies at the\r\nbasis of all forms of philosophical thought, however\r\nopposed they may be to one another,—the truth that\r\nknowledge and reality are so organic to each other\r\nthat to come to any conclusion about one, we must\r\nknow something about the other. Reality equals\r\nobjects known or knowable, and knowledge equals\r\nreality dissolved in ideas,—reality which has become\r\ntranslucent through its meaning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLocke’s Essay is, then, an account of the origin,\r\nnature, extent, and limitations of human knowledge.\r\nSuch is its subject-matter. What is its method?\r\nLocke himself tells us that he uses the “plain historical\r\nmethod.” We do not have to resort to the\r\nforcing of language to learn that this word “historical”\r\ncontains the key to his work. Every page\r\nof the Essay is testimony to the fact that Locke\r\nalways proceeds by inquiring into the way and\r\ncircumstances by which knowledge of the subject\r\nunder consideration came into existence and into\r\nthe conditions by which it was developed. Origin\r\nmeans with Locke, not logical dependence, but temporal\r\nproduction; development means temporal\r\nsuccession. In the language of our day, Locke’s\r\nEssay is an attempt to settle ontological questions\r\nby a psychological method. And as we have before\r\nnoticed, Leibniz meets him, not by inquiry into the\r\npertinence of the method or into the validity of\r\nresults so reached, but by the more direct way of\r\nimpugning his psychology, by substituting another\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"75\" id=\"Page_75\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ntheory of the nature of mind and of the way in\r\nwhich it works.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe questions with which the discussion begins\r\nare as to the existence of innate ideas, and as to\r\nwhether the soul always thinks,—questions which\r\nupon their face will lead the experienced reader of\r\nto-day to heave a sigh in memory of hours wasted\r\nin barren dispute, and which will create a desire to\r\nturn elsewhere for matter more solid and more\r\nnutritive. But in this case, under the form which\r\nthe discussion takes at the hands of Leibniz, the\r\nquestion which awaits answer under the meagre and\r\nworn-out formula of “innate ideas” is the function\r\nof intelligence in experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLocke denies, and denies with great vigor, the\r\nexistence of innate ideas. His motives in so doing\r\nare practical and theoretical. He sees almost every\r\nold idea, every hereditary prejudice, every vested\r\ninterest of thought, defended on the ground that\r\nit is an innate idea. Innate ideas were sacred, and\r\neverything which could find no defence before\r\nreason was an innate idea. Under such circumstances\r\nhe takes as much interest in demolishing\r\nthem as Bacon took in the destruction of the\r\n“eidols.” But this is but a small portion of the\r\nobject of Locke. He is a thorough-going empiricist;\r\nand the doctrine of innate ideas appears to\r\noffer the greatest obstacle to the acceptance of the\r\ntruth that all the furnishing of the intellect comes\r\nfrom experience. Locke’s metaphors for the mind\r\nare that it is a blank tablet, an empty closet, an\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"76\" id=\"Page_76\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nunwritten book. The “innate idea” is only a sentence\r\nwritten by experience, but which, deified by a\r\ncertain school of philosophers, has come to be\r\nregarded as eternally imprinted upon the soul.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch, indeed, is Locke’s understanding of the\r\nnature of innate ideas. He conceives of them as\r\n“characters \u003cem\u003estamped\u003c/em\u003e, as it were, upon the mind of\r\nman, which the soul has received in its first being\r\nand brings into the world with it;” or they are\r\n“constant \u003cem\u003eimpressions\u003c/em\u003e which the souls of men\r\nreceive in their first beings.” They are “truths\r\n\u003cem\u003eimprinted\u003c/em\u003e upon the soul.” Having this conception\r\nof what is meant by “innate ideas,” Locke sets\r\nhimself with great vigor, and, it must be confessed,\r\nwith equal success, to their annihilation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHis argument is somewhat diffuse and scattered,\r\nbut in substance it is as follows: Whatever is in\r\nthe mind, the mind must be conscious of. “To be\r\nin the mind and not to be perceived, is all one as to\r\nsay that anything is and is not in the mind.” If\r\nthere be anything in the mind which is innate, it\r\nmust be present to the consciousness of all, and, it\r\nwould seem, of all at all times, savages, infants,\r\nand idiots included. And as it requires little philosophical\r\npenetration to see that savages do not\r\nponder upon the principle that whatever is, is; that\r\ninfants do not dwell in their cradle upon the thought\r\nof contradiction, or idiots ruminate upon that of\r\nexcluded middle,—it ought to be evident that such\r\ntruths cannot be innate. Indeed, we must admit,\r\nwith Locke, that probably few men ever come to\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"77\" id=\"Page_77\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe explicit consciousness of such ideas, and that\r\nthese few are such as direct their minds to the\r\nmatter with some pains. Locke’s argument may be\r\nsummed up in his words: If these are not notions\r\nnaturally imprinted, how can they be innate? And\r\nif they are notions naturally imprinted, how can\r\nthey be unknown?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut since it may be said that these truths are in\r\nthe mind, but in such a way that it is only when\r\nthey are proposed that men assent to them, Locke\r\ngoes on to clinch his argument. If this be true, it\r\nshows that the ideas are not innate; for the same\r\nthing is true of a large number of scientific truths,\r\nthose of mathematics and morals, as well as of\r\npurely sensible facts, as that red is not blue, sweet\r\nis not sour, etc.,—truths and facts which no one\r\ncalls innate. Or if it be said that they are in the\r\nmind implicitly or potentially, Locke points out\r\nthat this means either nothing at all, or else that\r\nthe mind is \u003cem\u003ecapable\u003c/em\u003e of knowing them. If this is\r\nwhat is meant by innate ideas, then all ideas are\r\ninnate; for certainly it cannot be denied that the\r\nmind is capable of knowing all that it ever does\r\nknow, or, as Locke ingenuously remarks, “nobody\r\never denied that the mind was capable of knowing\r\nseveral truths.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is evident that the force of Locke’s contention\r\nagainst innate ideas rests upon a certain theory\r\nregarding the nature of innate ideas and of the\r\nrelations of consciousness to intelligence. Besides\r\nthis, there runs through his whole polemic the\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"78\" id=\"Page_78\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nassertion that, after all, innate ideas are useless, as\r\nexperience, in the sense of impressions received\r\nfrom without, and the formal action of intelligence\r\nupon them, is adequate to doing all they are supposed\r\nto do. It is hardly too much to say that the\r\nnerve of Locke’s argument is rather in this positive\r\nassertion than in the negations which he brings\r\nagainst this existence. Leibniz takes issue with\r\nhim on each of these three points. He has another\r\nconception of the very nature of innate ideas; he\r\ndenies Locke’s opinions about consciousness; he\r\nbrings forward an opposed theory upon the relation\r\nof experience to reason. This last point we shall\r\ntake up in a \u003ca href=\"#Chapter_V\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003echapter by itself\u003c/a\u003e, as its importance extends\r\nfar beyond the mere question as to the existence\r\nof ideas which may properly be called innate.\r\nThe other two questions, as to the real character of\r\ninnate ideas and the relation of an idea to consciousness,\r\nafford material to occupy us for the present.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe metaphor which Locke constantly uses is the\r\nclew to his conception of innate ideas. They are\r\ncharacters stamped or imprinted upon the mind,\r\nthey exist \u003cem\u003ein\u003c/em\u003e the mind. The mind would be just\r\nwhat it is, even if they had no existence. It would\r\nnot have quite so much “in” it, but its own nature\r\nwould not be changed. Innate ideas he conceives\r\nas bearing a purely external relation to mind. They\r\nare not organic to it, nor necessary instruments\r\nthrough which it expresses itself; they are mechanically\r\nimpressed upon it. But what the “intellectual”\r\nschool had meant by innate ideas was precisely\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"79\" id=\"Page_79\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthat the relation of ideas to intelligence is \u003cem\u003enot\u003c/em\u003e that of\r\npassive holding or containing on the side of mind,\r\nand of impressions or stamps on the side of the\r\nideas. Locke reads the fundamental category of\r\nempiricism—mechanical relation, or external action—into\r\nthe nature of innate ideas, and hence easily\r\ninfers their absurdity. But the object of the upholders\r\nof innate ideas had been precisely to deny\r\nthat this category was applicable to the whole of\r\nintelligence. By an innate idea they meant an assertion\r\nof the dynamic relation of intelligence and\r\nsome of its ideas. They meant to assert that intelligence\r\nhas a structure, which necessarily functions\r\nin certain ways. While Locke’s highest conception\r\nof an innate idea was that it must be something ready\r\nmade, dwelling in the mind prior to experience,\r\nLeibniz everywhere asserts that it is a connection\r\nand relation which forms the logical prius and the\r\npsychological basis of experience. He finds no\r\ndifficulty in admitting all there is of positive truth in\r\nLocke’s doctrine; namely, that we are not conscious\r\nof these innate ideas until a period later than that in\r\nwhich we are conscious of sensible facts, or, in many\r\ncases, are not conscious of them at all. This priority\r\nin time of sensible experience to rational knowledge,\r\nhowever, can become a reason for denying the\r\n“innate” character of the latter only when we\r\nsuppose that they are two entirely different orders\r\nof fact, one knowledge due to experience, the other\r\nknowledge already formed and existing in the mind\r\nprior to “experience.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"80\" id=\"Page_80\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eLeibniz’s conception of the matter is brought out\r\nwhen he says that it is indeed true that we begin\r\nwith particular experiences rather than with\r\ngeneral principles, but that the order of nature\r\nis the reverse, for the ground, the basis of the particular\r\ntruths is in the general; the former being in\r\nreality only instances of the latter. General principles,\r\nhe says, enter into \u003cem\u003eall\u003c/em\u003e our thoughts, and form\r\ntheir soul and interconnection. They are as necessary\r\nfor thought as muscles and tendons are for\r\nwalking, although we may not be conscious of their\r\nexistence. This side of the teaching of Leibniz\r\nconsists, accordingly, in the assertion that “innate”\r\nknowledge and knowledge derived from experience\r\nare not two kinds of knowledge, but rather two\r\nways of considering it. If we consider it as it\r\ncomes to us, piecemeal and fragmentary, a succession\r\nof particular instances, to be gathered up at a\r\nfuture time into general principles, and stated in a\r\nrational form, it is seen as empirical. But, after all,\r\nthis is only a superficial and external way of looking\r\nat it. If we examine into it we shall see that there\r\nare contained in these transitory and particular experiences\r\ncertain truths more general and fundamental,\r\nwhich condition them, and at the same time\r\nconstitute their meaning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we inquire into the propriety of calling these\r\ntruths “innate,” we find it is because they are native\r\nto intelligence, and are not acquisitions which\r\nit makes. Indeed, it may be said that they \u003cem\u003eare\u003c/em\u003e intelligence,\r\nso close and organic is their relation,\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"81\" id=\"Page_81\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\njust as the muscles, the tendons, the skeleton, are\r\nthe body. Thus it is that Leibniz accepts the statement,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eNihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nwith the addition of the statement \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003enisi ipse intellectus\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThe doctrine of the existence of innate ideas\r\nis thus shown to mean that intelligence exists with\r\na real content which counts for something in the\r\nrealm of experience. If we take intelligence and\r\nexamine into its structure and ascertain its modes\r\nof expression, we find organically inherent in its\r\nactivity certain conceptions like unity, power, substance,\r\nidentity, etc., and these we call “innate.”\r\nAn idea, in short, is no longer conceived as something\r\nexisting in the mind or in consciousness; it is\r\nan activity of intelligence. An innate idea is a\r\nnecessary activity of intelligence; that is, such\r\nan activity as enters into the framework of all\r\nexperience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz thus succeeds in avoiding two errors into\r\nwhich philosophers whose general aims are much\r\nlike his have fallen. One is dividing \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ea posteriori\u003c/i\u003e truths from each other by a hard and\r\nfixed line, so that we are conceived to have some\r\nknowledge which comes wholly from experience,\r\nwhile there is another which comes wholly from reason.\r\nAccording to Leibniz, there is no thought so\r\nabstract that it does not have its connection with a\r\nsensible experience, or rather its embodiment in it.\r\nAnd, on the other hand, there is no experience so\r\nthoroughly sensuous that it does not bear in itself\r\ntraces of its origin in reason. “\u003cem\u003eAll\u003c/em\u003e our thoughts\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"82\" id=\"Page_82\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ncome from the depths of the soul,” says Leibniz;\r\nthere are none that “come” to us from without.\r\nThe other error is the interpretation of the existence\r\nof innate ideas or “intuitions” (as this school generally\r\ncalls them) in a purely formal sense. They\r\nare thus considered as truths contained in and somehow\r\nexpressed by intelligence, but yet not so connected\r\nwith it that in knowing them we necessarily\r\nknow intelligence itself. They are considered rather\r\nas arbitrary determinations of truths by a power\r\nwhose own nature is conceivably foreign to truth,\r\nthan as so many special developments of an activity\r\nwhich may indifferently be called “intelligence” or\r\n“truth.” Leibniz, however, never fails to state that\r\nan innate truth is, after all, but one form or aspect\r\nof the activity of the mind in knowing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this way, by bringing to light a deeper and\r\nricher conception of what in reality constitutes an\r\ninnate idea, Leibniz answers Locke. His reply is\r\nindirect; it consists rather in throwing a flood of\r\nnew light upon the matter discussed, than in a ponderous\r\nresponse and counter-attack. But when\r\nLeibniz touches upon the conception of a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003etabula\r\nrasa\u003c/i\u003e, of a mind which in itself is a mere blank, but\r\nhas the capacity for knowing, he assumes the offensive.\r\nThe idea of a bare capacity, a formal faculty,\r\nof power which does not already involve some actual\r\ncontent within itself, he repudiates as a relic of\r\nscholasticism. What is the soul, which has nothing\r\nuntil it gets it from without? The doctrine of a\r\nvacuum, an emptiness which is real, is always absurd;\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"83\" id=\"Page_83\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nand it is doubly so when to this vacuum is ascribed\r\npowers of feeling and thinking, as Locke does. Accepting\r\nfor the moment the metaphor of a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003etabula\r\nrasa\u003c/i\u003e, Leibniz asks where we shall find a tablet which\r\nyet does not have some quality, and which is not a\r\nco-operating cause, at least, in whatever effects are\r\nproduced upon it? The notion of a soul without\r\nthought, an empty tablet of the soul, he says, is one\r\nof a thousand fictions of philosophers. He compares\r\nit with the idea of “space empty of matter,\r\nabsolute uniformity or homogeneity, perfect spheres\r\nof the second element produced by primordial perfect\r\ncubes, abstractions pure and simple, to which our\r\nignorance and inattention give birth, but of which\r\nreality does not admit.” If Locke admits then\r\n(as he does) certain capacities inherent in the soul,\r\nhe cannot mean the scholastic fiction of bare capacity\r\nor mere possibility; he must mean “real\r\npossibilities,”—that is, capacities accompanied with\r\nsome actual tendency, an inclination, a disposition,\r\nan aptitude, a preformation which determines our\r\nsoul in a certain direction, and which makes it necessary\r\nthat the possibility becomes actual. And this\r\ntendency, this actual inclination of intelligence in\r\none way rather than another, so that it is not a\r\nmatter of indifference to intelligence what it produces,\r\nis precisely what constitutes an innate idea.\r\nSo Leibniz feels certain that at bottom Locke must\r\nagree with him in this matter if the latter is really in\r\nearnest in rejecting the “faculties” of the scholastics\r\nand in wishing for a real explanation of knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"84\" id=\"Page_84\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eBut the argument of Locke rests upon yet another\r\nbasis. He founds his denial of innate ideas not\r\nonly upon a static conception of their ready made\r\nexistence “in” the soul, but also upon an equally\r\nmechanical conception of consciousness. “Nothing\r\ncan be in the mind which is not in consciousness.”\r\nThis statement appears axiomatic to Locke, and by\r\nit he would settle the whole discussion. Regarding\r\nit, Leibniz remarks that if Locke has such a prejudice\r\nas this, it is not surprising that he rejects innate\r\nideas. But consciousness and mental activity are\r\nnot thus identical. To go no farther, the mere\r\nempirical fact of memory is sufficient to show the\r\nfalsity of such an idea. Memory reveals that we\r\nhave an indefinite amount of knowledge of which\r\nwe are not always conscious. Rather than that\r\nknowledge and consciousness are one, it is true\r\nthat actual consciousness only lays hold of an\r\ninfinitesimal fraction of knowledge. But Leibniz\r\ndoes not rely upon the fact of memory alone. We\r\nmust constantly keep in mind that to Leibniz the\r\nsoul is not a form of being wholly separate from\r\nnature, but is the culmination of the system of\r\nreality. The reality is everywhere the monad, and\r\nthe soul is the monad with the power of feeling,\r\nremembering, and connecting its ideas. The activities\r\nof the monad, those representative changes\r\nwhich sum up and symbolize the universe, do not\r\ncease when we reach the soul. They are continued.\r\nIf the soul has the power of attention, they are\r\npotentially conscious. Such as the soul actually\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"85\" id=\"Page_85\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nattends to, thus giving them relief and making\r\nthem distinct, are actually conscious. But all of\r\nthem exist.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus it is that Leibniz not only denies the equivalence\r\nof soul and consciousness, but asserts that\r\nthe fundamental error of the psychology of the\r\nCartesians (and here, at least, Locke is a Cartesian)\r\nis in identifying them. He asserts that “unconscious\r\nideas” are of as great importance in psychology\r\nas molecules are in physics. They are the link\r\nbetween unconscious nature and the conscious soul.\r\nNothing happens all at once; nature never makes\r\njumps; these facts stated in the law of continuity\r\nnecessitate the existence of activities, which may\r\nbe called ideas, since they belong to the soul and\r\nyet are not in consciousness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen, therefore, Locke asks how an innate idea\r\ncan exist and the soul not be conscious of it, the\r\nanswer is at hand. The “innate idea” exists as\r\nan activity of the soul by which it represents—that\r\nis, expresses—some relation of the universe, although\r\nwe have not yet become conscious of what\r\nis contained or enveloped in this activity. To become\r\nconscious of the innate idea is to lift it from\r\nthe sphere of nature to the conscious life of spirit.\r\nAnd thus it is, again, that Leibniz can assert that all\r\nideas whatever proceed from the depths of the soul.\r\nIt is because it is the very being of the soul as a\r\nmonad to reflect “from its point of view” the world.\r\nIn this way Leibniz brings the discussion regarding\r\ninnate ideas out of the plane of examination into a\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"86\" id=\"Page_86\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nmatter of psychological fact into a consideration\r\nof the essential nature of spirit. An innate idea\r\nis now seen to be one of the relations by which the\r\nsoul reproduces some relation which constitutes the\r\nuniverse of reality, and at the same time realizes its\r\nown individual nature. It is one reflection from\r\nthat spiritual mirror, the soul. With this enlarged\r\nand transformed conception of an idea apt to be so\r\nmeagre we may well leave the discussion. There\r\nhas been one mind at least to which the phrase\r\n“innate ideas” meant something worth contending\r\nfor, because it meant something real.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"87\" id=\"Page_87\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\u003ca id=\"Chapter_V\"\u003eCHAPTER V.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eSENSATION AND EXPERIENCE.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"upper-case\"\u003eA careful\u003c/span\u003e study of the various theories which\r\nhave been held concerning sensation would\r\nbe of as much interest and importance as an investigation\r\nof any one point in the range of philosophy.\r\nIn the theory of a philosopher about\r\nsensation we have the reflex of his fundamental\r\ncategory and the clew to his further doctrine.\r\nSensation stands on the border-line between the\r\nworld of nature and the realm of soul; and every\r\nadvance in science, every development of philosophy,\r\nleaves its impress in a change in the theory\r\nof sensation. Apparently one of the simplest and\r\nmost superficial of questions, in reality it is one of\r\nthe most difficult and far-reaching. At first sight\r\nit seems as if it were a sufficient account of sensation\r\nto say that an object affects the organ of sense,\r\nand thus impresses upon the mind the quality which\r\nit possesses. But this simple statement arouses a\r\nthrong of further questions: How is it possible\r\nthat one substance,—matter,—should affect another,—mind?\r\nHow can a causal relation exist\r\nbetween them? Is the mind passive or active in\r\nthis impression? How can an object convey unchanged\r\nto the mind a quality which it possesses?\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"88\" id=\"Page_88\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nOr is the sensational \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003equale\u003c/i\u003e itself a product of the\r\nmind’s activity? If so, what is the nature of the object\r\nwhich excites the sensation? As known, it is\r\nonly a collection of sensuous qualities; if these\r\nare purely mental, what becomes of the object?\r\nAnd if there is no object really there, what is it\r\nthat excites the sensation? Such questionings\r\nmight be continued almost indefinitely; but those\r\ngiven are enough to show that an examination of\r\nthe nature and origin of sensation introduces us to\r\nthe problems of the relation of intelligence and the\r\nworld; to the problem of the ultimate constitution\r\nof an object which is set over against a subject\r\nand which affects it; and to the problem of the\r\nnature of mind, which as thus affected from without\r\nmust be limited in its nature, but which as\r\nbearer of the whole known universe must be in\r\nsome sense infinite. If we consider, not the mode\r\nof production of sensation, but its relation to knowledge,\r\nwe find philosophical schools divided into two,—Sensationalists,\r\nand Rationalists. If we inquire\r\ninto its functions, we find that the empiricist sees\r\nin it convincing evidence of the fact that all knowledge\r\noriginates from a source \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eextra mentem\u003c/i\u003e; that\r\nthe intellectual idealist finds in it evidence of the\r\ngradual transition of nature into spirit; that the\r\nethical idealist, like Kant and Fichte, sees in it\r\nthe material of the phenomenal world, which is\r\nnecessary in its opposition to the rational sphere\r\nin order that there may occur that conflict of pure\r\nlaw and sensuous impulse which alone makes morality\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"89\" id=\"Page_89\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\npossible. We thus realize that as we look\r\nat the various aspects of sensation, we are taken\r\ninto the discussion of ontology, of the theory of\r\nknowledge and of ethics.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLocke virtually recognizes the extreme importance\r\nof the doctrine of sensation, and his second book\r\nmight almost be entitled “Concerning the Nature\r\nand Products of Sensation.” On the other hand,\r\none of the most characteristic and valuable portions\r\nof the reply of Leibniz is in his development of\r\na theory of sensation which is thoroughly new,\r\nexcept as we seek for its germs in its thoughts of\r\nPlato and Aristotle. According to Locke, knowledge\r\noriginates from two sources,—sensation and\r\nreflection. Sensations are “the impressions made\r\non our senses by outward objects that are extrinsic\r\nto the mind.” When the mind “comes to reflect\r\non its own operations about the ideas got by sensation,\r\nand thereby stores itself with a new set of\r\nideas,” it gets ideas of reflection.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we leave out of account for the present the\r\nideas of reflection, we find that the ideas which come\r\nthrough sensation have two main characteristics.\r\nFirst, in having sensations, the mind is passive;\r\nits part is purely receptive. The objects impress\r\nthemselves upon the mind, they obtrude into consciousness,\r\nwhether the mind will or not. There is\r\na purely external relation existing between sensation\r\nand the understanding. The ideas are offered\r\nto the mind, and the understanding cannot refuse\r\nto have them, cannot change them, blot them out,\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"90\" id=\"Page_90\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nnor create them, any more than a mirror can refuse,\r\nalter, or obliterate the images which objects produce\r\nin it. Sensation, in short, is a purely passive having\r\nof ideas. Secondly, every sensation is simple.\r\nLocke would say of sensations what Hume said of\r\nall ideas,—every distinct sensation is a separate\r\nexistence. Every sensation is “uncompounded,\r\ncontaining nothing but one uniform appearance,\r\nnot being distinguishable into different ideas.”\r\nKnowledge is henceforth a process of compounding,\r\nof repeating, comparing, and uniting sensation.\r\nMan’s understanding “reaches no further\r\nthan to compound and divide the materials that\r\nare made to his hand.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt hardly need be said that Locke has great difficulty\r\nin keeping up this thoroughly atomic theory\r\nof mind. It is a theory which makes all relations\r\nexternal; they are, as Locke afterwards says, “superinduced”\r\nupon the facts. It makes it impossible\r\nto account for any appearance of unity and\r\nconnection among ideas, and Locke quietly, and\r\nwithout any consciousness of the contradiction involved,\r\nintroduces certain inherent relations into the\r\nstructure of the ideas when he comes to his constructive\r\nwork. “Existence and unity are two ideas,” he\r\nsays, “that are suggested to the understanding by\r\nevery object without, and every idea within.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAt other places he introduces the idea of quality\r\nof a substance, effect of a cause, continued permanence\r\nor identity into a sensation, as necessary\r\nconstituents of it; thus making a sensation a unity\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"91\" id=\"Page_91\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nof complex elements instead of an isolated bare\r\nnotion. How far he could have got on in his account\r\nof knowledge without this surreptitious qualifying\r\nof a professedly simple existence, may be\r\nseen by asking what would be the nature of a sensation\r\nwhich did not possess existence and unity,\r\nand which was not conceived as the quality of a\r\nthing or as the effect of an external reality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis digression has been introduced at this point\r\nbecause the next character of a sensation which\r\nLocke discusses is its objective character,—its relation\r\nto the object which produces it. To discourse\r\nof our ideas intelligibly, he says, it will be convenient\r\nto distinguish them as they are ideas in our\r\nminds and as they are modifications of matter in\r\nthe bodies that cause them. In other words, he\r\ngives up all thought of considering ideas as simply\r\nmental modifications, and finds it necessary to take\r\nthem in their relations to objects.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTaking them in this way, he finds that they are\r\nto be divided into two classes, of which one contains\r\nthose ideas that are copies and resemblances of\r\nqualities in the objects, ideas “which are really in\r\nthe object, whether we take notice of them or no,”—in\r\nwhich case we have an idea of the thing as it is\r\nin itself; while the other class contains those which\r\nare in no way resemblances of the objects which\r\nproduce them, “having no more similitude than\r\nthe idea of pain and of a sword.” The former are\r\nprimary qualities, and are solidity, extension, figure,\r\nmotion or rest, and number; while the secondary\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"92\" id=\"Page_92\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nqualities are colors, smells, and tastes. The former\r\nideas are produced by impulse of the bodies themselves,\r\nwhich simply effect a transference of their\r\nqualities over into the mind; while the secondary\r\nqualities are arbitrarily annexed by the power of\r\nGod to the objects which excite them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt will be noticed that there are two elements\r\nwhich make the sensation of Locke what it is.\r\nWith reference to its \u003cem\u003eproduction\u003c/em\u003e, it is the effect\r\nwhich one substance, matter, has upon another substance,\r\nmind, which is unlike it in nature, and between\r\nwhich whatever relations exist, are thoroughly\r\nincomprehensible, so that, indeed, their connections\r\nwith each other can be understood only by recourse\r\nto a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003etertium quid\u003c/i\u003e, an omnipotent power which can\r\narbitrarily produce such collocations as please it.\r\nWith reference to its \u003cem\u003efunction\u003c/em\u003e, it is the isolated\r\nand “simple” (that is, non-relational) element out\r\nof which all actual forms of knowledge are made by\r\ncomposition and re-arrangement.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz, without entering into explicit criticism of\r\njust these two points, develops his own theory with\r\nreference to them. To Leibniz, reality constitutes\r\na system; that is, it is of such a nature that its\r\nvarious portions have an essential and not merely\r\nexternal relation to one another. Sensation is of\r\ncourse no exception. It is not a mere accident,\r\nnor yet a supernatural yoking of things naturally\r\nopposed. It has a meaning in that connection of\r\nthings which constitute the universe. It contributes\r\nto the significance of the world. It is one\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"93\" id=\"Page_93\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nway in which those activities which make the real\r\nexpress themselves. It has its place or reason in\r\nthe totality of things, and this whether we consider\r\nits origin or its position with regard to knowledge.\r\nIn a word, while the characteristic of Locke’s theory\r\nis that he conceives sensation as in external relation\r\nboth to reality, as mechanically produced by\r\nit, and to knowledge, as being merely one of the\r\natomic elements which may enter into a compound,\r\nLeibniz regards reality as organic to sensation, and\r\nthis in turn as organic to knowledge. We have\r\nhere simply an illustration of the statement with\r\nwhich we set out; namely, that the treatment of\r\nsensation always reflects the fundamental philosophical\r\ncategory of the philosopher.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll reality exists in the form of monads; monads\r\nare simple substances whose nature is action;\r\nthis action consists in representing, according to a\r\ncertain law of succession, the universe. Various\r\nmonads have various degrees of activity; that is,\r\nof the power of reflecting the world. So much of\r\nLeibniz’s general philosophical attitude it is necessary\r\nto recall, to understand what he means by\r\n“sensation.” The generic name which is applied\r\nto this mirroring activity of the monads is “perception,”\r\nwhich, as Leibniz often says, is to be carefully\r\ndistinguished from apperception, which is the\r\nrepresentation become conscious. Perception may\r\nbe defined, therefore, as the inclusion of the many\r\nor multiform (the world of objects) in a unity (the\r\nsimple substance). It was the great defect of previous\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"94\" id=\"Page_94\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nphilosophy that it “considered only spirits or\r\nself-conscious beings as souls,” and had consequently\r\nrecognized only conscious perceptions. It\r\nhad been obliged, therefore, to make an impassable\r\ngulf between mind and matter, and sensations were\r\nthus rendered inexplicable. But Leibniz finds his\r\nfunction as a philosopher in showing that these problems,\r\nwhich seem insoluble, arise when we insist\r\nupon erecting into actual separations or differences\r\nof kind what really are only stages of development\r\nor differences of degree. A sensation is not\r\nan effect which one substance impresses upon\r\nanother because God pleased that it should, or\r\nbecause of an incomprehensible incident in the\r\noriginal constitution of things. It is a higher\r\ndevelopment of that representative power which\r\nbelongs to every real being.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCertain monads reach a state of development,\r\nor manifestation of activity, which is characterized\r\nby the possession of distinct organs. Such monads\r\nmay be called, in a pre-eminent sense, “souls,” and\r\ninclude all the higher animals as well as man. This\r\npossession of differentiated organs finds its analogue\r\nin the internal condition of the monad. What appears\r\nexternally as an organ of sense appears\r\nideally as a conscious representative state which we\r\ncall “sensation.” “When,” Leibniz says, “the monad\r\nhas its organs so developed that there is relief\r\nand differentiation in the impressions received, and\r\nconsequently in the perceptions which represent\r\nthem, we have feeling or sensation; that is, a perception\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"95\" id=\"Page_95\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\naccompanied by memory,” to which at other\r\ntimes he adds “attention.” Life, he says, “is\r\na perceptive principle; the soul is sensitive life;\r\nmind is rational soul.” And again he says in\r\nsubstance that when the soul begins to have interests,\r\nand to regard one representation as of more\r\nvalue than others, it introduces relief into its perceptions,\r\nand those which stand out are called\r\n“sensations.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis origin of sensations as higher developments\r\nof the representative activities of a monad conditions\r\ntheir relation to further processes of knowledge.\r\nThe sensations are confused knowledge;\r\nthey are ideas in their primitive and most undifferentiated\r\nform. They constitute, as Leibniz somewhere\r\nsays, the vertigo of the conscious life. In\r\nevery sentient organism multitudes of sensations\r\nare constantly thronging in and overpowering its\r\ndistinct consciousness. The soul is so flooded\r\nwith ideas of everything in the world which has\r\nany relation to its body that it has distinct ideas of\r\nnothing. Higher knowledge, then, does not consist\r\nin compounding these sensations; that would literally\r\nmake confusion worse confounded. It consists\r\nin introducing distinctness into the previously\r\nconfused sensations,—in finding out what they\r\nmean; that is, in finding out their bearings, what\r\nthey point to, and how they are related. Knowledge\r\nis not an external process performed upon the\r\nsensations, it is the development of their internal\r\ncontent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"96\" id=\"Page_96\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eIt follows, therefore, that sensation is organic to\r\nall forms of knowledge whatever. The monad,\r\nwhich is pure activity, that which culminates the\r\nscale of reality, has no confused ideas, and to it all\r\nknowledge is eternally rational, having no sensible\r\ntraces about it. But every other monad, having its\r\nactivity limited, has ideas which come to it at first\r\nin a confused way, and which its activity afterwards\r\ndifferentiates. Thus it is that Leibniz can agree so\r\nheartily with the motto of the Sensationalist school,—that\r\nthere is nothing in the intellect which was not\r\nfirst in the sensory. But Leibniz uses this phrase\r\nas Aristotle would have done, having in mind the\r\ndistinction between potentiality and actuality. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIn\r\nposse\u003c/i\u003e, sensation is all knowledge; but only \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein posse\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nAnd he, like Aristotle, interprets the relation between\r\npotentiality and actuality as one of a difference of\r\nactivity. The potential is that which becomes real\r\nthrough a dynamic process. The actual is capacity\r\nplus action. Sensation, in short, is spiritual activity\r\nin an undeveloped and hence partial and limited\r\ncondition. It is not, as Locke would have it, the\r\nreal factor in all knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe marks of sensation which Locke lays down,—their\r\npassivity, their simplicity, their position\r\nas the real element in knowledge,—Leibniz either\r\ndenies, therefore, or accepts in a sense different\r\nfrom that of Locke. Strictly speaking, sensation\r\nis an activity of the mind. There are no windows\r\nthrough which the soul receives impressions.\r\nPure passivity of any kind is a myth, \u003cins title=\"as\"\u003ea\u003c/ins\u003e scholastic\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"97\" id=\"Page_97\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nfiction. Sensation is developed from the soul\r\nwithin; it is the activity of reality made manifest\r\nto itself. It is a higher kind of action than\r\nanything we find in minerals or in plants. If we\r\nlook at sensation ideally, however, that is, according\r\nto the position which it holds in the system of\r\nknowledge, it is properly regarded as passive. It\r\nrepresents the limitation, the unrealized (that is,\r\nthe non-active) side of spiritual life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e“Efficient causality” is a term which has its rightful\r\nand legitimate use in physical science. Simply\r\nfrom the scientific point of view we are correct\r\nin speaking of objects as affecting the body, and\r\nthe body, through its nervous system, as affecting\r\nthe soul and producing sensations. But philosophy\r\ndoes not merely use categories, it explains\r\nthem. And Leibniz contends that to explain the\r\ncategory of causality in a mechanical sense, to\r\nunderstand by it physical influence actually transferred\r\nfrom one thing to another, is to make the\r\nidea inexplicable and irrational. The true meaning\r\nof causality is ideal. It signifies the relative positions\r\nwhich the objects concerned have in the harmonious\r\nsystem of reality. The body that is higher\r\nin the scale impresses the other; that is to say, it\r\ndominates it or gives its law. There is no energy or\r\nquality which passes physically from one to the other.\r\nBut one monad, as higher in the stage of development\r\nthan another, makes an ideal demand upon\r\nthat one. It places before the other its own more\r\nreal condition. The less-developed monad, since its\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"98\" id=\"Page_98\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhole activity consists in representing the universe\r\nof reality, answers to this demand by developing\r\nthe corresponding quality in itself. The category\r\nof harmonious or co-operative action is thus substituted\r\nfor that of external and mechanical influence.\r\nPhysical causality when given a philosophic interpretation\r\nmeans organic development. The reality\r\nof a higher stage is the more active: the more\r\nactive has a greater content in that it mirrors the\r\nuniverse more fully; it manifests accordingly more\r\nof the law of the universe, and hence has an ideal\r\ndomination over that which is lower in the scale.\r\nIt is actually (that is, in activity) what the other is\r\npotentially. But as the entire existence of the latter\r\nis in representing or setting forth the relations\r\nwhich make the world, its activity is aroused to\r\na corresponding production. Hence the former is\r\ncalled “cause,” and the latter “effect.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis introduces us to the relation of soul and\r\nbody, or, more generally stated, to the relation of\r\nmind and matter. It is the theory of co-operation,\r\nof harmonious activity, which Leibniz substitutes\r\nfor the theory which Descartes had formulated, according\r\nto which there are two opposed substances\r\nwhich can affect each other only through the medium\r\nof a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003edeus ex machina\u003c/i\u003e. Locke, on the other hand,\r\ntook the Cartesian principle for granted, and thus\r\nenveloped himself in all the difficulties which surround\r\nthe question of “mind and matter.” Locke\r\nwavers between two positions, one of which is that\r\nthere are two unknown substances,—the soul and\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"99\" id=\"Page_99\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe object in itself,—which, coming in contact,\r\nproduce sensations; while the other takes the hypothetical\r\nattitude that there may be but one\r\nsubstance,—matter,—and that God, out of the\r\nplenitude of his omnipotence, has given matter a\r\ncapacity which does not naturally belong to it,—that\r\nof producing sensations. In either case, however,\r\nthe final recourse is to the arbitrary power of God.