Ethics
{"WorkMasterId":6301,"WpPageId":281288,"ParentWpPageId":193822,"Slug":"ethics","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/ethics/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/ethics/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":1571264,"CleanHtmlLength":1515154,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"Ethics","Deck":"Dewey treats moral life as social conduct, habit, valuation, character, institutions, and intelligent reconstruction of ends.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to John Dewey","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"John Dewey","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/john-dewey-01-portrait-by-underwood-underwood.jpg","ImageAlt":"Underwood and Underwood portrait of John Dewey","FilterTerra":"North America","ClickText":"John Dewey","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/","Copies":["1859 CE – 1952 CE","Burlington, Vermont","American pragmatist philosopher of instrumentalism, democratic experimentalism, progressive education, inquiry, experience, logic, ethics, aesthetics, public life, science, and naturalistic religion."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:4","Title":"Modern History","DateText":"1800 CE – 1944 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:11","Title":"Long 19th Century","DateText":"1870 CE – 1913 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/philosophers-of-the-long-19th-century/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"1908 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Displayed as 1908 CE for the first Dewey-Tufts Ethics edition; later revision is evidence, not a duplicate work row.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:6"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:25"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:USA:6"}],"OriginalTitle":"Ethics","Language":"English","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:ethics"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:political-philosophy"}],"Tradition":"American pragmatism; instrumentalism; pragmatic naturalism; democratic experimentalism; progressive education","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #39551 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Dewey treats moral life as social conduct, habit, valuation, character, institutions, and intelligent reconstruction of ends."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"Ethics with James Hayden Tufts","KeyConcepts":"ethics; conduct; habit; valuation; character; institutions; social life","Methodology":"Direct Dewey work-cluster record based on SEP, IEP, Britannica, Center for Dewey Studies, Dewey scholarship, catalog records, and public edition evidence. 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No full text is imported."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"One work-cluster page with explicit integer display year, date note, evidence note, discipline mapping, and public source evidence."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Dewey treats moral life as social conduct, habit, valuation, character, institutions, and intelligent reconstruction of ends."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, G. W. F. Hegel, Darwinian naturalism, experimental science, Jane Addams and social reform, American democratic institutions, and educational practice."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"Pragmatism, analytic and continental social philosophy, democratic theory, progressive education, inquiry theory, aesthetics, public philosophy, deliberative democracy, philosophy of science, and American philosophy."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct Dewey work-cluster via bibliography, catalog, and scholarship evidence.","Dewey remains central for inquiry, democratic life, public problem-solving, education, experience, habits, art, values, religion as human faith, and experimental social intelligence."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct Dewey work-cluster via bibliography, catalog, and scholarship evidence."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003ePublic-domain full text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/39551\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #39551\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch1\u003eETHICS\u003c/h1\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003csmall\u003eBY\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nJOHN DEWEY\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eProfessor of Philosophy in Columbia University\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003csmall\u003eAND\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nJAMES H. TUFTS\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eProfessor of Philosophy in the University of Chicago\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 235px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-ethics-titlepage.jpg\" width=\"235\" height=\"273\" alt=\"\" title=\"\" /\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"ft20\"\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eNEW YORK\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cb\u003eHENRY HOLT AND COMPANY\u003c/b\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLondon\u003c/span\u003e: GEORGE BELL AND SONS\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n1909\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_ii\" id=\"Page_ii\"\u003e[Pg ii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCopyright, 1908,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nby\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHENRY HOLT AND COMPANY\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_iii\" id=\"Page_iii\"\u003e[Pg iii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003ePREFACE\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe significance of this text in Ethics lies in its effort\r\nto awaken a vital conviction of the genuine reality\r\nof moral problems and the value of reflective thought\r\nin dealing with them. To this purpose are subordinated\r\nthe presentation in Part I. of historic material; the discussion\r\nin Part II. of the different types of theoretical\r\ninterpretation, and the consideration, in Part III., of some\r\ntypical social and economic problems which characterize\r\nthe present.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eExperience shows that the student of morals has difficulty\r\nin getting the field objectively and definitely before\r\nhim so that its problems strike him as real problems. Conduct\r\nis so intimate that it is not easy to analyze. It is so\r\nimportant that to a large extent the perspective for regarding\r\nit has been unconsciously fixed by early training.\r\nThe historical method of approach has proved in the\r\nclassroom experience of the authors an effective method\r\nof meeting these difficulties. To follow the moral life\r\nthrough typical epochs of its development enables students\r\nto realize what is involved in their own habitual standpoints;\r\nit also presents a concrete body of subject-matter\r\nwhich serves as material of analysis and discussion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe classic conceptions of moral theory are of remarkable\r\nimportance in illuminating the obscure places\r\nof the moral life and in giving the student clues which\r\nwill enable him to explore it for himself. But there is\r\nalways danger of either dogmatism or a sense of unreality\r\nwhen students are introduced abruptly to the theoretical\r\nideas. Instead of serving as tools for understanding the\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_iv\" id=\"Page_iv\"\u003e[Pg iv]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003emoral facts, the ideas are likely to become substitutes for\r\nthe facts. When they are proffered ready-made, their\r\ntheoretical acuteness and cleverness may be admired, but\r\ntheir practical soundness and applicability are suspected.\r\nThe historical introduction permits the student to be\r\npresent, as it were, at the social situations in which the\r\nintellectual instruments were forged. He appreciates their\r\nrelevancy to the conditions which provoked them, and he\r\nis encouraged to try them on simple problems before attempting\r\nthe complex problems of the present. By assisting\r\nin their gradual development he gains confidence in\r\nthe ideas and in his power to use them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the second part, devoted more specifically to the\r\nanalysis and criticism of the leading conceptions of moral\r\ntheory, the aim accordingly has not been to instill the\r\nnotions of a school nor to inculcate a ready-made system,\r\nbut to show the development of theories out of the problems\r\nand experience of every-day conduct, and to suggest\r\nhow these theories may be fruitfully applied in practical\r\nexigencies. Aspects of the moral life have been so thoroughly\r\nexamined that it is possible to present certain principles\r\nin the confidence that they will meet general acceptance.\r\nRationalism and hedonism, for example, have\r\ncontributed toward a scientific statement of the elements\r\nof conduct, even though they have failed as self-inclosed\r\nand final systems. After the discussions of Kant and Mill,\r\nSidgwick and Green, Martineau and Spencer, it is possible\r\nto affirm that there is a place in the moral life for reason\r\nand a place for happiness,\u0026mdash;a place for duty and a place\r\nfor valuation. Theories are treated not as incompatible\r\nrival systems which must be accepted or rejected \u003ci\u003een bloc\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nbut as more or less adequate methods of surveying the\r\nproblems of conduct. This mode of approach facilitates\r\nthe scientific estimation and determination of the part\r\nplayed by various factors in the complexity of moral life.\r\nThe student is put in a position to judge the problems of\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_v\" id=\"Page_v\"\u003e[Pg v]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003econduct for himself. This emancipation and enlightenment\r\nof individual judgment is the chief aim of the\r\ntheoretical portion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn a considerable part of the field, particularly in the\r\npolitical and economic portions of Part III., no definitive\r\ntreatment is as yet possible. Nevertheless, it is highly\r\ndesirable to introduce the student to the examination of\r\nthese unsettled questions. When the whole civilized world\r\nis giving its energies to the meaning and value of justice\r\nand democracy, it is intolerably academic that those interested\r\nin ethics should have to be content with conceptions\r\nalready worked out, which therefore relate to what is\r\nleast doubtful in conduct rather than to questions now\r\nurgent. Moreover, the advantages of considering theory\r\nand practice in direct relation to each other are mutual.\r\nOn the one hand, as against the \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e claims of both\r\nindividualism and socialism, the need of the hour seems\r\nto us to be the application of methods of more deliberate\r\nanalysis and experiment. The extreme conservative may\r\ndeprecate any scrutiny of the present order; the ardent\r\nradical may be impatient of the critical and seemingly\r\ntardy processes of the investigator; but those who have\r\nconsidered well the conquest which man is making of the\r\nworld of nature cannot forbear the conviction that the\r\ncruder method of trial and error and the time-honored\r\nmethod of prejudice and partisan controversy need not\r\nlonger completely dominate the regulation of the life of\r\nsociety. They hope for a larger application of the scientific\r\nmethod to the problems of human welfare and progress.\r\nConversely, a science which takes part in the actual\r\nwork of promoting moral order and moral progress must\r\nreceive a valuable reflex influence of stimulus and of test.\r\nTo consider morality in the making as well as to dwell\r\nupon values already established should make the science\r\nmore vital. And whatever the effect upon the subject-matter,\r\nthe student can hardly appreciate the full force\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_vi\" id=\"Page_vi\"\u003e[Pg vi]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eof his materials and methods as long as they are kept aloof\r\nfrom the questions which are occupying the minds of his\r\ncontemporaries.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTeachers who are limited in time will doubtless prefer\r\nto make their own selections of material, but the following\r\nsuggestions present one possible line of choice. In Part\r\nI., of the three chapters dealing with the Hebrew, Greek,\r\nand modern developments, any one may be taken as furnishing\r\nan illustration of the method; and certain portions\r\nof Chapter IX. may be found more detailed in analysis\r\nthan is necessary for the beginner. In Part II., Chapters\r\nXI.-XII. may be omitted without losing the thread of the\r\nargument. In Part III., any one of the specific topics\u0026mdash;viz.,\r\nthe political state, the economic order, the family\u0026mdash;may\r\nbe considered apart from the others. Some teachers\r\nmay prefer to take Parts in their entirety. In this case,\r\nany two may be chosen.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs to the respective shares of the work for which the\r\nauthors are severally responsible, while each has contributed\r\nsuggestions and criticisms to the work of the\r\nother in sufficient degree to make the book throughout a\r\njoint work, Part I. has been written by Mr. Tufts, Part II.\r\nby Mr. Dewey, and in Part III., Chapters XX. and XXI.\r\nare by Mr. Dewey, Chapters XXII.-XXVI. by Mr. Tufts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt need scarcely be said that no attempt has been made\r\nin the bibliographies to be exhaustive. When the dates\r\nof publication of the work cited are given, the plan\r\nhas been in general to give, in the case of current literature,\r\nthe date of the latest edition, and in the case of\r\nsome classical treatises the date of original publication.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn conclusion, the authors desire to express their indebtedness\r\nto their colleagues and friends Dr. Wright,\r\nMr. Talbert, and Mr. Eastman, who have aided in the\r\nreading of the proof and with other suggestions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_vii\" id=\"Page_vii\"\u003e[Pg vii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003eTABLE OF CONTENTS\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\u0027center\u0027\u003e\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"4\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\" width=\"90%\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003csmall\u003ePAGE\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eI. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eIntroduction\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003e\u0026sect; 1. \u003ci\u003eDefinition and Method:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Ethical and moral, specific\r\nproblem, \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e; importance of genetic study, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 2. \u003ci\u003eCriterion of\r\nthe moral:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;The moral in cross section, the \"what\" and the\r\n\"how,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e; the moral as growth, \u003ca href=\"#Page_8\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 3. \u003ci\u003eDivisions of the\r\ntreatment\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_13\"\u003e13\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\u00272\u0027 align=\u0027center\u0027\u003e\u003cbig\u003ePART I\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Beginnings and Growth of Morality\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/big\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eII. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEarly Group Life\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_17\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003e\u0026sect; 1. \u003ci\u003eTypical facts of group life:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Primitive unity and\r\nsolidarity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_17\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 2. \u003ci\u003eKinship and household groups:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\nkinship group, \u003ca href=\"#Page_21\"\u003e21\u003c/a\u003e; the family or household group, \u003ca href=\"#Page_23\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e.\r\n\u0026sect; 3. \u003ci\u003eKinship and family groups as economic and industrial\r\nunits:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;The land and the group, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e; movable goods, \u003ca href=\"#Page_25\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e.\r\n\u0026sect; 4. \u003ci\u003eKinship and family groups as political bodies:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Their\r\ncontrol over the individual, \u003ca href=\"#Page_26\"\u003e26\u003c/a\u003e; rights and responsibility, \u003ca href=\"#Page_27\"\u003e27\u003c/a\u003e.\r\n\u0026sect; 5. \u003ci\u003eThe kinship or household as a religious unit:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Totem\r\ngroups, \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e; ancestral religion, \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 6. \u003ci\u003eAge and sex groups\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_32\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 7. \u003ci\u003eMoral significance of the group\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_34\"\u003e34\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eIII. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Rationalizing and Socializing Agencies in Early\r\nSociety\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_37\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003e\u0026sect; 1. \u003ci\u003eThree levels of conduct:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Conduct as instinctive and\r\ngoverned by primal needs, regulated by society\u0027s standards,\r\nand by personal standards, \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 2. \u003ci\u003eRationalizing agencies:\u003c/i\u003e\r\nWork, \u003ca href=\"#Page_40\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e; arts and crafts, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e; war, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 3. \u003ci\u003eSocializing\r\nagencies:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Co\u0026ouml;peration, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e; art, \u003ca href=\"#Page_45\"\u003e45\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 4. \u003ci\u003eFamily life as\r\nidealizing and socializing agency\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_47\"\u003e47\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 5. \u003ci\u003eMoral interpretation\r\nof this first level\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_49\"\u003e49\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eIV. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGroup Morality\u0026mdash;Customs or Mores\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_51\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003e\u0026sect; 1. \u003ci\u003eMeaning, authority, and origin of customs\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e.\r\n\u0026sect; 2. \u003ci\u003eMeans of enforcing custom:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Public approval, taboos,\r\nrituals, force, \u003ca href=\"#Page_54\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 3. \u003ci\u003eConditions which render group control\r\nconscious:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Educational customs, \u003ca href=\"#Page_57\"\u003e57\u003c/a\u003e; law and justice,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_59\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e; danger or crisis, \u003ca href=\"#Page_64\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 4. \u003ci\u003eValues and defects of customary\r\nmorality:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Standards, motives, content, organization of\r\ncharacter, \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_viii\" id=\"Page_viii\"\u003e[Pg viii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eV. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFrom Custom to Conscience; from Group Morality to\r\nPersonal Morality\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_73\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003e\u0026sect; 1. \u003ci\u003eContrast and collision\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 2. \u003ci\u003eSociological agencies\r\nin the transition:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Economic forces, \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e; science and the arts,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_78\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e; military forces, \u003ca href=\"#Page_80\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e; religious forces, \u003ca href=\"#Page_81\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 3. \u003ci\u003ePsychological\r\nagencies:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Sex, \u003ca href=\"#Page_81\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e; private property, \u003ca href=\"#Page_83\"\u003e83\u003c/a\u003e; struggles\r\nfor mastery and liberty, \u003ca href=\"#Page_84\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e; honor and esteem, \u003ca href=\"#Page_85\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 4. \u003ci\u003ePositive\r\nreconstruction\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_89\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eVI. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Hebrew Moral Development\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_91\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003e\u0026sect; 1. \u003ci\u003eGeneral character and determining principles:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\nHebrew and the Greek, \u003ca href=\"#Page_91\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e; Political and economic factors, \u003ca href=\"#Page_92\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e.\r\n\u0026sect; 2. \u003ci\u003eReligious agencies:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Covenant, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\"\u003e94\u003c/a\u003e; personal law-giver,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_95\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e; cultus, \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e; prophets, \u003ca href=\"#Page_99\"\u003e99\u003c/a\u003e; the kingdom, \u003ca href=\"#Page_100\"\u003e100\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 3. \u003ci\u003eMoral\r\nconceptions attained:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Righteousness and sin, \u003ca href=\"#Page_102\"\u003e102\u003c/a\u003e; responsibility,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_104\"\u003e104\u003c/a\u003e; purity of motive, \u003ca href=\"#Page_105\"\u003e105\u003c/a\u003e; the ideal of \"life,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e;\r\nthe social ideal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eVII. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Moral Development of the Greeks\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_111\"\u003e111\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003e\u0026sect; 1. \u003ci\u003eThe fundamental notes:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Convention versus nature, \u003ca href=\"#Page_111\"\u003e111\u003c/a\u003e;\r\nmeasure, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e; good and just, \u003ca href=\"#Page_113\"\u003e113\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 2. \u003ci\u003eIntellectual forces\r\nof individualism:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;The scientific spirit, \u003ca href=\"#Page_114\"\u003e114\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 3. \u003ci\u003eCommercial\r\nand political individualism:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Class interests, \u003ca href=\"#Page_119\"\u003e119\u003c/a\u003e; why\r\nobey laws? \u003ca href=\"#Page_122\"\u003e122\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 4. \u003ci\u003eIndividualism and ethical theory:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\nquestion formulated, \u003ca href=\"#Page_124\"\u003e124\u003c/a\u003e; individualistic theories, \u003ca href=\"#Page_126\"\u003e126\u003c/a\u003e.\r\n\u0026sect; 5. \u003ci\u003eThe deeper view of nature and the good, of the individual\r\nand the social order:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Aristotle on the natural, \u003ca href=\"#Page_127\"\u003e127\u003c/a\u003e;\r\nPlato\u0027s ideal state, \u003ca href=\"#Page_129\"\u003e129\u003c/a\u003e; passion or reason, \u003ca href=\"#Page_131\"\u003e131\u003c/a\u003e; eud\u0026aelig;monism\r\nand the mean, \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e; man and the cosmos, \u003ca href=\"#Page_135\"\u003e135\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 6. \u003ci\u003eThe conception\r\nof the ideal:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Contrast with the actual, \u003ca href=\"#Page_136\"\u003e136\u003c/a\u003e; ethical\r\nsignificance, \u003ca href=\"#Page_138\"\u003e138\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 7. \u003ci\u003eThe conception of the self, of character\r\nand responsibility:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;The poets, \u003ca href=\"#Page_138\"\u003e138\u003c/a\u003e; Plato and the\r\nStoics, \u003ca href=\"#Page_140\"\u003e140\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eVIII. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Modern Period\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_142\"\u003e142\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003e\u0026sect; 1. \u003ci\u003eThe medi\u0026aelig;val ideals:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Groups and class ideals, \u003ca href=\"#Page_143\"\u003e143\u003c/a\u003e; the\r\nchurch ideal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_145\"\u003e145\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 2. \u003ci\u003eMain lines of modern development\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_147\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 3. \u003ci\u003eThe old and new in the beginnings of individualism\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_149\"\u003e149\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 4. \u003ci\u003eIndividualism in the progress of liberty and\r\ndemocracy:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Rights, \u003ca href=\"#Page_151\"\u003e151\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 5. \u003ci\u003eIndividualism as affected by\r\nthe development of industry, commerce, and art:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Increasing\r\npower and interests, \u003ca href=\"#Page_153\"\u003e153\u003c/a\u003e; distribution of goods, \u003ca href=\"#Page_157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e; industrial\r\nrevolution raises new problems, \u003ca href=\"#Page_159\"\u003e159\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 6. \u003ci\u003eThe individual\r\nand the development of intelligence:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;The Renaissance,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_163\"\u003e163\u003c/a\u003e; the Enlightenment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_165\"\u003e165\u003c/a\u003e; the present significance of scientific\r\nmethod, \u003ca href=\"#Page_167\"\u003e167\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eIX. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA General Comparison of Customary and Reflective\r\nMorality\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_171\"\u003e171\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003e\u0026sect; 1. \u003ci\u003eElements of agreement and continuity:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;R\u0026eacute;gime of\r\ncustom, \u003ca href=\"#Page_172\"\u003e172\u003c/a\u003e; persistence of group morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_173\"\u003e173\u003c/a\u003e; origin of\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_ix\" id=\"Page_ix\"\u003e[Pg ix]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eethical terms, \u003ca href=\"#Page_175\"\u003e175\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 2. \u003ci\u003eElements of contrast:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Differentiation\r\nof the moral, \u003ca href=\"#Page_177\"\u003e177\u003c/a\u003e; observing \u003ci\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e reflecting, \u003ca href=\"#Page_178\"\u003e178\u003c/a\u003e; the\r\nhigher law, \u003ca href=\"#Page_181\"\u003e181\u003c/a\u003e; deepening of meaning, \u003ca href=\"#Page_182\"\u003e182\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 3. \u003ci\u003eOpposition\r\nbetween individual and social aims and standards:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Withdrawal\r\nfrom the social order, \u003ca href=\"#Page_184\"\u003e184\u003c/a\u003e; individual emancipation,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_186\"\u003e186\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 4. \u003ci\u003eEffects upon the individual character:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Increased\r\npossibilities of evil as well as of good, \u003ca href=\"#Page_187\"\u003e187\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 5. \u003ci\u003eMoral\r\ndifferentiation and the social order:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Effects on the family,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_193\"\u003e193\u003c/a\u003e; on industry and government, \u003ca href=\"#Page_194\"\u003e194\u003c/a\u003e; on religion, \u003ca href=\"#Page_195\"\u003e195\u003c/a\u003e; general\r\nrelation of religion to morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_197\"\u003e197\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\u00272\u0027 align=\u0027center\u0027\u003e\u003cbig\u003ePART II\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTheory of the Moral Life\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/big\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eX. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Moral Situation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_201\"\u003e201\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003eDistinguishing marks of the moral situation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_201\"\u003e201\u003c/a\u003e; Traits of\r\nvoluntary activity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_202\"\u003e202\u003c/a\u003e; The good and bad in non-voluntary\r\nbehavior, \u003ca href=\"#Page_203\"\u003e203\u003c/a\u003e; Indifferent voluntary conduct, \u003ca href=\"#Page_205\"\u003e205\u003c/a\u003e; The moral is\r\nintroduced when ends have conflicting values, \u003ca href=\"#Page_207\"\u003e207\u003c/a\u003e; Selection\r\nthen depends upon, and influences, the nature of the self,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_209\"\u003e209\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eXI. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eProblems of Moral Theory\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_212\"\u003e212\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003eTheory grows from practical problems, \u003ca href=\"#Page_212\"\u003e212\u003c/a\u003e; Three typical\r\nproblems of reflective practice, \u003ca href=\"#Page_213\"\u003e213\u003c/a\u003e; Corresponding problems\r\nof theory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_214\"\u003e214\u003c/a\u003e; Their historical sequence, \u003ca href=\"#Page_215\"\u003e215\u003c/a\u003e; Growth of individualism,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_220\"\u003e220\u003c/a\u003e; The two types of individualism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_221\"\u003e221\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eXII. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTypes of Moral Theory\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_224\"\u003e224\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003e\u0026sect; 1. \u003ci\u003eTypical divisions of theories:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Teleological and jural,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_224\"\u003e224\u003c/a\u003e; individual and institutional, \u003ca href=\"#Page_225\"\u003e225\u003c/a\u003e; empirical and intuitional,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_226\"\u003e226\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 2. \u003ci\u003eDivision of voluntary activity into Inner\r\nand Outer:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;The \"how\" and the \"what,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_227\"\u003e227\u003c/a\u003e; attitude and\r\nconsequences, \u003ca href=\"#Page_228\"\u003e228\u003c/a\u003e; different types of each theory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_229\"\u003e229\u003c/a\u003e; bearing\r\nof each theory upon problems of knowledge and of control,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_231\"\u003e231\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 3. \u003ci\u003eGeneral interpretation of these theories:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Ordinary\r\nview of disposition and of consequences, \u003ca href=\"#Page_232\"\u003e232\u003c/a\u003e; advantages\r\nclaimed for emphasis upon consequences, \u003ca href=\"#Page_234\"\u003e234\u003c/a\u003e; for\r\nemphasis upon disposition or attitude, \u003ca href=\"#Page_236\"\u003e236\u003c/a\u003e; necessity of reconciliation\r\nof these theories, \u003ca href=\"#Page_237\"\u003e237\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eXIII. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eConduct and Character\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_240\"\u003e240\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003eProblem of their relation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_240\"\u003e240\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 1. \u003ci\u003eThe good will of\r\nKant:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Emphasis upon motive, \u003ca href=\"#Page_241\"\u003e241\u003c/a\u003e; motive with or without\r\nconsequences, \u003ca href=\"#Page_242\"\u003e242\u003c/a\u003e; necessity of effort, \u003ca href=\"#Page_243\"\u003e243\u003c/a\u003e; overt action required\r\nto prove motive, \u003ca href=\"#Page_245\"\u003e245\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 2. \u003ci\u003eThe \"Intention\" of the\r\nUtilitarians:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Emphasis upon consequences, \u003ca href=\"#Page_246\"\u003e246\u003c/a\u003e; distinction\r\nof intention from motive, \u003ca href=\"#Page_247\"\u003e247\u003c/a\u003e; they are really identical, \u003ca href=\"#Page_248\"\u003e248\u003c/a\u003e;\r\nmotive as blind and as intelligent, \u003ca href=\"#Page_249\"\u003e249\u003c/a\u003e; practical importance\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_x\" id=\"Page_x\"\u003e[Pg x]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eof insistence upon consequences, \u003ca href=\"#Page_251\"\u003e251\u003c/a\u003e; foresight of consequences\r\ndepends upon motive, \u003ca href=\"#Page_252\"\u003e252\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 3. \u003ci\u003eConduct and character:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\nnature of disposition, \u003ca href=\"#Page_254\"\u003e254\u003c/a\u003e; partial and complete\r\nintention, \u003ca href=\"#Page_256\"\u003e256\u003c/a\u003e; complexity of motives, \u003ca href=\"#Page_257\"\u003e257\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 4. \u003ci\u003eMorality of\r\nacts and of agents:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Subjective and objective morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_259\"\u003e259\u003c/a\u003e;\r\nthe doer and his deed, \u003ca href=\"#Page_260\"\u003e260\u003c/a\u003e; summary, \u003ca href=\"#Page_261\"\u003e261\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eXIV. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHappiness and Conduct: The Good and Desire\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_263\"\u003e263\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003eResidence and nature of goodness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_263\"\u003e263\u003c/a\u003e; happiness as the\r\ngood, \u003ca href=\"#Page_264\"\u003e264\u003c/a\u003e; love of happiness as the evil, \u003ca href=\"#Page_265\"\u003e265\u003c/a\u003e; ambiguity in\r\nconception of happiness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_266\"\u003e266\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 1. \u003ci\u003eThe Object of Desire:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Is\r\nit pleasure? \u003ca href=\"#Page_269\"\u003e269\u003c/a\u003e; desire presupposes instinctive appetites,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_270\"\u003e270\u003c/a\u003e; and objects of thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_271\"\u003e271\u003c/a\u003e; happiness and desire, \u003ca href=\"#Page_272\"\u003e272\u003c/a\u003e;\r\nneed for standard, \u003ca href=\"#Page_274\"\u003e274\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 2. \u003ci\u003eThe Conception of Happiness\r\nas a Standard:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Utilitarian method, \u003ca href=\"#Page_275\"\u003e275\u003c/a\u003e; Difficulty of measuring\r\npleasure, \u003ca href=\"#Page_276\"\u003e276\u003c/a\u003e; character determines the value of a\r\npleasure, \u003ca href=\"#Page_277\"\u003e277\u003c/a\u003e; Mill\u0027s introduction of quality of pleasure, \u003ca href=\"#Page_279\"\u003e279\u003c/a\u003e.\r\n\u0026sect; 3. \u003ci\u003eThe constitution of happiness:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Pleasures depend upon\r\nobjects, \u003ca href=\"#Page_281\"\u003e281\u003c/a\u003e; they are qualitative, \u003ca href=\"#Page_282\"\u003e282\u003c/a\u003e; they vary with disposition,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_283\"\u003e283\u003c/a\u003e; happiness as the moral good, \u003ca href=\"#Page_284\"\u003e284\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eXV. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHappiness and Social Ends\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_286\"\u003e286\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003eUtilitarianism aims at social welfare, \u003ca href=\"#Page_286\"\u003e286\u003c/a\u003e; value as a theory\r\nof social reform, \u003ca href=\"#Page_287\"\u003e287\u003c/a\u003e; its aim conflicts with its hedonistic theory\r\nof motive, \u003ca href=\"#Page_289\"\u003e289\u003c/a\u003e; Bentham\u0027s method of reconciling personal\r\nand general happiness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_291\"\u003e291\u003c/a\u003e; Mill\u0027s method, \u003ca href=\"#Page_293\"\u003e293\u003c/a\u003e; sympathy\r\nand the social self, \u003ca href=\"#Page_298\"\u003e298\u003c/a\u003e; the distinctively moral interest, \u003ca href=\"#Page_300\"\u003e300\u003c/a\u003e;\r\nequation of virtue and happiness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_301\"\u003e301\u003c/a\u003e; moral democracy, \u003ca href=\"#Page_303\"\u003e303\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eXVI. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Place of Reason in the Moral Life: Moral\r\nKnowledge\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_306\"\u003e306\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003e\u0026sect; 1. \u003ci\u003eProblem of reason and desire:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Nature of a reasonable\r\nact, \u003ca href=\"#Page_306\"\u003e306\u003c/a\u003e; theories about moral knowledge, \u003ca href=\"#Page_307\"\u003e307\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 2. \u003ci\u003eKant\u0027s\r\ntheory of practical reason:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Traits of morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_309\"\u003e309\u003c/a\u003e; reason\r\nas \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e and formal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_310\"\u003e310\u003c/a\u003e; true meaning of generalization,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_313\"\u003e313\u003c/a\u003e; the general and the social, \u003ca href=\"#Page_314\"\u003e314\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 3. \u003ci\u003eMoral sense intuitionalism:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Function\r\nof reason, \u003ca href=\"#Page_317\"\u003e317\u003c/a\u003e; habit and sense, \u003ca href=\"#Page_319\"\u003e319\u003c/a\u003e;\r\ninvalid intuitions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_321\"\u003e321\u003c/a\u003e; deliberation and intuition, \u003ca href=\"#Page_322\"\u003e322\u003c/a\u003e; the\r\ngood man\u0027s judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_324\"\u003e324\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 4. \u003ci\u003eThe place of general rules:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Their\r\nvalue, \u003ca href=\"#Page_325\"\u003e325\u003c/a\u003e; casuistry, \u003ca href=\"#Page_326\"\u003e326\u003c/a\u003e; and its dangers, \u003ca href=\"#Page_327\"\u003e327\u003c/a\u003e;\r\nsecondary ends of utilitarianism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_329\"\u003e329\u003c/a\u003e; empirical rules and\r\ncustoms, \u003ca href=\"#Page_330\"\u003e330\u003c/a\u003e; distinction of rules and principles, \u003ca href=\"#Page_333\"\u003e333\u003c/a\u003e; sympathy\r\nand reasonableness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_334\"\u003e334\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eXVII. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Place of Duty in the Moral Life: Subjection to\r\nAuthority\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_337\"\u003e337\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003eConflict of the rational with the attractive end, \u003ca href=\"#Page_337\"\u003e337\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 1.\r\n\u003ci\u003eThe subjection of desire to law\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_339\"\u003e339\u003c/a\u003e; cause of conflict of\r\ndesire and thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_342\"\u003e342\u003c/a\u003e; demand for transformation of desire,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_343\"\u003e343\u003c/a\u003e; social character of duties, \u003ca href=\"#Page_345\"\u003e345\u003c/a\u003e; the social self is the\r\n\"universal\" self, \u003ca href=\"#Page_346\"\u003e346\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 2. \u003ci\u003eKantian theory:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Accord with\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_xi\" id=\"Page_xi\"\u003e[Pg xi]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eduty versus from duty, \u003ca href=\"#Page_346\"\u003e346\u003c/a\u003e; the two-fold self of Kant, \u003ca href=\"#Page_347\"\u003e347\u003c/a\u003e;\r\ncriticism of Kant, \u003ca href=\"#Page_348\"\u003e348\u003c/a\u003e; emphasis falls practically on political\r\nauthority, \u003ca href=\"#Page_351\"\u003e351\u003c/a\u003e; \"Duty for duty\u0027s sake,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_351\"\u003e351\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 3. \u003ci\u003eThe Utilitarian\r\ntheory of duty:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;The hedonistic problem, \u003ca href=\"#Page_353\"\u003e353\u003c/a\u003e; Moral\r\nsanctions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_354\"\u003e354\u003c/a\u003e; they are too external, \u003ca href=\"#Page_355\"\u003e355\u003c/a\u003e; Bain\u0027s account,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_356\"\u003e356\u003c/a\u003e; Spencer\u0027s account, \u003ca href=\"#Page_358\"\u003e358\u003c/a\u003e; such views set up a fictitious non-social\r\nself, \u003ca href=\"#Page_361\"\u003e361\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 3. \u003ci\u003eFinal statement:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Growth requires disagreeable\r\nreadjustments, \u003ca href=\"#Page_362\"\u003e362\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eXVIII. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Place of the Self in the Moral Life\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_364\"\u003e364\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003eProblems regarding the self, \u003ca href=\"#Page_364\"\u003e364\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 1. \u003ci\u003eThe doctrine of self-denial:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Explanation\r\nof its origin, \u003ca href=\"#Page_365\"\u003e365\u003c/a\u003e; four objections to\r\ndoctrine, \u003ca href=\"#Page_366\"\u003e366\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 2. \u003ci\u003eSelf-assertion:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Ethical dualism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_369\"\u003e369\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n\"naturalistic\" ethics, \u003ca href=\"#Page_369\"\u003e369\u003c/a\u003e; false biological basis, \u003ca href=\"#Page_371\"\u003e371\u003c/a\u003e; misinterprets\r\nnature of efficiency, \u003ca href=\"#Page_373\"\u003e373\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 3. \u003ci\u003eSelf-love and benevolence;\r\nor egoism and altruism:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;The \"crux\" of ethical speculation,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_375\"\u003e375\u003c/a\u003e; are all motives selfish? \u003ca href=\"#Page_376\"\u003e376\u003c/a\u003e; ambiguity of term\r\nselfish, \u003ca href=\"#Page_377\"\u003e377\u003c/a\u003e; are results selfish? \u003ca href=\"#Page_379\"\u003e379\u003c/a\u003e; self-preservation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_380\"\u003e380\u003c/a\u003e;\r\nrational regard for self, \u003ca href=\"#Page_382\"\u003e382\u003c/a\u003e; regard for others, \u003ca href=\"#Page_384\"\u003e384\u003c/a\u003e; the existence\r\nof \"other-regarding\" impulses, \u003ca href=\"#Page_385\"\u003e385\u003c/a\u003e; altruism may\r\nbe immoral, \u003ca href=\"#Page_387\"\u003e387\u003c/a\u003e; social justice necessary to moral altruism,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_389\"\u003e389\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 4. \u003ci\u003eThe good as self-realization:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Self-realization an\r\nambiguous idea, \u003ca href=\"#Page_391\"\u003e391\u003c/a\u003e; true and false consideration of the self,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_393\"\u003e393\u003c/a\u003e; equation of personal and general happiness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_395\"\u003e395\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eXIX. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Virtues\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_399\"\u003e399\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003eIntroductory\u0026mdash;virtue defined, \u003ca href=\"#Page_399\"\u003e399\u003c/a\u003e; natural ability and virtue,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_400\"\u003e400\u003c/a\u003e; evolution of virtues, \u003ca href=\"#Page_401\"\u003e401\u003c/a\u003e; responsibility for moral judgment,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_402\"\u003e402\u003c/a\u003e; futility of cataloguing virtues, \u003ca href=\"#Page_402\"\u003e402\u003c/a\u003e; their cardinal\r\naspects, \u003ca href=\"#Page_403\"\u003e403\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 1. \u003ci\u003eTemperance:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Greek, Roman, and Christian\r\nconceptions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_405\"\u003e405\u003c/a\u003e; negative and positive aspects, \u003ca href=\"#Page_407\"\u003e407\u003c/a\u003e;\r\npleasure and excitement, \u003ca href=\"#Page_408\"\u003e408\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 2. \u003ci\u003eCourage or persistent\r\nvigor:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Dislike of the disagreeable, \u003ca href=\"#Page_410\"\u003e410\u003c/a\u003e; \"dimensions\" of\r\ncourage, \u003ca href=\"#Page_411\"\u003e411\u003c/a\u003e; optimism and pessimism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_412\"\u003e412\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 3. \u003ci\u003eJustice:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Three\r\nmeanings of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_414\"\u003e414\u003c/a\u003e; justice and love, \u003ca href=\"#Page_415\"\u003e415\u003c/a\u003e; justice and\r\npunishment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_416\"\u003e416\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 4. \u003ci\u003eWisdom or conscientiousness:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Importance\r\nof intelligent interest, \u003ca href=\"#Page_418\"\u003e418\u003c/a\u003e; Greek and modern ideas\r\nof moral wisdom, \u003ca href=\"#Page_419\"\u003e419\u003c/a\u003e; ideals and thoughtfulness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_420\"\u003e420\u003c/a\u003e; ideals\r\nand progress, \u003ca href=\"#Page_422\"\u003e422\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\u00272\u0027 align=\u0027center\u0027\u003e\u003cbig\u003ePART III\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe World of Action\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/big\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eXX. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSocial Organization and the Individual\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_427\"\u003e427\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003eObject of discussion, \u003ca href=\"#Page_427\"\u003e427\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 1. \u003ci\u003eGrowth of individuality\r\nthrough social organizations:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Emancipation from custom,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_428\"\u003e428\u003c/a\u003e; double movement towards individuality and complex\r\nassociations, \u003ca href=\"#Page_429\"\u003e429\u003c/a\u003e; morality and legality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_432\"\u003e432\u003c/a\u003e; two-fold contribution\r\nof social environment to individual morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_433\"\u003e433\u003c/a\u003e;\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_xii\" id=\"Page_xii\"\u003e[Pg xii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003emoral value of the state, \u003ca href=\"#Page_434\"\u003e434\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 2. \u003ci\u003eResponsibility and freedom:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Liability,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_436\"\u003e436\u003c/a\u003e; freedom as exemption and as power,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_437\"\u003e437\u003c/a\u003e; legal and moral freedom, \u003ca href=\"#Page_438\"\u003e438\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 3. \u003ci\u003eRights and obligations:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Their\r\ndefinition, \u003ca href=\"#Page_439\"\u003e439\u003c/a\u003e; they are correlative, \u003ca href=\"#Page_440\"\u003e440\u003c/a\u003e; physical\r\nrights, \u003ca href=\"#Page_442\"\u003e442\u003c/a\u003e; limitations put upon them by war and punishment,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_443\"\u003e443\u003c/a\u003e; by poverty, \u003ca href=\"#Page_444\"\u003e444\u003c/a\u003e; mental rights, \u003ca href=\"#Page_445\"\u003e445\u003c/a\u003e; limitations to\r\nfreedom of thought and expression, \u003ca href=\"#Page_446\"\u003e446\u003c/a\u003e; education, \u003ca href=\"#Page_448\"\u003e448\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eXXI. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCivil Society and the Political State\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_451\"\u003e451\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003e\u0026sect; 1. \u003ci\u003eCivil rights and obligations:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Their definition, \u003ca href=\"#Page_451\"\u003e451\u003c/a\u003e; their\r\nclasses, \u003ca href=\"#Page_452\"\u003e452\u003c/a\u003e; significance of established remedies for wrongs,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_454\"\u003e454\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 2. \u003ci\u003eDevelopment of civil rights:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Contrast with savage\r\nage justice, \u003ca href=\"#Page_456\"\u003e456\u003c/a\u003e; social harm versus metaphysical evil, \u003ca href=\"#Page_457\"\u003e457\u003c/a\u003e;\r\nrecognition of accident and intent, \u003ca href=\"#Page_459\"\u003e459\u003c/a\u003e; of character and\r\ncircumstances, \u003ca href=\"#Page_460\"\u003e460\u003c/a\u003e; of mental incapacity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_462\"\u003e462\u003c/a\u003e; significance\r\nof negligence and carelessness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_464\"\u003e464\u003c/a\u003e; conflict of substantial and\r\ntechnical justice, \u003ca href=\"#Page_465\"\u003e465\u003c/a\u003e; relations of the legal and moral, \u003ca href=\"#Page_467\"\u003e467\u003c/a\u003e;\r\nreform of criminal procedure necessary, \u003ca href=\"#Page_468\"\u003e468\u003c/a\u003e; also of punitive\r\nmethods, \u003ca href=\"#Page_470\"\u003e470\u003c/a\u003e; and of civil administration, \u003ca href=\"#Page_471\"\u003e471\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 3. \u003ci\u003ePolitical\r\nrights and obligations:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Significance of the state, \u003ca href=\"#Page_473\"\u003e473\u003c/a\u003e;\r\ndistrust of government, \u003ca href=\"#Page_474\"\u003e474\u003c/a\u003e; indifference to politics, \u003ca href=\"#Page_476\"\u003e476\u003c/a\u003e;\r\npolitical corruption, \u003ca href=\"#Page_477\"\u003e477\u003c/a\u003e; reform of partisan machinery, \u003ca href=\"#Page_478\"\u003e478\u003c/a\u003e;\r\nof governmental machinery, \u003ca href=\"#Page_479\"\u003e479\u003c/a\u003e; constructive social legislation,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_480\"\u003e480\u003c/a\u003e; a federated humanity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_481\"\u003e481\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 4. \u003ci\u003eThe moral criterion\r\nof political activity:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Its statement, \u003ca href=\"#Page_482\"\u003e482\u003c/a\u003e; the individualistic\r\nformula, \u003ca href=\"#Page_483\"\u003e483\u003c/a\u003e; the collectivistic formula, \u003ca href=\"#Page_484\"\u003e484\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eXXII. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Ethics of the Economic Life\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_486\"\u003e486\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003e\u0026sect; 1. \u003ci\u003eGeneral analysis:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;The economic in relation to happiness,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_487\"\u003e487\u003c/a\u003e; relation to character, \u003ca href=\"#Page_488\"\u003e488\u003c/a\u003e; social aspects, \u003ca href=\"#Page_491\"\u003e491\u003c/a\u003e.\r\n\u0026sect; 2. \u003ci\u003eThe problem set by the new economic order:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Collective\r\nand impersonal organizations, \u003ca href=\"#Page_495\"\u003e495\u003c/a\u003e; readjustments required,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_496\"\u003e496\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 3. \u003ci\u003eThe agencies for carrying on commerce and industry:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Early\r\nagencies, \u003ca href=\"#Page_497\"\u003e497\u003c/a\u003e; the business enterprise, \u003ca href=\"#Page_498\"\u003e498\u003c/a\u003e; the\r\nlabor union, \u003ca href=\"#Page_499\"\u003e499\u003c/a\u003e; reversion to group morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_500\"\u003e500\u003c/a\u003e; members\r\nand management, \u003ca href=\"#Page_500\"\u003e500\u003c/a\u003e; employer and employed, \u003ca href=\"#Page_501\"\u003e501\u003c/a\u003e; relations\r\nto the public, \u003ca href=\"#Page_502\"\u003e502\u003c/a\u003e; to the law, \u003ca href=\"#Page_503\"\u003e503\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 4. \u003ci\u003eThe methods\r\nof production, exchange, and valuation:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;The machine, \u003ca href=\"#Page_507\"\u003e507\u003c/a\u003e;\r\nbasis of valuation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_508\"\u003e508\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 5. \u003ci\u003eThe factors which aid ethical\r\nreconstruction:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Principles more easily seen, \u003ca href=\"#Page_511\"\u003e511\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eXXIII. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSome Principles in the Economic Order\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_514\"\u003e514\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003e1. Wealth subordinate to personality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_514\"\u003e514\u003c/a\u003e. 2. Wealth and\r\nactivity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_514\"\u003e514\u003c/a\u003e. 3. Wealth and public service, \u003ca href=\"#Page_515\"\u003e515\u003c/a\u003e. 4. A\r\nchange demanded from individual to collective morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_517\"\u003e517\u003c/a\u003e.\r\n5. Personal responsibility, \u003ca href=\"#Page_519\"\u003e519\u003c/a\u003e. 6. Publicity and legal control,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_520\"\u003e520\u003c/a\u003e. 7. Democracy and distribution, \u003ca href=\"#Page_521\"\u003e521\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eXXIV. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eUnsettled Problems in the Economic Order\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_523\"\u003e523\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003e\u0026sect; 1. \u003ci\u003eIndividualism and socialism:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;General statement, \u003ca href=\"#Page_523\"\u003e523\u003c/a\u003e;\r\nequal opportunity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_526\"\u003e526\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 2. \u003ci\u003eIndividualism or free contract\u003c/i\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_xiii\" id=\"Page_xiii\"\u003e[Pg xiii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eanalyzed; its values:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Efficiency, \u003ca href=\"#Page_527\"\u003e527\u003c/a\u003e; initiative, \u003ca href=\"#Page_527\"\u003e527\u003c/a\u003e; regulation\r\nof production, \u003ca href=\"#Page_528\"\u003e528\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 3. \u003ci\u003eCriticisms upon individualism:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;It\r\ndoes not secure real freedom, \u003ca href=\"#Page_528\"\u003e528\u003c/a\u003e; nor justice, \u003ca href=\"#Page_530\"\u003e530\u003c/a\u003e; competition\r\ntends to destroy itself, \u003ca href=\"#Page_531\"\u003e531\u003c/a\u003e; position of the aristocratic\r\nindividualists, \u003ca href=\"#Page_532\"\u003e532\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eXXV. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eUnsettled Problems in the Economic Order (Continued)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_536\"\u003e536\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003e\u0026sect; 4. \u003ci\u003eThe theory of public agency and control\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_536\"\u003e536\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 5.\r\n\u003ci\u003eSociety as agency of production:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Charges against private\r\nmanagement, \u003ca href=\"#Page_537\"\u003e537\u003c/a\u003e; corruption, \u003ca href=\"#Page_538\"\u003e538\u003c/a\u003e; conditions of labor, \u003ca href=\"#Page_540\"\u003e540\u003c/a\u003e;\r\ncollective agency not necessarily social, \u003ca href=\"#Page_544\"\u003e544\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 6. \u003ci\u003eTheories\r\nof just distribution:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Individualistic theory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_546\"\u003e546\u003c/a\u003e; equal division,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_547\"\u003e547\u003c/a\u003e; a working programme, \u003ca href=\"#Page_548\"\u003e548\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 7. \u003ci\u003eOwnership and\r\nuse of property:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Defects in the present system, \u003ca href=\"#Page_551\"\u003e551\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 8.\r\n\u003ci\u003ePresent tendencies:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Individualistic character of the Constitution,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_554\"\u003e554\u003c/a\u003e; increased recognition of public welfare, \u003ca href=\"#Page_555\"\u003e555\u003c/a\u003e;\r\nsocial justice through economic, social, and scientific progress,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_557\"\u003e557\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 9. \u003ci\u003eThree special problems:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;The open versus the\r\nclosed shop, \u003ca href=\"#Page_559\"\u003e559\u003c/a\u003e; the capitalization of corporations, \u003ca href=\"#Page_561\"\u003e561\u003c/a\u003e; the\r\nunearned increment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_564\"\u003e564\u003c/a\u003e. Appendix: Prof. Seager\u0027s programme\r\nof social legislation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_566\"\u003e566\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003eXXVI. \u0026nbsp; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Family\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027right\u0027\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_571\"\u003e571\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\u0027tjust\u0027\u003e\u0026sect; 1. \u003ci\u003eHistorical antecedents of the modern family:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Maternal\r\ntype, \u003ca href=\"#Page_572\"\u003e572\u003c/a\u003e; paternal type, \u003ca href=\"#Page_572\"\u003e572\u003c/a\u003e; influence of the church, \u003ca href=\"#Page_576\"\u003e576\u003c/a\u003e.\r\n\u0026sect; 2. \u003ci\u003eThe psychological basis of the family:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Emotional and\r\ninstinctive basis, \u003ca href=\"#Page_578\"\u003e578\u003c/a\u003e; common will, \u003ca href=\"#Page_580\"\u003e580\u003c/a\u003e; parenthood, \u003ca href=\"#Page_581\"\u003e581\u003c/a\u003e;\r\nsocial and religious factors, \u003ca href=\"#Page_582\"\u003e582\u003c/a\u003e; the children, \u003ca href=\"#Page_582\"\u003e582\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 3.\r\n\u003ci\u003eGeneral elements of strain in family relations:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Differences\r\nbetween the sexes in temperament and occupation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_584\"\u003e584\u003c/a\u003e; in\r\nattitude toward the family, \u003ca href=\"#Page_587\"\u003e587\u003c/a\u003e; differences between parents\r\nand children, \u003ca href=\"#Page_589\"\u003e589\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 4. \u003ci\u003eSpecial conditions which give rise to\r\npresent problems:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;The economic factors, \u003ca href=\"#Page_590\"\u003e590\u003c/a\u003e; cultural and\r\npolitical factors, \u003ca href=\"#Page_593\"\u003e593\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 5. \u003ci\u003eUnsettled problems:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Economic\r\nproblems, \u003ca href=\"#Page_594\"\u003e594\u003c/a\u003e; the dilemma between the domestic life and\r\noccupations outside the home, \u003ca href=\"#Page_595\"\u003e595\u003c/a\u003e; the family as consumer,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_598\"\u003e598\u003c/a\u003e. \u0026sect; 6. \u003ci\u003eUnsettled problems:\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Political problems, authority\r\nwithin the family, \u003ca href=\"#Page_599\"\u003e599\u003c/a\u003e; equality or inequality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_600\"\u003e600\u003c/a\u003e; isolation\r\nnot the solution, \u003ca href=\"#Page_602\"\u003e602\u003c/a\u003e; authority over the family, divorce,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Page_603\"\u003e603\u003c/a\u003e; general law of social health, \u003ca href=\"#Page_605\"\u003e605\u003c/a\u003e; conclusion, \u003ca href=\"#Page_605\"\u003e605\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_xiv\" id=\"Page_xiv\"\u003e[Pg xiv]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_1\" id=\"Page_1\"\u003e[Pg 1]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch1\u003eETHICS\u003c/h1\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER I\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nINTRODUCTION\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 1. DEFINITION AND METHOD\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eProvisional Definition.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The place for an accurate\r\ndefinition of a subject is at the end of an inquiry rather\r\nthan at the beginning, but a brief definition will serve to\r\nmark out the field. Ethics is the science that deals with\r\nconduct, in so far as this is considered as right or wrong,\r\ngood or bad. A single term for conduct so considered\r\nis \"moral conduct,\" or the \"moral life.\" Another way of\r\nstating the same thing is to say that Ethics aims to give\r\na systematic account of our judgments about conduct, in\r\nso far as these estimate it from the standpoint of right\r\nor wrong, good or bad.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEthical and Moral.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The terms \"ethics\" and \"ethical\"\r\nare derived from a Greek word \u003ci\u003eethos\u003c/i\u003e which originally meant\r\ncustoms, usages, especially those belonging to some group\r\nas distinguished from another, and later came to mean\r\ndisposition, character. They are thus like the Latin\r\nword \"moral,\" from \u003ci\u003emores\u003c/i\u003e, or the German \u003ci\u003esittlich\u003c/i\u003e, from\r\n\u003ci\u003eSitten\u003c/i\u003e. As we shall see, it was in customs, \"ethos,\"\r\n\"mores,\" that the moral or ethical began to appear. For\r\ncustoms were not merely habitual ways of acting; they\r\nwere ways approved by the group or society. To act\r\ncontrary to the customs of the group brought severe disapproval.\r\nThis might not be formulated in precisely our\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_2\" id=\"Page_2\"\u003e[Pg 2]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nterms\u0026mdash;right and wrong, good and bad,\u0026mdash;but the attitude\r\nwas the same in essence. The terms ethical and moral\r\nas applied to the conduct of to-day imply of course a\r\nfar more complex and advanced type of life than the old\r\nwords \"ethos\" and \"mores,\" just as economics deals with a\r\nmore complex problem than \"the management of a household,\"\r\nbut the terms have a distinct value if they suggest\r\nthe way in which the moral life had its beginning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTwo Aspects of Conduct.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;To give a scientific account\r\nof judgments about conduct, means to find the\r\nprinciples which are the basis of these judgments. Conduct\r\nor the moral life has two obvious aspects. On the\r\none hand it is a life of purpose. It implies thought and\r\nfeeling, ideals and motives, valuation and choice. These\r\nare processes to be studied by psychological methods. On\r\nthe other hand, conduct has its outward side. It has relations\r\nto nature, and especially to human society. Moral\r\nlife is called out or stimulated by certain necessities of\r\nindividual and social existence. As Protagoras put it,\r\nin mythical form, the gods gave men a sense of justice\r\nand of reverence, in order to enable them to unite for\r\nmutual preservation.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_1_1\" id=\"FNanchor_1_1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_1_1\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e And in turn the moral life aims\r\nto modify or transform both natural and social environments,\r\nto build a \"kingdom of man\" which shall be also\r\nan ideal social order\u0026mdash;a \"kingdom of God.\" These relations\r\nto nature and society are studied by the biological\r\nand social sciences. Sociology, economics, politics, law,\r\nand jurisprudence deal particularly with this aspect of\r\nconduct. Ethics must employ their methods and results\r\nfor this aspect of its problem, as it employs psychology\r\nfor the examination of conduct on its inner side.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Specific Problem of Ethics.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;But ethics is not\r\nmerely the sum of these various sciences. It has a problem\r\nof its own which is created by just this twofold aspect\r\nof life and conduct. It has to relate these two sides. It\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_3\" id=\"Page_3\"\u003e[Pg 3]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhas to study the inner process \u003ci\u003eas determined by the outer\r\nconditions or as changing these outer conditions\u003c/i\u003e, and the\r\noutward behavior or institution \u003ci\u003eas determined by the inner\r\npurpose, or as affecting the inner life\u003c/i\u003e. To study choice\r\nand purpose is psychology; to study choice as affected\r\nby the rights of others and to judge it as right or wrong\r\nby this standard is ethics. Or again, to study a corporation\r\nmay be economics, or sociology, or law; to study its\r\nactivities as resulting from the purposes of persons or as\r\naffecting the welfare of persons, and to judge its acts\r\nas good or bad from such a point of view, is ethics.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGenetic Study.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;When we deal with any process of life\r\nit is found to be a great aid for understanding the\r\npresent conditions if we trace the history of the process\r\nand see how present conditions have come about. And\r\nin the case of morality there are four reasons in particular\r\nfor examining earlier stages. The first is that we\r\nmay begin our study with a simpler material. Moral life\r\nat present is extremely complex. Professional, civic,\r\ndomestic, philanthropic, ecclesiastical, and social obligations\r\nclaim adjustment. Interests in wealth, in knowledge,\r\nin power, in friendship, in social welfare, make demand\r\nfor recognition in fixing upon what is good. It is\r\ndesirable to consider first a simpler problem. In the second\r\nplace, this complex moral life is like the human body\r\nin that it contains \"rudiments\" and \"survivals.\" Some\r\nof our present standards and ideals were formed at one\r\nperiod in the past, and some at another. Some of these\r\napply to present conditions and some do not. Some\r\nare at variance with others. Many apparent conflicts\r\nin moral judgments are explained when we discover how\r\nthe judgments came to be formed in the first instance.\r\nWe cannot easily understand the moral life of to-day\r\nexcept in the light of earlier morality. The third reason\r\nis that we may get a more objective material for study.\r\nOur moral life is so intimate a part of ourselves that\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_4\" id=\"Page_4\"\u003e[Pg 4]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nit is hard to observe impartially. Its characteristics escape\r\nnotice because they are so familiar. When we travel\r\nwe find the customs, laws, and moral standards of other\r\npeoples standing out as \"peculiar.\" Until we have been\r\nled by some such means to compare our own conduct with\r\nthat of others it probably does not occur to us that our\r\nown standards are also peculiar, and hence in need of explanation.\r\nIt is as difficult scientifically as it is personally \"to\r\nsee ourselves as others see us.\" It is doubtless true that\r\nto see ourselves merely as others see us would not be\r\nenough. Complete moral analysis requires us to take\r\ninto our reckoning motives and purposes which may perhaps\r\nbe undiscoverable by the \"others.\" But it is a great\r\naid to this completer analysis if we can sharpen our vision\r\nand awaken our attention by a comparative study. A\r\nfourth reason for a genetic study is that it emphasizes\r\nthe dynamic, progressive character of morality. Merely\r\nto examine the present may easily give the impression that\r\nthe moral life is not a life, a moving process, something\r\nstill in the making\u0026mdash;but a changeless structure. There is\r\nmoral progress as well as a moral order. This may be\r\ndiscovered by an analysis of the very nature of moral\r\nconduct, but it stands out more clearly and impressively\r\nif we trace the actual development in history. Before\r\nattempting our analysis of the present moral consciousness\r\nand its judgments, we shall therefore give an outline of\r\nthe earlier stages and simpler phases.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTheory and Practice.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Finally, if we can discover\r\nethical principles these ought to give some guidance for\r\nthe unsolved problems of life which continually present\r\nthemselves for decision. Whatever may be true for other\r\nsciences it would seem that ethics at least ought to have\r\nsome practical value. \"In this theater of man\u0027s life it is\r\nreserved for God and the angels to be lookers on.\" Man\r\nmust act; and he must act well or ill, rightly or wrongly.\r\nIf he has reflected, has considered his conduct in the light\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_5\" id=\"Page_5\"\u003e[Pg 5]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the general principles of human order and progress, he\r\nought to be able to act more intelligently and freely,\r\nto achieve the satisfaction that always attends on scientific\r\nas compared with uncritical or rule-of-thumb practice.\r\nSocrates gave the classic statement for the study\r\nof conduct when he said, \"A life unexamined, uncriticized,\r\nis not worthy of man.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 2. CRITERION OF THE MORAL\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is not proposed to attempt at this point an accurate or\r\nminute statement of what is implied in moral conduct, as\r\nthis is the task of Part II. But for the purposes of tracing\r\nin Part I. the beginnings of morality, it is desirable to\r\nhave a sort of rough chart to indicate to the student what\r\nto look for in the earlier stages of his exploration, and\r\nto enable him to keep his bearings on the way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCertain of the characteristics of the moral may be seen\r\nin a cross-section, a statement of the elements in moral\r\nconduct at a given time. Other characteristics come out\r\nmore clearly by comparing later with earlier stages. We\r\ngive first a cross-section.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. Characteristics of the Moral Life in Cross-section.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In\r\nthis cross-section the first main division is suggested\r\nby the fact that we sometimes give our attention to \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e\r\nis done or intended, and sometimes to \u003ci\u003ehow\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003ewhy\u003c/i\u003e the\r\nact is done. These divisions may turn out to be less absolute\r\nthan they seem, but common life uses them and moral\r\ntheories have often selected the one or the other as the\r\nimportant aspect. When we are told to seek peace, tell\r\nthe truth, or aim at the greatest happiness of the greatest\r\nnumber, we are charged to do or intend some definite act.\r\nWhen we are urged to be conscientious or pure in heart\r\nthe emphasis is on a kind of attitude that might go with\r\na variety of acts. A newspaper advocates a good measure.\r\nSo far, so good. But people may ask, what is the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_6\" id=\"Page_6\"\u003e[Pg 6]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmotive in this? and if this is believed to be merely selfish,\r\nthey do not credit the newspaper with having genuine interest\r\nin reform. On the other hand, sincerity alone is not\r\nenough. If a man advocates frankly and sincerely a\r\nscheme for enriching himself at the public expense we condemn\r\nhim. We say his very frankness shows his utter\r\ndisregard for others. One of the great moral philosophers\r\nhas indeed said that to act rationally is all that is necessary,\r\nbut he at once goes on to claim that this implies\r\ntreating every man as an end and not merely a means, and\r\nthis calls for a particular kind of action. Hence we may\r\nassume for the present purpose a general agreement that\r\nour moral judgments take into account both what is done\r\nor intended, and how or why the act is done. These two\r\naspects are sometimes called the \"matter\" and the \"form,\"\r\nor the \"content\" and the attitude. We shall use the\r\nsimpler terms, the What and the How.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe \"What\" as a Criterion.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;If we neglect for the\r\nmoment the How and think of the What, we find two main\r\nstandpoints employed in judging: one is that of \"higher\"\r\nand \"lower\" within the man\u0027s own self; the other is his\r\ntreatment of others.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe distinction between a higher and lower self has many\r\nguises. We speak of a man as \"a slave to his appetites,\"\r\nof another as possessed by greed for money, of another as\r\ninsatiately ambitious. Over against these passions we\r\nhear the praise of scientific pursuits, of culture, of art,\r\nof friendship, of meditation, or of religion. We are bidden\r\nto think of things \u0026#963;\u0026#941;\u0026#956;\u0026#957;\u0026#945;, nobly serious. A life of\r\nthe spirit is set off against the life of the flesh, the finer\r\nagainst the coarser, the nobler against the baser. However\r\nmisguided the forms in which this has been interpreted,\r\nthere is no doubt as to the reality of the conflicting\r\nimpulses which give rise to the dualism. The source is\r\nobvious. Man would not be here if self-preservation and\r\nself-assertion and sex instinct were not strongly rooted in\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_7\" id=\"Page_7\"\u003e[Pg 7]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhis system. These may easily become dominant passions.\r\nBut just as certainly, man cannot be all that he may be\r\nunless he controls these impulses and passions by other motives.\r\nHe has first to create for himself a new world of\r\nideal interests before he finds his best life. The appetites\r\nand instincts may be \"natural,\" in the sense that they are\r\nthe beginning; the mental and spiritual life is \"natural,\"\r\nas Aristotle puts it, in the sense that man\u0027s full nature\r\nis developed only in such a life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe other aspect of the What, the treatment of others,\r\nneed not detain us. Justice, kindness, the conduct of the\r\nGolden Rule are the right and good. Injustice, cruelty,\r\nselfishness are the wrong and the bad.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAnalysis of the How: the Right and the Good.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We\r\nhave used right and good as though they might be used\r\ninterchangeably in speaking of conduct. Perhaps this\r\nmay in the end prove to be true. If an act is right, then\r\nthe hero or the saint may believe that it is also good;\r\nif an act is good in the fullest sense, then it will commend\r\nitself as right. But right and good evidently approach\r\nconduct from two different points of view. These might\r\nhave been noted when speaking of the content or the What,\r\nbut they are more important in considering the How.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is evident that when we speak of conduct as \u003ci\u003eright\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwe think of it as before a judge. We bring the act to a\r\nstandard, and measure the act. We think too of this\r\nstandard as a \"moral law\" which we \"ought\" to obey.\r\nWe respect its authority and hold ourselves responsible.\r\nThe standard is conceived as a control over our impulses and\r\ndesires. The man who recognizes such a law and is anxious\r\nto find and to do his duty, we call conscientious; as governing\r\nhis impulses, he has self-control; as squaring his\r\nconduct strictly by his standard, he is upright and\r\nreliable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf I think of \"\u003ci\u003egood\u003c/i\u003e,\" I am approaching conduct from\r\nthe standpoint of value. I am thinking of what is desira\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_8\" id=\"Page_8\"\u003e[Pg 8]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eble.\r\nThis too is a standard, but it is a standard regarded\r\nas an end to be sought rather than as a law. I am to\r\n\"choose\" it and identify myself with it, rather than to control\r\nmyself by it. It is an \"ideal.\" The conscientious\r\nman, viewed from this standpoint, would seek to discover\r\nthe true good, to value his ends, to form ideals,\r\ninstead of following impulse or accepting any seeming\r\ngood without careful consideration. In so far as impulses\r\nare directed by ideals the thoroughly good man will be\r\nstraightforward, \"sincere\": that is, he will not be moved\r\nto do the good act by fear of punishment, or by bribery,\r\njust as the upright man will be \"governed by a sense of\r\nduty,\" of \"respect for principles.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSummary of the Characteristics of the Moral.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;To sum\r\nup the main characteristics of the moral life viewed in\r\ncross-section, or when in full activity, we may state them\r\nas follows:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the side of the \"what,\" there are two aspects:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(a) The dominance of \"higher,\" ideal interests of\r\nknowledge, art, freedom, rights, and the \"life of the\r\nspirit.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(b) Regard for others, under its various aspects of\r\njustice, sympathy, and benevolence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the side of the \"how\" the important aspects\r\nare:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(a) The recognition of some standard, which may arise\r\neither as a control in the guise of \"right\" and \"law,\" or\r\nas measure of value in the form of an ideal to be followed\r\nor good to be approved.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(b) A sense of duty and respect for the law; sincere\r\nlove of the good.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(a) and (b) of this latter division are both included\r\nunder the \"conscientious\" attitude.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. The Moral as a Growth.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The psychologists distinguish\r\n\u003ci\u003ethree stages\u003c/i\u003e in conduct: (a) Instinctive activity.\r\n(b) Attention; the stage of conscious direction or control\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_9\" id=\"Page_9\"\u003e[Pg 9]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof action by imagery; of deliberation, desire, and choice.\r\n(c) Habit; the stage of unconscious activity along lines\r\nset by previous action. Consciousness thus \"occupies a\r\ncurious middle ground between hereditary reflex and automatic\r\nactivities upon the one hand and acquired habitual\r\nactivities upon the other.\" Where the original equipment\r\nof instincts fails to meet some new situation, when\r\nthere are stimulations for which the system has no ready-made\r\nresponse, consciousness appears. It selects from the\r\nvarious responses those which suit the purpose, and when\r\nthese responses have become themselves automatic, habitual,\r\nconsciousness \"betakes itself elsewhere to points\r\nwhere habitual accommodatory movements are as yet\r\nwanting and needed.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_2_2\" id=\"FNanchor_2_2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_2_2\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e To apply this to the moral development\r\nwe need only to add that this process repeats itself\r\nover and over. The starting-point for each later repetition\r\nis not the hereditary instinct, but the habits which\r\nhave been formed. For the habits formed at one age\r\nof the individual\u0027s life, or at one stage of race development,\r\nprove inadequate for more complex situations. The\r\nchild leaves home, the savage tribe changes to agricultural\r\nlife, and the old habits no longer meet the need.\r\nAttention is again demanded. There is deliberation, struggle,\r\neffort. If the result is successful new habits are\r\nformed, but upon a higher level. For the new habits, the\r\nnew character, embody more intelligence. The first stage,\r\npurely instinctive action, we do not call moral conduct. It\r\nis of course not \u003ci\u003eim\u003c/i\u003emoral; it is merely \u003ci\u003eun\u003c/i\u003emoral. The second\r\nstage shows morality in the making. It includes the\r\nprocess of transition from impulse, through desire to will.\r\nIt involves the stress of conflicting interests, the processes\r\nof deliberation and valuation, and the final act of choice.\r\nIt will be illustrated in our treatment of race development\r\nby the change from early group life and customs to the\r\nmore conscious moral life of higher civilization. The third\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_10\" id=\"Page_10\"\u003e[Pg 10]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nstage, well-organized character, is the goal of the process.\r\nBut it is evidently only a relative point. A good man\r\nhas built up a set of habits; a good society has established\r\ncertain laws and moral codes. But unless the man or\r\nsociety is in a changeless world with no new conditions\r\nthere will be new problems. And this means that however\r\ngood the habit was for its time and purpose there\r\nmust be new choices and new valuations. A character that\r\nwould run automatically in every case would be pretty\r\nnearly a mechanism. It is therefore the second stage of\r\nthis process that is the stage of active moral consciousness.\r\nIt is upon this that we focus our attention.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMoral growth from the first on through the second stage\r\nmay be described as a process in which man becomes more\r\n\u003ci\u003erational\u003c/i\u003e, more \u003ci\u003esocial\u003c/i\u003e, and finally more \u003ci\u003emoral\u003c/i\u003e. We examine\r\nbriefly each of these aspects.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Rationalizing or Idealizing Process.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The first\r\nneed of the organism is to live and grow. The first\r\ninstincts and impulses are therefore for food, self-defence,\r\nand other immediate necessities. Primitive men eat,\r\nsleep, fight, build shelters, and give food and protection\r\nto their offspring. The \"rationalizing\" process will\r\nmean at first greater use of intelligence to satisfy these\r\nsame wants. It will show itself in skilled occupations,\r\nin industry and trade, in the utilizing of all resources to\r\nfurther man\u0027s power and happiness. But to rationalize\r\nconduct is also to introduce new ends. It not only enables\r\nman to get what he wants; it changes the kind of objects\r\nthat he wants. This shows itself externally in what man\r\nmakes and in how he occupies himself. He must of course\r\nhave food and shelter. But he makes temples and statues\r\nand poems. He makes myths and theories of the world.\r\nHe carries on great enterprises in commerce or government,\r\nnot so much to gratify desires for bodily wants\r\nas to experience the growth of power. He creates a family\r\nlife which is raised to a higher level by art and reli\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_11\" id=\"Page_11\"\u003e[Pg 11]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003egion.\r\nHe does not live by bread only, but builds up\r\ngradually a life of reason. Psychologically this means\r\nthat whereas at the beginning we want what our body\r\ncalls for, we soon come to want things which the mind\r\ntakes an interest in. As we form by memory, imagination,\r\nand reason a more continuous, permanent, highly-organized\r\nself, we require a far more permanent and ideal kind\r\nof good to satisfy us. This gives rise to the contrast\r\nbetween the material and ideal selves, or in another form,\r\nbetween \"the world\" and \"the spirit.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Socializing Process.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The \"socializing\" side of\r\nthe process of development stands for an increased capacity\r\nto enter into relations with other human beings. Like\r\nthe growth of reason it is both a means and an end. It\r\nhas its roots in certain instincts\u0026mdash;sex, gregariousness,\r\nparental instincts\u0026mdash;and in the necessities of mutual support\r\nand protection. But the associations thus formed\r\nimply a great variety of activities which call out new\r\npowers and set up new ends. Language is one of the first\r\nof these activities and a first step toward more complete\r\nsocialization. Co\u0026ouml;peration, in all kinds of enterprises,\r\ninterchange of services and goods, participation in social\r\narts, associations for various purposes, institutions of\r\nblood, family, government, and religion, all add enormously\r\nto the individual\u0027s power. On the other hand, as he\r\nenters into these relations and becomes a \"member\" of all\r\nthese bodies he inevitably undergoes a transformation in\r\nhis interests. Psychologically the process is one of building\r\nup a \"social\" self. Imitation and suggestion, sympathy\r\nand affection, common purpose and common interest,\r\nare the aids in building such a self. As the various\r\ninstincts, emotions, and purposes are more definitely organized\r\ninto such a unit, it becomes possible to set off the\r\ninterests of others against those interests that center in\r\nmy more individual good. Conscious egoism and altruism\r\nbecome possible. And in a way that will be explained, the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_12\" id=\"Page_12\"\u003e[Pg 12]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninterests of self and others are raised to the plane of\r\nrights and justice.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWhat is Needed to Make Conduct Moral.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;All this\r\nis not yet moral progress in the fullest sense. The progress\r\nto more rational and more social conduct is the indispensable\r\ncondition of the moral, but not the whole story.\r\nWhat is needed is that the more rational and social conduct\r\nshould itself be valued as good, and so be chosen\r\nand sought; or in terms of control, that the law which\r\nsociety or reason prescribes should be consciously thought\r\nof as right, used as a standard, and respected as binding.\r\nThis gives the contrast between the higher and lower, as\r\na conscious aim, not merely as a matter of taste. It raises\r\nthe collision between self and others to the basis of personal\r\nrights and justice, of deliberate selfishness or benevolence.\r\nFinally it gives the basis for such organization of the\r\nsocial and rational choices that the progress already\r\ngained may be permanently secured, while the attention,\r\nthe struggle between duty and inclination, the conscious\r\nchoice, move forward to a new issue. Aristotle made these\r\npoints clear:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"But the virtues are not in this point analogous to the arts.\r\nThe products of art have their excellence in themselves, and\r\nso it is enough if when produced they are of a certain quality;\r\nbut in the case of the virtues, a man is not said to act justly\r\nor temperately (or like a just or temperate man) if what he\r\ndoes merely be of a certain sort\u0026mdash;he must also be in a certain\r\nstate of mind when he does it: i.e., first of all, he must know\r\nwhat he is doing; secondly, he must choose it, and choose it\r\nfor itself; and, thirdly, his act must be the expression of a\r\nformed and stable character.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSummary of the Characteristics of the Moral as\r\nGrowth.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The full cycle has three stages:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(a) Instinctive or habitual action.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(b) Action under the stress of attention, with conscious\r\nintervention and reconstruction.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_13\" id=\"Page_13\"\u003e[Pg 13]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(c) Organization of consciously directed conduct into\r\nhabits and a self of a higher order: Character.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe advance from (a) to and through (b) has three\r\naspects.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(a) It is a rationalizing and idealizing process. Reason\r\nis both a means to secure other ends, and an element\r\nin determining what shall be sought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(b) It is a socializing process. Society both strengthens\r\nand transforms the individual.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(c) It is a process in which finally conduct itself is made\r\nthe conscious object of reflection, valuation, and criticism.\r\nIn this the definitely moral conceptions of right and duty,\r\ngood and virtue appear.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 3. DIVISIONS OF THE TREATMENT\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePart I.\u003c/span\u003e, after a preliminary presentation of certain\r\nimportant aspects of group life, will first trace the process\r\nof moral development in its general outlines, and then\r\ngive specific illustrations of the process taken from the life\r\nof Israel, of Greece, and of modern civilization.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePart II.\u003c/span\u003e will analyze conduct or the moral life on its\r\ninner, personal side. After distinguishing more carefully\r\nwhat is meant by moral action, and noting some typical\r\nways in which the moral life has been viewed by ethical\r\ntheory, it will examine the meaning of right and good,\r\nof duty and virtue, and seek to discover the principles\r\nunderlying moral judgments and moral conduct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePart III.\u003c/span\u003e will study conduct as action in society. But\r\ninstead of a general survey, attention will be centered\r\nupon three phases of conduct which are of especial interest\r\nand importance. Political rights and duties, the production,\r\ndistribution, and ownership of wealth, and finally\r\nthe relations of domestic and family life, all present\r\nunsettled problems. These challenge the student to\r\nmake a careful examination, for he must take some attitude\r\nas citizen on the issues involved.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_14\" id=\"Page_14\"\u003e[Pg 14]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe literature on specific topics will be found at the beginning of\r\neach Part, and at the close of the several chapters. We indicate here\r\nsome of the more useful manuals and recent representative works,\r\nand add some specific references on the scope and methods of ethics.\r\nBaldwin\u0027s \u003ci\u003eDictionary of Philosophy and Psychology\u003c/i\u003e has selected lists\r\n(see especially articles, \u003ci\u003eEthical Theories\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eWorth\u003c/i\u003e) and general\r\nlists (Vol. III.). Runze, \u003ci\u003eEthik\u003c/i\u003e, 1891, has good bibliographies.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eElementary Texts\u003c/span\u003e: Mackenzie, \u003ci\u003eManual of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, 3rd ed., 1900;\r\nMuirhead, \u003ci\u003eElements of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, 1892; Seth, \u003ci\u003eA Study of Ethical Principles\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n6th ed., 1902; Thilly, \u003ci\u003eIntroduction to Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, 1900.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRepresentative Books and Treatises in English\u003c/span\u003e: Green, \u003ci\u003eProlegomena\r\nto Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, 1883 (Idealism); Martineau, \u003ci\u003eTypes of Ethical\r\nTheory\u003c/i\u003e, 1885, 3rd ed., 1891 (Intuitionism); Sidgwick\u0027s \u003ci\u003eMethods of\r\nEthics\u003c/i\u003e, 1874, 6th ed., 1901 (Union of Intuitionist and Utilitarian Positions\r\nwith careful analysis of common sense); Spencer, \u003ci\u003eThe Principles\r\nof Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, 1892-3 (Evolution); Stephen\u0027s \u003ci\u003eScience of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, 1882; The\r\ncomprehensive work of Paulsen (\u003ci\u003eSystem der Ethik\u003c/i\u003e, 1889, 5th ed.,\r\n1900) has been translated in part by Thilly, 1899; that of Wundt\r\n(\u003ci\u003eEthik\u003c/i\u003e, 1886, 3rd ed., 1903), by Titchener, Gulliver, and Washburn,\r\n1897-1901. Among the more recent contributions, either to the whole\r\nfield or to specific parts, may be noted: Alexander, \u003ci\u003eMoral Order and\r\nProgress\u003c/i\u003e, 1889; 2nd ed., 1891; Dewey, \u003ci\u003eOutlines of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, 1891, and\r\n\u003ci\u003eThe Study of Ethics, A Syllabus\u003c/i\u003e, 1894; Fite, \u003ci\u003eAn Introductory Study\r\nof Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, 1903; H\u0026ouml;ffding, \u003ci\u003eEthik\u003c/i\u003e (German tr.), 1887; Janet, \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nTheory of Morals\u003c/i\u003e (Eng. tr.), 1884; Ladd, \u003ci\u003eThe Philosophy of Conduct\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1902; Mezes, \u003ci\u003eEthics, Descriptive and Explanatory\u003c/i\u003e, 1900; Moore,\r\n\u003ci\u003ePrincipia Ethica\u003c/i\u003e, 1903; Palmer, \u003ci\u003eThe Field of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, 1902, \u003ci\u003eThe Nature\r\nof Goodness\u003c/i\u003e, 1903; Taylor, \u003ci\u003eThe Problem of Conduct\u003c/i\u003e, 1901; Rashdall,\r\n\u003ci\u003eThe Theory of Good and Evil\u003c/i\u003e, 1907; Bowne, \u003ci\u003eThe Principles of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1892; Rickaby, \u003ci\u003eMoral Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e, 1888.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHistories of Ethics\u003c/span\u003e: Sidgwick, \u003ci\u003eHistory of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, 3rd ed., 1892;\r\nAlbee, \u003ci\u003eA History of English Utilitarianism\u003c/i\u003e, 1902; Stephen, \u003ci\u003eThe Utilitarians\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1900; Martineau, \u003ci\u003eTypes of Ethical Theory\u003c/i\u003e; Whewell, \u003ci\u003eLectures\r\non the History of Moral Philosophy in England\u003c/i\u003e, 1852, 1862;\r\nK\u0026ouml;stlin, \u003ci\u003eGeschichte der Ethik\u003c/i\u003e, 2 vols., 1881-92 (ancient theories);\r\nJodl, \u003ci\u003eGeschichte der Ethik\u003c/i\u003e, 2 vols., 1882-89 (modern); Wundt, \u003ci\u003eEthik\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nVol. II.; the histories of philosophy by Windelband, H\u0026ouml;ffding, Erdmann,\r\nUeberweg, Falckenberg.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eScope and Method of Ethics\u003c/span\u003e: See the opening chapters in nearly\r\nall the works cited above, especially Palmer (\u003ci\u003eField of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e), Moore,\r\nStephen, Spencer, Paulsen, and Wundt (\u003ci\u003eFacts of the Moral Life\u003c/i\u003e);\r\nsee also Ritchie, \u003ci\u003ePhilosophical Studies\u003c/i\u003e, 1905, pp. 264-291; Wallace,\r\n\u003ci\u003eLectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, 1898, pp.\r\n194 ff.; Dewey, \u003ci\u003eLogical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(\u003ci\u003eUniversity of Chicago Decennial Publications\u003c/i\u003e, 1903); Stuart,\r\n\u003ci\u003eThe Logic of Self-realization\u003c/i\u003e, in University of California Publications:\r\n\u003ci\u003ePhilosophy\u003c/i\u003e, I., 1904; Small, \u003ci\u003eThe Significance of Sociology for\r\nEthics\u003c/i\u003e, 1902; Hadley, Article \u003ci\u003eEconomic Theory\u003c/i\u003e in Baldwin\u0027s \u003ci\u003eDict.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRelation of Theory to Life\u003c/span\u003e: Green, \u003ci\u003eProlegomena\u003c/i\u003e, Book IV.;\r\nDewey, \u003ci\u003eInternational Journal of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., 1891, pp. 186-203;\r\nJames, same journal, Vol. I., 330-354; Mackenzie, same journal,\r\nVol. IV., 1894, pp. 160-173.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_1_1\" id=\"Footnote_1_1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_1_1\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[1]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Plato, \u003ci\u003eProtagoras\u003c/i\u003e, 320 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_2_2\" id=\"Footnote_2_2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_2_2\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[2]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Angell, \u003ci\u003ePsychology\u003c/i\u003e, p. 59.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_15\" id=\"Page_15\"\u003e[Pg 15]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"PART_I\" id=\"PART_I\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003ePART I\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTHE BEGINNINGS AND GROWTH OF MORALITY\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_16\" id=\"Page_16\"\u003e[Pg 16]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eGENERAL LITERATURE FOR PART I\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHobhouse, \u003ci\u003eMorals in Evolution\u003c/i\u003e, 2 vols., 1906.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWestermarck, \u003ci\u003eThe Origin and Development of Moral Ideas\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I.,\r\n1906.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSutherland, \u003ci\u003eThe Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct\u003c/i\u003e, 2 vols.,\r\n1898.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWundt, \u003ci\u003eFacts of the Moral Life\u003c/i\u003e, 1902; also \u003ci\u003eEthik\u003c/i\u003e, 3rd ed., 1903,\r\nVol. I., pp. 280-523.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePaulsen, \u003ci\u003eA System of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, 1899, Book I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSumner, \u003ci\u003eFolkways\u003c/i\u003e, 1907.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBergmann, \u003ci\u003eEthik als Kulturphilosophie\u003c/i\u003e, 1904.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMezes, \u003ci\u003eEthics, Descriptive and Explanatory\u003c/i\u003e, Part I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDewey, \u003ci\u003eThe Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality\u003c/i\u003e, Philos.\r\nReview, XI., 1902, pp. 107-124, 353-371.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAdam Smith, \u003ci\u003eTheory of Moral Sentiments\u003c/i\u003e, 1759.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBaldwin, \u003ci\u003eSocial and Ethical Interpretations\u003c/i\u003e, 1902.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTaylor, \u003ci\u003eThe Problem of Conduct\u003c/i\u003e, 1901, chap. iii.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSpencer, \u003ci\u003eData of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, 1879; \u003ci\u003ePsychology\u003c/i\u003e, 1872, Part IX., chs.\r\nv.-viii.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIhering, \u003ci\u003eDer Zweck im Recht\u003c/i\u003e, 3rd ed., 1893.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSteinthal, \u003ci\u003eAllgemeine Ethik\u003c/i\u003e, 1885.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_17\" id=\"Page_17\"\u003e[Pg 17]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER II\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nEARLY GROUP LIFE\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo understand the origin and growth of moral life, it is\r\nessential to understand primitive society. And while there\r\nis much that is uncertain, there is one fact of capital importance\r\nwhich stands out clearly. This is \u003ci\u003ethe dominant\r\ninfluence of group life\u003c/i\u003e. It is not asserted that all peoples\r\nhave had precisely the same type of groups, or the same\r\ndegree of group solidarity. It is beyond question that\r\nthe ancestors of modern civilized races lived under the\r\ngeneral types of group life which will be outlined, and\r\nthat these types or their survivals are found among the\r\ngreat mass of peoples to-day.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 1. TYPICAL FACTS OF GROUP LIFE\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eConsider the following incident as related by Dr. Gray:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"A Chinese aided by his wife flogged his mother. The imperial\r\norder not only commanded that the criminals should\r\nbe put to death; it further directed that the head of the clan\r\nshould be put to death; that the immediate neighbors each\r\nreceive eighty blows and be sent into exile; that the head or\r\nrepresentatives of the graduates of the first degree (or B.A.)\r\namong whom the male offender ranked should be flogged and\r\nexiled; that the granduncle, the uncle, and two elder brothers\r\nshould be put to death; that the prefect and the rulers should\r\nfor a time be deprived of their rank; that on the face of the\r\nmother of the female offender four Chinese characters expressive\r\nof neglect of duty towards her daughter should be tattooed,\r\nand that she be exiled to a distant province; that the\r\nfather of the female offender, a bachelor of arts, should not\r\nbe allowed to take any higher literary degrees, and that he be\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_18\" id=\"Page_18\"\u003e[Pg 18]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nflogged and exiled; that the son of the offenders should receive\r\nanother name, and that the lands of the offender for a time\r\nremain fallow.\" (\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJ. H. Gray\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eChina\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., pp. 237 f.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePut beside this the story of Achan:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAchan had taken for his own possession certain articles from\r\nthe spoil of Jericho which had been set apart or \"devoted\"\r\nto Jehovah. Israel then suffered a defeat in battle. When\r\nAchan\u0027s act became known, \"Joshua and all Israel with him\r\ntook Achan, the son of Zerah, and the mantle, and the wedge\r\nof gold, and his sons and his daughters, and his oxen, and his\r\nasses, and his sheep, and his tent, and all that he had….\r\nAnd all Israel stoned him with stones; and they burned\r\nthem with fire and stoned them with stones.\" (\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJoshua\u003c/span\u003e\r\nvii: 24, 25.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe converse of these situations is brought out in the\r\nregulations of the Kumi, a Japanese local institution comprising\r\nfive or more households:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"As members of a Kumi we will cultivate friendly feelings\r\neven more than with our relatives, and will promote each\r\nother\u0027s happiness as well as share each other\u0027s grief. If there\r\nis an unprincipled or lawless person in a Kumi, we shall all\r\nshare the responsibility for him.\" (\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSimmons\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWigmore\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003eTransactions, Asiatic Society of Japan\u003c/i\u003e, xix., 177 f.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor another aspect of the group take C\u0026aelig;sar\u0027s description\r\nof landholding among the Germans:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"No one possesses privately a definite extent of land; no\r\none has limited fields of his own; but every year the magistrates\r\nand chiefs distribute the land to the clans and the\r\nkindred groups (\u003ci\u003egentibus cognationibusque hominum\u003c/i\u003e) and to\r\nthose (\u003ci\u003eother\u003c/i\u003e groups) who live together.\" (\u003ci\u003eDe Bell. Gall.\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nVI., 22.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf the Greeks, our intellectual ancestors, as well as\r\nfellow Aryans, it is stated that in Attica, even to a late\r\nperiod, the land remained to a large degree in possession\r\nof ideal persons, gods, phyl\u0026aelig; (tribes) or phratries, kinships,\r\npolitical communities. Even when the superficies\r\nof the land might be regarded as private, mines were re\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_19\" id=\"Page_19\"\u003e[Pg 19]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eserved\r\nas public.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_3_3\" id=\"FNanchor_3_3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_3_3\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[3]\u003c/a\u003e The basis on which these kinship groups\r\nrested is thus stated by Grote:\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_4_4\" id=\"FNanchor_4_4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_4_4\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[4]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"All these phratric and gentile associations, the larger as\r\nwell as the smaller, were founded upon the same principles\r\nand tendencies of the Grecian mind\u0026mdash;a coalescence of the\r\nidea of worship with that of ancestry, or of communion in\r\ncertain special religious rites with communion of blood, real\r\nor supposed.\" \"The god or hero, to whom the assembled\r\nmembers offered their sacrifices, was conceived as the primitive\r\nancestor to whom they owed their origin.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCoulanges gives a similar statement as to the ancient\r\nfamily group:\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_5_5\" id=\"FNanchor_5_5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_5_5\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[5]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"The members of the ancient family were united by something\r\nmore powerful than birth, affection, or physical strength;\r\nthis was the religion of the sacred fire, and of dead ancestors.\r\nThis caused the family to form a single body both in this life\r\nand in the next.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFinally, the following passage on clanship among the\r\nKafirs brings out two points: (1) That such a group life\r\nimplies feelings and ideas of a distinctive sort; and (2)\r\nthat it has a strength rooted in the very necessities of life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"A Kafir feels that the \u0027frame that binds him in\u0027 extends to\r\nthe clan. The sense of solidarity of the family in Europe is\r\nthin and feeble compared to the full-blooded sense of corporate\r\nunion of the Kafir clan. The claims of the clan\r\nentirely swamp the rights of the individual. The system of\r\ntribal solidarity, which has worked so well in its smoothness\r\nthat it might satisfy the utmost dreams of the socialist, is a\r\nstanding proof of the sense of corporate union of the clan. In\r\nolden days a man did not have any feeling of personal injury\r\nwhen a chief made him work for white men and then told him\r\nto give all, or nearly all of his wages to his chief; the money\r\nwas kept within the clan, and what was the good of the clan\r\nwas the good of the individual and \u003ci\u003evice versa\u003c/i\u003e. The striking\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_20\" id=\"Page_20\"\u003e[Pg 20]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ething about this unity of the clan is that it was not a thought-out\r\nplan imposed from without by legislation upon an unwilling\r\npeople, but it was a \u003ci\u003efelt-out\u003c/i\u003e plan which arose spontaneously\r\nalong the line of least resistance. If one member of the\r\nclan suffered, all the members suffered, not in sentimental\r\nphraseology, but in real fact.\" (\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDudley Kidd\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eSavage Childhood\u003c/i\u003e,\r\npp. 74 f.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe above passages refer to Aryan, Semitic, Mongolian,\r\nand Kafir peoples. They could be matched by\r\nsimilar statements concerning nearly every people. They\r\nsuggest a way of living, and a view of life very different\r\nfrom that of the American or of most Europeans.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_6_6\" id=\"FNanchor_6_6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_6_6\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[6]\u003c/a\u003e The\r\nAmerican or European belongs to groups of various kinds,\r\nbut he \"joins\" most of them. He of course is born into\r\na family, but he does not stay in it all his life unless he\r\npleases. And he may choose his own occupation, residence,\r\nwife, political party, religion, social club, or even national\r\nallegiance. He may own or sell his own house, give or\r\nbequeath his property, and is responsible generally speaking\r\nfor no one\u0027s acts but his own. This makes him an\r\n\"individual\" in a much fuller sense than he would be if\r\nall these relations were settled for him. On the other hand,\r\nthe member of such groups as are referred to in our examples\r\nabove, has all, or nearly all, his relations fixed when\r\nhe is born into a certain clan or family group. This settles\r\nhis occupation, dwelling, gods, and politics. If it\r\ndoesn\u0027t decide upon his wife, it at least usually fixes the\r\ngroup from which she must be taken. His conditions, in\r\nthe words of Maine, are thus of \"status,\" not of \"contract.\"\r\nThis makes a vast difference in his whole attitude.\r\nIt will help to bring out more clearly by contrast the\r\ncharacter of present morality, as well as to see moral life\r\nin the making, if we examine more carefully this group\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_21\" id=\"Page_21\"\u003e[Pg 21]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlife. We shall find, as brought out in the passages already\r\nquoted, that the most important type of group is at\r\nonce a kindred or family, an economic, a political, a religious,\r\nand a moral unit. First, however, we notice briefly\r\nthe most important types of groups.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 2. KINSHIP AND HOUSEHOLD GROUPS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. The Kinship Group.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The kinship group is a body\r\nof persons who conceive of themselves as sprung from one\r\nancestor, and hence as having in their veins one blood.\r\nIt does not matter for our study whether each group\r\nhas actually sprung from a single ancestor. It is highly\r\nprobable that the contingencies of food-supply or of war\r\nmay have been an original cause for the constitution of\r\nthe group, wholly or in part. But this is of no consequence\r\nfor our purpose. The important point is that\r\nthe members of the group regard themselves as of one\r\nstock. In some cases the ancestor is believed to have been\r\nan animal. Then we have the so-called totem group,\r\nwhich is found among North American Indians, Africans,\r\nand Australians, and was perhaps the early form of\r\nSemitic groups. In other cases, some hero or even some\r\ngod is named as the ancestor. In any case the essential\r\npart of the theory remains the same: namely, that one\r\nblood circulates in all the members, and hence that the\r\nlife of each is a part of the common life of the group.\r\nThere are then no degrees of kindred. This group, it\r\nshould be noted, is not the same as the family, for in the\r\nfamily, as a rule, husband and wife are of different kinship\r\ngroups, and continue their several kinship relations.\r\nAmong some peoples marriage ceremonies, indeed, symbolize\r\nthe admission of the wife into the husband\u0027s kinship,\r\nand in this case the family becomes a kinship group, but\r\nthis is by no means universally the case.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe feeling that one is first and foremost a member of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_22\" id=\"Page_22\"\u003e[Pg 22]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na group, rather than an individual, is furthered among\r\ncertain kin groups by a scheme of class relationship.\r\nAccording to this system, instead of having one definite\r\nperson whom I, and I alone, regard and address as father\r\nor mother, grandfather, uncle, brother, sister, I call any\r\none of a given group or class of persons mother, grandfather,\r\nbrother, sister. And any one else who is in the\r\nsame class with me calls the same persons, mother, grandfather,\r\nbrother, or sister.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_7_7\" id=\"FNanchor_7_7\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_7_7\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[7]\u003c/a\u003e The simplest form of such a\r\nclass system is that found among the Hawaiians. Here\r\nthere are five classes based upon the generations corresponding\r\nto what we call grandparents, parents, brothers\r\nand sisters, children, and grandchildren, but the words\r\nused to designate them do not imply any such specific\r\nparentage as do these words with us. Bearing this in\r\nmind, we may say that every one in the first class is\r\nequally grandparent to every one in the third; every one\r\nin the third is equally brother or sister to every other in\r\nthe third, equally father or mother to every one in the\r\nfourth, and so on. In Australia the classes are more\r\nnumerous and the relationships far more intricate and\r\ncomplicated, but this does not, as might be supposed, render\r\nthe bond relatively unimportant; on the contrary, his\r\nrelationship to every other class is \"one of the most\r\nimportant points with which each individual must be\r\nacquainted\"; it determines marital relations, food distribution,\r\nsalutations, and general conduct to an extraordinary\r\ndegree. A kinship group was known as \"tribe\"\r\nor \"family\" (English translation) among the Israelites;\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_23\" id=\"Page_23\"\u003e[Pg 23]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas genos, phratria, and phyle among the Greeks, gens\r\nand curia among the Romans; clan in Scotland; sept in\r\nIreland; Sippe in Germany.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. The Family or Household Group.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Two kinds of\r\nfamilies may be noted as significant for our purpose. In\r\nthe \u003ci\u003ematernal family\u003c/i\u003e the woman remains among her own\r\nkin, and the children are naturally reckoned as belonging\r\nto the mother\u0027s kin. The husband and father is more or\r\nless a guest or outsider. In a blood feud he would have\r\nto side with his own clan and against that of his wife\r\nif his clan quarreled with hers. Clan and family are thus\r\nseen to be distinct. In the \u003ci\u003epaternal\u003c/i\u003e, which easily becomes\r\nthe \u003ci\u003epatriarchal\u003c/i\u003e family the wife leaves her relatives to\r\nlive in her husband\u0027s house and among his kin. She might\r\nthen, as at Rome, abjure her own kindred and be formally\r\nadopted into her husband\u0027s gens or clan. The Greek\r\nmyth of Orestes is an illustration of the clashing of these\r\ntwo conceptions of father kin and mother kin, and Hamlet\u0027s\r\nsparing of his mother under similar circumstances,\r\nshows a more modern point of view.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is evident that with the prevalence of the paternal\r\ntype of family, clan and household ties will mutually\r\nstrengthen each other. This will make an important difference\r\nin the father\u0027s relation to the children, and gives\r\na much firmer basis for ancestral religion. But in many\r\nrespects the environing atmosphere, the pressure and support,\r\nthe group sympathy and group tradition, are essentially\r\nsimilar. The important thing is that every person\r\nis a member of a kindred, and likewise, of some family\r\ngroup, and that he thinks, feels, and acts accordingly.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_8_8\" id=\"FNanchor_8_8\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_8_8\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[8]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_24\" id=\"Page_24\"\u003e[Pg 24]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 3. THE KINSHIP AND FAMILY GROUPS ARE ALSO ECONOMIC\r\nAND INDUSTRIAL UNITS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. The Land and the Group.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In land, as a rule, no\r\nindividual ownership in the modern sense was recognized.\r\nAmong hunting and pastoral peoples there was, of course,\r\nno \"ownership\" by any group in the strict sense of modern\r\nlaw. But none the less, the group, large or small, had\r\nits fairly well-defined territory within which it hunted\r\nand fished; in the pastoral life it had its pasture range\r\nand its wells of water. With agriculture a more definite\r\nsense of possession arose. But possession was by\r\nthe tribe or gens or household, not by the individual:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"The land belonged to the clan, and the clan was settled\r\nupon the land. A man was thus not a member of the clan,\r\nbecause he lived upon, or even owned, the land; but he lived\r\nupon the land, and had interests in it, because he was a member\r\nof the clan.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_9_9\" id=\"FNanchor_9_9\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_9_9\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[9]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eGreek and German customs were quoted at the outset.\r\nAmong the Celts the laws of ancient Ireland show a transitional\r\nstage. \"The land of the tribe consisted of two\r\ndistinct allotments, the \u0027fechfine\u0027 or tribeland, and the\r\n\u0027orta\u0027 or inheritance land. This latter belonged as individual\r\nproperty to the men of the chieftain groups.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_10_10\" id=\"FNanchor_10_10\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_10_10\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[10]\u003c/a\u003e The\r\nHindoo joint-family and the house-community of the\r\nSouthern Slavonians are present examples of group\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_25\" id=\"Page_25\"\u003e[Pg 25]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nownership. They are joint in food, worship, and estate.\r\nThey have a common home, a common table. Maxims of\r\nthe Slavs express their appreciation of community life:\r\n\"The common household waxes rich\"; \"The more bees in\r\nthe hive, the heavier it weighs.\" One difficulty in the English\r\nadministration of Ireland has been this radical difference\r\nbetween the modern Englishman\u0027s individualistic\r\nconception of property and the Irishman\u0027s more primitive\r\nconception of group or clan ownership. Whether rightly\r\nor not, the Irish tenant refuses to regard himself as merely\r\na tenant. He considers himself as a member of a family\r\nor group which formerly owned the land, and he does\r\nnot admit the justice, even though he cannot disprove\r\nthe legality, of an alienation of the group possession. For\r\nsuch a clan or household as we have described is not merely\r\nequivalent to the persons who compose it at a given time.\r\nIts property belongs to the ancestors and to the posterity\r\nas well as to the present possessors; and hence in\r\nsome groups which admit an individual possession or use\r\nduring life, no right of devise or inheritance is permitted.\r\nThe property reverts at death to the whole gens or clan.\r\nIn other cases a child may inherit, but in default of such\r\nan heir the property passes to the common possession.\r\nThe right to bequeath property to the church was long\r\na point on which civil law and canon law were at variance.\r\nThe relations of the primitive clan or household group to\r\nland were therefore decidedly adapted to keep the individual\u0027s\r\ngood bound up with the good of the group.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Movable Goods.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In the case of movable goods, such\r\nas tools, weapons, cattle, the practice is not uniform.\r\nWhen the goods are the product of the individual\u0027s own\r\nskill or prowess they are usually his. Tools, weapons,\r\nslaves or women captured, products of some special craft\r\nor skill, are thus usually private. But when the group\r\nacts as a unit the product is usually shared. The buffalo\r\nand salmon and large game were thus for the whole Indian\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_26\" id=\"Page_26\"\u003e[Pg 26]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ngroup which hunted or fished together; and in like manner\r\nthe maize which was tended by the women belonged to\r\nthe household in common. Slavic and Indian house communities\r\nat the present day have a common interest in\r\nthe household property. Even women and children among\r\nsome tribes are regarded as the property of the group.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 4. THE KINSHIP AND FAMILY GROUPS WERE POLITICAL\r\nBODIES\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn a modern family the parents exercise a certain degree\r\nof control over the children, but this is limited in several\r\nrespects. No parent is allowed to put a child to death,\r\nor to permit him to grow up in ignorance. On the other\r\nhand, the parent is not allowed to protect the child from\r\narrest if a serious injury has been done by him. The\r\n\u003ci\u003eState\u003c/i\u003e, through its laws and officers, is regarded by us as\r\nthe highest authority in a certain great sphere of action.\r\nIt must settle conflicting claims and protect life and property;\r\nin the opinion of many it must organize the life of\r\nits members where the co\u0026ouml;peration of every member is\r\nnecessary for some common good. In early group life\r\nthere may or may not be some political body over and\r\nabove the clan or family, but in any case the \u003ci\u003ekin or family\r\nis itself a sort of political State\u003c/i\u003e. Not a State in the\r\nsense that the political powers are deliberately separated\r\nfrom personal, religious, and family ties; men gained a\r\nnew conception of authority and rose to a higher level\r\nof possibilities when they consciously separated and defined\r\ngovernment and laws from the undifferentiated whole\r\nof a religious and kindred group. But yet this primitive\r\ngroup was after all a State, not a mob, or a voluntary\r\nsociety, or a mere family; for (1) it was a more or less\r\npermanently organized body; (2) it exercised control over\r\nits members which they regarded as rightful authority, not\r\nas mere force; (3) it was not limited by any higher author\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_27\" id=\"Page_27\"\u003e[Pg 27]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eity,\r\nand acted more or less effectively for the interest of the\r\nwhole. The representatives of this political aspect of the\r\ngroup may be chiefs or sachems, a council of elders, or, as\r\nin Rome, the House Father, whose \u003ci\u003epatria potestas\u003c/i\u003e marks\r\nthe extreme development of the patriarchal family.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe control exercised by the group over individual\r\nmembers assumes various forms among the different peoples.\r\nThe more important aspects are a right over\r\nlife and bodily freedom, in some cases extending to power\r\nof putting to death, maiming, chastising, deciding whether\r\nnewly born children shall be preserved or not; the right\r\nof betrothal, which includes control over the marriage\r\nportion received for its women; and the right to administer\r\nproperty of the kin in behalf of the kin as a whole.\r\nIt is probable that among all these various forms of control,\r\nthe control over the marriage relations of women\r\nhas been most persistent. One reason for this control\r\nmay have been the fact that the group was bound to resent\r\ninjuries of a member of the group who had been married\r\nto another. Hence this responsibility seemed naturally\r\nto involve the right of decision as to her marriage.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIt is Membership in the Group Which Gives the Individual\r\nWhatever Rights He Has.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;According to present\r\nconceptions this is still largely true of legal rights.\r\nA State may allow a citizen of another country to own\r\nland, to sue in its courts, and will usually give him a\r\ncertain amount of protection, but the first-named rights\r\nare apt to be limited, and it is only a few years since\r\nChief Justice Taney\u0027s dictum stated the existing legal\r\ntheory of the United States to be that the negro \"had no\r\nrights which the white man was bound to respect.\" Even\r\nwhere legal theory does not recognize race or other distinctions,\r\nit is often hard in practice for an alien to get\r\njustice. In primitive clan or family groups this principle\r\nis in full force. Justice is a privilege which falls to a\r\nman as belonging to some group\u0026mdash;not otherwise. The\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_28\" id=\"Page_28\"\u003e[Pg 28]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmember of the clan or the household or the village community\r\nhas a claim, but the stranger has no standing.\r\nHe may be treated kindly, as a guest, but he cannot demand\r\n\"justice\" at the hands of any group but his own.\r\nIn this conception of rights within the group we have the\r\nprototype of modern civil law. The dealing of clan\r\nwith clan is a matter of war or negotiation, not of law;\r\nand the clanless man is an \"outlaw\" in fact as well as in\r\nname.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eJoint Responsibility\u003c/b\u003e and mutual support, as shown in\r\nthe blood feud, was a natural consequence of this fusion of\r\npolitical and kindred relations. In modern life States\r\ntreat each other as wholes in certain respects. If some\r\nmember of a savage tribe assaults a citizen of one of the\r\ncivilized nations, the injured party invokes the help of\r\nhis government. A demand is usually made that the guilty\r\nparty be delivered up for trial and punishment. If he is\r\nnot forthcoming a \"punitive expedition\" is organized\r\nagainst the whole tribe; guilty and innocent suffer alike.\r\nOr in lieu of exterminating the offending tribe, in part or\r\ncompletely, the nation of the injured man may accept\r\nan indemnity in money or land from the offender\u0027s tribe.\r\nRecent dealings between British and Africans, Germans\r\nand Africans, France and Morocco, the United States\r\nand the Filipinos, the Powers and China, illustrate this.\r\nThe State protects its own members against other States,\r\nand avenges them upon other States. Each opposes a\r\nunited body to the other. The same principle carried out\r\nthrough private citizens as public agents, and applied to\r\ntowns, is seen in the practice which prevailed in the Middle\r\nAges. \"When merchants of one country had been defrauded\r\nby those of another, or found it impossible to collect\r\na debt from them, the former country issued letters\r\nof marque and reprisal, authorizing the plunder of any\r\ncitizens of the offending town until satisfaction should\r\nbe obtained.\" Transfer the situation to the early clan\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_29\" id=\"Page_29\"\u003e[Pg 29]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor tribe, and this solidarity is increased because each member\r\nis related to the rest by blood, as well as by national\r\nunity. The Arabs do not say \"The blood of M. or N. has\r\nbeen spilt,\" naming the man; they say, \"Our blood has\r\nbeen spilt.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_11_11\" id=\"FNanchor_11_11\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_11_11\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[11]\u003c/a\u003e The whole group, therefore, feels injured\r\nand regards every man in the offender\u0027s kin as more or\r\nless responsible. The next of kin, the \"avenger of blood,\"\r\nstands first in duty and privilege, but the rest are all\r\ninvolved in greater or less degree.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWithin the Group\u003c/b\u003e each member will be treated more\r\nor less fully as an individual. If he takes his kinsman\u0027s\r\nwife or his kinsman\u0027s game he will be dealt with by the\r\nauthorities or by the public opinion of his group. He\r\nwill not indeed be put to death if he kills his kinsman,\r\nbut he will be hated, and may be driven out. \"Since the\r\nliving kin is not killed for the sake of the dead kin, everybody\r\nwill hate to see him.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_12_12\" id=\"FNanchor_12_12\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_12_12\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[12]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen now a smaller group, like a family, is at the\r\nsame time a part of a larger group like a phratry or a\r\ntribe, we have the phase of solidarity which is so puzzling\r\nto the modern. We hold to solidarity in war or between\r\nnations; but with a few exceptions\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_13_13\" id=\"FNanchor_13_13\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_13_13\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[13]\u003c/a\u003e we have replaced it\r\nby individual responsibility of adults for debts and crimes\r\nso far as the civil law has jurisdiction. In earlier times\r\nthe higher group or authority treated the smaller as a\r\nunit. Achan\u0027s family all perished with him. The Chinese\r\nsense of justice recognized a series of degrees in responsibility\r\ndependent on nearness of kin or of residence, or of\r\noccupation. The Welsh system held kinsmen as far as\r\nsecond cousins responsible for insult or injury short of\r\nhomicide, and as far as fifth cousins (seventh degree of\r\ndescent) for the payment in case of homicide. \"The\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_30\" id=\"Page_30\"\u003e[Pg 30]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmutual responsibility of kinsmen for \u003ci\u003esaraal\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003egalanas\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(the Wergild of the Germans), graduated according to\r\nnearness of kin to the murdered man and to the criminal,\r\nreveals more clearly than anything else the extent to\r\nwhich the individual was bound by innumerable meshes to\r\nhis fixed place in the tribal community.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_14_14\" id=\"FNanchor_14_14\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_14_14\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[14]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 5. THE KINSHIP OR HOUSEHOLD GROUP WAS A RELIGIOUS\r\nUNIT\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe kinship or household group determined largely\r\nboth the ideas and the cultus of primitive religion;\r\nconversely religion gave completeness, value, and sacredness\r\nto the group life. Kinship with unseen powers or\r\npersons was the fundamental religious idea. The kinship\r\ngroup as a religious body \u003ci\u003esimply extended the kin to\r\ninclude invisible as well as visible members\u003c/i\u003e. The essential\r\nfeature of religion is not unseen beings who are feared,\r\nor cajoled, or controlled by magic. It is rather \u003ci\u003ekindred\u003c/i\u003e\r\nunseen beings, who may be feared, but who are also reverenced\r\nand loved. The kinship may be physical or spiritual,\r\nbut however conceived it makes gods and worshippers\r\nmembers of one group.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_15_15\" id=\"FNanchor_15_15\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_15_15\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[15]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. Totem Groups.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In totem groups, the prevailing\r\nconception is that one blood circulates in all the members\r\nof the group and that the ancestor of the whole group\r\nis some object of nature, such as sun or moon, plant or\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_31\" id=\"Page_31\"\u003e[Pg 31]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nanimal. Perhaps the most interesting and intelligible account\r\nof the relation between the animal ancestor and the\r\nmembers of the group is that which has recently been\r\ndiscovered in certain Australian tribes who believe that\r\nevery child, at its birth, is the reincarnation of some previous\r\nmember of the group, and that these ancestors were\r\nan actual transformation of animals and plants, or of\r\nwater, fire, wind, sun, moon, or stars. Such totem groups\r\ncherish that animal which they believe to be their ancestor\r\nand ordinarily will not kill it or use it for food. The\r\nvarious ceremonies of religious initiation are intended to\r\nimpress upon the younger members of the group the\r\nsacredness of this kindred bond which units them to each\r\nother and to their totem. The beginnings of decorative art\r\nfrequently express the importance of the symbol, and the\r\ntotem is felt to be as distinctly a member of the group as\r\nis any of the human members.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Ancestral Religion.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;At a somewhat higher stage\r\nof civilization, and usually in connection with the patriarchal\r\nhouseholds or groups in which kinship is reckoned\r\nthrough the male line, the invisible members of the group\r\nare the \u003ci\u003edeparted ancestors\u003c/i\u003e. This ancestor worship is a\r\npower to-day in China and Japan, and in the tribes of\r\nthe Caucasus. The ancient Semites, Romans, Teutons,\r\nCelts, Hindoos, all had their kindred gods of the household.\r\nThe Roman genius, lares, penates, and manes, perhaps the\r\nHebrew teraphim,\u0026mdash;prized by Laban and Rachel, kept\r\nby David, valued in the time of Hosea,\u0026mdash;were loved and\r\nhonored side by side with other deities. Sometimes the\r\nnature deities, such as Zeus or Jupiter, were incorporated\r\nwith the kinship or family gods. The Greek Hestia and\r\nRoman Vesta symbolized the sacredness of the hearth. The\r\nkinship tie thus determined for every member of the group\r\nhis religion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eReligion Completes the Group.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Conversely, this bond\r\nof union with unseen, yet ever present and powerful kin\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_32\" id=\"Page_32\"\u003e[Pg 32]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003edred\r\nspirits completed the group and gave to it its highest\r\nauthority, its fullest value, its deepest sacredness. If the\r\nunseen kin are nature beings, they symbolize for man his\r\ndependence upon nature and his kinship in some vague\r\nfashion with the cosmic forces. If the gods are the\r\ndeparted ancestors, they are then conceived as still potent,\r\nlike Father Anchises, to protect and guide the fortunes\r\nof their offspring. The wisdom, courage, and affection,\r\nas well as the power of the great heroes of the group,\r\nlive on. The fact that the gods are unseen enhances tremendously\r\ntheir supposed power. The visible members of\r\nthe group may be strong, but their strength can be measured.\r\nThe living elders may be wise, yet they are not\r\nfar beyond the rest of the group. But the invisible beings\r\ncannot be measured. The long-departed ancestor may\r\nhave inconceivable age and wisdom. The imagination has\r\nfree scope to magnify his power and invest him with all\r\nthe ideal values it can conceive. The religious bond is,\r\ntherefore, fitted to be the bearer, as the religious object\r\nis the embodiment in concrete form, of the higher standards\r\nof the group, and to furnish the sanction for their\r\nenforcement or adoption.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 6. GROUPS OR CLASSES ON THE BASIS OF AGE AND SEX\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhile the kindred and family groups are by far the\r\nmost important for early morality, other groupings are\r\nsignificant. The division by ages is widespread. The\r\nsimplest scheme gives three classes: (1) children, (2)\r\nyoung men and maidens, (3) married persons. Puberty\r\nforms the bound between the first and second; marriage\r\nthat between the second and third. Distinct modes of\r\ndress and ornament, frequently also different residences\r\nand standards of conduct, belong to these several classes.\r\nOf groups on the basis of sex, the \u003ci\u003emen\u0027s clubs\u003c/i\u003e are espe\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_33\" id=\"Page_33\"\u003e[Pg 33]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ecially\r\nworthy of note. They flourish now chiefly in the\r\nislands of the Pacific, but there are indications, such as\r\nthe common meals of the Spartans, of a wide spread among\r\nEuropean peoples in early times. The fundamental idea\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_16_16\" id=\"FNanchor_16_16\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_16_16\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[16]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nseems to be that of a common house for the unmarried\r\nyoung men, where they eat, sleep, and pass their time,\r\nwhereas the women, children, and married men sleep and\r\neat in the family dwelling. But in most cases all the men\r\nresort to the clubhouse by day. Strangers may be entertained\r\nthere. It thus forms a sort of general center for\r\nthe men\u0027s activities, and for the men\u0027s conversation. As\r\nsuch, it is an important agency for forming and expressing\r\npublic opinion, and for impressing upon the young\r\nmen just entering the house the standards of the older\r\nmembers. Further, in some cases these houses become the\r\ncenter of rites to the dead, and thus add the impressiveness\r\nof religious significance to their other activities.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFinally, \u003ci\u003esecret societies\u003c/i\u003e may be mentioned as a subdivision\r\nof sex groups, for among primitive peoples such\r\nsocieties are confined in almost all cases to the men. They\r\nseem in many cases to have grown out of the age classes\r\nalready described. The transition from childhood to manhood,\r\nmysterious in itself, was invested with further mysteries\r\nby the old men who conducted the ceremonies of\r\ninitiation. Masks were worn, or the skulls of deceased\r\nancestors were employed, to give additional mystery and\r\nsanctity. The increased power gained by secrecy would\r\noften be itself sufficient to form a motive for such organization,\r\nespecially where they had some end in view not\r\napproved by the dominant authorities. Sometimes they\r\nexercise strict authority over their members, and assume\r\njudicial and punitive functions, as in the Vehm of the\r\nMiddle Ages. Sometimes they become merely leagues of\r\nenemies to society.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_34\" id=\"Page_34\"\u003e[Pg 34]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 7. MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE KINDRED AND OTHER\r\nGROUPS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe moral in this early stage is not to be looked for\r\nas something distinct from the political, religious, kindred,\r\nand sympathetic aspects of the clan, family, and other\r\ngroups. The question rather is, \u003ci\u003eHow far are these very\r\npolitical, religious, and other aspects implicitly moral\u003c/i\u003e?\r\nIf by moral we mean a conscious testing of conduct by\r\nan inner and self-imposed standard, if we mean a freely\r\nchosen as contrasted with a habitual or customary standard,\r\nthen evidently we have the moral only in germ. For the\r\nstandards are group standards, rather than those of individual\r\nconscience; they operate largely through habit\r\nrather than through choice. Nevertheless they are not set\r\nfor the individual by outsiders. They are set by a group\r\nof which he is a member. They are enforced by a group\r\n\u003ci\u003eof which he is a member\u003c/i\u003e. Conduct is praised or blamed,\r\npunished or rewarded by the group of which he is a\r\nmember. Property is administered, industry is carried on,\r\nwars and feuds prosecuted for the common good. What\r\nthe group does, each member joins in doing. It is a reciprocal\r\nmatter: A helps enforce a rule or impose a service\r\non B; he cannot help feeling it fair when the same rule\r\nis applied to himself. He has to \"play the game,\" and\r\nusually he expects to play it as a matter of course. Each\r\nmember, therefore, is practicing certain acts, standing in\r\ncertain relations, maintaining certain attitudes, just because\r\nhe is one of the group which does these things and\r\nmaintains these standards. And he does not act in common\r\nwith the group without sharing in the group emotions.\r\nIt is a grotesque perversion to conceive the restraints of\r\ngods and chiefs as purely external terrors. The primitive\r\ngroup could enter into the spirit implied in the words\r\nof the Athenian chorus, which required of an alien upon\r\nadoption\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_35\" id=\"Page_35\"\u003e[Pg 35]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"To loathe whate\u0027er our state does hateful hold,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTo reverence what it loves.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_17_17\" id=\"FNanchor_17_17\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_17_17\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[17]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"noidt\"\u003eThe gregarious instinct may be the most elemental of\r\nthe impulses which bind the group together, but it is\r\nreinforced by sympathies and sentiments growing out\r\nof common life, common work, common danger, common\r\nreligion. The morality is already implicit, it needs only to\r\nbecome conscious. The standards are embodied in the\r\nold men or the gods; the rational good is in the inherited\r\nwisdom; the respect for sex, for property rights, and for\r\nthe common good, is embodied in the system\u0026mdash;but it is\r\nthere. Nor are the union and control a wholly objective\r\naffair. \"The corporate union was not a pretty religious\r\nfancy with which to please the mind, but was so truly felt\r\nthat it formed an excellent basis from which the altruistic\r\nsentiment might start. Gross selfishness was curbed, and\r\nthe turbulent passions were restrained by an impulse which\r\nthe man felt welling up within him, instinctive and unbidden.\r\nClannish camaraderie was thus of immense value\r\nto the native races.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_18_18\" id=\"FNanchor_18_18\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_18_18\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[18]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe works of Hobhouse, Sumner, Westermarck contain copious\r\nreferences to the original sources. Among the most valuable are:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFor Savage People\u003c/span\u003e: Waitz, \u003ci\u003eAnthropologie der Naturv\u0026ouml;lker\u003c/i\u003e, 1859-72;\r\nTylor, \u003ci\u003ePrimitive Culture\u003c/i\u003e, 1903; Spencer and Gillen, \u003ci\u003eThe Native Tribes\r\nof Central Australia\u003c/i\u003e, 1899, and \u003ci\u003eThe Northern Tribes of Central\r\nAustralia\u003c/i\u003e, 1904; Howitt and Fison, \u003ci\u003eKamilaroi and Kurnai\u003c/i\u003e, 1880;\r\nHowitt, \u003ci\u003eThe Native Tribes of S. E. Australia\u003c/i\u003e, 1904; N. Thomas,\r\n\u003ci\u003eKinship, Organization and Group Marriages in Australia\u003c/i\u003e, 1906;\r\nMorgan, \u003ci\u003eHouses and House-life of the American Aborigines\u003c/i\u003e, 1881,\r\n\u003ci\u003eThe League of the Iroquois\u003c/i\u003e, 1851, \u003ci\u003eSystems of Consanguinity, Smithsonian\r\nContributions\u003c/i\u003e, 1871, \u003ci\u003eAncient Society\u003c/i\u003e, 1877. Many papers in\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eReports of the Bureau of Ethnology\u003c/i\u003e, especially by Powell in 1st,\r\n1879-80; Dorsey in 3rd, 1881-82, Mendeleff in 19th, 1893-94.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFor India, China, and Japan\u003c/span\u003e: Lyall, \u003ci\u003eAsiatic Studies, Religious\r\nand Social\u003c/i\u003e, 1882; Gray, \u003ci\u003eChina\u003c/i\u003e, 1878; Smith, \u003ci\u003eChinese Characteristics\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1894; \u003ci\u003eVillage Life in China\u003c/i\u003e, 1899; Nitob\u0026eacute;, \u003ci\u003eBushido\u003c/i\u003e, 1905; L. Hearn,\r\n\u003ci\u003eJapan\u003c/i\u003e, 1904.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_36\" id=\"Page_36\"\u003e[Pg 36]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFor Semitic and Indo-Germanic Peoples\u003c/span\u003e: W. R. Smith, \u003ci\u003eKinship\r\nand Marriage in Early Arabia\u003c/i\u003e, 1885; \u003ci\u003eThe Religion of the Semites\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1894; W. Hearn, \u003ci\u003eThe Aryan Household\u003c/i\u003e, 1879; Coulanges, \u003ci\u003eThe Ancient\r\nCity\u003c/i\u003e, 1873; Seebohm, \u003ci\u003eThe Tribal System in Wales\u003c/i\u003e, 1895, and \u003ci\u003eTribal\r\nCustom in Anglo-Saxon Law\u003c/i\u003e, 1902; Krauss, \u003ci\u003eSitte und Brauch der\r\nS\u0026uuml;dslaven\u003c/i\u003e, 1885.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGeneral\u003c/span\u003e: Grosse, \u003ci\u003eDie Formen der Familie und die Formen der\r\nWirthschaft\u003c/i\u003e, 1896; Starke, \u003ci\u003eThe Primitive Family\u003c/i\u003e, 1889; Maine, \u003ci\u003eAncient\r\nLaw\u003c/i\u003e, 1885; McLennan, \u003ci\u003eStudies in Ancient History\u003c/i\u003e, 1886; Rivers,\r\n\u003ci\u003eOn the Origin of the Classificatory System of Relationships\u003c/i\u003e, in Anthropological\r\nEssays, presented to E. B. Tylor, 1907; Ratzel, \u003ci\u003eHistory\r\nof Mankind\u003c/i\u003e, 1896-98; Kovalevsky, \u003ci\u003eTableau des origines et de l\u0027Evolution\r\nde la Famille et de la Propri\u0026eacute;t\u0026eacute;\u003c/i\u003e, 1890; Giddings, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of\r\nSociology\u003c/i\u003e, 1896, pp. 157-168, 256-298; Thomas, \u003ci\u003eRelation of Sex to\r\nPrimitive Social Control\u003c/i\u003e in Sex and Society, 1907; Webster, \u003ci\u003ePrimitive\r\nSecret Societies\u003c/i\u003e, 1908; Simmel, \u003ci\u003eThe Sociology of Secrecy and of\r\nSecret Societies\u003c/i\u003e, American Journal Sociology, Vol. XI., 1906, pp.\r\n441-498. See also the references at close of Chapters VI., VII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_3_3\" id=\"Footnote_3_3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_3_3\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[3]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Wilamowitz-M\u0026ouml;llendorf, \u003ci\u003eAristotle und Athen\u003c/i\u003e, II. 93, 47.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_4_4\" id=\"Footnote_4_4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_4_4\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[4]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eHistory of Greece\u003c/i\u003e, III., 55.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_5_5\" id=\"Footnote_5_5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_5_5\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[5]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eThe Ancient City\u003c/i\u003e, p. 51.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_6_6\" id=\"Footnote_6_6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_6_6\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[6]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Russian mirs, South Slavonian \"joint\" families, Corsican clans\r\nwith their vendettas, and tribes in the Caucasus still have the group\r\ninterest strong, and the feuds of the mountaineers in some of the\r\nborder states illustrate family solidarity.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_7_7\" id=\"Footnote_7_7\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_7_7\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[7]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"In all the tribes with whom we are acquainted all the terms\r\ncoincide without any exception in the recognition of relationships,\r\nall of which are dependent on the existence of a classificatory system,\r\nthe fundamental idea of which is that the women of certain groups\r\nmarry the men of others. Each tribe has one term applied indiscriminately\r\nto the man or woman whom he actually marries and to\r\nall whom he might lawfully marry, that is, who belong to the right\r\ngroup: One term to his actual mother and to all the women whom\r\nhis father might lawfully have married.\"\u0026mdash;\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSpencer\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGillen\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003eNative Tribes of Central Australia\u003c/i\u003e, p. 57.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_8_8\" id=\"Footnote_8_8\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_8_8\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[8]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The fact that primitive man is at once an individual and a member\r\nof a group\u0026mdash;that he has as it were two personalities or selves,\r\nan individual self and a clan-self, or \"tribal-self,\" as Clifford called\r\nit,\u0026mdash;is not merely a psychologist\u0027s way of stating things. The Kafir\r\npeople, according to their most recent student, Mr. Dudley Kidd,\r\nhave two distinct words to express these two selves. They call one\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eidhlozi\u003c/i\u003e and other the \u003ci\u003eitongo\u003c/i\u003e. \"The \u003ci\u003eidhlozi\u003c/i\u003e is the individual and\r\npersonal spirit born with each child\u0026mdash;something fresh and unique\r\nwhich is never shared with any one else\u0026mdash;while the \u003ci\u003eitongo\u003c/i\u003e is the ancestral\r\nand corporate spirit which is not personal but tribal, or a thing\r\nof the clan, the possession of which is obtained not by birth but by\r\ncertain initiatory rites. The \u003ci\u003eidhlozi\u003c/i\u003e is personal and inalienable,\r\nfor it is wrapped up with the man\u0027s personality, and at death it\r\nlives near the grave, or goes into the snake or totem of the clan;\r\nbut the \u003ci\u003eitongo\u003c/i\u003e is of the clan, and haunts the living-hut; at death it\r\nreturns to the tribal \u003ci\u003eamatongo\u003c/i\u003e (ancestral spirits). A man\u0027s share\r\nin this clan-spirit (\u003ci\u003eitongo\u003c/i\u003e) is lost when he becomes a Christian, or\r\nwhen he is in any way unfaithful to the interests of the clan, but\r\na man never loses his \u003ci\u003eidhlozi\u003c/i\u003e any more than he ever loses his\r\nindividuality.\"\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eSavage Childhood\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 14 f.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_9_9\" id=\"Footnote_9_9\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_9_9\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[9]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Hearn, \u003ci\u003eThe Aryan Household\u003c/i\u003e, p. 212.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_10_10\" id=\"Footnote_10_10\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_10_10\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[10]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e MacLennan, \u003ci\u003eStudies in Ancient History\u003c/i\u003e, p. 381.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_11_11\" id=\"Footnote_11_11\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_11_11\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[11]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Robertson Smith, \u003ci\u003eKinship and Marriage in Early Arabia\u003c/i\u003e, p. 23.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_12_12\" id=\"Footnote_12_12\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_12_12\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[12]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cited from the Gwentian Code. Seebohm, \u003ci\u003eThe Tribal System in\r\nWales\u003c/i\u003e, p. 104.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_13_13\" id=\"Footnote_13_13\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_13_13\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[13]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e E.g., certain joint responsibilities of husband and wife.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_14_14\" id=\"Footnote_14_14\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_14_14\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[14]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Seebohm, \u003ci\u003eThe Tribal System in Wales\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 103 f.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_15_15\" id=\"Footnote_15_15\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_15_15\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[15]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"From the earliest times, religion, as distinct from magic or sorcery,\r\naddresses itself to kindred and friendly beings, who may indeed\r\nbe angry with their people for a time, but are always placable\r\nexcept to the enemies of their worshippers or to renegade members\r\nof the community. It is not with a vague fear of unknown powers,\r\nbut with a loving reverence for known gods who are knit to their\r\nworshippers by strong bonds of kinship, that religion in the only true\r\nsense of the word begins.\"\u0026mdash;\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRobertson Smith\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eReligion of the\r\nSemites\u003c/i\u003e, p. 54.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_16_16\" id=\"Footnote_16_16\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_16_16\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[16]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Schurtz, \u003ci\u003eAltersklassen und M\u0026auml;nnerb\u0026uuml;nde\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_17_17\" id=\"Footnote_17_17\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_17_17\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[17]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003e\u0026#338;dipus at Colonus\u003c/i\u003e, vv. 186 f.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_18_18\" id=\"Footnote_18_18\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_18_18\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[18]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Dudley Kidd, \u003ci\u003eSavage Childhood\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 74 f.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_37\" id=\"Page_37\"\u003e[Pg 37]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER III\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTHE RATIONALIZING AND SOCIALIZING AGENCIES\r\nIN EARLY SOCIETY\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 1. THREE LEVELS OF CONDUCT\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA young man may enter a profession thinking of it\r\nonly as a means of support. But the work requires foresight\r\nand persistence; it broadens his interests; it develops\r\nhis character. Like Saul, he has gone to search for\r\nasses, he has found a kingdom. Or he may marry on the\r\nbasis of emotional attraction. But the sympathies evoked,\r\nthe co\u0026ouml;peration made necessary, are refining and enlarging\r\nhis life. Both these cases illustrate agencies which\r\nare moral in their results, although not carried on from\r\na consciously moral purpose.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuppose, however, that children are born into the family.\r\nThen the parent consciously sets about controlling\r\ntheir conduct, and in exercising authority almost inevitably\r\nfeels the need of some standard other than caprice\r\nor selfishness. Suppose that in business the partners differ\r\nas to their shares in the profits, then the question of\r\nfairness is raised; and if one partner defaults, the question\r\nof guilt. Or suppose the business encounters a law\r\nwhich forbids certain operations, the problem of justice\r\nwill come to consciousness. Such situations as these are\r\nevidently in the moral sphere in a sense in which those\r\nof the preceding paragraph are not. They demand\r\nsome kind of judgment, some approval or disapproval.\r\nAs Aristotle says, it is not enough to do the acts; it is\r\nnecessary to do them in a certain way,\u0026mdash;not merely to\r\nget the result, but to intend it. The result must be\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_38\" id=\"Page_38\"\u003e[Pg 38]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthought of as in some sense good or right; its opposite as\r\nin some sense bad or wrong.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut notice that the judgments in these cases may follow\r\neither of two methods: (1) The parent or business\r\nman may teach his child, or practice in business, what\r\ntradition or the accepted standard calls for; or (2) he\r\nmay consider and examine the principles and motives\r\ninvolved. Action by the first method is undoubtedly moral,\r\nin one sense. It is judging according to a standard, though\r\nit takes the standard for granted. Action by the second\r\nmethod is moral in a more complete sense. It examines\r\nthe standard as well. The one is the method of \"customary\"\r\nmorality, the other that of reflective morality,\r\nor of conscience in the proper sense.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Three Levels and Their Motives.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We may distinguish\r\nthen three levels of conduct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. Conduct arising from instincts and fundamental\r\nneeds. To satisfy these needs certain conduct is necessary,\r\nand this in itself involves ways of acting which are\r\nmore or less rational and social. The conduct may be \u003ci\u003ein\r\naccordance with\u003c/i\u003e moral laws, though not directed by moral\r\njudgments. We consider this level in the present chapter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. Conduct regulated by \u003ci\u003estandards of society\u003c/i\u003e, for some\r\nmore or less conscious end involving the social welfare.\r\nThe level of custom, which is treated in Chapter IV.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. Conduct regulated by a standard which is both\r\nsocial and rational, which is examined and criticized. The\r\nlevel of conscience. Progress toward this level is outlined\r\nin Chapters V. to VIII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe motives in these levels will show a similar scale.\r\nIn (1) the motives are external to the end gained. The\r\nman seeks food, or position, or glory, or sex gratification;\r\nhe is forced to practice sobriety, industry, courage, gentleness.\r\nIn (2) the motive is to seek some good which is\r\nsocial, but the man acts for the group mainly because he is\r\n\u003ci\u003eof\u003c/i\u003e the group, and does not conceive his own good as dis\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_39\" id=\"Page_39\"\u003e[Pg 39]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etinct\r\nfrom that of the group. His acts are only in part\r\nguided by intelligence; they are in part due to habit\r\nor accident. (3) In full morality a man not only intends\r\nhis acts definitely, he also values them as what he can\r\ndo \"with all his heart.\" He does them \u003ci\u003ebecause\u003c/i\u003e they are\r\nright and good. He chooses them freely and intelligently.\r\nOur study of moral development will consider successively\r\nthese three levels. They all exist in present morality.\r\nOnly the first two are found in savage life. If (1)\r\nexisted alone it was before the group life, which is our\r\nstarting-point in this study. We return now to our consideration\r\nof group life, and note the actual forces which\r\nare at work. We wish to discover the process by which\r\nthe first and second levels prepare the way for the\r\nthird.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Necessary Activities of Existence Start the\r\nProcess.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The prime necessities, if the individual is to\r\nsurvive, are for food, shelter, defense against enemies.\r\nIf the stock is to survive, there must be also reproduction\r\nand parental care. Further, it is an advantage in\r\nthe struggle if the individual can master and acquire,\r\ncan outstrip rivals, and can join forces with others of\r\nhis kind for common ends. To satisfy these needs we find\r\nmen in group life engaged in work, in war or blood feuds,\r\nin games and festal activities, in parental care. They\r\nare getting food and booty, making tools and houses,\r\nconquering or enslaving their enemies, protecting the\r\nyoung, winning trophies, and finding emotional excitement\r\nin contests, dances, and songs. These all help in\r\nthe struggle for existence. But the workmen, warriors,\r\nsingers, parents, are getting more. They are forming\r\ncertain elements of character which, if not necessarily\r\nmoral in themselves, are yet indispensable requisites for\r\nfull morality. We may say therefore that nature is\r\ndoing this part of moral evolution, without the aid\r\nof conscious intention on man\u0027s part. To use the terms\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_40\" id=\"Page_40\"\u003e[Pg 40]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof Chapter I., we may call this a rationalizing and socializing\r\nprocess, though not a conscious moral process.\r\nWe notice some of the more important agencies that are\r\noperative.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 2. RATIONALIZING AGENCIES\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. Work.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The earlier forms of occupation, hunting\r\nand fishing, call for active intelligence, although the activity\r\nis sustained to a great degree by the immediate\r\ninterest or thrill of excitement, which makes them a recreation\r\nto the civilized man. Quickness of perception, alertness\r\nof mind and body, and in some cases, physical daring,\r\nare the qualities most needed. But in the pastoral life,\r\nand still more with the beginning of agriculture and commerce,\r\nthe man who succeeds must have foresight and\r\ncontinuity of purpose. He must control impulse by reason.\r\nHe must organize those habits which are the basis\r\nof character, instead of yielding to the attractions of\r\nvarious pleasures which might lead him from the main\r\npurpose. To a certain extent the primitive communism\r\nacted to prevent the individual from feeling the full\r\nforce of improvidence. Even if he does not secure a supply\r\nof game, or have a large enough flock to provide for the\r\nnecessities of himself and his immediate family, the group\r\ndoes not necessarily permit him to starve. The law\r\n\"Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap\" does\r\nnot press upon him with such relentless grasp as in the\r\nmodern individualistic struggle for existence. Nevertheless\r\nit would be an entirely mistaken view of primitive\r\ngroup life to suppose that it is entirely a lazy man\u0027s\r\nparadise, or happy-go-lucky existence. The varying economic\r\nconditions are important here as measuring the\r\namount of forethought and care required. It is the\r\nshepherd Jacob whose craft outwits Esau the hunter; and\r\nwhile the sympathy of the modern may be with Esau, he\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_41\" id=\"Page_41\"\u003e[Pg 41]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmust remember that forethought like other valuable\r\nweapons may be used in a social as well as a selfish fashion.\r\nThe early Greek appreciation of craft is probably expressed\r\nin their deification of theft and deception in\r\nHermes. Agriculture and commerce, still more than preceding\r\ntypes of occupation, demand thoughtfulness and\r\nthe long look ahead.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003edifferentiation of labor\u003c/i\u003e has been a powerful influence\r\nfor increasing the range of mental life and stimulating\r\nits development. If all do the same thing, all are\r\nmuch alike, and inevitably remain on a low level. But\r\nwhen the needs of men induce different kinds of work,\r\nslumbering capacities are aroused and new ones are called\r\ninto being. The most deeply-rooted differentiation of\r\nlabor is that between the sexes. The woman performs\r\nthe work within or near the dwelling, the man hunts or\r\ntends the flocks or ranges abroad. This probably tends\r\nto accentuate further certain organic differences. Among\r\nthe men, group life in its simplest phases has little differentiation\r\nexcept \"for counsel\" or \"for war.\" But with\r\nmetal working and agricultural life the field widens. At\r\nfirst the specializing is largely by families rather than\r\nby individual choice. Castes of workmen may take the\r\nplace of mere kinship ties. Later on the rules of caste\r\nin turn become a hindrance to individuality and must be\r\nbroken down if the individual is to emerge to full self-direction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. The Arts and Crafts.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Aside from their influence as\r\nwork, the arts and crafts have a distinctly elevating and\r\nrefining effect. The textiles, pottery, and skilfully made\r\ntools and weapons; the huts or houses when artistically\r\nconstructed; the so-called free or fine arts of dance and\r\nmusic, of color and design\u0026mdash;all have this common element:\r\nthey give some visible or audible embodiment for order or\r\nform. The artist or craftsman must make definite his\r\nidea in order to work it out in cloth or clay, in wood\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_42\" id=\"Page_42\"\u003e[Pg 42]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor stone, in dance or song. When thus embodied, it is\r\npreserved, at least for a time. It is part of the daily\r\nenvironment of the society. Those who see or hear are\r\nhaving constantly suggested to them ideas and values\r\nwhich bring more meaning into life and elevate its interests.\r\nMoreover, the order, the rational plan or arrangement\r\nwhich is embodied in all well-wrought objects, as well\r\nas in the fine arts in the narrow sense, deserves emphasis.\r\nPlato and Schiller have seen in this a valuable preparation\r\nfor morality. To govern action by law is moral, but\r\nit is too much to expect this of the savage and the child\r\nas a conscious principle where the law opposes impulse.\r\nIn art as in play there is direct interest and pleasure in\r\nthe act, but in art there is also order or law. In conforming\r\nto this order the savage, or the child, is in\r\ntraining for the more conscious control where the law,\r\ninstead of favoring, may thwart or oppose impulse and\r\ndesire.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. War.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;War and the contests in games were serving\r\nto work out characteristics which received also a definite social\r\nre\u0026euml;nforcement: namely, courage and efficiency, a sense\r\nof power, a consciousness of achievement. All these, like\r\ncraft, may be used for unmoral or even immoral ends,\r\nbut they are also highly important as factors in an\r\neffective moral personality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 3. SOCIALIZING AGENCIES\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCo\u0026ouml;peration and Mutual Aid.\u003c/b\u003e\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_19_19\" id=\"FNanchor_19_19\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_19_19\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[19]\u003c/a\u003e\u0026mdash;Aside from their effects\r\nin promoting intelligence, courage, and ideality of\r\nlife, industry, art, and war have a common factor by\r\nwhich they all contribute powerfully to the social basis of\r\nmorality. They all require co\u0026ouml;peration. They are socializing\r\nas well as rationalizing agencies. Mutual aid is the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_43\" id=\"Page_43\"\u003e[Pg 43]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfoundation of success. \"Woe to him who stands alone, e\u0027en\r\nthough his platter be never so full,\" runs the Slav proverb.\r\n\"He that belongs to no community is like unto one without\r\na hand.\" Those clans or groups which can work\r\ntogether, and fight together, are stronger in the struggle\r\nagainst nature and other men. The common activities\r\nof art have value in making this community of action\r\nmore possible. Co\u0026ouml;peration implies a common end. It\r\nmeans that each is interested in the success of all. This\r\ncommon end forms then a controlling rule of action, and\r\nthe mutual interest means sympathy. Co\u0026ouml;peration is\r\ntherefore one of nature\u0027s most effective agencies for a\r\nsocial standard and a social feeling.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. Co\u0026ouml;peration in Industry.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In industry, while there\r\nwas not in primitive life the extensive exchange of goods\r\nwhich expresses the interdependence of modern men, there\r\nwas yet much concerted work, and there was a great\r\ndegree of community of property. In groups which lived\r\nby hunting or fishing, for instance, although certain kinds\r\nof game might be pursued by the individual hunter, the\r\ngreat buffalo and deer hunts were organized by the tribe\r\nas a whole. \"A hunting bonfire was kindled every morning\r\nat daybreak at which each brave must appear and\r\nreport. The man who failed to do this before the party\r\nset out on the day\u0027s hunt was harassed by ridicule.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_20_20\" id=\"FNanchor_20_20\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_20_20\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[20]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nSalmon fishery was also conducted as a joint undertaking.\r\nLarge game in Africa is hunted in a similar fashion, and\r\nthe product of the chase is not for the individual but for\r\nthe group. In the pastoral life the care of the flocks\r\nand herds necessitates at least some sort of co\u0026ouml;peration\r\nto protect these flocks from the attacks of wild beasts and\r\nfrom the more dreaded forays of human robbers. This\r\nrequires a considerable body of men, and the journeying\r\nabout in company, the sharing together of watch and\r\nward, the common interest in the increase of flocks and\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_44\" id=\"Page_44\"\u003e[Pg 44]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nherds, continually strengthens the bonds between the\r\ndwellers in tents.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the agricultural stage there are still certain forces\r\nat work which promote the family or tribal unity, although\r\nhere we begin to find the forces which make for individuality\r\nat work until they result in individual ownership\r\nand individual property. Just as at the pastoral\r\nstage, so in this, the cattle and the growing grain must\r\nbe protected from attacks by man and beast. It is only\r\nthe group which can afford such protection, and accordingly\r\nwe find the Lowland farmer always at the mercy of\r\nthe Highland clan.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Co\u0026ouml;peration in War.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;War and the blood feud,\r\nhowever divisive between groups, were none the less potent\r\nas uniting factors within the several groups. The members\r\nmust not only unite or be wiped out, when the actual\r\ncontest was on, but the whole scheme of mutual help in\r\ndefense or in avenging injuries and insults made constant\r\ndemand upon fellow feeling, and sacrifice for the good\r\nof all. To gain more land for the group, to acquire\r\nbooty for the group, to revenge a slight done to some\r\nmember of the group, were constant causes for war.\r\nNow although any individual might be the gainer, yet\r\nthe chances were that he would himself suffer even\r\nthough the group should win. In the case of blood\r\nrevenge particularly, most of the group were not individually\r\ninterested. Their resentment was a \"sympathetic\r\nresentment,\" and one author has regarded this as perhaps\r\nthe most fundamental of the sources of moral emotion.\r\nIt was because the tribal blood had been shed, or the\r\nwomen of the clan insulted, that the group as a whole\r\nreacted, and in the clash of battle with opposing groups,\r\nwas closer knit together.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"Ally thyself with whom thou wilt in peace, yet know\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nIn war must every man be foe who is not kin.\"\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"noidt\"\u003e\"Comrades in arms\" by the very act of fighting together\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_45\" id=\"Page_45\"\u003e[Pg 45]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhave a common cause, and by the mutual help and protection\r\ngiven and received become, for the time at least, one\r\nin will and one in heart. Ulysses counsels Agamemnon\r\nto marshal his Greeks, clan by clan and \"brotherhood\r\n(phratry) by brotherhood,\" that thus brother may support\r\nand stimulate brother more effectively; but the effect\r\nis reciprocal, and it is indeed very probable that the\r\nunity of blood which is believed to be the tie binding\r\ntogether the members of the group, is often an afterthought\r\nor pious fiction designed to account for the\r\nunity which was really due originally to the stress of common\r\nstruggle.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. Art as Socializing Agency.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Co\u0026ouml;peration and sympathy\r\nare fostered by the activities of art. Some of these\r\nactivities are spontaneous, but most of them serve some\r\ndefinite social end and are frequently organized for the\r\ndefinite purpose of increasing the unity and sympathy of\r\nthe group. The hunting dance or the war dance represents,\r\nin dramatic form, all the processes of the hunt or\r\nfight, but it would be a mistake to suppose that this takes\r\nplace purely for dramatic purposes. The dance and celebration\r\nafter the chase or battle may give to the whole\r\ntribe the opportunity to repeat in vivid imagination the\r\ntriumphs of the successful hunter or warrior, and thus\r\nto feel the thrill of victory and exult in common over\r\nthe fallen prey. The dance which takes place before\r\nthe event is designed to give magical power to the hunter\r\nor warrior. Every detail is performed with the most exact\r\ncare and the whole tribe is thus enabled to share in the\r\nwork of preparation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the act of song the same uniting force is present.\r\nTo sing with another involves a contagious sympathy,\r\nin perhaps a higher degree than is the case with any\r\nother art. There is, in the first place, as in the dance,\r\na unity of rhythm. Rhythm is based upon co\u0026ouml;peration\r\nand, in turn, immensely strengthens the possibility of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_46\" id=\"Page_46\"\u003e[Pg 46]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nco\u0026ouml;peration. In the bas-reliefs upon the Egyptian monuments\r\nrepresenting the work of a large number of men\r\nwho are moving a stone, we find the sculptured figure of a\r\nman who is beating the time for the combined efforts.\r\nWhether all rhythm has come from the necessities of common\r\naction or whether it has a physiological basis sufficient\r\nto account for the effect which rhythmic action produces,\r\nin any case when a company of people begin to\r\nwork or dance or sing in rhythmic movement, their efficiency\r\nand their pleasure are immensely increased. In\r\naddition to the effect of rhythm we have also in the\r\ncase of song the effect of unity of pitch and of melody,\r\nand the members of the tribe or clan, like those who to-day\r\nsing the Marseillaise or chant the great anthems of the\r\nchurch, feel in the strongest degree their mutual sympathy\r\nand support. For this reason, the Corroborees\r\nof the Australian, the sacred festivals of Israel, the\r\nMysteries and public festivals of the Greeks, in short,\r\namong all peoples, the common gatherings of the tribe for\r\npatriotic or religious purposes, have been attended with\r\ndance and song. In many cases these carry the members\r\non to a pitch of enthusiasm where they are ready to die\r\nfor the common cause.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMelodic and rhythmic sound is a unifying force simply\r\nby reason of form, and some of the simpler songs seem\r\nto have little else to commend them, but at very early\r\nperiods there is not merely the song but the recital, in\r\nmore or less rhythmic or literary form, of the history\r\nof the tribe and the deeds of the ancestors. This adds\r\nstill another to the unifying forces of the dance and song.\r\nThe kindred group, as they hear the recital, live over\r\ntogether the history of the group, thrill with pride at\r\nits glories, suffer at its defeats; every member feels that\r\nthe clan\u0027s history is his history and the clan\u0027s blood his\r\nblood.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_47\" id=\"Page_47\"\u003e[Pg 47]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 4. FAMILY LIFE AS AN IDEALIZING AND SOCIALIZING\r\nAGENCY\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFamily life, so far as it is merely on the basis of instinct,\r\ntakes its place with other agencies favored by\r\nnatural selection which make for more rational and social\r\nexistence. Various instincts are more or less at work.\r\nThe sex instinct brings the man and the woman together.\r\nThe instinct of jealousy, and the property or possessing\r\ninstinct, may foster exclusive and permanent relations.\r\nThe parental instinct and affection bind the parents together\r\nand thus contribute to the formation of the social\r\ngroup described in the preceding chapter. Considering\r\nnow the more immediate relations of husband and wife,\r\nparents and children, rather than the more general group\r\nrelations, we call attention to some of the most obvious\r\naspects, leaving fuller treatment for Part III. The\r\nidealizing influences of the sex instinct, when this is subject\r\nto the general influences found in group life, is\r\nfamiliar. Lyric song is a higher form of its manifestation,\r\nbut even a mute lover may be stimulated to fine\r\nthoughts or brave deeds. Courtship further implies an\r\nadaptation, an effort to please, which is a strong socializing\r\nforce. If \"all the world loves a lover,\" it must be\r\nbecause the lover is on the whole a likable r\u0026ocirc;le. But\r\nother forces come in. Sex love is intense, but so far as\r\nit is purely instinctive it may be transitory. Family life\r\nneeded more permanence than sex attraction could provide,\r\nand before the powerful sanctions of religion, society,\r\nand morals were sufficient to secure permanence, it is\r\nprobable that the property interest of the husband was\r\nlargely effective in building up a family life, requiring\r\nfidelity to the married relation on the part of the wife.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the most far-reaching of the forces at work in\r\nthe family has been the parental instinct and affection\r\nwith its consequences upon both parents and children. It\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_48\" id=\"Page_48\"\u003e[Pg 48]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncontributes probably more than any other naturally\r\nselected agency to the development of the race in sympathy;\r\nit shares with work in the development of responsibility.\r\nIt is indeed one of the great incentives to industry\r\nthroughout the higher species of animals as well as in\r\nhuman life. The value of parental care in the struggle\r\nfor existence is impressively presented by Sutherland.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_21_21\" id=\"FNanchor_21_21\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_21_21\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[21]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nWhereas the fishes which exercise no care for their eggs\r\npreserve their species only by producing these in enormous\r\nnumbers, certain species which care for them maintain\r\ntheir existence by producing relatively few. Many species\r\nproduce hundreds of thousands or even millions of eggs.\r\nThe stickleback, which constructs a nest and guards the\r\nyoung for a few days, is one of the most numerous of\r\nfishes, but it lays only from twenty to ninety eggs. Birds\r\nand mammals with increased parental care produce few\r\nyoung. Not only is parental care a valuable asset, it is\r\nan absolute necessity for the production of the higher\r\nspecies. \"In the fierce competition of the animated forms\r\nof earth, the loftier type, with its prolonged nervous\r\ngrowth, and consequently augmented period of helplessness,\r\ncan never arise but with concomitant increases of\r\nparental care.\" Only as the emotional tendency has kept\r\npace with the nerve development has the human race been\r\npossible. The very refinements in the organism which\r\nmake the adult a victor would render the infant a victim\r\nif it were without an abundance of loving assistance.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_22_22\" id=\"FNanchor_22_22\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_22_22\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[22]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhether, as has been supposed by some, the parental\r\ncare has also been the most effective force in keeping the\r\nparents together through a lengthened infancy, or whether\r\nother factors have been more effective in this particular,\r\nthere is no need to enlarge upon the wide-reaching moral\r\nvalues of parental affection. It is the atmosphere in which\r\nthe child begins his experience. So far as any environ\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_49\" id=\"Page_49\"\u003e[Pg 49]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ement\r\ncan affect him, this is a constant influence for sympathy\r\nand kindness. And upon the parents themselves\r\nits transforming power, in making life serious, in overcoming\r\nselfishness, in projecting thought and hope on\r\ninto the future, cannot be measured. The moral order\r\nand progress of the world might conceivably spare some\r\nof the agencies which man has devised; it could not spare\r\nthis.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 5. MORAL INTERPRETATION OF THIS FIRST LEVEL\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn this first level we are evidently dealing with forces\r\nand conduct, not as moral in purpose, but as valuable\r\nin result. They make a more rational, ideal, and social\r\nlife, and this is the necessary basis for more conscious\r\ncontrol and valuation of conduct. The forces are biological\r\nor sociological or psychological. They are not\r\nthat particular kind of psychological activities which\r\nwe call moral in the proper sense, for this implies not only\r\ngetting a good result but aiming at it. Some of the\r\nactivities, such as those of song and dance, or the simpler\r\nacts of maternal care, have a large instinctive element.\r\nWe cannot call these moral in \u003ci\u003eso far as\u003c/i\u003e they are purely\r\ninstinctive. Others imply a large amount of intelligence,\r\nas, for example, the operations of agriculture and the\r\nvarious crafts. These have purpose, such as to satisfy\r\nhunger, or to forge a weapon against an enemy. But the\r\nend is one set up by our physical or instinctive nature.\r\nSo long as this is merely \u003ci\u003eaccepted\u003c/i\u003e as an end, and not\r\ncompared with others, valued, and \u003ci\u003echosen\u003c/i\u003e, it is not\r\nproperly moral.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe same is true of emotions. There are certain emotions\r\non the instinctive level. Such are parental love in\r\nits most elemental form, sympathy as mere contagious\r\nfeeling, anger, or resentment. So far as these are at this\r\nlowest level, so far as they signify simply a bodily thrill,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_50\" id=\"Page_50\"\u003e[Pg 50]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthey have no claim to proper moral value. They are tremendously\r\nimportant as the source from which strong\r\nmotive forces of benevolence, intelligent parental care, and\r\nan ardent energy against evil may draw warmth and fire.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFinally, even the co\u0026ouml;peration, the mutual aid, which\r\nmen give, so far as it is called out purely by common\r\ndanger, or common advantage, is not in the moral sphere\r\nin so far as it is instinctive, or merely give and take.\r\nTo be genuinely moral there must be some thought of\r\nthe danger as touching others and \u003ci\u003etherefore\u003c/i\u003e requiring our\r\naid; of the advantage as being common and \u003ci\u003etherefore\u003c/i\u003e\r\nenlisting our help.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut even although these processes are not consciously\r\nmoral they are nevertheless fundamental. The activities\r\nnecessary for existence, and the emotions so intimately\r\nbound up with them, are the \"cosmic roots\" of the moral\r\nlife. And often in the higher stages of culture, when\r\nthe codes and instruction of morality and society fail\r\nto secure right conduct, these elementary agencies of\r\nwork, co\u0026ouml;peration, and family life assert their power.\r\nSociety and morality take up the direction of the process\r\nand carry it further, but they must always rely largely\r\non these primary activities to afford the basis for intelligent,\r\nreliable, and sympathetic conduct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBagehot, \u003ci\u003ePhysics and Politics\u003c/i\u003e, 1890; B\u0026uuml;cher, \u003ci\u003eIndustrial Evolution\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nEng. tr., 1901, \u003ci\u003eArbeit und Rythmus\u003c/i\u003e, 3rd ed., 1901; Schurtz, \u003ci\u003eUrgeschichte\r\nder Kultur\u003c/i\u003e, 1900; Fiske, \u003ci\u003eCosmic Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II., \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nCosmic Roots of Love and Self-sacrifice\u003c/i\u003e in Through Nature to God,\r\n1899; Dewey, \u003ci\u003eInterpretation of the Savage Mind\u003c/i\u003e, Psychological Review,\r\nVol. IX., 1892, pp. 217-230; Durkheim, \u003ci\u003eDe la Division du\r\nTravail Social\u003c/i\u003e, 1893; P. Kropotkin, \u003ci\u003eMutual Aid, a Factor in Evolution\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1902; \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRoss\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eFoundations of Society\u003c/i\u003e, 1905, Chap. VII.; Baldwin,\r\nArticle \u003ci\u003eSocionomic Forces\u003c/i\u003e in his Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology;\r\nGiddings, \u003ci\u003eInductive Sociology\u003c/i\u003e, 1901; Small, \u003ci\u003eGeneral Sociology\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1906; Tarde, \u003ci\u003eLes Lois de l\u0027Imitation\u003c/i\u003e, 1895; W. I. Thomas, \u003ci\u003eSex\r\nand Society\u003c/i\u003e, 1907, pp. 55-172; Gummere, \u003ci\u003eThe Beginnings of Poetry\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1901; Hirn, \u003ci\u003eThe Origin of Art\u003c/i\u003e, 1900.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_19_19\" id=\"Footnote_19_19\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_19_19\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[19]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. Kropotkin, \u003ci\u003eMutual Aid a Factor in Evolution\u003c/i\u003e; Bagehot,\r\n\u003ci\u003ePhysics and Politics\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_20_20\" id=\"Footnote_20_20\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_20_20\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[20]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Eastman, \u003ci\u003eIndian Boyhood\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_21_21\" id=\"Footnote_21_21\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_21_21\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[21]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eThe Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct\u003c/i\u003e, Chs. II.-V.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_22_22\" id=\"Footnote_22_22\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_22_22\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[22]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 99.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_51\" id=\"Page_51\"\u003e[Pg 51]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER IV\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nGROUP MORALITY\u0026mdash;CUSTOMS OR MORES\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have seen how the natural forces of instinct\r\nlead to activities which elevate men and knit them together.\r\nWe consider next the means which society\r\nuses for these purposes, and the kind of conduct which\r\ngoes along with the early forms of society\u0027s agencies.\r\nThe organization of early society is that of group life,\r\nand so far as the individual is merged in the group the\r\ntype of conduct may be called \"group morality.\"\r\nInasmuch as the agencies by which the group controls its\r\nmembers are largely those of custom, the morality may be\r\ncalled also \"customary morality.\" Such conduct is what\r\nwe called at the opening of the previous chapter \"the second\r\nlevel.\" It is \"ethical\" or \"moral\" in the sense of conforming\r\nto the \u003ci\u003eethos\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003emores\u003c/i\u003e of the group.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 1. MEANING, AUTHORITY, AND ORIGIN OF CUSTOMS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMeaning of Customs or Mores.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Wherever we find\r\ngroups of men living as outlined in Chapter II., we find\r\nthat there are certain ways of acting which are common\r\nto the group\u0026mdash;\"folkways.\" Some of these may be due\r\nmerely to the fact that the members are born of the same\r\nstock, just as all ducks swim. But a large part of human\r\nconduct, in savage as truly as in civilized life, is not merely\r\ninstinctive. There are \u003ci\u003eapproved\u003c/i\u003e ways of acting, common\r\nto a group, and handed down from generation to generation.\r\nSuch approved ways of doing and acting are\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_52\" id=\"Page_52\"\u003e[Pg 52]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncustoms, or to use the Latin term, which Professor Sumner\r\nthinks brings out more clearly this factor of approval,\r\nthey are \u003ci\u003emores\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_23_23\" id=\"FNanchor_23_23\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_23_23\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[23]\u003c/a\u003e They are habits\u0026mdash;but they are more.\r\nThey imply the judgment of the group that they are to\r\nbe followed. The welfare of the group is regarded as in\r\nsome sense imbedded in them. If any one acts contrary\r\nto them he is made to feel the group\u0027s disapproval. The\r\nyoung are carefully trained to observe them. At times\r\nof special importance, they are rehearsed with special\r\nsolemnity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAuthority Behind the Mores.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The old men, or the\r\npriests, or medicine men, or chiefs, or old women, may\r\nbe the especial guardians of these customs. They may\r\nmodify details, or add new customs, or invent explanations\r\nfor old ones. But the authority back of them is the\r\ngroup in the full sense. Not the group composed merely\r\nof visible and living members, but the larger group which\r\nincludes the dead, and the kindred totemic or ancestral\r\ngods. Nor is it the group considered as a collection of\r\nindividual persons. It is rather in a vague way the whole\r\nmental and social world. The fact that most of the customs\r\nhave no known date or origin makes them seem a part\r\nof the nature of things. Indeed there is more than a\r\nmere analogy between the primitive regard for custom\r\nand that respect for \"Nature\" which from the Stoics to\r\nSpencer has sought a moral standard in living \"according\r\nto nature.\" And there is this much in favor of taking the\r\nworld of custom as the standard: the beings of this system\r\nare like the person who is expected to behave like them;\r\nits rules are the ways in which his own kin have lived and\r\nprospered, and not primarily the laws of cosmic forces,\r\nplants, and animals.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eOrigin of Customs; Luck.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The origin of customs is\r\nto be sought in several concurrent factors. There are in\r\nthe first place the activities induced by the great primi\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_53\" id=\"Page_53\"\u003e[Pg 53]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etive\r\nneeds and instincts. Some ways of acting succeed;\r\nsome fail. Man not only establishes habits of acting in\r\nthe successful ways; he remembers his failures. He hands\r\nsuccessful ways down with his approval; he condemns those\r\nthat fail.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis attitude is re\u0026euml;nforced by the views about good luck\r\nand bad luck. Primitive man\u0026mdash;and civilized man\u0026mdash;is not\r\nruled by a purely rational theory of success and failure.\r\n\"One might use the best known means with the greatest\r\ncare, yet fail of the result. On the other hand, one might\r\nget a great result with no effort at all. One might\r\nalso incur a calamity without any fault of his own.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_24_24\" id=\"FNanchor_24_24\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_24_24\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[24]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\"Grimm gives more than a thousand ancient German\r\napothegms, dicta, and proverbs about \u0027luck.\u0027\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_25_25\" id=\"FNanchor_25_25\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_25_25\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[25]\u003c/a\u003e Both\r\ngood and bad fortune are attributed to the unseen powers,\r\nhence a case of bad luck is not thought of as a mere\r\nchance. If the ship that sailed Friday meets a storm,\r\nor one of thirteen falls sick, the inference is that this is\r\nsure to happen again. And at this point the conception\r\nof the group welfare as bound up with the acts of every\r\nmember, comes in to make individual conformity a matter\r\nfor group concern\u0026mdash;to make conduct a matter of mores and\r\nnot merely a private affair. One most important, if not\r\nthe most important, object of early legislation was the\r\nenforcement of lucky rites to prevent the individual from\r\ndoing what might bring ill luck on all the tribe. For\r\nthe conception always was that the ill luck does not\r\nattach itself simply to the doer, but may fall upon any\r\nmember of the group. \"The act of one member is conceived\r\nto make all the tribe impious, to offend its particular\r\ngod, to expose all the tribe to penalties from heaven.\r\nWhen the street statues of Hermes were mutilated, all the\r\nAthenians were frightened and furious; they thought they\r\nshould all be ruined because some one had mutilated a\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_54\" id=\"Page_54\"\u003e[Pg 54]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ngod\u0027s image and so offended him.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_26_26\" id=\"FNanchor_26_26\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_26_26\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[26]\u003c/a\u003e \"The children were\r\nreproved for cutting and burning embers, on the ground\r\nthat this might be the cause for the accidental cutting\r\nof some member of the family.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_27_27\" id=\"FNanchor_27_27\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_27_27\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[27]\u003c/a\u003e In the third place, besides\r\nthese sources of custom, in the usefulness or lucky\r\ncharacter of certain acts, there is also the more immediate\r\nreaction of individuals or groups to certain ways of acting\r\naccording \"as things jump with the feelings or displease\r\nthem.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_28_28\" id=\"FNanchor_28_28\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_28_28\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[28]\u003c/a\u003e An act of daring is applauded, whether\r\nuseful or not. The individual judgment is caught up, repeated,\r\nand plays its part in the formation of group opinion.\r\n\"Individual impulse and social tradition are thus\r\nthe two poles between which we move.\" Or there may even\r\nbe a more conscious discussion analogous to the action of\r\nlegislatures or philosophic discussion. The old men among\r\nthe Australians deliberate carefully as to each step of the\r\ninitiation ceremonies. They make customs to be handed\r\ndown.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 2. MEANS OF ENFORCING CUSTOMS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe most general means for enforcing customs are public\r\nopinion, taboos, ritual or ceremony, and physical force.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePublic Approval\u003c/b\u003e uses both language and form to express\r\nits judgments. Its praise is likely to be emphasized\r\nby some form of art. The songs that greet the returning\r\nvictor, the decorations, costumes, and tattoos for those\r\nwho are honored, serve to voice the general sentiment. On\r\nthe other hand ridicule or contempt is a sufficient penalty\r\nto enforce compliance with many customs that may be\r\npersonally irksome. It is very largely the ridicule of the\r\nmen\u0027s house which enforces certain customs among the men\r\nof peoples which have that institution. It is the ridicule or\r\nscorn of both men and women which forbids the Indian to\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_55\" id=\"Page_55\"\u003e[Pg 55]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmarry before he has proved his manhood by some notable\r\ndeed of prowess in war or chase.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTaboos.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Taboos are perhaps not so much a means for\r\nenforcing custom, as they are themselves customs invested\r\nwith peculiar and awful sanction. They prohibit or ban\r\nany contact with certain persons or objects under penalty\r\nof danger from unseen beings. Any events supposed\r\nto indicate the activity of spirits, such as birth and death,\r\nare likely to be sanctified by taboos. The danger is contagious;\r\nif a Polynesian chief is taboo, the ordinary man\r\nfears even to touch his footprints. But the taboos are\r\nnot all based on mere dread of the unseen.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"They include such acts as have been found by experience\r\nto produce unwelcome results.\u0026mdash;The primitive taboos correspond\r\nto the fact that the life of man is environed by perils:\r\nHis food quest must be limited by shunning poisonous plants.\r\nHis appetite must be restrained from excess. His physical\r\nstrength and health must be guarded from dangers. The\r\ntaboos carry on the accumulated wisdom of generations which\r\nhas almost always been purchased by pain, loss, disease, and\r\ndeath. Other taboos contain inhibitions of what will be injurious\r\nto the group. The laws about the sexes, about property,\r\nabout war, and about ghosts, have this character. They\r\nalways include some social philosophy.\" (\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSumner\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eFolkways\u003c/i\u003e,\r\npp. 33 f.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThey may be used with conscious purpose. In order\r\nto have a supply of cocoanuts for a religious festival\r\nthe head men may place a taboo upon the young cocoanuts\r\nto prevent them from being consumed before they\r\nare fully ripe. The conception works in certain respects\r\nto supply the purpose which is later subserved by ideas\r\nof property. But it serves also as a powerful agency to\r\nmaintain respect for the authority of the group.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRitual.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;As taboo is the great negative guardian of\r\ncustoms, ritual is the great positive agent. It works by\r\nforming habits, and operates through associations formed\r\nby actually doing certain acts, usually under conditions\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_56\" id=\"Page_56\"\u003e[Pg 56]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich appeal to the emotions. The charm of music and of\r\norderly movement, the impressiveness of ordered masses\r\nin processions, the awe of mystery, all contribute to stamp\r\nin the meaning and value. Praise or blame encourages\r\nor inhibits; ritual secures the actual doing and at the\r\nsame time gives a value to the doing. It is employed by\r\ncivilized peoples more in the case of military or athletic\r\ndrill, or in training children to observe forms of etiquette,\r\nso that these may become \"second nature.\" Certain religious\r\nbodies also use its agency. But in primitive life\r\nit is widely and effectively used to insure for educational,\r\npolitical, and domestic customs obedience to the group\r\nstandards, which among us it secures to the codes of the\r\narmy, or to those of social etiquette. Examples of its\r\nelaborate and impressive use will be given below under\r\neducational ceremonies.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePhysical Force.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;When neither group opinion, nor\r\ntaboo, nor ritual secures conformity, there is always in\r\nthe background physical force. The chiefs are generally\r\nmen of strength whose word may not be lightly disregarded.\r\nSometimes, as among the Sioux, the older braves\r\nconstitute a sort of police. Between different clans the\r\nblood feud is the accepted method of enforcing custom,\r\nunless a substitute, the wergeld, is provided. For homicide\r\nwithin a clan the remaining members may drive the\r\nslayer out, and whoever meets such a Cain may slay him.\r\nIf a man murdered his chief of kindred among the ancient\r\nWelsh he was banished and \"it was required of every\r\none of every sex and age within hearing of the horn\r\nto follow that exile and to keep up the barking of dogs,\r\nto the time of his putting to sea, until he shall have passed\r\nthree score hours out of sight.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_29_29\" id=\"FNanchor_29_29\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_29_29\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[29]\u003c/a\u003e It should be borne in\r\nmind, however, that physical pains, either actual or\r\ndreaded, would go but a little way toward maintaining\r\nauthority in any such group as we have regarded as typi\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_57\" id=\"Page_57\"\u003e[Pg 57]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ecal.\r\nAbsolutism, with all its cruel methods of enforcing\r\nterror, needs a more highly organized system. In primitive\r\ngroups the great majority support the authority of\r\nthe group as a matter of course, and uphold it as a sacred\r\nduty when it is challenged. Physical coercion is not the\r\nrule but the exception.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 3. CONDITIONS WHICH BRING OUT THE IMPORTANCE OF\r\nGROUP STANDARDS AND RENDER GROUP CONTROL\r\nCONSCIOUS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAlthough customs or mores have in them an element of\r\nsocial approval which makes them vehicles of moral judgment,\r\nthey tend in many cases to sink to the level of mere\r\nhabits. The reason\u0026mdash;such as it was\u0026mdash;for their original\r\nforce\u0026mdash;is forgotten. They become, like many of our\r\nforms of etiquette, mere conventions. There are, however,\r\ncertain conditions which center attention upon their importance\r\nand lift them to the level of conscious agencies.\r\nThese conditions may be grouped under three heads. (1)\r\nThe education of the younger, immature members of the\r\ngroup and their preparation for full membership. (2)\r\nThe constraint and restraint of refractory members and\r\nthe adjustment of conflicting interests. (3) Occasions\r\nwhich involve some notable danger or crisis and therefore\r\ncall for the greatest attention to secure the favor of the\r\ngods and avert disaster.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. Educational Customs.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Among the most striking\r\nand significant of these are the initiation ceremonies which\r\nare so widely observed among primitive peoples. They\r\nare held with the purpose of inducting boys into the privileges\r\nof manhood and into the full life of the group. They\r\nare calculated at every step to impress upon the initiate\r\nhis own ignorance and helplessness in contrast with the\r\nwisdom and power of the group; and as the mystery with\r\nwhich they are conducted imposes reverence for the elders\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_58\" id=\"Page_58\"\u003e[Pg 58]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand the authorities of the group, so the recital of the\r\ntraditions and performances of the tribe, the long series\r\nof ritual acts, common participation in the mystic dance\r\nand song and decorations, serve to re\u0026euml;nforce the ties that\r\nbind the tribe.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eInitiation into the full privileges of manhood among the\r\ntribes of Central Australia, for instance, includes three\r\nsets of ceremonies which occupy weeks, and even months,\r\nfor their completion. The first set, called \"throwing up\r\nin the air,\" is performed for the boy when he has reached\r\nthe age of from ten to twelve. In connection with being\r\nthrown up in the air by certain prescribed members of\r\nhis tribe, he is decorated with various totem emblems and\r\nafterward the septum of his nose is bored for the insertion\r\nof the nose-bone. At a period some three or four years\r\nlater a larger and more formidable series of ceremonies is\r\nundertaken, lasting for ten days. A screen of bushes is\r\nbuilt, behind which the boy is kept during the whole period,\r\nunless he is brought out on the ceremonial ground to witness\r\nsome performance. During this whole period of\r\nten days, he is forbidden to speak except in answer to\r\nquestions. He is decorated with various totem emblems,\r\nfor which every detail is prescribed by the council of the\r\ntribal fathers and tribal elder brothers. He is charged to\r\nobey every command and never to tell any woman or boy\r\nwhat he may see. The sense that something out of the\r\nordinary is to happen to him helps to impress him strongly\r\nwith a feeling of the deep importance of compliance with\r\nthe tribal rules, and further still, with a strong sense of\r\nthe superiority of the older men who know and are familiar\r\nwith the mysterious rites of which he is about to learn the\r\nmeaning for the first time. At intervals he watches symbolic\r\nperformances of men decorated like various totem\r\nanimals, who represent the doings of the animal ancestors\r\nof the clan; he hears mysterious sounds of the so-called\r\nbull-roarers, which are supposed by the women and un\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_59\" id=\"Page_59\"\u003e[Pg 59]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003einitiated\r\nto be due to unseen spirits; and the whole ends\r\nwith the operation which symbolizes his induction into\r\nyoung manhood. But even this is not all; when the young\r\nman has reached the age of discretion, when it is felt that\r\nhe can fully comprehend the traditions of the tribe, at the\r\nage of from twenty to twenty-five, a still more impressive\r\nseries of ceremonies is conducted, which in the instance reported\r\nlasted from September to January. This period\r\nwas filled up with dances, \"corroborees,\" and inspection\r\nof the churinga or sacred emblems\u0026mdash;stones or sticks which\r\nwere supposed to be the dwellings of ancestral spirits and\r\nwhich are carefully preserved in the tribe, guarded from\r\nthe sight of women and boys, but known individually\r\nto the elders as the sacred dwelling-place of father or\r\ngrandfather. As these were shown and passed around,\r\ngreat solemnity was manifest and the relatives sometimes\r\nwept at the sight of the sacred object. Ceremonies imitating\r\nvarious totem animals, frequently of the most elaborate\r\nsort, were also performed. The young men were\r\ntold the traditions of the past history of the tribe, and\r\nat the close of the recital they felt added reverence for the\r\nold men who had been their instructors, a sense of pride in\r\nthe possession of this mysterious knowledge, and a deeper\r\nunity because of what they now have in common. One is\r\nat a loss whether to wonder most at the possibility of the\r\nwhole tribe devoting itself for three months to these elaborate\r\nfunctions of initiation, or at the marvelous adaptability\r\nof such ceremonies to train the young into an\r\nattitude of docility and reverence. A tribe that can enforce\r\nsuch a process is not likely to be wanting in one\r\nside, at least, of the moral consciousness, namely, reverence\r\nfor authority and regard for the social welfare.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_30_30\" id=\"FNanchor_30_30\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_30_30\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[30]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Law and Justice.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The occasions for some control\r\nover refractory members will constantly arise, even though\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_60\" id=\"Page_60\"\u003e[Pg 60]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe conflict between group and individual may need no\r\nphysical sanctions to enforce the authority of the group\r\nover its members. The economic motive frequently prompts\r\nan individual to leave the tribe or the joint family.\r\nThere was a constant tendency, Eastman states, among\r\nhis people, when on a hunting expedition in the enemy\u0027s\r\ncountry, to break up into smaller parties to obtain food\r\nmore easily and freely. The police did all they could\r\nto keep in check those parties who were intent on stealing\r\naway. Another illustration of the same tendency is\r\nstated by Maine with reference to the joint families of\r\nthe South Slavonians:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"The adventurous and energetic member of the brotherhood\r\nis always rebelling against its natural communism. He\r\ngoes abroad and makes his fortune, and as strenuously resists\r\nthe demands of his relatives to bring it into the common account.\r\nOr perhaps he thinks that his share of the common\r\nstock would be more profitably employed by him as capital\r\nin a mercantile venture. In either case he becomes a dissatisfied\r\nmember or a declared enemy of the brotherhood.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_31_31\" id=\"FNanchor_31_31\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_31_31\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[31]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOr covetousness might lead to violation of the ban,\r\nas with Achan. Sex impulse may lead a man to seek for\r\nhis wife a woman not in the lawful group. Or, as one of\r\nthe most dangerous offenses possible, a member of the\r\ngroup may be supposed to practice witchcraft. This is\r\nto use invisible powers in a selfish manner, and has been\r\nfeared and punished by almost all peoples.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn all these cases it is of course no abstract theory of\r\ncrime which leads the community to react; it is self-preservation.\r\nThe tribe must be kept together for protection\r\nagainst enemies. Achan\u0027s sin is felt to be the cause\r\nof defeat. The violation of sex taboos may ruin the\r\nclan. The sorcerer may cause disease, or inflict torture\r\nand death, or bring a pestilence or famine upon the whole\r\ngroup. None the less all such cases bring to conscious\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_61\" id=\"Page_61\"\u003e[Pg 61]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eness\r\none aspect of moral authority, the social control over\r\nthe individual.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd it is a \u003ci\u003esocial\u003c/i\u003e control\u0026mdash;not an exercise of brute force\r\nor a mere terrorizing by ghosts. For the chief or judge\r\ngenerally wins his authority by his powerful service to\r\nhis tribesmen. A Gideon or Barak or Ehud or Jephthah\r\njudged Israel because he had delivered them. \"Three\r\nthings, if possessed by a man, make him fit to be a chief\r\nof kindred: That he should speak on behalf of his kin\r\nand be listened to, that he should fight on behalf of his\r\nkin and be feared, and that he should be security on behalf\r\nof his kin and be accepted.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_32_32\" id=\"FNanchor_32_32\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_32_32\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[32]\u003c/a\u003e If, as is often the case, the\r\nking or judge or chief regards himself as acting by divine\r\nright, the authority is still \u003ci\u003ewithin the group\u003c/i\u003e. It is the\r\ngroup judging itself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn its \u003ci\u003estandards\u003c/i\u003e this primitive court is naturally on the\r\nlevel of customary morality, of which it is an agent.\r\nThere is usually neither the conception of a general principle\r\nof justice (our Common Law), nor of a positive law\r\nenacted as the express will of the people. At first the\r\njudge or ruler may not act by any fixed law except that\r\nof upholding the customs. Each decision is then a special\r\ncase. A step in advance is found when the heads or\r\nelders or priests of the tribe decide cases, not independently\r\nof all others, but in accordance with certain precedents or\r\ncustoms. A legal tradition is thus established, which,\r\nhowever imperfect, is likely to be more impartial than the\r\narbitrary caprice of the moment, influenced as such special\r\ndecisions are likely to be by the rank or power of the\r\nparties concerned.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_33_33\" id=\"FNanchor_33_33\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_33_33\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[33]\u003c/a\u003e A law of precedents or tradition is\r\nthus the normal method at this level. The progress toward\r\na more rational standard belongs under the next\r\nchapter, but it is interesting to note that even at an\r\nearly age the myths show a conception of a divine judge\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_62\" id=\"Page_62\"\u003e[Pg 62]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwho is righteous, and a divine judgment which is ideal.\r\nRhadamanthus is an embodiment of the demand for justice\r\nwhich human collisions and decisions awakened.