Auguste Comte and Positivism
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It is not very widely known\r\nwhat they represent, but it is understood that they represent something.\r\nThey are symbols of a recognised mode of thought, and one of sufficient\r\nimportance to induce almost all who now discuss the great problems of\r\nphilosophy, or survey from any elevated point of view the opinions of\r\nthe age, to take what is termed the Positivist view of things into\r\nserious consideration, and define their own position, more or less\r\nfriendly or hostile, in regard to it. Indeed, though the mode of thought\r\nexpressed by the terms Positive and Positivism is widely spread, the\r\nwords themselves are, as usual, better known through the enemies of that\r\nmode of thinking than through its friends; and more than one thinker who\r\nnever called himself or his opinions by those appellations, and\r\ncarefully guarded himself against being confounded with those who did,\r\nfinds himself, sometimes to his displeasure, though generally by a\r\ntolerably correct instinct, classed with Positivists, and assailed as a\r\nPositivist. This change in the bearings of philosophic opinion commenced\r\nin England earlier than in France, where a philosophy of a contrary kind\r\nhad been more widely cultivated, and had taken a firmer hold on the\r\nspeculative minds of a generation formed by Royer-Collard, Cousin,\r\nJouffroy, and their compeers. The great treatise of M. Comte was\r\nscarcely mentioned in French literature or criticism, when it was\r\nalready working powerfully on the minds of many British students and\r\nthinkers. But, agreeably to the usual course of things in France, the\r\nnew tendency, when it set in, set in more strongly. Those who call\r\nthemselves Positivists are indeed not numerous; but all French writers\r\nwho adhere to the common philosophy, now feel it necessary to begin by\r\nfortifying their position against \"the Positivist school.\" And the mode\r\nof thinking thus designated is already manifesting its importance by one\r\nof the most unequivocal signs, the appearance of thinkers who attempt a\r\ncompromise or \u003ci\u003ejuste milieu\u003c/i\u003e between it and its opposite. The acute\r\ncritic and metaphysician M. Taine, and the distinguished chemist M.\r\nBerthelot, are the authors of the two most conspicuous of these\r\nattempts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe time, therefore, seems to have come, when every philosophic thinker\r\nnot only ought to form, but may usefully express, a judgment respecting\r\nthis intellectual movement; endeavouring to understand what it is,\r\nwhether it is essentially a wholesome movement, and if so, what is to be\r\naccepted and what rejected of the direction given to it by its most\r\nimportant movers. There cannot be a more appropriate mode of discussing\r\nthese points than in the form of a critical examination of the\r\nphilosophy of Auguste Comte; for which the appearance of a new edition\r\nof his fundamental treatise, with a preface by the most eminent, in\r\nevery point of view, of his professed disciples, M. Littr\u0026eacute;, affords a\r\ngood opportunity. The name of M. Comte is more identified than any other\r\nwith this mode of thought. He is the first who has attempted its\r\ncomplete systematization, and the scientific extension of it to all\r\nobjects of human knowledge. And in doing this he has displayed a\r\nquantity and quality of mental power, and achieved an amount of success,\r\nwhich have not only won but retained the high admiration of thinkers as\r\nradically and strenuously opposed as it is possible to be, to nearly the\r\nwhole of his later tendencies, and to many of his earlier opinions. It\r\nwould have been a mistake had such thinkers busied themselves in the\r\nfirst instance with drawing attention to what they regarded as errors in\r\nhis great work. Until it had taken the place in the world of thought\r\nwhich belonged to it, the important matter was not to criticise it, but\r\nto help in making it known. To have put those who neither knew nor were\r\ncapable of appreciating the greatness of the book, in possession of its\r\nvulnerable points, would have indefinitely retarded its progress to a\r\njust estimation, and was not needful for guarding against any serious\r\ninconvenience. While a writer has few readers, and no influence except\r\non independent thinkers, the only thing worth considering in him is what\r\nhe can teach us: if there be anything in which he is less wise than we\r\nare already, it may be left unnoticed until the time comes when his\r\nerrors can do harm. But the high place which M. Comte has now assumed\r\namong European thinkers, and the increasing influence of his principal\r\nwork, while they make it a more hopeful task than before to impress and\r\nenforce the strong points of his philosophy, have rendered it, for the\r\nfirst time, not inopportune to discuss his mistakes. Whatever errors he\r\nmay have fallen into are now in a position to be injurious, while the\r\nfree exposure of them can no longer be so.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe propose, then, to pass in review the main principles of M. Comte\u0027s\r\nphilosophy; commencing with the great treatise by which, in this\r\ncountry, he is chiefly known, and postponing consideration of the\r\nwritings of the last ten years of his life, except for the occasional\r\nillustration of detached points.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen we extend our examination to these later productions, we shall\r\nhave, in the main, to reverse our judgment. Instead of recognizing, as\r\nin the Cours de Philosophic Positive, an essentially sound view of\r\nphilosophy, with a few capital errors, it is in their general character\r\nthat we deem the subsequent speculations false and misleading, while in\r\nthe midst of this wrong general tendency, we find a crowd of valuable\r\nthoughts, and suggestions of thought, in detail. For the present we put\r\nout of the question this signal anomaly in M. Comte\u0027s intellectual\r\ncareer. We shall consider only the principal gift which he has left to\r\nthe world, his clear, full, and comprehensive exposition, and in part\r\ncreation, of what he terms the Positive Philosophy: endeavouring to\r\nsever what in our estimation is true, from the much less which is\r\nerroneous, in that philosophy as he conceived it, and distinguishing, as\r\nwe proceed, the part which is specially his, from that which belongs to\r\nthe philosophy of the age, and is the common inheritance of thinkers.\r\nThis last discrimination has been partially made in a late pamphlet, by\r\nMr Herbert Spencer, in vindication of his own independence of thought:\r\nbut this does not diminish the utility of doing it, with a less limited\r\npurpose, here; especially as Mr Spencer rejects nearly all which\r\nproperly belongs to M. Comte, and in his abridged mode of statement does\r\nscanty justice to what he rejects. The separation is not difficult, even\r\non the direct evidence given by M. Comte himself, who, far from claiming\r\nany originality not really belonging to him, was eager to connect his\r\nown most original thoughts with every germ of anything similar which he\r\nobserved in previous thinkers.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe fundamental doctrine of a true philosophy, according to M. Comte,\r\nand the character by which he defines Positive Philosophy, is the\r\nfollowing:\u0026mdash;We have no knowledge of anything but Phaenomena; and our\r\nknowledge of phaenomena is relative, not absolute. We know not the\r\nessence, nor the real mode of production, of any fact, but only its\r\nrelations to other facts in the way of succession or of similitude.\r\nThese relations are constant; that is, always the same in the same\r\ncircumstances. The constant resemblances which link phaenomena together,\r\nand the constant sequences which unite them as antecedent and\r\nconsequent, are termed their laws. The laws of phaenomena are all we\r\nknow respecting them. Their essential nature, and their ultimate causes,\r\neither efficient or final, are unknown and inscrutable to us.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eM. Comte claims no originality for this conception of human knowledge.\r\nHe avows that it has been virtually acted on from the earliest period by\r\nall who have made any real contribution to science, and became\r\ndistinctly present to the minds of speculative men from the time of\r\nBacon, Descartes, and Galileo, whom he regards as collectively the\r\nfounders of the Positive Philosophy. As he says, the knowledge which\r\nmankind, even in the earliest ages, chiefly pursued, being that which\r\nthey most needed, was \u003ci\u003efore\u003c/i\u003eknowledge: \"savoir, pour prevoir.\" When they\r\nsought for the cause, it was mainly in order to control the effect or if\r\nit was uncontrollable, to foreknow and adapt their conduct to it. Now,\r\nall foresight of phaenomena, and power over them, depend on knowledge of\r\ntheir sequences, and not upon any notion we may have formed respecting\r\ntheir origin or inmost nature. We foresee a fact or event by means of\r\nfacts which are signs of it, because experience has shown them to be its\r\nantecedents. We bring about any fact, other than our own muscular\r\ncontractions, by means of some fact which experience has shown to be\r\nfollowed by it. All foresight, therefore, and all intelligent action,\r\nhave only been possible in proportion as men have successfully attempted\r\nto ascertain the successions of phaenomena. Neither foreknowledge, nor\r\nthe knowledge which is practical power, can be acquired by any other\r\nmeans.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe conviction, however, that knowledge of the successions and\r\nco-existences of phaenomena is the sole knowledge accessible to us,\r\ncould not be arrived at in a very early stage of the progress of\r\nthought. Men have not even now left off hoping for other knowledge, nor\r\nbelieving that they have attained it; and that, when attained, it is, in\r\nsome undefinable manner, greatly more precious than mere knowledge of\r\nsequences and co-existences. The true doctrine was not seen in its full\r\nclearness even by Bacon, though it is the result to which all his\r\nspeculations tend: still less by Descartes. It was, however, correctly\r\napprehended by Newton.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_1_1\" id=\"FNanchor_1_1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_1_1\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut it was probably first conceived in its entire generality by Hume,\r\nwho carries it a step further than Comte, maintaining not merely that\r\nthe only causes of phaenomena which can be known to us are other\r\nphaenomena, their invariable antecedents, but that there is no other\r\nkind of causes: cause, as he interprets it, \u003ci\u003emeans\u003c/i\u003e the invariable\r\nantecedent. This is the only part of Hume\u0027s doctrine which was contested\r\nby his great adversary, Kant; who, maintaining as strenuously as Comte\r\nthat we know nothing of Things in themselves, of Noumena, of real\r\nSubstances and real Causes, yet peremptorily asserted their existence.\r\nBut neither does Comte question this: on the contrary, all his language\r\nimplies it. Among the direct successors of Hume, the writer who has best\r\nstated and defended Comte\u0027s fundamental doctrine is Dr Thomas Brown. The\r\ndoctrine and spirit of Brown\u0027s philosophy are entirely Positivist, and\r\nno better introduction to Positivism than the early part of his Lectures\r\nhas yet been produced. Of living thinkers we do not speak; but the same\r\ngreat truth formed the groundwork of all the speculative philosophy of\r\nBentham, and pre-eminently of James Mill: and Sir William Hamilton\u0027s\r\nfamous doctrine of the Relativity of human knowledge has guided many to\r\nit, though we cannot credit Sir William Hamilton himself with having\r\nunderstood the principle, or been willing to assent to it if he had.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe foundation of M. Comte\u0027s philosophy is thus in no way peculiar to\r\nhim, but the general property of the age, however far as yet from being\r\nuniversally accepted even by thoughtful minds.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe philosophy called Positive is not a recent invention of M. Comte,\r\nbut a simple adherence to the traditions of all the great scientific\r\nminds whose discoveries have made the human race what it is. M. Comte\r\nhas never presented it in any other light. But he has made the doctrine\r\nhis own by his manner of treating it. To know rightly what a thing is,\r\nwe require to know, with equal distinctness, what it is not. To enter\r\ninto the real character of any mode of thought, we must understand what\r\nother modes of thought compete with it. M. Comte has taken care that we\r\nshould do so. The modes of philosophizing which, according to him,\r\ndispute ascendancy with the Positive, are two in number, both of them\r\nanterior to it in date; the Theological, and the Metaphysical.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe use the words Theological, Metaphysical, and Positive, because they\r\nare chosen by M. Comte as a vehicle for M. Comte\u0027s ideas. Any\r\nphilosopher whose thoughts another person undertakes to set forth, has a\r\nright to require that it should be done by means of his own\r\nnomenclature. They are not, however, the terms we should ourselves\r\nchoose. In all languages, but especially in English, they excite ideas\r\nother than those intended. The words Positive and Positivism, in the\r\nmeaning assigned to them, are ill fitted to take, root in English soil;\r\nwhile Metaphysical suggests, and suggested even to M. Comte, much that\r\nin no way deserves to be included in his denunciation. The term\r\nTheological is less wide of the mark, though the use of it as a term of\r\ncondemnation implies, as we shall see, a greater reach of negation than\r\nneed be included in the Positive creed. Instead of the Theological we\r\nshould prefer to speak of the Personal, or Volitional explanation of\r\nnature; instead of Metaphysical, the Abstractional or Ontological: and\r\nthe meaning of Positive would be less ambiguously expressed in the\r\nobjective aspect by Phaenomenal, in the subjective by Experiential. But\r\nM. Comte\u0027s opinions are best stated in his own phraseology; several of\r\nthem, indeed, can scarcely be presented in some of their bearings\r\nwithout it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Theological, which is the original and spontaneous form of thought,\r\nregards the facts of the universe as governed not by invariable laws of\r\nsequence, but by single and direct volitions of beings, real or\r\nimaginary, possessed of life and intelligence. In the infantile state of\r\nreason and experience, individual objects are looked upon as animated.\r\nThe next step is the conception of invisible beings, each of whom\r\nsuperintends and governs an entire class of objects or events. The last\r\nmerges this multitude of divinities in a single God, who made the whole\r\nuniverse in the beginning, and guides and carries on its phaenomena by\r\nhis continued action, or, as others think, only modifies them from time\r\nto time by special interferences.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe mode of thought which M. Comte terms Metaphysical, accounts for\r\nphaenomena by ascribing them, not to volitions either sublunary or\r\ncelestial, but to realized abstractions. In this stage it is no longer a\r\ngod that causes and directs each of the various agencies of nature: it\r\nis a power, or a force, or an occult quality, considered as real\r\nexistences, inherent in but distinct from the concrete bodies in which\r\nthey reside, and which they in a manner animate. Instead of Dryads\r\npresiding over trees, producing and regulating their phaenomena, every\r\nplant or animal has now a Vegetative Soul, the \u0026#952;\u0026#961;\u0026#949;\u0026#960;\u0026#964;\u0026#943;\u0026#954;\u0026#951; \u0026#968;\u0026#965;\u0026#967;\u0026#942; of\r\nAristotle. At a later period the Vegetative Soul has become a Plastic\r\nForce, and still later, a Vital Principle. Objects now do all that they\r\ndo because it is their Essence to do so, or by reason of an inherent\r\nVirtue. Phaenomena are accounted for by supposed tendencies and\r\npropensities of the abstraction Nature; which, though regarded as\r\nimpersonal, is figured as acting on a sort of motives, and in a manner\r\nmore or less analogous to that of conscious beings. Aristotle affirms a\r\ntendency of nature towards the best, which helps him to a theory of many\r\nnatural phaenomena. The rise of water in a pump is attributed to\r\nNature\u0027s horror of a vacuum. The fall of heavy bodies, and the ascent of\r\nflame and smoke, are construed as attempts of each to get to its\r\n\u003ci\u003enatural\u003c/i\u003e place. Many important consequences are deduced from the\r\ndoctrine that Nature has no breaks (non habet saltum). In medicine the\r\ncurative force (vis medicatrix) of Nature furnishes the explanation of\r\nthe reparative processes which modern physiologists refer each to its\r\nown particular agencies and laws.