On Liberty
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L. Courtney, LL.D.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tbrk\"\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eThe Walter Scott Publishing Co., Ltd.\u003cbr\u003e\r\nLondon and Felling-on-Tyne\u003cbr\u003eNew York and Melbourne\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_v\"\u003e[Pg v]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eTo the beloved and deplored memory of her who was the inspirer, and in\r\npart the author, of all that is best in my writings—the friend and wife\r\nwhose exalted sense of truth and right was my strongest incitement, and\r\nwhose approbation was my chief reward—I dedicate this volume. Like all\r\nthat I have written for many years, it belongs as much to her as to me;\r\nbut the work as it stands has had, in a very insufficient degree, the\r\ninestimable advantage of her revision; some of the most important\r\nportions having been reserved for a more careful re-examination, which\r\nthey are now never destined to receive. Were I but capable of\r\ninterpreting to the world one-half the great thoughts and noble feelings\r\nwhich are buried in her grave, I should be the medium of a greater\r\nbenefit to it than is ever likely to arise from anything that I can\r\nwrite, unprompted and unassisted by her all but unrivalled wisdom.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_vii\"\u003e[Pg vii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003cspan\u003eINTRODUCTION.\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smaller\"\u003eI.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eJohn Stuart Mill was born on 20th May 1806. He was a delicate child, and\r\nthe extraordinary education designed by his father was not calculated to\r\ndevelop and improve his physical powers. \"I never was a boy,\" he says;\r\n\"never played cricket.\" His exercise was taken in the form of walks with\r\nhis father, during which the elder Mill lectured his son and examined\r\nhim on his work. It is idle to speculate on the possible results of a\r\ndifferent treatment. Mill remained delicate throughout his life, but was\r\nendowed with that intense mental energy which is so often combined with\r\nphysical weakness. His youth was sacrificed to an idea; he was designed\r\nby his father to carry on his work; the individuality of the boy was\r\nunimportant. A visit to the south of France at the age of fourteen, in\r\ncompany with the family of General Sir Samuel Bentham, was\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_viii\"\u003e[Pg viii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e not without\r\nits influence. It was a glimpse of another atmosphere, though the\r\nstudious habits of his home life were maintained. Moreover, he derived\r\nfrom it his interest in foreign politics, which remained one of his\r\ncharacteristics to the end of his life. In 1823 he was appointed junior\r\nclerk in the Examiners\u0027 Office at the India House.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMill\u0027s first essays were written in the \u003ci\u003eTraveller\u003c/i\u003e about a year before\r\nhe entered the India House. From that time forward his literary work was\r\nuninterrupted save by attacks of illness. His industry was stupendous.\r\nHe wrote articles on an infinite variety of subjects, political,\r\nmetaphysical, philosophic, religious, poetical. He discovered Tennyson\r\nfor his generation, he influenced the writing of Carlyle\u0027s \u003ci\u003eFrench\r\nRevolution\u003c/i\u003e as well as its success. And all the while he was engaged in\r\nstudying and preparing for his more ambitious works, while he rose step\r\nby step at the India Office. His \u003ci\u003eEssays on Unsettled Questions in\r\nPolitical Economy\u003c/i\u003e were written in 1831, although they did not appear\r\nuntil thirteen years later. His \u003ci\u003eSystem of Logic\u003c/i\u003e, the design of which\r\nwas even then fashioning itself in his brain, took thirteen years to\r\ncomplete, and was actually published\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_ix\"\u003e[Pg ix]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e before the \u003ci\u003ePolitical Economy\u003c/i\u003e. In\r\n1844 appeared the article on Michelet, which its author anticipated\r\nwould cause some discussion, but which did not create the sensation he\r\nexpected. Next year there were the \"Claims of Labour\" and \"Guizot,\" and\r\nin 1847 his articles on Irish affairs in the \u003ci\u003eMorning Chronicle\u003c/i\u003e. These\r\nyears were very much influenced by his friendship and correspondence\r\nwith Comte, a curious comradeship between men of such different\r\ntemperament. In 1848 Mill published his \u003ci\u003ePolitical Economy\u003c/i\u003e, to which he\r\nhad given his serious study since the completion of his \u003ci\u003eLogic\u003c/i\u003e. His\r\narticles and reviews, though they involved a good deal of work—as, for\r\ninstance, the re-perusal of the \u003ci\u003eIliad\u003c/i\u003e and the \u003ci\u003eOdyssey\u003c/i\u003e in the\r\noriginal before reviewing Grote\u0027s \u003ci\u003eGreece\u003c/i\u003e—were recreation to the\r\nstudent. The year 1856 saw him head of the Examiners\u0027 Office in the\r\nIndia House, and another two years brought the end of his official work,\r\nowing to the transfer of India to the Crown. In the same year his wife\r\ndied. \u003ci\u003eLiberty\u003c/i\u003e was published shortly after, as well as the \u003ci\u003eThoughts on\r\nParliamentary Reform\u003c/i\u003e, and no year passed without Mill making important\r\ncontributions on the political, philosophical, and ethical questions of\r\nthe day.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_x\"\u003e[Pg x]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSeven years after the death of his wife, Mill was invited to contest\r\nWestminster. His feeling on the conduct of elections made him refuse to\r\ntake any personal action in the matter, and he gave the frankest\r\nexpression to his political views, but nevertheless he was elected by a\r\nlarge majority. He was not a conventional success in the House; as a\r\nspeaker he lacked magnetism. But his influence was widely felt. \"For the\r\nsake of the House of Commons at large,\" said Mr. Gladstone, \"I rejoiced\r\nin his advent and deplored his disappearance. He did us all good.\" After\r\nonly three years in Parliament, he was defeated at the next General\r\nElection by Mr. W. H. Smith. He retired to Avignon, to the pleasant\r\nlittle house where the happiest years of his life had been spent in the\r\ncompanionship of his wife, and continued his disinterested labours. He\r\ncompleted his edition of his father\u0027s \u003ci\u003eAnalysis of the Mind\u003c/i\u003e, and also\r\nproduced, in addition to less important work, \u003ci\u003eThe Subjection of Women\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nin which he had the active co-operation of his step-daughter. A book on\r\nSocialism was under consideration, but, like an earlier study of\r\nSociology, it never was written. He died in 1873, his last years being\r\nspent peacefully in the pleasant society of his\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_xi\"\u003e[Pg xi]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e step-daughter, from\r\nwhose tender care and earnest intellectual sympathy he caught maybe a\r\nfar-off reflection of the light which had irradiated his spiritual life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smaller\"\u003eII.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe circumstances under which John Stuart Mill wrote his \u003ci\u003eLiberty\u003c/i\u003e are\r\nlargely connected with the influence which Mrs. Taylor wielded over his\r\ncareer. The dedication is well known. It contains the most extraordinary\r\npanegyric on a woman that any philosopher has ever penned. \"Were I but\r\ncapable of interpreting to the world one-half the great thoughts and\r\nnoble feelings which are buried in her grave, I should be the medium of\r\na greater benefit to it than is ever likely to arise from anything that\r\nI can write, unprompted and unassisted by her all but unrivalled\r\nwisdom.\" It is easy for the ordinary worldly cynicism to curl a\r\nsceptical lip over sentences like these. There may be exaggeration of\r\nsentiment, the necessary and inevitable reaction of a man who was\r\ntrained according to the \"dry light\" of so unimpressionable a man as\r\nJames Mill, the father; but the passage quoted is not the only one in\r\nwhich John Stuart Mill proclaims his unhesitating\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_xii\"\u003e[Pg xii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e belief in the\r\nintellectual influence of his wife. The treatise on \u003ci\u003eLiberty\u003c/i\u003e was\r\nwritten especially under her authority and encouragement, but there are\r\nmany earlier references to the power which she exercised over his mind.\r\nMill was introduced to her as early as 1831, at a dinner-party at Mr.\r\nTaylor\u0027s house, where were present, amongst others, Roebuck, W. J. Fox,\r\nand Miss Harriet Martineau. The acquaintance rapidly ripened into\r\nintimacy and the intimacy into friendship, and Mill was never weary of\r\nexpatiating on all the advantages of so singular a relationship. In some\r\nof the presentation copies of his work on \u003ci\u003ePolitical Economy\u003c/i\u003e, he wrote\r\nthe following dedication:—\"To Mrs. John Taylor, who, of all persons\r\nknown to the author, is the most highly qualified either to originate or\r\nto appreciate speculation on social advancement, this work is with the\r\nhighest respect and esteem dedicated.\" An article on the enfranchisement\r\nof women was made the occasion for another encomium. We shall hardly be\r\nwrong in attributing a much later book, \u003ci\u003eThe Subjection of Women\u003c/i\u003e,\r\npublished in 1869, to the influence wielded by Mrs. Taylor. Finally, the\r\npages of the \u003ci\u003eAutobiography\u003c/i\u003e ring with the dithyrambic praise of his\r\n\"almost infallible counsellor.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_xiii\"\u003e[Pg xiii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe facts of this remarkable intimacy can easily be stated. The\r\ndeductions are more difficult. There is no question that Mill\u0027s\r\ninfatuation was the cause of considerable trouble to his acquaintances\r\nand friends. His father openly taxed him with being in love with another\r\nman\u0027s wife. Roebuck, Mrs. Grote, Mrs. Austin, Miss Harriet Martineau\r\nwere amongst those who suffered because they made some allusion to a\r\nforbidden subject. Mrs. Taylor lived with her daughter in a lodging in\r\nthe country; but in 1851 her husband died, and then Mill made her his\r\nwife. Opinions were widely divergent as to her merits; but every one\r\nagreed that up to the time of her death, in 1858, Mill was wholly lost\r\nto his friends. George Mill, one of Mill\u0027s younger brothers, gave it as\r\nhis opinion that she was a clever and remarkable woman, but \"nothing\r\nlike what John took her to be.\" Carlyle, in his reminiscences, described\r\nher with ambiguous epithets. She was \"vivid,\" \"iridescent,\" \"pale and\r\npassionate and sad-looking, a living-romance heroine of the royalist\r\nvolition and questionable destiny.\" It is not possible to make much of a\r\njudgment like this, but we get on more certain ground when we discover\r\nthat Mrs. Carlyle said on one occasion\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_xiv\"\u003e[Pg xiv]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e that \"she is thought to be\r\ndangerous,\" and that Carlyle added that she was worse than dangerous,\r\nshe was patronising. The occasion when Mill and his wife were brought\r\ninto close contact with the Carlyles is well known. The manuscript of\r\nthe first volume of the \u003ci\u003eFrench Revolution\u003c/i\u003e had been lent to Mill, and\r\nwas accidentally burnt by Mrs. Mill\u0027s servant. Mill and his wife drove\r\nup to Carlyle\u0027s door, the wife speechless, the husband so full of\r\nconversation that he detained Carlyle with desperate attempts at\r\nloquacity for two hours. But Dr. Garnett tells us, in his \u003ci\u003eLife of\r\nCarlyle\u003c/i\u003e, that Mill made a substantial reparation for the calamity for\r\nwhich he was responsible by inducing the aggrieved author to accept half\r\nof the £200 which he offered. Mrs. Mill, as I have said, died in 1858,\r\nafter seven years of happy companionship with her husband, and was\r\nburied at Avignon. The inscription which Mill wrote for her grave is too\r\ncharacteristic to be omitted:—\"Her great and loving heart, her noble\r\nsoul, her clear, powerful, original, and comprehensive intellect, made\r\nher the guide and support, the instructor in wisdom and the example in\r\ngoodness, as she was the sole earthly delight of those who had the\r\nhappiness to belong to her. As earnest for\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_xv\"\u003e[Pg xv]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e all public good as she was\r\ngenerous and devoted to all who surrounded her, her influence has been\r\nfelt in many of the greatest improvements of the age, and will be in\r\nthose still to come. Were there even a few hearts and intellects like\r\nhers, this earth would already become the hoped-for Heaven.\" These lines\r\nprove the intensity of Mill\u0027s feeling, which is not afraid of abundant\r\nverbiage; but they also prove that he could not imagine what the effect\r\nwould be on others, and, as Grote said, only Mill\u0027s reputation could\r\nsurvive these and similar displays.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eEvery one will judge for himself of this romantic episode in Mill\u0027s\r\ncareer, according to such experience as he may possess of the\r\nphilosophic mind and of the value of these curious but not infrequent\r\nrelationships. It may have been a piece of infatuation, or, if we prefer\r\nto say so, it may have been the most gracious and the most human page in\r\nMill\u0027s career. Mrs. Mill may have flattered her husband\u0027s vanity by\r\nechoing his opinions, or she may have indeed been an Egeria, full of\r\ninspiration and intellectual helpfulness. What usually happens in these\r\ncases,—although the philosopher himself, through his belief in the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_xvi\"\u003e[Pg xvi]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nequality of the sexes, was debarred from thinking so,—is the extremely\r\nvaluable action and reaction of two different classes and orders of\r\nmind. To any one whose thoughts have been occupied with the sphere of\r\nabstract speculation, the lively and vivid presentment of concrete fact\r\ncomes as a delightful and agreeable shock. The instinct of the woman\r\noften enables her not only to apprehend but to illustrate a truth for\r\nwhich she would be totally unable to give the adequate philosophic\r\nreasoning. On the other hand, the man, with the more careful logical\r\nmethods and the slow processes of formal reasoning, is apt to suppose\r\nthat the happy intuition which leaps to the conclusion is really based\r\non the intellectual processes of which he is conscious in his own case.\r\nThus both parties to the happy contract are equally pleased. The\r\nabstract truth gets the concrete illustration; the concrete illustration\r\nfinds its proper foundation in a series of abstract inquiries. Perhaps\r\nCarlyle\u0027s epithets of \"iridescent\" and \"vivid\" refer incidentally to\r\nMrs. Mill\u0027s quick perceptiveness, and thus throw a useful light on the\r\nmutual advantages of the common work of husband and wife. But it savours\r\nalmost of impertinence even to attempt to lift the veil on\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_xvii\"\u003e[Pg xvii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e a mystery\r\nlike this. It is enough to say, perhaps, that however much we may\r\ndeplore the exaggeration of Mill\u0027s references to his wife, we recognise\r\nthat, for whatever reason, the pair lived an ideally happy life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt still, however, remains to estimate the extent to which Mrs. Taylor,\r\nboth before and after her marriage with Mill, made actual contributions\r\nto his thoughts and his public work. Here I may be perhaps permitted to\r\navail myself of what I have already written in a previous work.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_1_1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_1_1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e Mill\r\ngives us abundant help in this matter in the \u003ci\u003eAutobiography\u003c/i\u003e. When first\r\nhe knew her, his thoughts were turning to the subject of Logic. But his\r\npublished work on the subject owed nothing to her, he tells us, in its\r\ndoctrines. It was Mill\u0027s custom to write the whole of a book so as to\r\nget his general scheme complete, and then laboriously to re-write it in\r\norder to perfect the phrases and the composition. Doubtless Mrs. Taylor\r\nwas of considerable help to him as a critic of style. But to be a critic\r\nof doctrine she was hardly qualified. Mill has made some clear\r\nadmissions on this point. \"The only actual revolution which has ever\r\ntaken place in my modes of thinking was\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_xviii\"\u003e[Pg xviii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e already complete,\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_2_2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_2_2\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e he says,\r\nbefore her influence became paramount. There is a curiously humble\r\nestimate of his own powers (to which Dr. Bain has called attention),\r\nwhich reads at first sight as if it contradicted this. \"During the\r\ngreater part of my literary life I have performed the office in relation\r\nto her, which, from a rather early period, I had considered as the most\r\nuseful part that I was qualified to take in the domain of thought, that\r\nof an interpreter of original thinkers, and mediator between them and\r\nthe public.\" So far it would seem that Mill had sat at the feet of his\r\noracle; but observe the highly remarkable exception which is made in the\r\nfollowing sentence:—\"For I had always a humble opinion of my own powers\r\nas an original thinker, \u003ci\u003eexcept in abstract science (logic, metaphysics,\r\nand the theoretic principles of political economy and politics.)\u003c/i\u003e\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_3_3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_3_3\"\u003e[3]\u003c/a\u003e If\r\nMill then was an original thinker in logic, metaphysics, and the science\r\nof economy and politics, it is clear that he had not learnt these from\r\nher lips. And to most men logic and metaphysics may be safely taken as\r\nforming a domain in which originality of thought, if it can be honestly\r\nprofessed, is a sufficient title of distinction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_xix\"\u003e[Pg xix]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eMrs. Taylor\u0027s assistance in the \u003ci\u003ePolitical Economy\u003c/i\u003e is confined to\r\ncertain definite points. The purely scientific part was, we are assured,\r\nnot learnt from her. \"But it was chiefly her influence which gave to the\r\nbook that general tone by which it is distinguished from all previous\r\nexpositions of political economy that had any pretensions to be\r\nscientific, and which has made it so useful in conciliating minds which\r\nthose previous expositions had repelled. This tone consisted chiefly in\r\nmaking the proper distinction between the laws of the production of\r\nwealth, which are real laws of Nature, dependent on the properties of\r\nobjects, and the modes of its distribution, which, subject to certain\r\nconditions, depend on human will…. \u003ci\u003eI had indeed partially learnt this\r\nview of things from the thoughts awakened in me by the speculations of\r\nSt. Simonians\u003c/i\u003e; but it was made a living principle, pervading and\r\nanimating the book, by my wife\u0027s promptings.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_4_4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_4_4\"\u003e[4]\u003c/a\u003e The part which is\r\nitalicised is noticeable. Here, as elsewhere, Mill thinks out the matter\r\nby himself; the concrete form of the thoughts is suggested or prompted\r\nby the wife. Apart from this \"general tone,\" Mill tells us that there\r\nwas a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_xx\"\u003e[Pg xx]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e specific contribution. \"The chapter which has had a greater\r\ninfluence on opinion than all the rest, that on the Probable Future of\r\nthe Labouring Classes, is entirely due to her. In the first draft of the\r\nbook that chapter did not exist. She pointed out the need of such a\r\nchapter, and the extreme imperfection of the book without it; she was\r\nthe cause of my writing it.\" From this it would appear that she gave\r\nMill that tendency to Socialism which, while it lends a progressive\r\nspirit to his speculations on politics, at the same time does not\r\nmanifestly accord with his earlier advocacy of peasant proprietorships.\r\nNor, again, is it, on the face of it, consistent with those doctrines of\r\nindividual liberty which, aided by the intellectual companionship of his\r\nwife, he propounded in a later work. The ideal of individual freedom is\r\nnot the ideal of Socialism, just as that invocation of governmental aid\r\nto which the Socialist resorts is not consistent with the theory of\r\n\u003ci\u003elaisser-faire\u003c/i\u003e. Yet \u003ci\u003eLiberty\u003c/i\u003e was planned by Mill and his wife in\r\nconcert. Perhaps a slight visionariness of speculation was no less the\r\nattribute of Mrs. Mill than an absence of rigid logical principles. Be\r\nthis as it may, she undoubtedly checked the half-recognised leanings\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_xxi\"\u003e[Pg xxi]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of\r\nher husband in the direction of Coleridge and Carlyle. Whether this was\r\nan instance of her steadying influence,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_5_5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_5_5\"\u003e[5]\u003c/a\u003e or whether it added one more\r\nunassimilated element to Mill\u0027s diverse intellectual sustenance, may be\r\nwisely left an open question. We cannot, however, be wrong in\r\nattributing to her the parentage of one book of Mill, \u003ci\u003eThe Subjection of\r\nWomen\u003c/i\u003e. It is true that Mill had before learnt that men and women ought\r\nto be equal in legal, political, social, and domestic relations. This\r\nwas a point on which he had already fallen foul of his father\u0027s essay on\r\n\u003ci\u003eGovernment\u003c/i\u003e. But Mrs. Taylor had actually written on this very point,\r\nand the warmth and fervour of Mill\u0027s denunciations of women\u0027s servitude\r\nwere unmistakably caught from his wife\u0027s view of the practical\r\ndisabilities entailed by the feminine position.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smaller\"\u003eIII.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eLiberty\u003c/i\u003e was published in 1859, when the nineteenth century was half\r\nover, but in its general spirit and in some of its special tendencies\r\nthe little tract belongs rather to the standpoint of the eighteenth\r\ncentury than to that which saw its birth. In many of his\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_xxii\"\u003e[Pg xxii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e speculations\r\nJohn Stuart Mill forms a sort of connecting link between the doctrines\r\nof the earlier English empirical school and those which we associate\r\nwith the name of Mr. Herbert Spencer. In his \u003ci\u003eLogic\u003c/i\u003e, for instance, he\r\nrepresents an advance on the theories of Hume, and yet does not see how\r\nprofoundly the victories of Science modify the conclusions of the\r\nearlier thinker. Similarly, in his \u003ci\u003ePolitical Economy\u003c/i\u003e, he desires to\r\nimprove and to enlarge upon Ricardo, and yet does not advance so far as\r\nthe modifications of political economy by Sociology, indicated by some\r\nlater—and especially German—speculations on the subject. In the tract\r\non \u003ci\u003eLiberty\u003c/i\u003e, Mill is advocating the rights of the individual as against\r\nSociety at the very opening of an era that was rapidly coming to the\r\nconclusion that the individual had no absolute rights against Society.\r\nThe eighteenth century view is that individuals existed first, each with\r\ntheir own special claims and responsibilities; that they deliberately\r\nformed a Social State, either by a contract or otherwise; and that then\r\nfinally they limited their own action out of regard for the interests of\r\nthe social organism thus arbitrarily produced. This is hardly the view\r\nof the nineteenth century. It is possible\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_xxiii\"\u003e[Pg xxiii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e that logically the individual\r\nis prior to the State; historically and in the order of Nature, the\r\nState is prior to the individual. In other words, such rights as every\r\nsingle personality possesses in a modern world do not belong to him by\r\nan original ordinance of Nature, but are slowly acquired in the growth\r\nand development of the social state. It is not the truth that individual\r\nliberties were forfeited by some deliberate act when men made themselves\r\ninto a Commonwealth. It is more true to say, as Aristotle said long ago,\r\nthat man is naturally a political animal, that he lived under strict\r\nsocial laws as a mere item, almost a nonentity, as compared with the\r\nOrder, Society, or Community to which he belonged, and that such\r\nprivileges as he subsequently acquired have been obtained in virtue of\r\nhis growing importance as a member of a growing organisation. But if\r\nthis is even approximately true, it seriously restricts that liberty of\r\nthe individual for which Mill pleads. The individual has no chance,\r\nbecause he has no rights, against the social organism. Society can\r\npunish him for acts or even opinions which are anti-social in character.\r\nHis virtue lies in recognising the intimate communion with his fellows.\r\nHis sphere of activity is bounded by\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_xxiv\"\u003e[Pg xxiv]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the common interest. Just as it is\r\nan absurd and exploded theory that all men are originally equal, so it\r\nis an ancient and false doctrine to protest that a man has an individual\r\nliberty to live and think as he chooses in any spirit of antagonism to\r\nthat larger body of which he forms an insignificant part.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNowadays this view of Society and of its development, which we largely\r\nowe to the \u003ci\u003ePhilosophie Positive\u003c/i\u003e of M. Auguste Comte, is so familiar\r\nand possibly so damaging to the individual initiative, that it becomes\r\nnecessary to advance and proclaim the truth which resides in an opposite\r\ntheory. All progress, as we are aware, depends on the joint process of\r\nintegration and differentiation; synthesis, analysis, and then a larger\r\nsynthesis seem to form the law of development. If it ever comes to pass\r\nthat Society is tyrannical in its restrictions of the individual, if, as\r\nfor instance in some forms of Socialism, based on deceptive analogies of\r\nNature\u0027s dealings, the type is everything and the individual nothing, it\r\nmust be confidently urged in answer that the fuller life of the future\r\ndepends on the manifold activities, even though they may be\r\nantagonistic, of the individual. In England, at all events, we know that\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_xxv\"\u003e[Pg xxv]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003egovernment in all its different forms, whether as King, or as a caste\r\nof nobles, or as an oligarchical plutocracy, or even as trades unions,\r\nis so dwarfing in its action that, for the sake of the future, the\r\nindividual must revolt. Just as our former point of view limited the\r\nvalue of Mill\u0027s treatise on \u003ci\u003eLiberty\u003c/i\u003e, so these considerations tend to\r\nshow its eternal importance. The omnipotence of Society means a dead\r\nlevel of uniformity. The claim of the individual to be heard, to say\r\nwhat he likes, to do what he likes, to live as he likes, is absolutely\r\nnecessary, not only for the variety of elements without which life is\r\npoor, but also for the hope of a future age. So long as individual\r\ninitiative and effort are recognised as a vital element in English\r\nhistory, so long will Mill\u0027s \u003ci\u003eLiberty\u003c/i\u003e, which he confesses was based on\r\na suggestion derived from Von Humboldt, remain as an indispensable\r\ncontribution to the speculations, and also to the health and sanity, of the world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tbrk\"\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat his wife really was to Mill, we shall, perhaps, never know. But\r\nthat she was an actual and vivid force, which roused the latent\r\nenthusiasm of his nature, we have abundant evidence. And when she died\r\nat Avignon,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_xxvi\"\u003e[Pg xxvi]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e though his friends may have regained an almost estranged\r\ncompanionship, Mill was, personally, the poorer. Into the sorrow of that\r\nbereavement we cannot enter: we have no right or power to draw the veil.\r\nIt is enough to quote the simple words, so eloquent of an unspoken\r\ngrief—\"I can say nothing which could describe, even in the faintest\r\nmanner, what that loss was and is. But because I know that she would\r\nhave wished it, I endeavour to make the best of what life I have left,\r\nand to work for her purposes with such diminished strength as can be\r\nderived from thoughts of her, and communion with her memory.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"right\"\u003eW. L. COURTNEY.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLondon\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eJuly 5th, 1901\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch3\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_1_1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_1_1\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[1]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eLife of John Stuart Mill\u003c/i\u003e, chapter vi. (Walter Scott.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_2_2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_2_2\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[2]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eAutobiography\u003c/i\u003e, p. 190.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_3_3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_3_3\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[3]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 242.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_4_4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_4_4\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[4]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eAutobiography\u003c/i\u003e, pp. 246, 247.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_5_5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_5_5\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[5]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cf. an instructive page in the \u003ci\u003eAutobiography\u003c/i\u003e, p. 252.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_xxvii\"\u003e[Pg xxvii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"bold2\"\u003eCONTENTS.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ctable data-summary=\"CONTENTS\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003cth class=\"center\" colspan=\"2\"\u003eCHAPTER I.\u003c/th\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003ePAGE\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"left\"\u003eINTRODUCTORY\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_1\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003c/th\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003cth class=\"center\" colspan=\"2\"\u003eCHAPTER II.\u003c/th\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"left\"\u003eOF THE LIBERTY OF THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_28\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003c/th\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003cth class=\"center\" colspan=\"2\"\u003eCHAPTER III.\u003c/th\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"left\"\u003eOF INDIVIDUALITY, AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF WELL-BEING\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_103\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003c/th\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003cth class=\"center\" colspan=\"2\"\u003eCHAPTER IV.\u003c/th\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"left\"\u003eOF THE LIMITS TO THE AUTHORITY OF SOCIETY OVER THE INDIVIDUAL\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_140\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e140\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003cth colspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003c/th\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003cth class=\"center\" colspan=\"2\"\u003eCHAPTER V.\u003c/th\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"left\"\u003eAPPLICATIONS\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_177\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e177\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_xxviii\"\u003e[Pg xxviii]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe grand, leading principle, towards which every argument\r\nunfolded in these pages directly converges, is the absolute and\r\nessential importance of human development in its richest\r\ndiversity.—\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWilhelm Von Humboldt\u003c/span\u003e: \u003ci\u003eSphere and Duties of Government\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_1\"\u003e[Pg 1]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"bold2\"\u003eON LIBERTY.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"smler\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003cspan\u003eCHAPTER I.\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smaller\"\u003eINTRODUCTORY.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe subject of this Essay is not the so-called Liberty of the Will, so\r\nunfortunately opposed to the misnamed doctrine of Philosophical\r\nNecessity; but Civil, or Social Liberty: the nature and limits of the\r\npower which can be legitimately exercised by society over the\r\nindividual. A question seldom stated, and hardly ever discussed, in\r\ngeneral terms, but which profoundly influences the practical\r\ncontroversies of the age by its latent presence, and is likely soon to\r\nmake itself recognised as the vital question of the future. It is so far\r\nfrom being new, that in a certain sense, it has divided mankind, almost\r\nfrom the remotest ages; but in the stage of progress into which the more\r\ncivilised portions of the species have now\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_2\"\u003e[Pg 2]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e entered, it presents itself\r\nunder new conditions, and requires a different and more fundamental treatment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe struggle between Liberty and Authority is the most conspicuous\r\nfeature in the portions of history with which we are earliest familiar,\r\nparticularly in that of Greece, Rome, and England. But in old times this\r\ncontest was between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the\r\ngovernment. By liberty, was meant protection against the tyranny of the\r\npolitical rulers. The rulers were conceived (except in some of the\r\npopular governments of Greece) as in a necessarily antagonistic position\r\nto the people whom they ruled. They consisted of a governing One, or a\r\ngoverning tribe or caste, who derived their authority from inheritance\r\nor conquest, who, at all events, did not hold it at the pleasure of the\r\ngoverned, and whose supremacy men did not venture, perhaps did not\r\ndesire, to contest, whatever precautions might be taken against its\r\noppressive exercise. Their power was regarded as necessary, but also as\r\nhighly dangerous; as a weapon which they would attempt to use against\r\ntheir subjects, no less than against external enemies. To prevent the\r\nweaker members of the community from being preyed upon by innumerable\r\nvultures, it was needful that there\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_3\"\u003e[Pg 3]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e should be an animal of prey\r\nstronger than the rest, commissioned to keep them down. But as the king\r\nof the vultures would be no less bent upon preying on the flock than any\r\nof the minor harpies, it was indispensable to be in a perpetual attitude\r\nof defence against his beak and claws. The aim, therefore, of patriots,\r\nwas to set limits to the power which the ruler should be suffered to\r\nexercise over the community; and this limitation was what they meant by\r\nliberty. It was attempted in two ways. First, by obtaining a recognition\r\nof certain immunities, called political liberties or rights, which it\r\nwas to be regarded as a breach of duty in the ruler to infringe, and\r\nwhich if he did infringe, specific resistance, or general rebellion, was\r\nheld to be justifiable. A second, and generally a later expedient, was\r\nthe establishment of constitutional checks; by which the consent of the\r\ncommunity, or of a body of some sort, supposed to represent its\r\ninterests, was made a necessary condition to some of the more important\r\nacts of the governing power. To the first of these modes of limitation,\r\nthe ruling power, in most European countries, was compelled, more or\r\nless, to submit. It was not so with the second; and to attain this, or\r\nwhen already in some degree possessed, to attain it more completely,\r\nbecame\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_4\"\u003e[Pg 4]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e everywhere the principal object of the lovers of liberty. And so\r\nlong as mankind were content to combat one enemy by another, and to be\r\nruled by a master, on condition of being guaranteed more or less\r\nefficaciously against his tyranny, they did not carry their aspirations\r\nbeyond this point.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eA time, however, came, in the progress of human affairs, when men ceased\r\nto think it a necessity of nature that their governors should be an\r\nindependent power, opposed in interest to themselves. It appeared to\r\nthem much better that the various magistrates of the State should be\r\ntheir tenants or delegates, revocable at their pleasure. In that way\r\nalone, it seemed, could they have complete security that the powers of\r\ngovernment would never be abused to their disadvantage. By degrees, this\r\nnew demand for elective and temporary rulers became the prominent object\r\nof the exertions of the popular party, wherever any such party existed;\r\nand superseded, to a considerable extent, the previous efforts to limit\r\nthe power of rulers. As the struggle proceeded for making the ruling\r\npower emanate from the periodical choice of the ruled, some persons\r\nbegan to think that too much importance had been attached to the\r\nlimitation\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_5\"\u003e[Pg 5]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of the power itself. \u003ci\u003eThat\u003c/i\u003e (it might seem) was a resource\r\nagainst rulers whose interests were habitually opposed to those of the\r\npeople. What was now wanted was, that the rulers should be identified\r\nwith the people; that their interest and will should be the interest and\r\nwill of the nation. The nation did not need to be protected against its\r\nown will. There was no fear of its tyrannising over itself. Let the\r\nrulers be effectually responsible to it, promptly removable by it, and\r\nit could afford to trust them with power of which it could itself\r\ndictate the use to be made. Their power was but the nation\u0027s own power,\r\nconcentrated, and in a form convenient for exercise. This mode of\r\nthought, or rather perhaps of feeling, was common among the last\r\ngeneration of European liberalism, in the Continental section of which\r\nit still apparently predominates. Those who admit any limit to what a\r\ngovernment may do, except in the case of such governments as they think\r\nought not to exist, stand out as brilliant exceptions among the\r\npolitical thinkers of the Continent. A similar tone of sentiment might\r\nby this time have been prevalent in our own country, if the\r\ncircumstances which for a time encouraged it, had continued unaltered.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut, in political and philosophical theories, as\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_6\"\u003e[Pg 6]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e well as in persons,\r\nsuccess discloses faults and infirmities which failure might have\r\nconcealed from observation. The notion, that the people have no need to\r\nlimit their power over themselves, might seem axiomatic, when popular\r\ngovernment was a thing only dreamed about, or read of as having existed\r\nat some distant period of the past. Neither was that notion necessarily\r\ndisturbed by such temporary aberrations as those of the French\r\nRevolution, the worst of which were the work of a usurping few, and\r\nwhich, in any case, belonged, not to the permanent working of popular\r\ninstitutions, but to a sudden and convulsive outbreak against\r\nmonarchical and aristocratic despotism. In time, however, a democratic\r\nrepublic came to occupy a large portion of the earth\u0027s surface, and made\r\nitself felt as one of the most powerful members of the community of\r\nnations; and elective and responsible government became subject to the\r\nobservations and criticisms which wait upon a great existing fact. It\r\nwas now perceived that such phrases as \"self-government,\" and \"the power\r\nof the people over themselves,\" do not express the true state of the\r\ncase. The \"people\" who exercise the power are not always the same people\r\nwith those over whom it is exercised; and the \"self-government\" spoken\r\nof\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_7\"\u003e[Pg 7]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the\r\nrest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means, the will of\r\nthe most numerous or the most active \u003ci\u003epart\u003c/i\u003e of the people; the majority,\r\nor those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority: the\r\npeople, consequently, \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e desire to oppress a part of their number;\r\nand precautions are as much needed against this, as against any other\r\nabuse of power. The limitation, therefore, of the power of government\r\nover individuals, loses none of its importance when the holders of power\r\nare regularly accountable to the community, that is, to the strongest\r\nparty therein. This view of things, recommending itself equally to the\r\nintelligence of thinkers and to the inclination of those important\r\nclasses in European society to whose real or supposed interests\r\ndemocracy is adverse, has had no difficulty in establishing itself; and\r\nin political speculations \"the tyranny of the majority\" is now generally\r\nincluded among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLike other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is\r\nstill vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of\r\nthe public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when\r\nsociety is itself the tyrant\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_8\"\u003e[Pg 8]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e—society collectively, over the separate\r\nindividuals who compose it—its means of tyrannising are not restricted\r\nto the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries.\r\nSociety can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong\r\nmandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which\r\nit ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable\r\nthan many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually\r\nupheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape,\r\npenetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the\r\nsoul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the\r\nmagistrate is not enough: there needs protection also against the\r\ntyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of\r\nsociety to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas\r\nand practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to\r\nfetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any\r\nindividuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to\r\nfashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the\r\nlegitimate interference of collective opinion with individual\r\nindependence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against\r\nencroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_9\"\u003e[Pg 9]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e human affairs,\r\nas protection against political despotism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut though this proposition is not likely to be contested in general\r\nterms, the practical question, where to place the limit—how to make the\r\nfitting adjustment between individual independence and social\r\ncontrol—is a subject on which nearly everything remains to be done. All\r\nthat makes existence valuable to any one, depends on the enforcement of\r\nrestraints upon the actions of other people. Some rules of conduct,\r\ntherefore, must be imposed, by law in the first place, and by opinion on\r\nmany things which are not fit subjects for the operation of law. What\r\nthese rules should be, is the principal question in human affairs; but\r\nif we except a few of the most obvious cases, it is one of those which\r\nleast progress has been made in resolving. No two ages, and scarcely any\r\ntwo countries, have decided it alike; and the decision of one age or\r\ncountry is a wonder to another. Yet the people of any given age and\r\ncountry no more suspect any difficulty in it, than if it were a subject\r\non which mankind had always been agreed. The rules which obtain among\r\nthemselves appear to them self-evident and self-justifying. This all but\r\nuniversal illusion is one of the examples of the magical influence of\r\ncustom,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_10\"\u003e[Pg 10]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e which is not only, as the proverb says, a second nature, but is\r\ncontinually mistaken for the first. The effect of custom, in preventing\r\nany misgiving respecting the rules of conduct which mankind impose on\r\none another, is all the more complete because the subject is one on\r\nwhich it is not generally considered necessary that reasons should be\r\ngiven, either by one person to others, or by each to himself. People are\r\naccustomed to believe, and have been encouraged in the belief by some\r\nwho aspire to the character of philosophers, that their feelings, on\r\nsubjects of this nature, are better than reasons, and render reasons\r\nunnecessary. The practical principle which guides them to their opinions\r\non the regulation of human conduct, is the feeling in each person\u0027s mind\r\nthat everybody should be required to act as he, and those with whom he\r\nsympathises, would like them to act. No one, indeed, acknowledges to\r\nhimself that his standard of judgment is his own liking; but an opinion\r\non a point of conduct, not supported by reasons, can only count as one\r\nperson\u0027s preference; and if the reasons, when given, are a mere appeal\r\nto a similar preference felt by other people, it is still only many\r\npeople\u0027s liking instead of one. To an ordinary man, however, his own\r\npreference, thus supported, is not only a perfectly satisfactory\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_11\"\u003e[Pg 11]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreason, but the only one he generally has for any of his notions of\r\nmorality, taste, or propriety, which are not expressly written in his\r\nreligious creed; and his chief guide in the interpretation even of that.\r\nMen\u0027s opinions, accordingly, on what is laudable or blamable, are\r\naffected by all the multifarious causes which influence their wishes in\r\nregard to the conduct of others, and which are as numerous as those\r\nwhich determine their wishes on any other subject. Sometimes their\r\nreason—at other times their prejudices or superstitions: often their\r\nsocial affections, not seldom their anti-social ones, their envy or\r\njealousy, their arrogance or contemptuousness: but most commonly, their\r\ndesires or fears for themselves—their legitimate or illegitimate\r\nself-interest. Wherever there is an ascendant class, a large portion of\r\nthe morality of the country emanates from its class interests, and its\r\nfeelings of class superiority. The morality between Spartans and Helots,\r\nbetween planters and negroes, between princes and subjects, between\r\nnobles and roturiers, between men and women, has been for the most part\r\nthe creation of these class interests and feelings: and the sentiments\r\nthus generated, react in turn upon the moral feelings of the members of\r\nthe ascendant class, in their relations among themselves. Where, on the\r\nother\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_12\"\u003e[Pg 12]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e hand, a class, formerly ascendant, has lost its ascendancy, or\r\nwhere its ascendancy is unpopular, the prevailing moral sentiments\r\nfrequently bear the impress of an impatient dislike of superiority.\r\nAnother grand determining principle of the rules of conduct, both in act\r\nand forbearance, which have been enforced by law or opinion, has been\r\nthe servility of mankind towards the supposed preferences or aversions\r\nof their temporal masters, or of their gods. This servility, though\r\nessentially selfish, is not hypocrisy; it gives rise to perfectly\r\ngenuine sentiments of abhorrence; it made men burn magicians and\r\nheretics. Among so many baser influences, the general and obvious\r\ninterests of society have of course had a share, and a large one, in the\r\ndirection of the moral sentiments: less, however, as a matter of reason,\r\nand on their own account, than as a consequence of the sympathies and\r\nantipathies which grew out of them: and sympathies and antipathies which\r\nhad little or nothing to do with the interests of society, have made\r\nthemselves felt in the establishment of moralities with quite as great force.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe likings and dislikings of society, or of some powerful portion of\r\nit, are thus the main thing which has practically determined the rules\r\nlaid down for general observance, under the penalties\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_13\"\u003e[Pg 13]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of law or\r\nopinion. And in general, those who have been in advance of society in\r\nthought and feeling have left this condition of things unassailed in\r\nprinciple, however they may have come into conflict with it in some of\r\nits details. They have occupied themselves rather in inquiring what\r\nthings society ought to like or dislike, than in questioning whether its\r\nlikings or dislikings should be a law to individuals. They preferred\r\nendeavouring to alter the feelings of mankind on the particular points\r\non which they were themselves heretical, rather than make common cause\r\nin defence of freedom, with heretics generally. The only case in which\r\nthe higher ground has been taken on principle and maintained with\r\nconsistency, by any but an individual here and there, is that of\r\nreligious belief: a case instructive in many ways, and not least so as\r\nforming a most striking instance of the fallibility of what is called\r\nthe moral sense: for the \u003ci\u003eodium theologicum\u003c/i\u003e, in a sincere bigot, is one\r\nof the most unequivocal cases of moral feeling. Those who first broke\r\nthe yoke of what called itself the Universal Church, were in general as\r\nlittle willing to permit difference of religious opinion as that church\r\nitself. But when the heat of the conflict was over, without giving a\r\ncomplete victory to any party, and each church or\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_14\"\u003e[Pg 14]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e sect was reduced to\r\nlimit its hopes to retaining possession of the ground it already\r\noccupied; minorities, seeing that they had no chance of becoming\r\nmajorities, were under the necessity of pleading to those whom they\r\ncould not convert, for permission to differ. It is accordingly on this\r\nbattle-field, almost solely, that the rights of the individual against\r\nsociety have been asserted on broad grounds of principle, and the claim\r\nof society to exercise authority over dissentients, openly controverted.\r\nThe great writers to whom the world owes what religious liberty it\r\npossesses, have mostly asserted freedom of conscience as an indefeasible\r\nright, and denied absolutely that a human being is accountable to others\r\nfor his religious belief. Yet so natural to mankind is intolerance in\r\nwhatever they really care about, that religious freedom has hardly\r\nanywhere been practically realised, except where religious indifference,\r\nwhich dislikes to have its peace disturbed by theological quarrels, has\r\nadded its weight to the scale. In the minds of almost all religious\r\npersons, even in the most tolerant countries, the duty of toleration is\r\nadmitted with tacit reserves. One person will bear with dissent in\r\nmatters of church government, but not of dogma; another can tolerate\r\neverybody, short of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_15\"\u003e[Pg 15]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e a Papist or a Unitarian; another, every one who\r\nbelieves in revealed religion; a few extend their charity a little\r\nfurther, but stop at the belief in a God and in a future state. Wherever\r\nthe sentiment of the majority is still genuine and intense, it is found\r\nto have abated little of its claim to be obeyed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn England, from the peculiar circumstances of our political history,\r\nthough the yoke of opinion is perhaps heavier, that of law is lighter,\r\nthan in most other countries of Europe; and there is considerable\r\njealousy of direct interference, by the legislative or the executive\r\npower, with private conduct; not so much from any just regard for the\r\nindependence of the individual, as from the still subsisting habit of\r\nlooking on the government as representing an opposite interest to the\r\npublic. The majority have not yet learnt to feel the power of the\r\ngovernment their power, or its opinions their opinions. When they do so,\r\nindividual liberty will probably be as much exposed to invasion from the\r\ngovernment, as it already is from public opinion. But, as yet, there is\r\na considerable amount of feeling ready to be called forth against any\r\nattempt of the law to control individuals in things in which they have\r\nnot hitherto been accustomed to be controlled by it;\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_16\"\u003e[Pg 16]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and this with very\r\nlittle discrimination as to whether the matter is, or is not, within the\r\nlegitimate sphere of legal control; insomuch that the feeling, highly\r\nsalutary on the whole, is perhaps quite as often misplaced as well\r\ngrounded in the particular instances of its application. There is, in\r\nfact, no recognised principle by which the propriety or impropriety of\r\ngovernment interference is customarily tested. People decide according\r\nto their personal preferences. Some, whenever they see any good to be\r\ndone, or evil to be remedied, would willingly instigate the government\r\nto undertake the business; while others prefer to bear almost any amount\r\nof social evil, rather than add one to the departments of human\r\ninterests amenable to governmental control. And men range themselves on\r\none or the other side in any particular case, according to this general\r\ndirection of their sentiments; or according to the degree of interest\r\nwhich they feel in the particular thing which it is proposed that the\r\ngovernment should do, or according to the belief they entertain that the\r\ngovernment would, or would not, do it in the manner they prefer; but\r\nvery rarely on account of any opinion to which they consistently adhere,\r\nas to what things are fit to be done by a government. And it seems to me\r\nthat in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_17\"\u003e[Pg 17]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e consequence of this absence of rule or principle, one side is\r\nat present as often wrong as the other; the interference of government\r\nis, with about equal frequency, improperly invoked and improperly condemned.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as\r\nentitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the\r\nindividual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used\r\nbe physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion\r\nof public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which\r\nmankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with\r\nthe liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That\r\nthe only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any\r\nmember of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to\r\nothers. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient\r\nwarrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it\r\nwill be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier,\r\nbecause, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even\r\nright. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning\r\nwith him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling\r\nhim, or visiting him with\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_18\"\u003e[Pg 18]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify\r\nthat, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be\r\ncalculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the\r\nconduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which\r\nconcerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his\r\nindependence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and\r\nmind, the individual is sovereign.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to\r\napply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are\r\nnot speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the\r\nlaw may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a\r\nstate to require being taken care of by others, must be protected\r\nagainst their own actions as well as against external injury. For the\r\nsame reason, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of\r\nsociety in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage. The\r\nearly difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great, that\r\nthere is seldom any choice of means for overcoming them; and a ruler\r\nfull of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any\r\nexpedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable.\r\nDespotism is a legitimate\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_19\"\u003e[Pg 19]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e mode of government in dealing with\r\nbarbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means\r\njustified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has\r\nno application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind\r\nhave become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion.\r\nUntil then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar\r\nor a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one. But as soon\r\nas mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their own\r\nimprovement by conviction or persuasion (a period long since reached in\r\nall nations with whom we need here concern ourselves), compulsion,\r\neither in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties for\r\nnon-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their own good,\r\nand justifiable only for the security of others.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be derived\r\nto my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent\r\nof utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical\r\nquestions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the\r\npermanent interests of man as a progressive being. Those interests, I\r\ncontend, authorise the subjection of individual spontaneity to external\r\ncontrol, only in respect to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_20\"\u003e[Pg 20]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e those actions of each, which concern the\r\ninterest of other people. If any one does an act hurtful to others,\r\nthere is a \u003ci\u003eprimâ facie\u003c/i\u003e case for punishing him, by law, or, where legal\r\npenalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation. There\r\nare also many positive acts for the benefit of others, which he may\r\nrightfully be compelled to perform; such as, to give evidence in a court\r\nof justice; to bear his fair share in the common defence, or in any\r\nother joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which he\r\nenjoys the protection; and to perform certain acts of individual\r\nbeneficence, such as saving a fellow-creature\u0027s life, or interposing to\r\nprotect the defenceless against ill-usage, things which whenever it is\r\nobviously a man\u0027s duty to do, he may rightfully be made responsible to\r\nsociety for not doing. A person may cause evil to others not only by his\r\nactions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable\r\nto them for the injury. The latter case, it is true, requires a much\r\nmore cautious exercise of compulsion than the former. To make any one\r\nanswerable for doing evil to others, is the rule; to make him answerable\r\nfor not preventing evil, is, comparatively speaking, the exception. Yet\r\nthere are many cases clear enough and grave enough to justify that\r\nexception. In all things which regard\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_21\"\u003e[Pg 21]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the external relations of the\r\nindividual, he is \u003ci\u003ede jure\u003c/i\u003e amenable to those whose interests are\r\nconcerned, and if need be, to society as their protector. There are\r\noften good reasons for not holding him to the responsibility; but these\r\nreasons must arise from the special expediencies of the case: either\r\nbecause it is a kind of case in which he is on the whole likely to act\r\nbetter, when left to his own discretion, than when controlled in any way\r\nin which society have it in their power to control him; or because the\r\nattempt to exercise control would produce other evils, greater than\r\nthose which it would prevent. When such reasons as these preclude the\r\nenforcement of responsibility, the conscience of the agent himself\r\nshould step into the vacant judgment seat, and protect those interests\r\nof others which have no external protection; judging himself all the\r\nmore rigidly, because the case does not admit of his being made\r\naccountable to the judgment of his fellow-creatures.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut there is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from\r\nthe individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending\r\nall that portion of a person\u0027s life and conduct which affects only\r\nhimself, or if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary,\r\nand undeceived consent and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_22\"\u003e[Pg 22]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e participation. When I say only himself, I\r\nmean directly, and in the first instance: for whatever affects himself,\r\nmay affect others \u003ci\u003ethrough\u003c/i\u003e himself; and the objection which may be\r\ngrounded on this contingency, will receive consideration in the sequel.\r\nThis, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises,\r\nfirst, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of\r\nconscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and\r\nfeeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects,\r\npractical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty\r\nof expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different\r\nprinciple, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual\r\nwhich concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as\r\nthe liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same\r\nreasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle\r\nrequires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life\r\nto suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such\r\nconsequences as may follow: without impediment from our\r\nfellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though\r\nthey should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from\r\nthis liberty of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_23\"\u003e[Pg 23]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e each individual, follows the liberty, within the same\r\nlimits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any\r\npurpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being\r\nsupposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected, is\r\nfree, whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely\r\nfree in which they do not exist absolute and unqualified. The only\r\nfreedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our\r\nown way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or\r\nimpede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his\r\nown health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater\r\ngainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves,\r\nthan by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThough this doctrine is anything but new, and, to some persons, may have\r\nthe air of a truism, there is no doctrine which stands more directly\r\nopposed to the general tendency of existing opinion and practice.\r\nSociety has expended fully as much effort in the attempt (according to\r\nits lights) to compel people to conform to its notions\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_24\"\u003e[Pg 24]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of personal, as\r\nof social excellence. The ancient commonwealths thought themselves\r\nentitled to practise, and the ancient philosophers countenanced, the\r\nregulation of every part of private conduct by public authority, on the\r\nground that the State had a deep interest in the whole bodily and mental\r\ndiscipline of every one of its citizens; a mode of thinking which may\r\nhave been admissible in small republics surrounded by powerful enemies,\r\nin constant peril of being subverted by foreign attack or internal\r\ncommotion, and to which even a short interval of relaxed energy and\r\nself-command might so easily be fatal, that they could not afford to\r\nwait for the salutary permanent effects of freedom. In the modern world,\r\nthe greater size of political communities, and above all, the separation\r\nbetween spiritual and temporal authority (which placed the direction of\r\nmen\u0027s consciences in other hands than those which controlled their\r\nworldly affairs), prevented so great an interference by law in the\r\ndetails of private life; but the engines of moral repression have been\r\nwielded more strenuously against divergence from the reigning opinion in\r\nself-regarding, than even in social matters; religion, the most powerful\r\nof the elements which have entered into the formation\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_25\"\u003e[Pg 25]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of moral feeling,\r\nhaving almost always been governed either by the ambition of a\r\nhierarchy, seeking control over every department of human conduct, or by\r\nthe spirit of Puritanism. And some of those modern reformers who have\r\nplaced themselves in strongest opposition to the religions of the past,\r\nhave been noway behind either churches or sects in their assertion of\r\nthe right of spiritual domination: M. Comte, in particular, whose social\r\nsystem, as unfolded in his \u003ci\u003eTraité de Politique Positive\u003c/i\u003e, aims at\r\nestablishing (though by moral more than by legal appliances) a despotism\r\nof society over the individual, surpassing anything contemplated in the\r\npolitical ideal of the most rigid disciplinarian among the ancient philosophers.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eApart from the peculiar tenets of individual thinkers, there is also in\r\nthe world at large an increasing inclination to stretch unduly the\r\npowers of society over the individual, both by the force of opinion and\r\neven by that of legislation: and as the tendency of all the changes\r\ntaking place in the world is to strengthen society, and diminish the\r\npower of the individual, this encroachment is not one of the evils which\r\ntend spontaneously to disappear, but, on the contrary, to grow more and\r\nmore formidable. The disposition of mankind,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_26\"\u003e[Pg 26]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e whether as rulers or as\r\nfellow-citizens to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule\r\nof conduct on others, is so energetically supported by some of the best\r\nand by some of the worst feelings incident to human nature, that it is\r\nhardly ever kept under restraint by anything but want of power; and as\r\nthe power is not declining, but growing, unless a strong barrier of\r\nmoral conviction can be raised against the mischief, we must expect, in\r\nthe present circumstances of the world, to see it increase.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt will be convenient for the argument, if, instead of at once entering\r\nupon the general thesis, we confine ourselves in the first instance to a\r\nsingle branch of it, on which the principle here stated is, if not\r\nfully, yet to a certain point, recognised by the current opinions. This\r\none branch is the Liberty of Thought: from which it is impossible to\r\nseparate the cognate liberty of speaking and of writing. Although these\r\nliberties, to some considerable amount, form part of the political\r\nmorality of all countries which profess religious toleration and free\r\ninstitutions, the grounds, both philosophical and practical, on which\r\nthey rest, are perhaps not so familiar to the general mind, nor so\r\nthoroughly appreciated by many even of the leaders of opinion, as might\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_27\"\u003e[Pg 27]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhave been expected. Those grounds, when rightly understood, are of much\r\nwider application than to only one division of the subject, and a\r\nthorough consideration of this part of the question will be found the\r\nbest introduction to the remainder. Those to whom nothing which I am\r\nabout to say will be new, may therefore, I hope, excuse me, if on a\r\nsubject which for now three centuries has been so often discussed, I\r\nventure on one discussion more.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_28\"\u003e[Pg 28]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003cspan\u003eCHAPTER II.\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smaller\"\u003eOF THE LIBERTY OF THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe time, it is to be hoped, is gone by, when any defence would be\r\nnecessary of the \"liberty of the press\" as one of the securities against\r\ncorrupt or tyrannical government. No argument, we may suppose, can now\r\nbe needed, against permitting a legislature or an executive, not\r\nidentified in interest with the people, to prescribe opinions to them,\r\nand determine what doctrines or what arguments they shall be allowed to\r\nhear. This aspect of the question, besides, has been so often and so\r\ntriumphantly enforced by preceding writers, that it need not be\r\nspecially insisted on in this place. Though the law of England, on the\r\nsubject of the press, is as servile to this day as it was in the time of\r\nthe Tudors, there is little danger of its being actually put in force\r\nagainst political discussion, except during some temporary panic, when\r\nfear of insurrection drives ministers and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_29\"\u003e[Pg 29]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e judges from their\r\npropriety;\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_6_6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_6_6\"\u003e[6]\u003c/a\u003e and, speaking generally, it is not, in constitutional\r\ncountries, to be apprehended that the government, whether completely\r\nresponsible to the people or not, will often attempt to control the\r\nexpression of opinion, except when in doing so it makes itself the organ\r\nof the general intolerance of the public. Let us suppose, therefore,\r\nthat the government is entirely at one with the people, and never thinks\r\nof exerting any power of coercion unless in agreement with what it\r\nconceives to be their voice. But I deny the right of the people to\r\nexercise such coercion, either by themselves or by their government. The\r\npower itself is illegitimate. The best\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_30\"\u003e[Pg 30]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e government has no more title to\r\nit than the worst. It is as noxious, or more noxious, when exerted in\r\naccordance with public opinion, than when in or opposition to it. If all\r\nmankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the\r\ncontrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that\r\none person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in\r\nsilencing mankind. Were an opinion a personal possession of no value\r\nexcept to the owner; if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were\r\nsimply a private injury, it would make some difference whether the\r\ninjury was inflicted only on a few persons or on\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_31\"\u003e[Pg 31]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e many. But the peculiar\r\nevil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing\r\nthe human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who\r\ndissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the\r\nopinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging\r\nerror for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit,\r\nthe clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its\r\ncollision with error.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is necessary to consider separately these two hypotheses, each of\r\nwhich has a distinct branch of the argument corresponding to it. We can\r\nnever be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false\r\nopinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tbrk\"\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFirst: the opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may\r\npossibly be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its\r\ntruth; but they are not infallible. They have no authority to decide the\r\nquestion for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the means\r\nof judging. To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure\r\nthat it is false, is to assume that \u003ci\u003etheir\u003c/i\u003e certainty is the same thing\r\nas \u003ci\u003eabsolute\u003c/i\u003e certainty. All silencing of discussion is\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_32\"\u003e[Pg 32]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e an assumption\r\nof infallibility. Its condemnation may be allowed to rest on this common\r\nargument, not the worse for being common.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eUnfortunately for the good sense of mankind, the fact of their\r\nfallibility is far from carrying the weight in their practical judgment,\r\nwhich is always allowed to it in theory; for while every one well knows\r\nhimself to be fallible, few think it necessary to take any precautions\r\nagainst their own fallibility, or admit the supposition that any\r\nopinion, of which they feel very certain, may be one of the examples of\r\nthe error to which they acknowledge themselves to be liable. Absolute\r\nprinces, or others who are accustomed to unlimited deference, usually\r\nfeel this complete confidence in their own opinions on nearly all\r\nsubjects. People more happily situated, who sometimes hear their\r\nopinions disputed, and are not wholly unused to be set right when they\r\nare wrong, place the same unbounded reliance only on such of their\r\nopinions as are shared by all who surround them, or to whom they\r\nhabitually defer: for in proportion to a man\u0027s want of confidence in his\r\nown solitary judgment, does he usually repose, with implicit trust, on\r\nthe infallibility of \"the world\" in general. And the world, to each\r\nindividual, means the part of it with which he comes in contact; his\r\nparty,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_33\"\u003e[Pg 33]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e his sect, his church, his class of society: the man may be\r\ncalled, by comparison, almost liberal and large-minded to whom it means\r\nanything so comprehensive as his own country or his own age. Nor is his\r\nfaith in this collective authority at all shaken by his being aware that\r\nother ages, countries, sects, churches, classes, and parties have\r\nthought, and even now think, the exact reverse. He devolves upon his own\r\nworld the responsibility of being in the right against the dissentient\r\nworlds of other people; and it never troubles him that mere accident has\r\ndecided which of these numerous worlds is the object of his reliance,\r\nand that the same causes which make him a Churchman in London, would\r\nhave made him a Buddhist or a Confucian in Pekin. Yet it is as evident\r\nin itself as any amount of argument can make it, that ages are no more\r\ninfallible than individuals; every age having held many opinions which\r\nsubsequent ages have deemed not only false but absurd; and it is as\r\ncertain that many opinions, now general, will be rejected by future\r\nages, as it is that many, once general, are rejected by the present.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe objection likely to be made to this argument, would probably take\r\nsome such form as the following. There is no greater assumption of\r\ninfallibility in forbidding the propagation of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_34\"\u003e[Pg 34]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e error, than in any other\r\nthing which is done by public authority on its own judgment and\r\nresponsibility. Judgment is given to men that they may use it. Because\r\nit may be used erroneously, are men to be told that they ought not to\r\nuse it at all? To prohibit what they think pernicious, is not claiming\r\nexemption from error, but fulfilling the duty incumbent on them,\r\nalthough fallible, of acting on their conscientious conviction. If we\r\nwere never to act on our opinions, because those opinions may be wrong,\r\nwe should leave all our interests uncared for, and all our duties\r\nunperformed. An objection which applies to all conduct, can be no valid\r\nobjection to any conduct in particular. It is the duty of governments,\r\nand of individuals, to form the truest opinions they can; to form them\r\ncarefully, and never impose them upon others unless they are quite sure\r\nof being right. But when they are sure (such reasoners may say), it is\r\nnot conscientiousness but cowardice to shrink from acting on their\r\nopinions, and allow doctrines which they honestly think dangerous to the\r\nwelfare of mankind, either in this life or in another, to be scattered\r\nabroad without restraint, because other people, in less enlightened\r\ntimes, have persecuted opinions now believed to be true. Let us take\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_35\"\u003e[Pg 35]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncare, it may be said, not to make the same mistake: but governments and\r\nnations have made mistakes in other things, which are not denied to be\r\nfit subjects for the exercise of authority: they have laid on bad taxes,\r\nmade unjust wars. Ought we therefore to lay on no taxes, and, under\r\nwhatever provocation, make no wars? Men, and governments, must act to\r\nthe best of their ability. There is no such thing as absolute certainty,\r\nbut there is assurance sufficient for the purposes of human life. We\r\nmay, and must, assume our opinion to be true for the guidance of our own\r\nconduct: and it is assuming no more when we forbid bad men to pervert\r\nsociety by the propagation of opinions which we regard as false and pernicious.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI answer that it is assuming very much more. There is the greatest\r\ndifference between presuming an opinion to be true, because, with every\r\nopportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its\r\ntruth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation. Complete liberty\r\nof contradicting and disproving our opinion, is the very condition which\r\njustifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no\r\nother terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance\r\nof being right.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_36\"\u003e[Pg 36]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhen we consider either the history of opinion, or the ordinary conduct\r\nof human life, to what is it to be ascribed that the one and the other\r\nare no worse than they are? Not certainly to the inherent force of the\r\nhuman understanding; for, on any matter not self-evident, there are\r\nninety-nine persons totally incapable of judging of it, for one who is\r\ncapable; and the capacity of the hundredth person is only comparative;\r\nfor the majority of the eminent men of every past generation held many\r\nopinions now known to be erroneous, and did or approved numerous things\r\nwhich no one will now justify. Why is it, then, that there is on the\r\nwhole a preponderance among mankind of rational opinions and rational\r\nconduct? If there really is this preponderance—which there must be,\r\nunless human affairs are, and have always been, in an almost desperate\r\nstate—it is owing to a quality of the human mind, the source of\r\neverything respectable in man either as an intellectual or as a moral\r\nbeing, namely, that his errors are corrigible. He is capable of\r\nrectifying his mistakes, by discussion and experience. Not by experience\r\nalone. There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be\r\ninterpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and\r\nargument: but facts\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_37\"\u003e[Pg 37]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind,\r\nmust be brought before it. Very few facts are able to tell their own\r\nstory, without comments to bring out their meaning. The whole strength\r\nand value, then, of human judgment, depending on the one property, that\r\nit can be set right when it is wrong, reliance can be placed on it only\r\nwhen the means of setting it right are kept constantly at hand. In the\r\ncase of any person whose judgment is really deserving of confidence, how\r\nhas it become so? Because he has kept his mind open to criticism of his\r\nopinions and conduct. Because it has been his practice to listen to all\r\nthat could be said against him; to profit by as much of it as was just,\r\nand expound to himself, and upon occasion to others, the fallacy of what\r\nwas fallacious. Because he has felt, that the only way in which a human\r\nbeing can make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject, is by\r\nhearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of\r\nopinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every\r\ncharacter of mind. No wise man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but\r\nthis; nor is it in the nature of human intellect to become wise in any\r\nother manner. The steady habit of correcting and completing his own\r\nopinion by collating it\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_38\"\u003e[Pg 38]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e with those of others, so far from causing doubt\r\nand hesitation in carrying it into practice, is the only stable\r\nfoundation for a just reliance on it: for, being cognisant of all that\r\ncan, at least obviously, be said against him, and having taken up his\r\nposition against all gainsayers—knowing that he has sought for\r\nobjections and difficulties, instead of avoiding them, and has shut out\r\nno light which can be thrown upon the subject from any quarter—he has a\r\nright to think his judgment better than that of any person, or any\r\nmultitude, who have not gone through a similar process.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is not too much to require that what the wisest of mankind, those who\r\nare best entitled to trust their own judgment, find necessary to warrant\r\ntheir relying on it, should be submitted to by that miscellaneous\r\ncollection of a few wise and many foolish individuals, called the\r\npublic. The most intolerant of churches, the Roman Catholic Church, even\r\nat the canonisation of a saint, admits, and listens patiently to, a\r\n\"devil\u0027s advocate.\" The holiest of men, it appears, cannot be admitted\r\nto posthumous honours, until all that the devil could say against him is\r\nknown and weighed. If even the Newtonian philosophy were not permitted\r\nto be questioned, mankind could not feel as complete assurance of its\r\ntruth as they now do. The beliefs\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_39\"\u003e[Pg 39]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e which we have most warrant for, have\r\nno safeguard to rest on, but a standing invitation to the whole world to\r\nprove them unfounded. If the challenge is not accepted, or is accepted\r\nand the attempt fails, we are far enough from certainty still; but we\r\nhave done the best that the existing state of human reason admits of; we\r\nhave neglected nothing that could give the truth a chance of reaching\r\nus: if the lists are kept open, we may hope that if there be a better\r\ntruth, it will be found when the human mind is capable of receiving it;\r\nand in the meantime we may rely on having attained such approach to\r\ntruth, as is possible in our own day. This is the amount of certainty\r\nattainable by a fallible being, and this the sole way of attaining it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eStrange it is, that men should admit the validity of the arguments for\r\nfree discussion, but object to their being \"pushed to an extreme;\" not\r\nseeing that unless the reasons are good for an extreme case, they are\r\nnot good for any case. Strange that they should imagine that they are\r\nnot assuming infallibility, when they acknowledge that there should be\r\nfree discussion on all subjects which can possibly be \u003ci\u003edoubtful\u003c/i\u003e, but\r\nthink that some particular principle or doctrine should be forbidden to\r\nbe questioned because it is \u003ci\u003eso certain\u003c/i\u003e,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_40\"\u003e[Pg 40]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e that is, because \u003ci\u003ethey are\r\ncertain\u003c/i\u003e that it is certain. To call any proposition certain, while\r\nthere is any one who would deny its certainty if permitted, but who is\r\nnot permitted, is to assume that we ourselves, and those who agree with\r\nus, are the judges of certainty, and judges without hearing the other side.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the present age—which has been described as \"destitute of faith, but\r\nterrified at scepticism\"—in which people feel sure, not so much that\r\ntheir opinions are true, as that they should not know what to do without\r\nthem—the claims of an opinion to be protected from public attack are\r\nrested not so much on its truth, as on its importance to society. There\r\nare, it is alleged, certain beliefs, so useful, not to say indispensable\r\nto well-being, that it is as much the duty of governments to uphold\r\nthose beliefs, as to protect any other of the interests of society. In a\r\ncase of such necessity, and so directly in the line of their duty,\r\nsomething less than infallibility may, it is maintained, warrant, and\r\neven bind, governments, to act on their own opinion, confirmed by the\r\ngeneral opinion of mankind. It is also often argued, and still oftener\r\nthought, that none but bad men would desire to weaken these salutary\r\nbeliefs; and there can be nothing wrong, it is thought, in restraining\r\nbad\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_41\"\u003e[Pg 41]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e men, and prohibiting what only such men would wish to practise.