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe conscious authority of the group is also evoked in\r\nthe case of feuds or disputes between its members. The case\r\nof the blood feud, indeed, might well be treated as belonging\r\nunder war and international law rather than as a case\r\nof private conflict. For so far as the members of the\r\nvictim\u0027s clan are concerned, it is a case of war. It is\r\na patriotic duty of every kinsman to avenge the shed\r\nblood. The groups concerned were smaller than modern\r\nnations which go to war for similar reasons, but the principle\r\nis the same. The chief difference in favor of modern\r\ninternational wars is that since the groups are larger\r\nthey do not fight so often and require a more serious\r\nconsideration of the possibility of peaceable adjustment.\r\nOrestes and Hamlet feel it a sacred duty to avenge their\r\nfathers\u0027 murders.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the case is not simply that of clan against clan.\r\nFor the smaller group of kin, who are bound to avenge,\r\nare nearly always part of a larger group. And the larger\r\ngroup may at once recognize the duty of vengeance and\r\nalso the need of keeping it within bounds, or of substituting\r\nother practices. The larger group may see in the\r\nmurder a pollution, dangerous to all;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_34_34\" id=\"FNanchor_34_34\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_34_34\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[34]\u003c/a\u003e the blood which\r\n\"cries from the ground\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_35_35\" id=\"FNanchor_35_35\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_35_35\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[35]\u003c/a\u003e renders the ground \"unclean\"\r\nand the curse of gods or the spirits of the dead may\r\nwork woe upon the whole region. But an unending blood\r\nfeud is likewise an evil. And if the injured kin can be appeased\r\nby less than blood in return, so much the better.\r\nHence the wergeld, or indemnity, a custom which persisted\r\namong the Irish until late, and seemed to the English\r\njudges a scandalous procedure.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor lesser offenses a sort of regulated duel is sometimes\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_63\" id=\"Page_63\"\u003e[Pg 63]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nallowed. For example, among the Australians the incident\r\nis related of the treatment of a man who had eloped\r\nwith his neighbor\u0027s wife. When the recreant parties returned\r\nthe old men considered what should be done, and\r\nfinally arranged the following penalty. The offender\r\nstood and called out to the injured husband, \"I stole your\r\nwoman; come and growl.\" The husband then proceeded to\r\nthrow a spear at him from a distance, and afterwards to\r\nattack him with a knife, although he did not attempt to\r\nwound him in a vital part. The offender was allowed\r\nto evade injury, though not to resent the attack. Finally\r\nthe old men said, \"Enough.\" A curious form of private\r\nagencies for securing justice is also found in the Japanese\r\ncustom of hara-kiri, according to which an injured man\r\nkills himself before the door of his offender, in order that\r\nhe may bring public odium upon the man who has injured\r\nhim. An Indian custom of Dharna is of similar significance,\r\nthough less violent. The creditor fasts before the\r\ndoor of the debtor until he either is paid, or dies of starvation.\r\nIt may be that he thinks that his double or spirit\r\nwill haunt the cruel debtor who has thus permitted him\r\nto starve to death, but it also has the effect of bringing\r\npublic opinion to bear.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn all these cases of kindred feuds there is little\r\npersonal responsibility, and likewise little distinction between\r\nthe accidental and intentional. These facts are\r\nbrought out in the opening quotations in Chapter II. The\r\nimportant thing for the student to observe is that like\r\nour present practices in international affairs they show a\r\n\u003ci\u003egrade\u003c/i\u003e of morality, a limited social unity, whether it is\r\ncalled kinship feeling or patriotism; complete morality is\r\nnot possible so long as there is no complete way of settling\r\ndisputes by justice instead of force.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_36_36\" id=\"FNanchor_36_36\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_36_36\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[36]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_64\" id=\"Page_64\"\u003e[Pg 64]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. Occasions Which Involve Some Special Danger or\r\nCrisis.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Such occasions call for the greatest attention\r\nto secure success or avoid disaster. Under this head we\r\nnote as typical (a) the occasions of birth, marriage,\r\ndeath; (b) seed time and harvest, or other seasons important\r\nfor the maintenance of the group; (c) war; (d)\r\nhospitality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(a) Birth and Death Customs.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The entrance of a\r\nnew life into the world and the disappearance of the animating\r\nbreath (\u003ci\u003espiritus\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eanima\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003epsyche\u003c/i\u003e), might well impress\r\nman with the mysteries of his world. Whether the\r\nnewborn infant is regarded as a reincarnation of an\r\nancestral spirit as with the Australians, or as a new creation\r\nfrom the spirit world as with the Kafirs, it is a time\r\nof danger. The mother must be \"purified,\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_37_37\" id=\"FNanchor_37_37\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_37_37\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[37]\u003c/a\u003e the child,\r\nand in some cases the father, must be carefully guarded.\r\nThe elaborate customs show the group judgment of the\r\nimportance of the occasion. And the rites for the dead\r\nare yet more impressive. For as a rule the savage has no\r\nthought of an entire extinction of the person. The dead\r\nlives on in some mode, shadowy and vague, perhaps, but\r\nhe is still potent, still a member of the group, present\r\nat the tomb or the hearth. The preparation of the body\r\nfor burial or other disposition, the ceremonies of interment\r\nor of the pyre, the wailing, and mourning costumes,\r\nthe provision of food and weapons, or of the favorite\r\nhorse or wife, to be with the dead in the unseen world, the\r\nperpetual homage paid\u0026mdash;all these are eloquent. The event,\r\nas often as it occurs, appeals by both sympathy and awe\r\nto the common feeling, and brings to consciousness the\r\nunity of the group and the control exercised by its\r\njudgments.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe regulations for marriage are scarcely less important;\r\nindeed, they are often seemingly the most important\r\nof the customs. The phrases \"marriage by capture\" and\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_65\" id=\"Page_65\"\u003e[Pg 65]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\"marriage by purchase,\" are quite misleading if they give\r\nthe impression that in early culture any man may have\r\nany woman. It is an almost universal part of the clan\r\nsystem that the man must marry out of his own clan or\r\ntotem (exogamy), and it is frequently specified exactly\r\ninto what other clan he must marry. Among some the\r\nregulations are minute as to which of the age classes, as\r\nwell as to which of the kin groups, a man of specific group\r\nmust choose from. The courtship may follow different\r\nrules from ours, and the relation of the sexes in certain\r\nrespects may seem so loose as to shock the student, but\r\nthe regulation is in many respects stricter than with\r\nus, and punishment of its violation often severer. There\r\ncan be no doubt of the meaning of the control, however mistaken\r\nsome of its features. Whether the regulations for\r\nexogamy, which provide so effectually for avoiding incest,\r\nare reinforced by an instinctive element of aversion to sex\r\nrelations with intimates, is uncertain; in any case, they are\r\nenforced by the strongest taboos. Nor does primitive society\r\nstop with the negative side. The actual marriage is\r\ninvested with the social values and religious sanctions which\r\nraise the relation to a higher level. Art, in garments and\r\nornament, in dance and epithalamium, lends ideal values.\r\nThe sacred meal at the encircled hearth secures the participation\r\nof the kindred gods.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(b) Certain Days or Seasons Important for the Industrial\r\nLife.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Seed time and harvest, the winter and summer\r\nsolstices, the return of spring, are of the highest\r\nimportance to agricultural and pastoral peoples, and are\r\nwidely observed with solemn rites. Where the rain is\r\nthe center of anxiety, a whole ritual may arise in connection\r\nwith it, as among the Zu\u0026ntilde;i Indians. Ceremonies\r\nlasting days, involving the preparation of special symbols\r\nof clouds and lightning, and the participation of\r\nnumerous secret fraternities, constrain the attention of\r\nall. Moreover, this constraint of need, working through\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_66\" id=\"Page_66\"\u003e[Pg 66]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe conception of what the gods require, enforces some\r\nvery positive moral attitudes:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"A Zu\u0026ntilde;i must speak with one tongue (sincerely) in order to\r\nhave his prayers received by the gods, and unless his prayers\r\nare accepted no rains will come, which means starvation. He\r\nmust be gentle, and he must speak and act with kindness to all,\r\nfor the gods care not for those whose lips speak harshly. He\r\nmust observe continence four days previous to, and four days\r\nfollowing, the sending of breath prayers through the spiritual\r\nessence of plume offerings, and thus their passions are brought\r\nunder control.\" (\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMrs. M. C. Stevenson\u003c/span\u003e in 23d Report,\r\n\u003ci\u003eBureau of Ethnology\u003c/i\u003e.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePhases of the moon give other sacred days. Sabbaths\r\nwhich originally are negative\u0026mdash;the forbidding of labor\u0026mdash;may\r\nbecome later the bearers of positive social and spiritual\r\nvalue. In any case, all these festivals bring the group\r\nauthority to consciousness, and by their ritual promote\r\nthe intimate group sympathy and consciousness of a common\r\nend.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(c) War.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;War as a special crisis always brings out\r\nthe significance and importance of certain customs. The\r\ndeliberations, the magic, the war paint which precede, the\r\nobedience compelled by it to chiefs, the extraordinary\r\npowers exercised by the chief or heads at such crises, the\r\nsense of danger which strains the attention, all insure\r\nattention. No carelessness is permitted. Defeat is interpreted\r\nas a symbol of divine anger because of a violated\r\nlaw or custom. Victory brings all together to celebrate\r\nthe glory of the clan and to mourn in common the warriors\r\nslain in the common cause. Excellence here may be so\r\nconspicuous in its service, or in the admiration it calls\r\nout, as to become a general term for what the group\r\napproves. So the \u003ci\u003earet\u0026#275;\u003c/i\u003e of the Greeks became their general\r\nterm, and the Latin \u003ci\u003evirtus\u003c/i\u003e, if not so clearly military,\r\nwas yet largely military in its early coloring. The \"spirit\r\nof Jehovah,\" the symbol of divine approval and so of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_67\" id=\"Page_67\"\u003e[Pg 67]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ngroup approval, was believed to be with Samson and Jephthah\r\nin their deeds of prowess in Israel\u0027s behalf.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(d) Hospitality.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;To the modern man who travels without\r\nfear and receives guests as a matter of almost daily\r\npractice, it may seem strained to include hospitality along\r\nwith unusual or critical events. But the ceremonies observed\r\nand the importance attached to its rites, show that\r\nhospitality was a matter of great significance; its customs\r\nwere among the most sacred.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"But as for us,\" says Ulysses to the Cyclops, \"we have\r\nlighted here, and come to these thy knees, if perchance they\r\nwill give us a stranger\u0027s gift, or make any present, as is the\r\ndue of strangers. Nay, lord, have regard to the gods, for we\r\nare thy suppliants, and Zeus is the avenger of suppliants and\r\nsojourners, Zeus, the god of the stranger, who fareth in the\r\ncompany of reverend strangers.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe duty of hospitality is one of the most widely\r\nrecognized. Westermarck has brought together a series\r\nof maxims from a great variety of races which show this\r\nforcibly.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_38_38\" id=\"FNanchor_38_38\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_38_38\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[38]\u003c/a\u003e Indians, Kalmucks, Greeks, Romans, Teutons,\r\nArabs, Africans, Ainos, and other peoples are drawn upon\r\nand tell the same story. The stranger is to be respected\r\nsacredly. His person must be guarded from insult even\r\nif the honor of the daughter of the house must be sacrificed.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_39_39\" id=\"FNanchor_39_39\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_39_39\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[39]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\"Jehovah preserveth the sojourners,\" and they\r\nare grouped with the fatherless and the widow in Israel\u0027s\r\nlaw.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_40_40\" id=\"FNanchor_40_40\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_40_40\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[40]\u003c/a\u003e The Romans had their \u003ci\u003edii hospitales\u003c/i\u003e and the \"duties\r\ntoward a guest were even more stringent than those toward\r\na relative\"\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eprimum tutel\u0026aelig;\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003edelude hospiti\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003edeinde clienti\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003etum cognato\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003epostea affini\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_41_41\" id=\"FNanchor_41_41\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_41_41\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[41]\u003c/a\u003e \"He who has a spark of\r\ncaution in him,\" says Plato, \"will do his best to pass\r\nthrough life without sinning against the stranger.\" And\r\nthere is no doubt that this sanctity of the guest\u0027s person\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_68\" id=\"Page_68\"\u003e[Pg 68]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwas not due to pure kindness. The whole conduct of group\r\nlife is opposed to a general spirit of consideration for\r\nthose outside. The word \"guest\" is akin to \u003ci\u003ehostis\u003c/i\u003e, from\r\nwhich comes \"hostile.\" The stranger or the guest was\r\nlooked upon rather as a being who was specially potent.\r\nHe was a \"live wire.\" He might be a medium of blessing,\r\nor he might be a medium of hurt. But it was highly\r\nimportant to fail in no duty toward him. The definite\r\npossibility of entertaining angels unawares might not be\r\nalways present to consciousness, but there seems reason to\r\nbelieve that the possibility of good luck or bad luck\r\nas attending on a visitor was generally believed in. It is\r\nalso plausible that the importance attached to sharing a\r\nmeal, or to bodily contact, is based on magical ideas of\r\nthe way in which blessing or curse may be communicated.\r\nTo cross a threshold or touch a tent-rope or to eat \"salt,\"\r\ngives a sacred claim. In the right of asylum, the refugee\r\ntakes advantage of his contact with the god. He lays\r\nhold of the altar and assumes that the god will protect\r\nhim. The whole practice of hospitality is thus the converse\r\nof the custom of blood revenge. They are alike sacred\u0026mdash;or\r\nrather the duty of hospitality may protect even the man\r\nwhom the host is bound to pursue. But, whereas the one\r\nmakes for group solidarity by acts of exclusive and hostile\r\ncharacter, the other tends to set aside temporarily the\r\ndivision between the \"we-group\" and the \"others-group.\"\r\nUnder the sanction of religion it keeps open a way of communication\r\nwhich trade and other social interchange will\r\nwiden. It adds to family and the men\u0027s house a powerful\r\nagency in maintaining at least the possibility of humaneness\r\nand sympathy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 4. VALUES AND DEFECTS OF CUSTOMARY MORALITY\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese have been suggested, in the main, in the description\r\nof the nature of custom and its regulation of conduct.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_69\" id=\"Page_69\"\u003e[Pg 69]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nWe may, however, summarize them as a preparation for\r\nthe next stage of morality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. The Forming of Standards.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;There is a standard,\r\na \"good,\" a \"right,\" which is to some degree rational\r\nand to some degree social. We have seen that custom rests\r\nin part on rational conceptions of welfare. It is really\r\nnothing against this that a large element of luck enters\r\ninto the idea of welfare. For this means merely that the\r\nactual conditions of welfare are not understood. The next\r\ngeneration may be able to point out as equally absurd our\r\npresent ignorance about health and disease. The members\r\nof the group embodied in custom what they thought\r\nto be important; they were approving some acts and forbidding\r\nor condemning others; they were using the elders,\r\nand the wisdom of all the past, in order to govern life.\r\nSo far, then, they were acting morally. They were also,\r\nto a degree, using a rational and social standard when they\r\nmade custom binding on all, and conceived its origin as\r\nimmemorial. When further they conceived it as approved\r\nby the gods, they gave it all the value they knew how to\r\nput into it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe standards and valuations of custom are, however,\r\nonly partly rational. Many customs are irrational; some\r\nare injurious. But in them all the habitual is a large,\r\nif not the largest, factor. And this is often strong enough\r\nto resist any attempt at rational testing. Dr. Arthur\r\nSmith tells us of the advantage it would be in certain parts\r\nof China to build a door on the south side of the house\r\nin order to get the breeze in hot weather. The simple\r\nand sufficient answer to such a suggestion is, \"We don\u0027t\r\nbuild doors on the south side.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAn additional weakness in the character of such irrational,\r\nor partly rational standards, is the misplaced energy\r\nthey involve. What is merely trivial is made as important\r\nand impressive as what has real significance.\r\nTithing mint, anise, and cummin is quite likely to involve\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_70\" id=\"Page_70\"\u003e[Pg 70]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nneglect of the weightier matters of the law. Moral life\r\nrequires men to estimate the value of acts. If the irrelevant\r\nor the petty is made important, it not only prevents\r\na high level of value for the really important act,\r\nit loads up conduct with burdens which keep it back;\r\nit introduces elements which must be got rid of later, often\r\nwith heavy loss of what is genuinely valuable. When there\r\nare so many ways of offending the gods and when these\r\nturn so often upon mere observance of routine or formula,\r\nit may require much subsequent time and energy to make\r\namends. The morals get an expiatory character.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. The Motives.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In the motives to which it appeals,\r\ncustom is able to make a far better showing than earlier\r\nwriters, like Herbert Spencer, gave it credit for. It doubtless\r\nemploys fear in its taboos; it doubtless enlists the\r\npassion of resentment in its blood feuds. Even these are\r\nmodified by a social environment. For the fear of violating\r\na taboo is in part the fear of bringing bad luck\r\non the whole group, and not merely on the violator. We\r\nhave, therefore, a quasi-social fear, not a purely instinctive\r\nreaction. The same is true in perhaps a stronger\r\ndegree of the resentments. The blood revenge is in a\r\nmajority of cases not a personal but a group affair. It\r\nis undertaken at personal risk and for others\u0027 interest\u0026mdash;or\r\nrather for a common interest. The resentment is thus a\r\n\"\u003ci\u003esympathetic resentment\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_42_42\" id=\"FNanchor_42_42\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_42_42\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[42]\u003c/a\u003e Regarded as a mere reaction\r\nfor self-preservation this instinctive-emotional process is\r\nunmoral. As a mere desire to produce pain it would be immoral.\r\nBut so far as it implies an attitude of reacting\r\nfrom a general point of view and to aid others, it is moral.\r\nAside from the passions of fear and resentment, however,\r\nthere is a wide range of motives enlisted. Filial and parental\r\naffection, some degree of affection between the sexes\r\nover and above sex passion, respect for the aged and the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_71\" id=\"Page_71\"\u003e[Pg 71]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbeings who embody ideals however crude, loyalty to fellow\r\nclansmen,\u0026mdash;all these are not only fostered but actually secured\r\nby the primitive group. But the motives which\r\nimply reflection\u0026mdash;reverence for duty as the imperious law\r\nof a larger life, sincere love of what is good for its\r\nown sake\u0026mdash;cannot be brought to full consciousness until\r\nthere is a more definite conception of a moral authority, a\r\nmore definite contrast between the one great good and the\r\npartial or temporary satisfactions. The development of\r\nthese conceptions requires a growth in individuality; it\r\nrequires conflicts between authority and liberty, and those\r\ncollisions between private interests and the public welfare\r\nwhich a higher civilization affords.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. The Content.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;When we consider the \"what\" of\r\ngroup and customary morality we note at once that the\r\nfactors which make for the idealizing and expansion of interests\r\nare less in evidence than those which make for a common\r\nand social interest and satisfaction. There is indeed, as\r\nwe have noted, opportunity for memory and fancy. The\r\ntraditions of the past, the myths, the cultus, the folk songs\u0026mdash;these\r\nkeep up a mental life which is as genuinely valued\r\nas the more physical activities. But as the mode of life in\r\nquestion does not evoke the more abstractly rational activities\u0026mdash;reasoning,\r\nselecting, choosing\u0026mdash;in the highest degree,\r\nthe ideals lack reach and power. It needs the incentives\r\ndescribed in the following chapters to call out a true\r\nlife of the spirit. The social aspects of the \"what,\" on the\r\nother hand, are well rooted in group morality. It is unnecessary\r\nto repeat what has been dwelt upon in the\r\npresent and preceding chapters so fully. We point out now\r\nthat while the standard is social, it is unconsciously rather\r\nthan consciously social. Or perhaps better: it is a standard\r\nof society but not a standard which each member deliberately\r\nmakes his own. He takes it as a matter of course.\r\nHe is in the clan, \"with the gang\"; he thinks and acts\r\naccordingly. He cannot begin to be as selfish as a modern\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_72\" id=\"Page_72\"\u003e[Pg 72]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nindividualist; he simply hasn\u0027t the imagery to conceive such\r\nan exclusive good, nor the tools with which to carry it out.\r\nBut he cannot be as broadly social either. He may not be\r\nable to sink so low as the civilized miser, or debauchee, or\r\ncriminal, but neither can he conceive or build up the character\r\nwhich implies facing opposition. The moral hero\r\nachieves full stature only when he pits himself against\r\nothers, when he recognizes evil and fights it, when he \"overcomes\r\nthe world.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4. Organization of Character.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In the organization of\r\nstable character the morality of custom is strong on one\r\nside. The group trains its members to act in the ways it\r\napproves and afterwards holds them by all the agencies in\r\nits power. It forms habits and enforces them. Its weakness\r\nis that the element of habit is so large, that of freedom\r\nso small. It holds up the average man; it holds back\r\nthe man who might forge ahead. It is an anchor, and a\r\ndrag.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMuch of the literature at the close of Chapters II. and III., particularly\r\nthe works of Spencer and Gillen and Schurtz, belongs here\r\nalso. Schoolcraft, \u003ci\u003eIndian Tribes\u003c/i\u003e, 1851-57; Eastman, \u003ci\u003eIndian Boyhood\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1902. Papers on various cults of North American Indians in reports\r\nof the \u003ci\u003eBureau of Ethnology\u003c/i\u003e, by Stevenson, 8th, 1886-87; Dorsey, 11th,\r\n1889-90; Fewkes, 15th, 1893-94, 21st, 1899-1900; Fletcher, 22nd,\r\n1900-01; Stevenson, 23d, 1901-02; Kidd, \u003ci\u003eSavage Childhood\u003c/i\u003e, 1906;\r\n\u003ci\u003eThe Essential Kaffir\u003c/i\u003e, 1904; Skeat, \u003ci\u003eMalay Magic\u003c/i\u003e, 1900; N. W. Thomas,\r\ngeneral editor of Series, \u003ci\u003eThe Native Races of the British Empire\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1907-; Barton, \u003ci\u003eA Sketch of Semitic Origins\u003c/i\u003e, 1902; Harrison, \u003ci\u003eProlegomena\r\nto the Study of Greek Religion\u003c/i\u003e, 1903; Reinach, \u003ci\u003eCultes,\r\nMythes et Religions\u003c/i\u003e, 2 vols., 1905; Frazer, \u003ci\u003eThe Golden Bough\u003c/i\u003e, 3\r\nvols., 1900; Marett, \u003ci\u003eIs Taboo Negative Magic?\u003c/i\u003e in Anthropological\r\nEssays, presented to E. B. Tylor, 1907; Crawley, \u003ci\u003eThe Mystic Rose\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1902; Spencer, \u003ci\u003eSociology\u003c/i\u003e, 1876-96; Clifford, \u003ci\u003eOn the Scientific Basis of\r\nMorals\u003c/i\u003e in Lectures and Essays, 1886; Maine, \u003ci\u003eEarly History of Institutions\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1888; \u003ci\u003eEarly Law and Custom\u003c/i\u003e, 1886; Post, \u003ci\u003eDie Grundlagen\r\ndes Rechts und die Grundz\u0026uuml;ge seiner Entwicklungsgeschichte\u003c/i\u003e, 1884;\r\n\u003ci\u003eEthnologische Jurisprudenz\u003c/i\u003e, 1894-95; Pollock and Maitland, \u003ci\u003eHistory\r\nof English Law\u003c/i\u003e, 1899; Steinmetz, \u003ci\u003eEthnologische Studien zur ersten\r\nEntwicklung der Strafe\u003c/i\u003e, 1894.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_23_23\" id=\"Footnote_23_23\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_23_23\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[23]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e W. G. Sumner, \u003ci\u003eFolkways\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_24_24\" id=\"Footnote_24_24\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_24_24\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[24]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Sumner, \u003ci\u003eFolkways\u003c/i\u003e, p. 6.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_25_25\" id=\"Footnote_25_25\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_25_25\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[25]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 11.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_26_26\" id=\"Footnote_26_26\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_26_26\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[26]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Bagehot, \u003ci\u003ePhysics and Politics\u003c/i\u003e, p. 103.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_27_27\" id=\"Footnote_27_27\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_27_27\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[27]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Eastman, \u003ci\u003eIndian Boyhood\u003c/i\u003e, p. 31.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_28_28\" id=\"Footnote_28_28\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_28_28\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[28]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Hobhouse, \u003ci\u003eMorals in Evolution\u003c/i\u003e, Part I., p. 16. Hume pointed out\r\nthis twofold basis of approval.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_29_29\" id=\"Footnote_29_29\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_29_29\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[29]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Seebohm, \u003ci\u003eThe Tribal System of Wales\u003c/i\u003e, p. 59.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_30_30\" id=\"Footnote_30_30\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_30_30\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[30]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The account is based on Spencer and Gillen, \u003ci\u003eThe Native Tribes\r\nof Central Australia\u003c/i\u003e, chs. vii.-ix.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_31_31\" id=\"Footnote_31_31\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_31_31\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[31]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Maine\u0027s \u003ci\u003eEarly Law and Custom\u003c/i\u003e, p. 264.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_32_32\" id=\"Footnote_32_32\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_32_32\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[32]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eWelsh Triads\u003c/i\u003e, cited by Seebohm, op. cit., p. 72.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_33_33\" id=\"Footnote_33_33\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_33_33\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[33]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Post, \u003ci\u003eGrundlagen des Rechts\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 45 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_34_34\" id=\"Footnote_34_34\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_34_34\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[34]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Deuteronomy 21:1-9; Numbers 35:33, 34.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_35_35\" id=\"Footnote_35_35\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_35_35\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[35]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Genesis 4:10-12; Job 16:18.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_36_36\" id=\"Footnote_36_36\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_36_36\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[36]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e On the subject of early justice Westermarck, \u003ci\u003eThe Origin and\r\nDevelopment of Moral Ideas\u003c/i\u003e, ch. vii. ff.; Hobhouse, \u003ci\u003eMorals in\r\nEvolution\u003c/i\u003e, Part I., ch. ii.; Pollock and Maitland, \u003ci\u003eHistory of English\r\nLaw\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_37_37\" id=\"Footnote_37_37\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_37_37\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[37]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Leviticus, ch. xii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_38_38\" id=\"Footnote_38_38\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_38_38\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[38]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"The Influence of Magic on Social Relationships\" in \u003ci\u003eSociological\r\nPapers\u003c/i\u003e, II., 1905. Cf. also Morgan, \u003ci\u003eHouse-life\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_39_39\" id=\"Footnote_39_39\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_39_39\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[39]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Genesis 19:8; Judges 19:23, 24.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_40_40\" id=\"Footnote_40_40\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_40_40\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[40]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Psalms 146:9; Deuteronomy 24:14-22.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_41_41\" id=\"Footnote_41_41\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_41_41\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[41]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Gellius, in Westermarck, op. cit., p. 155.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_42_42\" id=\"Footnote_42_42\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_42_42\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[42]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Westermarck regards this as one of the fundamental elements\r\nin the beginnings of morality.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_73\" id=\"Page_73\"\u003e[Pg 73]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER V\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nFROM CUSTOM TO CONSCIENCE; FROM GROUP\r\nMORALITY TO PERSONAL MORALITY\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 1. CONTRAST AND COLLISION\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. What the Third Level Means.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Complete morality\r\nis reached only when the individual recognizes the right or\r\nchooses the good freely, devotes himself heartily to its fulfillment,\r\nand seeks a progressive social development in which\r\nevery member of society shall share. The group morality\r\nwith its agencies of custom set up a standard, but one that\r\nwas corporate rather than personal. It approved and disapproved,\r\nthat is it had an idea of good, but this did not\r\nmean a good that was personally valued. It enlisted its\r\nmembers, but it was by drill, by pleasure and pain, and by\r\nhabit, rather than by fully voluntary action. It secured\r\nsteadiness by habit and social pressure, rather than by\r\nchoices built into character. It maintained community of\r\nfeeling and action, but of the unconscious rather than the\r\ndefinitely social type. Finally it was rather fitted to maintain\r\na fixed order than to promote and safeguard progress.\r\nAdvance then must (1) substitute some rational method of\r\nsetting up standards and forming values, in place of habitual\r\npassive acceptance; (2) secure voluntary and personal\r\nchoice and interest, instead of unconscious identification\r\nwith the group welfare, or instinctive and habitual response\r\nto group needs; (3) encourage at the same time individual\r\ndevelopment and the demand that all shall share in this\r\ndevelopment\u0026mdash;the worth and happiness of the person and\r\nof \u003ci\u003eevery\u003c/i\u003e person.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_74\" id=\"Page_74\"\u003e[Pg 74]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Collisions Involved.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Such an advance brings\r\nto consciousness two collisions. The oppositions were\r\nthere before, but they were not felt as oppositions. So\r\nlong as the man was fully with his group, or satisfied\r\nwith the custom, he would make no revolt. When the\r\nmovement begins the collisions are felt. These collisions\r\nare:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(1) The collision between the authority and interests of\r\nthe group, and the independence and private interests of\r\nthe individual.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) The collision between order and progress, between\r\nhabit and reconstruction or reformation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is evident that there is a close connection between\r\nthese two collisions; in fact, the second becomes in practice\r\na form of the first. For we saw in the last chapter that\r\ncustom is really backed and enforced by the group, and its\r\nmerely habitual parts are as strongly supported as those\r\nparts which have a more rational basis. It would perhaps\r\nbe conceivable that a people should move on all together,\r\nworking out a higher civilization in which free thought\r\nshould keep full reverence for social values, in which political\r\nliberty should keep even pace with the development of\r\ngovernment, in which self-interest should be accompanied\r\nby regard for the welfare of others, just as it may be possible\r\nfor a child to grow into full morality without a period\r\nof \"storm and stress.\" But this is not usual. Progress\r\nhas generally cost struggle. And the first phase of this\r\nstruggle is opposition between the individual and the\r\ngroup. The self-assertive instincts and impulses were present\r\nin group life, but they were in part undeveloped because\r\nthey had not enough stimulus to call them out. A man\r\ncould not develop his impulse for possession to its full extent\r\nif there was little or nothing for him to possess. In\r\npart they were not developed because the group held them\r\nback, and the conditions of living and fighting favored\r\nthose groups which did keep them back. Nevertheless they\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_75\" id=\"Page_75\"\u003e[Pg 75]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwere present in some degree, always contending against the\r\nmore social forces. Indeed what makes the opposition between\r\ngroup and individual so strong and so continuous is\r\nthat both the social and the individual are rooted in human\r\nnature. They constitute what Kant calls the \u003ci\u003eunsocial sociableness\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof man. \"Man cannot get on with his fellows and\r\nhe cannot do without them.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIndividualism.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The assertion by the individual of his\r\nown opinions and beliefs, his own independence and interests,\r\nas over against group standards, authority, and interests,\r\nis known as individualism. It is evident that such\r\nassertion will always mark a new level of conduct. Action\r\nmust now be personal and voluntary. It is also evident\r\nthat it may be either better or worse than the level of custom\r\nand group life. The first effect is likely to be, in appearance\r\nat least, a change for the worse. The old restraints are\r\ntossed aside; \"creeds outworn\" no longer steady or direct;\r\nthe strong or the crafty individual comes to the fore and\r\nexploits his fellows. Every man does what is \"right in his\r\nown eyes.\" The age of the Sophists in Greece, of the Renaissance\r\nin Italy, of the Enlightenment and Romantic\r\nmovement in western Europe, and of the industrial revolution\r\nin recent times illustrate different phases of individualism.\r\nA people, as well as an individual, may \"go to\r\npieces\" in its reaction against social authority and custom.\r\nBut such one-sided individualism is almost certain to call\r\nout prophets of a new order; \"organic filaments\" of new\r\nstructures appear; family, industry, the state, are organized\r\nanew and upon more voluntary basis. Those who accept\r\nthe new conditions and assume responsibility with\r\ntheir freedom, who direct their choices by reason instead of\r\npassion, who \"aim at justice and kindness\" as well as at\r\nhappiness, become moral persons and gain thereby new\r\nworth and dignity. While, then, the general movement is on\r\nthe whole a movement of individualism, it demands just as\r\nnecessarily, if there is to be moral progress, a \u003ci\u003erecon\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_76\" id=\"Page_76\"\u003e[Pg 76]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003estructed\r\nindividual\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;a person who is individual in choice,\r\nin feeling, in responsibility, and at the same time social in\r\nwhat he regards as good, in his sympathies, and in his purposes.\r\nOtherwise individualism means progress toward the\r\nimmoral.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 2. SOCIOLOGICAL AGENCIES IN THE TRANSITION\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe agencies which bring about the change from customary\r\nand group morality to conscious and personal\r\nmorality are varied. Just as character is developed in\r\nthe child and young man by various means, sometimes\r\nby success, sometimes by adversity or loss of a parent,\r\nsometimes by slow increase in knowledge, and sometimes\r\nby a sudden right-about-face with a strong emotional basis,\r\nso it is with peoples. Some, like the Japanese at the present,\r\nare brought into sudden contact with the whole set of\r\ncommercial and military forces from without. Among\r\nothers, as with the Greeks, a fermentation starts within,\r\nalong intellectual, economic, political, and religious lines.\r\nOr again, national calamities may upset all the old values,\r\nas with the Hebrews. But we may note four typical agencies\r\nwhich are usually more or less active.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. Economic Forces.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The action of economic forces in\r\nbreaking up the early kinship group or joint family may\r\nbe noticed in the history of many peoples. The clan flourishes\r\nin such conditions of hunting life or of simple agriculture\r\nas were found among Australians and Indians, or\r\namong the Celts in Ireland and the Scottish Highlands.\r\nIt cannot survive when a more advanced state of agriculture\r\nprevails. A certain amount of individualism will appear\r\nwherever the advantage for the individual lies in separate\r\nindustry and private ownership. If buffalo was to\r\nbe hunted it was better to pool issues, but for smaller game\r\nthe skilful or persistent huntsman or shepherd will think\r\nhe can gain more by working for himself. This is intensi\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_77\" id=\"Page_77\"\u003e[Pg 77]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003efied\r\nwhen agriculture and commerce take the place of\r\nearlier modes of life. The farmer has to work so hard and\r\nlong, his goal is so far in the future, that differences of\r\ncharacter show themselves much more strongly. Hunting\r\nand fishing are so exciting, and the reward is so near, that\r\neven a man who is not very industrious will do his part.\r\nBut in agriculture only the hard and patient worker gets\r\na reward and he does not like to share it with the lazy, or\r\neven with the weaker. Commerce, bargaining, likewise puts\r\na great premium on individual shrewdness. And for a\r\nlong time commerce was conducted on a relatively individual\r\nbasis. Caravans of traders journeyed together for\r\nmutual protection but there was not any such organization\r\nas later obtained, and each individual could display\r\nhis own cunning or ability. Moreover commerce leads to\r\nthe comparison of custom, to interchange of ideas as well\r\nas goods. All this tends to break down the sanctity of\r\ncustoms peculiar to a given group. The trader as well as\r\nthe guest may overstep the barriers set up by kin. The\r\nearly Greek colonists, among whom a great individualistic\r\nmovement began, were the traders of their day. The parts\r\nof Europe where most survives of primitive group life are\r\nthose little touched by modern commerce.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut we get a broader view of economic influences if we\r\nconsider the methods of organizing industry which have\r\nsuccessively prevailed. In early society, and likewise in\r\nthe earlier period of modern civilization, the family was a\r\ngreat economic unit. Many or most of the industries could\r\nbe advantageously carried on in the household. As in the\r\ncases cited above (p. 60) the stronger or adventurous member\r\nwould be constantly trying to strike out for himself.\r\nThis process of constant readjustment is, however, far less\r\nthoroughgoing in its effects on mores than the three great\r\nmethods of securing a broader organization of industry.\r\nIn primitive society large enterprises had to be carried on\r\nby the co-operation of the group. Forced labor as used\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_78\" id=\"Page_78\"\u003e[Pg 78]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nby the Oriental civilizations substituted a method by which\r\ngreater works like the pyramids or temples could be built,\r\nbut it brought with it the overthrow of much of the old\r\ngroup sympathies and mutual aid. In Greece and Rome\r\nslavery did the drudgery and left the citizens free to cultivate\r\nart, letters, and government. It gave opportunity\r\nand scope for the few. Men of power and genius arose,\r\nand at the same time all the negative forces of individualism\r\nasserted themselves. In modern times capitalism is the\r\nmethod for organizing industry and trade. It proves\r\nmore effective than forced labor or slavery in securing\r\ncombination of forces and in exploiting natural resources.\r\nIt likewise gives extraordinary opportunities for the rise\r\nof men of organizing genius. The careers of \"captains\r\nof industry\" are more fascinating than those of old-time\r\nconquerors because they involve more complex situations,\r\nand can utilize the discoveries and labors of more men. But\r\nmodern capitalism has been as destructive to the morality\r\nof the Middle Ages, or even of a hundred years ago, as\r\nwas forced labor or slavery to the group life and mores\r\nwhich they destroyed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. The Progress of Science and the Arts.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The effect\r\nof the progress of science and intelligence upon the mores\r\nis direct. Comparisons of the customs of one people with\r\nthose of another bring out differences, and arouse questions\r\nas to the reasons for such diversity. And we have\r\nseen that there is more or less in the customs for which no\r\nreason can be given. Even if there was one originally\r\nit has been forgotten. Or again, increasing knowledge of\r\nweather and seasons, of plants and animals, of sickness\r\nand disease, discredits many of the taboos and ceremonials\r\nwhich the cruder beliefs had regarded as essential\r\nto welfare. Certain elements of ritual may survive under\r\nthe protection of \"mysteries,\" but the more enlightened\r\nportion of the community keeps aloof. Instead of the\r\nmores with their large infusion of the accidental, the ha\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_79\" id=\"Page_79\"\u003e[Pg 79]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ebitual,\r\nand the impulsive, increasing intelligence demands\r\nsome rational rule of life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd science joins with the various industrial and fine\r\narts to create a new set of interests for the individual.\r\nAny good piece of workmanship, any work of art however\r\nsimple, is twice blest. It blesses him that makes and him\r\nthat uses or enjoys. The division of labor, begun in group\r\nlife, is carried further. Craftsmen and artists develop\r\nincreasing individuality as they construct temples or palaces,\r\nfashion statues or pottery, or sing of gods and heroes.\r\nTheir minds grow with what they do. Side by side with\r\nthe aspect of art which makes it a bond of society is the\r\naspect which so frequently makes the skilled workman the\r\ncritic, and the artist a law to himself. In the next place\r\nnote the effect on those who can use and enjoy the products\r\nof the arts. A new world of satisfaction and happiness is\r\nopened which each person can enter for himself. In cruder\r\nconditions there was not much out of which to build up\r\nhappiness. Food, labor, rest, the thrill of hunt or contest,\r\nthe passion of sex, the pride in children\u0026mdash;these made up the\r\ninterests of primitive life. Further means of enjoyment were\r\nfound chiefly in society of the kin, or in the men\u0027s house.\r\nBut as the arts advanced the individual could have made\r\nfor him a fine house and elaborate clothing. Metal, wood,\r\nand clay minister to increasing wants. A permanent and\r\nstately tomb makes the future more definite. The ability\r\nto hand down wealth in durable form places a premium on\r\nits acquirement. Ambition has more stuff to work with.\r\nA more definite, assertive self is gradually built up.\r\n\"Good\" comes to have added meaning with every new\r\nwant that awakes. The individual is not satisfied any\r\nlonger to take the group\u0027s valuation. He wants to get his\r\nown good in his own way. And it will often seem to him\r\nthat he can get his own good most easily and surely\r\neither by keeping out of the common life or by using\r\nhis fellow men to his own advantage. Men of culture\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_80\" id=\"Page_80\"\u003e[Pg 80]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhave frequently shown their selfishness in the first way;\r\nmen of wealth in the second. An aristocracy of culture,\r\nor birth, or wealth may come to regard the whole\r\nprocess of civilization as properly ministering to the wants\r\nof the select few. Nearly every people which has developed\r\nthe arts and sciences has developed also an aristocracy.\r\nIn the ancient world slavery was a part of the process. In\r\nmodern times other forms of exploitation may serve the\r\npurpose better. Individualism, released from the ties\r\nwhich bound up the good of one with the good of all, tends\r\nto become exclusive and selfish; civilization with all its opportunities\r\nfor increasing happiness and increasing life\r\nhas its moral risks and indirectly, at least, its moral evils.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese evils may appear as the gratification of sense and\r\nappetite and thus may be opposed to the higher life of the\r\nspirit, which needs no outer objects or luxuries. Or they\r\nmay appear as rooted in selfishness, in the desire for gratifying\r\nthe exclusive self of material interests or ambition,\r\nas over against sympathy, justice, and kindness, which\r\nmark a broadly human and social life. In both cases serious\r\nmen have sought to overcome by some form of \"self-denial\"\r\nthe evils that attend on civilization, even if they are\r\nnot due to it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. Military Forces.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The kinship group is a protection\r\nso long as it has to contend only with similar groups. The\r\nheadlong valor and tribal loyalty of German or Scottish\r\nclans may even win conflicts with more disciplined troops\r\nof Rome or England. But permanent success demands\r\nhigher organization than the old clans and tribes permitted.\r\nOrganization means authority, and a single directing,\r\ncontrolling commander or king. As Egypt, Assyria,\r\nPh\u0026#339;nicia show their strength the clans of Israel cry, \"Nay,\r\nbut we will have a king over us; that we may also be like all\r\nthe nations; and that our king may judge us, and go out\r\nbefore us, and fight our battles.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_43_43\" id=\"FNanchor_43_43\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_43_43\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[43]\u003c/a\u003e Wars afford the oppor\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_81\" id=\"Page_81\"\u003e[Pg 81]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etunity\r\nfor the strong and unscrupulous leader to assert\r\nhimself. Like commerce they may tend also to spread culture\r\nand thus break down barriers of ancient custom. The\r\nconquests of Babylon and Alexander, the Crusades and the\r\nFrench Revolution, are instances of the power of military\r\nforces to destroy old customs and give individualism new\r\nscope. In most cases, it is true, it is only the leader or \"tyrant\"\r\nwho gets the advantage. He uses the whole machinery\r\nof society for his own elevation. Nevertheless\r\ncustom and group unity are broken for all. Respect for\r\nlaw must be built new from the foundation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4. Religious Forces.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;While in general religion is a\r\nconservative agency, it is also true that a new religion or\r\na new departure in religion has often exercised a powerful\r\ninfluence on moral development. The very fact that religion\r\nis so intimately bound up with all the group mores\r\nand ideals, makes a change in religion bear directly on\r\nold standards of life. The collision between old and new\r\nis likely to be fundamental and sharp. A conception of\r\nGod may carry with it a view of what conduct is pleasing\r\nto him. A doctrine as to the future may require a certain\r\nmode of life. A cultus may approve or condemn certain\r\nrelations between the sexes. Conflicting religions may then\r\nforce a moral attitude in weighing their claims. The contests\r\nbetween Jehovah and Baal, between Orphic cults and\r\nthe public Greek religion, between Judaism and Christianity,\r\nChristianity and Roman civilization, Christianity\r\nand Germanic religion, Catholicism and Protestantism,\r\nhave brought out moral issues. We shall notice this factor\r\nespecially in Chapters VI. and VIII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 3. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AGENCIES\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe psychological forces which tend toward individualism\r\nhave been already stated to be the self-assertive instincts\r\nand impulses. They are all variations of the effort\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_82\" id=\"Page_82\"\u003e[Pg 82]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the living being first to preserve itself and then to rise\r\nto more complicated life by entering into more complex\r\nrelations and mastering its environment. Spinoza\u0027s \"\u003ci\u003esui\r\nesse conservare\u003c/i\u003e,\" Schopenhauer\u0027s \"will to live,\" Nietzsche\u0027s\r\n\"will to power,\" the Hebrew\u0027s passionate ideal of \"life\",\r\nand Tennyson\u0027s \"More life, and fuller\" express in varying\r\ndegree the meaning of this elemental bent and process.\r\nGrowing intelligence adds to its strength by giving\r\ngreater capacity to control. Starting with organic needs,\r\nthis developing life process may find satisfactions in\r\nthe physical world in the increasing power and mastery\r\nover nature gained by the explorer or the hunter, the discoverer,\r\nthe craftsman, or the artist. It is when it enters\r\nthe world of persons that it displays a peculiar intensity\r\nthat marks the passions of individualism \u003ci\u003epar excellence\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nWe note four of these tendencies toward self-assertion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. Sex.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The sex instinct and emotion occupies a peculiar\r\nposition in this respect. On the one hand it is a\r\npowerful socializing agency. It brings the sexes together\r\nand is thus fundamental to the family. But on the other\r\nhand it is constantly rebelling against the limits and conventions\r\nestablished by the social group for its regulation.\r\nThe statutes against illicit relations, from the codes of\r\nHammurabi and Moses to the latest efforts for stricter\r\ndivorce, attest the collision between the individual\u0027s inclination\r\nand the will of the group. Repeatedly some passion\r\nof sex has broken over all social, legal, and religious sanctions.\r\nIt has thus been a favorite theme of tragedy from\r\nthe Greeks to Ibsen. It finds another fitting medium in\r\nthe romance. It has called into existence and maintains\r\nin every large city an outcast colony of wretched creatures,\r\nand the evils which attend are not limited in their results\r\nto those who knowingly take the risks. It has worked repeated\r\nchanges in the structure of the family authorized\r\nby society. Its value and proper regulation were points\r\nat issue in that wide-reaching change of mores attendant\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_83\" id=\"Page_83\"\u003e[Pg 83]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nupon the Reformation, and apparently equilibrium has not\r\nyet been reached.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. The Demand for Possession and Private Property.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In\r\nthe primitive group we have seen that there might be\r\nprivate property in tools or weapons, in cattle or slaves.\r\nThere was little private property in land under the maternal\r\nclan; and indeed in any case, so long as the arts were\r\nundeveloped, private property had necessary limits. The\r\ndemand for private property is a natural attendant upon\r\nindividual modes of industry. As we have said, it was a\r\ncommon principle that what the group produced was owned\r\nby the group, and what the individual made or captured\r\nwas treated as his. When individual industry came to\r\ncount for more, the individual claimed more and more as\r\nprivate possession.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe change from the maternal clan to the paternal\r\nfamily or household was a re\u0026euml;nforcement to the individual\r\ncontrol of property. The father could hand down his cattle\r\nor his house to his son. The joint family of India is\r\nindeed a type of a paternal system. Nevertheless the\r\ntendency is much stronger to insist on individual property\r\nwhere the father\u0027s goods pass to his son than where they go\r\nto his sister\u0027s children.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe chiefs or rulers were likely to gain the right of private\r\nproperty first. Among certain families of the South\r\nSlavs to-day, the head has his individual eating utensils,\r\nthe rest share. Among many people the chiefs have cattle\r\nwhich they can dispose of as they will; the rest have simply\r\ntheir share of the kin\u0027s goods. The old Brehon laws of\r\nIreland show this stage.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut however it comes about, the very meaning of property\r\nis, in the first place, exclusion of others from some\r\nthing which I have. It is therefore in so far necessarily\r\nopposed to group unity, opposed to any such simple solidarity\r\nof life as we find in group morality. As the American\r\nIndian accepts land in severalty, the old group life,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_84\" id=\"Page_84\"\u003e[Pg 84]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe tribal restraints and supports, the group custom and\r\nmoral unity that went with it, are gone. He must find a\r\nnew basis or go to pieces.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. Struggles for Mastery or Liberty.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In most cases\r\nthese cannot be separated from economic struggles. Masters\r\nand slaves were in economic as well as personal relations,\r\nand nearly all class contests on a large scale have\r\nhad at least one economic root, whatever their other\r\nsources. But the economic is not their only root. There\r\nhave been wars for glory or for liberty as well as for\r\nterritory or booty or slaves. As the struggle for existence\r\nhas bred into the race the instinct of self-defense\r\nwith its emotion of anger, the instinct to rivalry and\r\nmastery, and the corresponding aversion to being ruled,\r\nso the progress of society shows trials of strength between\r\nman and man, kin and kin, tribe and tribe. And while,\r\nas stated in the preceding chapter, the co\u0026ouml;peration made\r\nnecessary in war or feud is a uniting force, there is\r\nanother side to the story. Contests between individuals\r\nshow who is master; contests between groups tend to\r\nbring forward leaders. And while such masterful men\r\nmay serve the group they are quite as likely to find\r\nan interest in opposing group customs. They assert an\r\nindependence of the group, or a mastery over it, quite incompatible\r\nwith the solidarity of the kinship clan, although\r\nthe patriarchal type of household under a strong head\r\nmay be quite possible. There comes to be one code for\r\nrich and another for poor, one for Patricians and another\r\nfor Plebs, one for baron and another for peasant, one for\r\ngentry and another for the common folk. For a time this\r\nmay be accepted patiently. But when once the rich become\r\narrogant, the feudal lord insolent, the bitter truth is faced\r\nthat the customs have become mere conventions. They no\r\nlonger hold. All the old ties are cast off. The demand for\r\nfreedom and equality rises, and the collision between authority\r\nand liberty is on.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_85\" id=\"Page_85\"\u003e[Pg 85]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOr the contest may be for intellectual liberty\u0026mdash;for free\r\nthought and free speech. It is sometimes considered that\r\nsuch liberty meets its strongest opponent in the religious\r\nor ecclesiastical organization. There is no doubt a conservative\r\ntendency in religion. As we have pointed out,\r\nreligion is the great conservator of group values and group\r\nstandards. Its ritual is most elaborate, its taboos most\r\nsacred. Intellectual criticism tends to undermine what is\r\noutgrown or merely habitual here as elsewhere. Rationalism\r\nor free thought has set itself in frequent opposition\r\nlikewise to what has been claimed to be \"above reason.\"\r\nNevertheless it would be absurd to attribute all the individualism\r\nto science and all the conservatism to religion.\r\nScientific dogmas and \"idols\" are hard to displace. Schools\r\nare about as conservative as churches. And on the other\r\nhand the struggle for religious liberty has usually been\r\ncarried on not by the irreligious but by the religious. The\r\nprophet Amos found himself opposed by the religious organization\r\nof his day when he urged social righteousness,\r\nand the history of the noble army of martyrs is a record\r\nof appeal to individual conscience, or to an immediate personal\r\nrelation to God, as over against the formal, the traditional,\r\nthe organized religious customs and doctrines of\r\ntheir age. The struggle for religious toleration and religious\r\nliberty takes its place side by side with the struggles\r\nfor intellectual and political liberty in the chapters\r\nof individualism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4. The Desire for Honor, or Social Esteem.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;James,\r\nin his psychology of the self, calls the recognition which\r\na man gets from his mates his \"social self.\" \"We are not\r\nonly gregarious animals, liking to be in sight of our fellows,\r\nbut we have an innate propensity to get ourselves\r\nnoticed, and noticed favorably by our kind. No more fiendish\r\npunishment could be devised, were such a thing physically\r\npossible, than that one should be turned loose in\r\nsociety and remain absolutely unnoticed by all the members\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_86\" id=\"Page_86\"\u003e[Pg 86]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthereof.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_44_44\" id=\"FNanchor_44_44\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_44_44\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[44]\u003c/a\u003e From such a punishment \"the cruelest bodily\r\ntortures would be a relief; for this would make us feel that\r\nhowever bad might be our plight, we had not sunk to such\r\ndepth as to be unworthy of attention at all.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_45_45\" id=\"FNanchor_45_45\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_45_45\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[45]\u003c/a\u003e Honor or\r\nfame is a name for one of the various \"social selves\" which\r\na man may build up. It stands for what those of a given\r\ngroup may think or say of him. It has a place and a\r\nlarge place in group life. Precedence, salutations, decorations\r\nin costume and bodily ornament, praises in song\r\nfor the brave, the strong, the cunning, the powerful, with\r\nridicule for the coward or the weakling are all at work.\r\nBut with the primitive group the difference between men\r\nof the group is kept within bounds. When more definite\r\norganization of groups for military or civil purposes begins,\r\nwhen the feudal chief gathers his retainers and\r\nbegins to rise above the rest of the community in strength,\r\nfinally when the progress of the arts gives greater means\r\nfor display, the desire for recognition has immensely\r\ngreater scope. It is increased by the instinct of emulation;\r\nit often results in envy and jealousies. It becomes then a\r\npowerful factor in stimulating individualism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut while desires for honor and fame provoke individualism,\r\nthey carry with them, like desires for property and\r\npower, elements that make for reconstruction of the social\r\non a higher level. For honor implies some common sentiment\r\nto which the individual can make appeal. Group members\r\npraise or blame what accords with their feeling or desire,\r\nbut they do not act as individuals merely, praising\r\nwhat pleases them as individuals. They react more or less\r\ncompletely from the group point of view; they honor the\r\nman who embodies the group-ideal of courage, or other admirable\r\nand respected qualities. And here comes the\r\nmotive which operates to force a better ideal than mere\r\ndesire of praise. No group honors the man who is definitely\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_87\" id=\"Page_87\"\u003e[Pg 87]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nseeking merely its applause rather than its approval\u0026mdash;at\r\nleast not after it has found him out. The force of public\r\nopinion is therefore calculated to elicit a desire to be\r\n\u003ci\u003eworthy\u003c/i\u003e of honor, as well as to be honored. This means a\r\ndesire to act as a true social individual, for it is only the\r\ntrue member of the group,\u0026mdash;true clansman,\u0026mdash;true patriot,\u0026mdash;true\r\nmartyr,\u0026mdash;who appeals to the other members when\r\nthey judge as members, and not selfishly. When now the\r\ngroup whose approval is sought is small, we have class\r\nstandards, with all the provincialism, narrowness, and\r\nprejudice that belong to them. As the honor-seeker is\r\nmerely after the opinion of his class, he is bound to be\r\nonly partly social. So long as he is with his kin, or his\r\nset, or his \"gang,\" or his \"party,\" or his \"union,\" or\r\nhis \"country\"\u0026mdash;regardless of any wider appeal\u0026mdash;he is\r\nbound to be imperfectly rational and social in his conduct.\r\nThe great possibilities of the desire for honor,\r\nand of the desire to be worthy of honor, lie then in the\r\nconstant extension of the range. The martyr, the seeker\r\nfor truth, the reformer, the neglected artist, looks for\r\nhonor from posterity; if misjudged or neglected, he appeals\r\nto mankind. He is thus forming for himself an\r\nideal standard. And if he embodies this ideal standard\r\nin a personal, highest possible judging companion, his\r\ndesire to be worthy of approval takes a religious form.\r\nHe seeks \"the honor that is from God.\" Though \"the\r\ninnermost of the empirical selves of a man is a self\r\nof the \u003ci\u003esocial\u003c/i\u003e sort, it yet can find its only adequate \u003ci\u003esocius\u003c/i\u003e\r\nin an ideal world.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_46_46\" id=\"FNanchor_46_46\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_46_46\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[46]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe moral value of these three forces of individualism\r\nwas finely stated by Kant:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"The means which nature uses to bring about the development\r\nof all the capacities she has given man is their \u003ci\u003eantagonism\u003c/i\u003e\r\nin society, in so far as this antagonism becomes in the end\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_88\" id=\"Page_88\"\u003e[Pg 88]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ea cause of social order. Men have an inclination to \u003ci\u003eassociate\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthemselves, for in a social state they feel themselves more\r\ncompletely men: i.e., they are conscious of the development\r\nof their natural capacities. But they have also a great propensity\r\nto \u003ci\u003eisolate\u003c/i\u003e themselves, for they find in themselves at the\r\nsame time this unsocial characteristic: each wishes to direct\r\neverything solely according to his own notion, and hence\r\nexpects resistance, just as he knows that he is inclined to resist\r\nothers. It is just this resistance which awakens all man\u0027s\r\npowers; this brings him to overcome his propensity to indolence,\r\nand drives him through the lust for honor, power, or\r\nwealth to win for himself a rank among his fellowmen. Man\u0027s\r\nwill is for concord, but nature knows better what is good for\r\nthe species, and she wills discord. He would like a life of\r\ncomfort and pleasure; nature wills that he be dragged out of\r\nidleness and inactive content, and plunged into labor and\r\ntrouble in order that he may find out the means of extricating\r\nhimself from his difficulties. The natural impulses which\r\nprompt this effort, the sources of unsociableness and of the\r\nmutual conflict from which so many evils spring, are then\r\nspurs to a more complete development of man\u0027s powers.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_47_47\" id=\"FNanchor_47_47\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_47_47\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[47]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have spoken of the \"forces\" which tend to break\r\ndown the old unity of the group and bring about new\r\norganization. But of course these forces are not impersonal.\r\nSometimes they seem to act like the ocean\r\ntide, pushing silently in, and only now and then sending\r\na wave a little higher than its fellows. Frequently, however,\r\nsome great personality stands out pre\u0026euml;minent, either\r\nas critic of the old or builder of the new. The prophets\r\nwere stoned because they condemned the present; the next\r\ngeneration was ready to build their sepulchers. Socrates\r\nis the classic example of the great man who perishes in\r\nseeking to find a rational basis to replace that of custom.\r\nIndeed, this conflict\u0026mdash;on the one hand, the rigid system of\r\ntradition and corporate union hallowed by all the sanctions\r\nof religion and public opinion; upon the other, the individual\r\nmaking appeal to reason, or to his conscience, or to\r\na \"higher law\"\u0026mdash;is the tragedy of history.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_89\" id=\"Page_89\"\u003e[Pg 89]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 4. POSITIVE RECONSTRUCTION\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt must not be supposed that the moral process stops\r\nat the points indicated under the several divisions of this\r\nlast section. As already stated, if the people really\r\nworks out a higher type of conscious and personal morality,\r\nit means not only a more powerful individual, but\r\na reconstructed individual and a reconstructed society.\r\nIt means not only the disintegration of the old kinship or\r\nfamily group, which is an economic, political, and religious\r\nunity as well. It means the construction of a new\r\nbasis for the family; new moral principles for business;\r\na distinct political state with new means for government,\r\nnew conceptions of authority and liberty; finally, a national\r\nor universal religion. And the individual must on\r\nthis higher level choose all these voluntarily. More than\r\nthis: as he chooses in the presence of the new conflicting\r\nends presented by individualism, he sets up or adopts a\r\nstandard for himself. He thinks definitely of what is\r\n\"good\" and \"right.\" As he recognizes its claim, he is\r\nresponsible as well as free. As he identifies himself heartily\r\nwith it, he becomes sincerely and genuinely moral. Reverence,\r\nduty, and love for what is good become the\r\nquickening emotions. Thoughtfulness, self-control, aspiration\r\ntoward an ideal, courageous venturing in its achievement,\r\nkindness and justice, become the dominant temper,\r\nor at least are recognized as the temper that should\r\nbe dominant. The conception of moral character and\r\nmoral personality is brought to consciousness. The development\r\nof the Hebrews and Greeks will show how these\r\npositive values emerge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eKant\u0027s Principles of Politics\u003c/i\u003e, tr. by Hastie, 1891, especially the\r\nessay \u003ci\u003eThe Idea of a Universal Cosmopolitical History\u003c/i\u003e; Hegel,\r\n\u003ci\u003ePhi\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_90\" id=\"Page_90\"\u003e[Pg 90]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003elosophy of History\u003c/i\u003e, tr. by Sibree, 1881; Darwin, \u003ci\u003eThe Descent of\r\nMan\u003c/i\u003e, 1871, 1882-87; Schurman, \u003ci\u003eThe Ethical Import of Darwinism\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1888; Seth, \u003ci\u003eThe Evolution of Morality\u003c/i\u003e, Mind, XIV., 1889, pp. 27-49;\r\nWilliams, \u003ci\u003eA Review of Systems of Ethics founded on the Theory\r\nof Evolution\u003c/i\u003e, 1893; Harris, \u003ci\u003eMoral Evolution\u003c/i\u003e, 1895; Tufts, \u003ci\u003eOn Moral\r\nEvolution\u003c/i\u003e, in Studies in Philosophy and Psychology (\u003ci\u003eGarman Commemorative\r\nVolume\u003c/i\u003e), 1906; Ihering, \u003ci\u003eDer Kampf ums Recht\u003c/i\u003e; Simcox,\r\n\u003ci\u003eNatural Law\u003c/i\u003e, 1877; Sorley, \u003ci\u003eEthics of Naturalism\u003c/i\u003e, 1885.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_43_43\" id=\"Footnote_43_43\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_43_43\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[43]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e 1 Sam. 8:19, 20.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_44_44\" id=\"Footnote_44_44\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_44_44\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[44]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003ePsychology\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., ch. x.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_45_45\" id=\"Footnote_45_45\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_45_45\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[45]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 293 f.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_46_46\" id=\"Footnote_46_46\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_46_46\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[46]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e James, \u003ci\u003ePsychology\u003c/i\u003e, I., 316.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_47_47\" id=\"Footnote_47_47\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_47_47\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[47]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIdea of a Universal Cosmopolitical History.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_91\" id=\"Page_91\"\u003e[Pg 91]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER VI\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTHE HEBREW MORAL DEVELOPMENT\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 1. GENERAL CHARACTER AND DETERMINING PRINCIPLES\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. The Hebrew and the Greek.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The general character\r\nof the Hebrew moral development may be brought\r\nout by a contrast with that of the Greeks.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_48_48\" id=\"FNanchor_48_48\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_48_48\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[48]\u003c/a\u003e While many\r\nphases are common, there is yet a difference in emphasis\r\nand focus. There were political and economic forces at\r\nwork in Israel, and religious forces in Greece. Nevertheless,\r\nthe moral life in one people kept close to the religious,\r\nand in the other found independent channels. Conscientious\r\nconduct for the Hebrew centered in doing the\r\nwill of God; for the Greek, in finding rational standards\r\nof good. For the Hebrew, righteousness was the typical\r\ntheme; for the Greek, the ideal lay rather in measure\r\nand harmony. For the Greek, wisdom or insight was\r\nthe chief virtue; for the Hebrew, the fear of the Lord\r\nwas the beginning of wisdom. The social ideal of the\r\nHebrews was the kingdom of God; of the Greeks, a political\r\nState. If we distinguish in conscience two aspects,\r\nthoughtfulness in discovering what to do and hearty desire\r\nto do the right when found, then the Greeks emphasize\r\nthe former, the Hebrews the latter. Intellect plays a\r\nlarger part with the Greek; emotion and the voluntary\r\naspect of will with the Hebrew. Feeling plays its part\r\nwith the Greeks largely as an \u0026aelig;sthetic demand for measure\r\nand harmony; with the Hebrews it is chiefly prominent\r\nin motivation, where it is an element in what is called\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_92\" id=\"Page_92\"\u003e[Pg 92]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\"the heart,\" or it functions in appreciation of acts performed,\r\nas the joy or sorrow felt when God approves or\r\ncondemns. Both peoples are interesting for our study,\r\nnot only as illustrating different kinds of moral development,\r\nbut also as contributing largely to the moral consciousness\r\nof western peoples to-day.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. The Early Morality.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The accounts of the tribal\r\nlife and customs in the early period after the settlement\r\nin Canaan, show the main features of group life which are\r\nalready familiar to us. Clan or kinship loyalty was strong\r\non both its good and its defective sides. There were fidelity,\r\na jeoparding of lives unto death, honor for group heroes,\r\njoint responsibility, and blood revenge. There were respect\r\nfor hospitality and regulation of marriage, though not according\r\nto later standards. A rough measure of justice\r\nwas recognized in \"as I have done, so God hath requited\r\nme.\" But there was no public authority to restrain the\r\nwrongdoer, except when a particularly revolting brutality\r\nshocked public sentiment. Festivals and sacrificial meals\r\nunited the members of the family or clan more closely\r\nto each other and to their god. Vows must be kept\r\ninviolable even if they involved human sacrifice. The interests\r\nand ends of life were simple. The satisfaction\r\nof bodily wants, the love of kin and above all of children,\r\nthe desire to be in right relation of favor and harmony\r\nwith the unseen deity who protected from enemies and sent\r\nfruitful seasons,\u0026mdash;these made their chief good. The line\r\nof their progress from these rude beginnings to a lofty\r\nmoral ideal lay through religion. But the religious conceptions\r\nwere directly related to political, social, and\r\neconomic conditions; hence, both aspects must be briefly\r\ncharacterized.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. Political Development.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The political development\r\n(a) built up a national unity which worked to break down\r\nold group units, (b) strengthened military ambition and\r\nrace pride, (c) stimulated the prophets to their highest\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_93\" id=\"Page_93\"\u003e[Pg 93]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nconceptions of the divine majesty and universality, but,\r\nfinally when the national power and hope were shattered,\r\n(d) compelled the most thoroughgoing reconstruction\r\nof all the values, ideals, and meaning of life. It is not\r\npossible or necessary to trace this process in detail, but\r\nwe may point out here the general effect of the political\r\ndevelopment in bringing into clearer consciousness the\r\nconceptions of authority and law which were important\r\nfactors in Hebrew morality. The earlier patriarchal\r\nhead of the clan or family exercised certain political\r\npower, but there was no explicit recognition of this. Government\r\nby the \"elders\" or by the heads of the household\r\nmakes no clear distinction between the common kinship\r\nand the political and legal authority of the sovereign.\r\nThe \"judges,\" whose rule preceded the kingdom, were\r\nmilitary deliverers who owed their authority to personal\r\npowers rather than to a definite provision. To establish\r\nan organized political community, a kingdom, was then\r\nto bring into clearer recognition this element of authority\r\nwhich was merely implicit in the tribal organization. It\r\nallowed a more distinctly voluntary relationship to be\r\ndifferentiated from the involuntary relationship of kinship,\r\nor the personal relationship of the hero. While, therefore,\r\nin the formation of the kingdom the earlier prophets\r\nsaw only a rejection of God, the later prophets saw in\r\nit the symbol of a higher type of relation between God and\r\npeople. It was given religious sanction and the king was\r\nregarded as the son of Jehovah. It was thus ready to\r\nserve as the scheme or setting for the moral unity and\r\norder of a people.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4. The Economic Factors.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The organization and growing\r\nprosperity of the political power were attended by economic\r\nand social changes. The simple agricultural life\r\nof the early period had not caused entire loss of clan\r\norganization and customs. But the growth of trade and\r\ncommerce under Solomon and later kings brought in wealth\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_94\" id=\"Page_94\"\u003e[Pg 94]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand shifted the center of power and influence from country\r\nto city. Wealth and luxury had their usual results.\r\nClashing interests asserted their strength. Economic and\r\nsocial individualism destroyed the old group solidarity.\r\nAt the times of the prophets Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, there\r\nwere classes of rich and poor. Greed had asserted itself\r\nin rulers, judges, priests, and \"regular\" prophets. Oppression,\r\nland monopoly, bribery, extortion, stirred moral\r\nindignation. The fact that these were practiced by the\r\nmost zealous observers of ritual and guardians of religion\r\nroused in the great reformers a demand for a change in\r\nreligion itself. Not sacrifices but justice is the need of\r\nthe hour and the demand of God.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 2. RELIGIOUS AGENCIES\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe interaction between the religious and the moral\r\neducation of the Hebrews was so intimate that it is difficult\r\nto distinguish the two, but we may abstract certain conceptions\r\nor motives in Israel\u0027s religion which were especially\r\nsignificant. The general conception was that of\r\nthe close personal relation between god and people. Israel\r\nshould have no other god; Jehovah\u0026mdash;at least this was the\r\nearlier thought\u0026mdash;would have no other people. He had\r\nloved and chosen Israel; Israel in gratitude, as well as\r\nin hope and fear, must love and obey Jehovah. Priests\r\nmaintained his cultus; prophets brought new commands\r\naccording to the requirements of the hour; the king represented\r\nhis sovereignty and justice; the course of events\r\nexhibited his purpose. Each of these elements served to\r\nprovoke or elicit moral reflection or moral conduct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. The \"Covenant\" Relation was a Moral Conception.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\nusual religious conception is that of some blood\r\nor kin relation between people and deity. This has the\r\nsame potential meaning and value as that of the other\r\nrelations of group life outlined in Chapter II. But it is\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_95\" id=\"Page_95\"\u003e[Pg 95]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nrather a natural than a \"moral\"\u0026mdash;i.e., conscious and\r\nvoluntary\u0026mdash;tie. To conceive of the relation between god\r\nand people as due to voluntary choice, is to introduce\r\na powerful agency toward making morality conscious.\r\nWhatever the origin of the idea, the significant fact is\r\nthat the religious and moral leaders present the relation\r\nof Israel to Jehovah as based on a covenant. On the\r\none hand, Jehovah protects, preserves, and prospers; on\r\nthe other, Israel is to obey his laws and serve no other\r\ngods. This conception of mutual obligation is presented\r\nat the opening of the \"Ten Commandments,\" and to this\r\ncovenant relation the prophets again and again make\r\nappeal. The obligation to obey the law is not \"This is\r\nthe custom,\" or \"Our fathers did so\"; it is placed on the\r\nground that the people has voluntarily accepted Jehovah\r\nas its god and lawgiver.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe meaning of this covenant and the symbols by which\r\nit was conceived, changed with the advance of the social\r\nrelationships of the people. At first Jehovah was \"Lord\r\nof Hosts,\" protector in war, and giver of prosperity,\r\nand the early conceptions of the duty of the people seemed\r\nto include human sacrifice, at least in extreme cases. But\r\nwith later prophets we find the social and family relationship\r\nof husband and father brought increasingly into\r\nuse. Whether by personal experience or by more general\r\nreflection, we find Hosea interpreting the relationship\r\nbetween God and his people in both of these family conceptions.\r\nThe disloyalty of the people takes on the more\r\nintimate taint of a wife\u0027s unfaithfulness, and, conversely,\r\nin contrast to the concepts of other religions, the people\r\nmay call Jehovah \"my husband\" and no longer \"my\r\nmaster\" (Baal). The change from status to contract is\r\nthus, in Israel\u0027s religion, fruitful with many moral results.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. The Conception of a Personal Lawgiver.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The conception\r\nof a personal lawgiver raises conduct from the\r\nlevel of custom to the level of conscious morality. So\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_96\" id=\"Page_96\"\u003e[Pg 96]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlong as a child follows certain ways by imitation or suggestion,\r\nhe does not necessarily attach any moral meaning\r\nto them. But if the parent expressly commands or\r\nprohibits, it becomes a matter of obedience or disobedience.\r\nChoice becomes necessary. Character takes the\r\nplace of innocence. So Jehovah\u0027s law compelled obedience\r\nor rebellion. Customs were either forbidden or enjoined.\r\nIn either case they ceased to be merely customs. In the\r\nlaw of Israel the whole body of observances in private\r\nlife, in ceremonial, and in legal forms, is introduced with\r\na \"Thus saith the Lord.\" We know that other Semitic\r\npeople observed the Sabbath, practiced circumcision, distinguished\r\nclean from unclean beasts, and respected the\r\ntaboos of birth and death. Whether in Israel all these observances\r\nwere old customs given new authority by statute,\r\nor were customs taken from other peoples under the authority\r\nof the laws of Jehovah, is immaterial. The ethical significance\r\nof the law is that these various observances, instead\r\nof being treated merely as customs, are regarded as\r\npersonal commands of a personal deity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis makes a vital difference in the view taken of the violation\r\nof these observances. When a man violates a custom\r\nhe fails to do the correct thing. He misses the mark.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_49_49\" id=\"FNanchor_49_49\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_49_49\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[49]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nBut when the observance is a personal command, its violation\r\nis a personal disobedience; it is rebellion; it is an act\r\nof will. The evil which follows is no longer bad luck; it\r\nis punishment. Now punishment must be either right\r\nor wrong, moral or immoral. It can never be merely non-moral.\r\nHence the very conception of sin as a personal\r\noffense, and of ill as a personal punishment, forces a moral\r\nstandard. In its crudest form this may take the god\u0027s\r\ncommands as right simply because he utters them, and\r\nassume that the sufferer is guilty merely because he suffers.\r\nWe find this in the penitential psalms of the Babylonians.\r\nThese express the deepest conviction of sin and the utmost\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_97\" id=\"Page_97\"\u003e[Pg 97]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndesire to please the god, but when we try to discover\r\nwhat the penitent has done that wakens such remorse\r\nwithin him, we find that he seems merely to feel that in\r\nsome way he has failed to please God, no matter how. He\r\nexperiences misfortune, whether of disease, or ill-luck, or\r\ndefeat, and is sure that this must be due to some offense.\r\nHe does not know what this may be. It may have been\r\nthat he has failed to repeat a formula in the right manner;\r\nit is all one. He feels guilty and even exaggerates\r\nhis own guilt in view of the punishment which has befallen\r\nhim. Job\u0027s three friends apply the same logic to his case.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_50_50\" id=\"FNanchor_50_50\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_50_50\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[50]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut side by side with the conception that the laws of\r\nJehovah must be obeyed because they were his commands,\r\nthere was another doctrine which was but an extension of\r\nthe theory that the people had freely accepted their ruler.\r\nThis was that Jehovah\u0027s commands were not arbitrary.\r\nThey were right; they could be placed before the people\r\nfor their approval; they were \"life\"; \"the judge of all\r\nthe earth\" would \"do right.\" We have here a striking\r\nillustration of the principle that moral standards, at first\r\nembodied in persons, slowly work free, so that persons are\r\njudged by them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. The Cultus as Morally Symbolical.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The elaborate\r\ncultus carried on by the priests, symbolized, however\r\nimperfectly, certain moral ideas. The solicitous care for\r\nceremonial \"purity\" might have no direct moral value;\r\nthe contamination from contact with birth or death or\r\ncertain animals might be a very external sort of \"un\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_98\" id=\"Page_98\"\u003e[Pg 98]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ecleanness.\"\r\nNevertheless, they emphasized in the most\r\nforcible manner a constant control over conduct by a\r\nstandard which was set by a divine law. The \"holiness\"\r\nof the priests, as set apart to special service of Jehovah,\r\nemphasized the seriousness of their work; and further,\r\nit contributed to that distinction between spiritual and\r\nmaterial, between higher and lower, which is a part of\r\nmoral life. Moreover, while part of this value inheres in\r\nall ritual, the contrast between Jehovah\u0027s worship and\r\nthat of other deities challenged moral attention. The gods\r\nof the land, the various Baals, were worshipped \"upon\r\nevery high hill and under every green tree.\" As gods\r\nof fertility, they were symbolized by the emblems of sex,\r\nand great freedom prevailed at their festivals. At certain\r\nshrines men and women gave themselves for the service\r\nof the god. The first born children were not infrequently\r\nsacrificed.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_51_51\" id=\"FNanchor_51_51\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_51_51\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[51]\u003c/a\u003e These festivals and shrines seem to have been\r\nadopted more or less fully by Israel from the Canaanites,\r\nbut the prophets have an utterly different idea of Jehovah\u0027s\r\nworship. The god of Sinai rejects utterly such\r\npractices. License and drunkenness are not, as the cultus\r\nof Baal and Astarte implied, the proper symbols of life\r\nand deity. The sensual cannot fitly symbolize the spiritual.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMoreover, one part of the cultus, the \"sin offering,\"\r\ndirectly implied transgression and the need of forgiveness.\r\nThe \"sins\" might themselves be ceremonial rather than\r\nmoral, and the method of removing them might be external\u0026mdash;especially\r\nthe process of putting the sins upon\r\na scapegoat which should \"bear upon him all their iniquities\r\ninto a solitary land,\"\u0026mdash;nevertheless, the solemn confession,\r\nand the shedding of the blood which was the\r\n\"life,\" could not but remind of responsibility and deepen\r\nreflection. The need of atonement and reconciliation, thus\r\nimpressed, symbolized the moral process of reconstructing,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_99\" id=\"Page_99\"\u003e[Pg 99]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof putting away a lower past, and readjusting life to\r\nmeet an ideal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4. The Prophets as a Moral Force.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The prophets\r\nwere by far the most significant moral agency in Israel\u0027s\r\nreligion. In the first place, they came to the people\r\nbearing a message from a living source of authority, intended\r\nfor the immediate situation. They brought a present\r\ncommand for a present duty. \"Thou art the man,\"\r\nof Nathan to David, \"Hast thou killed, and also taken\r\npossession?\" of Elijah to Ahab, had personal occasions.\r\nBut the great sermons of Amos, Isaiah, Jeremiah, were\r\nno less for the hour. A licentious festival, an Assyrian\r\ninvasion, an Egyptian embassy, a plague of locusts, an\r\nimpending captivity\u0026mdash;these inspire demand for repentance,\r\nwarnings of destruction, promises of salvation. The\r\nprophet was thus the \"living fountain.\" The divine will\r\nas coming through him \"was still, so to speak, fluid, and\r\nnot congealed into institutions.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the second place, the prophets seized upon the inward\r\npurpose and social conduct of man as the all-important\r\nissues; cultus, sacrifice, are unimportant. \"I hate, I despise\r\nyour feasts, and I will take no delight in your\r\nsolemn assemblies,\" cries Amos in Jehovah\u0027s name, \"But\r\nlet justice roll down as waters and righteousness as a\r\nmighty stream.\" \"I have had enough of the burnt offerings\r\nof rams, and the fat of fed beasts,\" proclaims Isaiah,\r\n\"new moons, and sabbaths, the calling of assemblies,\u0026mdash;I\r\ncannot away with iniquity and the solemn meeting.\" You\r\nneed not ceremonial, but moral, purity. \"Wash you, make\r\nyou clean; put away the evil of your doings;\u0026mdash;seek justice,\r\nrelieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead\r\nfor the widow.\" Micah\u0027s \"Shall I give my first-born for\r\nmy transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my\r\nsoul?\" seized upon the difference once for all between the\r\nphysical and the moral; a completely ethical standpoint\r\nis gained in his summary of religious duty: \"What doth\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_100\" id=\"Page_100\"\u003e[Pg 100]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nGod require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy,\r\nand to walk humbly with thy God?\" And the New Testament\r\nanalogue marks the true ethical valuation of all the\r\nexternal religious manifestations, even of the cruder forms\r\nof prophecy itself. Gifts, mysteries, knowledge, or the\r\n\"body to be burned\"\u0026mdash;there is a more excellent way than\r\nthese. For all these are \"in part.\" Their value is but\r\ntemporary and relative. The values that abide, that stand\r\ncriticism, are that staking of oneself upon the truth and\r\nworth of one\u0027s ideal which is faith; that aspiration and\r\nforward look which is hope; that sum of all social charity,\r\nsympathy, justice, and active helpfulness, which is love.\r\n\"But the greatest of these is love.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e5. The Religious View of the Kingdom Gave the\r\nSetting for a Social Ideal.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Jehovah was the king of\r\nhis people. The human ruler in Jerusalem was his representative.\r\nThe kingdom of Israel was under divine care\r\nand had on the other hand a serious purpose. The expansion\r\nand glory of the kingdom under Solomon showed\r\nthe divine favor. Division and calamity were not mere\r\nmisfortunes, or the victory of greater armies; they were\r\ndivine rebukes. Only in righteousness and justice could\r\nthe nation survive. On the other hand, the confidence in\r\nJehovah\u0027s love for Israel guaranteed that he would never\r\nforsake his people. He would purify them and redeem\r\nthem even from the grave. He would establish a kingdom\r\nof law and peace, \"an everlasting kingdom that should\r\nnot be destroyed.\" Politics in Israel had a moral goal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e6. Religion Gave the Problem of Evil a Moral Significance.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\nGreek treatment of the problem of evil\r\nis found in the great tragedies. An ancestral curse follows\r\ndown successive generations, dealing woe to all the\r\nunhappy house. For the victims there seems to be nothing\r\nbut to suffer. The necessity of destiny makes the\r\ncatastrophe sublime, but also hopeless. Ibsen\u0027s \u003ci\u003eGhosts\u003c/i\u003e\r\nis conceived in a similar spirit. There is a tremendous\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_101\" id=\"Page_101\"\u003e[Pg 101]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmoral lesson in it for the fathers, but for the children\r\nonly horror. The Greek and the Scandinavian are doubtless\r\ninterpreting one phase of human life\u0026mdash;its continuity\r\nand dependence upon cosmical nature. But the Hebrew\r\nwas not content with this. His confidence in a divine government\r\nof the world forced him to seek some moral value,\r\nsome purpose in the event. The search led along one path\r\nto a readjustment of values; it led by another path to a\r\nnew view of social interdependence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe book of Job gives the deepest study of the first\r\nof these problems. The old view had been that virtue\r\nand happiness always went together. Prosperity meant\r\ndivine favor, and therefore it must be the good. Adversity\r\nmeant divine punishment; it showed wrongdoing\r\nand was itself an evil. When calamity comes upon Job, his\r\nfriends assume it to be a sure proof of his wickedness.\r\nHe had himself held the same view, and since he refuses\r\nto admit his wickedness and \"holds fast to his integrity,\"\r\nit confounds all his philosophy of life and of God. It\r\ncompels a \"reversal and revaluation of all values.\" If\r\nhe could only meet God face to face and have it out\r\nwith him he believes there would be some solution. But\r\ncome what may, he will not sell his soul for happiness.\r\nTo \"repent,\" as his friends urge, in order that he may\r\nbe again on good terms with God, would mean for him to\r\ncall sin what he believes to be righteousness. And he will\r\nnot lie in this way. God is doubtless stronger, and if\r\nhe pursues his victim relentlessly, may convict him. But\r\nbe this as it may, Job will not let go his fundamental\r\nconsciousness of right and wrong. His \"moral self\"\r\nis the one anchor that holds, is the supreme value of life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"As God liveth, who hath taken away my right,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAnd the Almighty who hath vexed my soul;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSurely my lips shall not speak unrighteousness.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTill I die, I will not put away my integrity from me,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMy righteousness I hold fast, and will not let it go.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_52_52\" id=\"FNanchor_52_52\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_52_52\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[52]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_102\" id=\"Page_102\"\u003e[Pg 102]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"noidt\"\u003eAnother suggestion of the book is that evil comes to\r\nprove man\u0027s sincerity: \"Does Job serve God for naught?\"\r\nand from that standpoint the answer is, Yes; he does.\r\n\"There is a disinterested love of God.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_53_53\" id=\"FNanchor_53_53\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_53_53\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[53]\u003c/a\u003e In this setting,\r\nalso, the experience of suffering produces a shifting of\r\nvalues from the extrinsic to the internal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe other treatment of the problem of suffering is\r\nfound in the latter half of Isaiah. It finds an interpretation\r\nof the problem by a deeper view of social interdependence,\r\nin which the old tribal solidarity is given, as it\r\nwere, a transfigured meaning. The individualistic interpretation\r\nof suffering was that it meant personal guilt.\r\n\"We did esteem him stricken of God.\" This breaks down.\r\nThe suffering servant is not wicked. He is suffering for\r\nothers\u0026mdash;in some sense. \"He hath borne our griefs and\r\ncarried our sorrows.\" The conception here reached of\r\nan interrelation which involves that the suffering of the\r\ngood may be due to the sin or the suffering of others,\r\nand that the assumption of this burden marks the higher\r\ntype of ethical relation, is one of the finest products of\r\nIsrael\u0027s religion. As made central in the Christian conception\r\nof the Cross, it has furnished one of the great elements\r\nin the modern social consciousness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 3. THE MORAL CONCEPTIONS ATTAINED\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe moral conceptions which were thus worked out may\r\nnow be brought together for convenient summary under\r\nthe two heads of the \"How\" and the \"What\" indicated\r\nin our introductory chapter. Under the first we\r\nspecify the conceptions resulting (1) from recognition of\r\na standard of right, and an ideal of good, (2) from\r\nfree choice of this ideal. Under the What we indicate\r\nthe content of the ideal on both its personal and its social\r\nsides.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_103\" id=\"Page_103\"\u003e[Pg 103]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. Righteousness and Sin.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Righteousness and sin\r\nwere not exact or contradictory opposites. The righteous\r\nman was not necessarily sinless. Nevertheless, the consciousness\r\nof sin, like a dark background, brought out\r\nmore emphatically the conception of righteousness. This\r\nconception had its two aspects, derived from the civil and\r\nthe religious spheres of life\u0026mdash;spheres which were not\r\nseparate for the Hebrew. On the one hand, the just or\r\nrighteous respected the moral order in human society.\r\nThe unrighteous was unjust, extortionate, cruel. He did\r\nnot respect the rights of others. On the other hand,\r\nthe righteous man was in \"right\" relation to God. This\r\nright relation might be tested by the divine law; but as\r\nGod was conceived as a living person, loving his people,\r\n\"forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin,\" it might\r\nalso be measured by an essential harmony of spirit with\r\nthe divine will. There was the \"righteousness of the law,\"\r\nand the \"righteousness of faith.\" The first implies complete\r\nobedience; the second implies that in spite of transgressions\r\nthere is room for atonement\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_54_54\" id=\"FNanchor_54_54\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_54_54\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[54]\u003c/a\u003e or reconciliation.\r\nAs the first means ethically the testing of conduct by a\r\nmoral standard, a \"moral law,\" so the second stands for\r\nthe thought that character is rather a matter of spirit\r\nand of constant reconstruction than of exact conformity\r\nonce for all to a hard and fast rule. Specific acts may\r\nfail to conform, but the life is more than a series of specific\r\nacts. The measurement of conduct by the law has its\r\nvalue to quicken a sense of shortcoming, but alone it may\r\nalso lead either to self-righteous complacency or to despair.\r\nThe possibility of new adjustment, of renewal, of\r\n\"a new birth,\" means liberation and life. As such it may\r\nbe contrasted with the Buddhist doctrine of Karma, the\r\ncausality from which there is no escape but by the extinction\r\nof desire.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_104\" id=\"Page_104\"\u003e[Pg 104]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Sin\" had likewise its various aspects. It stood for\r\nmissing the mark, for violating the rules of clean and unclean;\r\nbut it stood also for personal disobedience to the\r\ndivine will, for violation of the moral order of Israel. In\r\nthis latter sense, as identified by the prophets with social\r\nunrighteousness, it is a significant ethical conception. It\r\nbrings out the point that evil and wrongdoing are not\r\nmerely individual matters, not merely failures; they offend\r\nagainst a law which is above the private self, against a\r\nmoral order which has its rightful demands upon us.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Personal Responsibility.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The transition from group\r\nto individual responsibility was thoroughly worked out by\r\nthe prophets, even if they were not able to carry full popular\r\nassent. In early days the whole kin was treated as guilty\r\nfor the offense of the kinsman. Achan\u0027s case has already\r\nbeen cited; and in the case of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram,\r\n\"Their wives and their sons and their little ones\" were\r\nall treated alike.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_55_55\" id=\"FNanchor_55_55\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_55_55\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[55]\u003c/a\u003e In like manner, the family of the\r\nrighteous man shared in the divine favor. The later\r\nprophets pronounced a radical change. The proverb,\r\n\"The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children\u0027s\r\nteeth are set on edge,\" is no more to be used, declares\r\nEzekiel, speaking for Jehovah. \"The soul that sinneth, it\r\nshall die; the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father,\r\nneither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son;\"\r\nand it is especially interesting to note that the Lord is\r\nrepresented as pleading with the people that this is fair,\r\nwhile the people say, \"Wherefore doth not the son bear\r\nthe iniquity of the father?\" The solidarity of the family\r\nresisted the individualism of the prophetic conception, and\r\nfive hundred years after Ezekiel the traces of the older\r\nconception still lingered in the question, \"Who did sin,\r\nthis man or his parents, that he was born blind?\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_56_56\" id=\"FNanchor_56_56\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_56_56\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[56]\u003c/a\u003e For\r\nanother aspect of responsibility, viz., intent, as distinct\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_105\" id=\"Page_105\"\u003e[Pg 105]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfrom accidental action,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_57_57\" id=\"FNanchor_57_57\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_57_57\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[57]\u003c/a\u003e we have certain transitional steps\r\nshown in the interesting \"cities of refuge\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_58_58\" id=\"FNanchor_58_58\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_58_58\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[58]\u003c/a\u003e for the accidental\r\nhomicide in which he might be safe from the\r\navenger of blood, provided he was swift enough of foot to\r\nreach a city of refuge before he was caught. But the fullest\r\ndevelopment in the ethics of responsibility along this\r\nline seemed to take the form described under the next head.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. Sincerity, and Purity of Motive.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The Hebrew had\r\na philosophy of conduct which made it chiefly a matter\r\nof \"wisdom\" and \"folly,\" but the favorite term of prophet\r\nand psalmist to symbolize the central principle was rather\r\n\"the heart.\" This term stood for the voluntary disposition,\r\nespecially in its inner springs of emotions and sentiments,\r\naffections and passions. The Greek was inclined\r\nto look askance at this side of life, to regard the emotions\r\nas perturbations of the soul, and to seek their control\r\nby reason, or even their repression or elimination. The\r\nHebrew found a more positive value in the emotional side\r\nof conduct, and at the same time worked out the conception\r\nof a sincere and thoroughgoing interest as lying\r\nat the very root of all right life. The religious influence\r\nwas as elsewhere the important agency. \"Man\r\nlooketh on the outward appearance, but Jehovah looketh\r\non the heart,\" \"If I regard iniquity in my heart, Jehovah\r\nwill not hear me,\" are characteristic expressions. A divine\r\nvision, which penetrates to the deepest springs of purpose\r\nand feeling, will not tolerate pretense. Nor will it be satisfied\r\nwith anything less than entire devotion: the Israelite\r\nmust serve Jehovah with all his heart. Outer con\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_106\" id=\"Page_106\"\u003e[Pg 106]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eformity\r\nis not enough: \"Rend your heart and not your\r\ngarments.\" It is the \"pure in heart\" who have the\r\nbeatific vision. Not external contacts, or ceremonial\r\n\"uncleanness,\" on which earlier ritual had insisted, defile\r\nthe man, but rather what proceeds from the heart. For\r\nthe heart is the source of evil thoughts and evil deeds.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_59_59\" id=\"FNanchor_59_59\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_59_59\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[59]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nAnd conversely, the interests, the emotions, and enthusiasms\r\nwhich make up the man\u0027s deepest self do not spring\r\nforth in a vacuum; they go with the steadfast purpose\r\nand bent, with the self of achievement. \"Where your\r\ntreasure is, there will your heart be also.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePurity of motive in a full moral consciousness means\r\nnot only (formal) sincerity, but sincere love of good\r\nand right. This was not stated by the Hebrew in abstract\r\nterms, but in the personal language of love to God. In\r\nearly days there had been more or less of external motives\r\nin the appeals of the law and the prophets. Fear\r\nof punishment, hope of reward, blessings in basket and\r\nstore, curses in land and field, were used to induce fidelity.\r\nBut some of the prophets sought a deeper view, which\r\nseems to have been reached in the bitterness of human\r\nexperience. Hosea\u0027s wife had forsaken him, and should not\r\nthe love of people to Jehovah be as personal and sincere\r\nas that of wife to husband? She had said, \"I will go\r\nafter my lovers \u003ci\u003ethat give me my bread and my water, my\r\nwood and my flax, my oil and my drink\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_60_60\" id=\"FNanchor_60_60\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_60_60\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[60]\u003c/a\u003e Is not serving\r\nGod for hire a form of prostitution?\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_61_61\" id=\"FNanchor_61_61\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_61_61\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[61]\u003c/a\u003e The calamities\r\nof the nation tested the disinterestedness of its fidelity.\r\nThey were the challenge of the Adversary, \"Doth Job\r\nfear God for naught?\" And a remnant at least attested\r\nthat fidelity did not depend on rewards. The moral maxim\r\nthat virtue is its own reward is put in personal terms\r\nby the prophet after the exile:\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_107\" id=\"Page_107\"\u003e[Pg 107]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"For though the fig tree shall not blossom, neither shall\r\nfruit be in the vines; the labor of the olive shall fail, and the\r\nfields shall yield no meat; the flock shall be cut off from the\r\nfold, and there shall be no herd in the stalls: Yet I will\r\nrejoice in the Lord, I will joy in the God of my salvation.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_62_62\" id=\"FNanchor_62_62\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_62_62\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[62]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4. The Conception of \"Life\" as an Ideal.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The content\r\nof Israel\u0027s moral ideal on its individual side was\r\nexpressed by the term \"Life.\" All the blessings that the\r\nleader of Israel could offer his people were summarized\r\nin the phrase, \"I have set before you life and death;\r\nwherefore choose life.\" The same final standard of value\r\nappears in the question of Jesus, \"What shall it profit\r\na man to gain the whole world and lose his own life?\"\r\nWhen we inquire what life meant, so far as the early\r\nsources give us data for judgment, we must infer it\r\nto have been measured largely in terms of material comfort\r\nand prosperity, accompanied by the satisfaction of\r\nstanding in right relations to the god and ruler. This\r\nlatter element was so closely united with the first that\r\nit was practically identical with it. If the people were\r\nprosperous they might assume that they were right; if\r\nthey suffered they were surely wrong. Good and evil\r\nwere, therefore, in this stage, measured largely in terms\r\nof pleasure and pain. The end to be sought and the ideal\r\nto be kept in mind was that of long and prosperous life\u0026mdash;\"in\r\nher right hand length of days, in her left hand\r\nriches and honor.\" Intellectual and \u0026aelig;sthetic interests\r\nwere not prized as such. The knowledge which was\r\nvalued was the wisdom for the conduct of life, of which\r\nthe beginning and crown was \"the fear of the Lord.\"\r\nThe art which was valued was sacred song or poetry.\r\nBut the ideal values which came to bulk most in the expanding\r\nconception of \"life\" were those of personal relation.\r\nFamily ties, always strong among Oriental peoples,\r\ngained in purity. Love between the sexes was refined and\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_108\" id=\"Page_108\"\u003e[Pg 108]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nidealized.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_63_63\" id=\"FNanchor_63_63\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_63_63\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[63]\u003c/a\u003e National feeling took on added dignity, because\r\nof the consciousness of a divine mission. Above all,\r\npersonal union with God, as voiced in the psalms and\r\nprophets, became the desire. He, and not his gifts, was\r\nthe supreme good. He was the \"fountain of life.\" His\r\nlikeness would satisfy. In his light the faithful would\r\nsee light.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut even more significant than any specific content put\r\ninto the term \"life,\" was \u003ci\u003ewhat was involved in the idea\r\nitself\u003c/i\u003e. The legalists had attempted to define conduct\r\nby a code, but there was an inherent vitality in the ideal\r\nof life, which refused to be measured or bounded. The\r\n\"words of eternal life,\" which began the new moral movement\r\nof Christianity, had perhaps little definite content\r\nto the fishermen, and it is not easy to say just what they\r\nmeant in moral terms to the writer of the Fourth Gospel\r\nwho uses the phrase so often. With Paul, life as the realm\r\nof the spirit gets definition as it stands over against\r\nthe \"death\" of sin and lust. But with all writers of Old\r\nor New Testament, whatever content it had, life meant\r\nabove all the suggestion of something beyond, the gleam\r\nand dynamic power of a future not yet understood. It\r\nmeant to Paul a progress which was governed not by\r\nlaw or \"rudiments,\" but by freedom. Such a life would\r\nset itself new and higher standards; the laws and customs\r\nthat had obtained were felt to be outgrown. The significance\r\nof early Christianity as a moral movement, aside\r\nfrom its elements of personal devotion and social unity to\r\nbe noticed below, was the spirit of movement, the sense of\r\nnewly forming horizons beyond the old, the conviction\r\nthat as sons of God its followers had boundless possibilities,\r\nthat they were not the children of the bond woman,\r\nbut of the free.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e5. The Social Ideal of Justice, Love, and Peace.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We\r\nhave seen how this ideal was framed in the setting of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_109\" id=\"Page_109\"\u003e[Pg 109]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na kingdom of God. At first national, it became universal,\r\nand with a fraternity which the world is far from having\r\nrealized, it was to know \"neither Jew nor Greek, bond nor\r\nfree.\" At first military, it took on with seer and psalmist\r\nthe form of a reign of peace and justice. After the fierce\r\nand crude powers typified by the lion and the bear and\r\nthe leopard had passed, the seer saw a kingdom represented\r\nby a human form. Such a kingdom it was that\r\nshould not pass away. Such was the kingdom \"not of this\r\nworld\" which Jesus presented as his message. Membership\r\nin this moral kingdom was for the poor in spirit,\r\nthe pure in heart, the merciful, the peace-makers, the\r\nhungerers after righteousness. Greatness in this moral\r\ncommunity was to depend on service, not on power. The\r\nking should not fail till he had \"set justice in the earth.\"\r\nHe should \"deliver the needy, and the poor.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCertain features of this ideal order have since found\r\nembodiment in social and political structures; certain\r\nfeatures remain for the future. Certain periods in history\r\nhave transferred the ideal entirely to another world, regarding\r\nhuman society as hopelessly given over to evil.\r\nSuch theories find a morality possible only by renouncing\r\nsociety. The Hebrews presented rather the ideal of a\r\nmoral order on earth, of a control of all life by right, of\r\na realization of good, and of a completeness of life. It\r\nwas an ideal not dreamed out in ecstatic visions of pure\r\nfancy, but worked out in struggle and suffering, in confidence\r\nthat moral efforts are not hopeless or destined to\r\ndefeat. The ideal order is to be made real. The divine\r\nkingdom is to come, the divine will to be done \"\u003ci\u003eon earth\u003c/i\u003e\r\nas it is in heaven.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe works of W. R. Smith (\u003ci\u003eReligion of the Semites\u003c/i\u003e) and Barton\r\n(\u003ci\u003eA Sketch of Semitic Origins\u003c/i\u003e) already mentioned. Schultz, \u003ci\u003eOld\r\nTestament Theology\u003c/i\u003e, tr. \u003ci\u003e1892\u003c/i\u003e; Marti, \u003ci\u003eReligion of the Old Testament\u003c/i\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_110\" id=\"Page_110\"\u003e[Pg 110]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\ntr. 1907; Budde, \u003ci\u003eReligion of the Old Testament to the Exile\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1899; H. P. Smith, \u003ci\u003eOld Testament History\u003c/i\u003e, 1903; W. R. Smith, \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nProphets of Israel\u003c/i\u003e, 1895; Bruce, \u003ci\u003eEthics of the Old Testament\u003c/i\u003e, 1895;\r\nPeake, \u003ci\u003eProblem of Suffering in the Old Testament\u003c/i\u003e, 1904; Royce, \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nProblem of Job\u003c/i\u003e in Studies of Good and Evil, 1898; Pratt, \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nPsychology of Religious Belief\u003c/i\u003e, 1907, ch. v.; Harnack, \u003ci\u003eWhat is\r\nChristianity?\u003c/i\u003e tr. 1901; Cone, \u003ci\u003eRich and Poor in the New Testament\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1902; Pfleiderer, \u003ci\u003ePrimitive Christianity\u003c/i\u003e, tr. 1906; Matthews, \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nSocial Teaching of Jesus\u003c/i\u003e, 1897; Wendt, \u003ci\u003eThe Teaching of Jesus\u003c/i\u003e, 1899;\r\nPfleiderer, \u003ci\u003ePaulinism\u003c/i\u003e, 1891; Cone, \u003ci\u003ePaul, The Man, the Missionary,\r\nand the Teacher\u003c/i\u003e, 1898; Beyschlag, \u003ci\u003eNew Testament Theology\u003c/i\u003e, tr. 1895;\r\nThe \u003ci\u003eEncyclopedia Biblica\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eThe Jewish Encyclopedia\u003c/i\u003e, and Hastings\u0027\r\n\u003ci\u003eDictionary\u003c/i\u003e, have numerous valuable articles.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_48_48\" id=\"Footnote_48_48\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_48_48\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[48]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e M. Arnold, \"Hebraism and Hellenism,\" in \u003ci\u003eCulture and Anarchy\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nch. iv.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_49_49\" id=\"Footnote_49_49\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_49_49\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[49]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The Hebrew and Greek words for sin both mean \"to miss.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_50_50\" id=\"Footnote_50_50\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_50_50\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[50]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The general function of punishment as bringing home to the individual\r\nthe consciousness of guilt and thus awakening the action of\r\nconscience, has an illustration in Shakespere\u0027s conception of the\r\nprayer of Henry Vth before the battle of Agincourt. In ordinary\r\nlife the bluff King Harry devotes little time to meditation upon\r\nhis own sin or that of his father, but on the eve of possible calamity\r\nthe old crime rises fresh before him. Stimulated by the thought of\r\nan actual penalty to be imposed by a recognized authority, he cried:\r\n\"Not to-day, O Lord! Oh, not to-day! Think not upon the fault\r\nmy father made in compassing the crown.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_51_51\" id=\"Footnote_51_51\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_51_51\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[51]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Recent excavations are held to confirm the prophets on this\r\n(Marti, \u003ci\u003eReligion of the Old Testament\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 78 ff.).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_52_52\" id=\"Footnote_52_52\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_52_52\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[52]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Job 27:1-6.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_53_53\" id=\"Footnote_53_53\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_53_53\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[53]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Genung, \u003ci\u003eJob, The Epic of the Inner Life\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_54_54\" id=\"Footnote_54_54\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_54_54\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[54]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See \u003ci\u003eAtonement in Literature and in Life\u003c/i\u003e, by Charles A. Dinsmore.\r\nBoston, 1906.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_55_55\" id=\"Footnote_55_55\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_55_55\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[55]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Numbers 16, Joshua 7.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_56_56\" id=\"Footnote_56_56\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_56_56\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[56]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e John 9:2.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_57_57\" id=\"Footnote_57_57\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_57_57\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[57]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Hammurabi\u0027s code showed a disregard of intent which would\r\nmake surgery a dangerous profession: \"If a physician operate on a\r\nman for a severe wound with a bronze lancet and cause the man\u0027s\r\ndeath; or open an abscess [in the eye] of a man with a bronze lancet\r\nand destroy the man\u0027s eye, they shall cut off his fingers.\" Early\r\nGerman and English law is just as na\u0026iuml;ve. If a weapon was left to be\r\nrepaired at a smith\u0027s and was then caught up or stolen and used\r\nto do harm, the original owner was held responsible.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_58_58\" id=\"Footnote_58_58\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_58_58\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[58]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Numbers 35, Deuteronomy 19, Joshua 20.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_59_59\" id=\"Footnote_59_59\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_59_59\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[59]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mark 7:1-23.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_60_60\" id=\"Footnote_60_60\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_60_60\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[60]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Hosea 2:5.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_61_61\" id=\"Footnote_61_61\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_61_61\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[61]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e H. P. Smith, \u003ci\u003eOld Testament History\u003c/i\u003e, p. 222.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_62_62\" id=\"Footnote_62_62\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_62_62\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[62]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Habakkuk 3:17, 18.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_63_63\" id=\"Footnote_63_63\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_63_63\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[63]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The Song of Songs.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_111\" id=\"Page_111\"\u003e[Pg 111]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER VII\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTHE MORAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE GREEKS\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 1. THE FUNDAMENTAL NOTES\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eConvention versus Nature.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The Hebrew moral life\r\nwas developed under the relation, first of the people, then\r\nof the individuals, to God,\u0026mdash;a relation at once of union\r\nand of conflict. It was out of the relation of the individual\r\nto social traditions and political order that the\r\nGreek came to full consciousness of moral law on the\r\none hand, and a moral personality on the other. And\r\njust as in Jewish life the law and the prophets (or,\r\nlater, the \"law and the gospel\") stood for the conflicting\r\nforces, so in Greek life the opposition between the authority\r\nof the group, embodied in custom and institutions, on\r\nthe one hand, and the urging claims of developing personality,\r\nmanifest in both intelligence and desire, on the\r\nother, found expression in contrasted terms. The authority\r\nof the group embodied in customs and institutions, came\r\nto be regarded by the radicals as relatively external, artificial,\r\nand rigid. It was dubbed \"convention,\" or \"institution\"\r\n(\u003ci\u003ethesis\u003c/i\u003e, what is set up). The rapidly developing\r\nintelligence challenged the merely customary and traditional;\r\nthe increasing individuality challenged the superior\r\nauthority of the group, especially when this manifested\r\nitself apparently in a government of force. Personal\r\nintelligence and personal feeling asserted a more elemental\r\nclaim, felt themselves rooted in a more original source,\r\nand called this source \"nature\" (\u003ci\u003ephysis\u003c/i\u003e). Social tradition\r\nand authority, individual reason and feeling, thus\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_112\" id=\"Page_112\"\u003e[Pg 112]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003econfronted each other as \"convention\" and \"nature.\" It\r\nwas a struggle which has its analogy in the development of\r\nmany a young man or young woman who is emerging from\r\nparental control to self-direction. But in Greek life more\r\ndistinctly than elsewhere we see the steps of the process\r\nas a civic and not merely an individual development.\r\n\u0026AElig;schylus, Sophocles, and Euripides presented this conflict\r\nof the individual with law or destiny as the great,\r\noft-repeated tragedy of human life. Aristophanes mocked\r\nwith bitter satire the \"new\" views. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle,\r\nCynics, Cyrenaics, Epicureans, and Stoics took part\r\nin the theoretical discussions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMeasure.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The fundamental note of all Greek life,\r\nbefore, during, and after this development, was \u003ci\u003eMeasure\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003eOrder\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eProportion\u003c/i\u003e. This note found expression in religion,\r\nscience, art, and conduct. Among their gods, the\r\nGreeks set Moira, \"Destiny,\" and Themis, \"Custom,\"\r\n\"Law,\" \"Right.\" They found order in the universe,\r\nwhich on this account they called the \"cosmos.\" They\r\nexpressed it in their arts, especially in architecture, sculpture,\r\nthe choral dance, and the more highly developed\r\ntragedy or lyric:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"And all life is full of them [of form and measure],\" says\r\nPlato, \"as well as every constructive and creative art. And\r\nsurely the art of the painter and every other creative and constructive\r\nart are full of them,\u0026mdash;weaving, embroidery, architecture,\r\nand every kind of manufacture; also nature, animal and\r\nvegetable,\u0026mdash;in all of them there is grace or the absence of\r\ngrace; and if our youth are to do their work in life, must they\r\nnot make these graces and harmonies their perpetual aim?\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe best people, the \"gentlemen,\" were styled kaloika-gathoi\u0026mdash;\"fair\r\nand good.\" The motto at the Delphic\r\nshrine was, \"Nothing in excess.\" Insolent disregard of\r\npropriety, \"hybris,\" was the quality most denounced by the\r\nearly moralizing poets. Tityus, Tantalus, and Sisyphus,\r\nthe three special subjects of divine punishment, suffered the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_113\" id=\"Page_113\"\u003e[Pg 113]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npenalty of insatiate desire, or limits overstepped. And\r\nafter criticism and individualism had done their work,\r\nPlato\u0027s conception of justice, Aristotle\u0027s doctrine of the\r\n\"mean,\" the Stoic maxim of \"life according to nature,\"\r\nhave but discovered a deeper significance for the fundamental\r\nlaw of Greek life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Good and the Just.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The conceptions of the Good\r\nand the Just are developed from the two notes just presented.\r\nThe motive for challenge to established institutions\r\nwas the awakening desire of the individual to seek\r\nhis own good and to live his own life. Commerce was\r\nbringing a great variety of rewards to the shrewd merchant\r\nand a great variety of goods to evoke and gratify\r\nwants. Slavery set free the citizen from the need of\r\nmanual labor and gave him leisure to cultivate his tastes.\r\nThe forces of individualism, described in Chapter V., were\r\nall at work to bring the process and object of desire to\r\nconsciousness. Moreover, the term \"good\" was also in use\r\nto mark the popular ideal. It was applied to what we\r\nshould call the \"successful\" men of the day. In present\r\nlife our term \"good\" has become so definitely moral that\r\nprobably most young persons would hesitate to say that\r\nthey have it as their ideal to become good, although few\r\nwould hesitate to say that they wish to be capable and\r\nsuccessful. For social and political recognition seems to\r\nbe based rather on achievement of striking results than\r\nupon what is technically called \"goodness.\" But in Greece\r\nmoral goodness was not used to designate \"character\" as\r\ncontrasted with \"results.\" The \"good man\" was like the\r\n\"good lawyer\" or \"good athlete\" or \"good soldier,\" the\r\nman who was efficient and conspicuous. It was in the process\r\nwhich we are to trace that the ambiguities and deeper\r\nmeanings of the term came to definition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe terms Just and Justice were not of course merely\r\nsynonyms for order and measure. They had likewise\r\nthe social significance coming from the courts and the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_114\" id=\"Page_114\"\u003e[Pg 114]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nassembly. They stood for the control side of life, as Good\r\nstood for its aspect of valuation and desire. But as compared\r\nwith the Hebrew conception of righteousness, they\r\nmeant much less a conformity to a law divine or human\r\nwhich had been already set up as standard, and much\r\nmore, an ordering, a regulating, a harmonizing. The\r\nrational element of measure or order was more prominent\r\nthan the personal note of authority. Hence we shall find\r\nPlato passing easily back and forth between justice or\r\norder in the individual and justice or order in the State.\r\nOn the other hand, the radicals of the day could seize\r\nupon the legal usage and declare that Justice or the Law\r\nwas purely a matter of self-interest or class interest.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 2. INTELLECTUAL FORCES OF INDIVIDUALISM\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Scientific Spirit.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The older standards were embodied\r\nin religious and political ideas and institutions;\r\nthe agency which was to disentangle and bring into clear\r\nconsciousness the standards \u003ci\u003eas such\u003c/i\u003e, was the scientific\r\nspirit, the knowledge and reflection of an intellectual people\r\nat a period of extraordinarily rapid development. The\r\ncommercial life, the free intercourse with other peoples\r\nand civilizations, especially in the colonies, the absence\r\nof any generally dominating political authority, the architectural\r\nproblems suggested by a beauty-loving people,\u0026mdash;all\r\npromoted alertness and flexibility of mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn a concrete form, this rational character had already\r\nfound expression in the quality of Greek art. Reference\r\nhas already been made to the formal side of Greek art,\r\nwith its embodiment of rhythm and measure; the subject-matter\r\nshows the same element. The Greek world, as contrasted\r\nwith the barbarian world, was conceived by the\r\nGreek as the realm of light contrasted with darkness; the\r\nnational God, Apollo, embodied this ideal of light and\r\nreason, and his fitting symbol was the sun. The great\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_115\" id=\"Page_115\"\u003e[Pg 115]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nPan-Athenaic procession, as reproduced in the Parthenon\r\nfrieze, celebrated the triumph of Greek light and intelligence\r\nover barbarian darkness. Athena, goddess of wisdom,\r\nwas a fitting guardian of the most Greek of all\r\nGreek cities. Greek tragedy, beginning in hymns of\r\nworship, soon passed over into a portrayal of the all-controlling\r\nlaws of life, as these are brought into stronger\r\nrelief by a tragic collision with human agents.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt was, however, in the realm of science that this intellectual\r\ngenius found field for expression in a clearly conscious\r\nmanner. Almost all our sciences were originated\r\nby the Greeks, and they were particularly successful in\r\nthose which called for abstract thinking in the highest\r\ndegree. Euclid\u0027s geometry and Aristotle\u0027s logic are conspicuous\r\nillustrations of this ability. The most general\r\nconceptions of natural science: e.g., the conception of the\r\natom and the whole materialistic theory of the universe;\r\nthe conception of evolution, meaning by this the process\r\nof change according to an all-controlling law; the conception\r\nof natural selection, according to which those organisms\r\nsurvive which are fitted for their environment,\u0026mdash;all\r\nthese were the product of the keen intelligence of the\r\nGreeks. Nor was their scientific ability expended upon\r\nexternal nature alone. The conception of history as more\r\nthan a series of events, the comparative method in the\r\nstudy of political systems, the analysis of literary and\r\nartistic effects, attest the same clarity of mind and the\r\nsame eager search for the most general laws of every aspect\r\nof experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eScience and Religion.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;When, now, this scientific mind\r\nbegan to consider the practical guidance of life, the older\r\npolitical and religious controls presented serious difficulty.\r\nThe gods were supposed to reward the good and punish\r\nthe evil,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_64_64\" id=\"FNanchor_64_64\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_64_64\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[64]\u003c/a\u003e but how could this be reconciled with their practices?\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_116\" id=\"Page_116\"\u003e[Pg 116]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u0026AElig;schylus attempted a purifying and elevating of\r\nthe divine ideal, similar to that which Israel\u0027s conception\r\nunderwent in the work of the prophets. He magnified the\r\ndignity and providential government of Zeus, which,\r\nthough dark, is yet just and certain. But the great\r\nobstacle was that the earlier and cruder conceptions of\r\nthe gods had been fixed in literary form; the tales of\r\nCronos\u0027s impiety to Uranos, of Zeus\u0027 deceitful messenger\r\nand marital unfaithfulness, of Aphrodite\u0027s amours, and\r\nHermes\u0027 gift of theft, were all written in Hesiod and\r\nHomer. The cruder conceptions of the gods had thus become\r\ntoo firmly fixed in the popular imagination to be\r\ncapable of becoming the bearers of advancing ethical\r\nideals, and so not merely the irreverent scoffer, but the\r\nserious tragedian, Euripides, and the religious idealist,\r\nPlato, do not hesitate to challenge boldly the older conceptions,\r\nor to demand a revision of all this literature before\r\nit comes into the hands of the young.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSocial Standards.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The social standards of propriety\r\nand honorable conduct were likewise brought in question\r\nby advancing intelligence. The word which summed up\r\nthe early Greek idea of the best type was \u003ci\u003eKalokagathos\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThis word was very nearly the equivalent of our English\r\nword \"gentleman.\" It combined the elements of birth,\r\nability, and refinement, but in the earlier usage the emphasis\r\nwas upon the fact of birth, even as our terms \"generous,\"\r\n\"noble,\" \"gentle,\" originally referred to membership\r\nin a \"gens.\" Socrates investigated the current estimates\r\nand found that the people who were generally regarded\r\nas the \"respectable,\" or, as we should say, the \"best\"\r\npeople of Athens, were not necessarily either \"fine\" or\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_117\" id=\"Page_117\"\u003e[Pg 117]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\"good\" in person or character; the term had come to be\r\none of \"convention,\" without basis in reason. Plato goes\r\nstill further and with a direct application of the rational\r\nstandard to the current estimates, pokes fun at the conventional\r\njudgment of what constitutes the respectable\r\ngentleman.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"When they sing the praises of family and say that some\r\none is a gentleman because he has had seven generations of\r\nwealthy ancestors, he [the philosopher] thinks that their sentiments\r\nonly betray the dullness and narrowness of vision of\r\nthose who utter them, and who are not educated enough to\r\nlook at the whole, nor to consider that every man has had\r\nthousands and thousands of progenitors, and among them have\r\nbeen rich and poor, kings and slaves, Hellenes and barbarians,\r\nmany times over. And when some one boasts of a catalogue\r\nof twenty-five ancestors, and goes back to Heracles, the son\r\nof Amphitryon, he cannot understand his poverty of ideas.\r\nWhy is he unable to calculate that Amphitryon had a twenty-fifth\r\nancestor, who might have been anybody, and was such as\r\nfortune made him, and he had a fiftieth, and so on? He is\r\namused at the notion that he cannot do a sum, and thinks that\r\na little arithmetic would have got rid of his senseless vanity.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe type of life that is really noble or fine and good\r\nis to be found in the seeker for true beauty and goodness.\r\nExternal beauty of form and appearance has its\r\nvalue in kindling the desire for the higher forms of beauty,\u0026mdash;beauty\r\nof mind, of institutions and laws, of science,\u0026mdash;until\r\nfinally the conception of the true beauty is reached.\r\nThis true beauty, as distinct from the particular beauties,\r\nand true good, as distinct from seeming or partial good,\r\nare discovered only by the \"philosopher,\" the seeker for\r\nwisdom.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePopular Morals.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Nor did the more positively recognized\r\ntypes of moral excellence fare better. As recognized\r\nin common life, they were courage, prudence or moderation,\r\nholiness or a certain respect for the serious things\r\nof life, and justice: but none of these, Plato argues, is\r\nreally an independent excellence, apart from conscious\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_118\" id=\"Page_118\"\u003e[Pg 118]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand intelligent action. Courage, for example, is not really\r\ncourage unless one knows and foresees the danger in all\r\nits strength; otherwise there is merely reckless bravery.\r\nPrudence or moderation, to be really excellent, must be\r\nmeasured by wisdom. Even justice cannot be regarded\r\nas at bottom distinct from wisdom, the true measure of\r\nall the relations of life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eScience and the Laws.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The political control was likewise\r\ninvolved in question by the same forces of intelligence\r\nwhich had challenged the religious authority. The frequent\r\nchanges of government, and the more or less\r\narbitrary measures that were oftentimes adopted, were\r\nadapted to awaken doubt as to the absolute right and\r\nauthority of the laws. The despot who gained control\r\nin many a Greek city was not bound by ties of blood\r\nto all members of the community, nor did he govern in\r\naccordance with the ancestral traditions of the tribe.\r\nThe political authority frequently clashed with the instincts\r\nand traditions of family and kinship. Under such\r\ncircumstances, the political authority was likely to be\r\nchallenged and its constraining power stretched to the\r\nbreaking point. So in the \u003ci\u003eAntigone\u003c/i\u003e of Sophocles, the\r\ncommand of the ruler is opposed to the \"higher law\" of\r\nkinship and nature. The law of man is not the law of\r\nnature or of God. To disobey this conventional law of\r\nman is to be guilty of \"holiest crime.\" The old standards,\r\nboth of religion and of political life, crumbled before the\r\nanalysis of the developing intelligence, and the demand\r\nfor some standard could be met only by the intelligence\r\nitself. To question the old must inevitably seem irreverent\r\nand anarchical. Some questioned merely to doubt; others,\r\nand of these Socrates was the leader, questioned in order\r\nto find a firmer basis, a more authoritative standard. But\r\nnaturally the popular mind did not distinguish between\r\nthese two classes of questioners, and so Socrates perished,\r\nnot merely as the victim of unjust popular calumny, but\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_119\" id=\"Page_119\"\u003e[Pg 119]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas the victim of the tragedy of moral progress, of the\r\nchange from the established to the new.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 3. COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL INDIVIDUALISM\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA further line of development joined forces with this\r\ngrowth of intelligence, to emphasize the problem of moral\r\ncontrol, and to set the individual with his standards over\r\nagainst the objective standards of society. This was the\r\nrapidly growing consciousness of individual goods and\r\ninterests. The commercial life, with its possibilities of\r\nindividual property, the rapid changes of political life,\r\nwith the rise of individuals to power and privilege, the\r\nincreasing opportunities which a high civilization brought\r\nboth men and women for personal enjoyment and gratification\r\nof rapidly increasing wants, all tended to make the\r\nindividual seek his own good, and to shift the emphasis\r\nof life from the question, What is proper, or honorable?\r\nto the question, What is \u003ci\u003egood\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;good for \u003ci\u003eme\u003c/i\u003e?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eClass Interests.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The conviction that the authority of\r\ngovernment and law was largely dictated by the very considerations\r\nof private interests which they were supposed\r\nto overrule and eliminate, made the situation more acute.\r\nFor the Greek States were no longer groups with common\r\ninterests. The growth of capital, the corresponding eagerness\r\nfor gain, the formation of distinct classes, each intent\r\non its interests, supplanted the older, more homogeneous\r\nState. \"The whole development of the political\r\nlife of the Hellenic republics depended ultimately on the\r\ndecision of the question, which of the different social\r\nclasses\u0026mdash;the capitalistic minority, the middle class, or\r\nthe poor\u0026mdash;should obtain the dominant place.\" Aristotle\r\ndefines an oligarchy as a State governed in the interest\r\nof the rich; a democracy, as a State governed in the\r\ninterest of the poor. Another contemporary writer explains\r\na democracy as consulting the interests of the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_120\" id=\"Page_120\"\u003e[Pg 120]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndemocrats, the \"lower classes,\" and considers this a matter\r\nof course, \"for if the rich had the say, they would do\r\nwhat was good for themselves but not for the multitude.\"\r\nNaturally such dominance by classes called out vigorous\r\ncriticisms upon the laws and standards so established.\r\nThe aristocratic minority inveighed against \"custom\" or\r\nconventions which would tame the strong to the level of the\r\nweak. Nature demands rather the \"survival of the fittest,\"\r\ni.e., of the strong. The enlightened spectator of the game\r\nof government, on the other hand, declares that all laws\r\nare made in the interest of ruling classes. The reader of\r\ncurrent criticisms on laws and courts will see how close\r\nis the parallel to present complaints. We have to-day\r\nthe same two classes: One inveighs against governmental\r\ninterference with the right to combine, to contract, and\r\nin general to get from the earth or from men, women,\r\nand children all that superior power and shrewdness can\r\npossibly extract. The other complains that legislatures\r\nare owned by wealth, that judges are appointed from corporation\r\nlawyers, that common law is a survival of ancient\r\naristocratic status, and that for these reasons labor can\r\nget no justice.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us first hear the plea for inequality:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"Custom and nature are generally at variance with one another;\r\n… for by the rule of nature, that only is the more\r\ndisgraceful which is the greater evil; as, for example, to suffer\r\ninjustice; but by the rule of custom, to do evil is the more\r\ndisgraceful. For this suffering of injustice is not the part of\r\na man, but of a slave, who indeed had better die than live; for\r\nwhen he is wronged and trampled upon, he is unable to help\r\nhimself or any other about whom he cares. The reason, as I\r\nconceive, is that the makers of laws are the many weak; and\r\nthey make laws and distribute praises and censures with a\r\nview to themselves and their own interests; and they terrify\r\nthe mightier sort of men, and those who are able to get the\r\nbetter of them, in order that they may not get the better of\r\nthem; and they say that dishonesty is shameful and unjust;\r\nmeanwhile, when they speak of injustice, they desire to have\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_121\" id=\"Page_121\"\u003e[Pg 121]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmore than their neighbors, for knowing their own inferiority,\r\nthey are only too glad of equality. And therefore, this seeking\r\nto have more than the many is conventionally said to be\r\nshameful and unjust, and is called injustice, whereas nature\r\nherself intimates that it is just for the better to have more\r\nthan the worse, the more powerful than the weaker; and in\r\nmany ways she shows, among men as well as among animals,\r\nand indeed among whole cities and races, that justice consists\r\nin the superior ruling over and having more than the inferior.\r\nFor on what principle of justice did Xerxes invade Hellas, or\r\nhis father the Scythians? (not to speak of numberless other\r\nexamples). They, I conceive, act according to nature; yes,\r\nand according to the law of nature; not perhaps, according to\r\nthat artificial law which we frame and fashion, taking the best\r\nand strongest of us from their youth upwards, and taming\r\nthem like young lions, and charming them with the sound of\r\nthe voice, saying to them that with equality they must be content,\r\nand that this is the honorable and the just. But if there\r\nwere a man who had sufficient force, he would shake off and\r\nbreak through and escape from all this; he would trample\r\nunder foot all our formulas and spells and charms, and all our\r\nlaws, sinning against nature; the slave would rise in rebellion\r\nand be lord over us, and the light of natural justice would\r\nshine forth. And this I take to be the lesson of Pindar, in\r\nthe poem in which he says that\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"\u0027Law is the King of all, mortals as well as immortals!\u0027\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"noidt\"\u003eThis, as he says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"\u0027Makes might to be right, and does violence with exalted hand; as\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nI infer from the deeds of Heracles, for without buying them\u0026mdash;\u0026mdash;\u0027\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I do not remember the exact words, but the meaning is,\r\nthat he carried off the oxen of Geryon without buying them,\r\nand without their being given to him by Geryon, according\r\nto the law of natural right, and that the oxen and other possessions\r\nof the weaker and inferior properly belong to the\r\nstronger and superior.\" (\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePlato\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eGorgias\u003c/i\u003e, 482-4.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe essence of this view is, therefore, that might is\r\nright, and that no legislation or conventional code ought\r\nto stand in the way of the free assertion of genius and\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_122\" id=\"Page_122\"\u003e[Pg 122]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npower. It is similar to the teaching of Nietzsche in\r\nrecent times.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the other side had its complaint also. The laws\r\nare made by the \"shepherds\" of the people, as Homer\r\ncalled them. But who is now so simple as to suppose that\r\nthe \"shepherds\" fatten or tend the sheep with a view to\r\nthe good of the sheep, and not to their own good? All\r\nlaws and governments really exist for the interest of the\r\nruling class.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_65_65\" id=\"FNanchor_65_65\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_65_65\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[65]\u003c/a\u003e They rest upon convention or \"institution,\"\r\nnot upon \"nature.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWhy Obey Laws?\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;And if laws and social codes are but\r\nclass legislation, conventional, why obey them? The older\r\nGreek life had felt the motives described in Chapter IV.,\r\nthough it had embodied them in symbolism and imagery.\r\nThe Nemesis that followed the guilty, the Erinnys, or\r\navenging goddesses, were the personified wrath of outraged\r\nlaw; \u003ci\u003eaid\u0026#333;s\u003c/i\u003e, respect or reverence, \u003ci\u003eaischyne\u003c/i\u003e, regard for public\r\nopinion, were the inner feelings. But with the advancing\r\ntide of intellectual criticism and individual interest, these\r\nsanctions were discredited; feelings of personal enjoyment\r\ndemanded recognition, and the moralists at first appealed\r\nto this. \"Parents and tutors are always telling their sons\r\nand their wards that they are to be just; but only not for\r\nthe sake of justice, but for the sake of character and\r\nreputation.\" But if the only reason for justice is reputation,\r\nthere might seem to be no sufficient reason for\r\ntaking the thorny path, if there be an easier. Will not\r\nthe youth say, in the words of Pindar:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"Can I by justice, or by crooked ways of deceit, ascend a\r\nloftier tower which may be a fortress to me all my days?\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_66_66\" id=\"FNanchor_66_66\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_66_66\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[66]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd if I decide that the crooked way is the easier, why\r\nshall I not follow it? My party, or my \"union\", or my\r\nlawyer will stand by and see me through:\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_123\" id=\"Page_123\"\u003e[Pg 123]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"But I hear some one exclaiming that the concealment of\r\nwickedness is often difficult; to which I answer, Nothing great\r\nis easy. Nevertheless, the argument indicates this, if we\r\nwould be happy, to be the path along which we should proceed.\r\nWith a view to concealment we will establish secret brotherhoods\r\nand political clubs. And there are professors of\r\nrhetoric who teach the art of persuading courts and assemblies;\r\nand so, partly by persuasion and partly by force, I shall\r\nmake unlawful gains and not be punished. Still I hear a\r\nvoice saying that the gods cannot be deceived, neither can they\r\nbe compelled. But what if there are no gods? or, suppose\r\nthem to have no care of human things, why in either case\r\nshould we mind about concealment?\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_67_67\" id=\"FNanchor_67_67\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_67_67\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[67]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBesides, the greatest prizes, not only in material goods,\r\nbut even in the line of reputation, seemed to fall to the\r\nindividualist if he could only act on a sufficiently large\r\nscale. He could then be both prosperous and \"respectable.\"\r\nIf he could steal the government, or, in modern\r\nphrase, bribe a legislature to elect him to Congress, pass\r\nspecial legislation, or grant a franchise, he could not\r\nmerely escape punishment, but be honored by his fellows.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"I am speaking of injustice on a large scale, in which the\r\nadvantage of the unjust is most apparent, and my meaning\r\nwill be most clearly seen in that highest form of injustice, the\r\nperpetrator of which is the happiest of men, as the sufferers\r\nof these who refuse to do injustice are the most miserable\u0026mdash;I\r\nmean tyranny which by fraud and force takes away the property\r\nof others, not retail but wholesale; comprehending in one\r\nthings sacred as well as profane, private and public, for any\r\none of which acts of wrong, if he were detected perpetrating\r\nthem singly, he would be punished and incur great dishonor;\r\nfor they who are guilty of any of these crimes in single\r\ninstances are called robbers of temples and man-stealers and\r\nburglars and swindlers and thieves. But when a man has\r\ntaken away the money of the citizens and made slaves of them,\r\nthen instead of these dishonorable names, he is called happy\r\nand blessed, not only by the citizens but by all who hear of his\r\nhaving achieved the consummation of injustice. For injustice\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_124\" id=\"Page_124\"\u003e[Pg 124]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eis censured because the censurers are afraid of suffering, and\r\nnot from any fear which they have of doing injustice. And\r\nthus, as I have shown, Socrates, injustice, when on a sufficient\r\nscale, has more strength and freedom and mastery than justice;\r\nand, as I said at first, justice is the interest of the\r\nstronger, whereas injustice is a man\u0027s own profit and interest.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_68_68\" id=\"FNanchor_68_68\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_68_68\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[68]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 4. INDIVIDUALISM AND ETHICAL THEORY\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Question Formulated.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The outcome of this first\r\nmovement was thus twofold: (a) It forced the questions,\r\n\"What is just?\" \"What is good?\" into clear and\r\ndefinite consciousness. The very necessity of comparison\r\nand of getting a \u003ci\u003egeneral standard\u003c/i\u003e, forced the inquirer\r\nto disentangle the concepts previously embodied in customs\r\nand laws. But when the essence was thus found and\r\nfreed, or disembodied, as it were, the custom seemed lifeless,\r\nmerely \"convention\", and the essence often quite opposed\r\nto the form. (b) It emphasized the \u003ci\u003epersonal interest\u003c/i\u003e, the\r\naffective or emotional side of conduct, and made the moral\r\nproblem take the form, \"What is the good?\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFurthermore, two positive theses have been established\r\nby the very forces which have been active in disintegrating\r\nthe old status. If custom no longer suffices, then reason\r\nmust set the standard; if society cannot prescribe the good\r\nto the individual, then the individual must find some method\r\nof defining and seeking it for himself unless he is to make\r\nshipwreck of his whole venture.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may bring both aspects of the problem under the\r\nconception of \"nature\", as opposed to convention or institution.\r\nConvention is indeed outgrown, nature is the imperious\r\nauthority. But granting that nature is rightful\r\nmaster, is \"nature\" to be sought in the primitive beginnings,\r\nor in the fullest development? in a life of isolation,\r\nor in a life of society? in the desires and passions, or in\r\nreason and a harmonious life?\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_125\" id=\"Page_125\"\u003e[Pg 125]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOr, stating the same problem otherwise: granting that\r\nreason must fix the measure, and the individual must define\r\nand seek the good for himself, is the good to be found in\r\nisolation, or is it to be sought in human society with its\r\nbonds of family, friendship, and justice? Is the end to\r\nbe pleasure, found in the gratification of desires, irrespective\r\nof their quality, and is it the business of reason\r\nmerely to measure one gratification with another and get\r\nthe most? or is wisdom itself a good, and is it better to\r\nsatisfy certain impulses rather than others? i.e., shall\r\nreason form the standard as well as apply it?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese contrasting solutions of the problem of life may\r\nbe stated then under the two pairs of antitheses: (1) The\r\nIndividual \u003ci\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e the Social; (2) The Immediate Satisfaction\r\n\u003ci\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e an Ideal Standard, at once higher and more\r\npermanent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTypical Solutions.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Poets, radicals, sensualists, individualists\r\nof no philosophic school, as well as the historic\r\nphilosophic schools, contributed to the discussion and solution\r\nof these problems. All sought the \"natural\" life; but\r\nit is noteworthy that all the philosophic schools claimed\r\nSocrates as their master, and all sought to justify their\r\nanswers by reason, all made the wise man the ideal. The\r\nCynics and Cyrenaics, Stoics and Epicureans, Plato and\r\nAristotle represent the various philosophic answers to these\r\nalternatives. Cynics and Cyrenaics both answer (1) by\r\nindividualism, but diverge on (2), the Cynics placing emphasis\r\non independence from wants, the Cyrenaics on gratification\r\nof wants. Stoics and Epicureans represent\r\nbroader and more social development of the same principles,\r\nthe Stoics seeking a cosmopolitan state, the Epicureans\r\na community of friends; the Stoics emphasizing\r\nreason or wisdom as the only good; the Epicureans finding\r\nfor wisdom a field in the selection of refined pleasures.\r\nPlato and Aristotle, with varying emphasis but essential\r\nagreement, insist (1) that the good of man is found in\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_126\" id=\"Page_126\"\u003e[Pg 126]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfulfilling completely his highest possible functions, which\r\nis possible only in society; (2) that wisdom is not merely\r\nto apply a standard but to form one; that while neither\r\nreason alone nor feeling alone is enough for life, yet that\r\npleasure is rather for life than life for pleasure. Finally,\r\nPlato, Aristotle and the Stoics, as well as the tragic poets,\r\ncontribute successively to the formation of an ideal of\r\nresponsible character.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEarly Individualistic Theories.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Cynics and Cyrenaics\r\nwere alike individualists. Society, they held, is artificial.\r\nIts so-called goods, on the one hand, and its restrictions\r\non the other, are to be rejected unless they favor the\r\nindividual\u0027s happiness. Independence was the mark of wisdom\r\namong the Cynics; Antisthenes, proud of the holes in\r\nhis garment; Diogenes, dwelling in his tent or sleeping in\r\nthe street, scoffing at the current \"conventions\" of decency,\r\nasking from Philip only that he would get out of his sunshine\u0026mdash;are\r\nthe characteristic figures. The \"state of nature\"\r\nwas opposed to the State. Only the primitive wants\r\nwere recognized as natural. \"Art and science, family and\r\nnative land, were indifferent. Wealth and refinement, fame\r\nand honor, seemed as superfluous as those enjoyments of\r\nthe senses which went beyond the satisfaction of the natural\r\nwants of hunger and sex.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Cyrenaics, or hedonists (\u003ci\u003eh\u0026#275;don\u0026#275;\u003c/i\u003e, pleasure), gave a\r\ndifferent turn to wisdom. The good is pleasure, and wisdom\r\nis found in that prudence which selects the purest and\r\nmost intense. Hence, if this is the good, why should a man\r\ntrouble himself about social standards or social obligations?\r\n\"The hedonists gladly shared the refinement of enjoyment\r\nwhich civilization brought with it; they found it\r\nconvenient and permissible that the intelligent man should\r\nenjoy the honey which others prepared; but no feeling of\r\nduty or thankfulness bound them to the civilization whose\r\nfruits they enjoyed. Sacrifice for others, patriotism, and\r\ndevotion to a general object, Theodorus declared to be a\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_127\" id=\"Page_127\"\u003e[Pg 127]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nform of foolishness which it did not become the wise man to\r\nshare.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_69_69\" id=\"FNanchor_69_69\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_69_69\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[69]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 5. THE DEEPER VIEW OF NATURE AND THE GOOD; OF THE\r\nINDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL ORDER\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eValue of a State.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Plato and Aristotle take up boldly\r\nthe challenge of individualism. It may indeed be granted\r\nthat existing states are too often ruled by classes. There\r\nare oligarchies in which the soldier or the rich control for\r\ntheir own interests; there are tyrannies in which the despot\r\nis greed and force personified; there are democracies\r\n(Plato was an aristocrat) in which the mob bears rule,\r\nand those who flatter and feed its passions are in authority.\r\nBut all these do but serve to bring out more clearly the\r\nconception of a true State, in which the rule is by the wisest\r\nand best and is not for the interest of a class, but for the\r\nwelfare of all. Even as it was, the State of Athens\r\nin Plato\u0027s day\u0026mdash;except when it condemned a Socrates\u0026mdash;meant\r\ncompleteness and freedom of life. It represented\r\nnot merely a police force to protect the individual, but stood\r\nfor the complete organization of all the life which needs\r\nco\u0026ouml;peration and mutual support. The State provided instruction\r\nfor the mind and training for the body. It\r\nsurrounded the citizen with an atmosphere of beauty and\r\nprovided in the tragedy and comedy opportunities for\r\nevery citizen to consider the larger significance of life or to\r\njoin in the contagious sympathy of mirth. In festivals\r\nand solemn processions it brought the citizen into unity\r\nof religious feeling. To be an Athenian citizen meant to\r\nshare in all the higher possibilities which life afforded. Interpreting\r\nthis life, Aristotle proclaims that it is not in\r\nisolation, but in the State, that \"the goal of full independence\r\nmay be said to be first attained.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Natural.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Aristotle goes directly to the heart of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_128\" id=\"Page_128\"\u003e[Pg 128]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe problem as to what is natural by asserting that\r\nnature is not to be found in the crude beginning, but\r\nrather in the complete development. \"The nature of\r\nanything, e.g., of a man, a horse, or a house, may\r\nbe defined to be its condition when the process of production\r\nis complete.\" Hence the State \"in which alone completeness\r\nof life is attained\" is in the highest sense natural:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"The object proposed or the complete development of a\r\nthing is its highest good; but independence which is first\r\nattained in the State is a complete development or the highest\r\ngood and is therefore natural.\" \"For as the State was formed\r\nto make life possible, so it exists to make life good.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Thus we see that the State is a natural institution, that\r\nman is naturally a political animal and that one who is not a\r\ncitizen of any State, if the cause of his isolation be natural\r\nand not accidental, is either a superhuman being or low in\r\nthe scale of human civilization, as he stands alone like a \u0027blot\u0027\r\non the backgammon board. The \u0027clanless, lawless, hearthless\r\nman,\u0027 so bitterly described by Homer, is a case in point, for\r\nhe is naturally a citizen of no state and a lover of war.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_70_70\" id=\"FNanchor_70_70\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_70_70\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[70]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNor does Aristotle stop here. With a profound insight\r\ninto the relation of man to society, and the dependence of\r\nthe individual upon the social body, a relation which modern\r\nsocial psychology has worked out in greater detail,\r\nAristotle asserts that the State is not merely the goal of the\r\nindividual\u0027s development, but the source of his life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"Again, in the order of nature the State is prior to the\r\nhousehold or individual. For the whole must needs be prior\r\nto its part. For instance, if you take away the body which\r\nis the whole, there will not remain any such thing as a hand\r\nor foot, unless we use the same word in a different sense, as\r\nwhen we speak of a stone hand as a hand. For a hand\r\nseparated from the body will be a disabled hand; whereas it\r\nis the faculty or function of a thing which makes it what it is,\r\nand therefore when things lose their function or faculty, it\r\nis not correct to call them the same things, but rather\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_129\" id=\"Page_129\"\u003e[Pg 129]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ehomonymous, i.e., different things having the same name. We\r\nsee, then, the State is a natural institution, and also that it\r\nis prior to the individual. For if the individual as a separate\r\nunit is not independent, he must be a part and must bear the\r\nsame relation to the State as the other parts to their wholes;\r\nand one who is incapable of association with others or is\r\nindependent and has no need of such association, is no member\r\nof a State; in other words, he is either a brute or a God.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_71_71\" id=\"FNanchor_71_71\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_71_71\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[71]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd, moreover, when we look into the nature of the individual,\r\nwe do not find him a being devoid of the sympathies\r\nand qualities which find their natural expression not only\r\nin the State, but in various social and friendly relations.\r\nThere is \"an impulse toward the life in common\" (\u0026#966;\u0026#953;\u0026#955;\u0026#943;\u0026#945;)\r\nwhich expresses itself in friendship, but which is also so\r\nessential to that recognition of others called justice that\r\nwe may say \"it is the most just of all just things.\" There\r\nis also a unity of disposition and purpose (\u0026#8001;\u0026#956;\u0026#972;\u0026#957;\u0026#959;\u0026#953;\u0026#945;) which\r\nmay be called \"political friendship.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_72_72\" id=\"FNanchor_72_72\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_72_72\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[72]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePlato\u0027s Ideal State.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;How then is the State constituted\r\nand governed which is to provide for man\u0027s full development,\r\nhis complete good? Evidently two principles must\r\ncontrol. In the first place, it must be so constituted that\r\nevery man may develop in it the full capacities of his nature,\r\nand thereby serve at once the perfection of the State\r\nand his own completeness; and in the second place, the State\r\nor social whole must be ruled by those best fitted for this\r\nwork. Not the soldier, nor the plutocrat, nor the artisan,\r\nbut the man who knows, is the suitable ruler for our ideal\r\ncommunity. The soldier may defend, the artisan may support,\r\nbut the scientific or intelligent man should rule. And\r\nit is evident that in settling this principle, we have also answered\r\nour first problem; for the soldier and the artisan\r\nwill find his full development by doing the work which he\r\ncan do well, not by meddling with a task in which he must\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_130\" id=\"Page_130\"\u003e[Pg 130]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnecessarily fail. In order to guard against the greed\r\nwhich was so characteristic of the governments of his day,\r\nPlato would provide that the rulers and warriors should\r\nhave no private property, and not even private families.\r\nTheir eye should be single to the good of the whole. When\r\nasked as to the practicability of a State governed by such\r\ndisinterested rulers, and with such wisdom, he admits indeed\r\nits difficulty, but he stoutly demands its necessity:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes\r\nof this world have the spirit and power of philosophy,\r\nand political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those\r\ncommoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the\r\nother are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have\r\nrest from their evils,\u0026mdash;no, nor the human race, as I believe,\u0026mdash;and\r\nthen only will this our State have a possibility of life and\r\nbehold the light of day.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_73_73\" id=\"FNanchor_73_73\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_73_73\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[73]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd yet the question of the actual existence of a perfect\r\nState is not the question of supreme importance. For Plato\r\nhas grasped the thought that man is controlled not only\r\nby what he sees, but by what he images as desirable. And\r\nif a man has once formed the image of an ideal State or\r\ncity of this kind, in which justice prevails, and life reaches\r\nfuller and higher possibilities than it has yet attained, this\r\nis the main thing:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"In heaven, there is laid up a pattern of it, methinks,\r\nwhich he who desires may behold, and beholding, may set\r\nhis own house in order. But whether such an one exists, or\r\never will exist in fact, is no matter: for he will live after the\r\nmanner of that city, having nothing to do with any other.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_74_74\" id=\"FNanchor_74_74\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_74_74\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[74]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Social as Law of Nature.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The social nature of\r\nman, thus vindicated by Plato and Aristotle, remained as\r\nthe permanent possession of Greek thought. Even the\r\nEpicureans, who developed further the hedonistic theory of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_131\" id=\"Page_131\"\u003e[Pg 131]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlife, emphasized the values of friendship as among the\r\nchoicest and most refined sources of pleasure. The Stoics,\r\nwho in their independence of wants took up the tradition of\r\nthe Cynics, were yet far from interpreting this as an independence\r\nof society. The disintegration of the Greek\r\nstates made it impossible to find the social body in the old\r\ncity-state, and so we find with the Stoics a certain cosmopolitanism.\r\nIt is the highest glory of man to be a citizen\r\nnot of Athens but of the universe,\u0026mdash;not of the city of Cecrops,\r\nbut of the city of Zeus. And through this conception\r\nthe social nature of man was made the basis of a \"natural\r\nlaw,\" which found its expression in the principles of\r\nRoman and modern jurisprudence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePassion or Reason.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In answering the question as to\r\nthe true nature of man, Plato and Aristotle found the suggestions\r\nlikewise for the problem of individual good. For\r\nif the soldier as the seeker for fame and honor, the avaricious\r\nman embodying the desire for wealth, and still more,\r\nthe tyrant personifying the unbridled expression of every\r\nlust and passion, are abhorrent, is it not easy to see that\r\nan orderly and harmonious development of impulses under\r\nthe guidance and control of reason, is far better than that\r\nuncramped expression of desires and cravings for which\r\nsome of the radical individualists and sensualists of the\r\nday were clamoring? As representative of this class, hear\r\nCallicles:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"I plainly assert that he who would truly live ought to\r\nallow his desires to wax to the uttermost, and not to chastise\r\nthem; but when they have grown to their greatest, he should\r\nhave courage and intelligence to minister to them and to\r\nsatisfy all his longings. And this I affirm to be natural justice\r\nand nobility.\" The temperate man is a fool. It is only in\r\nhungering and eating, in thirsting and drinking, in having\r\nall his desires about him, and gratifying every possible desire,\r\nthat man lives happily.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_75_75\" id=\"FNanchor_75_75\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_75_75\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[75]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_132\" id=\"Page_132\"\u003e[Pg 132]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut even Callicles himself admits that there are certain\r\nmen, the creatures of degraded desire, whose lives are not\r\nideal, and hence that there must be some choice of pleasure.\r\nAnd carrying out in the individual life the thought above\r\nsuggested by the State, Plato raises the question as to\r\nwhether man, a complex being, with both noble and ignoble\r\nimpulses, and with the capacity of controlling reason, can\r\nbe said to make a wise choice if he lets the passions run\r\nriot and choke out wholly his rational nature:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"Is not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man,\r\nor rather to the god in man; and the ignoble that which subjects\r\nthe man to the beast? He can hardly avoid admitting\r\nthis,\u0026mdash;can he now? Not if he has any regard for my opinion.\r\nBut, if he admits this, we may ask him another question:\r\nHow would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the\r\ncondition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the\r\nworst? Who can imagine that a man who sold his son or\r\ndaughter into slavery for money, especially if he sold them\r\ninto the hands of fierce and evil men, would be the gainer,\r\nhowever large might be the sum which he received? And will\r\nany one say that he is not a miserable caitiff who sells his own\r\ndivine being to that which is most atheistical and detestable\r\nand has no pity? Eriphyle took the necklace as the price of\r\nher husband\u0027s life, but he is taking a bribe in order to compass\r\na worse ruin.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_76_76\" id=\"FNanchor_76_76\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_76_76\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[76]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eNecessity of a Standard for Pleasure.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;If, for the\r\nmoment, we rule out the question of what is noble or\r\n\"kalon,\" and admit that the aim of life is to live pleasantly,\r\nor if, in other words, it is urged as above that justice\r\nis not profitable and that hence he who would seek the\r\nhighest good will seek it by some other than the thorny\r\npath, we must recognize that the decision as to which kind\r\nof pleasure is preferable will depend on the character of\r\nthe man who judges:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"Then we may assume that there are three classes of men,\u0026mdash;lovers\r\nof wisdom, lovers of ambition, lovers of gain? Exactly.\r\nAnd there are three kinds of pleasure, which are their\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_133\" id=\"Page_133\"\u003e[Pg 133]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eseveral objects? Very true. Now, if you examine the three\r\nclasses and ask of them in turn which of their lives is pleasantest,\r\neach of them will be found praising his own and deprecating\r\nthat of others; the money-maker will contrast the\r\nvanity of honor or of learning with the solid advantages of\r\ngold and silver? True, he said. And the lover of honor,\u0026mdash;what\r\nwill be his opinion? Will he not think that the pleasure\r\nof riches is vulgar, while the pleasure of learning, which has\r\nno need of honor, he regards as all smoke and nonsense?\r\nTrue, he said. But may we not suppose, I said, that philosophy\r\nestimates other pleasures as nothing in comparison with\r\nknowing the truth, and in that abiding, ever learning, in the\r\npursuit of truth, not far indeed from the heaven of pleasure?\r\nThe other pleasures the philosopher disparages by calling\r\nthem necessary, meaning that if there were no necessity for\r\nthem, he would not have them. There ought to be no doubt\r\nabout that, he replied. Since, then, the pleasure of each class\r\nand the life of each is in dispute, and the question is not which\r\nlife is most honorable, or better or worse, but which is the\r\nmore pleasant or painless,\u0026mdash;how shall we know? I cannot\r\ntell, he said. Well, but what ought to be the criterion? Is\r\nany better than experience and wisdom and reason? There\r\ncannot be a better, he said. If wealth and gain were the\r\ncriterion, then what the lover of gain praised and blamed\r\nwould surely be the truest? Assuredly. Of if honor or\r\nvictory or courage, in that case the ambitions or contentments\r\nwould decide best? Clearly. But since experience and\r\nwisdom and reason are the judges, the inference of course is,\r\nthat the truest pleasures are those which are approved by the\r\nlover of wisdom and reason.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_77_77\" id=\"FNanchor_77_77\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_77_77\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[77]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is thus evident that even if we start out to find the\r\ngood in pleasure, we need some kind of measuring art. We\r\nneed a \"standard for pleasure,\" and this standard can be\r\nfound only in wisdom. And this forces us to maintain that\r\nwisdom is after all \u003ci\u003ethe\u003c/i\u003e good. Not merely intellectual attainment\u0026mdash;a\r\nlife of intellect without feeling would be just\r\nas little a true human life as would the life of an oyster,\r\nwhich has feeling with no intelligence. A life which includes\r\nsciences and arts, and the pure pleasures of beauty,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_134\" id=\"Page_134\"\u003e[Pg 134]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npresided over by wisdom and measure and symmetry,\u0026mdash;this\r\nis Plato\u0027s vision of the life of the individual, viewed from\r\nwithin.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEudaemonism.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Aristotle\u0027s conception of the good is\r\nfundamentally the same. It is a full development of man\u0027s\r\ncapacities, culminating in a rational and harmonious life.\r\nIf, says Aristotle, we are to find the ultimate good, we must\r\ntry to find, if possible, some one end which is pursued as an\r\nend in itself, and never as a means to something else, and\r\nthe most general term for this final end is \"eudaimonia,\"\r\nor well-being, \"for we also choose it for itself and never for\r\nthe sake of something else.\" What is the essence of well-being?\r\nThis, according to Aristotle, is to be found by asking\r\nwhat is the function of man. The life of nutrition and\r\ngrowth man has in common with the plants; the life of\r\nsense in common with the animal. It is in the life of his rational\r\nnature that we must find his especial function. \"The\r\ngood of man is exercise of his faculties in accordance with\r\ntheir appropriate excellence.\" External goods are valuable\r\nbecause they may be instruments toward such full\r\nactivity. Pleasure is to be valued because it \"perfects the\r\nactivities, and therefore perfects life, which is the aim of\r\nhuman desire\"\u0026mdash;rather than valued as an end in itself.\r\nNo one would choose to live on condition of having a child\u0027s\r\nintellect all his life, though he were to enjoy in the highest\r\npossible degree all the pleasures of a child.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_78_78\" id=\"FNanchor_78_78\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_78_78\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[78]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe \"Mean.\"\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The crowning importance of wisdom as\r\nthe rational measure of the ideal life is also illustrated in\r\nAristotle\u0027s theory of excellence (or virtue) as a \"mean\".\r\nThis phrase is somewhat ambiguous, for some passages\r\nwould seem to indicate that it is merely striking an average\r\nbetween two kinds of excesses, and finding, as it were,\r\na moderate amount of feeling or action; but there is evidently\r\ninvolved here just the old thought of measure, and\r\n\"the mean is what right reason prescribes.\" It is not every\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_135\" id=\"Page_135\"\u003e[Pg 135]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\none who can find the mean, but only he who has the requisite\r\nknowledge. The supreme excellence or virtue is, therefore,\r\nthe wisdom which can find the true standard for\r\naction.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_79_79\" id=\"FNanchor_79_79\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_79_79\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[79]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Wise Man.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Finally the conception of virtue as\r\nwisdom is illustrated in the ideals of the three prominent\r\nschools in later Greek thought,\u0026mdash;the Sceptics, Epicureans,\r\nand Stoics. The wise man among Sceptics is he who\r\nsuspends judgment where it is impossible to be certain.\r\nThe wise man among Epicureans is he who chooses the finest\r\nand surest and most lasting pleasures. The wise man\r\namong Stoics is he who overcomes his emotions. But in\r\nevery case the ideal is expressed in the same phrase, \"the\r\nwise man.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMan and the Cosmos.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We see thus how Greek\r\nthought, starting out to challenge all society\u0027s laws and\r\nstandards and bring them to the bar of knowledge, has\r\nfound a deeper value and higher validity in the true social\r\nand moral order. The appeal was to the C\u0026aelig;sar of reason,\r\nand reason taken in its full significance carries us beyond\r\nthe immediate and transient to the broader and more permanent\r\ngood. Nor can reason in its search for good be\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_136\" id=\"Page_136\"\u003e[Pg 136]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncontent, urges Plato, with the superficial facts of life and\r\nsociety. He who would find and achieve his complete function,\r\nhis full development, must broaden his horizon still\r\nfurther. As his own particular life is but a part of the ongoing\r\nof the larger world, whose forces act upon him, limit\r\nhim, and determine his possibilities, it becomes absolutely\r\nnecessary to study not merely his own end and purpose, but\r\nthe end and purpose of the universe. Human good requires\r\nus to know the larger good, \u003ci\u003ethe\u003c/i\u003e Good, in the full and complete\r\nsense. And this perfect Good which is, in truth, the\r\nvery essence of the universe, is but another term for God,\r\nand Plato often uses the two as interchangeable terms.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo the \"Nature\" which Greek life was seeking gets its\r\ndeepest significance and reinterprets the old religious demand\r\nfor unity of the life of man with the forces of the\r\nunseen. And the Stoic later, in his maxim \"Follow Nature,\"\r\ngives more explicit recognition to the return of the circle.\r\nFor the great work of Greek science had brought out into\r\ncomplete clearness the idea of Nature as a system of law.\r\nThe universe is a rational universe, a cosmos, and man, as\r\nabove all else a rational being, finds thus his kinship to the\r\nuniverse. To follow Nature, therefore, means to know the\r\nall-pervading law of Nature and submit to it in calm acceptance\r\nor resignation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"All is harmonious to me that is harmonious to thee, O\r\nuniverse; all is fruit to me which thy seasons bring.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_80_80\" id=\"FNanchor_80_80\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_80_80\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[80]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 6. THE CONCEPTION OF THE IDEAL\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eContrast of Actual and Ideal.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The two stages of\r\nGreek thought which we have sketched did more than to readjust\r\nGreek life to deeper views of the State and the individual;\r\nof the good and of nature. The very challenge\r\nand process brought into explicit consciousness a new\r\nfeature of the moral life, which is fundamental to true\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_137\" id=\"Page_137\"\u003e[Pg 137]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmoral consciousness, viz., the factor of contrast between\r\nthe actual and the ideal. We have seen that the clash of\r\none-sided interests and political institutions and, in the case\r\nof Plato, the tragic execution of Socrates, obliged Plato\r\nand Aristotle to admit that the actual State did not subserve\r\nthe real purpose which they were forced to seek in\r\nsocial organization. Both Plato and Aristotle, therefore,\r\ndraw the picture of a State that should serve the complete\r\npurposes of human development. And again, in the individual\r\nlife, both the conception of the development of man\u0027s\r\nhighest possibilities and the conception of a measure or\r\nstandard for the conflicting desires and purposes lead on\r\nto a conception which shall embody not merely the existing\r\nstatus but the goal of yet unrealized purpose.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Ideal as the True Reality.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Various qualities and\r\naspirations are embodied by Plato in this conception, and\r\nwith characteristic Greek genius he has given to this conception\r\nof the ideal almost as concrete and definite a form\r\nas the Greek sculptor of Apollo gave to his ideal of light\r\nand clarity, or the sculptor of Aphrodite to the conception\r\nof grace. As contrasted with the flux of transient emotions,\r\nor the uncertain play of half-comprehended or futile\r\ngoods, this ideal good is conceived as eternal, unchanging,\r\never the same. It is superhuman and divine. As contrasted\r\nwith various particular and partial goods on which\r\nthe sons of men fix their affections, it is the one universal\r\ngood which is valid for all men everywhere and forever.\r\nIn his effort to find suitable imagery for this conception,\r\nPlato was aided by the religious conceptions of the Orphic\r\nand Pythagorean societies, which had emphasized the pre-existence\r\nand future existence of the soul, and its distinction\r\nfrom the body. In its previous life, said Plato,\r\nthe soul has had visions of a beauty, a truth, and a goodness\r\nof which this life affords no adequate examples. And\r\nwith this memory within it of what it has looked upon before,\r\nit judges the imperfect and finite goods of this present\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_138\" id=\"Page_138\"\u003e[Pg 138]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nworld and longs to fly away again and be with God. This\r\nthought of contrast between ideal and actual, to which\r\nPlato in some of his writings gave the turn of a contrast\r\nbetween soul and body, passed on with increased emphasis\r\ninto Stoic and later Platonist schools, and furnished a philosophic\r\nbasis for the dualism and asceticism which is found\r\nin Hellenistic and medi\u0026aelig;val morality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEthical Significance.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;While the true ethical contrast\r\nbetween the actual and the ideal was thus shifted over into\r\na metaphysical contrast between soul and body, or between\r\nwhat is fixed and what is changing, the fundamental\r\nthought is highly significant, for it merely symbolizes\r\nin objective form the characteristic of every moral\r\njudgment, viz., the testing and valuing of an act by some\r\nstandard, and what is even more important, the forming\r\nof a standard by which to do the testing. Even Aristotle,\r\nwho is frequently regarded as the mere describer of what\r\nis, rather than the idealistic portrayer of what ought to\r\nbe, is no less insistent upon the significance of the ideal.\r\nIn fact, his isolation of reflection or \u003ci\u003etheoria\u003c/i\u003e from the civic\r\nvirtues was used by the medi\u0026aelig;val church in its idealization\r\nof the \"contemplative life.\" Like Plato, he conceives the\r\nideal as a divine element in human nature:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"Nevertheless, instead of listening to those who advise us as\r\nmen and mortals not to lift our thoughts above what is human\r\nand mortal, we ought rather, as far as possible, to put off our\r\nmortality and make every effort to live in the exercise of the\r\nhighest of our faculties; for though it be but a small part of\r\nus, yet in power and value it far surpasses all the rest.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_81_81\" id=\"FNanchor_81_81\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_81_81\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[81]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 7. THE CONCEPTION OF THE SELF; OF CHARACTER AND\r\nRESPONSIBILITY\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Poets.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Out of the fierce competition of individual\r\ndesires, the clashing of individual ambitions, the conflict\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_139\" id=\"Page_139\"\u003e[Pg 139]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbetween the individual and the state, and the deepening of\r\nthe conception of the individual\u0027s \"nature,\" emerged also\r\nanother conception of fundamental importance for the\r\nmore highly developed reflective moral life, viz., that\r\nof the moral personality, its character and its responsibility.\r\nWe may trace the development of this conception\r\nthrough the poets, as well as in the philosophers. \u0026AElig;schylus\r\nset man over against the gods, subject to their divine\r\nlaws, but gave little play to human character or conscious\r\nself-direction. With Sophocles, the tragic situation\r\nwas brought more directly into the field of human character,\r\nalthough the conception of destiny and the limitations\r\nmarked thereby were still the dominant note. With Euripides,\r\nhuman emotions and character are brought into the\r\nforeground. Stout-heartedness, the high spirit that can\r\nendure in suffering or triumph in death, which shows not\r\nmerely in his heroes but in the women, Polyxena and Medea,\r\nPh\u0026aelig;dra and Iphigenia, evinces the growing consciousness\r\nof the self\u0026mdash;a consciousness which will find further\r\ndevelopment in the proud and self-sufficient endurance of\r\nthe Stoic. In more directly ethical lines, we find increasing\r\nrecognition of the self in the motives which are set up\r\nfor human action, and in the view which is formed of\r\nhuman character. Conscience in the earlier poets and moralists,\r\nwas largely a compound of Nemesis, the external\r\nmessenger and symbol of divine penalty, on the one hand,\r\nand Aidos, the sense of respect or reverence for public\r\nopinion and for the higher authority of the gods, on the\r\nother. But already in the tragedians we find suggestions\r\nof a more intimate and personal conception. Pains sent by\r\nZeus in dreams may lead the individual to meditate, and\r\nthus to better life. Neoptolemus, in Sophocles, says,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"All things are noisome when a man deserts\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHis own true self and does what is not meet.\"\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"noidt\"\u003eand Philoctetes replies,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"Have mercy on me, boy, by all the gods,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAnd do not shame thyself by tricking me.\"\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_140\" id=\"Page_140\"\u003e[Pg 140]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"noidt\"\u003eThe whole \u003ci\u003eAntigone\u003c/i\u003e of Sophocles is the struggle between\r\nobedience to the political rulers and obedience to the higher\r\nlaws which as \"laws of reverence\" become virtually inner\r\nlaws of duty:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"I know I please the souls I ought to please.\"\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePlato.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Here, as in the formulation of his conception of\r\nthe ideal, religious imagery helped Plato to find a more objective\r\nstatement for the conception of a moral judgment\r\nand a moral character. In the final judgment of the soul\r\nafter death, Plato sees the real self stripped bare of all\r\nexternal adornments of beauty, rank, power, or wealth,\r\nand standing as naked soul before the naked judge, to receive\r\nhis just reward. And the very nature of this reward\r\nor penalty shows the deepening conception of the self, and\r\nof the intrinsic nature of moral character. The true penalty\r\nof injustice is not to be found in anything external,\r\nbut in the very fact that the evil doers become base and\r\nwicked:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"They do not know the penalty of injustice, which above\r\nall things they ought to know,\u0026mdash;not stripes and death, as they\r\nsuppose, which evil doers often escape, but a penalty which\r\ncannot be escaped.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTheod.\u003c/span\u003e What is that?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSoc.\u003c/span\u003e There are two patterns set before them in nature; the\r\none blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched; and\r\nthey do not see, in their utter folly and infatuation, that they\r\nare growing like the one and unlike the other, by reason of\r\ntheir evil deeds; and the penalty is that they lead a life\r\nanswering to the pattern which they resemble.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_82_82\" id=\"FNanchor_82_82\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_82_82\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[82]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Stoics.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It is, however, in the Stoics that we find\r\nthe conception of inner reflection reaching clearest expression.\r\nSeneca and Epictetus repeat again and again\r\nthe thought that the conscience is of higher importance\r\nthan any external judgment,\u0026mdash;that its judgment is inevitable.\r\nIn these various conceptions, we see attained the\r\nthird stage of Adam Smith\u0027s description of the formation\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_141\" id=\"Page_141\"\u003e[Pg 141]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof conscience.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_83_83\" id=\"FNanchor_83_83\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_83_83\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[83]\u003c/a\u003e Man who read his duty at first in the judgments\r\nof his fellows, in the customs and laws and codes of\r\nhonor, and in the religious precepts of the gods, has again\r\ncome to find in gods and laws, in custom and authority, the\r\ntrue rational law of life; but it is now a law of self. Not\r\na particular or individual self, but a self which embraces\r\nwithin it at once the human and the divine. The individual\r\nhas become social and has recognized himself as such.\r\nThe religious, social, and political judgments have become\r\nthe judgments of man upon himself. \"Duty,\" what is\r\nbinding or necessary, takes its place as a definite moral\r\nconception.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBesides the writings of Plato (especially, the \u003ci\u003eApology\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eCrito\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003eProtagoras\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eGorgias\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003eRepublic\u003c/i\u003e), Xenophon (\u003ci\u003eMemorabilia\u003c/i\u003e), Aristotle\r\n(\u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ePolitics\u003c/i\u003e), Cicero (\u003ci\u003eOn Ends, Laws, Duties\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003eOn the\r\nNature of the Gods\u003c/i\u003e), Epictetus, Seneca, M. Aurelius, Plutarch, and\r\nthe fragments of various Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, the tragedies\r\nof \u0026AElig;schylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and the comedies of\r\nAristophanes (especially the \u003ci\u003eClouds\u003c/i\u003e) afford valuable material.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll the histories of philosophy treat the theoretical side; among\r\nthem may be mentioned Gomp\u0026eacute;rz (\u003ci\u003eGreek Thinkers\u003c/i\u003e, 1900-05), Zeller\r\n(\u003ci\u003eSocrates\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003ePlato\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003eAristotle\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003eStoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics\u003c/i\u003e),\r\nWindelband, Benn (\u003ci\u003ePhilosophy of Greece\u003c/i\u003e, 1898, chs. i., v.).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the Moral Consciousness: Schmidt, \u003ci\u003eEthik der alten Griechen\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1882. On the social conditions and theories: P\u0026ouml;hlmann, \u003ci\u003eGeschichte des\r\nantiken Kommunismus und Sozialismus\u003c/i\u003e, 1893-1901; D\u0026ouml;ring, \u003ci\u003eDie Lehre\r\ndes Sokrates als sociales Reformsystem\u003c/i\u003e, 1895. On the religion: Farnell,\r\n\u003ci\u003eCults of the Greek States\u003c/i\u003e, 3 vols., 1896; Rohde, \u003ci\u003ePsyche\u003c/i\u003e, 1894.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn Political Conditions and Theory: Newman, Introd. to \u003ci\u003ePolitics of\r\nAristotle\u003c/i\u003e, 1887; Bradley, \u003ci\u003eAristotle\u0027s Theory of the State in Hellenica\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nWilamovitz-M\u0026ouml;llendorf, \u003ci\u003eAristotle und Athen\u003c/i\u003e, 1900.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn Nature and Law of Nature: Ritchie, \u003ci\u003eNatural Rights\u003c/i\u003e, 1895;\r\nBurnet, \u003ci\u003eInt. Journal of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, vii., 1897, pp. 328-33; Hardy, \u003ci\u003eBegriff\r\nder Physis\u003c/i\u003e, 1884; Voigt, \u003ci\u003eDie Lehre vom jus naturale\u003c/i\u003e, 1856-75.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eGeneral: Denis, \u003ci\u003eHistoire des Th\u0026eacute;ories et des Id\u0026eacute;es Morales dans\r\nl\u0027Antiquit\u0026eacute;\u003c/i\u003e, 1879; Taylor, \u003ci\u003eAncient Ideals\u003c/i\u003e, 1900; Caird, \u003ci\u003eEvolution of\r\nTheology in the Greek Philosophers\u003c/i\u003e, 1904; Janet, \u003ci\u003eHistoire de la\r\nScience Politique dans ses Rapports avec la Morale\u003c/i\u003e, 1887; Grote, \u003ci\u003eHistory\r\nof Greece\u003c/i\u003e, 4th ed., 1872; \u003ci\u003ePlato and the Other Companions of\r\nSocrates\u003c/i\u003e, 1888.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_64_64\" id=\"Footnote_64_64\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_64_64\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[64]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. Xenophon\u0027s account of the impressive appeal of Clearchus:\r\n\"For, first and greatest, the oaths which we have sworn by the gods\r\nforbid us to be enemies to each other. Whoever is conscious of\r\nhaving transgressed these,\u0026mdash;him I could never deem happy. For if\r\none were at war with the gods, I know not with what swiftness\r\nhe might flee so as to escape, or into what darkness he might run,\r\nor into what stronghold he might retreat and find refuge. For\r\nall things are everywhere subject to the gods, and the gods rule all\r\neverywhere with equity.\"\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eAnabasis\u003c/i\u003e, II., v.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_65_65\" id=\"Footnote_65_65\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_65_65\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[65]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eRepublic\u003c/i\u003e, I., 343.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_66_66\" id=\"Footnote_66_66\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_66_66\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[66]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eRepublic\u003c/i\u003e, II., 365.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_67_67\" id=\"Footnote_67_67\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_67_67\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[67]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eRepublic\u003c/i\u003e, II., 365.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_68_68\" id=\"Footnote_68_68\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_68_68\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[68]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eRepublic\u003c/i\u003e, I., 343 f.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_69_69\" id=\"Footnote_69_69\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_69_69\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[69]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Windelband, \u003ci\u003eHistory of Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e, p. 86.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_70_70\" id=\"Footnote_70_70\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_70_70\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[70]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003ePolitics\u003c/i\u003e, I., ii. Welldon\u0027s translation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_71_71\" id=\"Footnote_71_71\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_71_71\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[71]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003ePolitics\u003c/i\u003e, I., ii. Welldon\u0027s translation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_72_72\" id=\"Footnote_72_72\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_72_72\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[72]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, VIII., i.; IX., vi.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_73_73\" id=\"Footnote_73_73\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_73_73\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[73]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eRepublic\u003c/i\u003e, V., 473.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_74_74\" id=\"Footnote_74_74\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_74_74\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[74]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, IX., 592.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_75_75\" id=\"Footnote_75_75\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_75_75\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[75]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eGorgias\u003c/i\u003e, 491 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_76_76\" id=\"Footnote_76_76\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_76_76\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[76]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eRepublic\u003c/i\u003e, IX., 589 f.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_77_77\" id=\"Footnote_77_77\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_77_77\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[77]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eRepublic\u003c/i\u003e, IX., 581 f.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_78_78\" id=\"Footnote_78_78\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_78_78\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[78]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, X., ii.-iv.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_79_79\" id=\"Footnote_79_79\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_79_79\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[79]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Among the various types of excellence which Aristotle enumerates\r\nas exemplifying this principle, the quality of high-mindedness\r\n(\u0026#956;\u0026#949;\u0026#947;\u0026#945;\u0026#955;\u0026#959;\u0026#968;\u0026#965;\u0026#967;\u0026#943;\u0026#945;)\r\nis pre-eminent, and may be taken as embodying the trait\r\nmost prized in an Athenian gentleman. The high-minded man claims\r\nmuch and deserves much; lofty in his standard of honor and excellence\r\nhe accepts tributes from good men as his just desert, but\r\ndespises honor from ordinary men or on trivial grounds; good and\r\nevil fortune are alike of relatively small importance. He neither\r\nseeks nor fears danger; he is ready to confer favors and forget\r\ninjuries, slow to ask favors or cry for help; fearless in his love and\r\nhatred, in his truth and his independence of conduct; \"not easily\r\nmoved to admiration, for nothing is great to him. He loves to\r\npossess beautiful things that bring no profit, rather than useful\r\nthings that pay; for this is characteristic of the man whose resources\r\nare in himself. Further, the character of the high-minded man seems\r\nto require that his gait should be slow, his voice deep, his speech\r\nmeasured; for a man is not likely to be in a hurry when there\r\nare few things in which he is deeply interested, nor excited when he\r\nholds nothing to be of very great importance; and these are the\r\ncauses of a high voice and rapid movements\" (\u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, IV., vi.-viii.).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_80_80\" id=\"Footnote_80_80\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_80_80\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[80]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Marcus Aurelius, \u003ci\u003eThoughts\u003c/i\u003e, IV., 23.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_81_81\" id=\"Footnote_81_81\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_81_81\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[81]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, X., vii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_82_82\" id=\"Footnote_82_82\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_82_82\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[82]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eThe\u0026aelig;tetus\u003c/i\u003e, 176.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_83_83\" id=\"Footnote_83_83\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_83_83\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[83]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Smith held that we (1) approve or disapprove the conduct of\r\nothers; (2) see ourselves as others see us, judging ourselves from\r\ntheir standpoint; (3) finally, form a true social standard, that of\r\nthe \"impartial spectator.\" This is an inner standard\u0026mdash;conscience.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_142\" id=\"Page_142\"\u003e[Pg 142]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER VIII\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTHE MODERN PERIOD\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe moral life of the modern western world differs from\r\nboth Hebrew and Greek morality in one respect. The Hebrews\r\nand Greeks were pioneers. Their leaders had to\r\nmeet new situations and shape new conceptions of righteousness\r\nand wisdom. Modern civilization and morality,\r\non the other hand, received certain ideals and standards\r\nalready worked out and established. These came to it\r\npartly through the literature of Hebrews, Greeks, and\r\nLatins, partly through Greek art and Roman civilization,\r\nbut chiefly, perhaps, through two institutions: (1) Roman\r\ngovernment and law embodied Stoic conceptions of a natural\r\nlaw of reason and of a world state, a universal rational\r\nsociety. This not only gave the groundwork of government\r\nand rights to the modern world; it was a constant\r\ninfluence for guiding and shaping ideas of authority\r\nand justice. (2) The Christian Church in its cathedrals,\r\nits cloisters, its ceremonials, its orders, and its doctrines had\r\na most impressive system of standards, valuations, motives,\r\nsanctions, and prescriptions for action. These were\r\nnot of Hebrew origin solely. Greek and Roman philosophy\r\nand political conceptions were fused with more primitive\r\nteaching and conduct. When the Germans conquered\r\nthe Empire they accepted in large measure its institutions\r\nand its religion. Modern morality, like modern civilization,\r\nshows the mingled streams of Hebrew, Greek, Roman, and\r\nGerman or Celtic life. It contains also conceptions due\r\nto the peculiar industrial, scientific, and political development\r\nof modern times. Thus we have to-day such inherited\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_143\" id=\"Page_143\"\u003e[Pg 143]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nstandards as that of \"the honor of a gentleman\" side by\r\nside with the modern class standard of business honesty,\r\nand the labor union ideal of class solidarity. We have the\r\naristocratic ideals of chivalry and charity side by side with\r\nmore democratic standards of domestic and social justice.\r\nWe find the Christian equal standard for the two sexes\r\nside by side with another which sets a high value on woman\u0027s\r\nchastity, but a trivial value on man\u0027s. We find a\r\ncertain ideal of self-sacrifice side by side with an ideal of\r\n\"success\" as the only good. We cannot hope to disentangle\r\nall the threads that enter this variegated pattern,\r\nor rather collection of patterns, but we can point out certain\r\nfeatures that at the same time illustrate certain general\r\nlines of development. We state first the general attitude\r\nand ideals of the Middle Ages, and then the three lines\r\nalong which individualism has proceeded to the moral consciousness\r\nof to-day.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 1. THE MEDI\u0026AElig;VAL IDEALS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe medi\u0026aelig;val attitude toward life was determined in part\r\nby the character of the Germanic tribes with their bold,\r\nbarbaric strength and indomitable spirit, their clan and\r\nother group organizations, their customs or mores belonging\r\nto such a stock; and in part by the religious ideals\r\npresented in the church. The presence of these two factors\r\nwas manifest in the strong contrasts everywhere present.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"Associated with mail-clad knights whose trade is war and\r\nwhose delight is to combat are the men whose sacred vocation\r\nforbids the use of force altogether. Through lands\r\noverspread with deeds of violence, the lonely wayfarer with\r\nthe staff and badge of a pilgrim passes unarmed and in safety.\r\nIn sight of castles, about whose walls fierce battles rage, are\r\nthe church and the monastery, within the precincts of which\r\nquiet reigns and all violence is branded as sacrilege.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_84_84\" id=\"FNanchor_84_84\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_84_84\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[84]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe harsh clashes of the Venus music over against\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_144\" id=\"Page_144\"\u003e[Pg 144]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe solemn strains from the Pilgrim\u0027s Chorus in Tannh\u0026auml;user\r\nmight well symbolize not only the specific collision\r\nof the opera but the broader range of passions opposed\r\nto the religious controls and values in this medi\u0026aelig;val\r\nsociety.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Group and Class Ideal.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The early Germans and\r\nCelts in general had the clan system, the group ideals,\r\nand group virtues which belonged to other Aryan peoples,\r\nbut the very fact of the Germanic victories shows\r\na military spirit which included both personal heroism\r\nand good capacity for organization. Group loyalty was\r\nstrong, and the group valuation of strength and courage\r\nwas unbounded. A high value was also set on woman\u0027s\r\nchastity. These qualities, particularly the loyalty\r\nto the clan and its head, survived longest in Celtic\r\npeoples like the Scots and Irish who were not subjected\r\nto the forces of political organization. Every reader of\r\nScott is familiar with the values and defects of the type;\r\nand the problems which it causes in modern democracy have\r\nbeen acutely described by Jane Addams.