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eExamples are not necessary to prove to those who are acquainted with the\r\npast phases of human thought, how great a place both the theological and\r\nthe metaphysical interpretations of phaenomena have historically\r\noccupied, as well in the speculations of thinkers as in the familiar\r\nconceptions of the multitude. Many had perceived before M. Comte that\r\nneither of these modes of explanation was final: the warfare against\r\nboth of them could scarcely be carried on more vigorously than it\r\nalready was, early in the seventeenth century, by Hobbes. Nor is it\r\nunknown to any one who has followed the history of the various physical\r\nsciences, that the positive explanation of facts has substituted itself,\r\nstep by step, for the theological and metaphysical, as the progress of\r\ninquiry brought to light an increasing number of the invariable laws of\r\nphaenomena. In these respects M. Comte has not originated anything, but\r\nhas taken his place in a fight long since engaged, and on the side\r\nalready in the main victorious. The generalization which belongs to\r\nhimself, and in which he had not, to the best of our knowledge, been at\r\nall anticipated, is, that every distinct class of human conceptions\r\npasses through all these stages, beginning with the theological, and\r\nproceeding through the metaphysical to the positive: the metaphysical\r\nbeing a mere state of transition, but an indispensable one, from the\r\ntheological mode of thought to the positive, which is destined finally\r\nto prevail, by the universal recognition that all phaemomena without\r\nexception are governed by invariable laws, with which no volitions,\r\neither natural or supernatural, interfere. This general theorem is\r\ncompleted by the addition, that the theological mode of thought has\r\nthree stages, Fetichism, Polytheism, and Monotheism: the successive\r\ntransitions being prepared, and indeed caused, by the gradual uprising\r\nof the two rival modes of thought, the metaphysical and the positive,\r\nand in their turn preparing the way for the ascendancy of these; first\r\nand temporarily of the metaphysical, finally of the positive.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis generalization is the most fundamental of the doctrines which\r\noriginated with M. Comte; and the survey of history, which occupies the\r\ntwo largest volumes of the six composing his work, is a continuous\r\nexemplification and verification of the law. How well it accords with\r\nthe facts, and how vast a number of the greater historical phaenomena it\r\nexplains, is known only to those who have studied its exposition, where\r\nalone it can be found\u0026mdash;in these most striking and instructive volumes.\r\nAs this theory is the key to M. Comte\u0027s other generalizations, all of\r\nwhich arc more or less dependent on it; as it forms the backbone, if we\r\nmay so speak, of his philosophy, and, unless it be true, he has\r\naccomplished little; we cannot better employ part of our space than in\r\nclearing it from misconception, and giving the explanations necessary to\r\nremove the obstacles which prevent many competent persons from assenting\r\nto it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is proper to begin by relieving the doctrine from a religious\r\nprejudice. The doctrine condemns all theological explanations, and\r\nreplaces them, or thinks them destined to be replaced, by theories which\r\ntake no account of anything but an ascertained order of phaenomena. It\r\nis inferred that if this change were completely accomplished, mankind\r\nwould cease to refer the constitution of Nature to an intelligent will\r\nor to believe at all in a Creator and supreme Governor of the world.\r\nThis supposition is the more natural, as M. Comte was avowedly of that\r\nopinion. He indeed disclaimed, with some acrimony, dogmatic atheism, and\r\neven says (in a later work, but the earliest contains nothing at\r\nvariance with it) that the hypothesis of design has much greater\r\nverisimilitude than that of a blind mechanism. But conjecture, founded\r\non analogy, did not seem to him a basis to rest a theory on, in a mature\r\nstate of human intelligence. He deemed all real knowledge of a\r\ncommencement inaccessible to us, and the inquiry into it an overpassing\r\nof the essential limits of our mental faculties. To this point, however,\r\nthose who accept his theory of the progressive stages of opinion are not\r\nobliged to follow him. The Positive mode of thought is not necessarily a\r\ndenial of the supernatural; it merely throws back that question to the\r\norigin of all things. If the universe had a beginning, its beginning, by\r\nthe very conditions of the case, was supernatural; the laws of nature\r\ncannot account for their own origin. The Positive philosopher is free to\r\nform his opinion on the subject, according to the weight he attaches to\r\nthe analogies which are called marks of design, and to the general\r\ntraditions of the human race. The value of these evidences is indeed a\r\nquestion for Positive philosophy, but it is not one upon which Positive\r\nphilosophers must necessarily be agreed. It is one of M. Comte\u0027s\r\nmistakes that he never allows of open questions. Positive Philosophy\r\nmaintains that within the existing order of the universe, or rather of\r\nthe part of it known to us, the direct determining cause of every\r\nphaenomenon is not supernatural but natural. It is compatible with this\r\nto believe, that the universe was created, and even that it is\r\ncontinuously governed, by an Intelligence, provided we admit that the\r\nintelligent Governor adheres to fixed laws, which are only modified or\r\ncounteracted by other laws of the same dispensation, and are never\r\neither capriciously or providentially departed from. Whoever regards\r\nall events as parts of a constant order, each one being the invariable\r\nconsequent of some antecedent condition, or combination of conditions,\r\naccepts fully the Positive mode of thought: whether he acknowledges or\r\nnot an universal antecedent on which the whole system of nature was\r\noriginally consequent, and whether that universal antecedent is\r\nconceived as an Intelligence or not.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is a corresponding misconception to be corrected respecting the\r\nMetaphysical mode of thought. In repudiating metaphysics, M. Comte did\r\nnot interdict himself from analysing or criticising any of the abstract\r\nconceptions of the mind. He was not ignorant (though he sometimes seemed\r\nto forget) that such analysis and criticism are a necessary part of the\r\nscientific process, and accompany the scientific mind in all its\r\noperations. What he condemned was the habit of conceiving these mental\r\nabstractions as real entities, which could exert power, produce\r\nphaenomena, and the enunciation of which could be regarded as a theory\r\nor explanation of facts. Men of the present day with difficulty believe\r\nthat so absurd a notion was ever really entertained, so repugnant is it\r\nto the mental habits formed by long and assiduous cultivation of the\r\npositive sciences. But those sciences, however widely cultivated, have\r\nnever formed the basis of intellectual education in any society. It is\r\nwith philosophy as with religion: men marvel at the absurdity of other\r\npeople\u0027s tenets, while exactly parallel absurdities remain in their own,\r\nand the same man is unaffectedly astonished that words can be mistaken\r\nfor things, who is treating other words as if they were things every\r\ntime he opens his mouth to discuss. No one, unless entirely ignorant of\r\nthe history of thought, will deny that the mistaking of abstractions for\r\nrealities pervaded speculation all through antiquity and the middle\r\nages. The mistake was generalized and systematized in the famous Ideas\r\nof Plato. The Aristotelians carried it on. Essences, quiddities, virtues\r\nresiding in things, were accepted as a \u003ci\u003ebon\u0026acirc; fide\u003c/i\u003e explanation of\r\nphaenomena. Not only abstract qualities, but the concrete names of\r\ngenera and species, were mistaken for objective existences. It was\r\nbelieved that there were General Substances corresponding to all the\r\nfamiliar classes of concrete things: a substance Man, a substance Tree,\r\na substance Animal, which, and not the individual objects so called,\r\nwere directly denoted by those names. The real existence of Universal\r\nSubstances was the question at issue in the famous controversy of the\r\nlater middle ages between Nominalism and Realism, which is one of the\r\nturning points in the history of thought, being its first struggle to\r\nemancipate itself from the dominion of verbal abstractions. The Realists\r\nwere the stronger party, but though the Nominalists for a time\r\nsuccumbed, the doctrine they rebelled against fell, after a short\r\ninterval, with the rest of the scholastic philosophy. But while\r\nuniversal substances and substantial forms, being the grossest kind of\r\nrealized abstractions, were the soonest discarded, Essences, Virtues,\r\nand Occult Qualities long survived them, and were first completely\r\nextruded from real existence by the Cartesians. In Descartes\u0027 conception\r\nof science, all physical phaenomena were to be explained by matter and\r\nmotion, that is, not by abstractions but by invariable physical laws:\r\nthough his own explanations were many of them hypothetical, and turned\r\nout to be erroneous. Long after him, however, fictitious entities (as\r\nthey are happily termed by Bentham) continued to be imagined as means of\r\naccounting for the more mysterious phaenomena; above all in physiology,\r\nwhere, under great varieties of phrase, mysterious \u003ci\u003eforces\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci\u003eprinciples\u003c/i\u003e were the explanation, or substitute for explanation, of the\r\nphaenomena of organized beings. To modern philosophers these fictions\r\nare merely the abstract names of the classes of phaenomena which\r\ncorrespond to them; and it is one of the puzzles of philosophy, how\r\nmankind, after inventing a set of mere names to keep together certain\r\ncombinations of ideas or images, could have so far forgotten their own\r\nact as to invest these creations of their will with objective reality,\r\nand mistake the name of a phaenomenon for its efficient cause. What was\r\na mystery from the purely dogmatic point of view, is cleared up by the\r\nhistorical. These abstract words are indeed now mere names of\r\nphaenomena, but were not so in their origin. To us they denote only the\r\nphaenomena, because we have ceased to believe in what else they once\r\ndesignated; and the employment of them in explanation is to us\r\nevidently, as M. Comte says, the na\u0026iuml;f reproduction of the phaenomenon as\r\nthe reason for itself: but it was not so in the beginning. The\r\nmetaphysical point of view was not a perversion of the positive, but a\r\ntransformation of the theological. The human mind, in framing a class of\r\nobjects, did not set out from the notion of a name, but from that of a\r\ndivinity. The realization of abstractions was not the embodiment of a\r\nword, but the gradual disembodiment of a Fetish.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe primitive tendency or instinct of mankind is to assimilate all the\r\nagencies which they perceive in Nature, to the only one of which they\r\nare directly conscious, their own voluntary activity. Every object which\r\nseems to originate power, that is, to act without being first visibly\r\nacted upon, to communicate motion without having first received it, they\r\nsuppose to possess life, consciousness, will. This first rude conception\r\nof nature can scarcely, however, have been at any time extended to all\r\nphaenomena. The simplest observation, without which the preservation of\r\nlife would have been impossible, must have pointed out many uniformities\r\nin nature, many objects which, under given circumstances, acted exactly\r\nlike one another: and whenever this was observed, men\u0027s natural and\r\nuntutored faculties led them to form the similar objects into a class,\r\nand to think of them together: of which it was a natural consequence to\r\nrefer effects, which were exactly alike, to a single will, rather than\r\nto a number of wills precisely accordant. But this single will could not\r\nbe the will of the objects themselves, since they were many: it must be\r\nthe will of an invisible being, apart from the objects, and ruling them\r\nfrom an unknown distance. This is Polytheism. We are not aware that in\r\nany tribe of savages or negroes who have been observed, Fetichism has\r\nbeen found totally unmixed with Polytheism, and it is probable that the\r\ntwo coexisted from the earliest period at which the human mind was\r\ncapable of forming objects into classes. Fetichism proper gradually\r\nbecomes limited to objects possessing a marked individuality. A\r\nparticular mountain or river is worshipped bodily (as it is even now by\r\nthe Hindoos and the South Sea Islanders) as a divinity in itself, not\r\nthe mere residence of one, long after invisible gods have been imagined\r\nas rulers of all the great classes of phaenomena, even intellectual and\r\nmoral, as war, love, wisdom, beauty, \u0026amp;c. The worship of the earth\r\n(Tellus or Pales) and of the various heavenly bodies, was prolonged into\r\nthe heart of Polytheism. Every scholar knows, though \u003ci\u003elitt\u0026eacute;rateurs\u003c/i\u003e and\r\nmen of the world do not, that in the full vigour of the Greek religion,\r\nthe Sun and Moon, not a god and goddess thereof, were sacrificed to as\r\ndeities\u0026mdash;older deities than Zeus and his descendants, belonging to the\r\nearlier dynasty of the Titans (which was the mythical version of the\r\nfact that their worship was older), and these deities had a distinct set\r\nof fables or legends connected with them. The father of Pha\u0026euml;thon and the\r\nlover of Endymion were not Apollo and Diana, whose identification with\r\nthe Sungod and the Moongoddess was a late invention. Astrolatry, which,\r\nas M. Comte observes, is the last form of Fetichism, survived the other\r\nforms, partly because its objects, being inaccessible, were not so soon\r\ndiscovered to be in themselves inanimate, and partly because of the\r\npersistent spontaneousness of their apparent motions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs far as Fetichism reached, and as long as it lasted, there was no\r\nabstraction, or classification of objects, and no room consequently for\r\nthe metaphysical mode of thought. But as soon as the voluntary agent,\r\nwhose will governed the phaenomenon, ceased to be the physical object\r\nitself, and was removed to an invisible position, from which he or she\r\nsuperintended an entire class of natural agencies, it began to seem\r\nimpossible that this being should exert his powerful activity from a\r\ndistance, unless through the medium of something present on the spot.