\r\nThere is no natural—that is, intrinsic and explicable—connection\r\nbetween the sensation and that which\r\nproduces it. Sensation occupied the hard position\r\nwhich the mechanical school of to-day still allots it.\r\nIt is that “inexplicable,” “mysterious,” “unaccountable”\r\nlink between the domains of matter and\r\nmind of which no rational account can be given,\r\nbut which is yet the source of all that we know\r\nabout matter, and the basis of all that is real in\r\nthe mind!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz, recognizing that reality is an organic\r\nwhole,—not two parts with a chasm between them,—says\r\nthat “God does not arbitrarily give substances\r\nwhatever qualities may happen, or that he\r\nmay arbitrarily determine, but only such as are natural;\r\nthat is, such as are related to one another in an\r\n\u003cem\u003eexplicable\u003c/em\u003e way as modifications of the substance.”\r\nLeibniz feels sure that to introduce the idea of the\r\ninexplicable, the purely supernatural, into the natural\r\nis to give up all the advantages which the modern mechanical\r\ntheory had introduced, and to relapse into\r\nthe meaningless features of scholasticism. If the\r\n“supernatural”—that is, the essentially inexplicable—is\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"100\" id=\"Page_100\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nintroduced in this one case, why should it\r\nnot be in others; why should we not return outright\r\nto the “fanatic philosophy which explains all facts\r\nby simply attributing them to God immediately or\r\nby way of miracle, or to the barbarian philosophy,\r\nwhich explains phenomena by manufacturing, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ead\r\nhoc\u003c/i\u003e, occult qualities or faculties, seemingly like little\r\ndemons or spirits capable of performing, without\r\nceremony, whatever is required,—as if watches\r\nmarked time by their horodeictic power, without\r\nwheels, and mills ground grain, without grindstones,\r\nby their fractive power”? In fact, says\r\nLeibniz, by introducing the inexplicable into our\r\n\u003cem\u003eexplanations\u003c/em\u003e “we fall into something worse than\r\noccult qualities,—we give up philosophy and reason;\r\nwe open asylums for ignorance and laziness,\r\nholding not only that there are qualities which we\r\ndo not understand (there are, indeed, too many\r\nsuch), but qualities which the greatest intelligence,\r\nif God gave it all the insight possible, could not\r\nunderstand,—that is, such as are \u003cem\u003ein themselves\u003c/em\u003e without\r\nrhyme or reason. And indeed it would be a\r\nthing without rhyme or reason that God should\r\nperform miracles in the ordinary course of nature.”\r\nAnd regarding the whole matter of introducing the\r\ninconceivable and the inexplicable into science, he\r\nsays that “while the conception of men is not the\r\nmeasure of God’s power, their capacity of conception\r\nis the measure of \u003cem\u003enature’s\u003c/em\u003e power, since everything\r\noccurring in the natural order is capable of\r\nbeing understood by the created intelligence.” Such\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"101\" id=\"Page_101\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nbeing the thought of Leibniz regarding the virtual\r\nattempt to introduce in his day the unknowable into\r\nphilosophy, it is evident that he must reject, from\r\nthe root up, all theories of sensation which, like\r\nLocke’s, make it the product of the inexplicable\r\nintercourse of two substances.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor this doctrine, then, Leibniz substitutes that\r\nof an infinite number of substances, all of the same\r\nkind, all active, all developing from within, all conspiring\r\nto the same end, but of various stages of\r\nactivity, or bearing various relations of completeness\r\nto the one end.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIndeed, one and the same monad has various\r\ndegrees of activity in itself; that is, it represents\r\nmore or less distinctly the universe according to its\r\npoint of view. Its point of view requires of it, of\r\ncourse, primarily, a representation of that which is\r\nabout it. Thus an infinity of states arises, each\r\ncorresponding to some one of the multitude of objects\r\nsurrounding the monad. The soul has no control,\r\nno mastery, over these states. It has to take\r\nthem as they come; with regard to them, the soul\r\nappears passive. It appears so because it does not\r\nas yet clearly distinguish them. It does not react\r\nupon them and become conscious of their meaning\r\nor thoroughly rational character. We shall afterwards\r\nsee that “matter” is, with Leibniz, simply\r\nthis passive or confused side of monads. It is the\r\nmonad so far as it has not brought to light the\r\nrational activity which is immanent in it. At present\r\nwe need only notice that the body is simply the\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"102\" id=\"Page_102\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\npart of matter or of passivity which limits the complete\r\nactivity of any monad. So Leibniz says, “in\r\nso far as the soul has perfection, it has distinct\r\nthoughts, and God has accommodated the body to\r\nthe soul. So far as it is imperfect and its perceptions\r\nare confused, God has accommodated the\r\nsoul to the body in such a way that the soul lets\r\nitself be inclined by the passions, which are born\r\nfrom corporeal representations. It is by its confused\r\nthoughts (sensations) that the soul represents\r\nthe bodies about it,” just as, we may add, its distinct\r\nthoughts represent the monads or souls about\r\nit, and, in the degree of their distinctness, God, the\r\nmonad which is \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003epurus actus\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFollowing the matter into more detail, we may\r\nsay that since God alone is pure energy, knowing\r\nno limitation, God alone is pure spirit. Every\r\nfinite soul is joined to an organic body. “I do not\r\nadmit,” says Leibniz, “that there are souls entirely\r\nseparate from matter, nor created spirits detached\r\nfrom body. . . . It is this body which the monad represents\r\nmost distinctly; but since this body expresses\r\nthe entire universe by the connection of all matter\r\nthroughout it, the soul represents the entire universe\r\nin representing the body which belongs to it most\r\nparticularly.” But according to the principle of\r\ncontinuity there must be in the least apparent portion\r\nof matter still “a universe of creatures, of\r\nsouls, of entelechies. There is nothing sterile,\r\nnothing dead in the universe. It is evident from\r\nthese considerations that every living body has a\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"103\" id=\"Page_103\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ndominant entelechy, which is the soul in that body,\r\nbut that the members of this living body are again\r\nfull of other living beings and souls,” which, however,\r\nsince not of so high a grade, that is, not\r\nrepresenting the universe so fully, appear to be\r\nwholly material and subject to the “dominant” entelechy;\r\nnamely, to the one which gives the law to\r\nthe others by expressing more adequately the idea\r\nat which they only confusedly aim. Owing to the\r\nconstant change of activity, however, these particles\r\ndo not remain in constant subordination to the\r\nsame entelechy (that is, do not form parts of the\r\nsame body), but pass on to higher or lower degrees\r\nof “evolution,” and have their places taken by others\r\nundergoing similar processes of change. Thus “all\r\nbodies are in a perpetual flux, like rivers, with parts\r\ncontinually leaving and entering in.” Or, interpreting\r\nthis figurative language, each monad is continually,\r\nin its process of development, giving law\r\nto new and less developed monads, which therefore\r\nappear as its body. The nature of matter in itself,\r\nand of its phenomenal manifestation in the body,\r\nare, however, subjects which find no explanation\r\nhere, and which will demand explanation in \u003ca href=\"#Chapter_VII\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eanother\r\nchapter\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may sum up Leibniz’s theory of sensation by\r\nsaying that it is a representative state developed by\r\nthe self-activity of the soul; that in itself it is a\r\nconfused or “involved” grade of activity, and in\r\nits relation to the world represents the confused or\r\npassive aspects of existence; that this limitation of\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"104\" id=\"Page_104\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe monad constitutes matter, and in its necessary\r\nconnection with the monad constitutes the body\r\nwhich is always joined to the finite soul; that to\r\nthis body are joined in all cases an immense number\r\nof monads, whose action is subordinate to that\r\nof this dominant monad, and that it is the collection\r\nof these which constitute the visible animal\r\nbody. Thus if we look at sensation with regard to\r\nthe monad which possesses it, it is a product of the\r\nbody of the monad; if we look at it with reference\r\nto other monads, it represents or reflects their passive\r\nor material side. This is evidently one aspect\r\nagain of the pre-established harmony,—an aspect\r\nin which some of the narrower of Leibniz’s critics\r\nhave seen the whole meaning of the doctrine exhausted.\r\nIt is, however, simply one of the many\r\nforms in which the harmony, the union of spiritual\r\nand mechanical, ideal and material, meets us. In\r\ntruth, while in other systems the fact of sensation\r\nis a fact demanding some artificial mode of reconciling\r\n“mind” and “matter,” or is else to be accepted\r\nas an inexplicable fact, in the system of Leibniz\r\nit is itself evidence that the spiritual and the mechanical\r\nare not two opposed kinds of existence,\r\nbut are organically united. It is itself the manifestation\r\nof the harmony of the ideal and the material,\r\nnot something which requires that a factitious theory\r\nbe invented for explaining their appearance of harmony.\r\nSensation has within itself the ideal element,\r\nfor it is the manifestation, in its most undeveloped\r\nform, of the spiritual meaning of the universe. It\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"105\" id=\"Page_105\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nhas a mechanical element, for it expresses the limitation,\r\nthe passivity, of the monad.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is from this standpoint that Leibniz criticises\r\nwhat Locke says about the relation of sensations\r\nto the objects which produce them. Leibniz holds\r\nthat all our sensations have a definite and natural\r\nconnection with the qualities of objects,—the “secondary”\r\nas well as the “primary.” They all represent\r\ncertain properties of the object. Even the\r\npain which the thrust of a needle gives us, while it\r\ndoes not resemble anything in the needle, does in\r\nsome way represent or resemble motions going on\r\nin our body. This resemblance is not necessarily\r\none of exact form, but just as the ellipse, hyperbola,\r\nand parabola are projections of the circle in the\r\nsense that there is a natural and fixed law of connection\r\nbetween them, so that every point of one\r\ncorresponds by a certain relation with every point\r\nof the other, so the resemblance between the sensation\r\nand the quality of the object is always in the\r\nform of a fixed law of order, which, however unknown\r\nto us it may now be, is capable of being\r\nfound out. If we are to make any distinction between\r\n“secondary” and “primary” sensations, it\r\nshould be not that one presents qualities that are in\r\nthe objects, and the other affections which exist only\r\nin us, but that the primary sensations (of number,\r\nform, size, etc.) represent the qualities in a distinct\r\nway, appealing to the rational activity of\r\nintelligence, while the secondary represent the qualities\r\nin a confused way, a way not going beyond\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"106\" id=\"Page_106\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe effect upon the mind into relations, that is, into\r\ndistinct knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis brings regularly before us the question of\r\nthe relation of sensations to knowledge. We have\r\nseen enough already to know that Leibniz does not\r\nbelieve that knowledge begins with the simple (that\r\nis, unrelated), and then proceeds by a process of\r\ncompounding. The sensation is not simple to Leibniz,\r\nbut thoroughly complex, involving confusedly\r\nwithin itself all possible relations. As relations are\r\nbrought forth into distinct light out of this confusion,\r\nknowledge ends rather than begins with the simple.\r\nAnd again it is evident that Leibniz cannot believe\r\nthat knowledge begins and ends in experience, in\r\nthe sense in which both himself and Locke use the\r\nword; namely, as meaning the combination and succession\r\nof impressions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e“Experience,” as they use the term, consists in\r\nsensations and their association,—“consecution” as\r\nLeibniz calls it. Experience is the stage of knowledge\r\nreached by animals, and in which the majority\r\nof men remain,—and indeed all men in the greater\r\npart of their knowledge. Leibniz takes just the\r\nsame position regarding the larger part of our\r\nknowledge which Hume takes regarding it all. It\r\nconsists simply in associations of such a nature that\r\nwhen one part recurs there is a tendency to expect\r\nthe recurrence of the other member. It resembles\r\nreason, but it is based on the accidental experience\r\nof events in a consecutive order, and not on knowledge\r\nof their causal connection. We all expect the\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"107\" id=\"Page_107\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nsun to rise to-morrow; but with all of us, excepting\r\nthe astronomer, such expectation is purely “empirical,”\r\nbeing based on the images of past experiences\r\nwhich recur. The astronomer, however, sees into\r\nthe grounds, that is, the reasons, of the expectation,\r\nand hence his knowledge is rational.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus we have two grades of knowledge,—one empirical,\r\nconsisting of knowledge of facts; the other\r\nrational, being of the truths of reason. The former\r\nis contingent and particular, the latter is necessary\r\nand universal. Leibniz insists, with a pertinacity\r\nwhich reminds us of Kant, that “experience” can\r\ngive instances or examples only, and that the fact that\r\nanything has happened in a given way any number\r\nof times in the past, can give no assurance that it\r\nwill continue to do so in the future. There is\r\nnothing in the nature of the case which renders its\r\nexact opposite impossible. But a rational truth is\r\nnecessary, for its opposite is impossible, being irrational\r\nor meaningless. This may not always be\r\nevident in the case of a complex rational truth; but\r\nif it be analyzed into simpler elements, as a geometrical\r\nproposition into definitions, axioms, and\r\npostulates, the absurdity of its opposite becomes\r\nevident. Sensation, in conclusion, is the having of\r\nconfused ideas,—ideas corresponding to matter.\r\nExperience is the association of these confused\r\nideas, and their association according to their accidental\r\njuxtaposition in the life of the soul. It\r\ntherefore is not only thoroughly sensible, but is\r\nalso phenomenal. Its content is sensations; its form\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"108\" id=\"Page_108\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nis contingent and particular consecution. Both form\r\nand content, accordingly, need to be reconstructed\r\nif they are to be worthy of the name of science or\r\nof knowledge. This is the position which Leibniz\r\nassumes as against the empiricist, Locke. The details\r\nof this reconstruction, its method and result,\r\nwe must leave till we come in the course of the\r\nargument again to the subject of knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"109\" id=\"Page_109\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\u003ca id=\"Chapter_VI\"\u003eCHAPTER VI.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eTHE IMPULSES AND THE WILL.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"upper-case\"\u003eLocke\u003c/span\u003e, after discussing the subject of innate\r\nideas in their relation to knowledge, goes on\r\nto discuss their practical side, or connection with\r\nwill. We shall follow him in this as Leibniz does;\r\nbut we shall consider in connection with this, Leibniz’s\r\ngeneral theory of will, which is developed\r\npartially in this chapter, but more completely in his\r\ncritical remarks upon what Locke has to say of the\r\nnotion of “power.” Since the theory of morals is\r\nas closely connected with will as the theory of\r\nknowledge is with the intellect, we shall supplement\r\nthis discussion with what Leibniz says upon the\r\nethical question, drawing our material somewhat\r\nfreely from his other writings.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe doctrine of will which Leibniz propounds is in\r\nclosest harmony with his conception of intelligence,\r\nand this not merely in the way of empirical juxtaposition,\r\nbut as the result of his fundamental principles.\r\nIf we recall what has been said concerning\r\nthe monad, we shall remember that it is an activity,\r\nbut an activity with a content. It is a force, but a\r\nforce which mirrors the universe. The content,\r\nthat portion of reality which is reflected in the action,\r\nis knowledge, or the idea; the activity which\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"110\" id=\"Page_110\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nbrings this about is will, or the volition. They are\r\nrelated to each other as form and content. There\r\nis, strictly speaking, no “state” of mind; there is\r\nonly a tension, a pushing forward of mind. There\r\nis no idea which is not a volition. Will is thus used,\r\nin a very broad sense, as equivalent to action.\r\nSince, however, the activity of the monad is in no\r\ncase aimless, but has an end in view, the will is\r\nnot \u003cem\u003emere\u003c/em\u003e activity in general, it is action towards\r\nsome definite end. And since the end at which\r\nthe monad aims is always the development of an\r\nidea, the reflection of some constituent of the universe,\r\nthe will is always directed towards and determined\r\nby some idea of the intellect.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have seen, however, that there are various\r\nstages in the reflecting power of the soul, or in the\r\nrealization of intellect. Taking only the broadest\r\ndivision, there are perception and apperception;\r\nthat is, there are the conscious and the unconscious\r\nmirroring of reality. We shall expect, then, to find\r\ntwo corresponding stages of volition. Leibniz calls\r\nthese stages “appetition” and “volition” in the narrower\r\nsense. The constant tendency in every monad\r\nto go from one perception to another,—that is, the\r\nfollowing of the law of development,—constitutes\r\nappetition. If joined to feeling, it constitutes instinct.\r\nSince, again, there are two degrees of apperception,\r\none of empirical, the other of rational,\r\nconsciousness, we shall expect to find two grades of\r\nvolition proper,—one corresponding to action for\r\nconscious particular ends; the other for ends which\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"111\" id=\"Page_111\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nare proposed by reason, and are hence universal.\r\nIn this chapter we shall simply expand and illustrate\r\nthese various propositions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSensations, looked at not as to what they represent,\r\nbut in themselves, are impulses. As such they\r\nconstitute the lowest stage of will. Impulsive action\r\nthen includes all such as occurs for an end\r\nwhich is unknown, or at best but dimly felt. Such\r\naction may be called blind, not in the sense that\r\nit is without reason, but in the sense that reason is\r\nnot consciously present. We are not to think of\r\nthis instinctive action, however, as if it were found\r\nsimply in the animals. Much of human action is\r\nalso impulsive; probably, indeed, an impulsive factor\r\nis contained in our most rational willing. We\r\nare never able to take complete account of the\r\nagencies which are acting upon us. Along with the\r\nreasons of which we are conscious in choosing, there\r\nare mingled faint memories of past experience, subconscious\r\nsolicitations of the present, dim expectations\r\nfor the future. Such elements are decisive\r\nfactors far more than we realize.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIndeed, it is because of the extent to which such\r\nunconscious influences bear upon us and move us\r\nthat there arises the idea of indifferent or unmotivated\r\nchoice. Were both motive and choice unconscious,\r\nthe question as to whether choice were\r\nantecedently determined would not arise; and were\r\nour motives and their results wholly in consciousness,\r\nthe solution of the question would be evident. But\r\nwhen we are conscious of our choice, but are not\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"112\" id=\"Page_112\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nconscious of our impulses and motives, we get the\r\nimpression that our choice is unmotived, and hence\r\ncome to believe in “indifferent freedom,”—the\r\nability to choose as we will.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe shall shortly take up in more detail the\r\ntheory of Leibniz regarding the freedom of will;\r\nand it is needful here to remark only that the conception\r\nwhich makes it consist in ability to choose\r\nwithout reason is in direct contradiction to his fundamental\r\nthought,—namely, that there can be no\r\nactivity which does not aim at some reflection of\r\nthe universe, by which, therefore, it is determined.\r\nFrom the psychological point of view, it is interesting\r\nalso to notice how Leibniz’s theory of unconscious\r\nideas enables him to dispose of the strongest\r\nargument for indifferent choice,—that drawn from\r\nthe immediate “testimony” of consciousness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eUpon the origin and nature of desires Leibniz has\r\nmuch more to say than about the impulses. His account\r\nof the transition from impulse to desire is based\r\nupon the conception of unconscious ideas. Slight\r\nand imperceptible impulses are working upon us all\r\nthe time. Indeed, they are a necessity; for the\r\nactual state of a soul or monad at any time is, of\r\ncourse, one of incompleteness. Our nature must\r\nalways work to free itself from its hindrances and\r\nobtain its goal of complete development. But it\r\nwill not do this unless there is some stimulus, some\r\nsolicitation to induce it to overcome its limitation.\r\nThere is found accordingly in our every condition a\r\nfeeling of dissatisfaction, or, using Locke’s word, of\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"113\" id=\"Page_113\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\n“uneasiness;” and it is this which calls forth that\r\nactivity which brings about a nearer approach to the\r\nsoul’s real good. But Leibniz differs from Locke in\r\nsaying that this feeling of uneasiness is not a distinct,\r\nor even in most cases a conscious, one. It is\r\nnot pain, although it differs from pain only in degree.\r\nUneasiness and pain are related to each other\r\nas appetite for food is to hunger,—the first suffices\r\nto stimulate us to satisfaction, but if the want is\r\nnot met, results in actual pain; if met, these “half\r\npains” become tributary to pleasure itself. These\r\nunconscious stimuli to action result in actions which\r\nmeet the want, and the aggregation of these satisfactions\r\nresults in pleasure. In Leibniz’s own\r\nwords:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e“If these elements of pain were themselves true\r\npains, we should always be in a state of misery, even in\r\npursuing the good. But since there is always going\r\non a summation of minute successes in overcoming\r\nthese states of uneasiness, and these put us more\r\nand more at ease, there comes about a decided\r\npleasure, which often has greater value even than\r\nthe enjoyment of the good. Far, then, from regarding\r\nthis uneasiness as a thing incompatible with\r\nhappiness, I find that it is an essential condition of\r\nour happiness. For this does not consist in perfect\r\npossession, which would make us insensible and\r\nstupid, but in a constant progress towards greater\r\nresults, which must always be accompanied, accordingly,\r\nby this element of desire or uneasiness.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd again he says that “we enjoy all the advantages\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"114\" id=\"Page_114\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nof pain without any of its inconveniences. If\r\nthe uneasiness should become too distinct, we should\r\nbe miserable in our awaiting the good which relieves\r\nit; but as it is, there is a constant victory over these\r\nhalf-pains, which we always find in desire, and this\r\ngives us a quantity of half-pleasures, whose continuance\r\nand summation (for they acquire force like a\r\nmoving body as it falls) result in a whole and true\r\npleasure.” In short, there is indeed an element of\r\npain in all desire which stimulates us to action, and\r\ntherefore to higher development. But ordinarily\r\nthis element of pain is not present as such in consciousness,\r\nbut is absorbed in the pleasure which\r\naccompanies the realization of the higher good.\r\nThus Leibniz, accepting and emphasizing the very\r\nsame fact that served Schopenhauer as a psychological\r\nbase of pessimism, uses it as a foundation-stone\r\nof optimism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut desire, or the conscious tendency towards\r\nsomething required as a good, accompanied by the\r\ndim feeling of uneasiness at its absence, does not\r\nyet constitute the complete act of volition. “Several\r\nimpulses and inclinations meet in forming the\r\ncomplete volition which is the result of their conflict.”\r\nIn the concrete act of will there are contained\r\nimpulses which push us towards some end\r\nwhose nature is not known; there is desire both in\r\nits inchoate stage, where pleasure and pain are not\r\nin consciousness, and in its formed state, where the\r\npain and pleasure are definitely presented. Mixed\r\nwith these desires and impulses are images of past\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"115\" id=\"Page_115\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nexperiences which call up the feelings which were formerly\r\nattached to them, and thus there are aroused\r\nindirectly additional impulses and desires. Out\r\nof this complicated mass of impulses, desires, and\r\nfeelings, both original and reproduced, comes the\r\n“dominant effort” which constitutes complete will.\r\nBut what governs the production of this prevailing\r\nor dominant effort, which we may interpret as the\r\nact of choice? The answer is simple: the result of\r\nthe conflict of these various factors, the striking of\r\nthe balance, \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e the choice. Some desire emerges\r\nfrom the confused complex, and that desire is the\r\nfinal determination of the will. This desire may\r\nnot in all cases be the strongest in itself,—that is,\r\nthe one whose satisfaction will allay the greatest\r\n“uneasiness,” for the others, taken together, may\r\noutweigh it; it may, so to speak, have a plurality,\r\nbut not a majority, of volitional forces on its side,—and\r\nin this case a fusion of opposing factors may\r\ndefeat it. But in any event the result will be the\r\n\u003cem\u003ealgebraic\u003c/em\u003e sum of the various desires and impulses.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is not at all necessary, however, that the net\r\noutcome shall make itself apparent as a mechanical\r\nequivalent of the forces at work. The soul, Leibniz\r\nsays, may use its skill in the formation of parties,\r\nso as to make this or that side the victor. How is\r\nthis to be done, and still disallow the possibility of\r\narbitrary choice? This problem is solved through\r\naction becoming deliberate. Deliberate action is\r\nimpossible unless the soul has formed the habit of\r\nlooking ahead and of arranging for modes of\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"116\" id=\"Page_116\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\naction which do not present themselves as immediate\r\nnecessities. Only in this way can one look at the\r\nmatter impartially and coolly; “at the moment of\r\ncombat there is no time for discussion. Everything\r\nwhich then occurs throws its full force on the\r\nbalance, and contributes to an outcome made up in\r\nthe same way as in mechanics.” The formation of\r\ncertain habits beforehand, therefore, is the secret\r\nof translating impulsive action into the deliberate\r\nsphere.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf these habits the simplest consists in thinking\r\nonly occasionally and incidentally of certain things.\r\nImagination is the mother of desire. If we do not\r\nallow the imagination to dwell upon certain lines\r\nof thought, the probability of such thoughts acquiring\r\nsufficient force to become motives of weight is\r\nsmall. A still more effective method of regulating\r\naction is “to accustom ourselves to forming a\r\ntrain of thoughts of which reason, and not chance\r\n(that is, association), is the basis. We must get\r\nout of the tumult of present impressions, beyond\r\nour immediate surroundings, and ask: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eDic cur hic?\r\nrespice finem!\u003c/i\u003e” In other words, we must cross-question\r\nour impulses and desires, we must ask\r\nwhence they come, that we may see how valid are\r\nthe credentials which they offer. We must ask\r\nwhither they tend, that we may measure them, not\r\nby their immediate interest, but by their relation\r\nto an end. The desires are not to be taken at their\r\nface-value, but are to be weighed and compared.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch a process will evidently result in arresting\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"117\" id=\"Page_117\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ninstantaneous action. There will be a pause between\r\nthe presentation of the desires and the overt\r\nact. During this pause it may well occur that the\r\nexamination to which the desires have been subject\r\nhas awakened contrary desires. The thought\r\nof the ignoble origin of a desire or of its repulsive,\r\nthough remote, result will bring into action desires\r\nof an opposed kind. Thus the soul regulates action,\r\nnot as if, however, it had any direct influence\r\nover desires, but by its ability of bringing other\r\ndesires into the field. The will, in short, is not\r\nopposed to desire, though rational desire may be\r\nopposed to sensuous desire. “By various artifices,\r\nthen,” Leibniz concludes, “we become masters of\r\nourselves, and can make ourselves think and do\r\nthat which we ought to will, and which reason ordains.”\r\nSuch is the summary of Leibniz’s analysis\r\nof the elements and mechanism of volition. There\r\nwas not much psychology existing at the time which\r\ncould aid him in such an acute and subtle account;\r\nonly in Aristotle could he have found much help.\r\nOn the other hand, it has been so generally incorporated\r\ninto current psychology that we may seem\r\nto have wasted space in repeating truisms.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf moral action, however, we have as yet heard\r\nnothing. We have an account of a psychological\r\nmechanism; but for what ethical end does this work,\r\nand by what method? This question may best be\r\nanswered by turning in more detail to the question\r\nof the “freedom of the will.” Freedom in the\r\nsense of arbitrary choice Leibniz wholly rejects, as\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"118\" id=\"Page_118\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nwe have seen. It is inconsistent with at least two\r\nof his fundamental principles; those, namely, of\r\nsufficient reason, and of continuity. “Everything\r\nthat occurs must have a sufficient reason for its\r\noccurrence.” This oft-repeated dictum of Leibniz,\r\nthe logical way of stating the complete rationality\r\nof experience, would be shattered into fragments\r\nby collision with groundless choice. It conflicts\r\nequally (indeed for the same reason) with the principle\r\nof continuity. “The present is pregnant\r\nwith the future.” “Nature never makes leaps.”\r\n“An absolute equilibrium is a chimera.” “The\r\nsoul is never wholly at rest.” These are only various\r\nways of saying that the notion of arbitrary\r\nor unmotivated choice rests upon the assumption\r\nthat there is a complete break in the life of the\r\nsoul, so that it is possible for something to happen\r\nwhich bears no organic relation to anything\r\nthat precedes. The notion of a state of the soul\r\nwithout motives, followed by the irruption of a\r\ncertain line of conduct, the notion of an equilibrium\r\nbroken by arbitrary choice, is simply the counterpart\r\nof the idea of a vacuum. All that makes Leibniz\r\nreject the latter conception makes it impossible for\r\nhim to accept the former.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis should not be interpreted to mean that\r\nLeibniz denied the “freedom of the will.” What\r\nhe denied is a notion of freedom which seemed to\r\nhim at once unverifiable, useless, and irrational.\r\nThere is a conception of freedom which Leibniz not\r\nonly accepts, but insists upon. Such a notion of\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"119\" id=\"Page_119\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nfreedom is indeed his ethical ideal. Its three traits\r\nare contingency, spontaneity, and rationality of\r\naction. How action can be at the same time\r\ncontingent and determined is perhaps difficult to\r\nunderstand; but Leibniz takes the position that it\r\nis. His first step is to distinguish between physical,\r\nmathematical, metaphysical, and moral necessity.\r\nThere are truths which are eternal, truths\r\nwhich are absolutely necessary, because their opposites\r\ninvolve contradiction. They cannot be\r\nviolated without involving us in absurdity. There\r\nare other truths which are “positive,” that is, ordained\r\nfor good reason. These truths may be\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e, or rational, and not merely empirical; for\r\nthey have been chosen for reasons of advantage.\r\nGod always chooses and ordains the best of a\r\nnumber of possibilities; but he does it, not because\r\nthe opposite is impossible, but because it is inferior.\r\nTruths whose opposites are impossible have metaphysical\r\nand mathematical necessity. Positive\r\ntruths have moral necessity. The principle of\r\ncausation \u003cem\u003emust\u003c/em\u003e be true; the three interior angles\r\nof a triangle \u003cem\u003emust\u003c/em\u003e be equal to two right angles.\r\nBut that God shall choose the better of two courses\r\nis a moral necessity only. It invokes no absolute\r\nlogical contradiction to conceive him choosing some\r\nother way. Upon moral necessity depends the\r\nphysical. The particular laws of nature are necessary,\r\nnot because their opposites are logically\r\nabsurd, but because these laws are most in accordance\r\nwith the general principles of good and\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"120\" id=\"Page_120\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\norder, in agreement with which God chooses. Physical\r\nand moral action is therefore in all cases\r\ncontingent. (Contingency does not of itself, of\r\ncourse, constitute freedom, but conjoined with the\r\ncharacteristics of rationality and spontaneity, does\r\nso.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNecessity, in short, is based upon the principle\r\nof logical contradiction; contingency upon that of\r\nsufficient reason. Since our actions are in no case\r\nnecessitated in such a way that their opposite is\r\nself-contradictory, or, put positively, since our\r\nactions are always determined by the choice of that\r\nwhich seems best, our actions are contingent.\r\nOccasionally Leibniz puts the matter in a much\r\nsimpler way, and one which brings out the essential\r\nelement more clearly than the foregoing distinction.\r\nSome facts are determined by the principle\r\nof physical causation; others by that of final\r\ncausation. Some, in other words, are necessary as\r\nthe mechanical outcome of their antecedents; others\r\nare necessary as involved in the reaching of a given\r\nend. It is simply the Aristotelian distinction between\r\nefficient and teleological causation. Human\r\naction is determined, since it always has a motive\r\nor reason; it is contingent, because it springs from\r\nthis reason and not from its temporal antecedents.\r\nIt is, in short, determined, but it is also free.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt does not require much analysis, however, to\r\nsee that this distinction, in whatever way it be put,\r\nreally has no significance, except as it points to the\r\nother marks of freedom,—spontaneity and rationality.\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"121\" id=\"Page_121\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nAs we shall see, Leibniz makes and can make\r\nno absolute distinction between truths of reason\r\nand truths of fact. The contingent and the necessary\r\nare one at bottom. To us with our limited\r\nintelligence it does indeed often appear as if no\r\ncontradiction were involved in the former,—as if,\r\nfor example, a man could turn either to right or left\r\nwithout there being any logical contradiction in\r\neither case; but this is because of our defective\r\ninsight. An intelligence cognizant of the whole\r\nmatter could see that one action would contradict\r\nsome truth involved in the constitution of the universe.\r\nThe source of the contingent and changing\r\nis in the necessary and eternal. Thus it is that\r\nalthough Leibniz at one time says that “neither\r\none’s self nor any other spirit more enlightened\r\ncould demonstrate that the opposite of a given action\r\n(like going out in preference to staying in)\r\ninvolves contradiction,” at another time he says\r\nthat “a perfect knowledge of all the circumstances,\r\ninternal and external, would enable any one to\r\nforesee” the decision in a given case. If that be\r\nso, any other action must be impossible; that is,\r\naccording to Leibniz’s invariable logic, imply\r\ncontradiction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe get the same result if we consider the relation\r\nof final and efficient causes. It is only when\r\nspeaking in a very general way that Leibniz opposes\r\naction as determined by precedent activities to that\r\ndirected towards the attainment of an end. He\r\ndoes not really mean that \u003cem\u003esome\u003c/em\u003e action is physical,\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"122\" id=\"Page_122\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhile \u003cem\u003eother\u003c/em\u003e is teleological. He cannot suppose that\r\nsome action has an antecedent cause, while other\r\nhas a purpose. The very essence of his thought is\r\nthat action is both mechanical and teleological; that\r\nall action follows in a law of order from precedent\r\naction, and that all fulfils a certain spiritual function.\r\nThe distinction is not, with Leibniz, one between two\r\nkinds of action, but between two ways of looking\r\nat every action. The desire to go rather than to\r\nstay, has its efficient cause; the movements by\r\nwhich the desire is executed, have their final cause.\r\nThe truth of the matter seems to be that Leibniz in\r\nhis desire to guard against being thought a fatalist,\r\nor one denying all freedom, uses terms which are\r\ncompatible only with a freedom of indifference. So\r\nin his statement that man’s action is free because\r\n“contingent,” he seems actuated rather by a wish to\r\navoid the hateful term “necessity” than by considerations\r\nstrictly in harmony with his own principles.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHad he confined his use of the term “contingent,”\r\nhowever, simply to re-stating the fact that human\r\naction is spontaneous, no such apparent contradiction\r\nwould have presented itself. Human actions\r\nmay be called contingent, as physical actions are\r\nnot, because the latter always seem to be externally\r\ndetermined, while the former are internally\r\ndirected. Motions act from without; motives from\r\nwithin. The cause of the falling of a stone lies outside\r\nit; the source of a desire which moves to action\r\nis from the mind itself. We are thus introduced to\r\ncontingency as a synonym of “spontaneity.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"123\" id=\"Page_123\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eKuno Fischer calls attention to the fact that\r\nSpinoza and Leibniz both use the same sort of illustration\r\nto show the non-arbitrary character of\r\nhuman action, but the same illustration with a difference;\r\nand in the difference he finds the distinction\r\nbetween the two philosophies. Spinoza\r\nsays that a stone falling to the ground, if endowed\r\nwith consciousness, might imagine itself following\r\nits own will in falling. Leibniz says that a magnetic\r\nneedle similarly endowed might imagine that\r\nit turned towards the north simply because it wished.\r\nBoth examples are used to illustrate the folly of\r\nrelying upon the immediate “testimony” of consciousness.\r\nBut the example of Spinoza is that of\r\nan object, all whose movements are absolutely necessitated\r\nfrom without; the example of Leibniz is\r\nthat of an object whose activity, though following\r\nlaw, and not caprice, is apparently initiated from\r\nwithin. Of course in reality the movements of the\r\nmagnetic needle are just as much externally conditioned\r\nas those of the stone; but the appearance\r\nof self-action in the latter case may serve at least\r\nto exemplify what is meant by spontaneity as attributed\r\nto human action.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt must be noticed at the outset that spontaneity\r\nbelongs to every simple substance. We have only\r\nto recall the doctrine of monads. These suffer nothing\r\nfrom without, all their activity is the expression,\r\nis the unfolding, of their own law. “By nature,”\r\nLeibniz says, “every simple substance has perceptions,\r\nand its individuality consists in the permanent\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"124\" id=\"Page_124\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nlaw which forms the succession of its perceptions,\r\nthat are born naturally one of another. Hence\r\nit is not necessary for it to receive any physical\r\ninfluence from without; and therefore the soul has\r\nin itself a perfect spontaneity in such a way that\r\nits actions depend only upon God and itself.” Or\r\nif we put the matter in its connection with his\r\npsychology rather than with his metaphysics, it is\r\ntrue that our actions are determined by our motives;\r\nbut motives are not forces without the soul,\r\nthey are forces \u003cem\u003eof\u003c/em\u003e the soul. In acting according\r\nto motives the soul is simply acting according to\r\nits own laws. A desire is not an impulsion from\r\nan external cause; it is the expression of an inward\r\ntendency. To say that the soul acts from\r\nthe strongest desire is simply to say, from this\r\nstandpoint, that it manifests the most real part\r\nof itself, not that it obeys a foreign force. Impulses,\r\ndesires, motives, are all psychical; they\r\nadmit of no description or explanation except in\r\ntheir relation to the soul itself. Thus when Leibniz\r\ncompares, as he often does, motives to weights acting\r\nupon a balance, we are to remember that the\r\nbalance is not to be conceived as the soul, and\r\nthe weights as energies outside it, but that this is\r\nonly a way of picturing what is going on \u003cem\u003ewithin\u003c/em\u003e\r\nthe soul itself. The soul may be a mechanism, but\r\nit is a self-directing and self-executing mechanism.