\r\nThis mode of thinking makes the justification of restraints on\r\ndiscussion not a question of the truth of doctrines, but of their\r\nusefulness; and flatters itself by that means to escape the\r\nresponsibility of claiming to be an infallible judge of opinions. But\r\nthose who thus satisfy themselves, do not perceive that the assumption\r\nof infallibility is merely shifted from one point to another. The\r\nusefulness of an opinion is itself matter of opinion: as disputable, as\r\nopen to discussion, and requiring discussion as much, as the opinion\r\nitself. There is the same need of an infallible judge of opinions to\r\ndecide an opinion to be noxious, as to decide it to be false, unless the\r\nopinion condemned has full opportunity of defending itself. And it will\r\nnot do to say that the heretic may be allowed to maintain the utility or\r\nharmlessness of his opinion, though forbidden to maintain its truth. The\r\ntruth of an opinion is part of its utility. If we would know whether or\r\nnot it is desirable that a proposition should be believed, is it\r\npossible to exclude the consideration of whether or not it is true? In\r\nthe opinion, not of bad men, but of the best men, no belief which is\r\ncontrary to truth can be really useful: and can you prevent such men\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_42\"\u003e[Pg 42]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfrom urging that plea, when they are charged with culpability for\r\ndenying some doctrine which they are told is useful, but which they\r\nbelieve to be false? Those who are on the side of received opinions,\r\nnever fail to take all possible advantage of this plea; you do not find\r\n\u003ci\u003ethem\u003c/i\u003e handling the question of utility as if it could be completely\r\nabstracted from that of truth: on the contrary, it is, above all,\r\nbecause their doctrine is \"the truth,\" that the knowledge or the belief\r\nof it is held to be so indispensable. There can be no fair discussion of\r\nthe question of usefulness, when an argument so vital may be employed on\r\none side, but not on the other. And in point of fact, when law or public\r\nfeeling do not permit the truth of an opinion to be disputed, they are\r\njust as little tolerant of a denial of its usefulness. The utmost they\r\nallow is an extenuation of its absolute necessity, or of the positive\r\nguilt of rejecting it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn order more fully to illustrate the mischief of denying a hearing to\r\nopinions because we, in our own judgment, have condemned them, it will\r\nbe desirable to fix down the discussion to a concrete case; and I\r\nchoose, by preference, the cases which are least favourable to me—in\r\nwhich the argument against freedom of opinion, both on the score of\r\ntruth and on that of utility, is considered the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_43\"\u003e[Pg 43]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e strongest. Let the\r\nopinions impugned be the belief in a God and in a future state, or any\r\nof the commonly received doctrines of morality. To fight the battle on\r\nsuch ground, gives a great advantage to an unfair antagonist; since he\r\nwill be sure to say (and many who have no desire to be unfair will say\r\nit internally), Are these the doctrines which you do not deem\r\nsufficiently certain to be taken under the protection of law? Is the\r\nbelief in a God one of the opinions, to feel sure of which, you hold to\r\nbe assuming infallibility? But I must be permitted to observe, that it\r\nis not the feeling sure of a doctrine (be it what it may) which I call\r\nan assumption of infallibility. It is the undertaking to decide that\r\nquestion \u003ci\u003efor others\u003c/i\u003e, without allowing them to hear what can be said on\r\nthe contrary side. And I denounce and reprobate this pretension not the\r\nless, if put forth on the side of my most solemn convictions. However\r\npositive any one\u0027s persuasion may be, not only of the falsity, but of\r\nthe pernicious consequences—not only of the pernicious consequences,\r\nbut (to adopt expressions which I altogether condemn) the immorality and\r\nimpiety of an opinion; yet if, in pursuance of that private judgment,\r\nthough backed by the public judgment of his country\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_44\"\u003e[Pg 44]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or his\r\ncontemporaries, he prevents the opinion from being heard in its defence,\r\nhe assumes infallibility. And so far from the assumption being less\r\nobjectionable or less dangerous because the opinion is called immoral or\r\nimpious, this is the case of all others in which it is most fatal. These\r\nare exactly the occasions on which the men of one generation commit\r\nthose dreadful mistakes, which excite the astonishment and horror of\r\nposterity. It is among such that we find the instances memorable in\r\nhistory, when the arm of the law has been employed to root out the best\r\nmen and the noblest doctrines; with deplorable success as to the men,\r\nthough some of the doctrines have survived to be (as if in mockery)\r\ninvoked, in defence of similar conduct towards those who dissent from\r\n\u003ci\u003ethem\u003c/i\u003e, or from their received interpretation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMankind can hardly be too often reminded that there was once a man named\r\nSocrates, between whom and the legal authorities and public opinion of\r\nhis time, there took place a memorable collision. Born in an age and\r\ncountry abounding in individual greatness, this man has been handed down\r\nto us by those who best knew both him and the age, as the most virtuous\r\nman in it; while \u003ci\u003ewe\u003c/i\u003e know him as the head and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_45\"\u003e[Pg 45]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e prototype of all\r\nsubsequent teachers of virtue, the source equally of the lofty\r\ninspiration of Plato and the judicious utilitarianism of Aristotle, \"\u003ci\u003ei\r\nmaëstri di color che sanno\u003c/i\u003e,\" the two headsprings of ethical as of all\r\nother philosophy. This acknowledged master of all the eminent thinkers\r\nwho have since lived—whose fame, still growing after more than two\r\nthousand years, all but outweighs the whole remainder of the names which\r\nmake his native city illustrious—was put to death by his countrymen,\r\nafter a judicial conviction, for impiety and immorality. Impiety, in\r\ndenying the gods recognised by the State; indeed his accuser asserted\r\n(see the \"Apologia\") that he believed in no gods at all. Immorality, in\r\nbeing, by his doctrines and instructions, a \"corruptor of youth.\" Of\r\nthese charges the tribunal, there is every ground for believing,\r\nhonestly found him guilty, and condemned the man who probably of all\r\nthen born had deserved best of mankind, to be put to death as a criminal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo pass from this to the only other instance of judicial iniquity, the\r\nmention of which, after the condemnation of Socrates, would not be an\r\nanticlimax: the event which took place on Calvary rather more than\r\neighteen hundred years\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_46\"\u003e[Pg 46]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e ago. The man who left on the memory of those who\r\nwitnessed his life and conversation, such an impression of his moral\r\ngrandeur, that eighteen subsequent centuries have done homage to him as\r\nthe Almighty in person, was ignominiously put to death, as what? As a\r\nblasphemer. Men did not merely mistake their benefactor; they mistook\r\nhim for the exact contrary of what he was, and treated him as that\r\nprodigy of impiety, which they themselves are now held to be, for their\r\ntreatment of him. The feelings with which mankind now regard these\r\nlamentable transactions, especially the later of the two, render them\r\nextremely unjust in their judgment of the unhappy actors. These were, to\r\nall appearance, not bad men—not worse than men commonly are, but rather\r\nthe contrary; men who possessed in a full, or somewhat more than a full\r\nmeasure, the religious, moral, and patriotic feelings of their time and\r\npeople: the very kind of men who, in all times, our own included, have\r\nevery chance of passing through life blameless and respected. The\r\nhigh-priest who rent his garments when the words were pronounced, which,\r\naccording to all the ideas of his country, constituted the blackest\r\nguilt, was in all probability quite as sincere in his horror and\r\nindignation, as the generality of respectable and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_47\"\u003e[Pg 47]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e pious men now are in\r\nthe religious and moral sentiments they profess; and most of those who\r\nnow shudder at his conduct, if they had lived in his time, and been born\r\nJews, would have acted precisely as he did. Orthodox Christians who are\r\ntempted to think that those who stoned to death the first martyrs must\r\nhave been worse men than they themselves are, ought to remember that one\r\nof those persecutors was Saint Paul.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us add one more example, the most striking of all, if the\r\nimpressiveness of an error is measured by the wisdom and virtue of him\r\nwho falls into it. If ever any one, possessed of power, had grounds for\r\nthinking himself the best and most enlightened among his cotemporaries,\r\nit was the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. Absolute monarch of the whole\r\ncivilised world, he preserved through life not only the most unblemished\r\njustice, but what was less to be expected from his Stoical breeding, the\r\ntenderest heart. The few failings which are attributed to him, were all\r\non the side of indulgence: while his writings, the highest ethical\r\nproduct of the ancient mind, differ scarcely perceptibly, if they differ\r\nat all, from the most characteristic teachings of Christ. This man, a\r\nbetter Christian in all but the dogmatic sense of the word, than almost\r\nany of the ostensibly\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_48\"\u003e[Pg 48]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Christian sovereigns who have since reigned,\r\npersecuted Christianity. Placed at the summit of all the previous\r\nattainments of humanity, with an open, unfettered intellect, and a\r\ncharacter which led him of himself to embody in his moral writings the\r\nChristian ideal, he yet failed to see that Christianity was to be a good\r\nand not an evil to the world, with his duties to which he was so deeply\r\npenetrated. Existing society he knew to be in a deplorable state. But\r\nsuch as it was, he saw, or thought he saw, that it was held together,\r\nand prevented from being worse, by belief and reverence of the received\r\ndivinities. As a ruler of mankind, he deemed it his duty not to suffer\r\nsociety to fall in pieces; and saw not how, if its existing ties were\r\nremoved, any others could be formed which could again knit it together.\r\nThe new religion openly aimed at dissolving these ties: unless,\r\ntherefore, it was his duty to adopt that religion, it seemed to be his\r\nduty to put it down. Inasmuch then as the theology of Christianity did\r\nnot appear to him true or of divine origin; inasmuch as this strange\r\nhistory of a crucified God was not credible to him, and a system which\r\npurported to rest entirely upon a foundation to him so wholly\r\nunbelievable, could not be foreseen by him to be that renovating agency\r\nwhich, after\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_49\"\u003e[Pg 49]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e all abatements, it has in fact proved to be; the gentlest\r\nand most amiable of philosophers and rulers, under a solemn sense of\r\nduty, authorised the persecution of Christianity. To my mind this is one\r\nof the most tragical facts in all history. It is a bitter thought, how\r\ndifferent a thing the Christianity of the world might have been, if the\r\nChristian faith had been adopted as the religion of the empire under the\r\nauspices of Marcus Aurelius instead of those of Constantine. But it\r\nwould be equally unjust to him and false to truth, to deny, that no one\r\nplea which can be urged for punishing anti-Christian teaching, was\r\nwanting to Marcus Aurelius for punishing, as he did, the propagation of\r\nChristianity. No Christian more firmly believes that Atheism is false,\r\nand tends to the dissolution of society, than Marcus Aurelius believed\r\nthe same things of Christianity; he who, of all men then living, might\r\nhave been thought the most capable of appreciating it. Unless any one\r\nwho approves of punishment for the promulgation of opinions, flatters\r\nhimself that he is a wiser and better man than Marcus Aurelius—more\r\ndeeply versed in the wisdom of his time, more elevated in his intellect\r\nabove it—more earnest in his search for truth, or more single-minded in\r\nhis devotion to it when found;—let him abstain from that assumption of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_50\"\u003e[Pg 50]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe joint infallibility of himself and the multitude, which the great\r\nAntoninus made with so unfortunate a result.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAware of the impossibility of defending the use of punishment for\r\nrestraining irreligious opinions, by any argument which will not justify\r\nMarcus Antoninus, the enemies of religious freedom, when hard pressed,\r\noccasionally accept this consequence, and say, with Dr. Johnson, that\r\nthe persecutors of Christianity were in the right; that persecution is\r\nan ordeal through which truth ought to pass, and always passes\r\nsuccessfully, legal penalties being, in the end, powerless against\r\ntruth, though sometimes beneficially effective against mischievous\r\nerrors. This is a form of the argument for religious intolerance,\r\nsufficiently remarkable not to be passed without notice.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eA theory which maintains that truth may justifiably be persecuted\r\nbecause persecution cannot possibly do it any harm, cannot be charged\r\nwith being intentionally hostile to the reception of new truths; but we\r\ncannot commend the generosity of its dealing with the persons to whom\r\nmankind are indebted for them. To discover to the world something which\r\ndeeply concerns it, and of which it was previously ignorant; to prove to\r\nit that it had been mistaken on some vital point\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_51\"\u003e[Pg 51]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of temporal or\r\nspiritual interest, is as important a service as a human being can\r\nrender to his fellow-creatures, and in certain cases, as in those of the\r\nearly Christians and of the Reformers, those who think with Dr. Johnson\r\nbelieve it to have been the most precious gift which could be bestowed\r\non mankind. That the authors of such splendid benefits should be\r\nrequited by martyrdom; that their reward should be to be dealt with as\r\nthe vilest of criminals, is not, upon this theory, a deplorable error\r\nand misfortune, for which humanity should mourn in sackcloth and ashes,\r\nbut the normal and justifiable state of things. The propounder of a new\r\ntruth, according to this doctrine, should stand, as stood, in the\r\nlegislation of the Locrians, the proposer of a new law, with a halter\r\nround his neck, to be instantly tightened if the public assembly did\r\nnot, on hearing his reasons, then and there adopt his proposition.\r\nPeople who defend this mode of treating benefactors, cannot be supposed\r\nto set much value on the benefit; and I believe this view of the subject\r\nis mostly confined to the sort of persons who think that new truths may\r\nhave been desirable once, but that we have had enough of them now.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut, indeed, the dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution, is\r\none of those pleasant\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_52\"\u003e[Pg 52]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e falsehoods which men repeat after one another\r\ntill they pass into commonplaces, but which all experience refutes.\r\nHistory teems with instances of truth put down by persecution. If not\r\nsuppressed for ever, it may be thrown back for centuries. To speak only\r\nof religious opinions: the Reformation broke out at least twenty times\r\nbefore Luther, and was put down. Arnold of Brescia was put down. Fra\r\nDolcino was put down. Savonarola was put down. The Albigeois were put\r\ndown. The Vaudois were put down. The Lollards were put down. The\r\nHussites were put down. Even after the era of Luther, wherever\r\npersecution was persisted in, it was successful. In Spain, Italy,\r\nFlanders, the Austrian empire, Protestantism was rooted out; and, most\r\nlikely, would have been so in England, had Queen Mary lived, or Queen\r\nElizabeth died. Persecution has always succeeded, save where the\r\nheretics were too strong a party to be effectually persecuted. No\r\nreasonable person can doubt that Christianity might have been extirpated\r\nin the Roman Empire. It spread, and became predominant, because the\r\npersecutions were only occasional, lasting but a short time, and\r\nseparated by long intervals of almost undisturbed propagandism. It is a\r\npiece of idle sentimentality that truth, merely as truth,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_53\"\u003e[Pg 53]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e has any\r\ninherent power denied to error, of prevailing against the dungeon and\r\nthe stake. Men are not more zealous for truth than they often are for\r\nerror, and a sufficient application of legal or even of social penalties\r\nwill generally succeed in stopping the propagation of either. The real\r\nadvantage which truth has, consists in this, that when an opinion is\r\ntrue, it may be extinguished once, twice, or many times, but in the\r\ncourse of ages there will generally be found persons to rediscover it,\r\nuntil some one of its reappearances falls on a time when from favourable\r\ncircumstances it escapes persecution until it has made such head as to\r\nwithstand all subsequent attempts to suppress it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt will be said, that we do not now put to death the introducers of new\r\nopinions: we are not like our fathers who slew the prophets, we even\r\nbuild sepulchres to them. It is true we no longer put heretics to death;\r\nand the amount of penal infliction which modern feeling would probably\r\ntolerate, even against the most obnoxious opinions, is not sufficient to\r\nextirpate them. But let us not flatter ourselves that we are yet free\r\nfrom the stain even of legal persecution. Penalties for opinion, or at\r\nleast for its expression, still exist by law; and their enforcement is\r\nnot, even in these times,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_54\"\u003e[Pg 54]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e so unexampled as to make it at all incredible\r\nthat they may some day be revived in full force. In the year 1857, at\r\nthe summer assizes of the county of Cornwall, an unfortunate man,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_7_7\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_7_7\"\u003e[7]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsaid to be of unexceptionable conduct in all relations of life, was\r\nsentenced to twenty-one months\u0027 imprisonment, for uttering, and writing\r\non a gate, some offensive words concerning Christianity. Within a month\r\nof the same time, at the Old Bailey, two persons, on two separate\r\noccasions,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_8_8\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_8_8\"\u003e[8]\u003c/a\u003e were rejected as jurymen, and one of them grossly insulted\r\nby the judge and by one of the counsel, because they honestly declared\r\nthat they had no theological belief; and a third, a foreigner,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_9_9\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_9_9\"\u003e[9]\u003c/a\u003e for\r\nthe same reason, was denied justice against a thief. This refusal of\r\nredress took place in virtue of the legal doctrine, that no person can\r\nbe allowed to give evidence in a court of justice, who does not profess\r\nbelief in a God (any god is sufficient) and in a future state; which is\r\nequivalent to declaring such persons to be outlaws, excluded from the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_55\"\u003e[Pg 55]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eprotection of the tribunals; who may not only be robbed or assaulted\r\nwith impunity, if no one but themselves, or persons of similar opinions,\r\nbe present, but any one else may be robbed or assaulted with impunity,\r\nif the proof of the fact depends on their evidence. The assumption on\r\nwhich this is grounded, is that the oath is worthless, of a person who\r\ndoes not believe in a future state; a proposition which betokens much\r\nignorance of history in those who assent to it (since it is historically\r\ntrue that a large proportion of infidels in all ages have been persons\r\nof distinguished integrity and honour); and would be maintained by no\r\none who had the smallest conception how many of the persons in greatest\r\nrepute with the world, both for virtues and for attainments, are well\r\nknown, at least to their intimates, to be unbelievers. The rule,\r\nbesides, is suicidal, and cuts away its own foundation. Under pretence\r\nthat atheists must be liars, it admits the testimony of all atheists who\r\nare willing to lie, and rejects only those who brave the obloquy of\r\npublicly confessing a detested creed rather than affirm a falsehood. A\r\nrule thus self-convicted of absurdity so far as regards its professed\r\npurpose, can be kept in force only as a badge of hatred, a relic of\r\npersecution; a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_56\"\u003e[Pg 56]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e persecution, too, having the peculiarity, that the\r\nqualification for undergoing it, is the being clearly proved not to\r\ndeserve it. The rule, and the theory it implies, are hardly less\r\ninsulting to believers than to infidels. For if he who does not believe\r\nin a future state, necessarily lies, it follows that they who do believe\r\nare only prevented from lying, if prevented they are, by the fear of\r\nhell. We will not do the authors and abettors of the rule the injury of\r\nsupposing, that the conception which they have formed of Christian\r\nvirtue is drawn from their own consciousness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese, indeed, are but rags and remnants of persecution, and may be\r\nthought to be not so much an indication of the wish to persecute, as an\r\nexample of that very frequent infirmity of English minds, which makes\r\nthem take a preposterous pleasure in the assertion of a bad principle,\r\nwhen they are no longer bad enough to desire to carry it really into\r\npractice. But unhappily there is no security in the state of the public\r\nmind, that the suspension of worse forms of legal persecution, which has\r\nlasted for about the space of a generation, will continue. In this age\r\nthe quiet surface of routine is as often ruffled by attempts to\r\nresuscitate past evils, as to introduce new benefits. What is boasted of\r\nat\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_57\"\u003e[Pg 57]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the present time as the revival of religion, is always, in narrow\r\nand uncultivated minds, at least as much the revival of bigotry; and\r\nwhere there is the strong permanent leaven of intolerance in the\r\nfeelings of a people, which at all times abides in the middle classes of\r\nthis country, it needs but little to provoke them into actively\r\npersecuting those whom they have never ceased to think proper objects of\r\npersecution.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_10_10\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_10_10\"\u003e[10]\u003c/a\u003e For it is this—it is the opinions men entertain, and\r\nthe feelings they cherish, respecting those who disown the beliefs they\r\ndeem important, which makes this country not a place of mental freedom.\r\nFor a long time past, the chief mischief of the legal penalties is that\r\nthey strengthen the social stigma.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_58\"\u003e[Pg 58]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e It is that stigma which is really\r\neffective, and so effective is it that the profession of opinions which\r\nare under the ban of society is much less common in England, than is, in\r\nmany other countries, the avowal of those which incur risk of judicial\r\npunishment. In respect to all persons but those whose pecuniary\r\ncircumstances make them independent of the good will of other people,\r\nopinion, on this subject, is as efficacious as law; men might as well be\r\nimprisoned, as excluded from the means of earning their bread. Those\r\nwhose bread is already secured, and who desire no favours from men in\r\npower, or from bodies of men, or from the public, have nothing to fear\r\nfrom the open avowal of any opinions, but to be ill-thought\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_59\"\u003e[Pg 59]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of and\r\nill-spoken of, and this it ought not to require a very heroic mould to\r\nenable them to bear. There is no room for any appeal \u003ci\u003ead misericordiam\u003c/i\u003e\r\nin behalf of such persons. But though we do not now inflict so much evil\r\non those who think differently from us, as it was formerly our custom to\r\ndo, it may be that we do ourselves as much evil as ever by our treatment\r\nof them. Socrates was put to death, but the Socratic philosophy rose\r\nlike the sun in heaven, and spread its illumination over the whole\r\nintellectual firmament. Christians were cast to the lions, but the\r\nChristian church grew up a stately and spreading tree, overtopping the\r\nolder and less vigorous growths, and stifling them by its shade. Our\r\nmerely social intolerance kills no one, roots out no opinions, but\r\ninduces men to disguise them, or to abstain from any active effort for\r\ntheir diffusion. With us, heretical opinions do not perceptibly gain, or\r\neven lose, ground in each decade or generation; they never blaze out far\r\nand wide, but continue to smoulder in the narrow circles of thinking and\r\nstudious persons among whom they originate, without ever lighting up the\r\ngeneral affairs of mankind with either a true or a deceptive light. And\r\nthus is kept up a state of things very satisfactory to some minds,\r\nbecause,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_60\"\u003e[Pg 60]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e without the unpleasant process of fining or imprisoning\r\nanybody, it maintains all prevailing opinions outwardly undisturbed,\r\nwhile it does not absolutely interdict the exercise of reason by\r\ndissentients afflicted with the malady of thought. A convenient plan for\r\nhaving peace in the intellectual world, and keeping all things going on\r\ntherein very much as they do already. But the price paid for this sort\r\nof intellectual pacification, is the sacrifice of the entire moral\r\ncourage of the human mind. A state of things in which a large portion of\r\nthe most active and inquiring intellects find it advisable to keep the\r\ngenuine principles and grounds of their convictions within their own\r\nbreasts, and attempt, in what they address to the public, to fit as much\r\nas they can of their own conclusions to premises which they have\r\ninternally renounced, cannot send forth the open, fearless characters,\r\nand logical, consistent intellects who once adorned the thinking world.\r\nThe sort of men who can be looked for under it, are either mere\r\nconformers to commonplace, or time-servers for truth, whose arguments on\r\nall great subjects are meant for their hearers, and are not those which\r\nhave convinced themselves. Those who avoid this alternative, do so by\r\nnarrowing their thoughts and interest to things\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_61\"\u003e[Pg 61]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e which can be spoken of\r\nwithout venturing within the region of principles, that is, to small\r\npractical matters, which would come right of themselves, if but the\r\nminds of mankind were strengthened and enlarged, and which will never be\r\nmade effectually right until then: while that which would strengthen and\r\nenlarge men\u0027s minds, free and daring speculation on the highest\r\nsubjects, is abandoned.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThose in whose eyes this reticence on the part of heretics is no evil,\r\nshould consider in the first place, that in consequence of it there is\r\nnever any fair and thorough discussion of heretical opinions; and that\r\nsuch of them as could not stand such a discussion, though they may be\r\nprevented from spreading, do not disappear. But it is not the minds of\r\nheretics that are deteriorated most, by the ban placed on all inquiry\r\nwhich does not end in the orthodox conclusions. The greatest harm done\r\nis to those who are not heretics, and whose whole mental development is\r\ncramped, and their reason cowed, by the fear of heresy. Who can compute\r\nwhat the world loses in the multitude of promising intellects combined\r\nwith timid characters, who dare not follow out any bold, vigorous,\r\nindependent train of thought, lest it should land them in something\r\nwhich would\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_62\"\u003e[Pg 62]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e admit of being considered irreligious or immoral? Among\r\nthem we may occasionally see some man of deep conscientiousness, and\r\nsubtle and refined understanding, who spends a life in sophisticating\r\nwith an intellect which he cannot silence, and exhausts the resources of\r\ningenuity in attempting to reconcile the promptings of his conscience\r\nand reason with orthodoxy, which yet he does not, perhaps, to the end\r\nsucceed in doing. No one can be a great thinker who does not recognise,\r\nthat as a thinker it is his first duty to follow his intellect to\r\nwhatever conclusions it may lead. Truth gains more even by the errors of\r\none who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself, than by the\r\ntrue opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer\r\nthemselves to think. Not that it is solely, or chiefly, to form great\r\nthinkers, that freedom of thinking is required. On the contrary, it is\r\nas much, and even more indispensable, to enable average human beings to\r\nattain the mental stature which they are capable of. There have been,\r\nand may again be, great individual thinkers, in a general atmosphere of\r\nmental slavery. But there never has been, nor ever will be, in that\r\natmosphere, an intellectually active people. Where any people has made a\r\ntemporary approach to such a character, it has\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_63\"\u003e[Pg 63]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e been because the dread\r\nof heterodox speculation was for a time suspended. Where there is a\r\ntacit convention that principles are not to be disputed; where the\r\ndiscussion of the greatest questions which can occupy humanity is\r\nconsidered to be closed, we cannot hope to find that generally high\r\nscale of mental activity which has made some periods of history so\r\nremarkable. Never when controversy avoided the subjects which are large\r\nand important enough to kindle enthusiasm, was the mind of a people\r\nstirred up from its foundations, and the impulse given which raised even\r\npersons of the most ordinary intellect to something of the dignity of\r\nthinking beings. Of such we have had an example in the condition of\r\nEurope during the times immediately following the Reformation; another,\r\nthough limited to the Continent and to a more cultivated class, in the\r\nspeculative movement of the latter half of the eighteenth century; and a\r\nthird, of still briefer duration, in the intellectual fermentation of\r\nGermany during the Goethian and Fichtean period. These periods differed\r\nwidely in the particular opinions which they developed; but were alike\r\nin this, that during all three the yoke of authority was broken. In\r\neach, an old mental despotism had been thrown off, and no new one had\r\nyet\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_64\"\u003e[Pg 64]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e taken its place. The impulse given at these three periods has made\r\nEurope what it now is. Every single improvement which has taken place\r\neither in the human mind or in institutions, may be traced distinctly to\r\none or other of them. Appearances have for some time indicated that all\r\nthree impulses are well-nigh spent; and we can expect no fresh start,\r\nuntil we again assert our mental freedom.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us now pass to the second division of the argument, and dismissing\r\nthe supposition that any of the received opinions may be false, let us\r\nassume them to be true, and examine into the worth of the manner in\r\nwhich they are likely to be held, when their truth is not freely and\r\nopenly canvassed. However unwillingly a person who has a strong opinion\r\nmay admit the possibility that his opinion may be false, he ought to be\r\nmoved by the consideration that however true it may be, if it is not\r\nfully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead\r\ndogma, not a living truth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is a class of persons (happily not quite so numerous as formerly)\r\nwho think it enough if a person assents undoubtingly to what they think\r\ntrue, though he has no knowledge whatever of the grounds of the opinion,\r\nand could not make a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_65\"\u003e[Pg 65]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e tenable defence of it against the most superficial\r\nobjections. Such persons, if they can once get their creed taught from\r\nauthority, naturally think that no good, and some harm, comes of its\r\nbeing allowed to be questioned. Where their influence prevails, they\r\nmake it nearly impossible for the received opinion to be rejected wisely\r\nand considerately, though it may still be rejected rashly and\r\nignorantly; for to shut out discussion entirely is seldom possible, and\r\nwhen it once gets in, beliefs not grounded on conviction are apt to give\r\nway before the slightest semblance of an argument. Waiving, however,\r\nthis possibility—assuming that the true opinion abides in the mind, but\r\nabides as a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against,\r\nargument—this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a\r\nrational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but\r\none superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which\r\nenunciate a truth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf the intellect and judgment of mankind ought to be cultivated, a thing\r\nwhich Protestants at least do not deny, on what can these faculties be\r\nmore appropriately exercised by any one, than on the things which\r\nconcern him so much that it is considered necessary for him to hold\r\nopinions on\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_66\"\u003e[Pg 66]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e them? If the cultivation of the understanding consists in\r\none thing more than in another, it is surely in learning the grounds of\r\none\u0027s own opinions. Whatever people believe, on subjects on which it is\r\nof the first importance to believe rightly, they ought to be able to\r\ndefend against at least the common objections. But, some one may say,\r\n\"Let them be \u003ci\u003etaught\u003c/i\u003e the grounds of their opinions. It does not follow\r\nthat opinions must be merely parroted because they are never heard\r\ncontroverted. Persons who learn geometry do not simply commit the\r\ntheorems to memory, but understand and learn likewise the\r\ndemonstrations; and it would be absurd to say that they remain ignorant\r\nof the grounds of geometrical truths, because they never hear any one\r\ndeny, and attempt to disprove them.\" Undoubtedly: and such teaching\r\nsuffices on a subject like mathematics, where there is nothing at all to\r\nbe said on the wrong side of the question. The peculiarity of the\r\nevidence of mathematical truths is, that all the argument is on one\r\nside. There are no objections, and no answers to objections. But on\r\nevery subject on which difference of opinion is possible, the truth\r\ndepends on a balance to be struck between two sets of conflicting\r\nreasons. Even in natural philosophy, there is always some\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_67\"\u003e[Pg 67]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e other\r\nexplanation possible of the same facts; some geocentric theory instead\r\nof heliocentric, some phlogiston instead of oxygen; and it has to be\r\nshown why that other theory cannot be the true one: and until this is\r\nshown, and until we know how it is shown, we do not understand the\r\ngrounds of our opinion. But when we turn to subjects infinitely more\r\ncomplicated, to morals, religion, politics, social relations, and the\r\nbusiness of life, three-fourths of the arguments for every disputed\r\nopinion consist in dispelling the appearances which favour some opinion\r\ndifferent from it. The greatest orator, save one, of antiquity, has left\r\nit on record that he always studied his adversary\u0027s case with as great,\r\nif not with still greater, intensity than even his own. What Cicero\r\npractised as the means of forensic success, requires to be imitated by\r\nall who study any subject in order to arrive at the truth. He who knows\r\nonly his own side of the case, knows little of that. His reasons may be\r\ngood, and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally\r\nunable to refute the reasons on the opposite side; if he does not so\r\nmuch as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either\r\nopinion. The rational position for him would be suspension of judgment,\r\nand unless he contents himself with that, he is either\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_68\"\u003e[Pg 68]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e led by\r\nauthority, or adopts, like the generality of the world, the side to\r\nwhich he feels most inclination. Nor is it enough that he should hear\r\nthe arguments of adversaries from his own teachers, presented as they\r\nstate them, and accompanied by what they offer as refutations. That is\r\nnot the way to do justice to the arguments, or bring them into real\r\ncontact with his own mind. He must be able to hear them from persons who\r\nactually believe them; who defend them in earnest, and do their very\r\nutmost for them. He must know them in their most plausible and\r\npersuasive form; he must feel the whole force of the difficulty which\r\nthe true view of the subject has to encounter and dispose of; else he\r\nwill never really possess himself of the portion of truth which meets\r\nand removes that difficulty. Ninety-nine in a hundred of what are called\r\neducated men are in this condition; even of those who can argue fluently\r\nfor their opinions. Their conclusion may be true, but it might be false\r\nfor anything they know: they have never thrown themselves into the\r\nmental position of those who think differently from them, and considered\r\nwhat such persons may have to say; and consequently they do not, in any\r\nproper sense of the word, know the doctrine which they themselves\r\nprofess. They do\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_69\"\u003e[Pg 69]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e not know those parts of it which explain and justify\r\nthe remainder; the considerations which show that a fact which seemingly\r\nconflicts with another is reconcilable with it, or that, of two\r\napparently strong reasons, one and not the other ought to be preferred.\r\nAll that part of the truth which turns the scale, and decides the\r\njudgment of a completely informed mind, they are strangers to; nor is it\r\never really known, but to those who have attended equally and\r\nimpartially to both sides, and endeavoured to see the reasons of both in\r\nthe strongest light. So essential is this discipline to a real\r\nunderstanding of moral and human subjects, that if opponents of all\r\nimportant truths do not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them, and\r\nsupply them with the strongest arguments which the most skilful devil\u0027s\r\nadvocate can conjure up.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo abate the force of these considerations, an enemy of free discussion\r\nmay be supposed to say, that there is no necessity for mankind in\r\ngeneral to know and understand all that can be said against or for their\r\nopinions by philosophers and theologians. That it is not needful for\r\ncommon men to be able to expose all the misstatements or fallacies of an\r\ningenious opponent. That it is enough if there is always somebody\r\ncapable of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_70\"\u003e[Pg 70]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e answering them, so that nothing likely to mislead\r\nuninstructed persons remains unrefuted. That simple minds, having been\r\ntaught the obvious grounds of the truths inculcated on them, may trust\r\nto authority for the rest, and being aware that they have neither\r\nknowledge nor talent to resolve every difficulty which can be raised,\r\nmay repose in the assurance that all those which have been raised have\r\nbeen or can be answered, by those who are specially trained to the task.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eConceding to this view of the subject the utmost that can be claimed for\r\nit by those most easily satisfied with the amount of understanding of\r\ntruth which ought to accompany the belief of it; even so, the argument\r\nfor free discussion is no way weakened. For even this doctrine\r\nacknowledges that mankind ought to have a rational assurance that all\r\nobjections have been satisfactorily answered; and how are they to be\r\nanswered if that which requires to be answered is not spoken? or how can\r\nthe answer be known to be satisfactory, if the objectors have no\r\nopportunity of showing that it is unsatisfactory? If not the public, at\r\nleast the philosophers and theologians who are to resolve the\r\ndifficulties, must make themselves familiar with those difficulties in\r\ntheir most puzzling form; and this cannot be \u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_71\"\u003e[Pg 71]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eaccomplished unless they\r\nare freely stated, and placed in the most advantageous light which they\r\nadmit of. The Catholic Church has its own way of dealing with this\r\nembarrassing problem. It makes a broad separation between those who can\r\nbe permitted to receive its doctrines on conviction, and those who must\r\naccept them on trust. Neither, indeed, are allowed any choice as to what\r\nthey will accept; but the clergy, such at least as can be fully confided\r\nin, may admissibly and meritoriously make themselves acquainted with the\r\narguments of opponents, in order to answer them, and may, therefore,\r\nread heretical books; the laity, not unless by special permission, hard\r\nto be obtained. This discipline recognises a knowledge of the enemy\u0027s\r\ncase as beneficial to the teachers, but finds means, consistent with\r\nthis, of denying it to the rest of the world: thus giving to the \u003ci\u003eélite\u003c/i\u003e\r\nmore mental culture, though not more mental freedom, than it allows to\r\nthe mass. By this device it succeeds in obtaining the kind of mental\r\nsuperiority which its purposes require; for though culture without\r\nfreedom never made a large and liberal mind, it can make a clever \u003ci\u003enisi\r\nprius\u003c/i\u003e advocate of a cause. But in countries professing Protestantism,\r\nthis resource is denied; since Protestants hold, at least in theory,\r\nthat the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_72\"\u003e[Pg 72]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e responsibility for the choice of a religion must be borne by\r\neach for himself, and cannot be thrown off upon teachers. Besides, in\r\nthe present state of the world, it is practically impossible that\r\nwritings which are read by the instructed can be kept from the\r\nuninstructed. If the teachers of mankind are to be cognisant of all that\r\nthey ought to know, everything must be free to be written and published\r\nwithout restraint.