\r\nThrough the same Natural Prejudice which made Newton unable to conceive\r\nthe possibility of his own law of gravitation without a subtle ether\r\nfilling up the intervening space, and through which the attraction could\r\nbe communicated\u0026mdash;from this same natural infirmity of the human mind, it\r\nseemed indispensable that the god, at a distance from the object, must\r\nact through something residing in it, which was the immediate agent, the\r\ngod having imparted to the intermediate something the power whereby it\r\ninfluenced and directed the object. When mankind felt a need for naming\r\nthese imaginary entities, they called them the \u003ci\u003enature\u003c/i\u003e of the object,\r\nor its \u003ci\u003eessence\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci\u003evirtues\u003c/i\u003e residing in it, or by many other\r\ndifferent names. These metaphysical conceptions were regarded as\r\nintensely real, and at first as mere instruments in the hands of the\r\nappropriate deities. But the habit being acquired of ascribing not only\r\nsubstantive existence, but real and efficacious agency, to the abstract\r\nentities, the consequence was that when belief in the deities declined\r\nand faded away, the entities were left standing, and a semblance of\r\nexplanation of phaenomena, equal to what existed before, was furnished\r\nby the entities alone, without referring them to any volitions. When\r\nthings had reached this point, the metaphysical mode of thought, had\r\ncompletely substituted itself for the theological.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus did the different successive states of the human intellect, even at\r\nan early stage of its progress, overlap one another, the Fetichistic,\r\nthe Polytheistic, and the Metaphysical modes of thought coexisting even\r\nin the same minds, while the belief in invariable laws, which\r\nconstitutes the Positive mode of thought, was slowly winning its way\r\nbeneath them all, as observation and experience disclosed in one class\r\nof phaenomena after another the laws to which they are really subject.\r\nIt was this growth of positive knowledge which principally determined\r\nthe next transition in the theological conception of the universe, from\r\nPolytheism to Monotheism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt cannot be doubted that this transition took place very tardily. The\r\nconception of a unity in Nature, which would admit of attributing it to\r\na single will, is far from being natural to man, and only finds\r\nadmittance after a long period of discipline and preparation, the\r\nobvious appearances all pointing to the idea of a government by many\r\nconflicting principles. We know how high a degree both of material\r\ncivilization and of moral and intellectual development preceded the\r\nconversion of the leading populations of the world to the belief in one\r\nGod. The superficial observations by which Christian travellers have\r\npersuaded themselves that they found their own Monotheistic belief in\r\nsome tribes of savages, have always been contradicted by more accurate\r\nknowledge: those who have read, for instance, Mr Kohl\u0027s Kitchigami, know\r\nwhat to think of the Great Spirit of the American Indians, who belongs\r\nto a well-defined system of Polytheism, interspersed with large remains\r\nof an original Fetichism. We have no wish to dispute the matter with\r\nthose who believe that Monotheism was the primitive religion,\r\ntransmitted to our race from its first parents in uninterrupted\r\ntradition. By their own acknowledgment, the tradition was lost by all\r\nthe nations of the world except a small and peculiar people, in whom it\r\nwas miraculously kept alive, but who were themselves continually lapsing\r\nfrom it, and in all the earlier parts of their history did not hold it\r\nat all in its full meaning, but admitted the real existence of other\r\ngods, though believing their own to be the most powerful, and to be the\r\nCreator of the world. A greater proof of the unnaturalness of Monotheism\r\nto the human mind before a certain period in its development, could not\r\nwell be required. The highest form of Monotheism, Christianity, has\r\npersisted to the present time in giving partial satisfaction to the\r\nmental dispositions that lead to Polytheism, by admitting into its\r\ntheology the thoroughly polytheistic conception of a devil. When\r\nMonotheism, after many centuries, made its way to the Greeks and Romans\r\nfrom the small corner of the world where it existed, we know how the\r\nnotion of daemons facilitated its reception, by making it unnecessary\r\nfor Christians to deny the existence of the gods previously believed in,\r\nit being sufficient to place them under the absolute power of the new\r\nGod, as the gods of Olympus were already under that of Zeus, and as the\r\nlocal deities of all the subjugated nations had been subordinated by\r\nconquest to the divine patrons of the Roman State.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn whatever mode, natural or supernatural, we choose to account for the\r\nearly Monotheism of the Hebrews, there can be no question that its\r\nreception by the Gentiles was only rendered possible by the slow\r\npreparation which the human mind had undergone from the philosophers. In\r\nthe age of the Caesars nearly the whole educated and cultivated class\r\nhad outgrown the polytheistic creed, and though individually liable to\r\nreturns of the superstition of their childhood, were predisposed (such\r\nof them as did not reject all religion whatever) to the acknowledgment\r\nof one Supreme Providence. It is vain to object that Christianity did\r\nnot find the majority of its early proselytes among the educated class:\r\nsince, except in Palestine, its teachers and propagators were mainly of\r\nthat class\u0026mdash;many of them, like St Paul, well versed in the mental\r\nculture of their time; and they had evidently found no intellectual\r\nobstacle to the new doctrine in their own minds. We must not be deceived\r\nby the recrudescence, at a much later date, of a metaphysical Paganism\r\nin the Alexandrian and other philosophical schools, provoked not by\r\nattachment to Polytheism, but by distaste for the political and social\r\nascendancy of the Christian teachers. The fact was, that Monotheism had\r\nbecome congenial to the cultivated mind: and a belief which has gained\r\nthe cultivated minds of any society, unless put down by force, is\r\ncertain, sooner or later, to reach the multitude. Indeed the multitude\r\nitself had been prepared for it, as already hinted, by the more and more\r\ncomplete subordination of all other deities to the supremacy of Zeus;\r\nfrom which the step to a single Deity, surrounded by a host of angels,\r\nand keeping in recalcitrant subjection an army of devils, was by no\r\nmeans difficult.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy what means, then, had the cultivated minds of the Roman Empire been\r\neducated for Monotheism? By the growth of a practical feeling of the\r\ninvariability of natural laws. Monotheism had a natural adaptation to\r\nthis belief, while Polytheism naturally and necessarily conflicted with\r\nit. As men could not easily, and in fact never did, suppose that beings\r\nso powerful had their power absolutely restricted, each to its special\r\ndepartment, the will of any divinity might always be frustrated by\r\nanother: and unless all their wills were in complete harmony (which\r\nwould itself be the most difficult to credit of all cases of\r\ninvariability, and would require beyond anything else the ascendancy of\r\na Supreme Deity) it was impossible that the course of any of the\r\nphaenomena under their government could be invariable. But if, on the\r\ncontrary, all the phaenomena of the universe were under the exclusive\r\nand uncontrollable influence of a single will, it was an admissible\r\nsupposition that this will might be always consistent with itself, and\r\nmight choose to conduct each class of its operations in an invariable\r\nmanner. In proportion, therefore, as the invariable laws of phaenomena\r\nrevealed themselves to observers, the theory which ascribed them all to\r\none will began to grow plausible; but must still have appeared\r\nimprobable until it had come to seem likely that invariability was the\r\ncommon rule of all nature. The Greeks and Romans at the Christian era\r\nhad reached a point of advancement at which this supposition had become\r\nprobable. The admirable height to which geometry had already been\r\ncarried, had familiarized the educated mind with the conception of laws\r\nabsolutely invariable. The logical analysis of the intellectual\r\nprocesses by Aristotle had shown a similar uniformity of law in the\r\nrealm of mind. In the concrete external world, the most imposing\r\nphaenomena, those of the heavenly bodies, which by their power over the\r\nimagination had done most to keep up the whole system of ideas connected\r\nwith supernatural agency, had been ascertained to take place in so\r\nregular an order as to admit of being predicted with a precision which\r\nto the notions of those days must have appeared perfect. And though an\r\nequal degree of regularity had not been discerned in natural phaenomena\r\ngenerally, even the most empirical observation had ascertained so many\r\ncases of an uniformity \u003ci\u003ealmost\u003c/i\u003e complete, that inquiring minds were\r\neagerly on the look-out for further indications pointing in the same\r\ndirection; and vied with one another in the formation of theories which,\r\nthough hypothetical and essentially premature, it was hoped would turn\r\nout to be correct representations of invariable laws governing large\r\nclasses of phaenomena. When this hope and expectation became general,\r\nthey were already a great encroachment on the original domain of the\r\ntheological principle. Instead of the old conception, of events\r\nregulated from day to day by the unforeseen and changeable volitions of\r\na legion of deities, it seemed more and more probable that all the\r\nphaenomena of the universe took place according to rules which must have\r\nbeen planned from the beginning; by which conception the function of the\r\ngods seemed to be limited to forming the plans, and setting the\r\nmachinery in motion: their subsequent office appeared to be reduced to a\r\nsinecure, or if they continued to reign, it was in the manner of\r\nconstitutional kings, bound by the laws to which they had previously\r\ngiven their assent. Accordingly, the pretension of philosophers to\r\nexplain physical phaenomena by physical causes, or to predict their\r\noccurrence, was, up to a very late period of Polytheism, regarded as a\r\nsacrilegious insult to the gods. Anaxagoras was banished for it,\r\nAristotle had to fly for his life, and the mere unfounded suspicion of\r\nit contributed greatly to the condemnation of Socrates. We are too well\r\nacquainted with this form of the religious sentiment even now, to have\r\nany difficulty in comprehending what must have been its violence then.\r\nIt was inevitable that philosophers should be anxious to get rid of at\r\nleast \u003ci\u003ethese\u003c/i\u003e gods, and so escape from the particular fables which stood\r\nimmediately in their way; accepting a notion of divine government which\r\nharmonized better with the lessons they learnt from the study of nature,\r\nand a God concerning whom no mythos, as far as they knew, had yet been\r\ninvented.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgain, when the idea became prevalent that the constitution of every\r\npart of Nature had been planned from the beginning, and continued to\r\ntake place as it had been planned, this was itself a striking feature of\r\nresemblance extending through all Nature, and affording a presumption\r\nthat the whole was the work, not of many, but of the same hand. It must\r\nhave appeared vastly more probable that there should be one indefinitely\r\nforeseeing Intelligence and immovable Will, than hundreds and thousands\r\nof such. The philosophers had not at that time the arguments which might\r\nhave been grounded on universal laws not yet suspected, such as the law\r\nof gravitation and the laws of heat; but there was a multitude, obvious\r\neven to them, of analogies and homologies in natural phaenomena, which\r\nsuggested unity of plan; and a still greater number were raised up by\r\ntheir active fancy, aided by their premature scientific theories, all of\r\nwhich aimed at interpreting some phaenomenon by the analogy of others\r\nsupposed to be better known; assuming, indeed, a much greater similarity\r\namong the various processes of Nature, than ampler experience has since\r\nshown to exist. The theological mode of thought thus advanced from\r\nPolytheism to Monotheism through the direct influence of the Positive\r\nmode of thought, not yet aspiring to complete speculative ascendancy.\r\nBut, inasmuch as the belief in the invariability of natural laws was\r\nstill imperfect even in highly cultivated minds, and in the merest\r\ninfancy in the uncultivated, it gave rise to the belief in one God, but\r\nnot in an immovable one. For many centuries the God believed in was\r\nflexible by entreaty, was incessantly ordering the affairs of mankind by\r\ndirect volitions, and continually reversing the course of nature by\r\nmiraculous interpositions; and this is believed still, wherever the\r\ninvariability of law has established itself in men\u0027s convictions as a\r\ngeneral, but not as an universal truth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the change from Polytheism to Monotheism, the Metaphysical mode of\r\nthought contributed its part, affording great aid to the up-hill\r\nstruggle which the Positive spirit had to maintain against the\r\nprevailing form, of the Theological. M. Comte, indeed, has considerably\r\nexaggerated the share of the Metaphysical spirit in this mental\r\nrevolution, since by a lax use of terms he credits the Metaphysical mode\r\nof thought with all that is due to dialectics and negative criticism\u0026mdash;to\r\nthe exposure of inconsistencies and absurdities in the received\r\nreligions. But this operation is quite independent of the Metaphysical\r\nmode of thought, and was no otherwise connected with it than in being\r\nvery generally carried on by the same minds (Plato is a brilliant\r\nexample), since the most eminent efficiency in it does not necessarily\r\ndepend on the possession of positive scientific knowledge. But the\r\nMetaphysical spirit, strictly so called, did contribute largely to the\r\nadvent of Monotheism. The conception of impersonal entities, interposed\r\nbetween the governing deity and the phaenomena, and forming the\r\nmachinery through which these are immediately produced, is not\r\nrepugnant, as the theory of direct supernatural volitions is, to the\r\nbelief in invariable laws. The entities not being, like the gods, framed\r\nafter the exemplar of men\u0026mdash;being neither, like them, invested with human\r\npassions, nor supposed, like them, to have power beyond the phaenomena\r\nwhich are the special department of each, there was no fear of offending\r\nthem by the attempt to foresee and define their action, or by the\r\nsupposition that it took place according to fixed laws. The popular\r\ntribunal which condemned Anaxagoras had evidently not risen to the\r\nmetaphysical point of view. Hippocrates, who was concerned only with a\r\nselect and instructed class, could say with impunity, speaking of what\r\nwere called the god-inflicted diseases, that to his mind they were\r\nneither more nor less god-inflicted than all others. The doctrine of\r\nabstract entities was a kind of instinctive conciliation between the\r\nobserved uniformity of the facts of nature, and their dependence on\r\narbitrary volition; since it was easier to conceive a single volition as\r\nsetting a machinery to work, which afterwards went on of itself, than to\r\nsuppose an inflexible constancy in so capricious and changeable a thing\r\nas volition must then have appeared. But though the r\u0026eacute;gime of\r\nabstractions was in strictness compatible with Polytheism, it demanded\r\nMonotheism as the condition of its free development. The received\r\nPolytheism being only the first remove from Fetichism, its gods were too\r\nclosely mixed up in the daily details of phaenomena, and the habit of\r\npropitiating them and ascertaining their will before any important\r\naction of life was too inveterate, to admit, without the strongest shock\r\nto the received system, the notion that they did not habitually rule by\r\nspecial interpositions, but left phaenomena in all ordinary cases to the\r\noperation of the essences or peculiar natures which they had first\r\nimplanted in them. Any modification of Polytheism which would have made\r\nit fully compatible with the Metaphysical conception of the world, would\r\nhave been more difficult to effect than the transition to Monotheism, as\r\nMonotheism was at first conceived.