\r\nTo say that human action is free because\r\nit is spontaneous, is to say that it follows an\r\nimmanent principle, that it is independent of\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"125\" id=\"Page_125\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nforeign influences,—in a word, that it is self-determined.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut here again it seems as if Leibniz had stated\r\na principle altogether too wide to throw any light\r\nupon the nature of moral freedom. Spontaneity is\r\nno more an attribute of human activity than it is\r\nof all real activity. Every monad, even the unconscious,\r\nas truly follows its own law without interference\r\nfrom without as does man himself. If the\r\nspontaneity of action constitutes its morality, we\r\nare not in a condition to ascribe morality to man any\r\nmore than to any real thing. We are thus thrown\r\nback again upon the conception of rationality as the\r\nfinal and decisive trait of freedom and of ethical conduct.\r\nJust as “contingency” gets a moral import\r\nonly in connection with conscious ends of action, so\r\n“spontaneity” comes within the moral realm only\r\nwhen conjoined to reason.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhy is there this close connection between reason\r\nand freedom? The reader has only to recall what\r\nwas said of Leibniz’s theory of causality to get a\r\nglimpse into their unity. Causality is not a matter\r\nof physical influence, but of affording the reason in\r\nvirtue of which some fact is what it is. This applies\r\nof course to the relation of the soul and the\r\nbody. “So far as the soul is perfect and has distinct\r\nideas, God has accommodated the body to it;\r\nso far as the soul is imperfect and its ideas are confused,\r\nGod has accommodated the soul to the body.\r\nIn the former case the body always responds to the\r\ndemands of the soul; in the latter the soul is moved\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"126\" id=\"Page_126\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nby the passions which are born of the sensuous\r\nideas. Each is thought to act upon the other in the\r\nmeasure of its perfection [that is, degree of activity],\r\nsince God has adjusted one thing to another\r\naccording to its perfection or imperfection. Activity\r\nand passivity are always reciprocal in created\r\nthings, because a portion of the reasons which serve\r\nto explain what goes on is in one substance, and\r\nanother portion in the other. This is what makes\r\nus call one active, the other passive.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we translate these ideas out of their somewhat\r\nscholastic phraseology, the meaning is that the self-activity\r\nof any substance is accurately measured by\r\nthe extent to which it contains the reasons for its\r\nown actions; and conversely, that it is dependent\r\nor enslaved just so far as it has its reasons beyond\r\nitself. Sensations, sensuous impulses, represent,\r\nas we have seen before, the universe only in a confused\r\nand inarticulate way. They are knowledge\r\nwhich cannot give an account of itself. They represent,\r\nin short, that side of mind which may be\r\nregarded as affected, or the limitation of mind,—its\r\nwant of activity. So far as the mind acts from\r\nthese sensations and the feelings which accompany\r\nthem, it is ideally determined from without; it is a\r\ncaptive to its own states; it is in a condition of passivity.\r\nIn all action, therefore, which occurs from\r\na sensuous basis, the soul is rightly regarded as\r\nunfree.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand, just in the degree in which\r\ndistinctness is introduced into the sensations, so\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"127\" id=\"Page_127\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthat they are not simply experienced as they come,\r\nbut are related to one another so that their reason\r\nfor existence, their spiritual meaning, is ascertained,\r\njust in that degree is the soul master of itself. In\r\nLeibniz’s own words: “Distinct knowledge or intelligence\r\nhas its place in the true use of reason,\r\nwhile the senses furnish confused ideas. Hence we\r\ncan say that we are free from slavery just in the\r\ndegree that we act with distinct knowledge, but are\r\nsubject to our passions in just the degree that our\r\nideas are confused;” that is, not really representative\r\nof things as they are. “Intelligence is the\r\nsoul of liberty.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis psychological explanation rests, of course,\r\nupon the foundation principle of the Leibnizian\r\nphilosophy. Spirit is the sole reality, and spirit\r\nis activity. But there are various degrees of activity,\r\nand each grade lower than the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003epurus actus\u003c/i\u003e\r\nmay be rightfully regarded as in so far passive.\r\nThis relative passivity or unreality constitutes the\r\nmaterial and hence the sensuous world. One who\r\nhas not insight into truth, lives and acts in this\r\nworld of comparative unreality; he is in bondage\r\nto it. From this condition of slavery only reason,\r\nthe understanding of things as they are, can lift\r\none. The rational man is free because he acts, in\r\nthe noble words of Spinoza, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003esub specie æternitatis\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nHe acts in view of the eternal truth of things,—as\r\nGod himself would act.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eGod alone, it further follows, is wholly free. In\r\nhim alone are understanding and will wholly one.\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"128\" id=\"Page_128\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nIn him the true and the good are one; while every\r\ncreated intelligence is subject in some degree to\r\nsensuous affection, to passion. “In us, besides\r\nthe judgment of the understanding, there is always\r\nmixed some unreal idea of the sensation which\r\ngives birth to passions and impulses, and these traverse\r\nthe judgment of the practical understanding.”\r\nFreedom, in fine, is not a ready made garment with\r\nwhich all men are clothed to do with as they will.\r\nIt is the ethical ideal; it is something to be attained;\r\nit is action in conformity with reason, or insight\r\ninto the spiritual nature of reality and into its laws;\r\nit is not the starting-point, it is the goal. Only\r\nwith a great price do men purchase such freedom.\r\nIt will be noticed at once that Leibniz comes very\r\nclose to Plato in his fundamental ethical ideas. The\r\nunity of virtue and reason, of virtue and freedom,—these\r\nare thoroughly Platonic conceptions. To both\r\nPlato and Leibniz reason is the ethical ideal because\r\nit is the expression of, nay, rather, \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e the reality of\r\nthe universe; while all else is, as Leibniz says,\r\nimperfect or unreal, since it is not an activity, or,\r\nas Plato says, a mixture of Being and Non-Being.\r\nAgain, to both man bears a similar relation to this\r\nspiritual reality. In Plato’s words, he participates\r\nin the Ideas; in those of Leibniz he reflects, as a\r\nmirror, the universe. To both, in a word, the\r\nreality, the true-self of the individual, is the spiritual\r\nuniverse of which it is an organic member. To\r\nboth, therefore, man obtains freedom or self-realization\r\nonly as he realizes his larger and more comprehensive\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"129\" id=\"Page_129\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nidentity with the Reason of the universe.\r\nWith both, knowledge is the good, ignorance is the\r\nevil. No man is voluntarily bad, but only through\r\nlack of knowledge of the true Good. Leibniz,\r\nhowever, with a more developed psychology, supplements\r\nPlato in the point where the latter had the\r\nmost difficulty,—the possibility of the feelings or\r\nof a love of pleasure overcoming knowledge of the\r\ngood. This possibility Plato was compelled to\r\ndeny, while Leibniz, by his subtle identifying of the\r\npassions with lack of knowledge, or with confused\r\nknowledge, can admit it. “It is an imperfection\r\nof our freedom,” says Leibniz, “which causes us\r\nto choose evil rather than good,—a greater evil\r\nrather than the less, the less good rather than the\r\ngreater. This comes from the \u003cem\u003eappearances\u003c/em\u003e of good\r\nand evil which deceive us; but God, who is perfect\r\nknowledge, is always led to the true and to the best\r\ngood, that is, to the true and absolute good.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt only remains briefly to apply these conceptions\r\nto some specific questions of moral actions. Locke\r\nasks whether there are practical innate ideas, and\r\ndenies them, as he denies theoretical. Leibniz, in\r\nreplying, recognizes two kinds of “innate” practical\r\nprinciples, one of which is to be referred to\r\nthe class of instincts, the other to that of maxims.\r\nPrimarily, and probably wholly in almost all men,\r\nmoral truths take the rank of instincts alone. All\r\nmen aim at the Good; it is impossible to think of\r\nman wilfully seeking his own evil. The methods,\r\nthe means of reaching this Good, are implanted in\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"130\" id=\"Page_130\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nmen as instincts. These instincts, when brought to\r\nthe light of reason and examined, become \u003cem\u003emaxims\u003c/em\u003e\r\nof action; they lose their particular and impulsive\r\ncharacter, and become universal and deliberate principles.\r\nThus Leibniz is enabled to answer the various\r\nobjections which are always brought against\r\nany “intuitive” theory of moral actions,—the variability\r\nof men’s moral beliefs and conduct in different\r\ncountries and at different times. Common\r\ninstincts, but at first instincts only, are present in\r\nall men whenever and wherever they live. These\r\ninstincts may readily be “resisted by men’s passions,\r\nobscured by prejudice, and changed by custom.”\r\nThe moral instincts are always the basis of\r\nmoral action, but “custom, tradition, education”\r\nbecome mixed with them. Even when so confounded,\r\nhowever, the instinct will generally prevail,\r\nand custom is, upon the whole, on the side of\r\nright rather than wrong, so that Leibniz thinks\r\nthere is a sense in which all men have one common\r\nmorality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut these moral instincts, even when pure, are\r\nnot ethical science. This is innate, Leibniz says,\r\nonly in the sense in which arithmetic is innate,—it\r\ndepends upon demonstrations which reason furnishes.\r\nLeibniz does not, then, oppose intuitive and\r\ndemonstrative, as sometimes happens. Morality is\r\n\u003cem\u003epractically\u003c/em\u003e intuitive in the sense that all men tend to\r\naim at the Good, and have an instinctive feeling of\r\nwhat makes towards the Good. It is \u003cem\u003etheoretically\u003c/em\u003e\r\ndemonstrative, since it does not become a science\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"131\" id=\"Page_131\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nuntil Reason has an insight into the nature of the\r\nGood, and ascertains the fixed laws which are tributary\r\nto it. Moral principles are \u003cem\u003enot\u003c/em\u003e intuitive in\r\nthe sense that they are immediately discovered as\r\nseparate principles by some one power of the soul\r\ncalled “conscience.” Moral laws are intuitive, he\r\nsays, “as the \u003cem\u003econsequences\u003c/em\u003e of our own development\r\nand our true well-being.” Here we may well\r\nleave the matter. What is to be said in detail of\r\nLeibniz’s ethics will find its congenial home in what\r\nwe have to say of his theology.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"132\" id=\"Page_132\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\u003ca id=\"Chapter_VII\"\u003eCHAPTER VII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eMATTER AND ITS RELATION TO SPIRIT.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"upper-case\"\u003eLocke’s\u003c/span\u003e account of innate ideas and of sensation\r\nis only preparatory to a discussion of the\r\nideas got by sensation. His explanation of the\r\nmode of knowledge leads up to an explanation of\r\nthe things known. He remains true to his fundamental\r\nidea that before we come to conclusions\r\nabout any matters we must “examine our own ability.”\r\nHe deals first with ideas got by the senses,\r\nwhether by some one or by their conjoint action.\r\nOf these the ideas of solidity, of extension, and of\r\nduration are of most concern to us. They form as\r\nnear an approach to a general philosophy of nature\r\nas may be found anywhere in Locke. They are, too,\r\nthe germ from which grew the ideas of matter, of\r\nspace, and of time, which, however more comprehensive\r\nin scope and more amply worked out in\r\ndetail, characterize succeeding British thought, and\r\nwhich are reproduced to-day by Mr. Spencer.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e“The idea of solidity we receive by our touch.”\r\n“The ideas we get by more than one sense are of\r\nspace or extension, figure, rest, and motion.” These\r\nsentences contain the brief statement of the chief\r\ncontention of the sensational school. Locke certainly\r\nwas not conscious when he wrote them\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"133\" id=\"Page_133\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthat they were the expression of ideas which should\r\nresolve the world of matter and of space into a dissolving\r\nseries of accidentally associated sensations;\r\nbut such was none the less the case. When he\r\nwrites, “If any one asks me what solidity is, I send\r\nhim to his senses to inform him,” he is preparing\r\nthe way for Berkeley, and for a denial of all reality\r\nbeyond the feelings of the individual mind. When\r\nhe says that “we get the idea of space both by sight\r\nand touch,” this statement, although appearing truistic,\r\nis none the less the source of the contention\r\nof Hume that even geometry contains no necessary\r\nor universal elements, but is an account of sensible\r\nappearances, relative, as are all matters of\r\nsensation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLocke’s ideas may be synopsized as follows: It\r\nis a sufficient account of solidity to say that it is got\r\nby touch and that it arises from the resistance found\r\nin bodies to the entrance of any other body. “It\r\nis that which hinders the approach of two bodies\r\nwhen they are moved towards one another.” If not\r\nidentical with matter, it is at all events its most essential\r\nproperty. “This of all others seems the\r\nidea most intimately connected with and essential to\r\nbody, so as nowhere else to be found or imagined,\r\nbut only in matter.” It is, moreover, the source of\r\nthe other properties of matter. “Upon the solidity\r\nof bodies depend their mutual impulse, resistance,\r\nand protrusion.” Solidity, again, “is so inseparable\r\nan idea from body that upon that depends its filling\r\nof space, its contact, impulse, and communication\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"134\" id=\"Page_134\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nof motion upon impulse.” It is to be distinguished,\r\ntherefore, from hardness, for hardness is relative\r\nand derived, various bodies having various degrees\r\nof it; while solidity consists in utter exclusion of\r\nother bodies from the space possessed by any one,\r\nso that the hardest body has no more solidity than\r\nthe softest.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe close connection between solidity and matter\r\nmakes it not only possible, but necessary, to distinguish\r\nbetween matter and extension as against the\r\nCartesians, who had identified them. In particular\r\nLocke notes three differences between these notions.\r\nExtension includes neither solidity nor resistance;\r\nits parts are inseparable from one another both really\r\nand mentally, and are immovable; while matter has\r\nsolidity, its parts are mutually separable, and may\r\nbe moved \u003cem\u003ein\u003c/em\u003e space. From this distinction between\r\nspace and matter it follows, according to Locke,\r\nthat there is such a thing as a vacuum, or that\r\nspace is not necessarily a plenum of matter. Matter\r\nis that which fills space; but it is entirely indifferent\r\nto space whether or not it is filled. Space is\r\noccupied by matter, but there is no essential relation\r\nbetween them. Solidity is the essence of matter;\r\nemptiness is the characteristic of space. “The\r\nidea of space is as distinct from that of solidity as\r\nit is from that of scarlet color. It is true, solidity\r\ncannot exist without extension, neither can scarlet\r\ncolor exist without extension; but this hinders not\r\nthat they are \u003cem\u003edistinct ideas\u003c/em\u003e.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus there is fixed for us the idea of space as\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"135\" id=\"Page_135\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nwell as of matter. It is a distinct idea; that is,\r\nabsolute or independent in itself, having no intrinsic\r\nconnection with phenomena \u003cem\u003ein\u003c/em\u003e space. Yet it is got\r\nthrough the senses. How that can be a matter of\r\nsensation which is not only not material, but has\r\nno connection in itself with matter, Locke does\r\nnot explain. He thinks it sufficient to say that we\r\nsee distance between bodies of different color just\r\nas plainly as we see the colors. Space is, therefore,\r\na purely immediate idea, containing no more organic\r\nrelation to intelligence than it has to objects. We get\r\nthe notion of time as we do that of space, excepting\r\nthat it is the observation of internal states and not\r\nof external objects which furnishes the material of\r\nthe idea. Time has two elements,—succession and\r\nduration. “Observing what passes in the mind,\r\nhow of our ideas there in train some constantly\r\nvanish, and others begin to appear, we come by the\r\nidea of succession, and by observing a distance in\r\nthe parts of this succession we get the idea of\r\nduration.” Whether, however, time is something\r\nessentially empty, having no relation to the events\r\nwhich fill it, as space is essentially empty, without\r\nnecessary connection with the objects which fill it,\r\nis a question Locke does not consider. In fact, the\r\ngist of his ideas upon this point is as follows: there\r\nis actually an objective space or pure emptiness;\r\nemploying our senses, we get the idea of this space.\r\nThere is actually an objective time; employing reflection,\r\nwe perceive it. There is not the slightest\r\nattempt to form a philosophy of them, or to show\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"136\" id=\"Page_136\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ntheir function in the construction of an intelligible\r\nworld, except in the one point of the absolute independence\r\nof matter and space.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt cannot be said that Leibniz criticises the minor\r\npoints of Locke in such a way as to throw much\r\nlight upon them, or that he very fully expresses his\r\nown ideas about them. He contents himself with\r\ndeclaring that while the senses may give instances\r\nof space, time, and matter, and may suggest to intelligence\r\nthe stimuli upon which intelligence realizes\r\nthese notions from itself, they cannot be the source\r\nof these notions themselves; finding the evidence of\r\nthis in the sciences of geometry, arithmetic, and pure\r\nphysics. For these sciences deal with the notions\r\nof space, time, and matter, giving necessary and\r\ndemonstrative ideas concerning them, which the\r\nsenses can never legitimate. He further denies the\r\nsupposed absoluteness or independence of space,\r\nmatter, and motion. Admitting, indeed, the distinction\r\nbetween extension and matter, he denies that\r\nthis distinction suffices to prove the existence, or\r\neven the possibility, of a vacuum, and ends with a\r\ngeneral reference to his doctrine of pre-established\r\nharmony, as serving to explain these matters more\r\nfully and more accurately.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz has, however, a complete philosophy of\r\nnature. In his other writing, he explains the ideas\r\nof matter and force in their dependence upon his\r\nmetaphysic, or doctrine of spiritual entelechies. The\r\ntask does not at first sight appear an easy one.\r\nThe reality, according to Leibniz, is purely spiritual,\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"137\" id=\"Page_137\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ndoes not exist in space nor time, and is a principle\r\nof activity following its own law,—that of reflecting\r\nthe universe of spiritual relations. How from\r\nthis world of ideal, unextended, and non-temporal\r\ndynamic realities we are to pass over to a material\r\nworld of extension, with its static existence in\r\nspace, and transitory passage in time, is a question\r\nchallenging the whole Leibnizian system. It is a\r\nquestion, however, for which Leibniz himself has\r\nprovided an answer. We may not regard it as\r\nadequate; we may think that he has not truly\r\nderived the material world from his spiritual principles:\r\nbut at all events he asked himself the\r\nquestion, and gave an answer. We shall investigate\r\nthis answer by arranging what Leibniz has said\r\nunder the heads of: matter as a metaphysical principle;\r\nmatter as a physical phenomenon; and the\r\nrelation of phenomena to absolute reality, or of\r\nthe physical to the metaphysical. In connection\r\nwith the second head, particularly, we shall find it\r\nnecessary to discuss what Leibniz has said about\r\nspace, time, and motion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWolff, who put the ideas of Leibniz into systematic\r\nshape, did it at the expense of almost all their\r\nsignificance. He took away the air of paradox, of\r\nremoteness, that characterized Leibniz’s thought,\r\nand gave it a popular form. But its depth and suggestiveness\r\nvanished in the process. Unfortunately,\r\nWolff’s presentations of the philosophy of Leibniz\r\nhave been followed by others, to whom it seemed\r\na dull task to follow out the intricacies of a thought\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"138\" id=\"Page_138\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nnowhere systematically expressed. This has been\r\nespecially the case as concerns the Leibnizian\r\ndoctrine of matter. A superficial interpretation of\r\ncertain passages in Leibniz has led to an almost\r\nuniversal misunderstanding about it. Leibniz frequently\r\nsays that since matter is composite or\r\ncomplex, it follows that there must be something\r\nsimple as its basis, and this simple something is\r\nthe monad. The misinterpretation just spoken of\r\nconsists in supposing that Leibniz meant that matter\r\nas composite is made up of monads as simple;\r\nthat the monad and matter are facts of the same\r\norder, the latter being only an aggregate, or continued\r\ncollection of the former. It interpreted the\r\nconception of Leibniz in strict analogy with the\r\natomic theory of Lucretius, excepting that it granted\r\nthat the former taught that the ultimate atom, the\r\ncomponent of all complex forms of matter, has\r\nposition only, not extension, its essence consisting\r\nin its exercise of force, not in its mere space occupancy.\r\nThe monad was thus considered to be \u003cem\u003ein\u003c/em\u003e\r\nspace, or at least conditioned by space relations,\r\nas is a mathematical point, although not itself\r\nspatial in the sense of being extended. Monad and\r\nmatter were thus represented as facts of the same\r\nkind or genus, having their difference only in their\r\nrelative isolation or aggregation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut Leibniz repudiated this idea, and that not\r\nonly by the spirit of his teaching, but in express\r\nwords. Monads “are not ingredients or constituents\r\nof matter,” he says, “but only \u003cem\u003econditions\u003c/em\u003e of it.”\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"139\" id=\"Page_139\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\n“Monads can no more be said to be parts of bodies,\r\nor to come in contact with them, or to compose\r\nthem, than can souls or mathematical points.”\r\n“Monads \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e have \u003cem\u003eno\u003c/em\u003e situation relative to one\r\nanother.” An increase in the number of created\r\nmonads, he says again, if such a thing could be\r\nsupposed, would no more increase the amount of\r\nmatter in existence, than mathematical points added\r\nto a line would increase its length. And again:\r\n“There is no nearness or remoteness among monads;\r\nto say that they are gathered in a point or\r\nare scattered in space, is to employ mental fictions,\r\n\u003cem\u003ein trying to imagine what can only be thought\u003c/em\u003e.” The\r\nitalicized words give the clew to the whole discussion.\r\nTo make monads of the same order as\r\ncorporeal phenomena, is to make them sensible, or\r\ncapable of being imaged, or conditioned by space\r\nand time,—three phrases which are strictly correlative.\r\nBut the monads can only be thought,—that\r\nis, their qualities are ideal, not sensible; they\r\ncan be realized only by reason, not projected in\r\nforms having spatial outline and temporal habitation,\r\nthat is, in images. Monads and material\r\nthings, in other words, are facts of two distinct\r\norders; they are related as the rational or spiritual\r\nand the physical or sensible. Matter is no more\r\ncomposed of monads than it is of thoughts or of\r\nlogical principles. As Leibniz says over and over\r\nagain: Matter, space, time, motion are only phenomena,\r\nalthough phenomena \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ebene fundata\u003c/i\u003e,—phenomena,\r\nthat is, having their rational basis and\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"140\" id=\"Page_140\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ncondition. The monads, on the other hand, are\r\nnot appearances, they are realities.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHaving freed our minds from the supposition\r\nthat it is in any way possible to form an image or\r\npicture of the monad; having realized that it is\r\nwholly false to suppose that monads occupy position\r\nin space, and then by their continuity fill it,\r\nand make extended matter,—we must attempt to\r\nframe a correct theory of the nature of matter and\r\nits relation to the monad. We shall do this only\r\nas we realize that “matter,” so far as it has any\r\nreality, or so far as it has any real \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003efundamentum\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nmust be something ideal, or, in Leibniz’s language,\r\n“metaphysical.” As he says over and over again,\r\nthe only realities are the substances or spiritual\r\nunits of activity, to which the name “monad” is\r\ngiven. In the inquiry, then, after such reality as\r\nmatter may have, we must betake ourselves to this\r\nunit of living energy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAlthough every monad is active, it is not entirely\r\nactive. There is, as we have already seen, an\r\ninfinite scale of substances; and since substance is\r\nequivalent to activity, this is saying that there is\r\nan infinite scale of activities. God alone is \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003epurus\r\nactus\u003c/i\u003e, absolute energy, untouched by passivity or\r\nreceptivity. Every other being has the element of\r\nincompleteness, of inadequacy; it does not completely\r\nrepresent the universe. In this passivity\r\nconsists its finitude, so that Leibniz says that not\r\neven God himself could deprive monads of it, for\r\nthis would be to make them equal to himself. In\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"141\" id=\"Page_141\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthis passivity, incompleteness, or finitude, consists\r\nwhat we call matter. Leibniz says that he can understand\r\nwhat Plato meant when he called matter\r\nsomething essentially imperfect and transitory. Every\r\nfinite monad is a union of two principles,—those\r\nof activity and of passivity. “I do not admit,”\r\nsays Leibniz, “that there are souls existing\r\nsimply by themselves, or that there are created\r\nspirits detached from all body. God alone is\r\nabove all matter, since he is its author; creatures\r\nfreed from matter would be at the same time detached\r\nfrom the universal connection of things, and,\r\nas it were, deserters from the general order.” And\r\nagain, “Beings have a nature which is both active\r\nand passive; \u003cem\u003ethat is\u003c/em\u003e, material and immaterial.”\r\nAnd again, he says that every created monad requires\r\nboth an entelechy, or principle of activity,\r\nand matter. “Matter is essential to any entelechy,\r\nand can never be separated from it, since matter\r\n\u003cem\u003ecompletes\u003c/em\u003e it.” In short, the term “monad” is equivalent\r\nto the term “entelechy” only when applied to\r\nGod. In every other monad, the entelechy, or energy,\r\nis but one factor. “Matter, or primitive passive\r\npower, completes the entelechy, or primitive\r\nactive power, so that it becomes a perfect substance,\r\nor monad.” On the other hand, of course, matter,\r\nas the passive principle, is a mere potentiality or\r\nabstraction, considered in itself. It is real only\r\nin its union with the active principle. Matter, he\r\nsays, “cannot exist without immaterial substances.”\r\n“To every particular portion of matter belongs a\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"142\" id=\"Page_142\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nparticular \u003cem\u003eform\u003c/em\u003e; that is, a soul, a spirit.” To this\r\nelement of matter, considered as an abstraction, in\r\nits distinction from soul, Leibniz, following the\r\nscholastics, and ultimately Aristotle, gives the\r\nname, “first” or “bare” matter. The same influence\r\nis seen in the fact that he opposes this element\r\nof matter to “form,” or the active principle.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur starting-point, therefore, for the consideration\r\nof matter is the statement that it is receptivity,\r\nthe capacity for being affected, which always constitutes\r\nmatter. But what is meant by “receptivity”?\r\nTo answer this question we must return to\r\nwhat was said about the two activities of the monad,—representation,\r\nor perception, and appetition,—and\r\nto the difference between confused and distinct\r\nideas. The monad has appetition so far as it determines\r\nitself from within to change, so far as it\r\nfollows an internal principle of energy. It is representative\r\nso far as it is determined from without,\r\nso far as it receives impressions from the universe.\r\nYet we have learned to know that in one sense\r\neverything occurs from the spontaneity of the\r\nmonad itself; it receives no influence or influxus\r\nfrom without; everything comes from its own\r\ndepths, or is appetition. But, on the other hand,\r\nall that which so comes forth is only a mirroring or\r\ncopying of the universe. The whole content of the\r\nappetition is representation. Although the monad\r\nworks spontaneously, it is none the less determined\r\nin its activities to produce only reflections or images\r\nof the world. In this way appetition and representation\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"143\" id=\"Page_143\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nappear to be identical. The monad is determined\r\nfrom within, indeed, but it is determined to\r\nexactly the same results as if wholly determined\r\nfrom without. What light, then, can be thrown from\r\nthis distinction upon the nature of matter?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNone, unless we follow Leibniz somewhat farther.\r\nIf we do, we shall see that the soul is regarded as\r\nappetitive, or self-active, so far as it has clear and\r\ndistinct ideas. If the monad reaches distinct consciousness,\r\nit has knowledge of self,—that is, of the\r\nnature of pure spirit,—or, what again is equivalent\r\nto this, of the nature of reality as it universally is.\r\nSuch knowledge is knowledge of God, of substance,\r\nof unity, of pure activity, and of all the innate ideas\r\nwhich elevate the confused perceptions of sense into\r\nscience. Distinct consciousness is therefore equivalent\r\nto self-activity, and this to recognition of God\r\nand the universal. But if knowledge is confused, it\r\nis not possible to see it in its relations to self; it\r\ncannot be analyzed; the rational or ideal element\r\nin it is concealed from view. In confused ideas,\r\ntherefore, the soul appears to be passive; being\r\npassive, to be determined from without. This determination\r\nfrom without is equivalent to that\r\nwhich is opposed to spirit or reason, and hence appears\r\nas matter. Such is in outline the Leibnizian\r\nphilosophy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt thus is clear that merely stating that matter is\r\npassivity in the monad is not the ultimate way of stating\r\nits nature. For passivity means in reality nothing\r\nbut confused representations,—representations, that\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"144\" id=\"Page_144\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nis, whose significance is not perceived. The true significance\r\nof every representation is found in its relation\r\nto the ego, or pure self-activity, which, through\r\nits dependent relation upon God, the absolute self-activity\r\nand ego, produces the representation from\r\nits own ideal being. So far as the soul does not\r\nhave distinct recognition of relation of all representations\r\nto self, it feels them as coming from\r\nwithout; as foreign to spirit; in short, as matter.\r\nLeibniz thus employs exactly the same language\r\nabout confused ideas that he does about passivity,\r\nor matter. It is not possible that the monad should\r\nhave distinct consciousness of itself as a mirror of\r\nthe whole universe, he says, “for in that case every\r\nentelechy would be God.” Again, “the soul would\r\nbe God if it could enter at once and with distinctness\r\ninto everything occurring within it.” But it is\r\nnecessary “that we should have passions which consist\r\nin confused ideas, in which there is something\r\ninvoluntary and unknown, and which represent the\r\nbody and constitute our imperfection.” Again, he\r\nspeaks of matter as “the \u003cem\u003emixture\u003c/em\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003emélange\u003c/i\u003e) of the\r\neffects of the infinite environing us.” In that expression\r\nis summed up his whole theory of matter. It is\r\na mixture; it is, that is to say, confused, aggregated,\r\nirresolvable into simple ideas. But it is a mixture\r\nof “effects of the infinite about us;” that is, it takes\r\nits rise in the true, the real, the spiritual. It only\r\nfails to represent this as it actually is. Matter, in\r\nshort, is a phenomenon dependent upon inability to\r\nrealize the entire spiritual character of reality. It\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"145\" id=\"Page_145\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nis spirit apprehended in a confused, hesitating, and\r\npassive manner.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is none the less a necessary phenomenon, for it\r\nis involved in the idea of a continuous gradation of\r\nmonads, in the distinction between the infinite and\r\nthe finite, or, as Leibniz often prefers to put it,\r\nbetween the “creator” and the “created.” There is\r\ninvolved everywhere in the idea of Leibniz the conception\r\nof subordination; of a hierarchy of forms,\r\neach of which receives the law of its action from the\r\nnext higher, and gives the law to the next lower.\r\nWe have previously considered the element of passivity\r\nor receptivity as relating only to the monad\r\nwhich manifests it. It is evident, however, that\r\nwhat is passive in one, implies something active in\r\nanother. What one receives, is what another gives.\r\nThe reciprocal influence of monads upon one another,\r\ntherefore, as harmonious members of one system,\r\nrequires matter. More strictly speaking, this reciprocal\r\ninfluence \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e matter. To take away all receptivity,\r\nall passivity, from monads would be to isolate\r\nthem from all relations with others; it would be to\r\ndeprive them of all power of affecting or being affected\r\nby others. That is what Leibniz meant by the\r\nexpression already quoted, that if monads had not\r\nmatter as an element in them, “they would be, as\r\nit were, deserters from the general order.” The\r\nnote of unity, of organic connection, which we found\r\nto be the essence of the Leibnizian philosophy, absolutely\r\nrequires, therefore, matter, or passivity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt must be remembered that this reciprocal influence\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"146\" id=\"Page_146\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nis ideal. As Leibniz remarks, “When it is\r\nsaid that one monad is affected by another, this is\r\nto be understood concerning its \u003cem\u003erepresentation\u003c/em\u003e of the\r\nother. For the Author of things has so accommodated\r\nthem to one another that one is said to suffer\r\n(or receive from the other) when its relative value\r\ngives way to that of the other.” Or again, “the\r\nmodifications of one monad are the ideal causes of\r\nthe modifications of another monad, so far as there\r\nappear in one the reasons on account of which God\r\nbrought about in the beginning certain modifications\r\nin another.” And most definitely of all: “A creature\r\nis called active so far as it has perfection;\r\npassive in so far as it is imperfect. One creature\r\nis more perfect than another so far as there is found\r\nin it that which serves to \u003cem\u003erender the reason\u003c/em\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nfor that occurring in the other; and it is in this way\r\nthat it acts upon the other.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe are thus introduced, from a new point of\r\nview and in a more concrete way, to the conception\r\nof pre-established harmony. The activity of one,\r\nthe energy which gives the law to the other and\r\nmakes it subordinate in the hierarchy of monads,\r\nis conceived necessarily as spirit, as soul; that\r\nwhich receives, which is rendered subordinate by\r\nthe activity of the other, is body. The pre-established\r\nharmony is the fact that they are so related\r\nthat one can receive the law of its activity from the\r\nother. Leibniz is without doubt partially responsible\r\nfor the ordinary misconception of his views\r\nupon this point by reason of the illustration which he\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"147\" id=\"Page_147\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nwas accustomed to use; namely, of two clocks so\r\nconstructed that without any subsequent regulation\r\neach always kept perfect time with the other,—as\r\nmuch so as if there were some actual physical connection\r\nbetween them. This seems to put soul and body,\r\nspirit and matter, as two co-ordinate substances, on\r\nthe same level, with such natural opposition between\r\nthem that some external harmony must arrange some\r\nunity of action. In causing this common idea of his\r\ntheory of pre-established harmony, Leibniz has paid\r\nthe penalty for attempting to do what he often reproves\r\nin others,—imagining or presenting in sensible\r\nform what can only be thought. But his other\r\nexplanations show clearly enough that the pre-established\r\nharmony expresses, not a relation between\r\ntwo parallel substances, but a condition of dependence\r\nof lower forms of activity upon the higher for\r\nthe law of their existence and activity,—in modern\r\nterms, it expresses the fact that phenomena are\r\nconditioned upon noumena; that material facts get\r\ntheir significance and share of reality through their\r\nrelation to spirit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may sum up what has been said about matter\r\nas an element in the monad, or as a metaphysical\r\nprinciple, as follows: The existence of matter is not\r\nonly not opposed to the fundamental ideas of Leibniz,\r\nbut is a necessary deduction from them. It is\r\na necessity of the principle of continuity; for this\r\nrequires an infinity of monads, alike indeed in the\r\nuniversal law of their being, but unlike, each to\r\neach, in the specific coloring or manifestation of this\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"148\" id=\"Page_148\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nlaw. The principle of organic unity requires that\r\nthere be as many real beings as possible participating\r\nin and contributing to it. It is necessary, again,\r\nin order that there may be reciprocal influence or\r\nconnection among the monads. Were it not for\r\nthe material element in the monad, each would be\r\na God; if each were thus infinite and absolute,\r\nthere would be so many principles wholly independent\r\nand isolated. The principle of harmony would\r\nbe violated. So much for the necessity of the\r\nmaterial factor. As to its nature, it is a principle\r\nof passivity; that is, of ideal receptivity, of conformity\r\nto a law apparently not self-imposed, but externally\r\nlaid down. This makes matter equivalent to\r\na phenomenon; that is to say, to the having of confused,\r\nimperfect, inadequate ideas. To say that\r\nmatter is correlative to confused ideas is to say that\r\nthere is no recognition of its relation to self or to\r\nspirit. As Leibniz sometimes puts it, since there\r\nis an infinity of beings in the universe, each one of\r\nwhich exercises an ideal influence upon every other\r\none of the series, it is impossible that this other one\r\nshould realize their full meaning; they appear only\r\nas confused ideas, or as matter. To use language\r\nwhich Leibniz indeed does not employ, but which\r\nseems to convey his thought, the spirit, not seeing\r\nthem as they really are, does not \u003cem\u003efind\u003c/em\u003e itself in them.\r\nBut matter is thus not only the confused manifestation\r\nor phenomenon of spirit, it is also its potentiality.\r\nPassivity is always relative. It does not mean\r\ncomplete lack of activity; that, as Leibniz says, is\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"149\" id=\"Page_149\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nnothingness, and matter is not a form of nothingness.\r\nLeibniz even speaks of it as passive \u003cem\u003epower\u003c/em\u003e.