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf, however, the mischievous operation of the absence of free\r\ndiscussion, when the received opinions are true, were confined to\r\nleaving men ignorant of the grounds of those opinions, it might be\r\nthought that this, if an intellectual, is no moral evil, and does not\r\naffect the worth of the opinions, regarded in their influence on the\r\ncharacter. The fact, however, is, that not only the grounds of the\r\nopinion are forgotten in the absence of discussion, but too often the\r\nmeaning of the opinion itself. The words which convey it, cease to\r\nsuggest ideas, or suggest only a small portion of those they were\r\noriginally employed to communicate. Instead of a vivid conception and a\r\nliving belief, there remain only a few phrases retained by rote; or, if\r\nany part, the shell and husk only of the meaning is retained, the finer\r\nessence being lost. The great chapter in human history which this fact\r\noccupies\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_73\"\u003e[Pg 73]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and fills, cannot be too earnestly studied and meditated on.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is illustrated in the experience of almost all ethical doctrines and\r\nreligious creeds. They are all full of meaning and vitality to those who\r\noriginate them, and to the direct disciples of the originators. Their\r\nmeaning continues to be felt in undiminished strength, and is perhaps\r\nbrought out into even fuller consciousness, so long as the struggle\r\nlasts to give the doctrine or creed an ascendency over other creeds. At\r\nlast it either prevails, and becomes the general opinion, or its\r\nprogress stops; it keeps possession of the ground it has gained, but\r\nceases to spread further. When either of these results has become\r\napparent, controversy on the subject flags, and gradually dies away. The\r\ndoctrine has taken its place, if not as a received opinion, as one of\r\nthe admitted sects or divisions of opinion: those who hold it have\r\ngenerally inherited, not adopted it; and conversion from one of these\r\ndoctrines to another, being now an exceptional fact, occupies little\r\nplace in the thoughts of their professors. Instead of being, as at\r\nfirst, constantly on the alert either to defend themselves against the\r\nworld, or to bring the world over to them, they have subsided into\r\nacquiescence, and neither listen, when they\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_74\"\u003e[Pg 74]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e can help it, to arguments\r\nagainst their creed, nor trouble dissentients (if there be such) with\r\narguments in its favour. From this time may usually be dated the decline\r\nin the living power of the doctrine. We often hear the teachers of all\r\ncreeds lamenting the difficulty of keeping up in the minds of believers\r\na lively apprehension of the truth which they nominally recognise, so\r\nthat it may penetrate the feelings, and acquire a real mastery over the\r\nconduct. No such difficulty is complained of while the creed is still\r\nfighting for its existence: even the weaker combatants then know and\r\nfeel what they are fighting for, and the difference between it and other\r\ndoctrines; and in that period of every creed\u0027s existence, not a few\r\npersons may be found, who have realised its fundamental principles in\r\nall the forms of thought, have weighed and considered them in all their\r\nimportant bearings, and have experienced the full effect on the\r\ncharacter, which belief in that creed ought to produce in a mind\r\nthoroughly imbued with it. But when it has come to be a hereditary\r\ncreed, and to be received passively, not actively—when the mind is no\r\nlonger compelled, in the same degree as at first, to exercise its vital\r\npowers on the questions which its belief presents to it, there is a\r\nprogressive tendency to forget all of the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_75\"\u003e[Pg 75]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e belief except the\r\nformularies, or to give it a dull and torpid assent, as if accepting it\r\non trust dispensed with the necessity of realising it in consciousness,\r\nor testing it by personal experience; until it almost ceases to connect\r\nitself at all with the inner life of the human being. Then are seen the\r\ncases, so frequent in this age of the world as almost to form the\r\nmajority, in which the creed remains as it were outside the mind,\r\nencrusting and petrifying it against all other influences addressed to\r\nthe higher parts of our nature; manifesting its power by not suffering\r\nany fresh and living conviction to get in, but itself doing nothing for\r\nthe mind or heart, except standing sentinel over them to keep them vacant.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo what an extent doctrines intrinsically fitted to make the deepest\r\nimpression upon the mind may remain in it as dead beliefs, without being\r\never realised in the imagination, the feelings, or the understanding, is\r\nexemplified by the manner in which the majority of believers hold the\r\ndoctrines of Christianity. By Christianity I here mean what is accounted\r\nsuch by all churches and sects—the maxims and precepts contained in the\r\nNew Testament. These are considered sacred, and accepted as laws, by all\r\nprofessing Christians. Yet it is scarcely too much to say that not one\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_76\"\u003e[Pg 76]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nChristian in a thousand guides or tests his individual conduct by\r\nreference to those laws. The standard to which he does refer it, is the\r\ncustom of his nation, his class, or his religious profession. He has\r\nthus, on the one hand, a collection of ethical maxims, which he believes\r\nto have been vouchsafed to him by infallible wisdom as rules for his\r\ngovernment; and on the other, a set of every-day judgments and\r\npractices, which go a certain length with some of those maxims, not so\r\ngreat a length with others, stand in direct opposition to some, and are,\r\non the whole, a compromise between the Christian creed and the interests\r\nand suggestions of worldly life. To the first of these standards he\r\ngives his homage; to the other his real allegiance. All Christians\r\nbelieve that the blessed are the poor and humble, and those who are\r\nill-used by the world; that it is easier for a camel to pass through the\r\neye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven; that\r\nthey should judge not, lest they be judged; that they should swear not\r\nat all; that they should love their neighbour as themselves; that if one\r\ntake their cloak, they should give him their coat also; that they should\r\ntake no thought for the morrow; that if they would be perfect, they\r\nshould sell all that they have and give it to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_77\"\u003e[Pg 77]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the poor. They are not\r\ninsincere when they say that they believe these things. They do believe\r\nthem, as people believe what they have always heard lauded and never\r\ndiscussed. But in the sense of that living belief which regulates\r\nconduct, they believe these doctrines just up to the point to which it\r\nis usual to act upon them. The doctrines in their integrity are\r\nserviceable to pelt adversaries with; and it is understood that they are\r\nto be put forward (when possible) as the reasons for whatever people do\r\nthat they think laudable. But any one who reminded them that the maxims\r\nrequire an infinity of things which they never even think of doing,\r\nwould gain nothing but to be classed among those very unpopular\r\ncharacters who affect to be better than other people. The doctrines have\r\nno hold on ordinary believers—are not a power in their minds. They have\r\na habitual respect for the sound of them, but no feeling which spreads\r\nfrom the words to the things signified, and forces the mind to take\r\n\u003ci\u003ethem\u003c/i\u003e in, and make them conform to the formula. Whenever conduct is\r\nconcerned, they look round for Mr. A and B to direct them how far to go\r\nin obeying Christ.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow we may be well assured that the case was not thus, but far\r\notherwise, with the early\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_78\"\u003e[Pg 78]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Christians. Had it been thus, Christianity\r\nnever would have expanded from an obscure sect of the despised Hebrews\r\ninto the religion of the Roman empire. When their enemies said, \"See how\r\nthese Christians love one another\" (a remark not likely to be made by\r\nanybody now), they assuredly had a much livelier feeling of the meaning\r\nof their creed than they have ever had since. And to this cause,\r\nprobably, it is chiefly owing that Christianity now makes so little\r\nprogress in extending its domain, and after eighteen centuries, is still\r\nnearly confined to Europeans and the descendants of Europeans. Even with\r\nthe strictly religious, who are much in earnest about their doctrines,\r\nand attach a greater amount of meaning to many of them than people in\r\ngeneral, it commonly happens that the part which is thus comparatively\r\nactive in their minds is that which was made by Calvin, or Knox, or some\r\nsuch person much nearer in character to themselves. The sayings of\r\nChrist coexist passively in their minds, producing hardly any effect\r\nbeyond what is caused by mere listening to words so amiable and bland.\r\nThere are many reasons, doubtless, why doctrines which are the badge of\r\na sect retain more of their vitality than those common to all recognised\r\nsects, and why more pains are taken by teachers to keep their\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_79\"\u003e[Pg 79]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e meaning\r\nalive; but one reason certainly is, that the peculiar doctrines are more\r\nquestioned, and have to be oftener defended against open gainsayers.\r\nBoth teachers and learners go to sleep at their post, as soon as there\r\nis no enemy in the field.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe same thing holds true, generally speaking, of all traditional\r\ndoctrines—those of prudence and knowledge of life, as well as of morals\r\nor religion. All languages and literatures are full of general\r\nobservations on life, both as to what it is, and how to conduct oneself\r\nin it; observations which everybody knows, which everybody repeats, or\r\nhears with acquiescence, which are received as truisms, yet of which\r\nmost people first truly learn the meaning, when experience, generally of\r\na painful kind, has made it a reality to them. How often, when smarting\r\nunder some unforeseen misfortune or disappointment, does a person call\r\nto mind some proverb or common saying, familiar to him all his life, the\r\nmeaning of which, if he had ever before felt it as he does now, would\r\nhave saved him from the calamity. There are indeed reasons for this,\r\nother than the absence of discussion: there are many truths of which the\r\nfull meaning \u003ci\u003ecannot\u003c/i\u003e be realised, until personal experience has brought\r\nit home. But much more of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_80\"\u003e[Pg 80]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the meaning even of these would have been\r\nunderstood, and what was understood would have been far more deeply\r\nimpressed on the mind, if the man had been accustomed to hear it argued\r\n\u003ci\u003epro\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003econ\u003c/i\u003e by people who did understand it. The fatal tendency of\r\nmankind to leave off thinking about a thing when it is no longer\r\ndoubtful, is the cause of half their errors. A contemporary author has\r\nwell spoken of \"the deep slumber of a decided opinion.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut what! (it may be asked) Is the absence of unanimity an indispensable\r\ncondition of true knowledge? Is it necessary that some part of mankind\r\nshould persist in error, to enable any to realise the truth? Does a\r\nbelief cease to be real and vital as soon as it is generally\r\nreceived—and is a proposition never thoroughly understood and felt\r\nunless some doubt of it remains? As soon as mankind have unanimously\r\naccepted a truth, does the truth perish within them? The highest aim and\r\nbest result of improved intelligence, it has hitherto been thought, is\r\nto unite mankind more and more in the acknowledgment of all important\r\ntruths: and does the intelligence only last as long as it has not\r\nachieved its object? Do the fruits of conquest perish by the very\r\ncompleteness of the victory?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_81\"\u003e[Pg 81]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eI affirm no such thing. As mankind improve, the number of doctrines\r\nwhich are no longer disputed or doubted will be constantly on the\r\nincrease: and the well-being of mankind may almost be measured by the\r\nnumber and gravity of the truths which have reached the point of being\r\nuncontested. The cessation, on one question after another, of serious\r\ncontroversy, is one of the necessary incidents of the consolidation of\r\nopinion; a consolidation as salutary in the case of true opinions, as it\r\nis dangerous and noxious when the opinions are erroneous. But though\r\nthis gradual narrowing of the bounds of diversity of opinion is\r\nnecessary in both senses of the term, being at once inevitable and\r\nindispensable, we are not therefore obliged to conclude that all its\r\nconsequences must be beneficial. The loss of so important an aid to the\r\nintelligent and living apprehension of a truth, as is afforded by the\r\nnecessity of explaining it to, or defending it against, opponents,\r\nthough not sufficient to outweigh, is no trifling drawback from, the\r\nbenefit of its universal recognition. Where this advantage can no longer\r\nbe had, I confess I should like to see the teachers of mankind\r\nendeavouring to provide a substitute for it; some contrivance for making\r\nthe difficulties of the question as present to the learner\u0027s\r\nconsciousness,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_82\"\u003e[Pg 82]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e as if they were pressed upon him by a dissentient\r\nchampion, eager for his conversion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut instead of seeking contrivances for this purpose, they have lost\r\nthose they formerly had. The Socratic dialectics, so magnificently\r\nexemplified in the dialogues of Plato, were a contrivance of this\r\ndescription. They were essentially a negative discussion of the great\r\nquestions of philosophy and life, directed with consummate skill to the\r\npurpose of convincing any one who had merely adopted the commonplaces of\r\nreceived opinion, that he did not understand the subject—that he as yet\r\nattached no definite meaning to the doctrines he professed; in order\r\nthat, becoming aware of his ignorance, he might be put in the way to\r\nattain a stable belief, resting on a clear apprehension both of the\r\nmeaning of doctrines and of their evidence. The school disputations of\r\nthe middle ages had a somewhat similar object. They were intended to\r\nmake sure that the pupil understood his own opinion, and (by necessary\r\ncorrelation) the opinion opposed to it, and could enforce the grounds of\r\nthe one and confute those of the other. These last-mentioned contests\r\nhad indeed the incurable defect, that the premises appealed to were\r\ntaken from authority, not from reason; and, as a discipline to the mind,\r\nthey were in every respect\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_83\"\u003e[Pg 83]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e inferior to the powerful dialectics which\r\nformed the intellects of the \"Socratici viri\": but the modern mind owes\r\nfar more to both than it is generally willing to admit, and the present\r\nmodes of education contain nothing which in the smallest degree supplies\r\nthe place either of the one or of the other. A person who derives all\r\nhis instruction from teachers or books, even if he escape the besetting\r\ntemptation of contenting himself with cram, is under no compulsion to\r\nhear both sides; accordingly it is far from a frequent accomplishment,\r\neven among thinkers, to know both sides; and the weakest part of what\r\neverybody says in defence of his opinion, is what he intends as a reply\r\nto antagonists. It is the fashion of the present time to disparage\r\nnegative logic—that which points out weaknesses in theory or errors in\r\npractice, without establishing positive truths. Such negative criticism\r\nwould indeed be poor enough as an ultimate result; but as a means to\r\nattaining any positive knowledge or conviction worthy the name, it\r\ncannot be valued too highly; and until people are again systematically\r\ntrained to it, there will be few great thinkers, and a low general\r\naverage of intellect, in any but the mathematical and physical\r\ndepartments of speculation. On any other subject no one\u0027s opinions\r\ndeserve the name\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_84\"\u003e[Pg 84]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of knowledge, except so far as he has either had\r\nforced upon him by others, or gone through of himself, the same mental\r\nprocess which would have been required of him in carrying on an active\r\ncontroversy with opponents. That, therefore, which when absent, it is so\r\nindispensable, but so difficult, to create, how worse than absurd is it\r\nto forego, when spontaneously offering itself! If there are any persons\r\nwho contest a received opinion, or who will do so if law or opinion will\r\nlet them, let us thank them for it, open our minds to listen to them,\r\nand rejoice that there is some one to do for us what we otherwise ought,\r\nif we have any regard for either the certainty or the vitality of our\r\nconvictions, to do with much greater labour for ourselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tbrk\"\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt still remains to speak of one of the principal causes which make\r\ndiversity of opinion advantageous, and will continue to do so until\r\nmankind shall have entered a stage of intellectual advancement which at\r\npresent seems at an incalculable distance. We have hitherto considered\r\nonly two possibilities: that the received opinion may be false, and some\r\nother opinion, consequently, true; or that, the received opinion being\r\ntrue, a conflict with the opposite error is essential to a clear\r\napprehension\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_85\"\u003e[Pg 85]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and deep feeling of its truth. But there is a commoner\r\ncase than either of these; when the conflicting doctrines, instead of\r\nbeing one true and the other false, share the truth between them; and\r\nthe nonconforming opinion is needed to supply the remainder of the\r\ntruth, of which the received doctrine embodies only a part. Popular\r\nopinions, on subjects not palpable to sense, are often true, but seldom\r\nor never the whole truth. They are a part of the truth; sometimes a\r\ngreater, sometimes a smaller part, but exaggerated, distorted, and\r\ndisjoined from the truths by which they ought to be accompanied and\r\nlimited. Heretical opinions, on the other hand, are generally some of\r\nthese suppressed and neglected truths, bursting the bonds which kept\r\nthem down, and either seeking reconciliation with the truth contained in\r\nthe common opinion, or fronting it as enemies, and setting themselves\r\nup, with similar exclusiveness, as the whole truth. The latter case is\r\nhitherto the most frequent, as, in the human mind, one-sidedness has\r\nalways been the rule, and many-sidedness the exception. Hence, even in\r\nrevolutions of opinion, one part of the truth usually sets while another\r\nrises. Even progress, which ought to superadd, for the most part only\r\nsubstitutes one partial and incomplete truth for\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_86\"\u003e[Pg 86]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e another; improvement\r\nconsisting chiefly in this, that the new fragment of truth is more\r\nwanted, more adapted to the needs of the time, than that which it\r\ndisplaces. Such being the partial character of prevailing opinions, even\r\nwhen resting on a true foundation; every opinion which embodies somewhat\r\nof the portion of truth which the common opinion omits, ought to be\r\nconsidered precious, with whatever amount of error and confusion that\r\ntruth may be blended. No sober judge of human affairs will feel bound to\r\nbe indignant because those who force on our notice truths which we\r\nshould otherwise have overlooked, overlook some of those which we see.\r\nRather, he will think that so long as popular truth is one-sided, it is\r\nmore desirable than otherwise that unpopular truth should have one-sided\r\nasserters too; such being usually the most energetic, and the most\r\nlikely to compel reluctant attention to the fragment of wisdom which\r\nthey proclaim as if it were the whole.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus, in the eighteenth century, when nearly all the instructed, and all\r\nthose of the uninstructed who were led by them, were lost in admiration\r\nof what is called civilisation, and of the marvels of modern science,\r\nliterature, and philosophy, and while greatly overrating the amount of\r\nunlikeness\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_87\"\u003e[Pg 87]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e between the men of modern and those of ancient times,\r\nindulged the belief that the whole of the difference was in their own\r\nfavour; with what a salutary shock did the paradoxes of Rousseau explode\r\nlike bombshells in the midst, dislocating the compact mass of one-sided\r\nopinion, and forcing its elements to recombine in a better form and with\r\nadditional ingredients. Not that the current opinions were on the whole\r\nfarther from the truth than Rousseau\u0027s were; on the contrary, they were\r\nnearer to it; they contained more of positive truth, and very much less\r\nof error. Nevertheless there lay in Rousseau\u0027s doctrine, and has floated\r\ndown the stream of opinion along with it, a considerable amount of\r\nexactly those truths which the popular opinion wanted; and these are the\r\ndeposit which was left behind when the flood subsided. The superior\r\nworth of simplicity of life, the enervating and demoralising effect of\r\nthe trammels and hypocrisies of artificial society, are ideas which have\r\nnever been entirely absent from cultivated minds since Rousseau wrote;\r\nand they will in time produce their due effect, though at present\r\nneeding to be asserted as much as ever, and to be asserted by deeds, for\r\nwords, on this subject, have nearly exhausted their power.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn politics, again, it is almost a commonplace,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_88\"\u003e[Pg 88]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e that a party of order\r\nor stability, and a party of progress or reform, are both necessary\r\nelements of a healthy state of political life; until the one or the\r\nother shall have so enlarged its mental grasp as to be a party equally\r\nof order and of progress, knowing and distinguishing what is fit to be\r\npreserved from what ought to be swept away. Each of these modes of\r\nthinking derives its utility from the deficiencies of the other; but it\r\nis in a great measure the opposition of the other that keeps each within\r\nthe limits of reason and sanity. Unless opinions favourable to democracy\r\nand to aristocracy, to property and to equality, to co-operation and to\r\ncompetition, to luxury and to abstinence, to sociality and\r\nindividuality, to liberty and discipline, and all the other standing\r\nantagonisms of practical life, are expressed with equal freedom, and\r\nenforced and defended with equal talent and energy, there is no chance\r\nof both elements obtaining their due; one scale is sure to go up and the\r\nother down. Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a\r\nquestion of the reconciling and combining of opposites, that very few\r\nhave minds sufficiently capacious and impartial to make the adjustment\r\nwith an approach to correctness, and it has to be made by the rough\r\nprocess of a struggle between\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_89\"\u003e[Pg 89]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e combatants fighting under hostile\r\nbanners. On any of the great open questions just enumerated, if either\r\nof the two opinions has a better claim than the other, not merely to be\r\ntolerated, but to be encouraged and countenanced, it is the one which\r\nhappens at the particular time and place to be in a minority. That is\r\nthe opinion which, for the time being, represents the neglected\r\ninterests, the side of human well-being which is in danger of obtaining\r\nless than its share. I am aware that there is not, in this country, any\r\nintolerance of differences of opinion on most of these topics. They are\r\nadduced to show, by admitted and multiplied examples, the universality\r\nof the fact, that only through diversity of opinion is there, in the\r\nexisting state of human intellect, a chance of fair-play to all sides of\r\nthe truth. When there are persons to be found, who form an exception to\r\nthe apparent unanimity of the world on any subject, even if the world is\r\nin the right, it is always probable that dissentients have something\r\nworth hearing to say for themselves, and that truth would lose something\r\nby their silence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt may be objected, \"But \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e received principles, especially on the\r\nhighest and most vital subjects, are more than half-truths. The\r\nChristian morality, for instance, is the whole truth\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_90\"\u003e[Pg 90]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e on that subject,\r\nand if any one teaches a morality which varies from it, he is wholly in\r\nerror.\" As this is of all cases the most important in practice, none can\r\nbe fitter to test the general maxim. But before pronouncing what\r\nChristian morality is or is not, it would be desirable to decide what is\r\nmeant by Christian morality. If it means the morality of the New\r\nTestament, I wonder that any one who derives his knowledge of this from\r\nthe book itself, can suppose that it was announced, or intended, as a\r\ncomplete doctrine of morals. The Gospel always refers to a pre-existing\r\nmorality, and confines its precepts to the particulars in which that\r\nmorality was to be corrected, or superseded by a wider and higher;\r\nexpressing itself, moreover, in terms most general, often impossible to\r\nbe interpreted literally, and possessing rather the impressiveness of\r\npoetry or eloquence than the precision of legislation. To extract from\r\nit a body of ethical doctrine, has ever been possible without eking it\r\nout from the Old Testament, that is, from a system elaborate indeed, but\r\nin many respects barbarous, and intended only for a barbarous people.\r\nSt. Paul, a declared enemy to this Judaical mode of interpreting the\r\ndoctrine and filling up the scheme of his Master, equally assumes a\r\npre-existing\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_91\"\u003e[Pg 91]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e morality, namely, that of the Greeks and Romans; and his\r\nadvice to Christians is in a great measure a system of accommodation to\r\nthat; even to the extent of giving an apparent sanction to slavery. What\r\nis called Christian, but should rather be termed theological, morality,\r\nwas not the work of Christ or the Apostles, but is of much later origin,\r\nhaving been gradually built up by the Catholic church of the first five\r\ncenturies, and though not implicitly adopted by moderns and Protestants,\r\nhas been much less modified by them than might have been expected. For\r\nthe most part, indeed, they have contented themselves with cutting off\r\nthe additions which had been made to it in the middle ages, each sect\r\nsupplying the place by fresh additions, adapted to its own character and\r\ntendencies. That mankind owe a great debt to this morality, and to its\r\nearly teachers, I should be the last person to deny; but I do not\r\nscruple to say of it, that it is, in many important points, incomplete\r\nand one-sided, and that unless ideas and feelings, not sanctioned by it,\r\nhad contributed to the formation of European life and character, human\r\naffairs would have been in a worse condition than they now are.\r\nChristian morality (so called) has all the characters of a reaction; it\r\nis, in great part, a protest against Paganism. Its\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_92\"\u003e[Pg 92]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e ideal is negative\r\nrather than positive; passive rather than active; Innocence rather than\r\nNobleness; Abstinence from Evil, rather than energetic Pursuit of Good:\r\nin its precepts (as has been well said) \"thou shalt not\" predominates\r\nunduly over \"thou shalt.\" In its horror of sensuality, it made an idol\r\nof asceticism, which has been gradually compromised away into one of\r\nlegality. It holds out the hope of heaven and the threat of hell, as the\r\nappointed and appropriate motives to a virtuous life: in this falling\r\nfar below the best of the ancients, and doing what lies in it to give to\r\nhuman morality an essentially selfish character, by disconnecting each\r\nman\u0027s feelings of duty from the interests of his fellow-creatures,\r\nexcept so far as a self-interested inducement is offered to him for\r\nconsulting them. It is essentially a doctrine of passive obedience; it\r\ninculcates submission to all authorities found established; who indeed\r\nare not to be actively obeyed when they command what religion forbids,\r\nbut who are not to be resisted, far less rebelled against, for any\r\namount of wrong to ourselves. And while, in the morality of the best\r\nPagan nations, duty to the State holds even a disproportionate place,\r\ninfringing on the just liberty of the individual; in purely Christian\r\nethics, that grand department of duty is scarcely\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_93\"\u003e[Pg 93]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e noticed or\r\nacknowledged. It is in the Koran, not the New Testament, that we read\r\nthe maxim—\"A ruler who appoints any man to an office, when there is in\r\nhis dominions another man better qualified for it, sins against God and\r\nagainst the State.\" What little recognition the idea of obligation to\r\nthe public obtains in modern morality, is derived from Greek and Roman\r\nsources, not from Christian; as, even in the morality of private life,\r\nwhatever exists of magnanimity, high-mindedness, personal dignity, even\r\nthe sense of honour, is derived from the purely human, not the religious\r\npart of our education, and never could have grown out of a standard of\r\nethics in which the only worth, professedly recognised, is that of obedience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI am as far as any one from pretending that these defects are\r\nnecessarily inherent in the Christian ethics, in every manner in which\r\nit can be conceived, or that the many requisites of a complete moral\r\ndoctrine which it does not contain, do not admit of being reconciled\r\nwith it. Far less would I insinuate this of the doctrines and precepts\r\nof Christ himself. I believe that the sayings of Christ are all, that I\r\ncan see any evidence of their having been intended to be; that they are\r\nirreconcilable with nothing which a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_94\"\u003e[Pg 94]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e comprehensive morality requires;\r\nthat everything which is excellent in ethics may be brought within them,\r\nwith no greater violence to their language than has been done to it by\r\nall who have attempted to deduce from them any practical system of\r\nconduct whatever. But it is quite consistent with this, to believe that\r\nthey contain, and were meant to contain, only a part of the truth; that\r\nmany essential elements of the highest morality are among the things\r\nwhich are not provided for, nor intended to be provided for, in the\r\nrecorded deliverances of the Founder of Christianity, and which have\r\nbeen entirely thrown aside in the system of ethics erected on the basis\r\nof those deliverances by the Christian Church. And this being so, I\r\nthink it a great error to persist in attempting to find in the Christian\r\ndoctrine that complete rule for our guidance, which its author intended\r\nit to sanction and enforce, but only partially to provide. I believe,\r\ntoo, that this narrow theory is becoming a grave practical evil,\r\ndetracting greatly from the value of the moral training and instruction,\r\nwhich so many well-meaning persons are now at length exerting themselves\r\nto promote. I much fear that by attempting to form the mind and feelings\r\non an exclusively religious type, and discarding those\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_95\"\u003e[Pg 95]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e secular\r\nstandards (as for want of a better name they may be called) which\r\nheretofore co-existed with and supplemented the Christian ethics,\r\nreceiving some of its spirit, and infusing into it some of theirs, there\r\nwill result, and is even now resulting, a low, abject, servile type of\r\ncharacter, which, submit itself as it may to what it deems the Supreme\r\nWill, is incapable of rising to or sympathising in the conception of\r\nSupreme Goodness. I believe that other ethics than any which can be\r\nevolved from exclusively Christian sources, must exist side by side with\r\nChristian ethics to produce the moral regeneration of mankind; and that\r\nthe Christian system is no exception to the rule, that in an imperfect\r\nstate of the human mind, the interests of truth require a diversity of\r\nopinions. It is not necessary that in ceasing to ignore the moral truths\r\nnot contained in Christianity, men should ignore any of those which it\r\ndoes contain. Such prejudice, or oversight, when it occurs, is\r\naltogether an evil; but it is one from which we cannot hope to be always\r\nexempt, and must be regarded as the price paid for an inestimable good.\r\nThe exclusive pretension made by a part of the truth to be the whole,\r\nmust and ought to be protested against, and if a reactionary impulse\r\nshould make the protestors\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_96\"\u003e[Pg 96]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e unjust in their turn, this one-sidedness,\r\nlike the other, may be lamented, but must be tolerated. If Christians\r\nwould teach infidels to be just to Christianity, they should themselves\r\nbe just to infidelity. It can do truth no service to blink the fact,\r\nknown to all who have the most ordinary acquaintance with literary\r\nhistory, that a large portion of the noblest and most valuable moral\r\nteaching has been the work, not only of men who did not know, but of men\r\nwho knew and rejected, the Christian faith.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI do not pretend that the most unlimited use of the freedom of\r\nenunciating all possible opinions would put an end to the evils of\r\nreligious or philosophical sectarianism. Every truth which men of narrow\r\ncapacity are in earnest about, is sure to be asserted, inculcated, and\r\nin many ways even acted on, as if no other truth existed in the world,\r\nor at all events none that could limit or qualify the first. I\r\nacknowledge that the tendency of all opinions to become sectarian is not\r\ncured by the freest discussion, but is often heightened and exacerbated\r\nthereby; the truth which ought to have been, but was not, seen, being\r\nrejected all the more violently because proclaimed by persons regarded\r\nas opponents. But it is not on the impassioned partisan, it is on the\r\ncalmer and more\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_97\"\u003e[Pg 97]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e disinterested bystander, that this collision of\r\nopinions works its salutary effect. Not the violent conflict between\r\nparts of the truth, but the quiet suppression of half of it, is the\r\nformidable evil: there is always hope when people are forced to listen\r\nto both sides; it is when they attend only to one that errors harden\r\ninto prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the effect of truth, by\r\nbeing exaggerated into falsehood. And since there are few mental\r\nattributes more rare than that judicial faculty which can sit in\r\nintelligent judgment between two sides of a question, of which only one\r\nis represented by an advocate before it, truth has no chance but in\r\nproportion as every side of it, every opinion which embodies any\r\nfraction of the truth, not only finds advocates, but is so advocated as\r\nto be listened to.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tbrk\"\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have now recognised the necessity to the mental well-being of mankind\r\n(on which all their other well-being depends) of freedom of opinion, and\r\nfreedom of the expression of opinion, on four distinct grounds; which we\r\nwill now briefly recapitulate.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFirst, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for\r\naught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_98\"\u003e[Pg 98]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSecondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very\r\ncommonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general or\r\nprevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it\r\nis only by the collision of adverse opinions, that the remainder of the\r\ntruth has any chance of being supplied.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole\r\ntruth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and\r\nearnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held\r\nin the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of\r\nits rational grounds. And not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of\r\nthe doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and\r\ndeprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma\r\nbecoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering\r\nthe ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt\r\nconviction, from reason or personal experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBefore quitting the subject of freedom of opinion, it is fit to take\r\nsome notice of those who say, that the free expression of all opinions\r\nshould be permitted, on condition that the manner be temperate, and do\r\nnot pass the bounds of fair discussion. Much might be said on the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_99\"\u003e[Pg 99]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eimpossibility of fixing where these supposed bounds are to be placed;\r\nfor if the test be offence to those whose opinion is attacked, I think\r\nexperience testifies that this offence is given whenever the attack is\r\ntelling and powerful, and that every opponent who pushes them hard, and\r\nwhom they find it difficult to answer, appears to them, if he shows any\r\nstrong feeling on the subject, an intemperate opponent. But this, though\r\nan important consideration in a practical point of view, merges in a\r\nmore fundamental objection. Undoubtedly the manner of asserting an\r\nopinion, even though it be a true one, may be very objectionable, and\r\nmay justly incur severe censure. But the principal offences of the kind\r\nare such as it is mostly impossible, unless by accidental self-betrayal,\r\nto bring home to conviction. The gravest of them is, to argue\r\nsophistically, to suppress facts or arguments, to misstate the elements\r\nof the case, or misrepresent the opposite opinion. But all this, even to\r\nthe most aggravated degree, is so continually done in perfect good\r\nfaith, by persons who are not considered, and in many other respects may\r\nnot deserve to be considered, ignorant or incompetent, that it is rarely\r\npossible on adequate grounds conscientiously to stamp the\r\nmisrepresentation as morally culpable; and still\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_100\"\u003e[Pg 100]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e less could law presume\r\nto interfere with this kind of controversial misconduct. With regard to\r\nwhat is commonly meant by intemperate discussion, namely invective,\r\nsarcasm, personality, and the like, the denunciation of these weapons\r\nwould deserve more sympathy if it were ever proposed to interdict them\r\nequally to both sides; but it is only desired to restrain the employment\r\nof them against the prevailing opinion: against the unprevailing they\r\nmay not only be used without general disapproval, but will be likely to\r\nobtain for him who uses them the praise of honest zeal and righteous\r\nindignation. Yet whatever mischief arises from their use, is greatest\r\nwhen they are employed against the comparatively defenceless; and\r\nwhatever unfair advantage can be derived by any opinion from this mode\r\nof asserting it, accrues almost exclusively to received opinions. The\r\nworst offence of this kind which can be committed by a polemic, is to\r\nstigmatise those who hold the contrary opinion as bad and immoral men.\r\nTo calumny of this sort, those who hold any unpopular opinion are\r\npeculiarly exposed, because they are in general few and uninfluential,\r\nand nobody but themselves feel much interest in seeing justice done\r\nthem; but this weapon is, from the nature of the case, denied to those\r\nwho attack\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_101\"\u003e[Pg 101]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e a prevailing opinion: they can neither use it with safety to\r\nthemselves, nor, if they could, would it do anything but recoil on their\r\nown cause. In general, opinions contrary to those commonly received can\r\nonly obtain a hearing by studied moderation of language, and the most\r\ncautious avoidance of unnecessary offence, from which they hardly ever\r\ndeviate even in a slight degree without losing ground: while unmeasured\r\nvituperation employed on the side of the prevailing opinion, really does\r\ndeter people from professing contrary opinions, and from listening to\r\nthose who profess them. For the interest, therefore, of truth and\r\njustice, it is far more important to restrain this employment of\r\nvituperative language than the other; and, for example, if it were\r\nnecessary to choose, there would be much more need to discourage\r\noffensive attacks on infidelity, than on religion. It is, however,\r\nobvious that law and authority have no business with restraining either,\r\nwhile opinion ought, in every instance, to determine its verdict by the\r\ncircumstances of the individual case; condemning every one, on whichever\r\nside of the argument he places himself, in whose mode of advocacy either\r\nwant of candour, or malignity, bigotry, or intolerance of feeling\r\nmanifest themselves; but not inferring these vices from the side\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_102\"\u003e[Pg 102]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e which\r\na person takes, though it be the contrary side of the question to our\r\nown: and giving merited honour to every one, whatever opinion he may\r\nhold, who has calmness to see and honesty to state what his opponents\r\nand their opinions really are, exaggerating nothing to their discredit,\r\nkeeping nothing back which tells, or can be supposed to tell, in their\r\nfavour. This is the real morality of public discussion; and if often\r\nviolated, I am happy to think that there are many controversialists who\r\nto a great extent observe it, and a still greater number who\r\nconscientiously strive towards it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch3\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_6_6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_6_6\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[6]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e These words had scarcely been written, when, as if to give\r\nthem an emphatic contradiction, occurred the Government Press\r\nProsecutions of 1858. That ill-judged interference with the liberty of\r\npublic discussion has not, however, induced me to alter a single word in\r\nthe text, nor has it at all weakened my conviction that, moments of\r\npanic excepted, the era of pains and penalties for political discussion\r\nhas, in our own country, passed away. For, in the first place, the\r\nprosecutions were not persisted in; and, in the second, they were never,\r\nproperly speaking, political prosecutions. The offence charged was not\r\nthat of criticising institutions, or the acts or persons of rulers, but\r\nof circulating what was deemed an immoral doctrine, the lawfulness of\r\nTyrannicide.