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_85_85\" id=\"FNanchor_85_85\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_85_85\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[85]\u003c/a\u003e Among the\r\nGermanic peoples, when the clan and tribal systems were\r\nfollowed by the more thoroughgoing demarcation of\r\nclasses, free and serfs, lords and villains, chevalier or\r\nknight, and churl, the old Latin terms \"gentle\" and \"vulgar\"\r\nfound a fitting application. The term \"gentle\"\r\nwas indeed given in one of its usages the force of the\r\nkindred term \"kind\" to characterize the conduct appropriate\r\nwithin the kin, but in the compound \"gentleman\"\r\nit formed one of the most interesting conceptions of class\r\nmorality. The \"honor\" of a gentleman was determined\r\nby what the class demanded. Above all else the gentleman\r\nmust not show fear. He must be ready to fight at\r\nany instant to prove his courage. His word must not\r\nbe doubted. This seems to have been on the ground that\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_145\" id=\"Page_145\"\u003e[Pg 145]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsuch doubt would be a refusal to take the man at his own\r\nestimate, rather than because of any superlative love of\r\ntruth, for the approved way to prove the point at issue was\r\nby fighting, not by any investigation. But the class character\r\nappears in the provision that no insult from one of\r\na lower class need be noticed. Homicide was not contrary\r\nto the character and honor of a gentleman. Nor did this\r\nrequire any such standard in sex relations as a \"woman\u0027s\r\nhonor\" requires of a woman. In conduct toward others,\r\nthe \"courtesy\" which expresses in ceremony and manner\r\nrespect for personal dignity was a fine trait. It\r\ndid not always prevent insolence toward inferiors, although\r\nthere was in many cases the feeling, \u003ci\u003enoblesse oblige\u003c/i\u003e. What\r\nwas needed to make this ideal of gentleman a moral and\r\nnot merely a class ideal, was that it should base treatment\r\nof others on personal worth rather than on birth, or\r\nwealth, or race, and that it should not rate reputation for\r\ncourage above the value of human life. This has been\r\nin part effected, but many traits of the old conception\r\nlive on to-day.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Ideal of the Church.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The ideal of life which the\r\nchurch presented contained two strongly contrasting\r\nelements, which have been frequently found in religion\r\nand are perhaps inevitably present. On the one hand, a\r\nspiritual religion implies that man in comparison with\r\nGod is finite, weak, and sinful; he should therefore be of\r\n\"a humble and contrite heart.\" On the other hand, as a\r\nchild of God he partakes of the divine and is raised to\r\ninfinite worth. On the one hand, the spiritual life is not\r\nof this world and must be sought in renouncing its pleasures\r\nand lusts; on the other hand, if God is really the\r\nsupreme governor of the universe, then this world also\r\nought to be subject to his rule. In the medi\u0026aelig;val view of\r\nlife, the humility and withdrawal from the world were\r\nassigned to the individual; the sublimity and the ruling\r\nauthority to the church. Ethically this distribution had\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_146\" id=\"Page_146\"\u003e[Pg 146]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsomewhat the effect of group morality in that it minimized\r\nthe individual and magnified the corporate body\r\nof which he was a part. Asceticism and humility go hand\r\nin hand with the power of the hierarchy. Individual\r\npoverty\u0026mdash;wealth of the church; individual meekness and\r\nsubmission\u0026mdash;unlimited power and authority in the church;\r\nthese antitheses reflect the fact that the church was the heir\r\nboth of a kingdom of God and of a Roman Empire. The\r\nhumility showed itself in extreme form in the ascetic type\r\nof monasticism with its vows of poverty, chastity, and\r\nobedience. It was reflected in the art which took for its\r\nsubjects the saints, conceived not individually, but typically\r\nand according to tradition and authority. Their thin\r\nattenuated figures showed the ideal prescribed. The same\r\nhumility showed itself in the intellectual sphere in the\r\npre\u0026euml;minence given to faith as compared with reason, while\r\nthe mystic losing himself in God showed yet another phase\r\nof individual renunciation. Even charity, with which the\r\nchurch sought to temper the hardship of the time, took\r\na form which tended to maintain or even applaud the\r\ndependent attitude of the recipient. So far as life for\r\nthe individual had a positive value, this lay not in living\r\noneself out, but rather in the calm and the support afforded\r\nby the church:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"A life in the church, for the church, through the church;\r\na life which she blessed in mass at morning and sent to peaceful\r\nrest by the vesper hymn; a life which she supported by\r\nthe constantly recurring stimulus of the sacraments, relieving\r\nit by confession, purifying it by penance, admonishing it by\r\nthe presentation of visible objects for contemplation and worship\u0026mdash;this\r\nwas the life which they of the Middle Ages conceived\r\nof as the rightful life of man; it was the actual life\r\nof many, the ideal of all.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_86_86\" id=\"FNanchor_86_86\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_86_86\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[86]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the other side, the church boldly asserted the right\r\nand duty of the divine to control the world,\u0026mdash;the reli\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_147\" id=\"Page_147\"\u003e[Pg 147]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003egious\r\nsymbol of the modern proposition that conscience\r\nshould dominate political and business affairs. \"No institution\r\nis apart from the authority of the church,\" wrote\r\n\u0026AElig;gidius Colonna. \"No one can legitimately possess field\r\nor vine except under its authority or by it. Heretics are\r\nnot owners, but unjustly occupy.\" Canossa symbolized\r\nthe supremacy of the spiritual over the temporal power,\r\nand there is a sublime audacity, moral as well as political,\r\nin the famous Bull of Boniface VIII., \"We declare that\r\nevery human creature is subject to the Roman pontiff.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe church as a corporate society expressed also the\r\n\u003ci\u003ecommunity\u003c/i\u003e of its members. It was indeed no mere collection\r\nof individual believers. As a divine institution,\r\nthe \"body of Christ on earth,\" it gave to its members\r\nrather than received from them. It invested them with\r\nnew worth, instead of getting its own worth from them.\r\nNevertheless, it was not an absolute authority; it represented\r\nthe union of all in a common fellowship, a common\r\ndestiny, and a common cause against the powers\r\nof evil.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe massive cathedrals which remain as the monuments\r\nof the ages of faith, are fitting symbols of these\r\naspects of medi\u0026aelig;val life. They dominate their cities\r\narchitecturally, as the church dominated the life of the\r\nages which built them. They inspired within the worshipper,\r\non the one hand, a sense of finiteness in the presence\r\nof the sublime; on the other, an elevation of soul\r\nas he became conscious of union with a power and presence\r\nnot his own. They awed the worshiping assembly\r\nand united it in a common service.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 2. MAIN LINES OF MODERN DEVELOPMENT\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have seen that the medi\u0026aelig;val life had two sets of\r\nstandards and values: one set by the tribal codes and the\r\ninstinct of a warlike people; the other set by a church\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_148\" id=\"Page_148\"\u003e[Pg 148]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich required renunciation while it asserted control.\r\nChanges may be traced in both ideals. The group morality\r\nbecomes refined and broadened. The church standards\r\nare affected in four ways: (a) The goods of the secular\r\nlife, art, family, power, wealth, claim a place in the system\r\nof values. (b) Human authority asserts itself, at\r\nfirst in sovereign states with monarchs, then in the growth\r\nof civil liberty and political democracy. (c) Instead of\r\nfaith, reason asserts itself as the agency for discovering\r\nthe laws of nature and of life. (d) As the result of the\r\ngreater dignity and worth of the individual which is\r\nworked out in all these lines, social virtue tends to lay\r\nless value on charity and more on social justice.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt must not be supposed that the movements to be\r\noutlined have resulted in the displacement or loss of\r\nthe positive values in the religious ideal. The morality\r\nof to-day does not ignore spiritual values; it aims rather\r\nto use them to give fuller meaning to all experience. It\r\ndoes not abandon law in seeking freedom, or ignore\r\nduty because it is discovered by reason. Above all, it\r\nis seeking to bring about in more intimate fashion that\r\nsupremacy of the moral order in all human relations for\r\nwhich the church was theoretically contending. And in\r\nrecent times we are appreciating more thoroughly that\r\nthe individual cannot attain a full moral life by himself.\r\nOnly as he is a member of a moral society can he find\r\nscope and support for full development of will. In concrete\r\nphrase, it is just as necessary to improve the general\r\nsocial environment in which men, women, and children\r\nare to live, in order to make better individuals, as it\r\nis to improve the individuals in order to get a better\r\nsociety. This was a truth which the religious conception\r\nof salvation through the church taught in other\r\nterms.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo follow the development of the modern moral consciousness,\r\nwe shall rely not so much on the formal writ\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_149\" id=\"Page_149\"\u003e[Pg 149]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eings\r\nof moral philosophers as on other sources. What men\r\nvalue most, and what they recognize as right, is shown\r\nin what they work for and fight for and in how they spend\r\ntheir leisure. This is reflected more immediately in their\r\nlaws, their art and literature, their religion, and their\r\neducational institutions, although it finds ultimate expression\r\nin moral theories. The more concrete aspects are\r\nsuggested in this chapter, the theories in Chapter XII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 3. THE OLD AND NEW IN THE BEGINNINGS OF\r\nINDIVIDUALISM\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAn interesting blending of the class ideal of the warrior\r\nand \"gentleman\" with the religious ideals of devotion to\r\nsome spiritual service, and of protection to the weak, is\r\nafforded by \u003ci\u003echivalry\u003c/i\u003e. The knights show their faith by\r\ntheir deeds of heroism, not by renunciation. But they\r\nfight for the Holy Sepulcher, or for the weak and oppressed.\r\nTheir investiture is almost as solemn as that\r\nof a priest. Honor and love appear as motives side by\r\nside with the quest of the Holy Grail. Chevalier Bayard\r\nis the gallant fighter for country, but he is also the\r\npassionate admirer of justice, the knight \u003ci\u003esans peur et\r\nsans reproche\u003c/i\u003e. Moreover, the literature which embodies\r\nthe ideal exhibits not only feats of arms and religious\r\nsymbolism. Parsifal is not a mere abstraction; he has\r\nlife and character. \"And who will deny,\" writes Francke,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_87_87\" id=\"FNanchor_87_87\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_87_87\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[87]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\"that in this character Wolfram has put before us, within\r\nthe forms of chivalrous life, an immortal symbol of\r\nstruggling, sinning, despairing, but finally redeemed,\r\nhumanity?\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf chivalry represented in some degree a moralizing\r\nof the warrior class, the mendicant orders represented\r\nan effort to bring religion into secular life. The followers\r\nof St. Dominic and St. Francis were indeed ascetic, but\r\ninstead of maintaining the separate life of the cloister\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_150\" id=\"Page_150\"\u003e[Pg 150]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthey aimed to awaken a personal experience among the\r\nwhole people. Further, the Dominicans adopted the methods\r\nand conceptions of Greek philosophy to support the\r\ndoctrines of the church, instead of relying solely on faith.\r\nThe Franciscans on their part devoted an ecstatic type\r\nof piety to deeds of charity and beneficence. They aimed\r\nto overcome the world rather than to withdraw from it.\r\nA bolder appeal to the individual, still within the sphere\r\nof religion, was made when Wyclif asserted the right of\r\nevery instructed man to search the Bible for himself,\r\nand a strong demand for social justice found expression in\r\nWyclif\u0027s teaching as well as in the vision of Piers Plowman.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the political world the growing strength of the\r\nempire sought likewise a religious sanction in its claim of\r\na divine right, independent of the church. The claims of\r\nthe civic life find also increasing recognition with the\r\nspiritual teachers.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe State had been regarded by Augustine as a consequence\r\nof the fall of man, but it now comes to claim\r\nand receive a moral value: first, with Thomas Aquinas,\r\nas the institution in which man perfects his earthly nature\r\nand prepares for his higher destiny in the realm\r\nof grace; then, with Dante, as no longer subordinate to\r\nthe church, but co\u0026ouml;rdinate with it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFinally, the rise of the universities shows a most significant\r\nappearance of the modern spirit under the old\r\nsanctions. The range of secular studies was limited and\r\nthe subject-matter to be studied was chiefly the doctrine\r\nof the Fathers. The teachers who drew thousands of eager\r\nyoung men about them were clerics. But the very fact\r\nthat dialectics\u0026mdash;the art of reasoning\u0026mdash;was the focus of\r\ninterest, shows the dawn of a spirit of inquiry. Such\r\na book as Abelard\u0027s \u003ci\u003eSic et Non\u003c/i\u003e, which marshaled the\r\nopposing views of the Fathers in \"deadly parallel,\" was\r\na challenge to tradition and an assertion of reason. And\r\nit is not without significance that the same bold thinker was\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_151\" id=\"Page_151\"\u003e[Pg 151]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe first of the medi\u0026aelig;val scholars to treat ethics again as\r\na field by itself. The title \"\u003ci\u003eKnow Thyself\u003c/i\u003e\" suggests its\r\nmethod. The essence of the moral act is placed in the\r\nintent or resolve of the will; the criterion for judgment is\r\nagreement or disagreement with conscience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 4. INDIVIDUALISM IN THE PROGRESS OF LIBERTY AND\r\nDEMOCRACY\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRights.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It is not possible or necessary here to sketch the\r\nadvance of political and civil liberty. Finding its agents\r\nsometimes in kings, sometimes in cities, sometimes in an\r\naristocracy or a House of Commons, and sometimes in a\r\npopular uprising, it has also had as its defenders with\r\nthe pen, Churchmen, Protestants, and freethinkers, lawyers,\r\npublicists, and philosophers. All that can be done\r\nhere is to indicate briefly the moral significance of the\r\nmovement. Some of its protagonists have been actuated\r\nby conscious moral purpose. They have fought with\r\nsword or pen not only in the conviction that their cause\r\nwas just, but because they believed it just. At other times,\r\na king has favored a city to weaken the power of the\r\nnobility, or the Commons have opposed the king because\r\nthey objected to taxation. What makes the process significant\r\nmorally is that, whatever the motives actuating\r\nthose who have fought its battles with sword or pen, they\r\nhave nearly always claimed to be fighting for \"rights.\"\r\nThey have professed the conviction that they are engaged\r\nin a just cause. They have thus made appeal to a moral\r\nstandard, and in so far as they have sincerely sought to\r\nassert rights, they have been recognizing in some sense\r\na social and rational standard; they have been building up\r\na moral personality. Sometimes indeed the rights have\r\nbeen claimed as a matter of \"possession\" or of tradition.\r\nThis is to place them on the basis of customary\r\nmorality. But in such great crises as the English Revo\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_152\" id=\"Page_152\"\u003e[Pg 152]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003elutions\r\nof the seventeenth century, or the French and\r\nAmerican Revolutions of the eighteenth, some deeper basis\r\nhas been sought. A Milton, a Locke, a Rousseau, a Jefferson,\r\nhas but voiced the sentiments of a people in\r\nformulating an explicitly moral principle. Sometimes this\r\nhas taken the form of an appeal to God-given rights. All\r\nmen are equal before God; why should one man assume to\r\ncommand another because of birth? In this sense the\r\nPuritans stood for liberty and democracy as part of their\r\ncreed of life. But often the appeal to a moral principle\r\nborrowed the conceptions of Greek philosophy and Roman\r\nlaw, and spoke of \"natural rights\" or a \"law of nature.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_88_88\" id=\"FNanchor_88_88\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_88_88\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[88]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eNatural Rights.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This conception, as we have noted,\r\nhad its origin in Greece in the appeal from custom or convention\r\nto Nature. At first an appeal to the natural\r\nimpulses and wants, it became with the Stoics an appeal\r\nto the rational order of the universe. Roman jurists found\r\nin the idea of such a law of nature the rational basis\r\nfor the law of society. Cicero had maintained that every\r\nman had its principles innate within him. It is obvious\r\nthat here was a principle with great possibilities. The\r\nRoman law itself was most often used in the interest of\r\nabsolutism, but the idea of a natural law, and so of a\r\nnatural right more fundamental than any human dictate,\r\nproved a powerful instrument in the struggle for personal\r\nrights and equality. \"All men naturally were born free,\"\r\nwrote Milton. \"To understand political power right,\"\r\nwrote Locke, \"and derive it from its original, we must\r\nconsider what state all men are naturally in, and that is\r\na state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose\r\nof their possessions and persons, as they think fit,\r\nwithin the bounds of the law of nature; without asking\r\nleave or depending on the will of any other man. A state\r\nalso of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is\r\nreciprocal.\" These doctrines found eloquent portrayal\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_153\" id=\"Page_153\"\u003e[Pg 153]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin Rousseau, and appear in the Declaration of Independence\r\nof 1776. Finally, the effort to find in nature some\r\nbasis for independence and freedom is given a new turn\r\nby Herbert Spencer when he points to the instinct for\r\nliberty in animals as well as in human beings as the origin\r\nof the law of freedom.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy one of the paradoxes of history, the principle is now\r\nmost often invoked in favor of \"vested interests.\" \"Natural\"\r\neasily loses the force of an appeal to reason and\r\nto social good, and becomes merely an assertion of ancient\r\nusage, or precedent, or even a shelter for mere selfish\r\ninterests. Natural rights in property may be invoked\r\nto thwart efforts to protect life and health. Individualism\r\nhas been so successful in asserting rights that it is\r\nnow apt to forget that there are no rights morally except\r\nsuch as express the will of a good \u003ci\u003emember of society\u003c/i\u003e. But\r\nin recognizing possible excesses we need not forget the\r\nvalue of the idea of rights as a weapon in the struggle\r\nin which the moral personality has gradually won its\r\nway. The other side of the story has been the growth\r\nof responsibility. The gain in freedom has not meant\r\nan increase in disorder; it has been marked rather by gain\r\nin peace and security, by an increasing respect for law,\r\nand an increasing stability of government. The external\r\ncontrol of force has been replaced by the moral control\r\nof duty.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 5. INDIVIDUALISM AS AFFECTED BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF\r\nINDUSTRY, COMMERCE, AND ART\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe development of industry, commerce, and art affects\r\nthe moral life in a variety of ways, of which three are of\r\nespecial importance for our purpose.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(1) It gives new interests, and new opportunities for\r\nindividual activity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) This raises the question of \u003ci\u003evalues\u003c/i\u003e. Are all the ac\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_154\" id=\"Page_154\"\u003e[Pg 154]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etivities\r\ngood, and shall one satisfy whatever interest\r\nappeals to him, or are some better than others?\u0026mdash;the old\r\nquestion of \"kinds of happiness.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) It raises further the question of sharing and distribution.\r\nHow far may one enjoy the goods of life in\r\nan exclusive way and how far is it his duty to share with\r\nothers? Do society\u0027s present methods of industry, commerce,\r\nart, and education distribute these goods in a\r\njust manner?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe examination of these questions will be made in Part\r\nIII. It is our purpose at this point merely to indicate\r\nthe trend of the moral consciousness with regard to them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. The Increasing Power and Interests of the Individual.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Power\r\nfor the medi\u0026aelig;val man could be sought in\r\nwar or in the church; interests were correspondingly limited.\r\nThe Crusades, contact, through them and later\r\nthrough commerce, with Arabian civilization, growing\r\nacquaintance with the literature and art of Greece and\r\nRome, were effective agencies in stimulating the modern\r\ndevelopment. But when once started it needed but the\r\nopportunities of sufficient wealth and freedom to go on.\r\nArt and letters have depicted a variety and richness of\r\nexperience which the ancient world did not feel. Shakspere,\r\nRembrandt, Bunyan, Beethoven, Goethe, Balzac,\r\nShelley, Byron, Hugo, Wagner, Ibsen, Thackeray, Eliot,\r\nTolstoy, to name almost at random, reflect a wealth of\r\ninterests and motives which show the range of the modern\r\nman. Commerce and the various lines of industry have\r\nopened new avenues for power. No one can see the palaces\r\nor dwellings of Venice or the old Flemish ports, or consider\r\nthe enormous factories, shops, and office buildings\r\nof to-day, without a sense of the accession to human\r\npower over nature and over the activities of fellow men\r\nwhich trade and industry have brought with them. The\r\nuse of money instead of a system of personal service\u0026mdash;slavery\r\nor serfdom\u0026mdash;has not only made it possible to\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_155\" id=\"Page_155\"\u003e[Pg 155]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhave men\u0027s labor without owning the men, it has aided in\r\na vastly more effective system than the older method\r\nallowed. The industrial revolution of the past century\r\nhas had two causes: one the use of machinery; the other\r\nthe combination of human labor which this makes possible.\r\nSo far this has greatly increased the power of the\r\nfew leaders, but not of the many. It is the present problem\r\nto make possible a larger opportunity for individual\r\nfreedom and power.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. The Values of Art and Industry.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Are all these wider\r\ninterests and fuller powers good? The church ideal\r\nand the class ideal already described gave different\r\nanswers. The class ideal of gentleman really expressed a\r\nform of self-assertion, of living out one\u0027s powers fully,\r\nand this readily welcomed the possibilities which art and\r\nits enjoyment afforded.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_89_89\" id=\"FNanchor_89_89\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_89_89\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[89]\u003c/a\u003e The gentleman of the Renaissance,\r\nthe cavalier of England, the noblesse of France,\r\nwere patrons of art and letters. The Romanticist urged\r\nthat such free and full expression as art afforded was\r\nhigher than morality with its control and limitation. The\r\nchurch admitted art in the service of religion, but was\r\nchary of it as an individual activity. The Puritans\r\nwere more rigorous. Partly because they associated its\r\nchurchly use with what they regarded as \"idolatry,\"\r\npartly as a protest against the license in manners which\r\nthe freedom of art seemed to encourage, they frowned\r\nupon all forms of art except sacred literature or music.\r\nTheir condemnation of the stage is still an element, though\r\nprobably a lessening element, and it is not long since fiction\r\nwas by many regarded with suspicion. On the whole,\r\nthe modern moral consciousness accepts art as having a\r\nplace in the moral life, although it by no means follows\r\nthat art can be exempt from moral criticism as to its sincerity,\r\nhealthfulness, and perspective.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the case of industry the church ideal has prevailed.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_156\" id=\"Page_156\"\u003e[Pg 156]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe class ideal of gentleman was distinctly opposed to\r\nindustry, particularly manual labor. \"Arms\" or the\r\nCourt was the proper profession. This was more or less\r\nbound up with the fact that in primitive conditions labor\r\nwas mainly performed by women or by slaves. It was the\r\nbusiness, the \"virtue\" of men to fight. So far as this\r\nclass ideal was affected by the models of ancient culture,\r\nthe prejudice was strengthened. The classic civilization\r\nrested on slave labor. The ideal of the gentleman of\r\nAthens was the free employment of leisure, not active\r\nenterprise. The church, on the other hand, maintained\r\nboth the dignity and the moral value of labor. Not only\r\nthe example of the Founder of Christianity and his early\r\ndisciples, who were for the most part manual laborers, but\r\nthe intrinsic moral value of work, already referred to,\r\nentered into the appraisal.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_90_90\" id=\"FNanchor_90_90\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_90_90\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[90]\u003c/a\u003e The Puritans, who have had\r\na wide-reaching influence upon the standards of the middle\r\nand lower classes of England, and upon the northern and\r\nwestern portions of America, were insistent upon industry,\r\nnot merely for the sake of its products,\u0026mdash;they were frugal\r\nin their consumption,\u0026mdash;but as expressing a type of character.\r\nIdleness and \"shiftlessness\" were not merely ineffective,\r\nthey were sinful. \"If any will not work, neither\r\nlet him eat,\" commended itself thoroughly to this moral\r\nideal. That the laborer brought something to the common\r\nweal, while the idler had to be supported, was a re\u0026euml;nforcement\r\nto the motives drawn from the relation of work to\r\ncharacter. As the middle and lower classes became increasingly\r\ninfluential, the very fact that they were laborers\r\nand traders strengthened the religious ideal by a class\r\nmotive. It was natural that a laboring class should regard\r\nlabor as \"honest,\" though from the history of the word\r\nsuch a collocation of terms as \"honest labor\" would once\r\nhave been as absurd as \"honest villain.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_91_91\" id=\"FNanchor_91_91\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_91_91\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[91]\u003c/a\u003e A further\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_157\" id=\"Page_157\"\u003e[Pg 157]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninfluence effective in America has been the fluidity of class\r\ndistinctions in a new country. The \"influence of the\r\nfrontier\" has been all on the side of the value of work\r\nand the reprobation of idleness. At least this is true for\r\nmen. A certain tendency has been manifest to exempt\r\nwomen of the well-to-do classes from the necessity of labor,\r\nand even by training and social pressure to exclude them\r\nfrom the opportunity of work, and make of them a \"leisure\r\nclass,\" but this is not likely to establish itself as a permanent\r\nmoral attitude. The woman will not be content\r\nto live in \"The Doll\u0027s House\" while the man is in the\r\nreal work of the world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. The Distribution of the Goods of Life.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Medi\u0026aelig;val\r\nsociety made provision for both benevolence and justice.\r\nCharity, the highest of the virtues, had come to mean\r\nspecifically the giving of goods. The monasteries relieved\r\nthe poor and the infirm. Hospitals were established.\r\nThe gentleman felt it to be not only a religious duty, but\r\na tradition of his class to be liberal. To secure justice\r\nin the distribution of wealth, various restrictions were\r\nimposed. Goods were not to be sold for whatever they\r\ncould bring, nor was money to be loaned at whatever rate\r\nof interest the borrower was willing to pay. Society\r\naimed to find out by some means what was a \"reasonable\r\nprice\" for products. In the case of manufactured goods\r\nthis could be fixed by the opinion of fellow craftsmen. A\r\n\"common estimation,\" where buyers and sellers met and\r\nbargained in an open market, could be trusted to give a\r\nfair value. A maximum limit was set for victuals in\r\ntowns. Or, again, custom prescribed what should be the\r\nmoney equivalent for payments formerly made in kind,\r\nor in personal service.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_92_92\" id=\"FNanchor_92_92\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_92_92\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[92]\u003c/a\u003e Money-lending was under especial\r\nguard. To ask interest for the use of money, provided\r\nthe principal was returned intact, seemed to be taking\r\nadvantage of another\u0027s necessity. It was usury. Class\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_158\" id=\"Page_158\"\u003e[Pg 158]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmorality added a different kind of restrictions. As embodied\r\nin the laws, it bound the tenants to the soil and\r\nforbade the migration of laborers. The significant thing\r\nin the whole medi\u0026aelig;val attitude was that \u003ci\u003esociety attempted\r\nto control business and industry by a moral standard\u003c/i\u003e. It\r\ndid not trust the individual to make his own bargains or\r\nto conduct his business as he pleased.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eModern Theory: Free Contract.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The distinctive feature\r\nof the modern development has been the tendency to\r\nabandon moral restrictions and to substitute a wage\r\nsystem, freedom of exchange, and free contract. It was\r\nmaintained by the advocates of the new method that it\r\nwas both more efficient and at least as just as the old.\r\nIt was more efficient because it stimulated every one to\r\nmake the best possible bargain. Surely every man is the\r\nmost interested, and therefore the best promoter of his\r\nown welfare. And if each is getting the best results for\r\nhimself, the good of the whole community will be secured.\r\nFor\u0026mdash;so ran the theory, when individualism had so far\r\nadvanced\u0026mdash;society is simply the aggregate of its members;\r\nthe good of all is the sum of the goods of the\r\nmembers. The system also claimed to provide for justice\r\nbetween buyer and seller, capitalist and laborer, by the\r\nagencies noticed in the next paragraph.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCompetition.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;To prevent extortionate prices on the\r\none hand, or unduly low prices or wages on the other,\r\nthe reliance was on \u003ci\u003ecompetition\u003c/i\u003e and the general principle\r\nof supply and demand. If a baker charges too high for\r\nhis bread, others will set up shops and sell cheaper. If\r\na money-lender asks too high interest, men will not borrow\r\nor will find a loan elsewhere. If a wage is too low, labor\r\nwill go elsewhere; if too high, capital will not be able\r\nto find a profit and so will not employ labor\u0026mdash;so runs\r\nthe theory. Without analyzing the moral value of the\r\ntheory at this point, we notice only that, so far as it\r\nassumes to secure fair bargains and a just distribution,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_159\" id=\"Page_159\"\u003e[Pg 159]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nit assumes the parties to the free contract to be really\r\nfree. This implies that they are upon nearly equal footing.\r\nIn the days of hand work and small industries this\r\nwas at least a plausible assumption. But a new face was\r\nplaced upon the situation by the \u003ci\u003eindustrial revolution\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eProblem Raised by the Industrial Revolution.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\nintroduction of machinery on a large scale near the end\r\nof the eighteenth century brought about a change which\r\nhas had extraordinary economic, social, and moral effects.\r\nThe revolution had two factors: (1) it used steam power\r\ninstead of human muscle; (2) it made possible the greater\r\nsubdivision of labor, and hence it made it profitable to\r\norganize large bodies of men under a single direction. Both\r\nthese factors contributed to an enormous increase in productive\r\npower. But this increase made an overwhelming\r\ndifference in the status of capitalist and laborer. Without\r\ndiscussing the question as to whether capital received\r\nmore than a \"fair\" share of the increased profit, it was\r\nobvious that if one \"Captain of Industry\" were receiving\r\neven a small part of the profits earned by each of his\r\nthousand workmen, he would be immeasurably better off\r\nthan any one of them. Like the mounted and armored\r\nknight of the Middle Ages, or the baron in his castle, he\r\nwas more than a match for a multitude of poorly equipped\r\nfootmen. There seemed to be in the nineteenth century\r\nan enormous disproportion between the shares of wealth\r\nwhich fell to capitalist and to laborer. If this was the\r\nresult of \"free contract,\" what further proof was necessary\r\nthat \"freedom\" was a mere empty term\u0026mdash;a name with\r\nno reality? For could it be supposed that a man would\r\n\u003ci\u003efreely\u003c/i\u003e make an agreement to work harder and longer than\r\nany slave, receiving scarcely the bare necessities of existence,\r\nwhile the other party was to gain enormous wealth\r\nfrom the bargain?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe old class morality was not disturbed by such contrasts.\r\nEven the religious morality was apt to consider\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_160\" id=\"Page_160\"\u003e[Pg 160]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ethe distinction between rich and poor as divinely ordered,\r\nor else as insignificant compared with eternal destiny of\r\nweal or woe. But the individualistic movements have made\r\nit less easy to accept either the class morality or the religious\r\ninterpretation. The latter lends itself equally well to\r\na justification of disease because it is providentially permitted.\r\nMoreover, the old group morality and religious\r\nideal had this in their favor: they recognized an obligation\r\nof the strong to the weak, of the group for every\r\nmember, of master for servant. The cash basis seemed to\r\nbanish all responsibility, and to assert the law of \"each\r\nfor himself\" as the supreme law of life\u0026mdash;except so far as\r\nindividuals might mitigate suffering by voluntary kindness.\r\nEconomic theory seemed to show that wages must\r\nalways tend toward a starvation level.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSympathy.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Such tendencies inevitably called out response\r\nfrom the sentiments of benevolence and sympathy.\r\nFor the spread of civilization has certainly made man more\r\nsensitive to pain, more capable of sympathy and of entering\r\nby imagination into the situations of others. It is\r\nnoteworthy that the same Adam Smith who argued so\r\nforcibly the cause of individualism in trade, made sympathy\r\nthe basis of his moral system. Advance in sympathy\r\nhas shown itself in the abolition of judicial torture,\r\nin prison reform, in the improved care of the insane and\r\ndefective; in the increased provision for hospitals, and\r\nasylums, and in an innumerable multitude of organizations\r\nfor relief of all sorts and conditions of men. Missions,\r\naside from their distinctly ecclesiastical aims, represent\r\ndevotion of human life and of wealth to the relief\r\nof sickness and wretchedness, and to the education of children\r\nin all lands. Sympathy has even extended to the\r\nanimal world. And the notable fact in modern sympathy\r\nand kindness, as contrasted with the medi\u0026aelig;val type, is\r\nthat the growth in individuality has demanded and evoked\r\na higher kind of benevolence. Instead of fostering de\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_161\" id=\"Page_161\"\u003e[Pg 161]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ependence\r\nand relieving wants, the best modern agencies aim\r\nto promote independence, to set the man upon his own\r\nfeet and enable him to achieve self-respect. \"Social settlements\"\r\nhave been strong factors in bringing about this\r\nchange of attitude.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eJustice.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Various movements looking toward greater\r\njustice in distribution have likewise been called out by\r\nthe conditions since the industrial revolution. Naturally\r\none reaction was to denounce the whole individualistic\r\ntendency as represented in the \"cash-payment\" basis. This\r\nfound its most eloquent expositor in Carlyle. His \u003ci\u003ePast\r\nand Present\u003c/i\u003e is a bitter indictment of a system \"in which\r\nall working horses could be well fed, and innumerable\r\nworkingmen should die starved\"; of a \u003ci\u003elaissez-faire\u003c/i\u003e theory\r\nwhich merely says \"impossible\" when asked to remedy evils\r\nsupposedly due to \"economic laws\"; of a \"Mammon Gospel\"\r\nwhich transforms life into a mutual hostility, with\r\nits laws-of-war named \"fair competition.\" The indictment\r\nis convincing, but the remedy proposed\u0026mdash;a return to strong\r\nleaders with a re\u0026euml;stablishment of personal relations\u0026mdash;has\r\nrallied few to its support. Another reaction against individualistic\r\nselfishness has taken the form of communism.\r\nNumerous experiments have been made by voluntary associations\r\nto establish society on a moral basis by abolishing\r\nprivate property. \"These new associations,\" said Owen,\r\none of the most ardent and generous of social reformers,\r\n\"can scarcely be formed before it will be discovered that\r\nby the most simple and easy regulations all the natural\r\nwants of human nature may be abundantly supplied;\r\nand the principle of selfishness will cease to exist for want\r\nof an adequate motive to produce it.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn contrast with these plans for a return to earlier conditions,\r\nthe two most conspicuous tendencies in the thought\r\nof the past century have claimed to be advancing toward\r\nfreedom and justice along the lines which we have just\r\ntraced. The one, which we may call \"individualistic\" re\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_162\" id=\"Page_162\"\u003e[Pg 162]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eform,\r\nhas sought justice by giving free play to individual\r\naction. The other, socialism, has aimed to use the power\r\nof the State to secure more adequate justice and, as it\r\nbelieves, a more genuine freedom. The great reform\r\nmovement in Great Britain during the nineteenth century\r\nemphasized free trade and free contracts. It sought the\r\ncauses of injustice in the survival of some privilege or\r\nvested interest which prevents the full working of the\r\nprinciples of free contract and competition. Let every\r\nman \"count as one\"; make laws for \"the greatest good\r\nof the greatest number.\" The trouble is not that there\r\nis too much individualism, but that there is too little.\r\nTax reformers like Henry George have urged the same\r\nprinciple. If land is monopolized by a few who can levy\r\na toll upon all the rest of society, how can justice obtain?\r\nThe remedy for injustice is to be found in promoting\r\ngreater freedom of industry and trade. Socialism on the\r\nother hand claims that individualism defeats itself; it\r\nresults in tyranny, not freedom. The only way to secure\r\nfreedom is through united action. The merits of some\r\nof these programs for social justice will be examined\r\nin Part III. They signify that the age is finding its\r\nmoral problem set anew by the collision between material\r\ninterests and social good. Greek civilization used the industry\r\nof the many to set free the higher life\u0026mdash;art, government,\r\nscience\u0026mdash;of a few. The medi\u0026aelig;val ideal recognized\r\nthe moral value of industry in relation to character.\r\nThe modern conscience, resting back upon a higher appreciation\r\nof human dignity and worth, is seeking to work\r\nout a social and economic order that shall combine both\r\nthe Greek and the medi\u0026aelig;val ideas. It will require work\r\nand secure freedom. These are necessary for the individual\r\nperson. But it is beginning to be seen that these\r\nvalues cannot be divided so that one social class shall perform\r\nthe labor and the other enjoy the freedom. The\r\ngrowth of democracy means that all members of society\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_163\" id=\"Page_163\"\u003e[Pg 163]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nshould share in the value and the service of work. It\r\nmeans that all should share according to capacity in the\r\nvalues of free life, of intelligence and culture. Can material\r\ngoods be so produced and distributed as to promote\r\nthis democratic ideal?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 6. THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF\r\nINTELLIGENCE\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe development of intelligence in the modern world,\r\nas in Greece, has two sides: on the one hand, a working-free\r\nfrom the restrictions which theology or the State or\r\nother social authorities imposed; on the other hand, positive\r\nprogress in knowledge of nature and of human life.\r\nUnder its first aspect it is known as the growth of rationalism;\r\nunder its second aspect, as the growth of science and\r\neducation. We cannot separate the development into two\r\nperiods, the one negative, the other positive, as was convenient\r\nin the case of Greece. The negative and the positive\r\nin the modern world have gone on contemporaneously,\r\nalthough the emphasis has sometimes been on one side and\r\nsometimes upon the other. We may, however, indicate\r\nthree periods as standing out with clearly defined characteristics.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(1) The Renaissance, in which the Greek spirit of\r\nscientific inquiry found a new birth; in which the discovery\r\nof new continents stimulated the imagination; and in\r\nwhich new and more fruitful methods of investigation were\r\ndevised in mathematics and the natural sciences.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) The period of the Enlightenment, in which the\r\nnegative aspect of the process reached its sharpest definition.\r\nThe doctrines of revealed religion and natural religion\r\nwere criticised from the standpoint of reason. Mysteries\r\nand superstition were alike rejected. General intelligence\r\nmade rapid progress. It was the \"Age of Reason.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) The Nineteenth Century, in which both the natural\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_164\" id=\"Page_164\"\u003e[Pg 164]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand social sciences underwent an extraordinary development.\r\nThe doctrine of evolution has brought a new\r\npoint of view for considering the organic world and human\r\ninstitutions. Education has come to be regarded as both\r\nthe necessary condition for the safety of society and as\r\nthe right of every human being; Science, in large measure\r\nset free from the need of fighting for its right to exist,\r\nis becoming constructive; it is assuming increasingly the\r\nduty of preserving human life and health, of utilizing\r\nand preserving natural resources, of directing political\r\nand economic affairs.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. The Renaissance.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It would be giving a wrong impression\r\nto imply that there was no inquiry, no use of\r\nreason in the medi\u0026aelig;val world. The problems set by the\r\ninheritance of old-world religion and politics, forced themselves\r\nupon the builders of castles and cathedrals,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_93_93\" id=\"FNanchor_93_93\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_93_93\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[93]\u003c/a\u003e of law\r\nand of dogma. As indicated above, the universities were\r\ncenters of discussion in which brilliant minds often challenged\r\nreceived opinions. Men like Roger Bacon sought\r\nto discover nature\u0027s secrets, and the great scholastics\r\nmastered Greek philosophy in the interest of defending\r\nthe faith. But theological interest limited freedom and\r\nchoice of theme. It was not until the expansion of the\r\nindividual along the lines already traced\u0026mdash;in political freedom,\r\nin the use of the arts, in the development of commerce\u0026mdash;that\r\nthe purely intellectual interest such as had\r\nonce characterized Greece awoke. A new world of possibilities\r\nseemed dawning upon the Italian Galileo, the\r\nFrenchman Descartes, the Englishman Francis Bacon.\r\nThe instruments of thought had been sharpened by the\r\ndialectics of the schools; now let them be used to analyze\r\nthe world in which we live. Instead of merely observing\r\nnature Galileo applied the experimental method, putting\r\ndefinite questions to nature and thus preparing the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_165\" id=\"Page_165\"\u003e[Pg 165]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nway for a progress step by step toward a positive knowledge\r\nof nature\u0027s laws. Descartes found in mathematics\r\na method of analysis which had never been appreciated\r\nbefore. What seemed the mysterious path of bodies in\r\ncurved lines could be given a simple statement in his analytic\r\ngeometry. Leibniz and Newton carried this method\r\nto triumphant results in the analysis of forces. Reason\r\nappeared able to discover and frame the laws of the universe\u0026mdash;the\r\n\"principles\" of nature. Bacon, with less of\r\npositive contribution in method, sounded another note\r\nwhich was equally significant. The human mind is liable\r\nto be clouded and hindered in its activities by certain\r\ninveterate sources of error. Like deceitful images or obsessions\r\nthe \"idols\" of the tribe, of the cave, of the\r\nmarket, and of the theater\u0026mdash;due to instinct or habit,\r\nto language or tradition\u0026mdash;prevent the reason from doing\r\nits best work. It needs vigorous effort to free the mind\r\nfrom these idols. But this can be done. Let man turn\r\nfrom metaphysics and theology to nature and life; let him\r\nfollow reason instead of instinct or prejudice. \"Knowledge\r\nis power.\" Through it may rise above the kingdom\r\nof nature the \"kingdom of man.\" In his \u003ci\u003eNew Atlantis\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nBacon foresees a human society in which skill and invention\r\nand government shall all contribute to human welfare.\r\nThese three notes, the experimental method, the power of\r\nrational analysis through mathematics, and the possibility\r\nof controlling nature in the interests of man, were\r\ncharacteristic of the period.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. The Enlightenment.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;A conflict of reason with authority\r\nwent on side by side with the progress of science.\r\nHumanists and scientists had often set themselves against\r\ndogma and tradition. The Reformation was not in form\r\nan appeal to reason, but the clash of authorities stimulated\r\nmen to reasoning upon the respective claims of Catholic\r\nand Protestant. And in the eighteenth century, under\r\nthe favoring influence of a broad toleration and a gen\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_166\" id=\"Page_166\"\u003e[Pg 166]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eeral\r\ngrowth of intelligence, the conflict of reason with\r\ndogma reached its culmination. The French call the\r\nperiod \"\u003ci\u003el\u0027Illumination\u003c/i\u003e\"\u0026mdash;the illumination of life and experience\r\nby the light of reason. The Germans call it the\r\n\u003ci\u003eAufkl\u0026auml;rung\u003c/i\u003e, \"the clearing-up.\" What was to be cleared\r\nup? First, ignorance, which limits the range of man\u0027s\r\npower and infects him with fear of the unknown; then\r\nsuperstition, which is ignorance consecrated by wont and\r\nemotion; finally, dogma, which usually embodies irrational\r\nelements and seeks to force them upon the mind by the\r\npower of authority, not of truth. Nor was it merely a\r\nquestion of intellectual criticism. Voltaire saw that dogma\r\nwas often responsible for cruelty. Ignorance meant belief\r\nin witchcraft and magic. From the dawn of civilization\r\nthis had beset man\u0027s progress and quenched many of the\r\nbrightest geniuses of the past. It was time to put an\r\nend once for all to the remnants of primitive credulity;\r\nit was time to be guided by the light of reason. The\r\nmovement was not all negative. Using the same appeal\r\nto \"nature,\" which had served so well as a rallying cry\r\nin the development of political rights, the protagonists of\r\nthe movement spoke of a \"natural light\" which God had\r\nplaced in man for his guidance\u0026mdash;\"the candle of the Lord\r\nset up by himself in men\u0027s minds, which it is impossible\r\nfor the breath or power of man wholly to extinguish.\"\r\nA natural and rational religion should take the place\r\nof supposed revelation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the great achievement of the eighteenth century in\r\nthe intellectual development of the individual was that\r\nthe human mind came to realize the part it was itself\r\nplaying in the whole realm of science and conduct. Man\r\nbegan to look within. Whether he called his work an\r\n\u003ci\u003eEssay concerning Human Understanding\u003c/i\u003e, or a \u003ci\u003eTreatise\r\nof Human Nature\u003c/i\u003e, or a \u003ci\u003eTheory of Moral Sentiments\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nor a \u003ci\u003eCritique of Pure Reason\u003c/i\u003e, the aim was\r\nto study human experience. For of a sudden it was dawn\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_167\" id=\"Page_167\"\u003e[Pg 167]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eing\r\nupon man that, if he was then living upon a higher\r\nlevel of knowledge and conduct than the animal or the\r\nsavage, this must be due to the activity of the mind.\r\nIt appeared that man, not satisfied with \"nature,\" had\r\ngone on to build a new world with institutions and morality,\r\nwith art and science. This was no creation of\r\ninstinct or habit; nor could it be explained in terms of\r\nsense, or feeling, or impulse alone; it was the work of\r\nthat more active, universal, and creative type of intelligence\r\nwhich we call reason. Man, as capable of such\r\nachievements in science and conduct, must be regarded\r\nwith new respect. As having political rights, freedom,\r\nand responsibility, man has the dignity of a citizen,\r\nsovereign as well as subject. As guiding and controlling\r\nhis own life and that of others by the power of ideas, not\r\nof force, he has the dignity of a moral person, a moral\r\nsovereignty. He does not merely take what nature brings;\r\nhe sets up ends of his own and gives them worth. In this,\r\nKant saw the supreme dignity of the human spirit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. The Present Significance and Task of Scientific\r\nMethod.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In the thought that man is able to form ends\r\nwhich have value for all, to set up standards which all\r\nrespect, and thus to achieve worth and dignity in the\r\nestimation of his fellows, the Individualism of the eighteenth\r\ncentury was already pointing beyond itself. For\r\nthis meant that the individual attains his highest reach\r\nonly as a member of a moral society. But it is one thing\r\nto point out the need and meaning of a moral society, it is\r\nanother thing to bring such a society into being. It has\r\nbecome evident during the past century that this is the\r\ncentral problem for human reason to solve. The various\r\nsocial sciences, economics, sociology, political science,\r\njurisprudence, social psychology, have either come into\r\nbeing for the first time, or have been prosecuted with new\r\nenergy. Psychology has assumed new significance as\r\ntheir instrument. Not that the scientific progress of the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_168\" id=\"Page_168\"\u003e[Pg 168]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncentury has seen its greatest triumphs in these fields. The\r\nconspicuous successes have been rather in such sciences\r\nas biology, or in the applications of science to engineering\r\nand medicine. The social sciences have been occupied\r\nlargely in getting their problems stated and their methods\r\ndefined. But the discoveries and constructions of the\r\nnineteenth century are none the less indispensable prerequisites\r\nfor a moral society. For the new conditions of\r\ncity life, the new sources of disease, the new dangers which\r\nattend every successive step away from the life of the\r\nsavage, demand all the resources of the sciences.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_94_94\" id=\"FNanchor_94_94\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_94_94\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[94]\u003c/a\u003e And as\r\nthe natural sciences overcome the technical difficulties\r\nwhich obstruct their work of aiding human welfare, the\r\ndemand will be more insistent that the social sciences contribute\r\ntheir share toward enabling man to fulfil his moral\r\nlife. Some of the specific demands will become more evident,\r\nas we study in subsequent chapters the present\r\nproblems of political, economic, and family life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEducation.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The importance for the moral life of the\r\nmodern development of science is paralleled by the significance\r\nof modern education. The universities date from\r\nthe Middle Ages. The classical interest of humanism found\r\nits medium in the college or \"grammar school.\" The in\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_169\" id=\"Page_169\"\u003e[Pg 169]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003evention\r\nof printing and the growth of commerce promoted\r\nelementary schools. Supposed necessities of popular government\r\nstimulated a general educational movement in the\r\nUnited States. Modern trade and industry have called\r\nout the technical school. Germany has educated for\r\nnational defense and economic advance; England has concerned\r\nitself pre\u0026euml;minently for the education of statesmen\r\nand administrators; and the United States for the education\r\nof voters. But, whatever the motive, education\r\nhas been made so general as to constitute a new element\r\nin the modern consciousness and a new factor to be reckoned\r\nwith. The moral right of every child to have an\r\neducation, measured not by his parents\u0027 abilities, but by\r\nhis own capacity, is gaining recognition. The moral value\r\nof a possession, which is not, like material goods, exclusive,\r\nbut common, will be more appreciated when we\r\nhave worked out a more social and democratic type of\r\ntraining.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_95_95\" id=\"FNanchor_95_95\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_95_95\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[95]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTheoretical Interpretation of this Period in Ethical\r\nSystems.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;While the theoretical interpretation of this\r\nperiod is to be treated in Part II., we may point out here\r\nthat the main lines of development which we have traced\r\nfind expression in the two systems which have been most\r\ninfluential during the past century. These are the systems\r\nof Kant and of the Utilitarians. The political and\r\ncertain aspects of the intellectual development are reflected\r\nin the system of Kant. He emphasized freedom, the power\r\nand authority of reason, human dignity, the supreme value\r\nof character, and the significance of a society in which\r\nevery member is at once sovereign and subject. The Utilitarians\r\nrepresent the values brought out in the development\r\nof industry, education, and the arts. They claimed that\r\nthe good is happiness, and happiness of the greatest number.\r\nThe demands for individual satisfaction and for\r\nsocial distribution of goods are voiced in this system.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_170\" id=\"Page_170\"\u003e[Pg 170]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe histories of philosophy and of ethics give the theoretical side.\r\nIn addition to those previously mentioned the works of H\u0026ouml;ffding,\r\nFalckenberg, and Fischer may be named. Stephen, \u003ci\u003eEnglish Thought\r\nin the Eighteenth Century\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003eThe Utilitarians\u003c/i\u003e; Fichte, \u003ci\u003eCharacteristics\r\nof the Present Age\u003c/i\u003e (in \u003ci\u003ePopular Works\u003c/i\u003e, tr. by Smith); Stein,\r\n\u003ci\u003eDie sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie\u003c/i\u003e, 1897; Comte, \u003ci\u003ePositive\r\nPhilosophy\u003c/i\u003e, tr. by Martineau, 1875, Book VI. Tufts and Thompson,\r\n\u003ci\u003eThe Individual and His Relation to Society as Reflected in British\r\nEthics\u003c/i\u003e, 1896, 1904; Merz, \u003ci\u003eHistory of European Thought in the 19th\r\nCentury\u003c/i\u003e, 1904; Robertson, \u003ci\u003eA Short History of Free Thought\u003c/i\u003e, 1899;\r\nBonar, \u003ci\u003ePhilosophy and Political Economy in Some of Their Historical\r\nRelations\u003c/i\u003e, 1893.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eOn the Medi\u0026aelig;val and Renaissance Attitude\u003c/span\u003e: Lecky, \u003ci\u003eHistory\r\nof European Morals\u003c/i\u003e, 3rd ed., 1877; Adams, \u003ci\u003eCivilization during the\r\nMiddle Ages\u003c/i\u003e, 1895; Rashdall, \u003ci\u003eThe Universities of Europe in the\r\nMiddle Ages\u003c/i\u003e, 1895; Eicken, \u003ci\u003eGeschichte und System der mittelalterlichen\r\nWeltanschauung\u003c/i\u003e, 1877; Burckhardt, \u003ci\u003eThe Civilization of the Renaissance\r\nin Italy\u003c/i\u003e, 1892; Draper, \u003ci\u003eHistory of the Intellectual Development\r\nof Europe\u003c/i\u003e, 1876.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eOn the Industrial and Social Side\u003c/span\u003e: Ashley, \u003ci\u003eEnglish Economic\r\nHistory\u003c/i\u003e; Cunningham, \u003ci\u003eWestern Civilization in Its Economic Aspects\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1900; and \u003ci\u003eGrowth of English Industry and Commerce\u003c/i\u003e, 3rd ed., 1896-1903;\r\nHobson, \u003ci\u003eThe Evolution of Modern Capitalism\u003c/i\u003e, 1894; Traill,\r\n\u003ci\u003eSocial England\u003c/i\u003e, 1894; Rambaud, \u003ci\u003eHistoire de Civilization Fran\u0026ccedil;aise\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1897; Held, \u003ci\u003eZwei B\u0026uuml;cher zur socialen Geschichte Englands\u003c/i\u003e, 1881;\r\nCarlyle, \u003ci\u003ePast and Present\u003c/i\u003e; Ziegler, \u003ci\u003eDie Geistigen und socialen Str\u0026ouml;mungen\r\ndes neunzehnten Jahrhunderts\u003c/i\u003e, 1901.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eOn the Political and Jural Development\u003c/span\u003e: Hadley, \u003ci\u003eFreedom and\r\nResponsibility in the Evolution of Democratic Government\u003c/i\u003e, 1903;\r\nPollock, \u003ci\u003eThe Expansion of the Common Law\u003c/i\u003e, 1904; Ritchie, \u003ci\u003eNatural\r\nRights\u003c/i\u003e, 1895; \u003ci\u003eDarwin and Hegel\u003c/i\u003e, 1893, ch. vii.; Dicey, \u003ci\u003eLectures on\r\nthe Relation of Law and Public Opinion in England during the\r\nNineteenth Century\u003c/i\u003e, 1905.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eOn the Literary Side\u003c/span\u003e: Brandes, \u003ci\u003eThe Main Currents in the Literature\r\nof the Nineteenth Century\u003c/i\u003e, 1905; Francke, \u003ci\u003eSocial Forces in German\r\nLiterature\u003c/i\u003e, 1895; Carriere, \u003ci\u003eDie Kunst im Zusammenhang der\r\nCulturentwicklung und die Ideale der Menschheit\u003c/i\u003e, 3rd ed., 1877-86.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_84_84\" id=\"Footnote_84_84\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_84_84\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[84]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Fisher, \u003ci\u003eHistory of the Christian Church\u003c/i\u003e, p. 227.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_85_85\" id=\"Footnote_85_85\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_85_85\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[85]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eDemocracy and Social Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 222-77; \u003ci\u003eNewer Ideals of Peace\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nch. v.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_86_86\" id=\"Footnote_86_86\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_86_86\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[86]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Bryce, \u003ci\u003eHoly Roman Empire\u003c/i\u003e, p. 367.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_87_87\" id=\"Footnote_87_87\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_87_87\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[87]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eSocial Forces in German Literature\u003c/i\u003e, p. 93.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_88_88\" id=\"Footnote_88_88\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_88_88\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[88]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Pp. 130 f., 136.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_89_89\" id=\"Footnote_89_89\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_89_89\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[89]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Tolstoy, \u003ci\u003eWhat is Art?\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_90_90\" id=\"Footnote_90_90\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_90_90\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[90]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 40.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_91_91\" id=\"Footnote_91_91\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_91_91\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[91]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See p. 176.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_92_92\" id=\"Footnote_92_92\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_92_92\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[92]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cunningham, \u003ci\u003eAn Essay on Western Civilization\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 77 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_93_93\" id=\"Footnote_93_93\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_93_93\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[93]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The writer is indebted to his colleague Professor Mead for the\r\nsignificance of this for the beginnings of modern science.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_94_94\" id=\"Footnote_94_94\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_94_94\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[94]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"Civilized man has proceeded so far in his interference with\r\nextra-human nature, has produced for himself and the living organisms\r\nassociated with him such a special state of things by his rebellion\r\nagainst natural selection and his defiance of Nature\u0027s prehuman\r\ndispositions, that he must either go on and acquire firmer\r\ncontrol of the conditions or perish miserably by the vengeance certain\r\nto fall on the half-hearted meddler in great affairs…. We may\r\nthink of him as the heir to a vast and magnificent kingdom who has\r\nbeen finally educated so as to fit him to take possession of his property,\r\nand is at length left alone to do his best; he has wilfully\r\nabrogated, in many important respects, the laws of his Mother Nature\r\nby which the kingdom was hitherto governed; he has gained some\r\npower and advantage by so doing, but is threatened on every hand\r\nby dangers and disasters hitherto restrained: no retreat is possible\u0026mdash;his\r\nonly hope is to control, as he knows that he can, the sources of\r\nthese dangers and disasters. They already make him wince: how long\r\nwill he sit listening to the fairy-tales of his boyhood and shrink\r\nfrom manhood\u0027s task?\"\u0026mdash;\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRay Lankester\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eThe Kingdom of Man\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1907, pp. 31 f.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_95_95\" id=\"Footnote_95_95\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_95_95\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[95]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e John Dewey, \u003ci\u003eThe School and Society\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_171\" id=\"Page_171\"\u003e[Pg 171]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER IX\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nA GENERAL COMPARISON OF CUSTOMARY AND\r\nREFLECTIVE MORALITY\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of\r\ngood and evil may result in ultimate gain. A more\r\nconscious and individualistic attitude may result in definite\r\nconceptions of duty and rights, of values and ideals. At\r\nthe same time, as humanity\u0027s eyes have been opened and its\r\nwisdom increased, many forms of nakedness unknown in\r\nruder conditions have been disclosed. With every increase\r\nof opportunity and efficiency for good there is a\r\ncorresponding opportunity for evil. An immensely more\r\ncomplex environment gives scope for correspondingly more\r\ncapable and subtle personalities. Some will react to the\r\nsituation in such a way as to rise to a higher moral level,\r\nboth in personal integrity and in public usefulness. Others\r\nwill find in facilities for gratifying some appetite or\r\npassion a temptation too strong for their control and\r\nwill become vicious, or will seize the chances to exploit\r\nothers and become unjust in their acquirement and use of\r\npower and wealth. There will be a Nero as well as an\r\nAurelius, a C\u0026aelig;sar Borgia as well as a Savonarola, a\r\nJeffreys as well as a Sidney, a Bentham, or a Howard.\r\nFor an Eliot or a Livingston or an Armstrong, there are\r\nthe exploiters of lower races; and for an Elizabeth Fry,\r\nthe women who trade in the wretchedness of their kind.\r\nBy the side of those who use great abilities and resources\r\nunselfishly are those who view indifferently the sacrifice\r\nof human health or life, and pay no heed to human misery.\r\nSuch contrasts show that the \"evolution of morality\" is\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_172\" id=\"Page_172\"\u003e[Pg 172]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nalso an evolution of weakness, wretchedness, evil, and crime.\r\nThey suggest some general comparisons between custom\r\nand reflective morality. They require from every age a\r\nrenewed analysis of conduct and the social system. As a\r\npreliminary to such an analysis, we review in this chapter\r\nsome of the general relations between the morality of custom\r\nand the morality of reflection.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 1. ELEMENTS OF AGREEMENT AND CONTINUITY\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe moral life shows its continuity in two ways. First,\r\nthe earlier type of group and customary morality persists\r\nin part; in the second place, when the moral is differentiated\r\nfrom the other spheres of life in which it was embedded,\r\nit does not have to find entirely new conceptions.\r\nIt borrows its terms from the group life or from the various\r\nspheres, religious, political, \u0026aelig;sthetic, economic, which\r\nseparate out from the older group unity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe following quotation from Grote will serve as a vivid\r\nrestatement of the r\u0026eacute;gime of custom:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"This aggregate of beliefs and predispositions to believe,\r\nEthical, Religious, \u0026AElig;sthetical, and Social, respecting what is\r\ntrue or false, probable or improbable, just or unjust, holy\r\nor unholy, honorable or base, respectable or contemptible,\r\npure or impure, beautiful or ugly, decent or indecent, obligatory\r\nto do or obligatory to avoid, respecting the status and\r\nrelations of each individual in the society, respecting even the\r\nadmissible fashions of amusement and recreation\u0026mdash;this is an\r\nestablished fact and condition of things, the real origin of\r\nwhich is for the most part unknown, but which each new\r\nmember of the group is born to and finds subsisting…. It\r\nbecomes a part of each person\u0027s nature, a standing habit of\r\nmind, or fixed set of mental tendencies, according to which\r\nparticular experience is interpreted and particular persons\r\nappreciated…. The community hate, despise or deride any\r\nindividual member who proclaims his dissent from their social\r\ncreed…. Their hatred manifests itself in different ways\r\n… at the very least by exclusion from that amount of forbearance,\r\ngood will and estimation without which the life of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_173\" id=\"Page_173\"\u003e[Pg 173]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nan individual becomes insupportable…. \u0027Nomos (Law and\r\nCustom), king of all\u0027 (to borrow the phrase which Herodotus\r\ncites from Pindar) exercises plenary power, spiritual and\r\ntemporal, over individual minds; moulding the emotions as\r\nwell as the intellect, according to the local type … and\r\nreigning under the appearance of habitual, self-suggested\r\ntendencies.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_96_96\" id=\"FNanchor_96_96\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_96_96\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[96]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe important facts brought out are (1) the existence\r\nin a social group of certain habits not only of acting, but\r\nof feeling and believing about actions, of valuing or approving\r\nand disapproving. (2) The persistent forcing\r\nof these mental habitudes upon the attention of each new\r\nmember of the group. The newcomer, whether by birth\r\nor adoption, is introduced into a social medium whose\r\nconditions and regulations he can no more escape than\r\nhe can those of his physical environment. (3) Thus the\r\nmental and practical habits of the newly introduced individual\r\nare shaped. The current ways of esteeming and\r\nbehaving in the community become a \"standing habit\" of\r\nhis own mind; they finally reign as \"habitual, self-suggested\r\ntendencies.\" Thus he becomes a full member of the social\r\ngroup, interested in the social fabric to which he belongs,\r\nand ready to do his part in maintaining it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. Persistence of Group Morality.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Comparing this\r\nstate of affairs with what obtains to-day in civilized communities,\r\nwe find certain obvious points of agreement. The\r\nsocial groups with which an individual comes in touch are\r\nnow more numerous and more loosely formed. But everywhere\r\nthere are customs not only of acting, but of thinking\r\nand feeling about acting. Each profession, each institution,\r\nhas a \u003ci\u003ecode\u003c/i\u003e of which the individual has to take account.\r\nThe nature of this code, unexpressed as well as\r\nformulated, is brought to the attention of the individual\r\nin countless ways; by the approval and disapproval of its\r\npublic opinion; by his own failures and successes; by his\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_174\" id=\"Page_174\"\u003e[Pg 174]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nown tendency to imitate what he sees about him, as well as\r\nby deliberate, intentional instruction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn other words, group morality does not vanish in order\r\nthat conscious and personal morality may take its place.\r\nGroup and customary morality is still the morality of many\r\nof us most of the time, and of all of us for a good deal\r\nof the time. We do not any of us think out all of our\r\nstandards, weigh independently our values, make all our\r\nchoices in a rational manner, or form our characters by\r\nfollowing a clearly conceived purpose. As children we\r\nall start in a family group. We continue in a school\r\ngroup and perhaps a church group. We enter an occupation\r\ngroup, and later, it may be, family, political, social,\r\nand neighborhood groups. In every one of these if we are\r\nmembers, we must to a certain degree accept standards\r\nthat are given. We have to play according to the rules\r\nof the game. As children we do this unconsciously. We\r\nimitate, or follow suggestions; we are made to conform\r\nby all the agencies of group morality\u0026mdash;group opinion,\r\nritual, pleasure and pain, and even by taboos;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_97_97\" id=\"FNanchor_97_97\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_97_97\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[97]\u003c/a\u003e above all,\r\nwe act as the others act, and co\u0026ouml;perate more or less to\r\na common end. We form habits which persist, many of\r\nthem as long as we live. We accept many of the traditions\r\nwithout challenge. Even when we pass from the\r\nearly family group to the new situations and surroundings\r\nwhich make us repeat more or less of the experience\r\nof the race, a large share of our conduct and of our\r\njudgments of others is determined by the influences of\r\ngroup and custom. And it is fortunate for progress that\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_175\" id=\"Page_175\"\u003e[Pg 175]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthis is true. If every one had to start anew to frame\r\nall his ideals and make his laws, we should be in as melancholy\r\na plight morally as we should be intellectually if\r\nwe had to build each science anew. The fundamental safeguards\r\nwhich the group provides against individual impulse\r\nand passion, the condition of close association, interdependence\r\nand mutual sympathy which the group affords,\r\nthe habituation to certain lines of conduct valued by the\r\ngroup\u0026mdash;all this is a root on which the stem and flower of\r\npersonal morality may grow. Individualism and intellectual\r\nactivity, however necessary to man\u0027s progress, would\r\ngive no morality did they not start out of this deeper\r\nlevel of common feeling and common destiny. The rational\r\nand personal agencies of the \"third level\" come not\r\nto destroy, but to fulfill the meaning of the forces and\r\nagencies of the first and second levels described in Chapters\r\nIII and IV.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. The Moral Conceptions.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The conceptions for the\r\nmoral are nearly all taken from the group relations or\r\nfrom the jural and religious aspects, as these have been\r\ngradually brought to clearer consciousness. As already\r\nnoted, the Greek term \"ethical,\" the Latin \"moral,\" the\r\nGerman \"\u003ci\u003esittlich\u003c/i\u003e,\" suggest this\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eethos\u003c/i\u003e meant the \"sum of\r\nthe characteristic usages, ideas, standards, and codes by\r\nwhich a group was differentiated and individualized in\r\ncharacter from other groups.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_98_98\" id=\"FNanchor_98_98\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_98_98\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[98]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSome specific moral terms come directly from group\r\nrelations. The \"kind\" man acts as one of the kin. When\r\nthe ruling or privileged group is contrasted with the man\r\nof no family or of inferior birth, we get a large number\r\nof terms implying \"superiority\" or \"inferiority\" in birth,\r\nand so of general value. This may or may not be due\r\nto some inherent superiority of the upper class, but it\r\nmeans at least that the upper class has been most effectual\r\nin shaping language and standards of approval. So\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_176\" id=\"Page_176\"\u003e[Pg 176]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\"noble\" and \"gentle\" referred to birth before they had\r\nmoral value; \"duty\" in modern usage seems to have been\r\nprincipally what was due to a superior. Many words for\r\nmoral disapproval are very significant of class feeling.\r\nThe \"caitiff\" was a captive, and the Italians have their\r\ngeneral term for morally bad, \"\u003ci\u003ecattivo\u003c/i\u003e,\" from the same\r\nidea. The \"villain\" was a feudal tenant, the \"blackguard\"\r\nlooked after the kettles, the \"rascal\" was one of\r\nthe common herd, the \"knave\" was the servant; the \"base\"\r\nand \"mean\" were opposed to the gentle and noble. Another\r\nset of conceptions reflects the old group \u003ci\u003eapprovals\u003c/i\u003e\r\nor combines these with conceptions of birth. We have\r\nnoted the twofold root of \u003ci\u003ekalokagathia\u003c/i\u003e in Greek. \"Honor\"\r\nand \"honesty\" were what the group admired, and conversely\r\n\"\u003ci\u003eaischros\u003c/i\u003e\" and \"\u003ci\u003eturpe\u003c/i\u003e\" in Greek and Latin, like\r\nthe English \"disgraceful\" or \"shameful,\" were what the\r\ngroup condemned. \"Virtue\" was the manly excellence\r\nwhich called out the praise of a warlike time, while one\r\nof the Greek terms for morally bad originally meant\r\ncowardly, and our \"scoundrel\" has possibly the same\r\norigin. The \"bad\" was probably the weak or the womanish.\r\nThe economic appears in \"merit,\" what I have earned,\r\nand likewise in \"duty\" and \"ought,\" what is due or owed\u0026mdash;though\r\nduty seems to have made itself felt especially, as\r\nnoted above, toward a superior. Forethought and skill\r\nin practical affairs provided the conception of \"wisdom,\"\r\nwhich was highest of the virtues for the Greeks, and as\r\n\"prudence\" stood high in medi\u0026aelig;val systems. The conception\r\nof valuing and thus of forming some permanent\r\nstandard of a better and a worse, is also aided, if not\r\ncreated, by economic exchange. It appears in almost\r\nidentical terms in Plato and the New Testament in the\r\nchallenge, \"What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole\r\nworld and lose his own life?\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_99_99\" id=\"FNanchor_99_99\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_99_99\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[99]\u003c/a\u003e From the processes of fine\r\nor useful arts came probably the conceptions of measure,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_177\" id=\"Page_177\"\u003e[Pg 177]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\norder, and harmony. A whole mode of considering the\r\nmoral life is jural. \"Moral law,\" \"authority,\" \"obligation,\"\r\n\"responsibility,\" \"justice,\" \"righteousness,\" bring\r\nwith them the associations of group control and of the more\r\ndefinitely organized government and law. Finally the last\r\nnamed terms bear also a religious imprint, and numerous\r\nconceptions of the moral come from that sphere or get their\r\nspecific flavor from religious usage. The conceptions of the\r\n\"soul\" have contributed to the ideal of a good which is permanent,\r\nand which is made rather by personal companionship,\r\nthan by sensuous gratification. \"Purity\" began\r\nas a magical and religious idea; it came to symbolize\r\nnot only freedom from contamination but singleness of\r\npurpose. \"Chastity\" lends a religious sacredness to a\r\nvirtue which had its roots largely in the conception of\r\nproperty. \"Wicked\" is from witch.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have indeed certain conceptions drawn from individual\r\nexperiences of instinct, or reflection. From the sense\r\nrecoil from what was disgusting such conceptions as \"foul,\"\r\nand from kindred imagery of what suits eye or muscular\r\nsense come \"straightforward,\" \"upright,\" \"steady.\"\r\nFrom the thinking process itself we have \"conscience.\"\r\nThis word in Greek and Latin was a general term for\r\nconsciousness and suggests one of the distinctive, perhaps\r\nthe most distinctive characteristic of the moral. For it\r\nimplies a \"conscious\" thoughtful attitude, which operates\r\nnot only in forming purposes, but in measuring and valuing\r\naction by the standards it approves. But it is evident\r\nthat by far the larger part of our ethical terms are derived\r\nfrom social relations in the broad sense.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 2. ELEMENTS OF CONTRAST\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDifferentiation of the Moral.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The most obvious difference\r\nbetween the present and the early attitude is that\r\nwe now make a clear distinction between the moral aspect\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_178\" id=\"Page_178\"\u003e[Pg 178]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof behavior and other aspects such as the conventional,\r\nthe political, the legal; while in customary morality all activities\r\nesteemed by society were put upon the same level and\r\nenforced with the same vigor. Matters which we should\r\nregard as purely matters of fashion or etiquette, or as\r\nmodes of amusement, such as styles of wearing the hair,\r\nwere imperative. To mutilate the body in a certain way\r\nwas as exigent as to observe certain marriage customs;\r\nto refrain from speaking to the mother-in-law as\r\nbinding as to obey the chieftain; not to step over the\r\nshadow of the chief was even more important than not to\r\nmurder the member of another tribe. In general we make\r\na clear distinction between \"manners\" and morals, while\r\nin customary morality manners \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e morals, as the very\r\nwords \"ethical,\" \"moral\" still testify.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen Grote speaks of \"Ethical, Religious, \u0026AElig;sthetical,\r\nand Social\" beliefs, the term \"ethical\" belongs with the\r\nother terms only from a modern standpoint. The characteristic\r\nthing about the condition of which he is speaking\r\nis that the \"religious, \u0026aelig;sthetical, and social\" beliefs\r\nbrought to bear upon the individual \u003ci\u003econstitute\u003c/i\u003e the ethical.\r\nWe make the distinction between them as naturally\r\nas the r\u0026eacute;gime of custom failed to make it. Only by imagining\r\na social set in which failure to observe punctiliously\r\nthe fashions of the set as to the proper style of dress\r\nmakes the person subject to a disparagement which influences\r\nhis feelings and ideas as keenly \u003ci\u003eand in the same\r\nway\u003c/i\u003e as conviction of moral delinquency, can we realize\r\nthe frame of mind characteristic of the ethics of\r\ncustom.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eObserving versus Reflecting.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Customs may be \"observed.\"\r\nIndeed, customary morality made goodness or\r\nrightness of character practically identical with observing\r\nthe established order of social estimations in all departments.\r\nThis word \u003ci\u003eobserve\u003c/i\u003e is significant: it means to note,\r\nor notice as matter of fact, by perception; and it means\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_179\" id=\"Page_179\"\u003e[Pg 179]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto yield allegiance, to conform to, in action.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_100_100\" id=\"FNanchor_100_100\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_100_100\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[100]\u003c/a\u003e The element\r\nof intelligence, of reason, is thus reduced to a minimum.\r\nThe moral values are \u003ci\u003ethere\u003c/i\u003e, so to speak, palpably, tangibly;\r\nand the individual has only to use his mind enough\r\nto notice them. And since they are forced upon his notice\r\nby drastic and unrelaxing methods of discipline, little initiative\r\nis required for even the attitude of attention. But\r\nwhen the moral is something which is in customs and\r\nhabits, rather than those customs themselves, the good and\r\nright do not stand out in so obvious and external fashion.\r\nRecognition now demands thought, reflection; the power of\r\nabstraction and generalization. A child may be shown in\r\na pretty direct and physical fashion the difference between\r\n\u003ci\u003emeum\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003etuum\u003c/i\u003e in its bearing upon his conduct:\r\na fence may be pointed at which divides his yard from that\r\nof a neighbor and which draws as well the moral line between\r\nwhat is permissible and what is forbidden; a whipping\r\nmay intensify the observation. But modern business\r\nknows also of \"intangible\" property\u0026mdash;good will, reputation,\r\ncredit. These, indeed, can be bought and sold but\r\nthe detection of their existence and nature demands an intelligence\r\nwhich is more than perception. The greater\r\nnumber of duties and rights of which present morality\r\nconsists are of just this type. They are relations, not just\r\noutward habits. Their acknowledgment requires accordingly\r\nsomething more than just to follow and reproduce\r\nexisting customs. It involves power to see \u003ci\u003ewhy\u003c/i\u003e certain\r\nhabits are to be followed, what \u003ci\u003emakes\u003c/i\u003e a thing good or bad.\r\n\u003ci\u003eConscience\u003c/i\u003e is thus substituted for \u003ci\u003ecustom\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003eprinciples\u003c/i\u003e take\r\nthe place of external \u003ci\u003erules\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is what we mean by calling present morality reflective\r\nrather than customary. It is not that social customs\r\nhave ceased to be, or even have been reduced in number.\r\nThe exact contrary is the case. It is not that they have\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_180\" id=\"Page_180\"\u003e[Pg 180]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nshrunk in importance, or that they have less significance\r\nfor the individual\u0027s activity, or claim less of his attention.\r\nAgain, the reverse is the case. But the individual has to\r\ngrasp the \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e of these customs over and above the\r\nbare fact of their existence, and has to guide himself by\r\ntheir \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e and not by the mere fact noted.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_101_101\" id=\"FNanchor_101_101\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_101_101\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[101]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCustom is Static.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This difference introduces a second\r\nvery important difference. In customary morality, there\r\nis no choice between being enmeshed in the net of social\r\nrules which control activity, and being an outlaw\u0026mdash;one beyond\r\nthe pale, whose hand is against every man\u0027s, and\r\nevery man\u0027s against him. The extent to which social customs\r\nare regarded as of divine origin and are placed under\r\nthe protection of the gods, i.e., the tendency of all sanctions\r\nto become religious and supernatural, is evidence of\r\nthe binding force of institutions upon the individual. To\r\nviolate them is impiety, sacrilege, and calls down the wrath\r\nof gods, as well as of men. The custom cannot be questioned.\r\nTo inquire means uncertainty, and hence it is immoral,\r\nan attack upon the very foundations of the life of\r\nthe group. The apparent exception, which after all exhibits\r\nthe rule, is the case of great reforming heroes who\r\ndemarcate epochs of history even in customary societies.\r\nSuch individuals meet contemporary opposition and persecution;\r\nit is only by victory, by signal success over a\r\nrival faction at home, over plague and famine, or over an\r\nenemy abroad, that the hero is justified. Thereby it is\r\nproved that the gods are with him and sanction his\r\nchanges\u0026mdash;indeed that he is their own chosen instrument.\r\nThen the modified or new customs and institutions have\r\nall the binding sacredness and supernatural sanction of\r\nthe old. It is not yet an outgrown story for the fathers\r\nto kill the prophets, and for the sons to build and adorn\r\ntheir tombs, and make them into shrines.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_181\" id=\"Page_181\"\u003e[Pg 181]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eReflection Discovers a Higher Law.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;But in so far\r\nas the individual\u0027s activity is directed by his comprehension\r\nof the \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e of customs, not by his apprehension of\r\ntheir \u003ci\u003eexistence\u003c/i\u003e, so far the notion of moral progress or reform\r\nin social affairs becomes ethically important and\r\ngreater moral responsibility is put upon the individual\r\njust as greater practical freedom is secured to him. For\r\n(a) the individual may set the meaning of a custom \u003ci\u003eagainst\u003c/i\u003e\r\nits present form; or (b) he may find the meaning of\r\nsome custom much more commanding in value than that of\r\nothers, and yet find that its realization is hindered by the\r\nexistence of these other customs of less moral importance.\r\nOn the basis of such discrimination, the abolition or, at\r\nleast, the modification of certain social habits is demanded.\r\nSo far as this sort of situation frequently recurs, the individual\r\n(c) becomes more or less vaguely aware that he\r\n\u003ci\u003emust not accept the current standard\u003c/i\u003e as justification of\r\nhis own conduct, unless \u003ci\u003eit also\u003c/i\u003e justify itself to his own\r\nmoral intelligence. The fact that it exists gives it indeed\r\na certain \u003ci\u003eprima facie\u003c/i\u003e claim, but no ultimate moral warrant.\r\nPerhaps the custom is itself wrong\u0026mdash;and the individual\r\nis responsible for bearing this possibility in mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eConsequent Transformation of Custom.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Of course\r\nthe plane of customary morality still persists; no wholesale\r\ndivergence of reflective from customary morality exists.\r\nPractically, for example, many business men do not\r\nbother themselves about the morality of certain ways of doing\r\nbusiness. Such and such is the custom of the trade, and\r\nif a man is going to do business at all he must follow its\r\ncustoms\u0026mdash;or get out. Law, medicine, the ministry, journalism,\r\nfamily life, present, in considerable extent, the same\r\nphenomenon. Customary morality persists, almost as the\r\ncore of present morality. But there is still a difference.\r\nA few, at least, are actively engaged in a moral criticism\r\nof the custom, in a demand for its transformation; and almost\r\neverybody is sufficiently affected by the discussions\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_182\" id=\"Page_182\"\u003e[Pg 182]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand agitations thus called out to have some lingering and\r\nuneasy idea of responsibility for his part in the maintenance\r\nof a questionable custom. The duty of some exercise\r\nof discriminating intelligence as to existing customs\r\nfor the sake of improvement and progress, is thus a mark\r\nof reflective morality\u0026mdash;of the r\u0026eacute;gime of conscience as over\r\nagainst custom. In the morally more advanced members\r\nof contemporary society, the need of fostering a habit of\r\nexamination and judgment, of keeping the mind open,\r\nsensitive, to the defects and the excellences of the existing\r\nsocial order is recognized as obligation. To reflect\r\non one\u0027s own behavior in relation to the existing order is a\r\nstanding habit of mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDeepening of Meaning.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;While the materials and conceptions\r\nof more conscious morality are provided by the\r\nearlier stages, and taken from other spheres of life,\r\nwe find that these conceptions naturally undergo a deepening\r\nof meaning when they are used to express the more\r\nintimate and personal attitude. Take, for example, the\r\nconceptions borrowed from the jural sphere. It is in\r\nthe school of government and courts that man has learned\r\nto talk and think of right and law, of responsibility and\r\njustice. To make these moral instead of jural terms,\r\nthe first thing that is needed is that we make the whole\r\nprocess an inward one. The person must himself set\r\nup a standard, recognize it as \"law,\" judge his conduct\r\nby it, hold himself responsible to himself, and seek to do\r\njustice. It takes several persons to carry on these processes\r\nin the realm of government. Legislators, judges,\r\njury, executive officers, all represent the State, organized\r\nsociety. That a single person can be himself lawgiver,\r\njudge, and jury, as well as claimant or defendant, shows\r\nthat he is himself a complex being. He is a being\r\nof passions, appetites, and individual interests, but he\r\nis also a being who has a rational and social nature.\r\nAs a member of society he not only feels his individual\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_183\" id=\"Page_183\"\u003e[Pg 183]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninterest but recognizes social interests. As a rational\r\nbeing he not only feels the thrill of passion but responds\r\nto the authority of a law and obeys the voice of duty.\r\nLike a member of a democratic State he finds himself in\r\nthe sphere of conduct, not only a subject but a sovereign,\r\nand feels the dignity of a \u003ci\u003eperson\u003c/i\u003e. A conscientious person\r\nis in so far one who has made the law of God or man\r\nan inward law of life\u0026mdash;a \"moral law.\" But the act of\r\nmaking the process inward makes possible a deepening\r\nof meaning. Governments and courts are necessarily\r\nlimited in purview and fallible in decisions. They are sometimes\r\ntoo lenient, sometimes too severe. Conscience implies\r\na knowledge of the whole act\u0026mdash;purpose, motive, and deed.\r\nIts authority makes claim for absolute obedience. The\r\nlaws of the State are felt to be binding just because they\r\nare believed to be, on the whole, right and just as measured\r\nby this moral court of appeal. When they conflict, the\r\npower may be with the political sovereign, but the man\r\nwhose conscience is clear believes that he follows a \"higher\r\nlaw.\" Much of the great literature of the world draws\r\nits interest from its portrayal of this fundamental fact\r\nof human experience. \"Two things fill the mind with\r\never new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener\r\nand the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry\r\nheavens above and the moral law within.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe conceptions taken from the economic sphere show\r\nsimilar deepening. In the economic world things are\r\ngood or have value if people want them. It is in the\r\nexperience of satisfying wants that man has learned the\r\nlanguage of \"good and evil,\" and to compare one good\r\nwith another; it is doubtless by the progress of science\r\nand the arts that objective standards of more permanent,\r\nrational, and social \"goods\" are provided. When this\r\nterm is taken up to a higher level and given moral meaning,\r\ntwo new factors appear. First the individual begins\r\nto consider his various goods and values in relation to\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_184\" id=\"Page_184\"\u003e[Pg 184]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\neach other and to his life as a whole. In the second\r\nplace, in thus comparing the various goods and the desires\r\nthey satisfy, he begins to realize that in some way\r\nhe is himself more than the mere sum of his natural\r\ninstincts and appetites. He finds that he can take an\r\ninterest in certain things, and is not merely passive. He\r\n\u003ci\u003egives\u003c/i\u003e value as well as measures it. He feels that as such\r\nan active and organizing judge and creator of value, he\r\nhimself has a higher worth than any of the particular\r\nthings that gratify particular desires. \"A man\u0027s life\r\nconsisteth not in the abundance of the things that he possesseth.\"\r\n\"The life is more than meat.\" Or, to use the\r\nphrase which will be explained later, moral good implies\r\npurpose, character, \"good will.\" In common language, it\r\nimplies being, and not merely having.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe term good where used in our judgments upon others\r\n(as in a \"good\" man), may have a different history.\r\nAs has been noted, it may come from class feeling, or\r\nfrom the praise we give to acts as they immediately please.\r\nIt may be akin to noble or fine or admirable. All such\r\nconceptions undergo a similar transformation as they\r\npass from the sphere of class or public opinion to become\r\nmoral terms. As moral they imply in the first place that\r\nwe consider not merely outward acts, but inward purpose\r\nand character. They imply in the second place that we\r\nwho judge are ourselves acting not as members of a\r\nclass, not as merely emotional beings, but as social and\r\nrational. Our moral judgments in this sense are from\r\na general, a universal standard; those of a class are\r\npartial.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 3. OPPOSITION BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL AIMS\r\nAND STANDARDS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWithdrawal from the Social Order.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The development\r\nof reflection tends to set up a moral opposition\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_185\" id=\"Page_185\"\u003e[Pg 185]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbetween the individual and society. Sometimes \"conscience\"\r\ngoes beyond the need of criticizing, of discriminating,\r\nof interpreting social customs, of following their\r\nspirit rather than their letter; it takes the form of an\r\nassertion of a purely inner, personal morality, so distinct\r\nfrom the conditions of social life that the latter are\r\nconceived to be totally lacking in positive moral significance.\r\nThe prescriptions of morality are thought to be\r\nrevealed in conscience, as a faculty of pure intuition or\r\nrevelation, receiving neither material nor warrant from\r\nsocial conditions. The distinction already spoken of between\r\nthe moral and the economic, legal, or conventional,\r\nis conceived as a complete separation; customs and\r\ninstitutions are external, indifferent, irrelevant, or even\r\nhostile to the ideal and personally perceived demands of\r\nmorality. Such a conception of morality is especially\r\nlikely to arise in a period when through the clash of ways\r\nand standards of living, all customs, except those maintained\r\nby force and authority, are disintegrating or\r\nrelaxing. Such a state existed in the early years of the\r\nRoman empire when, for the first time in history, local\r\nboundaries were systematically overstepped; when the\r\nempire was a seething mixture of alien and unlike gods,\r\nbeliefs, ideals, standards, practices. In the almost universal\r\nflux and confusion, \u003ci\u003eexternal\u003c/i\u003e order was maintained\r\nby the crystallized legislation and administration of Rome;\r\nbut personal aims and modes of behavior had to be ascertained\r\nby the individual thrown back upon himself.\r\nChristian, Stoic, Epicurean, alike found the political order\r\nwholly external to the moral, or in chronic opposition to\r\nit. There was a withdrawal into the region of personal\r\nconsciousness. In some cases the withdrawal was pushed\r\nto the point where men felt that they could be truly\r\nrighteous only by going by themselves into the desert, to\r\nlive as hermits; or by forming separate communities of\r\nthose who agreed in their conceptions of life; mental\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_186\" id=\"Page_186\"\u003e[Pg 186]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand moral aloofness from prevailing social standards and\r\nhabitudes was preached by all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIndividual Emancipation.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In other cases, what takes\r\nplace is a consciousness of liberation; of assertion of\r\npersonal rights and privileges, claims for new modes of\r\nactivity and new kinds of enjoyment. The individual\r\nfeels that he is his own end; that the impulses and capacities\r\nwhich he finds in himself are sacred, and afford the\r\nonly genuine law for his behavior; that whatever restricts\r\nthe full exercise of these personal powers and hampers the\r\nsatisfaction of personal desires is coercive and morally abnormal.\r\nExisting social institutions may be practically\r\nnecessary, but they are morally undesirable; they are to\r\nbe used, or got around in the interests of personal gratifications.\r\nAs some feel that social conditions are hostile\r\nto the realization of the highest moral \u003ci\u003eobligations\u003c/i\u003e, so\r\nothers feel that they are hostile to the full possession of\r\ntheir \u003ci\u003erights\u003c/i\u003e, of that to which they are properly entitled.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEventual Transformation of Social Values and Aims.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In\r\nextreme cases, the individual may come to believe\r\nthat, either on the basis of his true obligations or his\r\ntrue rights, the very principle of society is morally indifferent\r\nor even unworthy; that the moral life is eventually\r\nor intrinsically an individual matter, although it happens\r\nto be outwardly led under social conditions. But in the\r\nmain the opposition is not to the social relations as such,\r\nbut to existing institutions and customs as inadequate.\r\nThen the reaction of the individual against the existing\r\nsocial scheme, whether on the ground of ideals too high\r\nto be supported by it or on the ground of personal claims\r\nto which it does not afford free play, becomes a means\r\nto the reconstruction and transformation of social habits.\r\nIn this way, \u003ci\u003ereflective morality is a mark of a progressive\r\nsociety, just as customary morality is of a stationary\r\nsociety\u003c/i\u003e. Reflection on values is the method of their\r\nmodification.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_187\" id=\"Page_187\"\u003e[Pg 187]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe monastic Christian in his outward withdrawal\r\nfrom social life, still maintained the conception of a perfected\r\nsociety, of a kingdom of God or Heaven to be\r\nestablished. This ideal became to some extent the working\r\nmethod for changing the existing order. The Stoics,\r\nwho held in light esteem existing community ties, had the\r\nconception of a universal community, a cosmopolis, ruled\r\nby universal law, of which every rational being was a\r\nmember and subject. This notion became operative to\r\nsome extent in the development of judicial and administrative\r\nsystems much more generalized and equitable than\r\nthe purely local customs, laws, and standards which it\r\nswept away. The Epicurean had the ideal of friendship\r\non the basis of which were formed groups of congenial\r\nassociates held together neither by legal ties, nor by universal\r\nlaws of reason, nor by unity of religious aspiration\r\nand belief, but by friendship and companionable intercourse.\r\nThus were afforded other centers of social\r\nreconstruction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 4. EFFECTS UPON THE INDIVIDUAL CHARACTER\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGeneral Effects.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The characteristic differences which\r\nhave been pointed out in the preceding section, when taken\r\ntogether with the specific conditions of change\u0026mdash;liberty\r\nof action and thought, incentives to private acquisition,\r\nfacilities for power and pleasure\u0026mdash;enable us to understand\r\nthe contrasts referred to at the opening of the\r\nchapter. We have, on the one hand, the inbred craving\r\nfor power, for acquisition, for excitement, for gratification\r\nof sense and appetite, enhanced by what it feeds on. We\r\nhave, on the other hand, the progressive differentiation\r\nof the moral, tearing the individual loose from the bonds\r\nof the external moral order and forcing him to stand\r\non his own feet\u0026mdash;or fall. Note how each of the points\r\nbrought out in the preceding section operates.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_188\" id=\"Page_188\"\u003e[Pg 188]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(1) To separate out the moral as a distinct element\r\nfrom certain spheres of life, allows the less seriously\r\nminded and the less sympathetic individuals to live complacently\r\na trivial or unscrupulous life. Fashion, \"social\r\nduties,\" amusements, \"culture\" emptied of all earnest\r\nmeaning, \"business\" and \"politics\" divorced from any\r\nhumane or public considerations, may be regarded as justifiable\r\nvocations. A \"gentleman\" who no longer has the\r\noccupation of his fighting predecessors as an excuse for\r\na distinct type of life, may find the support of a large\r\nleisure class in declining any useful service to the community\r\nand devoting himself to \"sport\"; a \"lady\" may\r\nbe so engaged by the multifarious demands of \"society\"\r\nas never to notice what an utterly worthless round she\r\nfollows.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) The fact that the morality of conscience requires\r\nreflection, progress, and a deeper meaning for its conception,\r\nmakes it obvious why many fail to grasp any\r\nmoral meaning at all. They fail to put forth the effort,\r\nor to break with habit. Under customary morality\r\nit was enough to \"observe\" and to continue in the mores.\r\nIt requires a higher degree of insight and a greater\r\ninitiative to get any moral attitude at all when the forms\r\nhave become mere forms and the habits mere habits.\r\nHence when a change in personal environment or in\r\ngeneral social and economic conditions comes, many fail\r\nto see the principles involved. They remain completely\r\nsatisfied with the \"old-fashioned virtues\" or intrench\r\nthemselves in the \"righteousness\" and \"honesty\" of a\r\npast generation. This habitual and \"painless\" morality\r\nwill often mean a \"virtue\" or \"righteousness\" which involves\r\nno conflict with present conditions. A man who\r\nfeels honest because he does not break contracts or defraud\r\nin old-fashioned ways, may be quite at ease about\r\nwatering stock or adulterating goods. A society which\r\nabhors murder with iron and explosives in the form of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_189\" id=\"Page_189\"\u003e[Pg 189]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndaggers and bombs, may feel quite unconcerned about the\r\npreventable homicides by iron machinery, or by explosives\r\nused in coal mines.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) The conflict with society which reflective morality\r\nrequires, works to thrust some below the general level,\r\nwhile it raises others above it. To criticize the general\r\nmoral order may make a man a prophet, but it may also\r\nmake him a Pharisee. Practical reaction may make\r\nreformers, but it is likely to make another set of\r\nmen dissolute; to make them feel superior to the morality\r\nof \"Philistines\" and therefore exempt from social\r\nrestraints.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eVices Incident to Reflective Stage.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The vices increase\r\nwith civilization, partly because of increased opportunity,\r\npartly because of increased looseness in social restraint.\r\nThere is a further element. When any activity of man\r\nis cut off from its original and natural relations and\r\nmade the object of special attention and pursuit, the\r\nwhole adjustment is thrown out of balance. What was\r\nbefore a useful function becomes pathological. The\r\ncraving for excitement or stimulation is normal within\r\ncertain limits. In the chase or the battle, in the venture\r\nof the explorer or the merchant, it functions as a healthy\r\nincentive. When isolated as an end in itself, taken out\r\nof the objective social situation, it becomes the spring\r\nof gambling or drunkenness. The instincts and emotions\r\nof sex, possessing power and interest necessitated by their\r\nplace in the continuance of the race, become when isolated\r\nthe spring of passion or of obscenity or lubricity. Avarice\r\nand gluttony illustrate the same law. The gladiatorial\r\nshows at Rome became base and cowardly when the\r\nRomans were themselves no longer fighters.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_102_102\" id=\"FNanchor_102_102\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_102_102\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[102]\u003c/a\u003e Even the\r\naspiration for what is higher and better may become an\r\n\"otherworldliness\" which leaves this world to its misery\r\nand evil. Such a series of pictures as Balzac has given in\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_190\" id=\"Page_190\"\u003e[Pg 190]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhis \u003ci\u003eCom\u0026eacute;die Humaine\u003c/i\u003e, shows better than any labored\r\ndescription the possibilities of modern civilization.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is, moreover, in civilized society a further most\r\ndemoralizing agency unknown to earlier life. As the vices\r\nare specialized and pursued they become economic and\r\npolitical interests. Vast capital is invested in the business\r\nof ministering to the vicious appetites. It is pecuniarily\r\ndesirable that these appetites should be stimulated\r\nas greatly as possible. It makes \"business.\" The tribute\r\nlevied by public officials upon the illegal pursuits forms\r\na vast fund for carrying elections. The multitude engaged\r\nin the traffic or dependent upon it for favors, can\r\nbe relied upon to cast their votes as a unit for men who\r\nwill guarantee protection.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRelations to Fellow Men.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The motives and occasions\r\nfor selfishness and injustice have been indicated sufficiently\r\nperhaps in preceding chapters. As the general\r\nprocess of increasing individuality and reflection goes on,\r\nit is an increasingly easy matter to be indifferent or\r\neven unjust. When all lead a common life it is easy to\r\nenter into the situation of another, to appreciate his\r\nmotives, his needs, and in general to \"put yourself in his\r\nplace.\" The external nature of the conduct makes it\r\neasy to hold all to a common standard. The game must\r\nbe shared; the property\u0026mdash;so far as there is property\u0026mdash;respected;\r\nthe religious rites observed. But when standards\r\nbecomes more inward the more intelligent or rigorous\r\nmay find sympathy less easy. When they attempt to be\r\n\"charitable\" they may easily become condescending. The\r\npure will not soil their skirts by contact with the fallen.\r\nThe \"high-minded citizen\" refuses to mix in politics. The\r\nscholar thinks the business man materialistic. The man\r\nof breeding, wealth, and education finds the uneducated\r\nlaborer lacking in courtesy and refinement and argues\r\nthat it is useless to waste sympathy upon the \"masses.\"\r\nThe class terms which have become moral terms are illus\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_191\" id=\"Page_191\"\u003e[Pg 191]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etrations\r\nof this attitude. Finally, the moral process\r\nof building up freedom and right easily leads to a disposition\r\nto stand on rights and let other persons look\r\nout for themselves. Kant\u0027s doctrine, that since all morality\r\nis personal I can do nothing to promote my neighbor\u0027s\r\nperfection, is a \u003ci\u003elaissez faire\u003c/i\u003e in ethics which he did not\r\ncarry out, but it is a not unnatural corollary of reflective\r\nmorality. \"Am I my brother\u0027s keeper?\" is much more\r\nlikely to be the language of reflective, than of customary\r\nand group life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eReconstructive Forces.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We have dwelt at length upon\r\nthe disintegrating forces, not because civilization necessarily\r\ngrows worse, but because, having pointed out in\r\nearlier chapters the positive advances, it becomes necessary\r\nto allude also to the other aspect of the process. Otherwise\r\nit might appear that there is no problem. If the\r\nevolution were supposed to be all in one direction there\r\nwould be no seriousness in life. It is only in the pressure\r\nof constantly new difficulties and evils that moral character\r\nadds new fiber, and moral progress emerges. Individualism,\r\nself-seeking, and desire for property force\r\nthe establishment of governments and courts which protect\r\npoor as well as rich. Luxury and ostentation have\r\nnot only called out the asceticism which renounces the\r\nworld and sees in all gratification of appetite an evil;\r\nthey have brought into the fore the serious meaning of\r\nlife; they have served to emphasize the demand for social\r\njustice. The countless voluntary associations for the\r\nrelief of sickness, misfortune, and poverty; for aiding\r\nthe defective, dependent, and criminal; for promoting numberless\r\ngood causes\u0026mdash;enlist a multitude in friendly co-operation.\r\nThe rising demand for legislation to embody\r\nthe new sentiments of justice is part of the process of\r\nreconstruction. And now when all the arts and goods of\r\ncivilization are becoming more and more fully the work, not\r\nof any individual\u0027s labor or skill, but rather of the com\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_192\" id=\"Page_192\"\u003e[Pg 192]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ebined\r\nlabor and intelligence of many, when life in cities is\r\nnecessitating greater interdependence, finally when contrasts\r\nin conditions are brought more forcibly to notice by\r\nthe very progress of knowledge and the means of knowledge,\u0026mdash;the\r\nmore thoroughly social use of all that civilization\r\nproduces becomes more insistent and compelling. It\r\nis not a matter of sentiment but of necessity. If any one\r\nis disposed to deny the claim, it becomes increasingly certain\r\nthat Carlyle\u0027s Irish widow will prove her sisterhood by\r\ninfecting the denier with fever;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_103_103\" id=\"FNanchor_103_103\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_103_103\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[103]\u003c/a\u003e that the ignorant, or\r\ncriminal, or miserable will jeopardize his happiness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 5. MORAL DIFFERENTIATION AND THE SOCIAL ORDER\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTwo processes went on side by side in the movement we\r\nhave traced. (1) The primitive group, which was at once\r\na kinship or family, an economic, a political, a religious,\r\nan educational, and a moral unit, was broken down and\r\nreplaced by several distinct institutions, each with its\r\nown special character. (2) The moral, which was so\r\nlargely unreflective that it could be embodied in every\r\ncustom and observance, became more personal and subjective.\r\nThe result of this was either that the moral\r\nwas now more consciously and voluntarily \u003ci\u003eput into\u003c/i\u003e the\r\nsocial relations, thereby raising them all to a higher moral\r\nlevel, or that, failing such a leavening of the distinct\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_193\" id=\"Page_193\"\u003e[Pg 193]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nspheres of the social order, the latter were emptied of moral\r\nvalue and lost moral restraints. We notice very briefly\r\ncertain illustrations of this, leaving a fuller treatment\r\nfor Part III.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Family.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;When the family was largely determined\r\nby status, when it was an economic, a political, and\r\na religious unit, it had a strong support. But the support\r\nwas largely external to the true purpose and meaning\r\nof the family. Only as these other elements were\r\nseparated, and the family placed on a voluntary basis,\r\ncould its true significance emerge. Affection and mutual\r\nsupplementation of husband and wife, love and devotion\r\nto offspring, must stand the strains formerly distributed\r\nover several ties. The best types of family life which\r\nhave resulted from this more moral basis are unquestionably\r\nfar superior to the older form. At the same time\r\nthe difficulties and perversion or subversion of the more\r\nvoluntary type are manifest. When no personal attachment\r\nwas sought or professed, or when marriage by\r\npurchase was the approved custom, the marriage contracted\r\nunder these conditions might have all the value\r\nwhich the general state of intelligence and civilization allowed.\r\nWhen the essential feature which hallows the\r\nunion has come to be recognized as a union of will and\r\naffection, then marriage without these, however \"solemnized,\"\r\nalmost inevitably means moral degradation. And\r\nif the consent of the parties is regarded as the basis\r\nof the tie, then it is difficult to make sure that this\r\n\"consent\" has within it enough of steadfast, well-considered\r\npurpose and of emotional depth to take the place\r\nof all the older sanctions and to secure permanent unions.\r\nThe more complete responsibility for the children which\r\nhas been gained by the separation of the family, has also\r\nproved susceptible of abuse as well as of service. For\r\nwhile savages have often practiced infanticide for economic\r\nreasons, it is doubtful if any savage family ever\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_194\" id=\"Page_194\"\u003e[Pg 194]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nequaled the more refined selfishness and cruelty of the\r\nchild labor which modern families have furnished and\r\nmodern society has permitted.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Economic and Industrial.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The economic lost powerful\r\nrestraints when it became a separate activity\r\ndivorced from family, religious, and, in the view of some,\r\nfrom moral considerations. It has worked out certain important\r\nmoral necessities of its own. Honesty, the keeping\r\nof contracts, the steadiness and continuity of character\r\nfostered by economic relations, are important\r\ncontributions. Modern business, for example, is the most\r\neffective agency in securing sobriety. It is far more\r\nefficient than \"temperance societies.\" Other values of the\r\neconomic and industrial process\u0026mdash;the increase of production,\r\nthe interchange of services and goods, the new means\r\nof happiness afforded by the increase of wealth\u0026mdash;are\r\nobvious. On the other hand, the honesty required by\r\nbusiness is a most technical and peculiarly limited sort.\r\nIt does not interfere with adulteration of goods under\r\ncertain conditions, nor with corrupt bargains with public\r\nofficials. The measurement of values on a purely pecuniary\r\nbasis tends to release a large sphere of activity from any\r\nmoral restraints. The maxim \"Business is business\" may\r\nbe made the sanction for any kind of conduct not excluded\r\nby commercial standards. Unless there is a constant injection\r\nof moral valuation and control, there is a tendency\r\nto subvert all other ends and standards to the purely\r\neconomic.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLaw and Government.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;To remove these functions\r\nfrom the kinship group as such, is at once to bring the\r\nimportant principles of authority and duty, and gradually\r\nof rights and freedom, to consciousness. Only by\r\nsuch separation could the universality and impartiality\r\nof law be established. And only by universality can the\r\njudgment of the society as a whole be guaranteed its\r\nexecution as over against the variations in intelligence\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_195\" id=\"Page_195\"\u003e[Pg 195]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand right purpose of individual rulers and judges. Moreover,\r\nthe separation of law from morality has likewise\r\nits gain or loss. On the one hand, to separate off a definite\r\nsphere of external acts to which alone physical constraints\r\nor penalties may attach, is at once to free a\r\ngreat sphere of inner thought and purpose and to enable\r\npurely psychical values and restraints to attain far\r\ngreater power in conduct. Liberty of thought and religious\r\nbelief, sincerity and thorough responsibility, require\r\nsuch a separation. It is also to make possible a\r\ngeneral law which rises above the conscience of the lower\r\neven if it does not always reach the level of the most\r\nenlightened and just. To make a command a \"universal\r\nlaw\" is itself a steadying and elevating influence, and\r\nit is only by a measure of abstraction from the individual,\r\ninner aspect of conduct that this can be achieved.\r\nOn the other hand, the not infrequent contrast between\r\nlaw and justice, the substitution of technicality for substantials,\r\nthe conservatism which made Voltaire characterize\r\nlawyers as the \"conservators of ancient barbarous\r\nusages,\" above all the success with which law has been\r\nused to sanction or even facilitate nearly every form of\r\noppression, extortion, class advantage, or even judicial\r\nmurder, is a constant attestation of the twofold possibilities\r\ninherent in all institutions. Government in other\r\nfunctions exhibits similar possibilities. At first it was\r\ntyranny against which the subject had to defend himself.\r\nNow it is rather the use of political machinery for private\r\ngain. \"Eternal vigilance\" is the price not only of freedom,\r\nbut of every moral value.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Religious Life.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;When freed from interdependence\r\nwith kinship, economic, and political association,\r\nreligion has an opportunity to become more personal and\r\nmore universal. When a man\u0027s religious attitude is not\r\nfixed by birth, when worship is not so closely bound up\r\nwith economic interests, when there is not only religious\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_196\" id=\"Page_196\"\u003e[Pg 196]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\"toleration,\" but religious liberty, the significance of religion\r\nas a personal, spiritual relation comes to view. The\r\nkinship tie is sublimated into a conception of divine fatherhood.\r\nIt becomes credible that Job does serve God \"for\r\nnaught.\" Faith and purity of heart are not secured by\r\nmagistrates or laws.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd the universality of religion is no less a gain. So\r\nfar as religion was of the group it tended to emphasize\r\nthe boundary between Jew and Gentile, Greek and Barbarian,\r\nbetween the \"we-group\" and the \"others-group.\"\r\nBut when this group religion gave place to a more universal\r\nreligion, the kingdom of Israel could give place\r\nto the kingdom of God; brotherhood could transcend\r\nfamily or national lines. In the fierce struggles of the\r\nMiddle Ages the church was a powerful agency for restraining\r\nthe powerful and softening the feuds of hostile\r\nclans and peoples. The \"peace of God\" was not only\r\na symbol of a far-off ideal, but an actual relief. The\r\nuniversality might indeed be sought by force in a crusade\r\nof Christian against Moslem, or in the horror of a thirty\r\nyears\u0027 war between Catholic and Protestant. But as the\r\nconception of religion as a spiritual relation becomes\r\nclearer, the tendency must inevitably be to disclose religion\r\nas essentially a unifying rather than a divisive and discordant\r\nforce. If any religion becomes universal it will\r\nbe because of its universal appeal. And so far as it does\r\nmake universal appeal, like science, like art, it invites\r\nits followers.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe differentiation of the moral from the religious\r\nis often difficult to trace. For the religious has often been\r\nthe agency through which certain of the characteristics\r\nof the moral have been brought about. The inward and\r\nvoluntary aspect of the moral, as compared with the verdicts\r\nof law or public opinion, has been emphasized. But this\r\nis often developed by the religious conceptions of an all-seeing\r\nGod, an all-wise judge. \"Man looketh on the outer\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_197\" id=\"Page_197\"\u003e[Pg 197]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nappearance, but the Lord looketh upon the heart\" has its\r\nliterary parallels in Xenophon and Plato and Shakspere.\r\nThe distinction between higher and lower values has\r\nreceived its most impressive symbol in the conception of\r\n\"another world,\" in which there is neither pain nor sin,\r\nbut eternal blessedness and eternal life. Ideals of character,\r\nwhen embodied in divine persons, command love,\r\nreverence, and devotion in supreme degree. A society\r\nin which love and justice are the law of life has seemed\r\nmore possible, more potent to inspire sacrifice and enthusiasm,\r\nwhen envisaged as the Kingdom of God. But\r\nin all these illustrations we have, not the religious as\r\ndistinct from the moral, but the religious as modified\r\nby the moral and embodying the moral in concrete examples\r\nand imagery. We can see the two possible types\r\nof development, however, in the concrete instances of the\r\nHebrews and the Greeks. In Israel religion was able to\r\ntake up the moral ideals and become itself more completely\r\nethical. The prophets of religion were at the same\r\ntime the moral reformers. But in Greece, in spite of the\r\nefforts of some of the great poets, the religious conceptions\r\nfor the most part remained set and hence became\r\nsuperstition, or emotional orgy, or ecstasy, while the moral\r\nfound a distinct path of its own. Religion at present\r\nis confronting the problem of whether it will be able to\r\ntake up into itself the newer ethical values\u0026mdash;the scientific\r\nspirit which seeks truth, the enhanced value of human\r\nworth which demands higher types of social justice.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\u0027width: 15%;\u0027 /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA brief characterization of the respective standpoints\r\nof religion and morality may be added, as they both aim\r\nto control and give value to human conduct. The religious\r\nhas always implied some relation of man\u0027s life\r\nto unseen powers or to the cosmos. The relation may be\r\nthe social relation of kin or friend or companion, the\r\npolitical of subject to a sovereign, the cosmic relation of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_198\" id=\"Page_198\"\u003e[Pg 198]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndependence, or that of seeking in the divine completer\r\nmeaning or more perfect fulfillment for what is fragmentary\r\nand imperfect. In its aspect of \"faith\" it holds\r\nall these ideals of power, wisdom, goodness, justice, to\r\nbe real and effective. The moral, on the other hand, concerns\r\nitself, not with unseen beings or cosmic reality, but\r\nwith human purposes and the relations of a man to his\r\nfellows. For religion, conscience may be the \"voice of\r\nGod\"; for morality, it must be stated in terms of thought\r\nand feeling. The \"moral law\" must be viewed as a law\r\nwhich is capable of being approved, at least\u0026mdash;and this\r\nimplies that it may also be criticized\u0026mdash;by the mind. The\r\ndifference which religion states as a choice between \"God\r\nand mammon,\" between heaven and earth, morality must\r\nstate in terms of good and evil, right and wrong, ideal\r\ninterests and natural appetites. Instead of regarding\r\nits standards as laws established once for all by a divine\r\nauthority, morality seeks to reach \u003ci\u003eprinciples\u003c/i\u003e. Instead\r\nof embodying its ideals in persons, the moral seeks to\r\nreshape them continually. It is for religion to hold\r\nthat \"God reigns,\" and therefore \"All\u0027s right with the\r\nworld.\" The moral as such must be continually overcoming\r\nevil, continually working out ideals into conduct,\r\nand changing the natural order into a more rational and\r\nsocial order.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_96_96\" id=\"Footnote_96_96\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_96_96\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[96]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Grote, \u003ci\u003ePlato and the Other Companions of Sokrates\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., p.\r\n249.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_97_97\" id=\"Footnote_97_97\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_97_97\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[97]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Nearly every railway journey or other occasion for observing\r\nfamily discipline discloses the prevalence of this agency of savage\r\nmorality. \"If you are not quiet I\u0027ll give you to the conductor,\"\r\n\"the black man will get you,\" \"Santa Claus will not give presents\r\nto naughty children.\" That persons who in many respects are kindly\r\nand decent should aim to cultivate morality by a system of deliberate\r\nlying and more or less brutal cruelty is one of the interesting\r\nphenomena of education. The savages who used taboos believed what\r\nthey said.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_98_98\" id=\"Footnote_98_98\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_98_98\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[98]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Sumner, \u003ci\u003eFolkways\u003c/i\u003e, p. 36.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_99_99\" id=\"Footnote_99_99\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_99_99\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[99]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Plato\u0027s wording is given on p. 132.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_100_100\" id=\"Footnote_100_100\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_100_100\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[100]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"Recognition\" has the same double sense. So has \"acknowledgment,\"\r\nwith greater emphasis upon rendering allegiance in action.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_101_101\" id=\"Footnote_101_101\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_101_101\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[101]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Logically, this means that intelligence works conceptually, not\r\nperceptually alone.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_102_102\" id=\"Footnote_102_102\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_102_102\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[102]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Sumner, \u003ci\u003eFolkways\u003c/i\u003e, p. 570.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_103_103\" id=\"Footnote_103_103\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_103_103\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[103]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"One of Dr. Alison\u0027s Scotch facts struck us much. A poor Irish\r\nWidow, her husband having died in one of the Lanes of Edinburgh,\r\nwent forth with her three children, bare of all resources, to solicit help\r\nfrom the Charitable Establishments of that City. At this Charitable\r\nEstablishment and then at that she was refused; referred from one\r\nto the other, helped by none; till she had exhausted them all; till her\r\nstrength and heart failed her; she sank down in typhus-fever; died,\r\nand infected her Lane with fever, so that \u0027seventeen other persons\u0027\r\ndied of fever there in consequence…. The forlorn Irish Widow\r\napplies to her fellow creatures, as if saying, \u0027Behold I am sinking,\r\nbare of help; ye must help me! I am your sister, bone of your bone;\r\none God made us; ye must help me.\u0027 They answer, \u0027No, impossible;\r\nthou art no sister of ours.\u0027 But she proves her sisterhood; her typhus\r\nfever kills \u003ci\u003ethem\u003c/i\u003e:\" (\u003ci\u003ePast and Present\u003c/i\u003e, Book III., ch. ii.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_199\" id=\"Page_199\"\u003e[Pg 199]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"PART_II\" id=\"PART_II\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003ePART II\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTHEORY OF THE MORAL LIFE\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_200\" id=\"Page_200\"\u003e[Pg 200]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eGENERAL LITERATURE FOR PART II\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAmong the works which have had the most influence upon the\r\ndevelopment of the theory of morals are: Plato, dialogues entitled\r\n\u003ci\u003eRepublic, Laws\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eProtagoras\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eGorgias\u003c/i\u003e; Aristotle, \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e; Cicero,\r\n\u003ci\u003eDe Finibus\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eDe Officiis\u003c/i\u003e; Marcus Aurelius, \u003ci\u003eMeditations\u003c/i\u003e; Epictetus,\r\n\u003ci\u003eConversations\u003c/i\u003e; Lucretius, \u003ci\u003eDe Rerum Natura\u003c/i\u003e; St. Thomas Aquinas\r\n(selected and translated by Rickaby under title of \u003ci\u003eAquinas Ethicus\u003c/i\u003e);\r\nHobbes, \u003ci\u003eLeviathan\u003c/i\u003e; Spinoza, \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e; Shaftesbury, \u003ci\u003eCharacteristics\u003c/i\u003e, and\r\n\u003ci\u003eInquiry concerning Virtue\u003c/i\u003e; Hutcheson, \u003ci\u003eSystem of Moral Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nButler, \u003ci\u003eSermons\u003c/i\u003e; Hume, \u003ci\u003eEssays, Principles of Morals\u003c/i\u003e; Adam Smith,\r\n\u003ci\u003eTheory of Moral Sentiments\u003c/i\u003e; Bentham, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Morals and\r\nLegislation\u003c/i\u003e; Kant, \u003ci\u003eCritique of Practical Reason\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003eFoundations of\r\nthe Metaphysics of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e; Comte, Social Physics (in his \u003ci\u003eCourse\r\nof Positive Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e); Mill, \u003ci\u003eUtilitarianism\u003c/i\u003e; Spencer, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples\r\nof Ethics\u003c/i\u003e; Green, \u003ci\u003eProlegomena to Ethics\u003c/i\u003e; Sidgwick, \u003ci\u003eMethods of\r\nEthics\u003c/i\u003e; Selby-Bigge, \u003ci\u003eBritish Moralists\u003c/i\u003e, 2 vols. (a convenient collection\r\nof selections). For contemporary treatises, and histories consult\r\nthe literature referred to in ch. i. of Part I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_201\" id=\"Page_201\"\u003e[Pg 201]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER X\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTHE MORAL SITUATION\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eObject of Part Two and of Present Chapter.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;From\r\nthe history of morals, we turn to the theoretical analysis\r\nof reflective morality. We are concerned to discover\r\n(1) just what in conduct it is that we judge good and\r\nevil, right and wrong (conduct being a complicated\r\nthing); (2) what we mean by good and evil, right and\r\nwrong; (3) on what basis we apply these conceptions\r\nto their appropriate objects in conduct. But before\r\nwe attempt these questions, we must detect and identify\r\nthe \u003ci\u003emoral situation\u003c/i\u003e, the situation in which considerations\r\nof good and evil, right and wrong, present themselves\r\nand are employed. For some situations we employ\r\nthe ideas of true and false; of beautiful and ugly;\r\nof skilful and awkward; of economical and wasteful,\r\netc. We may indeed apply the terms right and wrong\r\nto these same situations; but if so, it is to them\r\nin some other light. What then are the differentiating\r\ntraits, the special earmarks, presented by the situation\r\nwhich we identify as distinctively moral? For we use\r\nthe term moral in a broad sense to designate that which\r\nis either moral or immoral: i.e., right or wrong in the\r\nnarrower sense. It is the moral situation in the broad\r\nsense as distinct from the non-moral, not from the immoral,\r\nthat we are now concerned with.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Moral Situation Involves Voluntary Activity.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It\r\nwill be admitted on all hands that the moral situation\r\nis one which, whatever else it may or may not be,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_202\" id=\"Page_202\"\u003e[Pg 202]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninvolves a voluntary factor. Some of the chief traits of\r\nvoluntary activity we have already become acquainted\r\nwith, as in the account by Aristotle, already noted (\u003ci\u003eante\u003c/i\u003e,\r\np. 12). The agent must know what he is about; he\r\nmust have some idea of what he is doing; he must not\r\nbe a somnambulist, or an imbecile, or insane, or an infant\r\nso immature as to have no idea of what he is doing.\r\nHe must also have some wish, some desire, some preference\r\nin the matter. A man overpowered by superior force\r\nmight be physically compelled by some ingenious device\r\nto shoot a gun at another, knowing what he was doing,\r\nbut his act would not be voluntary because he had no\r\nchoice in the matter, or rather because his preference\r\nwas not to do the act which he is aware he is doing. But\r\nif he is ordered to kill another and told if he does not he\r\nwill himself be killed, he has \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e will in the matter. He\r\nmay do the deed, not because he likes it or wishes it in\r\nitself, but because he wishes to save his own life. The\r\nattendant circumstances may affect our judgment of the\r\nkind and degree of morality attaching to the act; but they\r\ndo not take it entirely out of the moral sphere.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_104_104\" id=\"FNanchor_104_104\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_104_104\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[104]\u003c/a\u003e Aristotle\r\nsays the act must also be the expression of a disposition\r\n(a habit or \u0026#7957;\u0026#958;\u0026#953;\u0026#962;), a more or less settled tendency\r\non the part of the person. It must bear some relation to\r\nhis character. Character is not, we may say, a third factor,\r\nIt is making clear what is implied in deliberation and wish.\r\nThere may be little deliberation in a child\u0027s act and little\r\nin an adult\u0027s, and yet we may regard the latter as much\r\nmore voluntary than the child\u0027s. With the child, the\r\nthought is superficial and casual, because of the restricted\r\nstage of organization or growth reached (see p. 10):\r\nhis act flows from organic instinct or from accidental\r\ncircumstances\u0026mdash;whim, caprice, and chance suggestion, or\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_203\" id=\"Page_203\"\u003e[Pg 203]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfancy. The adult\u0027s act may flow from habitual tendencies\r\nand be accompanied by an equally small amount of conscious\r\nreflection. But the tendencies themselves are the outcome\r\nof prior deliberations and choices which have finally\r\ngot funded into more or less automatic habits. The child\u0027s\r\nact is to a slight extent the expression of character; the\r\nadult\u0027s to a large extent. In short, we mean by character\r\nwhatever lies behind an act in the way of deliberation and\r\ndesire, whether these processes be near-by or remote.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eNot Everything Voluntary is Morally Judged.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;A\r\nvoluntary act may then be defined as one \u003ci\u003ewhich manifests\r\ncharacter\u003c/i\u003e, the test of its presence being the presence\r\nof desire and deliberation; these sometimes being present\r\ndirectly and immediately, sometimes indirectly and remotely\r\nthrough their effects upon the agent\u0027s standing\r\nhabits. But we do not judge all voluntary activity from\r\nthe moral standpoint. Some acts we judge from the\r\nstandpoint of skill or awkwardness; others as amusing\r\nor boring; others as stupid or highly intelligent, and so\r\non. We do not bring to bear the conceptions of right\r\nand wrong. And on the other hand, there are many\r\nthings called good and bad which are not voluntary.\r\nSince what we are in search of must lie somewhere between\r\nthese two limits, we may begin with cases of the\r\nlatter sort.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003e(1) Not Everything Judged Good or Right is Moral.\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;We\r\nspeak, for example, of an ill-wind; of a good\r\nengine; of a watch being wrong; or of a screw being set\r\nright. We speak of good and bad bread, money, or\r\nsoil. That is, from the standpoint of value, we judge\r\nthings as \u003ci\u003emeans\u003c/i\u003e to certain results in themselves desirable\r\nor undesirable. A \"good\" machine does efficiently the\r\nwork for which it is designed; \"bad\" money does not\r\nsubserve the ends which money is meant to promote;\r\nthe watch that is wrong comes short of telling us time\r\ncorrectly. We have to use the notion of value and\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_204\" id=\"Page_204\"\u003e[Pg 204]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof contribution to value; that is a positive factor. But\r\nthis contribution to valuable result is not, in inanimate\r\nobjects, something meant or intended by the things themselves.\r\nIf we thought the ill-wind had an idea of its\r\nown destructive effect and took pleasure in that idea, we\r\nshould attribute moral quality to it\u0026mdash;just as men did in\r\nearly times, and so tried to influence its behavior in order\r\nto make it \"good.\" Among things that promote favorable\r\nor unfavorable results a line is drawn between those\r\nwhich just do so as matter of fact, and those in which\r\nmeaning so to do, or intention, plays a part.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(2) Good in Animal Conduct.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Let us now consider\r\nthe case of good and bad animal conduct. We speak of a\r\ngood watch-dog; of a bad saddle-horse, and the like.\r\nMoreover, we \u003ci\u003etrain\u003c/i\u003e the dog and the horse to the right or\r\ndesired kind of action. We make, we repair the watch;\r\nbut we do not \u003ci\u003etrain\u003c/i\u003e it. Training involves a new factor:\r\nenlistment of the animal\u0027s tendencies; of its own conscious\r\nattitudes and reactions. We pet, we reward by feeding, we\r\npunish and threaten. By these means we induce animals to\r\nexercise in ways that form the habits we want. We modify\r\nthe animal\u0027s behavior by modifying its own impulses. But\r\nwe do not give moral significance to the good and bad, for\r\nwe are still thinking of means to ends. We do not suppose\r\nthat we have succeeded in supplying the hunting\r\ndog, for example, with \u003ci\u003eideas\u003c/i\u003e that certain results are more\r\nexcellent than others, so that henceforth he acts on the\r\nbasis of his own discrimination of the less and the more\r\nvaluable. We just induce certain habits by managing\r\nto make certain ways of acting \u003ci\u003efeel\u003c/i\u003e more agreeable than\r\ndo others. Thus James says: \"Whether the dog has the\r\nnotion of your being angry or of your property being\r\nvaluable in any such abstract way as \u003ci\u003ewe\u003c/i\u003e have these notions,\r\nis more than doubtful. The conduct is more likely\r\nan impulsive result of a conspiracy of outward stimuli;\r\nthe beast \u003ci\u003efeels like\u003c/i\u003e acting so when these stimuli are pres\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_205\" id=\"Page_205\"\u003e[Pg 205]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eent,\r\nthough conscious of no definite reason why\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_105_105\" id=\"FNanchor_105_105\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_105_105\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[105]\u003c/a\u003e (\u003ci\u003ePsychology\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nVol. II., p. 350, note). Or putting it the other\r\nway: if the dog has an idea of the results of guarding\r\nthe house, and is controlled in what he does by loyalty to\r\nthis idea, by the satisfaction which he takes in it, then\r\nin calling the dog good we mean that in being good for\r\na certain result, he is also morally good.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(3) Non-moral Human Acts.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;There are also acts\r\nevoked by an idea of value in the results to be reached,\r\nwhich are not judged as coming within the moral sphere.\r\n\"Conduct is three-fourths of life,\" but in some sense it is\r\nmore: it is four-fourths. All conscious human life is\r\nconcerned with ends, and with selecting, arranging, and\r\nemploying the means, intellectual, emotional, and practical,\r\ninvolved in these ends. This makes \u003ci\u003econduct\u003c/i\u003e. But\r\nit does not follow that all conduct has \u003ci\u003emoral\u003c/i\u003e import.\r\n\"As currently conceived, stirring the fire, reading a newspaper,\r\nor eating a meal, are acts with which morality\r\nhas no concern. Opening the window to air the room,\r\nputting on an overcoat when the weather is cold, are\r\nthought of as having no ethical significance. These, however,\r\nare all portions of conduct\" (Spencer, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of\r\nEthics\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., p. 5). They all involve the idea of some\r\nresult worth reaching, and the putting forth of energy\r\nto reach the result\u0026mdash;of intelligently selected and adapted\r\nmeans. But this may leave the act morally indifferent\u0026mdash;innocent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIntroduction of Moral Factor.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;A further quotation\r\nfrom Spencer may introduce discussion of the needed\r\nmoral qualification:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"As already said, a large part of the ordinary conduct is indifferent.\r\nShall I walk to the water fall today? or, shall I\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_206\" id=\"Page_206\"\u003e[Pg 206]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eramble along the sea shore? Here the ends are ethically\r\nindifferent. If I go to the water fall, shall I go over the\r\nmoor or take the path through the wood? Here the means\r\nare ethically indifferent…. But if a friend who is with me\r\nhas explored the sea shore, but has not seen the water fall,\r\nthe choice of one or other end is no longer ethically indifferent.\r\nAgain, if a probable result of making the one excursion\r\nrather than the other, is that I shall not be back in\r\ntime to keep an appointment, or if taking the longer route entails\r\nthis risk while the shorter does not, the decision in favor\r\nof one end or means acquires in another way an ethical\r\ncharacter\" (Spencer, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 5-6).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis illustration suggests two differing types of conduct;\r\ntwo differing ways in which activity is induced and guided\r\nby ideas of valuable results. In one case the end presents\r\nitself directly as desirable, and the question is only as\r\nto the steps or means of achieving this end. Here we have\r\nconduct which, although excited and directed by considerations\r\nof value, is still morally indifferent. Such is the\r\ncondition of things \u003ci\u003ewherever one end is taken for granted\r\nby itself without any consideration of its relationship\r\nto other ends\u003c/i\u003e. It is then a technical rather than a\r\nmoral affair. It is a question of taste and of skill\u0026mdash;of\r\npersonal preference and of practical wisdom, or of\r\neconomy, expediency. There are many different roads to\r\nmost results, and the selection of this path rather than\r\nthat, on the assumption that either path actually leads\r\nto the end, is an intellectual, \u0026aelig;sthetic, or executive, rather\r\nthan an ethical matter. I may happen to prefer a marine\r\nview to that of the uplands\u0026mdash;that is an \u0026aelig;sthetic interest.\r\nI may wish to utilize the time of the walk for thinking,\r\nand may find the moor path less distracting; here is a\r\nmatter of intellectual economy. Or I may conclude that\r\nI shall best get the exercise I want by going to the water\r\nfall. Here it is a question of \"prudence,\" of expediency,\r\nor practical wisdom. Let any one of the ends, \u0026aelig;sthetic,\r\nintellectual, hygienic, stand alone and it is a fit and\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_207\" id=\"Page_207\"\u003e[Pg 207]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nproper consideration. The moral issue does not arise.\r\nOr the various ends may be regarded as means to a\r\nfurther unquestioned end\u0026mdash;say a walk with the maximum\r\nof combined \u0026aelig;sthetic interest and physical exercise.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(4) Criterion for Moral Factor.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;But let the value of\r\none proposed end be felt to be really incompatible with\r\nthat of another, let it be felt to be so opposed as\r\nto appeal to a different kind of interest and choice, in\r\nother words, to different kinds of disposition and agency,\r\nand we have a moral situation. This is what occurs when\r\none way of traveling means self-indulgence; another,\r\nkindliness or keeping an engagement. There is no longer\r\none end, nor two ends so homogeneous that they may be\r\nreconciled by both being used as means to some more\r\ngeneral end of undisputed worth. We have alternative\r\nends so heterogeneous that choice has to be made; an\r\nend has to be developed out of conflict. The problem now\r\nbecomes what \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e really valuable. It is the \u003ci\u003enature\u003c/i\u003e of the\r\nvaluable, of the desirable, that the individual has to pass\r\nupon.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_106_106\" id=\"FNanchor_106_106\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_106_106\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[106]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuppose a person has unhesitatingly accepted an end,\r\nhas acquiesced in some suggested purpose. Then, starting\r\nto realize it, he finds the affair not so simple. He is led to\r\nreview the matter and to consider what really constitutes\r\nworth for him. The process of attainment calls for toil\r\nwhich is disagreeable, and imposes restraints and abandonments\r\nof accustomed enjoyments. An Indian boy,\r\nfor example, thinks it desirable to be a good rider, a skilful\r\nshot, a sagacious scout. Then he \"naturally,\" as we\r\nsay, disposes of his time and energy so as to realize\r\nhis purpose. But in trying to become a \"brave,\" he finds\r\nthat he has to submit to deprivation and hardship, to\r\nforego other enjoyments and undergo arduous toil. He\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_208\" id=\"Page_208\"\u003e[Pg 208]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfinds that the end does not mean in actual realization what\r\nit meant in original contemplation\u0026mdash;something that often\r\nhappens, for, as Goldsmith said: \"In the first place, we\r\ncook the dish to our own appetite; in the latter, nature\r\ncooks it for us.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis change in apparent worth raises a new question:\r\nIs the aim first set up of the value it seemed to be? Is\r\nit, after all, so important, so desirable? Are not other\r\nresults, playing with other boys, convivial companionship,\r\nwhich are reached more easily and pleasantly, really more\r\nvaluable? The labors and pains connected with the means\r\nemployed to reach an end, have thrown another and incompatible\r\nend into consciousness. The individual no\r\nlonger \"naturally,\" but \"morally,\" follows the selected\r\nend, whichever of the two it be, because it has been chosen\r\nafter conscious valuation of competing aims.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch competitions of values for the position of control\r\nof action are inevitable accompaniments of individual\r\nconduct, whether in civilized or in tribal life. A child,\r\nfor example, finds that the fulfillment of an appetite\r\nof hunger is not only possible, but that it is desirable\u0026mdash;that\r\nfulfillment brings, or is, satisfaction, not mere satiety.\r\nLater on, moved by the idea of this sort of value, he\r\nsnatches at food. Then he is made aware of other sorts\r\nof values involved in the act performed\u0026mdash;values incompatible\r\nwith just the value at which he aimed. He brings down\r\nupon himself social disapproval and reproach. He is\r\ntermed rude, unmannerly, greedy, selfish. He acted in\r\naccordance with an unhesitatingly accepted idea of value.\r\nBut while reaching one result he accomplished also certain\r\nother results which he did not intend, results in the\r\nway of being thought ill of, results which are disagreeable:\r\n\u003ci\u003enegative values\u003c/i\u003e. He is taught to raise the question\r\nof what, after all, in such cases is the \u003ci\u003ereally\u003c/i\u003e desirable or\r\nvaluable. Before he is free to deliberate upon means, he\r\nhas to form an estimate of the relative worth of various\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_209\" id=\"Page_209\"\u003e[Pg 209]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npossible ends, and to be willing to forego one and select\r\nthe other. The chapters on Hebrew and Greek moral\r\ndevelopment have shown this same process at work in the\r\nlife of a people.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSummary and Definition.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;If we sum up the three\r\nclasses of instances thus far considered, we get the following\r\ndefining traits of a moral situation, that is,\r\nof one which is an appropriate subject of determinations\r\nof right and wrong: Moral experience is (1) a matter\r\nof \u003ci\u003econduct\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ebehavior\u003c/i\u003e; that is, of activities which are called\r\nout by \u003ci\u003eideas of the worth, the desirability of results\u003c/i\u003e. This\r\nevocation by an \u003ci\u003eidea\u003c/i\u003e discriminates it from the so-called\r\nbehavior of a pump, where there is no recognition of results;\r\nand from conduct attributed to the lower animals,\r\nwhere there are probably feelings and even dim imagery,\r\nbut hardly ideas of the comparative desirability or value\r\nof various ends. Moral experience is (2) that kind of\r\nconduct in which there are ends so discrepant, so incompatible,\r\nas to require selection of one and rejection of\r\nthe other. This perception of, and selection from, incompatible\r\nalternatives, discriminates moral experience from\r\nthose cases of conduct which are called out and directed\r\nby ideas of value, but which do not necessitate passing\r\nupon the \u003ci\u003ereal worth\u003c/i\u003e, as we say, of the value selected.\r\nIt is incompatibility of ends which necessitates consideration\r\nof the true worth of a given end; and such\r\nconsideration it is which brings the experience into the\r\nmoral sphere. Conduct as moral may thus be defined as\r\n\u003ci\u003eactivity called forth and directed by ideas of value or\r\nworth, where the values concerned are so mutually incompatible\r\nas to require consideration and selection before an\r\novert action is entered upon\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEnd Finally at Issue.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Many questions about ends are\r\nin reality questions about means: the artist considers\r\nwhether he will paint a landscape or a figure; this or\r\nthat landscape, and so on. The general character of the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_210\" id=\"Page_210\"\u003e[Pg 210]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nend is unchanged: it is to paint. But let this end persist\r\nand be felt as desirable, as valuable; let at the same\r\ntime an alternative end presents itself as also desirable\r\n(say keeping an engagement), so that the individual does\r\nnot find any way of adjusting and arranging them into\r\na common scheme (like doing first one and then the other),\r\nand the person has a moral problem on his hands. Which\r\nshall he decide for, and why? The appeal is to himself;\r\nwhat does \u003ci\u003ehe\u003c/i\u003e really think the desirable end? What\r\nmakes the supreme appeal to him? What sort of an\r\nagent, of a person, shall he be? This is the question finally\r\nat stake in any genuinely moral situation: What shall the\r\nagent \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e? What sort of a character shall he assume?\r\nOn its face, the question is what he shall \u003ci\u003edo\u003c/i\u003e, shall he act\r\nfor this or that end. But the incompatibility of the ends\r\nforces the issue back into the question of the kinds of\r\nselfhood, of agency, involved in the respective ends. The\r\ndistinctively moral situation is then one in which elements\r\nof value and control are bound up with the processes\r\nof deliberation and desire; and are bound up in a peculiar\r\nway: \u003ci\u003eviz.\u003c/i\u003e, they decide what kind of a character shall\r\ncontrol further desires and deliberations. When ends are\r\ngenuinely incompatible, no common denominator can be\r\nfound except by deciding what sort of character is most\r\nhighly prized and shall be given supremacy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Moral and Indifferent Situations.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This criterion\r\nthrows lights upon our earlier discussion of morally indifferent\r\nacts. Persons perform the greater bulk of their activities\r\nwithout any conscious reference to considerations\r\nof right and wrong, as any one may verify for himself by\r\nrecollecting the general course of his activity on any ordinary\r\nday from the time he arises in the morning to the\r\ntime he goes to bed at night. His deliberations and wants\r\nare mostly concerned with the ends involved in his regular\r\nvocation and recreations. But at any time the question of\r\nhis character as concerned with what he is doing may arise\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_211\" id=\"Page_211\"\u003e[Pg 211]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor judgment. The person may later on realize that the\r\ntype or kind of character which is to prevail in his further\r\nactivity was involved in deeds which were performed without\r\nany such thought. He \u003ci\u003ethen\u003c/i\u003e judges them morally, approving\r\nor disapproving. On the other hand, a course of\r\naction which at the time presented a moral crisis even, may\r\nafterwards come to be followed as a matter of course.\r\nThere is then no \u003ci\u003efixed\u003c/i\u003e line between the morally indifferent\r\nand the morally significant. Every act is \u003ci\u003epotential\u003c/i\u003e subject-matter\r\nof moral judgment, for it strengthens or weakens\r\nsome habit which influences whole classes of judgments.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are comparatively few distinct analyses of the moral situation,\r\nthe topic generally being treated as a running part of the\r\ntheory of the author, or in connection with an account of character\r\nor conduct (see references at end of ch. xiii.). See, however, Mezes,\r\n\u003ci\u003eEthics, Descriptive and Explanatory\u003c/i\u003e, ch. ii.; Martineau, \u003ci\u003eTypes of\r\nEthical Theory\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II., pp. 17-54; Spencer, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nVol. I.; \u003ci\u003eStudies in Logical Theory\u003c/i\u003e, Stuart, essay on Valuation as a\r\nLogical Process, pp. 237-241, 257-258, 273-275, 289-293; Dewey, \u003ci\u003eLogical\r\nConditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality\u003c/i\u003e; Mead, \u003ci\u003ePhilosophical\r\nBasis of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, International Journal of Ethics, April,\r\n1908; Fite, \u003ci\u003eIntroductory Study of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, chs. ii., xviii., and xix.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_104_104\" id=\"Footnote_104_104\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_104_104\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[104]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Aristotle illustrates by a man who throws his goods overboard in\r\na storm at sea. He does not wish absolutely to lose his goods, but\r\nhe prefers losing them to losing the ship or his own life: he wishes\r\nit \u003ci\u003eunder the circumstances\u003c/i\u003e and his act is so far voluntary.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_105_105\" id=\"Footnote_105_105\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_105_105\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[105]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Of course, this is also true of a large part of human activity. But\r\nthese are also the cases in which we do not ascribe moral value; or\r\nat least we do not except when we want to make the agent conscious\r\nof some reason why.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_106_106\" id=\"Footnote_106_106\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_106_106\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[106]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e While we have employed Spencer\u0027s example, it should be noted\r\nthat incompatibility of ends is not the criterion of the distinctively\r\nmoral situation which Spencer himself employs.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_212\" id=\"Page_212\"\u003e[Pg 212]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER XI\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nPROBLEMS OF MORAL THEORY\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have identified in its framework and main outlines\r\nthe sort of voluntary activity in which the problem of\r\ngood and evil appears and in which the ideas of right and\r\nwrong are employed. This task, however, is only preliminary\r\nto theoretical analysis. For it throws no light upon\r\njust what we mean by good and bad; just what elements of\r\ncomplex voluntary behavior are termed right or wrong; or\r\nwhy they are so termed. It does not even indicate what\r\nmust be discovered before such questions can be answered.\r\nIt only sets forth the limits of the subject-matter within\r\nwhich such questions arise and in reference to which\r\nthey must be answered. What are the distinctive problems\r\nwhich must be dealt with in the course of such a\r\ndiscussion?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGrowth of Theory from Practical Problems.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Of one\r\nthing we may be sure. If inquiries are to have any substantial\r\nbasis, if they are not to be wholly up in the air,\r\nthe theorist must take his departure from the problems\r\nwhich men actually meet in their own conduct. He may\r\ndefine and refine these; he may divide and systematize; he\r\nmay abstract the problems from their concrete contexts\r\nin individual lives; he may classify them when he has thus\r\ndetached them; but if he gets away from them he is talking\r\nabout something which his own brain has invented,\r\nnot about moral realities. On the other hand, the perplexities\r\nand uncertainties of direct and personal behavior invite\r\na more abstract and systematic impersonal treatment\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_213\" id=\"Page_213\"\u003e[Pg 213]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthan that which they receive in the exigencies of their occurrence.\r\nThe recognition of any end or authority going beyond\r\nwhat is embodied in existing customs, involves some\r\nappeal to thought, and moral theory makes this appeal more\r\nexplicit and more complete. If a child asks why he should\r\ntell the truth, and is answered, \"because you ought to and\r\nthat is reason enough\"; or, \"because it will prove profitable\r\nfor you to do so\"; or, \"because truth-telling is a condition\r\nof mutual communication and common aims,\" the answer\r\nimplies a principle which requires only to be made explicit\r\nto be full-fledged theory. And when this principle is\r\ncompared with those employed in other cases to see if they\r\nare mutually consistent; and if not, to find a still more\r\nfundamental reconciling principle, we have passed over\r\nthe border into ethical system.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTypes of Theoretical Problems.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The practical problems\r\nwhich a thoughtful and progressive individual must\r\nconsider in his own conduct will, then, give the clue to the\r\ngenuine problems of moral theory. The framework of\r\none is an outline of the other. The man who does not satisfy\r\nhimself with sheer conventional conformity to the customs,\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eethos\u003c/i\u003e, of his class will find such problems as the following\r\nforced upon his attention:\u0026mdash;(1) He must consider\r\nthe \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e of habits which have been formed more or less\r\nunreflectively\u0026mdash;by imitation, suggestion, and inculcation\r\nfrom others\u0026mdash;and he must consider the meaning of those customs\r\nabout him to which he is invited to conform till they\r\nhave become personal habits. This problem of discovering\r\nthe meaning of these habits and customs is the problem of\r\nstating what, after all, is \u003ci\u003ereally\u003c/i\u003e good, or worth while in\r\nconduct. (2) The one whose morality is of the reflective\r\nsort will be faced by the problem of moral advance, of\r\nprogress beyond the level which has been reached by this\r\nmore or less unreflective taking on of the habits and ideas\r\nof those about him, progress up to the level of his own\r\nreflective insight. Otherwise put, he has to face the prob\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_214\" id=\"Page_214\"\u003e[Pg 214]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003elem\r\nof what is to be the place and r\u0026ocirc;le in his own conduct\r\nof ideals and principles generated not by custom but by\r\ndeliberation and insight. (3) The individual must consider\r\nmore consciously the relation between what is currently\r\nregarded as good by the social groups in which he\r\nis placed and in which he has to act, and that regarded as\r\ngood by himself. The moment he ceases to accept conformity\r\nto custom as an adequate sanction of behavior, he is met by\r\ndiscrepancy between his personally conceived goods and\r\nthose reigning in the customs about him. Now while this\r\ndetachment makes possible the birth of higher and more\r\nideal types of morality, and hence of systematic effort for\r\nsocial reform and advance; it also makes possible (as we\r\nhave seen on the historical side, p. 189) a more generalized\r\nand deliberate selfishness; a less instinctive and more intentional\r\npursuit of what the individual judges to be good\r\n\u003ci\u003efor himself\u003c/i\u003e against what society exacts as good for itself.\r\nThe same reflective attitude which generates the conscientious\r\nmoral reformer may generate also a more deliberate\r\nand resolute anti-social egoism. In any case, the individual\r\nwho has acquired the habit of moral reflection, is\r\nconscious of a new problem\u0026mdash;the relation of public good\r\nto individual good. In short, the individual who is\r\nthoughtfully serious and who aims to bring his habit of reflection\r\nto bear on his conduct, will have occasion (1) to\r\nsearch for the elements of good and bad, of positive and\r\nnegative, value in the situations that confront him; (2)\r\nto consider the methods and principles by which he shall\r\nreach conclusions, and (3) to consider the relations between\r\nhimself, his own capacities and satisfactions, and\r\nthe ends and demands of the social situations in which he\r\nis placed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Corresponding Problems of Theory.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Theory will\r\nthen have similar problems to deal with. (1) What is the\r\nGood, the end in any voluntary act? (2) How is this\r\ngood known? Is it directly perceived, and if so, how? Or\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_215\" id=\"Page_215\"\u003e[Pg 215]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis it worked out through inquiry and reflection? And if\r\nso, how? (3) When the good is known, how is it \u003ci\u003eacknowledged\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nhow does it acquire authority? What is the place\r\nof \u003ci\u003elaw\u003c/i\u003e, of control, in the moral life? Why is it that some\r\nends are attractive of themselves, while others present\r\nthemselves as \u003ci\u003eduties\u003c/i\u003e, as involving subordination of what\r\nis naturally attractive? (4) What is the place of selfhood\r\nin the moral process? And this question assumes\r\ntwo forms: (a) What is the relation of the good of the self\r\nto the good of others? (b) What is the difference between\r\nthe morally good and the morally bad in the self? What\r\nare virtues and vices as dispositions of the self? These\r\nabstract and formal questions will become more concrete if\r\nwe consider them briefly in the order of their development\r\nin the history of the moral theory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eProblem of Knowledge of Good Comes First in Theory.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\nclash and overlapping of customs once so local as\r\nto be isolated, brought to Athenian moral philosophers the\r\nproblem of discovering the underlying and final good to\r\nwhich all the conflicting values of customs might be referred\r\nfor judgment. The movement initiated by Socrates\r\nwas precisely the effort to find out what is the real\r\ngood, the true end, of all the various institutions, customs,\r\nand procedures current among men. The explanation of\r\nconflict among men\u0027s interests, and of lack of consistency\r\nand unity in any given person\u0027s behavior, of the division of\r\nclasses in the state, of the diverse recommendations of different\r\nwould-be moral teachers, was that they were ignorant\r\nof their own ends. Hence the fundamental precept\r\nis \"Know thyself,\" one\u0027s own end, one\u0027s good and one\u0027s\r\nproper function. Different followers of Socrates gave\r\nvery different accounts of knowledge, and hence proposed\r\nvery different final aims. But they all agreed that the\r\nproblem of knowing the good was the central problem, and\r\nthat if this were settled, action in accord with good would\r\nfollow of itself. Could it be imagined that man could know\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_216\" id=\"Page_216\"\u003e[Pg 216]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhis own good and yet not seek it? Ignorance of good is\r\nevil and the source of evil; insight into the real good will\r\nclear up the confusion and partiality which makes men\r\npursue false ends and thus straighten out and put in\r\norder conduct. Control would follow as a matter of\r\ncourse from \u003ci\u003eknowledge\u003c/i\u003e of the end. Such control would be\r\nno matter of coercion or external restriction, but of subordination\r\nand organization of minor ends with reference to\r\nthe final end.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eProblem of Motive Force.\u003c/b\u003e\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_107_107\" id=\"FNanchor_107_107\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_107_107\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[107]\u003c/a\u003e\u0026mdash;The problem of attaining\r\nthis knowledge was seen to be attended, however, by peculiar\r\nobstructions and difficulties, the growing recognition\r\nof which led to a shifting of the problem itself. The\r\ndilemma, in brief, was this: The man who is already good\r\nwill have no difficulty in knowing the good both in general\r\nand in the specific clothing under which it presents\r\nitself in particular cases. But the one who does not yet\r\nknow the good, does not know \u003ci\u003ehow\u003c/i\u003e to know it. His ignorance,\r\nmoreover, puts positive obstacles in his way, for\r\nit leads him to delight in superficial and transitory\r\nends. This delight increases the hold of these ends upon\r\nthe agent; and thus it builds up an \u003ci\u003ehabitual\u003c/i\u003e interest in\r\nthem which renders it impossible for the individual to get\r\na glimpse of the final end, to say nothing of a clear and\r\npersisting view. \u003ci\u003eOnly if the individual is habituated, exercised,\r\npracticed in good ends so as to take delight in them,\r\nwhile he is still so immature as to be incapable of really\r\nknowing how and why they are good, will he be capable of\r\nknowing the good when he is mature.\u003c/i\u003e Pleasure in right\r\nends and pain in wrong must operate as a motive force in\r\norder to give experience of the good, before knowledge\r\ncan be attained and operate as the motor force.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_217\" id=\"Page_217\"\u003e[Pg 217]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDivision of Problem.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;But the exercise and training\r\nrequisite to form the habits which make the individual rejoice\r\nin right activity before he knows how and why it is\r\nright, presuppose adults who already have knowledge of\r\nthe good. They presuppose a social order capable not\r\nmerely of giving theoretic instruction, but of habituating\r\nthe young to right practices. But where shall such adults\r\nbe found, and where is the social order so good that it is\r\ncapable of right training of its own immature members?\r\nHence the problem again shifts, breaking up into two\r\nparts. On the one hand, attention is fixed upon the irrational\r\nappetites, desires, and impulses, which hinder apprehension\r\nof the good; on the other, it is directed to the political\r\nlaws and institutions which are capable of training\r\nthe members of the State into a right manner of living.\r\nFor the most part, these two problems went their\r\nown way independently of each other, a fact which resulted\r\nin the momentous breach between the inner and\r\n\"spiritual,\" and the outer and \"physical\" aspects of\r\nbehavior.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eProblem of Control of Affections and Desires.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;If it is\r\nthe lively movements of natural appetites and desires\r\nwhich make the individual apprehend false goods as true\r\nones, and which present obstacles to knowledge of the true\r\ngood, the serious problem is evidently to check and so far\r\nas possible to abolish the power of desire to move the mind.\r\nSince it is anger, fear, hope, despair, sexual desire which\r\nmake men regard particular things instead of the final end\r\nas good, the great thing is wholly to free attention and\r\njudgment from the influence of such passions. It may be\r\nimpossible to prevent the passions; they are natural perturbations.\r\nBut man can at least prevent his judgment\r\nof what is good or bad from being modified by them.\r\nThe Stoic moral philosophers most emphasized the misleading\r\ninfluence of desire and passion, and set up the\r\nideal of apathy (lack of passion) and \"ataraxy\" (ab\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_218\" id=\"Page_218\"\u003e[Pg 218]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003esence\r\nof being stirred up). The other moral schools, the\r\nSceptics and Epicureans, also made independence of mind\r\nfrom influence of passion the immediate and working end;\r\nthe Sceptics because they emphasized the condition of mental\r\ndetachment and non-committal, which is the state appropriate\r\nto doubt and uncertainty; the Epicureans because\r\nthe pleasures of the mind are the only ones not at\r\nthe mercy of external circumstances. Mental pleasures are\r\nequable, and hence are the only ones which do not bring\r\nreactions of depression, exhaustion, and subsequent pain.\r\nThe problem of moral theory is now in effect, if not in\r\nname, that of \u003ci\u003econtrol\u003c/i\u003e, of authority and subordination, of\r\nchecking and restraining desire and passion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eProblem of Control of Private Interests by Law.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Such\r\nviews could at the best, however, affect only a comparatively\r\nsmall number, the philosophers. For the great\r\nmasses of men in the Roman Empire, the problem existed\r\non the other line: by what laws and what administration\r\nof laws to direct the outward acts of men into right\r\ncourses, courses at least sufficiently right so as to maintain\r\noutward peace and unity through the vast empire. In the\r\nGreek city-state, with its small number of free citizens all\r\ndirectly participating in public affairs, it was possible to\r\nconceive an ideal of a common good which should bind all\r\ntogether. But in an Empire covering many languages,\r\nreligions, local customs, varied and isolated occupations,\r\na single system of administration and law exercised from\r\na single central source could alone maintain the requisite\r\nharmony. The problems of legislations, codification, and\r\nadministration were congenial to the Latin mind, and were\r\nforced by the actual circumstances. From the external\r\nside, then, as well as from the internal, the problem of\r\ncontrol became dominant over that of value and the\r\ngood.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eProblem of Unification.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It was the province of the\r\nmoral philosophers, of the theologians, of the church to at\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_219\" id=\"Page_219\"\u003e[Pg 219]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etempt\r\na fusion of these elements of inner and outer control.\r\nIt was their aim to connect, to synthesize these factors into\r\none commanding and comprehensive view of life. But the\r\ncharacteristic of their method was to suppose that the combination\r\ncould be brought about, whether intellectually or\r\npractically, only upon a supernatural basis, and by supernatural\r\nresources. From the side of the natural constitution\r\nof both man and the State, the various elements of behavior\r\nare so hopelessly at war with one another that\r\nthere is no health in them nor help from them. The appetites\r\nand desires are directed only upon carnal goods and\r\nform the dominant element in the person. Even when\r\nreason gets glimpses of the good, the good seen is narrow\r\nin scope and temporal in duration; and even then reason\r\nis powerless as an adequate motive. \"We perceive the better\r\nand we follow the worse.\" Moreover, it is useless to\r\nseek aid from the habituation, the education, the discipline\r\nand restraint of human institutions. They themselves\r\nare corrupt. The product of man\u0027s lower nature cannot be\r\ncapable of enlightening and improving that nature; at\r\nmost it can only restrain outer action by appealing to\r\nfear. Only a divine revelation can make known man\u0027s\r\ntrue end; and only divine assistance, embodied in the ordinances\r\nand sacraments of the supernaturally founded\r\nand directed church, can bring this knowledge home to\r\nerring individuals so as to make it effectual. In theory\r\nthe conception of the end, the good, was supreme; but man\u0027s\r\ntrue good is supernatural and hence can be achieved only\r\nby supernatural assistance and in the next world. In\r\npractice, therefore, the important thing for man in his\r\npresent condition is implicit reliance upon and obedience\r\nto the requirements of the church. This represents on\r\nearth the divine sovereign, ultimate source of all moral\r\nlaw. In effect, the moral law became a net-work of ordinances,\r\nprescriptions, commands, rewards, penalties, penances,\r\nand remissions. The jural point of view was com\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_220\" id=\"Page_220\"\u003e[Pg 220]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003epletely\r\nenthroned.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_108_108\" id=\"FNanchor_108_108\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_108_108\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[108]\u003c/a\u003e There was no problem; there was a\r\nfinal, because a supernatural solution.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Problems of Individuality and Citizenship.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;With\r\nthe Renaissance began the revolt against the jural view of\r\nlife. A sense of the joys and delights which attend the\r\nfree and varied exercise of human capacities in this world\r\nwas reborn. The first results were a demand for natural\r\nsatisfaction; the next a profound reawakening of the antique\r\ncivic and political consciousness. The first in its reaction\r\nagainst the Middle Ages was more individualistic\r\nthan the Greek ideal, to which it was in some respects allied.\r\nThe Greek had emphasized the notion of value, but had conceived\r\nthis as generic, as the fulfillment of the essential nature\r\nof man as man. But with the moderns, satisfaction,\r\nthe good, meant something direct, specific, personal; something\r\nthe individual as an individual could lay hold of and\r\npossess. It was an individual right; it was final and inalienable.\r\nNothing had a right to intervene or deprive\r\nthe individual of it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis extreme individualistic tendency was contemporaneous\r\nwith a transfer of interest from the supernatural\r\nchurch-state over to the commercial, social, and political\r\nbodies with which the modern man found himself identified.\r\nThe rise of the free cities, and more especially the development\r\nof national states, with the growth of commerce and\r\nexchange, opened to the individual a natural social whole.\r\nWith this his connections were direct, in this he gained\r\nnew outlets and joys, and yet it imposed upon him definite\r\nresponsibilities and exacted of him specific burdens.\r\nIf the individual had gained a new sense of himself as an\r\nindividual, he also found himself enmeshed in national\r\nstates of a power constantly increasing in range and intensity.\r\nThe problem of the moral theorists was to recon\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_221\" id=\"Page_221\"\u003e[Pg 221]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ecile\r\nthese two tendencies, the individualistic and that of political\r\ncentralization. For a time, the individual felt the\r\nsocial organization in which he was set to be, with whatever\r\nincidental inconveniences, upon the whole an outlet\r\nand re\u0026euml;nforcement of prized personal powers. Hence in\r\nobserving its conditions, he was securing the conditions of\r\nhis own peace and tranquillity or even of his own freedom\r\nand achievement. But the balance was easily upset, and\r\nthe problem of the relation of the individual and the social,\r\nthe private and the public, was soon forced into prominence;\r\na problem which in one form or other has been the central\r\nproblem of modern ethical theory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIndividualistic Problem.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Only for a short time, during\r\nthe first flush of new achievement and of hopeful adventure,\r\ndid extreme individualism and social interests remain\r\nna\u0026iuml;vely combined. The individualistic tendency\r\nfound a convenient intellectual tool in a psychology which\r\nresolved the individual into an association or series of\r\nparticular states of feeling and sensations; and the good\r\ninto a like collection of pleasures also regarded as particular\r\nmental states. This psychological atomism made individuals\r\nas separate and disconnected as the sensations\r\nwhich constituted their selves were isolated and mutually\r\nexclusive. Social arrangements and institutions were, in\r\ntheory, justifiable only as they could be shown to augment\r\nthe sum of pleasurable states of feeling of individuals.\r\nAnd as, quite independent of any such precarious theory,\r\nthe demand for reform of institutions became more and\r\nmore imperative, the situation was packed by Rousseau\r\ninto a formula that man was naturally both free and good,\r\nand that institutional life had enslaved and thereby depraved\r\nhim. At the same time, there grew up an enthusiastic\r\nand optimistic faith in \"Nature,\" in her kindly intentions\r\nfor the happiness of humanity, and in her potency to\r\ndraw it to perfection when artificial restrictions were once\r\nout of the way. Individuals, separate in themselves and\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_222\" id=\"Page_222\"\u003e[Pg 222]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin their respective goods, were thereby brought into a complete\r\ncoincidence and harmony of interests. Nature\u0027s laws\r\nwere such that if the individual obeyed them in seeking his\r\nown good he could not fail to further the happiness of\r\nothers. While there developed in France (with original\r\ninitiative from England) this view of the internal isolation\r\nand external harmony of men, a counterpart movement\r\ntook place in Germany.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Rationalistic Problem.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;German thought inherited\r\nthrough both Roman law and the natural theology and\r\nethics of the church, the conception that man\u0027s rational\r\nnature makes him sociable. Stoicism, with its materialistic\r\nidealism, had taught that all true laws are natural, while\r\nall laws of nature are diffusions and potencies of reason.\r\nAs they bind things together in the world, so they\r\nbind men together in societies. Moral theory is \"Natural\r\nLaw\" conceived in this sense. From the laws of reason, regarded\r\nas the laws of man\u0027s generic and hence sociable\r\nnature, all the principles of jurisprudence and of individual\r\nmorals may be deduced. But man has also a sensuous\r\nnature, an appetitive nature which is purely private and\r\nexclusive. Since reason is higher than sense, the authority\r\nof the State is magnified. The juristic point of view was\r\nreinstated, but with the important change that the law\r\nwas that of a social order which is the realization of man\u0027s\r\nown rational being.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_109_109\" id=\"FNanchor_109_109\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_109_109\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[109]\u003c/a\u003e If the laws of the State were criticized,\r\nthe reply was that however unworthy the civic\r\nregulations and however desirable their emendation, still\r\nthe State is the expression of the idea of reason, that is of\r\nman in his true generic nature. Hence to attempt to overthrow\r\nthe government is to attack the fundamental and\r\nobjective conditions of moral or rational life. Without\r\nthe State, the particularistic, private side of man\u0027s nature\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_223\" id=\"Page_223\"\u003e[Pg 223]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwould have free sway to express itself. Man\u0027s true moral\r\nnature is within. We are then left, from both the English-French\r\nand the German sides, with the problem of the relation\r\nof the individual and the social; of the relation of the\r\ninner and outer, of the psychological structure of the\r\nperson and the social conditions and results of his behavior.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSee the references on the scope and methods of ethics at the end\r\nof ch. i. of Part I., and also, Sorley, \u003ci\u003eEthics of Naturalism\u003c/i\u003e, ch. i., and\r\nhis \u003ci\u003eRecent Tendencies in Ethics\u003c/i\u003e; Fite, \u003ci\u003eAn Introductory Study of\r\nEthics\u003c/i\u003e, ch. ii.; Bowne, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, ch. i.; Seth, \u003ci\u003eEthical\r\nPrinciples\u003c/i\u003e, ch. i.; Martineau, \u003ci\u003eTypes of Ethical Theory\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., Introduction;\r\nHensel, \u003ci\u003eProblems of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, in Vol. I. of St. Louis\r\nCongress of Arts and Science.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_107_107\" id=\"Footnote_107_107\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_107_107\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[107]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e On the \u003ci\u003epractical\u003c/i\u003e side, this was always, as we have seen, the\r\nprominent problem of Hebrew thought. But we are concerned here\r\nwith the statement of the problem by Plato and Aristotle from the\r\ntheoretical side.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_108_108\" id=\"Footnote_108_108\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_108_108\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[108]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The Ten Commandments, divided and subdivided into all their\r\nconceivable applications, and brought home through the confessional,\r\nwere the specific basis.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_109_109\" id=\"Footnote_109_109\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_109_109\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[109]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The idealistic philosophic movement beginning with Kant is in\r\nmany important respects the outgrowth of the earlier \u003ci\u003eNaturrecht\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nthe moral philosophers from Grotius on.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_224\" id=\"Page_224\"\u003e[Pg 224]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER XII\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTYPES OF MORAL THEORY\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 1. TYPICAL DIVISIONS OF THEORIES\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eProblems and Theories.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We were concerned in the\r\nlast chapter with the typical \u003ci\u003eproblems\u003c/i\u003e of moral theory.\r\nBut it was evident that theories themselves developed and\r\naltered as now this, now that, problem was uppermost. To\r\nregard the question of how to know the good as the central\r\nproblem of moral inquiry is already to have one type\r\nof theory; to consider the fundamental problem to be\r\neither the subordination or the satisfaction of desire is\r\nto have other types. A classification of types of theory is\r\nrendered difficult, a thoroughly satisfactory classification\r\nalmost impossible, by the fact that the problems arrange\r\nthemselves about separate principles leading to cross-divisions.\r\nAll that we may expect to do is somewhat arbitrarily\r\nto select that principle which seems most likely to be\r\nuseful in conducting inquiry.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(1) Teleological and Jural.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;One of the fundamental\r\ndivisions arises from taking either Value or Duty, Good\r\nor Right, as the fundamental idea. Ethics of the first\r\ntype is concerned above all with \u003ci\u003eends\u003c/i\u003e; hence it is frequently\r\ncalled \u003ci\u003eteleological\u003c/i\u003e theory (Greek \u0026#964;\u0026#941;\u0026#955;\u0026#959;\u0026#962;, end). To\r\nthe other type of theory, obligations, imperatives, commands,\r\nlaw, and authority, are the controlling ideas. By\r\nthis emphasis, arise the \u003ci\u003ejural\u003c/i\u003e theories (Latin, \u003ci\u003ejus\u003c/i\u003e, law).\r\nAt some point, of course, each theory has to deal with the\r\nfactor emphasized by its rival. If we start with Law as\r\ncentral, the good resides in these acts which conform to\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_225\" id=\"Page_225\"\u003e[Pg 225]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nits obligations. The good is obedience to law, submission\r\nto its moral authority. If we start from the Good, laws,\r\nrules, are concerned with the means of defining or achieving\r\nit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(2) Individual and Institutional.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This fundamental\r\ndivision is at once cut across by another, arising from emphasizing\r\nthe problem of the individual and the social.\r\nThis problem may become so urgent as to force into\r\nthe background the conflict between teleological and jural\r\ntheories, while in any case it complicates and subdivides\r\nthem. We have individualistic and institutional types of\r\ntheory. Consider, for example, the following representative\r\nquotations: \"No school can avoid taking for the ultimate\r\nmoral aim a desirable \u003ci\u003estate of feeling\u003c/i\u003e called by whatever\r\nname\u0026mdash;gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure\r\nsomewhere, at some time, \u003ci\u003eto some being or beings\u003c/i\u003e, is an\r\nelement of the conception\";\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_110_110\" id=\"FNanchor_110_110\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_110_110\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[110]\u003c/a\u003e and again,\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_110_110\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[110]\u003c/a\u003e \"the good is universally\r\nthe pleasurable.\" And while the emphasis is here\r\nupon the good, the desirable, the same type of statement,\r\n\u003ci\u003eas respects emphasis upon the individual\u003c/i\u003e, may be made\r\nfrom the side of duty. For example, \"it is the very essence\r\nof moral duty to be imposed by a man on himself.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_111_111\" id=\"FNanchor_111_111\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_111_111\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[111]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nContrast both of these statements with the following:\r\n\"What a man ought to do, or what duties he should fulfill\r\nin order to be virtuous, is in an ethical community not\r\nhard to say. He has to do nothing except what is presented,\r\nexpressed, and recognized in his established relations.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_112_112\" id=\"FNanchor_112_112\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_112_112\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[112]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\"The individual has his truth, real existence, and\r\nethical status only in being a member of the State. His\r\nparticular satisfactions, activities, and way of life have in\r\nthis authenticated, substantive principle, their origin and\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_226\" id=\"Page_226\"\u003e[Pg 226]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nresult.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_113_113\" id=\"FNanchor_113_113\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_113_113\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[113]\u003c/a\u003e And in another connection: \"The striving for a\r\nmorality of one\u0027s own is futile and by its very nature impossible\r\nof attainment. In respect to morality the saying\r\nof one of the wisest men of antiquity is the true one. To\r\nbe moral is to live in accord with the moral tradition of\r\none\u0027s country.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_114_114\" id=\"FNanchor_114_114\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_114_114\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[114]\u003c/a\u003e Here both the good and the law of the\r\nindividual are placed on a strictly institutional basis.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(3) Empirical and Intuitional.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Another cross-division\r\narises from consideration of the method of ascertaining\r\nand determining the nature of moral distinctions: the\r\nmethod of knowledge. From this standpoint, the distinction\r\nof ethical theories into the \u003ci\u003eempirical\u003c/i\u003e (\u0026#7952;\u0026#956;\u0026#960;\u0026#949;\u0026#953;\u0026#961;\u0026#953;\u0026#1008;\u0026#972;\u0026#962;)\r\nand the \u003ci\u003eintuitional\u003c/i\u003e (Latin, \u003ci\u003eintueor\u003c/i\u003e, to look at or upon)\r\nrepresents their most fundamental cleavage. One view\r\nmakes knowledge of the good and the right dependent\r\nupon recollection of prior experiences and their conditions\r\nand effects. The other view makes it an immediate apprehension\r\nof the quality of an act or motive, a trait so intrinsic\r\nand characteristic it cannot escape being seen. While\r\nin general the empirical school has laid stress upon the\r\nconsequences, the consequences to be searched for were\r\nconsidered as either individual or social. Some, like\r\nHobbes, have held that it was directed upon law; to knowledge\r\nof the commands of the state. And similarly the direct\r\nperception or intuition of moral quality was by\r\nsome thought to apply to recognition of differences of\r\nvalue, and by others to acknowledgment of law and authority,\r\nwhich again might be divine, social, or personal.\r\nThis division cleaves straight across our other bases of\r\nclassification. To describe a theory definitely, it would\r\nthen be necessary to state just where it stood with reference\r\nto each possible combination or permutation of elements\r\nof all three divisions. Moreover, there are theories\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_227\" id=\"Page_227\"\u003e[Pg 227]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich attempt to find a deeper principle which will bridge\r\nthe gulf between the two opposites.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eComplexity of Subject-matter and Voluntary Activity.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This\r\nbrief survey should at least warn us of the complexity\r\nof the attempt to discriminate types of theory, and\r\nput us on our guard against undue simplification. It may\r\nalso serve to remind us that various types of theory are not\r\narbitrary personal devices and constructions, but arise\r\nbecause, in the complexity of the subject-matter, one element\r\nor another is especially emphasized, and the other\r\nelements arranged in different perspectives. As a rule, all\r\nthe elements are recognized in some form or other by all\r\ntheories; but they are differently placed and accounted for.\r\nIn any case, it is voluntary activity with which we are concerned.\r\nThe problem of analyzing voluntary activity into\r\nits proper elements, and rightly arranging them, must\r\ncoincide finally with the problem of the relation of good\r\nand law of control to each other, with the problem of the\r\nnature of moral knowledge, and with that of the relation\r\nof the individual and social aspects of conduct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 2. DIVISION OF VOLUNTARY ACTIVITY INTO INNER AND\r\nOUTER\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe What and How of Activity.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Starting from the\r\nside of the voluntary act, we find in it one distinction which\r\nwhen forced into an extreme separation throws light upon\r\nall three divisions in theory which have been noted. This\r\nis the relation between desire and deliberation as mental\r\nor private, and the deed, the doing, as overt and public.\r\nIs there any intrinsic moral connection between the \u003ci\u003emental\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand the \u003ci\u003eovert\u003c/i\u003e in activity? We may analyze an act which\r\nhas been accomplished into two factors, one of which is\r\nsaid to exist within the agent\u0027s own consciousness; while\r\nthe other, the external execution, carries the mental into\r\noperation, affects the world, and is appreciable by others.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_228\" id=\"Page_228\"\u003e[Pg 228]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nNow on the face of the matter, these two things, while capable\r\nof intellectual discrimination, are incapable of real\r\nseparation. The \"mental\" side, the desire and the deliberation,\r\nis for the sake of determining what shall be \u003ci\u003edone\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nthe overt side is for the sake of making real certain precedent\r\nmental processes, which are partial and inadequate\r\ntill carried into effect, and which occur for the sake of\r\nthat effect. The \"inner\" and \"outer\" are really only the\r\n\"how\" and the \"what\" of activity, neither being real or\r\nsignificant apart from the other. (See \u003ci\u003eante\u003c/i\u003e, p. 6).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSeparation into Attitude and Consequences.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;But\r\nunder the strain of various theories, this organic unity has\r\nbeen denied; the inner and the outer side of activity have\r\nbeen severed from one another. When thus divided, the\r\n\"inner\" side is connected exclusively with the will, the disposition,\r\nthe character of the person; the \"outer\" side is\r\nconnected wholly with the consequences which flow from it,\r\nthe changes it brings about. Theories will then vary radically\r\naccording as the so-called inner or the so-called\r\nouter is selected as the bearer and carrier of moral distinctions.\r\nOne theory will locate the moral quality of an\r\nact in that \u003ci\u003efrom\u003c/i\u003e which it issues; the other in that \u003ci\u003einto\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwhich it issues.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe following quotations put the contrast in a nutshell,\r\nthough unfortunately the exact meaning of the second is\r\nnot very apparent apart from its context.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"A motive is substantially nothing more than pleasure or\r\npain operating in a certain manner. Now pleasure is in itself\r\na good; nay, even setting aside immunity from pain, the only\r\ngood…. It follows, therefore, immediately and incontestably\r\nthat there is no such thing as any sort of motive that is\r\nin itself a bad one. If motives are good or bad, it is only on\r\naccount of their effects\" (Bentham, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Morals and\r\nLegislation\u003c/i\u003e, ch. x., \u0026sect;2). Over against this, place the following\r\nfrom Kant: \"Pure reason is practical of itself alone, and\r\ngives to man a universal law which we call the Moral Law….\r\nIf this law determines the will directly [without any\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_229\" id=\"Page_229\"\u003e[Pg 229]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreference to objects and to pleasure or pain] the action conformed\r\nto it is good in itself; a will whose principle always\r\nconforms to this law is good absolutely in every respect and\r\nis the supreme condition of all good.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf now we recur to the distinction between the \"what\"\r\nand the \"how\" of action in the light of these quotations,\r\nwe get a striking result. \"What\" one does is to pay\r\nmoney, or speak words, or strike blows, and so on. The\r\n\"how\" of this action is the spirit, the temper in which it is\r\ndone. One pays money with a hope of getting it back, or to\r\navoid arrest for fraud, or because one wishes to discharge\r\nan obligation; one strikes in anger, or in self-defense, or in\r\nlove of country, and so on. Now the view of Bentham says\r\nin effect that the \"what\" is significant, and that the \"what\"\r\nconsists ultimately only of the pleasures it produces; the\r\n\"how\" is unimportant save as it incidentally affects resulting\r\nfeelings. The view of Kant is that the moral core\r\nof every act is in its \"how,\" that is in its spirit, its actuating\r\nmotive; and that the law of reason is the only right\r\nmotive. \u003ci\u003eWhat\u003c/i\u003e is aimed at is a secondary and (except as\r\ndetermined by the inner spirit, the \"how\" of the action) an\r\nirrelevant matter. In short the separation of the mental\r\nand the overt aspects of an act has led to an equally complete\r\nseparation of its initial spirit and motive from its\r\nfinal content and consequence. And in this separation, one\r\ntype of theory, illustrated by Kant, takes its stand on the\r\nactuating source of the act; the other, that of Bentham,\r\non its outcome. For convenience, we shall frequently refer\r\nto these types of theories as respectively the \"attitude\"\r\nand the \"content\"; the formal and the material; the disposition\r\nand the consequences theory. The fundamental\r\nthing is that \u003ci\u003eboth\u003c/i\u003e theories separate character and conduct,\r\ndisposition and behavior; which of the two is most emphasized\r\nbeing a secondary matter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDifferent Ways of Emphasizing Results.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;There are,\r\nhowever, different forms of the consequences or \"content\"\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_230\" id=\"Page_230\"\u003e[Pg 230]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntheory\u0026mdash;as we shall, for convenience, term it. Some writers,\r\nlike Spencer as quoted, say the only consequences that are\r\ngood are simply pleasures, and that pleasures differ only in\r\n\u003ci\u003eintensity\u003c/i\u003e, being alike in everything but degree. Others\r\nsay, pleasure is the good, but pleasures differ in quality\r\nas well as intensity and that a certain \u003ci\u003ekind\u003c/i\u003e of pleasure\r\nis the morally good. Others say that natural satisfaction\r\nis not found in any one pleasure, or in any number of\r\nthem, but in a more permanent mood of experience, which\r\nis termed \u003ci\u003ehappiness\u003c/i\u003e. Happiness is different from a pleasure\r\nor from a collection of pleasures, in being an abiding\r\nconsequence or result, which is not destroyed even by the\r\npresence of pains (while a pain ejects a pleasure). The\r\npleasure view is called Hedonism; the happiness view,\r\nEudaimonism.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_115_115\" id=\"FNanchor_115_115\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_115_115\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[115]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDifferent Forms of the \"Attitude\" Theory.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The opposite\r\nschool of theory holds that the peculiar character\r\nof \"moral\" good is precisely that it is \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e found in consequences\r\nof action. In this negative feature of the definition\r\nmany different writers agree; there is less harmony\r\nin the positive statement of just what the moral\r\ngood is. It is an attribute or disposition of character,\r\nor the self, not a trait of results experienced, and in general\r\nsuch an attribute is called \u003ci\u003eVirtue\u003c/i\u003e. But there are\r\nas many differences of opinion as to what constitutes\r\nvirtue as there are on the other side as to what pleasure\r\nand happiness are. In one view, it merges, in its outcome\r\nat least, very closely with one form of eudaimonism.\r\nIf happiness be defined as the fulfillment of satisfaction\r\nof the characteristic functions of a human being,\r\nwhile a certain function, that of reason, is regarded as\r\n\u003ci\u003ethe\u003c/i\u003e characteristic human trait whose exercise is \u003ci\u003ethe\u003c/i\u003e virtue\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_231\" id=\"Page_231\"\u003e[Pg 231]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor supreme excellence, it becomes impossible to maintain\r\nany sharp line of distinction. Kant, however, attempted\r\nto cut under this union of happiness and virtue, which\r\nunder the form of \u003ci\u003eperfectionism\u003c/i\u003e has been attempted by\r\nmany writers, by raising the question of \u003ci\u003emotivation\u003c/i\u003e. Why\r\ndoes the person aim at perfection? Is it for the sake of\r\nthe resulting happiness? Then we have only Hedonism.\r\nIs it because the moral law, the law of reason, requires\r\nit? Then we have law morally deeper than the end\r\naimed at.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may now consider the bearing of this discussion\r\nupon theories of moral knowledge and (2) of moral\r\nauthority.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_116_116\" id=\"FNanchor_116_116\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_116_116\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[116]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eI. Characteristic Theories of Moral Knowledge.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;(1)\r\nThose who set chief store by the goods naturally experienced,\r\nfind that past experiences supply all the data required\r\nfor moral knowledge. Pleasures and pains, satisfactions\r\nand miseries, are recurrent familiar experiences. All\r\nwe have to do is to note them and their occasions (or, put\r\nthe other way, to observe the tendency of some of our impulses\r\nand acts to bring pleasure as a consequence, of\r\nothers to effect misery), and to make up our ends and\r\naims accordingly. As a theory of moral knowledge,\r\nHedonism is thus almost always allied with \u003ci\u003eempiricism\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nunderstanding by empiricism the theory that particular\r\npast experiences furnish the method of all ideas and\r\nbeliefs.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) The theory that the good is some type of virtuous\r\ncharacter requires a special organ to give moral knowledge.\r\nVirtue is none the less the Good, even when it is\r\nnot attained, when it is not experienced, that is, as we\r\nexperience a pleasure. In any case, it is not good because\r\nit is experienced, but because it \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e virtue. Thus the \"attitude\"\r\ntheory tends to connect itself with some form of In\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_232\" id=\"Page_232\"\u003e[Pg 232]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etuitionalism,\r\nRationalism, or Transcendentalism, all of\r\nthese terms meaning that there is something in knowledge\r\ngoing beyond the particular experiences. Intuitionalism\r\nholds there is a certain special faculty which reveals\r\ntruths beyond the scope of experience; Rationalism, that\r\nbeside the particular elements of experience there are\r\nuniversal and necessary conceptions which regulate it;\r\nTranscendentalism, that within experience there is a\r\nfactor derived from a source transcending experience.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_117_117\" id=\"FNanchor_117_117\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_117_117\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[117]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eII. Characteristic Theories of Moral Control.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\nresult school tends to view authority, control, law, obligation\r\nfrom the standpoint of \u003ci\u003emeans to an end\u003c/i\u003e; the\r\nmoralistic, or virtue, school to regard the idea of \u003ci\u003elaw\u003c/i\u003e as\r\nmore fundamental than that of the good. From the first\r\nstandpoint, the authority of a given rule lies in its power\r\nto regulate desires so that after all pleasures\u0026mdash;or a maximum\r\nof them, and a minimum of pains\u0026mdash;may be had. At\r\nbottom, it is a principle of expediency, of practical wisdom,\r\nof adjustment of means to end. Thus Hume said:\r\n\"Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions\"\u0026mdash;that\r\nis, the principles and rules made known by reason\r\nare, at last, only instruments for securing the fullest satisfaction\r\nof desires. But according to the point of view\r\nof the other school, no satisfaction is \u003ci\u003ereally\u003c/i\u003e (i.e., morally)\r\ngood unless it is acquired in accordance with a law existing\r\nindependently of pleasurable satisfaction. Thus the\r\ngood depends upon the law, not the law upon the desirable\r\nend.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 3. GENERAL INTERPRETATION OF THESE THEORIES\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Opposition in Ordinary Life.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;To some extent,\r\nsimilar oppositions are latent in our ordinary moral convictions,\r\nwithout regard to theory. Indeed, we tend, at\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_233\" id=\"Page_233\"\u003e[Pg 233]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndifferent times, to pass from one point of view to the\r\nother, without being aware of it. Thus, as against the\r\nidentification of goodness with a \u003ci\u003emere\u003c/i\u003e attitude of will;\r\nwe say, \"It is not enough for a man to be good; he must\r\nbe good for something.\" It is not enough to mean well;\r\none must mean to do well; to excuse a man by saying\r\n\"he \u003ci\u003emeans\u003c/i\u003e well,\" conveys a shade of depreciation. \"Hell\r\nis paved with good intentions.\" Good \"resolutions,\" in\r\ngeneral, are ridiculed as not modifying overt action. A\r\ntree is to be judged by its fruits. \"Faith without works\r\nis dead.\" A man is said \"to be too good for this world\"\r\nwhen his motives are not effective. Sometimes we say,\r\n\"So and so is a \u003ci\u003egood\u003c/i\u003e man,\" meaning to say that that is\r\nabout all that can be said for him\u0026mdash;he does not count,\r\nor amount to anything, practically. The objection to\r\nidentifying goodness with inefficiency also tends to render\r\nsuspected a theory which seems to lead logically to such\r\nidentification. More positively we dwell upon goodness\r\nas involving \u003ci\u003eservice\u003c/i\u003e; \"love is the fulfilling of the law,\"\r\nand while love is a trait of character, it is one which takes\r\nimmediate action in order to bring about certain definite\r\nconsequences. We call a man Pharisaical who cherishes his\r\nown good character as an end distinct from the common\r\ngood for which it may be serviceable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand, indicating the supremacy of the\r\nvoluntary attitude over consequences, we have, \"What\r\nshall a man give in exchange for his soul?\" \"What shall\r\nit profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his\r\nown life?\" \"Let us do evil that good may come, whose damnation\r\nis just.\" The deep-seated objection to the maxim\r\nthat the end justifies the means is hard to account for,\r\nexcept upon the basis that it is possible to attain ends\r\notherwise worthy and desirable at the expense of conduct\r\nwhich is immoral. Again, compare Shakspere\u0027s\r\n\"There\u0027s nothing right or wrong, but thinking makes\r\nit so\" with the Biblical \"As a man thinketh in his heart,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_234\" id=\"Page_234\"\u003e[Pg 234]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nso is he.\" And finally we have such sayings as, \"Take\r\nthe will for the deed\"; \"His heart is in the right place\";\r\n\u003ci\u003ePereat mundus, fiat justitia\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePassing from this popular aspect of the matter, we\r\nfind the following grounds for the \"content\" theory:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. It Makes Morality Really Important.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Would there\r\nbe any use or sense in moral acts if they did not tend\r\nto promote welfare, individual and social? If theft uniformly\r\nresulted in great happiness and security of life,\r\nif truth-telling introduced confusion and inefficiency into\r\nmen\u0027s relations, would we not consider the first a virtue,\r\nand the latter a vice?\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_118_118\" id=\"FNanchor_118_118\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_118_118\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[118]\u003c/a\u003e So far as the identification of\r\ngoodness with mere motive (apart from results effected by\r\nacts) reduces morality to nullity, there seems to be furnished\r\na \u003ci\u003ereductio ad absurdum\u003c/i\u003e of the theory that results\r\nare not the decisive thing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(2) It Makes Morality a Definite, Concrete Thing.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Morality\r\nis found in consequences; and consequences\r\nare definite, observable facts which the individual can be\r\nmade responsible for noting and for employing in the direction\r\nof his further behavior. The theory gives morality\r\nan objective, a tangible guarantee and sanction. Moreover,\r\nresults are something objective, common to different\r\nindividuals because outside them all. But the doctrine\r\nthat goodness consists in motives formed by and within\r\nthe individual without reference to obvious, overt results,\r\nmakes goodness something vague or else whimsical and\r\narbitrary. The latter view makes virtue either something\r\nunattainable, or else attained by merely cultivating certain\r\ninternal states having no outward results at all, or even\r\nresults that are socially harmful. It encourages fanaticism,\r\nmoral crankiness, moral isolation or pride; obstinate\r\npersistence in a bad course in spite of its demonstrable\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_235\" id=\"Page_235\"\u003e[Pg 235]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nevil results. It makes morality non-progressive, since by\r\nits assumption no amount of experience of consequences\r\ncan throw any light upon essential moral elements.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(3) The Content Theory Not Only Puts Morality\r\nItself upon a Basis of Facts, but Also Puts the Theory of\r\nMorality upon a Solid Basis.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We know what we mean\r\nby goodness and evil when we discuss them in terms of\r\nresults achieved or missed, and can therefore discuss them\r\nintelligibly. We can formulate concrete ends and lay\r\ndown rules for their attainment. Thus there can be\r\na science of morals just as there can be a science of any\r\nbody of observable facts having a common principle.