Studies in Logical Theory
{"WorkMasterId":6300,"WpPageId":281287,"ParentWpPageId":193822,"Slug":"studies-in-logical-theory","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/studies-in-logical-theory/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/studies-in-logical-theory/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":1048912,"CleanHtmlLength":992802,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"Studies in Logical Theory","Deck":"Dewey and collaborators develop logic as theory of inquiry, judgment, mediation, and the transformation of problematic situations.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to John Dewey","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"John Dewey","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/john-dewey-01-portrait-by-underwood-underwood.jpg","ImageAlt":"Underwood and Underwood portrait of John Dewey","FilterTerra":"North America","ClickText":"John Dewey","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/","Copies":["1859 CE – 1952 CE","Burlington, Vermont","American pragmatist philosopher of instrumentalism, democratic experimentalism, progressive education, inquiry, experience, logic, ethics, aesthetics, public life, science, and naturalistic religion."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:4","Title":"Modern History","DateText":"1800 CE – 1944 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:11","Title":"Long 19th Century","DateText":"1870 CE – 1913 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/philosophers-of-the-long-19th-century/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"1903 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Displayed as 1903 CE for the published collection.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:6"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:25"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:USA:6"}],"OriginalTitle":"Studies in Logical Theory","Language":"English","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:logic"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:epistemology"}],"Tradition":"American pragmatism; instrumentalism; pragmatic naturalism; democratic experimentalism; progressive education","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #40665 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Dewey and collaborators develop logic as theory of inquiry, judgment, mediation, and the transformation of problematic situations."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"Logical Theory","KeyConcepts":"logic; inquiry; judgment; situation; mediation; instrumentalism","Methodology":"Direct Dewey work-cluster record based on SEP, IEP, Britannica, Center for Dewey Studies, Dewey scholarship, catalog records, and public edition evidence. 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Hegel, Darwinian naturalism, experimental science, Jane Addams and social reform, American democratic institutions, and educational practice.","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Accepted as a direct Dewey-led work-cluster via bibliography and scholarship evidence.","Dewey remains central for inquiry, democratic life, public problem-solving, education, experience, habits, art, values, religion as human faith, and experimental social intelligence."],"EvidenceNote":["Accepted as a direct Dewey-led work-cluster via bibliography and scholarship evidence."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Versions","BodyHtml":"\u003cdiv class=\"dz-philo__full-version-grid\"\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-version-card\"\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-provider\"\u003eProject Gutenberg\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3 class=\"dz-philo__full-version-title\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #40665\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-meta\"\u003eHtmlText · Imported\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ca class=\"dz-philo__full-version-link\" href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40665\"\u003eOpen full version\u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["Dewey and collaborators develop logic as theory of inquiry, judgment, mediation, and the transformation of problematic situations."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":"Logical Theory"},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"logic; inquiry; judgment; situation; mediation; instrumentalism"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Direct Dewey work-cluster record based on SEP, IEP, Britannica, Center for Dewey Studies, Dewey scholarship, catalog records, and public edition evidence. No full text is imported."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"One work-cluster page with explicit integer display year, date note, evidence note, discipline mapping, and public source evidence."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Dewey and collaborators develop logic as theory of inquiry, judgment, mediation, and the transformation of problematic situations."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, G. W. F. Hegel, Darwinian naturalism, experimental science, Jane Addams and social reform, American democratic institutions, and educational practice."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"Pragmatism, analytic and continental social philosophy, democratic theory, progressive education, inquiry theory, aesthetics, public philosophy, deliberative democracy, philosophy of science, and American philosophy."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct Dewey-led work-cluster via bibliography and scholarship evidence.","Dewey remains central for inquiry, democratic life, public problem-solving, education, experience, habits, art, values, religion as human faith, and experimental social intelligence."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct Dewey-led work-cluster via bibliography and scholarship evidence."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003ePublic-domain full text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40665\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #40665\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch1\u003eThe Project Gutenberg eBook, Studies in Logical Theory, by John Dewey\u003c/h1\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"pg\"\u003eE-text prepared by Barbara Tozier, Bill Tozier,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n (http://www.pgdp.net)\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"full\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch1\u003eSTUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY\u003c/h1\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch5\u003eBY\u003c/h5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eJOHN DEWEY\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch5\u003ePROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY\u003c/h5\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003e\r\nWITH THE CO-OPERATION OF MEMBERS AND FELLOWS OF THE\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003eTHE DECENNIAL PUBLICATIONS\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSECOND SERIES \u0026nbsp; VOLUME XI\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eCHICAGO\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTHE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n1903\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003e\u003ci\u003eCopyright, 1903\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBY THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_ix\" id=\"Page_ix\"\u003e[Pg ix]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"PREFACE\" id=\"PREFACE\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003ePREFACE\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis volume presents some results of the work done in the\r\nmatter of logical theory in the Department of Philosophy of\r\nthe University of Chicago in the first decade of its existence.\r\nThe eleven Studies are the work of eight different hands,\r\nall, with the exception of the editor, having at some period\r\nheld Fellowships in this University, Dr. Heidel in Greek,\r\nthe others in Philosophy. Their names and present pursuits\r\nare indicated in the Table of Contents. The editor\r\nhas occasionally, though rarely, added a footnote or phrase\r\nwhich might serve to connect one Study more closely with\r\nanother. The pages in the discussion of Hypothesis, on\r\nMill and Whewell, are by him. With these exceptions,\r\neach writer is individually and completely responsible for\r\nhis own Study.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe various Studies present, the editor believes, about\r\nthe relative amount of agreement and disagreement that is\r\nnatural in view of the conditions of their origin. The\r\nvarious writers have been in contact with one another in\r\nSeminars and lecture courses in pursuit of the same topics,\r\nand have had to do with shaping one another\u0027s views.\r\nThere are several others, not represented in this volume,\r\nwho have also participated in the evolution of the point of\r\nview herein set forth, and to whom the writers acknowledge\r\ntheir indebtedness. The disagreements proceed from the\r\ndiversity of interests with which the different writers approach\r\nthe logical topic; and from the fact that the point\r\nof view in question is still (happily) developing and showing\r\nno signs of becoming a closed system.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf the Studies themselves do not give a fair notion of the\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_x\" id=\"Page_x\"\u003e[Pg x]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003enature and degree of the harmony in the different writers\u0027\r\nmethods, a preface is not likely to succeed in so doing. A few\r\nwords may be in place, however, about a matter repeatedly\r\ntouched upon, but nowhere consecutively elaborated\u0026mdash;the\r\nmore ultimate philosophical bearing of what is set forth. All\r\nagree, the editor takes the liberty of saying, that judgment is\r\nthe central function of knowing, and hence affords the central\r\nproblem of logic; that since the act of knowing is intimately\r\nand indissolubly connected with the like yet diverse functions\r\nof affection, appreciation, and practice, it only distorts results\r\nreached to treat knowing as a self-inclosed and self-explanatory\r\nwhole\u0026mdash;hence the intimate connections of logical theory\r\nwith functional psychology; that since knowledge appears\r\nas a function within experience, and yet passes judgment\r\nupon both the processes and contents of other functions, its\r\nwork and aim must be distinctively reconstructive or transformatory;\r\nthat since Reality must be defined in terms of\r\nexperience, judgment appears accordingly as the medium\r\nthrough which the consciously effected evolution of Reality\r\ngoes on; that there is no reasonable standard of truth (or of\r\nsuccess of the knowing function) in general, except upon the\r\npostulate that Reality is thus dynamic or self-evolving, and,\r\nin particular, except through reference to the specific offices\r\nwhich knowing is called upon to perform in readjusting and\r\nexpanding the means and ends of life. And all agree that\r\nthis conception gives the only promising basis upon which\r\nthe working methods of science, and the proper demands of\r\nthe moral life, may co-operate. All this, doubtless, does not\r\ntake us very far on the road to detailed conclusions, but it\r\nis better, perhaps, to get started in the right direction than\r\nto be so definite as to erect a dead-wall in the way of farther\r\nmovement of thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn general, the obligations in logical matters of the writers\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_xi\" id=\"Page_xi\"\u003e[Pg xi]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eare roughly commensurate with the direction of their criticisms.\r\nUpon the whole, most is due to those whose views\r\nare most sharply opposed. To Mill, Lotze, Bosanquet, and\r\nBradley the writers then owe special indebtedness. The\r\neditor acknowledges personal indebtedness to his present\r\ncolleagues, particularly to Mr. George H. Mead, in the\r\nFaculty of Philosophy, and to a former colleague, Dr. Alfred\r\nH. Lloyd, of the University of Michigan. For both inspiration\r\nand the forging of the tools with which the writers\r\nhave worked there is a pre-eminent obligation on the part\r\nof all of us to William James, of Harvard University, who,\r\nwe hope, will accept this acknowledgment and this book as\r\nunworthy tokens of a regard and an admiration that are\r\ncoequal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_xii\" id=\"Page_xii\"\u003e[Pg xii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_xiii\" id=\"Page_xiii\"\u003e[Pg xiii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"TABLE_OF_CONTENTS\" id=\"TABLE_OF_CONTENTS\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eTABLE OF CONTENTS\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\u0027center\u0027\u003e\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"4\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003eI.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eThought and its Subject-Matter\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tdtxt\u0027\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJohn Dewey\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003eII.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eThought and its Subject-Matter: The Antecedents of Thought\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_23\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tdtxt\u0027\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJohn Dewey\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003eIII.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eThought and its Subject-Matter: The Datum of Thinking\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_49\"\u003e49\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tdtxt\u0027\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJohn Dewey\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003eIV.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eThought and its Subject-Matter: The Content and Object of Thought\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_65\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tdtxt\u0027\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJohn Dewey\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003eV.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eBosanquet\u0027s Theory of Judgment\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_86\"\u003e86\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tdtxt\u0027\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHelen Bradford Thompson\u003c/span\u003e, Ph.D., Director of the Psychological Laboratory of Mount Holyoke College\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003eVI.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eTypical Stages in the Development of Judgment\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_127\"\u003e127\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tdtxt\u0027\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSimon Fraser McLennan\u003c/span\u003e, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in Oberlin College\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003eVII.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eThe Nature of Hypothesis\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_142\"\u003e142\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tdtxt\u0027\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMyron Lucius Ashley\u003c/span\u003e, Ph.D., Instructor, American Correspondence School\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003eVIII.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eImage and Idea in Logic\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_183\"\u003e183\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tdtxt\u0027\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWillard Clark Gore\u003c/span\u003e, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Psychology in the University of Chicago\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003eIX.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eThe Logic of the Pre-Socratic Philosophy\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_203\"\u003e203\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tdtxt\u0027\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWilliam Arthur Heidel\u003c/span\u003e, Ph.D., Professor of Latin in Iowa College\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003eX.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eValuation as a Logical Process\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_227\"\u003e227\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tdtxt\u0027\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHenry Waldgrave Stuart\u003c/span\u003e, Ph.D., Instructor in Philosophy in the State University of Iowa\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003eXI.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eSome Logical Aspects of Purpose\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_341\"\u003e341\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tdtxt\u0027\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAddison Webster Moore\u003c/span\u003e, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the University of Chicago\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_xiv\" id=\"Page_xiv\"\u003e[Pg xiv]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_1\" id=\"Page_1\"\u003e[Pg 1]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"I\" id=\"I\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eI\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eTHOUGHT AND ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: THE GENERAL\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPROBLEM OF LOGICAL THEORY\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo one doubts that thought, at least reflective, as distinct\r\nfrom what is sometimes called constitutive, thought, is derivative\r\nand secondary. It comes after something and out of\r\nsomething, and for the sake of something. No one doubts\r\nthat the thinking of everyday practical life and of science is\r\nof this reflective type. We think about; we reflect over. If\r\nwe ask what it is which is primary and radical to thought;\r\nif we ask what is the final objective for the sake of which\r\nthought intervenes; if we ask in what sense we are to understand\r\nthought as a derived procedure, we are plunging ourselves\r\ninto the very heart of the logical problem: the relation\r\nof thought to its empirical antecedents and to its consequent,\r\ntruth, and the relation of truth to reality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet from the na\u0026iuml;ve point of view no difficulty attaches to\r\nthese questions. The antecedents of thought are our universe\r\nof life and love; of appreciation and struggle. We\r\nthink about anything and everything: snow on the ground;\r\nthe alternating clanks and thuds that rise from below; the\r\nrelation of the Monroe Doctrine to the embroglio in Venezuela;\r\nthe relation of art to industry; the poetic quality of\r\na painting by Botticelli; the battle of Marathon; the economic\r\ninterpretation of history; the proper definition of cause; the\r\nbest method of reducing expenses; whether and how to\r\nrenew the ties of a broken friendship; the interpretation of\r\nan equation in hydrodynamics; etc.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThrough the madness of this miscellaneous citation there\r\nappears so much of method: anything\u0026mdash;event, act, value,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_2\" id=\"Page_2\"\u003e[Pg 2]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nideal, person, or place\u0026mdash;may be an object of thought. Reflection\r\nbusies itself alike with physical nature, the record of\r\nsocial achievement, and the endeavors of social aspiration.\r\nIt is with reference to \u003ci\u003esuch\u003c/i\u003e affairs that thought is derivative;\r\nit is with reference to them that it intervenes or mediates.\r\nTaking some part of the universe of action, of affection, of\r\nsocial construction, under its special charge, and having\r\nbusied itself therewith sufficiently to meet the special difficulty\r\npresented, thought releases that topic and enters upon\r\nfurther more direct experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSticking for a moment to this na\u0026iuml;ve standpoint, we recognize\r\na certain rhythm of direct practice and derived theory;\r\nof primary construction and of secondary criticism; of living\r\nappreciation and of abstract description; of active endeavor\r\nand of pale reflection. We find that every more direct\r\nprimary attitude passes upon occasion into its secondary\r\ndeliberative and discursive counterpart. We find that when\r\nthe latter has done its work it passes away and passes on.\r\nFrom the na\u0026iuml;ve standpoint such rhythm is taken as a matter\r\nof course. There is no attempt to state either the nature of\r\nthe occasion which demands the thinking attitude, nor to\r\nformulate a theory of the standard by which is judged its\r\nsuccess. No general theory is propounded as to the exact\r\nrelationship between thinking and what antecedes and succeeds\r\nit. Much less do we ask how empirical circumstances\r\ncan generate rationality of thought; nor how it is possible\r\nfor reflection to lay claim to power of determining truth and\r\nthereby of constructing further reality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we were to ask the thinking of na\u0026iuml;ve life to present,\r\nwith a minimum of theoretical elaboration, its conception of\r\nits own practice, we should get an answer running not unlike\r\nthis: Thinking is a kind of activity which we perform at\r\nspecific need, just as at other need we engage in other sorts of\r\nactivity: as converse with a friend; draw a plan for a house;\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_3\" id=\"Page_3\"\u003e[Pg 3]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntake a walk; eat a dinner; purchase a suit of clothes; etc.,\r\netc. In general, its material is anything in the wide universe\r\nwhich seems to be relevant to this need\u0026mdash;anything which\r\nmay serve as a resource in defining the difficulty or in suggesting\r\nmodes of dealing effectively with it. The measure\r\nof its success, the standard of its validity, is precisely the\r\ndegree in which the thinking actually disposes of the difficulty\r\nand allows us to proceed with more direct modes of\r\nexperiencing, that are forthwith possessed of more assured\r\nand deepened value.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we inquire why the na\u0026iuml;ve attitude does not go on to\r\nelaborate these implications of its own practice into a systematic\r\ntheory, the answer, on its own basis, is obvious.\r\nThought arises in response to its own occasion. And this\r\noccasion is so exacting that there is time, as there is need,\r\nonly to do the thinking which is needed in that occasion\u0026mdash;not\r\nto reflect upon the thinking itself. Reflection follows so\r\nnaturally upon its appropriate cue, its issue is so obvious, so\r\npractical, the entire relationship is so organic, that once\r\ngrant the position that thought arises in reaction to specific\r\ndemand, and there is not the particular type of thinking\r\ncalled logical theory because there is not the practical demand\r\nfor reflection of that sort. Our attention is taken up with\r\nparticular questions and specific answers. What we have to\r\nreckon with is not the problem of, How can I think \u003ci\u003e\u0026uuml;berhaupt\u003c/i\u003e?\r\nbut, How shall I think right \u003ci\u003ehere and now\u003c/i\u003e? Not\r\nwhat is the test of thought at large, but what validates and\r\nconfirms \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e thought?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn conformity with this view, it follows that a generic\r\naccount of our thinking behavior, the generic account termed\r\nlogical theory, arises at historic periods in which the situation\r\nhas lost the organic character above described. The\r\ngeneral theory of reflection, as over against its concrete\r\nexercise, appears when occasions for reflection are so over\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_4\" id=\"Page_4\"\u003e[Pg 4]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ewhelming\r\nand so mutually conflicting that specific adequate\r\nresponse in thought is blocked. Again, it shows itself when\r\npractical affairs are so multifarious, complicated, and remote\r\nfrom control that thinking is held off from successful passage\r\ninto them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnyhow (sticking to the na\u0026iuml;ve standpoint), it is true that\r\nthe stimulus to that particular form of reflective thinking\r\ntermed logical theory is found when circumstances require\r\nthe act of thinking and nevertheless impede clear and coherent\r\nthinking in detail; or when they occasion thought and\r\nthen prevent the results of thinking from exercising directive\r\ninfluence upon the immediate concerns of life. Under these\r\nconditions we get such questions as the following: What is\r\nthe relation of rational thought to crude or unreflective experience?\r\nWhat is the relation of thought to reality? What\r\nis the barrier which prevents reason from complete penetration\r\ninto the world of truth? What is it that makes us live\r\nalternately in a concrete world of experience in which thought\r\nas such finds not satisfaction, and in a world of ordered\r\nthought which is yet only abstract and ideal?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is not my intention here to pursue the line of historical\r\ninquiry thus suggested. Indeed, the point would not be\r\nmentioned did it not serve to fix attention upon the nature\r\nof the logical problem.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is in dealing with this latter type of questions that\r\nlogical theory has taken a turn which separates it widely\r\nfrom the theoretical implications of practical deliberation\r\nand of scientific research. The two latter, however much they\r\ndiffer from each other in detail, agree in a fundamental\r\nprinciple. They both assume that every reflective problem\r\nand operation arises with reference to some \u003ci\u003especific\u003c/i\u003e situation,\r\nand has to subserve a \u003ci\u003especific\u003c/i\u003e purpose dependent upon its\r\nown occasion. They assume and observe distinct limits\u0026mdash;limits\r\nfrom which and to which. There is the limit of origin\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_5\" id=\"Page_5\"\u003e[Pg 5]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin the needs of the particular situation which evokes reflection.\r\nThere is the limit of terminus in successful dealing\r\nwith the particular problem presented\u0026mdash;or in retiring, baffled,\r\nto take up some other question. The query that at once faces\r\nus regarding the nature of logical theory is whether reflection\r\nupon reflection shall recognize these limits, endeavoring to\r\nformulate them more exactly and to define their relationships\r\nto each other more adequately; or shall it abolish limits, do\r\naway with the matter of specific conditions and specific aims\r\nof thought, and discuss thought and its relation to empirical\r\nantecedents and rational consequents (truth) at large?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAt first blush, it might seem as if the very nature of\r\nlogical theory as generalization of the reflective process must\r\nof necessity disregard the matter of particular conditions and\r\nparticular results as irrelevant. How, the implication runs,\r\ncould reflection become generalized save by elimination of\r\ndetails as irrelevant? Such a conception in fixing the central\r\nproblem of logic fixes once for all its future career and material.\r\nThe essential business of logic is henceforth to discuss\r\nthe relation of thought as such to reality as such. It may,\r\nindeed, involve much psychological material, particularly in\r\nthe discussion of the processes which antecede thinking and\r\nwhich call it out. It may involve much discussion of the\r\nconcrete methods of investigation and verification employed\r\nin the various sciences. It may busily concern itself with\r\nthe differentiation of various types and forms of thought\u0026mdash;different\r\nmodes of conceiving, various conformations of judgment,\r\nvarious types of inferential reasoning. But it concerns\r\nitself with any and all of these three fields, not on their own\r\naccount or as ultimate, but as subsidiary to the main problem:\r\nthe relation of thought as such, or at large, to reality as\r\nsuch, or at large. Some of the detailed considerations referred\r\nto may throw light upon the terms under which thought\r\ntransacts its business with reality; upon, say, certain peculiar\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_6\" id=\"Page_6\"\u003e[Pg 6]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlimitations it has to submit to as best it may. Other considerations\r\nthrow light upon the ways in which thought gets\r\nat reality. Still other considerations throw light upon the\r\nforms which thought assumes in attacking and apprehending\r\nreality. But in the end all this is incidental. In the end the\r\none problem holds: How do the specifications of thought as\r\nsuch hold good of reality as such? In fine, logic is supposed\r\nto grow out of the epistemological inquiry and to lead\r\nup to its solution.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom this point of view various aspects of logical theory\r\nare well stated by an author whom later on we shall consider\r\nin some detail. Lotze\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_1_1\" id=\"FNanchor_1_1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_1_1\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e refers to \"universal forms and\r\nprinciples of thought which hold good everywhere both in\r\njudging of reality and in weighing possibility, \u003ci\u003eirrespective\r\nof any difference in the objects\u003c/i\u003e.\" This defines the business\r\nof \u003ci\u003epure\u003c/i\u003e logic. This is clearly the question of thought as\r\nsuch\u0026mdash;of thought at large or in general. Then we have the\r\nquestion \"of how far the most complete structure of thought … can\r\nclaim to be an adequate account of that which we\r\nseem compelled to assume as the object and occasion of our\r\nideas.\" This is clearly the question of the relation of thought\r\nat large to reality at large. It is epistemology. Then\r\ncomes \"applied logic,\" having to do with the actual employment\r\nof concrete forms of thought with reference to investigation\r\nof specific topics and subjects. This \"applied\" logic\r\nwould, if the standpoint of practical deliberation and of scientific\r\nresearch were adopted, be the sole genuine logic. But\r\nthe existence of thought \u003ci\u003ein itself\u003c/i\u003e having been agreed upon,\r\nwe have in this \"applied\" logic only an incidental inquiry of\r\nhow the particular resistances and oppositions which \"pure\"\r\nthought meets from particular matters may best be discounted.\r\nIt is concerned with methods of investigation\r\nwhich obviate defects in the relationship of thought at\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_7\" id=\"Page_7\"\u003e[Pg 7]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlarge to reality at large, as these present themselves under\r\nthe limitations of human experience. It deals merely with\r\nhindrances, and with devices for overcoming them; it is\r\ndirected by considerations of utility. When we reflect that\r\nthis field includes the entire procedure of practical deliberation\r\nand of concrete scientific research, we begin to realize\r\nsomething of the significance of the theory of logic which\r\nregards the limitations of specific origination and specific\r\noutcome as irrelevant to its main problem, which assumes an\r\nactivity of thought \"pure\" or \"in itself,\" that is, \"irrespective\r\nof any difference in its objects.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis suggests, by contrast, the opposite mode of stating\r\nthe problem of logical theory. Generalization of the nature\r\nof the reflective process certainly involves elimination of much\r\nof the specific material and contents of the thought-situations\r\nof daily life and of critical science. Quite compatible\r\nwith this, however, is the notion that it seizes upon \u003ci\u003ecertain\u003c/i\u003e\r\nspecific conditions and factors, and aims to bring them to\r\nclear consciousness\u0026mdash;not to abolish them. While eliminating\r\nthe particular material of particular practical and scientific\r\npursuits, (1) it may strive to hit upon the common\r\ndenominator in the various situations which are antecedent\r\nor primary to thought and which evoke it; (2) it may attempt\r\nto show how typical features in the specific antecedents of\r\nthought call out to diverse typical modes of thought-reaction;\r\n(3) it may attempt to state the nature of the specific consequences\r\nin which thought fulfils its career.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(1) It does not eliminate dependence upon specific occasions\r\nas provocative of thought; but endeavors to define\r\n\u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e in the various situations constitutes them thought-provoking.\r\nThe specific occasion is not eliminated, but insisted\r\nupon and brought into the foreground. Consequently\r\npsychological considerations are not subsidiary incidents,\r\nbut of essential importance so far as they enable us to trace\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_8\" id=\"Page_8\"\u003e[Pg 8]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe generation of the thought-situation. (2) So from this\r\npoint of view the various types and modes of conceiving, judging,\r\nand inference are treated, not as qualifications of thought\r\nper se or at large, but of thought engaged in its specific,\r\nmost economic, effective response to its own particular occasion;\r\nthey are adaptations for control of stimuli. The distinctions\r\nand classifications that have been accumulated in\r\n\"formal\" logic are relevant data; but they demand interpretation\r\nfrom the standpoint of use as organs of adjustment\r\nto material antecedents and stimuli. (3) Finally the\r\nquestion of validity, or ultimate objective of thought, is relevant;\r\nbut is such as a matter of the specific issue of the specific\r\ncareer of a thought-function. All the typical investigatory\r\nand verificatory procedures of the various sciences are inherently\r\nconcerned as indicating the ways in which thought\r\nactually brings itself to its own successful fulfilment in\r\ndealing with various types of problems.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhile the epistemological type of logic may, as we have\r\nseen, leave (under the name of applied logic), a subsidiary\r\nplace open for the instrumental type, the type which deals\r\nwith thinking as a specific procedure relative to a specific\r\nantecedent occasion and to a subsequent specific fulfilment,\r\nis not able to reciprocate the favor. From its point of view,\r\nan attempt to discuss the antecedents, data, forms, and objective\r\nof thought, apart from reference to particular position\r\noccupied, and particular part played in the growth of experience\r\nis to reach results which are not so much either true or\r\nfalse as they are radically meaningless\u0026mdash;because they are\r\nconsidered apart from limits. Its results are not only\r\nabstractions (for all theorizing ends in abstractions), but\r\nabstractions without possible reference or bearing. From\r\nthis point of view, the taking of something, whether that\r\nsomething be thinking activity, its empirical condition, or\r\nits objective goal, apart from the limits of a historic or devel\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_9\" id=\"Page_9\"\u003e[Pg 9]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eoping\r\nsituation, is the essence of \u003ci\u003emetaphysical\u003c/i\u003e procedure\u0026mdash;in\r\nthe sense of metaphysics which makes a gulf between it\r\nand science.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs the reader has doubtless anticipated, it is the object\r\nof this chapter to present the problem and industry of reflective\r\nthought from this latter point of view. I recur again\r\nto the standpoint of na\u0026iuml;ve experience, using the term in a\r\nsense wide enough to cover both practical procedure and\r\nconcrete scientific research. I resume by saying that this\r\npoint of view knows no fixed distinction between the empirical\r\nvalues of unreflective life and the most abstract process\r\nof rational thought. It knows no fixed gulf between the\r\nhighest flight of theory and control of the details of practical\r\nconstruction and behavior. It passes, according to the occasion\r\nand opportunity of the moment, from the attitude of loving\r\nand struggling and doing to that of thinking and the\r\nreverse. Its contents or material shift their values back\r\nand forth from technological or utilitarian to \u0026aelig;sthetic, ethic,\r\nor affectional. It utilizes data of perception or of discursive\r\nideation as need calls, just as an inventor now utilizes heat,\r\nnow mechanical strain, now electricity, according to the\r\ndemands set by his aim. From this point of view, more\r\ndefinite logical import is attached to our earlier statements\r\n(p. 2) regarding the possibility of taking anything in the\r\nuniverse of experience as subject-matter of thought. Anything\r\nfrom past experience may be taken which appears to be\r\nan element in either the statement or the solution of the\r\npresent problem. Thus we understand the coexistence\r\nwithout contradiction of an indeterminate possible field and\r\na limited actual field. The undefined set of means becomes\r\nspecific through reference to an end.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn all this, there is no difference of kind between the\r\nmethods of science and those of the plain man. The difference\r\nis the greater control in science of the statement of the prob\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_10\" id=\"Page_10\"\u003e[Pg 10]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003elem,\r\nand of the selection and use of relevant material, both\r\nsensible or ideational. The two are related to each other\r\njust as the hit-or-miss, trial-and-error inventions of uncivilized\r\nman stand to the deliberate and consecutively persistent\r\nefforts of a modern inventor to produce a certain\r\ncomplicated device for doing a comprehensive piece of work.\r\nNeither the plain man nor the scientific inquirer is aware, as\r\nhe engages in his reflective activity, of any transition from\r\none sphere of existence to another. He knows no two fixed\r\nworlds\u0026mdash;reality on one side and mere subjective ideas on\r\nthe other; he is aware of no gulf to cross. He assumes uninterrupted,\r\nfree, and fluid passage from ordinary experience\r\nto abstract thinking, from thought to fact, from things to\r\ntheories and back again. Observation passes into development\r\nof hypothesis; deductive methods pass to use in description\r\nof the particular; inference passes into action with\r\nno sense of difficulty save those found in the particular task\r\nin question. The fundamental assumption is \u003ci\u003econtinuity\u003c/i\u003e in\r\nand of experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis does not mean that fact is confused with idea, or\r\nobserved datum with voluntary hypothesis, theory with doing,\r\nany more than a traveler confuses land and water when he\r\njourneys from one to the other. It simply means that each\r\nis placed and used with reference to service rendered the\r\nother, and with reference to future use of the other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOnly the epistemological spectator is aware of the fact\r\nthat the everyday man and the scientific man in this free and\r\neasy intercourse are rashly assuming the right to glide over\r\na cleft in the very structure of reality. This fact raises a\r\nquery not favorable to the epistemologist. Why is it that\r\nthe scientific man, who is constantly plying his venturous\r\ntraffic of exchange of facts for ideas, of theories for laws, of\r\nreal things for hypotheses, should be so wholly unaware of\r\nthe radical and generic (as distinct from specific) difficulty\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_11\" id=\"Page_11\"\u003e[Pg 11]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the undertakings in which he is engaged? We thus\r\ncome afresh to our inquiry: Does not the epistemological\r\nlogician unwittingly transfer the specific difficulty which\r\nalways faces the scientific man\u0026mdash;the difficulty in detail of\r\ncorrect and adequate translation back and forth of \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e set\r\nof facts and \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e group of ideas\u0026mdash;into a totally different\r\nproblem of the wholesale relation of thought at large with\r\nreality in general? If such be the case, it is clear that the\r\nvery way in which the epistemological type of logic states\r\nthe problem of thinking, in relation both to empirical antecedents\r\nand to objective truth, makes that problem insoluble.\r\nWorking terms, terms which as working are flexible and\r\nhistoric, relative, are transformed into absolute, fixed, and\r\npredetermined forms of being.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe come a little closer to the problem when we recognize\r\nthat every scientific inquiry passes historically through at\r\nleast four stages. (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) The first of these stages is, if I may\r\nbe allowed the bull, that in which scientific inquiry does not\r\ntake place at all, because no problem or difficulty in the\r\nquality of the experience has presented itself to provoke\r\nreflection. We have only to cast our eye back from the\r\nexisting status of any science, or back from the status of any\r\nparticular topic in any science, to discover a time when no\r\nreflective or critical thinking busied itself with the matter\u0026mdash;when\r\nthe facts and relations were taken for granted and\r\nthus were lost and absorbed in the value which accrued from\r\nthe experience. (\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) After the dawning of the problem,\r\nthere comes a period of occupation with relatively crude and\r\nunorganized facts\u0026mdash;the hunting for, locating, and collecting\r\nof raw material. This is the empiric stage, which no existing\r\nscience, however proud in its attained rationality, can\r\ndisavow as its own progenitor. (\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) Then there is also a\r\nspeculative stage: a period of guessing, of making hypotheses,\r\nof framing ideas which later on are labeled and con\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_12\" id=\"Page_12\"\u003e[Pg 12]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003edemned\r\nas only ideas. There is a period of distinction and\r\nclassification-making which later on is regarded as only\r\nmentally-gymnastic in character. And no science, however\r\nproud in its present security of experimental assurance, can\r\ndisavow a scholastic ancestor. (\u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e) Finally, there comes a\r\nperiod of fruitful interaction between the mere ideas and\r\nthe mere facts: a period when observation is determined by\r\nexperimental conditions depending upon the use of certain\r\nguiding conceptions; when reflection is directed and checked\r\nat every point by the use of experimental data, and by the\r\nnecessity of finding such form for itself as will enable it to\r\nserve as premise in a deduction leading to evolution of new\r\nmeanings, and ultimately to experimental inquiry, which\r\nbrings to light new facts. In the emerging of a more orderly\r\nand significant region of fact, and of a more coherent and\r\nself-luminous system of meaning, we have the natural limit\r\nof evolution of the logic of a given science.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut consider what has happened in this historic record.\r\nUnanalyzed experience has broken up into distinctions of\r\nfacts and ideas; the factual side has been developed by\r\nindefinite and almost miscellaneous descriptions and cumulative\r\nlistings; the conceptual side has been developed by\r\nunchecked and speculative elaboration of definitions, classifications,\r\netc. There has been a relegation of accepted\r\nmeanings to the limbo of mere ideas; there has been a passage\r\nof some of the accepted facts into the region of mere\r\nhypothesis and opinion. Conversely, there has been a continued\r\nissuing of ideas from the region of hypotheses and\r\ntheories into that of facts, of accepted objective and meaningful\r\ncontents. Out of a world of only \u003ci\u003eseeming\u003c/i\u003e facts, and\r\nof only \u003ci\u003edoubtful\u003c/i\u003e ideas, there emerges a universe continually\r\ngrowing in definiteness, order, and luminosity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis progress, verified in every record of science, is an\r\nabsolute monstrosity from the standpoint of the epistemol\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_13\" id=\"Page_13\"\u003e[Pg 13]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eogy\r\nwhich assumes a thought in general, on one side, and a\r\nreality in general, on the other. The reason that it does not\r\npresent itself as such a monster and miracle to those actually\r\nconcerned with it is because there is a certain \u003ci\u003ehomogeneity\u003c/i\u003e\r\nor \u003ci\u003econtinuity\u003c/i\u003e of reference and of use which controls all\r\ndiversities in both the modes of existence specified and the\r\ngrades of value assigned. The distinction of thought and\r\nfact is treated in the growth of a science, or of any particular\r\nscientific problem, as an \u003ci\u003einduced\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eintentional\u003c/i\u003e practical\r\ndivision of labor; as relative assignments of position\r\nwith reference to performance of a task; as deliberate distribution\r\nof forces at command for their more economic use.\r\nThe interaction of bald fact and hypothetical idea into the\r\noutcome of a single world of scientific apprehension and\r\ncomprehension is but the successful achieving of the aim on\r\naccount of which the distinctions in question were instituted.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus we come back to the problem of logical theory. To\r\ntake the distinctions of thought and fact, etc., as ontological,\r\nas inherently fixed in the make-up of the structure\r\nof being, is to treat the actual development of scientific\r\ninquiry and scientific control as a mere subsidiary topic\r\nultimately of only utilitarian worth. It is also to state the\r\nterms upon which thought and being transact business in a\r\nway so totally alien to the use made of these distinctions in\r\nconcrete experience as to create a problem which can be discussed\r\nonly in terms of itself\u0026mdash;not in terms of the conduct\r\nof life\u0026mdash;metaphysics again in the bad sense of that term.\r\nAs against this, the problem of a logic which aligns itself\r\nwith the origin and employ of reflective thought in everyday\r\nlife and in critical science, is to follow the natural history of\r\nthinking as a life-process having its own generating antecedents\r\nand stimuli, its own states and career, and its own\r\nspecific objective or limit.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_14\" id=\"Page_14\"\u003e[Pg 14]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis point of view makes it possible for logical theory\r\nto come to terms with psychology.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_2_2\" id=\"FNanchor_2_2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_2_2\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e When logic is considered\r\nas having to do with the wholesale activity of thought\r\nper se, the question of the historic process by which this\r\nor that particular thought came to be, of how its object\r\nhappens to present itself as sensation, or perception, or conception,\r\nis quite irrelevant. These things are mere temporal\r\naccidents. The psychologist (not lifting his gaze from\r\nthe realm of the changeable) may find in them matters of\r\ninterest. His whole industry is just with natural history\u0026mdash;to\r\ntrace series of psychical events as they mutually excite\r\nand inhibit one another. But the logician, we are told, has\r\na deeper problem and an outlook of more unbounded horizon.\r\nHe deals with the question of the eternal nature of thought\r\nand its eternal validity in relation to an eternal reality. He\r\nis concerned, not with genesis, but with value, not with a\r\nhistoric cycle, but with absolute distinctions and relations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eStill the query haunts us: Is this so in truth? Or has\r\nthe logician of a certain type arbitrarily made it thus by taking\r\nhis terms apart from reference to the specific occasions\r\nin which they arise and situations in which they function?\r\nIf the latter, then the very denial of historic relationship\r\nand of the significance of historic method, is indicative\r\nonly of the unreal character of his own abstraction. It\r\nmeans in effect that the affairs under consideration have\r\nbeen isolated from the conditions in which alone they have\r\ndeterminable meaning and assignable worth. It is astonishing\r\nthat, in the face of the advance of the evolutionary\r\nmethod in natural science, any logician can persist in the\r\nassertion of a rigid difference between the problem of origin\r\nand of nature; between genesis and analysis; between history\r\nand validity. Such assertion simply reiterates as final\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_15\" id=\"Page_15\"\u003e[Pg 15]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na distinction which grew up and had meaning in pre-evolutionary\r\nscience. It asserts against the most marked advance\r\nwhich scientific method has yet made a survival of a crude\r\nperiod of logical scientific procedure. We have no choice\r\nsave either to conceive of thinking as a response to a specific\r\nstimulus, or else to regard it as something \"in itself,\" having\r\njust in and of itself certain traits, elements, and laws. If\r\nwe give up the last view, we must take the former.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe entire significance of the evolutionary method in\r\nbiology and social history is that every distinct organ, structure,\r\nor formation, every grouping of cells or elements, has\r\nto be treated as an instrument of adjustment or adaptation\r\nto a particular environing situation. Its meaning, its character,\r\nits value, is known when, and only when, it is considered\r\nas an arrangement for meeting the conditions involved\r\nin some specific situation. This analysis of value is carried\r\nout in detail by tracing successive stages of development\u0026mdash;by\r\nendeavoring to locate the particular situation in which\r\neach structure has its origin, and by tracing the successive\r\nmodifications through which, in response to changing media,\r\nit has reached its present conformation.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_3_3\" id=\"FNanchor_3_3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_3_3\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[3]\u003c/a\u003e To persist in condemning\r\nnatural history from the standpoint of what natural\r\nhistory meant before it identified itself with an evolutionary\r\nprocess is not so much to exclude the natural-history standpoint\r\nfrom philosophic consideration as it is to evince ignorance\r\nof what it signifies.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePsychology as the natural history of the various attitudes\r\nand structures through which experiencing passes, as\r\nan account of the conditions under which this or that state\r\nemerges, and of the way in which it influences, by stimulation\r\nor inhibition, production of other states or conformations\r\nof consciousness, is indispensable to logical evaluation,\r\nthe moment we treat logical theory as an account of think\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_16\" id=\"Page_16\"\u003e[Pg 16]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eing\r\nas a mode of adaptation to its own generating conditions,\r\nand judge its validity by reference to its efficiency in\r\nmeeting its problems. The historical point of view describes\r\nthe sequence; the normative follows the sequence to its\r\nconclusion, and then turns back and judges each historical\r\nstep by viewing it in reference to its own outcome.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_4_4\" id=\"FNanchor_4_4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_4_4\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[4]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the course of changing experience we keep our balance\r\nas we move from situations of an affectional quality to those\r\nwhich are practical or appreciative or reflective, because we\r\nbear constantly in mind the context in which any particular\r\ndistinction presents itself. As we submit each characteristic\r\nfunction and situation of experience to our gaze, we find it\r\nhas a dual aspect. Wherever there is striving there are\r\nobstacles; wherever there is affection there are persons who\r\nare attached; wherever there is doing there is accomplishment;\r\nwherever there is appreciation there is value; wherever\r\nthere is thinking there is material-in-question. We\r\nkeep our footing as we move from one attitude to another,\r\nfrom one characteristic quality to another, because we know\r\nthe position occupied in the whole growth by the particular\r\nfunction in which we are engaged, and the position within\r\nthe function of the particular element that engages us.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe distinction \u003ci\u003ebetween\u003c/i\u003e each attitude and function and\r\nits predecessor and successor is serial, dynamic, operative.\r\nThe distinctions \u003ci\u003ewithin\u003c/i\u003e any given operation or function are\r\nstructural, contemporaneous, and distributive. Thinking\r\nfollows, we will say, striving, and doing follows thinking.\r\nEach in the fulfilment of its own function inevitably calls out\r\nits successor. But coincident, simultaneous, and correspondent\r\n\u003ci\u003ewithin\u003c/i\u003e doing, is the distinction of doer and of deed;\r\n\u003ci\u003ewithin\u003c/i\u003e the function of thought, of thinking and material\r\nthought upon; within the function of striving, of obstacle\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_17\" id=\"Page_17\"\u003e[Pg 17]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof aim, of means and end. We keep our paths straight\r\nbecause we do not confuse the sequential, efficient, and\r\nfunctional relationship of types of experience with the contemporaneous,\r\ncorrelative, and structural distinctions of elements\r\nwithin a given function. In the seeming maze of\r\nendless confusion and unlimited shiftings, we find our way\r\nby the means of the stimulations and checks occurring within\r\nthe process we are actually engaged with. We do not contrast\r\nor confuse a condition or state which is an element in\r\nthe formation of one operation with the status or element\r\nwhich is one of the distributive terms of another function.\r\nIf we do, we have at once an insoluble, because meaningless,\r\nproblem upon our hands.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow the epistemological logician deliberately shuts himself\r\noff from those cues and checks upon which the plain\r\nman instinctively relies, and which the scientific man\r\ndeliberately searches for and adopts as constituting his\r\ntechnique. Consequently he is likely to set the sort of object\r\nor material which has place and significance only in one of\r\nthe serial functional situations of experience, over against\r\nthe active attitude which describes part of the structural\r\nconstitution of another situation; or with equal lack of\r\njustification to assimilate terms characteristic of different\r\nstages to one another. He sets the agent, as he is found\r\nin the intimacy of love or appreciation, over against the\r\nexternality of the fact, as that is defined within the reflective\r\nprocess. He takes the material which thought selects\r\nas its own basis for further procedure to be identical with\r\nthe significant content which it secures for itself in the\r\nsuccessful pursuit of its aim; and this in turn he regards\r\nas the material which was presented at the outset, and whose\r\npeculiarities were the express means of awakening thought.\r\nHe identifies the final deposit of the thought-function with\r\nits own generating antecedent, and then disposes of the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_18\" id=\"Page_18\"\u003e[Pg 18]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nresulting surd by reference to some metaphysical consideration,\r\nwhich remains when logical inquiry, when science\r\n(as interpreted by him), has done its work. He does this,\r\nnot because he prefers confusion to order, or error to truth,\r\nbut simply because, when the chain of historic sequence is\r\ncut, the vessel of thought is afloat to veer upon a sea without\r\nsoundings or moorings. There are but two alternatives:\r\neither there is an object \"in itself\" of thought \"in itself,\"\r\nor else there are a series of values which vary with the varying\r\nfunctions to which they belong. If the latter, the only\r\nway these values can be defined is by discriminating the\r\nfunctions to which they belong. It is only conditions\r\nrelative to a specific period or epoch of development in a\r\ncycle of experience which-enables one to tell what to do\r\nnext, or to estimate the value and meaning of what is already\r\ndone. And the epistemological logician, in choosing to take\r\nhis question as one of thought which has its own form just\r\nas \"thought,\" apart from the limits of the special work it has\r\nto do, has deprived himself of these supports and stays.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe problem of logic has a more general and a more\r\nspecific phase. In its generic form, it deals with this question:\r\nHow does one type of functional situation and attitude\r\nin experience pass out of and into another; for example, the\r\ntechnological or utilitarian into the \u0026aelig;sthetic, the \u0026aelig;sthetic\r\ninto the religious, the religious into the scientific, and this\r\ninto the socio-ethical and so on? The more specific question\r\nis: How does the particular functional situation termed the\r\nreflective behave? How shall we describe it? What in\r\ndetail are its diverse contemporaneous distinctions, or divisions\r\nof labor, its correspondent \u003ci\u003estatuses\u003c/i\u003e; in what specific\r\nways do these operate with reference to each other so as\r\nto effect the specific aim which is proposed by the needs of\r\nthe affair?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis chapter may be brought to conclusion by reference\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_19\" id=\"Page_19\"\u003e[Pg 19]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto the more alternate value of the logic of experience, of\r\nlogic taken in its wider sense; that is, as an account of the\r\nsequence of the various typical functions or situations of\r\nexperience in their determining relations to one another.\r\nPhilosophy, defined as such a logic, makes no pretense to\r\nbe an account of a closed and finished universe. Its business\r\nis not to secure or guarantee any particular reality or value.\r\n\u003ci\u003ePer contra\u003c/i\u003e, it gets the significance of a method. The right\r\nrelationship and adjustment of the various typical phases of\r\nexperience to one another is a problem felt in every department\r\nof life. Intellectual rectification and control of these\r\nadjustments cannot fail to reflect itself in an added clearness\r\nand security on the practical side. It may be that general\r\nlogic can not become an instrument in the immediate direction\r\nof the activities of science or art or industry; but it is\r\nof value in criticising and in organizing the tools of\r\nimmediate research in these lines. It also has direct significance\r\nin the valuation for social or life-purposes of results\r\nachieved in particular branches. Much of the immediate\r\nbusiness of life is badly done because we do not know in\r\nrelation to its congeners the organic genesis and outcome\r\nof the work that occupies us. The manner and degree of\r\nappropriation of the values achieved in various departments\r\nof social interest and vocation are partial and faulty because\r\nwe are not clear as to the due rights and responsibilities of\r\none function of experience in reference to others.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe value of research for social progress; the bearing of\r\npsychology upon educational procedure; the mutual relations\r\nof fine and industrial art; the question of the extent and\r\nnature of specialization in science in comparison with the\r\nclaims of applied science; the adjustment of religious aspirations\r\nto scientific statements; the justification of a refined\r\nculture for a few in face of economic insufficiency for the\r\nmass\u0026mdash;such are a few of the many social questions whose\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_20\" id=\"Page_20\"\u003e[Pg 20]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003efinal\u003c/i\u003e answer depends upon the possession and use of a general\r\nlogic of experience as a method of inquiry and interpretation.\r\nI do not say that headway cannot be made in such\r\nquestions apart from the method indicated: a logic of\r\ngenetic experience. But unless we have a critical and\r\nassured view of the juncture in which and with reference to\r\nwhich a given attitude or interest arises, unless we know the\r\nservice it is thereby called upon to perform and hence the\r\norgans or methods by which it best functions in that service,\r\nour progress is impeded and irregular. We take a part for a\r\nwhole, a means for an end, or attack wholesale some other\r\ninterest because it interferes with the deified sway of the\r\none we have selected as ultimate. A clear and comprehensive\r\nconsensus of social conviction, and a consequent concentrated\r\nand economical direction of effort, are assured only\r\nas there is some way of locating the position and r\u0026ocirc;le of each\r\ntypical interest and occupation in experience. The domain\r\nof opinion is one of conflict; its rule is arbitrary and costly.\r\nOnly intellectual method affords a substitute for opinion.\r\nThe general logic of experience can alone do for the region\r\nof social values and aims what the natural sciences after centuries\r\nof struggle are doing for activity in the physical\r\nrealm.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis does not mean that systems of philosophy which\r\nhave attempted to state the nature either of thought and of\r\nreality at large, apart from limits of particular crises in the\r\ngrowth of experience, have been worthless\u0026mdash;though it does\r\nmean that their industry has been somewhat misapplied.\r\nThe unfolding of metaphysical theory has made large\r\ncontributions to positive evaluations of the typical situations\r\nand relationships of experience\u0026mdash;even when its conscious\r\nintention has been quite otherwise. Every system of philosophy\r\nis itself a mode of reflection; consequently (if our\r\nmain contention be true), it too has been evoked out of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_21\" id=\"Page_21\"\u003e[Pg 21]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nspecific social antecedents, and has had its use as a response\r\nto them. It has effected something in modifying the\r\nsituation within which it found its origin. It may not\r\nhave solved the problem which it consciously put itself;\r\nin many cases we may freely admit that the question put\r\nhas afterward been found to be so wrongly put as to be\r\ninsoluble. Yet exactly the same thing is true, in precisely\r\nthe same sense, in the history of science. For this reason,\r\nif for no other, it is impossible for the scientific man to\r\ncast the first stone at the philosopher.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe progress of science in any branch continually brings\r\nwith it a realization that problems in their previous form of\r\nstatement are insoluble because put in terms of unreal conditions;\r\nbecause the real conditions have been mixed up\r\nwith mental artifacts or misconstructions. Every science is\r\ncontinually learning that its supposed solutions are only\r\napparent, because the \"solution\" solves, not the actual problem,\r\nbut one which has been made up. But the very putting\r\nof the question, the very giving of the wrong answer, induces\r\nmodification of existing intellectual habits, standpoints,\r\nand aims. Wrestling with the problem, there is\r\nevolution of new forms of technique to control its treatment,\r\nthere is search for new facts, institution of new types of\r\nexperimentation; there is gain in the methodic control of\r\nexperience. And all this is progress. It is only the worn-out\r\ncynic, the devitalized sensualist, and the fanatical dogmatist\r\nwho interpret the continuous change of science as\r\nproving that, since each successive statement is wrong, the\r\nwhole record is error and folly; and that the present truth\r\nis only the error not yet found out. Such draw the moral\r\nof caring naught for all these things, or of flying to some\r\nexternal authority which will deliver once for all the fixed\r\nand unchangeable truth. But historic philosophy even in\r\nits aberrant forms has proved a factor in the valuation of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_22\" id=\"Page_22\"\u003e[Pg 22]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nexperience; it has brought problems to light, it has provoked\r\nintellectual conflicts without which values are only nominal;\r\neven through its would-be absolutistic isolations, it has secured\r\nrecognition of mutual dependencies and reciprocal\r\nreinforcements. Yet if it can define its work more clearly, it\r\ncan concentrate its energy upon its own characteristic problem:\r\nthe genesis and functioning in experience of various\r\ntypical interests and occupations with reference to one\r\nanother.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_23\" id=\"Page_23\"\u003e[Pg 23]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"II\" id=\"II\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eII\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eTHOUGHT AND ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: THE ANTECEDENT\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCONDITIONS AND CUES OF THE THOUGHT-FUNCTION\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have discriminated logic in its wider sense, concerned\r\nwith the sequence of characteristic functions and attitudes\r\nin experience, from logic in its stricter meaning, concerned\r\nin particular with description and interpretation of the function\r\nof reflective thought. We must avoid yielding to the\r\ntemptation of identifying logic with either of these to the\r\nexclusion of the other; or of supposing that it is possible to\r\nisolate one finally from the other. The more detailed treatment\r\nof the organs and methods of reflection cannot be\r\ncarried on with security save as we have a correct idea of\r\nthe historic position of reflection in the evolving of experience.\r\nYet it is impossible to determine this larger placing,\r\nsave as we have a defined and analytic, as distinct from\r\na merely vague and gross, view of what we mean by reflection\u0026mdash;what\r\nis its actual constitution. It is necessary to\r\nwork back and forth between the larger and the narrower\r\nfields, transforming every increment upon one side into a\r\nmethod of work upon the other, and thereby testing it.\r\nThe apparent confusion of existing logical theory, its uncertainty\r\nas to its own bounds and limits, its tendency to oscillate\r\nfrom larger questions of the inherent worth of judgment and\r\nvalidity of inference over to details of scientific technique,\r\nand to translation of distinctions of formal logic into terms\r\nof an investigatory or verificatory process, are indications of\r\nthe need of this double movement.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the next three chapters it is proposed to take up some\r\nof the considerations that lie on the borderland between the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_24\" id=\"Page_24\"\u003e[Pg 24]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlarger and the narrower conceptions of logical theory. I\r\nshall discuss the \u003ci\u003elocus\u003c/i\u003e of the function of thought, so far as\r\nsuch \u003ci\u003elocus\u003c/i\u003e enables us to select and characterize some of the\r\nmost fundamental distinctions, or divisions of labor, within\r\nthe reflective process. In taking up the problem of the\r\nsubject-matter of thought, I shall try to make clear that it\r\nassumes three quite distinct forms according to the epochal\r\nmoment reached in transformation of experience; and that\r\ncontinual confusion and inconsistency are introduced when\r\nthese respective meanings are not identified and described\r\naccording to their respective geneses and places. I shall\r\nattempt to show that we must consider subject-matter from\r\nthe standpoint, first, of the \u003ci\u003eantecedents\u003c/i\u003e or conditions that\r\nevoke thought; second, of the \u003ci\u003edatum\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eimmediate material\u003c/i\u003e\r\npresented to thought; and, third, of the \u003ci\u003eproper content\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nthought. Of these three distinctions the first, that of antecedent\r\nand stimulus, clearly refers to the situation that is\r\nimmediately prior to the thought-function as such. The\r\nsecond, that of datum or immediately given matter, refers to\r\na distinction which is made within the thought-process as a\r\npart of and for the sake of its own \u003ci\u003emodus operandi\u003c/i\u003e. It is a\r\nstatus in the scheme of thinking. The third, that of content\r\nor object, refers to the progress actually made in any thought-function;\r\nthe material which is organized into the thought-situation,\r\nso far as this has fulfilled its purpose. It goes\r\nwithout saying that these are to be discriminated as stages of\r\na life-process in the natural history of experience, not as\r\nready-made or ontological; it is contended that, save as they\r\nare differentiated in connection with well-defined historical\r\nstages, they are either lumped off as equivalents, or else\r\ntreated as absolute divisions\u0026mdash;or as each by turns, according\r\nto the exigencies of the particular argument. In fact,\r\nthis chapter will get at the matter of preliminary conditions\r\nof thought indirectly rather than directly, by indicating the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_25\" id=\"Page_25\"\u003e[Pg 25]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncontradictory positions into which one of the most vigorous\r\nand acute of modern logicians, Lotze, has been forced through\r\nfailing to define logical distinctions in terms of the history\r\nof readjustment of experience, and therefore endeavoring to\r\ninterpret certain notions as absolute instead of as periodic\r\nand methodological.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBefore passing directly to the exposition and criticism of\r\nLotze, it will be well, however, to take the matter in a somewhat\r\nfreer way. We cannot approach logical inquiry in a\r\nwholly direct and uncompromised manner. Of necessity we\r\nbring to it certain distinctions\u0026mdash;distinctions partly the outcome\r\nof concrete experience; partly due to the logical\r\ntheory which has got embodied in ordinary language and in\r\ncurrent intellectual habits; partly results of deliberate scientific\r\nand philosophic inquiry. These more or less ready-made\r\nresults are resources; they are the only weapons with\r\nwhich we can attack the new problem. Yet they are full\r\nof unexamined assumptions; they commit us to all sorts\r\nof logically predetermined conclusions. In one sense our\r\nstudy of the new subject-matter, let us say logical theory, is\r\nin truth only a review, a re-testing and criticising of the\r\nintellectual standpoints and methods which we bring with\r\nus to the study.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEveryone comes with certain distinctions already made\r\nbetween the subjective and the objective, between the physical\r\nand the psychical, between the intellectual and the factual.\r\n(1) We have learned to regard the region of emotional disturbance,\r\nof uncertainty and aspiration, as belonging somehow\r\npeculiarly to ourselves; we have learned to set over\r\nagainst this a world of observation and of valid thought as\r\nsomething unaffected by our moods, hopes, fears, and opinions.\r\n(2) We have also come to distinguish between what is\r\nimmediately present in our experience and the past and the\r\nfuture; we contrast the realms of memory and anticipation\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_26\" id=\"Page_26\"\u003e[Pg 26]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof sense-perception; the given with the ideal. (3) We are\r\nconfirmed in a habit of distinguishing between what we\r\ncall actual fact and our mental attitude toward that fact\u0026mdash;the\r\nattitude of surmise or wonder or reflective investigation.\r\nWhile one of the aims of logical theory is precisely to make\r\nus critically conscious of the significance and bearing of\r\nthese various distinctions, to change them from ready-made\r\nassumptions into controlled constructs, our mental habits are\r\nso set that they tend to have their own way with us; and\r\nwe read into logical theory conceptions that were formed\r\nbefore we had even dreamed of the logical undertaking\r\nwhich after all has for its business to assign to the terms in\r\nquestion their proper meaning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe find in Lotze an unusually explicit inventory of these\r\nvarious preliminary distinctions; and an unusually serious\r\neffort to deal with the problems which arise from introducing\r\nthem into the structure of logical theory. (1) He expressly\r\nseparates the matter of logical worth from that of psychological\r\ngenesis. He consequently abstracts the subject-matter\r\nof logic as such wholly from the question of historic \u003ci\u003elocus\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand \u003ci\u003esitus\u003c/i\u003e. (2) He agrees with common-sense in holding that\r\nlogical thought is reflective and thus presupposes a given\r\nmaterial. He occupies himself with the nature of the antecedent\r\nconditions. (3) He wrestles with the problem of\r\nhow a material formed prior to thought and irrespective of\r\nit can yet afford it stuff upon which to exercise itself. (4)\r\nHe expressly raises the question of how thought working\r\nindependently and from without upon a foreign material can\r\nshape the latter into results which are valid\u0026mdash;that is,\r\nobjective.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf his discussion is successful; if Lotze can provide the\r\nintermediaries which span the gulf between an independent\r\nthought-material and an independent thought-activity; if\r\nhe can show that the question of the origin of thought-\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_27\" id=\"Page_27\"\u003e[Pg 27]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ematerial\r\nand of thought-activity is irrelevant to the question\r\nof its worth, we shall have to surrender the position already\r\ntaken. But if we find that Lotze\u0027s elaborations only elaborate\r\nthe same fundamental difficulty, presenting it now in this\r\nlight and now in that, but never effecting more than presenting\r\nthe problem as if it were its own solution, we shall\r\nbe confirmed in our idea of the need of considering logical\r\nquestions from a different point of view. If we find that,\r\nwhatever his formal treatment, he always, as matter of\r\nfact, falls back upon some organized situation or function as\r\nthe source of both the specific thought-material and the\r\nspecific thought-activity in correspondence with each other,\r\nwe shall have in so far an elucidation and even a corroboration\r\nof our theory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. We begin with the question of the material antecedents\r\nof thought\u0026mdash;antecedents which condition reflection, and\r\nwhich call it out as reaction or response, by giving it its cue.\r\nLotze differs from many logicians of the same type in\r\naffording us an explicit account of these antecedents. The\r\nultimate material antecedents of thought are found in impressions,\r\nwhich are due to external objects as stimuli. Taken\r\nin themselves, these impressions are mere psychical states or\r\nevents. They exist in us side by side, or one after the other,\r\naccording as the objects which excite them operate simultaneously\r\nor successively. The occurrence of these various\r\npsychical states is not, however, entirely dependent upon the\r\npresence of the exciting thing. After a state has once been\r\nexcited, it gets the power of reawakening other states which have\r\naccompanied it or followed it. The associative mechanism\r\nof revival plays a part. If we had a complete knowledge\r\nof both the stimulating object and its effects, and of\r\nthe details of the associative mechanism, we should be able\r\nfrom given data to predict the whole course of any given\r\ntrain or current of ideas (for the impressions as conjoined\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_28\" id=\"Page_28\"\u003e[Pg 28]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsimultaneously or successively become ideas and a current of\r\nideas).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTaken in itself, a sensation or impression is nothing but\r\na \"state of our consciousness, a mood of ourselves.\" Any\r\ngiven current of ideas is a necessary sequence of existences\r\n(just as necessary as any succession of material events),\r\nhappening in some particular sensitive soul or organism.\r\n\"Just because, under their respective conditions, every\r\nsuch series of ideas hangs together by the same necessity\r\nand law as every other, there would be no ground for making\r\nany such distinction of value as that between truth\r\nand untruth, thus placing one group in opposition to all the\r\nothers.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_5_5\" id=\"FNanchor_5_5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_5_5\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[5]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. Thus far, as the last quotation clearly indicates, there\r\nis no question of reflective thought, and hence no question\r\nof logical theory. But further examination reveals a peculiar\r\nproperty of the current of ideas. Some ideas are merely\r\ncoincident, while others may be termed coherent. That is\r\nto say, the exciting causes of some of our simultaneous and\r\nsuccessive ideas really belong together; while in other cases\r\nthey simply happen to act at the same time, without there\r\nbeing a real connection between them. By the associative\r\nmechanism, however, both the coherent and the merely coincident\r\ncombinations recur. The first type of recurrence\r\nsupplies positive material for knowledge; the second gives\r\noccasion for error.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. It is a peculiar mixture of the coincident and the\r\ncoherent which sets the peculiar problem of reflective\r\nthought. The business of thought is to recover and confirm\r\nthe coherent, the really connected, adding to its\r\nreinstatement an accessory justifying notion of the real\r\nground of coherence, while it eliminates the coincident as\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_29\" id=\"Page_29\"\u003e[Pg 29]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsuch. While the mere current of ideas is something which\r\njust happens within us, the process of elimination and of\r\nconfirmation by means of statement of real ground and\r\nbasis of connection is an activity which mind as such exercises.\r\nIt is this distinction which marks off thought as\r\nactivity from any psychical event and from the associative\r\nmechanism as receptive happenings. One is concerned\r\nwith mere \u003ci\u003ede facto\u003c/i\u003e coexistences and sequences; the other\r\nwith the \u003ci\u003eworth\u003c/i\u003e of these combinations.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_6_6\" id=\"FNanchor_6_6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_6_6\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[6]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eConsideration of the peculiar work of thought in going\r\nover, sorting out, and determining various ideas according\r\nto a standard of value will occupy us in our next chapter.\r\nHere we are concerned with the material antecedents of\r\nthought as they are described by Lotze. At first glance, he\r\nseems to propound a satisfactory theory. He avoids the\r\nextravagancies of transcendental logic, which assumes that\r\nall the matter of experience is determined from the very\r\nstart by rational thought; and he also avoids the pitfall\r\nof purely empirical logic, which makes no distinction\r\nbetween the mere occurrence and association of ideas and\r\nthe real worth and validity of the various conjunctions thus\r\nproduced. He allows unreflective experience, defined in\r\nterms of sensations and their combinations, to provide material\r\nconditions for thinking, while he reserves for thought\r\na distinctive work and dignity of its own. Sense-experience\r\nfurnishes the antecedents; thought has to introduce and\r\ndevelop systematic connection\u0026mdash;rationality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA further analysis of Lotze\u0027s treatment may, however,\r\nlead us to believe that his statement is riddled through and\r\nthrough with inconsistencies and self-contradictions; that,\r\nindeed, any one part of it can be maintained only by the\r\ndenial of some other portion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. The impression is the ultimate antecedent in its purest\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_30\" id=\"Page_30\"\u003e[Pg 30]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor crudest form (according to the angle from which one\r\nviews it). It is that which has never felt, for good or for bad,\r\nthe influence of thought. Combined into ideas, these impressions\r\nstimulate or arouse the activities of thought, which\r\nare forthwith directed upon them. As the recipient of the\r\nactivity which they have excited and brought to bear upon\r\nthemselves, they furnish also the material content of thought\u0026mdash;its\r\nactual stuff. As Lotze says over and over again: \"It\r\nis the relations themselves already subsisting between\r\nimpressions, when we become conscious of them, by which\r\nthe action of thought which is never anything but reaction,\r\nis attracted; and this action consists merely in interpreting\r\nrelations which we find existing between our passive impressions\r\ninto aspects of the matter of impressions.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_7_7\" id=\"FNanchor_7_7\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_7_7\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[7]\u003c/a\u003e And\r\nagain:\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_8_8\" id=\"FNanchor_8_8\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_8_8\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[8]\u003c/a\u003e \"Thought can make no difference where it finds\r\nnone already in the matter of the impressions.\" And\r\nagain:\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_9_9\" id=\"FNanchor_9_9\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_9_9\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[9]\u003c/a\u003e \"The possibility and the success of thought\u0027s procedure\r\ndepends upon this original constitution and organization\r\nof the whole world of ideas, a constitution which,\r\nthough not necessary in thought, is all the more necessary\r\nto make thinking possible.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe impressions and ideas play a versatile r\u0026ocirc;le; they now\r\nassume the part of ultimate antecedents and provocative\r\nconditions; of crude material; and somehow, when arranged,\r\nof content for thought. This very versatility awakens\r\nsuspicion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhile the impression is merely subjective and a bare state\r\nof our own consciousness, yet it is determined, both as to its\r\nexistence and as to its relation to other similar existences,\r\nby external objects as stimuli, if not as causes. It is also\r\ndetermined by a psychical mechanism so thoroughly objective\r\nor regular in its workings as to give the same necessary\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_31\" id=\"Page_31\"\u003e[Pg 31]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncharacter to the current of ideas that is possessed by any physical\r\nsequence. Thus that which is \"nothing but a state of\r\nour consciousness\" turns out straightway to be a specifically\r\ndetermined objective fact in a system of facts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat this absolute transformation is a contradiction is no\r\nclearer than that just such a contradiction is indispensable\r\nto Lotze. If the impressions were nothing but states of\r\nconsciousness, moods of ourselves, bare psychical existences,\r\nit is sure enough that we should never even know them to be\r\nsuch, to say nothing of conserving them as adequate conditions\r\nand material for thought. It is only by treating them\r\nas real facts in a real world, and only by carrying over into\r\nthem, in some assumed and unexplained way, the capacity\r\nof representing the cosmic facts which arouse them, that\r\nimpressions or ideas come in any sense within the scope of\r\nthought. But if the antecedents are really impressions-in-their-objective-setting,\r\nthen Lotze\u0027s whole way of distinguishing\r\nthought-worth from \u003ci\u003emere\u003c/i\u003e existence or event without\r\nobjective significance must be radically modified.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe implication that impressions have actually a matter\r\nor quality or meaning of their own becomes explicit when\r\nwe refer to Lotze\u0027s theory that the immediate antecedent of\r\nthought is found in the \u003ci\u003ematter\u003c/i\u003e of ideas. When thought is\r\nsaid to \"take cognizance of \u003ci\u003erelations\u003c/i\u003e which its own activity\r\ndoes not originate, but which have been prepared for it by\r\nthe unconscious mechanism of the psychic states,\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_10_10\" id=\"FNanchor_10_10\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_10_10\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[10]\u003c/a\u003e the attribution\r\nof objective content, of reference and meaning to\r\nideas, is unambiguous. The idea forms a most convenient\r\nhalf-way house for Lotze. On one hand, as absolutely prior\r\nto thought, as material antecedent condition, it is merely\r\npsychical, a bald subjective event. But as subject-matter for\r\nthought, as antecedent which affords stuff for thought\u0027s exercise,\r\nit is \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e, characteristic quality of content.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_32\" id=\"Page_32\"\u003e[Pg 32]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAlthough we have been told that the impression is a mere\r\nreceptive irritation without participation of mental activity,\r\nwe are not surprised, in view of this capacity of ideas, to learn\r\nthat the mind actually has a determining share in both the reception\r\nof stimuli and in their further associative combinations.\r\nThe subject always enters into the presentation of any\r\nmental object, even the sensational, to say nothing of the perceptional\r\nand the imaged. The perception of a given state of\r\nthings is possible only on the assumption that \"the perceiving\r\nsubject is at once enabled and compelled by its own\r\nnature to combine the excitations which reach it from\r\nobjects into those forms which it is to perceive in the objects,\r\nand which it supposes itself simply to \u003ci\u003ereceive\u003c/i\u003e from them.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_11_11\" id=\"FNanchor_11_11\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_11_11\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[11]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is only by continual transition from impression and\r\nideas as mental states and events to ideas as cognitive (or\r\nlogical) \u003ci\u003eobjects or contents\u003c/i\u003e, that Lotze bridges the gulf from\r\nbare exciting antecedent to concrete material conditions of\r\nthought. This contradiction, again, is necessary to Lotze\u0027s\r\nstandpoint. To set out frankly with \"meanings\" as antecedents\r\nwould demand reconsideration of the whole view-point,\r\nwhich supposes that the difference between the logical\r\nand its antecedent is a matter of the difference between \u003ci\u003eworth\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand mere \u003ci\u003eexistence\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eoccurrence\u003c/i\u003e. It would indicate that\r\nsince meaning or value is already there, the task of thought\r\nmust be that of the transformation or \u003ci\u003ereconstruction of worth\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthrough an intermediary process of valuation. On the other\r\nhand, to stick by the standpoint of \u003ci\u003emere\u003c/i\u003e existence is not to\r\nget anything which can be called even antecedent of thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. Why is there a task of transformation? Consideration\r\nof the material in its function of evoking thought, giving\r\nit its cue, will serve to complete the picture of the contradiction\r\nand of the real facts. It is the conflict between\r\nideas as merely coincident and ideas as coherent that con\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_33\" id=\"Page_33\"\u003e[Pg 33]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003estitutes\r\nthe need which provokes the response of thought.\r\nHere Lotze vibrates (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) between considering coincidence and\r\ncoherence as both affairs of existence of psychical events;\r\n(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) considering coincidence as purely psychical and coherence\r\nas at least quasi-logical, and (\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) the inherent logic which\r\nmakes them both determinations within the sphere of reflective\r\nthought. In strict accordance with his own premises,\r\ncoincidence and coherence both ought to be mere peculiarities\r\nof the current of ideas as events within ourselves. But so\r\ntaken the distinction becomes absolutely meaningless.\r\nEvents do not cohere; at the most certain sets of them happen\r\nmore or less frequently than other sets; the only intelligible\r\ndifference is one of repetition of coincidence. And even this\r\nattributes to an event the supernatural trait of reappearing\r\nafter it has disappeared. Even coincidence has to be\r\ndefined in terms of relation of the \u003ci\u003eobjects\u003c/i\u003e which are supposed\r\nto excite the psychical events that happen together.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs recent psychological discussion has made clear enough,\r\nit is the matter, meaning, or content, of ideas that is associated,\r\nnot the ideas as states or existences. Take such an\r\nidea as sun-revolving-about-earth. We may say it means\r\nthe conjunction of various sense-impressions, but it is conjunction,\r\nor mutual reference, of \u003ci\u003eattributes\u003c/i\u003e that we have in mind\r\nin the assertion. It is absolutely certain that our psychical\r\nimage of the sun is not psychically engaged in revolving\r\nabout our psychical image of the earth. It would be\r\namusing if such were the case; theaters and all dramatic\r\nrepresentations would be at a discount. In truth, sun-revolving-about-earth\r\nis a single meaning or idea; it is a\r\nunified subject-matter within which certain distinctions of\r\nreference appear. It is concerned with what we intend when\r\nwe think earth and sun, and think them in their relation to\r\neach other. It is really a specification or direction of how\r\nto think when we have occasion to think a certain subject-\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_34\" id=\"Page_34\"\u003e[Pg 34]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ematter.\r\nTo treat the origin of this mutual reference as if it\r\nwere simply a case of conjunction of ideas produced by conditions\r\nof original psycho-physical irritation and association\r\nis a profound case of the psychological fallacy. We may,\r\nindeed, analyze an experience and find that it had its origin\r\nin certain conditions of the sensitive organism, in certain\r\npeculiarities of perception and of association, and hence conclude\r\nthat the belief involved in it was not justified by the\r\nfacts themselves. But the significance of the belief in sun-revolving-about-earth\r\nas an item of the experience of those\r\nwho meant it, consisted precisely in the fact that it was taken\r\nnot as a mere association of feelings, but as a definite portion\r\nof the whole structure of objective experience, guaranteed\r\nby other parts of the fabric, and lending its support and\r\ngiving its tone to them. It was to them part of the experience-frame\r\nof things\u0026mdash;of the real universe.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePut the other way, if such an instance meant a mere conjunction\r\nof psychical states, there would be in it absolutely\r\nnothing to evoke thought. Each idea as event, as Lotze\r\nhimself points out (Vol. I, p. 2), may be regarded as adequately\r\nand necessarily determined to the place it occupies.\r\nThere is absolutely no question on the side of events of mere\r\ncoincidence \u003ci\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e genuine connection. As event, it is there\r\nand it belongs there. We cannot treat something as at once\r\nbare fact of existence and as problematic subject-matter of\r\nlogical inquiry. To take the reflective point of view is to\r\nconsider the matter in a totally new light; as Lotze says, it is\r\nto raise the question of rightful claims to a position or relation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe point becomes clearer when we contrast coincidence\r\nwith connection. To consider coincidence as simply psychical,\r\nand coherence as at least quasi-logical, is to put the\r\ntwo on such different bases that no question of contrasting\r\nthem can arise. The coincidence which precedes a valid or\r\ngrounded coherence (the conjunction which as coexistence\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_35\" id=\"Page_35\"\u003e[Pg 35]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof objects and sequence of acts is perfectly adequate) never\r\nis, as antecedent, the coincidence which is set over against\r\ncoherence. The side-by-sideness of books on my bookshelf,\r\nthe succession of noises that rise through my window,\r\ndo not as such trouble me logically. They do not appear as\r\nerrors or even as problems. One coexistence is just as good\r\nas any other until some new point of view, or new end, presents\r\nitself. If it is a question of the convenience of arrangement\r\nof books, then the value of their present collocation\r\nbecomes a problem. Then I may contrast their present bare\r\nconjunction with a scheme of possible coherence. If I regard\r\nthe sequence of noises as a case of articulate speech, their\r\norder becomes important\u0026mdash;it is a problem to be determined.\r\nThe inquiry whether a given combination means only apparent\r\nor real connection, shows that reflective inquiry is already\r\ngoing on. Does this phase of the moon really mean rain,\r\nor does it just happen that the rain-storm comes when the\r\nmoon has reached this phase? To ask such questions shows\r\nthat a certain portion of the universe of experience is subjected\r\nto critical analysis for purposes of definitive restatement.\r\nThe tendency to regard one combination as bare\r\nconjunction or mere coincidence is absolutely a \u003ci\u003epart\u003c/i\u003e of the\r\nmovement of mind in its search for the real connection.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf coexistence as such is to be set over against coherence\r\nas such, as the non-logical against the logical, then, since our\r\nwhole spatial universe is one of collocation, and since thought\r\nin this universe can never get farther than substituting one\r\ncollocation for another, the whole realm of space-experience\r\nis condemned off-hand and in perpetuity to anti-rationality.\r\nBut, in truth, coincidence as over against coherence, conjunction\r\nas over against connection, is just \u003ci\u003esuspected\u003c/i\u003e coherence,\r\none which is under the fire of active inquiry. The distinction\r\nis one which arises only within the grasp of the logical\r\nor reflective function.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_36\" id=\"Page_36\"\u003e[Pg 36]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. This brings us explicitly to the fact that there is no\r\nsuch thing as either coincidence or coherence in terms of the\r\nelements or meanings contained in any couple or pair of\r\nideas taken by itself. It is only when they are co-factors\r\nin a situation or function which includes more than either\r\nthe \"coincident\" or the \"coherent\" and more than the arithmetical\r\nsum of the two, that thought\u0027s activity can be\r\nevoked. Lotze is continually in this dilemma: Thought\r\neither shapes its own material or else just accepts it. In\r\nthe first case (since Lotze cannot rid himself of the presumption\r\nthat thought must have a fixed ready-made antecedent)\r\nits activity can only alter this stuff and thus lead the\r\nmind farther away from reality. But if thought just accepts\r\nits material, how can there be any distinctive aim or activity\r\nof thought at all? As we have seen, Lotze endeavors to\r\nescape this dilemma by supposing that, while thought receives\r\nits material, it yet checks it up: it eliminates certain portions\r\nof it and reinstates others, plus the stamp and seal of its own\r\nvalidity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLotze objects most strenuously to the notion that thought\r\nawaits its subject-matter with certain ready-made modes of\r\napprehension. This notion would raise the insoluble question\r\nof how thought contrives to bring the matter of each\r\nimpression under that particular form which is appropriate\r\nto it (Vol. I, p. 24). But he has not really avoided the difficulty.\r\nHow does thought know which of the combinations\r\nare merely coincident and which are merely coherent? How\r\ndoes it know which to eliminate as irrelevant and which to\r\nconfirm as grounded? Either this evaluation is an imposition\r\nof its own, or else gets its cue and clue from the\r\nsubject-matter. Now, if the coincident and the coherent\r\ntaken in and of themselves are competent to give this direction,\r\nthey are already practically labeled. The further work\r\nof thought is one of supererogation. It has at most barely\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_37\" id=\"Page_37\"\u003e[Pg 37]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto note and seal the material combinations that are already\r\nthere. Such a view clearly renders thought\u0027s work as\r\nunnecessary in form as it is futile in force.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut there is no alternative in this dilemma except to\r\nrecognize that an entire situation of experience, within which\r\nare both that afterward found to be mere coincidence and\r\nthat found to be real connection, actually provokes thought.\r\nIt is only as an experience previously accepted comes up in\r\nits wholeness against another one equally integral; and only\r\nas some larger experience dawns which requires each as a\r\npart of itself and yet within which the required factors show\r\nthemselves mutually incompatible, that thought arises. It\r\nis not bare coincidence, or bare connection, or bare addition\r\nof one to the other, that excites thought. It is a situation\r\nwhich is organized or constituted as a whole, and which yet\r\nis falling to pieces in its parts\u0026mdash;a situation which is in conflict\r\nwithin itself\u0026mdash;that arouses the search to find what really\r\ngoes together and a correspondent effort to shut out what\r\nonly seemingly belongs together. And real coherence means\r\nprecisely capacity to exist within the comprehending whole.\r\nIt is a case of the psychologist\u0027s fallacy to read back into the\r\npreliminary situation those distinctions of mere conjunction\r\nof material and of valid relationship which get existence, to\r\nsay nothing of fixation, only within the thought-process.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe must not leave this phase of the discussion, however,\r\nuntil it is quite clear that our objection is not to Lotze\u0027s\r\nposition that reflective thought arises from an antecedent\r\nwhich is not reflectional in character; nor yet to his idea that\r\nthis antecedent has a certain structure and content of its own\r\nsetting the peculiar problem which evokes thought and gives\r\nthe cue to its specific activities. On the contrary, it is this\r\nlatter point upon which we would insist; and, by insisting,\r\npoint out, negatively, that this view is absolutely inconsistent\r\nwith Lotze\u0027s theory that psychical impressions and ideas\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_38\" id=\"Page_38\"\u003e[Pg 38]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nare the true antecedents of thought; and, positively, that it is\r\nthe \u003ci\u003esituation as a whole\u003c/i\u003e, and not any one isolated part of it,\r\nor distinction within it, that calls forth and directs thinking.\r\nWe must beware the fallacy of assuming that some one element\r\nin the prior situation in isolation or detachment induces\r\nthe thought which in reality comes forth only from the\r\nwhole disturbed situation. On the negative side, characterizations\r\nof impression and idea (whether as mental contents\r\nor as psychical existences) are distinctions which arise only\r\nwithin reflection upon the situation which is the genuine\r\nantecedent of thought; while the distinction of psychical\r\nexistences from external existences arises only within a\r\nhighly elaborate technical reflection\u0026mdash;that of the psychologist\r\nas such.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_12_12\" id=\"FNanchor_12_12\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_12_12\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[12]\u003c/a\u003e Positively, it is the whole dynamic experience\r\nwith its qualitative and pervasive identity of value, and its\r\ninner distraction, its elements at odds with each other, in\r\ntension against each other, contending each for its proper\r\nplacing and relationship, that generates the thought-situation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom this point of view, at this period of development,\r\nthe distinctions of objective and subjective have a characteristic\r\nmeaning. The antecedent, to repeat, is a situation\r\nin which the various factors are actively incompatible with\r\neach other, and which yet in and through the striving tend to\r\na re-formation of the whole and to a restatement of the parts.\r\nThis situation as such is clearly objective. It is there; it is\r\nthere as a whole; the various parts are there; and their\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_39\" id=\"Page_39\"\u003e[Pg 39]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eactive incompatibility with one another is there. Nothing\r\nis conveyed at this point by asserting that any particular part\r\nof the situation is illusory or subjective, or mere appearance;\r\nor that any other is truly real. It is the further work of\r\n\u003ci\u003ethought\u003c/i\u003e to exclude some of the contending factors from membership\r\nin experience, and thus to relegate them to the\r\nsphere of the merely subjective. But just at this epoch\r\nthe experience exists as one of vital and active confusion\r\nand conflict. The conflict is not only objective in a \u003ci\u003ede facto\u003c/i\u003e\r\nsense (that is, really existent), but is objective in a logical\r\nsense as well; it is just this conflict which effects the transition\r\ninto the thought-situation\u0026mdash;this, in turn, being only a\r\nconstant movement toward a defined equilibrium. The conflict\r\nhas objective logical value because it is the antecedent\r\ncondition and cue of thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEvery reflective attitude and function, whether of na\u0026iuml;ve\r\nlife, deliberate invention, or controlled scientific research,\r\nhas risen through the medium of some such total objective\r\nsituation. The abstract logician may tell us that sensations\r\nor impressions, or associated ideas, or bare physical\r\nthings, or conventional symbols, are antecedent conditions.\r\nBut such statements cannot be verified by reference to a\r\nsingle instance of thought in connection with actual practice\r\nor actual scientific research. Of course, by extreme mediation\r\nsymbols may become conditions of evoking thought.\r\nThey get to be objects in an active experience. But they are\r\nstimuli only in case their manipulation to form a new whole\r\noccasions resistance, and thus reciprocal tension. Symbols\r\nand their definitions develop to a point where dealing with\r\nthem becomes itself an experience, having its own identity;\r\njust as the handling of commercial commodities, or arrangement\r\nof parts of an invention, is an individual experience.\r\nThere is always as antecedent to thought an experience of some\r\nsubject-matter of the physical or social world, or organized\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_40\" id=\"Page_40\"\u003e[Pg 40]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nintellectual world, whose parts are actively at war with each\r\nother\u0026mdash;so much so that they threaten to disrupt the entire\r\nexperience, which accordingly for its own maintenance\r\nrequires deliberate re-definition and re-relation of its tensional\r\nparts. This is the reconstructive process termed\r\nthinking: the reconstructive situation, with its parts in tension\r\nand in such movement toward each other as tends to a\r\nunified experience, is the thought-situation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis at once suggests the subjective phase. The situation,\r\nthe experience as such, is objective. There is an\r\nexperience of the confused and conflicting tendencies. But\r\njust \u003ci\u003ewhat in particular\u003c/i\u003e is objective, just \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e form the situation\r\nshall take as an organized harmonious whole, is\r\nunknown; that is the problem. It is the uncertainty as\r\nto the \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e of the experience together with the certainty\r\n\u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e there is such an experience, that evokes the thought-function.\r\nViewed from this standpoint of uncertainty, the\r\nsituation as a whole is subjective. No particular content or\r\nreference can be asserted off-hand. Definite assertion is\r\nexpressly reserved\u0026mdash;it is to be the outcome of the procedure\r\nof reflective inquiry now undertaken. This holding\r\noff of contents from definitely asserted position, this viewing\r\nthem as candidates for reform, is what we mean at this stage\r\nof the natural history of thought by the subjective.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have followed Lotze through his tortuous course of\r\ninconsistencies. It is better, perhaps, to run the risk of\r\nvain repetition, than that of leaving the impression that these\r\nare \u003ci\u003emere\u003c/i\u003e self-contradictions. It is an idle task to expose\r\ncontradictions save we realize them in relation to the\r\nfundamental assumption which breeds them. Lotze is\r\nbound to differentiate thought from its antecedents. He is\r\nintent to do this, however, through a preconception that\r\nmarks off the thought-situation radically from its predecessor,\r\nthrough a difference that is complete, fixed, and absolute,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_41\" id=\"Page_41\"\u003e[Pg 41]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor at large. It is a total contrast of thought as such to\r\nsomething else as such that he requires, not a contrast within\r\nexperience of one phase of a process, one period of a rhythm,\r\nfrom others.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis complete and rigid difference Lotze finds in the\r\ndifference between an experience which is \u003ci\u003emere existence\u003c/i\u003e or\r\noccurrence, and one which has to do with worth, truth, right\r\nrelationship. Now things, objects, have already, implicitly\r\nat least, determinations of worth, of truth, reality, etc. The\r\nsame is true of deeds, affections, etc., etc. Only states of\r\nfeelings, bare impressions, etc., seem to fulfil the prerequisite\r\nof being given as existence, and yet without qualification\r\nas to worth, etc. Then the current of ideas offers itself,\r\na ready-made stream of events, of existences, which can be\r\ncharacterized as wholly innocent of reflective determination,\r\nand as the natural predecessor of thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut this stream of existences is no sooner there than its\r\ntotal incapacity to officiate as material condition and cue of\r\nthought appears. It is about as relevant as are changes that\r\nmay be happening on the other side of the moon. So, one\r\nby one, the whole series of determinations of value or\r\nworth already traced are introduced \u003ci\u003einto\u003c/i\u003e the very make-up,\r\nthe inner structure, of what was to be \u003ci\u003emere\u003c/i\u003e existence:\r\nviz., (1) value as determined by things of whose spatial and\r\ntemporal relations the things are somehow \u003ci\u003erepresentative\u003c/i\u003e;\r\n(2) hence, value in the shape of \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;the idea as significant,\r\npossessed of quality, and not a mere event; (3) distinguished\r\nvalues of coincidence and coherence within the\r\nstream. All these kinds of value are explicitly asserted, as\r\nwe have seen; underlying and running through them all is\r\nthe recognition of the supreme value of a situation which is\r\norganized as a whole, yet conflicting in its inner constitution.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese contradictions all arise in the attempt to put\r\nthought\u0027s work, as concerned with value or validity over\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_42\" id=\"Page_42\"\u003e[Pg 42]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nagainst experience as a mere antecedent happening, or occurrence.\r\nSince this contrast arises because of the deeper\r\nattempt to consider thought as an independent somewhat in\r\ngeneral which yet, in \u003ci\u003eour\u003c/i\u003e experience, is specifically dependent,\r\nthe sole radical avoiding of the contradictions can be found\r\nin the endeavor to characterize thought as a specific mode of\r\nvaluation in the evolution of significant experience, having its\r\nown specific occasion or demand, and its own specific place.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe nature of the organization and value that the antecedent\r\nconditions of the thought-function possess is too large\r\na question here to enter upon in detail. Lotze himself\r\nsuggests the answer. He speaks of the current of ideas, just\r\nas a current, supplying us with the \"mass of well-grounded\r\ninformation which \u003ci\u003eregulates\u003c/i\u003e daily life\" (Vol. I, p. 4). It\r\ngives rise to \"\u003ci\u003euseful combinations\u003c/i\u003e,\" \"\u003ci\u003ecorrect expectations\u003c/i\u003e,\"\r\n\"\u003ci\u003eseasonable reactions\u003c/i\u003e\" (Vol. I, p. 7). He speaks of it,\r\nindeed, as if it were just the ordinary world of na\u0026iuml;ve experience,\r\nthe so-called empirical world, as distinct from the\r\nworld as critically revised and rationalized in scientific and\r\nphilosophic inquiry. The contradiction between this interpretation\r\nand that of a mere stream of psychical impressions\r\nis only another instance of the difficulty already discussed.\r\nBut the phraseology suggests the type of value possessed by\r\nit. The unreflective world is a world of practical values; of\r\nends and means, of their effective adaptations; of control\r\nand regulation of conduct in view of results. Even the most\r\npurely utilitarian of values are nevertheless values; not \u003ci\u003emere\u003c/i\u003e\r\nexistences. But the world of uncritical experience is saved\r\nfrom reduction to just material uses and worths; for it is a\r\nworld of social aims and means, involving at every turn the\r\nvalues of affection and attachment, of competition and\r\nco-operation. It has incorporate also in its own being the\r\nsurprise of \u0026aelig;sthetic values\u0026mdash;the sudden joy of light, the\r\ngracious wonder of tone and form.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_43\" id=\"Page_43\"\u003e[Pg 43]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI do not mean that this holds in gross of the unreflective\r\nworld of experience over against the critical thought-situation\u0026mdash;such\r\na contrast implies the very wholesale, at\r\nlarge, consideration of thought which I am striving to avoid.\r\nDoubtless many and many an act of thought has intervened\r\nin effecting the organization of our commonest practical-affectional-\u0026aelig;sthetic\r\nregion of values. I only mean to\r\nindicate that thought does take place in such a world; not\r\n\u003ci\u003eafter\u003c/i\u003e a world of bare existences lacking value-specifications;\r\nand that the more systematic reflection we call\r\norganized science, may, in some fair sense, be said to come\r\n\u003ci\u003eafter\u003c/i\u003e, but to come after affectional, artistic, and technological\r\ninterests which have found realization and expression in\r\nbuilding up a world of values.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHaving entered so far upon a suggestion which cannot be\r\nfollowed out, I venture one other digression. The notion\r\nthat value or significance as distinct from mere existentiality\r\nis the product of thought or reason, and that the source of\r\nLotze\u0027s contradictions lies in the effort to find \u003ci\u003eany\u003c/i\u003e situation\r\nprior or antecedent to thought, is a familiar one\u0026mdash;it is\r\neven possible that my criticisms of Lotze have been interpreted\r\nby some readers in this sense.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_13_13\" id=\"FNanchor_13_13\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_13_13\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[13]\u003c/a\u003e This is the position\r\nfrequently called neo-Hegelian (though, I think, with\r\nquestionable accuracy), and has been developed by many\r\nwriters in criticising Kant. This position and that taken\r\nin this chapter do indeed agree in certain general regards.\r\nThey are at one in denial of the factuality and the possi\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_44\" id=\"Page_44\"\u003e[Pg 44]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ebility\r\nof developing fruitful reflection out of antecedent\r\nbare existence or mere events. They unite in denying that\r\nthere is or can be any such thing as mere existence\u0026mdash;phenomenon\r\nunqualified as respects meaning, whether such\r\nphenomenon be psychic or cosmic. They agree that reflective\r\nthought grows organically out of an experience which is\r\nalready organized, and that it functions within such an organism.\r\nBut they part company when a fundamental question\r\nis raised: Is all organized meaning the work of thought?\r\nDoes it therefore follow that the organization out of which\r\nreflective thought grows is the work of thought of some\r\nother type\u0026mdash;of Pure Thought, Creative or Constitutive\r\nThought, Intuitive Reason, etc.? I shall indicate briefly\r\nthe reasons for divergence at this point.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo cover all the practical-social-\u0026aelig;sthetic values involved,\r\nthe term \"thought\" has to be so stretched that the situation\r\nmight as well be called by any other name that describes\r\na typical value of experience. More specifically, when the\r\ndifference is minimized between the organized and arranged\r\nscheme of values out of which reflective inquiry proceeds,\r\nand reflective inquiry itself (and there can be no other reason\r\nfor insisting that the antecedent of reflective thought\r\nis itself somehow thought), exactly the same type of problem\r\nrecurs that presents itself when the distinction is\r\nexaggerated into one between bare unvalued existences and\r\nrational coherent meanings.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the more one insists that the antecedent situation is\r\nconstituted by thought, the more one has to wonder why\r\nanother type of thought is required; what need arouses it,\r\nand how it is possible for it to improve upon the work of\r\nprevious constitutive thought. This difficulty at once forces\r\nus from a logic of experience as it is concretely experienced\r\ninto a metaphysic of a purely hypothetical experience. Constitutive\r\nthought precedes \u003ci\u003eour\u003c/i\u003e conscious thought-operations;\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_45\" id=\"Page_45\"\u003e[Pg 45]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhence it must be the working of some absolute universal\r\nthought which, unconsciously to our reflection, builds up an\r\norganized world. But this recourse only deepens the difficulty.\r\nHow does it happen that the absolute constitutive and intuitive\r\nThought does such a poor and bungling job that it\r\nrequires a finite discursive activity to patch up its products?\r\nHere more metaphysic is called for: The Absolute Reason\r\nis now supposed to work under limiting conditions of finitude,\r\nof a sensitive and temporal organism. The antecedents of\r\nreflective thought are not, therefore, determinations of\r\nthought pure and undefiled, but of what thought can do\r\nwhen it stoops to assume the yoke of change and of feeling.\r\nI pass by the metaphysical problem left unsolved by this flight\r\ninto metaphysic: Why and how should a perfect, absolute,\r\ncomplete, finished thought find it necessary to submit to\r\nalien, disturbing, and corrupting conditions in order, in the\r\nend, to recover through reflective thought in a partial, piecemeal,\r\nwholly inadequate way what it possessed at the outset\r\nin a much more satisfactory way?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI confine myself to the logical difficulty. How can\r\nthought relate itself to the fragmentary sensations, impressions,\r\nfeelings, which, in their contrast with and disparity\r\nfrom the workings of constitutive thought, mark it off from\r\nthe latter; and which in their connection with its products\r\ngive the cue to reflective thinking? \u003ci\u003eHere we have again\r\nexactly the problem with which Lotze has been wrestling\u003c/i\u003e:\r\nwe have the same insoluble question of the reference of\r\nthought-activity to a wholly indeterminate unrationalized,\r\nindependent, prior existence. The absolute rationalist who\r\ntakes up the problem at this point will find himself forced\r\ninto the same continuous seesaw, the same scheme of alternate\r\nrude robbery and gratuitous gift, that Lotze engaged\r\nin. The simple fact is that here \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e just where Lotze himself\r\nbegan; he saw that previous transcendental logicians had\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_46\" id=\"Page_46\"\u003e[Pg 46]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nleft untouched the specific question of relation of \u003ci\u003eour\u003c/i\u003e supposedly\r\nfinite, reflective thought to its own antecedents, and\r\nhe set out to make good the defect. If reflective thought is\r\nrequired because constitutive thought works under externally\r\nlimiting conditions of sense, then we have some elements\r\nwhich are, after all, mere existences, events, etc. Or,\r\nif they have organization from some other source, and induce\r\nreflective thought not as bare impressions, etc., but through\r\ntheir place in some whole, then we have admitted the possibility\r\nof organic unity in experience, apart from Reason,\r\nand the ground for assuming Pure Constitutive Thought is\r\nabandoned.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe contradiction appears equally when viewed from the\r\nside of thought-activity and its characteristic forms. All our\r\nknowledge, after all, of thought as constitutive is gained by\r\nconsideration of the operations of reflective thought. The\r\nperfect system of thought is so perfect that it is a luminous,\r\nharmonious whole, without definite parts or distinctions\u0026mdash;or,\r\nif there are such, it is only reflection that brings them\r\nout. The categories and methods of constitutive thought\r\nitself must therefore be characterized in terms of the \u003ci\u003emodus\r\noperandi\u003c/i\u003e of reflective thought. Yet the latter takes place\r\njust because of the peculiar problem of the peculiar conditions\r\nunder which it arises. Its work is progressive, reformatory,\r\nreconstructive, synthetic, in the terminology made familiar\r\nby Kant. We are not only \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e justified, accordingly, in\r\ntransferring its determinations over to constitutive thought,\r\nbut we are absolutely prohibited from attempting any such\r\ntransfer. To identify logical processes, states, devices, results\r\nthat are conditioned upon the primary fact of resistance to\r\nthought as constitutive with the structure of such thought is\r\nas complete an instance of the fallacy of recourse from one\r\ngenus to another as could well be found. Constitutive and\r\nreflective thought are, first, defined in terms of their dissimi\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_47\" id=\"Page_47\"\u003e[Pg 47]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003elarity\r\nand even opposition, and then without more ado the\r\nforms of the description of the latter are carried over bodily\r\nto the former!\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_14_14\" id=\"FNanchor_14_14\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_14_14\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[14]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is not meant for a merely controversial criticism. It\r\nis meant to point positively toward the fundamental thesis of\r\nthese chapters: All the distinctions of the thought-function,\r\nof conception as over against sense-perception, of judgment in\r\nits various modes and forms, of inference in its vast diversity\r\nof operation\u0026mdash;all these distinctions come within the thought-situation\r\nas growing out of a characteristic antecedent typical\r\nformation of experience; and have for their purpose the solution\r\nof the peculiar problem with respect to which the\r\nthought-function is generated or evolved: the restoration of\r\na deliberately integrated experience from the inherent conflict\r\ninto which it has fallen.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe failure of transcendental logic has the same origin as\r\nthe failure of the empiristic (whether taken pure or in the\r\nmixed form in which Lotze presents it). It makes absolute\r\nand fixed certain distinctions of existence and meaning, and\r\nof one kind of meaning and another kind, which are wholly\r\nhistoric and relative in their origin and their significance.\r\nIt views thought as attempting to represent or state reality\r\nonce for all, instead of trying to determine some phases or\r\ncontents of it with reference to their more effective and\r\nsignificant reciprocal employ\u0026mdash;instead of as reconstructive.\r\nThe rock against which every such logic splits is that either\r\nreality already has the statement which thought is endeavoring\r\nto give it, or else it has not. In the former case, thought\r\nis futilely reiterative; in the latter, it is falsificatory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe significance of Lotze for critical purposes is that his\r\npeculiar effort to combine a transcendental view of thought\r\n(\u003ci\u003ei. e.\u003c/i\u003e, of Thought as active in forms of its own, pure in and\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_48\" id=\"Page_48\"\u003e[Pg 48]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof themselves) with certain obvious facts of the dependence\r\nof our thought upon specific empirical antecedents, brings\r\nto light fundamental defects in both the empiristic and the\r\ntranscendental logics. We discover a common failure in\r\nboth: the failure to view logical terms and distinctions with\r\nrespect to their necessary function in the redintegration of\r\nexperience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_49\" id=\"Page_49\"\u003e[Pg 49]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"III\" id=\"III\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eIII\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eTHOUGHT AND ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: THE DATUM OF\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTHINKING\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have now reached a second epochal stage in the evolution\r\nof the thought-situation, a crisis which forces upon\r\nus the problem of the distinction and mutual reference\r\nof the datum or presentation, and the ideas or \"thoughts.\"\r\nIt will economize and perhaps clarify discussion if we start from\r\nthe relatively positive and constructive result just reached,\r\nand review Lotze\u0027s treatment from that point of regard.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have reached the point of conflict in the matters or\r\ncontents of an experience. It is \u003ci\u003ein\u003c/i\u003e this conflict and because\r\nof it that the matters or contents, or significant quales, stand\r\nout as such. As long as the sun revolves about earth without\r\ntension or question, this \"content,\" or fact, is not in any way\r\nabstracted \u003ci\u003eas\u003c/i\u003e content or object. Its very distinction as\r\ncontent from the form or mode of experience as such is the\r\nresult of post-reflection. The same conflict makes other\r\nexperiences assume conscious objectification; they, too, cease\r\nto be ways of living, and become distinct objects of observation\r\nand consideration. The movements of planets, eclipses,\r\netc., are cases in point.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_15_15\" id=\"FNanchor_15_15\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_15_15\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[15]\u003c/a\u003e The maintenance of a unified experience\r\nhas become a problem, an end. It is no longer secure.\r\nBut this involves such restatement of the conflicting elements\r\nas will enable them to take a place somewhere in the\r\nnew experience; they must be disposed of somehow, and they\r\ncan be disposed of finally only as they are provided for. That\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_50\" id=\"Page_50\"\u003e[Pg 50]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis, they cannot be simply denied or excluded or eliminated;\r\nthey must be taken into the fold of the new experience;\r\nsuch introduction, on the other hand, clearly demands more\r\nor less modification or transformation on their part. The\r\nthought-situation is the conscious maintenance of the unity\r\nof experience, with a critical consideration of the claims of\r\nthe various conflicting contents to a place within itself, and\r\na deliberate final assignment of position.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe conflicting situation inevitably polarizes or dichotomizes\r\nitself. There is somewhat which is untouched in the contention\r\nof incompatibles. There is something which remains\r\nsecure, unquestioned. On the other hand, there are elements\r\nwhich are rendered doubtful and precarious. This\r\ngives the framework of the general distribution of the field\r\ninto \"facts,\" the given, the presented, the Datum; and ideas,\r\nthe ideal, the conceived, the Thought. For there is always\r\nsomething unquestioned in any problematic situation at any\r\nstage of its process,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_16_16\" id=\"FNanchor_16_16\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_16_16\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[16]\u003c/a\u003e even if it be only the fact of conflict or\r\ntension. For this is never \u003ci\u003emere\u003c/i\u003e tension at large. It is\r\nthoroughly qualified, or characteristically toned and colored,\r\nby the particular elements which are in strife. Hence it is\r\n\u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e conflict, unique and irreplaceable. That it comes now\r\nmeans precisely that it has never come before; that it is\r\nnow passed in review and some sort of a settlement reached,\r\nmeans that just \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e conflict will never recur. In a word,\r\nthe conflict as such is immediately expressed, or felt, as of\r\njust this and no other sort, and this immediately apprehended\r\nquality is an irreducible datum. \u003ci\u003eIt\u003c/i\u003e is fact, even if\r\nall else be \u003ci\u003edoubtful\u003c/i\u003e. As it is subjected to examination, it\r\nloses vagueness and assumes more definite form.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_51\" id=\"Page_51\"\u003e[Pg 51]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOnly in very extreme cases, however, does the assured,\r\nunquestioned element reduce to as low terms as we have\r\nhere imagined. Certain things come to stand forth as facts,\r\nno matter what else may be doubted. There are certain\r\n\u003ci\u003eapparent\u003c/i\u003e diurnal changes of the sun; there is a certain\r\nannual course or track. There are certain nocturnal changes\r\nin the planets, and certain seasonal rhythmic paths. The\r\nsignificance of these may be doubted: Do they \u003ci\u003emean\u003c/i\u003e real\r\nchange in the sun or in the earth? But change, and change\r\nof a certain definite and numerically determinate character\r\nis there. It is clear that such out-standing facts (ex-istences)\r\nconstitute the data, the given or presented, of the thought-function.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is obvious that this is only one correspondent, or status,\r\nin the total situation. With the consciousness of \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e as certain,\r\nas given to be reckoned with, goes the consciousness of\r\nuncertainty as to \u003ci\u003ewhat it means\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;of how it is to be understood\r\nor interpreted. The facts \u003ci\u003equa\u003c/i\u003e presentation or existences\r\nare sure; \u003ci\u003equa\u003c/i\u003e meaning (position and relationship in an\r\nexperience yet to be secured) they are doubtful. Yet doubt\r\ndoes not preclude memory or anticipation. Indeed, it is\r\npossible only through them. The memory of past experience\r\nmakes sun-revolving-about-earth an object of attentive\r\nregard. The recollection of certain other experiences suggests\r\nthe idea of earth-rotating-daily-on-axis and revolving-annually-about-sun.\r\nThese contents are as much present\r\nas is the observation of change, but as respects worth,\r\nthey are only possibilities. Accordingly, they are categorized\r\nor disposed of as just ideas, meanings, thoughts, ways\r\nof conceiving, comprehending, interpreting facts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCorrespondence of reference here is as obvious as correlation\r\nof existence. In the logical process, the datum is not\r\njust real existence, and the idea mere psychical unreality.\r\nBoth are modes of existence\u0026mdash;one of \u003ci\u003egiven\u003c/i\u003e existence, the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_52\" id=\"Page_52\"\u003e[Pg 52]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nother of \u003ci\u003emental\u003c/i\u003e existence. And if the mental existence is in\r\nsuch cases regarded, from the standpoint of the unified\r\nexperience aimed at, as having only \u003ci\u003epossible\u003c/i\u003e value, the datum\r\nalso is regarded, from the value standpoint, as incomplete and\r\nunassured. The very existence of the idea or meaning as\r\nseparate \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e the partial, broken up, and hence objectively\r\nunreal (from the validity standpoint) character of the datum.\r\nOr, as we commonly put it, while the ideas are impressions,\r\nsuggestions, guesses, theories, estimates, etc., the facts are\r\ncrude, raw, unorganized, brute. They lack relationship, that\r\nis, assured place in the universe; they are deficient as to continuity.\r\nMere change of apparent position of sun, which is\r\nabsolutely unquestioned as datum, is a sheer abstraction\r\nfrom the standpoint either of the organized experience left\r\nbehind, or of the reorganized experience which is the end\u0026mdash;the\r\nobjective. It is impossible as a persistent object in experience\r\nor reality. In other words, datum and ideatum are\r\ndivisions of labor, co-operative instrumentalities, for economical\r\ndealing with the problem of the maintenance of the\r\nintegrity of experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOnce more, and briefly, both datum and ideatum may\r\n(and positively, veritably, do) break up, each for itself, into\r\nphysical and psychical. In so far as the conviction gains\r\nground that the earth revolves about the sun, the old fact is\r\nbroken up into a new cosmic existence, and a new psychological\r\ncondition\u0026mdash;the recognition of a mental process in virtue of\r\nwhich movements of smaller bodies in relation to very remote\r\nlarger bodies are interpreted in a reverse sense. We do\r\nnot just eliminate as false the source of error in the old content.\r\nWe reinterpret it as valid in its own place, viz., a case\r\nof the psychology of apperception, although invalid as a\r\nmatter of cosmic structure. In other words, with increasing\r\naccuracy of determination of the given, there comes a distinction,\r\nfor methodological purposes, between the \u003ci\u003equality\u003c/i\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_53\" id=\"Page_53\"\u003e[Pg 53]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor matter of the sense-experience and its \u003ci\u003eform\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;the sense-perceiving,\r\nas itself a psychological fact, having its own place\r\nand laws or relations. Moreover, the old experience, that\r\nof sun-revolving, abides. But it is regarded as belonging to\r\n\"me\"\u0026mdash;to this experiencing individual, rather than to the\r\ncosmic world. It is \u003ci\u003epsychic\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHere, then, \u003ci\u003ewithin\u003c/i\u003e the growth of the thought-situation\r\nand as a part of the process of determining \u003ci\u003especific\u003c/i\u003e truth\r\nunder \u003ci\u003especific\u003c/i\u003e conditions, we get for the first time the clue\r\nto that distinction with which, as ready-made and prior to all\r\nthinking, Lotze started out, namely, the separation of the\r\nmatter of impression from impression as psychical event.\r\nThe separation which, taken at large, engenders an insoluble\r\nproblem, appears within a particular reflective inquiry,\r\nas an inevitable differentiation of a scheme of values.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe same sort of thing occurs on the side of thought, or\r\nmeaning. The meaning or idea which is growing in acceptance,\r\nwhich is gaining ground as meaning-of-datum, gets\r\nlogical or intellectual or objective force; that which is losing\r\nstanding, which is increasingly doubtful, gets qualified as\r\njust a notion, a fancy, a pre-judice, mis-conception\u0026mdash;or finally\r\njust an error, a mental slip.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEvaluated as fanciful in validity it becomes mere image\u0026mdash;subjective;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_17_17\" id=\"FNanchor_17_17\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_17_17\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[17]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand finally a psychical existence. It is not\r\neliminated, but receives a new reference or meaning. Thus\r\nthe distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is not\r\none between meaning as such and datum as such. It is a\r\nspecification that emerges, correspondently, in \u003ci\u003eboth\u003c/i\u003e datum\r\nand ideatum, as affairs of the direction of logical movement.\r\nThat which is left behind in the evolution of accepted meaning\r\nis characterized as real, but only in a psychical sense;\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_54\" id=\"Page_54\"\u003e[Pg 54]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ethat which is moved toward is regarded as real in an objective,\r\ncosmic sense.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_18_18\" id=\"FNanchor_18_18\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_18_18\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[18]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe implication of the psychic and the logical within\r\nboth the given presentation and the thought about it, appears\r\nin the continual shift to which logicians of Lotze\u0027s type are\r\nput. When the psychical is regarded as existence over\r\nagainst meaning as just ideal, reality seems to reside in the\r\npsychical; it is \u003ci\u003ethere\u003c/i\u003e anyhow, and meaning is just a curious\r\nattachment\u0026mdash;curious because as \u003ci\u003emere meaning\u003c/i\u003e it is non-existent\r\nas event or state\u0026mdash;and there seems to be nothing by\r\nwhich it can be even tied to the psychical state as its bearer\r\nor representative. But when the emphasis falls on thought\r\nas \u003ci\u003econtent\u003c/i\u003e, as significance, then the psychic event, the idea as\r\nimage\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_19_19\" id=\"FNanchor_19_19\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_19_19\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[19]\u003c/a\u003e (as distinct from idea as meaning) appears as an\r\naccidental but necessary evil, the unfortunate irrelevant\r\nmedium through which \u003ci\u003eour\u003c/i\u003e thinking has to go on.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_20_20\" id=\"FNanchor_20_20\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_20_20\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[20]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_55\" id=\"Page_55\"\u003e[Pg 55]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1. \u003ci\u003eThe data of thought.\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;When we turn to Lotze,\r\nwe find that he makes a clear distinction between the presented\r\nmaterial of thought, its datum, and the typical characteristic\r\nmodes of thinking in virtue of which the datum gets\r\norganization or system. It is interesting to note also that\r\nhe states the datum in terms different from those in which\r\nthe antecedents of thought are defined. From the point of\r\nview of the material upon which ideas exercise themselves,\r\nit is not coincidence, collocation, or succession that counts;\r\nbut gradation of degrees in a scale. It is not things in\r\nspatial or temporal grouping that are emphasized, but qualities\r\nas mutually distinguished, yet classed\u0026mdash;as differences\r\nof a common somewhat. There is no inherent inconceivability\r\nin the idea that every impression should be as incomparably\r\ndifferent from every other as sweet is from warm.\r\nBut by a remarkable circumstance such is not the case.\r\nWe have series, and networks of series. We have diversity\r\nof a common\u0026mdash;diverse colors, sounds, smells, tastes, etc. In\r\nother words, the datum is sense-qualities which, fortunately\r\nfor thought, are given arranged, as shades, degrees, variations,\r\nor qualities of somewhat that is identical.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_21_21\" id=\"FNanchor_21_21\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_21_21\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[21]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll this is given, presented, to our ideational activities.