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have given, in our own way, and at some length, this important\r\nportion of M. Comte\u0027s view of the evolution of human thought, as a\r\nsample of the manner in which his theory corresponds with and interprets\r\nhistorical facts, and also to obviate some objections to it, grounded on\r\nan imperfect comprehension, or rather on a mere first glance. Some, for\r\nexample, think the doctrine of the three successive stages of\r\nspeculation and belief, inconsistent with the fact that they all three\r\nexisted contemporaneously; much as if the natural succession of the\r\nhunting, the nomad, and the agricultural state could be refuted by the\r\nfact that there are still hunters and nomads. That the three states were\r\ncontemporaneous, that they all began before authentic history, and still\r\ncoexist, is M. Comte\u0027s express statement: as well as that the advent of\r\nthe two later modes of thought was the very cause which disorganized and\r\nis gradually destroying the primitive one. The Theological mode of\r\nexplaining phaenomena was once universal, with the exception, doubtless,\r\nof the familiar facts which, being even then seen to be controllable by\r\nhuman will, belonged already to the positive mode of thought. The first\r\nand easiest generalizations of common observation, anterior to the first\r\ntraces of the scientific spirit, determined the birth of the\r\nMetaphysical mode of thought; and every further advance in the\r\nobservation of nature, gradually bringing to light its invariable laws,\r\ndetermined a further development of the Metaphysical spirit at the\r\nexpense of the Theological, this being the only medium through which the\r\nconclusions of the Positive mode of thought and the premises of the\r\nTheological could be temporarily made compatible. At a later period,\r\nwhen the real character of the positive laws of nature had come to be in\r\na certain degree understood, and the theological idea had assumed, in\r\nscientific minds, its final character, that of a God governing by\r\ngeneral laws, the positive spirit, having now no longer need of the\r\nfictitious medium of imaginary entities, set itself to the easy task of\r\ndemolishing the instrument by which it had risen. But though it\r\ndestroyed the actual belief in the objective reality of these\r\nabstractions, that belief has left behind it vicious tendencies of the\r\nhuman mind, which are still far enough from being extinguished, and\r\nwhich we shall presently have occasion to characterize.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe next point on which we have to touch is one of greater importance\r\nthan it seems. If all human speculation had to pass through the three\r\nstages, we may presume that its different branches, having always been\r\nvery unequally advanced, could not pass from one stage to another at the\r\nsame time. There must have been a certain order of succession in which\r\nthe different sciences would enter, first into the metaphysical, and\r\nafterwards into the purely positive stage; and this order M. Comte\r\nproceeds to investigate. The result is his remarkable conception of a\r\nscale of subordination of the sciences, being the order of the logical\r\ndependence of those which follow on those which precede. It is not at\r\nfirst obvious how a mere classification of the sciences can be not\r\nmerely a help to their study, but itself an important part of a body of\r\ndoctrine; the classification, however, is a very important part of M.\r\nComte\u0027s philosophy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHe first distinguishes between the abstract and the concrete sciences.\r\nThe abstract sciences have to do with the laws which govern the\r\nelementary facts of Nature; laws on which all phaenomena actually\r\nrealized must of course depend, but which would have been equally\r\ncompatible with many other combinations than those which actually come\r\nto pass. The concrete sciences, on the contrary, concern themselves only\r\nwith the particular combinations of phaenomena which are found in\r\nexistence. For example; the minerals which compose our planet, or are\r\nfound in it, have been produced and are held together by the laws of\r\nmechanical aggregation and by those of chemical union. It is the\r\nbusiness of the abstract sciences, Physics and Chemistry, to ascertain\r\nthese laws: to discover how and under what conditions bodies may become\r\naggregated, and what are the possible modes and results of chemical\r\ncombination. The great majority of these aggregations and combinations\r\ntake place, so far as we are aware, only in our laboratories; with these\r\nthe concrete science, Mineralogy, has nothing to do. Its business is\r\nwith those aggregates, and those chemical compounds, which form\r\nthemselves, or have at some period been formed, in the natural world.\r\nAgain, Physiology, the abstract science, investigates, by such means as\r\nare available to it, the general laws of organization and life. Those\r\nlaws determine what living beings are possible, and maintain the\r\nexistence and determine the phaenomena of those which actually exist:\r\nbut they would be equally capable of maintaining in existence plants and\r\nanimals very different from these. The concrete sciences, Zoology and\r\nBotany, confine themselves to species which really exist, or can be\r\nshown to have really existed: and do not concern themselves with the\r\nmode in which even these would comport themselves under all\r\ncircumstances, but only under those which really take place. They set\r\nforth the actual mode of existence of plants and animals, the phaenomena\r\nwhich they in fact present: but they set forth all of these, and take\r\ninto simultaneous consideration the whole real existence of each\r\nspecies, however various the ultimate laws on which it depends, and to\r\nwhatever number of different abstract sciences these laws may belong.\r\nThe existence of a date tree, or of a lion, is a joint result of many\r\nnatural laws, physical, chemical, biological, and even astronomical.\r\nAbstract science deals with these laws separately, but considers each of\r\nthem in all its aspects, all its possibilities of operation: concrete\r\nscience considers them only in combination, and so far as they exist and\r\nmanifest themselves in the animals or plants of which we have\r\nexperience. The distinctive attributes of the two are summed up by M.\r\nComte in the expression, that concrete science relates to Beings, or\r\nObjects, abstract science to Events.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_2_2\" id=\"FNanchor_2_2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_2_2\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe concrete sciences are inevitably later in their development than the\r\nabstract sciences on which they depend. Not that they begin later to be\r\nstudied; on the contrary, they are the earliest cultivated, since in our\r\nabstract investigations we necessarily set out from spontaneous facts.\r\nBut though we may make empirical generalizations, we can form no\r\nscientific theory of concrete phaenomena until the laws which govern and\r\nexplain them are first known; and those laws are the subject of the\r\nabstract sciences. In consequence, there is not one of the concrete\r\nstudies (unless we count astronomy among them) which has received, up to\r\nthe present time, its final scientific constitution, or can be accounted\r\na science, except in a very loose sense, but only materials for science:\r\npartly from insufficiency of facts, but more, because the abstract\r\nsciences, except those at the very beginning of the scale, have not\r\nattained the degree of perfection necessary to render real concrete\r\nsciences possible.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePostponing, therefore, the concrete sciences, as not yet formed, but\r\nonly tending towards formation, the abstract sciences remain to be\r\nclassed. These, as marked out by M. Comte, are six in number; and the\r\nprinciple which he proposes for their classification is admirably in\r\naccordance with the conditions of our study of Nature. It might have\r\nhappened that the different classes of phaenomena had depended on laws\r\naltogether distinct; that in changing from one to another subject of\r\nscientific study, the student left behind all the laws he previously\r\nknew, and passed under the dominion of a totally new set of\r\nuniformities. The sciences would then have been wholly independent of\r\none another; each would have rested entirely on its own inductions, and\r\nif deductive at all, would have drawn its deductions from premises\r\nexclusively furnished by itself. The fact, however, is otherwise. The\r\nrelation which really subsists between different kinds of phaenomena,\r\nenables the sciences to be arranged in such an order, that in travelling\r\nthrough them we do not pass out of the sphere of any laws, but merely\r\ntake up additional ones at each step. In this order M. Comte proposes to\r\narrange them. He classes the sciences in an ascending series, according\r\nto the degree of complexity of their phaenomena; so that each science\r\ndepends on the truths of all those which precede it, with the addition\r\nof peculiar truths of its own.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus, the truths of number are true of all things, and depend only on\r\ntheir own laws; the science, therefore, of Number, consisting of\r\nArithmetic and Algebra, may be studied without reference to any other\r\nscience. The truths of Geometry presuppose the laws of Number, and a\r\nmore special class of laws peculiar to extended bodies, but require no\r\nothers: Geometry, therefore, can be studied independently of all\r\nsciences except that of Number.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eRational Mechanics presupposes, and depends on, the laws of number and\r\nthose of extension, and along with them another set of laws, those of\r\nEquilibrium and Motion. The truths of Algebra and Geometry nowise depend\r\non these last, and would have been true if these had happened to be the\r\nreverse of what we find them: but the phaenomena of equilibrium and\r\nmotion cannot be understood, nor even stated, without assuming the laws\r\nof number and extension, such as they actually are. The phaenomena of\r\nAstronomy depend on these three classes of laws, and on the law of\r\ngravitation besides; which last has no influence on the truths of\r\nnumber, geometry, or mechanics. Physics (badly named in common English\r\nparlance Natural Philosophy) presupposes the three mathematical\r\nsciences, and also astronomy; since all terrestrial phaenomena are\r\naffected by influences derived from the motions of the earth and of the\r\nheavenly bodies. Chemical phaenomena depend (besides their own laws) on\r\nall the preceding, those of physics among the rest, especially on the\r\nlaws of heat and electricity; physiological phaenomena, on the laws of\r\nphysics and chemistry, and their own laws in addition. The phaenomena of\r\nhuman society obey laws of their own, but do not depend solely upon\r\nthese: they depend upon all the laws of organic and animal life,\r\ntogether with those of inorganic nature, these last influencing society\r\nnot only through their influence on life, but by determining the\r\nphysical conditions under which society has to be carried on. \"Chacun de\r\nces degr\u0026eacute;\u0027s successifs exige des inductions qui lui sont propres; mais\r\nelles ne peuvent jamais devenir syst\u0026eacute;matiques que sous l\u0027impulsion\r\nd\u0026eacute;ductive result\u0026eacute;e de tous les ordres moins compliqu\u0026eacute;s.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_3_3\" id=\"FNanchor_3_3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_3_3\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[3]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus arranged by M. Comte in a series, of which each term represents an\r\nadvance in speciality beyond the term preceding it, and (what\r\nnecessarily accompanies increased speciality) an increase of\r\ncomplexity\u0026mdash;a set of phaenomena determined by a more numerous\r\ncombination of laws; the sciences stand in the following order: 1st,\r\nMathematics; its three branches following one another on the same\r\nprinciple, Number, Geometry, Mechanics. 2nd, Astronomy. 3rd, Physics.\r\n4th, Chemistry. 5th, Biology. 6th, Sociology, or the Social Science, the\r\nphaemomena, of which depend on, and cannot be understood without, the\r\nprincipal truths of all the other sciences. The subject matter and\r\ncontents of these various sciences are obvious of themselves, with the\r\nexception of Physics, which is a group of sciences rather than a single\r\nscience, and is again divided by M. Comte into five departments:\r\nBarology, or the science of weight; Thermology, or that of heat;\r\nAcoustics, Optics, and Electrology. These he attempts to arrange on the\r\nsame principle of increasing speciality and complexity, but they hardly\r\nadmit of such a scale, and M. Comte\u0027s mode of placing them varied at\r\ndifferent periods. All the five being essentially independent of one\r\nanother, he attached little importance to their order, except that\r\nbarology ought to come first, as the connecting link with astronomy, and\r\nelectrology last, as the transition to chemistry.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf the best classification is that which is grounded on the properties\r\nmost important for our purposes, this classification will stand the\r\ntest. By placing the sciences in the order of the complexity of their\r\nsubject matter, it presents them in the order of their difficulty. Each\r\nscience proposes to itself a more arduous inquiry than those which\r\nprecede it in the series; it is therefore likely to be susceptible, even\r\nfinally, of a less degree of perfection, and will certainly arrive later\r\nat the degree attainable by it. In addition to this, each science, to\r\nestablish its own truths, needs those of all the sciences anterior to\r\nit. The only means, for example, by which the physiological laws of life\r\ncould have been ascertained, was by distinguishing, among the\r\nmultifarious and complicated facts of life, the portion which physical\r\nand chemical laws cannot account for. Only by thus isolating the effects\r\nof the peculiar organic laws, did it become possible to discover what\r\nthese are. It follows that the order in which the sciences succeed one\r\nanother in the series, cannot but be, in the main, the historical order\r\nof their development; and is the only order in which they can rationally\r\nbe studied. For this last there is an additional reason: since the more\r\nspecial and complete sciences require not only the truths of the simpler\r\nand more general ones, but still more their methods. The scientific\r\nintellect, both in the individual and in the race, must learn in the\r\nmove elementary studies that art of investigation and those canons of\r\nproof which are to be put in practice in the more elevated. No intellect\r\nis properly qualified for the higher part of the scale, without due\r\npractice in the lower.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMr Herbert Spencer, in his essay entitled \"The Genesis of Science,\" and\r\nmore recently in a pamphlet on \"the Classification of the Sciences,\" has\r\ncriticised and condemned M. Comte\u0027s classification, and proposed a more\r\nelaborate one of his own: and M. Littr\u0026eacute;, in his valuable biographical\r\nand philosophical work on M. Comte (\"Auguste Comte et la Philosophie\r\nPositive\"), has at some length criticised the criticism. Mr Spencer is\r\none of the small number of persons who by the solidity and\r\nencyclopedical character of their knowledge, and their power of\r\nco-ordination and concatenation, may claim to be the peers of M. Comte,\r\nand entitled to a vote in the estimation of him. But after giving to his\r\nanimadversions the respectful attention due to all that comes from Mr\r\nSpencer, we cannot find that he has made out any case. It is always easy\r\nto find fault with a classification. There are a hundred possible ways\r\nof arranging any set of objects, and something may almost always be said\r\nagainst the best, and in favour of the worst of them. But the merits of\r\na classification depend on the purposes to which it is instrumental. We\r\nhave shown the purposes for which M. Comte\u0027s classification is intended.