\r\nBut if morality depends upon purely subjective, personal\r\nmotives, no objective observation and common interpretation\r\nare possible. We are thrown back upon the capricious\r\nindividual \u003ci\u003eipse dixit\u003c/i\u003e, which by this theory is made final.\r\nEthical theory is rendered impossible. Thus Bentham,\r\nwho brings these charges (and others) against the\r\n\"virtue\" theory of goodness, says at the close of the\r\npreface to his \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Morals and Legislation\u003c/i\u003e (ed.\r\nof 1823):\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"Truths that form the basis of political and moral science\r\nare not to be discovered but by investigations as severe as\r\nmathematical ones, and beyond all comparison more intricate\r\nand extensive…. They are not to be forced into detached\r\nand general propositions, unincumbered with explanations\r\nand exceptions. They will not compress themselves into epigrams.\r\nThey recoil from the tongue and the pen of the declaimer.\r\nThey flourish not in the same soil with sentiment.\r\nThey grow among thorns; and are not to be plucked, like\r\ndaisies, by infants as they run…. There is no \u003ci\u003eKing\u0027s Road\u003c/i\u003e\r\n… to legislative, any more than to mathematical science.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_119_119\" id=\"FNanchor_119_119\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_119_119\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[119]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_236\" id=\"Page_236\"\u003e[Pg 236]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eArguments not unlike, however, may be adduced in\r\nfavor of the attitude theory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. It, and It Alone, Places Morality in the High and\r\nAuthoritative Place Which by Right Characterizes It.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Morality\r\nis not just a means of reaching other ends;\r\nit is an end in itself. To reduce virtue to a tool or instrumentality\r\nfor securing pleasure is to prostitute and destroy\r\nit. Unsophisticated common sense is shocked at\r\nputting morality upon the same level with prudence, policy,\r\nand expediency. Morality is morality, just because\r\nit possesses an absolute authoritativeness which they lack.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. The Morally Good Must be Within the Power of the\r\nIndividual to Achieve.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The amount of pleasure and\r\npain the individual experiences, his share of satisfaction,\r\ndepends upon outward circumstances which are beyond\r\nhis control, and which accordingly have no moral significance.\r\nOnly the beginning, the willing, of an act lies\r\nwith the man; its conclusion, its outcome in the way of\r\nconsequences, lies with the gods. Accident, misfortune,\r\nunfavorable circumstance, may shut the individual within\r\na life of sickness, misery, and discomfort. They may deprive\r\nhim of external goods; but they cannot modify the moral\r\ngood, for that resides in the attitude with which one faces\r\nthese conditions and results. Conditions hostile to pros\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_237\" id=\"Page_237\"\u003e[Pg 237]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eperity\r\nmay be only the means of calling forth virtues\r\nof bravery, patience, and amiability. Only consequences\r\nwithin character itself, the tendency of an act to form a\r\nhabit or to cultivate a disposition, are really of moral\r\nsignificance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. Motives Furnish a Settled and Workable Criterion\r\nby Which to Measure the Rightness or Wrongness of\r\nSpecific Acts.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Consequences are indefinitely varied; they\r\nare too much at the mercy of the unforeseen to serve as\r\nbasis of measurement. One and the same act may turn\r\nout in a hundred different ways according to accidental\r\ncircumstances. If the individual had to calculate consequences\r\nbefore entering upon action, he would engage in\r\ntrying to solve a problem where each new term introduced\r\nmore factors. No conclusion would ever be reached;\r\nor, if reached, would be so uncertain that the agent would\r\nbe paralyzed by doubt. But since the motives are within\r\nthe person\u0027s own breast, the problem of knowing the right\r\nis comparatively simple: the data for the judgment are\r\nalways at hand and always accessible to the one who\r\nsincerely wishes to know the right.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eConclusion.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The fact that common life recognizes,\r\nunder certain conditions, both theories as correct, and\r\nthat substantially the same claims may be made for both,\r\nsuggests that the controversy depends upon some underlying\r\nmisapprehension. Their common error, as we shall\r\nattempt to show in the sequel, lies in trying to split a\r\nvoluntary act which is single and entire into two unrelated\r\nparts, the one termed \"inner,\" the other, \"outer\";\r\nthe one called \"motive,\" the other, \"end.\" A voluntary\r\nact is always a disposition, or habit of the agent \u003ci\u003epassing\r\ninto an overt act\u003c/i\u003e, which, so far as it can, produces certain\r\nconsequences. A \"mere\" motive which does not do\r\nanything, which makes nothing different, is not a genuine\r\nmotive at all, and hence is not a voluntary act. On the\r\nother hand, consequences which are not intended, which\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_238\" id=\"Page_238\"\u003e[Pg 238]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nare not personally wanted and chosen and striven for,\r\nare no part of a voluntary act. \u003ci\u003eNeither the inner\r\napart from the outer, nor the outer apart from the inner,\r\nhas any voluntary or moral quality at all. The former\r\nis mere passing sentimentality or reverie; the latter is\r\nmere accident or luck.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTendency of Each Theory to Pass into the Other.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Hence\r\neach theory, realizing its own onesidedness, tends\r\ninevitably to make concessions, and to borrow factors\r\nfrom its competitor, and thus insensibly to bridge the gap\r\nbetween them. Consequences are emphasized, but only\r\n\u003ci\u003eforeseen\u003c/i\u003e consequences; while to \u003ci\u003eforesee\u003c/i\u003e is a mental act whose\r\nexercise depends upon character. It is disposition, interest,\r\nwhich leads an agent to estimate the consequences\r\nat their true worth; thus an upholder of the \"content\"\r\ntheory ends by falling back upon the \u003ci\u003eattitude\u003c/i\u003e taken in\r\nforecasting and weighing results. In like fashion, the\r\nrepresentative of the motive theory dwells upon the tendency\r\nof the motive to bring about certain effects. The\r\nman with a truly benevolent disposition is not the one who\r\nindulges in indiscriminate charity, but the one who considers\r\nthe effect of his gift upon its recipient and upon\r\nsociety. While lauding the motive as the sole bearer of\r\nmoral worth, the motive is regarded as a force working\r\ntowards the production of certain \u003ci\u003eresults\u003c/i\u003e. When the\r\n\"content\" theory recognizes disposition as an inherent\r\nfactor in bringing about consequences, and the \"attitude\"\r\ntheory views motives as forces tending to effect consequences,\r\nan approximation of each to the other has taken\r\nplace which almost cancels the original opposition. It\r\nis realized that a complete view of the place of motive\r\nin a voluntary act will conceive motive as a motor force;\r\nas inspiring to action which will inevitably produce\r\ncertain results unless this is prevented by superior external\r\nforce. It is also realized that only \u003ci\u003ethose\u003c/i\u003e consequences\r\nare any part of voluntary behavior which are so con\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_239\" id=\"Page_239\"\u003e[Pg 239]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003egenial\r\nto character as to appeal to it as good and stir\r\nit to effort to realize them. \u003ci\u003eWe may begin the analysis of a\r\nvoluntary act at whichever end we please, but we are\r\nalways carried to the other end in order to complete the\r\nanalysis.\u003c/i\u003e The so-called distinction between the \"inner\"\r\nand \"outer\" parts of an act is in reality a distinction\r\nbetween the \u003ci\u003eearlier\u003c/i\u003e and the \u003ci\u003elater\u003c/i\u003e period of its development.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the following chapter we shall enter upon a direct\r\ndiscussion of the relation of conduct and character to one\r\nanother; we shall then apply the results of the discussion,\r\nin successive chapters, to the problems already raised:\r\nThe Nature of Good; of Knowledge; of Moral Authority;\r\nThe Relation of the Self to Others and Society; The\r\nCharacteristics of the Virtuous Self.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMany of the references in ch. xi. trench upon this ground. Compare,\r\nalso, Lecky, \u003ci\u003eHistory of European Morals\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., pp. 1-2, and\r\n122-130; Sidgwick, \u003ci\u003eMethods of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 6-11, 77-88 and 494-507;\r\nWundt, \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II., ch. iv.; Mackenzie, \u003ci\u003eManual of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Book\r\nII., ch. ii.; Murray, \u003ci\u003eIntroduction to Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, p. 143; Paulsen, \u003ci\u003eSystem\r\nof Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Introduction, and Book II., ch. i.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_110_110\" id=\"Footnote_110_110\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_110_110\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[110]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Spencer, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., p. 46, and p. 30. (Italics\r\nnot in original.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_111_111\" id=\"Footnote_111_111\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_111_111\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[111]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Green, \u003ci\u003eProlegomena to Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, p. 354.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_112_112\" id=\"Footnote_112_112\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_112_112\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[112]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Hegel\u0027s \u003ci\u003ePhilosophy of Right\u003c/i\u003e, translated by Dyde, Part III., 150\r\n(p. 159).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_113_113\" id=\"Footnote_113_113\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_113_113\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[113]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Hegel\u0027s \u003ci\u003ePhilosophy of Right\u003c/i\u003e, translated by Dyde, Part III., 258\r\n(p. 241).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_114_114\" id=\"Footnote_114_114\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_114_114\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[114]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eWerke\u003c/i\u003e, Book I., 389.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_115_115\" id=\"Footnote_115_115\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_115_115\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[115]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The Greek words\r\n\u0026#7969;\u0026#948;\u0026#959;\u0026#957;\u0026#942;, pleasure, and\r\n\u0026#949;\u0026#8016;\u0026#948;\u0026#945;\u0026#953;\u0026#956;\u0026#959;\u0026#957;\u0026#943;\u0026#945;, happiness. The\r\nlatter conception is due chiefly to Aristotle. Happiness is, however,\r\na good translation only when taken very vaguely. The Greek term\r\nhas a peculiar origin which influenced its meaning.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_116_116\" id=\"Footnote_116_116\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_116_116\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[116]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The differences as regards self and society will be considered in\r\nlater chapters.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_117_117\" id=\"Footnote_117_117\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_117_117\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[117]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For similar reasons, the \"content\" theories tend to ally themselves\r\nwith the positive sciences; the \"attitude\" theories with philosophy\r\nas distinct from sciences.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_118_118\" id=\"Footnote_118_118\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_118_118\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[118]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"Suppose that picking a man\u0027s pocket excited in him joyful emotions,\r\nby brightening his prospects, would theft be counted among\r\ncrimes?\"\u0026mdash;\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSpencer.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_119_119\" id=\"Footnote_119_119\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_119_119\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[119]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mill in his \u003ci\u003eAutobiography\u003c/i\u003e has given a striking account of how\r\nthis phase of Utilitarianism appealed to him. (See pp. 65-67 of London\r\nedition of 1874; see also his \u003ci\u003eDissertations and Discussions\u003c/i\u003e, Vol.\r\nI., Essay on Bentham, especially pp. 339 and ff.) Bentham \"introduced\r\ninto morals and politics those habits of thought, and modes\r\nof investigation, which are essential to the idea of science; and the\r\nabsence of which made these departments of inquiry, as physics had\r\nbeen before Bacon, a field of interminable discussion, leading to\r\nno result. It was not his \u003ci\u003eopinions\u003c/i\u003e, in short, but his \u003ci\u003emethod\u003c/i\u003e, that\r\nconstituted the novelty and value of what he did…. Bentham\u0027s\r\nmethod may be shortly described as the method of \u003ci\u003edetail\u003c/i\u003e…. Error\r\nlurks in generalities.\"\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nMill finally says: \"He has thus, it is not too much to say, for the\r\nfirst time introduced precision of thought in moral and political\r\nphilosophy. Instead of taking up their opinions by intuition, or by\r\nratiocination from premises adopted on a mere rough view, and\r\ncouched in language so vague that it is impossible to say exactly\r\nwhether they are true or false, philosophers are now forced to understand\r\none another, to break down the generality of their propositions,\r\nand join a precise issue in every dispute. This is nothing\r\nless than a revolution in philosophy.\" In view of the character\r\nof the larger amount of discussions in moral and political philosophy\r\nstill current, Mill perhaps took a too optimistic view of the extent\r\nto which this \"revolution\" had been accomplished.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_240\" id=\"Page_240\"\u003e[Pg 240]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER XIII\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCONDUCT AND CHARACTER\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eProblem of Chapter.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We have endeavored in the preceding\r\nchapters (1) to identify the sort of situation in\r\nwhich the ideas of good and evil, right and wrong, in\r\ntheir moral sense, are employed; (2) to set forth the\r\ntypical problems that arise in the analysis of this situation;\r\nand (3) to name and describe briefly the types of\r\ntheory which have developed in the course of the history of\r\nthe problems. We have now to return to the moral situation\r\nas described, and enter upon an independent analysis\r\nof it. We shall commence this analysis, as was indicated\r\nin the last chapter, by considering the question of the\r\nrelation of attitude and consequences to each other in\r\nvoluntary activity,\u0026mdash;not that this is the only way to\r\napproach the problem, but that it is the way which brings\r\nout most clearly the points at issue among types of\r\nmoral theory which since the early part of the nineteenth\r\ncentury have had the chief currency and influence.\r\nAccordingly the discussion will be introduced by a statement\r\nof the two most extreme doctrines that separate the\r\n\"inner\" and the \"outer,\" the \"psychical\" and the \"overt\"\r\naspects of activity: \u003ci\u003eviz.\u003c/i\u003e, the Kantian, exclusively emphasizing\r\nthe \"how,\" the spirit, and motive of conduct;\r\nthe Utilitarian, dwelling exclusively upon its \"what,\" its\r\neffects and consequences. Our positive problem is, of\r\ncourse, by means of arraying these two extreme views\r\nagainst each other, to arrive at a statement of the mutual\r\nrelations of attitude and act, motive and consequence,\r\ncharacter and conduct.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_241\" id=\"Page_241\"\u003e[Pg 241]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe shall begin with Kant as a representative of the\r\nattitude theory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 1. THE GOOD WILL OF KANT\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eKant says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"Nothing can possibly be conceived, in the world or out of\r\nit, which can be called Good without qualification, except a\r\nGood Will. Intelligence, wit, judgment, and the other talents\r\nof the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution,\r\nperseverance as qualities of temperament are individually\r\ngood and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of\r\nnature may also become extremely bad and mischievous, if\r\nthe will which is to make use of them and which, therefore,\r\nconstitutes what is called character, is not good. It is the\r\nsame with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honor, even\r\nhealth … inspire pride and often presumption if there is\r\nnot a Good Will to correct the influence of these on the mind.\r\nModeration of the affections and passions, self-control and\r\ncalm deliberation are not only good in many respects, but even\r\nseem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of the person;\r\nbut they are far from deserving to be called good without\r\nqualification … for without the principles of a good will\r\nthey may become extremely bad. The coolness of a villain\r\nmakes him both more dangerous and more abominable\" (Kant:\r\n\u003ci\u003eTheory of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, tr. by Abbott, pp. 9-10).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eElement of Truth in Statement.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;There can be no\r\ndoubt that in some respects these ideas of Kant meet\r\na welcome in our ordinary convictions. Gifts of fortune,\r\ntalents of mind, qualities of temperament, are regarded\r\nas desirable, as good, but we qualify the concession. We\r\nsay they are good, if a good use is made of them; but\r\nthat, administered by a bad character, they add to power\r\nfor evil. Moreover, Kant\u0027s statement of the \u003ci\u003eintrinsic\u003c/i\u003e\r\ngoodness of the Good Will, \"A jewel which shines by its\r\nown light\" (\u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 10), awakens ready response in us.\r\nSome goods we regard as means and conditions\u0026mdash;health,\r\nwealth, business, and professional success. They afford\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_242\" id=\"Page_242\"\u003e[Pg 242]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmoral opportunities and agencies, but need not possess\r\nmoral value in and of themselves; when they become parts,\r\nas they may, of a moral good, it is because of their place\r\nand context. Personality, character, has a dignity of\r\nits own, which forbids that it be considered a simple\r\nmeans for the acquisition of other goods. The man who\r\nmakes his good character a simple tool for securing\r\npolitical preferment, is, we should say, prostituting and\r\nso destroying his own goodness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAmbiguity of Statement.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The statement made by\r\nKant, however, is ambiguous and open to opposed interpretations.\r\nThe notion that the Good Will is good in\r\nand of itself may be interpreted in two different ways:\r\n(i) We may hold, for example, that honesty is good as\r\na trait of will because it tends inevitably to secure a\r\ndesirable relationship among men; it removes obstructions\r\nbetween persons and keeps the ways of action clear and\r\nopen. Every man can count upon straightforward action\r\nwhen all act from honesty; it secures for each singleness\r\nof aim and concentration of energy. (ii) But we may\r\nalso mean that honesty is absolutely good as a trait\r\nof character just in and by itself, quite apart from any\r\ninfluence this trait of character has in securing and promoting\r\ndesirable ends. In one case, we emphasize its\r\ngoodness because it arranges for and tends towards certain\r\nresults; in the other case, we ignore the factor of\r\ntendency toward results.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eKant\u0027s Interpretation of Goodness of Will is Formal.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Kant\u0027s\r\nfurther treatment leaves us in no doubt in which\r\nof these two senses he uses the term Good Will. He goes\r\non (\u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 10):\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"A Good Will is good, not because of what it performs or\r\neffects, \u003ci\u003enot by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed\r\nend\u003c/i\u003e, but simply by virtue of the volition; that is, it is\r\ngood in itself…. Even if it should happen that, owing to\r\nthe special disfavor of fortune, or the niggardly provision of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_243\" id=\"Page_243\"\u003e[Pg 243]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na stepmotherly nature, this will should wholly lack power\r\nto accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should\r\nyet achieve nothing, and there should remain only the Good\r\nWill (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the assuming of all\r\nmeans in our power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine\r\nby its own light as a thing which has its whole value in\r\nitself. Its fruitfulness or fruitlessness can neither add nor\r\ntake away anything from this value.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd again he says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"An action … derives its moral worth not from the \u003ci\u003epurpose\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwhich is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by\r\nwhich it is determined and therefore depends … merely on\r\nthe principle of volition by which the action has taken place,\r\nwithout regard to any \u003ci\u003eobject of desire\u003c/i\u003e…. The purposes\r\nwhich we may have in view in our actions or their effect\r\nregarded as ends and springs of will cannot give the actions\r\nan unconditional or moral worth…. It cannot lie anywhere\r\nbut in the principle of the Will, without regard to the\r\nends which can be attained by the action\" (\u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 16).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRelation of Endeavor and Achievement to Will.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Here,\r\nalso, we find a certain agreement with our every-day\r\nmoral experience. It is undoubtedly true that in many\r\ncases we ascribe moral worth or goodness to acts without\r\nreference to the results actually attained by them; a man\r\nwho tries to rescue a drowning child is not judged only\r\non the basis of success. If he is prevented, because he\r\nis crippled, or because the current is too rapid for him,\r\nwe do not refuse hearty moral approbation. We do not\r\njudge the goodness of the act or of the agent from the\r\nstandpoint of its attained result, which here is failure.\r\nWe regard the man as good because he proposed to himself\r\na worthy end or aim, the rescue of another, even\r\nat the risk of harm to himself. We should agree with\r\nKant in saying that the moral worth does not depend\r\non the \u003ci\u003erealization\u003c/i\u003e of the object of desire. But we should\r\nregard the worth of the man to consist precisely in the\r\nfact that, so far as he was concerned, he \u003ci\u003eaimed at a good\r\nresult\u003c/i\u003e. We do not rule out purpose, but we approve because\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_244\" id=\"Page_244\"\u003e[Pg 244]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe purpose was good. By will we mean tendencies,\r\ndesires, and habits operating to realize results regarded\r\nas desirable. Will is not the \u003ci\u003esole\u003c/i\u003e condition of reaching\r\na result\u0026mdash;that is, of making the aim an actual fact. Circumstances\r\nneed to co\u0026ouml;perate to insure a successful issue;\r\nand if these fail, the best will in the world cannot secure\r\nthe transformation of desire for an end into that end.\r\nWe know that sometimes it is only by accident that the\r\ndesirable end is not effected, but we also know that without\r\nthe proper disposition it is only by accident that the\r\nresults \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e achieved. Moreover, we know that our own\r\nattitude is not only an important condition of securing\r\nthe results, but that it is the only condition \u003ci\u003econstantly\u003c/i\u003e\r\nunder our control. What we mean by calling it \"ours\"\r\nis precisely that it is that condition whose operation lies\r\nwith us. Accordingly, it is the key and clue to the results,\r\nso far as they concern us. So far, given desire and endeavor,\r\nachievement is not necessary to volition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"\u003cb\u003eMeaning Well.\u003c/b\u003e\"\u0026mdash;On the other hand, can a man justify\r\nhimself on the ground that he \"means well,\" if the\r\n\"meaning well\" does not \u003ci\u003eregulate the overt acts\u003c/i\u003e that he\r\nperforms, and hence the consequences that proceed from\r\nthem? Are we not justified in suspecting a person\u0027s good\r\nfaith when his good intentions uniformly bring suffering\r\nto others? If we do not question his good faith, do we\r\nnot regard him as needing moral enlightenment, and a\r\nchange of disposition? We distinguish in our judgments\r\nof good between the fanatic and the thoroughly selfish\r\nman, but we do not carry this distinction to the point\r\nof approving the fanatic; of saying, \"Let him alone; he\r\nmeans well, he has a good will, he is actuated by a sense\r\nof duty.\" On the contrary, we condemn his aims; and in\r\nso far we censure him for willingly entertaining ans approving\r\nthem. We may, indeed, approve of his character\r\nwith respect to its sincerity, singleness of aim, and its thoroughness\r\nof effort, for such things, \u003ci\u003etaken by themselves\u003c/i\u003e, or\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_245\" id=\"Page_245\"\u003e[Pg 245]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin the abstract, are good traits of character. We esteem\r\nthem highly, however, just because they have so much\r\nto do with results; they are, \u003ci\u003epar excellence\u003c/i\u003e, executive\r\ntraits. But we do not approve of the man\u0027s whole character\r\nin approving these traits. There is something the\r\nmatter with the man in whom good traits are put to a\r\nbad use. It is not true in such cases that we approve\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eagent\u003c/i\u003e but condemn his \u003ci\u003eacts\u003c/i\u003e. We approve certain\r\nphases of conduct, and in so far regard the doer as\r\npraiseworthy; we condemn other features of acts, and in\r\nso far disapprove him.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_120_120\" id=\"FNanchor_120_120\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_120_120\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[120]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eOvert Action Proves Will.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Again, under what circumstances\r\ndo we actually \"take the will for the deed\"?\r\nWhen do we assume that so far as the will was concerned\r\nit did aim at the result and aimed at it thoroughly, without\r\nevasion and without reservation? Only when there\r\nis \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e action which testifies to the real presence of the\r\nmotive and aim.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_121_121\" id=\"FNanchor_121_121\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_121_121\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[121]\u003c/a\u003e The man, in our earlier instance, must\r\nhave made some effort to save the drowning child to justify\r\neither us or himself in believing that he \u003ci\u003emeant\u003c/i\u003e to do it;\r\nthat he had the right intent. The individual who habitually\r\njustifies himself (either to others or to himself) by\r\ninsisting upon the rightness of his motives, lays himself\r\nopen to a charge of self-deception, if not of deliberate\r\nhypocrisy, if there are no outward evidences of effort\r\ntowards the realization of his pretended motive. A\r\nhabitually careless child, when blamed for some disorder\r\nor disturbance, seeks to excuse himself by saying he\r\n\"didn\u0027t mean to\": i.e., he had no intention or aim; the\r\nresults did not flow morally from him. We often reply,\r\nin effect, \"that is just the trouble; you didn\u0027t mean at\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_246\" id=\"Page_246\"\u003e[Pg 246]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nall; you ought to have meant \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e to do this.\" In other\r\nwords, if you had thought about what you were doing\r\nyou would not have done this and would not have brought\r\nabout the undesirable results. With adults there is such\r\na thing as culpable carelessness and blameworthy negligence.\r\nSo far as the individual\u0027s conscious will was\r\nconcerned, everything he deliberately intended may have\r\nbeen entirely praiseworthy; but we blame him because\r\nhis character was such that the end appropriate to the\r\ncircumstances did not occur to him. We do not disapprove\r\nwhen the failure to think of the right purpose\r\nis due to inexperience or to lack of intellectual development;\r\nbut we do blame when the man does not employ his\r\nattained experience and intellectual capacity. Given\r\nthese factors, if the right end is not thought of or is\r\nquickly dismissed, indisposition is the only remaining\r\nexplanation. These two facts, that we require effort or evidence\r\nof sincerity of good will and that the character is\r\ndisapproved for \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e entertaining certain aims, are sufficient\r\nto prove that we do not identify will and motive\r\nwith something which has nothing to do with \"aptness for\r\nattaining ends.\" Will or character \u003ci\u003emeans intelligent\r\nforethought of ends and resolute endeavor to achieve\r\nthem\u003c/i\u003e. It cannot be conceived apart from \u003ci\u003eends\u003c/i\u003e purposed\r\nand desired.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 2. THE \"INTENTION\" OF THE UTILITARIANS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEmphasis of Utilitarians upon Ends.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We are brought\r\nto the opposite type of moral theory, the utilitarian,\r\nwhich finds moral quality to reside in consequences, that\r\nis to say, in the ends achieved. To the utilitarians, motive\r\nmeans simply certain states of consciousness which happen\r\nto be uppermost in a man\u0027s mind as he acts. Not\r\nthis subjective feeling existing only in the inner consciousness,\r\nbut the external outcome, the objective change which\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_247\" id=\"Page_247\"\u003e[Pg 247]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis made in the common world, is what counts. If we can\r\nget the act done which produces the right sort of changes,\r\nwhich brings the right kind of result to the various persons\r\nconcerned, it is irrelevant and misleading to bother\r\nwith the private emotional state of the doer\u0027s mind.\r\nMurder would be none the less murder even if the consciousness\r\nof the killer were filled with the most maudlin\r\nsentiments of general philanthropy; the rescue of a\r\ndrowning man would be none the less approvable even\r\nif we happened to know that the consciousness of the\r\nrescuer were irritable and grumpy while he was performing\r\nthe deed. Acts, not feelings, count, and acts mean\r\nchanges actually effected.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_122_122\" id=\"FNanchor_122_122\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_122_122\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[122]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDistinction of Intention from Motive.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The utilitarians\r\nmake their point by distinguishing between intention\r\nand motive, attributing moral value exclusively to the\r\nformer. According to them, intention is \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e a man\r\nmeans to do; motive is the personal frame of mind which\r\nindicates \u003ci\u003ewhy\u003c/i\u003e he means to do it. Intention is the concrete\r\naim, or purpose; the results which are foreseen and\r\nwanted. Motive is the state of mind which renders these\r\nconsequences, rather than others, interesting and attractive.\r\nThe following quotations are typical. Bentham\r\nsays concerning motives:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"If they are good or bad, it is only on account of their\r\neffects: good, on account of their tendency to produce pleasure,\r\nor avert pain: bad, on account of their tendency to produce\r\npain, or avert pleasure. Now the case is, that from one\r\nand the same motive, and from every kind of motive, may\r\nproceed actions that are good, others that are bad, and others\r\nthat are indifferent.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eConsequently the question of motive is totally irrelevant.\r\nHe goes on to give a long series of illustrations, from\r\nwhich we select one:\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_248\" id=\"Page_248\"\u003e[Pg 248]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"1. A boy, in order to divert himself, reads an inspiring book;\r\nthe motive is accounted, perhaps, a good one: at any rate, not\r\na bad one. 2. He sets his top a-spinning: the motive is\r\ndeemed at any rate not a bad one. 3. He sets loose a mad ox\r\namong a crowd: his motive is now, perhaps, termed an\r\nabominable one. Yet in all three cases the motive may be the\r\nvery same: it may be neither more nor less than curiosity.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_123_123\" id=\"FNanchor_123_123\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_123_123\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[123]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nMill writes to the following effect: \"The morality of the action\r\ndepends entirely upon the \u003ci\u003eintention\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;\u0026mdash;that is, upon \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthe agent wills to do. But the motive, that is, the feeling\r\nwhich made him will so to do, when it makes no difference in\r\nthe act, makes none in the morality.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_124_124\" id=\"FNanchor_124_124\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_124_124\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[124]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow if motives were merely inert feelings or bare states\r\nof consciousness happening to fill a person\u0027s mind apart\r\nfrom his desires and his ideas, they certainly would not\r\nmodify his acts, and we should be compelled to admit the\r\ncorrectness of this position. But Mill gives the whole\r\ncase away when he says that the motive which makes a\r\nman will something, \"\u003ci\u003ewhen it makes no difference in the\r\nact\u003c/i\u003e,\" makes none in its morality. Every motive does\r\nmake a difference in the act; it makes precisely the difference\r\nbetween one act and another. It is a contradiction\r\nin terms to speak of the motive as that \u003ci\u003ewhich\r\nmakes a man\u003c/i\u003e will to do an act or intend to effect certain\r\nconsequences, and then speak of the motive making no\r\ndifference to the act! How can that which makes an\r\nintention make no difference to it, and to the act which\r\nproceeds from it?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eConcrete Identity of Motive and Intention.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Ordinary\r\nspeech uses motive and intention interchangeably. It\r\nsays, indifferently, that a man\u0027s motive in writing a letter\r\nwas to warn the person addressed or was friendliness.\r\nAccording to Bentham and Mill, only so-called\r\nstates of consciousness in which one feels friendly can\r\nbe called motive; the object aimed at, the warning of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_249\" id=\"Page_249\"\u003e[Pg 249]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe person, is intention, not motive. Again ordinary\r\nspeech says either that a doctor\u0027s intention was to relieve\r\nhis patient, or that it was kind and proper, although the\r\nact turned out badly. But the utilitarians would insist\r\nthat only the first usage is correct, the latter confounding\r\nintent with motive. In general, such large terms as\r\nambition, revenge, benevolence, patriotism, justice, avarice,\r\nare used to signify both motives and aims; both\r\ndispositions \u003ci\u003efrom\u003c/i\u003e which one acts and results \u003ci\u003efor\u003c/i\u003e which\r\none acts. It is the gist of the following discussion that\r\ncommon speech is essentially correct in this interchangeable\r\nuse of intention and motive. The same set of real\r\nfacts, \u003ci\u003ethe entire voluntary act\u003c/i\u003e, is pointed to by both\r\nterms.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAmbiguity in Term \"Feelings.\"\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;There is a certain\r\nambiguity in the term \"feelings\" as employed by Mill\r\nand Bentham. It may mean feelings apart from ideas,\r\nblind and vague mental states unenlightened by thought,\r\npropelling and impelling tendencies undirected by either\r\nmemory or anticipation. Feelings then mean sheer instincts\r\nor impulses. In this sense, they are, as Bentham\r\nclaims, without moral quality. But also in this sense\r\nthere are no intentions with which motives may be contrasted.\r\nSo far as an infant or an insane person is impelled\r\nby some blind impulsive tendency, he foresees nothing,\r\nhas no object in view, means nothing, in his act; he\r\nacts without premeditation and intention. \"Curiosity\" of\r\nthis sort may be the source of acts which are harmful or\r\nuseful or indifferent. But no consequences were intelligently\r\nforeseen or deliberately wished for, and hence the\r\nacts in question lie wholly outside the scope of morals, even\r\naccording to the utilitarian point of view. Morality is a\r\nmatter of intent, and intent there was none.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMotive as Intelligent.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In some cases, then, motives have\r\nno moral quality whatsoever, and, \u003ci\u003ein these cases\u003c/i\u003e, it is true\r\nthat intention has no moral quality either, because there\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_250\" id=\"Page_250\"\u003e[Pg 250]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis none. Intention and motive are morally on the same\r\nlevel, not opposed to one another. But motive means not\r\nonly blind feeling, that is, impulse without thought; it\r\nalso means a tendency which is aware of its own probable\r\noutcome when carried into effect, and which is interested in\r\nthe resulting effect. It is perhaps conceivable that a\r\nchild should let loose a bull in a crowd from sheer innocent\r\ncuriosity to see what would happen\u0026mdash;just as he might\r\npour acid on a stone. But if he were a normal child, the\r\nnext time the impulse presented itself he would recall\r\nthe previous result: the fright, the damage, the injury to\r\nlife and limb, and would foresee that similar consequences\r\nare likely to happen if he again performs a like act. He\r\nnow has what Bentham and Mill call an intention. Suppose\r\nhe again lets loose the bull. Only verbally is motive\r\nnow the same that it was before. In fact, curiosity is a\r\nvery different thing. If the child is still immature and inexperienced\r\nand unimaginative, we might content ourselves\r\nwith saying that his motive is egoistic amusement; but\r\nwe may also say it is downright malevolence characteristic\r\nof a criminal. In no case should we call it curiosity.\r\nWhen foresight enters, intent, purpose enters also, and\r\nwith it a change of motive from innocent, because blind,\r\nimpulse, to deliberate, and hence to virtuous or blameworthy\r\ninterest in effecting a certain result. Intention and motive\r\nare upon the same moral level. Intention is the\r\n\u003ci\u003eoutcome\u003c/i\u003e foreseen and wanted; motive, this outcome \u003ci\u003eas\u003c/i\u003e\r\nforeseen and wanted. But the voluntary act, as such,\r\nis an \u003ci\u003eoutcome, forethought and desired\u003c/i\u003e, and hence\r\nattempted.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis discussion brings out the positive truth for which\r\nBentham and Mill stand: \u003ci\u003eviz.\u003c/i\u003e, that \u003ci\u003ethe moral quality of\r\nany impulse or active tendency can be told only by observing\r\nthe sort of consequences to which it leads in actual\r\npractice\u003c/i\u003e. As against those who insist that there are certain\r\nfeelings in human nature so sacred that they do not\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_251\" id=\"Page_251\"\u003e[Pg 251]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nneed to be measured or tested by noting the consequences\r\nwhich flow from them, so sacred that they justify an act\r\n\u003ci\u003eno matter what its results\u003c/i\u003e, the utilitarians are right.\r\nIt is true, as Bentham says, that if motives are good or\r\nbad it is on account of their effects. Hence we must be\r\nconstantly considering the effects of our various half-impulsive,\r\nhalf-blind, half-conscious, half-unconscious motives,\r\nin order to find out what sort of things they are\u0026mdash;whether\r\nto be approved and encouraged, or disapproved\r\nand checked.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePractical Importance of Defining Springs to Action\r\nby Results.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This truth is of practical as well as of\r\ntheoretical significance. Many have been taught that\r\ncertain emotions are inherently so good that they are\r\nabsolutely the justification of certain acts, so that the\r\nindividual is absolved from any attention whatsoever to\r\nresults. Instance \"charity,\" or \"benevolence.\" The belief\r\nis engrained that the emotion of pity, of desire\r\nto relieve the sufferings of others, is intrinsically noble\r\nand elevating. Hence it has required much discussion and\r\nteaching to bring home, even partially, the evils of indiscriminate\r\ngiving. The fact is that pity, sympathy, apart\r\nfrom forecast of specific results to be reached by acting\r\nupon it, is a mere psychological reaction, as much so as is\r\nshrinking from suffering, or as is a tendency to run away\r\nfrom danger; in this blind form it is devoid of any moral\r\nquality whatsoever. Hence to teach that the feeling\r\nis good in itself is to make its mere discharge an end in\r\nitself. This is to overlook the evil consequences in the\r\nway of fraud, laziness, inefficiency, parasitism produced in\r\nothers, and of sentimentality, pride, self-complacency produced\r\nin the self. There is no doubt that the effect\r\nof some types of moral training is to induce the belief\r\nthat an individual may develop goodness of character\r\nsimply by cultivating and keeping uppermost in his consciousness\r\ncertain types of feelings, irrespective of the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_252\" id=\"Page_252\"\u003e[Pg 252]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nobjective results of the acts they lead to\u0026mdash;one of the\r\nmost dangerous forms of hypocrisy and of weakened\r\nmoral fiber. The insistence of utilitarianism that we must\r\nbecome aware of the moral quality of our impulses and\r\nstates of mind on the basis of the results they effect, and\r\nmust control them\u0026mdash;no matter how \"good\" they feel\u0026mdash;by\r\ntheir results, is a fundamental truth of morals.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eExistence and Influence of Idea of Consequences Depends\r\nupon Disposition.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;But the converse is equally\r\ntrue. Behind every concrete purpose or aim, as idea\r\nor thought of results, lies something, some passion, instinct,\r\nimpulse, habit, interest, which gives it a hold on\r\nthe person, which gives it motor and impelling force;\r\nand which confers upon it the capacity to operate as\r\nmotive, as spring to action. Otherwise, foreseen consequences\r\nwould remain mere intellectual entities which\r\nthought might speculatively contemplate from afar, but\r\nwhich would never possess weight, influence, power to stir\r\neffort. But we must go further. Not only is some active\r\ntendency in the constitution of the man responsible for\r\nthe motive power, whether attractive or otherwise, which\r\nforeseen consequences possess, but it is responsible for the\r\nfact that this rather than that consequence is suggested.\r\nA man of consistently amiable character will not be\r\nlikely to have thoughts of cruelty to weigh and to dismiss;\r\na man of greed will be likely to have thoughts of\r\npersonal gain and acquisition constantly present to him.\r\nWhat an individual is interested in occurs to him; what he\r\nis indifferent to does not present itself in imagination or\r\nlightly slips away. Active tendencies, personal attitudes,\r\nare thus in the end the determining causes of our having\r\ncertain intentions in mind, as well as the causes of their\r\nactive or moving influence. As Bentham says, motives\r\n\u003ci\u003emake\u003c/i\u003e intentions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eInfluence of Interest on Ideas.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;\"Purpose is but the\r\nslave of memory.\" We can anticipate this or that only\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_253\" id=\"Page_253\"\u003e[Pg 253]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas from past experience we can construct it. But recall,\r\nre-membering (rearticulation) is selective. We pick out\r\ncertain past results, certain formerly experienced results,\r\nand we ignore others. Why? Because of our present\r\ninterests. We are interested in this or that, and accordingly\r\nit comes to mind and dwells there; or it fails to\r\nappear in recollection, or if appearing, is quickly dismissed.\r\nIt is important that the things from the past, which are\r\nrelevant to our present activity, should come promptly to\r\nmind and find fertile lodgment, and character decides how\r\nthis happens.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSays James:\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_125_125\" id=\"FNanchor_125_125\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_125_125\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[125]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"What constitutes the difficulty for a man laboring under\r\nan unwise passion acting as if the passion were unwise?…\r\nThe difficulty is mental; it is that of getting the idea of the\r\nwise action to stay before our mind at all. When any strong\r\nemotional state whatever is upon us the tendency is for no\r\nimages but such as are congruous with it to come up. If\r\nothers by chance offer themselves, they are instantly smothered\r\nand crowded out…. By a sort of self-preserving instinct\r\nwhich our passion has, it feels that these chill objects\r\n[the thoughts of what is disagreeable to the passion] if they\r\nonce but gain a lodgment, will work and work until they have\r\nfrozen the very vital spark from out of all our mood….\r\nPassion\u0027s cue accordingly is always and everywhere to prevent\r\ntheir still small voice from being heard at all.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis quotation refers to a strong passion. It is important\r\nto note \u003ci\u003ethat every interest, every emotion, of\r\nwhatever nature or strength, works in precisely the\r\nsame way\u003c/i\u003e. Upon this hangs the entertaining of memories\r\nand ideas about things. Hence interest is the central\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_254\" id=\"Page_254\"\u003e[Pg 254]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfactor in the development of any concrete intention, both\r\nas to what it is and as to what it is not\u0026mdash;that is, what\r\nthe aim would have been if the emotional attitude had\r\nbeen different. Given a certain emotional attitude, and\r\nthe consequences which are pertinent to it are thought\r\nof, while other and equally probable consequences are ignored.\r\nA man of a truly kindly disposition is sensitive\r\nto, aware of, probable results on other people\u0027s welfare;\r\na cautious person sees consequences with reference to his\r\nown standing; an avaricious man feels results in terms of\r\nthe probable increase or decrease of his possessions; and\r\nso on. The intimate relation of interest and attention\r\nforms the inseparable tie of intention, \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e one will, to\r\nmotive, \u003ci\u003ewhy\u003c/i\u003e he so wills. When Bentham says that \"Motives\r\nare the causes of intentions,\" he states the fact, and\r\nalso reveals motive as the proper final object of moral\r\njudgment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 3. CONDUCT AND CHARACTER\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe discussion enables us to place conduct and character\r\nin relation to each other. Mill, after the passage\r\nalready quoted (see above, p. 248), to the effect that motive\r\nmakes no difference to the morality of the act, says\r\nit \"makes a great difference in our moral estimation of\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eagent\u003c/i\u003e, especially if it indicates a good or a bad\r\nhabitual \u003ci\u003edisposition\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;a bent of character from which\r\nuseful, or from which hurtful, actions are likely to arise.\"\r\nTo like effect Bentham:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"Is there nothing, then,\" he asks,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_126_126\" id=\"FNanchor_126_126\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_126_126\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[126]\u003c/a\u003e \"about a man which can\r\nbe termed good or bad, when on such or such an occasion,\r\nhe suffers himself to be governed by such and such a motive?\r\nYes, certainly, his \u003ci\u003edisposition\u003c/i\u003e. Now disposition is a\r\nkind of fictitious entity,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_127_127\" id=\"FNanchor_127_127\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_127_127\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[127]\u003c/a\u003e feigned for the convenience of\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_255\" id=\"Page_255\"\u003e[Pg 255]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ediscourse, in order to express what there is supposed to be\r\n\u003ci\u003epermanent\u003c/i\u003e in a man\u0027s frame of mind, where, on such or such\r\nan occasion, he has been influenced by such or such a motive,\r\nto engage in an act, which, as it appeared to him, was of\r\nsuch or such a tendency.\" He then goes on to say that disposition\r\nis good or bad according to its effects. \"A man is\r\nsaid to be of a mischievous\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_128_128\" id=\"FNanchor_128_128\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_128_128\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[128]\u003c/a\u003e disposition, when by the influence\r\nof no matter what motives, he is \u003ci\u003epresumed\u003c/i\u003e to be more apt\r\nto engage, or form intentions of engaging, in acts which\r\nare \u003ci\u003eapparently\u003c/i\u003e of a pernicious tendency than in such as are\r\napparently of a beneficial tendency: of a meritorious or\r\nbeneficent disposition in the opposite case.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_129_129\" id=\"FNanchor_129_129\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_129_129\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[129]\u003c/a\u003e And again:\r\n\"It is evident that the nature of a man\u0027s disposition must\r\ndepend upon the nature of the motives he is apt to be influenced\r\nby; in other words, upon the degree of his sensibility\r\nto the force of such and such motives. For his disposition\r\nis, as it were, the sum of his intentions…. Now,\r\nintentions, like everything else, are produced by the things\r\nthat are their causes: \u003ci\u003eand the causes of intentions are\r\nmotives\u003c/i\u003e. If, on any occasion, a man forms either a good or\r\na bad intention, it must be by the influence of some\r\nmotive.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_130_130\" id=\"FNanchor_130_130\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_130_130\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[130]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eR\u0026ocirc;le of Character.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Here we have an explicit recognition\r\nof the fundamental r\u0026ocirc;le of character in the moral life;\r\nand also of why it is important. Character is that body\r\nof active tendencies and interests in the individual which\r\nmake him open, ready, warm to certain aims, and callous,\r\ncold, blind to others, and which accordingly habitually\r\ntend to make him acutely aware of and favorable to certain\r\nsorts of consequences, and ignorant of or hostile to\r\nother consequences. A selfish man need not consciously\r\nthink a great deal of himself, nor need he be one who,\r\nafter deliberately weighing his own claims and others\u0027\r\nclaims, consciously and persistently chooses the former.\r\nThe number of persons who after facing the entire situation,\r\nwould still be anti-social enough deliberately to sacrifice\r\nthe welfare of others is probably small. But a man\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_256\" id=\"Page_256\"\u003e[Pg 256]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwill have a selfish and egoistic character who, irrespective\r\nof any such conscious balancing of his own and others\u0027 welfare,\r\nis habitually more accessible to the thought of those\r\nconsequences which affect himself than he is to those which\r\nbear upon others. It is not so much that \u003ci\u003eafter\u003c/i\u003e thinking of\r\nthe effect upon others he declines to give these thoughts any\r\nweight, as that he habitually fails to think at all, or to\r\nthink in a vivid and complete way, of the interests of\r\nothers. As we say, he does not care; he does not consider,\r\nor regard, others.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_131_131\" id=\"FNanchor_131_131\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_131_131\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[131]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePartial and Complete Intent.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;To Mill\u0027s statement that\r\nmorality depends on intention not upon motive, a critic\r\nobjected that on this basis a tyrant\u0027s act in saving a man\r\nfrom drowning would be good\u0026mdash;the intent being rescue of\r\nlife\u0026mdash;although his motive was abominable, namely cruelty,\r\nfor it was the reservation of the man for death by torture.\r\nMill\u0027s reply is significant. Not so, he answered; there\r\nis in this case a difference of intention, not merely of motive.\r\nThe rescue was not the whole act, but \"only the\r\nnecessary first step of an act.\" This answer will be found\r\nto apply to every act in which a superficial analysis would\r\nseem to make intent different in its moral significance from\r\nmotive. Take into account the remote consequences in\r\nview as well as the near, and the seeming discrepancy disappears.\r\nThe intent of rescuing a man and the motive of\r\ncruelty are both descriptions of the same act, the same\r\nmoral reality; the difference lying not in the fact, but in\r\nthe point of view from which it is named. Now there is\r\nin every one a tendency to fix in his mind only a part of\r\nthe probable consequences of his deed; the part which is\r\nmost innocent, upon which a favorable construction may\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_257\" id=\"Page_257\"\u003e[Pg 257]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmost easily be put, or which is temporarily most agreeable\r\nto contemplate. Thus the person concentrates his thought,\r\nhis forecast of consequences upon external and indifferent\r\nmatters, upon distribution of commodities, increase of\r\nmoney or material resources, and upon positively valuable\r\nresults, at the expense of other changes\u0026mdash;\u0026mdash;changes for the\r\nworse in his disposition and in the well-being and freedom\r\nof others. Thus he causes to stand out in strong light\r\nall of those consequences of his activity which are beneficial\r\nand right, and dismisses those of another nature\r\nto the dim recesses of consciousness, so they will not\r\ntrouble him with scruples about the proper character of\r\nhis act. Since consequences are usually more or less\r\nmixed, such half-conscious, half-unconscious, half-voluntary,\r\nhalf-instinctive selection easily becomes a habit.\r\nThen the individual excuses himself with reference to the\r\nactual bad results of his behavior on the ground that\r\nhe \"meant well,\" his \"intention was good\"! Common\r\nsense disposes of this evasion by recognizing the\r\nreality of \"willing.\" We say a man is \"willing\" to\r\nhave things happen when, in spite of the fact that\r\nin and of themselves they are objectionable and hence\r\nwould not be willed in their isolation, they are consented to,\r\nbecause they are bound up with something else the person\r\nwants. And to be \"willing\" to have the harm follow is\r\nreally to will it. \u003ci\u003eThe agent intends or wills all those consequences\r\nwhich his prevailing motive or character makes\r\nhim willing under the circumstances to accept or tolerate.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eExactly the same point comes out from the side of\r\nmotive. Motives are complex and \"mixed\"; ultimately\r\nthe motive to an act is that \u003ci\u003eentire\u003c/i\u003e character of an\r\nagent on account of which one alternative set of possible\r\nresults appeal to him and stir him. Such motives as pure\r\nbenevolence, avarice, gratitude, revenge, are abstractions;\r\nwe name the motive from the \u003ci\u003egeneral trend of the issue\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nignoring contributing and indirect causes. All \u003ci\u003eassigned\u003c/i\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_258\" id=\"Page_258\"\u003e[Pg 258]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmotives are more or less \u003ci\u003epost-mortem\u003c/i\u003e affairs. No \u003ci\u003eactuating\u003c/i\u003e\r\nmotive is ever as simple as reflection afterwards makes\r\nit. But the justification of the simplification is that it\r\nbrings to light some factor which needs further attention.\r\nNo one can read his own motives, much less those of\r\nanother, with perfect accuracy;\u0026mdash;though the more sincere\r\nand transparent the character the more feasible is the\r\nreading. Motives which are active in the depths of\r\ncharacter present themselves only obscurely and subconsciously.\r\nNow if one has been trained to think that\r\nmotive apart from intention, apart from view of consequences\r\nflowing from an act, is the source and justification\r\nof its morality, a false and perverse turn is almost sure to\r\nbe given to his judgment. Such a person fosters and\r\nkeeps uppermost in the focus of his perceptions certain\r\nstates of feeling, certain emotions which he has been\r\ntaught are good; and then excuses his act, in face of bad\r\nconsequences, on the ground that it sprang from a good\r\nmotive. Selfish persons are always being \"misunderstood.\"\r\nThus a man of naturally buoyant and amiable disposition\r\nmay unconsciously learn to cultivate superficially certain\r\nemotions of \"good-feeling\" to others, and yet act in ways\r\nwhich, judged by consequences that the man might have\r\nforeseen if he had chosen to, are utterly hostile to the\r\ninterests of others. Such a man may feel indignant when\r\naccused of unjust or ungenerous behavior, and calling\r\nothers to account for uncharitableness, bear witness in his\r\nown behalf that he never entertained any \"feelings\" of\r\nunkindness, or any \"feelings\" except those of benevolence,\r\ntowards the individual in question.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_132_132\" id=\"FNanchor_132_132\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_132_132\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[132]\u003c/a\u003e Only the habit of\r\nreading \"motives\" in the light of persistent, thorough, and\r\nminute attention to the consequences which flow from them\r\ncan save a man from such moral error.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_259\" id=\"Page_259\"\u003e[Pg 259]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 4. MORALITY OF ACTS AND OF AGENTS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSubjective and Objective Morality.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Finally we may\r\ndiscuss the point at issue with reference to the supposed\r\ndistinction between subjective and objective morality\u0026mdash;an\r\nagent may be good and his act bad or \u003ci\u003evice-versa\u003c/i\u003e. Both\r\nof the schools which place moral quality either in attitude\r\nor in content, in motive or intent independently of\r\neach other, agree in making a distinction between the morality\r\nof an act and the morality of the agent\u0026mdash;between\r\nobjective and subjective morality.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_133_133\" id=\"FNanchor_133_133\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_133_133\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[133]\u003c/a\u003e Thus, as we have seen,\r\nMill says the motive makes a difference in our moral estimate\r\nof its doer, even when it makes none in our judgment\r\nof his action. It is a common idea that certain acts are\r\nright no matter what the motive of the doer, even when\r\ndone by one with a bad disposition in doing them. There\r\ncan be no doubt that there is a serious difficulty in the facts\r\nthemselves. Men actuated by a harsh and narrow desire\r\nfor industrial power or for wealth produce social benefits,\r\nstimulate invention and progress, and raise the level of\r\nsocial life. Napoleon was doubtless moved by vanity and\r\nvainglory to an extent involving immense disregard of\r\nothers\u0027 rights. And yet in jurisprudence, civil arrangements,\r\nand education he rendered immense social service.\r\nAgain, the \"conscientious man\" is often guilty of bringing\r\ngreat evils upon society. His very conviction of his own\r\nrightness may only add to the intense vigor which he puts\r\ninto his pernicious acts. Surely, we cannot approve the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_260\" id=\"Page_260\"\u003e[Pg 260]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nconduct, although we are not entitled morally to condemn\r\nthe conscientious doer, who does \"the best he knows\"\u0026mdash;or\r\nbelieves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMoral Quality of Doer and Deed Proportionate.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;If\r\nwe rule out irrelevant considerations, we find that\r\nwe never, without qualification, invert our moral judgments\r\nof doer and deed. So far as we regard Napoleon\u0027s\r\nactions as \u003ci\u003emorally\u003c/i\u003e good (not merely as happening to effect\r\ncertain desirable results) we give Napoleon credit\r\nfor interest in bringing about those results, \u003ci\u003eand in so far\r\nforth\u003c/i\u003e, call him good. Character, like conduct, is a highly\r\ncomplex thing. No human being is all good or all bad.\r\nEven if we were sure that Napoleon was an evil-minded\r\nman, our judgment is of him as evil \u003ci\u003eupon the whole\u003c/i\u003e. Only\r\nif we suppose him to be bad and only bad all the time is\r\nthere the opposition of evil character and good actions.\r\nWe may believe that even in what Napoleon did in the way\r\nof legal and civic reform he was actuated by mixed motives\u0026mdash;by\r\nvanity, love of greater, because more centralized,\r\npower, etc. But these interests in and of themselves could\r\nnot have effected the results he accomplished. He must have\r\nhad some insight into a better condition of affairs, and\r\nthis insight evidences an interest in so far good. Moreover,\r\nso far as we judge Napoleon bad as to his character\r\nand motive in these acts, we are entitled to hold that the\r\nactions and also the outward results were also partially\r\nevil. That is, while to some extent, socially beneficial,\r\nthey would have been still more so if Napoleon had been\r\nactuated by less self-centred considerations. If his character\r\nhad been simpler, more sincere, more straightforward,\r\nthen certain evil results, certain offsets to the good\r\nhe accomplished, would not have occurred. The mixture\r\nof good and evil in the results and the mixture of good\r\nand evil in the motives are proportionate to each other.\r\nSuch is the conclusion when we recognize the complexities\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_261\" id=\"Page_261\"\u003e[Pg 261]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof character and conduct, and do not allow ourselves to\r\nbe imposed upon by a fictitious simplicity of analysis.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSummary.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The first quality which is the object of\r\njudgment primarily resides then in intention: in the consequences\r\nwhich are foreseen and desired. Ultimately it resides\r\nin that disposition or characteristics of a person\r\nwhich are responsible for his foreseeing and desiring just\r\nsuch consequences rather than others. The ground for\r\njudging an act on the basis of consequences not foreseen\r\nis that the powers of a man are not fixed, but capable of\r\nmodification and redirection. It is only through taking\r\ninto account in \u003ci\u003esubsequent\u003c/i\u003e acts consequences of \u003ci\u003eprior\u003c/i\u003e acts\r\nnot intended in those prior acts that the agent learns the\r\nfuller significance of his own power and thus of himself.\r\nEvery builder builds other than he knows, whether better\r\nor worse. In no case, can he foresee all the consequences\r\nof his acts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn subsequent experience these results, mere by-products\r\nof the original volition, enter in. \"Outer\" and non-moral\r\nfor the original act, they are within subsequent\r\nvoluntary activity, because they influence desire and\r\nmake foresight more accurate in detail and more extensive\r\nin range. This translation of consequences once\r\nwholly unforeseeable into consequences which have to be\r\ntaken in account is at its maximum in the change of impulsive\r\ninto intelligent action. But there is no act so intelligent\r\nthat its actual consequences do not run beyond its\r\nforeseen ones, and thus necessitate a subsequent revision of\r\nintention. Thus the distinction of \"inner\" and \"outer\" is\r\none involved in the \u003ci\u003egrowth of character and conduct\u003c/i\u003e. Only\r\nif character were not in process of change, only if conduct\r\nwere a fixed because isolated thing, should we have that\r\nseparation of the inner and the outer which underlies alike\r\nthe Kantian and the utilitarian theories. In truth, there\r\nis no separation, but only a contrast of the different levels\r\nof desire and forethought of earlier and later activities.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_262\" id=\"Page_262\"\u003e[Pg 262]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe great need of the moral agent is thus a character\r\nwhich will make him as open, as accessible as possible, to the\r\nrecognition of the consequences of his behavior.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eConduct and Character\u003c/span\u003e in general, see Paulsen, \u003ci\u003eSystem of\r\nEthics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 468-472; Mackenzie, \u003ci\u003eManual of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Book I., ch. iii.;\r\nSpencer, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Part I., chs. i.-viii.; Green, \u003ci\u003eProlegomena\r\nto Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 110-117, 152-159; Alexander, \u003ci\u003eMoral Order and Progress\u003c/i\u003e,\r\npp. 48-52; Stephen, \u003ci\u003eScience of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, ch. ii.; Mezes, \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, ch. iv.;\r\nSeth, \u003ci\u003eEthical Principles\u003c/i\u003e, ch. iii.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUpon \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMotive and Intention\u003c/span\u003e consult Bentham, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of\r\nMorals and Legislation\u003c/i\u003e, chs. viii. and x.; James Mill, \u003ci\u003eAnalysis of\r\nHuman Mind\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II., chs. xxii. and xxv.; Austin, \u003ci\u003eJurisprudence\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nVol. I., chs. xviii.-xx.; Green, \u003ci\u003eProlegomena\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 315-325; Alexander,\r\n\u003ci\u003eMoral Order and Progress\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 36-47; Westermarck, \u003ci\u003eOrigin and\r\nDevelopment of the Moral Ideas\u003c/i\u003e, chs. viii., xi., and xiii.; Ritchie,\r\n\u003ci\u003eInternational Journal of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. IV., pp. 89-94, and 229-238, where\r\nfarther references are given.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUpon \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFormal and Material\u003c/span\u003e (or subjective and objective) \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRightness\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsee Sidgwick, \u003ci\u003eHistory of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, p. 200; Rickaby, \u003ci\u003eMoral Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e,\r\np. 3, pp. 33-40; Bowne, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 39-40;\r\nBrown, \u003ci\u003ePhilosophy of Mind\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. III., p. 489 and pp. 499-500; Paulsen,\r\n\u003ci\u003eSystem of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 227-233; Green, \u003ci\u003eProlegomena\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 317-323;\r\nSidgwick, \u003ci\u003eMethods of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 206-207.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_120_120\" id=\"Footnote_120_120\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_120_120\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[120]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e When Kant says that the coolness of a villain makes him \"more\r\ndangerous and more abominable,\" it is suggested that it is more abominable\r\n\u003ci\u003ebecause\u003c/i\u003e it is more dangerous\u0026mdash;surely a statement of the value\r\nof will in terms of the results it tends to effect.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_121_121\" id=\"Footnote_121_121\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_121_121\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[121]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Kant\u0027s distinction between a mere wish, and \"assuming all the\r\nmeans in our power,\" appears to recognize this fact, but he does not\r\napply the fact in his theory.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_122_122\" id=\"Footnote_122_122\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_122_122\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[122]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e But, as we shall see, the utilitarians make finally a distinction\r\nbetween ends \u003ci\u003eachieved\u003c/i\u003e and ends \u003ci\u003eattempted\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_123_123\" id=\"Footnote_123_123\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_123_123\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[123]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Bentham, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Morals and Legislation\u003c/i\u003e, ch. x., \u0026sect; 3.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_124_124\" id=\"Footnote_124_124\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_124_124\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[124]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mill, \u003ci\u003eUtilitarianism\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_125_125\" id=\"Footnote_125_125\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_125_125\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[125]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003ePsychology\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II., pp. 562-563. The whole passage, pp. 561-569,\r\nshould be thoroughly familiar to every ethical student; and should\r\nbe compared with what is said in Vol. I., pp. 284-290, about the\r\nselective tendency of feelings; and Vol. I., ch. xi., upon attention, and\r\nVol. I., pp. 515-522, upon discrimination.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nH\u0026ouml;ffding, \u003ci\u003ePsychology\u003c/i\u003e (translated), is also clear and explicit with\r\nreference to the influence of our emotions upon our ideas. (See\r\nespecially pp. 298-307.) The development of this fact in some of\r\nits aspects is one of the chief traits of the Ethics of Spinoza.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_126_126\" id=\"Footnote_126_126\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_126_126\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[126]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Morals and Legislation\u003c/i\u003e, ch. xi., \u0026sect; 1.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_127_127\" id=\"Footnote_127_127\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_127_127\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[127]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Bentham does not mean \"unreal\" by a fictitious entity. According\r\nto his logic, all general and abstract terms, all words designating\r\nrelations rather than elements, are \"fictitious entities.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_128_128\" id=\"Footnote_128_128\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_128_128\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[128]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e By mischievous he means pernicious, bad, vicious, or even depraved\r\nin extreme cases.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_129_129\" id=\"Footnote_129_129\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_129_129\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[129]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, ch. xi., \u0026sect; 3.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_130_130\" id=\"Footnote_130_130\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_130_130\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[130]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, \u0026sect;\u0026sect; 27 and 28.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_131_131\" id=\"Footnote_131_131\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_131_131\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[131]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The fact that common moral experience, as embodied in common\r\nspeech, uses such terms as \"think of,\" \"consider,\" \"regard,\" \"pay\r\nattention to\" (in such expressions as he is thoughtful of, considerate\r\nof, regardful of, mindful of, attentive to, the interests of others)\r\nin a way implying both the action of intelligence and of the affections,\r\nis the exact counterpart of the interchangeable use, already\r\nmentioned, of the terms intention and motive.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_132_132\" id=\"Footnote_132_132\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_132_132\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[132]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In short, the way an individual favors himself in reading his own\r\nmotives is as much an evidence of his egoism as the way he favors\r\nhimself in outward action. Criminals can almost always assign\r\n\"good\" motives.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_133_133\" id=\"Footnote_133_133\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_133_133\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[133]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"Formally\" and \"materially\" good or bad are terms also employed\r\nto denote the same distinction. (See Sidgwick, \u003ci\u003eHistory of\r\nEthics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 199-200; so Bowne, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 39-40.)\r\n\"The familiar distinction between the formal and the material rightness\r\nof action: The former depends upon the attitude of the agent\u0027s\r\nwill towards his ideal of right; the latter depends upon the harmony\r\nof the act with the laws of reality and its resulting tendency to\r\nproduce and promote well-being.\" Bowne holds that both are necessary,\r\nwhile formal rightness is ethically \u003ci\u003emore\u003c/i\u003e important, though not\r\nall important.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_263\" id=\"Page_263\"\u003e[Pg 263]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER XIV\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nHAPPINESS AND CONDUCT: THE GOOD AND\r\nDESIRE\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have reached a conclusion as to our first inquiry\r\n(p. 201), and have decided that the appropriate subject-matter\r\nof moral judgment is the disposition of the person\r\nas manifested in the tendencies which cause certain consequences,\r\nrather than others, to be considered and esteemed\u0026mdash;foreseen\r\nand desired. Disposition, motive, intent\r\nare then judged good or bad according to the consequences\r\nthey tend to produce. But what are the consequences by\r\nwhich we determine anything to be good or bad? We turn\r\nfrom the locus or residence of the distinctions of good and\r\nbad to the nature of the distinctions themselves. What\r\ndo good and bad mean as terms of voluntary behavior?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHappiness and Misery as the Good and Bad.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;There is\r\none answer to this question which is at once so simple and\r\nso comprehensive that it has always been professed by some\r\nrepresentative ethical theory: the good is happiness, well-being,\r\npleasure; the bad is misery, woe, pain.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_134_134\" id=\"FNanchor_134_134\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_134_134\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[134]\u003c/a\u003e The agreeableness\r\nor disagreeableness attending consequences differentiates\r\nthem into good and bad; and it is because some\r\ndeeds are found to lead to pleasure, while others lead to\r\npain, that they are adjudged virtuous or vicious. In its\r\nmodern form, this theory is known as utilitarianism. Bentham\r\nhas given it a sweeping and clear formulation.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_264\" id=\"Page_264\"\u003e[Pg 264]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two\r\nsovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone\r\nto point out what we ought to do as well as to determine what\r\nwe shall do. On the one hand, the standard of right and\r\nwrong, on the other chain of causes and effects, are fastened\r\nto their throne.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Strictly speaking nothing can be said to be good or bad\r\nbut either in itself, which is the case only with pain or pleasure;\r\nor on account of its effects, which is the case only with\r\nthings that are the cause or preventive of pain or pleasure.\"\r\nAgain: \"By the principle of utility is meant that principle\r\nwhich approves or disapproves of every action whatever according\r\nto the tendency it appears to have to augment or\r\ndiminish the happiness of the party whose interests are in\r\nquestion.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_135_135\" id=\"FNanchor_135_135\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_135_135\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[135]\u003c/a\u003e Once more: \"The greatest happiness of all those\r\nwhose interest is in question is the right and proper, and the\r\nonly right and proper and universally desirable end of human\r\naction.\" \"Only on the basis of this principle do the words\r\n\u0027right and wrong\u0027 and \u0027ought\u0027 have an intelligent meaning as\r\napplied to actions; otherwise they have not.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis last statement need not mean, however, that all judgments\r\nof right and wrong are as matter of fact derived\r\nfrom a consideration of the results of action in the way of\r\npain and pleasure, but that upon this ground alone \u003ci\u003eshould\u003c/i\u003e\r\nour judgments be formed, since upon this basis alone can\r\nthey be justified.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_136_136\" id=\"FNanchor_136_136\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_136_136\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[136]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAxiomatic Identification of Good with Happiness.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\nprinciple that happiness is the ultimate aim of human\r\naction and the ultimate standard of the moral value of\r\nthat action is generally regarded by the utilitarians as\r\naxiomatic and not susceptible of proof. As Bentham says,\r\n\"that which is used to prove everything else cannot itself\r\nbe proved. A chain of proofs must have their commence\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_265\" id=\"Page_265\"\u003e[Pg 265]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ement\r\nsomewhere.\" So Bain says (\u003ci\u003eMoral Science\u003c/i\u003e, p. 27),\r\n\"Now there can be no proof offered for the position that\r\nhappiness is the proper end of all human procedures, the\r\ncriterion of all right conduct. It is an ultimate or final\r\nassumption to be tested by reference to the individual judgments\r\nof mankind.\" Thus also Mill (\u003ci\u003eUtilitarianism\u003c/i\u003e):\r\n\"The only proof capable of being given that an object\r\nis visible is that people actually see it. In like manner\r\nthe sole proof that it is possible to produce that anything\r\nis desirable is that people do actually desire it.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_137_137\" id=\"FNanchor_137_137\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_137_137\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[137]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eExtreme Opposition to Happiness Theory.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In striking\r\ncontrast to this view of the self-evident character\r\nof happiness as the all-desirable, is the view of those to\r\nwhom it is equally self-evident that to make pleasure the\r\nend of action is destructive of all morality. Carlyle is an\r\ninteresting illustration of a violent reaction against utilitarianism.\r\nHis more moderate characterization of it is\r\n\"mechanical profit and loss\" theory. It is \"an upholstery\r\nand cookery conception of morals.\" It never gets above\r\nthe level of considerations of comfort and expediency.\r\nMore vehemently, it is a \"pig philosophy\" which regards\r\nthe universe as a \"swine trough\" in which virtue is thought\r\nof as the attainment of the maximum possible quantity of\r\n\"pig\u0027s wash.\" Again, apostrophizing man, he says: \"Art\r\nthou nothing else than a Vulture that flies through the Universe\r\nseeking after Somewhat to eat; shrieking dolefully because\r\nCarrion enough is not given thee?\" Of the attempt\r\nto make general happiness the end, he says it proposes the\r\nproblem of \"Given a world of Knaves, to produce honesty\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_266\" id=\"Page_266\"\u003e[Pg 266]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfrom their united action,\" the term \"knave\" referring to\r\nthe individualistic self-seeking character of pleasure and\r\n\"honesty\" to the social outcome desired. As a political\r\ntheory, he thought that utilitarianism subordinated justice\r\nto benevolence, and in that light he referred to it as\r\na \"universal syllabub of philanthrophic twaddle.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAmbiguity in Notion of Happiness.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;If to some it is\r\nself-evident that happiness is the aim of action, and success\r\nin achieving it the test both of the act and the disposition\r\nfrom which it proceeds; while to others it is equally obvious\r\nthat such a view means immorality or at least a base\r\nand sordid morality, it is reasonable to suppose that the\r\n\"happiness\" does not mean the same to both parties; that\r\nthere is some fundamental ambiguity in the notion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSource of Ambiguity.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The nature of this ambiguity\r\nmay be inferred from the fact that Bentham himself\u0026mdash;and\r\nin this he is typical of all the utilitarians\u0026mdash;combines\r\nin his statement two aspects of happiness, or two views of\r\npleasure. He says it is for pleasure and pain alone to\r\n\"\u003ci\u003epoint out what we ought to do\u003c/i\u003e,\" that they are the only\r\nbasis upon which our judgments of right and wrong \u003ci\u003eought\u003c/i\u003e\r\nto be formed, or upon which they can be justified. Other\r\nthings \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e be taken as pointing out what we ought to do;\r\nother standards of judgment\u0026mdash;caprice, sympathy, dogma\u0026mdash;are\r\nemployed. But they are not the right and proper\r\nones. Consideration of consequences of the act in the way\r\nof effect upon the happiness and misery of all concerned,\r\nfurnishes the only proper way of regulating the formation\r\nof right ends. A certain happiness, that of results,\r\nis the standard. But this presupposes that, in any case\r\nthere is some end, and one which may be improper because\r\nnot in accord with the standard. Yet this end also must be\r\npleasure. Pleasure and pain \"determine what we \u003ci\u003eshall\u003c/i\u003e\r\ndo,\" whether we act for the maximum of pleasures or not.\r\nThe \"chain of causes\" as well as the \"standard of right\"\r\nis fastened to them. We act for pleasure, even when we do\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_267\" id=\"Page_267\"\u003e[Pg 267]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnot act for the pleasures for which we ought to act.\r\nPleasure or happiness thus appears in a double r\u0026ocirc;le. Only\r\nin the case of \u003ci\u003eright\u003c/i\u003e ends, is it the same happiness which\r\nserves as a moving spring and as standard of judgment.\r\nIn other cases, it is one pleasure which is the end in view,\r\nand another pleasure, one not in view, or at least not influencing\r\naction, which measures rightness. The essence,\r\nso to speak, of a wrong act is precisely that the pleasures\r\nwhich produce it are not these pleasures which measure\r\nits goodness; the agent is not moved to act by those pleasures\r\nand pains which as consequences settle its moral value,\r\nbut by some pleasure or pain which happens to be strongly\r\nfelt at the moment of action.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTwo Sorts of Good.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Thus, even from Bentham\u0027s point\r\nof view, there is a difference between real and apparent\r\nhappiness, between the good which moves to action and\r\nthat which, being the standard, should move. If the end\r\nof \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e acts is happiness and yet we require a consideration\r\nof results to show us \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e happiness we are justified in\r\nseeking, then \"happiness\" is in a highly ambiguous position.\r\nWhile from one standpoint, it furnishes the standard\r\nof right and wrong; from another, it furnishes the\r\nmoving spring of all wrong action; it is that which so\r\nsolicits and tempts us that we fail to employ the right\r\nstandard for the regulation of our action, and hence go\r\nastray. It seems to some (as to Carlyle) that this distinction\r\nis so fundamental that it is absurd to say that one\r\nand the same thing can be the standard of all right action\r\nand the moving spring of all wrong action. Hence they\r\ninsist upon the fundamental opposition of virtue and happiness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMoreover, from Bentham\u0027s own point of view, there is\r\na difference between the good which \u003ci\u003efirst\u003c/i\u003e presents itself,\r\nwhich \u003ci\u003efirst\u003c/i\u003e stirs desire and solicits to action, and the good\r\nwhich being formed \u003ci\u003eafter and upon the basis of consideration\r\nof consequences\u003c/i\u003e, is the \u003ci\u003eright\u003c/i\u003e good. In calling the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_268\" id=\"Page_268\"\u003e[Pg 268]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlatter the \u003ci\u003eright\u003c/i\u003e, we mean that it has authority over the\r\nend which first appears; and hence has supreme claim\r\nover action. So it is again evident that we are using happiness\r\nin two quite different senses; so that if we call the\r\nfirst end that presents itself happiness, the right end will\r\nbe something else; or if we call the consequences which\r\nmeasure the worth of the act happiness, then the first end\r\nought to be called something else. If happiness is the\r\n\u003ci\u003enatural\u003c/i\u003e end of all desire and endeavor, it is absurd to say\r\nthat the same happiness ought to be the end. If all objects\r\nfall to the ground any way, we do not say they\r\nought to fall. If all our acts are moved any way by\r\npleasure and pain, this fact, just because it applies\r\nequally to all acts, throws no lights upon the rightness\r\nor wrongness of any one of them. Or, on the other\r\nhand, if that for which we \u003ci\u003eshould\u003c/i\u003e act is a kind of happiness\r\nwhich involves full consideration of consequences,\r\nit is misleading to call that happiness from which we act\r\n\"blindly\" or without proper forethought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf happiness is to be the same as the moral good, it\r\nmust be after the right kind of happiness has been distinguished;\r\nnamely, that which commends itself after adequate\r\nreflection. Our criticism of Bentham will be directed\r\nto showing that, so far as he conceives of happiness as\r\nsimply a sum of pleasures alike in quality, but differing\r\nonly in quantity, he cannot make this distinction. As an\r\nearly critic (Hazlitt) of Bentham said: \"Pleasure is that\r\nwhich is so in itself. Good is that which approves itself\r\non reflection, or the \u003ci\u003eidea\u003c/i\u003e of which is a source of satisfaction.\r\nAll pleasure is not, therefore (morally speaking),\r\nequally a good; for all pleasure does not equally bear reflecting\r\nupon.\" We shall further try to show that the\r\nreason for Bentham\u0027s conceiving happiness as simply a\r\nsum of pleasures is that he falls into the error already\r\ndiscussed, of separating consequences from the disposition\r\nand capacities or active tendencies of the agent. And that,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_269\" id=\"Page_269\"\u003e[Pg 269]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhen we correct this error, the proper meaning of happiness\r\nturns out to be the satisfaction, realization, or fulfillment\r\nof some \u003ci\u003epurpose and power of the agent\u003c/i\u003e. Thus\r\nwe can distinguish between the false and unsatisfactory\r\nhappiness found in the expression of a more or less isolated\r\nand superficial tendency of the self, and the true or\r\ngenuine good found in the adequate fulfillment of a fundamental\r\nand fully related capacity. We shall first take\r\nup the discussion under the heads just brought out: I.\r\nHappiness \u003ci\u003eas the Natural End or Object of Desire\u003c/i\u003e; II.\r\nHappiness \u003ci\u003eas Standard of Judgment\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 1. THE OBJECT OF DESIRE\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHedonistic Theory of Desire.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;That phase of utilitarianism\r\nwhich holds that the object of desire is pleasure,\r\nis termed hedonism, or sometimes psychological hedonism\r\nto distinguish it from ethical hedonism, the theory that\r\npleasure is the standard for judging acts. The fundamental\r\nfallacy of psychological hedonism has been well\r\nstated by Green to be supposing that a desire can be\r\naroused or created by the anticipation of its own satisfaction\u0026mdash;i.e.,\r\nin supposing that the idea of the pleasure of\r\nexercise arouses desire for it, when in fact the idea of\r\nexercise is pleasant only if there be already some desire for\r\nit (Green, \u003ci\u003eProlegomena to Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, p. 168). Given a desire\r\nalready in existence, the idea of an object which is thought\r\nof as satisfying that desire will always arouse pleasure, or\r\nbe thought of as pleasurable. But hedonism fails to consider\r\nthe radical difference between an object\u0027s arousing\r\npleasure, because it is regarded as satisfying desire, and\r\nthe thought of a pleasure arousing a desire:\u0026mdash;although the\r\nfeeling of agreeableness may intensify the movement towards\r\nthe object. A hungry man thinks of a beefsteak as\r\nthat which would satisfy his appetite; his thought is at\r\nonce clothed with an agreeable tone and the conscious force\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_270\" id=\"Page_270\"\u003e[Pg 270]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the appetite is correspondingly intensified; the miser\r\nthinks of gold in a similar way; the benevolent of an act\r\nof charity, etc. But in each case the presence of the pleasurable\r\nelement is dependent upon the thought of an object\r\nwhich is not pleasure\u0026mdash;the beefsteak, the gold. The\r\nthought of the object \u003ci\u003eprecedes\u003c/i\u003e the pleasure and excites\r\nit because it is felt to promise the satisfaction of a desire.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePleasure is the Felt Concomitant of Imagining a Desire\r\nRealized in Its Appropriate Object.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The object of\r\ndesire is not pleasure, but some object is pleasurable because\r\nit is the congenial terminus of desire. The pleasure\r\nfelt is a \u003ci\u003epresent\u003c/i\u003e pleasure, the pleasure which \u003ci\u003enow\u003c/i\u003e accompanies\r\nthe idea of the satisfied desire. It intensifies the desire\r\nin its present character, through opposition to the disagreeable\r\ntone of the experienced lack and want.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. Pleasures and Original Appetites.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Biological instincts\r\nand appetites exist not for the sake of furnishing\r\npleasure, but as activities needed to maintain life\u0026mdash;the life\r\nof the individual and the species. Their adequate fulfillment\r\nis attended with pleasure. Such is the undoubted biological\r\nfact. Now if the animal be gifted with memory and\r\nanticipation, this complicates the process, but does not\r\nchange its nature. The animal in feeling hungry may now\r\nconsciously anticipate the getting of food and may feel\r\npleasure in the idea of food. The pleasure henceforth attends\r\nnot merely upon attained satisfaction of appetite,\r\nbut also upon appetite prior to satisfaction, so far as that\r\nanticipates its future satisfaction. But desire is still for\r\nthe object, for the food. If the desire is healthy, it will\r\nnot depend for its origin upon the recollection of a prior\r\npleasure; the animal does not happen to recall that it got\r\npleasure from food and thus arouse a desire for more food.\r\nThe desire springs up naturally from the state of the organism.\r\nOnly a jaded and unhealthy appetite has to\r\nwhip itself up by recalling previous pleasures. But if\r\nthere are many obstacles and discouragements in the way\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_271\" id=\"Page_271\"\u003e[Pg 271]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof getting the object which satisfies want, the anticipation\r\nof pleasure in its fulfillment may normally intensify the\r\nputting forth of energy, may give an extra re\u0026euml;nforcement\r\nto flagging effort. In this way, the anticipation of pleasure\r\nhas a normal place in the effective direction of activities.\r\nBut in any case, the desire and its own object are\r\nprimary; the pleasure is secondary.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Pleasure and Acquired Desires.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The same point\r\ncomes out even more clearly when we take into account\r\nthe so-called higher desires and sentiments\u0026mdash;those which\r\nusually enter into distinctively moral questions. In these\r\ncases it is no longer a matter of the original instincts\r\nand appetites of the organism. Their place is taken by\r\nacquired habits and dispositions. The object of a benevolent\r\ndesire is the supplying of another\u0027s lack, or the\r\nincrease of his good. The pleasure which accompanies\r\nthe doing of a kindness to others is not the object, for the\r\nindividual thinks of the kindly act as pleasure-giving\r\nonly because he already has a benevolent character which\r\nnaturally expresses itself in amiable desires. So far as\r\nhe is not benevolent, the act will appear repulsive rather\r\nthan attractive to him; and if it is done, it will be not from\r\na benevolent desire, but from a cowardly or an avaricious\r\ndesire, the pleasure in that case attending the thought\r\nof some other objective consequence, such as escaping unpopularity.\r\nIn like manner, the aim to behave honestly,\r\nor to obey the civil law, or to love one\u0027s country, leads\r\nto dwelling upon the acts and objects in which these desires\r\nand intents may be fulfilled; and those objects which\r\nare thought of as affording fulfillment are necessarily put\r\nin a favorable and attractive light\u0026mdash;they are regarded as\r\nsources of happiness. To a patriot the thought even of\r\npossible death may arouse a glow of satisfaction as he\r\nthinks of this act as strengthening his country\u0027s existence.\r\nBut to suppose that this attendant pleasure is the aim\r\nand object of desire is to put the cart before the horse.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_272\" id=\"Page_272\"\u003e[Pg 272]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. Happiness and Desire.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;All men, then, may be said\r\nto desire happiness. But this happiness is not dependent\r\nupon prior experiences of pleasure, which, coming up in\r\nmemory, arouse desire and rivet attention upon themselves.\r\nTo say that the desire of a man is for happiness is only\r\nto say that happiness comes in the fulfillment of desire,\r\nthe desires arising on their own account as expressions of\r\na state of lack or incompletion in which the person finds\r\nhimself. Happiness thus conceived \u003ci\u003eis dependent upon the\r\nnature of desire and varies with it, while desire varies\r\nwith the type of character\u003c/i\u003e. If the desire is the desire\r\nof an honest man, then the prosperous execution of some\r\nhonorable intent, the payment of a debt, the adequate termination\r\nof a trust, is conceived as happiness, as good.\r\nIf it be the desire of a profligate, then entering upon\r\nthe riotous course of living now made possible by inheritance\r\nof property is taken as happiness\u0026mdash;the one consummation\r\ngreatly to be wished. If we know what any person\r\nreally finds desirable, what he stakes his happiness upon,\r\nwe can read his nature. In happiness, as the anticipation\r\nof the satisfaction of desire, there is, therefore, no sure or\r\nunambiguous quality; for it may be a token of good or of\r\nbad character, according to the sort of object which appeals\r\nto the person. The present joy found in the idea of\r\nthe completion of a purpose cannot be the object of desire,\r\nfor we desire only things absent. But the joy is a mark of\r\nthe congruity or harmony of the thought of the object,\r\nwhatever it be\u0026mdash;health, dissipation, miserliness, prodigality,\r\nconquest, helpfulness\u0026mdash;with the character of the agent.\r\nIt is an evidence of the moving force, the influence, the\r\nweight, of the conceived end; it registers the extent in\r\nwhich the end is not a mere intellectual abstraction, but is a\r\n\u003ci\u003emotive\u003c/i\u003e (see p. 252). But the moral worth of this motive\r\ndepends upon the character of the end in which the person\r\nfinds his satisfaction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4. Confusion of Future and Present Pleasure.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It is the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_273\" id=\"Page_273\"\u003e[Pg 273]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nconfusion of \u003ci\u003epresent\u003c/i\u003e pleasure, attendant upon the thought\r\nof an object as satisfying desire, with the pleasure that\r\n\u003ci\u003ewill come when the desire is satisfied\u003c/i\u003e, that accounts for\r\nthe persistence of the idea that pleasure is the object of\r\ndesire. The fact that the object of desire is \u003ci\u003enow\u003c/i\u003e pleasurable\r\nis distorted into the statement that we \u003ci\u003eseek\u003c/i\u003e for an\r\nabsent pleasure.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_138_138\" id=\"FNanchor_138_138\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_138_138\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[138]\u003c/a\u003e A good illustration of the confusion is\r\nseen in the following quotation:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"The love of happiness must express the sole possible motive\r\nof Judas Iscariot and of his Master; it must explain the\r\nconduct of Stylites on his pillar or Tiberius at Capr\u0026aelig; or\r\n\u0026agrave; Kempis in his cell or of Nelson in the cockpit of the Victory.\r\nIt must be equally good for saints and martyrs, heroes,\r\ncowards, debauch\u0026eacute;s, ascetics, mystics, misers, prodigals, men,\r\nwomen and babes in arms\" (Leslie Stephen, \u003ci\u003eScience of\r\nEthics\u003c/i\u003e, p. 44).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis statement is true, as we have just seen, in the sense\r\nthat different persons find different things good in accordance\r\nwith their different characters or habitually\r\ndominant purposes; that each finds his happiness in whatever\r\nhe most sets his affections upon. Where a man\u0027s heart\r\nis, there will his treasure be also, and where that is which\r\na man regards as treasure, there also is the heart. A\r\nman\u0027s character is revealed by the objects which make him\r\nhappy, whether anticipated or realized.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eOur Ends are Our Happiness, Not a Means to It.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;But\r\nthe fallacy is in the words \"love of happiness.\" They\r\nsuggest that all alike are seeking for some one and the\r\nsame thing, some one thing labeled \"happiness,\" identical\r\nin all cases, differing in the way they look for it\u0026mdash;that\r\nsaints and martyrs, heroes and cowards, all have\r\njust the same objective goal in view\u0026mdash;if they only knew\r\nit! In so far as it is true that there are certain funda\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_274\" id=\"Page_274\"\u003e[Pg 274]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003emental\r\nconditions of the self which have to be satisfied in\r\norder that there shall be a \u003ci\u003etrue self and a true satisfaction\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nhappiness is the same for all, and is the ultimate\r\ngood of all. But this holds only of the \u003ci\u003estandard\u003c/i\u003e of happiness\r\nwhich makes any particular conception of happiness\r\nright or wrong, not to the conceptions actually entertained.\r\nTo say that all are consciously and deliberately after\r\nthe same happiness is to pervert the facts. Happiness as\r\nstandard means the genuine fulfillment of whatever is\r\nnecessary to the development and integrity of the self. In\r\nthis sense, it is what men \u003ci\u003eought\u003c/i\u003e to desire; it is what they\r\ndo desire so far as they understand themselves and the\r\nconditions of their satisfaction. But as natural or psychological\r\nend, it means that in which a man happens at\r\na given time to find delectation, depending upon his uppermost\r\nwishes and strongest habits. Hence the objection\r\nwhich almost every one, including the hedonists, feels to\r\nthe statement that happiness is the conscious aim of conduct.\r\nIt suggests that the objects at which we ordinarily\r\naim are not sought for themselves, but for some ulterior\r\ngratification to ourselves. In reality these ends, so far\r\nas they correspond to our capacity and intention, \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e our\r\nhappiness. All men love happiness\u0026mdash;yes, in the sense\r\nthat, having desires, they are interested in the objects in\r\nwhich the desires may be realized, no matter whether they\r\nare worthy or degraded. No; if by this be meant that\r\nhappiness is something other than and beyond the conditions\r\nin which the powers of the person are brought out,\r\nand made effective; no, or if it means that all love that\r\nwhich really will bring happiness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eNecessity for Standard.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;As many sorts of character,\r\nso many sorts of things regarded as satisfactory, as constitutive\r\nof good. Not all anticipations when realized\r\nare what they were expected to be. The good in prospect\r\nmay be apples of Sodom, dust and ashes, in attainment.\r\nHence some ends, some forms of happiness, are regarded\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_275\" id=\"Page_275\"\u003e[Pg 275]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas unworthy, not as \"real\" or \"true.\" While they appeared\r\nto be happiness during the expectancy of desire, they are\r\nnot approved as such in later reflection. Hence the demand\r\nfor some standard good or happiness by which\r\nthe individual may regulate the formation of his desires\r\nand purposes so that the present and the permanent\r\ngood, the good in desire and in reflection, will coincide\u0026mdash;so\r\nthat the individual will find that to be satisfactory in\r\nhis present view which will also permanently satisfy him.\r\nFrom happiness as a conceived good we turn to happiness\r\nas \u003ci\u003erightly\u003c/i\u003e conceived good; from happiness as result to happiness\r\nas standard. As before, we begin with the narrower\r\nutilitarian conception.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 2. THE CONCEPTION OF HAPPINESS AS A STANDARD\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eUtilitarian Method.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Hedonism means that pleasure is\r\nthe end of human action, because the end of desire. Utilitarianism\r\nor universalistic hedonism holds that the pleasure\r\nof all affected is the standard for judging the worth\r\nof action,\u0026mdash;not that conduciveness to happiness is the sole\r\nmeasure actually employed by mankind for judging moral\r\nworth, but that it is the sole standard that should be\r\nemployed. Many other tests may actually be used, sympathy,\r\nprejudice, convention, caprice, etc., but \"utility\"\r\nis the one which will enable a person to judge \u003ci\u003etruly\u003c/i\u003e what\r\nis right or wrong in any proposed course of action. The\r\nmethod laid down by Bentham is as follows: Every proposed\r\nact is to be viewed with reference to its probable\r\nconsequences in (a) \u003ci\u003eintensity\u003c/i\u003e of pleasure and pains; (b)\r\ntheir duration; (c) their certainty or uncertainty; (d)\r\ntheir nearness or remoteness; (e) their fecundity\u0026mdash;i.e.,\r\nthe tendency of a pleasure to be followed by others, or\r\na pain by other pains; (f) their \u003ci\u003epurity\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;i.e., the tendency\r\nof a pleasure to be followed by pains and \u003ci\u003evice versa\u003c/i\u003e; (g)\r\ntheir extent, that is, the number or range of persons\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_276\" id=\"Page_276\"\u003e[Pg 276]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhose happiness is affected\u0026mdash;with reference to whose\r\npleasures and pains each one of the first six items ought\r\nalso in strictness to be calculated! Then sum up all the\r\npleasures which stand to the credit side of the account;\r\nadd the pains which are the debit items, or liabilities, on\r\nthe other; then take their algebraic sum, and \"the balance\r\nof it on the side of pleasure will be the good tendency of\r\nthe act upon the whole.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCircle in Method.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Bentham\u0027s argument depends wholly\r\nupon the possibility of both foreseeing and accurately\r\nmeasuring the amount of future pleasures and pains that\r\nwill follow from the intention if it is carried into effect,\r\nand of being able to find their algebraic sum. Our examination\r\nwill be directed to showing that we have here\r\nthe same fallacy that we have just discussed; and that\r\nBentham argues in a circle. For the argument purports\r\nto measure present disposition or intent by summing up\r\nfuture units of pleasure or pain; but there is no way\r\nof estimating amounts of future satisfaction, the relative\r\nintensity and weight of future possible pain and pleasure\r\nexperiences, except upon the basis of present tendencies,\r\nthe habitual aims and interests, of the person. (1)\r\nThe only way to estimate the relative amount (bulk, intensity,\r\netc.) of a future \"lot\" of pleasure or pain, is by\r\nseeing how agreeable to \u003ci\u003epresent\u003c/i\u003e disposition are certain\r\nanticipated consequences, themselves not pleasures or pains\r\nat all. (2) The only basis upon which we can be sure\r\nthat there is a \u003ci\u003eright\u003c/i\u003e estimate of future satisfactions, is\r\nthat we already have a good character as a basis and\r\norgan for forming judgment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(1) How Pleasures and Pains are Measured.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;If we\r\nkeep strictly to Bentham\u0027s own conception of pleasures\r\nas isolated entities, all just alike in quality, but differing\r\nin quantity\u0026mdash;in the two dimensions of intensity and\r\nduration\u0026mdash;the scheme he recommends is simply impossible.\r\nWhat does it mean to say that one pleasure, as an ex\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_277\" id=\"Page_277\"\u003e[Pg 277]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eternal\r\nand future fact, is equal to another? What practical\r\nsense is there in the notion that a pain may be found\r\nwhich is exactly equal to a pleasure, so that it may just\r\noffset it or reduce it to zero? How can one weigh the\r\namount of pain in a jumping and long-continued toothache\r\nagainst, say, the pleasure of some charitable deed\r\nperformed under conditions which may bring on the toothache?\r\nWhat relevancy has the quantitative comparison\r\nto a judgment of moral worth? How many units of\r\npleasure are contained in the fulfillment of the intention\r\nto go to war for one\u0027s country? How many in the fulfillment\r\nof the intention to remain at home with one\u0027s\r\nfamily and secure profitable contracts from the government?\r\nHow shall the pains involved in each set be detected\r\nand have their exact numerical force assigned them?\r\nHow shall one set be measured over against the other?\r\nIf a man is already a patriot, one set of consequences\r\ncomes into view and has weight; if one is already a coward\r\nand a money-grubber, another set of consequences looms up\r\nand its value is measured on a rule of very different scale.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePresent Congeniality to Character Measures Importance.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;When\r\nwe analyze what occurs, we find that this\r\nprocess of comparing future possible satisfactions, to see\r\nwhich is the greater, takes place on exactly the opposite\r\nbasis from that set forth by Bentham. We do not compare\r\nresults in the way of fixed amounts of pleasures and\r\npains, but we compare \u003ci\u003eobjective\u003c/i\u003e results, changes to be\r\neffected in ourselves, in others, in the whole social situation;\r\nduring this comparison desires and aversions take\r\nmore definite form and strength, so that we find the idea\r\nof one result more agreeable, more harmonious, to our\r\npresent character than another. \u003ci\u003eThen\u003c/i\u003e we say it is more\r\nsatisfying, it affords more pleasure than another. The\r\nsatisfaction \u003ci\u003enow\u003c/i\u003e aroused in the mind at the thought of\r\ngetting even with an enemy may be stronger than the painfulness\r\nof the thought of the harm or loss that will come\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_278\" id=\"Page_278\"\u003e[Pg 278]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto him or than the thought of danger itself,\u0026mdash;then the\r\npleasures to follow from vengeance are esteemed more numerous,\r\nstronger, more lasting, etc., than those which\r\nwould follow from abstinence. Or, to say that satisfactions\r\nare about equal means that we are \u003ci\u003enow\u003c/i\u003e at a loss\r\nto choose between them. But we are not at a loss to choose\r\nbecause certain future pains and pleasures present themselves\r\nin and of themselves as fixed amounts irrespective\r\nof our own wishes, habits, and plans of life. Similarly\r\nwe may speak of satisfactions being added to one another\r\nand the total sum increased; or of dissatisfaction coming\r\nin as offsets and reducing the amount of satisfaction. But\r\nthis does not mean that pains and pleasures which we expect\r\nto arrive in the future are added and subtracted\u0026mdash;what\r\nintelligible meaning can such a phrase possess? It\r\nmeans that as we think first of this result and then of\r\nanother, the present happiness found in the anticipation\r\nof one is increased by the anticipation of the other; or that\r\nthe results are so incompatible that the present satisfaction,\r\ninstead of swelling and expanding as from one\r\nthought to another, is chilled and lessened. Thus we might\r\nfind the thought of revenge sweet (and thus give a high\r\nvaluation to the units of pleasure to result from it), but\r\nbe checked by the thought of the meanness of the act, or\r\nof how we would feel if some one else, whose good opinion\r\nwe highly esteem, should hear of it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(2) Congeniality to a Good Character the Right Measure.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\nnet outcome of this discussion is that the practical\r\nvalue of our acts is defined to us at any given time\r\nby the satisfaction, or displeasure, we take in the ideas of\r\nchanges we foresee in case the act takes place. The present\r\nhappiness or distaste, depending upon the harmony between\r\nthe idea in question and the character, defines for\r\nus the value of the future consequences: which is the\r\nreverse of saying that a calculation of future pains and\r\npleasures determines for us the value of the act and char\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_279\" id=\"Page_279\"\u003e[Pg 279]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eacter.\r\nBut this applies to any end as it happens to arise,\r\nnot to the end as we ought to form it; we are still without\r\na standard. What has been said applies to the criminal\r\nas well as to the saint; to the miser and the prodigal\r\nand the wisely generous alike. The idea of a certain result\r\nwarms the heart of each, his heart being what it is.\r\nThe assassin would not be one if the thought of a murder\r\nhad not been entertained by him and if the thought had\r\nnot been liked and welcomed\u0026mdash;made at home. Only upon\r\nthe supposition that character is already good can we\r\ntrust judgment, first, to foresee all the consequences that\r\nshould be foreseen; and, secondly, to respond to each foreseen\r\nconsequence with the right emotional stamp of like\r\nand dislike, pleasure and pain. The Greeks said it is the\r\nobject of a moral education to see that the individual finds\r\nhis pleasure in the thought of noble ends and finds his pain\r\nin the contemplation of base ends. Again, as Aristotle\r\nsaid:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"The good man wills the real object of intent, but what the\r\nbad man desires may be anything; just as physically those\r\nin good condition want things that are wholesome, while the\r\ndiseased may take anything to be healthful; for the good man\r\njudges correctly\" (\u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, Book III., 4, 4). And again:\r\n\"The good man is apt to go right about pleasure, and the bad\r\nman is apt to go wrong\" (Book II., 3, 7), and, finally, \"It\r\nis only to the good man that the good presents itself as good,\r\nfor vice perverts us and causes us to err about the principle\r\nof action\" (Book III., 12, 10).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePrinciple of Quality of Pleasure as Criterion.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Mill,\r\nstill calling himself a utilitarian, reaches substantially the\r\nsame result by (a) making the \u003ci\u003equality\u003c/i\u003e of pleasure, not\r\nits bulk or intensity, the standard; and (b) referring differences\r\nin quality to differences in the \u003ci\u003echaracters\u003c/i\u003e which\r\nexperience them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"It is,\" he says, \"quite compatible with the principle of utility\r\nto recognize the fact that some \u003ci\u003ekinds\u003c/i\u003e of pleasure are more\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_280\" id=\"Page_280\"\u003e[Pg 280]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndesirable and more valuable than others. Human beings have\r\nfaculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and, when\r\nonce made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness\r\nthat does not include their gratification.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe higher the capacity or faculty, the higher in quality\r\nthe pleasure of its exercise and fulfillment, irrespective\r\nof bulk. But how do we know which faculty \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e higher,\r\nand hence what satisfaction is more valuable? By reference\r\nto the experience of the man who has had the best\r\nopportunity to exercise all the powers in question.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any\r\nof the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance\r\nof a beast\u0027s pleasure; no intelligent human being would consent\r\nto be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus,\r\nno person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base,\r\neven though they should be persuaded that the fool, the\r\ndunce or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than\r\nthey are with theirs.\" And again, \"It is indisputable that\r\nthe being whose capacities of enjoyment are low has the\r\ngreatest chance of having them fully satisfied; and a highly\r\nendowed being will always feel that any happiness which he\r\ncan look for, as the world is constituted, is imperfect…. It\r\nis better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied;\r\nbetter to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And\r\nif the fool or the pig is of a different opinion, it is because\r\nhe only knows his own side of the question. The other party\r\nto the comparison knows both sides.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe net result of our discussion is, then, (1) that happiness\r\nconsists in the fulfillment in their appropriate objects\r\n(or the anticipation of such fulfillment) of the powers\r\nof the self manifested in desires, purposes, efforts; (2)\r\ntrue happiness consists in the satisfaction of those powers\r\nof the self which are of higher quality; (3) that the man\r\nof good character, the one in whom these high powers are\r\nalready active, is the judge, in the concrete, of happiness\r\nand misery. We shall now discuss\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_281\" id=\"Page_281\"\u003e[Pg 281]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 3. THE CONSTITUTION OF HAPPINESS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHappiness consists in the agreement, whether anticipated\r\nor realized, of the objective conditions brought about\r\nby our endeavors with our desires and purposes. This conception\r\nof happiness is contrasted with the notion that it\r\nis a sum or collection of separate states of sensation or\r\nfeeling.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. One View Separates, while the Other Connects,\r\nPleasure and Objective Conditions.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In one case, the\r\nagreeable feeling is a kind of psychical entity, supposed\r\nto be capable of existence by itself and capable of abstraction\r\nfrom the objective end of action. The pleasant\r\n\u003ci\u003ething\u003c/i\u003e is one thing; the pleasure, another; or, rather, the\r\n\u003ci\u003epleasant thing\u003c/i\u003e must be analyzed into two independent elements,\r\nthe pleasure as \u003ci\u003efeeling\u003c/i\u003e and the \u003ci\u003ething\u003c/i\u003e with which\r\nit happens to be associated. It is the pleasure alone, \u003ci\u003ewhen\r\ndissociated\u003c/i\u003e, which is the real end of conduct, an object\r\nbeing at best an external means of securing it. It is the\r\npleasurable feeling which happens to be \u003ci\u003eassociated\u003c/i\u003e with\r\nfood, with music, with a landscape, that makes it good;\r\nhealth, art, are not good in themselves. The other view\r\nholds that pleasure has no such existence by itself; that\r\nit is only a name for the \u003ci\u003epleasant object\u003c/i\u003e; that by pleasure\r\nis meant the agreement or congruity which exists between\r\nsome capacity of the agent and some objective fact\r\nin which this capacity is realized. It expresses the way\r\nsome object meets, fits into, responds to, an activity of\r\nthe agent. To say that food is agreeable, means that food\r\nsatisfies an organic function. Music is pleasant because\r\nby it certain capacities or demands of the person with respect\r\nto rhythm of hearing are fulfilled; a landscape is\r\nbeautiful because it carries to fulfillment the visual possibilities\r\nof the spectator.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Qualities of Pleasure Vary with Objects, and with\r\nSprings to Action.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;When happiness is conceived as an\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_282\" id=\"Page_282\"\u003e[Pg 282]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\naggregate of states of feeling, these are regarded as\r\nhomogeneous in quality, differing from one another only\r\nin intensity and duration. Their qualitative differences\r\nare not intrinsic, but are due to the different objects with\r\nwhich they are associated (as pleasures of hearing, or\r\nvision). Hence they disappear when the pleasure is taken\r\nby itself as an end. But if agreeableness is precisely the\r\nagreeableness or congruousness of some objective condition\r\nwith some impulse, habit, or tendency of the agent,\r\nthen, of course, pure pleasure is a myth. Any pleasure\r\nis qualitatively unique, being precisely the harmony of\r\none set of conditions with its appropriate activity. The\r\npleasure of eating is one thing; the pleasure of hearing\r\nmusic, another; the pleasure of an amiable act, another;\r\nthe pleasure of drunkenness or of anger is still another.\r\nHence the possibility of absolutely different moral values\r\nattaching to pleasures, according to the type or aspect\r\nof character which they express. But if the good is only\r\na sum of pleasures, any pleasure, so far as it goes, is as\r\ngood as any other\u0026mdash;the pleasure of malignity as good as\r\nthe pleasure of kindliness, simply as pleasure. Accordingly\r\nBentham said, the pleasure of push-pin (a game)\r\nis as good as that of poetry. And as he said again, since\r\npleasure is the motive of every act, there is no motive\r\nwhich \u003ci\u003ein itself\u003c/i\u003e, and as far as it goes, is not good\u0026mdash;it is\r\nbad only if it turns out in the end to produce more pain\r\nthan pleasure. The pleasure of malignant gossip is so\r\nfar as it is pleasure a mitigation of the badness of the\r\nact. Not so, if happiness is the experience into which\r\npleasures enter so far as the tendencies of character\r\nthat produce them are approved of. An act may bring\r\na pleasure and yet that pleasure be no part of happiness,\r\nbut rather a blot and blemish. Such would be the\r\ncase, for example, with the pleasure which one might take\r\nin an act of charity because one had thereby put himself\r\nin a position superior to that of the recipient. A\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_283\" id=\"Page_283\"\u003e[Pg 283]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ngood man who caught himself feeling pleasure from this\r\nphase of the act would not regard this pleasure as a\r\nfurther element of good attained, but as detracting from\r\nhis happiness. A pleasure may be accepted or reacted\r\nagainst. So far as not acquiesced in it is, from the standpoint\r\nof happiness, positively disagreeable. Surrender\r\nto a pleasure, taking it to be one\u0027s happiness, is one of\r\nthe surest ways of revealing or discovering what sort of\r\na man one is. On the other hand, the pain which a\r\nmiserly man feels in his first acts of generosity may be\r\nwelcomed by him as, under the circumstances, an element\r\nin his good, since it is a sign of and factor in the improvement\r\nof character.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. The Unification of Character.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Happiness as a sum\r\nof pleasures does not afford a basis for unifying or organizing\r\nthe various tendencies and capacities of the self.\r\nIt makes possible at best only a mechanical compromise\r\nor external adjustment. Take, for example, the satisfaction\r\nattendant upon acting from a benevolent or a malicious\r\nimpulse. There can be no question that some\r\npleasure is found in giving way to either impulse when\r\nit is strongly felt. Now if we regard the pleasure as\r\na fixed state in itself, and good or happiness as a sum\r\nof such states, the only moral superiority that can attach\r\nto acting benevolently is that, upon the whole, \u003ci\u003emore\u003c/i\u003e units\r\nof pleasure come from it than from giving way to the\r\nopposite spring of action. It is simply a question of\r\ngreater or less quantity in the long run. Each trait\r\nof character, each act, remains morally independent, cut\r\noff from others. Its only relation to others is that which\r\narises when its results in the way of units of agreeable\r\nor painful feeling are compared, as to bulk, with analogous\r\nconsequences flowing from some other trait, or act. But if\r\nthe fundamental thing in happiness is the relation of the\r\ndesire and intention of the agent to its own successful outlet,\r\nthere is an inherent connection between our different\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_284\" id=\"Page_284\"\u003e[Pg 284]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntendencies. The satisfaction of one tendency strengthens\r\nitself, and strengthens allied tendencies, while it weakens\r\nothers. A man who gives way easily to anger (and finds\r\ngratification in it) against the acts of those whom he\r\nregards as enemies, nourishes unawares a tendency to irritability\r\nin all directions and thus modifies the sources and\r\nnature of all satisfaction. The man who cherishes the satisfaction\r\nhe derives from a landscape may increase his\r\nsusceptibility to enjoyment from poetry and pictures.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Final Question.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The final question of happiness,\r\nthe question which marks off true and right happiness\r\nfrom false and wrong gratification, comes to this: Can\r\nthere be found ends of action, desirable in themselves,\r\nwhich re\u0026euml;nforce and expand not only the motives from\r\nwhich they directly spring, but also the other tendencies\r\nand attitudes which are sources of happiness? Can there be\r\nfound powers whose exercise confirms ends which are stable\r\nand weakens and removes objects which occasion only restless,\r\npeevish, or transitory satisfaction, and ultimately\r\nthwart and stunt the growth of happiness? Harmony,\r\nre\u0026euml;nforcement, expansion are the signs of a true or moral\r\nsatisfaction. What is the good which while good in direct\r\nenjoyment also brings with it fuller and more continuous\r\nlife?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor pleasure as the object of desire and the psychology of hedonism,\r\nsee Bain, \u003ci\u003eEmotions and Will\u003c/i\u003e, Part II., ch. viii.; Rickaby, \u003ci\u003eMoral\r\nPhilosophy\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 54-61, and \u003ci\u003eAquinas Ethicus\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., pp. 104-121;\r\nSidgwick, \u003ci\u003eMethods of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 34-47, and the whole of Book II.,\r\nand Book III., chs. xiii. and xiv.; Mackenzie, \u003ci\u003eManual of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nBook II., ch. iv.; Muirhead, \u003ci\u003eElements of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Book III., ch. i.;\r\nGizyeki, \u003ci\u003eA Student\u0027s Manual of Ethical Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e; Green, \u003ci\u003eProlegomena\r\nto Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 163-177, 226-240, 374-388; James, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of\r\nPsychology\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II., pp. 549-559; Martineau, \u003ci\u003eTypes of Ethical\r\nTheory\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II., Part II., Book II., Branch iv.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the history of hedonism, see Wallace, \u003ci\u003eEpicureanism\u003c/i\u003e; Pater,\r\n\u003ci\u003eMarius the Epicurean\u003c/i\u003e; Sidgwick, \u003ci\u003eHistory of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, ch. ii., \u003ci\u003epassim\u003c/i\u003e and\r\nch. iv., \u0026sect;14-17; Hume, \u003ci\u003eTreatise of Human Nature\u003c/i\u003e, Book III., and the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_285\" id=\"Page_285\"\u003e[Pg 285]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreferences to Bentham and Mill in the text; Watson, \u003ci\u003eHedonistic\r\nTheories from Aristippus to Spencer\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the utilitarian standard, see Lecky, \u003ci\u003eHistory of European\r\nMorals\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., ch. i.; Stephen, \u003ci\u003eScience of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, chs. iv. and v.;\r\nSpencer, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Part I.; H\u0026ouml;ffding, \u003ci\u003eEthik\u003c/i\u003e, ch. vii., and\r\n\u003ci\u003eMonist\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., p. 529; Paulsen, \u003ci\u003eSystem of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 222-286, and\r\n404-414; Grote, \u003ci\u003eExamination of the Utilitarian Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e; Wilson\r\nand Fowler, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Morals\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., pp. 98-112; Vol. II., pp.\r\n262-273; Green, \u003ci\u003eProlegomena\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 240-255, 399-415; Martineau, \u003ci\u003eTypes\u003c/i\u003e,\r\npp. 308-334; Alexander, \u003ci\u003eMoral Order and Progress\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 204-211; Seth,\r\n\u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 94-111; Sidgwick, \u003ci\u003eThe Ethics of T. H. Green,\r\nHerbert Spencer and J. Martineau\u003c/i\u003e, Lectures I.-IV. of the Criticism\r\nof Spencer. Compare the references \u003ci\u003esub voce\u003c/i\u003e Happiness, 899-903, in\r\nRand\u0027s \u003ci\u003eBibliography\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. III. of Baldwin\u0027s Dictionary of Philosophy\r\nand Psychology.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_134_134\" id=\"Footnote_134_134\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_134_134\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[134]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Later we shall see reasons for discriminating between happiness\r\nand pleasure. But here we accept the standpoint of those who\r\nidentify them.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_135_135\" id=\"Footnote_135_135\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_135_135\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[135]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The context shows that this \"party\" may be either the individual,\r\nor a limited social group or the entire community. Even the pleasures\r\nand pains of animals, of the sentient creation generally, may\r\ncome into the account.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_136_136\" id=\"Footnote_136_136\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_136_136\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[136]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e These quotations are all taken from Bentham\u0027s \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of\r\nMorals and Legislation\u003c/i\u003e; the first, third, and fourth from ch. i.; the\r\nsecond from ch. xiii.; and the last from ch. ii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_137_137\" id=\"Footnote_137_137\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_137_137\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[137]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e With these statements may he compared Spencer, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of\r\nEthics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 30-32: Stephen, \u003ci\u003eScience of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 42. Sidgwick, in\r\nhis \u003ci\u003eMethods of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, holds that the axiomatic character of happiness\r\nas an end proves that the position is not empirical but intuitional\r\nor \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e. Only as we base ourselves on certain ultimate deliverances\r\nof conscience can we he said to know that happiness is the\r\ndesirable end and that the happiness of one is just as intrinsically\r\ndesirable as the happiness of another. (See his \u003ci\u003eMethods of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nBook III., chs. xiii. and xiv.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_138_138\" id=\"Footnote_138_138\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_138_138\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[138]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This ambiguity affects the statement quoted from Bentham that\r\npleasure and pain determine what we shall do. His implication is\r\nthat pleasure as \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e of desire moves us; the fact is that \u003ci\u003epresent\u003c/i\u003e\r\npleasure, aroused by the idea of some object, influences us.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_286\" id=\"Page_286\"\u003e[Pg 286]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER XV\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nHAPPINESS AND SOCIAL ENDS\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_139_139\" id=\"FNanchor_139_139\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_139_139\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[139]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn form, the true good is thus an inclusive or expanding\r\nend. In substance, the only end which fulfills these conditions\r\nis the social good. The utilitarian standard is\r\nsocial consequences. To repeat our earlier quotation from\r\nBentham (above, p. 264):\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"The greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in\r\nquestion is the right and proper, and the only right and\r\nproper and \u003ci\u003euniversally desirable\u003c/i\u003e end of human action.\" Mill\r\nsays, \"To do as you would be done by, and to love your\r\nneighbor as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian\r\nmorality.\" And again: \"The happiness which is the\r\nUtilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the\r\nagent\u0027s own happiness, but that of all concerned; as between\r\nhis own happiness and that of others, Utilitarianism requires\r\nhim to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent\r\nspectator.\" So Sidgwick (\u003ci\u003eMethods of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, p. 379):\r\n\"By Utilitarianism is here meant the ethical theory, first distinctly\r\nformulated by Bentham, that the conduct which under\r\nany given circumstances is externally or objectively right is\r\nthat which produces the greatest amount of happiness \u003ci\u003eon the\r\nwhole\u003c/i\u003e; that is taking into account all whose happiness is\r\naffected by the conduct. It would tend to clearness if we\r\nmight call this principle, and the method based upon it, by\r\nsome such name as Universalistic hedonism.\" And finally,\r\nBain (\u003ci\u003eEmotions and Will\u003c/i\u003e, p. 303): \"Utility is opposed to the\r\nselfish principle, for, as propounded, it always implies the\r\ngood of society generally and the subordination of individual\r\ninterests to the general good.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_287\" id=\"Page_287\"\u003e[Pg 287]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSocial Purpose of Utilitarianism.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Its aim, then, was\r\nthe \"greatest possible happiness of the greatest possible\r\nnumber,\" a democratic, fraternal aim. In the computation\r\nof the elements of this aim, it insisted upon the\r\nprinciple of social and moral equality: \"every one to count\r\nfor one, and only for one.\" The standard was the well-being\r\nof the community conceived as a community of individuals,\r\nall of whom had equal rights and none of whom had\r\nspecial privileges or exclusive avenues of access to happiness.\r\nIn a period in which the democratic spirit in England\r\nwas asserting itself against vested interests and\r\nclass-distinctions, against legalized inequalities of all sorts,\r\nthe utilitarian philosophy became the natural and perhaps\r\nindispensable adjunct of the liberal and reforming\r\nspirit in law, education, and politics. Every custom,\r\nevery institution, was cross-questioned; it was not allowed\r\nto plead precedent and prior existence as a basis for continued\r\nexistence. It had to prove that it conduced to\r\nthe happiness of the community as a whole, or be legislated\r\nout of existence or into reform. Bentham\u0027s fundamental\r\nobjection to other types of moral theories than his\r\nown was not so much philosophic or theoretic as it was\r\npractical. He felt that every intuitional theory tended\r\nto dignify prejudice, convention, and fixed customs,\r\nand so to consecrate vested interests and inequitable\r\ninstitutions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRecognition by an Opponent.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The following remarks\r\nby T. H. Green are the more noteworthy because coming\r\nfrom a consistent opponent of the theory:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"The chief theory of conduct which in Modern Europe has\r\nafforded the conscientious citizen a vantage ground for judging\r\nof the competing claims on his obedience, and enabled\r\nhim to substitute a critical and intelligent for a blind and\r\nunquestioning conformity, has no doubt been the Utilitarian.\r\n… Whatever the errors arising from its hedonistic psychology,\r\nno other theory has been available for the social or\r\npolitical reformer, combining so much truth with such ready\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_288\" id=\"Page_288\"\u003e[Pg 288]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\napplicability. No other has offered so commanding a point\r\nof view from which to criticize the precepts and institutions\r\npresented as authoritative.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_140_140\" id=\"FNanchor_140_140\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_140_140\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[140]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd again, speaking of the possibility of practical\r\nservice from theory, he says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"The form of philosophy which in the modern world has\r\nmost conspicuously rendered this service has been the Utilitarian,\r\nbecause it has most definitely announced the interest\r\nof humanity without distinction of persons or classes, as the\r\nend by reference to which all claims upon obedience are\r\nultimately to be measured…. Impartiality of reference to\r\nhuman well-being has been the great lesson which the Utilitarian\r\nhas had to teach.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_141_141\" id=\"FNanchor_141_141\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_141_141\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[141]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIrreconcilable Conflict of Motive and End.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;But unfortunately\r\nthe assertion that the happiness of all concerned\r\nis the \"universally \u003ci\u003edesirable\u003c/i\u003e end,\" is mixed up by\r\nearly utilitarianism with an hedonistic psychology, according\r\nto which the \u003ci\u003edesired\u003c/i\u003e object is private and personal\r\npleasure. What is \u003ci\u003edesirable\u003c/i\u003e is thus so different from what\r\nis \u003ci\u003edesired\u003c/i\u003e as to create an uncrossable chasm between the\r\ntrue end of action\u0026mdash;the happiness of all,\u0026mdash;and the moving\r\nspring of desire and action\u0026mdash;private pleasure. That\r\nthere is a difference between what is \u003ci\u003enaturally\u003c/i\u003e desired\r\n(meaning by \"naturally\" what first arouses interest and\r\nexcites endeavor) and what is morally desirable (understanding\r\nby this the consequences which present themselves\r\nin adequate deliberation), is certain enough. But\r\nthe desirable must be \u003ci\u003ecapable of becoming\u003c/i\u003e desired, or\r\nelse there is such a contradiction that morality is impossible.\r\nIf, now, the object of desire is always private\r\npleasure, how can the recognition of the consequences\r\nupon the happiness or misery of others ever become an\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_289\" id=\"Page_289\"\u003e[Pg 289]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\neffective competitor with considerations of personal well-being,\r\nwhen the two conflict?\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_142_142\" id=\"FNanchor_142_142\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_142_142\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[142]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLack of Harmony among Pleasurable Ends.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;If it so\r\nhappens that the activities which secure the personal\r\npleasure also manage to affect others favorably, so much\r\nthe better; but since, by the theory, the individual \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e\r\nbe moved exclusively by desire for his own pleasure, woe\r\nbetide others if their happiness happens to stand in the\r\nway.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_143_143\" id=\"FNanchor_143_143\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_143_143\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[143]\u003c/a\u003e It could only be by accident that activities of a\r\nlarge number of individuals all seeking their own private\r\npleasures should coincide in effecting the desirable end\r\nof the common happiness. The outcome would, more likely,\r\nbe a competitive \"war of all against all.\" It is of such\r\na situation that Kant says: \"There results a harmony\r\nlike that which a certain satirical poem depicts as existing\r\nbetween a married couple bent on going to ruin,\r\n\u0027Oh, marvelous harmony! what he wishes, she wishes too\u0027;\r\nor like what is said of the pledge of Francis I. to the\r\nEmperor Charles V., \u0027What my brother wants, that I want\r\ntoo\u0027 (namely Milan).\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_144_144\" id=\"FNanchor_144_144\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_144_144\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[144]\u003c/a\u003e The existence already noted of\r\nan unperceived and unreconcilable division between happiness\r\n\u003ci\u003ein the form of future consequences\u003c/i\u003e, and pleasure \u003ci\u003eas\r\nobject of desire and present moving spring\u003c/i\u003e, thus becomes\r\nof crucial and, for hedonistic utilitarianism, of catastrophic\r\nimportance. We shall first discuss the efforts of\r\nutilitarianism to deal with the problem.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_290\" id=\"Page_290\"\u003e[Pg 290]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMill\u0027s Formal Method.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We mention first a purely\r\nlogical or formal suggestion of Mill\u0027s, not because it is\r\nof very much significance one way or the other, but because\r\nit helps to bring out the problem.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable,\r\nexcept that each person, so far as he believes it to\r\nbe obtainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being\r\na fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits\r\nof, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a\r\ngood; that each person\u0027s happiness is a good to that person;\r\nand the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate\r\nof all persons.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_145_145\" id=\"FNanchor_145_145\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_145_145\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[145]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt clearly does not follow that because the good of A and\r\nB and C, etc., is \u003ci\u003ecollectively\u003c/i\u003e, or aggregately, a good to A\r\nand B and C, etc., that therefore the good of A and B and\r\nC, etc., or of anybody beyond A himself, is regarded as a\r\ngood by A\u0026mdash;especially when the original premise is that\r\nA seeks his own good. Because all men want to be happy\r\nthemselves, it hardly follows that each wants all to be\r\nso. It does follow, perhaps, that that would be the \u003ci\u003ereasonable\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthing to want. If each man desires happiness\r\nfor himself, to an outside spectator looking at the matter\r\nin the cold light of intelligence, there might be no reason\r\nwhy the happiness of one should be any more precious or\r\ndesirable than that of another. From a mathematical\r\nstandpoint, the mere fact that the individual knows he\r\nwants happiness, and knows that others are like himself,\r\nthat they too are individuals who want happiness, might\r\ncommit each individual, theoretically, to the necessity\r\nof regarding the happiness of every other as equally\r\nsacred with his own. But the difficulty is that there is\r\nno chance, upon the hedonistic psychology of desire, for\r\nthis rational conviction to get in its work, even if it be\r\nintellectually entertained. The intellectual perception and\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_291\" id=\"Page_291\"\u003e[Pg 291]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe mechanism of human motivation remain opposed.\r\nMill\u0027s statement, in other words, puts the problem which\r\nhedonistic utilitarianism has to solve.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMaterially, as distinct from this formal statement,\r\nutilitarianism has two instrumentalities upon which it\r\nrelies: one, internal, found in the nature of the individual;\r\nthe other, external, or in social arrangements.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eI. Bentham\u0027s View of Sympathetic Pleasures.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In the\r\nlong list of pleasures moving men to action which Bentham\r\ndrew up, he included what he called the social and\r\nthe semi-social. The social are the pleasures of benevolence;\r\nthe semi-social, the pleasures of amity (peace with\r\none\u0027s fellows) and of reputation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"The pleasures of benevolence are the pleasures resulting\r\nfrom the view of any pleasures supposed to be possessed by\r\nthe beings who may be the objects of benevolence\" (\u003ci\u003ePrinciples\r\nof Morals and Legislation\u003c/i\u003e). And if it be asked what\r\nmotives lying within a man\u0027s self he has to consult the happiness\r\nof others, \"in answer to this, it cannot but be admitted\r\nthat the only interests which a man at all times and upon\r\nall occasions is sure to find \u003ci\u003eadequate\u003c/i\u003e motives for consulting\r\nare his own. Notwithstanding this there are no occasions on\r\nwhich a man has not some motives for consulting the happiness\r\nof other men. In the first place, he has, on all occasions,\r\nthe purely social motive of sympathy and benevolence; in the\r\nnext place, he has, on most occasions, the semi-social motives\r\nof amity and love of reputation\" (\u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, ch. xix., \u0026sect; 1). So\r\nimportant finally are the sympathetic motives that he says\r\n\"The Dictates of Utility are neither more nor less than the\r\ndictates of the most extensive and enlightened (that is, well\r\nadvised)\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_146_146\" id=\"FNanchor_146_146\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_146_146\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[146]\u003c/a\u003e benevolence\" (\u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, ch. x., \u0026sect; 4).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn short, we are so constituted that the happiness of\r\nothers gives us happiness, their misery creates distress in\r\nus. We are also so constituted that, even aside from\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_292\" id=\"Page_292\"\u003e[Pg 292]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndirect penalties imposed upon us by others, we are made\r\nto suffer more or less by the knowledge that they have\r\na low opinion of us, or that we are not \"popular\" with\r\nthem. The more enlightened our activity, the more we\r\nshall see how by sympathy our pleasures are directly bound\r\nup with others, so that we shall get more pleasure by\r\nencouraging that of others. The same course will also\r\nindirectly increase our own, because others will be likely\r\nto esteem and honor us just in the degree in which our\r\nacts conduce to their pleasure. A wise or enlightened\r\ndesire for our own pleasure will thus lead us to regard the\r\npleasures of others in our activities.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLimitations of Doctrine.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;To state the doctrine is\r\nalmost to criticize it. It comes practically to saying\r\nthat a sensible and prudent self-love will make us pay\r\ndue heed to the effect of our activities upon the welfare\r\nof others. We are to be benevolent, but the reason is\r\nthat we get more pleasure, or get pleasure more surely\r\nand easily, that way than in any other. We are to be\r\nkind, because upon the whole the net return of pleasure\r\nis greater that way. This does not mean that Bentham\r\ndenied the existence of \"disinterested motives\" in man\u0027s\r\nmake-up; or that he held that all sympathy is coldly\r\ncalculating. On the contrary, he held that sympathetic\r\nreactions to the well-being and suffering of others are involved\r\nin our make-up. But as it relates to \u003ci\u003emotives\u003c/i\u003e for\r\naction he holds that the sympathetic affections influence\r\nus only under the form of desire for our own pleasure:\r\nthey make us rejoice in the rejoicing of others, and\r\nmove us to act that others may rejoice so that we may\r\nthereby rejoice the more. They do not move us to act\r\nas direct interests in the welfare of others for their own\r\nsake.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_147_147\" id=\"FNanchor_147_147\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_147_147\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[147]\u003c/a\u003e We shall find that just as Mill transformed the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_293\" id=\"Page_293\"\u003e[Pg 293]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nutilitarian theory of motives by substituting quality of\r\nhappiness for quantity of pleasures, so he also transformed\r\nthe earlier Benthamite conception of both the internal and\r\nthe external methods for relating the happiness of the\r\nindividual and the welfare of society.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eII. Mill\u0027s Criticism.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Mill charges Bentham with overlooking\r\nthe motive in man which makes him love excellence\r\nfor its own sake. \"Even under the head of sympathy,\"\r\nhe says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"his recognition does not extend to the more complex forms\r\nof the feeling\u0026mdash;the love of \u003ci\u003eloving\u003c/i\u003e, the need of a sympathizing\r\nsupport, or of an object of admiration and reverence.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_148_148\" id=\"FNanchor_148_148\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_148_148\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[148]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\"Self culture, the training by the human being himself of his\r\naffections and will … is a blank in Bentham\u0027s system. The\r\nother and co-equal part, the regulation of his outward actions,\r\nmust be altogether halting and imperfect without the first;\r\nfor how can we judge in what manner many an action will\r\naffect the worldly interests of ourselves or others unless we\r\ntake in, as part of the question, its influence on the regulation\r\nof our or their affections and desires?\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_149_149\" id=\"FNanchor_149_149\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_149_149\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[149]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn other words, Mill saw that the weakness of Bentham\u0027s\r\ntheory lay in his supposition that the factors of character,\r\nthe powers and desires which make up disposition,\r\nare of value only as moving us to seek pleasure; to Mill\r\nthey have a worth of their own or are \u003ci\u003edirect\u003c/i\u003e sources and\r\ningredients of happiness. So Mill says:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"I regard any considerable increase of human happiness,\r\nthrough mere changes in outward circumstances, unaccompanied\r\nby changes in the state of desires, as hopeless.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_150_150\" id=\"FNanchor_150_150\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_150_150\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[150]\u003c/a\u003e And\r\nin his \u003ci\u003eAutobiography\u003c/i\u003e speaking of his first reaction against\r\nBenthamism, he says: \"I, for the first time, gave its proper\r\nplace, among the prime necessities of human well-being, to\r\nthe internal culture of the individual. I ceased to attach almost\r\nexclusive importance to the ordering of outward circum\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_294\" id=\"Page_294\"\u003e[Pg 294]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003estances….\r\nThe cultivation of the feelings became one of\r\nthe cardinal points in my ethical and philosophical creed.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_151_151\" id=\"FNanchor_151_151\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_151_151\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[151]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Social Affections as Direct Interest in Others.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\nimportance of this changed view lies in the fact that\r\nit compels us to regard certain desires, affections, and\r\nmotives as inherently worthy, because intrinsic constituent\r\nfactors of happiness. Thus it enables us to \u003ci\u003eidentify\u003c/i\u003e our\r\nhappiness with the happiness of others, to find our good\r\nin their good, not just to seek their happiness as, upon\r\nthe whole, the most effective way of securing our own.\r\nOur social affections are direct interests in the well-being\r\nof others; their cultivation and expression is at one and\r\nthe same time a source of good to ourselves, and, intelligently\r\nguided, to others. Taken in this light, it is sympathetic\r\nemotion and imagination which make the standard\r\nof general happiness not merely the \"desirable end,\"\r\nbut the desired end, the effectively working object of\r\nendeavor.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIntrinsic Motivation of Regard for Others.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;If it is\r\nasked \u003ci\u003ewhy\u003c/i\u003e the individual should thus regard the well-being\r\nof others as an inherent object of desire, there is,\r\naccording to Mill, but one answer: We cannot think of\r\nourselves save as to some extent \u003ci\u003esocial\u003c/i\u003e beings. Hence we\r\ncannot separate the idea of ourselves and of our own\r\ngood from our idea of others and of their good. The\r\nnatural sentiment which is the basis of the utilitarian\r\nmorality, which gives the idea of the social good weight\r\nwith us, is the\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures…. The\r\nsocial state is at once so natural, so necessary, and so habitual\r\nto man, that except in some unusual circumstances or by an\r\neffort of voluntary abstraction, \u003ci\u003ehe never conceives himself\r\notherwise than as a member of a body\u003c/i\u003e…. Any condition,\r\ntherefore, which is essential to a state of society becomes\r\nmore and more an inseparable part of every person\u0027s concep\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_295\" id=\"Page_295\"\u003e[Pg 295]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etion\r\nof the state of things he is born into and which is the\r\ndestiny of a human being.\" This strengthening of social\r\nties leads the individual \"to identify his \u003ci\u003efeelings\u003c/i\u003e more and\r\nmore with the good\" of others. \"He comes, as though instinctively,\r\nto be conscious of himself as a being, who, \u003ci\u003eof\r\ncourse\u003c/i\u003e, pays regard to others. The good of others becomes\r\nto him a thing naturally and necessarily to be attended to,\r\nlike any of the physical conditions of our existence.\" This\r\nsocial feeling, finally, however weak, does not present itself\r\n\"as a superstition of education, or a law despotically imposed\r\nfrom without, but as an attribute which it would not be well\r\nto be without…. Few but those whose mind is a moral\r\nblank could \u003ci\u003ebear\u003c/i\u003e to lay out their course of life on the line\r\nof paying no regard to others except so far as their own private\r\ninterest compels.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_152_152\" id=\"FNanchor_152_152\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_152_152\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[152]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe transformation is tremendous. It is no longer a\r\nquestion of acting for the general interest because that\r\nbrings most pleasure or brings it more surely and easily.\r\nIt is a question of finding one\u0027s good in the good of\r\nothers.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIII. The Benthamite External Ties of Private and\r\nGeneral Interests.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Aside from sympathy and love of\r\npeaceful relations and good repute, Bentham relied upon\r\nlaw, changes in political arrangements, and the play of\r\neconomic interests which make it worth while for the individual\r\nto seek his own pleasure in ways that would also\r\nconduce to the pleasure of others. Penal law can at\r\nleast make it painful for the individual to try to get\r\nhis own good in ways which bring suffering to others.\r\nCivil legislation can at least abolish those vested interests\r\nand class privileges which inevitably favor one at the\r\nexpense of others, and which make it customary and\r\nnatural to seek and get happiness in ways which disregard\r\nthe happiness of others. In the industrial life each\r\nindividual seeks his own advantage under such conditions\r\nthat he can achieve his end only by rendering service to\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_296\" id=\"Page_296\"\u003e[Pg 296]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nothers, that is, through exchange of commodities or\r\nservices. The proper end of legislation is then to make\r\npolitical and economic conditions such that the individual\r\nwhile seeking his own good will at least not inflict suffering\r\nupon others, and positively, so far as possible, will\r\npromote their good.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_153_153\" id=\"FNanchor_153_153\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_153_153\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[153]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIV. Mill\u0027s Criticism.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Mill\u0027s criticism does not turn\r\nupon the importance of legislation and of social economic\r\narrangements in promoting the identity of individual\r\nand general good. On the contrary, after identifying\r\n(in a passage already quoted, \u003ci\u003eante\u003c/i\u003e, p. 286) the\r\nideal of utilitarian morality with love of neighbor, he\r\ngoes on:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal\r\nutility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements\r\nshould place the happiness of every individual as nearly as\r\npossible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and,\r\nsecondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a\r\npower over human character, should so use that power as to\r\nestablish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association\r\nbetween his own happiness and the good of the\r\nwhole.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe criticism turns upon the fact that \u003ci\u003eunless\u003c/i\u003e the intrinsic\r\nsocial idea, already discussed, be emphasized, any association\r\nof private and general happiness which law and social\r\narrangements can effect will be external, more or less artificial\r\nand arbitrary, and hence dissoluble either by intellectual\r\nanalysis, or by the intense prepotency of egoistic\r\ndesire.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMill\u0027s Transformation.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;If, however, this idea of inherent\r\nsocial ties and of oneself as a social being is presupposed,\r\nthe various external agencies have something\r\ninternal to work upon; and their effect is internal,\r\nnot external. Their effect is not to establish a mere\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_297\" id=\"Page_297\"\u003e[Pg 297]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003ecoincidence\u003c/i\u003e (as with Bentham) between pleasure to oneself\r\nand pleasure to others, but to protect, strengthen, and\r\nfoster the sense, otherwise intermittent and feeble, of the\r\nsocial aspects and relations of one\u0027s own being. It is for\r\nthis reason that Mill lays more stress on \u003ci\u003eeducation\u003c/i\u003e than\r\non mere external institutional changes, and, indeed, conceives\r\nof the ultimate moral value of the institutional arrangements\r\nas itself educative. Their value to him is\r\nnot that they are contrivances or pieces of machinery for\r\nmaking the behavior of one conduce more or less automatically\r\nto the happiness of others, but that they train and\r\nexercise the individual in the recognition of the social elements\r\nof his own character.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSummary of Previous Discussion.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We have carried\r\non our discussion of the relation between the common good\r\nas the standard for measuring rightness, and pleasure\r\nas the end and spring of the individual\u0027s activity, in\r\nterms of Mill\u0027s development of Bentham\u0027s utilitarianism.\r\nBut of course our results are general, and they may be\r\ndetached not only from this particular discussion, but\r\nfrom the truth or falsity of utilitarianism as a technical\r\ntheory. Put positively, our results are these: (1) Moral\r\nquality is an attribute of character, of dispositions and\r\nattitudes which express themselves in desires and efforts.\r\n(2) Those attitudes and dispositions are morally good\r\nwhich aim at the production, the maintenance, and development\r\nof ends in which the agent and others affected\r\nalike find satisfaction. There is no difference (such as\r\nearly utilitarianism made) between good as standard and\r\nas aim, because \u003ci\u003eonly a voluntary preference for and interest\r\nin a social good is capable, otherwise than by coincidence\r\nor accident, of producing acts which have common\r\ngood as their result\u003c/i\u003e. Acts which are not motivated by it as\r\naim cannot be trusted to secure it as result; \u003ci\u003eacts which\r\nare motived by it as a living and habitual interest are\r\nthe guarantee, so far as conditions allow, of its realization\u003c/i\u003e.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_298\" id=\"Page_298\"\u003e[Pg 298]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThose who care for the general good for its own sake are\r\nthose who are surest of promoting it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Good Moral Character.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The genuinely moral\r\nperson is one, then, in whom the habit of regarding all\r\ncapacities and habits of self from the social standpoint is\r\nformed and active. Such an one forms his plans, regulates\r\nhis desires, and hence performs his acts with reference\r\nto the effect they have upon the social groups of\r\nwhich he is a part. He is one whose dominant attitudes\r\nand interests are bound up with associated activities. Accordingly\r\nhe will find his happiness or satisfaction in the\r\npromotion of these activities irrespective of the particular\r\npains and pleasures that accrue.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSocial Interests and Sympathy.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;A genuine social interest\r\nis then something much broader and deeper than an\r\ninstinctive sympathetic reaction. Sympathy is a genuine\r\nnatural instinct, varying in intensity in different individuals.\r\nIt is a precious instrumentality for the development\r\nof social insight and socialized affection; but in\r\nand of itself it is upon the same plane as any natural\r\nendowment. It may lead to sentimentality or to selfishness;\r\nthe individual may shrink from scenes of misery just\r\nbecause of the pain they cause him, or may seek jovial\r\ncompanions because of the sympathetic pleasures he gets.\r\nOr he may be moved by sympathy to labor for the good\r\nof others, but, because of lack of deliberation and thoughtfulness,\r\nbe quite ignorant of what their good really is, and\r\ndo a great deal of harm. One may wish to do unto others\r\nas he would they should do unto him, but may err egregiously\r\nbecause his conception of what is desirable for\r\nhimself is radically false; or because he assumes arbitrarily\r\nthat whatever he likes is good for others, and may thus\r\ntyrannically impose his own standards upon them. Again\r\ninstinctive sympathy is partial; it may attach itself vehemently\r\nto those of blood kin or to immediate associates\r\nin such a way as to favor them at the expense of others,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_299\" id=\"Page_299\"\u003e[Pg 299]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand lead to positive injustice toward those beyond the\r\ncharmed circle.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_154_154\" id=\"FNanchor_154_154\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_154_154\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[154]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTransformation of Instinctive Sympathies.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It still\r\nremains true that the instinctive affectionate reactions in\r\ntheir various forms (parental, filial, sexual, compassionate,\r\nsympathetic) are the sole portions of the psychological\r\nstructure or mechanism of a man which can be relied upon\r\nto work the identification of other\u0027s ends with one\u0027s own\r\ninterests. What is required is a \u003ci\u003eblending\u003c/i\u003e, a \u003ci\u003efusing\u003c/i\u003e of the\r\nsympathetic tendencies with all the other impulsive and\r\nhabitual traits of the self. When interest in power is\r\npermeated with an affectionate impulse, it is protected\r\nfrom being a tendency to dominate and tyrannize; it becomes\r\nan interest in \u003ci\u003eeffectiveness of regard for common\r\nends\u003c/i\u003e. When an interest in artistic or scientific objects is\r\nsimilarly fused, it loses the indifferent and coldly impersonal\r\ncharacter which marks the specialist as such, and\r\nbecomes an interest in the adequate \u0026aelig;sthetic and intellectual\r\ndevelopment of the conditions of a common life.\r\nSympathy does not merely \u003ci\u003eassociate\u003c/i\u003e one of these tendencies\r\n\u003ci\u003ewith\u003c/i\u003e another; still less does it make one a means to the\r\nother\u0027s end. It so intimately permeates them as to transform\r\nthem both into a single new and moral interest. This\r\nsame fusion protects sympathy from sentimentality and\r\nnarrowness. Blended with interest in power, in science,\r\nin art, it is liberalized in quality and broadened in range.\r\nIn short, the fusion of affectionate reactions with the\r\nother dispositions of the self \u003ci\u003eilluminates, gives perspective\r\nand body to the former\u003c/i\u003e, while it \u003ci\u003egives social quality and\r\ndirection to the latter\u003c/i\u003e. The result of this reciprocal absorption\r\nis the disappearance of the natural tendencies in\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_300\" id=\"Page_300\"\u003e[Pg 300]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntheir original form \u003ci\u003eand the generation of moral\u003c/i\u003e, i.e., \u003ci\u003esocialized\r\ninterests\u003c/i\u003e. It is sympathy transformed into a\r\nhabitual standpoint which satisfies the demand for a standpoint\r\nwhich will render the person interested in foresight of\r\nall obscure consequences (\u003ci\u003eante\u003c/i\u003e, p. 262).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. Social Interest and the Happiness of the Agent.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We\r\nnow see what is meant by a distinctively \u003ci\u003emoral\u003c/i\u003e happiness,\r\nand how this happiness is supreme in quality as\r\ncompared with other satisfactions, irrespective of superior\r\nintensity and duration on the part of the latter. It is\r\nimpossible to draw any fixed line between the \u003ci\u003econtent\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nthe moral good and of natural satisfaction. The end, the\r\nright and only right end, of man, lies in the fullest and\r\nfreest realization of powers in their appropriate objects.\r\nThe good consists of friendship, family and political relations,\r\neconomic utilization of mechanical resources, science,\r\nart, in all their complex and variegated forms and elements.\r\nThere is no separate and rival moral good; no\r\nseparate empty and rival \"good will.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eNature of Moral Interest and Motivation.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Yet \u003ci\u003ethe interest\u003c/i\u003e\r\nin the social or the common and progressive realization\r\nof these interests may properly be called a distinctive\r\nmoral interest. The degree of actual objective realization\r\nor achievement of these ends, depends upon circumstances\r\nand accidents over which the agent has little or\r\nno control. The more happily situated individual who\r\nsucceeds in realizing these ends more largely we may call\r\nmore fortunate; we cannot call him morally better. The\r\ninterest in all other interests, the voluntary desire to discover\r\nand promote them within the range of one\u0027s own\r\ncapacities, one\u0027s own material resources, and the limits\r\nof one\u0027s own surroundings, is, however, under one\u0027s control:\r\n\u003ci\u003eit is one\u0027s moral self\u003c/i\u003e. \u003ci\u003eThe nature and exercise of\r\nthis interest constitutes then the distinctively moral\r\nquality in all good purposes.\u003c/i\u003e They are morally good\r\nnot so far as objectively accomplished and possessed,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_301\" id=\"Page_301\"\u003e[Pg 301]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbut so far as cherished in the dominant affections of the\r\nperson.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Moral Interest as Final Happiness.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Consequently\r\nthe true or final happiness of an individual, the happiness\r\nwhich is not at the mercy of circumstance and change of\r\ncircumstance, lies not in objective achievement of results,\r\nbut in the supremacy within character of an alert, sincere,\r\nand persistent interest in those habits and institutions\r\nwhich forward common ends among men. Mill insisted\r\nthat quality of happiness was morally important, not\r\nquantity. Well, that quality which is most important\r\nis the peace and joy of mind that accompanies the abiding\r\nand equable maintenance of socialized interests as\r\ncentral springs of action. To one in whom these interests\r\nlive (and they live to some extent in every individual\r\nnot completely pathological) their exercise brings happiness\r\nbecause it fulfills his life. To those in whom it is the\r\nsupreme interest it brings supreme or final happiness. It\r\nis not preferred because it is the greater happiness, but\r\nin being preferred as expressing the only kind of self\r\nwhich the agent fundamentally wishes himself to be, it constitutes\r\na kind of happiness with which others cannot be\r\ncompared. It is unique, final, invaluable.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_155_155\" id=\"FNanchor_155_155\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_155_155\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[155]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIdentity of the Individual and General Happiness.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;No\r\nalgebraic summing up of sympathetic pleasures, utilities\r\nof friendship, advantages of popularity and esteem,\r\nprofits of economic exchange among equals, over against\r\npains from legal penalties and disapproving public opinion,\r\nand lack of sympathetic support by others, can ever\r\nmake it even approximately certain that an individual\u0027s\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_302\" id=\"Page_302\"\u003e[Pg 302]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nown interest, in terms of quantity of pleasures and pains,\r\nis to regard the interest of others.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_156_156\" id=\"FNanchor_156_156\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_156_156\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[156]\u003c/a\u003e Such a demonstration,\r\nmoreover, if possible, would not support but would weaken\r\nthe moral life. It would reduce the manifestation of character\r\nto selecting greater rather than less amounts of\r\nhomogeneous ends. It would degrade reflection and consideration\r\nto ingenuity in detecting where larger quantities\r\nof pleasures lie, and to skill in performing sums of\r\naddition and subtraction. Even if such a scheme could be\r\ndemonstrated, every one except the most languid and\r\nphlegmatic of pleasure-seekers would reject a life built\r\nupon it. Not only the \"good,\" but the more vigorous and\r\nhearty of the \"bad,\" would scorn a life in which character,\r\nselfhood, had no significance, and where the experimental\r\ndiscovery and testing of destiny had no place. The identity\r\nof individual and general happiness is a \u003ci\u003emoral\u003c/i\u003e matter;\r\nit depends, that is, upon the reflective and intentional development\r\nof that type of character which identifies itself\r\nwith common ends, and which is happy in these ends\r\njust because it has made them its own.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Social Ends and the Happiness of Others.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\nsame principle holds of the happiness of others. Happiness\r\nmeans the expression of the active tendencies of a self\r\nin their appropriate objects. Moral happiness means the\r\nsatisfaction which comes when the dominant active tendencies\r\nare made interests in the maintenance and propagation\r\nof the things that make life worth living. Others, also,\r\ncan be happy and should be happy only upon the same\r\nterms. Regard for the happiness of others means \u003ci\u003eregard\r\nfor those conditions and objects which permit others freely\r\nto exercise their own powers from their own initiative, reflection,\r\nand choice\u003c/i\u003e. Regard for their final happiness (i.e.,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_303\" id=\"Page_303\"\u003e[Pg 303]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor a happiness whose \u003ci\u003equality\u003c/i\u003e is such that it cannot be\r\n\u003ci\u003eexternally\u003c/i\u003e added to or subtracted from) demands that\r\nthese others shall find the controlling objects of preference,\r\nresolution, and endeavor in the things that are worth\r\nwhile.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. Happiness and Common Ends.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;For all alike, in\r\nshort, the chief thing is the discovery and promotion of\r\nthose activities and active relationships in which the capacities\r\nof all concerned are effectively evoked, exercised, and\r\nput to the test. It is difficult for a man to attain a point\r\nof view from which steadily to apprehend how his own\r\nactivities affect and modify those of others. It is hard,\r\nthat is, to learn to accommodate one\u0027s ends to those of\r\nothers; to adjust, to give way here, and fit in there with\r\nrespect to our aims. But difficult as this is, it is easy compared\r\nwith the difficulty of acting \u003ci\u003ein such a way\u003c/i\u003e for ends\r\nwhich are helpful to others as will call out and make effective\r\ntheir activities.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMoral Democracy.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;If the vice of the criminal, and of\r\nthe coarsely selfish man is to disturb the aims and the good\r\nof others; if the vice of the ordinary egoist, and of every\r\nman, upon his egoistic side, is to neglect the interests of\r\nothers; the vice of the social leader, of the reformer, of\r\nthe philanthropist and the specialist in every worthy cause\r\nof science, or art, or politics, is to seek ends which promote\r\nthe social welfare in ways which fail to engage the\r\nactive interest and co\u0026ouml;peration of others.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_157_157\" id=\"FNanchor_157_157\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_157_157\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[157]\u003c/a\u003e The conception\r\nof conferring the good upon others, or at least of attaining\r\nit for them, which is our inheritance from the aristocratic\r\ncivilization of the past, is so deeply embodied\r\nin religious, political, and charitable institutions and in\r\nmoral teachings, that it dies hard. Many a man, feeling\r\nhimself justified by the social character of his ultimate aim\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_304\" id=\"Page_304\"\u003e[Pg 304]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n(it may be economic, or educational, or political), is\r\ngenuinely confused or exasperated by the increasing antagonism\r\nand resentment which he evokes, because he has\r\nnot enlisted in his pursuit of the \"common\" end the freely\r\nco\u0026ouml;perative activities of others. This co\u0026ouml;peration must be\r\nthe root principle of the morals of democracy. It must be\r\nconfessed, however, that it has as yet made little progress.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur traditional conceptions of the morally great man,\r\nthe moral hero and leader, the exceptionally good social\r\nand political character, all work against the recognition\r\nof this principle either in practice or theory. They foster\r\nthe notion that it is somebody\u0027s particular business to reach\r\nby his more or less isolated efforts (with \"following,\" or\r\nobedience, or unreflective subordination on the part of\r\nothers) a needed social good. Some genius is to lead the\r\nway; others are to adopt and imitate. Moreover, the\r\nmethod of awakening and enlisting the activities of all\r\nconcerned in pursuit of the end seems slow; it seems to\r\npostpone accomplishment indefinitely. But in truth a\r\ncommon end which is not made such by common, free voluntary\r\nco\u0026ouml;peration in process of achievement is common in\r\nname only. It has no support and guarantee in the activities\r\nwhich it is supposed to benefit, because it is not the\r\nfruit of those activities. Hence, it does not stay put.\r\nIt has to be continually buttressed by appeal to external,\r\nnot voluntary, considerations; bribes of pleasure, threats\r\nof harm, use of force. It has to be undone and done over.\r\nThere is no way to escape or evade this law of happiness,\r\nthat it resides in the exercise of the active capacities of\r\na voluntary agent; and hence no way to escape or evade\r\nthe law of a common happiness, that it must reside in\r\nthe congruous exercise of the voluntary activities of all\r\nconcerned. The inherent irony and tragedy of much\r\nthat passes for a high kind of socialized activity is precisely\r\nthat it seeks a common good by methods which forbid\r\nits being either common or a good.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_305\" id=\"Page_305\"\u003e[Pg 305]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSee references upon utilitarianism at end of ch. xiv. For happiness,\r\nsee Aristotle, \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, Book I., and Book X., chs. vi.-ix.; Dickinson,\r\n\u003ci\u003eThe Meaning of Good\u003c/i\u003e; Paulsen, \u003ci\u003eSystem of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 268-286;\r\nRickaby, \u003ci\u003eAquinas Ethicus\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., pp. 6-39; Mezes, \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, ch. xv.;\r\nSantayana, \u003ci\u003eThe Life of Reason\u003c/i\u003e; Rashdall, \u003ci\u003eThe Theory of Good and\r\nEvil\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe following histories of utilitarianism bring out the social side\r\nof the utilitarian theory: Albee, \u003ci\u003eHistory of Utilitarianism\u003c/i\u003e; Stephen,\r\n\u003ci\u003eThe English Utilitarians\u003c/i\u003e; Hal\u0026eacute;vy, \u003ci\u003eLa Formation du Radicalisme\r\nPhilosophique\u003c/i\u003e, especially Vols. I. and II.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_139_139\" id=\"Footnote_139_139\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_139_139\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[139]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The discussion of altruism and egoism in ch. xviii. on the Self,\r\nconsiders some aspects of this question from another point of view.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_140_140\" id=\"Footnote_140_140\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_140_140\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[140]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eProlegomena to Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, p. 361.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_141_141\" id=\"Footnote_141_141\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_141_141\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[141]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 365-66. Green then goes on to argue that this service\r\nhas been in spite of its hedonistic factor, and that if the theory were\r\ngenerally applied with all the hedonistic implications to personal\r\nbehavior in private life, it would put impediments in the way of moral\r\nprogress.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_142_142\" id=\"Footnote_142_142\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_142_142\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[142]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It will be noted that we have here the same double r\u0026ocirc;le of\r\npleasure that met us at the outset (see \u003ci\u003eante\u003c/i\u003e, p. 267): one sort of\r\nhappiness is the moving spring of action, because object of desire;\r\nanother and incompatible sort is the standard, and hence proper\r\nor right end.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_143_143\" id=\"Footnote_143_143\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_143_143\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[143]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It is this hedonistic element of the object of desire and moving\r\nspring which calls forth such denunciations as Carlyle\u0027s; on the\r\nother hand, it is the assertion of the common happiness as the\r\nstandard which calls out the indignant denial of the utilitarians;\r\nwhich, for example, leads Spencer to retort upon Carlyle\u0027s epithet of\r\n\"pig-philosophy\" with a counter charge that Carlyle\u0027s epithet is a\r\nsurvival of \"devil-worship,\" since it assumes pain to be a blessing.\r\n(\u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., pp. 40-41).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_144_144\" id=\"Footnote_144_144\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_144_144\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[144]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Abbott\u0027s \u003ci\u003eKant\u0027s Theory of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, p. 116.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_145_145\" id=\"Footnote_145_145\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_145_145\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[145]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eUtilitarianism\u003c/i\u003e, third paragraph of ch. iv.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_146_146\" id=\"Footnote_146_146\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_146_146\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[146]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e By this phrase Bentham refers to the necessity of controlling this\r\nspring to activity just as any other is regulated, by reference to\r\nits consequences.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_147_147\" id=\"Footnote_147_147\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_147_147\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[147]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Bentham himself was not a psychologist, and he does not state\r\nthe doctrine in this extreme form. But those of the Benthamites\r\nwho were psychologists, being hedonistic in their psychology, gave\r\nthe doctrine this form.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_148_148\" id=\"Footnote_148_148\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_148_148\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[148]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eEarly Essays\u003c/i\u003e, p. 354. (Reprint by Gibbs, London, 1897.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_149_149\" id=\"Footnote_149_149\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_149_149\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[149]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 357.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_150_150\" id=\"Footnote_150_150\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_150_150\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[150]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 404.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_151_151\" id=\"Footnote_151_151\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_151_151\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[151]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eAutobiography\u003c/i\u003e, London, 1884, p. 143.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_152_152\" id=\"Footnote_152_152\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_152_152\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[152]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eUtilitarianism\u003c/i\u003e, ch. iii., \u003ci\u003epassim\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_153_153\" id=\"Footnote_153_153\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_153_153\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[153]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Some phases of this view as respects legislation, etc., are touched\r\nupon later in ch. xviii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_154_154\" id=\"Footnote_154_154\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_154_154\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[154]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mill in his article on Bentham says of him: \"Personal affection, he\r\nwell knew, is as liable to operate to the injury of third parties, and\r\nrequires as much to be kept in check, as any other feeling whatever:\r\nand general philanthropy … he estimated at its true value when\r\ndivorced from the feeling of duty, as the very weakest and most\r\nunsteady of all feelings\" (\u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 356).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_155_155\" id=\"Footnote_155_155\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_155_155\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[155]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"It is only a poor sort of happiness that could ever come by caring\r\nvery much about our own narrow pleasures. We can only have the\r\nhighest happiness, such as goes along with being a great man, by having\r\nwide thought and much feeling for the rest of the world as well\r\nas ourselves; and this sort of happiness often brings so much pain\r\nwith it, that we can only tell it from pain by its being what we would\r\nchoose before everything else, because our souls see it is good.\"\u0026mdash;\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGeorge\r\nEliot\u003c/span\u003e in \u003ci\u003eRomola\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_156_156\" id=\"Footnote_156_156\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_156_156\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[156]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The recognition of this by many utilitarian hedonists has caused\r\nthem to have recourse to the supernaturally inflicted penalties and\r\nconferred delights of a future life to make sure of balancing up\r\nthe account of virtue as self-sacrificing action with happiness, its\r\nproper end.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_157_157\" id=\"Footnote_157_157\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_157_157\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[157]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The recognition of this type of spiritual selfishness is modern.\r\nIt is the pivot upon which the later (especially) of Ibsen\u0027s tragedies\r\nturn.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_306\" id=\"Page_306\"\u003e[Pg 306]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER XVI\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTHE PLACE OF REASON IN THE MORAL LIFE;\r\nMORAL KNOWLEDGE\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 1. PROBLEM OF REASON AND DESIRE\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIntelligence and Reason in a Moral Act.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;A voluntary\r\nact is one which involves intention, purpose, and thus\r\nsome degree of deliberateness. It is this trait which marks\r\noff the voluntary act from a purely unconscious one (like\r\nthat of a machine) and from one which yields to the superior\r\nurgency of present feeling, one which is pushed on\r\nfrom behind, as an instinctive or impulsive act, instead\r\nof being called out by some possibility ahead. This factor\r\nof forethought and of preference after comparison for\r\nsome one of the ends considered, is the factor of intelligence\r\ninvolved in every voluntary act. To be intelligent in action\r\nis, however, a far-reaching affair. To know what one\r\nis really about is a large and difficult order to fill; so large\r\nand difficult that it is the heart of morality.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_158_158\" id=\"FNanchor_158_158\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_158_158\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[158]\u003c/a\u003e The relevant\r\nbearings of any act are subtler and larger than those\r\nwhich can be foreseen and than those which will be \u003ci\u003eunless\u003c/i\u003e\r\nspecial care is taken. The tendencies which strongly move\r\none to a certain act are often exactly those which tend\r\nto prevent one\u0027s seeing the effect of the act upon his own\r\nhabits and upon the well-being of others. The internal\r\nforces and the external circumstance which evoke the idea\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_307\" id=\"Page_307\"\u003e[Pg 307]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof an end and of the means of attaining it are frequently\r\nalso those which deflect intelligence to a narrow and partial\r\nview. The demand for a standard by which to regulate\r\njudgment of ends is thus the demand not only for intelligence,\r\nbut for a certain kind of intelligence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn short, a truly moral (or right) act is one which is\r\nintelligent in an emphatic and peculiar sense; it is a \u003ci\u003ereasonable\u003c/i\u003e\r\nact. It is not merely one which is thought of, and\r\nthought of as good, at the moment of action, but one which\r\nwill continue to be thought of as \"good\" in the most alert\r\nand persistent reflection.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_159_159\" id=\"FNanchor_159_159\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_159_159\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[159]\u003c/a\u003e For by \"reasonable\" action we\r\nmean such action as recognizes and observes all the necessary\r\nconditions; action in which impulse, instinct, inclination,\r\nhabit, opinion, prejudice (as the case may be) are\r\nmoderated, guided, and determined by considerations\r\nwhich lie outside of and beyond them. Not merely to form\r\nends and select means, but to judge the \u003ci\u003eworth\u003c/i\u003e of these\r\nmeans and ends by a standard, is then the distinctive province\r\nof reason in morals. Its outcome is \u003ci\u003emoral knowledge\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nthat is judgments of right and wrong, both in general,\r\nand in the particular and perplexing cases as they arise.\r\nThis is the topic of the present chapter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTypical Problems.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The problem of moral knowledge is\r\nin its general form: Is there a distinct and separate faculty\r\nof moral reason and knowledge, or is there but one power\r\nof judgment which varies with its object? The former\r\nview is the intuitional (from Latin, \u003ci\u003eintueor\u003c/i\u003e: to look at);\r\nit is associated with theories, which, like the Kantian, emphasize\r\nattitudes, not results and intentions; while the view\r\nwhich holds that there is but one form of thought which,\r\nin morals, concerns itself with results, and with their association\r\nwith the present aim, is the empirical. There\r\nare two especial difficulties which lead to the upholding of\r\nthe intuitional point of view, difficulties which any theory\r\nof moral knowledge has to meet. They are (I) The Rela\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_308\" id=\"Page_308\"\u003e[Pg 308]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etion\r\nof Desire and Reason, and (II) the Knowledge of\r\nPrivate and General Good.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. Desire and Reason.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Ordinary knowledge in practical\r\nmatters follows the line set by desire. Hunger makes\r\nus think of food and of how to get it; sociable desire, of\r\nfriends, and how to secure their companionship, and so on.\r\nNow a surging mass of desires, vehement and bulky, may\r\nconcentrate itself upon the idea of any end; and as soon as\r\nit does so, it tends to shut out wider considerations. As\r\nwe have just seen, it is the object of reason to give us a\r\ncalm, objective, broad, and general survey of the field.\r\nDesires work against this, and unless (so runs the argument)\r\nthere is a faculty which works wholly independent of\r\ndesires, as our ordinary practical knowledge does not, it\r\nis absurd to suppose there can be a rational principle which\r\nwill correct and curb desire.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Private and General Good.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Since the wide and\r\npermanent good is social, it is urged that unless we\r\nhave an independent faculty of moral knowledge, our judgment\r\nwill be subservient to the ends of private desire, and\r\nhence will not place itself at the public point of view. Or,\r\nif it does so, it will be simply as a matter of expediency\r\nto calculate better the means for getting our own pleasure.\r\nIn general, it is urged that only a faculty of knowledge\r\ncompletely independent of personal wishes, habits, purposes\r\ncan secure judgments possessing inherent dignity\r\nand authoritativeness; since these require an elevated,\r\nimpartial, universal, and necessary point of view. We shall\r\nin the sequel attempt to show that this view of knowledge\r\nresults from the false conception of desire as having pleasure\r\nfor its object, and from a false conception of the relation\r\nof intent and motive. When these errors are corrected,\r\nthere is no ground to assume any special faculty of\r\nmoral intelligence, save as the one capacity of thought is\r\nspecialized into a particular mental habit by being constantly\r\noccupied in judging values. We shall try to show\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_309\" id=\"Page_309\"\u003e[Pg 309]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat the broad and public point of view is secured by fusion\r\nof impulses with sympathetic affections. We shall begin\r\nwith stating and criticizing the views of Kant, who upholds\r\nthe doctrine of a separate independent Moral Reason\r\nin its most extreme form.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 2. KANT\u0027S THEORY OF PRACTICAL REASON\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eKant is at one with the hedonist as regards the natural\r\nobject of desire; it is pleasure. All purposes and ends that\r\nspring from inclination and natural tendency come under\r\none head: self-love. Hence, the ordinary use of intelligence\r\nis confined to the matter of passing upon what constitutes\r\nthe individual\u0027s private happiness and how he shall secure\r\nit. There are then fundamental contrasts between ordinary\r\npractical activity and genuinely moral activity,\r\ncontrasts which reflect themselves in the theory of the nature\r\nand function of moral knowledge. (1) The moral end\r\nis \u003ci\u003eunqualified\u003c/i\u003e, absolute, categorical. It is not something\r\nwhich we can pick or leave at our option. Morality is the\r\nregion of final ends, ends not to be disputed or questioned;\r\nand reason must set forth such final ends. Since, however,\r\nhappiness is not a morally necessary end, intelligence in its\r\nbehalf can only give hypothetical counsel and advice: \u003ci\u003eif\u003c/i\u003e\r\nyou would be happy, or happy in this, or that way, then\r\ntake such and such measures. Reason which promulgates\r\nends must be of a different sort from the intelligence which\r\nsimply searches for means.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) Morality is not qualified, but \u003ci\u003ecertain\u003c/i\u003e in its requirements.\r\nThe most inexperienced, the humblest, the one\r\nmost restricted in his circumstances and opportunities,\r\nmust know what is morally required as surely as the\r\nwisest and most educated. Hence moral reason must utter\r\nits precepts clearly and unambiguously. But no one can be\r\n\u003ci\u003esure\u003c/i\u003e what happiness is, or whether a given act will bring joy\r\nor sorrow. \"The problem of determining certainly\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_310\" id=\"Page_310\"\u003e[Pg 310]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhat action would promote the happiness of a rational\r\nbeing is insoluble.\" (Abbott\u0027s \u003ci\u003eKant\u003c/i\u003e, p. 36.) The demand\r\nfor \u003ci\u003ecertainty\u003c/i\u003e of precepts in moral matters also requires\r\na special faculty.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) Morality, which is inexorable and certain in its demands,\r\nis also \u003ci\u003euniversal\u003c/i\u003e in its requirements. Its laws are\r\nthe same yesterday, to-day, and forever, the same for one\r\nas for another. Now happiness notoriously varies with the\r\ncondition and circumstances of a person, as well as with\r\nthe conditions of different peoples and epochs. Intelligence\r\nwith reference to happiness can only give counsel,\r\nnot even rules, so variable is happiness. It can only advise\r\nthat upon the average, under certain conditions, a given\r\ncourse of action has usually promoted happiness. When\r\nwe add that the commands of morality are also universal\r\nwith respect to the different inclinations of different individuals,\r\nwe are made emphatically aware of the necessity of\r\na rational standpoint, which in its impartiality totally\r\ntranscends the ends and plans that grow out of the ordinary\r\nexperience of an individual.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAn A Priori Reason Kant\u0027s Solution.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The net outcome\r\nis that only a reason which is separate and independent\r\nof all experience is capable of meeting the requirements\r\nof morality. What smacks in its origin and aim\r\nof experience is tainted with self-love; is partial, temporary,\r\nuncertain, and relative or dependent. The moral law\r\nis unqualified, necessary, and universal. Hence we have to\r\nrecognize in man as a moral being a faculty of reason\r\nwhich expresses itself in the law of conduct \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e to all\r\nexperience of desire, pleasure, and pain. Besides his sensuous\r\nnature (with respect to which knowledge is bound\r\nup with appetite) man has a purely rational nature, which\r\nmanifests itself in the consciousness of the absolute authority\r\nof universal law.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_160_160\" id=\"FNanchor_160_160\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_160_160\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[160]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_311\" id=\"Page_311\"\u003e[Pg 311]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFormal Character of Such Reason.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This extreme separation\r\nof reason from experience brings with it, however,\r\na serious problem. We shall first state this problem; and\r\nthen show that its artificial and insoluble character serves\r\nas a refutation of Kant\u0027s theory of a transcendental,\r\nor wholly non-natural and non-empirical, mode of knowledge.\r\nReason which is wholly independent of experience\r\nof desires and their results is, as Kant expressly declares,\r\npurely \u003ci\u003eformal\u003c/i\u003e. (Abbott\u0027s \u003ci\u003eKant\u003c/i\u003e, p. 33; p. 114.) That is\r\nto say, it is \u003ci\u003eempty\u003c/i\u003e; it does not point out or indicate anything\r\nparticular to be done. It cannot say be industrious,\r\nor prudent, generous; give, or refrain from giving, so much\r\nmoney to this particular man at this particular time under\r\njust these circumstances. All it says is that morality is\r\nrational and requires man to follow the law of reason. But\r\nthe law of reason is just that a man should follow the law\r\nof reason. And to the inevitable inquiry \"What then is the\r\nlaw of reason?\" the answer still is: To follow the law of\r\nreason. How do we break out of this empty circle into\r\nspecific knowledge of the specific right things to be done?\r\nKant has an answer, which we shall now consider.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eKant\u0027s Method.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;He proceeds as follows: The law is\r\nindeed purely formal or empty (since, once more, all specific\r\nends are \"empirical\" and changeable), but it is so\r\nbecause it is universal. Now nothing which is universal can\r\ncontradict itself. All we need to do is to take any proposed\r\nprinciple of any act and ask ourselves whether it\r\ncan be universalized without self-inconsistency. If it cannot\r\nbe, the act is wrong. If it can be, the act is right.\r\nFor example:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"May I, when in distress, make a promise with the intention\r\nnot to keep it?… The shortest way, and an unerring one to\r\ndiscover the answer to the question whether a lying promise\r\nis consistent with duty, is to ask myself, Should I be content\r\nthat my maxim (to extricate myself from trouble by a\r\nfalse promise) should hold good as a universal law, for myself\r\nas well as for others? And should I be able to say to\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_312\" id=\"Page_312\"\u003e[Pg 312]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmyself, every one may make a deceitful promise when he finds\r\nhimself in a difficulty from which he cannot otherwise extricate\r\nhimself? Then I personally become aware that while I\r\ncan will the lie, I can by no means will that lying should\r\nbe a universal law. For with such a law there would be no\r\nsuch thing as a promise. No one should have any faith in\r\nthe proffered intention, or, if they do so over hastily, would\r\npay one back in one\u0027s own coin at the first opportunity\" (\u003ci\u003eOp.\r\ncit.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 19).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe principle if made universal simply contradicts itself,\r\nand thus reveals that it is no principle at all, not rational.\r\nSumming this up in a formula, we get as our standard of\r\nright action the principle: \"Act as if the maxim of thy\r\naction were to become by thy will a universal law of nature\"\r\n(\u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 39).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe procedure thus indicated seems simple. As long as\r\nan individual considers the purpose or motive of his action\r\nas if it were merely a matter of that one deed; as if it were\r\nan isolated thing, there is no rationality, no consciousness\r\nof moral law or principle. But let the individual imagine\r\nhimself gifted with such power that, if he acts, the motive\r\nof his act will become a fixed, a regular law in the constitution\r\nof things. Would he, as a rational being, be willing to\r\nbring about such a universalization,\u0026mdash;can he, with equanimity\r\nas a reasonable being, contemplate such an outcome?\r\nIf he can, the act is right; if not (as in the case of making\r\na lying promise), wrong.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo sensible person would question the instructiveness of\r\nthis scheme in the concrete. It indicates that the value of\r\nreason\u0026mdash;of abstraction and generalization\u0026mdash;in conduct is\r\nto help us escape from the partiality that flows from desire\r\nand emotion in their first and superficial manifestations,\r\nand to attain a more unified and permanent end. As a\r\nmethod (though not the only one) of realizing the \u003ci\u003efull\r\nmeaning\u003c/i\u003e of a proposed course of action, nothing could be\r\nbetter than asking ourselves how we should like to be\r\ncommitted forever to its principle; how we should like\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_313\" id=\"Page_313\"\u003e[Pg 313]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto have others committed to it and to treat us according\r\nto it? Such a method is well calculated to make us face\r\nour proposed end in its impartial consequences; to teach the\r\ndanger of cherishing merely those results which are most\r\ncongenial to our passing whim and our narrow conception\r\nof personal profit. In short, by generalizing a purpose\r\nwe make its \u003ci\u003egeneral\u003c/i\u003e character evident.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut this method does not proceed (as Kant would have\r\nit) from a mere consideration of moral law \u003ci\u003eapart from a\r\nconcrete end, but from an end in so far as it persistently\r\napproves itself to reflection after an adequate survey of\r\nit in all its bearings\u003c/i\u003e. It is the possibility of \u003ci\u003egeneralizing\r\nthe concrete end\u003c/i\u003e that Kant falls back upon.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOther illustrations which Kant offers enforce the same\r\nlesson. He suggests the following:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1) A man in despair from misfortune considers suicide.\r\n\"Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become\r\na universal law of nature.\" We see at once that a\r\nsystem of nature by which it should be a law to destroy life\r\nby means of the very feeling\u0026mdash;self-love\u0026mdash;whose nature it is\r\nto impel to the maintenance of life, would contradict itself\r\nand therefore could not exist.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) A man who has a certain talent is tempted from sluggishness\r\nand love of amusement not to cultivate it. But if he\r\napplies the principle he sees that, while a system of nature\r\nmight subsist if his motive became a law (so that all people\r\ndevoted their lives to idleness and amusement), yet he cannot\r\n\u003ci\u003ewill\u003c/i\u003e that such a system should receive absolute realization.\r\nAs a rational being he necessarily also wills that faculties\r\nbe developed since they serve for all sorts of possible\r\npurposes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) A prosperous man, who sees some one else to be\r\nwretched, is tempted to pay no attention to it, alleging that\r\nit is no concern of his. Now, if this attitude were made a\r\nuniversal law of nature, the human race might subsist and\r\neven get on after a fashion; but it is impossible to will that\r\nsuch a principle should have the validity of a law of nature.\r\nSuch a will would contradict itself, for many cases would\r\noccur in which the one willing would need the love and\r\nsympathy of others; he could not then without contradicting\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_314\" id=\"Page_314\"\u003e[Pg 314]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhimself wish that selfish disregard should become a regular, a\r\nfixed uniformity.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Social End is the Rational End.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;These illustrations\r\nmake it clear that the \"contradiction\" Kant really\r\ndepends upon to reveal the wrongness of acts, is the introduction\r\nof friction and disorder among the various concrete\r\nends of the individual. He insists especially that the social\r\nrelations of an act bring out its general purport. A\r\nright end is one which can be projected harmoniously\r\ninto the widest and broadest survey of life which the\r\nindividual can make. A \"system of nature\" or of conduct\r\nin which love of life should lead to its own destruction\r\ncertainly contradicts itself. A course of action which\r\nshould include all the tendencies that make for amusement\r\nand sluggishness would be inconsistent with a scheme\r\nof life which would take account of other tendencies\u0026mdash;such\r\nas interest in science, in music, in friendship, in business\r\nachievement, which are just as real constituents of the\r\nindividual, although perhaps not so strongly felt at the\r\nmoment. A totally callous and cruel mode of procedure\r\ncertainly \"contradicts\" a course of life in which every\r\nindividual is so placed as to be dependent upon the sympathy\r\nand upon the help of others. It is the province\r\nof reason to call up a sufficiently wide view of the consequences\r\nof an intention as to enable us to realize such\r\ninconsistencies and contradictions if they exist; to put\r\nbefore us, not through any logical manipulation of the\r\nprinciple of contradiction, but through memory and imagination\r\na particular act, proposal, or suggestion as a portion\r\nof a connected whole of life; to make real to us that\r\nno man, no act, and no satisfaction of any man, falls or\r\nstands to itself, but that it affects and is affected by others.\r\nOur conclusion is: the right as the \u003ci\u003erational\u003c/i\u003e good means\r\nthat which is harmonious with all the capacities and desires\r\nof the self, that which expands them into a co\u0026ouml;perative\r\nwhole.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_315\" id=\"Page_315\"\u003e[Pg 315]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eKant\u0027s Introduction of Social Factors.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The further\r\ndevelopment which Kant gives the formula already quoted\r\n(p. 312) goes far to remove the appearance of opposition\r\nbetween the utilitarian social standard and his own abstract\r\nrationalism. Kant points out that according to\r\nhis view the moral or rational will is its own end. Hence\r\nevery rational person is always an end, never a means:\u0026mdash;this,\r\nindeed, is what we mean by a person. But every normal\r\nhuman being is a rational person. Consequently\r\nanother formula for his maxim is: \"So act as to treat\r\nhumanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any\r\nother, as an end, never as a means merely.\" The man who\r\ncontemplates suicide \"uses a person merely as a means to\r\nmaintaining a tolerable condition of life.\" He who would\r\nmake a lying promise to another makes that other one\r\nmerely a means to his profit, etc. Moreover, since all persons\r\nare equally ends in themselves and are to be equally\r\nregarded in behavior, we may say the standard of right is\r\nthe notion of a \"Kingdom of Ends\"\u0026mdash;the idea of \"the union\r\nof different rational beings in a system by common laws.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_161_161\" id=\"FNanchor_161_161\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_161_161\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[161]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese propositions are rather formal, but the moment\r\nwe put definite meaning into them, they suggest that the\r\ngood for any man is that in which the welfare of others\r\ncounts as much as his own. The right is that action\r\nwhich, so far as in it lies, combines into a whole of common\r\ninterests and purposes the otherwise conflicting aims and\r\ninterests of different persons. So interpreted, the Kantian\r\nformula differs in words, rather than in idea, from Bentham\u0027s\r\nhappiness of all concerned \"each counting for one\r\nand only one\"; from Mill\u0027s statement that the \"deeply\r\nrooted conception which every individual even now has of\r\nhimself as a social being tends to make him feel it as one\r\nof his natural wants, that there should be harmony between\r\nhis feelings and aims and those of his fellow creatures.\"\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_316\" id=\"Page_316\"\u003e[Pg 316]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIn all of these formul\u0026aelig; we find re-statements of our conception\r\nthat the good is the activities in which all men\r\nparticipate so that the powers of each are called out, put\r\nto use, and re\u0026euml;nforced.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eConsequent Transformation of Theory of Reason.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Now\r\nif the common good, in the form of a society of individuals,\r\nas a kingdom of ends, is the object with reference\r\nto which the ends of desire have to be rationalized, Kant\u0027s\r\ntheory of an \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e and empty Reason is completely made\r\nover. In strict logic Kant contradicts himself when he\r\nsays that we are to generalize the end of desire, so as to\r\nsee whether it could become a universal law. For according\r\nto him no end of desire (since it is private and a\r\nform of self-love) \u003ci\u003ecan possibly be generalized\u003c/i\u003e. He is setting\r\nup as a method of enlightenment precisely the very\r\nimpossibility (impossible, that is, on his own theory that\r\nprivate happiness is the end of desire) which made him\r\nfirst resort to his \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e and transcendental reason. No\r\nmore complete contradiction can be imagined.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand, if we neglect the concrete, empirical\r\nconditions and consequences of the object of desire,\r\nthere is no motive whatsoever that may not be generalized.\r\nThere is no \u003ci\u003eformal\u003c/i\u003e contradiction in acting always on a\r\nmotive of theft, unchastity, or insolence. All that Kant\u0027s\r\nmethod can require, in strict logic, is that the individual\r\nalways, under similar circumstances, act from the same motive.\r\nBe willing to be always dishonest, or impure, or proud\r\nin your intent; achieve consistency in the badness of your\r\nmotives, and you will be good! Doubtless no one, not even\r\nthe worst man, would be willing to be universally consistent\r\nin his badness. But this is not in the least a matter\r\nof a purely formal, logical inconsistency of the motive\r\nwith itself;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_162_162\" id=\"FNanchor_162_162\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_162_162\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[162]\u003c/a\u003e it is due rather to that \u003ci\u003econflict among diverse\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_317\" id=\"Page_317\"\u003e[Pg 317]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndesires, and different objects for which one strives, which\r\nmakes him aware that at some time he should want to act\r\nkindly and fairly\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eOrganization of Desires from the Social Standpoint.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;What\r\nKant is really insisting upon at bottom is, then, the\r\ndemand for such a revision of desire as it casually and\r\nunreflectively presents itself as would make the desire a\r\nconsistent expression of the whole body of the purposes of\r\nthe self. What he demands is that a desire shall not be\r\naccepted as an adequate motive till it has been organized\r\ninto desire for an end which will be compatible with the\r\nwhole system of ends involved in the capacities and tendencies\r\nof the agent. This is true rationalization. And\r\nhe further warns us that only when a particular desire\r\nhas in view a good which is social will it meet this requirement.