\r\nEven the universal, the common-color which runs through\r\nthe various qualities of blue, green, white, etc., is not a\r\nproduct of thought, but something which thought finds\r\nalready in existence. It conditions comparison and reciprocal\r\ndistinction. Particularly all mathematical determinations,\r\nwhether of counting (number), degree (more or less),\r\nand quantity (greatness and smallness), come back to this\r\npeculiarity of the datum of thought. Here Lotze dwells at\r\nconsiderable length upon the fact that the very possibility, as\r\nwell as the success, of thought is due to this peculiar universalization\r\nor \u003ci\u003eprima facie\u003c/i\u003e ordering with which its material\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_56\" id=\"Page_56\"\u003e[Pg 56]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eis given to it. Such pre-established fitness in the meeting\r\nof two things that have nothing to do with each other is\r\ncertainly cause enough for wonder and congratulation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt should not be difficult to see why Lotze uses different\r\ncategories in describing the given material of thought from\r\nthose employed in describing its antecedent conditions,\r\neven though, according to him, the two are absolutely the\r\nsame.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_22_22\" id=\"FNanchor_22_22\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_22_22\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[22]\u003c/a\u003e He has different \u003ci\u003efunctions\u003c/i\u003e in mind. In one case,\r\nthe material must be characterized as evoking, as incentive,\r\nas stimulus\u0026mdash;from this point of view the peculiar combination\r\nof coincidence and coherence is emphasized. But in\r\nthe other case the material must be characterized as affording\r\nstuff, actual subject-matter. Data are not only what is\r\ngiven \u003ci\u003eto\u003c/i\u003e thought, but they are also the food, the raw material,\r\n\u003ci\u003eof\u003c/i\u003e thought. They must be described as, on the one\r\nhand, wholly outside of thought. This clearly puts them\r\ninto the region of sense-perception. They are matter of\r\n\u003ci\u003esensation\u003c/i\u003e given free from all inferring, judging, relating\r\ninfluence. Sensation is just what is \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e called up in memory\r\nor in anticipated projection\u0026mdash;it is the immediate, the\r\nirreducible. On the other hand, sensory-\u003ci\u003ematter\u003c/i\u003e is quali\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_57\" id=\"Page_57\"\u003e[Pg 57]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etative,\r\nand quales are made up on a common basis. They\r\nare degrees or grades of a common quality. Thus they\r\nhave a certain ready-made setting of mutual distinction and\r\nreference which is already almost, if not quite, the effect of\r\ncomparing, of relating, and these are the express traits of\r\nthinking.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is easy to interpret this miraculous gift of grace in\r\nthe light of what has been said. The data are in truth\r\nprecisely that which is selected and set aside \u003ci\u003eas\u003c/i\u003e present, as\r\nimmediate. Thus they are \u003ci\u003egiven\u003c/i\u003e to \u003ci\u003efurther\u003c/i\u003e thought. But\r\nthe selection has occurred in view of the need for thought;\r\nit is a listing of the capital in the way of the undisturbed,\r\nthe undiscussed, which thought can count upon in this\r\nparticular problem. Hence it is not strange that it has a\r\npeculiar fitness of adaptation for thought\u0027s further work.\r\nHaving been selected with precisely that end in view, the\r\nwonder would be if it were not so fitted. A man may coin\r\ncounterfeit money for use upon others, but hardly with the\r\nintent of passing it off upon himself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur only difficulty here is that the mind flies away from\r\nthe logical interpretation of sense-datum to a ready-made\r\nnotion of it brought over from abstract psychological\r\ninquiry. The belief in sensory quales as somehow forced\r\nupon us, and forced upon us at large, and thus conditioning\r\nthought wholly \u003ci\u003eab extra\u003c/i\u003e, instead of determining it as\r\ninstrumentalities or elements in its own scheme, is too\r\nfixed. Such qualities \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e forced upon us, but \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e at large.\r\nThe sensory data of experience, as distinct from the psychologists\u0027\r\nconstructs, always come \u003ci\u003ein a context\u003c/i\u003e; they always\r\nappear as variations in a continuum of values. Even the\r\nthunder which breaks in upon me (to take the extreme of\r\napparent discontinuity and irrelevancy) disturbs me because\r\nit is taken as a part of the same space-world as that in\r\nwhich my chair and room and house are located; and it is\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_58\" id=\"Page_58\"\u003e[Pg 58]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntaken as an influence which interrupts and disturbs, \u003ci\u003ebecause\u003c/i\u003e\r\nit is part of my common world of causes and effects.\r\nThe solution of continuity is itself practical or teleological,\r\nand thus presupposes and affects continuity of purpose,\r\noccupations, and means in a life-process. It is not metaphysics,\r\nit is biology which enforces the idea that actual\r\nsensation is not only determined as an event in a world of\r\nevents,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_23_23\" id=\"FNanchor_23_23\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_23_23\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[23]\u003c/a\u003e but is an occurrence occurring at a certain period in\r\nthe evolution of experience, marking a certain point in\r\nits cycle, and, consequently\u0026mdash;having always its own conscious\r\ncontext and bearings\u0026mdash;is a characteristic function of\r\nreconstruction in experience.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_24_24\" id=\"FNanchor_24_24\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_24_24\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[24]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. \u003ci\u003eForms of thinking data.\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;As sensory datum is material\r\nset for the work of thought, so the ideational forms with\r\nwhich thought does its work are apt and prompt to meet\r\nthe needs of the material. The \"accessory\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_25_25\" id=\"FNanchor_25_25\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_25_25\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[25]\u003c/a\u003e notion of\r\nground of coherence turns out, in truth, not to be a formal,\r\nor external, addition to the data, but a requalification of\r\nthem. Thought is accessory as accomplice, not as addendum.\r\n\"Thought\" is to eliminate mere coincidence, and to\r\nassert grounded coherence. Lotze makes it absolutely clear\r\nthat he does not at bottom conceive of \"thought\" as an\r\nactivity \"in itself\" imposing a form of coherence; but that\r\nthe organizing work of \"thought\" is only the progressive\r\nrealization of an inherent unity, or system, in the material\r\nexperience. The specific modes in which thought brings\r\nits \"accessory\" power to bear\u0026mdash;names, conception, judgment,\r\nand inference\u0026mdash;are successive stages in the adequate\r\norganization of the matter which comes to us first as\r\ndatum; they are successive stages of the effort to overcome the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_59\" id=\"Page_59\"\u003e[Pg 59]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\noriginal defects of the datum. Conception starts from the\r\ngiven universal (the common element) of sense. Yet (and\r\nthis is the significant point) it does not simply abstract this\r\ncommon element, and consciously generalize it as over\r\nagainst its own differences. Such a \"universal\" is \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e\r\ncoherence, just because it does not \u003ci\u003einclude\u003c/i\u003e and dominate the\r\ntemporal and local heterogeneity. The \u003ci\u003etrue\u003c/i\u003e concept (see\r\nVol. I, p. 38) is a system of attributes, held together on the\r\nbasis of some ground, or determining, dominating principle\u0026mdash;a\r\nground which so controls all its own instances as to make\r\nthem into an inwardly connected whole, and so specifies its\r\nown limits as to be exclusive of all else. If we abstract color\r\nas the common element of various colors, the result is not a\r\nscientific idea or concept. Discovery of a process of light-waves\r\nwhose various rates constitute the various colors of the\r\nspectrum gives the concept. And when we get such a concept,\r\nthe former mere temporal abruptness of color experiences\r\ngives way to organic parts of a color system. The\r\nlogical product\u0026mdash;the concept, in other words\u0026mdash;is not a formal\r\nseal or stamp; it is a thoroughgoing transformation of data\r\nin a given sense.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe form or mode of thought which marks the continued\r\ntransformation of the data and the idea in reference to each\r\nother is judgment. Judgment makes explicit the assumption\r\nof a principle which determines connection within an\r\nindividualized whole. It definitely states red as \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e case or\r\ninstance of the law or process of color, and thus overcomes\r\nfurther the defect in \u003ci\u003esubject-matter\u003c/i\u003e or data still left by conception.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_26_26\" id=\"FNanchor_26_26\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_26_26\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[26]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nNow judgment logically terminates in disjunction.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_60\" id=\"Page_60\"\u003e[Pg 60]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIt gives a universal which may determine any one of a number\r\nof alternative defined particulars, but which is arbitrary\r\nas to \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e one is selected. Systematic \u003ci\u003einference\u003c/i\u003e brings to\r\nlight the material conditions under which the law, or dominating\r\nuniversal, applies to this, rather than that alternative\r\nparticular, and so completes the ideal organization of the\r\nsubject-matter. If this act were complete, we should finally\r\nhave present to us a whole on which we should know the\r\ndetermining and effective or authorizing elements, and the\r\norder of development or hierarchy of dependence, in which\r\nothers follow from them.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_27_27\" id=\"FNanchor_27_27\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_27_27\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[27]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this account by Lotze of the operations of the forms\r\nof thought, there is clearly put before us the picture of a\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_61\" id=\"Page_61\"\u003e[Pg 61]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncontinuous correlative determination of datum on one side\r\nand of idea or meaning on the other, till experience is again\r\nintegral, data thoroughly defined and corrected, and ideas\r\ncompletely incarnate as the relevant meaning of subject-matter.\r\nThat we have here in outline a description of what\r\nactually occurs there can be no doubt. But there is as little\r\ndoubt that it is thoroughly inconsistent with Lotze\u0027s supposition\r\nthat the material or data of thought is precisely the same\r\nas the antecedents of thought; or that ideas, conceptions, are\r\npurely mental somewhats brought to bear, as the sole essential\r\ncharacteristics of thought, extraneously upon a material\r\nprovided ready-made. It means but one thing: The maintenance\r\nof unity and wholeness in experience through conflicting\r\ncontents occurs by means of a strictly correspondent\r\nsetting apart of fact to be accurately described and properly\r\nrelated, and meaning to be adequately construed and properly\r\nreferred. The datum is given \u003ci\u003ein\u003c/i\u003e the thought-situation,\r\nand \u003ci\u003eto\u003c/i\u003e further qualification of ideas or meanings. But even\r\nin this aspect it presents a problem. To find out \u003ci\u003ewhat is\u003c/i\u003e\r\ngiven is an inquiry which taxes reflection to the uttermost.\r\nEvery important advance in scientific method means better\r\nagencies, more skilled technique for simply detaching and\r\ndescribing what is barely there, or given. To be able to find\r\nout what can safely be taken as \u003ci\u003ethere\u003c/i\u003e, as given in any particular\r\ninquiry, and hence be taken as material for orderly and\r\nverifiable thinking, for fruitful hypothesis-making, for entertaining\r\nof explanatory and interpretative ideas, is one phase\r\nof the effort of systematic scientific inquiry. It marks its\r\ninductive phase. To take what is given \u003ci\u003ein\u003c/i\u003e the thought-situation,\r\nfor the sake of accomplishing the aim of thought\r\n(along with a correlative discrimination of ideas or meanings),\r\nas if it were given absolutely, or apart from a particular historic\r\nsitus and context, is the fallacy of empiricism as a\r\nlogical theory. To regard the thought-forms of conception,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_62\" id=\"Page_62\"\u003e[Pg 62]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\njudgment, and inference as qualifications of \"pure thought,\r\napart from any difference in objects,\" instead of as successive\r\ndispositions in the progressive organization of the material\r\n(or objects) is the fallacy of rationalism. Lotze attempts to\r\ncombine the two, thinking thereby to correct each by the\r\nother.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLotze recognizes the futility of thought if the sense-data\r\nare final, if they alone are real, the truly existent,\r\nself-justificatory and valid. He sees that, if the empiricist\r\nwere right in his assumption as to the real worth of the\r\ngiven data, thinking would be a ridiculous pretender,\r\neither toilfully and poorly doing over again what needs no\r\ndoing, or making a wilful departure from truth. He realizes\r\nthat thought really is evoked because it is needed, and that\r\nit has a work to do which is not merely formal, but which\r\neffects a modification of the subject-matter of experience.\r\nConsequently he assumes a thought-in-itself, with certain\r\nforms and modes of action of its own, a realm of meaning\r\npossessed of a directive and normative worth of its\r\nown\u0026mdash;the root-fallacy of rationalism. His attempted compromise\r\nbetween the two turns out to be based on the\r\nassumption of the indefensible ideas of both\u0026mdash;the notion\r\nof an independent matter of thought, on one side, and of\r\nan independent worth or value of thought-forms, on the other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis pointing out of inconsistencies becomes stale and\r\nunprofitable save as we bring them back into connection\r\nwith their root-origin\u0026mdash;the erection of distinctions that are\r\ngenetic and historic, and working or instrumental divisions of\r\nlabor, into rigid and ready-made differences of structural reality.\r\nLotze clearly recognizes that thought\u0027s nature is dependent\r\nupon its aim, its aim upon its problem, and this upon the\r\nsituation in which it finds its incentive and excuse. Its\r\nwork is cut out for it. It does not what it would, but what\r\nit must. As Lotze puts it, \"Logic has to do with thought,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_63\" id=\"Page_63\"\u003e[Pg 63]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnot as it would be under hypothetical conditions, but as it is\"\r\n(Vol. I, p. 33), and this statement is made in explicit combination\r\nwith statements to the effect that the peculiarity of the\r\nmaterial of thought conditions its activity. Similarly he says\r\nin a passage already referred to: \"The possibility and the\r\nsuccess of thought\u0027s production in general depends upon this\r\noriginal constitution and organization of the whole world of\r\nideas, a constitution which, though not necessary in thought,\r\nis all the more necessary to make thought possible.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_28_28\" id=\"FNanchor_28_28\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_28_28\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[28]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs we have seen, the essential nature of conception, judgment,\r\nand inference is dependent upon peculiarities of the\r\npropounded material, they being forms dependent for their\r\nsignificance upon the stage of organization in which they\r\nbegin.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom this only one conclusion is suggested. If thought\u0027s\r\nnature is dependent upon its actual conditions and circumstances,\r\nthe primary logical problem is to study thought-in-its-conditioning;\r\nit is to detect the crisis within which\r\nthought and its subject-matter present themselves in their\r\nmutual distinction and cross-reference. But Lotze is so\r\nthoroughly committed to a ready-made antecedent of some\r\nsort, that this genetic consideration is of no account to him.\r\nThe historic method is a mere matter of psychology, and has\r\nno logical worth (Vol. I, p. 2). We must presuppose a\r\npsychological mechanism and psychological material, but\r\nlogic is concerned not with origin or history, but with\r\nauthority, worth, value (Vol. I, p. 10). Again: \"Logic is\r\nnot concerned with the manner in which the elements utilized\r\nby thought come into existence, but their value\r\n\u003ci\u003eafter\u003c/i\u003e they have somehow come into existence, for the carrying\r\nout of intellectual operations\" (Vol. I, p. 34). And\r\nfinally: \"I have maintained throughout my work that\r\nlogic cannot derive any serious advantage from a discussion\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_64\" id=\"Page_64\"\u003e[Pg 64]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof \u003ci\u003ethe conditions under which thought as a psychological\r\nprocess comes about\u003c/i\u003e. The significance of logical forms …\r\nis to be found in the utterances of thought, the laws which\r\nit imposes, after or during the act of thinking, not in the\r\nconditions which lie back of and which produce thought.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_29_29\" id=\"FNanchor_29_29\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_29_29\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[29]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLotze, in truth, represents a halting-stage in the evolution\r\nof logical theory. He is too far along to be contented\r\nwith the reiteration of the purely formal distinctions of\r\na merely formal thought-by-itself. He recognizes that\r\nthought as formal is the form of some matter, and has its\r\nworth only as organizing that matter to meet the ideal\r\ndemands of reason; and that \"reason\" is in truth only an\r\nideal systematization of the matter or content. Consequently\r\nhe has to open the door to admit \"psychical processes\"\r\nwhich furnish this material. Having let in the material, he\r\nis bound to shut the door again in the face of the processes\r\nfrom which the material proceeded\u0026mdash;to dismiss them as\r\nimpertinent intruders. If thought gets its data in such a\r\nsurreptitious manner, there is no occasion for wonder that\r\nthe legitimacy of its dealings with the material remains an\r\nopen question. Logical theory, like every branch of the\r\nphilosophic disciplines, waits upon a surrender of the obstinate\r\nconviction that, while the work and aim of thought is\r\nconditioned by the material supplied to it, yet the \u003ci\u003eworth\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nits performances is something to be passed upon in complete\r\nabstraction from conditions of origin and development.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_65\" id=\"Page_65\"\u003e[Pg 65]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"IV\" id=\"IV\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eIV\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eTHOUGHT AND ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: THE CONTENT AND\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nOBJECT OF THOUGHT\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the foregoing discussion, particularly in the last chapter,\r\nwe were led repeatedly to recognize that thought has its\r\nown content. At times Lotze gives way to the tendency to\r\ndefine thought entirely in terms of modes and forms of\r\nactivity which are exercised by it upon a strictly foreign\r\nmaterial. But two motives continually push him in the other\r\ndirection. (1) Thought has a distinctive work to do, one\r\nwhich involves a qualitative transformation of (at least) the\r\n\u003ci\u003erelationships\u003c/i\u003e of the presented matter; as fast as it accomplishes\r\nthis work, the subject-matter becomes somehow\r\nthought\u0027s own. As we have just seen, the data are progressively\r\norganized to meet thought\u0027s ideal of a complete\r\nwhole, with its members interconnected according to a\r\ndetermining principle. Such progressive organization\r\nthrows backward doubt upon the assumption of the original\r\ntotal irrelevancy of the data and thought-form to each\r\nother. (2) A like motive operates from the side of the\r\nsubject-matter. As merely foreign and external, it is too\r\nheterogeneous to lend itself to thought\u0027s exercise and\r\ninfluence. The idea, as we saw in the first chapter, is the\r\nconvenient medium through which Lotze passes from the\r\npurely heterogeneous psychical impression or event, which\r\nis totally irrelevant to thought\u0027s purpose and working, over\r\nto a state of affairs which can reward thought. Idea as\r\nmeaning forms the bridge from the brute factuality of the\r\npsychical impression over to the coherent value of thought\u0027s\r\nown content.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_66\" id=\"Page_66\"\u003e[Pg 66]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have, in this chapter, to consider the question of the\r\nidea or content of thought from two points of view: first,\r\nthe \u003ci\u003epossibility\u003c/i\u003e of such a content\u0026mdash;its consistency with\r\nLotze\u0027s fundamental premises; secondly, its \u003ci\u003eobjective\u003c/i\u003e character\u0026mdash;its\r\nvalidity and test.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI. The question of the possibility of a specific content\r\nof thought is the question of the nature of the idea as\r\nmeaning. Meaning is the characteristic content of thought\r\nas such. We have thus far left unquestioned Lotze\u0027s continual\r\nassumption of meaning as a sort of thought-unit; the\r\nbuilding-stone of thought\u0027s construction. In his treatment\r\nof meaning, Lotze\u0027s contradictions regarding the\r\nantecedents, data, and content of thought reach their full\r\nconclusion. He expressly makes meaning to be the product\r\nof thought\u0027s activity and also the unreflective material out\r\nof which thought\u0027s operations grow.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis contradiction has been worked out in accurate and\r\ncomplete detail by Professor Jones.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_30_30\" id=\"FNanchor_30_30\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_30_30\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[30]\u003c/a\u003e He summarizes it as\r\nfollows (p. 99): \"No other way was left to him [Lotze]\r\nexcepting this of first attributing all to sense and afterwards\r\nattributing all to thought, and, finally of attributing it to\r\nthought only because it was already in its material. This\r\n\u003ci\u003eseesaw\u003c/i\u003e is essential to his theory; the elements of knowledge\r\nas he describes them can subsist only by the alternate\r\nrobbery of each other.\" We have already seen how strenuously\r\nLotze insists upon the fact that the given subject-matter\r\nof thought is to be regarded wholly as the work of a physical\r\nmechanism, \"without any action of thought.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_31_31\" id=\"FNanchor_31_31\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_31_31\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[31]\u003c/a\u003e But Lotze also\r\nstates that if the products of the psychical mechanism \"are\r\nto admit of combination in the definite form of a \u003ci\u003ethought\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthey each require some previous shaping to make them into\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_67\" id=\"Page_67\"\u003e[Pg 67]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlogical building-stones and to convert them from \u003ci\u003eimpressions\u003c/i\u003e\r\ninto \u003ci\u003eideas\u003c/i\u003e. Nothing is really more familiar to us than this first\r\noperation of thought; the only reason why we usually overlook\r\nit is that in the language which we inherit, it is already\r\ncarried out, and it seems, therefore, to belong to the self-evident\r\npresuppositions of thought, \u003ci\u003enot to its own specific\r\nwork\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_32_32\" id=\"FNanchor_32_32\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_32_32\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[32]\u003c/a\u003e And again (Vol. I, p. 23) judgments \"can consist\r\nof nothing but combinations of ideas which are no longer\r\nmere impressions: every such idea must have undergone at\r\nleast the simple formation mentioned above.\" Such ideas\r\nare, Lotze goes on to urge, already rudimentary concepts\u0026mdash;that\r\nis to say, logical determinations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe obviousness of the logical contradiction of attributing\r\nto a preliminary specific work of thought exactly the\r\ncondition of affairs which is elsewhere explicitly attributed\r\nto a psychical mechanism prior to any thought-activity,\r\nshould not blind us to its meaning and relative necessity.\r\nThe impression, it will be recalled, is a mere state of our\r\nown consciousness\u0026mdash;a mood of ourselves. As such it has\r\nsimply \u003ci\u003ede facto\u003c/i\u003e relations as an event to other similar events.\r\nBut reflective thought is concerned with the relationship of\r\na content or matter to other contents. Hence the impression\r\nmust have a matter before it can come at all within\r\nthe sphere of thought\u0027s exercise. How shall it secure\r\nthis? Why, by a preliminary activity of thought which\r\nobjectifies the impression. Blue as a mere sensuous irritation\r\nor feeling is given a quality, the meaning \"blue\"\u0026mdash;blueness;\r\nthe sense-impression is objectified; it is presented\r\n\"no longer as a condition which we undergo, but\r\nas a something which has its being and its meaning in itself,\r\nand which continues to be what it is, and to mean what it\r\nmeans whether we are conscious of it or not. It is easy to\r\nsee here the \u003ci\u003enecessary beginning of that activity which we\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_68\" id=\"Page_68\"\u003e[Pg 68]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nabove appropriated to thought as such\u003c/i\u003e: it has not yet got\r\nso far as converting coexistence into coherence. It has first\r\nto perform the previous task of investing each single impression\r\nwith an independent validity, without which the later\r\nopposition of their real coherence to mere coexistence could\r\nnot be made in any intelligible sense.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_33_33\" id=\"FNanchor_33_33\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_33_33\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[33]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis objectification, which converts a sensitive state into\r\na sensible matter to which the sensitive state is referred,\r\nalso gives this matter \"position,\" a certain typical character.\r\nIt is not objectified in a merely general way, but is given a\r\nspecific sort of objectivity. Of these kinds of objectivity\r\nthere are three mentioned: that of a substantive content;\r\nthat of an attached dependent content; that of an active\r\nrelationship connecting the various contents with each other.\r\nIn short, we have the types of meaning embodied in language\r\nin the form of nouns, adjectives, and verbs. It is through this\r\npreliminary formative activity of thought that reflective or\r\n\u003ci\u003elogical\u003c/i\u003e thought has presented to it a world of meanings\r\nranged in an order of relative independence and dependence,\r\nand ranged as elements in a complex of meanings whose\r\nvarious constituent parts mutually influence each other\u0027s\r\nmeanings.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_34_34\" id=\"FNanchor_34_34\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_34_34\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[34]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs usual, Lotze mediates the contradiction between\r\nmaterial constituted \u003ci\u003eby\u003c/i\u003e thought and the same material just\r\npresented \u003ci\u003eto\u003c/i\u003e thought, by a further position so disparate to\r\neach that, taken in connection with each in a pair, and by\r\nturns, it seems to bridge the gulf. After describing the\r\nprior constitutive work of thought as above, he goes on to\r\ndiscuss a \u003ci\u003esecond\u003c/i\u003e phase of thought which is intermediary\r\nbetween this and the third phase, viz., reflective thought\r\nproper. This second activity is that of arranging experi\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_69\" id=\"Page_69\"\u003e[Pg 69]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eenced\r\nquales in series and groups, thus ascribing a sort of\r\nuniversal or common somewhat to various instances (as\r\nalready described; see p. 55). On one hand, it is clearly\r\nstated that this second phase of thought\u0027s activity is in reality\r\nthe \u003ci\u003esame\u003c/i\u003e as the first phase: since all objectification\r\ninvolves positing, since positing involves distinction of one\r\nmatter from others, and since this involves placing it in a\r\nseries or group in which each is measurably marked off, as to\r\nthe degree and nature of its diversity, from every other. We\r\nare told that we are only considering \"a really inseparable\r\noperation\" of thought from two different sides: first, as to\r\nthe effect which objectifying thought has upon the matter\r\nas set over against the feeling \u003ci\u003esubject\u003c/i\u003e, secondly, the effect\r\nwhich this objectification has upon the matter in relation\r\nto \u003ci\u003eother matters\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_35_35\" id=\"FNanchor_35_35\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_35_35\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[35]\u003c/a\u003e Afterward, however, these two operations\r\nare declared to be radically different in type and nature.\r\nThe first is determinant and formative; it gives ideas \"the\r\nshape without which the logical spirit could not accept them.\"\r\nIn a way it dictates \"its own laws to its object-matter.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_36_36\" id=\"FNanchor_36_36\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_36_36\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[36]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe second activity of thought is rather passive and receptive.\r\nIt simply recognizes what is already there. \"Thought\r\ncan make no difference where it finds none already in the\r\nmatter of impressions.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_37_37\" id=\"FNanchor_37_37\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_37_37\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[37]\u003c/a\u003e \"The first universal, as we saw,\r\ncan only be experienced in immediate sensation. It is\r\nno product of thought, but something that thought finds\r\nalready in existence.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_38_38\" id=\"FNanchor_38_38\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_38_38\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[38]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_70\" id=\"Page_70\"\u003e[Pg 70]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe obviousness of this further contradiction is paralleled\r\nonly by its inevitableness. Thought is in the air, is arbitrary\r\nand wild in dealing with meanings, unless it gets its\r\nstart and cue from actual experience. Hence the necessity\r\nof insisting upon thought\u0027s activity as just recognizing the\r\ncontents already given. But, on the other hand, prior to the\r\nwork of thought there is to Lotze no content or meaning. It\r\nrequires a work of thought to detach anything from the flux of\r\nsense-irritations and invest it with a meaning of its own. This\r\ndilemma is inevitable to any writer who declines to consider\r\nas correlative the nature of thought-activity and thought-content\r\nfrom the standpoint of their generating conditions in\r\nthe movement of experience. Viewed from such a standpoint\r\nthe principle of solution is clear enough. As we have already\r\nseen (p. 53), the internal dissension of an experience leads\r\nto detaching certain values previously absorptively integrated\r\ninto the concrete experience as part of its own qualitative\r\ncoloring; and to relegating them, for the time being,\r\n(pending integration into further immediate values of a reconstituted\r\nexperience) into a world of bare meanings, a sphere\r\nqualified as ideal throughout. These meanings then become\r\nthe tools of thought in interpreting the data, just as the sense-qualities\r\nwhich define the presented situation are the immediate\r\nobject to thought. The two \u003ci\u003eas mutually referred\u003c/i\u003e are\r\ncontent. That is, the datum and the thought-mode or idea\r\nas connected are the object of thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo reach this unification is thought\u0027s objective or goal.\r\nExactly the same value is idea, as either tool or content, according\r\nas it is taken as instrumental or as accomplishment.\r\nEvery successive cross-section of the thought-situation presents\r\nwhat may be taken for granted as the outcome of\r\nprevious thinking, and consequently as the determinant of\r\nfurther reflective procedure. Taken as defining the point\r\nreached in the thought-function and serving as constituent\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_71\" id=\"Page_71\"\u003e[Pg 71]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nunit of further thought, it is content. Lotze\u0027s instinct is sure\r\nin identifying and setting over against each other the material\r\ngiven to thought and the content which is thought\u0027s own\r\n\"building-stone.\" His contradictions arise simply from the\r\nfact that his absolute, non-historic method does not permit\r\nhim to interpret this joint identity and distinction in a working,\r\nand hence relative, sense.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eII. The question of how the possibility of meanings, or\r\nthought-contents, is to be understood merges imperceptibly\r\ninto the question of the real objectivity or validity of such\r\ncontents. The difficulty for Lotze is the now familiar one:\r\nSo far as his logic compels him to insist that these meanings\r\nare the possession and product of thought (since thought is\r\nan independent activity), the ideas are merely ideas; there is\r\nno test of objectivity beyond the thoroughly unsatisfactory\r\nand formal one of their own mutual consistency. In reaction\r\nfrom this Lotze is thrown back upon the idea of these contents\r\nas the original matter given in the impressions themselves.\r\nHere there seems to be an objective or external test\r\nby which the reality of thought\u0027s operations may be tried; a\r\ngiven idea is verified or found false according to its measure\r\nof correspondence with the matter of experience as such.\r\nBut now we are no better off. The original independence\r\nand heterogeneity of impressions and of thought is so great\r\nthat there is no way to compare the results of the latter with\r\nthe former. We cannot compare or contrast distinctions of\r\nworth with bare differences of factual existence (Vol. I, p. 2).\r\nThe standard or test of objectivity is so thoroughly external\r\nthat by original definition it is wholly outside the realm of\r\nthought. How can thought compare its own contents with\r\nthat which is wholly outside itself?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOr again, the given material of experience apart from\r\nthought is precisely the relatively chaotic and unorganized;\r\nit even reduces itself to a mere sequence of psychical events.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_72\" id=\"Page_72\"\u003e[Pg 72]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nWhat rational meaning is there in directing us to compare\r\nthe highest results of scientific inquiry with the bare sequence\r\nof our own states of feeling; or even with the original\r\ndata whose fragmentary and uncertain character was the\r\nexact motive for entering upon scientific inquiry? How can\r\nthe former in any sense give a check or test of the value of\r\nthe latter? This is professedly to test the validity of a system\r\nof meanings by comparison with that whose defects and\r\nerrors call forth the construction of the system of meanings\r\nby which to rectify and replace themselves. Our subsequent\r\ninquiry simply consists in tracing some of the phases of the\r\ncharacteristic seesaw from one to the other of the two horns\r\nof the now familiar dilemma: either thought is separate\r\nfrom the matter of experience, and then its validity is wholly\r\nits own private business; or else the objective results of\r\nthought are already in the antecedent material, and then\r\nthought is either unnecessary, or else has no way of checking\r\nits own performances.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. Lotze assumes, as we have seen, a certain independent\r\nvalidity in each meaning or qualified content, taken in and of\r\nitself. \"Blue\" has a certain validity, or meaning, in and of\r\nitself; it is an object for consciousness as such. After the\r\noriginal sense-irritation through which it was mediated has\r\nentirely disappeared, it persists as a valid idea, as a meaning.\r\nMoreover, it is an object or content of thought for\r\nothers as well. Thus it has a double mark of validity: in\r\nthe comparison of one part of my own experience with\r\nanother, and in the comparison of my experience as a whole\r\nwith that of others. Here we have a sort of validity which\r\ndoes not raise at all the question of \u003ci\u003emetaphysical\u003c/i\u003e reality\r\n(Vol. I, pp. 14, 15). Lotze thus seems to have escaped\r\nfrom the necessity of employing as check or test for the\r\nvalidity of ideas any reference to a real outside the sphere\r\nof thought itself. Such terms as \"conjunction,\" \"fran\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_73\" id=\"Page_73\"\u003e[Pg 73]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003echise,\"\r\n\"constitution,\" \"algebraic zero,\" etc., etc., claim to\r\npossess objective validity. Yet none of these professes\r\nto refer to a reality beyond thought. Generalizing this\r\npoint of view, validity or objectivity of meaning means\r\nsimply that which is \"identical for all consciousness\" (Vol.\r\nI, p. 3); \"it is quite indifferent whether certain parts of the\r\nworld of thought indicate something which has beside an\r\nindependent reality outside of thinking minds, or whether\r\nall that it contains exists only in the thoughts of those who\r\nthink it, but with equal validity for them all\" (Vol. I, p. 16).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo far it seems clear sailing. Difficulties, however, show\r\nthemselves, the moment we inquire what is meant by a\r\nself-identical content for all thought. Is this to be taken in\r\na static or in a dynamic way? That is to say: Does it\r\nexpress the fact that a given content or meaning is \u003ci\u003ede facto\u003c/i\u003e\r\npresented to the consciousness of all alike? Does this\r\ncoequal presence guarantee an objectivity? Or does validity\r\nattach to a given meaning or content in so far as it directs\r\nand controls the further exercise of thinking, and thus the\r\nformation of further \u003ci\u003enew\u003c/i\u003e contents of consciousness?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe former interpretation is alone consistent with Lotze\u0027s\r\nnotion that the independent idea as such is invested with a\r\ncertain validity or objectivity. It alone is consistent with\r\nhis assertion that concepts precede judgments. It alone, that\r\nis to say, is consistent with the notion that reflective thinking\r\nhas a sphere of ideas or meanings supplied to it at the\r\noutset. But it is impossible to entertain this belief. The\r\nstimulus which, according to Lotze, goads thought on from\r\nideas or concepts to judgments and inferences, is in truth\r\nsimply the lack of validity, of objectivity in its original independent\r\nmeanings or contents. A meaning as independent\r\nis precisely that which is not invested with validity, but\r\nwhich is a mere idea, a \"notion,\" a fancy, at best a\r\nsurmise which may turn out to be valid (and of course\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_74\" id=\"Page_74\"\u003e[Pg 74]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthis indicates possible reference); a standpoint to have its\r\nvalue determined by its further active use. \"Blue\" as a\r\nmere detached floating meaning, an idea at large, would\r\nnot gain in validity simply by being entertained continuously\r\nin a given consciousness; or by being made at one\r\nand the same time the persistent object of attentive regard\r\nby all human consciousnesses. If this were all that were\r\nrequired, the chimera, the centaur, or any other subjective\r\nconstruction, could easily gain validity. \"Christian Science\"\r\nhas made just this notion the basis of its philosophy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe simple fact is that in such illustrations as \"blue,\"\r\n\"franchise,\" \"conjunction,\" Lotze instinctively takes cases\r\nwhich are not mere independent and detached meanings,\r\nbut which involve reference to a region of cosmic experience,\r\nor to a region of mutually determining social activities.\r\nThe conception that reference to a \u003ci\u003esocial\u003c/i\u003e activity does not\r\ninvolve the same sort of reference of thought beyond itself\r\nthat is involved in physical matters, and hence may be taken\r\nquite innocent and free of the metaphysical problem of\r\nreference to reality beyond meaning, is one of the strangest\r\nthat has ever found lodgment in human thinking. Either\r\nboth physical and social reference or neither, is metaphysical;\r\nif neither, then it is because the meaning functions, as\r\nit originates, in a specific situation which carries with it\r\nits own tests (see p. 17). Lotze\u0027s conception is made possible\r\nonly by unconsciously substituting the idea of object as content\r\nof thought for a large number of persons (or a \u003ci\u003ede facto\u003c/i\u003e\r\nsomewhat for every consciousness), for the genuine definition\r\nof object as a determinant in a scheme of experience.\r\nThe former is consistent with Lotze\u0027s conception of thought,\r\nbut wholly indeterminate as to validity or intent. The\r\nlatter is the test used experimentally in all concrete thinking,\r\nbut involves a radical transformation of all Lotze\u0027s assumptions.\r\nA given idea of the conjunction of the franchise, or\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_75\" id=\"Page_75\"\u003e[Pg 75]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof blue, is valid, not because everybody happens to entertain\r\nit, but because it expresses the factor of control or direction\r\nin a given movement of experience. The test of validity\r\nof idea\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_39_39\" id=\"FNanchor_39_39\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_39_39\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[39]\u003c/a\u003e is its functional or instrumental use in effecting\r\nthe transition from a relatively conflicting experience to a\r\nrelatively integrated one. If Lotze\u0027s view were correct,\r\n\"blue\" valid once would be valid always\u0026mdash;even when red\r\nor green were actually called for to fulfil specific conditions.\r\nThis is to say validity always refers to rightfulness or\r\nadequacy of performance in an asserting of connection\u0026mdash;not\r\nto the meaning as detached and contemplated.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we refer again to the fact that the genuine antecedent\r\nof thought is a situation which is tensional as regards its\r\nexisting status, or disorganized in its structural elements,\r\nyet organized as emerging out of the unified experience\r\nof the past and as striving as a whole, or equally in all its\r\nphases, to reinstate an experience harmonized in make-up, we\r\ncan easily understand how certain contents may be detached\r\nand held apart as meanings or references, actual or possible\r\n(according as they are viewed with reference to the past\r\nor to the future). We can understand how such detached\r\ncontents may be of use in effecting a review of the entire\r\nexperience, and as affording standpoints and methods of a\r\nreconstruction which will maintain the integrity of experience.\r\nWe can understand how validity of meaning is\r\nmeasured by reference to something which is not mere\r\nmeaning; by reference to something which lies beyond the\r\nidea as such\u0026mdash;viz., the reconstitution of an experience into\r\nwhich thought enters as mediator. That paradox of ordinary\r\nexperience and of scientific inquiry by which objectivity is\r\ngiven alike to matter of perception and to conceived relations\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_76\" id=\"Page_76\"\u003e[Pg 76]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u0026mdash;to\r\nfacts and to laws\u0026mdash;affords no peculiar difficulty, because\r\nwe see that the test of objectivity is everywhere the same:\r\nanything is objective in so far as, through the medium\r\nof conflict, it controls the movement of experience in its\r\nreconstructive transition from one unified form to another.\r\nThere is not first an object, whether of sense-perception or\r\nof conception, which afterward somehow exercises this controlling\r\ninfluence; but the objective is such in virtue of the\r\nexercise of function of control. It may only control the act\r\nof inquiry; it may only set on foot doubt, but this is direction\r\nof subsequent experience, and, in so far, is a token of\r\nobjectivity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo much for the thought-content or meaning as having\r\na validity of its own. It does not have it as isolated or\r\ngiven or static; it has it in its dynamic reference, its use in\r\ndetermining further movement of experience. In other\r\nwords, the \"meaning\" or idea as such, having been selected\r\nand made-up with reference to performing a certain office in\r\nthe evolution of a unified experience, can be tested in no\r\nother way than by discovering whether it does what it was\r\nintended to do and what it purports to do.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_40_40\" id=\"FNanchor_40_40\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_40_40\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[40]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. Lotze has to wrestle with this question of validity in a\r\nfurther aspect: What constitutes the objectivity of thinking\r\nas a total attitude, activity, or function? According to his\r\nown statement, the meanings or valid ideas are after all only\r\nbuilding-stones for logical thought. Validity is thus not a\r\nquestion of them in their independent existences, but of their\r\nmutual reference to each other. Thinking is the process of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_77\" id=\"Page_77\"\u003e[Pg 77]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninstituting these mutual references; of building up the\r\nvarious scattered and independent building-stones into the\r\ncoherent system of thought. What is the validity of the\r\nvarious forms of thinking which find expression in the\r\nvarious types of judgment and in the various forms of inference?\r\nCategorical, hypothetical, disjunctive judgment; inference\r\nby induction, by analogy, by mathematical equation;\r\nclassification, theory of explanation\u0026mdash;all these are processes\r\nof reflection by which mutual connection in an individualized\r\nwhole is given to the fragmentary meanings or ideas with\r\nwhich thought as it sets out is supplied. What shall we say\r\nof the validity of such processes?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn one point Lotze is quite clear. These various logical\r\nacts do not really enter into the constitution of the valid\r\nworld. The logical forms as such are maintained \u003ci\u003eonly\u003c/i\u003e in\r\nthe process of thinking. The world of valid truth does not\r\nundergo a series of contortions and evolutions, paralleling in\r\nany way the successive steps and missteps, the succession of\r\ntentative trials, withdrawals, and retracings, which mark the\r\ncourse of our own thinking.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_41_41\" id=\"FNanchor_41_41\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_41_41\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[41]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLotze is explicit upon the point that it is only the thought-content\r\nin which the process of thinking issues that has objective\r\nvalidity; the act of thinking is \"purely and simply an\r\ninner movement of our own minds, made necessary to us by\r\nreason of the constitution of our nature and of our place\r\nin the world\" (Vol. II, p. 279).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHere the problem of validity presents itself as the problem\r\nof the relation of the act of thinking to its own product.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_78\" id=\"Page_78\"\u003e[Pg 78]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIn his solution Lotze uses two metaphors: one derived from\r\nbuilding operations, the other from traveling. The construction\r\nof a building requires of necessity certain tools and\r\nextraneous constructions, stagings, scaffoldings, etc., which\r\nare necessary to effect the final construction, but yet which\r\ndo not enter into the building as such. The activity has an\r\ninstrumental, though not a constitutive, value as regards its\r\nproduct. Similarly, in order to get a view from the top of\r\na mountain\u0026mdash;this view being the objective\u0026mdash;the traveler\r\nhas to go through preliminary movements along devious\r\ncourses. These again are antecedent prerequisites, but do\r\nnot constitute a portion of the attained view.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe problem of thought as activity, as distinct from\r\nthought as content, opens up altogether too large a question\r\nto receive complete consideration at this point. Fortunately,\r\nhowever, the previous discussion enables us to narrow the\r\npoint which is in issue just here. It is once more the question\r\nwhether the activity of thought is to be regarded as an\r\nindependent function supervening entirely from without\r\nupon antecedents, and directed from without upon data; or\r\nwhether it marks merely a phase of the transformation which\r\nthe course of experience (whether practical, or artistic, or\r\nsocially affectional or whatever) undergoes in entering into\r\na tensional status where the maintenance of its harmony\r\nof content is problematic and hence an aim. If it be\r\nthe latter, a thoroughly intelligent sense can be given to\r\nthe proposition that the activity of thinking is instrumental,\r\nand that its worth is found, not in its own successive states\r\nas such, but in the result in which it comes to conclusion.\r\nBut the conception of thinking as an independent activity\r\nsomehow occurring after an independent antecedent, playing\r\nupon an independent subject-matter, and finally effecting\r\nan independent result, presents us with just one miracle the\r\nmore.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_79\" id=\"Page_79\"\u003e[Pg 79]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI do not question the strictly instrumental character of\r\nthinking. The problem lies not here, but in the interpretation\r\nof the nature of the organ and instrument. The difficulty\r\nwith Lotze\u0027s position is that it forces us into the\r\nassumption of a means and an end which are simply and\r\nonly external to each other, and yet necessarily dependent\r\nupon each other\u0026mdash;a position which, whenever found, is so\r\nthoroughly self-contradictory as to necessitate critical reconsideration\r\nof the premises which lead to it. Lotze vibrates\r\nbetween the notion of thought as a tool in the external sense,\r\na mere scaffolding to a finished building in which it has no\r\npart nor lot, and the notion of thought as an immanent tool,\r\nas a scaffolding which is an integral part of the very operation\r\nof building, and set up for the sake of the building-activity\r\nwhich is carried on effectively only with and through\r\na scaffolding. Only in the former case can the scaffolding be\r\nconsidered as a \u003ci\u003emere\u003c/i\u003e tool. In the latter case the external\r\nscaffolding is not itself the instrumentality; the actual tool\r\nis the \u003ci\u003eaction\u003c/i\u003e of erecting the building, and this action involves\r\nthe scaffolding as a constituent part of itself. The work of\r\nerecting is not set over against the completed building as\r\nmere means to an end; it \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e the end taken in process or\r\nhistorically, longitudinally viewed. The scaffolding, moreover,\r\nis not an external means to the process of erecting,\r\nbut an organic member of it. It is no mere accident of\r\nlanguage that \"building\" has a double sense\u0026mdash;meaning at\r\nonce the process and the finished product. The outcome of\r\nthought is the thinking activity carried on to its own completion;\r\nthe activity, on the other hand, \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e the outcome\r\ntaken anywhere short of its own realization, and thereby still\r\ngoing on.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe only consideration which prevents easy and immediate\r\nacceptance of this view is the notion of thinking as\r\nsomething purely formal. It is strange that the empiricist\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_80\" id=\"Page_80\"\u003e[Pg 80]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndoes not see that his insistence upon a matter extraneously\r\ngiven to thought only strengthens the hands of the\r\nrationalist with his claim of thinking as an independent\r\nactivity, separate from the actual make-up of the affairs\r\nof experience. Thinking as a merely formal activity exercised\r\nupon certain sensations or images or objects sets forth\r\nan absolutely meaningless proposition. The psychological\r\nidentification of thinking with the process of association is\r\nmuch nearer the truth. It is, indeed, on the way to the\r\ntruth. We need only to recognize that association is of contents\r\nor matters or meanings, not of ideas as bare existences\r\nor events; and that the type of association we call\r\nthinking differs from the associations of casual fancy and\r\nrevery in an element of control by reference to an end\r\nwhich determines the fitness and thus the selection of the\r\nassociates, to apprehend how completely thinking is a reconstructive\r\nmovement of actual contents of experience in relation\r\nto each other, and for the sake of a redintegration of a\r\nconflicting experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is no miracle in the fact that tool and material are\r\nadapted to each other in the process of reaching a valid conclusion.\r\nWere they external in origin to each other and\r\nto the result, the whole affair would, indeed, present an\r\ninsoluble problem\u0026mdash;so insoluble that, if this were the true\r\ncondition of affairs, we never should even know that there\r\nwas a problem. But, in truth, both material and tool have\r\nbeen secured and determined with reference to economy and\r\nefficiency in effecting the end desired\u0026mdash;the maintenance of\r\na harmonious experience. The builder has discovered that\r\nhis building means building tools, and also building material.\r\nEach has been slowly evolved with reference to its fit\r\nemploy in the entire function; and this evolution has been\r\nchecked at every point by reference to its own correspondent.\r\nThe carpenter has not thought at large on his building and\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_81\" id=\"Page_81\"\u003e[Pg 81]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthen constructed tools at large, but has thought of his building\r\nin terms of the material which enters into it, and through\r\nthat medium has come to the consideration of the tools\r\nwhich are helpful. Life proposes to maintain at all hazards\r\nthe unity of its own process. Experience insists on being\r\nitself, on securing integrity even through and by means of\r\nconflict.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is not a formal question, but one of the placing and\r\nrelations of the matters or values actually entering into experience.\r\nAnd this in turn determines the taking up of just\r\nthose mental attitudes, and the employing of just those\r\nintellectual operations, which most effectively handle and\r\norganize the material. Thinking is adaptation \u003ci\u003eto\u003c/i\u003e an end\r\n\u003ci\u003ethrough\u003c/i\u003e the adjustment of particular objective contents.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe thinker, like the carpenter, is at once stimulated and\r\nchecked in every stage of his procedure by the particular\r\nsituation which confronts him. A person is at the stage of\r\nwanting a new house: well then, his materials are available\r\nresources, the price of labor, the cost of building, the state\r\nand needs of his family, profession, etc.; his tools are paper\r\nand pencil and compass, or possibly the bank as a credit\r\ninstrumentality, etc. Again, the work is beginning. The\r\nfoundations are laid. This in turn determines its own specific\r\nmaterials and tools. Again, the building is almost\r\nready for occupancy. The concrete process is that of taking\r\naway the scaffolding, clearing up the grounds, furnishing\r\nand decorating rooms, etc. This specific operation again\r\ndetermines its own fit or relevant materials and tools. It\r\ndefines the time and mode and manner of beginning and\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_82\" id=\"Page_82\"\u003e[Pg 82]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nceasing to use them. Logical theory will get along as well\r\nas does reflective practice, when it sticks close by and\r\nobserves the directions and checks inherent in each successive\r\nphase of the evolution of the cycle of experiencing. The\r\nproblem in general of validity of the thinking process as distinct\r\nfrom the validity of this or that process arises only\r\nwhen thinking is isolated from its historic position and its\r\nmaterial context.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. But Lotze is not yet done with the problem of validity,\r\neven from his own standpoint. The ground shifts again\r\nunder his feet. It is no longer a question of the validity of\r\nthe idea or meaning with which thought is supposed to set\r\nout; it is no longer a question of the validity of the process\r\nof thinking in reference to its own product; it is the question\r\nof the validity of the product. Supposing, after all,\r\nthat the final meaning, or logical idea, is thoroughly coherent\r\nand organized; supposing it is an object for all consciousness\r\nas such. Once more arises the question: What is the\r\nvalidity of even the most coherent and complete idea?\u0026mdash;a\r\nquestion which rises and will not down. We may reconstruct\r\nour notion of the chimera until it ceases to be an\r\nindependent idea and becomes a part of the system of Greek\r\nmythology. Has it gained in validity in ceasing to be\r\nan independent myth, in becoming an element in systematized\r\nmyth? Myth it was and myth it remains.\r\nMythology does not get validity by growing bigger. How\r\ndo we know the same is not the case with the ideas which\r\nare the product of our most deliberate and extended scientific\r\ninquiry? The reference again to the content as the\r\nself-identical object of all consciousness proves nothing;\r\nthe matter of a hallucination does not gain worth in proportion\r\nto its social contagiousness. Or the reference proves\r\nthat we have not as yet reached any conclusion, but are entertaining\r\na hypothesis\u0026mdash;since social validity is not a matter of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_83\" id=\"Page_83\"\u003e[Pg 83]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmere common content, but of securing participation in a\r\ncommonly adjudged social experience through action directed\r\nthereto and directed by consensus of judgment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAccording to Lotze, the final product is, after all, still\r\nthought. Now, Lotze is committed once for all to the notion\r\nthat thought, in any form, is directed by and at an outside\r\nreality. The ghost haunts him to the last. How, after all,\r\ndoes even the ideally perfect valid thought apply or refer to\r\nreality? Its genuine subject is still beyond itself. At the\r\nlast Lotze can dispose of this question only by regarding\r\nit as a metaphysical, not a logical, problem (Vol. II, pp.\r\n281, 282). In other words, \u003ci\u003elogically\u003c/i\u003e speaking, we are at the\r\nend just exactly where we were at the beginning\u0026mdash;in the\r\nsphere of ideas, and of ideas only, plus a consciousness of\r\nthe necessity of referring these ideas to a reality which is\r\nbeyond them, which is utterly inaccessible to them, which is\r\nout of reach of any influence which they may exercise, and\r\nwhich transcends any possible comparison with their results.\r\n\"It is vain,\" says Lotze, \"to shrink from acknowledging the\r\ncircle here involved … all we know of the external world\r\ndepends upon the ideas of it which are within us\" (Vol. II,\r\np. 185). \"It is then this varied world of ideas within us\r\nwhich forms the sole material directly given to us\" (Vol. II,\r\np. 186). As it is the only material given to us, so it is the\r\nonly material with which thought can end. To talk about\r\nknowing the external world through ideas which are merely\r\nwithin us is to talk of an inherent self-contradiction. There\r\nis no common ground in which the external world and our\r\nideas can meet. In other words, the original implication of\r\na separation between an independent thought-material and\r\nan independent thought-function and purpose lands us inevitably\r\nin the metaphysics of subjective idealism, plus a\r\nbelief in an unknown reality beyond, which unknowable is yet\r\ntaken as the ultimate test of the value of our ideas as just\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_84\" id=\"Page_84\"\u003e[Pg 84]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsubjective. The subjectivity of the psychical event infects\r\nat the last the meaning or ideal object. Because it has been\r\ntaken to be something \"in itself,\" thought is also something\r\n\"in itself,\" and at the end, after all our maneuvering we are\r\nwhere we began:\u0026mdash;with two separate disparates, one of\r\nmeaning, but no existence, the other of existence, but no\r\nmeaning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe other aspect of Lotze\u0027s contradiction which completes\r\nthe circle is clear when we refer to his original propositions,\r\nand recall that at the outset he was compelled to regard the\r\norigination and conjunctions of the impressions, the elements\r\nof ideas, as themselves the effects exercised by a world of\r\nthings already in existence (see p. 31). He sets up an\r\nindependent world of thought, and yet has to confess that\r\nboth at its origin and termination it points with absolute\r\nnecessity to a world beyond itself. Only the stubborn\r\nrefusal to take this initial and terminal reference of thought\r\nbeyond itself as having a historic meaning, indicating a particular\r\nplace of generation and a particular point of fulfilment\r\nin the drama of evolving experience, compels Lotze to give\r\nsuch bifold objective reference a purely metaphysical turn.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen Lotze goes on to say (Vol. II, p. 191) that the\r\nmeasure of truth of particular parts of experience is found in\r\nasking whether, when judged by thought, they are in harmony\r\nwith other parts of experience; when he goes on to say that\r\nthere is no sense in trying to compare the entire world of\r\nideas with a reality which is non-existent, excepting as it\r\nitself should become an idea, Lotze lands where he might\r\nbetter have frankly commenced.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_43_43\" id=\"FNanchor_43_43\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_43_43\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[43]\u003c/a\u003e He saves himself from utter\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_85\" id=\"Page_85\"\u003e[Pg 85]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nskepticism only by claiming that the explicit assumption of\r\nskepticism, the need of agreement of a ready-made idea as\r\nsuch, with an extraneous independent material as such, is\r\nmeaningless. He defines correctly the work of thought as\r\nconsisting in harmonizing the various portions of experience\r\nwith each other: a definition which has meaning only\r\nin connection with the fact that experience is continually integrating\r\nitself into a wholeness of coherent meaning deepened\r\nin significance by passing through an inner distraction\r\nin which by means of conflict certain contents are rendered\r\npartial and hence objectively conscious. In this case the\r\ntest of thought is the harmony or unity of experience actually\r\neffected. In that sense the test of reality is beyond thought,\r\nas thought, just as at the other limit thought originates out\r\nof a situation which is not reflectional in character. Interpret\r\nthis before and beyond in a historic sense, as an affair of\r\nthe place occupied and r\u0026ocirc;le played by thinking as a function\r\nin experience in relation to other functions, and the intermediate\r\nand instrumental character of thought, its dependence\r\nupon unreflective antecedents for its existence, and upon a\r\nconsequent experience for its test of final validity, becomes\r\nsignificant and necessary. Taken at large, it plunges us in\r\nthe depths of a hopelessly complicated and self-revolving\r\nmetaphysic.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_86\" id=\"Page_86\"\u003e[Pg 86]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"V\" id=\"V\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eV\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eA CRITICAL STUDY OF BOSANQUET\u0027S THEORY OF\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nJUDGMENT\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_44_44\" id=\"FNanchor_44_44\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_44_44\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[44]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBosanquet\u0027s theory of the judgment, in common with all\r\nsuch theories of the judgment, necessarily involves the\r\nmetaphysical problem of the nature of reality and of the\r\nrelation of thought to reality. That the judgment is the\r\nfunction by which knowledge is attained is a proposition\r\nwhich would meet with universal acceptance. But knowledge\r\nis itself a relation of some sort between thought and\r\nreality. The view which any logician adopts as to the\r\nnature of the knowledge-process is accordingly conditioned\r\nby his metaphysical presuppositions as to the nature of\r\nreality. It is equally true that the theory of the judgment\r\ndeveloped from any metaphysical standpoint serves as a\r\ntest of the validity of that standpoint. We shall attempt in\r\nthe present paper to show how Bosanquet\u0027s theory of the\r\njudgment develops from his view of the nature of reality,\r\nand to inquire whether the theory succeeds in giving such\r\nan account of the knowledge-process as to corroborate the\r\npresupposition underlying it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBosanquet defines judgment as \"the intellectual function\r\nwhich defines reality by significant ideas and in so doing\r\naffirms the reality of those ideas\" (p. 104).\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_45_45\" id=\"FNanchor_45_45\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_45_45\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[45]\u003c/a\u003e The form of\r\nthe definition suggests the nature of his fundamental prob\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_87\" id=\"Page_87\"\u003e[Pg 87]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003elem.\r\nThere is, on the one hand, a world of reality which\r\nmust be regarded as having existence outside of and independently\r\nof the thoughts or ideas we are now applying to\r\nit; and there is, on the other hand, a world of ideas whose\r\nvalue is measured by the possibility of applying them to\r\nreality, of qualifying reality by them. The judgment is the\r\nfunction which makes the connection between these two\r\nworlds. If judgment merely brought one set of ideas into\r\nrelation with another set, then it could never give us anything\r\nmore than purely hypothetical knowledge whose\r\napplication to the real world would remain forever problematic.\r\nIt would mean that knowledge is impossible,\r\na result which seems to be contradicted by the existence\r\nof knowledge. The logician must, therefore, as Bosanquet\r\ntells us, regard it as an essential of the act of judgment\r\nthat it always refers to a reality which goes beyond\r\nand is independent of the act itself (p. 104). His central\r\nproblem thus becomes that of understanding what the\r\nnature of reality is which permits of being defined by\r\nideas, and what the nature of an idea is that it can ever be\r\naffirmed to be real. How does the real world get representation\r\nin experience, and what is the guarantee that the\r\nrepresentation, when obtained, is correct?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe defining of the problem suggests the view of the\r\nnature of reality out of which Bosanquet\u0027s theory of the\r\njudgment grows. The real world is to him a world which\r\nhas its existence quite independently of the process by\r\nwhich it is known. The real world is there to be known,\r\nand is in no wise modified by the knowledge which we\r\nobtain of it. The work of thought is to build up a world of\r\nideas which shall represent, or correspond to, the world of\r\nreality. The more complete and perfect the correspondence,\r\nthe greater our store of knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTranslated into terms of the judgment, this representa\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_88\" id=\"Page_88\"\u003e[Pg 88]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etional\r\nview means that the subject of the judgment must\r\nalways be reality, while the predicate is an idea. But when\r\nwe examine the content of any universal judgment, or even of\r\nan ordinary judgment of perception, the subject which\r\nappears in the judgment is evidently not reality at all, if by\r\nreality we mean something which is in no sense constituted\r\nby the thought-process. When I say, \"The tree is green,\"\r\nthe subject, tree, cannot be regarded as a bit of reality\r\nwhich is given ready-made to the thought-process. The\r\nability to perceive a tree, to distinguish it from other\r\nobjects and single it out for the application of an idea,\r\nevidently implies a long series of previous judgments.\r\nThe content \"tree\" is itself ideal. As Bosanquet forcibly\r\nstates it: \"If a sensation or elementary perception is in\r\nconsciousness (and if not we have nothing to do with it\r\nin logic), it already bears the form of thinking\" (p. 33).\r\nHow, then, can it serve as the subject of a judgment?\r\nBosanquet\u0027s solution of the problem is to say that the real\r\nsubject of a judgment is not the grammatical subject which\r\nappears in a proposition, but reality itself. In the more\r\ncomplex forms of judgment the reference to reality is disguised\r\nby the introduction of explicit ideas to designate\r\nthe portion of reality to which reference is made (pp. 78,\r\n79). In the simplest type of judgment known, however, the\r\nqualitative judgment of perception, the reference to reality\r\nappears within the judgment itself. The relations of thought\r\nto reality and of the elements of the judgment to one\r\nanother can, accordingly, most readily be seen in the consideration\r\nof this rudimentary form of judgment in which\r\nthe various parts lie bare before us.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBosanquet describes it as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIf I say, pointing to a particular house, \"That is my home,\" it\r\nis clear that in this act of judgment the reference conveyed by the\r\ndemonstrative is indispensable. The significant idea \"my home\"\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_89\" id=\"Page_89\"\u003e[Pg 89]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis affirmed, not of any other general significant idea in my mind,\r\nbut of something which is rendered unique by being present to me\r\nin perception. In making the judgment, \"That is my home,\" I\r\nextend the present sense-perception of a house in a certain landscape\r\nby attaching to it the ideal content or meaning of \"home;\"\r\nand moreover, in doing this, I pronounce the ideal content to be,\r\nso to speak, of one and the same tissue with what I have before\r\nme in my actual perception. That is to say, I affirm the meaning\r\nof the idea, or the idea considered as a meaning, to be a real quality\r\nof that which I perceive in my perception.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe same account holds good of every perceptive judgment;\r\nwhen I see a white substance on a plate and judge that \"it is\r\nbread\" I affirm the reference, or general meaning which constitutes\r\nthe symbolic idea \"bread\" in my mind, to be a real quality\r\nof the spot or point in present perception which I attempt to designate\r\nby the demonstrative \"this.\" The act defines the given\r\nbut indefinite real by affirmation of a quality, and affirms reality of\r\nthe definite quality by attaching it to the previously undefined\r\nreal. Reality is given for me \u003ci\u003ein\u003c/i\u003e present sensuous perception, and\r\n\u003ci\u003ein\u003c/i\u003e the immediate feeling of my own sentient existence that goes\r\nwith it. (Pp. 76, 77.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgain, he says that the general features of the judgment\r\nof perception are as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThere is a presence of a something in contact with our sensitive\r\nself, which, as being so in contact, has the character of reality;\r\nand there is the qualification of this reality by the reference to it\r\nof some meaning \u003ci\u003esuch as can\u003c/i\u003e be symbolized by a name (p. 77).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur point of contact with reality, the place where reality\r\ngets into the thought-process, is, according to this view, to\r\nbe found in the simplest, most indefinite type of judgment\r\nof perception. We meet with reality in the mere undefined\r\n\"this\" of primitive experience. But each such elementary\r\njudgment about an undefined \"this\" is an isolated\r\nbit of experience. Each \"this\" could give us only a detached\r\nbit of reality at best, and the further problem now confronts\r\nus of how we ever succeed in piecing our detached bits of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_90\" id=\"Page_90\"\u003e[Pg 90]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreality together to form a real world. Bosanquet\u0027s explanation\r\nis, in his words, this:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe real world, as a definite organized system, is \u003ci\u003efor me\u003c/i\u003e an\r\nextension of this present sensation and self-feeling by means of\r\njudgment, and it is the essence of judgment to effect and sustain\r\nsuch an extension (p. 77).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgain he says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe subject in every judgment of Perception is some given spot\r\nor point in sensuous contact with the percipient self. But, as all\r\nreality is continuous, the subject is not \u003ci\u003emerely\u003c/i\u003e this given spot or\r\npoint. It is impossible to confine the real world within this or that\r\npresentation. Every definition or qualification of a point in present\r\nperception is affirmed of the real world which is continuous\r\nwith present perception. The ultimate subject of the perceptive\r\njudgment is the real world as a whole, and it is of this that, in\r\njudging, we affirm the qualities or characteristics. (P. 78.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe problem is the same as that with which Bradley\r\nstruggles in his treatment of the subject of the judgment,\r\nand the solution is also the same. Bradley\u0027s treatment\r\nof the point is perhaps somewhat more explicit. Like\r\nBosanquet, he starts with the proposition that the subject of\r\nthe judgment must be reality itself and not an idea, because,\r\nif it were the latter, judgment could never give us\r\nanything but a union of ideas, and a union of ideas remains\r\nforever universal and hypothetical. It can never acquire\r\nthe uniqueness, the singularity, which is necessary to make\r\nit refer to the real. Uniqueness can be found only in our\r\ncontact with the real. But just where does our contact\r\nwith the real occur? Bradley recognizes the fact that it\r\ncannot be the \u003ci\u003econtent\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;even in the case of a simple sensation\u0026mdash;which\r\ngives us reality. The content of a sensation is a\r\nthing which is in my consciousness, and which has the form\r\nwhich it presents because it is in my consciousness. Reality\r\nis precisely something which is not itself sensation, and cannot\r\nbe in my consciousness. If I say, \"This is white,\" the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_91\" id=\"Page_91\"\u003e[Pg 91]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\"this\" has a content which is a sensation of whiteness.\r\nBut the sensation of whiteness is not reality. The experience\r\nbrings with it an assurance of reality, not because its\r\ncontent is the real, but because it is \"my direct encounter\r\nin sensible presentation with the real world.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_46_46\" id=\"FNanchor_46_46\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_46_46\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[46]\u003c/a\u003e To make\r\nthe matter clearer, Bradley draws a distinction between the\r\n\u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e and the \u003ci\u003ethisness\u003c/i\u003e. In every experience, however simple,\r\nthere is a content\u0026mdash;a \"thisness\"\u0026mdash;which is not itself\r\nunique. Considered merely as content, it is applicable to an\r\nindefinite number of existences; in other words, it is an\r\nidea. But there is also in every experience a \"this\" which\r\nis unique, but which is not a content. It is a mere sign of\r\nexistence which gives the experience uniqueness, but nothing\r\nelse. The \"thisness\" falls on the side of the content, and\r\nthe \"this\" on the side of existence. It is exactly the distinction\r\nwhich Bosanquet has in mind in the passages quoted\r\nin which he tells us that \"reality is given for me \u003ci\u003ein\u003c/i\u003e present\r\nsensuous perception, and \u003ci\u003ein\u003c/i\u003e the immediate feeling of my\r\nown sentient existence which goes with it;\" and again when\r\nhe says: \"There is a presence of a something in contact\r\nwith our sensitive self, which, as being so in contact, has the\r\ncharacter of reality.\" The same point is made somewhat\r\nmore explicitly in his introduction when he says that the\r\nindividual\u0027s present perception is not, indeed, reality as\r\nsuch, but is his present point of contact with reality as\r\nsuch (p. 3).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut has this distinction between the content of an experience\r\nand its existence solved the problem of how we\r\n\u003ci\u003eknow\u003c/i\u003e reality? When Bosanquet talks of knowing reality,\r\nhe means possessing ideas which are an accurate reproduction\r\nof reality. It is still far from clear how, according to\r\nhis own account, we could ever have any assurance that our\r\nideas do represent reality accurately, if we can nowhere find\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_92\" id=\"Page_92\"\u003e[Pg 92]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na point at which the content of an experience can be held to\r\ngive us reality. The case is still worse when we go beyond\r\nthe problem of how any particular bit of reality can be\r\nknown, and ask ourselves how reality as a whole can be\r\nknown. The explanation offered by both Bradley and\r\nBosanquet is that by means of judgment we extend the bit\r\nof reality of whose existence we get a glimpse through a\r\npeep-hole in the curtain of sensuous perception, and thus\r\nbuild up the organized system of reality. In a passage previously\r\nquoted, Bosanquet tells us that all reality is continuous,\r\nand therefore the real subject of a judgment cannot be\r\nthe mere spot or point which is given in sensuous perception,\r\nbut must be the real world as a whole. But how does\r\nhe know that reality is continuous, and that the real world is\r\nan organized system? Our only knowledge of reality comes\r\nthrough judgment, and judgment brings us into contact with\r\nreality only at isolated points. When he tells us that reality\r\nis a continuous whole, he does so on the basis of a metaphysical\r\npresupposition which is not justifiable by his theory\r\nof the judgment. The only statement about reality which\r\ncould be maintained on the basis of his theory is that some\r\nsort of a reality exists, but the theory furnishes equal justification\r\nfor the assurance that this reality is of such a nature\r\nthat we can never know anything more about it than the\r\nbare fact of its existence. Moreover, the bare fact of the existence\r\nof reality comes to us merely in the form of a feeling of\r\nour own sentient existence which goes with sense-perception.\r\nBut the mere assurance that somewhere behind the curtain\r\nof sensuous perception reality exists (even if this could go\r\nunchallenged), accompanied by the certainty that we can never\r\nby any possibility know anything more about it, is practically\r\nequivalent to the denial of the possibility of knowledge.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_47_47\" id=\"FNanchor_47_47\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_47_47\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[47]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_93\" id=\"Page_93\"\u003e[Pg 93]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAlthough the denial of the possibility of knowledge seems\r\nto be the logical outcome of the premises, it is not the conclusion\r\nreached by Bosanquet. At the outset of his treatise,\r\nBosanquet propounds the fundamental question we have\r\nbeen considering in these words: \"How does the analysis\r\nof knowledge as a systematic function, or system of functions,\r\nexplain that relationship in which truth appears to\r\nconsist, between the human intelligence on the one hand,\r\nand fact or reality on the other?\" His answer is: \"To this\r\ndifficulty there is only one reply. If the object-matter of\r\nreality lay genuinely outside the system of thought, not only\r\nour analysis, but thought itself, would be unable to lay hold of\r\nreality.\" (Pp. 2, 3.) The statement is an explicit recognition\r\nof the impossibility of bridging the chasm between a reality\r\noutside the content of knowledge and a known real world.\r\nIt brings before us the dilemma contained in Bosanquet\u0027s\r\ntreatment of the subject of the judgment. On the one hand\r\nthe subject of the judgment must be outside the realm of my\r\nthoughts. If it were not, judgment would merely establish\r\na relation between my ideas and would give me no knowledge\r\nof the real world. On the other hand, the subject of the\r\njudgment must be within the realm of my thoughts. If it\r\nwere not, I could never assert anything of it; could never\r\njudge, or know it. The stress he lays on the first horn of\r\nthe dilemma has been shown. It remains to show his recognition\r\nof the second horn, and to find out whether or not he\r\ndiscovers any real reconciliation between the two.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBosanquet sums up the section of the introduction on\r\nknowledge and its content, truth, with the following paragraph:\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_94\" id=\"Page_94\"\u003e[Pg 94]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe real world for every individual is thus emphatically \u003ci\u003ehis\u003c/i\u003e\r\nworld; an extension and determination of his present perception,\r\nwhich perception is to him not indeed reality as such, but his point\r\nof contact with reality as such. Thus in the enquiry which will\r\nhave to be undertaken as to the logical subject of the judgment, we\r\nshall find that the subject, however it may shift, contract, and\r\nexpand, is always in the last resort some greater or smaller element\r\nof this determinate reality, which the individual has constructed by\r\nidentifying significant ideas with that world of which he has assurance\r\nthrough his own perceptive experience. In analyzing common\r\njudgment it is ultimately one to say that \u003ci\u003eI judge\u003c/i\u003e and that \u003ci\u003ethe real\r\nworld for me, my real world, extends itself\u003c/i\u003e, or maintains its organized\r\nextension. This is the ultimate connection by which the distinction\r\nof subject and predication is involved in the act of affirmation\r\nor enunciation which is the differentia of judgment. (Pp. 3, 4).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHere the subject of the judgment appears as an element\r\nof a reality \u003ci\u003ewhich the individual has constructed\u003c/i\u003e by identifying\r\nsignificant ideas with that world of which he has assurance\r\nthrough his own perceptive experience. But the very\r\npoint with reference to the subject of the judgment previously\r\nemphasized is that it is not and cannot be something\r\nwhich the individual has constructed. The subject of the\r\njudgment must be reality, and reality does not consist of\r\nideas, even if it be determined by them. It does not mend\r\nmatters to explain that the individual has constructed his\r\nreal world by identifying significant ideas with that world of\r\nwhich he has assurance through his own perceptive experiences,\r\nbecause, as we have seen, \"the individual\u0027s perceptive\r\nexperiences\" either turn out to be merely similar mental\r\nconstructions made at a prior time, so that nothing is gained\r\nby attaching to them, or else they mean once more the mere\r\nshock of contact which is supposed to give assurance that some\r\nsort of reality exists, but which gives no assurance of what\r\nit is. That and what, this and thisness still remain detached.\r\nWhen he talks of \u003ci\u003ethe real world for any individual\u003c/i\u003e we are\r\nleft entirely in the dark as to what the relation between \u003ci\u003ethe\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_95\" id=\"Page_95\"\u003e[Pg 95]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreal world as it is for any individual\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ethe real world as\r\nit is for itself\u003c/i\u003e may be, or how the individual is to gain any\r\nassurance that \u003ci\u003ethe real world as it is for him\u003c/i\u003e represents \u003ci\u003ethe\r\nreal world as it is for itself\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnother attempt at a reconciliation of these opposing views\r\nleaves us no better satisfied. The passage is as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe real world, as a definite organized system, is \u003ci\u003efor me\u003c/i\u003e an\r\nextension of this present sensation and self-feeling by means of\r\njudgment, and it is the essence of judgment to effect and sustain\r\nsuch an extension. It makes no essential difference whether the\r\nideas whose content is pronounced to be an attribute of reality\r\nappear to fall within what is given in perception, or not. We shall\r\nfind hereafter that it is vain to attempt to lay down boundaries\r\nbetween the given and its extension. The moment we try to do\r\nthis we are on the wrong track. The given and its extension differ\r\nnot absolutely but relatively; they are continuous with each other,\r\nand the metaphor by which we speak of an extension conceals from\r\nus that the so-called \"given\" is no less artificial than that by\r\nwhich it is extended. It is the character and quality of being\r\ndirectly in contact with sense-perception, not any fixed datum of\r\ncontent, that forms the constantly shifting center of the individual\u0027s\r\nreal world, and spreads from that center over every extension which\r\nthe system of reality receives from judgment. (P. 77.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this passage by the \"given\" he evidently means the\r\ncontent of sensory experience, the thisness, the what. It is,\r\nas he says, of the same stuff as that by which it is extended.\r\nBoth the given and that by which it is extended are artificial\r\nin the sense of not being \u003ci\u003ereal\u003c/i\u003e according to Bosanquet\u0027s\r\ninterpretation of reality; they are ideas. But if all this is\r\nadmitted, what becomes of the possibility of knowledge?\r\nBosanquet undertakes to rescue it by assuring us again that\r\nit is the character and quality of being directly in contact\r\nwith sense-perception, not any fixed datum of content, that\r\nforms the center of the individual\u0027s real world and gives the\r\nstamp of reality to his otherwise ideal extension of this\r\ncenter. Here again we find ourselves with no evidence\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_96\" id=\"Page_96\"\u003e[Pg 96]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat the \u003ci\u003econtent\u003c/i\u003e of our knowledge bears any relation to\r\nreality. We have merely the feeling of vividness attached\r\nto sensory experience which seems to bring us the certainty\r\nthat there is some sort of a reality behind it, but this is\r\nnot to give assurance that our ideal content even belongs\r\nrightfully to that against which we have bumped, much\r\nless of \u003ci\u003ehow\u003c/i\u003e it belongs\u0026mdash;and only this deserves the title\r\n\"knowledge.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the chapter on \"Quality and Comparison,\" in which\r\nhe takes up the more detailed treatment of the simplest\r\ntypes of judgment of perception, he comes back to the same\r\ncontradiction, and again attempts to explain how both horns\r\nof his dilemma must be true. The passage is this:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe Reality to which we ascribe the predicate is undoubtedly\r\nself-existent; it is not \u003ci\u003emerely\u003c/i\u003e in my mind or in my act of judgment;\r\nif it were, the judgment would only be a game with my\r\nideas. It is well to make this clear in the case before us, for in the\r\nlater forms of the judgment it will be much disguised. Still the\r\nreality which attracts my concentrated attention is also within my\r\nact of judgment; it is not even the whole reality present to my\r\nperception; still less of course the whole self-existent Reality\r\nwhich I dimly presuppose. The immediate subject of the judgment\r\nis a mere aspect, too indefinite to be described by explicit\r\nideas except in as far as the qualitative predication imposes a first\r\nspecification upon it. \u003ci\u003eThis\u003c/i\u003e Reality \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e in my judgment; it is the\r\npoint at which the actual world impinges upon my consciousness\r\nas real, and it is only by judging with reference to this point that I\r\ncan refer the ideal content before my mind to the whole of reality\r\nwhich I at once believe to exist, and am attempting to construct.\r\nThe Subject is both in and out of the Judgment, as Reality is both\r\nin and out of my consciousness. (Pp. 113, 114.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe conclusion he reaches is a mere restatement of the\r\ndifficulty. The problem he is trying to solve is how the\r\nsubject \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e be both in and out of the judgment, and how\r\nthe subject without is related to the subject within. The\r\nmere assertion that it is so does not help us to understand it.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_97\" id=\"Page_97\"\u003e[Pg 97]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nHis procedure seems like taking advantage of two meanings\r\nof sense-perception, its conscious quality and its brute\r\nabrupt immediacy, and then utilizing this ambiguity to solve\r\na problem which grows out of the conception of judgment\r\nas a reference of idea to reality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTurning from his treatment of the world of fact to his\r\ndiscussion of the world of idea, from the subject to the\r\npredicate, as it appears in his theory of the judgment we\r\nfind again a paradox which must be recognized and cannot\r\nbe obviated. An idea is essentially a meaning. It is not\r\na particular existence whose essence is uniqueness as is the\r\ncase with the subject of the judgment, but is a meaning\r\nwhose importance is that it may apply to an indefinite number\r\nof unique existences. Its characteristic is universality.\r\nAnd yet an idea regarded as a psychical existence, an idea\r\nas a content in my mind, is just as particular and unique as\r\nany other existence. How, then, does it obtain its characteristic\r\nof universality? Bosanquet\u0027s answer is that it must\r\nbe universal by means of a reference to something other\r\nthan itself. Its meaning resides, not in its existence as a\r\npsychical image, but in its reference to something beyond\r\nitself. Now, any idea that is affirmed is referred to reality,\r\nbut do ideas exist which are not being affirmed? If so,\r\ntheir reference cannot be to reality. Bosanquet discusses\r\nthe question in the second section of his introduction as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIt is not easy to deny that there is a world of ideas or of meanings,\r\nwhich simply consists in that identical reference of symbols\r\nby which mutual understanding between rational beings is made\r\npossible. A \u003ci\u003emere\u003c/i\u003e suggestion, a \u003ci\u003emere\u003c/i\u003e question, a \u003ci\u003emere\u003c/i\u003e negation,\r\nseem all of them to imply that we sometimes \u003ci\u003eentertain\u003c/i\u003e ideas without\r\naffirming them of reality, and therefore without affirming their\r\nreference to be a reference to something real or their meaning to\r\nbe fact. We may be puzzled indeed to say what an idea can\r\nmean, or to what it can refer, if it does not mean or refer to some\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_98\" id=\"Page_98\"\u003e[Pg 98]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ething\r\nreal\u0026mdash;to some element in the fabric continuously sustained\r\nby the judgment which is our consciousness. On the other hand,\r\nit would be shirking a difficulty to neglect the consideration that\r\nan idea, while denied of reality, may nevertheless, or even must,\r\npossess an identical and so intelligible reference\u0026mdash;a symbolic\r\nvalue\u0026mdash;for the rational beings who deny it. A reference, it may\r\nbe argued, must be a reference to something. But it seems as\r\nif in this case the something were the fact of reference itself,\r\nthe rational convention between intelligent beings, or rather the\r\nworld which has existence, whether for one rational being or for\r\nmany, merely as contained in and sustained by such intellectual\r\nreference.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI only adduce these considerations in order to explain that\r\ntransitional conception of an objective world or world of meanings,\r\ndistinct from the real world or world of facts, with which it is\r\nimpossible wholly to dispense in an account of thought starting\r\nfrom the individual subject. The paradox is that the real world\r\nor world of fact thus seems for us to fall within and be included\r\nin the objective world or world of meanings, as if all that is fact\r\nwere meaning, but not every meaning were fact. This results in\r\nthe contradiction that something is objective, which is not real.\r\n(Pp. 4, 5.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the seventh section of the introduction Bosanquet\r\nexplains his meaning further by what the reader is privileged\r\nto regard as a flight of the imagination\u0026mdash;a mere\r\nsimile\u0026mdash;which he thinks may, nevertheless, make the matter\r\nclearer.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe might try to think that the world, \u003ci\u003eas known to each of us\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nis constructed and sustained by his individual consciousness; and\r\nthat every other individual also frames for himself, and sustains by\r\nthe action of his intelligence, the world in which he in particular\r\nlives and moves. Of course such a construction is to be taken as a\r\nreconstruction, a construction by way of knowledge only; but for\r\nour present purpose this is indifferent. Thus we might think of\r\nthe ideas and objects of our private world rather as corresponding to\r\nthan as from the beginning identical with those which our fellow-men\r\nare occupied in constructing each within his own sphere of\r\nconsciousness. And the same would be true even of the objects and\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_99\" id=\"Page_99\"\u003e[Pg 99]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncontents within our own world, in as far as an act or effort would\r\nbe required to maintain them, of the same kind with that which\r\nwas originally required to construct them…. Thus the paradox\r\nof reference would become clearer. We should understand that we\r\nrefer to a correspondence by means of a content. We should soften\r\ndown the contradiction of saying that a name to meet which we have\r\nand can get nothing but an idea, nevertheless does not stand for that\r\nidea but for something else. We should be able to say that the\r\nname stands for those elements in the idea which correspond in all\r\nour separate worlds, and in our own world of yesterday and of\r\ntoday, considered as so corresponding. (Pp. 45, 46.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAccording to this view, the idea obtains the universality\r\nwhich constitutes it an idea by a sort of process of elimination.\r\nIt is like a composite photograph. It selects only\r\nthe common elements in a large number of particular existences,\r\nand thus succeeds in representing, or referring to, all\r\nthe particular existences which have gone to make it up.\r\nBut when we come to consider the bearing which this view\r\nof universality, or generalized significance, has on our estimate\r\nof the knowledge-process, we feel that it has not solved\r\nthe problem for us. In the first place, the idea \u003ci\u003ein its existence\u003c/i\u003e\r\nis just as particular when regarded as made up of the\r\ncommon elements of many ideas as is any of the ideas whose\r\nelements are taken. A composite photograph is just as\r\nmuch a single photograph as any one of the photographs\r\nwhich are taken to compose it. The chasm between the\r\nparticularity of the psychical image and the universality\r\nof its meaning is not bridged by regarding the content\r\nof the image as made up by eliminating unlike elements\r\nin a number of images. The stuff with which thought has\r\nto work is still nothing more than a particular psychical\r\nimage, and the problem of what gives it its logical value\r\nas a general significance is still unsolved. Nor does it\r\nseem possible to find anything in the \u003ci\u003eexistence\u003c/i\u003e of the image\r\nwhich could account for its reference to something outside\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_100\" id=\"Page_100\"\u003e[Pg 100]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof itself. The \u003ci\u003efact\u003c/i\u003e of reference itself becomes an ultimate\r\nmystery.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_48_48\" id=\"FNanchor_48_48\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_48_48\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[48]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut even waiving this difficulty, the judgment must still\r\nappear truncated, if it really totally disregard a part of its\r\ncontent\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003ei. e.\u003c/i\u003e, the particular existence of the image as part\r\nof the judging consciousness. The theory holds that the\r\nparticular existence of the image has no logical value. It\r\nis only its meaning, or general reference, which has logical\r\nvalue. But the image \u003ci\u003equa\u003c/i\u003e image is just as real as that\r\nto which it is supposed to refer. If the judgment really\r\ndoes ignore its existence, then it ignores a portion of the\r\nreality it attempts to represent, and stands self-confessed\r\nas a failure.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_49_49\" id=\"FNanchor_49_49\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_49_49\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[49]\u003c/a\u003e At still another point, ideas, as Bosanquet represents\r\nthem, prove to be unsatisfactory tools to use in the\r\nwork of building up reality. In Bosanquet\u0027s words: \"The\r\nmeaning tyrannizes over the psychical image in another\r\nrespect. Besides crushing out of sight its particular and\r\nexclusive existence, it also crushes out part of its content\"\r\n(p. 74). The idea, as we use it, is not, as to content, a\r\ncomplete or accurate representation of anything real. To\r\ntake Bosanquet\u0027s illustration:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSome one speaks to me of the \u0026AElig;gean sea, which I have never\r\nseen. He tells me that it is a deep blue sea under a cloudless sky,\r\nstudded with rocky islands. The meanings of these words are a\r\nproblem set to my thought. I have to meet him in the world of\r\nobjective references, which as intelligent beings we have in common.\r\nHow I do this is my own affair, and the precise images at\r\nmy command will vary from day to day, and from minute to minute.\r\nIt sounds simple to say that I combine my recollections of\r\nsea and sky at Torbay with those of the island-studded waters of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_101\" id=\"Page_101\"\u003e[Pg 101]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nOrkney or the Hebrides. Even so, there is much to adjust and\r\nto neglect; the red cliffs of Torbay, and the cloudy skies of the\r\nnorth. But then again, my recollections are already themselves\r\nsymbolic ideas; the reference to Torbay or the Hebrides is itself\r\na problem set to thought, and puts me upon the selection of index-elements\r\nin fugitive images that are never twice the same. I have\r\n\u003ci\u003efirst\u003c/i\u003e to symbolize the color of Torbay, using for the purpose any\r\nblue that I can call to mind, and fixing, correcting, subtracting\r\nfrom, the color so recalled, till I reduce it to a mere index quality;\r\nand \u003ci\u003ethen\u003c/i\u003e I have to deal in the same way with the meaning or significant\r\nidea so obtained, clipping and adjusting the qualities of\r\nTorbay till it seems to serve as a symbol of the \u0026AElig;gean. (Pp. 74, 75.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd by the time all this is performed what sort of a representation\r\nof reality is the idea? Evidently a very poor and\r\nmeager and fragmentary one.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is so poor and fragmentary, that it cannot itself be\r\nthat which is affirmed of reality. It must be some other\r\nfuller existence to be found in the world of meanings which\r\nis affirmed. And yet how the meager content of the idea\r\nsucceeds in referring to the world of meanings, and acting\r\nas the instrument for referring a meaning to reality, is not\r\nat all clear. It seems impossible to explain reference intelligibly\r\nby the concept of a \u003ci\u003ecorrespondence\u003c/i\u003e of contents.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe fundamental difficulty in the interpretation of the\r\npredicate is the same one that we encountered in the interpretation\r\nof the subject. If the predicate is to be affirmed\r\nof reality (and if it be not, it has no logical value), then it\r\nmust, when affirmed, be in some sense an accurate representation\r\nof reality. But the predicate is an idea, and, moreover,\r\nan idea which is, both in its existence and in its meaning\r\npalpably the outcome of transformations wrought upon\r\ngiven sensory contents by the individual consciousness. Since\r\nthe one point of contact with reality is in sensory experience,\r\nthe more simple sensory experiences are reacted upon and\r\nworked over, the farther they recede from reality. The idea\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_102\" id=\"Page_102\"\u003e[Pg 102]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nseems, therefore, in its very essence, a thing which never\r\ncan be affirmed of reality. As image it is itself a reality,\r\nbut not affirmed; as meaning it is that reality (the image)\r\nmanipulated for individual ends. Why suppose that by distorting\r\nreality we get it in shape to affirm \u003ci\u003eof\u003c/i\u003e reality? Moreover,\r\nthe farther an idea is removed from immediate sensory\r\nexperience\u0026mdash;in other words, the more abstract it\r\nbecomes\u0026mdash;the less is the possibility of affirming it of reality.\r\nThe final outcome of this point of view, if we adhere rigorously\r\nto its logic is that the more thinking we do, the less we\r\nknow about the real world. Bosanquet avoids this conclusion\r\nby a pure act of faith. If knowledge is to be rescued,\r\nwe must believe that the work done by consciousness upon\r\nthe bits of reality given in sensory experience really does\r\nsucceed in building up a knowledge of reality for us. As\r\nBosanquet puts it: \"The presentation of Reality, qualified\r\nby an ideal content, is one aspect of Subject and Predication;\r\nand my individual percipient consciousness determining\r\nitself by a symbolic idea is the other. That the latter is\r\nidentified with the former follows from the claim of conscious\r\nthought that its nature is to know.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_50_50\" id=\"FNanchor_50_50\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_50_50\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[50]\u003c/a\u003e (P. 83.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo sum up the situation, Bosanquet starts out with the\r\nassumption that by knowledge we must mean knowledge of a\r\nworld entirely independent of our ideas. If we fail to make\r\nthis assumption, knowledge becomes merely a relation between\r\nideas. But its whole importance seems to us to rest on\r\nthe conviction that it does give us knowledge of a world\r\nwhich is what it is quite independently of our ideas about it,\r\nand cannot in any sense be modified by what we think about\r\nit. What knowledge does is to give us a copy or representation\r\nof the real world, whose value depends on the accuracy\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_103\" id=\"Page_103\"\u003e[Pg 103]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eof the representation. And yet when we examine any individual\r\nknowing consciousness, the subject which appears\r\nwithin the judgment is never some portion of the world\r\nwhich exists outside of the knowing consciousness, but always\r\nsome portion of the world which exists within the knowing\r\nconsciousness, and which is constituted by the knowledge\r\nprocess. The predicate which is affirmed of reality is constantly\r\nfound to derive its meaning, its generalized significance,\r\nnot from its correspondence with, or reference to, the\r\nreal world outside of the knowing consciousness, but from\r\nreference to a world of meanings, which consists in a sort of\r\nconvention among rational beings\u0026mdash;a world whose existence\r\nis distinctly within the knowing consciousness and not outside\r\nof it.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_51_51\" id=\"FNanchor_51_51\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_51_51\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[51]\u003c/a\u003e Between the real world, as Bosanquet conceives\r\nit, and the world of knowledge, we find inserted on the side\r\nof the subject, the world \u003ci\u003eas known to each of us\u003c/i\u003e, and on the\r\nside of the predicate, the \u003ci\u003eobjective world of meanings\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nNeither of these is the real world. Both of them are ideal, \u003ci\u003ei. e.\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nare constructions of the individual consciousness. We nowhere\r\nfind any satisfactory explanation of how these ideal worlds\r\nare related to the real world. There is merely the assertion\r\nthat we must believe that they represent the real world in\r\norder that we may believe that knowledge exists. But the\r\nfact remains that whenever we try to analyze and explain\r\nany particular judgment, what we find ourselves dealing with\r\nis always the world as it exists to us as subject, and the\r\nobjective world of meanings as predicate. If we stop here,\r\nthen knowledge turns out to be just what Bosanquet asserted\r\nat the outset that it was \u003ci\u003enot, i. e.\u003c/i\u003e, a relation between ideas.\r\nWhen we demand a justification for going farther than\r\nthis, we find none except the claim of conscious thought\r\nthat its nature is to know\u0026mdash;a claim whose justice we have\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_104\" id=\"Page_104\"\u003e[Pg 104]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nno possible means of testing, and which would not, even if\r\nadmitted, be of the slightest value in deciding which \u003ci\u003eparticular\u003c/i\u003e\r\njudgment is true and which false.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBosanquet\u0027s development of his subject has proved to be\r\nthroughout the necessary logical outcome of the presuppositions\r\nwith reference to reality from which he starts. The\r\nfundamental difficulty of erecting a theory of the knowledge-process\r\nupon such a basis is recognized by him at the start\r\nin a passage already quoted: \"If the object-matter of reality\r\nlay genuinely outside the system of thought, not only our\r\nanalysis, but thought itself, would be unable to lay hold of\r\nreality\" (p. 2). But, in spite of this assertion, his fundamental\r\nconception of reality remains that of a system which\r\ndoes lie outside the thought-process. His theory is an\r\nattempt to reconcile the essentially irreconcilable views that\r\nreality is outside of the thought-process, and that it is inside\r\nof the thought-process, and he succeeds only by calling upon\r\nour faith that so it is.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf it be true, as it seems to him to be, that we are compelled\r\nto adhere to both of these views of reality, then surely\r\nthere is no other outcome. It means, however, that we finally\r\nresign all hope of \u003ci\u003eknowing\u003c/i\u003e reality. We may \u003ci\u003ehave faith\u003c/i\u003e in\r\nits existence, but we have no way of deciding what particular\r\njudgment has reality in it as it should have it, and what\r\nas it should not. All stand (and fall) on the same basis.\r\nBut does not Bosanquet himself point out a pathway which,\r\nif followed farther, would reach a more satisfactory view of\r\nthe realm of knowledge? He has shown us that the only\r\nsort of reality \u003ci\u003ewe know\u003c/i\u003e, or can know, is the reality which\r\nappears within our judgment-process\u0026mdash;the reality as known\r\nto us. Would it not be possible to drop the presupposed\r\nreality outside of the judgment-process (with which judgment\r\nis endeavoring to make connections) and content ourselves\r\nwith the sort of reality which appears within the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_105\" id=\"Page_105\"\u003e[Pg 105]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\njudgment-process? In other words, may there not be a\r\nsatisfactory view of reality which frankly recognizes its\r\norganic relation to the knowledge-process, without at the\r\nsame time destroying its value as reality? Is it possible to\r\nadmit that reality is in a sense constituted in the judgment\r\nwithout making it at the same time the figment of the individual\r\nimagination\u0026mdash;\"a game with ideas\"?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us assume for the moment that the real difficulty\r\nwith Mr. Bosanquet\u0027s conception, the error that keeps him\r\ntraveling in his hopeless circles, is the notion that truth is a\r\nmatter of reference of ideas as such to reality as such, leading\r\nus to oscillate between the alternatives that either all\r\nideas have such reference, and so are true, constitute knowledge;\r\nor else none have such reference, and so are false; or\r\nelse are mere ideas to which neither truth nor falsity can be\r\nattributed. Let us ask if truth is not rather some \u003ci\u003especific\u003c/i\u003e\r\nrelation within experience, something which characterizes\r\none idea rather than another, so that our problem is not how\r\nan idea can refer to a reality beyond itself, but what are the\r\nmarks by which we discriminate a true reference from a\r\nfalse one. Then let us ask for the criterion used in daily\r\nlife and in science by which to test reality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we ask the philosophically unsophisticated individual\r\nwhy he believes that his house still exists when he is away\r\nfrom it and has no immediate evidence of the fact, he will tell\r\nyou it is because he has found that he can go back to it time\r\nand again and see it and walk into it. It never fails him when\r\nhe acts upon the assumption that it is there. He would\r\nnever tell you that he believed in its existence when he was\r\nnot experiencing it because his mental picture of his house\r\nstood for and represented accurately an object in the real\r\nworld which was nevertheless of a different order of existence\r\nfrom his mental picture. When you ask the physicist why\r\nhe believes that the laws of motion are true, he will tell you\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_106\" id=\"Page_106\"\u003e[Pg 106]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat it is because he finds that bodies always do behave\r\naccording to them. He can predict just what a body will\r\ndo under given circumstances. He is never disappointed\r\nhowever long he takes it for granted that the laws of motion\r\nare true and that bodies behave according to them. The\r\nonly thing that could make him question their truth would\r\nbe to find some body which did not prove to behave in\r\naccordance with them. The criterion is the same in both\r\ncases. It is the practical criterion of what as a matter of\r\nfact will work. That which can safely be taken for granted\r\nas a basis for further action is regarded as real and true. It\r\nremains real so long, and only so long, as it continues to\r\nfulfil this condition. As soon as it ceases to do so, it\r\nceases to be regarded as real. When a man finds that he\r\ncan no longer obtain the accustomed experience of seeing\r\nand entering his house, he ceases to regard it as real. It\r\nhas burned down, or been pulled down. When a physicist\r\nfinds that a body does not, as a matter of fact, behave as a\r\ngiven law leads him to expect it would behave, he ceases to\r\nregard the law as \u003ci\u003etrue\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe contrast between the na\u0026iuml;ve view of the criterion\r\nof reality and the one we have just been discussing may\r\nbe brought out by considering how we should have to\r\ninterpret from each standpoint the constant succession of\r\nfacts in the history of science which have ceased to be facts.\r\nFor illustration take the former fact that the earth is flat.\r\nIt ceased to be a fact, says the theory we have been\r\nreviewing, because further thought-constructions of the real\r\nworld convinced us that there is no reality which the idea\r\n\"flat-world\" represents. The idea \"round-world\" alone\r\nreproduces reality. It ceased to be a fact, says the na\u0026iuml;ve\r\nview, because it ceased to be a safe guide for action. Men\r\nfound they could sail around the world. Correspondence in\r\none case is pictorial, and its existence or non-existence can,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_107\" id=\"Page_107\"\u003e[Pg 107]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas we have seen, never be ascertained. In the other, correspondence\r\nis response, adjustment, the co-meeting of specific\r\nconditions in further constituting of experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn actual life, therefore, the criterion of reality which we\r\nuse is a practical one. The test of reality does not consist\r\nin ascertaining the relationship between an idea and an \u003ci\u003ex\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwhich is not idea, but in ascertaining what experience can\r\nbe taken for granted as a safe basis for securing other experiences.\r\nThe evident advantage of the latter view, leaving\r\naside for the moment the question of its adequacy in other\r\nrespects, is that it avoids the fundamental skepticism at once\r\nsuggested by the former. How can we ever be sure that the\r\nfact which we have discovered will stand the test of further\r\nthought-constructions? Perhaps it comes no nearer to reality\r\nthan the discarded one. Obviously we never \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e be sure\r\nthat any particular content of thought represents reality so\r\naccurately and perfectly that it will never be subject to revision.\r\nIf, however, the test of reality is the \u003ci\u003eadequacy\u003c/i\u003e of a\r\ngiven content of consciousness as a stimulus to action, as a\r\nmode of control, we have an applicable standard. A given\r\ncontent of consciousness is real\u0026mdash;is a fact\u0026mdash;so long as the\r\nact resulting from it is adequate in adaptation to other contents.\r\nIt ceases to be real as soon as the act it stimulates\r\nproves to be inadequate.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe view which places the ultimate test of facts, not in\r\nany relationship of contents or existences, but in the practical\r\noutcome of thought, is the one which seems to follow\r\nnecessarily from a thoroughgoing conception of the judgment\r\nas a function\u0026mdash;an act. Our fundamental biological\r\nconception of the activities of living organisms is that acts\r\nexist for the sake of their results. Acts are always stimulated\r\nby some definite set of conditions, and their value is\r\nalways tested by the adequacy with which they meet this set\r\nof conditions. The judgment is no exception to the rule. It\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_108\" id=\"Page_108\"\u003e[Pg 108]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis always an act stimulated by some set of conditions which\r\nneeds readjusting. Its outcome is a readjustment whose\r\nvalue is and can be tested only by its adequacy. It is\r\naccordingly entirely in line with our reigning biological\r\nconceptions to expect to find the ultimate criterion of truth\r\nand reality in the practical outcome of thought, and to seek\r\nfor an understanding of the nature of the \"real\" and of\r\nthe \"ideal\" within the total activity of judgment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne difficulty besets us at the outset of such an investigation\u0026mdash;that\r\nof being sure that we have a genuine judgment\r\nunder examination. A large portion of the so-called judgments\r\nconsidered by logicians, even by those who emphasize\r\nthe truth that a judgment is an \u003ci\u003eact\u003c/i\u003e, are really not judgments\r\nat all, but contents of thought which are the outcome of\r\njudgments\u0026mdash;what might be called dead judgments, instead\r\nof live judgments. When we analyze a real act of judgment,\r\nas it occurs in a living process of thought, we find given\r\nelements which are always present. There is always a certain\r\nsituation which demands a reaction. The situation is\r\nalways in part determined and taken for granted, and in\r\npart questioned. It is determined in so far as it is a definite\r\nsituation of some sort; it is undetermined in so far as it furnishes\r\nan inadequate basis for further action and therefore\r\ncomes to consciousness as a problem. For example, take one\r\nof the judgments Bosanquet uses. \"This is bread.\" We\r\nhave first to inquire when such a judgment actually occurs\r\nin the living process of thought. A man does not make\r\nsuch a judgment in the course of his thinking unless there\r\nis some instigation to do so. Perhaps he is in doubt as to\r\nwhether the white object he perceives is bread or cake. He\r\nwants some bread, but does not want cake. A closer inspection\r\nconvinces him that it is bread, and the finished judgment\r\nis formulated in the proposition: \"This is bread.\"\r\nWhat is the test of the reality of the bread, and the truth of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_109\" id=\"Page_109\"\u003e[Pg 109]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe judgment? Evidently the act based on it. He eats the\r\nbread. If it tastes like bread and affects him like bread,\r\nthen the bread was real and the judgment true. If, on the\r\nother hand, it does not taste like bread, or if it makes him\r\nviolently ill, then the \"bread\" was not real and the judgment\r\nwas false. In either case, the \"this\"\u0026mdash;the experience to be\r\ninterpreted\u0026mdash;is unquestioned. The man does not question\r\nthe fact that he has a perception of a white object. So much\r\nis taken for granted and is unquestioned within that judgment.\r\nBut there is another part of the experience which is\r\nquestioned, and which remains tentative up to the conclusion\r\nof the act of judgment; that is the doubt as to whether the\r\nperceived white object is bread or something else. Every\r\nlive judgment, every judgment as it normally occurs in the\r\nvital process of thought, must have these phases. It is only\r\nwhen a judgment is taken out of its context and reduced to\r\na mere memorandum of past judgments that it fails to reveal\r\nsuch parts. The man may, of course, go farther back. He\r\nmay wonder whether this is really white or not. But he falls\r\nback then on something else which he takes unquestioningly\u0026mdash;a\r\n\"this\" experience of some sort or other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo far we have considered the practical criterion of reality\r\nmerely as the one which is actually operative in everyday\r\nlife, and as the one suggested by our biological theory of the\r\nfunctions of living organisms. It also offers a suggestion\r\nfor the modified view of the nature of reality for which we\r\nare in search. Our previous discussion brought out incidentally\r\na contradiction in the traditional theory of the\r\nnature of reality which it will be worth while to consider\r\nfurther. In dealing with the subject of the judgment,\r\nreality seemed to be made synonymous with fact. In this\r\nsense fact, or the real, was set off against the ideal. Knowledge\r\nwas viewed as the correspondence between real and\r\nideal. When we came to deal with the ideal itself\u0026mdash;with\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_110\" id=\"Page_110\"\u003e[Pg 110]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe predicate of the judgment\u0026mdash;there appeared in it an element\r\nof fact or reality which proved a serious stumbling-block\r\nfor the theory. As image in my mind, the idea is\r\njust as real as the so-called facts; but this sort of reality\r\naccording to the theory in question is neither the reality\r\nabout which we are judging nor a real quality of it. Both\r\nBradley and Bosanquet are forced to admit that the judgment\r\nignores it, and is in so far by nature inadequate to its\r\nappointed task of knowing reality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe suggestion which the situation offers for a new theory\r\nis that the view of reality has been too narrow. Reality\r\nmust evidently be a broad enough term to cover both fact\r\nand idea. If so, the reality must be nothing more nor less\r\nthan the total process of experience with its continual\r\nopposition of fact and idea, and their continual resolution\r\nthrough activity. That which previous theory has been\r\ncalling the real is not the total reality, but merely one aspect\r\nof it. The problem of relation of fact and idea is thus the\r\nproblem of the relation of one form of reality to another,\r\nand so a determinate soluble one, not a \u003ci\u003emerely\u003c/i\u003e metaphysical\r\nor general one. Granting this, does it still remain true that\r\nreality in the narrower sense, reality as fact, can be regarded\r\nas a different order of existence from the ideal, and set over\r\nagainst the thought-process? Evidently not. Fact and idea\r\nbecome merely two aspects of a total reality. The way in\r\nwhich fact and idea are distinguished has already been suggested\r\nby the practical and biological criterion of fact, or\r\nreality in the narrower sense. From this point of view,\r\nfact is not a different order of existence from idea, but is\r\nmerely a part of the total process of experience which functions\r\nin a given way. It is merely that part of experience\r\nwhich is taken as given, and which serves as a stimulus to\r\naction. Thus the essential nature of fact, or reality in the\r\npopular sense, falls not at all on the side of its content, but\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_111\" id=\"Page_111\"\u003e[Pg 111]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\non the side of its function. Similarly the ideal is merely\r\nthat part of the total experience which is taken as tentative.\r\nThere is no problem as to how either of them is related to\r\nreality. In this relationship they \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e reality. That which\r\nprevious theories had been calling the whole of reality now\r\nappears as merely one aspect of it\u0026mdash;the fact aspect\u0026mdash;artificially\r\nisolated from the rest.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen we translate this view of the nature of reality into\r\nterms of a theory of the judgment, we find that we can agree\r\nwith Bosanquet in his definition of a judgment. It is an\r\nact, and an act which refers an ideal content to reality.\r\nThe judgment must be an act, because it is essentially an\r\nadaptation\u0026mdash;a reaction toward a given situation. The subject\r\nof the judgment is that part of the content of experience\r\nwhich represents the situation to be reacted to. It is that\r\nwhich is taken for granted as given in each case. Now this\r\nis, as we have seen, reality\u0026mdash;in the narrower sense of that\r\nterm. What Bosanquet has been calling reality now appears\r\nmerely as the subject of the judgment taken out of its normal\r\nfunction and considered as an isolated thing. It is an\r\nartificial abstraction. It is accordingly true, as Bosanquet\r\ninsists, that the subject of the judgment must always be\r\nreality\u0026mdash;both in his sense of the term and in ours. This\r\nreality is not real, however, by virtue of its independence\r\nfrom the judgment, but by virtue of its function within the\r\njudgment. His fundamental problem with reference to the\r\nsubject of the judgment is disposed of from this point of\r\nview. The subject is wholly within the judgment, not in\r\nany sense outside of it; but it is at the same time true that\r\nthe subject of the judgment is reality. The fact that the\r\nsubjects of all judgments\u0026mdash;even those of the most elementary\r\ntype\u0026mdash;bear evident marks of the work done by thought upon\r\nthem, ceases to be a problem. The subject is essentially a\r\nthing constituted by the doubt-inquiry process, and func\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_112\" id=\"Page_112\"\u003e[Pg 112]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etioning\r\nwithin it. The necessity for an intermediate \u003ci\u003ereal\r\nworld as it is to me\u003c/i\u003e between the real world and the knowing\r\nprocess disappears, because the \u003ci\u003ereal world as it is to me\u003c/i\u003e is\r\nthe only real world of which the judgment can take account.\r\nThere is no longer any divorce between the content of the\r\nsubject and its existence. Reality in his sense of the term\u0026mdash;reality\r\nas fact\u0026mdash;does not fall on the side of \u003ci\u003eexistence\u003c/i\u003e in\r\ndistinction from content, but on the side of \u003ci\u003efunction\u003c/i\u003e in distinction\r\nfrom content.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe predicate of the judgment is that part of the total\r\nexperience which is taken as doubtful, or tentative. As we\r\nhave seen, every act of adaptation involves a definite situation\r\nto be reacted to (subject) and an indefinite or tentative\r\nmaterial with which to react (predicate). We have\r\npointed out that a situation which demands a judgment never\r\nappears in consciousness as mere questioned or questionable\r\nsituation.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_52_52\" id=\"FNanchor_52_52\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_52_52\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[52]\u003c/a\u003e There is always present, as soon as the doubt\r\narises, some sort of tentative solution. This is the predicate\r\nor idea. Just as the fact, or real in the narrower sense, is\r\nthat which is taken as given in the situation, so the ideal\r\nis that which is taken as tentative. Its ideality does not\r\nconsist in its reference to another order of existence, the\r\nobjective world of meanings, but in its function within the\r\njudgment, the estimate of the whole situation as leading up\r\nto the adequate act. Just as we no longer have any need for\r\nthe mediation of the \u003ci\u003ereal world as known to me\u003c/i\u003e between subject\r\nand reality, so we no longer need \u003ci\u003ethe objective world of\r\nmeanings\u003c/i\u003e to bridge the chasm between the predicate and\r\nreality. The difficulty of understanding how ideas can be\r\nused to build up facts disappears when we regard fact and\r\nidea, not as different orders of existence, but as contents\r\nmarking different phases of a total function.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_113\" id=\"Page_113\"\u003e[Pg 113]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIdeas, as Bosanquet represented them, proved to be\r\nextremely unsatisfactory tools to use in building up a knowledge\r\nof reality. In the first place, their value as instruments\r\nof thought depends upon their universality. We have\r\nalready reviewed Bosanquet\u0027s difficulties in attempting to\r\nexplain the universality of ideas. The universality of an idea\r\ncannot reside in its mere existence as image. Its existence\r\nis purely particular. Its universality must reside in its reference\r\nto something outside of itself. But no explanation of\r\nhow the particular existence\u0026mdash;image\u0026mdash;could refer to another\r\nand fuller content of a different order of existence could be\r\ndiscovered. The fact of reference remained an ultimate\r\nmystery. From the new point of view the image gains its\r\nuniversality through its organizing function. It represents\r\nan organized habit which may be brought to bear upon the\r\npresent situation, and which serves, by directing action, to\r\norganize and unify experience as a whole. It is only as function\r\nthat the concept of reference can be made intelligible.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf course, considered as content, the idea is just as particular\r\nfrom this point of view as from any other. We still\r\nhave to discuss the question as to whether or not the particularity\r\nof the idea has a logical value. The fact that it had none\r\nin Bosanquet\u0027s theory sets a limit to the validity of thought.\r\nBut if the real test of the validity of a judgment is the act\r\nin which it issues, then the existential aspect of the idea\r\nmust have logical value. The existential aspect of the idea\r\nis the \"my\" side of it. It is as my personal experience that\r\nit exists. But it is only as my idea that it has any impulsive\r\npower, or can issue in action. Far from being ignored,\r\ntherefore, the existential aspect is essential to the logical,\r\nthe determinative, value of an idea.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIdeas, according to the representational theory of knowledge,\r\nproved to be a poor medium for knowing reality in\r\nstill another respect. They are in their very nature contents\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_114\" id=\"Page_114\"\u003e[Pg 114]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat have been reduced from the fulness of experience to\r\nmere index-signs. Even though their reference to a fuller\r\ncontent in the objective world of meanings presented no\r\nproblem, still this objective world of meanings is far removed\r\nfrom reality. And yet, in order to know, we must be able\r\nto affirm ideas of reality. On the functional theory of ideas,\r\ntheir value does not rest at all upon their representational\r\nnature. They are not taken either in their existence or in\r\ntheir meaning as representations of any other content. They\r\nare taken as contents which mark a given function, and their\r\nvalue is determined entirely by the adequacy of the function\r\nof which they are the conscious expression. Their content\r\nmay be as meager as you please. It may have been obtained\r\nby a long process of reducing and transforming sensory\r\nexperience, but if it serve to enable its possessor to meet the\r\nsituation which called it up with the appropriate act, then it\r\nhas truth and value in the fullest sense. The reduction of\r\nthe idea to a mere index-sign presents no problem when we\r\nrealize that it is the tool of a given function, not the sign\r\nfor a different and fuller content. The idea thus becomes a\r\ncommendable economy in the thought-process, rather than a\r\nreprehensible departure from reality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have already upon general considerations criticised\r\nthe point of view which holds that ideality consists in reference\r\nto another content. In arguing that this reference\r\ncannot be primarily to reality itself, but rather to an intermediate\r\nworld of meanings, Bosanquet cites the question\r\nand the negative judgment. In the question ideas are not\r\naffirmed of reality, and in negation they are definitely denied\r\nof reality, hence their reference cannot be to reality. It must\r\ntherefore be to an objective world of meanings. It may be\r\nworth while to point out in passing that, from the functional\r\npoint of view, the part played by ideas in the question and\r\nin negative judgment is the same that it is in affirmation.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_115\" id=\"Page_115\"\u003e[Pg 115]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have brought out the fact that all judgment arises in\r\na doubt. The earliest stage of judgment is accordingly a\r\nquestion. Whether the process stops at that point, or is\r\ncarried on to an affirmation or negation, depends upon the\r\nparticular conditions. The ideas which appear in questions\r\npresent no other problem than those of affirmation. They\r\nare ideas, not by virtue of their reference to another content\r\nin the world of meanings, but by virtue of their function,\r\n\u003ci\u003ei. e.\u003c/i\u003e, that of constituting that part of the total experience\r\nwhich is taken as doubtful, and hence as in process.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn order to make this point clear with reference to negative\r\njudgments, it will be necessary to consider the relation\r\nof negative and positive judgments somewhat more in detail.\r\nAll judgment is in its earliest stages a question, but a question\r\nis never \u003ci\u003emere\u003c/i\u003e question. There are always present some\r\nsuggestions of an answer, which make the process really a\r\ndisjunctive judgment. A question might be defined as a\r\ndisjunctive judgment in which one member of the disjunction\r\nis expressed and the others implied. If the process\r\ngoes on to take the form of affirmation or negation, one of\r\nthe suggested answers is selected. To follow out the illustration\r\nof the bread used above, the judgment arises in a\r\ndoubt as to the nature of the white object perceived, but the\r\ndoubt never takes the form of a blank question. It at once\r\nsuggests certain possible solutions drawn from the mass of\r\norganized experience at the command of the person judging.\r\nAt this stage the judgment is disjunctive. In the illustration\r\nit would probably take the form: \"This is either bread\r\nor cake.\" The further course of the judgment rejects the\r\ncake alternative, and selects the bread, and the final outcome\r\nof the judgment is formulated in the proposition: \"This is\r\nbread.\" But how did it happen that it did not take the\r\nform: \"This is not cake\"? That proposition is also involved\r\nin the outcome, and implied in the judgment made. The\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_116\" id=\"Page_116\"\u003e[Pg 116]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nanswer is that the form taken by the final outcome depends\r\nentirely on the direction of interest of the person making\r\nthe judgment. If his interest happened to lie in obtaining\r\nbread, then the outcome would naturally take the form:\r\n\"This is bread,\" and his act would consist in eating it. If\r\nhe happened to want cake, the natural form would be, \"This\r\nis not cake,\" and his act would consist in refraining from\r\neating. In other words, the question as to whether a judgment\r\nturns out to be negative or positive is a question of\r\nwhether the stress of interest happens to fall on the selected\r\nor on the rejected portions of the original disjunction. Every\r\ndetermination of a subject through a predicate includes both.\r\nThe selection of one or the other according to interest affects\r\nthe final formulation of the process, but does not change the\r\nrelations of its various phases. An idea in a negative judgment\r\nis just what it is in a positive judgment. In neither case\r\nis it constituted an idea by reference to some other content.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo far we have outlined Bosanquet\u0027s theory of the judgment;\r\nhave noted the apparently insoluble problems inherent\r\nin his system, and have sketched a radically different theory\r\nwhich offered a possible solution for his difficulties. It now\r\nremains to develop the implications of the new theory further\r\nby comparing its application to some of the more important\r\nproblems of logic with that of Bosanquet. In closing\r\nwe shall have to inquire to what extent the new theory of\r\nthe judgment with its metaphysical implications has proved\r\nmore satisfactory than that of Bosanquet.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe special problems to be considered are (1) the relation\r\nof judgment to inference; (2) the parts of the judgment\r\nand their relationship; (3) the time element in the\r\njudgment; and (4) the way in which one judgment can be\r\nseparated from another.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. The discussion of the relation between judgment and\r\ninference comes up incidentally in Bosanquet\u0027s treatment of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_117\" id=\"Page_117\"\u003e[Pg 117]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe distinction between a judgment and a proposition (p. 79).\r\nThe proposition, he says, is merely the enunciative sentence\r\nwhich represents the act of thought called judgment. With\r\nthis distinction we should agree. In his discussion of the\r\npoint, however, he criticises Hegel\u0027s doctrine that a judgment\r\nis distinguished from a proposition in that a judgment\r\nmaintains itself against a doubt, while a proposition is a\r\nmere temporal affirmation, not implying the presence of a\r\ndoubt. The ground of his criticism is that judgment must\r\nbe regarded as operative before the existence of a conscious\r\ndoubt, and that, while it is true, as Hegel suggests, that\r\njudgment and inference begin together, they both begin farther\r\nback than the point at which conscious doubt arises.