\r\nThat is to say, there is an undeveloped or incomplete\r\nactivity in what appears as matter, and this\r\nmay be,—if we admit an infinity of time,—must be\r\ndeveloped. When developed it manifests itself as\r\nit really is, as spirit. Confused ideas, as Leibniz\r\ntakes pains to state, are not a genus of ideas antithetical\r\nto distinct; they differ only in degree or\r\ngrade. They are on their way to become distinct,\r\nor else they are distinct ideas which have fallen\r\nback into an “involved” state of being. Matter,\r\ntherefore, is not absolutely opposed to spirit,—on\r\nthe one hand because it is the manifestation, the\r\nphenomenon, of spirit; on the other, because it is\r\nthe potentiality of spirit, capable of sometime realizing\r\nthe whole activity implied in it, but now\r\nlatent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus it is that Leibniz says that everything is\r\n“full” of souls or monads. What appears to be\r\nlifeless is in reality like a pond full of fishes, like a\r\ndrop of water full of infusoria. Everything is organic\r\ndown to the last element. More truly, there\r\nis no last element. There is a true infinity of\r\norganic beings wrapped up in the slightest speck\r\nof apparently lifeless matter. These illustrations,\r\nlike many others which Leibniz uses, are apt to\r\nsuggest that erroneous conception of the relation\r\nof monads to spirit which we were obliged, in\r\nLeibniz’s name, to correct at the outset,—the idea,\r\nnamely, that matter is composed, in a spatial or\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"150\" id=\"Page_150\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nmechanical way, of monads. But after the foregoing\r\nexplanations we can see that what Leibniz\r\nmeans when he says that every portion of matter is\r\nfull of entelechies or souls, like a garden full of\r\nplants, is that there is an absolute continuity of\r\nspiritual principles, each having its ideal relation\r\nwith every other. There is no point of matter\r\nwhich does not represent in a confused way the\r\nentire universe. It is therefore as infinite in its\r\nactivities as the universe. In idea also it is capable\r\nof representing in distinct consciousness, or as\r\na development of its own self-activity, each of\r\nthese infinite activities.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn a word, every created or finite being may be\r\nregarded as matter or as spirit, according as it is\r\naccounted for by its external relations, as the reasons\r\nfor what happen in it are to be found elsewhere\r\nthan in its own explicit activity, or according as it\r\nshows clearly in itself the reasons for its own modifications,\r\nand also accounts for changes occurring in\r\nother beings. The externally conditioned is matter;\r\nthe internally conditioned, the self-explanatory,\r\nis self-active, or spirit. Since all external relations\r\nare finally dependent on organic; since the ultimate\r\nsource of all explanation must be that which is its\r\nown reason; since the ultimate source of all activity\r\nmust be that which is self-active,—the final reason\r\nor source of matter is spirit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"151\" id=\"Page_151\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\u003ca id=\"Chapter_VIII\"\u003eCHAPTER VIII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eMATERIAL PHENOMENA AND THEIR REALITY.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"upper-case\"\u003eWe\u003c/span\u003e have seen the necessity and nature of matter\r\nas deductions from the fundamental principles\r\nof Leibniz. We have seen that matter is\r\na phenomenon or manifestation of spirit in an imperfect\r\nand confused way. But why should it appear\r\nas moving, as extended, as resisting, as having\r\ncohesion, with all the concrete qualities which always\r\nmark it? Is there any connection between these\r\nparticular properties of matter as physical, and its\r\n“metaphysical” or ideal character? These are the\r\nquestions which now occupy us. Stated more definitely,\r\nthey take the following form: Is there any\r\nessential connection between the properties of matter\r\nas a metaphysical element, and its properties as\r\na sensible fact of experience? Leibniz holds that\r\nthere is. He does not, indeed, explicitly take the\r\nground that we can deduce \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e all the characteristics\r\nof matter as a fact of actual experience\r\nfrom its rational notion, but he thinks we can find\r\na certain analogy between the two, that the sensible\r\nqualities are images or reflexes of the spiritual qualities,\r\nwitnessing, so far as possible, to their origin in\r\npure energy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"152\" id=\"Page_152\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eHis position is as follows: that which in the\r\nmonad is activity or substantial, is, in sensible matter,\r\nmotion. That which in the monad is lack of a\r\ngiven activity, that which constitutes its subordinate\r\nposition in the hierarchy of monads, is, in the sphere\r\nof material things, inertia. That which in the spiritual\r\nworld is the individuality of monads, making\r\neach forever ideally distinct from every other, is, in\r\nthe phenomenal realm, resistance or impenetrability.\r\nThe perfect continuity of monads in the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003emundus\r\nintelligibilis\u003c/i\u003e has also its counterpart in the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003emundus\r\nsensibilis\u003c/i\u003e in the diffusion or extension of physical\r\nthings.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eInstead of following out this analogy directly, it\r\nwill rather be found convenient to take up Leibniz’s\r\nthought in its historical connection. We have\r\nalready alluded to the fact that he began as a Cartesian,\r\nand that one of the first ideas which repelled\r\nhim from that system of thought was the notion\r\nthat the essence of matter is extension. His earliest\r\nphilosophical writings, as he was gradually coming\r\nto the thoughts which thereafter dominated him,\r\nare upon this point. In general, his conclusions\r\nare as follows: If matter were extension, it would\r\nbe incapable of passion or of action. Solidity, too,\r\nis a notion entirely opposed to the conception of\r\nmere extension. The idea of matter as extension\r\ncontradicts some of the known laws of motion. It\r\nrequires that the quantity of motion remain unchanged\r\nwhenever two bodies come in contact,\r\nwhile as matter of fact it is the quantity of energy,\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"153\" id=\"Page_153\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthat which the motion is capable of effecting,\r\nthat remains unchanged; or, as he more often puts\r\nthe objection, the Cartesian notion of matter requires\r\nthat matter be wholly indifferent to motion,\r\nthat there be nothing in it which resists motion when\r\nimparted. But, says Leibniz, there is something\r\nresisting, that to which Keppler gave the name\r\n“inertia.” It is not found to be true if one body\r\nimpacts upon another that the second moves without\r\ndiminishing the velocity or changing the direction\r\nof the first. On the other hand, just in proportion\r\nto the size of the second body, it resists and changes\r\nthe motion of the first, up to the point of causing\r\nthe first to rebound if small in comparison. And\r\nwhen it was replied that the retardation was due to\r\nthe fact that the force moving the first body had\r\nnow to be divided between two, Leibniz answered\r\nthat this was simply to give up the contention, and\r\nbesides the notion of extension to use that of force.\r\nIf extension were the essence of matter, it should be\r\npossible to deduce all the properties of matter, or\r\nat least to account for them all, from it. But since,\r\nas just seen, this does not enable us to account for\r\nany of them, since for any of its concrete qualities\r\nwe have to fall back on force, it is evident where\r\nthe true essence of matter is to be found.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz has another argument of a logical nature,\r\nas those already referred to are of a physical:\r\n“Those who claim that extension is a substance,\r\nreverse the order of words as well as of thoughts.\r\nBesides extension there must be a subject which is\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"154\" id=\"Page_154\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nextended; that is to say, something to which it\r\nbelongs to be repeated or continued. For extension\r\nis nothing but a repetition or continued multiplication\r\nof that which is spread out,—it is a plurality, a\r\ncontinuity, a co-existence of parts. Consequently,\r\nextension does not suffice to explain the nature of\r\nthe repeated or manifold substance, of which the\r\nnotion is anterior to that of its repetition.” Extension,\r\nin other words, is nothing substantial, it is\r\nnot something which can exist by itself; it is only\r\na quality, a property, a mode of being. It is\r\nalways relative to something which has extension.\r\nAs Leibniz says elsewhere: “I insist that extension\r\nis only an \u003cem\u003eabstraction\u003c/em\u003e, and requires something which\r\nis extended. It presupposes some quality, some\r\nattribute, some nature in a subject which is extended,\r\ndiffused, or continued. Extension is a diffusion\r\nof this quality. For example, in milk there is\r\nan extension or diffusion of whiteness; in the diamond\r\nan extension or diffusion of hardness; in\r\nbody in general a diffusion of antitypia or materiality.\r\nThere is accordingly in body something\r\nanterior to extension.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom the physical side, therefore, we find it impossible\r\nto account for the concrete properties of\r\nmaterial phenomena from extension; on the logical\r\nwe find that the idea of extension is always relative\r\nto that which is extended. What is that which is\r\nto be considered as the bearer of extension and the\r\nsource of physical qualities? We are led back to\r\nthe point at which we left the matter in the \u003ca href=\"#Chapter_VII\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003elast chapter\u003c/a\u003e.\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"155\" id=\"Page_155\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nIt is force, and force both passive and\r\nactive. Leibniz uses the term “matter” in at least\r\nthree senses: it is the metaphysical element of passive\r\nforce \u003cem\u003ein\u003c/em\u003e the monad; it is the monad itself\r\nconsidered as, upon the whole, externally conditioned\r\nor unconscious; and it is the phenomenon\r\nresulting from the aggregation of the monads in the\r\nsecond sense. The first is naked matter, and is a\r\npure abstraction; the second is the monad as material,\r\nas opposed to the monad, as soul; the third is\r\nclothed, or second matter, or, concretely, body, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecorpus\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThe first is unreal by itself; the second is\r\none phase of substance; the third is not substantial,\r\nbut is a reality, though a phenomenal one. It is\r\nfrom the substantial monad that we are to explain\r\nthe two things now demanding explanation,—that\r\nelement in \u003cem\u003ebodies\u003c/em\u003e (matter in third sense) which\r\nis the source of their physical properties, and that\r\nwhich is the subject, the carrier, so to speak, of\r\nextension.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat of which we are in search as the source of the\r\nphysical qualities of bodies is motion. This is not\r\nforce, but its “image.” It is force, says Leibniz,\r\nthat “is the real element in motion; that is to say,\r\nit is that element which out of the present state induces\r\na change in the future state.” As force, in\r\nother words, is the causal activity which effects the\r\ndevelopment of one “representation” of a monad out\r\nof another, so motion, in the realm of phenomena,\r\nis not only change, but change which is continuous\r\nand progressive, each new position being dependent\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"156\" id=\"Page_156\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nupon the foregoing, and following out of it absolutely\r\nwithout break.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMotion, therefore, is the manifestation of the\r\nideal unity of substance,—a unity not of mere\r\nstatic inherence, but of a continuous process of activity.\r\nIt is from this standpoint that Leibniz accounts\r\nfor the so-called transference of motion from\r\none body to another upon contact. The ordinary\r\nview of this, which looks at it as if one body loses\r\nthe motion which another body gains, Leibniz\r\nridicules, saying that those who hold this view seem\r\nto think that motion is a kind of thing, resembling,\r\nperchance, salt dissolved in water. The right view,\r\non the other hand, does away with all appearance of\r\nmystery in the carrying over of motion from one\r\nbody to another, for it recognizes that continuity is\r\nthe very essence of motion, and that we do not\r\nhave two things and a third process, but that the\r\ntwo bodies are phases or elements in one and the\r\nsame system of movement.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eStarting from this idea of motion, then, Leibniz\r\nis to account for the actual qualities of matter as\r\nfound in experience. These are the form, magnitude,\r\ncohesion, resistance, and the purely sensible\r\nqualities of objects. “First” matter, that is, abstract\r\nmatter, may be conceived, according to Leibniz,\r\nas perfectly homogeneous, a “subtle fluid,” in\r\nhis words, without any distinction of parts or of solidity.\r\nBut this \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e an abstract notion. It is what\r\nmatter would be without motion. Motion necessarily\r\ndifferentiates this plenum of homogeneity, and\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"157\" id=\"Page_157\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthus causes distinctions of figure (that is, boundaries\r\nof parts) and varieties of cohesion, or the\r\nvarying solidity and fluidity of bodies. The latter\r\ndifference is indeed the ultimate one. The principle\r\nof continuity or gradation, as applied to motion,\r\nmakes it necessary that motions should not be in\r\nany two places of exactly the same energy. The\r\nresult is that the original fluid matter is everywhere\r\ndifferently divided. Motion, entering into the uniform\r\nplenum, introduces distinction; it causes so\r\nmuch of the matter as is affected by a given movement\r\nto collect together and form in appearance a\r\ncoherent body, as opposed to surrounding bodies\r\nwhich are affected by different degrees of energy.\r\nBut even this is only approximate; the same principle\r\nof continuity must be applied within any\r\napparently coherent body; its parts, while, in relation\r\nto other bodies, they have the same amount of\r\nmotion, are in relation to one another differently\r\naffected. There are no two having exactly the\r\nsame motion; if they had, there would be no distinction\r\nbetween them; and thus, according to the\r\nprinciple of Leibniz, they would be the same.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt follows at once from this that there is in the\r\nuniverse no body of absolute hardness or solidity,\r\nnor of entire softness or fluidity. A perfectly solid\r\nbody would be one whose system of motions could\r\nnot be affected by any other system,—a body which\r\nby motion had separated itself from motion, or become\r\nabsolute. This is evidently an idea which\r\ncontradicts itself, for the very essence of motion is\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"158\" id=\"Page_158\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ncontinuity or relation. A body perfectly fluid, on\r\nthe other hand, would be one in which there was\r\nno resistance offered to other motions,—a body, in\r\nother words, in which there are no movements\r\nthat, entering into connection with one another,\r\nform a relative opposition to other movements.\r\nIt would be a body isolated or out of relation with\r\nthe general system of motions, and hence an impossibility.\r\nThere is no last term either of solidity\r\nor of fluidity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt equally follows as matter of course that there\r\nis no indivisible particle of matter,—no atom.\r\nThe infinity of degrees of motion implies a corresponding\r\ndivision of matter. As already said, it is\r\nonly in contrast with other relatively constant systems\r\nof motion that any body is of uniform motion;\r\nin reality there is everywhere throughout it variety\r\nof movement, and hence complete divisibility, or\r\nrather, complete division. If Leibniz were to employ\r\nthe term “atom” at all, it could be only in the\r\nsense of the modern dynamical theory (of which,\r\nindeed, he is one of the originators), according to\r\nwhich the atom is not defined by its spatial position\r\nand outlines, but, by the range of its effects, as the\r\ncentre of energies of infinite circumference. Correlative\r\nto the non-existence of the atom is the non-existence\r\nof the vacuum. The two imply each\r\nother. The hard, limited, isolated body, having no\r\nintrinsic relations with other bodies, must have room\r\nto come into external relations with them. This\r\nempty space, which is the theatre of such accidental\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"159\" id=\"Page_159\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ncontacts as may happen, is the vacuum. But\r\nif bodies are originally in connection with one\r\nanother, if they are in reality but differentiations\r\nof varying degrees of motion within one system of\r\nmotion, then there is no necessity for the vacuum,—nay,\r\nthere is no place for it. The vacuum in this\r\ncase could mean only a break, a chasm, in the order\r\nof nature. According to the theory of Leibniz,\r\n“bodies” are but the dynamic divisions of the one\r\nenergy that fills the universe; their separateness is\r\nnot an independent possession of any one of them\r\nor of all together, but is the result of relations to\r\nthe entire system. Their apparent isolation is only\r\nby reason of their actual connections. To admit a\r\nvacuum anywhere, would thus be to deny the relatedness\r\nof the parts separated by it. The theory of\r\nthe atom and the vacuum are the two phases of\r\nthe metaphysical assumption of an indefinite plurality\r\nof independent separate realities. The theory\r\nof Leibniz, resting as it does on the idea of\r\na perfect unity of interrelated members, must deny\r\nboth of these aspects. Were we making an extended\r\nanalysis of the opposed view, it would be\r\nnecessary to point out that it denies itself. For\r\nit is only \u003cem\u003ethrough\u003c/em\u003e the vacuum that the atoms are\r\nisolated or independent, and the sole function of\r\nthe vacuum is to serve as the background of the\r\natoms. The \u003cins title=\"atoms,\"\u003eatoms\u003c/ins\u003e are separated only in virtue of\r\ntheir connection, and the vacuum is what it is—pure\r\nemptiness—only on account of that which is\r\nin it. In short, the theory is only an abstract and\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"160\" id=\"Page_160\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nincomplete way of grasping the thought of relation\r\nor mediated unity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have thus discovered that all motions conspire\r\ntogether, or form a system. But in their\r\nunity they do not cease to be motions, or variously\r\ndifferentiated members. Through this differentiation,\r\nor mutual reaction of motions, there comes\r\nabout the appearance of boundaries, of separation.\r\nFrom these boundaries or terminations arise the\r\nform and size of bodies. From motion also proceeds\r\nthe cohesion of bodies, in the sense that each relative\r\nsystem resists dissolution, or hangs together.\r\nSays Leibniz, “The motions, since they are conspiring,\r\nwould be troubled by separation; and\r\naccordingly this can be accomplished only by\r\nviolence and with resistance.” Not only form, size,\r\nand stability depend upon motion, but also the\r\nsensible, the “secondary” qualities. “It must\r\nnot be supposed that color, pain, sound, etc., are\r\narbitrary and without relation to their causes. It\r\nis not God’s way to act with so little reason and\r\norder. There is a kind of resemblance, not entire,\r\nbut of relation, of order. We say, for example,\r\n‘Light is in the fire,’ since there are motions in the\r\nfire which are imperceptible in their separation,\r\nbut which are sensible in their conjunction or confusion;\r\nand this is what is made known in the idea\r\nof light.” In other words, color, sound, etc., even\r\npain, are still the perception of motion, but in a\r\nconfused way. We thus see how thoroughly Leibniz\r\ncarries back all the properties of bodies to motion.\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"161\" id=\"Page_161\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nTo sum up, motion is the origin of the relative\r\nsolidity, the divisibleness, the form, the size, the\r\ncohesion, or active resistance of bodies, and of their\r\nproperties as made known to us in immediate\r\nsensation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn all that has been said it has been implied that\r\nextension is already in existence; “first matter” is\r\nsupposed to fill all space, and motion to determine\r\nit to take upon itself its actual concrete properties.\r\nBut this “first matter,” when thus spoken of, has\r\na somewhat mythological sound, even if it be admitted\r\nthat it is an abstraction. For how can an\r\nabstraction be extended in space, and how can it\r\nform, as it were, a background upon which motion\r\ndisplays itself? The idea of “first matter” in its\r\nrelation to extension evidently demands explanation.\r\nIn seeking this explanation we shall also\r\nlearn about that “subject” which Leibniz said\r\nwas necessarily presupposed in extension, as a\r\nconcrete thing is required for a quality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe clew to the view of Leibniz upon this point\r\nmay be derived, I think, from the following quotations:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e“If it were possible to see what makes extension,\r\nthat kind of extension which falls under our eyes\r\nat present would vanish, and our minds would\r\nperceive nothing else than simple realities existing\r\nin mutual externality to one another. It would be\r\nas if we could distinguish the minute particles of\r\nmatter variously disposed from which a painted\r\nimage is formed: if we could do it, the image, which\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"162\" id=\"Page_162\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nis nothing but a phenomenon, would vanish. . . .\r\nIf we think of two simple realities as both existing\r\nat the same time, but distinct from one another, we\r\nlook at them as if they were outside of one another,\r\nand hence conceive them as extended.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe monads are outside of one another, not\r\nspatially, but ideally; but this reciprocal distinction\r\nfrom one another, if it is to appear in phenomenal\r\nmode, must take the form of an image,\r\nand the image is spatial. But if the monads were\r\npure activity, they would \u003cem\u003enot\u003c/em\u003e take phenomenal form\r\nor appear in an image. They would always be\r\nthought just as they are,—unextended activities\r\nrealizing the spiritual essence of the universe. But\r\nthey are not pure activity; they are passive as well.\r\nIt is in virtue of this passive element that the ideal\r\nexternality takes upon itself phenomenal or sensible\r\nform, and thus appears as spatial externality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz, in a passage already quoted, refers to\r\nthe diffusion of materiality or \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eantitypia\u003c/i\u003e. This word,\r\nwhich is of frequent occurrence in the discussions\r\nof Leibniz, he translates generally as “impenetrability,”\r\nsometimes as “passive resistance.” It corresponds\r\nto the solidity or resistance of which\r\nLocke spoke as forming the essence of matter.\r\nAntitypia is the representation by a monad of the\r\npassive element in other monads. Leibniz sometimes\r\nspeaks as if all created monads had in themselves\r\nantitypia, and hence extension; but he more accurately\r\nexpresses it by saying that they need\r\n(\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eexigent\u003c/i\u003e) it. This is a technical term which he\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"163\" id=\"Page_163\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nelsewhere uses to express the relation of the possible\r\nto the actual. The possible “needs” the\r\nactual, not in the sense that it \u003cem\u003enecessarily\u003c/em\u003e requires\r\nexistence, but in the sense that when the actual\r\ngives it existence, it is the logical basis of the\r\nactual,—the actual, on the other hand, being its\r\nreal complement. The passivity of the monad is\r\ntherefore at once the logical basis and the possibility\r\nof the impenetrability of matter. It is owing\r\nto the passivity of the monad that it does not\r\nadequately reflect (that it is not transparent to, so\r\nto speak) the activities of other monads. In its\r\nirresponsiveness, it fails to mirror them in itself.\r\nIt may be said, therefore, to be impenetrable to\r\nthem. They in turn, so far as they are passive,\r\nare impenetrable to it. Now the impenetrable is,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eex vi terminis\u003c/i\u003e, that which excludes, and that which\r\nexcludes, not in virtue of its active elasticity, but\r\nin virtue of its mere inertia, its dead weight, as it\r\nwere, of resistance. But mutual exclusion of this\r\npassive sort constitutes that which is extended.\r\nExtension is the abstract quality of this concrete\r\nsubject. Such, in effect, is the deduction which\r\nLeibniz gives of body, or physical matter, from\r\nmatter as metaphysical; of matter as sensible or\r\nphenomenal, from matter as ideal or as intelligible.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we put together what has been said, it is clear\r\nthat material phenomena (bodies, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecorpora\u003c/i\u003e, in Leibniz’s\r\nphrase) simply repeat in another sphere the\r\nproperties of the spiritual monad. There is a complete\r\nparallelism between every property, each to\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"164\" id=\"Page_164\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\neach, and this necessarily; for every property of\r\n“body” is in logical dependence upon, and a phenomenalization\r\nof, some spiritual or ideal quality.\r\nMotion is the source of all the dynamic qualities of\r\nbody, and motion is the reflection of Force, that\r\nforce which is Life. But this force in all finite forms\r\nis conditioned by a passive, unreceptive, unresponsive\r\nfactor; and this must also have its correlate in\r\n“body.” This correlate is primarily impenetrability,\r\nand secondarily extension. Thus it is that concrete\r\nbody always manifests motion, indeed, but upon a\r\nbackground of extension, and against inertia. It\r\nnever has free play; had it an unrestrained field\r\nof activity, extension would disappear, and spatial\r\nmotion would vanish into ideal energy. On the\r\nother hand, were the essence of matter found in\r\nresistance or impenetrability, it would be wholly\r\ninert; it would be a monotone of extension, without\r\nvariety of form or cohesion. As Leibniz puts it\r\nwith reference to Locke, “body” implies motion,\r\nor impetuosity, resistance, and cohesion. Motion is\r\nthe active principle, resistance the passive; while\r\ncohesion, with its various grades of completeness,\r\nwhich produce form, size, and solidity, is the result\r\nof their union.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz, like Plato, has an intermediary between\r\nthe rational and the sensible; and as Plato found\r\nthat it was mathematical relations that mediate\r\nbetween the permanent and unified Ideas and the\r\nchanging manifold objects, so Leibniz found that\r\nthe relations of space and time form the natural\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"165\" id=\"Page_165\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ntransition from the sphere of monads to the world\r\nof bodies. As Plato found that it was the possibility\r\nof applying mathematical considerations to\r\nthe world of images that showed the participation\r\nof Ideas in them, and constituted such reality as\r\nthey had, so Leibniz found that space and time\r\nformed the element of order and regularity among\r\nsense phenomena, and thus brought them into kinship\r\nwith the monads and made them subjects of\r\nscience. It is implied in what is here said that\r\nLeibniz distinguished between space and time on\r\nthe one hand, and duration and extension on the\r\nother. This distinction, which Leibniz draws repeatedly\r\nand with great care, has been generally\r\noverlooked by his commentators. But it is evident\r\nthat this leaves Leibniz in a bad plight. Mathematics,\r\nin its various forms, is the science of spatial\r\nand temporal relations. But if these are identical\r\nwith the forms of duration and extension, they are\r\npurely phenomenal and sensible. The science of\r\nthem, according to the Leibnizian distinction between\r\nthe absolutely real and the phenomenally\r\nreal, would be then a science of the confused, the\r\nimperfect, and the transitory; in fact, no science at\r\nall. But mathematics, on the contrary, is to Leibniz\r\nthe type of demonstrative, conclusive science.\r\nSpace and time are, in his own words, “innate ideas,”\r\nand the entire science of them is the drawing out of the\r\ncontent of these innate—that is, rational, distinct,\r\nand eternal—ideas. But extension and duration are\r\nsensible experiences; not rational, but phenomenal;\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"166\" id=\"Page_166\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nnot distinct, but confused; not eternal, but evanescent.\r\nWe may be sure that this contradiction would\r\nnot escape Leibniz, although it has many of his critics\r\nand historians.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is true, however, that he occasionally uses the\r\nterms as synonymous; but this where the distinction\r\nbetween them has no bearing on the argument in\r\nhand, and where the context determines in what\r\nsense the term is used. The distinction which he\r\nactually makes, and to which he keeps when space\r\nand time are the subject of discussion, is that extension\r\nand duration are qualities or predicates of\r\nobjects and events, while space and time are relations,\r\nor orders of existence. Extension and duration\r\nare, as he says, the \u003cem\u003eimmensity\u003c/em\u003e, the mass, the\r\ncontinuation, the repetition, of some underlying\r\nsubject. But space and time are the \u003cem\u003emeasure\u003c/em\u003e of the\r\nmass, the rule or law of the continuation, the order\r\nor mode of the repetition. Thus immediately after\r\nthe passage already quoted, in which he says that\r\nextension in body is the diffusion of materiality,\r\njust as whiteness is the diffusion of a property of\r\nmilk, he goes on to say “that extension is to space\r\nas duration to time. Duration and extension are\r\nattributes of things; but space and time are to be\r\nconsidered, as it were, outside of things, and as\r\nserving to measure them.” Still more definitely he\r\nsays: “Many confound the immensity or extent\r\nof things with the space by means of which this\r\nextent is defined. Space is not the extension of\r\nbody, any more than duration is its time. Things\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"167\" id=\"Page_167\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nkeep their extension, not always their space. Everything\r\nhas its own extent and duration; but it\r\ndoes not have a time of its own, nor keep for its\r\nown a space.” Or, as he expresses the latter idea\r\nelsewhere, space is like number, in the sense that\r\nit is indifferent to spatial things, just as number is\r\nindifferent to \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eres numerata\u003c/i\u003e. Just as the number\r\nfive is not a quality or possession of any object, or\r\ngroup of objects, but expresses an order or relation\r\namong them, so a given space is not the property\r\nof a thing, but expresses the order of its parts to\r\none another. But extension, on the other hand, is\r\na property of the given objects. While extension,\r\ntherefore, must always belong to some actual thing,\r\nspace, as a relation, is as applicable to possible\r\nthings as to actual existences; so that Leibniz\r\nsometimes says that time and space “express possibilities.”\r\nThey are that which makes it possible\r\nfor a definite and coherent order of experiences\r\nto exist. They determine existence in some of\r\nits relations, and as such are logically prior to any\r\ngiven forms of existence; while extent and duration\r\nare always qualities of some given form of existence,\r\nand hence logically derivative. Since time and\r\nspace “characterize possibilities” as well as actualities,\r\nit follows as a matter of course “that they are\r\nof the nature of eternal truths, which relate equally\r\nto the possible and to the existing.” Being an eternal\r\ntruth, space must have its place in that which is\r\nsimply the active unity of all eternal truths,—the\r\nmind of God. “Its truth and reality are based\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"168\" id=\"Page_168\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nupon God. It is an order whose source is God.”\r\nSince God is \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003epurus actus\u003c/i\u003e, he is the immediate, the\r\nefficient source only of that which partakes in some\r\ndegree of his own nature, or is rational; and here\r\nis another clear point of distinction between space\r\nand extension, between time and duration.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut we must ask more in detail regarding their\r\nnature. Admitting that they are relations, ideal and\r\nprior to particular experiences, the question must be\r\nasked, What sort of relations are they; how are they\r\nconnected with the purely spiritual on one hand, and\r\nwith the phenomenal on the other? Leibniz’s most\r\nextended answers to these questions are given in his\r\ncontroversy with Clarke. The latter took much the\r\nsame position regarding the nature of space (though\r\nnot, indeed, concerning the origin of its idea) as Locke,\r\nand the arguments which Leibniz uses against him\r\nhe might also have used, for the most part, against\r\nLocke. Locke and Clarke both conceived of space\r\nand time as wholly without intrinsic relation to objects\r\nand events. It is especially against this position\r\nthat Leibniz argues, holding that space and\r\ntime are simply orders or relations of objects and\r\nevents, that space exists only where objects are existing,\r\nand that it is the order of their co-existence,\r\nor of their possible co-existence; while time exists\r\nonly as events are occurring, and is the relation of\r\ntheir succession. Clarke, on the other hand, speaks\r\nof the universe of objects as bounded by and moving\r\nabout in an empty space, and says that time\r\nexisted before God created the finite world, so that\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"169\" id=\"Page_169\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe world came into a time already there to receive\r\nits on-goings, just as it fell into a space already\r\nthere to receive its co-existences.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo get at the ideas of Leibniz, therefore, we cannot\r\ndo better than follow the course of this discussion.\r\nHe begins by saying that both space and\r\ntime are purely relative, one being the order of co-existences,\r\nthe other of successions. Space characterizes\r\nin terms of possibility an order of things\r\nexisting at the same time, so far as they exist in\r\nmutual relations (\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eensemble\u003c/i\u003e), without regard to their\r\nspecial modes of existence. As to the alternate\r\ndoctrine that space is a substance, or something absolute,\r\nit contradicts the principle of sufficient reason.\r\nWere space something absolutely uniform, without\r\nthings placed in it, there would be no difference between\r\none part and another, and it would be a matter\r\nof utter indifference to God why he gave bodies\r\ncertain positions in space rather than others; similarly\r\nit would be a matter of indifference why he\r\ncreated the world when he did, if time were something\r\nindependent of events. In other words, the\r\nsupposed absoluteness of space and time would\r\nrender the action of God wholly without reason,\r\ncapricious, and at haphazard. Similarly, it contradicts\r\nthe principle of “indiscernibles,” by which\r\nLeibniz means the principle of specification, or distinction.\r\nAccording to him, to suppose two things\r\nexactly alike, is simply to imagine the same thing\r\ntwice. Absolute uniformity, wholly undifferentiated,\r\nis a fiction impossible to realize in thought.\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"170\" id=\"Page_170\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\n“Space considered without objects has nothing in\r\nit to determine it; it is accordingly nothing actual.\r\nThe parts of space must be determined and distinguished\r\nby the objects which are in them.”\r\nFinally, were space and time absolutely real things\r\nin themselves, they would be independent of God,\r\nand even limitations upon him. “They would be\r\nmore substantial than substances. God would not\r\nbe able to change or destroy them. They would be\r\nimmutable and eternal in every part. Thus there\r\nwould be an infinity of eternal things (these parts)\r\nindependent of God.” They would limit God because\r\nhe would be obliged to exist \u003cem\u003ein\u003c/em\u003e them. Only\r\nby existing through this independent time would he\r\nbe eternal; only by extending through this independent\r\nspace would he be omnipresent. Space\r\nand time thus become gods themselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen Clarke declares that by the absoluteness\r\nof space and time he does not mean that they are\r\nthemselves substances, but only properties, attributes\r\nof substance, Leibniz advances the same\r\narguments in different form. If space were the\r\nproperty of the things that are in space, it would\r\nbelong now to one substance, now to another, and\r\nwhen empty of all material substance, even to an\r\nimmaterial substance, perhaps to God. “Truly a\r\nstrange attribute which is handed about from\r\none thing to another. Substances thus leave their\r\naccidents as if they were old clothes, and other\r\nsubstances put them on.” Since these finite spaces\r\nare in infinite space, and the latter is an attribute\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"171\" id=\"Page_171\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nof God, it must be that an attribute of God is\r\ncomposed of parts, some of them empty, some full,\r\nsome round, some square. So, too, whatever is\r\nin time would help make one of the attributes of\r\nGod. “Truly a strange God,” says Leibniz, “this\r\nDeity of parts” (\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003ece Dieu à parties\u003c/i\u003e). Clarke’s reply\r\nto this was that space and time are attributes of\r\nGod and of God alone, not of things in space and\r\ntime,—that, indeed, strictly speaking, there are no\r\nparts in space or in time; they are absolutely one.\r\nThis was virtually to give up the whole matter. It\r\nwas to deny the existence of finite spaces and times,\r\nand to resolve them into an indefinite attribute of\r\nGod. Such a view, as Leibniz points out, not only\r\nis contrary to experience, but affords no aid in\r\ndetermining the actual concrete forms and situations\r\nof bodies, and durations and successions of events.\r\nThe absolute space and time, having no parts, are\r\nwholly out of relations to these concrete existences.\r\nThe latter require, therefore, a space and a time\r\nthat are relations or orders. Clarke’s hypothesis\r\nis, as Leibniz says, wholly without use or function,\r\nand requires a theory like that of Leibniz to account\r\nfor the actually determinate forms of experience.\r\nIn his last reply Clarke shifts his ground again,\r\nand says that space and time are \u003cem\u003eeffects\u003c/em\u003e of God’s\r\nexistence; “they are the necessary results of his\r\nexistence.” “His existence is the cause of space\r\nand time.” The death of Leibniz prevented any\r\nfurther reply. It is not hard to imagine, however,\r\nthat in a general way his reply would have been to\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"172\" id=\"Page_172\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nask how space and time are at once attributes essential\r\nand necessary to God, as constituting his immensity\r\nand eternity, and effects dependent upon\r\nhis existence. To take this latter position, indeed,\r\nseems to abandon the position that they are absolute,\r\nand to admit that, like the rest of God’s\r\ncreation, they are relative and finite.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo much for Leibniz’s polemic. Its meaning is\r\nthat space and time have significance only with\r\nreference to things and events, that they are the\r\nintellectual, the ideal side of these objects and\r\noccurrences, being the relations which give them\r\norder and unity. A space which is not the space\r\nof objects, which is not space in and through objects,\r\nis an inanity; it is not spirit, it is not matter;\r\nit is not a relation of either. It is nothingness\r\nmagnified to infinity, and then erected into existence.\r\nAnd all for nothing; for it does not enable us to\r\naccount for a single concrete fact of experience.\r\nFor this we must have recourse to relations and\r\norders of existence. Space is therefore to be\r\ndefined as the order which makes it possible for\r\nobjects to have situation; time as that which makes\r\nit possible for events to have dating,—not as if\r\nthey were actually prior to them, and although\r\nnothings in themselves, yet capable of giving concrete\r\ndetermination to things, but as \u003cem\u003eactually\u003c/em\u003e the\r\nrelations themselves, and as \u003cem\u003eideally\u003c/em\u003e necessary for\r\nthe coherent experience of co-existent objects and\r\nof connected events. As Leibniz puts it epigrammatically:\r\n“Space is the order of possible\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"173\" id=\"Page_173\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nconstants; time the order of inconstant possibilities.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have finished the exposition of the views\r\nof Leibniz about matter and material facts. One\r\nquestion, however, remains to be discussed,—a\r\nquestion which Leibniz’s contemporary critics would\r\nnot allow him to pass over in silence, even had he\r\nbeen so disposed. What is the reality of matter,\r\nof motion, of space, and of time? Since they are,\r\nas Leibniz says, only phenomena, not absolute\r\nrealities, what distinguishes them from dreams,\r\nfrom illusions? What distinguishes sensible phenomena\r\nfrom capricious fantasies, and gives them\r\nreality?