\r\nMr Spencer has not shown that it is ill adapted to those purposes: and\r\nwe cannot perceive that his own answers any ends equally important. His\r\nchief objection is that if the more special sciences need the truths of\r\nthe more general ones, the latter also need some of those of the former,\r\nand have at times been stopped in their progress by the imperfect state\r\nof sciences which follow long after them in M. Comte\u0027s scale; so that,\r\nthe dependence being mutual, there is a \u003ci\u003econsensus\u003c/i\u003e, but not an\r\nascending scale or hierarchy of the sciences. That the earlier sciences\r\nderive help from the later is undoubtedly true; it is part of M. Comte\u0027s\r\ntheory, and amply exemplified in the details of his work. When he\r\naffirms that one science historically precedes another, he does not mean\r\nthat the perfection of the first precedes the humblest commencement of\r\nthose which follow. Mr Spencer does not distinguish between the\r\nempirical stage of the cultivation of a branch of knowledge, and the\r\nscientific stage. The commencement of every study consists in gathering\r\ntogether unanalyzed facts, and treasuring up such spontaneous\r\ngeneralizations as present themselves to natural sagacity. In this stage\r\nany branch of inquiry can be carried on independently of every other;\r\nand it is one of M. Comte\u0027s own remarks that the most complex, in a\r\nscientific point of view, of all studies, the latest in his series, the\r\nstudy of man as a moral and social being, since from its absorbing\r\ninterest it is cultivated more or less by every one, and pre-eminently\r\nby the great practical minds, acquired at an early period a greater\r\nstock of just though unscientific observations than the more elementary\r\nsciences. It is these empirical truths that the later and more special\r\nsciences lend to the earlier; or, at most, some extremely elementary\r\nscientific truth, which happening to be easily ascertainable by direct\r\nexperiment, could be made available for carrying a previous science\r\nalready founded, to a higher stage of development; a re-action of the\r\nlater sciences on the earlier which M. Comte not only fully recognized,\r\nbut attached great importance to systematizing.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_4_4\" id=\"FNanchor_4_4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_4_4\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[4]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut though detached truths relating to the more complex order of\r\nphaenomena may be empirically observed, and a few of them even\r\nscientifically established, contemporaneously with an early stage of\r\nsome of the sciences anterior in the scale, such detached truths, as M.\r\nLittr\u0026eacute; justly remarks, do not constitute a science. What is known of a\r\nsubject, only becomes a science when it is made a connected body of\r\ntruth; in which the relation between the general principles and the\r\ndetails is definitely made out, and each particular truth can be\r\nrecognized as a case of the operation of wider laws. This point of\r\nprogress, at which the study passes from the preliminary state of mere\r\npreparation, into a science, cannot be reached by the more complex\r\nstudies until it has been attained by the simpler ones. A certain\r\nregularity of recurrence in the celestial appearances was ascertained\r\nempirically before much progress had been made in geometry; but\r\nastronomy could no more be a science until geometry was a highly\r\nadvanced one, than the rule of three could have been practised before\r\naddition and subtraction. The truths of the simpler sciences are a part\r\nof the laws to which the phaenomena of the more complex sciences\r\nconform: and are not only a necessary element in their explanation, but\r\nmust be so well understood as to be traceable through complex\r\ncombinations, before the special laws which co-exist and co-operate with\r\nthem can be brought to light. This is all that M. Comte affirms, and\r\nenough for his purpose.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_5_5\" id=\"FNanchor_5_5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_5_5\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[5]\u003c/a\u003e He no doubt occasionally indulges in more\r\nunqualified expressions than can be completely justified, regarding the\r\nlogical perfection of the construction of his series, and its exact\r\ncorrespondence with the historical evolution of the sciences;\r\nexaggerations confined to language, and which the details of his\r\nexposition often correct. But he is sufficiently near the truth, in both\r\nrespects, for every practical purpose.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_6_6\" id=\"FNanchor_6_6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_6_6\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[6]\u003c/a\u003e Minor inaccuracies must often\r\nbe forgiven even to great thinkers. Mr Spencer, in the very-writings in\r\nwhich he criticises M. Comte, affords signal instances of them.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_7_7\" id=\"FNanchor_7_7\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_7_7\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[7]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCombining the doctrines, that every science is in a less advanced\r\nstate as it occupies a higher place in the ascending scale, and that all\r\nthe sciences pass through the three stages, theological, metaphysical,\r\nand positive, it follows that the more special a science is, the tardier\r\nis it in effecting each transition, so that a completely positive state\r\nof an earlier science has often coincided with the metaphysical state of\r\nthe one next to it, and a purely theological state of those further on.\r\nThis statement correctly represents the general course of the facts,\r\nthough requiring allowances in the detail. Mathematics, for example,\r\nfrom the very beginning of its cultivation, can hardly at any time have\r\nbeen in the theological state, though exhibiting many traces of the\r\nmetaphysical. No one, probably, ever believed that the will of a god\r\nkept parallel lines from meeting, or made two and two equal to four; or\r\never prayed to the gods to make the square of the hypothenuse equal to\r\nmore or less than the sum of the squares of the sides. The most devout\r\nbelievers have recognized in propositions of this description a class of\r\ntruths independent of the devine omnipotence. Even among the truths\r\nwhich popular philosophy calls by the misleading name of Contingent the\r\nfew which are at once exact and obvious were probably, from the very\r\nfirst, excepted from the theological explanation. M. Comte observes,\r\nafter Adam Smith, that we are not told in any age or country of a god of\r\nWeight. It was otherwise with Astronomy: the heavenly bodies were\r\nbelieved not merely to be moved by gods, but to be gods themselves: and\r\nwhen this theory was exploded, there movements were explained by\r\nmetaphysical conceptions; such as a tendency of Nature to perfection, in\r\nvirtue of which these sublime bodies, being left to themselves, move in\r\nthe most perfect orbit, the circle. Even Kepler was full of fancies of\r\nthis description, which only terminated when Newton, by unveiling the\r\nreal physical laws of the celestial motions, closed the metaphysical\r\nperiod of astronomical science. As M. Comte remarks, our power of\r\nforeseeing phaenomena, and our power of controlling them, are the two\r\nthings which destroy the belief of their being governed by changeable\r\nwills. In the case of phaenomena which science has not yet taught us\r\neither to foresee or to control, the theological mode of thought has not\r\nceased to operate: men still pray for rain, or for success in war, or to\r\navert a shipwreck or a pestilence, but not to put back the stars in\r\ntheir courses, to abridge the time necessary for a journey, or to arrest\r\nthe tides. Such vestiges of the primitive mode of thought linger in\r\nthe more intricate departments of sciences which have attained a high\r\ndegree of positive development. The metaphysical mode of explanation,\r\nbeing less antagonistic than the theological to the idea of invariable\r\nlaws, is still slower in being entirely discarded. M. Comte finds\r\nremains of it in the sciences which are the most completely positive,\r\nwith the single exception of astronomy, mathematics itself not being, he\r\nthinks, altogether free from them: which is not wonderful, when we see\r\nat how very recent a date mathematicians have been able to give the\r\nreally positive interpretation of their own symbols.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_8_8\" id=\"FNanchor_8_8\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_8_8\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[8]\u003c/a\u003e We have already\r\nhowever had occasion to notice M. Comte\u0027s propensity to use the term\r\nmetaphysical in cases containing nothing that truly answers to his\r\ndefinition of the word. For instance, he considers chemistry as tainted\r\nwith the metaphysical mode of thought by the notion of chemical\r\naffinity. He thinks that the chemists who said that bodies combine\r\nbecause they have an affinity for each other, believed in a mysterious\r\nentity residing in bodies and inducing them to combine. On any other\r\nsupposition, he thinks the statement could only mean that bodies combine\r\nbecause they combine. But it really meant more. It was the abstract\r\nexpression of the doctrine, that bodies have an invariable tendency to\r\ncombine with one thing in preference to another: that the tendencies of\r\ndifferent substances to combine are fixed quantities, of which the\r\ngreater always prevails over the less, so that if A detaches B from C in\r\none case it will do so in every other; which was called having a greater\r\nattraction, or, more technically, a greater affinity for it. This was\r\nnot a metaphysical theory, but a positive generalization, which\r\naccounted for a great number of facts, and would have kept its place as\r\na law of nature, had it not been disproved by the discovery of cases in\r\nwhich though A detached B from C in some circumstances, C detached it\r\nfrom A in others, showing the law of elective chemical combination to be\r\na less simple one than had at first been supposed. In this case,\r\ntherefore, M. Comte made a mistake: and he will be found to have made\r\nmany similar ones. But in the science next after chemistry, biology, the\r\nempty mode of explanation by scholastic entities, such as a plastic\r\nforce, a vital principle, and the like, has been kept up even to the\r\npresent day. The German physiology of the school of Oken,\r\nnotwithstanding his acknowledged genius, is almost as metaphysical as\r\nHegel, and there is in France a quite recent revival of the Animism of\r\nStahl. These metaphysical explanations, besides their inanity, did\r\nserious harm, by directing the course of positive scientific inquiry\r\ninto wrong channels. There was indeed nothing to prevent investigating\r\nthe mode of action of the supposed plastic or vital force by observation\r\nand experiment; but the phrases gave currency and coherence to a false\r\nabstraction and generalization, setting inquirers to look out for one\r\ncause of complex phaenomena which undoubtedly depended on many.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAccording to M. Comte, chemistry entered into the positive stage with\r\nLavoisier, in the latter half of the last century (in a subsequent\r\ntreatise he places the date a generation earlier); and biology at the\r\nbeginning of the present, when Bichat drew the fundamental distinction\r\nbetween nutritive or vegetative and properly animal life, and referred\r\nthe properties of organs to the general laws of the component tissues.\r\nThe most complex of all sciences, the Social, had not, he maintained,\r\nbecome positive at all, but was the subject of an ever-renewed and\r\nbarren contest between the theological and the metaphysical modes of\r\nthought. To make this highest of the sciences positive, and thereby\r\ncomplete the positive character of all human speculations, was the\r\nprincipal aim of his labours, and he believed himself to have\r\naccomplished it in the last three volumes of his Treatise. But the term\r\nPositive is not, any more than Metaphysical, always used by M. Comte in\r\nthe same meaning. There never can have been a period in any science when\r\nit was not in some degree positive, since it always professed to draw\r\nconclusions from experience and observation. M. Comte would have been\r\nthe last to deny that previous to his own speculations, the world\r\npossessed a multitude of truths, of greater or less certainty, on social\r\nsubjects, the evidence of which was obtained by inductive or deductive\r\nprocesses from observed sequences of phaenomena. Nor could it be denied\r\nthat the best writers on subjects upon which so many men of the highest\r\nmental capacity had employed their powers, had accepted as thoroughly\r\nthe positive point of view, and rejected the theological and\r\nmetaphysical as decidedly, as M. Comte himself. Montesquieu; even\r\nMacchiavelli; Adam Smith and the political economists universally, both\r\nin France and in England; Bentham, and all thinkers initiated by\r\nhim,\u0026mdash;had a full conviction that social phaenomena conform to invariable\r\nlaws, the discovery and illustration of which was their great object as\r\nspeculative thinkers. All that can be said is, that those philosophers\r\ndid not get so far as M. Comte in discovering the methods best adapted\r\nto bring these laws to light. It was not, therefore, reserved for M.\r\nComte to make sociological inquiries positive. But what he really meant\r\nby making a science positive, is what we will call, with M. Littr\u0026eacute;,\r\ngiving it its final scientific constitution; in other words, discovering\r\nor proving, and pursuing to their consequences, those of its truths\r\nwhich are fit to form the connecting links among the rest: truths which\r\nare to it what the law of gravitation is to astronomy, what the\r\nelementary properties of the tissues are to physiology, and we will add\r\n(though M. Comte did not) what the laws of association are to\r\npsychology. This is an operation which, when accomplished, puts an end\r\nto the empirical period, and enables the science to be conceived as a\r\nco-ordinated and coherent body of doctrine. This is what had not yet\r\nbeen done for sociology; and the hope of effecting it was, from his\r\nearly years, the prompter and incentive of all M. Comte\u0027s philosophic\r\nlabours.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt was with a view to this that he undertook that wonderful\r\nsystematization of the philosophy of all the antecedent sciences, from\r\nmathematics to physiology, which, if he had done nothing else, would\r\nhave stamped him, in all minds competent to appreciate it, as one of the\r\nprincipal thinkers of the age. To make its nature intelligible to those\r\nwho are not acquainted with it, we must explain what we mean by the\r\nphilosophy of a science, as distinguished from the science itself. The\r\nproper meaning of philosophy we take to be, what the ancients understood\r\nby it\u0026mdash;the scientific knowledge of Man, as an intellectual, moral, and\r\nsocial being. Since his intellectual faculties include his knowing\r\nfaculty, the science of Man includes everything that man can know, so\r\nfar as regards his mode of knowing it: in other words, the whole\r\ndoctrine of the conditions of human knowledge. The philosophy of a\r\nScience thus comes to mean the science itself, considered not as to its\r\nresults, the truths which it ascertains, but as to the processes by\r\nwhich the mind attains them, the marks by which it recognises them, and\r\nthe co-ordinating and methodizing of them with a view to the greatest\r\nclearness of conception and the fullest and readiest availibility for\r\nuse: in one word, the logic of the science. M. Comte has accomplished\r\nthis for the first five of the fundamental sciences, with a success\r\nwhich can hardly be too much admired. We never reopen even the least\r\nadmirable part of this survey, the volume on chemistry and biology\r\n(which was behind the actual state of those sciences when first written,\r\nand is far in the rear of them now), without a renewed sense of the\r\ngreat reach of its speculations, and a conviction that the way to a\r\ncomplete rationalizing of those sciences, still very imperfectly\r\nconceived by most who cultivate them, has been shown nowhere so\r\nsuccessfully as there.