\r\nDoubt marks the point at which inference becomes conscious\r\nof its ground. Now, it is undoubted that inferences in\r\nwhich the ground is implicit exist at an earlier stage of\r\nexperience than those in which it is explicit. The former\r\nwe usually call simple apprehension, and the latter judgment.\r\nWhat Bosanquet wishes to do is to make the term \"judgment\"\r\ncover both the implicit and the explicit activities.\r\nThe question at once arises whether such a use of terms is\r\naccurate. There is certainly a wide difference between an\r\ninference which is conscious of its ground, and one which is\r\nnot. It is conceivably a distinction of philosophic importance.\r\nTo slur the difference by applying one name to both\r\naccomplishes nothing. It will be remembered that the presence\r\nof a conscious doubt is the criterion of judgment\r\nadopted in the standpoint from which we have been criticising\r\nBosanquet\u0027s theory. We should accordingly make the\r\nterm \"inference\" a wider one than the term \"judgment.\"\r\nA judgment is an inference which is conscious of its ground.\r\nSince fact and idea have been represented as constituted in\r\nand through judgment, the question which at once suggests\r\nitself is: What, from such a standpoint, is the criterion of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_118\" id=\"Page_118\"\u003e[Pg 118]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfact and idea in the stage of experience previous to the\r\nappearance of judgment? The answer is that the question\r\ninvolves the psychological fallacy. There is no such distinction\r\nas fact and idea in experience previous to the appearance\r\nof judgment. The distinction between fact and idea\r\narises only at the higher level of experience at which inference\r\nbecomes conscious of its grounds. To ask what they\r\nwere previous to that is to ask \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e they were before they\r\n\u003ci\u003ewere\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;a question which, of course, cannot be answered.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur reason for not adopting Hegel\u0027s distinction between\r\na judgment and a proposition would accordingly not be the\r\nsame as Bosanquet\u0027s. The question has already been\r\ntouched upon in the distinction between dead and live judgments.\r\nWhat Hegel calls a proposition is really nothing\r\nbut a dead judgment. His illustration of a temporal affirmation\r\nis the sentence: \"A carriage is passing the house.\"\r\nThat sentence would be a judgment, he says, only in case\r\nthere were some doubt as to whether or not a carriage was\r\npassing. But the question to be answered first is: When\r\nwould such a \"statement\" occur in the course of our experience?\r\nIt is impossible to conceive of any circumstances\r\nin which it would naturally occur, unless there were some\r\ndoubt to be solved either of our own or of another. Perhaps\r\none is expecting a friend, and does not know at first\r\nwhether it is a carriage or a cart which is passing. Perhaps\r\nsome one has been startled, and asks: \"What is this\r\nnoise?\" What Hegel wishes to call a proposition is, accordingly,\r\nnothing but a judgment taken out of its setting.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. In dealing with the traditional three parts of the judgment\u0026mdash;subject,\r\npredicate, and copula\u0026mdash;Bosanquet disposes\r\nof the copula at once, by dividing the judgment into subject\r\nand predication. But the two terms \"subject\" and \"predication\"\r\nare not co-ordinate. Subject, as he uses it, is a\r\nstatic term indicating a \u003ci\u003econtent\u003c/i\u003e. Predication is a dynamic\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_119\" id=\"Page_119\"\u003e[Pg 119]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nterm indicating the act of predicating. It implies something\r\nwhich is predicated of something else, \u003ci\u003ei. e.\u003c/i\u003e, two contents\r\nand the act of bringing them into relation. Now, if\r\nwhat we understand by the copula is the \u003ci\u003eact\u003c/i\u003e of predicating\r\nabstracted from the content which is predicated of another\r\ncontent, then it does not dispose of the copula as a separate\r\nfactor in judgment to include thing predicated and act of\r\npredicating under the single term \"predication.\" The term\r\n\"predication\" might just as reasonably be made to absorb\r\nthe subject as well, and would then appear\u0026mdash;as it really is\u0026mdash;synonymous\r\nwith the term \"judgment.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut Bosanquet\u0027s difficulties with the parts of the judgment\r\nare not disposed of even by the reduction to subject\r\nand predication. He goes on to say:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIt is plain that the judgment, however complex, is a single idea.\r\nThe relations within it are not relations between ideas, but are\r\nthemselves a part of the idea which is predicated. In other words,\r\nthe subject must be outside the judgment in order that the content\r\nof the judgment may be predicated of it. If not, we fall back into\r\n\"my idea of the earth goes round my idea of the sun,\" and this, as\r\nwe have seen, is never the meaning of \"The earth goes round the\r\nsun.\" What we want is, \"The real world has in it as a fact what\r\nI mean by earth-going-round-sun.\" (P. 81.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have already pointed out the difficulties into which\r\nBosanquet\u0027s presupposition as to the nature of reality\r\nplunges him. This is but another technical statement of\r\nthe same problem. If the subject is really outside of judgment,\r\nthen the entire \u003ci\u003econtent\u003c/i\u003e of the judgment must fall on\r\nthe side of predicate, or idea. In the paragraphs that follow,\r\nBosanquet brings out the point that the judgment must\r\nnevertheless contain the distinction of subject and predicate,\r\nsince it is impossible to affirm without introducing a\r\ndistinction into the \u003ci\u003econtent\u003c/i\u003e of the affirmation. Yet he considers\r\nthis distinction to be \u003ci\u003emerely\u003c/i\u003e a difference within an\r\nidentity. It serves to mark off the grammatical subject\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_120\" id=\"Page_120\"\u003e[Pg 120]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand predicate, but cannot be the essential distinction of\r\nsubject and predicate. His solution of the puzzle is really\r\nthe one for which we have been contending, \u003ci\u003ei. e.\u003c/i\u003e, that \"the\r\nreal world is primarily and emphatically my world,\" but he\r\nstill cannot be satisfied with that kind of a real world as\r\nultimate. Behind the subject which presents my world he\r\npostulates a real world which is not my world, but which my\r\nworld represents. It is the relation between this real world\r\nand the total content of a judgment which he considers the\r\nessential relation of judgment. This leaves him\u0026mdash;as we\r\nhave pointed out\u0026mdash;as far as ever from a theory of the relation\r\nof thought to reality, and, moreover, with no criterion\r\nfor the distinction of subject and predicate within the judgment.\r\nTo say that it is a difference within an identity does\r\nnot explain how, on a mere basis of content, such a difference\r\nis distinguished within an identity or how it assumes the\r\nimportance it actually has. He vibrates between taking the\r\nwhole intellectual content as predicate, the reality to be represented\r\nas subject (in which case the copula would be the\r\n\"contact of sense-perception\") and a distinction appearing\r\nwithout reasonable ground or bearing \u003ci\u003ewithin\u003c/i\u003e the intellectual\r\ncontent. When subject and predicate are regarded as the\r\ncontents in which phases of a function appear, this difficulty\r\nno longer exists.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. In discussing the time relations within judgment (p. 85)\r\nBosanquet first disposes of the view which holds that the subject\r\nis prior to the predicate in time, and is distinguished from\r\nthe predicate by its priority. He emphasizes the fact that no\r\ncontent of consciousness can have the significance of a subject,\r\nexcept with reference to something already referred to\r\nit as predicate. But while it cannot be true that the parts\r\nof the judgment fall outside of one another in time, it is yet\r\nevident that in one sense at least the judgment is in time.\r\nTo make this clear, Bosanquet draws a provisional distinc\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_121\" id=\"Page_121\"\u003e[Pg 121]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etion\r\nbetween the process of arriving at a judgment and the\r\ncompleted judgment. The process of arriving at a judgment\r\nis a process of passing from a subject with an indefinite\r\nprovisional predicate\u0026mdash;a sort of disjunctive judgment\u0026mdash;to\r\na subject with a defined predicate. This process is evidently\r\nin time, but it is as evidently not a transition from subject\r\nto predicate. It is, as he says, a modification, \u003ci\u003epari passu\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nof both subject and predicate. The same distinction, he\r\nthinks, must hold of the judgment when completed. But this\r\nthrows us into a dilemma with reference to the time-factor\r\nin judgment. Time either is or is not an essential factor in\r\njudgment. If it is not essential, then how explain the evident\r\nfact that the judgment as an intellectual process does\r\nhave duration? If it is essential, then how explain the fact\r\nthat its parts do not fall outside one another in time? Bosanquet\r\nevidently regards the former problem as the easier of\r\nthe two. His solution is that, while the judgment is an\r\nintellectual process in time, still this is a purely external\r\naspect. The essential relation between subject and predicate\r\nis not in time, since they are coexistent; therefore time is not\r\nan essential element in judgment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first point at which we take issue with this treatment\r\nof time in relation to judgment is in the distinction between\r\nthe process of arriving at the judgment and the completed\r\njudgment. Bosanquet himself defines judgment as an intellectual\r\nact by which an ideal content is referred to reality.\r\nNow, at what point does this act begin? Certainly at the\r\npoint where an ideal content is first applying to reality, and\r\nthis, as he points out, is at the beginning of the process\r\nwhich he describes as the process of arriving at a judgment.\r\nIt is nothing to the point that at this stage the predicate is\r\ntentative, while later it becomes defined. His process of\r\narriving at the judgment is exactly the process we have\r\nbeen describing as the early stages of any and every judg\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_122\" id=\"Page_122\"\u003e[Pg 122]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ement.\r\nWhen he talks about the judgment as completed, he\r\nhas apparently shifted from the dynamic view of judgment\r\nimplied in his definition to a static view. All he could mean\r\nby a completed judgment\u0026mdash;in distinction to the total activity\r\nof arriving at a judgment\u0026mdash;is the new content of which we\r\nfind ourselves possessed when the total process of predication\r\nis complete. But this content is not a judgment at all. It\r\nis a new construction of reality which may serve either as\r\nsubject or as predicate in future judgments.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, if we regard the judgment as the total activity by\r\nwhich an ideal content is referred to reality, then must we\r\nnot regard time as an essential element? Bosanquet answers\r\nthis question in the negative, because he believes that if\r\ntime is an essential element, then the parts of the judgment\r\nmust necessarily fall outside one another in time. But is\r\nthis necessary? If the essence of judgment is the very\r\nmodification, \u003ci\u003epari passu\u003c/i\u003e, of subject and predicate, then\r\ntime must be an essential element in it, but it is not at all\r\nnecessary that its elements should fall outside of one another\r\nin time. In other words, the dilemma which Bosanquet points\r\nout on p. 87 is not a genuine one. There is no difficulty\r\ninvolved in admitting that the judgment is a transition in\r\ntime, and still holding that its \u003ci\u003eparts\u003c/i\u003e do not fall outside \u003ci\u003eone\r\nanother\u003c/i\u003e in time. His own solution of the problem\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003ei. e.\u003c/i\u003e, that,\r\nalthough judgment is an intellectual process in time, still time\r\nis not an essential feature of it, because subject and predicate\r\nare coexistent and judgment is a relation between them\u0026mdash;involves\r\na desertion of his dynamic view of judgment. He\r\ndefines judgment, not as a relation between subject and\r\npredicate, but as an intellectual \u003ci\u003eact\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_53_53\" id=\"FNanchor_53_53\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_53_53\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[53]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_123\" id=\"Page_123\"\u003e[Pg 123]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e4. The discussion of the time-element in judgment leads\r\nup to the next puzzle\u0026mdash;that as to the way in which one\r\njudgment can be marked off from another in the total activity\r\nof thought. Bosanquet has pointed out that subject and predicate\r\nare both of them present at every stage of the judging\r\nprocess, and are undergoing progressive modification. If,\r\ntherefore, we take a cross-section of the process at any point,\r\nwe find both subject and predicate present; but a cross-section\r\nat one point would not reveal quite the same subject\r\nand predicate as the cross-section at another point. He comes\r\nto the conclusion that judgment breaks up into judgments as\r\nrhomboidal spar into rhomboids (p. 88). It is, accordingly,\r\nquite arbitrary to mark out any limits for a single judgment.\r\nThe illustration he gives of the point is as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTake such an every-day judgment of mixed perception and\r\ninference as, \"He is coming down stairs and going into the\r\nstreet.\" It is the merest chance whether I break up the process\r\nthus, into two judgments as united by a mere conjunction, or,\r\nknowing the man\u0027s habits, say, when I hear him half way down\r\nstairs, \"He is going out.\" In the latter case I summarize a more\r\nvarious set of observations and inferences in a single judgment; but\r\nthe judgment is as truly single as each of the two which were before\r\nseparated by a conjunction; for each of them was also a summary\r\nof a set of perceptions, which might, had I chosen, have been subdivided\r\ninto distinct propositions expressing separate judgments;\r\n\u003ci\u003ee. g.\u003c/i\u003e, \"He has opened his door, and is going toward the staircase,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_124\" id=\"Page_124\"\u003e[Pg 124]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand is half way down, and is in the passage,\" etc. If I simply say,\r\n\"He is going out,\" I am not a whit the less conscious that I judge\r\nall these different relations, but I then include them all in a single\r\nsystematic content \"going out.\" (P. 89.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut is it a question of merest chance which of these\r\nvarious possibilities is actualized? Is Bosanquet really\r\nlooking\u0026mdash;as he thinks\u0026mdash;at the actual life of thought, or is he\r\nconsidering, not what as a matter of fact does take place under\r\na concrete set of circumstances, but what might take place\r\nunder slightly differing sets of circumstances? If it is true\r\nthat judgment is a crisis developing through adequate interaction\r\nof stimulus and response into a definite situation,\r\nbeginning with doubt and ending with a solution of the\r\ndoubt, then it is not true that its limits are purely arbitrary.\r\nIt begins with the appearance of the problem and its tentative\r\nsolutions, and ends with the solution of a final response.\r\nIt does, of course, depend upon momentary interest, but this\r\ndoes not make its limits arbitrary, for the interest is inherent,\r\nnot external. In the case of Bosanquet\u0027s illustration, the\r\nquestion of whether one judgment or half a dozen is made\r\nis not a question of merest chance. It depends upon where\r\nthe interest of the person making the judgment is centered\u0026mdash;in\r\nother words, upon what is the particular doubt to be\r\nsolved. If the real doubt is as to whether the man will stay in\r\nhis room or go out, then when he is heard leaving his room\r\nthe solution comes in the form: \"He is going out.\" But if\r\nthe doubt is as to whether he will stay in his room, go out, or\r\ngo into some other room, then the succession of judgments\r\noccurs, each of which solves a problem. \"He has opened\r\nhis door\"\u0026mdash;then he is not going to stay in his room; \"He\r\nis going toward the staircase\"\u0026mdash;then he is not going into a\r\nroom in the opposite direction, etc. It is impossible to conceive\r\nof such a series of judgments as actually being made,\r\nunless each one represents a problematic situation and its\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_125\" id=\"Page_125\"\u003e[Pg 125]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndetermination. The only time that a man would, as a matter\r\nof fact, choose to break up the judgment, \"He is going\r\nout,\" into such a series, would be the time when each member\r\nof the series had its own special interest as representing\r\na specific uncertain aim or problem. Nor is it altogether\r\ntrue that in making the judgment, \"He is going out,\" one is\r\nnot a whit the less conscious that he judges all these different\r\nrelations. He judges only such relations as are necessary to\r\nthe solution of the problem in hand. If hearing the man\r\nopen his door is a sufficient basis for the solution, then that\r\nis the only one which consciously enters into the formation\r\nof the judgment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have attempted to bring out in the preceding pages\r\nwhat seem to be the contradictions and insoluble problems\r\ninvolved in Bosanquet\u0027s theory of the judgment, and to\r\nexhibit them as the logical outcome of his metaphysical presuppositions.\r\nWe have also tried to develop another theory\r\nof the judgment involving a different view of the nature of\r\nreality, and to show that the new theory is able to avoid\r\nthe difficulties inherent in Bosanquet\u0027s system. The change\r\nin view-point briefly is this: Instead of regarding the real\r\nworld as self-existent, independently of the judgments we\r\nmake about it, we viewed it as the totality of experience\r\nwhich is assured, \u003ci\u003ei. e.\u003c/i\u003e, determined as to certainty or specific\r\navailability, through the instrumentality of judgment. We\r\nthus avoided the essentially insoluble problem of how a\r\nreal world whose content is self-existent quite outside of\r\nknowledge can ever be correctly represented by ideas. The\r\ndifficulty in understanding the relation of the subject and\r\nthe predicate of judgment to reality disappears when we\r\ncease to regard reality as self-existent outside of knowledge.\r\nSubject and predicate become instrumentalities in the process\r\nof building up reality. Thought no longer seems to\r\ncarry us farther and farther from reality as ideas become\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_126\" id=\"Page_126\"\u003e[Pg 126]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nabstract and recede from the immediate sensory experience\r\nin which contact with the real occurs. On the contrary,\r\nthought carries us constantly toward reality. Finally, we\r\navoid the fundamental skepticism about the possibility of\r\nknowledge which, from the other standpoint, is forced upon\r\nus by the long succession of facts which have faded into the\r\nrealm of false opinions, and the lack of any guarantee that\r\nour present so-called knowledge of reality shall not meet the\r\nsame fate. From that point of view, reality seems to be not\r\nonly unknown, but unknowable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe criticism sure to be passed upon the alternative view\r\ndeveloped is that the solution of Bosanquet\u0027s problems\r\nwhich it affords is not a real solution, but rather the abandonment\r\nof an attempt at a solution. It represents reality\r\nas a thing which is itself in process of development. It\r\nwould force us to admit that the reality of a hundred years\r\nago, or even of yesterday, was not in content the reality of\r\ntoday. A growing, developing reality is, it will be said,\r\nan imperfect reality, while we must conceive of reality as\r\ncomplete and perfect in itself. The only answer which can\r\nbe made is to insist again that we have no right to assume\r\nthat reality is such an already completed existence, unless\r\nsuch an assumption enables us to understand experience and\r\norganize it into a consistent whole. The attempt of this\r\npaper has been to show that such a conception of reality\r\nreally makes it inherently impossible to give an intelligible\r\naccount of experience as a whole, while the view which\r\nregards reality as developing in and through judgment does\r\nenable us to build up a consistent and understandable view\r\nof the world. This suggests that the \"perfect\" may not\r\nafter all be that which is finished and ended, but that whose\r\nreality is so abundant and vital as to issue in continuous\r\nself-modification. The Reality that evolves and moves may\r\nbe more perfect, less finite, than that which has exhausted\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_127\" id=\"Page_127\"\u003e[Pg 127]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nitself. Moreover, only the view that Reality is developmental\r\nin quality, and that the instrument of its development\r\nis judgment involving the psychical in its determination\r\nof subject and predicate gives the psychical as such any\r\nsignificant place in knowledge or in reality. According to\r\nthe view of knowledge as representation of an eternal content,\r\nthe psychical is a mere logical surd.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_128\" id=\"Page_128\"\u003e[Pg 128]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"VI\" id=\"VI\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eVI\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eTYPICAL STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDGMENT\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLogic aims at investigating the general function of\r\nknowing. But knowing, it is commonly asserted, is constituted\r\nas judgment. Furthermore, there is reason to believe\r\nthat judgment undergoes well-marked changes in its development.\r\nConsequently, an understanding of the judgment-function\r\nand of its epochs in development is of prime importance.\r\nIn carrying through the investigation we shall\r\nendeavor, first, to state and to defend a certain presupposition\r\nwith reference to the character of the judgment-function;\r\nsecond, to exhibit the application of this presupposition in\r\nthe typical stages of judgment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eI\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eJudgment is essentially \u003ci\u003einstrumental\u003c/i\u003e. This is the presupposition\r\nwhich we must explain and make good. And\r\nwe shall accomplish this by way of an analysis of judgment\r\nas meaning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt cannot be denied that what we call knowledge is concerned\r\nwith the discrimination of valid meaning. To know\r\nis to appreciate the \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e of things and the meaning \u003ci\u003eof\r\nthings\u003c/i\u003e is the same with valid meaning. Judging determines\r\nknowledge, and in the same act develops meaning. To put\r\nit otherwise, knowledge is a matter of \u003ci\u003econtent\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003econtent\u003c/i\u003e is\r\n\u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e, and we have knowledge when we have meaning\r\nsatisfactorily determined. It is evident, therefore, that if\r\nwe would understand the judging-function, we must first\r\nmake clear to ourselves the nature and r\u0026ocirc;le of \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMeaning is universally embodied in \u003ci\u003eideas\u003c/i\u003e. To know, to\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_129\" id=\"Page_129\"\u003e[Pg 129]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nunderstand the meaning, to get ideas, are the same. Now,\r\nin ideas two factors may be distinguished. First, every\r\nidea has as its base an image or emphasized portion of\r\nexperience. In some forms of ideation we are more immediately\r\naware of the presence of images than in others, but no\r\nidea\u0026mdash;even the most abstract\u0026mdash;can exist apart from an\r\nultimate base. Second, every idea is equally a function of\r\n\u003ci\u003ereference\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003econtrol\u003c/i\u003e. As \u003ci\u003ereference\u003c/i\u003e, the idea projects in the\r\nmind\u0027s view an anticipation of experiences and of the conditions\r\nupon which these experiences depend for their realization;\r\nas \u003ci\u003econtrol\u003c/i\u003e, ideas are agencies in turning anticipations\r\ninto realizations.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_54_54\" id=\"FNanchor_54_54\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_54_54\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[54]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo be more specific on both points: Since the days of\r\nGalton it has been almost a commonplace in psychology that\r\nideas are embodied in forms of imagery which vary for and\r\nin different individuals. It has been maintained, it is true,\r\nthat in abstract forms of thought, imagery disappears. This\r\nobjection is met in two ways. For one, words\u0026mdash;the vehicle\r\nof many abstract ideas\u0026mdash;involve imagery of a most pronounced\r\ntype: for another, every idea, when examined\r\nclosely, discloses an image, no matter how much for the time\r\nbeing this has been driven into obscurity by the characteristics\r\nof reference and control. Furthermore, when we\r\nexamine the anticipatory aspect of ideas, the presence of\r\nimagery both with reference to outcome and to conditions is\r\nso evident that its presence will scarcely be denied.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe second point may be illustrated in several ways. In\r\neveryday life anticipation and realization are inseparable\r\nfrom the nature and use of ideas. \"Hat\" means anticipation\r\nof protection to the head and the tendency toward setting\r\nin motion the conditions appropriate to the realization\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_130\" id=\"Page_130\"\u003e[Pg 130]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof this anticipation. The same factors are evident in the\r\nboy\u0027s definition of a knife as \"something to whittle with.\"\r\nAgain it is maintained that intelligence is an essential factor\r\nin human self-consciousness. By this is meant that human\r\nbeings are universally aware in some degree of what they\r\nare about. And this awareness consists in understanding\r\nthe meaning of their actions, of forecasting the outcome of\r\nvarious kinds of activity, of apprehending beforehand the\r\nconditions connected with determinate results. Within this\r\nsphere we speak of certain men as being pre-eminently\r\nintelligent, meaning that for such men outcomes are previewed\r\nand connected with their appropriate conditions far\r\nbeyond the range of ordinary foresight. Finally, scientific\r\nintelligence is essentially of this kind. It aims at understanding\r\nthe varying types of process which operate in\r\nnature and thus at possessing itself of information with\r\nreference to results to be expected under determinate conditions.\r\nFor example, the knowledge acquired in his\r\nresearches by Louis Pasteur enabled him to predict the life\r\nor death of animals inoculated with charbon virus according\r\nas they had or had not been vaccinated previously. His\r\ninformation, in other words, became an instrument for the\r\ncontrol and eradication of the disease. And what is true of\r\nthis case is true of all science. To the scientist ideas are\r\n\"working hypotheses\" and have their value only as they\r\nenable him to predict, and to control. And while it is true\r\nthat the scientist usually overlooks the so-called \u003ci\u003epractical\u003c/i\u003e\r\nvalue of his discoveries, it is none the less true that in due\r\ntime the inventor follows the investigator. The investigator\r\nis content to construct and show the truth of his idea.\r\nThe inventor assumes the truth of the investigator\u0027s work\r\nand carries his idea as a constructive principle into the\r\ncomplications of life. To both men \"knowledge is power,\"\r\nalthough the \"power\" may be realized in connection with\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_131\" id=\"Page_131\"\u003e[Pg 131]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndifferent interests. But if this be true, ideas can no longer\r\nbe regarded as copies in individual experience of some pre-existing\r\nreality. They are rather instruments for transforming\r\nand directing experience, by way of constructing anticipations\r\nand the conditions appropriate to their realization.\r\nHerein also consists their truth or falsity. The true idea is\r\nreliable, carrying us from anticipation to realization; the\r\nfalse idea is unreliable, and fails in bringing the promised\r\nresult.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, in the development of instruments generally, we\r\nmay distinguish a rule-of-thumb or more or less unreflective\r\nstage of construction, and one entirely reflective. As to use\r\nthere is the distinction of inexpert and expert control. This\r\nleads us to expect that in the thought-function also certain\r\ntypical stages of construction and of control may be found.\r\nTo the investigation of this point we shall next direct attention.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eII\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn its development from crude to expert forms judgment\r\nexhibits three typical stages\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003ethe impersonal\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ethe reflective\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand \u003ci\u003ethe intuitive\u003c/i\u003e. These we shall consider in order of\r\ndevelopment. But first it is to be noticed that these stages\r\nof judgment are not to be regarded as hard and fast distinctions\r\nof the kind that no indications of the higher are to be\r\nfound in the lower types, but rather as working distinctions\r\nwithin a process of continuous development.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. \u003ci\u003eThe impersonal judgment.\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Ever since the days of the\r\nGreek grammarians the impersonal judgment has been considered\r\nan anomaly in logic. And the reason is not far to\r\nseek. From the time of Aristotle it has been customary to\r\nmaintain that judgments, when analyzed, disclose a subject\r\nand a predicate. Logically considered, these appear to be\r\nentirely correlative, for, as Erdmann puts it,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_55_55\" id=\"FNanchor_55_55\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_55_55\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[55]\u003c/a\u003e \"an event\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_132\" id=\"Page_132\"\u003e[Pg 132]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwithout a substrate, a quality without a subject, is altogether\r\nunpresentable.\" But there is in all languages a class of\r\njudgments, such as, \"It rains,\" \"It snows,\" \"Fire!\" in which\r\nno directly asserted subject is discoverable. To these the\r\nname impersonal and subjectless has been given. Here then\r\nis the difficulty. If we admit that the impersonal expression\r\ninvolves predication, we must, in all consistency, search for\r\na subject, while at the same time the subject refuses to disclose\r\nitself. In ancient days the orthodox logician confined\r\nhis search to language and to the spoken or written proposition.\r\nThe unorthodox critic maintained, in opposition to\r\nthis, that a subject was provided only by warping and twisting\r\nthe natural sense of the impersonal expression. And\r\nthus the matter stood until the development of modern comparative\r\nphilology. It was then demonstrated beyond the\r\npossibility of doubt that the \"it\" (or its equivalent) of the\r\nimpersonal is a purely contentless form word. Language\r\nprovides no subject whatsoever. So strong, however, is the\r\nhold of tradition that the search has been renewed. Attention\r\nhas been turned upon the mental processes involved,\r\nand this time with more apparent result. Although there\r\nhas been no general agreement with reference to the subject,\r\na classification of the different views may still be made.\r\n(\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) The subject is universal and undetermined; (\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) it is\r\nindividual and more or less determined; (\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) between these\r\nextremes lies almost every intermediate degree conceivable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUeberweg maintains that the subject of the impersonal\r\nis the actual totality of present experience. When we ask,\r\n\"What rains?\" we must understand a reference to our general\r\nenvironment, in which no special element is singled out.\r\nSigwart, on the other hand, maintains that the subject can\r\nbe construed only as the actual sense-impression. This\r\ndiversity of opinion might seem to indicate that, were it not\r\nfor the constraining power of theory, a subject would scarcely\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_133\" id=\"Page_133\"\u003e[Pg 133]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbe thought of for the impersonal. Still it must be admitted\r\nthat when we examine the impersonal expression closely we\r\ncan discover a sense-impression, whether definite or indefinite,\r\ncombined with an idea. This would seem to give the\r\ncase to the orthodox logician, for he will at once claim the\r\nsense-impression as the subject and the idea as the predicate\r\nof the judgment. But we must have a care. Predication is\r\nusually held to consist in a \u003ci\u003ereference\u003c/i\u003e of predicate \u003ci\u003eto\u003c/i\u003e subject.\r\nThe factors of the judgment are, as it were, held apart. In\r\nthe impersonal no such thing as this can be discovered. The\r\nmeaning is so close a unity that impression and idea are\r\nentirely fused. We may analyze the expression and find\r\nthem there, but by so doing we destroy the immediacy which\r\nis an essential characteristic of the impersonal. In other\r\nwords, the impersonal does not analyze itself. It is entirely\r\nunconscious of its make-up. And yet it is definite and\r\napplies itself with precision: If I am in a lecture-hall and\r\nhear the fire-alarm, the thought \"Fire!\" which enters my\r\nmind leads to an immediate change in my conduct. I arise,\r\nmove quietly out, and prepare for duty. If, on the other\r\nhand, I open the street door and the rain strikes my face, I\r\nejaculate \"Raining!\" turn, reach for my umbrella, and pass\r\nout protected. In both cases I act \u003ci\u003eknowingly\u003c/i\u003e and with\r\n\u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e, but I do not analyze the movement either of thought\r\nor of action. A correlate to the unreflective impersonal judgment\r\nis found in early custom. Custom embodies social\r\nideas and is an instrument for the determination and control\r\nof action. Individuals moved by custom know what they\r\nare about and act with precision according as custom may\r\ndemand. But it is notorious that custom is direct and unreflective.\r\nIt represents social instruments of control which\r\nhave grown up without method and which represent the\r\nslow accretion of rule-of-thumb activities through many\r\nages. So in the impersonal judgment we have a type of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_134\" id=\"Page_134\"\u003e[Pg 134]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nintellectual instrument which has been brought to a high\r\ndegree of precision in use, but which still retains the simplicity\r\nand certainty of an unquestioned instrument of action.\r\nFor this reason, whatever complexity of elements the impersonal\r\nmay present to a reflective view, it does not contain to\r\nitself. Consequently it may be best to say that to the impersonal\r\nthere is neither subject, predicate, nor reference of the\r\none to the other. These are distinctions which arise only\r\nwhen the instrument of action has been questioned and the\r\nmind turns back upon the meaning which it has unhesitatingly\r\nused, analyzing, investigating, constructing, laying\r\nbare the method and function of its tools. Thus arises a\r\nnew and distinctive type of judgment, viz., the reflective.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. \u003ci\u003eThe reflective judgment.\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;By the reflective judgment\r\nis to be understood that form of meaning whose structure\r\nand function have become a problem to itself. The days of\r\nna\u0026iuml;ve trust and spontaneous action have gone by. Inquiry,\r\ncriticism, aloofness, stay the tendency to immediate action.\r\nMeaning has grown worldly wise and demands that each\r\nsituation shall explain itself and that the general principles\r\nand concrete applications of its own instruments shall be\r\nmade manifest. Hence in the various forms of reflective\r\nthought we find the progressive steps in which meaning\r\ncomes to full consciousness of its function in experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe demonstrative judgment (the simplest of the reflective\r\ntype) carries doubt, criticism, construction, and assertion\r\nwritten on the face of it. For example, in the expression,\r\n\"That is hot,\" we do not find the directness and immediacy\r\nof response characteristic of the simpler impersonal \"hot.\"\r\nInstead, we note a clash of tendencies, a suspension of the\r\nproposed action, a demand for and a carrying out of a reconsideration\r\nof the course of action, the emergence of a new\r\nmeaning, and the consequent redirection of activities. An\r\niron lies upon the hearth; I stretch out my hand to return it\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_135\" id=\"Page_135\"\u003e[Pg 135]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto its place; I stop suddenly, having become conscious of\r\nsigns of warmth; the thought arises in my mind, \"That is\r\nhot;\" I experiment and find my judgment correct; I search\r\nfor a cloth, and thus protected carry out my first intention.\r\nAgain, a hunter notes a movement in the thicket, quickly\r\nraises his gun, and is about to fire. Something in the\r\nmovement of the object arrests him. He stops, thinking,\r\n\"That is a man, perhaps.\" What has caught the eye has\r\narrested his action, has become a demand, and not until\r\nthe situation has become clear can the hunter determine\r\nwhat to do. In other words, he must reflectively assure\r\nhimself what the object is before he can satisfy himself as to\r\nhow he should act. Subject and predicate have arisen and\r\nhave consciously played their parts in the passage from\r\ndoubt to decision.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUnder the heading \"individual judgments\" are classed\r\nsuch expressions as, \"That ship is a man-o\u0027-war,\" \"Russia\r\nopposes the policy of the open door in China.\" In both\r\nthese cases it is evident that an advance in definiteness of\r\nconception and of complexity of meaning has been made,\r\nwhile at the same time we recognize that the instrumental\r\ncharacteristics of the thought-movement remain the same.\r\nIn considering the subject of the judgment we note that the\r\nstimulus presents itself partly as a determinate factor and\r\npartly as a problem\u0026mdash;an insistent demand. The expression,\r\n\"That ship is a man-o\u0027-war,\" might be written, \"That is a\r\nship and of the kind man-o\u0027-war,\" and it thus constitutes\r\nwhat Sigwart calls a \"double synthesis.\" As used in actual\r\njudgment, however, the two are held together and constitute\r\nthe statement of a single stimulus of which a certain portion\r\nis evident and a certain portion is in doubt. The working\r\nout of the difficulty is given in the predicate \"is a man-o\u0027-war,\"\r\nin which we at once detect the instrumental characteristics\r\nfundamental to all judgment. To illustrate: At the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_136\" id=\"Page_136\"\u003e[Pg 136]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nclose of the battle of Santiago, in the Spanish-American\r\nwar, smoke appeared upon the horizon revealing the presence\r\nof a strange ship. Instantly attention was directed to it,\r\nand it became a problem for action\u0026mdash;a demand for instrumental\r\ninformation. Soon it was identified as a man-o\u0027-war,\r\nand the American ships were cleared for action. Closer\r\napproach raised a further question with reference to its\r\nnationality. After some debate this also was resolved, and\r\nhostile demonstrations were abandoned.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe universal judgment is sometimes said to exhibit two\r\ndistinct forms. Investigation, however, has proved this\r\nstatement to be incorrect. Instances taken in themselves\r\nand apart from their character are of no logical significance.\r\nAdvance is made by weighing instances and not by counting\r\nthem. In short, the true universal is the hypothetical judgment,\r\nand the reason for this may be readily shown. The\r\nhypothetical judgment is essentially double-ended. On the\r\none hand, it is a statement of the problem of action in terms\r\nof the conditions which will turn the problem into a solution.\r\nOn the other hand, it is an assertion that once the conditions\r\nof action have been determined the result desired may be\r\nattained. Here we note that the judgment has come to clear\r\nconsciousness of itself and of the part which it plays in\r\nexperience. It has now obtained an insight into the criterion\r\nof its legitimate employment, \u003ci\u003ei. e.\u003c/i\u003e, of its truth and\r\nfalsity. And this insight makes the justification of its claim\r\nalmost self-evident. For, inasmuch as the hypothetical judgment\r\nsays, \"If such and such conditions be realized, such\r\nand such a result will be obtained,\" the test of the claim is\r\nmade by putting the conditions into effect and watching\r\nwhether the promised experience is given. And further,\r\nsince it has been found that the judgment formulated as a\r\nhypothesis actually accomplishes what it promises, we must\r\nadmit that the hypothetical judgment is also categorical.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_137\" id=\"Page_137\"\u003e[Pg 137]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThese two factors cannot be separated from each other. It\r\nis true that the hypothetical judgment reduces every valid\r\nmeaning to the form, \"\u003ci\u003eIf\u003c/i\u003e certain conditions be realized,\"\r\nbut it as plainly and positively asserts, \"such and such\r\nresults \u003ci\u003ewill\u003c/i\u003e be obtained.\" When we grasp the absolute correlativity\r\nof the hypothetical and categorical aspects of\r\njudgment, we realize at once the essentially instrumental\r\ncharacter of judgment, when it comes to consciousness of its\r\nstructure and function. It arises in the self-conscious realization\r\nof a problem. This it reflects upon and sizes up.\r\nWhen the difficulty has been apprehended, the judgment\r\nemerges as the consciousness of the conditions which will\r\nattain the desired end of action freed and unimpeded. This\r\nmay be illustrated by reference to the work of Pasteur cited\r\nabove. His investigations began in a problem set for him\r\nby agricultural conditions in France. A certain disease had\r\nmade the profitable rearing of sheep and cattle almost an\r\nimpossibility. After long and careful examination he discovered\r\nthe beneficial effects of vaccination. To him the\r\nconditions which governed the presence of the disease became\r\napparent, and this knowledge furnished him with an instrument\r\nby means of which one difficulty was removed from the\r\npath of the stock-raiser. In this illustration we have an\r\nepitome of the work accomplished everywhere by the scientist.\r\nIt is his task to develop and to reduce to exact terms\r\ninstruments of control for the varied activities of life. In\r\nits parts and as a whole each instrument is intelligently constructed\r\nand tested so that its make-up and function are exactly\r\nknown. Because of this, reasoned belief now takes the place\r\nof unreflective trust as that was experienced in the impersonal\r\nstage of judgment. What at first hand might appear to be\r\na loss was in reality a gain; the breakdown of the impersonal\r\nwas the first step in the development of an instrument of\r\naction conscious of its reason for being, its methods and\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_138\" id=\"Page_138\"\u003e[Pg 138]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nconditions of action. These latter constitute the distinctive\r\nsubject and predicate of the reflective judgment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis brings us to the connection between the hypothetical\r\ncharacter of this form of judgment and its universality.\r\nAnd this perhaps will now be quite apparent. The reflective\r\njudgment lays bare an objective connection between the\r\nconditions and outcomes of actions. It proves its point by\r\nactually constructing the event. Such being the case, universality\r\nis no more than a statement of identical results\r\nbeing predictable wherever like conditions are realized. If\r\nit be true that \"man is mortal,\" then it is an identical statement\r\nto insist that, \"Wherever we find men there we shall\r\nalso find mortality.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd this point brings us naturally to the treatment of\r\nthe disjunctive judgment: \"A is either B or C or D.\" In the\r\ndisjunctive judgment the demand is not for the construction\r\nof a reliable instrument of action, but for the resolution of a\r\ndoubt as to which instrument is precisely fitted to the circumstances.\r\nIn fact, the disjunctive judgment involves the\r\nidentification of the practical problem. When we say of a\r\nman, \"He is either very simple or very deep,\" we have no\r\ndoubt as to our proper course of action in either case. If he\r\nis simple, then we shall do so and so; if he is deep, then\r\nanother course of action follows. We can lay out alternative\r\ncourses beforehand, but the point of difficulty lies here: \"But\r\njust which is he?\" In short, the disjunctive judgment is\r\nthe demand for and the attempt at a precise diagnosis of a\r\nconcrete problem. To illustrate: A patient afflicted with\r\naphasia is brought to a physician. The fact that the trouble\r\nis aphasia may be quite evident. But what precisely is the\r\nform and seat of the aphasia? To the mind of the educated\r\nphysician the problem will take on the disjunctive form:\r\n\"This is either subcortical or cortical aphasia. If subcortical,\r\nintelligence will not be impaired; if cortical, the sensor\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_139\" id=\"Page_139\"\u003e[Pg 139]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand motor tracts will be in good condition.\" Appropriate\r\ntests are made and the subcortical possibilities are shut out.\r\nThe disjunction disappears and the judgment emerges: \"This\r\nis a case of cortical aphasia.\" But now a new disjunction\r\narises. It is either the sensory or motor form of cortical\r\naphasia, and, whichever one of these, it is again one of several\r\npossibilities. As the alternatives arise, the means for discriminating\r\nthem arise also; determinate symptoms are\r\nobserved, and in due time the physician arrives at the final\r\nconclusion: \"This is sensory cortical aphasia of the visual\r\ntype.\" Having determined this, his method of action is\r\nassured, and he proceeds to the appropriate operation. Thus,\r\nfinally, we are brought to a form of judgment aware not\r\nonly of its motive, method, and justification, but also to one\r\naware of its specific application to individual cases. Thus it\r\nwould seem as though judgment had returned upon itself\r\nand had completed the determination of its sphere of action.\r\nAnd in one sense this is true. In the disjunctive judgment,\r\nas inclusive of the motives of the hypothetical and categorical\r\nforms, the reflective judgment would appear to have come\r\nto its limit of development. One thing, however, remains\r\nto be considered, viz., the development from crude to expert\r\nuses of intellectual instruments.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. \u003ci\u003eThe intuitive judgment.\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;As stated above, the intuitive\r\ntype of judgment depends upon efficiency in the use of judgment.\r\nIn this regard there is a great similarity between\r\nthe impersonal and the intuitive judgments. Both are\r\nimmediate and precise. But there is a radical and essential\r\ndifference. The impersonal judgment knows nothing of the\r\nstrict analysis, insight, and constructive power of the reflective\r\njudgment. The intuitive judgment, on the other hand,\r\nincludes the results of reflection and brings them to their\r\nhighest power. Paradoxically put, in the intuitive judgment\r\nthere is so much reflection that there is no need for\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_140\" id=\"Page_140\"\u003e[Pg 140]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nit at all. To the intuitive judgment there is no hesitation,\r\nno aloofness. Action is direct, but entirely self-conscious.\r\nThat such a type of judgment as the intuitive exists there\r\ncan be no doubt. There is all the difference in the world\r\nbetween the quality of consciousness of a mere layman and\r\nthat of an expert, no matter what the line. The layman\r\nmust size up a situation. It is a process whose parts are\r\nsuccessive, whether much or little difficulty be experienced.\r\nFor the expert situations are taken in at a glance, parts and\r\nwhole are simultaneous and immediate. Yet the meaning is\r\nentirely exact. The expert judgment is self-conscious to the\r\nlast degree. While other individuals are thinking out what\r\nto do, the expert has it, sees the advantage, adjusts, and\r\nmoves. Demand and solution jump together. How otherwise\r\ncan we explain, for example, the action of an expert\r\nball-player? Witness his rapid reactions, his instantaneous\r\nadjustments. Mistakes of opponents which would never be\r\nnoticed by the average player are recognized and seized\r\nupon. On the instant the new opening is seen, the adjustment\r\nis evident, the movement made. Illustrations to the\r\nsame effect could be drawn from other modes of life, \u003ci\u003ee. g.\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nmusic, the military life, etc. That intuitive judgments are\r\nnot more common is a proof in itself of their distinctive\r\ncharacter and value. Only in so far as we become experts\r\nin our special fields of experience and have reduced our\r\ninstruments of action to precise control, can we expect the\r\npresence of intuitive judgments. They remain, therefore, as\r\nthe final outcome of the judgment-function made perfect in\r\nits technique and use.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn conclusion we shall make a brief summary of our\r\ninvestigation and a criticism of certain current theories of\r\njudgment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eJudgment is essentially instrumental. Its function is to\r\nconstruct, justify, and refine experience into exact instruments\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_141\" id=\"Page_141\"\u003e[Pg 141]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor the direction and control of future experience through\r\naction. It exhibits itself first in the form of instruments\r\ndeveloped unsystematically in response to the hard necessities\r\nof life. In a higher stage of development the instrumental\r\nprocess itself is taken into account, and systematically\r\ndeveloped until in the methodical procedure of science the\r\ngeneral principles of knowledge are laid bare and efficient\r\ninstruments of action constructed. Finally, constant, intelligent\r\nuse results in complete control, so that within certain\r\nspheres doubt and hesitancy would seem to disappear as\r\nto the character of the tools used, and remain only as a\r\nmoment in determining their wisest or most appropriate\r\nemploy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe criticism indicated is based upon the instrumental\r\ncharacter of judgment and is directed against all theories\r\nwhich contend that knowledge is a \"copying\" or \"reproducing\"\r\nof reality. In whatever form this \"copy\" theory be\r\nstated, the question inevitably arises how we can compare\r\nour ideas with reality and thus know their truth. On this\r\ntheory, what we possess is ever the copy; the reality is\r\nbeyond. In other words, such a theory logically carried\r\nout leads to the breakdown of knowledge. Only a theory\r\nwhich contains and constructs its criterion within its own\r\nspecific movement can verify its constructions. Such a\r\ntheory is the instrumental. Judgment constructs a situation\r\nin consciousness. The values assigned in this situation have\r\na determining influence upon values further appreciated.\r\nThe construction arrived at concerns future weal and woe.\r\nThus gradually a sense of truth and falsity attaches to the\r\nconstruing of situations. One sees that he \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e look beyond\r\n\u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e situation, because the way he estimates \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e situation is\r\nfraught with meaning beyond itself. Hence the critically\r\nreflective judgment in which hesitancy and doubt direct\r\nthemselves at the attitude, elements, and tools involved in\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_142\" id=\"Page_142\"\u003e[Pg 142]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndefining and identifying the situation, instead of at the situation\r\nitself \u003ci\u003ein toto\u003c/i\u003e. Instead of developing a complex of\r\nexperience through assigning qualities and meanings to the\r\n\u003ci\u003esituation\u003c/i\u003e as such, some one of the quales is selected, to have\r\n\u003ci\u003eits\u003c/i\u003e significance determined. It becomes, \u003ci\u003epro tempore\u003c/i\u003e, the\r\nsituation judged. Or the same thing takes place as regards\r\nsome \"idea\" or value hitherto immediately fastened upon\r\nand employed. In either case we get the reflective judgment,\r\nthe judgment of pure relationship as distinct from\r\nthe constructive judgment. But the judgment of relation,\r\nemploying the copula to refer a specified predicate to a specified\r\nobject, is after all only for the sake of controlling some\r\nimmediate judgment of constructive experience. It realizes\r\nitself in forming the confident habit of prompt and precise\r\nmental adjustment to individualized situations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_143\" id=\"Page_143\"\u003e[Pg 143]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"VII\" id=\"VII\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eVII\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eTHE NATURE OF HYPOTHESIS\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the various discussions of the hypothesis which have\r\nappeared in works on inductive logic and in writings on\r\nscientific method, its structure and function have received\r\nconsiderable attention, while its origin has been comparatively\r\nneglected. The hypothesis has generally been treated\r\nas that part of scientific procedure which marks the stage\r\nwhere a definite plan or method is proposed for dealing with\r\nnew or unexplained facts. It is regarded as an invention\r\nfor the purpose of explaining the given, as a definite conjecture\r\nwhich is to be tested by an appeal to experience to\r\nsee whether deductions made in accordance with it will be\r\nfound true in fact. The function of the hypothesis is to\r\nunify, to furnish a method of dealing with things, and its\r\nstructure must be suitable to this end. It must be so\r\nformed that it will be likely to prove valid, and writers\r\nhave formulated various rules to be followed in the formation\r\nof hypotheses. These rules state the main requirements\r\nof a good hypothesis, and are intended to aid in a\r\ngeneral way by pointing out certain limits within which it\r\nmust fall.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn respect to the origin of the hypothesis, writers have\r\nusually contented themselves with pointing out the kind of\r\nsituations in which hypotheses are likely to appear. But\r\nafter this has been done, after favorable external conditions\r\nhave been given, the rest must be left to \"genius,\" for\r\nhypotheses arise as \"happy guesses,\" for which no rule or\r\nlaw can be given. In fact, the genius differs from the\r\nordinary plodding mortal in just this ability to form fruitful\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_144\" id=\"Page_144\"\u003e[Pg 144]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhypotheses in the midst of the same facts which to other less\r\ngifted individuals remain only so many disconnected experiences.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis unequal stress which has been laid on the structure\r\nand function of the hypothesis in comparison with its origin\r\nmay be attributed to three reasons: (1) The facts, or data,\r\nwhich constitute the working material of hypotheses are\r\nregarded as given to all alike, and all alike are more or less\r\ninterested in systematizing and unifying experience. The\r\npurpose of the hypothesis and the opportunity for forming it\r\nare thus practically the same for all, and hence certain definite\r\nrules can be laid down which will apply to all cases\r\nwhere hypotheses are to be employed. (2) But beyond this\r\nthere seems to be no clue that can be formulated. There is\r\napparently a more or less open acceptance of the final answer\r\nof the boy Zerah Colburn, who, when pressed to give an\r\nexplanation of his method of instantaneous calculation, exclaimed\r\nin despair: \"God put it into my head, and I can\u0027t\r\nput it into yours.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_56_56\" id=\"FNanchor_56_56\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_56_56\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[56]\u003c/a\u003e (3) And, furthermore, there is very often\r\na strong tendency to disregard investigation into the origin\r\nof that which is taken as given, for, since it is already\r\npresent, its origin, whatever it may have been, can have\r\nnothing to do with what it is now. The facts, the data,\r\nare \u003ci\u003ehere\u003c/i\u003e, and must be dealt with as they \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e. Their past,\r\ntheir history or development, is entirely irrelevant. So,\r\neven if we could trace the hypothesis farther back on the\r\npsychological side, the investigation would be useless, for\r\nthe rules to which a good hypothesis must conform would\r\nremain the same.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhether or not it can be shown that Zerah Colburn\u0027s\r\nultimate explanation is needed in logic as little as Laplace\r\nasserted a similar one to be required in his celestial me\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_145\" id=\"Page_145\"\u003e[Pg 145]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003echanics,\r\nit may at least be possible to defer it to some extent\r\nby means of a further psychological inquiry. It will be\r\nfound that psychological inquiry into the origin of the\r\nhypothesis is not irrelevant in respect to an understanding\r\nof its structure and function; for origin and function cannot\r\nbe understood apart from each other, and, since structure\r\nmust be adapted to function, it cannot be independent\r\nof origin. In fact, origin, structure, and function are organically\r\nconnected, and each loses its meaning when absolutely\r\nseparated from each other. It will be found, moreover, that\r\nthe data which are commonly taken as the given material\r\nare not something to which the hypothesis is subsequently\r\napplied, but that, instead of this external relation between\r\ndata and hypothesis, the hypothesis exercises a directive function\r\nin determining what are the data. In a word, the main\r\nobject of this discussion will be to contend against making\r\na merely convenient and special way of regarding the\r\nhypothesis a full and adequate one. Though we speak of\r\nfacts and of hypotheses that may be applied to them, it\r\nmust not be forgotten that there are no facts which remain\r\nthe same whatever hypothesis be applied to them; and that\r\nthere are no hypotheses which are hypotheses at all except\r\nin reference to their function in dealing with our subject-matter\r\nin such a way as to facilitate its factual apprehension.\r\nData are selected in order to be determined, and hypotheses\r\nare the ways in which this determination is carried on. If,\r\nas we shall attempt to show, the relation between data and\r\nhypothesis is not external, but strictly correlative, it is evident\r\nthat this fact must be taken into account in questions\r\nconcerning deduction and induction, analytic and synthetic\r\njudgments, and the criterion of truth. Its bearing must be\r\nrecognized in the investigation of metaphysical problems as\r\nwell, for reality cannot be independent of the knowing\r\nprocess. In a word, the purpose of this discussion of the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_146\" id=\"Page_146\"\u003e[Pg 146]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhypothesis is to determine its nature a little more precisely\r\nthrough an investigation of its rather obscure origin, and to\r\ncall attention to certain features of its function which have\r\nnot generally been accorded their due significance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eI\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe hypothesis as predicate.\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;It is generally admitted\r\nthat the function of the hypothesis is to provide a way of\r\ndealing with the data or subject-matter which we need to\r\norganize. In this use of the hypothesis it appears in the\r\nr\u0026ocirc;le of predicate in a judgment of which the data, or facts,\r\nto be construed constitute the subject.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn his attempts to reduce the movements of the planets\r\nabout the sun to some general formula, Kepler finally hit\r\nupon the law since known as Kepler\u0027s law, viz., that the\r\nsquares of the periodic times of the several planets are proportional\r\nto the cubes of their mean distances from the sun.\r\nThis law was first tentatively advanced as a hypothesis.\r\nKepler was not certain of its truth till it had proved its\r\nclaim to acceptance. Neither did Newton have at first any\r\ngreat degree of assurance in regard to his law of gravitation,\r\nand was ready to give it up when he failed in his first attempt\r\nto test it by observation of the moon. And the same thing\r\nmay be said about the caution of Darwin and other investigators\r\nin regard to accepting hypotheses. The only reason\r\nfor their extreme care in not accepting at once their tentative\r\nformulations or suggestions was the fear that some other\r\nexplanation might be the correct one. This rejection of\r\nother possibilities is the negative side of the matter. We\r\nbecome confident that our hypothesis is the right one as we\r\nlose confidence in other possible explanations; and it might\r\nbe added, without falling into a circle, that we lose confidence\r\nin the other possibilities as we become more convinced of\r\nour hypothesis.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_147\" id=\"Page_147\"\u003e[Pg 147]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt appears that such may be the relation of the positive\r\nand negative sides in case of such elaborate hypotheses as\r\nthose of Kepler and Newton; but is it true where our\r\nhypotheses are more simple? It is not easy to understand\r\nwhy the fact that the hypothesis is more simple, and the\r\ntime required for its formulation and test a good deal\r\nshorter, should materially change the state of affairs. The\r\nquestion remains: Why, if there is no opposition, should\r\nthere be any uncertainty? In all instances, then, the hypothesis\r\nappears as one among other possible predicates which\r\nmay be applied to our data taken as subject-matter of a\r\njudgment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe predicate as hypothesis.\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Suppose, then, the\r\nhypothesis is a predicate; is the predicate necessarily a\r\nhypothesis? This is the next question we are called upon\r\nto answer, and, since the predicate cannot very well be taken\r\naside from the judgment, our question involves the nature\r\nof the judgment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhile it will not be necessary to give a very complete\r\naccount of the various definitions of the judgment that might\r\nbe adduced, still the mention of a few of the more prominent\r\nones may serve to indicate that something further is needed.\r\nIn definitions of the judgment sometimes the subjective side\r\nis emphasized, sometimes the objective side, and in other\r\ninstances there are attempts to combine the two. For\r\ninstance, Lotze regards the judgment as the idea of a unity\r\nor relation between two concepts, with the further implication\r\nthat this connection holds true of the object referred\r\nto. J. S. Mill says that every proposition either affirms or\r\ndenies existence, coexistence, sequence, causation, or resemblance.\r\nTrendelenburg regards the judgment as a form of\r\nthought which corresponds to the real connection of things,\r\nwhile Ueberweg states the case a little differently, and says\r\nthat the essence of judgment consists in recognizing the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_148\" id=\"Page_148\"\u003e[Pg 148]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nobjective validity of a subjective connection of ideas. Royce\r\npoints to a process of imitation and holds that in the judgment\r\nwe try to portray by means of the ideas that enter into\r\nit. Ideas are imitative in their nature. Sigwart\u0027s view of\r\nthe judgment is that in it we say something about something.\r\nWith him the judgment is a synthetic process, while\r\nWundt considers its nature analytic and holds that, instead\r\nof uniting, or combining, concepts into a whole, it separates\r\nthem out of a total idea or presentation. Instead of blending\r\nparts into a whole, it separates the whole into its constituent\r\nparts. Bradley and Bosanquet both hold that in\r\nthe judgment an ideal content comes into relation with\r\nreality. Bradley says that in every judgment reality is\r\nqualified by an idea, which is symbolic. The ideal content\r\nis recognized as such, and is referred to a reality beyond the\r\nact. This is the essence of judgment. Bosanquet seems\r\nto perceive a closer relation between idea and reality, for\r\nalthough he says that judgment is the \"intellectual function\r\nwhich defines reality by significant ideas,\" he also tells us\r\nthat \"the subject is both in and out of the judgment, as\r\nReality is both in and out of my consciousness.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn all these definitions of judgment the predicate appears\r\nas ideal. An ideal content is predicated of something,\r\nwhether we regard this something as an idea or as reality\r\nbeyond, or as reality partly within and partly without the\r\nact of judging; and it is ideal whether we consider it as one\r\nof the three parts into which judgments are usually divided,\r\nor whether we say, with Bosanquet and Bradley, that subject,\r\npredicate, and copula all taken together form a single\r\nideal content, which is somehow applied to reality. Moreover,\r\nwe not only judge about reality, but it seems to be\r\nquite immaterial to reality whether we judge concerning it\r\nor not.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMany of our judgments prove false. Not only do we err\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_149\" id=\"Page_149\"\u003e[Pg 149]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin our judgments, but we often hesitate in making them for\r\nfear of being wrong; we feel there are other possibilities,\r\nand our predication becomes tentative. Here we have something\r\nvery like the hypothesis, for our ideal content shows\r\nitself to be a tentative attempt in the presence of alternatives\r\nto qualify and systematize reality. It appears, then,\r\non the basis of the views of the judgment that have been\r\nmentioned, that not only do we find the hypothesis taking\r\nits place as the predicate of a judgment, but the predicate is\r\nitself essentially of the nature of a hypothesis.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the views of the judgment so far brought out, reality,\r\nwith which it is generally admitted that the judgment\r\nattempts to deal in some way, appears to lie outside the act\r\nof judging. Now, everyone would say that we make some\r\nadvance in judging, and that we have a better grasp of\r\nthings after than before. But how is this possible if reality\r\nlies without or beyond our act of judging? Is the reality\r\nwe now have the same that we had to begin with? If so,\r\nthen we have made no advance as far as the real itself is\r\nconcerned. If merely our conception of it has changed,\r\nthen it is not clear why we may not be even worse off than\r\nbefore. If reality does lie beyond our judgment, then how,\r\nin the nature of the case, can we ever know whether we\r\nhave approached it or have gone still farther away? To\r\nmake any claim of approximation implies that we do reach\r\nreality in some measure, at least, and, if so, it is difficult to\r\nunderstand how it lies beyond, and is independent of, the\r\nact of judging.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eFurther analysis of judgment.\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;It remains to be seen\r\nwhether a further investigation of the judgment will still\r\nshow the predicate to be a hypothesis. It is evident that in\r\nsome cases the judgment appears at the end of a more or\r\nless pronounced reflective process, during which other possible\r\njudgments have suggested themselves, but have been\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_150\" id=\"Page_150\"\u003e[Pg 150]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nrejected. The history of scientific discovery is filled with\r\ncases which illustrate the nature of the process by which a\r\nnew theory is developed. For instance, in Darwin\u0027s \u003ci\u003eFormation\r\nof Vegetable Mould through the Action of Earth Worms\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nwe find the record of successive steps in the development of\r\nhis hypothesis. Darwin suspected from his observations that\r\nvegetable mold was due to some agency which was not yet\r\ndetermined. He reasoned that if vegetable mold is the result\r\nof the life-habits of earthworms, \u003ci\u003ei. e.\u003c/i\u003e, if earth is brought up\r\nby them from beneath the surface and afterward spread out\r\nby wind and rain, then small objects lying on the surface of the\r\nground would tend to disappear gradually below the surface.\r\nFacts seemed to support his theory, for layers of red sand,\r\npieces of chalk, and stones were found to have disappeared\r\nbelow the surface in a greater or less degree. A common\r\nexplanation had been that heavy objects tend to sink in soft\r\nsoil through their own weight, but the earthworm hypothesis\r\nled to a more careful examination of the data. It was\r\nfound that the weight of the object and the softness of the\r\nground made no marked difference, for sand and light objects\r\nsank, and the ground was not always soft. In general, it\r\nwas shown that where earthworms were found vegetable\r\nmold was also present, and \u003ci\u003evice versa\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this investigation of Darwin\u0027s the conflicting explanations\r\nof sinking stones appear within the main question of\r\nthe formation of vegetable mold by earthworms. The facts\r\nthat disagreed with the old theory about sinking stones were\r\napproached through this new one. But the theories had something\r\nin common, viz., the disappearance of the stones or\r\nother objects: they differed in their further determination of\r\nthis disappearance. In this case it may seem as if the facts\r\nwhich were opposed to the current theory of sinking stones\r\nwere seen to be discrepant only after the earthworm hypothesis\r\nhad been advanced; the conflict between the new facts\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_151\" id=\"Page_151\"\u003e[Pg 151]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand the old theory appears to have arisen through the influence\r\nof the new theory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are cases, however, where the facts seem clearly to\r\ncontradict the old theory and thus give rise to a new one.\r\nFor example, we find in Darwin\u0027s introduction to his \u003ci\u003eOrigin\r\nof Species\u003c/i\u003e the following: \"In considering the origin of\r\nspecies it is quite conceivable that a naturalist reflecting on\r\nthe mental affinities of organic beings, on their embryological\r\nrelations, their geographical distribution, geological succession,\r\nand other such facts, might come to the conclusion\r\nthat species had not been independently created but had\r\ndescended, like varieties, from other species.\" It would\r\nseem from this statement that certain data were found for\r\nwhich the older theory of independent creation did not offer\r\nan adequate explanation. And yet the naturalist would\r\nhardly \"reflect\" on all these topics in a comparative way\r\nunless some other mode of interpretation were already dawning\r\nupon him, which led him to review the accepted reflections\r\nor views.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs a more simple illustration, we may cite the common\r\nexperience of a person who is uncertain concerning the\r\nidentity of an approaching object, say, another person. At\r\nfirst he may not be sure it is a person at all. He then sees\r\nthat it is someone, and as the person approaches he is inclined\r\nto believe him to be an acquaintance. As the supposed\r\nacquaintance continues to approach, the observer may distinguish\r\ncertain features that cause him to doubt, and then\r\nrelinquish his supposition that it is an acquaintance. Or,\r\nhe may conclude at once that the approaching person is\r\nanother individual he knows, and the transition may be so\r\nreadily made from one to the other that it would be difficult\r\nto determine whether the discordant features are discordant\r\nbefore the new supposition arises, or whether they are not\r\nrecognized as conflicting till this second person is in mind.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_152\" id=\"Page_152\"\u003e[Pg 152]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nOr, again, the identification of the new individual and the\r\ndiscovery of the features that are in conflict with the first\r\nsupposition may appear to go on together.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, marked lines of likeness appear between this\r\nrelatively simple judgment and the far more involved ones\r\nof scientific research. In the more extended scientific\r\nprocess we find data contradicting an old theory and a new\r\nhypothesis arising to account for them. The hypothesis is\r\ntested, and along with its verification we have the rejection,\r\nor rather the modification, of the old theory. Similarly, in\r\ncase of the approaching stranger all these features are\r\npresent, though in less pronounced degree. In scientific\r\ninvestigation there is an interval of testing by means of more\r\ncareful consideration of the data and even actual experimentation.\r\nBefore an explanation is accepted subject to test, a\r\nnumber of others may have been suggested and rejected.\r\nThey may not have received even explicit recognition. In\r\ncase of the identification of the stranger this feature is\r\nalso present. Between two fairly definite attempts to\r\nidentify the mind does not remain a mere blank or stationary,\r\nbut other possible identifications may be suggested\r\nwhich do not have sufficient plausibility to command serious\r\nattention; they are only comparatively brief suggestions or\r\ntendencies.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is to be noted that in all these instances the first supposition\r\nwas not \u003ci\u003eentirely\u003c/i\u003e abandoned, but was modified and\r\nmore exactly determined. (Why it could not be wholly\r\nfalse and the new one wholly new, will be considered later\r\nin connection with discussion of the persistence and re-formation\r\nof habit.) There was such a modification of the\r\nold theory as would meet the requirements of the new data,\r\nand the new explanations thus contained both old and new\r\nfeatures.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have seen that the predicate of the scientific judg\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_153\" id=\"Page_153\"\u003e[Pg 153]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ement\r\nis a hypothesis which is consciously applied to certain\r\ndata. If the similarity between the scientific judgment and\r\nthe more immediate and simple judgment is to be maintained,\r\nit is clear that the predicate of the simple judgment\r\nmust be of like nature. The structure of the two varieties\r\nof judgment differs only in the degree of explicitness which\r\nthe hypothesis acquires. That is, the predicate of a judgment,\r\nas such, is ideal; it is meaning, significant quality.\r\nIf conditions are such as to make the one judging hesitant\r\nor doubtful the mind wavers; the predicate is not applied\r\nat once to the determination or qualification of data, and\r\nhence comes to more distinct consciousness on its own\r\naccount. From being \"ideal,\" it becomes \u003ci\u003ean\u003c/i\u003e idea. Yet its\r\nsole purpose and value remains in its possible use to interpret\r\ndata. Let the idea remain detached, and let the query\r\nwhether it be a true predicate (\u003ci\u003ei. e\u003c/i\u003e., really fit to be employed\r\nin determining the present data) become more critical, and\r\nthe idea becomes clearly a hypothesis.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_57_57\" id=\"FNanchor_57_57\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_57_57\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[57]\u003c/a\u003e In other words, the\r\nhypothesis is just the predicate-function of judgment definitely\r\napprehended and regarded with reference to its nature\r\nand adequacy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ePsychological analysis of judgment.\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;This hypothetical\r\nnature of the predicate will be even more apparent after a\r\nfurther psychological analysis, which, while applying more\r\ndirectly to the simpler and more immediate judgments, may\r\nbe extended to the more involved ones as well.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn psychological terms, we may say, in explanation of\r\nthe judging process, that some stimulus to action has failed\r\nto function properly as a stimulus, and that the activity\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_154\" id=\"Page_154\"\u003e[Pg 154]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich was going on has thus been interrupted. Response\r\nin the accustomed way has failed. In such a case there\r\narises a division in experience into sensation content as subject\r\nand ideal content as predicate. In other words, an\r\nactivity has been going on in accordance with established\r\nhabits, but upon failure of the accustomed stimulus to be\r\nlonger an adequate stimulus this particular activity ceases,\r\nand is resumed in an integral form only when a new habit\r\nis set up to which the new or altered stimulus is adequate. It\r\nis in this process of reconstruction that subject and predicate\r\nappear. Sensory quality marks the point of stress, or\r\nseeming arrest, while the ideal or imaged aspect defines the\r\ncontinuing activity as projected, and hence that with which\r\nstart is to be made in coping with the obstacle. It serves as\r\nstandpoint of regard and mode of indicated behavior. The\r\nsensation stands for the interrupted habit, while the image\r\nstands for the new habit, that is, the new way of dealing\r\nwith the subject-matter.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_58_58\" id=\"FNanchor_58_58\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_58_58\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[58]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt appears, then, that the purpose of the judgment is to\r\nobtain an adequate stimulus in that, when stimulus and\r\nresponse are adjusted to each other, activity will be resumed.\r\nBut if this reconstruction and response were to follow at\r\nonce, would there be any clearly defined act of judging at\r\nall? In such a case there would be no judgment, properly\r\nspeaking, and no occasion for it. There would be simply a\r\nready transition from one line of activity to another; we\r\nshould have changed our method of reaction easily and\r\nreadily to meet the new requirements. On the one hand,\r\nour subject-matter would not have become a clearly recognized\r\ndatum with which we must deal; on the other hand,\r\nthere would be no ideal method of construing it.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_59_59\" id=\"FNanchor_59_59\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_59_59\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[59]\u003c/a\u003e Activity\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_155\" id=\"Page_155\"\u003e[Pg 155]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwould have changed without interruption, and neither subject\r\nnor predicate would have arisen.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn order that judgment may take place there must be\r\ninterruption and suspense. Under what conditions, then, is\r\nthis suspense and uncertainty possible? Our reply must be\r\nthat we hesitate because of more or less sharply defined\r\nalternatives; we are not sure which predicate, which method\r\nof reaction, is the right one. The clearness with which\r\nthese alternatives come to mind depends upon the degree of\r\nexplicitness of the judgment, or, more exactly, the explicitness\r\nof the judgment depends upon the sharpness of these\r\nalternatives. Alternatives may be carefully weighed one\r\nagainst the other, as in deliberative judgments; or they may\r\nbe scarcely recognized as alternatives, as in the case in the\r\ngreater portion of our more simple judgments of daily conduct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe predicate is essentially hypothetical.\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;If we review\r\nin a brief r\u0026eacute;sum\u0026eacute; the types of judgment we have considered,\r\nwe find in the explicit scientific judgment a fairly well-defined\r\nsubject-matter which we seek further to determine.\r\nDifferent suggestions present themselves with varying\r\ndegrees of plausibility. Some are passed by as soon as\r\nthey arise. Others gain a temporary recognition. Some\r\nare explicitly tested with resulting acceptance or rejection.\r\nThe acceptance of any one explanation involves the\r\nrejection of some other explanation. During the process of\r\nverification or test the newly advanced supposition is recognized\r\nto be more or less doubtful. Besides the hypothesis\r\nwhich is tentatively applied there is recognized the possibility\r\nof others. In the disjunctive judgment these possible\r\nreactions are thought to be limited to certain clearly defined\r\nalternatives, while in the less explicit judgments they are\r\nnot so clearly brought out. Throughout the various forms\r\nof judgment, from the most complex and deliberate down to\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_156\" id=\"Page_156\"\u003e[Pg 156]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe most simple and immediate, we found that a process\r\ncould be traced which was like in kind and varied only in\r\ndegree. And, finally, in the most immediate judgments\r\nwhere some of these features seem to disappear, the same\r\naccount not only appears to be the most reasonable one, but\r\nthere is the additional consideration, from the psychological\r\nside, that were not the judgment of this doubtful, tentative\r\ncharacter, it would be difficult to understand how there could\r\nbe judgment as distinct from a reflex. It appears, then, that\r\nthroughout, the predicate is essentially of the nature of a\r\nhypothesis for dealing with the subject-matter. And, however\r\nsimple and immediate, or however involved and prolonged,\r\nthe judgment may be, it is to be regarded as\r\nessentially a process of reconstruction which aims at the\r\nresumption of an interrupted experience; and when experience\r\nhas become itself a consciously intellectual affair, at the\r\nrestoration of a unified objective situation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eII\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eCriticism of certain views concerning the hypothesis.\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\nexplanation we have given of the hypothesis will enable\r\nus to criticise the treatment it has received from the\r\nempirical and the rationalistic schools. We shall endeavor\r\nto point out that these schools have, in spite of their opposed\r\nviews, an assumption in common\u0026mdash;something given in a\r\nfixed, or non-instrumental way; and that consequently the\r\nhypothesis is either impossible or else futile.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBacon is commonly recognized as a leader in the reactionary\r\ninductive movement, which arose with the decline\r\nof scholasticism, and will serve as a good example of the\r\nextreme empirical position. In place of authority and the\r\ndeductive method, Bacon advocated a return to nature and\r\ninduction from data given through observation. The new\r\nmethod which he advanced has both a positive and a\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_157\" id=\"Page_157\"\u003e[Pg 157]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnegative side. Before any positive steps can be taken, the\r\nmind must be cleared of the various false opinions and\r\nprejudices that have been acquired. This preliminary task\r\nof freeing the mind from \"phantoms,\" or \"eidola,\" which\r\nBacon likened to the cleansing of the threshing-floor, having\r\nbeen accomplished, nature should be carefully interrogated.\r\nThere must be no hasty generalization, for the true method\r\n\"collects axioms from sense and particulars, ascending continuously\r\nand by degrees, so that in the end it arrives at\r\nthe most general axioms.\" These axioms of Bacon\u0027s are\r\ngeneralizations based on observation, and are to be applied\r\ndeductively, but the distinguishing feature of Bacon\u0027s\r\ninduction is its carefully graduated steps. Others, too, had\r\nproceeded with caution (for instance Galileo), but Bacon laid\r\nmore stress than they on the subordination of steps.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is evident that Bacon left very little room for hypotheses,\r\nand this is in keeping with his aversion to anticipation\r\nof nature by means of \"phantoms\" of any sort; he\r\neven said explicitly that \"our method of discovery in science\r\nis of such a nature that there is not much left to acuteness\r\nand strength of genius, but all degrees of genius and intellect\r\nare brought nearly to the same level.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_60_60\" id=\"FNanchor_60_60\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_60_60\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[60]\u003c/a\u003e Bacon gave no\r\nexplanation of the function of the hypothesis; in his opinion\r\nit had no lawful place in scientific procedure and must be\r\nbanished as a disturbing element. Instead of the reciprocal\r\nrelation between hypothesis and data, in which hypothesis\r\nis not only tested in experience, but at the same time\r\ncontrols in a measure the very experience which tests it,\r\nBacon would have a gradual extraction of general laws from\r\nnature through direct observation. He is so afraid of the\r\ndistorting influence of conception that he will have nothing\r\nto do with conception upon any terms. So fearful is he of\r\nthe influence of pre-judgment, of prejudice, that he will have\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_158\" id=\"Page_158\"\u003e[Pg 158]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nno judging which depends upon ideas, since the idea\r\ninvolves anticipation of the fact. Particulars are somehow\r\nto arrange and classify themselves, and to record or\r\nregister, in a mind free from conception, certain generalizations.\r\nIdeas are to be registered derivatives of the given\r\nparticulars. This view is the essence of empiricism as a\r\nlogical theory. If the views regarding the logic of thought\r\nbefore set forth are correct, it goes without saying that such\r\nempiricism is condemned to self-contradiction. It endeavors\r\nto construct judgment in terms of its subject alone; and\r\nthe subject, as we have seen, is always a co-respondent to a\r\npredicate\u0026mdash;an idea or mental attitude or tendency of intellectual\r\ndetermination. Thus the subject of judgment can be determined\r\nonly with reference to a corresponding determination\r\nof the predicate. Subject and predicate, fact and idea, are contemporaneous,\r\nnot serial in their relations (see pp. 110-12).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLess technically the failure of Bacon\u0027s denial of the worth\r\nof hypothesis\u0026mdash;which is in such exact accord with empiricism\r\nin logic\u0026mdash;shows itself in his attitude toward experimentation\r\nand toward observation. Bacon\u0027s neglect of\r\nexperimentation is not an accidental oversight, but is bound\r\nup with his view regarding the worthlessness of conception\r\nor anticipation. To experiment means to set out from an\r\nidea as well as from facts, and to try to construe, or even to\r\ndiscover, facts in accordance with the idea. Experimentation\r\nnot only anticipates, but strives to make good an anticipation.\r\nOf course, this struggle is checked at every point\r\nby success or failure, and thus the hypothesis is continuously\r\nundergoing in varying ratios both confirmation and transformation.\r\nBut this is not to make the hypothesis secondary to\r\nthe fact. It is simply to remain true to the proposition that\r\nthe distinction and the relationship of the two is a thoroughly\r\ncontemporaneous one. But it is impossible to draw any\r\nfixed line between experimentation and scientific observa\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_159\" id=\"Page_159\"\u003e[Pg 159]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etions.\r\nTo insist upon the need of systematic observation\r\nand collection of particulars is to set up a principle which is\r\nas distinct from the casual accumulation of impressions as\r\nit is from nebulous speculation. If there is to be observation\r\nof a directed sort, it must be with reference to some\r\nproblem, some doubt, and this, as we have seen, is a stimulus\r\nwhich throws the mind into a certain attitude of response.\r\nControlled observation is inquiry, it is search; consequently\r\nit must be search for something. Nature cannot answer\r\ninterrogations excepting as such interrogations are put; and\r\nthe putting of a question involves anticipation. The observer\r\ndoes not inquire about anything or look for anything excepting\r\nas he is after something. This search implies at once\r\nthe incompleteness of the particular given facts, and the\r\npossibility\u0026mdash;that is ideal\u0026mdash;of their completion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt was not long until the development of natural science\r\ncompelled a better understanding of its actual procedure\r\nthan Bacon possessed. Empiricism changed to experimentalism.\r\nWith experimentalism inevitably came the recognition\r\nof hypotheses in observing, collecting, and comparing\r\nfacts. It is clear, for instance, that Newton\u0027s fruitful investigations\r\nare not conducted in accordance with the Baconian\r\nnotion. It is quite clear that his celebrated four rules for\r\nphilosophizing\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_61_61\" id=\"FNanchor_61_61\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_61_61\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[61]\u003c/a\u003e are in truth statements of certain principles\r\nwhich are to be observed in forming hypotheses. They\r\nimply that scientific technique had advanced to a point\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_160\" id=\"Page_160\"\u003e[Pg 160]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhere hypotheses were such regular and indispensable factors\r\nthat certain uniform conditions might be laid down for\r\ntheir use. The fourth rule in particular is a statement of\r\nthe relative validity of hypothesis as such until there is\r\nground for entertaining a contrary hypothesis.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe subsequent history of logical theory in England is\r\nconditioned upon its attempt to combine into one system the\r\ntheories of empiristic logic with recognition of the procedure\r\nof experimental science. This attempt finds its culmination\r\nin the logic of John Stuart Mill. Of his interest in and\r\nfidelity to the actual procedure of experimental science, as\r\nhe saw it, there can be no doubt. Of his good faith in concluding\r\nhis \u003ci\u003eIntroduction\u003c/i\u003e with the words following there can\r\nbe no doubt: \"I can conscientiously affirm that no one\r\nproposition laid down in this work has been adopted for the\r\nsake of establishing, or with any reference for its fitness in\r\nbeing employed in establishing, preconceived opinions in\r\nany department of knowledge or of inquiry on which the\r\nspeculative world is still undecided.\" Yet Mill was equally\r\nattached to the belief that ultimate reality, as it is for the\r\nhuman mind, is given in sensations, independent of ideas;\r\nand that all valid ideas are combinations and convenient\r\nways of using such given material. Mill\u0027s very sincerity made\r\nit impossible that this belief should not determine, at every\r\npoint, his treatment of the thinking process and of its various\r\ninstrumentalities.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn Book III, chap. 14, Mill discusses the logic of explanation,\r\nand in discussing this topic naturally finds it necessary\r\nto consider the matter of the proper use of scientific\r\nhypotheses. This is conducted from the standpoint of their\r\nuse as that is reflected in the technique of scientific discovery.\r\nIn Book IV, chap. 2, he discusses \"Abstraction or\r\nthe Formation of Conceptions\"\u0026mdash;a topic which obviously\r\ninvolves the forming of hypotheses. In this chapter, his con\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_161\" id=\"Page_161\"\u003e[Pg 161]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003esideration\r\nis conducted in terms, not of scientific procedure,\r\nbut of general philosophical theory, and this point of view\r\nis emphasized by the fact that he is opposing a certain view\r\nof Dr. Whewell.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe contradiction between the statements in the two\r\nchapters will serve to bring out the two points already made,\r\nviz., the correspondent character of datum and hypothesis,\r\nand the origin of the latter in a problematic situation and its\r\nconsequent use as an instrument of unification and solution.\r\nMill first points out that hypotheses are invented to enable\r\nthe deductive method to be applied earlier to phenomena;\r\nthat it does this by suppressing the first of the three steps,\r\ninduction, ratiocination, and verification. He states that:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe process of tracing regularity in any complicated, and at\r\nfirst sight confused, set of appearances is necessarily tentative; we\r\nbegin by making any supposition, even a false one, to see what consequences\r\nwill follow from it; and by observing how these differ\r\nfrom the real phenomena, we learn what corrections to make in our\r\nassumption…. \u003ci\u003eNeither induction nor deduction would enable\r\nus to understand even the simplest phenomena\u003c/i\u003e, if we did not\r\noften commence by anticipating the results; by making a provisional\r\nsupposition, at first essentially conjectural, as to some of the\r\nvery notions which constitute the final object of the inquiry.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_62_62\" id=\"FNanchor_62_62\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_62_62\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[62]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf in addition we recognize that, according to Mill, our\r\ndirect experience of nature always presents us with a complicated\r\nand confused set of appearances, we shall be in no\r\ndoubt as to the importance of ideas as anticipations of a possible\r\nexperience not yet had. Thus he says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe order of nature, as perceived at a first glance, presents at\r\nevery instant a chaos followed by another chaos. We must decompose\r\neach chaos into single facts. We must learn to see in the\r\nchaotic antecedent a multitude of distinct antecedents, in the chaotic\r\nconsequent a multitude of distinct consequents.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_63_63\" id=\"FNanchor_63_63\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_63_63\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[63]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_162\" id=\"Page_162\"\u003e[Pg 162]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the next section of the same chapter he goes on to state\r\nthat, having discriminated the various antecedents and consequents,\r\nwe then \"are to inquire which is connected with\r\nwhich.\" This requires a still further resolution of the complex\r\nand of the confused. To effect this we must vary the circumstances;\r\nwe must modify the experience as given with\r\nreference to accomplishing our purpose. To accomplish\r\nthis purpose we have recourse either to observation or to\r\nexperiment: \"We may either \u003ci\u003efind\u003c/i\u003e an instance in nature\r\n\u003ci\u003esuited to our purposes\u003c/i\u003e, or, by an artificial arrangement of\r\ncircumstances, \u003ci\u003emake\u003c/i\u003e one\" (the italics in \"suited to our purpose\"\r\nare mine; the others are Mill\u0027s). He then goes on to\r\nsay that there is no real logical distinction between observation\r\nand experimentation. The four methods of experimental\r\ninquiry are expressly discussed by Mill in terms of their\r\nworth in singling out and connecting the antecedents and\r\nconsequents which actually belong together, from the chaos\r\nand confusion of direct experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have only to take these statements in their logical\r\nconnection with each other (and this connection runs through\r\nthe entire treatment by Mill of scientific inquiry), to recognize\r\nthe absolute necessity of hypothesis to undertaking any\r\ndirected inquiry or scientific operation. Consequently we\r\nare not surprised at finding him saying that \"the function\r\nof hypotheses is one which must be reckoned absolutely\r\nindispensable in science;\" and again that \"the hypothesis\r\nby suggesting observations and experiments puts us on the\r\nroad to independent evidence.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_64_64\" id=\"FNanchor_64_64\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_64_64\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[64]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSince Mill\u0027s virtual retraction, from the theoretical point\r\nof view, of what is here said from the standpoint of scientific\r\nprocedure, regarding the necessity of ideas is an accompaniment\r\nof his criticism of Whewell, it will put the discussion\r\nin better perspective if we turn first to Whewell\u0027s views.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_65_65\" id=\"FNanchor_65_65\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_65_65\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[65]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_163\" id=\"Page_163\"\u003e[Pg 163]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe latter began by stating a distinction which easily might\r\nhave been developed into a theory of the relation of fact and\r\nidea which is in line with that advanced in this chapter, and\r\nindeed in this volume as a whole. He questions (chap. 2)\r\nthe fixity of the distinction between theory and practice.\r\nHe points out that what we term facts are in effect simply\r\naccepted inferences; and that what we call theories are\r\ndescribable as facts, in proportion as they become thoroughly\r\nestablished. A true theory is a fact. \"All the great theories\r\nwhich have successively been established in the world are\r\nnow thought of as facts.\" \"The most recondite theories\r\nwhen firmly established are accepted as facts; the simplest\r\nfacts seem to involve something of the nature of theory.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe conclusion is that the distinction is a historic one,\r\ndepending upon the state of knowledge at the time, and\r\nupon the attitude of the individual. What is theory for one\r\nepoch, or for one inquirer in a given epoch, is fact for some\r\nother epoch, or even for some other more advanced inquirer\r\nin the same epoch. It is theory when the element of inference\r\ninvolved in judging any fact is consciously brought\r\nout; it is fact when the conditions are such that we have\r\nnever been led to question the inference involved, or else,\r\nhaving questioned it, have so thoroughly examined into the\r\ninferential process that there is no need of holding it further\r\nbefore the mind, and it relapses into unconsciousness again.\r\n\"If this greater or less consciousness of our own internal act\r\nbe all that distinguishes fact from theory, we must allow that\r\nthe distinction is still untenable\" (untenable, that is to say,\r\nas a fixed separation). Again, \"fact and theory have no\r\nessential difference except in the degree of their \u003ci\u003ecertainty\r\nand familiarity\u003c/i\u003e. Theory, when it becomes firmly established\r\nand steadily lodged in the mind becomes fact.\" (P. 45;\r\nitalics mine.) And, of course, it is equally true that as fast\r\nas facts are suspected or doubted, certain aspects of them\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_164\" id=\"Page_164\"\u003e[Pg 164]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nare transferred into the class of theories and even of mere\r\nopinions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI say this conception might have been developed in a\r\nway entirely congruous with the position of this chapter.\r\nThis would have happened if the final distinction between\r\nfact and idea had been formulated upon the basis simply of\r\nthe points, \"relative certainty and familiarity.\" From\r\nthis point of view the distinction between fact and idea is\r\none purely relative to the doubt-inquiry function. It has\r\nto do with the evolution of an experience as regards its conscious\r\nsurety. It has its origin in problematic situations.\r\nWhatever appears to us as a problem appears as contrasted\r\nwith a possible solution. Whatever objects of thought refer\r\nparticularly to the problematic side are theories, ideas,\r\nhypotheses; whatever relates to the solution side is surety,\r\nunquestioned familiarity, fact. This point of view makes\r\nthe distinctions entirely relative to the exigencies of the process\r\nof reflective transformation of experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhewell, however, had no sooner started in this train of\r\nthought than he turns his back upon it. In chap. 3 he transforms\r\nwhat he had proclaimed to be a relative, historic, and\r\nworking distinction into a fixed and absolute one. He\r\ndistinguishes between sensations and ideas, not upon a\r\ngenetic basis with reference to establishing the conditions\r\nof further operation; but with reference to a fundamentally\r\nfixed line of demarkation between what is passively \u003ci\u003egiven\u003c/i\u003e to\r\nthe mind and the \u003ci\u003eactivity\u003c/i\u003e put forth by the mind. Thus he\r\nreinstates in its most generalized and fixed, and therefore\r\nmost vicious, form the separation which he has just rejected.\r\nSensations are a brute unchangeable element of fact which\r\nexists and persists independent of ideas; an idea is a\r\nmode of mental operation which occurs and recurs in an\r\nindependent individuality of its own. If he had carried out\r\nthe line of thought with which he began, sensation as fact\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_165\" id=\"Page_165\"\u003e[Pg 165]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwould have been that residuum of familiarity and certainty\r\nwhich cannot be eliminated, however much else of an experience\r\nis dissolved in the inner conflict. Idea as hypothesis\r\nor theory would have been the corresponding element\r\nin experience which is necessary to redintegrate this residuum\r\ninto a coherent and significant experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut since Whewell did not follow out his own line of\r\nthought, choosing rather to fall back on the Kantian antithesis\r\nof sense and thought, he had no sooner separated his\r\nfact and idea, his given datum and his mental relation, than\r\nhe is compelled to get them together again. The idea becomes\r\n\"a general relation which is imposed upon perception\r\nby an act of the mind, and which is different from anything\r\nwhich our senses directly offer to us\" (p. 26). Such conceptions\r\nare necessary to connect the facts which we learn\r\nfrom our senses into truths. \"The ideal conception which\r\nthe mind itself supplies is superinduced upon the facts as\r\nthey are originally presented to observation. Before the\r\ninductive truth is detected, the facts are there, but they are\r\nmany and unconnected. The conception which the discoverer\r\napplies to them gives them connection and unity.\"\r\n(P. 42.) All induction, according to Whewell, thus depends\r\nupon superinduction\u0026mdash;imposition upon sensory data of certain\r\nideas or general relations existing independently in\r\nthe mind.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_66_66\" id=\"FNanchor_66_66\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_66_66\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[66]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe do not need to present again the objections already\r\noffered to this view: the impossibility of any orderly stimulation\r\nof ideas by facts, and the impossibility of any check\r\nin the imposition of idea upon fact. \"Facts\" and conception\r\nare so thoroughly separate and independent that any\r\nsensory datum is indifferently and equally related to any\r\nconceivable idea. There is no basis for \"superinducing\"\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_166\" id=\"Page_166\"\u003e[Pg 166]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\none idea or hypothesis, rather than any other, upon any\r\nparticular set of data.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the chapter already referred to upon abstraction, or\r\nthe formation of conceptions, Mill seizes upon this difficulty.\r\nYet he and Whewell have one point in common: they both\r\nagree in the existence of a certain subject-matter which is\r\ngiven for logical purposes quite outside of the logical process\r\nitself. Mill agrees with Whewell in postulating a\r\nraw material of pure sensational data. In criticising Whewell\u0027s\r\ntheory of superinduction of idea upon fact, he is\r\ntherefore led to the opposite assertion of the complete dependence\r\nof ideas as such upon the given facts as such\u0026mdash;in\r\nother words, he is led to a reiteration of the fundamental\r\nBaconian empiricism; and thus to a virtual retraction of\r\nwhat he had asserted regarding the necessity of ideas to\r\nfruitful scientific inquiry, whether in the way of observation\r\nor experimentation. The following quotation gives a\r\nfair notion of the extent of Mill\u0027s retraction:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe conceptions then which we employ for the colligation and\r\nmethodization of facts, do not develop themselves from within, \u003ci\u003ebut\r\nare impressed upon the mind from without\u003c/i\u003e; they are never obtained\r\notherwise than by way of comparison and abstraction, and,\r\nin the most important and most numerous cases, are evolved by abstraction\r\n\u003ci\u003efrom the very phenomena which it is their office to colligate\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_67_67\" id=\"FNanchor_67_67\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_67_67\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[67]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEven here Mill\u0027s sense for the positive side of scientific inquiry\r\nsuffices to reveal to him that the \"facts\" are somehow\r\ninadequate and defective, and are in need of assistance\r\nfrom ideas\u0026mdash;and yet the ideas which are to help out the\r\nfacts are to be the impress of the unsure facts! The contradiction\r\ncomes out very clearly when Mill says: \"The\r\nreally difficult cases are those in which the conception destined\r\nto create light and order out of darkness and confu\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_167\" id=\"Page_167\"\u003e[Pg 167]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003esion\r\nhas to be sought for among the very phenomena which\r\nit afterward serves to arrange.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_68_68\" id=\"FNanchor_68_68\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_68_68\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[68]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf course, there is a sense in which Mill\u0027s view is very\r\nmuch nearer the truth than is Whewell\u0027s. Mill at least sees\r\nthat \"idea\" must be relevant to the facts or data which it is\r\nto arrange, which are to have \"light and order\" introduced\r\ninto them by means of the idea. He sees clearly enough\r\nthat this is impossible save as the idea develops \u003ci\u003ewithin\u003c/i\u003e the\r\nsame experience in which the \"dark and confused\" facts are\r\npresented. He goes on to show correctly enough how conflicting\r\ndata lead the mind to a \"confused feeling of an\r\nanalogy\" between the data of the confused experience and\r\nof some other experience which is orderly (or already colligated\r\nand methodized); and how this vague feeling, through\r\nprocesses of further exploration and comparison of experiences,\r\ngets a clearer and more adequate form until we finally\r\naccept it. He shows how in this process we continually\r\njudge of the worth of the idea which is in process of formation,\r\nby reference to its appropriateness to \u003ci\u003eour purpose\u003c/i\u003e. He\r\ngoes so far as to say: \"The question of appropriateness is\r\nrelative to the \u003ci\u003eparticular object we have in view\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_69_69\" id=\"FNanchor_69_69\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_69_69\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[69]\u003c/a\u003e He sums\r\nup his discussion by stating: \"We cannot frame good general\r\nconceptions beforehand. That the conception we have\r\nobtained is the one we want can only be known when we have\r\n\u003ci\u003edone the work for the sake of which we wanted it\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_70_70\" id=\"FNanchor_70_70\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_70_70\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[70]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis all describes the actual state of the case, but it is\r\nconsistent only with a logical theory which makes the distinction\r\nbetween fact and hypothesis instrumental in the\r\ntransformation of experience from a confused into an organized\r\nform; not with Mill\u0027s notion that sensations are somehow\r\nfinally and completely given as ultimate facts, and\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_168\" id=\"Page_168\"\u003e[Pg 168]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat ideas are mere re-registrations of such facts. It is\r\nperfectly just to say that the hypothesis is impressed upon\r\nthe mind (in the sense that any notion which occurs to the\r\nmind is impressed) \u003ci\u003ein the course\u003c/i\u003e of an experience. It is\r\nwell enough, if one define what he means, to say that the\r\nhypothesis is impressed (that is to say, occurs or is suggested)\r\nthrough the medium of given facts, or even of sensations.\r\nBut it is equally true that the \u003ci\u003efacts\u003c/i\u003e are presented\r\nand that \u003ci\u003esensations\u003c/i\u003e occur within the course of an experience\r\nwhich is larger than the bare facts, because involving the\r\nconflicts among them and the corresponding intention to\r\ntreat them in some fashion which will secure a unified experience.\r\nFacts get power to suggest ideas to the mind\u0026mdash;to\r\n\"impress\"\u0026mdash;only through their position in an entire experience\r\nwhich is in process of disintegration and of reconstruction\u0026mdash;their\r\n\"fringe\" or feeling of tendency is quite\r\nas factual as they are. The fact that \"the conception we\r\nhave obtained is the one we want can be known only when\r\nwe have done the work for the sake of which we wanted it,\"\r\nis enough to show that it is not bare facts, but facts in relation\r\nto want and purpose and purpose in relation to facts,\r\nwhich originate the hypothesis.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt would be interesting to follow the history of discussion\r\nof the hypothesis since the time of Whewell and of Mill,\r\nparticularly in the writings of Jevons, Venn, and Bosanquet.\r\nThis history would refine the terms of our discussion by\r\nintroducing more complex distinctions and relations. But\r\nit would be found, I think, only to refine, not to introduce\r\nany fundamentally new principles. In each case, we find the\r\nwriter struggling with the necessity of distinguishing\r\nbetween fact and idea; of giving the fact a certain primacy\r\nwith respect to testing of idea and of giving the idea a primacy\r\nwith respect to the significance and orderliness of the fact;\r\nand of holding throughout to a relationship of idea with\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_169\" id=\"Page_169\"\u003e[Pg 169]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfact so intimate that the idea develops only by being \"compared\"\r\nwith facts (that is, used in construing them), and facts\r\nget to be known only as they are \"connected\" through the\r\nidea\u0026mdash;and we find that what is a maze of paradoxes and\r\ninconsistencies from an absolute, from a non-historic standpoint,\r\nis a matter of course the moment it is looked at from\r\nthe standpoint of experience engaged in self-transformation\r\nof meaning through conflict and reconstitution.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut we can only note one or two points. Jevons\u0027s \"infinite\r\nballot-box\" of nature which is absolutely neutral as to\r\nany particular conception or idea, and which accordingly\r\nrequires as its correlate the formation of every possible hypothesis\r\n(all standing in themselves upon the same level of\r\nprobability) is an interesting example of the logical consequences\r\nof feeling the need of both fact and hypothesis for\r\nscientific procedure and yet regarding them as somehow\r\narising independently of each other. It is an attempt to\r\ncombine extreme empiricism and extreme rationalism. The\r\nprocess of forming hypotheses and of deducing their rational\r\nconsequences goes on at random, because the disconnectedness\r\nof facts as given is so ultimate that the facts suggest one hypothesis\r\nno more readily than another. Mathematics, in its two\r\nforms of measurements as applied to the facts, and of calculation\r\nas applied in deduction, furnishes Jevons the bridge by\r\nwhich he finally covers the gulf which he has first himself created.\r\nVenn\u0027s theory requires little or no restatement to bring\r\nit into line with the position taken in the text. He holds to\r\nthe origin of hypothesis in the original practical needs of\r\nmankind, and to its gradual development into present scientific\r\nform.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_71_71\" id=\"FNanchor_71_71\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_71_71\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[71]\u003c/a\u003e He states expressly:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003edistinction between what is known and what is not\r\nknown is essential to Logic\u003c/i\u003e, and peculiarly characteristic of it\r\nin a degree not to be found in any other science. Inference is the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_170\" id=\"Page_170\"\u003e[Pg 170]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nprocess of passing from one to the other; from facts which we had\r\naccepted as premises, to those which we have not yet accepted,\r\n\u003ci\u003ebut are in the act of doing so by the very process in question\u003c/i\u003e. No\r\nscrutiny of the facts themselves, regarded as objective, can ever\r\ndetect these characteristics of their greater or less familiarity to\r\nour minds. We must introduce also the subjective element if we\r\nwish to give any adequate explanation of them.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_72_72\" id=\"FNanchor_72_72\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_72_72\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[72]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eVenn, however, does not attempt a thoroughgoing statement\r\nof logical distinctions, relations, and operations, as\r\nparts \"of the act of passing from the unknown to the known.\"\r\nHe recognizes the relation of reflection to a historic process,\r\nwhich we have here termed \"reconstruction,\" and the origin\r\nand worth of hypothesis as a tool in the movement, but does\r\nnot carry his analysis to a systematic form.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eIII\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eOrigin of the hypothesis.\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;In our analysis of the process\r\nof judgment, we attempted to show that the predicate arises\r\nin case of failure of some line of activity going on in terms\r\nof an established habit. When the old habit is checked\r\nthrough failure to deal with new conditions (\u003ci\u003ei. e.\u003c/i\u003e, when the\r\nsituation is such as to stimulate two habits with distinct\r\naims) the problem is to find a new method of response\u0026mdash;that\r\nis, to co-ordinate the conflicting tendencies by building\r\nup a single aim which will function the existing situation.\r\nAs we saw that, in case of judgment, habit when checked\r\nbecame ideal, an idea, so the new habit is first formalized as\r\nan ideal type of reaction and is the hypothesis by which we\r\nattempt to construe new data. In our inquiry as to how this\r\nformulation is effected, \u003ci\u003ei. e.\u003c/i\u003e, how the hypothesis is developed,\r\nit will be convenient to take some of the currently accepted\r\nstatements as to their origin, and show how these statements\r\nstand in reference to the analysis proposed.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_171\" id=\"Page_171\"\u003e[Pg 171]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eEnumerative induction and allied processes.\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;It is\r\npointed out by Welton\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_73_73\" id=\"FNanchor_73_73\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_73_73\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[73]\u003c/a\u003e that the various ways in which\r\nhypotheses are suggested may be reduced to three classes,\r\nviz., enumerative induction, conversion of propositions, and\r\nanalogy. Under the head of \"enumeration\" he reminds us\r\nthat \"every observed regularity of connection between phenomena\r\nsuggests a question as to whether it is universal.\"\r\nThere are numerous instances of this in mathematics. For\r\nexample, it is noticed that 1+3=2\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e, 1+3+5=3\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e, 1+3+5+7=4\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e,\r\netc.; and one is led to ask whether there is any\r\ngeneral principle involved, so that the sum of the first \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e odd\r\nnumbers will be \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e, where \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e is any number, however great.\r\nIn this early form of inductive inference there are two divergent\r\ntendencies. One is the tendency to complete enumeration.\r\nThis \u003ci\u003etendency\u003c/i\u003e is clearly ideal\u0026mdash;it transcends the facts\r\nas given. To look for all the cases is thus itself an experimental\r\ninquiry, based upon a hypothesis which it endeavors\r\nto test. But in most cases enumeration can be only incomplete,\r\nand we are able to reach nothing better than probability.\r\nHence the other tendency in the direction of an\r\nanalysis of content in search for a principle of connection in\r\nthe elements in any \u003ci\u003eone\u003c/i\u003e case. For if a characteristic belonging\r\nto a number of individuals suggests a class where it\r\nbelongs to all individuals, it must be that it is found in\r\nevery individual as such. The hypothesis of complete class\r\ninvolves a hypothesis as to the character of each individual\r\nin the class. Thus a hypothesis as to extension transforms\r\nitself into one as to intension.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut it is analogy which Welton considers \"the chief\r\nsource from which new hypotheses are drawn.\" In the\r\nsecond tendency mentioned under enumerative induction,\r\nthat is, the tendency to analysis of content or intension, we\r\nare naturally led to analogy, for in our search for the char\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_172\" id=\"Page_172\"\u003e[Pg 172]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eacteristic\r\nfeature which determines classification among the\r\nconcrete particulars our first step will be an inference by\r\nanalogy. In analogy attention is turned from the number\r\nof observed instances to their character, and, because particulars\r\nhave some feature in common, they are supposed to\r\nbe the same in still other respects. While the best we can\r\nreach in analogy is probability, the arguments may be such\r\nas to result in a high degree of certainty. The form of the\r\nargument is valuable in so far as we are able to distinguish\r\nbetween essential and nonessential characteristics on which\r\nto base our analogy. What is essential and what nonessential\r\ndepends upon the particular end we have in view.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn addition to enumerative induction, which Welton has\r\nmentioned, it is to be noted that there are a number of other\r\nprocesses which are very similar to it in that a number of\r\nparticulars appear to furnish a basis for a general principle\r\nor method. Such instances are common in induction, in\r\ninstruction, and in methods of proof.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf one is to be instructed in some new kind of labor, he\r\nis supposed to acquire a grasp of the method after having\r\nbeen shown in a few instances how this particular work is to\r\nbe done; and, if he performs the manipulations himself, so\r\nmuch the better. It is not asked why the experience of a\r\nfew cases should be of any assistance, for it seems self-evident\r\nthat an experienced man, a man who has acquired\r\nthe skill, or knack, of doing things, should deal better with\r\nall other cases of similar nature.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is something very similar in inductive proofs, as\r\nthey are called. The inductive proof is common in algebra.\r\nSuppose we are concerned in proving the law of expansion\r\nof the binomial theorem. We show by actual calculation\r\nthat, if the law holds good for the \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003eth power, it is true for\r\nthe \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e+first power. That is, if it holds for any power, it\r\nholds for the next also. But we can easily show that it does\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_173\" id=\"Page_173\"\u003e[Pg 173]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhold for, say, the second power. Then it must be true for\r\nthe third, and hence for the fourth, and so on. Whether\r\nthis law, though discovered by inductive processes, depends\r\non deduction for the conclusiveness of its proof, as Jevons\r\nholds;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_74_74\" id=\"FNanchor_74_74\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_74_74\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[74]\u003c/a\u003e whether, as Erdmann\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_75_75\" id=\"FNanchor_75_75\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_75_75\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[75]\u003c/a\u003e contends, the proof is thoroughly\r\ndeductive; or whether Wundt\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_76_76\" id=\"FNanchor_76_76\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_76_76\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[76]\u003c/a\u003e is right in maintaining\r\nthat it is based on an exact analogy, while the\r\nfundamental axioms of mathematics are inductive, it is clear\r\nthat in such proofs a few instances are employed to give the\r\nlearner a start in the right direction. Something suggests\r\nitself, and is found true in this case, in the next, and again\r\nin the next, and so on. It may be questioned whether there\r\nis usually a very clear notion of what is involved in the \"so\r\non.\" To many it appears to mark the point where, after\r\nhaving been taken a few steps, the learner is carried on by\r\nthe acquired momentum somewhat after the fashion of one\r\nof Newton\u0027s laws of motion. Whether the few successive\r\nsteps are an integral part of the proof or merely serve as\r\nillustration, they are very generally resorted to. In fact,\r\nthey are often employed where there is no attempt to introduce\r\na general term such as \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci\u003ek\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci\u003el\u003c/i\u003e, but the few individual\r\ninstances are deemed quite sufficient. Such, for\r\ninstance, is the custom in arithmetical processes. We call\r\nattention to these facts in order to show that successive\r\ncases are utilized in the course of explanation as an aid in\r\nestablishing the generality of a law.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn geometry we find a class of proofs in which the successive\r\nsteps seem to have great significance. A common\r\nproof of the area of the circle will serve as a fair example.\r\nA regular polygon is circumscribed about the circle. Then\r\nas the number of its sides are increased its area will approach\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_174\" id=\"Page_174\"\u003e[Pg 174]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat of the circle, as its perimeter approaches the circumference\r\nof the circle. The area of the circle is thus inferred to\r\nbe \u0026#960;\u003ci\u003eR\u003c/i\u003e\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e, since the area of the polygon is always \u0026frac12;\u003ci\u003eR\u003c/i\u003e\u0026times; perimeter,\r\nand in case of the circle the circumference =2\u0026#960;\u003ci\u003eR\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nHere again we get under such headway by means of the\r\npolygon that we arrive at the circle with but little difficulty.\r\nHad we attempted the transition at once, say, from a circumscribed\r\nsquare, we should doubtless have experienced\r\nsome uncertainty and might have recoiled from what would\r\nseem a rash attempt; but as the number of the sides of our\r\npolygon approach infinity\u0026mdash;that mysterious realm where\r\nmany paradoxical things become possible\u0026mdash;the transition\r\nbecomes so easy that our polygon is often said to have truly\r\nbecome a circle.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSimilarly, some statements of the infinitesimal calculus\r\nrest on the assumption that slight degrees of difference may\r\nbe neglected. Though the more modern theory of limits\r\nhas largely displaced this attitude in calculus and has also\r\nchanged the method of proof in such geometrical problems\r\nas the area of the circle, the underlying motive seems to\r\nhave been to make transitions easy, and thus to make possible\r\na continued application of some particular method or way of\r\ndealing with things.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut granted that this is all true, what has it to do with\r\nthe origin of the hypothesis? It seems likely that the\r\nhypothesis may be suggested by a few successive instances;\r\nbut are these to be classed with the successive steps in proof\r\nto which we have referred? In the first place, we attempt\r\nto prove our hypothesis because we are not sure it is true;\r\nwe are not satisfied that there are no other tenable hypotheses.\r\nBut if we do test it, is not such test enough? It\r\ndepends upon how thorough a grasp we have of the situation;\r\nbut, in general, each test case adds to its probability.\r\nThe value of tests lies in the fact that they strengthen and\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_175\" id=\"Page_175\"\u003e[Pg 175]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntend to confirm our hypothesis by checking the force of\r\nalternatives. One instance is not sufficient because there\r\nare other possible incipient hypotheses, or more properly\r\ntendencies, and the enumeration serves to bring one of these\r\ntendencies into prominence in that it diminishes other vague\r\nand perhaps subconscious tendencies and strengthens the\r\none which suddenly appears as the mysterious product of\r\ngenius.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe question might arise why the mere repetition of conflicting\r\ntendencies would lead to a predominance of one of\r\nthem. Why would they not all remain in conflict and continue\r\nto check any positive result? It is probably because\r\nthere never is any absolute equilibrium. The successive\r\ninstances tend to intensify and bring into prominence some\r\ntendency which is already taking a lead, so to speak. And\r\nit may be said further in this connection that only as seen\r\nfrom the outside, only as a mechanical view is taken, does\r\nthere appear to be an excluding of definitely made out alternatives.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn explanation of the part played by analogy in the origin\r\nof hypotheses, Welton points out that a mere number of\r\ninstances do not take us very far, and that there must be\r\nsome \"\u003ci\u003especification\u003c/i\u003e of the instances as well as numbering of\r\nthem,\" and goes on to show that the argument by enumerative\r\ninduction passes readily into one from analogy, as soon\r\nas attention is turned from the number of the observed\r\ninstances to their character. It is not necessary, however,\r\nto pass to analogy through enumerative induction. \"When\r\nthe instances presented to observation offer immediately the\r\ncharacteristic marks on which we base the inference to the\r\nconnection of S and P, we can proceed at once to an inference\r\nfrom analogy, without any preliminary enumeration of\r\nthe instances.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_77_77\" id=\"FNanchor_77_77\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_77_77\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[77]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_176\" id=\"Page_176\"\u003e[Pg 176]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWelton, and logicians generally, regard analogy as an\r\ninference on the basis of partial identity. Because of certain\r\ncommon features we are led to infer a still greater likeness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBoth enumerative induction and analogy are explicable\r\nin terms of habit. We saw in our examination of enumerative\r\ninduction that a form of reaction gains strength\r\nthrough a series of successful applications. Analogy marks\r\nthe presence of an identical element together with the tendency\r\nto extend this \"partial identity\" (as it is commonly\r\ncalled) still farther. In other words, in analogy it is suggested\r\nthat a type of reaction which is the same in certain\r\nrespects may be made similar in a greater degree. In enumerative\r\ninduction we lay stress on the number of instances\r\nin which the habit is applied. In analogy we emphasize the\r\ncontent side and take note of the partial identity. In fact,\r\nthe relation between enumerative induction and analogy is\r\nof the same sort as that existing between association by contiguity\r\nand association by similarity. In association by\r\ncontiguity we think of the things associated as merely standing\r\nin certain temporal or spatial relations, and disregard the\r\nfact that they were elements in a larger experience. In case\r\nof association by similarity we regard the like feature in the\r\nthings associated as a basis for further correction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn conversion of propositions we try to reverse the direction\r\nof the reaction, so to speak, and thereby to free the habit,\r\nto get a mode of response so generalized as to act with a\r\nminimum cue. For instance, we can deal with A in a\r\nway called B, or, in other words, in the same way that\r\nwe did with other things called B. If we say, \"Man is\r\nan animal,\" then to a certain extent the term \"animal\"\r\nsignifies the way in which we regard \"man.\" But the\r\nquestion arises whether we can regard all animals as we\r\ndo man. Evidently not, for the reaction which is fitting in\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_177\" id=\"Page_177\"\u003e[Pg 177]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncase of animals would be only partially applicable to man.\r\nWith the animals that are also men we have the beginning\r\nof a habit which, if unchecked, would lead to a similar reaction\r\ntoward all animals, \u003ci\u003ei. e.\u003c/i\u003e, we would say: \"All animals\r\nare men.\" Man may be said to be the richer concept, in\r\nthat only a part of the reaction which determines an object\r\nto be a man is required to designate it as an animal. On\r\nthe other hand, if we start with animal, then (except in case\r\nof the animals which are men) there is lacking the subject-matter\r\nwhich would permit the fuller concept to be applied.\r\nBy supplying the conditions under which animal=man we\r\nget a reversible habit. The equation of technical science has\r\njust this character. It represents the maximum freeing or\r\nabstraction of a predicate \u003ci\u003equa\u003c/i\u003e predicate, and thereby multiplies\r\nthe possible applications of it to subjects of future\r\njudgments, and lessens the amount of shearing away of\r\nirrelevancies and of re-adaptation necessary when so used\r\nin any particular case.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eFormation and test of the hypothesis.\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;The formation of\r\nthe hypothesis is commonly regarded as essentially different\r\nfrom the process of testing, which it subsequently undergoes.\r\nWe are said to observe facts, invent hypotheses, and\r\n\u003ci\u003ethen\u003c/i\u003e test them. The hypothesis is not required for our preliminary\r\nobservations; and some writers, regarding the\r\nhypothesis as a formulation which requires a difficult and\r\nelaborate test, decline to admit as hypotheses those more\r\nsimple suppositions, which are readily confirmed or rejected.\r\nA very good illustration of this point of view is met with in\r\nWundt\u0027s discussion of the hypothesis, by an examination of\r\nwhich we hope to show that such distinctions are rather artificial\r\nthan real.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe subject-matter of science, says Wundt,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_78_78\" id=\"FNanchor_78_78\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_78_78\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[78]\u003c/a\u003e is constituted\r\nby that which is actually given and that which is actually to\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_178\" id=\"Page_178\"\u003e[Pg 178]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbe expected. The whole content is not limited to this,\r\nhowever, for these facts must be supplemented by certain\r\npresuppositions, which are not given in a factual sense.\r\nSuch presuppositions are called hypotheses and are justified\r\nby our fundamental demand for unity. However valuable\r\nthe hypothesis may be when rightly used, there is constant\r\ndanger of illegitimately extending it by additions that spring\r\nfrom mere inclinations of fancy. Furthermore, the hypothesis\r\nin this proper scientific sense must be carefully distinguished\r\nfrom the various inaccurate uses, which are\r\nprevalent. For instance, hypotheses must not be confused\r\nwith expectations of fact. As cases in point Wundt mentions\r\nGalileo\u0027s suppositions that small vibrations of the\r\npendulum are isochronous, and that the space traversed by\r\na falling body is proportional to the square of the time it\r\nhas been falling. It is true that such anticipations play an\r\nimportant part in science, but so long as they relate to the\r\nfacts themselves or to their connections, and can be confirmed\r\nor rejected any moment through observation, they\r\nshould not be classed with those added presuppositions\r\nwhich are used to co-ordinate facts. Hence not all suppositions\r\nare hypotheses. On the other hand, not every\r\nhypothesis can be actually experienced. For example, one\r\nemploys in physics the hypothesis of electric fluid, but does\r\nnot expect actually to meet with it. In many cases, however,\r\nthe hypothesis becomes proved as an experienced fact.\r\nSuch was the course of the Copernican theory, which was at\r\nfirst only a hypothesis, but was transformed into fact\r\nthrough the evidence afforded by subsequent astronomical\r\nobservation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWundt defines a theory as a hypothesis taken together\r\nwith the facts for whose elucidation it was invented. In\r\nthus establishing a connection between the facts which the\r\nhypothesis merely suggested, the theory furnishes at the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_179\" id=\"Page_179\"\u003e[Pg 179]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsame time partly the foundation (\u003ci\u003eBegr\u0026uuml;ndung\u003c/i\u003e) and partly\r\nthe confirmation (\u003ci\u003eBest\u0026auml;tigung\u003c/i\u003e) of the hypothesis.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_79_79\" id=\"FNanchor_79_79\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_79_79\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[79]\u003c/a\u003e These\r\naspects, Wundt insists, must be sharply distinguished.\r\nEvery hypothesis must have its \u003ci\u003eBegr\u0026uuml;ndung\u003c/i\u003e, but there can\r\nbe \u003ci\u003eBest\u0026auml;tigung\u003c/i\u003e only in so far as the hypothesis contains\r\nelements which are accessible to actual processes of verification.\r\nIn most cases verification is attainable in only certain\r\nelements of the hypothesis. For example, Newton was\r\nobliged to limit himself to one instance in the verification of\r\nhis theory of gravitation, viz., the movements of the moon.