\r\nThis brings us to our next problem. Just\r\nwhat is the process by which we judge of the worth of particular\r\nproposals, plans, courses of actions, desires?\r\nGranted that a generalized good, a socialized happiness,\r\nis the point of view at which we must place ourselves to\r\nsecure the reasonable point of view, how does this point of\r\nview become an operative method?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 3. MORAL SENSE INTUITIONALISM\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo far, our conclusions are (1) that the province of\r\nreason is to enable us to generalize our concrete ends; to\r\nform such ends as are consistent with one another, and\r\nre\u0026euml;nforce one another, introducing continuity and force,\r\nwhere otherwise there would be division and weakness; and\r\n(2) that only social ends are ultimately reasonable, since\r\nthey alone permit us to organize our acts into consistent\r\nwholes. We have now, however, to consider how this conception\r\ntakes effect in detail; how it is employed to determine\r\nthe right or the reasonable in a given situation. We\r\nshall approach this problem by considering a form of in\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_318\" id=\"Page_318\"\u003e[Pg 318]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etuitionalism\r\nhistorically prior to that of Kant. This emphasizes\r\nthe direct character of moral knowledge in particular\r\ncases, and assimilates moral knowledge to the\r\nanalogy of sense perception, which also deals directly with\r\nspecific objects; it insists, however, that a different kind\r\nof faculty of knowledge operates in the knowledge of acts\r\nfrom that which operates in the knowledge of things. Our\r\nunderlying aim here is to bring out the relation of immediate\r\nappreciation to deliberate reflection, with a view to\r\nshowing that the reasonable standpoint, that of the common\r\ngood, becomes effective through the socialized attitudes\r\nand emotions of a person\u0027s own character.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMoral Sense.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This theory holds that rightness is an\r\nintrinsic, absolute quality of special acts, and as such is\r\nimmediately known or recognized for what it is. Just as\r\na white color is known as white, a high tone as high, a\r\nhard body as existent, etc., so an act which is right is\r\nknown as right. In each case, the quality and the fact are\r\nso intimately and inherently bound together that it is absurd\r\nto think of one and not know the other. As a theory\r\nof moral judgment, intuitionalism is thus opposed to utilitarianism,\r\nwhich holds that rightness is not an inherent\r\nquality but one relative to and borrowed from external\r\nand more or less remote consequences. While some\r\nforms of intuitionalism hold that this moral quality belongs\r\nto general rules or to classes of ends, the form we\r\nare now to consider holds that the moral quality of an\r\nindividual act cannot be borrowed even from a moral law,\r\nbut shines forth as an absolute and indestructible part of\r\nthe motive of the act itself. Because the theory in question\r\nsticks to the direct perception of the immediately present\r\nquality of acts, it is usually called, in analogy with\r\nthe direct perception of eye or ear, the moral sense theory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eObjections to Theory.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The objections to this theory\r\nin the extreme form just stated may be brought under\r\ntwo heads: (1) There is no evidence to prove that all\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_319\" id=\"Page_319\"\u003e[Pg 319]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nacts are directly characterized by the possession of absolute\r\nand self-evident rightness and wrongness; there is\r\nmuch evidence to show that this quality when presented by\r\nacts can, as a rule, be traced to earlier instruction, to the\r\npressure of correction and punishment, and to association\r\nwith other experiences. (2) While in this way many acts,\r\nperhaps almost all, of the average mature person of a good\r\nmoral environment, have acquired a direct moral coloring,\r\nmaking unnecessary elaborate calculation or reference to\r\ngeneral principles, yet there is nothing infallible in such\r\nintuitively presented properties. An act may present itself\r\nas thoroughly right and yet may be, in reality, wrong.\r\nThe function of conscious deliberation and reasoning is\r\nprecisely to detect the existence of and to correct such\r\nintuitive cases.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_163_163\" id=\"FNanchor_163_163\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_163_163\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[163]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eI. Direct Perception as Effect of Habits.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It must be\r\nadmitted, as a result of any unprejudiced examination,\r\nthat a large part of the acts, motives, and plans of the\r\nadult who has had favorable moral surroundings seem to\r\npossess directly, and in their own intrinsic make-up, rightness\r\nor wrongness or moral indifference. To think of\r\nlying or stealing is one with thinking of it as wrong;\r\nto recall or suggest an act of kindness is the same as\r\nthinking of it as right; to think of going after mail is to\r\nthink of an act free from either rightness or wrongness.\r\nWith the average person it is probably rare for much\r\ntime to be spent in figuring out whether an act is right\r\nor wrong, after the idea of that act has once definitely\r\npresented itself. So far as the facts of moral experience\r\nin such cases are concerned, the \"moral sense\" theory\r\nappears to give a correct description.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(1) But the conclusion that, therefore, moral goodness\r\nor badness is and always has been an inherent, abso\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_320\" id=\"Page_320\"\u003e[Pg 320]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003elute\r\nproperty of the act itself, overlooks well-known psychological\r\nprinciples. In all perception, in all recognition,\r\nthere is a funding or capitalizing of the results of past\r\nexperience by which the results are rendered available in\r\nnew experiences. Even a young child recognizes a table,\r\na chair, a glass of milk, a dog, as soon as he sees it;\r\nthere is no analysis, no conscious interpretation. Distance,\r\ndirection, size, under normal circumstances, are\r\nperceived with the same assurance and ease. But there\r\nwas a time when all these things were learning; when conscious\r\nexperimentation involving interpretation took\r\nplace. Such perceptions, moreover, take place under\r\nthe guidance of others; pains are taken indelibly\r\nto stamp moral impressions by associating them with\r\nintense, vivid, and mysterious or awful emotional\r\naccompaniments.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_164_164\" id=\"FNanchor_164_164\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_164_164\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[164]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnthropological and historical accounts of different\r\nraces and peoples tell the same story. Acts once entirely\r\ninnocent of moral distinctions have acquired, under differing\r\ncircumstances and sometimes for trivial and absurd\r\nreasons, different moral values:\u0026mdash;one and the same sort\r\nof act being stamped here as absolute guilt, there as an\r\nact of superior and heroic virtue. Now it would be fallacious\r\nto argue (as some do) that because distinctions of\r\nmoral quality have been acquired and are not innate, they\r\nare therefore unreal when they are acquired. Yet the\r\nfact of gradual development proves that no fixed line exists\r\nwhere it can be said the case is closed; that just this is\r\nhenceforth forever right or wrong; that there shall be no\r\nfurther observation of consequences, no further correction\r\nand revision of present \"intuitions.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) Our immediate moral recognitions take place, moreover,\r\nonly under usual circumstances. There is after all\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_321\" id=\"Page_321\"\u003e[Pg 321]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nno such thing as complete moral maturity; all persons\r\nare still more or less children\u0026mdash;in process of learning\r\nmoral distinctions. The more intense their moral interests,\r\nthe more childlike, the more open, flexible, and growing\r\nare their minds. It is only the callous and indifferent,\r\nor at least the conventional, who find all acts and projects\r\nso definitely right and wrong as to render reflection\r\nunnecessary. \"New occasions teach new duties,\" but they\r\nteach them only to those who recognize that they are not\r\nalready in possession of adequate moral judgments. Any\r\nother view destroys the whole meaning of reflective morality\r\nand marks a relapse to the plane of sheer custom. Extreme\r\nintuitionalism and extreme moral conservatism; dislike\r\nto calculation and reflection, for fear of innovations\r\nwith attendant trouble and discomfort, are usually found\r\nto go together.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eII. Direct Perception No Guarantee of Validity.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This\r\nsuggests our second objection. The existence of immediate\r\nmoral quality, the direct and seemingly final\r\npossession of rightness, as matter of fact, is not adequate\r\nproof of validity. At best, it furnishes a presumption\r\nof correctness, in the absence of grounds for questioning\r\nit, in fairly familiar situations. (a) There is nothing\r\nmore direct, more seemingly self-evident, than inveterate\r\nprejudice. When class or vested interest is enlisted in\r\nthe maintenance of the custom or institution which is\r\nexpressed in a prejudice, the most vicious moral judgments\r\nassume the guise of self-conscious sanctity. (b)\r\nA judgment which is correct under usual circumstances\r\nmay become quite unfit, and therefore wrong, if persisted\r\nin under new conditions. Life, individual and social, is in\r\nconstant process of change; and there is always danger\r\nof error in clinging to judgments adjusted to older circumstances.\r\n\"The good is the enemy of the better.\" It\r\nis not merely false ideas of the values of life that have to\r\nbe re-formed, but ideas once true. When economic, politi\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_322\" id=\"Page_322\"\u003e[Pg 322]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ecal,\r\nand scientific conditions are modifying themselves as\r\nrapidly and extensively as they are in our day, it is reconstruction\r\nof moral judgment that needs emphasis,\r\nrather than the existence of a lot of ready-made \"intuitions.\"\r\nWhen readjustment is required, deliberate inquiry\r\nis the only alternative to inconsiderate, undirected,\r\nand hence probably violent changes:\u0026mdash;changes involving\r\nundue relaxation of moral ties on one side and arbitrary\r\nreactions on the other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDeliberation and Intuition.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It is indeed absurd to\r\nset immediate recognition of quality and indirect calculation\r\nof more or less remote consequences, intuition\r\nand thought, over against each other as if they were rivals.\r\nFor they are mutually supplementary. As we saw in a\r\nprevious chapter, the foresight of future results calls\r\nout an \u003ci\u003eimmediate reaction\u003c/i\u003e of satisfaction and dissatisfaction,\r\nof happiness or dislike. (See p. 272.) It is\r\njust as false to say that we calculate only future pains\r\nand pleasures (instead of changes in the world of things\r\nand persons) as it is to say that anticipations of the\r\nchanges to be wrought in the world by our act are not\r\naccompanied by an immediate emotional appreciation of\r\ntheir value. The notion that deliberation upon the various\r\nalternatives open to us is simply a cold-blooded setting\r\ndown of various items to our advantage, and various other\r\nitems to our disadvantage (as Robinson Crusoe wrote\r\ndown in bookkeeping fashion his miseries and blessings),\r\nand then striking an algebraic balance, implies something\r\nthat never did and never could happen. Deliberation\r\nis a process of active, suppressed, rehearsal; of imaginative\r\ndramatic performance of various deeds carrying\r\nto their appropriate issues the various tendencies which\r\nwe feel stirring within us. When we see in imagination this\r\nor that change brought about, there is a direct sense of\r\nthe amount and kind of worth which attaches to it, as\r\nreal and as direct, if not as strong, as if the act were\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_323\" id=\"Page_323\"\u003e[Pg 323]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreally performed and its consequence really brought home\r\nto us.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDeliberation as Dramatic Rehearsal.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We, indeed, estimate\r\nthe import or significance of any present desire\r\nor impulse by forecasting what it would come or amount\r\nto if carried out; literally its consequences define its \u003ci\u003econsequence\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nits meaning and importance. But if these\r\nconsequences were conceived \u003ci\u003emerely as remote\u003c/i\u003e, if their\r\npicturing did not at once arouse a present sense of peace,\r\nof fulfillment, or of dissatisfaction, of incompletion and\r\nirritation, the process of thinking out consequences would\r\nremain purely intellectual. It would be as barren of\r\ninfluence upon behavior as the mathematical speculations\r\nof a disembodied angel. Any actual experience of reflection\r\nupon conduct will show that every foreseen result\r\nat once stirs our present affections, our likes and dislikes,\r\nour desires and aversions. There is developed a running\r\ncommentary which stamps values at once as good or evil.\r\nIt is this direct sense of value, not the consciousness of\r\ngeneral rules or ultimate goals, which finally determines\r\nthe worth of the act to the agent. Here is the inexpugnable\r\nelement of truth in the intuitional theory. Its\r\nerror lies in conceiving this immediate response of appreciation\r\nas if it excluded reflection instead of following\r\ndirectly upon its heels. Deliberation is actually an imaginative\r\nrehearsal of various courses of conduct. We\r\ngive way, \u003ci\u003ein our mind\u003c/i\u003e, to some impulse; we try, \u003ci\u003ein our\r\nmind\u003c/i\u003e, some plan. Following its career through various\r\nsteps, we find ourselves in imagination in the presence of\r\nthe consequences that would follow: and as we then like\r\nand approve, or dislike and disapprove, these consequences,\r\nwe find the original impulse or plan good or bad.\r\nDeliberation is dramatic and active, not mathematical and\r\nimpersonal; and hence it has the intuitive, the direct factor\r\nin it. The advantage of a mental trial, prior to the overt\r\ntrial (for the act after all is itself also a trial, a prov\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_324\" id=\"Page_324\"\u003e[Pg 324]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eing\r\nof the idea that lies back of it), is that it is retrievable,\r\nwhereas overt consequences remain. They cannot be recalled.\r\nMoreover, many trials may mentally be made in a\r\nshort time. The imagining of various plans carried out\r\nfurnishes an opportunity for many impulses which at\r\nfirst are not in evidence at all, to get under way. Many\r\nand varied direct sensings, appreciations, take place.\r\nWhen many tendencies are brought into play, there is\r\nclearly much greater probability that the capacity of self\r\nwhich is really needed and appropriate will be brought\r\ninto action, and thus a truly reasonable happiness result.\r\nThe tendency of deliberation to \"polarize\" the various lines\r\nof activity into opposed alternatives, into incompatible\r\n\"either this or that,\" is a way of forcing into clear recognition\r\nthe importance of the issue.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Good Man\u0027s Judgments as Standard.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This explains\r\nthe idea of Aristotle that only the good man is a\r\ngood judge of what is really good. Such an one will take\r\nsatisfaction in the thought of noble ends and will recoil\r\nat the idea of base results. Because of his formed capacities,\r\nhis organized habits and tendencies, he will respond\r\nto a suggested end with an emotion which confers its\r\nappropriate kind and shade of value. The brave man\r\nis sensitive to all acts and plans so far as they involve\r\nenergy and endurance in overcoming painful obstacles;\r\nthe kindly man responds at once to the elements that\r\naffect the well-being of others. The moral sense or direct\r\nappreciations of the good man may thus be said to furnish\r\nthe standard of right and wrong. There are few persons\r\nwho, when in doubt regarding a difficult matter of conduct,\r\ndo not think of some other person in whose goodness\r\nthey believe, and endeavor to direct and clinch their\r\nown judgment by imagining how such an one would react\r\nin a similar situation\u0026mdash;what he would find congenial and\r\nwhat disagreeable. Or else they imagine what that other\r\nperson would think of them if he knew of their doing such\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_325\" id=\"Page_325\"\u003e[Pg 325]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand such an act. And while this method cannot supply the\r\nstandard of their own judgment, cannot determine the\r\nright or wrong for their own situations, it helps emancipate\r\njudgment from selfish partialities, and it facilitates\r\na freer and more flexible play of imagination in construing\r\nand appreciating the situation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 4. THE PLACE OF GENERAL RULES\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBetween such a highly generalized and formal principle\r\nas that of Kant, and the judgment of particular cases, we\r\nhave intermediate generalizations; rules which are broad\r\nas compared with individual deeds, but narrow as compared\r\nwith some one final principle. What are their rational\r\norigin, place, and function? We have here again\r\nboth the empirical and the intuitional theories of knowledge,\r\nhaving to deal with the same fundamental difficulty:\r\nWhat is the relation of the special rule to the general\r\nprinciple on one side and to the special case on the other?\r\nThe more general, the more abstractly rational the rule,\r\nthe vaguer and less applicable it is. The more definite\r\nand fixed it is, the greater the danger that it will be a\r\nProcrustean bed, mutilating the rich fullness of the individual\r\nact, or destroying its grace and freedom by making\r\nit conform servilely to a hard and fast rule. Our analysis\r\nwill accordingly be devoted to bringing to light the conditions\r\nunder which a rule may be rational and yet be of\r\nspecific help.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eI. Intuitionalism and Casuistry.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Utilitarianism at\r\nleast holds that rules are derived from actual cases of conduct;\r\nhence there must be points of likeness between the\r\ncases to be judged and the rules for judging them. But\r\nrules which do not originate from a consideration of\r\nspecial cases, which simply descend out of the blue sky,\r\nhave only the most mechanical and external relation to the\r\nindividual acts to be judged. Suppose one is convinced\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_326\" id=\"Page_326\"\u003e[Pg 326]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat the rule of honesty was made known just in and of\r\nitself by a special faculty, and had absolutely nothing\r\nto do with the recollection of past cases or the forecast\r\nof possible future circumstances. How would such a rule\r\napply itself to any particular case which needed to be\r\njudged? What bell would ring, what signal would be\r\ngiven, to indicate that just \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e case is the appropriate\r\ncase for the application of the rule of honest dealing?\r\nAnd if by some miracle this question were answered so one\r\nknows that here is a case for the rule of honesty, how would\r\nwe know just what course in detail the rule calls for?\r\nFor the rule, to be applicable to all cases, must omit the\r\nconditions which differentiate one case from another; it\r\nmust contain only the very few similar elements which are\r\nto be found in all honest deeds. Reduced to this skeleton,\r\nnot much would be left save the bare injunction to be honest\r\nwhatever happens, leaving it to chance, the ordinary judgment\r\nof the individual, or to external authority to find\r\nout just \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e honesty specifically means in the given case.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis difficulty is so serious that all systems which have\r\ncommitted themselves to belief in a number of hard and\r\nfast rules having their origin in conscience, or in the word\r\nof God impressed upon the human soul or externally revealed,\r\nalways have had to resort to a more and more\r\ncomplicated procedure to cover, if possible, all the cases.\r\nThe moral life is finally reduced by them to an elaborate\r\nformalism and legalism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIllustration in Casuistry.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Suppose, for example, we\r\ntake the Ten Commandments as a starting-point. They\r\nare only ten, and naturally confine themselves to general\r\nideas, and ideas stated mainly in negative form. Moreover,\r\nthe same act may be brought under more than one\r\nrule. In order to resolve the practical perplexities and\r\nuncertainties which inevitably arise under such circumstances,\r\n\u003ci\u003eCasuistry\u003c/i\u003e is built up (from the Latin \u003ci\u003ecasus\u003c/i\u003e,\r\ncase). The attempt is made to foresee all the different\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_327\" id=\"Page_327\"\u003e[Pg 327]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncases of action which may conceivably occur, and provide\r\nin advance the exact rule for each case. For example, with\r\nreference to the rule \"do not kill,\" a list will be made of\r\nall the different situations in which killing might occur:\u0026mdash;accident,\r\nwar, fulfillment of command of political superior\r\n(as by a hangman), self-defense (defense of one\u0027s\r\nown life, of others, of property), deliberate or premeditated\r\nkilling with its different motives (jealousy, avarice,\r\nrevenge, etc.), killing with slight premeditation, from sudden\r\nimpulse, from different sorts and degrees of provocation.\r\nTo each one of these possible cases is assigned\r\nits exact moral quality, its exact degree of turpitude\r\nand innocency. Nor can this process end with overt acts;\r\nall the inner springs of action which affect regard for life\r\nmust be similarly classified: envy, animosity, sudden rage,\r\nsullenness, cherishing of sense of injury, love of tyrannical\r\npower, hardness or hostility, callousness\u0026mdash;all these\r\nmust be specified into their different kinds and the exact\r\nmoral worth of each determined. What is done for this\r\none kind of case must be done for every part and phase\r\nof the entire moral life until it is all inventoried, catalogued,\r\nand distributed into pigeon-holes definitely labelled.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDangers of Casuistry.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Now dangers and evils attend\r\nthis way of conceiving the moral life, (a) \u003ci\u003eIt tends to\r\nmagnify the letter of morality at the expense of its spirit.\u003c/i\u003e\r\nIt fixes attention not upon the positive good in an act,\r\nnot upon the underlying agent\u0027s disposition which forms its\r\nspirit, nor upon the unique occasion and context which\r\nform its atmosphere, but upon its literal conformity with\r\nRule A, Class I., Species 1, sub-head (1), etc. The\r\neffect of this is inevitably to narrow the scope and lessen\r\nthe depth of conduct. (i.) It tempts some to hunt for that\r\nclassification of their act which will make it the most convenient\r\nor profitable for themselves. In popular speech,\r\n\"casuistical\" has come to mean a way of judging acts\r\nwhich splits hairs in the effort to find a way of acting\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_328\" id=\"Page_328\"\u003e[Pg 328]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat conduces to personal interest and profit, and which\r\nyet may be justified by some moral principle. (ii.) With\r\nothers, this regard for the letter makes conduct formal\r\nand pedantic. It gives rise to a rigid and hard type of\r\ncharacter illustrated among the Pharisees of olden and\r\nthe Puritans of modern time\u0026mdash;the moral schemes of both\r\nclasses being strongly impregnated with the notion of fixed\r\nmoral rules.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(b) \u003ci\u003eThis ethical system also tends in practice to\r\na legal view of conduct.\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;Historically it always has\r\nsprung from carrying over legal ideas into morality.\r\nIn the legal view, liability to blame and to punishment\r\ninflicted from without by some superior authority, is necessarily\r\nprominent. Conduct is regulated through specific\r\ninjunctions and prohibitions: Do this, Do not do that.\r\nExactly the sort of analysis of which we have spoken\r\nabove (p. 327) in the case of killing is necessary, so that\r\nthere may be definite and regular methods of measuring\r\nguilt and assigning blame. Now the ideas of liability and\r\npunishment and reward are, as we shall see in our further\r\ndiscussion (chs. xvii. and xxi.), important factors in the\r\nconduct of life, but any scheme of morals is defective\r\nwhich puts the question of avoiding punishment in the\r\nforeground of attention, and which tends to create a Pharisaical\r\ncomplacency in the mere fact of having conformed\r\nto command or rule.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(c) \u003ci\u003eProbably the worst evil of this moral system is\r\nthat it tends to deprive moral life of freedom and spontaneity\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand to reduce it (especially for the conscientious\r\nwho take it seriously) to a more or less anxious and\r\nservile conformity to externally imposed rules. Obedience\r\nas loyalty to principle is a good, but this scheme practically\r\nmakes it the only good and conceives it not as loyalty\r\nto ideals, but as conformity to commands. Moral\r\nrules exist just as independent deliverances on their own\r\naccount, and the right thing is merely to follow them. This\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_329\" id=\"Page_329\"\u003e[Pg 329]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nputs the center of moral gravity outside the concrete\r\nprocesses of living. All systems which emphasize the letter\r\nmore than the spirit, legal consequences more than vital\r\nmotives, put the individual under the weight of external\r\nauthority. They lead to the kind of conduct described by\r\nSt. Paul as under the law, not in the spirit, with its constant\r\nattendant weight of anxiety, uncertain struggle,\r\nand impending doom.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAll Fixed Rules Have Same Tendencies.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Many who\r\nstrenuously object to all of these schemes of conduct, to\r\neverything which hardens it into forms by emphasizing\r\nexternal commands, authority and punishments and rewards,\r\nfail to see that such evils are logically connected\r\nwith any acceptance of the finality of fixed rules. They\r\nhold certain bodies of people, religious officers, political\r\nor legal authorities, responsible for what they object to\r\nin the scheme; while they still cling to the idea that morality\r\nis an effort to apply to particular deeds and projects a\r\ncertain number of absolute unchanging moral rules. They\r\nfail to see that, if this were its nature, those who attempt\r\nto provide the machinery which would render it practically\r\nworkable deserve praise rather than blame. In fact, the\r\nnotion of absolute rules or precepts cannot be made workable\r\nexcept through certain superior authorities who declare\r\nand enforce them. Said Locke: \"It is no small power\r\nit gives one man over another to be the dictator of principles\r\nand teacher of unquestionable truths.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eII. Utilitarian View of General Rules.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The utilitarians\r\nescape the difficulties inherent in the application to\r\nparticular cases of a rule which has nothing to do with\r\nparticular cases. Their principles for judging right and\r\nwrong in particular cases are themselves generalizations\r\nfrom particular observations of the effect of certain acts\r\nupon happiness and misery. But if we take happiness\r\nin the technical sense of Bentham (as meaning, that is,\r\nan aggregate of isolated pleasures) it is impossible for\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_330\" id=\"Page_330\"\u003e[Pg 330]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ngeneral rules to exist\u0026mdash;there is nothing to generalize.\r\nIf, however, we take happiness in its common-sense form,\r\nas welfare, a state of successful achievement, satisfactory\r\nrealization of purpose, there can be no doubt of the existence\r\nof maxims and formul\u0026aelig; in which mankind has registered\r\nits experience. The following quotations from Mill\r\nbring out the essential points:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"We think utility or happiness much too complex and indefinite\r\nan end to be sought except through the medium of\r\nvarious secondary ends concerning which there may be, and\r\noften is, agreement among persons who differ in their ultimate\r\nstandard; and about which there does in fact prevail a much\r\ngreater unanimity among thinking persons, than might be supposed\r\nfrom their diametrical divergence on the great questions\r\nof moral metaphysics\" (\u003ci\u003eEssay on Bentham\u003c/i\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese secondary ends or principles are such matters as\r\nregard for health, honesty, chastity, kindness, and the\r\nlike. Concerning them he says in his \u003ci\u003eUtilitarianism\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(ch. ii.):\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"Mankind must by this time have acquired positive beliefs as\r\nto the effects of some actions on their happiness; and the beliefs\r\nwhich have thus come down are rules of morality for the\r\nmultitude and for the philosopher until he has succeeded in\r\nfinding better…. To consider the rules of morality as improvable\r\nis one thing; to pass over the intermediate generalizations\r\nentirely and endeavor to test each individual action\r\ndirectly by the first principle, is another…. Nobody argues\r\nthat the act of navigation is not founded on astronomy,\r\nbecause sailors cannot wait to calculate the nautical almanac.\r\nBeing rational creatures, they go to sea with it already calculated;\r\nand all rational creatures go out upon the sea of life\r\nwith their minds made up on the common questions of right\r\nand wrong, as well as on many of the far more difficult questions\r\nof wise and foolish.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEmpirical Rules Run into Fixed Customs.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It cannot\r\nbe denied that Mill here states considerations which are of\r\ngreat value in aiding present judgments on right and\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_331\" id=\"Page_331\"\u003e[Pg 331]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwrong. The student of history will have little doubt that\r\nthe rules of conduct which the intuitionalist takes as ultimate\r\ndeliverances of a moral faculty are in truth generalizations\r\nof the sort indicated by Mill. But the truth\r\nbrought out by Mill does not cover the ground which\r\nneeds to be covered. Such rules at best cover customary\r\nelements; they are based upon past habits of life, past\r\nnatural economic and political environments. And, as the\r\nstudent of customs knows, greater store is often set upon\r\ntrivial, foolish, and even harmful things than upon serious\r\nones\u0026mdash;upon fashions of hair-dressing, ablutions, worship\r\nof idols. Coming nearer our own conditions, past customs\r\ncertainly tolerate and sanction many practices, such\r\nas war, cruel business competition, economic exploitation\r\nof the weak, and absence of co\u0026ouml;perative intelligent foresight,\r\nwhich the more sensitive consciences of the day will\r\nnot approve.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHence are Unsatisfactory.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Yet such things have been\r\nso identified with happiness that to forego them means\r\nmisery, to alter them painful disturbance. To take the\r\nrules of the past with any literalness as criteria of judgment\r\nin the present, would be to return to the unprogressive\r\nmorality of the r\u0026eacute;gime of custom\u0026mdash;to surrender\r\nthe advance marked by reflective morality. Since Bentham\r\nand Mill were both utilitarians, it is worth noting that\r\nBentham insisted upon the utilitarian standard just because\r\nhe was so convinced of the unsatisfactory character\r\nof the kind of rules upon which Mill is dwelling. The\r\n\"Nautical Almanac\" has been \u003ci\u003escientifically\u003c/i\u003e calculated; it\r\nis adapted rationally to its end; but the rules which sum\r\nup custom are a confused mixture of class interest, irrational\r\nsentiment, authoritative pronunciamento, and genuine\r\nconsideration of welfare.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEmpirical Rules Also Differ Widely.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The fact is,\r\nmoreover, that it is only when the \"intermediate generalizations\"\r\nare taken vaguely and abstractly that there is\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_332\" id=\"Page_332\"\u003e[Pg 332]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas much agreement as Mill claims. All educated and\r\nvirtuous persons in the same country practically agree\r\nupon the rules of justice, benevolence, and regard for life,\r\nso long as they are taken in such a vague way that they\r\nmean anything in general and nothing in particular.\r\nEvery one is in favor of justice in the abstract; but existing\r\npolitical and economic discussions regarding tariff,\r\nsumptuary laws, monetary standards, trades unions,\r\ntrusts, the relation of capital and labor, the regulation\r\nor ownership of public utilities, the nationalization of land\r\nand industry, show that large bodies of intelligent and\r\nequally well-disposed people are quite capable of finding\r\nthat the principle of justice requires exactly opposite\r\nthings.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCustom still forms the background of all moral life,\r\nnor can we imagine a state of affairs in which it should\r\nnot. Customs are not external to individuals\u0027 courses\r\nof action; they are embodied in the habits and purposes\r\nof individuals; in the words of Grote (quoted above, p.\r\n173), they \"reign under the appearance of habitual, \u003ci\u003eself-suggested\u003c/i\u003e\r\ntendencies.\" Laws, formulated and unformulated,\r\nsocial conventions, rules of manners, the general\r\nexpectations of public opinion, are all of them sources\r\nof instruction regarding conduct. Without them the\r\nindividual would be practically helpless in determining the\r\nright courses of action in the various situations in which\r\nhe finds himself. Through them he has provided himself\r\nin advance with a list of questions, an organized series of\r\npoints-of-view, by which to approach and estimate each\r\nstate of affairs requiring action. Most of the moral judgments\r\nof every individual are framed in this way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFor Customs Conflict.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;If social customs, or individual\r\nhabits, never conflicted with one another, this sort\r\nof guidance would suffice for the determination of right\r\nand wrong. But reflection is necessitated because opposite\r\nhabits set up incompatible ends, forms of happiness be\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_333\" id=\"Page_333\"\u003e[Pg 333]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etween\r\nwhich choice has to be made. Hence the need of\r\n\u003ci\u003eprinciples in judging\u003c/i\u003e. Principles of judgment cannot\r\nsimply reinstate past rules of behavior, for the simple reason\r\nthat as long as these rules suffice there is no reflection\r\nand no demand for principles. Good and evil, right and\r\nwrong, are embodied in the injunctions and prohibitions of\r\ncustoms and institutions and are not thought about.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMoral Import of Principles is Intellectual, Not Imperative.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This\r\nbrings us to the essential point in the consideration\r\nof the value of general principles. \u003ci\u003eRules are\r\npractical; they are habitual ways of doing things. But\r\nprinciples are intellectual; they are useful methods of\r\njudging things.\u003c/i\u003e The fundamental error of the intuitionalist\r\nand of the utilitarian (represented in the quotation\r\nfrom Mill) is that they are on the lookout for rules which\r\nwill of themselves tell agents just what course of action to\r\npursue; \u003ci\u003ewhereas the object of moral principles is to supply\r\nstandpoints and methods which will enable the individual to\r\nmake for himself an analysis of the elements of good and\r\nevil in the particular situation in which he finds himself\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nNo genuine moral principle prescribes a specific course of\r\naction; rules\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_165_165\" id=\"FNanchor_165_165\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_165_165\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[165]\u003c/a\u003e like cooking recipes, may tell just what to\r\ndo and how to do it. A moral principle, such as that of\r\nchastity, of justice, of the golden rule, gives the agent a\r\nbasis for looking at and examining a particular question\r\nthat comes up. It holds before him certain possible aspects\r\nof the act; it warns him against taking a short or\r\npartial view of the act. It economizes his thinking by\r\nsupplying him with the main heads by reference to which\r\nto consider the bearings of his desires and purposes; it\r\nguides him in his thinking by suggesting to him the important\r\nconsiderations for which he should be on the\r\nlookout.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_334\" id=\"Page_334\"\u003e[Pg 334]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGolden Rule as a Tool of Analysis.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;A moral principle,\r\nthen, is not a command to act or forbear acting in a given\r\nway: \u003ci\u003eit is a tool for analyzing a special situation\u003c/i\u003e, the right\r\nor wrong being determined by the situation in its entirety,\r\nand not by the rule as such. We sometimes hear it stated,\r\nfor example, that the universal adoption of the Golden\r\nRule would at once settle all industrial disputes and difficulties.\r\nBut supposing that the principle were accepted in\r\ngood faith by everybody; it would not at once tell everybody\r\njust what to do in all the complexities of his relations\r\nto others. When individuals are still uncertain of what\r\ntheir real good may be, it does not finally decide matters\r\nto tell them to regard the good of others as they would\r\ntheir own. Nor does it mean that whatever in detail we\r\nwant for ourselves we should strive to give to others.\r\nBecause I am fond of classical music it does not follow that\r\nI should thrust as much of it as possible upon my neighbors.\r\nBut the \"Golden Rule\" does furnish us a \u003ci\u003epoint\r\nof view from which to consider acts\u003c/i\u003e; it suggests the necessity\r\nof considering how our acts affect the interests of\r\nothers as well as our own; it tends to prevent partiality\r\nof regard; it warns against setting an undue estimate\r\nupon a particular consequence of pain or pleasure, simply\r\nbecause it happens to affect us. In short, the Golden Rule\r\ndoes not issue special orders or commands; but it does\r\nsimplify judgment of the situations requiring intelligent\r\ndeliberation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSympathy as Actuating Principle of a Reasonable\r\nJudgment.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We have had repeated occasion (as in the\r\ndiscussion of intent and motive, of intuition and deliberate\r\ncalculation) to see how artificial is the separation of emotion\r\nand thought from one another. As the only effective\r\nthought is one fused by emotion into a dominant interest,\r\nso the only truly general, the reasonable as distinct\r\nfrom the merely shrewd or clever thought, is the \u003ci\u003egenerous\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthought. Sympathy widens our interest in consequences\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_335\" id=\"Page_335\"\u003e[Pg 335]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand leads us to take into account such results as affect\r\nthe welfare of others; it aids us to count and weigh these\r\nconsequences as counting for as much as those which touch\r\nour own honor, purse, or power. To put ourselves in the\r\nplace of another, to see from the standpoint of his purposes\r\nand values, to humble our estimate of our own claims\r\nand pretensions to the level they would assume in the\r\neyes of a sympathetic and impartial observer, is the surest\r\nway to attain universality and objectivity of moral knowledge.\r\nSympathy, in short, is the general principle of\r\nmoral knowledge, not because its commands take precedence\r\nof others (which they do not necessarily), but because\r\nit furnishes the most reliable and efficacious \u003ci\u003eintellectual\u003c/i\u003e\r\nstandpoint. It supplies the tool, \u003ci\u003epar excellence\u003c/i\u003e, for\r\nanalyzing and resolving complex cases. As was said in\r\nour last chapter, it is the \u003ci\u003efusion\u003c/i\u003e of the sympathetic impulses\r\nwith others that is needed; what we now add is\r\nthat in this fusion, sympathy supplies the \u003ci\u003epou sto\u003c/i\u003e for an\r\neffective, broad, and objective survey of desires, projects,\r\nresolves, and deeds. It translates the formal and empty\r\nreason of Kant out of its abstract and theoretic character,\r\njust as it carries the cold calculations of utilitarianism\r\ninto recognition of the common good.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor criticisms of Kant\u0027s view of reason, see Caird, \u003ci\u003ePhilosophy of\r\nKant\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II., Book II., ch. ii.; Paulsen, \u003ci\u003eSystem of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 194-203\r\nand 355-363; Fite, \u003ci\u003eIntroductory Study\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 173-188; Muirhead,\r\n\u003ci\u003eElements of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 112-124.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor intuitionalism, see Calderwood, \u003ci\u003eHandbook of Moral Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nMaurice, \u003ci\u003eConscience\u003c/i\u003e; Whewell, \u003ci\u003eThe Elements of Morality\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nMartineau, \u003ci\u003eTypes of Ethical Theory\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II., pp. 96-115; Mezes,\r\n\u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, ch. iii.; Sidgwick, \u003ci\u003eMethods of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Book I., chs. viii.-ix.,\r\nand Book III. entire, but especially ch. i.; \u003ci\u003eHistory of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, 170-204,\r\nand 224-236, and \u003ci\u003eLectures on Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n361-374.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the moral sense theory, see Sidgwick, \u003ci\u003eHistory of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, p.\r\n189; Shaftesbury, \u003ci\u003eCharacteristics\u003c/i\u003e; Hutcheson, \u003ci\u003eSystem of Moral\r\nPhilosophy\u003c/i\u003e.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_336\" id=\"Page_336\"\u003e[Pg 336]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor casuistry, see references in Rand\u0027s \u003ci\u003eBibliography\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. III.,\r\nPart II., p. 880.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the variability of moral rules, see Locke, \u003ci\u003eEssay on the Human\r\nUnderstanding\u003c/i\u003e, Book I.; Bain, \u003ci\u003eMoral Science\u003c/i\u003e, Part I., ch. iii.; Spencer,\r\n\u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., Part II.; Williams, \u003ci\u003eReview of Evolutional\r\nEthics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 423-465; Bowne, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, ch. v.;\r\nSchurman, \u003ci\u003eThe Ethical Import of Darwinism\u003c/i\u003e; the writings of Westermarck\r\nand Hobhouse elsewhere referred to, and Darwin, \u003ci\u003eDescent of\r\nMan\u003c/i\u003e, Part I., chs. iv.-v.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the nature of moral judgment and the function of reason in\r\nconduct, see Aristotle, Book III., chs. ii.-iii., and Book VI.; Ladd,\r\n\u003ci\u003ePhilosophy of Conduct\u003c/i\u003e, ch. vii.; Sharp, \u003ci\u003eEssay on Analysis of the\r\nMoral Judgment\u003c/i\u003e, in Studies in Philosophy and Psychology (Garman\r\nCommemorative Volume); Santayana, \u003ci\u003eLife of Reason\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., chs.\r\nx.-xii.; Bryant, \u003ci\u003eStudies in Character\u003c/i\u003e, Part II., chs. iv.-v.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the social character of conscience, see Cooley, \u003ci\u003eHuman Nature\r\nand the Social Order\u003c/i\u003e, ch. x.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor sympathy and conscience, see Adam Smith, \u003ci\u003eTheory of Moral\r\nSentiments\u003c/i\u003e, especially Part III., chs. i. and iv., and Part IV., chs.\r\ni.-iii.; Stephen, \u003ci\u003eScience of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 228-238.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_158_158\" id=\"Footnote_158_158\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_158_158\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[158]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"Any one can be angry: that is quite easy. Any one can give\r\nmoney away or spend it. But to do these things to the right person,\r\nto the right amount, at the right time, with the right aim and in the\r\nright manner\u0026mdash;this is not what any one can easily do.\"\u0026mdash;\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAristotle\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, Book II., ch. ix.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_159_159\" id=\"Footnote_159_159\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_159_159\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[159]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Compare the sentence quoted on p. 268 from Hazlitt.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_160_160\" id=\"Footnote_160_160\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_160_160\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[160]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This means Duty. This phase will be discussed in the next\r\nchapter.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_161_161\" id=\"Footnote_161_161\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_161_161\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[161]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eKant\u0027s Theory of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, trans. by Abbott, pp. 47-51.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_162_162\" id=\"Footnote_162_162\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_162_162\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[162]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In last analysis Kant is trying to derive moral enlightenment\r\nfrom the most abstract principle of formal logic, the principle of\r\nIdentity, that A is A!\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_163_163\" id=\"Footnote_163_163\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_163_163\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[163]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e A student in an ethics class once made this remark: \"Conscience\r\nis infallible, but we should not always follow it. Sometimes we\r\nshould use our reason.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_164_164\" id=\"Footnote_164_164\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_164_164\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[164]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Compare Locke, \u003ci\u003eEssay on the Human Understanding\u003c/i\u003e, Book I.,\r\nch. iii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_165_165\" id=\"Footnote_165_165\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_165_165\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[165]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Of course, the word \"rule\" is often used to designate a principle\u0026mdash;as\r\nin the case of the phrase \"golden-rule.\" We are speaking not\r\nof the words, but of their underlying ideas.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_337\" id=\"Page_337\"\u003e[Pg 337]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER XVII\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTHE PLACE OF DUTY IN THE MORAL LIFE:\r\nSUBJECTION TO AUTHORITY\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eConflict of Ends as Attractive and as Reasonable.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\nprevious discussion has brought out the contrast between\r\na Good or Satisfaction which is such \u003ci\u003edirectly\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nimmediately, by appealing attractively to desire; and\r\none which is such indirectly, through considerations which\r\nreflection brings up. As we have seen, the latter must,\r\nif entertained at all, arouse some direct emotional response,\r\nmust be felt to be in some way satisfactory. But the\r\n\u003ci\u003eway\u003c/i\u003e may be quite unlike that of the end which attracts\r\nand holds a man irrespective of the principle brought\r\nto light by reflection. The one may be intense, vivid,\r\nabsorbing, passing at once into overt action, unless\r\nchecked by a contrary reason. The good whose claim to\r\nbe good depends mainly on projection of remote considerations,\r\nmay be theoretically recognized and yet the direct\r\nappeal to the particular agent at the particular time be\r\nfeeble and pallid. The \"law of the mind\" may assert itself\r\nless urgently than the \"law of the members\" which wars\r\nagainst it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTwo Senses of Term Duty.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This contrast gives rise\r\nto the fact of Duty. On one side is the rightful supremacy\r\nof the reasonable but remote good; on the other side is\r\nthe aversion of those springs to action which are immediately\r\nmost urgent. Between them exists the necessity\r\nof securing for the reasonable good efficacy in operation;\r\nor the necessity of redirecting the play of naturally\r\ndominant desires. Duty is also used, to be sure, in a\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_338\" id=\"Page_338\"\u003e[Pg 338]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlooser and more external sense. To identify the dutiful\r\nwith the right apart from conflict, to say that a man did\r\nhis duty, may mean that he did right, irrespective of the\r\nprior state of his inclinations. It frequently happens\r\nthat the wider and larger good which is developed through\r\nreflective memory and foresight is welcomed, is directly\r\nappreciated as good, since it is thoroughly attractive.\r\nWithout stress and strain, without struggle, it just displaces\r\nthe object which unreflective impulse had suggested.\r\nIt is the fit and proper, the only sensible and\r\nwise thing, under the circumstances. The man does his\r\nduty, but is glad to do it, and would be troubled by the\r\nthought of another line of action. So far as calling the\r\nact \"duty\" brings in any new meaning, it means that the\r\nright act is one which is found to meet the demands, the\r\nnecessities, of the situation in which it takes place. The\r\nRomans thus spoke of duties as \u003ci\u003eoffices\u003c/i\u003e, the performance\r\nof those functions which are appropriate to the status\r\nwhich every person occupies because of his social relations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eConscious Conflict.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;But there are other cases in which\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eright\u003c/i\u003e end is distinctly apprehended by the person\r\nas standing in opposition to his natural inclinations, as\r\na principle or law which \u003ci\u003eought\u003c/i\u003e to be followed, but which\r\n\u003ci\u003ecan\u003c/i\u003e be followed only by constraining the inclinations, by\r\nsnubbing and coercing them. This state of affairs is\r\nwell represented by the following quotation from Matthew\r\nArnold, if we take it as merely describing the facts, not\r\nas implying a theory as to their explanation:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"All experience with conduct brings us at last to the fact\r\nof two selves, or instincts, or forces\u0026mdash;name them, however\r\nwe may and however we may suppose them to have arisen\u0026mdash;contending\r\nfor the mastery over men: one, a movement of\r\nfirst impulse and more involuntary, leading us to gratify any\r\ninclination that may solicit us and called generally a movement\r\nof man\u0027s ordinary or passing self, of sense, appetite,\r\ndesire; the other a movement of reflection and more voluntary,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_339\" id=\"Page_339\"\u003e[Pg 339]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nleading us to submit inclination to some rule, and called generally\r\na movement of man\u0027s higher or enduring self, of reason,\r\nspirit, will.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_166_166\" id=\"FNanchor_166_166\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_166_166\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[166]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe shall (I.) present what we consider the true account\r\nof this situation of conflict in which the sense of duty\r\nis found; (II.) turn to explanations which are one-sided,\r\ntaking up (1) the intuitive, (2) the utilitarian theory;\r\nand finally (III.) return with the results of this criticism\r\nto a restatement of our own theory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 1. THE SUBJECTION OF DESIRE TO LAW\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOrdinary language sets before us some main facts:\r\nduty suggests what is due, a debt to be paid; ought is\r\nconnected with owe; obligation implies being bound to\r\nsomething\u0026mdash;as we speak of \"bounden duty.\" We speak\r\nnaturally of \"meeting obligations\"; of duties being \"imposed,\"\r\n\"laid upon\" one. The person who is habitually\r\ncareless about his duties is \"unruly\" or \"lawless\"; one\r\nwho evades or refuses them is \"unprincipled.\" These ideas\r\nsuggest there is something required, exacted, having the\r\nsanction of law, or a regular and regulative principle;\r\nand imply natural aversion to the requirements exacted, a\r\npreference for something else. Hence duty as a conscious\r\nfactor means constraint of inclination; an unwillingness or\r\nreluctance which \u003ci\u003eshould\u003c/i\u003e be overcome but which it is difficult\r\nto surmount, requiring an effort which only adequate\r\nrecognition of the rightful supremacy of the dutiful end\r\nwill enable one to put forth. Thus we speak of interest\r\nconflicting with principle, and desire with duty. While\r\nthey are inevitably bound together, it will be convenient to\r\ndiscuss separately (1) Inclination and impulse as averse to\r\nduty, and (2) Duty as having authority, as expressing\r\nlaw.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_340\" id=\"Page_340\"\u003e[Pg 340]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. Inclination Averse to Duty.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Directly and indirectly,\r\nall desires root in certain fundamental organic\r\nwants and appetites. Conduct, behavior, implies a living\r\norganism. If this organism were not equipped with an\r\nintense instinctive tendency to keep itself going, to sustain\r\nitself, it would soon cease to be amid the menaces,\r\ndifficulties, rebuffs, and failures of life. Life means appetites,\r\nlike hunger, thirst, sex; instincts like anger, fear,\r\nand hope, which are almost imperious in their struggles\r\nfor satisfaction. They do not arise from reflection, but\r\nantedate it; their existence does not depend upon consideration\r\nof consequences, but their existence it is which tends\r\nto call out reflection. Their very presence in a healthy\r\norganism means a certain reservoir of energy which overflows\r\nalmost spontaneously. They are impulsive. Such\r\ntendencies, then, constitute an essential and fundamental\r\npart of the capacities of a person; their realization is\r\ninvolved in one\u0027s happiness. In all this there is nothing\r\nabnormal nor immoral. But a human being is something\r\nmore than a mere demand for the satisfaction of instincts\r\nof food, sex, and protection. If we admit (as the theory\r\nof organic evolution requires) that all other desires and\r\npurposes are \u003ci\u003eultimately\u003c/i\u003e derived from these tendencies of\r\nthe organism, still it is true that the refined and highly\r\ndeveloped forms exist side by side with crude, organic\r\nforms, and that the simultaneous satisfaction of the two\r\ntypes, just as they stand, is impossible.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eOrganic and Reflectively Formed Tendencies Conflict.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Even\r\nif it be true, as it may well be, that the desires and\r\npurposes connected with property were developed out\r\nof instincts having to do with food for self and offspring,\r\nit is still true that the developed desires do not wholly\r\ndisplace those out of which they developed. The presence\r\nof the purposes elaborated by thought side by side\r\nwith the more organic demands causes strife and the\r\nneed of resolution. The accumulation of property may\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_341\" id=\"Page_341\"\u003e[Pg 341]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003einvolve subordinating the immediate urgency of hunger;\r\nproperty as an institution implies that one is not free\r\nto satisfy his appetite just as he pleases, but may have\r\nto postpone or forego satisfaction, because the food supply\r\nbelongs to another; or that he can satisfy hunger only\r\nthrough some labor which in itself is disagreeable to him.\r\nSimilarly the family springs originally out of the instinct\r\nof reproduction. But the purposes and plans which\r\ngo with family life are totally inconsistent with the mere\r\ngratification of sexual desire in its casual and spontaneous\r\nappearance. The refined, highly developed, and complex\r\npurposes exact a checking, a regulation and subordination\r\nof inclinations as they first spring up\u0026mdash;a\r\ncontrol to which the inclinations are not of themselves\r\nprone and against which they may rebelliously assert\r\nthemselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDuty May Reside on the More Impulsive Side.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It\r\nwould be a great mistake, however, to limit the need\r\nof subordination simply to the unruly agencies of appetite.\r\nHabits which have been consciously or reflectively\r\nformed, even when in their original formation these habits\r\nhad the sanction and approval of reason, require control.\r\nThe habits of a professional man, of an investigator, or\r\na lawyer, for example, have been formed through careful\r\nand persistent reflection directed upon ends adjudged\r\nright. Virtues of painstaking industry, of perseverance,\r\nhave been formed; untimely and unseemly desires have\r\nbeen checked. But as an outcome these habits, and the\r\ndesires and purposes that express them, have perhaps\r\nbecome all-engrossing. Occupation is preoccupation. It\r\nencroaches upon the attention needed for other concerns.\r\nThe skill gained tends to shut the individual up to narrow\r\nmatters and to shut out other \"universes\" of good which\r\nshould be desired. Domestic and civic responsibilities are\r\nperhaps felt to be insignificant details or irritating burdens\r\nunworthy of attention. Thus a reflective habit, legiti\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_342\" id=\"Page_342\"\u003e[Pg 342]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003emate\r\nin itself, right in its right place, may give rise to\r\ndesires and ends which involve a corrosive selfishness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMoreover, that the insubordination does not reside in\r\nappetites or impulses just as appetites and impulses, is\r\nseen in the fact that duty may lie on the side of a purpose\r\nconnected with them, and be asserted against the force of\r\na habit formed under the supervision of thought. The\r\nstudent or artist may find his pursuit makes him averse to\r\nsatisfying the needful claims of hunger and healthy exercise.\r\nThe prudent business man may find himself undutifully\r\ncold to the prompting of an impulse of pity;\r\nthe student of books or special intellectual or artistic\r\nends may find duty on the side of some direct human\r\nimpulse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eStatement of Problem.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Such considerations show that\r\nwe cannot attribute the conflict of duty and inclination\r\nsimply to the existence of appetites and unreflective impulses,\r\nas if these were in and of themselves opposed to\r\nregulation by any principle. We must seek for an explanation\r\nwhich will apply equally to appetites and to\r\nhabits of thought. What is there common to the situations\r\nof him who feels it his duty to check the satisfaction of\r\nstrong hunger until others have been properly served, and\r\nof the scientific investigator who finds it his duty to check\r\nthe exercise of his habit of thinking in order that he may\r\nsatisfy the demands of his body?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eStatement of Explanation.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Any habit, like any appetite\r\nor instinct, represents something formed, set; whether\r\nthis has occurred in the history of the race or of the\r\nindividual makes little difference to its established urgency.\r\nHabit is second, if not first, nature. (1) Habit represents\r\n\u003ci\u003efacilities\u003c/i\u003e; what is set, organized, is relatively easy. It\r\n\u003ci\u003emarks the line of least resistance\u003c/i\u003e. A habit of reflection,\r\nso far as it is a specialized habit, is as easy and natural\r\nto follow as an organic appetite. (2) Moreover, the exercise\r\nof any easy, frictionless habit is pleasurable. It\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_343\" id=\"Page_343\"\u003e[Pg 343]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis a commonplace that use and wont deprive situations of\r\noriginally disagreeable features. (3) Finally, a formed\r\nhabit is an active \u003ci\u003etendency\u003c/i\u003e. It only needs an appropriate\r\nstimulus to set it going; frequently the mere absence\r\nof any strong obstacle serves to release its pent-up energy.\r\nIt is a propensity to act in a certain way whenever opportunity\r\npresents. Failure to function is uncomfortable and\r\narouses feelings of irritation or lack.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eReluctance to the right end, an aversion requiring to\r\nbe overcome, if at all, by recognition of the superior value\r\nof the right end, is then to be accounted for \u003ci\u003eon the\r\nground of the inertia or momentum of any organized,\r\nestablished tendency\u003c/i\u003e. This momentum gives the common\r\nground to instinctive impulses and deliberately formed\r\nhabits. The momentum represents the \u003ci\u003eold\u003c/i\u003e, an adaptation\r\nto familiar, customary conditions. So far as similar\r\nconditions recur, the formed power functions economically\r\nand effectively, supplying ease, promptness, certainty, and\r\nagreeableness to the execution of an act.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut if new, changed conditions require a serious readjustment\r\nof the old habit or appetite, the natural tendency\r\nwill be to resist this demand. Thus we have precisely\r\nthe traits of reluctance and constraint which mark\r\nthe consciousness of duty. A self without habits, one loose\r\nand fluid, in which change in one direction is just as easy\r\nas in another, would not have the sense of duty. A self\r\nwith no new possibilities, rigidly set in conditions and perfectly\r\naccommodated to them, would not have it. But\r\ndefinite, persistent, urgent tendencies to act in a given way,\r\noccurring at the same time with other incompatible tendencies\r\nwhich represent the self more adequately and yet\r\nare not organized into habits, afford the conditions of the\r\nsense of restraint. If for any reason the unorganized\r\ntendency is judged to be the truer expression of self, we\r\nhave also the sense of lawful constraint. \u003ci\u003eThe constraint\r\nof appetite and desire is a phenomenon of practical read\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_344\" id=\"Page_344\"\u003e[Pg 344]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ejustment,\r\nwithin the structure of character, due to conflict\r\nof tendencies so irreconcilable in their existing forms\r\nas to demand radical redirection.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen an appetite is in accord with those habits of\r\nan individual which enable him to perform his social\r\nfunctions, or which naturally accrue from his social relations,\r\nit is legitimate and good; when it conflicts, it is\r\nillicit, it is lust; we call it by hard names and we demand\r\nthat it be curbed; we regard its force as a menace to\r\nthe integrity of the agent and a threat to social order.\r\nWhen the reflective habits of an individual come into\r\nconflict with natural appetites and impulses, the manifestation\r\nof which would enlarge or make more certain\r\nthe powers of the individual in his full relations to others,\r\nit is the reflective habits which have to be held in and\r\nredirected at the cost of whatever disagreeableness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(2) The Authority of Duty.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;A duty, in Kant\u0027s words,\r\nis a \u003ci\u003ecategorical\u003c/i\u003e imperative\u0026mdash;it claims the absolute right\r\nof way as against immediate inclination. That which, on\r\none side, is the constraint of natural desire, is, on the\r\nother, the authoritative claim of the right end to regulate.\r\nOver against the course of action most immediately urgent,\r\nmost easy and comfortable, so congenial as at once\r\nto motivate action unless checked, stands another course,\r\nrepresenting a wider and more far-reaching point of\r\nview, and hence furnishing the rational end of the situation.\r\nHowever lacking in intensity, however austere this\r\nend, it stands for the whole self, and is therefore felt to\r\nbe rightly supreme over any partial tendency. But since\r\nit looks to realization in an uncertain future, rather than\r\npermission just to let go what is most urgent at the moment,\r\nit requires effort, hard work, work of attention more\r\nor less repulsive and uncongenial. Hence that sense of\r\nstress and strain, of being pulled one way by inclination\r\nand another by the claims of right, so characteristic of\r\nan experience of obligation.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_345\" id=\"Page_345\"\u003e[Pg 345]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSocial Character of Duties.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;But this statement describes\r\nthe experience only on its formal side. In the concrete,\r\nthat end which possesses claim to regulate desire is\r\nthe one which grows out of the social position or function\r\nof the agent, out of \u003ci\u003ea course of action to which he is committed\r\nby a regular, socially established connection between\r\nhimself and others\u003c/i\u003e. The man who has assumed the position\r\nof a husband and a parent has by that very fact\r\nentered upon a \u003ci\u003eline\u003c/i\u003e of action, something continuous, running\r\nfar into the future; something so fundamental that\r\nit modifies and pervades his other activities, requiring them\r\nto be co\u0026ouml;rdinated or rearranged from its point of view.\r\nThe same thing holds, of course, of the calling of a doctor,\r\na lawyer, a merchant, a banker, a judge, or other officer\r\nof the State. Each social calling implies a continuous,\r\nregular mode of action, binding together into a whole a\r\nmultitude of acts occurring at different times, and giving\r\nrise to definite expectations and demands on the part of\r\nothers. Every relationship in life, is, as it were, \u003ci\u003ea tacit\r\nor expressed contract with others\u003c/i\u003e, committing one, by the\r\nsimple fact that he occupies that relationship, to a corresponding\r\nmode of action. Every one, willy-nilly, occupies\r\na social position; if not a parent, he is a child; if not\r\nan officer, then a citizen of the State; if not pursuing an\r\noccupation, he is in preparation for an occupation, or\r\nelse is living upon the results of the labors of others.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eConnection with Selfhood.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Every one, in short, is in\r\n\u003ci\u003egeneral relations to others\u003c/i\u003e,\u0026mdash;relationships which enter so\r\ninternally and so intimately into the very make-up of his\r\nbeing that he is not morally free to pick and choose, saying,\r\nthis good is really my affair, that other one not. The\r\nmode of action which is required by the fact that the\r\nperson is a member of a complex social network is a more\r\nfinal expression of his own nature than is the temporarily\r\nintense instinctive appetite, or the habit which has become\r\n\"second nature.\" It is not for the individual to say, the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_346\" id=\"Page_346\"\u003e[Pg 346]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlatter is attractive and therefore really mine, while the\r\nformer is repellant and therefore an alien intruder, to\r\nbe surrendered to only if it cannot be evaded. From this\r\npoint of view, the conflict of desire and duty, of interest\r\nand principle, expresses itself as a conflict between tendencies\r\nwhich have got organized into one\u0027s \u003ci\u003efixed character\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand which therefore appeal to him just as he is; and those\r\ntendencies which relate to the development of a larger\r\nself, a self which should take fuller account of social relations.\r\nThe Kantian theory emphasizes the fact brought\r\nout above: \u003ci\u003eviz.\u003c/i\u003e, that duty represents the authority of an\r\nact expressing the reasonable and \"universal\" self over\r\na casual and partial self; while the utilitarian theory emphasizes\r\nthe part played by social institutions and demands\r\nin creating and enforcing both special duties and the\r\nsense of duty in general.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 2. KANTIAN THEORY\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e\"Accord with\" Duty versus \"from\" Duty.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Kant\r\npoints out that acts may be \"in accordance with duty\"\r\nand yet not be done \"from duty.\" \"It is always, for example,\r\na matter of duty that a dealer should not overcharge\r\nan inexperienced purchaser, and wherever there is\r\nmuch commerce the prudent tradesman does not overcharge….\r\nMen are thus honestly served; but this is\r\nnot enough to prove that the tradesman so acted from duty\r\nand from principles of honesty; his own advantage required\r\nit\" (\u003ci\u003eKant\u0027s Theory of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Abbott\u0027s translation,\r\np. 13). In such a case the act externally viewed is in \u003ci\u003eaccordance\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwith duty; morally viewed, it proceeds from selfish\r\ncalculation of personal profit, not from duty. This is\r\ntrue in general of all acts which, though outwardly right,\r\nspring from considerations of expediency, and are based\r\non the consideration that \"honesty (or whatever) is the\r\nbest policy.\" Persons are naturally inclined to take care\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_347\" id=\"Page_347\"\u003e[Pg 347]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof their health, their property, their children, or whatever\r\nbelongs to them. Such acts, no matter how much they\r\naccord with duty, are not done \u003ci\u003efrom duty\u003c/i\u003e, but from inclination.\r\nIf a man is suffering, unfortunate, desirous\r\nof death, and yet cherishes his life with no love for it, but\r\nfrom the duty to do so, his motive has truly moral value.\r\nSo if a mother cares for her child, \u003ci\u003ebecause\u003c/i\u003e she recognizes\r\nthat it is her duty, the act is truly moral.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFrom Duty alone Moral.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;According to Kant, then,\r\nacts alone have moral import that are consciously performed\r\n\"from duty,\" that is, with recognition of its authority\r\nas their animating spring. \"\u003ci\u003eThe idea of good and\r\nevil (in their moral sense) must not be determined before\r\nthe moral law, but only after it and by means of it\u003c/i\u003e\" (\u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e,\r\np. 154). All our desires and inclinations seek naturally\r\nfor an \u003ci\u003eend\u003c/i\u003e which is good\u0026mdash;for happiness, success,\r\nachievement. No one of them nor all of them put together,\r\nthen, can possibly supply the motive of acting \u003ci\u003efrom\u003c/i\u003e\r\nduty. Hence duty and its authority must spring\r\nfrom another source, from reason itself, which supplies\r\nthe consciousness of a law which \u003ci\u003eought\u003c/i\u003e to be the motive\r\nof every act, whether it is or not. The utilitarians completely\r\nreverse the truth of morals when they say that the\r\nidea of the good end comes first and the \"right\" is that\r\nwhich realizes the good end.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDual Constitution of Man.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We are all familiar with\r\nthe notion that man has a dual constitution; that he is\r\na creature both of sense and spirit; that he has a carnal\r\nand an ideal nature; a lower and a higher self, a self of\r\nappetite and of reason. Now Kant\u0027s theory of duty is a\r\npeculiar version of this common notion. Man\u0027s special ends\r\nand purposes all spring from desires and inclinations.\r\nThese are all for personal happiness and hence without\r\nmoral worth. They form man\u0027s sensuous, appetitive nature,\r\nwhich if not \"base\" in itself easily becomes so,\r\nbecause it struggles with principle for the office of supply\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_348\" id=\"Page_348\"\u003e[Pg 348]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eing\r\nmotives for action. The principle of a law absolutely\r\nbinding, requires the complete expulsion of the claim of\r\ndesires to \u003ci\u003emotivate\u003c/i\u003e action. (See \u003ci\u003eKant\u0027s Theory\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 70-79;\r\n132-136; 159-163.) If a man were an animal, he\r\nwould have only appetite to follow; if he were a god or\r\nangel, he would have only reason. Being man, being a\r\npeculiar compound of sense and reason, he has put upon\r\nhim the problem of resisting the natural prompting of\r\ninclination and of accepting the duty of acting from\r\nreverence for duty.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCriticism of Kant\u0027s Theory.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;There is an undoubted\r\nfact back of Kant\u0027s conception which gives it whatever\r\nplausibility it has\u0026mdash;the fact that inclinations which are\r\nnot necessarily evil tend to claim a controlling position, a\r\nclaim which has to be resisted. The peculiarity of Kant\u0027s\r\ninterpretation lies in its complete and final separation of\r\nthe two aspects, \"higher\" and \"lower,\" the appetitive and\r\nrational, of man\u0027s nature, and it is upon this separation,\r\naccordingly, that our discussion will be directed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eI. Duty and the Affections.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In the first place, Kant\u0027s\r\nabsolute separation of sense or appetite from reason and\r\nduty, because of its necessary disparagement of the affections\r\nleads to a formal and pedantic view of morality.\r\nIt is one thing to say that desire as it \u003ci\u003efirst\u003c/i\u003e shows itself\r\n\u003ci\u003esometimes\u003c/i\u003e prompts to a morally inadequate end; it is quite\r\nanother thing to say that \u003ci\u003eany\u003c/i\u003e acceptance of an end of\r\ndesire as a motive is morally wrong\u0026mdash;that the act to be\r\nright must be first brought under a conscious acknowledgment\r\nof some law or principle. Only the exigencies of a\r\nready-made theory would lead any one to think that habitual\r\npurposes that express the habitually dominant tendencies\r\nand powers of the agent, may not suffice to keep\r\nmorally sound the main tenor of behavior; that it is impossible\r\nfor regard for right ends to become organized\r\ninto character and to be fused into working unity with\r\nnatural impulses. Only a metaphysical theory regarding\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_349\" id=\"Page_349\"\u003e[Pg 349]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe separation of sense and reason in man leads to the\r\ndenial of this fact.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBetween the merchant who is honest in his weights and\r\nfixed in his prices merely because he calculates that such a\r\ncourse is to his own advantage, and the merchant (if such\r\na person could exist) who should never sell a spool of thread\r\nor a paper of pins without having first reminded himself\r\nthat his ultimate motive for so doing was respect for\r\nthe law of duty, there is the ordinary merchant who is\r\nhonest because he has the desires characteristic of an honest\r\nman. Schiller has made fun of the artificial stringency\r\nof Kant\u0027s theory in some verses which represent a disciple\r\ncoming to Kant with his perplexity:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"Willingly serve I my friends, but I do it, alas with affection.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHence I am plagued with this doubt, virtue I have not attained!\"\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"noidt\"\u003eto which he received the reply:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\"This is your only resource, you must stubbornly seek to abhor them;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nThen you can do with disgust that which the law may enjoin.\"\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese verses are a caricature of Kant\u0027s position; he\r\ndoes not require that affections should be crushed, but that\r\nthey should be stamped with acknowledgment of law before\r\nbeing accepted as motives. But the verses bring out\r\nthe absurd element in the notion that the affections and\r\ninclinations may not of themselves be morally adequate\r\nsprings to action,\u0026mdash;as if a man could not eat his dinner\r\nsimply because he was hungry, or be amiable to a companion\r\nbecause he wanted to be, or relieve distress because\r\nhis compassionate nature urged him to it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is worth while noting that some moralists have gone\r\nto the opposite extreme and have held that an act is not\r\nright unless it expresses the overflowing spontaneity of the\r\naffections; that a man\u0027s act is only imperfectly right when\r\nhe performs it not from affection, but from coercion by\r\nduty. Thus Emerson speaks of men who \"do by knowledge\r\nwhat the stones do by structure.\" And again, \"We\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_350\" id=\"Page_350\"\u003e[Pg 350]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlove characters in proportion as they are impulsive and\r\nspontaneous. When we see a soul whose acts are all regal,\r\ngraceful, and pleasant as roses, we must thank God that\r\nsuch things can be and are, and not turn sourly on the\r\nangel and say, \u0027Crump is a better man with his grunting\r\nresistance to all his native devils.\u0027\" The facts seem to be\r\nthat while, in a good man, natural impulses and formed\r\nhabits are adequate motive powers under ordinary conditions,\r\nthere are times when an end, somewhat weak in\r\nits motive force because it does not express an habitually\r\ndominant power of the self, needs to be re\u0026euml;nforced by\r\nassociations which have gathered at all periods of his\r\npast around the experience of good. There is a certain\r\nreservoir of emotional force which, while far from\r\nfluid, is capable of transfer and application, especially\r\nin a conscientious person. Kant criticizes the moral\r\nsense theory on the ground that \"in order to imagine\r\nthe vicious man tormented with a sense of his transgressions,\r\nit must first represent him as morally good in the\r\nmain trend of his character\" (Abbott, p. 128). Well, a\r\nman who is capable of making appeal to the sense of duty\r\nin general, is the one in whom love of good is already\r\ndominant.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eII. Tendency to Fanaticism and Idealization of Authority.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Kant\u0027s\r\ntheory of fixed and final separation\r\nbetween desire and reason leads us into a fatal dilemma;\r\neither a right end is impossible, or any end is right\r\nprovided we fall back on a belief that it is our duty\r\nto perform it. Kant holds that every concrete end,\r\nevery definite purpose which we entertain, comes from\r\ndesire. Law utters no specific command except \"do your\r\nduty\"; it stamps an end of desire as right only when it is\r\npursued, not because it is an end of desire, but \"from\r\nduty.\" The actual end which is before us is, in any\r\ncase, supplied through inclination and desire. Reason\r\nfurnishes \u003ci\u003eprinciple\u003c/i\u003e as a \u003ci\u003emotive\u003c/i\u003e. We have here, in an\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_351\" id=\"Page_351\"\u003e[Pg 351]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eother\r\nform, the separation of end and motive which has\r\nalready occupied us (p. 248). End and motive are so\r\ndisconnected, so irrelevant to one another, that we have\r\nno alternative except either to condemn every end, because,\r\nbeing prompted by desire, it falls so far short of\r\nthe majesty of duty; or else fanatically to persist in any\r\ncourse when once we have formally brought it under the\r\nnotion of duty.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe latter alternative would be the one chosen by a truly\r\nKantian agent because it is alone possible in practice.\r\nBut the moral fanatic does about as much evil in the world\r\nas the man of no moral principle. Religious wars, persecutions,\r\nintolerance, harsh judgment of others, obstinate\r\npersistence in a course of action once entered upon in spite\r\nof the testimony of experience to the harm that results;\r\nblind devotion to narrow and one-sided aims; deliberate\r\nopposition to art, culture, social amenities, recreations, or\r\nwhatever the \"man of principle\" happens to find obnoxious:\r\npharisaical conviction of superiority, of being the\r\npeculiar, chosen instrument of the moral law;\u0026mdash;these and\r\nthe countless ills that follow in their wake, are inevitable effects\r\nof erecting the isolated conviction of duty into a sufficient\r\nmotive of action. So far as these evils do not\r\nactually flow from an acceptance of the Kantian principle,\r\nit is because that has been promulgated and for the most\r\npart adopted, where reverence for authority and law is\r\nstrong. In Germany the Kantian philosophy has, upon\r\nthe whole, served as a help in criticizing law and procedure\r\non the basis of their rationality, while it has also served\r\nas a convenient stamp of rational sanction upon a politically\r\nauthoritative r\u0026eacute;gime, already fairly reasonable, as\r\nsuch matters go, in the content of its legislation and\r\nadministration.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIII. Meaning of Duty for Duty\u0027s Sake.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It is a sound\r\nprinciple to do our duty \u003ci\u003eas\u003c/i\u003e our duty, and not for the sake\r\nof something else. \"Duty for duty\u0027s sake\" means, in truth,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_352\" id=\"Page_352\"\u003e[Pg 352]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003ean act for the act\u0027s own sake\u003c/i\u003e; the gift of cold water, the\r\nword of encouragement, the sweeping of the room, the\r\nlearning of the lesson, the selling of the goods, the painting\r\nof the picture, because they are the things really\r\ncalled for at a given time, and hence their own excuses\r\nfor being. \u003ci\u003eNo moral act is a means to anything beyond\r\nitself,\u0026mdash;not even to morality.\u003c/i\u003e But, upon Kant\u0027s theory,\r\nduty for duty\u0027s sake means a special act not for its own\r\nsake, but for the sake of abstract principle. Just as the\r\nhedonists regard a special act as a mere means to happiness,\r\nso Kant makes the concrete act a mere means to virtue.\r\nAs there is a \"hedonistic paradox,\" namely that the\r\nway to get happiness is to forget it, to devote ourselves\r\nto things and persons about us; so there is a \"moralistic\"\r\nparadox, that the way to get goodness is to cease to think\r\nof it\u0026mdash;as something separate\u0026mdash;and to devote ourselves to\r\nthe realization of the full value of the practical situations\r\nin which we find ourselves. Men can really think of their\r\n\"duty\" only when they are thinking of specific things to\r\nbe done; to think of Duty at large or in the abstract is\r\none of the best ways of avoiding doing it, or of doing it in\r\na partial and perverted way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSummary of Criticism of Kant.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;To sum up, the\r\ntheory which regards duty as having its source in a\r\nrational self which is independent of and above the self\r\nof inclination and affection (1) deprives the habitual\r\ndesires and affections, which make the difference between\r\none concrete character and another, of moral significance;\r\n(2) commits us to an unenlightened performance of what\r\nis called duty irrespective of its real goodness; and (3)\r\nmakes moral principle a remote abstraction, instead of the\r\nvivifying soul of a concrete deed. Its strongest point, its\r\ninsistence upon the \u003ci\u003eautonomous\u003c/i\u003e character of duty, or that\r\nduty is organically connected with the self in some of\r\nits phases or functions, will appear more clearly as we contrast\r\nit with the utilitarian theory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_353\" id=\"Page_353\"\u003e[Pg 353]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 3. THE UTILITARIAN THEORY OF DUTY\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eProblem of Duty on Hedonistic Basis.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The utilitarians\u0027\r\nexplanation of the constraint of desire by the authority\r\nof right is framed to meet the peculiar difficulty\r\nin which their hedonistic theory places them. If pleasure\r\nis the good, and if all desire is naturally for the good, why\r\nshould desire have to be constrained? How can such a\r\nthing as \"duty\" exist at all? For to say that a man is\r\nobliged or bound to seek that which he just can\u0027t help\r\nseeking is absurd. There is, according to the utilitarian,\r\na difference, however, between the pleasure which is the\r\nobject of desire and that which is the standard of judgment.\r\nThe former is the person\u0027s own pleasure; it is\r\nprivate. The happiness which measures the rightness\r\nof the act is that of all persons who are affected by it. In\r\nview of this divergence, there must, if right action is to\r\noccur, be agencies which operate upon the individual so as\r\nto make him find his personal pleasure in that which\r\nconduces to the general welfare. These influences\r\nare the expectations and demands of \u003ci\u003eothers so far as\r\nthey attach consequences in the way of punishment, of\r\nsuffering, and of reward and pleasure, to the deeds of an\r\nindividual\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this way the natural inclination of an individual towards\r\na certain pleasure, or his natural revulsion from a\r\ncertain pain, may be checked and transformed by recognition\r\nthat if he seeks the pleasure, others will inflict more\r\nthan an equivalent pain, or if he bears the pain, others will\r\nreward him with more than compensating pleasures. In\r\nsuch cases, we have the fact of duty or obligation. There\r\nis constraint of first inclination through recognition of\r\nsuperior power, this power being asserted in its expressly\r\ndeclared intention of rewarding and penalizing according\r\nas its prescriptions are or are not followed. These\r\nare the factors: (1) demands, expectations, rules exter\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_354\" id=\"Page_354\"\u003e[Pg 354]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003enally\r\nimposed; (2) consequences in the way of proffered\r\nreward of pleasure, and penalty of pain; (3) resulting\r\nconstraint of the natural manifestation of desires. In the\r\nmain, the theory is based on the analogy of legal obligations.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_167_167\" id=\"FNanchor_167_167\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_167_167\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[167]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(a) Bentham\u0027s Account.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Bentham dislikes the very\r\nword duty; and speaks preferably of the \"sanctions\"\r\nof an act. The following quotations will serve to confirm\r\nthe foregoing statements.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"The happiness of the individuals of whom a community is\r\ncomposed is … the sole standard, in conformity to which\r\neach individual \u003ci\u003eought\u003c/i\u003e to be made to fashion his behavior. But\r\nwhether it be this, or anything else that is to be done, there\r\nis nothing by which a man can ultimately be \u003ci\u003emade\u003c/i\u003e to do it,\r\nbut either pain or pleasure.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA kind of pain or pleasure which tends to \u003ci\u003emake\u003c/i\u003e an individual\r\nfind his own good in the good of the community is\r\na \u003ci\u003esanction\u003c/i\u003e. Of these Bentham mentions four kinds, of\r\nwhich the first alone is not due to the will of others, but\r\nis \u003ci\u003ephysical\u003c/i\u003e. Thus the individual may check his inclination\r\nto drink by a thought of the ills that flow from drunkenness.\r\nMetaphorically, then, he may be said to have a duty\r\nnot to drink; strictly speaking, however, this is his own\r\nobvious interest. The sanctions proper are (a) political,\r\nconsequences in the way of pleasure and pain (especially\r\npain) attached to injunctions and prohibitions by a legal\r\nsuperior; (b) popular, the consequences following from\r\nthe more indefinite influence of public opinion\u0026mdash;such as\r\nbeing \"sent to Coventry,\" being shunned, rendered unpopular,\r\nlosing reputation, or honor, etc.; and (3) religious,\r\npenalties of hell and rewards of heaven attached to\r\naction by a divine being, or similar penances and rewards\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_355\" id=\"Page_355\"\u003e[Pg 355]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nby the representatives on earth (church, priests, etc.) of\r\nthis divine being.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_168_168\" id=\"FNanchor_168_168\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_168_168\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[168]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eValue and Deficiencies of This View.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The strong\r\npoint of this explanation of duty is obviously that it recognizes\r\nthe large, the very large, r\u0026ocirc;le played by social institutions,\r\nregulations, and demands in bringing home to a\r\nperson the fact that certain acts, whether he is naturally\r\nso inclined or not, should be performed. But its\r\nweak point is that it tends to identify duty with coercion;\r\nto change the \"ought\" if not into a physical \"must,\" at\r\nleast into the psychological \"must\" of fear of pain and\r\nhope of pleasure. Hope of reward and fear of penalty\r\nare real enough motives in human life; but acts performed\r\nmainly or solely on their account do not, in the\r\nunprejudiced judgment of mankind, rank very high morally.\r\nHabitually to appeal to such motives is rather\r\nto weaken than to strengthen the tendencies in the individual\r\nwhich make for right action. The difficulty\r\nlies clearly in the purely \u003ci\u003eexternal\u003c/i\u003e character of the \"sanctions,\"\r\nand this in turn is due to the fact that the obligations\r\nimposed by the demands and expectancies of others\r\ndo not have any intrinsic connection with the character\r\nof the individual of whom they are exacted. They are\r\nwholly external burdens and impositions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe individual, with his desires and his pleasures, being\r\nmade up out of particular states of feeling, is complete in\r\nhimself. Social relationships must then be alien and external;\r\nif they modify in any way the existing body of feelings\r\nthey are artificial constraints. One individual merely\r\n\u003ci\u003ehappens\u003c/i\u003e to live side by side with other individuals, who are\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_356\" id=\"Page_356\"\u003e[Pg 356]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin themselves isolated, and are complete in their isolation.\r\nIf their external acts conflict, it may be necessary to\r\ninvade and change the body of feelings which make up the\r\nself from which the act flows. Hence duty.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe later development of utilitarianism tended to get\r\naway from this psychical and atomic individualism; and to\r\nconceive the good of an individual as including \u003ci\u003ewithin\u003c/i\u003e himself\r\nrelations to others. So far as this was done, the demands\r\nof others, public opinion, laws, etc., became factors\r\n\u003ci\u003ein the development of the individual, and in arousing him\r\nto an adequate sense of what his good is, and of interest\r\nin effecting it\u003c/i\u003e. Later utilitarianism dwells less than Bentham\r\nupon external sanctions, and more upon an unconscious\r\nshaping of the individual\u0027s character and motives\r\nthrough imitation, education, and all the agencies which\r\nmould the individual\u0027s desires into natural agreement with\r\nthe social type. While it is John Stuart Mill who insists\r\nmost upon the internal and qualitative change of disposition\r\nthat thus takes place,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_169_169\" id=\"FNanchor_169_169\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_169_169\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[169]\u003c/a\u003e it is Bain and Spencer who\r\ngive the most detailed account of the methods by which\r\nit is brought about.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(b) Bain\u0027s Account.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;His basis agrees with Bentham\u0027s:\r\n\"The proper meaning, or import, of the terms (duty, obligation)\r\nrefers to that class of action which is enforced by\r\nthe sanction of punishment\" (Bain, \u003ci\u003eEmotions and Will\u003c/i\u003e,\r\np. 286). But he sets less store by political legislation and\r\nthe force of vague public opinion, and more by the gradual\r\nand subtle processes of family education. The lesson of\r\nobedience, that there are things to be done whether one\r\nwishes or no, is impressed upon the child almost unremittingly\r\nfrom the very first moment of life. There are three\r\nstages in the complete evolution of the sense of duty. The\r\nfirst, the lowest and that beyond which some persons never\r\ngo, is that in which \"susceptibility to pleasure and pain\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_357\" id=\"Page_357\"\u003e[Pg 357]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis made use of to bring about obedience, and a mental association\r\nis rapidly formed between the obedience and apprehended\r\npain, more or less magnified by fear.\" The fact\r\nthat punishment may be kept up until the child desists\r\nfrom the act \"leaves on his mind a certain dread and awful\r\nimpression as connected with forbidden actions.\" Here\r\nwe have in its germ conscience, acknowledgment of duty,\r\nin its most external form.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA child in a good home (and a citizen in a good state)\r\nsoon adds other associations. The command is uttered,\r\nthe penalty threatened, by those whom he admires, respects,\r\nand loves. This element brings in a new dread\u0026mdash;the fear\r\nof giving pain to the beloved object. Such dread is more\r\ndisinterested. It centers rather about the point of view\r\nfrom which the act is held wrong than about the thought\r\nof harm to self. As intelligence develops, the person apprehends\r\nthe positive ends, the goods, which are protected\r\nby the command put on him; he sees the use and reason\r\nof the prohibition to which he is subject, and approving\r\nof what it safeguards, approves the restriction itself. \"A\r\nnew motive is added on and begirds the action with a threefold\r\nfear…. If the duty prescribed has been approved\r\nof by the mind as \u003ci\u003eprotective of the general interests of\r\npersons engaging our sympathies\u003c/i\u003e, the violation of this on\r\nour part affects us with all the pain that we feel from\r\ninflicting \u003ci\u003ean injury upon those interests\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTransformation into an Internal Power.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;When the\r\nchild appreciates \"\u003ci\u003ethe reasons for the command, the character\r\nof conscience is entirely transformed\u003c/i\u003e.\" The fear\r\nwhich began as fear of the penalty that a superior power\r\nmay inflict, adds to itself the fear of displeasing a beloved\r\nperson; and is finally transformed into the dread of injuring\r\ninterests the worth of which the individual appreciates\r\nand in which he shares. The sense of duty now \"stands\r\nupon an independent foundation.\" It is an internal \"ideal\r\nresemblance of public authority,\" \"an imitation (or fac\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_358\" id=\"Page_358\"\u003e[Pg 358]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003esimile)\r\nwithin ourselves of the government without us.\"\r\n\"Regard is now had to the intent and meaning of the law\r\nand not to the mere fact of its being prescribed by some\r\npower.\" Thus there is developed a sense of obligation in\r\ngeneral, which may be detached from the particular deeds\r\nwhich were originally imposed under the sanction of penalty,\r\nand transferred to new ends which have never even\r\nbeen socially imposed, which the individual has perhaps for\r\nthe first time conceived within himself. \"The feeling and\r\nhabit of obligation\" which was generated from social pressure\r\nremains, but as a distinct individually cherished\r\nthing (Bain, \u003ci\u003eEmotions and Will\u003c/i\u003e, p. 319 n.). This view of\r\nthe \u003ci\u003efinal\u003c/i\u003e sense of obligation thus approximates Kant\u0027s view\r\nof the autonomous character of duty.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(c) Spencer\u0027s Account.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Herbert Spencer (like Bentham)\r\nlays emphasis upon the restraining influence of various\r\nsocial influences, but lays stress, as Bentham does\r\nnot, upon the \u003ci\u003einternal\u003c/i\u003e changes effected by long-continued,\r\nunremitting pressure exercised through the entire period\r\nof human evolution. Taken in itself, the consciousness\r\nof duty\u0026mdash;the distinctively moral consciousness\u0026mdash;is the control\r\nof proximate ends by remote ones, of simple by complex\r\naims, of the sensory or presentative by the ideal or\r\nrepresentative. An undeveloped individual or race lives\r\nand acts in the present; the mature is controlled by foresight\r\nof an indefinitely distant future. The thief who\r\nsteals is actuated by a simple feeling, the mere impulse of\r\nacquisition; the business man conducts his acquisition in\r\nview of highly complex considerations of property and\r\nownership. A low-grade intelligence acts only upon\r\nsensory stimulus, immediately present; a developed mind\r\nis moved by elaborate intellectual constructions, by imaginations\r\nand ideas which far outrun the observed or observable\r\nscene. Each step of the development of intelligence,\r\nof culture, whether in the individual or the race,\r\nis dependent upon ability to \u003ci\u003esubordinate\u003c/i\u003e the immediate\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_359\" id=\"Page_359\"\u003e[Pg 359]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsimple, physically present tendency and aim to the remote,\r\ncompound, and only ideally present intention (Spencer,\r\n\u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., Part I, ch. vii.).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSubordination of Near to Remote Good Dependent\r\non Social Influences.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;\"The conscious relinquishment of\r\nimmediate and special good to gain distant and general\r\ngood … is a cardinal trait of the self-restraint called\r\nmoral.\" But this develops out of forms of restraint which\r\nare not moral; where the \"relinquishment\" and subordination\r\nof the present and temporary good is not consciously\r\nwilled by the individual in view of a conscious appreciation\r\nof a distant and inclusive good; but where\r\naction in view of the latter is forced upon the individual\r\nby outside authority, operating by menace, and having\r\nthe sanction of fear. These outside controls are three in\r\nnumber: political or legal; supernatural, priestly, or religious;\r\nand popular. All these external controls, working\r\nthrough dread of pain and promise of reward, bring\r\nabout, however, in the individual a habit of looking to the\r\nremote, rather than to the proximate, end. At first the\r\nthought of these extrinsic consequences, those which do\r\nnot flow from the act but from the reaction of others to\r\nit, is mixed up with the thought of its own proper consequences.\r\nBut this association causes attention at least\r\nto be fixed upon intrinsic consequences that, because of\r\ntheir remoteness and complexity, might otherwise escape\r\nattention. Gradually the thought of them grows in clearness\r\nand efficacy and dissociates itself as a motive from\r\nthe externally imposed consequences, and there is a control\r\nwhich alone is truly moral.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Internal Sanction.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"The truly moral deterrent from murder, is not constituted\r\nby a representation of hanging as a consequence, or by a representation\r\nof tortures in hell as a consequence, or by a representation\r\nof the horror and hatred excited in fellow-men; but\r\nby a representation of the \u003ci\u003enecessary natural results\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;the\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_360\" id=\"Page_360\"\u003e[Pg 360]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003einfliction of death agony on the victim, the destruction of all\r\nhis possibilities of happiness, the entailed sufferings to his\r\nbelongings\" (Spencer, \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 120).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe external constraints thus serve as a schoolmaster to\r\nbring the race and the individual to internal restraint.\r\nGradually the abstract sense of coerciveness, authoritativeness,\r\nthe need of controlling the present by the future good\r\nis disentangled, and there arises the sense of duty in general.\r\nBut even this \"is transitory and will diminish as fast\r\nas moralization increases\" (\u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 127). Persistence in\r\nperformance of a duty makes it a pleasure; an habitually\r\nexercised obligation is naturally agreeable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the present state of evolutionary development, obligation,\r\nor the demands made by the external environment, and\r\nspontaneous inclination, or the demand of the organism,\r\ncannot coincide. But at the goal of evolution, the organism\r\nand environment will be in perfect adjustment. Actions\r\ncongenial to the former and appropriate to the latter will\r\ncompletely coincide. \"In their proper times and places,\r\nand proportions, the moral sentiments will guide men just\r\nas spontaneously and adequately as now do the sensations\"\r\n(\u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 129).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCriticism of Utilitarianism.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The utilitarian account\r\nof the development of the consciousness of duty or its\r\nemphasis upon concrete facts of social arrangements and\r\neducation affords a much-needed supplement to the empty\r\nand abstract formalism of Kant. (i.) The individual is\r\ncertainly brought to his actual recognition of specific duties\r\nand to his consciousness of obligation or moral law in general\r\nthrough social influences. Bain insists more upon the\r\nfamily training and discipline of its immature members;\r\nBentham and Spencer more upon the general institutional\r\nconditions, or the organization of government, law, judicial\r\nprocedure, crystallized custom, and public opinion. In\r\nreality, these two conditions imply and re\u0026euml;nforce each\r\nother. It is through the school of the family, for the most\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_361\" id=\"Page_361\"\u003e[Pg 361]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npart, that the meaning of the requirements of the larger\r\nand more permanent institutions are brought home to\r\nthe individual; while, on the other hand, the family derives\r\nthe aims and values which it enforces upon the attention\r\nof its individual members mainly from the larger society\r\nin which it finds its own setting. (ii.) The later utilitarianism,\r\nin its insistence upon an \"internal sanction,\" upon\r\nthe ideal personal, or free facsimile of public authority,\r\nupon regard for \"intrinsic consequences,\" corrects the\r\nweak point in Bentham (who relies so unduly upon mere\r\nthreat of punishment and mere fear of pain) and approximates\r\nin practical effect, though not in theory, Kant\u0027s\r\ndoctrine of the connection of duty with the rational or\r\n\"larger\" self which is social, even if individual. Even in\r\nits revised version utilitarianism did not wholly escape\r\nfrom the rigid unreal separation between the selfhood\r\nof the agent and his social surroundings forced upon it\r\nby its hedonistic psychology.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFictitious Theory of Nature of Self.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The supposition\r\nthat the individual starts with mere love of private pleasure,\r\nand that, if he ever gets beyond to consideration of the\r\ngood of others, it is because others have forced their good\r\nupon him by interfering with his private pleasures, is pure\r\nfiction. The requirements, encouragements, and approbations\r\nof others react not primarily upon the pleasures and\r\ncalculations of the individual, but upon his \u003ci\u003eactivities\u003c/i\u003e, upon\r\nhis inclinations, desires, habits. There is a common defect\r\nin the utilitarian and Kantian psychology. Both neglect\r\nthe importance of the active, the organically spontaneous\r\nand direct tendencies which enter into the individual.\r\nBoth assume unreal \"\u003ci\u003estates\u003c/i\u003e of consciousness,\" passive\r\nsensations, and feelings. Active tendencies may be internally\r\nmodified and redirected by the very conditions and\r\nconsequences of their own exercise. Family discipline,\r\njural influences, public opinion, may do little, or they may\r\ndo much. But their educative influence is as far from the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_362\" id=\"Page_362\"\u003e[Pg 362]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmere association of feelings of pleasure and pain as it is\r\nfrom Kant\u0027s purely abstract law. \u003ci\u003eSocial influences enable\r\nan individual to realize the weight and import of the\r\nsocially available and helpful manifestations of the tendencies\r\nof his own nature and to discriminate them from\r\nthose which are socially harmful or useless.\u003c/i\u003e When the\r\ntwo conflict, the perception of the former is the recognition\r\nof duties as distinct from \u003ci\u003emere\u003c/i\u003e inclinations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 3. FINAL STATEMENT\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDuty and a Growing Character.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Duty is what is owed\r\nby a partial isolated self embodied in established, facile, and\r\nurgent tendencies, to that ideal self which is presented in\r\naspirations which, since they are not yet formed into\r\nhabits, have no organized hold upon the self and which\r\ncan get organized into habitual tendencies and interests\r\nonly by a more or less painful and difficult reconstruction\r\nof the habitual self. For Kant\u0027s fixed and absolute separation\r\nbetween the self of inclination and the self of reason,\r\nwe substitute the relative and shifting distinction between\r\nthose factors of self which have become so definitely organized\r\ninto set habits that they take care of themselves,\r\nand those other factors which are more precarious, less\r\ncrystallized, and which depend therefore upon conscious\r\nacknowledgment and intentionally directed affection. The\r\nconsciousness of duty grows out of the complex character\r\nof the self; the fact that at any given time, it has tendencies\r\nrelatively set, ingrained, and embodied in fixed\r\nhabits, while it also has tendencies in process of making,\r\nlooking to the future, taking account of unachieved possibilities.\r\nThe former give the solid relatively formed\r\nelements of character; the latter, its ideal or unrealized\r\npossibilities. Each must play into the other; each must\r\nhelp the other out.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe conflict of duty and desire is thus an accom\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_363\" id=\"Page_363\"\u003e[Pg 363]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003epaniment\r\nof a \u003ci\u003egrowing\u003c/i\u003e self. Spencer\u0027s complete disappearance\r\nof obligation would mean an exhausted and fossilized\r\nself; wherever there is progress, tension arises between\r\nwhat is already accomplished and what is possible. In a\r\nbeing whose \"reach should exceed his grasp,\" a conflict\r\nwithin the self making for the readjustment of the direction\r\nof powers must always be found. The value of continually\r\n\u003ci\u003ehaving to meet the expectations and requirements\r\nof others is in keeping the agent from resting on his oars,\r\nfrom falling back on habits already formed as if they\r\nwere final\u003c/i\u003e. The phenomena of duty in all their forms are\r\nthus phenomena attendant upon the expansion of ends\r\nand the reconstruction of character. So far, accordingly,\r\nas the recognition of duty is capable of operating as a\r\ndistinct r\u0026euml;enforcing motive, it operates most effectively,\r\nnot as an interest in duty, or law in the abstract, but as\r\nan interest in progress in the face of the obstacles found\r\nwithin character itself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe most important references on the subject of duty are given\r\nin the text. To these may be added: Ladd, \u003ci\u003ePhilosophy of Conduct\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nchs. v. and xv.; Mackenzie, \u003ci\u003eManual\u003c/i\u003e, Part I., ch. iv.; Green, \u003ci\u003eProlegomena\u003c/i\u003e,\r\npp. 315-320, 353-354 and 381-388; Sharp, \u003ci\u003eInternational Journal\r\nof Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II., pp. 500-513; Muirhead, \u003ci\u003eElements of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nBook II., ch. ii.; McGilvary, \u003ci\u003ePhilosophical Review\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. XI., pp. 333-352;\r\nStephen, \u003ci\u003eScience of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 161-171; Sturt, \u003ci\u003eInternational\r\nJournal of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. VII., 334-345; Schurman, \u003ci\u003ePhilosophical Review\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nVol. III., pp. 641-654; Guyau, \u003ci\u003eSketch of Morals, without Obligation\r\nor Sanction\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_166_166\" id=\"Footnote_166_166\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_166_166\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[166]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eLast Essays on Church and Religion\u003c/i\u003e, preface.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_167_167\" id=\"Footnote_167_167\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_167_167\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[167]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Historically it has often taken theological form. Thus Paley\r\ndefined virtue as \"doing good to mankind in obedience to the will\r\nof God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness.\" Of obligation\r\nhe said, \"A man is said to be obliged, when he is urged by a violent\r\nmotive resulting from the command of another.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_168_168\" id=\"Footnote_168_168\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_168_168\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[168]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The earlier English utilitarians (though not called by that name),\r\nsuch as Tucker and Paley, assert that upon this earth there is no exact\r\ncoincidence of the right and the pleasure-giving; that it is future\r\nrewards and punishments which make the equilibrium. Sidgwick,\r\namong recent writers, has also held that no complete identification\r\nof virtue and happiness can be found apart from religious considerations.\r\n(See \u003ci\u003eMethods of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, p. 505. For theological utilitarianism\r\nsee Albee, \u003ci\u003eHistory\u003c/i\u003e.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_169_169\" id=\"Footnote_169_169\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_169_169\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[169]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See his \u003ci\u003eUtilitarianism\u003c/i\u003e, ch. iii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_364\" id=\"Page_364\"\u003e[Pg 364]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER XVIII\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTHE PLACE OF THE SELF IN THE MORAL LIFE\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have reached the conclusion that disposition as\r\nmanifest in endeavor is the seat of moral worth, and that\r\nthis worth itself consists in a readiness to regard the general\r\nhappiness even against contrary promptings of personal\r\ncomfort and gain. This brings us to the problems\r\nconnected with the nature and functions of the self. We\r\nshall, in our search for the moral self, pass in review the\r\nconceptions which find morality in (1) Self-Denial or Self-Sacrifice,\r\n(2) Self-Assertion, (3) Combination of Regard\r\nfor Self and for Others, (4) Self-Realization.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 1. THE DOCTRINE OF SELF-DENIAL\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWidespread Currency of the Doctrine.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The notion\r\nthat real goodness, or virtue, consists essentially in abnegation\r\nof the self, in denying and, so far as may be, eliminating\r\neverything that is of the nature of the self, is one\r\nof the oldest and most frequently recurring notions of\r\nmoral endeavor and religion, as well as of moral theory. It\r\ndescribes Buddhism and, in large measure, the monastic\r\nideal of Christianity, while, in Protestantism, Puritanism\r\nis permeated with its spirit. It characterized Cynicism\r\nand Stoicism. Kant goes as far as to say that every rational\r\nbeing must wish to be wholly free from inclinations.\r\nPopular morality, while not going so far as to hold that\r\nall moral goodness is self-denial, yet more or less definitely\r\nassumes that self-denial on its own account, irrespective of\r\nwhat comes out of it, is morally praiseworthy. A notion\r\nso deeply rooted and widely flourishing must have strong\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_365\" id=\"Page_365\"\u003e[Pg 365]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmotives in its favor, all the more so because its practical\r\nvogue is always stronger than any reasons which are theoretically\r\nset forth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eOrigin of the Doctrine.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The notion arises from the\r\ntendency to identify the self with one of its own factors.\r\nIt is one and the same self which conceives and is interested\r\nin some generous and ideal good that is also tempted by\r\nsome near, narrow, and exclusive good. The force of the\r\nlatter resides in the \u003ci\u003ehabitual\u003c/i\u003e self, in purposes which have\r\ngot themselves inwrought into the texture of ordinary\r\ncharacter. Hence there is a disposition to overlook the\r\ncomplexity of selfhood, and to identify it with those factors\r\nin the self which resist ideal aspiration, and which are\r\nrecalcitrant to the thought of duty; to identify the self\r\nwith impulses that are inclined to what is frivolous, sensuous\r\nand sensual, pleasure-seeking. All vice being, then,\r\negoism, selfishness, self-seeking, the remedy is to check it\r\nat its roots; to keep the self down in its proper place, denying\r\nit, chastening it, mortifying it, refusing to listen to its\r\npromptings. Ignoring the variety and subtlety of the\r\nfactors that make up the self, all the different elements of\r\nright and of wrong are gathered together and set over\r\nagainst each other. All the good is placed once for all in\r\nsome outside source, some higher law or ideal; and the\r\nsource of all evil is placed within the corrupted and vile\r\nself. When one has become conscious of the serious nature\r\nof the moral struggle; has found that vice is easy, and to\r\nerr \"natural,\" needing only to give way to some habitual\r\nimpulse or desire; that virtue is arduous, requiring resistance\r\nand strenuous effort, one is apt to overlook the\r\nhabitual tendencies which are the ministers of the higher\r\ngoods. One forgets that unless ideal ends were also\r\nrooted in some natural tendencies of the self, they could\r\nneither occur to the self nor appeal to the self. Hence\r\neverything is swept into the idea that the self is inherently\r\nso evil that it must be denied, snubbed, sacrificed, mortified.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_366\" id=\"Page_366\"\u003e[Pg 366]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn general, to point out the truth which this theory perverts,\r\nto emphasize the demand for constant reconstruction\r\nand rearrangement of the habitual powers of the\r\nself\u0026mdash;is sufficient criticism of it. But in detail the theory\r\nexercises such pervasive influence that it is worth\r\nwhile to mention specifically some of the evils that accrue\r\nfrom it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. It so Maims and Distorts Human Nature as to\r\nNarrow the Conception of the Good.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In its legitimate\r\nantagonism to pleasure-seeking, it becomes a foe to happiness,\r\nand an implacable enemy of all its elements. Art is\r\nsuspected, for beauty appeals to the lust of the eye. Family\r\nlife roots in sexual impulses, and property in love of\r\npower, gratification, and luxury. Science springs from the\r\npride of the intellect; the State from the pride of will. \u003ci\u003eAsceticism\u003c/i\u003e\r\nis the logical result; a purely negative conception\r\nof virtue. But it surely does dishonor, not honor, to the\r\nmoral life to conceive it as mere negative subjection of the\r\nflesh, mere holding under control the lust of desire and\r\nthe temptations of appetite. All positive content, all liberal\r\nachievement, is cut out and morality is reduced to a\r\nmere struggle \u003ci\u003eagainst\u003c/i\u003e solicitations to sin. While asceticism\r\nis in no danger of becoming a popular doctrine, there\r\nis a common tendency to conceive self-control in this negative\r\nfashion; to fail to see that the important thing is some\r\npositive good \u003ci\u003efor\u003c/i\u003e which a desire is controlled. In general\r\nwe overemphasize that side of morality which consists\r\nin abstinence and \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e doing wrong.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. To Make so Much of Conflict with the \"Flesh,\" is\r\nto Honor the Latter too Much.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It is to fix too much\r\nattention on it. It is an open lesson of psychology that to\r\noppose doing an act by mere injunction not to do it, is to\r\nincrease the power of the thing \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e to be done, and to\r\nweaken the spring and effectiveness of the other motives,\r\nwhich, if positively attended to, might keep the obnoxious\r\nmotive from gaining supremacy. The \"expulsive power\"\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_367\" id=\"Page_367\"\u003e[Pg 367]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof a generous affection is more to be relied upon than effort\r\nto suppress, which keeps alive the very thing to be suppressed.\r\nThe history of monks and Puritan saints alike\r\nis full of testimony to the fact that withdrawal from\r\npositive generous and wholesome aims re\u0026euml;nforces the vitality\r\nof the lower appetites and stimulates the imagination\r\nto play about them. Flagellation and fasting work as\r\nlong as the body is exhausted; but the brave organism\r\nreasserts itself, and its capacities for science, art, the life\r\nof the family and the State not having been cultivated,\r\nsheer ineradicable physical instinct is most likely to come\r\nto the front.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. We Judge Others by Ourselves Because We Have\r\nNo Other Way to Judge.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It is impossible for a man\r\nwho conceives his own good to be in \"going without,\" in\r\njust restricting himself, to have any large or adequate\r\nidea of the good of others. Unconsciously and inevitably\r\na hardening and narrowing of the conditions of the lives\r\nof others accompanies the reign of the Puritanic ideal.\r\nThe man who takes a high view of the capacities of human\r\nnature in itself, who reverences its possibilities and\r\nis jealous for their high maintenance in himself, is the\r\none most likely to have keen and sensitive appreciation\r\nof the needs of others. There is, moreover, no selfishness,\r\nno neglect of others more thoroughgoing, more effectively\r\ncruel than that which comes from preoccupation with the\r\nattainment of personal goodness, and this interest is an\r\nalmost inevitable effect of devotion to the negative ideal\r\nof self-denial.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4. The Principle Radically Violates Human Nature.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This\r\nindeed is its claim\u0026mdash;that human nature, just as\r\nhuman nature, requires to have violence done it. But the\r\ncapacities which constitute the self demand fulfillment.\r\nThe place, the time, the manner, the degree, and the proportion\r\nof their fulfillment, require infinite care and pains,\r\nand to secure this attention is the business of morals.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_368\" id=\"Page_368\"\u003e[Pg 368]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nMorals is a matter of direction, not of suppression. The\r\nurgency of desires and capacities for expression cannot be\r\ngot rid of; nature cannot be expelled. If the need of\r\nhappiness, of satisfaction of capacity, is checked in one\r\ndirection, it will manifest itself in another. If the direction\r\nwhich is checked is an unconscious and wholesome one,\r\nthat which is taken will be likely to be morbid and perverse.\r\nThe one who is conscious of continually denying himself\r\ncannot rid himself of the idea that it ought to be \"made\r\nup\" to him; that a compensating happiness is due him\r\nfor what he has sacrificed, somewhat increased, if anything,\r\non account of the unnatural virtue he has displayed.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_170_170\" id=\"FNanchor_170_170\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_170_170\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[170]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nTo be self-sacrificing is to \"lay up\" merit, and\r\nthis achievement must surely be rewarded with happiness\u0026mdash;if\r\nnot now, then later. Those who habitually live on the\r\nbasis of conscious self-denial are likely to be exorbitant\r\nin the demands which they make on some one near them,\r\nsome member of their family or some friend; likely to blame\r\nothers if their own \"virtue\" does not secure for itself an\r\nexacting attention which reduces others to the plane of\r\nservility. Often the doctrine of self-sacrifice leads to an\r\ninverted hedonism: we are to be good\u0026mdash;that is, to forego\r\npleasure\u0026mdash;now, that we may have a greater measure of\r\nenjoyment in some future paradise of bliss. Or, the individual\r\nwho has taken vows of renunciation is entitled by\r\nthat very fact to represent spiritual authority on earth\r\nand to lord it over others.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 2. SELF-ASSERTION\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe idea that morality consists in an unbridled assertion\r\nof self, in its forceful aggressive manifestation, rarely\r\nreceives consistent theoretical formulation\u0026mdash;possibly because\r\nmost men are so ready to act upon it practically\r\nthat explicit acknowledgment would be a hindrance rather\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_369\" id=\"Page_369\"\u003e[Pg 369]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthan a help to the idea. But it is a doctrine which tends\r\nto be invoked more or less explicitly as a reaction from\r\nthe impotency of the self-denial dogma. In reference\r\nto some superior individual or class, some leader or group\r\nof aristocratically ordained leaders, it is always a more\r\nor less conscious principle. Concerning these it is held that\r\nordinary morality holds eventually only for the \"common\r\nherd,\" the activities of the leader being amenable to\r\na higher law than that of common morality.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_171_171\" id=\"FNanchor_171_171\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_171_171\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[171]\u003c/a\u003e Moreover,\r\nsince the self-sacrifice morality is almost never carried out\r\nconsistently\u0026mdash;that is, to the point of monastic asceticism,\u0026mdash;much\r\npopular morality is an unbalanced combination of\r\nself-sacrifice in some regards and ruthless self-assertion in\r\nothers. It is not \"practicable\" to carry out the principle\r\nof self-denial everywhere; it is reserved for the family\r\nlife, for special religious duties; in business (which is business,\r\nnot morals), the proper thing is aggressive and unremitting\r\nself-assertion. In business, the end is success, to\r\n\"make good\"; weakness is failure, and failure is disgrace,\r\ndishonor. Thus in practice the two conceptions of self-denial\r\nin one region and self-assertion in another mutually\r\nsupport each other. They give occasion for the more or\r\nless unformulated, yet prevalent, idea that moral considerations\r\n(those of self-denial) apply to a limited phase\r\nof life, but have nothing to do with other regions in which\r\naccordingly the principle of \"efficiency\" (that is, personal\r\nsuccess, wealth, power obtained in competitive victory)\r\nholds supreme sway.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eRecently, however, there has sprung up a so-called\r\n\"naturalistic\" school of ethics which has formulated explicitly\r\nthe principle of self-assertion, and which claims to\r\nfind scientific sanction for it in the evolutionary doctrine\r\nof Darwin. Evolution, it says, is the great thing, and\r\nevolution means the \u003ci\u003esurvival of the fit in the struggle for\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_370\" id=\"Page_370\"\u003e[Pg 370]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nexistence\u003c/i\u003e. Nature\u0027s method of progress is precisely, so it\r\nis said, ruthless self-assertion\u0026mdash;to the strong the victory,\r\nto the victorious the spoils, and to the defeated, woe. Nature\r\naffords a scene of egoistic endeavor or pressure, suffer\r\nwho may, of struggle to get ahead, that is, ahead of others,\r\neven by thrusting them down and out. But the justification\r\nof this scene of rapine and slaughter is that out of\r\nit comes progress, advance, everything that we regard\r\nas noble and fair. Excellence is the sign of excelling;\r\nthe goal means outrunning others. The morals of humility,\r\nof obedience to law, of pity, sympathy, are merely\r\na self-protective device on the part of the weak who try\r\nto safeguard their weakness by setting fast limitations to\r\nthe activities of the truly strong (compare what was said of\r\nthe not dissimilar doctrine among the Greeks, pp. 120-22).\r\nBut the truly moral man, in whom the principle of progress\r\nis embodied, will break regardlessly through these\r\nmeshes and traps. He will carry his own plans through\r\nto victorious achievement. He is the super-man. The\r\nmass of men are simply food for his schemes, valuable as\r\nfurnishing needed material and tools.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_172_172\" id=\"FNanchor_172_172\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_172_172\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[172]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePractical Vogue of the Underlying Idea.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Such a\r\ntheory, in and of itself, is a literary diversion for those\r\nwho, not being competent in the fields of outer achievement,\r\namuse themselves by idealizing it in writing. Like most\r\nliterary versions of science, it rests upon a pseudo-science,\r\na parody of the real facts. But at a time when economic\r\nconditions are putting an extraordinary emphasis upon\r\noutward achievement, upon success in manipulating nat\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_371\" id=\"Page_371\"\u003e[Pg 371]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eural\r\nand social resources, upon \"efficiency\" in exploiting\r\nboth inanimate energies and the minds and bodies of other\r\npersons, the underlying principle of this theory has a\r\nsanction and vogue which is out of all proportion to the\r\nnumber of those who consciously entertain it as a theory.\r\nFor a healthy mind, the frank statement and facing of the\r\ntheory is its best criticism. Its bald brutalism flourishes\r\nfreely only when covered and disguised. But in view of the\r\nforces at present, and especially in America, making for\r\na more or less unconscious acceptance of its principle in\r\npractice, it may be advisable to say something (1) regarding\r\nits alleged scientific foundation, and (2) the\r\ninadequacy of its conception of efficiency.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. The Theory Exaggerates the R\u0026ocirc;le of Antagonistic\r\nCompetitive Struggle in the Darwinian Theory.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;(a)\r\nThe initial step in any \"progress\" is \u003ci\u003evariation\u003c/i\u003e; this is\r\nnot so much struggle \u003ci\u003eagainst\u003c/i\u003e other organisms, as it is\r\n\u003ci\u003einvention\u003c/i\u003e or discovery of some \u003ci\u003enew\u003c/i\u003e way of acting, involving\r\nbetter adaptation of hitherto merely latent natural\r\nresources, use of some possible food or shelter not previously\r\nutilized. The struggle against other organisms\r\nat work preserves from elimination a species already\r\nfixed\u0026mdash;quite a different thing from the variation which\r\noccasions the introduction of a higher or more complex\r\nspecies. (b) Moreover, so far as the Darwinian theory\r\nis concerned, the \"struggle for existence\" may take any\r\nconceivable form; rivalry in generosity, in mutual aid\r\nand support, may be the kind of competition best fitted\r\nto enable a species to survive. It not only may be so, but\r\nit is so within certain limits. The rage for survival, for\r\npower, must not be asserted indiscriminately; the mate of\r\nthe other sex, the young, to some extent other individuals\r\nof the same kin, are spared, or, in many cases, protected\r\nand nourished.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_173_173\" id=\"FNanchor_173_173\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_173_173\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[173]\u003c/a\u003e (c) The higher the form of life, the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_372\" id=\"Page_372\"\u003e[Pg 372]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003emore\u003c/i\u003e effective the two methods just suggested: namely,\r\nthe method of intelligence in discovering and utilizing new\r\nmethods, tools, and resources as substituted for the direct\r\nmethod of brute conflict; and the method of mutual protection\r\nand care substituted for mutual attack and combat.\r\nIt is among the lower forms of life, not as the theory\r\nwould require among the higher types, that conditions\r\napproximate its picture of the gladiatorial show. The\r\nhigher species among the vertebrates, as among insects\r\n(like ants and bees), are the \"sociable\" kinds. It is sometimes\r\nargued that Darwinism carried into morals would\r\nabolish charity: all care of the hopelessly invalid, of the\r\neconomically dependent, and in general of all the weak and\r\nhelpless except healthy infants. It is argued that our current\r\nstandards are sentimental and artificial, aiming to\r\nmake survive those who are unfit, and thus tending to\r\ndestroy the conditions that make for advance, and to introduce\r\nsuch as make towards degeneration. But this\r\nargument (1) wholly ignores the reflex effect of interest\r\nin those who are ill and defective in strengthening social\r\nsolidarity\u0026mdash;in promoting those ties and reciprocal interests\r\nwhich are as much the prerequisites of strong individual\r\ncharacters as they are of a strong social group.\r\nAnd (2) it fails to take into account the stimulus to foresight,\r\nto scientific discovery, and practical invention, which\r\nhas proceeded from interest in the helpless, the weak, the\r\nsick, the disabled, blind, deaf, and insane. Taking the\r\nmost coldly scientific view, the gains in these two respects\r\nhave, through the growth of social pity, of care for the\r\nunfortunate, been purchased more cheaply than we can\r\nimagine their being bought in any other way. In other\r\nwords, the chief objection to this \"naturalistic\" ethics is\r\nthat it overlooks the fact that, even from the Darwinian\r\npoint of view, the human \u003ci\u003eanimal\u003c/i\u003e is a \u003ci\u003ehuman\u003c/i\u003e animal. It\r\nforgets that the sympathetic and social instincts, those\r\nwhich cause the individual to take the interests of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_373\" id=\"Page_373\"\u003e[Pg 373]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nothers for his own and thereby to restrain his sheer\r\nbrute self-assertiveness, are the highest achievements, the\r\nhigh-water mark of evolution. The theory urges a systematic\r\nrelapse to lower and foregone stages of biological\r\ndevelopment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Its Conception of \"Power,\" \"Efficiency,\" \"Achievement\"\r\nis Perverse.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Compared with the gospel of abstinence,\r\nof inefficiency, preached by the self-denial school,\r\nthere is an element of healthy reaction in any ethical system\r\nwhich stresses positive power, positive success, positive\r\nattainment. Goodness has been too much identified\r\nwith practical feebleness and ineptitude; strength and\r\nsolidity of accomplishment, with unscrupulousness. But\r\npower for the sake of power is as unreal an abstraction\r\nas self-denial for the sake of sacrifice, or self-restraint\r\nfor the sake of the mere restraint. Erected into a central\r\nprinciple, it takes means for end\u0026mdash;the fallacy of all materialism.\r\nIt makes little of many of the most important\r\nand excellent \u003ci\u003einherent ingredients\u003c/i\u003e of happiness in its\r\neagerness to master \u003ci\u003eexternal conditions\u003c/i\u003e of happiness.\r\nSensitive discrimination of complex and refined distinctions\r\nof worth, such as good taste, the resources of poetry and\r\nhistory, frank and varied social converse among intellectual\r\nequals, the humor of sympathetic contemplation of\r\nthe spectacle of life, the capacity to extract happiness\r\nfrom solitude and society, from nature and from art:\u0026mdash;all\r\nof these, as well as the more obvious virtues of sympathy\r\nand benevolence, are swept aside for one coarse undiscriminating\r\nideal of external activity, measured by sheer quantity\r\nof external changes made and external results accumulated.\r\nOf such an ideal we may say, as Mill said,\r\nthat the judge of good, of happiness, is the one who has\r\nexperienced its various forms; and that as \"no intelligent\r\nperson would consent to be a fool\" on account of the pleasures\r\nof the fool, so no man of cultivated spirit would\r\nconsent to be a lover of \"efficiency\" and \"power\" for the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_374\" id=\"Page_374\"\u003e[Pg 374]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsake of brute command of the external commodities of\r\nnature and man.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePresent Currency of This Ideal.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In spite of the extraordinary\r\ncurrency of this ideal at present, there is\r\nlittle fear that it will be permanently established. Human\r\nnature is too rich and varied in its capacities and demands;\r\nthe world of nature and society is too fruitful in sources\r\nof stimulus and interest for man to remain indefinitely\r\ncontent with the idea of power for power\u0027s sake, command\r\nof means for the mere sake of the means. Humanity has\r\nlong lived a precarious and a stunted life because of its\r\npartial and easily shaken hold on natural resources.\r\nStarved by centuries of abstinence enforced through lack\r\nof control of the forces and methods of nature, taught\r\nthe gospel of the merit of abstention, it is not surprising\r\nthat it should be intoxicated when scientific discovery\r\nbears its fruit of power in utilization of natural\r\nforces, or that, temporarily unbalanced, it should take the\r\nexternal conditions of happiness for happiness itself. But\r\nwhen the values of material acquisition and achievement\r\nbecome familiar they will lose the contrast value they now\r\npossess; and human endeavor will concern itself mainly\r\nwith the problem of rendering its conquests in power and\r\nefficiency tributary to the life of intelligence and art and\r\nof social communication.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_174_174\" id=\"FNanchor_174_174\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_174_174\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[174]\u003c/a\u003e Such a moral idealism will rest\r\nupon a more secure and extensive natural foundation than\r\nthat of the past, and will be more equitable in applica\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_375\" id=\"Page_375\"\u003e[Pg 375]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etion\r\nand saner in content than that with which aristocracies\r\nhave made us familiar. It will be a democratic ideal,\r\na good for all, not for a noble class; and it will include,\r\nnot exclude, those physical and physiological factors which\r\naristocratic idealisms have excluded as common and\r\nunclean.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 3. SELF-LOVE AND BENEVOLENCE; OR, EGOISM AND\r\nALTRUISM\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the last three centuries, the most discussed point\r\nin English ethical literature (save perhaps whether moral\r\nknowledge is intuitive or derived from experience) has\r\nbeen the relation of regard for one\u0027s own self and for\r\nother selves as motives of action\u0026mdash;\"the crux of all ethical\r\nspeculation,\" Spencer terms it. All views have been represented:\r\n(a) that man naturally acts from purely selfish\r\nmotives and that morality consists in an enforced subjection\r\nof self-love to the laws of a common social order,\r\n(b) That man is naturally selfish, while morality is an\r\n\"enlightened selfishness,\" or a regard for self based upon\r\nrecognition of the extent to which its happiness requires\r\nconsideration of others. (c) That the tendencies of the\r\nagent are naturally selfish, but that morality is the subjection\r\nof these tendencies to the law of duty. (d) That\r\nman\u0027s interests are naturally partly egoistic and partly\r\nsympathetic, while morality is a compromise or adjustment\r\nof these tendencies. (e) That man\u0027s interests are naturally\r\nboth, and morality a subjection of both to conscience as\r\numpire. (f) That they are both, while morality is a subjection\r\nof egoistic to benevolent sentiments. (g) That the\r\nindividual\u0027s interests are naturally in objective ends which\r\nprimarily are neither egoistic nor altruistic; and these\r\nends become either selfish or benevolent at special crises,\r\nat which times morality consists in referring them, equally\r\nand impartially for judgment, to a situation in which\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_376\" id=\"Page_376\"\u003e[Pg 376]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe interests of the self and of others concerned are involved:\r\n\u003ci\u003eto a common good\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThree Underlying Psychological Principles.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We shall\r\nmake no attempt to discuss these various views in detail;\r\nbut will bring into relief some of the factors in the discussion\r\nwhich substantiate the view (g) stated last. It will be\r\nnoted that the theories rank themselves under three heads\r\nwith reference to the constitution of man\u0027s tendencies:\r\nholding they (1) naturally have in view personal ends exclusively\r\nor all fall under the principle of self-love or self-regard;\r\nthat (2) some of them contemplate one\u0027s own happiness\r\nand some of them that of others; that (3) primarily\r\nthey are not \u003ci\u003econsciously\u003c/i\u003e concerned with either one\u0027s own\r\nhappiness or that of others. Memory and reflection may\r\nshow (just as it shows other things) that their consequences\r\naffect both the self and others, when the recognition\r\nof this fact becomes an additional element, either for\r\ngood or for evil, in the motivation of the act. We shall\r\nconsider, first, the various senses in which action occurs,\r\nor is said to occur, in behalf of the person\u0027s own self;\r\nand then take up, in similar fashion, its reference to the\r\ninterests of others.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eI. Action in Behalf of Self.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;1. \u003ci\u003eMotives as Selfish\u003c/i\u003e:\r\nThe Natural Selfishness of Man is maintained from such\r\ndifferent standpoints and with such different objects in\r\nview that it is difficult to state the doctrine in any one\r\ngeneralized form. By some theologians, it has been associated\r\nwith an innate corruption or depravity of human\r\nnature and been made the basis of a demand for supernatural\r\nassistance to lead a truly just and benevolent life.\r\nBy Hobbes (1588-1679) it was associated with the anti-social\r\nnature of individuals and made the basis for a plea\r\nfor a strong and centralized political authority\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_175_175\" id=\"FNanchor_175_175\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_175_175\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[175]\u003c/a\u003e to con\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_377\" id=\"Page_377\"\u003e[Pg 377]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etrol\r\nthe natural \"war of all against all\" which flows inevitably\r\nfrom the psychological egoism. By Kant, it was\r\nconnected with the purely sense origin of desires, and\r\nmade the basis for a demand for the complete subordination\r\nof desire to duty as a motive for action. Morals, like\r\npolitics, make strange bedfellows! The common factor in\r\nthese diverse notions, however, is that every act of a self\r\nmust, when left to its \u003ci\u003enatural\u003c/i\u003e or psychological course,\r\nhave the interest of the self in view; otherwise there would\r\nbe no motive for the deed and it would not be done. This\r\ntheoretical and \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e view is further supported by pointing\r\nout, sometimes in reprobation of man\u0027s sinful nature,\r\nsometimes in a more or less cynical vein, the lurking presence\r\nof some subtle regard for self in acts that apparently\r\nare most generous and \"disinterested.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_176_176\" id=\"FNanchor_176_176\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_176_176\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[176]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAmbiguity of the Psychological Basis.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The notion\r\nthat all action is \"for the self\" is infected with the same\r\nambiguity as the (analogous) doctrine that all desire\r\nis for happiness. Like that doctrine, in one sense it is\r\na truism, in another a falsity\u0026mdash;this latter being the sense\r\nin which its upholders maintain it. Psychologically, any\r\nobject that moves us, any object in which we imagine our\r\nimpulses to rest satisfied or to find fulfillment, \u003ci\u003ebecomes\u003c/i\u003e, in\r\nvirtue of that fact, a factor in the self. If I am enough\r\ninterested in collecting postage stamps, a collection of\r\npostage stamps becomes a part of my \"ego,\" which is incomplete\r\nand restless till filled out in that way. If my\r\nhabits are such that I am not content when I know my\r\nneighbor is suffering from a lack of food until I have\r\nrelieved him, then relief of his suffering becomes a part\r\nof my selfhood. If my desires are such that I have no\r\nrest of mind until I have beaten my competitor in business,\r\nor have demonstrated my superiority in social gifts\r\nby putting my fellow at some embarrassing disadvantage,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_378\" id=\"Page_378\"\u003e[Pg 378]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthen that sort of thing constitutes my self. Our instincts,\r\nimpulses, and habits all demand appropriate objects in\r\norder to secure exercise and expression; and these ends\r\nin their office of furnishing outlet and satisfaction to our\r\npowers form a cherished part of the \"me.\" In this sense\r\nit is true, and a truism, that all action involves the interest\r\nof self.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTrue and False Interpretation.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;But this doctrine is\r\nthe exact opposite of that intended by those who claim\r\nthat all action is from self-love. The true doctrine says,\r\n\u003ci\u003ethe self is constituted and developed through instincts and\r\ninterests which are directed upon their own objects with\r\nno conscious regard necessarily for anything except those\r\nobjects themselves\u003c/i\u003e. The false doctrine implies that the\r\nself \u003ci\u003eexists by itself apart from these objective ends, and\r\nthat they are merely means for securing it a certain profit\r\nor pleasure\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuppose, for example, it is a case of being so disturbed\r\nin mind by the thought of another in pain that one is\r\nmoved to do something to relieve him. This means that\r\ncertain native instincts or certain acquired habits demand\r\nrelief of others as part of themselves. The well-being of\r\nthe other is an interest of the self: is a part of the self.\r\nThis is precisely what is meant ordinarily by unselfishness:\r\nnot lack or absence of a self, but \u003ci\u003esuch\u003c/i\u003e a self as\r\nidentifies itself in action with others\u0027 interests and hence\r\nis satisfied only when they are satisfied. To find pain in\r\nthe thought of others pained and to take pleasure in the\r\nthought of their relief, is to have and to be moved by\r\npersonal motives, by states which are \"selfish\" in the sense\r\nof making up the self; but which are the exact opposite\r\nof selfish in the sense of being the thought of some private\r\nadvantage to self.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_177_177\" id=\"FNanchor_177_177\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_177_177\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[177]\u003c/a\u003e Putting it roundly, then, the fallacy\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_379\" id=\"Page_379\"\u003e[Pg 379]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the selfish motive theory is that it fails to see that\r\n\u003ci\u003einstincts and habits directed upon objects are primary\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand that they come before any conscious thought of self\r\nas end, since they are necessary to the constitution of\r\nthat thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe following quotation from James\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_178_178\" id=\"FNanchor_178_178\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_178_178\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[178]\u003c/a\u003e states the true\r\ndoctrine:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"When I am led by selflove to keep my seat whilst ladies\r\nstand, or to grab something first and cut out my neighbor,\r\nwhat I really love is the comfortable seat; it is the thing\r\nitself which I grab. I love \u003ci\u003ethem\u003c/i\u003e primarily, as the mother\r\nloves her babe, or a generous man an heroic deed. Wherever,\r\nas here, selfseeking is the outcome of simple instinctive propensity,\r\nit is but a name for certain reflex acts. Something\r\nrivets my attention fatally and fatally provokes the \u0027selfish\u0027\r\nresponse…. It is true I am no automaton, but a thinker.\r\nBut my thoughts, like my acts, are here concerned only with\r\nthe outward things…. In fact the more utterly selfish I\r\nam in this primitive way, the more blindly absorbed my\r\nthought will be in the objects and impulses of my lust and\r\nthe more devoid of any inward looking glance.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Results as Selfish: Ambiguity in the Notion.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We\r\nmust then give up the notion that motives are inherently\r\nself-seeking, in the sense that there is in voluntary\r\nacts a thought of the self as the end for the sake of which\r\nthe act is performed. The self-seeking doctrine may,\r\nhowever, be restated in these terms: Although there is\r\nno thought of self or its advantage consciously entertained,\r\nyet our original instincts are such that their\r\nobjects do as \u003ci\u003ematter of result\u003c/i\u003e conduce primarily to the\r\nwell-being and advantage of the self. In this sense, anger,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_380\" id=\"Page_380\"\u003e[Pg 380]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfear, hunger, and thirst, etc., are said to be egoistic or self-seeking\u0026mdash;not\r\nthat their \u003ci\u003econscious\u003c/i\u003e object is the self, but\r\nthat their inevitable effect is to preserve and protect the\r\nself. The fact that an instinct secures self-preservation\r\nor self-development does not, however, make it \"egoistic\" or\r\n\"selfish\" in the moral sense; nor does it throw any light\r\nupon the moral status of the instinct. \u003ci\u003eEverything depends\r\nupon the sort of self which is maintained.\u003c/i\u003e There is,\r\nindeed, some presumption (see \u003ci\u003eante\u003c/i\u003e, p. 294) that the act\r\nsustains a \u003ci\u003esocial\u003c/i\u003e self, that is, a self whose maintenance is of\r\nsocial value. If the individual organism did not struggle\r\nfor food; strive aggressively against obstacles and interferences;\r\nevade or shelter itself against menacing superior\r\nforce, what would become of children, fathers and\r\nmothers, lawyers, doctors and clergymen, citizens and\r\npatriots\u0026mdash;in short, of society? If we avoid setting up a\r\npurely abstract self, if we keep in mind that every actual\r\nself is a self which \u003ci\u003eincludes\u003c/i\u003e social relations and offices,\r\nboth actual and potential, we shall have no difficulty\r\nin seeing that self-preservative instincts \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e be, and taken\r\nby and large, \u003ci\u003emust\u003c/i\u003e be, socially conservative. Moreover,\r\nwhile it is not true that if \"a man does not look after his\r\nown interests no one else will\" (if that means that his interests\r\nare no one else\u0027s affair in any way), it is true\r\nthat no one has a right to neglect his own interests in\r\nthe hope that some one else will care for them. \"His own\r\ninterests,\" properly speaking, are precisely the ends which\r\nconcern him more directly than they concern any one else.\r\nEach man is, so to say, nearer himself than is any one\r\nelse, and, therefore, has certain duties to and about himself\r\nwhich cannot be performed by any other one. Others\r\nmay present food or the conditions of education, but the\r\nindividual alone can digest the food or educate himself.\r\nIt is profitable for society, not merely for an individual,\r\nthat each of us should instinctively have his powers most\r\nactively and intensely called out by the things that dis\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_381\" id=\"Page_381\"\u003e[Pg 381]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etinctively\r\naffect him and his own welfare. Any other\r\narrangement would mean waste of social energy, inefficiency\r\nin securing social results.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe quotation from James also makes it clear, however,\r\nthat under certain circumstances the mere absorption in\r\na thing, even without conscious thought of self, is morally\r\noffensive. The \"pig\" in manners is not necessarily thinking\r\nof himself; all that is required to make him a pig\r\nis that he should have too narrow and exclusive an object\r\nof regard. The man sees simply the seat, not the seat\r\n\u003ci\u003eand\u003c/i\u003e the lady. The boor in manners is unconscious of\r\nmany of the objects in the situation which \u003ci\u003eshould\u003c/i\u003e operate\r\nas stimuli. One impulse or habit is operating at the\r\nexpense of others; the self in play is too petty or narrow.\r\nViewed from the standpoint of results, the fact which constitutes\r\nselfishness in the moral sense is not that certain\r\nimpulses and habits secure the well-being of the self, \u003ci\u003ebut\r\nthat the well-being secured is a narrow and exclusive one\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThe forms of coarse egoism which offend us most in ordinary\r\nlife are not usually due to a deliberate or self-conscious\r\nseeking of advantage for self, but to such preoccupation\r\nwith certain ends as blinds the agent to the\r\nthought of the interests of others. Many whose behavior\r\nseems to others most selfish would deny indignantly (and,\r\nfrom the standpoint of their \u003ci\u003edefinite\u003c/i\u003e consciousness, honestly)\r\nany self-seeking motives: they would point to certain\r\nobjective results, which in the abstract are desirable, as\r\nthe true ends of their activities. But none the less, they\r\n\u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e selfish, because the limitations of their interests make\r\nthem overlook the consequences which affect the freedom\r\nand happiness of others.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. There are also Cases in Which the Thought of\r\nthe Resulting Consequence to the Self Consciously\r\nEnters in and Modifies the Motive of the Act.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;With\r\nincreasing memory and foresight, one can no more ignore\r\nthe lesson of the past as to the consequences of an act\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_382\" id=\"Page_382\"\u003e[Pg 382]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nupon himself than he can ignore other consequences. A\r\nman who has learned that a certain act has painful consequences\r\nto himself, whether to his body, his reputation,\r\nhis comfort, or his character, is quite likely to have the\r\nthought of himself present itself as part of the foreseen\r\nconsequences when the question of a similar act recurs.\r\nIn and of itself, once more, this fact throws no light upon\r\nthe moral status of the act. Everything depends upon\r\nwhat sort of a self moves and how it moves. A man who\r\nhesitated to rush into a burning building to rescue a suit\r\nof clothes because he thought of the danger to himself,\r\nwould be sensible; a man who rushed out of the\r\nbuilding just because he thought of saving himself when\r\nthere were others he might have assisted, would be contemptible.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe one who began taking exercise because he thought\r\nof his own health, would be commended; but a man who\r\nthought so continually of his own health as to shut out\r\nother objects, would become an object of ridicule or worse.\r\n\u003ci\u003eThere is a moral presumption that a man should make\r\nconsideration of himself a part of his aim and intent.\u003c/i\u003e A\r\ncertain care of health, of body, of property, of mental\r\nfaculty, because they are one\u0027s own is not only permissible,\r\nbut obligatory. This is what the older moral writers\r\nspoke of as \"prudence,\" or as \"reasonable self-love.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(i.) It is a stock argument of the universal selfishness\r\ntheory to point out that a man\u0027s acknowledgment of some\r\n\u003ci\u003epublic need or benefit\u003c/i\u003e is quite likely to coincide with his\r\nrecognition of some private advantage. A statesman\u0027s\r\nrecognition of some measure of public policy happens to\r\ncoincide with perceiving that by pressing it he can bring\r\nhimself into prominence or gain office. A man is more\r\nlikely to see the need of improved conditions of sanitation\r\nor transportation in a given locality if he has property\r\nthere. A man\u0027s indignation at some prevalent public ill\r\nmay sleep till he has had a private taste of it. We may\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_383\" id=\"Page_383\"\u003e[Pg 383]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nadmit that these instances describe a usual, though not\r\nuniversal, state of affairs. But does it follow that such\r\nmen are moved \u003ci\u003emerely\u003c/i\u003e by the thought of gain to themselves?\r\nPossibly this sometimes happens; then the act is\r\nselfish in the obnoxious sense. The man has isolated his\r\nthought of himself as an end and made the thought of\r\nthe improvement or reform merely an external means.\r\nThe latter is not truly his \u003ci\u003eend\u003c/i\u003e at all; he has not identified\r\nit with himself. In other cases, while the individual would\r\nnot have recognized the end if the thought of himself had\r\nnot been implicated, yet \u003ci\u003eafter\u003c/i\u003e he has recognized it, the\r\ntwo\u0026mdash;the thought of himself and of the public advantage\u0026mdash;may\r\nblend. His thought of himself may lend warmth and\r\nintimacy to an object which otherwise would have been\r\ncold, \u003ci\u003ewhile, at the same time, the self is broadened and\r\ndeepened by taking in the new object of regard\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(ii.) Take the case of amusement or recreation. To an\r\nadult usually engaged in strenuous pursuits, the thought\r\nof a pleasure for the mere sake of pleasure, of enjoyment,\r\nof having a \"good time,\" may appeal as an end. And if\r\nthe pleasure is itself \"innocent,\" only the requirements of\r\na preconceived theory (like the Kantian) would question\r\nits legitimacy. Even its moral necessity is clear when\r\nrelaxation is conducive to cheerfulness and efficiency\r\nin more serious pursuits. But if a man discriminates\r\nmentally between himself and the play or exercise in\r\nwhich he finds enjoyment and relief, thinking of himself\r\nas a distinct end to which the latter is merely means,\r\nhe is not likely to get the recreation. It is by forgetting\r\nthe self, that is by taking the light and easy activity \u003ci\u003eas\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthe self of the situation, that the benefit comes. To be\r\na \"lover of pleasure\" in the bad sense is precisely to\r\nseek amusements as excitements for a self which somehow\r\nremains outside them as their fixed and ulterior\r\nend.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(iii.) Exactly the same analysis applies to the idea of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_384\" id=\"Page_384\"\u003e[Pg 384]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe moral culture of the self, of its moral perfecting.\r\nEvery serious-minded person has, from time to time, to\r\ntake stock of his status and progress in moral matters\u0026mdash;to\r\ntake thought of the moral self just as at other times\r\nhe takes thought of the health of the bodily self. But\r\nwoe betides that man who, having entered upon a course of\r\nreflection which leads to a clearer conception of his own\r\nmoral capacities and weaknesses, maintains that thought\r\nas a distinct mental end, and thereby makes his subsequent\r\nacts simply means to improving or perfecting his moral\r\nnature. Such a course defeats itself. At the least, it\r\nleads to priggishness, and its tendency is towards one of\r\nthe worst forms of selfishness: a habit of thinking and feeling\r\nthat persons, that concrete situations and relations,\r\nexist simply to render contributions to one\u0027s own precious\r\nmoral character. The worst of such selfishness is that\r\nhaving protected itself with the mantle of interest in moral\r\ngoodness, it is proof against that attrition of experience\r\nwhich may always recall a man to himself in the case of\r\ngrosser and more unconscious absorption. A sentimentally\r\nrefined egoism is always more hopeless than a brutal and\r\nna\u0026iuml;ve one\u0026mdash;though a brutal one not infrequently protects\r\nitself by adoption and proclamation of the language of\r\nthe former.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eII. Benevolence or Regard for Others.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eAmbiguity in\r\nConception\u003c/i\u003e: There is the same ambiguity in the idea of\r\nsympathetic or altruistic springs to action that there is\r\nin that of egoistic and self-regarding. Does the phrase\r\nrefer to their conscious and express intent? or to their\r\nobjective results when put into operation, irrespective\r\nof explicit desire and aim? And, if the latter, are we\r\nto believe contribution to the welfare of others to be\r\nthe sole and exclusive character of some springs of\r\naction, or simply that, under certain circumstances, the\r\n\u003ci\u003eemphasis\u003c/i\u003e falls more upon the good resulting to others\r\nthan upon other consequences? The discussion will\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_385\" id=\"Page_385\"\u003e[Pg 385]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nshow that the same general principles hold for \"benevolent\"\r\nas for self-regarding impulses: namely (1) that\r\nthere are none which from the start are consciously such;\r\n(2) that while reflection may bring to light their bearing\r\nupon the welfare of others so that it becomes an element\r\nin the conscious desire, this is a matter of relative preponderance,\r\nnot of absolute nature; and (3) that just as\r\nconscious regard for self is not necessarily bad or \"selfish,\"\r\nso conscious regard for others is not necessarily good:\r\nthe criterion is the whole situation in which the desire\r\ntakes effect.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. The Existence of Other-Regarding Springs to\r\nAction.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Only the preconceptions of hedonistic psychology\r\nwould ever lead one to deny the existence of reactions\r\nand impulses called out by the sight of others\u0027 misery\r\nand joy and which tend to increase the latter and to relieve\r\nthe former. Recent psychologists (writing, of course,\r\nquite independently of ethical controversies) offer lists\r\nof native instinctive tendencies such as the following:\r\nAnger, jealousy, rivalry, secretiveness, acquisitiveness,\r\nfear, shyness, sympathy, affection, pity, sexual love, curiosity,\r\nimitation, play, constructiveness.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_179_179\" id=\"FNanchor_179_179\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_179_179\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[179]\u003c/a\u003e In this inventory,\r\nthe first seven may be said to be aroused specially\r\nby situations having to do with the preservation of the\r\nself; the next four are responses to stimuli proceeding\r\nespecially from others and tending to consequences favorable\r\nto them, while the last four are mainly impersonal.\r\nBut the division into self-regarding and other-regarding\r\nis not exclusive and absolute. Anger \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e be wholly other-regarding,\r\nas in the case of hearty indignation at wrongs\r\nsuffered by others; rivalry may be generous emulation or\r\nbe directed toward surpassing one\u0027s own past record.\r\nLove between the sexes, which should be the source of\r\nsteady, far-reaching interest in others, and which at times\r\nexpresses itself in supreme abnegation of devotion, easily\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_386\" id=\"Page_386\"\u003e[Pg 386]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbecomes the cause of brutal and persistent egoism. In\r\nshort, the division into egoistic and altruistic holds only\r\n\"other things being equal.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eConfining ourselves for the moment to the native psychological\r\nequipment, we may say that man is endowed\r\nwith instinctive promptings which naturally (that is, without\r\nthe intervention of deliberation or calculation) tend to\r\npreserve the self (by aggressive attack as in anger, or in\r\nprotective retreat as in fear); and to develop his powers\r\n(as in acquisitiveness, constructiveness, and play); and\r\nwhich equally, without consideration of resulting ulterior\r\nbenefit either to self or to others, tend to bind the\r\nself closer to others and to advance the interests of others\u0026mdash;as\r\npity, affectionateness, or again, constructiveness and\r\nplay. Any given individual is \u003ci\u003enaturally\u003c/i\u003e an erratic mixture\r\nof fierce insistence upon his own welfare and of profound\r\nsusceptibility to the happiness of others\u0026mdash;different individuals\r\nvarying much in the respective intensities and proportions\r\nof the two tendencies.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. The Moral Status of Altruistic Tendencies.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We\r\nhave expressly devoted considerable space (ch. xiii.) to\r\nshowing that there are no motives which in and of themselves\r\nare right; that any tendency, whether original\r\ninstinct or acquired habit, requires sanction from the\r\nspecial consequences which, in the special situation, are\r\nlikely to flow from it. The mere fact that pity in general\r\ntends to conserve the welfare of others does not guarantee\r\nthe rightness of giving way to an impulse of pity,\r\njust as it happens to spring up. This might mean sentimentalism\r\nfor the agent, and weakening of the springs of\r\npatience, courage, self-help, and self-respect in others.\r\nThe persistence with which the doctrine of the evils of\r\nindiscriminate charity has to be taught is sufficient evidence\r\nthat the so-called other-regarding impulses require\r\nthe same control by reason as do the \"egoistic\" ones.\r\nThey have no inherent sacredness which exempts them from\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_387\" id=\"Page_387\"\u003e[Pg 387]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe application of the standard of the common and reasonable\r\nhappiness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEvils of Unregulated Altruism.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;So much follows from\r\nthe general principles already discussed. But there are\r\nspecial dangers and evils attendant upon an exaggeration\r\nof the altruistic idea. (i.) \u003ci\u003eIt tends to render others dependent\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand thus contradicts its own professed aim: the\r\nhelping of others. Almost every one knows some child who\r\nis so continuously \"helped\" by others, that he loses his\r\ninitiative and resourcefulness. Many an invalid is confirmed\r\nin a state of helplessness by the devoted attention\r\nof others. In large social matters there is always danger\r\nof the substitution of an ideal of conscious \"benevolence\"\r\nfor justice: it is in aristocratic and feudal periods that\r\nthe idea flourishes that \"charity\" (conceived as conferring\r\nbenefits \u003ci\u003eupon\u003c/i\u003e others, doing things \u003ci\u003efor\u003c/i\u003e them) is inherently\r\nand absolutely a good. The idea assumes the continued\r\nand necessary existence of a dependent \"lower\" class to\r\nbe the recipients of the kindness of their superiors; a class\r\nwhich serves as passive material for the cultivation in\r\nothers of the virtue of charity, the higher class \"acquiring\r\nmerit\" at expense of the lower, while the lower\r\nhas gratitude and respect for authority as its chief virtues.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(ii.) \u003ci\u003eThe erection of the \"benevolent\" impulse into a\r\nvirtue in and of itself tends to build up egoism in others.\u003c/i\u003e\r\nThe child who finds himself unremittingly the object of\r\nattention from others is likely to develop an exaggerated\r\nsense of the relative importance of his own \u003ci\u003eego\u003c/i\u003e. The\r\nchronic invalid, conspicuously the recipient of the conscious\r\naltruism of others, is happy in nature who avoids the slow\r\ngrowth of an insidious egoism. Men who are the constant\r\nsubjects of abnegation on the part of their wives\r\nand female relatives rarely fail to develop a self-absorbed\r\ncomplacency and unconscious conceit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(iii.) Undue emphasis upon altruism as a motive is quite\r\nlikely to react to form a \u003ci\u003epeculiarly subtle egoism in the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_388\" id=\"Page_388\"\u003e[Pg 388]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nperson who cultivates it\u003c/i\u003e. Others cease to be \u003ci\u003enatural\u003c/i\u003e objects\r\nof interest and regard, and are converted into excuses for\r\nthe manifestation and nurture of one\u0027s own generous goodness.\r\nUnderlying complacency with respect to social ills\r\ngrows up because they afford an opportunity for developing\r\nand displaying this finest of virtues. In our interest\r\nin the maintenance of our own benign altruism we cease\r\nto be properly disturbed by conditions which are intrinsically\r\nunjust and hateful.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_180_180\" id=\"FNanchor_180_180\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_180_180\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[180]\u003c/a\u003e (iv.) As present circumstances\r\namply demonstrate, there is the danger that\r\nthe erection of benevolence into a conscious principle in\r\nsome things will serve to supply rich persons with a cloak\r\nfor selfishness in other directions. Philanthropy is made\r\nan offset and compensation for brutal exploitation. A\r\nman who pushes to the breaking-point of legality aggressively\r\nselfish efforts to get ahead of others in business,\r\nsquares it in his own self-respect and in the esteem of\r\nthose classes of the community who entertain like conceptions,\r\nby gifts of hospitals, colleges, missions, and\r\nlibraries.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGenuine and False Altruism.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;These considerations\r\nmay be met by the obvious retort that it is not true\r\naltruism, genuine benevolence, sincere charity, which we\r\nare concerned with in such cases. This is a true remark.\r\nWe are not of course criticizing true but spurious interest\r\nin others. But why is it counterfeit? What is the nature\r\nof the genuine article? The danger is not in benevolence\r\nor altruism, but in that conception of them which makes\r\nthem equivalent to regard for others \u003ci\u003eas others\u003c/i\u003e, irrespective\r\nof a social situation to which all alike belong. There is\r\nnothing in the selfhood of others, because they are others,\r\nwhich gives it any supremacy over selfhood in oneself.\r\nJust as it is exclusiveness of objective ends, the ignoring\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_389\" id=\"Page_389\"\u003e[Pg 389]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof relations, which is objectionable in selfishness, so it is\r\ntaking the part for the whole which is obnoxious in so-called\r\naltruism. To include in our view of consequences the\r\nneeds and possibilities of others on the same basis as our\r\nown, is to take the only course which will give an adequate\r\nview of the situation. There is no situation into which\r\nthese factors do not enter. To have a generous view of\r\nothers is to have a larger world in which to act. To\r\nremember that they, like ourselves, are persons, are individuals\r\nwho are centers of joy and suffering, of lack and\r\nof potentiality, is alone to have a just view of the conditions\r\nand issues of behavior. Quickened sympathy means\r\nliberality of intelligence and enlightened understanding.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Social Sense versus Altruism.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;There is a great\r\ndifference in principle between modern philanthropy and\r\nthe \"charity\" which assumes a superior and an inferior\r\nclass. The latter principle tries to acquire merit by employing\r\none\u0027s superior resources to lessen, or to mitigate, the\r\nmisery of those who are fixed in a dependent status. Its\r\nprinciple, so far as others are concerned, is negative and\r\npalliative merely. The motive of what is vital in modern\r\nphilanthropy is constructive and expansive because it\r\nlooks to the well-being of society as a whole, not to\r\nsoothing or rendering more tolerable the conditions of a\r\nclass. It realizes the interdependence of interests: that\r\ncomplex and variegated interaction of conditions which\r\nmakes it impossible for any one individual or \"class\" really\r\nto secure, to assure, its own good as a separate thing. Its\r\naim is general social advance, constructive social reform,\r\nnot merely doing something kind for individuals who are\r\nrendered helpless from sickness or poverty. Its aim is\r\nthe equity of justice, not the inequality of conferring\r\nbenefits. That the sight of the misery that comes from\r\nsickness, from insanity, from defective organic structure\r\n(as among the blind and deaf), from poverty that destroys\r\nhope and dulls initiative, from bad nutrition, should stim\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_390\" id=\"Page_390\"\u003e[Pg 390]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eulate\r\nthis general quickening of the social sense is natural.\r\nBut just as the activities of the parent with reference\r\nto the welfare of a helpless infant are wisely directed in\r\nthe degree in which attention is mainly fixed not upon\r\nweakness, but upon positive opportunities for growth, so\r\nthe efforts of those whose activities, by the nature of circumstances,\r\nhave to be especially remedial and palliative\r\nare most effective when centered on the social rights and\r\npossibilities of the unfortunate individuals, instead of\r\ntreating them as separate individuals to whom, in their\r\nseparateness, \"good is to be done.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe best kind of help to others, whenever possible, is\r\nindirect, and consists in such modifications of the conditions\r\nof life, of the general level of subsistence, as enables\r\nthem independently to help themselves.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_181_181\" id=\"FNanchor_181_181\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_181_181\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[181]\u003c/a\u003e Whenever conditions\r\nrequire purely direct and personal aid, it is best\r\ngiven when it proceeds from a natural social relationship,\r\nand not from a motive of \"benevolence\" as a separate\r\nforce.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_182_182\" id=\"FNanchor_182_182\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_182_182\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[182]\u003c/a\u003e The gift that pauperizes when proceeding from\r\na philanthropist in his special capacity, is a beneficent\r\nacknowledgment of the relationships of the case when it\r\ncomes from a neighbor or from one who has other interests\r\nin common with the one assisted.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Private and the Social Self.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The contrast between\r\nthe narrow or restrictive and the general or\r\nexpansive good explains why evil presents itself as a\r\nselfish end in contrast with an authoritative, but faint,\r\ngood of others. This is not, as we have seen, because\r\nregard for the good of self is inherently bad and regard\r\nfor that of others intrinsically right; but because we are\r\napt to identify the self with the habitual, with that to\r\nwhich we are best adjusted and which represents the cus\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_391\" id=\"Page_391\"\u003e[Pg 391]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etomary\r\noccupation. Any moral crisis is thus fairly pictured\r\nas a struggle to overcome selfishness. The tendency\r\nunder such circumstances is to contract, to secrete, to hang\r\non to what is already achieved and possessed. The habitual\r\nself needs to go out of the narrowness of its accustomed\r\ngrooves into the spacious air of more generous\r\nbehavior.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 4. THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe now come to the theory which attempts to do justice\r\nto the one-sided truths we have been engaged with, \u003ci\u003eviz.\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthe idea that the moral end is \u003ci\u003eself-realization\u003c/i\u003e. Like self-assertion\r\nin some respects, it differs in conceiving the self\r\nto be realized as universal and ultimate, involving the fulfillment\r\nof \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e capacities and the observance of \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e\r\nrelations. Such a comprehensive self-realization includes\r\nalso, it is urged, the truth of altruism, since the \"universal\r\nself\" is realized only when the relations that bind\r\none to others are fulfilled. It avoids also the inconsistencies\r\nand defects of the notion of self-sacrifice for its own sake,\r\nwhile emphasizing that the present incomplete self must be\r\ndenied for the sake of attainment of a more complete and\r\nfinal self. A discussion of this theory accordingly furnishes\r\nthe means of gathering together and summarizing\r\nvarious points regarding the r\u0026ocirc;le of the self in the moral\r\nlife.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAmbiguity in the Conception.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Is self-realization the\r\nend? As we have had such frequent occasion to observe,\r\n\"end\" means either the consequences actually effected, the\r\nclosing and completing phase of an act, or the aim held\r\ndeliberately in view. Now realization of self is an end\r\n(though not the only end) in the former sense. Every\r\nmoral act in its outcome marks a development or fulfillment\r\nof selfhood. But the very nature of right action\r\nforbids that the self should be the end in the sense of\r\nbeing the conscious aim of moral activity. For there\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_392\" id=\"Page_392\"\u003e[Pg 392]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis no way of discovering the nature of the self except in\r\nterms of objective ends which fulfill its capacities, and\r\nthere is no \u003ci\u003eway\u003c/i\u003e of realizing the self except as it is forgotten\r\nin devotion to these objective ends.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. Self-Realization as Consequence of Moral Action.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Every\r\ngood act realizes the selfhood of the agent who performs\r\nit; every bad act tends to the lowering or destruction\r\nof selfhood. This truth is expressed in Kant\u0027s maxim\r\nthat every personality should be regarded as always an end,\r\nnever as a means, with its implication that a wrong intent\r\nalways reduces selfhood to the status of a mere tool or\r\ndevice for securing some end beyond itself\u0026mdash;the self-indulgent\r\nman treating his personal powers as mere means to\r\nsecuring ease, comfort, or pleasure. It is expressed by\r\nordinary moral judgment in its view that all immoral\r\naction is a sort of prostitution, a lowering of the dignity\r\nof the self to base ends. The destructive tendency of evil\r\ndeeds is witnessed also by our common language in its conception\r\nof wrong as dissipation, dissoluteness, duplicity.\r\nThe bad character is one which is shaky, empty,\r\n\"naughty,\" unstable, gone to pieces, just as the good\r\nman is straight, solid, four-square, sound, substantial.\r\nThis conviction that at bottom and in the end, in spite\r\nof all temporary appearance to the contrary, the right\r\nact effects a realization of the self, is also evidenced in\r\nthe common belief that virtue brings its own bliss. No\r\nmatter how much suffering from physical loss or from\r\nmaterial and mental inconvenience or loss of social repute\r\nvirtue may bring with it, the \u003ci\u003equality of happiness\u003c/i\u003e that\r\naccompanies devotion to the right end is so unique,\r\nso \u003ci\u003einvaluable\u003c/i\u003e, that pains and discomforts do not weigh\r\nin the balance. It is indeed possible to state this truth in\r\nsuch an exaggerated perspective that it becomes false; but\r\ntaken just for what it is, it acknowledges that whatever\r\nharm or loss a right act may bring to the self in some of\r\nits aspects,\u0026mdash;even extending to destruction of the bodily\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_393\" id=\"Page_393\"\u003e[Pg 393]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nself,\u0026mdash;the inmost moral self finds fulfillment and consequent\r\nhappiness in the good.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Self-Realization as Aim of Moral Action.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This\r\nrealization of selfhood in the right course of action is,\r\nhowever, not \u003ci\u003ethe\u003c/i\u003e end of a moral act\u0026mdash;that is, it is not\r\nthe only end. The moral act is one which sustains a whole\r\ncomplex system of social values; one which keeps vital\r\nand progressive the industrial order, science, art, and the\r\nState. The patriot who dies for his country may find\r\nin that devotion his own supreme realization, but none the\r\nless the aim of his act is precisely that for which he performs\r\nit: the conservation of his nation. He dies \u003ci\u003efor\u003c/i\u003e his\r\ncountry, not \u003ci\u003efor\u003c/i\u003e himself. He is what he would be in dying\r\nfor his country, not in dying for himself. To say that\r\nhis conscious aim is self-realization is to put the cart\r\nbefore the horse. That his willingness to die for his country\r\nproves that his country\u0027s good is taken by him to\r\nconstitute himself and his own good is true; but his aim\r\nis his country\u0027s good \u003ci\u003eas constituting\u003c/i\u003e his self-realization,\r\nnot the self-realization. It is impossible that genuine\r\nartistic creation or execution should not be accompanied\r\nwith the joy of an expanding selfhood, but the artist\r\nwho thinks \u003ci\u003eof\u003c/i\u003e himself and allows a view of himself to intervene\r\nbetween his performance and its result, has the\r\nembarrassment and awkwardness of \"self-consciousness,\"\r\nwhich affects for the worse his artistic product. And it\r\nmakes little difference whether it is the thought of himself\r\nas materially profiting, or as famous, or as technical\r\nperformer, or as benefiting the public, or as securing\r\nhis own complete artistic culture, that comes in between.\r\nIn any case, there is loss to the work, and loss in the\r\nvery thing taken as end, namely, development of his\r\nown powers. The problem of morality, upon the intellectual\r\nside, is the discovery of, the finding of, the self, in\r\nthe objective end to be striven for; and then upon the\r\novert practical side, it is the losing of the self in the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_394\" id=\"Page_394\"\u003e[Pg 394]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nendeavor for the objective realization. This is the lasting\r\ntruth in the conception of self-abnegation, self-forgetfulness,\r\ndisinterested interest.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Thought of Self-Realization.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Since, however, the\r\nrealization of selfhood, the strengthening and perfecting\r\nof capacity, is as matter of fact one phase of the objective\r\nend, it may, \u003ci\u003eat times\u003c/i\u003e, be definitely present in\r\nthought as part of the foreseen consequences; and even,\r\n\u003ci\u003eat times\u003c/i\u003e, may be the most prominent feature of the conceived\r\nresults. The artist, for example a musician or\r\npainter, may practice for the sake of acquiring skill, that\r\nis, of developing capacity. In this case, the usual relationship\r\nof objective work and personal power is reversed;\r\nthe product or performance being subordinated to the\r\nperfecting of power, instead of power being realized in\r\nthe use it is put to. But the development of power is\r\nnot conceived as a final end, but as \u003ci\u003edesirable because of an\r\neventual more liberal and effective use\u003c/i\u003e. It is matter of\r\ntemporary emphasis. Something of like nature occurs in\r\nthe moral life\u0026mdash;not that one definitely rehearses or practices\r\nmoral deeds for the sake of acquiring more skill\r\nand power. At times the effect upon the self of a deed\r\nbecomes the conspicuously controlling element in the forecast\r\nof consequences. (See p. 382.) For example, a person\r\nmay realize that a certain act is trivial in its effects\r\nupon others and in the changes it impresses upon the\r\nworld; and yet he may hesitate to perform it because he\r\nrealizes it would intensify some tendency of his own in\r\nsuch a way as, in the delicate economy of character, to disturb\r\nthe proper balance of the springs to action. Or, on\r\nthe other hand, the agent may apprehend that some consequences\r\nthat are legitimate and important in themselves\r\ninvolve, in their attainment, an improper sacrifice of personal\r\ncapacity. In such cases, the consideration of the\r\neffect upon self-realization is not only permissible, but\r\nimperative as \u003ci\u003ea part or phase of the total end\u003c/i\u003e.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_395\" id=\"Page_395\"\u003e[Pg 395]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Problem of Equating Personal and General Happiness.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Much\r\nmoral speculation has been devoted to\r\nthe problem of equating personal happiness and regard for\r\nthe general good. Right moral action, it is assumed,\r\nconsists especially of justice and benevolence,\u0026mdash;attitudes\r\nwhich aim at the good of others. But, it is also assumed,\r\na just and righteous order of the universe requires\r\nthat the man who seeks the happiness of others should\r\nalso himself be a happy man. Much ingenuity has been\r\ndirected to explaining away and accounting for the seeming\r\ndiscrepancies: the cases where men not conspicuous for\r\nregard for others or for maintaining a serious and noble\r\nview of life seem to maintain a banking-credit on the side\r\nof happiness; while men devoted to others, men conspicuous\r\nfor range of sympathetic affections, seem to have a\r\ndebit balance. The problem is the more serious because\r\nthe respective good and ill fortunes do not seem to be\r\nentirely accidental and external, but to come as results\r\nfrom the moral factors in behavior. It would not be\r\ndifficult to build up an argument to show that while extreme\r\nviciousness or isolated egoism is unfavorable to\r\nhappiness, so also are keenness and breadth of affections.\r\nThe argument would claim that the most comfortable\r\ncourse of life is one in which the man cultivates enough\r\nintimacies with enough persons to secure for himself their\r\nsupport and aid, but avoids engaging his sympathies too\r\nclosely in their affairs and entangling himself in any associations\r\nwhich would require self-sacrifice or exposure to\r\nthe sufferings of others: a course of life in which the\r\nindividual shuns those excesses of vice which injure health,\r\nwealth, and lessen the decent esteem of others, but also\r\nshuns enterprises of precarious virtue and devotion to\r\nhigh and difficult ends.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eReal and Artificial Aspects of the Problem.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\nproblem thus put seems insoluble, or soluble only upon\r\nthe supposition of some prolongation of life under condi\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_396\" id=\"Page_396\"\u003e[Pg 396]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etions\r\nvery different from those of the present, in which the\r\npresent lack of balance between happiness and goodness\r\nwill be redressed. \u003ci\u003eBut the problem is insoluble because it\r\nis artificial.\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_183_183\" id=\"FNanchor_183_183\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_183_183\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[183]\u003c/a\u003e It assumes a ready-made self and hence a\r\nready-made type of satisfaction of happiness. It is not\r\nthe business of moral theory to demonstrate the existence\r\nof mathematical equations, in this life or another one, between\r\ngoodness and virtue. It is the business of men\r\nto develop such capacities and desires, such selves as\r\nrender them capable of finding their own satisfaction,\r\ntheir invaluable value, in fulfilling the demands which\r\ngrow out of their associated life. Such happiness may\r\nbe short in duration and slight in bulk: but that it outweighs\r\nin quality all accompanying discomforts as well as\r\nall enjoyments which may have been missed by not doing\r\nsomething else, is attested by the simple fact that men do\r\nconsciously choose it. Such a person has found \u003ci\u003ehimself\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand has solved the problem in the only place and in the\r\nonly way in which it can be solved: \u003ci\u003ein action\u003c/i\u003e. To demand\r\nin advance of voluntary desire and deliberate choice that\r\nit be demonstrated that an individual shall get happiness\r\nin the measure of the rightness of his act, is to demand\r\nthe obliteration of the essential factor in morality:\r\nthe constant discovery, formation, and reformation of the\r\nself in the ends which an individual is called upon to\r\nsustain and develop in virtue of his membership in a\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_397\" id=\"Page_397\"\u003e[Pg 397]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsocial whole. The solution of the problem through the\r\nindividual\u0027s voluntary identification of himself with social\r\nrelations and aims is neither rare nor utopian. It is\r\nachieved not only by conspicuous social figures, but by\r\nmultitudes of \"obscure\" figures who are faithful to the\r\ncallings of their social relationships and offices. That the\r\nconditions of life for all should be enlarged, that wider\r\nopportunities and richer fields of activity should be opened,\r\nin order that happiness may be of a more noble and variegated\r\nsort, that those inequalities of status which lead men\r\nto find their advantage in disregard of others should be\r\ndestroyed\u0026mdash;these things are indeed necessary. But under\r\nthe most ideal conditions which can be imagined, if there\r\nremain any moral element whatsoever, it will be only\r\nthrough personal deliberation and personal preference as\r\nto objective and social ends that the individual will discover\r\nand constitute himself, and hence discover the sort\r\nof happiness required as his good.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur final word about the place of the self in the moral\r\nlife is, then, that the problem of morality is the formation,\r\nout of the body of original instinctive impulses which compose\r\nthe natural self, of a voluntary self in which socialized\r\ndesires and affections are dominant, and in which the last\r\nand controlling principle of deliberation is the love of the\r\nobjects which will make this transformation possible. If\r\nwe identify, as we must do, the interests of such a character\r\nwith the virtues, we may say with Spinoza that happiness\r\nis not the reward of virtue, but is virtue itself. What,\r\nthen, are the virtues?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor asceticism, see Lecky, \u003ci\u003eHistory of European Morals\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor self-denial, Mackenzie, \u003ci\u003eInternational Journal of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. V.,\r\npp. 273-295.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor egoism and altruism: Comte, \u003ci\u003eSystem of Positive Politics\u003c/i\u003e, Introduction,\r\nch. iii., and Part II., ch. ii.; Spencer, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nVol. I., Part I., chs. xi.-xiv.; Stephen, \u003ci\u003eScience of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, ch. vi.;\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_398\" id=\"Page_398\"\u003e[Pg 398]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nPaulsen, \u003ci\u003eSystem of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 379-399; Sorley, \u003ci\u003eRecent Tendencies\r\nin Ethics\u003c/i\u003e; Sidgwick, \u003ci\u003eMethods of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 494-507.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the doctrine of self-interest, see Mandeville, \u003ci\u003eFable of Bees\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nSidgwick, \u003ci\u003eMethods of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Book I., ch. vii., and Book II., ch. v.;\r\nStephen, \u003ci\u003eScience of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, ch. x.; Martineau, \u003ci\u003eTypes of Ethical\r\nTheory\u003c/i\u003e, Part II., Book II., Branch I., ch. i.; Fite, \u003ci\u003eIntroductory Study\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nch. ii.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor historic development of sympathy, see Sutherland, \u003ci\u003eOrigin and\r\nGrowth of the Moral Instinct\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the doctrine of self-realization, see Aristotle, \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e; Green,\r\n\u003ci\u003eProlegomena to Ethics\u003c/i\u003e; Seth, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Part I., ch. iii.;\r\nBradley, \u003ci\u003eEthical Studies\u003c/i\u003e, Essay II.; Fite, \u003ci\u003eIntroductory Study\u003c/i\u003e, ch.\r\nxi.; Paulsen, \u003ci\u003eSystem of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Book II., ch. i.; Taylor, \u003ci\u003eInternational\r\nJournal of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. VI., pp. 356-371; Palmer, \u003ci\u003eThe Heart of\r\nEthics\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003eThe Nature of Goodness\u003c/i\u003e; Calderwood, \u003ci\u003ePhilosophical\r\nReview\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. V., pp. 337-351; Dewey, \u003ci\u003ePhilosophical Review\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II.,\r\npp. 652-664; Bryant, \u003ci\u003eStudies in Character\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 97-117.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the ethics of success, besides the writings of Nietzsche, see\r\nPlato, \u003ci\u003eGorgias\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eRepublic\u003c/i\u003e, Book I., and Sumner, \u003ci\u003eFolkways\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nch. xx.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the social self: Cooley, \u003ci\u003eHuman Nature and the Social Order\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nchs. v. and vi.; for the antagonistic self, chs. vii.-ix.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor a general discussion of the Moral Self, see Bosanquet, \u003ci\u003ePsychology\r\nof the Moral Self\u003c/i\u003e; Ladd, \u003ci\u003ePhilosophy of Conduct\u003c/i\u003e, ch. ix.\r\n(see also ch. xviii. on the Good Man).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_170_170\" id=\"Footnote_170_170\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_170_170\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[170]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Compare the opening words of Emerson\u0027s \u003ci\u003eEssay on Compensation\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_171_171\" id=\"Footnote_171_171\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_171_171\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[171]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The principle of a \"higher law\" for the few who are leaders was\r\nfirst explicitly asserted in modern thought by Machiavelli.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_172_172\" id=\"Footnote_172_172\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_172_172\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[172]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Some phases of the writings of Nietzsche supply relevant material\r\nfor this sketch. See especially his \u003ci\u003eWill for Power, Beyond Good\r\nand Evil\u003c/i\u003e, and such statements as: \"The loss of force which suffering\r\nhas already brought upon life is still further increased and multiplied\r\nby sympathy. Suffering itself becomes contagious through\r\nsympathy\" (overlooking the reaction of sympathy to abolish the source\r\nof suffering and thus increase force). \"Sympathy thwarts, on the\r\nwhole, in general, the law of development, which is the law of selection.\"\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eWorks\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nVol. XI., p. 242.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_173_173\" id=\"Footnote_173_173\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_173_173\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[173]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This phase of the matter has been brought out (possibly with\r\nsome counter-exaggeration) by Kropotkin in his \u003ci\u003eMutual Aid\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_174_174\" id=\"Footnote_174_174\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_174_174\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[174]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Spencer puts the matter truly, if ponderously, in the following:\r\n\"The citizens of a large nation industrially organized, have reached\r\ntheir possible ideal of happiness when the producing, distributing\r\nand other activities, are such in their kinds and amounts, that each\r\nindividual finds in them a place for all his energies and aptitudes,\r\nwhile he obtains the means of satisfying all his desires. Once more\r\nwe may recognize as not only possible, but probable, the eventual\r\nexistence of a community, also industrial, the members of which,\r\nhaving natures similarly responding to these requirements, are also\r\ncharacterized by dominant \u0026aelig;sthetic faculties, and achieve complete\r\nhappiness only when a large part of life is filled with \u0026aelig;sthetic activities\"\r\n(\u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., p. 169).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_175_175\" id=\"Footnote_175_175\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_175_175\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[175]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Machiavelli, transferring from theology to statecraft the notion\r\nof the corruption and selfishness of all men, was the first modern\r\nto preach this doctrine.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_176_176\" id=\"Footnote_176_176\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_176_176\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[176]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See, for example, Hobbes, \u003ci\u003eLeviathan\u003c/i\u003e; Mandeville, \u003ci\u003eFable of the\r\nBees\u003c/i\u003e; and Rochefoucauld, \u003ci\u003eMaxims\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_177_177\" id=\"Footnote_177_177\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_177_177\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[177]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Compare what was said above, p. 273, on the confusion of\r\npleasure as end, and as motive. Compare also the following from\r\nLeslie Stephen, \u003ci\u003eScience of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, p. 241. It is often \"insinuated\r\nthat I dislike your pain because it is painful to me in some special\r\nrelation. I do not dislike it as your pain, but in virtue of some\r\nparticular consequence, such, for example, as its making you less\r\nable to render me a service. In that case I do not really object\r\nto your pain as your pain at all, but only to some removable and\r\naccidental consequences.\" The entire discussion of sympathy (pp.\r\n230-245), which is admirable, should be consulted.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_178_178\" id=\"Footnote_178_178\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_178_178\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[178]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003ePsychology\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., p. 320. The whole discussion, pp. 317-329,\r\nis very important.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_179_179\" id=\"Footnote_179_179\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_179_179\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[179]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See, for example, James, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Psychology\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II., ch.\r\nxxiv.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_180_180\" id=\"Footnote_180_180\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_180_180\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[180]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Measures of public or state activity in the extension, for example,\r\nof education (furnishing free text-books, adequate medical inspection,\r\nand remedy of defects), are opposed by \"good people\" because\r\nthere are \"charitable\" agencies for doing these things.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_181_181\" id=\"Footnote_181_181\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_181_181\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[181]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Compare Spencer\u0027s criticisms of Bentham\u0027s view of happiness\r\nas a social standard in contrast with his own ideal of freedom.\r\nSee \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., pp. 162-168.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_182_182\" id=\"Footnote_182_182\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_182_182\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[182]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See Addams, \u003ci\u003eDemocracy and Social Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, ch. ii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_183_183\" id=\"Footnote_183_183\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_183_183\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[183]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Compare the following extreme words of Sumner (\u003ci\u003eFolkways\u003c/i\u003e,\r\np. 9): \"The great question of world philosophy always has been,\r\nwhat is the real relation between happiness and goodness? It is\r\nonly within a few generations that men have found courage to say\r\nthere is none.\" But when Sumner, in the next sentence, says, \"The\r\nwhole strength of the notion that they are correlated is in the\r\nopposite experience which proves that no evil thing brings happiness,\"\r\none may well ask what more relation any reasonable man\r\nwould want. For it indicates that \"goodness\" consists in active\r\ninterest in those things which really bring happiness; and while\r\nit by no means follows that this interest will \u003ci\u003ebring\u003c/i\u003e even a preponderance\r\nof pleasure over pain to the person, it is always open to him\r\nto \u003ci\u003efind\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003etake\u003c/i\u003e his dominant happiness in making this interest\r\ndominant in his life.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_399\" id=\"Page_399\"\u003e[Pg 399]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER XIX\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTHE VIRTUES\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eINTRODUCTORY\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDefinition of Virtue.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It is upon the self, upon the\r\nagent, that ultimately falls the burden of maintaining and\r\nof extending the values which make life reasonable and\r\ngood. The worth of science, of art, of industry, of relationship\r\nof man and wife, parent and child, teacher and\r\npupil, friend and friend, citizen and State, exists only as\r\nthere are characters consistently interested in such goods.\r\nHence any trait of character which makes for these\r\ngoods is esteemed; it is given positive value; while any\r\ndisposition of selfhood found to have a contrary tendency\r\nis condemned\u0026mdash;has negative value. The habits of character\r\nwhose effect is to sustain and spread the rational\r\nor common good are virtues; the traits of character which\r\nhave the opposite effect are vices.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eVirtue and Approbation; Vice and Condemnation.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\napprobation and disapprobation visited upon conduct\r\nare never purely intellectual. They are also emotional and\r\npractical. We are stirred to hostility at whatever disturbs\r\nthe order of society; we are moved to admiring sympathy\r\nof whatever makes for its welfare. And these emotions\r\nexpress themselves in appropriate conduct. To disapprove\r\nand dislike is to reprove, blame, and punish. To approve\r\nis to encourage, to aid, and support. Hence the judgments\r\nexpress the character of the one who utters them\u0026mdash;they\r\nare traits of his conduct and character; and they\r\nreact into the character of the agent upon whom they are\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_400\" id=\"Page_400\"\u003e[Pg 400]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndirected. They are part of the process of forming character.\r\nThe commendation is of the nature of a reward\r\ncalculated to confirm the person in the right course of\r\naction. The reprobation is of the nature of punishment,\r\nfitted to dissuade the agent from the wrong course. This\r\nencouragement and blame are not necessarily of an external\r\nsort; the reward and the punishment may not be\r\nin material things. It is not from ulterior design that\r\nsociety esteems and respects those attributes of an agent\r\nwhich tend to its own peace and welfare; it is from natural,\r\ninstinctive response to acknowledge whatever makes for its\r\ngood. None the less, the social esteem, the honor which\r\nattend certain acts inevitably educate the individual\r\nwho performs these acts, and they strengthen, emotionally\r\nand practically, his interest in the right. Similarly,\r\nthere is an instinctive reaction of society against an\r\ninfringement of its customs and ideals; it naturally\r\n\"makes it hot\" for any one who disturbs its values. And\r\nthis disagreeable attention instructs the individual as to\r\nthe consequences of his act, and works to hinder the formation\r\nof dispositions of the socially disliked kind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eNatural Ability and Virtue.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;There is a tendency to\r\nuse the term virtue in an abstract \"moralistic\" sense\u0026mdash;a\r\nway which makes it almost Pharisaic in character. Hard\r\nand fast lines are drawn between certain traits of character\r\nlabeled \"virtues\" and others called talents, natural\r\nabilities, or gifts of nature. Apart from deliberate or\r\nreflective nurture, modesty or generosity is no less and no\r\nmore a purely natural ability than is good-humor, a turn\r\nfor mechanics, or presence of mind. Every natural capacity,\r\nevery talent or ability, whether of inquiring mind,\r\nof gentle affection or of executive skill, becomes a virtue\r\nwhen it is turned to account in supporting or extending\r\nthe fabric of social values; and it turns, if not to vice\r\nat least to delinquency, when not thus utilized. The important\r\nhabits conventionally reckoned virtues are barren\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_401\" id=\"Page_401\"\u003e[Pg 401]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nunless they are the cumulative assemblage of a multitude\r\nof anonymous interests and capacities. Such natural aptitudes\r\nvary widely in different individuals. Their endowments\r\nand circumstances occasion and exact different\r\nvirtues, and yet one person is not more or less virtuous\r\nthan another because his virtues take a different form.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChanges in Virtues.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It follows also that the meaning,\r\nor content, of virtues changes from time to time. Their\r\nabstract form, the man\u0027s attitude towards the good, remains\r\nthe same. But when institutions and customs\r\nchange and natural abilities are differently stimulated and\r\nevoked, ends vary, and habits of character are differently\r\nesteemed both by the individual agent and by others who\r\njudge. No social group could be maintained without\r\npatriotism and chastity, but the actual meaning of chastity\r\nand patriotism is widely different in contemporary\r\nsociety from what it was in savage tribes or from what\r\nwe may expect it to be five hundred years from now. Courage\r\nin one society may consist almost wholly in willingness\r\nto face physical danger and death in voluntary devotion to\r\none\u0027s community; in another, it may be willingness to\r\nsupport an unpopular cause in the face of ridicule.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eConventional and Genuine Virtue.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;When we take\r\nthese social changes on a broad scale, in the gross, the point\r\njust made is probably clear without emphasis. But we are\r\napt to forget that minor changes are going on all the\r\nwhile. The community\u0027s formulated code of esteem and\r\nregard and praise at any given time is likely to lag somewhat\r\nbehind its practical level of achievement and possibility.\r\nIt is more or less traditional, describing what used\r\nto be, rather than what are, virtues. The \"respectable\"\r\ncomes to mean tolerable, passable, conventional. Accordingly\r\nthe prevailing scheme of assigning merit and blame,\r\nwhile on the whole a mainstay of moral guidance and instruction,\r\nis also a menace to moral growth. Hence men\r\nmust look behind the current valuation to the real value.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_402\" id=\"Page_402\"\u003e[Pg 402]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nOtherwise, mere conformity to custom is conceived to be\r\nvirtue;\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_184_184\" id=\"FNanchor_184_184\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_184_184\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[184]\u003c/a\u003e and the individual who deviates from custom in\r\nthe interest of wider and deeper good is censured.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMoral Responsibility for Praise and Blame.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The practical\r\nassigning of value, of blame and praise, is a measure\r\nand exponent of the character of the one from whom it\r\nissues. In judging others, in commending and condemning,\r\nwe judge ourselves. What we find to be praiseworthy\r\nand blameworthy is a revelation of our own affections.\r\nVery literally the measure we mete to others is meted to\r\nus. To be free in our attributions of blame is to be\r\ncensorious and uncharitable; to be unresentful to evil is to\r\nbe indifferent, or interested perhaps chiefly in one\u0027s own\r\npopularity, so that one avoids giving offense to others.\r\nTo engage profusely in blame and approbation in speech\r\nwithout acts which back up or attack the ends verbally\r\nhonored or condemned, is to have a perfunctory morality.\r\nTo cultivate complacency and remorse apart from effort\r\nto improve is to indulge in sentimentality. In short, to\r\napprove or to condemn is itself a moral act for which we\r\nare as much responsible as we are for any other deed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eImpossibility of Cataloguing Virtues.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;These last three\r\nconsiderations: (1) the intimate connection of virtues with\r\nall sorts of individual capacities and endowments, (2) the\r\nchange in types of habit required with change of social\r\ncustoms and institutions, (3) the dependence of judgment\r\nof vice and virtue upon the character of the one judging,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_185_185\" id=\"FNanchor_185_185\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_185_185\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[185]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nmake undesirable and impossible a catalogued list of vir\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_403\" id=\"Page_403\"\u003e[Pg 403]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etues\r\nwith an exact definition of each. Virtues are numberless.\r\nEvery situation, not of a routine order,\r\nbrings in some special shading, some unique adaptation,\r\nof disposition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTwofold Classification.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We may, however, classify\r\nthe chief institutions of social life\u0026mdash;language, scientific investigation,\r\nartistic production, industrial efficiency, family,\r\nlocal community, nation, humanity\u0026mdash;and specify the\r\ntypes of mental disposition and interest which are fitted to\r\nmaintain them flourishingly; or, starting from typical impulsive\r\nand instinctive tendencies, we may consider the\r\nform they assume when they become intelligently exercised\r\nhabits. A virtue may be defined, accordingly, either as\r\n\u003ci\u003ethe settled intelligent identification of an agent\u0027s capacity\r\nwith some aspect of the reasonable or common happiness\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nor, as \u003ci\u003ea social custom or tendency organized into a personal\r\nhabit of valuation\u003c/i\u003e. From the latter standpoint,\r\ntruthfulness is the social institution of language maintained\r\nat its best pitch of efficiency through the habitual\r\npurposes of individuals; from the former, it is an instinctive\r\ncapacity and tendency to communicate emotions\r\nand ideas directed so as to maintain social peace and\r\nprosperity. In like fashion, one might catalogue all forms\r\nof social custom and institution on one hand; and all the\r\nspecies and varieties of individual equipment on the other,\r\nand enumerate a virtue for each. But the performance is\r\nso formal as not to amount to much.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAspects of Virtue.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Any virtuous disposition of character\r\nexhibits, however, certain main traits, a consideration\r\nof which will serve to review and summarize our analysis\r\nof the moral life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eI. The Interest Must be Entire or Whole-hearted.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\nwhole self, without division or reservation, must go\r\nout into the proposed object and find therein its own satisfaction.\r\nVirtue is integrity; vice duplicity. Goodness is\r\nstraight, right; badness is crooked, indirect. Interest that\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_404\" id=\"Page_404\"\u003e[Pg 404]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis incomplete is not interest, but (so far as incomplete) indifference\r\nand disregard. This totality of interest we call\r\naffection, love; and love is the fulfilling of the law. A\r\ngrudging virtue is next to no virtue at all; thorough heartiness\r\nin even a bad cause stirs admiration, and lukewarmness\r\nin every direction is always despised as meaning lack\r\nof character. Surrender, abandonment, is of the essence\r\nof identification of self with an object.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eII. The Interest Must be Energetic and Hence Persistent.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;One\r\nswallow does not make a summer nor a sporadic\r\nright act a virtuous habit. Fair-weather character\r\nhas a proverbially bad name. Endurance through discouragement,\r\nthrough good repute and ill, weal and woe, tests\r\nthe vigor of interest in the good, and both builds up and\r\nexpresses a formed character.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIII. The Interest Must be Pure or Sincere.