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz begins his answer by pointing out that\r\nthe mere fact that bodies are phenomena does not\r\nmake them unreal. To say that anything is phenomenal\r\nis to say that it is sensible; but “the\r\nsenses make no declaration regarding metaphysical\r\nmatters” such as truth and reality. The senses, in\r\na word, only inform us that the experiences are there\r\nfor the senses, that they are sensible. What is the\r\nultimate nature of the sensible or the phenomenal,\r\nwhat is their reality, is a question wholly outside\r\nthe province of sense. The questions of ultimate\r\nnature, of reality, are questions of metaphysics, and\r\nhence are to be decided by the reason, not by the\r\nsenses. And Leibniz goes on to say that the truthfulness\r\nof the senses, since it concerns only the\r\nsensible, consists in the reciprocal agreement of\r\nsensible facts, and in that we are not deceived in\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"174\" id=\"Page_174\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nreasoning from one to another. An isolated sense-experience\r\ncould not be said to be either true or\r\nfalse, real or illusory. It would be true that it was\r\nexperienced, and that is all that could be said about\r\nit. But since our experiences are not thus separated,\r\nbut have a certain order, there arises what we may\r\ncall sensible reality and illusion. When the order\r\nbetween two facts remains the same “in different\r\ntimes and places and in the experience of different\r\nmen,” we call these facts real. If, however, our\r\nexperience cannot be repeated by ourselves or by\r\nother men when the same conditions (that is, connections)\r\nare present, it is unreal, or false. It is\r\nthus “the \u003cem\u003erelation\u003c/em\u003e of phenomena which guarantees\r\ntruth of fact regarding sensible objects.” Constancy,\r\nregularity, justify us in ascribing reality;\r\nchaotic change and lack of orderly connection are\r\na sign of unreality. Even our dreams have a\r\nreality; for they have their connections and place\r\nin experience. If we understood their connections\r\nwe should even be able to explain their apparent\r\nlack of connection with the rest of experience.\r\nLeibniz thinks that both the Academicians and\r\nSceptics and their opponents erred in attempting\r\nto find greater reality in sensible things than that\r\nof regular phenomena. Since our observations\r\nand judgments upon sensible phenomena are of\r\nsuch a nature that we can predict future phenomena\r\nand prepare for them, we have all the reality in\r\nthem that can be had or asked for. Even if it be\r\ngranted possible (as it must be on this basis) that,\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"175\" id=\"Page_175\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nmetaphysically speaking, sense-experience is only\r\na connected dream, it yet has a sufficient reality;\r\nfor we are not deceived in the measures taken\r\nwith reference to phenomena, provided that we act\r\non the ground of their observed harmonies and\r\nrelations. Thus while we are obliged to admit that\r\nour senses inform us that there are hard, passive,\r\nextended, indivisible things, not perfectly continuous\r\nand not intellectual in their nature, and we\r\nknow on metaphysical grounds that this information\r\nis not correct, we cannot say that our senses deceive\r\nus, for sense makes no statements regarding such\r\nmatters. It is our reason that errs if it takes the\r\ninformation that the senses give as if it were a\r\ndeclaration of reason itself. Sensible things have\r\nall the reality necessary for this range of experience,—\u003cem\u003epractical\u003c/em\u003e,—such\r\nregularity of co-existence and sequence\r\nas allows us to act without being led astray.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut if we regard sense-phenomena not merely in\r\ntheir connection with one another, but in their\r\ndependence upon the absolute realities, we have\r\nstill better justification for their comparative reality.\r\nThese phenomena are consequences of necessary\r\nand eternal truths. One endowed with a perfect\r\nknowledge of such truths would be able to deduce,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e, the phenomena from them. The reality\r\nof sensible phenomena thus consists not merely in\r\ntheir connection with one another, but in the fact\r\nthat they are connected as the laws of the intelligible\r\nworld require. They follow not only rules of\r\nco-existence and sequence; but these rules may be\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"176\" id=\"Page_176\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nbrought under general laws of motion, which in turn\r\nmay be deduced from geometrical principles. These\r\nlatter, however, are \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e; they are truths which\r\nare grounded in the very intelligence of God. The\r\nsensible has its basis in the ideal. To state the\r\nsame fact in another way, all sensible phenomena\r\noccur in time and space; or rather, time\r\nand space are the orders, the relations, of phenomena\r\noccurring and existing. But, as we have\r\njust seen, time and space are ideal. A relation, as\r\nLeibniz points out, being neither attribute nor accident,\r\ncannot be \u003cem\u003ein\u003c/em\u003e the things which it relates, as\r\ntheir possession. In his own words, it cannot be\r\nconceived as if it had one leg in one object, the\r\nother leg in the other. A relation is not a material\r\nbond, running through or cementing objects; it is\r\nideal, existing in the mind. And while it is true\r\nthat space and time are the relations of objects and\r\nevents, it is also true that if all objects and events\r\nwere annihilated, space and time would continue\r\nto have their ideal existence in the intelligence of\r\nGod as the eternal conditions of phenomena. They\r\nthus form the links between absolute reality and the\r\nreality of sensible existence. The principle of sufficient\r\nreason forms another link. It may be recalled\r\nthat in discussing Leibniz’s theory of volition\r\nwe found that the will of God in relation to the\r\nsensible world is always determined by the choice\r\nof the better; that in this consists the controlling\r\nreason and regulative principle of all that occurs\r\nand exists. Thus for every fact in the sensible\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"177\" id=\"Page_177\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nworld there is connection with “metaphysical,” or\r\nabsolute, reality, not only through the medium of\r\nthe intellectual relations of time and space, but\r\nthrough the dynamic intermediary of the divine will\r\nacting in accordance with the divine reason. Sensible\r\nfacts have, then, a reality, but a dependent\r\none. There would be no \u003cem\u003econtradiction\u003c/em\u003e involved if\r\nthey were not what they actually are.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may sum up the matter by saying that the\r\nreality of sensible phenomena consists in the constancy\r\nof the mutual order in which they exist, and\r\nin the dependence of this order upon the divine Intelligence\r\nand Will. In this respect, at least,\r\nLeibniz resembles the young Irish idealist, Berkeley,\r\nwho only seven years after Leibniz wrote the “New\r\nEssays” composed his “Principles of Human\r\nKnowledge,” urging that the immediate reality of\r\nsense-phenomena consists in their “steadiness,\r\norder, and coherence,” “in a constant uniform\r\nworking,” and that this “gives us a foresight\r\nwhich enables us to regulate our actions for the\r\nbenefit of life.” It was Berkeley also who wrote\r\nthat their ultimate reality consists in their being\r\nideas of a Divine Spirit. This was six years\r\nbefore the death of Leibniz. Yet it does not\r\nappear that Berkeley knew of Leibniz, and the only\r\nallusion to Berkeley which I have found in the\r\nwritings of Leibniz shows that Leibniz knew only of\r\nthat caricature of his views which has always been\r\ncurrent,—that Berkeley was one who denied the\r\nexistence of any external world. What he writes\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"178\" id=\"Page_178\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nis as follows: “As for him in Ireland who questions\r\nthe reality of ‘bodies,’ he seems neither to\r\noffer what is rational, nor sufficiently to explain his\r\nown ideas. I suspect that he is one of those men\r\nwho are desirous of making themselves known\r\nthrough paradoxes.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"179\" id=\"Page_179\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\u003ca id=\"Chapter_IX\"\u003eCHAPTER IX.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eSOME FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"upper-case\"\u003eThe\u003c/span\u003e fundamental category of Locke, as of all\r\nwho take simply a mechanical view of experience,\r\nis that of substance. He had good reason\r\nto be surprised when the Bishop of Worcester objected\r\nthat Locke wished “to discard substance out\r\nof the world.” How can that be so, Locke asks,\r\nwhen I say that “our idea of body is an extended\r\nsolid substance, and our idea of soul is of a substance\r\nthat thinks.” And he adds, “Nay, as long\r\nas there is any simple idea or sensible quality left,\r\naccording to my way of arguing, substance cannot\r\nbe discarded.” Everything that really exists, is,\r\naccording to Locke, substance. But substance to\r\nLocke, as again to all who interpret the universe\r\nafter sensible categories, is unknowable. For such\r\ncategories allow only of external relations; they\r\nadmit only of static existence. Substance, in this\r\nway of looking at it, must be distinct from its qualities,\r\nand must be simply the existing substratum in\r\nwhich they inhere.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLocke’s account of the way in which we get the\r\nidea, and of its nature, is as follows: “All the\r\nideas of all the sensible qualities of a cherry come\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"180\" id=\"Page_180\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ninto my mind by sensation. The ideas of these\r\nqualities and actions, or powers, are perceived by\r\nthe mind to be by themselves inconsistent with existence.\r\nThey cannot subsist of themselves. Hence\r\nthe mind perceives their necessary connection with\r\ninherence, or with being supported.” Correlative\r\nto the idea of being supported is, of course, the\r\nidea of the support. But this idea “is not represented\r\nto the mind by any clear and distinct idea;\r\nthe obscure and vague, indistinct idea of thing or\r\nsomething, is all that is left.” Or yet more simply,\r\n“Taking notice that a certain number of simple ideas\r\ngo together, and not imagining how these simple\r\nideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves\r\nto suppose some substratum wherein they do\r\nsubsist, and from which they do result.” Hence\r\nthe only idea we have of it is of something which\r\nunderlies known qualities. It is their “supposed,\r\nbut unknown, support.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we translate these expressions into the ideas of\r\nto-day, we see that they are equivalent to the view\r\nof the world which is given us by scientific categories\r\nwhen these categories are regarded not merely\r\nas scientific, but also as philosophic; that is, capable\r\nof interpreting and expressing the ultimate\r\nnature of experience. This modern view uses the\r\nwords “things-in-themselves” (or absolute realities)\r\nand “phenomena.” It says that we know nothing of\r\nexistence as it is in itself, but only of its phenomena.\r\nMind, matter, objects, are all substances, all\r\nequally substances, and all have their unknown\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"181\" id=\"Page_181\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nessence and their phenomenal appearance. Such\r\na distinction between the known and the unknown\r\ncan rest, it is evident, only upon a separation between\r\nreality and phenomena similar to that which\r\nLocke makes between substance and qualities. In\r\nknowing the latter, we know nothing of the former.\r\nAlthough the latter are called “phenomena,” they do\r\nnot really manifest the substantial reality; they conceal\r\nit. This absolute distinction between substance\r\nand quality, between reality and phenomenon, rests,\r\nin turn, upon the hypothesis that reality is \u003cem\u003emere\u003c/em\u003e\r\nexistence; that is, it is something which is, and that\r\nis all. It is a substratum; it lies under, in a passive\r\nway, qualities; it is (literally) substance; it simply\r\nstands, inactively, under phenomena. It may, by\r\npossibility, \u003cem\u003ehave\u003c/em\u003e actions; but it \u003cem\u003ehas\u003c/em\u003e them. Activities\r\nare qualities which, like all qualities, are in\r\nexternal relation to the substance. Being, in other\r\nwords, is the primary notion, and “being” means\r\nsomething essentially passive and merely enduring,\r\naccidentally and secondarily something acting.\r\nHere, as elsewhere, Locke is the father of the\r\nmechanical philosophy of to-day.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have already learned how completely Leibniz\r\nreverses this way of regarding reality. According\r\nto Locke, reality essentially is; and in its being\r\nthere is no ground of revelation of itself. It then\r\nacts; but these actions, “powers, or qualities,” since\r\nnot flowing from the very being of substance, give no\r\nglimpse into its true nature. According to Leibniz,\r\nreality acts, and \u003cem\u003etherefore\u003c/em\u003e is. Its being is conditioned\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"182\" id=\"Page_182\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nupon its activity. It is not first there, and secondly\r\nacts; but its “being there” is its activity. Since its\r\nvery substance is activity, it is impossible that it\r\nshould not manifest its true nature. Its every activity\r\nis a revelation of itself. It cannot hide itself as a\r\npassive subsistence behind qualities or phenomena.\r\nIt must break forth into them. On the other hand,\r\nsince the qualities are not something which merely\r\ninhere in an underlying support, but are the various\r\nforms or modes of the activity which constitutes\r\nreality, they necessarily reveal it. They \u003cem\u003eare\u003c/em\u003e its\r\nrevelations. There is here no need to dwell further\r\non the original dynamic nature of substance; what\r\nwas said in the way of general exposition suffices.\r\nIt is only in its relations to Locke’s view as just\r\nlaid down that it now concerns us.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the first place, Leibniz points out that qualities\r\nare “abstract,” while substance is “concrete.”\r\nThe qualities, from the very fact that they have no\r\nself-subsistence, are only relations, while the substance,\r\nas that of which they are qualities, or from\r\nwhich they are abstractions, is concrete. It is, Leibniz\r\nsays, to invert the true order to take qualities or\r\nabstract terms as the best known and most easily\r\ncomprehended, and “concretes” as unknown, and\r\nas having the most difficulty about them. “It is\r\nabstractions which give birth to almost all our difficulties,”\r\nand Locke’s error here is that he begins\r\nwith abstractions, and takes them to be most open\r\nto intelligence. Locke’s second error is separating\r\nso completely substance and attribute. “After\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"183\" id=\"Page_183\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nhaving distinguished,” says Leibniz, “two things\r\nin substance, the attributes or predicates, and the\r\ncommon subject of these predicates, it is not to be\r\nwondered at that we cannot conceive anything in\r\nparticular in the subject. This result is necessary,\r\nsince we have separated all the attributes in which\r\nthere is anything definite to be conceived. Hence\r\nto demand anything more than a mere unknown\r\nsomewhat in the subject, is to contradict the supposition\r\nwhich was made in making the abstraction\r\nand in conceiving separately the subject and its qualities\r\nor accidents.” We are indeed ignorant of a\r\nsubject from which abstraction has been made of all\r\ndefining and characteristic qualities; “but this ignorance\r\nresults from our demanding a sort of knowledge\r\nof which the object does not permit.” In short,\r\nit is a credit to our knowledge, not an aspersion\r\nupon it, that we cannot know that which is thoroughly\r\nunreal,—a substance deprived of all attributes.\r\nThis is, indeed, a remark which is applicable\r\nto the supposed unknowableness of pure Being, or\r\nAbsolute Being, when it is defined as the absence of\r\nall relations (as is done, for example, by Mr. Spencer\r\nto-day).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eClosely connected with the notion of substance\r\nare the categories of identity and diversity. These\r\nrelations are of course to Locke thoroughly external.\r\nIt is “relation of time and place which\r\nalways determines identity.” “That that had one\r\nbeginning is the same thing; and that which had a\r\ndifferent beginning in time and place from that, is\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"184\" id=\"Page_184\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nnot the same, but diverse.” It is therefore easy\r\nto discover the principle of individuation. It “is\r\nexistence itself, which determines a being of any\r\nsort to a particular time and place, incommunicable\r\nto two beings of the same kind.” He applies this\r\nnotion to organic being, including man, and to the\r\npersonal identity of man. The identity of an organism,\r\nvegetable, brute, or human, is its continuous\r\norganization; “it is the participation of the same\r\ncontinued life, by constantly fleeting particles of\r\nmatter in succession vitally united to the same organized\r\nbody.” \u003cem\u003ePersonal\u003c/em\u003e identity is constituted by\r\na similar continuity of consciousness. “It being\r\nthe same consciousness that makes a man be himself\r\nto himself, personal identity depends on that\r\nonly.” It “consists not in the identity of substance,\r\nbut in the identity of consciousness.” It\r\nwill be noticed that Locke uses the notion of identity\r\nwhich he has already established to explain organic\r\nand personal unity. It is the “\u003cem\u003esame\u003c/em\u003e continued\r\nlife,” “\u003cem\u003eidentity\u003c/em\u003e of consciousness,” that constitute\r\nthem. We are, hence, introduced to no new principle.\r\nIdentity is even in personality a matter of\r\ntemporal and spatial relations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the general account of the system of Leibniz\r\nit was pointed out that it is characteristic of his\r\nthought to regard identity and distinction as internal\r\nprinciples, and as necessarily implied in each other.\r\nWe need not go over that ground again, but simply\r\nsee how he states his position with reference to what\r\nis quoted from Locke. These are his words: “Besides\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"185\" id=\"Page_185\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe difference of place and time there is always\r\nnecessary an \u003cem\u003einternal principle\u003c/em\u003e [or law] of distinction,\r\nso that while there may be several things of the\r\nsame species, there are no two things exactly alike.\r\nThus, although time and place (that is, relations to\r\nthe external) aid us in distinguishing things, things\r\ndo not cease to be distinguished in themselves.\r\nThe essence of identity and diversity does not consist\r\nin time and place, although it is true that diversity\r\nof things is accompanied with that of time\r\nand place, since they carry along with them different\r\nimpressions upon the thing;” that is, they expose the\r\nthing to different surroundings. But in reality “it\r\nis things which diversify times and places from one\r\nanother, for in themselves these are perfectly similar,\r\nnot being substances or complete realities.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe principle of individuation follows, of course,\r\nfrom this. “If two individuals were perfectly\r\nsimilar and equal, that is, indistinguishable in\r\nthemselves, there would be no principle of individuation;\r\nthere would not be two individuals.” Thus\r\nLeibniz states his important principle of the “identity\r\nof indiscernibles,” the principle that where there\r\nis not some internal differentiating principle which\r\nspecifies the existence in this or that definite way,\r\nthere is no individual. Leibniz here states, in effect,\r\nthe principle of organic unity, the notion that concrete\r\nunity is a unity \u003cem\u003eof\u003c/em\u003e differences, not \u003cem\u003efrom\u003c/em\u003e them.\r\nIt is the principle which allows him at once to accept\r\nand transform the thought of Spinoza that all qualification\r\nor determination is negation. Spinoza, in\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"186\" id=\"Page_186\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nspite of his intellectual greatness, conceived of distinction\r\nor determination as external, and hence as\r\nexternal negation. But since ultimate reality admits\r\nof no external negation, it must be without distinction,\r\nan all-inclusive one. But to Leibniz the\r\nnegation is internal; it is determination of its own\r\nbeing into the greatest possible riches. “Things\r\nthat are conceived as absolutely uniform and containing\r\nno variety are pure abstractions.” “Things\r\nindistinguishable in themselves, and capable of being\r\ndistinguished only by external characteristics without\r\ninternal foundation, are contrary to the most important\r\nprinciples of reason. The truth is that every\r\nbeing is capable of change [or differentiation], and\r\nis itself actually changed in such a way that in\r\nitself it differs from every other.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs to organic bodies, so far as they \u003cem\u003eare\u003c/em\u003e bodies, or\r\ncorporeal, they are one and identical only in appearance.\r\n“They are not the same an instant. . . .\r\nBodies are in constant flux.” “They are like a river\r\nwhich is always changing its water, or like the ship\r\nof Theseus which the Athenians are constantly repairing.”\r\nSuch unity as they really possess is like\r\nall unity,—ideal or spiritual. “They remain the\r\nsame individual by virtue of that same soul or spirit\r\nwhich constitutes the ‘Ego’ in those individuals who\r\nthink.” “Except for the soul, there is neither the\r\nsame life nor any vital union.” As to personal\r\nidentity, Leibniz distinguishes between “physical\r\nor real” identity and “moral.” In neither case,\r\nhowever, is it a unity which excludes plurality, an\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"187\" id=\"Page_187\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nidentity which does not comprehend diversity.\r\n“Every spirit has,” he says, “traces of all the\r\nimpressions which it has ever experienced, and even\r\npresentiments of all that ever will happen. But\r\nthese feelings are generally too minute to be distinguished\r\nand brought into consciousness, though they\r\nmay be sometime developed. This \u003cem\u003econtinuity\u003c/em\u003e and\r\n\u003cem\u003econnection\u003c/em\u003e of \u003cem\u003eperceptions\u003c/em\u003e makes up the real identity\r\nof the individual, while \u003cem\u003eapperceptions\u003c/em\u003e (that which\r\nis consciously apprehended of past experiences)\r\nconstitute the moral identity and make manifest\r\nthe real identity.” We have had occasion before to\r\nallude to the part played in the Leibnizian philosophy\r\nby “minute perceptions” or “unconscious\r\nideas.” Of them he says, relative to the present\r\npoint, that “insensible perceptions mark and even\r\nconstitute the sameness of the individual, which is\r\ncharacterized by the residua preserved from its preceding\r\nstates, as they form its connection with its\r\npresent state.” If these connections are “apperceived”\r\nor brought into distinct consciousness,\r\nthere is moral identity as well. As he expresses\r\nit in one place: “The self (\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003esoi\u003c/i\u003e) is real and physical\r\nidentity; the appearance of self, accompanied\r\nwith truth, is personal identity.” But the essential\r\npoint in either case is that the identity is not that\r\nof a substance underlying modifications, nor of a\r\nconsciousness which merely accompanies all mental\r\nstates, but is the connection, the active continuity,\r\nor—in Kant’s word—the synthesis, of all particular\r\nforms of the mental life. The self is not the most\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"188\" id=\"Page_188\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nabstract unity of experience, it is the most organic.\r\nWhat Leibniz says of his monads generally is especially\r\ntrue of the higher monads,—human souls.\r\n“They vary, up to infinity itself, with the greatest\r\nabundance, order, and beauty imaginable.” Not a\r\nmathematical point, but life, is the type of Leibniz’s\r\nconception of identity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the order in which Locke takes up his topics\r\n(and in which Leibniz follows him) we have omitted\r\none subject, which, however, may find its natural\r\nplace in the present connection,—the subject of\r\ninfinity. In Locke’s conception, the infinite is only\r\na ceaseless extension or multiplication of the finite.\r\nHe considers the topic immediately after the discussions\r\nof space, time, and number, and with good\r\nlogic from his standpoint; for “finite and infinite,”\r\nhe says, are “looked upon by the mind as the modes\r\nof \u003cem\u003equantity\u003c/em\u003e, and are attributed, in their first designation,\r\nonly to those things which have parts and\r\nare capable of increase and diminution.” This is\r\ntrue even of the application of the term “infinite” to\r\nGod, so far as concerns the attributes of duration\r\nand ubiquity; and as applied to his other attributes\r\nthe term is figurative, signifying that they are incomprehensible\r\nand inexhaustible. Such being the\r\nidea of the infinite, it is attained as follows: There\r\nis no difficulty, says Locke, as to the way in\r\nwhich we come by the idea of the finite. Every\r\nobvious portion of extension and period of succession\r\nwhich affects us is bounded. If we take one\r\nof these periods or portions, we find that we can\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"189\" id=\"Page_189\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ndouble it, or “otherwise multiply it,” as often as we\r\nwish, and that there is no reason to stop, nor are we\r\none jot nearer the end at any point of the multiplication\r\nthan when we set out. “By repeating as\r\noften as we will any idea of space, we get the idea\r\nof infinity; by being able to repeat the idea of any\r\nlength of duration, we come by the idea of eternity.”\r\nThere is a difference, then, between the\r\nideas of the infinity of space, time, and number,\r\nand of an infinite space, time, and number. The\r\nformer idea we have; it is the idea that we can\r\ncontinue without end the process of multiplication\r\nor progression. The latter we have not; it would\r\nbe the idea of having completed the infinite multiplication,\r\nit would be the result of the never-ending\r\nprogression. And this is evidently a contradiction\r\nin terms. To sum the matter up, the term “infinite”\r\nalways relates to the notion of quantity. Quantity\r\nis that which is essentially capable of increase or\r\ndecrease. There is then an infinity of quantity;\r\nthere is no quantity which is the absolute limit to\r\nquantity. Such a quantity would be incapable of\r\nincrease, and hence contradictory to quantity. But\r\nan actual infinite quantity (whether of space, time,\r\nor number) would be one than which there could\r\nbe no greater; and hence the impossibility of our\r\nhaving a positive idea of an actual or completed\r\ninfinite.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz’s reply consists simply in carrying out\r\nthis same thought somewhat further. It is granted\r\nthat the idea of an infinite quantity of any kind is\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"190\" id=\"Page_190\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nabsurd and self-contradictory. But what does this\r\nprove, except that the notions of quantity and infinity\r\nare incompatible with each other, that they\r\ncontradict each other? Hence, instead of the infinite\r\nbeing a mode of quantity, it must be conceived\r\nas essentially distinct from and even opposed to\r\nquantity. Locke’s argument is virtually a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ereductio\r\nad absurdum\u003c/i\u003e of the notion that the infinite is capable\r\nof parts. In the few pages of comment which\r\nLeibniz in 1696 wrote upon Locke, this topic of the\r\ninfinite is one of the few touched upon. His words\r\nupon that occasion were as follows: “I agree with\r\nMr. Locke that, properly speaking, there is no space,\r\ntime, nor number which is infinite; and that it is\r\nonly true that however great be a space, a time, or a\r\nnumber, there is always another which is still greater,\r\nand this without end; and that, \u003cem\u003etherefore\u003c/em\u003e, the infinite\r\nis not to be found in a whole made up of parts.\r\nBut it does not cease to exist: it is found in the\r\nabsolute, which is without parts, and of which compound\r\nthings [phenomena in space and time, or\r\nfacts which may be numbered] are only limitations.\r\nThe positive infinite being nothing else than the\r\nabsolute, it may be said that there is, in this sense,\r\na positive idea of the infinite, and that it is anterior\r\nto the idea of the finite.” In other words, while\r\nthe infinite is to Locke an indefinite extension\r\nof the finite, which alone is positively “given,”\r\nto Leibniz the infinite is the positive and real, and\r\nthe finite is only in and by it. The finite is the\r\nnegative.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"191\" id=\"Page_191\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eLeibniz amplifies this thought upon other occasions,\r\nas in his present more extended examination.\r\n“There is no infinite number, line, or quantity, if\r\nthey are taken as true wholes.” “We deceive ourselves\r\nin trying to imagine an absolute space which\r\nshould be an infinite whole, composed of parts.\r\nThere is none such. It is an idea which implies\r\ncontradiction; and all these ‘infinites’ and ‘infinitesimals’\r\nare of use only in geometry, as imaginary\r\nroots are in algebra.” That which is ordinarily\r\ncalled the infinite, that is, the quantitative infinite,\r\nis in reality only the indefinite. “We involve\r\nourselves in difficulty when we talk about a series\r\nof numbers extending \u003cem\u003eto\u003c/em\u003e infinity; we imagine a last\r\nterm, an infinite number, or one infinitely little. But\r\nthese are only fictions. All number is finite and\r\nassignable, [that is, of a certain definite quantity];\r\nevery line is the same. ‘Infinites’ and ‘infinitesimals’\r\nsignify only quantities which can be taken\r\nas large or as small as one wishes, simply for the\r\npurpose of showing that there is no error which can\r\nbe assigned. Or we are to understand by the infinitely\r\nlittle, the state of vanishing or commencing\r\nof a quantum after the analogy of a quantum already\r\nformed.” On the other hand, the true infinite “is\r\nnot an aggregate, nor a whole of parts; it is not\r\nclothed with magnitude, nor does it consist in number. . . .\r\nThe Absolute alone, the indivisible infinite,\r\nhas true unity,—I mean God.” And as he\r\nsums up the matter: “The infinite, consisting of\r\nparts, is neither one nor a whole; it cannot be\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"192\" id=\"Page_192\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nbrought under any notion of the mind except that\r\nof quantity. Only the infinite without parts is\r\none, and this is not a whole [of parts]: this infinite\r\nis God.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt cannot be admitted, however, that Locke has\r\ngiven a correct account of the origin of the notion\r\nof the quantitative infinite, or—to speak philosophically,\r\nand not after the use of terms convenient in\r\nmathematics—the indefinite. According to him, its\r\norigin is the mere empirical repeating of a sensuous\r\ndatum of time and space. According to Leibniz,\r\nthis repetition, however long continued, can give\r\nno idea beyond itself; it can never generate the\r\nidea that the process of repetition may be continued\r\nwithout a limit. Here, as elsewhere, he objects that\r\nexperience cannot guarantee notions beyond the\r\nlimits of experience. Locke’s process of repetition\r\ncould tell us that a number \u003cem\u003ehad\u003c/em\u003e been extended up\r\nto a given point; not that it could be extended without\r\nlimit. The source of this latter idea must be\r\nfound, therefore, where we find the origin of all\r\nextra-empirical notions,—in reason. “Its origin is\r\nthe same as that of universal and necessary truths.”\r\nIt is not the empirical process of multiplying, but the\r\nfact that the \u003cem\u003esame reason\u003c/em\u003e for multiplying always exists,\r\nthat originates and guarantees the idea. “Take\r\na straight line and prolong it in such a way that it is\r\ndouble the first. It is evident that the second, being\r\nperfectly \u003cem\u003esimilar\u003c/em\u003e to the first, can be itself doubled;\r\nand we have a third, which in turn is \u003cem\u003esimilar\u003c/em\u003e to the\r\npreceding. The \u003cem\u003esame reason\u003c/em\u003e always being present,\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"193\" id=\"Page_193\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nit is not possible that the process should ever be\r\nbrought to a stop. Thus the line can be prolonged\r\n‘to infinity.’ Therefore the idea of ‘infinity’ comes\r\nfrom the consideration of the identity of relation or\r\nof reason.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe considerations which we have grouped together\r\nin this chapter serve to show the fundamental\r\nphilosophical difference between Locke and Leibniz.\r\nAlthough, taken in detail, they are self-explanatory,\r\na few words may be permitted upon their unity and\r\nultimate bearing. It is characteristic of Locke that\r\nhe uses the same principle of explanation with reference\r\nto the conceptions of substance, identity\r\nand diversity, and infinity, and that this principle\r\nis that of spatial and temporal relation. Infinity\r\nis conceived as quantitative, as the successive addition\r\nof times and spaces; identity and diversity\r\nare oneness and difference of existence as determined\r\nby space and time; substance is the underlying\r\nstatic substratum of qualities, and, as such,\r\nis considered after the analogy of things existing in\r\nspace and through time. It must not be forgotten\r\nthat Locke believed as thoroughly as Leibniz in the\r\nsubstantial existence of the world, of the human\r\nsoul, and of God; in the objective continuity of\r\nthe world, and the personal identity of man, and in\r\nthe true infinity of God. Whatever negative or sceptical\r\ninferences may have afterwards been drawn\r\nfrom Locke’s premises were neither drawn nor\r\ndreamed of by him. His purpose was in essence\r\none with that of Leibniz.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"194\" id=\"Page_194\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eBut the contention of Leibniz is that when substance,\r\nidentity, and infinity are conceived of by mechanical\r\ncategories, or measured by the sensible\r\nstandard of space and time, they lose their meaning\r\nand their validity. According to him such notions\r\nare spiritual in their nature, and to be spiritually\r\nconceived of. “Spiritual,” however, does not mean\r\nopposed to the sensible; it does not mean something\r\nto be known by a peculiar kind of intuition unlike\r\nour knowledge of anything else. It means the\r\nactive and organic basis of the sensible, its significance\r\nand ideal purpose. It is known by knowing\r\nthe sensible or mechanical as it really is; that is, as\r\nit is completely, as a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003econcretum\u003c/i\u003e, in Leibniz’s phrase.\r\nLeibniz saw clearly that to make the infinite something\r\nat one end of the finite, as its mere external\r\nlimit, or something miraculously intercalated\r\ninto the finite, was to deprive it of meaning, and,\r\nby making it unknowable, to open the way for its\r\ndenial. To make identity consist in the removal of\r\nall diversity (as must be done if it be thought after\r\nthe manner of external relations), is to reduce it\r\nto nothing,—as Hume, indeed, afterwards showed.\r\nSubstance, which is merely a support behind qualities,\r\nis unknowable, and hence unverifiable. While,\r\nthen, the aim of both Locke and Leibniz as regards\r\nthese categories was the same, Leibniz saw what\r\nLocke did not,—that to interpret them after the\r\nmanner of existence in space and time, to regard\r\nthem (in Leibniz’s terminology) as mathematical,\r\nand not as metaphysical, is to defeat that aim. The\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"195\" id=\"Page_195\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nsole way to justify them, and in justifying them to\r\ngive relative validity to the sensible and phenomenal,\r\nis to demonstrate their spiritual and dynamic\r\nnature, to show them as conditioning space and\r\ntime, and not as conditioned by them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"196\" id=\"Page_196\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\u003ca id=\"Chapter_X\"\u003eCHAPTER X.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eTHE NATURE AND EXTENT OF KNOWLEDGE.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"upper-case\"\u003eThe\u003c/span\u003e third book of Locke’s Essay is upon words\r\nand language; and in the order of treatment\r\nthis would be the next topic for discussion. But\r\nmuch of what is said in this connection both by\r\nLocke and by Leibniz is philological, rhetorical, and\r\ngrammatical in character, and although not without\r\ninterest in itself, is yet without any especial\r\nbearing upon the philosophical points in controversy.\r\nThe only topics in this book demanding our attention\r\nare general and particular terms; but these\r\nfall most naturally into the discussion of general\r\nand particular knowledge. In fact, it is not the\r\nterms which Locke actually discusses, but the ideas\r\nfor which the terms stand. We pass on accordingly,\r\nwithout further ceremony, to the fourth book, which\r\nis concerning knowledge in general. Locke defines\r\nknowledge as “nothing but the perception of the\r\nconnection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy,\r\nof any of our ideas.” These agreements\r\nor disagreements may be reduced to four sorts,—Identity,\r\nor diversity; Relation; Co-existence, or\r\nnecessary connection; Real existence. The statement\r\nof identity and diversity is implied in all\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"197\" id=\"Page_197\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nknowledge whatsoever. By them “the mind clearly\r\nand infallibly perceives each idea to agree with itself\r\nand be what it is, and all distinct ideas to disagree;\r\n\u003ci\u003ei. e.\u003c/i\u003e, the one not to be the other.” The agreement of\r\nrelation is such knowledge as the mind derives from\r\nthe \u003cem\u003ecomparison\u003c/em\u003e of its ideas. It includes mathematical\r\nknowledge. The connection of co-existence\r\n“belongs particularly to substances.” Locke’s example\r\nis that “gold is fixed,”—by which we understand\r\nthat the idea of fixedness goes along with that\r\ngroup of ideas which we call gold. All statements\r\nof fact coming under the natural sciences would fall\r\ninto this class. The fourth sort is “that of actual\r\nand real existence agreeing to any idea.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz’s criticism upon these statements of\r\nLocke is brief and to the point. He admits Locke’s\r\ndefinition of knowledge, qualifying it, however, by\r\nthe statement that in much of our knowledge, perhaps\r\nin all that is merely empirical, we do not know\r\nthe reason and connection of things and hence cannot\r\nbe said to \u003cem\u003eperceive\u003c/em\u003e the agreement or disagreement\r\nof ideas, but only to feel it confusedly. His\r\nmost important remark, however, is to the effect\r\nthat relation is not a special kind of knowledge, but\r\nthat all Locke’s four kinds are varieties of relation.\r\nLocke’s “connection” of ideas which makes knowledge\r\nis nothing but relation. And there are two\r\nkinds of relation,—those of “comparison” and of\r\n“concourse.” That of comparison states the identity\r\nor distinction of ideas, either in whole or in part.\r\nThat of concourse contains Locke’s two classes of\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"198\" id=\"Page_198\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nco-existence and existence. “When we say that a\r\nthing really exists, this existence is the predicate,—that\r\nis to say, a notion connected with the idea\r\nwhich is the subject; and there is connection between\r\nthese two notions. The existence of an\r\nobject of an idea may be considered as the concourse\r\nof this object with me. Hence comparison,\r\nwhich marks identity or diversity, and concourse of\r\nan object with me (or with the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eego\u003c/i\u003e) are the only\r\nforms of knowledge.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz leaves the matter here; but he only\r\nneeded to develop what is contained in this statement\r\nto anticipate Berkeley and Kant in some of\r\nthe most important of their discoveries. The contradiction\r\nwhich lies concealed in Locke’s account is\r\nbetween his definition of knowledge in general, and\r\nknowledge of real existence in particular. One\r\nis the agreement or disagreement of \u003cem\u003eideas\u003c/em\u003e; the\r\nother is the agreement of an idea \u003cem\u003ewith an object\u003c/em\u003e.\r\nBerkeley’s work, in its simplest form, was to remove\r\nthis inconsistency. He saw clearly that the\r\n“object” was an intruder here. If knowledge\r\nlies in the connection of \u003cem\u003eideas\u003c/em\u003e, it is impossible to\r\nget outside the ideas to find an object with which\r\nthey agree. Either that object is entirely unknown,\r\nor it is an idea. It is impossible, therefore, to find\r\nthe knowledge of reality in the comparison of an\r\nidea with an object. It must be in some property\r\nof the ideas themselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eKant developed more fully the nature of this\r\nproperty, which constitutes the “objectivity” of\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"199\" id=\"Page_199\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nour ideas. It is their connection with one another\r\naccording to certain \u003cem\u003enecessary\u003c/em\u003e forms of perception\r\nand rules of conception. In other words, the reality\r\nof ideas lies in their being connected by the necessary\r\nand hence universal relations of synthetic\r\nintelligence, or, as Kant often states it, in their\r\nagreement with the conditions of self-consciousness.\r\nIt is not, I believe, unduly stretching either the letter\r\nor the spirit of Leibniz to find in that “concourse of\r\nthe object with the ego” which makes its reality, the\r\nanalogue of this doctrine of Kant; it is at all events\r\nthe recognition of the fact that reality is not to\r\nbe found in the relating of ideas to unknown\r\nthings, but in their relation to self-conscious intelligence.\r\nThe points of similarity between Kant\r\nand Leibniz do not end here. Leibniz’s two relations\r\nof “comparison” and “concourse” are\r\ncertainly the congeners of Kant’s “analytic” and\r\n“synthetic” judgments. But Leibniz, as we shall\r\nsee hereafter, trusts too thoroughly to the merely\r\nformal relations of identity and contradiction to\r\npermit him such a development of these two kinds\r\nof relation as renders Kant’s treatment of them\r\nepoch-making.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe discussion then advances to the subject of\r\ndegrees of knowledge, of which Locke recognizes\r\nthree,—intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive. Intuitive\r\nknowledge is immediate knowledge,—recognition\r\nof likeness or difference without the\r\nintervention of a third idea; it is the most\r\ncertain and clear of all knowledge. In demonstrative\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"200\" id=\"Page_200\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nknowledge the agreement or disagreement\r\ncannot be perceived directly, because the ideas cannot\r\nbe put together so as to show it. Hence the\r\nmind has recourse to intermediaries. “And this\r\nis what we call reasoning.” Demonstrative rests\r\non intuitive knowledge, because each intermediate\r\nidea used must be immediately perceived to be like\r\nor unlike its neighboring idea, or it would itself\r\nneed intermediates for its proof. Besides these two\r\ndegrees of knowledge there is “another perception\r\nof the mind employed about the particular existence\r\nof finite things without us, which, going beyond\r\nbare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to\r\neither of the foregoing degrees of certainty, passes\r\nunder the name of knowledge.