\r\nThe other heavenly bodies afforded nothing better than a\r\nfoundation in that the supposition that gravity decreases as\r\nthe square of the distance increases enabled him to deduce\r\nthe movements of the planets. The main object of his\r\ntheory, however, lay in the deduction of these movements\r\nand not in the proof of universal gravity. With the Darwinian\r\ntheory, on the contrary, the main interest is in seeking\r\nits verification through examination of actual cases of\r\ndevelopment. Thus, while the Newtonian and the greater\r\npart of the other physical theories lead to a deduction of\r\nthe facts from the hypotheses, which can be verified only\r\nin individual instances, the Darwinian theory is concerned\r\nin evolving as far as possible the hypothesis out of the\r\nfacts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us look more closely at Wundt\u0027s position. We will\r\nask, first, whether the distinction between hypotheses and\r\nexpectations is as pronounced as he maintains; and, second,\r\nwhether the relation between \u003ci\u003eBegr\u0026uuml;ndung\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eBest\u0026auml;tigung\u003c/i\u003e\r\nmay not be closer than Wundt would have us believe.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs examples of the hypothesis Wundt mentions the\r\nCopernican hypothesis, Newton\u0027s hypothesis of gravitation,\r\nand the predictions of the astronomers which led to the discovery\r\nof Neptune. As examples of mere expectations we\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_180\" id=\"Page_180\"\u003e[Pg 180]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nare referred to Galileo\u0027s experiments with falling bodies and\r\npendulums. In case of Newton\u0027s hypothesis there was the\r\nassumption of a general law, which was verified after much\r\nlabor and delay. The heliocentric hypothesis of Copernicus,\r\nwhich was invented for the purpose of bringing system\r\nand unity into the movements of the planets, has also been\r\nfairly well substantiated. In the discovery of Neptune we\r\nhave, apparently, not the proof of a general law or the discovery\r\nof further peculiarities of previously known data, but\r\nrather the discovery of a new object or agent by means of\r\nits observed effects. In each of these instances we admit\r\nthat the hypothesis was not readily suggested or easily\r\nand directly tested.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we turn to Galileo\u0027s pendulum and falling bodies, it is\r\nclear first of all that he did not have in mind the discovery\r\nof some object, as was the case in the discovery of Neptune.\r\nDid he, then, either contribute to the proof of a general law\r\nor discover further characteristics of things already known\r\nin a more general way? Wundt tells us that Galileo only\r\ndetermined a little more exactly what he already knew, and\r\nthat he did this with but little labor or delay.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat, then, is the real difference between hypothesis and\r\nexpectation? If we compare Galileo\u0027s determination of the\r\nlaw of falling bodies with Newton\u0027s test of his hypothesis of\r\ngravitation, we see that both expectation and hypothesis\r\nwere founded on observation and took the form of mathematical\r\nformul\u0026aelig;. Each tended to confirm the general law\r\nexpressed in its formula, though there was, of course, much\r\ndifference in the time and labor required. If we compare\r\nthe Copernican hypothesis with Galileo\u0027s supposition concerning\r\nthe pendulum, we find again that they agree in\r\nregard to general purpose and method, and differ in the\r\ndifficulty of verification. If the experiment with the pendulum\r\nonly substituted exactness for inexactness, did the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_181\" id=\"Page_181\"\u003e[Pg 181]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nCopernican theory do anything different in \u003ci\u003ekind\u003c/i\u003e? It is true\r\nthat the more exact statement of the swing of the pendulum\r\nwas expressed in quantitative form, but quantitative statement\r\nis no criterion of either the presence or the absence of\r\nthe hypothesis.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgain, we may compare the pendulum with Kepler\u0027s laws.\r\nWhat was Kepler\u0027s hypothesis, that the square of the periodic\r\ntimes of the several planets are proportional to the cubes of\r\ntheir mean distances from the sun, except a more exact formulation\r\nof facts which were already known in a more general\r\nway? Wundt\u0027s position seems to be this: whenever a\r\nsupposition or suggestion can be tested readily, it should\r\nnot be classed as a hypothesis. This would make the distinction\r\none of degree rather than kind, and it does not\r\nappear how much labor we must expend, or how long our\r\nsupposition must evade our efforts to test it, before it can\r\nwin the title of hypothesis.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the second place, we have seen that Wundt draws a\r\nsharp line between \u003ci\u003eBegr\u0026uuml;ndung\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eBest\u0026auml;tigung\u003c/i\u003e. It is\r\ndoubtless true that every hypothesis requires a certain justification,\r\nfor unless other facts can be found which agree\r\nwith deductions made in accordance with it, its only support\r\nwould be the data from which it is drawn. Such support\r\nas this would be obtained through a process too clearly\r\ncircular to be seriously entertained. The distinction which\r\nWundt draws between \u003ci\u003eBegr\u0026uuml;ndung\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eBest\u0026auml;tigung\u003c/i\u003e is\r\nevidently due to the presence of the experimental element\r\nin the latter. For descriptive purposes this distinction is\r\nuseful, but is misleading if it is understood to mean that\r\nthere is mere experience in one case and mere inference in the\r\nother. The difference is rather due to the relative parts played\r\nby inference and by accepted experience in each. In \u003ci\u003eBegr\u0026uuml;ndung\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthe inferential feature is the more prominent, while in\r\n\u003ci\u003eBest\u0026auml;tigung\u003c/i\u003e the main emphasis is on the experiential aspect.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_182\" id=\"Page_182\"\u003e[Pg 182]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIt must not be supposed, however, that either of these\r\naspects can be wholly absent. It is difficult to understand\r\nhow any hypothesis can be entertained at all unless it meets\r\nin some measure the demand with reference to which it was\r\ninvented, viz., a unification of conflicts in experience. And,\r\n\u003ci\u003ein so far\u003c/i\u003e, it is confirmed. The motive which casts doubt\r\nupon its adequacy is the same that leads to its re-forming\r\nas a hypothesis, as a mental concept.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe difficulties in Wundt\u0027s position are thus due to a\r\nfailure to take account of the reconstructive nature of the\r\njudgment. The predicate, supposition, or hypothesis, whatever\r\nwe may choose to call it, is formed because of the check\r\nof a former habit. The judgment is an ideal application of\r\na new habit, and its test is the attempt to act in accordance\r\nwith this ideal reconstruction. It must not be thought, however,\r\nthat our supposition is first fully developed and then\r\ntried and accepted or rejected without modification. On\r\nthe contrary, its growth is the result of successive minor\r\ntests and corresponding minor modifications in its form.\r\nFormation and test are merely convenient distinctions in a\r\nlarger process in which forming, testing, and \u003ci\u003ere\u003c/i\u003e-forming go\r\non together. The activity of experimental verification is not\r\nonly a testing, a confirming or weakening of the validity of\r\na hypothesis, but it is equally well an evolution of the \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof the hypothesis through bringing it into closer relations\r\nwith specific data not previously included in defining\r\nits import. \u003ci\u003ePer contra\u003c/i\u003e, a purely reflective and deductive\r\nconsideration which develops the idea as hypothesis, \u003ci\u003ein\r\nso far\u003c/i\u003e as it introduces the determinateness of previously\r\naccepted facts within the scope, comprehension, or intension\r\nof the idea, is in so far forth, a verification.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf the view which we have maintained is correct, the hypothesis\r\nis not to be limited to those elaborate formulations of\r\nthe scientist which he seeks to confirm by crucial tests. The\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_183\" id=\"Page_183\"\u003e[Pg 183]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhypothesis of the investigator differs from the comparatively\r\nrough conjecture of the plain man only in its greater precision.\r\nIndeed, as we have attempted to show, the hypothesis\r\nis not a method which we may employ or not as we choose;\r\non the contrary, as predicate of the judgment it is present\r\nin a more or less explicit form if we judge at all. Whether\r\nthe time and labor required for its confirmation or rejection\r\nis a matter of a lifetime or a moment, its nature remains the\r\nsame. Its function is identical with that of the predicate.\r\nIn short, the hypothesis is the predicate so brought to consciousness\r\nand defined that those features which are not\r\nnoticed in the ordinary judgment are brought into prominence.\r\nWe then recognize the hypothesis to be what in\r\nfact the predicate always is, viz., a method of organization\r\nand control.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_184\" id=\"Page_184\"\u003e[Pg 184]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"VIII\" id=\"VIII\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eVIII\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eIMAGE AND IDEA IN LOGIC\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe logic of sense-impressions and of ideas as copies of\r\nsense-impressions has had its day. It engaged in a conflict\r\nwith dogmatism, and scored a decisive victory. It overthrew\r\nthe dynasty of prescribed formul\u0026aelig; and innate ideas,\r\nof ideas derived ready-made from custom and social usage,\r\nancient enough to be lost in the remote obscurity of divine\r\nsources; and enthroned in their place ideas derived from,\r\nand representative of, the sense-experiences of a very real\r\nand present world. It marked a reaction from dogma back\r\nto the original meaning of dogma, back to the seeming, the\r\nappearance, of things. So thoroughly did Bacon and Hobbes,\r\nLocke and Hume, to mention only these four, do their work,\r\nthat many of the problems growing out of the conflict itself,\r\nto say nothing of the scholastic traditions that were combated,\r\nhave come to have merely a historical rather than a\r\nlogical interest. Logic no longer concerns itself very\r\neagerly with the content or sensuous qualities of ideas, with\r\ntheir derivation from sense-impressions, or with questions as\r\nto the relation of copy to original, of representative to that\r\nwhich is presented. It is concerned rather with the constructive\r\noperations of thought, with meaning, reference to\r\nreality, inference\u0026mdash;with intellectual processes. Perhaps in\r\nno respect is this shifting of logical standpoint indicated\r\nmore clearly than in the unregretful way with which the old\r\nlogical interest in the sense-qualities of ideas is now made\r\nover to psychology. States of consciousness as such, we are\r\ntold, are the proper study of psychology; whereas logic concerns\r\nitself with the relation of thought to its object. True,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_185\" id=\"Page_185\"\u003e[Pg 185]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthese states of consciousness include thought-states, as well\r\nas sense-impressions; ideas and concepts, as well as feelings\r\nand fancies; and the business of psychology is to observe,\r\ncompare and classify, describe and chronicle, these states\r\nand whatever else is carried along in the stream of consciousness.\r\nBut logic is concerned, not with these states of consciousness\r\n\u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e, least of all with the flotsam and jetsam of\r\nthe stream, but with its reference to reality; not with the\r\ntrue, but with truth; not even with what consciousness does,\r\nbut with how consciousness is to outdo itself, transcend itself,\r\nin a rational and universal whole. Even an empirical logic\r\nhas to arrange somehow the way to get from one sense-impression\r\nto another.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn drawing this distinction between logic and psychology\u0026mdash;a\r\ndistinction which virtually amounts to a separation\u0026mdash;two\r\nthings are overlooked: first, that the distinction itself is a\r\nlogical distinction, and may properly constitute a problem\r\nfalling under the province of logical inquiry and theory;\r\nand, second, that the rather arbitrary and official setting\r\napart of psychology to look after the task of studying states\r\nof consciousness does not carry with it the guarantee that\r\npsychology will confine itself exclusively to that task. This\r\nlast point in particular must be my excuse for discussing the\r\nquestion of image and idea from the psychological rather\r\nthan from the logical standpoint. The logic of ideas derived\r\nfrom sense-impressions has had its day. But even the very\r\nleavings of the past may have been gathered up and reconstructed\r\nby psychology in such a way as to anticipate some\r\nof the newer developments of logical theory and meet some\r\nof its difficulties. One can hardly hope to justify in advance\r\na discussion based on such a sheer possibility. Let us begin,\r\nrather, by noting down from the standpoint of logic some of\r\nthe distinctions between image and idea, and the estimate\r\nof the logical function and value of mental imagery, and see\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_186\" id=\"Page_186\"\u003e[Pg 186]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin what direction they take us and whether they suggest a\r\nresort to an analysis from the standpoint of psychology.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eProceeding from the standpoint of logic to inquire into\r\nthe logical function of mental imagery and into the distinction\r\nbetween image and idea, we shall come upon two\r\nopposed but characteristic answers. If the inquiry be\r\ndirected to a member of the empirical school of logic, he\r\nwould be bound to answer in the affirmative, so far as the\r\nquestion regarding the function of mental imagery is concerned.\r\nHe would be likely to say, if he were loyal to the\r\ntraditions of his school, that mental imagery is the counterpart\r\nof sense-perception, and is thus the representative of the\r\ndata with which empirical logic is concerned. Mental\r\nimagery, he would continue, is a representative in a literal\r\nsense, a copy, a reflection, of what comes to us through the\r\navenues of sensation. True, it is not the perfect twin of\r\nsense-experience; else we could not tell them apart; indeed,\r\nthere are times when the copy becomes so much like the\r\noriginal that we are deceived by it, as in dreams or in\r\nhallucinations. Ordinarily, however, we are able to distinguish\r\none from the other. Two criteria are usually present;\r\n(1) imagery is fainter, more fleeting, than the corresponding\r\nsense-experience; and (2), save in the case of accurate\r\nmemory-images, it is subject to a more or less arbitrary\r\nrearrangement of its parts, as when, for example, we make\r\nover the images of scenes we have actually experienced, to\r\nfurnish forth the setting of some remote historical event.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBarring, or controlling and rectifying, its tendencies\r\ntoward both arbitrary and constructive variations from\r\nthe original, mental imagery is on the same level as\r\nsense-experience, and serves the same logical purpose.\r\nThat is to say, it contributes to the data which constitute\r\nthe foundations of empirical logic. It furnishes materials\r\nfor the operations of observing, comparing, abstracting\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_187\" id=\"Page_187\"\u003e[Pg 187]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand generalizing. Mental imagery helps to piece out the\r\nfragments that may be presented to sense-experience. It\r\nsupplies the entire anatomy when only a single bone, say,\r\nis actually given. Yet, however useful as a servant of truth,\r\nit has to be carefully watched, lest its spontaneous tendency\r\nto vary the actual order and coexistence of data lead the\r\ninvestigator astray. The copy it presents is, after all, a\r\ntemporary makeshift, until it can be shown to correspond\r\npoint for point to the now absent reality. Mental imagery\r\nfurnishes one with an illustrated edition of the book of\r\nnature, but the illustrations await the confirmation of comparison\r\nwith the originals.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMental imagery functions logically when it extends the\r\narea of data beyond the range of the immediate sense-perceptions\r\nof any given time, and thus makes possible a more\r\ncomprehensive application of the empirical methods of\r\nobservation, comparison, abstraction, and generalization. It\r\nfunctions logically when it acts as a feeder of logical\r\nmachinery, though it is not indispensable to this machinery\r\nand does not modify its principles. The logical mill could\r\ngrind up in the same way the pure grain of sense-perceptions,\r\nunmixed with mental images, but it would have to\r\ngrind more slowly for lack of material. In other words,\r\nempirical logic could carry on its operations of observing,\r\ncomparing, abstracting, and generalizing, solely on the basis\r\nof objects or data present to the senses, and with no extension\r\nof this basis in terms of imagery, or copies of objects\r\nnot immediately present; but it would take more time for it\r\nto apply and carry through its operations. The logical\r\nmachinery is the same in each case. The materials fed and\r\nthe product issuing are the same in each case. Imagery\r\nsimply fulfils the function of providing a more copious grist.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe empiricist\u0027s answer to our question regarding the\r\nlogical function of mental imagery leaves that function in an\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_188\" id=\"Page_188\"\u003e[Pg 188]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nuncertain and parlous state. Imagery lacks the security of\r\nsense-perception on the one hand, and it has no part in the\r\noperation of thought on the other. It is a sort of hod-carrier,\r\nwhose function it is to convey the raw materials of\r\nsense-perception to a more exalted position where someone\r\nelse does all the work. I suppose this could be called a\r\nfunctional interpretation of a logical element. The question,\r\nthen, would be whether an element so functioning is\r\nin any sense logical. As an element lying outside of the\r\nthought-process it owes no responsibility to logic; it is not\r\namenable to its regulations. Thought simply finds it expedient\r\nto operate with an agent over which it has no intrinsic\r\ncontrol. The case might be allowed to rest here. Yet were\r\nthis extra-logical element of imagery to abandon thought,\r\nall conscious thinking as opposed to sense-perception would\r\ncease. A false alarm, perhaps. Imagery may be so constituted\r\nthat it is inseparably subordinated to thought and can\r\nnever abandon it. Thought may simply exude imagery.\r\nBut imagery somehow has to represent sense-perception,\r\nalso. It can hardly be a secretion of thought and a copy of\r\nsense-perceptions at one and the same time, unless the\r\nempiricist is willing to turn absolute idealist! Before taking\r\nsuch a desperate plunge as this, it might be desirable to\r\nsee whether there is any other recourse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is another and a very different answer to the question\r\nregarding the logical function of mental imagery. To\r\ndistinguish this answer from that of the associationist or\r\nempiricist, I will call it the answer of the conceptualist. I\r\nam not at all positive that this label would stick even to\r\nthose to whom it might be applied with considerable justification.\r\nThe terms \"rationalistic\" and \"transcendental\"\r\nmight be preferred in opposition to the term \"empirical.\"\r\nAnd we have the term \"apperceptionist\" in opposition to\r\nthe term \"associationist.\" If the term \"conceptualist\" is\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_189\" id=\"Page_189\"\u003e[Pg 189]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nadmissible, it should be brought down to date, perhaps, by\r\nmaking it \"neo-conceptualist.\" The present difficulties\r\nregarding terminology would be eased considerably if we\r\nonly had a convenient set of derivatives made from the word\r\n\"meaning.\" Since we have not, I will use derivatives made\r\nfrom the word \"concept\" to denote views opposite to those\r\nheld by the empirical school.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe conceptualist could be depended upon to answer our\r\nquestion in the negative. Logical functions begin where\r\nthe image leaves off. They begin with the \u003ci\u003eidea\u003c/i\u003e, with meaning.\r\nThe conceptualist distinguishes sharply between the\r\nimage as a psychical existence and the idea, or concept, as\r\nlogical meaning. On the one hand, you have the \"image,\"\r\nnot only as a mere psychical existence, but a mocking existence\r\nat that, fleeting, inconstant, shifting, never perhaps\r\ntwice alike; yet, mind you, an \u003ci\u003eexistence\u003c/i\u003e, a \u003ci\u003efact\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;that must\r\nbe admitted. On the other hand, you have the \"idea,\" with\r\n\"a fixed content or logical meaning,\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_80_80\" id=\"FNanchor_80_80\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_80_80\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[80]\u003c/a\u003e which is referred by\r\nan act of judgment to a reality beyond the act.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_81_81\" id=\"FNanchor_81_81\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_81_81\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[81]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \"idea,\" the logical meaning, begins where the\r\n\"image\" leaves off. Does this mean that the \"idea\" is\r\nwholly independent of the \"image\"? Yes and no. The\r\n\"idea\" is independent of that which is ordinarily regarded\r\nas the special characteristic of an \"image,\" namely, its\r\nquality, its sense-content. That is to say, the \"idea\" is\r\nindependent of any particular \"image,\" any special embodiment\r\nof sense-content. Any image will do. As Mr. Bosanquet\r\nremarks in comparing the psychical images that pass\r\nthrough our minds to a store of signal flags:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eNot only is it indifferent whether your signal flag of today is\r\nthe same bit of cloth that you hoisted yesterday, but also, no one\r\nknows or cares whether it is clean or dirty, thick or thin, frayed or\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_190\" id=\"Page_190\"\u003e[Pg 190]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsmooth, as long as it is distinctly legible as an element of the signal\r\ncode. Part of its content, of its attributes and relations, is a\r\nfixed index which carries a distinct reference; all the rest is\r\nnothing to us, and, except in a moment of idle curiosity, we are\r\nunaware that it exists.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_82_82\" id=\"FNanchor_82_82\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_82_82\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[82]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand, the \"idea\" could not operate as an\r\nidea, could not be in consciousness, save as it involves some\r\nimagery, however old, dirty, thin, and frayed. Take the\r\nstatement, \"The angles of a triangle are equal to two right\r\nangles.\" If the statement means anything to a given individual,\r\nif it conveys an idea, it must necessarily involve some\r\nform of imagery, some qualitative or conscious content.\r\nBut so far as the \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e is concerned, it is a matter of\r\ncomplete indifference as to \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e qualities are involved.\r\nThese qualities may be in terms of visual, auditory, tactual,\r\nkin\u0026aelig;sthetic, or verbal imagery. The individual may visualize\r\na blackboard drawing of a triangle with its sides produced,\r\nor he may imagine himself to be generating a\r\ntriangle while revolving through an angle of 180\u0026deg;. Any\r\nimagery anyone pleases may be employed, so long as there\r\ngoes with it somehow the \u003ci\u003eidea\u003c/i\u003e of the relation of equality\r\nbetween the angles of a triangle and two right angles. But\r\nthe conceptualist does not stop here. The act of judgment\r\ncomes in to affirm that the \"idea\" is no mere idea, but is a\r\nquality of the real. \"The act [of judgment] attaches the\r\nfloating adjective [the idea, the logical meaning] to the\r\nnature of the world, and, at the same time, tells one it was\r\nthere already.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_83_83\" id=\"FNanchor_83_83\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_83_83\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[83]\u003c/a\u003e The \"idea,\" the logical meaning, begins\r\nwhere the \"image\" leaves off. Yet, somehow, the \"idea\"\r\ncould not begin, unless there were an \"image\" to leave off.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAn \"image\" is not an \"idea,\" says the conceptualist.\r\nAn \"idea\" is not an \"image.\" (1) An \"image\" is not an\r\n\"idea,\" because an \"image\" is a particular, individual frag\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_191\" id=\"Page_191\"\u003e[Pg 191]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ement\r\nof consciousness. It is so bound up with its own\r\nexistence that it cannot reach out to the existence of an\r\n\"idea,\" or to anything beyond itself. Chemically speaking,\r\nit is an \u003ci\u003eavalent\u003c/i\u003e atom of consciousness, if such a thing is\r\nthinkable. Mr. Bosanquet raises the question:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAre there at all ideas which are not symbolic?… The\r\nanswer is that \u003ci\u003e(a)\u003c/i\u003e in judgment itself the idea can be distinguished\r\n\u003ci\u003equa\u003c/i\u003e particular in time or psychical fact, and \u003ci\u003eso far\u003c/i\u003e is not symbolic;\r\nand \u003ci\u003e(b)\u003c/i\u003e in all those human experiences from which we draw\r\nour conjectures as to the animal intelligence, when in languor or\r\nin ignorance image succeeds image without conscious judgment, we\r\nfeel what it is to have ideas as facts and not as symbols.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_84_84\" id=\"FNanchor_84_84\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_84_84\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[84]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) An \"idea\" is not an \"image,\" because an idea \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e meaning,\r\nwhich consists in a part of the content of the image,\r\ncut off, and considered apart from the \u003ci\u003eexistence\u003c/i\u003e of the content\r\nor sign itself.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_85_85\" id=\"FNanchor_85_85\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_85_85\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[85]\u003c/a\u003e This meaning, this fragment of\r\npsychical existence, lays down all claim to existence on its\r\nown account, that it may refer through an act of judgment\r\nto a reality beyond itself and beyond the act also. An\r\n\"image\" is not an \"idea\" and an \"idea\" is not an\r\n\"image,\" because an \"image\" exists only as a quality, a\r\nsense-content, whereas an \"idea\" exists only as a relation,\r\na reference to reality beyond. \"On the one hand,\" to recall\r\nBradley\u0027s antinomy, \"no possible idea [as a psychical\r\nimage] can be that which it means…. On the other\r\nhand, no idea [as logical signification] is anything but just\r\nwhat it means.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is a significant point of agreement between the\r\nconceptualist and the empiricist. Both regard imagery as\r\non the level with sense-perception. For the empiricist, as\r\nwe have seen, the fact that imagery may be compelled to\r\nserve as a yoke-fellow of sense-experience constitutes its\r\nlogical value. For the conceptualist, however, the associa\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_192\" id=\"Page_192\"\u003e[Pg 192]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etion\r\nof imagery with sense-experience is of no logical consequence\r\nwhatsoever, save as it may help to intensify the\r\ndistinction between imagery and meaning. To quote again\r\nfrom Bradley:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFor logical purposes the psychological distinction of idea and\r\nsensation may be said to be irrelevant, while the distinction of idea\r\nand fact is vital. The image, or psychological idea, is for logic\r\nnothing but a sensible reality. It is on a level with the mere sensations\r\nof the senses. For both are facts and neither are meanings.\r\nNeither are cut from a mutilated presentation and fixed as a connection.\r\nNeither are indifferent to their place in the stream of\r\npsychical events, their time and their relations to the presented\r\ncongeries. Neither are adjectives to be referred from their existence,\r\nto live on strange soils, under other skies, and through\r\nchanging seasons. The lives of both are so entangled with their\r\nenvironment, so one with their setting of sensuous particulars, that\r\ntheir character is destroyed if but one thread is broken.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_86_86\" id=\"FNanchor_86_86\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_86_86\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[86]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis point of agreement between conceptualism and\r\nempiricism, this placing of imagery and sense-experience on\r\na common level, serves to bring into relief fundamental differences\r\nbetween the two schools of thought; fundamental,\r\nbecause they have to do with the nature of reality itself.\r\nThe conceptualist in his zealous endeavor to distinguish\r\nbetween imagery and logical meaning has come perilously\r\nnear driving imagery into the arms of reality. It is the\r\nopportunity of empiricism to make them one. How can\r\nconceptualism prevent the union? Has it not disarmed\r\nitself? The act of judgment, which includes within itself\r\nlogical meaning as predicate, refers to a reality beyond the\r\nact. Both imagery and reality, then, lie outside of the act\r\nof judgment! What alliance, or \u003ci\u003em\u0026eacute;salliance\u003c/i\u003e, may they not\r\nform, one with the other?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe difficulties we have noted thus far in the discussion\r\nare due to a large extent, I believe, to incomplete psychologi\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_193\" id=\"Page_193\"\u003e[Pg 193]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ecal\r\nanalysis of logical machinery. The empiricist has not\r\ncarried the psychology of logic as far as the conceptualist,\r\nalthough the latter might be the loudest to disclaim the\r\nhonor. I will not try to prove this statement, but simply\r\ngive it as a reason why, in the interest of brevity, I shall\r\npass with little comment over the psychological shortcomings\r\nand contributions of empirical logic, and devote what space\r\nremains to the psychology implicitly worked out by conceptual\r\nlogic, and to its possible development, with special\r\nreference, of course, to the problem of the logical function\r\nof imagery.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe logical distinction, which practically amounts to a\r\nseparation between imagery and meaning, is the counterpart of\r\nthe psychological distinction between stimulus and response,\r\nbetween the two poles of sensori-motor activity, where the\r\nstimulus is defined in consciousness in the form of imagery,\r\nin the form of sense-qualities centrally excited, and where\r\nthe response is directed and controlled \u003ci\u003evia\u003c/i\u003e this imagery, so\r\nas to function in bringing some end, project, purpose, or\r\nideal, nearer to realization, some problem nearer to solution.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePsychologically, there is no break between image and\r\nresponse, between thought and action. The stimulus is a\r\ncondition of action, in both senses of the ambiguity of the\r\nword \"condition.\" (1) It \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e action; it is a state or condition\r\nof action. (2) It is also an initiation of action. \u003ci\u003eIf\u003c/i\u003e the\r\nappropriate stimulus, then the desired action. The response\r\nto an image is the meaning of the image. Or, the response\r\nto any stimulus \u003ci\u003evia\u003c/i\u003e an image\u0026mdash;mediated, controlled or\r\ndirected by an image\u0026mdash;is the meaning of that image. The\r\nless imagery involved in any response, the greater the presumption\r\nin favor of the belief that the response is either\r\nan instinctive impulse or else has become a habit of mind, an\r\nadequate idea. The reduction and loss of sense-content\r\nwhich an image may undergo\u0026mdash;the wearing away of an\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_194\" id=\"Page_194\"\u003e[Pg 194]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nimage, it is sometimes called\u0026mdash;is not a sign that this sense-content\r\nhas no logical function; but rather that it has fulfilled\r\na logical function so well that it has made part of itself useless.\r\nThe husk, to recall one of Mr. Bradley\u0027s comparisons,\r\nthat useless husk, tends to fall away, to lapse from consciousness,\r\nafter it has served the purpose of helping to bring the\r\nkernel of truth to fruition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis raises again the original question as to whether the\r\nsense-content, the quality, the existential quality, of an\r\nimage has a logical function. I will ask first whether it has\r\na function from the standpoint of psychology. We will\r\nagree with the empiricist that the content of an image is\r\nrepresentative, that it is a return, a revival, of a sense-content\r\npreviously experienced through the activity of sense-organs\r\nstimulated from the periphery. What is the function, then,\r\nof the representative image? Sensation, quality, as we have\r\nimplied above, is the stimulus come to consciousness. To\r\nexplain how a stimulus can \"come\" to consciousness is a\r\nproblem I will not attempt to go into here. I assume as a\r\nfact that there are times when we know what we are about;\r\nwhen we are conscious of the stimuli, or conditions of action,\r\nwhich are tending in this direction or in that, and when\r\nthrough this consciousness we exercise a controlling influence\r\nover action by selecting and reinforcing certain stimuli and\r\nsuppressing or inhibiting others. It is true that we do not\r\nalways realize to how great an extent our actions are controlled\r\nby stimuli which do not come to consciousness, by\r\nreflexes, instincts, and habits which do not rise above the\r\nthreshold of imagery. And when this vast complex of hidden\r\nmachinery is partly revealed to us, it may either cause\r\nthe beholder to take a materialistic, mechanical, or fatalistic\r\nview of existence, to say that we are the victims of our own\r\nmachinery, or else it may induce the other extreme of more\r\nor less mystic pronouncements regarding the province of the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_195\" id=\"Page_195\"\u003e[Pg 195]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsubconscious, of the subliminal self; thus out of partial\r\nviews, out of half-truths, metaphysical problems arise and\r\narm for mutual conflict. Nevertheless, there is a presumption,\r\namounting in most minds to a conviction, that we do\r\nat times consciously control some of our actions. And it is\r\nonly making this conviction a little more explicit to say that\r\nwe consciously control our actions through becoming aware\r\nof the stimuli, or conditions of action, and through selecting\r\nand reinforcing them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIs it begging the question to speak of consciousness as\r\nexercising a selective function with reference to stimuli?\r\nFrom the standpoint of psychology, I cannot see that it is.\r\nNo characteristic of consciousness has been more clearly\r\nmade out, both reflectively and experimentally, than its\r\nselective function, than its ability to pick out and intensify\r\nwithin certain limits the stimuli or conditions of action.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe representational image is a stimulus come to consciousness\r\nin the same way that a sensation is a stimulus\r\ncome to consciousness. It is both a direct and an indirect\r\nstimulus. The terms \"direct\" and \"indirect\" are used as\r\nrelative solely to the demands of the particular situation out\r\nof which they arise. By direct stimulus I mean a stimulus\r\nwhich initiates with almost no appreciable delay the response\r\nor attitude appropriate to the demands of a given situation,\r\nbridging the difficulties, removing the obstacles, or solving\r\nthe problem with the minimum of conscious reflection. As\r\nan image becomes more and more of a working symbol, an\r\nidea, it tends to become simply a direct stimulus.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy an \"indirect stimulus\" is meant a stimulus initiating\r\na response which, if not inhibited, would be irrelevant to the\r\nsituation, yet which may represent stimuli which are not\r\nfound in the immediate field of sense-perception, and which\r\nare essential to the carrying on of the activity. The situation\r\nis a problematic one. Acquired habits or mental\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_196\" id=\"Page_196\"\u003e[Pg 196]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nadjustments break down at some point or fail to operate\r\nsmoothly, either owing to the absence of customary stimuli\r\nor to the presence of new and untried conditions of action.\r\nPart of the stress of meeting such a situation as this falls on\r\nthe side of discovering appropriate stimuli and part on the\r\nside of developing out of habits already acquired new\r\nmethods of response.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn such a situation as this, imagery may function on the\r\nside of \u003ci\u003estimulus\u003c/i\u003e when, taking its cue from the stimuli which\r\nare actually present, and which grow out of the strain and\r\nfriction, it represents the missing conditions of action sufficiently\r\nto direct a search for them. It projects a map, so to\r\nspeak, in which the fragmentary conditions immediately\r\npresent to sense-perception may find their bearings, or in\r\nwhich in some way the missing members may be discovered.\r\nA familiar instance of this would be the experience one\r\nsometimes has in trying to recall the forgotten name of an\r\nacquaintance. The images of scenes associated with the\r\nacquaintance, of various letters and sounds of words associated\r\nwith his name, which may be called to mind, do not\r\nfunction so much as direct stimuli as they do as intermediate\r\nor indirect stimuli. It is a case of casting about for the\r\nimage that will function as a direct stimulus in bringing an\r\nacquired but temporarily lost adjustment into play.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eImage functions on the side of \u003ci\u003eresponse\u003c/i\u003e, on the side of\r\ndeveloping new habits, new forms of adjustment, in so far as\r\nthe conditions of action which it represents, or projects, are\r\nnot the actual conditions of action, either because they are\r\nso inaccessible as to demand development of new habits for\r\npurposes of attaining them, or else because, though actually\r\npresent, they stimulate relatively uncontrolled \u0026aelig;sthetic or\r\nemotional responses, whose very expression, however, may\r\nbe translated into a demand for more adequate, intelligent,\r\ncontrolled habits or adjustments. The conscious projection\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_197\" id=\"Page_197\"\u003e[Pg 197]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the unattained, even of the unattainable, not only marks\r\na certain degree of attainment, but is the initiation of further\r\ndevelopment. Here we see again that a stimulus is a\r\ncondition of action in both senses of the ambiguity of the\r\nword \"condition.\" It is both a state or condition of activity,\r\nand an initiation or condition of further activity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs an indirect stimulus growing out of a problematic situation\r\nimagery necessarily brings in more or less irrelevant\r\nmaterial. If I may be permitted the paradox, imagery\r\nwould not be relevant if it did not bring in the irrelevant.\r\nThe novelty of the situation makes it impossible to say in\r\nadvance what will be relevant. Hence the demand for range\r\nand play of imagery. It is only the successful adjustment\r\nfinally hit upon and worked out that is the test of the relevancy\r\nof the imagery which anticipated it. Even this test\r\nmay be unfair, since it is likely to discount the value of\r\nimagery which is now ruled out, but which may have been\r\nindispensable in turning up the proper cues in the course of\r\nthe process of reflection and experiment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo restate the point in regard to the psychological function\r\nof imagery. Imagery functions in representing control\r\nas ideal, not as fact. It represents a possible process of\r\nreconstructing adjustments and habits; it is not an actual\r\nand complete readjustment. It arises normally in a stress,\r\nin the presence of fresh demands and new problems. It\r\nlooks forward in every possible direction, because it is\r\nimportant and difficult to foresee consequences. But suppose\r\nthe new adjustment to be made with reasonable success\u0026mdash;reasonable,\r\nnote. Suppose the ideal to be realized. With\r\npractice the adjustment becomes less problematic, more\r\nunder control\u0026mdash;that is, it comes to require less conscious\r\nattention to bring it about. The image loses some of its\r\nsensuous content. It becomes worn away, more remote,\r\nuntil at last it becomes respectably vague and abstract\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_198\" id=\"Page_198\"\u003e[Pg 198]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nenough to be classed as a concept. Imagery is the stimulus\r\nof the reconstructive process between habit and habit, concept\r\nand concept, idea and idea.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe now return to the original question regarding the\r\nlogical function of imagery. There is only one condition, I\r\nbelieve, on which we can accept the assumption of both\r\nempiricist and conceptualist that imagery is on the same\r\nlevel with sense-perception, and that is the assumption that\r\nmeaning, logical meaning, is on the same level with habit,\r\nhabit naming the more obvious, overt forms of response to\r\nstimuli, logical meaning naming the more internal forms of\r\nresponse or reference. Psychical response and logical reference\r\nthus become equivalent terms.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have seen that imagery may exercise two functions\r\nwith reference to habit, as direct and as indirect stimulus; so\r\nalso with reference to logical meaning, imagery may be the\r\nstimulus to a direct reference of the idea to reality, or it may\r\npresent, or mirror, conditions with regard to which some\r\nnew meaning is to be worked out. The quality, the sense-content,\r\nof imagery may \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e suffice directly to arouse a\r\nhabitual attitude, to call forth an immediate reference to\r\nreality. It may cause one to \"tumble\" to what is taking\r\nplace, to \"catch on,\" to apprehend (pardon these expressions\r\nfor the sake of their description of the motor aspect of\r\nmeaning), as when we say, for example: \"It came over me\r\nlike a flash what I was to do, and I did it.\" Our more\r\nabstract and complicated forms of judgment and reasoning,\r\nin which the imagery involved is reduced to the minimum\r\nof conscious, qualitative content, are of the same order,\r\nthough at the other extreme, so far as immediate overt\r\nexpression is concerned. We are working along lines of\r\nhabitual activity so familiar that we can work almost in the\r\ndark. We need no elaborate imagery. Guided only by the\r\nwaving of a signal flag or by the shifting gleam of a sema\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_199\" id=\"Page_199\"\u003e[Pg 199]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ephore,\r\nwe thread our way swiftly through the maze of tracks\r\nworn smooth by use and habit. But suppose a new line of\r\nhabit is to be constructed. No signal flags or semaphores\r\nwill suffice. A detailed survey of the proposed route must\r\nbe had, and here is where imagery with a rich and varied\r\nyet flexible sensuous content, growing out of previous surveys,\r\nmay function in projecting and anticipating the new\r\nset of conditions, and thus become the stimulus of a new\r\nline of habit, of a new and more far-reaching meaning. As\r\nthis new line of habit, of meaning, gets into working order\r\nwith the rest of the system, imagery tends normally to\r\ndecline again to the r\u0026ocirc;le of signal flags and semaphores.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe distinction in logical theory between \"image\" and\r\n\"idea\" which we have been considering is only a half-truth\r\nfrom the point of view of psychology. It virtually limits\r\nthe \"idea\" to a fixed, unalterable reference of a fragment\r\nof a desiccated image to a reality beyond. It indifferently\r\nloses the play and richness of imagery to the floating remnants\r\nof sense-content, or to an external reality. It limits\r\nitself to an examination of a final stage in thinking, a stage\r\nin which the image acts as a direct stimulus, a stage in\r\nwhich the sense-content of the image has little or no function\r\n\u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e, because this content now initiates directly a\r\nhabitual adjustment, a worked-out and established adaptation\r\nof means to end. It overlooks the process of conscious\r\nreflection which logically precedes every such adjustment\r\nnot purely instinctive or accidental, a process in which\r\nimagery as representational functions indirectly in bringing\r\nthe resources of past experience, the fund of acquired habits,\r\nto bear upon the fragmentary and problematic elements of\r\nsense-experience actually present, thus maintaining the flow\r\nand continuity of experience. It fails to recognize that in\r\nthe inseparable association of meaning with quality, of\r\n\"idea\" with \"image,\" there goes the possibility of working\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_200\" id=\"Page_200\"\u003e[Pg 200]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nout and applying new meanings from old, of developing\r\ndeeper meanings, of testing and affirming more inclusive\r\nand universal meaning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe are confronted with this alternative. Either the\r\nimage has a logical function in virtue of its sense-content, or\r\nelse the image functions logically merely as a symbol, the\r\nsense-content of which is a matter of complete logical indifference.\r\nAccording to the empiricist, the former is the case,\r\naccording to the conceptualist, the latter. The empiricist\r\nwould say that he needs the image to piece out the data upon\r\nwhich logical processes operate. Having met this need, the\r\nimage is retired from active service. For the empiricist the\r\nprocesses of thought, observing, comparing, generalizing,\r\netc., are as independent of the data they use as, for the\r\nconceptualist, logical meaning, reference, and \"idea\" are\r\nindependent of the sense-content of the \"image.\" In reality\r\nhe agrees with the conceptualist in excluding the sense-content\r\nof the image from the processes of thought, and\r\nhence from the domain of logic.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom the standpoint of psychological theory the conceptualist\r\nis an improvement over the empiricist. He has gone\r\na step farther in the analysis of thought-processes by showing\r\nthat they are bound up with some kind of imagery,\r\nhowever irrelevant, inconsequential, and worn down the\r\nsense-quality of that imagery may be. His statement of\r\nideas as references to reality lends itself readily, as we have\r\nseen, to the unitary conception in psychology of ideo-motor,\r\nor sensori-motor, activity. But is this where logical theory\r\nis to stop, while psychology as a study of \"states of consciousness\"\r\ntakes up the unfinished tale and carries it forward?\r\nIt seems hardly possible, unless logic is willing to\r\ngive over its task of thinking about thinking.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eReduce the image to a mere symbol. Let its sense-quality\r\nbe a matter of complete indifference. What have\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_201\" id=\"Page_201\"\u003e[Pg 201]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nyou, then, but an elementary and primitive type of reflex\r\naction? It is of no particular consequence even from what\r\nsense-organ it appears to proceed, or whether it appears to\r\nbe peripherally or centrally excited. It is simply a case of\r\nfeel and act; touch and go. Is this thinking? It may be\r\nregarded as either the germ or the finality of thinking, but\r\nwhat most of us are inclined to believe is the true subject-matter\r\nof logic is not to be limited to a simple reflex, or\r\neven to a chain of reflexes. It is something more complex,\r\neven if nothing more than an intricate tangle of chains of\r\nreflexes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe complexity of the process called thinking does not\r\nreside alone in the instinctive or habitual reflexes involved.\r\nThe more instinctive and habitual any adjustment may be,\r\nthe less is it a matter of thought, as everyone knows, although\r\nits biological complexity is none the less patent to one who\r\nlooks at it from the outside. The complexity of the thinking\r\nprocess resides in consciousness also; it resides in the imagery,\r\nthe stimuli, the mere symbols, if you like, that have \"come\"\r\nto consciousness. As soon as the complexity begins to be\r\n\u003ci\u003efelt\u003c/i\u003e, as soon as any discrimination whatsoever begins to be\r\nintroduced or appreciated, at that instant the sense-content,\r\nthe quale, of imagery begins to have a logical function.\r\nConscious discrimination, however vague and evanescent,\r\nand the logical function of the quale of imagery are born\r\ntogether, unless one chooses to regard the more obvious and\r\ndeliberate forms of conscious discrimination as more characteristic\r\nof a logical process. It is only as the sense-contents\r\nof various images are discriminated and compared that anything\r\nlike thinking can be conceived to go on. The particular\r\nsense-content of an image, instead of being a matter of logical\r\nindifference, is the condition, the possibility, of thinking.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe conceptualist has contributed to the data of descriptive\r\npsychology by calling attention, by implication at least, to\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_202\" id=\"Page_202\"\u003e[Pg 202]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe remote and reduced character of the imagery which may\r\ncharacterize thinking. But it by no means follows that the\r\nmore remote and reduced the sense-content of an image\r\nbecomes, the less important is that sense-content for thinking,\r\nthe less demand for discrimination. On the contrary, the\r\nsense-content that remains may be of supreme logical importance.\r\nIt may be the quintessence of meaning. It may be\r\nthe conscious factor which, when discriminated from another\r\nalmost equally sublimated conscious factor, may determine a\r\nwhole course of action. The delicacy and rapidity with\r\nwhich these reduced forms of imagery as they hover about\r\nthe margin of consciousness or flit across its focus are discriminated\r\nand caught, are points in the technique of that\r\nlong art of thinking, begun in early childhood. The fact\r\nthat questionnaire investigations\u0026mdash;like that of Galton\u0027s, for\r\nexample\u0026mdash;have in many instances failed to discover in the\r\nminds of scientists and advanced thinkers a rich and varied\r\nfurniture of imagery does not argue the poverty of imagery\r\nin such minds; it argues, rather, a highly developed technique,\r\na species of virtuosity, with reference to the sense-content\r\nof the types of imagery actually in use.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo push a step farther the alternative we have already\r\nstated in a preliminary way: Either the \"idea,\" or \"logical\r\nmeaning,\" lies outside of the process of thinking, as a mere\r\nimpulse or reflex; or else, in virtue of the sense-content of\r\nits \"image,\" it enters into that conscious process of discrimination,\r\ncomparison, and selection, of light and shade,\r\nof doubt and inquiry, which constitutes the evolution of a\r\njudgment, which makes the life-history of a movement of\r\nthought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_203\" id=\"Page_203\"\u003e[Pg 203]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"IX\" id=\"IX\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eIX\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eTHE LOGIC OF THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_87_87\" id=\"FNanchor_87_87\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_87_87\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[87]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is not the purpose of this study to show that the Pre-Socratics\r\npossessed a system of logic which is now for the\r\nfirst time brought to the notice of the modern world. Indeed,\r\nthere is nothing to indicate that they had reflected on mental\r\nprocesses in such a way as to call for an organized body\r\nof canons regulating the forms of concepts and conclusions.\r\nAristotle attributed the discovery of the art of dialectic to\r\nZeno the Eleatic, and we shall see in the sequel that there\r\nwas much to justify the opinion. But logic, in the technical\r\nsense, is inconceivable without concepts, and from the days\r\nof Aristotle it has been universally believed that proper definitions\r\nowe their origin to Socrates. A few crude attempts\r\nat definition, if such they may be rightly called, are referred\r\nto Empedocles and Democritus. But in so far as they were\r\nconceived in the spirit of science, they essayed to define\r\nthings materially by giving, so to speak, the chemical formula\r\nfor their production. Significant as this very fact is,\r\nit shows that even the rudiments of the canons of thought\r\nwere not the subjects of reflection.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn his \u003ci\u003eOrganon\u003c/i\u003e Aristotle makes it evident that the demand\r\nfor a regulative art of scientific discourse was created by the\r\neristic logic-chopping of those who were most deeply influenced\r\nby the Eleatic philosophy. Indeed, the case is quite\r\nparallel to the rise of the art of rhetoric. Aristotle regarded\r\nEmpedocles as the originator of that art, as he referred the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_204\" id=\"Page_204\"\u003e[Pg 204]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbeginnings of dialectic to Zeno. But the formulation of both\r\narts in well-rounded systems came much later. As men\r\nconducted lawsuits before the days of Tisias and Corax, so\r\nalso were the essential principles of logic operative and\r\neffective in practice before Aristotle gave them their abstract\r\nformulation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhile it is true, therefore, that the Pre-Socratics had no\r\nformal logic, it is equally true, and far more significant, that\r\nthey either received from their predecessors or themselves\r\ndeveloped the conceptions and the presuppositions on which\r\nthe Aristotelian logic is founded. One of the objects of this\r\nstudy is to institute a search for some of these basic conceptions\r\nof Greek thought, almost all of which existed before\r\nthe days of Socrates, and to consider their origin as well as\r\ntheir logical significance. The other aim here kept in view\r\nis to trace the course of thought in which the logical principles,\r\nlatent in all attempts to construct and verify theories,\r\ncame into play.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is impossible, no doubt, to discover a body of thought\r\nwhich does not ground itself upon presuppositions. They\r\nare the warp into which the woof of the system, itself too\r\noften consisting of frayed ends of other fabrics, is woven\r\nwith the delight of a supposed creator. Rarely is the thinker\r\nso conscious of his own mental processes that he is aware of\r\nwhat he takes for granted. Ordinarily this retirement to an\r\ninterior line takes place only when one has been driven back\r\nfrom the advanced position which could no longer be maintained.\r\nEmerson has somewhere said: \"The foregoing generations\r\nbeheld God and Nature face to face; we through\r\ntheir eyes. Why should not we also enjoy an original relation\r\nto the universe? Why should not we have a poetry and philosophy\r\nof insight and not of tradition, and a religion by revelation\r\nto us and not the history of theirs?\" The difficulty lies\r\nprecisely in our faith in immediate insight and revelation,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_205\" id=\"Page_205\"\u003e[Pg 205]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich are themselves only short-cuts of induction, psychological\r\nshort circuits, conducted by media we have disregarded.\r\nOnly a fundamentally critical philosophy pushes\r\nits doubt to the limit of demanding the credentials of those\r\nconceptions which have come to be regarded as axiomatic.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe need of going back of Aristotle in our quest for the\r\ntruth is well shown by his attitude toward the first principles\r\nof the several sciences. To him they are immediately\r\ngiven\u0026mdash;\u0026#7940;\u0026#956;\u0026#949;\u0026#963;\u0026#959;\u0026#953;\r\n\u0026#960;\u0026#961;\u0026#959;\u0026#964;\u0026#940;\u0026#963;\u0026#949;\u0026#953;\u0026#962;\u0026mdash;and\r\nhence are ultimate \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e. The\r\nhistorical significance of this fact is already apparent. It\r\nmeans that in his day these first principles, which sum up\r\nthe outcome of previous inductive movements of thought,\r\nwere regarded as so conclusively established that the steps\r\nby which they had been inferred were allowed to lapse from\r\nmemory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo account of the history of thought can hope to satisfy\r\nthe demands of reason that does not \u003ci\u003eexplain\u003c/i\u003e the origin of the\r\nconvictions thus embodied in principles. The only acceptable\r\nexplanation would be in terms of will and interest. To\r\ngive such an account would, however, require the knowledge\r\nof secular pursuits and ambitions no longer obtainable. It\r\nmight be fruitful of results if we could discover even the\r\ntheoretical interests of the age before Thales; but we know\r\nthat in modern times the direction of interest characteristic\r\nof the purely practical pursuits manifests its reformative\r\ninfluences in speculation a century or more after it has begun\r\nto shape the course of common life. Hence we might misinterpret\r\nthe historical data if they were obtainable. But\r\ngeneral considerations, which we need not now rehearse, as\r\nwell as indications contained in the later history of thought,\r\nhereinafter sketched, point to the primacy of the practical as\r\nyielding the direction of interest that determines the course\r\nit shall take.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt was said above that the principles of science are the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_206\" id=\"Page_206\"\u003e[Pg 206]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nresult of an inductive movement, and that the inductive\r\nmovement is directed by an interest. Hence the principles\r\nare contained in, or rather are the express definition of, the\r\ninterest that gave them birth. In other words, there is\r\nimplied in all induction a process of deduction. Every\r\nstream of thought embraces not only the main current, but\r\nalso an eddy, which here and there re-enters it. And this is\r\none way of explaining the phenomenon which has long\r\nengaged the thought of philosophers, namely, the fact of\r\nsuccessful anticipations of the discoveries of science or, more\r\ngenerally still, the possibility of synthetic judgments \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThe solution of the problem is ultimately contained in its\r\nstatement.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_88_88\" id=\"FNanchor_88_88\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_88_88\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[88]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo arrive at a stage of mentality not based on assumptions\r\none would have, no doubt, to go back to its beginnings.\r\nGreek thought, even in the time of Thales, was well furnished\r\nwith them. We cannot pause to catalogue them, but it may\r\nfurther our project if we consider a few of the more important.\r\nThe precondition of thought as of life is that nature\r\nbe uniform, or ultimately that the world be rational. This\r\nis not even, as it becomes later, a conscious demand; it is the\r\nprimary ethical postulate which expresses itself in the confidence\r\nthat it is so. Viewed from a certain angle it\r\nmay be called the principle of sufficient reason. Closely\r\nassociated with it is the universal belief of the early philosophers\r\nof Greece that everything that comes into being is\r\nbound up inseparably with that which has been before; more\r\nprecisely, that there is no absolute, but only relative, Becoming.\r\nCorollaries of this axiom soon appeared in the postulates\r\nof the conservation of matter or mass, and the conservation\r\nof energy, or more properly for the ancients, of motion.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_207\" id=\"Page_207\"\u003e[Pg 207]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nLogically these principles appear to signify that the subject,\r\nwhile under definition, shall remain just what it is; and that,\r\nin the system constituted of subject, predicate, and copula,\r\nthe terms shall \"stay put\" while the adjustment of verification\r\nis in progress. It is a matter of course that the constants\r\nin the great problem should become permanent landmarks.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOther corollaries derive from this same principle of\r\nuniformity. Seeing that all that comes to be in some sense\r\nalready is, there appears the postulate of the unity of the\r\nworld; and this unity manifests itself not only in the integrity\r\nand homogeneity of the world-ground, but also in the more\r\nideal conception of a universal law to which all special\r\nmodes of procedure in nature are ancillary. In these we\r\nrecognize the insistent demand for the organization of predicate\r\nand copula. Side by side with these formul\u0026aelig; stands\r\nthe other, which requires an ordered process of becoming\r\nand a graduated scale of existences, such as can mediate\r\nbetween the extremes of polarity. Such series meet us on\r\nevery hand in early Greek thought. The process of rarefaction\r\nand condensation in Anaximenes, the\r\n\u0026#8001;\u0026#948;\u0026#8056;\u0026#962;\r\n\u0026#7940;\u0026#957;\u0026#969;\r\n\u0026#954;\u0026#940;\u0026#964;\u0026#969;\r\nof Heraclitus, the regular succession of the four Empedoclean\r\nelements in almost all later systems\u0026mdash;these and other examples\r\nspontaneously occur to the mind. The significance of\r\nthis conception, as the representative of an effective copula,\r\nwill presently be seen. More subtle, perhaps, than any of\r\nthese principles, though not allowed to go so long unchallenged,\r\nis the assumption of a \u0026#966;\u0026#973;\u0026#963;\u0026#953;\u0026#962;, that is, the assumption\r\nthat all nature is instinct with life. The logical interpretation\r\nof this postulate would seem to be that the concrete\r\nsystem of things\u0026mdash;subject, predicate, copula\u0026mdash;constitutes a\r\ntotality complete in itself and needing no jog from without.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this survey of the preconceptions of the early Greek\r\nphilosophers I have employed the terms of the judgment without\r\napology. The justification for this course must come\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_208\" id=\"Page_208\"\u003e[Pg 208]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nultimately, as for any assumption, from the success of its\r\napplication to the facts. But if \"logic\" merely formulates\r\nin a schematic way that which in life is the manipulation of\r\nconcrete experience, with a view to attaining practical ends,\r\nthen its forms must apply here as well as anywhere. Logical\r\nterminology may therefore be assumed to be welcome to this\r\nfield where judgments are formed, induction is made from\r\ncertain facts to defined conceptions, and deductions are\r\nderived from principles or premises assumed. Speaking then\r\nin these terms we may say that the Pre-Socratics had three\r\nlogical problems set for them: First, there was a demand\r\nfor a predicate, or, in other words, for a theory of the world.\r\nSecondly, there was the need of ascertaining just what should\r\nbe regarded as the subject, or, otherwise stated, just what\r\nit was that required explanation. Thirdly, there arose the\r\nnecessity of discovering ways and means by which the theory\r\ncould be predicated of the world and by which, in turn, the\r\nhypothesis erected could be made to account for the concrete\r\nexperience of life: in terms of logic this problem is that of\r\nmaintaining an efficient copula. It is not assumed that the\r\nsequence thus stated was historically observed without crossing\r\nand overlapping; but a survey of the history of the period\r\nwill show that, in a general way, the logical requirements\r\nasserted themselves in this order.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. Greek philosophy began its career with induction.\r\nWe have already stated that the preconceptions with which\r\nit approached its task were the result of previous inductions,\r\nand indeed the epic and theogonic poetry of the Greeks\r\nabounds in thoughts indicative of the consciousness of all of\r\nthese problems. Thus Homer is familiar with the notion\r\nthat all things proceed from water,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_89_89\" id=\"FNanchor_89_89\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_89_89\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[89]\u003c/a\u003e and that, when the\r\nhuman body decays, it resolves itself into earth and water.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_90_90\" id=\"FNanchor_90_90\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_90_90\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[90]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nOther opinions might be enumerated, but they would add\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_209\" id=\"Page_209\"\u003e[Pg 209]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnothing to the purpose. When men began, in the spirit of\r\nphilosophy, to theorize about the world, they assumed that\r\nit\u0026mdash;the subject\u0026mdash;was sufficiently known. Its existence was\r\ntaken for granted, and that which engaged their attention\r\nwas the problem of its meaning. What predicate\u0026mdash;so we\r\nmay formulate their question\u0026mdash;should be given to the subject?\r\nIt is noticeable that their induction was quite perfunctory.\r\nBut such is always the case until there are rival\r\ntheories competing for acceptance, and even then the impulse\r\nto gather up evidence derived from a wide field and assured\r\nby resort to experiment comes rather with the desire to test\r\na hypothesis than to form it. It is the effort to \u003ci\u003everify\u003c/i\u003e that\r\nbrings out details and also the negative instances. Hence\r\nwe are not to blame Thales for rashness in making his\r\ngeneralization that all is Water. We do not know what indications\r\nled to this conclusion. Aristotle ventured a guess,\r\nbut the motives assumed for Thales agree too well with those\r\nwhich weighed with Hippo to admit of ready acceptance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnaximander, feeling the need of deduction as a sequel\r\nto induction, found his predicate in the Infinite. We cannot\r\nnow delay to inquire just what he meant by the\r\nterm; but it is not unlikely that its very vagueness recommended\r\nit to a man of genius who caught enthusiastically\r\nat the skirts of knowledge. Anaximenes, having pushed\r\nverification somewhat farther and eliciting some negative\r\ninstances, rejected water and the Infinite and inferred\r\nthat all was air. His \u0026#7936;\u0026#961;\u0026#967;\u0026#942; must have the quality of infinity,\r\nbut, a copula having been found in the process of rarefaction\r\nand condensation, it must occupy a determinate place in the\r\nseries of typical forms of existence. The logical significance\r\nof this thought will engage our attention later.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMeanwhile it may be well to note that thus far only \u003ci\u003eone\u003c/i\u003e\r\npredicate has been offered by each philosopher. This is\r\ndoubtless due to the preconception of the unity and homo\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_210\" id=\"Page_210\"\u003e[Pg 210]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003egeneity\r\nof the world, of which we have already made mention.\r\nAlthough at the beginning its significance was little realized,\r\nthe conception was destined to play a prominent part in\r\nGreek thought. It may be regarded from different points\r\nof view not necessarily antagonistic. One may say, as\r\nindeed has oftentimes been said, that it was due to ignorance.\r\nMen did not know the complexity of the world, and hence\r\ndeclared its substance to be simple. Again, it may be\r\naffirmed that the assumption was merely the na\u0026iuml;ve reflex of\r\nthe ethical postulate that we shall unify our experience and\r\norganize it for the realization of our ideals. While increased\r\nknowledge has multiplied the so-called chemical elements,\r\nphysics knows nothing of their differences, and chemistry\r\nitself demands their reduction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe extension and enlarged scope of homogeneity came\r\nin two ways: First, it presented itself by way of abstraction\r\nfrom the particular predicates that may be given to things.\r\nThis was due to the operation of the fundamental assumption\r\nthat the world must be intelligible. Thus, even in\r\nAnaximander, the world-ground takes no account of the\r\ndiversity of things except in the negative way of providing\r\nthat the contrariety of experience shall arise from it. We\r\nare therefore referred for our predicate to a somewhat\r\nbehind concrete experience. The Pythagoreans fix upon a\r\nsingle aspect of things as the essential, and find the meaning\r\nof the world in mathematical relations. The Eleatics\r\npress the conception of homogeneity until it is reduced to\r\nidentity. Identity means the absence of difference; hence,\r\nspatially considered, it requires the negation of a void and\r\nthe indivisibility of the world; viewed temporally, it precludes\r\nthe succession of different states and hence the\r\npossibility of change.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe thus reach the acute stage of the problem of the One\r\nand the Many. The One is here the predicate, the subject\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_211\" id=\"Page_211\"\u003e[Pg 211]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis the Many. The solution of the difficulty is the task of\r\nthe copula, and we shall recur to the theme in due time.\r\nIt may be well, however, at this point to draw attention to\r\nthe fact that the One is not always identical with the predicate,\r\nnor the Many with the subject. In the rhythmic\r\nmovement of erecting and verifying hypotheses the interest\r\nshifts and what was but now the predicate, by taking the\r\nplace of the premises, comes to be regarded as the given\r\nfrom which the particular is to be derived or deduced.\r\nThere is thus likewise a shift in the positions of existence\r\nand meaning. The subject, or the world, was first assumed\r\nas the given means with which to construct the predicate,\r\nits meaning; once the hypothesis has been erected, the\r\ndirection of interest shifts back to the beginning, and in\r\nthe process of verification or deduction the quondam predicate,\r\nnow the premises, becomes the given, and the task set\r\nfor thought is the derivation of fact. For the moment, or\r\nuntil the return to the world is accomplished, the One is the\r\nonly real, the Manifold remains mere appearance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe second form in which the sense of the homogeneity\r\nof the world embodies itself is not, like the first, static, but\r\nis altogether dynamic. That which makes the whole world\r\nkin is neither the presence nor the absence of a quality, but a\r\nprinciple. The law thus revealed is, therefore, not a matter\r\nof the predicate, but is the copula itself. Hence we must\r\ndefer a fuller consideration of it for the present.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. As has already been said, the inductive movement\r\nimplies the deductive, and not only as something preceding\r\nor accompanying it, but as its inner meaning and ultimate\r\npurpose. So too it was with the earliest Greek thinkers.\r\nTheir object in setting up a predicate was the derivation of\r\nthe subject from it. In other words their ambition was to\r\ndiscover the \u0026#7936;\u0026#961;\u0026#967;\u0026#942; from which the genesis of the world proceeds.\r\nBut deduction is really a much more serious task\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_212\" id=\"Page_212\"\u003e[Pg 212]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthan would at first appear to one who is familiar with the\r\nAristotelian machinery of premises and middle terms. The\r\nbusiness of deduction is to reveal the subject, and ordinarily\r\nthe subject quite vanishes from view. Induction is\r\nrapid, but deduction lags far behind. It may require but a\r\nmomentary flash of \"insight\" on the part of the physical philosopher\r\nto discover a principle; if it is really significant,\r\ninventors will be engaged for centuries in deducing from it\r\napplications to the needs of life by means of contrivances.\r\nThus after ages we come to know more of the subject, which\r\nis thereby enriched. The contrivances are the representatives\r\nof the copula in practical affairs; in quasi-theoretical\r\nspheres they are the apparatus for experimentation. It has\r\njust been remarked that by the application of the principles\r\nto life it is enriched; in other words, it receives new meaning,\r\nand new meaning signifies a new predicate. Theory\r\nis at times painfully aware of the multitude of new predicates\r\nproposed; rarely does it realize that there has been created\r\na new heaven and a new earth. Without the latter, the former\r\nwould be absurd.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMen take very much for granted and regard almost every\r\nachievement as a matter of course. Hence they do not become\r\naware of their changed position except as it reflects itself in\r\nnew schemes and in a larger outlook. The subject receives\r\nonly a summary glance to discover what new predicate shall\r\nbe evolved. Hence, while there is in Greek philosophy a\r\nstrongly marked deductive movement, the theoretical results\r\nto the subject are insignificant. Thales seems, indeed, to\r\nhave had no means to offer for the derivation of the world,\r\nbut he evidently had no doubt that it was possible. With him\r\nand with others the assumption, however vaguely understood,\r\nseems to have been that the subject, like the predicate, was simple.\r\nThus the essential unity of the world, considered as existence\r\nno less than as meaning, is a foregone conclusion. The\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_213\" id=\"Page_213\"\u003e[Pg 213]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsense of a division in the subject seems to arise with Empedocles\r\nwhen, reaping the harvest of the Eleatic definition of\r\nsubstance, he parted the world, as subject and as predicate,\r\ninto four elements.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may, perhaps, pause a moment to consider the significance\r\nof the assumption of four elements which plays so\r\nlarge a part in subsequent philosophies. There is no need\r\nof enlarging on the importance of the association of multiple\r\nelements with the postulate that nothing is absolutely created\r\nand nothing absolutely passes away. These are indeed the\r\npillars that support chemical science, and they further imply\r\nthe existence of qualities of different rank; but that implication,\r\nas we shall see, lay even in the process of rarefaction\r\nand condensation introduced by Anaximenes. The four\r\nelements concern us here chiefly as testifying to the fact that\r\ncertain practical interests had summed up the essential\r\ncharacteristics of nature in forms sufficiently significant to\r\nhave maintained themselves even to our day. In regard to\r\nfire, air, and water this is not greatly to be wondered at; it\r\nis a somewhat different case with earth. If metallurgy and\r\nother pursuits which deal with that which is roughly classed\r\nas earth had been highly enough developed to have reacted\r\nupon the popular mind, this element could not possibly have\r\nbeen assumed to be so homogeneous. The conception\r\nclearly reflects the predominantly agricultural interest of\r\nthe Greeks in their relation to the earth. This further\r\nillustrates the slow progress which deduction makes in the\r\nreconstitution of the subject.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is different, however, with Anaxagoras and the Atomists.\r\nApparently the movement begun by Empedocles\r\nsoon ran its extreme course. Instead of four elements there\r\nis now an infinite number of substances, each differentiated\r\nfrom the other. The meaning of this wide swing of the\r\npendulum is not altogether clear; but it is evident from the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_214\" id=\"Page_214\"\u003e[Pg 214]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsystem of Anaxagoras that the metals, for example, possessed\r\na significance which they can not have had for Empedocles.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe opposite swing of the pendulum is seen in the later\r\ncourse of the Eleatics. Given a predicate as fixed and\r\nunified as they assumed, the subject cannot possibly be conceived\r\nin terms of it and hence it is denied outright. In the\r\ndialectic of Zeno and Melissus, dealing with the problems\r\nof the One and the Many, there is much that suggests the\r\nsolution offered by the Atomists; but it is probably impossible\r\nnow to ascertain whether these passages criticise a doctrine\r\nalready propounded or pointed the way for successors.\r\nWhile the Eleatics asserted the sole reality of the One,\r\nAnaxagoras and the Atomists postulated a multiplicity without\r\nessential unity. But the human mind seems to be incapable\r\nof resting in that decision; it demands that the world shall\r\nhave not meanings, but a meaning. This demand calls not\r\nonly for a unified predicate, but also for an effective copula.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. We have already remarked that the steps by which\r\nthe predicate was inferred are for the most part unknown.\r\nCertain suggestions are contained in the reports of Aristotle,\r\nbut it is safe to say that they are generally guesses well or\r\nill founded. The summary inductive mediation has left few\r\ntraces; and the process of verification, in the course of which\r\nhypotheses were rejected and modified, can be followed only\r\nhere and there in the records. Almost our only source of\r\ninformation is the dialectic of systems. Fortunately for our\r\npresent purpose we do not need to know the precise form\r\nwhich a question assumed to the minds of the several philosophers;\r\nthe efforts which they made to meet the imperious\r\ndemands of logic here speak for themselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAt first there was no scheme for the mediation of the\r\npredicate back to the subject. Indeed there seems not to\r\nhave existed in the mind of Thales a sense of its need.\r\nAnaximander raised the question, but the process of segrega\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_215\" id=\"Page_215\"\u003e[Pg 215]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etion\r\nor separation (\u0026#7952;\u0026#954;\u0026#954;\u0026#961;\u0026#943;\u0026#957;\u0026#949;\u0026#963;\u0026#952;\u0026#945;\u0026#953;) which he propounded was so\r\nvaguely conceived that it has created more problems than it\r\nsolved. Anaximenes first proposed a scheme that has borne\r\nfruits. He said that things are produced from air by rarefaction\r\nand condensation. This process offers not only a\r\nprinciple of difference, but also a regulative conception, the\r\nevaluation of which engaged the thought of almost all the\r\nlater Pre-Socratics. It implies that extension and mass constitute\r\nthe essential characters of substance, and, fully apprehended,\r\ncontains in germ the whole materialistic philosophy\r\nfrom Parmenides at one extreme to Democritus and Anaxagoras\r\nat the other. The difficulties inherent in the view\r\nwere unknown to Anaximenes; for, having a unitary predicate,\r\nhe assumed also a homogeneous subject.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe logical position of Heraclitus is similar to that of\r\nAnaximenes. He likewise posits a simple predicate and\r\nfurther signalizes its functional character by naming it Fire.\r\nWithout venturing upon debatable ground we may say that\r\nit was the restless activity of the element that caused him to\r\nsingle it out as best expressing the meaning of things. Its\r\nrhythmic libration typified to him the principle of change in\r\nexistence and of existence in change. It is the \"ever-living\"\r\ncopula, devouring subject and predicate alike and re-creating\r\nthem functionally as co-ordinate expressions of itself. That\r\nwhich alone \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e, the abiding, is not the physical composition\r\nof a thing, but the law of reciprocity by which it maintains\r\na balance. This he calls variously by the names of Harmony,\r\nLogos, Necessity, Justice. In this system of functional\r\nco-ordinates nothing escapes the accounting on \u0027Change;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_91_91\" id=\"FNanchor_91_91\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_91_91\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[91]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_216\" id=\"Page_216\"\u003e[Pg 216]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nall things are in continuous flux, only the nodes of the rhythm\r\nremaining constant. It is not surprising therefore that\r\nHeraclitus has been the subject of so much speculation and\r\ncomment in modern times; for the functional character of all\r\ndistinctions in his system marks the affinity of his doctrines\r\nfor those of modern psychology and logic.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_92_92\" id=\"FNanchor_92_92\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_92_92\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[92]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Pythagoreans, having by abstraction obtained a\r\npredicate, acknowledged the existence of the subject, but did\r\nnot feel the need of a copula in the theoretical sphere, except\r\nas it concerned the inner relation of the predicate. To them\r\nthe world was number, but number itself was pluralistic, or\r\nlet us rather say dualistic. The odd and the even, the generic\r\nconstituents of number, had somehow to be brought together.\r\nThe bond was found in Unity, or, again, in Harmony. When\r\nthey inquired how numbers constituted the world, their\r\nanswer was in general only a nugatory exercise of an unbridled\r\nfancy.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_93_93\" id=\"FNanchor_93_93\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_93_93\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[93]\u003c/a\u003e Such and such a number was Justice, such\r\nanother, Man. It was only in the wholly practical sphere of\r\nexperiment that they reached a conclusion worth recording.\r\nIts significance they themselves did not perceive. Here, by\r\nthe application of mathematical measurements to sounds,\r\nthey discovered how to produce tones of a given pitch, and\r\nthus successfully demonstrated the efficiency of their copula.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Eleatics followed the same general course of abstraction;\r\nbut with them the sense of the unity of the world\r\neffaced its rich diversity. Xenophanes does not appear to\r\nhave pressed the conception so far as to deny all change\r\nwithin the world. Parmenides, however, bated no jot of the\r\nlegitimate consequences of his logical position, interpreting,\r\nas he did, the predicate, originally conceived as meaning, in\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_217\" id=\"Page_217\"\u003e[Pg 217]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nterms of existence. That which is simply \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e. Thus there\r\nis left only a one-time predicate, now converted into a subject\r\nof which only itself, as a brute fact, can be predicated.\r\nStated logically, Parmenides is capable only of uttering\r\nidentical propositions: A=A. The fallacious character of\r\nthe report of the senses and the impossibility of Becoming\r\nfollowed as a matter of course. Where the logical copula is\r\na mere sign of equation there can be neither induction nor\r\ndeduction. We are caught in a theoretical \u003ci\u003ecul-de-sac\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe are not now concerned to know in what light the\r\ndemand for a treatise on the world of Opinion may have\r\nappeared to Parmenides himself. The avenues by which\r\nmen reach conclusions which are capable of simplification\r\nand syllogistic statement are too various to admit of plausible\r\nconjecture in the absence of specific evidence. But it is\r\nclear that his resort to the expedient reflected a consciousness\r\nof the state of deadlock. In that part of his philosophical\r\npoem he dealt with many questions of detail in a rather\r\nmore practical spirit. Following the lead of Heraclitus and\r\nthe Pythagoreans he was more successful here than in the\r\nfield of metaphysics. Thus we see once more that the wounds\r\nof theory are healed by practice. But, as usual, even though\r\nthe metaphysician does receive the answer to his doubts by\r\nfalling into a severely practical pit and extricating himself\r\nby steps which he fashions with his hands, his mental habit\r\nis not thereby reconstructed. The fixed predicate of the\r\nEleatics was bequeathed to the Platonic-Aristotelian formal\r\nlogic, and induction and deduction remained for centuries in\r\ntheory a race between the hedgehog and the hare.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_94_94\" id=\"FNanchor_94_94\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_94_94\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[94]\u003c/a\u003e The\r\ntrue significance of the destructive criticism brought to bear\r\nby Zeno and Melissus on the concepts of unity, plurality,\r\ncontinuity, extension, time, and motion is simply this: that\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_218\" id=\"Page_218\"\u003e[Pg 218]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhen by a shift of the attention a predicate becomes subject\r\nor meaning fossilizes as existence, the terms of the logical\r\nprocess lose their functional reference and grow to be\r\nunmeaning and self-contradictory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have already remarked that Empedocles, Anaxagoras,\r\nand the Atomists sought to solve the problem of the One and\r\nthe Many, of the subject and the predicate, by shattering\r\nthe unitary predicate and thus leaving the field to plurality\r\nin both spheres. But obviously they were merely postponing\r\nthe real question. Thought, as well as action, demands\r\na unity somewhere. Hence the absorbing task of these philosophers\r\nis to disclose or contrive such a bond of unity.\r\nThe form which their quest assumed was the search for a\r\nbasis for physical interaction.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_95_95\" id=\"FNanchor_95_95\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_95_95\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[95]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEmpedocles clearly believed that he was solving the difficulty\r\nin one form when he instituted the rhythmic libration\r\nbetween unity under the sway of Love and multiplicity\r\nunder the domination of Hate. But even he was not satisfied\r\nwith that. While Love brought all the elements together\r\ninto a sphere and thus produced a unity, it was a unity constituted\r\nof a mixture of elements possessing inalienable characters\r\nnot only different but actually antagonistic. On the\r\nother hand, Hate did indeed separate the confused particles,\r\nbut it effected a sort of unity in that, by segregating the\r\nparticles of the several elements from the others, it brought\r\nlike and like together. In so far Aristotle was clearly right in\r\nattributing to Love the power to separate as well as to unite.\r\nMoreover, it would seem that there never was a moment in\r\nwhich both agencies were not conceived to be operative, to\r\nhowever small an extent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEmpedocles asserted, however, that a world could arise\r\nonly in the intervals between the extremes of victory in the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_219\" id=\"Page_219\"\u003e[Pg 219]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncontest between Love and Hate, when, so to speak, the battle\r\nwas drawn and there was a general \u003ci\u003em\u0026ecirc;l\u0026eacute;e\u003c/i\u003e of the combatants.\r\nIt may be questioned, perhaps, whether he distinctly stated\r\nthat in our world everything possessed its portion of each of\r\nthe elements; but so indispensable did he consider this \u003ci\u003emixture\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthat its function of providing a physical unity is unmistakable.\r\nA further evidence of his insistent demand for\r\nunity\u0026mdash;the copula\u0026mdash;is found in his doctrine that only like\r\ncan act on like; and the scheme of pores and effluvia which\r\nhe contrived bears eloquent testimony to the earnest consideration\r\nhe gave to this matter. For he conceived that all\r\ninteraction took place by means of them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEmpedocles, then, may be said to have annulled the decree\r\nof divorce he had issued for the elements at the beginning.\r\nBut the solution here too is found, not in the\r\ntheoretical, but in the practical, sphere; for he never retracts\r\nhis assertion that the elements are distinct and antagonistic.\r\nBut even so his problem is defined rather than solved; for\r\nafter the elements have been brought within microscopic\r\ndistance of each other in the mixture, since like can act only\r\non like, the narrow space that separates them is still an\r\nimpassable gulf.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_96_96\" id=\"FNanchor_96_96\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_96_96\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[96]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnaxagoras endowed his infinitely numerous substances\r\nwith the same characters of fixity and contrariety that mark\r\nthe four elements of Empedocles. For him, therefore, the\r\ndifficulty of securing unity and co-operation in an effective\r\ncopula is, if that be possible, further aggravated. His grasp\r\nof the problem, if we may judge from the relatively small\r\nbody of documentary evidence, was not so sure as that of\r\nEmpedocles, though he employed in general the same\r\nmeans for its solution. He too postulates a mixture of all\r\nsubstances, more consciously and definitely indeed than his\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_220\" id=\"Page_220\"\u003e[Pg 220]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npredecessor. Believing that only like can act on like,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_97_97\" id=\"FNanchor_97_97\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_97_97\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[97]\u003c/a\u003e he is\r\nled to assume not only an infinite multiplicity of substances,\r\nbut also their complete mixture, so that everything, however\r\nsmall, contains a portion of every other. Food, for example,\r\nhowever seeming-simple, nourishes the most diverse tissues\r\nof the body. Thus we discover in the universal mixture of\r\nsubstances the basis for co-operation and interaction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnaxagoras, therefore, like Empedocles, feels the need of\r\nbridging the chasm which he has assumed to exist between\r\nhis distinct substances. Their failure is alike great, and\r\nis due to the presuppositions they inherited from the Eleatic\r\nconception of a severe homogeneity which implies an\r\nabsolute difference from everything else. The embarrassment\r\nof Anaxagoras increases with the introduction of the\r\n\u0026#925;\u0026#959;\u0026#8166;\u0026#962;. This agency was conceived with a view to explaining\r\nthe formation of the world; that is, with a view to mediating\r\nbetween the myriad substances in their essential aloofness\r\nand effecting the harmonious concord of concrete things.\r\nWhile, even on the basis of a universal mixture, the function\r\nof the \u0026#925;\u0026#959;\u0026#8166;\u0026#962; was foredoomed to failure, its task was made more\r\ndifficult still by the definition given to its nature. According\r\nto Anaxagoras it was the sole exception to the composite\r\ncharacter of things; it is absolutely pure and simple in\r\nnature.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_98_98\" id=\"FNanchor_98_98\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_98_98\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[98]\u003c/a\u003e By its definition, then, it is prevented from accomplishing\r\nthe work it was contrived to do; and hence we cannot\r\nbe surprised at the lamentations raised by Plato and\r\nAristotle about the failure of Anaxagoras to employ the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_221\" id=\"Page_221\"\u003e[Pg 221]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nagency he had introduced. To be sure, the \u0026#925;\u0026#959;\u0026#8166;\u0026#962; is no more\r\na \u003ci\u003edeus ex machina\u003c/i\u003e than were the ideas of Plato or the God\r\nof Aristotle. They all labored under the same restrictions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Atomists followed with the same recognition of the\r\nMany, in the infinitely various kinds of atoms; but it was\r\ntempered by the assumption of an essential homogeneity.\r\nOne atom is distinguished from another by characteristics\r\ndue to its spatial relations. Mass and weight are proportional\r\nto size. Aristotle reports that, though things and\r\natoms have differences, it is not in virtue of their differences,\r\nbut in virtue of their essential identity, that they interact.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_99_99\" id=\"FNanchor_99_99\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_99_99\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[99]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThere is thus introduced a distinction which runs nearly, but\r\nnot quite, parallel to that between primary and secondary\r\nqualities.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_100_100\" id=\"FNanchor_100_100\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_100_100\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[100]\u003c/a\u003e Primary qualities are those of size, shape, and\r\nperhaps\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_101_101\" id=\"FNanchor_101_101\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_101_101\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[101]\u003c/a\u003e position; all others are secondary. On the other\r\nhand, that which is common to all atoms is their corporeity,\r\nwhich does indeed define itself with reference to the primary\r\n(spatial) qualities, but not alike in all. The atoms of which\r\nthe world is constituted are alike in essential nature, but\r\nthey differ most widely in position.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is the void that breaks up the unity of the world\u0026mdash;atomizes\r\nit, if we may use the expression. It is the basis of\r\nall discontinuity. Atoms and void are thus polar extremes\r\nreciprocally exclusive. The atoms in their utter isolation\r\nin space are incapable of producing a world. In order to\r\nbridge the chasm between atom and atom, recourse is had\r\nto motion eternal, omnipresent, and necessary. This it\r\nis that annihilates distances. In the course of their motion\r\natoms collide, and in their impact one upon the other the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_222\" id=\"Page_222\"\u003e[Pg 222]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nAtomists find the precise mode of co-operation by which the\r\nworld is formed.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_102_102\" id=\"FNanchor_102_102\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_102_102\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[102]\u003c/a\u003e To this agency are due what Lucretius\r\nhappily called \"generating motions.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe problem, however, so insistently pursued the philosophers\r\nof this time that the Atomists did not content themselves\r\nwith this solution, satisfactory as modern science has\r\npretended to consider it. They followed the lead of Empedocles\r\nand Anaxagoras in postulating a widespread, if not\r\nabsolutely universal, \u003ci\u003emixture\u003c/i\u003e. Having on principle excluded\r\n\"essential\" differences among the atoms, the impossibility of\r\nfinally distinguishing essential and non-essential had its\r\nrevenge. Important as the device of mixture was to\r\nEmpedocles and Anaxagoras, just so unmeaning ought it to\r\nhave been in the Atomic philosophy, provided that the\r\nhypothesis could accomplish what was claimed for it. It is not\r\nnecessary to reassert that the assumption of \"individua,\" utterly\r\nalienated one from the other by a void, rendered the problem\r\nof the copula insoluble for the Atomists.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDiogenes of Apollonia is commonly treated contemptuously\r\nas a mere reactionary who harked back to Anaximenes\r\nand had no significance of his own. The best that can be\r\nsaid of such an attitude is that it regards philosophical\r\ntheories as accidental utterances of individuals, naturally\r\nwell or ill endowed, who happen to express conclusions with\r\nwhich men in after times agree or disagree. A philosophical\r\ntenet is an atom, set somewhere in a vacuum, utterly out of relation\r\nto everything else. But it is impossible to see how, on this\r\ntheory, any system of thought should possess any significance\r\nfor anybody, or how there should be any progress even, or\r\nretardation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eViewed entirely from without, the doctrine of Diogenes\r\nwould seem to be substantially a recrudescence of that of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_223\" id=\"Page_223\"\u003e[Pg 223]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nAnaximenes. Air is once more the element or \u0026#7936;\u0026#961;\u0026#967;\u0026#942; out of\r\nwhich all proceeds and into which all returns. Again the process\r\nof transformation is seen in rarefaction and condensation;\r\nand the attributes of substance are those which were common\r\nto the early hylozoists. But there is present a keen\r\nsense of a problem unknown to Anaximenes. What the\r\nearly philosopher asserted in the innocence of the youth of\r\nthought, the later physiologist reiterates with emphasis\r\nbecause he believes that the words are words of life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe motive for recurring to the earlier system is supplied\r\nby the imperious demand for a copula which had so much\r\ndistressed Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists. And\r\nhere we are not left to conjecture, but are able to refer to\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eipsissima verba\u003c/i\u003e of our philosopher. After a brief prologue,\r\nin which he stated that one\u0027s starting-point must be\r\nbeyond dispute, he immediately\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_103_103\" id=\"FNanchor_103_103\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_103_103\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[103]\u003c/a\u003e turned to his theme in these\r\nwords:\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_104_104\" id=\"FNanchor_104_104\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_104_104\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[104]\u003c/a\u003e \"In my opinion, to put the whole matter in a nutshell,\r\nall things are derived by alteration from the same\r\nsubstance, and indeed all are one and the same. And this\r\nis altogether evident. For if the things that now exist in\r\nthe world\u0026mdash;earth and water and air and fire and whatsoever\r\nelse appears to exist in this world\u0026mdash;if, I say, any one of\r\nthese were different from the other, different that is to say\r\nin its proper peculiar nature, and did not rather, being one\r\nand the same, change and alter in many ways, then in no-wise\r\nwould things be able to mix with one another, nor would\r\nhelp or harm come to one from the other, nor would any\r\nplant spring from the earth, nor any other living thing come\r\ninto being, if things were not so constituted as to be one\r\nand the same.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese words contain a singularly interesting expression\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_224\" id=\"Page_224\"\u003e[Pg 224]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the need of restoring the integrity of the process which\r\nhad been lost in the effort to solve the problem of the One\r\nand the Many without abandoning the point of view won by\r\nthe Eleatics. Aristotle and Theophrastus paraphrase and\r\nsum up the passage above quoted by saying\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_105_105\" id=\"FNanchor_105_105\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_105_105\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[105]\u003c/a\u003e that interaction\r\nis impossible except on the assumption that all the world is\r\none and the same. Hence it is manifest, as was said above,\r\nthat the return of Diogenes to the monistic system of Anaximenes\r\nhad for its conscious motive the avoidance of the\r\ndualism that had sprung up in the interval and had rendered\r\nfutile the multiplied efforts to secure an effective copula.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe should note, however, that in the attempt thus made\r\nto undo the work of several generations Diogenes retained\r\nthe principle which had wrought the mischief. We have\r\nbefore remarked that the germ of the Atomic philosophy\r\nwas contained in the process of rarefaction and condensation.\r\nHence, in accepting it along with the remainder of Anaximenes\u0027s\r\ntheory, the fatal assumption was reinstated. It is\r\nthe story of human systems in epitome. The superstructure\r\nis overthrown, and with the d\u0026eacute;bris a new edifice is built upon\r\nthe old foundations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the entire course of philosophical thought from Thales\r\nonward the suggestion of an opposition between the subject\r\nand the predicate had appeared. It has often been said that\r\nit was expressed by the search for a \u0026#966;\u0026#973;\u0026#963;\u0026#953;\u0026#962;, or a \u003ci\u003etrue nature\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nin contrast with the world as practically accepted. There is\r\na certain truth in this view; for the effort to attain a predicate\r\nwhich does not merely repeat the subject does imply\r\nthat there is an opposition. But the efforts made to return\r\nfrom the predicate to the subject, in a deductive movement,\r\nshows that the difference was not believed to be absolute.\r\nThis is true, however, only of those fields of speculation\r\nthat lie next to the highways of practical life, which lead\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_225\" id=\"Page_225\"\u003e[Pg 225]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nequally in both directions, or, let us rather say, which unite\r\nwhile they mark separation. In the sphere of abstract ideas\r\nthe sense of embarrassment was deep and constantly growing\r\ndeeper. The reconstruction, accomplished on lower levels,\r\ndid not attain unto those heights. Men doubted conclusions,\r\nbut did not think to demand the credentials of their common\r\npresuppositions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSide by side with the later philosophers whom we have\r\nmentioned there walked men whom we are wont to call the\r\nSophists. They were the journalists and pamphleteers of\r\nthose days, men who, without dealing profoundly with any\r\nspecial problem, familiarized themselves with the generalizations\r\nof workers in special fields and combined these ideas\r\nfor the entertainment of the public. They were neither\r\nphilosophers nor physicists, but, like some men whom we\r\nmight cite from our own times, endeavored to popularize\r\nthe teachings of both. Naturally they seized upon the most\r\nsweeping generalizations and the preconceptions which disclosed\r\nthemselves in manifold forms. Just as naturally they\r\nhad no eyes with which to detect the significance of the\r\nbesetting problems at which, in matters more concrete, the\r\nmasters were toiling. Hence the contradictions, revealed in\r\nthe analysis we have just given of the philosophy of the age,\r\nstood out in utter nakedness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe result was inevitable. The inability to discover a\r\nunitary predicate, more still, the failure to attain a working\r\ncopula, led directly to the denial of the possibility of predication.\r\nThere was no truth. Granted that it existed, it\r\ncould not be known. Even if known, it could not be communicated.\r\nIn these incisive words of Gorgias the conclusion\r\nof the ineffectual effort to establish a logic of science is\r\nclearly stated. But the statement is happily only the half-truth,\r\nwhich is almost a complete falsehood. It takes no\r\naccount of the indications, everywhere present, of a needed\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_226\" id=\"Page_226\"\u003e[Pg 226]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreconstruction. Least of all does it catch the meaning of\r\nsuch a demand.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Sophists did not, however, merely repeat in abstract\r\nfrom the teachings of the philosophers. It matters not\r\nwhether they originated the movement or not; at all events\r\nthey were pioneers in the field of moral philosophy. Here\r\nit was that they chiefly drew the inferences from the distinction\r\nbetween \u0026#966;\u0026#973;\u0026#963;\u0026#949;\u0026#953; and \u0026#957;\u0026#972;\u0026#956;\u0026#8179;.\r\nNothing could have been more effective in disengaging the firmly\r\nrooted moral pre-possessions and rendering them amenable to philosophy.\r\nJust here, at last, we catch a hint of the significance of the\r\nlogical process. In a striking passage in Plato\u0027s \u003ci\u003eProtagoras\u003c/i\u003e,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_106_106\" id=\"FNanchor_106_106\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_106_106\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[106]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhich one is fain to regard as an essentially true reproduction\r\nof a discourse by that great man, Justice and Reverence\r\nare accorded true validity. On inquiring to what characteristic\r\nthis honorable distinction is due, we find that it does\r\nnot reside in themselves; it is due to \u003ci\u003ethe assumption that a\r\nstate must exist\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHere, then, in a word, is the upshot of the logical\r\nmovement. Logical predicates are essentially hypothetical,\r\nderiving their validity from the interest that moves men to\r\naffirm them. When they lose this hypothetical character,\r\nas terms within a volitional system, and set up as entities at\r\nlarge, they cease to function and forfeit their right to exist.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_227\" id=\"Page_227\"\u003e[Pg 227]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"X\" id=\"X\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eX\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eVALUATION AS A LOGICAL PROCESS\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe purpose of this discussion is to supply the main outlines\r\nof a theory of value based upon analysis of the valuation-process\r\nfrom the logical point of view. The general\r\nprinciple which we shall seek to establish is that judgments\r\nof value, whether passed upon things or upon modes of\r\nconduct, are essentially objective in import, and that they\r\nare reached through a process of valuation which is essentially\r\nof the same logical character as the judgment-process\r\nwhereby conclusions of physical fact are established\u0026mdash;in\r\na word, that the valuation-process, issuing in the finished\r\njudgment of value expressive of the judging person\u0027s definitive\r\nattitude toward the thing in question, is constructive of\r\nan order of reality in the same sense as, in current theories\r\nof knowledge, is the judgment of sense-perception and science.\r\nOur method of procedure to this end will be that of\r\nassuming, and adhering to as consistently as possible, the\r\nstandpoint of the individual in the process of deliberating\r\nupon an ethical or economic problem (for, as we shall hold,\r\nall values properly so called are either ethical or economic),\r\nand of ascertaining, as accurately as may be, the meaning of\r\nthe deliberative or evaluating process and of the various factors\r\nin it as these are presented in the individual\u0027s apprehension.\r\nIt is in this sense that our procedure will be logical\r\nrather than psychological. We shall be concerned to determine\r\nthe \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e of the object of valuation as object, of the\r\nstandard of value as standard, and of the valued object as\r\nvalued, in terms of the individual\u0027s own apprehension of\r\nthese, rather than to ascertain the nature and conditions of\r\nhis apprehensions of these considered as psychical events.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_228\" id=\"Page_228\"\u003e[Pg 228]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nOur attention will throughout be directed to these factors\r\nor phases of the valuation-process in their functional aspect\r\nof determinants of the valuing agent\u0027s practical attitude, and\r\nnever, excepting for purposes of incidental illustration and\r\nin a very general and tentative way, as events in consciousness\r\nmediated by more \"elementary\" psychical processes.\r\nThe results which we shall gain by adhering to this method\r\nwill enable us to see not merely that our judgments of value\r\nare in function and meaning objective, but also that our\r\njudgments of sense-perception and science are, as such,\r\ncapable of satisfactory interpretation only as being incidental\r\nto the attainment and progressive reconstruction of judgments\r\nof value.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first three main divisions will be given over to establishing\r\nthe objectivity of content and function of judgments\r\nof value. The fourth division will present a detailed analysis\r\nof the two types of judgment of value, the ethical and\r\neconomic, defining them and relating them to each other,\r\nand correlating them in the manner just suggested with\r\njudgment of the physical type. After considering, in the\r\nfifth part, certain general objections to the positions thus\r\nstated, we shall proceed in the sixth and concluding division\r\nto define the function of the consciousness of value in the\r\neconomy of life.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_107_107\" id=\"FNanchor_107_107\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_107_107\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[107]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eI\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe system of judgments which defines what one calls\r\nthe objective order of things is inevitably unique for each\r\nparticular individual. No two men can view the world from\r\nthe standpoint of the same theoretical and practical inter\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_229\" id=\"Page_229\"\u003e[Pg 229]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eests,\r\nnor can any two proceed in the work of gaining for\r\nthemselves knowledge of the world with precisely equal\r\ndegrees of skill and accuracy. Each must be prompted and\r\nguided, in the construction of his knowledge of single things\r\nand of the system in which they have their being, by his\r\nown particular interests and aims; and even when one person\r\nin a measure shares in the interests and aims of another,\r\nthe rate and manner of procedure will not be the same for\r\nboth, nor will the knowledge gained be for both equally\r\nsystematic in arrangement or in interrelation of its parts.\r\nEach man lives in a world of his own\u0026mdash;a world, indeed,\r\nidentical in certain fundamental respects with the worlds\r\nwhich his fellow-men have constructed for themselves, but\r\none nevertheless necessarily unique through and through\r\nbecause each man is a unique individual. There is, doubtless,\r\na \"social currency\" of objects which implies a certain\r\nidentity of meaning in objects as experienced by different\r\nindividuals. The existence of society presupposes, and its\r\nevolution in turn develops and extends, a system of generally\r\naccepted objects and relations. Nevertheless, the \"socially\r\ncurrent object\" is, as such, an abstraction just as the uniform\r\nsocial individual is likewise an abstraction. The only concrete\r\nobject ever actually known or in any wise experienced\r\nby any person is the object as constructed by that person in\r\naccordance with his own aims and purposes, and in which\r\nthere is, therefore, a large and important share of meaning\r\nwhich is significant to no one else.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is needless in this discussion to dwell at length upon\r\nthe general principle of recent \"functional\" psychology, that\r\npractical ends are the controlling factors in the acquisition\r\nof our knowledge of objective things. We shall take for\r\ngranted the truth of the general proposition that cognition,\r\nin whatever sphere of science or of practical life, is essentially\r\nteleological in the sense of being incidental always,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_230\" id=\"Page_230\"\u003e[Pg 230]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmore or less directly, to the attainment of ends. Cognition,\r\nas the apperceptive or attentive process, is essentially the\r\nprocess of scrutinizing a situation (whether theoretical or\r\npractical) with a view to determining the availability for one\u0027s\r\nintended purpose of such objects and conditions as the\r\nsituation may present. The objects and conditions thus\r\ndetermined will be made use of or ignored, counted upon as\r\nadvantageous or guarded against as unfavorable\u0026mdash;in a word,\r\nresponded to\u0026mdash;in ways suggested by their character as\r\nascertained through reference to the interest in question.\r\nIn this sense, then, objective things as known by individual\r\npersons are essentially complex stimuli whose proper function\r\nand reason for being it is to elicit useful responses in\r\nthe way of conduct\u0026mdash;responses conducive to the realization\r\nof ends.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom this point of view, then, the difference between one\r\nperson\u0027s knowledge of a particular object and another\u0027s\r\nsignifies (1) a difference between these persons\u0027 original\r\npurposes in setting out to gain knowledge of the object, and\r\n(2) consequently a difference between their present ways\r\nof acting with reference to the object. The bare object as\r\nsocially current is, at best, for each individual simply a ground\r\nupon which subsequent construction may be made; and the\r\nsubsequent construction which each individual is prompted\r\nby his circumstances and is able to work out in judgment\r\nfirst makes the object, for this individual, real and for his\r\npurposes complete.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, it is our primary intention to show that objects are,\r\nin cases of a certain important class, not yet ready to serve\r\nthe person who knows them in their proper character of\r\nstimuli, when they have been, even exhaustively, defined in\r\nmerely physical terms. It is very often not enough that the\r\ndimensions of an object and its physical properties, even the\r\nmore recondite ones as well as those more commonly under\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_231\" id=\"Page_231\"\u003e[Pg 231]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003estood\u0026mdash;it\r\nis often not enough for the purposes of an agent\r\nthat these characters should make up the whole sum of his\r\nknowledge of the object in question. A measure of knowledge\r\nin terms of physical categories is often only a beginning\u0026mdash;the\r\nresult of a preliminary stage of the entire process\r\nof teleological determination, which must be carried through\r\nbefore the object of attention can be satisfactorily known.\r\nIn the present study of the logic of valuation we shall be\r\noccupied exclusively with the discussion of cases of this kind.\r\nIn our judgments of sense-perception and physical science\r\nwe have presented to us material objects in their physical\r\naspect. When these latter are inadequate to suggest or warrant\r\novert conduct, our knowledge of them must be supplemented\r\nand reconstructed in ways presently to be specified.\r\nIt is in the outcome of judgment-processes in which this\r\nwork of supplementing and reconstructing is carried through\r\nthat the consciousness of value, in the proper sense, arises,\r\nand these processes, then, are those which we shall here consider\r\nunder the name of \"processes of valuation.\" They will\r\ntherefore best be approached through specification of the\r\nways in which our physical judgments may be inadequate.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us, then, assume, as has been indicated, that the process\r\nof acquiring knowledge\u0026mdash;that is to say, the process of\r\njudgment or attention\u0026mdash;is in every case of its occurrence\r\nincidental to the attainment of an end. We must make this\r\nassumption without attempting formally to justify it\u0026mdash;though\r\nin the course of our discussion it will be abundantly illustrated.\r\nLet us, in accordance with this view, think of the\r\ntypical judgment-process as proceeding, in the main, as follows:\r\nFirst of all must come a sense of need or deficiency,\r\nwhich may, on occasion, be preceded by a more or less violent\r\nand sudden shock to the senses, forcibly turning one\u0027s attention\r\nto the need of immediate action. By degrees this sense\r\nof need will grow more definite and come to express itself in\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_232\" id=\"Page_232\"\u003e[Pg 232]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na more or less \"clear and distinct\" image of an end, toward\r\nwhich end the agent is drawn by desire and to which he\r\nlooks with much or little of emotion. The emergence of\r\nthe end into consciousness immediately makes possible and\r\noccasions definite analysis of the situation in which the end\r\nmust be worked out. Salient features of the situation forthwith\r\nare noticed\u0026mdash;whether useful things or favoring conditions,\r\nor, on the other hand, the absence of any such. Thus\r\npredicates and then subjects for many subsidiary judgments\r\nin the comprehensive judgment-process emerge together in\r\naction and interaction upon each other. The predicates,\r\ndeveloped out of the general end toward which the agent\r\nstrives, afford successive points of view for fresh analyses of\r\nthe situation. The logical subjects thus discovered\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eobjects\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof attention and knowledge\u0026mdash;require, on the other hand, as\r\nthey are scrutinized and judged, modification and re-examination\r\nof the end. The end grows clearer and fuller of\r\ndetail as the predicates or implied (\"constituent\") ideas\r\nwhich are developed out of it are distinguished from each\r\nother and used in making one\u0027s inventory of the objective\r\nsituation. Conversely, the situation loses its first aspect of\r\nconfusion and takes on more and more the aspect of an\r\norderly assemblage of objects and conditions, useful, indifferent,\r\nand adverse, by means of which the end may in\r\ngreater or less measure be attained or must, in however\r\ngreatly modified a form, be defeated. Now, in this development\r\nof the judgment-process, it must be observed, the end\r\nmust be more or less clearly and consistently conceived\r\nthroughout as an \u003ci\u003eactivity\u003c/i\u003e, if the objective means of action\r\nwhich have been determined in the process are not to be, at the\r\nlast, separate and unrelated data still requiring co-ordination.\r\nIf the end has been so conceived, the means will inevitably be\r\nknown as members of a mechanical \u003ci\u003esystem\u003c/i\u003e, since the predicates\r\nby which they have been determined have at every\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_233\" id=\"Page_233\"\u003e[Pg 233]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npoint involved this factor of amenability to co-ordination.\r\nThe judgment-process, if properly conducted and brought to\r\na conclusion, must issue at the end in the functional unity of\r\na finished plan of conduct with a perfected mechanical\r\nco-ordination of the available means.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have now to see that much more may be involved in\r\nsuch a process as this than has been explicitly stated in our\r\nbrief analysis. For the end itself may be a matter of deliberation,\r\njust as must be the physical means of accomplishing\r\nit; and, again, the means may call for scrutiny and determination\r\nfrom other points of view than the physical and\r\nmechanical. The final action taken at the end may express\r\nthe outcome of deliberate ethical and economic judgment\r\nas well as of judgments in the sphere of sense-perception\r\nand physical science. Let us consider, for example, that\r\none\u0027s end is the construction of a house upon a certain plot\r\nof ground. This end expresses the felt need of a more comfortable\r\nor more reputable abode, and has so much of general\r\npresumption in its favor. There may, however, be\r\nmany reasons for hesitation. The cost in time or money or\r\nmaterials on hand may tax one\u0027s resources and injuriously\r\ncurtail one\u0027s activities along other lines. And there may be\r\nethical reasons why the plan should not be carried out. The\r\nhouse may shut off a pleasing prospect from the view of the\r\nentire neighborhood and serve no better end than the gratification\r\nof its owner\u0027s selfish vanity. It will cost a sum of\r\nmoney which might be used in paying just, though outlawed,\r\ndebts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, from the standpoint of such problems as these the\r\nfullest possible preliminary knowledge of the physical and\r\nmechanical fitness of our means must still be very abstract\r\nand general. It would be of use in any undertaking like the\r\none we have supposed, but it is not sufficient in so far as the\r\nproblem is one\u0027s own problem, concrete, particular, and so\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_234\" id=\"Page_234\"\u003e[Pg 234]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nunique. One may, of course, proceed to the stage of physical\r\njudgment without having settled the ethical problems\r\nwhich may have presented themselves at the outset. The\r\nend may be entertained tentatively as a hypothesis until\r\ncertain mechanical problems have been dealt with. But\r\nmanifestly this is only postponement of the issue. The agent\r\nis still quite unprepared, even after the means have been so\r\nfar determined, to take the first step in the execution of the\r\nplan; indeed, his uncertainty is probably only the more harassing\r\nthan before. Moreover, the economic problems in\r\nthe case are now more sharply defined, and these for the time\r\nbeing still further darken counsel. Manifestly the need for\r\ndeliberation is at this point quite as urgent as the need for\r\nphysical determination can ever be, and the need is evidenced\r\nin the same way by the actual arrest and postponement of\r\novert conduct. The agent, despite his physical knowledge,\r\nis not yet free to embrace the end and, having done so, use\r\nthereto the means at his disposal. It is plainly impossible\r\nto use the physical means until one knows in terms of Substance\r\nand Attribute or Cause and Effect, or whatever other\r\nphysical categories one may please, what manner of behavior\r\nmay be expected of them. So likewise is it as truly impossible,\r\nfor one intellectually and morally capable of appreciating\r\nproblems of a more advanced and complex sort, to exploit\r\nthe physical properties thus discovered until ethical determination\r\nof the end and economic determination of the means\r\nhave been completed.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_108_108\" id=\"FNanchor_108_108\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_108_108\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[108]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are, then, we conclude, cases in which physical\r\ndetermination of the means is by itself not a sufficient prepa\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_235\" id=\"Page_235\"\u003e[Pg 235]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eration\r\nfor conduct\u0026mdash;in which there are ethical and economic\r\nproblems which delay the application of the physical means to\r\nthe end to which they may be physically adapted. Indeed,\r\nso much as this may well appear as sufficiently obvious\r\nwithout extended illustration. Everyone knows that it is\r\nnearly always necessary, in undertaking any work in which\r\nmaterial things are used as means, to count the cost; and\r\neveryone knows likewise that not every end that is in any\r\nway attractive and within one\u0027s reach may without more ado\r\nbe taken as an object of settled desire and effort. It is\r\nindeed needless to elaborate these commonplaces in the\r\nsense in which they are commonly understood. However,\r\nsuch is not our present purpose. Our purpose is the more\r\nspecific one of showing that the meaning of Objectivity must\r\nbe widened so as to include (1) the \"universe\" of ends in\r\ntheir ethical aspect and (2) the economic aspect of the\r\nmeans of action, as well as (3) the physical aspect to which\r\nthe character of Objectivity is commonly restricted. We\r\nshall maintain that these are parts or phases of a complete\r\nconception of Reality, and that of them, consequently, Objectivity\r\nmust be predicated for every essential reason connoted\r\nby such characterization of the world of things \"external\"\r\nto the senses. It has been with this conclusion in mind,\r\nthen, that we have sought to emphasize the frequent serious\r\ninadequacy, for practical purposes, of the merely physical\r\ndetermination of the means in one\u0027s environment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe principle thus suggested would imply that the\r\nethical and economic stages in the one inclusive process\r\nof reflective attention should be regarded as involving,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_236\" id=\"Page_236\"\u003e[Pg 236]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhen they occur, the same logical function of judgment\r\nas is operative in the sphere of sense-perception and\r\nthe sciences generally. Ethical and economic factors\r\nmust on occasion be present at the final choice and\r\nshaping of one\u0027s course of conduct, along with the physical\r\ndeterminations of environing means and conditions which\r\none has made in sense-perception. There is, then, it would\r\nappear, at least a fair presumption, though not indeed an \u003ci\u003ea\r\npriori\u003c/i\u003e certainty, that these ethical and economic factors or\r\nconditions have, like the physical, taken form in a \u003ci\u003ejudgment-process\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwhich will admit of profitable analysis in accordance\r\nwith whatever general theory of judgment one may hold as\r\nvalid elsewhere in the field of knowledge. This presumption\r\nwe shall seek to verify. Now, our interest in thus determining,\r\nfirst of all, the logical character of these processes will\r\nreadily be understood from this, that, in the present view,\r\nthese are the processes, and the only ones in our experience,\r\nwhich are properly to be regarded as processes of Valuation.\r\nWe shall hold that Valuation, and so all consciousness of\r\nValue, properly so called, must be either ethical or economic;\r\nthat the only conscious processes in which Values can come\r\nto definition are these processes of ethical and economic\r\njudgment. The present theory of Value is, then, essentially\r\na logical one, in the sense of holding that Values are determined\r\nin and by a logical\u0026mdash;that is, a judgmental\u0026mdash;valuation-process\r\nand in its details is closely dependent upon the\r\ngeneral conception of judgment of which the outlines have\r\nbeen sketched above. Accordingly, the exposition must proceed\r\nin the following general order: Assuming the conception\r\nof judgment which has been presented (which our\r\ndiscussion will in several ways further illustrate and so tend\r\nto confirm), we shall seek to show that the determinations\r\nmade in ethical and economic judgment are in the proper\r\nsense objective. This will involve, first of all, a statement\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_237\" id=\"Page_237\"\u003e[Pg 237]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the conditions under which the ethical and economic\r\njudgments respectively arise\u0026mdash;which statement will serve to\r\ndistinguish the two types of judgment from each other. We\r\nshall then proceed to the special analysis of the ethical and\r\neconomic forms from the standpoint of our general theory\r\nof judgment, thereby establishing in detail the judgmental\r\ncharacter of these parts of the reflective process. This\r\nanalysis will serve to introduce our interpretation of the\r\nconsciousness of Value as a factor in the conduct and economy\r\nof life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eII\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us then define the problem of the objective reference\r\nof the valuational judgments by stating, as distinctly as may\r\nbe, the conditions by which ethical and economic deliberation,\r\nrespectively, are prompted. A study of these conditions will\r\nmake it easier to see in what way the judgments reached in\r\ndealing with them can be objective.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen will an end, presenting itself in consciousness in\r\nthe manner indicated in our brief analysis of the judgment-process,\r\nbecome the center of attention, thereby checking\r\nthe advance, through investigation of the possible means, to\r\nfinal overt action? This is the general statement of the\r\nproblem of the typical ethical situation. Manifestly there\r\nwill be no ethical deliberation if the imaged end at once\r\nturns the attention toward the environment of possible\r\nmeans, instead of first of all itself becoming the object\r\ninstead of the director of attention; there will be no suspension\r\nof progress toward final action, excepting such as\r\nmay later come through difficulty in the discovery and\r\nco-ordination of the means. However, there are cases in\r\nwhich the emergence of the end forthwith is followed by a\r\ncheck to the reflective process, and the agent shrinks from\r\nthe end presented in imagination as being, let us say, one\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_238\" id=\"Page_238\"\u003e[Pg 238]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nforbidden by authority or one repugnant to his own established\r\nstandards. The end may in such a case disappear at\r\nonce; very often it will insistently remain. On this latter\r\nsupposition, the simplest possibility will be the development\r\nof a mere mechanical tension, a \"pull and haul\" between\r\nthe end, or properly the impulses which it represents, and\r\nthe agent\u0027s habit of suppressing impulses of the class to\r\nwhich the present one is, perhaps intuitively, recognized as\r\nbelonging. The case is the common one of \"temptation\"\r\non the one side and \"principle\" or \"conscience\" on the\r\nother, and so long as the two forces remain thus in hard-and-fast\r\nopposition to each other there can be no ethical deliberation\r\nor judgment in a proper sense. The standard or\r\nhabit may gain the day by sheer mechanical excess of power,\r\nor the new impulse, the temptation, may prevail because its\r\nonset can break down the mechanical resistance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOut of such a situation as this, however, genuine ethical\r\ndeliberation may arise on condition that standard and\r\n\"temptation\" can lose something of their abstractness and\r\ntheir hard-and-fast opposition, and develop into terms of\r\nconcrete meaning. The agent may come to see that the\r\nend is in some definite way of really vital interest and too\r\nimportant to be put aside without consideration. He may,\r\nof course, in this fall into gross self-sophistication, like the\r\ndrunkard in the classical instance who takes another glass\r\nto test his self-control and thereby gain assurance, or he\r\nmay act with wisdom and with full sincerity, like Dorothea\r\nCasaubon when she renounced the impossible task imposed\r\nby her departed husband. In the moral life one can ask or\r\nhope for complete exemption from the risk of self-deception\r\nwith as little reason as in scientific research. But however\r\nthis may be, our present interest is in the method, not in particular\r\nresults of ethical reflection. Whether properly so in\r\na particular case or not, the imaged end may come to seem\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_239\" id=\"Page_239\"\u003e[Pg 239]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nat least plausibly defensible on grounds of principle which\r\nserve to sanction certain other modes of conduct to which a\r\nplace is given in the accepted scheme of life; or the end\r\nmay simply press for a relatively independent recognition on\r\nthe very general ground that its emergence represents an\r\nenlargement and new development of the personality.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_109_109\" id=\"FNanchor_109_109\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_109_109\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[109]\u003c/a\u003e The\r\nend may thus cease to stand in the character of blind self-assertive\r\nimpulse, and press its claim as a positive means of\r\nfuture moral growth, as bringing freedom from repressive\r\nand enfeebling restraints and as tending to the reinforcement\r\nof other already valued modes of conduct. On the\r\nother hand, the standard will cease to stand as mere resistance\r\nand negation, and may discover something of its hidden\r\nmeaning as a product of long experience and slow growth,\r\nand as perhaps a vital part of the organization of one\u0027s present\r\nlife, not to be touched without grave risk.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, on whichever side the development may first commence,\r\na like development must soon follow on the other,\r\nand it is the action and reaction of standard and prospective\r\nor problematic end upon each other that constitutes\r\nthe process of ethical deliberation or judgment. Just as\r\nin the typical judgment-process, as sketched above, so also\r\nhere predicate and subject \u003ci\u003edevelop each other\u003c/i\u003e, when once\r\nthey have given over their first antagonism and come to\r\nthe attitude of reasoning together. The predicate explains\r\nitself that the subject or new end may be searchingly and\r\nfairly tested; and under this scrutiny the subject develops\r\nits full meaning as a course of conduct, thereby prompting\r\nfurther analysis and reinterpretation of the standard. But\r\nthis is not the place for detailed analysis of the process;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_110_110\" id=\"FNanchor_110_110\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_110_110\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[110]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nhere we are concerned only to define the type of situation,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_240\" id=\"Page_240\"\u003e[Pg 240]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand this we may now do in the following terms: The indispensable\r\ncondition of ethical judgment is the presence in\r\nthe agent\u0027s mind of at least two rival interesting ends or\r\nsystems of such ends. In the foregoing, the subject of the\r\njudgment is the new end that has arisen; the predicate or\r\n\"standard\" is the symbol for the old ends or values which\r\nin the tension of the judgment-process must be brought to\r\nmore or less explicit enumeration\u0026mdash;and, we must add,\r\nreconstruction also. Indeed, it is important, even at this\r\nstage of our discussion, to observe that Predicate and Standard\r\nare not equivalent in meaning. The predicate, or predicative\r\nside, of judgment is the imagery of control in the\r\nprocess, which, as we have seen, develops with the subject\r\nside; while the term \"Standard\" connotes the rigid fixity\r\nwhich belongs to the inhibiting concept or ideal in the stage\r\nbefore the judgment-process proper can begin. The ethical\r\njudgment-process is, in a word, just the process of reconstructing\r\nstandards\u0026mdash;as in its other and corresponding\r\naspect it is the process of interpreting new ends. Those who\r\noppose measures of social reform or new modes of conduct\r\nor belief on alleged grounds of \"immorality\" instinctively\r\nfeel in doing so that the change may make its way more easily\r\nagainst a resistance that will candidly explain itself; and,\r\non the other side of the social judgment-process, the more\r\nfanatical know how to turn to good advantage for their\r\npropaganda the bitterness or contempt of those who represent\r\nthe established order. On both sides there are those\r\nwho trust more in mechanical \"pull and haul\" than in the\r\nintrinsic merits of their cause.