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Honesty\r\nis, doubtless, the best policy, and it is better a man should\r\nbe honest from policy than not honest at all. If genuinely\r\nhonest from considerations of prudence, he is on the road\r\nto learn better reasons for honesty. None the less, we are\r\nsuspicious of a man if we believe that motives of personal\r\nprofit are the only stay of his honesty. For circumstances\r\nmight arise in which, in the exceptional case, it would be\r\nclear that personal advantage lay in dishonesty. The motive\r\nfor honesty would hold in most cases, in ordinary and\r\nroutine circumstances and in the glare of publicity, but\r\nnot in the dark of secrecy, or in the turmoil of disturbed\r\ncircumstance. The eye single to the good, the \"disinterested\r\ninterest\" of moralists, is required. The motive\r\nthat has to be coaxed or coerced to its work by some\r\npromise or threat is imperfect.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCardinal or Indispensable Aspects of Virtue.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Bearing\r\nin mind that we are not attempting to classify various\r\nacts or habits, but only to state traits essential to all morality,\r\nwe have the \"cardinal virtues\" of moral theory.\r\nAs whole-hearted, as complete interest, any habit or\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_405\" id=\"Page_405\"\u003e[Pg 405]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nattitude of character involves justice and love; as persistently\r\nactive, it is courage, fortitude, or vigor; as unmixed\r\nand single, it is temperance\u0026mdash;in its classic sense.\r\nAnd since no habitual interest can be integral, enduring,\r\nor sincere, save as it is reasonable, save, that is, as it is\r\nrooted in the deliberate habit of viewing the part in the\r\nlight of the whole, the present in the light of the past and\r\nfuture, interest in the good is also wisdom or conscientiousness:\u0026mdash;interest\r\nin the discovery of the true good of\r\nthe situation. Without this interest, all our interest is\r\nlikely to be perverted and misleading\u0026mdash;requiring to be\r\nrepented of.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWisdom, or (in modern phrase) conscientiousness, is the\r\nnurse of all the virtues. Our most devoted courage is in\r\nthe will to know the good and the fair by unflinching attention\r\nto the painful and disagreeable. Our severest discipline\r\nin self-control is that which checks the exorbitant\r\npretensions of an appetite by insisting upon knowing it in\r\nits true proportions. The most exacting justice is that of\r\nan intelligence which gives due weight to each desire and\r\ndemand in deliberation before it is allowed to pass into\r\novert action. That affection and wisdom lie close to each\r\nother is evidenced by our language; thoughtfulness, regard,\r\nconsideration for others, recognition of others,\r\nattention to others.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 1. TEMPERANCE\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe English word \"temperance\" (particularly in its\r\nlocal association with agitation regarding use of intoxicating\r\nliquors) is a poor substitute for the Greek \u003ci\u003esophrosyne\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwhich, through the Latin \u003ci\u003etemperantia\u003c/i\u003e, it represents.\r\nThe Athenian Greek was impressed with the fact that just\r\nas there are lawless, despotically ruled, and self-governed\r\ncommunities, so there are lawless, and servile, and self-ruled\r\nindividuals. Whenever there is a self-governed soul,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_406\" id=\"Page_406\"\u003e[Pg 406]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthere is a happy blending of the authority of reason with\r\nthe force of appetite. The individual\u0027s diverse nature is\r\ntempered into a living harmony of desire and intelligence.\r\nReason governs not as a tyrant from without, but as a\r\nguide to which the impulses and emotions are gladly responsive.\r\nSuch a well-attuned nature, as far from asceticism\r\non one side as from random indulgence on the other,\r\nrepresented the ideal of what was fair and graceful in\r\ncharacter, an ideal embodied in the notion of \u003ci\u003esophrosyne\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThis was a \u003ci\u003ewhole-mindedness\u003c/i\u003e which resulted from the\r\nhappy furtherance of all the elements of human nature\r\nunder the self-accepted direction of intelligence. It implied\r\nan \u003ci\u003e\u0026aelig;sthetic\u003c/i\u003e view of character; of harmony in\r\nstructure and rhythm in action. It was the virtue of\r\njudgment exercised in the estimate of pleasures:\u0026mdash;since\r\nit is the agreeable, the pleasant, which gives an end\r\nexcessive hold upon us.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRoman Temperantia.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The Roman conceived this virtue\r\nunder the term \u003ci\u003etemperantia\u003c/i\u003e, which conveys the same\r\nidea, but accommodated to the Roman genius. It is connected\r\nwith the word \u003ci\u003etempus\u003c/i\u003e, time, which is connected also\r\nwith a root meaning divide, distribute; it suggests a consecutive\r\norderliness of behavior, a freedom from excessive\r\nand reckless action, first this way, and then that. It means\r\nseemliness, decorum, decency. It was \"moderation,\" not\r\nas quantity of indulgence, but as a moderating of each act\r\nin a series by the thought of other and succeeding acts\u0026mdash;keeping\r\neach in sequence with others in a whole. The idea\r\nof time involves time to think; the sobering second thought\r\nexpressed in seriousness and gravity. The negative side,\r\nthe side of restraint, of inhibition, is strong, and functions\r\nfor the consistent calm and gravity of life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChristian Purity.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Through the Christian influence, the\r\nconnotation which is marked in the notion of control of\r\nsexual appetite, became most obvious\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003epurity\u003c/i\u003e. Passion is\r\nnot so much something which disturbs the harmony of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_407\" id=\"Page_407\"\u003e[Pg 407]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nman\u0027s nature, or which interrupts its orderliness, as it is\r\nsomething which defiles the purity of spiritual nature. It\r\nis the grossness, the contamination of appetite which is\r\ninsisted upon, and temperance is the maintenance of the\r\nsoul spotless and unsullied.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eNegative Phase\u003c/b\u003e:\u0026mdash;Self-control. A negative aspect of\r\nself-control, restraint, inhibition is everywhere involved.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_186_186\" id=\"FNanchor_186_186\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_186_186\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[186]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIt is not, however, desire, or appetite, or passion, or impulse,\r\nwhich has to be checked (much less eliminated); it\r\nis rather that tendency of desire and passion so to engross\r\nattention as to destroy our sense of the other ends which\r\nhave a claim upon us. This moderation of pretension is\r\nindispensable for every desire. In one direction, it is modesty,\r\nhumility; the restraint of the tendency of self-conceit\r\nto distort the relative importance of the agent\u0027s and others\u0027\r\nconcerns; in another direction, it is chastity; in another,\r\n\"temperance\" in the narrower sense of that word\u0026mdash;keeping\r\nthe indulgence of hunger and thirst from passing reasonable\r\nbounds; in another, it is calmness, self-possession\u0026mdash;moderation\r\nof the transporting power of excitement; in\r\nyet another, it is discretion, imposing limits upon the use\r\nof the hand, eye, or tongue. In matters of wealth, it is\r\ndecent regulation of display and ostentation. In general,\r\nit is prudence, control of the present impulse and desire\r\nby a view of the \"long run,\" of proximate by remote\r\nconsequences.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_187_187\" id=\"FNanchor_187_187\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_187_187\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[187]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePositive Phase: Reverence.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The tendency of dominant\r\npassion is to rush us along, to prevent our thinking.\r\nThe one thing that desire emphasizes is, for the time being,\r\nthe most important thing in the universe. This is necessary\r\nto heartiness and effectiveness of interest and be\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_408\" id=\"Page_408\"\u003e[Pg 408]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ehavior.\r\nBut it is important that the thing which thus absorbs\r\ndesire should be an end capable of justifying its\r\npower to absorb. This is possible only if it expresses the\r\nentire self. Otherwise capacities and desires which will\r\noccur later will be inconsistent and antagonistic, and\r\nconduct will be unregulated and unstable. The underlying\r\nidea in \"temperance\" is then a care of details for the\r\nsake of the whole course of behavior of which they are\r\nparts; heedfulness, painstaking devotion. Laxness in conduct\r\nmeans carelessness; lack of regard for the whole life\r\npermits temporary inclinations to get a sway that the\r\noutcome will not justify. In its more striking forms,\r\nwe call this care and respect \u003ci\u003ereverence\u003c/i\u003e; recognition of the\r\nunique, invaluable worth embodied in any situation or\r\nact of life, a recognition which checks that flippancy of\r\nsurrender to momentary excitement coming from a superficial\r\nview of behavior. A sense of momentous issues\r\nat stake means a sobering and deepening of the mental\r\nattitude. The consciousness that every deed of\r\nlife has an import clear beyond its immediate, or first\r\nsignificance, attaches dignity to every act. To live\r\nin the sense of the larger values attaching to our passing\r\ndesires and deeds is to be possessed by the virtue of\r\ntemperance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eControl of Excitement.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;What hinders such living is,\r\nas we have seen, the exaggerated intensity, the lack of proportion\r\nand perspective, with which any appetite or desire\r\nis likely to present itself. It is this which moralists of\r\nall ages have attacked under the name of pleasure\u0026mdash;the alluring\r\nand distracting power of the momentarily agreeable.\r\nSeeing in this the enemy which prevents the rational\r\nsurvey of the whole field and the calm, steady insight into\r\nthe true good, it is hardly surprising that moralists have\r\nattacked \"pleasure\" as the source of every temptation to\r\nstray from the straight path of reason. But it is not\r\npleasure, it is one form of pleasure, the \u003ci\u003epleasure of excite\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_409\" id=\"Page_409\"\u003e[Pg 409]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ement\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nwhich is the obstacle and danger.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_188_188\" id=\"FNanchor_188_188\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_188_188\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[188]\u003c/a\u003e Every impulse\r\nand desire marks a certain disturbance in the order of\r\nlife, an exaltation above the existing level, a pressure\r\nbeyond its existing limit. To give way to desire, to let it\r\ngrow, to taste to the full its increasing and intensifying\r\nexcitement, is the temptation. The bodily appetites of\r\nhunger and thirst and sex, with which we associate the\r\ngrossest forms of indulgence and laxity, exemplify the\r\nprinciple of expanding waves of organic stimulation. But\r\nso also do many of the subtler forms of unrestraint or intemperate\r\naction. The one with a clever and lively tongue\r\nis tempted to let it run away with him; the vain man\r\nfeeds upon the excitement of a personality heightened by\r\ndisplay and the notice of others; the angry man, even\r\nthough he knows he will later regret his surrender, gives\r\naway to the sense of expanding power coincident with\r\nhis discharge of rage. The shiftless person finds it easier\r\nto take chances and let consequences take care of themselves,\r\nwhile he enjoys local and casual stimulations. Trivialities\r\nand superficialities entangle us in a flippant life,\r\nbecause each one as it comes promises to be \"thrilling,\"\r\nwhile the very fear that this promise will not\r\nbe kept hurries us on to new experiences. To think of\r\nalternatives and consequences is not \"thrilling,\" but\r\nserious.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eNecessity of Superior Interest.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Now calculation of\r\nthe utilitarian type is not adequate to deal with this temptation.\r\nThose who are prone to reflection upon results\r\nare just those who are least likely to be carried away by\r\nexcitement\u0026mdash;unless, as is the case with some specialists,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_410\" id=\"Page_410\"\u003e[Pg 410]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthinking is itself the mode of indulgence in excitement.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_189_189\" id=\"FNanchor_189_189\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_189_189\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[189]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nWith those who are carried away habitually by some mode\r\nof excitement, the disease and the incapacity to take the\r\nproffered remedy of reflection are the same thing. Only\r\nsome \u003ci\u003eother\u003c/i\u003e passion will accomplish the desired control.\r\nWith the Greeks, it was \u0026aelig;sthetic passion, love of the grace\r\nand beauty, the rhythm and harmony, of a self-controlled\r\nlife. With the Romans, it was the passion for dignity,\r\npower, honor of personality, evidenced in rule of appetite.\r\nBoth of these motives remain among the strong allies of\r\nordered conduct. But the passion for purity, the sense\r\nof something degrading and foul in surrender to the base,\r\nan interest in something spotless, free from adulteration,\r\nare, in some form or other, the chief resource in overcoming\r\nthe tendency of excitement to usurp the governance\r\nof the self.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_190_190\" id=\"FNanchor_190_190\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_190_190\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[190]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 2. COURAGE\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_191_191\" id=\"FNanchor_191_191\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_191_191\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[191]\u003c/a\u003e OR PERSISTENT VIGOR\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhile love of excitement allures man from the path of\r\nreason, fear of pain, dislike to hardship, and laborious\r\neffort, hold him back from entering it. Dislike of the disagreeable\r\ninhibits or contracts the putting forth of energy,\r\njust as liking for agreeable stimulation discharges and\r\nexhausts it. Intensity of active interest in the good alone\r\nsubdues that instinctive shrinking from the unpleasant\r\nand hard which slackens energy or turns it aside. Such\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_411\" id=\"Page_411\"\u003e[Pg 411]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nenergy of devotion is courage. Its etymological connection\r\nwith the Latin word for \u003ci\u003eheart\u003c/i\u003e, suggests a certain\r\nabundant spontaneity, a certain overflow of positive\r\nenergy; the word was applied to this aspect of virtue when\r\nthe heart was regarded as literally (not metaphorically)\r\nthe seat of vital impulse and abundant forcefulness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCourage and the Common Good.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;One of the problems\r\nof early Greek thought was that of discriminating\r\ncourage as virtuous from a sort of animal keenness and\r\nalacrity, easily running into recklessness and bravado. It\r\nwas uniformly differentiated from mere overflow of physical\r\nenergy by the fact that it was exhibited in support of\r\nsome common or social good. It bore witness to its voluntary\r\ncharacter by abiding in the face of threatened evil.\r\nIts simplest form was patriotism\u0026mdash;willingness to brave the\r\ndanger of death in facing the country\u0027s enemy from love\r\nof country. And this basic largeness of spirit in which\r\nthe individual sinks considerations of personal loss and\r\nharm in allegiance to an objective good remains a cardinal\r\naspect of all right disposition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCourage is Pre\u0026euml;minently the Executive Side of Every\r\nVirtue.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The good will, as we saw, means endeavor, effort,\r\ntowards certain ends; unless the end stirs to strenuous exertion,\r\nit is a sentimental, not a moral or practical end. And\r\nendeavor implies obstacles to overcome, resistance to what\r\ndiverts, painful labor. It is the degree of threatened harm\u0026mdash;in\r\nspite of which one does not swerve\u0026mdash;which measures\r\nthis depth and sincerity of interest in the good.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAspects of Interest in Execution.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Certain formal\r\ntraits of courage follow at once from this general definition.\r\nIn its onset, willingness in behalf of the common\r\ngood to endure attendant private evils is alacrity, promptness.\r\nIn its abiding and unswerving devotion, it is constancy,\r\nloyalty, and faithfulness. In its continual resistance\r\nto evil, it is fortitude, patience, perseverance, willingness\r\nto abide for justification an ultimate issue. The\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_412\" id=\"Page_412\"\u003e[Pg 412]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003etotality\u003c/i\u003e of commitment of self to the good is decision and\r\nfirmness. Conviction and resolution accompany all true\r\nmoral endeavor. These various dimensions (intensity, duration,\r\nextent, and fullness) are, however, only differing\r\nexpressions of one and the same attitude of vigorous, energetic\r\nidentification of agency with the object.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGoodness and Effectiveness.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It is the failure to give\r\ndue weight to this factor of morality (the \"works\" of theological\r\ndiscussion) which is responsible for the not uncommon\r\nidea that moral goodness means loss of practical efficacy.\r\nWhen inner disposition is severed from outer action,\r\nwishing divorced from executive willing, morality is\r\nreduced to mere harmlessness; outwardly speaking, the best\r\nthat can then be said of virtue is that it is innocent and\r\ninnocuous. Unscrupulousness is identified with energy of\r\nexecution; and a minute and paralyzing scrupulosity with\r\ngoodness. It is in reaction from such futile morality that\r\nthe gospel of force and of shrewdness of selecting and\r\nadapting means to the desired end, is preached and gains\r\nhearers\u0026mdash;as in the Italy of the Renaissance\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_192_192\" id=\"FNanchor_192_192\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_192_192\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[192]\u003c/a\u003e in reaction\r\nagainst medi\u0026aelig;val piety, and again in our own day (see\r\n\u003ci\u003eante\u003c/i\u003e, p. 374).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMoral Courage and Optimism.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;A characteristic modern\r\ndevelopment of courageousness is implied in the phrase\r\n\"moral courage,\"\u0026mdash;as if all genuine courage were not\r\nmoral. It means devotion to the good in the face of the\r\ncustoms of one\u0027s friends and associates, rather than against\r\nthe attacks of one\u0027s enemies. It is willingness to brave\r\nfor sake of a new idea of the good the unpopularity that\r\nattends breach of custom and convention. It is this\r\ntype of heroism, manifested in integrity of memory and\r\nforesight, which wins the characteristic admiration of\r\nto-day, rather than the outward heroism of bearing\r\nwounds and undergoing physical dangers. It is \u003ci\u003eattention\u003c/i\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_413\" id=\"Page_413\"\u003e[Pg 413]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nupon which the stress falls.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_193_193\" id=\"FNanchor_193_193\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_193_193\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[193]\u003c/a\u003e This supplies, perhaps,\r\nthe best vantage point from which to survey optimism\r\nand pessimism in their direct moral bearings. The individual\r\nwhose pursuit of the good is colored by honest\r\nrecognition of existing and threatening evils is almost always\r\ncharged with being a pessimist; with cynical delight\r\nin dwelling upon what is morbid, base, or sordid; and he is\r\nurged to be an \"optimist,\" meaning in effect to conceal\r\nfrom himself and others evils that obtain. Optimism, thus\r\nconceived, is a combination of building rosy-colored castles\r\nin the air and hiding, ostrich-like, from actual facts.\r\nAs a general thing, it will be those who have some interest\r\nat stake in evils remaining unperceived, and hence unremedied,\r\nwho most clamor in the cause of such \"optimism.\"\r\nHope and aspiration, belief in the supremacy of good in\r\nspite of all evil, belief in the realizability of good in spite\r\nof all obstacles, are necessary inspirations in the life of\r\nvirtue. The good can never be demonstrated to the senses,\r\nnor be proved by calculations of personal profit. It involves\r\na radical venture of the will in the interest of what is\r\nunseen and prudentially incalculable. But such optimism\r\nof \u003ci\u003ewill\u003c/i\u003e, such determination of the man that, so far as his\r\nchoice is concerned, only the good shall be recognized as\r\nreal, is very different from a sentimental refusal to look at\r\nthe realities of the situation just as they are. In fact a certain\r\nintellectual pessimism, in the sense of a steadfast willingness\r\nto uncover sore points, to acknowledge and search\r\nfor abuses, to note how presumed good often serves as a\r\ncloak for actual bad, is a necessary part of the moral optimism\r\nwhich actively devotes itself to making the right\r\nprevail. Any other view reduces the aspiration and hope,\r\nwhich are the essence of moral courage, to a cheerful animal\r\nbuoyancy; and, in its failure to see the evil done to\r\nothers in its thoughtless pursuit of what it calls good, is\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_414\" id=\"Page_414\"\u003e[Pg 414]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnextdoor to brutality, to a brutality bathed in the atmosphere\r\nof sentimentality and flourishing the catchwords of\r\nidealism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 3. JUSTICE\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIn Ethical Literature Justice Has Borne at Least\r\nThree Different Senses.\u003c/b\u003e\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_194_194\" id=\"FNanchor_194_194\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_194_194\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[194]\u003c/a\u003e\u0026mdash;In its widest sense, it means\r\nrighteousness, uprightness, rectitude. It sums up morality.\r\nIt is not \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e virtue, but it is virtue. The just act is\r\nthe \u003ci\u003edue\u003c/i\u003e act; justice is fulfillment of obligation. (2) This\r\npasses over into fairness, equity, impartiality, honesty in\r\nall one\u0027s dealing with others. (3) The narrowest meaning\r\nis that of \u003ci\u003evindication\u003c/i\u003e of right through the administration\r\nof law.\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_194_194\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[194]\u003c/a\u003e Since Aristotle\u0027s time (and following his treatment)\r\nthis has been divided into (i.) the \u003ci\u003edistributive\u003c/i\u003e, having\r\nto do with the assignment of honor, wealth, etc., in proportion\r\nto desert, and (ii.) the \u003ci\u003ecorrective\u003c/i\u003e, vindicating the\r\nlaw against the transgressor by effecting a requital, redress,\r\nwhich restores the supremacy of law.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eA Thread of Common Significance Runs through\r\nThese Various Meanings.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The rational good means a\r\ncomprehensive or complete end, in which are harmoniously\r\nincluded a variety of special aims and values. The just\r\nman is the man who takes in the whole of a situation and\r\nreacts to it in its wholeness, not being misled by undue\r\nrespect to some particular factor. Since the general or\r\ninclusive good is a common or social good, reconciling and\r\ncombining the ends of a multitude of private or particular\r\npersons, justice is the pre\u0026euml;minently social virtue: that\r\nwhich maintains the due order of individuals in the interest\r\nof the comprehensive or social unity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eJustice, as equity, fairness, impartiality, honesty,\r\ncarries the recognition of the whole over into the question\r\nof right distribution and apportionment among its\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_415\" id=\"Page_415\"\u003e[Pg 415]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nparts. The equitable judge or administrator is the one\r\nwho makes no unjustifiable distinctions among those dealt\r\nwith. A fair price is one which recognizes the rights of\r\nboth buyer and seller. An honest man is the one who, with\r\nrespect to whatever he has to distribute to others and to\r\nreceive from them, is desirous of giving and taking just\r\nwhat belongs to each party concerned. The fair-minded\r\nman is not bribed by pleasure into giving undue importance\r\nto some element of good nor coerced by fear of pain\r\ninto ignoring some other. He \u003ci\u003edistributes\u003c/i\u003e his attention,\r\nregard, and attachment according to the reasonable or\r\nobjective claims of each factor.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eJustice and Sympathy or Love.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The most significant\r\nquestions regarding justice are as to its connection with\r\nlove and with condemnation and punishment. It is a common\r\nnotion that justice is harsh or hard in its workings and\r\nthat it requires to be supplemented, if not replaced, by\r\nmercy. Taken literally this would mean that justice\r\nis not just in its workings. The truth contained is that\r\nwhat is frequently regarded as justice is not justice, but\r\nan imperfect substitute for it. When a legal type of morality\r\nis current, justice is regarded as the working of\r\nsome fixed and abstract law; it is the law as law which is\r\nto be reverenced; it is law as law whose majesty is to be\r\nvindicated. It is forgotten that the nobility and dignity\r\nof law are due to the place of law in securing the order\r\ninvolved in the realization of human happiness. Then the\r\nlaw instead of being a servant of the good is put arbitrarily\r\nabove it, as if man was made for law, not law for\r\nman. The result is inevitably harshness; indispensable\r\nfactors of happiness are ruthlessly slighted, or ruled out;\r\nthe loveliness and grace of behavior responding freely\r\nand flexibly to the requirements of unique situations are\r\nstiffened into uniformity. The formula \u003ci\u003esummum jus\r\nsumma injuria\u003c/i\u003e expresses the outcome when abstract law\r\nis insisted upon without reference to the needs of con\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_416\" id=\"Page_416\"\u003e[Pg 416]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ecrete\r\ncases. Under such conditions, there arises a demand\r\nfor tempering the sternness of justice with mercy, and\r\nsupplementing the severity of law with grace. This demand\r\nmeans that the neglected human values shall be\r\nrestored into the idea of what is just.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e\"Social Justice.\"\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Our own time has seen a generous\r\nquickening of the idea of social justice due to the growth\r\nof love, or philanthropy, as a working social motive. In\r\nthe older scheme of morals, justice was supposed to meet\r\nall the necessary requirements of virtue; charity was doing\r\ngood in ways not obligatory or strictly exacted. Hence\r\nit was a source of peculiar merit in the doer, a means of\r\nstoring up a surplus of virtue to offset vice. But a\r\nmore generous sense of inherent social relationships binding\r\nthe aims of all into one comprehensive good, which\r\nis the result of increase of human intercourse, democratic\r\ninstitutions, and biological science, has made men recognize\r\nthat the greater part of the sufferings and miseries\r\nwhich afford on the part of a few the opportunity for\r\ncharity (and hence superior merit), are really social inequities,\r\ndue to causes which may be remedied. That justice\r\nrequires radical improvement of these conditions displaces\r\nthe notion that their effects may be here and there\r\npalliated by the voluntary merit of morally superior individuals.\r\nThe change illustrates, on a wide scale, the\r\ntransformation of the conception of justice so that it joins\r\nhands with love and sympathy. That human nature should\r\nhave justice done it under all circumstances is an infinitely\r\ncomplicated and difficult requirement, and only a vision\r\nof the capacities and accomplishments of human beings\r\nrooted in affection and sympathy can perceive and execute\r\njustly.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTransformation of Punitive Justice.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The conception\r\nof punitive or corrective justice is undergoing the same\r\ntransformation. Aristotle stated the rule of equity in\r\nthe case of wrongdoing as an arithmetical requital: the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_417\" id=\"Page_417\"\u003e[Pg 417]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nindividual was to suffer according to his deed. Later,\r\nthrough conjunction with the idea of a divine judge inflicting\r\nretribution upon the sinner, this notion passed into\r\nthe belief that punishment is a form of justice restoring\r\nthe balance of disturbed law by inflicting suffering upon\r\nthe one who has done wrong. The end and aim of punishment\r\nwas retribution, bringing back to the agent the evil\r\nconsequences of his own deed. That punishment is suffering,\r\nthat it inevitably involves pain to the guilty one, there\r\ncan be no question; this, whether the punishment is externally\r\ninflicted or is in the pangs of conscience, and\r\nwhether administered by parent, teacher, or civil authority.\r\nBut that suffering is for the sake of suffering, or\r\nthat suffering can in any way restore or affect the violated\r\nmajesty of law, is a different matter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat erring human nature deserves or merits, it is just\r\nit should have. But in the end, a moral agent deserves\r\nto \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e a moral agent; and hence deserves that punishments\r\ninflicted should be \u003ci\u003ecorrective\u003c/i\u003e, not merely retributive.\r\nEvery wrongdoer should have his due. But what is his\r\ndue? Can we measure it by his past alone; or is it due\r\nevery one to regard him as a man with a future as well?\r\nas having possibilities for good as well as achievements in\r\nbad? Those who are responsible for the infliction of punishment\r\nhave, as well as those punished, to meet the requirements\r\nof justice; and failure to employ the means\r\nand instrumentalities of punishment in a way to lead, so\r\nfar as possible, the wrongdoer to reconsideration of conduct\r\nand re-formation of disposition, cannot shelter itself\r\nunder the plea that it vindicates law. Such failure comes\r\nrather from thoughtless custom; from a lazy unwillingness\r\nto find better means; from an admixture of pride\r\nwith lack of sympathy for others; from a desire to maintain\r\nthings as they are rather than go to the causes which\r\ngenerate criminals.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_418\" id=\"Page_418\"\u003e[Pg 418]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 4. WISDOM OR CONSCIENTIOUSNESS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs we have repeatedly noted, the heart of a voluntary\r\nact is its intelligent or deliberate character. The individual\u0027s\r\n\u003ci\u003eintelligent\u003c/i\u003e concern for the good is implied in his\r\nsincerity, his faithfulness, and his integrity. Of all the\r\nhabits which constitute the character of an individual, the\r\nhabit of \u003ci\u003ejudging\u003c/i\u003e moral situations is the most important,\r\nfor this is the key to the \u003ci\u003edirection\u003c/i\u003e and to the \u003ci\u003eremaking\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nall other habits. When an act is overt, it is irretrievably\r\nlaunched. The agent has no more control. The moral\r\nlife has its center in the periods of suspended and postponed\r\naction, when the energy of the individual is spent\r\nin recollection and foresight, in severe inquiry and serious\r\nconsideration of alternative aims. Only through reflection\r\ncan habits, however good in their origin and past exercise,\r\nbe readapted to the needs of the present; only through\r\nreflection can impulses, not yet having found direction, be\r\nguided into the haven of a reasonable happiness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGreek Emphasis upon Insight or Wisdom.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It is not\r\nsurprising that the Greeks, the first seriously to inquire\r\ninto the nature of behavior and its end or good, should\r\nhave eulogized \u003ci\u003ewisdom\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003einsight\u003c/i\u003e, as the supreme virtue and\r\nthe source of all the virtues. Now, indeed, it seems paradoxical\r\nto say with Socrates that ignorance is the only\r\nvice; that man is bad not voluntarily, from deliberate\r\nchoice, but only from ignorance. But this is largely because\r\nwe discriminate between different kinds of knowledge\r\nas the Greek did not, and as they had no occasion for\r\ndoing. We have a second-hand knowledge, a knowledge\r\nfrom books, newspapers, etc., which was practically non-existent\r\neven in the best days of Athens. Knowledge meant\r\nto them something more personal; something like what we\r\ncall a \"realizing sense\"; an intimate and well-founded conviction.\r\nTo us knowledge suggests information about what\r\nothers have found out, and hence is more remote in its\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_419\" id=\"Page_419\"\u003e[Pg 419]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmeaning. Greek knowledge was mostly directly connected\r\nwith the affairs of their common associated life. The very\r\nwords for knowledge and art, understanding and skill, were\r\nhardly separated. Knowledge was knowledge about the\r\ncity, its traditions, literature, history, customs, purposes,\r\netc. Their astronomy was connected with their civic religion;\r\ntheir geography with their own topography; their\r\nmathematics with their civil and military pursuits. Now\r\nwe have immense bodies of impersonal knowledge, remote\r\nfrom direct bearing upon affairs. Knowledge has accordingly\r\nsubdivided itself into theoretical or scientific and\r\npractical or moral. We use the term knowledge usually\r\nonly for the first kind; hence the Socratic position seems\r\ngratuitously paradoxical. But under the titles of \u003ci\u003econscience\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand \u003ci\u003econscientiousness\u003c/i\u003e we preserve the meaning\r\nwhich was attached to the term knowledge. It is not paradoxical\r\nto say that unconscientiousness is the fundamental\r\nvice, and genuine conscientiousness is guarantee of all\r\nvirtue.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eConscientiousness.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In this change from Greek wisdom\r\nto modern conscientiousness there have been some loss and\r\nsome gain. The loss lies in a certain hardening of the\r\nidea of insight and deliberation, due to the isolation of the\r\nmoral good from the other goods of life. The good man\r\nand the bad man have been endowed with the same faculty;\r\nand this faculty has been treated as automatically delivering\r\ncorrect conclusions. On the other hand, modern conscientiousness\r\ncontains less of the idea of intellectual accomplishment,\r\nand more of the idea of interest in finding\r\nout the good in conduct. \"Wisdom\" tended to emphasize\r\nachieved insight; knowledge which was proved, guaranteed,\r\nand unchangeable. \"Conscientiousness\" tends rather\r\nto fix attention upon that voluntary attitude which is\r\ninterested in \u003ci\u003ediscovery\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis implies a pretty radical change in wisdom as virtue.\r\nIn the older sense it is an attainment; something possessed.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_420\" id=\"Page_420\"\u003e[Pg 420]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIn the modern, it resides in the active desire and effort,\r\nin pursuit rather than in possession. The \u003ci\u003eattainment\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nknowledge varies with original intellectual endowment;\r\nwith opportunity for leisurely reflection; with all sorts of\r\nexternal conditions. Possession is a \u003ci\u003eclass\u003c/i\u003e idea and tends to\r\nmark off a moral aristocracy from a common herd. Since\r\nthe activities of the latter must be directed, on this assumption,\r\nby attained knowledge, its practical outcome is\r\nthe necessity of the regulation of their conduct by the\r\nwisdom possessed by the superior class. When, however,\r\nthe morally important thing is the desire and effort to\r\ndiscover the good, every one is on the same plane, in spite\r\nof differences in intellectual endowment and in learning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMoral knowing, as a fundamental or cardinal aspect of\r\nvirtue, is then the completeness of the interest in good\r\nexhibited in effort to discover the good. Since knowing\r\ninvolves two factors, a direct and an indirect, conscientiousness\r\ninvolves both \u003ci\u003esensitiveness\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ereflectiveness\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_195_195\" id=\"FNanchor_195_195\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_195_195\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[195]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(1) Moral Sensitiveness.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The individual who is not\r\ndirectly aware of the presence of values needing to be perpetuated\r\nor achieved, in the things and persons about him,\r\nis hard and callous or tough. A \"tender\" conscience is one\r\nwhich is immediately responsive to the presentation of good\r\nand evil. The modern counterpart to the Socratic doctrine\r\nthat ignorance is the root of vice, is that being\r\nmorally \"cold\" or \"dead,\" being indifferent to moral distinctions,\r\nis the most hopeless of all conditions. One who\r\ncares, even if he cares in the wrong way, has at least a\r\nspring that may be touched; the one who is just irresponsive\r\noffers no leverage for correction or improvement.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(2) Thoughtfulness.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;While the possession of such\r\nan immediate, unreflective responsiveness to elements of\r\ngood and bad must be the mainstay of moral wisdom, the\r\ncharacter which lies back of these intuitive apprehensions\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_421\" id=\"Page_421\"\u003e[Pg 421]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmust be thoughtful and serious-minded. There is no individual\r\nwho, however morally sensitive, can dispense with\r\ncool, calm reflection, or whose intuitive judgments, if\r\nreliable, are not largely the funded outcome of prior\r\nthinking. Every voluntary act is intelligent: i.e., includes\r\nan idea of the end to be reached or the consequences to\r\naccrue. Such ends are ideal in the sense that they are\r\npresent to thought, not to sense. But special ends, because\r\nthey are limited, are not what we mean by ideals.\r\nThey are specific. With the growth of the habit of reflection,\r\nagents become conscious that the values of their particular\r\nends are not circumscribed, but extend far beyond\r\nthe special case in question; so far indeed that their range\r\nof influence cannot be foreseen or defined. A kindly act\r\nmay not only have the particular consequence of relieving\r\npresent suffering, but may make a difference in the entire\r\nlife of its recipient, or may set in radically different directions\r\nthe interest and attention of the one who performs it.\r\nThese larger and remoter values in any moral act transcend\r\nthe end which was consciously present to its doer.\r\nThe person has always to aim at something definite, but\r\nas he becomes aware of this penumbra or atmosphere of\r\nfar-reaching ulterior values the meaning of his special act\r\nis thereby deepened and widened. An act is outwardly\r\ntemporary and circumstantial, but its meaning is permanent\r\nand expansive. The act passes away; but its significance\r\nabides in the increment of meaning given to\r\nfurther growth. To live in the recognition of this deeper\r\nmeaning of acts is to live in the ideal, in the only sense\r\nin which it is profitable for man to dwell in the ideal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eOur \"ideals,\" our types of excellence, are the various\r\nways in which we figure to ourselves the outreaching and\r\never-expanding values of our concrete acts.\u003c/i\u003e Every\r\nachievement of good deepens and quickens our sense of\r\nthe inexhaustible value contained in every right act. With\r\nachievement, our conception of the possible goods of life\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_422\" id=\"Page_422\"\u003e[Pg 422]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nincreases, and we find ourselves called to live upon a still\r\ndeeper and more thoughtful plane. An ideal is not some\r\nremote all-exhaustive goal, a fixed \u003ci\u003esummum bonum\u003c/i\u003e with\r\nrespect to which other things are only means. It is not\r\nsomething to be placed in contrast to the direct, local,\r\nand tangible quality of our actual situations, so that by\r\ncontrast these latter are lightly esteemed as insignificant.\r\nOn the contrary, an ideal is the conviction that each of\r\nthese special situations carries with it a final value, a meaning\r\nwhich in itself is unique and inexhaustible. To set up\r\n\"ideals\" of perfection which are other than the serious\r\nrecognition of the possibilities of development resident\r\nin each concrete situation, is in the end to pay ourselves\r\nwith sentimentalities, if not with words, and meanwhile\r\nit is to direct thought and energy away from the situations\r\nwhich need and which welcome the perfecting care of\r\nattention and affection.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThoughtfulness and Progress.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This sense of wider\r\nvalues than those definitely apprehended or definitely attained\r\nis a constant warning to the individual not to be\r\ncontent with an accomplishment. Conscientiousness takes\r\nmore and more the form of interest in improvement, in\r\nprogress. Conscientiousness as sensitiveness may rest upon\r\nthe plane of already secured satisfactions, upon discriminating\r\nwith accuracy their quality and degree. As\r\nthoughtfulness, it will always be on the lookout for the\r\nbetter. The good man not only measures his acts by a\r\nstandard, but he is concerned to revise his standard. His\r\nsense of the ideal, of the undefinable because ever-expanding\r\nvalue of special deeds, forbids his resting satisfied with\r\nany formulated standard; for the very formulation gives\r\nthe standard a technical quality, while the good can be\r\nmaintained only in enlarging excellence. The highest form\r\nof conscientiousness is interest in constant progress.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLove and Courage Required for Thoughtfulness.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We\r\nmay close this chapter by repeating what we have\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_423\" id=\"Page_423\"\u003e[Pg 423]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nalready noted, that genuine moral knowledge involves the\r\naffections and the resolute will as well as the intelligence.\r\nWe cannot know the varied elements of value in the lives\r\nof others and in the possibilities of our own, save as our\r\naffections are strong. Every narrowing of love, every\r\nencroachment of egoism, means just so much blindness\r\nto the good. The man who pleads \"good motives\" as excuse\r\nfor acts which injure others is always one whose absorption\r\nin himself has wrought harm to his powers of perception.\r\nEvery widening of contact with others, every deepening\r\nof the level of sympathetic acquaintance, magnifies in\r\nso much vision of the good. Finally, the chief ally of\r\nmoral thoughtfulness is the resolute courage of willingness\r\nto face the evil for the sake of the good. Shrinking\r\nfrom apprehension of the evil to others consequent upon\r\nour behavior, because such realization would demand painful\r\neffort to change our own plans and habits, maintains\r\nhabitual dimness and narrowness of moral vision.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUpon the principle of virtue in general, see Plato, \u003ci\u003eRepublic\u003c/i\u003e, 427-443;\r\nAristotle, \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, Books II. and IV.; Kant, \u003ci\u003eTheory of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(Abbott\u0027s trans.), pp. 164-182, 305, 316-322; Green, \u003ci\u003eProlegomena\u003c/i\u003e, pp.\r\n256-314 (and for conscientiousness, 323-337); Paulsen, \u003ci\u003eSystem of\r\nEthics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 475-482; Alexander, \u003ci\u003eMoral Order and Progress\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 242-253;\r\nLadd, \u003ci\u003ePhilosophy of Conduct\u003c/i\u003e, chs. x. and xiv.; Stephen, \u003ci\u003eScience\r\nof Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, ch. v.; Spencer, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II., pp. 3-34 and\r\n263-276; Sidgwick, \u003ci\u003eMethods of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 2-5 and 9-10; Rickaby,\r\n\u003ci\u003eAquinas Ethicus\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., pp. 155-195; Mezes, \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, chs. ix. and xvi.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor natural ability and virtue: Hume, \u003ci\u003eTreatise\u003c/i\u003e, Part II., Book III.,\r\nand \u003ci\u003eInquiry\u003c/i\u003e, Appendix IV.; Bonar, \u003ci\u003eIntellectual Virtues\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor discussions of special virtues: Aristotle, \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, Book III.,\r\nand Book VII., chs. i.-x.; for justice: Aristotle, \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, Book V.;\r\nRickaby, \u003ci\u003eMoral Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 102-108, and \u003ci\u003eAquinas Ethicus\u003c/i\u003e (see\r\nIndex); Paulsen, \u003ci\u003eSystem of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 599-637; Mezes, \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, ch.\r\nxiii.; Mill, \u003ci\u003eUtilitarianism\u003c/i\u003e, ch. v.; Sidgwick, \u003ci\u003eMethods of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Book\r\nIII., ch. v., and see Index; also criticism of Spencer in his \u003ci\u003eLectures\r\non the Ethics of Green, Spencer and Martineau\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 272-302; Spencer,\r\n\u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II.; Stephen, \u003ci\u003eScience of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, ch. v.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor benevolence, see Aristotle, \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, Books VII.-IX. (on friendship);\r\nRickaby, \u003ci\u003eMoral Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 237-244, and \u003ci\u003eAquinas Ethicus\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(see charity and almsgiving in Index); Paulsen, \u003ci\u003eSystem\u003c/i\u003e, chs. viii.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_424\" id=\"Page_424\"\u003e[Pg 424]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand x. of Part III.; Mezes, \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, ch. xii.; Sidgwick, \u003ci\u003eMethods of\r\nEthics\u003c/i\u003e, Book II., ch. iv.; Spencer, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II.; see\r\nalso the references under sympathy and altruism at end of ch. xviii.\r\nCourage and temperance are discussed in chs. x. and xi. of Mezes; in\r\npp. 485-504 of Paulsen; pp. 327-336 of Sidgwick; ch. xi. of Ladd\u0027s\r\n\u003ci\u003ePhilosophy of Conduct\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_184_184\" id=\"Footnote_184_184\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_184_184\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[184]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This is, of course, the point made in ch. iv. on \"\u003ci\u003eCustoms or\r\nMores\u003c/i\u003e,\" save that there the emphasis was upon the epoch of customary\r\nas distinct from the reflective morals, while here it is upon\r\nthe customary factor in the present.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_185_185\" id=\"Footnote_185_185\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_185_185\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[185]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This fact might be employed to re\u0026euml;nforce our prior conclusion\r\nthat moral rules, classifications, etc., are not of final importance but\r\nare of value in clarifying and judging individual acts and situations.\r\nNot the rule, but the use which the person makes of the rule\r\nin approving and disapproving himself and others, is the significant\r\nthing.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_186_186\" id=\"Footnote_186_186\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_186_186\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[186]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Less is said on this point because this phase of the matter has\r\nbeen covered in the discussion of self-denial in the previous chapter.\r\nSee pp. 364-68.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_187_187\" id=\"Footnote_187_187\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_187_187\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[187]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Strict hedonism would tend to reduce all virtue to prudence\u0026mdash;the\r\ncalculation of subtler and remoter consequences and the control of\r\npresent behavior by its outcome.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_188_188\" id=\"Footnote_188_188\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_188_188\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[188]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Says Hazlitt, \"The charm of criminal life, like that of savage\r\nlife, consists in liberty, in hardship, in danger, and in the contempt\r\nof death: in one word, in \u003ci\u003eextraordinary excitement\u003c/i\u003e\" (Essay on\r\nBentham). But this is equally true in principle (though not in\r\ndegree) of every temptation to turn from the straight and narrow\r\npath. Virtue seems dull and sober, uninteresting, in comparison\r\nwith the increasing excitation of some desire. There are as many\r\nforms of excitement as there are individual men.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_189_189\" id=\"Footnote_189_189\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_189_189\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[189]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e There is something of the nature of gambling, of taking chances\r\non future results for the sake of present stimulation, in all unrestraint\r\nor intemperate action. And the reflection of the specialist\u0026mdash;that\r\nis, the one whose reflection is not subjected to responsible tests\r\nin social behavior\u0026mdash;is a more or less exciting adventure\u0026mdash;a \"speculation.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_190_190\" id=\"Footnote_190_190\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_190_190\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[190]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In the last words of Spinoza\u0027s \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, \"No one delights in the\r\ngood because he curbs his appetites, but because we delight in the\r\ngood we are able to curb our lusts.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_191_191\" id=\"Footnote_191_191\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_191_191\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[191]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e What has been said about Self-assertion, in the last chapter,\r\nanticipates in some measure what holds of this virtue.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_192_192\" id=\"Footnote_192_192\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_192_192\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[192]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See Sumner, \u003ci\u003eFolkways\u003c/i\u003e, ch. xx.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_193_193\" id=\"Footnote_193_193\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_193_193\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[193]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Upon this point see James, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Psychology\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II.,\r\npp. 561-567, and Royce, \u003ci\u003eWorld and Individual\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II., pp. 354-360.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_194_194\" id=\"Footnote_194_194\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_194_194\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[194]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This receives more attention in ch. xxi. of Part III.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_195_195\" id=\"Footnote_195_195\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_195_195\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[195]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Compare what was said concerning the intuitive and the discursive\r\nfactors in moral knowledge in ch. xvi.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_425\" id=\"Page_425\"\u003e[Pg 425]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"PART_III\" id=\"PART_III\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003ePART III\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTHE WORLD OF ACTION\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_426\" id=\"Page_426\"\u003e[Pg 426]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eGENERAL LITERATURE FOR PART III\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAddams, \u003ci\u003eDemocracy and Social Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, 1902, \u003ci\u003eNewer Ideals of\r\nPeace\u003c/i\u003e, 1907; Santayana, \u003ci\u003eThe Life of Reason\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II., 1905; Bergmann,\r\n\u003ci\u003eEthik als Kulturphilosophie\u003c/i\u003e, 1904, especially pp. 154-304;\r\nWundt, \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. III., \u003ci\u003eThe Principles of Morality and the Departments\r\nof the Moral Life\u003c/i\u003e (trans. 1901); Spencer, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of\r\nEthics\u003c/i\u003e, 1893, Vol. II., \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Sociology\u003c/i\u003e, 1882, Vol. I., Part II.;\r\nRitchie, \u003ci\u003eStudies in Political and Moral Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e, 1888; Bosanquet,\r\n\u003ci\u003ePhilosophical Theory of the State\u003c/i\u003e, 1899; Willoughby, \u003ci\u003eSocial Justice\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1900; Cooley, \u003ci\u003eHuman Nature and the Social Order\u003c/i\u003e, 1902; Paulsen,\r\n\u003ci\u003eSystem der Ethik\u003c/i\u003e, 5th ed., 1900, Book IV.; Runze, \u003ci\u003ePraktische Ethik\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1891; Janet, \u003ci\u003eHistoire de la Science Politique dans ses Rapports avec\r\nla Morale\u003c/i\u003e, 3d ed., 1887; Plato, \u003ci\u003eThe Republic\u003c/i\u003e; Aristotle, \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, Book\r\nV., and \u003ci\u003ePolitics\u003c/i\u003e (trans. by Welldon, 1883); Hegel, \u003ci\u003ePhilosophy of\r\nRight\u003c/i\u003e (pub. 1820, trans. by Dyde, 1896); Mackenzie, \u003ci\u003eAn Introduction\r\nto Social Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e, 1890; Dunning, \u003ci\u003eHistory of Political Theories\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nVol. I., 1902, Vol. II., 1905; Stein, \u003ci\u003eDie Sociale Frage im Licht der\r\nPhilosophie\u003c/i\u003e, 1897.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_427\" id=\"Page_427\"\u003e[Pg 427]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER XX\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE INDIVIDUAL\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eObject of Part and Chapter.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The history of morals\r\nmanifests a twofold movement. It reveals, on one side,\r\nconstantly increasing stress on \u003ci\u003eindividual\u003c/i\u003e intelligence and\r\naffection. The transformation of customary into reflective\r\nmorals is the change from \"Do those things which our\r\nkin, class, or city do\" to \"Be a person with certain habits\r\nof desire and deliberation.\" The moral history of the race\r\nalso reveals constantly growing emphasis upon the \u003ci\u003esocial\u003c/i\u003e\r\nnature of the objects and ends to which personal preferences\r\nare to be devoted. While the agent has been learning\r\nthat it is his personal attitude which counts in his\r\ndeeds, he has also learnt that there is no attitude which is\r\nexclusively private in scope, none which does not need to\r\nbe socially valued or judged. Theoretic analysis enforces\r\nthe same lesson as history. It tells us that moral quality\r\n\u003ci\u003eresides in\u003c/i\u003e the habitual dispositions of an agent; and that\r\nit \u003ci\u003econsists of\u003c/i\u003e the tendency of these dispositions to secure\r\n(or hinder) values which are sociably shared or sharable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn Part One we sketched the historical course of this development;\r\nin Part Two we traced its theoretic analysis. In\r\nthe present and concluding Part, our purpose is to consider\r\nthe distinctively social aspects of morality. We shall\r\nconsider how social institutions and tendencies supply\r\nvalue to the activities of individuals, impose the conditions\r\nof the formation and exercise of their desires and aims;\r\nand, especially, how they create the peculiarly urgent\r\nproblems of contemporary moral life. The present chap\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_428\" id=\"Page_428\"\u003e[Pg 428]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eter\r\nwill take up the general question, that of the relation\r\nof social organization to individual life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 1. GROWTH OF INDIVIDUALITY THROUGH SOCIAL\r\nORGANIZATIONS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom one point of view, historic development represents\r\nthe increasing liberation of individual powers from rigid\r\nsocial control. Sir John Lubbock remarks: \"No savage\r\nis free. All over the world his daily life is regulated by a\r\ncomplicated and apparently most inconvenient set of customs\r\n(as forcible as laws), of quaint prohibitions and\r\nprivileges.\" Looked at from another point of view, emancipation\r\nfrom one sort of social organization means initiation\r\ninto some other social order; the individual is liberated\r\nfrom a small and fixed (customary) social group, to become\r\na member of a larger and progressive society. The\r\nhistory of setting free individual power in desire, thought,\r\nand initiative is, upon the whole, the history of the formation\r\nof more complex and extensive social organizations.\r\nMovements that look like the disintegration of the order\r\nof society, when viewed with reference to what has preceded\r\nthem, are factors in the construction of a new social\r\norder, which allows freer play to individuals, and yet\r\nincreases the number of social groupings and the depth of\r\nsocial combinations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis fact of historical development is well summed up in\r\nthe following words of Hobhouse, set forth as a summary\r\nof a comprehensive survey of the historic development of\r\nlaw and justice, of the family including the status of\r\nwomen and children, of the relations between communities,\r\nand between classes, the rich and the poor.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eHe says: \"Amid all the variety of social institutions and the\r\nebb and flow of historical change, it is possible in the end to\r\ndetect a double movement, marking the transition from the\r\nlower to the higher levels of civilized law and custom. On the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_429\" id=\"Page_429\"\u003e[Pg 429]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\none hand, the social order is strengthened and extended….\r\nOn this side the individual human being becomes more and\r\nmore subject to social constraint, and, as we have frequently\r\nseen, the changes making for the tightening of the social fabric\r\nmay diminish the rights which the individual or large classes\r\nof individuals can claim…. In this relation liberty and\r\norder become opposed. But the opposition is not essential.\r\nFrom the first the individual relies on social forces to maintain\r\nhim in his rights, and in the higher form of social organization\r\nwe have seen order and liberty drawing together again….\r\nThe best ordered community is that which gives most\r\nscope to its component members to make the best of themselves,\r\nwhile the \u0027best\u0027 in human nature is that which contributes\r\nto the harmony and onward movement of society….\r\nThe responsible human being, man or woman, is the\r\ncenter of modern ethics as of modern law, free so far as custom\r\nand law are concerned to make his own life…. The\r\nsocial nature of man is not diminished either on the side of\r\nits needs or its duties by the fuller recognition of personal\r\nrights. The difference is that, so far as rights and duties are\r\nconceived as attaching to human beings as such, they become\r\nuniversalized, \u003ci\u003eand are therefore the care of society as a\r\nwhole rather than of any partial group organization\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_196_196\" id=\"FNanchor_196_196\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_196_196\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[196]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith this statement may be compared the words of Green\r\nand Alexander. According to Green, moral progress\r\nconsists in the \u003ci\u003eextension\u003c/i\u003e of the area or range of persons\r\nwhose common good is concerned, and in the deepening\r\nor \u003ci\u003eintensification\u003c/i\u003e in the individual of his social interest:\r\n\"the settled disposition on each man\u0027s part to make the\r\nmost and best of humanity in his own person and in the\r\nperson of others.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_197_197\" id=\"FNanchor_197_197\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_197_197\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[197]\u003c/a\u003e Alexander\u0027s formul\u0026aelig; for moral\r\ngrowth are the \"laws of differentiation and of comprehension.\"\r\nThe first means diversification, specialization,\r\ndifferentiating the powers of an individual with\r\nincreased refinement of each. The law of comprehension\r\nmeans the steady enlargement of the size and scope of\r\nthe social group (as from clan to modern national state)\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_430\" id=\"Page_430\"\u003e[Pg 430]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith its increased complexity of ways in which men are\r\nbrought into contact with one another.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_198_198\" id=\"FNanchor_198_198\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_198_198\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[198]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSocial Life Liberates and Directs Individual Energies.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Breadth\r\nin extent of community life goes hand in hand\r\nwith multiplication of the stimuli which call out an individual\u0027s\r\npowers. Diversification of social activities increases\r\nopportunities for his initiative and endeavor. Narrow\r\nand meager social life means limitation of the scope\r\nof activities in which its members may engage. It means\r\nlittle occasion for the exercise of deliberation and choice,\r\nwithout which character is both immature and fossilized;\r\nit means, in short, restricted personality. But a rich and\r\nvaried society, one which liberates powers otherwise torpid\r\nand latent, also exacts that they be employed in ways consistent\r\nwith its own interests. A society which is extensive\r\nand complex would dissolve in anarchy and confusion were\r\nnot the activities of its various members upon the whole\r\nmutually congruent. The world of action is a world of\r\nwhich the individual is one limit, and humanity the other;\r\nbetween them lie all sorts of associative arrangements of\r\nlesser and larger scope, families, friendships, schools,\r\nclubs, organizations for making or distributing goods, for\r\ngathering and supplying commodities; activities politically\r\norganized by parishes, wards, villages, cities, countries,\r\nstates, nations. Every maladjustment in relations among\r\nthese institutions and associated activities means loss and\r\nfriction in the relations between individuals; and thereby\r\nintroduces defect, division, and restriction into the various\r\npowers which constitute an individual. All harmonious\r\nco\u0026ouml;peration among them means a fuller life and greater\r\nfreedom of thought and action for the individual person.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eO\u003cb\u003erder and Laws.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The world of action as a scene of\r\norganized activities going on in regular ways\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_199_199\" id=\"FNanchor_199_199\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_199_199\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[199]\u003c/a\u003e thus pre\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_431\" id=\"Page_431\"\u003e[Pg 431]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003esents\r\na public or common order and authority, with its\r\nestablished modes of operation, its laws. Organized institutions,\r\nfrom the more permanent to the more casual,\r\nwith their orderly rules of conduct, are not, of course,\r\nprior to individual activity; for their elements are individual\r\nactivities related in certain ways. But with respect\r\nto \u003ci\u003eany one\u003c/i\u003e individual in his separate or distributive capacity,\r\nthere is a genuine and important sense in which the\r\ninstitution comes first. A child is born into an already\r\nexisting family with habits and beliefs already formed, not\r\nindeed rigid beyond readaptation, but with their own\r\norder (arrangements). He goes to schools which have\r\ntheir established methods and aims; he gradually assumes\r\nmembership in business, civic, and political organizations,\r\nwith their own settled ways and purposes. Only in participating\r\nin already fashioned systems of conduct does\r\nhe apprehend his own powers, appreciate their worth and\r\nrealize their possibilities, and achieve for himself a controlled\r\nand orderly body of physical and mental habits.\r\nHe finds the value and the principles of his life, his satisfaction\r\nand his norms of authority, in being a member of\r\nassociated groups of persons and in playing his part in\r\ntheir maintenance and expansion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Social and the Moral.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In customary society, it\r\ndoes not occur to any one that there is a difference between\r\nwhat he ought to do, i.e., the moral, and what those\r\nabout him customarily do, i.e., the social. The socially\r\nestablished is the moral. Reflective morality brings with\r\nit, as we have seen, a distinction. A thoughtfully minded\r\nperson reacts against certain institutions and habits which\r\nobtain in his social environment; he regards certain ideas,\r\nwhich he frames himself and which are not embodied in\r\nsocial habits, as more moral than anything existing about\r\nhim. Such reactions against custom and such projections\r\nof new ideas are necessary if there is to be progress in\r\nsociety. But unfortunately it has often been forgotten\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_432\" id=\"Page_432\"\u003e[Pg 432]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat this distinctly \u003ci\u003epersonal\u003c/i\u003e morality, which takes its\r\nstand against some established usage, and which, therefore,\r\nfor the time being has its abode only in the initiative\r\nand effort of an individual, is simply the means of \u003ci\u003esocial\u003c/i\u003e\r\nreconstruction. It is treated as if it were an end in itself,\r\nand as if it were something higher than any morality which\r\nis or can be socially embodied.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAt some periods, this view has led to a monastic retreat\r\nfrom all social affairs for the sake of cultivating personal\r\ngoodness. At other times, it has led to the political indifference\r\nof the Cynic and Stoic. For ages, it led to\r\na morality of \"other worldliness\"; to the belief that true\r\ngoodness can be attained only in another kind of life and\r\nworld\u0026mdash;a belief which carried with it relative contempt and\r\nneglect of concrete social conditions in this life. Social\r\naffairs at best were only \"secular\" and temporal, and,\r\nin contrast with the eternal and spiritual salvation of the\r\nindividual\u0027s own soul, of little account. After the Renaissance\r\nand the Protestant Revolt, this kind of moral\r\nindividualism persisted in different forms. Among the\r\nhedonists, it took the form of assuming that while social\r\narrangements are of very great importance, their importance\r\nlies in the fact that they hinder or help individuals\r\nin the attainment of their own private pleasures.\r\nThe transcendentalists (such as Kant) asserted that, since\r\nmorality is wholly a matter of the inner motive, of the\r\npersonal attitude towards the moral law, social conditions\r\nare wholly external. Good or evil lies wholly inside the\r\nindividual\u0027s own will. Social institutions may help or\r\nhinder the outward \u003ci\u003eexecution\u003c/i\u003e of moral purpose; they may\r\nbe favorable or hostile to the successful outward display\r\nof virtue. But they have nothing to do with originating\r\nor developing the moral purpose, the Good Will, and hence,\r\nin themselves, are lacking in moral significance. Thus\r\nKant made a sharp and fast distinction between \u003ci\u003emorality\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nappertaining solely to the individual\u0027s own inner conscious\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_433\" id=\"Page_433\"\u003e[Pg 433]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eness,\r\nand \u003ci\u003elegality\u003c/i\u003e, appertaining to the social and political\r\nconditions of outward behavior. Social institutions and\r\nlaws may indeed regulate men\u0027s outer acts. So far as men\r\nexternally conform, their conduct is legal. But laws cannot\r\nregulate or touch men\u0027s motives, which alone determine\r\nthe morality of their behavior.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe shall not repeat here our prior criticisms of hedonism\r\nand utilitarianism in order to point out the falsity of this\r\ndivision of moral action into unrelated inner (or private)\r\nand outer (or social) factors. We may recall to memory,\r\nhowever, that Kant himself virtually passed beyond his\r\nown theory of moral individualism in insisting upon the\r\npromotion of a \"Kingdom of Ends,\" in which every person\r\nis to be treated as an end in himself. We may recall\r\nthat the later utilitarians (such as Mill, Leslie Stephen,\r\nBain, and Spencer) insisted upon the \u003ci\u003eeducative\u003c/i\u003e value of\r\nsocial institutions, upon their importance in forming certain\r\ninterests and habits in the individual. Thus social\r\narrangements were taken out of the category of mere\r\nmeans to private good, and made the necessary factors\r\nand conditions of the development of an individuality which\r\nshould have a reasonable and just conception of its own\r\nnature and of its own good. We may also enumerate some\r\nof the more fundamental ways in which social institutions\r\ndetermine individual morality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. Apart from the social medium, the individual would\r\nnever \"know himself\"; he would never become acquainted\r\nwith his own needs and capacities. He would live the life\r\nof a brute animal, satisfying as best he could his most\r\nurgent appetites of hunger, thirst, and sex, but being, as\r\nregards even that, handicapped in comparison with other\r\nanimals. And, as we have already seen, the wider and the\r\nricher the social relationships into which an individual\r\nenters, the more fully are his powers evoked, and the more\r\nfully is he brought to recognize the possibilities latent in\r\nthem. It is from seeing noble architecture and hearing\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_434\" id=\"Page_434\"\u003e[Pg 434]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nharmonious music that the individual learns to know to\r\nwhat his own constructive and rhythmic tendencies, otherwise\r\nblind and inchoate, may come. It is from achievement\r\nin industrial, national, and family life that he is\r\ninitiated into perception of his own energy, loyalty, and\r\naffection.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. Social conditions not only evoke what is latent, and\r\nbring to conscious recognition what is blind, but they\r\nselect, encourage, and confirm certain tendencies at the\r\nexpense of others. They enable the individual to discriminate\r\nthe better and the worse among his tendencies\r\nand achievements. There is no limit in the power of\r\nsociety to awaken and strengthen this habit of discrimination,\r\nof choice after comparison, in its individual members.\r\nA small social group with fixed habits, a clan, a\r\ngang, a narrow sect, a dogmatic party, will restrict the\r\nformation of critical powers\u0026mdash;i.e., of conscientiousness or\r\nmoral thoughtfulness. But an individual who \u003ci\u003ereally\u003c/i\u003e becomes\r\na member of modern society, with its multiple occupations,\r\nits easy intercourse, its free mobility, its rich\r\nresources of art and science, will have only too many\r\nopportunities for reflective judgment and personal valuation\r\nand preference. \u003ci\u003eThe very habits of individual moral\r\ninitiative, of personal criticism of the existent order, and\r\nof private projection of a better order, to which moral\r\nindividualists point as proofs of the purely \"inner\" nature\r\nof morality, are themselves effects of a variable and\r\ncomplex social order.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Moral Value of the State.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;If then we take modern\r\nsocial life in its broadest extent, as including not only\r\nwhat has become institutionalized and more or less fossilized,\r\nbut also what is still growing (forming and re-forming), we\r\nmay justly say that it is as true of progressive as of stationary\r\nsociety, that the moral and the social are one.\r\nThe virtues of the individual in a progressive society are\r\nmore reflective, more critical, involve more exercise of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_435\" id=\"Page_435\"\u003e[Pg 435]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncomparison and selection, than in customary society. But\r\nthey are just as socially conditioned in their origin and\r\nas socially directed in their manifestation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn rudimentary societies, customs furnish the highest\r\nends of achievement; they supply the principles of social\r\norganization and combination; and they form binding\r\nlaws whose breach is punished. The moral, political, and\r\nlegal are not differentiated. But village communities and\r\ncity-states, to say nothing of kingdoms and empires and\r\nmodern national States, have developed special organs\r\nand special regulations for maintaining social unity and\r\npublic order. Small groups are usually firmly welded together\r\nand are exclusive. They have a narrow but intense\r\nsocial code:\u0026mdash;like a patriarchal family, a gang, a social\r\nset, they are clannish. But when a large number of such\r\ngroups come together within a more inclusive social unity,\r\nsome institution grows up to represent the interests and\r\nactivities of the whole as against the narrow and centrifugal\r\ntendencies of the constituent factors. A society is then\r\n\u003ci\u003epolitically\u003c/i\u003e organized; and a true public order with its\r\ncomprehensive laws is brought into existence. The moral\r\nimportance of the development of this public point of view,\r\nwith its extensive common purposes and with a general will\r\nfor maintaining them, can hardly be overestimated. Without\r\nsuch organization, society and hence morality would\r\nremain sectional, jealous, suspicious, unfraternal. Sentiments\r\nof intense cohesion within would have been conjoined\r\nwith equally strong sentiments of indifference,\r\nintolerance, and hostility to those without. In the wake of\r\nthe formation of States have followed more widely co-operative\r\nactivities, more comprehensive and hence more\r\nreasonable principles of judgment and outlook. The individual\r\nhas been emancipated from his relative submergence\r\nin the local and fixed group, and set upon his\r\nown feet, with varied fields of activity open to him in which\r\nto try his powers, and furnished with principles of judg\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_436\" id=\"Page_436\"\u003e[Pg 436]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eing\r\nconduct and projecting ideals which in theory,\r\nat least, are as broad as the possibilities of humanity\r\nitself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 2. RESPONSIBILITY AND FREEDOM\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe more comprehensive and diversified the social order,\r\nthe greater the responsibility and the freedom of the individual.\r\nHis freedom is the greater, because the more numerous\r\nare the effective stimuli to action, and the more varied\r\nand the more certain the ways in which he may fulfill\r\nhis powers. His responsibility is greater because there\r\nare more demands for considering the consequences of his\r\nacts; and more agencies for bringing home to him the\r\nrecognition of consequences which affect not merely more\r\npersons individually, but which also influence the more\r\nremote and hidden social ties.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLiability.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Freedom and responsibility have a relatively\r\nsuperficial and negative meaning and a relatively positive\r\ncentral meaning. In its external aspect, responsibility\r\nis \u003ci\u003eliability\u003c/i\u003e. An agent is free to act; yes, but\u0026mdash;. He\r\nmust stand the consequences, the disagreeable as well as\r\nthe pleasant, the social as well as the physical. He may do\r\na given act, but if so, let him look out. His act is a matter\r\nthat concerns others as well as himself, and they will\r\nprove their concern by calling him to account; and if he\r\ncannot give a satisfactory and credible account of his\r\nintention, subject him to correction. Each community and\r\norganization informs its members what it regards as obnoxious,\r\nand serves notice upon them that they have to\r\nanswer if they offend. The individual then is (1) likely\r\nor liable to have to explain and justify his behavior, and\r\nis (2) liable or open to suffering consequent upon inability\r\nto make his explanation acceptable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePositive Responsibility.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In this way the individual is\r\nmade aware of the stake the community has in his behavior;\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_437\" id=\"Page_437\"\u003e[Pg 437]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand is afforded an opportunity to take that interest into\r\naccount in directing his desires and making his plans.\r\nIf he does so, he is a responsible person. The agent who\r\ndoes not take to heart the concern which others show\r\nthat they have in his conduct, will note his liability only\r\nas an evil to which he is exposed, and will take it into\r\nconsideration only to see how to escape or evade it. But\r\none whose point of view is sympathetic and reasonable will\r\nrecognize the justice of the community interest in his performances;\r\nand will recognize the value to him of the\r\ninstruction contained in its assertions of its interest. Such\r\nan one responds, answers, to the social demands made;\r\nhe is not merely called to answer. He holds himself responsible\r\nfor the consequences of his acts; he does not wait\r\nto be held liable by others. When society looks for responsible\r\nworkmen, teachers, doctors, it does not mean\r\nmerely those whom it may call to account; it can do that\r\nin any case. It wants men and women who habitually form\r\ntheir purposes after consideration of the social consequences\r\nof their execution. Dislike of disapprobation, fear\r\nof penalty, play a part in generating this responsive\r\nhabit; but fear, operating directly, occasions only cunning\r\nor servility. Fused, through reflection, with other\r\nmotives which prompt to action, it helps bring about that\r\napprehensiveness, or susceptibility to the rights of others,\r\nwhich is the essence of responsibility, which in turn is the\r\nsole \u003ci\u003eultimate\u003c/i\u003e guarantee of social order.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Two Senses of Freedom.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In its external aspect,\r\nfreedom is negative and formal. It signifies freedom \u003ci\u003efrom\u003c/i\u003e\r\nsubjection to the will and control of others; exemption\r\nfrom bondage; release from servitude; capacity to act\r\nwithout being exposed to direct obstructions or interferences\r\nfrom others. It means a clear road, cleared of impediments,\r\nfor action. It contrasts with the limitations\r\nof prisoner, slave, and serf, who have to carry out the will\r\nof others.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_438\" id=\"Page_438\"\u003e[Pg 438]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEffective Freedom.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Exemption from restraint and\r\nfrom interference with overt action is only a condition,\r\nthough an absolutely indispensable one, of effective freedom.\r\nThe latter requires (1) positive control of the resources\r\nnecessary to carry purposes into effect, possession\r\nof the means to satisfy desires; and (2) mental equipment\r\nwith the trained powers of initiative and reflection requisite\r\nfor free preference and for circumspect and far-seeing desires.\r\nThe freedom of an agent who is merely released\r\nfrom direct external obstructions is formal and empty.\r\nIf he is without resources of personal skill, without control\r\nof the tools of achievement, he must inevitably lend\r\nhimself to carrying out the directions and ideas of others.\r\nIf he has not powers of deliberation and invention, he must\r\npick up his ideas casually and superficially from the suggestions\r\nof his environment and appropriate the notions\r\nwhich the interests of some class insinuate into his mind.\r\nIf he have not powers of intelligent self-control, he will\r\nbe in bondage to appetite, enslaved to routine, imprisoned\r\nwithin the monotonous round of an imagery flowing from\r\nilliberal interests, broken only by wild forays into the\r\nillicit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLegal and Moral.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Positive responsibility and freedom\r\nmay be regarded as moral, while liability and exemption\r\nare legal and political. A particular individual at a given\r\ntime is possessed of certain secured resources in execution\r\nand certain formed habits of desire and reflection. In so\r\nfar, he is positively free. Legally, his sphere of activity\r\nmay be very much wider. The laws, the prevailing body\r\nof rules which define existing institutions, would protect\r\nhim in exercising claims and powers far beyond those\r\nwhich he can actually put forth. He is exempt from interference\r\nin travel, in reading, in hearing music, in pursuing\r\nscientific research. But if he has neither material means\r\nnor mental cultivation to enjoy these legal possibilities,\r\nmere exemption means little or nothing. It does, however,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_439\" id=\"Page_439\"\u003e[Pg 439]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncreate a moral demand that the practical limitations which\r\nhem him in should be removed; that practical conditions\r\nshould be afforded which will enable him effectively to\r\ntake advantage of the opportunities formally open. Similarly,\r\nat any given time, the liabilities to which an individual\r\nis actually held come far short of the accountability\r\nto which the more conscientious members of society hold\r\nthemselves. The morale of the individual is in advance of\r\nthe formulated morality, or legality, of the community.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRelation of Legal to Moral.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It is, however, absurd\r\nto separate the legal and the ideal aspects of freedom\r\nfrom one another. It is only as men are held liable that\r\nthey become responsible; even the conscientious man, however\r\nmuch in some respects his demands upon himself\r\nexceed those which would be enforced against him by\r\nothers, still needs in other respects to have his unconscious\r\npartiality and presumption steadied by the requirements\r\nof others. He needs to have his judgment balanced against\r\ncrankiness, narrowness, or fanaticism, by reference to the\r\nsanity of the common standard of his times. It is only\r\nas men are exempt from external obstruction that they\r\nbecome aware of possibilities, and are awakened to demand\r\nand strive to obtain more positive freedom. Or,\r\nagain, it is the possession by the more favored individuals\r\nin society of an effectual freedom to do and to enjoy things\r\nwith respect to which the masses have only a formal and\r\nlegal freedom, that arouses a sense of inequity, and that\r\nstirs the social judgment and will to such reforms of law,\r\nof administration and economic conditions as will transform\r\nthe empty freedom of the less favored individuals\r\ninto constructive realities.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 3. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Individual and Social in Rights and Obligations.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;That\r\nwhich, taken at large or in a lump, is called free\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_440\" id=\"Page_440\"\u003e[Pg 440]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003edom\r\nbreaks up in detail into a number of specific, concrete\r\nabilities to act in particular ways. These are termed\r\n\u003ci\u003erights\u003c/i\u003e. Any right includes within itself in intimate unity\r\nthe individual and social aspects of activity upon which\r\nwe have been insisting. As a capacity for exercise of\r\npower, it resides in and proceeds from some special agent,\r\nsome individual. As exemption from restraint, a secured\r\nrelease from obstruction, it indicates at least the permission\r\nand sufferance of society, a tacit social assent and\r\nconfirmation; while any more positive and energetic effort\r\non the part of the community to guarantee and safeguard\r\nit, indicates an active acknowledgment on the part of\r\nsociety that the free exercise by individuals of the power\r\nin question is positively in its own interest. Thus a\r\nright, individual in residence, is social in origin and intent.\r\nThe social factor in rights is made explicit in the demand\r\nthat the power in question be exercised in certain ways. A\r\nright is never a claim to a wholesale, indefinite activity,\r\nbut to a \u003ci\u003edefined\u003c/i\u003e activity; \u003ci\u003eto one carried on\u003c/i\u003e, that is, \u003ci\u003eunder\r\ncertain conditions\u003c/i\u003e. This limitation constitutes the \u003ci\u003eobligatory\u003c/i\u003e\r\nphases of every right. The individual is free; yes,\r\nthat is his right. But he is free to act only according to\r\ncertain regular and established conditions. That is the\r\nobligation imposed upon him. He has a right to use\r\npublic roads, but he is obliged to turn in a certain way.\r\nHe has a right to use his property, but he is obliged to\r\npay taxes, to pay debts, not to harm others in its use, and\r\nso on.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCorrespondence of Rights and Obligations.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Rights\r\nand obligations are thus strictly correlative. This is true\r\nboth in their external employment and in their intrinsic\r\nnatures. Externally the individual is under obligation to\r\nuse his right in a way which does not interfere with the\r\nrights of others. He is free to drive on the public highways,\r\nbut not to exceed a certain speed, and on condition\r\nthat he turns to right or left as the public order requires.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_441\" id=\"Page_441\"\u003e[Pg 441]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nHe is entitled to the land which he has bought, but this\r\npossession is subject to conditions of public registration\r\nand taxation. He may use his property, but not so that\r\nit menaces others or becomes a nuisance. Absolute rights,\r\nif we mean by absolute those not relative to any social\r\norder and hence exempt from any social restriction, there\r\nare none. But rights correspond even more intrinsically\r\nto obligations. The right is itself a social outcome: it\r\nis the individual\u0027s in so far as he is himself a social member\r\nnot merely physically, but in his habits of thought\r\nand feeling. He is under obligation to use his rights in\r\nsocial ways. The more we emphasize the free right of\r\nan individual to his property, the more we emphasize what\r\nsociety has done for him: the avenues it has opened to him\r\nfor acquiring; the safeguards it has put about him for\r\nkeeping; the wealth achieved by others which he may acquire\r\nby exchanges themselves socially buttressed. So\r\nfar as an individual\u0027s own merits are concerned these\r\nopportunities and protections are \"unearned increments,\"\r\nno matter what credit he may deserve for initiative and\r\nindustry and foresight in using them. The only fundamental\r\nanarchy is that which regards rights as private\r\nmonopolies, ignoring their social origin and intent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eClasses of Rights and Obligations.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We may discuss\r\nfreedom and responsibility with respect to the social organization\r\nwhich secures and enforces them; or from the\r\nstandpoint of the individual who exercises and acknowledges\r\nthem. From the latter standpoint, rights are conveniently\r\ntreated as physical and mental: not that the\r\nphysical and mental can be separated, but that emphasis\r\nmay fall primarily on control of the conditions required\r\nto execute ideas and intentions, or upon the control of the\r\nconditions involved in their personal formation and choice.\r\nFrom the standpoint of the public order, rights and duties\r\nare civil and political. We shall consider them in the next\r\nchapter in connection with the organization of society\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_442\" id=\"Page_442\"\u003e[Pg 442]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin the State. Here we consider rights as inhering in an\r\nindividual in virtue of his membership in society.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eI. Physical Rights.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;These are the rights to the free\r\nunharmed possession of the body (the rights to life and\r\nlimb), exemption from homicidal attack, from assault and\r\nbattery, and from conditions that threaten health in more\r\nobscure ways; and positively, the right to free movement\r\nof the body, to use its members for any legitimate purpose,\r\nand the right to unhindered locomotion. Without\r\nthe exemption, there is no security in life, no assurance;\r\nonly a life of constant fear and uncertainty, of loss of\r\nlimb, of injury from others, and of death. Without some\r\npositive assurance, there is no chance of carrying ideas\r\ninto effect. Even if sound and healthy and extremely protected,\r\na man lives a slave or prisoner. Right to the\r\ncontrol and use of physical conditions of life takes effect\r\nthen in property rights, command of the natural tools and\r\nmaterials which are requisite to the maintenance of the\r\nbody in a due state of health and to an effective and competent\r\nuse of the person\u0027s powers. These physical rights\r\nto life, limb, and property are so basic to all achievement\r\nand capability that they have frequently been termed\r\n\"natural rights.\" They are so fundamental to the existence\r\nof personality that their insecurity or infringement\r\nis a direct menace to the social welfare. The struggle\r\nfor human liberty and human responsibility has accordingly\r\nbeen more acute at this than at any other point.\r\nRoughly speaking, the history of personal liberty is the\r\nhistory of the efforts which have safeguarded the security\r\nof life and property and which have emancipated bodily\r\nmovement from subjection to the will of others.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eUnsolved Problems: War and Punishment.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;While\r\nhistory marks great advance, especially in the last four\r\nor five centuries, as to the negative aspect of freedom or\r\nrelease from direct and overt tyranny, much remains undone\r\non the positive side. It is at this point of free\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_443\" id=\"Page_443\"\u003e[Pg 443]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nphysical control that all conflicts of rights concentrate\r\nthemselves. While the limitation by war of the right\r\nto life may be cited as evidence for the fact that even this\r\nright is not absolute but is socially conditioned, yet that\r\nkind of correspondence between individual activity and social\r\nwell-being which exacts exposure to destruction as its\r\nmeasure, is too suggestive of the tribal morality in which\r\nthe savage shows his social nature by participation in\r\na blood feud, to be satisfactory. Social organization is\r\nclearly defective when its constituent portions are so\r\nset at odds with one another as to demand from individuals\r\ntheir death as their best service to the community. While\r\none may cite capital punishment to enforce, as if in large\r\ntype, the fact that the individual holds even his right to\r\nlife subject to the social welfare, the moral works the other\r\nway to underline the failure of society to socialize its\r\nmembers, and its tendency to put undesirable results out\r\nof sight and mind rather than to face responsibility for\r\ncauses. The same limitation is seen in methods of imprisonment,\r\nwhich, while supposed to be protective rather\r\nthan vindictive, recognize only in a few and sporadic cases\r\nthat the sole sure protection of society is through education\r\nand correction of individual character, not by mere\r\nphysical isolation under harsh conditions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSecurity of Life.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In civilized countries the blood feud,\r\ninfanticide, putting to death the economically useless and\r\nthe aged, have been abolished. Legalized slavery, serfdom,\r\nthe subjection of the rights of wife and child to the will\r\nof husband and father, have been done away with. But\r\nmany modern industries are conducted with more reference\r\nto financial gain than to life, and the annual roll of\r\nkilled, injured, and diseased in factory and railway practically\r\nequals the list of dead and wounded in a modern\r\nwar.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_200_200\" id=\"FNanchor_200_200\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_200_200\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[200]\u003c/a\u003e Most of these accidents are preventable. The will\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_444\" id=\"Page_444\"\u003e[Pg 444]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eingness\r\nof parents on one side and of employers on the\r\nother, conjoined with the indifference of the general public,\r\nmakes child-labor an effective substitute for exposure of\r\nchildren and other methods of infanticide practiced by\r\nsavage tribes. Agitation for old-age pensions shows that\r\nfaithful service to society for a lifetime is still inadequate\r\nto secure a prosperous old age.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCharity and Poverty.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Society provides assistance and\r\nremedial measures, poorhouses, asylums, hospitals. The\r\nexceedingly poor are a public charge, supported by taxes\r\nas well as by alms. Individuals are not supposed to die\r\nfrom starvation nor to suffer without any relief or assistance\r\nfrom physical defects and disease. So far, there is\r\ngrowth in positive provision for the right to live. But the\r\nvery necessity for such extensive remedial measures shows\r\nserious defects farther back. It raises the question of social\r\nresponsibility for the causes of such wholesale poverty\r\nand widespread misery. Taken in conjunction with the\r\nidleness and display of the congested rich, it raises the\r\nquestion how far we are advanced beyond barbarism in\r\nmaking organic provision for an effective, as distinct\r\nfrom formal, right to life and movement. It is hard to\r\nsay whether the heavier indictment lies in the fact that\r\nso many shirk their share of the necessary social labor\r\nand toil, or in the fact that so many who are willing to\r\nwork are unable to do so, without meeting recurrent crises\r\nof unemployment, and except under conditions of hours,\r\nhygiene, compensation, and home conditions which reduce\r\nto a low level the positive rights of life. The social order\r\nprotects the property of those who have it; but, although\r\nhistoric conditions have put the control of the machinery\r\nof production in the hands of a comparatively few per\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_445\" id=\"Page_445\"\u003e[Pg 445]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003esons,\r\nsociety takes little heed to see that great masses of\r\nmen get even that little property which is requisite to\r\nsecure assured, permanent, and properly stimulating conditions\r\nof life. Until there is secured to and imposed upon\r\nall members of society the right and the duty of work in\r\nsocially serviceable occupations, with due return in social\r\ngoods, rights to life and free movement will hardly advance\r\nmuch beyond their present largely nominal state.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eII. Rights to Mental Activity.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;These rights of course\r\nare closely bound up with rights to physical well-being\r\nand activity. The latter would have no meaning were it\r\nnot that they subserve purposes and affections; while the\r\nlife of mind is torpid or remote, dull or abstract, save as\r\nit gets impact in physical conditions and directs them.\r\nThose who hold that the limitations of physical conditions\r\nhave no \u003ci\u003emoral\u003c/i\u003e signification, and that their improvement\r\nbrings at most an increase of more or less materialistic\r\ncomfort, not a moral advance, fail to note that the development\r\nof concrete purposes and desires is dependent upon\r\nso-called outward conditions. These conditions affect the\r\nexecution of purposes and wants; and this influence reacts\r\nto determine the further arrest or growth of needs and\r\nresolutions. The sharp and unjustifiable antithesis of\r\nspiritual and material in the current conception of moral\r\naction leads many well-intentioned people to be callous and\r\nindifferent to the moral issues involved in physical and economic\r\nprogress. Long hours of excessive physical labor,\r\njoined with unwholesome conditions of residence and work,\r\nrestrict the growth of mental activity, while idleness and\r\nexcess of physical possession and control pervert mind, as\r\nsurely as these causes modify the outer and overt acts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFreedom of Thought and Affection.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The fundamental\r\nforms of the right to mental life are liberty of judgment\r\nand sympathy. The struggle for spiritual liberty has been\r\nas prolonged and arduous as that for physical freedom.\r\nDistrust of intelligence and of love as factors in concrete\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_446\" id=\"Page_446\"\u003e[Pg 446]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nindividuals has been strong even in those who have proclaimed\r\nmost vigorously their devotion to them as abstract\r\nprinciples. Disbelief in the integrity of mind, assertion\r\nthat the divine principles of thought and love are perverted\r\nand corrupt in the individual, have kept spiritual authority\r\nand prestige in the hands of the few, just as other\r\ncauses have made material possessions the monopoly of\r\na small class. The resulting restriction of knowledge and\r\nof the tools of inquiry have kept the masses where their\r\nblindness and dullness might be employed as further evidence\r\nof their natural unfitness for personal illumination\r\nby the light of truth and for free direction of the energy\r\nof moral warmth.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_201_201\" id=\"FNanchor_201_201\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_201_201\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[201]\u003c/a\u003e Gradually, however, free speech, freedom\r\nof communication and intercourse, of public assemblies,\r\nliberty of the press and circulation of ideas, freedom\r\nof religious and intellectual conviction (commonly called\r\nfreedom of conscience), of worship, and to some extent the\r\nright to education, to spiritual nurture, have been achieved.\r\nIn the degree the individual has won these liberties, the\r\nsocial order has obtained its chief safeguard against explosive\r\nchange and intermittent blind action and reaction,\r\nand has got hold of the method of graduated and steady\r\nreconstruction. Looked at as a mere expedient, liberty\r\nof thought and expression is the most successful device\r\never hit upon for reconciling tranquillity with progress,\r\nso that peace is not sacrificed to reform nor improvement\r\nto stagnant conservatism.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_202_202\" id=\"FNanchor_202_202\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_202_202\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[202]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRight and Duty of Education.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It is through education\r\nin its broadest sense that the right of thought and\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_447\" id=\"Page_447\"\u003e[Pg 447]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsympathy become effective. The final value of all institutions\r\nis their educational influence; they are measured\r\nmorally by the occasions they afford and the guidance\r\nthey supply for the exercise of foresight, judgment,\r\nseriousness of consideration, and depth of regard. The\r\nfamily, the school, the church, art, especially (to-day)\r\nliterature, nurture the affections and imagination, while\r\nschools impart information and inculcate skill in various\r\nforms of intellectual technique. In the last one hundred\r\nyears, the right of each individual to spiritual self-development\r\nand self-possession, and the interest of society\r\nas a whole in seeing that each of its members has an\r\nopportunity for education, have been recognized in publicly\r\nmaintained schools with their ladder from kindergarten\r\nthrough the college to the engineering and\r\nprofessional school. Men and women have had put at\r\ntheir disposal the materials and tools of judgment; have\r\nhad opened to them the wide avenues of science, history,\r\nand art that lead into the larger world\u0027s culture. To some\r\nextent negative exemption from arbitrary restriction\r\nupon belief and thought has been developed into positive\r\ncapacities of intelligence and sentiment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRestrictions from Inadequate Economic Conditions.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Freedom\r\nof thought in a developed constructive form is,\r\nhowever, next to impossible for the masses of men so long\r\nas their economic conditions are precarious, and their\r\nmain problem is to keep the wolf from their doors. Lack\r\nof time, hardening of susceptibility, blind preoccupation\r\nwith the machinery of highly specialized industries, the\r\ncombined apathy and worry consequent upon a life maintained\r\njust above the level of subsistence, are unfavorable\r\nto intellectual and emotional culture. Intellectual cowardice,\r\ndue to apathy, laziness, and vague apprehension, takes\r\nthe place of despotism as a limitation upon freedom of\r\nthought and speech. Uncertainty as to security of position,\r\nthe welfare of a dependent family, close men\u0027s mouths\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_448\" id=\"Page_448\"\u003e[Pg 448]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfrom expressing their honest convictions, and blind their\r\nminds to clear perception of evil conditions. The instrumentalities\r\nof culture\u0026mdash;churches, newspapers, universities,\r\ntheatres\u0026mdash;themselves have economic necessities which tend\r\nto make them dependent upon those who can best supply\r\ntheir needs. The congestion of poverty on one side and\r\nof \"culture\" on the other is so great that, in the words\r\nof a distinguished economist, we are still questioning\r\n\"whether it is really impossible that all should start in\r\nthe world with a fair chance of leading a cultured life\r\nfree from the pains of poverty and the stagnating influences\r\nof a life of excessive mechanical toil.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_203_203\" id=\"FNanchor_203_203\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_203_203\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[203]\u003c/a\u003e We provide\r\nfree schools and pass compulsory education acts, but actively\r\nand passively we encourage conditions which limit\r\nthe mass of children to the bare rudiments of spiritual\r\nnurture.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRestriction of Educational Influences.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Spiritual resources\r\nare practically as much the possession of a special\r\nclass, in spite of educational advance, as are material\r\nresources. This fact reacts upon the chief educative\r\nagencies\u0026mdash;science, art, and religion. Knowledge in its\r\nideas, language, and appeals is forced into corners; it is\r\noverspecialized, technical, and esoteric because of its isolation.\r\nIts lack of intimate connection with social practice\r\nleads to an intense and elaborate over-training which\r\nincreases its own remoteness. Only when science and philosophy\r\nare one with literature, the art of successful communication\r\nand vivid intercourse, are they liberal in effect;\r\nand this implies a society which is already intellectually\r\nand emotionally nurtured and alive. Art itself, the embodiment\r\nof ideas in forms which are socially contagious,\r\nbecomes what it is so largely, a development of technical\r\nskill, and a badge of class differences. Religious emotion,\r\nthe quickening of ideas and affections by recognition of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_449\" id=\"Page_449\"\u003e[Pg 449]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntheir inexhaustible signification, is segregated into special\r\ncults, particular days, and peculiar exercises, and the\r\ncommon life is left relatively hard and barren.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn short, the limitations upon freedom both of the physical\r\nconditions and the mental values of life are at bottom\r\nexpressions of one and the same divorce of theory and\r\npractice,\u0026mdash;which makes theory remote, sterile, and technical,\r\nwhile practice remains narrow, harsh, and also illiberal.\r\nYet there is more cause for hope in that so much has been\r\naccomplished, than for despondency because mental power\r\nand service are still so limited and undeveloped. The intermixture\r\nand interaction of classes and nations are very\r\nrecent. Hence the opportunities for an effective circulation\r\nof sympathetic ideas and of reasonable emotions have\r\nonly newly come into existence. Education as a public\r\ninterest and care, applicable to all individuals, is hardly\r\nmore than a century old; while a conception of the richness\r\nand complexity of the ways in which it should\r\ntouch any one individual is hardly half a century old.\r\nAs society takes its educative functions more seriously and\r\ncomprehensively into account, there is every promise of\r\nmore rapid progress in the future than in the past. For\r\neducation is most effective when dealing with the immature,\r\nthose who have not yet acquired the hard and fixed directing\r\nforms of adult life; while, in order to be effectively\r\nemployed, it must select and propagate that which is\r\ncommon and hence typical in the social values that form\r\nits resources, leaving the eccentric, the partial, and exclusive\r\ngradually to dwindle. Upon some generous souls of\r\nthe eighteenth century there dawned the idea that the cause\r\nof the indefinite improvement of humanity and the cause\r\nof the little child are inseparably bound together.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eKant, \u003ci\u003ePhilosophy of Law\u003c/i\u003e, 1796 (trans. by Hastie, 1887); Fichte,\r\n\u003ci\u003eThe Science of Rights\u003c/i\u003e, 1798 (trans. by Kroeger, 1869); Rousseau,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_450\" id=\"Page_450\"\u003e[Pg 450]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eSocial Contract\u003c/i\u003e, 1762 (trans. by Tozer, 1893); Bonar, \u003ci\u003ePhilosophy and\r\nPolitical Economy\u003c/i\u003e, 1893; Stephen, \u003ci\u003eScience of Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, ch. iii. (on Social\r\nMotives); Caird, \u003ci\u003eSocial Philosophy of Comte\u003c/i\u003e, 1885; Sidgwick,\r\n\u003ci\u003ePractical Ethics\u003c/i\u003e, 1898, Essay on Public Morality; Sidgwick, \u003ci\u003eElements\r\nof Politics\u003c/i\u003e, 1891, ch. iv. on Individualism, vi. on Contract, x. on\r\nSocialistic Interferences, xiii. on Law and Morality; Maine, \u003ci\u003eAncient\r\nLaw\u003c/i\u003e, 1861, Pollock\u0027s ed., 1906, chs. iii. and iv. on law of nature and\r\nequity; Stephen, \u003ci\u003eEssays in Political and Moral Philosophy\u003c/i\u003e, 1888;\r\nRickaby, \u003ci\u003ePolitical and Moral Essays\u003c/i\u003e, 1902; Hobhouse, \u003ci\u003eMorals in\r\nEvolution\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II., ch. vii. (on the general relation of the social\r\nand the moral). On the development of rights to life, limb, and freedom\r\nof movement, see Westermarck, chs. xiv.-xxii., and Sumner,\r\n\u003ci\u003eFolkways\u003c/i\u003e, chs. vi., vii., and viii.; Hobhouse, Vol. I., ch. vii. (on\r\nslavery); Spencer, \u003ci\u003eEthics\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II., Part IV. For charity, see Loch\r\non Charity and Charities, \u003ci\u003eEncyclop\u0026aelig;dia Britannica\u003c/i\u003e; Uhlhorn, \u003ci\u003eChristian\r\nCharity in the Ancient Church\u003c/i\u003e; L\u0027Allemand, \u003ci\u003eHistoire de la\r\nCharit\u0026eacute;\u003c/i\u003e; Nicholl, \u003ci\u003eHistory of the English Poor Law\u003c/i\u003e, 2 vols., 1898.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_196_196\" id=\"Footnote_196_196\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_196_196\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[196]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Vol. I., pp. 367-368, italics not in original.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_197_197\" id=\"Footnote_197_197\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_197_197\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[197]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e P. 262 of \u003ci\u003eProlegomena to Ethics\u003c/i\u003e; see chs. iii. and iv. of Book III.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_198_198\" id=\"Footnote_198_198\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_198_198\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[198]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Alexander, \u003ci\u003eMoral Order and Progress\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 384-898.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_199_199\" id=\"Footnote_199_199\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_199_199\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[199]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This does not of course exclude change and reform. It means\r\nthat, so far as a society is organized, these changes themselves occur\r\nin regular and authorized ways.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_200_200\" id=\"Footnote_200_200\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_200_200\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[200]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It is stated, upon good authority, that a street railway system\r\nin a large American city declined to adopt an improved fender, which\r\nmade it practically impossible to kill persons, because the annual cost\r\nwould be $5,000 more than the existing expense for damages. This\r\nsame system declined to adopt improved brakes which would reduce\r\naccidents to life and limb; and it was discovered that one of its\r\ndirectors was largely interested in the manufacture of the old brakes.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_201_201\" id=\"Footnote_201_201\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_201_201\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[201]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Said Emerson: \"If a man is sick, is unable, is mean-spirited\r\nand odious, it is because there is so much of his nature which is unlawfully\r\nwithholden from him.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_202_202\" id=\"Footnote_202_202\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_202_202\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[202]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Recent suppression by the police in the larger American cities\r\nof public meetings called to discuss unemployment or other matters\r\ndeemed by some dangerous to vested interests, shows that the value\r\nof free speech as a \"safety-valve\" has not even yet been thoroughly\r\nlearned. It also shows how the victories of freedom in the past\r\nhave to be fought and won over again under new conditions, if they\r\nare to be kept alive.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_203_203\" id=\"Footnote_203_203\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_203_203\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[203]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Marshall, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Economics\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_451\" id=\"Page_451\"\u003e[Pg 451]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER XXI\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nCIVIL SOCIETY AND THE POLITICAL STATE\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have been considering responsible freedom as it\r\ncenters in and affects individuals in their distinctive\r\ncapacities. It implies a public order which guarantees,\r\ndefines, and enforces rights and obligations. This public\r\norder has a twofold relation to rights and duties: (1)\r\nAs the social counterpart of their exercise by individuals,\r\nit constitutes \u003ci\u003eCivil Society\u003c/i\u003e. It represents those forms of\r\nassociated life which are orderly and authorized, because\r\nconstituted by individuals in the exercise of their rights,\r\ntogether with those special forms which protect and insure\r\nthem. Families, clubs, guilds, unions, corporations come\r\nunder the first head; courts and civil administrative bodies,\r\nlike public railway and insurance commissions, etc., come\r\nunder the second. (2) The public order also fixes the\r\nfundamental terms and conditions on which at any given\r\ntime rights are exercised and remedies secured; it is organized\r\nfor the purpose of defining the basic methods of\r\nexercising the activities of its constituent elements, individual\r\nand corporate. In this aspect it is the \u003ci\u003eState\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 1. CIVIL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEvery act brings the agent who performs it into association\r\nwith others, whether he so intends or not. His act\r\ntakes effect in an organized world of action; in social\r\narrangement and institutions. So far as such combinations\r\nof individuals are recurrent or stable, their nature\r\nand operations are definitely formulated and definitely\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_452\" id=\"Page_452\"\u003e[Pg 452]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nenforceable. Partnerships, clubs, corporations, guilds,\r\nfamilies are such stable unions, with their definite spheres\r\nof action. Buying and selling, teaching and learning, producing\r\nand consuming, are recurrent activities whose legitimate\r\nmethods get prescribed. These specific provinces and\r\nmethods of action are defined in Civil Rights. They express\r\nthe guaranteed and regular ways in which an individual,\r\nthrough action, voluntarily enters into association or combination\r\nwith others for the sake of a common end. They\r\ndiffer from political rights and obligations in that the latter\r\nconcern modes of social organization which are so fundamental\r\nthat they are not left to the voluntary choice and purpose\r\nof an individual. As a social being, he must have political\r\nrelationships, must be subject to law, pay taxes, etc.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. Contract Rights.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Modes of association are so numerous\r\nand variable that we can only select those aspects\r\nof civil rights which are morally most significant. We\r\nshall discriminate them according as they have to do (1)\r\nwith the more temporary and casual combinations of individuals,\r\nfor limited and explicit purposes; and (2) with\r\nmore permanent, inclusive, and hence less definable ends;\r\nand (3) with the special institutions which exist for guaranteeing\r\nindividuals the enjoyment of their rights and\r\nproviding remedies if these are infringed upon. (1)\r\nContract rights. Rights of the first type are rights resulting\r\nfrom express or implied agreements of certain\r\nagents to do or refrain from doing specific acts, involving\r\nexchange of services or goods to the mutual benefit of both\r\nparties in the transaction. Every bargain entered into,\r\nevery loaf of bread one buys or paper of pins one sells,\r\ninvolves an implied and explicit contract. A genuinely\r\nfree agreement or contract means (i.) that each party\r\nto the transaction secures the benefit he wants; (ii.)\r\nthat the two parties are brought into co\u0026ouml;perative or\r\nmutually helpful relations; and that (iii.) the vast, vague,\r\ncomplex business of conducting social life is broken up\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_453\" id=\"Page_453\"\u003e[Pg 453]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninto a multitude of specific acts to be performed and of\r\nspecific goods to be delivered, at definite times and definite\r\nplaces. Hence it is hardly surprising that one school of\r\nsocial moralists has found in the conception of free contract\r\nits social ideal. Every individual concerned assumes\r\nobligations which it is to his interest to perform so that\r\nthe performance is voluntary, not coerced; while, at the\r\nsame time, some other person is engaged to serve him in\r\nsome way. The limitations of the contract idea will concern\r\nus later.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. The Permanent Voluntary Associations.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Partnerships,\r\nlimited liability corporations, guilds, trades\r\nunions, churches, schools, clubs, are more permanent and\r\ncomprehensive associations, involving more far-reaching\r\nrights and obligations. Societies organized for conversation\r\nand sociability or conviviality, \"corporations not for\r\nprofit,\" but for mutual enjoyment or for benevolent ends,\r\ncome under the same head. Most significant are the associations\r\nwhich, while entered only voluntarily and having\r\ntherefore a basis in contract, are for generic ends. Thus\r\nthey are permanent, and cover much more than can be\r\nwritten in the contract. Marriage, in modern society, is\r\nentered into by contract; but married life is not narrowed\r\nto the exchange of specific services at specific times. It is\r\na union for mutual economic and spiritual goods which\r\nare coextensive with all the interests of the parties. In\r\nits connection with the generation and rearing of children,\r\nit is a fundamental means of guarding all social\r\ninterests and of directing their progress. Schools, colleges,\r\nchurches, federations of labor, organizations of\r\nemployers, and of both together, represent other forms of\r\npermanent voluntary organizations which may have the\r\nmost far-reaching influence both upon those directly concerned\r\nand upon society at large.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. Right to Use of Courts.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;All civil rights get their\r\nfinal application and test in the right to have conflicting\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_454\" id=\"Page_454\"\u003e[Pg 454]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nrights defined and infringed rights remedied by appeal\r\nto a public authority having general and final jurisdiction.\r\n\"The right to sue and be sued\" may seem too legal\r\nand external a matter to be worthy of much note in an\r\nethical treatise; but it represents the culmination of an\r\nage-long experimentation with the problem of reconciling\r\nindividual freedom and public order. No civil right is\r\neffective unless it carries with it a statement of a method\r\nof enforcement and, if necessary, of redress and remedy.\r\nOtherwise it is a mere name. Moreover, conflicts of civil\r\nrights are bound to occur even when there is good faith\r\non the part of all concerned, just because new situations\r\narise. Unless there is a way of defining the respective\r\nrights of each party in the new situation, each will arbitrarily\r\nand yet in good faith insist upon asserting his\r\nrights on the old basis: private war results. A new order\r\nis not achieved and the one already attained is threatened\r\nor disrupted. The value of rights to the use of courts\r\nresides, then, to a comparatively small degree, in the specific\r\ncases of deliberate wrong which are settled. What is more\r\nimportant is that men get instruction as to the proper scope\r\nand limits of their activities, through the provision of an\r\neffective mechanism for amicable settlement of disputes\r\nin those cases in which rights are vague and ambiguous\r\nbecause the situations are novel.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eClasses of Wrongs and Remedies.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Infringements\r\nupon rights, such as murder, theft, arson, forgery, imply\r\na character which is distinctly anti-social in its bent. The\r\nwrong, although done to one, is an expression of a disposition\r\nwhich is dangerous to all. Such a wrong is a crime;\r\nit is a matter for the direct jurisdiction of public authority.\r\nIt is the business of all to co\u0026ouml;perate in giving evidence,\r\nand it may render one a criminal accomplice to\r\nconceal or suppress evidence, just as it is \"compounding\r\na felony\" for the wronged individual to settle the wrong\r\ndone him by arranging privately for compensation. The\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_455\" id=\"Page_455\"\u003e[Pg 455]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npenalty in such cases is generally personal; imprisonment\r\nor at least a heavy fine. The violation may, however, be\r\nof the nature of a wrong or \"tort,\" rather than of a crime;\r\nit may indicate a disposition indifferent to social interests\r\nor neglectful of them rather than one actively hostile to\r\nthem. Such acts as libels, trespasses upon the land of\r\nanother, are illustrations. In such cases, the machinery of\r\njustice is put in motion by the injured individual, not\r\nby the commonwealth. This does not mean that society\r\nas a whole has no interest in the matter; but that under\r\ncertain circumstances encouraging individuals to look out\r\nfor their own rights and wrongs is socially more important\r\nthan getting certain wrongs remedied irrespective of\r\nwhether men stand up for their own rights or not. Then\r\nagain, there are civil disputes which indicate neither a\r\ncriminal nor a harmful disposition, but rather uncertainty\r\nas to what the law really is, leading to disputes\r\nabout rights\u0026mdash;interpretations of a contract, express or\r\nimplied. Here the interest of society is to provide a\r\nmethod of settlement which will hinder the growth of ill\r\nwill and private retaliation; and which also will provide\r\nprecedents and principles that will lessen uncertainty and\r\nconflict in like cases in the future.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePeace and tranquillity are not merely the absence of\r\nopen friction and disorder. They mean specific, easily-known,\r\nand generally recognized principles which determine\r\nthe province and limits of the legitimate activity\r\nof every person. Publicity, standards, rules of procedure,\r\nremedies acknowledged in common, are their essence. \u003ci\u003eRes\r\npublica\u003c/i\u003e, the common concern, remains vague and latent\r\ntill defined by impartial, disinterested social organs. Then\r\nit is expressed in regular and guaranteed modes of activity.\r\nIn the pregnant phrase of Aristotle, the administration\r\nof justice is also its determination: that is, its\r\ndiscovery and promulgation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_456\" id=\"Page_456\"\u003e[Pg 456]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 2. DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eContrast of Primitive with Present Justice.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The significance\r\nof the accomplishments and the defects of the\r\npresent administration of law may be brought out by a\r\nsketch of its contrast with primitive methods. In savage\r\nand barbarian society, on account of the solidarity of the\r\nkin-group, any member of the group is likely to be attacked\r\nfor the offense of any other (see p. 28). He may\r\nnot have participated in the act, or have had complicity\r\nin planning it. His guilt is that the same blood runs\r\nin his veins.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_204_204\" id=\"FNanchor_204_204\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_204_204\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[204]\u003c/a\u003e The punitive attack, moreover, is made\r\ndirectly and promiscuously by the injured man and by\r\nhis blood-relatives; it is made in the heat of passion or in\r\nthe vengeance of stealth as custom may decree. Says\r\nHearn, the state \"did not interfere in the private quarrels\r\nof its citizens. Every man took care of his own\r\nproperty and his own household, and every hand guarded\r\nits own head. If any injury were done to any person,\r\nhe retaliated, or made reprisals, or otherwise sought\r\nredress, as custom prescribed.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_205_205\" id=\"FNanchor_205_205\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_205_205\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[205]\u003c/a\u003e The reprisal may itself\r\nhave called for another, and the blood-feud was on. In\r\nany case, the state of affairs was one literally, not metaphorically,\r\ndescribed as \"private war.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChanges Now Effected.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This state of affairs has been\r\nsuperseded by one in which a third, a public and impartial\r\nauthority (1) takes cognizance of offenses against another\r\nindividual as offenses against the commonwealth;\r\n(2) apprehends the supposed offender; (3) determines\r\nand applies an objective standard of judgment, the same\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_457\" id=\"Page_457\"\u003e[Pg 457]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor all, the law; (4) tries the supposed offender according\r\nto rules of procedure, including rules of evidence or\r\nproof, which are also publicly promulgated; and (5)\r\ntakes upon itself the punishment of the offender, if found\r\nguilty. The history of this change, important and interesting\r\nas it is, does not belong here. We are concerned\r\nhere only with the relation of public authority, public\r\nlaw, and public activity to the development of the freedom\r\nof the individual on one side and of his responsibility\r\non the other.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_206_206\" id=\"FNanchor_206_206\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_206_206\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[206]\u003c/a\u003e We shall point out in a number of particulars\r\nthat the evolution of freedom and responsibility in\r\nindividuals has coincided with the evolution of a public\r\nand impartial authority.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. Good and Evil as Quasi-Physical.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;There are two\r\nalternatives in the judgment of good and evil. (1) They\r\nmay be regarded as having \u003ci\u003emoral\u003c/i\u003e significance, that is,\r\nas having a voluntary basis and origin. (2) Or they may\r\nbe considered as substantial properties of things, as a sort\r\nof essence diffused through them, or as a kind of force\r\nresident in them, in virtue of which persons and things are\r\nnoxious or helpful, malevolent or kindly. Savage tribes,\r\nfor instance, cannot conceive either sickness or death as\r\nnatural evils; they are attributed to the malicious magic\r\nof an enemy. Similarly the evil which follows from the\r\nacts of a man is treated as a sign of some metaphysical\r\ntendency inherent in him. Some men bring bad luck upon\r\neverything and everybody they have anything to do with.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_458\" id=\"Page_458\"\u003e[Pg 458]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nA curse is on their doings. No distinction is made between\r\nsuch evils and those which flow from intention and\r\ncharacter. The notion of the moral or voluntary nature\r\nof good and evil hardly obtains. The quasi-physical view,\r\nbordering upon the magical, prevails. The result is that\r\nevil is thought of as a contagious matter, transmitted from\r\ngeneration to generation, from class or person to class or\r\nperson; and as something to be got rid of, if at all, by\r\ndevices which are equally physical. Natural evils, plagues,\r\ndefeats, earthquakes, etc., \u003ci\u003eare treated as quasi-moral, while\r\nmoral evils are treated as more than half physical\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nSins are infectious diseases, and natural diseases are\r\nmalicious interferences of a human or divine enemy.\r\nMorals are materialized, and nature is moralized or\r\ndemoralized.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_207_207\" id=\"FNanchor_207_207\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_207_207\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[207]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow it is hardly necessary to point out the effect of\r\nsuch conceptions in restricting the freedom and responsibility\r\nof the individual person. Man is hemmed in as to\r\nthought and action on all sides by all kinds of mysterious\r\nforces working in unforeseeable ways. This is true\r\nenough in his best estate. When to this limitation is added\r\na direction of energy into magical channels, away from\r\nthose controllable sources of evil which reside in human disposition,\r\nthe amount of effective freedom possible is slight.\r\nThis same misplacing of liability holds men accountable\r\nfor acts they have not committed, because some magic\r\ntendency for evil is imputed to them. Famine, pestilence,\r\ndefeat in war are evils to be remedied by sacrifice of goods\r\nor persons or by ritualistic ceremonies; while the reme\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_459\" id=\"Page_459\"\u003e[Pg 459]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ediable\r\ncauses of harm in human ignorance and negligence\r\ngo without attention.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Accident and Intention.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Under such circumstances,\r\nlittle distinction can be made between the good and evil\r\nwhich an individual \u003ci\u003emeant\u003c/i\u003e to do and that which he \u003ci\u003ehappened\u003c/i\u003e\r\nto do. The working presumption of society, up to\r\na comparatively late stage of its history, was that every\r\nharmful consequence is an evidence of evil disposition\r\nin those who were in any way concerned. This limitation\r\nof freedom was accompanied by a counterpart limitation\r\nof responsibility. Where no harm actually resulted, there\r\nwas thought to be no harmful intent. Animals and even\r\ninanimate objects which do injury are baleful things and\r\ncome under disapprobation and penalty. Even in civilized\r\nAthens there was a survival of the practice of holding\r\ninanimate things liable. If a tree fell on a man and killed\r\nhim, the tree was to be brought to trial, and after condemnation\r\ncast beyond the civic borders, i.e., outlawed.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_208_208\" id=\"FNanchor_208_208\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_208_208\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[208]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nAnyhow, the owner of an offending article was almost\r\nalways penalized. Westermarck,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_209_209\" id=\"FNanchor_209_209\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_209_209\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[209]\u003c/a\u003e with reference to the\r\nguilt of animals, cites an instance, dated in 1457, \"when\r\na sow and her six young ones were tried on a charge of\r\ntheir having murdered and partly eaten a child; the sow,\r\nbeing found guilty, was condemned to death, the young\r\npigs were acquitted on account of their youth and the\r\nbad example of their mother.\" When sticks, stones, and\r\nanimals are held accountable for evil results, there is little\r\nchance of discriminating intent and accident or misadventure\r\nin the case of personal agents. \"The devil himself\r\nknoweth not the intent, the \u0027thought\u0027 of man\" was\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_460\" id=\"Page_460\"\u003e[Pg 460]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe medi\u0026aelig;val maxim; all that can be certain is that harm\r\nhas come and the one who caused it must suffer; or else\r\nno overt harm has come and no one is to blame.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_210_210\" id=\"FNanchor_210_210\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_210_210\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[210]\u003c/a\u003e Harm\r\nhas been done and any one concerned, even remotely, in\r\nthe injurious situation, is \u003ci\u003eex officio\u003c/i\u003e guilty; it will not do\r\nto take chances. The remoteness of an implication which\r\nmay involve liability is seen in the condition of English\r\nlaw in the thirteenth century: \"At your request I accompany\r\nyou when you are about your own affairs: my\r\nenemies fall upon and kill me: you must pay for my death.\r\nYou take me to see a wild-beast show, or that interesting\r\nspectacle a madman: beast or madman kills me; you must\r\npay. You hang up your sword; some one else knocks it\r\ndown so that it cuts me; you must pay.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_211_211\" id=\"FNanchor_211_211\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_211_211\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[211]\u003c/a\u003e Only gradually\r\ndid intent clearly evolve as the central element in an act,\r\nand thus lead to the idea of a voluntary or free act.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat the limitation upon the side of responsibility was\r\nequally great is obvious. If a man is held liable for what\r\nhe did not and could not foresee or desire, there is no\r\nground for his \u003ci\u003eholding himself\u003c/i\u003e responsible for anticipating\r\nthe consequences of his acts, and forming his\r\nplans according as he foresees. This comes out clearly\r\nin the obverse of what has just been said. If no harm\r\nresults from a willful attempt to do evil, the individual is\r\nnot blamed. He goes scot free. \"An attempt to commit\r\na crime is no crime.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_212_212\" id=\"FNanchor_212_212\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_212_212\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[212]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. Character and Circumstances.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Even in law, to say\r\nnothing of personal moral judgments, we now almost as a\r\nmatter of course take into account, in judging an agent\u0027s\r\nintent, both circumstances, and character as inferred from\r\npast behavior. We extend our view of consequences, tak\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_461\" id=\"Page_461\"\u003e[Pg 461]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eing\r\ninto account in judging the moral quality of a particular\r\ndeed, consequences its doer is \u003ci\u003ehabitually\u003c/i\u003e found to\r\neffect. We blame the individual less for a deed if we find it\r\ncontrary to his habitual course. We blame him more, if we\r\nfind he has a character given to that sort of thing. We\r\ntake into account, in short, the permanent attitude and\r\ndisposition of the agent. We also discriminate the conditions\r\nand consequences of a deed much more carefully.\r\nSelf-defense, protection of others or of property, come\r\nin as \"extenuating circumstances\"; the degree of provocation,\r\nthe presence of immediate impulsive fear or anger,\r\nas distinct from a definitely formed, long-cherished idea,\r\nare considered. The questions of first or of repeated\r\noffense, of prior criminality or good behavior, enter\r\nin. Questions of heredity, of early environment, of early\r\neducation and opportunity are being brought to-day into\r\naccount.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe are still very backward in this respect, both in personal\r\nand in public morals; in private judgment and in\r\nlegal procedure and penalty. Only recently have we, for\r\nexample, begun to treat juvenile delinquents in special\r\nways; and the effort to carry appropriate methods further\r\nmeets with strong opposition and the even stronger inertia\r\nof indifference. It is regarded by many good\r\npeople as lowering the bars of responsibility to consider\r\nearly training and opportunity, just as in its day it was\r\nso regarded to plead absence of intent in cases where evil\r\nhad actually resulted. It is not \"safe\" to let any one\r\noff from the rigor of the law. The serious barrier, now\r\nas earlier, is upon the scientific or intellectual side. There\r\nwas a time when it did not seem feasible to pass upon\r\nintent; it was hidden, known only to God. But we have\r\nnow devised ways, adequate in principle, though faulty\r\nin detail, to judge immediate intent; similarly, with the\r\ngrowth of anthropology, psychology, statistics, and the\r\nresources of publicity in social science, we shall in time\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_462\" id=\"Page_462\"\u003e[Pg 462]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfind it possible to consider the effects of heredity, early\r\nenvironment, and training upon character and so upon\r\nintent. We shall then regard present methods of judging\r\nintent to be almost as barbarous as we now consider the\r\nearlier disregard of accident and provocation. Above\r\nall we shall learn that increased, not relaxed responsibility,\r\ncomes with every increase of discrimination of causes lying\r\nin character and conditions.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_213_213\" id=\"FNanchor_213_213\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_213_213\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[213]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4. Intellectual Incapacity and Thoughtlessness.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;With\r\nincreasing recognition of character as the crucial element\r\nin voluntary action, we now take into account such matters\r\nas age, idiocy, and insanity as factors of judgment. But\r\nthis also has been a slow growth. If we take the one\r\nquestion of insanity, for example, in 1724 exculpation for\r\nharm resulting from a madman\u0027s acts required that the\r\nperson excused \"be a man that is totally deprived of\r\nhis understanding and memory, and doth not know what\r\nhe is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a\r\nwild beast.\" At the beginning of the nineteenth century,\r\nthe excuse was no longer that of being such a raving\r\nlunatic as is here implied; but of knowing right and wrong\r\nfrom each other \u003ci\u003ein the abstract\u003c/i\u003e. By a celebrated case in\r\n1843, the rule was changed, in English law, to knowledge\r\nof the difference between right and wrong in the\r\nparticular case. Further advance waits upon progress\r\nof science which will make it more possible to judge the\r\nspecific mental condition of the person acting; and thus\r\ndo away with the abuses of the present system which tend,\r\non the one hand, to encourage the pleading of insanity where\r\nnone may exist; and, on the other hand (by a rigid application\r\nof a technical rule), to condemn persons really irre\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_463\" id=\"Page_463\"\u003e[Pg 463]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003esponsible.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_214_214\" id=\"FNanchor_214_214\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_214_214\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[214]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nPopular judgment still inclines to impute clear\r\nand definite intention on the basis of results; and to ignore\r\nconditions of intellectual confusion and bewilderment, and\r\njustifies itself in its course on the ground that such is the\r\nonly \"safe\" course.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_215_215\" id=\"FNanchor_215_215\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_215_215\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[215]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eResponsibility for Thoughtlessness.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;But the release\r\nfrom responsibility for deeds in which the doer is intellectually\r\nincapacitated, is met on the other side by holding\r\nindividuals of normal mental constitution responsible for\r\nsome consequences which were not thought of at all. We\r\neven hold men accountable for \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e thinking to do certain\r\nacts. The former are acts of heedlessness or carelessness,\r\nas when a mason on top of a building throws rubbish on\r\nto a street below which injures some one, without any\r\nthought on his part of this result, much less any deliberate\r\ndesire to effect it. The latter are acts of negligence, as\r\nwhen, say, an engineer fails to note a certain signal. In\r\nsuch cases even when no harm results, we now hold the\r\nagent morally culpable. Similarly we blame children for\r\n\u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e thinking of the consequences of their acts; we blame\r\nthem for \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e thinking to do certain things at a certain\r\ntime\u0026mdash;to come home when told, and so on. This is not\r\nmerely a matter of judgment by others. The more conscientious\r\na person is, the more occasions he finds to judge\r\n\u003ci\u003ehimself\u003c/i\u003e with respect to results which \u003ci\u003ehappened because he\r\ndid not think or deliberate or foresee at all\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;provided he\r\nhas reason to believe he would have thought of the harmful\r\nresults if he had been of a different character. Because\r\nwe were absorbed in something else we did not think, and\r\nwhile, in the abstract, this something else may have been\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_464\" id=\"Page_464\"\u003e[Pg 464]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nall right, in the concrete it may be proof of an unworthy\r\ncharacter. The very fact that we permitted ourselves to\r\nbecome so absorbed that the thought of an engagement,\r\nor of an opportunity to help some friend whom we knew\r\nto be in need, did not occur to us, is evidence of a selfish,\r\ni.e., inconsiderate, character.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe case seems paradoxical and is crucial. Others\r\nhold us responsible because we \u003ci\u003ewere\u003c/i\u003e irresponsible in action\r\nand \u003ci\u003ein order\u003c/i\u003e that we may \u003ci\u003ebecome\u003c/i\u003e responsible. We\r\nblame ourselves precisely because we discover that an\r\nunconscious preference for a private or exclusive good\r\nled us to be careless of the good of others. The effect\r\n(if the regret is genuine, not simulated) is to develop\r\na habit of greater thoughtfulness in the future. Less and\r\nless do men accept for others or for themselves ignorance\r\nas an excuse for bad consequences, when the ignorance\r\nitself flows from character. Our chief moral business\r\nis to become acquainted with consequences. Our moral\r\ncharacter surely does not depend in this case, then, upon\r\nthe fact that we had alternatives clearly in mind and chose\r\nthe worse; the difficulty is that we had only one alternative\r\nin mind and did not \u003ci\u003econsciously\u003c/i\u003e choose at all. Our\r\nfreedom lies in the \u003ci\u003ecapacity\u003c/i\u003e to alter our mode of action,\r\nthrough having our ignorance enlightened by being held\r\nfor the neglected consequences when brought to accountability\r\nby others, or by holding ourselves accountable in subsequent\r\nreflection. Cases of careless acts and of acts\r\nomitted through negligence are thus crucial for any theory\r\nof freedom and responsibility. Either we are all wrong in\r\nblaming ourselves or others in such cases, because there is\r\nno free or voluntary element in them; or else there is\r\nresponsibility when deliberate comparison of alternatives\r\nand conscious preference are absent. There is responsibility\r\nfor the absence of deliberation. Nature does not\r\nforbear to attach consequences to acts because of the\r\nignorance of the one who does the deed. The evil results\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_465\" id=\"Page_465\"\u003e[Pg 465]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat follow in the wake of a thoughtless act are precisely\r\nthe reminders that make one take thought the next time.\r\nSimilarly, to be held liable by others or to take ourselves to\r\ntask for forgetfulness, inconsiderateness, and negligence,\r\nis the way in which to build up conscientious foresight and\r\ndeliberate choice. The increased complexity and danger\r\nof modern industrial activity, the menace of electric power,\r\nof high explosives, of railway trains and trolley cars, of\r\npowerful machines, have done much to quicken recognition\r\nthat negligence may be criminal, and to reawaken\r\nthe conviction of Greek thought that thoughtless ignorance,\r\nwhere knowledge is possible, is the worst of evils.\r\nThe increased interdependence of men, through travel\r\nand transportation, collective methods of production, and\r\ncrowding of population in cities, has widened the area\r\nof the harm likely to result from inconsiderate action, and\r\nhas strengthened the belief that adequate thoughtfulness is\r\npossible only where there is sympathetic interest in others.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e5. The Conflict of Form and Substance.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The technical\r\nforms of procedure concerned in establishing and remedying\r\nrights were, for long ages, more important than\r\nthe substantial ends by which alone the forms may be\r\njustified. Any effort for a remedy was nullified if the\r\nminuti\u0026aelig; of complicated formul\u0026aelig; (largely magical or ritualistic\r\nin their origin) were deviated from. Almost any\r\nobligation might be escaped by some quirk or turn in some\r\nslight phrase or motion, without which no agreement was\r\nbinding, so sacramental was the importance of the very\r\nwords. In early days the rigidity of these semi-ritualistic\r\nperformances doubtless served to check arbitrary and\r\nreckless acts, and to impress the sense of the value of a\r\nstandard.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_216_216\" id=\"FNanchor_216_216\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_216_216\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[216]\u003c/a\u003e But they survived as \"rudimentary organs\"\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_466\" id=\"Page_466\"\u003e[Pg 466]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlong after they had done their work in this respect; and\r\nafter they had been eliminated from legal procedure they\r\nsurvived as habits of judging conduct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSurvivals of Spirit of Individualistic Litigation.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\nfact that the procedure of justice originated as methods\r\nof supplying impartial umpires for conflicts waged between\r\nindividuals, has had serious consequences. It has\r\nhad indeed the desirable consequence of quickening men\r\nto the perception of their rights and to their obligation as\r\nsocial members to maintain them intact. But it has also\r\nhad the undesirable result of limiting the function of the\r\npublic interest to the somewhat negative one of securing\r\nfair play between contentious individuals. The battle is\r\nnot now fought out with fists or spears or oaths or ordeals:\r\nbut it is largely a battle of wits and of technical resources\r\nbetween the opposite parties and their lawyers, with the\r\nState acting the part of a benevolently neutral umpire.\r\nThe ignorant, the poor, the foreign, and the \u003ci\u003emerely\u003c/i\u003e\r\nhonest are almost inevitably at a discount in this battle.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_217_217\" id=\"FNanchor_217_217\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_217_217\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[217]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nAnd, in any case, the technical aspect of justice, that is,\r\nthe question of proper forms gets out of true perspective.\r\nThe \"legally-minded\" man is likely to be one with whom\r\ntechnical precedents and rules are more important than\r\nthe goods to be achieved and the evils to be avoided. With\r\nincrease of publicity and scientific methods of determining\r\nand interpreting facts, and with a public and professional\r\ncriticism which is impartial and wise, we may anticipate\r\nthat the supremacy of the general good will be increasingly\r\nrecognized in cases of litigation, and that the courts,\r\nas organs of public justice, will take a more active and substantial\r\npart in the management of all legal controversies.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_218_218\" id=\"FNanchor_218_218\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_218_218\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[218]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_467\" id=\"Page_467\"\u003e[Pg 467]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLegal and Moral.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;But, at the best, definitions of rights\r\nand of remedial procedures only (1) lay down general, not\r\nindividual conditions, and (2), so far as they are strict,\r\nregister precedent and custom rather than anticipate the\r\nnovel and variable. They can state what shall not be\r\ndone. Except in special cases, they cannot state what\r\nshall be done, much less the spirit and disposition in which\r\nit shall be done. In their formulations, they present a sort\r\nof minimum limit of morality not to be overstepped by\r\nthose inclined to ill. They throw little light on the positive\r\ncapacities and responsibilities of those who are socially\r\nminded. They have a moral purpose: they free energy\r\nfrom the friction attendant upon vague, obscure, and\r\nuncertain situations, by enlightening men as to what they\r\nmay do and how they may do it. But the exaggeration\r\nof form at the expense of the substantial end and good,\r\nleads to misplaced emphasis and false perspective. The\r\nrules are treated as ends; they are employed not to get\r\ninsight into consequences, but as justifying, apart from\r\nconsequences, certain acts. The would-be conscientious\r\nagent is led into considering goodness as a matter of obeying\r\nrules, not of fulfilling ends. The average individual\r\nconceives he has satisfied the requirements of morality when\r\nhe has conformed to the average level of legal definition\r\nand prescription. Egoistic, self-seeking men regard their\r\nactions as sanctioned if they have \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e broken the laws; and\r\ndecide this question by success in evading penalties. The\r\nintelligence that should go to employing the spirit of laws\r\nto enlighten behavior is spent in ingenious inventions for\r\nobserving their letter. The \"respectable\" citizen of this\r\ntype is one of the unsocialized forces that social reformers\r\nfind among their most serious obstacles.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis identification of morality with the legal and jural\r\nleads to a reaction which is equally injurious: the complete\r\nseparation of the legal and the moral, the former\r\nconceived as merely \"outer,\" concerned entirely with acts,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_468\" id=\"Page_468\"\u003e[Pg 468]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnot at all with motive and character. The effect of this\r\ndivorce is perhaps more serious upon the moral than upon\r\nthe legal. The separation makes morals sentimental and\r\nwhimsical, or else transcendental and esoteric. It leads\r\nto neglect of the social and institutional realities which\r\nform a world of action as surely as natural objects and\r\nenergies form a physical world, and ends in the popular\r\nconception of morals as just a matter of \"goodness\"\r\n(the goody-goodiness) of individuals. One of the most\r\nfundamental of moral duties is that of making the legal\r\norder a more adequate expression of the common good.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSpecial Problems.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Civil Society thus imposes upon its\r\nmembers not only specific obligations, but it also imposes\r\nupon all who enjoy its benefits the supreme obligation of\r\nseeing that the civic order is itself intelligently just in\r\nits methods of procedure. The peculiar moral problems\r\nwhich men have to face as members of civil society change,\r\nof course, from time to time with change of conditions;\r\namong the more urgent of present problems, we may\r\nmention:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. Reform of Criminal Procedure.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The negative side\r\nof morality is never so important as the positive, because\r\nthe pathological cannot be as important as the physiological\r\nof which it is a disturbance and perversion. But\r\nno fair survey of our methods, either of locating criminality\r\nor of punishing it, can fail to note that they contain far\r\ntoo many survivals of barbarism. Compared with primitive\r\ntimes we have indeed won a precious conquest. Even as\r\nlate as 1813, a proposal to change the penalty for stealing\r\nfive shillings from death to transportation to a remote\r\ncolony, was defeated in England.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_219_219\" id=\"FNanchor_219_219\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_219_219\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[219]\u003c/a\u003e But we are likely in\r\nflattering ourselves upon the progress made to overlook\r\nthat which it remains to make. Our trials are technical\r\nrather than human: they assume that just about so much\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_469\" id=\"Page_469\"\u003e[Pg 469]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npersistent criminality must persist in any case. They\r\nendeavor, in rather routine and perfunctory ways, to label\r\nthis and that person as criminal in such and such degrees,\r\nor, by technical devices and resources, to acquit. In many\r\nAmerican states, distrust of government, inherited from\r\ndays of tyrannical monarchy or oligarchy, protects the\r\naccused in all sorts of ways. For fear the government\r\nwill unjustly infringe upon the liberty of the individual,\r\nthe latter is not only\u0026mdash;as is just\u0026mdash;regarded as innocent till\r\nproved guilty; but is provided with every possible technical\r\nadvantage in rules of evidence, postponements and appeals,\r\nadvantages backed up, in many cities, by association\r\nwith political bosses which gives him a corrupt \"pull.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand, there is as yet no general recognition\r\nof the possibility of an unbiased scientific investigation\r\ninto all the antecedents (hereditary and environmental) of\r\nevildoers; an investigation which would connect the wrong\r\ndone with the \u003ci\u003echaracter of the individual\u003c/i\u003e committing it, and\r\nnot merely with one of a number of technical degrees of\r\ncrime, laid down in the statute books in the abstract, without\r\nreference to particular characters and circumstances.\r\nThus while the evildoer has in one direction altogether\r\ntoo much of a chance to evade justice, he has in another\r\ndirection a chance at only technical, rather than at moral,\r\njustice\u0026mdash;justice as an individual human being. It is not\r\npossible to discuss here various methods which have been\r\nproposed for remedying these defects. But it is clearly\r\nthe business of the more thoughtful members of society\r\nto consider the evils seriously and to interest themselves\r\nactively in their reform. We need, above all, a change in\r\ntwo respects: (a) recognition of the possibilities of new\r\nmethods of judgment which the sciences of physiology,\r\npsychology, and sociology have brought about; and (b)\r\nsurrender of that feudal conception according to which\r\nmen are divided, as it were essentially, into two classes:\r\none the criminal and the other the meritorious. We need\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_470\" id=\"Page_470\"\u003e[Pg 470]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto consider the ways in which the pressure and the opportunities\r\nof environment and education, of poverty and comfortable\r\nliving, of extraneous suggestion and stimulation,\r\nmake the differences between one man and another; and\r\nto recognize how fundamentally one human nature is at\r\nbottom. Juvenile courts, probation officers, detention\r\nofficers, mark the beginnings of what is possible, but only\r\nthe beginnings. For the most part crime is still treated\r\nsordidly and by routine, except when, being sensational,\r\nit is the occasion for a great battle of wits between keen\r\nprosecuting attorney and clever \"criminal lawyer,\" with\r\nthe world through the newspapers watching the display.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Reform of Punishment.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Emerson\u0027s bitter words are\r\nstill too applicable. \"Our distrust is very expensive. The\r\nmoney we spend for courts and prisons is very ill laid out.\r\nWe make, by distrust, the thief and burglar and incendiary,\r\nand by our court and jail we keep him so.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_220_220\" id=\"FNanchor_220_220\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_220_220\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[220]\u003c/a\u003e Reformatories,\r\nwhose purpose is change of disposition, not\r\nmere penalization, have been founded; but there are still\r\nmany more prisons than reformatories. And, if it be\r\nargued that most criminals are so hardened in evil-doing\r\nthat reformatories are of no use, the answer is twofold.\r\nWe do not know, because we have never systematically\r\nand intelligently tried to find out; and, even if it were so,\r\nnothing is more illogical than to turn the unreformed criminal,\r\nat the end of a certain number of months or years,\r\nloose to prey again upon society. Either reform or else\r\npermanent segregation is the logical alternative. Indeterminate\r\nsentences, release on probation, discrimination of\r\nclasses of offenders, separation of the first and more or\r\nless accidental and immature offender from the old and\r\nexperienced hand, special matrons for women offenders,\r\nintroduction of education and industrial training into penitentiaries,\r\nthe finding of employment for those released\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_471\" id=\"Page_471\"\u003e[Pg 471]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u0026mdash;all\r\nmark improvements. They are, however, as yet inchoate.\r\nIntelligent members of society need to recognize\r\ntheir own responsibility for the promotion of such reforms\r\nand for the discovery of new ones.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. Increase of Administrative Efficiency.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In the last\r\none hundred years, society has rapidly grown in internal\r\ncomplexity. Commercial changes have brought about\r\nan intense concentration of population in cities; have\r\npromoted migratory travel and intercourse, with destruction\r\nof local ties; have developed world markets and collective\r\nbut impersonal (corporate) production and distribution.\r\nMany new problems have been created, while at\r\nthe same time many of the old agencies for maintaining\r\norder have been weakened or destroyed, especially such\r\nas were adapted to small groups with fixed habits. A\r\ngreat strain has thus been put upon the instrumentalities\r\nof justice. Pioneer conditions retarded in America the\r\ndevelopment of the problems incident upon industrial\r\nreconstruction. The possibility of moving on, of taking\r\nup new land, finding unutilized resources of forest and\r\nmine, the development of new professions, the growth of\r\npopulation with new needs to be met, stimulated and rewarded\r\nindividual enterprise. Under such circumstances\r\nthere could be no general demand for public agencies of\r\ninspection, supervision, and publicity. But the pioneer\r\ndays of America are practically ended. American cities\r\nand states find themselves confronted with the same problems\r\nof public health, poverty and unemployment, congested\r\npopulation, traffic and transportation, charitable\r\nrelief, tramps and vagabondage, and so forth, that have\r\ntroubled older countries.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe face these problems, moreover, with traditions which\r\nare averse to \"bureaucratic\" administration and public\r\n\"interference.\" Public regulation is regarded as a\r\n\"paternalistic\" survival, quite unsuited to a free and\r\nindependent people. It would be foolish, indeed, to over\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_472\" id=\"Page_472\"\u003e[Pg 472]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003elook\r\nor deny the great gains that have come from our\r\nAmerican individualistic convictions: the quickening of\r\nprivate generosity, the growth of a generalized sense of\r\n\u003ci\u003enoblesse oblige\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;of what every successful individual owes\r\nto his community; of personal initiative, self-reliance,\r\nand versatile \"faculty\"; of interest in all the voluntary\r\nagencies which by education and otherwise develop the\r\nindividuality of every one; and of a demand for equality of\r\nopportunity, a fair chance, and a square deal for all. But\r\nit is certain that the country has reached a state of\r\ndevelopment, in which these individual achievements and possibilities\r\nrequire new civic and political agencies if they\r\nare to be maintained as realities. Individualism means\r\ninequity, harshness, and retrogression to barbarism (no\r\nmatter under what veneer of display and luxury), unless\r\nit is a \u003ci\u003egeneralized\u003c/i\u003e individualism: an individualism which\r\ntakes into account the real good and effective\u0026mdash;not merely\r\nformal\u0026mdash;freedom of \u003ci\u003eevery\u003c/i\u003e social member.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHence the demand for civic organs\u0026mdash;city, state,\r\nand federal,\u0026mdash;of expert inquiry, inspection, and supervision\r\nwith respect to a large number of interests\r\nwhich are too widespread and too intricate to be well\r\ncared for by private or voluntary initiative. The\r\nwell-to-do in great cities may segregate themselves in\r\nthe more healthful quarters; they may rely upon their\r\nautomobiles for local transportation; they may secure pure\r\nmilk and unadulterated foods from personal resources;\r\nthey may, by their combined \"pull,\" secure good schools,\r\npolicing, lighting, and well-paved streets for their own\r\nlocalities. But the great masses are dependent upon public\r\nagencies for proper air, light, sanitary conditions of\r\nwork and residence, cheap and effective transportation,\r\npure food, decent educative and recreative facilities in\r\nschools, libraries, museums, parks.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe problems which fall to the lot of the proper organs\r\nof administrative inspection and supervision are essentially\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_473\" id=\"Page_473\"\u003e[Pg 473]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003escientific\u003c/i\u003e problems, questions for expert intelligence conjoined\r\nwith wide sympathy. In the true sense of the word\r\npolitical, they are political questions: that is, they relate\r\nto the welfare of society as an organized community of\r\nattainment and endeavor. In the cant sense of the term\r\npolitical, the sense of conventional party-issues and party-lines,\r\nthey have no more to do with politics than have the\r\nmultiplication table and the laws of hygiene. Yet they\r\nare at present almost hopelessly entangled with irrelevant\r\n\"political\" issues, and are almost hopelessly under the\r\nheel of party-politicians whose least knowledge is of the\r\nscientific questions involved, just as their least interest is\r\nfor the human issues at stake. So far \"civil service reform\"\r\nhas been mainly negative: a purging away of some\r\nof the grosser causes which have influenced appointments\r\nto office. But now there is needed a constructive reform\r\nof civil administration which will develop the agencies\r\nof inquiry, oversight, and publicity required by modern\r\nconditions; and which will necessitate the selection of\r\npublic servants of scientifically equipped powers.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 3. POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo hard and fast line can be drawn between civil society\r\nand the State. By the State, however, we denote those\r\nconditions of social organization and regulation which are\r\nmost fundamental and most general:\u0026mdash;conditions which are\r\nsummed up in and expressed through the general will as\r\nmanifested in legislation and its execution. As a civil\r\nright is technically focused in the right to use the courts,\r\n\"to sue and be sued,\" that is in the right to have other\r\nclaims adjudicated and enforced by a public, impartial\r\nauthority, so a political right is technically summed up in\r\nthe power to vote\u0026mdash;either to vote directly upon laws or\r\nto vote for those who make and carry out laws. To have\r\nthe right in a legislative assembly to speak for or against\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_474\" id=\"Page_474\"\u003e[Pg 474]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na certain measure; to be able to say \"yea\" or \"nay\" upon\r\na roll-call; to be able to put into a ballot-box a piece of\r\npaper with a number of names written thereon, are not\r\nacts which of themselves possess the inherent value of many\r\nof the most ordinary transactions of daily life. But the\r\nrepresentative and potential significance of political rights\r\nexceeds that of any other class of rights. Suffrage stands\r\nfor direct and active participation in the regulation of\r\nthe terms upon which associated life shall be sustained, and\r\nthe pursuit of the good carried on. Political freedom and\r\nresponsibility \u003ci\u003eexpress an individual\u0027s power and obligation\r\nto make effective all his other capacities by fixing the\r\nsocial conditions of their exercise\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGrowth of Democracy.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The evolution of democratically\r\nregulated States, as distinct from those ordered in the\r\ninterests of a small group, or of a special class, is the\r\nsocial counterpart of the development of a comprehensive\r\nand common good. Externally viewed, democracy is a\r\npiece of machinery, to be maintained or thrown away, like\r\nany other piece of machinery, on the basis of its economy\r\nand efficiency of working. Morally, it is the effective\r\nembodiment of the moral ideal of a good which consists in\r\nthe development of all the social capacities of every individual\r\nmember of society.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePresent Problems: 1. Distrust of Government.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Present\r\nmoral problems connected with political affairs have to\r\ndo with safeguarding the democratic ideal against the influences\r\nwhich are always at work to undermine it, and with\r\nbuilding up for it a more complete and extensive embodiment.\r\nThe historic antecedent of our own governmental\r\nsystem was the exercise of a monopoly by a privileged\r\nclass.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_221_221\" id=\"FNanchor_221_221\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_221_221\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[221]\u003c/a\u003e It became a democratic institution partly because\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_475\" id=\"Page_475\"\u003e[Pg 475]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe King, in order to secure the monopoly, had to concede\r\nand guarantee to the masses of the people certain rights\r\nas against the oligarchical interests which might rival\r\nhis powers; and partly because the centralization of power,\r\nwith the arbitrary despotism it created, called out protests\r\nwhich finally achieved the main popular liberties: safety\r\nof life and property from arbitrary forfeiture, arrest, or\r\nseizure by the sovereign; the rights of free assembly,\r\npetition, a free press, and of representation in the law-making\r\nbody.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUpon its face, the struggle for individual liberty was a\r\nstruggle against the overbearing menace of despotic rulers.\r\nThis fact has survived in an attitude towards government\r\nwhich cripples its usefulness as an agency of the general\r\nwill. Government, even in the most democratic countries,\r\nis still thought of as an external \"ruler,\" operating from\r\nabove, rather than as an organ by which people associated\r\nin pursuit of common ends can most effectively co\u0026ouml;perate\r\nfor the realization of their own aims. Distrust of government\r\nwas one of the chief traits of the situation in which\r\nthe American nation was born. It is embodied not only\r\nin popular tradition, and party creeds, but in our organic\r\nlaws, which contain many provisions expressly calculated\r\nto prevent the corporate social body from effecting its\r\nends freely and easily through governmental agencies.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_222_222\" id=\"FNanchor_222_222\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_222_222\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[222]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere can be no doubt that the movement to restrict the\r\nfunctions of government, the \u003ci\u003elaissez-faire\u003c/i\u003e movement, was\r\nin its time an important step in human freedom, because\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_476\" id=\"Page_476\"\u003e[Pg 476]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nso much of governmental action was despotic in intention\r\nand stupid in execution. But it is also a mistake to continue\r\nto think of a government which is only the people\r\nassociated for the assuring of their own ends as if it\r\nwere the same sort of thing as a government which represented\r\nthe will of an irresponsible class. The advance\r\nof means of publicity, and of natural and social science,\r\nprovides not only protection against ignorant and unwise\r\npublic action, but also constructive instrumentalities of\r\nintelligent administrative activities. One of the chief\r\nmoral problems of the present day is, then, that of making\r\ngovernmental machinery such a prompt and flexible\r\norgan for expressing the \u003ci\u003ecommon\u003c/i\u003e interest and purpose\r\nas will do away with that distrust of government\r\nwhich properly must endure so long as \"government\" is\r\nsomething imposed from above and exercised from without.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Indifference to Public Concerns.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The multiplication\r\nof private interests is a measure of social progress:\r\nit marks the multiplication of the sources and ingredients\r\nof happiness. But it also invites neglect of the fundamental\r\ngeneral concerns which, seeming very remote, get\r\npushed out of sight by the pressure of the nearer and\r\nmore vivid personal interests. The great majority of men\r\nhave their thoughts and feelings well occupied with their\r\nfamily and business affairs; with their clubs for recreation,\r\ntheir church associations, and so on. \"Politics\" becomes\r\nthe trade of a class which is especially expert in the\r\nmanipulation of their fellows and skilled in the \"acceleration\"\r\nof public opinion. \"Politics\" then gets a bad\r\nname, and the aloofness from public matters of those best\r\nfitted, theoretically, to participate in them is further promoted.\r\nThe saying of Plato, twenty-five hundred years\r\nago, that the penalty good men pay for not being interested\r\nin government is that they are then ruled by men\r\nworse than themselves, is verified in most of our American\r\ncities.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_477\" id=\"Page_477\"\u003e[Pg 477]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. Corruption.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This indifference of the many, which\r\nthrows the management of political affairs into the hands\r\nof a few, leads inevitably to corruption. At the best, government\r\nis administered by human beings possessed of\r\nordinary human frailties and partialities; and, at the best,\r\ntherefore, its ideal function of serving impartially the\r\ncommon good must be compromised in its execution. But\r\nthe control of the inner machinery of governmental power\r\nby a few who can work in irresponsible secrecy because of\r\nthe indifference and even contempt of the many, incites to\r\ndeliberate perversion of public functions into private advantages.\r\nAs embezzlement is appropriation of trust\r\nfunds to private ends, so corruption, \"graft,\" is prostitution\r\nof public resources, whether of power or of money,\r\nto personal or class interests. That a \"public office is a\r\npublic trust\" is at once an axiom of political ethics and\r\na principle most difficult to realize.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn our own day, a special field has been opened within\r\nwhich corruption may flourish, in the development of public\r\nutility companies. Railways, city transportation systems,\r\ntelegraph and telephone systems, the distribution of water\r\nand light, require public franchises, for they either employ\r\npublic highways or they call upon the State to exercise\r\nits power of eminent domain. These enterprises can\r\nbe carried on efficiently and economically only as they\r\nare either monopolies, or quasi-monopolies. All modern\r\nlife, however, is completely bound up with and dependent\r\nupon facilities of communication, intercourse, and distribution.\r\nPower to control the various public-service corporations\r\ncarries with it, therefore, power to control and\r\nto tax all industries, power to build up and cast down\r\ncommunities, companies, and individuals, to an extent\r\nwhich might well have been envied by royal houses of the\r\npast. It becomes then a very special object for great\r\ncorporations to control the agencies of legislation and\r\nadministration; and it becomes a very special object for\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_478\" id=\"Page_478\"\u003e[Pg 478]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nparty leaders and bosses to get control of party machinery\r\nin order to act as brokers in franchises and in special\r\nfavors\u0026mdash;sometimes directly for money, sometimes for the\r\nperpetuation and extension of their own power and influence,\r\nsometimes for the success, through influential support\r\nand contribution to party funds, of the national party\r\nwith which they are identified.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4. Reforms in Party Machinery.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The last decade or\r\nso of our history has been rife with schemes to improve\r\npolitical conditions. It has become clear, among other\r\nthings, that our national growth has carried with it the\r\ndevelopment of secondary political agencies, not contemplated\r\nby the framers of our constitutions, agencies which\r\nhave become primary in practical matters. These agencies\r\nare the \"machines\" of political parties, with their hierarchical\r\ngradation of bosses from national to ward rulers,\r\nbosses who are in close touch with great business interests\r\nat one extreme, and with those who pander to the vices\r\nof the community (gambling, drink, and prostitution) at\r\nthe other; parties with their committees, conventions, primaries,\r\ncaucuses, party-funds, societies, meetings, and all\r\nsorts of devices for holding together and exciting masses\r\nof men to more or less blind acquiescence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is not necessary to point out the advantages which\r\nparties have subserved in concentrating and defining public\r\nopinion and responsibility in large issues; nor to dwell\r\nupon their value in counteracting tendencies which break\r\nup and divide men into a multitude of small groups having\r\nlittle in common with one another. But behind these advantages\r\na vast number of abuses have sheltered themselves.\r\nRecent legislation and recent discussion have shown\r\na marked tendency formally to recognize the part actually\r\nplayed by party machinery in the conduct of the State,\r\nand to take measures to make this factor more responsible\r\nin its exercise. Since these measures directly affect the\r\nconditions under which the government as the organ of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_479\" id=\"Page_479\"\u003e[Pg 479]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe general will does its work of securing the fundamental\r\nconditions of equal opportunity for all, they have a direct\r\nmoral import. Such questions as the Australian ballot, the\r\nrecognition of party emblems and party groupings of\r\nnames; laws for direct primary nominations; the registering\r\nof voters for primary as well as for final elections;\r\nlegal control of party committees and party conventions;\r\npublicity of accounts as to the reception and use of party\r\nfunds; forbidding of contributions by corporations, are\r\nthus as distinctly moral questions as are bribery and ballot-box\r\nstuffing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e5. Reforms in Governmental Machinery.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Questions\r\nthat concern the respective advantages of written versus\r\nunwritten constitutions are in their present state problems\r\nof technical political science rather than of morals. But\r\nthere are problems, growing out of the fact that for the\r\nmost part American constitutions were written and adopted\r\nunder conditions radically unlike those of the present,\r\nwhich have a direct ethical import. As already noted, our\r\nconstitutions are full of evidences of distrust of popular\r\nco\u0026ouml;perative action. They did not and could not foresee\r\nthe direction of industrial development, the increased complexity\r\nof social life, nor the expansion of national territory.\r\nMany measures which have proved indispensable\r\nhave had therefore to be as it were smuggled in; they\r\nhave been justified by \"legal fictions\" and by interpretations\r\nwhich have stretched the original text to uses undreamed\r\nof. At the same time, the courts, which are the\r\nmost technical and legal of our political organs, are supreme\r\nmasters over the legislative branch, the most popular\r\nand general. The distribution of functions between\r\nthe states and the nation is curiously ill-adapted to present\r\nconditions (as the discussions regarding railway regulation\r\nindicate); and the distribution of powers between\r\nthe state and its municipalities is hardly less so, resting in\r\ntheory upon the idea of local self-government, and in prac\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_480\" id=\"Page_480\"\u003e[Pg 480]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etice\r\ndoing almost everything possible to discourage responsible\r\ninitiative for the conduct of their own affairs on\r\nthe part of municipalities.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese conditions have naturally brought forth a large\r\ncrop of suggestions for reforms. It is not intended to\r\ndiscuss them here, but the more important of them, so far\r\nas involving moral questions, may be briefly noted. The\r\nproposals termed the initiative and the referendum and the\r\n\"recall\" (this last intended to enable the people to withdraw\r\nfrom office any one with whose conduct of affairs they\r\nare dissatisfied) are clearly intended to make the ideal of\r\ndemocratic control more effective in practice. Proposals\r\nfor limited or complete woman\u0027s suffrage call attention\r\nto the fact that one-half of the citizenship does the political\r\nthinking for the other half, and emphasize the difficulty\r\nunder such conditions of getting a comprehensive\r\nsocial standpoint (which, as we have already seen, is the\r\nsympathetic and reasonable standpoint) from which to\r\njudge social issues. Many sporadic propositions from this\r\nand that quarter indicate a desire to revise constitutions\r\nso as to temper their cast-iron quality and increase their\r\nflexible adaptation to the present popular will, and so as\r\nto emancipate local communities from subjection to State\r\nlegislatures in such a way as to give them greater autonomy\r\nand hence greater responsibility, in the management\r\nof their own corporate affairs. It is not the arguments\r\n\u003ci\u003epro\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003econ\u003c/i\u003e that we are here concerned with;\r\nbut we are interested to point out that moral issues are\r\ninvolved in the settlement of these questions. It may,\r\nmoreover, be noted that dividing lines in the discussion\r\nare generally drawn, consciously or unconsciously, on the\r\nbasis of the degree of faith which exists in the democratic\r\nprinciple and ideal, as against the class idea in some\r\nof its many forms.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e6. Constructive Social Legislation.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The rapid change\r\nof economic methods, the accumulation and concentration\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_481\" id=\"Page_481\"\u003e[Pg 481]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof wealth, the aggregation of capital and labor into distinct\r\nbodies of corporations and trusts, on one side, and\r\nfederated labor unions, on the other; the development of\r\ncollective agencies of production and distribution, have\r\nbrought to the focus of public attention a large number\r\nof proposals for new legislation, almost all of which have\r\na direct moral import. These matters are discussed at\r\nlength in subsequent chapters (chs. xxii.-xxv.); and so are\r\npassed over here with the reminder that, while on one side\r\nthey are questions of the ethics of industry, they are\r\nalso questions of the right and wrong use of political power\r\nand authority. We may also note that the theoretical\r\nprinciple at issue, the extension versus the restriction of\r\ngovernmental agencies, so far as it is not simply a question\r\nof what is expedient under the given circumstances,\r\nis essentially a question of a \u003ci\u003egeneralized\u003c/i\u003e versus a \u003ci\u003epartial\u003c/i\u003e\r\nindividualism. The democratic movement of emancipation\r\nof personal capacities, of securing to each individual\r\nan \u003ci\u003eeffective\u003c/i\u003e right to count in the order and movement\r\nof society as a whole (that is, in the common good), has\r\ngone far enough to secure to many, more favored than\r\nothers, peculiar powers and possessions. It is part of the\r\nirony of the situation that such now oppose efforts to secure\r\nequality of opportunity to \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e on the ground that these\r\nefforts would effect an invasion of individual liberties and\r\nrights: i.e., of privileges based on inequality. It requires\r\nperhaps a peculiarly sympathetic imagination to see that\r\nthe question really involved is not one of magnifying the\r\npowers of the State against individuals, but is one of\r\nmaking individual liberty a more extensive and equitable\r\nmatter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e7. The International Problem.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The development of\r\nnational States marks a tremendous step forward in the\r\nrealization of the principle of a truly inclusive common\r\ngood. But it cannot be the final step. Just as clans, sects,\r\ngangs, etc., are intensely sympathetic within and intensely\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_482\" id=\"Page_482\"\u003e[Pg 482]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nexclusive and jealous without, so States are still arrayed\r\nagainst States, with patriotism, loyalty, as an internal\r\nvirtue, and the distrust and hatred of divisive hostility as\r\nthe counterpart vice. The idea of humanity in the abstract\r\nhas been attained as a moral ideal. But the political\r\norganization of this conception, its embodiment in law and\r\nadministrative agencies, has not been achieved. International\r\nlaw, arbitration treaties, and even a court like the\r\nHague tribunal, whose power is sentimental rather than\r\npolitical, mark steps forward. Nothing could be more\r\nabsurd, from the historic point of view, than to regard the\r\nconception of an international State of federated humanity,\r\nwith its own laws and its own courts and its own rules for\r\nadjudicating disputes, as a mere dream, an illusion of\r\nsentimental hope. It is a very slight step to take forward\r\ncompared with that which has substituted the authority\r\nof national States for the conflict of isolated clans and\r\nlocal communities; or with that which has substituted a\r\npublicly administered justice for the r\u0026eacute;gime of private war\r\nand retaliation. The argument for the necessity (short\r\nof the attainment of a federated international State with\r\nuniversal authority and policing of the seas) of preparing\r\nin peace by enlarged armies and navies for the possibility\r\nof war, must be offset at least by recognition that the\r\npossession of irresponsible power is always a direct temptation\r\nto its irresponsible use. The argument that war is\r\nnecessary to prevent moral degeneration of individuals\r\nmay, under present conditions, where every day brings\r\nits fresh challenge to civic initiative, courage, and vigor,\r\nbe dismissed as unmitigated nonsense.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 4. THE MORAL CRITERION OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe moral criterion by which to try social institutions\r\nand political measures may be summed up as follows: The\r\ntest is whether a given custom or law sets free individual\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_483\" id=\"Page_483\"\u003e[Pg 483]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncapacities in such a way as to make them available for the\r\ndevelopment of the general happiness or the common\r\ngood. This formula states the test with the emphasis falling\r\nupon the side of the individual. It may be stated from\r\nthe side of associated life as follows: The test is whether\r\nthe general, the public, organization and order are promoted\r\nin such a way as to equalize opportunity for all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eComparison with the Individualistic Formula.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\nformula of the individualistic school (in the narrow sense\r\nof that term\u0026mdash;the \u003ci\u003elaissez-faire\u003c/i\u003e school) reads: The moral\r\nend of political institutions and measures is the maximum\r\npossible freedom of the individual consistent with his not\r\ninterfering with like freedom on the part of other individuals.\r\nIt is quite possible to interpret this formula\r\nin such a way as to make it equivalent to that just given.\r\nBut it is not employed in that sense by those who advance\r\nit. An illustration will bring out the difference. Imagine\r\none hundred workingmen banded together in a desire to\r\nimprove their standard of living by securing higher\r\nwages, shorter hours, and more sanitary conditions of\r\nwork. Imagine one hundred other men who, because they\r\nhave no families to support, no children to educate, or\r\nbecause they do not care about their standard of life,\r\nare desirous of replacing the first hundred at lower wages,\r\nand upon conditions generally more favorable to the\r\nemployer of labor. It is quite clear that in offering themselves\r\nand crowding out the others, they are not interfering\r\nwith the \u003ci\u003elike\u003c/i\u003e freedom on the part of others. The\r\nmen already engaged are \"free\" to work for lower wages\r\nand longer time, if they want to. But it is equally certain\r\nthat they are interfering with the \u003ci\u003ereal\u003c/i\u003e freedom of the\r\nothers: that is, with the effective expression of their \u003ci\u003ewhole\u003c/i\u003e\r\nbody of activities.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe formula of \"\u003ci\u003elike\u003c/i\u003e freedom\" artificially isolates some\r\none power, takes that in the abstract, and then inquires\r\nwhether \u003ci\u003eit\u003c/i\u003e is interfered with. The one truly moral ques\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_484\" id=\"Page_484\"\u003e[Pg 484]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etion\r\nis what relation this particular power, say the power\r\nto do a certain work for a certain reward, sustains to all the\r\nother desires, purposes, and interests of the individual. How\r\nare \u003ci\u003ethey\u003c/i\u003e affected by the way in which some one activity is\r\nexercised? It is in them that the concrete freedom of\r\nthe man resides. We do not know whether the freedom of\r\na man is interfered with or is assisted until we have taken\r\ninto account his whole system of capacities and activities.\r\nThe maximum freedom of one individual consistent with\r\nequal \u003ci\u003econcrete\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003etotal\u003c/i\u003e freedom of others, would indeed\r\nrepresent a high moral ideal. But the individualistic\r\nformula is condemned by the fact that it has in mind\r\nonly an abstract, mechanical, external, and hence formal\r\nfreedom.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eComparison with the Collectivistic Formula.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;There\r\nis a rival formula which may be summed up as the subordination\r\nof private or individual good to the public or\r\ngeneral good: the subordination of the good of the part\r\nto the good of the whole. This notion also \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e be interpreted\r\nin a way which renders it identical with our own\r\ncriterion. But it is usually not so intended. It tends to\r\nemphasize quantitative and mechanical considerations.\r\nThe individualistic formula tends in practice to emphasize\r\nthe freedom of the man who has power at the expense of\r\nhis neighbor weaker in health, in intellectual ability, in\r\nworldly goods, and in social influence. The collectivistic\r\nformula tends to set up a static social whole and to prevent\r\nthe variations of individual initiative which are necessary\r\nto progress. An individual variation may involve\r\nopposition, not conformity or subordination, to the existing\r\nsocial good taken statically; and yet may be the sole\r\nmeans by which the existing State is to progress. Minorities\r\nare not always right; but every advance in right begins\r\nin a minority of one, when some individual conceives\r\na project which is at variance with the social good as it\r\n\u003ci\u003ehas\u003c/i\u003e been established.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_485\" id=\"Page_485\"\u003e[Pg 485]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA true public or social good will accordingly not subordinate\r\nindividual variations, but will encourage individual\r\nexperimentation in new ideas and new projects,\r\nendeavoring only to see that they are put into execution\r\nunder conditions which make for securing responsibility\r\nfor their consequences. A just social order promotes in\r\nall its members habits of criticizing its attained goods and\r\nhabits of projecting schemes of new goods. It does not\r\naim at intellectual and moral subordination. Every form\r\nof social life contains survivals of the past which need to\r\nbe reorganized. The struggle of some individuals \u003ci\u003eagainst\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthe existing subordination of their good to the good of\r\nthe whole is the method of the reorganization of the whole\r\nin the direction of a more generally distributed good. Not\r\norder, but orderly progress, represents the social ideal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eGreen, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Political Obligation\u003c/i\u003e, 1888; Ritchie, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples\r\nof State Interference\u003c/i\u003e, 1891, \u003ci\u003eNatural Rights\u003c/i\u003e, 1895; Lioy, \u003ci\u003ePhilosophy\r\nof Right\u003c/i\u003e, 2 vols., 1901; Willoughby, \u003ci\u003eAn Examination of the Nature\r\nof the State\u003c/i\u003e, 1896; Wilson, \u003ci\u003eThe State\u003c/i\u003e, 1889; Donisthorpe, \u003ci\u003eIndividualism\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1889; Giddings, \u003ci\u003eDemocracy and Empire\u003c/i\u003e, 1900; Mulford, \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nNation\u003c/i\u003e, 1882; Spencer, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Sociology\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II., Part V., 1882,\r\non Political Institutions; Bentham, \u003ci\u003eFragment on Government\u003c/i\u003e, 1776;\r\nMill, \u003ci\u003eConsiderations on Representative Government\u003c/i\u003e, 1861, \u003ci\u003eOn Liberty\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1859, and \u003ci\u003eThe Subjection of Women\u003c/i\u003e, 1859; Austin, \u003ci\u003eJurisprudence\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n2 vols., 4th ed., 1873; Hadley, \u003ci\u003eThe Relations between Freedom and\r\nResponsibility in the Evolution of Democratic Government\u003c/i\u003e, 1903; Pollock,\r\n\u003ci\u003eExpansion of the Common Law\u003c/i\u003e, 1904; Hall, \u003ci\u003eCrime in Its Relations\r\nto Social Progress\u003c/i\u003e, 1901; \u003ci\u003ePhilanthropy and Social Progress\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nSeven Essays, 1893; Stephen (J. F.), \u003ci\u003eLiberty, Equality, Fraternity\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1873 (a criticism of Mill\u0027s \u003ci\u003eLiberty\u003c/i\u003e); Tufts, \u003ci\u003eSome Contributions of\r\nPsychology to the Conception of Justice\u003c/i\u003e, Philosophical Review, Vol.\r\nXV., p. 361.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_204_204\" id=\"Footnote_204_204\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_204_204\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[204]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e A traveler tells of overhearing children in Australia, when one\r\nof their kin had injured some one in another clan, discuss whether\r\nor no they came within the degree of nearness of relationship which\r\nmade them liable to suffer.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_205_205\" id=\"Footnote_205_205\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_205_205\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[205]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Hearn, \u003ci\u003eThe Aryan Household\u003c/i\u003e, p. 431. Hearn is speaking, moreover,\r\nof a later and more advanced condition of society, one lying\r\nwell within \"civilization.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_206_206\" id=\"Footnote_206_206\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_206_206\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[206]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Those interested in this important history, as every student of\r\nmorals may well be, will find easily accessible material in the following\r\nreferences: Hobhouse, \u003ci\u003eMorals in Evolution\u003c/i\u003e, ch. iii. of Vol. I.;\r\nHearn, \u003ci\u003eThe Aryan Household\u003c/i\u003e, ch. xix.; Westermarck, \u003ci\u003eThe Origin and\r\nDevelopment of the Moral Ideas\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. I., pp. 120-185, and parts of\r\nch. xx.; Sutherland, \u003ci\u003eOrigin and Growth of the Moral Instinct\u003c/i\u003e, chs.\r\nxx. and xxi.; Pollock and Maitland, \u003ci\u003eHistory of of English Law\u003c/i\u003e, Vol.\r\nII., pp. 447-460 and ch. ix.; Pollock, \u003ci\u003eOxford Lectures\u003c/i\u003e (The King\u0027s\r\nPeace); Cherry, \u003ci\u003eCriminal Law in Ancient Communities\u003c/i\u003e; Maine,\r\n\u003ci\u003eAncient Law\u003c/i\u003e. References to anthropological literature, dealing with\r\nsavage and barbarian customs, will be found especially in Westermarck\r\nand Hobhouse.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_207_207\" id=\"Footnote_207_207\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_207_207\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[207]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For facts regarding the importance and nature of these conceptions,\r\nsee Westermarck, \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 52-72; Robertson Smith, \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nReligion of the Semites\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 427-435 and 139-149; Jevons, \u003ci\u003eIntroduction\r\nto the History of Religion\u003c/i\u003e; Hobhouse, \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II., chs. i. and ii.;\r\nand in general facts bearing on the relations between taboos, holiness,\r\nand uncleanness; ablutions, purifications by fire, transference by\r\nscapegoats; also the evil power of curses, and the early conceptions\r\nof doom and fate. For a suggestive interpretation of the underlying\r\nfacts, see Santayana, \u003ci\u003eThe Life of Reason\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. III., chs. iii. and iv.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_208_208\" id=\"Footnote_208_208\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_208_208\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[208]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See Plato, \u003ci\u003eLaws\u003c/i\u003e, IX., 873. Compare Holmes, \u003ci\u003eCommon Law\u003c/i\u003e. In\r\nmedi\u0026aelig;val and early modern Europe, offending objects were \"deodand,\"\r\nthat is, devoted to God. They were to be appropriated by\r\nthe proper civil or ecclesiastical authority, and used for charity. In\r\ntheory, this lasted in England up to 1846. See Tylor, \u003ci\u003ePrimitive Culture\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nVol. I., pp. 286-287; and Pollock and Maitland, \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, II.,\r\npp. 471-472.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_209_209\" id=\"Footnote_209_209\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_209_209\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[209]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eOp. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 257.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_210_210\" id=\"Footnote_210_210\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_210_210\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[210]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The very words cause and to blame are closely connected in their\r\norigin. Cf. the Greek \u0026#945;\u0026#7989;\u0026#964;\u0026#943;\u0026#945;.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_211_211\" id=\"Footnote_211_211\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_211_211\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[211]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Pollock and Maitland, \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, II., p. 469; I., 30. For the history\r\nof the idea of accident in English law with reference to homicide,\r\nsee also pp. 477-483. Also Stephen, \u003ci\u003eHistory of the Criminal Law in\r\nEngland\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. III., pp. 316-376.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_212_212\" id=\"Footnote_212_212\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_212_212\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[212]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Pollock and Maitland, II., p. 473; see Westermarck, pp. 240-247.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_213_213\" id=\"Footnote_213_213\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_213_213\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[213]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The slowness and indirectness of change throw light upon the\r\nsupposed distinction of justice and mercy (see \u003ci\u003eante\u003c/i\u003e, p. 415). When\r\nthe practical injustice of regarding accidental homicide or killing in\r\nself-defense as murder began to be felt, the theory was still that\r\nthe man in justice was guilty, but that he was to be recommended\r\nto the crown for mercy or pardon. This was a mean term in the\r\nevolution of our present notion of justice.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_214_214\" id=\"Footnote_214_214\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_214_214\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[214]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For some of the main historic facts on intellectual disability,\r\nsee Westermarck, pp. 264-277.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_215_215\" id=\"Footnote_215_215\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_215_215\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[215]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Popular judgment, we may say, tends to be as grossly utilitarian\r\nin its practice as it is grossly intuitional in its theoretical standpoint.\r\nIn assuming the possibility of an almost infallible, offhand, pat perception\r\nof right and wrong, it commits itself practically to judging\r\nin an offhand, analyzed way, on the basis of the evils which overtly\r\nresult.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_216_216\" id=\"Footnote_216_216\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_216_216\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[216]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See Pollock and Maitland, Vol. II., p. 561, who quote from\r\nIhering: \"Formulation is the sworn enemy of arbitrariness, the twin-sister\r\nof liberty\"; and who add: \"As time goes on there is always\r\na larger room for discretion in the law of procedure: but discretionary\r\npowers can only be safely entrusted to judges whose impartiality\r\nis above suspicion and whose every act is exposed to public\r\nand professional criticism.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_217_217\" id=\"Footnote_217_217\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_217_217\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[217]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e A lawyer, asked if the poor were not at a disadvantage in the\r\nlegal maintenance of their rights, replied: \"\u003ci\u003eNot any more than they\r\nare in the other relations of life.\u003c/i\u003e\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_218_218\" id=\"Footnote_218_218\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_218_218\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[218]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The devices of \"equity\" as distinct from strict legality are of\r\ncourse in part intended to secure this result.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_219_219\" id=\"Footnote_219_219\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_219_219\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[219]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Robinson and Beard, \u003ci\u003eDevelopment of Modern Europe\u003c/i\u003e, Vol. II.,\r\np. 207.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_220_220\" id=\"Footnote_220_220\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_220_220\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[220]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"Man the Reformer.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_221_221\" id=\"Footnote_221_221\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_221_221\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[221]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The term \"the King\u0027s Peace,\" as the equivalent in England for\r\nthe peace and order of the commonwealth, goes back to a time when\r\nliterally it meant a private possession. Pollock says that the desire\r\nto collect larger revenues was the chief motive for pushing the\r\nroyal jurisdiction against lesser local authorities. Essay on the\r\nKing\u0027s Peace in \u003ci\u003eOxford Essays\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_222_222\" id=\"Footnote_222_222\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_222_222\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[222]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Says President Hadley: \"The fundamental division of powers in\r\nthe Constitution of the United States is between voters on the one\r\nhand, and property-owners on the other. The forces of democracy\r\non one side, divided between the executive and the legislature, are set\r\nover against the forces of property on the other side, with the judiciary\r\nas arbiter between them…. The voter could elect what\r\nofficers he pleased, so long as these officers did not try to do certain\r\nduties confided by the Constitution to the property-holders. Democracy\r\nwas complete as far as it went, but constitutionally it was\r\nbound to stop short of \u003ci\u003esocial\u003c/i\u003e democracy.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_486\" id=\"Page_486\"\u003e[Pg 486]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER XXII\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTHE ETHICS OF THE ECONOMIC LIFE\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn considering the ethics of the economic life and of\r\nproperty, so far as this latter topic has not received treatment\r\nelsewhere, we give (1) a general analysis of the ethical\r\nquestions involved, (2) a more specific account of the\r\nproblems raised by the present tendencies of industry, business,\r\nand property; we follow these analyses with (3) a\r\nstatement of principles, and (4) a discussion of unsettled\r\nproblems.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 1. GENERAL ANALYSIS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBoth the economic process and property have three\r\ndistinct ethical aspects corresponding respectively to the\r\nethical standpoint of happiness, character, and social\r\njustice. (1) The economic process supplies men with\r\ngoods for their bodily wants and with many of the necessary\r\nmeans for satisfying intellectual, \u0026aelig;sthetic, and social\r\nneeds; property represents permanence and security in\r\nthese same values. (2) Through the difficulties it presents,\r\nthe work it involves, and the incitements it offers, the economic\r\nprocess has a powerful influence in evoking skill,\r\nforesight, and scientific control of nature, in forming character,\r\nand stimulating ambition to excel. Property means\r\npower, control, and the conditions for larger freedom.\r\n(3) The economic process has an important social function.\r\nThrough division of labor, co\u0026ouml;peration, and exchange\r\nof goods and services, it affords one of the fundamental\r\nexpressions of the organic nature of society in\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_487\" id=\"Page_487\"\u003e[Pg 487]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich members are reciprocally ends to each other. Property,\r\nlikewise, is not only a possessing, but a \"right,\" and\r\nthus, like all rights, involves the questions why and how far\r\nsociety should support the individual in his interests and\r\nclaims. Let us examine each of these aspects further.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. The Economic in Relation to Happiness.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Subject\r\nto the important qualifications to be made below under\r\nthis and the succeeding sections, we note first that the\r\nsupply of needs and wants by industry and commerce is\r\nethically a good. A constant increase in production and\r\nconsumption is at least a possible factor in a fuller life.\r\nWealth is a possible condition of weal, even if it is not\r\nto be gratuitously identified with it. Rome is frequently\r\ncited as an example of the evil effects of material wealth.\r\nBut it was not wealth \u003ci\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e, but wealth (a) gained by\r\nconquest, and exploitation, rather than by industry; (b)\r\ncontrolled by a minority; and (c) used in largesses or in\r\ncrude spectacles\u0026mdash;rather than democratically distributed\r\nand used to minister to higher wants. The present average\r\nincome in the United States is about two hundred\r\ndollars a year per capita, too small a sum to permit\r\ncomfortable living, sufficient education for children, and\r\nthe satisfaction which even a very moderate taste may\r\nseek. From this point of view we may then ask of any\r\nindustrial process or business method whether it is an economical\r\nand efficient method of production, and whether\r\nit naturally tends to stimulate increased production. To\r\ndo this is\u0026mdash;so far as it goes\u0026mdash;ethically as well as economically\r\ndesirable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf wealth is a good, it might seem that property must\r\nbe judged by the same standard, since it represents security\r\nin the satisfactions which wealth affords. But\r\nthere is an important distinction. Wealth means enjoyment\r\nof goods and satisfaction of wants. Property means\r\nthe title to the exclusive use or possession of goods. Hence\r\nthe increase of property may involve increasing exclusion\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_488\" id=\"Page_488\"\u003e[Pg 488]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof part of the community from wealth, although the owners\r\nof the property may be increasing their own enjoyments.\r\nFor, as pointed out very forcibly by Hadley in the first\r\nchapter of his \u003ci\u003eEconomics\u003c/i\u003e, the public wealth of a community\r\nis by no means equal to the sum of its private property.\r\nIf all parks were divided up into private estates,\r\nall schoolhouses controlled by private owners, all water\r\nsupplies and highways given into private control, the sum\r\nof private property might be very much increased; but\r\nthe public wealth would be decreased. Property is one of\r\nthe means of dealing with public wealth. It is important\r\nto bear in mind, however, that it is only one means. Wealth\r\nmay be (1) privately owned and privately used; (2) privately\r\nowned and publicly or commonly used; (3) publicly\r\nowned, but privately used; (4) publicly owned and publicly\r\nor commonly used. Illustrations of these four methods\r\nare, for the first, among practically all peoples, clothing\r\nand tools; of the second, a private estate opened to public\r\nuse\u0026mdash;as a park; of the third, public lands or franchises\r\nleased to individuals; of the fourth, public highways,\r\nparks, navigable rivers, public libraries. Whether property\r\nin any given case is a means to happiness will depend,\r\nthen, largely upon whether it operates chiefly to increase\r\nwealth or to diminish it. The view has not been\r\ninfrequent that the wealth of the community is the sum\r\nof its private property. From this it is but a step to\r\nbelieve \"that the acquisition of property is the production\r\nof wealth, and that he best serves the common good who,\r\nother things equal, diverts the larger share of the aggregate\r\nwealth to his own possession.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_223_223\" id=\"FNanchor_223_223\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_223_223\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[223]\u003c/a\u003e The ethical questions\r\nas to the relation of property to happiness involve accordingly\r\nthe problem of justice and can be more conveniently\r\nconsidered under that head.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Relation to Character.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Even in its aspect of satisfying\r\nhuman wants, quantity of production is not the only\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_489\" id=\"Page_489\"\u003e[Pg 489]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nconsideration. As was pointed out in the chapters on Happiness,\r\nthe satisfaction of any and every want is not\r\nnecessarily a moral good. It depends upon the nature of\r\nthe wants; and as the nature of the wants reflects the\r\nnature of the man who wants, the moral value of the economic\r\nprocess and of the wealth it provides must depend\r\nupon the relation of goods to persons. As economists we\r\nestimate values in terms of external goods or commodities;\r\nas ethical students we estimate values in terms of a certain\r\nquality of life. We must ask first how the satisfaction of\r\nwants affects the consumers.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMoral Cost of Production.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Consider next the producers.\r\nIt is desirable to have cheap goods, but the\r\nprice of goods or service is not measurable solely in\r\nterms of other commodities or service; the price of an\r\narticle is also, as Thoreau has said, what it costs in\r\nterms of human life. There is cheap production which\r\nby this standard is dear. The introduction of machinery\r\nfor spinning and weaving cotton cheapened cotton cloth,\r\nbut the child labor which was supposedly necessary as a\r\nfactor in cheap production, involving disease, physical\r\nstunting, ignorance, and frequently premature exhaustion\r\nor death, made the product too expensive to be tolerated.\r\nAt least, it was at last recognized as too expensive in\r\nEngland; apparently the calculation has to be made over\r\nagain in every community where a new system of child\r\nlabor is introduced. What is true of child labor is true\r\nof many other forms of modern industry\u0026mdash;the price in\r\nhuman life makes the product dear. The minute subdivision\r\nof certain parts of industry with the consequent monotony\r\nand mechanical quality of the labor, the accidents\r\nand diseases due to certain occupations, the devices to\r\ncheapen goods by ingredients which injure the health of\r\nthe consumer, the employment of women under unsanitary\r\nconditions and for excessive hours with consequent\r\nrisk to the health of themselves and their offspring\u0026mdash;all\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_490\" id=\"Page_490\"\u003e[Pg 490]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthese are part of the moral price of the present processes\r\nof industry and commerce.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMoreover, the relation of production to physical welfare\r\nis only one aspect of its effects upon life and character.\r\nWe may properly ask of any process or system whether\r\nit quickens intelligence or deadens it, whether it necessitates\r\nthe degradation of work to drudgery, and whether\r\nit promotes freedom or hampers it. To answer this last\r\nquestion we shall have to distinguish formal from real\r\nfreedom. It might be that a system favorable to the\r\nutmost formal freedom\u0026mdash;freedom of contract\u0026mdash;would result\r\nin the most entire absence of that real freedom which\r\nimplies real alternatives. If the only alternative is, this or\r\nstarve, the real freedom is limited.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eProperty and Character.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Viewed on its positive side,\r\nproperty means an expansion of power and freedom.\r\nTo seize, master, and possess is an instinct inbred by\r\nthe biological process. It is necessary for life; it is a\r\nform of the \u003ci\u003eWille zum Leben\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eWille zur Macht\u003c/i\u003e which\r\nneed not be despised. But in organized society possession\r\nis no longer mere animal instinct; through expression\r\nin a social medium and by a social person it\r\nbecomes a \u003ci\u003eright\u003c/i\u003e of property. This is a far higher capacity;\r\nlike all rights it involves the assertion of personality\r\nand of a rational claim upon fellow members of\r\nsociety for their recognition and backing. Fichte\u0027s doctrine,\r\nthat property is essential to the effective exercise\r\nof freedom, is a strong statement of its moral importance\r\nto the individual.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOver against these positive values of property are certain\r\nevils which moralists have always recognized, evils\r\nboth to the property owner and to society. Avarice, covetousness,\r\nhardness toward others, seem to be the natural\r\neffects of the enormous possibilities of power offered\r\nby property, joined with its exclusive character. The\r\nprophets of Israel denounced the rich, and Jesus\u0027s image\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_491\" id=\"Page_491\"\u003e[Pg 491]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the difficulty found by the rich man in entering the\r\nkingdom of God\u0026mdash;a moral society\u0026mdash;has met general acceptance.