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet, for a correct appreciation of this great philosophical achievement,\r\nwe ought to take account of what has not been accomplished, as well as\r\nof what has. Some of the chief deficiencies and infirmities of M.\r\nComte\u0027s system of thought will be found, as is usually the case, in\r\nclose connexion with its greatest successes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe philosophy of Science consists of two principal parts; the methods\r\nof investigation, and the requisites of proof. The one points out the\r\nroads by which the human intellect arrives at conclusions, the other the\r\nmode of testing their evidence. The former if complete would be an\r\nOrganon of Discovery, the latter of Proof. It is to the first of these\r\nthat M. Comte principally confines himself, and he treats it with a\r\ndegree of perfection hitherto unrivalled. Nowhere is there anything\r\ncomparable, in its kind, to his survey of the resources which the mind\r\nhas at its disposal for investigating the laws of phaenomena; the\r\ncircumstances which render each of the fundamental modes of exploration\r\nsuitable or unsuitable to each class of phaenomena; the extensions and\r\ntransformations which the process of investigation has to undergo in\r\nadapting itself to each new province of the field of study; and the\r\nespecial gifts with which every one of the fundamental sciences enriches\r\nthe method of positive inquiry, each science in its turn being the best\r\nfitted to bring to perfection one process or another. These, and many\r\ncognate subjects, such as the theory of Classification, and the proper\r\nuse of scientific Hypotheses, M. Comte has treated with a completeness\r\nof insight which leaves little to be desired. Not less admirable is his\r\nsurvey of the most comprehensive truths that had been arrived at by each\r\nscience, considered as to their relation to the general sum of human\r\nknowledge, and their logical value as aids to its further progress. But\r\nafter all this, there remains a further and distinct question. We are\r\ntaught the right way of searching for results, but when a result has\r\nbeen reached, how shall we know that it is true? How assure ourselves\r\nthat the process has been performed correctly, and that our premises,\r\nwhether consisting of generalities or of particular facts, really prove\r\nthe conclusion we have grounded on them? On this question M. Comte\r\nthrows no light. He supplies no test of proof. As regards deduction, he\r\nneither recognises the syllogistic system of Aristotle and his\r\nsuccessors (the insufficiency of which is as evident as its utility is\r\nreal) nor proposes any other in lieu of it: and of induction he has no\r\ncanons whatever. He does not seem to admit the possibility of any\r\ngeneral criterion by which to decide whether a given inductive inference\r\nis correct or not. Yet he does not, with Dr Whewell, regard an inductive\r\ntheory as proved if it accounts for the facts: on the contrary, he sets\r\nhimself in the strongest opposition to those scientific hypotheses\r\nwhich, like the luminiferous ether, are not susceptible of direct proof,\r\nand are accepted on the sole evidence of their aptitude for explaining\r\nphenomena. He maintains that no hypothesis is legitimate unless it is\r\nsusceptible of verification, and that none ought to be accepted as true\r\nunless it can be shown not only that it accords with the facts, but that\r\nits falsehood would be inconsistent with them. He therefore needs a test\r\nof inductive proof; and in assigning none, he seems to give up as\r\nimpracticable the main problem of Logic properly so called. At the\r\nbeginning of his treatise he speaks of a doctrine of Method, apart from\r\nparticular applications, as conceivable, but not needful: method,\r\naccording to him, is learnt only by seeing it in operation, and the\r\nlogic of a science can only usefully be taught through the science\r\nitself. Towards the end of the work, he assumes a more decidedly\r\nnegative tone, and treats the very conception of studying Logic\r\notherwise than in its applications as chimerical. He got on, in his\r\nsubsequent writings, to considering it as wrong. This indispensable part\r\nof Positive Philosophy he not only left to be supplied by others, but\r\ndid all that depended on him to discourage them from attempting it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis hiatus in M. Comte\u0027s system is not unconnected with a defect in his\r\noriginal conception of the subject matter of scientific investigation,\r\nwhich has been generally noticed, for it lies on the surface, and is\r\nmore apt to be exaggerated than overlooked. It is often said of him that\r\nhe rejects the study of causes. This is not, in the correct acceptation,\r\ntrue, for it is only questions of ultimate origin, and of Efficient as\r\ndistinguished from what are called Physical causes, that he rejects. The\r\ncauses that he regards as inaccessible are causes which are not\r\nthemselves phaenomena. Like other people he admits the study of causes,\r\nin every sense in which one physical fact can be the cause of another.\r\nBut he has an objection to the \u003ci\u003eword\u003c/i\u003e cause; he will only consent to\r\nspeak of Laws of Succession: and depriving himself of the use of a word\r\nwhich has a Positive meaning, he misses the meaning it expresses. He\r\nsees no difference between such generalizations as Kepler\u0027s laws, and\r\nsuch as the theory of gravitation. He fails to perceive the real\r\ndistinction between the laws of succession and coexistence which\r\nthinkers of a different school call Laws of Phaenomena, and those of\r\nwhat they call the action of Causes: the former exemplified by the\r\nsuccession of day and night, the latter by the earth\u0027s rotation which\r\ncauses it. The succession of day and night is as much an invariable\r\nsequence, as the alternate exposure of opposite sides of the earth to\r\nthe sun. Yet day and night are not the causes of one another; why?\r\nBecause their sequence, though invariable in our experience, is not\r\nunconditionally so: those facts only succeed each other, provided that\r\nthe presence and absence of the sun succeed each other, and if this\r\nalternation were to cease, we might have either day or night unfollowed\r\nby one another. There are thus two kinds of uniformities of succession,\r\nthe one unconditional, the other conditional on the first: laws of\r\ncausation, and other successions dependent on those laws. All ultimate\r\nlaws are laws of causation, and the only universal law beyond the pale\r\nof mathematics is the law of universal causation, namely, that every\r\nphaenomenon has a phaenomenal cause; has some phaenomenon other than\r\nitself, or some combination of phaenomena, on which it is invariably and\r\nunconditionally consequent. It is on the universality of this law that\r\nthe possibility rests of establishing a canon of Induction. A general\r\nproposition inductively obtained is only then proved to be true, when\r\nthe instances on which it rests are such that if they have been\r\ncorrectly observed, the falsity of the generalization would be\r\ninconsistent with the constancy of causation; with the universality of\r\nthe fact that the phaenomena of nature take place according to\r\ninvariable laws of succession.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_9_9\" id=\"FNanchor_9_9\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_9_9\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[9]\u003c/a\u003e It is probable, therefore, that M.\r\nComte\u0027s determined abstinence from the word and the idea of Cause, had\r\nmuch to do with his inability to conceive an Inductive Logic, by\r\ndiverting his attention from the only basis upon which it could be\r\nfounded.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe are afraid it must also be said, though shown only by slight\r\nindications in his fundamental work, and coming out in full evidence\r\nonly in his later writings\u0026mdash;that M. Comte, at bottom, was not so\r\nsolicitous about completeness of proof as becomes a positive\r\nphilosopher, and that the unimpeachable objectivity, as he would have\r\ncalled it, of a conception\u0026mdash;its exact correspondence to the realities of\r\noutward fact\u0026mdash;was not, with him, an indispensable condition of adopting\r\nit, if it was subjectively useful, by affording facilities to the mind\r\nfor grouping phaenomena. This appears very curiously in his chapters on\r\nthe philosophy of Chemistry. He recommends, as a judicious use of \"the\r\ndegree of liberty left to our intelligence by the end and purpose of\r\npositive science,\" that we should accept as a convenient generalization\r\nthe doctrine that all chemical composition is between two elements only;\r\nthat every substance which our analysis decomposes, let us say into four\r\nelements, has for its immediate constituents two hypothetical\r\nsubstances, each compounded of two simpler ones. There would have been\r\nnothing to object to in this as a scientific hypothesis, assumed\r\ntentatively as a means of suggesting experiments by which its truth may\r\nbe tested. With this for its destination, the conception, would have\r\nbeen legitimate and philosophical; the more so, as, if confirmed, it\r\nwould have afforded an explanation of the fact that some substances\r\nwhich analysis shows to be composed of the same elementary substances in\r\nthe same proportions, differ in their general properties, as for\r\ninstance, sugar and gum.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_10_10\" id=\"FNanchor_10_10\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_10_10\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[10]\u003c/a\u003e And if, besides affording a reason for\r\ndifference between things which differ, the hypothesis had afforded a\r\nreason for agreement between things which agree; if the intermediate\r\nlink by which the quaternary compound was resolved into two binary ones,\r\ncould have been so chosen as to bring each of them within the analogies\r\nof some known class of binary compounds (which it is easy to suppose\r\npossible, and which in some particular instances actually happens);\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_11_11\" id=\"FNanchor_11_11\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_11_11\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[11]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe universality of binary composition would have been a successful\r\nexample of an hypothesis in anticipation of a positive theory, to give a\r\ndirection to inquiry which might end in its being either proved or\r\nabandoned. But M. Comte evidently thought that even though it should\r\nnever be proved\u0026mdash;however many cases of chemical composition might always\r\nremain in which the theory was still as hypothetical as at first\u0026mdash;so\r\nlong as it was not actually disproved (which it is scarcely in the\r\nnature of the case that it should ever be) it would deserve to be\r\nretained, for its mere convenience in bringing a large body of\r\nphaenomena under a general conception. In a \u003ci\u003er\u0026eacute;sum\u0026eacute;\u003c/i\u003e of the general\r\nprinciples of the positive method at the end of the work, he claims, in\r\nexpress terms, an unlimited license of adopting \"without any vain\r\nscruple\" hypothetical conceptions of this sort; \"in order to satisfy,\r\nwithin proper limits, our just mental inclinations, which always turn,\r\nwith an instinctive predilection, towards simplicity, continuity, and\r\ngenerality of conceptions, while always respecting the reality of\r\nexternal laws in so far as accessible to us\" (vi. 639). \"The most\r\nphilosophic point of view leads us to conceive the study of natural laws\r\nas destined to represent the external world so as to give as much\r\nsatisfaction to the essential inclinations of our intelligence, as is\r\nconsistent with the degree of exactitude commanded by the aggregate of\r\nour practical wants\" (vi. 642). Among these \"essential inclinations\" he\r\nincludes not only our \"instinctive predilection for order and harmony,\"\r\nwhich makes us relish any conception, even fictitious, that helps to\r\nreduce phaenomena to system; but even our feelings of taste, \"les\r\nconvenances purement esth\u0026eacute;tiques,\" which, he says, have a legitimate\r\npart in the employment of the \"genre de libert\u0026eacute;\" rest\u0026eacute; facultatif pour\r\nnotre intelligence.\" After the due satisfaction of our \"most eminent\r\nmental inclinations,\" there will still remain \"a considerable margin of\r\nindeterminateness, which should be made use of to give a direct\r\ngratification to our \u003ci\u003ebesoin\u003c/i\u003e of ideality, by embellishing our\r\nscientific thoughts, without injury to their essential reality\" (vi.\r\n647). In consistency with all this, M. Comte warns thinkers against too\r\nsevere a scrutiny of the exact truth of scientific laws, and stamps with\r\n\"severe reprobation\" those who break down \"by too minute an\r\ninvestigation\" generalizations already made, without being able to\r\nsubstitute others (vi. 639): as in the case of Lavoisier\u0027s general\r\ntheory of chemistry, which would have made that science more\r\nsatisfactory than at present to \"the instinctive inclinations of our\r\nintelligence\" if it had turned out true, but unhappily it did not. These\r\nmental dispositions in M. Comte account for his not having found or\r\nsought a logical criterion of proof; but they are scarcely consistent\r\nwith his inveterate hostility to the hypothesis of the luminiferous\r\nether, which certainly gratifies our \"predilection for order and\r\nharmony,\" not to say our \"besoin d\u0027id\u0026eacute;alite\", in no ordinary degree.\r\nThis notion of the \"destination\" of the study of natural laws is to our\r\nminds a complete dereliction of the essential principles which form the\r\nPositive conception of science; and contained the germ of the perversion\r\nof his own philosophy which marked his later years. It might be\r\ninteresting, but scarcely worth while, to attempt to penetrate to the\r\njust thought which misled M. Comte, for there is almost always a grain\r\nof truth in the errors of an original and powerful mind. There is\r\nanother grave aberration in M. Comte\u0027s view of the method of positive\r\nscience, which though not more unphilosophical than the last mentioned,\r\nis of greater practical importance. He rejects totally, as an invalid\r\nprocess, psychological observation properly so called, or in other\r\nwords, internal consciousness, at least as regards our intellectual\r\noperations. He gives no place in his series of the science of\r\nPsychology, and always speaks of it with contempt. The study of mental\r\nphaenomena, or, as he expresses it, of moral and intellectual functions,\r\nhas a place in his scheme, under the head of Biology, but only as a\r\nbranch of physiology. Our knowledge of the human mind must, he thinks,\r\nbe acquired by observing other people. How we are to observe other\r\npeople\u0027s mental operations, or how interpret the signs of them without\r\nhaving learnt what the signs mean by knowledge of ourselves, he does not\r\nstate. But it is clear to him that we can learn very little about the\r\nfeelings, and nothing at all about the intellect, by self-observation.\r\nOur intelligence can observe all other things, but not itself: we cannot\r\nobserve ourselves observing, or observe ourselves reasoning: and if we\r\ncould, attention to this reflex operation would annihilate its object,\r\nby stopping the process observed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is little need for an elaborate refutation of a fallacy respecting\r\nwhich the only wonder is that it should impose on any one. Two answers\r\nmay be given to it. In the first place, M. Comte might be referred to\r\nexperience, and to the writings of his countryman M. Cardaillac and our\r\nown Sir William Hamilton, for proof that the mind can not only be\r\nconscious of, but attend to, more than one, and even a considerable\r\nnumber, of impressions at once.