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf the arguments of the present chapter are of any validity, there ought\r\nto exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a matter\r\nof ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be\r\nconsidered. It would, therefore, be irrelevant and out of place to\r\nexamine here, whether the doctrine of Tyrannicide deserves that title. I\r\nshall content myself with saying, that the subject has been at all times\r\none of the open questions of morals; that the act of a private citizen\r\nin striking down a criminal, who, by raising himself above the law, has\r\nplaced himself beyond the reach of legal punishment or control, has been\r\naccounted by whole nations, and by some of the best and wisest of men,\r\nnot a crime, but an act of exalted virtue; and that, right or wrong, it\r\nis not of the nature of assassination, but of civil war. As such, I hold\r\nthat the instigation to it, in a specific case, may be a proper subject\r\nof punishment, but only if an overt act has followed, and at least a\r\nprobable connection can be established between the act and the\r\ninstigation. Even then, it is not a foreign government, but the very\r\ngovernment assailed, which alone, in the exercise of self-defence, can\r\nlegitimately punish attacks directed against its own existence.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_7_7\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_7_7\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[7]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Thomas Pooley, Bodmin Assizes, July 31, 1857. In December\r\nfollowing, he received a free pardon from the Crown.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_8_8\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_8_8\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[8]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e George Jacob Holyoake, August 17, 1857; Edward Truelove,\r\nJuly, 1857.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_9_9\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_9_9\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[9]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Baron de Gleichen, Marlborough-Street Police Court, August\r\n4, 1857.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_10_10\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_10_10\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[10]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Ample warning may be drawn from the large infusion of the\r\npassions of a persecutor, which mingled with the general display of the\r\nworst parts of our national character on the occasion of the Sepoy\r\ninsurrection. The ravings of fanatics or charlatans from the pulpit may\r\nbe unworthy of notice; but the heads of the Evangelical party have\r\nannounced as their principle, for the government of Hindoos and\r\nMahomedans, that no schools be supported by public money in which the\r\nBible is not taught, and by necessary consequence that no public\r\nemployment be given to any but real or pretended Christians. An\r\nUnder-Secretary of State, in a speech delivered to his constituents on\r\nthe 12th of November, 1857, is reported to have said: \"Toleration of\r\ntheir faith\" (the faith of a hundred millions of British subjects), \"the\r\nsuperstition which they called religion, by the British Government, had\r\nhad the effect of retarding the ascendency of the British name, and\r\npreventing the salutary growth of Christianity…. Toleration was the\r\ngreat corner-stone of the religious liberties of this country; but do\r\nnot let them abuse that precious word toleration. As he understood it,\r\nit meant the complete liberty to all, freedom of worship, \u003ci\u003eamong\r\nChristians, who worshipped upon the same foundation\u003c/i\u003e. It meant\r\ntoleration of all sects and denominations of \u003ci\u003eChristians who believed in\r\nthe one mediation\u003c/i\u003e.\" I desire to call attention to the fact, that a man\r\nwho has been deemed fit to fill a high office in the government of this\r\ncountry, under a liberal Ministry, maintains the doctrine that all who\r\ndo not believe in the divinity of Christ are beyond the pale of\r\ntoleration. Who, after this imbecile display, can indulge the illusion\r\nthat religious persecution has passed away, never to return?\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_103\"\u003e[Pg 103]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003cspan\u003eCHAPTER III.\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smaller\"\u003eOF INDIVIDUALITY, AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF WELL-BEING.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch being the reasons which make it imperative that human beings should\r\nbe free to form opinions, and to express their opinions without reserve;\r\nand such the baneful consequences to the intellectual, and through that\r\nto the moral nature of man, unless this liberty is either conceded, or\r\nasserted in spite of prohibition; let us next examine whether the same\r\nreasons do not require that men should be free to act upon their\r\nopinions—to carry these out in their lives, without hindrance, either\r\nphysical or moral, from their fellow-men, so long as it is at their own\r\nrisk and peril. This last proviso is of course indispensable. No one\r\npretends that actions should be as free as opinions. On the contrary,\r\neven opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which they\r\nare expressed are such as to constitute their\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_104\"\u003e[Pg 104]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e expression a positive\r\ninstigation to some mischievous act. An opinion that corn-dealers are\r\nstarvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be\r\nunmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly\r\nincur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled\r\nbefore the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same\r\nmob in the form of a placard. Acts, of whatever kind, which, without\r\njustifiable cause, do harm to others, may be, and in the more important\r\ncases absolutely require to be, controlled by the unfavourable\r\nsentiments, and, when needful, by the active interference of mankind.\r\nThe liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make\r\nhimself a nuisance to other people. But if he refrains from molesting\r\nothers in what concerns them, and merely acts according to his own\r\ninclination and judgment in things which concern himself, the same\r\nreasons which show that opinion should be free, prove also that he\r\nshould be allowed, without molestation, to carry his opinions into\r\npractice at his own cost. That mankind are not infallible; that their\r\ntruths, for the most part, are only half-truths; that unity of opinion,\r\nunless resulting from the fullest and freest comparison of opposite\r\nopinions, is not\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_105\"\u003e[Pg 105]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e desirable, and diversity not an evil, but a good,\r\nuntil mankind are much more capable than at present of recognising all\r\nsides of the truth, are principles applicable to men\u0027s modes of action,\r\nnot less than to their opinions. As it is useful that while mankind are\r\nimperfect there should be different opinions, so is it that there should\r\nbe different experiments of living; that free scope should be given to\r\nvarieties of character, short of injury to others; and that the worth of\r\ndifferent modes of life should be proved practically, when any one\r\nthinks fit to try them. It is desirable, in short, that in things which\r\ndo not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself.\r\nWhere, not the person\u0027s own character, but the traditions or customs of\r\nother people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the\r\nprincipal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient\r\nof individual and social progress.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn maintaining this principle, the greatest difficulty to be encountered\r\ndoes not lie in the appreciation of means towards an acknowledged end,\r\nbut in the indifference of persons in general to the end itself. If it\r\nwere felt that the free development of individuality is one of the\r\nleading essentials of well-being; that it is not only a co-ordinate\r\nelement with all that is designated\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_106\"\u003e[Pg 106]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e by the terms civilisation,\r\ninstruction, education, culture, but is itself a necessary part and\r\ncondition of all those things; there would be no danger that liberty\r\nshould be under-valued, and the adjustment of the boundaries between it\r\nand social control would present no extraordinary difficulty. But the\r\nevil is, that individual spontaneity is hardly recognised by the common\r\nmodes of thinking, as having any intrinsic worth, or deserving any\r\nregard on its own account. The majority, being satisfied with the ways\r\nof mankind as they now are (for it is they who make them what they are),\r\ncannot comprehend why those ways should not be good enough for\r\neverybody; and what is more, spontaneity forms no part of the ideal of\r\nthe majority of moral and social reformers, but is rather looked on with\r\njealousy, as a troublesome and perhaps rebellious obstruction to the\r\ngeneral acceptance of what these reformers, in their own judgment, think\r\nwould be best for mankind. Few persons, out of Germany, even comprehend\r\nthe meaning of the doctrine which Wilhelm von Humboldt, so eminent both\r\nas a \u003ci\u003esavant\u003c/i\u003e and as a politician, made the text of a treatise—that\r\n\"the end of man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal or immutable\r\ndictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_107\"\u003e[Pg 107]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e desires,\r\nis the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a\r\ncomplete and consistent whole;\" that, therefore, the object \"towards\r\nwhich every human being must ceaselessly direct his efforts, and on\r\nwhich especially those who design to influence their fellow-men must\r\never keep their eyes, is the individuality of power and development;\"\r\nthat for this there are two requisites, \"freedom, and a variety of\r\nsituations;\" and that from the union of these arise \"individual vigour\r\nand manifold diversity,\" which combine themselves in \"originality.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_11_11\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_11_11\"\u003e[11]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLittle, however, as people are accustomed to a doctrine like that of Von\r\nHumboldt, and surprising as it may be to them to find so high a value\r\nattached to individuality, the question, one must nevertheless think,\r\ncan only be one of degree. No one\u0027s idea of excellence in conduct is\r\nthat people should do absolutely nothing but copy one another. No one\r\nwould assert that people ought not to put into their mode of life, and\r\ninto the conduct of their concerns, any impress whatever of their own\r\njudgment, or of their own individual character. On the other hand, it\r\nwould be absurd to pretend that people ought to live as if nothing\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_108\"\u003e[Pg 108]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhatever had been known in the world before they came into it; as if\r\nexperience had as yet done nothing towards showing that one mode of\r\nexistence, or of conduct, is preferable to another. Nobody denies that\r\npeople should be so taught and trained in youth, as to know and benefit\r\nby the ascertained results of human experience. But it is the privilege\r\nand proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity of his\r\nfaculties, to use and interpret experience in his own way. It is for him\r\nto find out what part of recorded experience is properly applicable to\r\nhis own circumstances and character. The traditions and customs of other\r\npeople are, to a certain extent, evidence of what their experience has\r\ntaught \u003ci\u003ethem\u003c/i\u003e; presumptive evidence, and as such, have a claim to his\r\ndeference: but, in the first place, their experience may be too narrow;\r\nor they may not have interpreted it rightly. Secondly, their\r\ninterpretation of experience may be correct, but unsuitable to him.\r\nCustoms are made for customary circumstances, and customary characters:\r\nand his circumstances or his character may be uncustomary. Thirdly,\r\nthough the customs be both good as customs, and suitable to him, yet to\r\nconform to custom, merely \u003ci\u003eas\u003c/i\u003e custom, does not educate or develop in\r\nhim any of the qualities\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_109\"\u003e[Pg 109]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e which are the distinctive endowment of a human\r\nbeing. The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative\r\nfeeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only\r\nin making a choice. He who does anything because it is the custom, makes\r\nno choice. He gains no practice either in discerning or in desiring what\r\nis best. The mental and moral, like the muscular powers, are improved\r\nonly by being used. The faculties are called into no exercise by doing a\r\nthing merely because others do it, no more than by believing a thing\r\nonly because others believe it. If the grounds of an opinion are not\r\nconclusive to the person\u0027s own reason, his reason cannot be\r\nstrengthened, but is likely to be weakened by his adopting it: and if\r\nthe inducements to an act are not such as are consentaneous to his own\r\nfeelings and character (where affection, or the rights of others, are\r\nnot concerned), it is so much done towards rendering his feelings and\r\ncharacter inert and torpid, instead of active and energetic.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHe who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life\r\nfor him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of\r\nimitation. He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his\r\nfaculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment to\r\nforesee, activity to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_110\"\u003e[Pg 110]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e gather materials for decision, discrimination to\r\ndecide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold to\r\nhis deliberate decision. And these qualities he requires and exercises\r\nexactly in proportion as the part of his conduct which he determines\r\naccording to his own judgment and feelings is a large one. It is\r\npossible that he might be guided in some good path, and kept out of\r\nharm\u0027s way, without any of these things. But what will be his\r\ncomparative worth as a human being? It really is of importance, not only\r\nwhat men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it. Among the\r\nworks of man, which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and\r\nbeautifying, the first in importance surely is man himself. Supposing it\r\nwere possible to get houses built, corn grown, battles fought, causes\r\ntried, and even churches erected and prayers said, by machinery—by\r\nautomatons in human form—it would be a considerable loss to exchange\r\nfor these automatons even the men and women who at present inhabit the\r\nmore civilised parts of the world, and who assuredly are but starved\r\nspecimens of what nature can and will produce. Human nature is not a\r\nmachine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work\r\nprescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_111\"\u003e[Pg 111]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e develop\r\nitself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces\r\nwhich make it a living thing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt will probably be conceded that it is desirable people should exercise\r\ntheir understandings, and that an intelligent following of custom, or\r\neven occasionally an intelligent deviation from custom, is better than a\r\nblind and simply mechanical adhesion to it. To a certain extent it is\r\nadmitted, that our understanding should be our own: but there is not the\r\nsame willingness to admit that our desires and impulses should be our\r\nown likewise; or that to possess impulses of our own, and of any\r\nstrength, is anything but a peril and a snare. Yet desires and impulses\r\nare as much a part of a perfect human being, as beliefs and restraints:\r\nand strong impulses are only perilous when not properly balanced; when\r\none set of aims and inclinations is developed into strength, while\r\nothers, which ought to co-exist with them, remain weak and inactive. It\r\nis not because men\u0027s desires are strong that they act ill; it is because\r\ntheir consciences are weak. There is no natural connection between\r\nstrong impulses and a weak conscience. The natural connection is the\r\nother way. To say that one person\u0027s desires and feelings are stronger\r\nand more various than those\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_112\"\u003e[Pg 112]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of another, is merely to say that he has\r\nmore of the raw material of human nature, and is therefore capable,\r\nperhaps of more evil, but certainly of more good. Strong impulses are\r\nbut another name for energy. Energy may be turned to bad uses; but more\r\ngood may always be made of an energetic nature, than of an indolent and\r\nimpassive one. Those who have most natural feeling, are always those\r\nwhose cultivated feelings may be made the strongest. The same strong\r\nsusceptibilities which make the personal impulses vivid and powerful,\r\nare also the source from whence are generated the most passionate love\r\nof virtue, and the sternest self-control. It is through the cultivation\r\nof these, that society both does its duty and protects its interests:\r\nnot by rejecting the stuff of which heroes are made, because it knows\r\nnot how to make them. A person whose desires and impulses are his\r\nown—are the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and\r\nmodified by his own culture—is said to have a character. One whose\r\ndesires and impulses are not his own, has no character, no more than a\r\nsteam-engine has a character. If, in addition to being his own, his\r\nimpulses are strong, and are under the government of a strong will, he\r\nhas an energetic character. Whoever thinks that \u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_113\"\u003e[Pg 113]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eindividuality of\r\ndesires and impulses should not be encouraged to unfold itself, must\r\nmaintain that society has no need of strong natures—is not the better\r\nfor containing many persons who have much character—and that a high\r\ngeneral average of energy is not desirable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn some early states of society, these forces might be, and were, too\r\nmuch ahead of the power which society then possessed of disciplining and\r\ncontrolling them. There has been a time when the element of spontaneity\r\nand individuality was in excess, and the social principle had a hard\r\nstruggle with it. The difficulty then was, to induce men of strong\r\nbodies or minds to pay obedience to any rules which required them to\r\ncontrol their impulses. To overcome this difficulty, law and discipline,\r\nlike the Popes struggling against the Emperors, asserted a power over\r\nthe whole man, claiming to control all his life in order to control his\r\ncharacter—which society had not found any other sufficient means of\r\nbinding. But society has now fairly got the better of individuality; and\r\nthe danger which threatens human nature is not the excess, but the\r\ndeficiency, of personal impulses and preferences. Things are vastly\r\nchanged, since the passions of those who were strong by station or by\r\npersonal endowment\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_114\"\u003e[Pg 114]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e were in a state of habitual rebellion against laws\r\nand ordinances, and required to be rigorously chained up to enable the\r\npersons within their reach to enjoy any particle of security. In our\r\ntimes, from the highest class of society down to the lowest, every one\r\nlives as under the eye of a hostile and dreaded censorship. Not only in\r\nwhat concerns others, but in what concerns only themselves, the\r\nindividual, or the family, do not ask themselves—what do I prefer? or,\r\nwhat would suit my character and disposition? or, what would allow the\r\nbest and highest in me to have fair-play, and enable it to grow and\r\nthrive? They ask themselves, what is suitable to my position? what is\r\nusually done by persons of my station and pecuniary circumstances? or\r\n(worse still) what is usually done by persons of a station and\r\ncircumstances superior to mine? I do not mean that they choose what is\r\ncustomary, in preference to what suits their own inclination. It does\r\nnot occur to them to have any inclination, except for what is customary.\r\nThus the mind itself is bowed to the yoke: even in what people do for\r\npleasure, conformity is the first thing thought of; they live in crowds;\r\nthey exercise choice only among things commonly done: peculiarity of\r\ntaste, eccentricity of conduct, are shunned equally with\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_115\"\u003e[Pg 115]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e crimes: until\r\nby dint of not following their own nature, they have no nature to\r\nfollow: their human capacities are withered and starved: they become\r\nincapable of any strong wishes or native pleasures, and are generally\r\nwithout either opinions or feelings of home growth, or properly their\r\nown. Now is this, or is it not, the desirable condition of human nature?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is so, on the Calvinistic theory. According to that, the one great\r\noffence of man is Self-will. All the good of which humanity is capable,\r\nis comprised in Obedience. You have no choice; thus you must do, and no\r\notherwise: \"whatever is not a duty, is a sin.\" Human nature being\r\nradically corrupt, there is no redemption for any one until human nature\r\nis killed within him. To one holding this theory of life, crushing out\r\nany of the human faculties, capacities, and susceptibilities, is no\r\nevil: man needs no capacity, but that of surrendering himself to the\r\nwill of God: and if he uses any of his faculties for any other purpose\r\nbut to do that supposed will more effectually, he is better without\r\nthem. That is the theory of Calvinism; and it is held, in a mitigated\r\nform, by many who do not consider themselves Calvinists; the mitigation\r\nconsisting in giving a less ascetic interpretation to the alleged will\r\nof God; asserting\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_116\"\u003e[Pg 116]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e it to be his will that mankind should gratify some of\r\ntheir inclinations; of course not in the manner they themselves prefer,\r\nbut in the way of obedience, that is, in a way prescribed to them by\r\nauthority; and, therefore, by the necessary conditions of the case, the\r\nsame for all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn some such insidious form there is at present a strong tendency to\r\nthis narrow theory of life, and to the pinched and hidebound type of\r\nhuman character which it patronises. Many persons, no doubt, sincerely\r\nthink that human beings thus cramped and dwarfed, are as their Maker\r\ndesigned them to be; just as many have thought that trees are a much\r\nfiner thing when clipped into pollards, or cut out into figures of\r\nanimals, than as nature made them. But if it be any part of religion to\r\nbelieve that man was made by a good being, it is more consistent with\r\nthat faith to believe, that this Being gave all human faculties that\r\nthey might be cultivated and unfolded, not rooted out and consumed, and\r\nthat he takes delight in every nearer approach made by his creatures to\r\nthe ideal conception embodied in them, every increase in any of their\r\ncapabilities of comprehension, of action, or of enjoyment. There is a\r\ndifferent type of human excellence from the Calvinistic; a conception of\r\nhumanity as having its nature\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_117\"\u003e[Pg 117]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e bestowed on it for other purposes than\r\nmerely to be abnegated. \"Pagan self-assertion\" is one of the elements of\r\nhuman worth, as well as \"Christian self-denial.\"\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_12_12\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_12_12\"\u003e[12]\u003c/a\u003e There is a Greek\r\nideal of self-development, which the Platonic and Christian ideal of\r\nself-government blends with, but does not supersede. It may be better to\r\nbe a John Knox than an Alcibiades, but it is better to be a Pericles\r\nthan either; nor would a Pericles, if we had one in these days, be\r\nwithout anything good which belonged to John Knox.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in\r\nthemselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the\r\nlimits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings\r\nbecome a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the works\r\npartake the character of those who do them, by the same process human\r\nlife also becomes rich, diversified, and animating, furnishing more\r\nabundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating feelings, and\r\nstrengthening the tie which binds every individual to the race, by\r\nmaking the race infinitely better worth belonging to. In proportion to\r\nthe development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable\r\nto himself, and is therefore capable\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_118\"\u003e[Pg 118]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of being more valuable to others.\r\nThere is a greater fulness of life about his own existence, and when\r\nthere is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is\r\ncomposed of them. As much compression as is necessary to prevent the\r\nstronger specimens of human nature from encroaching on the rights of\r\nothers, cannot be dispensed with; but for this there is ample\r\ncompensation even in the point of view of human development. The means\r\nof development which the individual loses by being prevented from\r\ngratifying his inclinations to the injury of others, are chiefly\r\nobtained at the expense of the development of other people. And even to\r\nhimself there is a full equivalent in the better development of the\r\nsocial part of his nature, rendered possible by the restraint put upon\r\nthe selfish part. To be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of\r\nothers, develops the feelings and capacities which have the good of\r\nothers for their object. But to be restrained in things not affecting\r\ntheir good, by their mere displeasure, develops nothing valuable, except\r\nsuch force of character as may unfold itself in resisting the restraint.\r\nIf acquiesced in, it dulls and blunts the whole nature. To give any\r\nfair-play to the nature of each, it is essential that different persons\r\nshould be allowed to lead\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_119\"\u003e[Pg 119]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e different lives. In proportion as this\r\nlatitude has been exercised in any age, has that age been noteworthy to\r\nposterity. Even despotism does not produce its worst effects, so long as\r\nIndividuality exists under it; and whatever crushes individuality is\r\ndespotism, by whatever name it may be called, and whether it professes\r\nto be enforcing the will of God or the injunctions of men.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHaving said that Individuality is the same thing with development, and\r\nthat it is only the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can\r\nproduce, well-developed human beings, I might here close the argument:\r\nfor what more or better can be said of any condition of human affairs,\r\nthan that it brings human beings themselves nearer to the best thing\r\nthey can be? or what worse can be said of any obstruction to good, than\r\nthat it prevents this? Doubtless, however, these considerations will not\r\nsuffice to convince those who most need convincing; and it is necessary\r\nfurther to show, that these developed human beings are of some use to\r\nthe undeveloped—to point out to those who do not desire liberty, and\r\nwould not avail themselves of it, that they may be in some intelligible\r\nmanner rewarded for allowing other people to make use of it without hindrance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_120\"\u003e[Pg 120]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the first place, then, I would suggest that they might possibly\r\nlearn something from them. It will not be denied by anybody, that\r\noriginality is a valuable element in human affairs. There is always need\r\nof persons not only to discover new truths, and point out when what were\r\nonce truths are true no longer, but also to commence new practices, and\r\nset the example of more enlightened conduct, and better taste and sense\r\nin human life. This cannot well be gainsaid by anybody who does not\r\nbelieve that the world has already attained perfection in all its ways\r\nand practices. It is true that this benefit is not capable of being\r\nrendered by everybody alike: there are but few persons, in comparison\r\nwith the whole of mankind, whose experiments, if adopted by others,\r\nwould be likely to be any improvement on established practice. But these\r\nfew are the salt of the earth; without them, human life would become a\r\nstagnant pool. Not only is it they who introduce good things which did\r\nnot before exist; it is they who keep the life in those which already\r\nexisted. If there were nothing new to be done, would human intellect\r\ncease to be necessary? Would it be a reason why those who do the old\r\nthings should forget why they are done, and do them like cattle, not\r\nlike human beings? There is only too great\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_121\"\u003e[Pg 121]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e a tendency in the best\r\nbeliefs and practices to degenerate into the mechanical; and unless\r\nthere were a succession of persons whose ever-recurring originality\r\nprevents the grounds of those beliefs and practices from becoming merely\r\ntraditional, such dead matter would not resist the smallest shock from\r\nanything really alive, and there would be no reason why civilisation\r\nshould not die out, as in the Byzantine Empire. Persons of genius, it is\r\ntrue, are, and are always likely to be, a small minority; but in order\r\nto have them, it is necessary to preserve the soil in which they grow.\r\nGenius can only breathe freely in an \u003ci\u003eatmosphere\u003c/i\u003e of freedom. Persons of\r\ngenius are, \u003ci\u003eex vi termini\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003emore\u003c/i\u003e individual than any other\r\npeople—less capable, consequently, of fitting themselves, without\r\nhurtful compression, into any of the small number of moulds which\r\nsociety provides in order to save its members the trouble of forming\r\ntheir own character. If from timidity they consent to be forced into one\r\nof these moulds, and to let all that part of themselves which cannot\r\nexpand under the pressure remain unexpanded, society will be little the\r\nbetter for their genius. If they are of a strong character, and break\r\ntheir fetters, they become a mark for the society which has not\r\nsucceeded in reducing\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_122\"\u003e[Pg 122]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e them to commonplace, to point at with solemn\r\nwarning as \"wild,\" \"erratic,\" and the like; much as if one should\r\ncomplain of the Niagara river for not flowing smoothly between its banks\r\nlike a Dutch canal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI insist thus emphatically on the importance of genius, and the\r\nnecessity of allowing it to unfold itself freely both in thought and in\r\npractice, being well aware that no one will deny the position in theory,\r\nbut knowing also that almost every one, in reality, is totally\r\nindifferent to it. People think genius a fine thing if it enables a man\r\nto write an exciting poem, or paint a picture. But in its true sense,\r\nthat of originality in thought and action, though no one says that it is\r\nnot a thing to be admired, nearly all, at heart, think that they can do\r\nvery well without it. Unhappily this is too natural to be wondered at.\r\nOriginality is the one thing which unoriginal minds cannot feel the use\r\nof. They cannot see what it is to do for them: how should they? If they\r\ncould see what it would do for them, it would not be originality. The\r\nfirst service which originality has to render them, is that of opening\r\ntheir eyes: which being once fully done, they would have a chance of\r\nbeing themselves original. Meanwhile, recollecting that nothing was ever\r\nyet done which some one\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_123\"\u003e[Pg 123]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e was not the first to do, and that all good\r\nthings which exist are the fruits of originality, let them be modest\r\nenough to believe that there is something still left for it to\r\naccomplish, and assure themselves that they are more in need of\r\noriginality, the less they are conscious of the want.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn sober truth, whatever homage may be professed, or even paid, to real\r\nor supposed mental superiority, the general tendency of things\r\nthroughout the world is to render mediocrity the ascendant power among\r\nmankind. In ancient history, in the middle ages, and in a diminishing\r\ndegree through the long transition from feudality to the present time,\r\nthe individual was a power in himself; and if he had either great\r\ntalents or a high social position, he was a considerable power. At\r\npresent individuals are lost in the crowd. In politics it is almost a\r\ntriviality to say that public opinion now rules the world. The only\r\npower deserving the name is that of masses, and of governments while\r\nthey make themselves the organ of the tendencies and instincts of\r\nmasses. This is as true in the moral and social relations of private\r\nlife as in public transactions. Those whose opinions go by the name of\r\npublic opinion, are not always the same sort of public: in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_124\"\u003e[Pg 124]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e America they\r\nare the whole white population; in England, chiefly the middle class.\r\nBut they are always a mass, that is to say, collective mediocrity. And\r\nwhat is a still greater novelty, the mass do not now take their opinions\r\nfrom dignitaries in Church or State, from ostensible leaders, or from\r\nbooks. Their thinking is done for them by men much like themselves,\r\naddressing them or speaking in their name, on the spur of the moment,\r\nthrough the newspapers. I am not complaining of all this. I do not\r\nassert that anything better is compatible, as a general rule, with the\r\npresent low state of the human mind. But that does not hinder the\r\ngovernment of mediocrity from being mediocre government. No government\r\nby a democracy or a numerous aristocracy, either in its political acts\r\nor in the opinions, qualities, and tone of mind which it fosters, ever\r\ndid or could rise above mediocrity, except in so far as the sovereign\r\nMany have let themselves be guided (which in their best times they\r\nalways have done) by the counsels and influence of a more highly gifted\r\nand instructed One or Few. The initiation of all wise or noble things,\r\ncomes and must come from individuals; generally at first from some one\r\nindividual. The honour and glory of the average man is that he is\r\ncapable of following that initiative; that he can\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_125\"\u003e[Pg 125]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e respond internally to\r\nwise and noble things, and be led to them with his eyes open. I am not\r\ncountenancing the sort of \"hero-worship\" which applauds the strong man\r\nof genius for forcibly seizing on the government of the world and making\r\nit do his bidding in spite of itself. All he can claim is, freedom to\r\npoint out the way. The power of compelling others into it, is not only\r\ninconsistent with the freedom and development of all the rest, but\r\ncorrupting to the strong man himself. It does seem, however, that when\r\nthe opinions of masses of merely average men are everywhere become or\r\nbecoming the dominant power, the counterpoise and corrective to that\r\ntendency would be, the more and more pronounced individuality of those\r\nwho stand on the higher eminences of thought. It is in these\r\ncircumstances most especially, that exceptional individuals, instead of\r\nbeing deterred, should be encouraged in acting differently from the\r\nmass. In other times there was no advantage in their doing so, unless\r\nthey acted not only differently, but better. In this age the mere\r\nexample of nonconformity, the mere refusal to bend the knee to custom,\r\nis itself a service. Precisely because the tyranny of opinion is such as\r\nto make eccentricity a reproach, it is desirable, in order to break\r\nthrough that tyranny,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_126\"\u003e[Pg 126]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e that people should be eccentric. Eccentricity has\r\nalways abounded when and where strength of character has abounded; and\r\nthe amount of eccentricity in a society has generally been proportional\r\nto the amount of genius, mental vigour, and moral courage which it\r\ncontained. That so few now dare to be eccentric, marks the chief danger\r\nof the time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have said that it is important to give the freest scope possible to\r\nuncustomary things, in order that it may in time appear which of these\r\nare fit to be converted into customs. But independence of action, and\r\ndisregard of custom are not solely deserving of encouragement for the\r\nchance they afford that better modes of action, and customs more worthy\r\nof general adoption, may be struck out; nor is it only persons of\r\ndecided mental superiority who have a just claim to carry on their lives\r\nin their own way. There is no reason that all human existences should be\r\nconstructed on some one, or some small number of patterns. If a person\r\npossesses any tolerable amount of common-sense and experience, his own\r\nmode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best\r\nin itself, but because it is his own mode. Human beings are not like\r\nsheep; and even sheep are not\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_127\"\u003e[Pg 127]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e undistinguishably alike. A man cannot get\r\na coat or a pair of boots to fit him, unless they are either made to his\r\nmeasure, or he has a whole warehouseful to choose from: and is it easier\r\nto fit him with a life than with a coat, or are human beings more like\r\none another in their whole physical and spiritual conformation than in\r\nthe shape of their feet? If it were only that people have diversities of\r\ntaste, that is reason enough for not attempting to shape them all after\r\none model. But different persons also require different conditions for\r\ntheir spiritual development; and can no more exist healthily in the same\r\nmoral, than all the variety of plants can in the same physical,\r\natmosphere and climate. The same things which are helps to one person\r\ntowards the cultivation of his higher nature, are hindrances to another.\r\nThe same mode of life is a healthy excitement to one, keeping all his\r\nfaculties of action and enjoyment in their best order, while to another\r\nit is a distracting burthen, which suspends or crushes all internal\r\nlife. Such are the differences among human beings in their sources of\r\npleasure, their susceptibilities of pain, and the operation on them of\r\ndifferent physical and moral agencies, that unless there is a\r\ncorresponding diversity in their modes of life, they neither obtain\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_128\"\u003e[Pg 128]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntheir fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral, and\r\naesthetic stature of which their nature is capable. Why then should\r\ntolerance, as far as the public sentiment is concerned, extend only to\r\ntastes and modes of life which extort acquiescence by the multitude of\r\ntheir adherents? Nowhere (except in some monastic institutions) is\r\ndiversity of taste entirely unrecognised; a person may, without blame,\r\neither like or dislike rowing, or smoking, or music, or athletic\r\nexercises, or chess, or cards, or study, because both those who like\r\neach of these things, and those who dislike them, are too numerous to be\r\nput down. But the man, and still more the woman, who can be accused\r\neither of doing \"what nobody does,\" or of not doing \"what everybody\r\ndoes,\" is the subject of as much depreciatory remark as if he or she had\r\ncommitted some grave moral delinquency. Persons require to possess a\r\ntitle, or some other badge of rank, or of the consideration of people of\r\nrank, to be able to indulge somewhat in the luxury of doing as they like\r\nwithout detriment to their estimation. To indulge somewhat, I repeat:\r\nfor whoever allow themselves much of that indulgence, incur the risk of\r\nsomething worse than disparaging speeches—they are in peril of a\r\ncommission \u003ci\u003ede lunatico\u003c/i\u003e, and of having their\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_129\"\u003e[Pg 129]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e property taken from them\r\nand given to their relations.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_13_13\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_13_13\"\u003e[13]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is one characteristic of the present direction of public opinion,\r\npeculiarly calculated to make it intolerant of any marked demonstration\r\nof individuality. The general average of mankind are not only moderate\r\nin intellect, but also moderate in inclinations: they have no tastes or\r\nwishes strong enough to incline them to do anything unusual, and they\r\nconsequently do not understand those who have, and class all such with\r\nthe wild and intemperate whom they are accustomed to look down upon.