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz’s comments are again brief. The primitive\r\ntruths which are known by intuition are to be\r\ndivided into two classes,—truths of reason and of\r\nfact. The primitive truths of reason are necessary,\r\nand may be called identical, because they seem\r\nonly to repeat the same thing, without teaching us\r\nanything. A is A. A is not non-A. Such propositions\r\nare not frivolous or useless, because the\r\nconclusions of logic are demonstrated by means of\r\nidentical propositions, and many of those of geometry\r\nby the principle of contradiction. All the\r\nintuitive truths of reason may be said to be made\r\nknown through the “immediation” of ideas. The\r\nintuitive truths of fact, on the other hand, are contingent\r\nand are made known through the “immediation”\r\nof feeling. In this latter class come such\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"201\" id=\"Page_201\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ntruths as the Cartesian, “I think, therefore I am.”\r\nNeither class can be proved by anything more\r\ncertain.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eDemonstration is defined by Leibniz as by Locke.\r\nThe former recognizes, however, two sorts,—analytic\r\nand synthetic. Synthesis goes from the simple\r\nto the complex. There are many cases, however,\r\nwhere this is not applicable; where it would be a\r\ntask “equal to drinking up the sea to attempt to\r\nmake all the necessary combinations. Here the\r\nmethod of exclusions should be employed, cutting\r\noff many of the useless combinations.” If this\r\ncannot be done, then it is analysis which gives the\r\nclew into the labyrinth. He is also of the opinion\r\nthat besides demonstration, giving certainty, there\r\nshould be admitted an art of calculating probabilities,—the\r\nlack of which is, he says, a great\r\ndefect in our present logic, and which would be\r\nmore useful than a large part of our demonstrative\r\nsciences. As to sensitive knowledge, he agrees\r\nwith Locke that there is such a thing as real knowledge\r\nof objects without us, and that this variety\r\ndoes not have the same metaphysical certainty as\r\nthe other two; but he disagrees regarding its criterion.\r\nAccording to Locke, the criterion is simply\r\nthe greater degree of vividness and force that sensations\r\nhave as compared with imaginations, and\r\nthe actual pleasures or pains which accompany\r\nthem. Leibniz points out that this criterion, which\r\nin reality is purely emotional, is of no great value,\r\nand states the principle of the reality of sensible\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"202\" id=\"Page_202\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nphenomena which we have already given, repeating\r\nthat it is found in the \u003cem\u003econnection\u003c/em\u003e of phenomena, and\r\nthat “this connection is verified by means of the\r\ntruths of reason, just as the phenomena of optics\r\nare explained by geometry.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe discussion regarding “primitive truths,”\r\naxioms, and maxims, as well as the distinction\r\nbetween truths of fact and of reason, has its most\r\nimportant bearing in Locke’s next chapter. This\r\nchapter has for its title the “Extent of Human\r\nKnowledge,” and in connection with the sixth\r\nchapter, upon universal propositions, and with the\r\nseventh, upon axioms, really contains the gist of\r\nthe treatment of knowledge. It is here also that\r\nare to be considered chapters three and six of\r\nbook third, having respectively as their titles,\r\n“Of General Terms,” and “Of the Names of\r\nSubstances.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo understand Locke’s views upon the extent\r\nand limitations of our knowledge, it is necessary\r\nto recur to his theory of its origin. If we compare\r\nwhat he says about the origin of ideas from sensations\r\nwith what he says about the development\r\nof general knowledge from particular, we shall find\r\nthat Locke unconsciously puts side by side two\r\ndifferent, and even contradictory, theories upon this\r\npoint. In the view already given when treating\r\nof sensation, knowledge originates from the combination,\r\nthe addition, of the simple ideas furnished\r\nus by our senses. It begins with the simple, the\r\nunrelated, and advances to the complex. But according\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"203\" id=\"Page_203\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nto the doctrine which he propounds in\r\ntreating of general terms, knowledge begins with\r\nthe individual, which is already qualified by definite\r\nrelations, and hence complex, and proceeds, by\r\nabstracting some of these qualities, towards the\r\nsimple. Or, in Locke’s own language, “ideas become\r\ngeneral by separating from them the circumstances\r\nof time and place and any other ideas\r\nthat may \u003cem\u003edetermine\u003c/em\u003e them to this and that particular\r\nexistence.” And, still more definitely, he says\r\nthat general ideas are framed by “leaving out of\r\nthe \u003cem\u003ecomplex\u003c/em\u003e idea of individuals that which is peculiar\r\nto each, and retaining only what is common\r\nto them all.” From this it follows that “general\r\nand universal belong not to the real existence of\r\nthings, but are the inventions and creatures of the\r\nunderstanding.” “When we quit particulars, the\r\ngenerals that rest are only creatures of our own\r\nmaking. . . . The signification they have is nothing\r\nbut a relation that by the mind of man is added\r\nto them.” And in language which reminds us of\r\nKant, but with very different bearing, he says that\r\nrelations are the workmanship of the understanding.\r\nThe abstract idea of what is common to all the\r\nmembers of the class constitutes “nominal essence.”\r\nThis nominal essence, not being a particular\r\nexistence in nature, but the “workmanship\r\nof the understanding,” is to be carefully distinguished\r\nfrom the real essence, “which is the being\r\nof anything whereby it is what it is.” This real\r\nessence is evidently equivalent to the unknown\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"204\" id=\"Page_204\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\n“substance” of which we have heard before. “It\r\nis the real, internal, and unknown constitution of\r\nthings.” In simple or unrelated ideas and in modes\r\nthe real and the nominal essence is the same; and\r\nhence whatever is demonstrated of one is demonstrated\r\nof the other. But as to substance it is different,\r\nthe one being natural, the other artificial. The\r\nnominal essence always relates to sorts, or classes,\r\nand is a pattern or standard by which we classify\r\nobjects. In the individual there is nothing essential,\r\nin this sense. “Particular beings, considered\r\nbarely in themselves, will be found to have\r\nall their qualities equally essential to them, or,\r\nwhich is more, nothing at all.” As for the “real\r\nessence” which things have, “we only suppose its\r\nbeing without precisely knowing what it is.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLocke here presents us with the confusion which,\r\nin one form or another, is always found in empiricism,\r\nand which indeed is essential to it. Locke,\r\nlike the ordinary empiricist, has no doubt of the\r\nexistence of real things. His starting-point is the\r\nexistence of two substances, mind and matter;\r\nwhile, further, there is a great number of substances\r\nof each kind. Each mind and every separate\r\nportion of matter is a distinct substance.\r\nThis supposed deliverance of common sense Locke\r\nnever called into question. Working on this line,\r\nall knowledge will consist in abstraction from the\r\nready-made things presented to us in perception,\r\n“in leaving out from the complex idea of individuals”\r\nsomething belonging to them. But on the\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"205\" id=\"Page_205\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nother hand, Locke never doubts that knowledge begins\r\nwith sensation, and that, therefore, the process\r\nof knowledge is one of adding simple, unrelated\r\nelements. The two theories are absolutely opposed\r\nto each other, and yet one and the same philosophical\r\ninference may be drawn from each; namely,\r\nthat only the particular is real, and that the universal\r\n(or relations) is an artificial product, manufactured\r\nin one case by abstraction from the real\r\nindividual, in the other by compounding the real\r\nsensation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe result is, that when he comes to a discussion\r\nof the extent of knowledge, he admits knowledge of\r\nself, of God, and of “things,” only by a denial of\r\nhis very definition of knowledge, while knowledge\r\nof other conceptions, like those of mathematics, is\r\nnot knowledge of reality, but only of ideas which\r\nwe ourselves frame. All knowledge, that is to say,\r\nis obtained only either by contradicting his own\r\nfundamental notion, or by placing it in relations\r\nwhich are confessedly artificial and superinduced.\r\nIt is to this point that we come.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe proposition which is fundamental to the discussion\r\nis that we have knowledge only where we\r\nperceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas.\r\nLocke then takes up each of his four classes of connection,\r\nin order to ascertain the extent of knowledge\r\nin it. Our knowledge of “identity and diversity\r\nextends as far as our ideas,” because we intuitively\r\nperceive every idea to be “what it is, and different\r\nfrom any other.” Locke afterwards states, however,\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"206\" id=\"Page_206\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthat all purely identical propositions are “trifling,”\r\nthat is, they contain no instruction; they teach us\r\nnothing. Thus the first class of relations cannot\r\nbe said to be of much avail. If we consider the\r\nfourth kind of knowledge, that of real existence,\r\nwe have an intuitive knowledge of self, a demonstrative\r\nknowledge of God, and a sensitive knowledge\r\nof other things. But sensitive knowledge, it\r\nmust be noted, “does not extend beyond the objects\r\n\u003cem\u003eactually present\u003c/em\u003e to our senses.” It can hardly be said,\r\ntherefore, to assure us of the existence of \u003cem\u003eobjects\u003c/em\u003e at\r\nall. It only tells us what experiences are being at\r\nthe time undergone. Furthermore, knowledge of all\r\nthree (God, self, and matter), since of real being,\r\nand not of relations between ideas, contradicts his\r\ndefinition of knowledge. But perhaps we shall find\r\nknowledge more extended in the other classes. And\r\nindeed Locke tells us that knowledge of relations\r\nis the “largest field of our knowledge.” It includes\r\nmorals and mathematics; but it is to be\r\nnoticed that, according to Locke, in both of these\r\nbranches our demonstrations are not regarding facts,\r\nbut regarding either “modes” framed by ourselves,\r\nor relations that are the creatures of our minds,—“extraneous\r\nand superinduced” upon the facts, as\r\nhe says. He thus anticipates in substance, though\r\nnot in phraseology, Hume’s distinction between\r\n“matters of fact” and “connections of ideas,” in\r\nthe latter of which we may have knowledge, but\r\nnot going beyond the combinations that we ourselves\r\nmake.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"207\" id=\"Page_207\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eThis leaves one class, that of co-existence, to be\r\nexamined. Here, if anywhere, must knowledge, worthy\r\nof being termed scientific, be found. This class,\r\nit will be remembered, comprehends our knowledge\r\nconcerning substances. But this extends, according\r\nto Locke, “a very little way.” The idea of a substance\r\nis a complex of various “simple ideas united\r\nin one subject and co-existing together.” When\r\nwe would know anything further concerning a substance,\r\nwe only inquire what other simple ideas,\r\nbesides those already united, co-exist with them.\r\nSince there is no \u003cem\u003enecessary\u003c/em\u003e connection, however,\r\namong these simple ideas, since each is, by its very\r\nsimplicity, essentially distinct from every other, or,\r\nas we have already learned, since nothing is essential\r\nto an individual, we can never be sure that any\r\nidea really co-exists with others. Or, as Locke\r\nsays, in physical matters we “can go no further\r\nthan particular experience informs us of. . . . We\r\ncan have no certain knowledge of universal truths\r\nconcerning natural bodies.” And again, “universal\r\npropositions of whose truth and falsehood we have\r\ncertain knowledge concern not existence;” while,\r\non the other hand, “particular affirmations are only\r\nconcerning existence, declaring only the \u003cem\u003eaccidental\u003c/em\u003e\r\nunion or separation of ideas in things existing.”\r\nThis particular knowledge, it must be recalled, is,\r\nin turn, only sensitive, and thus extends not beyond\r\nthe time when the sensation is had.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe are not surprised then at learning from Locke\r\nthat regarding bodies “we are not capable of\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"208\" id=\"Page_208\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nscientific knowledge.” “Natural philosophy is not\r\ncapable of being made a science;” or, as Locke elsewhere\r\nstates it, knowledge regarding the nominal\r\nessence is “trifling” (Kant’s analytic judgment);\r\nregarding the real essence is impossible. For example,\r\nwhen we say that all gold is fusible, this\r\nmeans either simply that fusibility is one of the\r\nideas which we combine to get the general idea of\r\ngold, so that in making the given judgment we only\r\nexpand our own notion; or it means that the “real”\r\nsubstance gold is always fusible. But this is a statement\r\nwe have no right to make, and for two reasons:\r\nwe do not know what the real substance gold is; and\r\neven if we did, we should not know that fusibility\r\n\u003cem\u003ealways\u003c/em\u003e co-exists with it. The summary of the whole\r\nmatter is that “general certainty is to be found only\r\nin our ideas. Whenever we go to seek it elsewhere,\r\nin experiment or observations without us, our\r\nknowledge goes not beyond particulars.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt has been necessary to give an account of\r\nLocke’s views at this length because it is in his discussion\r\nof the limitations and extent of knowledge\r\nthat his theory culminates. While not working out\r\nhis sensationalism as consistently as did Hume, he\r\nyet reduces knowledge to that of the existence of\r\nGod and ourselves (whose natures, however, are\r\nunknown), and to a knowledge of mathematical and\r\nmoral relations, which, however, concerns only “the\r\nhabitudes and relations of abstract ideas.” We\r\nhave now to see by what means Leibniz finds a\r\nwider sphere for certain and general knowledge by\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"209\" id=\"Page_209\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nhis theory of intellectualism than Locke can by his\r\nsensationalism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz’s theory of knowledge rests upon a distinction\r\nbetween truths of fact, which are \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ea posteriori\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand contingent, and truths of reason, which are \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ea\r\npriori\u003c/i\u003e and necessary. In discussing his views regarding\r\nexperience, we learned that, according to\r\nhim, all judgments which are empirical are also particular,\r\nnot allowing any inference beyond the given\r\ncases experienced. Experience gives only instances,\r\nnot principles. If we postpone for the present the\r\ndiscussions of truths of reason, by admitting that\r\nthey may properly be said to be at once certain and\r\nuniversal, the question arises how in matters of fact\r\nthere can be any knowledge beyond that which\r\nLocke admits; and the answer is, that so far as\r\nthe mere existence and occurrence of these facts is\r\nconcerned, there is neither demonstrative nor general\r\nknowledge. But the intelligence of man does\r\nnot stop with the isolated fact; it proceeds to inquire\r\ninto its cause, to ascertain its conditions, and\r\nthus to see into, not merely its actual existence,\r\nbut its \u003cem\u003epossibility\u003c/em\u003e. In Leibniz’s language: “The\r\nreal existence of things that are not necessary\r\nis a point of fact or history; but the knowledge\r\nof possibilities or necessities (the necessary being\r\nthat whose opposite is not possible) constitutes demonstrative\r\nscience.” In other words, it is the\r\nprinciple of causality, which makes us see a fact not\r\nas a mere fact, but as a dependent consequence;\r\nwhich elevates knowledge, otherwise contingent and\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"210\" id=\"Page_210\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nparticular, into the realm of the universal and\r\napodictic. Underlying all “accidental union” is\r\nthe real synthesis of causation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we follow the discussion as it centres about the\r\nterms “nominal” and “real,” it stands as follows:\r\nLeibniz objects to the use of the term “essence” in\r\nthis connection, but is willing to accept that of “definition;”\r\nfor, as he says, a substance can have but\r\none essence, while there may be several definitions,\r\nwhich, however, all express the same essence. The\r\nessence is the \u003cem\u003epossibility\u003c/em\u003e of that which is under consideration;\r\nthe definition is the statement of that\r\nwhich is supposed to be possible. The “nominal”\r\ndefinition, however, while it implies this possibility,\r\ndoes not expressly affirm it,—that is to say, it may\r\nalways be doubted whether the nominal definition\r\nhas any possibility (or reality) corresponding to it\r\nuntil experience comes to our aid and makes us\r\nknow it \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ea posteriori\u003c/i\u003e. A “real” definition, on the\r\nother hand, makes us know \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e the reality of\r\nthe thing defined by showing us the mode of its\r\nproduction, “by exhibiting its cause or generation.”\r\nEven our knowledge of facts of experience cannot\r\nbe said, therefore, to be arbitrary, for we do not\r\ncombine ideas just as we please, but “our combinations\r\nmay be justified by reason which shows them\r\nto be possible, or by experience which shows them\r\nto be actual, and consequently also possible.” To\r\ntake Locke’s example about gold, “the essence of\r\ngold is that which constitutes it and gives it its\r\nsensible qualities, and these qualities, so far as they\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"211\" id=\"Page_211\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nenable us to recognize it, constitute its nominal\r\nessence, while a real and causal definition would\r\nenable us to explain the contexture or internal disposition.\r\nThe nominal definition, however, is also\r\nreal in one sense,—not in itself, indeed, since it does\r\nnot enable us to know \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e the possibility or production\r\nof the body, but empirically real.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is evident from these quotations that what Leibniz\r\nunderstands by “possibility” is the condition or\r\ncause of a given fact; and that, while Locke distinguishes\r\nbetween particular, accidental and demonstrative,\r\ngeneral knowledge as two opposed kinds,\r\nconcerned with two distinct and mutually exclusive\r\nspheres, with Leibniz they are distinctions in the\r\naspect of the same sphere of fact. In reality there\r\nis no combination of qualities accidental, as Locke\r\nthought that by far the greater part were; in every\r\nempirical fact there is a cause or condition involved\r\nthat is invariable, and that constitutes the reason\r\nof the fact. The “accidental” is only in the relation\r\nof our ideas to objects, not in the objects\r\nthemselves. There may be accidental mental associations;\r\nthere are no accidental relations. In\r\nempirical, or \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ea posteriori\u003c/i\u003e, knowledge, so-called, the\r\nreason is there, but is not known. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eA priori\u003c/i\u003e knowledge,\r\nthe real definition, discovers and explicitly\r\nstates this reason. Contingent knowledge is therefore\r\npotentially rational; demonstrative knowledge\r\nis the actual development of the reasons implicitly\r\ncontained in experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may with advantage connect this discussion\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"212\" id=\"Page_212\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nwith the fundamental doctrine of Locke and Leibniz\r\nregarding intelligence and reality. To Locke, as we\r\nhave seen, knowledge is essentially a matter of relations\r\nor connections; but relations are “superinduced”\r\nand “extraneous” as regards the facts.\r\nEvery act of knowledge constitutes, therefore, in\r\nsome way a departure from the reality to be known.\r\nKnowledge and fact are, by their very definition,\r\nopposed to one another. But in Leibniz’s view intelligence,\r\nor reason, enters into the constitution of\r\nreality; indeed, it is reality. The relations which\r\nare the “creatures of the understanding” are, therefore,\r\nnot foreign to the material to be known, but are\r\norganic to it, forming its content. The process,\r\nthen, in which the mind perceives the connections\r\nor relations of ideas or objects, is simply the process\r\nby which the mind comes to the consciousness\r\nof the real nature of these objects, not a process of\r\n“superinducing” unreal ideas upon them. The difficulty\r\nof Locke is the difficulty of every theory of\r\nknowledge that does not admit an organic unity of\r\nthe knowing mind and the known universe. The\r\ntheory is obliged to admit that all knowledge is in the\r\nform of relations which have their source in intelligence.\r\nBut being tied to the view that reality is\r\ndistinct from intelligence, it is obliged to draw the\r\nconclusion that these relations are not to be found\r\nin actual existence, and hence that all knowledge,\r\nwhatever else it may be, is unreal in the sense that\r\nit does not and cannot conform to actual fact. But,\r\nin the theory of Leibniz, the process of relating\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"213\" id=\"Page_213\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhich is the essence of knowledge is only the realization\r\non the part of the individual mind of the\r\nrelations or reasons that eternally constitute reality.\r\nSince reality is, and is what it is, through\r\nintelligence, whatever relations intelligence rightly\r\nperceives are not “extraneous” to reality, but are\r\nits “essence.” As Leibniz says, “Truth consists in\r\nthe relations between the objects of our ideas. This\r\ndoes not depend upon language, but is common to\r\nus with God, so that when God manifests a truth to\r\nus, \u003cem\u003ewe acquire what is already in his understanding\u003c/em\u003e.\r\nFor although there is an infinite difference between\r\nhis ideas and ours as to their perfection and extent,\r\nyet it is always true that as to the same relation\r\nthey are identical. And it is in this relation that\r\ntruth exists.” To this may be added another statement,\r\nwhich throws still further light on this point:\r\n“Ideas are eternally in God, and are in us before\r\nwe perceive them.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have now to consider somewhat more in detail\r\nthe means by which the transformation of empirical\r\ninto rational knowledge is carried on. Leibniz\r\npoints out that the difficulty concerning scientific\r\nknowledge of sensible facts is not lack of data, but,\r\nin a certain sense, superfluity of data. It is not\r\nthat we perceive no connections among objects, but\r\nthat we perceive many which we cannot reduce to\r\none another. “Our experiences,” says Leibniz,\r\n“are simple only in appearance, for they are always\r\naccompanied by circumstances connected with\r\nthem, although these relations are not understood by\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"214\" id=\"Page_214\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nus. These circumstances furnish material capable\r\nof explanation and analysis. There is thus a sort\r\nof \u003cem\u003epleonasm\u003c/em\u003e in our perceptions of sensible objects\r\nand qualities, since we have more than one idea of\r\nthe same object. Gold can be nominally defined in\r\nmany ways. Such definitions are only \u003cem\u003eprovisional\u003c/em\u003e.”\r\nThis is to say, empirical knowledge will become rational\r\nwhen it is possible to view any subject-matter\r\nas a unity, instead of a multiplicity of varied\r\naspects. And on this same subject he says, in another\r\nconnection: “A great number of experiences\r\ncan furnish us data more than sufficient for scientific\r\nknowledge, provided only we have the art of using\r\nthese data.” The aim of science is therefore, to\r\ndiscover the dynamic unity which makes a whole\r\nof what appears to be a mere mass of accidentally\r\nconnected circumstances. This unity of relations is\r\nthe individual.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is thus evident that to Leibniz the individual is\r\nnot the beginning of knowledge, but its goal. The\r\nindividual is the organic, the dynamic unity of the\r\nvariety of phases or notions presented us in sense-experience.\r\nIndividuality is not “simplicity” in the\r\nsense of Locke; that is, separation from all relations.\r\nIt is complete connection of all relations. “It is impossible\r\nfor us to have [complete] knowledge of individuals,\r\nand to find the means of determining exactly\r\nthe individuality of anything; for in individuality all\r\ncircumstances are combined. Individuality envelops\r\nthe infinite. Only so far as we know the infinite do\r\nwe know the individual, on account of the influence\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"215\" id=\"Page_215\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\n(if this word be correctly understood) that all\r\nthings in the universe exercise upon one another.”\r\nLeibniz, in short, remains true to his conception of\r\nthe monad as the ultimate reality; for the monad,\r\nthough an individual, yet has the universe as its content.\r\nWe shall be able, therefore, to render our\r\nsensible experiences rational just in the degree in\r\nwhich we can discover the underlying relations and\r\ndependencies which make them members of one\r\nindividual.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the process of transformation Leibniz relies\r\nespecially upon two methods,—those of mathematics\r\nand of classification. Of the former he here says but\r\nlittle; but the entire progress of physical science\r\nsince the time of Leibniz has been the justification\r\nof that little. In the passage already quoted regarding\r\nthe need of method for using our sensible\r\ndata, he goes on to say that the “infinitesimal\r\nanalysis has given us the means of allying physics\r\nand geometry, and that dynamics has furnished us\r\nwith the key to the general laws of nature.” It is\r\ncertainly competent testimony to the truth of Leibniz’s\r\nfundamental principles that he foresaw also\r\nthe course which the development of biological\r\nscience would take. No classification based upon\r\nresemblances, says Leibniz in effect, can be regarded\r\nas wholly arbitrary, since resemblances are\r\nfound in nature also. The only question is whether\r\nour classification is based upon superficial or fundamental\r\nidentities; the superficial resemblances being\r\nsuch as are external, or the effects of some common\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"216\" id=\"Page_216\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ncause, while the fundamental resemblances are such\r\nas are the cause of whatever other similarities are\r\nfound. “It can be said that whatever we compare\r\nor distinguish with truth, nature differentiates, or\r\nmakes agree, also; but that nature has differences\r\nand identities which are better than ours, which we\r\ndo not know. . . . \u003cem\u003eThe more we discover the generation\r\nof species\u003c/em\u003e, and the more we follow in our classifications\r\nthe conditions that are required for their\r\nproduction, the nearer we approach the natural\r\norder.” Our classifications, then, so far as they\r\ndepend upon what is conditioned, are imperfect and\r\nprovisional, although they cannot be said to be false\r\n(since “while nature may give us those more complete\r\nand convenient, it will not give the lie to those\r\nwe have already”); while so far as they rest upon\r\nwhat is causal and conditioning, they are true, general,\r\nand necessary. In thus insisting that classification\r\nshould be genetic, Leibniz anticipated the\r\ngreat service which the theory of evolution has\r\ndone for biological science in enabling science to\r\nform classes which are “natural;” that is, based on\r\nidentity of origin.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz culminates his discussion of classification\r\nas a method of translating the empirical into the rational,\r\nby pointing out that it rests upon the law of\r\ncontinuity; and that this law contains two factors,—one\r\nequivalent to the axiom of the Realists, that nature\r\nis nowhere empty; the other, to that of the Nominalists,\r\nthat nature does nothing uselessly. “One\r\nof these principles seems to make nature a prodigal,\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"217\" id=\"Page_217\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe other a miser; and yet both are true if properly\r\nunderstood,” says Leibniz. “Nature is like a good\r\nmanager, sparing where it is necessary, in order to\r\nbe magnificent. It is magnificent in its effects, and\r\neconomical in the causes used to produce them.”\r\nIn other words, classification becomes science when\r\nit presents us with both unity and difference. The\r\nprinciple of unity is that of nature as a miser and\r\neconomical; that of differentiation is the principle\r\nof nature as prodigal and magnificent. The thoroughly\r\ndifferentiated unity is nature as self-specifying,\r\nor as an organic, not an abstract, unity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe gist of the whole matter is, then, that experience\r\npresents us with an infinity of ideas, which\r\nmay appear at first sight arbitrary and accidental\r\nin their connections. This appearance, however, is\r\nnot the fact. These ideas are the effects of certain\r\ncauses; and in ascertaining these conditions, we\r\nreduce the apparently unrelated variety of experiences\r\nto underlying unities, and these unities, like\r\nall real unities or simple beings, are spiritual and\r\nrational in nature. Leibniz’s ordinary way of stating\r\nthis is that the principle of truths of fact is that of\r\n\u003cem\u003esufficient reason\u003c/em\u003e. This principle Leibniz always\r\ntreats as distinguished from that of identity (and\r\ncontradiction) as the ruling category of truths of\r\nreason. And we shall follow him in discussing the\r\ntwo together.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e“Our reasonings are based on two leading principles,—that\r\nof contradiction, in virtue of which\r\nwe judge false all which contains contradiction,\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"218\" id=\"Page_218\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nand true that which is opposed or contradictory to\r\nthat which is false; and that of sufficient reason,\r\nin virtue of which we judge that no fact is true or\r\nactual, no proposition veritable, unless there is a\r\nsufficient reason why it is as it is, and not otherwise,\r\nalthough these reasons are generally unknown to us.\r\nThus there are two sorts of truths,—those of reason,\r\nand those of fact. The truths of reason are necessary,\r\nand their opposites impossible; while those of\r\nfact are contingent, and their opposites possible.\r\nWhen a truth is necessary, its reason can be discovered\r\nby analysis, resolving it into ideas and\r\ntruths that are simpler, until the primitive truths\r\nare arrived at. It is thus that the mathematicians\r\nproceed in reducing by analysis the theorems of\r\nspeculation and the canons of practice into definitions,\r\naxioms, and postulates. Thus they come to\r\nsimple ideas whose definition cannot be given;\r\nprimitive truths that cannot be proved, and which\r\ndo not need it, since they are identical propositions,\r\nwhose opposite contains a manifest contradiction.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e“But in contingent truths—those of fact—the\r\nsufficient reason must be found; namely, in the succession\r\nof things which fill the created universe,—for\r\notherwise the analysis into particular reasons would\r\ngo into detail without limit, by reason of the immense\r\nvariety of natural things, and of the infinite\r\ndivisibility of bodies. There are an infinity of\r\nfigures and of past and present movements which\r\nenter into the efficient cause of my present writing,\r\nand there are an infinity of minute inclinations and\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"219\" id=\"Page_219\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ndispositions of my soul which enter into its final\r\ncause. And since all this detail contains only other\r\ncontingent and particular antecedents, each of which\r\nhas need of a similar analysis to account for it, we\r\nreally make no progress by this analysis; and it is\r\nnecessary that the final or sufficient reason be outside\r\nthe endless succession or series of contingent\r\nparticulars, that it consist in a necessary being, in\r\nwhich this series of changes is contained only \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eeminenter\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nas in its source. This necessary being and\r\nsource is what we call God.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn other words, the tracing of empirical facts to\r\ntheir causes and conditions does not, after all, render\r\nthem wholly rational. The series of causes is endless.\r\nEvery condition is in turn conditioned. We\r\nare not so much solving the problem of the reason\r\nof a given fact, as we are stating the problem in\r\nother terms as we go on in this series. Every solution\r\noffers itself again as a problem, and this endlessly.\r\nIf these truths of fact, then, are to be\r\nrendered wholly rational, it must be in something\r\nwhich lies outside of the series considered as a\r\nseries; that is, something which is not an antecedent\r\nof any one of the series, but is equally related\r\nto each and to all as their ground and source.\r\nThis, considered as an argument for the existence\r\nof God, we shall deal with hereafter; now we are\r\nconcerned only with its bearing upon the relation\r\nof experience to the universality and necessity of\r\nknowledge. According to this, the ultimate meaning\r\nof facts is found in their relation to the divine\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"220\" id=\"Page_220\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nintelligence; for Leibniz is emphatic in insisting\r\nthat the relation of God to experience is not one of\r\nbare will to creatures produced by this will (as Descartes\r\nhad supposed), but of a will governed wholly\r\nby Intelligence. As Leibniz states it in another\r\nconnection, not only matters of fact, but mathematical\r\ntruths, have the same final basis in the divine\r\nunderstanding.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e“Such truths, strictly speaking, are only conditional,\r\nand say that in case their subject existed\r\nthey would be found such and such. But if it is\r\nagain asked in what consists this conditional connection\r\nin which there is necessary reality, the reply\r\nis that it is in the relation of ideas. And by the further\r\nquestion, Where would be the ideas if no spirit\r\nexisted; and what would then become of the foundation\r\nof the certainty of such truths?—we are brought\r\nto the final foundation of truths; namely, that supreme\r\nand universal spirit, which must exist, and\r\nwhose understanding is, in reality, the region of the\r\neternal truths. And in order that it may not be\r\nthought that it is not necessary to have recourse to\r\nthis region, we must consider that these necessary\r\ntruths contain the determining reason and regulative\r\nprinciple of existence, and, in a word, of the laws\r\nof the universe. Thus these necessary truths, being\r\nanterior to the existences of contingent beings, must\r\nin turn be based upon the existence of a necessary\r\nsubstance.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is because facts are not \u003cem\u003emere\u003c/em\u003e facts, in short, but\r\nare the manifestation of a “determining reason and\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"221\" id=\"Page_221\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nregulative principle” which finds its home in universal\r\nintelligence, that knowledge of them can\r\nbecome necessary and general.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe general nature of truths of reason and of\r\ntheir ruling principle, identity and contradiction, has\r\nalready been given in the quotation regarding the\r\nprinciple of sufficient reason. It is Leibniz’s contention\r\nthat only in truths whose opposite is seen to\r\ninvolve self-contradiction can we have absolute certainty,\r\nand that it is through connection with such\r\neternal truths that the certainty of our other knowledge\r\nrests. It is thus evident why Leibniz insists,\r\nas against Locke, upon the great importance of\r\naxioms and maxims. They are important, not\r\nmerely in themselves, but as the sole and indispensable\r\nbases of scientific truth regarding all matters.\r\nLeibniz at times, it is true, speaks as if\r\ndemonstrative and contingent truths were of themselves,\r\nin principle, distinct, and even opposed. But\r\nhe also corrects himself by showing that contingency\r\nis rather a subjective limitation than an objective\r\nquality. We, indeed, do not see that the truth “I\r\nexist,” for example, is necessary, because we cannot\r\nsee how its opposite involves contradiction.\r\nBut “God sees how the two terms ‘I’ and ‘exist’\r\nare connected; that is, \u003cem\u003ewhy\u003c/em\u003e I exist.” So far as we\r\ncan see facts, then, from the standpoint of the\r\ndivine intelligence, so far, it would appear, our\r\nknowledge is necessary.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSince these axioms, maxims, or first truths are\r\n“innate,” we are in a condition to complete (for\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"222\" id=\"Page_222\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe first time) the discussion of innate ideas. These\r\nideas constitute, as we have learned, the essential\r\ncontent of the divine intelligence, and of ours so far\r\nas we have realized our identity with God’s understanding.\r\nThe highest form of knowledge, therefore,\r\nis self-consciousness. This bears the same\r\nrelation to necessary truths that the latter bear to\r\nexperience. “Knowledge of necessary and eternal\r\ntruths,” says Leibniz, “distinguishes us from simple\r\nanimals, and makes us have reason and science, \u003cem\u003eelevating\r\nus to the knowledge of ourselves\u003c/em\u003e. We are thus\r\ndeveloped to self-consciousness; and in being conscious\r\nof ourselves we are conscious of being, of\r\nsubstance, of the simple, of the spiritual, of God.”\r\nAnd again he says that “those that know necessary\r\ntruths are rational spirits, capable of self-consciousness,\r\nof recognizing what is termed Ego, substance,\r\nand monad. \u003cem\u003eThus\u003c/em\u003e they are rendered capable of\r\ndemonstrative knowledge.” “We are innate to\r\nourselves; and since we are beings, being is innate\r\nto us, for knowledge of it is implicit in that which\r\nwe have of ourselves.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eKnowledge, in fine, may be regarded as an ascending\r\nseries of four terms. The first is constituted by\r\nsensations associated together in such a way that a\r\nrelation of antecedence and consequence exists between\r\nthem. This is “experience.” The second\r\nstage comes into existence when we connect these\r\nexperiences, not by mere relations of “consecution,”\r\nbut by their conditions, by the principle of causality,\r\nand especially by that of sufficient reason, which\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"223\" id=\"Page_223\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nconnects them with the supreme intelligence, God.\r\nThis stage is science. The third is knowledge of\r\nthe axioms and necessary truths in and of themselves,\r\nnot merely as involved in science. The\r\nfourth is self-consciousness, the knowledge of intelligence,\r\nin its intimate and universal nature, by\r\nwhich we know God, the mind, and all real substance.\r\nIn the order of time the stage of experience\r\nis first, and that of self-consciousness last. But in\r\nthe lowest stage there are involved the others. The\r\nprogress of knowledge consists in the development\r\nor unfolding of this implicit content, till intelligence,\r\nspirit, activity, is clearly revealed as the source and\r\ncondition of all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"224\" id=\"Page_224\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\u003ca id=\"Chapter_XI\"\u003eCHAPTER XI.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eTHE THEOLOGY OF LEIBNIZ.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"upper-case\"\u003eOne\u003c/span\u003e of the chapters concerning knowledge is\r\nentitled, “The Knowledge that we have of\r\nGod.” This introduces us to the theology of Leibniz\r\nand indirectly to the completion of those ethical\r\ndoctrines already outlined in the \u003ca href=\"#Chapter_VI\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003echapter on will\u003c/a\u003e.\r\nLeibniz employs three arguments to prove the existence\r\nof God: that of God as the sufficient reason\r\nof the world (substantially the cosmological proof);\r\nof God as the source of the pre-established harmony\r\n(an extension of the teleological proof); and the\r\nontological. The latter he accepts as it came from\r\nthe hands of Descartes, but insists that it requires\r\nan added argument before it ranks as anything\r\nmore than presumptive proof. The Anselmic-Cartesian\r\nargument, as stated by Leibniz, is as\r\nfollows: “God is defined as the greatest, or most\r\nperfect, of beings, or as a being of supreme grandeur\r\nand perfection. But in the notion of a perfect\r\nbeing, existence must be included, since it is something\r\nmore to exist than not to exist. Or existence\r\nis a perfection, and hence must belong to the most\r\nperfect being; otherwise some perfection would be\r\nlacking, which is contrary to the definition.” Or\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"225\" id=\"Page_225\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nas Descartes sometimes puts it, in the notion of\r\nanything like a tree, a mountain, a triangle, contingency\r\nis contained. We may conceive such an\r\nobject to exist or not, as we like. There is no\r\nnecessity involved in our thought. But we cannot\r\nthink of a perfect being except as existing. It\r\ndoes not rest with the decision of our thinking\r\nwhether or not to include existence in this notion.