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_12_12\" id=\"FNanchor_12_12\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_12_12\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[12]\u003c/a\u003e It is true that attention is\r\nweakened by being divided; and this forms a special difficulty in\r\npsychological observation, as psychologists (Sir William Hamilton in\r\nparticular) have fully recognised; but a difficulty is not an\r\nimpossibility. Secondly, it might have occurred to M. Comte that a fact\r\nmay be studied through the medium of memory, not at the very moment of\r\nour perceiving it, but the moment after: and this is really the mode in\r\nwhich our best knowledge of our intellectual acts is generally acquired.\r\nWe reflect on what we have been doing, when the act is past, but when\r\nits impression in the memory is still fresh. Unless in one of these\r\nways, we could not have acquired the knowledge, which nobody denies us\r\nto have, of what passes in our minds. M. Comte would scarcely have\r\naffirmed that we are not aware of our own intellectual operations. We\r\nknow of our observings and our reasonings, either at the very time, or\r\nby memory the moment after; in either case, by direct knowledge, and not\r\n(like things done by us in a state of somnambulism) merely by their\r\nresults. This simple fact destroys the whole of M. Comte\u0027s argument.\r\nWhatever we are directly aware of, we can directly observe.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd what Organon for the study of \"the moral and intellectual functions\"\r\ndoes M. Comte offer, in lieu of the direct mental observation which he\r\nrepudiates? We are almost ashamed to say, that it is Phrenology! Not,\r\nindeed, he says, as a science formed, but as one still to be created;\r\nfor he rejects almost all the special organs imagined by phrenologists,\r\nand accepts only their general division of the brain into the three\r\nregions of the propensities, the sentiments, and the intellect,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_13_13\" id=\"FNanchor_13_13\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_13_13\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[13]\u003c/a\u003e and\r\nthe subdivision of the latter region between the organs of meditation\r\nand those of observation. Yet this mere first outline of an\r\napportionment of the mental functions among different organs, he regards\r\nas extricating the mental study of man from the metaphysical stage, and\r\nelevating it to the positive. The condition of mental science would be\r\nsad indeed if this were its best chance of being positive; for the later\r\ncourse of physiological observation and speculation has not tended to\r\nconfirm, but to discredit, the phrenological hypothesis. And even if\r\nthat hypothesis were true, psychological observation would still be\r\nnecessary; for how is it possible to ascertain the correspondence\r\nbetween two things, by observation of only one of them? To establish a\r\nrelation between mental functions and cerebral conformations, requires\r\nnot only a parallel system of observations applied to each, but (as M.\r\nComte himself, with some inconsistency, acknowledges) an analysis of the\r\nmental faculties, \"des diverses facult\u0026eacute;s \u0026eacute;l\u0026eacute;mentaires,\" (iii. 573),\r\nconducted without any reference to the physical conditions, since the\r\nproof of the theory would lie in the correspondence between the division\r\nof the brain into organs and that of the mind into faculties, each shown\r\nby separate evidence. To accomplish this analysis requires direct\r\npsychological study carried to a high pitch of perfection; it being\r\nnecessary, among other things, to investigate the degree in which mental\r\ncharacter is created by circumstances, since no one supposes that\r\ncerebral conformation does all, and circumstances nothing. The\r\nphrenological study of Mind thus supposes as its necessary preparation\r\nthe whole of the Association psychology. Without, then, rejecting any\r\naid which study of the brain and nerves can afford to psychology (and it\r\nhas afforded, and will yet afford, much), we may affirm that M. Comte\r\nhas done nothing for the constitution of the positive method of mental\r\nscience. He refused to profit by the very valuable commencements made by\r\nhis predecessors, especially by Hartley, Brown, and James Mill (if\r\nindeed any of those philosophers were known to him), and left the\r\npsychological branch of the positive method, as well as psychology\r\nitself, to be put in their true position as a part of Positive\r\nPhilosophy by successors who duly placed themselves at the twofold point\r\nof view of physiology and psychology, Mr Bain and Mr Herbert Spencer.\r\nThis great mistake is not a mere hiatus in M. Comte\u0027s system, but the\r\nparent of serious errors in his attempt to create a Social Science. He\r\nis indeed very skilful in estimating the effect of circumstances in\r\nmoulding the general character of the human race; were he not, his\r\nhistorical theory could be of little worth: but in appreciating the\r\ninfluence which circumstances exercise, through psychological laws, in\r\nproducing diversities of character, collective or individual, he is\r\nsadly at fault.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAfter this summary view of M. Comte\u0027s conception of Positive Philosophy,\r\nit remains to give some account of his more special and equally\r\nambitious attempt to create the Science of Sociology, or, as he\r\nexpresses it, to elevate the study of social phaenomena to the positive\r\nstate.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHe regarded all who profess any political opinions as hitherto divided\r\nbetween the adherents of the theological and those of the metaphysical\r\nmode of thought: the former deducing all their doctrines from divine\r\nordinances, the latter from abstractions. This assertion, however,\r\ncannot be intended in the same sense as when the terms are applied to\r\nthe sciences of inorganic nature; for it is impossible that acts\r\nevidently proceeding from the human will could be ascribed to the agency\r\n(at least immediate) of either divinities or abstractions. No one ever\r\nregarded himself or his fellow-man as a mere piece of machinery worked\r\nby a god, or as the abode of an entity which was the true author of what\r\nthe man himself appeared to do. True, it was believed that the gods, or\r\nGod, could move or change human wills, as well as control their\r\nconsequences, and prayers were offered to them accordingly, rather as\r\nable to overrule the spontaneous course of things, than as at each\r\ninstant carrying it on. On the whole, however, the theological and\r\nmetaphysical conceptions, in their application to sociology, had\r\nreference not to the production of phaenomena, but to the rule of duty,\r\nand conduct in life. It is this which was based, either on a divine\r\nwill, or on abstract mental conceptions, which, by an illusion of the\r\nrational faculty, were invested with objective validity. On the one\r\nhand, the established rules of morality were everywhere referred to a\r\ndivine origin. In the majority of countries the entire civil and\r\ncriminal law was looked upon as revealed from above; and it is to the\r\npetty military communities which escaped this delusion, that man is\r\nindebted for being now a progressive being. The fundamental institutions\r\nof the state were almost everywhere believed to have been divinely\r\nestablished, and to be still, in a greater or less degree, of divine\r\nauthority. The divine right of certain lines of kings to rule, and even\r\nto rule absolutely, was but lately the creed of the dominant party in\r\nmost countries of Europe; while the divine right of popes and bishops to\r\ndictate men\u0027s beliefs (and not respecting the invisible world alone) is\r\nstill striving, though under considerable difficulties, to rule mankind.\r\nWhen these opinions began to be out of date, a rival theory presented\r\nitself to take their place. There were, in truth, many such theories,\r\nand to some of them the term metaphysical, in M. Comte\u0027s sense, cannot\r\njustly be applied. All theories in which the ultimate standard of\r\ninstitutions and rules of action was the happiness of mankind, and\r\nobservation and experience the guides (and some such there have been in\r\nall periods of free speculation), are entitled to the name Positive,\r\nwhatever, in other respects, their imperfections may be. But these were\r\na small minority. M. Comte was right in affirming that the prevailing\r\nschools of moral and political speculation, when not theological, have\r\nbeen metaphysical. They affirmed that moral rules, and even political\r\ninstitutions, were not means to an end, the general good, but\r\ncorollaries evolved from the conception of Natural Rights. This was\r\nespecially the case in all the countries in which the ideas of\r\npublicists were the offspring of the Roman Law. The legislators of\r\nopinion on these subjects, when not theologians, were lawyers: and the\r\nContinental lawyers followed the Roman jurists, who followed the Greek\r\nmetaphysicians, in acknowledging as the ultimate source of right and\r\nwrong in morals, and consequently in institutions, the imaginary law of\r\nthe imaginary being Nature. The first systematizers of morals in\r\nChristian Europe, on any other than a purely theological basis, the\r\nwriters on International Law, reasoned wholly from these premises, and\r\ntransmitted them to a long line of successors. This mode of thought\r\nreached its culmination in Rousseau, in whose hands it became as\r\npowerful an instrument for destroying the past, as it was impotent for\r\ndirecting the future. The complete victory which this philosophy gained,\r\nin speculation, over the old doctrines, was temporarily followed by an\r\nequally complete practical triumph, the French Revolution: when, having\r\nhad, for the first time, a full opportunity of developing its\r\ntendencies, and showing what it could not do, it failed so conspicuously\r\nas to determine a partial reaction to the doctrines of feudalism and\r\nCatholicism. Between these and the political metaphysics (meta-politics\r\nas Coleridge called it) of the Revolution, society has since oscillated;\r\nraising up in the process a hybrid intermediate party, termed\r\nConservative, or the party of Order, which has no doctrines of its own,\r\nbut attempts to hold the scales even between the two others, borrowing\r\nalternately the arguments of each, to use as weapons against whichever\r\nof the two seems at the moment most likely to prevail.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch, reduced to a very condensed form, is M. Comte\u0027s version of the\r\nstate of European opinion on politics and society. An Englishman\u0027s\r\ncriticism would be, that it describes well enough the general division\r\nof political opinion in France and the countries which follow her lead,\r\nbut not in England, or the communities of English origin: in all of\r\nwhich, divine right died out with the Jacobites, and the law of nature\r\nand natural rights have never been favourites even with the extreme\r\npopular party, who preferred to rest their claims on the historical\r\ntraditions of their own country, and on maxims drawn from its law books,\r\nand since they outgrew this standard, almost always base them on general\r\nexpediency. In England, the preference of one form of government to\r\nanother seldom turns on anything but the practical consequences which it\r\nproduces, or which are expected from it. M. Comte can point to little of\r\nthe nature of metaphysics in English politics, except \"la m\u0026eacute;taphysique\r\nconstitutionnelle,\" a name he chooses to give to the conventional\r\nfiction by which the occupant of the throne is supposed to be the source\r\nfrom whence all power emanates, while nothing can be further from the\r\nbelief or intention of anybody than that such should really be the case.\r\nApart from this, which is a matter of forms and words, and has no\r\nconnexion with any belief except belief in the proprieties, the severest\r\ncriticism can find nothing either worse or better, in the modes of\r\nthinking either of our conservative or of our liberal party, than a\r\nparticularly shallow and flimsy kind of positivism. The working classes\r\nindeed, or some portion of them, perhaps still rest their claim to\r\nuniversal suffrage on abstract right, in addition to more substantial\r\nreasons, and thus far and no farther does metaphysics prevail in the\r\nregion of English politics. But politics is not the entire art of social\r\nexistence: ethics is a still deeper and more vital part of it: and in\r\nthat, as much in England as elsewhere, the current opinions are still\r\ndivided between the theological mode of thought and the metaphysical.\r\nWhat is the whole doctrine of Intuitive Morality, which reigns supreme\r\nwherever the idolatry of Scripture texts has abated and the influence of\r\nBentham\u0027s philosophy has not reached, but the metaphysical state of\r\nethical science? What else, indeed, is the whole \u003ci\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e philosophy,\r\nin morals, jurisprudence, psychology, logic, even physical science, for\r\nit does not always keep its hands off that, the oldest domain of\r\nobservation and experiment? It has the universal diagnostic of the\r\nmetaphysical mode of thought, in the Comtean sense of the word; that of\r\nerecting a mere creation of the mind into a test or \u003ci\u003enorma\u003c/i\u003e of external\r\ntruth, and presenting the abstract expression of the beliefs already\r\nentertained, as the reason and evidence which justifies them. Of those\r\nwho still adhere to the old opinions we need not speak; but when one of\r\nthe most vigorous as well as boldest thinkers that English speculation\r\nhas yet produced, full of the true scientific spirit, Mr Herbert\r\nSpencer, places in the front of his philosophy the doctrine that the\r\nultimate test of the truth of a proposition is the inconceivableness of\r\nits negative; when, following in the steps of Mr Spencer, an able\r\nexpounder of positive philosophy like Mr Lewes, in his meritorious and\r\nby no means superficial work on Aristotle, after laying, very justly,\r\nthe blame of almost every error of the ancient thinkers on their\r\nneglecting to \u003ci\u003everify\u003c/i\u003e their opinions, announces that there are two\r\nkinds of verification, the Real and the Ideal, the ideal test of truth\r\nbeing that its negative is unthinkable, and by the application of that\r\ntest judges that gravitation must be universal even in the stellar\r\nregions, because in the absence of proof to the contrary, \"the idea of\r\nmatter without gravity is unthinkable;\"\u0026mdash;when those from whom it was\r\nleast to be expected thus set up acquired necessities of thought in the\r\nminds of one or two generations as evidence of real necessities in the\r\nuniverse, we must admit that the metaphysical mode of thought still\r\nrules the higher philosophy, even in the department of inorganic nature,\r\nand far more in all that relates to man as a moral, intellectual, and\r\nsocial being.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut, while M. Comte is so far in the right, we often, as already\r\nintimated, find him using the name metaphysical to denote certain\r\npractical conclusions, instead of a particular kind of theoretical\r\npremises. Whatever goes by the different names of the revolutionary, the\r\nradical, the democratic, the liberal, the free-thinking, the sceptical,\r\nor the negative and critical school or party in religion, politics, or\r\nphilosophy, all passes with him under the designation of metaphysical,\r\nand whatever he has to say about it forms part of his description of the\r\nmetaphysical school of social science. He passes in review, one after\r\nanother, what he deems the leading doctrines of the revolutionary school\r\nof politics, and dismisses them all as mere instruments of attack upon\r\nthe old social system, with no permanent validity as social truth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHe assigns only this humble rank to the first of all the articles of the\r\nliberal creed, \"the absolute right of free examination, or the dogma of\r\nunlimited liberty of conscience.\" As far as this doctrine only means\r\nthat opinions, and their expression, should be exempt from \u003ci\u003elegal\u003c/i\u003e\r\nrestraint, either in the form of prevention or of penalty, M. Comte is a\r\nfirm adherent of it: but the \u003ci\u003emoral\u003c/i\u003e right of every human being, however\r\nill-prepared by the necessary instruction and discipline, to erect\r\nhimself into a judge of the most intricate as well as the most important\r\nquestions that can occupy the human intellect, he resolutely denies.