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus it is by encountering some rival end or entire system\r\nof ends, as symbolized by an ideal, that a new end\r\nemerging out of impulse comes to stand for an agent, as\r\nthe center of a problem of conduct, and so to occupy the\r\ncenter of attention. And it thereby becomes an Object, as\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_241\" id=\"Page_241\"\u003e[Pg 241]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwe shall hold, which must be more fully defined in order\r\nthat it may be \u003ci\u003evalued\u003c/i\u003e, and accordingly be held to warrant a\r\ndeterminate attitude toward itself on the agent\u0027s part. We\r\nhave now to define in the same general terms the typical\r\neconomic situation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn economic theory as in common thought it is not the\r\ncontemplated act of applying certain means to the attainment\r\nof an end regarded as desirable that functions as the\r\nlogical subject of valuation. The thing or object valued in\r\nthe economic situation is one\u0027s present wealth, whether\r\nmaterial or immaterial, one\u0027s services or labor\u0026mdash;whatever one\r\ngives in exchange or otherwise sets apart for the attainment\r\nof a desired end or, proximately, to secure possession of the\r\nnecessary and sufficient means to the attainment of a desired\r\nend. The object of attention in the valuing process is here\r\nnot itself an end of action. In this respect the economic type\r\nof judgment is like the physical, for in both the object to be\r\nvalued is a certain means which one is seeking to adapt to\r\nsome more or less definitely imaged purpose; or a condition\r\nof which one wishes, likewise for some special purpose, to\r\ntake advantage. The ultimate goal of all judgment is the\r\ndetermination of a course of conduct looking toward an\r\nend, and our present problem may accordingly be stated in\r\nthe following terms: Under what circumstances in the\r\njudgment-process does it become necessary to the definition\r\nand attainment of an end as yet vague and indeterminate\r\nthat the requisite means, as in part already physically\r\ndetermined, should be further scrutinized in attention and\r\ndetermined from the economic point of view? Or, in a\r\nword: What is the \"jurisdiction\" of the economic point of\r\nview?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor ordinary judgements of sense-perception the presence\r\nin consciousness of a single unquestioned end is the adequate\r\noccasion, as our analysis (assuming its validity) has shown.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_242\" id=\"Page_242\"\u003e[Pg 242]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nFor ethical judgment we have seen that the presence of conflicting\r\nends is necessary; and we shall now hold that this\r\ncondition is necessary, though not, without a certain qualification,\r\nadequate, for the economic type as well. If an\r\nimaged end can hold its place in consciousness without a\r\nrival, and the physical means of attaining it have been found\r\nand co-ordinated, then the use or consumption of the means\r\nmust inevitably follow, without either ethical or economic\r\njudgement; for, to paraphrase the saying of Professor James,\r\nnothing but an end can displace or inhibit effort toward\r\nanother end. The economic situation differs, then, from the\r\nethical in this, that the end or system of ends entering into\r\ncompetition with the one for the time being of chief and primary\r\ninterest has been brought to consciousness through reference\r\nto those \"physical\" means which already have been\r\ndetermined as necessary to this latter end. The conflict of ends\r\nin the economic situation, that is to say, is not due to a direct\r\nand intrinsic incompatibility between them. Where there\r\nmanifestly is such incompatibility, judgment will be of the\r\nethical type\u0026mdash;as when building the house involves the foreclosure\r\nof a mortgage, and so, in working an injury to the\r\nholder of the site, may do violence to one\u0027s ideal of friendship\r\nor of more special obligation; or when an impulse to\r\nintemperate self-indulgence is met by one\u0027s ideal of social\r\nusefulness. In cases such as these one clearly sees, or can\r\non reflection come to see, in what way an evil result to personal\r\ncharacter will follow upon the imminent misdeed, and\r\nin what way suppression of the momentary impulse will conserve\r\nthe entire approved and established way of life. Very\r\noften, however, the conflicting ends are related in no such\r\nmutually exclusive way. Each may be in itself permissible\r\nand compatible with the other, and, so far as any possible\r\nethical discrimination can determine, there is no ground for\r\nchoice between them. Thus it is only through the fact that\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_243\" id=\"Page_243\"\u003e[Pg 243]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nboth ends are dependent upon a limited supply of means\r\nthat one would, for example, ever bring together and deliberately\r\noppose in judgment the purpose of making additions\r\nto his library and the necessity of providing a store of fuel\r\nfor the winter. Both ends in such a case are in themselves\r\nindeed permissible in a general way, but they may very well\r\nnot both of them be economically possible, and hence, for\r\nthe person in question and in the presence of the economic\r\nconditions which confront him, not, in the last analysis, both\r\nethically possible. When there is a conflict between two\r\nends that stand in close organic relation in the sense\r\nexplained above, the problem is an ethical one; when the conflict\r\nis, in the sense explained, one of competition between\r\nends ethically permissible\u0026mdash;not at variance, either one, that\r\nis, with other ends \u003ci\u003edirectly\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;for the whole or for a share\r\nof one\u0027s supply of means, the problem is of the economic\r\ntype.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_111_111\" id=\"FNanchor_111_111\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_111_111\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[111]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are three typical cases in which economic judgment\r\nor valuation of the means is necessary, and the enumeration\r\nof these will make clear the relation between the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_244\" id=\"Page_244\"\u003e[Pg 244]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nethical and the economic types of judgment: (1) First may\r\nbe mentioned the case in which ethical deliberation has\r\napparently reached its end in the formation of a plan of action\r\nwhich, so far as one can see, on ethical grounds is unobjectionable.\r\nA definite \"temptation\" may have been overcome,\r\nor out of a more complex situation a satisfactory ethical compromise\r\nor readjustment may have been developed with much\r\ndifficulty. Now, there are very often cases in which such a\r\ncourse of action still may not be entered on without further\r\nhesitation; for, if the plan be one requiring for its working\r\nout the use of material means, the fact of an existing limitation\r\nof one\u0027s supply of means must bring hitherto unthought of\r\nends into conflict with it. There are doubtless many situations\r\nin which one\u0027s moral choice may be carried into practice\r\nwithout consideration of ways and means, as when one\r\nforgives an injury or holds his instinctive nature under discipline\r\nin the effort to attain an ascetic or a genuinely social\r\nideal of character. But more often than the moral rigorist\r\ncares to see, questions of an economic nature must be raised\r\nafter the ethical \"evidence is all in\"\u0026mdash;questions which are\r\nprobably more trying to a sensitive moral nature than those\r\nmore dramatic situations in which the real perils of self-sophistication\r\nare vastly less, and the simpler, sharper defini\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_245\" id=\"Page_245\"\u003e[Pg 245]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etion\r\nof the issue makes possible a less difficult, though a more\r\ndecisive and edifying, victory. (2) In the second place are\r\nthose cases in which the end that has emerged is without\r\nconspicuous moral quality, because, although it may represent\r\nsome worthy impulse, it has not been obliged to make its\r\nway to acceptance against the resistance of desires less\r\nworthy than itself. This is the ideal case of economic theory\r\nin which \"moral distinctions are irrelevant,\" and the economic\r\nman is free, according to the myth, to perform his\r\nhedonistic calculations without thought of moral scruple. The\r\nend ethically acceptable in itself, like the enriching of one\u0027s\r\nlibrary, must, when the means are limited, divert a portion of\r\nthe means from other uses, and will thus, \u003ci\u003ethrough reference\r\nto the indispensable means\u003c/i\u003e, engage in conflict with other ends\r\nquite remotely, if in the agent\u0027s knowledge at all, related\r\nwith itself. (3) Finally we reach the limit of apparent freedom\r\nfrom ethical considerations in the operations of business\r\ninstitutions, and perhaps especially in those of large business\r\ncorporations. Apart from the routine operations of a business\r\nwhich involve no present exercise of the valuing judgment,\r\nthere are constantly in such institutions new projects which\r\nmust be considered, and which commonly must involve\r\nrevaluation of the means. In this revaluation the principle\r\nof greatest revenue is supposed to be the sole criterion,\r\nregardless of other personal or social points of view from\r\nwhich confessedly the measure might be considered. But\r\nsuch a supposition, however true to the facts of current\r\nbusiness practice it may be, we must hold to be an abstraction\r\nwhen viewed from the standpoint of the social life at\r\nlarge, and hence no real exception to our general principle.\r\nThe economic and the ethical situations differ, as types, only\r\nin the closeness of relation between the ends that are in conflict\r\nand in the manner in which the ends are first brought\r\ninto conflict\u0026mdash;not in respect of the intrinsic nature of the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_246\" id=\"Page_246\"\u003e[Pg 246]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nends which are involved in them.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_112_112\" id=\"FNanchor_112_112\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_112_112\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[112]\u003c/a\u003e It is this difference which,\r\nas we shall see, explains why ethical valuation must be of\r\nends, and economic valuation, on the other hand, of means.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have yet to see \u003ci\u003ein what way\u003c/i\u003e valuation of the means\r\nof action can serve to resolve a difficulty of the type which\r\nhas thus been designated as Economic. The question must be\r\ndeferred until a more detailed analysis of the economic judgment-process\r\ncan be undertaken. It is enough for our present\r\npurpose to note that the subject of valuation in this\r\nprocess \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e the means, and to see that under the typical conditions\r\nwhich have been described some further determination\r\nof the means than the merely physical one of their\r\nfactual availability for the competing ends is needed.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_113_113\" id=\"FNanchor_113_113\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_113_113\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[113]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nPhysically and mechanically the means are available for each\r\none of the ends or groups of ends in question; the pressing\r\nproblem is to determine for which one of the ends, if any,\r\nor to what compromise or readjustment of certain of the\r\nends or all of them, the means at hand are in an economic\r\nsense most properly available.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_114_114\" id=\"FNanchor_114_114\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_114_114\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[114]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_247\" id=\"Page_247\"\u003e[Pg 247]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom this preliminary discussion of the ethical and economic\r\nsituations we must now pass to discuss the objectivity\r\nof the judgments by which the agent meets the difficulties\r\nwhich such situations as these present. We shall seek to\r\nshow that these judgments are constructive of an objective\r\norder of reality. It will be necessary in the first place to\r\ndetermine the psychological conditions of the more commonly\r\nrecognized experience of Objectivity in the restricted sphere\r\nof sense-perception. There might otherwise remain a certain\r\nantecedent presumption against the thesis which we wish to\r\nestablish even after the direct argument had been presented.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_115_115\" id=\"FNanchor_115_115\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_115_115\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[115]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eIII\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCommon-sense and natural science certainly tend to identify\r\nthe objectively real with the existent in space and time.\r\nThe physical universe is held to be palpably real in a way\r\nin which nothing not presented in sensuous terms can be.\r\nTo most minds doubtless it is difficult to understand why\r\nPlato should have ascribed to the Ideas a higher degree of\r\nreality than that possessed by the particular objects of sense-perception,\r\nand still more difficult to understand his ascription\r\nof real existence to such Ideas as those of Beauty,\r\nJustice, and the Good. There is a certain apparent stability\r\nin a universe presented in \"immediate\" sense-perception\u0026mdash;a\r\nuniverse with which we are in constant bodily intercourse\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_248\" id=\"Page_248\"\u003e[Pg 248]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u0026mdash;that\r\nseems not to belong to a mere order of relations\r\nwhich, if known in any sense, is not known to us through\r\nthe senses. Moreover, knowledge of the physical world is\r\nfelt to possess a higher degree of certainty than does any\r\nknowledge we can have of supposed economic or moral truth,\r\nor of economic or moral standards. Of such knowledge one\r\nis disposed to say, as Mr. Spencer does of metaphysics, that\r\nat the best it presupposes a long and elaborate inferential\r\nprocess which, as long, is likely to be faulty; whereas physical\r\ntruth is immediate or else, when inference is involved in\r\nit, easy to be tested by appeal to immediate facts. Physical\r\nreality is a reality that can be seen and handled and felt\r\nas offering resistance, and this is evidence of objectivity of a\r\nsort not to be found in other spheres of knowledge for which\r\nthe like claim is made.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe force of these impressions (and it would not be difficult\r\nto find stronger statements in the history of scientific\r\nand ethical nominalism) diminishes if one tries to determine\r\nin what consists that objectivity which they uncritically\r\nassume as given in sense-perception. For one must recognize\r\nthat not all our possible modes of sense-experience are\r\nequally concerned in the presentation of this perceived\r\nobjective world. Certain sensory \"quales\" are immediately\r\nreferred to outward objects as belonging to them. Certain\r\nothers are, in a way, \"inward,\" either not more definitely localized\r\nat all or merely localized in the sense-organ which\r\nmediates them. Now, the reason for this difference cannot\r\nlie in the content of the various sense-qualities abstractly\r\ntaken. A visual sensation, apart from the setting in which\r\nit occurs in common experience, can be no more objective in\r\nits reference\u0026mdash;indeed, can have no more reference of any\r\nkind\u0026mdash;than the least definite and instructive organic sensation.\r\nFor the degree of distinctness with which one discriminates\r\nsense-qualities depends upon the number and\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_249\" id=\"Page_249\"\u003e[Pg 249]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nimportance of the interpretative associations which it is\r\nimportant from time to time to \"connect\" with them; or, conversely,\r\nthe sense-qualities are not \u003ci\u003eself\u003c/i\u003e-discriminating in\r\nvirtue of an intrinsic objective reference or meaning which\r\neach possesses and which drives it apart from all the rest.\r\nIndeed, an intrinsic meaning, if a sensation could possess\r\none, would not only be superfluous in the development of\r\nknowledge, but, as likely to be mistaken for the acquired or\r\nfunctional meaning, even seriously confusing.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_116_116\" id=\"FNanchor_116_116\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_116_116\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[116]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, it must be granted that, if the \"simple idea of sensation\"\r\nis without objective reference, no association with\r\nit of similarly abstract sensations can supply the lack. A\r\n\"movement\" sensation, or a tactual, having in itself no such\r\nmeaning, cannot merely by being \"associated\" with a similarly\r\nmeaningless visual sensation endow this latter with\r\nreference to an object. Objective reference is, in fact, not a\r\nsensuous thing; it is not a conscious \"element,\" nor does it\r\narise from any combination or fusion of such. It is neither\r\n\u003ci\u003ein\u003c/i\u003e the association of ideas as a constituent member, nor does\r\nit belong to the association considered as a sequence of\r\npsychical states. Instead, in our present view, it belongs to or\r\narises out of the activity through which and with reference\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_250\" id=\"Page_250\"\u003e[Pg 250]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto which associations are first of all established. It is an\r\naspect or kind of reference or category under which any\r\nsense-quality or datum is apperceived when it is held apart\r\nfrom the stream of consciousness in order that it may receive\r\nnew meaning as a stimulus; and a sensation functioning in\r\nsuch a \"state of consciousness\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_117_117\" id=\"FNanchor_117_117\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_117_117\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[117]\u003c/a\u003e is a psychical phenomenon\r\nvery different from the conscious element of \"analytical\"\r\npsychology. The extent to which it is true that the objective\r\nworld of sense-perception is pre-eminently visual and\r\ntactual is then merely an evidence of the extent to which\r\nthe exigencies of the life-process have required finer sense-discrimination\r\nfor the sake of more refined reaction within\r\nthese spheres as compared with others. Our conclusion,\r\nthen, must be that the consciousness of objectivity is not\r\nas such sensuous, even as given in our perception of the\r\nmaterial world. The world, as viewed from the standpoint\r\nof a particular, practical emergency, is an objective world,\r\nnot in virtue of its having a \"sensuous\" or a \"material\"\r\naspect as something existent \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e, but because it is a\r\nworld of stimuli in course of definition for the guidance of\r\nactivity.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_118_118\" id=\"FNanchor_118_118\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_118_118\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[118]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt will be well to give further positive exposition of the\r\nmeaning of the view thus stated. To return once more to\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_251\" id=\"Page_251\"\u003e[Pg 251]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nour fundamental psychological conception, knowledge is\r\nessentially relevant to the solution of particular problems of\r\nmore or less urgency and of various kinds and figures in the\r\nsolution of such problems as the assemblage of consciously\r\nrecognized symbols or stimuli by which various actions are\r\nsuggested. The object as known is therefore not the same\r\nas the object as apprehended in other possible modes of being\r\nconscious of it. The workman who is actually using his\r\ntool in shaping his material, or the warrior who is actually\r\nusing his weapon in the thick of combat, is, if conscious of\r\nthese objects at all (and doubtless he may be conscious of\r\nthem at such times), not conscious of them \u003ci\u003eas objects\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;as\r\nthe one might be, for example, in adjusting the tool for a\r\nparticular kind of use, and the other in giving a keen edge\r\nto his blade. Under these latter circumstances the tool or\r\nweapon is an \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e, and its observed condition, viewed in\r\nthe light of a purpose of using the object in a certain way,\r\nis regarded as properly suggesting certain changes or\r\nimprovements. And likewise will the tool or the weapon\r\nhave an objective character in the agent\u0027s apprehension in\r\nthe moment of identifying and selecting it from among a\r\nnumber of others, or even in the act of reaching for it, especially\r\nif it is inconveniently placed. But in the act of freely\r\nusing one\u0027s objective means the category of the objective\r\nplays no part in consciousness, because at such times there\r\nis no judgment respecting the means\u0026mdash;because there is no\r\nsufficient occasion for the isolation of certain conscious elements\r\nfrom the rest of the stream of conscious experience\r\nto be defined as stimuli to certain needed responses. Such\r\nisolation will not normally take place so long as the reactions\r\nsuggested by the conscious contents involved in the\r\nexperience are fully adequate to the situation. Objects are\r\nnot normally held apart as such from the stream of consciousness\r\nin which they are presented and recognized as possess\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_252\" id=\"Page_252\"\u003e[Pg 252]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eing\r\nqualities warranting certain modes of conduct, excepting\r\nas it has become necessary to the attainment of the\r\nagent\u0027s purposes to modify or reconstruct his activity.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_119_119\" id=\"FNanchor_119_119\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_119_119\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[119]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAre things, then, apprehended as objective in virtue of\r\nthe agent\u0027s attitude toward them, or is the agent\u0027s attitude\r\nin a typical case grounded upon an antecedent determination\r\nof the objectivity of the things in question? We must\r\nanswer, in the first place, that there can be no such antecedent\r\ndetermination. We may, it is true, speak of believing,\r\non the evidence of sight or touch, that a certain object is\r\nreally present before us. But neither sight nor touch possesses\r\nin itself, as a particular sense-quality, any objective\r\nmeaning. If touch is \u003ci\u003epar excellence\u003c/i\u003e the sense of the objective\r\nand the appeal to touch the test of objectivity, this can\r\nonly be because touch is the sense most closely and intimately\r\nconnected in our experience with action. After any interval\r\nof hesitation and judgment, action begins with contact with\r\nand manipulation of the physical means which have been\r\nunder investigation. Not only is touch the proximate stimulus\r\nand guide to manipulation, but all relevant knowledge\r\nwhich has been gained in any judgment-process, through the\r\nother senses, and especially through sight, must ultimately\r\nbe reducible to terms of touch or other contact sense. The\r\nalleged tactual evidence of objectivity is, then, rather a confirmation\r\nthan a difficulty for our present view. In short,\r\nwe must dismiss as impossible the hypothesis that there can\r\nbe a consciousness of objectivity which is not dependent\r\nupon and an expression of primary antecedent tendencies\r\ntoward motor response to the presented stimulus. It is our\r\nattitude toward the prospective stimulus that mediates the\r\nconsciousness of an object standing over against us.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo far, indeed, is it from being true that objectivity is a\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_253\" id=\"Page_253\"\u003e[Pg 253]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmatter for special determination antecedently to action that\r\nby common testimony the conviction of objectivity comes to\r\nus quite irresistibly. The object forces itself upon us, as we\r\nsay, and \"whether we will or no\" we must recognize its\r\npresence there before us and its independence of any choice\r\nof ours or of our knowledge. In the cautious manipulation\r\nof an instrument, in the laborious shaping of some refractory\r\nmaterial, in the performance of any delicate or difficult\r\ntask, one\u0027s sense of the objectivity of the thing with which\r\none works is as obtrusive as remorse or grief, and as little to\r\nbe shaken off. We shall revert to this suggested analogy at\r\na later stage in our discussion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe are now in a position to define more precisely the\r\nnature of the conditions in which the sense of objectivity\r\nemerges, and this will bring us to the point at which the\r\nobjective import of our economic and ethical judgments can\r\nprofitably be discussed. We have said that the world of\r\nthe physical is objective, not in virtue of the sensuous terms\r\nin which it is presented, but because it is a world of stimuli\r\nfor the guidance of human conduct. Under what circumstances,\r\nthen, are we conscious of stimuli in their capacity\r\nof guides or incentives or grounds of conduct? And the\r\nanswer must be that stimuli are interpreted as such, and so\r\ntake on the character of objectivity, when their precise character\r\nas stimuli is still in doubt, and they must therefore\r\nreceive further definition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor example, a man pursued by a wild beast must find\r\nsome means of escape or defense, and, seeing a tree which\r\nhe may climb or a stone which he may hurl, will inspect\r\nthese as well as may be with reference to their fitness for the\r\nintended purpose. It is at just such moments as these,\r\nthen, that physical things become things for knowledge and\r\ntake on their stubbornly objective character\u0026mdash;that is to say,\r\nwhen they are essentially problematic. Now, in order that\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_254\" id=\"Page_254\"\u003e[Pg 254]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nany physical thing may be thus problematic and so possess\r\nobjective character for knowledge, it must (1) be in part\r\nunderstood, and so prompt certain more or less indiscriminate\r\nresponses; and (2) be in part as yet not understood\u0026mdash;in\r\nsuch wise that, while there are certain indefinite or\r\nunmeasured tendencies on the agent\u0027s part to respond to the\r\nobject\u0026mdash;climb the tree or hurl the stone\u0026mdash;there is also a\r\ncertain failure of complete unity in the co-ordination of\r\nthese activities, a certain contradiction between different\r\nsuggestions of conduct which different observed qualities of\r\nthe tree or stone may give, and so hesitation and arrest of\r\nfinal action. The pursued man views the tree suspiciously\r\nbefore trusting himself to its doubtful strength, or weighs\r\nwell the stone and tests its rough edges before pausing to\r\nthrow it. Thus, to state the matter negatively, there are\r\ntwo possible situations in which the sense of objectivity, if\r\nit emerge into consciousness at all, cannot long continue.\r\nAn object\u0026mdash;-as, for example, some strange shrub or flower\u0026mdash;which,\r\nin the case we are supposing, may attract the pursued\r\nwayfarer\u0027s notice, may awaken no responses relevant\r\nto the emergency in which the agent finds himself; and it\r\nwill therefore forthwith lapse from consciousness. Or, on\r\nthe other hand, the object, as the tree or stone, may rightly\r\nor wrongly seem to the agent so completely satisfactory, or,\r\nrather, in effect may \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e so, as instantly to prompt the action\r\nwhich otherwise would come, if at all, only after a period of\r\nmore or less prolonged attention. In neither of these cases,\r\nthen, is there a problematic object. In the one the thing in\r\nquestion is wholly apart from any present interest, and\r\ntherefore lapses. In the other case the thing seen is comprehended\r\non the instant with reference to its general use\r\nand merges immediately into the main stream of the agent\u0027s\r\nconsciousness without having been an object of express\r\nattention. In neither case, therefore, is there hesitation\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_255\" id=\"Page_255\"\u003e[Pg 255]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith reference to the thing in question\u0026mdash;any conflict\r\nbetween inconsiderate positive responses prompted by certain\r\nfeatures of the object and inhibitions due to recognition\r\nof its shortcomings. In a word, in neither case is there any\r\njudgment or possibility of judgment, and hence no sense of\r\nobjectivity. We can have consciousness of an object, in the\r\nstrict sense of the term, only when some part or general\r\naspect of the total situation confronting an agent excites or\r\nseems to warrant responses which must be held in check for\r\nfurther determination. In terms of consciousness, an object\r\nis always an object of attention\u0026mdash;that is, an object which is\r\nunder process of development and reconstruction with reference\r\nto an end.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAn inhibited impulse to react in a more or less definite\r\nway to a stimulus is, then, the adequate condition of the\r\nemergence in consciousness of the sense of objectivity. So\r\nlong as an activity is proceeding without check or interruption,\r\nand no conflict develops between motor responses\r\nprompted by different parts or aspects of the situation, the\r\nagent\u0027s consciousness will not present the distinction of\r\nObjective and Subjective. The mode of being conscious\r\nwhich accompanies free and harmonious activity of this sort\r\nmay be exemplified by such experiences as \u0026aelig;sthetic appreciation,\r\nsensuous enjoyment, acquiescent absorption in pleasurable\r\nemotion, or even intellectual processes of the mechanical\r\nsort, such as easy computation or the solution of simple algebraic\r\nproblems\u0026mdash;processes in which no more serious difficulty\r\nis encountered than suffices to stimulate a moderate\r\ndegree of interest. If, however, reverting to the illustration,\r\nour present need for a stone calls for some property which\r\nthe stone we have seized appears to lack, consciousness must\r\npass over into the reflective or attentive phase. The stone\r\nwill now figure as an \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e possessing certain qualities which\r\nrender it in a general way relevant to the emergency before\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_256\" id=\"Page_256\"\u003e[Pg 256]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nus. A needed quality is missing, and this defect must hold\r\nin check all the imminent responses until discovery of the\r\nmissing quality can set them free. In a word, the stone as\r\nknown to us has assumed the station of subject in a judgment-process,\r\nand our effort is, if possible, to assign to it a new\r\npredicate relevant to our present situation. Psychologically\r\nspeaking, the stone is an object, a stimulus to which we are\r\nendeavoring to find warrant for responding in some new or\r\nreconstructed way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this process we must assume, then, first of all, an\r\ninterest on the agent\u0027s part in the situation as a whole,\r\nwhich in the first place, in terms of the illustration, makes\r\nthe pursued one note the tree or stone\u0026mdash;which might\r\notherwise have escaped his notice as completely as any\r\npassing cloud or falling leaf\u0026mdash;and suggests what particular\r\nqualities or adaptabilities should be looked for in it.\r\nGiven this interest in \"making something\" out of the total\r\nsituation as explaining the recognition of the stone and\r\nthe impulse to seize and hurl it, we find the sense of the\r\nstone\u0027s objectivity emerging just in the arrest of the undiscriminating\r\nimpulse. The stone must have a certain meaning\r\nas a stimulus first of all, but it must be a meaning not\r\nyet quite defined and certain of acceptance. The stone will\r\nbe an \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e only if, and so long as, the undiscriminating\r\nimpulses suggested by these elements of meaning are held\r\nin check in order that they may be ordered, supplemented,\r\nor made more definite. It is, then, the essence of the present\r\ncontention that physical things are \u003ci\u003eobjective\u003c/i\u003e in our\r\nexperience in virtue of their recognized inadequacy as\r\nmeans or incentives of action\u0026mdash;an inadequacy which, in\r\nturn, is felt as such in so far as we are seeking to use them\r\nas means or grounds of conduct, or to avail ourselves of\r\nthem as conditions, in coping with the general situation\r\nfrom which our attention has abstracted them.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_257\" id=\"Page_257\"\u003e[Pg 257]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom this analysis of the conditions of the consciousness\r\nof objectivity we must now proceed to inquire whether in the\r\ntypical ethical and economic situations, as they have been\r\ndescribed, essentially these same conditions are present.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the ethical situation, according to our statement, the\r\nsubject of the judgment (the object of attention) is the new\r\nend which has just been presented in imagination, and we\r\nhave now to see that the agent\u0027s attitude toward this end is\r\nfor our present purpose essentially the same as toward a\r\nphysical object which is under scrutiny. For just as the\r\nphysical object is such for consciousness because it is partly\r\nrelevant (whether in the way of furthering or of hindering)\r\nto the agent\u0027s purpose, but as yet partly not understood\r\nfrom this point of view, so the imaged end may likewise be\r\nambiguous. The agent\u0027s moral purpose may be the (very\r\nlikely mythical) primitive one of which we read in \"associational\"\r\ndiscussions of the moral consciousness\u0026mdash;that of avoiding\r\npunishment. It may be that of \"imitative,\" sympathetic\r\nobedience to authority\u0026mdash;a sentiment whose fundamental\r\nimportance for ethical psychology has long remained without\r\ndue recognition.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_120_120\" id=\"FNanchor_120_120\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_120_120\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[120]\u003c/a\u003e It may be loyalty to an ideal of\r\nconscience, or yet again a purpose of enlargement and\r\ndevelopment of personality. But on either supposition the\r\ncompatibility of the end with the prevailing standard or\r\nprinciple of decision may be a matter of doubt and so call for\r\njudgment. The problem will, of course, be a problem in the\r\nfull logical sense as involving judgment of the type described\r\nin our discussion of the ethical situation only when the attitudes\r\nof obedience to authority and to fixed ideals have been\r\noutgrown; but, on the other hand, as might be shown, it is\r\njust the inevitable increasing use of judgment with reference\r\nto these formulations of the moral life which gradually\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_258\" id=\"Page_258\"\u003e[Pg 258]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nundermines them and, by a kind of \"internal dialectic\" of\r\nthe moral consciousness, brings the agent to recognition as\r\nwell as to more perfect practice of a logical or deliberative\r\nmethod.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe end, then, is, in the typical ethical situation, an\r\n\u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e which one must determine by analysis and reconstruction\r\nas a means or condition of moral \"integrity\" and progress.\r\nIt is, accordingly, in the second place, an object\r\nupon whose determination a definite activity of the agent is\r\nregarded by him as depending. Just as in the physical\r\njudgment-process the object is set off over against the self\r\nand regarded as a given thing which, when once completely\r\ndefined, will prompt certain movements of the body, so here\r\nthe contemplated act is an object which, when fully defined\r\nin all its relevant psychological and sociological bearings,\r\nwill prompt a definite act of rejection or acceptance by the\r\nself. Now, it might be shown, as we believe, that the complete\r\npsychological and sociological definition of the course\r\nof conduct \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e in truth the full explanation of the choice;\r\nthere is no \u003ci\u003eseparate\u003c/i\u003e reaction of the moral self to which the\r\ncourse of conduct is, as defined, an external stimulus. So\r\nalso in the sphere of physical judgment complete definition\r\npasses over into action\u0026mdash;or the appreciative mode of consciousness\r\nwhich accompanies action\u0026mdash;without breach of\r\ncontinuity. But within the judgment-process in all its forms\r\nthere is in the agent\u0027s apprehension this characteristic feature\r\nof apparent separation between the subject as an objective\r\nthing presently to be known and used or responded to,\r\nand the predicate as a response yet to be perfected in details,\r\nbut at the right time, when one has proper warrant, to be set\r\nfree. It is not our purpose here to speak of metaphysical\r\ninterpretations or misinterpretations of this functional distinction;\r\nbut only to argue from the presence of the distinction\r\nin the ethical type of judgment as in the physical as\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_259\" id=\"Page_259\"\u003e[Pg 259]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ngenuine an objectivity for the ethical type as can be ascribed\r\nto the other. The ethical judgment is objective in the sense\r\nthat in it an object\u0026mdash;an imaged mode of conduct taken as\r\nsuch\u0026mdash;is presented for development to a degree of adequacy\r\nat which one can accept it or reject it as a mode of conduct.\r\nThe ethical predicates Right and Wrong, Good and Bad,\r\neach pair representing a particular standpoint, as we shall\r\nlater see, signify this accepting or rejecting movement of\r\nthe self, this \"act of will,\" of which, as an act in due time\r\nto be performed, the agent is more or less acutely conscious\r\nin the course of moral judgment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the economic situation also, as above described, there\r\nis present the requisite condition of the consciousness of\r\nobjectivity. Here, as in the ethical situation, an object is\r\npresented which one must redetermine, and toward which\r\none must presently act in a way likewise to be determined in\r\ndetail in judgment. We shall defer until a later stage discussion\r\nof the reason why this subject of the economic judgment\r\nis the \u003ci\u003emeans\u003c/i\u003e in the activity that is in progress. We\r\nare not yet ready to show that the means \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e be the center\r\nof attention under the conditions which have been specified.\r\nHere we need only note the fact of common experience that\r\neconomic judgment does center upon the means, and show\r\nthat in this fact is given the objective status of the means in\r\nthe judgment-process; for the economic problem is essentially\r\nthat of withdrawing a portion, a \"marginal increment,\" of\r\nthe means from some use or set of uses to which they are at\r\npresent set apart, and applying it to the new end that has\r\ncome to seem, on ethical grounds at least, desirable; and we\r\nmay regard this diversion as the essentially economic act\r\nwhich, in the agent\u0027s apprehension during judgment, is contingent\r\nupon the determination of the means. The object\r\nas economic is accordingly the means, or a marginal portion\r\nof the means, which is to be thus diverted (or, so to speak,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_260\" id=\"Page_260\"\u003e[Pg 260]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nexposed to the likelihood of such diversion), and its determination\r\nmust be of such a nature as to show the economic\r\nurgency, or at least the permissibility, of this diversion.\r\nInto this determination, manifestly, the results of much\r\nauxiliary inquiry into physical properties of the means must\r\nenter\u0026mdash;such properties, for example, as have to do with its\r\ntechnological fitness for its present use as compared with possible\r\nsubstitutes, and its adaptability for the new use proposed.\r\nTaking the word in the broad sense of \u003ci\u003eobject of\r\nthought\u003c/i\u003e, it is always an object in space and time to which\r\nthe economic judgment assigns an economic value; and it is\r\ntrue here (just the same is true, \u003ci\u003emutatis mutandis\u003c/i\u003e, of the\r\npsychological and sociological determinations necessary to\r\nthe fixation of ethical value) that the \u003ci\u003eeconomically motivated\u003c/i\u003e\r\nphysical determination of the objective means from the\r\nstandpoint of the emergency in hand is the full \"causal\"\r\nexplanation of the economic act. It must, however, be carefully\r\nobserved that this physical determination is in the\r\ntypical case altogether incidental, from the agent\u0027s standpoint,\r\nto the assignment of an economic character or value\r\nto the means\u0026mdash;a value which will at the close of the judgment\r\ncome to conscious recognition. As we shall see, the\r\nprocess is directed throughout by reference to economic principles\r\nand standards, and what shall be an adequate determination\r\nin the case depends upon the precision with which\r\nthese are formulated and the strenuousness with which they\r\nare applied. In a word, the economic judgment assigns to\r\nthe physical object, as known at the outset, a new non-physical\r\ncharacter. Throughout the judgment-process this\r\ncharacter is gaining in distinctness, and at the end it is\r\naccepted as the Value of the means, as warrant for the\r\ndiversion of them to the new use which has been decided on.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_121_121\" id=\"FNanchor_121_121\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_121_121\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[121]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_261\" id=\"Page_261\"\u003e[Pg 261]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have now to consider whether in the actual ethical\r\nand economic experience of men there is any direct evidence\r\nconfirming the conclusions which our logical analysis of the\r\nrespective situations would appear to require. Can any\r\nphases of the total experience of working out a satisfactory\r\ncourse of conduct in these typical emergencies be appealed\r\nto as actually showing at least some tacit recognition that\r\nthese types of judgment present each one an order of reality\r\nor an aspect of the one reality?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the first place, then, one must recognize that in the\r\nagent\u0027s own apprehension a judgment of value has something\r\nmore than a purely subjective meaning. It is never\r\noffered, by one who has taken the trouble to work it out\r\nmore or less laboriously and then to express it in terms\r\nwhich are certainly objective, as a mere announcement of \u003ci\u003ede\r\nfacto\u003c/i\u003e determination or a registration of arbitrary whim and\r\ncaprice. One no more means to announce a groundless\r\nchoice or a choice based upon pleasure felt in contemplation\r\nof the imaged end than in his judgments concerning the\r\nphysical universe he means to affirm coexistences and\r\nsequences, agreements and disagreements, of \"ideas\" as\r\npsychical happenings. That there is an ethical or economic\r\ntruth to which one can appeal in doubtful cases is, indeed,\r\nthe tacit assumption in all criticism of another\u0027s deliberate\r\nconduct; the contrary assumption, that criticism is merely\r\nthe opposition of one\u0027s own private prejudice or desire to the\r\nequally private prejudice or desire of another, would render\r\nall criticism and mutual discussion of ethical problems meaningless\r\nand futile in the plain man\u0027s apprehension as in the\r\nphilosopher\u0027s. For the plain man has a spontaneous confidence\r\nin his knowledge of the material world which makes\r\nhim look askance at any alleged analysis of his sense-perceptions\r\nand scientific judgments into \"associations of\r\nideas,\" and the same confidence, or something very like it,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_262\" id=\"Page_262\"\u003e[Pg 262]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nattaches to judgments of these other types. It may perhaps\r\nbe easier (though the concession is a very doubtful one) to\r\ndestroy a na\u0026iuml;ve confidence in the objectivity of moral truth\r\nthan a like confidence in scientific knowledge, but it must\r\nbe remembered that the plain man\u0027s sense of the urgency, at\r\nleast of ethical problems, if not of economic, is commonly less\r\nacute than for the physical. In the plain man\u0027s experience\r\nserious moral problems are infrequent\u0026mdash;problems of the\r\ntrue type, that is, which cannot be disposed of as mere cases of\r\ntemptation; one must have attained a considerable capacity\r\nfor sympathy and a considerable knowledge of social relations\r\nbefore either the recognition of such problems or\r\nproper understanding of their significance is possible. Moral\r\nand economic crises are not vividly presented in sensuous\r\nimagery excepting in minds of developed intelligence,\r\nexperience, and imaginative power; and the judgments\r\nreached in coping with them do not, as a rule, obviously call\r\nfor nicely measured, calculated, and adjusted bodily movements.\r\nThe immediate act of executing an important\r\neconomic judgment may be a very commonplace performance,\r\nlike the dictation of a letter, and an ethical decision\r\nmay, however great its importance for future overt conduct,\r\nbe expressed by no immediate visible movements of the\r\nbody. But this possible difference of impressiveness between\r\nphysical and other types of judgments is from our present\r\nstandpoint unessential; and indeed, after all, it cannot be\r\ndenied that there are persons whose sense of moral obligation\r\nis quite as distinct and influential, and even sensuously\r\nvivid, as their conviction of the real existence of an external\r\nworld. To the average man it certainly is clear that, as Dr.\r\nMartineau declares, \"it is an inversion of moral truth to say … that\r\nhonour is higher than appetite \u003ci\u003ebecause\u003c/i\u003e we feel\r\nit so; we feel it so because it \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e so. This \u0027\u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 we know to\r\nbe not contingent on our apprehension, not to arise from our\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_263\" id=\"Page_263\"\u003e[Pg 263]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nconstitution of faculty, but to be a reality irrespective of us\r\nin adaptation to which our nature is constituted, and for the\r\nrecognition of which the faculty is given.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_122_122\" id=\"FNanchor_122_122\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_122_122\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[122]\u003c/a\u003e And the\r\nimpressiveness, to most minds, of likening the sublimity of\r\nthe moral law to the visible splendor of the starry heavens\r\nwould seem to suggest that the apprehension of moral truth\r\nis a mode of consciousness, in form at least, so far akin to\r\nsense-perception as to be capable of illustration and even\r\nreinforcement from that type of experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAt this point we must revert to a suggestion which presented\r\nitself above in another connection, but which at the\r\ntime could not be further developed. This was, in a word, that\r\nthere is often a feeling of \u003ci\u003eobtrusiveness\u003c/i\u003e in our appreciation\r\nof the objectivity of the things before us in ordinary sense-perception\r\n(or physical judgment) which is not unlike the\r\nfelt insistence of remorse and grief.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_123_123\" id=\"FNanchor_123_123\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_123_123\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[123]\u003c/a\u003e This feeling is so conspicuous\r\na feature of the state of consciousness in physical\r\njudgment as frequently to serve the plain man as his last\r\nand irrefragable evidence of the metaphysical independence\r\nof the material world, and it is indeed a feature whose explanation\r\ndoes throw much light upon the meaning of the consciousness\r\nof objectivity as a factor within experience. Now,\r\nthere is another common feeling\u0026mdash;or, as we do not scruple\r\nto call it, another emotion\u0026mdash;which is perhaps quite as often\r\nappealed to in this way; though, as we believe, never in\r\nquite the same connection in any argument in which the\r\ntwo experiences are called upon to do service to the same\r\nend. Material objects, we are told, are \u003ci\u003ereliable\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003estable\u003c/i\u003e\r\nas distinguished from the fleeting illusive images of a\r\ndream\u0026mdash;they have a \"solidity\" in virtue of which one\r\ncan \"depend upon them,\" are \"hard and fast\" remaining\r\nfaithfully where one deposits them for future use or, if they\r\nchange and disappear, doing so in accordance with fixed\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_264\" id=\"Page_264\"\u003e[Pg 264]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlaws which make the changes calculable in advance. The\r\nmaterial realm is the realm of \"solid fact\" in which one can\r\nwork with assurance that causes will infallibly produce their\r\nright and proper effects, and to which one willingly returns\r\nfrom the dream-world in which his adversary, the \"idealist,\"\r\nwould hold him spellbound. We propose now briefly to\r\nconsider these two modes of apprehension of external physical\r\nreality in the light of the general analysis of judgment\r\ngiven above\u0026mdash;from which it will appear that they are, psychologically,\r\nemotional expressions of what have been set\r\nforth as the essential features of the judgment-situation,\r\nwhether in its physical, ethical, or economic forms. From\r\nthis we shall argue that there should actually be in the ethical\r\nand economic spheres similar, or essentially identical,\r\n\"emotions of reality,\" and we shall then proceed to verify\r\nthe hypothesis by pointing to those ethical and economic\r\nexperiences which answer the description.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have seen that the center of attention or subject in\r\nthe judgment-process is as such problematic\u0026mdash;in the sense\r\nthat there are certain of its observed and recognized attributes\r\nwhich make it in some sense relevant and useful to the\r\npurpose in hand, while yet other of its attributes (or absences\r\nof certain attributes) suggest conflicting activities. The\r\nobject which one sees is certainly a stone and of convenient\r\nsize for hurling at the pursuing animal. The situation has\r\nbeen analyzed and found to demand a missile, and this\r\ndemand has led to search for and recognition of a stone.\r\nThe stone, however, may be of a color suggesting a soft and\r\ncrumbling texture, or its form may appear from a distance\r\nto be such as to make it practically certain to miss the mark,\r\nhowever carefully it may be aimed and thrown. Until these\r\npoints of difficulty have been ascertained, the stone is wanting\r\nstill in certain essential determinations. So far as it has\r\nbeen certainly determined, it prompts to the response directly\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_265\" id=\"Page_265\"\u003e[Pg 265]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsuggested by one\u0027s general end of defense and escape, but\r\nthere are these other indications which hold this response in\r\ncheck and which, if verified, will cause the stone to be let lie\r\nunused. Now, we have, in this situation of conflict or tension\r\nbetween opposed incitements given by the various discriminated\r\ncharacters of the object, the explanation of the\r\naspect of obtrusiveness, of arbitrary resistance to and independence\r\nof one\u0027s will, which for the time being seems the\r\nunmistakable mark or coefficient of the thing\u0027s objectivity.\r\nFor it is not the object as a whole that is obtrusive; indeed,\r\nclearly, there could be no obtrusiveness on the part of an\r\n\"object as a whole,\" and in such a case there could also be\r\nno judgment. The obtrusion in the case before us is not a\r\nsense of the energy of a recalcitrant metaphysical object put\r\nforth upon a coerced and helpless human will, but simply\r\na conscious interpretation of the inhibition of certain of the\r\nagent\u0027s motor tendencies by certain others prompted by the\r\nobject\u0027s \"suspicious\" and as yet undetermined appearances\r\nor possible attributes. The object as amenable to use\u0026mdash;those\r\nof its qualities which taken by themselves are unquestionable\r\nand clearly conducive to the agent\u0027s purpose\u0026mdash;needs\r\nno attention for the moment, let us say. The\r\nattention is rather upon the dubious and to all appearance\r\nunfavorable qualities, and these for the time being make up\r\nthe sum and content of the agent\u0027s knowledge of the object.\r\nOn the other hand, the agent as an active self is identified\r\nwith the end and with those modes of response to the\r\nobject which promise to contribute directly to its realization.\r\nIt is in this direction that his interest is set and he\r\nstrains with all his powers of mind to move, and it is upon\r\nthe self as identified with, and for the time being expressed\r\nin, the \"effort of the agent\u0027s will\" that the object as resistant,\r\nrefusing to be misconstrued, obtrudes. One \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e see\r\nthe object and \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e acknowledge its apparent, or in the end\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_266\" id=\"Page_266\"\u003e[Pg 266]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nits ascertained, unfitness. One is \"coerced.\" The situation\r\nis one of conflict, and it is out of the conflict that the essentially\r\nemotional experience of \"resistance\" emerges.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_124_124\" id=\"FNanchor_124_124\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_124_124\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[124]\u003c/a\u003e The\r\nmore special emotions of impatience, anger, or discouragement\r\nmay in a given case not be present or may be suppressed,\r\nbut the emotion of objectivity will still remain.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_125_125\" id=\"FNanchor_125_125\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_125_125\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[125]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the same general principles the other of our two\r\ncoefficients of reality may be explained. Let us assume that\r\nthe stone in our illustration has at last been cleared of all\r\nambiguity in its suggestion, having been taken as a missile,\r\nand that the man in flight now holds it ready awaiting the\r\nmost favorable moment for hurling it at his pursuer. It\r\nwill hardly be maintained that under these conditions the\r\ncoefficient of the stone\u0027s reality as an object consists in its\r\nobtrusiveness, in its resistance to or coercion of the self.\r\nThe stone is now regarded as a fixed and determinate feature\r\nof the situation\u0026mdash;a condition which can be counted on,\r\nwhatever else may fail. Over against other still uncertain\r\naspects of the situation (which are now in \u003ci\u003etheir\u003c/i\u003e turn real\r\nbecause resistant, coercive, and obtrusive) stands the stone\r\nas a reassuring fact upon and about which the agent can\r\nbuild up the whole plan of conduct which may, if all goes\r\nwell, bring him safely out of his predicament. The stone\r\nhas, so to speak, passed over to the \"end\" side of the situation,\r\nand although it may have to be rejected for some other\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_267\" id=\"Page_267\"\u003e[Pg 267]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmeans of defense, as the definition of the situation proceeds\r\nand the plan of action accordingly changes (as in some degree\r\nit probably must), nevertheless for the time being the imaged\r\nactivities as stimulus to which the stone is now accepted are\r\na fixed part of the plan and guide in further judgment of\r\nthe means still undefined. The agent can hardly recur to\r\nthe stone, when, after attending for a time to the bewildering\r\nperplexities of the situation, he pauses once more to take\r\nan inventory of his certain resources, without something of\r\nan emotional thrill of assurance and encouragement. In\r\nthis emotional appreciation of the \"solidity\" and \"dependability\"\r\nof the object the second of our coefficients of reality\r\nconsists. This might be termed the Recognition, the other\r\nthe Perception, coefficient. Classifying them as emotions,\r\nbecause both are phenomena of tension in activity, we should\r\ngroup the Perception coefficient with emotions of the Contraction\r\ntype, like grief and anger, and the Recognition\r\ncoefficient with the Expansion emotions, like joy and triumph.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, in the foregoing interpretation no reference has\r\nbeen made to any conditions peculiar to the physical type of\r\njudgment-situation. The ground of explanation has been\r\nthe feature of arrest of activity for the sake of reconstruction,\r\nand this, if our analyses have been correct, is the essence of\r\nthe ethical and economic situations as well as of the physical.\r\nCan there then be found in these two spheres experiences\r\nof the same nature and emerging under the same\r\ngeneral conditions as our Perception and Recognition coefficients\r\nof reality? If so, then our case for the objective\r\nsignificance and value of ethical and economic judgment is\r\nin so far strengthened. (1) In the first place, then, the\r\nobject in its economic character is problematic, assuming\r\na desire on the agent\u0027s part to apply it, as means, to some\r\nnew or freshly interesting end, because it has already been,\r\nand accordingly now is, set apart for other uses and cannot\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_268\" id=\"Page_268\"\u003e[Pg 268]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthoughtlessly be withdrawn from them. Extended illustration\r\nis not needed to remind one that these established and\r\nhitherto unquestioned uses will haunt the economic conscience\r\nas obtrusively and inhibit the desired course of economic\r\nconduct with as much energy of resistance as in the\r\nother case will any of the contrary promptings of a physical\r\nobject. Moreover, the Recognition coefficient may as easily\r\nbe identified in this connection. If one\u0027s scruples gain the\r\nday, in such a case one has at least a sense of comforting\r\nassurance in the conservatism of his choice and its accordance\r\nwith the facts, however unreconciled in another way\r\none may be to the deprivation that has thus seemed to be\r\nnecessary. If, however, the new end in a measure makes\r\ngood its case and the modes of expenditure which the \"scruples\"\r\nrepresented have been readjusted in accordance with it,\r\nthen the means, no less than before the new interpretation had\r\nbeen placed upon them, will enjoy the status of Reality in\r\nthe economic sense. They will be real now, however, not in\r\nthe obtrusive way, as presenting aspects which inhibit the\r\nleading tendency in the judgment-process, but, instead, as\r\nmeans having a fixed and certain character in one\u0027s economic\r\nlife, which, after the hesitation and doubt just now superseded,\r\none may safely count upon and will do well to keep\r\nin view henceforth. (2) In the second place, mere mention\r\nof the corresponding ethical experiences must suffice, since\r\nonly extended illustration from literature and life would be\r\nfully adequate: on the one hand, the \"still small voice\" of\r\nConscience or the authoritativeness of Duty, \"stern daughter\r\nof the voice of God;\" and, on the other, the restful\r\nassurance with which, from the vantage-ground of a satisfying\r\ndecision, one may look back in wonder at the possibility\r\nof so serious a temptation or in rejoicing over the new-won\r\nfreedom from a burdensome and repressive prejudice.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis must for the present serve as positive exposition of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_269\" id=\"Page_269\"\u003e[Pg 269]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nour view as to the objective significance of the valuational\r\ntypes of judgment. There are certain essential points which\r\nhave as yet not been touched upon, and there are certain\r\nobjections to the general view the consideration of which\r\nwill serve further to explain it; but the discussion of these\r\nvarious matters will more conveniently follow the special\r\nanalysis of the valuational judgments, to which we shall now\r\nproceed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eIV\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the last analysis the ultimate motive of all reflective\r\nthought is the progressive determination of the ends of\r\nconduct. Physical judgment, or, in psychological terms,\r\nreflective attention to objects in the physical world, is at\r\nevery turn directed and controlled by reference to a gradually\r\ndeveloping purpose, so that the process may also be\r\ndescribed as one of bringing to fulness of definition an at\r\nfirst vaguely conceived purpose through ascertainment and\r\ndetermination of the means at hand. The problematic situation\r\nin which reflection takes its rise inevitably develops in\r\nthis two-sided way into consciousness of a definite end\r\non the one side, and of the means or conditions of attaining\r\nit on the other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt has been shown that there \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e be involved in any\r\nfinally satisfactory determination of a situation an explicit\r\nreflection upon and definition of the controlling end which\r\nis present and gives point and direction to the physical\r\ndetermination. But very often such is not the case. When\r\na child sees a bright object at a distance and makes toward\r\nit, availing himself more or less skilfully of such assistance\r\nas intervening articles of furniture may afford, there is of\r\ncourse no consciousness on his part of any definite purpose\r\nas such, and this is to say that the child does not subject his\r\nconduct to criticism from the standpoint of the value or its\r\nends. There is simply strong desire for the distant red ball,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_270\" id=\"Page_270\"\u003e[Pg 270]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncontrolling all the child\u0027s movements for the time being and\r\nprompting a more or less critical inspection of the intervening\r\nterritory with reference to the easiest way of crossing\r\nit. The purpose is implicitly accepted, not explicitly determined,\r\nas a preliminary to physical determination of the\r\nsituation. If one may speak of a development of the purpose\r\nin such a case as this, one must say that the development\r\ninto details comes through judgment of the environing\r\nconditions. To change the illustration in order not to\r\ncommit ourselves to the ascription of too developed a\r\nfaculty of judgment to the child, this is true likewise of\r\nany process of reflective attention in the mind of an adult in\r\nwhich a general purpose is accepted at the outset and is carried\r\nthrough to execution without reflection upon its ethical\r\nor economic character as a purpose. The specific purpose\r\nas executed is certainly not the same as the general purpose\r\nwith which the reflective process took its rise. It is filled\r\nout with details, or may perhaps even be quite different in\r\nits general outlines. There has necessarily been development\r\nand perhaps even transformation, but our contention is\r\nthat all this has been effected in and through a process of\r\njudgment in which the conditions of action, and not the\r\npurpose itself, have been the immediate objects of determination.\r\nUpon these the attention has been centered, though\r\nof course the attention was directed to them by the purpose.\r\nTo state the case in logical terms, it has been only through\r\nselection and determination of the means and conditions of\r\naction from the standpoint of predicates suggested by the\r\ngeneral purpose accepted at the outset that this purpose\r\nitself had been rendered definite and practical and possible\r\nof execution. Probably such cases are seldom to be found in\r\nthe adult experience. As a rule, the course of physical or\r\ntechnological judgment will almost always bring to light\r\nimplications involved in the accepted purpose which must\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_271\" id=\"Page_271\"\u003e[Pg 271]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninevitably raise ethical and economic questions; and the\r\nresolution of these latter will in turn afford new points of\r\nview for further physical determination of the situation. In\r\nsuch processes the logical points of the problem of ethical\r\nand economic valuation come clearly into view.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn our earlier account of the matter it was more convenient\r\nto use language which implied that ethical and\r\neconomic judgment must be preceded by implicit or explicit\r\nacceptance of a definite situation presented in sense-perception,\r\nand that these evaluating judgments could be\r\ncarried through to their goal only upon the basis of such an\r\ninventory of fixed conditions. Thus the ultimate ethical\r\nquality of the general purpose of building a house would\r\nseem to depend upon the precise form which this purpose\r\ncomes to assume after the actual presence and the quality of\r\nthe means of building have been ascertained and the economic\r\nbearings of the proposed expenditure have been\r\nconsidered. Surely it is a waste of effort to debate with\r\noneself upon the ethical rightness of a project which is physically\r\nimpossible or else out of the question from the economic\r\npoint of view. We are, however, now in a position to see\r\nthat this way of looking at the matter is both inaccurate and\r\nself-contradictory. In the actual development of our purposes\r\nthere is no such orderly and inflexible arrangement of\r\nstages; and if it is a waste of effort to deliberate upon a\r\npurpose that is physically impossible, it may, with still\r\ngreater force, be argued that we cannot find, and judge the\r\nfitness of, the necessary physical means until we know what,\r\nprecisely, it is that we wish to do. The truth is that there is\r\nconstant interplay and interaction between the various phases\r\nof the inclusive judgment-process, or rather, more than this,\r\nthat there is a complete and thoroughgoing mutual implication.\r\nIt is indeed true that our ethical purposes cannot take\r\nform in a vacuum apart from consideration of their physical\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_272\" id=\"Page_272\"\u003e[Pg 272]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand economic possibility, but it is also true that our physical\r\nand economic problems are ultimately meaningless and\r\nimpossible, whether of statement or of solution, except as\r\nthey are interpreted as arising in the course of ethical\r\nconflict.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have, then, to do, in the present division, with situations\r\nin which, whether at the outset or from time to time\r\nduring the course of the reflective process, there is explicit\r\nconflict between ends of conduct. These situations are the\r\nspecial province of the judgment of valuation. Our line of\r\nargument may be briefly indicated in advance as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. The judgment of valuation, whether expressed in terms\r\nof the individual experience or in terms of social evolution, is\r\nessentially the process of the explicit and deliberate resolution\r\nof conflict between ends. As an incidental, though\r\nnearly always indispensable, step to the final resolution of\r\nsuch conflict, physical judgment, or, in general, the judgment\r\nof fact or existence, plays its part, this part being to define\r\nthe situation in terms of the means necessary for the execution\r\nof the end that is gradually taking form. The two\r\nmodes of judgment mutually incite and control each other,\r\nand neither could continue to any useful purpose without\r\nthis incitement and control of the other. Both modes of\r\njudgment are objective in content and significance. At the\r\nend of the reflective process and immediately upon the verge\r\nof execution of the end or purpose which has taken form the\r\nresult may be stated or apprehended in either of two ways:\r\n(1) directly, in terms of the end, and (2) indirectly, in terms\r\nof the ordered system of existent means which have been discovered,\r\ndetermined, and arranged. If such final survey of\r\nthe result be taken by way of preparation for action, or for\r\nwhatever reason, the end will be apprehended as possessing\r\nethical value and the means, under conditions later to be\r\nspecified, as possessing economic value.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_273\" id=\"Page_273\"\u003e[Pg 273]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. What then is the nature and source of this apprehension\r\nof end or means as valuable? The consciousness of end\r\nor means as valuable is an emotional consciousness expressive\r\nof the agent\u0027s practical attitude as determined in the just\r\ncompleted judgment of ethical or economic valuation and\r\narising in consequence of the inhibition placed upon the\r\nactivities which constitute the attitude by the effort of\r\napprehending or imaging the valued object. Ethical and\r\neconomic value are thus strictly correlative; psychologically\r\nthey are emotional incidents of apprehending in the two\r\nrespective ways just indicated the same total result of the\r\ninclusive complex judgment-process. Finally, as the moment\r\nof action comes on, the consciousness of the ethically\r\nvalued end lapses first; then the consciousness of economic\r\nvalue is lost in a purely \"physical,\" \u003ci\u003ei. e.\u003c/i\u003e, technological, consciousness\r\nof the means and their properties and interrelations\r\nin the ordered system which has been arranged; and\r\nthis finally merges into the immediate and undifferentiated\r\nconsciousness of activity as use of the means becomes sure\r\nand unhesitating.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen we say that the ends which oppose each other in an\r\nethical situation (that is, a situation for the time being seen in\r\nan ethical aspect) are related, and the ends in an economic\r\nsituation are not, we by no means wish to imply that in the one\r\ncase we have in this fact of relatedness a satisfactory solution\r\nat hand which is wanting in the other. To feel, for example,\r\nthat there is a direct and inherent relationship between a\r\ncherished purpose of self-culture and an ideal of social service\r\nwhich seems now to require the abandonment of the purpose\r\ndoes not mean that one yet knows just \u003ci\u003ehow\u003c/i\u003e the two ends should\r\nbe related in his life henceforth; and again, to say that one\r\ncan see no inherent relation between a desire for books and\r\npictures and the need of food, excepting in so far as both ends\r\ndepend for their realization upon a limited supply of means,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_274\" id=\"Page_274\"\u003e[Pg 274]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis not to say that the issue of the conflict is not of ethical\r\nsignificance. Such a view as we here reject would amount to\r\na denial of the possibility of genuinely problematic ethical\r\nsituations\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_126_126\" id=\"FNanchor_126_126\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_126_126\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[126]\u003c/a\u003e and would accord with the opinion that economic\r\njudgment as such lies apart from the sphere of ethics and is\r\nat most subject only to occasional revision and control in the\r\nlight of ethical considerations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy the relatedness of the ends in a situation we mean the\r\nfact, more or less explicitly recognized by the agent, that the\r\nnew, and as yet undefined, purpose which has arisen belongs\r\nin the same system with the end, or group of ends, which\r\nthe standard inhibiting immediate action represents. The\r\nstandard inhibits action in obedience to the impulse that has\r\ncome to consciousness, and the image of the new end is, on\r\nits part, definite and impressive enough to inhibit action in\r\nobedience to the standard. The relatedness of the two\r\nfactors is shown in a practical way by the fact that, in the\r\nfirst instance at least, they are tacitly expected to work out\r\ntheir own adjustment. By the process already described in\r\noutline, subject and predicate begin to develop and thereby\r\nto approach each other, and a provisional or partial solution\r\nof the problem may thus be reached without resort to any\r\nother method than that of direct comparison and adjustment\r\nof the ends involved on either side. The standard which\r\nhas been called in question has enough of congruence with\r\nthe new imaged purpose to admit of at least some progress\r\ntoward a solution through this method.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe can best come to an understanding of this recognition\r\nof the relatedness of the ends in ethical valuation by\r\npausing to examine somewhat carefully into the conditions\r\ninvolved in the acceptance or reflective acknowledgment of\r\na defined end of conduct as being one\u0027s own. Any new end\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_275\" id=\"Page_275\"\u003e[Pg 275]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin coming to consciousness encounters some more or less\r\nfirmly established habit represented in consciousness by a\r\nsign or symbolic image of some sort, the habit being itself\r\nthe outcome of past judgment-process. Our present problem\r\nis the significance of the agent\u0027s recognition of a relatedness\r\nbetween his new impulsive end and the end which represents\r\nthe habit, and we shall best approach its solution by considering\r\nthe various factors and conditions involved in the agent\u0027s\r\nconscious recognition of the established end as being such.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn any determinate end there is inevitably implied a\r\nnumber of groups of factual judgments in which are presented\r\nthe objective conditions under which execution of the\r\nend or purpose must take place. There is in the first place\r\na general view of environing conditions, physical and social,\r\npresented in a group of judgments (1) descriptive of the\r\nmeans at hand, of the topography of the region in which the\r\npurpose is to be carried out, of climatic conditions, and the\r\nlike, and (2) descriptive of the habits of thought and feeling\r\nof the people with whom one is to deal, their prejudices,\r\ntheir tastes, and their institutions. The project decided on\r\nmay, let us say, be an individual or a national enterprise,\r\nwhether philanthropic or commercial, which is to be launched\r\nin a distant country peopled by partly civilized races. In\r\naddition to these groups of judgments upon the physical and\r\nsociological conditions under which the work must proceed,\r\nthere will also be a more or less adequate and impartial\r\nknowledge of one\u0027s own physical and mental fitness for the\r\nenterprise, since the work as projected may promise to tax\r\none\u0027s physical powers severely and to require, for its successful\r\nconduct, large measure of industry, devotion, patience,\r\nand wisdom. Indeed any determinate purpose whatever\r\ninevitably implies a more or less varied and comprehensive\r\ninventory of conditions. Further illustration is not necessary\r\nfor our present purpose. We may say that in a general\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_276\" id=\"Page_276\"\u003e[Pg 276]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nway the conditions relevant to a practical purpose will group\r\nthemselves naturally under four heads of classification, as\r\nphysical, sociological, physiological, and psychological. All\r\nfour classes are objective, though the last two embrace conditions\r\npeculiar to the agent as an individual over against\r\nthe environment to which for purposes of his present activity\r\nhe stands in a sense opposed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow our present interest is not so much in the enumeration\r\nand classification of possible relevant conditions in a typical\r\nsituation as in the significance of these relevant conditions\r\nin the agent\u0027s apprehension of them. Perhaps this significance\r\ncannot better be described than by saying that essentially\r\nand impressively the conditions are apprehended as,\r\ntaken together, \u003ci\u003ewarranting\u003c/i\u003e the purpose that has been determined.\r\nWe appeal, in support of this account of the\r\nmatter, to an impartial introspection of the way in which\r\nthe means and conditions of action stand related to the\r\nformed purpose in the moment of survey of a situation. The\r\nvarious details presented in the survey of a situation are\r\napprehended, not as bare facts such as one might find set\r\ndown in a scientist\u0027s notebook, but as warranting\u0026mdash;as closely,\r\nuniquely, and vitally relevant to\u0026mdash;the action that is about to\r\nbe taken. This, as we believe, is a fair account of the situation\r\nin even the commoner and simpler emergencies that\r\nconfront the ordinary man. Quite conspicuously is it true\r\nof cases in which the purpose is a purely technological one\r\nthat has been worked out with considerable difficulty and is\r\ntherefore not executed until after a somewhat careful survey\r\nof conditions has been taken. It is often true likewise in\r\ncases of express ethical judgment; if the ethical phases of\r\nthe reflective process have not been excessively long and\r\ndifficult, our definite sense of the ethical value of the act we\r\nare about to do lapses quite easily, and the factual aspects\r\nand features of the situation as given in one or more of the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_277\" id=\"Page_277\"\u003e[Pg 277]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfour classes which we have distinguished take on an access\r\nof significance in their character of warranting, confirming,\r\nor even compelling the act determined upon. Of our ordinary\r\nsense-perception in the moments of its actual functioning\r\nno less than of conscience in its aspect of a moral\r\nperceptive faculty are the words of Bishop Butler sensibly\r\ntrue that \"to preside and govern, from the very economy\r\nand constitution of man, belongs to it.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_127_127\" id=\"FNanchor_127_127\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_127_127\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[127]\u003c/a\u003e I Even in cases of\r\nmore serious moral difficulty this sanctioning aspect of the\r\nmeans and conditions of action is not overshadowed. If the\r\nsituation is one in which by reason of their complexity these\r\nplay a conspicuous r\u0026ocirc;le and must be surveyed, by way of\r\npreparation on the agents\u0027 part, for performance of the act,\r\nthey inevitably assume, for the agent, their proper functional\r\ncharacter. In general, the conditions presented in the\r\nsystem of factual judgments have a certain \"rightful authority\"\r\nwhich they seem to lend to the purpose or end with\r\nreference to which they were worked out to their present\r\ndegree of factual detail. The conditions can thus seem to\r\nsanction the end because conditions and end have been\r\nworked out together. Gradual development on the one side\r\nprompts analytical inquiry upon the other and is in turn\r\ndirected and advanced by the results of this inquiry. In\r\nthe end the result may be read off either in terms of end or in\r\nterms of conditions and means.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_128_128\" id=\"FNanchor_128_128\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_128_128\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[128]\u003c/a\u003e The two readings must be\r\nin accord and the agent\u0027s apprehension of the conditions as\r\nwarrant for the end is expression in consciousness of this\r\n\"agreement.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_129_129\" id=\"FNanchor_129_129\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_129_129\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[129]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow in this mode of apprehension of factual conditions\r\nthere is a highly important logical implication\u0026mdash;an implica\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_278\" id=\"Page_278\"\u003e[Pg 278]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etion\r\nwhich inevitably comes more and more clearly into view\r\nwith the continued exercise of judgment, even though the\r\nagent\u0027s habit of interest in the scrutiny of perplexing situations\r\nmay still remain, by reason of the want of trained\r\ncapacity for a broader view, limited in its range quite strictly\r\nto the physical sphere. This implication is, we shall declare\r\nat once, that of an endeavoring, striving, active principle or\r\nself which can be helped or hindered in its unfolding by\r\nparticular purposes and sets of corresponding conditions\u0026mdash;can\r\nlose or gain, through devotion to particular purposes, in\r\nthe breadth, fulness, and energy of its life. The agent\u0027s\r\napprehension of and reference to this active principle of\r\ncourse varies in all degrees of explicitness, according to circumstances,\r\nfrom the vague awareness that is present in a\r\nsimple case of physical judgment to the clear recognition and\r\nendeavor at definition that are characteristic of serious\r\nethical crises.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat the situation should develop and bring to light this\r\nfactor is what should be expected on general grounds of\r\nlogic\u0026mdash;for to say that a set of conditions warrants or sanctions\r\nor confirms a given purpose implies that our purposes can\r\nstand in need of warrant, and this would seem to be impossible\r\napart from reference to a process whose maintenance and\r\ndevelopment in and through our purposes are assumed as being\r\nas a matter of course desirable. It is of the essence of our contention\r\nthat the apprehension of the conditions of action as\r\n\u003ci\u003ewarranting the end\u003c/i\u003e is a primordial and necessary feature of\r\nthe situation\u0026mdash;indeed, its constitutive feature. If our concern\r\nwere with the psychological development of self-consciousness\r\nas a phase of reflective experience, we should endeavor to show\r\nthat this development is mediated in the first instance by the\r\n\"subjective\" phenomena of feeling, emotion, and desire\r\nwhich find their place \u003ci\u003ein the course\u003c/i\u003e of the judgment-process.\r\nWe should then hold that, with the \u003ci\u003econclusion\u003c/i\u003e of the judg\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_279\" id=\"Page_279\"\u003e[Pg 279]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ement-process\r\nand the accompanying sense of the known\r\nconditions as reassuring and confirmatory of the end, comes\r\nthe earliest possibility of a discriminative recognition of the\r\nself as having been all along a necessary factor in the\r\nprocess. We should hold that outside of the \u003ci\u003eprocess\u003c/i\u003e of reflective\r\nattention there can be no psychical or \"elementary\"\r\n\u003ci\u003ebeginnings\u003c/i\u003e of self-consciousness, and then that, except as\r\na development out of the experience to which we have referred\r\nas marking the \u003ci\u003econclusion\u003c/i\u003e of the attentive process,\r\nthere can be no recognized specific and in any degree definable\r\nconsciousness of self. All this, however, lies rather\r\nbeside our present purpose. We wish simply to insist that\r\nit is out of the apprehension of conditions as reassuring and\r\nconfirmatory, out of this \"primordial germ,\" that the agent\u0027s\r\ndefinite recognition of himself as a center of development\r\nand expenditure of energy takes its rise. Here are the\r\nbeginnings of the possibility of self-conscious ethical and\r\neconomic valuation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis apprehension of the means as \u003ci\u003ewarranting\u003c/i\u003e is, we have\r\nheld, a fact even when the means surveyed are wholly of the\r\nphysical sort, and we have thereby implied that consciousness\r\nof the self as \"energetic\" may take its rise in situations of\r\nthis type or during the physical stage in the development of\r\na more complex total situation. It would be an interesting\r\nspeculation to consider to what extent and in what way the\r\ndevelopment of the sciences of sociology and physiology may\r\nhave been essentially facilitated by the emergence of this\r\nform of self-consciousness. But however the case may stand\r\nwith these sciences or with the rise of real interest in them\r\nin the mind of a given individual, interest in the objective\r\npsychological conditions of a contemplated act is certainly\r\nvery closely dependent upon interest in that subjective self\r\nwhich one has learned to know through the past exercise of\r\njudgment in definition and contemplation of conditions of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_280\" id=\"Page_280\"\u003e[Pg 280]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe three other kinds. The more diversified and complex\r\nthe array of physical and social conditions with reference to\r\nwhich one is to act, the more important becomes not simply\r\na clearly articulated knowledge of these, but also a knowledge\r\nof oneself. The self that is warranted in its purpose by the\r\nsurveyed conditions must hold itself in a steady and consistent\r\nattitude during the performance on pain of \"falling short of\r\nits opportunity\" and thereby rendering nugatory the reflective\r\nprocess in which the purpose was worked out. Experience\r\nabundantly shows how easily the assurance that comes\r\nwith the survey of conditions may come to grief, though\r\nthere may have been on the side of the conditions, so far as\r\ndefined, no visible change; and in so far as self-consciousness\r\nhas already emerged as a distinguishable factor in such\r\nsituations, failures of the sort we here refer to are the more\r\neasily identified and interpreted. Some sudden impulse may\r\nhave broken in upon the execution of the chosen purpose;\r\nthere may have been an unexpected shift of interest away\r\nfrom that general phase of life which the purpose represented;\r\nor in any one of a number of other ways may have\r\ncome about a wavering and a slackening in the resolution\r\nwhich marked the commencement of action. The \"energetic\"\r\nself forthwith (if we may so express it) recognizes that the\r\nsanction which the conditions so far as then known gave to\r\nits purpose was a misleading because an incomplete one, and\r\nit proceeds to develop within itself a new range of objective\r\nfact in which may be worked out the explanation, and thereby\r\na method of control, of these new disturbing phenomena.\r\nThe qualities of patience under disappointment, courage in\r\nencountering resistance, steadiness and self-control in sustained\r\nand difficult effort\u0026mdash;these qualities and others of like\r\nnature come to be discriminated from each other by introspective\r\nanalysis and may be as accurately measured, and in\r\ngeneral as objectively studied, as any of the conditions to a\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_281\" id=\"Page_281\"\u003e[Pg 281]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsaving knowledge and respect of which one may already\r\nhave attained, and these newly determined psychological\r\nconditions will henceforth play the same part in affording\r\nsanction to one\u0027s purposes as do the rest. An ordered system\r\nof psychological categories or points of view comes to be\r\ndeveloped, and an accurate statement of conditions of personal\r\ndisposition and capacity relevant to each emergency as\r\nit arises will hereafter be worked out\u0026mdash;over against and in\r\ntension with one\u0027s gradually forming purposes in like manner\r\nas are statements of all the other relevant objective aspects\r\nof the situation.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_130_130\" id=\"FNanchor_130_130\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_130_130\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[130]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the \"energetic\" self, we shall now seek to show, we\r\nhave the common and essential principle of both ethical and\r\neconomic valuation which marks these off from other and subordinate\r\ntypes of judgment. Let us determine as definitely\r\nas possible the nature and function of this principle.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe recognition of the chosen purpose as one favorable\r\nor otherwise to the self, and so the recognition of the self as\r\ncapable of furtherance or retardation by its chosen purposes,\r\nis not always a feature of the state of mind which may ensue\r\nupon completed judgment. In the commoner situations of\r\nthe everyday life of normal persons, as practically always in\r\nthe lives of persons of relatively undeveloped reflective powers,\r\nit is quite wanting as a separate distinguished phase of the\r\nexperience. In such cases it is present, if present at all,\r\nmerely as the vaguely felt implicit meaning of the recognition\r\nthat the known conditions sanction and confirm the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_282\" id=\"Page_282\"\u003e[Pg 282]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npurpose. Such situations yield easily to attack and threaten\r\nnone of those dangers, none of those possible occasions for\r\nregret or remorse, of which complex situations make the person\r\nof developed reflective capacity and long experience so\r\nkeenly apprehensive. They are disposed of with comparatively\r\nlittle of conscious reconstruction on either the subject or\r\nthe predicate side, and when a conclusion has been reached\r\nthe agent\u0027s recognition of the conditions carries with it the\r\ncomfortable though too often delusive assurance of the complete\r\nand perfect eligibility of the purpose. If the question of\r\neligibility is raised at all, the answer is given on the tacit principle\r\nthat \"whatever purpose is, is right.\" To the \"plain\r\nman,\" and to all of us on certain sides of our lives, every purpose\r\nfor which the requisite means and factual conditions are\r\nfound to be at hand is, just as our purpose, therefore right.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe same experience of failure and disappointment which\r\nproves our purpose to have been, from the standpoint of\r\nenlargement and enrichment of the self, a mistaken one\r\nbrings a clearer consciousness of the logic implicit in our\r\nfirst confident belief in the purpose, and at the same time\r\nemphasizes the need of making this logic explicit. The purpose,\r\nas warranted to us by the conditions and assembled\r\nmeans that lay before us, was our own, and \u003ci\u003eas our own\u003c/i\u003e was\r\nimplicitly a purpose of furtherance of the self. The disappointment\r\nthat has come brings this implication more clearly\r\ninto view, and likewise the need of methodical procedure,\r\nnot as before in the determination of \u003ci\u003econditions\u003c/i\u003e, but in the\r\ndetermination of purposes as such; for the essence of the\r\nsituation is that the \u003ci\u003eexecution\u003c/i\u003e of the purpose has brought to\r\nlight some unforeseen consequence now recognized as having\r\nbeen all the while in the nature of things involved in the\r\npurpose. This consequence or group of consequences consists\r\n(in general terms) in the abatement or arrest of desirable\r\nmodes of activity which find their motivation elsewhere\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_283\" id=\"Page_283\"\u003e[Pg 283]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin the agent\u0027s system of accepted ends, and it is registered\r\nin consciousness in that sense of restriction or repression\r\nfrom without which is a notable phase of all emotional experience,\r\nparticularly in its early stages. The consequences are\r\nas undesirable as they are unexpected, and the reaction against\r\nthem, at first emotional, presently passes over into the form\r\nof a reflective interpretation of the situation to the effect that\r\nthe self has suffered a loss by reason of its thoughtless haste\r\nin identifying itself with so unsafe a purpose.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_131_131\" id=\"FNanchor_131_131\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_131_131\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[131]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is the essential logical function of the consciousness of\r\nself to stimulate the valuation processes which take their rise\r\nin the stage of reflective thought thus attained. The consciousness\r\nof self is a peculiarly baffling theme for discussion\r\nfrom whatever point of view, because one finds its meaning\r\nshifting constantly between the two extremes of a subjectivity\r\nto which \"all objects of all thought\" are external and\r\nan objective thing or system of energies which is known just\r\nas other things are\u0026mdash;known in a sense by itself, to be sure,\r\nbut \u003ci\u003eknown\u003c/i\u003e nevertheless, and thought of as an object standing\r\nin possible relations to other objects. Now, it is of the\r\nsubjective self that we are speaking when we say that its\r\nessential function is the stimulation or incitement of the\r\nvaluation processes, but manifestly in order to serve thus it\r\nmust nevertheless be presented in some sort of sensuous\r\nimagery. The subjective self may, in fact, be thought of in\r\nmany ways\u0026mdash;presented in many different sorts of imagery\u0026mdash;but\r\nin all its forms it must be distinguished carefully from\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_284\" id=\"Page_284\"\u003e[Pg 284]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ethat objective self which, as described in psychology, is the\r\nassemblage of conditions under which the subjective or\r\n\"energetic\" self works out its purposes. It may be the\r\npale, attenuated double of the body, or a personal being\r\nstanding in need of deliverance from sin, or an atom of\r\nsoul-substance, or, in our present terminology, a center of\r\ndeveloping and unfolding energy. The significant fact is\r\nthat, however different in content and in motive these various\r\npresentations of the subjective self may be, they are, one and\r\nall, as presentations and as in so far objective, stimuli to\r\nsome definite response. The savage warrior deposits his\r\ndouble in a tree or stone for safety while he goes into battle;\r\nthe self that is to be saved from sin is a self that prompts\r\ncertain acceptable acts in satisfaction of the quasi-legal obligations\r\nthat the fact of sin has laid upon the agent. The\r\npresented self, whatever the form it may assume as presentation,\r\nhas its function, and this function is in general that\r\nof stimulus to the conservation and increase, in some sense,\r\nof the self that is not presented, but for whom the presentation\r\nis. Now our own present description of the self as\r\n\"energetic,\" as a center or source of developing and unfolding\r\nenergy is in its way a presentation. It consists of\r\nsensuous imagery and suggests a mechanical process, or the\r\ngrowth of a plant perhaps, which if properly safeguarded\r\nwill go on satisfactorily\u0026mdash;a process which one must not\r\nallow to be perturbed or hindered by external resistance or\r\ninternal friction or to run down. To many persons doubtless\r\nsuch an account would seem arbitrary and fantastic in\r\nthe extreme, but no great importance need be attached to\r\nits details. The kind and number and sensuous vividness\r\nof the details in which this essential content of presentation\r\nmay be clothed must of course depend, for each person, upon\r\nhis psychical idiosyncrasy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIndeed, as the habit of reflection upon purposes comes\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_285\" id=\"Page_285\"\u003e[Pg 285]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto be more firmly fixed, and the procedure of valuation to be\r\nconsciously methodical and orderly, the sensuous content of\r\nthe presented self must grow constantly more and more\r\nattenuated until it has declined into a mere unexpressed\r\nprinciple or maxim or tacit presumption, prescribing the free\r\nand impartial application of the method of valuation to\r\nparticular practical emergencies as these arise. For a self,\r\nconsisting of presented content of whatever sort, which one\r\nseeks to further through attentive deliberation upon concrete\r\npurposes, must, just in so far as it has \u003ci\u003econtent\u003c/i\u003e, determine\r\nthe outcome of ethical judgment in definite ways.\r\nThus the soul that must be saved from sin (if this be the\r\ncontent of the presented self) is one that has transgressed\r\nthe law in certain ways and the right relations that should\r\nsubsist between creature and Creator, and has thereby\r\nincurred a more or less technically definable guilt. This\r\nguilt can only be removed and the self rehabilitated in its\r\nnormal relations to the law by an appropriate response to the\r\nsituation\u0026mdash;by a choice on the agent\u0027s part, first, of a certain\r\ntechnical procedure of repentance, and then of a settled\r\npurpose of living as the law prescribes.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_132_132\" id=\"FNanchor_132_132\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_132_132\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[132]\u003c/a\u003e So also our own\r\nimage of the self as \"energetic\" after the manner of a\r\ngrowing organism may well seem, if taken too seriously as\r\nto its presentational details, to foster a bias in favor of over-conservative\r\nadherence to the established and the accredited\r\nas such.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_133_133\" id=\"FNanchor_133_133\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_133_133\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[133]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe argument of the last few paragraphs may be restated\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_286\" id=\"Page_286\"\u003e[Pg 286]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin the following way in terms of the evolution of the individual\u0027s\r\nmoral attitude or technique of self-control:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. In the stage of moral evolution in which custom and\r\nauthority are the controlling principles of conduct, moral\r\njudgment in the proper sense of self-conscious, critical, and\r\nreconstructive valuation of purposes is wanting. Such judgment\r\nas finds here a place is at best of the merely casuistical\r\ntype, looking to a determination of particular cases as falling\r\nwithin the scope of fixed and definite concepts. There is no\r\nself-consciousness except such as may be mediated by the\r\nsentiment of willing obedience. It is, at this stage, not the\r\n\u003ci\u003eparticular sort\u003c/i\u003e of conduct which the law prescribes that in\r\nthe agent\u0027s apprehension enlarges and develops the self; so\r\nfar as any thought of enlargement and development of the\r\nself plays a part in influencing conduct, these effects are such\r\nas, in the agent\u0027s trusting faith, will come from an entire and\r\nwilling acceptance of the law as such. \"If any man will do\r\nHis will, he shall know of the doctrine.\" Moreover, the stage\r\nof custom and authority goes along with, in social evolution,\r\neither very simple social conditions or else conditions which,\r\nthough very complex, are stable, so that in either case the\r\nconditions of conduct are in general in harmony with the\r\nconduct which custom and authority prescribe. The law,\r\ntherefore, can be absolute and takes no account of possible\r\ninability to obey. The divine justice punishes infraction of\r\nthe law simply as objective infraction; not as sin, in proportion\r\nto the sinner\u0027s responsibility.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. But inevitably custom and authority come to be inadequate.\r\nAs social conditions change, custom becomes antiquated\r\nand authority blunders, wavers, contradicts itself in\r\nthe endeavor to prescribe suitable modes of individual conduct.\r\nObedience no longer is the way to light. The self\r\nbecomes self-conscious through feeling more and more the\r\nrepression and the misdirection of its energies that obedi\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_287\" id=\"Page_287\"\u003e[Pg 287]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eence\r\nnow involves. This is the stage of subjective morality\r\nor conscience; and the rise of conscience, the attitude of\r\nappeal to conscience, means the beginning of endeavor at\r\n\u003ci\u003emethodical solution\u003c/i\u003e of those new problematic situations in the\r\nattempt to deal with which authority as such has palpably\r\ncollapsed. We say, however, that conscience is the \u003ci\u003ebeginning\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof this endeavor; for conscience is, in fact, an ambiguous\r\nand essentially transitional phenomenon. On the one\r\nhand conscience is the inner nature of a man speaking\r\nwithin him, and so the self furthers its own growth in listening\r\nto this expression of itself. In this aspect conscience is\r\nmethodological. But on the other hand conscience \u003ci\u003espeaks\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand, speaking, must say something determinate, however\r\ngeneral this something may be. In this aspect conscience is\r\na \u003ci\u003er\u0026eacute;sum\u0026eacute;\u003c/i\u003e of the \u003ci\u003egeneric\u003c/i\u003e values realized under the system of\r\ncustom and authority, but to the present continued attainment\r\nof which the \u003ci\u003eparticular prescriptions\u003c/i\u003e of custom and authority\r\nare no longer adequate guides. Conscience is thus at\r\nonce an inward prompting to the application of logical\r\nmethod to the case in hand and a body of general or specific\r\nrules under some one of which the case can be subsumed.\r\nIn ethical theory we accordingly find no unanimity as to the\r\nnature of conscience. At the one extreme it is the voice of\r\nGod speaking in us or through us, in detailed and specific\r\nterms\u0026mdash;and so, virtually, custom and authority in disguise.\r\nAt the other it is an empty abstract intuition that the right\r\nis binding upon us\u0026mdash;and, so, simply the hypostasis of\r\ndemand for a logical procedure. The history of ethics\r\npresents us with all possible intermediate conceptions in\r\nwhich these extreme motives are more or less skilfully interwoven\r\nor combined in varying proportions. The truth is\r\nthat conscience is essentially a transitional conception, and\r\nso necessarily looks before and after. In one of its aspects\r\nit is a self which has come to miss (and therefore to image\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_288\" id=\"Page_288\"\u003e[Pg 288]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor itself) the values and, it may be, a certain dawning sense\r\nof vitality and growth which obedience to authority once\r\nafforded.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_134_134\" id=\"FNanchor_134_134\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_134_134\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[134]\u003c/a\u003e In its other aspect it is a self that is looking forward\r\nin a self-reliant way to the determination on its own\r\naccount of its purposes and values. And finally, as for the\r\nenvironing world of means and conditions, clearly this is not\r\nnecessarily harmonious with and amenable to conscience;\r\nindeed, in the nature of things it can be only partially so.\r\nThe morality of conscience is, therefore, either mystical, a\r\nmorality that seeks to escape the world in the very moment\r\nof its affirmation that the world is unreal (because worthless),\r\nor else it takes refuge in a virtual distinction between \"absolute\"\r\nand \"relative\" morality (to borrow a terminology from\r\na system in which properly it should have no place), perhaps\r\nsetting up as an intermediary between heaven and earth a\r\nmachinery of special dispensation.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_135_135\" id=\"FNanchor_135_135\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_135_135\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[135]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. Conscience professes in general, that is, to be autonomous,\r\nand the profession is, strictly speaking, a contradiction\r\nin terms. Moreover, apart from considerations of the logic\r\nof the situation, theories of conscience have, as a matter of\r\nfact, always lent themselves kindly to theological purposes\r\njust as the theory of self-realization in its classic modern\r\nstatement rests upon a metaphysical doctrine of the Absolute.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_136_136\" id=\"FNanchor_136_136\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_136_136\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[136]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nInevitably the movement concealed within this essentially\r\nunstable conception must have its legitimate outcome\r\n(1) in a clearing of the presented self of its fixed elements\r\nof content, thus setting it free in its character of a non-presentational\r\nprinciple of valuation, and (2) a setting apart\r\nof these elements of content from the principle of valuation\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_289\" id=\"Page_289\"\u003e[Pg 289]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas standards for reference and consultation rather than as\r\nlaw to be obeyed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have thus correlated our account of the logic whereby\r\nthe \"energetic\" self comes to explicit recognition as stimulus\r\nto the valuation-process with the three main stages in the\r\nmoral evolution of the individual and the race. We were\r\nbrought to this first-mentioned part of our discussion by our\r\nendeavor to find out the factors involved in the first acceptance\r\nof a conscious purpose (or, indifferently, the subsequent\r\nrecognition of it as a standard)\u0026mdash;an endeavor prompted by\r\nthe need of distinguishing, with a view to their special\r\nanalysis, the two types of valuation-process. We now return\r\nto this problem.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe following illustration will serve our present undertaking:\r\nA lawyer or man of business is struck by the great\r\nneed of honest men in public office, or has had his attention\r\nin some impressive way called to the fact of great inequality\r\nin the present distribution of wealth, and to the diverse evils\r\nresulting therefrom. These facts hold his attention, perhaps\r\nagainst his will, and at last suggest the thought of his making\r\nsome personal endeavor toward improvement of conditions,\r\npolitical or social, as the case may be. On the other\r\nhand, however, the man has before him the promise of a\r\nsuccessful or even brilliant career in his chosen occupation,\r\nand is already in the enjoyment of a substantial income, which\r\nis rapidly increasing. Moreover, he has a family growing\r\nup about him, and he is not simply strongly interested in the\r\nearly training and development of his children, and desirous\r\nof having himself some share in conducting it, but he sees\r\nthat the suitable higher education of his children will in a\r\nfew years make heavy demands upon his pecuniary means.\r\nHere, then, we have a situation the analysis of which will\r\nenable us to distinguish and define the provinces of ethical\r\nand economic judgment.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_290\" id=\"Page_290\"\u003e[Pg 290]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is easy to see that we have here a conflict between\r\nends. On the one side is the thought of public service in\r\nsome important office or, let us say, the thought of bettering\r\nsociety in a more fundamental way by joining the propaganda\r\nof some proposed social reform. This end rests upon\r\ncertain social impulses in the man\u0027s nature and appeals to\r\nhim as strongly, we may fairly assume, as would any purpose\r\nof immediate self-interest or self-indulgence, so that it\r\nstands before him and urges him with an insistent pertinacity\r\nthat at first even puts him on his guard against it as a\r\ntemptation. Over against this concrete end or subject of\r\nmoral valuation stand other ends comprehended or symbolized\r\nin the ideals of regular and steady industry, of material\r\nprovision for family, of paternal duty toward children, of\r\nscholarly achievement as lawyer or judge, and the like\u0026mdash;ideals\r\nwhich are indeed practical and personal, but which, as\r\nthey now function, are general or universal in character,\r\nare lacking in the concreteness and emotional quality which\r\nbelong to the new purpose which has just come to imagination\r\nand has brought these ideals into action on the predicate\r\nside. Will this life of social agitation really be quite\r\n\"respectable,\" and befitting the character of a sober and\r\nindustrious man? Will it enable me to support and educate\r\nmy family? Will it permit me to devote sufficient attention\r\nto their present care and training? And will it not so warp\r\nmy nature, so narrow and concentrate my interests, as in a\r\nmeasure to disqualify me for the right exercise of paternal\r\nauthority over them in years to come? Moreover, will not a\r\nlife of agitation, of constant intercourse with minds and\r\nnatures in many ways inferior to my own and those of my\r\npresent professional associates, lower my intellectual and\r\nmoral standards, and so make of me in the end a less useful\r\nmember of society than I am at present? These and other\r\nquestions like them present the issue in its earlier aspect.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_291\" id=\"Page_291\"\u003e[Pg 291]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nPresently, however, the tentative purpose puts in its defense,\r\nappealing to yet other recognized ideals or standards of self-sacrifice,\r\nbenevolence, or social justice as witnesses in its\r\nfavor. The conflict thus takes on the subject-predicate form,\r\nas has already been explained. On the one hand we have\r\nthe undefined but strongly insistent concrete purpose; on\r\nthe other hand we have a number of symbolic concepts or universals\r\nstanding for accepted and accredited habitual modes\r\nof conduct. The problem is that of working the two sides\r\nof the situation together into a unified and harmonious plan\r\nof conduct which shall be at once concrete and particular,\r\nas a plan chosen by way of solution of a given present\r\nemergency, and universal, as having due regard for past\r\nmodes of conduct, and as itself worthy of consideration in\r\ncoping with future emergencies.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, how shall we discriminate the ethical and the economic\r\naspects of the situation which we have described?\r\nWe shall most satisfactorily do this through a consideration\r\nof the various sorts of conditions and means of which account\r\nmust be taken in working the situation through to a solution,\r\nor (to express it more accurately) the various sorts of conditions\r\nand means which need to be defined over against the\r\npurpose as the purpose gradually develops into detailed form.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may say, first of all, that there are \u003ci\u003epsychological\u003c/i\u003e\r\nconditions which must be taken into consideration in the\r\ncase before us. Our thesis is that in so far as a situation gives\r\nrise to the determination of psychological conditions and is\r\nadvanced along the way toward final solution through determination\r\nof these, the situation is an ethical one. In other\r\nwords, we hold that the ends at issue in the situation are\r\n\"related\" in so far as they depend upon the same set of psychological\r\nconditions. In so far as these statements are not true\r\nof the situation there must be a resort to economic judgment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy the general questions suggested above as presenting\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_292\" id=\"Page_292\"\u003e[Pg 292]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthemselves to the agent we have indicated in what way the\r\ncourse of action taken must have regard to certain psychological\r\nconsiderations. Entering upon the new way of life\r\nwill inevitably lessen the agent\u0027s interest in his present\r\nprofessional pursuits and so make difficult, and in the end\r\neven irksome, any attempt at continuing in them either as a\r\npartial means of livelihood or as a recreation. The new work\r\nwill be absorbing\u0026mdash;as indeed it must be if it is to be worth\r\nwhile. In the same way the man must recognize that his\r\nnature is not one of the rare ones so richly endowed in\r\ncapacity for sympathy that constant familiarity with general\r\nconditions of misery and suffering does not dull their fineness\r\nof sensibility to the special concerns and interests of\r\nparticular individuals. If he takes his suffering fellow-men\r\nat large for his children, his own children will probably\r\nsuffer just in so far the loss of a father\u0027s special sympathy\r\nand understanding care. And likewise he must be drawn\r\naway and isolated from his friends, for it will be hard for\r\nhim, he must foresee, to hold free and intimate converse with\r\nmen whose ways of thinking lie apart from his own controlling\r\ninterest and for whose insensibility to the things\r\nthat move him so profoundly he must come more and more\r\nto feel a certain impatience if not contempt. Not to enlarge\r\nupon these possibilities and others of like nature, we must\r\nsee that reflection upon the situation must presently bring\r\nto consciousness these various consequences of the kind of\r\naction which is proposed and a recognition that the ground\r\nof relation between them and the action proposed lies in\r\ncertain qualities and limitations of his own nature. These\r\nlatter are for him the general psychological conditions of\r\naction, his \"empirical self,\" the general nature of which he\r\nhas doubtless already come to be familiar with in many\r\nformer situations perhaps wholly different in superficial\r\naspect from from the present one.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_293\" id=\"Page_293\"\u003e[Pg 293]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, just in so far as there is this relation of mutual\r\nexclusiveness between the end proposed and certain of the\r\nstandard ends or modes of conduct which are involved, judgment\r\nwill be by the direct or ethical method of adjustment\r\npresently to be described. Let us assume accordingly that\r\na tentative solution of the problem has been reached to\r\nthe effect that a portion of the lawyer\u0027s time shall be given\r\nto his profession and to his family life, and that the remainder\r\nshall be given to a moderate participation in the social\r\npropaganda. Over against this tentative ethical solution, as\r\nits warrant in the sense explained above, will stand in the\r\nsurvey of the situation that may now be taken a certain\r\nfairly definite disposition or \u003ci\u003eAnlage\u003c/i\u003e of the capacities and\r\nfunctions of the empirical self.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_137_137\" id=\"FNanchor_137_137\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_137_137\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[137]\u003c/a\u003e Now on the basis of the\r\nethical solution thus reached there will be further study of\r\nthe situation, perhaps as a result of failure in the attempt to\r\ncarry the solution into practice, but more probably as a\r\nfurther preparation for overt action. Forthwith it develops\r\nthat the compromise proposed will be impossible. Participation\r\nin the social agitation will excite hostility on the part\r\nof the classes from which possible clients would come and\r\nwill cause distrust and a suspicion of inattention to details\r\nof business among the lawyer\u0027s present clientage. There\r\nare, in a word, a whole assemblage of \"external\" sociological\r\nconditions (and we need not stop to speak of physical\r\nconditions which co-operate with these and contribute to\r\ntheir effect) which effectually veto the plan proposed. In\r\ngeneral these external conditions are such as to deprive the\r\nagent of the means of living in the manner which the ethical\r\ndetermination of the end proposes. In the present case,\r\nunless some other more feasible compromise can be devised,\r\neither the one extreme or the other must be chosen\u0026mdash;either\r\ncontinuance in the profession and the corresponding general\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_294\" id=\"Page_294\"\u003e[Pg 294]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nscheme of life or the social propaganda and reliance upon\r\nsuch scant and precarious income as it may incidentally\r\nafford.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe can now define the economic aspect of a situation in\r\nterms of our present illustration. The end which the lawyer\r\nhad in view in a vague and tentative way was, as we saw,\r\ndefined with reference to his ethical standards\u0026mdash;that is to\r\nsay, a certain measure of participation in the new work was\r\ndetermined as satisfactory at once to his ideals of devotion\r\nto the cause of social justice and to his sense of obligation to\r\nhimself and to his family. In this sense, logically speaking,\r\na subject was defined to which a system of predicates, comprehended\r\nperhaps under the general predicate of right or\r\ngood, applies. Now, however, it appears, from the inspection\r\nof the material and social environment, that the execution of\r\nthis purpose, perfectly in accord though it may be with the\r\nspiritual capacities and powers of the agent, is possible only\r\non pain of certain other consequences, certain other sacrifices,\r\nwhich have not hitherto been considered. That a\r\nhalf-hearted interest in his profession would still not prevent\r\nhis earning a moderate income from it was never questioned\r\nin the ethical \"first approximation\" to a final decision, but\r\nnow the issue is fairly presented, and, as we must see, in a\r\nvery difficult and distressing way; for the essence of the\r\nsituation is that the ends now in conflict, that of earning a\r\nliving and caring for his family and that of laboring for the\r\nsocial good, are not intrinsically (that is, from the standpoint\r\nof the empirical self) incompatible. On the contrary,\r\nthese two ends are psychologically quite compatible, as the\r\noutcome of the ethical judgment shows; only the \"external\"\r\nconditions oppose them to each other. The difficulty of the\r\ncase lies, then, just in the fact that the conflicting ends, both\r\nstanding, as they do, for strong personal interests of the self,\r\nnevertheless cannot be brought to an adjustment by the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_295\" id=\"Page_295\"\u003e[Pg 295]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndirect method of an apportionment between them of the\r\n\"spiritual resources\" or \"energies\" of the self. Instead,\r\nthe case is one calling for an apportionment of the external\r\nmeans, and so, proximately, not for immediate determination\r\nof the final end, but for economic determination of the means.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe come now to the task of describing, so far as this\r\nmay be possible, the judgment or valuation-processes which\r\ncorrespond to the types of situation thus distinguished. We\r\nare able now to see that these must be constructive processes,\r\nin the sense that in and through them courses of conduct\r\nadapted to unique situations are shaped by the concourse of\r\nestablished standards with a new end which has arisen and\r\nput in its claim for recognition. We can see, moreover, that\r\nthese valuation-processes effect a construction of a different\r\norder from that given in factual judgment. Factual judgment\r\ndetermines external objects as means or conditions\r\nof action from standpoints suggested by the analysis and\r\ndevelopment of ends. Judgments of valuation determine\r\nconcrete purposes from standpoints given in recognized\r\ngeneral purposes of the self\u0026mdash;purposes which are general in\r\nvirtue of their having been taken by abstraction from concrete\r\ncases, in which they have received particular formulation\r\nas purposes, and set apart as typical modes of conduct\r\nin general serviceable to the \"energetic\" self.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_138_138\" id=\"FNanchor_138_138\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_138_138\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[138]\u003c/a\u003e Logically\r\nfactual judgment is at all times subordinate to valuational;\r\nwhen valuational judgment has become consciously deliberate,\r\nthis logical subordination becomes explicit and factual\r\njudgment appears in its true character. Its essential function\r\nis that of presenting the conditions which sanction and\r\nstimulate our ethically and economically determined purposes.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_139_139\" id=\"FNanchor_139_139\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_139_139\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[139]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nFinally, in the construction of purposes and recon\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_296\" id=\"Page_296\"\u003e[Pg 296]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003estruction\r\nof standards in valuation the ideal of the expansion\r\nand development of the \"energetic\" self controls\u0026mdash;not as a\r\n\"presented\" or contentual self prescribing particular modes\r\nof conduct, but as a principle prescribing the greatest possible\r\nopenness to suggestion and an impartial application of the\r\nmethod of valuation to the case in hand. As we have said,\r\nin whatever sensuous image we figure the \"energetic\" self,\r\nits essential character lies in its function of stimulating\r\nmethodical valuation. In place of the two-faced and ambiguous\r\n\"presented\" self, which is characteristic of the stage\r\nof conscience, we now have in the stage of valuation the\r\n\"energetic\" self on the one hand and standards on the other.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_140_140\" id=\"FNanchor_140_140\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_140_140\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[140]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have now to consider the actual procedure of valuation,\r\nand first the ethical form as above defined. Bearing\r\nin mind that we are not concerned with cases of obedience\r\nto authority or deference to conscience, let us take a case of\r\ngenuine moral conflict such as we were considering some\r\ntime since. Suppose that one has the impulse to indulge in\r\nsome form of amusement which he has been in the habit of\r\nconsidering frivolous or absolutely wrong. The end, as soon\r\nas imaged, or rather as the condition of its being imaged,\r\nencounters past habits of conduct symbolized by standards\u0026mdash;standards\r\nwhich may be presented under a variety of forms,\r\na maxim learned in early childhood, the ideal of a Stoic\r\nsage or Christian saint, the example of some friend, or a precept\r\nput in abstract terms, but which, however presented,\r\nare essentially symbolic of established habits of thought or\r\naction.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_141_141\" id=\"FNanchor_141_141\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_141_141\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[141]\u003c/a\u003e Solution of such a problem proceeds, in general,\r\nalong two closely interwoven lines: (1) collation and comparison\r\nof cases recognized as conforming to the standard,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_297\" id=\"Page_297\"\u003e[Pg 297]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith a view to determining the standard type of conduct in\r\na less ambiguous way, and (2) definition of the relations\r\nbetween this type of conduct and other recognized types in\r\nthe catalogue of virtues.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, these two movements are in fact inseparable, for,\r\nwithout reference to the entire system of virtues of which\r\nthe one now asserting itself is a member, the comparison of\r\ncases with a view to definition of the virtue would be blind\r\nand hopeless of any outcome. The agent in the case before\r\nus desires to be temperate in amusement and to make profitable\r\nuse of leisure time, but after all he may wonder whether\r\nthese ideals really require the austerities of certain medi\u0026aelig;val\r\nsaints or the Stoic \u003ci\u003eataraxy\u003c/i\u003e. The saint\u0027s feats of spiritual\r\nathletics may have served a useful purpose, in ruder times,\r\nas evidence of human power to lead a virtuous and thoughtful\r\nlife, but can such self-denial now be required of the\r\nmoral man? It is apparent, in short, that the superficially\r\nconceived ideal must be analyzed. We must consider the\r\n\"spirit\" of our saint or hero, not the letter of his conduct,\r\nas we say, and in interpreting it make due allowance for the\r\nconditions of the time in which he lived and the grade of\r\ngeneral intelligence of those he sought to edify. Whether\r\nour standard is a person or a parable or an abstractly formulated\r\nprecept, the logic of the situation is the same in every\r\ncase of judgment. The analysis of a standard cannot proceed\r\nwithout the \"synthesis\" or co-ordination of the type of\r\nconduct thereby defined with other distinguishable recognized\r\ntypes of conduct into a comprehensive ideal of life as\r\na whole. In the last resort the implicit relations of all the\r\nvirtues will be made explicit in the process of defining accurately\r\nany one of them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the last resort, then, the predicate of the ethical judgment\r\nis the whole system of the recognized habits of the\r\nagent, and each judgment-process is in its outcome a read\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_298\" id=\"Page_298\"\u003e[Pg 298]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ejustment\r\nof the system to accommodate the new habit that\r\nhas been seeking admission. Both the old habits and the\r\nnew impulse have been modified in the process just as the\r\nintension of a class term and the particular \"subsumed\"\r\nunder the class are reciprocally modified in the ordinary judgment\r\nof sense-perception. We are once more able to see\r\nthat the process of ethical judgment or valuation is not a process\r\nof subsumption or classification, of \u003ci\u003eascertaining\u003c/i\u003e the value\r\nof particular modes of conduct, but on the contrary a process\r\nof determining or \u003ci\u003eassigning\u003c/i\u003e value. Each judgment process\r\nmeans a new and more or less thoroughgoing redetermination\r\nof the self and hence a fixation of the ethical value of\r\nthe conduct whose emergence as a purpose gave rise to the\r\nprocess. The moral experience is not essentially and in its\r\ntypical emergencies a \u003ci\u003erecognition\u003c/i\u003e of values with a view to\r\nshaping one\u0027s course accordingly, but rather a determining\r\nor a \u003ci\u003efixation\u003c/i\u003e of values which shall serve for the time being,\r\nbut be subject at all times to re-appraisal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf the present discussion were primarily intended as a\r\ncontribution to general ethical theory, it would be a part of\r\nour purpose to show in detail that any formulation of an\r\nethical ideal in contentual \"material\" terms must always be\r\ninadequate for practical purposes and hence theoretically\r\nindefensible. This, as we believe, could be shown true of the\r\npopularly current ideal of self-realization as well as of hedonism\r\nin its various forms and the older systems of conscience\r\nor the moral sense. These all are essentially fixed ideals\r\nadmitting of more or less complete specification in point\r\nof content and regarded as tests or canons by appeal to\r\nwhich the moral quality of any concrete act can be deductively\r\nascertained. They are the ethical analogues of such\r\nmetaphysical principles as the Cartesian God or the Substance\r\nof Spinoza, and the logic implied in regarding them\r\nas adequate standards for the valuation of conduct is the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_299\" id=\"Page_299\"\u003e[Pg 299]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlogic whereby the Rationalist sought to deduce from concepts\r\nthe world of particular things. The present desideratum\r\nin ethical theory would appear to be, not further attempts\r\nat definition of a moral ideal of any sort, but the development\r\nof a logical method for the valuation of ideals and ends in\r\nwhich the results of more modern researches in the theory of\r\nknowledge should be made use of\u0026mdash;in which the concept of\r\nself should play the part, not of the concept of Substance in\r\na rationalistic metaphysics,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_142_142\" id=\"FNanchor_142_142\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_142_142\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[142]\u003c/a\u003e but of such a principle as that of\r\nthe conservation of energy, for example, in scientific inference.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_143_143\" id=\"FNanchor_143_143\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_143_143\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[143]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have, then, in each readjustment of the activities of\r\nthe self a reconstruction in knowledge of ethical reality\u0026mdash;a\r\nreconstruction which at the same time involves the assignment\r\nof a definite value to the new mode of conduct which\r\nhas been worked out in the readjustment. We conclude, then,\r\nthat the ethical experience is one of continuous construction\r\nand reconstruction of an order of objective reality, within\r\nwhich the world of sense-perception is comprised as the world\r\nof more or less refractory means to the attainment of ethical\r\npurposes. In this process of construction of ethical reality\r\ncurrent moral standards play the same part as concepts\r\nalready defined\u0026mdash;that is to say, the agent\u0027s present habits\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_300\" id=\"Page_300\"\u003e[Pg 300]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u0026mdash;do\r\nin the typical judgment of sense-perception. They play\r\nthe part of symbols suggestive of recognized and heretofore\r\nhabitual modes of action with reference to conduct of the\r\ntype of the particular instance that is under consideration,\r\nserving thus to bring to bear upon the subject of the judgment\r\nsooner or later the entire moral self. The outcome is\r\na new self, and so for the future a new standard, in which\r\nthe past self as represented by the former standard and the\r\nnew impulse have been brought to mutual adjustment. Our\r\nposition is that this adjustment is essentially experimental\r\nand that in it the \u003ci\u003egeneral principle\u003c/i\u003e of the unity and expansion\r\nof the self must be presupposed, as in inductive inference\r\ngeneral principles of teleology, of the conservation of\r\nenergy, and of organic interconnection of parts in living\r\nthings are presupposed. The unity and increase of the self\r\nis not a test or canon, but a principle of moral experimentation.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_144_144\" id=\"FNanchor_144_144\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_144_144\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[144]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFinally, we must note one further parallel between ethical\r\njudgment and the judgment of sense-perception and science.\r\nHowever the man of science may, as a nominalist, regard\r\nthe laws of nature as mere observed uniformities of fact and\r\nparticulars as the true realities, these same laws will nevertheless\r\non occasion have a distinctly objective character in\r\nhis actual apprehension of them. The stubbornness with\r\nwhich a certain material may refuse to lend itself to a\r\ndesired purpose will commonly be reinforced, as a matter of\r\napprehension, by one\u0027s recognition of the \"scientific necessity\"\r\nof the phenomenon. As offering resistance the thing\r\nitself, as we have seen, becomes objective; so also does the\r\nlaw of which this case may be recognized as only a particular\r\nexample\u0026mdash;and the other type of objectivity experience\r\nwe need not here do more than mention as likewise possible\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_301\" id=\"Page_301\"\u003e[Pg 301]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin one\u0027s apprehension of the law as well as of the \"facts\"\r\nof nature. Both types of objectivity attach to the moral law\r\nas well. The standard that restrains is one \"above\" us or\r\n\"beyond\" us. Even Kant, as the similitude of the starry\r\nheavens would suggest, was not incapable of a faint \"emotion\r\nof the heteronomous,\" and authority in one form or\r\nanother is a moral force whose objective validity as moral,\r\nboth in its inhibiting and in its sanctioning aspects, human\r\nnature is prone to acknowledge. The apprehension of\r\nobjectivity is everywhere, as we have held, emotional. One\r\ntype of situation in which the moral law takes on this character\r\nis found in the interposition of the law to check a forward\r\ntendency; the other is found in the instant of transition\r\nfrom doubt to the new adjustment that has been reached.\r\nIn the one case the law is \"inexorable\" in its demands. In\r\nthe other case there are two possibilities: If the adjustment\r\nhas been essentially a rejection of the new \"temptation,\"\r\nthe law which one obeys is one no longer inexorable, but\r\nsustaining, as a rock of salvation. If the adjustment is a\r\ndistinctly new attitude, the sense of the objectivity of the\r\nprinciple embodied in it will commonly be less strong, if not\r\nfor the time being almost wholly wanting; but in the moment\r\nof overt action it will in some degree wear the character\r\nof a firm truth upon which one has taken his stand.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis general view of the logical constitution of the moral\r\nexperience may suggest a comparison with the fundamental\r\ndoctrine of the British Intellectualist school. The Intellectualist\r\nwriters were very largely guided in their expositions\r\nby the desire of refuting on the one hand Hobbes and on\r\nthe other Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Against Hobbes\r\nthey wished to establish the obligatory character of the\r\nmoral law entirely apart from sanction or enactment by\r\npolitical authority. Against the Sentimentalists they wished\r\nto vindicate its objectivity and permanence. This twofold\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_302\" id=\"Page_302\"\u003e[Pg 302]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npurpose they accomplished by holding that the morality of\r\nconduct lies in its conformity to the \"objective nature of\r\nthings,\" the knowledge of which, in its moral aspects, is\r\nlogically deducible from certain moral axioms, self-evident\r\nlike those of mathematics. Now this mathematical analogy\r\nis the key to the whole position of the Intellectualist writers.\r\nBy so conceiving the nature of knowledge these men seriously\r\nweakened their strong general position. Mathematics\r\nis just that species of knowledge which is most remote from\r\nand apparently independent of any reference to conduct, and\r\nthe Intellectualists, by choosing it as their ideal, were\r\nthereby rendered incapable of explaining the obligatoriness\r\nof the moral law. An adequate psychology of knowledge\r\nwould have obviated this difficulty in their system.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe occasion for economic judgment is given, as we have\r\nseen, in a conflict between ends not incompatible, in view of\r\nany ascertainable conditions of the agent\u0027s nature as an\r\nempirical self, but inhibitory of each other in view of what\r\nwe have described as conditions external to the agent. Thus\r\nthe lawyer in our illustration found his plan of compromise\r\nthwarted by the existence of such sociological conditions as\r\nwould make the practice of his profession, in the manner\r\nintended, impossible, and so cut off his income. Similarly\r\nthe peasant in a European country finds that (for reasons\r\nwhich, more probably, he does not understand) he can no\r\nlonger earn a living in the accustomed way, and emigrates\r\nto a country in which his capital and his physical energies\r\nmay be more profitably employed. So also in the everyday\r\nlives of all of us ends and interests quite disparate, so far as\r\nany relation to each other through our psychical capacities\r\nis concerned, stand very frequently in opposition, nevertheless,\r\nand calling for adjustment. We must make a choice\r\nbetween amusement or intellectual pursuits or the means of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_303\" id=\"Page_303\"\u003e[Pg 303]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u0026aelig;sthetic culture, on the one hand, and the common necessaries\r\nof life on the other, and the difficulty of the situation\r\nlies just in absence of any sort of \"spiritual affinity\" between\r\nthese ends. There is no necessary ratio between the\r\nsatisfaction of the common needs of life and the cultivation\r\nof the higher faculties\u0026mdash;no ratio for which the individual\r\ncan ever find a sanction in the constitution of his empirical\r\nself through the direct method of ethical valuation. The\r\ncommon needs must have their measure of recognition, but\r\nno attempted ethical valuation of them can ever come to a\r\nresult convincingly warranted to the \"energetic\" self by\r\npsychological conditions. The economic situation as such is\r\nin this sense (that is, from the standpoint of any recognized\r\nethical standards) unintelligible. It is this ethical unintelligibility\r\nthat often lends a genuine element of tragedy to\r\nsituations which press urgently and in which the ends at\r\nissue are of great ethical moment. It is no small matter to\r\nthe emigrant, for example, that he must cut the very\r\nroots by which he has grown to the sort of man he finds\r\nhimself to be. His whole nature protests against this\r\nviolence, and questions its necessity, though the necessity is\r\nunmistakable and it would be quite impossible for him not\r\nto act accordingly. Nevertheless, tragic as such a conflict\r\nmay well be, it does not differ in any logically essential way,\r\ndoes not differ in its degree of strictly logical difficulty, from\r\nthe ethically much less serious economic problems of our\r\neveryday life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, we have already defined the economic act for which\r\neconomic judgment is preparatory as being, in general terms,\r\nthe diversion of certain means from a present use to which\r\nthey have been devoted to a new use which has come to seem\r\nin a general way desirable.