\r\nNow, in addition to this fact which is general, we have only to suppose\r\nthat a strong movement has set in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_130\"\u003e[Pg 130]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e towards the improvement of morals,\r\nand it is evident what we have to expect. In these days such a movement\r\nhas set in; much has actually been effected in the way of increased\r\nregularity of conduct, and discouragement of excesses; and there is a\r\nphilanthropic spirit abroad, for the exercise of which there is no more\r\ninviting field than the moral and prudential improvement of our\r\nfellow-creatures. These tendencies of the times cause the public to be\r\nmore disposed than at most former periods to prescribe general rules of\r\nconduct, and endeavour to make every one conform to the approved\r\nstandard. And that standard, express or tacit, is to desire nothing\r\nstrongly. Its ideal of character is to be without any marked character;\r\nto maim by compression,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_131\"\u003e[Pg 131]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e like a Chinese lady\u0027s foot, every part of human\r\nnature which stands out prominently, and tends to make the person\r\nmarkedly dissimilar in outline to commonplace humanity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs is usually the case with ideals which exclude one-half of what is\r\ndesirable, the present standard of approbation produces only an inferior\r\nimitation of the other half. Instead of great energies guided by\r\nvigorous reason, and strong feelings strongly controlled by a\r\nconscientious will, its result is weak feelings and weak energies, which\r\ntherefore can be kept in outward conformity to rule without any strength\r\neither of will or of reason. Already energetic characters on any large\r\nscale are becoming merely traditional. There is now scarcely any outlet\r\nfor energy in this country except business. The energy expended in that\r\nmay still be regarded as considerable. What little is left from that\r\nemployment, is expended on some hobby; which may be a useful, even a\r\nphilanthropic hobby, but is always some one thing, and generally a thing\r\nof small dimensions. The greatness of England is now all collective:\r\nindividually small, we only appear capable of anything great by our\r\nhabit of combining; and with this our moral and religious\r\nphilanthropists are perfectly contented. But it was men of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_132\"\u003e[Pg 132]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e another\r\nstamp than this that made England what it has been; and men of another\r\nstamp will be needed to prevent its decline.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human\r\nadvancement, being in unceasing antagonism to that disposition to aim at\r\nsomething better than customary, which is called, according to\r\ncircumstances, the spirit of liberty, or that of progress or\r\nimprovement. The spirit of improvement is not always a spirit of\r\nliberty, for it may aim at forcing improvements on an unwilling people;\r\nand the spirit of liberty, in so far as it resists such attempts, may\r\nally itself locally and temporarily with the opponents of improvement;\r\nbut the only unfailing and permanent source of improvement is liberty,\r\nsince by it there are as many possible independent centres of\r\nimprovement as there are individuals. The progressive principle,\r\nhowever, in either shape, whether as the love of liberty or of\r\nimprovement, is antagonistic to the sway of Custom, involving at least\r\nemancipation from that yoke; and the contest between the two constitutes\r\nthe chief interest of the history of mankind. The greater part of the\r\nworld has, properly speaking, no history, because the despotism of\r\nCustom is complete. This is the case over the whole East.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_133\"\u003e[Pg 133]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Custom is\r\nthere, in all things, the final appeal; justice and right mean\r\nconformity to custom; the argument of custom no one, unless some tyrant\r\nintoxicated with power, thinks of resisting. And we see the result.\r\nThose nations must once have had originality; they did not start out of\r\nthe ground populous, lettered, and versed in many of the arts of life;\r\nthey made themselves all this, and were then the greatest and most\r\npowerful nations in the world. What are they now? The subjects or\r\ndependants of tribes whose forefathers wandered in the forests when\r\ntheirs had magnificent palaces and gorgeous temples, but over whom\r\ncustom exercised only a divided rule with liberty and progress. A\r\npeople, it appears, may be progressive for a certain length of time, and\r\nthen stop: when does it stop? When it ceases to possess individuality.\r\nIf a similar change should befall the nations of Europe, it will not be\r\nin exactly the same shape: the despotism of custom with which these\r\nnations are threatened is not precisely stationariness. It proscribes\r\nsingularity, but it does not preclude change, provided all change\r\ntogether. We have discarded the fixed costumes of our forefathers; every\r\none must still dress like other people, but the fashion may change once\r\nor twice a year. We thus take care that when there\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_134\"\u003e[Pg 134]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is change, it shall\r\nbe for change\u0027s sake, and not from any idea of beauty or convenience;\r\nfor the same idea of beauty or convenience would not strike all the\r\nworld at the same moment, and be simultaneously thrown aside by all at\r\nanother moment. But we are progressive as well as changeable: we\r\ncontinually make new inventions in mechanical things, and keep them\r\nuntil they are again superseded by better; we are eager for improvement\r\nin politics, in education, even in morals, though in this last our idea\r\nof improvement chiefly consists in persuading or forcing other people to\r\nbe as good as ourselves. It is not progress that we object to; on the\r\ncontrary, we flatter ourselves that we are the most progressive people\r\nwho ever lived. It is individuality that we war against: we should think\r\nwe had done wonders if we had made ourselves all alike; forgetting that\r\nthe unlikeness of one person to another is generally the first thing\r\nwhich draws the attention of either to the imperfection of his own type,\r\nand the superiority of another, or the possibility, by combining the\r\nadvantages of both, of producing something better than either. We have a\r\nwarning example in China—a nation of much talent, and, in some\r\nrespects, even wisdom, owing to the rare good fortune of having been\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_135\"\u003e[Pg 135]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nprovided at an early period with a particularly good set of customs, the\r\nwork, in some measure, of men to whom even the most enlightened European\r\nmust accord, under certain limitations, the title of sages and\r\nphilosophers. They are remarkable, too, in the excellence of their\r\napparatus for impressing, as far as possible, the best wisdom they\r\npossess upon every mind in the community, and securing that those who\r\nhave appropriated most of it shall occupy the posts of honour and power.\r\nSurely the people who did this have discovered the secret of human\r\nprogressiveness, and must have kept themselves steadily at the head of\r\nthe movement of the world. On the contrary, they have become\r\nstationary—have remained so for thousands of years; and if they are\r\never to be farther improved, it must be by foreigners. They have\r\nsucceeded beyond all hope in what English philanthropists are so\r\nindustriously working at—in making a people all alike, all governing\r\ntheir thoughts and conduct by the same maxims and rules; and these are\r\nthe fruits. The modern \u003ci\u003erégime\u003c/i\u003e of public opinion is, in an unorganised\r\nform, what the Chinese educational and political systems are in an\r\norganised; and unless individuality shall be able successfully to assert\r\nitself against this yoke, Europe, notwithstanding\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_136\"\u003e[Pg 136]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e its noble antecedents\r\nand its professed Christianity, will tend to become another China.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat is it that has hitherto preserved Europe from this lot? What has\r\nmade the European family of nations an improving, instead of a\r\nstationary portion of mankind? Not any superior excellence in them,\r\nwhich, when it exists, exists as the effect, not as the cause; but their\r\nremarkable diversity of character and culture. Individuals, classes,\r\nnations, have been extremely unlike one another: they have struck out a\r\ngreat variety of paths, each leading to something valuable; and although\r\nat every period those who travelled in different paths have been\r\nintolerant of one another, and each would have thought it an excellent\r\nthing if all the rest could have been compelled to travel his road,\r\ntheir attempts to thwart each other\u0027s development have rarely had any\r\npermanent success, and each has in time endured to receive the good\r\nwhich the others have offered. Europe is, in my judgment, wholly\r\nindebted to this plurality of paths for its progressive and many-sided\r\ndevelopment. But it already begins to possess this benefit in a\r\nconsiderably less degree. It is decidedly advancing towards the Chinese\r\nideal of making all people alike. M. de Tocqueville, in his last\r\nimportant\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_137\"\u003e[Pg 137]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e work, remarks how much more the Frenchmen of the present day\r\nresemble one another, than did those even of the last generation. The\r\nsame remark might be made of Englishmen in a far greater degree. In a\r\npassage already quoted from Wilhelm von Humboldt, he points out two\r\nthings as necessary conditions of human development, because necessary\r\nto render people unlike one another; namely, freedom, and variety of\r\nsituations. The second of these two conditions is in this country every\r\nday diminishing. The circumstances which surround different classes and\r\nindividuals, and shape their characters, are daily becoming more\r\nassimilated. Formerly, different ranks, different neighbourhoods,\r\ndifferent trades and professions, lived in what might be called\r\ndifferent worlds; at present, to a great degree in the same.\r\nComparatively speaking, they now read the same things, listen to the\r\nsame things, see the same things, go to the same places, have their\r\nhopes and fears directed to the same objects, have the same rights and\r\nliberties, and the same means of asserting them. Great as are the\r\ndifferences of position which remain, they are nothing to those which\r\nhave ceased. And the assimilation is still proceeding. All the political\r\nchanges of the age promote it, since they all tend\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_138\"\u003e[Pg 138]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e to raise the low and\r\nto lower the high. Every extension of education promotes it, because\r\neducation brings people under common influences, and gives them access\r\nto the general stock of facts and sentiments. Improvements in the means\r\nof communication promote it, by bringing the inhabitants of distant\r\nplaces into personal contact, and keeping up a rapid flow of changes of\r\nresidence between one place and another. The increase of commerce and\r\nmanufactures promotes it, by diffusing more widely the advantages of\r\neasy circumstances, and opening all objects of ambition, even the\r\nhighest, to general competition, whereby the desire of rising becomes no\r\nlonger the character of a particular class, but of all classes. A more\r\npowerful agency than even all these, in bringing about a general\r\nsimilarity among mankind, is the complete establishment, in this and\r\nother free countries, of the ascendency of public opinion in the State.\r\nAs the various social eminences which enabled persons entrenched on them\r\nto disregard the opinion of the multitude, gradually become levelled; as\r\nthe very idea of resisting the will of the public, when it is positively\r\nknown that they have a will, disappears more and more from the minds of\r\npractical politicians; there ceases to be any social support for\r\nnon-conformity—any \u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_139\"\u003e[Pg 139]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003esubstantive power in society, which, itself opposed\r\nto the ascendency of numbers, is interested in taking under its\r\nprotection opinions and tendencies at variance with those of the public.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe combination of all these causes forms so great a mass of influences\r\nhostile to Individuality, that it is not easy to see how it can stand\r\nits ground. It will do so with increasing difficulty, unless the\r\nintelligent part of the public can be made to feel its value—to see\r\nthat it is good there should be differences, even though not for the\r\nbetter, even though, as it may appear to them, some should be for the\r\nworse. If the claims of Individuality are ever to be asserted, the time\r\nis now, while much is still wanting to complete the enforced\r\nassimilation. It is only in the earlier stages that any stand can be\r\nsuccessfully made against the encroachment. The demand that all other\r\npeople shall resemble ourselves, grows by what it feeds on. If\r\nresistance waits till life is reduced \u003ci\u003enearly\u003c/i\u003e to one uniform type, all\r\ndeviations from that type will come to be considered impious, immoral,\r\neven monstrous and contrary to nature. Mankind speedily become unable to\r\nconceive diversity, when they have been for some time unaccustomed to see it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch3\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_11_11\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_11_11\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[11]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eThe Sphere and Duties of Government\u003c/i\u003e, from the German of\r\nBaron Wilhelm von Humboldt, pp. 11-13.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_12_12\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_12_12\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[12]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Sterling\u0027s \u003ci\u003eEssays\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_13_13\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_13_13\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[13]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e There is something both contemptible and frightful in the\r\nsort of evidence on which, of late years, any person can be judicially\r\ndeclared unfit for the management of his affairs; and after his death,\r\nhis disposal of his property can be set aside, if there is enough of it\r\nto pay the expenses of litigation—which are charged on the property\r\nitself. All the minute details of his daily life are pried into, and\r\nwhatever is found which, seen through the medium of the perceiving and\r\ndescribing faculties of the lowest of the low, bears an appearance\r\nunlike absolute commonplace, is laid before the jury as evidence of\r\ninsanity, and often with success; the jurors being little, if at all,\r\nless vulgar and ignorant than the witnesses; while the judges, with that\r\nextraordinary want of knowledge of human nature and life which\r\ncontinually astonishes us in English lawyers, often help to mislead\r\nthem. These trials speak volumes as to the state of feeling and opinion\r\namong the vulgar with regard to human liberty. So far from setting any\r\nvalue on individuality—so far from respecting the rights of each\r\nindividual to act, in things indifferent, as seems good to his own\r\njudgment and inclinations, judges and juries cannot even conceive that a\r\nperson in a state of sanity can desire such freedom. In former days,\r\nwhen it was proposed to burn atheists, charitable people used to suggest\r\nputting them in a madhouse instead: it would be nothing surprising\r\nnowadays were we to see this done, and the doers applauding themselves,\r\nbecause, instead of persecuting for religion, they had adopted so humane\r\nand Christian a mode of treating these unfortunates, not without a\r\nsilent satisfaction at their having thereby obtained their deserts.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_140\"\u003e[Pg 140]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003cspan\u003eCHAPTER IV.\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smaller\"\u003eOF THE LIMITS TO THE AUTHORITY OF SOCIETY OVER THE INDIVIDUAL.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat, then, is the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual\r\nover himself? Where does the authority of society begin? How much of\r\nhuman life should be assigned to individuality, and how much to society?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eEach will receive its proper share, if each has that which more\r\nparticularly concerns it. To individuality should belong the part of\r\nlife in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested; to\r\nsociety, the part which chiefly interests society.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThough society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose\r\nis answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social\r\nobligations from it, every one who receives the protection of society\r\nowes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders\r\nit indispensable that each should be bound to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_141\"\u003e[Pg 141]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e observe a certain line of\r\nconduct towards the rest. This conduct consists, first, in not injuring\r\nthe interests of one another; or rather certain interests which, either\r\nby express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be\r\nconsidered as rights; and secondly, in each person\u0027s bearing his share\r\n(to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labours and sacrifices\r\nincurred for defending the society or its members from injury and\r\nmolestation. These conditions society is justified in enforcing, at all\r\ncosts to those who endeavour to withhold fulfilment. Nor is this all\r\nthat society may do. The acts of an individual may be hurtful to others,\r\nor wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without going the\r\nlength of violating any of their constituted rights. The offender may\r\nthen be justly punished by opinion though not by law. As soon as any\r\npart of a person\u0027s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of\r\nothers, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the\r\ngeneral welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it,\r\nbecomes open to discussion. But there is no room for entertaining any\r\nsuch question when a person\u0027s conduct affects the interests of no\r\npersons besides himself, or needs not affect them unless they like (all\r\nthe persons concerned being of full age, and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_142\"\u003e[Pg 142]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the ordinary amount of\r\nunderstanding). In all such cases there should be perfect freedom, legal\r\nand social, to do the action and stand the consequences.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine, to suppose that\r\nit is one of selfish indifference, which pretends that human beings have\r\nno business with each other\u0027s conduct in life, and that they should not\r\nconcern themselves about the well-doing or well-being of one another,\r\nunless their own interest is involved. Instead of any diminution, there\r\nis need of a great increase of disinterested exertion to promote the\r\ngood of others. But disinterested benevolence can find other instruments\r\nto persuade people to their good, than whips and scourges, either of the\r\nliteral or the metaphorical sort. I am the last person to undervalue the\r\nself-regarding virtues; they are only second in importance, if even\r\nsecond, to the social. It is equally the business of education to\r\ncultivate both. But even education works by conviction and persuasion as\r\nwell as by compulsion, and it is by the former only that, when the\r\nperiod of education is past, the self-regarding virtues should be\r\ninculcated. Human beings owe to each other help to distinguish the\r\nbetter from the worse, and encouragement to choose the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_143\"\u003e[Pg 143]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e former and avoid\r\nthe latter. They should be for ever stimulating each other to increased\r\nexercise of their higher faculties, and increased direction of their\r\nfeelings and aims towards wise instead of foolish, elevating instead of\r\ndegrading, objects and contemplations. But neither one person, nor any\r\nnumber of persons, is warranted in saying to another human creature of\r\nripe years, that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what\r\nhe chooses to do with it. He is the person most interested in his own\r\nwell-being: the interest which any other person, except in cases of\r\nstrong personal attachment, can have in it, is trifling, compared with\r\nthat which he himself has; the interest which society has in him\r\nindividually (except as to his conduct to others) is fractional, and\r\naltogether indirect: while, with respect to his own feelings and\r\ncircumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge\r\nimmeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by any one else. The\r\ninterference of society to overrule his judgment and purposes in what\r\nonly regards himself, must be grounded on general presumptions; which\r\nmay be altogether wrong, and even if right, are as likely as not to be\r\nmisapplied to individual cases, by persons no better acquainted with the\r\ncircumstances of such\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_144\"\u003e[Pg 144]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e cases than those are who look at them merely from\r\nwithout. In this department, therefore, of human affairs, Individuality\r\nhas its proper field of action. In the conduct of human beings towards\r\none another, it is necessary that general rules should for the most part\r\nbe observed, in order that people may know what they have to expect; but\r\nin each person\u0027s own concerns, his individual spontaneity is entitled to\r\nfree exercise. Considerations to aid his judgment, exhortations to\r\nstrengthen his will, may be offered to him, even obtruded on him, by\r\nothers; but he himself is the final judge. All errors which he is likely\r\nto commit against advice and warning, are far outweighed by the evil of\r\nallowing others to constrain him to what they deem his good.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI do not mean that the feelings with which a person is regarded by\r\nothers, ought not to be in any way affected by his self-regarding\r\nqualities or deficiencies. This is neither possible nor desirable. If he\r\nis eminent in any of the qualities which conduce to his own good, he is,\r\nso far, a proper object of admiration. He is so much the nearer to the\r\nideal perfection of human nature. If he is grossly deficient in those\r\nqualities, a sentiment the opposite of admiration will follow. There is\r\na degree of folly, and a degree of what may be\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_145\"\u003e[Pg 145]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e called (though the\r\nphrase is not unobjectionable) lowness or depravation of taste, which,\r\nthough it cannot justify doing harm to the person who manifests it,\r\nrenders him necessarily and properly a subject of distaste, or, in\r\nextreme cases, even of contempt: a person could not have the opposite\r\nqualities in due strength without entertaining these feelings. Though\r\ndoing no wrong to any one, a person may so act as to compel us to judge\r\nhim, and feel to him, as a fool, or as a being of an inferior order: and\r\nsince this judgment and feeling are a fact which he would prefer to\r\navoid, it is doing him a service to warn him of it beforehand, as of any\r\nother disagreeable consequence to which he exposes himself. It would be\r\nwell, indeed, if this good office were much more freely rendered than\r\nthe common notions of politeness at present permit, and if one person\r\ncould honestly point out to another that he thinks him in fault, without\r\nbeing considered unmannerly or presuming. We have a right, also, in\r\nvarious ways, to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one, not to\r\nthe oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of ours. We are\r\nnot bound, for example, to seek his society; we have a right to avoid it\r\n(though not to parade the avoidance), for we have a right to choose the\r\nsociety most acceptable to us. We\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_146\"\u003e[Pg 146]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e have a right, and it may be our duty,\r\nto caution others against him, if we think his example or conversation\r\nlikely to have a pernicious effect on those with whom he associates. We\r\nmay give others a preference over him in optional good offices, except\r\nthose which tend to his improvement. In these various modes a person may\r\nsuffer very severe penalties at the hands of others, for faults which\r\ndirectly concern only himself; but he suffers these penalties only in so\r\nfar as they are the natural, and, as it were, the spontaneous\r\nconsequences of the faults themselves, not because they are purposely\r\ninflicted on him for the sake of punishment. A person who shows\r\nrashness, obstinacy, self-conceit—who cannot live within moderate\r\nmeans—who cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgences—who pursues\r\nanimal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect—must\r\nexpect to be lowered in the opinion of others, and to have a less share\r\nof their favourable sentiments; but of this he has no right to complain,\r\nunless he has merited their favour by special excellence in his social\r\nrelations, and has thus established a title to their good offices, which\r\nis not affected by his demerits towards himself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat I contend for is, that the inconveniences which are strictly\r\ninseparable from the \u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_147\"\u003e[Pg 147]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eunfavourable judgment of others, are the only ones\r\nto which a person should ever be subjected for that portion of his\r\nconduct and character which concerns his own good, but which does not\r\naffect the interests of others in their relations with him. Acts\r\ninjurious to others require a totally different treatment. Encroachment\r\non their rights; infliction on them of any loss or damage not justified\r\nby his own rights; falsehood or duplicity in dealing with them; unfair\r\nor ungenerous use of advantages over them; even selfish abstinence from\r\ndefending them against injury—these are fit objects of moral\r\nreprobation, and, in grave cases, of moral retribution and punishment.\r\nAnd not only these acts, but the dispositions which lead to them, are\r\nproperly immoral, and fit subjects of disapprobation which may rise to\r\nabhorrence. Cruelty of disposition; malice and ill-nature; that most\r\nanti-social and odious of all passions, envy; dissimulation and\r\ninsincerity; irascibility on insufficient cause, and resentment\r\ndisproportioned to the provocation; the love of domineering over others;\r\nthe desire to engross more than one\u0027s share of advantages (the πλεονεξἱα [Greek:\r\npleonexia] of the Greeks); the pride which derives gratification from\r\nthe abasement of others; the egotism which thinks self and its concerns\r\nmore important than \u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_148\"\u003e[Pg 148]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eeverything else, and decides all doubtful questions\r\nin its own favour;—these are moral vices, and constitute a bad and\r\nodious moral character: unlike the self-regarding faults previously\r\nmentioned, which are not properly immoralities, and to whatever pitch\r\nthey may be carried, do not constitute wickedness. They may be proofs of\r\nany amount of folly, or want of personal dignity and self-respect; but\r\nthey are only a subject of moral reprobation when they involve a breach\r\nof duty to others, for whose sake the individual is bound to have care\r\nfor himself. What are called duties to ourselves are not socially\r\nobligatory, unless circumstances render them at the same time duties to\r\nothers. The term duty to oneself, when it means anything more than\r\nprudence, means self-respect or self-development; and for none of these\r\nis any one accountable to his fellow-creatures, because for none of them\r\nis it for the good of mankind that he be held accountable to them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe distinction between the loss of consideration which a person may\r\nrightly incur by defect of prudence or of personal dignity, and the\r\nreprobation which is due to him for an offence against the rights of\r\nothers, is not a merely nominal distinction. It makes a vast difference\r\nboth in our feelings and in our conduct towards him,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_149\"\u003e[Pg 149]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e whether he\r\ndispleases us in things in which we think we have a right to control\r\nhim, or in things in which we know that we have not. If he displeases\r\nus, we may express our distaste, and we may stand aloof from a person as\r\nwell as from a thing that displeases us; but we shall not therefore feel\r\ncalled on to make his life uncomfortable. We shall reflect that he\r\nalready bears, or will bear, the whole penalty of his error; if he\r\nspoils his life by mismanagement, we shall not, for that reason, desire\r\nto spoil it still further: instead of wishing to punish him, we shall\r\nrather endeavour to alleviate his punishment, by showing him how he may\r\navoid or cure the evils his conduct tends to bring upon him. He may be\r\nto us an object of pity, perhaps of dislike, but not of anger or\r\nresentment; we shall not treat him like an enemy of society: the worst\r\nwe shall think ourselves justified in doing is leaving him to himself,\r\nif we do not interfere benevolently by showing interest or concern for\r\nhim. It is far otherwise if he has infringed the rules necessary for the\r\nprotection of his fellow-creatures, individually or collectively. The\r\nevil consequences of his acts do not then fall on himself, but on\r\nothers; and society, as the protector of all its members, must retaliate\r\non him; must inflict pain on him for the express purpose\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_150\"\u003e[Pg 150]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of punishment,\r\nand must take care that it be sufficiently severe. In the one case, he\r\nis an offender at our bar, and we are called on not only to sit in\r\njudgment on him, but, in one shape or another, to execute our own\r\nsentence: in the other case, it is not our part to inflict any suffering\r\non him, except what may incidentally follow from our using the same\r\nliberty in the regulation of our own affairs, which we allow to him in his.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe distinction here pointed out between the part of a person\u0027s life\r\nwhich concerns only himself, and that which concerns others, many\r\npersons will refuse to admit. How (it may be asked) can any part of the\r\nconduct of a member of society be a matter of indifference to the other\r\nmembers? No person is an entirely isolated being; it is impossible for a\r\nperson to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself,\r\nwithout mischief reaching at least to his near connections, and often\r\nfar beyond them. If he injures his property, he does harm to those who\r\ndirectly or indirectly derived support from it, and usually diminishes,\r\nby a greater or less amount, the general resources of the community. If\r\nhe deteriorates his bodily or mental faculties, he not only brings evil\r\nupon all who depended on him for any portion of their happiness, but\r\ndisqualifies himself for rendering\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_151\"\u003e[Pg 151]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the services which he owes to his\r\nfellow-creatures generally; perhaps becomes a burthen on their affection\r\nor benevolence; and if such conduct were very frequent, hardly any\r\noffence that is committed would detract more from the general sum of\r\ngood. Finally, if by his vices or follies a person does no direct harm\r\nto others, he is nevertheless (it may be said) injurious by his example;\r\nand ought to be compelled to control himself, for the sake of those whom\r\nthe sight or knowledge of his conduct might corrupt or mislead.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd even (it will be added) if the consequences of misconduct could be\r\nconfined to the vicious or thoughtless individual, ought society to\r\nabandon to their own guidance those who are manifestly unfit for it? If\r\nprotection against themselves is confessedly due to children and persons\r\nunder age, is not society equally bound to afford it to persons of\r\nmature years who are equally incapable of self-government? If gambling,\r\nor drunkenness, or incontinence, or idleness, or uncleanliness, are as\r\ninjurious to happiness, and as great a hindrance to improvement, as many\r\nor most of the acts prohibited by law, why (it may be asked) should not\r\nlaw, so far as is consistent with practicability and social convenience,\r\nendeavour to repress these\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_152\"\u003e[Pg 152]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e also? And as a supplement to the unavoidable\r\nimperfections of law, ought not opinion at least to organise a powerful\r\npolice against these vices, and visit rigidly with social penalties\r\nthose who are known to practise them? There is no question here (it may\r\nbe said) about restricting individuality, or impeding the trial of new\r\nand original experiments in living. The only things it is sought to\r\nprevent are things which have been tried and condemned from the\r\nbeginning of the world until now; things which experience has shown not\r\nto be useful or suitable to any person\u0027s individuality. There must be\r\nsome length of time and amount of experience, after which a moral or\r\nprudential truth may be regarded as established: and it is merely\r\ndesired to prevent generation after generation from falling over the\r\nsame precipice which has been fatal to their predecessors.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI fully admit that the mischief which a person does to himself, may\r\nseriously affect, both through their sympathies and their interests,\r\nthose nearly connected with him, and in a minor degree, society at\r\nlarge. When, by conduct of this sort, a person is led to violate a\r\ndistinct and assignable obligation to any other person or persons, the\r\ncase is taken out of the self-regarding class, and becomes amenable to\r\nmoral disapprobation in the proper\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_153\"\u003e[Pg 153]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e sense of the term. If, for example,\r\na man, through intemperance or extravagance, becomes unable to pay his\r\ndebts, or, having undertaken the moral responsibility of a family,\r\nbecomes from the same cause incapable of supporting or educating them,\r\nhe is deservedly reprobated, and might be justly punished; but it is for\r\nthe breach of duty to his family or creditors, not for the extravagance.\r\nIf the resources which ought to have been devoted to them, had been\r\ndiverted from them for the most prudent investment, the moral\r\nculpability would have been the same. George Barnwell murdered his uncle\r\nto get money for his mistress, but if he had done it to set himself up\r\nin business, he would equally have been hanged. Again, in the frequent\r\ncase of a man who causes grief to his family by addiction to bad habits,\r\nhe deserves reproach for his unkindness or ingratitude; but so he may\r\nfor cultivating habits not in themselves vicious, if they are painful to\r\nthose with whom he passes his life, or who from personal ties are\r\ndependent on him for their comfort. Whoever fails in the consideration\r\ngenerally due to the interests and feelings of others, not being\r\ncompelled by some more imperative duty, or justified by allowable\r\nself-preference, is a subject of moral disapprobation\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_154\"\u003e[Pg 154]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for that failure,\r\nbut not for the cause of it, nor for the errors, merely personal to\r\nhimself, which may have remotely led to it. In like manner, when a\r\nperson disables himself, by conduct purely self-regarding, from the\r\nperformance of some definite duty incumbent on him to the public, he is\r\nguilty of a social offence. No person ought to be punished simply for\r\nbeing drunk; but a soldier or a policeman should be punished for being\r\ndrunk on duty. Whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, or a\r\ndefinite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the\r\ncase is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of\r\nmorality or law.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut with regard to the merely contingent, or, as it may be called,\r\nconstructive injury which a person causes to society, by conduct which\r\nneither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions\r\nperceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself; the\r\ninconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of\r\nthe greater good of human freedom. If grown persons are to be punished\r\nfor not taking proper care of themselves, I would rather it were for\r\ntheir own sake, than under pretence of preventing them from impairing\r\ntheir capacity of rendering to society benefits which society does not\r\npretend it\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_155\"\u003e[Pg 155]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e has a right to exact. But I cannot consent to argue the\r\npoint as if society had no means of bringing its weaker members up to\r\nits ordinary standard of rational conduct, except waiting till they do\r\nsomething irrational, and then punishing them, legally or morally, for\r\nit. Society has had absolute power over them during all the early\r\nportion of their existence: it has had the whole period of childhood and\r\nnonage in which to try whether it could make them capable of rational\r\nconduct in life. The existing generation is master both of the training\r\nand the entire circumstances of the generation to come; it cannot indeed\r\nmake them perfectly wise and good, because it is itself so lamentably\r\ndeficient in goodness and wisdom; and its best efforts are not always,\r\nin individual cases, its most successful ones; but it is perfectly well\r\nable to make the rising generation, as a whole, as good as, and a little\r\nbetter than, itself. If society lets any considerable number of its\r\nmembers grow up mere children, incapable of being acted on by rational\r\nconsideration of distant motives, society has itself to blame for the\r\nconsequences. Armed not only with all the powers of education, but with\r\nthe ascendency which the authority of a received opinion always\r\nexercises over the minds who are least fitted to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_156\"\u003e[Pg 156]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e judge for themselves;\r\nand aided by the \u003ci\u003enatural\u003c/i\u003e penalties which cannot be prevented from\r\nfalling on those who incur the distaste or the contempt of those who\r\nknow them; let not society pretend that it needs, besides all this, the\r\npower to issue commands and enforce obedience in the personal concerns\r\nof individuals, in which, on all principles of justice and policy, the\r\ndecision ought to rest with those who are to abide the consequences. Nor\r\nis there anything which tends more to discredit and frustrate the better\r\nmeans of influencing conduct, than a resort to the worse. If there be\r\namong those whom it is attempted to coerce into prudence or temperance,\r\nany of the material of which vigorous and independent characters are\r\nmade, they will infallibly rebel against the yoke. No such person will\r\never feel that others have a right to control him in his concerns, such\r\nas they have to prevent him from injuring them in theirs; and it easily\r\ncomes to be considered a mark of spirit and courage to fly in the face\r\nof such usurped authority, and do with ostentation the exact opposite of\r\nwhat it enjoins; as in the fashion of grossness which succeeded, in the\r\ntime of Charles II., to the fanatical moral intolerance of the Puritans.\r\nWith respect to what is said of the necessity of protecting society\r\nfrom\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_157\"\u003e[Pg 157]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the bad example set to others by the vicious or the\r\nself-indulgent; it is true that bad example may have a pernicious\r\neffect, especially the example of doing wrong to others with impunity to\r\nthe wrong-doer. But we are now speaking of conduct which, while it does\r\nno wrong to others, is supposed to do great harm to the agent himself:\r\nand I do not see how those who believe this, can think otherwise than\r\nthat the example, on the whole, must be more salutary than hurtful,\r\nsince, if it displays the misconduct, it displays also the painful or\r\ndegrading consequences which, if the conduct is justly censured, must be\r\nsupposed to be in all or most cases attendant on it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the\r\npublic with purely personal conduct, is that when it does interfere, the\r\nodds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place. On\r\nquestions of social morality, of duty to others, the opinion of the\r\npublic, that is, of an overruling majority, though often wrong, is\r\nlikely to be still oftener right; because on such questions they are\r\nonly required to judge of their own interests; of the manner in which\r\nsome mode of conduct, if allowed to be practised, would affect\r\nthemselves. But the opinion of a similar majority, imposed as a law on\r\nthe minority, on questions of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_158\"\u003e[Pg 158]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e self-regarding conduct, is quite as\r\nlikely to be wrong as right; for in these cases public opinion means, at\r\nthe best, some people\u0027s opinion of what is good or bad for other people;\r\nwhile very often it does not even mean that; the public, with the most\r\nperfect indifference, passing over the pleasure or convenience of those\r\nwhose conduct they censure, and considering only their own preference.\r\nThere are many who consider as an injury to themselves any conduct which\r\nthey have a distaste for, and resent it as an outrage to their feelings;\r\nas a religious bigot, when charged with disregarding the religious\r\nfeelings of others, has been known to retort that they disregard his\r\nfeelings, by persisting in their abominable worship or creed. But there\r\nis no parity between the feeling of a person for his own opinion, and\r\nthe feeling of another who is offended at his holding it; no more than\r\nbetween the desire of a thief to take a purse, and the desire of the\r\nright owner to keep it. And a person\u0027s taste is as much his own peculiar\r\nconcern as his opinion or his purse. It is easy for any one to imagine\r\nan ideal public, which leaves the freedom and choice of individuals in\r\nall uncertain matters undisturbed, and only requires them to abstain\r\nfrom modes of conduct which universal experience has condemned. But\r\nwhere\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_159\"\u003e[Pg 159]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e has there been seen a public which set any such limit to its\r\ncensorship? or when does the public trouble itself about universal\r\nexperience? In its interferences with personal conduct it is seldom\r\nthinking of anything but the enormity of acting or feeling differently\r\nfrom itself; and this standard of judgment, thinly disguised, is held up\r\nto mankind as the dictate of religion and philosophy, by nine-tenths of\r\nall moralists and speculative writers. These teach that things are right\r\nbecause they are right; because we feel them to be so. They tell us to\r\nsearch in our own minds and hearts for laws of conduct binding on\r\nourselves and on all others. What can the poor public do but apply these\r\ninstructions, and make their own personal feelings of good and evil, if\r\nthey are tolerably unanimous in them, obligatory on all the world?