\r\nPlato\u0027s portrayal of the State in which the\r\nwealthy rule sketches the perversion and disobedience of\r\nlaws, the jealousies and class hatred, the evasion of taxes\r\nfor public defense, and gives the moral outcome:\u0026mdash;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"And henceforth they press forward on the path of money-getting,\r\nlosing their esteem for virtue as the esteem for wealth\r\ngrows upon them. For can you deny that there is such a\r\ngulf between wealth and virtue, that when weighed as it\r\nwere in the two scales of a balance one of the two always\r\nfalls, as the other rises?\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_224_224\" id=\"FNanchor_224_224\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_224_224\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[224]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEven apart from questions of just distribution, the\r\nmoral question arises as to whether an unlimited power\r\nshould be given to individuals in this form, and whether\r\nthere should be unlimited right of inheritance. But all\r\nthese tend to pass over at once into questions of justice.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. Social Aspects.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The various relations of man to\r\nman, political, friendly, kindred, are developed forms\r\nof the interdependence implicit in the early group life.\r\nA group of units, each independent of the others, would\r\nrepresent mass only, but such a group as is made up of\r\nmen, women, and children, sustaining all the relations\r\nfound in present human life, represents something vastly\r\nmore than a mass of individuals. Every life draws from\r\nthe rest. Man without friendship, love, pity, sympathy,\r\ncommunication, co\u0026ouml;peration, justice, rights, or duties,\r\nwould be deprived of nearly all that gives life its value.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe necessary help from others is obtained in various\r\nways. Parental, filial, and other kinship ties, friendship\r\nand pity, give rise to certain services, but they are necessarily\r\nlimited in their sphere and exact in return a special\r\nattitude that would be intolerable if made universal. The\r\nmodern man does not want to be cousin to every one, to\r\ngive every one his personal friendship, to be in a perpetual\r\nattitude of receiving favors, or of asking and not\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_492\" id=\"Page_492\"\u003e[Pg 492]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreceiving. Formerly the way of getting service from men\r\noutside these means was by slavery. The economic relation\r\nprovides for the mutual exchange of goods and\r\nservices on a basis of self-respect and equality. Through\r\nits system of contracts it provides for future as well as\r\npresent service. It enables each to obtain the services\r\nof all the rest, and in turn to contribute without incurring\r\nany other claims or relations. Nor does it at all diminish\r\nthe moral value of these mutual exchanges of goods and\r\nservices that they may be paid for. It used to be the\r\ntheory that in every bargain one party gained and the\r\nother lost. It is now recognized that a normal transaction\r\nbenefits both parties. The \"cash payment basis,\" which\r\nwas at first denounced as substituting a mechanical nexus\r\nfor the old personal tie, is in reality a means for establishing\r\na greater independence instead of the older personal\r\nrelation of \"master\" and \"servant.\" It enabled\r\na man, as Toynbee puts it, to sell his labor like any other\r\ncommodity without selling himself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut while the economic process has these moral possibilities,\r\nthe morality of any given system or practice will\r\ndepend on how far these are actually realized.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFirst of all, we may fairly ask of a process, Does it\r\ngive to each member the kind of service needed by him?\r\nIn economic terms, Does it produce the kinds of goods\r\nwhich society needs and desires? A method which provides\r\nfor this successfully will in so far be providing\r\nagainst scarcity of some goods and oversupply of others,\r\nand thus against one of the sources of crises, irregularity\r\nof work and wages, and ultimately against suffering and\r\nwant.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSecondly, if the process is an expression of the mutual\r\ndependence and service of members who as persons all have,\r\nas Kant puts it, intrinsic worth, and who in our political\r\nsociety are recognized as equal, we may fairly ask how\r\nit distributes the results of services rendered. Does\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_493\" id=\"Page_493\"\u003e[Pg 493]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe process tend to a broad and general distribution of\r\ngoods in return for services rendered, or to make \"the\r\nrich richer and the poor poorer?\" Or, from another\r\npoint of view, we might ask, Does the process tend to\r\nreward members on a moral or equitable basis, or upon a\r\nbasis which is non-moral if not immoral or unjust.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThirdly, the problem of \u003ci\u003econflicting services\u003c/i\u003e presents\r\nitself under several forms. There is, first, the ever-present\r\nconflict between producer and consumer. Higher wages\r\nand shorter hours are good for the carpenter or the\r\nweaver, until he pays his rent or buys clothes, when he is\r\ninterested in cheaper goods. What principle can be employed\r\nto adjust such a question? Again, service to the\r\nconsumer may lead a producer to a price-list implying a\r\nminimum of profits. One producer can afford this because\r\nof his larger business, but it will drive his competitor\r\nfrom the field. Shall he agree to a higher price\r\nat which all can do business, or insist on the lower which\r\nbenefits the consumer and also himself? The labor union\r\nis a constant embodiment of the problem of conflicting\r\nservices. How far shall it serve a limited group, the\r\nunion, at the expense of other workers in the same trade\u0026mdash;non-unionists?\r\nDoes it make a difference whether the union\r\nis open to all, or whether the dues are fixed so high as to\r\nlimit the membership? Shall the apprentices be limited to\r\nkeep up the wage by limiting the supply? If so, is this\r\nfair to the boys or unskilled laborers who would like to\r\nenter? And granting that it is a hardship to these, is\r\nit harder or is it kinder to them than it would be to leave\r\nthe issue to the natural weeding out or starving-out\r\nprocedure of natural selection in case too many enter\r\nthe trade? Shall the hours be reduced and wages raised\r\nas high as possible, or is there a \"fair\" standard\u0026mdash;fair to\r\nboth consumer and laborer? How far may the union\r\ncombine with the capitalist to raise prices to the\r\nconsumer?\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_494\" id=\"Page_494\"\u003e[Pg 494]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePrivate Property and Social Welfare.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The social value\r\nof property is obviously indirect, just as in law, private\r\nrights are regarded as indirectly based on social welfare.\r\nIt is society\u0027s aim to promote the worth of its members and\r\nto favor the development of their personal dignity and\r\nfreedom. Property may, therefore, claim social value in\r\nso far as it serves these ends, unless it interferes with\r\nother social values. The effect of private property has\r\nseemed to some disastrous to community of interest and\r\nfeeling. Plato, for example, in his ideal state would\r\npermit his guardians no private property. There would,\r\nthen, be no quarrels over \"meum\" and \"tuum,\" no suits or\r\ndivisions, no petty meanness or anxieties, no plundering\r\nof fellow-citizens, no flattery of rich by poor. The medi\u0026aelig;val\r\nchurch carried out his theory. Even modern\r\nsociety preserves a certain trace of its spirit. For the\r\nclasses that Plato called guardians\u0026mdash;soldiers, judges,\r\nclergy, teachers\u0026mdash;have virtually no property, although\r\nthey are given support by society. It would probably\r\nbe generally agreed that it is better for the public that\r\nthese classes should not have large possessions. But it\r\nis obvious that private property is not the sole cause of\r\ndivision between individuals and classes. Where there is\r\na deep-going unity of purpose and feeling, as in the early\r\nChristian community, or in various other companies that\r\nhave attempted to practice communism, common ownership\r\nof wealth may be morally valuable as well as practically\r\npossible. But without such unity, mere abolition of property\r\nis likely to mean more bitter divisions, because there\r\nis no available method for giving to each the independence\r\nwhich is necessary to avoid friction and promote\r\nhappiness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eGranting, however, the general position that some\r\nparts of wealth should be privately owned, we must recognize\r\nthat a great number of moral problems remain as\r\nto the precise conditions under which society will find it\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_495\" id=\"Page_495\"\u003e[Pg 495]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwise to entrust the control of wealth to private ownership.\r\nFor it must be clearly kept in mind that there is no absolute\r\nright of private property. Every right, legal or\r\nmoral, derives from the social whole, which in turn, if it\r\nis a moral whole, must respect the individuality of each\r\nof its members. On this basis moral problems, such as the\r\nfollowing, must be considered. What kind of public\r\nwealth should be given into absolute control of private\r\nindividuals or impersonal corporations? Does the institution\r\nin its present form promote the good of those\r\nwho have no property as well as of those who have it, or\r\nonly of those who own? Would the welfare of society as\r\na whole be promoted by giving a larger portion of public\r\nwealth into private control, or by retaining a larger proportion\r\nthan at present under public ownership? Should\r\nthere be any limit to the amount of land or other property\r\nwhich an individual or corporation may own? Are there\r\nany cases in which private ownership operates rather to\r\nexclude the mass of society from the benefits of civilization\r\nthan to give them a share of those benefits? Should a man\r\nbe allowed to transmit all his property to his heirs, or\r\nshould it be in part reserved by society?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe preceding analysis has aimed to state some of the\r\nproblems which belong necessarily to the economic life.\r\nAt the present time, however, the moral issues assume a\r\nnew and puzzling aspect because of the changes in economic\r\nconditions. It will be necessary to consider briefly\r\nthese changed conditions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 2. THE PROBLEMS SET BY THE NEW ECONOMIC ORDER\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Collective and Impersonal Organizations.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Two\r\nchanges have come over a large part of the economic and\r\nindustrial field. The first is the change from an individual\r\nto a collective basis. The second, which is in part\r\na consequence of the first, is a change from personal to\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_496\" id=\"Page_496\"\u003e[Pg 496]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nimpersonal or corporate relations. Corporations are of\r\ncourse composed of persons, but when organized for economic\r\npurposes they tend to become simply economic\r\npurpose incorporate, abstracted from all other human\r\nqualities. Although legally they may be subjects of rights\r\nand duties, they have but one motive, and are thus so\r\nabstract as to be morally impersonal. They tend to become\r\nmachines for carrying on business, and, as such, may\r\nbe as powerful\u0026mdash;and as incapable of moral considerations\u0026mdash;as\r\nother machines.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEthical Readjustment.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Both these changes require\r\nreadjustment of our ethical conceptions. Our conceptions\r\nof honesty and justice, of rights and duties, got their present\r\nshaping largely in an industrial and business order\r\nwhen mine and thine could be easily distinguished; when it\r\nwas easy to tell how much a man produced; when the producer\r\nsold to his neighbors, and an employer had also\r\nthe relations of neighbor to his workmen; when responsibility\r\ncould be personally located, and conversely a man\r\ncould control the business he owned or make individual\r\ncontracts; when each man had his own means of lighting,\r\nheating, water supply, and frequently of transportation,\r\ngiving no opportunity or necessity for public service corporations.\r\nSuch conceptions are inadequate for the present\r\norder. The old honesty could assume that goods belonged\r\nto their makers, and then consider exchanges and\r\ncontracts. The new honesty will first have to face a prior\r\nquestion, \u003ci\u003eWho owns what is collectively produced\u003c/i\u003e, and are\r\nthe present \"rules of the game\" distributing the returns\r\nhonestly and fairly? The old justice in the economic\r\nfield consisted chiefly in securing to each individual his\r\nrights in property or contracts. The new justice must\r\nconsider how it can secure for each individual a standard\r\nof living, and such a share in the values of civilization as\r\nshall make possible a full moral life. The old virtue\r\nallowed a man to act more as an individual; the new\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_497\" id=\"Page_497\"\u003e[Pg 497]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nvirtue requires him to act in concerted effort if he is to\r\nachieve results. Individualist theories cannot interpret\r\ncollectivist facts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe changes in the economic and industrial processes by\r\nwhich not only the associated powers of present human\r\nknowledge, skill, and endurance, but also the combined results\r\nof past and future skill and industry are massed\r\nand wielded, depend on several concurrent factors. We\r\nshall notice the social agency, the technique of industry,\r\nthe technique of business, the means of fixing value, and\r\nthe nature of property.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 3. THE AGENCIES FOR CARRYING ON COMMERCE AND\r\nINDUSTRY\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEarly Agencies.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The early agencies for carrying on\r\ntrade and industry were not organized purely for economic\r\npurposes. The kindred or family group engaged in certain\r\nindustries, but this was only part of its purpose.\r\nSo in the various territorial groups. The Athenian city-state\r\nowned the mines; the German village had its forest,\r\nmeadow, and water as a common possession; and the \"common\"\r\nsurvived long in English and American custom,\r\nthough the cattle pastured on it might be individually\r\nowned. In the United States certain land was reserved for\r\nschool purposes, and if retained would now in some cases\r\nbe yielding an almost incredible amount for public use;\r\nbut it has usually been sold to private individuals. The\r\nnational government still retains certain land for forest\r\nreserve, but until the recent movement toward municipal\r\nownership, the civic community had almost ceased to be\r\nan economic factor in England and America, except in the\r\nfield of roads, canals, and the postoffice. In both family\r\nand territorial or community control of industry, we have\r\nthe economic function exercised as only one among several\r\nothers. The economic helped to strengthen the other bonds\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_498\" id=\"Page_498\"\u003e[Pg 498]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof unity. On the other hand, the economic motive could\r\nnot disentangle itself and stand out in all its naked force.\r\nWithin either family or civic group the effects of the acquisitive\r\ninstincts were limited by the fact that individuals\r\nin their industrial relations were also kin or neighbors.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Business Enterprise.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In the business enterprise\u0026mdash;partnership,\r\ncompany, corporation, \"trust,\"\u0026mdash;on the\r\nother hand, men are organized solely for economic purposes.\r\nNo other interests or ends are regarded. Corporations\r\norganized for this purpose \"have no souls,\" because\r\nthey consist of merely the abstract economic interests.\r\nWhile in domestic and territorial agencies the\r\nacquisitive forces were to some degree beneficially controlled,\r\nthey were also injuriously hampered. With the\r\nrise of business enterprise as a distinct sphere of human\r\naction, the way was opened for a new force to manifest\r\nitself. This brought with it both advantages and disadvantages\r\nfor the moral and social life as a whole. On\r\nthe one hand, it increased tremendously the possibilities\r\nof economic and industrial efficiency. The size of the enterprise\r\ncould be as large or as small as was needed for\r\nthe most efficient production, and was not, as in family\r\nor community agency, sometimes too small and sometimes\r\ntoo large. The enterprise could group men according to\r\ntheir capacity for a particular task, and not, as in the\r\nother forms, be compelled to take a group already constituted\r\nby other than economic or industrial causes. Further,\r\nit could without difficulty dispense with the aged or those\r\notherwise unsuited to its purposes. When, moreover,\r\nas is coming to be increasingly the case, great corporations,\r\neach controlling scores or even hundreds of millions\r\nof capital, are linked together in common control, we have\r\na tremendous force which may be wielded as a unit. It is\r\neasy to assume\u0026mdash;indeed it is difficult for managers not\r\nto assume\u0026mdash;that the interests of such colossal organizations\r\nare of supreme importance, and that diplomacy,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_499\" id=\"Page_499\"\u003e[Pg 499]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntariffs, legislation, and courts should be subordinate. The\r\nmoral dangers attaching to such corporations formed\r\nsolely for economic purposes are obvious, and have found\r\nfrequent illustration in their actual workings. Knowing\r\nfew or none of the restraints which control an individual,\r\nthe corporation has treated competitors, employees, and\r\nthe public in a purely economic fashion. This insures\r\ncertain limited species of honesty, but does not include\r\nmotives of private sympathy or public duty.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Labor Union.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Correlative to these corporate\r\ncombinations of capital are Labor Unions of various types.\r\nThey are usually when first organized more complex in motive,\r\nincluding social and educational ends, and are more\r\nemotional, or even passionate in conduct. With age they\r\ntend to become more purely economic. In the United States\r\nthey have sought to secure better wages, to provide benefits\r\nor insurance in case of sickness and death, and to gain\r\nbetter conditions in respect of hours, of child-labor, and of\r\nprotection against dangerous machinery, explosions, and\r\noccupational diseases. In Great Britain they have also\r\nbeen successful in applying the co\u0026ouml;perative plan to the purchase\r\nof goods for consumption. The organizations have\r\nbeen most successful among the skilled trades. For so far\r\nas the aim is collective bargaining, it is evident that the\r\nunion will be effective in proportion as it controls the whole\r\nsupply of labor in the given trade. In the unskilled forms\r\nof labor, especially with a constant flow of immigration,\r\nit is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain organizations\r\ncomparable with the organizations of capital. Hence in\r\nconflicts it is natural to expect the moral situations which\r\nfrequently occur when grossly unequal combatants are opposed.\r\nThe stronger has contempt for the weaker and refuses\r\nto \"recognize\" his existence. The weaker, rendered\r\ndesperate by the hopelessness of his case when he contends\r\nunder rules and with weapons prescribed by the stronger,\r\nrefuses to abide by the rules and resorts to violence\u0026mdash;only\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_500\" id=\"Page_500\"\u003e[Pg 500]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto find that by this he has set himself in opposition to all\r\nthe forces of organized society.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGroup Morality Again.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The striking feature of the\r\nnew conditions is that it means a \u003ci\u003ereversion to group morality\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThat is, it has meant this so far. Society is struggling\r\nto reassert a general moral standard, but it has not\r\nyet found a standard, and has wavered between a rigid insistence\r\nupon outgrown laws on the one hand, and a more\r\nor less emotional and unreasoned sympathy with new demands,\r\nupon the other.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_225_225\" id=\"FNanchor_225_225\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_225_225\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[225]\u003c/a\u003e Group morality meant impersonal,\r\ncollective life. It meant loyalty to one\u0027s own group,\r\nlittle regard for others, lack of responsibility, and lack of a\r\ncompletely social standard. There is, of course, one important\r\ndifference. The present collective, impersonal agencies\r\nare not so na\u0026iuml;ve as the old kinship group. They can\r\nbe used as effective agencies to secure definite ends, while\r\nthe manipulators secure all the advantages of the old\r\nsolidarity and irresponsibility.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMembers and Management.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The corporation in its idea\r\nis democratic. For it provides for the union of a number\r\nof owners, some of them it may be small owners, under an\r\nelected management. It would seem to be an admirable\r\ndevice for maintaining concentration of power with distribution\r\nof ownership. But the very size of modern enterprises\r\nand unions prevents direct control by stockholders\r\nor members. They may dislike a given policy, but they are\r\nindividually helpless. If they attempt to control, it is almost\r\nimpossible, except in an extraordinary crisis, to unite\r\na majority for common action.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_226_226\" id=\"FNanchor_226_226\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_226_226\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[226]\u003c/a\u003e The directors can carry\r\non a policy and at the same time claim to be only agents of\r\nthe stockholders, and therefore not ultimately responsible.\r\nWhat influence can the small shareholders in a railway\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_501\" id=\"Page_501\"\u003e[Pg 501]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncompany, or a great industrial corporation, or labor union,\r\nhave? They unite with ease upon one point only: they\r\nwant dividends or results. When an illegal policy is to\r\nbe pursued, or a legislature or jury is to be bribed, or a\r\nnon-union man is to be \"dealt with,\" the head officials likewise\r\nseek only \"results.\" They turn over the responsibility\r\nto the operating or \"legal\" department, or to the \"educational\r\ncommittee,\" and know nothing further. These departments\r\nare \"agents\" for the stockholders or union, and\r\ntherefore, feel quite at ease. The stockholders are sure\r\nthey never authorized anything wrong. Some corporations\r\nare managed for the interest of a large number of owners;\r\nsome, on the other hand, by ingenious contracts with side\r\ncorporations formed from an inner circle, are managed for\r\nthe benefit of this inner circle. The tendency, moreover, in\r\nthe great corporations is toward a situation in which\r\nboards of directors of the great railroad, banking, insurance,\r\nand industrial concerns are made up of the same\r\nlimited group of men. This aggregate property may then\r\nbe wielded as absolutely as though owned by these individuals.\r\nIf it is used to carry a political election the directors,\r\naccording to New York courts, are not culpable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEmployer and Employed.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The same impersonal relation\r\noften prevails between employer and employed. The\r\nultimate employer is the stockholder, but he delegates\r\npower to the director, and he to the president, and he to\r\nthe foreman. Each is expected to get results. The employed\r\nmay complain about conditions to the president,\r\nand be told that he cannot interfere with the foreman, and\r\nto the foreman and be told that such is the policy of the\r\ncompany. The union may serve as a similar buffer. Often\r\nany individual of the series would act humanely or generously,\r\nif he were acting for himself. He cannot be humane\r\nor generous with the property of others, and hence there\r\nis no humanity or generosity in the whole system. This\r\nsystem seems to have reached its extreme in the creation of\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_502\" id=\"Page_502\"\u003e[Pg 502]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncorporations for the express purpose of relieving employers\r\nof any personal responsibility. Companies organized\r\nto insure employers against claims made by employees on\r\naccount of injuries may be regarded as a device for distributing\r\nthe burden. But as the company is organized,\r\nnot primarily to pay damages, as are life insurance companies,\r\nbut to avoid such payment, it has a powerful motive\r\nin contesting every claim, however just, and in making\r\nit so expensive to prosecute a claim that the victims may\r\nprefer not to make the attempt. The \"law\u0027s delay\" can\r\nnearly always be counted upon as a powerful defense when\r\na poor man is plaintiff and a rich corporation is defendant.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRelations to the Public.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The relations of corporations\r\nto the public, and of the public to corporations, are similarly\r\nimpersonal and non-moral. A convenient way of approach\r\nto this situation is offered by the ethical, or rather\r\nnon-ethical, status of the various mechanical devices which\r\nhave come into use in recent years for performing many\r\neconomic services. The weighing machines, candy machines,\r\ntelephones, are supposed to give a certain service\r\nfor a penny or a nickel. But if the machine is out of order,\r\nthe victim has no recourse. His own attitude is correspondingly\r\nmechanical. He regards himself as dealing, not\r\nwith a person, but with a thing. If he can exploit it or\r\n\"beat\" it, so much the better. Now a corporation, in the\r\nattitude which it takes and evokes, is about half-way between\r\nthe pure mechanism of a machine and the completely\r\npersonal attitude of a moral individual. A man is overcharged,\r\nor has some other difficulty with an official of a\r\nrailroad company. It is as hopeless to look for immediate\r\nrelief as it is in the case of a slot machine. The conductor\r\nis just as much limited by his orders as the machine by its\r\nmechanism. The man may later correspond with some\r\nhigher official, and if patience and life both persist long\r\nenough, he will probably recover. But to prevent fraud,\r\nthe company is obliged to be more rigorous than a person\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_503\" id=\"Page_503\"\u003e[Pg 503]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwould be who was dealing with the case in a personal fashion.\r\nHence the individual with a just grievance is likely to\r\nentertain toward the corporation the feeling that he is\r\ndealing with a machine, not with an ethical being, even as\r\nthe company\u0027s servants are not permitted to exercise any\r\nmoral consideration in dealing with the public. They\r\nmerely obey orders. Public sentiment, which would hold\r\nan individual teamster responsible for running over a child,\r\nor an individual stage owner responsible for reckless or\r\ncareless conduct in carrying his passengers, feels only a\r\nblind rage in the case of a railroad accident. It cannot\r\nfix moral responsibility definitely upon either stockholder\r\nor management or employee, and conversely neither stockholder,\r\nnor manager, nor employee\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_227_227\" id=\"FNanchor_227_227\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_227_227\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[227]\u003c/a\u003e feels the moral restraint\r\nwhich the individual would feel. He is not wholly\r\nresponsible, and his share in the collective responsibility\r\nis so small as often to seem entirely negligible.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRelations to the Law.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The collective business enterprises,\r\nwhen incorporated, are regarded as \"juristic persons,\"\r\nand so gain the support of law as well as become\r\nsubject to its control. If the great corporation can thus\r\ngain the right of an individual, it can enter the field of free\r\ncontract with great advantage. Labor unions have not\r\nincorporated, fearing, perhaps, to give the law control\r\nover their funds. They seek a higher standard of living,\r\nbut private law does not recognize this as a right. It\r\nmerely protects contracts, but leaves it to the individual\r\nto make the best contract he can. As most wage-earners\r\nhave no contracts, but are liable to dismissal at any time,\r\nthe unions have seen little to be gained by incorporation.\r\nThey have thus missed contact with the institution in\r\nwhich society seeks to embody, however tardily, its moral\r\nideas and have been, in a sense, outlaws. They were such\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_504\" id=\"Page_504\"\u003e[Pg 504]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nat first by no fault of their own, for the law treated such\r\ncombinations as conspiracies. And they are still at two\r\ndecided disadvantages. First, the capitalistic or employing\r\ncorporation acting as a single juristic person may\r\nrefuse to buy the labor of a union; indeed, according to a\r\nrecent decision, it cannot be forbidden to discharge its employees\r\nbecause of their membership in a union. As the\r\ncorporation may employ scores of thousands, and be practically\r\nthe only employer of a particular kind of labor, it\r\ncan thus enforce a virtual boycott and prevent the union\r\nfrom selling its labor. It does not need to use a \"blacklist\"\r\nbecause the employers are all combined in one \"person.\"\r\nOn the other hand, the union is adjudged to act in\r\nrestraint of interstate commerce if it boycotts the employing\r\ncorporation. The union is here treated as a combination,\r\nnot as a single person. The second point in which the\r\nemploying body has greatly the legal advantage appears\r\nin the case of a strike. Men are allowed to quit work, but\r\nthis is not an effective method of exerting pressure unless\r\nthe employer is anxious to keep his plant in operation and\r\ncan employ no one else. If he can take advantage of an\r\nopen labor market and hire other workmen, the only resource\r\nof the strikers is to induce these to join their ranks.\r\nBut they have been enjoined by the courts, not only from\r\nintimidating, but even from persuading\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_228_228\" id=\"FNanchor_228_228\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_228_228\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[228]\u003c/a\u003e employees to quit\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_505\" id=\"Page_505\"\u003e[Pg 505]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwork. The method of procedure in enforcing the injunction,\r\nwhich enables the judge to fix the offense, eliminate\r\ntrial by jury, determine the guilt, and impose any penalty\r\nhe deems fit, has all the results of criminal process with\r\nnone of its limitations, and forms a most effective agency\r\nagainst the unions. Where persuasion is enjoined it is\r\ndifficult to see how a union can exert any effective pressure\r\nexcept in a highly skilled trade, where it can control all\r\nthe labor supply. In the field of private rights and free\r\ncontract, the labor unions are then at a disadvantage because\r\nthey have no rights which are of any value for their\r\npurposes, except, under certain conditions, the right to\r\nrefuse to work. And since this is, in most cases, a weapon\r\nthat injures its wielder far more than his opponent, it is\r\nnot effective.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDisappointed in the field of free contract, the labor\r\nunions seek to enlist public agency in behalf of better sanitary\r\nconditions and in prevention of child-labor, long hours\r\nfor women, unfair contracts, and the like. Capitalistic\r\ncorporations frequently resist this change of venue on the\r\nground that it interferes with free contract or takes away\r\nproperty without \"due process of law,\" and many laws\r\nhave been set aside as unconstitutional on these grounds,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_229_229\" id=\"FNanchor_229_229\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_229_229\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[229]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_506\" id=\"Page_506\"\u003e[Pg 506]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nseveral of them no doubt because so drawn as to appear to\r\nbe in the interest of a class, rather than in that of the\r\npublic. The trend in the direction of asserting larger public\r\ncontrol both under the police power and over corporations\r\nin whose service the public has a direct interest, will\r\nbe noted later. Against other corporations the general\r\npublic or the unsuccessful competitor has sought legal aid\r\nin legislation against \"trusts,\" but this has mainly proved\r\nto be futile. It has merely induced a change in form of\r\norganization. Nor has it been easy as yet for the law to\r\nexercise any effective control over the business corporation\r\non any of the three principles invoked\u0026mdash;namely: to\r\nprevent monopoly, to secure the public interest in the case\r\nof public service corporations, and to assert police power.\r\nFor penalties by fine frequently fail to reach the guilty\r\npersons, and it is difficult to fix any personal responsibility.\r\nJuries are unwilling to convict subordinate officials of acts\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_507\" id=\"Page_507\"\u003e[Pg 507]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich they believe to have been required by the policy of the\r\nhigher officials, while, on the other hand, the higher officials\r\nare seldom directly cognizant of criminal acts. Gradually,\r\nhowever, we may believe that the law will find a way\r\nto make both capital and labor organizations respect the\r\npublic welfare, and to give them support in their desirable\r\nends. The co\u0026ouml;perative principle cannot be outlawed; it\r\nmust be more fully socialized.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 4. THE METHODS OF PRODUCTION, EXCHANGE, AND\r\nVALUATION\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Machine.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The technique of production has shown\r\na similar progress from individual to collective method.\r\nThe earlier method was that of handicraft. The present\r\nmethod in most occupations, aside from agriculture, is\r\nthat of the machine. But the great economic advantage\r\nof the machine is not only in the substitution of mechanical\r\npower for muscle; it is also in the substitution of collective\r\nfor individual work. It is the machine which makes possible\r\non a tremendously effective basis the division of labor\r\nand its social organization. The extraordinary increase\r\nin wealth during the past century depends upon these two\r\nfactors. The machine itself moreover, in its enormous expansion,\r\nis not only a social tool, but a social product. The\r\ninvention and discovery which gave rise to the new processes\r\nin industry of every sort were largely the outcome of\r\nscientific researches carried on at public expense to a great\r\nextent by men other than those who finally utilize their\r\nresults. They become in turn the instruments for the\r\nproduction of wealth, which is thus doubly social in origin.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis machine process has an important bearing upon\r\nthe factors of character mentioned in our analysis. It\r\nstandardizes efficiency; it calls for extraordinary increase\r\nof speed; it requires great specialization of function and\r\noften calls for no knowledge of the whole process. On the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_508\" id=\"Page_508\"\u003e[Pg 508]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nother hand, it gives a certain sense of power to control and\r\ndirect highly complicated machinery. In the more skilled\r\ntrades there is more time and resource for intellectual, \u0026aelig;sthetic,\r\nor social satisfactions. The association of workmen\r\nfavors discussion of common interests, sympathy, and\r\nco\u0026ouml;peration; this may evoke a readiness to sacrifice individual\r\nto group welfare, which is quite analogous to\r\npatriotic sentiment at its best, even if it is liable to such\r\nviolent expressions as characterize patriotic sentiment at\r\nits worst. The association of workmen is one of the most\r\nsignificant features of modern industry.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCapital and Credit.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The technique of exchange of services\r\nand goods has undergone a transformation from an\r\nindividual and limited to a collective and almost unlimited\r\nmethod. The earlier form of exchange and barter limited\r\nthe conduct of business to a small area, and the simpler\r\nform of personal service involved either slavery or some\r\npersonal control which was almost as direct. With the use\r\nof money it became possible to make available a far greater\r\narea for exchange and to accumulate capital which represented\r\nthe past labors of vast numbers of individuals.\r\nWith the further discovery of the possibilities of a credit\r\nsystem which business enterprise now employs, it is possible\r\nto utilize in any enterprise not merely the results of the\r\nlabor of the past, but the anticipated income of the future.\r\nA corporation, as organized at present, issues obligations\r\nin the form of bonds and stock which represent no value as\r\nyet produced, but only the values of labor or privilege anticipated.\r\nThe whole technique, therefore, of capital and\r\ncredit means a collective business enterprise. It masses the\r\nwork and the abilities of thousands and hundreds of thousands\r\nin the past and the future, and wields the product as\r\nan almost irresistible agency to achieve new enterprises or\r\nto drive from the field rival enterprises.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBasis of Valuation.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The whole basis for value and\r\nprices has also been changed. The old basis, employed for\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_509\" id=\"Page_509\"\u003e[Pg 509]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe most part through the Middle Ages in fixing the value\r\nof labor or goods, was the amount of labor and material\r\nwhich had been expended. The modern basis is that of supply\r\nand demand. This proceeds on the theory that it is human\r\nwants which after all give value to any product. I may\r\nhave expended time and labor upon a book or carving, or\r\nin the cultivation of a new vegetable, or in the manufacture\r\nof an article for apparel, but if no one cares to read the\r\nbook or look at the carving, if the vegetable is one that no\r\none can eat, or the garment is one that no one will wear, it\r\nhas no value. Starting then from this, we can see how\r\nthe two elements in valuation\u0026mdash;namely, demand and supply\u0026mdash;are\r\naffected by social factors. The demand for an\r\narticle depends upon the market: i.e., upon how many\r\nbuyers there are, and what wants they have. Modern\r\nmethods of communication and transportation have made\r\nthe market for goods as large as the civilized world. Education\r\nis constantly awakening new wants. The facilities\r\nfor communication, for travel, and for education are constantly\r\nleading one part of the world to imitate the standards\r\nor fashions set by other parts. We have, therefore,\r\na social standard for valuation which is constantly extending\r\nin area and in intensity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe other factor in valuation, namely, the supply, is\r\nlikewise being affected in an increasing degree by social\r\nforces. With many, if not with most, of the commodities\r\nwhich are of greatest importance, it has been found that\r\nthere is less profit in an unrestricted supply than in a supply\r\nregulated in the interest of the producers. The great\r\ncoal mines, the iron industries, the manufacturers of clothing,\r\nfind it more profitable to combine and produce a limited\r\namount. The great corporations and trusts have usually\r\nsignalized their acquisition of a monopoly or an approximate\r\ncontrol of any great field of production by shutting\r\ndown part of the factories formerly engaged. The supply\r\nof labor is likewise limited by the policies of labor unions\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_510\" id=\"Page_510\"\u003e[Pg 510]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin limiting the number of apprentices allowed, or by other\r\nmeans of keeping the union small. Tariffs, whether in the\r\ninterest of capital or of labor, are a social control of the\r\nsupply. Franchises, whether of steam railroads, street\r\ntransportation, gas, electric lighting, or other public\r\nutilities so-called, are all of them in the nature of\r\nmonopolies granted to a certain group of individuals.\r\nTheir value is dependent upon the general need of\r\nthese utilities, coupled with the public limitation of\r\nsupply. In many cases the services are so indispensable\r\nto the community that the servant does not need to give\r\nspecial care or thought to the rendering of especially\r\nefficient service. The increase in population makes the\r\nfranchises enormously profitable without any corresponding\r\nincrease of risk or effort on the part of the utility\r\ncompany.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the most striking illustration of the creation of\r\nvalues by society is seen in the case of land. That an acre\r\nof land in one part of the country is worth fifty dollars, and\r\nin another part two hundred thousand dollars,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_230_230\" id=\"FNanchor_230_230\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_230_230\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[230]\u003c/a\u003e is not due\r\nto any difference in the soil, nor for the most part to any\r\nlabor or skill or other quality of the owner. It is due to\r\nthe fact that in the one case there is no social demand,\r\nwhereas, in the other, the land is in the heart of a city. In\r\ncertain cases, no doubt, the owner of city real estate may\r\nhelp by his enterprise to build up the city, but even if so\r\nthis is incidental. The absentee owner profits as much by\r\nthe growth of the city as the foremost contributor to that\r\ngrowth. The owner need not even improve the property\r\nby a building. This enormous increase in land values has\r\nbeen called the \"unearned increment.\" In America it is due\r\nvery largely to features of natural location and transportation.\r\nIt has seemed to some writers, such as Henry\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_511\" id=\"Page_511\"\u003e[Pg 511]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nGeorge, not only a conspicuous injustice, but the root of all\r\neconomic evil. It is, no doubt, in many cases, a conspicuous\r\nform of \"easy money,\" but the principle is not different\r\nfrom that which is involved in nearly all departments of\r\nmodern industry. The wealth of modern society is really\r\na gigantic pool. No individual knows how much he creates;\r\nit is a social product. To estimate what any one should\r\nreceive by an attempted estimate of what he has individually\r\ncontributed is absolutely impossible.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 5. THE FACTORS WHICH AID ETHICAL RECONSTRUCTION\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe two distinctive features of the modern economic situation,\r\nits collective character and its impersonal character,\r\nare themselves capable of supplying valuable aid toward\r\nunderstanding the ethical problems and in making the\r\nreconstruction required. For \u003ci\u003ethe very magnitude of modern\r\noperations and properties serves to bring out more\r\nclearly the principles involved\u003c/i\u003e. \u003ci\u003eThe impersonal character\r\nallows economic forces pure and simple to be seen in their\r\nmoral bearings.\u003c/i\u003e Publicity becomes a necessity. Just as\r\nthe factories are compelled to have better light, air, and\r\nsanitation than the sweat shops, so public attention is\r\naroused and the conscience stimulated by practices of great\r\ncorporations, although these practices may be in principle\r\nprecisely the same as those of private persons which escape\r\nmoral reprobation. In some cases, no doubt, the very magnitude\r\nof the operation does actually change the principle.\r\nA \"lift\" on the road from an oldtime stage-driver, or a\r\n\"special bargain\" at a country store was not likely to disturb\r\nthe balance of competition as a system of free passes\r\nor secret rebates may in modern business. But in other\r\ncases what the modern organizations have done is simply\r\nto exhibit the workings of competition or other economic\r\nforces \u003ci\u003eon a larger scale\u003c/i\u003e. An illustration of this is seen in\r\nthe familiar fact that a law passed to correct some corpo\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_512\" id=\"Page_512\"\u003e[Pg 512]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003erate\r\npractice is often found to apply to many practices\r\nnot contemplated by the makers of the law.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe effect of getting a principle out into the open and\r\nat work on a large scale is to make public judgment clear\r\nand reprobation of bad practices more effective. The impersonal\r\nfactor likewise contributes powerfully to make\r\ncondemnation easy. Criticism is unhampered by the considerations\r\nwhich complicate the situation when the conduct\r\nof an individual is in question. The individual may be a\r\ngood neighbor, or a good fellow, or have had bad luck.\r\nBut no one hesitates to express his opinion of a corporation,\r\nand the average jury is not biased in its favor, whatever\r\nmay be true of the bench. Even the plea that the corporation\r\nincludes widows and orphans among its shareholders,\r\nwhich is occasionally put forth to avert interference\r\nwith corporate practices, usually falls on unsympathetic\r\nears. A higher standard will be demanded for business\r\nconduct, a more rigid regard for public service will be\r\nexacted, a more moderate return for invested capital in\r\npublic service, and a more liberal treatment of employees\r\nwill be insisted upon from corporations than from private\r\nindividuals. Nor does the organization of labor escape the\r\nsame law. When an agent of a union has been detected in\r\ncalling a strike for private gain, public sentiment has been\r\nas severe in condemnation as in the case of corporate officials\r\nwho have profited at the expense of stockholders.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSummary.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We may summarize some of the chief points\r\nbrought out by our analysis. Modern technique has increased\r\nenormously the productivity of labor, but has increased\r\nits dangers to health and life, and to some extent\r\ndiminished its educating and moralizing values. The impersonal\r\nagencies give vast power, but make responsibility\r\ndifficult to locate. The collective agencies and the social\r\ncontributions make the economic process a great social\r\npool. Men put in manual labor, skill, capital. Some\r\nof it they have inherited from their kin; some they\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_513\" id=\"Page_513\"\u003e[Pg 513]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhave inherited from the inventors and scientists who have\r\ndevised tools and processes; some they have wrought\r\nthemselves. This pooling of effort is possible because of\r\ngood government and institutions which were created by\r\nstatesmen, patriots, and reformers, and are maintained by\r\nsimilar agencies. The pool is immensely productive. But\r\nno one can say just how much his contribution earns.\r\nShall every one keep what he can get? Shall all share\r\nalike? Or shall there be other rules for division\u0026mdash;either\r\nmade and enforced by society or made by the individual\r\nand enforced by his own conscience? Are our present rules\r\nadequate to such a situation as that of the present? These\r\nare some of the difficult questions that modern conditions\r\nare pressing upon the man who thinks.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBesides the classic treatises of Adam Smith, J. S. Mill, and Karl\r\nMarx, which are important for the relation of the economic to the\r\nwhole social order during the past century, the following recent works\r\nin the general field give especial prominence to the ethical problems\r\ninvolved: Marshall, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Economics\u003c/i\u003e, 1898; Hadley, \u003ci\u003eEconomics\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1896; Clark, \u003ci\u003eEssentials of Economic Theory as Applied to Modern\r\nProblems of Industry and Public Policy\u003c/i\u003e, 1907; George, \u003ci\u003eProgress and\r\nPoverty\u003c/i\u003e, 1879; Schmoller, \u003ci\u003eGrundriss der allgemeinen Staatswirtschaftslehre\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1900-04; Bonar, \u003ci\u003ePhilosophy and Political Economy\u003c/i\u003e, 1893;\r\nHobson, \u003ci\u003eThe Social Problem\u003c/i\u003e, 1901; Brooks, \u003ci\u003eThe Social Unrest\u003c/i\u003e, 1903.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eOn Modern Business and Industry\u003c/span\u003e: Veblen, \u003ci\u003eThe Theory of\r\nBusiness Enterprise\u003c/i\u003e, 1904; Taylor, \u003ci\u003eThe Modern Factory System\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1891; Hobson, \u003ci\u003eEvolution of Modern Capitalism\u003c/i\u003e, 1894; Toynbee, \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nIndustrial Revolution\u003c/i\u003e, 1890; Adams and Sumner, \u003ci\u003eLabor Problems\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1905; S. and B. Webb, \u003ci\u003eHistory of Trade Unionism\u003c/i\u003e, 1894, \u003ci\u003eProblems\r\nof Modern Industry\u003c/i\u003e, 1898, and \u003ci\u003eIndustrial Democracy\u003c/i\u003e, 1902; Mitchell,\r\n\u003ci\u003eOrganized Labor\u003c/i\u003e, 1903; Ely, \u003ci\u003eThe Labor Movement in America\u003c/i\u003e, 1886;\r\nHollander and Barnett, \u003ci\u003eStudies in American Trades Unionism\u003c/i\u003e, 1907;\r\nHenderson, \u003ci\u003eSocial Elements\u003c/i\u003e, 1898, chs. vii.-x.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_223_223\" id=\"Footnote_223_223\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_223_223\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[223]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Veblen, \u003ci\u003eTheory of Business Enterprise\u003c/i\u003e, p. 291.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_224_224\" id=\"Footnote_224_224\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_224_224\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[224]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eRepublic\u003c/i\u003e, 550. Davies and Vaughan.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_225_225\" id=\"Footnote_225_225\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_225_225\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[225]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e E.g., in a strike there is sometimes a toleration by public sentiment\r\nof a certain amount of violence where it is believed that there\r\nis no legal remedy for unfair conditions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_226_226\" id=\"Footnote_226_226\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_226_226\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[226]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Recent elections in the great insurance companies have shown\r\nthis.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_227_227\" id=\"Footnote_227_227\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_227_227\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[227]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"J. O. Fagan,\" in the \u003ci\u003eAtlantic Monthly\u003c/i\u003e (1908), has called attention\r\nto the influence of the union in shielding individuals from the\r\npenalties of carelessness.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_228_228\" id=\"Footnote_228_228\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_228_228\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[228]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Recent Illinois decisions (216 Ill., 358 f., and especially 232 Ill.,\r\n431-440) uphold sweeping injunctions against persuasion, no matter\r\nhow peaceable. \"Lawful competition, which may injure the business\r\nof a person, even though successfully directed to driving him out\r\nof business, is not actionable.\" But for a union to hire laborers away\r\nfrom an employer by money or transportation is not \"lawful competition.\"\r\nThe object is assumed by the court to be malicious, i.e., the\r\ninjury of the employer. The court does not entertain the possibility\r\nthat to obtain an eight-hour day is as lawful an aim for the\r\nlabor union as to acquire property is for an employer. The decision\r\nshows clearly the difference in legal attitude toward pressure exerted\r\nby business corporations for the familiar end of acquisition, and that\r\nexerted by the union for the novel end of a standard of living.\r\nThe court regards the injury to others as incidental in the former, but\r\nas primary and therefore as malicious in the latter. It may be that\r\nfuture generations will regard this judicial psychology somewhat\r\nas we regard some of the cases cited above, ch. xxi. Other courts\r\nhave not always taken this view, and have permitted persuasion\r\nunless it is employed in such a manner or under such circumstances\r\nas to \"operate on fears rather than upon their judgments or their\r\nsympathies\" (17., \u003ci\u003eN. Y. Supp.\u003c/i\u003e, 264). For other cases, \u003ci\u003eAm. and Eng.\r\nDecisions in Equity\u003c/i\u003e, 1905, p. 565 f.; also \u003ci\u003eEddy on Combinations\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_229_229\" id=\"Footnote_229_229\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_229_229\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[229]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The list appended was bulletined at the Chicago Industrial Exhibit\r\nof 1906, and reprinted in \u003ci\u003eCharities and The Commons\u003c/i\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"What \u0027Freedom of Contract\u0027 has Meant to Labor:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n1. Denial of eight-hour law for women in Illinois.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n2. Denial of eight-hour law for city labor or for mechanics and\r\nordinary laborers.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n3. Denial of ten-hour law for bakers.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n4. Inability to prohibit tenement labor.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n5. Inability to prevent by law employer from requiring employee\r\nas condition of securing work, to assume all risk from injury\r\nwhile at work.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n6. Inability to prohibit employer selling goods to employees at\r\ngreater profit than to non-employees.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n7. Inability to prohibit mine owners screening coal which is mined\r\nby weight before crediting same to employees as basis of wages.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n8. Inability to legislate against employer using coercion to prevent\r\nemployee becoming a member of a labor union.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n9. Inability to restrict employer in making deductions from wages\r\nof employees.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n10. Inability to compel by law payment of wages at regular\r\nintervals.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n12. Inability to provide by law that laborers on public works\r\nshall be paid prevailing rate of wages.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n13. Inability to compel by law payment of extra compensation\r\nfor overtime.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n14. Inability to prevent by law employer from holding back part\r\nof wages.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n15. Inability to compel payment of wages in cash; so that employer\r\nmay pay in truck or scrip not redeemable in lawful money.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n16. Inability to forbid alien labor on municipal contracts.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n17. Inability to secure by law union label on city printing.\"\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nLabor representatives speak of \"the ironic manner in which the\r\ncourts guarantee to workers: The right to be maimed and killed without\r\nliability to the employer; the right to be discharged for belonging\r\nto a union; the right to work as many hours as employers please\r\nand under any considerations which they may impose.\" The \"irony\"\r\nis, of course, not intended by the courts. It is the irony inherent in a\r\nsituation when rules designed to secure justice become futile, if not\r\na positive cause of injustice, because of changed conditions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_230_230\" id=\"Footnote_230_230\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_230_230\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[230]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In Greater New York. An acre on Manhattan Island is of course\r\nworth much more. The Report of the New York Tax Department for\r\n1907 is very suggestive.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_514\" id=\"Page_514\"\u003e[Pg 514]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER XXIII\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nSOME PRINCIPLES IN THE ECONOMIC ORDER\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCertain problems suggested by the foregoing analysis\r\nare unsettled, for the issues are so involved, and in some\r\ncases, both the facts and their interpretations are so much\r\nin controversy, that we cannot yet formulate sure moral\r\njudgments. On the other hand, certain principles emerge\r\nwith a good degree of clearness. We state some of the\r\nmore obvious.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. Wealth and Property are Subordinate in Importance\r\nto Personality.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The life is more than meat. Most\r\nagree to this, stated abstractly, but many fail to make\r\nthe application. They may sacrifice their own health,\r\nor human sympathy, or family life; or they may consent\r\nto this actively or passively as employers, or consumers,\r\nor citizens, in the case of others. A civilization which\r\nloses life in providing the means to live is not highly\r\nmoral. A society which can afford luxuries for some cannot\r\neasily justify unhealthful conditions of production,\r\nor lack of general education. An individual who gratifies\r\na single appetite at the expense of vitality and efficiency\r\nis immoral. A society which considers wealth or\r\nproperty as ultimate, whether under a conception of \"natural\r\nrights\" or otherwise, is setting the means above the\r\nend, and is therefore unmoral or immoral.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Wealth Should Depend on Activity.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The highest\r\naspect of life on its individual side is found in active and\r\nresolute achievement, in the embodying of purpose in action.\r\nThought, discovery, creation, mark a higher value\r\nthan the satisfaction of wants, or the amassing of goods.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_515\" id=\"Page_515\"\u003e[Pg 515]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIf the latter is to be a help it must stimulate activity,\r\nnot deaden it. Inherited wealth without any accompanying\r\nincitement from education or class feeling or public\r\nopinion would be a questionable institution from this point\r\nof view. Veblen in his \u003ci\u003eTheory of the Leisure Class\u003c/i\u003e\r\npoints out various forms of degeneration that may attend\r\nupon leisure, when leisure means not merely release from\r\nmechanical labor in the interest of more intellectual activity,\r\nbut a relinquishing of all serious labor. As the race\r\nhas made its ascent in the presence of an environment\r\nwhich has constantly selected the more active persons, society\r\nin its institutions and consciously directed processes\r\nmay well plan to keep this balance between activity and\r\nreward. Modern charity has adopted this principle. We\r\nfear to pauperize by giving aid to the poor unless we can\r\nprovide some form of self-help. But in its treatment of\r\nthe rich, society is not solicitous. Our provisions for inheritance\r\nof property undoubtedly pauperize a certain\r\nproportion of those who inherit. Whether this can be\r\nprevented without interfering with motives to activity on\r\nthe part of those who acquire the property, or whether\r\nthe rich thus pauperized are not as well worth saving to\r\nsociety as the poor, will undoubtedly become more pressing\r\nproblems as the number of inheritors increases, and society\r\nrecognizes that it may have a duty to its idle rich\r\nas well as to its idle poor.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. Public Service Should Go Along with Wealth.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Note\r\nthat we do not say, \"wealth should be proportionate\r\nto public service.\" This would take us at once into the\r\ncontroversy between the individualist and the socialist\r\nwhich we shall consider later among the unsettled problems.\r\nThe individualist, as represented, for example, by\r\nHerbert Spencer, would say that except for the young,\r\nthe aged, or the sick, reward should be proportioned to\r\nmerit. The socialist, on the other hand, is more inclined\r\nto say, \"From each according to his ability, to each ac\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_516\" id=\"Page_516\"\u003e[Pg 516]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ecording\r\nto his needs.\" In either case, it is assumed that\r\nthere should be public service. Leaving for later consideration\r\nthe question whether we can fix any quantitative\r\nrule, let us notice at this time why some service is a fundamental\r\nmoral principle.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch service in the form of some economically useful\r\ncontribution, whether to the production and distribution\r\nof goods, to the public order, to education, to the satisfaction\r\nof \u0026aelig;sthetic and religious wants, might be demanded\r\nas a matter of common honesty. This would be\r\nto treat it as a just claim made by society upon each of\r\nits members. There is, of course, no legal claim. The\r\nlaw is far from adopting as a universal maxim, \"If any\r\nman will not work, neither let him eat.\" Vagrancy is not\r\na term applied to all idlers. It is sufficient for the law if\r\nsome of a man\u0027s ancestors obtained possession and title by\r\nservice, or force, or gift. Modern law, in its zeal to\r\nstrengthen the institution of property, releases all the\r\nowner\u0027s posterity forever from the necessity of any useful\r\nservice. The old theology used to carry the conception\r\nof inherited or imputed sin and merit to extremes\r\nwhich modern individualism rejects. But the law\u0026mdash;at\r\nleast in the United States\u0026mdash;permits a perpetual descent\r\nof inherited property; i.e., of inherited permission to receive\r\nfrom society without rendering any personal return.\r\nTheologically and morally, however, the man of to-day\r\nrepudiates any conception which would reduce him to a\r\nshadow of another. He wishes to stand on his own feet,\r\nto be rewarded or blamed according to his own acts, not\r\nbecause of a deed of some one else. To follow out this\r\nprinciple in the economic sphere would require that every\r\nman who receives aught from others should feel in duty\r\nbound to render some service. Merely \"to have been\r\nborn\" is hardly sufficient in a democratic society, however\r\nmunificent a contribution to the social weal the French\r\naristocrat may have felt this to be.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_517\" id=\"Page_517\"\u003e[Pg 517]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut it is only one aspect of the case to say that society\r\nmay claim service as a just due. There is another aspect\u0026mdash;what\r\nthis service means to the person himself. It\r\nis his opportunity to fulfill his function in the social organism.\r\nNow a person is as large as his purpose and\r\nwill. The person, therefore, who identifies his purposes\r\nwith the welfare of the public is thereby identifying himself\r\nwith the whole social body. He is no longer himself\r\nalone; he is a social power. Not only the leader of society,\r\nbut every efficient servant makes himself an organ through\r\nwhich society itself acts and moves forward. This is perhaps\r\nmost conspicuous in the case of the great inventors\r\nor organizers of industry and society. By serving civilization\r\nthey have become its bearers and have thus shared\r\nits highest pulses. But it is true of every laborer. As\r\nhe is an active contributor he becomes creative, not merely\r\nreceptive.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4. The Change from Individual to Collective Methods,\r\nof Industry and Business Demands a Change from Individual\r\nto Collective Types of Morality.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Moral action is\r\neither to accomplish some positive good or to hinder\r\nsome wrong or evil. But under present conditions the\r\nindividual by himself is practically helpless and useless\r\nfor either purpose. It was formerly possible for a man\r\nto set a high standard and live up to it, irrespective of\r\nthe practice or co\u0026ouml;peration of others. When a seller\u0027s\r\nmarket was limited to his acquaintance or a limited territory,\r\nit might well be that honesty or even fair dealing\r\nwas the best policy. But with the changes that have come\r\nin business conditions the worse practices, like a baser\r\ncoinage, tend to drive out the morally better. This may\r\nnot apply so thoroughly to the relations between seller\r\nand buyer, but it applies to many aspects of trade. A\r\nmerchant may desire to pay his women clerks wages on\r\nwhich they can support life without selling their souls.\r\nBut if his rival across the street pays only half the wage\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_518\" id=\"Page_518\"\u003e[Pg 518]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnecessary for subsistence, it is evident the former is in\r\nso far at a disadvantage. Extend the same policy. Let\r\nthe former have his goods made under good conditions\r\nand the latter have no scruple against \"sweating\"; let\r\nthe former pay taxes on an honest estimate and the latter\r\n\"see\" the assessor, or threaten to move out of town if\r\nhe is assessed for more than a figure named by himself;\r\nlet the former ask only for a fair chance, while the latter\r\nsecures legislation that favors his own interests, or gets\r\nspecifications for bids worded so that they will exclude\r\nhis opponents, or in selling to public bodies \"fixes\" the\r\ncouncils or school committees, or obtains illegal favors\r\nin transportation. Let this continue, and how long\r\nwill the former stay in the field? Even as regards quality\r\nof goods, where it would seem more plausible that honest\r\ndealing might succeed, experience has shown that this\r\ndepends on whether the frauds can be easily detected.\r\nIn the case of drugs and goods where the adulterations\r\ncannot be readily discovered, there is nothing to offset the\r\nmore economical procedure of the fraudulent dealer. The\r\nfact that it is so difficult to procure pure drugs and\r\npure food would seem to be most plausibly due to the fatal\r\ncompetition of the adulterated article.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOr, suppose a person has a little property invested in\r\nsome one of the various corporations which offer the\r\nmost convenient method for placing small sums as\r\nwell as large. This railroad defies the government by\r\nowning coal mines as well as transporting the product;\r\nthat public service corporation has obtained its franchise\r\nby bribery; this corporation is an employer of child labor;\r\nthat finds it less expensive to pay a few damage suits\u0026mdash;those\r\nit cannot fight successfully\u0026mdash;than to adopt devices\r\nwhich will protect employees. Does a man, or even\r\nan institution, act morally if he invests in such corporations\r\nin which he finds himself helpless as an individual\r\nstockholder? And if he sells his stock at the market\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_519\" id=\"Page_519\"\u003e[Pg 519]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nprice to invest the money elsewhere, is it not still the price\r\nof fraud or blood? If, finally, he buys insurance for his\r\nfamily\u0027s support, recent investigation has shown that he\r\nmay have been contributing unawares to bribery of legislatures,\r\nand to the support of political theories to which\r\nhe may be morally opposed. The individual cannot be\r\nmoral in independence. The modern business collectivism\r\nforces a collective morality. Just as the individual cannot\r\nresist the combination, so individual morality must\r\ngive place to a more robust or social type.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e5. To Meet the Change to Corporate Agency and\r\nOwnership, Ways Must be Found to Restore Personal\r\nControl and Responsibility.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Freedom and responsibility\r\nmust go hand in hand. The \"moral liability limited\"\r\ntheory cannot be accepted in the simple form in which\r\nit now obtains. If society holds stockholders responsible,\r\nthey will soon cease to elect managers merely on an economic\r\nbasis and will demand morality. If directors are\r\nheld personally responsible for their \"legal department,\"\r\nor union officials for their committees, directors and officials\r\nwill find means to know what their subordinates are\r\ndoing. \"Crime is always personal,\" and it is not usual\r\nfor subordinates to commit crimes for the corporation\r\nagainst the explicit wishes of the higher officials. In certain\r\nlines the parties concerned have voluntarily sought\r\nto restore a more personal relation.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_231_231\" id=\"FNanchor_231_231\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_231_231\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[231]\u003c/a\u003e It has been found\r\nprofitable to engage foremen who can get on smoothly\r\nwith workmen. It has proved to be good economy to treat\r\nmen, whether they sell labor or buy it, with respect\r\nand fairness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe managers of some of the great public service corporations\r\nhave also recently shown a disposition to recognize\r\nsome public obligations, with the na\u0026iuml;ve admission that\r\nthis has been neglected. Labor unions are coming to see\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_520\" id=\"Page_520\"\u003e[Pg 520]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe need of conciliating public opinion if they are to gain\r\ntheir contests.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e6. To Meet the Impersonal Agencies Society Must\r\nRequire Greater Publicity and Express Its Moral Standards\r\nMore Fully in Law.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Publicity is not a cure for\r\nbad practices, but it is a powerful deterrent agency so\r\nlong as the offenders care for public opinion and not\r\nsolely for the approval of their own class. Professor\r\nRoss\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_232_232\" id=\"FNanchor_232_232\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_232_232\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[232]\u003c/a\u003e maintains that in the United States classes are\r\nstill so loosely formed that general approval is desired\r\nby the leaders. Hence he urges that it is possible to\r\nenforce moral standards by the \"grilling of sinners.\"\r\nBut to make this \"grilling\" a moral process society needs\r\nmuch more accurate information and a more impartial\r\nbasis for selecting its sinners than present agencies\r\nafford. The public press is itself in many respects one\r\nof the most conspicuous examples of the purely economic\r\nmotive. The newspaper or magazine must interest readers\r\nand not displease advertisers. The news is selected, or\r\ncolored, or worked up to suit particular classes. If a\r\nspeaker says what the reporter does not regard as interesting\r\nhe is likely to find himself reported as saying\r\nsomething more striking. Publicity bureaus are able to\r\npoint with pride to the amount of matter, favorable to\r\ncertain interests, which they place before the public as\r\nnews. The particular interests singled out for \"exposure\"\r\nare likely to be determined more by the anticipated effects\r\non circulation or advertising than by the merits of the\r\ncase. It is scarcely more satisfactory to leave all the\r\neducation of public opinion to commercial control than\r\nto leave all elementary education to private interests.\r\nPublicity\u0026mdash;scientific investigation and public discussion\u0026mdash;is\r\nindeed indispensable, and its greatest value is probably\r\nnot in the exhilarating discharge of righteous indignation,\r\nbut in the positive elevation of standards, by giv\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_521\" id=\"Page_521\"\u003e[Pg 521]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eing\r\ncompleter knowledge and showing the fruits of certain\r\npractices. A large proportion of the public will wish to\r\ndo the right thing if they can see it clearly, and can have\r\npublic support, so that right action will not mean suicide.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the logical way to meet the impersonal character\r\nof modern economic agencies is by the moral consciousness\r\nembodied in an impersonal agency, the law. The\r\nlaw is not to be regarded chiefly as an agency for punishing\r\ncriminals. It, in the first place, defines a standard;\r\nand, in the next place, \u003ci\u003eit helps the morally disposed to\r\nmaintain this standard by freeing him from unscrupulous\r\ncompetition\u003c/i\u003e. It is a general principle that to resort to\r\nthe law is an ethical gain only when the getting something\r\ndone is more important than to get it done from the\r\nright motive. This evidently applies to acts of corporate\r\nbodies. We do not care for their motives. We are not\r\nconcerned to save their souls. We are concerned only\r\nfor results\u0026mdash;just the place where we have seen that the\r\npersonal responsibility breaks down. The value of good\r\nmotives and moral purpose is in this case located in those\r\nwho strive to secure and execute progressive legislation\r\nfor the public good, and in the personal spirit with which\r\nthis is accepted and carried out by officials.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_233_233\" id=\"FNanchor_233_233\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_233_233\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[233]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e7. Every Member of Society Should Share in Its\r\nWealth and in the Values Made Possible by It.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\nquantitative basis of division and the method for giving\r\neach a share belong to the unsettled problems. But the\r\nworth and dignity of every human being of moral capacity\r\nis fundamental in nearly every moral system of modern\r\ntimes. It is implicit in the Christian doctrine of the\r\nworth of the soul, in the Kantian doctrine of personality,\r\nin the Benthamic dictum, \"every man to count as one.\"\r\nIt is imbedded in our democratic theory and institutions.\r\nWith the leveling and equalizing of physical and mental\r\npower brought about by modern inventions and the spread\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_522\" id=\"Page_522\"\u003e[Pg 522]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof intelligence, no State is permanently safe except on a\r\nfoundation of justice. And justice cannot be fundamentally\r\nin contradiction with the essence of democracy.\r\nThis means that wealth must be produced, distributed,\r\nand owned justly: that is, so as to promote the individuality\r\nof every member of society, while at the same\r\ntime he must always function as a member, not as an\r\nindividual. In defining justice some will place freedom\r\nfirst; others, a standard of living. Some will seek fairness\r\nby distributing to each an actual share of the\r\ngoods; others, by giving to each a fair chance to get\r\nhis share of goods. Others again have held that if no\r\nmoral purpose is proposed and each seeks to get what he\r\ncan for himself, the result will be a just distribution because\r\nof the beneficent effects of competition. Still others\r\nhave considered that if the economic process has once been\r\nestablished on the basis of contracts rather than status\r\nor slavery, justice may be regarded as the maintenance\r\nof these contracts, whatever the effect in actual benefits.\r\nThese views will be considered under the next topic as\r\nunsettled problems.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn addition to the works cited at the close of the last chapter,\r\nGiddings, \u003ci\u003eThe Costs of Progress\u003c/i\u003e, in Democracy and Empire, 1901;\r\nBosanquet (Mrs. B.), \u003ci\u003eThe Standard of Life\u003c/i\u003e, 1898; Bosanquet, B.,\r\n\u003ci\u003eAspects of the Social Problem\u003c/i\u003e, 1895; Stephen, \u003ci\u003eSocial Rights and\r\nDuties\u003c/i\u003e, 1896; Tufts, \u003ci\u003eSome Contributions of Psychology toward the\r\nConception of Justice\u003c/i\u003e, Philosophical Review, xv., 1906, pp. 361-79;\r\nWoods, \u003ci\u003eDemocracy, a New Unfolding of Human Power\u003c/i\u003e, in Studies\r\nin Philosophy and Psychology (Garman Commemorative Volume),\r\n1906.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_231_231\" id=\"Footnote_231_231\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_231_231\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[231]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Hayes Robbins in the \u003ci\u003eAtlantic Monthly\u003c/i\u003e for June, 1907, \"The\r\nPersonal Factor in the Labor Problem.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_232_232\" id=\"Footnote_232_232\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_232_232\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[232]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eSin and Society.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_233_233\" id=\"Footnote_233_233\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_233_233\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[233]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See Florence Kelley, \u003ci\u003eSome Ethical Gains through Legislation\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_523\" id=\"Page_523\"\u003e[Pg 523]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER XXIV\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nUNSETTLED PROBLEMS IN THE ECONOMIC\r\nORDER\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUnder this head we propose to consider one general\r\nand three special problems on which society is at present\r\nat work, framing new moral standards to meet new conditions.\r\nMany of the questions involved in the new order\r\nmarshal themselves under a single antithesis. Will the\r\nmoral values of wealth be most fully secured and justly\r\ndistributed by leaving to individuals the greatest possible\r\nfreedom and holding them morally responsible, or by social\r\nagency and control? The first theory is known as \u003ci\u003eindividualism\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThe most convenient term for the second\r\nposition would be \u003ci\u003esocialism\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSocialism, however, is, for many, an epithet rather than\r\na scientific conception. It is supposed to mean necessarily\r\nthe abolition of all private enterprise or private property.\r\nIn its extreme form it might mean this, as individualism\r\nin its extreme form would mean anarchy. But as a practical\r\nethical proposition we have before us neither the\r\nabolition of public agency and control\u0026mdash;extreme individualism\u0026mdash;nor\r\nthe abolition of private agency and control.\r\nWe have the problem of getting the proper amount\r\nof each in order that the highest morality may prevail.\r\nEach theory professes to desire the fullest development\r\nand freedom of the individual. The individualist seeks\r\nit through formal freedom and would limit public agency\r\nto a minimum. The socialist is willing to permit limitations\r\non formal freedom in order to secure the \"real\"\r\nfreedom which he regards as more important and sub\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_524\" id=\"Page_524\"\u003e[Pg 524]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003estantial.\r\nBetween the extremes, and borrowing from each,\r\nis a somewhat indefinite programme known as the demand\r\nfor equal opportunity. Let us consider each in a brief\r\nstatement and then in a more thorough analysis.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 1. GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE POSITIONS OF INDIVIDUALISM\r\nAND OF PUBLIC AGENCY AND CONTROL\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. Individualism.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Individualism\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_234_234\" id=\"FNanchor_234_234\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_234_234\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[234]\u003c/a\u003e believes that each\r\nman can secure his own welfare better than any one else\r\ncan secure it for him. It further holds that society is\r\nmade up of individuals, and hence, if each is provided for,\r\nthe welfare of the whole is secured. Such goods as are\r\nsocial can be secured by voluntary association. Believing\r\nthat the course of civilization has been \"from status to\r\ncontract,\" it makes free contract its central principle.\r\nIt should be the chief business of organized society to\r\nmaintain and safeguard this freedom. It locates the\r\nimportant feature of freedom precisely in the act of\r\nassent, rather than in any consideration of whether the\r\nafter consequences of the assent are good or bad; nor does\r\nit ask what motives (force and fraud aside) brought about\r\nthe assent, or whether there was any other alternative. In\r\nother words, it regards formal freedom as fundamental. If\r\nnot in itself all that can be desired, it is the first step, and\r\nthe only one which law need recognize. The individual may\r\nbe trusted to take other steps, if protected in this. The\r\nonly restriction upon individual freedom should be that it\r\nmust not interfere with the equal freedom of others. In\r\nthe economic sphere this restriction would mean, \"must\r\nnot interfere by force.\" The theory does not regard economic\r\npressure by competition as interference. Hence\r\nit favors free competition. Leaving out of account benevolence,\r\nit holds that in business each should be allowed,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_525\" id=\"Page_525\"\u003e[Pg 525]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor even recommended, to seek his own advantage. But\r\nwhen the question as to the justice of the distribution\r\nreached by this method is raised, a division appears between\r\nthe \u003ci\u003edemocratic\u003c/i\u003e individualists and the \"\u003ci\u003esurvival of\r\nthe fittest\u003c/i\u003e\" individualists. The democratic individualists\u0026mdash;Adam\r\nSmith, Bentham, Mill\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_235_235\" id=\"FNanchor_235_235\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_235_235\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[235]\u003c/a\u003e\u0026mdash;believed that individualism\r\nwould promote the welfare of \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e members of\r\nsociety. The \"survival of the fittest\" school maintains\r\nthat the welfare of the race or of civilization depends on\r\nthe sifting and selecting process known as the \"struggle\r\nfor existence.\" If the \"fittest\" are thus selected and survive,\r\nit matters not so much what is the lot of the rest.\r\nWe must choose between progress through aristocratic\r\nselection and degeneration through democratic leveling.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Theory of Public Agency and Control.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Socialism\r\n(using the word in a broad sense) holds that society should\r\nsecure to all its members the goods of life. It holds that\r\nan unrestrained liberty of struggle for existence may\r\nsecure the survival of the strongest, but not necessarily\r\nof the morally best. The individualist\u0027s theory emphasizes\r\nformal freedom. \"Seek first freedom and all other things\r\nwill be added.\" The socialist view emphasizes the content.\r\nIt would have all members of society share in education,\r\nwealth, and all the goods of life. In this it agrees\r\nwith democratic individualism. But it considers this impossible\r\non the basis of individual effort. To hold that\r\nsociety as a whole can do nothing for the individual either\r\nignores social goods or supposes the social will, so powerful\r\nfor democracy in the political sphere, to be helpless\r\nand futile in the economic world. To assume that all\r\nthe control of economic distribution\u0026mdash;the great field of\r\njustice\u0026mdash;may be left to individual freedom and agency,\r\nis as archaic as to leave the collection of taxes, the administration\r\nof provinces, and the education of citizens to\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_526\" id=\"Page_526\"\u003e[Pg 526]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nprivate enterprise. It regards the unregulated struggle\r\nfor existence as economically wasteful and morally vicious,\r\nboth in its inequality of distribution and in the motives\r\nof egoism on which it relies. Individualism, on the other\r\nhand, so far as it is intelligent and does not lump socialism\r\nwith anarchy and all other criticisms on the established\r\norder, regards socialism as ignoring the supreme importance\r\nof active personal effort, and the value of freedom\r\nas the keynote to progress.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. Equal Opportunity.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;An intermediate view has for\r\nits maxim, \"equal opportunity.\" It holds with individualism\r\nthat the active personality is to be stimulated and\r\nmade a prime end. But because it believes that not merely\r\na few but all persons should be treated as ends, it finds\r\nindividualism condemned. For it holds that an unregulated\r\nstruggle for existence does not secure the end individualism\r\nprofesses to seek. When individuals start in\r\nthe race handicapped by differences in birth, education,\r\nfamily, business, friends, and inherited wealth, \u003ci\u003ethere is\r\nno selection of ability\u003c/i\u003e; there is \u003ci\u003eselection of the privileged\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nHence it would borrow so much from socialism as to give\r\neach individual a \"fair start.\" This would include public\r\nschools, and an undefined amount of provision for sanitation,\r\nand for governmental regulation of the stronger.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is manifest, however, that this theory of the \"square\r\ndeal\" is a name for a general aim rather than for a\r\ndefinite programme. For a \"square deal,\" or equality of\r\nopportunity, might be interpreted to call for a great\r\nvariety of concrete schemes, ranging all the way from an\r\nelementary education up to public ownership of all the tools\r\nfor production, and to abolition of the right to bequeath or\r\ninherit property. The peoples of America, Europe, and\r\nAustralasia are at present working out policies which combine\r\nin various degrees the individualistic and the socialistic\r\nviews. Most have public schools. Some have provision\r\nfor old age and accident through either mutual or\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_527\" id=\"Page_527\"\u003e[Pg 527]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nState systems of insurance and pensions. Let us analyze\r\nthe moral aspects of the two opposing theories more\r\nthoroughly. It is obvious that the third view is only\r\none of a number of mediating positions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 2. INDIVIDUALISM OR FREE CONTRACT ANALYZED: ITS\r\nVALUES\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEfficiency in Production.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Individualism can make out\r\na strong case in respect to several of the ethical qualities\r\nwhich are demanded: viz., efficiency in production of goods,\r\nstimulation of active and forceful character, promotion\r\nof freedom and responsibility, encouragement to wide\r\ndiversification of occupation and thus of services, and,\r\nfinally, the supply to society of the kinds of goods which\r\nsociety wants. It would be absurd to credit the enormous\r\nincrease in production of wealth during the past century\r\nto individualism alone, ignoring the contributions of\r\nscience and education which have been mainly made under\r\nsocial auspices. It would be as absurd to credit all the\r\ngains of the century in civilization and freedom to individualism\r\nas it would be to charge all the wretchedness and\r\niniquity of the century to this same policy. But, setting\r\naside extravagant claims, it can scarcely be doubted\r\nthat Adam Smith\u0027s contentions for greater individual\r\nfreedom have been justified as regards the tests named.\r\nGranting that the great increase in amount and variety\r\nof production, and in means of communication and distribution,\r\nhas been primarily due to two agencies, the machine\r\nand association, it remains true that individualism\r\nhas permitted and favored association and has stimulated\r\ninvention.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eInitiative and Responsibility.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Moreover, the general\r\npolicy of turning over to individuals the power and responsibility\r\nto regulate their own acts, is in accord with\r\none great feature of moral development. The evolution\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_528\" id=\"Page_528\"\u003e[Pg 528]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof moral personality, as traced in our early chapters,\r\nshows the individual at first living as a member of a kinship\r\ngroup which determines his economic as well as his\r\nreligious and social life, and permits him neither to strike\r\nout independently, nor, on the other hand, to suffer want\r\nso long as the group has supplies. Individual initiative\r\nand responsibility have steadily increased, and the economic\r\ndevelopment has undoubtedly strengthened the\r\ndevelopment of religious, political, and moral freedom.\r\nIt is the combination of these which gives the person of\r\nto-day the worth and dignity belonging to autonomy,\r\nself-government, and democracy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRegulation of Production.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Further, it may be said\r\nthat supply and demand, individualism\u0027s method of regulating\r\nprices and the kinds of goods produced, not only\r\naccords with a principle of freedom, but also gets\r\nthose goods made which society most needs or wants.\r\nIf goods of a certain kind are scarce, the high price stimulates\r\nproduction. While it permits crises, panics, and\r\nhardship, it at least throws the burden of avoiding hardship\r\nupon the foresight of a great many: namely, all\r\nproducers, rather than upon a few persons who might be\r\ndesignated for the purpose. In thus providing a method\r\nto find out what society wants and how much, it is performing\r\na social service, and, as we have pointed out, it\r\nis none the less a service because the goods are to be\r\npaid for; it is all the more so because they can be paid\r\nfor. So far, then, individualism has a strong case.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 3. CRITICISMS UPON INDIVIDUALISM\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is undoubtedly great waste in some of its methods,\r\ne.g., its advertising and its competitions, but the\r\nmost serious objections to individualism are not to be\r\nfound here; they arise in connection with the other ethical\r\ncriteria of economic morality. They fall chiefly under\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_529\" id=\"Page_529\"\u003e[Pg 529]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntwo heads. (1) Does individualism provide for real as\r\nwell as formal freedom? (2) Does it distribute the benefits\r\nwidely or to the few? Does it distribute them justly\r\nor unjustly?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIt Does Not Secure Real Freedom.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The distinction\r\nbetween real and formal\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_236_236\" id=\"FNanchor_236_236\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_236_236\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[236]\u003c/a\u003e freedom has been forced into\r\nprominence by several causes. The division of labor\r\ntrains a man for a specific kind of work. If there is\r\nno opening in this he is unable to find work. The continual\r\ninvention of improved machinery is constantly displacing\r\nparticular sets of workers and rendering their special\r\ntraining worthless. A business panic causes immediate\r\ndischarge of thousands of laborers. A \"trust\" closes\r\nseveral of its shops, and workmen who have purchased\r\nhomes must lose their jobs or their investments, or perhaps\r\nboth. The employer is no less limited in his conduct\r\nby the methods of competing firms; but it is the\r\nwage-workers who have felt this lack of real freedom\r\nmost keenly. Theoretically, no one is forced to labor.\r\nEvery one is free to choose whether he will work, and\r\nwhat work he will do. But in effect, freedom of choice\r\ndepends for its value upon what the alternative is. If\r\nthe choice is, do this or\u0026mdash;starve\u0026mdash;the freedom is not worth\r\nmuch. Formal freedom excludes constraint by the direct\r\ncontrol or will of others. It excludes violence or fear of\r\nviolence. But subjection to the stress or fear of want,\r\nor to the limits imposed by ignorance, is just as fatal to\r\nfreedom. Hunger is as coercive as violence; ignorance fetters\r\nas hopelessly as force. Whether a man has any choice\r\nof occupation, employment, residence, or wage, depends\r\non his physical strength, education, family ties, and accumulated\r\nresources, and on the pressure of present need.\r\nTo speak of free contract where there is gross inequality\r\nbetween the parties, is to use a mere form of words. Free\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_530\" id=\"Page_530\"\u003e[Pg 530]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncontract in this case means simply the right of the\r\nstronger to exploit the weaker.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIndividualism and Justice.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Individualists, as stated,\r\nbelong to two very different schools, which we may call\r\nthe democratic and aristocratic, or perhaps more correctly,\r\nif we may coin a word, \"oligocratic.\" Democratic\r\nindividualism would have every man count as one. It\r\nwould distribute benefits widely. It holds that since society\r\nis made up of individuals all social goods will be\r\nsecured if each individual seeks and finds his own. Aristocratic\r\nindividualism\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_237_237\" id=\"FNanchor_237_237\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_237_237\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[237]\u003c/a\u003e has been re\u0026euml;nforced by the Darwinian\r\ntheory of the struggle for existence as a condition\r\nfor \"survival of the fittest,\" by race prejudice, and\r\nby imperialism. It holds that civilization is for the few\r\n\"best,\" not necessarily for the many. Progress lies\r\nthrough the selection of the few efficient, masterful, aggressive\r\nindividuals, races, or nations. Individualism is\r\na policy which favors these few. It is Nature\u0027s method\r\nof dealing. It is of course regrettable that there should\r\nbe weak, backward, ineffective individuals or races, but\r\ntheir exploitation serves the advance of the rest, and\r\nbenevolence or charity may mitigate the most painful\r\nresults.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe older economists of democratic individualism could\r\nproperly claim two respects in which economic justice was\r\nfurthered by economic processes under free management\r\nand exchange. The social body is in truth made up of\r\nmembers, and the old policy had been to tie up the members\r\nto make the body grow. It did promote justice\r\nto remove needless and excessive restrictions. In the second\r\nplace, it is true, as the economists insisted, that in\r\na free exchange each party profits if he gets what he\r\nwants. There is mutual benefit, and so far as this goes\r\nthere is an element of justice. But while the benefit may\r\nbe mutual, the \u003ci\u003eamount\u003c/i\u003e of advantage each gets is not\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_531\" id=\"Page_531\"\u003e[Pg 531]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnecessarily the same, and if the party who has greater\r\nshrewdness or resources takes advantage of a great need\r\non the part of the other, the result may be a very unequal\r\ndivision. Exchanges of a birthright for a mess of pottage\r\nwill be common. Very well, says the individualist,\r\nEsau will know better next time\u0026mdash;or if he doesn\u0027t, he is\r\nan object for charity. But the trouble is that even if\r\nEsau does \"know better\" he is in even poorer condition\r\nnext time to make a bargain if his birthright is gone;\r\nbesides, if starvation or misery for himself or his family\r\nis his only alternative, what good will it do him to \"know\r\nbetter\"? Can the result, then, be just or fair? This\r\ndepends on how we define \"just\" and \"fair.\" If we take\r\na purely formal view and make formal freedom of contract\r\nthe only criterion, then any price is fair which both\r\nparties agree to. The law for the most part takes this\r\nview, assuming absence of force or fraud. But this leaves\r\nout of account everything except the bare formal act of\r\nassent. It is too abstract a conception of personality on\r\nwhich to base a definition of justice. To get the true\r\norganic relation of mutual service and benefit by a system\r\nof individualism we must have the two parties to the bargain\r\nequal. \u003ci\u003eBut in a large part of the exchange of business\r\nand services the two parties are not equal.\u003c/i\u003e One has\r\ngreater shrewdness, better education, more knowledge of\r\nthe market, more accumulated resources, and, therefore,\r\nless pressing need than the other. The moral consciousness\r\nwill call prices or contracts unfair where the stronger\r\ntakes advantage of the weaker\u0027s necessities, even if the law\r\ndoes not.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCompetition.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The fact of competition is depended\r\nupon by the individualist to obviate the disadvantages\r\nof the weaker party. If A is ignorant of the market, B\r\nmay impose upon him; but if C and D are competing with\r\nB for A\u0027s goods or services, A will soon find out what\r\nthey are \"worth.\" That is, he will get for them a social\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_532\" id=\"Page_532\"\u003e[Pg 532]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand not a purely individual valuation. There is doubtless\r\nsuch a gain to A. But in considering competition\r\nas removing the objections to the unfairness possible in bargaining,\r\nwe must bear in mind two things. First, competition\r\ncuts both ways. It helps A when several compete\r\nfor his goods or labor; but, on the other hand, it may\r\nruin one of the competitors. If A is a laborer, it is a\r\ngood thing if X, Y, and Z, employers, compete for his\r\nservices. But if the boot is on the other foot, if B, C,\r\nand D also are laborers and compete with A for a place,\r\nwe have the conditions which may lead to the sweat-shop.\r\nWhether there is any better way to avoid unequal distribution\r\nwill be considered later. The second and seemingly\r\nfatal objection to competition as a means to justice,\r\nis that \u003ci\u003efree competition under an individualistic system\r\ntends to destroy itself\u003c/i\u003e. For the enormous powers which\r\nthe new forms of economic agency and technique give to\r\nthe individual who can wield them, enable him to crush\r\ncompetitors. The process has been repeated over and\r\nover within the past few years in various fields. The\r\nonly way in which a semblance of competition has been\r\nmaintained in railroad business has been by appeal to the\r\ncourts. This is an appeal to maintain individualism by\r\nchecking individualism, and as might be expected from\r\nsuch a contradictory procedure, has accomplished little.\r\nNor can it be maintained that the evils may be obviated,\r\nas Spencer holds, by private restraints on excessive competition.\r\nAs already pointed out, if one of a body of\r\ncompetitors is unscrupulous, the rest are necessarily at a\r\ndisadvantage. Under present conditions individualism cannot\r\nguarantee, and in many cases cannot permit, just distribution\r\nand a true organic society.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe other school of individualists is not disturbed by\r\ninequality of goods. It frankly accedes to the logic of\r\nunrestrained competition. It stakes its case upon the\r\nimportance for social welfare of the exceptionally gifted\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_533\" id=\"Page_533\"\u003e[Pg 533]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfew. It is important to have their services. It can have\r\nthem only on terms which they set, as they will not work\r\nunless there is sufficient motive. It is, on this view, perfectly\r\njust that all the enormous increase of wealth due\r\nto modern methods should go to the few leaders, for their\r\nability has produced it all. \"The able minority of men\r\nwho direct the labor of the majority are the true producers\r\nof that amount of wealth by which the annual\r\ntotal output, in any given community, exceeds what would\r\nhave been produced by the laborers if left to their own\r\ndevices, whether working as isolated units or in small\r\nself-organized groups, and controlled by no knowledge or\r\nfaculties but such as are possessed in common by any\r\none who can handle a spade or lay one brick upon\r\nanother.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_238_238\" id=\"FNanchor_238_238\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_238_238\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[238]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEither from the standpoint of natural rights or from\r\nthat of utilitarianism it is proper, according to this\r\nschool, that all the increasing wealth of society, now and\r\nin all future time, should go to the few. For, on the one\r\nview, it belongs to the few since they have produced it;\r\nand, on the other, it must be given them if society is to\r\nhave their services. It is possible they may not claim\r\nit all for their exclusive possession. They may be pleased\r\nto distribute some of it in gifts. But this is for them\r\nto say. The logical method for carrying out this programme\r\nwould require an absolute abandonment by the\r\npeople as a whole, or by their representatives, or the\r\ncourts, of any attempt to control economic conditions.\r\nThe courts would be limited to enforcing contracts and\r\nwould cease to recognize considerations of public interest\r\nexcept in so far as these were accepted by the able minority.\r\nAll such legislation as imposes any check upon the freedom\r\nof the individual is mischievous. Under this head\r\nwould presumably come regulation of child labor, of\r\nhours, of sanitary conditions, of charges by railroads,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_534\" id=\"Page_534\"\u003e[Pg 534]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ngas companies, and other public service corporations.\r\nGraded income or inheritance taxes are also to be condemned\r\nfrom this standpoint. It should in fairness be\r\nadded that while its upholders do not allege as their main\r\nargument that individualism is for the interest of the\r\nmany, they hold, nevertheless, that the many are really\r\nbetter off under individualism than under socialism. For\r\nsince all the increase in wealth is due to the able few whom\r\nindividualism produces, and since some of this increase, in\r\ncases where the few compete for the custom or labor of\r\nthe many, may fall to the share of the many or else\r\nbe given them outright by the more generous, it appears\r\nthat the only hope for the many lies through the few.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe general naturalistic theory has been discussed in\r\nChapter XVIII. Here it is only necessary to point out\r\nthat it is a misreading of evolution to suppose unregulated\r\ncompetition to be its highest category of progress,\r\nand that it is a misinterpretation of ethics to assume\r\nthat might is right. With the dawn of higher forms of\r\nlife, co\u0026ouml;peration and sympathy prove stronger forces\r\nfor progress than ruthless competition. The \"struggle\"\r\nfor any existence that has a claim to moral recognition\r\nmust be a struggle for more than physical existence or\r\nsurvival of force. It must be a struggle for a \u003ci\u003emoral\u003c/i\u003e\r\nexistence, an existence of rational and social beings on\r\nterms of mutual sympathy and service as well as of full\r\nindividuality. Any claim for an economic process, if it\r\nis to be a moral claim, must make its appeal on moral\r\ngrounds and to moral beings. If it recognizes only a\r\nfew as having worth, then it can appeal only to these.\r\nThese few have no moral right to complain if the many,\r\nwhom they do not recognize, refuse to recognize them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSummary of the Ethics of Individualism.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Individualism\r\nprovides well for production of quantity and kinds\r\nrequired of goods and services; for activity and formal\r\nfreedom. Under present conditions of organization and\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_535\" id=\"Page_535\"\u003e[Pg 535]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmodern methods it cannot be made to serve a democratic\r\nconception of justice, but inevitably passes over into a\r\nstruggle for pre\u0026euml;minence, in which the strong and less\r\nscrupulous will have the advantage. It can be treated\r\nas just only if justice is defined as what is according\r\nto contract (formal freedom); or if the welfare of certain\r\nclasses or individual members of society is regarded\r\nas of subordinate importance; or, finally, if it is held\r\nthat this welfare is to be obtained only incidentally, as\r\ngift, not directly through social action. The criticism on\r\nindividualism is then that under a collective system like\r\nthat of the present, it does scant justice to most individuals.\r\nIt leaves the many out from all active participation\r\nin progress or morality.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_239_239\" id=\"FNanchor_239_239\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_239_239\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[239]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIndividualism and Socialism are discussed in the works of Hadley,\r\nVeblen, Hobson, Spencer, Marx, George, already cited; cf. also\r\nMenger, \u003ci\u003eThe Right to the Whole Produce of Labor\u003c/i\u003e, 1899; Ely, \u003ci\u003eSocialism\r\nand Social Reform\u003c/i\u003e, 1894; Bosanquet, \u003ci\u003eIndividualism and Socialism\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nin The Civilization of Christendom, 1893; Fite, \u003ci\u003eThe Theory of Democracy\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nInternational Journal of Ethics, xxviii. (1907), pp. 1-18; Huxley,\r\n\u003ci\u003eAdministrative Nihilism\u003c/i\u003e, in Essays; Godwin\u0027s \u003ci\u003ePolitical Justice\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1793, raised many of the fundamental questions. Recent representative\r\nIndividualistic works are: Spencer, \u003ci\u003eSocial Statics\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eThe Man\r\nversus the State\u003c/i\u003e, various essays in Vol. III. of Essays; Sumner,\r\n\u003ci\u003eWhat Social Classes Owe to Each Other\u003c/i\u003e, 1883; Donisthorpe, \u003ci\u003eIndividualism\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1889; Harris, \u003ci\u003eInequality and Progress\u003c/i\u003e, 1897; Mallock,\r\n\u003ci\u003eSocialism\u003c/i\u003e, 1907. On Socialism: \u003ci\u003eFabian Essays in Socialism\u003c/i\u003e, edited\r\nby Shaw, London, 1890, New York, 1891; Spargo, \u003ci\u003eSocialism\u003c/i\u003e, 1906;\r\nMarx and Engels, \u003ci\u003eThe Communist Manifesto\u003c/i\u003e, Eng. tr.; Reeve, \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nCost of Competition\u003c/i\u003e, 1906; Rae, \u003ci\u003eContemporary Socialism\u003c/i\u003e, 1891;\r\nHunter, \u003ci\u003eSocialists at Work\u003c/i\u003e, 1908; Wells, \u003ci\u003eNew Worlds for Old\u003c/i\u003e, 1907.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_234_234\" id=\"Footnote_234_234\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_234_234\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[234]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See above, pp. 428 f., 471-6, 483.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_235_235\" id=\"Footnote_235_235\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_235_235\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[235]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In his later years Mill had much more confidence in the value\r\nof social agency.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_236_236\" id=\"Footnote_236_236\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_236_236\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[236]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See above, p. 437 f.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_237_237\" id=\"Footnote_237_237\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_237_237\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[237]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See above, pp. 368 ff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_238_238\" id=\"Footnote_238_238\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_238_238\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[238]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e W. H. Mallock, \u003ci\u003eSocialism\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_239_239\" id=\"Footnote_239_239\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_239_239\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[239]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Above, p. 472.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_536\" id=\"Page_536\"\u003e[Pg 536]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER XXV\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nUNSETTLED PROBLEMS IN THE ECONOMIC\r\nORDER (\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eContinued\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 4. THE THEORY OF PUBLIC AGENCY AND CONTROL\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe various theories of public direction, including\r\nsocialism in the technical sense, are primarily interested\r\nin the just distribution of goods. It is not so much \"How\r\nmany goods can be produced?\" as \"Who is to get them?\"\r\nIndividualism was chiefly concerned in increasing public\r\nwealth, assuming (in the case of the democratic individualists)\r\nthat all would get the benefit. Socialism is more\r\nconcerned that the producing persons shall not be sacrificed,\r\nand that each member shall benefit by the result.\r\nPublic agency and control might assert itself (1) as\r\na method of production, (2) as a method of distribution\r\nof goods and returns, (3) as a method of property. It\r\nis important to note at the outset that all civilized peoples\r\nhave some degree of social direction in each of these\r\nfields. (1) Practically all peoples collect taxes, coin\r\nmoney, carry mails, protect life and property, and supply\r\nsuch elementary demands as those for water and drainage,\r\nthrough State or municipal agency instead of leaving it\r\nto private initiative. And in every one of the instances\r\nthe work was formerly done privately. (2) Under distribution,\r\nall progressive peoples give education through the\r\nState. Further, the benefits of the mail service are distributed\r\nnot in proportion to receipts, but on other principles\r\nbased on social welfare. (3) As a method of property-holding,\r\nall civilized peoples hold certain goods for\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_537\" id=\"Page_537\"\u003e[Pg 537]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncommon use, and in the United States, after a period in\r\nwhich it has been the policy to distribute for little or no\r\ncompensation public lands, public franchises, and public\r\ngoods of all kinds, the public policy is now not only to\r\nretain large tracts for forest reserve, but to construct\r\nirrigation plants, and to provide public parks, playgrounds,\r\nand other forms of property to be used for\r\ncommon advantage. Just as the individualist does not\r\nnecessarily carry his doctrine to the extreme of dispensing\r\nwith all social agency, at least in the matters of public\r\nprotection and public health, so the socialist does not\r\nnecessarily wish to abolish private property or private\r\nenterprise. We have, then, to consider briefly the ethical\r\naspects of public agency for production, public control\r\nover distribution, public holding of wealth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 5. SOCIETY AS AGENCY OF PRODUCTION\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe advantage claimed for society as an agent of\r\nproduction is not primarily greater efficiency, although\r\nit is claimed that the present method is enormously wasteful\r\nexcept where there already is private monopoly. Nor is\r\nit in the social service rendered by providing great variety\r\nof goods, and of the kinds most wanted. It is rather\r\n(1) that in the case of public service enterprises, such\r\nas transportation or lighting, fairness to the various\r\nshippers, localities, and other users can be secured only\r\nthrough public control or operation. These services are\r\nas indispensable to modern life as air or navigation. Only\r\nby public agency can discrimination be avoided. (2)\r\nThat the prizes to be gained are here so enormous that\r\nbribery and corruption are inevitable under private management.\r\n(3) That the profits arising from the growth\r\nof the community belong to the community, and can only\r\nbe secured if the community owns and operates such\r\nagencies of public service as transportation, communi\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_538\" id=\"Page_538\"\u003e[Pg 538]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ecation,\r\nand in cities water supply and lighting. (4)\r\nThat the method of individualistic production is reckless\r\nof child life and in general of the health of workmen.\r\nGreat Britain is already fearing a deterioration in\r\nphysical stature and capacity. (5) The motive of self-interest,\r\nrelied upon and fostered by individualism, is anti-social.\r\nHow can morality be expected to improve when\r\nthe fundamental agency and method of business and industry\r\nis contradictory to morality? (6) More complete\r\nsocialism maintains that, under modern capitalism, a disproportionate\r\nshare is sure to fall to the capitalist, and,\r\nmore than this, to the great capitalist. Modern production\r\nis complex and expensive. It requires an enormous\r\nplant; the capitalist, not the workman, has the tools,\r\nand can therefore charge what he pleases. The small\r\ncapitalist cannot undertake competition with the great\r\ncapitalist, for the latter can undersell him until he drives\r\nhim from business, and can then recoup himself by greater\r\ngains. Hence the only way to secure fair distribution is\r\nthrough social ownership of the tools and materials for\r\nproduction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePrivate Interests and Public Welfare.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Touching\r\nthese points it may be said that the public conscience is\r\nrapidly coming to a decision upon the first five. (1) The\r\npublic has been exploited, the officials of government\r\nhave been bribed, and individual members of society discriminated\r\nagainst. The process of competition always\r\ninvolves \u003ci\u003ev\u0026aelig; victis\u003c/i\u003e, but the particular factor which makes\r\nthis not only hard but unjust, is that in all these cases\r\nwe have a quasi-public agency (monopoly, franchise,\r\nState-aided corporation) used to give private advantage.\r\nThis must be remedied either by public ownership or\r\npublic control, unless the ethics of the struggle for existence\r\nis accepted. The corruption which has prevailed\r\nunder (2) must be met either by public ownership or control,\r\nor by so reducing the value of such franchises as\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_539\" id=\"Page_539\"\u003e[Pg 539]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto leave \"nothing in it\" for the \"grafter\" and his co-operators.\r\nVice\u0026mdash;gambling, excessive use of drugs and\r\nliquors, prostitution\u0026mdash;is no doubt injurious to its victims,\r\nand when leagued with public officials and yielding\r\nenormous corruption funds to debauch politics, it is a\r\npublic evil as well. But its victims are limited, and its\r\nappearance not attractive to the great majority. The\r\nexploitation and corruption practiced by the more generally\r\nsuccessful and \"respectable\" members of society,\r\nis far more insidious and wide-reaching. It demoralizes\r\nnot individuals only, but the standards of society. As\r\nto (3) there is no doubt as to the rights of the matter.\r\nGains due to social growth should be socially shared, not\r\nappropriated by a few. The only question is as to the\r\nbest method of securing these gains. European States\r\nand cities have gone much farther than the United States\r\nalong the line of public agency, and, while there is still\r\ndispute as to the balance of advantage in certain cases,\r\nthere is a growing sentiment that the more intelligent\r\nand upright the community, the more it can wisely undertake.\r\nThe moral principle is that the public must\r\nhave its due. Whether it pays certain agents a salary\r\nas its own officials, or a commission in the form of a moderate\r\ndividend, is not so important.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_240_240\" id=\"FNanchor_240_240\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_240_240\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[240]\u003c/a\u003e But to pay a man\r\nor a small group of promoters a million dollars to supply\r\nwater or lighting or transportation, seems no more moral\r\nthan to pay such a salary to a mayor or counsel or superintendent\r\nof schools. Taxpayers would probably denounce\r\nsuch salaries as robbery. Such franchises as have\r\nfor the most part been given in American cities have been\r\nlicenses to collect high taxes from the citizens for the\r\nbenefit of a few, and do not differ in principle from paying\r\nexcessive salaries, except as the element of risk enters.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_540\" id=\"Page_540\"\u003e[Pg 540]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nWhat is needed at present in the United States is a larger\r\nnumber of experiments in various methods of agency to\r\nsee which type results in least corruption, fairest distribution,\r\nand best service.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eConditions of Labor.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;On the fourth point, the necessity\r\nof public control to regulate child labor, the labor\r\nof women, sanitary conditions, and the use of dangerous\r\nmachinery, the public conscience is also awakening. Decisions\r\nof the courts on the constitutionality of regulating\r\nwomen\u0027s labor have been somewhat at variance. But the\r\nrecently announced decision\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_241_241\" id=\"FNanchor_241_241\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_241_241\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[241]\u003c/a\u003e of the United States Supreme\r\nCourt in the \"Oregon case\" seems likely to be decisive\r\nof the principle that women may be treated as a class.\r\nFreedom of contract cannot be regarded as interfering\r\nwith the right to establish reasonable precautions for\r\nwomen\u0027s health. Woman may be protected \"from the\r\ngreed as well as from the passion of man.\" The immorality\r\nof child labor under modern conditions is also becoming\r\nclear. For the public to see child life stunted\r\nphysically, mentally, and morally by premature labor\r\nunder the exhausting, deadening, and often demoralizing\r\nconditions of modern industry and business, is for the\r\npublic to consent to wickedness. It cannot leave this\r\nmatter to the conscience of individual manufacturers and\r\nparents, for the conscientious manufacturer is at a disadvantage,\r\nand it might with as much morality consent to\r\na parent\u0027s starving or poisoning his child as to his injuring\r\nit in less violent manner. For a society pretending to\r\nbe moral to permit little children to be used up or stunted\r\nunder any plea of cheap production or support of parents,\r\nis not above the moral level of those peoples which practice\r\ninfanticide to prevent economic stress. Indeed, in\r\nthe case of a country which boasts of its wealth, there\r\nis far less justification than for the savage. In the case\r\nof provision against accident due to dangerous machinery,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_541\" id=\"Page_541\"\u003e[Pg 541]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe ethical principle is also clear. To throw all the burden\r\nof the accidents incident to modern production upon the\r\nfamilies of the laborers is entirely unjust. To impose\r\nit upon the conscientious manufacturer is no better, for\r\nit places him at a disadvantage. This is a necessary\u0026mdash;except\r\nso far as it can be minimized by safety devices\u0026mdash;part\r\nof the modern machine process. It ought to be paid\r\nfor either by all manufacturers, who would then shift\r\nit to the consumers in the price of the goods, or by the\r\npublic as a whole in some form of insurance. European\r\ncountries have gone much farther than the United States\r\nin this direction. The theory that the employer is exempt\r\nif a fellow workman contributes in any way to the accident\r\nhas been applied in the United States in such a\r\nway as to free employers, and thus the public, from any\r\nshare in the burden of a large part of accidents\u0026mdash;except\r\nas these entail poverty and bring the victim and his family\r\ninto the dependent class.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMoreover, it is only by public action that fair conditions\r\nof labor can be secured in many trades and under\r\nmany employers. For the single workman has not the\r\nslightest chance to make conditions, and the union has\r\nno effective means to support its position unless it represents\r\na highly skilled trade and controls completely the\r\nsupply of labor. It may go without saying that violence\r\nis wrong. But it is often ignored that for a \u003ci\u003eprosperous\r\nsociety to leave the laborer no remedy but violence for\r\nan intolerable condition is just as wrong\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMotives.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;(5) On the question of motives the collectivist\r\ntheory is probably over-sanguine as to the gain to be\r\neffected by external means. It is difficult to believe that\r\nany change in methods would eliminate selfishness. There\r\nis abundant exercise of selfishness in political democracy,\r\nand even in families. Further, if it should be settled on\r\nother grounds that competition in certain cases performs\r\na social service, it would then be possible for a man to\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_542\" id=\"Page_542\"\u003e[Pg 542]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncompete with a desire to serve the public, just as truly\r\nas it would be possible to compete for selfish motives.\r\nThat a process causes pain incidentally does not necessarily\r\npervert the motive of the surgeon or parent. It\r\ndoes, of course, throw the burden of proof upon the advocate\r\nof the process. Rivalry need not mean enmity if\r\nthe rivals are on an equal footing and play fair.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eExploitation of Labor.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;(6) The question whether all\r\ncapitalistic production first exploits the laboring class,\r\nand then tends to absorb or drive out of business the small\r\ncapitalist, is not so easy of decision. It seems to be easy\r\nto make a plausible statement for each side by statistical\r\nevidence. There seems little doubt that the general standard\r\nof living for laborers is rising. On the other hand,\r\nthe number of enormous fortunes seems to rise much\r\nfaster, and there is an appalling amount of poverty in\r\nthe great cities. This is sometimes attributed to thriftlessness\r\nor to excessively large families. A careful study\r\nof an English agricultural community, where the conditions\r\nseemed at least as good as the average, showed that\r\na family could not have over two children without sinking\r\nbelow the line of adequate food, shelter, and clothing, to\r\nsay nothing of medical attendance or other comforts. In\r\nthe United States there has been such a supply of land\r\navailable that the stress has not been so intense. Just\r\nwhat the situation will be if the country becomes thickly\r\nsettled cannot be foretold. Professor J. B. Clark shows\r\nthat the tendency in a static society would be to give\r\nthe laborer more and more nearly his share\u0026mdash;provided\r\nthere is free competition for his services. The difficulty\r\nis that society is not static and that a laborer cannot\r\nshift at will from trade to trade and from place to\r\nplace.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat sometimes capital exploits labor is merely to say\r\nthat the buyer sometimes gets the advantage. That capital\r\nusually has the advantage in its greater resources may\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_543\" id=\"Page_543\"\u003e[Pg 543]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbe admitted, but that it \u003ci\u003einvariably must\u003c/i\u003e seems an unwarranted\r\ndeduction. The multiplication of wants widens\r\ncontinually the number of occupations and thus increases\r\nthe competition for the service of the more skilled. In\r\nsuch cases some, at least, of the sellers should be in a\r\nposition to make a fair bargain. Indeed, recent socialists\r\ndo not advocate any such complete assumption by society\r\nof all production as is presented in some of the socialistic\r\nUtopias. Their principle is \"that the State must undertake\r\nthe production and distribution of social wealth wherever\r\nprivate enterprise is dangerous or less efficient than\r\npublic enterprise.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_242_242\" id=\"FNanchor_242_242\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_242_242\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[242]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is for those who do not believe in public control to\r\nprove that in the great enterprises for the production of\r\nthe necessaries of life, for transportation, banking, mining,\r\nand the like, private enterprise is not dangerous.\r\nThe conduct of many\u0026mdash;not all\u0026mdash;of these enterprises in\r\nrecent years, not only in their economic aspects, but in\r\ntheir recklessness of human life, health, and morality, is\r\nwhat makes socialism a practical question. If it is\r\nadopted, it will not be for any academic or \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e reasons.\r\nIt will be because private enterprise fails to serve\r\nthe public, and its injustice becomes intolerable. If business\r\nenterprise, as sometimes threatens, seeks to subordinate\r\npolitical and social institutions, including legislatures\r\nand courts, to economic interests, the choice must be between\r\npublic control and public ownership. And if,\r\nwhether by the inherent nature of legal doctrine and\r\nprocedure, or by the superior shrewdness of capital\r\nin evading regulation, control is made to appear ineffective,\r\nthe social conscience will demand ownership. To\r\nsubordinate the State to commercial interests is as immoral\r\nas to make the economic interest supreme in the\r\nindividual.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs regards the relations between capital and labor, it\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_544\" id=\"Page_544\"\u003e[Pg 544]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nargues an undeveloped state of society that we have no\r\nmachinery for determining controversy as to what is a\r\nfair wage. In the long run, and on the whole, supply\r\nand demand may give an approximately fair adjustment,\r\nbut our present method of fighting it out in doubtful\r\ncases is barbaric. The issue is decided often by violence\r\nor the no less unmoral motive of pressing want, instead\r\nof by the moral test of what is fair. And the great third\r\ninterest, the consumer, or the public at large, is not represented\r\nat all. New Zealand, Canada, and some of the\r\nstates in the United States have made beginnings. The\r\nPresident undoubtedly commanded general support in his\r\nposition during the coal strike, when he maintained that\r\nthe public was morally bound to take some part in the\r\nstruggle.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMust not society be lacking in resources if its only\r\nresource is to permit exploitation, on the one hand,\r\nor carry on all industry and business itself, upon the\r\nother? To lose the flexibility, variety, and keenness of\r\ninterest secured by individual or associated enterprise,\r\nwould certainly be an evil. Early business was conducted\r\nlargely by kinship organizations. The pendulum has\r\ndoubtless reached the other extreme in turning over to\r\ngroups, organized on a purely commercial basis, operations\r\nthat could be more equitably managed by city or\r\nstate agency. Most favor public agency in the case of\r\nschools. Railroads, gas companies, and other monopolies\r\nare still subject to controversy. But that an ideally\r\norganized society should permit associations and grouping\r\nof a great many kinds as agencies for carrying on its\r\nwork seems a platform not to be abandoned until proved\r\nhopeless.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCollective Agency is Not Necessarily Social.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The\r\nsocialist is inclined to think that if the agency of production\r\nwere the government or the whole organized society\r\nthis would give a genuine social agency of control.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_545\" id=\"Page_545\"\u003e[Pg 545]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThis by no means follows. Party government and city\r\ngovernment in the United States have shown the fallacy\r\nof this. But even apart from the possibility of a corrupt\r\nboss there is still a wide gap between the collective\r\nand the socialized agency. For until the members of\r\nsociety have reached a sufficiently high level of intelligence\r\nand character to exercise voluntary control, and\r\nto co\u0026ouml;perate wisely and efficiently, there must be some\r\ncentral directing agency. And such an agency will be\r\nmorally external to a large number. It doesn\u0027t matter\r\nso much what name this agent is called by\u0026mdash;i.e., whether\r\nhe is \"capitalist,\" or \"government,\"\u0026mdash;so long as the control\r\nis external. In general, individuals are still without\r\nthe mutual confidence and public intelligence which\r\nwould enable them really to socialize the mechanically\r\ncollective process.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 6. THEORIES OF JUST DISTRIBUTION\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSocialism as theory of distribution does not necessarily\r\nimply public operation of production. By graded taxation\r\nthe proceeds of production might be taken by society\r\nand either held, used, or distributed on some supposedly\r\nmore equitable basis. To give point to any inquiry as\r\nto the justice of a proposed distribution, it would be desirable\r\nto know what is the present distribution. Unfortunately,\r\nno figures are accepted by all students. Spahr\u0027s\r\n\u003ci\u003ePresent Distribution of Wealth in the United States\u003c/i\u003e\r\nestimates that seven-eighths of the families in the United\r\nStates own only one-eighth of the wealth, and that one\r\nper cent. own more than the remaining ninety-nine per\r\ncent. This has been challenged, but any estimate made\r\nby the economists shows such enormous disproportion as\r\nto make it incredible that the present distribution can be\r\nregarded as just on any definition of justice other than\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_546\" id=\"Page_546\"\u003e[Pg 546]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\"according to the principles of contract and competition.\"\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 0.5em;\"\u003eSuppose, then, the question is raised, How can\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nwe make a just distribution?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCriteria Proposed.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The simplest, and at the same time\r\nmost mechanical and abstract, method would be to divide\r\nall goods equally. This would be to ignore all moral and\r\nother differences, as indeed is practically done in the suffrage.\r\nIf all men are accounted equal in the State, why\r\nnot in wealth? It may be admitted that, if society were\r\nto distribute, it would have to do it on some system which\r\ncould be objectively administered. To divide wealth according\r\nto merit, or according to efforts, or according\r\nto needs, would be a far more moral method. But it is\r\ndifficult to see how, in the case of material goods or their\r\nmoney equivalent, such a division could be made by any\r\nbeing not omniscient as well as absolutely just. If we are\r\nto consider distribution as administered by society, we\r\nseem reduced to the alternative of the present system or a\r\nsystem of equality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. The Individualistic Theory.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;It is indeed supposed\r\nby some that the individualistic or competitive system distributes\r\non a moral basis: viz., according to merit. This\r\nclaim would have to meet the following criticisms:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(1) The first abstraction which this individualistic\r\nprinciple of reward usually makes it that it gives a man\r\ncredit for all he achieves, or charges him with all his\r\nfailures, without recognizing the threefold origin of\r\nthese achievements or failures. Heredity, society, personal\r\nchoice, have each had some share in the result. But,\r\nin considering the ethics of competition upon this maxim,\r\nthere is evidently no attempt to discriminate between\r\nthese several sources. The man born with industrial genius,\r\npresented by society with the knowledge of all that\r\nhas been done in the past, and equipped by society with\r\nall the methods and tools society can devise, certainly has\r\nan advantage over the man of moderate talents and no\r\neducation. To claim that the first should be justly re\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_547\" id=\"Page_547\"\u003e[Pg 547]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ewarded\r\nfor his superiority would imply that the reception\r\nof one gift constitutes a just claim for another.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) Secondly, the theory as applied to our present system\r\nis guilty of a further abstraction in assuming that\r\nthe chief, if not the only, way to deserve reward is by individualistic\r\nshrewdness and energy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) It measures desert by service rendered without taking\r\nany account of motive or even of intent. The captain\r\nof industry performs an important service to society;\r\ntherefore, it is argued, he should be rewarded accordingly,\r\nquite irrespective of the question whether he was aiming\r\nat social welfare or at selfish gain. It may even be plausibly\r\nargued that to reward men financially for good motives\r\nwould be bribing men to be honest. It is true that\r\nfinancial rewards will not make good citizens, but this is\r\nirrelevant. The point is that whatever other reasons,\u0026mdash;expediency,\r\ndifficulty of estimating intent and motive,\u0026mdash;may\r\nbe urged for abstracting from everything but the\r\nresult, the one reason which cannot be urged is, such abstraction\r\nis just. A person has rights only because he is\r\na social person. But to call a man a social person because\r\nhe incidentally produces useful results, is to say that\r\npurpose and will are negligible elements of personality.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_243_243\" id=\"FNanchor_243_243\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_243_243\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[243]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Equal Division.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The system of equal division is\r\nliable to the following criticism. In their economic services\r\nmen are not equal. They are unequal not merely in talent\r\nand ability; not merely in the value of their work; they\r\nare unequal in their disposition. To treat idle and industrious,\r\nuseless and useful, slow and quick alike is not\r\nequality, but inequality. It is to be guilty of as palpable\r\nan abstraction as to say that all men are equally free\r\nbecause they are not subject to physical constraint. Real\r\nequality will try to treat like conditions alike, and unlike\r\ncharacter, efforts, or services differently.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is, moreover, a psychological objection which\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_548\" id=\"Page_548\"\u003e[Pg 548]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwould weigh against an equal division even if such were\r\nregarded as just. The average man perhaps prefers an\r\neconomic order in which there are prizes and blanks to an\r\norder in which every man draws out the same. He prefers\r\nan exciting game to a sure but tame return of his\r\ninvestment. He may call for a \"square deal,\" but we\r\nmust remember that a \"square deal\" in the great American\r\ngame from which the metaphor is taken is not designed to\r\nmake the game less one of chance. It is designed to give\r\nfull scope to luck and nerve. A game in which every\r\nplayer was sure to win, but also sure to win just what he\r\nhad put in, would be equitable, but it would not be a game.\r\nAn equal distribution might rob life of its excitement and\r\nits passion. Possibly the very strain of the process develops\r\nsome elements of character which it would be unfortunate\r\nto lose.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIs there no alternative possible for society except an\r\nequality which is external only, and therefore unequal,\r\nor an inequality which charges a man with all the accrued\r\nbenefits or evils of his ancestry? Must we either recognize\r\nno moral differences in men, or else be more merciless than\r\nthe old orthodox doctrine of hereditary or imputed guilt?\r\nThe theological doctrine merely made a man suffer for\r\nhis ancestors\u0027 sins; the doctrine of unlimited individualism\r\nwould damn him not only for his ancestors\u0027 sins and\r\ndefects, but for the injustice suffered by his ancestors at\r\nthe hands of others. The analysis of the sources of a\r\nman\u0027s ability may give a clue to a third possibility, and\r\nit is along this line that the social conscience of to-day is\r\nfeeling its way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. A Working Programme.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;A man\u0027s power is due (1)\r\nto physical heredity; (2) to social heredity, including care,\r\neducation, and the stock of inventions, information, and\r\ninstitutions which enables him to be more efficient than\r\nthe savage; and finally (3) to his own efforts. Individualism\r\nmay properly claim this third factor. It is just\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_549\" id=\"Page_549\"\u003e[Pg 549]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto treat men unequally so far as their efforts are unequal.\r\nIt is socially desirable to give as much incentive\r\nas possible to the full development of every one\u0027s powers.\r\nBut the \u003ci\u003every same reason demands that in the first two\r\nrespects we treat men as equally as possible\u003c/i\u003e. For it\r\nis for the good of the social body to get the most\r\nout of its members, and it can get the most out of\r\nthem only by giving them the best start possible. In\r\nphysical heredity the greater part is, as yet, wholly\r\noutside control, but there is an important factor which\r\nis in the sphere of moral action, namely, the physical\r\ncondition of the parents, particularly of the mother. Conditions\r\nof food, labor, and housing should be such that\r\nevery child may be physically well born. In the various\r\nelements included under social heredity society has a freer\r\nhand. Not a \u003ci\u003efree\u003c/i\u003e hand, for physical and mental incapacity\r\nlimit the amount of social accumulation which can\r\nbe communicated, but we are only beginning to appreciate\r\nhow much of the deficiency formerly acquiesced in as hopeless\r\nmay be prevented or remedied by proper food, hygiene,\r\nand medical care. \u003ci\u003eCompletely\u003c/i\u003e equal education, likewise,\r\ncannot be given; not in kind, for not all children have like\r\ninterests and society does not want to train all for the\r\nsame task; nor in quantity, for some will have neither the\r\nability nor the disposition to do the more advanced work.\r\nBut as, little by little, labor becomes in larger degree\r\nscientific, the ratio of opportunities for better trained\r\nmen will increase, and as education becomes less exclusively\r\nacademic, and more an active preparation for all kinds\r\nof work, the interests of larger and larger numbers of\r\nchildren will be awakened. Such a programme as this is\r\none of the meanings of the phrase \"\u003ci\u003eequal opportunity\u003c/i\u003e,\"\r\nwhich voices the demand widely felt for some larger conception\r\nof economic and social justice than now obtains.\r\nIt would make formal freedom, formal \"equality\" before\r\nthe law, less an empty mockery by giving to every child\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_550\" id=\"Page_550\"\u003e[Pg 550]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsome of the power and knowledge which are the necessary\r\nconditions of real freedom.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSociety has already gone a long way along the line of\r\ngiving an equal share in education. It is moving rapidly\r\ntoward broader conceptions of education for all occupations\u0026mdash;farming,\r\nmechanics, arts, trade, business\u0026mdash;as well\r\nas for the \"learned professions.\" It is making a beginning\r\ntoward giving children (see the Report of the New\r\nYork Tenement House Commission) a chance to be born\r\nand grow up with at least a living minimum of light and\r\nair. Libraries and dispensaries and public health officials\r\nare bringing the science and literature of the world in\r\nincreasing measure into the lives of all. When by the better\r\norganization of the courts the poor man has real, and\r\nnot merely formal equality before the law, and thereby\r\njustice itself is made more accessible to all, another long\r\nstep will be taken toward a juster order. How far society\r\ncan go is yet to be solved. But is it not at least a working\r\nhypothesis for experiment, that society should try to\r\ngive to all its members the gains due to the social progress\r\nof the past? How far the maxim of equal opportunity\r\nwill logically lead it is impossible to say. Fortunately,\r\nthe moral problem is to work out new ideals, not merely to\r\nadminister old ones. Other possibilities of larger justice\r\nare noticed under \u0026sect; 8 below.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 7. OWNERSHIP AND USE OF PROPERTY\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe public wealth may be controlled and used in four\r\nways: It may be (1) Privately owned and used; (2) Privately\r\nowned and publicly used; (3) Publicly held, but privately\r\nused; (4) Publicly held and commonly used. The\r\nindividualist would have all wealth, or as much as possible,\r\nunder one of the first two forms. The tendency in the\r\nUnited States until very recently has been to divest the\r\npublic of all ownership. The socialist, while favoring pri\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_551\" id=\"Page_551\"\u003e[Pg 551]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003evate\r\nownership and use of the more strictly personal articles,\r\nfavors the public holding of much which is now privately\r\nowned\u0026mdash;notably the land, or the instruments of\r\nproduction\u0026mdash;as versus the holding of these by private or\r\ncorporate persons. Or, again, it may be maintained that\r\nwhile individuals should be allowed to accumulate as much\r\nproperty as they can, they should not be allowed to transmit\r\nit entirely to their heirs.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eValue of Private Property.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The individualist may\r\nproperly point to the psychological and historical significance\r\nof private property, which has been stated in\r\na preceding chapter (p. 490). He may say that the\r\nevils there mentioned as attendant upon private property\r\ndo not belong to the property in itself, but to the exaggerated\r\nlove of it. He may admit that the present emphasis\r\nof attention upon the ownership of wealth, rather than\r\nupon intellectual or \u0026aelig;sthetic or social interests, is not the\r\nhighest type of human endeavor. But he urges that the\r\npositive values of property are such that the present policy\r\nof placing no check upon property should be maintained.\r\nIn addition to the indirect social value through\r\nthe power and freedom given to its owners, it may be\r\nclaimed that the countless educational, charitable, and\r\nphilanthropic agencies sustained by voluntary gifts from\r\nprivate property, are both the best method of accomplishing\r\ncertain socially valuable work, and have an important\r\nreflex value in promoting the active social interest of those\r\nwho carry them on. Nor is the force of this entirely\r\nbroken by the counter claim that this would justify keeping\r\nhalf the population in poverty in order to give the\r\nother half the satisfaction of charity. No system short of\r\nabsolute communism can abolish the need of friendly\r\nhelp.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDefects and Dangers in the Present System.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The first\r\nquestion which arises is: If property is so valuable morally,\r\nhow many are profiting by it under the present system,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_552\" id=\"Page_552\"\u003e[Pg 552]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand how many are without its beneficent effects? Is the\r\nnumber of property-owners increasing or diminishing? In\r\none of the morally most valuable forms of property, the\r\nnumber of those who profit is certainly decreasing relatively:\r\n\u003ci\u003eviz.\u003c/i\u003e, in the owning of homes. The building of private\r\nresidences has practically ceased in New York and many\r\nother cities except for the very rich. With the increasing\r\nvalue of land the owning of homes is bound to become more\r\nand more rare. Only the large capitalist can put up the\r\napartment house. In the ownership of shops and industries\r\nthe number of owners has relatively decreased, that\r\nof clerks has increased. The wage-workers in cities\r\nare largely propertyless. The management of industries\r\nthrough corporations while theoretically affording opportunity\r\nfor property has yet, as Judge Grosscup has\r\npointed out forcibly, been such as to discourage the small\r\ninvestor, and to prompt to the consumption of wages as\r\nfast as received. The objection to individualism on this\r\nground would then be as before, that it is not individual\r\nenough.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAn objection of contrary character is that the possession\r\nof property releases its owner from any necessity of\r\nactive effort or service to the public. It may therefore\r\ninjure character on both its individual and its social side.\r\nProbably the absolute number of those who refrain from\r\nany social service because of their property is not very\r\nlarge, and it may be questioned whether the particular\r\npersons would be socially very valuable under any system\r\nif they are now oblivious to all the moral arguments for\r\nsuch activity and service.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA more serious objection to the individualistic policy\r\nis the enormous power allowed to the holders of great properties.\r\nIt has been estimated that a trust fund recently\r\ncreated for two grandchildren will exceed five billion dollars\r\nwhen handed over. It is easily possible that some of\r\nthe private fortunes now held may, if undisturbed, amount\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_553\" id=\"Page_553\"\u003e[Pg 553]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto far more than the above within another generation.\r\nMoreover, the power of such a fortune is not limited to its\r\nown absolute purchasing value. By the presence of its\r\nowners upon directorates of industrial, transportation,\r\nbanking, and insurance corporations the resources of\r\nmany other owners are controlled. A pressure may be\r\nexerted upon political affairs compared with which actual\r\ncontributions to campaign funds are of slight importance.\r\nThe older theory in America was that the injury to the\r\nprivate character of the owners of wealth would negative\r\nthe possible dangers to the public, since possession of large\r\nwealth would lead to relaxation of energy, or even to dissipation.\r\nIt was assumed that the father acquired the fortune,\r\nthe son spent it, and thus scattered it among the\r\nmany, and the grandson began again at the bottom of the\r\nladder. Now that this theory is no longer tenable, society\r\nwill be obliged to ask how much power may safely be left\r\nto any individual.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt must be recognized that the present management of\r\nsuch natural resources as forests under the r\u0026eacute;gime of private\r\nproperty has been extremely wasteful and threatens\r\nserious injury to the United States. Individual owners\r\ncannot be expected to consider the welfare of the country\r\nat large, or of future generations; hence the water power\r\nis impaired and the timber supply of the future threatened.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFinally it must be remembered that many of the present\r\nevils and inequities in ownership are not due necessarily\r\nto a system of private property, but rather to special\r\nprivileges possessed by classes of individuals. These may\r\nbe survivals of past conquests of arms as in Europe, or\r\nderived by special legislation, or due to a perfectly unconscious\r\nattitude of public morals which carries over to a\r\nnew situation the customs of an early day. Mill\u0027s famous\r\nindictment of present conditions is not in all respects so\r\napplicable to America as to the older countries of Europe,\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_554\" id=\"Page_554\"\u003e[Pg 554]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbut it has too much truth to be omitted in any ethical consideration.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"If the choice were to be made between communism with\r\nall its chances, and the present state of society with all its\r\nsufferings and injustices, if the institution of private property\r\nnecessarily carried with it, as a consequence, that the produce\r\nof labor should be apportioned as we now see it, almost in an\r\ninverse ratio to the labor,\u0026mdash;the largest portions to those\r\nwho have not worked at all, the next largest to those whose\r\nwork is almost nominal, and so in descending scale, the\r\nremuneration dwindling as the work grows harder and more\r\ndisagreeable, until the most fatiguing and exhausting bodily\r\nlabor cannot count with certainty on being able to earn even\r\nthe necessaries of life,\u0026mdash;if this, or communism, were the alternative,\r\nall the difficulties, great or small, of communism\r\nwould be but as dust in the balance. But to make the comparison\r\napplicable, we must compare communism at its best\r\nwith the r\u0026eacute;gime of individual property, not as it is, but as it\r\nmight be made. The principle of private property has never\r\nyet had a fair trial in any country.\" (\u003ci\u003ePolit. Econ.\u003c/i\u003e, Book II.,\r\nch. i.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 8. PRESENT TENDENCIES\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIndividualistic Foundations.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The general tendency\r\nup to very recent time in the United States has been decidedly\r\nindividualistic, both in the policy concerning the\r\nmethod of holding property, and in the legal balance between\r\nvested property rights and the social welfare. Public\r\nlands were granted on easy terms to homesteaders;\r\nmines as well as soil were practically free to the prospector;\r\nschool fund lands were in most cases sold for a song instead\r\nof being kept for the public. So general has been\r\nthe attitude that all wealth ought to be in private hands\r\nthat it has been difficult to convict men who have fraudulently\r\nobtained vast tracts of public land. The magnitude\r\nof the operation has given \"respectability\" to the\r\nbeneficiaries. The taxing power has done little to maintain\r\nadjustment. In this, as in many other respects, the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_555\" id=\"Page_555\"\u003e[Pg 555]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npolicy of the United States has been far more individualistic\r\nthan that of Great Britain. The latter has graded\r\nincome and inheritance taxes. In the United States, on\r\nthe other hand, the Federal taxation bears more heavily on\r\nthe poor as they are the large body of consumers,\u0026mdash;not,\r\nof course, in the sense that the individual poor man pays\r\nmore than the individual rich man, but in the sense that\r\na million of dollars owned by a thousand men pays more\r\nthan a million owned by one man. Legally, the Constitution\r\nof the United States and certain of its amendments\r\ngave private rights extraordinary protection, especially\r\nwhen contracts were construed to mean charters, as well\r\nas private contracts. The public welfare was conceived\r\nto reside almost solely in private rights.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_244_244\" id=\"FNanchor_244_244\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_244_244\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[244]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIncreased Recognition of Public Welfare.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Recent policy\r\nand legal decisions show a decided change. Reserves\r\nof forest lands have been established. Water-supplies,\r\nparks, and many other kinds of property have been\r\nchanged from private to public ownership. The question\r\nas to mines has been raised. Graded inheritance taxes\r\nhave been established in some states, and the question of\r\ngraded income taxes is likely to be more generally considered\r\nunless some other form of taxation based on the\r\nsocial values given to land, or franchises, or other forms\r\nof property seems more equitable. The Supreme Court in\r\nrecent decisions \"has read into the constitution two sweeping\r\nexceptions to the inviolability of property rights.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_245_245\" id=\"FNanchor_245_245\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_245_245\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[245]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nOne is that of public use. \"Whenever the owner of a\r\nproperty devotes it to a use in which the public has an\r\ninterest, he in effect grants to the public an interest in such\r\nuse, and must to the extent of that use submit to be controlled\r\nby the public for the common good so long as he\r\nmaintains the use.\" The second exception is that of the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_556\" id=\"Page_556\"\u003e[Pg 556]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npolice power which in 1906 (204 U. S., 311, 318) was declared\r\nto extend \"to so dealing with the conditions which\r\nexist in the state as to bring out of them the greatest welfare\r\nof its people.\" The application of this broad principle\r\nis still in an uncertain condition, but there can be no\r\nquestion that it recognizes a changed situation. When people\r\nare living in such interdependence as in the collective\r\nlife of to-day, it is no longer possible to locate public welfare\r\nin any such preponderating degree in private rights\r\nas was justified under the conditions of a new country a\r\ncentury ago. Says Professor Smith:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"On the fundamental question of the relation of public\r\npolicy to private property rights the [Supreme] Court has\r\nabandoned the individualist views with which the founders\r\nof the constitution were imbued; and in its doctrines of the\r\npublic use and the police power it has distinctly accepted what\r\nmay be termed, in the literal and proper sense of the word,\r\nthe socialist view. In so doing, it has unquestionably expressed\r\nthe dominant opinion of the American people. The\r\nAmerican people does not accept the collectivist theory; it\r\nbelieves in private property; but it recognizes that rights\r\nof property must yield, in cases of conflict, to the superior\r\nrights of society at large.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf some of the means set forth above for securing juster\r\ndistribution were adopted, the first step toward Mill\u0027s demand\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_246_246\" id=\"FNanchor_246_246\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_246_246\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[246]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwould be met. If the community should reap the\r\nreturn for its own growth, if taxation should be so arranged\r\nas to fall most heavily on those best able to pay\r\nrather than on those who are most honest or least able\r\nto evade, it would seem rational to hold that society will\r\nfind a way to continue the four forms of control now existing,\r\nmaking such shifts as changing conditions require.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSome of these shiftings are already evident and give\r\npromise of greater justice without loss of any of the benefits\r\naccruing from private property.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_557\" id=\"Page_557\"\u003e[Pg 557]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSocial Justice through Economic, Social, and Scientific\r\nProgress.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Not all moral advance comes \"with observation,\"\r\nor by political agency. The economic process is\r\nproviding in certain lines a substitute for property.\r\nScience and invention, which are themselves a fine illustration\r\nof the balance and interaction between individual and\r\nsocial intelligence, individual effort and social co\u0026ouml;peration,\r\nare making possible in many ways a state of society in\r\nwhich men have at once greater freedom and greater power\r\nthrough association, greater individual development and\r\ngreater socialization of interests, less private property but\r\ngreater private use and enjoyment of what is common.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe substitute for property provided by the economic\r\nprocess itself is permanence or security of support. If\r\nthe person can count definitely upon a future, this is equivalent\r\nto the security of property. And through the organization\r\nof modern industry supplemented by insurance\r\nand pensions, either state, institutional, or in corporations,\r\nor in mutual benefit associations, there has been on the\r\nwhole, a great increase of security, although it is still unfortunately\r\ntrue that the wage-worker may in most cases\r\nbe dismissed at any moment, and has virtually no contract,\r\nor even any well-assured confidence of continued\r\nemployment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is a mutual co\u0026ouml;peration of economic, social, and scientific\r\nfactors which has brought about a great increase\r\nof individual use and enjoyment through public ownership.\r\nThis \u003ci\u003ehas placed many of the things which make life\r\nworth living within the enjoyment of all\u003c/i\u003e, and at the same\r\ntime given a far better service to the users than the old\r\nmethod of private ownership. \u003ci\u003eIn this change lies, perhaps,\r\nthe greatest advance of justice\u003c/i\u003e in the economic sphere, and\r\na great promise for the future. There was a time when\r\nif a man would sit down on a piece of ground and enjoy a\r\nfine landscape, he must own it. If he would have a plot\r\nwhere his children might play, he must own it. If he would\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_558\" id=\"Page_558\"\u003e[Pg 558]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntravel, he must carry his own lantern, and furnish his\r\nown protection from thieves. If he would have water, he\r\nmust sink his own well. If he would send a letter, he must\r\nown or hire a messenger. If he would read a book, he must\r\nnot merely own the book, but own or hire the author or\r\ncopyist. If he would educate his children, he must own\r\nor hire the tutor. We have learned that public parks,\r\npublic lighting and water works, public libraries, and\r\npublic schools, are better than private provision.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe objection which comes from the individualist to this\r\nprogramme is that it does too much for the individual. It\r\nis better, urges individualism, to stimulate the individual\u0027s\r\nactivity and leave his wants largely unsatisfied than to\r\nsatisfy all his wants at the expense of his activity. But\r\nthis assumes that what is done through public agencies is\r\ndone for the people and not by the people. A democracy\r\nmay do for itself what an aristocracy may not do for a\r\ndependent class. The greatest demoralization at the present\r\ntime is not to those who have not, but to those who\r\nappropriate gains due to associated activity, complacently\r\nsupposing that they have themselves created all that they\r\nenjoy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAnother Great Advance is the Change in What Makes\r\nUp the Chief Values of Life.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In early times the values\r\nof life were largely found in food, clothing, personal ornaments,\r\nbodily comfort, sex gratifications. Enjoyment\r\nof these involved exclusive possession and therefore property.\r\nBut with the advance of civilization an increasing\r\nproportion of life\u0027s values falls in the mental realm of\r\nsharable goods.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSatisfaction in knowledge, in art, in association, in freedom,\r\nis not diminished, but increased when it is shared.\r\nThe educated man may have no more property than the\r\nilliterate. He has access to a whole system of social values.\r\nHe has freedom; he has a more genuinely independent type\r\nof power than accrues from the mere possession of things.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_559\" id=\"Page_559\"\u003e[Pg 559]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe society of the future will find a part of its justice in\r\nso adjusting its economic system that all may enter as\r\nfully as possible into this more social world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMethods of Social Selection.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Finally, recognizing all\r\nthe value of the competitive process in the past as a\r\nmethod of selecting ability, it must be regarded as crude\r\nand wasteful. It is like the method of blind trial and\r\nerror which obtains in the animal world. The method\r\nof ideas, of conscious use of means to secure ends, is the\r\nmore effective and the more rational. Society now is\r\ngaining the scientific equipment which may allow the\r\nsubstitution of the more effective and less wasteful method.\r\nIt should discover and educate capacity instead of giving\r\nmerely a precarious encouragement to certain special\r\ntypes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 9. THREE SPECIAL PROBLEMS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThree special problems may be noticed about which\r\nmoral judgment is as yet uncertain: The open versus the\r\nclosed shop, the capitalization of corporations, and the\r\n\"unearned increment.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. The Open versus the Closed Shop.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;In certain industries\r\nin which the workmen are well organized they\r\nhave made contracts with employers which provide that\r\nonly union men shall be employed. Such a shop is called\r\na closed shop, in distinction from an \"open shop\" in which\r\nnon-union men may be employed in part or altogether.\r\nThe psychological motive for the demand for the closed\r\nshop is natural enough: the union has succeeded in gaining\r\ncertain advantages in hours or wages or both; this has\r\nrequired some expense and perhaps some risk. It is natural\r\nto feel that those who get the advantage should share\r\nthe expense and effort, and failing this, should not be admitted\r\nto the shop. If the argument stopped here it would\r\nbe insufficient for a moral justification for two reasons.\r\nFirst, joining a union involves much more than payment\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_560\" id=\"Page_560\"\u003e[Pg 560]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof dues. It means control by the union in ways which may\r\ninterfere with obligations to family, or even to the social\r\norder. Hence, to exclude a fellow workman from the opportunity\r\nto work because he\u0026mdash;perhaps for conscientious\r\nreasons\u0026mdash;would not belong to the union, could not be justified\r\nunless the union could make it appear that it was\r\nmaintaining a social and not merely a group interest.\r\nSecond, in some cases unions have sought to limit output.\r\nIn so far as this is done not for reasons of health but to\r\nraise prices, the union is opposing the interest of consumers.\r\nHere again the union must exhibit a social justification\r\nif it is to gain social approval.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand it may be noted that the individualist\r\nof the second sort\u0026mdash;who believes in the competitive\r\nstruggle as a moral process\u0026mdash;has no ground on which to\r\ndeclare for \"open shop.\" Exactly the same principle\r\nwhich would permit combination in capital and place no\r\nlimit on competitive pressure, provided it is all done\r\nthrough free contracts, can raise no objection against\r\ncombinations of laborers making the best contracts possible.\r\nWhen a syndicate of capitalists has made a highly\r\nfavorable contract or successfully underwritten a large\r\nissue of stock, it is not customary under the principle of\r\n\"open shop\" to give a share in the contract to all who\r\nask for it, or to let the whole public in \"on the ground\r\nfloor.\" Nor are capitalists accustomed to leave a part\r\nof the market to be supplied by some competitor for fear\r\nsuch competitor may suffer if he does not have business.\r\nWhen the capitalist argues for the open shop upon the\r\nground of freedom and democracy, it seems like the case\r\nof the mote and the beam.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAn analogy with a political problem may aid: Has a\r\nnation the right to exclude (or tax heavily) goods or persons\r\nfrom other countries? May it maintain a \"closed\r\nshop\"? The policy of the American colonists and of the\r\nUnited States has varied. The Puritans maintained a\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_561\" id=\"Page_561\"\u003e[Pg 561]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\"closed shop\" on religious lines. They came to this country\r\nto maintain a certain religion and polity. They expelled\r\nseveral men who did not agree with them. The\r\nUnited States excludes Chinese laborers, and imposes a\r\ntariff which in many cases is intended to be prohibitive\r\nagainst the products of other countries. This is done\r\navowedly to protect the laborer, and in so far as it is effective\r\nit closes the shop. The maxim \"This is a white man\u0027s\r\ncountry\" is a similar \"closed shop\" utterance. On moral\r\ngrounds the non-union man is in the same category as the\r\nman of alien race or country. What, if anything, can\r\njustify a nation or smaller group from excluding others\r\nfrom its benefits? Clearly the only conditions are (1)\r\nthat the group or nation is existing for some morally\r\njustifiable end, which (2) would be endangered by the admission\r\nof the outsiders. A colony established to work\r\nout religious or political liberty would be justified in\r\nexcluding a multitude who sought to enter it and then subvert\r\nthese principles. If a union is working for a morally\r\nvaluable end, e.g., a certain standard of living which is\r\nmorally desirable, and if this were threatened by the admission\r\nof non-union men, the closed shop would seem to\r\nbe justified. If the purpose were merely to secure certain\r\nadvantages to a small group, and if the open shop would\r\nnot lower the standard but merely extend its range of\r\nbenefits, it is hard to see why the closed shop is not a\r\nselfish principle\u0026mdash;though no more selfish than the grounds\r\non which the tariff is usually advocated.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. The Capitalization of Corporations\u003c/b\u003e, especially of\r\npublic service corporations, is a matter on which there\r\nis a difference of policy in different states, owing probably\r\nto uncertainty as to the morality of the principles involved.\r\nThe two theories held are: (a) Companies should\r\nissue capital stock only on the basis of money paid in;\r\ndividends then represent a return on actual investment.\r\n(b) Companies may issue whatever stock they please, or\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_562\" id=\"Page_562\"\u003e[Pg 562]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhatever they expect their income will enable them to pay\r\ndividends upon; dividends will then represent return for\r\nvaluable privileges, or for some utility to be marketed.\r\nIn behalf of this latter view it may be claimed that if the\r\ncompany pays dividends the investors have nothing to\r\ncomplain of, and if it sells its products or transportation\r\nat market rates, the consumer has nothing to complain of.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo far as the relations between corporation and investor\r\nare concerned, the issues are simple. If the stocks are\r\nissued with no expectation that they will give any return,\r\nmerely to \"sell,\" it is pure dishonesty, of the same type\r\nwhich under cruder conditions sold spavined horses or made\r\ncounterfeit money, and now assumes the more vulgar type\r\nof dealing in \"green goods.\" The fact that fictitious\r\ncapital can be publicly advertised, gives it a financial\r\nbut not a moral advantage. This, however, would have\r\nsuch decided limitations, credulous as human nature is,\r\nthat if fictitious capital paid no dividends it would soon\r\nhave no market. Hence, for the far-seeing promoter,\r\nthe pressure is toward making some at least of the fictitious\r\ncapital pay dividends. What is the principle in\r\nthis case? If we are dealing with a new and untried mode\r\nof production or public service, the case is simply that\r\nof any speculation. If a proposed product has a possible\r\nutility, but at the same time involves so much risk\r\nthat in the long run only half of such enterprises will\r\nsucceed, society may consider it worth offering a profit\r\nequal to fifty per cent. in order to pay for the risk. If,\r\non the other hand, the income is to derive from valuable\r\npublic franchises, or from the growth of the community\r\nand its necessities, the case is different. Here there is\r\nlittle, if any, risk for which it is fair for society to pay.\r\nThe excessive capital beyond the cost is designed to disguise\r\nthe rate of profit, and therefore conceal from the\r\ncommunity the cost of the goods or service. If the public\r\ndemands cheaper rates it is told that the company is now\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_563\" id=\"Page_563\"\u003e[Pg 563]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npaying only a fair dividend upon its stock.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_247_247\" id=\"FNanchor_247_247\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_247_247\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[247]\u003c/a\u003e The usual\r\nmethod of capitalizing many enterprises of a quasi-public\r\nsort is to issue bonds to cover the cost of construction\r\nor plant, and then one or more series of stocks which\r\nare known as \"velvet.\" In part these stocks may represent\r\na work of organization which is a legitimate public\r\nservice, but in many cases they represent devices for\r\ntransferring public wealth to private property. Enormous\r\nsums have been taken from the public in this\r\nmanner. The element which makes this method particularly\r\nobnoxious is that the quasi-public corporations are\r\ngiven a monopoly by the community and then take advantage\r\nof this to capitalize indefinitely the necessities of\r\na growing community. In this case the conception of\r\npublic service is lost sight of in the \"dazzling possibility\r\nof public exploitation.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_248_248\" id=\"FNanchor_248_248\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_248_248\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[248]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFew methods of extorting wealth have equaled this.\r\nIn some cases bribery of public officials has added an item\r\nof expense to be collected later from the public. When\r\nthe various forms of public service or protected industry\r\nwere first projected there was risk involved. It was necessary\r\nto offer inducements to capital to engage in them.\r\nIt was desirable to have railroads, gas, water, express\r\nservice. But as the factor of risk has been eliminated, the\r\npublic tires of paying double prices, and a \"fair\" return\r\nmust be estimated on the basis of actual rather than\r\nfictitious capital. The public has come to have a clear\r\nidea as to the morality of such practices as have been\r\nemployed in letting contracts for public buildings at\r\nprices far above market value. The New York City courthouse\r\nand Pennsylvania capitol offer familiar examples.\r\nDoes it differ materially from such practices when a com\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_564\" id=\"Page_564\"\u003e[Pg 564]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003epany\r\ncharges the public an excessive price for transportation\r\nor lighting, and when State or municipal authorities\r\nauthorize by franchise or monopoly such excessive\r\ncharges? Probably the conscience of the next century,\r\nif not of the next generation, will fail to see the superior\r\nmoral quality of the latter procedure.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. The \"Unearned Increment.\"\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This term is applied\r\nmost frequently to the increase in land value or franchise\r\nvalue which is due, not to the owner, but to the growth\r\nof the community. A tract of land is bought at a price\r\nfixed by its value as farm land. A city grows up. The\r\nowner of the land may have been active in the building\r\nup of industry, but he may not. An increase of values\r\nfollows, which is due to the growth of the community.\r\nShall the owner have it all, or shall the community have\r\nit all, or shall there be a division? The growth in value\r\nof a franchise for gas, electric lighting, transportation,\r\npresents the same problem. It is not usually recognized,\r\nhowever, that the same principle is found in every increase\r\nof value due to increasing demand. The logical\r\nbasis for distinction would seem to be that in some cases\r\nincrease of demand calls out competition, and the price is\r\nlowered; the public thus receives its share in lower cost.\r\nIn other cases, notably those first mentioned, there can\r\nbe no competition, the price is therefore not often lowered\r\nunless by legislative action, and the whole benefit goes\r\nto the owner of land or franchise. As regards land, the\r\ncase is much stronger in Europe, for land titles were\r\noriginally gained there largely by seizure, whereas\r\nin America private titles have been largely through\r\npurchase.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIndividualism, according as it argues from the platform\r\nof natural rights or from that of social welfare, would\r\nclaim either that individuals should have all the increase\r\nbecause they have a right to all they can get under a\r\nsystem of free contracts, or that it is for the social wel\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_565\" id=\"Page_565\"\u003e[Pg 565]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003efare\r\nto allow them all they can get since private property\r\nis public wealth. From the standpoint of natural rights\r\nthe reply would seem to be unanswerable: the community\r\ngives the increased value; it belongs to the community.\r\nFrom the standpoint of social welfare the answer is not\r\nso simple. It might, for example, be socially desirable to\r\nencourage the owners of farming land by leaving to them\r\nthe increase in value due to the growth of the country,\r\nwhereas city land-owners might need no such inducement.\r\nInvestors in a new form of public service corporation\r\nmight need greater inducements than would be fair to\r\nthose in enterprises well established. But, although details\r\nare complex, the social conscience is working toward\r\nthis general principle: the community should share in\r\nthe values which it produces. If it cannot do this by\r\ncheaper goods and better service, it must by graded taxation,\r\nby ownership, or by some other means. The British\r\ngovernment has already considered a measure for ascertaining\r\nthe land values in Scotland as a preliminary step\r\ntoward adjustment of this question.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 15%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_566\" id=\"Page_566\"\u003e[Pg 566]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eAPPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXV\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003ePROFESSOR SEAGER\u0027S PROGRAMME OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nWITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO WAGE-EARNERS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the conviction that in the field of social legislation\r\nthe United States is behind the more progressive countries\r\nof Europe, Professor Henry R. Seager, of Columbia University,\r\npresented the following \u003ci\u003eOutline\u003c/i\u003e for discussion at\r\na meeting of the American Association for Labor Legislation,\r\nDecember 30, 1907. It is reproduced with his\r\nconsent as giving concrete expression to several of the\r\nprinciples advocated in the foregoing chapters.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe ends to be aimed at in any programme of social legislation\r\nare:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI. To protect wage-earners in the continued enjoyment of\r\nstandards of living to which they are already accustomed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eII. To assist them to attain to higher standards of living.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eI. Measures to protect prevailing standards of living.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe principal contingencies which threaten standards of\r\nliving already acquired are: (1) industrial accidents; (2) illness;\r\n(3) invalidity and old age; (4) premature death; (5)\r\nunemployment. These contingencies are not in practice adequately\r\nprovided against by wage-earners themselves. In\r\nconsequence the losses they entail, in the absence of any social\r\nprovision against them, fall with crushing force on the families\r\nwhich suffer from them, and only too often reduce such families\r\nfrom a position of independence and self-respect to one of\r\nhumiliating and efficiency-destroying social dependency. The\r\nfollowing remedies for the evils resulting from this situation\r\nare suggested.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(1) Employers\u0027 liability laws fail to provide adequate indemnity\r\nto the victims of industrial accidents because in a large\r\nproportion of cases no legal blame attaches to the employer\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_567\" id=\"Page_567\"\u003e[Pg 567]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand because litigation under them is costly and uncertain in\r\nits outcome. Adequate indemnification must be sought along\r\nthe line of workmen\u0027s compensation for all industrial accidents\r\nat the expense of the employer (the British system) or of\r\ncompulsory accident insurance (the German system). The\r\nformer seems to accord better with American ideas and\r\ntraditions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) The principle of workmen\u0027s compensation may be extended\r\nto include indemnity for loss of wages due to trade\r\ndiseases. Provision against illness not directly traceable to\r\nthe employment must be sought either in compulsory illness\r\ninsurance or in subsidized and state-directed sick-insurance\r\nclubs. Trade unions may assume the functions of such clubs\r\nin organized trades. The latter plan seems better suited to\r\npresent American conditions than compulsory illness insurance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) Provision against invalidity and old age may be through\r\ncompulsory old age insurance, or through state old age pensions.\r\nThe latter, though more costly, are believed to be better\r\nsuited to American conditions, when hedged about by proper\r\nrestrictions, than compulsory old age insurance with the elaborate\r\nadministrative machinery which it entails.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) Premature death may be provided against by an extension\r\nof the machinery for caring for the victims of industrial\r\naccident and of illness to provide for their families when accident\r\nor illness results fatally.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) Provision against losses due to unemployment is attended\r\nwith great difficulties because unemployment is so frequently\r\nthe consequence of incapacity or of disinclination for\r\ncontinuous labor. The most promising plan for providing\r\nagainst this evil appears to be through subsidizing and supervising\r\ntrade unions which pay out-of-work benefits to stimulate\r\nthis side of their activity. Public employment bureaus and\r\nindustrial colonies for the unemployed may also help to\r\nalleviate the evil of unemployment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\u0027width: 15%;\u0027 /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAdequate social provision against these five contingencies\r\nalong the lines suggested, would, it is believed, go a long way\r\ntowards solving the problem of social dependency. If these\r\nconcessions were made to the demands of social justice, a more\r\ndrastic policy towards social dependents than public opinion\r\nwill now sanction might be inaugurated with good prospect of\r\nconfining social dependency to the physically, mentally, and\r\nmorally defective.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_568\" id=\"Page_568\"\u003e[Pg 568]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eII. Measures to elevate standards of living.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe primary conditions essential to rising standards of living\r\nare energy and enterprise on the part of wage-earners and\r\nopportunities to make energy and enterprise count in the form\r\nof higher earnings. The principal contributions which social\r\nlegislation may make to advancing standards of living in the\r\nUnited States are believed to be: (1) measures serving to encourage\r\nsaving for future needs on the part of wage-earners\r\nby providing safe investments for savings; (2) measures protecting\r\nwage-earners from the debilitating effects of an unregulated\r\ncompetition; (3) measures serving to bring within\r\nthe reach of all opportunities for industrial training. Standards\r\nof living will also be advanced, of course, by nearly all\r\nmeasures calculated to promote the general well-being, such as\r\ntax and tariff-reform legislation, laws safeguarding the national\r\ndomain, the public regulation of corporations, especially\r\nthose with monopolistic powers, etc., but these are not usually\r\nclassed under the head of social legislation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(1) The greatest present need under this head is for a postal\r\nsavings bank like those of European countries. The advantages\r\nof a postal savings bank over privately managed banks\r\nare the wider distribution of places of deposit, post-offices being\r\nlocated in every section of the country, and the greater confidence\r\ndepositors would feel in such a bank. Once established\r\nthe postal savings bank might enter the insurance field, as has\r\nthe British postal savings bank, not as a rival of privately\r\nmanaged insurance companies, but to bring to every wage-earner\r\nthe opportunity to secure safe insurance. Next to\r\nproviding itself opportunities for safe investment and insurance,\r\nthe government has an important duty to perform in\r\nsupervising the business of privately managed savings banks\r\nand insurance companies. Notwithstanding the progress made\r\nin recent years in the United States in this field, there is still\r\nsomething left for social legislation to accomplish.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) If energy and enterprise are to be kept at a maximum,\r\nwage-earners must be protected from exhausting toil under\r\nunhealthful conditions. Skilled wage-earners can usually protect\r\nthemselves through trade unions, but unskilled workers,\r\nwomen and children, require legal protection. Under this head\r\nbelong, therefore, the familiar types of protective labor laws.\r\nThe following may be specified:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(a) Laws prohibiting the employment of children below\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_569\" id=\"Page_569\"\u003e[Pg 569]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfourteen in all gainful pursuits. Such laws should be uniform\r\nthroughout the United States and rigidly enforced by means of\r\nemployment certificates based on convincing evidence of age\r\nand physical examination to determine fitness. As provision\r\nfor free public education is made more adequate to present\r\nneeds the minimum age may be advanced perhaps to sixteen.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(b) Laws limiting the hours of labor of young persons over\r\nfourteen. Protection here should extend to eighteen, at least\r\nin factory employments, and employment certificates should\r\nbe required of all under that age.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(c) Laws limiting the hours of labor of women. In the\r\nregulation of women\u0027s work in the United States the principal\r\nneeds are uniformity and machinery for efficient enforcement.\r\nThe last is facilitated by the plan of specifying in the law the\r\nworking period for the protected classes, and American courts\r\nmust be brought to see the reasonableness (administratively)\r\nof such prescriptions. The nine-hour day and prohibition of\r\nnight work set a high enough standard until greater uniformity\r\nand more efficient enforcement shall have been secured.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(d) Prescriptions in regard to sanitation and safety appliances.\r\nGeneral prescriptions in regard to ventilation, etc.,\r\nneed to be made more exact, and much more attention needs to\r\nbe given to the special regulation of dangerous trades, the\r\nexistence of which has been largely ignored thus far in American\r\nlegislation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) The chief reason for restricting the labor of children\r\nand young persons is to permit the physical and mental development\r\nof childhood and youth to proceed unhampered and\r\nto ripen into strong, vigorous, and efficient manhood and\r\nwomanhood. To attain this end, it is necessary to provide not\r\nonly for wholesome living conditions and general free public\r\neducation, but also for special industrial training for older\r\nchildren superior to the training afforded in modern factories\r\nand workshops. The apprenticeship system now fails as a\r\nmethod of industrial training, even in those few trades which\r\nretain the forms of apprenticeship. There is urgent social\r\nneed for comprehensive provision for industrial training as a\r\npart of the public school system, not to take the place of the\r\ntraining now given to children under fourteen, but to hold those\r\nbetween fourteen and sixteen in school. As this need is\r\nsupplied the period of compulsory school attendance may\r\ngradually be extended up to the sixteenth year. The guiding\r\nprinciple of such industrial training should be that it is the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_570\" id=\"Page_570\"\u003e[Pg 570]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfunction of free public education in the United States not only\r\nto prepare children to lead useful, well-rounded and happy\r\nlives, but to command the earnings without which such lives are\r\nimpossible.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe above programme of social legislation is urged as a step\r\ntowards realizing that canon of social justice which demands\r\nfor all equal industrial opportunities. It is believed that it will\r\nalso help to raise the standard of citizenship in the country by\r\nmaking both wage-earners and employers more intelligent,\r\nmore efficient, and more truly democratic. Thus it will serve\r\nto prepare the way for such further industrial reorganization\r\nas may be found desirable.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_240_240\" id=\"Footnote_240_240\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_240_240\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[240]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Boston has an ingenious method of dividing profits. The company\r\nwhich supplies gas must lower the price of gas in proportion\r\nas it increases its rate of dividends.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_241_241\" id=\"Footnote_241_241\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_241_241\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[241]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e February 24, 1908.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_242_242\" id=\"Footnote_242_242\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_242_242\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[242]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Spargo, \u003ci\u003eSocialism\u003c/i\u003e, 220-27.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_243_243\" id=\"Footnote_243_243\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_243_243\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[243]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003ePhilosophical Review\u003c/i\u003e, xiv., 370 f.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_244_244\" id=\"Footnote_244_244\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_244_244\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[244]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. J. A. Smith, \u003ci\u003eThe Spirit of American Government\u003c/i\u003e, 1907.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_245_245\" id=\"Footnote_245_245\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_245_245\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[245]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e I have followed in this paragraph the discussion of Professor\r\nMunroe Smith, \u003ci\u003eVan Norden\u0027s Magazine\u003c/i\u003e, February, 1908. For a full\r\nhistory see E. Freund, \u003ci\u003eThe Police Power\u003c/i\u003e, 1905.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_246_246\" id=\"Footnote_246_246\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_246_246\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[246]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Above, p. 554.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_247_247\" id=\"Footnote_247_247\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_247_247\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[247]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e As in the case of gas in New York City, where the court has\r\ndecided that the public cannot refuse to pay interest on the value of\r\nthe franchise\u0026mdash;its own gift.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_248_248\" id=\"Footnote_248_248\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_248_248\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[248]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. Hadley, \u003ci\u003eEconomics\u003c/i\u003e, p. 159.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_571\" id=\"Page_571\"\u003e[Pg 571]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER XXVI\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\r\nTHE FAMILY\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe family in its moral aspects has one end, the common\r\ngood of all its members, but this has three aspects.\r\n(1) Marriage converts an attachment between man and\r\nwoman, either of passion or of friendship, into a deliberate,\r\nintimate, permanent, responsible union for a common\r\nend of mutual good. It is this common end, a good\r\nof a higher, broader, fuller sort than either could attain\r\nin isolation, which lifts passion from the impulsive or\r\nselfish to the moral plane; it is the peculiar intimacy\r\nand the peculiar demands for common sympathy and co-operation,\r\nwhich give it greater depth and reach than\r\nordinary friendship. (2) The family is the great social\r\nagency for the care and training of the race. (3) This\r\nfunction reacts upon the character of the parents. Tenderness,\r\nsympathy, self-sacrifice, steadiness of purpose,\r\nresponsibility, and activity, are all demanded and usually\r\nevoked by the children. A brief sketch of the development\r\nof the family and of its psychological basis, will prepare\r\nthe way for a consideration of its present problems.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 1. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE MODERN FAMILY\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe division of the sexes appeals to the biologist as\r\nan agency for securing greater variability, and so greater\r\npossibility of adaptation and progress. It has also to\r\nthe sociologist the value of giving greater variety in\r\nfunction, and so a much richer society than could exist\r\nwithout it. Morally, the realization of these values, and\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_572\" id=\"Page_572\"\u003e[Pg 572]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe further effects upon character noted above, depend\r\ngreatly upon the terms under which the marriage union\r\nis formed and maintained. The number of parties to\r\nthe union, the mode of forming it, its stability, and the relations\r\nof husband and wife, parents and children, while in\r\nthe family relation, have shown in western civilization a\r\ntendency toward certain lines of progress, although the\r\nmovement has been irregular and has been interrupted by\r\ncertain halts or even reversions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Maternal Type.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The early family, certainly in\r\nmany parts of the world, was formed when a man left\r\nhis father and mother to \"cleave unto his wife,\" that is,\r\nwhen the woman remained in her own group and the man\r\ncame from his group to live with her. This tended to\r\ngive the woman continued protection\u0026mdash;and also continued\r\ncontrol\u0026mdash;by her own relatives, and made the children\r\nbelong to the mother\u0027s clan. As recent ethnologists seem\r\ninclined to agree, this does not mean a matriarchal family.\r\nThe woman\u0027s father and brothers, rather than the woman,\r\nare in the last analysis the authority. At the same time,\r\nat a stage when physical force is so large a factor, this\r\ntype of family undoubtedly favors the woman\u0027s condition\r\nas compared with the next to be mentioned.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Paternal Type.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;When the woman leaves her own\r\ngroup to live in the house of her husband, it means a possible\r\nloss of backing and position for her. But it means\r\na great gain for the influence which insures the wife\u0027s\r\nfidelity, the father\u0027s authority over the children and\r\ninterest in them, and finally the permanence of the family.\r\nThe power of the husband and father reached its extreme\r\namong western peoples in the patriarchate at Rome,\r\nwhich allowed him the right of life and death. At its\r\nbest the patriarchal type of family fostered the dignity\r\nand power of a ruler and owner, the sense of honor which\r\nwatched jealously over self and wife and children to\r\nkeep the name unsullied; finally the respective attitudes\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_573\" id=\"Page_573\"\u003e[Pg 573]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof protector and protected enhanced the charm of each\r\nfor the other. At its worst it meant domineering brutality,\r\nand either the weakness of abject submission or\r\nthe misery of hopeless injustice.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAlong with this building up of \"father right\" came\r\nvariations in the mode of gaining a wife. When the man\r\ntakes a wife instead of going to his wife, he may either\r\ncapture her, or purchase her, or serve for her. In any\r\nof these cases she may become to a certain extent his property\r\nas well as his wife. This does not necessarily imply a\r\nfeeling of humiliation. The Kafir women profess great\r\ncontempt for a system in which a woman is not worth\r\nbuying. But it evidently favors a commercial theory of\r\nthe whole relation. The bride\u0027s consent may sometimes\r\nbe a necessary part of the transaction, but it is not\r\nalways.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEffects of Father Right.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;This family of \"father\r\nright\" is also likely to encourage a theory that the man\r\nshould have greater freedom in marriage than the woman.\r\nIn the lowest types of civilization we often find the marital\r\nrelations very loose from our point of view, although, as\r\nwas noted in Chapter II., these peoples usually make up\r\nfor this in the rigidity of the rules as to who may marry\r\nor have marriage relations. With some advance in\r\ncivilization and with the father right, we are very apt\r\nto find polygamy permitted to chiefs or those who can\r\nafford it, even though the average man may have but\r\none wife. In certain cases the wives may be an economic\r\nadvantage rather than a burden. It goes along\r\nwith a family in which father and children are of first\r\nimportance that a wife may even be glad to have her\r\nservant bear the children if they may only be reckoned\r\nas hers. The husband has thus greater freedom\u0026mdash;for\r\npolyandry seems to have been rare among civilized\r\npeoples except under stress of poverty. The greater\r\nfreedom of the husband is likely to appear also in the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_574\" id=\"Page_574\"\u003e[Pg 574]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmatter of divorce. Among many savage peoples divorce\r\nis easy for both parties if there is mutual consent, but\r\nwith the families in which father right prevails it is\r\nalmost always easier for the man. The ancient Hebrew\r\nmight divorce his wife for any cause he pleased, but\r\nthere is no mention of a similar right on her part, and\r\nit doubtless did not occur to the lawgiver. The code of\r\nHammurabi allows the man to put away the mother of\r\nhis children by giving her and her children suitable maintenance,\r\nor a childless wife by returning the bride price,\r\nbut a wife who has acted foolishly or extravagantly may\r\nbe divorced without compensation or kept as a slave. The\r\nwoman may also claim a divorce \"if she has been economical\r\nand has no vice and her husband has gone out\r\nand greatly belittled her.\" But if she fails to prove\r\nher claim and appears to be a gadder-about, \"they shall\r\nthrow that woman into the water.\" India and China\r\nhave the patriarchal family, and the Brahmans added the\r\nobligation of the widow never to remarry. Greater freedom\r\nof divorce on the part of the husband is also attended\r\nby a very different standard for marital faithfulness.\r\nFor the unfaithful husband there is frequently no penalty\r\nor a slight one; for the wife it is frequently death.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Roman Family.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The modern family in western\r\ncivilization is the product of three main forces: the\r\nRoman law, the Teutonic custom, and the Christian\r\nChurch. Early Roman law had recognized the extreme\r\npower of the husband and father. Wife and children\r\nwere in his \"hand.\" All women must be in the \u003ci\u003etutela\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nsome man. The woman, according to the three early\r\nforms of marriage, passed completely from the power and\r\nhand of her father into that of her husband. At the\r\nsame time she was the only wife, and divorce was rare.\r\nBut by the closing years of the Republic a new method\r\nof marriage, permitting the woman to remain in the\r\n\u003ci\u003emanus\u003c/i\u003e of her father, had come into vogue, and with it\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_575\" id=\"Page_575\"\u003e[Pg 575]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nan easy theory of divorce. Satirists have charged great\r\ndegeneracy in morals as a result, but Hobhouse thinks\r\nthat upon the whole the Roman matron would seem to have\r\nretained the position of her husband\u0027s companion, counselor,\r\nand friend, which she had held in those more austere\r\ntimes when marriage brought her legally under his\r\ndominion.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_249_249\" id=\"FNanchor_249_249\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_249_249\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[249]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Germanic Family.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The Germanic peoples recognized\r\nan almost unlimited power of the husband. The\r\npassion for liberty, which C\u0026aelig;sar remarked as prevalent\r\namong them, did not seem to require any large measure\r\nof freedom for their women. In fact, they, like other peoples,\r\nmight be said to have satisfied the two principles\r\nof freedom and control by allotting all the freedom to\r\nthe men and all, or nearly all, the control to the women.\r\nHobhouse thus summarizes the conditions:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"The power of the husband was strongly developed; he might\r\nexpose the infant children, chastise his wife, dispose of her\r\nperson. He could not put her to death, but if she was unfaithful,\r\nhe was, with the consent of the relations, judge and executioner.\r\nThe wife was acquired by purchase from her own relatives\r\nwithout reference to her own desires, and by purchase\r\npassed out of her family. She did not inherit in early times at\r\nall, though at a later period she acquired that right in the\r\nabsence of male heirs. She was in perpetual ward, subject, in\r\nshort, to the Chinese rule of the three obediences, to which must\r\nbe added, as feudal powers developed, the rule of the king or\r\nother feudal superior. And the guardianship or \u003ci\u003emundium\u003c/i\u003e was\r\nfrankly regarded in early law rather as a source of profit to\r\nthe guardian than as a means of defense to the ward, and for\r\nthis reason it fetched a price in the market, and was, in fact,\r\nsalable far down in the Middle Ages. Lastly, the German\r\nwife, though respected, had not the certainty enjoyed by the\r\nearly Roman Matron of reigning alone in the household. It is\r\ntrue that polygamy was rare in the early German tribes, but\r\nthis, as we have seen, is universally the case where the numbers\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_576\" id=\"Page_576\"\u003e[Pg 576]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the sexes are equal. Polygamy was allowed, and was\r\npracticed by the chiefs.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTwo Lines of Church Influence.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The influence of the\r\nchurch on marriage and family life was in two conflicting\r\nlines. On the one hand, the homage and adoration\r\ngiven to Mary and to the saints, tended to exalt and\r\nrefine the conception of woman. Marriage was, moreover,\r\ntreated as a \"sacrament,\" a holy mystery, symbolic\r\nof the relation of Christ and the church. The priestly\r\nbenediction gave religious sacredness from the beginning;\r\ngradually a marriage liturgy sprang up which added to\r\nthe solemnity of the event, and finally the whole ceremony\r\nwas made an ecclesiastical instead of a secular function.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_250_250\" id=\"FNanchor_250_250\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_250_250\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[250]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe whole institution was undoubtedly raised to a more\r\nserious and significant position. But, on the other hand,\r\nan ascetic stream of influence had pursued a similar\r\ncourse, deepening and widening as it flowed. Although\r\nfrom the beginning those \"forbidding to marry\" had been\r\ndenounced, it had nearly always been held that the celibate\r\nlife was a higher privilege. If marriage was a sacrament,\r\nit was nevertheless held that marriage made a man\r\nunfit to perform the sacraments. Woman was regarded\r\nas the cause of the original sin. Marriage was from this\r\nstandpoint a concession to human weakness. \"The generality\r\nof men and women must marry or they will do\r\nworse; therefore, marriage must be made easy; but the\r\nvery pure hold aloof from it as from a defilement. The\r\nlaw that springs from this source is not pleasant to\r\nread.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_251_251\" id=\"FNanchor_251_251\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_251_251\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[251]\u003c/a\u003e It must, however, be noted that, although celibacy\r\nby a selective process tended to remove continually\r\nthe finer, more aspiring men and women, and prevent them\r\nfrom leaving any descendants, it had one important value\r\nfor woman. The convent was at once a refuge, and a\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_577\" id=\"Page_577\"\u003e[Pg 577]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndoor to activity. \"The career open to the inmates of\r\nconvents was greater than any other ever thrown open\r\nto women in the course of modern European history.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_252_252\" id=\"FNanchor_252_252\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_252_252\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[252]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTwo important contributions to the justice of the marriage\r\nrelation, and therefore to the better theory of the\r\nfamily, are in any case to be set down to the credit\r\nof the church. The first was that the consent of the\r\nparties was the only thing necessary to constitute a valid\r\nmarriage. \"Here the church had not only to combat\r\nold tradition and the authority of the parents, but also\r\nthe seignorial power of the feudal lord, and it must be\r\naccounted to it for righteousness that it emancipated the\r\nwoman of the servile as well as of the free classes in relation\r\nto the most important event of her life.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_253_253\" id=\"FNanchor_253_253\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_253_253\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[253]\u003c/a\u003e The other\r\nwas that in maintaining as it did the indissolubility of\r\nthe sacramental marriage, it held that its violation was\r\nas bad for the husband as for the wife. The older\r\ntheories had looked at infidelity either as an injury to\r\nthe husband\u0027s property, or as introducing uncertainty\r\nas to the parenthood of children, and this survives in Dr.\r\nJohnson\u0027s dictum of a \"boundless\" difference. The feelings\r\nof the wife, or even of the husband, aside from his\r\nconcern for his property and children, do not seem to\r\nhave been considered.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe church thus modified the Germanic and Roman\r\ntraditions, but never entirely abolished them, because she\r\nwas divided within herself as to the real place of family\r\nlife. Protestantism, in its revolt from Rome, opposed\r\nboth its theories of marriage. On the one hand, the Reformers\r\nheld that marriage is not a sacrament, but a civil\r\ncontract, admitting of divorce. On the other hand, they\r\nregarded marriage as the most desirable state, and abolished\r\nthe celibacy of the clergy. The \"subjection of\r\nwomen,\" especially of married women, has, however, re\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_578\" id=\"Page_578\"\u003e[Pg 578]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003emained\r\nas the legal theory until very recently. In England\r\nit was the theory in Blackstone\u0027s time that \"The\r\nvery being or legal existence of the woman is suspended\r\nduring the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated\r\ninto that of the husband, under whose wing,\r\nprotection, and cover, she performs everything.\" According\r\nto the old law, he might give her \"moderate\r\ncorrection.\" \"But with us in the politer reign of Charles\r\nII., this power of correction began to be doubted.\" It\r\nwas not until 1882, however, that a married woman in\r\nEngland gained control of her property. In the United\r\nStates the old injustice of the common law has been gradually\r\nremedied by statutes until substantial equality in relation\r\nto property and children has been secured.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 2. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE FAMILY\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe psychology of family life may be conveniently\r\nconsidered under two heads: that of the husband and\r\nwife, and that of parents and children, brothers and\r\nsisters.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. The complex sentiment, love, which is found in the\r\nmost perfect family life, is on the one hand (1) a feeling\r\nor emotion; on the other (2) a purpose, a will. Both\r\nthese are modified and strengthened by (3) parenthood\r\nand (4) social and religious influences.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(1) The Emotional and Instinctive Basis.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;As feeling\r\nor emotion love may have two roots. A mental sympathy,\r\nbased on kindred tastes and interests, is sometimes present\r\nat the outset, but in any case it is likely to develop\r\nunder the favoring conditions of a common life, particularly\r\nif there are either children or a common work. But\r\nit is well known that this is not all. A friend is one\r\nthing; a lover another. The intimacy involved requires\r\nnot only the more easily described and superficial attraction\r\nof mind for mind; it demands also a deeper con\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_579\" id=\"Page_579\"\u003e[Pg 579]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003egeniality\r\nof the whole person, incapable of precise formulation,\r\nmanifesting itself in the subtler emotional attitudes\r\nof instinctive reaction. This instinctive, as contrasted\r\nwith the more reflective, attraction is frequently\r\ndescribed as one of opposites or contrasting dispositions\r\nand physical characteristics. But this is nothing that\r\nenters into the feeling as a conscious factor. The only\r\nexplanation which we can give in the present condition of\r\nscience is the biological one. From the biological point\r\nof view it was a most successful venture when Nature, by\r\nsome happy variation, developed two sexes with slightly\r\ndifferent characters and made their union necessary to\r\nthe continuance of life in certain species. By uniting in\r\nevery new individual the qualities of two parents, the\r\nchances of variation are greatly increased, and variation\r\nis the method of progress. To keep the same variety of\r\nfruit the horticulturist buds or grafts; to get new varieties\r\nhe plants seed. The extraordinary progress combined\r\nwith continuity of type, which has been exhibited\r\nin the plant and animal world, has been effected, in part\r\nat least, through the agency of sex. This long process\r\nhas developed certain principles of selection which are\r\ninstinctive. Whether they are the best possible or not,\r\nthey represent a certain adjustment which has secured such\r\nprogress as has been attained, and such adaptation to\r\nenvironment as exists, and it would be unwise, if it were\r\nnot impossible, to disregard them. Marriages of convenience\r\nare certainly questionable from the biological\r\nstandpoint.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the instinctive basis is not in and of itself sufficient\r\nto guarantee a happy family life. If man were\r\nliving wholly a life of instinct, he might trust instinct\r\nas a guide in establishing his family. But since he is\r\nliving an intellectual and social life as well, intellectual\r\nand social factors must enter. The instinctive basis of\r\nselection was fixed by conditions which contemplated only\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_580\" id=\"Page_580\"\u003e[Pg 580]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na more or less limited period of attachment, with care of\r\nthe young for a few years. Modern society requires the\r\nhusband and wife to contemplate life-long companionship,\r\nand a care for children which implies capacity in the\r\nfather to provide for a great range of advantages, and in\r\nthe mother to be intellectual and moral guide and friend\r\nuntil maturity. To trust the security of these increased\r\ndemands to instinct is to invite failure. Instinct must\r\nbe guided by reason if perfect friendship and mutual\r\nsupplementation in the whole range of interests are\r\nto be added to the intenser, but less certain, attraction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(2) The Common Will.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;But whether based on instinct\r\nor intellectual sympathy, no feeling or emotion by itself\r\nis an adequate moral basis for the life together of a man\r\nand a woman. What was said on p. 249, as to the moral\r\nworthlessness of any \u003ci\u003emere\u003c/i\u003e feeling abstracted from will,\r\napplies here. Love or affection, in the only sense in\r\nwhich it makes a moral basis of the family, is not the\r\n\"affection\" of psychological language\u0026mdash;the pleasant or\r\nunpleasant tone of consciousness; it is the resolute purpose\r\nin each to seek the other\u0027s good, or rather to seek a\r\n\u003ci\u003ecommon\u003c/i\u003e good which can be attained only through a common\r\nlife involving mutual self-sacrifice. It is the good\r\nwill of Kant specifically directed toward creating a common\r\ngood. It is the formation of a small \"kingdom of\r\nends\" in which each treats the other \"as end,\" never\r\nas means only; in which each is \"both sovereign and\r\nsubject\"; in which the common will, thus created, enhances\r\nthe person of each and gives it higher moral dignity\r\nand worth. And, as in the case of all purpose which has\r\nmoral value, there is such a common good as the actual\r\nresult. The disposition and character of both husband\r\nand wife are developed and supplemented. The male\r\nis biologically the more variable and motor. He has\r\nusually greater initiative and strength. Economic and\r\nindustrial life accentuates these tendencies. But alone\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_581\" id=\"Page_581\"\u003e[Pg 581]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhe is apt to become rough or hard, to lack the feeling\r\nin which the charm and value of life are experienced. On\r\nthe other hand, the woman, partly by instinct, it may be,\r\nbut certainly by vocation, is largely occupied with the\r\nvariety of cares on which human health, comfort, and\r\nmorality depend. She tends to become narrow, unless supplemented\r\nby man. The value of emotion and feeling\r\nin relation to this process of mutual aid and enlargement,\r\nas in general, is, as Aristotle pointed out, to perfect the\r\nwill. It gives warmth and vitality to what would otherwise\r\nbe in any case partial and might easily become insincere.\r\nThere was a profound truth which underlay the\r\nold psychology in which \"the heart\" meant at once character\r\nand passion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(3) The Influence of Parenthood.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Nature takes one step\r\nat a time. If all the possible consequences of family life\r\nhad to be definitely forecasted, valued, and chosen at\r\nthe outset, many would shrink. But this would be because\r\nthere is as yet no capacity to appreciate new values\r\nbefore the actual experience of them. \"Every promise of\r\nthe soul has innumerable fulfillments; each of its joys\r\nripens into a new want.