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_145_145\" id=\"FNanchor_145_145\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_145_145\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[145]\u003c/a\u003e Thus, in the cases just mentioned,\r\nthe lawyer contemplates the virtual purchase of his\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_304\" id=\"Page_304\"\u003e[Pg 304]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnew career by the income which his profession might in\r\nyears to come afford him, the emigrant seeks a better market\r\nfor his labor, and the pleasure-seeker and the ambitious student\r\nand the buyer of a commodity in the market propose to themselves,\r\neach one, the diversion from some hitherto intended\r\nuse of a sum of money. Manifestly it is immaterial from\r\nour logical point of view whether the means in question\r\nwhich one proposes to apply in some new way are in the\r\nnature of physical and mental strength, or materials and\r\nimplements of manufacture ready to be used, or means of\r\npurchase of some sort wherewith the desired service or commodity\r\nmay be obtained at once. The economic problem, to\r\nstate it technically, is the problem of the \u003ci\u003ereapplicability of\r\nthe means\u003c/i\u003e, interpreting the category of means quite broadly.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn a word, then, the method of procedure adapted to the\r\neconomic type of situation is that of valuation of the means,\r\nnot that of direct valuation of the ends. This method is one\r\nof valuation since, like the ethical method, it is determinative\r\nof a purpose, but it accomplishes this result in its own\r\ndistinctive way. The problem of our present analysis will\r\naccordingly be how this method of valuation of the means\r\nis able to help toward an adjustment of disparate or unrelated\r\nends which the ethical method is inadequate to effect.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us assume that a vague purpose of foreign travel, for\r\nexample, has presented itself in imagination, and that the\r\npreliminary stage of ethical judgment has been passed\r\nthrough, with the result that the purpose, in a more definite\r\nform than it could have at first, is now ready for economic\r\nconsideration. In the first place the cost of the journey\r\nmust be determined, and this step, in terms of our present\r\npoint of view, is simply a methodological device whereby\r\ncertain ends which the standards involved in the stage of\r\nethical judgment could not suggest or could not effectually\r\ntake into co-operation with themselves in their determination\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_305\" id=\"Page_305\"\u003e[Pg 305]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the end are brought into play. Ascertaining the means\r\nsuggests these disparate ends, these established modes of\r\nuse of the means, with the result that the agent\u0027s \"forward\r\ntendency\" is checked. Shall the necessary sums be spent\r\nin foreign travel or shall they be spent in the present ways\u0026mdash;in\r\nproviding various physical necessities and comforts, or\r\nfor various forms of amusement, or in increasing investments\r\nin business enterprises? These modes of use do not admit\r\nof ethical comparison with the plan of foreign travel, and\r\nthe agent\u0027s interest must therefore now be centered on the\r\nmeans.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is in this check to the agent\u0027s forward tendency that the\r\nlogical status of the means is evinced. As merely so much\r\nmoney the means could only serve to further the execution\r\nof the purpose that is forming, since under the circumstances\r\nit could only prompt immediate expenditure. Like the subject\r\nin factual judgment, the means in economic judgment have\r\ntheir problematic aspect which as effectually hinders the\r\ndesired use of them as could any palpable physical defect.\r\nThis problematic aspect consists in the fact of the present\r\nestablished mode of use which the now-forming purpose\r\nthreatens to disturb, and it is the agent\u0027s interest in this mode\r\nof use that turns his attention to the valuation of the means.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt need hardly be pointed out that in the economic life\r\nwe find situations exactly corresponding to those of \"conscience\r\nand temptation\" and mechanical \"pull and haul\"\r\nwhich were discriminated in the ethical sphere and marked\r\noff from judgment properly so called. Indeed it seems\r\nreasonable to think, on general grounds of introspection, that\r\nthese methods of decision (if they deserve the name) are,\r\nrelatively speaking, more frequently relied upon in the economic\r\nthan in the moral life. The economic method of true\r\njudgment is roundabout and more complex and more difficult\r\nthan ethical, and involves a more express recourse to those\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_306\" id=\"Page_306\"\u003e[Pg 306]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nabstract conceptions which for the most part are only implicitly\r\ninvolved in valuation of the other type. The economic\r\ntype of valuation, in fact, differs from the ethical, not in an\r\nabsolute or essential way, but rather in the explicitness with\r\nwhich it brings to light and lays bare the vital elements in\r\nvaluation as such. In general, then, the economic process\r\nwould seem necessarily to embrace three stages, which will first\r\nof all be enumerated and then very briefly explained and discussed.\r\nThese are: (1) a preliminary consideration of the\r\nmeans necessary to attain the end\u0026mdash;which must be vague and\r\ntentative, of course, for the reason that the end as imagined\r\nis so, as compared with the fulness of detail which must belong\r\nto it before it can be finally accepted; (2) a consideration\r\nof the means, as thus provisionally taken, in the light of their\r\npresent devotion to other purposes, this present devotion\r\nof them being the outcome, in some degree at least, of past\r\nvaluation; (3) final definition of the means with reference\r\nto the proposed use through an adjustment effected between\r\nthis and the factors involved in the past valuation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. In the first stage as throughout, it must be carefully\r\nnoted, the means are under consideration not primarily in\r\ntheir physical aspect, but simply as \u003ci\u003esubject to a possible\r\nredisposition\u003c/i\u003e. Thus it is not money as lawful currency\r\nreceivable at the steamship office for an ocean passage, nor\r\ntools and materials and labor-power technically suitable for\r\nthe production of a desired object, that is the subject of the\r\neconomic judgment. The problem of redisposition would of\r\ncourse not be raised were the means not technically adaptable\r\nto the purpose, nor on the other hand can the means in\r\nthe course of economic judgment, as a rule, escape some\r\nmeasure of further (factual) inquiry into their technical\r\nproperties; but the standpoints are nevertheless distinct.\r\nAgain, it must be noted that the means in this first stage\r\nwill be only roughly measured. The length of one\u0027s stay\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_307\" id=\"Page_307\"\u003e[Pg 307]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nabroad, the size of the house one wishes to build, the purpose\r\nwhatever it may be, is still undefined\u0026mdash;these are in fact the\r\nvery matters which the process must determine\u0026mdash;and in the\r\nfirst instance it is \"money in general\" or \"a large sum of\r\nmoney\" with reference to which we raise the economic\r\nproblem. The category of quantity is in fact essentially an\r\neconomic one; it is essentially a standpoint for determining\r\nthe means of action in such a way as to facilitate their economic\r\nvaluation. The reader familiar with the writings of the\r\nAustrian school of economists will easily recall how uniformly\r\nin their discussions of the principle of marginal utility these\r\nwriters assume outright in the first place the division of the\r\nstock of goods into definite units, and then raise the question\r\nof how the value of a unit is measured. The stock contains\r\nalready a hundred bushels of wheat or ten loaves of bread\u0026mdash;apparently\r\nas a matter of metaphysical necessity\u0026mdash;whereas\r\nin fact the essential economic problem is this very one of\r\nhow \"wheat at large\" comes to be put in sacks of a certain\r\nsize and \"bread in general\" to be baked in twelve-ounce\r\nloaves. The subdivision of the stock and the valuation of\r\nthe unit are not successive stages, but inseparably correlative\r\nphases of the valuation-process as a whole. The outcome\r\nmay be stated either way, in accordance with one\u0027s interest\r\nin the situation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. But the unmeasured means as redisposable in an as yet\r\nundetermined way bring to consciousness established measured\r\nuses to which the means have been heretofore assigned\r\nin definite amounts. In this way the process of determining\r\na definite quantum as redisposable (which is to say, of attaining\r\nto a definite acceptable plan of conduct) can begin.\r\nHow, then, does this fact of past assignment to uses still\r\nrecognized as desirable figure in the situation? In the first\r\nplace the past assignment may have been (1) an outcome of\r\npast economic valuation, (2) an unhesitating or non-economic\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_308\" id=\"Page_308\"\u003e[Pg 308]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nact executive of an ethical decision, or (3) an act of more or\r\nless conscious obedience to \"conscience\" or \"authority.\"\r\nIn either case it now stands as a course of conduct which at\r\nthe time was, in the way explained above, \u003ci\u003esanctioned\u003c/i\u003e to the\r\nagent, to the \"energetic\" self, by the means and conditions\r\nrecognized as bearing upon it. In this sense, then, we have,\r\nin this recognition of the past adjustment and of the economic\r\ncharacter which the means now have in virtue of it,\r\nwhat we may term a judgment of \"energy-equivalence\"\r\nbetween the means and their established uses. For to the\r\nagent it was the essential meaning of the sense of sanction\r\nfelt when the means were assigned to these uses that the\r\n\"energetic\" self would on the whole be furthered thereby\u0026mdash;and\r\nthis in view of all the sacrifices that this use would\r\nentail, or in view of the sacrifices required for the production\r\nof the means, if the case were one in which the means were\r\nnot at hand and could only be secured by a more or less\r\nextended production process.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the illustration we have been considering, it will be\r\nobserved, there is an extensive schedule of present uses\r\nwhich the new project calls in question and from which the\r\nmeans must be diverted. This is in fact the commoner case.\r\nA new use of money will affect, as a rule, not simply a single\r\npresent mode of expenditure, but will very probably involve\r\na readjustment throughout the whole schedule of expenditure\r\nwhich our separate past valuations of money have in\r\neffect co-operated in establishing. So likewise if we wish to\r\nuse part of a store of building materials or of food, or of any\r\nother subdivisible commodity, we encounter an ordered system\r\nof consumption rather than a single predetermined use\r\nwhich we have not yet enjoyed. Where this is the case the\r\nwhole process of valuation is greatly facilitated, but this is\r\nnot essential. The means in cases of true economic valuation\r\nmay be capable of but a single use, like a railroad ticket\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_309\" id=\"Page_309\"\u003e[Pg 309]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor a perishable piece of fruit, or of a virtually endless\r\nseries of uses, like a painting or a literary masterpiece.\r\nWhether the means figure as representing but a single use or\r\nstand for the conservation of an extensive system, their economic\r\nsignificance is the same. They are the \"energy-equivalent\"\r\nof this use or system of uses considered as an act or\r\nsystem of acts of consumption in furtherance of the self.\r\nTheir past assignment meant then and means now simply\r\nthis, that the \"energetic\" self would thereby gain more than\r\nit would lose through the inevitable sacrifices. This is the\r\neconomic significance of the means in virtue of which they\r\nare now problematic to the extent of checking, for a time at\r\nleast, forward tendency toward the desired end.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_146_146\" id=\"FNanchor_146_146\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_146_146\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[146]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. The judgment of energy-equivalence, then, defines the\r\ninhibiting economic aspect of the means, and moreover defines\r\nit for the means as subdivided and set apart for a schedule of\r\nuses if this was the form of the past adjustments to which\r\nreference is made. The problem of the third stage of the\r\nprocess is that of \"bringing subject and predicate together,\"\r\nas we have elsewhere expressed it\u0026mdash;that is, of determining,\r\nin the light of the economic character of the means as just\r\nascertained, what measure of satisfaction, if any, may be\r\naccorded to the new and as yet undefined desire. The new\r\ndisposition of the means, if one is to be made, must bring to\r\nthe \"energetic\" self a degree of furtherance and development\r\nwhich shall be sensibly as great as would come from the established\r\nmethod of consumption. The means, as economic,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_310\" id=\"Page_310\"\u003e[Pg 310]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nare means to the conservation of the old adjustment, and\r\nany new disposal of them or of any portion of them for a\r\nfull or partial execution of the new purpose must make out\r\nat least as good a case. It must appear that the new disposition\r\nis not only physically possible, but also economically\r\nnecessary in the light of the same principle of expansion of\r\nthe self as sanctioned the disposition now in force. It must\r\nmake the self in some way more efficient\u0026mdash;whether more\r\nstrong and symmetrical in body, more skilled in work, more\r\nclear of brain, or more efficient in whatever other concrete\r\nway may be desired.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePsychologically the sanction of any course of action\r\nwhich is taken as evidence of conformity to the general rule\r\nthus inadequately stated is the more or less strong sense of\r\n\"relaxation\" of attentive strain which comes with the shift\r\nof attention, in the final survey, from means to end. We may\r\naccordingly, for the sake of greater definiteness, restate in\r\nthe following terms the process which has just been sketched:\r\nThe ends in conflict at the outset are ends which do not\r\nsensibly bear upon each other through their dependence\r\nupon a common fund of psychical capacities or energies.\r\nThey are related in the agent\u0027s experience solely through\r\ntheir dependence upon a common stock of physical means,\r\nand they do not therefore admit of adjustment through\r\nthe ethical type of process. The economic process consists\r\nessentially of a revival in imagination of the experiences\r\naccompanying the former disposition of the means and a\r\nre-enforcement by these of the means in their adherence to\r\nthat former and still recognized disposition. If an adapted\r\nform of the new end can be imagined which will mediate a\r\nlike experience of relaxation when the attention shifts from\r\nthe means, thus emotionally re-enforced in their economic\r\nstatus, to the end as thus conceived, the means will be recognized\r\nas economically redisposable. Thus the method of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_311\" id=\"Page_311\"\u003e[Pg 311]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nvaluation of the means makes possible, through appeal to the\r\nsensibly invariable experience of relaxation or assurance in\r\nthe outcome of judgment, a co-ordination of disparate ends\r\nwhich the ethical method of direct adjustment could not\r\neffect.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_147_147\" id=\"FNanchor_147_147\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_147_147\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[147]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe economic process thus presents on analysis the same\r\nfactors as does the ethical. On the subject side we have the\r\nmeans\u0026mdash;which as economic are problematic as to their reapplicability.\r\nOn the predicate side we have the suggested\r\nmode of reapplication in tension against conservative ideals\r\nof application to established purposes. Just as it may be\r\nheld that the general ethical predicate is that of Right or\r\nGood\u0026mdash;that is, deserving of adoption into the system of\r\none\u0027s ends\u0026mdash;so the economic predicate applied to the means\r\nas these come in the end to be defined is the general concept\r\nReappliable. And in general the distinction of the\r\ntypes is not an ultimate one, for the more deliberately and\r\nrigorously the method of economic valuation is pursued\u0026mdash;in\r\nsuch a case, for example, as that of the prospective emigrant\u0026mdash;the\r\nstronger will be the agent\u0027s sense of a genuinely\r\nethical sanction as belonging to the decision which is in the\r\nend worked out. The more certain and sincere, therefore,\r\nwill be the agent\u0027s judgment that the means must be reapplied,\r\nfor on the sense of sanction of which we speak rests\r\nthe explicit judgment that the purpose formed is expansive\r\nof the self.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom the analysis thus presented it must appear, therefore,\r\nthat the economic type of judgment is in our sense a\r\nconstructive process. Its function is to determine a particular\r\ncommodity or portion of a stock of some commodity in\r\nits economic character as \u003ci\u003edisposable\u003c/i\u003e, and in performing\r\nthis function it presents a definite reality in the economic\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_312\" id=\"Page_312\"\u003e[Pg 312]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\norder. Moreover, in thus defining the particular, recourse is\r\nhad to more or less distinctively namable economic standards\r\nwhich are in the last resort symbols representing established\r\nhabits of consumption in the light of which the means,\r\n\u003ci\u003eprima facie\u003c/i\u003e, seem not to be available for any other purposes.\r\nThese economic standards, like ethical standards and the\r\nclass concepts of science and our ordinary perceptual experience,\r\nare, with all due respect to nominalism, constitutive of\r\na real world\u0026mdash;a world which is real because it lends form and\r\nsignificance to our knowledge of particulars as stimuli to\r\nconduct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have now before us sufficient reason for our thesis\r\nthat the valuation-process in both its forms is constructive\r\nof an order of reality, and we have sufficiently explained the\r\nrelation which the economic order bears to the inclusive and\r\nlogically prior order of ethical objects and relations. We are\r\nnow in a position to see that in being thus constructive of\r\nreality (taking the conception in its proper functional meaning)\r\nthey are at the same time constructive of the self, since\r\nthe reality which they construct is in its functional aspect\r\nthe assemblage of means and conditions, of stimuli, in short,\r\nfor the development and expansion of the self. We shall\r\nbring this main division of our study to a close with a series\r\nof remarks in explanation and illustration of this view.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us consider once more the factors present in the\r\nagent\u0027s final survey of the situation after the completion of\r\nthe judgment-process and on the verge of action. These\r\nfactors are, as we have seen, (1) recognition of conditions\r\nsanctioning the purpose formed, (2) recognition of the purpose\r\nas, in view of this sanction, warranted to the \"energetic\"\r\nself as an eligible method of expansion and development, and\r\n(3) recognition of the \"energetic\" self, conversely, as in\r\npossession, in virtue of the favorable conditions given in\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_313\" id=\"Page_313\"\u003e[Pg 313]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfactual judgment, of this new method of furtherance. These\r\nthree factors are manifestly not so much factors co-operating\r\nin the situation as inseparable aspects of it distinguishable\r\nfrom each other and admitting of discriminative emphasis in\r\naccordance with the degree of reflective power which the\r\nindividual may possess or choose to exercise. Strictly speaking\r\nthese three aspects are present in every conscious recognition\r\nof a purpose as one\u0027s own and as presently to be\r\ncarried into effect, but they are not always present in equal\r\nconspicuousness, and never with equal logical importance for\r\nthe individual. In fact this enumeration of aspects coincides\r\nwith our enumeration of the three stages in the evolution of\r\nthe individual\u0027s conscious moral attitude toward new purposes\r\ngiven in impulse\u0026mdash;in the third of which the last\r\nnamed of these aspects comes to the fore with the others in\r\nlogical or functional subordination to it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow it will be apparent on grounds of logic, as on the\r\nevidence of simple introspection, that in this third type of\r\nattitude\u0026mdash;in the attitude of true valuation, that is to say\u0026mdash;the\r\nenergetic self cannot be identified with the chosen purpose.\r\nThe purpose is a determinate specified act to be performed\r\nsubject to recognized conditions, and with the use of\r\nthe co-ordinated means; the self, on the other hand, is a process\r\nto which this particular purpose is, indeed, from the\r\nstandpoint of the self\u0027s conservation and increase, indispensable,\r\nbut which is nevertheless apart from the purpose in\r\nthe sense that without the purpose it would still be a self,\r\nthough perhaps a narrower and less developed one. Our\r\nstandpoint here as elsewhere, the reader must remember, is\r\nthe logical. It is the standpoint of the agent\u0027s own interpretation\r\nof his experience of judgment during the judgment-process\r\nand at its close, and not the standpoint of the psychological\r\nmediation of this experience as a series of occurrences.\r\nThus we are here far from wishing to deny the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_314\" id=\"Page_314\"\u003e[Pg 314]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ngeneral proposition that a man\u0027s purposes are an expression\r\nof his nature, as the psychologist might describe it, or the\r\nproposition that a man\u0027s conduct and his character are one\r\nand the same thing viewed from different points of view. We\r\nwish merely to insist upon the fact that these psychological\r\npropositions are not a true account of the agent\u0027s own experience\r\nof himself and of his purposes \u003ci\u003ewhile these latter are\r\nin the making or are on the verge of execution\u003c/i\u003e. There is\r\nindeed no conflict between this \"inside view\" of the judgment-process\r\nand of the final survey and the psychological\r\npropositions just mentioned. The identity of conduct and\r\ncharacter means not simply that as the man is so does he\r\nact, but quite as much, and in a more important way, that as\r\nhe acts so is he and so does he become. It is, then, the\r\nessence of the agent\u0027s own view of the situation that his\r\ncharacter is in the making and that the purpose is the\r\nmethod to be taken. To the agent the self is not, indeed,\r\nindependent of the purpose, for plainly it is recognized that\r\nupon just this purpose the self is, in the sense explained, in\r\na vital way dependent. Nevertheless the self is in the\r\nagent\u0027s apprehension essentially beyond the purpose, and\r\nlarger than the purpose, and even, we may say, metaphysically\r\napart from it. Now the conclusion which we wish to draw\r\nfrom this examination of the agent\u0027s attitude in judgment is\r\nthat no formulation of an ideal self can ever be adequate to\r\nhis purposes, not simply because any such formulation must,\r\nas Green allows, inevitably be incomplete and inconsistent,\r\nbut because the self as a process is in the agent\u0027s own apprehension\r\nof it inherently incapable of formulation. Any\r\nformulation that might be attempted must be in terms of\r\nparticular purposes (since in a modern ethical theory the self\r\nmust be a \"concrete\" and not an abstract universal), and it\r\nis easy to see that any such would be, to the agent in the\r\nattitude of true ethical judgment, worse than useless. It\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_315\" id=\"Page_315\"\u003e[Pg 315]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncould as contentual and concrete only be a composite of\r\nexisting standards, more or less coherently put together,\r\noffered to the agent as a substitute for the new standard\r\nwhich he is trying to work out. If there were not need of\r\na new standard there would be no judgment-process; the\r\nagent must be, to say the least, embarrassed, even if the\r\nunwitting imposture does not deceive him, when such a composite,\r\nuseful and indeed indispensable in its proper place as\r\na standard of reference and a source of suggestion, is urged\r\nupon him as suitable for a purpose which in the very nature\r\nof the case it is logically incapable of serving.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_148_148\" id=\"FNanchor_148_148\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_148_148\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[148]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo the agent, then, the \"energetic\" self can never be\r\nrepresented as an ideal\u0026mdash;can never be expressed in terms of\r\npurpose\u0026mdash;since it is in its very nature logically incongruous\r\nwith any possible particular purpose or generalization of\r\nsuch purposes. It is commonly imaged by the agent in\r\nsome manner of sensuous terms, but it is imaged, in so far as\r\nthe case is one of judgment in a proper sense, for use as a\r\nstimulus to the methodical process of valuation\u0026mdash;not as a\r\nstandard, which if really adequate would make valuation\r\nunnecessary. The agent\u0027s consciousness of himself as \"energetic\"\r\ncannot be an ideal; it comes to consciousness only\r\nthrough the endeavor, first to follow, and then, in a later\r\nstage of moral development, to use ideals, and has for its\r\nfunction, as a presentation, the incitement of the process of\r\nmethodical use of standards in the control of the agent\u0027s\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_316\" id=\"Page_316\"\u003e[Pg 316]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nimpulsive ends. It is not an anticipatory vision of the final\r\ngoal of life, but the agent\u0027s coming to consciousness of the\r\ngeneral impulse and movement of the life that is.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is an inevitable consequence of acceptance of a contentual\r\nview of the \"energetic\" self as one\u0027s ideal that\r\nreflective morality should tend to degenerate into an introspective\r\nconscientiousness constantly in unstable equilibrium\r\nbetween a pharisaical selfishness on the one hand and a morally\r\nscarcely more dangerous hypocrisy on the other. There\r\nis certainly much justice in the stinging characterization of\r\n\"Neo-Hegelian Egoism\" which Mr. Taylor somewhere in\r\nhis unsearchable book applies to the currently prevailing\r\nconventionalized type of idealistic ethics. If the self of the\r\nvaluation-process is an ultimate goal of effort, then there\r\nmust certainly be an irreconcilable contrast to the disadvantage\r\nof the latter between the plain man\u0027s objective desire for right\r\nconduct, as such, and for the welfare of his fellow-beings,\r\nand the moralist\u0027s anxious questionings of the rectitude of\r\nthe motives by which his conformity to the fixed moral\r\nstandard are prompted.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_149_149\" id=\"FNanchor_149_149\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_149_149\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[149]\u003c/a\u003e Into the value and significance of\r\nthe attitude of conscientious examination of one\u0027s moral motives\r\nwe are not here concerned to inquire, but need only\r\ninsist, in accordance with our present view, that its value\r\nmust be distinctly subordinate and incidental to the general\r\ncourse and outcome of the valuation-process. In the valuation-process,\r\nconsciousness of self is not an object of solicitude,\r\nbut simply, we repeat, a pure presentation of stimulus,\r\nhaving for its office the incitement, and if need be the reincitement,\r\nof the attitude of deference to the suggestions of old\r\nstandards and openness to the petitions of new impulse, and\r\nof methodically bringing these to bear upon each other.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_317\" id=\"Page_317\"\u003e[Pg 317]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe outcome of such a process, of course, cannot be predicted\u0026mdash;and\r\nfor the same reasons as make unpredictable the\r\nscientist\u0027s factual hypothesis. Just as the scientist\u0027s data are\r\nincomplete and ill-assorted and unorganized, for the reason\r\nthat they have, of necessity, been collected, and must at the\r\noutset be interpreted, in the light of present concepts, whose\r\ninadequacy the very existence of the problem at issue demonstrates,\r\nso the final moral purpose that shall be developed is\r\nnot to be deduced from any possible inventory of the situation\r\nas it stands. The process in both cases is one of reconstruction,\r\nand the test of the validity of the reconstruction\r\nmust in both cases be of the same essentially practical character.\r\nIn both cases the process is constructive of reality,\r\nin the functional signification of the term. In both, the\r\njudgment process is constructive also of the self, in the\r\nsense that upon the determination of the agent\u0027s future attitude\r\nthe cumulative outcome of his past attitudes is methodically\r\nbrought to bear.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_150_150\" id=\"FNanchor_150_150\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_150_150\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[150]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eV\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eJudgments of value are, then, objective in their import in\r\nthe same sense as are the factual judgments in which the\r\nconditions of action are presented. The ideal problematic situation\r\nis, in the last resort, ethical, in the sense of requiring\r\nfor its solution determination of the new end that has arisen\r\nwith reference to existing standards. In structure and in\r\nfunction the judgment in which the outcome of this process\r\nis presented is knowledge, and objective in the only valid\r\nacceptation of the term.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_318\" id=\"Page_318\"\u003e[Pg 318]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut, after all, it may be urged, is it not the essential\r\nmark of the objective that it should be accessible to all\r\nmen, and not in the nature of the case valid for only a single\r\nindividual? At best the objectivity of content which has\r\nbeen made out for the judgment of value is purely functional,\r\nand not such as can be verified by appeal to the consensus\r\nof other persons. The agent\u0027s \u003ci\u003eassurance\u003c/i\u003e of the reality of\r\nthe economic or ethical subject-matter which he is endeavoring\r\nto determine, and his sense of the objectivity of the\r\nresults which he reaches, need not be denied. These may\r\nwell enough be illusions of personal prejudice or passion, or\r\neven normal illusions of the reflective faculty, like that of\r\ninterpreting the secondary qualities of bodies as objective in\r\nthe same sense as are the \"bulk, figure, extension, number,\r\nand motion of their solid parts.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_151_151\" id=\"FNanchor_151_151\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_151_151\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[151]\u003c/a\u003e Any man can see the\r\nphysical object to which I point, and verify with his own eyes\r\nthe qualities which I ascribe to it, but no man can either\r\nunderstand or verify my judgment that the purpose I have\r\nformed is in accord with rational ideals of industry and self-denial,\r\nor that this portion of my winter\u0027s fuel may be given\r\nto a neighbor who has none.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut this line of objection proves too much, for, made\r\nconsistent with itself, it really amounts to a denial that the\r\nvery judgment of sense-perception, to which it appeals so\r\nconfidently as a criterion, has objective import. The first\r\ndivision of this study was intended to show that every object\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_319\" id=\"Page_319\"\u003e[Pg 319]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin the experience of each individual is for the individual a\r\nunique construction of his own, determined in form and in\r\ndetails by individual interests and purposes, and therefore\r\ndifferent from that object in the experience of any other\r\nindividual which in social intercourse passes current as\r\nthe same. The real object is for me the object which\r\nfunctions in my experience, presenting problematic aspects\r\nfor solution, and lending itself more or less serviceably\r\nto my purposes; and this object is, we hold, not the\r\nobject as socially current, but the complete object which, as\r\ncomplete in its determination with reference to my unique\r\npurposes, cannot possibly have social currency. The objection\r\nas stated cuts away the very ground on which it rests,\r\nsince the shortcoming which it finds in the judgment of\r\nethical or economic value is present in the particular judgment\r\nof sense-perception also. The object about which I\r\ncan assure myself by an immediate appeal to other persons\r\nis the object in its bare \"conceptual\" aspects\u0026mdash;the object\r\nas a dictionary might define it, the commodity as it might\r\nbe described in a trade catalogue, or the ethical act as defined\r\nby the criminal code or in the treatise of a moral philosopher.\r\nIt is an object consisting of a central core or fixed\r\ndeposit of meaning, which renders it significant in a certain\r\ngeneral way to a number of persons, or even to all men, but\r\nwhich is not yet adequately known by me from the standpoint\r\nof my present forming purpose. In virtue of these\r\nconceptual characters it is adaptable to my purpose, which is\r\nas yet general and indeterminate; but in the nature of the\r\ncase it cannot yet be known to me as applicable to my\r\nprospective concrete purpose, as this shall come to be\r\nthrough judgment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus, if the test of objectivity of import is to be that the\r\njudgment shall present an object or a fact which, as presented,\r\nis socially current among men and not shut away in\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_320\" id=\"Page_320\"\u003e[Pg 320]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe individual intelligence apart from the possibility of social\r\nverification, then the apparent nominalism of the objection\r\nwe are considering turns out to be the uttermost extreme of\r\nrealism. Such a test amounts to a virtual affirmation that\r\nthe sole objective reality is the conceptual, and that the\r\n\"accidents\" of one\u0027s particular object of sense-perception are\r\nthe arbitrary play of private preference or fancy. At this\r\npoint, however, the objection may shift its ground and take\r\nrefuge in some such position as the following: The real\r\nobject is indeed the object which the individual knows in\r\nrelation to his particular purpose, and it is indeed impossible\r\nthat the individual\u0027s judgment should be limited in its content\r\nto coincidence with the conceptual elements of meaning\r\nwhich are socially current. The building-stone which one has\r\njudged precisely fit for a special purpose, the specimen which\r\nthe mineralogist or the botanist examines under his microscope,\r\nthe tool whose peculiarity of working one has learned\r\nto make allowance for in use\u0026mdash;these all are, of course,\r\nhighly individual objects, possessing for the person in question\r\nan indefinite number of objective aspects of which no\r\nother person can possibly be conscious at the time. And,\r\nmore than this, even though the individual may, in his scrutiny\r\nof the object, have discovered no conspicuous new qualities\r\nin it which were not present in the socially current\r\nmeaning, the object will still possess an individuality making\r\nit genuinely unique merely through its co-ordination with\r\nother objects in the mechanical process of working out the\r\npurpose in hand. It is at least an object standing here at\r\njust this time, a tool cutting this particular piece of stone\r\nand striking at this instant with this particular ringing\r\nsound, and these perhaps wholly nonessential facts will\r\nnevertheless serve to individualize the object (if one chances\r\nto think of them) in the sense of making it such a one as\r\nno other person knows. All this may be granted, the objec\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_321\" id=\"Page_321\"\u003e[Pg 321]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etion\r\nmay allow, and yet the vital point remains; for this is\r\nnot what it was intended, even in the first place, to deny.\r\nThe vital point at issue is not whether the object which I\r\nknow \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e known as I know it by any other person, but\r\nwhether, in the nature of things, it is one that \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e be so\r\nknown.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHerein, then, lies the difference between judgments of\r\nfact and judgments of value. The mineralogist can train\r\nhis pupil to see precisely what he himself sees; and so likewise\r\nin any case of sense-perception, the object, however\r\nrecondite may be the qualities or features which one may see\r\nin it, \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e nevertheless be seen by any other person in precisely\r\nthe same way on the single, more often not insuperably\r\ndifficult, condition that the discoverer shall point these\r\nout or otherwise prepare the other for seeing them. But\r\nwith the ton of coal which one may judge economically disposable\r\nfor a charitable purpose the case stands differently,\r\nsince it is not in its visible or other physical aspects that the\r\nton of coal is here the subject of the judgment. It is as\r\nhaving been set apart \u003ci\u003eby oneself exclusively\u003c/i\u003e for other uses\r\nthat the ton of coal now functions as an object and now\r\npossesses the character which the economic judgment has\r\ngiven it; and the case stands similarly with a contemplated\r\nact, of telling the truth in a trying situation. The valuation\r\nplaced upon the commodity or upon the moral act depends\r\nessentially upon psychological conditions of temperament,\r\ndisposition, mood, or whim into which it would be impossible\r\nfor another person to enter, and these depend upon\r\nconditions of past training and native endowment which can\r\nnever occur or be combined in future in precisely the same\r\nway for any other individual. In short, the physical object\r\nis \u003ci\u003edescribable\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e be made socially current, though\r\ndoubtless with more or less of difficulty, if other persons\r\nwill attend to it and learn to see it as I see it; but the value\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_322\" id=\"Page_322\"\u003e[Pg 322]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof an economic object or a moral act depends upon my\r\ndesires and feelings, and therefore must remain a matter of\r\nmy private appreciation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn answering this amended form of the objection it is\r\nentirely unnecessary to discuss the issue of fact which it has\r\nraised as to whether or not complete description of a physical\r\nobject or event is a practical or theoretical possibility. It need\r\nonly be pointed out that at best such complete description can\r\nonly be successful in its purpose on condition that the individual\r\nupon whom the experiment is tried be willing to attend\r\nand have the requisite \"apperceptive background.\" The\r\naccuracy with which another person\u0027s knowledge shall copy\r\nthe knowledge which I endeavor to impart to him must manifestly\r\ndepend upon these two leading conditions, not to mention\r\nalso the measure of my own pedagogical and literary skill.\r\nAny consideration of such a purely psychological problem\r\nas is here suggested would be entirely out of place in a discussion\r\nthe purpose of which is not that of analyzing the process\r\nof judgment, but that of interpreting its meaning aspects.\r\nLet us grant the entire psychological possibility of making\r\nsocially current in the manner here suggested the most\r\nhighly individual and concrete cognition of an object one\r\nmay please, and let us grant, moreover, that this possibility\r\nhas been actually realized. This concurrent testimony of\r\nthe witness will doubtless confirm one\u0027s impression of the\r\naccuracy of the process of observation and inference whereby\r\nthe knowledge which has been imparted was first gained,\r\nbut we must deny that it can do more than this. For indeed,\r\napart from some independent self-reliant conviction of the\r\nobjective validity of the knowledge in question, how should\r\nanother\u0027s assent be taken as \u003ci\u003econfirmation\u003c/i\u003e and not rather as\r\nevidence of one\u0027s own mere skill in suggestion and of the\r\nother\u0027s susceptibility thereto? We must deny that even in\r\nthe improved form the criterion of social currency is a valid\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_323\" id=\"Page_323\"\u003e[Pg 323]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\none. In a word, the social currency of knowledge to the\r\nextent to which it can exist requires as its condition, and is\r\nevidence of, the equal social currency of certain interests,\r\npurposes, or points of view for predication; and if it be\r\npossible to make socially current an item of concrete knowledge,\r\nwith all its concrete fulness of detail, then \u003ci\u003ea fortiori\u003c/i\u003e it\r\nmust be possible to make socially current the concrete individual\r\npurpose with reference to which this item of knowledge\r\nfirst of all took form. Whether such a thing be psychologically\r\npossible at all the reader may decide; but if it be\r\npossible in the sphere of knowledge of fact, then it must be\r\npossible in the sphere of valuation. In short, judgment\r\nin either field, in definition of a certain object or commodity\r\nor moral act as, for the agent, an objective fact possessing\r\ncertain characters, involves the tacit assumption of social\r\nverifiability as a matter of course; but it does not rest upon\r\nthis assumption, nor is this assumption the essence of its\r\nmeaning. To say that my judgment is socially verifiable,\r\nthat my concrete object of perception or of valuation would\r\nbe seen as I see it by any person in precisely my place, is\r\nmerely a tautological way of formally announcing that \u003ci\u003eI\r\nhave made the judgment\u003c/i\u003e and have now a definite object\r\nwhich to me has a certain definite functional meaning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus, instead of drawing a distinction between the\r\nrealms of fact and value, as between what is or can be common\r\nto all intelligent beings and what must be unique for\r\neach individual one, we must hold that the two realms are\r\ncoextensive. The socially current object answers to a certain\r\ngeneral type of conscious purpose or interest active in\r\nthe individual and so to a general habit of valuation, and\r\nthe concrete object to a special determination of this type of\r\npurpose with reference to others in the recognized working\r\nsystem of life. The agent\u0027s final attitude, on the conclusion\r\nof the judgment-process, may be expressed in either sort of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_324\" id=\"Page_324\"\u003e[Pg 324]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\njudgment\u0026mdash;in a judgment of the value of commodity or moral\r\npurpose, or in a judgment of concrete fact setting forth the\r\n\"external\" conditions which warrant the purpose to the\r\n\"energetic\" self. Throughout the judgment-process there\r\nis a correlation between the movement whereby the socially\r\ncurrent object develops into the adapted means and that\r\nwhereby the socially current type of conduct develops into\r\nthe defined and valued purpose.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_152_152\" id=\"FNanchor_152_152\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_152_152\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[152]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAt this point, however, a second general objection presents\r\nitself. However individual the content of my knowledge\r\nof physical fact may be, and however irrelevant, from\r\nthe logical point of view, to my confidence in its objective\r\nvalidity may be the possibility of sharing it with other persons,\r\nnevertheless it refers to an object which is in some\r\nsense permanent, and therein differs from my valuations. In\r\neconomic valuation I reach a definition of a certain commodity\r\nand am confirmed in it by all the conditions that\r\nenter into my final survey of the situation. But my desire\r\nfor the new sort of consumption may fail, and so expose my\r\nvaluation to easy attack from any new desire that may arise;\r\nor my supply of the commodity in question may be suddenly\r\nincreased or diminished, and my valuation of the unit quantity\r\nthereby changed. Likewise my ethical valuation may\r\nhave to be reversed (as Mr. Taylor has insisted) by reason\r\nof a change of disposition or particular desire which makes\r\nimpossible, except in obedience to some other and inclusive\r\nvaluation, further adherence to it. And these changes take\r\nplace without any accompanying sense of their doing violence\r\nto objective fact or, on the other hand, any judgment of their\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_325\" id=\"Page_325\"\u003e[Pg 325]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbeing in the nature of corrections of previous errors in valuation,\r\nand so more closely in accordance with the truth.\r\nMoreover, a new valuation, taking the place of an old, does\r\nnot supplement its predecessor as one set of judgments\r\nabout a physical object may supplement another, made from\r\na different point of view, but does literally take its place,\r\nand this without necessarily condemning it as having been\r\nerroneous.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis general objection rests upon a number of fairly\r\nobvious misconceptions, and its strength is apparent only.\r\nIn the first place, the question of the objectivity of any type\r\nof judgment must in the end, as we have seen, reduce itself to\r\na question of the judgment\u0027s import to the agent. However\r\nthe agent\u0027s valuations may shift from time to time,\r\neach several one will be sanctioned to the agent by the\r\nchanged conditions exhibited in the inventory which the\r\nagent takes at the close of judgment which has formed it.\r\nThe conditions have changed, and the valuation of the\r\nearlier purpose has likewise changed; but the new purpose\r\nis sanctioned by the new conditions, and the test of the presumed\r\nvalidity of the new valuation can only be in the\r\nmanner already discussed\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_153_153\" id=\"FNanchor_153_153\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_153_153\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[153]\u003c/a\u003e the test of actual execution of\r\nthe purpose. In the change, as the agent interprets the\r\nsituation, there is no violation of the former purpose nor a\r\nnearer approach to truth. Each valuation is true for the\r\nsituation to which it corresponds. We are obviously not\r\nhere considering the case of error. An error in valuation\r\nis evidenced to the agent, not by the need of a new valuation\r\nanswering to changed conditions, but by the failure of\r\na given valuation to make good its promise, although to all\r\nappearance conditions have remained unchanged. If the\r\nconditions have changed, then the purpose and the conditions\r\n\u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e be redetermined, if the expansion of the \"ener\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_326\" id=\"Page_326\"\u003e[Pg 326]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003egetic\"\r\nself is to continue; but the former valuation does not\r\nthereby become untrue.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese brief remarks should suffice by way of answer, but\r\nit will serve advantageously to illustrate our general position\r\nif we pursue the objection somewhat farther. The physical\r\nobject is, nevertheless, \u003ci\u003epermanent\u003c/i\u003e, it will be said, and this\r\nsurely distinguishes it from the object (now freely acknowledged\r\nas such) of the value-judgment. To one man gold\r\nmay be soluble in \u003ci\u003eaqua regia\u003c/i\u003e and to another worth so\r\nmany pence an ounce, but different and individual as are\r\nthese judgments and the standpoints they respectively imply,\r\nthe gold is \u003ci\u003eone\u003c/i\u003e, impartially admitting at the same time of\r\nboth characterizations. On the other hand, one cannot\r\njudge an act good and bad at once. The purpose of deception\r\nthat may be good is one controlled and shaped by ideals\r\nquite different from those which permit deception of the evil\r\nsort\u0026mdash;is, in truth, taken as a total act, altogether different\r\nfrom the purpose of deception which one condemns, and not,\r\nlike the \"parcel of matter\" in the two judgments about\r\ngold, the subject of both valuations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA brief consideration of the meaning of this \"parcel of\r\nmatter\" will easily expose the weakness of the plea. In the\r\nlast analysis the \"parcel of matter\" must for the agent\r\nreduce itself, let us say, to certain controllable energies centering\r\nabout certain closely contiguous points in space and\r\ncapable, in their exercise, of setting free or checking other\r\nenergies in the system of nature. Thus, put in \u003ci\u003eaqua regia\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthe gold will dissolve, but in the atmosphere it retains its\r\nbrilliant color, and in the photographer\u0027s solution its energies\r\nhave still a different mode of manifestation. And thus\r\nit would appear that the various predicates which are applied\r\nto \"gold\" imply, each one, a unique set of conditions. Gold\r\nis soluble in \u003ci\u003eaqua regia\u003c/i\u003e, but not if it is to retain its yellow\r\nluster; which predicate is to be true of it depends upon the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_327\" id=\"Page_327\"\u003e[Pg 327]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nconditions under which the energies \"resident in the gold\"\r\nare to be set free, just as the moral character of an act\r\ndepends upon the social conditions obtaining at the time of\r\nits performance\u0026mdash;that is, upon the ideals with reference to\r\nwhich it has been shaped in judgment. How can one\r\nmaintain that in a literal and concrete physical sense gold\r\nin process of solution is the \"same\" as gold entering into\r\nchemical combination? Surely the energy conditions which\r\nconstitute the \"gold\" in the two processes are not the\r\nsame\u0026mdash;and can one nowadays hope to find sameness in\r\nunchangeable atoms?\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_154_154\" id=\"FNanchor_154_154\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_154_154\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[154]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn a word, the permanent substance or \"real essence\"\r\nthat admits of various mutually supplementary determinations\r\ncorresponding to diverse points of view is, strictly\r\nspeaking, a convenient abstraction, and not an existent fact\r\nin time\u0026mdash;and we shall maintain that the same species of\r\nabstraction has its proper place, and in fact occurs, in the\r\nsphere of moral judgment. The type of moral conduct that\r\nin every actual case of its occurrence in the moral order is\r\ndetermined in some unique and special way by relation to\r\nother standards is precisely analogous to the \"substance\"\r\nthat is now dissolved in \u003ci\u003eaqua regia\u003c/i\u003e and now made to pass in\r\nthe form of current coin, but cannot be treated in both ways\r\nat once. Both are abstractions. The \"gold\" is a name for\r\nthe general possibility of attaining any one of a certain\r\nset of particular ends by appropriately co-ordinating certain\r\nenergies, resident elsewhere in the physical system,\r\nwith those at present stored in this particular \"parcel of\r\nmatter;\" the result to be attained depends not alone upon\r\nthe \"parcel of matter,\" but also upon the particular energies\r\nbrought to bear upon it from without. Now let us take a\r\ntype of conduct which is sometimes judged good and sometimes\r\nbad. Deception, for example, is such a type\u0026mdash;and\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_328\" id=\"Page_328\"\u003e[Pg 328]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas a type it simply stands for the general possibility of\r\nfurtherance or detriment to the \"energetic\" self according\r\nas it is determined in the concrete instance by ideals of\r\nsocial well-being or by considerations of immediate personal\r\nadvantage.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the type-form of conduct\u0026mdash;when considered, not as\r\na type of mere physical performance, but as conduct in the\r\ntechnical sense of a possible purpose of the self\u0026mdash;is, in\r\nthe sense we have explained, a symbol for the general possibility\r\nof access or dissipation of spiritual energy\u0026mdash;energy\r\nwhich must be set free by the bringing to bear of other\r\nenergies upon it, and which furthers or works counter to the\r\nenlargement and development of the self according to the\r\nmode of its co-ordination with other energies which the self\r\nhas already turned to its purposes.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_155_155\" id=\"FNanchor_155_155\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_155_155\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[155]\u003c/a\u003e But actual conduct is\r\nconcrete always and never typical; and so likewise, we have\r\nsought to show, actual \"substance,\" the objective thing\r\nreferred to in the factual judgment, is always concrete and\r\nnever an essence. It is not a fixed thing admitting of a simultaneous\r\nvariety of conflicting determinations and practical\r\nuses, but absolutely unique and already determined to its\r\nunique character by the whole assemblage of physical conditions\r\nwhich affect it at the time and which it in turn\r\nreacts upon. In the moral as in the physical sphere the\r\nfundamental category would, on our present account, appear\r\nto be that of energy. The particular physical object given\r\nin judgment is a concrete realization, in the form of a particular\r\nmeans or instrument, of that general possibility of\r\nattaining ends which the concept of a fixed fund of energy,\r\ninterpreted as a logical postulate or principle of inference,\r\nexpresses. The particular moral or economic act is a particular\r\nway in which the energy of the self may be increased\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_329\" id=\"Page_329\"\u003e[Pg 329]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor diminished. In both spheres the reality presented in the\r\nfinished judgment is objective as being a stimulus to the\r\nsetting free of the energies for which it stands. Once\r\nmore, then, our answer to the objection we have been considering\r\nmust be that the object as the permanent substrate\r\nis merely an abstract symbol standing for the indeterminate\r\nmeans in general set over against the self. Corresponding\r\nto it we have, on the other side, the concept of\r\nthe \"energetic\" self\u0026mdash;the self that is purposive in general,\r\nexpansive somehow or other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe function of completed factual judgment in the\r\ndevelopment of experience is, we have held, that of warranting\r\nto the agent the completed purpose which his judgment\r\nof value expresses. This view calls for some further comment\r\nand illustration in closing the present division. In the first\r\nplace the statement implies that the conditions which factual\r\njudgment presents in the \"final survey\" as sanctioning the\r\npurpose have not \u003ci\u003edetermined\u003c/i\u003e the purpose, since prior to the\r\ndetermination of the purpose the conditions were not, and\r\ncould not be, so presented. The question, therefore, naturally\r\narises whether our meaning is that in the formation of\r\nour purposes in valuation the recognition of existing conditions\r\nplays no part. Our answer can be indicated only in\r\nthe barest outline as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe agent must, of course, in an economic judgment-process,\r\nrecognize and take account of such facts as the technical\r\nadaptability of the means he is proposing to use to the\r\nnew purpose that is forming, as also of environing conditions\r\nwhich may affect the success which he may meet\r\nwith in applying them. He must consider also his own\r\nphysical strength and qualities of mind with a view to this\r\nsame technical problem. And similarly in ethical valuation,\r\nas we have seen, the psychology of the \"empirical ego\"\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_330\" id=\"Page_330\"\u003e[Pg 330]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmust play its part. But the conditions thus recognized are,\r\nas we might seek to show more in detail, explainable as the\r\noutcome of past factual judgment-processes, and on the\r\noccasion of their original definition in the form in which\r\nthey now are known played the sanctioning part of which\r\nwe have so often spoken. They therefore correspond to the\r\nagent\u0027s accepted practical ideals, so that the control which\r\nhis past experience exercises over his present conduct may\r\nbe stated equally well in either sort of terms\u0026mdash;in terms of\r\nhis prevailing recognized standards, or in terms of his\r\npresent knowledge of the conditions which his new purpose\r\nmust respect. Thus, in general, the concept of a physical\r\norder conditioning the conduct of all men and presented in a\r\ndefinite body of socially current knowledge is the logical\r\ncorrelate of the moral law conceived as a categorical imperative\r\nprescribing certain types of conduct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus the error of regarding the agent\u0027s conduct in a\r\npresent emergency as an outcome of existing determining\r\nconditions is logically identical with the corresponding error\r\nof the ethical theory of self-realization. The latter holds\r\nthe logical possibility of a determinate descriptive ideal\r\n(already realized in the unchanging Absolute Self) which is\r\nadequate to the solution of all possible ethical problems.\r\nThe former holds that all conduct must be subject to the\r\ndetermining force of external conditions which, if not at\r\npresent completely known, are at least in theory knowable.\r\nThe physical universe in its original nebulous state contained\r\nthe \"promise and potency\" of all that has been in the\r\nway of human conduct and of all that is to be. Into the\r\nfixed mechanical system no new energy can enter and from\r\nit none of the original fund of energy can be lost. This\r\nmechanical theory of conduct is the essential basis of the\r\nhedonistic theory of ethics; and it would not be difficult\r\nto show that Green\u0027s criticism of this latter and his\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_331\" id=\"Page_331\"\u003e[Pg 331]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nown affirmative theory of the moral ideal (as also the current\r\nconventional criticism of hedonism in the same tenor\r\nby the school of Green) are in a logical sense identical\r\nwith it. For the assumption that conduct is determined\r\nby existing objective conditions is precisely the logical correlate\r\nof the concept of a contentual and \"realizable\" ideal\r\nmoral self.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_156_156\" id=\"FNanchor_156_156\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_156_156\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[156]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may now interpret, in the light of our general view\r\nof the function of factual judgment, the concept of the\r\n\"empirical self\" referred to in our discussion of the various\r\ntypes of sanctioning condition which may enter into the\r\n\"final survey.\" The \"empirical self\" of psychological science\r\nis a construction gradually put together by psychologist\r\nor introspective layman as an interpretation of the way\r\nin which accepted concrete modes of conduct, in the determination\r\nof which standards have been operative, have\r\nworked out in practice to the furtherance or impoverishment\r\nof the \"energetic\" self. We have seen that the ambiguous\r\npresented self which functions in the moral attitude of obedience\r\nto authority or to conscience gives place in the attitude\r\nof conscious valuation to apprehension of the \"energetic\"\r\nself, on the one hand, and descriptive concepts of particular\r\ntypes of conduct, on the other. The \"empirical self\" at the\r\nsame time makes its appearance as a constantly expanding\r\ninventory of the \"spiritual resources\" which the \"energetic\"\r\nself has at its disposal. These are the functions of the soul\r\nwhich a functional psychology shows us in operation\u0026mdash;powers\r\nof attention, strength of memory, fertility in associative\r\nrecall, and the like\u0026mdash;and these are the resources wherewith\r\nthe \"energetic\" self may execute, and so exploit to its\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_332\" id=\"Page_332\"\u003e[Pg 332]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nown furtherance, the purposes which, in particular emergencies,\r\nnew end and recognized standards may work out\r\nin co-operation.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_157_157\" id=\"FNanchor_157_157\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_157_157\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[157]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eVI\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the foregoing pages we have consistently used the\r\nexpressions \"ethical and economic judgment\" and \"judgment\r\nof valuation\" as synonymous. This may have seemed\r\nto the reader something very like a begging of the question\r\nfrom the outset, as taking for granted that very judgmental\r\ncharacter of our valuational experience which it was the\r\nprofessed object of our discussion to establish. We are thus\r\ncalled upon very briefly to consider, first of all, the relations\r\nwhich subsist between the consciousness of value and the\r\nprocess which we have described as that of valuation. This\r\nwill enable us, in the second place, to determine the logical\r\nfunction which belongs to the consciousness of value in the\r\ngeneral economy of life. The consciousness of value is a\r\nperfectly definite and distinctive psychical fact mediated by\r\na doubtless highly complex set of psychical or ultimately\r\nphysiological conditions. As such it admits of descriptive\r\nanalysis, and in a complete theory of value such descriptive\r\nanalysis should certainly find a place. It would doubtless\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_333\" id=\"Page_333\"\u003e[Pg 333]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthrow much light upon the origin of valuation as a process,\r\nand of valuing as an attitude, and admirably illustrate the\r\nview of the function of the consciousness of value to which\r\na logical study of valuation as a process seems to lead us.\r\nThis problem in analysis belongs, however, to psychology,\r\nand therefore lies apart from our present purpose; nor is it\r\nnecessary to the establishment of our present view to undertake\r\nit. It is necessary for our purpose only to suggest, for\r\npurposes of identification, a brief description of the value-consciousness,\r\nand to indicate its place in the process of\r\nreflective thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe consciousness of value may best be described, by\r\nway of first approximation, in the language of the Austrian\r\neconomists as a sense of the \"importance\" to oneself of a\r\ncommodity or defined moral purpose. It belongs to the\r\nagent\u0027s attitude of survey or recapitulation which ensues\r\nupon the completion of the judgment-process and is mediated\r\nby attention to the ethical or economic object in its newly\r\ndefined character of specific conduciveness to the well-being\r\nof the self. The commodity, in virtue of its ascertained\r\nphysical properties, is adapted to certain modes of use or\r\nconsumption which, through valuation of the commodity,\r\nhave come to be accepted as desirable. The moral act\r\nlikewise has been approved by virtue of its having certain\r\ndefinite sociological tendencies, or being conducive to the\r\nwelfare and happiness of a friend. Thus commodity or\r\nmoral act, as the case may be, has a determinate complexity\r\nof meaning which has been judged as, in one sense, expansive\r\nof the self, and the value-consciousness we may identify\r\nas that sense of the valued object\u0027s importance which is\r\nmediated by recognition of it as the bearer of this complexity\r\nof concrete meaning. The meaning is, as we may say,\r\n\"condensed\" or \"compacted\" into the object as given in\r\nsense-perception, and because the meaning stands for ex\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_334\" id=\"Page_334\"\u003e[Pg 334]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003epansion\r\nof the self, the object in taking it up into itself\r\nreceives the character of importance as a valued object.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe sense of importance thus is expressive of an attitude\r\nupon the agent\u0027s part. The concrete meanings which make\r\nup the content of the object\u0027s importance would inevitably,\r\nif left to themselves, prompt overt action. The commodity\r\nwould forthwith be applied to its new use or the moral act\r\nwould be performed. The self would, as we may express it,\r\npossess itself of the spiritual energies resident in the chosen\r\npurpose. The attitude of survey, however, inhibits this action\r\nof the self and the sense of importance is the resulting emotional\r\napprehension of the value of the object hereby brought\r\nto recognition. Now, it should be carefully observed that the\r\nparticular concrete emotions appropriate to the details of\r\nthe valued purpose are not what we here intend. The purpose\r\nmay spring from some impulse of self-interest, hatred,\r\npatriotism, or love, and the psychical material of its presentation\r\nduring the agent\u0027s survey will be the varied complex\r\nof qualitative emotion that comes from inhibition of the\r\ndetailed activities which make up the purpose as a whole.\r\nSo also the apprehension of the physical object of economic\r\nvaluation is largely, if not altogether, emotional in its psychical\r\nconstitution. Psychologically these emotions are the\r\npurpose\u0026mdash;they are the \"stuff\" of which the purpose as a\r\npsychical fact occurring in time is made. But we must bear\r\nin mind that it is not the purpose as a psychical fact that is\r\nthe object of the agent\u0027s valuing\u0026mdash;any more than is the tool\r\nwith which one cuts perceived as a molecular mass or as an\r\naggregation of centers of ether-stress. As a cognized object of\r\nvalue the purpose is, in our schematic terminology, a source of\r\nenergy for the increase of the self, and thus the consciousness\r\nof value is the perfectly specific emotion arising from\r\nrestraint put upon the self in its movement of appropriation\r\nof this energy. In contrast with the concrete emotions which\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_335\" id=\"Page_335\"\u003e[Pg 335]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nare the substance of the purpose as presented, the consciousness\r\nof value may be called a \"formal\" emotion or the emotion\r\nof a typical reflective attitude.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe valuing attitude we may then describe as that of\r\n\"resolution\" on the part of the self to adhere to the finished\r\npurpose which it now surveys, with a view to exploitation of\r\nthe purpose. The connection between the valuation-process\r\nand the consciousness of value may be stated thus: The\r\nvaluation-process works out (and necessarily in cognitive,\r\nobjective terms) the purpose which is valued in the agent\u0027s\r\nsurvey. But this development of the purpose is at the same\r\ntime determination of the \"energetic\" self to acceptance of\r\nthe purpose that shall be worked out. Thus the valuation-process\r\nis the source of the consciousness of value in the\r\ntwofold way (1) of defining the object valued, and (2) of\r\ndetermining the self to the attitude of resolution to adhere\r\nto it and exploit it.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_158_158\" id=\"FNanchor_158_158\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_158_158\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[158]\u003c/a\u003e The consciousness of value is the apprehension\r\nof an object in its complete functional character as\r\na factor in experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe function of the consciousness of value must now be\r\nvery briefly considered. The phenomenon is a striking one,\r\nand apparently, as the economists especially have insisted, of\r\nmuch practical importance in the conduct of life.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_159_159\" id=\"FNanchor_159_159\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_159_159\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[159]\u003c/a\u003e And yet on\r\nour account of the phenomenon, as it may appear, the problem\r\nof assigning to it a function must be, to say the least,\r\ndifficult. For the consciousness of value is, we have held,\r\nemotional, and, on the conception of emotion in general which\r\nwe have taken for granted throughout our present discussion,\r\nthis mode of being conscious is merely a reflex of a state of\r\ntension in activity. As such it merely reports in consciousness\r\na process of motor co-ordination already going on and in\r\nthe nature of the case can contribute nothing to the outcome.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_336\" id=\"Page_336\"\u003e[Pg 336]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow if it were in a direct way as immediately felt emotion\r\nthat the consciousness of value must be functional if functional\r\nat all, then the problem might well be given up; but\r\nit would be a serious blunder to conceive the problem in\r\nthis strictly psychological way. A logical statement of the\r\nproblem would raise a different issue\u0026mdash;not the question of\r\nwhether emotion as emotion can in any sense be functional\r\nin experience, but whether the consciousness of value and\r\nemotion in general may not receive reflective interpretation\r\nand thereby, becoming objective, play a part as a factor in\r\nsubsequent valuation-processes. Indeed, the psychological\r\nstatement of the problem misses the entire point at issue\r\nand leads directly to the wholly irrelevant general problem of\r\nwhether any mode of consciousness whatever can, \u003ci\u003eas consciousness\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nput forth energy and be a factor in controlling\r\nconduct. The present problem is properly a logical one.\r\nWhat is the agent\u0027s apprehension of the matter? In his\r\nsubsequent reflective processes of valuation does the consciousness\r\nof value, which was a feature of the survey on a\r\npast occasion, receive recognition in any way and so play a\r\npart? This is simply a question of fact and clearly, as a\r\nquestion relating to the logical content of the agent\u0027s reflective\r\nprocess, has no connection with or interest in the\r\nproblem of a possible dynamic efficacy of consciousness as\r\nsuch. The question properly is logical, not psychological or\r\nmetaphysical.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus stated, then, the problem seems to admit of answer\u0026mdash;and\r\nalong the line already suggested in our account of\r\neconomic valuation.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_160_160\" id=\"FNanchor_160_160\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_160_160\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[160]\u003c/a\u003e Recognition of the fact that the consciousness\r\nof value was experienced in the survey of a certain\r\npurpose on an earlier occasion confirms this purpose, holding\r\nthe means, in an economic situation, to their appointed use\r\nand strengthening adherence to the standard in the ethical\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_337\" id=\"Page_337\"\u003e[Pg 337]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncase. This recognition serves as stimulus to a reproduction,\r\nin memory, of the cognitive details of the earlier survey,\r\nand so in the ideal case to a more or less complete and\r\nrecognizably adequate reinstatement of the earlier valuing\r\nattitude, and so to a reinstatement of the consciousness of\r\nvalue itself. The result is a strengthening of the established\r\nvaluation, a more efficacious control of the new end claiming\r\nrecognition, and an assured measure of continuity of ethical\r\ndevelopment from the old valuation to the new. The function\r\nthus assigned to the consciousness of value finds abundant\r\nillustration elsewhere in the field of emotion. The stated\r\nfestivals of antiquity commemorative of regularly recurrent\r\nphases of agricultural and pastoral life, as also the festivals\r\nin observance of signal events in the private and political\r\nlife of the individual, would appear to find, more or less distinctly,\r\nhere their explanation. These festivals must have\r\nbeen prompted by a more or less conscious recognition of the\r\nsocial value inherent in the important functions making up\r\nthe life of the community, and of the individual citizen as a\r\nmember of the community and as an individual. They\r\nsecured the end of a sustained and enhanced interest in\r\nthese normal functions by effecting, through a symbolic\r\nreproduction of these, an intensified and glorified experience\r\nof the emotional meaning normally and inherently belonging\r\nto them.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_161_161\" id=\"FNanchor_161_161\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_161_161\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[161]\u003c/a\u003e In the same way the rites of the religious cults of\r\nGreece, not to mention kindred phenomena so abundantly to\r\nbe found in lower civilizations as well as in our own, served\r\nto fortify the individual in a certain consistent and salutary\r\ncourse of institutional and private life.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_162_162\" id=\"FNanchor_162_162\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_162_162\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[162]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_338\" id=\"Page_338\"\u003e[Pg 338]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt has been taken for granted throughout that there are\r\nbut two forms of valuation-process, the ethical and the economic.\r\nThe reason for this limitation may already be sufficiently\r\napparent, but it will further illustrate our general\r\nconception of the valuation-process briefly to indicate it in\r\ndetail. What shall be said, for example, of the common use\r\nof the term \"value\" in such expressions as the \"value of\r\nlife,\" the \"emotional value\" of an object or a moral act, the\r\n\"natural value\" of a type of impulsive activity? In these\r\nuses of the word the reference is apparently to one\u0027s own\r\nincommunicable inner experience of living, of perception of\r\nthe object, or of the impulse, which cannot be suggested to\r\nany other person who has not himself had the experience.\r\nMy pleasure, my color-sensation in its affective aspect, my\r\nemotion, are inner and subjective, and I distinguish them by\r\nsuch expressions as the above from the visible, tangible object\r\nto which I ascribe them as constituting its immediate or\r\nnatural value to me. This broader use of the term \"value\"\r\nhas not found recognition in the foregoing pages, and it\r\nrequires here a word of comment. So long as these phases\r\nof the experience of the object are not recognized as separable\r\nin thought from the object viewed as an external condition\r\nor means, they would apparently be better characterized in\r\nsome other way. If, however, they are so recognized, and are\r\nthereby taken as determinative of the agent\u0027s practical attitude\r\ntoward the thing, we have merely our typical situation\r\nof ethical valuation of some implied purpose as conducive to\r\nthe self and economic valuation of the means as requisites for\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_339\" id=\"Page_339\"\u003e[Pg 339]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nexecution of the purpose. Our general criterion for the propriety\r\nof terming any mode of consciousness the \u003ci\u003evalue\u003c/i\u003e of an\r\nobject must be that it shall perform a logical function and\r\nnot simply be referred to in its aspect of psychical fact.\r\nThe feeling or emotion, or whatever the mode of consciousness\r\nin question may be, must play the recognized part, in\r\nthe agent\u0027s survey of the situation, of prompting and supporting\r\na definite practical attitude with reference to the\r\nobject. If, in short, the experience in question enters in\r\nany way into a conscious purpose of the agent, it may properly\r\nbe termed a value.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_163_163\" id=\"FNanchor_163_163\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_163_163\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[163]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026AElig;sthetic value also has not been recognized, and for the\r\nopposite reason. The sense of beauty would appear to be a\r\ncorrelate of relatively perfect attained adjustment between\r\nthe agent and his natural environment or the conditions suggested\r\nmore or less impressively by the work of art. There\r\nmust, indeed, be present in the \u0026aelig;sthetic experience an element\r\nof unsatisfied curiosity sufficient to stimulate an interest in\r\nthe changing or diverse aspects of the beautiful object, but\r\nthis must not be sufficient to prompt reflective judgment of\r\nthe details presented. On the whole, the \u0026aelig;sthetic experience\r\nwould appear to be essentially post-judgmental and appreciative.\r\nIt comes on the particular occasion, not as the\r\nresult of a judgment-process of the valuational type, but as an\r\nimmediate appreciation. As an immediate appreciation it\r\nhas no logical function and on our principles must be denied\r\nthe name of value. Our standpoint must be that of the\r\nexperiencing individual. The \u0026aelig;sthetic experience as a type\r\nmay well be a development out of the artistic and so find\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_340\" id=\"Page_340\"\u003e[Pg 340]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nits ultimate explanation in the psychology of man\u0027s\r\nprimitive technological occupations in the ordinary course of\r\nlife. It is, as we have said, of the post-judgmental type,\r\nand so may very probably be but the cumulative outcome\r\nof closer and closer approximations along certain lines to a\r\nperfected adjustment with the conditions of life. It may\r\nthus have its origin in past processes of the reflective valuational\r\ntype. Nevertheless, viewed in the light of its actual\r\npresent character and status in experience, the \u0026aelig;sthetic must\r\nbe excluded from the sphere of values.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus the realms of fact and value are both real, but that\r\nof value is logically prior and so the \"more real.\" The\r\nrealm of fact is that of conditions warranting the purposes of\r\nthe self; as a separate order, complete and absolute in\r\nitself, it is an abstraction that has forgotten the reason for\r\nwhich it was made. Reality in the logical sense is that\r\nwhich furthers the development of the self. The purpose\r\nthat falls short of its promise in this regard is unreal\u0026mdash;not,\r\nindeed, in the psychological sense that it never existed in\r\nimagination, but in the logical sense that it is no longer\r\nvalued. Within the inclusive realm of reality the realm of\r\nfact is that of the means which serve the concrete purposes\r\nwhich the self accepts. The completed purpose, however,\r\nis not \u003ci\u003emeans\u003c/i\u003e, since still behind and beyond it there can be\r\nno other concrete valued purpose which it can serve. Nor\r\nis it an ultimate \u003ci\u003eend\u003c/i\u003e, since in its character of accepted and\r\nvalued end the self adheres \u003ci\u003eto\u003c/i\u003e it, and it therefore cannot\r\nexpress the \u003ci\u003ewhole\u003c/i\u003e purpose of the self to whose unspecifiable\r\nfulness and increase of activity it is but a temporary probational\r\ncontributor. It is rather in the nature of a formula\r\nor method of behavior to which the self ascribes reality\r\nby recognizing and accepting it as its own.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_341\" id=\"Page_341\"\u003e[Pg 341]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"XI\" id=\"XI\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eXI\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eSOME LOGICAL ASPECTS OF PURPOSE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eINTRODUCTORY\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhenever and wherever it was discovered that the content\r\nof experience as given in immediate perception could\r\nbe reconstructed through ideas, then and there began to\r\nemerge such questions as these: What is the significance of\r\nthis reconstructive power? What is the relation between it\r\nand the immediate experience? What is the relative value\r\nof each in experience as a whole? What is their relation to\r\ntruth and error? If thinking leads to truth, and thought\r\nmust yet get its material from perception, how then shall\r\nthe product of thought escape infection from the material?\r\nOn the other hand, if truth is to be found in the immediate\r\nexperience, can it here be preserved from the blighting effects\r\nof thought? For so insistent and pervasive is this activity of\r\nthought that it appears to penetrate into the sanctum of\r\nperception itself. Turning to a third possibility, if it\r\nshould be found that truth and error are concerned with\r\nboth\u0026mdash;that they are products of the combined activity of\r\nperception and reflection\u0026mdash;then just what does each do?\r\nAnd what in their operations marks the difference between\r\ntruth and error? Or still again, if truth and error cannot\r\nbe found in the operations of perception and reflection as\r\nsuch, then they must be located in the relation of these\r\nprocesses to something else. If so, what is this something\r\nelse? Out of such questions as these is logic born.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere may be those who will object to some of these\r\nquestions as \"logical\" problems\u0026mdash;those who would limit\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_342\" id=\"Page_342\"\u003e[Pg 342]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlogic to a description of the forms and processes of reconstruction,\r\nrelegating the question of the criterion of truth\r\nand error to \"epistemology.\" This objection we must here\r\ndismiss summarily by saying that, by whatever name it is\r\ncalled, a treatment of the forms and processes of thought\r\nmust deal with the criterion of truth and error, since these\r\ndifferent \"forms\" are just those which thought assumes in\r\nattempting to reach truth under different conditions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCertainly in the beginning the Greeks regarded their\r\nnewly discovered power of thought as anything but formal.\r\nIndeed, it soon became so \"substantial\" that it was regarded\r\nas simply a new world of fact, of existence alongside of, or\r\nrather above, the world of perception. But Socrates hailed\r\nideas as deliverers from the contradictions and paradoxes\r\ninto which experience interpreted in terms of immediate\r\nsense-perception had fallen. In the concept Socrates\r\nfound a solution for the then pressing problems of social life.\r\nThe Socratic universal is not a mere empty form which\r\nthought imposes upon the world. It is something which\r\nthought creates in order that a life of social interaction and\r\nreciprocity may go on. This need not mean that the Greeks\r\nwere reflectively conscious of this, but that this was the way\r\nthe concept was actually used and developed by Socrates.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn attempting to formulate the relation between this new\r\nworld of ideas and immediate sense-experience, Plato constructed\r\nhis scheme of substantiation and participation. The\r\nPlatonic doctrine of substantiation and participation is an\r\nexpression of the conviction that anything so valuable as\r\nSocrates had shown ideas to be could not be merely formal\r\nor unreal. Up to the discovery of these ideas reality lay\r\nin the \"substances\" of perception. Hence in order to have\r\nthat reality to which their worth, their value in life, entitled\r\nthem, the ideas must be substantiated.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis introduction of the newly discovered ideas into the\r\nworld of substances and reality wrought, of course, a change\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_343\" id=\"Page_343\"\u003e[Pg 343]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin the conception of the latter\u0026mdash;a change which has well-nigh\r\ndominated the entire philosophic development ever\r\nsince. Let us recall that the aim of Socrates was to find\r\nsomething that would prevent society from going to pieces\r\nunder the influence of the disintegrating conception of experience\r\nas a mere flux of given immediate content. Now,\r\nin the concepts Socrates discovered the basis for just this\r\nmuch-needed wholeness and stability. Moreover, the fact\r\nthat unity and stability were the actual social needs of the\r\nhour led not only to the concepts which furnished them\r\nbeing conceived as substantial and real, but to their being\r\nregarded as a higher type of reality, as \"more real\" than the\r\ngiven, immediate experiences of perception. They were\r\nhigher and more real because, just then, they answered the\r\npressing social need.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe ideas supplied this unity because they furnished\r\nends, purposes, to the given material of perception. The\r\ngiven is now given for something; for something more,\r\ntoo, than mere contemplation. Socrates also showed, by\r\nthe most acute analysis, that the content of these ends,\r\nthese purposes, was social through and through.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom the ethical standpoint this teleological character of\r\nthe idea is clearly recognized. But as \"real,\" the ideas must\r\nbe stated in the metaphysical terms of substance and attribute.\r\nHere the social need is abstracted from and lost to\r\nsight. The fundamental attributes of the ideas are now a\r\nmetaphysical unity and stability. Hence unity and stability,\r\nwholeness and completeness, are the very essence of reality,\r\nwhile multiplicity and change constitute the nature of appearance.\r\nThus does Plato\u0027s reality become, as Windelband says,\r\n\"an immaterial eleaticism which seeks true being in the\r\nideas without troubling itself about the world of generation\r\nand occurrence which it leaves to perception and opinion.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_164_164\" id=\"FNanchor_164_164\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_164_164\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[164]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow it is the momentum of this conception of reality as\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_344\" id=\"Page_344\"\u003e[Pg 344]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na stable and complete system of absolute ideas, the development\r\nof which we have just roughly sketched, that is so\r\nimportant historically. Why this conception of reality,\r\nwhich apparently grew out of a particular historical situation,\r\nshould have dominated philosophic theory for over two\r\nthousand years appears at first somewhat puzzling. Those\r\nwho still hold and defend it will of course say that this survival\r\nis evidence of its validity. But, after all, our human\r\nworld may be yet very young. It may be that \"a thousand\r\nyears are but as yesterday.\" At any rate philosophy has\r\nnever been in a hurry to reconstruct conceptions which\r\nserved their day and generation with such distinction as did\r\nthe Platonic conception of reality. And this is true to the\r\nevolutionary instinct that experience has only its own products\r\nas material for further construction. On the other\r\nhand, the principle of evolution with equal force demands\r\nthat only as \u003ci\u003ematerial\u003c/i\u003e, not as final forms of experience, shall\r\nthese products continue. It may be that philosophy has\r\nnot yet taken the conception of evolution quite seriously.\r\nAt all events it is certain that long after it has been found\r\nthat, instead of being eternal and complete, the concept\r\nundergoes change, that it has simply the stability and wholeness\r\ndemanded by a particular and concrete situation; after\r\nit has been discovered, in other words, that the stability and\r\nwholeness, instead of attaching to the content of an idea, are\r\nsimply the functions of any content used as a purpose\u0026mdash;after\r\nall this has been accepted in psychology, the conception\r\nof truth and reality which arose under an entirely\r\ndifferent conception of the nature of thought still survives.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis change in the conception of the character of the\r\nideas, with no corresponding change in the conception of\r\nreality, marks the divorce of thought and reality and the\r\nrise of the epistemological problem. Let us recall that\r\nin Plato the relation between the higher and ultimate\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_345\" id=\"Page_345\"\u003e[Pg 345]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreality, as constituted by the complete and \"Eternal Ideas,\"\r\nand the lower reality of perception, is that of archetype\r\nand ectype. Perceptions attempt to imitate and copy\r\nthe ideas. Now, when the ideas are found to be changing,\r\nand when further the interpenetration of perception and conception\r\nis discovered, reality as fixed and complete must be\r\nlocated elsewhere. And just as in the old system it was the\r\nbusiness of perception to imitate the \"Eternal Ideas,\" so here\r\nit is still assumed that thought is to imitate the reality wherever\r\nnow it is to be located. And as regards the matter of\r\nlocation, the old conception is not abandoned. The elder\r\nPlato is mighty yet. Reality must still be a completed\r\nsystem of fixed and eternal \"things in themselves,\" \"relations,\"\r\nor \"noumena\" of some sort which \u003ci\u003eour\u003c/i\u003e ideas, now\r\nconstituted by both perception and conceptional processes,\r\nare still to \"imitate,\" \"copy,\" \"reflect,\" \"represent,\" or at\r\nleast \"symbolize\" in some fashion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom this point on, then, thought has two functions: one,\r\nto help experience meet and reorganize into itself the results\r\nof its own past activity; the other, to reflect or represent in\r\nsome sense the absolute system of reality. For a very long\r\ntime the latter has continued to constitute the logical problem,\r\nthe former being relegated to the realm of psychology.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut this discovery of the reconstructive function of the\r\nidea and its assignment to the jurisdiction of psychology did\r\nnot leave logic where it was before, nor did it lighten its\r\ntask. Logic could not shut its eyes to this \"psychological\"\r\ncharacter of the idea.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_165_165\" id=\"FNanchor_165_165\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_165_165\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[165]\u003c/a\u003e Indeed, logic had to take the idea\r\nas psychology described it, then do the best it could with it\r\nfor its purpose.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe embarrassment of logic by this reconstructive char\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_346\" id=\"Page_346\"\u003e[Pg 346]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eacter\r\nof the idea even Aristotle discovered to some extent in\r\nthe relation of the Platonic perceptions to the eternal ideas.\r\nHe found great difficulty in getting a flowing stream of consciousness\r\nto imitate or even symbolize an eternally fixed\r\nand completed reality. And since we have discovered, in\r\naddition, that the idea is so palpably a reconstructive activity,\r\nthe difficulties have not diminished.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn such a situation it could only be a question of time\r\nuntil solutions of the problem should be sought by attempting\r\nto bring together these two functions of the idea. Perhaps\r\nafter all the representation of objects in an absolute\r\nsystem is involved in the reconstruction of our experience.\r\nOr perhaps what appears as reconstructions of our experience\u0026mdash;as\r\ndesiring, struggling, deliberating, choosing, willing,\r\nas sorrows and joys, failures and triumphs\u0026mdash;are but\r\nthe machinery by which the absolute system is represented.\r\nAt any rate, these two functions surely cannot be\r\nregarded as belonging to the idea as color and form belong\r\nto a stone. We should never be satisfied with such a brute\r\ndualism as this.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWithout any further historical sketch of attempts at this\r\nsynthesis, I desire to pass at once to a consideration of\r\nwhat I am sure everyone will agree must stand as one of\r\nthe most brilliant and in every way notable efforts in this\r\ndirection\u0026mdash;Mr. Royce\u0027s Aberdeen lectures on \"The World\r\nand the Individual.\" It is the purpose here to examine\r\nthat part of these lectures, and it is the heart of the whole\r\nmatter, in which the key to the solution of the problem\r\nof the relation between ideas and reality is sought precisely\r\nin the purposive character of the idea. This will be found\r\nespecially in the \"Introduction\" and in the chapter on\r\n\"Internal and External Meaning of Ideas.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_166_166\" id=\"FNanchor_166_166\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_166_166\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[166]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_347\" id=\"Page_347\"\u003e[Pg 347]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eI. THE PURPOSIVE CHARACTER OF IDEAS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith his unerring sense for fundamentals, Mr. Royce\r\nbegins by telling us that the first thing called for by the\r\nproblem of the relation of ideas to reality is a discussion of\r\nthe nature of ideas. Here Mr. Royce says he shall \"be\r\nguided by certain psychological analyses of the mere contents\r\nof our consciousness, which have become prominent in\r\nrecent discussion.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_167_167\" id=\"FNanchor_167_167\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_167_167\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[167]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eYour intelligent ideas of things never consist of mere imagery\r\nof the thing, but always involve a consciousness of how you propose\r\nto act toward the thing of which you have ideas…. Complex\r\nscientific ideas viewed as to their conscious significance are, as\r\nProfessor Stout has well said, plans of action, ways of constructing\r\nthe object of your scientific consciousness…. By the word idea,\r\nthen, as we shall use it, when, after having criticised opposing\r\ntheory, we come to state in these lectures our own thesis, I shall\r\nmean in the end any state of consciousness, whether simple or\r\ncomplex, which when present is then and there viewed as at least\r\na partial expression, or embodiment of a single conscious purpose….\r\nIn brief, an idea in my present definition may, and in fact\r\nalways does, if you please, appear to be representative of a fact\r\nexistent beyond itself. But the \u003ci\u003eprimary\u003c/i\u003e character which makes it\r\nan idea is \u003ci\u003enot its representative character\u003c/i\u003e, is not its vicarious\r\nassumption of the responsibility of standing for a being beyond\r\nitself, but is its inner character as \u003ci\u003erelatively fulfilling the purpose\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthat is as presenting the partial fulfilment of the purpose which is\r\nin the consciousness of the moment wherein the idea takes place.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_168_168\" id=\"FNanchor_168_168\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_168_168\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[168]\u003c/a\u003e…\r\nNow this purpose, just in so far as it gets a present conscious\r\nembodiment in the contents, and in the form of the complex\r\nstate called the idea, constitutes what I shall hereafter call the\r\ninternal meaning of the idea.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_169_169\" id=\"FNanchor_169_169\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_169_169\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[169]\u003c/a\u003e… But ideas often seem to have\r\na meaning; yes, as one must add, finite ideas always undertake\r\nor appear to have a meaning that is not exhausted by this conscious\r\ninternal meaning presented and relatively fulfilled at the\r\nmoment when the idea is there for our finite view. The melody\r\nsung, the artists\u0027 idea, the thought of your absent friend, a thought\r\non which you love to dwell, all these not merely have their obvious\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_348\" id=\"Page_348\"\u003e[Pg 348]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninternal meaning as meeting a conscious purpose by their very\r\npresence, but also they at least appear to have that other sort of\r\nmeaning, that reference beyond themselves to objects, that cognitive\r\nrelation to outer facts, that attempted correspondence with\r\nouter facts, which many accounts of our ideas regard as their primary\r\ninexplicable and ultimate character. I call this second, and\r\nfor me still problematic, and derived aspect of the nature of ideas,\r\ntheir apparently external meaning.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_170_170\" id=\"FNanchor_170_170\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_170_170\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[170]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom all this it is quite evident that Mr. Royce accepts\r\nand welcomes the results of the work of modern psychology\r\non the nature of the idea. The difficulty will come in\r\nmaking the connection between these accepted results and\r\nthe Platonic conception of ultimate reality as stated in the\r\nfollowing:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo be means simply to express, to embody the complete internal\r\nmeaning of \u003ci\u003ea certain absolute system of ideas\u003c/i\u003e. A system, moreover,\r\nwhich is genuinely implied in the true internal meaning or\r\npurpose of every finite idea, however fragmentary.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_171_171\" id=\"FNanchor_171_171\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_171_171\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[171]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt may be well to note here in passing that, notwithstanding\r\nthe avowed subordination here of the representative\r\nto the reconstructive character of the ideas, the former\r\nbecomes very important in the chapter on the relation of\r\ninternal to external meaning, where the problem of truth\r\nand error is considered.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this account of the two meanings of the idea, which I\r\nhave tried to state as nearly as possible in the author\u0027s own\r\nwords, there appear some conceptions of idea, of purpose,\r\nand of their relation to each other, that play an important\r\npart in the further treatment and in determining the final\r\noutcome. In the description of the internal meaning there\r\nappear to be two quite different conceptions of the relation\r\nof idea to purpose. One regards the idea as itself constituting\r\nthe purpose or plan of action; the other describes the\r\nidea as \"the partial fulfilment\" of the purpose. (1) \"Complex\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_349\" id=\"Page_349\"\u003e[Pg 349]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nscientific ideas, viewed as to their conscious significance, are,\r\nas Professor Stout has well said, \u003ci\u003eplans of action\u003c/i\u003e.\" (2) \"You\r\nsing to yourself a melody; you are then and there conscious\r\nthat the melody, as you hear yourself singing it, \u003ci\u003epartially\r\nfulfils\u003c/i\u003e and embodies a purpose.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_172_172\" id=\"FNanchor_172_172\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_172_172\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[172]\u003c/a\u003e When we come to the\r\nproblem of the relation between the internal and external\r\nmeaning, we shall find that the idea as internal meaning\r\ncomes into a third relation to purpose, viz., that of \u003ci\u003ehaving\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthe further purpose to agree or correspond to the external\r\nmeaning. \"Is the correspondence reached between idea and\r\nobject the precise correspondence that the idea itself intended?\r\nIf it is, the idea is true…. Thus it is not mere\r\nagreement, but intended agreement, that constitutes truth.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_173_173\" id=\"FNanchor_173_173\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_173_173\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[173]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThus the idea is (1) the purpose, (2) the partial fulfilment\r\nof the purpose, and (3) has a further purpose\u0026mdash;to correspond\r\nto an object in the \"absolute system of ideas.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first statement of the internal meaning as constituting\r\nthe plan or purpose is, I take it, the conception of the\r\ninternal meaning as an ideal construction which gives a working\r\nform, a definition to the \"indefinite sort of restlessness\" and\r\nblind feeling of dissatisfaction out of which the need of and\r\ndemand for thought arises.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_174_174\" id=\"FNanchor_174_174\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_174_174\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[174]\u003c/a\u003e This accords with the scientific\r\nconception of the idea as a working hypothesis. If this\r\ninterpretation of idea were steadily followed throughout, it is\r\ndifficult to see how it could fail to lead to a conception of\r\nreality quite different from that described as \"a certain\r\nabsolute system of ideas.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe second definition of internal meaning is the one in\r\nwhich it is stated as the \"partial expression,\" \"embodiment,\"\r\nand \"fulfilment\" of a single conscious purpose, and in which\r\nsubsequently and consequently the idea is identified with\r\n\"any conscious act,\" for example, singing. The first part of\r\nthe statement appears to say that the idea of a melody is in\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_350\" id=\"Page_350\"\u003e[Pg 350]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\"partial fulfilment\" of the idea regarded as the purpose to\r\nsing the melody. But, as the first statement of internal\r\nmeaning implies, how can one have a purpose to sing the\r\nmelody except in and through the idea? It is precisely the\r\nconstruction of an idea that transforms the vague \"indefinite\r\nrestlessness\" and dissatisfaction into a purpose. The idea is\r\nthe defining, the sharpening of the blind activity of mere\r\nsensation, mere want, into a plan of action.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHowever, Mr. Royce meets this difficulty at once by the\r\nstatement that the term \"idea\" here not only covers the\r\nactivity involved in forming the idea, \u003ci\u003ee. g.\u003c/i\u003e, the idea of singing,\r\nbut includes the action of singing, which fulfils this\r\npurpose. \"In the same sense \u003ci\u003eany conscious act\u003c/i\u003e at the\r\nmoment when you perform it not merely expresses, but is,\r\nin my present sense, an idea.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_175_175\" id=\"FNanchor_175_175\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_175_175\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[175]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut this sort of an adjustment between the idea as the\r\npurpose and as the fulfilment of the purpose raises a new\r\nquestion. What here becomes of the distinction between\r\nimmediate and mediating experience? Surely there is a\r\npretty discernible difference between experience as a purposive\r\nidea and the experience which fulfils this purpose.\r\nTo call them both \"ideas\" is at least confusing, and indeed\r\nit appears that it is just this confusion that obscures the\r\nfundamental difficulty in dealing, later on, with the problem\r\nof truth and error. To be sure, the very formation of the\r\nidea as the purpose, the \"plan of action,\" is the beginning\r\nof the relief from the \"indefinite restlessness.\" On the\r\nother hand, it defines and sharpens the dissatisfaction.\r\nWhen this vague unrest takes the form of a purpose to\r\nattain food or shelter, or to sing in tune, it is of course the\r\nfirst step toward solution. But this very definition of the\r\ndissatisfaction intensifies it. The idea as purpose, then,\r\ninstead of being the fulfilment, appears to be the plan, the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_351\" id=\"Page_351\"\u003e[Pg 351]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmethod of fulfilment. The fulfilling experience is the\r\nfurther experience to which the idea points and leads.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo follow a little farther this relation between the purposive\r\nand fulfilling aspects of experience, it is of course\r\napparent that the idea as the purpose, the \"plan of action,\"\r\nmust as a function go over into the fulfilling experience.\r\nMy purpose to sing the melody must remain, in so far as the\r\naction is a conscious one, until the melody is sung. I say\r\n\"as a function,\" for the specific content of this purpose is\r\ncontinuously changing. The purpose is certainly not the\r\nsame in content after half the melody has been sung as it is\r\nat the beginning. This means that the purpose is being\r\nprogressively fulfilled; and as part of the purpose is fulfilled\r\neach moment, so a part of the original content of the\r\nidea drops out; and when the fulfilling process of this particular\r\npurpose is complete, or is suspended\u0026mdash;for, in Mr.\r\nRoyce\u0027s view, it never is complete in human experience\u0026mdash;that\r\npurpose then gives way to some other, perhaps one\r\ngrowing out of it, but still one regarded as another. A\r\npurpose realized, fulfilled, cannot persist as a purpose. We\r\nmay desire to repeat the experience in memory; \u003ci\u003ei. e.\u003c/i\u003e,\r\ninstead of singing aloud, simply, as Mr. Royce says, \"silently\r\nrecall and listen to its imagined presence.\" But here we\r\nmust remember that the memory experience, as such, is not\r\nan idea in the logical sense at all. It is an immediate experience\r\nthat is fulfilling the idea of the song which constitutes\r\nthe purpose to recall it, just as truly as the singing aloud\r\nfulfils the idea of singing aloud. Shouting, whistling, or\r\n\"listening in memory to the silent notes\" may all be equally\r\nimmediate, fulfilling experiences. Doubtless the idea as\r\npurpose involves memory, as Mr. Royce says.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_176_176\" id=\"FNanchor_176_176\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_176_176\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[176]\u003c/a\u003e But it is a\r\nmemory used as a purpose, and it is just this use of the\r\nmemory material as a purpose that makes it a logical idea.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_352\" id=\"Page_352\"\u003e[Pg 352]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIn its content the purposive idea is just as immediate and as\r\nmechanical as any other part of experience. \"Psychology\r\nexplains the presence and the partial present efficacy of\r\nthis purpose by the laws of motor processes, of habit, or of\r\nwhat is often called association.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_177_177\" id=\"FNanchor_177_177\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_177_177\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[177]\u003c/a\u003e Here \"idea,\" however,\r\nsimply means, as Mr. Royce takes it in his second statement,\r\nconscious content of any sort. But this is not the\r\nmeaning of \"idea\" in the logical sense. The logical\r\nidea is a conscious content used as an organizer, as \"a\r\nplan of action,\" to get other contents. If, for example,\r\nin the course of writing a paper one wishes to recall an\r\nabstract distinction, as the distinction dawns in consciousness,\r\nit is not an idea in the logical sense. It is just\r\nas truly an immediate fulfilling experience as is a good\r\ngolf stroke. So in the mathematician\u0027s most abstruse processes,\r\nwhich Mr. Royce so admirably portrays, the\r\nresults for which he watches \"as empirically as the astronomer\r\nalone with his star\" are not ideas in the logical sense;\r\nthey are immediate, fulfilling experiences.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_178_178\" id=\"FNanchor_178_178\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_178_178\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[178]\u003c/a\u003e The distinction\r\nbetween the idea as the mediating experience\u0026mdash;that is, the\r\nlogical idea\u0026mdash;and the immediate fulfilling experience is\r\ntherefore not one of content, but of use.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is a sense, however, in which the idea as a purpose\r\ncan be taken as the partial fulfilment of another purpose; in\r\nthe sense that any purpose is the outgrowth of activity involving\r\nprevious purposes. This becomes evident when we\r\ninquire into the \"indefinite restlessness\" and dissatisfaction\r\nout of which the idea as purpose springs. Dissatisfaction\r\npresupposes some activity already going on in attempted ful\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_353\" id=\"Page_353\"\u003e[Pg 353]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003efilment\r\nof some previous purpose. If one is dissatisfied with\r\nhis singing, or with not singing, it is because one has already\r\npurposed to participate in the performance of a company of\r\npeople which now he finds singing a certain melody, or one\r\nhas rashly contracted to entertain a strenuous infant who\r\nis vociferously demanding his favorite ditty. This is\r\nonly saying that any given dissatisfaction and the purpose\r\nto which it gives rise grow out of activity involving previous\r\npurposing. But this does not do away with the distinction\r\nbetween the idea as a purpose and the immediate fulfilling\r\nexperience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf the discussion appears at this point to be growing\r\nsomewhat captious, let us pass to a consideration of the\r\nrelation between internal and external meanings, where\r\nthe problem of truth and error appears, and where the vital\r\nimport of these distinctions becomes more obvious.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eII. PURPOSE AND THE JUDGMENT\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMr. Royce begins with the traditional definition of truth,\r\nwhich he then proceeds to reinterpret:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTruth is very frequently defined in terms of external meaning\r\nas \u003ci\u003ethat about which we judge\u003c/i\u003e…. In the second place, truth has\r\nbeen defined as the \u003ci\u003ecorrespondence between our ideas and their\r\nobjects\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_179_179\" id=\"FNanchor_179_179\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_179_179\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[179]\u003c/a\u003e…. When we undertake to express the objective\r\nvalidity of any truth, we use judgment. These judgments, if subjectively\r\nregarded, that is, if viewed merely as processes of our own\r\npresent thinking, whose objects are external to themselves, involve\r\nin all their more complex forms, combinations of ideas, devices\r\nwhereby we weave already present ideas into more manifold\r\nstructure, thereby enriching our internal meaning; but the act of\r\njudgment has always its other, its objective aspect. The ideas\r\nwhen we judge are also to possess external meaning…. It is\r\ntrue, as Mr. Bradley has well said, that the intended subject of\r\nevery judgment is reality itself. The ideas that we combine when\r\nwe judge about external meanings are to have value for us as truth\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_354\" id=\"Page_354\"\u003e[Pg 354]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nonly in so far as they not only possess internal meaning, but also\r\nimitate, by their structure, what is at once other than themselves,\r\nand, in significance, something above themselves. That, at least,\r\nis the natural view of our consciousness, just in so far as, in\r\njudging, we conceive our thought as essentially other than its\r\nexternal object, and as destined merely to correspond thereto.\r\nNow we have by this time come to feel how hard it is to define the\r\nReality to which our ideas are thus to conform, and about which\r\nour judgments are said to be made, so long as we thus sunder\r\nexternal and internal meanings.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_180_180\" id=\"FNanchor_180_180\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_180_180\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[180]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe universal judgment.\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;The problem is, then, to\r\ndiscover just the nature and ground of this relation between\r\nthe internal and external meaning, between the idea and its\r\nobject. This relation is established in the act of judgment.\r\nTaking first \u003ci\u003ethe universal judgment\u003c/i\u003e, we find here that the\r\ninternal meaning has at best only a negative relation to the\r\nexternal meaning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo say that all A is B is in fact merely to assert that the real\r\nworld contains no objects that are A, but that fail to be of the class\r\nB. To say that no A is B is to assert that the real world contains\r\nno objects that are at once A and B.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_181_181\" id=\"FNanchor_181_181\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_181_181\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[181]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe universal judgments then \"tell us indirectly what is\r\nin the realm of external meaning; but only by first telling\r\nus what is not.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_182_182\" id=\"FNanchor_182_182\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_182_182\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[182]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHowever, these universal judgments have after all a\r\npositive value in the realm of internal meaning; that is, as\r\nmere thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis negative character of the universal judgments holds true\r\nof them, as we have just said, just in so far as you sunder the\r\nexternal and internal meaning, and just in so far as you view the\r\nreal as the beyond, and as the merely beyond. If you turn your\r\nattention once more to the realm of ideas, viewed as internal meaning,\r\nyou see, indeed, that they are constantly becoming enriched in\r\ntheir inner life by all this process. To know by inner demonstration\r\nthat 2+2=4 and that this is necessarily so, is not yet to\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_355\" id=\"Page_355\"\u003e[Pg 355]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nknow that the external world, taken merely as the Beyond, contains\r\nany true or finally valid variety of objects at all, any two or four\r\nobjects that can be counted…. On the other hand, so far as\r\nyour internal meaning goes, to have experienced within that which\r\nmakes you call this judgment necessary, is indeed to have observed\r\na character about your own ideas which rightly seems to you very\r\npositive.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_183_183\" id=\"FNanchor_183_183\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_183_183\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[183]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis passage deserves especial attention. In the light of\r\nKant, and in view of Mr. Royce\u0027s general definition of the\r\njudgment as the reference of internal to external meanings,\r\none is puzzled to find that for the mathematician the positive\r\nvalue of the judgment \"two and two are four\" is confined\r\nto the realm of internal meaning. To be sure, Mr. Royce\r\nsays that this limitation of the positive value of the universal\r\njudgment to the world of internal meaning occurs\r\nonly when the external and internal meaning are sundered.\r\nBut the point is: Does the mathematician or anyone else\r\never so sunder as to regard the judgment \"two and two are\r\nfour\" as of positive value only as internal meaning?\r\nIndeed, in another connection Mr. Royce himself shows\r\nmost clearly that mathematical results are as objective and\r\nas empirical as the astronomer\u0027s star.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_184_184\" id=\"FNanchor_184_184\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_184_184\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[184]\u003c/a\u003e Nor would it appear\r\ncompetent for anyone to say here: \"Of course, they are not\r\ninternal meanings \u003ci\u003eafter\u003c/i\u003e we come to see, through the kind\r\noffices of the epistemologist, that the internal meanings are\r\nvalid of the external world.\" We are insisting that they\r\nare never taken by the mathematician and scientists at\r\nfirst as merely internal meaning whose external meaning\r\nis then to be established. Surely the mathematical judgment,\r\nor any other, does not require an epistemological\r\nmidwife to effect the passage from internal to external\r\nmeaning. The external meaning is there all the while\r\nin the form of the diagrams and motor tensions and\r\nimages with which the mathematician works. The difficulty\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_356\" id=\"Page_356\"\u003e[Pg 356]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhere again seems to be that the distinction above discussed\r\nbetween the idea in the logical sense, as purpose, and the\r\nimmediate fulfilling experience is lost sight of. The relation\r\nbetween two and four is not first discovered as a merely\r\ninternal meaning. It is discovered in the process of fulfilling\r\nsome purpose involving the working out of this\r\nrelation. So the sum of the angles of a triangle is not\r\ndiscovered as a mere internal meaning whose external\r\nmeaning is then to be found. It is found \u003ci\u003ein working with\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthe triangle. It is discovered \u003ci\u003ein\u003c/i\u003e the triangle. And, once\r\nmore, it matters not if the triangle here is a mere memory\r\nimage. In relation to the purpose, to the logical idea, it is\r\nas truly external and objective as pine sticks or chalk marks.\r\nThe streams of motor, etc., images that flow spontaneously\r\nunder the stimulus of the purpose are just as immediate\r\nfulfilling experiences as the manipulation of sticks or chalk\r\nlines.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe difficulty in keeping the universal judgment, as a\r\njudgment, in terms of merely internal meaning may be seen\r\nfrom the following:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAs to these two types of judgments, the universal and the particular,\r\nthey both, as we have seen, make use of experience. The\r\nuniversal judgments arise in the realm where experience and idea\r\nhave already fused into one whole; and this is precisely the realm\r\nof internal meanings. Here one constructs and observes the consequences\r\nof one\u0027s construction. But the construction is at once\r\nan experience \u003ci\u003eof fact and an idea\u003c/i\u003e…. Upon the basis of such\r\nideal constructions one makes universal judgments. These in a\r\nfashion still to us, at this stage, mysterious, undertake to be valid\r\nof that other world\u0026mdash;the world of external meaning.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_185_185\" id=\"FNanchor_185_185\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_185_185\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[185]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne is somewhat puzzled to know just what is meant by\r\nthe fusion \"of experience and idea.\" We must infer that it\r\nmeans the fusion of some aspect of experience which can be\r\nset over against idea, and this has always meant the external\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_357\" id=\"Page_357\"\u003e[Pg 357]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmeaning, and this interpretation seems further warranted\r\nby the statement immediately following which describes the\r\nfusion as one \"of \u003ci\u003efact\u003c/i\u003e and idea.\" The situation then seems\r\nto be this: An internal and an external meaning, a fact and\r\nan idea, \"fuse into one whole\" and thus constitute that\r\nwhich is yet \"precisely the realm of internal meanings,\"\r\nwhich aims to be valid of still another world of external\r\nmeanings. And this waives the question of how experience\r\nfused into one whole can be an internal meaning, since as\r\nsuch it must be in opposition and reference to an external\r\nmeaning; or conversely, how experience can be at once fact\r\n\u003ci\u003eand\u003c/i\u003e idea and still be \"fused into one whole.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNor does the difficulty disappear when we turn to\r\nthe aspects of universality and necessity. What is the\r\nsignificance and basis of universality and necessity as confined\r\nmerely to the realm of internal meaning?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSo far as your internal meaning goes, \u003ci\u003eto have experienced\r\nwithin that which makes you call this judgment necessary\u003c/i\u003e is,\r\nindeed, to have observed a character about your own ideas which\r\nrightly seems to you very positive.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_186_186\" id=\"FNanchor_186_186\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_186_186\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[186]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut what is it that we \"experience within\" which makes\r\nus call this judgment necessary? In the discussion of the\r\nrelation of the universal judgment to the disjunctive judgment,\r\nthrough which the former is shown to get even its\r\nnegative force, there is an interesting statement:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eOne who inquires into a matter upon which he believes himself\r\nable to decide in universal terms, \u003ci\u003ee. g.\u003c/i\u003e, in mathematics, has present\r\nto his mind, at the outset, questions such as admit of alternative\r\nanswers. \"A,\" he declares, \"in case it exists at all, is either B or\r\nC.\" Further research shows universally, perhaps, that No A is B.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe last sentence is the statement referred to. What is\r\nmeant by \"further research shows universally, perhaps, that\r\nNo A is B\"? What kind of \"research,\" internal or external,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_358\" id=\"Page_358\"\u003e[Pg 358]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncan show this? In short, there appears to be as much\r\ndifficulty with universality and necessity in the realm of\r\ninternal meaning as in the reference of internal to external\r\nmeaning.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_187_187\" id=\"FNanchor_187_187\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_187_187\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[187]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eInstead, however, of discussing this point, Mr. Royce\r\npursues the problem of the relation of the external and\r\ninternal meaning, and finds that regarded as sundered there\r\nis no basis so far for even the negative universality and\r\nnecessity in the reference of the internal meaning to the\r\nexternal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFor at this point arises the ancient question, How can you know\r\nat all that your judgment is universally valid, even in this ideal\r\nand negative way, about that external realm of validity, in so\r\nfar as it is external, and is merely your Other,\u0026mdash;the Beyond? Must\r\nyou not just dogmatically say that that world must agree with your\r\nnegations? This judgment is indeed positive. But how do you\r\nprove it? The only answer has to be in terms which already suggest\r\nhow vain is the very sundering in question. If you can predetermine,\r\neven if but thus negatively, what cannot exist in the\r\nobject, the object then cannot be merely foreign to you. It must\r\nbe somewhat predetermined by your Meaning.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_188_188\" id=\"FNanchor_188_188\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_188_188\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[188]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut in the universal judgment this determination, as referred\r\nto the external meaning, is only negative.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe particular judgment.\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;It is then through the particular\r\njudgment that the universal judgment is to get any\r\npositive value in its reference to the external meaning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAs has been repeatedly pointed out in the discussions on recent\r\nLogic, the particular judgments\u0026mdash;whose form is Some A is B, or\r\nSome A is not B\u0026mdash;are the typical judgments that positively assert\r\nBeing in the object viewed as external. This fact constitutes their\r\nessential contrast with the universal judgments. They undertake\r\nto cross the chasm that is said to sunder internal and external\r\nmeanings; and the means by which they do so is always what is\r\ncalled \"external experience.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_359\" id=\"Page_359\"\u003e[Pg 359]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is now high time to ask why the internal meaning\r\nseeks this external meaning. Why does it seek an object?\r\nWhy does it want to cross the chasm? In other words,\r\nwhat is the significance of the demand for the particular\r\njudgment? In the introduction we have been told, as a\r\nmatter of description, that the internal meanings do seek\r\nthe external meaning, but why do they? We have also\r\nbeen told that universal judgments \"develop and enrich\r\nthe realm of internal meaning.\" Why, then, should there\r\nbe a demand for the external meaning, for a further object?\r\nThe answer is:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe have our internal meanings. We develop them in inner\r\nexperience. There they get presented as something of universal\r\nvalue, \u003ci\u003ebut always in fragments\u003c/i\u003e. They, therefore, so far dissatisfy.\r\nWe conceive of the Other wherein these meanings shall get some\r\nsort of final fulfilment.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_189_189\" id=\"FNanchor_189_189\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_189_189\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[189]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is, then, the incomplete and fragmentary character of\r\nthe internal meaning that demands the particular judgment.\r\nThe particular judgment is to further complete and determine\r\nthe incomplete and indeterminate internal meaning.\r\nAnd yet no sooner is this particular judgment made than\r\nwe are told that \"it is a form at once positive, and very\r\nunsatisfactorily indeterminate.\" Again:\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_190_190\" id=\"FNanchor_190_190\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_190_190\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[190]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe judgments of experience, the particular judgments, express\r\na positive but still imperfect determination of internal meaning\r\nthrough external experience. The limit or goal of this process\r\nwould be an individual judgment wherein the will expressed its\r\nown final determination.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_191_191\" id=\"FNanchor_191_191\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_191_191\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[191]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eApparently, then, the particular judgment to which the\r\ninternal meaning appeals for completion and determination\r\nonly succeeds in increasing the fragmentary and indeterminate\r\ncharacter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis brings us to another \"previous question.\" Just\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_360\" id=\"Page_360\"\u003e[Pg 360]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhat are we to understand by this \"fragmentary\" and\r\n\"indeterminate\" character of the internal meaning? In\r\nwhat sense, with reference to what, is it incomplete and\r\nfragmentary? Later we shall be told that it is with reference\r\nto \"its own final and completely individual expression.\"\r\nThis is to be reached in the individual judgment. And if\r\nwe ask what is meant by this final, complete, and individual\r\nexpression\u0026mdash;which, by the way, no human being can\r\nexperience\u0026mdash;we read, wondering all the while how it can be\r\nknown, that it is simply \"the expression that seeks no other,\"\r\nthat \"is satisfied,\" that \"is conclusive of the search for perfection.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_192_192\" id=\"FNanchor_192_192\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_192_192\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[192]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nWaiving for the present questions concerning\r\nthe basis of this satisfaction and perfection, all this leaves\r\nunanswered our query concerning the other end of the\r\nmatter, viz., the meaning and criterion of the fragmentary\r\nand indeterminate character of these internal meanings.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we here return to the first definition of internal meaning\r\nof the idea as a purpose in the sense of \"a plan of\r\naction,\" such as \"singing in tune,\" or getting the properties\r\nof a geometrical figure, it does not seem difficult to find a\r\nbasis and meaning for this fragmentary and indeterminate\r\ncharacter. First we may note in a general way that it is of\r\nthe very essence of a plan or purpose to lead on to a fulfilling\r\nexperience such as singing in tune, or reaching a mathematical\r\nequation. But here this fulfilling experience to\r\nwhich the plan points is not a mere working out of detail\r\ninside the plan itself, although, indeed, this does take place.\r\nIf this were all the fulfilling experience meant, it is difficult\r\nto see how we should escape subjective idealism.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_193_193\" id=\"FNanchor_193_193\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_193_193\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[193]\u003c/a\u003e We start\r\nwith a relatively indeterminate idea and end with a more\r\ndeterminate \u003ci\u003eidea\u003c/i\u003e, though, indeed, there is yet no criterion\r\nfor this increased determination. To be sure, the idea as a\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_361\" id=\"Page_361\"\u003e[Pg 361]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nplan of action, as has already been stated, does undergo\r\nchange and does become, if you please, more definite and\r\ncomplete as a plan; but this does not constitute its fulfilment.\r\nIts fulfilment surely is to be found in the immediate\r\nexperiences of singing, etc., to which the idea points and\r\nleads.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe fragmentary and incomplete character of the internal\r\nmeaning as a plan of action does not, then, after all, so much\r\ndescribe the plan itself as it does the general condition of experience\r\nout of which the idea arises. Experience takes on the\r\nform of a plan, of an idea, precisely because it has fallen apart,\r\nhas become \"fragmentary.\" It is just the business of the\r\ninternal meaning, as Mr. Royce so well shows, to form a\r\nplan, an ideal, an hypothetical synthesis that shall stimulate\r\nan activity, which shall satisfactorily heal the breach.\r\n\"Fragmentary\" is a quality, then, that belongs, not to the\r\nidea in itself considered, but to the general condition of\r\nexperience, of which the idea as a plan is an expression.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf, now, the fragmentary character of the internal meaning\r\nis determined simply with relation to the fulfilling\r\nexperiences, such as singing in tune, adjustments of geometrical\r\nfigures, etc., to which it points and leads, it seems\r\nas if the completion of the internal meaning must be defined\r\nin the same terms. And this would appear to open a pretty\r\nstraight path to the redefinition of truth and error.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eIII. THE CRITERION OF TRUTH AND ERROR\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAt the outset, truth was defined as the \"correspondence\"\r\nor \"agreement\" of an idea with its object. But we have\r\nseen that correspondence or agreement with an object\r\nmeans the completion and determination of the idea itself,\r\nand since the idea is here a specific \"plan of action,\" it\r\nwould seem that the \"true\" idea would be the one that can\r\ncomplete itself by stimulating a satisfying activity. The\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_362\" id=\"Page_362\"\u003e[Pg 362]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfalse idea would be one that cannot complete itself in a satisfying\r\nactivity, such as singing in tune, constructing a\r\nmathematical equation, etc., and just this solution is very\r\nclearly expounded by our author. In the case of mathematical\r\ninquiry,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn just so far as we \u003ci\u003epause satisfied\u003c/i\u003e we observe that there \"is\r\nno other\" mathematical fact to be sought \u003ci\u003ein the direction of the\r\nparticular inquiry in hand\u003c/i\u003e. Satisfaction of purpose by means of\r\n\u003ci\u003epresented fact\u003c/i\u003e and such determinate satisfaction as sends us to no\r\nother experience for further light and fulfillment, precisely this\r\noutcome is itself the Other that is sought when we begin our\r\ninquiry.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_194_194\" id=\"FNanchor_194_194\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_194_194\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[194]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo \"when other facts of experience are sought,\" if I watch\r\nfor stars or for a chemical precipitate, or for a turn in the\r\nstock market, or in the sickness of a friend, my ideas are\r\ntrue when they are satisfied with \"the presented facts.\" Again,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIt follows that the finally determinate form of the object of any\r\nfinite idea is that form which the idea itself would assume whenever\r\nit became individuated, or in other words, became a completely\r\ndetermined idea, an idea or will fulfilled by a wholly adequate\r\nempirical content, for which no other content need be substituted\r\nor from the point of view of the satisfied idea, could be substituted.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_195_195\" id=\"FNanchor_195_195\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_195_195\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[195]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn such passages as these it seems clear that the test of\r\nthe truth of an idea is its power to bring us to the point\r\nwhere we \"pause satisfied,\" where \"no other content need\r\nbe substituted,\" etc. Nor in such passages does there seem\r\nto be any doubt of reaching satisfaction in particular cases.\r\nHere, it appears, we \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e sing in tune, we \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e get the\r\ndesired precipitate, and possibly even interpret the stock\r\nmarket correctly. Of course, the discord, the hunger, the\r\nloss, will come again; but so will new ideas, new truths.\r\n\"Man thinks in order to get control of his world and thereby\r\nof himself.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_196_196\" id=\"FNanchor_196_196\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_196_196\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[196]\u003c/a\u003e Then the control actually gained must measure\r\nthe value, the truth of his thought. Do you wish to\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_363\" id=\"Page_363\"\u003e[Pg 363]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsing in tune, \"then your musical ideas are false if they lead\r\nyou to strike what are then called false notes.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_197_197\" id=\"FNanchor_197_197\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_197_197\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[197]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt should also be noticed that here this desired determination\r\ndoes not consist in a further determination of the\r\nmere idea as such. It is found in \"the presented fact,\" in\r\nthe immediate activity of singing, of getting precipitates,\r\netc. As has already been pointed out, it is only by using\r\nthe term \"idea\" for both the purpose and the fulfilling act\r\nof singing that this \"pause of satisfaction\" can be ascribed\r\nto the further determination of the idea. As such, as also\r\nbefore remarked, the sort of determination that the idea\r\nhere gets means its termination, its disappearance in the\r\nimmediate experiences of singing, etc., to which it leads.\r\nThe \"indefinite restlessness\" of hunger and cold would\r\nscarcely be satisfied by getting more determinate and\r\nspecific \u003ci\u003eideas\u003c/i\u003e only of food and shelter. The satisfaction\r\ncomes when the ideas are \"realized,\" when the \"plans\" are\r\nswallowed up in fulfilment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut in all this nothing has been said about \"the certain\r\nabsolute system of ideas,\" nor does there appear to be here\r\nany demand for it. To be sure, in the passages just considered,\r\nexperience has been found to become \"fragmentary,\"\r\nbut it has also been found capable of healing, of wholing\r\nitself, not of course into any \"final whole,\" but into the unity\r\nof \"satisfaction\" as regards \"the particular inquiry in\r\nhand.\" There is of course failure as well, but this also is\r\nnot final. It means simply that we must look farther for\r\nthe \"pause of satisfaction,\" that we must construct another\r\nidea, another \"plan of action.