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe evil here pointed out is not one which exists only in theory; and it\r\nmay perhaps be expected that I should specify the instances in which the\r\npublic of this age and country improperly invests its own preferences\r\nwith the character of moral laws. I am not writing an essay on the\r\naberrations of existing moral feeling. That is too weighty a subject to\r\nbe discussed parenthetically, and by way of illustration. Yet examples\r\nare necessary, to show that the principle\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_160\"\u003e[Pg 160]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e I maintain is of serious and\r\npractical moment, and that I am not endeavouring to erect a barrier\r\nagainst imaginary evils. And it is not difficult to show, by abundant\r\ninstances, that to extend the bounds of what may be called moral police,\r\nuntil it encroaches on the most unquestionably legitimate liberty of the\r\nindividual, is one of the most universal of all human propensities.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs a first instance, consider the antipathies which men cherish on no\r\nbetter grounds than that persons whose religious opinions are different\r\nfrom theirs, do not practise their religious observances, especially\r\ntheir religious abstinences. To cite a rather trivial example, nothing\r\nin the creed or practice of Christians does more to envenom the hatred\r\nof Mahomedans against them, than the fact of their eating pork. There\r\nare few acts which Christians and Europeans regard with more unaffected\r\ndisgust, than Mussulmans regard this particular mode of satisfying\r\nhunger. It is, in the first place, an offence against their religion;\r\nbut this circumstance by no means explains either the degree or the kind\r\nof their repugnance; for wine also is forbidden by their religion, and\r\nto partake of it is by all Mussulmans accounted wrong, but not\r\ndisgusting. Their aversion to the flesh of the \"unclean beast\" is,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_161\"\u003e[Pg 161]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e on\r\nthe contrary, of that peculiar character, resembling an instinctive\r\nantipathy, which the idea of uncleanness, when once it thoroughly sinks\r\ninto the feelings, seems always to excite even in those whose personal\r\nhabits are anything but scrupulously cleanly, and of which the sentiment\r\nof religious impurity, so intense in the Hindoos, is a remarkable\r\nexample. Suppose now that in a people, of whom the majority were\r\nMussulmans, that majority should insist upon not permitting pork to be\r\neaten within the limits of the country. This would be nothing new in\r\nMahomedan countries.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_14_14\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_14_14\"\u003e[14]\u003c/a\u003e Would it be a legitimate exercise of the moral\r\nauthority of public opinion? and if not, why not? The practice is really\r\nrevolting to such a public. They also sincerely\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_162\"\u003e[Pg 162]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e think that it is\r\nforbidden and abhorred by the Deity. Neither could the prohibition be\r\ncensured as religious persecution. It might be religious in its origin,\r\nbut it would not be persecution for religion, since nobody\u0027s religion\r\nmakes it a duty to eat pork. The only tenable ground of condemnation\r\nwould be, that with the personal tastes and self-regarding concerns of\r\nindividuals the public has no business to interfere.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo come somewhat nearer home: the majority of Spaniards consider it a\r\ngross impiety, offensive in the highest degree to the Supreme Being, to\r\nworship him in any other manner than the Roman Catholic; and no other\r\npublic worship is lawful on Spanish soil. The people of all Southern\r\nEurope look upon a married clergy as not only irreligious, but unchaste,\r\nindecent, gross, disgusting. What do Protestants think of these\r\nperfectly sincere feelings, and of the attempt to enforce them against\r\nnon-Catholics? Yet, if mankind are justified in interfering with each\r\nother\u0027s liberty in things which do not concern the interests of others,\r\non what principle is it possible consistently to exclude these cases? or\r\nwho can blame people for desiring to suppress what they regard as a\r\nscandal in the sight of God and man? No stronger case can be shown for\r\nprohibiting\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_163\"\u003e[Pg 163]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e anything which is regarded as a personal immorality, than\r\nis made out for suppressing these practices in the eyes of those who\r\nregard them as impieties; and unless we are willing to adopt the logic\r\nof persecutors, and to say that we may persecute others because we are\r\nright, and that they must not persecute us because they are wrong, we\r\nmust beware of admitting a principle of which we should resent as a\r\ngross injustice the application to ourselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe preceding instances may be objected to, although unreasonably, as\r\ndrawn from contingencies impossible among us: opinion, in this country,\r\nnot being likely to enforce abstinence from meats, or to interfere with\r\npeople for worshipping, and for either marrying or not marrying,\r\naccording to their creed or inclination. The next example, however,\r\nshall be taken from an interference with liberty which we have by no\r\nmeans passed all danger of. Wherever the Puritans have been sufficiently\r\npowerful, as in New England, and in Great Britain at the time of the\r\nCommonwealth, they have endeavoured, with considerable success, to put\r\ndown all public, and nearly all private, amusements: especially music,\r\ndancing, public games, or other assemblages for purposes of diversion,\r\nand the theatre. There\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_164\"\u003e[Pg 164]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e are still in this country large bodies of\r\npersons by whose notions of morality and religion these recreations are\r\ncondemned; and those persons belonging chiefly to the middle class, who\r\nare the ascendant power in the present social and political condition of\r\nthe kingdom, it is by no means impossible that persons of these\r\nsentiments may at some time or other command a majority in Parliament.\r\nHow will the remaining portion of the community like to have the\r\namusements that shall be permitted to them regulated by the religious\r\nand moral sentiments of the stricter Calvinists and Methodists? Would\r\nthey not, with considerable peremptoriness, desire these intrusively\r\npious members of society to mind their own business? This is precisely\r\nwhat should be said to every government and every public, who have the\r\npretension that no person shall enjoy any pleasure which they think\r\nwrong. But if the principle of the pretension be admitted, no one can\r\nreasonably object to its being acted on in the sense of the majority, or\r\nother preponderating power in the country; and all persons must be ready\r\nto conform to the idea of a Christian commonwealth, as understood by the\r\nearly settlers in New England, if a religious profession similar to\r\ntheirs should ever succeed in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_165\"\u003e[Pg 165]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e regaining its lost ground, as religions\r\nsupposed to be declining have so often been known to do.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo imagine another contingency, perhaps more likely to be realised than\r\nthe one last mentioned. There is confessedly a strong tendency in the\r\nmodern world towards a democratic constitution of society, accompanied\r\nor not by popular political institutions. It is affirmed that in the\r\ncountry where this tendency is most completely realised—where both\r\nsociety and the government are most democratic—the United States—the\r\nfeeling of the majority, to whom any appearance of a more showy or\r\ncostly style of living than they can hope to rival is disagreeable,\r\noperates as a tolerably effectual sumptuary law, and that in many parts\r\nof the Union it is really difficult for a person possessing a very large\r\nincome, to find any mode of spending it, which will not incur popular\r\ndisapprobation. Though such statements as these are doubtless much\r\nexaggerated as a representation of existing facts, the state of things\r\nthey describe is not only a conceivable and possible, but a probable\r\nresult of democratic feeling, combined with the notion that the public\r\nhas a right to a veto on the manner in which individuals shall spend\r\ntheir incomes. We have only further to suppose a considerable diffusion\r\nof\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_166\"\u003e[Pg 166]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Socialist opinions, and it may become infamous in the eyes of the\r\nmajority to possess more property than some very small amount, or any\r\nincome not earned by manual labour. Opinions similar in principle to\r\nthese, already prevail widely among the artisan class, and weigh\r\noppressively on those who are amenable to the opinion chiefly of that\r\nclass, namely, its own members. It is known that the bad workmen who\r\nform the majority of the operatives in many branches of industry, are\r\ndecidedly of opinion that bad workmen ought to receive the same wages as\r\ngood, and that no one ought to be allowed, through piecework or\r\notherwise, to earn by superior skill or industry more than others can\r\nwithout it. And they employ a moral police, which occasionally becomes a\r\nphysical one, to deter skilful workmen from receiving, and employers\r\nfrom giving, a larger remuneration for a more useful service. If the\r\npublic have any jurisdiction over private concerns, I cannot see that\r\nthese people are in fault, or that any individual\u0027s particular public\r\ncan be blamed for asserting the same authority over his individual\r\nconduct, which the general public asserts over people in general.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut, without dwelling upon supposititious cases, there are, in our own\r\nday, gross usurpations upon\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_167\"\u003e[Pg 167]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the liberty of private life actually\r\npractised, and still greater ones threatened with some expectation of\r\nsuccess, and opinions proposed which assert an unlimited right in the\r\npublic not only to prohibit by law everything which it thinks wrong, but\r\nin order to get at what it thinks wrong, to prohibit any number of\r\nthings which it admits to be innocent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eUnder the name of preventing intemperance, the people of one English\r\ncolony, and of nearly half the United States, have been interdicted by\r\nlaw from making any use whatever of fermented drinks, except for medical\r\npurposes: for prohibition of their sale is in fact, as it is intended to\r\nbe, prohibition of their use. And though the impracticability of\r\nexecuting the law has caused its repeal in several of the States which\r\nhad adopted it, including the one from which it derives its name, an\r\nattempt has notwithstanding been commenced, and is prosecuted with\r\nconsiderable zeal by many of the professed philanthropists, to agitate\r\nfor a similar law in this country. The association, or \"Alliance\" as it\r\nterms itself, which has been formed for this purpose, has acquired some\r\nnotoriety through the publicity given to a correspondence between its\r\nSecretary and one of the very few English public men who hold that a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_168\"\u003e[Pg 168]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npolitician\u0027s opinions ought to be founded on principles. Lord Stanley\u0027s\r\nshare in this correspondence is calculated to strengthen the hopes\r\nalready built on him, by those who know how rare such qualities as are\r\nmanifested in some of his public appearances, unhappily are among those\r\nwho figure in political life. The organ of the Alliance, who would\r\n\"deeply deplore the recognition of any principle which could be wrested\r\nto justify bigotry and persecution,\" undertakes to point out the \"broad\r\nand impassable barrier\" which divides such principles from those of the\r\nassociation. \"All matters relating to thought, opinion, conscience,\r\nappear to me,\" he says, \"to be without the sphere of legislation; all\r\npertaining to social act, habit, relation, subject only to a\r\ndiscretionary power vested in the State itself, and not in the\r\nindividual, to be within it.\" No mention is made of a third class,\r\ndifferent from either of these, viz. acts and habits which are not\r\nsocial, but individual; although it is to this class, surely, that the\r\nact of drinking fermented liquors belongs. Selling fermented liquors,\r\nhowever, is trading, and trading is a social act. But the infringement\r\ncomplained of is not on the liberty of the seller, but on that of the\r\nbuyer and consumer; since the State might just as well forbid him to\r\ndrink wine,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_169\"\u003e[Pg 169]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e as purposely make it impossible for him to obtain it. The\r\nSecretary, however, says, \"I claim, as a citizen, a right to legislate\r\nwhenever my social rights are invaded by the social act of another.\" And\r\nnow for the definition of these \"social rights.\" \"If anything invades my\r\nsocial rights, certainly the traffic in strong drink does. It destroys\r\nmy primary right of security, by constantly creating and stimulating\r\nsocial disorder. It invades my right of equality, by deriving a profit\r\nfrom the creation of a misery, I am taxed to support. It impedes my\r\nright to free moral and intellectual development, by surrounding my path\r\nwith dangers, and by weakening and demoralising society, from which I\r\nhave a right to claim mutual aid and intercourse.\" A theory of \"social\r\nrights,\" the like of which probably never before found its way into\r\ndistinct language—being nothing short of this—that it is the absolute\r\nsocial right of every individual, that every other individual shall act\r\nin every respect exactly as he ought; that whosoever fails thereof in\r\nthe smallest particular, violates my social right, and entitles me to\r\ndemand from the legislature the removal of the grievance. So monstrous a\r\nprinciple is far more dangerous than any single interference with\r\nliberty; there is no violation of liberty which it\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_170\"\u003e[Pg 170]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e would not justify;\r\nit acknowledges no right to any freedom whatever, except perhaps to that\r\nof holding opinions in secret, without ever disclosing them: for the\r\nmoment an opinion which I consider noxious, passes any one\u0027s lips, it\r\ninvades all the \"social rights\" attributed to me by the Alliance. The\r\ndoctrine ascribes to all mankind a vested interest in each other\u0027s\r\nmoral, intellectual, and even physical perfection, to be defined by each\r\nclaimant according to his own standard.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnother important example of illegitimate interference with the rightful\r\nliberty of the individual, not simply threatened, but long since carried\r\ninto triumphant effect, is Sabbatarian legislation. Without doubt,\r\nabstinence on one day in the week, so far as the exigencies of life\r\npermit, from the usual daily occupation, though in no respect\r\nreligiously binding on any except Jews, is a highly beneficial custom.\r\nAnd inasmuch as this custom cannot be observed without a general consent\r\nto that effect among the industrious classes, therefore, in so far as\r\nsome persons by working may impose the same necessity on others, it may\r\nbe allowable and right that the law should guarantee to each, the\r\nobservance by others of the custom, by suspending the greater operations\r\nof industry on a particular day. But this justification, grounded on the\r\ndirect\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_171\"\u003e[Pg 171]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e interest which others have in each individual\u0027s observance of\r\nthe practice, does not apply to the self-chosen occupations in which a\r\nperson may think fit to employ his leisure; nor does it hold good, in\r\nthe smallest degree, for legal restrictions on amusements. It is true\r\nthat the amusement of some is the day\u0027s work of others; but the\r\npleasure, not to say the useful recreation, of many, is worth the labour\r\nof a few, provided the occupation is freely chosen, and can be freely\r\nresigned. The operatives are perfectly right in thinking that if all\r\nworked on Sunday, seven days\u0027 work would have to be given for six days\u0027\r\nwages: but so long as the great mass of employments are suspended, the\r\nsmall number who for the enjoyment of others must still work, obtain a\r\nproportional increase of earnings; and they are not obliged to follow\r\nthose occupations, if they prefer leisure to emolument. If a further\r\nremedy is sought, it might be found in the establishment by custom of a\r\nholiday on some other day of the week for those particular classes of\r\npersons. The only ground, therefore, on which restrictions on Sunday\r\namusements can be defended, must be that they are religiously wrong; a\r\nmotive of legislation which never can be too earnestly protested\r\nagainst. \"Deorum injuriæ Diis curæ.\" It remains to be proved that\r\nsociety\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_172\"\u003e[Pg 172]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or any of its officers holds a commission from on high to\r\navenge any supposed offence to Omnipotence, which is not also a wrong to\r\nour fellow-creatures. The notion that it is one man\u0027s duty that another\r\nshould be religious, was the foundation of all the religious\r\npersecutions ever perpetrated, and if admitted, would fully justify\r\nthem. Though the feeling which breaks out in the repeated attempts to\r\nstop railway travelling on Sunday, in the resistance to the opening of\r\nMuseums, and the like, has not the cruelty of the old persecutors, the\r\nstate of mind indicated by it is fundamentally the same. It is a\r\ndetermination not to tolerate others in doing what is permitted by their\r\nreligion, because it is not permitted by the persecutor\u0027s religion. It\r\nis a belief that God not only abominates the act of the misbeliever, but\r\nwill not hold us guiltless if we leave him unmolested.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI cannot refrain from adding to these examples of the little account\r\ncommonly made of human liberty, the language of downright persecution\r\nwhich breaks out from the press of this country, whenever it feels\r\ncalled on to notice the remarkable phenomenon of Mormonism. Much might\r\nbe said on the unexpected and instructive fact, that an alleged new\r\nrevelation, and a religion founded\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_173\"\u003e[Pg 173]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e on it, the product of palpable\r\nimposture, not even supported by the \u003ci\u003eprestige\u003c/i\u003e of extraordinary\r\nqualities in its founder, is believed by hundreds of thousands, and has\r\nbeen made the foundation of a society, in the age of newspapers,\r\nrailways, and the electric telegraph. What here concerns us is, that\r\nthis religion, like other and better religions, has its martyrs; that\r\nits prophet and founder was, for his teaching, put to death by a mob;\r\nthat others of its adherents lost their lives by the same lawless\r\nviolence; that they were forcibly expelled, in a body, from the country\r\nin which they first grew up; while, now that they have been chased into\r\na solitary recess in the midst of a desert, many in this country openly\r\ndeclare that it would be right (only that it is not convenient) to send\r\nan expedition against them, and compel them by force to conform to the\r\nopinions of other people. The article of the Mormonite doctrine which is\r\nthe chief provocative to the antipathy which thus breaks through the\r\nordinary restraints of religious tolerance, is its sanction of polygamy;\r\nwhich, though permitted to Mahomedans, and Hindoos, and Chinese, seems\r\nto excite unquenchable animosity when practised by persons who speak\r\nEnglish, and profess to be a kind of Christians. No one has a deeper\r\ndisapprobation than I have\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_174\"\u003e[Pg 174]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of this Mormon institution; both for other\r\nreasons, and because, far from being in any way countenanced by the\r\nprinciple of liberty, it is a direct infraction of that principle, being\r\na mere riveting of the chains of one half of the community, and an\r\nemancipation of the other from reciprocity of obligation towards them.\r\nStill, it must be remembered that this relation is as much voluntary on\r\nthe part of the women concerned in it, and who may be deemed the\r\nsufferers by it, as is the case with any other form of the marriage\r\ninstitution; and however surprising this fact may appear, it has its\r\nexplanation in the common ideas and customs of the world, which teaching\r\nwomen to think marriage the one thing needful, make it intelligible that\r\nmany a woman should prefer being one of several wives, to not being a\r\nwife at all. Other countries are not asked to recognise such unions, or\r\nrelease any portion of their inhabitants from their own laws on the\r\nscore of Mormonite opinions. But when the dissentients have conceded to\r\nthe hostile sentiments of others, far more than could justly be\r\ndemanded; when they have left the countries to which their doctrines\r\nwere unacceptable, and established themselves in a remote corner of the\r\nearth, which they have been the first to render habitable to human\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_175\"\u003e[Pg 175]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbeings; it is difficult to see on what principles but those of tyranny\r\nthey can be prevented from living there under what laws they please,\r\nprovided they commit no aggression on other nations, and allow perfect\r\nfreedom of departure to those who are dissatisfied with their ways. A\r\nrecent writer, in some respects of considerable merit, proposes (to use\r\nhis own words), not a crusade, but a \u003ci\u003ecivilizade\u003c/i\u003e, against this\r\npolygamous community, to put an end to what seems to him a retrograde\r\nstep in civilisation. It also appears so to me, but I am not aware that\r\nany community has a right to force another to be civilised. So long as\r\nthe sufferers by the bad law do not invoke assistance from other\r\ncommunities, I cannot admit that persons entirely unconnected with them\r\nought to step in and require that a condition of things with which all\r\nwho are directly interested appear to be satisfied, should be put an end\r\nto because it is a scandal to persons some thousands of miles distant,\r\nwho have no part or concern in it. Let them send missionaries, if they\r\nplease, to preach against it; and let them, by any fair means (of which\r\nsilencing the teachers is not one), oppose the progress of similar\r\ndoctrines among their own people. If civilisation has got the better of\r\nbarbarism when barbarism had the world to itself,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_176\"\u003e[Pg 176]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e it is too much to\r\nprofess to be afraid lest barbarism, after having been fairly got under,\r\nshould revive and conquer civilisation. A civilisation that can thus\r\nsuccumb to its vanquished enemy, must first have become so degenerate,\r\nthat neither its appointed priests and teachers, nor anybody else, has\r\nthe capacity, or will take the trouble, to stand up for it. If this be\r\nso, the sooner such a civilisation receives notice to quit, the better.\r\nIt can only go on from bad to worse, until destroyed and regenerated\r\n(like the Western Empire) by energetic barbarians.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch3\u003eFOOTNOTE:\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_14_14\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_14_14\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[14]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The case of the Bombay Parsees is a curious instance in\r\npoint. When this industrious and enterprising tribe, the descendants of\r\nthe Persian fire-worshippers, flying from their native country before\r\nthe Caliphs, arrived in Western India, they were admitted to toleration\r\nby the Hindoo sovereigns, on condition of not eating beef. When those\r\nregions afterwards fell under the dominion of Mahomedan conquerors, the\r\nParsees obtained from them a continuance of indulgence, on condition of\r\nrefraining from pork. What was at first obedience to authority became a\r\nsecond nature, and the Parsees to this day abstain both from beef and\r\npork. Though not required by their religion, the double abstinence has\r\nhad time to grow into a custom of their tribe; and custom, in the East,\r\nis a religion.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_177\"\u003e[Pg 177]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003cspan\u003eCHAPTER V.\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smaller\"\u003eAPPLICATIONS.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe principles asserted in these pages must be more generally admitted\r\nas the basis for discussion of details, before a consistent application\r\nof them to all the various departments of government and morals can be\r\nattempted with any prospect of advantage. The few observations I propose\r\nto make on questions of detail, are designed to illustrate the\r\nprinciples, rather than to follow them out to their consequences. I\r\noffer, not so much applications, as specimens of application; which may\r\nserve to bring into greater clearness the meaning and limits of the two\r\nmaxims which together form the entire doctrine of this Essay, and to\r\nassist the judgment in holding the balance between them, in the cases\r\nwhere it appears doubtful which of them is applicable to the case.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe maxims are, first, that the individual is not accountable to society\r\nfor his actions, in so far as\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_178\"\u003e[Pg 178]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e these concern the interests of no person\r\nbut himself. Advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance by other\r\npeople if thought necessary by them for their own good, are the only\r\nmeasures by which society can justifiably express its dislike or\r\ndisapprobation of his conduct. Secondly, that for such actions as are\r\nprejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable\r\nand may be subjected either to social or to legal punishments, if\r\nsociety is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its\r\nprotection.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the first place, it must by no means be supposed, because damage, or\r\nprobability of damage, to the interests of others, can alone justify the\r\ninterference of society, that therefore it always does justify such\r\ninterference. In many cases, an individual, in pursuing a legitimate\r\nobject, necessarily and therefore legitimately causes pain or loss to\r\nothers, or intercepts a good which they had a reasonable hope of\r\nobtaining. Such oppositions of interest between individuals often arise\r\nfrom bad social institutions, but are unavoidable while those\r\ninstitutions last; and some would be unavoidable under any institutions.\r\nWhoever succeeds in an overcrowded profession, or in a competitive\r\nexamination; whoever is preferred to another in any contest for an\r\nobject\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_179\"\u003e[Pg 179]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e which both desire, reaps benefit from the loss of others, from\r\ntheir wasted exertion and their disappointment. But it is, by common\r\nadmission, better for the general interest of mankind, that persons\r\nshould pursue their objects undeterred by this sort of consequences. In\r\nother words, society admits no rights, either legal or moral, in the\r\ndisappointed competitors, to immunity from this kind of suffering; and\r\nfeels called on to interfere, only when means of success have been\r\nemployed which it is contrary to the general interest to permit—namely,\r\nfraud or treachery, and force.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgain, trade is a social act. Whoever undertakes to sell any description\r\nof goods to the public, does what affects the interest of other persons,\r\nand of society in general; and thus his conduct, in principle, comes\r\nwithin the jurisdiction of society: accordingly, it was once held to be\r\nthe duty of governments, in all cases which were considered of\r\nimportance, to fix prices, and regulate the processes of manufacture.\r\nBut it is now recognised, though not till after a long struggle, that\r\nboth the cheapness and the good quality of commodities are most\r\neffectually provided for by leaving the producers and sellers perfectly\r\nfree, under the sole check of equal\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_180\"\u003e[Pg 180]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e freedom to the buyers for supplying\r\nthemselves elsewhere. This is the so-called doctrine of Free Trade,\r\nwhich rests on grounds different from, though equally solid with, the\r\nprinciple of individual liberty asserted in this Essay. Restrictions on\r\ntrade, or on production for purposes of trade, are indeed restraints;\r\nand all restraint, \u003ci\u003equâ\u003c/i\u003e restraint, is an evil: but the restraints in\r\nquestion affect only that part of conduct which society is competent to\r\nrestrain, and are wrong solely because they do not really produce the\r\nresults which it is desired to produce by them. As the principle of\r\nindividual liberty is not involved in the doctrine of Free Trade, so\r\nneither is it in most of the questions which arise respecting the limits\r\nof that doctrine: as for example, what amount of public control is\r\nadmissible for the prevention of fraud by adulteration; how far sanitary\r\nprecautions, or arrangements to protect work-people employed in\r\ndangerous occupations, should be enforced on employers. Such questions\r\ninvolve considerations of liberty, only in so far as leaving people to\r\nthemselves is always better, \u003ci\u003ecæteris paribus\u003c/i\u003e, than controlling them:\r\nbut that they may be legitimately controlled for these ends, is in\r\nprinciple undeniable. On the other hand, there are questions relating to\r\ninterference with trade,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_181\"\u003e[Pg 181]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e which are essentially questions of liberty;\r\nsuch as the Maine Law, already touched upon; the prohibition of the\r\nimportation of opium into China; the restriction of the sale of poisons;\r\nall cases, in short, where the object of the interference is to make it\r\nimpossible or difficult to obtain a particular commodity. These\r\ninterferences are objectionable, not as infringements on the liberty of\r\nthe producer or seller, but on that of the buyer.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne of these examples, that of the sale of poisons, opens a new\r\nquestion; the proper limits of what may be called the functions of\r\npolice; how far liberty may legitimately be invaded for the prevention\r\nof crime, or of accident. It is one of the undisputed functions of\r\ngovernment to take precautions against crime before it has been\r\ncommitted, as well as to detect and punish it afterwards. The preventive\r\nfunction of government, however, is far more liable to be abused, to the\r\nprejudice of liberty, than the punitory function; for there is hardly\r\nany part of the legitimate freedom of action of a human being which\r\nwould not admit of being represented, and fairly too, as increasing the\r\nfacilities for some form or other of delinquency. Nevertheless, if a\r\npublic authority, or even a private person, sees any one\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_182\"\u003e[Pg 182]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e evidently\r\npreparing to commit a crime, they are not bound to look on inactive\r\nuntil the crime is committed, but may interfere to prevent it. If\r\npoisons were never bought or used for any purpose except the commission\r\nof murder, it would be right to prohibit their manufacture and sale.\r\nThey may, however, be wanted not only for innocent but for useful\r\npurposes, and restrictions cannot be imposed in the one case without\r\noperating in the other. Again, it is a proper office of public authority\r\nto guard against accidents. If either a public officer or any one else\r\nsaw a person attempting to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to\r\nbe unsafe, and there were no time to warn him of his danger, they might\r\nseize him and turn him back, without any real infringement of his\r\nliberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not\r\ndesire to fall into the river. Nevertheless, when there is not a\r\ncertainty, but only a danger of mischief, no one but the person himself\r\ncan judge of the sufficiency of the motive which may prompt him to incur\r\nthe risk: in this case, therefore (unless he is a child, or delirious,\r\nor in some state of excitement or absorption incompatible with the full\r\nuse of the reflecting faculty), he ought, I conceive, to be only warned\r\nof the danger; not forcibly prevented from\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_183\"\u003e[Pg 183]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e exposing himself to it.\r\nSimilar considerations, applied to such a question as the sale of\r\npoisons, may enable us to decide which among the possible modes of\r\nregulation are or are not contrary to principle. Such a precaution, for\r\nexample, as that of labelling the drug with some word expressive of its\r\ndangerous character, may be enforced without violation of liberty: the\r\nbuyer cannot wish not to know that the thing he possesses has poisonous\r\nqualities. But to require in all cases the certificate of a medical\r\npractitioner, would make it sometimes impossible, always expensive, to\r\nobtain the article for legitimate uses. The only mode apparent to me, in\r\nwhich difficulties may be thrown in the way of crime committed through\r\nthis means, without any infringement, worth taking into account, upon\r\nthe liberty of those who desire the poisonous substance for other\r\npurposes, consists in providing what, in the apt language of Bentham, is\r\ncalled \"preappointed evidence.\" This provision is familiar to every one\r\nin the case of contracts. It is usual and right that the law, when a\r\ncontract is entered into, should require as the condition of its\r\nenforcing performance, that certain formalities should be observed, such\r\nas signatures, attestation of witnesses, and the like, in order that in\r\ncase of subsequent dispute, there may be\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_184\"\u003e[Pg 184]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e evidence to prove that the\r\ncontract was really entered into, and that there was nothing in the\r\ncircumstances to render it legally invalid: the effect being, to throw\r\ngreat obstacles in the way of fictitious contracts, or contracts made in\r\ncircumstances which, if known, would destroy their validity. Precautions\r\nof a similar nature might be enforced in the sale of articles adapted to\r\nbe instruments of crime. The seller, for example, might be required to\r\nenter into a register the exact time of the transaction, the name and\r\naddress of the buyer, the precise quality and quantity sold; to ask the\r\npurpose for which it was wanted, and record the answer he received. When\r\nthere was no medical prescription, the presence of some third person\r\nmight be required, to bring home the fact to the purchaser, in case\r\nthere should afterwards be reason to believe that the article had been\r\napplied to criminal purposes. Such regulations would in general be no\r\nmaterial impediment to obtaining the article, but a very considerable\r\none to making an improper use of it without detection.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe right inherent in society, to ward off crimes against itself by\r\nantecedent precautions, suggests the obvious limitations to the maxim,\r\nthat purely self-regarding misconduct cannot properly be\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_185\"\u003e[Pg 185]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e meddled with\r\nin the way of prevention or punishment. Drunkenness, for example, in\r\nordinary cases, is not a fit subject for legislative interference; but I\r\nshould deem it perfectly legitimate that a person, who had once been\r\nconvicted of any act of violence to others under the influence of drink,\r\nshould be placed under a special legal restriction, personal to himself;\r\nthat if he were afterwards found drunk, he should be liable to a\r\npenalty, and that if when in that state he committed another offence,\r\nthe punishment to which he would be liable for that other offence should\r\nbe increased in severity. The making himself drunk, in a person whom\r\ndrunkenness excites to do harm to others, is a crime against others. So,\r\nagain, idleness, except in a person receiving support from the public,\r\nor except when it constitutes a breach of contract, cannot without\r\ntyranny be made a subject of legal punishment; but if either from\r\nidleness or from any other avoidable cause, a man fails to perform his\r\nlegal duties to others, as for instance to support his children, it is\r\nno tyranny to force him to fulfil that obligation, by compulsory labour,\r\nif no other means are available.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgain, there are many acts which, being directly injurious only to the\r\nagents themselves, ought not to be legally interdicted, but which, if\r\ndone\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_186\"\u003e[Pg 186]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e publicly, are a violation of good manners and coming thus within\r\nthe category of offences against others may rightfully be prohibited. Of\r\nthis kind are offences against decency; on which it is unnecessary to\r\ndwell, the rather as they are only connected indirectly with our\r\nsubject, the objection to publicity being equally strong in the case of\r\nmany actions not in themselves condemnable, nor supposed to be so.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is another question to which an answer must be found, consistent\r\nwith the principles which have been laid down. In cases of personal\r\nconduct supposed to be blamable, but which respect for liberty precludes\r\nsociety from preventing or punishing, because the evil directly\r\nresulting falls wholly on the agent; what the agent is free to do, ought\r\nother persons to be equally free to counsel or instigate? This question\r\nis not free from difficulty. The case of a person who solicits another\r\nto do an act, is not strictly a case of self-regarding conduct. To give\r\nadvice or offer inducements to any one, is a social act, and may\r\ntherefore, like actions in general which affect others, be supposed\r\namenable to social control. But a little reflection corrects the first\r\nimpression, by showing that if the case is not strictly within the\r\ndefinition of individual liberty, yet the reasons\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_187\"\u003e[Pg 187]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e on which the\r\nprinciple of individual liberty is grounded, are applicable to it. If\r\npeople must be allowed, in whatever concerns only themselves, to act as\r\nseems best to themselves at their own peril, they must equally be free\r\nto consult with one another about what is fit to be so done; to exchange\r\nopinions, and give and receive suggestions. Whatever it is permitted to\r\ndo, it must be permitted to advise to do. The question is doubtful, only\r\nwhen the instigator derives a personal benefit from his advice; when he\r\nmakes it his occupation, for subsistence or pecuniary gain, to promote\r\nwhat society and the state consider to be an evil. Then, indeed, a new\r\nelement of complication is introduced; namely, the existence of classes\r\nof persons with an interest opposed to what is considered as the public\r\nweal, and whose mode of living is grounded on the counteraction of it.\r\nOught this to be interfered with, or not? Fornication, for example, must\r\nbe tolerated, and so must gambling; but should a person be free to be a\r\npimp, or to keep a gambling-house? The case is one of those which lie on\r\nthe exact boundary line between two principles, and it is not at once\r\napparent to which of the two it properly belongs. There are arguments on\r\nboth sides. On the side of toleration it may be said, that the fact\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_188\"\u003e[Pg 188]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of\r\nfollowing anything as an occupation, and living or profiting by the\r\npractice of it, cannot make that criminal which would otherwise be\r\nadmissible; that the act should either be consistently permitted or\r\nconsistently prohibited; that if the principles which we have hitherto\r\ndefended are true, society has no business, \u003ci\u003eas\u003c/i\u003e society, to decide\r\nanything to be wrong which concerns only the individual; that it cannot\r\ngo beyond dissuasion, and that one person should be as free to persuade,\r\nas another to dissuade. In opposition to this it may be contended, that\r\nalthough the public, or the State, are not warranted in authoritatively\r\ndeciding, for purposes of repression or punishment, that such or such\r\nconduct affecting only the interests of the individual is good or bad,\r\nthey are fully justified in assuming, if they regard it as bad, that its\r\nbeing so or not is at least a disputable question: That, this being\r\nsupposed, they cannot be acting wrongly in endeavouring to exclude the\r\ninfluence of solicitations which are not disinterested, of instigators\r\nwho cannot possibly be impartial—who have a direct personal interest on\r\none side, and that side the one which the State believes to be wrong,\r\nand who confessedly promote it for personal objects only. There can\r\nsurely, it may be urged, be nothing lost, no sacrifice of good, by\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_189\"\u003e[Pg 189]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e so\r\nordering matters that persons shall make their election, either wisely\r\nor foolishly, on their own prompting, as free as possible from the arts\r\nof persons who stimulate their inclinations for interested purposes of\r\ntheir own. Thus (it may be said) though the statutes respecting unlawful\r\ngames are utterly indefensible—though all persons should be free to\r\ngamble in their own or each other\u0027s houses, or in any place of meeting\r\nestablished by their own subscriptions, and open only to the members and\r\ntheir visitors—yet public gambling-houses should not be permitted. It\r\nis true that the prohibition is never effectual, and that whatever\r\namount of tyrannical power is given to the police, gambling-houses can\r\nalways be maintained under other pretences; but they may be compelled to\r\nconduct their operations with a certain degree of secrecy and mystery,\r\nso that nobody knows anything about them but those who seek them; and\r\nmore than this, society ought not to aim at. There is considerable force\r\nin these arguments; I will not venture to decide whether they are\r\nsufficient to justify the moral anomaly of punishing the accessary, when\r\nthe principal is (and must be) allowed to go free; or fining or\r\nimprisoning the procurer, but not the fornicator, the gambling-house\r\nkeeper, but not the gambler.