\r\nWe must necessarily think existence as soon as we\r\nthink such a being.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz takes a middle position, he says, between\r\nthose who consider this a demonstrative argument,\r\nand those who regard it as a mere paralogism. It\r\nis pre-supposed by this argument that the notion\r\nof a Supreme Being is possible, or that it does not\r\ninvolve contradiction. This pre-supposition is to\r\nbe proved. First, it is well to simplify the argument\r\nitself. The Cartesian definition may be reduced\r\nto this: “God is a being in whom existence\r\nand essence are one. From this definition it follows\r\nas a corollary that such a being, if possible,\r\nexists. For the essence of a thing being just that\r\nwhich constitutes its possibility, it is evident that\r\nto exist by its essence is the same as to exist by its\r\npossibility. Being in itself, then, or God, may be\r\nmost simply defined as the Being who must exist if\r\nhe is possible.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are two ways of proving this last clause\r\n(namely, that he is possible) the direct and the indirect.\r\nThe indirect is employed against those who\r\nassert that from mere notions, ideas, definitions or\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"226\" id=\"Page_226\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\npossible essences, it is not possible to infer actual\r\nexistence. Such persons simply deny the possibility\r\nof being in itself. But if being-in-itself, or absolute\r\nbeing, is impossible, being-by-another, or relative,\r\nis also impossible; for there is no “other”\r\nupon which it may depend. Nothing, in this case,\r\ncould exist. Or if necessary being is not possible,\r\nthere is no being possible. Put in another way,\r\nGod is as necessary for possibility as for actual\r\nexistence. If there is possibility of anything, there\r\nis God. This leads up to the direct proof; for it\r\nfollows that, if there be a possibility of God,—the\r\nBeing in whom existence and essence are one,—he\r\nexists. “God alone has such a position that\r\nexistence is necessary, if possible. But since there\r\ncan be nothing opposed to the possibility of a\r\nbeing without limit,—a being therefore without\r\nnegations and without contradiction,—this is sufficient\r\nto prove \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e the existence of God.” In\r\nshort, God being pure affirmation, pure self-identity,\r\nthe idea of his Being cannot include contradiction,\r\nand hence is possible,—and since possible, necessary.\r\nOf this conception of God as the purely\r\nself-identical, without negation, we shall have\r\nsomething to say in the \u003ca href=\"#Chapter_XII\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003enext chapter\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe cosmological proof is, as we have already\r\nseen, that every cause in the world being at the\r\nsame time an effect, it cannot be the sufficient reason\r\nof anything. The whole series is contingent, and\r\nrequires a ground not prior to, but beyond, the\r\nseries. The only \u003cem\u003esufficient\u003c/em\u003e reason of anything is\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"227\" id=\"Page_227\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthat which is also the sufficient reason of itself,—absolute\r\nbeing. The teleological argument Leibniz\r\ninvariably, I believe, presents in connection with\r\nthe idea of pre-established harmony. “If the\r\nsubstances of experience,” runs the argument,\r\n“had not received their being, both active and\r\npassive, from one universal supreme cause, they\r\nwould be independent of one another, and hence\r\nwould not exhibit that order, harmony, and beauty\r\nwhich we notice in nature. This argument possesses\r\nonly moral certainty which becomes demonstrative\r\nby the new kind of harmony which I have\r\nintroduced,—pre-established harmony. Since each\r\nsubstance expresses in its own way that which\r\noccurs beyond it, and can have no influence on\r\nother particular beings, it is necessary that each\r\nsubstance, before developing these phenomena\r\nfrom the depth of its own being, must have received\r\nthis nature (this internal ground of external\r\nphenomena) from a universal cause from\r\nwhom all beings depend, and which effects that one\r\nbe perfectly in accord with and corresponding to\r\nevery other. This cannot occur except through\r\na being of infinite knowledge and power.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHaving determined the existence of God, Leibniz\r\nstates his attributes. These may be reduced to\r\nthree. He is perfect in power, in wisdom, and in\r\ngoodness. “Perfection is nothing other than the\r\nwhole of positive reality separated from the limits\r\nand bounds of things. Where there are no limits,\r\nas in God, perfection is absolutely infinite.” “In\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"228\" id=\"Page_228\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nGod exists \u003cem\u003epower\u003c/em\u003e, which is the source of all \u003cem\u003eknowledge\u003c/em\u003e,—which\r\ncomprehends the realm of ideas, down\r\nto its minutest detail,—and \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e, which directs all\r\ncreations and changes according to the principle\r\nof the best.” Or as he expands it at another time:\r\n“The supreme cause must be intelligent, for the\r\nexisting world being contingent, and an infinity of\r\nother worlds being equally possible, it is necessary\r\nthat the cause of the world take into consideration\r\nall these possible worlds in order to decide upon\r\none. Now this relation of a substance to simple\r\nideas must be the relation of understanding to its\r\nideas, while deciding upon one is the act of will in\r\nchoosing. Finally it is the power of this substance\r\nwhich executes the volition. Power has its end in\r\nbeing; wisdom, or understanding, in truth; and will\r\nin good. Thus the cause must be absolutely perfect\r\nin power, wisdom, and goodness. His understanding\r\nis the source of essences, and his will the\r\norigin of existences.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis brings us to the relation of God to the\r\nworld, or to an account of the creating activity of\r\nGod. This may be considered to be metaphysically,\r\nlogically, or morally necessary. To say\r\nthat it is metaphysically necessary is to say that\r\nit is the result of the divine essence, that it would\r\nimply a contradiction of the very being of God for\r\nthe world not to be and not to be as it is. In short,\r\nthe world becomes a mere emanation of power,\r\nsince, as we have just learned, power and being are\r\ncorrelative. But this leaves out of account the\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"229\" id=\"Page_229\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ndivine understanding. Not all possible worlds\r\nemanate from God’s being, but there is recognition\r\nof them and of their relations to one another.\r\nWere the world to proceed from the divine understanding\r\nalone, however, it would be logically necessary,—that\r\nis, it would bear the same relation to\r\nhis understanding that necessary truths do. Its\r\nopposite would imply contradiction, not indeed of\r\nthe being of God, but of his understanding. But\r\nthe will of God plays the all-important part of\r\nchoosing among the alternative worlds presented\r\nby reason, each of which is \u003cem\u003elogically\u003c/em\u003e possible. One\r\nof these worlds, although standing on the same\r\nintellectual plane as the others, is \u003cem\u003emorally\u003c/em\u003e better,—that\r\nis, it involves greater happiness and perfection\r\nto the creatures constituting it. God is guided\r\nthen by the idea of the better (and this is the best\r\npossible) world. His will is not arbitrary in creating:\r\nit does not work by a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003efiat\u003c/i\u003e of brute power.\r\nBut neither is it fatalistic: it does not work by\r\ncompulsory necessity. It is both free and necessary;\r\nfree, for it is guided by naught excepting\r\nGod’s own recognition of an end; necessary, for\r\nGod, being God, cannot \u003cem\u003emorally\u003c/em\u003e act otherwise than\r\nby the principle of the better,—and this in contingent\r\nmatters is the best. Hence the optimism\r\nof Leibniz, to which here no further allusion can be\r\nmade.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSince the best is precisely God himself, it is evident\r\nthat the created world will have, \u003cem\u003eas far as\r\npossible\u003c/em\u003e, his perfections. It would thus be possible\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"230\" id=\"Page_230\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nto deduce from this conception of God and his\r\nrelation to the world all those characteristics of the\r\nLeibnizian monadology which we formerly arrived\r\nat analytically. God is individual, but with an\r\ninfinite comprehensiveness. Each substance repeats\r\nthese properties of the supreme substance.\r\nThere is an infinity of such substances, in order\r\nthat the world may as perfectly as possible mirror\r\nthe infinity of God. Each, so far as in it lies, reflects\r\nthe activity of God; for activity is the\r\nvery essence of perfection. And thus we might go\r\nthrough with the entire list of the properties of the\r\nmonad.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo complete the present discussion, however, it\r\nis enough to notice that intelligence and will must\r\nbe found in every creature, and that thus we account\r\nfor the “appetition” and the “perception”\r\nthat characterize even the lowest monad. The\r\nscale of monads, however, would not be as complete\r\nas possible unless there were beings in whom appetition\r\nbecame volition, and perception, self-conscious\r\nintelligence. Such monads will stand in\r\nquite other relation to God than the blind impulse-governed\r\nsubstances. “Spirits,” says Leibniz,\r\n“are capable of entering into community with God,\r\nand God is related to them not only as an inventor\r\nto his machine (as he is to other creatures) but as\r\na prince to his subjects, or, better, as a father to his\r\nchildren. This society of spirits constitutes the\r\ncity of God,—the most perfect state under the\r\nmost perfect monarch. This city of God, this\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"231\" id=\"Page_231\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ntruly cosmopolitan monarchy, is a moral world\r\nwithin the natural. Among all the works of God\r\nit is the most sublime and divine. In it consists\r\nthe true glory of God, for there would be no glory\r\nof God unless his greatness and goodness were\r\nknown and admired by spirits; and in his relation\r\nto this society, God for the first time reveals his\r\ngoodness, while he manifests everywhere his power\r\nand wisdom. And as previously we demonstrated\r\na perfect harmony between the two realms of nature,—those\r\nof efficient and final causes,—so must we\r\nhere declare harmony between the physical realm\r\nof nature and the moral realm of grace,—that is,\r\nbetween God as the architect of the mechanical\r\nworld-structure, and God as the monarch of the\r\nworld of spirits.” God fulfils his creation, in other\r\nwords, in a realm of spirits, and fulfils it because\r\nhere there are beings who do not merely reflect him\r\nbut who enter into relations of companionship with\r\nhim, forming a community. This community of\r\nspirits with one another and with God is the moral\r\nworld, and we are thus brought again to the ethics\r\nof Leibniz.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt has been frequently pointed out that Leibniz\r\nwas the first to give ethics the form which it has\r\nsince kept in German philosophy,—the division into\r\n\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eNatur-recht\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eNatur-moral\u003c/i\u003e. These terms are difficult\r\nto give in English, but the latter corresponds to\r\nwhat is ordinarily called “moral philosophy,” while\r\nthe former is political philosophy so far as that has\r\nan ethical bearing. Or the latter may be said to\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"232\" id=\"Page_232\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\ntreat of the moral ideal and of the moral motive and\r\nof duty in themselves, while the former deals with\r\nthe social, the public, and in a certain sense the\r\nexternal, aspects of morality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ePuffendorf undoubtedly suggested this division to\r\nLeibniz by his classification of duties as external\r\nand internal,—the first comprehending natural and\r\ncivil law, the second moral theology. But Puffendorf\r\nconfined the former to purely external acts,\r\nexcluding motives and intentions, and the latter to\r\ndivine revelation. Both are “positive,” and in\r\nsome sort arbitrary,—one resting merely on the fact\r\nthat certain institutions obtain, the other on the\r\nfact that God has made certain declarations. To\r\nLeibniz, on the other hand, the will of God is in no\r\nsense the source of moral truths. The will of God\r\ndoes not create truth, but carries into effect the\r\neternal truths of the divine understanding. Moral\r\ntruths are like those of mathematics. And again,\r\nthere is no such thing as purely external morality:\r\nit always contains an inner content, of which the\r\nexternal act is only the manifestation. Leibniz\r\nmay thus be said to have made two discoveries, or\r\nrather re-discoveries: one, that there is a science of\r\nmorals, independent of law, custom, and positive\r\nright; the other, that the basis of both “natural”\r\nand “positive” morals is not the mere will of God,\r\nbut is reason with its content of eternal truths.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn morals the end is happiness, the means wisdom.\r\nHappiness is defined, not as an occurrence,\r\nbut as a condition, or state of being. “It is the condition\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"233\" id=\"Page_233\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nof permanent joy. This does not mean that\r\nthe joy is actually felt every moment, but that one\r\nis in the condition to enjoy whenever he thinks of\r\nit, and that, in the interval, joyfulness arises from\r\nhis activity and being.” Pleasure, however, is not a\r\nstate, but a feeling. It is the feeling of perfection,\r\nwhether in ourselves or in anything else. It does\r\nnot follow that we perceive intellectually either in\r\nwhat the perfection of the pleasant thing consists\r\nor in what way it develops perfection within us. It\r\nis enough that it be realized in feeling, so as to give\r\nus pleasure. \u003ca id=\"Perfection\"\u003ePerfection\u003c/a\u003e is defined “as increase of\r\nbeing. As sickness is, as it were, a lowering and a\r\nfalling off from health, so perfection is something\r\nwhich mounts above health. It manifests itself in\r\npower to act; for all substance consists in a certain\r\npower, and the greater the power the higher and\r\nfreer the substance. But power increases in the\r\ndegree that the many manifests itself from one and\r\nin one, while the one rules many from itself and\r\ntransforms them into self. But unity in plurality\r\nis nothing else than harmony; and from this comes\r\norder or proportion, from which proceeds beauty,\r\nand beauty awakens love. Thus it becomes evident\r\nhow happiness, pleasure, love, perfection, substance,\r\npower, freedom, harmony, proportion, and beauty\r\nare bound up in one another.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom this condensed sketch, taken from Leibniz\r\nhimself, the main features of his ethical doctrine\r\nclearly appear. When we were studying freedom\r\nwe saw that it was not so much a starting-point\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"234\" id=\"Page_234\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nof the will as its goal and ideal. We saw also\r\nthat true freedom is dependent upon knowledge,\r\nupon recognition of the eternal and universal.\r\nWhat we have here is a statement of that doctrine\r\nin terms of feeling and of will instead of knowledge.\r\nThe end of man is stated to be happiness, but the\r\nnotion of happiness is developed in such a way that\r\nit is seen to be equivalent to the Aristotelian notion\r\nof self-realization; “it is development of substance,\r\nand substance is activity.” It is the union of one and\r\nthe many; and the one, according to the invariable\r\ndoctrine of Leibniz, is the spiritual element, and the\r\nmany is the real content which gives meaning to this\r\nrational unity. Happiness thus means perfection,\r\nand perfection a completely universalized individual.\r\nThe motive toward the moral life is elsewhere stated\r\nto be love; and love is defined as interest in perfection,\r\nand hence culminates in love of God, the\r\nonly absolute perfection. It also has its source\r\nin God, as the origin of perfection; so that Leibniz\r\nsays, Whoso loves God, loves all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNatural right, as distinguished from morals, is\r\nbased upon the notion of justice, this being the\r\noutward manifestation of wisdom, or knowledge,—appreciation\r\nof the relation of actions to happiness.\r\nThe definitions given by Leibniz are as follows:\r\nJust and unjust are what are useful or harmful to\r\nthe public,—that is, to the community of spirits.\r\nThis community includes first God, then humanity,\r\nthen the state. These are so subordinated that, in\r\ncases of collision of duty, God, the universe of\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"235\" id=\"Page_235\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nrelations, comes before the profit of humanity, and\r\nthis before the state. At another time Leibniz defines\r\njustice as social virtue, and says that there are\r\nas many kinds of “right” as there are kinds of\r\nnatural communities in which happiness is an end\r\nof action. A natural community is defined as one\r\nwhich rests upon desire and the power of satisfying\r\nit, and includes three varieties,—domestic, civil,\r\nand ecclesiastic. “Right” is defined as that which\r\nsustains and develops any natural community. It\r\nis, in other words, the will for happiness united with\r\ninsight into what makes happiness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCorresponding to the three forms of the social\r\norganism (as we should now call the “natural community”),\r\nare the three kinds of \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ejus\u003c/i\u003e,—\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ejus strictum\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nequity, and piety. Each of these has its corresponding\r\nprescript. That of \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ejus strictum\u003c/i\u003e is to injure no\r\none; of equity, to render to each his own; and of\r\npiety, to make the ethical law the law of conduct.\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eJus strictum\u003c/i\u003e includes the right of war and peace.\r\nThe right of peace exists between individuals till\r\none breaks it. The right of war exists between men\r\nand things. The victory of person over thing is\r\n\u003cem\u003eproperty\u003c/em\u003e. Things thus come to possess the right\r\nof the person to whom they belong as against every\r\nother person; that is, in the right of the person to\r\nhimself as against the attacks of another (the right\r\nto peace) is included a right to his property. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eJus\r\nstrictum\u003c/i\u003e is, of course, in all cases, enforceable by\r\ncivil law and the compulsory force which accompanies\r\nit. Equity, however, reaches beyond this to\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"236\" id=\"Page_236\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nobligation in cases where there is no right of compulsion.\r\nIts law is, Be of aid to all, but to each\r\naccording to his merits and his claims. Finally\r\ncomes piety. The other two stages are limited.\r\nThe lowest is negative, it wards off harm; the second\r\naims after happiness, but only within the limits\r\nof earthly existence. That we should ourselves bear\r\nmisery, even the greatest, for the sake of others,\r\nand should subject the whole of this existence to\r\nsomething higher, cannot be proved excepting as\r\nwe regard the society, or community, of our spirits\r\nwith God. Justice with relation to God comprehends\r\nall virtues. Everything that is, is from God;\r\nand hence the law of all conduct is to use everything\r\naccording to its place in the idea of God, according\r\nto its function in the universal harmony.\r\nIt thus not only complements the other two kinds\r\nof justice but is the source of their inner ethical\r\nworth. “Strict justice” may conflict with equity.\r\nBut God effects that what is of use to the public\r\nwell-being—that is, to the universe and to humanity—shall\r\nbe of use also to the individual. Thus\r\nfrom the standpoint of God the moral is advantageous,\r\nand the immoral hurtful. Kant’s indebtedness\r\nto Leibniz will at once appear to one initiated\r\ninto the philosophy of the former.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz never worked out either his ethics or his\r\npolitical philosophy in detail; but it is evident that\r\nthey both take their origin and find their scope in\r\nthe fact of man’s relationship to God, that they\r\nare both, in fact, accounts of the methods of\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"237\" id=\"Page_237\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nrealizing a universal but not a merely formal\r\nharmony. For harmony is not, with Leibniz, an\r\nexternal arrangement, but is the very soul of being.\r\nPerfect harmony, or adaptation to the universe of\r\nrelations, is the end of the individual, and man is\r\ninformed of his progress toward this end by an inner\r\nsentiment of pleasure.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt may be added that Leibniz’s æsthetic theory,\r\nso far as developed, rests upon the same basis as his\r\nethical,—namely, upon membership in the “city\r\nof God,” or community of spiritual beings. This\r\nis implied, indeed, in a \u003ca href=\"#Perfection\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epassage already quoted\u003c/a\u003e,\r\nwhere he states the close connection of beauty with\r\nharmony and perfection. The feeling of beauty is\r\nthe recognition in feeling of an order, proportion,\r\nand harmony which are not yet intellectually descried.\r\nLeibniz illustrates by music, the dance,\r\nand architecture. This feeling of the harmonious\r\nalso becomes an impulse to produce. As perception\r\nof beauty may be regarded as unexplained, or confused,\r\nperception of truth, so creation of beauty may\r\nbe considered as undeveloped will. It is action on\r\nits way to perfect freedom, for freedom is simply\r\nactivity with explicit recognition of harmony.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe cannot do better than quote the conclusion of\r\nthe matter from Leibniz’s “Principles of Nature\r\nand of Grace,” although, in part, it repeats what\r\nwe have already learned. “There is something\r\nmore in the rational soul, or spirit, than there is in\r\nthe monad or even in the simple soul. Spirit is\r\nnot only a mirror of the universe of creatures, but\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"238\" id=\"Page_238\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nis also an image of the divine being. Spirit not\r\nonly has a perception of the works of God, but is\r\nalso capable of producing something which resembles\r\nthem, though on a small scale. To say nothing\r\nof dreams, in which we invent without trouble and\r\nwithout volition things upon which we must reflect a\r\nlong time in order to discover in our waking state,—to\r\nsay nothing of this, our soul is architectonic in\r\nvoluntary actions; and, in discovering the sciences\r\nin accordance with which God has regulated all\r\nthings (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003epondere\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003emensura\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003enumero\u003c/i\u003e), it imitates in\r\nits department and in its own world of activity\r\nthat which God does in the macrocosm. This is\r\nthe reason why spirits, entering through reason and\r\neternal truths into a kind of society with God, are\r\nmembers of the city of God,—that is, of the most\r\nperfect state, formed and governed by the best of\r\nmonarchs, in which there is no crime without punishment,\r\nand no good action without reward, and where\r\nthere is as much of virtue and of happiness as may\r\npossibly exist. And this occurs not through a disturbance\r\nof nature, as if God’s dealing with souls\r\nwere in violation of mechanical laws, but by the\r\nvery order of natural things, on account of the\r\neternal, pre-established harmony between the kingdoms\r\nof nature and grace, between God as monarch\r\nand God as architect, since nature leads up to\r\ngrace, and grace makes nature perfect in making\r\nuse of it.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo better sentences could be found with which to\r\nconclude this analysis of Leibniz. They resound\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"239\" id=\"Page_239\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nnot only with the grandeur and wide scope characteristic\r\nof his thought, but they contain his essential\r\nidea, his pre-eminent “note,”—that of the\r\nharmony of the natural and the supernatural, the\r\nmechanical and the organic. The mechanical is to\r\nLeibniz what the word signifies; it is the \u003cem\u003einstrumental\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nand this in the full meaning of the term.\r\nNature is instrumental in that it performs a function,\r\nrealizes a purpose, and instrumental in the\r\nsense that without it spirit, the organic, is an empty\r\ndream. The spiritual, on the other hand, is the\r\nmeaning, the \u003cem\u003eidea\u003c/em\u003e of nature. It perfects it, in that\r\nit makes it instrumental to itself, and thus renders\r\nit not the passive panorama of \u003cem\u003emere\u003c/em\u003e material force,\r\nbut the manifestation of living spirit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"240\" id=\"Page_240\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\u003ca id=\"Chapter_XII\"\u003eCHAPTER XII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eCRITICISM AND CONCLUSION.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"upper-case\"\u003eIn\u003c/span\u003e the exposition now completed we have in general\r\ntaken for granted the truth and coherency\r\nof Leibniz’s fundamental ideas, and have contented\r\nourselves with an account of the principles and\r\nnotions that flow from these ideas. The time has\r\ncome for retracing our steps, and for inquiring\r\nwhether the assumed premises can be thus unquestioningly\r\nadopted. This final chapter, therefore,\r\nwe shall devote to criticism of the basis of Leibniz’s\r\nphilosophy, not attempting to test it by a comparison\r\nwith other systems, but by inquiring into its\r\ninternal coherency, and by a brief account of the\r\nways in which his successors, or at least one of\r\nthem, endeavored to make right the points in which\r\nhe appeared to fail.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe fundamental contradiction in Leibniz is to be\r\nfound, I believe, between the method which he\r\nadopted—without inquiry into its validity and scope—and\r\nthe subject-matter, or perhaps better the attitude,\r\nto which he attempted to apply this method;\r\nbetween, that is to say, the scholastic formal logic\r\non the one hand and the idea of inter-relation derived\r\nfrom the development of scientific thought, on\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"241\" id=\"Page_241\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe other. Leibniz never thought of investigating\r\nthe formal logic bequeathed by scholasticism, with\r\na view to determining its adequacy as philosophic\r\nmethod. He adopted, as we have seen, the principles\r\nof identity and contradiction as sole principles\r\nof the only perfect knowledge. The type of\r\nknowledge is that which can be reduced to a series\r\nof identical propositions, whose opposite is seen to\r\nbe impossible, because self-contradictory. Only\r\nknowledge in this form can be said to be demonstrative\r\nand necessary. As against Locke he justified\r\nthe syllogistic method of the schoolmen as the\r\ntypical method of all rational truth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand, Leibniz, as we saw in the\r\nearlier chapters, had learned positively from the\r\ngrowth of science, negatively from the failures of\r\nDescartes and Spinoza, to look upon the universe\r\nas a unity of inter-related members,—as an organic\r\nunity, not a mere self-identical oneness. Failing to\r\nsee the cause of the failures of Descartes and Spinoza\r\nin precisely their adoption of the logic of\r\nidentity and contradiction as ultimate, he attempted\r\nto reconcile this method with the conception of\r\norganic activity. The result is constant conflict\r\nbetween the method and content of his philosophy,\r\nbetween its letter and its spirit. The contradiction\r\nis a twofold one. The unity of the content of his\r\nphilosophy, the conception of organism or harmony,\r\nis a unity which essentially involves difference. The\r\nunity of his method is a formal identity which excludes\r\nit. The unity, whose discovery constitutes\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"242\" id=\"Page_242\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nLeibniz’s great glory as a philosopher, is a unity of\r\nactivity, a dynamic process. The unity of formal\r\nlogic is exclusive of any mediation or process, and\r\nis essentially rigid and lifeless. The result is that\r\nLeibniz is constantly wavering (in logical result,\r\nnot of course in spirit) between two opposed errors,\r\none of which is, in reality, not different from Spinozism,\r\nin that it regards all distinction as only\r\nphenomenal and unreal, while the other is akin to\r\natomism, in that attempting to avoid the doctrine\r\nof the all-inclusive one, it does so only by supposing\r\na multitude of unrelated units, termed monads.\r\nAnd thus the harmony, which in Leibniz’s intention\r\nis the very content of reality, comes to be, in effect,\r\nan external arrangement between the one and the\r\nmany, the unity and the distinction, in themselves\r\nincapable of real relations. Such were the results\r\nof Leibniz’s failure, in Kantian language, to criticise\r\nhis categories, in Hegelian language, to develop a\r\nlogic,—the results of his assuming, without examination,\r\nthe validity of formal logic as a method of\r\ntruth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo thoroughly is Leibniz imbued with the belief\r\nin its validity, that the very conception, that of\r\nsufficient reason, which should have been the means\r\nof saving him from his contradictions, is used in\r\nsuch a way as to plunge him deeper into them.\r\nThe principle of sufficient reason may indeed be\r\nused as purely formal and external,—as equivalent\r\nto the notion that everything, no matter what, has\r\n\u003cem\u003esome\u003c/em\u003e explanation. Thus employed, it simply declares\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"243\" id=\"Page_243\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthat everything has \u003cem\u003ea\u003c/em\u003e reason, without in the\r\nleast determining the \u003cem\u003ewhat\u003c/em\u003e of that reason,—its content.\r\nThis is what we mean by calling it formal.\r\nBut this is not the way in which Leibniz conceives\r\nof it. According to him, it is not a principle of\r\nthe external connection of one finite, or phenomenal,\r\nfact with another. It is a principle in the light of\r\nwhich the whole phenomenal world is to be viewed,\r\ndeclaring that its ground and meaning are to be\r\nfound in reason, in self-conscious intelligence. As\r\nwe have seen, it is equivalent, in Leibniz’s case, to\r\nthe notion that we have no complete nor necessary\r\nknowledge of the world of scientific fact until\r\nwe have referred it to a conditioning “Supreme\r\nSpirit.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLooked at in this way, we see that the unity\r\nwhich Leibniz is positively employing is an organic\r\nunity, a unity of intelligence involving organic reference\r\nto the known world. But such a conception of\r\nsufficient reason leaves no place for the final validity\r\nof identity and non-contradiction; and therefore\r\nLeibniz, when dealing with his method, and not, as\r\nin the passages referred to, with his subject-matter,\r\ncannot leave the matter thus. To do so indeed\r\nwould have involved a complete reconstruction of\r\nhis philosophy, necessitating a derivation of all the\r\ncategories employed from intelligence itself (that is,\r\nfrom the sufficient or conditioning reason). But the\r\nbondage to scholastic method is so great that Leibniz\r\ncan see no way but to measure intelligence by\r\nthe ready-made principle of identity, and thus virtually\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"244\" id=\"Page_244\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\n(though not in purpose) to explain away the\r\nvery principle of sufficient reason. In Leibniz’s\r\nwords: “Contingent truths require an infinite\r\nanalysis which only God can carry out. Whence\r\nby him alone are they known \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e and demonstratively.\r\nFor although the reason can always be\r\nfound for some occurring state in a prior state, this\r\nreason again requires a reason, and we never arrive\r\nin the series to the ultimate reason. But this \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprogressus\r\nad infinitum\u003c/i\u003e takes (in us) the place of a\r\nsufficient reason, which can be found only outside\r\nthe series in God, on whom all its members, prior\r\nand posterior depend, rather than upon one another.\r\n\u003cem\u003eWhatever truth, therefore, is incapable of analysis,\r\nand cannot be demonstrated from its own reasons, but\r\nhas its ultimate reason and certainty only from the\r\ndivine mind, is not necessary.\u003c/em\u003e Everything that we\r\ncall truths of fact come under this head, and this is\r\nthe root of their contingency.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe sentences before the one italicized repeat\r\nwhat we have learned before, and seem to convey\r\nthe idea that the phenomenal world is that which\r\ndoes not account for itself, because not itself a self-determining\r\nreason, and which gets its ultimate explanation\r\nand ground in a self-sufficient reason,—God.\r\nBut notice the turn given to the thought with\r\nthe word “therefore.” Therefore all truth incapable\r\nof analysis,—that is, of reduction to identical propositions,\r\nwhose opposite is impossible because self-contradictory,—all\r\ntruth whose meaning depends\r\nupon not its bare identity, but upon its relation\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"245\" id=\"Page_245\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nto the very content of all intelligence, is not necessary,\r\nbut contingent. Leibniz here distinctly\r\nopposes identical truths as necessary, to truth connected\r\nwith reason as contingent. Synthetic reference\r\nto the very structure of intelligence is thus\r\nmade, not the ground of truth, but a blot upon its\r\ncompleteness and necessity. Perfect truth, it is implied\r\nin the argument, is self-identical, known by\r\nmere analysis of itself, and needs no reference to an\r\norganism of reason. The reference, therefore, to a\r\nprinciple of sufficient reason is simply a concession\r\nto the fragmentary and imperfect condition of all\r\nknowledge. Truth in itself is self-identical; but\r\nappearing to us only confusedly, we employ the\r\nidea of sufficient reason as a makeshift, by which\r\nwe refer, in a mass, all that we cannot thus reduce\r\nto identical propositions, to an intelligence, or to a\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eDeus ex machina\u003c/i\u003e which can so reduce it. This is\r\nthe lame and impotent conclusion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz’s fundamental meaning is, no doubt, a\r\ncorrect one. He means that contingency of fact is\r\nnot real, but apparent; that it exists only because\r\nof our inability to penetrate the reason which would\r\nenable us completely to account for the facts under\r\nconsideration. He \u003cem\u003emeans\u003c/em\u003e that if we could understand,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003esub specie aeternitatis\u003c/i\u003e, from the standpoint\r\nof universal intelligence, we should see every fact\r\nas necessary, as resulting from an intrinsic reason.\r\nBut so thoroughly is he fettered by the scholastic\r\nmethod—that is, the method of formal logic—that\r\nhe can conceive of this immanent and intrinsic\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"246\" id=\"Page_246\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nreason which makes every fact a truth—that is,\r\nself-evident in its necessity—only as an analytic,\r\nself-contained identity. And herein lies his contradiction:\r\nhis method obliges him to conceive of\r\nultimate intelligence as purely formal, simply as\r\nthat which does not contradict itself, while the attitude\r\nof his thought and its concrete subject-matter\r\ncompel him to think of intelligence as possessing\r\na content, as the organic unity of a system of\r\nrelations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom this contradiction flow the other contradictions\r\nof Leibniz, which we are now prepared to examine\r\nin more detail. For his ideas are so much\r\ngreater than his method that in almost every point\r\nthere seems to be contradiction. His ideas \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e\r\nmean one thing, and his ideas as interpreted by his\r\nmethod another. Take his doctrine of individuality,\r\nfor instance. To some it has appeared that the\r\ngreat defect of the Leibnizian philosophy is its individualism.\r\nSuch conceive him simply to have\r\ncarried out in his monadism the doctrine of the individual\r\nisolated from the universe to its logical\r\nconclusions, and thereby to have rendered it absurd.\r\nIn a certain sense, the charge is true. The monad,\r\naccording to the oft-repeated statement, has no intercourse\r\nwith the rest of the universe. It really excludes\r\nall else. It acts as if nothing but itself and\r\nGod were in existence. That is to say, the monad,\r\nbeing the self-identical, must shut out all intrinsic\r\nor real relations with other substances. Such relations\r\nwould involve a differentiating principle for\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"247\" id=\"Page_247\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhich Leibniz’s logic has no place. Each monad\r\nis, therefore, an isolated universe. But such a result\r\nhas no value for Leibniz. He endeavors to\r\ncorrect it by the thought that each monad \u003cem\u003eideally\u003c/em\u003e\r\nincludes the whole universe by mirroring it. And\r\nthen to reconcile the real exclusion and the ideal inclusion,\r\nhe falls back on a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eDeus ex machina\u003c/i\u003e who\r\narranges a harmony between them, foreign to the\r\nintrinsic nature of each. Leibniz’s individualism,\r\nit is claimed, thus makes of his philosophy a synthesis,\r\nor rather a juxtaposition, of mutually contradictory\r\npositions, each of which appears true\r\nonly as long as we do not attempt to think it together\r\nwith the other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is, no doubt, truth in this representation.\r\nBut a more significant way of stating the matter is,\r\nI think, that Leibniz’s defect is not in his individualism,\r\nbut in the defect of his conception of the\r\nindividual. His individualism is more apparent\r\nthan real. It is a negative principle, and negative\r\nin the sense of \u003cem\u003eprivative\u003c/em\u003e. The individuality of the\r\nmonad is due to its incompleteness, to its imperfections.\r\nIt is really matter which makes monads\r\nmutually impenetrable or exclusive; it is matter\r\nwhich distinguishes them from God, and thus from\r\none another. Without the material element they\r\nwould be lost in an undistinguished identity with\r\nGod, the supreme substance. But matter, it must\r\nbe remembered, is passivity; and since activity is\r\nreality, or substance, matter is unsubstantial and\r\nunreal. The same results from a consideration of\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"248\" id=\"Page_248\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nknowledge. Matter is always correlative to confused\r\nideas. With the clearing up of knowledge,\r\nwith making it rational, matter must disappear, so\r\nthat to God, who is wholly reason, it must entirely\r\nvanish. But this view varies only in words from\r\nthat of Spinoza, to whom it is the imagination, as\r\ndistinguished from the intellect, that is the source\r\nof particular and finite objects.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is perhaps in his \u003ccite lang=\"fr\"\u003eTheodicée\u003c/cite\u003e, in the treatment\r\nof the problem of evil, that his implicit Spinozism,\r\nor denial of individuality, comes out most clearly.\r\nThat evil is negative, or privative, and consists in\r\nthe finitude of the creature, is the result of the discussion.\r\nWhat is this except to assert the unreality,\r\nthe merely privative character, of the finite, and to\r\nresolve all into God? To take one instance out\r\nof many: he compares inertia to the original limitation\r\nof creatures, and says that as inertia is the\r\nobstacle to the complete mobility of bodies, so privation,\r\nor lack, constitutes the essence of the imperfection,\r\nor evil, of creatures. His metaphor is of\r\nboats in the current of a river, where the heavier\r\none goes more slowly, owing to inertia. The force\r\nof the current, which is the same to all, and which\r\nis positive, suffering no diminution, is comparable\r\nto the activity of God, which also is perfect and\r\npositive. As the current is the positive source of\r\nall the movements of the bodies, and is in no way\r\nresponsible for the retardation of some boats, so\r\nGod is the source only of activities,—the perfections\r\nof his creatures. “As the inertia of the boat\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"249\" id=\"Page_249\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nis the cause of its slowness, so the limitations of its\r\nreceptivity are the cause of the defects found in the\r\naction of creatures.” Individuality is thus reduced\r\nto mere limitation; and the unlimited, the real which\r\nincludes all reality, is God. We are thus placed in\r\na double difficulty. This notion of an all-inclusive\r\none contradicts the reality of mutually exclusive\r\nmonads; and we have besides the characteristic difficulty\r\nof Spinoza,—how, on the basis of this unlimited,\r\nself-identical substance, to account for even the\r\nappearance of finitude, plurality and individuality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz’s fundamental defect may thus be said to be\r\nthat, while he realized, as no one before him had done,\r\nthe importance of the conception of the \u003cem\u003enegative\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nhe was yet unable to grasp the significance of the\r\nnegative, was led to interpret it as merely privative\r\nor defective, and thus, finally, to surrender the very\r\nidea. Had not his method, his presupposition\r\nregarding analytic identity, bound him so completely\r\nin its toils, his clear perception that it was\r\nthe negative element that differentiated God from\r\nthe universe, intelligence from matter, might have\r\nbrought him to a general anticipation not only of\r\nKant, but of Hegel. But instead of transforming\r\nhis method by this conception of negation, he allowed\r\nhis assumed (\u003ci\u003ei. e.