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut, after having shown that the idea as a plan of action\r\nmay lead to satisfaction in the particular case, and that its\r\nsuccess or failure so to do is one measure of its truth or\r\nfalsity, we are now suddenly aroused to the fact that after\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_364\" id=\"Page_364\"\u003e[Pg 364]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nall thought does not lead us to the completed \"absolute\r\nsystem of ideas,\" to a final stage of eternal unbroken satisfaction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBut never in our human process of experience do we reach that\r\ndetermination. It is for us the object of love and of hope, of desire\r\nand of will, of faith and of work, but never of present finding.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_198_198\" id=\"FNanchor_198_198\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_198_198\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[198]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf at this point one asks: Whence this absolute system\r\nof ideas? Why have we to reckon with it at all? there\r\nappears to be little that is satisfying. Indeed, it seems\r\ndifficult to get rid of the impression that this \"certain\r\nabsolute system of ideas\" is on our hands as a philosophical\r\nheirloom from the time of Plato, so hallowed by time and\r\nso established by centuries of acceptance that we have\r\nceased to ask for its credentials. To ground it in the\r\n\"essentially fragmentary character of human experience\"\r\nappears to be a \u003ci\u003epetitio\u003c/i\u003e, for experience does not appear\r\n\"essentially fragmentary\" in this sense until after the\r\nabsolute system has been posited.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd this brings to notice that at this point both the\r\nfragmentary and unitary characters of experience take on\r\nnew meaning. So far this fragmentary character has been\r\ndefined with reference to \"the particular inquiry in hand.\"\r\nNow, since the distinction between absolute and human\r\nexperience has emerged, the fragmentary character becomes\r\nan absolute quality of the latter in contrast with the former.\r\nSo, \u003ci\u003emutatis mutandis\u003c/i\u003e, of unity. Up to this point unity,\r\nwholeness, has been possible within human experience in the\r\ncase of particular problems, such as singing in tune, etc. But\r\nwith the appearance of the absolute system of ideas, wholeness\r\nis now the exclusive quality of the latter, as incompleteness\r\nis of human experience, though of course the \u003ci\u003eworking\u003c/i\u003e\r\nunity, the unity resulting in \"pauses of satisfaction,\" must\r\nstill remain in the latter.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_365\" id=\"Page_365\"\u003e[Pg 365]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe problem now is to somehow work the absolute system\r\nof ideas into connection with the conception of the idea as a\r\npurpose, as a concrete plan of action. Here is where the\r\nthird conception of the relation between idea and purpose,\r\ndescribed at the beginning, comes into play\u0026mdash;the conception\r\nin which the idea, instead of being the purpose, or the fulfilment\r\nof a purpose, \u003ci\u003ehas\u003c/i\u003e the purpose to correspond with, or\r\nrepresent \"its own final and completely individual expression,\"\r\ncontained in the absolute system. From the previous\r\nstandpoint the idea\u0027s \"own final and completely individual\r\nexpression\" has been found in the fulfilling experiences of\r\nsinging in tune, getting mathematical equations, chemical\r\nprecipitates, etc. Here this complete individual experience\r\ncan never be found in finite, human experience, but must be\r\nsought in the absolute system\u0026mdash;and this can be only \"the\r\nobject of love and hope, of desire and will, never of present\r\nfinding.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNotwithstanding the many previous protestations that the\r\npurposive function of the idea is its \"primary\" and \"most\r\nessential\" character, we are here forced to fall back upon\r\ncorrespondence\u0026mdash;representation as the primary, the essential,\r\nand indeed, it appears at times, as the sole function. For in\r\nthe attempt to bring these two functions together the purposive\r\nfunction is swallowed up in the representative. The idea\r\nstill is, or has a purpose, a \"plan of action,\" but this purpose,\r\nthis plan, is now nothing but to represent and correspond\r\nwith its own final and completed form in the absolute\r\nsystem. By this simple \u003ci\u003ecoup\u003c/i\u003e is the purposive function of\r\nthe idea reduced at once to the representative. Nor is it\r\npertinent to urge at this point that every purpose involves\r\nrepresentation, that the plan must be some sort of an image\r\nor scheme which symbolizes and stimulates the thing to\r\nbe done. This no one would question, but now the sole\r\n\"thing to be done\" apparently is to perfect this representa\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_366\" id=\"Page_366\"\u003e[Pg 366]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etion\r\nof the complete and individual form in the absolute\r\nsystem.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_199_199\" id=\"FNanchor_199_199\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_199_199\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[199]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOnce more, an array of passages could be marshaled from\r\nalmost every page refuting any such interpretation as this,\r\nbut they would be passages expounding the part played by\r\nthe idea in such concrete experiences as singing, measuring,\r\netc., not in representing an absolute system of ideas. Even\r\nas regards the latter one might urge that, by insisting on\r\nthe active character of the idea, we could after all regard\r\nthis absolute system as a life of will after the fashion of our\r\nown, were it not at once described as \"the complete embodiment,\"\r\n\"the final fulfilment,\" of finite ideas. A life consisting\r\nof mere fulfilment seems a baffling paradox. And\r\nits timeless character only adds to the difficulty. Moreover,\r\nif we regard the system as constituted by such concrete\r\nactivities as measuring and singing, etc., while we\r\nhave saved will, we shall now have to fallback upon our first\r\nconception of truth as found in the idea which unifies the\r\nfragmentary condition of experience as related to specific\r\nproblems, not fragmentary as related to an absolute system.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis brings us to the final and crucial point of the discussion,\r\nthe part which purpose plays in the determination\r\nof \u003ci\u003etruth\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eerror\u003c/i\u003e from the standpoint of \"the absolute\r\nsystem of ideas.\" When is this purpose of the idea to correspond\r\nwith its absolute, final, and completed form fulfilled,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_367\" id=\"Page_367\"\u003e[Pg 367]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor partially fulfilled? And here at the very outset is a\r\ndifficulty. We have read repeatedly that the idea is itself\r\n\"the partial fulfilment of a purpose.\" It is now to seek an\r\nobject which shall increase this degree of fulfilment, but\r\nstill this fulfilment shall be incomplete. And when we\r\ncome to consider error, it too will be found to consist in a\r\npartial fulfilment. So it appears that there are three stages\r\nof \"partial fulfilment\" to be discriminated, one belonging\r\nto the idea itself, another to finite truth, and still another\r\nto error.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eReturning to the problem, from this point on we find the\r\ntwo standpoints, that of the specific situation and that of the\r\nabsolute system, so closely interwoven and entangled that\r\nthey are followed with great difficulty. We have already\r\nseen that the idea seeks correspondence with its object,\r\nbecause it is \"fragmentary,\" \"incomplete,\" \"indetermined.\"\r\nAnd there we found that this indeterminate and fragmentary\r\ncharacter belonged to the idea as a purpose, a\r\nplan of seeking relief from some sort of \"restlessness\"\r\nand \"dissatisfaction,\" such as singing out of tune, etc.\r\nHere it is the incompleteness of an imperfect representation\r\nof its object in the absolute system that is the \u003ci\u003emotif\u003c/i\u003e, and\r\nhow it is to effect an improvement in its imperfect condition\r\nis now the problem. Here again the appeal is to purpose.\r\nWhatever may constitute the absolute system, one thing is\r\nassured: nothing in it can be an object except as the finite\r\nidea \"intends it,\" purposes it, to be its object. Again must\r\nwe ask: On what basis is this object in the absolute system\r\nselected at all? In general the answer is: On the basis of a\r\nneed of \"further determination;\" but when we further analyze\r\nthis, we find it means on the basis of a specific want or\r\nneed, such as food, shelter, measuring, singing, etc. The\r\nbasis of the selection, then, is entirely on the side of the concrete,\r\nfinite situation.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_368\" id=\"Page_368\"\u003e[Pg 368]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHere, too, we might ask: Whence the confidence that\r\nthere will be found something in the absolute system\r\nthat will fulfil the purpose generated on the side of the\r\nfinite? Must we not here fall back on something like a pre-established\r\nharmony? To this our author would say: \"Yea,\r\nverily. The fact that the absolute system responds to the\r\nfinite needs does precisely show that the finite and the absolute\r\ncannot be sundered.\" But when we try to state \u003ci\u003ehow\u003c/i\u003e the\r\npurpose generated on the side of the finite can be met by\r\nthe absolute system, the account again seems to run so much\r\nin terms of the finite experience that to call it a system of\r\n\"final,\" \"completed,\" and \"fulfilled\" ideas does not seem\r\naccurate. We must note here, too, the shifting in the sense\r\nof \"purpose.\" The idea selects its object on the basis of the\r\nmaterial needed to relieve the unrest and dissatisfaction of\r\nsinging out of tune, etc. But now it is to be satisfied by\r\nincreasing the extent of its representation of its object in the\r\nabsolute system.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd now, finally, what shall mark the attainment of this\r\npurpose of the idea to correspond and represent \"its own\r\ncompleted form\"? When is the correspondence and representation\r\ntrue? Simply at the point where \"we pause satisfied,\"\r\nwhere \"no other content need be substituted, or from\r\nthe point of view of the satisfied idea could be substituted.\"\r\nThat is all; there is no other answer. There are other\r\nstatements, but they all come to the same thing. For\r\ninstance:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIt is true\u0026mdash;this instant\u0027s idea\u0026mdash;if, in its own measure, and\r\non its own plan, it corresponds, even in its vagueness, to its own\r\nfinal and completely individual expression.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_200_200\" id=\"FNanchor_200_200\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_200_200\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[200]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the moment we ask what this \"final and individual\r\nexpression\" is, and what is meant by \"in its own measure,\"\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_369\" id=\"Page_369\"\u003e[Pg 369]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand \"on its own plan,\" we are thrown back at once upon the\r\npreceding statement. The next sentence following the passage\r\njust quoted does indeed define this \"individual expression.\"\r\n\"Its expression would be the very life of fulfilment\r\nof purpose which this present idea already fragmentarily\r\nbegins, as it were, to express.\" But how can we know that\r\nthe expression is \"fragmentary\" unless we have some experience\r\nof wholeness?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd here perhaps is the place to say, what has been implied\r\nall along, that this absolutely \"fragmentary\" character\r\nof human experience is an abstraction of the relatively disintegrated\r\ncondition into which experience temporarily falls,\r\nwhich abstraction is then reinstated as a fixed quality, overlooking\r\nthe fact that experience becomes fragmentary only\r\nthat it may again become whole. The absolute system, the\r\nfinal fulfilment, is in the same case. It too is but the hypostatized\r\nabstraction of the function of becoming whole, of\r\nwholing and fulfilling, which manifests itself in the \"pauses\r\nof satisfaction.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"But,\" Mr. Royce would say, \"the wholeness of the particular\r\ninstance is after all not a true and perfect wholeness,\r\nbecause we can always think of the fulfilling experience as\r\npossibly different, as having a possibly different embodiment.\"\r\nBut this implies also a different purpose. Moreover,\r\nit abstracts the purpose from the specific conditions\r\nunder which the purpose develops. Thus in singing in tune\r\none doubtless could easily imagine himself singing another\r\ntune, on another occasion, in another key, in a clear tenor\r\ninstead of a cracked bass, etc. But if on \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e occasion, in\r\n\u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e song, and with \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e cracked bass voice one, accepting\r\nall these conditions, does, with malice aforethought, purpose\r\nto strike the tune, and happily succeeds, why, for that purpose\r\nformed under the known and accepted conditions, is\r\nnot the accomplishment final and absolute? Nor is the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_370\" id=\"Page_370\"\u003e[Pg 370]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncase any different, so far as I can see, in mathematical\r\nexperience. To quote again:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eYou think of numbers, and accordingly count one, two, three.\r\nYour idea of these numbers is abstract, a mere generality. Why?\r\nBecause there could be other cases of counting, and other numbers\r\ncounted than the present counting process shows you, and why\r\nso? Because your purpose in counting is not wholly fulfilled by\r\nthe numbers now counted.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_201_201\" id=\"FNanchor_201_201\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_201_201\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[201]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI confess I cannot see here in what respect the purpose\r\nis not fulfilled. Doubtless there could be \"other cases of\r\ncounting,\" and \"other numbers,\" but these may not be\r\nincluded in my present purpose, which is simply to count\r\nhere and now. In this passage the purpose is not very fully\r\ndefined. One\u0027s counting is usually for something, if for\r\nnothing more than merely to illustrate the process. In this\r\nlatter case one\u0027s purpose would be completely fulfilled by just\r\nthe numbers used when he should \"pause satisfied\" with the\r\nillustration. Or, if I wish to show the properties of numbers,\r\nthen the discovery that there can always be more of\r\nthem fulfils my purpose, since this endless progression is one\r\nof the properties. Or yet again, if one should suddenly\r\nbecome enamored of the process of counting, and forthwith\r\nshould purpose to devote the rest of his days to it, it would\r\nstill be fortunate that there were always other numbers to be\r\ncounted. In other words, the idea as a purpose is formed\r\nwith reference to, and out of, specific conditions. In the last\r\nanalysis the problem always is: What is to be done here\r\nand now with the actual material at hand, under the present\r\nconditions? As the purpose is determined by these specific\r\nconditions, so is the fulfilment. To say that the fulfilment\r\nmight be different is virtually to say that the purpose might\r\nhave been different, or indeed that the universe might have\r\nbeen different.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_371\" id=\"Page_371\"\u003e[Pg 371]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis necessity of falling back upon the character of the\r\nidea as a purpose in the sense of the specific \"plan of action\"\r\ncomes into still bolder relief in the consideration of error\r\nfrom the standpoint of \"the absolute system of ideas.\" As\r\nalready mentioned, the initial and persistent problem here is\r\nto distinguish at all between truth and error in our experience\r\nfrom this standpoint. All our efforts at representing\r\nthe absolute system must fall short. What can we mean,\r\nthen, by calling some of our ideas true and others false?\r\nThe definition of error is as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAn error is an error about a specific object, only in case the\r\npurpose, imperfectly defined by the vague idea at the instant when\r\nthe error is made, is better defined, is in fact, better fulfilled by an\r\nobject whose determinate character in some wise, although never\r\nabsolutely, opposes the fragmentary efforts first made to define\r\nthem.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_202_202\" id=\"FNanchor_202_202\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_202_202\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[202]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut in relation to the absolute system the later part of this\r\nstatement holds of all our ideas. There always is the absolute\r\nobject which would \"better define\" and \"better fulfil\"\r\nour purposes. Hence it is only in reference to the \"specific\"\r\ninstances of singing, measuring, etc., that a basis\r\nfor the distinction can be found. Here our plan is not true\r\nso long as its mission of relieving the specific unrest and\r\ndissatisfaction, the specific discord or hunger, is unfulfilled.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe only criterion, then, which we have been able to find\r\nfor the fulfilment of the purpose, for the truth of the idea as\r\nrepresenting an object in the absolute system, is the sense\r\nof wholeness, the \"pause of satisfaction,\" which we experience\r\nin realizing such specific purposes as \"singing in tune.\"\r\nAnd if it be said again: \"Precisely so; this only shows how\r\nintimate is the relation between our experience and the absolute\r\nsystem of ideas;\" then must it also be said once more,\r\neither that the absolute system can be nothing more than an\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_372\" id=\"Page_372\"\u003e[Pg 372]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nabstraction of the element of wholeness or wholing in our\r\nexperience, or that thus far the relation appears to rest upon\r\nsheer assumption.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgain, it may be insisted, as suggested at the outset of\r\nthis discussion, that the idea can well have two purposes:\r\none to help constitute and solve the specific problems of\r\ndaily life; the other to represent the absolute system. Very\r\nwell, we must then make out a case for the latter. If the\r\npurposes are to be different, the purpose to represent the\r\nAbsolute should have a criterion of its own. This we have\r\nnot been able to find. On the contrary, whenever pushed\r\nto the point of stating a criterion for the representation of\r\nthe absolute system, we have had to appeal, in every case, to\r\nthe fulfilment of a specific finite purpose. And even if this\r\npurpose to represent the absolute system had some apparent\r\nstandard of its own, we should not be content to leave the\r\nmatter so. We should scarcely be satisfied to observe as a\r\nmere matter of fact that the idea has a reconstructive function,\r\nand \u003ci\u003ealso\u003c/i\u003e a representative function. Such a brute\r\ndualism would be intolerable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eIV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the end, the outcome of the endeavor to establish a\r\nconnection between the relation of the idea to human experience\r\nand its relation to the absolute system does not\r\nappear satisfying. The idea is left either with two independent\r\npurposes\u0026mdash;one to reconstruct finite experience, the\r\nother to represent and symbolize the absolute system\u0026mdash;or\r\none of these purposes is merged in the other. When the\r\nattempt is made from the standpoint of the absolute system,\r\nthe reconstructive purpose is swallowed up in the representative.\r\nWhen, on the other hand, the need for a basis of\r\ndistinction between truth and error \"here on this bank and\r\nshoal of time\" is felt, the representative disappears in the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_373\" id=\"Page_373\"\u003e[Pg 373]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreconstructive function. Nowhere are we able to discover a\r\ntrue unification. To be sure, we have been told again and\r\nagain that the representation of the absolute object, if only\r\nwe could accomplish it, would be \"the final fulfilment,\"\r\n\"completion,\" and \"realization\" of the human, finite purpose.\r\nBut besides a confessed impotency at the very start,\r\nthis involves, as we have seen, either a sudden transformation\r\nof the specific purpose of singing in tune, etc., into that\r\nof representing the absolute system, or a sheer assumption\r\nthat the representation of the absolute object does somehow\r\nhelp in the realization of the specific finite purpose. Nowhere\r\nis there any account of \u003ci\u003ehow\u003c/i\u003e this help would be given.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd this suggests that if the analysis of the idea as purpose,\r\ngiven at the outset of Mr. Royce\u0027s lecture, had been\r\ndeveloped further, if the conditions and origin of purpose\r\nhad been examined, it is difficult to see how this discrepancy\r\ncould have escaped disclosure. Mr. Royce starts his account\r\nby simply accepting from psychology a general description\r\nof the purposive character of the idea. Even in the more\r\ndetailed passages on purpose we have nothing but descriptions\r\nof purpose after it is formed. Nothing is said of the\r\norigin of this purposiveness. The purposive character of\r\nexperience is of course very manifest, but what is the significance\r\nof this purposing in experience as a whole? What is\r\nthe source and the material of the purposes?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is this uncritical acceptance of the purposive quality\r\nof the idea that obscures the irrelevancy of its relation to\r\nthe absolute system. If the idea must merely be or have a\r\npurpose, then it may as well be that of representing the\r\nabsolute system as any other. Of course, there are troublesome\r\nquestions as to how our finite ideas ever got such a\r\npurpose; but, after all, if it is simply a matter of having\r\nany sort of a purpose, representing the absolute system may\r\nanswer as well as anything. But when now we come to deal\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_374\" id=\"Page_374\"\u003e[Pg 374]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith the problem of fulfilment, with the question of truth\r\nand error, we have to reckon with this neglect of the source\r\nof this purposiveness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is this unanalyzed ground of the purpose that makes\r\nthe matter of fulfilment so ambiguous. Such an analysis, we\r\nbelieve, would have shown that the conditions out of which\r\nthe idea as a purpose arises determine also the sort of fulfilment\r\npossible. There are, indeed, one or two very general,\r\nbut very significant, statements in this direction, if they\r\nwere only followed up. For instance:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn doing what we often call \"making up our minds\" we pass\r\nfrom a vague to a definite state of will and of resolution. In such\r\ncases we begin with perhaps a very indefinite sort of restlessness\r\nwhich arouses the question: \"What is it that I want, what do I\r\ndesire, what is my real purpose?\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn other words, what does this restlessness mean? What\r\nis the matter? What is to be done?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePurpose is born, then, out of restlessness and dissatisfaction.\r\nBut whence comes this restlessness and dissatisfaction?\r\nSurely we cannot at this point charge it to a discrepancy\r\nbetween our finite idea and the absolute object, since it is\r\njust this restlessness that is giving birth to the purposive\r\nidea. One thing, at any rate, appears pretty certain: this\r\n\"indefinite restlessness\" presupposes some sort of activity\r\nalready going on. The restlessness is not generated in a\r\nvacuum. But why should this activity get into a condition to\r\nbe described as \"indefinite restlessness\" and dissatisfaction?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eRepugnant as it will be to many to have psycho-physical,\r\nto say nothing of biological, doctrines introduced into a\r\nlogical discussion, I confess that, at this point facing the\r\nissue squarely, I see no other way. And it appears to me that\r\njust at this point it is the fear of phenomenalistic giants that\r\nhas kept logic wandering so many years in the wilderness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat, then, in this action already going on is responsible\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_375\" id=\"Page_375\"\u003e[Pg 375]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor this restlessness? First let us note that \"indefinite restlessness\"\r\nand \"dissatisfaction\" are terms descriptive of what\r\nMr. James calls \"the first thing in the way of consciousness.\"\r\nThis assumes consciousness as a factor in activity. So that\r\nour question now becomes: What is the significance of this\r\nfactor of restless, dissatisfied consciousness in activity? Now,\r\nthere appears no way of getting at the part which consciousness\r\nplays different from that of discovering the function of\r\nanything else. And this way is simply that of observing, as\r\nbest we may, the conditions under which consciousness\r\noperates, and what it does. Here the biologist and psychologist\r\nwith one voice inform us that this indefinite restlessness\r\nwhich marks the point of the operation of consciousness\r\narises where, in a co-ordinated system of activities, there\r\ndevelop out of the continuation of the activity itself new\r\nconditions calling for a readjustment and reconstruction of\r\nthe activity, if it is to go on. Consciousness then appears\r\nto be the function which makes possible the reorganization\r\nof the results of a process back into the process itself, thus\r\nconstituting and preserving the continuity of activity. So\r\ninterpreted, consciousness appears to be an essential element\r\nin the conception of a self-sustaining activity. This\r\n\"indefinite restlessness,\" in which consciousness begins,\r\nmarks, then, the operation of the function of reconstruction\r\nwithout which activity would utterly break down.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePrecisely because, then, the idea \"as a plan\" is projected\r\nand constructed in response to this restlessness must its fulfilment\r\nbe relevant to it. It is when the idea as a purpose,\r\na plan, born out of this matrix of restlessness, begins to\r\naspire to the absolute system, and attempts to ignore or\r\nrepudiate its lowly antecedents, that the difficulties concerning\r\nfulfilment begin. They are the difficulties that beset every\r\nambition which aspires to things foreign to its inherited\r\npowers and equipment.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_376\" id=\"Page_376\"\u003e[Pg 376]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA detailed account at this point of the construction and\r\nfulfilment of the idea as \"a plan of action\" would contain a\r\nconsecutive reinterpretation of Mr. Royce\u0027s principal rubrics.\r\nSuch an account the limits of this paper forbid. We shall\r\nhave to be content with pointing out in a general way a few\r\ninstances by way of illustration.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the first place, it is in this matrix of indefinite restlessness\r\nout of which the idea is born that the \"fragmentary\r\ncharacter of experience,\" of which Mr. Royce is so keenly\r\nconscious, appears. But, once more, this fragmentary character\r\nis discernible only by contrast with the wholeness on\r\nboth sides of the fragments; the wholeness that precedes\r\nthe restlessness, and the new \"pause of satisfaction\" toward\r\nwhich it points. Nor must we forget that the habit matrix,\r\nout of the disintegration of which the restlessness is immediately\r\nborn, does not exist as some metaphysical ultimate out\r\nof which thought as such has evolved. Back of it is some\r\nprevious purpose in whose service habit was enlisted. On\r\nthe other hand, this disintegration means that the old purpose,\r\nthe old plan, must be reconstructed; that it, along with\r\nthe disintegrated habit, becomes the material for a new plan,\r\na new wholing of experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the next place, the construction of this new plan of\r\naction does involve \"re-presentation.\" The first step in the\r\ntransition from the condition of \"indefinite restlessness\"\r\ntoward a \"plan\" is the diagnosis, the definition of the restlessness.\r\nThis involves the re-presentation in consciousness of\r\nthe activities, out of which the restlessness has arisen. This\r\nre-presentation is also the beginning of the reconstruction.\r\nThe diagnosis of the singing activity as being \"out of tune\"\r\nis the negative side of beginning to sing in tune. It is now\r\na commonplace of psychology that all representation is\r\nreconstruction. And this is where Mr. Royce\u0027s emphasis of\r\nthe symbolic, the algebraic, as against the copy type of rep\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_377\" id=\"Page_377\"\u003e[Pg 377]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eresentation,\r\nhas its application. All we want here is some\r\nsort of an image\u0026mdash;visual, auditory, motor, it matters not\u0026mdash;that\r\nshall serve to focus attention upon the singing activities\r\nuntil they are reconstructed sufficiently to bring us to the\r\n\"pause of satisfaction.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_203_203\" id=\"FNanchor_203_203\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_203_203\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[203]\u003c/a\u003e But nowhere in all this is there any\r\nreference to the idea\u0027s object in the absolute system. Nor\r\ndoes there appear to be any call or place for such reference.\r\nThe representation here is a part of the very process of\r\nforming the plan of further reconstruction out of the\r\nmaterials of the specific situation. Representation is not the\r\nplan\u0027s own end and aim. This is to stimulate a new set of\r\nactivities that shall lead out of the present state of unrest\r\nand dissatisfaction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is also true, as already mentioned, that in the process\r\nof fulfilling the plan, of realizing the idea, further determination\r\nand specification is produced in the plan itself. The\r\nidea as a plan is certainly not formed all at once. Nor does\r\nit reach and maintain a fixed content. No purpose is ever\r\nrealized in its original content. But this does not mean\r\nthat its realization is, therefore, \"partial,\" \"incomplete,\" or\r\n\"fragmentary.\" It is a part of its business to change. The\r\npurpose is not there for its own sake. The purpose is there\r\nas a \u003ci\u003emeans\u003c/i\u003e to the reorganization and reconstruction of experience.\r\nIt exists, as Mr. Royce says, as an instrument, \"as a\r\ntool\" for \"introducing control into experience.\" And as,\r\nin the process of use, a tool always undergoes modification,\r\nso here, as an instrument for reconstructing habit, the plan,\r\ntoo, undergoes reconstruction. Indeed, as regards its content,\r\nit is itself, as Mr. Royce says, as much a habit, as\r\nmuch \"the product of association,\" as any part of experience.\r\nThe purposing function, the purposing activity, remains; its\r\ncontent is constantly shifting.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHere, too, is where \"the submission of the idea to the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_378\" id=\"Page_378\"\u003e[Pg 378]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nobject\" takes place. Only, here, it is not a submission to an\r\nobject already constituted as it is in Mr. Royce\u0027s conception\r\nof the absolute system. The idea as an hypothetical plan of\r\naction, as a trial construction, must be tested by the activities it\r\nis attempting to reconstruct. That is to say, at this point the\r\nquestion is: Does the plan apply to the activities actually\r\ninvolved in the unrest? Has it diagnosed the case properly,\r\nand is it therefore one in and through which these activities\r\ncan operate and come to unity again? The \"submission\"\r\nhere is the submission of the purpose, the end, to the\r\nmaterial out of which it is formed, and with which it must\r\nwork. But again this material to which the idea submits\r\nitself is anything but finally fixed and \"complete\" in form.\r\nOn the contrary, as we have seen, it is just the fragmentary\r\nand incomplete condition of this material that calls for the\r\nidea. Yet the idea as a plan must be true to its mission,\r\nand to this material, and in this sense must submit itself to\r\nwhatever modifications and reconstruction the material \"dictates\"\r\nas necessary in order that it may function in and\r\nthrough the plan.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_204_204\" id=\"FNanchor_204_204\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_204_204\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[204]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand\u0026mdash;and this is the point to which Mr.\r\nRoyce gives most emphasis\u0026mdash;it is equally apparent that\r\n\"the idea must determine its object.\" On this all philosophy,\r\nfrom Plato down, which approaches reality \"from the side of\r\nideas\" is at stake. And this does not appear impossible if,\r\nagain, the object is not already and eternally fixed and complete.\r\nIf the object is one constructed out of the very\r\nmass of habit material which the idea is reconstructing, and if\r\n\"determination\" means not copying, but construction, then,\r\nindeed, must the idea \"determine its object.\" Just for that\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_379\" id=\"Page_379\"\u003e[Pg 379]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndoes it have its being. That is its sole mission. Here the\r\ndetermination of the object by the idea is not a mere\r\nabstract postulate; it is not based upon a general consideration\r\nof the disastrous consequences to our logical and ethical\r\nassumptions, if it were not so determined. Here not only\r\nthe general necessity for it, but the \u003ci\u003emodus operandi\u003c/i\u003e of this\r\ndetermination, is apparent. But, at the risk of tedious\r\niteration, must it again be said that for the determination of\r\nthe completed and perfected object in the absolute system\r\nnot only is there nowhere any \u003ci\u003emodus\u003c/i\u003e to be found, but, even\r\nif there were, it is difficult to see what it would have to do\r\nwith the kind of determination demanded by such a specific\r\nsort of unrest as \"singing out of tune,\" etc. The process of\r\nsubmission is thus a reciprocal one. Neither in the object\r\nnor in the idea is there a fixed scheme or order \u003ci\u003eto\u003c/i\u003e which the\r\nother must submit and conform. And this is simply the\r\nlogical commonplace that submission cannot be a one-sided\r\naffair, that determination must be reciprocal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis brings us to what might as well have been our introductory\r\nas our concluding observation. It has just been\r\nsaid that the determination of the object by the idea is a\r\nvital matter in any philosophy which approaches reality\r\n\"from the side of ideas.\" Such a way of approach must\r\nassert \"the primacy of the world of ideas over the world as\r\na fact.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_205_205\" id=\"FNanchor_205_205\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_205_205\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[205]\u003c/a\u003e Mr. Royce thus further states the case:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eI am one of those who hold that when you ask what is an idea, and\r\nhow can ideas stand in any true relation to reality, you attack the\r\nworld knot in the way that promises most for the untying of its\r\nmeshes. This way is of course very ancient. It is the way of\r\nPlato…. It is in a different sense the way of Kant. If you\r\nview philosophy in this fashion, you subordinate the study of the\r\nworld as fact to a reflection upon the world as idea. Begin by\r\naccepting upon faith and tradition the mere brute reality of the\r\nworld as fact, and there you are sunk deep in an ocean of mystery.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_380\" id=\"Page_380\"\u003e[Pg 380]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e…\r\nThe world of fact surprises you with all sorts of strange contrasts…. It\r\nbaffles you with caprices like a charming and yet\r\nhopelessly wayward child, or like a bad fairy. The world of fact\r\ndaily announces itself to you as a defiant mystery.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_206_206\" id=\"FNanchor_206_206\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_206_206\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[206]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHere we have concisely stated at the outset of the lectures\r\nthe position which we have seen to be fraught with so many\r\ndifficulties: the position, namely, which accepts to start with\r\nthe opposition of the world as idea and the world as fact, as\r\nsomething given, instead of something to be accounted for;\r\nand which assumes that this opposition stands in the way of\r\nreaching reality, whereas it possibly may be of the very\r\nessence of reality. To be sure, the above statement of this\r\nopposition between the world as fact and as idea is but the\r\nexpository starting-point. And it is true that the rest of the\r\nargument is occupied in the attempt to close this breach.\r\nBut, as we have seen, except where the idea is expounded as\r\na specific purpose, arising out of a specific experience of\r\nunrest, such as singing out of tune, etc.\u0026mdash;except in this case,\r\nthe breach is taken as found and the attempt to heal it is\r\nmade by working forward from the opposition as given instead\r\nof back to its source. This opposition, of course, has its\r\nforward goal, but the difficulty is to find it without an exploration\r\nof its source. It is back in that matrix out of which\r\nthe opposition has arisen that the line of direction to the\r\ngoal is to be found.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMoreover, in starting from this opposition of fact and idea\r\nas given, the only method of quelling it seems to be either\r\nthat of reducing one side to terms of the other, or of appealing\r\nto some new, and therefore external unifying, agency.\r\nBut if the factors in the opposition are found, not one in\r\nsubmission \u003ci\u003eto\u003c/i\u003e the other, nor having the \"primacy\" \u003ci\u003eover\u003c/i\u003e the\r\nother, but as co-ordinate and mutually determining functions,\r\ndeveloped from a common matrix and co-operating\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_381\" id=\"Page_381\"\u003e[Pg 381]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ein the work of reconstructing experience, some of the difficulties\r\ninvolved in the alternative methods just mentioned\r\nappear to drop out.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_207_207\" id=\"FNanchor_207_207\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_207_207\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[207]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe point may be clearer if we recur to the passage and\r\nask just what is meant by \"the defiantly mysterious,\"\r\n\"baffling,\" and \"capricious\" character of the world as fact\u0026mdash;as\r\n\"brute reality.\" First, if by the world as \"fact;\" as\r\n\"brute reality,\" we mean experience so brute that it is not\r\nyet \"lighted up with ideas,\" it is difficult to see how it could\r\nbe mysterious or capricious, since mystery and caprice appear\r\nonly when experience ceases to be taken merely as it comes\r\nand an inquiry for connections and meanings has begun.\r\nThat is to say, there can be neither mystery nor caprice except\r\nin relation to some sort of order. And order is always a\r\nmatter of ideas. But it is sufficient to submit Mr. Royce\u0027s\r\nown statement on this point:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe all of us from moment to moment have experience. This\r\nexperience comes to us in part as brute fact; light and shade, sound\r\nand silence, pain and grief and joy…. These given facts flow by;\r\nand were they all, our world would be too much of a blind problem\r\nfor us even to be puzzled by its meaningless presence.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_208_208\" id=\"FNanchor_208_208\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_208_208\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[208]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf next we take the world of fact as in contrast and co-ordinate\r\nwith the world of ideas, mystery and caprice here,\r\ncertainly, are not all on the side of the fact. Here, again, must\r\nthey be functions of the relation between fact and idea. We\r\nhave seen that without thought there is neither mystery nor\r\ncaprice. The idea then cannot take part in the production\r\nof mystery and caprice, and forthwith deny its parenthood.\r\nOf course, mystery and caprice are not the final fruits of\r\nthis co-ordinate opposition of fact and idea. They are but\r\nthe \u003ci\u003efirst\u003c/i\u003e fruits\u0026mdash;the relatively unorganized embryonic mass\r\nwhich through the further activities of the parent functions\r\nshall develop into the symmetry of truth and law.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_382\" id=\"Page_382\"\u003e[Pg 382]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere appears then no ultimate \"primacy\" of either idea\r\nor fact over the other. Nor does either appear as a better\r\nway of approach \u003ci\u003eto\u003c/i\u003e reality than the other. It is only when\r\nwe say: \"Lo! here in the idea,\" \u003ci\u003eor\u003c/i\u003e \"Lo! there in the fact\r\nis reality,\" that we find it \"imperfect,\" \"incomplete,\" and\r\n\"fragmentary,\" and must straightway \"look for another.\"\r\nBut surely not in \"a certain absolute system of ideas,\"\r\nwhich is \"the object of love and hope, of desire and will, of\r\nfaith and work, but never of present finding,\" shall we seek\r\nit. Rather precisely in the loving and hoping, desiring and\r\nwilling, believing and working, shall we find that reality in\r\nwhich and for which both the \"World as fact\" and the\r\n\"World as idea\" have their being.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_383\" id=\"Page_383\"\u003e[Pg 383]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"INDEX\" id=\"INDEX\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eINDEX\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"pindex\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAbsolute\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas constituting reality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_348\"\u003e348\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas related to truth and error, \u003ca href=\"#Page_363\"\u003e363 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas a hypostatized abstraction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_369\"\u003e369\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAbsolute self\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_330\"\u003e330\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAccessory\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethought as, \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\"\u003e58 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eActivity\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas social, \u003ca href=\"#Page_74\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethought as, \u003ca href=\"#Page_78\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einterrupted, and judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand hypothesis, \u003ca href=\"#Page_170\"\u003e170\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas sensori-motor, \u003ca href=\"#Page_193\"\u003e193\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_200\"\u003e200\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Function, Reconstruction).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u0026AElig;sthetic experience\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eappreciative rather than reflective, \u003ca href=\"#Page_255\"\u003e255\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot a form of valuation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_339\"\u003e339\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_340\"\u003e340\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAlternatives\u003c/span\u003e: in judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_155\"\u003e155\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Disjunction).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAnalogy\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_171\"\u003e171\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_172\"\u003e172\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_175\"\u003e175\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein relation to habit, \u003ca href=\"#Page_176\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAnaxagoras\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein relation to the One and the Many, \u003ca href=\"#Page_219\"\u003e219\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehis \u0026#957;\u0026#959;\u0026#8166;\u0026#962;, \u003ca href=\"#Page_220\"\u003e220\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_221\"\u003e221\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAnaximander\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand the infinite, \u003ca href=\"#Page_209\"\u003e209\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehis process of segregation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_214\"\u003e214\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_215\"\u003e215\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAnaximenes\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehis \u0026#7936;\u0026#961;\u0026#967;\u0026#942;, \u003ca href=\"#Page_209\"\u003e209\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehis scheme of rarefaction and condensation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_209\"\u003e209\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_213\"\u003e213\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_215\"\u003e215\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_224\"\u003e224\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAngell\u003c/span\u003e, J. R., \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_2_2\"\u003e14 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_165_165\"\u003e345 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAnimism\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_15_15\"\u003e49 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAntecedents of thought\u003c/span\u003e (see Stimulus).\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eApplied logic\u003c/span\u003e: Lotze\u0027s definition, \u003ca href=\"#Page_6\"\u003e6\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAppreciation\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistinguished from reflection, \u003ca href=\"#Page_255\"\u003e255\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_339\"\u003e339\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot to be identified with valuation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_320\"\u003e320-24\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_338\"\u003e338\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u0026#7944;\u0026#961;\u0026#967;\u0026#942;:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emeaning of search for, \u003ca href=\"#Page_211\"\u003e211 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAssociation of ideas\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erefers to meanings, \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_34\"\u003e34\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econnection with thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_80\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edoctrine of: analogous to subjectivism in ethics, \u003ca href=\"#Page_261\"\u003e261\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epresupposes a mechanical metaphysics, \u003ca href=\"#Page_330\"\u003e330\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_156_156\"\u003e331 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAtomists\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etreatment of the One and the Many, \u003ca href=\"#Page_221\"\u003e221\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAustrian economists\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_307\"\u003e307\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_333\"\u003e333\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAuthority and custom\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elogic of attitude of obedience to, \u003ca href=\"#Page_286\"\u003e286\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esocial conditions compatible with dominance of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_286\"\u003e286\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efailure of, as moral control, \u003ca href=\"#Page_286\"\u003e286\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBacon\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eextreme empirical position, \u003ca href=\"#Page_156\"\u003e156 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eview of induction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_158\"\u003e158\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\"\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBad\u003c/span\u003e\":\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epractical significance of, as moral predicate, \u003ca href=\"#Page_259\"\u003e259\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to \"wrong,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_335\"\u003e335\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBaldwin, J. M.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_120_120\"\u003e257 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_204_204\"\u003e378 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBecoming: as relative, \u003ca href=\"#Page_206\"\u003e206\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\"Begr\u0026uuml;ndung\" and \"Best\u0026auml;tigung\"\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eWundt\u0027s distinction of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_179\"\u003e179\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecriticised, \u003ca href=\"#Page_181\"\u003e181\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_182\"\u003e182\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBiology\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eview of sensation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003euse of, in logic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_374\"\u003e374\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_375\"\u003e375\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBosanquet, B\u003c/span\u003e., \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_26_26\"\u003e59 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_147\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_189\"\u003e189\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_190\"\u003e190\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_191\"\u003e191\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_300\"\u003e300\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Study V).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBradley, F. H.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_14_14\"\u003e47 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_20_20\"\u003e54 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_90\"\u003e90 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_147\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_189\"\u003e189\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_190\"\u003e190\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_191\"\u003e191\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_192\"\u003e192\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_194\"\u003e194\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_143_143\"\u003e299 note 2\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_156_156\"\u003e331 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_157_157\"\u003e332 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_353\"\u003e353\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBrentano\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_118_118\"\u003e250 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eButler, J.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_277\"\u003e277\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCertain, the\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to tension, \u003ca href=\"#Page_50\"\u003e50\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas datum, \u003ca href=\"#Page_57\"\u003e57\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCoefficients of reality, perception, and recognition\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefined, \u003ca href=\"#Page_263\"\u003e263-7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epresent in economic and ethical experience, \u003ca href=\"#Page_267\"\u003e267-9\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCoexistence, coincidence, and coherence\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_28\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_29\"\u003e29\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\"\u003e33-6\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_59\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eConceptions\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eLotze\u0027s view of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_59\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eBacon\u0027s attitude toward, \u003ca href=\"#Page_157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to fact, \u003ca href=\"#Page_168\"\u003e168\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efunction in Greek philosophy, \u003ca href=\"#Page_342\"\u003e342\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Idea, Image, Hypothesis).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eConceptual logic\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas related to idea and image, \u003ca href=\"#Page_188\"\u003e188-92\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eConscience\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eevolution of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_286\"\u003e286\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_287\"\u003e287\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eambiguous and transitional character of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_287\"\u003e287\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emetaphysical implications of, as moral standard, \u003ca href=\"#Page_288\"\u003e288\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot autonomous, \u003ca href=\"#Page_288\"\u003e288\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eConscientiousness\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edangers of, consequent upon ideal of self-realization, \u003ca href=\"#Page_316\"\u003e316\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eGreen\u0027s defense of, referred to, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_149_149\"\u003e316 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eConservation\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof energy and mass, \u003ca href=\"#Page_206\"\u003e206\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Energy).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eContent of knowledge\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand logical object, originates in tension, \u003ca href=\"#Page_49\"\u003e49\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethought\u0027s own, \u003ca href=\"#Page_65\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand datum, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas truth, \u003ca href=\"#Page_79\"\u003e79 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas static and dynamic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_93\"\u003e93 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_110\"\u003e110 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Study IV; Objectivity, Validity).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eContinuity\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_10\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_13\"\u003e13\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_55\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eControl\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eidea and, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_129\"\u003e129\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eConversion of propositions\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_171\"\u003e171\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein relation to habit, \u003ca href=\"#Page_176\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCopernicus\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehis theory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_178\"\u003e178\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecompared with Galileo\u0027s supposition, \u003ca href=\"#Page_179\"\u003e179-81\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCopula\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_118\"\u003e118 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003escheme of mediation between subject and predicate, \u003ca href=\"#Page_208\"\u003e208\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_214\"\u003e214 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCorrespondence\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof datum and idea, \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof thought-content and thought-activity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_70\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas criterion of truth, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_353\"\u003e353 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDarwin, Charles\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_146\"\u003e146\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_150\"\u003e150\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_179\"\u003e179\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDatum of thought\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_8\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas fact, \u003ca href=\"#Page_26\"\u003e26\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_50\"\u003e50\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eLotze\u0027s theory of, stated, \u003ca href=\"#Page_55\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecriticised, \u003ca href=\"#Page_56\"\u003e56 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to induction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_61\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand content, \u003ca href=\"#Page_60\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_70\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Study III; Content, Fact, Stimulus).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_384\" id=\"Page_384\"\u003e[Pg 384]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDeduction\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_211\"\u003e211\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_212\"\u003e212\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDefinition\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einvented by Socrates, \u003ca href=\"#Page_203\"\u003e203\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDemocritus\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eattempts at definition, \u003ca href=\"#Page_203\"\u003e203\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDemonstrative judgment\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDetermination\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas criterion of truth, \u003ca href=\"#Page_362\"\u003e362 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eimpossibility of complete, in finite experience, \u003ca href=\"#Page_364\"\u003e364\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDewey, John\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_24_24\"\u003e58 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_44_44\"\u003e86 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_125_125\"\u003e266 note 2\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_149_149\"\u003e316 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_207_207\"\u003e381 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDialectic\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eZeno as originator of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_203\"\u003e203\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDiogenes of Apollonia\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_222\"\u003e222 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDisjunction\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_115\"\u003e115\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_138\"\u003e138\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDynamic\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eideas as, and as static, \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ereality as, \u003ca href=\"#Page_126\"\u003e126\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEarth\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas an element, \u003ca href=\"#Page_213\"\u003e213\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEconomic judgment\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einvolves same type of process as physical, \u003ca href=\"#Page_235\"\u003e235\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ea process of valuation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_236\"\u003e236\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etype of situation evoking, \u003ca href=\"#Page_241\"\u003e241-6\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_293\"\u003e293-5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_302\"\u003e302\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_303\"\u003e303\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistinguished from ethical, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_111_111\"\u003e243 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_112_112\"\u003e246 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_271\"\u003e271\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_302\"\u003e302\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_303\"\u003e303\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to physical, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_114_114\"\u003e246 note 3\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esubject of, the means of action, \u003ca href=\"#Page_259\"\u003e259\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_304\"\u003e304\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eanalysis of process of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_304\"\u003e304-12\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistinguished from \"pull and haul,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_237\"\u003e237\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_238\"\u003e238\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epsychological account of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_310\"\u003e310\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_311\"\u003e311\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ea reconstructive process, \u003ca href=\"#Page_311\"\u003e311\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_312\"\u003e312\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\"\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEgoism, Neo-Hegelian\u003c/span\u003e,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_316\"\u003e316\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEhrenfels, C. von\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_151_151\"\u003e318 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEidola\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eBacon\u0027s view of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEleatics\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheir logical position, \u003ca href=\"#Page_216\"\u003e216 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eElements\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas four, \u003ca href=\"#Page_213\"\u003e213\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas infinite, \u003ca href=\"#Page_213\"\u003e213 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEmerson, R. W.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_204\"\u003e204\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_113_113\"\u003e246 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEmpedocles\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eattempts at definition, \u003ca href=\"#Page_203\"\u003e203\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etreatment of the One and the Many, \u003ca href=\"#Page_218\"\u003e218 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEmpiricism\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_11\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_29\"\u003e29\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_47\"\u003e47\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_48\"\u003e48\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_61\"\u003e61 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand rationalism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_80\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecriticised, \u003ca href=\"#Page_156\"\u003e156\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eJevons, \u003ca href=\"#Page_169\"\u003e169\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etreatment of imagery, \u003ca href=\"#Page_186\"\u003e186-8\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEnds\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econtrolling factors in acquisition of knowledge, \u003ca href=\"#Page_229\"\u003e229\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emay themselves be objects of attention and judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_233\"\u003e233\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ejudgment of, inseparable from factual judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_234\"\u003e234\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econflict of, related, the occasion for ethical judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_238\"\u003e238-41\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eindirect conflict of unrelated, the occasion for economic judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_241\"\u003e241-3\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe subject-matter of ethical judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_258\"\u003e258\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_259\"\u003e259\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefinition of, the goal of all judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_264\"\u003e264\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_272\"\u003e272\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot always explicit in judgment-process, \u003ca href=\"#Page_269\"\u003e269\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_270\"\u003e270\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enature of relation between, in ethical judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_273\"\u003e273\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_274\"\u003e274\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_291\"\u003e291\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_292\"\u003e292\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etypes of factual condition implied in acceptance of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_275\"\u003e275\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_276\"\u003e276\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ewarranted by factual judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_276\"\u003e276\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enature of, unrelatedness of, in economic judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_293\"\u003e293-5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_302\"\u003e302\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_303\"\u003e303\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Purpose).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEnergy\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eprinciple of conservation of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_206\"\u003e206\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_299\"\u003e299\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_300\"\u003e300\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot valid in sphere of valuation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_328\"\u003e328\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\"\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEnergy-Equivalence\u003c/span\u003e\":\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eprinciple of, in economic judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_308\"\u003e308\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_309\"\u003e309\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emeaning of, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_146_146\"\u003e309 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEpistemology\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5-7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_10\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_11\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_13\"\u003e13\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_17\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_47\"\u003e47\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_341\"\u003e341\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eorigin of problem of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_344\"\u003e344\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_345\"\u003e345\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eErdmann, Benno\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econcerning induction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_173\"\u003e173\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eError\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecriterion of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_371\"\u003e371\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEthical judgment\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einvolves same type of process as physical, \u003ca href=\"#Page_235\"\u003e235\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ea process of valuation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_236\"\u003e236\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_332\"\u003e332\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etype of situation evoking, \u003ca href=\"#Page_237\"\u003e237-41\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_291\"\u003e291-4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistinguished from mechanical \"pull and haul\" between ends, \u003ca href=\"#Page_237\"\u003e237\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_238\"\u003e238\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistinguished from economic judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_111_111\"\u003e243 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_112_112\"\u003e246 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_271\"\u003e271\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_302\"\u003e302\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_303\"\u003e303\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esubject of, an end of action, \u003ca href=\"#Page_258\"\u003e258\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eanalysis of process of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_295\"\u003e295-302\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ea reconstructive process, \u003ca href=\"#Page_295\"\u003e295\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_299\"\u003e299\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eExistence\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e meaning, \u003ca href=\"#Page_216\"\u003e216\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_217\"\u003e217\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eExperience\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eduality of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_16\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elogic of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_19\"\u003e19-21\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehow organized, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation of thought to organization of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\"\u003e43-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas disorganized, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Absolute, Functions).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eExperiment\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas form of deduction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_212\"\u003e212\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFact\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas equivalent to datum, \u003ca href=\"#Page_26\"\u003e26\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_50\"\u003e50 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecriteria for determining, \u003ca href=\"#Page_106\"\u003e106 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas reality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_110\"\u003e110\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein relation to both idea and reality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_380\"\u003e380 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand theory, conflict between, \u003ca href=\"#Page_150\"\u003e150\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_151\"\u003e151\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emutual dependence of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_168\"\u003e168\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eWhewell\u0027s view of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_163\"\u003e163\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Datum, Idea, Reality, Truth).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFactual judgment\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einadequate to complete mediation of conduct, \u003ca href=\"#Page_230\"\u003e230-34\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econtrolled by ends, \u003ca href=\"#Page_269\"\u003e269\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eincidental to judgments of valuation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_272\"\u003e272\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_295\"\u003e295\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etypes of, implied in acceptance of an end, \u003ca href=\"#Page_275\"\u003e275\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_276\"\u003e276\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epresents warrant for acceptance of ends, \u003ca href=\"#Page_277\"\u003e277\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFite, W.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_156_156\"\u003e331 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFragmentary\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas quality of internal meaning, \u003ca href=\"#Page_360\"\u003e360\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_361\"\u003e361\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas an attribute of finite experience, \u003ca href=\"#Page_364\"\u003e364\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_376\"\u003e376\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Stimulus, Tension).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFunctions: of experience\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_16\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elogic of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_23\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistinguished from status, \u003ca href=\"#Page_16\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_23\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_78\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_85\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etotal, as stimulus to thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_36\"\u003e36-8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_80\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edifferent, and logical distinctions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edifferent, confused by Lotze, \u003ca href=\"#Page_56\"\u003e56\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esensations as, \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGenetic\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emethod, significance of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_14\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_15\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_187\"\u003e187\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistinctions, importance of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_71\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_85\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eeffect of ignoring, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_71\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Psychology).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\"\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGood\u003c/span\u003e\":\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epractical significance of, as moral predicate, \u003ca href=\"#Page_259\"\u003e259\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to \"right,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_335\"\u003e335\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGore, W. C.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_203_203\"\u003e377 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGorgias\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_225\"\u003e225\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGreek view of thought and reality\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_342\"\u003e342 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGreen, T. H.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_126_126\"\u003e274 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_136_136\"\u003e288 note 3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_148_148\"\u003e315 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_149_149\"\u003e316 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_330\"\u003e330\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_331\"\u003e331\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHabit\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation of judgment to, interruption and resumption of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand hypothesis, \u003ca href=\"#Page_170\"\u003e170\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand analogy, \u003ca href=\"#Page_176\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand simple enumeration, \u003ca href=\"#Page_176\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand conversion, \u003ca href=\"#Page_176\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand logical meaning, \u003ca href=\"#Page_198\"\u003e198\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elogical function of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_375\"\u003e375\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_376\"\u003e376\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHeraclitus\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehis position, \u003ca href=\"#Page_215\"\u003e215 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHippo\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_209\"\u003e209\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_385\" id=\"Page_385\"\u003e[Pg 385]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHobbes, Thomas\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_301\"\u003e301\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHomogeneity\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof the world-ground, \u003ca href=\"#Page_207\"\u003e207\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof the world, \u003ca href=\"#Page_209\"\u003e209\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_210\"\u003e210\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHutcheson, F.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_301\"\u003e301\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHypothesis\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enature of, \u003ca href=\"#VII\"\u003eVII\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_143\"\u003e143-83\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eunequal stress commonly laid on its origin, structure, and function, \u003ca href=\"#Page_143\"\u003e143-5\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation of data and hypothesis strictly correlative, \u003ca href=\"#Page_145\"\u003e145\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_152\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_168\"\u003e168\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas predicate, \u003ca href=\"#Page_146\"\u003e146\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_183\"\u003e183\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enegative and positive sides of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_146\"\u003e146\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_155\"\u003e155\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecame to be recognized with rise of experimentalism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_159\"\u003e159\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand test, \u003ca href=\"#Page_174\"\u003e174\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_175\"\u003e175\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_177\"\u003e177 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eorigin of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_170\"\u003e170\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_171\"\u003e171 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esupposition and, \u003ca href=\"#Page_178\"\u003e178\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einterdependence of formation and test of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_182\"\u003e182\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eIdea\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econtinuous with fact, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_10\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_12\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistinction from fact, \u003ca href=\"#Page_13\"\u003e13\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_110\"\u003e110\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eLotze\u0027s confusion regarding, \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_65\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eassociation of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econtrast with datum, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\"\u003e52-4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efunctional conception of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_70\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\"\u003e112 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eobjective validity of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\"\u003e72-5\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas entire content of judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_119\"\u003e119\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eexistential aspect of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_99\"\u003e99 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_113\"\u003e113\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein relation to reference, \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\"\u003e97 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_103\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_129\"\u003e129\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erepresentational theory of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_100\"\u003e100 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_113\"\u003e113 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_141\"\u003e141\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_347\"\u003e347 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_372\"\u003e372 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003euniversality of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\"\u003e97 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_113\"\u003e113 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas not referred to reality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\"\u003e97 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas forms of control, \u003ca href=\"#Page_129\"\u003e129\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efunction in judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_153\"\u003e153\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistinguished from image, \u003ca href=\"#Page_183\"\u003e183-93\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistinction criticised, \u003ca href=\"#Page_199\"\u003e199-202\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eproblems accompanying discovery of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_341\"\u003e341\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein Greek thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_342\"\u003e342\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einstrumental and representative functions of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_346\"\u003e346 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_372\"\u003e372 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epurposive character of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_347\"\u003e347 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eexternal and internal meaning of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_347\"\u003e347 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eRoyce\u0027s absolute system of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_348\"\u003e348\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etriple relation to purpose in Royce\u0027s account, \u003ca href=\"#Page_349\"\u003e349 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elogical \u003ci\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e memorial, \u003ca href=\"#Page_351\"\u003e351\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein relation to fact and reality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_379\"\u003e379 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Hypothesis, Image, Predicate).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eIdeas\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ePlatonic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_247\"\u003e247\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eImage\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas merely fanciful, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein relation to meaning, \u003ca href=\"#Page_54\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eplace of, in judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistinction from idea, \u003ca href=\"#Page_189\"\u003e189-93\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistinction criticised, \u003ca href=\"#Page_199\"\u003e199-202\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas direct and indirect stimulus, \u003ca href=\"#Page_195\"\u003e195-7\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eImagery\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eempirical criteria of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_186\"\u003e186\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efunction of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_187\"\u003e187\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas representative, \u003ca href=\"#Page_186\"\u003e186-8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_194\"\u003e194\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epsychological function of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_193\"\u003e193-7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elogical function of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_198\"\u003e198\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_199\"\u003e199\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eImmediate\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas related to mediation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_342\"\u003e342\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_350\"\u003e350 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eImpression\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eLotze\u0027s definition of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_27\"\u003e27\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_28\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_29\"\u003e29\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eobjective determination of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eobjective quality of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1.5em;\"\u003eas psychic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas transformed by thought into meanings or ideas, \u003ca href=\"#Page_67\"\u003e67 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Idea, Meaning, Sensation).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eIndeterminate\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas quality of finite experience, \u003ca href=\"#Page_364\"\u003e364\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eInduction\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eBacon\u0027s view of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eby enumeration and allied processes, \u003ca href=\"#Page_171\"\u003e171\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand habit, \u003ca href=\"#Page_176\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e deduction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_211\"\u003e211\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_212\"\u003e212\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eInference\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eLotze\u0027s view of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_60\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein relation to judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_117\"\u003e117\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eInstrumental\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas character of thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_78\"\u003e78-82\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_128\"\u003e128\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_140\"\u003e140\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_346\"\u003e346 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_372\"\u003e372 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Purpose).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eInteraction\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ephysical, \u003ca href=\"#Page_218\"\u003e218 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eInterest\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edirection of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_205\"\u003e205\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eInvention\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eform of deduction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_212\"\u003e212\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJames, William\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_42_42\"\u003e81 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_178_178\"\u003e352 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_375\"\u003e375\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJevons, W. Stanley\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_169\"\u003e169\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_173\"\u003e173\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJones, Henry\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_13_13\"\u003e43 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_26_26\"\u003e59 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_66\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJudgment\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eLotze\u0027s definition of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_59\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e and \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_26_26\"\u003enote\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation of, to ideas, \u003ca href=\"#Page_60\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003estructure of, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_39_39\"\u003e75 note\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eBosanquet\u0027s theory of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_86\"\u003e86 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas a function, \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\"\u003e107 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edead and live, \u003ca href=\"#Page_108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefinition of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_86\"\u003e86\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_111\"\u003e111\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to inference, \u003ca href=\"#Page_116\"\u003e116 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elimits of single, \u003ca href=\"#Page_123\"\u003e123 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enegative, \u003ca href=\"#Page_114\"\u003e114 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof perception, \u003ca href=\"#Page_88\"\u003e88 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_96\"\u003e96\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eparts of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_118\"\u003e118 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_207\"\u003e207\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_208\"\u003e208\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etime relations of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_120\"\u003e120 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas individual, \u003ca href=\"#Page_136\"\u003e136\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas instrumental, \u003ca href=\"#Page_128\"\u003e128\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_140\"\u003e140\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas categorical and hypothetical, \u003ca href=\"#Page_136\"\u003e136\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas impersonal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_131\"\u003e131\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas intuitive, \u003ca href=\"#Page_139\"\u003e139\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evarious definitions of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_147\"\u003e147 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eanalysis of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_149\"\u003e149 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edisjunctive, \u003ca href=\"#Page_155\"\u003e155\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epsychology of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_153\"\u003e153\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epurpose of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand interrupted activity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eunique system of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_224\"\u003e224-30\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003egeneral analysis of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_230\"\u003e230-32\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epurposive character of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_353\"\u003e353 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003euniversal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_354\"\u003e354\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eparticular, \u003ca href=\"#Page_358\"\u003e358\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eindividual, \u003ca href=\"#Page_359\"\u003e359\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_360\"\u003e360\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emathematical, \u003ca href=\"#Page_354\"\u003e354 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_370\"\u003e370\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Economic, Ethical, Factual judgments, Copula, Predicate, Reflection, Subject).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eKant\u003c/span\u003e, I., \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_46\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_26_26\"\u003e60 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_163\"\u003e163\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_263\"\u003e263\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_301\"\u003e301\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eKepler\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_146\"\u003e146\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_181\"\u003e181\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eKnowledge\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein relation to reality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_102\"\u003e102 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emeaning and, \u003ca href=\"#Page_128\"\u003e128\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\"copy\" and \"instrumental\" theories of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_129\"\u003e129\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_140\"\u003e140\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_141\"\u003e141\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Judgment, Truth).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eK\u0026uuml;lpe, O.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_117_117\"\u003e250 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eorigin of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_4\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etypes of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5-22\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas generic and specific, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_23\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelations to psychology, \u003ca href=\"#Page_14\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_15\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_63\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_64\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_184\"\u003e184\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_185\"\u003e185\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_192\"\u003e192 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eeffect of modern psychology upon, \u003ca href=\"#Page_345\"\u003e345\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to genetic method, \u003ca href=\"#Page_15\"\u003e15-18\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eproblems illustrated, \u003ca href=\"#Page_19\"\u003e19\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_20\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esocial significance of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_20\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eeristic the source of formal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_203\"\u003e203\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epre-Socratic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_203\"\u003e203\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand epistemology, \u003ca href=\"#Page_341\"\u003e341\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_342\"\u003e342\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Epistemology, Psychology).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLotze\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecriticised, Studies \u003ca href=\"#II\"\u003eII\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#III\"\u003eIII\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#IV\"\u003eIV\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eapplied logic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_6\"\u003e6\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethought as accessory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_56\"\u003e56\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eview of judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_147\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esimilarity between him and Whewell, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_66_66\"\u003e165 note\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003equoted, \u003ca href=\"#Page_6\"\u003e6\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_28\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_29\"\u003e29\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_22_22\"\u003e56 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_63\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_64\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_65\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_66\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_67\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_77\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_83\"\u003e83\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_84\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMany\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe, and the One, \u003ca href=\"#Page_210\"\u003e210 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_218\"\u003e218 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMarginal utility\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eprinciple of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_307\"\u003e307\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_162_162\"\u003e337 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMartineau, J., \u003ca href=\"#Page_262\"\u003e262\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMathematics\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecertain forms of proof in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_172\"\u003e172 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ejudgments of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_354\"\u003e354 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_370\"\u003e370\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMcGilvary, E. B.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_120_120\"\u003e257 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMead, G. H.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_12_12\"\u003e38 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_161_161\"\u003e337 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMeaning\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand logical idea, \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas content of thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_66\"\u003e66 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethree types of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas property of independent idea, \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\"\u003e73-5\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand association of ideas, \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_80\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand reference, \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eworld of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_98\"\u003e98\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_103\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand knowledge, \u003ca href=\"#Page_89\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_128\"\u003e128\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_190\"\u003e190\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eequivalent to response, \u003ca href=\"#Page_198\"\u003e198\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e existence, \u003ca href=\"#Page_216\"\u003e216-18\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einner and outer, \u003ca href=\"#Page_347\"\u003e347 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Content, Idea, Reference).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_386\" id=\"Page_386\"\u003e[Pg 386]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMeans\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas external and constitutive, \u003ca href=\"#Page_78\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ereapplication of, the problem of economic valuation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_242\"\u003e242\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_243\"\u003e243\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_246\"\u003e246\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_259\"\u003e259\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_260\"\u003e260\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_303\"\u003e303\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_304\"\u003e304\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eobjective in so far as not known adequately for one\u0027s purpose, \u003ca href=\"#Page_256\"\u003e256\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefinition of, incidental to all judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_272\"\u003e272\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efactual determination of, sometimes determinative of ends also, \u003ca href=\"#Page_270\"\u003e270\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMediation\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein relation to the immediate, \u003ca href=\"#Page_350\"\u003e350 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMelissus\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehis dialectic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_214\"\u003e214\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMetaphysics\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_8\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_13\"\u003e13\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_85\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand logic of experience, \u003ca href=\"#Page_13\"\u003e13\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas natural history, \u003ca href=\"#Page_13\"\u003e13-18\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eworth, \u003ca href=\"#Page_19\"\u003e19-22\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elogical and, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_74\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Epistemology, Logic).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMill, J. Stuart\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_147\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_160\"\u003e160 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_162\"\u003e162\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_166\"\u003e166\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMixture\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elogical meaning of idea of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_219\"\u003e219\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_220\"\u003e220\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_222\"\u003e222\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMonism\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_224\"\u003e224\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMoore, A. W.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_40_40\"\u003e76 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_166_166\"\u003e346 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMotion\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econservation of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_206\"\u003e206\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eNegation\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_114\"\u003e114 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eNeo-Hegelian\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_316\"\u003e316\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eNewton, I.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_146\"\u003e146\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_159\"\u003e159\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_179\"\u003e179\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehis notes for philosophizing, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_61_61\"\u003e159 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u0026#925;\u0026#972;\u0026#956;\u0026#8179; \u003ci\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e \u0026#966;\u0026#973;\u0026#963;\u0026#949;\u0026#953;, \u003ca href=\"#Page_226\"\u003e226\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eNormative and genetic\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_16\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see End, Purpose, Validity, Value).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eObedience\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ea factor in genesis of morality, 257\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see also Authority and Custom).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eObject\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehow defined, \u003ca href=\"#Page_38\"\u003e38\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_39\"\u003e39\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_74\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esocially current, \u003ca href=\"#Page_230\"\u003e230\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ereal, individual in significance, \u003ca href=\"#Page_230\"\u003e230\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enature of the ethical, \u003ca href=\"#Page_240\"\u003e240\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_328\"\u003e328\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof the economic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_259\"\u003e259\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_260\"\u003e260\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_328\"\u003e328\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Substance).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eObjectivity\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eLotze\u0027s view of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e (see Study IV);\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etypes of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eLotze\u0027s distinction of logical and ontological, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistinction denied, \u003ca href=\"#Page_341\"\u003e341\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_342\"\u003e342\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003escope of conception of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_235\"\u003e235\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecommonly denied to other than factual judgments, \u003ca href=\"#Page_247\"\u003e247\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_248\"\u003e248\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot a property of sense-elements as such, \u003ca href=\"#Page_248\"\u003e248\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_249\"\u003e249\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ea category of \"apperception,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_250\"\u003e250\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ea mark of the problematic as such, \u003ca href=\"#Page_250\"\u003e250\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_251\"\u003e251\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_255\"\u003e255\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot ascertainable by any specific method, \u003ca href=\"#Page_252\"\u003e252\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\"obtrusiveness\" as evidence of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_253\"\u003e253\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\"reliability\" as evidence of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_263\"\u003e263\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econditions of experience of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_253\"\u003e253-6\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econditions of, present in the ethical and economic situations, \u003ca href=\"#Page_257\"\u003e257-60\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ea real characteristic of ethical and economic judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_261\"\u003e261-3\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot dependent on social currency, \u003ca href=\"#Page_318\"\u003e318-20\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enor on possibility of social currency, \u003ca href=\"#Page_320\"\u003e320-24\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enor on permanence, \u003ca href=\"#Page_324\"\u003e324-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Reality, Validity).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eOne\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe, and the Many, \u003ca href=\"#Page_210\"\u003e210 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_218\"\u003e218 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eParmenides\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehis logical position, \u003ca href=\"#Page_216\"\u003e216 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einfluence on Platonic-Aristotelian logic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_217\"\u003e217\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eParticipation\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esignificance of, in Plato, \u003ca href=\"#Page_342\"\u003e342 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eParticularity\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof an idea, \u003ca href=\"#Page_99\"\u003e99\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_113\"\u003e113\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof a judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_358\"\u003e358\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePerception\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ejudgments of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_88\"\u003e88 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_96\"\u003e96\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePerfect, the\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_126\"\u003e126\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePhysical judgment\u003c/span\u003e (see Factual judgment).\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u0026#934;\u0026#973;\u0026#963;\u0026#949;\u0026#953; \u003ci\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e \u0026#957;\u0026#972;\u0026#956;\u0026#8179;, \u003ca href=\"#Page_226\"\u003e226\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u0026#934;\u0026#973;\u0026#963;\u0026#953;\u0026#962;, \u003ca href=\"#Page_207\"\u003e207\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_224\"\u003e224\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePlato\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_17_17\"\u003e53 note\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon ideas and reality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_342\"\u003e342 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_378\"\u003e378\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_379\"\u003e379\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePluralism\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_42_42\"\u003e81 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePositing\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethought as, \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePredicate\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehow constituted, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_39_39\"\u003e75 note\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein relation to reality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_101\"\u003e101\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_103\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas hypothesis, \u003ca href=\"#Page_147\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_153\"\u003e153\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_155\"\u003e155\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_156\"\u003e156\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_183\"\u003e183\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_186\"\u003e186\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edevelops out of imaged end, \u003ca href=\"#Page_232\"\u003e232\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einteraction with subject, \u003ca href=\"#Page_232\"\u003e232\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein ethical judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_258\"\u003e258\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_291\"\u003e291-6\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein economic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_259\"\u003e259\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_260\"\u003e260\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_309\"\u003e309-11\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Copula, Judgment, Hypothesis, Idea, Image).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePredication\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_118\"\u003e118 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePre-established harmony\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein Royce\u0027s philosophy, \u003ca href=\"#Page_368\"\u003e368\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePresuppositions\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_204\"\u003e204\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_206\"\u003e206\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eProblematic\u003c/span\u003e (see Tension).\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eProof\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einductive, \u003ca href=\"#Page_172\"\u003e172\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_173\"\u003e173\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof hypothesis, \u003ca href=\"#Page_174\"\u003e174\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_175\"\u003e175\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation of, to origin of hypothesis, \u003ca href=\"#Page_179\"\u003e179-82\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eWundt\u0027s view of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_177\"\u003e177\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_178\"\u003e178\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eProposition\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_118\"\u003e118\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eProtagoras\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_226\"\u003e226\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePrudence\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eethical status of, as a virtue, \u003ca href=\"#Page_246\"\u003e246\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePythagoreans, the\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheir logical position, \u003ca href=\"#Page_216\"\u003e216\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003euse of experiment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_216\"\u003e216\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePsychical\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistinguished from physical, \u003ca href=\"#Page_25\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eLotze\u0027s view of impression as barely, \u003ca href=\"#Page_27\"\u003e27\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_28\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eview criticised, \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\"\u003e31-4\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etwo meanings of, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_12_12\"\u003e38 note\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epsychical mechanism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eidea as, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eproblem of logical and, \u003ca href=\"#Page_54\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e and \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_18_18\"\u003enote\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_64\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eactivity of thought also made, by Lotze, \u003ca href=\"#Page_77\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e and \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_41_41\"\u003enote\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esubjective result, \u003ca href=\"#Page_84\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Impression).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePsychology\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand logic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_14\"\u003e14-16\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_26\"\u003e26\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_63\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_64\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_153\"\u003e153\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_184\"\u003e184\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_185\"\u003e185\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_192\"\u003e192 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_345\"\u003e345\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_348\"\u003e348\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eprinciple of, functional, \u003ca href=\"#Page_229\"\u003e229\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_230\"\u003e230\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003egenesis of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_280\"\u003e280\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_281\"\u003e281\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elogical value of functional, \u003ca href=\"#Page_293\"\u003e293\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePsychologists\u0027 fallacy\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePurpose\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elogical importance of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_4\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_10\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_13\"\u003e13\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_15\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_20\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_35\"\u003e35\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_80\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elogical aspects of, \u003ca href=\"#XI\"\u003eStudy XI\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein an idea, \u003ca href=\"#Page_347\"\u003e347 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_353\"\u003e353 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein criterion of truth and error, \u003ca href=\"#Page_361\"\u003e361 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eorigin of, as idea, \u003ca href=\"#Page_373\"\u003e373 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas method, \u003ca href=\"#Page_377\"\u003e377\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see End, Reconstruction).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eQuales\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof sensation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_55\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_56\"\u003e56\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_27_27\"\u003e60 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eQualities\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eprimary and secondary, \u003ca href=\"#Page_221\"\u003e221\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eQuestion\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_114\"\u003e114 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRationalism\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecriticised, \u003ca href=\"#Page_156\"\u003e156 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_188\"\u003e188 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_298\"\u003e298 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRationality\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof world, \u003ca href=\"#Page_206\"\u003e206\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eReality\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas constructed by thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\"\u003e94 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_104\"\u003e104\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas developing, \u003ca href=\"#Page_126\"\u003e126\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas including fact and idea, \u003ca href=\"#Page_108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_110\"\u003e110\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_125\"\u003e125\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_382\"\u003e382\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas independent of thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_85\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_87\"\u003e87 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_104\"\u003e104\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_387\" id=\"Page_387\"\u003e[Pg 387]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas subject of subject, \u003ca href=\"#Page_88\"\u003e88 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epopular criterion of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_105\"\u003e105 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epossibility of knowledge of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_91\"\u003e91 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_102\"\u003e102 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_125\"\u003e125\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efor the individual, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\"\u003e94 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_103\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_224\"\u003e224 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas relative to judging, \u003ca href=\"#Page_149\"\u003e149\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas given in sensation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_160\"\u003e160\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\"perception\" and \"recognition\" coefficients of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_263\"\u003e263-7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_277\"\u003e277\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethese present in ethical and economical experience, \u003ca href=\"#Page_267\"\u003e267-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eapprehension of, emotional, \u003ca href=\"#Page_263\"\u003e263\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003escope of complete conception of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_235\"\u003e235\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_340\"\u003e340\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edegrees of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_340\"\u003e340\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ePlatonic conception of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_343\"\u003e343 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eRoyce\u0027s conception of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_348\"\u003e348\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas related to fact and idea, \u003ca href=\"#Page_379\"\u003e379 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Fact, Truth, Validity).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eReason, sufficient\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eprinciple of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_206\"\u003e206\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eReconstruction\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe function of thinking, \u003ca href=\"#Page_38\"\u003e38\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_40\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_46\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_85\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eeffect of denying this, \u003ca href=\"#Page_47\"\u003e47\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_71\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edata and, \u003ca href=\"#Page_49\"\u003e49 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_291\"\u003e291\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_295\"\u003e295\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_299\"\u003e299\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_311\"\u003e311\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_312\"\u003e312\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_346\"\u003e346\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_347\"\u003e347\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Habit, Stimulus, Tension).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eReference\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas social, \u003ca href=\"#Page_74\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eproblem of reference of ideas, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas meaning, \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\"\u003e97 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efunctional conception of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_113\"\u003e113\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eparadox of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_99\"\u003e99\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eidea as, \u003ca href=\"#Page_129\"\u003e129\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eReflection\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas derived, \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1-12\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ena\u0026iuml;ve, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esubject-matter of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_8\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elogic and, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_23\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e constitutive thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\"\u003e43-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistinguished, \u003ca href=\"#Page_255\"\u003e255\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003egeneral nature of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_269\"\u003e269\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eend not always explicit in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_270\"\u003e270\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eoutcome of, statable in terms of end or means, \u003ca href=\"#Page_272\"\u003e272\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Judgment, Thought).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eReflective judgment\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRepresentation\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas one of the two functions of an idea, \u003ca href=\"#Page_345\"\u003e345\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_347\"\u003e347 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_372\"\u003e372\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esignificance of, in ideal reconstruction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_376\"\u003e376\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eResponse\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efailure of, and origin of judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRestlessness\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas source of reflection and purpose, \u003ca href=\"#Page_374\"\u003e374 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Tension).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRhetoric\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eorigin of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_203\"\u003e203\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_204\"\u003e204\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\"\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRight\u003c/span\u003e\" (see \"Good\").\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRoyce, Josiah\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ereferred to, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_40_40\"\u003e76 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_147\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheory of ideas discussed, \u003ca href=\"#Page_346\"\u003e346-82\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003equoted, \u003ca href=\"#Page_347\"\u003e347\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_348\"\u003e348\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_349\"\u003e349\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_350\"\u003e350\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_352\"\u003e352\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_353\"\u003e353\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_354\"\u003e354\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_355\"\u003e355\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_356\"\u003e356\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_357\"\u003e357\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_358\"\u003e358\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_359\"\u003e359\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_362\"\u003e362\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_364\"\u003e364\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_199_199\"\u003e366 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_368\"\u003e368\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_370\"\u003e370\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_371\"\u003e371\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_374\"\u003e374\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_379\"\u003e379\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_380\"\u003e380\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_381\"\u003e381\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSatisfaction\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epause of, as marking attainment of truth, \u003ca href=\"#Page_362\"\u003e362 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSchiller, F. C. S.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_154_154\"\u003e327 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_165_165\"\u003e345 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eScience\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to na\u0026iuml;ve experience, \u003ca href=\"#Page_10\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_11\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits historic stages, \u003ca href=\"#Page_11\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_12\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistinction of logical procedure from epistemology, \u003ca href=\"#Page_13\"\u003e13\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esame history as philosophy, \u003ca href=\"#Page_21\"\u003e21\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_22\"\u003e22\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSelf, empirical\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003egenesis and content of concept of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_290\"\u003e290\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_292\"\u003e292\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_331\"\u003e331\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_157_157\"\u003e332 note 1\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSelf, \"energetic\"\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eimplied in experience of \"warrant,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_277\"\u003e277\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_278\"\u003e278\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003estimulus to development of concept of empirical self, \u003ca href=\"#Page_279\"\u003e279-81\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eessential principle in all valuation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_281\"\u003e281-5\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eevolution of moral attitude of reference to, \u003ca href=\"#Page_285\"\u003e285-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elogical function of, in valuation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_296\"\u003e296\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eimportant place in economic valuation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_308\"\u003e308\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_309\"\u003e309\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot capable of being described in terms of purpose or ideal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_313\"\u003e313-16\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eBradley\u0027s misinterpretation of, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_157_157\"\u003e332 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSelf-realization\u003c/span\u003e (see also Green, T. H.):\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheory of, as moral ideal futile, \u003ca href=\"#Page_298\"\u003e298\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elogically congruous with determinism and hedonism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_330\"\u003e330\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_331\"\u003e331\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSensations\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elogical import of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_57\"\u003e57\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas functions of experience, \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas point of contact with reality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_90\"\u003e90\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eplace in judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand ideas, \u003ca href=\"#Page_164\"\u003e164 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Impressions, Psychical).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSensori-motor activity\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_193\"\u003e193\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_200\"\u003e200\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eShaftesbury\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_301\"\u003e301\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSigwart, C.\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eview of judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_147\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSkepticism\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_16_16\"\u003e50 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_85\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\"\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSocial currency\u003c/span\u003e\":\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eimplies an identity of aspect of an object to different persons, \u003ca href=\"#Page_229\"\u003e229\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eobject having, an abstraction like social individual, \u003ca href=\"#Page_229\"\u003e229\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot a test of objectivity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_318\"\u003e318-29\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSocrates\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efunction of concept, \u003ca href=\"#Page_342\"\u003e342\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSophists, the\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_225\"\u003e225\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSpencer, H.