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_190\"\u003e[Pg 190]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Still less ought the common operations of\r\nbuying and selling to be interfered with on analogous grounds. Almost\r\nevery article which is bought and sold may be used in excess, and the\r\nsellers have a pecuniary interest in encouraging that excess; but no\r\nargument can be founded on this, in favour, for instance, of the Maine\r\nLaw; because the class of dealers in strong drinks, though interested in\r\ntheir abuse, are indispensably required for the sake of their legitimate\r\nuse. The interest, however, of these dealers in promoting intemperance\r\nis a real evil, and justifies the State in imposing restrictions and\r\nrequiring guarantees, which but for that justification would be\r\ninfringements of legitimate liberty.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eA further question is, whether the State, while it permits, should\r\nnevertheless indirectly discourage conduct which it deems contrary to\r\nthe best interests of the agent; whether, for example, it should take\r\nmeasures to render the means of drunkenness more costly, or add to the\r\ndifficulty of procuring them, by limiting the number of the places of\r\nsale. On this as on most other practical questions, many distinctions\r\nrequire to be made. To tax stimulants for the sole purpose of making\r\nthem more difficult to be obtained, is a measure differing only in\r\ndegree from their entire \u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_191\"\u003e[Pg 191]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eprohibition; and would be justifiable only if\r\nthat were justifiable. Every increase of cost is a prohibition, to those\r\nwhose means do not come up to the augmented price; and to those who do,\r\nit is a penalty laid on them for gratifying a particular taste. Their\r\nchoice of pleasures, and their mode of expending their income, after\r\nsatisfying their legal and moral obligations to the State and to\r\nindividuals, are their own concern, and must rest with their own\r\njudgment. These considerations may seem at first sight to condemn the\r\nselection of stimulants as special subjects of taxation for purposes of\r\nrevenue. But it must be remembered that taxation for fiscal purposes is\r\nabsolutely inevitable; that in most countries it is necessary that a\r\nconsiderable part of that taxation should be indirect; that the State,\r\ntherefore, cannot help imposing penalties, which to some persons may be\r\nprohibitory, on the use of some articles of consumption. It is hence the\r\nduty of the State to consider, in the imposition of taxes, what\r\ncommodities the consumers can best spare; and \u003ci\u003eà fortiori\u003c/i\u003e, to select in\r\npreference those of which it deems the use, beyond a very moderate\r\nquantity, to be positively injurious. Taxation, therefore, of\r\nstimulants, up to the point which produces the largest amount of revenue\r\n(supposing that the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_192\"\u003e[Pg 192]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e State needs all the revenue which it yields) is not\r\nonly admissible, but to be approved of.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe question of making the sale of these commodities a more or less\r\nexclusive privilege, must be answered differently, according to the\r\npurposes to which the restriction is intended to be subservient. All\r\nplaces of public resort require the restraint of a police, and places of\r\nthis kind peculiarly, because offences against society are especially\r\napt to originate there. It is, therefore, fit to confine the power of\r\nselling these commodities (at least for consumption on the spot) to\r\npersons of known or vouched-for respectability of conduct; to make such\r\nregulations respecting hours of opening and closing as may be requisite\r\nfor public surveillance, and to withdraw the licence if breaches of the\r\npeace repeatedly take place through the connivance or incapacity of the\r\nkeeper of the house, or if it becomes a rendezvous for concocting and\r\npreparing offences against the law. Any further restriction I do not\r\nconceive to be, in principle, justifiable. The limitation in number, for\r\ninstance, of beer and spirit-houses, for the express purpose of\r\nrendering them more difficult of access, and diminishing the occasions\r\nof temptation, not only exposes all to an inconvenience because there\r\nare some by whom the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_193\"\u003e[Pg 193]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e facility would be abused, but is suited only to a\r\nstate of society in which the labouring classes are avowedly treated as\r\nchildren or savages, and placed under an education of restraint, to fit\r\nthem for future admission to the privileges of freedom. This is not the\r\nprinciple on which the labouring classes are professedly governed in any\r\nfree country; and no person who sets due value on freedom will give his\r\nadhesion to their being so governed, unless after all efforts have been\r\nexhausted to educate them for freedom and govern them as freemen, and it\r\nhas been definitively proved that they can only be governed as children.\r\nThe bare statement of the alternative shows the absurdity of supposing\r\nthat such efforts have been made in any case which needs be considered\r\nhere. It is only because the institutions of this country are a mass of\r\ninconsistencies, that things find admittance into our practice which\r\nbelong to the system of despotic, or what is called paternal,\r\ngovernment, while the general freedom of our institutions precludes the\r\nexercise of the amount of control necessary to render the restraint of\r\nany real efficacy as a moral education.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt was pointed out in an early part of this Essay, that the liberty of\r\nthe individual, in things wherein the individual is alone concerned,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_194\"\u003e[Pg 194]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nimplies a corresponding liberty in any number of individuals to regulate\r\nby mutual agreement such things as regard them jointly, and regard no\r\npersons but themselves. This question presents no difficulty, so long as\r\nthe will of all the persons implicated remains unaltered; but since that\r\nwill may change, it is often necessary, even in things in which they\r\nalone are concerned, that they should enter into engagements with one\r\nanother; and when they do, it is fit, as a general rule, that those\r\nengagements should be kept. Yet in the laws, probably, of every country,\r\nthis general rule has some exceptions. Not only persons are not held to\r\nengagements which violate the rights of third parties, but it is\r\nsometimes considered a sufficient reason for releasing them from an\r\nengagement, that it is injurious to themselves. In this and most other\r\ncivilised countries, for example, an engagement by which a person should\r\nsell himself, or allow himself to be sold, as a slave, would be null and\r\nvoid; neither enforced by law nor by opinion. The ground for thus\r\nlimiting his power of voluntarily disposing of his own lot in life, is\r\napparent, and is very clearly seen in this extreme case. The reason for\r\nnot interfering, unless for the sake of others, with a person\u0027s\r\nvoluntary acts, is consideration for his\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_195\"\u003e[Pg 195]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e liberty. His voluntary choice\r\nis evidence that what he so chooses is desirable, or at the least\r\nendurable, to him, and his good is on the whole best provided for by\r\nallowing him to take his own means of pursuing it. But by selling\r\nhimself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any future\r\nuse of it, beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own\r\ncase, the very purpose which is the justification of allowing him to\r\ndispose of himself. He is no longer free; but is thenceforth in a\r\nposition which has no longer the presumption in its favour, that would\r\nbe afforded by his voluntarily remaining in it. The principle of freedom\r\ncannot require that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom,\r\nto be allowed to alienate his freedom. These reasons, the force of which\r\nis so conspicuous in this peculiar case, are evidently of far wider\r\napplication; yet a limit is everywhere set to them by the necessities of\r\nlife, which continually require, not indeed that we should resign our\r\nfreedom, but that we should consent to this and the other limitation of\r\nit. The principle, however, which demands uncontrolled freedom of action\r\nin all that concerns only the agents themselves, requires that those who\r\nhave become bound to one another, in things which concern no third\r\nparty, should be able to release\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_196\"\u003e[Pg 196]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e one another from the engagement: and\r\neven without such voluntary release, there are perhaps no contracts or\r\nengagements, except those that relate to money or money\u0027s worth, of\r\nwhich one can venture to say that there ought to be no liberty whatever\r\nof retractation. Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt, in the excellent essay from\r\nwhich I have already quoted, states it as his conviction, that\r\nengagements which involve personal relations or services, should never\r\nbe legally binding beyond a limited duration of time; and that the most\r\nimportant of these engagements, marriage, having the peculiarity that\r\nits objects are frustrated unless the feelings of both the parties are\r\nin harmony with it, should require nothing more than the declared will\r\nof either party to dissolve it. This subject is too important, and too\r\ncomplicated, to be discussed in a parenthesis, and I touch on it only so\r\nfar as is necessary for purposes of illustration. If the conciseness and\r\ngenerality of Baron Humboldt\u0027s dissertation had not obliged him in this\r\ninstance to content himself with enunciating his conclusion without\r\ndiscussing the premises, he would doubtless have recognised that the\r\nquestion cannot be decided on grounds so simple as those to which he\r\nconfines himself. When a person, either by express promise or by\r\nconduct, has\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_197\"\u003e[Pg 197]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e encouraged another to rely upon his continuing to act in a\r\ncertain way—to build expectations and calculations, and stake any part\r\nof his plan of life upon that supposition, a new series of moral\r\nobligations arises on his part towards that person, which may possibly\r\nbe overruled, but cannot be ignored. And again, if the relation between\r\ntwo contracting parties has been followed by consequences to others; if\r\nit has placed third parties in any peculiar position, or, as in the case\r\nof marriage, has even called third parties into existence, obligations\r\narise on the part of both the contracting parties towards those third\r\npersons, the fulfilment of which, or at all events the mode of\r\nfulfilment, must be greatly affected by the continuance or disruption of\r\nthe relation between the original parties to the contract. It does not\r\nfollow, nor can I admit, that these obligations extend to requiring the\r\nfulfilment of the contract at all costs to the happiness of the\r\nreluctant party; but they are a necessary element in the question; and\r\neven if, as Von Humboldt maintains, they ought to make no difference in\r\nthe \u003ci\u003elegal\u003c/i\u003e freedom of the parties to release themselves from the\r\nengagement (and I also hold that they ought not to make \u003ci\u003emuch\u003c/i\u003e\r\ndifference), they necessarily make a great difference in the \u003ci\u003emoral\u003c/i\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_198\"\u003e[Pg 198]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfreedom. A person is bound to take all these circumstances into account,\r\nbefore resolving on a step which may affect such important interests of\r\nothers; and if he does not allow proper weight to those interests, he is\r\nmorally responsible for the wrong. I have made these obvious remarks for\r\nthe better illustration of the general principle of liberty, and not\r\nbecause they are at all needed on the particular question, which, on the\r\ncontrary, is usually discussed as if the interest of children was\r\neverything, and that of grown persons nothing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have already observed that, owing to the absence of any recognised\r\ngeneral principles, liberty is often granted where it should be\r\nwithheld, as well as withheld where it should be granted; and one of the\r\ncases in which, in the modern European world, the sentiment of liberty\r\nis the strongest, is a case where, in my view, it is altogether\r\nmisplaced. A person should be free to do as he likes in his own\r\nconcerns; but he ought not to be free to do as he likes in acting for\r\nanother, under the pretext that the affairs of another are his own\r\naffairs. The State, while it respects the liberty of each in what\r\nspecially regards himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant control over\r\nhis exercise of any power which it allows him to possess over others.\r\nThis\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_199\"\u003e[Pg 199]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e obligation is almost entirely disregarded in the case of the\r\nfamily relations, a case, in its direct influence on human happiness,\r\nmore important than all others taken together. The almost despotic power\r\nof husbands over wives need not be enlarged upon here because nothing\r\nmore is needed for the complete removal of the evil, than that wives\r\nshould have the same rights, and should receive the protection of law in\r\nthe same manner, as all other persons; and because, on this subject, the\r\ndefenders of established injustice do not avail themselves of the plea\r\nof liberty, but stand forth openly as the champions of power. It is in\r\nthe case of children, that misapplied notions of liberty are a real\r\nobstacle to the fulfilment by the State of its duties. One would almost\r\nthink that a man\u0027s children were supposed to be literally, and not\r\nmetaphorically, a part of himself, so jealous is opinion of the smallest\r\ninterference of law with his absolute and exclusive control over them;\r\nmore jealous than of almost any interference with his own freedom of\r\naction: so much less do the generality of mankind value liberty than\r\npower. Consider, for example, the case of education. Is it not almost a\r\nself-evident axiom, that the State should require and compel the\r\neducation, up to a certain standard, of every human being who is born\r\nits\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_200\"\u003e[Pg 200]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e citizen? Yet who is there that is not afraid to recognise and\r\nassert this truth? Hardly any one indeed will deny that it is one of the\r\nmost sacred duties of the parents (or, as law and usage now stand, the\r\nfather), after summoning a human being into the world, to give to that\r\nbeing an education fitting him to perform his part well in life towards\r\nothers and towards himself. But while this is unanimously declared to be\r\nthe father\u0027s duty, scarcely anybody, in this country, will bear to hear\r\nof obliging him to perform it. Instead of his being required to make any\r\nexertion or sacrifice for securing education to the child, it is left to\r\nhis choice to accept it or not when it is provided gratis! It still\r\nremains unrecognised, that to bring a child into existence without a\r\nfair prospect of being able, not only to provide food for its body, but\r\ninstruction and training for its mind, is a moral crime, both against\r\nthe unfortunate offspring and against society; and that if the parent\r\ndoes not fulfil this obligation, the State ought to see it fulfilled, at\r\nthe charge, as far as possible, of the parent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWere the duty of enforcing universal education once admitted, there\r\nwould be an end to the difficulties about what the State should teach,\r\nand how it should teach, which now convert the subject into a mere\r\nbattle-field for sects and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_201\"\u003e[Pg 201]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e parties, causing the time and labour which\r\nshould have been spent in educating, to be wasted in quarrelling about\r\neducation. If the government would make up its mind to \u003ci\u003erequire\u003c/i\u003e for\r\nevery child a good education, it might save itself the trouble of\r\n\u003ci\u003eproviding\u003c/i\u003e one. It might leave to parents to obtain the education where\r\nand how they pleased, and content itself with helping to pay the school\r\nfees of the poorer class of children, and defraying the entire school\r\nexpenses of those who have no one else to pay for them. The objections\r\nwhich are urged with reason against State education, do not apply to the\r\nenforcement of education by the State, but to the State\u0027s taking upon\r\nitself to direct that education; which is a totally different thing.\r\nThat the whole or any large part of the education of the people should\r\nbe in State hands, I go as far as any one in deprecating. All that has\r\nbeen said of the importance of individuality of character, and diversity\r\nin opinions and modes of conduct, involves, as of the same unspeakable\r\nimportance, diversity of education. A general State education is a mere\r\ncontrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another; and as\r\nthe mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant\r\npower in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an\r\naristocracy, or the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_202\"\u003e[Pg 202]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e majority of the existing generation, in proportion\r\nas it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the\r\nmind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body. An education\r\nestablished and controlled by the State, should only exist, if it exist\r\nat all, as one among many competing experiments, carried on for the\r\npurpose of example and stimulus, to keep the others up to a certain\r\nstandard of excellence. Unless, indeed, when society in general is in so\r\nbackward a state that it could not or would not provide for itself any\r\nproper institutions of education, unless the government undertook the\r\ntask; then, indeed, the government may, as the less of two great evils,\r\ntake upon itself the business of schools and universities, as it may\r\nthat of joint stock companies, when private enterprise, in a shape\r\nfitted for undertaking great works of industry, does not exist in the\r\ncountry. But in general, if the country contains a sufficient number of\r\npersons qualified to provide education under government auspices, the\r\nsame persons would be able and willing to give an equally good education\r\non the voluntary principle, under the assurance of remuneration afforded\r\nby a law rendering education compulsory, combined with State aid to\r\nthose unable to defray the expense.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_203\"\u003e[Pg 203]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe instrument for enforcing the law could be no other than public\r\nexaminations, extending to all children, and beginning at an early age.\r\nAn age might be fixed at which every child must be examined, to\r\nascertain if he (or she) is able to read. If a child proves unable, the\r\nfather, unless he has some sufficient ground of excuse, might be\r\nsubjected to a moderate fine, to be worked out, if necessary, by his\r\nlabour, and the child might be put to school at his expense. Once in\r\nevery year the examination should be renewed, with a gradually extending\r\nrange of subjects, so as to make the universal acquisition, and what is\r\nmore, retention, of a certain minimum of general knowledge, virtually\r\ncompulsory. Beyond that minimum, there should be voluntary examinations\r\non all subjects, at which all who come up to a certain standard of\r\nproficiency might claim a certificate. To prevent the State from\r\nexercising, through these arrangements, an improper influence over\r\nopinion, the knowledge required for passing an examination (beyond the\r\nmerely instrumental parts of knowledge, such as languages and their use)\r\nshould, even in the higher class of examinations, be confined to facts\r\nand positive science exclusively. The examinations on religion,\r\npolitics, or other disputed topics, should not turn on the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_204\"\u003e[Pg 204]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e truth or\r\nfalsehood of opinions, but on the matter of fact that such and such an\r\nopinion is held, on such grounds, by such authors, or schools, or\r\nchurches. Under this system, the rising generation would be no worse off\r\nin regard to all disputed truths, than they are at present; they would\r\nbe brought up either churchmen or dissenters as they now are, the state\r\nmerely taking care that they should be instructed churchmen, or\r\ninstructed dissenters. There would be nothing to hinder them from being\r\ntaught religion, if their parents chose, at the same schools where they\r\nwere taught other things. All attempts by the state to bias the\r\nconclusions of its citizens on disputed subjects, are evil; but it may\r\nvery properly offer to ascertain and certify that a person possesses the\r\nknowledge, requisite to make his conclusions, on any given subject,\r\nworth attending to. A student of philosophy would be the better for\r\nbeing able to stand an examination both in Locke and in Kant, whichever\r\nof the two he takes up with, or even if with neither: and there is no\r\nreasonable objection to examining an atheist in the evidences of\r\nChristianity, provided he is not required to profess a belief in them.\r\nThe examinations, however, in the higher branches of knowledge should, I\r\nconceive, be entirely voluntary. It would be giving\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_205\"\u003e[Pg 205]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e too dangerous a\r\npower to governments, were they allowed to exclude any one from\r\nprofessions, even from the profession of teacher, for alleged deficiency\r\nof qualifications: and I think, with Wilhelm von Humboldt, that degrees,\r\nor other public certificates of scientific or professional acquirements,\r\nshould be given to all who present themselves for examination, and stand\r\nthe test; but that such certificates should confer no advantage over\r\ncompetitors, other than the weight which may be attached to their\r\ntestimony by public opinion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is not in the matter of education only, that misplaced notions of\r\nliberty prevent moral obligations on the part of parents from being\r\nrecognised, and legal obligations from being imposed, where there are\r\nthe strongest grounds for the former always, and in many cases for the\r\nlatter also. The fact itself, of causing the existence of a human being,\r\nis one of the most responsible actions in the range of human life. To\r\nundertake this responsibility—to bestow a life which may be either a\r\ncurse or a blessing—unless the being on whom it is to be bestowed will\r\nhave at least the ordinary chances of a desirable existence, is a crime\r\nagainst that being. And in a country either over-peopled, or threatened\r\nwith being so, to produce children, beyond a very small number,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_206\"\u003e[Pg 206]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e with\r\nthe effect of reducing the reward of labour by their competition, is a\r\nserious offence against all who live by the remuneration of their\r\nlabour. The laws which, in many countries on the Continent, forbid\r\nmarriage unless the parties can show that they have the means of\r\nsupporting a family, do not exceed the legitimate powers of the state:\r\nand whether such laws be expedient or not (a question mainly dependent\r\non local circumstances and feelings), they are not objectionable as\r\nviolations of liberty. Such laws are interferences of the state to\r\nprohibit a mischievous act—an act injurious to others, which ought to\r\nbe a subject of reprobation, and social stigma, even when it is not\r\ndeemed expedient to superadd legal punishment. Yet the current ideas of\r\nliberty, which bend so easily to real infringements of the freedom of\r\nthe individual, in things which concern only himself, would repel the\r\nattempt to put any restraint upon his inclinations when the consequence\r\nof their indulgence is a life, or lives, of wretchedness and depravity\r\nto the offspring, with manifold evils to those sufficiently within reach\r\nto be in any way affected by their actions. When we compare the strange\r\nrespect of mankind for liberty, with their strange want of respect for\r\nit, we might imagine that a man had an indispensable\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_207\"\u003e[Pg 207]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e right to do harm\r\nto others, and no right at all to please himself without giving pain to\r\nany one.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have reserved for the last place a large class of questions respecting\r\nthe limits of government interference, which, though closely connected\r\nwith the subject of this Essay, do not, in strictness, belong to it.\r\nThese are cases in which the reasons against interference do not turn\r\nupon the principle of liberty: the question is not about restraining the\r\nactions of individuals, but about helping them: it is asked whether the\r\ngovernment should do, or cause to be done, something for their benefit,\r\ninstead of leaving it to be done by themselves, individually, or in\r\nvoluntary combination.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe objections to government interference, when it is not such as to\r\ninvolve infringement of liberty, may be of three kinds.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first is, when the thing to be done is likely to be better done by\r\nindividuals than by the government. Speaking generally, there is no one\r\nso fit to conduct any business, or to determine how or by whom it shall\r\nbe conducted, as those who are personally interested in it. This\r\nprinciple condemns the interferences, once so common, of the\r\nlegislature, or the officers of government, with the ordinary processes\r\nof industry. But this part of the subject has been sufficiently enlarged\r\nupon\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_208\"\u003e[Pg 208]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e by political economists, and is not particularly related to the\r\nprinciples of this Essay.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe second objection is more nearly allied to our subject. In many\r\ncases, though individuals may not do the particular thing so well, on\r\nthe average, as the officers of government, it is nevertheless desirable\r\nthat it should be done by them, rather than by the government, as a\r\nmeans to their own mental education—a mode of strengthening their\r\nactive faculties, exercising their judgment, and giving them a familiar\r\nknowledge of the subjects with which they are thus left to deal. This is\r\na principal, though not the sole, recommendation of jury trial (in cases\r\nnot political); of free and popular local and municipal institutions; of\r\nthe conduct of industrial and philanthropic enterprises by voluntary\r\nassociations. These are not questions of liberty, and are connected with\r\nthat subject only by remote tendencies; but they are questions of\r\ndevelopment. It belongs to a different occasion from the present to\r\ndwell on these things as parts of national education; as being, in\r\ntruth, the peculiar training of a citizen, the practical part of the\r\npolitical education of a free people, taking them out of the narrow\r\ncircle of personal and family selfishness, and accustoming them to the\r\ncomprehension of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_209\"\u003e[Pg 209]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e joint interests, the management of joint\r\nconcerns—habituating them to act from public or semi-public motives,\r\nand guide their conduct by aims which unite instead of isolating them\r\nfrom one another. Without these habits and powers, a free constitution\r\ncan neither be worked nor preserved, as is exemplified by the too-often\r\ntransitory nature of political freedom in countries where it does not\r\nrest upon a sufficient basis of local liberties. The management of\r\npurely local business by the localities, and of the great enterprises of\r\nindustry by the union of those who voluntarily supply the pecuniary\r\nmeans, is further recommended by all the advantages which have been set\r\nforth in this Essay as belonging to individuality of development, and\r\ndiversity of modes of action. Government operations tend to be\r\neverywhere alike. With individuals and voluntary associations, on the\r\ncontrary, there are varied experiments, and endless diversity of\r\nexperience. What the State can usefully do, is to make itself a central\r\ndepository, and active circulator and diffuser, of the experience\r\nresulting from many trials. Its business is to enable each\r\nexperimentalist to benefit by the experiments of others, instead of\r\ntolerating no experiments but its own.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe third, and most cogent reason for restricting\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_210\"\u003e[Pg 210]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the interference of\r\ngovernment, is the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power.\r\nEvery function superadded to those already exercised by the government,\r\ncauses its influence over hopes and fears to be more widely diffused,\r\nand converts, more and more, the active and ambitious part of the public\r\ninto hangers-on of the government, or of some party which aims at\r\nbecoming the government. If the roads, the railways, the banks, the\r\ninsurance offices, the great joint-stock companies, the universities,\r\nand the public charities, were all of them branches of the government;\r\nif, in addition, the municipal corporations and local boards, with all\r\nthat now devolves on them, became departments of the central\r\nadministration; if the employés of all these different enterprises were\r\nappointed and paid by the government, and looked to the government for\r\nevery rise in life; not all the freedom of the press and popular\r\nconstitution of the legislature would make this or any other country\r\nfree otherwise than in name. And the evil would be greater, the more\r\nefficiently and scientifically the administrative machinery was\r\nconstructed—the more skilful the arrangements for obtaining the best\r\nqualified hands and heads with which to work it. In England it has of\r\nlate been proposed that all the members of the civil\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_211\"\u003e[Pg 211]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e service of\r\ngovernment should be selected by competitive examination, to obtain for\r\nthose employments the most intelligent and instructed persons\r\nprocurable; and much has been said and written for and against this\r\nproposal. One of the arguments most insisted on by its opponents, is\r\nthat the occupation of a permanent official servant of the State does\r\nnot hold out sufficient prospects of emolument and importance to attract\r\nthe highest talents, which will always be able to find a more inviting\r\ncareer in the professions, or in the service of companies and other\r\npublic bodies. One would not have been surprised if this argument had\r\nbeen used by the friends of the proposition, as an answer to its\r\nprincipal difficulty. Coming from the opponents it is strange enough.\r\nWhat is urged as an objection is the safety-valve of the proposed\r\nsystem. If indeed all the high talent of the country \u003ci\u003ecould\u003c/i\u003e be drawn\r\ninto the service of the government, a proposal tending to bring about\r\nthat result might well inspire uneasiness. If every part of the business\r\nof society which required organised concert, or large and comprehensive\r\nviews, were in the hands of the government, and if government offices\r\nwere universally filled by the ablest men, all the enlarged culture and\r\npractised intelligence in the country, except the purely\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_212\"\u003e[Pg 212]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e speculative,\r\nwould be concentrated in a numerous bureaucracy, to whom alone the rest\r\nof the community would look for all things: the multitude for direction\r\nand dictation in all they had to do; the able and aspiring for personal\r\nadvancement. To be admitted into the ranks of this bureaucracy, and when\r\nadmitted, to rise therein, would be the sole objects of ambition. Under\r\nthis régime, not only is the outside public ill-qualified, for want of\r\npractical experience, to criticise or check the mode of operation of the\r\nbureaucracy, but even if the accidents of despotic or the natural\r\nworking of popular institutions occasionally raise to the summit a ruler\r\nor rulers of reforming inclinations, no reform can be effected which is\r\ncontrary to the interest of the bureaucracy. Such is the melancholy\r\ncondition of the Russian empire, as is shown in the accounts of those\r\nwho have had sufficient opportunity of observation. The Czar himself is\r\npowerless against the bureaucratic body; he can send any one of them to\r\nSiberia, but he cannot govern without them, or against their will. On\r\nevery decree of his they have a tacit veto, by merely refraining from\r\ncarrying it into effect. In countries of more advanced civilisation and\r\nof a more insurrectionary spirit, the public, accustomed to expect\r\neverything to be done for them by the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_213\"\u003e[Pg 213]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e State, or at least to do nothing\r\nfor themselves without asking from the State not only leave to do it,\r\nbut even how it is to be done, naturally hold the State responsible for\r\nall evil which befalls them, and when the evil exceeds their amount of\r\npatience, they rise against the government and make what is called a\r\nrevolution; whereupon somebody else, with or without legitimate\r\nauthority from the nation, vaults into the seat, issues his orders to\r\nthe bureaucracy, and everything goes on much as it did before; the\r\nbureaucracy being unchanged, and nobody else being capable of taking\r\ntheir place.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eA very different spectacle is exhibited among a people accustomed to\r\ntransact their own business. In France, a large part of the people\r\nhaving been engaged in military service, many of whom have held at least\r\nthe rank of non-commissioned officers, there are in every popular\r\ninsurrection several persons competent to take the lead, and improvise\r\nsome tolerable plan of action. What the French are in military affairs,\r\nthe Americans are in every kind of civil business; let them be left\r\nwithout a government, every body of Americans is able to improvise one,\r\nand to carry on that or any other public business with a sufficient\r\namount of intelligence, order, and decision. This is what every\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_214\"\u003e[Pg 214]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e free\r\npeople ought to be: and a people capable of this is certain to be free;\r\nit will never let itself be enslaved by any man or body of men because\r\nthese are able to seize and pull the reins of the central\r\nadministration. No bureaucracy can hope to make such a people as this do\r\nor undergo anything that they do not like. But where everything is done\r\nthrough the bureaucracy, nothing to which the bureaucracy is really\r\nadverse can be done at all. The constitution of such countries is an\r\norganisation of the experience and practical ability of the nation, into\r\na disciplined body for the purpose of governing the rest; and the more\r\nperfect that organisation is in itself, the more successful in drawing\r\nto itself and educating for itself the persons of greatest capacity from\r\nall ranks of the community, the more complete is the bondage of all, the\r\nmembers of the bureaucracy included. For the governors are as much the\r\nslaves of their organisation and discipline, as the governed are of the\r\ngovernors. A Chinese mandarin is as much the tool and creature of a\r\ndespotism as the humblest cultivator. An individual Jesuit is to the\r\nutmost degree of abasement the slave of his order, though the order\r\nitself exists for the collective power and importance of its members.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_215\"\u003e[Pg 215]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIt is not, also, to be forgotten, that the absorption of all the\r\nprincipal ability of the country into the governing body is fatal,\r\nsooner or later, to the mental activity and progressiveness of the body\r\nitself. Banded together as they are—working a system which, like all\r\nsystems, necessarily proceeds in a great measure by fixed rules—the\r\nofficial body are under the constant temptation of sinking into indolent\r\nroutine, or, if they now and then desert that mill-horse round, of\r\nrushing into some half-examined crudity which has struck the fancy of\r\nsome leading member of the corps: and the sole check to these closely\r\nallied, though seemingly opposite, tendencies, the only stimulus which\r\ncan keep the ability of the body itself up to a high standard, is\r\nliability to the watchful criticism of equal ability outside the body.\r\nIt is indispensable, therefore, that the means should exist,\r\nindependently of the government, of forming such ability, and furnishing\r\nit with the opportunities and experience necessary for a correct\r\njudgment of great practical affairs. If we would possess permanently a\r\nskilful and efficient body of functionaries—above all, a body able to\r\noriginate and willing to adopt improvements; if we would not have our\r\nbureaucracy degenerate into a pedantocracy, this body must not engross\r\nall the occupations which form\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_216\"\u003e[Pg 216]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and cultivate the faculties required for\r\nthe government of mankind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo determine the point at which evils, so formidable to human freedom\r\nand advancement, begin, or rather at which they begin to predominate\r\nover the benefits attending the collective application of the force of\r\nsociety, under its recognised chiefs, for the removal of the obstacles\r\nwhich stand in the way of its well-being; to secure as much of the\r\nadvantages of centralised power and intelligence, as can be had without\r\nturning into governmental channels too great a proportion of the general\r\nactivity, is one of the most difficult and complicated questions in the\r\nart of government. It is, in a great measure, a question of detail, in\r\nwhich many and various considerations must be kept in view, and no\r\nabsolute rule can be laid down. But I believe that the practical\r\nprinciple in which safety resides, the ideal to be kept in view, the\r\nstandard by which to test all arrangements intended for overcoming the\r\ndifficulty, may be conveyed in these words: the greatest dissemination\r\nof power consistent with efficiency; but the greatest possible\r\ncentralisation of information, and diffusion of it from the centre.\r\nThus, in municipal administration, there would be, as in the New England\r\nStates, a very minute \u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_217\"\u003e[Pg 217]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003edivision among separate officers, chosen by the\r\nlocalities, of all business which is not better left to the persons\r\ndirectly interested; but besides this, there would be, in each\r\ndepartment of local affairs, a central superintendence, forming a branch\r\nof the general government. The organ of this superintendence would\r\nconcentrate, as in a focus, the variety of information and experience\r\nderived from the conduct of that branch of public business in all the\r\nlocalities, from everything analogous which is done in foreign\r\ncountries, and from the general principles of political science. This\r\ncentral organ should have a right to know all that is done, and its\r\nspecial duty should be that of making the knowledge acquired in one\r\nplace available for others. Emancipated from the petty prejudices and\r\nnarrow views of a locality by its elevated position and comprehensive\r\nsphere of observation, its advice would naturally carry much authority;\r\nbut its actual power, as a permanent institution, should, I conceive, be\r\nlimited to compelling the local officers to obey the laws laid down for\r\ntheir guidance. In all things not provided for by general rules, those\r\nofficers should be left to their own judgment, under responsibility to\r\ntheir constituents. For the violation of rules, they should be\r\nresponsible to law, and the rules\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_218\"\u003e[Pg 218]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e themselves should be laid down by the\r\nlegislature; the central administrative authority only watching over\r\ntheir execution, and if they were not properly carried into effect,\r\nappealing, according to the nature of the case, to the tribunal to\r\nenforce the law, or to the constituencies to dismiss the functionaries\r\nwho had not executed it according to its spirit. Such, in its general\r\nconception, is the central superintendence which the Poor Law Board is\r\nintended to exercise over the administrators of the Poor Rate throughout\r\nthe country. Whatever powers the Board exercises beyond this limit, were\r\nright and necessary in that peculiar case, for the cure of rooted habits\r\nof maladministration in matters deeply affecting not the localities\r\nmerely, but the whole community; since no locality has a moral right to\r\nmake itself by mismanagement a nest of pauperism, necessarily\r\noverflowing into other localities, and impairing the moral and physical\r\ncondition of the whole labouring community. The powers of administrative\r\ncoercion and subordinate legislation possessed by the Poor Law Board\r\n(but which, owing to the state of opinion on the subject, are very\r\nscantily exercised by them), though perfectly justifiable in a case of\r\nfirst-rate national interest, would be wholly out of place in the\r\nsuperintendence\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_219\"\u003e[Pg 219]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of interests purely local. But a central organ of\r\ninformation and instruction for all the localities, would be equally\r\nvaluable in all departments of administration. A government cannot have\r\ntoo much of the kind of activity which does not impede, but aids and\r\nstimulates, individual exertion and development. The mischief begins\r\nwhen, instead of calling forth the activity and powers of individuals\r\nand bodies, it substitutes its own activity for theirs; when, instead of\r\ninforming, advising, and, upon occasion, denouncing, it makes them work\r\nin fetters, or bids them stand aside and does their work instead of\r\nthem. The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the\r\nindividuals composing it; and a State which postpones the interests of\r\n\u003ci\u003etheir\u003c/i\u003e mental expansion and elevation, to a little more of\r\nadministrative skill, or of that semblance of it which practice gives,\r\nin the details of business; a State which dwarfs its men, in order that\r\nthey may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial\r\npurposes, will find that with small men no great thing can really be\r\naccomplished; and that the perfection of machinery to which it has\r\nsacrificed everything, will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the\r\nvital power which, in order that the machine might work more smoothly,\r\nit has preferred to banish.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}