\" Parental affection is not usually\r\npresent until there are real children to evoke it. At the\r\noutset the mutual love of husband and wife is enough.\r\nBut as the first, more instinctive and emotional factors\r\nlose relatively, the deeper union of will and sympathy\r\nneeds community of interest if it is to become permanent\r\nand complete. Such community of interest is often found\r\nin sharing a business or a profession, but under present\r\nindustrial organization this is not possible as a general\r\nrule. The most general and effective object of common\r\ninterest is the children of the family. As pointed out by\r\nJohn Fiske, the mere keeping of the parents together by\r\nthe prolongation of infancy in the human species has had\r\ngreat moral influence. Present civilization does not merely\r\ndemand that the parents co\u0026ouml;perate eight or ten years\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_582\" id=\"Page_582\"\u003e[Pg 582]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor the child\u0027s physical support. There has been a second\r\nepoch in the prolongation. The parents now must\r\nco\u0026ouml;perate until the children are through school and\r\ncollege, and in business or homes of their own. And the\r\nsuperiority of children over the other common interests\r\nis that in a different form the parents repeat the process\r\nwhich first took them out of their individual lives to unite\r\nfor mutual helpfulness. If the parents treat the children\r\nnot merely as sources of gratification or pride, but\r\nas persons, with lives of their own to live, with capacities\r\nto develop, the personality of the parent is enlarged. The\r\naffection between husband and wife is enriched by the\r\nnew relationship it has created.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e(4) Social and Religious Factors.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The relations of\r\nhusband and wife, parent and child, are the most intimate\r\nof personal relations, but they are none the less relations\r\nof social interest. In fact, just because they are so intimate,\r\nsociety is the more deeply concerned. Or, to put it\r\nfrom the individual\u0027s standpoint, just because the parties\r\nare undertaking a profoundly personal step, they must\r\ntake it as members of a moral order. The act of establishing\r\nthe family signifies, indeed, the entrance into fuller\r\nparticipation in the social life; it is the assuming of ties\r\nwhich make the parties in a new and deeper sense organic\r\nparts of humanity. This social and cosmic meaning is\r\nappropriately symbolized by the civil and religious ceremony.\r\nIn its control over the marriage contract, and in\r\nits prescriptions as to the care and education of the children,\r\nsociety continues to show its interest. All this lends\r\nadded value and strength to the emotional and intellectual\r\nbases.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Parent and Child.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The other relationships in the\r\nfamily, those of parents and children, brothers and sisters,\r\nneed no elaborate analysis. The love of parents for children,\r\nlike that of man and woman, has an instinctive basis.\r\nThose species which have cared for their offspring have\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_583\" id=\"Page_583\"\u003e[Pg 583]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhad a great advantage in the struggle for existence.\r\nNature has selected them, and is constantly dropping the\r\nstrains of any race or set which cares more for power,\r\nor wealth, or learning than for children. Tenderness,\r\ncourage, responsibility, activity, patience, forethought,\r\npersonal virtue\u0026mdash;these are constantly evoked not by the\r\nneeds of children in general, but by the needs of our\r\nown children. The instinctive response, however, is soon\r\nbroadened in outlook and deepened in meaning. Intellectual\r\nactivity is stimulated by the needs of providing\r\nfor the physical welfare, and, still more, by the\r\nnecessity of planning for the unfolding mind. The interchange\r\nof question and answer which forces the parent\r\nto think his whole world anew, and which with the allied\r\ninterchange of imitation and suggestion produces a give\r\nand take between all members of the family, is constantly\r\nmaking for fluidity and flexibility, for tolerance and\r\ncatholicity. In the thoughtful parent these educative\r\ninfluences are still further enriched by the problem of\r\nmoral training. For in each family, as in the race, the\r\nneed of eliciting and directing right conduct in the young\r\nis one of the most important agencies in bringing home\r\nto the elders the significance of custom and authority, of\r\nright and wrong. It is natural enough, from one standpoint,\r\nto think of childhood as an imperfect state, looking\r\nforward for its completeness and getting its value because\r\nof its rich promise. But the biologist tells us that\r\nthe child is nearer the line of progress than the more\r\ndeveloped, but also more rigidly set, man. And the lover\r\nof children is confident that if any age of humanity\r\nexists by its own right, and \"pays as it goes,\" it is childhood.\r\nIt is not only meet, but a joy, that the fathers\r\nlabor for the children. Many, if not most, of the objects\r\nfor which men and women strive and drudge seem less satisfactory\r\nwhen obtained; because we have meanwhile outgrown\r\nthe desire. Children afford an object of affection\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_584\" id=\"Page_584\"\u003e[Pg 584]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich is constantly unfolding new powers, and opening\r\nnew reaches of personality.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_254_254\" id=\"FNanchor_254_254\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_254_254\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[254]\u003c/a\u003e Conversely, an authority\r\nwhich is also tender, patient, sympathetic, is the best\r\nmedium to develop in the child self-control. The necessity\r\nof mutual forbearance where there are several children,\r\nof sharing fairly, of learning to give and take,\r\nis the best possible method of training for membership\r\nin the larger society. In fact, from the point of view\r\nof the social organism as a whole, the family has two\r\nfunctions; as a smaller group, it affords an opportunity\r\nfor eliciting the qualities of affection and character\r\nwhich cannot be displayed at all in the larger\r\ngroup; and, in the second place, it is a training for\r\nfuture members of the larger group in those qualities\r\nof disposition and character which are essential to\r\ncitizenship.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_255_255\" id=\"FNanchor_255_255\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_255_255\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[255]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 3. GENERAL ELEMENTS OF STRAIN IN FAMILY RELATIONS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDifference in Temperament.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;While there are intrinsic\r\nqualities of men and women that bring them together for\r\nfamily life, and, while there is in most cases a strong\r\nre\u0026euml;nforcement afforded by the presence of children, there\r\nare certain characteristics which tend just as inevitably\r\nto produce tension, and those forces of tension are\r\nstrengthened at the present time by certain economic, educational,\r\nand cultural conditions. The differences between\r\nmen and women may be at the basis of their instinctive\r\nattraction for each other; they certainly have\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_585\" id=\"Page_585\"\u003e[Pg 585]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npossibilities of friction as well. A fundamental difference\r\nalready noted is that the male is more variable, the female\r\nmore true to the type. Biologically at least, the \u003ci\u003evarium et\r\nmutabile\u003c/i\u003e is applied by the poet to the wrong sex. Applied\r\nto the mind and disposition, this means probably not\r\nonly a greater variation of capacity and temper as\r\na whole,\u0026mdash;more geniuses and also more at the other extreme\r\nthan among women,\u0026mdash;but also a greater average\r\nmobility.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDifferences Accentuated by Occupation.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;From the\r\nearly occupations of hunting and fishing, to the modern\r\ngreater range of occupations, any native mobility in man\r\nhas found stimulation and scope, as compared with the\r\nenergies of women which have less distinct differentiation\r\nand a more limited contact with the work of others. And\r\nthere is another industrial difference closely connected\r\nwith this, which has been pointed out by Ellis,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_256_256\" id=\"FNanchor_256_256\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_256_256\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[256]\u003c/a\u003e and\r\nThomas.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_257_257\" id=\"FNanchor_257_257\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_257_257\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[257]\u003c/a\u003e Primitive man hunted and fought. Much of\r\nprimitive industry, the prototype, so far as it existed, of\r\nthe industrial activity of the modern world, was carried on\r\nby woman. Industrial progress has been signalized by the\r\nsplitting off of one phase of woman\u0027s work after another,\r\nand by the organization and expansion of this at the\r\nhands of man. Man\u0027s work has thus become more specialized\r\nand scientific; woman\u0027s has remained more detailed,\r\ncomplex, and diffused. Her work in the family\r\nof ordering the household, caring for the children, securing\r\nthe health and comfort of all its members, necessarily\r\ninvolves personal adjustment; hence it resists system.\r\nAs a result of the differentiation man has gained\r\nin greater and greater degree a scientific and objective\r\nstandard for his work; woman neither has nor can have\u0026mdash;at\r\nleast in the sphere of personal relations\u0026mdash;the advantage\r\nof a standard. Business has its ratings in the quantity\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_586\" id=\"Page_586\"\u003e[Pg 586]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof sales or the ratio of net profits. The professions and\r\nskilled trades have their own tests of achievement. A\r\nscientist makes his discovery, a lawyer wins his case, an\r\narchitect builds his bridge, the mechanic his machine; he\r\nknows whether he has done a good piece of work, and\r\nrespects himself accordingly. He can appeal from the\r\nman next to him to the judgment of his profession. Conversely,\r\nthe standard of the trade or profession helps to\r\nlift the individual\u0027s work. It is a constant stimulus, as\r\nwell as support. A woman\u0027s work in the family has no\r\nsuch professional stimulus, or professional vindication.\r\nIf the family is lenient, the work is not held up to a high\r\nlevel. On the other hand, it must make its appeal to\r\nthe persons immediately concerned, and if they do not\r\nrespond, the woman feels that she has failed to do something\r\nreally worth while. If her work is not valued,\r\nshe feels that it is not valuable. For there is no demonstrative\r\nproof of a successful home any more than there\r\nis of a good work of art. It is easy enough to point\r\nout reasons why the picture or the home should please and\r\nsatisfy, but if the work itself is not convincing, no\r\ndemonstration that similar works have satisfied is of any\r\navail.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe way in which men and women come into contact\r\nwith others is another element in the case. Man comes\r\ninto contact with others for the most part in an abstract\r\nway. He deals not with men, women, and children, but\r\nwith employers or employed, with customers or clients, or\r\npatients. He doesn\u0027t have to stand them in all their\r\nvaried phases, or enter into those intimate relations which\r\ninvolve strain of adjustment in its fullest extent. Moreover,\r\nbusiness or professional manner and etiquette come\r\nin to relieve the necessity of personal effort. The \"professional\r\nmanner\" serves the same function in dealing\r\nwith others, which habit plays in the individual life; it\r\ntakes the place of continual readjustment of attention.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_587\" id=\"Page_587\"\u003e[Pg 587]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nWhen a man is forced to lay this aside and deal in any\r\nserious situation as \"a human being,\" he feels a far\r\ngreater strain. The woman\u0027s task is less in extension,\r\nbut great in intension. It obliges her to deal with the\r\nchildren, at any rate, as wholes, and a \"whole\" child\r\nis a good deal of a strain. If she does not see the whole\r\nof the husband, it is quite likely that the part not brought\r\nhome\u0026mdash;the professional or business part of him\u0026mdash;is the\r\nmost alert, intelligent, and interesting phase. The constant\r\nclose-at-hand personal relations, unrelieved by the\r\nabstract impersonal attitude and the generalizing activity\r\nwhich it invites, constitute an element of strain\r\nwhich few men understand, and which probably few\r\ncould endure and possess their souls. The present division\r\nof labor seems, therefore, to make the man excessively\r\nabstract, the woman excessively personal, instead\r\nof supplementing to some extent the weak side of\r\neach.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDifference in Attitude toward the Family.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;As if\r\nthese differences in attitude based on disposition and occupation\r\nwere not enough, we have a thoroughgoing difference\r\nin the attitude of men and women toward the very\r\ninstitution which invites them. The man is ready enough\r\nto assent to the importance of the family for the race,\r\nbut his family means not an interference with other ambitions,\r\nbut usually an aid to their fulfillment. His family\r\nis one interest among several, and is very likely subordinate\r\nin his thought to his profession or his business.\r\nIn early ages to rove or conquer, in modern life to master\r\nnature and control her resources or his fellowmen\u0026mdash;this has\r\nbeen the insistent instinct which urges even the long-tossed\r\nUlysses from Ithaca and from Penelope again upon the\r\ndeep. Woman, on the other hand, if she enters a family,\r\nusually abandons any other ambition and forgets any\r\nacquired art or skill of her previous occupation. To be\r\nthe mistress of a home may be precisely what she would\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_588\" id=\"Page_588\"\u003e[Pg 588]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nchoose as a vocation. But there is usually no alternative\r\nif she is to have a home at all. It is not a question of a\r\nfamily in addition to a vocation, but of a family \u003ci\u003eas\u003c/i\u003e a\r\nvocation. Hence woman must regard family life not\r\nmerely as a good; it must be \u003ci\u003ethe\u003c/i\u003e good, and usually the\r\nexclusive good.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf, then, a woman has accepted the family as the\r\nsupreme good, it is naturally hard to be in perfect sympathy\r\nwith the man\u0027s standard of family life as secondary.\r\nOf course a completer vision may find that a\r\ndivision of labor, a difference of function, may carry with\r\nit a difference in standards of value; the mastery of\r\nnature and the maintenance of the family may be neither\r\nan absolute good in itself, but each a necessity to life\r\nand progress. But neither man nor woman is always\r\nequal to this view, and to the full sympathy for the relative\r\nvalue of the other\u0027s standpoint. Where it cuts closest\r\nis in the attitude toward breach of faith in the family\r\ntie. Men have severe codes for the man who cheats at\r\ncards or forges a signature, but treat much more\r\nleniently, or entirely ignore, the gravest offenses against\r\nthe family. These latter do not seem to form a barrier\r\nto political, business, or social success (among men).\r\nWomen have a severe standard for family sanctity, especially\r\nfor their own sex. But it would probably be difficult\r\nto convince most women that it is a more heinous\r\noffense to secrete a card, or even with Nora in \u003ci\u003eThe Doll\u0027s\r\nHouse\u003c/i\u003e, to forge a name, than to be unfaithful. It is\r\nnot meant that the average man or woman approves\r\neither form of wrongdoing, but that there is a difference\r\nof emphasis evidenced in the public attitude. In view of\r\nall these differences in nature, occupation, and social\r\nstandard it may be said that however well husband and\r\nwife may love each other, few understand each other\r\ncompletely. Perhaps most men do not understand women\r\nat all. Corresponding to the \"psychologist\u0027s fallacy,\"\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_589\" id=\"Page_589\"\u003e[Pg 589]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhose evils have been depicted by James, there is a \"masculine\r\nfallacy\" and a \"feminine fallacy.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDifference in Age.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The difference in age between\r\nparents and children brings certain inevitable hindrances\r\nto complete understanding. The most thoroughgoing\r\nis that parent and children really stand concretely for\r\nthe two factors of continuity and individual variation\r\nwhich confront each other in so many forms. The parent\r\nhas found his place in the social system, and is both\r\nsteadied and to some extent made rigid by the social tradition.\r\nThe child, though to some extent imitating and\r\nadopting this tradition, has as yet little reasoned adherence\r\nto it. The impulses and expanding life do not find\r\nfull expression in the set ways already open, and occasionally\r\nbreak out new channels. The conservatism of\r\nthe parent may be a wiser and more social, or merely\r\na more hardened and narrow, mode of conduct; some of\r\nthe child\u0027s variations may be irrational and pernicious\r\nto himself and society; others may promise a larger reasonableness,\r\na more generous social order\u0026mdash;but meanwhile\r\ncertain features of the conflict between reason and impulse,\r\norder and change, are constantly appearing. Differences\r\nin valuation are also inevitable and can be bridged\r\nonly by an intelligent sympathy. It is easy to consider\r\nthis or that to be of slight importance to the child when\r\nit is really his whole world for the time. Even if he does\r\n\"get over it,\" the effect on the disposition may remain,\r\nand affect the temper or emotional life, even though not\r\nconsciously remembered. Probably, also, most parents do\r\nnot realize how early a crude but sometimes even passionate\r\nsense for \"fairness\" develops, or how different the\r\nrelative setting of an act appears if judged from the\r\nmotives actually operative with the child, and not from\r\nthose which might produce such an act in a \"grown-up.\"\r\nMost parents and children love each other; few reach a\r\ncomplete understanding.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_590\" id=\"Page_590\"\u003e[Pg 590]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 4. SPECIAL CONDITIONS WHICH GIVE RISE TO PRESENT\r\nPROBLEMS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn addition to the more general conditions of family\r\nlife, there are certain conditions at present operative\r\nwhich give rise to special problems, or rather emphasize\r\ncertain aspects of the permanent problems. The family\r\nis quite analogous to political society. There needs to\r\nbe constant readjustment between order and progress,\r\nbetween the control of the society and the freedom of the\r\nindividual. The earlier bonds of custom or force have\r\nto be exchanged in point after point for a more voluntary\r\nand moral order. In the words of Kant, heteronomy must\r\nsteadily give place to autonomy, subordination of rank\r\nor status to division of labor with equality in dignity.\r\nThe elements of strain in the family life at present may\r\nfairly be expected to give rise ultimately to a better\r\nconstitution of its relations. The special conditions are\r\npartly economic, partly educational and political, but the\r\ngeneral process is a part of the larger growth of modern\r\ncivilization with the increasing development of individuality\r\nand desire for freedom. It is sometimes treated as\r\nif it affected only the woman or the children; in reality\r\nit affects the man as well, though in less degree, as his was\r\nnot the subordinate position.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Economic Factors.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The \"industrial revolution\"\r\ntransferred production from home to factory. The household\r\nis no longer as a rule an industrial unit. Spinning,\r\nweaving, tailoring, shoemaking, soap-making, iron- and\r\nwood-working, and other trades have gone to factories.\r\nMen, young unmarried women, and to some extent married\r\nwomen also, have gone with them. Children have lost\r\nassociation with one parent, and in some cases with both.\r\nThe concentration of industry and business leads to cities.\r\nUnder present means of transportation this means apartments\r\ninstead of houses, it means less freedom, more\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_591\" id=\"Page_591\"\u003e[Pg 591]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nstrain, for both mother and children, and possible deteriorating\r\neffects upon the race which as yet are quite\r\noutside any calculation. But leaving this uncertain field\r\nof effects upon child life, we notice certain potent effects\r\nupon men and women.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt might be a difficult question to decide the exact gains\r\nand losses for family life due to the absence of the man\r\nfrom home during the day. On the one hand, too constant\r\nassociation is a source of friction; on the other,\r\nthere is likely to result some loss of sympathy, and where\r\nthe working-day is long, an almost absolute loss of contact\r\nwith children. If children are the great natural agencies\r\nfor cultivating tenderness and affection, it is certainly unfortunate\r\nthat fathers should be deprived of this education.\r\nThe effect of the industrial revolution upon women\r\nhas been widely noted. First of all, the opening of an\r\nincreasing number of occupations to women has rendered\r\nthem economically more independent. They are not forced\r\nto the alternative of marriage or dependence upon relatives.\r\nIf already married, even although they may have\r\nlost touch to some extent with their former occupation,\r\nthey do not feel the same compulsion to endure intolerable\r\nconditions in the home rather than again attempt self-support.\r\nAn incidental effect of the entrance of women\r\nupon organized occupations, with definite hours and impersonal\r\nstandards, is to bring out more strongly by contrast\r\nthe \"belated\" condition of domestic work. It is\r\ndifficult to obtain skilled workers for an occupation requiring\r\nnearly double the standard number of hours, isolation\r\ninstead of companionship during work, close\r\npersonal contact with an employer, a measure of control\r\nover conduct outside of the hours on duty, and finally\r\nthe social inferiority implied by an occupation which has\r\nin it survivals of the status of the old-time servant. Indeed,\r\nthe mistress of the house, if she \"does her own work,\"\r\ndoesn\u0027t altogether like her situation. There is now no\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_592\" id=\"Page_592\"\u003e[Pg 592]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\none general occupation which all men are expected to\r\nmaster irrespective of native tastes and abilities. If every\r\nmale were obliged to make not only his own clothing,\r\nincluding head- and foot-wear, but that of his whole\r\nfamily, unassisted, or with practically unskilled labor,\r\nthere would probably be as much misfit clothing as there\r\nis now unsatisfactory home-making, and possibly there\r\nwould be an increase of irritability and \"nervousness\" on\r\nthe one side and of criticism or desertion on the other, which\r\nwould increase the present strain upon the divorce courts.\r\nTo an increasing number of women, the position of being\r\n\"jack-at-all-trades and master-of-none\" is irritating.\r\nThe conviction that there is a great waste of effort without\r\nsatisfactory results is more wearing than the actual\r\ndoing of the work.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the minority of women who do not \"keep house,\" or\r\nwho can be relieved entirely of domestic work by experts,\r\nthe industrial revolution has a different series of possibilities.\r\nIf there is a decided talent which has received\r\nadequate cultivation, there may be an opportunity for\r\nits exercise without serious interference with family life,\r\nbut the chances are against it. If the woman cannot leave\r\nher home for the entire day, or if her husband regards a\r\ngainful occupation on her part as a reflection upon his\r\nability to \"support the family,\" she is practically shut\r\nout from any occupation. If she has children and has\r\nan intelligent as well as an emotional interest in their\r\nwelfare, there is an unlimited field for scientific development.\r\nBut if she has no regular useful occupation, she\r\nis not leading a normal life. Her husband very likely\r\ncannot understand why she should not, in the words of\r\nVeblen, perform \"vicarious leisure\" for him, and be satisfied\r\ntherewith. If she is satisfied, so much the worse.\r\nWhether she is satisfied or not, she is certainly not likely\r\nto grow mentally or morally in such an existence, and the\r\nfamily life will not be helped by stagnation or frivolity.\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_593\" id=\"Page_593\"\u003e[Pg 593]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn certain classes of society there is one economic feature\r\nwhich is probably responsible for many petty annoyances\r\nand in some cases for real degradation of spirit.\r\nWhen the family was an industrial unit, when exchange\r\nwas largely in barter, it was natural to think of\r\nthe woman as a joint agent in production. When the\r\nproduction moved to factories and the wage or the wealth\r\nwas paid to the man and could be kept in his pocket or\r\nhis check-book, it became easy for him to think of himself\r\nas \"supporting\" the family, to permit himself to be\r\n\"asked\" for money for household expenses or even for\r\nthe wife\u0027s personal expenses, and to consider money used\r\nin these ways as \"gifts\" to his wife or children. Women\r\nhave more or less resistingly acquiesced in this humiliating\r\nconception, which is fatal to a real moral relation\r\nas well as to happiness. It is as absurd a conception as\r\nit would be to consider the receiving teller in a bank as\r\nsupporting the bank, or the manager of a factory as\r\nsupporting all the workmen. The end of the family is\r\nnot economic profit, but mutual aid, and the continuance\r\nand progress of the race. A division of labor does not\r\ngive superiority and inferiority. When one considers\r\nwhich party incurs the greater risks, and which works\r\nwith greater singleness and sincerity for the family, it\r\nmust pass as one of the extraordinary superstitions that\r\nthe theory of economic dependence should have gained\r\nvogue.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCultural and Political Factors.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Educational, cultural,\r\nand political movements re\u0026euml;nforce the growing sense\r\nof individuality. Educational and cultural advance\r\nstrengthens the demand that woman\u0027s life shall have as\r\nserious a purpose as man\u0027s, and that in carrying on her\r\nwork, whether in the family or without, she may have\r\nsome share in the grasp of mind, the discipline of character,\r\nand the freedom of spirit which come from the\r\nscientific spirit, and from the intelligent, efficient organ\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_594\" id=\"Page_594\"\u003e[Pg 594]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eization\r\nof work by scientific methods. Political democracy\r\ndraws increasing attention to personal dignity, irrespective\r\nof rank or wealth. Increasing legal rights have\r\nbeen granted to women until in most points they are now\r\nequal before the law, although the important exception\r\nof suffrage still remains for the most part. Under these\r\nconditions it is increasingly difficult to maintain a family\r\nunion on any other basis than that of equal freedom,\r\nequal responsibilities, equal dignity and authority. It will\r\nprobably be found that most of the tension now especially\r\nfelt in family life\u0026mdash;aside from those cases of maladaptation\r\nliable to occur under any system\u0026mdash;results either from\r\nlack of recognition of this equality, or from the more\r\ngeneral economic conditions which society as a whole,\r\nrather than any particular family, must meet and change.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 5. UNSETTLED PROBLEMS: (1) ECONOMIC\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe family as an economic unit includes the relation\r\nof its members to society both as producers and as\r\nconsumers.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Family and Production.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;We have noted the industrial\r\nchanges which have seemed to draw the issue\r\nsharply between the home and outside occupations. We\r\nhave seen that the present organization of industry, business,\r\nand the professions has separated most of the occupations\r\nfrom the family, so that woman must choose\r\nbetween family and a specific occupation, but cannot\r\nordinarily combine the two. We have said that in requiring\r\nall its women to do the same thing the family seems\r\nto exclude them from individual pursuits adapted to their\r\ntalents, and to exclude them likewise from the whole scientific\r\nand technical proficiency of modern life. Is this an\r\ninevitable dilemma? Those who think it is divide into\r\ntwo parties, which accept respectively the opposite horns.\r\nThe one party infers that the social division of labor must\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_595\" id=\"Page_595\"\u003e[Pg 595]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbe: man to carry on all occupations outside the family,\r\nwoman to work always within the family. The other\r\nparty infers that the family life must give way to the\r\nindustrial tendency.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(1) The \"domestic theory,\" or as Mrs. Bosanquet\r\nstyles it, the \"pseudo-domestic\" theory, is held sincerely\r\nby many earnest friends of the family in both sexes.\r\nThey feel strongly the fundamental necessity of family\r\nlife. They believe further that they are not seeking\r\nto subordinate woman to the necessities of the race, but\r\nrather to give her a unique position of dignity and affection.\r\nIn outside occupations she must usually be at a\r\ndisadvantage in competition with men, because of her\r\nphysical constitution which Nature has specialized for a\r\ndifferent function. In the family she \"reigns supreme.\"\r\nWith most women life is not satisfied, experience is not\r\nfull, complete consciousness of sex and individuality is\r\nnot attained, until they have dared to enter upon the\r\nfull family relations. Let these be preserved not merely\r\nfor the race, but especially for woman\u0027s own sake.\r\nFurther, it is urged, when woman enters competitive\r\noccupations outside the home, she lowers the scale of wages.\r\nThis makes it harder for men to support families, and\r\ntherefore more reluctant to establish them. Riehl urges\r\nthat not only should married women remain at home; unmarried\r\nwomen should play the part of \"aunt\" in some\r\none\u0027s household\u0026mdash;he says \u003ci\u003ealte Tante\u003c/i\u003e, but it is not necessary\r\nto load the theory too heavily with the adjective.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) The other horn of the dilemma is accepted by many\r\nwriters, especially among socialists. These writers assume\r\nthat the family necessarily involves not only an exclusively\r\ndomestic life for all women, but also their economic\r\ndependence. They believe this dependence to be not merely\r\na survival of barbarism, but an actual immorality in its\r\nexchange of sex attraction for economic support. Hence\r\nthey would abandon the family or greatly modify it. It\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_596\" id=\"Page_596\"\u003e[Pg 596]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmust no longer be \"coercive\"; it will be coercive under\r\npresent conditions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFallacies in the Dilemma.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Each of these positions\r\ninvolves a fallacy which releases us from the necessity of\r\nchoosing between them. The root of the fallacy in each\r\ncase is the conception that the economic status determines\r\nthe moral end, whereas the moral end ought to determine\r\nthe economic status.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe fallacy of the pseudo-domestic theory lies in supposing\r\nthat the home must continue its old economic\r\nform or be destroyed. What is essential to the family is\r\nthat man and wife, parents and children, should live in\r\nsuch close and intimate relation that they may be mutually\r\nhelpful. But it is not essential that present methods of\r\nhouse construction, domestic service, and the whole industrial\r\nside of home life be maintained immutable. There is\r\none fundamental division of labor between men and\r\nwomen. The woman who takes marriage at its full scope\r\naccepts this. \"The lines which it follows are drawn not\r\nso much by the woman\u0027s inability to work for her family\r\nin the outside world\u0026mdash;she constantly does so when the\r\ndeath or illness of her husband throws the double burden\r\nupon her; but from the obvious fact that the man is\r\nincapable of the more domestic duties incident upon the\r\nrearing of children.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_258_258\" id=\"FNanchor_258_258\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_258_258\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[258]\u003c/a\u003e But this does not involve the total\r\nlife of a woman, nor does it imply that to be a good wife\r\nand mother every woman must under all possible advances\r\nof industry continue to be cook, seamstress, housemaid,\r\nand the rest. True it is that if a woman steps out of her\r\nprofession or trade for five, ten, twenty years, it is in\r\nmany cases difficult to re\u0026euml;nter. But there are some occupations\r\nwhere total absence is not necessary. There are\r\nothers where her added experience ought to be an asset\r\ninstead of a handicap. A mother who has been well\r\ntrained ought to be a far more effective teacher in her\r\nwholesome and intelligent influence. She ought to be a\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_597\" id=\"Page_597\"\u003e[Pg 597]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmore efficient manager or worker in the great variety of\r\ncivic and social enterprises of both paid and unpaid character.\r\nThere is no doubt that the present educational\r\nand social order is suffering because deprived of the competent\r\nservice which many married women might render,\r\njust as women in their turn are suffering for want of congenial\r\noccupation, suited to their capacities and individual\r\ntastes. A growing freedom in economic pursuit would\r\nimprove the home, not injure it. For nothing that interferes\r\nwith normal development is likely to prove beneficial\r\nto the family\u0027s highest interest.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe fallacy of those who would abolish the family to\r\nemancipate woman from economic dependence is in supposing\r\nthat because the woman is not engaged in a gainful\r\noccupation she is therefore being supported by the\r\nman for his own pleasure. This is to adopt the absurd\r\nassumptions of the very condition they denounce. This\r\ntheory at most, applies to a marriage which is conceived\r\nfrom an entirely selfish and commercial point of view. If\r\na man marries for his own pleasure and is willing to pay\r\na cash price; if a woman marries for cash or support and\r\nis willing to pay the price, there is no doubt as to the\r\nproper term for such a transaction. The result is not a\r\nfamily in the moral sense, and no ceremonies or legal forms\r\ncan make it moral. A family in the moral sense exists for\r\na common good, not for selfish use of others. To secure\r\nthis common good each member contributes a part. If\r\nboth husband and wife carry on gainful occupations, well;\r\nif one is occupied outside the home and the other within,\r\nwell also. If there are children, the woman is likely to have\r\nthe far more difficult and wearing half of the common\r\nlabor. Which plan is followed, i.e., whether the woman\r\nworks outside or within the home, ought to depend on which\r\nplan is better on the whole for all concerned, and this will\r\ndepend largely on the woman\u0027s own ability and tastes, and\r\nupon the number and age of the children. But the eco\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_598\" id=\"Page_598\"\u003e[Pg 598]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003enomic\r\nrelation is not the essential thing. The essential\r\nthing is that the economic be held entirely subordinate to\r\nthe moral conception, before marriage and after.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Family as Consumer.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The relation of the family\r\nas consumer to society and to the economic process at\r\nlarge involves also an important moral problem. For\r\nwhile production has been taken from the home, the selective\r\ninfluence of the family over production through its\r\ndirection of consumption has proportionally increased.\r\nAnd in this field the woman of the family is and should be\r\nthe controlling factor. As yet only the internal aspects\r\nhave been considered. Most women regard it as their duty\r\nto buy economically, to secure healthful food, and make\r\ntheir funds go as far as possible. But the moral responsibility\r\ndoes not stop here. The consumer may have an\r\ninfluence in helping to secure better conditions of production,\r\nsuch as sanitary workshops, reasonable hours, decent\r\nwages, by a \"white label.\" But this is chiefly valuable\r\nin forming public opinion to demand workrooms free from\r\ndisease and legal abolition of sweatshops and child labor.\r\nThe greater field for the consumers\u0027 control is in determining\r\nthe kind of goods that shall be produced. What\r\nfoods shall be produced, what books written, what plays\r\npresented, what clothing made, what houses and what furnishing\r\nshall be provided\u0026mdash;all this may be largely determined\r\nby the consumers. And the value of simplicity, utility,\r\nand genuineness, is not limited to the effects upon the\r\nfamily which consumes. The workman who makes fraudulent\r\ngoods can hardly help being injured. The economic\r\nwaste involved in the production of what satisfies no permanent\r\nor real want is a serious indictment of our present\r\ncivilization. It was said, under the subject of the economic\r\nprocess, that it was an ethically desirable end to have increase\r\nof goods, and of the kind wanted. We may now\r\nadd a third end: it is important that society should learn\r\nto want the kinds of goods which give happiness and not\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_599\" id=\"Page_599\"\u003e[Pg 599]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmerely crude gratification. Men often need most what\r\nthey want least. Not only the happiness of life but its\r\nprogress, its unfolding of new capacities and interests, is\r\ndetermined largely by the direction of the consumption.\r\nWoman is here the influential factor.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf there were no other reason for the better and wider\r\neducation of woman than the desirability of more intelligent\r\nconsumption, society would have ample ground to\r\ndemand it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003e\u0026sect; 6. UNSETTLED PROBLEMS: (2) POLITICAL\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe family may be regarded as a political unit, first\r\nin its implication of some control of the members by the\r\ncommon end, and in the second place in its relation to the\r\nauthority of the State.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. Authority within the Family.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;If the political character\r\nof the family were kept clearly in mind, the internal\r\nrelations of the members of the family would be on a far\r\nmore moral basis and there would be less reason for friction\r\nor personal clashes. If there is a group of persons\r\nwhich is to act as a unity, there must be some leadership\r\nand control. In many cases there will be a common conviction\r\nas to the fittest person to lead or direct, but where\r\nthe group is a permanent one with frequent occasions for\r\ndivergent interests, unity has been maintained either by\r\nforce or by some agency regarded by the people as embodying\r\ntheir common will. In the earliest forms of society\r\nthis, as we have seen, was not clearly distinguished from\r\npersonal and individual command. But as the conception\r\nof the political worked free from that of the personal\r\nagent, it could be recognized more and more that the ruler\r\nwas not the man\u0026mdash;not Henry or William,\u0026mdash;but the\r\nKing or the Parliament, as representing the nation. Then\r\ngovernment became a more consciously moral act. Obedience\r\nwas not humiliating, because the members were\r\nsovereign as well as subject. It was not heteronomy but\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_600\" id=\"Page_600\"\u003e[Pg 600]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nautonomy. In the family the personal relation is so close\r\nthat this easily overshadows the fact that there is also\r\na family relation of a political sort. The man in the\r\npatriarchal family, and since, has exercised, or has had\r\nthe legal right to exercise authority. And with the legal\r\ntheory of inequality to support him it is not strange that\r\nhe should often have conceived that obedience was due to\r\nhim as a person, and not to him as, in certain cases, best\r\nrepresenting the joint purpose of the family, just as in\r\nother cases the woman best represents this same purpose.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEquality or Inequality.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;But even when there had been\r\nrecognition of a more than personal attitude the question\r\nwould at once arise, are the members of a family to be\r\nconsidered as of equal or unequal importance? The answer\r\nuntil recently has been unequivocal. In spite of such\r\napparent exceptions as chivalry, and the court paid to\r\nbeauty or wit, or the honor accorded to individual wives\r\nand mothers, woman has seldom been taken seriously in the\r\nlaws and institutions of society. Opportunities for education\r\nand full participation in the thought and life of\r\ncivilization are very recent. Public school education\r\nfor girls is scarcely a century old. College education\r\nfor women, in a general sense, is of the present generation.\r\nBut the conviction has steadily gained that democracy\r\ncannot treat half the race as inferior in dignity,\r\nor exclude it from the comradeship of life. Under primitive\r\nsociety a man was primarily a member of a group\r\nor caste, and only secondarily a person. A woman has\r\nbeen in this situation as regards her sex. She is now\r\nasserting a claim to be considered primarily as a person,\r\nrather than as a woman. This general movement, like the\r\neconomic movement, has seemed to affect the attitude\r\nof unmarried women, and to a less degree, of men,\r\ntoward marriage, and to involve an instability of the family\r\ntie. The question is then this: does the family necessarily\r\ninvolve inequality, or can it be maintained on a\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_601\" id=\"Page_601\"\u003e[Pg 601]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbasis of equality? Or to put the same thing from another\r\nangle: if the family and the modern movement toward\r\nequality are at variance, which ought to give way?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \"pseudo-domestic\" theory on this point is suggested\r\nby its general position on the economic relations of the\r\nfamily as already stated. It believes that the family must\r\nbe maintained as a distinct sphere of life, co\u0026ouml;rdinate in\r\nimportance for social welfare with the intellectual, artistic,\r\nand economic spheres. It holds, further, that the family\r\ncan be maintained in this position only if it be kept as\r\na unique controlling influence in woman\u0027s life, isolated\r\nfrom other spheres. This of course involves an exclusion\r\nof woman from a portion of the intellectual and political\r\nlife, and therefore an inferiority of development, even if\r\nthere is not an inferiority of capacity. Some of this\r\nschool have maintained that in America the rapid advance\r\nin education and intelligence among women has rendered\r\nthem so superior to the average man who has to leave\r\nschool for business at an early age that they are unwilling\r\nto marry. A German alliterative definition of woman\u0027s\r\n\"sphere\" has been found in \"the four K\u0027s\"\u0026mdash;Kirche, Kinder,\r\nK\u0026uuml;che, und Kleider.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf the permanence of the family rests on the maintenance\r\nof a relation of inferiority, it is indeed in a perilous\r\nstate. All the social and political forces are making toward\r\nequality, and from the moral standpoint it is impossible\r\nsuccessfully to deny Mill\u0027s classic statement, \"The\r\nonly school of genuine moral sentiment is society between\r\nequals.\" But some of the advocates of equality have accepted\r\nthe same fallacious separation between the family\r\nand modern culture. They have assumed that the family\r\nlife must continue to be unscientific in its methods, and\r\nmeager in its interests. Some women\u0026mdash;like some men\u0026mdash;undoubtedly\r\nplace a higher value on book learning, musical\r\nand dramatic entertainment, and other by-products of\r\nmodern civilization than on the elemental human sympathies\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_602\" id=\"Page_602\"\u003e[Pg 602]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand powers which these should serve to enrich. It is too\r\neasily granted that the opportunity and duty of woman\r\nas wife and mother are limited to a purely unscientific provision\r\nfor physical wants to the exclusion of scientific\r\nmethods, intellectual comradeship, and effective grappling\r\nwith moral problems.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIsolation Not the Solution.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The solution for the present\r\nunrest is therefore to be found not in forcing the separation\r\nbetween the family on the one hand and the intellectual,\r\npolitical, and other aspects of civilization on the\r\nother, but in a mutual permeation. They think very\r\nlightly of the elemental strength of sex and parental instincts\r\nwho suppose that these are to be overslaughed in\r\nany great portion of the race by cultural interests. And\r\nit is to ignore the history of political progress to suppose\r\nthat organic relations founded on equality and democracy\r\nare less stable than those resting on superiority and subordination.\r\nThe fact is that there is no part of life so\r\nmuch in need of all that modern science can give, and no\r\nfield for intellectual penetration and technological organization\r\nso great as the family. Correlative with its control\r\nover economic processes through its position as consumer,\r\nis its influence over social, educational, and political life,\r\nthrough its relation to the children who are constantly\r\nrenewing the structure. To fulfill the possibilities and even\r\nthe duties of family life under modern conditions requires\r\nboth scientific training and civic activity. Provisions for\r\nhealth and instruction and proper social life in school,\r\nprovisions for parks and good municipal housekeeping,\r\nfor public health and public morals,\u0026mdash;these demand the\r\nintelligent interest of the parent and have in most cases\r\ntheir natural motive in the family necessities. A theory\r\nof the family which would limit the parent, especially the\r\nmother, to \"the home\" needs first to define the limits of\r\n\"the home.\" To measure its responsibilities by the limit\r\nof the street door is as absurd as to suppose that the\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_603\" id=\"Page_603\"\u003e[Pg 603]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsphere of justice is limited by the walls of the courtroom.\r\nA broader education for women is certainly justified by\r\nprecisely this larger meaning of the care of children and\r\nof the family interests. The things of greatest importance\r\nto human life have scarcely been touched as yet by\r\nscience. We know more about astrophysics than about\r\nhealth and disease; more about waste in steam power than\r\nabout waste in foods, or in education; more about classical\r\narch\u0026aelig;ology than about the actual causes of poverty, alcoholism,\r\nprostitution, and childlessness, the chief enemies\r\nof home life. In the light of the actual possibilities and\r\nneeds of family life two positions seem equally absurd: the\r\none that family life can be preserved best by isolating it,\r\nand particularly its women, from culture; the other, that\r\nit does not afford an opportunity for a full life. Neither\r\nof these errors can be corrected apart from the other. It\r\nis in the mutual permeation and interaction of the respective\r\nspheres of family and cultural life, not in their isolation,\r\nthat the family is to be strengthened. Here, as in the\r\neconomic field, no one family can succeed entirely by itself.\r\nThe problem is largely a social one. But every family\r\nwhich is free and yet united, which shows comradeship as\r\nwell as mutual devotion, is forcing the issue and preparing\r\nthe way for the more perfect family of the future.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Authority over the Family: Divorce.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;The strains\r\nwhich have been noticed in the foregoing paragraphs have\r\ncentered public attention on the outward symptoms of unrest\r\nand maladaptation. Current discussions of family\r\nproblems are likely to turn largely upon the increase of divorce.\r\nFor the reasons which have been given there has\r\ndoubtless been increasing tendency to seek divorce, and\r\nthis may continue until more stable conditions are reached.\r\nNow that the authority of the church is less implicitly accepted,\r\nindividuals are thrown back upon their own voluntary\r\ncontrols, and whether marriages are arranged by parents\r\nas in France, or formed almost solely on the initia\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_604\" id=\"Page_604\"\u003e[Pg 604]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etive\r\nand unguided will of the parties as in America, the\r\nresult is much the same. Two classes of persons seek divorce.\r\nThose of individualistic temperament, who have\r\nformed the marriage for selfish ends or in frivolous moments,\r\nare likely to find its constraints irksome when the\r\nexpected happiness fails to be realized and the charm of\r\nnovelty is past. This is simply one type of immoral conduct\r\nwhich may be somewhat checked by public opinion\r\nor legal restraint, but can be overcome only by a more\r\nserious and social attitude toward all life. The other class\r\nfinds in the bond itself, under certain conditions, a seemingly\r\nfatal obstacle to the very purpose which it was designed\r\nto promote: unfaithfulness, cruelty, habitual intoxication,\r\nand other less coarse, but equally effective modes\r\nof behavior may be destructive of the common life and\r\nmorally injurious to the children. Or alienation of spirit\r\nmay leave external companionship empty of moral unity\r\nand value, if not positively opposed to self-respect. This\r\nclass is evidently actuated by sincere motives. How far\r\nsociety may be justified in permitting dissolution of the\r\nfamily under these conditions, and how far it may properly\r\ninsist on some personal sacrifice for the sake of larger\r\nsocial ends is simply another form of the problem which\r\nwe considered in the economic field\u0026mdash;the antithesis between\r\nindividual rights and public welfare. The solution in each\r\ncase cannot be reached by any external rule. It will be\r\nfound only in the gradual socializing of the individual on\r\nthe one hand, and in the correlative development of society\r\nto the point where it respects all its members and makes\r\ngreater freedom possible for them on the other. Meanwhile\r\nit must not be overlooked that the very conception\r\nof permanence in the union, upheld by the state, is itself\r\neffective toward thoughtful and well-considered action\r\nafter as well as before marriage. Some causes of friction\r\nmay be removed, some tendencies to alienation may be suppressed,\r\nif the situation is resolutely faced from the stand\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_605\" id=\"Page_605\"\u003e[Pg 605]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003epoint\r\nof a larger social interest rather than from that of\r\nmomentary or private concern.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGeneral Law of Social Health.\u003c/b\u003e\u0026mdash;Divorce is a symptom\r\nrather than a disease. The main reliance in cases of family\r\npathology, as for the diseases of the industrial and\r\neconomic system, is along the lines which modern science\r\nis pursuing in the field of medicine. It is isolating certain\r\nspecific organisms which invade the system under favorable\r\ncircumstances and disturb its equilibrium. But it finds\r\nthat the best, and in fact the only ultimate protection\r\nagainst disease is in the general \"resisting power\" of the\r\nliving process. This power may be temporarily aided by\r\nstimulation or surgery, but the ultimate source of its renewal\r\nis found in the steady rebuilding of new structures\r\nto replace the old stagnation; the retention of broken-down\r\ntissues means weakness and danger. The social organism\r\ndoes not escape this law. Science will succeed in\r\npointing out the specific causes for many of the moral\r\nevils from which we suffer. Poverty, crime, social injustice,\r\nbreaking down of the family, political corruption,\r\nare not all to be accepted simply as \"evils\" or \"wickedness\"\r\nin general. In many cases their amount may be\r\ngreatly reduced when we understand their specific causes\r\nand apply a specific remedy. But the great reliance is\r\nupon the primal forces which have brought mankind so far\r\nalong the line of advance. The constant remaking of\r\nvalues in the search for the genuinely satisfying, the constant\r\nforming, criticizing, and reshaping of ideals, the\r\nreverence for a larger law of life and a more than individual\r\nmoral order, the outgoing of sympathy and love,\r\nthe demand for justice\u0026mdash;all these are the forces which\r\nhave built our present social system, and these must continually\r\nreshape it into more adequate expressions of genuine\r\nmoral life if it is to continue unimpaired or in greater\r\nvigor.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe do not know in any full sense whence the life\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_606\" id=\"Page_606\"\u003e[Pg 606]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the spirit comes, and we cannot, while standing upon\r\nthe platform of ethics, predict its future. But if our\r\nstudy has shown anything, it is that the moral \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e a life, not\r\na something ready made and complete once for all. It is\r\ninstinct with movement and struggle, and it is precisely\r\nthe new and serious situations which call out new vigor\r\nand lift it to higher levels. Ethical science tracing this\r\nprocess of growth, has as its aim not to create life\u0026mdash;for\r\nthe life is present already,\u0026mdash;but to discover its laws and\r\nprinciples. And this should aid in making its further\r\nadvance stronger, freer, and more assured because more\r\nintelligent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the early history of the Family, see the works cited at close\r\nof ch. ii.; also Starcke, \u003ci\u003eThe Primitive Family\u003c/i\u003e, 1889; Westermarck,\r\n\u003ci\u003eThe History of Human Marriage\u003c/i\u003e, 1901; Howard, \u003ci\u003eA History of Matrimonial\r\nInstitutions\u003c/i\u003e, 3 vols., 1904. On present problems: H. Bosanquet,\r\n\u003ci\u003eThe Family\u003c/i\u003e, 1906; Parsons, \u003ci\u003eThe Family\u003c/i\u003e, 1906; Bryce, \u003ci\u003eMarriage and\r\nDivorce in Roman and in English Law\u003c/i\u003e, in Studies in History and\r\nJurisprudence, 1901; Ellis, \u003ci\u003eMan and Woman\u003c/i\u003e; Thomas, \u003ci\u003eSex and Society\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n1906; Bebel, \u003ci\u003eWoman and Socialism\u003c/i\u003e; Riehl, \u003ci\u003eDie Familie\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch4\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_249_249\" id=\"Footnote_249_249\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_249_249\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[249]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eMorals in Evolution\u003c/i\u003e, Part I., p. 216.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_250_250\" id=\"Footnote_250_250\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_250_250\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[250]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Howard, \u003ci\u003eHistory of Matrimonial Institutions\u003c/i\u003e, I., ch. vii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_251_251\" id=\"Footnote_251_251\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_251_251\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[251]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Pollock and Maitland, \u003ci\u003eHist. Eng. Law\u003c/i\u003e, II., 383, quoted in Howard,\r\nI., 325-26.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_252_252\" id=\"Footnote_252_252\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_252_252\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[252]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Eckstein, \u003ci\u003eWoman under Monasticism\u003c/i\u003e, p. 478.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_253_253\" id=\"Footnote_253_253\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_253_253\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[253]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Hobhouse, \u003ci\u003eop. cit.\u003c/i\u003e, I., 218.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_254_254\" id=\"Footnote_254_254\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_254_254\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[254]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Helen Bosanquet, \u003ci\u003eThe Family\u003c/i\u003e, p. 313: \"\u0027They must hinder your\r\nwork very much,\u0027 I said to a mother busy about the kitchen, with\r\na two-year-old clinging to her skirt. \u0027I\u0027d never get through my work\r\nwithout them,\u0027 was the instant rejoinder, and in it lay the answer to\r\nmuch of our sentimental commiseration of hard-worked mothers. It\r\nmay be hard to carry on the drudgery of daily life with the little\r\nones clamoring around; it is ten times harder without, for sheer\r\nlack of something to make it worth while.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_255_255\" id=\"Footnote_255_255\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_255_255\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[255]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Bosanquet, Part II., ch. x.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_256_256\" id=\"Footnote_256_256\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_256_256\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[256]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eMan and Woman.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_257_257\" id=\"Footnote_257_257\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_257_257\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[257]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eSex and Society.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_258_258\" id=\"Footnote_258_258\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_258_258\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[258]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Helen Bosanquet, \u003ci\u003eThe Family\u003c/i\u003e, p. 272.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_607\" id=\"Page_607\"\u003e[Pg 607]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003eINDEX\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"iquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAbelard, \u003ca href=\"#Page_150\"\u003e150 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAchan, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_29\"\u003e29\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_60\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_104\"\u003e104\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAddams, Jane, \u003ca href=\"#Page_144\"\u003e144\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u0026AElig;schylus, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_116\"\u003e116\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_139\"\u003e139\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u0026AElig;sthetic, in Greek valuation of conduct, \u003ca href=\"#Page_91\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_116\"\u003e116 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_133\"\u003e133 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_79_79\"\u003e135 n.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_137\"\u003e137\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_406\"\u003e406\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_410\"\u003e410\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAgency, public, see Public Agency;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erationalizing, \u003ca href=\"#Page_40\"\u003e40-2\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esocializing, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42-8\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAltruism, discussion of theories concerning, \u003ca href=\"#Page_384\"\u003e384-91\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ealtruistic springs, \u003ca href=\"#Page_385\"\u003e385\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etrue and false, \u003ca href=\"#Page_387\"\u003e387-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econtrasted with social justice, \u003ca href=\"#Page_389\"\u003e389\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAmos, \u003ca href=\"#Page_85\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nApprobation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_399\"\u003e399\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_402\"\u003e402\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAngell, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAquinas, Thomas, \u003ca href=\"#Page_150\"\u003e150\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAristophanes, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAristotle, on the criterion of a moral act, \u003ca href=\"#Page_12\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_202\"\u003e202\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon nature and the natural, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_127\"\u003e127 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon the State, \u003ca href=\"#Page_127\"\u003e127 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eEud\u0026aelig;monism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe \"mean,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon \"highmindedness,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_135\"\u003e135\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon the reflective life, \u003ca href=\"#Page_138\"\u003e138\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon the good man, \u003ca href=\"#Page_279\"\u003e279\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_324\"\u003e324\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon the right, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_158_158\"\u003e306 n.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon justice, \u003ca href=\"#Page_414\"\u003e414\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ereferred to, \u003ca href=\"#Page_230\"\u003e230\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_455\"\u003e455\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nArnold, M., \u003ca href=\"#Page_91\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_338\"\u003e338\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nArt and arts, as a rationalizing agency, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\"\u003e41 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas a socializing agency, \u003ca href=\"#Page_45\"\u003e45 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecreate new interests, \u003ca href=\"#Page_79\"\u003e79 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eHebrew, \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eGreek, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_114\"\u003e114 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emedi\u0026aelig;val, \u003ca href=\"#Page_147\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_149\"\u003e149\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eChurch and modern, \u003ca href=\"#Page_155\"\u003e155\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas a good that is sharable, \u003ca href=\"#Page_559\"\u003e559\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAsceticism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_145\"\u003e145\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_185\"\u003e185\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_366\"\u003e366\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_576\"\u003e576\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAttitude, defined, \u003ca href=\"#Page_229\"\u003e229\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eemphasized by one type of theory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_236\"\u003e236-7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_240\"\u003e240\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to will, \u003ca href=\"#Page_246\"\u003e246\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Motive and \"How\"\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAugustine, \u003ca href=\"#Page_150\"\u003e150\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAurelius, Marcus, \u003ca href=\"#Page_136\"\u003e136\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAuthority, of group, \u003ca href=\"#Page_26\"\u003e26 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ebehind customs, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein Israel\u0027s religion, \u003ca href=\"#Page_96\"\u003e96 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof custom challenged in Greece, \u003ca href=\"#Page_111\"\u003e111 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_119\"\u003e119 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof the church, \u003ca href=\"#Page_145\"\u003e145-7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econflict of reason with, \u003ca href=\"#Page_165\"\u003e165 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof duty, \u003ca href=\"#Page_344\"\u003e344\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein the family, \u003ca href=\"#Page_599\"\u003e599 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Duty, Control, Standard\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAutonomy, as essence of moral duty, \u003ca href=\"#Page_225\"\u003e225\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eKant\u0027s conception of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_169\"\u003e169\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_346\"\u003e346\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_352\"\u003e352\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein later utilitarianism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_361\"\u003e361\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein State and the family, \u003ca href=\"#Page_599\"\u003e599 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Control, Duty, Law, State\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAustralian customs, marriage, \u003ca href=\"#Page_22\"\u003e22\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einitiatory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\"\u003e58 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eregulated duel, \u003ca href=\"#Page_63\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBacon, Francis, \u003ca href=\"#Page_4\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_164\"\u003e164\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_165\"\u003e165\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBacon, Roger, \u003ca href=\"#Page_164\"\u003e164\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBagehot, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBain, on happiness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_265\"\u003e265\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon utilitarianism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_286\"\u003e286\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehis account of duty, \u003ca href=\"#Page_356\"\u003e356-8\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBalzac, \u003ca href=\"#Page_189\"\u003e189\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBayard, Chevalier, \u003ca href=\"#Page_149\"\u003e149\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBenevolence, \u003ca href=\"#Page_160\"\u003e160 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_375\"\u003e375-91\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBentham, on motive, \u003ca href=\"#Page_228\"\u003e228\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_247\"\u003e247-8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_354\"\u003e354\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon moral science, \u003ca href=\"#Page_235\"\u003e235\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon disposition, \u003ca href=\"#Page_254\"\u003e254-5\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon pleasure and happiness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_264\"\u003e264\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_286\"\u003e286\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon utilitarian calculus, \u003ca href=\"#Page_275\"\u003e275-6\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edenial of quality of pleasure, \u003ca href=\"#Page_282\"\u003e282\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon pleasure of sympathy, \u003ca href=\"#Page_291\"\u003e291\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edemocratic individualism of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_525\"\u003e525\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBlackstone, \u003ca href=\"#Page_578\"\u003e578\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBlood feud, \u003ca href=\"#Page_28\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\"\u003e62 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_70\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_456\"\u003e456\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBoniface VIII., Bull of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_147\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBosanquet, Helen, \u003ca href=\"#Page_584\"\u003e584\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_595\"\u003e595 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBryce, James, \u003ca href=\"#Page_146\"\u003e146\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nC\u0026aelig;sar, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_608\" id=\"Page_608\"\u003e[Pg 608]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCapital and labor, \u003ca href=\"#Page_499\"\u003e499\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_501\"\u003e501 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_505\"\u003e505 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_532\"\u003e532\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_542\"\u003e542 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCapitalism, as method of industry, \u003ca href=\"#Page_78\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_158\"\u003e158-60\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_498\"\u003e498 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_508\"\u003e508\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_538\"\u003e538\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_545\"\u003e545\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Capital, Corporation\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCarelessness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_462\"\u003e462-4\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCarlyle, criticism of individualism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_161\"\u003e161\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_192\"\u003e192\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof utilitarianism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_265\"\u003e265\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_143_143\"\u003e289 n.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCasuistry, \u003ca href=\"#Page_325\"\u003e325-8\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCategorical Imperative, \u003ca href=\"#Page_344\"\u003e344\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCelts, clan system of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_144\"\u003e144\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee also Ireland, Welsh\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCharacter, formation of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\"\u003e9 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eorganization of, in group morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein Hebrews, \u003ca href=\"#Page_104\"\u003e104-6\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eamong Greeks, \u003ca href=\"#Page_138\"\u003e138-41\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to desire and deliberation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_202\"\u003e202\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emoral importance of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_229\"\u003e229\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_233\"\u003e233\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to will, \u003ca href=\"#Page_246\"\u003e246\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to conduct, Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_240\"\u003eXIII.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand disposition, \u003ca href=\"#Page_254\"\u003e254-7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emeasures the pleasant and unpleasant, \u003ca href=\"#Page_277\"\u003e277-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eunification of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_283\"\u003e283\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits reconstruction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_343\"\u003e343\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_362\"\u003e362\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erecognized by law, \u003ca href=\"#Page_460\"\u003e460 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCharity, in Middle Ages, \u003ca href=\"#Page_146\"\u003e146\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand right to life, \u003ca href=\"#Page_444\"\u003e444\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Benevolence\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nChastity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_146\"\u003e146\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_177\"\u003e177\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nChief, authority of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_61\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nChild-labor, \u003ca href=\"#Page_193\"\u003e193 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_444\"\u003e444\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_489\"\u003e489\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_538\"\u003e538\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_540\"\u003e540 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nChinese customs, \u003ca href=\"#Page_17\"\u003e17 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nChivalry, \u003ca href=\"#Page_149\"\u003e149 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nChristian conceptions, love, \u003ca href=\"#Page_100\"\u003e100\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esacrifice, \u003ca href=\"#Page_102\"\u003e102\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efaith, \u003ca href=\"#Page_103\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efreedom, \u003ca href=\"#Page_108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esocial order, \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_187\"\u003e187\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003easceticism and authority, \u003ca href=\"#Page_145\"\u003e145 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_364\"\u003e364\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eunity of members, \u003ca href=\"#Page_147\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emoral value of labor, \u003ca href=\"#Page_156\"\u003e156\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to social order, \u003ca href=\"#Page_184\"\u003e184 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Church, Hebrew\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nChurch, its contribution to modern morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_142\"\u003e142\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits ideals, \u003ca href=\"#Page_145\"\u003e145\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand jural theory of morals, \u003ca href=\"#Page_218\"\u003e218 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits influence on history of the family, \u003ca href=\"#Page_576\"\u003e576-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee also Religion\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCicero, \u003ca href=\"#Page_152\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCivil Society, Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_451\"\u003eXXI.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefined, \u003ca href=\"#Page_451\"\u003e451\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ereform of its administration, \u003ca href=\"#Page_471\"\u003e471-3\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nClark, J. B., \u003ca href=\"#Page_542\"\u003e542\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nClass ideals, of Greeks, \u003ca href=\"#Page_116\"\u003e116 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof Germans and Celts, \u003ca href=\"#Page_144\"\u003e144 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehonor and, \u003ca href=\"#Page_86\"\u003e86 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas source of moral terms, \u003ca href=\"#Page_175\"\u003e175 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nClass interests, \u003ca href=\"#Page_84\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\"\u003e94\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_119\"\u003e119-24\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_127\"\u003e127\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_162\"\u003e162\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_474\"\u003e474\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nClosed shop, \u003ca href=\"#Page_559\"\u003e559-61\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCollective Agencies, see Corporations, Labor Union, Public Agency, Socialism\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCollectivism, its formula, \u003ca href=\"#Page_484\"\u003e484\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econtrasted with socialism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_556\"\u003e556\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nColonna, \u0026AElig;gidius, \u003ca href=\"#Page_147\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCommunism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_161\"\u003e161\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCompetition, modern theory of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_158\"\u003e158\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_531\"\u003e531\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_542\"\u003e542\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etends to destroy itself, \u003ca href=\"#Page_532\"\u003e532\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_538\"\u003e538\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecrude method of selecting ability, \u003ca href=\"#Page_559\"\u003e559\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eCarlyle on, \u003ca href=\"#Page_161\"\u003e161\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nConduct, as subject of ethics, \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etwo aspects of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_2\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethree stages of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_8\"\u003e8-10\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethree levels of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\"\u003e37-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efirst level, Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\"\u003eIII.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esecond level, Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\"\u003eIV.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethird level, Chapters \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\"\u003eV.-VIII.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enature of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_205\"\u003e205\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_237\"\u003e237-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to character, Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_240\"\u003eXIII.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eplace of happiness in, Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_263\"\u003eXIV.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eplace of reason in, Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_306\"\u003eXVI.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nConflicting services, problem of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_493\"\u003e493\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nConscience, transition from custom to, \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\"\u003e73 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_179\"\u003e179\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eGreek symbols of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_139\"\u003e139 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eStoic suggestion of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_140\"\u003e140 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ewith Abelard, \u003ca href=\"#Page_151\"\u003e151\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emeaning of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_183\"\u003e183\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_188\"\u003e188 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eanalysis of, see Intuitionalism, Knowledge, Reason\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nConscientiousness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_405\"\u003e405\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_434\"\u003e434\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nConsequences, Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_240\"\u003eXIII.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eimportance of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_234\"\u003e234-5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_238\"\u003e238\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edenied by Kant, \u003ca href=\"#Page_242\"\u003e242-4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ewhen foreseen form intention, \u003ca href=\"#Page_247\"\u003e247\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epractical importance, \u003ca href=\"#Page_251\"\u003e251\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas moral sanctions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_358\"\u003e358-60\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas self-realization, \u003ca href=\"#Page_392\"\u003e392\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eaccidental, \u003ca href=\"#Page_459\"\u003e459-60\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecareless, \u003ca href=\"#Page_463\"\u003e463\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nContent, see Consequences, and \"What\"\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nContracts, \u003ci\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e status, \u003ca href=\"#Page_20\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheory and value of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_158\"\u003e158\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_452\"\u003e452 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_496\"\u003e496\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof little benefit to wage-earner, \u003ca href=\"#Page_503\"\u003e503-5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_529\"\u003e529 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_609\" id=\"Page_609\"\u003e[Pg 609]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas obstacle to legislation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_505\"\u003e505 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eanalyzed, \u003ca href=\"#Page_527\"\u003e527 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nControl, the right as, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein primitive group, \u003ca href=\"#Page_26\"\u003e26-9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_34\"\u003e34\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eprimitive means of enforcing, \u003ca href=\"#Page_54\"\u003e54 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003echallenged in Greece, \u003ca href=\"#Page_118\"\u003e118 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eproblem of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_217\"\u003e217-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheories concerning, \u003ca href=\"#Page_225\"\u003e225\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_232\"\u003e232\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eexternal and internal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_353\"\u003e353-61\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eself-control, \u003ca href=\"#Page_407\"\u003e407\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Jural, Law, Standard, Right\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nConvention, in Greek morals and ethics, \u003ca href=\"#Page_111\"\u003e111 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_124\"\u003e124 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCo\u0026ouml;peration, and mutual aid, \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein industry, \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein war, \u003ca href=\"#Page_44\"\u003e44 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein art, \u003ca href=\"#Page_45\"\u003e45 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas organized in corporations and unions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_495\"\u003e495-507\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCorporations, moral difficulties of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_498\"\u003e498\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emanagement of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_500\"\u003e500 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelations to employ\u0026eacute;s and public, \u003ca href=\"#Page_501\"\u003e501 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erequire new types of morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_517\"\u003e517-22\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecapitalization of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_561\"\u003e561 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCorruption, political, \u003ca href=\"#Page_477\"\u003e477\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_537\"\u003e537-9\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCoulanges, \u003ca href=\"#Page_19\"\u003e19\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCourage, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_118\"\u003e118\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_410\"\u003e410-13\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCourts, primitive, \u003ca href=\"#Page_61\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas school of morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_182\"\u003e182 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas instruments of oppression, \u003ca href=\"#Page_195\"\u003e195\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecivil, ethical value of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_454\"\u003e454\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein labor disputes, \u003ca href=\"#Page_504\"\u003e504 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon police power, \u003ca href=\"#Page_505\"\u003e505 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_555\"\u003e555 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erecognition of public welfare by, \u003ca href=\"#Page_555\"\u003e555 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCovenant, in Hebrew moral development, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\"\u003e94 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCriminal Procedure, reform of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_468\"\u003e468-9\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCriterion of the moral, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5-13\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_202\"\u003e202 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof the good and right, typical theories of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_224\"\u003e224 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Good, Right, Kant, Utilitarianism, Plato, Aristotle\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCrusades, \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCunningham, W., \u003ca href=\"#Page_157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCustom, and the term ethics, \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein early group life, \u003ca href=\"#Page_17\"\u003e17 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas \"second level\" of conduct, \u003ca href=\"#Page_38\"\u003e38\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003egeneral discussion of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\"\u003e51 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_171\"\u003e171 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eeducational, \u003ca href=\"#Page_57\"\u003e57 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ejural, \u003ca href=\"#Page_59\"\u003e59 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ebirth, marriage, death, \u003ca href=\"#Page_64\"\u003e64 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efestal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_65\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehospitality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_67\"\u003e67 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evalues and defects of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\"\u003e68 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etransition to conscience from, \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\"\u003e73 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etransition among Hebrews, \u003ca href=\"#Page_95\"\u003e95 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eamong Greeks, \u003ca href=\"#Page_110\"\u003e110 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eopposed to \"nature,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_120\"\u003e120 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eGrote on, \u003ca href=\"#Page_172\"\u003e172 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecompared with reflective morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_172\"\u003e172 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand moral rules, \u003ca href=\"#Page_330\"\u003e330-2\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_431\"\u003e431\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCultus, of Hebrew priesthood, \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\"\u003e97 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCynics, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_125\"\u003e125 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCyrenaics, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_125\"\u003e125 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDante, \u003ca href=\"#Page_150\"\u003e150\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDarwinism, and morals, \u003ca href=\"#Page_371\"\u003e371 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Naturalism\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDeliberation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_202\"\u003e202\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_319\"\u003e319\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand intuition, \u003ca href=\"#Page_322\"\u003e322-3\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand conscience, \u003ca href=\"#Page_421\"\u003e421\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof crucial importance, \u003ca href=\"#Page_464\"\u003e464\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDemocracy, in Greece, \u003ca href=\"#Page_119\"\u003e119 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edevelopment of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_151\"\u003e151 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_162\"\u003e162 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emoral, \u003ca href=\"#Page_303\"\u003e303\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand moral problems, \u003ca href=\"#Page_474\"\u003e474-81\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe corporation in relation to, \u003ca href=\"#Page_500\"\u003e500\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand economic problems, \u003ca href=\"#Page_521\"\u003e521 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand individualism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_530\"\u003e530\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_535\"\u003e535\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas agency, \u003ca href=\"#Page_558\"\u003e558\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand the family, \u003ca href=\"#Page_594\"\u003e594\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_600\"\u003e600 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDescartes, \u003ca href=\"#Page_164\"\u003e164 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDesire, hedonistic theory of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_269\"\u003e269\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to pleasure, \u003ca href=\"#Page_270\"\u003e270-1\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eto happiness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_272\"\u003e272-3\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand reason, \u003ca href=\"#Page_308\"\u003e308\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheir organization, \u003ca href=\"#Page_317\"\u003e317\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econflict with duty, \u003ca href=\"#Page_339\"\u003e339-46\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand temperance, \u003ca href=\"#Page_406\"\u003e406-8\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDharna, \u003ca href=\"#Page_63\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDistribution, theories of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_545\"\u003e545-50\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epresent inequalities in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_545\"\u003e545\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eindividualism and, \u003ca href=\"#Page_546\"\u003e546\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eequal division, \u003ca href=\"#Page_547\"\u003e547\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ea working programme, \u003ca href=\"#Page_548\"\u003e548-50\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDivorce, \u003ca href=\"#Page_574\"\u003e574 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_577\"\u003e577\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_603\"\u003e603-5\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDominicans, \u003ca href=\"#Page_149\"\u003e149 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDuty, Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_337\"\u003eXVII.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eStoic conception, \u003ca href=\"#Page_140\"\u003e140 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eorigin of the term, \u003ca href=\"#Page_176\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003estandpoint of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_232\"\u003e232\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edouble meaning of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_337\"\u003e337\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econflict with desire, \u003ca href=\"#Page_340\"\u003e340\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eexplanation of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_342\"\u003e342-4\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_362\"\u003e362-3\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eauthority of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_344\"\u003e344\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esocial character of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_345\"\u003e345\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eKant\u0027s view, \u003ca href=\"#Page_346\"\u003e346-52\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eutilitarian view of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_353\"\u003e353-62\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEastman, Charles, \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_54\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_60\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEckstein, \u003ca href=\"#Page_577\"\u003e577\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_610\" id=\"Page_610\"\u003e[Pg 610]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eEconomic conditions and forces, in kinship and family groups, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\"\u003e24 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehelp to effect transition from group morality to conscience, \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eamong Hebrews, \u003ca href=\"#Page_93\"\u003e93 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eamong Greeks, \u003ca href=\"#Page_119\"\u003e119 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emodern, \u003ca href=\"#Page_155\"\u003e155-63\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein reflective morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_194\"\u003e194\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erestrict physical freedom, \u003ca href=\"#Page_444\"\u003e444\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand freedom of thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_447\"\u003e447\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elegislative reform of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_481\"\u003e481\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein relation to happiness and character, \u003ca href=\"#Page_487\"\u003e487 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esocial aspects of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_491\"\u003e491 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erequire ethical readjustment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_496\"\u003e496\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_517\"\u003e517-22\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eimpersonal character, \u003ca href=\"#Page_511\"\u003e511 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eethical principles, \u003ca href=\"#Page_514\"\u003e514 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eunsettled problems, \u003ca href=\"#Page_523\"\u003e523-65\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEducation, moral significance of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_168\"\u003e168 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eright to, \u003ca href=\"#Page_446\"\u003e446 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erestrictions upon, \u003ca href=\"#Page_448\"\u003e448 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas a means of justice, \u003ca href=\"#Page_548\"\u003e548 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_557\"\u003e557 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEgoism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_214\"\u003e214\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_258\"\u003e258\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_303\"\u003e303\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_423\"\u003e423\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_467\"\u003e467\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehedonistic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_288\"\u003e288-9\u003c/a\u003e (see Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_286\"\u003eXV.\u003c/a\u003e);\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enaturalistic theory of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_368\"\u003e368-74\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econtrasted with altruism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_375\"\u003e375\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eexplanation of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_377\"\u003e377-81\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ereasonable self-love, \u003ca href=\"#Page_382\"\u003e382\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Self, Individualism\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEllis, H., \u003ca href=\"#Page_584\"\u003e584\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEliot, George, \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_301\"\u003e301\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEmerson, \u003ca href=\"#Page_349\"\u003e349\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_350\"\u003e350\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_201_201\"\u003e446 n.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_470\"\u003e470\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_581\"\u003e581\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEmpiricism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_226\"\u003e226\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_231\"\u003e231\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_306\"\u003e306\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ediscussion of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_329\"\u003e329-32\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEnds, and Means, \u003ca href=\"#Page_210\"\u003e210\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation of happiness to, \u003ca href=\"#Page_273\"\u003e273-4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eutilitarian, conflicts with its hedonistic motive, \u003ca href=\"#Page_289\"\u003e289\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esocial and rational, \u003ca href=\"#Page_314\"\u003e314\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ekingdom of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_315\"\u003e315\u003c/a\u003e and \u003ca href=\"#Page_433\"\u003e433\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEnlightenment, period of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_163\"\u003e163\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_165\"\u003e165 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEpictetus, \u003ca href=\"#Page_140\"\u003e140\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEpicureans, theory of life, \u003ca href=\"#Page_125\"\u003e125\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_135\"\u003e135\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_218\"\u003e218\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon friendship, \u003ca href=\"#Page_125\"\u003e125\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_130\"\u003e130\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_187\"\u003e187\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEthics, definition, \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ederivation of term, \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003especific problem of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_2\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emethod of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\"\u003e3-13\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eEthos\u003c/i\u003e, meaning, \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eChapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\"\u003eIV.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_175\"\u003e175\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEud\u0026aelig;monism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_230\"\u003e230\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Happiness, Self-realization\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEuripides, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_116\"\u003e116\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_139\"\u003e139\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEvil, problem of, in Israel, \u003ca href=\"#Page_100\"\u003e100 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nExcitement, and pleasure, \u003ca href=\"#Page_408\"\u003e408\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEzekiel, on personal responsibility, \u003ca href=\"#Page_104\"\u003e104\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\"Fagan, J. O.,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_503\"\u003e503\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFamily, or Household Group, \u003ca href=\"#Page_23\"\u003e23-31\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas an agency in early society, \u003ca href=\"#Page_47\"\u003e47-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas affected by reflective morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_193\"\u003e193\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand contract, \u003ca href=\"#Page_453\"\u003e453\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehistory of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_571\"\u003e571-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epsychological basis of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_578\"\u003e578-84\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003estrain in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_584\"\u003e584-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epresent factors of strain in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_590\"\u003e590-4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand the economic order, \u003ca href=\"#Page_594\"\u003e594-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eauthority in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_599\"\u003e599-603\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand divorce, \u003ca href=\"#Page_603\"\u003e603-5\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFeelings, the hedonistic ultimate, \u003ca href=\"#Page_225\"\u003e225\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ean ambiguous term, \u003ca href=\"#Page_249\"\u003e249-51\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eMill on importance of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_294\"\u003e294\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFeud, see Blood Feud\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFichte, \u003ca href=\"#Page_490\"\u003e490\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFisher, G. P., \u003ca href=\"#Page_143\"\u003e143\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFiske, John, \u003ca href=\"#Page_581\"\u003e581\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFranchises, abuses of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_539\"\u003e539\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFranciscans, \u003ca href=\"#Page_149\"\u003e149 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFrancke, Kuno, \u003ca href=\"#Page_149\"\u003e149\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFreedom, Pauline conception, \u003ca href=\"#Page_108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eformal and real, \u003ca href=\"#Page_158\"\u003e158 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_437\"\u003e437-9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_483\"\u003e483 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_525\"\u003e525 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_529\"\u003e529\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_549\"\u003e549\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Rights\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFreund, E., \u003ca href=\"#Page_555\"\u003e555\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGalileo, \u003ca href=\"#Page_164\"\u003e164\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGenetic Method in Ethics, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGentleman, in Greece, \u003ca href=\"#Page_116\"\u003e116 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emedi\u0026aelig;val and class ideal of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_144\"\u003e144 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_149\"\u003e149\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_155\"\u003e155-7\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGenung, J. F., \u003ca href=\"#Page_102\"\u003e102\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGeorge, Henry, \u003ca href=\"#Page_162\"\u003e162\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_510\"\u003e510 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGermans, customs of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003echaracter and ideals, \u003ca href=\"#Page_143\"\u003e143 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_149\"\u003e149\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efamily among, \u003ca href=\"#Page_575\"\u003e575 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGolden Rule, \u003ca href=\"#Page_334\"\u003e334\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGood, the, as subject of ethics, \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_12\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_203\"\u003e203-5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_215\"\u003e215\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_236\"\u003e236\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_241\"\u003e241\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eorigin of the conception of moral, \u003ca href=\"#Page_183\"\u003e183 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein group morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\"\u003e69-72\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eHebrew ideals of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\"\u003e107-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esignificance in Greek thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_113\"\u003e113\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_117\"\u003e117\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_119\"\u003e119\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_124\"\u003e124\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eGreek individualistic and hedonistic theories of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_126\"\u003e126\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_611\" id=\"Page_611\"\u003e[Pg 611]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ePlato on, \u003ca href=\"#Page_131\"\u003e131-4\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_136\"\u003e136 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_140\"\u003e140\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eAristotle on, \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\"\u003e134 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_138\"\u003e138\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand modern civilization, \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\"\u003e154 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_557\"\u003e557 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas happiness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_169\"\u003e169\u003c/a\u003e, Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_263\"\u003eXIV.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eprivate and general, \u003ca href=\"#Page_289\"\u003e289-300\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_308\"\u003e308\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe true, \u003ca href=\"#Page_208\"\u003e208\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_284\"\u003e284\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_302\"\u003e302\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003egood men as standard, \u003ca href=\"#Page_279\"\u003e279\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_324\"\u003e324\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erational and sensuous, \u003ca href=\"#Page_337\"\u003e337\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ewealth as, \u003ca href=\"#Page_487\"\u003e487\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Happiness, Value\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGoodness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_233\"\u003e233\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_251\"\u003e251\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eformal and material, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_133_133\"\u003e259 n.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof character, \u003ca href=\"#Page_279\"\u003e279\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand happiness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_284\"\u003e284\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand social interest, \u003ca href=\"#Page_298\"\u003e298\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eintrinsic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_318\"\u003e318-20\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand progress, \u003ca href=\"#Page_422\"\u003e422\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Virtue\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGovernment, distrust of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_474\"\u003e474\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ereform of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_479\"\u003e479-80\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee also State\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGray, J. H., \u003ca href=\"#Page_17\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGreeks, early customs, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\"\u003e18 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_46\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecompared with Hebrews, \u003ca href=\"#Page_91\"\u003e91 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emoral development of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_111\"\u003e111-41\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_197\"\u003e197\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_215\"\u003e215\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_217\"\u003e217 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGreen, on duty, \u003ca href=\"#Page_225\"\u003e225\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon hedonism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_269\"\u003e269\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon practical value of utilitarianism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_287\"\u003e287-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon moral progress, \u003ca href=\"#Page_429\"\u003e429\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGrosscup, Judge, \u003ca href=\"#Page_552\"\u003e552\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGrote, \u003ca href=\"#Page_19\"\u003e19\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_172\"\u003e172 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_178\"\u003e178\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGroup ideal, medi\u0026aelig;val, \u003ca href=\"#Page_144\"\u003e144 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Class Ideal\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGroup Life, early, Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_17\"\u003eII.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enecessary to understand moral life, \u003ca href=\"#Page_17\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etypical facts of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_17\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ekinship, \u003ca href=\"#Page_21\"\u003e21 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efamily, \u003ca href=\"#Page_23\"\u003e23 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eownership of land in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eother economic aspects of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_25\"\u003e25 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epolitical aspects of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_26\"\u003e26-30\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erights and responsibilities of individual in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_27\"\u003e27-30\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ereligious aspects of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\"\u003e30-2\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eage and sex groups in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\"\u003e32-4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emoral significance of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_34\"\u003e34 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGroup Morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_34\"\u003e34 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\"\u003e51 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evalues and defects of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\"\u003e68-73\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein early Hebrew life, \u003ca href=\"#Page_92\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein Middle Ages, \u003ca href=\"#Page_144\"\u003e144 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epersistence of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_173\"\u003e173-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein legal progress, \u003ca href=\"#Page_456\"\u003e456\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand international relations, \u003ca href=\"#Page_481\"\u003e481 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein industrial conflicts, \u003ca href=\"#Page_500\"\u003e500\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHabit, and character, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\"\u003e9 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_12\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_202\"\u003e202\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eeffect on knowledge, \u003ca href=\"#Page_319\"\u003e319\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eeffect upon desire, \u003ca href=\"#Page_342\"\u003e342-3\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHadley, A. T., \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_222_222\"\u003e475 n.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_488\"\u003e488\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_563\"\u003e563\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHammurabi, Code of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_105\"\u003e105\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_574\"\u003e574\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHappiness, and pleasure, \u003ca href=\"#Page_230\"\u003e230\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_263\"\u003e263\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eambiguity in conception of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_266\"\u003e266\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to desire, \u003ca href=\"#Page_272\"\u003e272-4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas standard, \u003ca href=\"#Page_275\"\u003e275-80\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eelements in its constitution, \u003ca href=\"#Page_281\"\u003e281-3\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efinal or moral, \u003ca href=\"#Page_284\"\u003e284\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003egeneral, \u003ca href=\"#Page_286\"\u003e286\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand sympathy, \u003ca href=\"#Page_300\"\u003e300-3\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand efficiency, \u003ca href=\"#Page_373\"\u003e373\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eprivate and public, \u003ca href=\"#Page_395\"\u003e395-7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Eud\u0026aelig;monism, Good\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHazlitt, on Bentham, \u003ca href=\"#Page_268\"\u003e268\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon excitement, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_188_188\"\u003e409 n.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHearn, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHebrews, early morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emoral development, \u003ca href=\"#Page_91\"\u003e91-110\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecompared with Greek, \u003ca href=\"#Page_91\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHedonism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_230\"\u003e230\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eHebrew, \u003ca href=\"#Page_106\"\u003e106 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eGreek, \u003ca href=\"#Page_126\"\u003e126\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_132\"\u003e132 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecriticism of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_269\"\u003e269-75\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003euniversalistic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_286\"\u003e286\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eegoistic character of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_289\"\u003e289-94\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eKant\u0027s, \u003ca href=\"#Page_309\"\u003e309\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eparadox of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_352\"\u003e352\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits theory of duty, \u003ca href=\"#Page_353\"\u003e353\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHegel, on institutional character of morals, \u003ca href=\"#Page_225\"\u003e225-6\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHigh-mindedness, Aristotle\u0027s description of, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_79_79\"\u003e135 n.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHobhouse, L. T., on formation of custom, \u003ca href=\"#Page_54\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon social order and individuality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_428\"\u003e428\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon the family, \u003ca href=\"#Page_575\"\u003e575 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_577\"\u003e577\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nH\u0026ouml;ffding, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_125_125\"\u003e253 n.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHonesty, \u003ca href=\"#Page_188\"\u003e188\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_414\"\u003e414\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_496\"\u003e496\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHonor, \u003ca href=\"#Page_85\"\u003e85-8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_144\"\u003e144 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_176\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHosea, \u003ca href=\"#Page_95\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHospitality, in group morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_67\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\"How,\" the, in conduct, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5-8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_228\"\u003e228 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_240\"\u003e240\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein group morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\"\u003e69 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein Hebrew morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_102\"\u003e102 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein Greek ethics, \u003ca href=\"#Page_136\"\u003e136 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Attitude\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHoward, \u003ca href=\"#Page_576\"\u003e576\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nIbsen, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_100\"\u003e100\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_303\"\u003e303\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_588\"\u003e588\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nIdeal, \u003ci\u003evs.\u003c/i\u003e actual in Greek thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_136\"\u003e136-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emeaning of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_421\"\u003e421 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nIndia, customs of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_26\"\u003e26\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_63\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_524\"\u003e524\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nIndians (American), \u003ca href=\"#Page_25\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_54\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_60\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_612\" id=\"Page_612\"\u003e[Pg 612]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nIndifferent Acts, \u003ca href=\"#Page_205\"\u003e205-6\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_210\"\u003e210-11\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nIndividual, the, in early group life, \u003ca href=\"#Page_20\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_22\"\u003e22 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_27\"\u003e27-30\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_34\"\u003e34\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_71\"\u003e71 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecollision of with group, \u003ca href=\"#Page_74\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\"\u003e75 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_88\"\u003e88\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_184\"\u003e184-7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_432\"\u003e432\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eamong Hebrews, \u003ca href=\"#Page_104\"\u003e104\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edevelopment of, in modern civilization, \u003ca href=\"#Page_148\"\u003e148-69\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas affected by reflective morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_187\"\u003e187-92\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand society, \u003ca href=\"#Page_427\"\u003e427-36\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to corporations\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand unions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_500\"\u003e500-3\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Individualism, Self\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nIndividualism, as factor in transition from custom to conscience, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eforces producing, \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\"\u003e76-87\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein Israel, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\"\u003e94\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_102\"\u003e102\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_104\"\u003e104\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein Greece, \u003ca href=\"#Page_114\"\u003e114-24\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_432\"\u003e432\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein Greek ethical theory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_124\"\u003e124-6\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein modern world, \u003ca href=\"#Page_149\"\u003e149-63\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_184\"\u003e184-6\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_220\"\u003e220-3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_432\"\u003e432 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein ethical theory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_225\"\u003e225 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_290\"\u003e290\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eCarlyle\u0027s criticism of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_265\"\u003e265 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehedonistic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_289\"\u003e289 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_301\"\u003e301 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas self-assertion, \u003ca href=\"#Page_368\"\u003e368-75\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etrue and false, \u003ca href=\"#Page_481\"\u003e481\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epolitical formula of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_483\"\u003e483 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein economic theory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_523\"\u003e523-35\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edemocratic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_525\"\u003e525\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_530\"\u003e530 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\"survival of the fittest,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_525\"\u003e525\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_532\"\u003e532-4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evalues, \u003ca href=\"#Page_527\"\u003e527 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_548\"\u003e548 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edoes not secure real freedom, \u003ca href=\"#Page_529\"\u003e529\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enor justice, \u003ca href=\"#Page_530\"\u003e530 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_535\"\u003e535\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_546\"\u003e546 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eother defects of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_551\"\u003e551 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein U. S. Constitution, \u003ca href=\"#Page_534\"\u003e534\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon \"unearned increment,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_564\"\u003e564 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein family, \u003ca href=\"#Page_604\"\u003e604\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Individual, Self\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nIndustry, as a rationalizing agency, \u003ca href=\"#Page_39\"\u003e39-42\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edifferentiation in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas a socializing agency, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efactor in effecting transition from custom to conscience, \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\"\u003e76-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emodern development of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_155\"\u003e155-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eagencies of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_497\"\u003e497\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nInitiation, in primitive tribes, \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nInstitutions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_192\"\u003e192-5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_222\"\u003e222\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_225\"\u003e225-6\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_427\"\u003eXX.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nIntention, and Motive, \u003ca href=\"#Page_246\"\u003e246-54\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_257\"\u003e257-8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_261\"\u003e261\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand accident, \u003ca href=\"#Page_63\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_104\"\u003e104\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_459\"\u003e459-60\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Deliberation\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nIntuitionalism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_226\"\u003e226\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_232\"\u003e232\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_306\"\u003e306\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ediscussion of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_317\"\u003e317-25\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand casuistry, \u003ca href=\"#Page_325\"\u003e325-8\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nIreland, ancient law of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\"\u003e24 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_83\"\u003e83\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nIsrael, moral development of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_91\"\u003e91-110\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_197\"\u003e197\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nJames, William, on the social self, \u003ca href=\"#Page_85\"\u003e85-7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon animal activity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_204\"\u003e204\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon effect of emotion on ideas, \u003ca href=\"#Page_253\"\u003e253\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nJapanese morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nJesus, \u003ca href=\"#Page_106\"\u003e106 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nJob, moral theory in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_101\"\u003e101 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_106\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nJudgments, moral; see Moral\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nJural influence, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_103\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_113\"\u003e113 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_177\"\u003e177\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_218\"\u003e218-9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_224\"\u003e224\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_328\"\u003e328\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_353\"\u003e353-6\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_439\"\u003e439\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_454\"\u003e454-5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_467\"\u003e467-8\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nJustice, in primitive society, \u003ca href=\"#Page_27\"\u003e27 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas Hebrew ideal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\"\u003e94 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_99\"\u003e99 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_108\"\u003e108 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein Greek theory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_113\"\u003e113 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enatural and conventional, \u003ca href=\"#Page_120\"\u003e120 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas interest of the stronger, \u003ca href=\"#Page_122\"\u003e122-4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emodern demand for, \u003ca href=\"#Page_148\"\u003e148\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_161\"\u003e161 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand charity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_148\"\u003e148\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_389\"\u003e389 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evirtue of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_414\"\u003e414-7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edevelopment of civil, \u003ca href=\"#Page_456\"\u003e456-63\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eformal and substantial, \u003ca href=\"#Page_465\"\u003e465 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_531\"\u003e531\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esocial, \u003ca href=\"#Page_161\"\u003e161\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_410\"\u003e410\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_521\"\u003e521\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_556\"\u003e556-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe new, \u003ca href=\"#Page_496\"\u003e496 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand individualism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_530\"\u003e530-5\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein distribution, theories of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_545\"\u003e545-50\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nKafirs, clanship among, \u003ca href=\"#Page_19\"\u003e19\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_35\"\u003e35\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nKant, on unsocial sociableness of man, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eforces of progress, \u003ca href=\"#Page_87\"\u003e87 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehis \u003ci\u003eCritique of Pure Reason\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_166\"\u003e166\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon dignity of man, \u003ca href=\"#Page_167\"\u003e167\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003egeneral standpoint, \u003ca href=\"#Page_169\"\u003e169\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eindividualism of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_191\"\u003e191\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand the \"law of nature,\" \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_109_109\"\u003e222 n.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon moral law, \u003ca href=\"#Page_228\"\u003e228-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon the Good Will, \u003ca href=\"#Page_241\"\u003e241-3\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehis theory of will discussed, \u003ca href=\"#Page_241\"\u003e241-46\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon egoistic hedonism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_289\"\u003e289\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheory of practical reason, \u003ca href=\"#Page_309\"\u003e309-17\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheory of duty, \u003ca href=\"#Page_344\"\u003e344\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_346\"\u003e346-52\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon legality and morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_432\"\u003e432\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecf. also \u003ca href=\"#Page_231\"\u003e231\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_492\"\u003e492\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_580\"\u003e580\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nKidd, Dudley, \u003ca href=\"#Page_19\"\u003e19\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_23\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_35\"\u003e35\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nKinship, \u003ca href=\"#Page_21\"\u003e21 ff.\u003c/a\u003e; see Group Life\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nKnowledge, place in morals, \u003ca href=\"#Page_215\"\u003e215\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheories of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_231\"\u003e231-2\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eclose connection with emotion, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_131_131\"\u003e256 n.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ewith character, \u003ca href=\"#Page_279\"\u003e279\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_306\"\u003eXVI.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eKant\u0027s theory of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_309\"\u003e309-16\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_613\" id=\"Page_613\"\u003e[Pg 613]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eintuitional theory of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_317\"\u003e317-24\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecasuistical view, \u003ca href=\"#Page_325\"\u003e325-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eprinciples in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_333\"\u003e333-4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand sympathy, \u003ca href=\"#Page_334\"\u003e334\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand conscience, \u003ca href=\"#Page_418\"\u003e418-23\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nLabor, differentiation of, in early society, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe gentleman and, \u003ca href=\"#Page_156\"\u003e156\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003echurch and, \u003ca href=\"#Page_156\"\u003e156\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand the law, \u003ca href=\"#Page_504\"\u003e504-7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econditions of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_540\"\u003e540 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof women and children, \u003ca href=\"#Page_540\"\u003e540 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eexploitation of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_542\"\u003e542-4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eProf. Seager\u0027s programme for benefit of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_566\"\u003e566 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Industry, Labor Union, Capital\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nLabor Union, moral aspects of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_499\"\u003e499 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erevives group morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_500\"\u003e500\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelations to the law, \u003ca href=\"#Page_503\"\u003e503 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edisadvantages of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_503\"\u003e503-6\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eviolence of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_541\"\u003e541\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eopen and closed shop, \u003ca href=\"#Page_559\"\u003e559 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nLaissez-faire, \u003ca href=\"#Page_161\"\u003e161\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_475\"\u003e475\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nLand, \"unearned increment,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_510\"\u003e510 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_564\"\u003e564 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nLankester, Ray, \u003ca href=\"#Page_168\"\u003e168\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nLaw, as control in group life, \u003ca href=\"#Page_59\"\u003e59-63\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein Hebrew moral development, \u003ca href=\"#Page_95\"\u003e95-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erighteousness of the, \u003ca href=\"#Page_103\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eGreek conceptions of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_118\"\u003e118-23\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof nature, \u003ca href=\"#Page_130\"\u003e130\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_136\"\u003e136\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_152\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_222\"\u003e222\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eRoman, \u003ca href=\"#Page_142\"\u003e142\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_152\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_222\"\u003e222\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand government, \u003ca href=\"#Page_194\"\u003e194 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas defining rights, \u003ca href=\"#Page_454\"\u003e454\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edevelopment of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_456\"\u003e456 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eformal in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_465\"\u003e465\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eneeded reforms in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_468\"\u003e468 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to corporations and unions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_503\"\u003e503-7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eneeded to embody and enforce moral standards, \u003ca href=\"#Page_520\"\u003e520 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emoral, see Jural;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand Right; see Civil Society, Courts, Justice, Legal, State\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nLegal and Moral, \u003ca href=\"#Page_177\"\u003e177\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_182\"\u003e182 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_433\"\u003e433\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_439\"\u003e439\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_454\"\u003e454-5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_467\"\u003e467-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee also Jural, Law, Right\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nLeibniz, \u003ca href=\"#Page_165\"\u003e165\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nLevels of conduct, \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\"\u003e37-9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nLiability, equals external responsibility, \u003ca href=\"#Page_436\"\u003e436\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nLiberty, struggle for, \u003ca href=\"#Page_84\"\u003e84 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Freedom, Rights\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\"Life,\" Hebrew and Christian moral ideal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe moral as, \u003ca href=\"#Page_606\"\u003e606\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nLocke, on natural rights, \u003ca href=\"#Page_152\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon the \"natural light,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_166\"\u003e166\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehis \u003ci\u003eEssay\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_166\"\u003e166\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon danger of fixed rules, \u003ca href=\"#Page_329\"\u003e329\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nLove, between the sexes, \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epsychological analysis of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_578\"\u003e578 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas moral ideal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_100\"\u003e100\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_108\"\u003e108 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nLubbock, \u003ca href=\"#Page_428\"\u003e428\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMachine, in production, \u003ca href=\"#Page_507\"\u003e507 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMacLennan, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMagic, contrasted with religion, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_15_15\"\u003e30 n.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einfluence on morals, \u003ca href=\"#Page_457\"\u003e457 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Taboos\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMaine, status and contract, \u003ca href=\"#Page_20\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eSlav families, \u003ca href=\"#Page_60\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMallock, W. H., \u003ca href=\"#Page_533\"\u003e533\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMarriage, regulations for, in group morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_64\"\u003e64 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eviolation of, provokes moral reflection, \u003ca href=\"#Page_106\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein reflective morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_193\"\u003e193\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand contract, \u003ca href=\"#Page_453\"\u003e453\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eRoman, \u003ca href=\"#Page_574\"\u003e574 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003echurch views of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_576\"\u003e576 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Divorce, Family, Sex\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMarti, \u003ca href=\"#Page_98\"\u003e98\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMead, G. H., \u003ca href=\"#Page_164\"\u003e164\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMean, Aristotle\u0027s conception of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\"\u003e134 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMeasure, among Greeks, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\"\u003e112 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMen\u0027s clubs and houses, \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\"\u003e32 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMicah, \u003ca href=\"#Page_99\"\u003e99\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMill, John Stuart, on Bentham\u0027s method, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_119_119\"\u003e235 n.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon motive and intention, \u003ca href=\"#Page_248\"\u003e248\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon disposition, \u003ca href=\"#Page_254\"\u003e254\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon partial and complete intent, \u003ca href=\"#Page_256\"\u003e256\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon the desirable, \u003ca href=\"#Page_265\"\u003e265\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon the quality of pleasure, \u003ca href=\"#Page_279\"\u003e279-80\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon utilitarian standard, \u003ca href=\"#Page_286\"\u003e286\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon general happiness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_290\"\u003e290\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecriticism of Bentham, \u003ca href=\"#Page_293\"\u003e293\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon desire for social unity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_294\"\u003e294\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_295\"\u003e295\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_296\"\u003e296\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon personal affections, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_154_154\"\u003e299 n.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon general rules, \u003ca href=\"#Page_330\"\u003e330\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas democratic individualist, \u003ca href=\"#Page_525\"\u003e525\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon private property, \u003ca href=\"#Page_553\"\u003e553 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_556\"\u003e556\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon equality in the family, \u003ca href=\"#Page_601\"\u003e601\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMonasticism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_149\"\u003e149 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_185\"\u003e185 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_187\"\u003e187\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ewomen under, \u003ca href=\"#Page_576\"\u003e576 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMoral, derivation of term, \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003echaracteristics of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5-13\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_49\"\u003e49 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_89\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_201\"\u003e201-11\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econceptions, derivation of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_175\"\u003e175-7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edifferentiation of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_177\"\u003e177-92\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Morality\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMorality, customary or group, \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\"\u003e51 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefined, \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eHebrew, \u003ca href=\"#Page_91\"\u003e91 ff.\u003c/a\u003e (Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_91\"\u003eVI.\u003c/a\u003e);\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_614\" id=\"Page_614\"\u003e[Pg 614]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eGreek, \u003ca href=\"#Page_111\"\u003e111 ff.\u003c/a\u003e (Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_111\"\u003eVII.\u003c/a\u003e);\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eModern, \u003ca href=\"#Page_142\"\u003e142 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecustomary and reflective, compared, \u003ca href=\"#Page_171\"\u003e171 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esubjective and objective, \u003ca href=\"#Page_259\"\u003e259\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eKant\u0027s view of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_309\"\u003e309-10\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esocial nature of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_431\"\u003e431\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand legality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_433\"\u003e433\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_439\"\u003e439\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003echanges in, necessitated by present economic conditions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_496\"\u003e496 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_517\"\u003e517 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMores, or customs, Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\"\u003eIV.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefinition, \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eauthority and origin of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\"\u003e52-4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emeans of enforcing, \u003ca href=\"#Page_54\"\u003e54-7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_172\"\u003e172\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMoses, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMotives, \u003ca href=\"#Page_216\"\u003e216\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_228\"\u003e228\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_237\"\u003e237\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein customary morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_70\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epurity of, insisted on by Hebrews, \u003ca href=\"#Page_105\"\u003e105 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to effort and achievement, \u003ca href=\"#Page_243\"\u003e243-6\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to intention, \u003ca href=\"#Page_246\"\u003e246-54\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_257\"\u003e257-8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_261\"\u003e261\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehedonistic theory of, criticized, \u003ca href=\"#Page_273\"\u003e273\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_288\"\u003e288-92\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esympathy as, \u003ca href=\"#Page_298\"\u003e298-300\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eKantian view of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_346\"\u003e346-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eegoistic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_379\"\u003e379-80\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ealtruistic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_385\"\u003e385-6\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein business, \u003ca href=\"#Page_538\"\u003e538\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_541\"\u003e541 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNaturalism, ethical, \u003ca href=\"#Page_369\"\u003e369-75\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand individualism, in the economic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_525\"\u003e525\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_532\"\u003e532-4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Nature\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNature, opposed to convention among Greeks, \u003ca href=\"#Page_111\"\u003e111 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_124\"\u003e124-31\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_135\"\u003e135\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein modern development of rights, \u003ca href=\"#Page_152\"\u003e152 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eversus artificiality of society, \u003ca href=\"#Page_221\"\u003e221 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Naturalism\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNemesis, \u003ca href=\"#Page_132\"\u003e132\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_139\"\u003e139\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNewton, \u003ca href=\"#Page_165\"\u003e165\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNietzsche, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_122\"\u003e122\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_172_172\"\u003e370 n.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNineteenth Century, development of intelligence in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_163\"\u003e163\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nObligations, \u003ca href=\"#Page_186\"\u003e186\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand responsibility, \u003ca href=\"#Page_440\"\u003e440\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand rights, \u003ca href=\"#Page_441\"\u003e441\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Duty\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nOpportunity, equal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_526\"\u003e526 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_549\"\u003e549\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nOptimism and courage, \u003ca href=\"#Page_412\"\u003e412-3\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\"Oregon case,\" decision of U. S. Supreme Court in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_540\"\u003e540\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nOught, \u003ca href=\"#Page_176\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Duty\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nOwen, \u003ca href=\"#Page_161\"\u003e161\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPaley, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_167_167\"\u003e354 n.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nParsifal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_149\"\u003e149\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nParties, political, \u003ca href=\"#Page_478\"\u003e478\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPaul, his ethics, \u003ca href=\"#Page_100\"\u003e100\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_108\"\u003e108 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPeace, as moral ideal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPerfectionism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_231\"\u003e231\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPessimism, and courage, \u003ca href=\"#Page_413\"\u003e413\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPindar, \u003ca href=\"#Page_122\"\u003e122\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPlato, on the necessity of the moral sense, \u003ca href=\"#Page_2\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emoral influence of art, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eduty to strangers, \u003ca href=\"#Page_67\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon measure, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ereligious critic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_116\"\u003e116\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon the \"gentleman,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_117\"\u003e117\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epresents arguments of individualists, \u003ca href=\"#Page_120\"\u003e120 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon the State, \u003ca href=\"#Page_127\"\u003e127\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_129\"\u003e129 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon the good, \u003ca href=\"#Page_131\"\u003e131 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon pleasure, \u003ca href=\"#Page_132\"\u003e132 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon the ideal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_136\"\u003e136 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon the self, \u003ca href=\"#Page_140\"\u003e140\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon rule of wealthy, \u003ca href=\"#Page_491\"\u003e491\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon private property, \u003ca href=\"#Page_494\"\u003e494\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPleasure, good measured by, among early Hebrews, \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eGreek doctrines of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_125\"\u003e125 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_132\"\u003e132 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enot the object of desire, \u003ca href=\"#Page_269\"\u003e269-71\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003equality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_279\"\u003e279\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_282\"\u003e282\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_300\"\u003e300\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to happiness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_230\"\u003e230\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_281\"\u003e281-3\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand sympathy, \u003ca href=\"#Page_291\"\u003e291-2\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econtrol of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_407\"\u003e407-8\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPolice Power, \u003ca href=\"#Page_505\"\u003e505-7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_540\"\u003e540 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_555\"\u003e555 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPollock and Maitland, \u003ca href=\"#Page_460\"\u003e460\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_576\"\u003e576\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPost, \u003ca href=\"#Page_61\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPrinciples, \u003ca href=\"#Page_179\"\u003e179\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enature of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_333\"\u003e333-4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas motives, \u003ca href=\"#Page_350\"\u003e350-2\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nProblems of Moral Theory, Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_212\"\u003eXI.\u003c/a\u003e (\u003ca href=\"#Page_211\"\u003e211-23\u003c/a\u003e);\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eclassified, \u003ca href=\"#Page_201\"\u003e201\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_214\"\u003e214-5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_239\"\u003e239\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_263\"\u003e263\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_307\"\u003e307\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nProduction, moral cost of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_489\"\u003e489\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eefficiency of, in individualistic systems, \u003ca href=\"#Page_527\"\u003e527\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eregulation of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_528\"\u003e528 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nProperty, in primitive groups, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\"\u003e24-6\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etaboo as substitute for, \u003ca href=\"#Page_55\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas factor in growth of individualism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_79\"\u003e79 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_83\"\u003e83\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\"\u003e94\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_119\"\u003e119 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ePlato on, \u003ca href=\"#Page_130\"\u003e130\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe Church on, \u003ca href=\"#Page_146\"\u003e146 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand wealth, \u003ca href=\"#Page_487\"\u003e487 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand character, \u003ca href=\"#Page_490\"\u003e490\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esocial aspects of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_491\"\u003e491 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eprivate, and social welfare, \u003ca href=\"#Page_493\"\u003e493-5\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eimplies public service, \u003ca href=\"#Page_515\"\u003e515-7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evalue of private, \u003ca href=\"#Page_551\"\u003e551\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefects in present system, \u003ca href=\"#Page_551\"\u003e551 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nProphets, Hebrew, \u003ca href=\"#Page_99\"\u003e99 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nProtagoras, \u003ca href=\"#Page_2\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nProtestantism, conception of marriage, \u003ca href=\"#Page_577\"\u003e577\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_615\" id=\"Page_615\"\u003e[Pg 615]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPublic Agency, theory of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_525\"\u003e525\u003c/a\u003e, Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_536\"\u003eXXV.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eadvantages claimed by, \u003ca href=\"#Page_537\"\u003e537 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPublic ownership, \u003ca href=\"#Page_494\"\u003e494 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPublicity, necessity of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_511\"\u003e511 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_520\"\u003e520 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPunishment, as necessitating moral judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_96\"\u003e96 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eevil viewed as by Hebrews, \u003ca href=\"#Page_96\"\u003e96 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_101\"\u003e101\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand duty, \u003ca href=\"#Page_353\"\u003e353-5\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand justice, \u003ca href=\"#Page_417\"\u003e417\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand social welfare, \u003ca href=\"#Page_442\"\u003e442-3\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand intent, \u003ca href=\"#Page_461\"\u003e461\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ereform of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_470\"\u003e470\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPuritans, conception of God-given rights, \u003ca href=\"#Page_152\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof art, \u003ca href=\"#Page_155\"\u003e155\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eemphasized value of work, \u003ca href=\"#Page_156\"\u003e156\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nReason, as element in the moral, \u003ca href=\"#Page_10\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_12\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_40\"\u003e40-2\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas standard among Greeks, \u003ca href=\"#Page_91\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_131\"\u003e131 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eage of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_163\"\u003e163\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_166\"\u003e166\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_306\"\u003eXVI.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefined, \u003ca href=\"#Page_306\"\u003e306\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to desire, \u003ca href=\"#Page_308\"\u003e308\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e of Kant, \u003ca href=\"#Page_310\"\u003e310\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eis social, \u003ca href=\"#Page_315\"\u003e315\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evalue of principles, \u003ca href=\"#Page_333\"\u003e333\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand sympathy, \u003ca href=\"#Page_334\"\u003e334\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eopposition to desire, \u003ca href=\"#Page_338\"\u003e338\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_340\"\u003e340\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand virtue, \u003ca href=\"#Page_405\"\u003e405\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand conscientiousness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_418\"\u003e418-23\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nReligion, in early group life, \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\"\u003e30-2\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esocializing force, \u003ca href=\"#Page_81\"\u003e81 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emoral agency among Hebrews, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\"\u003e94-102\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eGreek, \u003ca href=\"#Page_115\"\u003e115 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_139\"\u003e139-41\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eideals of medi\u0026aelig;val, \u003ca href=\"#Page_145\"\u003e145-7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emodern development of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_148\"\u003e148-50\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand customary morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_180\"\u003e180\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein reflective morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_195\"\u003e195 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_432\"\u003e432\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_448\"\u003e448\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas sanction of the family, \u003ca href=\"#Page_582\"\u003e582\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Church.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nRenaissance, \u003ca href=\"#Page_163\"\u003e163 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nResponsibility, collective, in group life, \u003ca href=\"#Page_17\"\u003e17-20\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_63\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_70\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_102\"\u003e102\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edevelopment of personal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_104\"\u003e104 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_141\"\u003e141\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_153\"\u003e153\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_158\"\u003e158\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_182\"\u003e182 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emeaning of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_436\"\u003e436-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efor accidents, \u003ca href=\"#Page_458\"\u003e458-60\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efor carelessness and negligence, \u003ca href=\"#Page_463\"\u003e463-5\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas affected by modern economic conditions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_500\"\u003e500-3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_519\"\u003e519 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nReverence, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_15_15\"\u003e30 n.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_59\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_71\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_140\"\u003e140\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_407\"\u003e407\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nRevolution, American, \u003ca href=\"#Page_152\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eEnglish, \u003ca href=\"#Page_151\"\u003e151\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eFrench, \u003ca href=\"#Page_152\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eIndustrial, \u003ca href=\"#Page_159\"\u003e159\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_591\"\u003e591\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nRiehl, W., \u003ca href=\"#Page_595\"\u003e595\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nRight, as subject of ethics and moral judgments, \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1-3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\"\u003e37 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_201\"\u003e201-3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_215\"\u003e215\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_218\"\u003e218\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_224\"\u003e224\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_307\"\u003e307 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emeaning of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_177\"\u003e177\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_182\"\u003e182 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_224\"\u003e224 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas standard, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_89\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eamong Hebrews as righteousness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_102\"\u003e102-4\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eamong Greeks as justice, \u003ca href=\"#Page_113\"\u003e113 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_140\"\u003e140\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee also Jural, Justice, Law, Reason, Standard\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nRighteousness, typical theme in Hebrew morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_91\"\u003e91 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_99\"\u003e99\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_101\"\u003e101\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_102\"\u003e102 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_188\"\u003e188\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas justice, \u003ca href=\"#Page_414\"\u003e414\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Right, Justice\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nRights, development of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_83\"\u003e83 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_151\"\u003e151 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enatural, \u003ca href=\"#Page_152\"\u003e152 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emodern assertion of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_186\"\u003e186\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand freedom, \u003ca href=\"#Page_440\"\u003e440\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand obligations, \u003ca href=\"#Page_441\"\u003e441\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ephysical, \u003ca href=\"#Page_442\"\u003e442-4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emental, \u003ca href=\"#Page_445\"\u003e445-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecivil, \u003ca href=\"#Page_452\"\u003e452\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econtract, \u003ca href=\"#Page_452\"\u003e452\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof association, \u003ca href=\"#Page_453\"\u003e453\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eto use of courts, \u003ca href=\"#Page_454\"\u003e454\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edevelopment of civil, \u003ca href=\"#Page_456\"\u003e456-66\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epolitical, \u003ca href=\"#Page_473\"\u003e473-4\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nRitual, \u003ca href=\"#Page_55\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nRomanticists, on art and morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_155\"\u003e155\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nRome, government and law, contribution to modern morality of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_142\"\u003e142\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_152\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_218\"\u003e218\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_222\"\u003e222\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epatriarchal family, \u003ca href=\"#Page_572\"\u003e572\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_574\"\u003e574 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nRoss, E. A., \u003ca href=\"#Page_520\"\u003e520\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nRousseau, \u003ca href=\"#Page_152\"\u003e152 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_221\"\u003e221\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nRules, general, \u003ca href=\"#Page_325\"\u003e325-35\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand casuistry, \u003ca href=\"#Page_326\"\u003e326-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand legalism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_328\"\u003e328-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eutilitarian view of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_329\"\u003e329-32\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistinguished from principles, \u003ca href=\"#Page_333\"\u003e333-4\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSanctions, Bentham\u0027s theory of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_354\"\u003e354\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einternal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_359\"\u003e359\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSceptics, \u003ca href=\"#Page_135\"\u003e135\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_218\"\u003e218\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSchiller, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon Kant, \u003ca href=\"#Page_349\"\u003e349\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSchopenhauer, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSchurtz, \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nScience, as agency in effecting the transition from custom to conscience, \u003ca href=\"#Page_78\"\u003e78-80\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein Greek development, \u003ca href=\"#Page_114\"\u003e114-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein modern period, \u003ca href=\"#Page_155\"\u003e155\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_167\"\u003e167 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003einfluence on morals, \u003ca href=\"#Page_469\"\u003e469\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_473\"\u003e473-6\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas promoting justice, \u003ca href=\"#Page_557\"\u003e557-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand family problems, \u003ca href=\"#Page_593\"\u003e593 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_601\"\u003e601-3\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSeager, Henry R., programme of social legislation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_566\"\u003e566 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSecret societies, \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_616\" id=\"Page_616\"\u003e[Pg 616]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSeebohm, F., \u003ca href=\"#Page_29\"\u003e29\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_61\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSelf, higher and lower, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_347\"\u003e347 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esocial, how built up, \u003ca href=\"#Page_11\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_86\"\u003e86 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eindividual and tribal or clan, \u003ca href=\"#Page_23\"\u003e23 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eGreek conception of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_138\"\u003e138-41\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe twofold, \u003ca href=\"#Page_310\"\u003e310\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eArnold on, \u003ca href=\"#Page_338\"\u003e338\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eKant on, \u003ca href=\"#Page_347\"\u003e347\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas social, \u003ca href=\"#Page_294\"\u003e294\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_345\"\u003e345\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efictitious theory of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_221\"\u003e221\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_361\"\u003e361\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheories regarding its nature, see Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_364\"\u003eXVIII.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eself-denial, \u003ca href=\"#Page_364\"\u003e364-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eself-assertion, \u003ca href=\"#Page_368\"\u003e368-74\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eself-love and benevolence, \u003ca href=\"#Page_375\"\u003e375-91\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eself-realization, \u003ca href=\"#Page_391\"\u003e391-4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Individual, Self-sacrifice\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSelf-sacrifice, \u003ca href=\"#Page_366\"\u003e366-8\u003c/a\u003e; cf. \u003ca href=\"#Page_102\"\u003e102\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_298\"\u003e298-304\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_380\"\u003e380-2\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_388\"\u003e388-91\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_393\"\u003e393-5\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSeneca, \u003ca href=\"#Page_140\"\u003e140\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSense, moral, \u003ca href=\"#Page_317\"\u003e317-22\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSex, groups on the basis of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\"\u003e32 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas a socializing agency, \u003ca href=\"#Page_47\"\u003e47 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas prompting to self-assertion, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etaboos, \u003ca href=\"#Page_55\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_60\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_65\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein Hebrew conceptions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_98\"\u003e98\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein different standards for men and women, \u003ca href=\"#Page_142\"\u003e142 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003evices, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_189\"\u003e189\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epsychology of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_578\"\u003e578-81\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edifferences between the sexes, \u003ca href=\"#Page_584\"\u003e584-8\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nShakspere, \u003ca href=\"#Page_23\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_197\"\u003e197\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nShop, open \u003ci\u003evs.\u003c/i\u003e closed, \u003ca href=\"#Page_559\"\u003e559\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSimmons and Wigmore, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSidgwick, H., \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_137_137\"\u003e265 n.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_286\"\u003e286\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSin, \u003ca href=\"#Page_98\"\u003e98\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_103\"\u003e103 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSlav groups, \u003ca href=\"#Page_20\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\"\u003e24 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_60\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_83\"\u003e83\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSlavery, \u003ca href=\"#Page_84\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSmith, Adam, on the formation of conscience, \u003ca href=\"#Page_141\"\u003e141\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon sympathy, \u003ca href=\"#Page_160\"\u003e160\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eTheory of Moral Sentiments\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_166\"\u003e166\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas individualist, \u003ca href=\"#Page_525\"\u003e525\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_527\"\u003e527\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSmith, Arthur, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSmith, H. P., \u003ca href=\"#Page_106\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSmith, J. A., \u003ca href=\"#Page_555\"\u003e555\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSmith, Munroe, \u003ca href=\"#Page_555\"\u003e555 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSmith, W. Robertson, \u003ca href=\"#Page_29\"\u003e29 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSocial Ends, of utilitarianism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_287\"\u003e287\u003c/a\u003e (see Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_286\"\u003eXV.\u003c/a\u003e), \u003ca href=\"#Page_296\"\u003e296\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand happiness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_302\"\u003e302-3\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand rationality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_314\"\u003e314\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand duties, \u003ca href=\"#Page_338\"\u003e338\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_345\"\u003e345\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand altruism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_389\"\u003e389-90\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand individuality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_430\"\u003e430\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSocialism, doctrine of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_162\"\u003e162\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_523\"\u003e523\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_525\"\u003e525 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_535\"\u003e535\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon production, \u003ca href=\"#Page_537\"\u003e537 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein decision of U. S. Supreme Court, \u003ca href=\"#Page_556\"\u003e556\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Public Agency, Collectivism, Individualism\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSocializing Process and Agencies, \u003ca href=\"#Page_11\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_47\"\u003e47 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_57\"\u003e57 ff.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_186\"\u003e186\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_191\"\u003e191\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSocrates, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_116\"\u003e116\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_118\"\u003e118\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSophocles, \u003ca href=\"#Page_35\"\u003e35\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_118\"\u003e118\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_139\"\u003e139 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSpahr, C. B., \u003ca href=\"#Page_545\"\u003e545\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSpargo, John, \u003ca href=\"#Page_543\"\u003e543\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSpeech, freedom of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_446\"\u003e446\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSpencer (Baldwin), and Gillen (F. B.), \u003ca href=\"#Page_22\"\u003e22\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\"\u003e58 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSpencer, Herbert, on primitive morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_70\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon nature and morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon conduct as indifferent and as ethical, \u003ca href=\"#Page_205\"\u003e205-6\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon feeling as ultimate end, \u003ca href=\"#Page_225\"\u003e225\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon consequences, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_118_118\"\u003e234 n.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon happiness \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_137_137\"\u003e265 n.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon duty, \u003ca href=\"#Page_358\"\u003e358-60\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon \u0026aelig;sthetic ingredients of happiness, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_174_174\"\u003e374 n.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon reward and merit, \u003ca href=\"#Page_515\"\u003e515\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon voluntary limitation of competition, \u003ca href=\"#Page_532\"\u003e532\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSpinoza, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_125_125\"\u003e253 n.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_397\"\u003e397\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_190_190\"\u003e410 n.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nStandard, right as, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein group morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_34\"\u003e34\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecustom as, \u003ca href=\"#Page_38\"\u003e38\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\"\u003e51 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_61\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\"\u003e69 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elaw of deity as, \u003ca href=\"#Page_95\"\u003e95-7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_103\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emeasure as, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epopular, in Greece, \u003ca href=\"#Page_116\"\u003e116 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efelt necessity of in Greece, \u003ca href=\"#Page_118\"\u003e118\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_124\"\u003e124\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efor pleasure, \u003ca href=\"#Page_132\"\u003e132 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe \"mean\" as, \u003ca href=\"#Page_135\"\u003e135 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eimportance of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_138\"\u003e138\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eutilitarians confuse with object of desire, \u003ca href=\"#Page_266\"\u003e266-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ewhy necessary, \u003ca href=\"#Page_274\"\u003e274\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehappiness as, \u003ca href=\"#Page_275\"\u003e275-80\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003egeneral happiness as, Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_286\"\u003eXV.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe rational, \u003ca href=\"#Page_307\"\u003e307\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erevision of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_422\"\u003e422\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof political action, \u003ca href=\"#Page_482\"\u003e482-5\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nStandard of living, \u003ca href=\"#Page_503\"\u003e503\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_228_228\"\u003e504 n.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_522\"\u003e522\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_540\"\u003e540-2\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eProfessor Seager\u0027s programme for, \u003ca href=\"#Page_566\"\u003e566-70\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nState, the, early group as germ of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_26\"\u003e26-30\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_61\"\u003e61 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas bearer of moral ideals in Israel, \u003ca href=\"#Page_92\"\u003e92 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_100\"\u003e100\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_108\"\u003e108 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein Greece, \u003ca href=\"#Page_127\"\u003e127\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eauthority challenged, \u003ca href=\"#Page_118\"\u003e118-24\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ePlato and Aristotle on, \u003ca href=\"#Page_127\"\u003e127-30\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand Church, \u003ca href=\"#Page_146\"\u003e146 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_150\"\u003e150\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emoral effect of organization of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_194\"\u003e194 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emoral value of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_434\"\u003e434-6\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefined, \u003ca href=\"#Page_451\"\u003e451\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_451\"\u003eXXI.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_617\" id=\"Page_617\"\u003e[Pg 617]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nStephen, on love of happiness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_273\"\u003e273\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon egoism, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_177_177\"\u003e378 n.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ealso \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_137_137\"\u003e265 n.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nStevenson, Mrs. M. C., \u003ca href=\"#Page_66\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nStoics, the \"wise man\" of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_135\"\u003e135\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon following nature, \u003ca href=\"#Page_136\"\u003e136\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon inner self, \u003ca href=\"#Page_140\"\u003e140\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enatural law, \u003ca href=\"#Page_136\"\u003e136\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_142\"\u003e142\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_152\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_222\"\u003e222\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon conflict between the moral and the actual order, \u003ca href=\"#Page_185\"\u003e185\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecosmopolitanism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_187\"\u003e187\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon control of passions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_217\"\u003e217\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSumner, on \"mores,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon luck, \u003ca href=\"#Page_53\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon taboo, \u003ca href=\"#Page_55\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon Ethos, \u003ca href=\"#Page_175\"\u003e175\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003egladiatorial shows, \u003ca href=\"#Page_189\"\u003e189\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eon relation between goodness and happiness, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_183_183\"\u003e396 n.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSutherland, \u003ca href=\"#Page_48\"\u003e48\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSympathetic Resentment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_44\"\u003e44\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_49\"\u003e49\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_70\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Sympathy\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSympathy, as factor in socialization, \u003ca href=\"#Page_11\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_35\"\u003e35\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_44\"\u003e44\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efostered by art, \u003ca href=\"#Page_45\"\u003e45 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand family life, \u003ca href=\"#Page_47\"\u003e47 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand hospitality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ewhen moral, \u003ca href=\"#Page_49\"\u003e49\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_70\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein the moral judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_83_83\"\u003e141 n.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emodern development of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_160\"\u003e160 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eBentham\u0027s view of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_291\"\u003e291-2\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eMill\u0027s view of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_293\"\u003e293-4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eimportance of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_298\"\u003e298-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eprinciple of knowledge, \u003ca href=\"#Page_334\"\u003e334\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand duty, \u003ca href=\"#Page_348\"\u003e348-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand efficiency, \u003ca href=\"#Page_370\"\u003e370-3\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand thoughtfulness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_465\"\u003e465\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Sympathetic Resentment\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTaboos, \u003ca href=\"#Page_55\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_60\"\u003e60 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eHebrew, \u003ca href=\"#Page_96\"\u003e96\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esurvival of, in modern life, \u003ca href=\"#Page_174\"\u003e174\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTariff, protective, \u003ca href=\"#Page_560\"\u003e560\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTaxation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_555\"\u003e555\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTeleological, types of moral theory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_224\"\u003e224\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Good, Value\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTemperance, \u003ca href=\"#Page_405\"\u003e405-10\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eGreek view of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_117\"\u003e117\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_406\"\u003e406\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eRoman, \u003ca href=\"#Page_407\"\u003e407\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eChristian, \u003ca href=\"#Page_408\"\u003e408\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTheodorus, \u003ca href=\"#Page_126\"\u003e126\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTheory, relation to practice, \u003ca href=\"#Page_4\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_212\"\u003e212\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_606\"\u003e606\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etypes of, classified and discussed, \u003ca href=\"#Page_224\"\u003e224-39\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee also Problems\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nThomas, W., \u003ca href=\"#Page_584\"\u003e584\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nThoreau, \u003ca href=\"#Page_489\"\u003e489\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTotem groups, \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTorts, \u003ca href=\"#Page_455\"\u003e455\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nToynbee, A., \u003ca href=\"#Page_492\"\u003e492\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTrades Unions, see Labor Union\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nUnearned Increment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_510\"\u003e510 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_564\"\u003e564 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nUnited States, individualism in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_554\"\u003e554\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eSupreme Court decisions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_555\"\u003e555 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nUtilitarianism, relation of, to modern civilization, \u003ca href=\"#Page_169\"\u003e169\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheory of intention, \u003ca href=\"#Page_246\"\u003e246-52\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheory of the good, Chapters \u003ca href=\"#Page_263\"\u003eXIV.\u003c/a\u003e and \u003ca href=\"#Page_286\"\u003eXV.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emethod of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_275\"\u003e275\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eintroduction of the idea of quality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_279\"\u003e279\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eits social standard, Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_286\"\u003eXV.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheory of general rules, \u003ca href=\"#Page_329\"\u003e329-31\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheory of duty, \u003ca href=\"#Page_353\"\u003e353-61\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee also Bentham, Mill\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nValuation, changed basis of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_508\"\u003e508-11\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Value\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nValue, as \"higher and lower,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_6\"\u003e6\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_197\"\u003e197\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ethe good as, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_12\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emeasure of, among Hebrews, \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\"\u003e107 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003equestion and standard of, among the Greeks, \u003ca href=\"#Page_116\"\u003e116\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_119\"\u003e119\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_125\"\u003e125 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein modern civilization, \u003ca href=\"#Page_153\"\u003e153-7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_169\"\u003e169\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_194\"\u003e194\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etransformation of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_186\"\u003e186 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_558\"\u003e558\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emoral, and incompatible ends, \u003ca href=\"#Page_207\"\u003e207-9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand teleological theories, \u003ca href=\"#Page_224\"\u003e224\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof Good Will, \u003ca href=\"#Page_241\"\u003e241\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nVeblen, T. B., \u003ca href=\"#Page_488\"\u003e488\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_515\"\u003e515\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_592\"\u003e592\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nVices, of reflective stage of morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_189\"\u003e189 ff.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nVirtue, \u003ca href=\"#Page_230\"\u003e230\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_397\"\u003e397\u003c/a\u003e, Chapter \u003ca href=\"#Page_399\"\u003eXIX.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eorigin of term, \u003ca href=\"#Page_156\"\u003e156\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_176\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003egeneral meaning, \u003ca href=\"#Page_230\"\u003e230\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_397\"\u003e397\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein Greek popular usage, \u003ca href=\"#Page_117\"\u003e117 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas \"mean,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas wisdom, \u003ca href=\"#Page_135\"\u003e135\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ehighmindedness as, \u003ca href=\"#Page_135\"\u003e135\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003emeaning in group morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_176\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\"old-fashioned,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_188\"\u003e188\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefined, \u003ca href=\"#Page_399\"\u003e399-402\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eclassified, \u003ca href=\"#Page_402\"\u003e402-3\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003easpects of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_403\"\u003e403-4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecardinal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_405\"\u003e405\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nVoltaire, \u003ca href=\"#Page_166\"\u003e166\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_195\"\u003e195\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nVoluntary Action, its nature, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\"\u003e9 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_201\"\u003e201 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eessential to morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_12\"\u003e12 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_39\"\u003e39\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_49\"\u003e49 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_89\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eagencies tending to evoke, \u003ca href=\"#Page_57\"\u003e57\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\"\u003e75 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecovenant as implying, \u003ca href=\"#Page_95\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efundamental, in Hebrew morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_91\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_105\"\u003e105 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to moral theories, \u003ca href=\"#Page_227\"\u003e227\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\u0027pagenum\u0027\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_618\" id=\"Page_618\"\u003e[Pg 618]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edivided into \"inner\" and \"outer,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_227\"\u003e227-30\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_237\"\u003e237-9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_261\"\u003e261\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_432\"\u003e432\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eplace of motive and endeavor, \u003ca href=\"#Page_243\"\u003e243-6\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eplace of disposition, \u003ca href=\"#Page_254\"\u003e254-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand accident, \u003ca href=\"#Page_459\"\u003e459-60\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Conduct\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nWar, as agency in development, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_44\"\u003e44\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_66\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_84\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand right to life, \u003ca href=\"#Page_442\"\u003e442 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand organized humanity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_482\"\u003e482\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nWealth, in Israel, \u003ca href=\"#Page_93\"\u003e93 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein Greece, \u003ca href=\"#Page_119\"\u003e119 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand property, \u003ca href=\"#Page_487\"\u003e487 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esubordinate to personality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_514\"\u003e514\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eshould depend on activity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_514\"\u003e514 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eimplies public service, \u003ca href=\"#Page_515\"\u003e515-7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edistribution of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_521\"\u003e521 f.\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_545\"\u003e545 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Property\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nWelsh, kin group, \u003ca href=\"#Page_29\"\u003e29\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_61\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nWergild, \u003ca href=\"#Page_30\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nWestermarck, \u003ca href=\"#Page_67\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_70\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_459\"\u003e459\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\"What,\" the, meaning of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5-8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein group morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_71\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein Hebrew morality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_102\"\u003e102 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein Greek theory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_125\"\u003e125 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003erelation to the \"how\" as outer to inner, \u003ca href=\"#Page_228\"\u003e228-39\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Attitude, Consequences, \"How\"\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nWilamowitz-M\u0026ouml;llendorf, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nWindelband, \u003ca href=\"#Page_126\"\u003e126\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nWisdom, as chief excellence or virtue with Plato, \u003ca href=\"#Page_118\"\u003e118\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eAristotle, \u003ca href=\"#Page_135\"\u003e135\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eSceptics, Epicureans, and Stoics, \u003ca href=\"#Page_135\"\u003e135\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas standard for pleasure, \u003ca href=\"#Page_133\"\u003e133\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003enurse of all the virtues, \u003ca href=\"#Page_405\"\u003e405\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas conscientiousness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_418\"\u003e418-23\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nWoman, as \"leisure class,\" \u003ca href=\"#Page_157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_188\"\u003e188\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas laborer, protection for, \u003ca href=\"#Page_489\"\u003e489\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_540\"\u003e540\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand the family, \u003ca href=\"#Page_572\"\u003e572 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esubordination of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_574\"\u003e574 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eher temperamental and occupational distinction from man, \u003ca href=\"#Page_584\"\u003e584 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eeffect of industrial revolution upon, \u003ca href=\"#Page_591\"\u003e591 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand occupations, \u003ca href=\"#Page_594\"\u003e594 ff.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edetermines consumption, \u003ca href=\"#Page_598\"\u003e598 f.\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003euse of higher training for, \u003ca href=\"#Page_599\"\u003e599\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_602\"\u003e602\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esee Family, Marriage, Sex\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nWork, see Industry, Labor\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nWorth, see Value\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nWyclif, \u003ca href=\"#Page_150\"\u003e150\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nXenophon, \u003ca href=\"#Page_115\"\u003e115 f.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nZu\u0026ntilde;i ceremonies, \u003ca href=\"#Page_66\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 100%;\" /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003eAmerican Science Series\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"iquot\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"caption\"\u003ePhysics.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA. L. Kimball\u003c/span\u003e, Professor in Amherst College.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"caption\"\u003ePhysics.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGeorge F. Barker\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"caption\"\u003eChemistry.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eIra Remsen\u003c/span\u003e, President of the Johns Hopkins University.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"caption\"\u003eAstronomy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSimon Newcomb\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEdward S. Holden\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"caption\"\u003eGeology.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThomas C. Chamberlin\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRollin D. Salisbury\u003c/span\u003e, Professors\r\nin the University of Chicago.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"caption\"\u003ePhysiography.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRollin D. Salisbury\u003c/span\u003e, Professor in the University of Chicago.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"caption\"\u003eGeneral Biology.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWilliam T. Sedgwick\u003c/span\u003e, Professor in the Mass. Institute,\r\nand \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEdmund B. Wilson\u003c/span\u003e, Professor in Columbia University.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"caption\"\u003eBotany.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCharles E. Bessey\u003c/span\u003e, Professor in the University of Nebraska.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"caption\"\u003eZoology.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA. S. Packard\u003c/span\u003e, Professor in Brown University.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"caption\"\u003eThe Human Body.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eH. Newell Martin\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"caption\"\u003ePsychology.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWilliam James\u003c/span\u003e, Professor in Harvard University.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"caption\"\u003eEthics.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJohn Dewey\u003c/span\u003e, Professor in Columbia University, and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJames H. Tufts\u003c/span\u003e, Professor in the University of Chicago.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"caption\"\u003ePolitical Economy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFrancis A. Walker\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"caption\"\u003eFinance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHenry C. Adams\u003c/span\u003e, Professor in the University of Michigan.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\u0027center\u0027\u003e\r\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" summary=\"\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\u0027left\u0027\u003e\r\nFor full descriptions of the Advanced, Briefer, and Elementary Courses\u003cbr /\u003e\r\npublished under each topic, see the publishers\u0027 Educational Catalog.\r\n\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"ft20\"\u003eHENRY HOLT \u0026amp; CO.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n34 West 33d Street, N. Y.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n378 Wabash Ave., Chicago\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"notebox\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTRANSCRIBER\u0027S NOTE:\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. Footnotes have been renumbered and moved from the middle of a\r\nparagraph to the end of chapters.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. Obvious errors in spelling and punctuation have been corrected\r\nwithout comment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. Other than that, every effort has been made to duplicate\r\nthe original as closely as possible.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"full\" /\u003e\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}