\u003c/i\u003e, dogmatic) method to evacuate\r\nhis conception of its significance. It was\r\nHegel who was really sufficiently in earnest with\r\nthe idea to read it into the very notion of intelligence\r\nas a constituent organic element, not as a\r\nmere outward and formal limitation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"250\" id=\"Page_250\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eWe have already referred to the saying of Leibniz\r\nthat the monad acts as if nothing existed but God\r\nand itself. The same idea is sometimes expressed\r\nby saying that God alone is the immediate or direct\r\nobject of the monad. Both expressions mean that,\r\nwhile the monad excludes all other monads, such is\r\nnot the case in its relation to God, but that it has\r\nan organic relation with him. We cannot keep\r\nfrom asking whether there is not another aspect\r\nof the contradiction here. How is it possible for\r\nthe monad so to escape from its isolation that it\r\ncan have communication with God more than with\r\nother substances? Or if it can have communication\r\nwith God, why cannot it equally bear real\r\nrelations of community with other monads? And\r\nthe answer is found in Leibniz’s contradictory conceptions\r\nof God. Of these conceptions there are\r\nat least three. When Leibniz is emphasizing his\r\nmonadic theory, with its aspects of individuality\r\nand exclusion, God is conceived as the highest\r\nmonad, as one in the series of monads, differing\r\nfrom the others only in the degree of its activity.\r\nHe is the “monad of monads”; the most complete,\r\nactive, and individualized of all. But it is evident\r\nthat in this sense there can be no more intercourse\r\nbetween God and a monad than there is between\r\none monad and another. Indeed, since God is\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003epurus actus\u003c/i\u003e without any passivity, it may be said\r\nthat there is, if possible, less communication in this\r\ncase than in the others. He is, as Leibniz says, what\r\na monad without matter would be, “a deserter from\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"251\" id=\"Page_251\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe general order.” He is the acme of isolation.\r\nThis, of course, is the extreme development of the\r\n“individual” side of Leibniz’s doctrine, resulting in\r\na most pronounced atomism. Leibniz seems dimly\r\nconscious of this difficulty, and thus by the side of\r\nthis notion of God he puts another. According to\r\nit, God is the source of all monads. The monads\r\nare not created by a choice of the best of all possible\r\nworlds, as his official theology teaches, but are the\r\nradiations of his divinity. Writing to Bayle, Leibniz\r\nexpresses himself as follows: “The nature of\r\nsubstance consists in an active force of definite character,\r\nfrom which phenomena proceed in orderly\r\nsuccession. This force was originally received by,\r\nand is indeed preserved to, every substance by the\r\ncreator of all things, from whom all \u003cem\u003eactual forces\r\nor perfections emanate by a sort of continual creation\u003c/em\u003e.”\r\nAnd in his Monadology he says: All “the\r\ncreated or derived monads are the productions of\r\nGod, and are born, as it were, \u003cem\u003eby the continual fulgurations\r\nof the divinity from instant to instant\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nbounded by the receptivity of the creature to which\r\nit is essential to be limited.” What has become of\r\nthe doctrine of monads (although the word is retained)\r\nit would be difficult to say. There is certainly\r\nno individual distinction now between the\r\ncreated monads and God, and it is impossible to see\r\nwhy there should be individual distinctions between\r\nthe various created monads. They appear to be all\r\nalike, as modes of the one comprehensive substance.\r\nHere we have the universal, or “identity,” side of\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"252\" id=\"Page_252\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nLeibniz’s philosophy pushed to its logical outcome,—the\r\ndoctrine of pantheism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHis third doctrine of God is really a unity of the\r\ntwo previous. It is the doctrine that God is the\r\nharmony of the monads,—neither one among them\r\nnor one made up of them, but their organic unity.\r\nThis doctrine is nowhere expressly stated in words\r\n(unless it be when he says that “God alone constitutes\r\nthe relation and community of substances”),\r\nbut it runs through his whole system. According\r\nto this, God \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e the pre-established harmony. This\r\nconception, like that of harmony, may have either\r\na mechanical interpretation (according to which God\r\nis the artificial, external point of contact of intelligence\r\nand reality, in themselves opposed) or an organic\r\nmeaning, according to which God \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e the unity\r\nof intelligence and reality. On this interpretation\r\nalone does the saying that God is the only immediate\r\nobject of the monads have sense. It simply\r\nstates that the apparent dualism between intelligence\r\nand its object which is found in the world\r\nis overcome in God; that the distinction between\r\nthem is not the ultimate fact, but exists in and for\r\nthe sake of a unity which transcends the difference.\r\nAccording to this view, the opposition between\r\nideal inclusion and real exclusion vanishes.\r\nGod \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e the harmony of the real and ideal, not a\r\nmere arrangement for bringing them to an understanding\r\nwith one another. Individuality and\r\nuniversality are no longer opposed conceptions,\r\nneeding a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003etertium quid\u003c/i\u003e to relate them, but are\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"253\" id=\"Page_253\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\norganic factors of reality, and this, at the same\r\ntime, is intelligence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut admitting this conception as stating the implicit\r\nintention of Leibniz, the relation of monads to\r\none another is wholly different from that which\r\nLeibniz gives. And to this point we now come.\r\nIf in God, the absolute, the real and the ideal are\r\none, it is impossible that in substances, which have\r\ntheir being and significance only in relation to God,\r\nor this unity, the real and the ideal should be so\r\nwholly separated as Leibniz conceives.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLeibniz’s conception relative to this is, as we have\r\nseen, that there is no physical \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003einfluxus\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecommercium\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nof monads, but ideal consensus. \u003cem\u003eReally\u003c/em\u003e each\r\nshuts out every other; \u003cem\u003eideally\u003c/em\u003e, or representatively,\r\nit includes every other. His positive thought in the\r\nmatter is that a complete knowledge of any portion\r\nof the universe would involve a perfect knowledge\r\nof the whole, so organic is the structure of the universe.\r\nEach monad sums up the past history of the\r\nworld, and is big with its future. This is the conception\r\nof inter-relation; the conception of all in\r\none, and one as a member, not a part of a whole.\r\nIt is the conception which Leibniz brought to birth,\r\nthe conception of the thorough unity of the world.\r\nIn this notion there is no denial of community of\r\nrelation; it is rather the culmination of relation.\r\nThere is no isolation. But according to his presupposed\r\nlogic, individuality can mean only identity\r\nexcluding distinction,—identity without intrinsic relation,\r\nand, as Leibniz is bound at all hazards to save\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"254\" id=\"Page_254\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe notion of individuality, he is obliged to think\r\nof this inter-relation as only ideal, as the result of\r\na predetermined tendency given at its creation to\r\nthe self-identical monad by God. But of course\r\nLeibniz does not escape the contradiction between\r\nidentity and distinction, between individuality and\r\nuniversality, by this means. He only transfers it\r\nto another realm. In the relation of the monad to\r\nGod the diversity of its content, the real or universal\r\nelement, is harmonized with the identity of its law,\r\nits ideal or individual factor. But if these elements\r\ndo not conflict here, why should they in the relation\r\nof the monads to one another? Either there is\r\nalready an immanent harmony between the individual\r\nand universal, and no external arrangement\r\nis needed to bring it about, or there is no such\r\nharmony, and therefore no relation possible between\r\nGod and the individual monad. One side\r\nof the Leibnizian philosophy renders the other side\r\nimpossible.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnother consequence of Leibniz’s treatment of\r\nthe negative as merely limitative is that he can find\r\nno distinction, excepting of degree, between nature\r\nand spirit. Such a conception is undoubtedly in\r\nadvance of the Cartesian dualism, which regards\r\nthem as opposed realms \u003cem\u003ewithout\u003c/em\u003e any relation; but\r\nit may be questioned whether it is as adequate a\r\nview as that which regards them as distinct realms\r\n\u003cem\u003eon account\u003c/em\u003e of relation. At all events, it leads to\r\nconfusion in Leibniz’s treatment of both material\r\nobjects and self-conscious personalities. In the\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"255\" id=\"Page_255\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nformer case his method of escape is a metaphor,—that\r\nobjects apparently material are full of souls, or\r\nspirits. This may mean that the material is \u003cem\u003emerely\u003c/em\u003e\r\nmaterial only when considered in implicit abstraction\r\nfrom the intelligence which conditions it, that\r\nthe material, in truth, is constituted by some of the\r\nrelations which in their completeness make up\r\nintelligence. This at least bears a consistent meaning.\r\nBut it is not monadism; it is not the doctrine\r\nthat matter differs from spirit only in degree: it is\r\nthe doctrine that they differ in kind, as the conditioned\r\nfrom the conditioning. At times, however,\r\nLeibniz attempts to carry out his monadism literally,\r\nand the result is that he conceives matter as being\r\nitself endowed, in some unexplained way, with\r\nsouls, or since this implies a dualism between matter\r\nand soul, of being made up, composed, of souls.\r\nBut as he is obliged to explain that this composition\r\nis not spatial, or physical, but only ideal, this doctrine\r\ntends to resolve itself into the former. And\r\nthus we end where we began,—with a metaphor.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand there is a wavering treatment\r\nof the nature of spirit. At times it is treated as\r\nprecisely on a level in kind with the monads that\r\n“compose” matter, differing only in the greater\r\ndegree of its activity. But at other times it is\r\ncertainly represented as standing on another plane.\r\n“The difference between those monads which express\r\nthe world with consciousness and those which express\r\nit unintelligently is as great as the difference\r\nbetween a mirror and one who sees.” If Leibniz\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"256\" id=\"Page_256\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nmeans what he seems to imply by these words, it\r\nis plainly asserted that only the spiritual being is\r\nworthy of being called a monad, or individual, at all,\r\nand that material being is simply a dependent manifestation\r\nof spirit. Again he says: “Not all entelechies\r\nare, like our soul, \u003cem\u003eimages of God\u003c/em\u003e,—being\r\nmade as members of a society or state of which he is\r\nchief,—but all are \u003cem\u003eimages of the universe\u003c/em\u003e.” In this\r\ndistinction between self-conscious beings as images\r\nof God and unconscious monads as images of the\r\nuniverse there is again implied a difference of kind.\r\nThat something is the image of the universe need\r\nmean only that it cannot be explained without its\r\nrelations to the universe. To say that something\r\nis the image of God, must mean that it is itself\r\nspiritual and self-conscious. God alone is reason\r\nand activity. He alone has his reality in himself.\r\nSelf-conscious beings, since members of a community\r\nwith him, must participate in this reality in a\r\nway different in kind from those things which, at\r\nmost, are only substances or objects, not subjects.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNor do the difficulties cease here. If matter be\r\nconceived, not as implied in the relations by which\r\nreason is realized in constituting the universe, but as\r\nitself differing from reason only in degree, it is\r\nimpossible to account for its existence. Why should\r\na less degree of perfection exist than is necessary?\r\nWhy should not the perfect activity, God, complete\r\nthe universe in himself? Leibniz’s answer that an\r\ninfinity of monads multiplies his existence so far as\r\npossible, may hold indeed of other spirits, who mirror\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"257\" id=\"Page_257\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nhim and live in one divine society, but is utterly inapplicable\r\nto those which fail to image him. Their\r\nexistence, as material, is merely privative; it is\r\nmerely the absence of the activity found in conscious\r\nspirit. How can this deprivation, this limitation,\r\nincrease in any way the harmony and perfection of\r\nthe universe? Leibniz’s theory of the negative, in\r\nfine, compels him to put nature and spirit on the\r\nsame level, as differing only in degree. This, so\r\nfar from giving nature a reality, results in its being\r\nswallowed up in spirit, not as necessarily distinct\r\nfrom it and yet one with it, but as absorbed in it,\r\nsince the apparent difference is only privative. Nor\r\ndoes the theory insure the reality of spirit. This,\r\nsince one in kind with matter, is swallowed up\r\nalong with it in the one substance, which is positive\r\nand self-identical,—in effect, the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eDeus sive\r\nNatura\u003c/i\u003e of Spinoza.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have to see that this contradiction on the side\r\nof existence has its correlate on the side of knowledge,\r\nand our examination of this fundamental deficiency\r\nin Leibniz is ended. Sensation is on the\r\nside of intelligence what matter is on the side of\r\nreality. It is confused knowledge, as matter is\r\nimperfect activity or reality. Knowledge is perfect\r\nonly when it is seen to be necessary, and by “necessary”\r\nis meant that whose opposite is impossible, or\r\ninvolves contradiction. In spite, therefore, of Leibniz’s\r\nthorough conviction that “matters of fact”—the\r\nsubject-matter of physical science—are not arbitrary,\r\nhe is yet obliged finally to agree with Locke\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"258\" id=\"Page_258\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthat there is no certainty to be found in such knowledge,\r\neither as a whole or in any of its details. The\r\nelement of sensation, of confused knowledge, cannot\r\nbe eliminated. Hence it must always be open to any\r\none to object that it is only on account of this imperfect\r\nfactor of our knowledge that there appears\r\nto be a physical world at all, that the external\r\nworld is an illusion produced by our sensations.\r\nAnd Leibniz himself, while claiming that the world\r\nof fact, as opposed to the realm of relations,\r\npossesses \u003cem\u003epractical\u003c/em\u003e reality, is obliged to admit that\r\n\u003cem\u003emetaphysically\u003c/em\u003e it may be only an orderly dream.\r\nThe fact is that Leibniz unconsciously moves in\r\nthe same circle, with relation to sensation and the\r\nmaterial world, that confines Spinoza with regard\r\nto imagination and particular multiple existences.\r\nSpinoza explains the latter from that imperfection\r\nof our intelligence which leads us to imagine rather\r\nthan to think. But he accounts for the existence\r\nof imagination, when he comes to treat that, as\r\ndue to the plurality of particular things. So Leibniz,\r\nwhen an account of the existence of matter\r\nis demanded of him, refers to confused knowledge\r\nas its source, while in turn he explains the latter,\r\nor sensation, from the material element which sets\r\nbounds to the activity of spirit. Leibniz seems\r\nindeed, to advance upon Spinoza in admitting the\r\nreality of the negative factor in differentiating the\r\npurely self-identical, but he gives up what he\r\nhas thus gained by interpreting the negation as\r\npassivity, or mere deprivation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"259\" id=\"Page_259\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003eTo sum up, it may be doubted whether we have\r\nmore to learn from Leibniz’s successes or from his\r\nfailures. Leibniz’s positive significance for us is\r\nin his clear recognition of the problems of modern\r\nphilosophy, and in his perception of the isolated\r\nelements of their solution. His negative significance\r\nis in his clinging to a method which allowed\r\nhim only to juxtapose these elements without forming\r\nof them a true synthesis. There are a number\r\nof sides from which we may state Leibniz’s realization\r\nof the problem. Perhaps that which distinguishes\r\nLeibniz most clearly from Locke is their respective\r\ntreatments of the relation of the physical\r\nto the spiritual, or, as the question presented itself\r\nmainly to them, of the “natural” to the “supernatural.”\r\nTo Locke the supernatural was strictly\r\nmiraculous; it was, from our standpoint, mere\r\npower, or will. It might indeed be rational, but\r\nthis reason was incapable of being apprehended by\r\nus. Its distinction from the finite was so great\r\nthat it could be conceived only as something preceding\r\nand succeeding the finite in time, and meanwhile\r\nas intercalating itself arbitrarily here and\r\nthere into the finite; as, for example, in the relation\r\nof soul and body, in the production of\r\nsensation, etc. In a word, Locke thought that\r\nthe ends of philosophy, and with it of religion\r\nand morals, could be attained only by a complete\r\nseparation of the “natural” and the “supernatural.”\r\nLeibniz, on the other hand, conceived the aim of\r\nphilosophy to be the demonstration of their harmony.\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"260\" id=\"Page_260\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nThis is evidenced by his treatment of the\r\nrelations of the infinite and finite, of matter and\r\nspirit, of mechanical and final causation. And he\r\nfound the sought-for harmony in the fact that the\r\nspiritual is the reason, purpose, and function of\r\nthe natural. The oft-quoted words of Lotze express\r\nthe thought of Leibniz: “The mechanical\r\nis unbounded in range, but is subordinate in value.”\r\nWe cannot find some things that occur physically,\r\nand others that occur supernaturally; everything\r\nthat occurs has its sufficient mechanical antecedents,\r\nbut all that occurs has its significance, its purpose,\r\nin something that does not occur, but that eternally\r\nis—Reason. The mechanical and the spiritual are\r\nnot realms which here and there come into outward\r\ncontact. They are related as the conditioned\r\nand the conditioning. That, and not the idea of an\r\nartificial \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003emodus vivendi\u003c/i\u003e, is the true meaning of the\r\npre-established harmony.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn other words, Leibniz’s great significance for us\r\nis the fact that, although he accepted in good faith,\r\nand indeed as himself a master in its methods, the\r\nresults and principles of physical science, he remained\r\na teleological idealist of the type of Aristotle.\r\nBut I have not used the right words. It\r\nwas not in spite of his acceptance of the scientific\r\nview of the world that he retained his faith in\r\nthe primacy of purpose and reason. On the contrary,\r\nhe was an idealist because of his science,\r\nbecause only by the idea of an all-conditioning\r\nspiritual activity could he account for and make\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"261\" id=\"Page_261\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nvalid scientific conceptions; he was a teleologist,\r\nbecause natural processes, with their summing up\r\nin the notion of causality, were meaningless except\r\nas manifesting an immanent purpose.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are other more technical ways of stating\r\nthe bearing of Leibniz’s work. We may say that\r\nhe realized that the problem of philosophy consisted\r\nin giving due value to the notions of individuality\r\nand universality, of identity and difference,\r\nor of the real and the ideal. In developing these\r\nideas, however, we should only be repeating what has\r\nalready been said, and so we may leave the matter\r\nhere. On the negative side we need only recall what\r\nwas said a few pages back regarding the incompatibility\r\nof Leibniz’s method—the scholastic formal\r\nlogic—with the content of his philosophy. The\r\nattempt to find a formal criterion of truth was\r\nhopeless; it was worse than fruitless, for it led to\r\nsuch an interpretation of concrete truths as to\r\ndeprive them of their significance and as to land\r\nLeibniz in involved contradictions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo write a complete account of the influence of\r\nLeibniz’s philosophy would be too large a task for\r\nthese pages. If we were to include under this\r\nhead all the ramifications of thought to which\r\nLeibniz stimulated, directly and indirectly, either\r\nby stating truths which some one worked out or\r\nby stating errors which incited some one to new\r\npoints of view, we should have to sketch German\r\nphilosophy since his time,—and not only the professional\r\nphilosophy, but those wide aspects of\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"262\" id=\"Page_262\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nthought which were reflected in Herder, Lessing,\r\nand Goethe. It is enough to consider him as the\r\nforerunner of Kant. It has become so customary to\r\nrepresent Kant as working wholly on the problem\r\nwhich Hume presented, that his great indebtedness\r\nto Leibniz is overlooked. Because Hume aroused\r\nKant from his dogmatic slumbers, it is supposed\r\nthat Kant threw off the entire influence of the\r\nLeibnizian thought as vain dreams of his sleep.\r\nSuch a representation is one-sided. It is truer to\r\nstate that Hume challenged Kant to discover the\r\nmethod by which he could justify the results of\r\nLeibniz. In this process, the results, no doubt,\r\ntook on a new form: results are always relative\r\nto method; but Kant never lost sight of the results.\r\nIn the main, he accepted the larger features\r\nof the Leibnizian conclusions, and, taught by\r\nHume of the insufficiency of the method that Leibniz\r\nfollowed, searched for a method which should\r\nguarantee them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis aspect of Kant appears more fully in his\r\nlesser and somewhat controversial writings than in\r\nhis classic works: and this, no doubt, is one reason\r\nthat his indebtedness is so often overlooked. His\r\nclose relation to Leibniz appears most definitely in\r\nhis \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003ebrochure\u003c/i\u003e entitled “Concerning a Discovery which\r\nrenders Unnecessary all Critique of Pure Reason.”\r\nA Wolffian, Eberhard by name, had “made the discovery”\r\n(to use Kant’s words) “that the Leibnizian\r\nphilosophy contained a critique of reason just as\r\nwell as the modern, and accordingly contained\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"263\" id=\"Page_263\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\neverything that is true in the latter, and much else\r\nin addition.” In his reply to this writing, Kant\r\ntakes the position that those who claimed to be\r\nLeibnizians simply repeated the words of Leibniz\r\nwithout penetrating into his spirit, and that consequently\r\nthey misrepresented him on every important\r\npoint. He, Kant, on the other hand, making\r\nno claim to use the terminology of Leibniz, was his\r\ntrue continuator, since he had only changed the\r\ndoctrine of the latter so as to make it conform\r\nto the true intent of Leibniz, by removing its self-contradictions.\r\nHe closes: “‘The Critique of\r\nPure Reason’ may be regarded as the real apology\r\nfor Leibniz, even against his own professed\r\nfollowers.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eKant, in particular, names three points in which\r\nhe is the true follower of Leibniz. The professed\r\ndisciples of the latter insisted that the law of\r\nsufficient reason was an objective law, a law of\r\nnature. But, says Kant, it is so notorious, so self-evident,\r\nthat no one can make a new discovery\r\nthrough this principle, that Leibniz can have meant\r\nit only as subjective. “For what does it mean to\r\nsay that over and above the principle of contradiction\r\nanother principle must be employed? It\r\nmeans this: that, according to the principle of contradiction,\r\nonly that can be known which is already\r\ncontained in the notion of the object; if anything\r\nmore is to be known, it must be sought through the\r\nuse of a special principle, distinct from that of\r\ncontradiction. Since this last kind of knowledge\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"264\" id=\"Page_264\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nis that of synthetic principles, Leibniz means just\r\nthis: besides the principle of contradiction, or that\r\nof analytic judgments, there must be another, that\r\nof sufficient reason, for synthetic judgments. He\r\nthus pointed out, in a new and remarkable manner,\r\nthat certain investigations in metaphysics were still\r\nto be made.” In other words, Kant, by his distinction\r\nof analytic and synthetic judgments, with\r\ntheir respective principles and spheres, carried out\r\nthe idea of Leibniz regarding the principles of\r\ncontradiction and sufficient reason.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe second point concerns the relation of monads\r\nto material bodies. Eberhard, like the other professed\r\nLeibnizians, interpreted Leibniz as saying\r\nthat corporeal bodies, as composite, are actually\r\nmade up out of monads, as simple. Kant, on the\r\nother hand, saw clearly that Leibniz was not thinking\r\nof a relation of composition, but of condition.\r\n“He did not mean the material world, but the substrate,\r\nthe intellectual world which lies in the idea\r\nof reason, and in which everything must be thought\r\nas consisting of simple substances.” Eberhard’s\r\nprocess, he says, is to begin with sense-phenomena,\r\nto find a simple element as a part of the sense-perceptions,\r\nand then to present this simple element\r\nas if it were spiritual and equivalent to the monad\r\nof Leibniz. Kant claims to follow the thought of\r\nLeibniz in regarding the simple not as an element\r\n\u003cem\u003ein\u003c/em\u003e the sensuous, but as something super-sensuous,\r\nthe \u003cem\u003eground\u003c/em\u003e of the sensuous. Leibniz’s mistake was\r\nthat, not having worked out clearly the respective\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"265\" id=\"Page_265\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nlimits of the principles of identity and of sufficient\r\nreason, he supposed that we had a direct intellectual\r\nintuition of this super-sensuous, when in reality\r\nit is unknowable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe third group of statements concerns the\r\nprinciple of pre-established harmony. “Is it possible,”\r\nasks Kant, “that Leibniz meant by this\r\ndoctrine to assert the mere coincidence of two substances\r\nwholly independent of each other by nature,\r\nand incapable through their own force of being\r\nbrought into community?” And his answer is\r\nthat what Leibniz really implied was not a harmony\r\nbetween independent things, but a harmony between\r\nmodes of knowing, between sense on the one hand\r\nand understanding on the other. The “Critique of\r\nPure Reason” carried the discussion farther by\r\npointing out its grounds; namely, that, without the\r\nunity of sense and understanding, no experience\r\nwould be possible. \u003cem\u003eWhy\u003c/em\u003e there should be this harmony,\r\n\u003cem\u003ewhy\u003c/em\u003e we should have experience, this question\r\nit is impossible to answer, says Kant,—adding that\r\nLeibniz confessed as much when he called it a\r\n“pre-established” harmony, thus not explaining it,\r\nbut only referring it to a highest cause. That\r\nLeibniz really means a harmony within intelligence,\r\nnot a harmony of things by themselves, is made\r\nmore clear, according to Kant, from the fact that\r\nit is applied also to the relation between the kingdom\r\nof nature and of grace, of final and of efficient\r\ncauses. Here the harmony is clearly not between\r\ntwo independently existing \u003cem\u003eexternal things\u003c/em\u003e, but between\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"266\" id=\"Page_266\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhat flows from our notions of nature (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eNaturbegriffe\u003c/i\u003e)\r\nand of freedom (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eFreiheitsbegriffe\u003c/i\u003e); that\r\nis, between two distinct powers and principles\r\n\u003cem\u003ewithin us\u003c/em\u003e,—an agreement which can be explained\r\nonly through the idea of an intelligent cause of the\r\nworld.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we review these points in succession, the influence\r\nof Leibniz upon Kant becomes more marked.\r\nAs to the first one, it is well known that Kant’s\r\nphilosophy is based upon, and revolves within, the\r\ndistinction of analytic and synthetic judgments; and\r\nthis distinction Kant clearly refers to the Leibnizian\r\ndistinction between the principles of contradiction\r\nand of sufficient reason, or of identity and differentiation.\r\nIt is not meant that Kant came to this\r\nthought through the definitions of Leibniz; on the\r\ncontrary, Kant himself refers it to Hume’s distinction\r\nbetween matters of fact and relations of\r\nideas. But when Kant had once generalized the\r\nthought of Hume, it fell at once, as into ready\r\nprepared moulds, into the categories of Leibniz.\r\nHe never escapes from the Leibnizian distinction.\r\nIn his working of it out consists his greatness as\r\nthe founder of modern thought; from his acceptance\r\nof it as ultimate result his contradictions.\r\nThat is to say, Kant did not merely receive the\r\nvague idea of sufficient reason: he so connected it\r\nwith what he learned from Hume that he transformed\r\nit into the idea of synthesis, and proceeded\r\nto work out the conception of synthesis in the\r\nvarious notions of the understanding, or categories,\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"267\" id=\"Page_267\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nas applicable to the material of sense. What\r\nLeibniz bequeathed him was the undefined idea\r\nthat knowledge of matters of fact rests upon the\r\nprinciple of sufficient reason. What Kant did with\r\nthis inheritance was to identify the wholly vague\r\nidea of sufficient reason with the notion that every\r\nfact of experience rests upon necessary synthetic\r\nconnection,—that is, connection according to notions\r\nof understanding with other facts,—and to determine,\r\nso far as he could, the various forms of synthesis,\r\nor of sufficient reason. With Leibniz the\r\nprinciple remained essentially infertile, because it\r\nwas the mere notion of the ultimate reference of\r\nexperience to understanding. In the hands of\r\nKant, it became the instrument of revolutionizing\r\nphilosophy, because Kant showed the articulate\r\nmembers of understanding by which experience\r\nis constituted, and described them in the act of\r\nconstituting.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo much for his working out of the thought. But\r\non the other hand, Kant never transcended the absoluteness\r\nof the distinction between the principles\r\nof synthesis and analysis, of sufficient reason and\r\ncontradiction. The result was that he regarded the\r\nsynthetic principle as the principle only of our knowledge,\r\nwhile perfect knowledge he still considered to\r\nfollow the law of identity, of mere analysis. He\r\nworked out the factor of negation, of differentiation,\r\ncontained in the notion of synthesis, but limited it\r\nto synthesis upon material of sense, presupposing\r\nthat there is another kind of knowledge, not limited\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"268\" id=\"Page_268\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nto sense, not depending upon the synthetic principle,\r\nbut resting upon the principle of contradiction,\r\nor analysis, and that this kind is the type, the\r\nnorm, of the only perfect knowledge. In other\r\nwords, while admitting the synthetic principle of\r\ndifferentiation as a necessary element within \u003cem\u003eour\u003c/em\u003e\r\nknowledge, he held that on account of this element\r\nour knowledge is limited to the phenomenal realm.\r\nLeibniz’s error was in supposing that the pure principles\r\nof the logical understanding, resting on contradiction,\r\ncould give \u003cem\u003eus\u003c/em\u003e knowledge of the noumenal\r\nworld; his truth was in supposing that only by such\r\nprinciples \u003cem\u003ecould\u003c/em\u003e they be known. Thus, in substance,\r\nKant. Like Leibniz, in short, he failed to\r\ntranscend the absoluteness of the value of the scholastic\r\nmethod; but he so worked out another and\r\nsynthetic method,—the \u003cem\u003edevelopment\u003c/em\u003e of the idea of\r\nsufficient reason,—that he made it necessary for\r\nhis successors to transcend it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe second point concerns the relations of the\r\nsensuous and the super-sensuous. Here, besides\r\nsetting right the ordinary misconception of Leibniz,\r\nKant did nothing but render him consistent with\r\nhimself. Leibniz attempted to prove the existence\r\nof God, as we have seen, by the principles both of\r\nsufficient reason and contradiction. Kant denies the\r\nvalidity of the proof by either method. God is the\r\nsufficient cause, or reason, of the contingent sense\r\nworld. But since Leibniz admits that this contingent\r\nworld may, after all, be but a dream, how shall\r\nwe rise from it to the notion of God? It is not\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"269\" id=\"Page_269\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nour dreams that demonstrate to us the existence of\r\nreality. Or, again, sense-knowledge is confused\r\nknowledge. How shall this knowledge, by hypothesis\r\nimperfect, guarantee to us the existence of a\r\nperfect being? On the other hand, since the synthetic\r\nprinciple, or that of sufficient reason, \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e necessary\r\nto give us knowledge of matters of fact, the\r\nprinciple of contradiction, while it may give us a\r\nconsistent and even necessary notion of a supreme\r\nbeing, cannot give this notion reality. Leibniz,\r\nwhile admitting, with regard to all other matters\r\nof fact, that the principles of formal logic can give\r\nno unconditional knowledge, yet supposes that,\r\nwith regard to the one unconditional reality, they\r\nare amply sufficient. Kant but renders him self-consistent\r\non this point.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is, however, with regard to the doctrine of\r\npre-established harmony that Kant’s large measure\r\nof indebtedness to Leibniz is most apt to be overlooked.\r\nKant’s claim that Leibniz himself meant\r\nthe doctrine in a subjective sense (that is, of a\r\nharmony between powers in our own intelligence)\r\nrather than objective (or between things out of\r\nrelation to intelligence) seems, at first sight, to go\r\nfar beyond the mark. However, when we recall\r\nthat to Leibniz the sense world is only the confused\r\nside of rational thought, there is more truth in Kant’s\r\nsaying than appears at this first sight. The harmony\r\nis between sense and reason. But it may at\r\nleast be said without qualification that Kant only\r\ntranslated into subjective terms, terms of intelligence,\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"270\" id=\"Page_270\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhat appears in Leibniz as objective. This\r\nis not the place to go into the details of Kant’s conception\r\nof the relation of the material to the psychical,\r\nof the body and the soul. We may state,\r\nhowever, in his own words, that “the question is\r\nno longer as to the possibility of the association\r\nof the soul with other known and foreign substances\r\noutside it, but as to the connection of the presentations\r\nof inner sense with the modifications of our external\r\nsensibility.” It is a question, in short, of the\r\nharmony of two modes of our own presentation, not\r\nof the harmony of two independent things. And\r\nKant not only thus deals with the fact of harmony,\r\nbut he admits, as its \u003cem\u003epossible\u003c/em\u003e source, just what Leibniz\r\nclaims to be its \u003cem\u003eactual\u003c/em\u003e source; namely, some one\r\nunderlying reality, which Leibniz calls the monad,\r\nbut to which Kant gives no name. “I can well\r\nsuppose,” says Kant, “that the substance to which\r\nthrough external sense extension is attributed, is\r\nalso the subject of the presentations given to us by\r\nits inner sense: \u003cem\u003ethus that which in one respect is\r\ncalled material being would be in another respect\r\nthinking being\u003c/em\u003e.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eKant treats similarly the problem of the relations\r\nof physical and final causes, of necessity and freedom.\r\nHere, as in the case just mentioned, his main\r\nproblem is to discover their \u003cem\u003eharmony\u003c/em\u003e. His solution,\r\nagain, is in the union, in our intelligence, of the understanding—as\r\nthe source of the notions which\r\n“make nature”—with the ideas of that reason\r\nwhich gives a “categorical imperative.” The cause\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"271\" id=\"Page_271\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nof the possibility of this harmony between nature and\r\nfreedom, between the sense world and the rational,\r\nhe finds in a being, God, whose sole function in the\r\nKantian philosophy may be said to be to “pre-establish”\r\nit. I cannot believe that Kant, in postulating\r\nthe problems of philosophy as the harmony of sense\r\nand understanding, of nature and freedom, and in\r\nfinding this harmony where he did, was not profoundly\r\ninfluenced, consciously as well as unconsciously,\r\nby Leibniz. In fact, I do not think that we can\r\nunderstand the nature either of Kant’s immense contributions\r\nto modern thought or of his inconsistencies,\r\nuntil we have traced them to their source in the\r\nLeibnizian philosophy,—admitting, on the other\r\nhand, that we cannot understand why Kant should\r\nhave found necessary a new way of approach to\r\nthe results of Leibniz, until we recognize to the\r\nfull his indebtedness to Hume. It was, indeed,\r\nHume that awoke him to his endeavors, but it was\r\nLeibniz who set before him the goal of these endeavors.\r\nThat the goal should appear somewhat\r\ntransformed, when approached from a new point of\r\nview, was to be expected. But alas! the challenge\r\nfrom Hume did not wholly awaken Kant. He still\r\naccepted without question the validity of the scholastic\r\nmethod,—the analytic principle of identity as\r\nthe type of perfect knowledge,—although denying\r\nits sufficiency for human intelligence. Leibniz suggested,\r\nand suggested richly, the synthetic, the negative\r\naspect of thought; Kant worked it out as a\r\nnecessary law of \u003cem\u003eour\u003c/em\u003e knowledge; it was left to his\r\n\u003ca class=\"pagenum\" title=\"272\" id=\"Page_272\"\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\r\nsuccessors to work it out as a factor in the law of\r\n\u003cem\u003eall\u003c/em\u003e knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt would be a grievous blunder to suppose that\r\nthis final chapter annihilates the earlier ones; that\r\nthe failure of Leibniz as to method, though a failure\r\nin a fundamental point, cancelled his splendid\r\nachievements. Such thoughts as that substance is\r\nactivity; that its process is measured by its end, its\r\nidea; that the universe is an inter-related unit; the\r\nthoughts of organism, of continuity, of uniformity\r\nof law,—introduced and treated as Leibniz treated\r\nthem,—are imperishable. They are members of the\r\ngrowing consciousness, on the part of intelligence, of\r\nits own nature. There are but three or four names\r\nin the history of thought which can be placed by the\r\nside of Leibniz’s in respect to the open largeness, the\r\nunexhausted fertility, of such thoughts. But it is\r\nnot enough for intelligence to have great thoughts\r\nnor even true thoughts. It is testimony to the sincerity\r\nand earnestness of intelligence that it cannot\r\ntake even such thoughts as those of Leibniz on trust.\r\nIt must \u003cem\u003eknow\u003c/em\u003e them; it must have a method adequate\r\nto their demonstration. And in a broad sense, the\r\nwork of Kant and of his successors was the discovery\r\nof a method which should justify the objective\r\nidealism of Leibniz, and which in its history has\r\nmore than fulfilled this task.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"transcribers-note page-break-after\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"tn-bottom\"\u003e\u003cb\u003eTranscriber’s Note:\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe following is a list of corrections made to the original. The\r\nfirst passage is the original passage, the second the corrected one.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul id=\"corrections\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ca href=\"#copyright\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eCopyright statement\u003c/a\u003e:\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"small-caps\"\u003eBy S. \u003cspan class=\"correction\"\u003eC\u003c/span\u003e Griggs and Company\u003c/span\u003e.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"small-caps\"\u003eBy S. \u003cspan class=\"correction\"\u003eC.\u003c/span\u003e Griggs and Company\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_96\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ePage 96\u003c/a\u003e:\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPure passivity of any kind is a myth, \u003cspan class=\"correction\"\u003eas\u003c/span\u003e scholastic\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPure passivity of any kind is a myth, \u003cspan class=\"correction\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e scholastic\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_159\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ePage 159\u003c/a\u003e:\u003cbr\u003e\r\natoms. The \u003cspan class=\"correction\"\u003eatoms,\u003c/span\u003e are separated only in virtue of\u003cbr\u003e\r\natoms. The \u003cspan class=\"correction\"\u003eatoms\u003c/span\u003e are separated only in virtue of\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}