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_248\"\u003e248\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_117_117\"\u003e250 note 1\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_148_148\"\u003e315 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eStandard\u003c/span\u003e (see also Predicate):\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eidentified with predicate in ethical judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_238\"\u003e238-40\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efunction of, in ethical judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_274\"\u003e274\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_299\"\u003e299\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_300\"\u003e300\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emorphology and mode of reconstruction of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_296\"\u003e296\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_297\"\u003e297\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ean ultimate ethical, impossible, \u003ca href=\"#Page_299\"\u003e299\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eobjectivity of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_300\"\u003e300\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_301\"\u003e301\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eStimulus\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_8\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_17\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\"\u003e37-40\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_47\"\u003e47\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_81\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eLotze\u0027s view of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_27\"\u003e27\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_29\"\u003e29\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eview criticised, \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\"\u003e30-36\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econfusion of datum with, \u003ca href=\"#Page_61\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefined, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_153\"\u003e153-4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas condition of thinking, \u003ca href=\"#Page_193\"\u003e193 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas direct and indirect, \u003ca href=\"#Page_195\"\u003e195-7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof ethical judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_238\"\u003e238-41\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_291\"\u003e291\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof economic, judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_241\"\u003e241-6\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_302\"\u003e302\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Content, Datum).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eStout, G. F.\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ereferred to, \u003ca href=\"#Page_349\"\u003e349\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eStratton, G. M.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_151_151\"\u003e318 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eStructure\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_15\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_16\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_17\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Function).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSubject\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof judgment, how constituted, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_39_39\"\u003e75 note\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas constructed by thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\"\u003e94 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_103\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas a part of judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_118\"\u003e118 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas reality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_88\"\u003e88 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas inside and outside of judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_93\"\u003e93\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_96\"\u003e96\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efunctional theory of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_111\"\u003e111\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_125\"\u003e125\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas that requiring explanation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_208\"\u003e208\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_211\"\u003e211 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas modified by deduction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_212\"\u003e212\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003egiven by analysis of situation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_232\"\u003e232\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einteracts with predicate in judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_232\"\u003e232\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof ethical judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_258\"\u003e258\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_296\"\u003e296-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof economic judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_259\"\u003e259\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_260\"\u003e260\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_304\"\u003e304\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_309\"\u003e309-11\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Copula, Datum, Judgment, Predicate).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSubjective\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistinguished from objective, \u003ca href=\"#Page_25\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eLotze\u0027s view of impressions as purely, \u003ca href=\"#Page_27\"\u003e27\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_28\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eview criticised, \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefinition of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_39\"\u003e39\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edeveloped only within reflection, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Psychical).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSubjectivism\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein Lotze, \u003ca href=\"#Page_83\"\u003e83\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_84\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein Royce, \u003ca href=\"#Page_360\"\u003e360\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSubject-matter of thought\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistinguished as stimulus, datum, and content, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_8\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econfusion of these (genetic) distinctions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_17\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas antecedent, \u003ca href=\"#II\"\u003eStudy II\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas datum, \u003ca href=\"#III\"\u003eStudy III\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas content, \u003ca href=\"#IV\"\u003eStudy IV\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_388\" id=\"Page_388\"\u003e[Pg 388]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSubstance\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eethical theories based on logic involved in rationalistic conception of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_298\"\u003e298\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_299\"\u003e299\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emeaning of concept of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_326\"\u003e326\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_327\"\u003e327\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etype-form of conduct analogous to concept of a particular kind of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_327\"\u003e327\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_328\"\u003e328\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSubstantiation\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esignificance of Plato\u0027s, of ideas, \u003ca href=\"#Page_342\"\u003e342 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSupposition and hypothesis\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_178\"\u003e178-81\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSweet, Henry\u003c/span\u003e: quoted, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_57_57\"\u003e153 note\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSynthetic\u003c/span\u003e (see Reconstruction).\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTaylor, A. E.\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_143_143\"\u003e299 note 2\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_148_148\"\u003e315 note\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_316\"\u003e316\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_324\"\u003e324\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTeleology\u003c/span\u003e (see End, Purpose).\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTemptation\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eethical, \u003ca href=\"#Page_238\"\u003e238\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_301\"\u003e301\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eeconomic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_305\"\u003e305\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTension\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas stimulus to thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_38\"\u003e38\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_49\"\u003e49\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_50\"\u003e50\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_70\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_85\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein relation to constitution of sensory datum, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_59\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_70\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econstitution of meaning as distinct from fact, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_85\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_237\"\u003e237-46\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_250\"\u003e250\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_251\"\u003e251\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_255\"\u003e255\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_291\"\u003e291-5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_374\"\u003e374 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Purpose, Reconstruction).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThales\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehis \u0026#7936;\u0026#961;\u0026#967;\u0026#942;, water, \u003ca href=\"#Page_209\"\u003e209\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein relation to deduction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_212\"\u003e212\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_214\"\u003e214\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThought\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eforms of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\"\u003e58 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas modes of organizing data, \u003ca href=\"#Page_63\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethree kinds according to Lotze, \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas positing and distinguishing, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evalidity of its function, \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\"\u003e76-82\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof its products, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82-5\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einstrumental character, \u003ca href=\"#Page_78\"\u003e78-82\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas discriminating sensory qualities, \u003ca href=\"#Page_200\"\u003e200-202\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Judgment, Reflection).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTime\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas involved in judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_120\"\u003e120 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTranscendentalism\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_29\"\u003e29\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\"\u003e43-8\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTrendelenburg, A.\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eview of judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_147\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTruth\u003c/span\u003e: criterion of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_84\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eBosanquet\u0027s conception of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_105\"\u003e105\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epopular criterion of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_105\"\u003e105 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand purpose, \u003ca href=\"#XI\"\u003eStudy XI\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erepresentational \u003ci\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e teleological view of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_341\"\u003e341 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecriterion of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_361\"\u003e361 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Objectivity, Validity).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eUeberweg\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eview of judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_147\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eUniformity\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof nature, \u003ca href=\"#Page_206\"\u003e206\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eUnity\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof the world, \u003ca href=\"#Page_207\"\u003e207\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eUniversal\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efirst and second according to Lotze, \u003ca href=\"#Page_56\"\u003e56\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_59\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eideas as, \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\"\u003e97 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_113\"\u003e113\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ejudgment as, \u003ca href=\"#Page_136\"\u003e136\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eMr. Royce\u0027s treatment of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_354\"\u003e354 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enecessity and, \u003ca href=\"#Page_357\"\u003e357\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eValidity\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_8\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to genesis, \u003ca href=\"#Page_14\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_15\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etest, \u003ca href=\"#Page_17\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefines content of thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eproblem of, \u003ca href=\"#IV\"\u003eStudy IV\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eLotze\u0027s dilemma regarding, \u003ca href=\"#Page_71\"\u003e71-85\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof bare object of thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\"\u003e72-6\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof activity of thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\"\u003e76-82\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof product of thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82-5\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Objectivity, Reality, Truth).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eValue\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eLotze\u0027s distinction of, from existence, \u003ca href=\"#Page_28\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_29\"\u003e29\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eview criticised, \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_45\"\u003e45\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eorganized, of experience, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edetermined in and by a logical process, \u003ca href=\"#Page_233\"\u003e233\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enature of consciousness of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_273\"\u003e273\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_333\"\u003e333-5\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efunction of consciousness of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_335\"\u003e335-7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eproperly mediate and functional in character, \u003ca href=\"#Page_338\"\u003e338-40\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eValuation\u003c/span\u003e (see also Ethical judgment, Economic judgment):\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eincludes only ethical and economic types of judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_227\"\u003e227\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_236\"\u003e236\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_338\"\u003e338-40\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003egeneral account of process of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_272\"\u003e272\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_295\"\u003e295\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ereconstructive of self as well as of reality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_312\"\u003e312\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eVenn, John\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eorigin of hypothesis, \u003ca href=\"#Page_169\"\u003e169\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\"\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWarrant\u003c/span\u003e\":\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econsciousness of, accompanies purely factual as well as valuational judgment processes, \u003ca href=\"#Page_276\"\u003e276\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_277\"\u003e277\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe constitutive feature of survey of factual conditions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_278\"\u003e278\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_279\"\u003e279\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWelton, J.\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eorigin of hypothesis, \u003ca href=\"#Page_171\"\u003e171\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWhewell, William\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_163\"\u003e163\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eview of sensations and ideas, \u003ca href=\"#Page_164\"\u003e164\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_165\"\u003e165\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof induction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_165\"\u003e165\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ea certain agreement between him and Mill, \u003ca href=\"#Page_166\"\u003e166\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWieser, F. von\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_159_159\"\u003e335 note 2\u003c/a\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWill\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas related to thought, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_199_199\"\u003e366 note\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e(see Activity, End, Purpose).\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWundt, W.\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eview of judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_147\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eview of mathematical induction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_173\"\u003e173\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eformation and proof of hypothesis, \u003ca href=\"#Page_177\"\u003e177 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistinction between supposition and hypothesis, \u003ca href=\"#Page_178\"\u003e178 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\"\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWrong\u003c/span\u003e\" (see \"Bad\").\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eXenophanes\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehis logical position, \u003ca href=\"#Page_216\"\u003e216\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eZeno\u003c/span\u003e:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehis dialectic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_214\"\u003e214\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch3\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_1_1\" id=\"Footnote_1_1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_1_1\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[1]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eLogic\u003c/i\u003e (translation, Oxford, 1888), Vol. I, pp. 10, 11. Italics mine.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_2_2\" id=\"Footnote_2_2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_2_2\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[2]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAngell\u003c/span\u003e, \"The Relations of Structural and Functional Psychology to Philosophy,\"\r\n\u003ci\u003eThe Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. III (1903),\r\nPart II, pp. 61-6, 70-72.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_3_3\" id=\"Footnote_3_3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_3_3\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[3]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See \u003ci\u003ePhilosophical Review\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. XI, pp. 117-20.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_4_4\" id=\"Footnote_4_4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_4_4\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[4]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See statements regarding the psychological and the logical in \u003ci\u003eThe Child and\r\nthe Curriculum\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 28, 29.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_5_5\" id=\"Footnote_5_5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_5_5\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[5]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLotze\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eLogic\u003c/i\u003e (translation, Oxford, 1888), Vol. I, p. 2. For the preceding exposition\r\nsee Vol. I, pp. 1, 2, 13, 14, 37, 38; also \u003ci\u003eMicrokosmus\u003c/i\u003e, Book V, chap. 4.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_6_6\" id=\"Footnote_6_6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_6_6\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[6]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLotze\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eLogic\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I, pp. 6, 7.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_7_7\" id=\"Footnote_7_7\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_7_7\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[7]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLotze\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eLogic\u003c/i\u003e (translation, Oxford, 1888), Vol. I, p. 25.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_8_8\" id=\"Footnote_8_8\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_8_8\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[8]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I, p. 36.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_9_9\" id=\"Footnote_9_9\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_9_9\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[9]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_10_10\" id=\"Footnote_10_10\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_10_10\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[10]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eMicrokosmus\u003c/i\u003e, Book V, chap. 4.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_11_11\" id=\"Footnote_11_11\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_11_11\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[11]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eLogic\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II, p. 235; see the whole discussion, \u0026sect;\u0026sect; 325 through 327.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_12_12\" id=\"Footnote_12_12\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_12_12\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[12]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The emphasis here is upon the term \"existences,\" and in its plural form.\r\nDoubtless the distinction of some experiences as belonging to me, as mine in a\r\npeculiarly intimate way, from others as chiefly concerning other persons, or as having\r\nto do with things, is an early one. But this is a distinction of \u003ci\u003econcern\u003c/i\u003e, of value.\r\nThe distinction referred to above is that of making an \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e, or presentation, out of\r\nthis felt type of value, and thereby breaking it up into distinct \"events,\" etc., with\r\ntheir own laws of inner connection. This is the work of psychological analysis.\r\nUpon the whole matter of the psychical I am glad to refer to \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eProfessor George H.\r\nMead\u0027s\u003c/span\u003e article entitled \"The Definition of the Psychical,\" Vol. III, Part II, of \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nDecennial Publications of the University of Chicago\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_13_13\" id=\"Footnote_13_13\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_13_13\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[13]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e We have a most acute and valuable criticism of Lotze from this point of\r\nview in \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eProfessor Henry Jones\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003ePhilosophy of Lotze\u003c/i\u003e, 1895. My specific criticisms\r\nagree in the main with his, and I am glad to acknowledge my indebtedness.\r\nBut I cannot agree in the belief that the business of thought is to qualify reality as\r\nsuch; its occupation appears to me to be determining the reconstruction of some\r\naspect or portion of reality, and to fall within the course of reality itself; being,\r\nindeed, the characteristic medium of its activity. And I cannot agree that reality as\r\nsuch, with increasing fulness of knowledge, presents itself as a thought-system,\r\nthough, as just indicated, I have no doubt that reality appears as thought-specifications\r\nor values, just as it does as affectional and \u0026aelig;sthetic and the rest of them.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_14_14\" id=\"Footnote_14_14\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_14_14\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[14]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Bradley\u0027s criticisms of rationalistic idealism should have made the force of\r\nthis point reasonably familiar.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_15_15\" id=\"Footnote_15_15\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_15_15\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[15]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The common statement that primitive man projects his own volitions,\r\nemotions, etc., into objects is but a back-handed way of expressing the truth that\r\n\"objects,\" etc., have only gradually emerged from their life-matrix. Looking back,\r\nit is almost impossible to avoid the fallacy of supposing that somehow such\r\nobjects were there first and were afterward emotionally appreciated.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_16_16\" id=\"Footnote_16_16\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_16_16\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[16]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Of course, this very element may be the precarious, the ideal, and possibly\r\nfanciful of some other situation. But it is to change the historic into the absolute\r\nto conclude that therefore everything is uncertain, all at once, or as such. This\r\ngives metaphysical skepticism as distinct from the working skepticism which is an\r\ninherent factor in all reflection and scientific inquiry.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_17_17\" id=\"Footnote_17_17\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_17_17\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[17]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e But this is a slow progress within reflection. Plato, who was influential in\r\nbringing this general distinction to consciousness, still thought and wrote as if\r\n\"image\" were itself a queer sort of objective existence; it was only gradually that\r\nit was disposed of as psychical, or a phase of immediate experience.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_18_18\" id=\"Footnote_18_18\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_18_18\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[18]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Of course, this means that what is excluded and so left behind in the problem\r\nof determination of \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e objective content is regarded as psychical. With reference\r\nto other problems and aims this same psychic existence is initial, not survival.\r\nReleased from its prior absorption in some unanalyzed experience it gains standing\r\nand momentum on its own account; \u003ci\u003ee. g.\u003c/i\u003e, the \"personal equation\" represents what\r\nis eliminated from a given astronomic time-determination as being purely subjective,\r\nor \"source-of-error.\" But it is initiatory in reference to new modes of technique,\r\nre-readings of previous data\u0026mdash;new considerations in psychology, even new socio-ethical\r\njudgments. Moreover, it remains a fact, and even a worthful fact, as a part\r\nof one\u0027s own \"inner\" experience, as an immediate \u003ci\u003epsychical reality\u003c/i\u003e. That is to say,\r\nthere is a region of \u003ci\u003epersonal\u003c/i\u003e experience (mainly emotive or affectional) already recognized\r\nas a sphere of value. The \"source of error\" is disposed of by making it a \u003ci\u003efact\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof this region. The recognition of falsity does not \u003ci\u003eoriginate\u003c/i\u003e the psychic (p. 38, note).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_19_19\" id=\"Footnote_19_19\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_19_19\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[19]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Of course, this is a further reflective distinction. The plain man and the student\r\ndo not determine the extraneous, irrelevant, and misleading matter as image\r\nin a \u003ci\u003epsychological\u003c/i\u003e sense, but only as \u003ci\u003efanciful\u003c/i\u003e or fantastic. Only to the psychologist\r\nand for \u003ci\u003ehis\u003c/i\u003e purpose does it break up into image and meaning.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_20_20\" id=\"Footnote_20_20\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_20_20\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[20]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Bradley, more than any other writer, has seized upon this double antithesis,\r\nand used it first to condemn the logical as such, and then turned it around as the\r\nimpartial condemnation of the psychical also. See \u003ci\u003eAppearance and Reality\u003c/i\u003e. In\r\nchap. 15 he metes out condemnation to \"thought\" because it can never take in\r\nthe psychical existence or reality which is present; in chap. 19, he passes similar\r\njudgment upon the \"psychical\" because it is brutally fragmentary. Other epistemological\r\nlogicians have wrestled\u0026mdash;or writhed\u0026mdash;with this problem, but I believe Bradley\u0027s\r\nposition is impregnable\u0026mdash;from the standpoint of ready-made differences.\r\nWhen the antithesis is treated as part and lot of the process of defining the truth of\r\na particular subject-matter, and thus as historic and relative, the case is quite\r\notherwise.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_21_21\" id=\"Footnote_21_21\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_21_21\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[21]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Vol. I, pp. 28-34.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_22_22\" id=\"Footnote_22_22\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_22_22\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[22]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It is interesting to see how explicitly Lotze is compelled finally to differentiate\r\ntwo aspects in the antecedents of thoughts, one of which is necessary in order that\r\nthere may be anything to call out thought (a lack, or problem); the other in order\r\nthat when thought is evoked it may find data at hand\u0026mdash;that is, material in shape to\r\nreceive and respond to its exercise. \"The manifold matter of ideas is brought\r\nbefore us, not only in the \u003ci\u003esystematic order of its qualitative relationships\u003c/i\u003e, but in the\r\nrich \u003ci\u003evariety of local and temporal combinations\u003c/i\u003e…. The \u003ci\u003ecombinations of heterogeneous\r\nideas\u003c/i\u003e … forms the \u003ci\u003eproblems\u003c/i\u003e, in connection with which the efforts of\r\nthought to reduce coexistence to coherence will \u003ci\u003esubsequently\u003c/i\u003e be made. The \u003ci\u003ehomogeneous\r\nor similar\u003c/i\u003e ideas, on the other hand, give occasion to separate, to connect, and\r\nto count their repetitions.\" (Vol. I, pp. 33, 34; italics mine.) Without the heterogeneous\r\nvariety of the local and temporal juxtapositions there would be nothing to\r\nexcite thought. Without the systematic arrangement of quality there would be\r\nnothing to meet thought and reward it for its efforts. The homogeneity of qualitative\r\nrelationships, \u003ci\u003ein the pre-thought material\u003c/i\u003e, gives the tools or instruments by\r\nwhich thought is enabled successfully to tackle the heterogeneity of collocations\r\nand conjunctions also found in the same material! One would suppose that when\r\nLotze reached this point he might have been led to suspect that in this remarkable\r\nadjustment of thought-stimuli, thought-material, and thought-tools to one another,\r\nhe must after all be dealing, not with something prior to the thought-function, but\r\nwith the necessary elements in and of the thought-situation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_23_23\" id=\"Footnote_23_23\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_23_23\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[23]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eSupra\u003c/i\u003e, p. 30.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_24_24\" id=\"Footnote_24_24\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_24_24\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[24]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For the identity of sensory experience with the point of greatest strain and\r\nstress in conflicting or tensional experience, see \"The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,\"\r\n\u003ci\u003ePsychological Review\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. III, p. 57.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_25_25\" id=\"Footnote_25_25\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_25_25\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[25]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For the \"accessory\" character of thought, see \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLotze\u003c/span\u003e, Vol. I, pp. 7, 25-7, 61, etc.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_26_26\" id=\"Footnote_26_26\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_26_26\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[26]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBosanquet\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eLogic\u003c/i\u003e (Vol. I, pp. 30-34), and Jones (\u003ci\u003ePhilosophy of Lotze\u003c/i\u003e, 1895, chap.\r\n4) have called attention to a curious inconsistency in Lotzes\u0027s treatment of judgment.\r\nOn one hand, the statement is as given above. Judgment grows out of conception\r\nin making explicit the determining relation of universal to its own particular,\r\nimplied in conception. But, on the other hand, judgment grows not out of conception\r\nat all, but out of the question of determining connection in change. Lotze\u0027s\r\nnominal reason for this latter view is that the conceptual world is purely static;\r\nsince the actual world is one of change, we need to pass upon what really goes\r\ntogether (is causal) in the change as distinct from such as are merely coincident.\r\nBut, as Jones clearly shows, it is also connected with the fact that, while Lotze\r\nnominally asserts that judgment grows out of conception, he treats conception as\r\nthe result of judgment since the first view makes judgment a mere explication of\r\nthe content of an idea, and hence merely expository or analytic (in the Kantian\r\nsense) and so of more than doubtful applicability to reality. The affair is too\r\nlarge to discuss here, and I will content myself with referring to the oscillation between\r\nconflicting contents, and gradation of sensory qualities already discussed (p.\r\n56, note). It is judgment which grows out of the former, because judgment is the\r\nwhole situation as such; conception is referable to the latter because it \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e one\r\nabstraction within the whole (the solution of possible meanings of the data) just\r\nas the datum is another. In truth, since the sensory datum is not absolute, but\r\ncomes in a historical context, the qualities apprehended as constituting the datum\r\nsimply define the locus of conflict in the entire situation. They are attributives of\r\nthe contents-in-tension of the colliding things, not calm untroubled ultimates. On\r\npp. 33 and 34 of Vol. I, Lotze recognizes (as we have just seen) that, as matter of\r\nfact, it is both sensory qualities in their systematic grading, or quantitative determinations\r\n(see Vol. I, p. 43, for the recognition of the necessary place of the\r\nquantitative in the true concept), \u003ci\u003eand\u003c/i\u003e the \"rich variety of local and temporal\r\ncombinations,\" that provoke thought and supply it with material. But, as usual,\r\nhe treats this simply as a historical accident, not as furnishing the key to the\r\nwhole matter. In fine, while the heterogeneous collocations and successions constitute\r\nthe problematic element that stimulates thought, quantitative determination\r\nof the sensory quality furnishes one of the two chief means through which thought\r\ndeals with the problem. It is a reduction of the original colliding contents to a form\r\nin which the effort at redintegration gets maximum efficiency. The concept, as ideal\r\nmeaning, is of course the other partner to the transaction. It is getting the various\r\npossible meanings-of-the-data into such shape as to make them most useful in construing\r\nthe data. The bearing of this upon the subject and predicate of judgment\r\ncannot be discussed here.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_27_27\" id=\"Footnote_27_27\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_27_27\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[27]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See Vol. I, pp. 38, 59, 61, 105, 129, 197, for Lotze\u0027s treatment of these distinctions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_28_28\" id=\"Footnote_28_28\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_28_28\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[28]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Vol. I, p. 36; see also Vol. II, pp. 290, 291.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_29_29\" id=\"Footnote_29_29\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_29_29\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[29]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Vol. II, p. 246; the same is reiterated in Vol. II, p. 250, where the question of\r\norigin is referred to as a corruption in logic. Certain psychical acts are necessary as\r\n\"conditions and occasions\" of logical operations, but the \"deep gulf between psychical\r\nmechanism and thought remains unfilled.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_30_30\" id=\"Footnote_30_30\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_30_30\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[30]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003ePhilosophy of Lotze\u003c/i\u003e, chap. 3, \"Thought and the Preliminary Process of Experience.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_31_31\" id=\"Footnote_31_31\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_31_31\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[31]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Vol. I, p. 38.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_32_32\" id=\"Footnote_32_32\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_32_32\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[32]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Vol. I, p. 13; last italics mine.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_33_33\" id=\"Footnote_33_33\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_33_33\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[33]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Vol. I, p. 14; italics mine.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_34_34\" id=\"Footnote_34_34\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_34_34\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[34]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See Vol. I, pp. 16-20. On p. 22 this work is declared to be not only the first,\r\nbut the most indispensable of all thought\u0027s operations.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_35_35\" id=\"Footnote_35_35\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_35_35\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[35]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Vol. I, p. 26.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_36_36\" id=\"Footnote_36_36\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_36_36\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[36]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Vol. I, p. 35.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_37_37\" id=\"Footnote_37_37\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_37_37\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[37]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Vol. I, p. 36; see the strong statements already quoted, p. 30. What if this\r\ncanon were applied in the first act of thought referred to above: the original\r\nobjectification which transforms the mere state into an abiding quality or meaning?\r\nSuppose, that is, it were said that the first objectifying act cannot make a substantial\r\n(or attached) quale out of a mere state of feeling; it must \u003ci\u003efind\u003c/i\u003e the distinction it\r\nmakes there already! It is clear we should at once get a \u003ci\u003eregressus ad infinitum\u003c/i\u003e. We\r\nhere find Lotze face to face with this fundamental dilemma: thought either arbitrarily\r\nforces in its own distinctions, or else just repeats what is already there\u0026mdash;is\r\neither falsifying or futile. This same contradiction, so far as it affects the impression,\r\nhas already been discussed. See p. 31.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_38_38\" id=\"Footnote_38_38\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_38_38\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[38]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Vol. I, p. 31.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_39_39\" id=\"Footnote_39_39\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_39_39\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[39]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e As we have already seen, the concept, the meaning as such, is always a factor\r\nor status in a reflective situation; it is always a predicate of judgment, in use in\r\ninterpreting and developing the logical subject, or datum of perception. See\r\nStudy VII, on the Hypothesis.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_40_40\" id=\"Footnote_40_40\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_40_40\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[40]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRoyce\u003c/span\u003e, in his \u003ci\u003eWorld and Individual\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I, chaps. 6 and 7, has criticised the\r\nconception of meaning as valid, but in a way which implies that there is a difference\r\nbetween validity and reality, in the sense that the meaning or content of the valid\r\nidea becomes real only when it is experienced in direct feeling. The above implies,\r\nof course, a difference between validity and reality, but finds the test of validity in\r\nexercise of the function of direction or control to which the idea makes pretension\r\nor claim. The same point of view would profoundly modify Royce\u0027s interpretation\r\nof what he terms \"inner\" and \"outer\" meaning. See \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMoore\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eThe University of\r\nChicago Decennial Publications\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. III, on \"Existence, Meaning, and Reality.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_41_41\" id=\"Footnote_41_41\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_41_41\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[41]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Vol. II, pp. 257, 265 and in general Book III, chap. 4. It is significant that\r\nthought itself, appearing as an act of thinking over against its own content, is here\r\ntreated as psychical. Even this explicit placing of thinking in the psychical sphere,\r\nalong with sensations and the associative mechanism, does not, however, lead Lotze\r\nto reconsider his statement that the psychological problem is totally irrelevant and\r\neven corrupting as regards the logical. Consequently, as we see in the text, it only\r\ngives him one more difficulty to wrestle with: how a process which is \u003ci\u003eex officio\u003c/i\u003e purely\r\npsychical and subjective can yet yield results which are valid, in a logical, to say\r\nnothing of an ontological, sense.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_42_42\" id=\"Footnote_42_42\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_81\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[42]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Professor James\u0027s satisfaction in the contemplation of bare pluralism, of disconnection,\r\nof radical having-nothing-to-do-with-one-another, is a case in point.\r\nThe satisfaction points to an \u0026aelig;sthetic attitude in which the brute diversity becomes\r\nitself one interesting object; and thus unity asserts itself in its own denial. When\r\ndiscords are hard and stubborn, and intellectual and practical unification are far to\r\nseek, nothing is commoner than the device of securing the needed unity by recourse\r\nto an emotion which feeds on the very brute variety. Religion and art and romantic\r\naffection are full of examples.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_43_43\" id=\"Footnote_43_43\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_43_43\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[43]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Lotze even goes so far in this connection as to say that the antithesis between\r\nour ideas and the objects to which they are directed is itself a part of the world of\r\nideas (Vol. II, p. 192). Barring the phrase \"world of \u003ci\u003eideas\u003c/i\u003e\" (as against world of\r\ncontinuous experiencing) he need only have commenced at this point to have traveled\r\nstraight and arrived somewhere. But it is absolutely impossible to hold both this\r\nview and that of the original independent existence of something given to and in\r\nthought and an independent existence of a thought-activity, thought-forms, and\r\nthought-contents.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_44_44\" id=\"Footnote_44_44\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_44_44\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[44]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The criticism of Bosanquet\u0027s theory of the judgment offered in this paper is\r\nfrom the standpoint of the theory of the judgment developed by Professor John\r\nDewey, in his lectures on \"The Theory of Logic.\" While the chief interest of the\r\npaper, as the title implies, is critical, it has been necessary to devote a portion of it\r\nto the exposition of the point of view from which the criticism is made.\u0026mdash;H. B. T.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_45_45\" id=\"Footnote_45_45\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_45_45\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[45]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The references throughout this paper are to the pages of Vol. I of \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBernard\r\nBosanquet\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eLogic or the Morphology of Knowledge\u003c/i\u003e, Oxford, 1888.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_46_46\" id=\"Footnote_46_46\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_46_46\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[46]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eF. H. Bradley\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Logic\u003c/i\u003e, p. 64.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_47_47\" id=\"Footnote_47_47\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_47_47\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[47]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The difficulty, of course, is not a merely formal one, much less a verbal one.\r\nInstinctively we grant to Bosanquet his statement that reality is a continuous\r\nwhole; we feel it almost captious to question his right to it. But why? Because\r\nthe \u003ci\u003econtent of judgment\u003c/i\u003e is continuous; judgment is always engaged with the determination\r\nof a related totality. But if all content is ideal, and judgment is just the\r\napplication of this content to reality in virtue of an isolated contact, surely it begs\r\nthe entire question to say that reality apart from the content applied is continuous,\r\nand then to use this assertion to justify the objective validity of the judgment\u0026mdash;its\r\nelement of permanent truth.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_48_48\" id=\"Footnote_48_48\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_48_48\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[48]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e There is good reason for believing that Mr. Bosanquet escapes, in his own\r\nmind, the difficulty by the term \"correspondence.\" \"The name stands for these elements\r\nin the idea which \u003ci\u003ecorrespond\u003c/i\u003e in the separate worlds;\" we may even be accused\r\nof injustice in confusing this correspondence with bare identity of existence. But if\r\none idea corresponds to another in the sense of referring to it, what is this but the\r\nfact to be explained\u0026mdash;how an existence can refer beyond itself?\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_49_49\" id=\"Footnote_49_49\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_49_49\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[49]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This conclusion is clearly recognized by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBradley\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eAppearance and Reality\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nchap. 4.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_50_50\" id=\"Footnote_50_50\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_50_50\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[50]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It would be suggestive to inquire in what sense conscious thought claims to\r\nknow. Is it a general claim which thought \u003ci\u003equa\u003c/i\u003e thought puts forth, or is it the claim\r\nof the content of some particular thought? The former, of course, is a mere pious\r\naspiration having no reference to specific validity or truth; the latter is precisely the\r\nproblem under consideration.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_51_51\" id=\"Footnote_51_51\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_51_51\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[51]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Bosanquet would seem to have followed Lotze in this insertion of a world of\r\n\"meanings\" intermediate between the individual idea as such and the real object\r\nas such. See the criticism already passed, pp. 93-5.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_52_52\" id=\"Footnote_52_52\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_52_52\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[52]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Or, the situation as questioned is itself a fact, and a perfectly determinate\r\n(though not determined) one. See pp. 38, 50.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_53_53\" id=\"Footnote_53_53\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_53_53\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[53]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Of course, the distinction between the process of arriving as temporal, and the\r\nessential relation of subject and predicate as eternal, harks back to the notion of\r\njudgment as the process by which \"we\" reproduce, or make real for ourselves, a\r\nreality already real within itself. And it involves just the same difficulties. The\r\nrelation of subject and predicate\u0026mdash;this simultaneous distinction and mutual\r\nreference\u0026mdash;has meaning only in an act of adjustment, of attempt to control, within\r\nwhich we distribute our conditions. When the act is completed, the relation\r\nof subject and predicate, as subject and predicate, quite disappears. An eternal\r\nrelation of the two is meaningless; we might as well talk of an eternal reaching\r\nfor the same distant object by the same hand. In such conceptions, we have only\r\ngrasped a momentary phase of a situation, isolated it, and set it up as an entity. Significant\r\nresults would be reached by considering the \"synthetic\" character (in the\r\nKantian sense) of judgment from this point of view. All modern logicians agree that\r\njudgment must be ampliative, must extend knowledge; that a \"trifling proposition\"\r\nis no judgment at all. What does this mean save that judgment is developmental,\r\ntransitive, in effect and purport? And yet these same writers conceive of Reality as\r\na \u003ci\u003efinished system of content in a complete and unchangeable single Judgment\u003c/i\u003e! It is\r\nimpossible to evade the contradiction save by recognizing that since it is the business\r\nof judgment to transform, its test (or Truth) is successful performance of the\r\nparticular transformation it has set itself, and that transformation is temporal.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_54_54\" id=\"Footnote_54_54\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_54_54\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[54]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It is worth considering whether this may not be the reality of Royce\u0027s distinction\r\nbetween outer and inner meaning. An anticipation of experience is the working\r\nprerequisite of the control which will realize the idea, \u003ci\u003ei. e.\u003c/i\u003e, the experience anticipated.\r\nOne is no more \"inner\" or \"outer\" than the other.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_55_55\" id=\"Footnote_55_55\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_55_55\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[55]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eLogik\u003c/i\u003e, p. 304.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_56_56\" id=\"Footnote_56_56\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_56_56\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[56]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDe Morgan\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eBudget of Paradoxes\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 55, 56; quoted by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWelton\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eLogic\u003c/i\u003e, Vol.\r\nII, p. 60.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_57_57\" id=\"Footnote_57_57\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_57_57\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[57]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Advanced grammarians treat this matter in a way which should be instructive\r\nto logicians. The hypothesis, says \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSweet\u003c/span\u003e (\u0026sect; 295 of \u003ci\u003eA New English Grammar, Logical\r\nand Historical\u003c/i\u003e, Oxford, 1892), suggests an affirmation or negation \"as objects of\r\nthought.\" \"In fact, we often say \u003ci\u003esupposing\u003c/i\u003e (that is, \u0027thinking\u0027) \u003ci\u003eit is true\u003c/i\u003e, instead\r\nof \u003ci\u003eif it is true\u003c/i\u003e.\" In a word, the hypothetical judgment as such puts explicitly before\r\nus the content of thought, of the predicate or hypothesis; and in so far is a moment\r\nin judgment rather than adequate judgment itself.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_58_58\" id=\"Footnote_58_58\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_58_58\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[58]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This carries with it, of course, the notion that \"sensation\" and \"image\" are\r\nnot distinct psychical existences in themselves, but are distinguished logical forces.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_59_59\" id=\"Footnote_59_59\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_59_59\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[59]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Concerning the strict correlativity of subject and predicate, data and hypothesis,\r\nsee p. 34.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_60_60\" id=\"Footnote_60_60\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_60_60\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[60]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eNovum Organum\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I, p. 61.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_61_61\" id=\"Footnote_61_61\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_61_61\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[61]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Newton\u0027s \"Rules for Philosophizing\" (\u003ci\u003ePrincipia\u003c/i\u003e, Book III) are as follows:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nRule I. \"No more causes of natural things are to be admitted than such as are\r\nboth true, and sufficient to explain the phenomena of those things.\"\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nRule II. \"Natural effects of the same kind are to be referred as far as possible\r\nto the same causes.\"\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nRule III. \"Those qualities of bodies that can neither be increased nor diminished\r\nin intensity, and which are found to belong to all bodies within reach of our\r\nexperiments are to be regarded as qualities of all bodies whatever.\"\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nRule IV. \"In experimental philosophy propositions collected by induction\r\nfrom phenomena are to be regarded either as accurately true or very nearly true\r\nnotwithstanding any contrary hypothesis, till other phenomena occur, by which they\r\nare made more accurate or are rendered subject to exceptions.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_62_62\" id=\"Footnote_62_62\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_62_62\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[62]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Book III, chap. 2, sec. 5; italics mine. The latter part of the passage, beginning\r\nwith the words \"If we did not often commence,\" etc., is quoted by Mill from\r\nComte. The words \"neither induction nor deduction would enable us to understand\r\neven the simplest phenomena\" are his own.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_63_63\" id=\"Footnote_63_63\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_63_63\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[63]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Book III, chap. 7, sec. 1.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_64_64\" id=\"Footnote_64_64\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_64_64\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[64]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Book III, chap. 14, secs. 4 and 5.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_65_65\" id=\"Footnote_65_65\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_65_65\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[65]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWilliam Whewell\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eThe Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences\u003c/i\u003e, London, 1840.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_66_66\" id=\"Footnote_66_66\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_66_66\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[66]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The essential similarity between Whewell\u0027s view and that of Lotze, already discussed\r\n(see chap. 3) is of course explainable on the basis of their common relationship\r\nto Kant.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_67_67\" id=\"Footnote_67_67\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_67_67\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[67]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eLogic\u003c/i\u003e, Book IV, chap. 2, sec. 2; italics mine.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_68_68\" id=\"Footnote_68_68\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_68_68\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[68]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_69_69\" id=\"Footnote_69_69\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_69_69\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[69]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, sec. 4; in sec. 6 he states even more expressly that any conception is appropriate\r\nin the degree in which it \"helps us toward what we wish to understand.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_70_70\" id=\"Footnote_70_70\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_70_70\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[70]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, sec. 6; italics mine.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_71_71\" id=\"Footnote_71_71\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_71_71\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[71]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eVenn\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eEmpirical Logic\u003c/i\u003e, p. 383.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_72_72\" id=\"Footnote_72_72\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_72_72\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[72]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eVenn\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eEmpirical Logic\u003c/i\u003e, p. 25; italics mine.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_73_73\" id=\"Footnote_73_73\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_73_73\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[73]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWelton\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eManual of Logic\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II, chap. 3.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_74_74\" id=\"Footnote_74_74\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_74_74\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[74]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eW. S. Jevons\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Science\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 231, 232.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_75_75\" id=\"Footnote_75_75\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_75_75\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[75]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eB. Erdmann\u003c/span\u003e, \"Zur Theorie des Syllogismus und der Induktion,\" \u003ci\u003ePhilosophische\r\nAbhandlungen\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. VI, p. 230.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_76_76\" id=\"Footnote_76_76\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_76_76\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[76]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWundt\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eLogik\u003c/i\u003e, 2d ed., Vol. II, p. 131.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_77_77\" id=\"Footnote_77_77\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_77_77\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[77]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWelton\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eManual of Logic\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II, p. 72.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_78_78\" id=\"Footnote_78_78\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_78_78\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[78]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I, p. 452 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_79_79\" id=\"Footnote_79_79\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_79_79\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[79]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I, pp. 454-461.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_80_80\" id=\"Footnote_80_80\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_80_80\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[80]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBosanquet\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eLogic\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I, p. 46.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_81_81\" id=\"Footnote_81_81\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_81_81\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[81]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBradley\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Logic\u003c/i\u003e, p. 10.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_82_82\" id=\"Footnote_82_82\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_82_82\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[82]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I, p. 74.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_83_83\" id=\"Footnote_83_83\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_83_83\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[83]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBradley\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Logic\u003c/i\u003e, p. 11.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_84_84\" id=\"Footnote_84_84\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_84_84\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[84]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I, pp. 75, 76.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_85_85\" id=\"Footnote_85_85\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_85_85\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[85]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBradley\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 4-6.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_86_86\" id=\"Footnote_86_86\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_86_86\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[86]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 7, 8.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_87_87\" id=\"Footnote_87_87\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_87_87\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[87]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This study may be regarded as in some sense a development of pp. 7-10 of\r\n\u003ci\u003eThe Necessary and the Contingent in the Aristotelian System\u003c/i\u003e, published in 1896\r\nby The University of Chicago Press. While quite independent in treatment, the two\r\npapers supplement each other.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_88_88\" id=\"Footnote_88_88\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_88_88\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[88]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The best special illustration of this truth with which I am acquainted is presented\r\nfor the science of chemistry in an article by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eF. Wald\u003c/span\u003e, \"Die Genesis der\r\nst\u0026ouml;chiometrischen Grundgesetze,\" in \u003ci\u003eZeitschrift f\u0026uuml;r physikalische Chemie\u003c/i\u003e, Vol.\r\nXVIII (1895), pp. 337 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_89_89\" id=\"Footnote_89_89\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_89_89\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[89]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u0026#926; \u0026nbsp; 201, 246.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_90_90\" id=\"Footnote_90_90\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_90_90\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[90]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u0026#919; \u0026nbsp; 99.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_91_91\" id=\"Footnote_91_91\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_91_91\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[91]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In allusion to fr. 90 (\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDiels\u003c/span\u003e). \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDiels\u003c/span\u003e finds in fr. 108 (fr. 18, \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBywater\u003c/span\u003e),\r\n\u0026#8004;\u0026#964;\u0026#953; \u0026#963;\u0026#959;\u0026#966;\u0026#972;\u0026#957; \u0026#7952;\u0026#963;\u0026#964;\u0026#953;\r\n\u0026#960;\u0026#940;\u0026#957;\u0026#964;\u0026#969;\u0026#957; \u0026#954;\u0026#949;\u0026#967;\u0026#969;\u0026#961;\u0026#953;\u0026#963;\u0026#956;\u0026#941;\u0026#957;\u0026#959;\u0026#957;\r\nthe thought that God is the Absolute, comparing the\r\n\u0026#925;\u0026#959;\u0026#8166;\u0026#962; of Anaxagoras and the\r\n\u0026#967;\u0026#969;\u0026#961;\u0026#953;\u0026#963;\u0026#964;\u0026#8052; \u0026#943;\u0026#948;\u0026#941;\u0026#945;\r\nof Plato and the \u0026#959;\u0026#8016;\u0026#963;\u0026#943;\u0026#945; \u0026#967;\u0026#969;\u0026#961;\u0026#953;\u0026#963;\u0026#964;\u0026#942; of Aristotle.\r\nHe assumes that \u0026#963;\u0026#959;\u0026#966;\u0026#972;\u0026#957;=\u0026#955;\u0026#972;\u0026#947;\u0026#959;\u0026#962; and concedes great significance to the fragment.\r\nBut this interpretation is utterly incompatible with everything else that we know\r\nof Heraclitus, and should be admitted only if it were the only one admissible.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eZeller\u003c/span\u003e discusses the fragment at length, Vol. I, p. 629, 1. If Diels\u0027s interpretation\r\nbe accepted, the exposition above given of Heraclitus\u0027s logical position must be\r\nabandoned.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_92_92\" id=\"Footnote_92_92\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_92_92\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[92]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It has been, and in some quarters is still, the fashion to say that Heraclitus is\r\nthe originator of the doctrine of relativity; but Zeller is quite right in denying the\r\ncharge. No doubt his teachings lent themselves readily to such a development, but\r\nhe did not so express himself. According to him the \u003ci\u003econtrarieties coexist in the process\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_93_93\" id=\"Footnote_93_93\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_93_93\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[93]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eCf.\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRitter-Preller\u003c/span\u003e, \u0026sect; 65\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_94_94\" id=\"Footnote_94_94\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_94_94\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[94]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This, in a word, is the burden of my study of \u003ci\u003eThe Necessary and the Contingent\r\nin the Aristotelian System\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_95_95\" id=\"Footnote_95_95\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_95_95\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[95]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I have in preparation a study of the problem of physical interaction in Pre-Socratic\r\nphilosophy which deals with this question in all its phases.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_96_96\" id=\"Footnote_96_96\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_96_96\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[96]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This statement is, of course, figurative, since Empedocles denied the existence\r\nof a void.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_97_97\" id=\"Footnote_97_97\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_97_97\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[97]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I cannot now undertake a defense of this statement, which runs counter to certain\r\nancient reports, but must reserve a full discussion for my account of physical\r\ninteraction.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_98_98\" id=\"Footnote_98_98\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_98_98\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[98]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The motive for making this assumption was clearly the desire to make of the\r\n\u0026#925;\u0026#959;\u0026#8166;\u0026#962; the prime mover in the world while exempting it from reaction on the part of\r\nthe world, which would have been unavoidable if its nature had contained parts of\r\nother things. It is the same problem of \"touching without being touched in return\"\r\nthat led Aristotle to a similar definition of God and of the rational soul. The same\r\ndifficulty besets the absolutely \"simple\" soul of Plato\u0027s \u003ci\u003ePhaedo\u003c/i\u003e and the causality of\r\nthe Ideas.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_99_99\" id=\"Footnote_99_99\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_99_99\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[99]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAristotle\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eDe Generatione et Corruptione\u003c/i\u003e, 323\u003csup\u003eb\u003c/sup\u003e 10 f.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_100_100\" id=\"Footnote_100_100\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_100_100\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[100]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e We have seen that this distinction was latent in Anaximenes\u0027s process of rarefaction\r\nand condensation. For other matters see \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eChaignet\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eHistoire de la Psychologie\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nVol. I, p. 114, whose account, however, needs to be corrected in some\r\nparticulars.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_101_101\" id=\"Footnote_101_101\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_101_101\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[101]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I say \"perhaps\" because ancient reports differ as to the precise relation of position\r\nand arrangement to the distinction between qualities, primary and secondary.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_102_102\" id=\"Footnote_102_102\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_102_102\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[102]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This is only another instance of what \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMr. Venn\u003c/span\u003e (\u003ci\u003eEmpirical Logic\u003c/i\u003e, p. 56) has\r\nwittily alluded to as \"screwing up the cause and the effect into close juxtaposition.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_103_103\" id=\"Footnote_103_103\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_103_103\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[103]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Simplicius says\r\n\u0026#949;\u0026#8016;\u0026#952;\u0026#8058;\u0026#962; \u0026#956;\u0026#949;\u0026#964;\u0026#8048; \u0026#964;\u0026#8056;\r\n\u0026#960;\u0026#961;\u0026#959;\u0026#959;\u0026#943;\u0026#956;\u0026#953;\u0026#959;\u0026#957;;\r\nsee \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDiels\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eDie Fragmente der Vorsokratiker\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(Berlin, 1903), p. 347, l. 18.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_104_104\" id=\"Footnote_104_104\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_104_104\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[104]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Fr. 2, \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDiels\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_105_105\" id=\"Footnote_105_105\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_105_105\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[105]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDiels\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eFragmente der Vorsokratiker\u003c/i\u003e, p. 343, l. 2; p. 344, l. 27.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_106_106\" id=\"Footnote_106_106\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_106_106\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[106]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e 320 C f.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_107_107\" id=\"Footnote_107_107\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_107_107\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[107]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Considerations of space as well as circumstances attending the immediate\r\npreparation of this discussion for the press have precluded any but the most general\r\nand casual reference to the recent literature of the subject. Much of this literature\r\nonly imperfectly distinguishes the logical and psychological points of view, so that\r\ncritical reference to it, unaccompanied by detailed restatement and analysis of the\r\npositions criticised, would be useless.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_108_108\" id=\"Footnote_108_108\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_108_108\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[108]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In order to avoid complicating the problems, we have here employed the common\r\nnotion that the physical world, physical object, and property may be taken for\r\ngranted as possible adequate contents of judgment, and that the problem is only as\r\nto the objectivity of economic and ethical contents. Of course we may, in the\r\nend, come to believe that the \"physical\" object is itself an economic construct, in\r\nthe large sense of \"economic;\" that is, an instrument of an effective or successful\r\nexperience. Thus in terms of the illustration used above, in the attitude of entertaining\r\nin a general way the plan of building a house \u003ci\u003eof some sort or other\u003c/i\u003e, one may\r\nhave before him various building materials the ascertained qualities of which are,\r\nit may be, socially recognized as in a general way fitting them for such a use. There\r\nis doubtless so much of real foundation for the common notion here referred to.\r\nBut along with the \u003ci\u003edefinition\u003c/i\u003e of the plan in ethical and economic judgment, along\r\nwith the determination actually to build a house, and a house of a certain specific\r\nkind, must go \u003ci\u003efurther\u003c/i\u003e determination of the means in their physical aspects, a determination\r\nwhich all the while reacts into the process of determination of the end.\r\nSee below, p. 246, note 3.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_109_109\" id=\"Footnote_109_109\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_109_109\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[109]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In the moral life, as elsewhere, the distinction of deduction and induction is\r\none of degree. There is but one \u003ci\u003etype\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003emethod\u003c/i\u003e of inference, though some inferences\r\nmay approach more closely than do others the limit of pure \"subsumption.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_110_110\" id=\"Footnote_110_110\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_110_110\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[110]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See III below.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_111_111\" id=\"Footnote_111_111\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_111_111\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[111]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It is no part of the present view that the ends which enter into economic conflict\r\nare incapable of becoming organic and intrinsically interrelated members of the\r\nprovisional system of life. On the contrary, the very essence of our contention is\r\nthat adjustment established between two such conflicting ends in economic judgment\r\nis in itself ethical and a member of the provisional system of the individual\u0027s ends of\r\nlife, and will stand as such, subject to modification through changes elsewhere in\r\nthe system, so long as the economic conditions in view of which it was determined\r\nremained unchanged. The \"mutual exclusiveness\" of the ends in ethical deliberation\r\nis simply the correlate of a relative fixity in certain of the conditions of life. A\r\nman\u0027s command over the means of obtaining such things as books and fuel varies\r\nmuch and often suddenly in a society like ours from time to time; but, on the other\r\nhand, his physical condition, his intelligence, his powers of sympathy, and his\r\nspiritual capacity for social service commonly do not. Hence there can be and is a\r\ncertain more or less definite and permanent comprehensive scheme of conduct morally\r\nobligatory upon him so far as the exercise of these latter faculties is concerned,\r\nbut so far as his conduct depends upon the variable conditions mentioned, it cannot\r\nbe prescribed in general terms, nor will any provisional ideal of moral selfhood\r\nadmit any such prescriptions as integral elements into itself. The moral self is an\r\nideal construct based upon these fixed conditions of life\u0026mdash;conditions so fixed that\r\nthe spiritual furtherance or deterioration likely to result from certain modes of conduct\r\ninvolving and affecting them can be estimated directly and with relative ease\r\nby the \"ethical\" method of judgment. Implied in such a construct is, of course, a\r\nreference to certain relatively permanent social and also physical conditions. In so\r\nfar as society and physical nature, and for that matter the individual\u0027s own nature,\r\nare \u003ci\u003evariable\u003c/i\u003e, these are the subjects of \"scientific\" or \"factual\" judgments incidental\r\nto the determination of problems by the \"economic\" method\u0026mdash;problems,\r\nthat is, for which no \u003ci\u003egeneral\u003c/i\u003e answer, through reference to a more or less definite and\r\nstable working concept of the self, can be given. Thus our knowledge of the physical\r\nuniverse is largely, if not chiefly, incidental to and conditioned by our economic\r\nexperience. Again, our economic judgments are in every case determinative of the\r\nself in situations in which, as presented by (perhaps even momentarily) variable conditions,\r\nphysical, social, or personal, the ethical method is inapplicable. In a socialistic\r\nstate, in which economic conditions might be more stable than in our present\r\none, many problems in consumption which now are economic in one sense would be\r\nethical because admitting of solution by reference to the type of self presupposed\r\nin the established state program of production and distribution. Even now it is not\r\neasy to specify an economic situation the solution of which is absolutely indifferent\r\nethically. There is a possibility of intemperance even in so \"\u0026aelig;sthetic\" an indulgence\r\nas Turkish rugs.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_112_112\" id=\"Footnote_112_112\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_112_112\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[112]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Accordingly there can be no distinction of ends, some as ethical, others as economic,\r\nbut from an ethical standpoint indifferent, and yet others as amenable\r\nneither to ethical nor to economic judgment. The type of situation and the corresponding\r\nmode of judgment employed determines whether an end shall be for the\r\ntime being ethical, economic, or of neither sort conspicuously.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_113_113\" id=\"Footnote_113_113\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_113_113\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[113]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The right of Prudence to rank among the virtues cannot, on our present view,\r\nbe questioned. Economic judgment, though it must be valuation of means, is essentially\r\nchoice of ends\u0026mdash;and, as would appear, choice of a sort peculiarly difficult by\r\nreason of the usually slight intrinsic relation between the ends involved and also\r\nby reason of the absence of effective points of view for comparison. Culture, as\r\nEmerson remarks, \"sees prudence not to be a several faculty, but a name for wisdom\r\nand virtue conversing with the body and its wants.\" And again, \"The spurious\r\nprudence, making the senses final, is the god of sots and cowards, and is the subject\r\nof all comedy…. [The true prudence] takes the laws of the world whereby\r\nman\u0027s being is conditioned, as they are, and keeps these laws that it may enjoy their\r\nproper good\" (Essay on \u003ci\u003ePrudence\u003c/i\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_114_114\" id=\"Footnote_114_114\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_114_114\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[114]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Here again we purposely use inaccurate language. Strictly, the ends here\r\nspoken of as competing are such, we must say, only because they are as yet in a\r\nmeasure indeterminate, wanting in \"clearness,\" and are not yet understood in their\r\ntrue economic character; likewise the means are wanting in that final shade or\r\ndegree of physical and mechanical determinateness which they are presently to\r\npossess as means to a finally determinate economic end. Thus economic judgment,\r\nby which is to be understood determination of an end of action by the economic\r\nmethod and in accordance with economic principles, involves in general physical\r\nre-determination of the means. The means which at the outset of the present economic\r\njudgment-process appear as physically available indifferently for either of the\r\ntentative ends under consideration are only in a general way the same means for\r\nknowledge as they will be when the economic problem has been solved. They are,\r\nso far as now determinate, the outcome of former physical judgment-processes incidental\r\nto the definition of economic ends in former situations like the present.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_115_115\" id=\"Footnote_115_115\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_115_115\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[115]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In our discussion of this preliminary question there is no attempt to furnish\r\nwhat might be called an \u003ci\u003eanalysis\u003c/i\u003e of the consciousness of objectivity. This has been\r\nundertaken by various psychologists in recent well-known contributions to the subject.\r\nFor our purpose it is necessary only to specify the intellectual and practical\r\nattitude out of which the consciousness of objectivity arises; not the sensory \"elements\"\r\nor factors involved in its production as an experience.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_116_116\" id=\"Footnote_116_116\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_116_116\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[116]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e So, on the other hand, our vague organic sensations are possibly more instructive\r\nas they are, \u003ci\u003efor their own purpose\u003c/i\u003e, than they would be if more sharply discriminated\r\nand complexly referred.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor convenience we here meet the view under consideration with its own terminology;\r\nwe by no means wish to be understood as indorsing this terminology as psychologically\r\ncorrect. The sense-quality of which we read in \"structural psychology\"\r\nis, we hold, not a structural unit at all, but in fact a highly abstract development out\r\nof that unorganized whole of sensory experience in which reflective attention begins.\r\nThere is, for example, no such thing as the simple unanalyzable sense-quality \"red\"\r\nin consciousness until judgment has proceeded far enough to have constructed a\r\ndefinite and measured experience which may be symbolized as \"object-before-me-possessing-the-attribute-red.\"\r\nIn place of the original sensory total-experience we\r\nnow have a more or less developed perceptual (\u003ci\u003ei. e.\u003c/i\u003e, judgmental) total-experience.\r\nIt is an instance of the \"psychological fallacy\" to interpret what are really elements\r\nof \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e in a perceived object constructed in judgment (for this is the true nature\r\nof the \"simple idea of sensation\" or \"sense-element\") as so many bits of psychical\r\nmaterial which were isolated from each other at the outset, and have been externally\r\njoined together in their present combination.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_117_117\" id=\"Footnote_117_117\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_117_117\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[117]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The phrase is K\u0026uuml;lpe\u0027s and is used in his sense of consciousness taken as a whole,\r\nas, for example, attentive, apperceptive, volitional, rather than in the sense made\r\nfamiliar by Spencer and others.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_118_118\" id=\"Footnote_118_118\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_118_118\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[118]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The foregoing discussion is in many ways similar to Brentano\u0027s upon the same\r\nsubject. In discussing his first class of modes of consciousness, the \u003ci\u003eVorstellungen\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nhe says: \"We find no contrasts between presentations excepting those of the objects\r\nto which the presentations refer. Only in so far as warm and cold, light and dark,\r\na high note and a low, form contrasts can we speak of the corresponding presentations\r\nas contrasted; and, in general, there is in any other sense than this no contrast\r\nwithin the entire range of these conscious processes\" (\u003ci\u003ePsychologie vom empirischen\r\nStandpunkte\u003c/i\u003e, Bd. I, p. 29). This may stand as against any attempt to find\r\ncontrast between abstract sense-qualities taken apart from their objective reference.\r\nWhat is, however, the ground of distinction between the presented objects? Apparently\r\nthis must be answered in the last resort as above. In this sense we should need\r\nfinally to interpret \"sensuous\" and \"material\" in terms of objectivity as above\r\ndefined, rather than the reverse. They are cases in or specifications of the determination\r\nof adequate stimuli.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_119_119\" id=\"Footnote_119_119\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_119_119\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[119]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In this connection reference may be made to the well-known disturbing effect\r\nof the forced introduction of attention to details into established sensori-motor\r\nco-ordinations, such as \"typewriting,\" playing upon the piano, and the like.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_120_120\" id=\"Footnote_120_120\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_120_120\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[120]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eCf.\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eProfessor Baldwin\u0027s\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eSocial and Ethical Interpretations\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eProfessor\r\nMcGilvary\u0027s\u003c/span\u003e recent paper on \"Moral Obligation,\" \u003ci\u003ePhilosophical Review\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. XI,\r\nespecially pp. 349 f.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_121_121\" id=\"Footnote_121_121\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_121_121\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[121]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Manifestly, as indicated just above, this accepted value of the object implies\r\nfuller physical knowledge of the object than was possessed at the outset of the economic\r\njudgment. See above, p. 234, note; p. 246, note 3; and p. 271, below.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_122_122\" id=\"Footnote_122_122\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_122_122\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[122]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eTypes of Ethical Theory\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II, p. 5.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_123_123\" id=\"Footnote_123_123\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_123_123\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[123]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See p. 253 above.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_124_124\" id=\"Footnote_124_124\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_124_124\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[124]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It is not so much the case that the object, on the one side, excites in the agent\u0027s\r\nconsciousness, on the other, the \"sensations of resistance\" which have played such\r\na part in recent controversy on the subject, as that (1) the object in certain of its\r\npromptings is \"resisting\" certain other of its promptings, or that (2) certain\r\n\"positive\" activities of the agent are being inhibited by certain \"negative\" activities,\r\nthereby giving rise to the \"emotion of resistance.\" That \"positive\" and\r\n\"negative\" are here used in a teleological way will be apparent. It is surely misleading\r\nto speak of \"\u003ci\u003esensations\u003c/i\u003e of resistance\" even in deprecatory quotation marks,\r\nexcept as \"sensation\" is used in its everyday meaning, viz., experience of strongly\r\nsensory quality.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_125_125\" id=\"Footnote_125_125\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_125_125\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[125]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The general theory of emotion which is here presupposed, and indeed is fundamental\r\nto the entire discussion, may be found in \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eProfessor Dewey\u0027s\u003c/span\u003e papers on\r\n\"The Theory of Emotion,\" \u003ci\u003ePsychological Review\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I, p. 553; Vol. II, p. 13.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_126_126\" id=\"Footnote_126_126\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_126_126\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[126]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Such is, in fact, the teaching of the various forms of ethical intuitionism,\r\nand we find it not merely implied, but explicitly affirmed, in a work in many respects\r\nso remote from intuitionism in its standpoint as \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGreen\u0027s\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eProlegomena to Ethics\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nSee pp. 178-81, and especially pp. 355-9.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_127_127\" id=\"Footnote_127_127\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_127_127\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[127]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Sermon II.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_128_128\" id=\"Footnote_128_128\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_128_128\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[128]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Not to imply of course that psychologically or logically the distinction of conditions\r\nand means is other than a convenient superficial one.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_129_129\" id=\"Footnote_129_129\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_129_129\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[129]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Manifestly we have here been approaching from a new direction the \"Recognition\r\ncoefficient\" of reality described above. See p. 266.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_130_130\" id=\"Footnote_130_130\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_130_130\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[130]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This, if it were intended as an account of the genesis of psychology as a science\r\nand of the psychological interest on the part of the individual, would doubtless be\r\nmost inadequate. We have, for one thing, made no mention of the part which error\r\nand resulting practical failure play in stimulating an interest in the \u003ci\u003ejudgmental\u003c/i\u003e\r\nprocesses of observation and the like, and in technique of the control of these. Here,\r\nas well as in the processes of \u003ci\u003eexecution\u003c/i\u003e of our purposes, must be found many of the\r\nroots of psychology as a science. Moreover, no explanation has been offered above\r\nfor the appropriation by the \"energetic\" self of these phenomena of interruption\r\nand retardation of its energy as being, in fact, its own, or within itself. The problem\r\nwould appear to be psychological, and so without our province, and we gladly pass\r\nit by.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_131_131\" id=\"Footnote_131_131\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_131_131\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[131]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e We can, of course, undertake no minute analysis of the psychological mechanism\r\nor concatenation of the process here sketched in barest outline. Our present\r\npurpose is wholly that of description. Slight as our account of the process of transition\r\nis, we give it space only because it seems necessary to do so in order to make\r\nintelligible the accounts yet to be given of the conscious valuation processes for\r\nwhich the movement here described prepares the way.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt will be observed that we assume above that the purpose is \u003ci\u003esuccessful as\r\nplanned\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eby succeeding\u003c/i\u003e brings about the undesirable results. Failure in execution\r\nof the purpose as such could only, in the manner already outlined, prompt a\r\nmore adequate investigation of the \u003ci\u003efactual conditions\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_132_132\" id=\"Footnote_132_132\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_132_132\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[132]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The case is not essentially altered in logical character if for the Levitical law\r\nbe substituted the general principles of the new dispensation read off details\r\nby an authoritative church or by \"private judgment.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_133_133\" id=\"Footnote_133_133\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_133_133\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[133]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e A remark may be added here by way of caution. The presented self, we have\r\nsaid, attenuates to a mere maxim or tacit presumption in favor of a certain type of\r\nlogical procedure in dealing with the situation. It must be remembered that the\r\npresented self, like all other presentation, is and comes to be for the sake of its\r\nfunction in experience, and so is practical from the start. The process sketched\r\nabove is therefore not from bare presented content as such to a methodological\r\npresumption, which, as methodological and not contentual, is qualitatively different\r\nfrom what preceded it.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_134_134\" id=\"Footnote_134_134\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_134_134\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[134]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eRecognized\u003c/i\u003e authority is, of course, not the same thing by any means as\r\nauthority unrecognized because absolutely dominant.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_135_135\" id=\"Footnote_135_135\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_135_135\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[135]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e We may be pardoned for supplying from the history of ethics no illustrations\r\nof this slight sketch.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_136_136\" id=\"Footnote_136_136\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_136_136\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[136]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In fact, as suggested above, the \u003ci\u003eProlegomena to Ethics\u003c/i\u003e is in many respects\r\nessentially intuitional in spirit, though its intuitionism is of a modern discreetly\r\nattenuated sort.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_137_137\" id=\"Footnote_137_137\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_137_137\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[137]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This would appear to be the logical value of functional psychology as a science\r\nof mental process.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_138_138\" id=\"Footnote_138_138\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_138_138\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[138]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e We have already given a slight sketch of the historical process here characterized\r\nin the barest logical terms.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_139_139\" id=\"Footnote_139_139\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_139_139\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[139]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Further consideration of the problem of factual judgment must be deferred to\r\nPart V.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_140_140\" id=\"Footnote_140_140\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_140_140\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[140]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The relation of the empirical self to the \"energetic\" and to standards will\r\ncome in for statement in Part V in the connection just referred to.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_141_141\" id=\"Footnote_141_141\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_141_141\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[141]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It might be possible to construct a \"logic\" of these various types of working\r\nmoral standard in such a way as to show that in each type there is implied the one\r\nnext higher morphologically, and ultimately the highest\u0026mdash;that is, some sort of concept\r\nof the \"energetic\" self.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_142_142\" id=\"Footnote_142_142\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_142_142\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[142]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It matters not at all whether, in ethics or metaphysics, our universal be\r\nabstract or on the other hand \"concrete,\" like Green\u0027s conception of the self, or a\r\n\"Hegelian\" Absolute. Its logical use in the determination of particulars must be\r\nessentially the same in either case.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_143_143\" id=\"Footnote_143_143\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_143_143\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[143]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In this connection reference may be made to \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMr. Taylor\u0027s\u003c/span\u003e recent work, \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nProblem of Conduct\u003c/i\u003e. Mr. Taylor reduces the moral life to terms of an ultimate conflict\r\nbetween the ideals of egoism and social justice, holding that the conflict is in\r\ntheory irreconcilable. With this negative attitude toward current standards in\r\nethical theory one may well be in accord without accepting Mr. Taylor\u0027s further contention\r\nthat a theory of ethics is therefore impossible. Because the \"ethics of subsumption\"\r\nis demonstrably futile it by no means follows that a method of ethics\r\ncannot be developed along the lines of modern scientific logic which shall be as valid\r\nas the procedure of the investigator in the sciences. Mr. Taylor\u0027s \u003ci\u003elogic\u003c/i\u003e is virtually\r\nthe same as that of the ethical theories which he criticises; because an ethical \u003ci\u003eideal\u003c/i\u003e\r\nis impossible, a theory of ethics is impossible also. One is reminded of \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMr. Bradley\u0027s\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncriticism of knowledge in the closing chapters of the \u003ci\u003eLogic\u003c/i\u003e as an interesting\r\nparallel.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_144_144\" id=\"Footnote_144_144\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_144_144\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[144]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMr. Bosanquet\u0027s\u003c/span\u003e discussion of the place of the principle of teleology in analogical\r\ninference will be found suggestive in this connection (\u003ci\u003eLogic\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II,\r\nchap. iii).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_145_145\" id=\"Footnote_145_145\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_145_145\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[145]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See above, p. 243 and p. 259 \u003ci\u003ead fin.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_146_146\" id=\"Footnote_146_146\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_146_146\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[146]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e We use the expression \"energy-\u003ci\u003eequivalent\u003c/i\u003e\" because the \"excess\" gained by\r\nthe self through the past adjustment is not of importance at just this point. The\r\nessential significance of the means now is not that they \"cost\" less than they promised\r\nto bring in in energy, but that \u003ci\u003ebecause they required sacrifice the self will now lose\r\nunless they are allowed to fulfil the promise\u003c/i\u003e. They are the logical equivalent of the\r\nestablished modes of consumption from the standpoint of conservation of the\r\nenergies of the self, not the mathematical equivalent.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt would be desirable, if there were space, to present a brief account of the\r\npsychological basis of the concepts of energy and energy-equivalence which here\r\ncome into play, but this must be omitted.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_147_147\" id=\"Footnote_147_147\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_147_147\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[147]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Putting it negatively, the renunciation of the new end involves a \"greater\"\r\nsacrifice than all the sacrifices which adherence to the present system of consumption\r\ncan compensate.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_148_148\" id=\"Footnote_148_148\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_148_148\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[148]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Green, as is well known, allows that any formulation of the ideal self must be\r\nincomplete, but holds that it is not for this reason useless. But this is to assume\r\nthat development in the ideal is never to be radically reconstructive, that the ideal\r\nis to expand and fill out along established and unchangeable lines of growth so that all\r\nincrease shall be in the nature of accretion. The self as a system is fixed and all\r\nindividual moral growth is in the nature of approximation to this absolute ideal.\r\nThis would appear to be essentially identical in a logical sense with Mr. Spencer\u0027s\r\nhypothesis of social evolution as a process of gradual approach to a condition of\r\nperfect adaptation of society and the individual to each other in an environment to\r\nwhich society is perfectly adapted\u0026mdash;a condition in which \"perfectly evolved\" individuals\r\nshall live in a state of blessedness in conformity to the requirements of\r\n\"absolute ethics.\" For a criticism of this latter type of view see \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMr. Taylor\u0027s\u003c/span\u003e\r\nabove-mentioned work (chap. v, \u003ci\u003epassim\u003c/i\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_149_149\" id=\"Footnote_149_149\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_149_149\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[149]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGreen\u0027s\u003c/span\u003e cautious defense of conscientiousness as a moral attitude see the\r\n\u003ci\u003eProlegomena to Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Book IV, chap. i; and for a statement of the present point\r\nof view as bearing upon Green\u0027s difficulty, see \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDewey\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eThe Study of Ethics: A Syllabus\u003c/i\u003e,\r\np. 37 \u003ci\u003ead fin.\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003ePhilosophical Review\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II, pp. 661, 662.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_150_150\" id=\"Footnote_150_150\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_150_150\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[150]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Along the line thus inadequately suggested might be found an answer to certain\r\ncriticisms of the attempt to dispense with a metaphysical idea of the self. Such\r\ncriticisms usually urge that without reference to a metaphysical ideal no meaning\r\nattaches to such conceptions as \"adjustment,\" \"expansion,\" \"furtherance,\" and\r\nthe like as predicated of the moral acts of an agent in their effect upon the \"energetic\"\r\nself. Anything that one may do, it is said, is expansive of the self, if it be\r\nsomething new, except as we judge it by a metaphysical ideal of a rightly expanded\r\nself. For an excellent statement of this general line of criticism see \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eStratton\u003c/span\u003e, \"A\r\nPsychological Test of Virtue,\" \u003ci\u003eInternational Journal of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. XI, p. 200.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_151_151\" id=\"Footnote_151_151\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_151_151\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[151]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The polemic of certain recent writers (as, for example, \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEhrenfels\u003c/span\u003e in his \u003ci\u003eSystem\r\nder Werttheorie\u003c/i\u003e) against the objectivity of judgments of value appears to rest\r\nupon an uncritical acceptance of the time-honored distinction between \"primary\"\r\nand \"secondary\" qualities as equivalent to the logical distinction of subjective\r\nand objective. Thus \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEhrenfels\u003c/span\u003e confutes \"das Vorurteil von der objectiven\r\nBedeutung des Wertbegriffes\" by explaining it as due to a misleading usage of speech\r\nexpressive of \"an impulse, deep-rooted in the human understanding, to objectify\r\nits presentations\" and then goes on to say \"We do not desire things because we\r\nrecognize the presence in them of a mysterious impalpable essence of Value but we\r\nascribe value to them because we desire them.\" (\u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, Bd. I, p. 2.) This may serve\r\nto illustrate the easy possibility of confusing the logical and psychological points of\r\nview, as likewise does \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEhrenfels\u003c/span\u003e\u0027s formal definition of value. (Bd. I., p. 65.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_152_152\" id=\"Footnote_152_152\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_152_152\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[152]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The essential dependence of factual judgment upon the rise of economic and\r\nethical conflict is implied in the widely current doctrine of the teleological character\r\nof knowledge. It is indeed nowadays something like a commonplace to say in one\r\nsense or another that knowledge is relative to ends, but it is not always recognized by\r\nthose who hold this view that an end never appears as such in consciousness alone.\r\nThe end that guides in the construction of factual knowledge is an end in ethical or\r\neconomic conflict with some other likewise indeterminate end in the manner above\r\ndiscussed.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_153_153\" id=\"Footnote_153_153\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_153_153\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[153]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See above, pp. 282, 283.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_154_154\" id=\"Footnote_154_154\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_154_154\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[154]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eCf.\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSchiller\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eRiddles of the Sphinx\u003c/i\u003e, chap. vii, \u0026sect;\u0026sect; 10-14.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_155_155\" id=\"Footnote_155_155\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_155_155\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[155]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It would appear that the principle of the conservation of energy is valid only\r\nin the physical sphere; but the logical significance of this limitation cannot be\r\nhere discussed.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_156_156\" id=\"Footnote_156_156\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_156_156\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[156]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e That the assumption mentioned is the essential basis of the twin theories of\r\nassociationism in psychology and hedonism in ethics is shown by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDr. Warner Fite\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin his article, \"The Associational Conception of Experience,\" \u003ci\u003ePhilosophical Review\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nVol. IX, pp. 283 ff. \u003ci\u003eCf.\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMr. Bradley\u003c/span\u003e\u0027s remarks on the logic of hedonism in his\r\n\u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Logic\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 244-9.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_157_157\" id=\"Footnote_157_157\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_157_157\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[157]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The \"energetic\" self is apparently \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMr. Bradley\u0027s\u003c/span\u003e fourth \"meaning of self,\"\r\nthe self as monad\u0026mdash;\"something moving parallel with the life of a man, or, rather,\r\nsomething not moving, but literally \u003ci\u003estanding\u003c/i\u003e in relation to his successive variety\"\r\n(\u003ci\u003eAppearance and Reality\u003c/i\u003e [1st ed.] p. 86, in chap. ix, \"The Meanings of the Self\").\r\nMr. Bradley\u0027s difficulty appears to come from his desiring a psychological content for\r\nwhat is essentially a logical conception\u0026mdash;a confusion (if we may be permitted the\r\nremark) which runs through the entire chapter to which we refer and is responsible\r\nfor the undeniable and hopeless incoherency of the various meanings of the self, as\r\nMr. Bradley therein expounds them. \"If the monad stands aloof,\" says Mr. Bradley,\r\n\"either with no character at all or a private character apart, then it may be a fine\r\nthing in itself, but it is a mere mockery to call it the self of a man\" (p. 87). Surely\r\nthis is to misconstrue and then find fault with that very character of essential \u003ci\u003elogical\u003c/i\u003e\r\napartness from any possibility of determination in point of descriptive psychological\r\ncontent which constitutes the whole value of the \"energetic\" self as a logical conception\r\nstimulative of the valuation-process and so inevitably of factual judgment.\r\nSee pp. 258, 259, above. The reader may find for himself in Mr. Bradley\u0027s enumeration\r\nof meanings our concept of the empirical self. But surely the \"energetic\" and\r\nempirical selves would appear on our showing to have no necessary conflict with\r\neach other.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_158_158\" id=\"Footnote_158_158\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_158_158\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[158]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In the first of these inseparable aspects valuation is determinative of Rightness\r\nand Wrongness; in the second it presents the object as Good or Bad. See p. 259,\r\nabove.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_159_159\" id=\"Footnote_159_159\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_159_159\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[159]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See, for example, \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWieser\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eNatural Value\u003c/i\u003e (Eng. trans.), p. 17.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_160_160\" id=\"Footnote_160_160\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_160_160\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[160]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See pp. 307-12 above.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_161_161\" id=\"Footnote_161_161\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_161_161\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[161]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The illustration, as also the general principle which it here is used to illustrate,\r\nwas suggested some years since by Professor G. H. Mead in a lecture course on\r\nthe \"History of Psychology,\" which the writer had the advantage of attending.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_162_162\" id=\"Footnote_162_162\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_162_162\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[162]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The conservative function of valuation may be further illustrated by reference\r\nto the well-known principle of marginal utility of which we have already made mention\r\n(p. 307 above), and which has played so great a part in modern economic\r\ntheory. The value of the unit quantity of a stock of any commodity is, according to\r\nthis principle, measured by the least important single use in the schedule of uses to\r\nwhich the stock as a whole is to be applied. Manifestly, then, adherence to this\r\nvaluation placed upon the unit quantity is in so far conservative of the whole schedule\r\nand the marginal value is a \"short-hand\" symbol expressive of the value of the\r\nwhole complex purpose presented in the schedule. Moreover, the increase of marginal\r\nvalue concurrently with diminution of the stock through consumption, loss,\r\nor reapplication is not indicative so much of a change of purpose as of determination\r\nto adhere to so much of the original program of consumption as may still be\r\npossible of attainment with the depleted supply of the commodity.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_163_163\" id=\"Footnote_163_163\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_163_163\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[163]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Thus except on this condition we should deny the propriety of speaking of the\r\nvalue of a friend or of a memento or sacred relic. The purpose of accurate definition\r\nof the function of such objects as these in the attainment of one\u0027s ends is foreign to\r\nthe proper attitude of loving, prizing, or venerating them. We may ethically value\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eact\u003c/i\u003e of sacrifice for a friend or of solicitous care of the memento, but the object of\r\nour sacrifice or solicitude has simply the direct or immediate \"qualitative\" emotional\r\ncharacter appropriate to the kinds of activity to which it is the adequate stimulus.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_164_164\" id=\"Footnote_164_164\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_164_164\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[164]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eHistory of Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e (\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTuft\u003c/span\u003e\u0027s translation), p. 117.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_165_165\" id=\"Footnote_165_165\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_165_165\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[165]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eCf.\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eProfessor J. R. Angell\u003c/span\u003e\u0027s article, \"Relations of Structural and Functional\r\nPsychology to Philosophy,\" \u003ci\u003eDecennial Publications of the University of Chicago\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nVol. III, pp. 10-12; also \u003ci\u003ePhilosophical Review\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. XII, No. 3. \u003ci\u003eCf.\u003c/i\u003e also \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMr. Schiller\u003c/span\u003e\u0027s\r\nessay on \"Axioms as Postulates\" in \u003ci\u003ePersonal Idealism\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_166_166\" id=\"Footnote_166_166\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_166_166\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[166]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e From this point on this paper is an expansion of some paragraphs, pp. 11-13, in\r\nan article on \"Existence, Meaning, and Reality,\" printed from Vol. III of the First\r\nSeries of the \u003ci\u003eDecennial Publications of the University of Chicago\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_167_167\" id=\"Footnote_167_167\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_167_167\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[167]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 22.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_168_168\" id=\"Footnote_168_168\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_168_168\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[168]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Pp. 22, 23; italics mine.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_169_169\" id=\"Footnote_169_169\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_169_169\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[169]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 25.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_170_170\" id=\"Footnote_170_170\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_170_170\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[170]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 26.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_171_171\" id=\"Footnote_171_171\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_171_171\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[171]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e p. 36; italics mine.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_172_172\" id=\"Footnote_172_172\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_172_172\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[172]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Pp. 22, 23; italics mine.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_173_173\" id=\"Footnote_173_173\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_173_173\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[173]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 307.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_174_174\" id=\"Footnote_174_174\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_174_174\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[174]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 327.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_175_175\" id=\"Footnote_175_175\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_175_175\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[175]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 23; italics mine.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_176_176\" id=\"Footnote_176_176\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_176_176\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[176]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eCf.\u003c/i\u003e p. 34; also p. 22.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_177_177\" id=\"Footnote_177_177\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_177_177\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[177]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 35.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_178_178\" id=\"Footnote_178_178\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_178_178\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[178]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This warns us that in the phrase, \"a plan of action,\" the term \"action\" must\r\nbe more inclusive than it is in much current discussion. It must not be limited to\r\ngymnastic performance. It must apply to any sort of activity planned for, and\r\nwhich, when it arrives, fulfils the plan. This, I take it, is the import of the paragraph\r\nat the top of p. 7 of \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eProfessor James\u003c/span\u003e\u0027s \u003ci\u003ePhilosophical Conceptions and Practical\r\nResults\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_179_179\" id=\"Footnote_179_179\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_179_179\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[179]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 270.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_180_180\" id=\"Footnote_180_180\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_180_180\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[180]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Pp. 270, 271.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_181_181\" id=\"Footnote_181_181\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_181_181\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[181]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 276.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_182_182\" id=\"Footnote_182_182\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_182_182\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[182]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 277.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_183_183\" id=\"Footnote_183_183\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_183_183\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[183]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Pp. 280, 281.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_184_184\" id=\"Footnote_184_184\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_184_184\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[184]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See p. 256.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_185_185\" id=\"Footnote_185_185\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_185_185\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[185]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 289; italics mine.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_186_186\" id=\"Footnote_186_186\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_186_186\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[186]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 281; italics mine.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_187_187\" id=\"Footnote_187_187\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_187_187\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[187]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It is worth noting in passing that here the universal appears to be located in\r\nfinite experience, while the ground of the particular is in the absolute.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_188_188\" id=\"Footnote_188_188\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_188_188\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[188]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 282.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_189_189\" id=\"Footnote_189_189\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_189_189\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[189]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 284; italics mine.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_190_190\" id=\"Footnote_190_190\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_190_190\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[190]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 283.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_191_191\" id=\"Footnote_191_191\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_191_191\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[191]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 332.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_192_192\" id=\"Footnote_192_192\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_192_192\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[192]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 339.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_193_193\" id=\"Footnote_193_193\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_193_193\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[193]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This ghost of subjectivism haunts the entire part of the essay in which the\r\nfinal fulfilment of finite ideas is found in \"a certain absolute system of ideas.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_194_194\" id=\"Footnote_194_194\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_194_194\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[194]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 330; italics mine.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_195_195\" id=\"Footnote_195_195\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_195_195\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[195]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 337.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_196_196\" id=\"Footnote_196_196\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_196_196\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[196]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 286.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_197_197\" id=\"Footnote_197_197\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_197_197\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[197]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 307.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_198_198\" id=\"Footnote_198_198\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_198_198\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[198]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 297.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_199_199\" id=\"Footnote_199_199\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_199_199\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[199]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This reduction of the purposive to the representative function carries with it\r\nan interesting implication concerning the whole character and relationship of\r\nthought and will. From beginning to end, on almost every page, Mr. Royce insists\r\nupon the idea as an expression of will. At the outset we read: \"When we try to\r\ndefine the idea in itself, as a conscious fact, our best means is to lay stress upon the\r\nsort of will or active meaning which any idea involves for the mind that forms the\r\nidea\" (p. 22). Again: \"The idea is a will seeking its own determination. It is\r\nnothing else\" (p. 332)\u0026mdash;and so on throughout the lectures. And we have already seen\r\nhow consistently this is worked out in the analysis of concrete acts, such as singing,\r\netc. But now, as related to the absolute system, the will, as embodied in the idea, is\r\nto find its final determination in approximating the certain absolute system of ideas.\r\nThis would seem to make will but little more than the mere form of representation\r\nitself. The idea is a will, but in its relation to truth its will is \"to correspond even\r\nin its vagueness to its own final and completely individual expression.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_200_200\" id=\"Footnote_200_200\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_200_200\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[200]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 339.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_201_201\" id=\"Footnote_201_201\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_201_201\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[201]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 338.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_202_202\" id=\"Footnote_202_202\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_202_202\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[202]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 335.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_203_203\" id=\"Footnote_203_203\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_203_203\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[203]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eCf.\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMr. Gore\u0027s\u003c/span\u003e paper, above.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_204_204\" id=\"Footnote_204_204\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_204_204\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[204]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eCf.\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBaldwin\u0027s\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci\u003eDevelopment and Evolution\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 250, 251, on the necessity of the\r\nsubmission of the \"new experience\" to the test of its ability to utilize habit.\r\nInterpreted broadly, habit might here mean the whole mechanical side, including\r\norganism \u003ci\u003eand\u003c/i\u003e environment, and so include Mr. Baldwin\u0027s second or \"extra-organic\"\r\ntest.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_205_205\" id=\"Footnote_205_205\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_205_205\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[205]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 19.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_206_206\" id=\"Footnote_206_206\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_206_206\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[206]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Pp. 17, 18.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_207_207\" id=\"Footnote_207_207\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_207_207\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[207]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See, above, \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eProfessor Dewey\u0027s\u003c/span\u003e Study III, pp. 49 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_208_208\" id=\"Footnote_208_208\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_208_208\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[208]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 55.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"notebox\"\u003e\r\n\u003cb\u003eTranscriber\u0027s Note:\u003c/b\u003e Footnotes have been renumbered and moved from the middle of a chapter\r\nto the end of the HTML. Printer\u0027s inconsistencies in spelling, punctuation,\r\nhyphenation, and ligature usage have been retained.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}