\r\n\"There is no liberty of conscience,\" he said in an early work, \"in\r\nastronomy, in physics, in chemistry, even in physiology, in the sense\r\nthat every one would think it absurd not to accept in confidence the\r\nprinciples established in those sciences by the competent persons. If it\r\nis otherwise in politics, the reason is merely because, the old\r\ndoctrines having gone by and the new ones not being yet formed, there\r\nare not properly, during the interval, any established opinions.\" When\r\nfirst mankind outgrew the old doctrines, an appeal from doctors and\r\nteachers to the outside public was inevitable and indispensable, since\r\nwithout the toleration and encouragement of discussion and criticism\r\nfrom all quarters, it would have been impossible for any new doctrines\r\nto grow up. But in itself, the practice of carrying the questions which\r\nmore than all others require special knowledge and preparation, before\r\nthe incompetent tribunal of common opinion, is, he contends, radically\r\nirrational, and will and ought to cease when once mankind have again\r\nmade up their minds to a system of doctrine. The prolongation of this\r\nprovisional state, producing an ever-increasing divergence of opinions,\r\nis already, according to him, extremely dangerous, since it is only when\r\nthere is a tolerable unanimity respecting the rule of life, that a real\r\nmoral control can be established over the self-interest and passions of\r\nindividuals. Besides which, when every man is encouraged to believe\r\nhimself a competent judge of the most difficult social questions, he\r\ncannot be prevented from thinking himself competent also to the most\r\nimportant public duties, and the baneful competition for power and\r\nofficial functions spreads constantly downwards to a lower and lower\r\ngrade of intelligence. In M. Comte\u0027s opinion, the peculiarly complicated\r\nnature of sociological studies, and the great amount of previous\r\nknowledge and intellectual discipline requisite for them, together with\r\nthe serious consequences that may be produced by even, temporary errors\r\non such subjects, render it necessary in the case of ethics and\r\npolitics, still more than of mathematics and physics, that whatever\r\nlegal liberty may exist of questioning and discussing, the opinions of\r\nmankind should really be formed for them by an exceedingly small number\r\nof minds of the highest class, trained to the task by the most thorough\r\nand laborious mental preparation: and that the questioning of their\r\nconclusions by any one, not of an equivalent grade of intellect and\r\ninstruction, should be accounted equally presumptuous, and more\r\nblamable, than the attempts occasionally made by sciolists to refute the\r\nNewtonian astronomy. All this is, in a sense, true: but we confess our\r\nsympathy with those who feel towards it like the man in the story, who\r\nbeing asked whether he admitted that six and five make eleven, refused\r\nto give an answer until he knew what use was to be made of it. The\r\ndoctrine is one of a class of truths which, unless completed by other\r\ntruths, are so liable to perversion, that we may fairly decline to take\r\nnotice of them except in connexion with some definite application. In\r\njustice to M. Comte it should be said that he does not wish this\r\nintellectual dominion to be exercised over an ignorant people. Par from\r\nhim is the thought of promoting the allegiance of the mass to scientific\r\nauthority by withholding from them scientific knowledge. He holds it the\r\nduty of society to bestow on every one who grows up to manhood or\r\nwomanhood as complete a course of instruction in every department of\r\nscience, from mathematics to sociology, as can possibly be made general:\r\nand his ideas of what is possible in that respect are carried to a\r\nlength to which few are prepared to follow him. There is something\r\nstartling, though, when closely looked into, not Utopian or chimerical,\r\nin the amount of positive knowledge of the most varied kind which he\r\nbelieves may, by good methods of teaching, be made the common\r\ninheritance of all persons with ordinary faculties who are born into the\r\nworld: not the mere knowledge of results, to which, except for the\r\npractical arts, he attaches only secondary value, but knowledge also of\r\nthe mode in which those results were attained, and the evidence on which\r\nthey rest, so far as it can be known and understood by those who do not\r\ndevote their lives to its study.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have stated thus fully M. Comte\u0027s opinion on the most fundamental\r\ndoctrine of liberalism, because it is the clue to much of his general\r\nconception of politics. If his object had only been to exemplify by that\r\ndoctrine the purely negative character of the principal liberal and\r\nrevolutionary schools of thought, he need not have gone so far: it would\r\nhave been enough to say, that the mere liberty to hold and express any\r\ncreed, cannot itself \u003ci\u003ebe\u003c/i\u003e that creed. Every one is free to believe and\r\npublish that two and two make ten, but the important thing is to know\r\nthat they make four. M. Comte has no difficulty in making out an equally\r\nstrong case against the other principal tenets of what he calls the\r\nrevolutionary school; since all that they generally amount to is, that\r\nsomething ought not to be: which cannot possibly be the whole truth, and\r\nwhich M. Comte, in general, will not admit to be even part of it. Take\r\nfor instance the doctrine which denies to governments any initiative in\r\nsocial progress, restricting them to the function of preserving order,\r\nor in other words keeping the peace: an opinion which, so far as\r\ngrounded on so-called rights of the individual, he justly regards as\r\npurely metaphysical; but does not recognise that it is also widely held\r\nas an inference from the laws of human nature and human affairs, and\r\ntherefore, whether true or false, as a Positive doctrine. Believing with\r\nM. Comte that there are no absolute truths in the political art, nor\r\nindeed in any art whatever, we agree with him that the \u003ci\u003elaisser faire\u003c/i\u003e\r\ndoctrine, stated without large qualifications, is both unpractical and\r\nunscientific; but it does not follow that those who assert it are not,\r\nnineteen times out of twenty, practically nearer the truth than those\r\nwho deny it. The doctrine of Equality meets no better fate at M. Comte\u0027s\r\nhands. He regards it as the erection into an absolute dogma of a mere\r\nprotest against the inequalities which came down from the middle ages,\r\nand answer no legitimate end in modern society. He observes, that\r\nmankind in a normal state, having to act together, are necessarily, in\r\npractice, organized and classed with some reference to their unequal\r\naptitudes, natural or acquired, which demand that some should be under\r\nthe direction of others: scrupulous regard being at the same time had to\r\nthe fulfilment towards all, of \"the claims rightfully inherent in the\r\ndignity of a human being; the aggregate of which, still very\r\ninsufficiently appreciated, will constitute more and more the principle\r\nof universal morality as applied to daily use… a grand moral\r\nobligation, which has never been directly denied since the abolition of\r\nslavery\" (iv. 51). There is not a word to be said against these\r\ndoctrines: but the practical question is one which M. Comte never even\r\nentertains\u0026mdash;viz., when, after being properly educated, people are left\r\nto find their places for themselves, do they not spontaneously class\r\nthemselves in a manner much more conformable to their unequal or\r\ndissimilar aptitudes, than governments or social institutions are likely\r\nto do it for them? The Sovereignty of the People, again,\u0026mdash;that\r\nmetaphysical axiom which in France and the rest of the Continent has so\r\nlong been the theoretic basis of radical and democratic politics,\u0026mdash;he\r\nregards as of a purely negative character, signifying the right of the\r\npeople to rid themselves by insurrection of a social order that has\r\nbecome oppressive; but, when erected into a positive principle of\r\ngovernment, which condemns indefinitely all superiors to \"an arbitrary\r\ndependence upon the multitude of their inferiors,\" he considers it as a\r\nsort of \"transportation to peoples of the divine right so much\r\nreproached to kings\" (iv. 55, 56). On the doctrine as a metaphysical\r\ndogma or an absolute principle, this criticism is just; but there is\r\nalso a Positive doctrine, without any pretension to being absolute,\r\nwhich claims the direct participation of the governed in their own\r\ngovernment, not as a natural right, but as a means to important ends,\r\nunder the conditions and with the limitations which those ends impose.\r\nThe general result of M. Comte\u0027s criticism on the revolutionary\r\nphilosophy, is that he deems it not only incapable of aiding the\r\nnecessary reorganization of society, but a serious impediment thereto,\r\nby setting up, on all the great interests of mankind, the mere negation\r\nof authority, direction, or organization, as the most perfect state, and\r\nthe solution of all problems: the extreme point of this aberration being\r\nreached by Rousseau and his followers, when they extolled the savage\r\nstate, as an ideal from which civilization was only a degeneracy, more\r\nor less marked and complete.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe state of sociological speculation being such as has been\r\ndescribed\u0026mdash;divided between a feudal and theological school, now effete,\r\nand a democratic and metaphysical one, of no value except for the\r\ndestruction of the former; the problem, how to render the social science\r\npositive, must naturally have presented itself, more or less distinctly,\r\nto superior minds. M. Comte examines and criticises, for the most part\r\njustly, some of the principal efforts which have been made by individual\r\nthinkers for this purpose. But the weak side of his philosophy comes out\r\nprominently in his strictures on the only systematic attempt yet made by\r\nany body of thinkers, to constitute a science, not indeed of social\r\nphenomena generally, but of one great class or division of them. We\r\nmean, of course, political economy, which (with a reservation in favour\r\nof the speculations of Adam Smith as valuable preparatory studies for\r\nscience) he deems unscientific, unpositive, and a mere branch of\r\nmetaphysics, that comprehensive category of condemnation in which he\r\nplaces all attempts at positive science which are not in his opinion\r\ndirected by a right scientific method. Any one acquainted with the\r\nwritings of political economists need only read his few pages of\r\nanimadversions on them (iv. 193 to 205), to learn how extremely\r\nsuperficial M. Comte can sometimes be. He affirms that they have added\r\nnothing really new to the original \u003ci\u003eaper\u0026ccedil;us\u003c/i\u003e of Adam Smith; when every\r\none who has read them knows that they have added so much as to have\r\nchanged the whole aspect of the science, besides rectifying and clearing\r\nup in the most essential points the \u003ci\u003eaper\u0026ccedil;us\u003c/i\u003e themselves. He lays an\r\nalmost puerile stress, for the purpose of disparagement, on the\r\ndiscussions about the meaning of words which are found in the best books\r\non political economy, as if such discussions were not an indispensable\r\naccompaniment of the progress of thought, and abundant in the history of\r\nevery physical science. On the whole question he has but one remark of\r\nany value, and that he misapplies; namely, that the study of the\r\nconditions of national wealth as a detached subject is unphilosophical,\r\nbecause, all the different aspects of social phaenomena acting and\r\nreacting on one another, they cannot be rightly understood apart: which\r\nby no means proves that the material and industrial phaenomena of\r\nsociety are not, even by themselves, susceptible of useful\r\ngeneralizations, but only that these generalizations must necessarily be\r\nrelative to a given form of civilization and a given stage of social\r\nadvancement. This, we apprehend, is what no political economist would\r\ndeny. None of them pretend that the laws of wages, profits, values,\r\nprices, and the like, set down in their treatises, would be strictly\r\ntrue, or many of them true at all, in the savage state (for example), or\r\nin a community composed of masters and slaves. But they do think, with\r\ngood reason, that whoever understands the political economy of a country\r\nwith the complicated and manifold civilization of the nations of Europe,\r\ncan deduce without difficulty the political economy of any other state\r\nof society, with the particular circumstances of which he is equally\r\nwell acquainted.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_14_14\" id=\"FNanchor_14_14\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_14_14\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[14]\u003c/a\u003e We do not pretend that political economy has never\r\nbeen prosecuted or taught in a contracted spirit. As often as a study is\r\ncultivated by narrow minds, they will draw from it narrow conclusions.\r\nIf a political economist is deficient in general knowledge, he will\r\nexaggerate the importance and universality of the limited class of\r\ntruths which he knows. All kinds of scientific men are liable to this\r\nimputation, and M. Comte is never weary of urging it against them;\r\nreproaching them with their narrowness of mind, the petty scale of their\r\nthoughts, their incapacity for large views, and the stupidity of those\r\nthey occasionally attempt beyond the bounds of their own subjects.\r\nPolitical economists do not deserve these reproaches more than other\r\nclasses of positive inquirers, but less than most. The principal error\r\nof narrowness with which they are frequently chargeable, is that of\r\nregarding, not any economical doctrine, but their present experience of\r\nmankind, as of universal validity; mistaking temporary or local phases\r\nof human character for human nature itself; having no faith in the\r\nwonderful pliability of the human mind; deeming it impossible, in spite\r\nof the strongest evidence, that the earth can produce human beings of a\r\ndifferent type from that which is familiar to them in their own age, or\r\neven, perhaps, in their own country. The only security against this\r\nnarrowness is a liberal mental cultivation, and all it proves is that a\r\nperson is not likely to be a good political economist who is nothing\r\nelse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus far, we have had to do with M. Comte, as a sociologist, only in his\r\ncritical capacity. We have now to deal with him as a constructor\u0026mdash;the\r\nauthor of a sociological system. The first question is that of the\r\nMethod proper to the study. His view of this is highly instructive.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Method proper to the Science of Society must be, in substance, the\r\nsame as in all other sciences; the interrogation and interpretation of\r\nexperience, by the twofold process of Induction and Deduction. But its\r\nmode of practising these operations has features of peculiarity. In\r\ngeneral, Induction furnishes to science the laws of the elementary\r\nfacts, from which, when known, those of the complex combinations are\r\nthought out deductively: specific observation of complex phaenomena\r\nyields no general laws, or only empirical ones; its scientific function\r\nis to verify the laws obtained by deduction. This mode of philosophizing\r\nis not adequate to the exigencies of sociological investigation. In\r\nsocial phaemomena the elementary facts are feelings and actions, and the\r\nlaws of these are the laws of human nature, social facts being the\r\nresults of human acts and situations. Since, then, the phaenomena of man\r\nin society result from his nature as an individual being, it might be\r\nthought that the proper mode of constructing a positive Social Science\r\nmust be by deducing it from the general laws of human nature, using the\r\nfacts of history merely for verification. Such, accordingly, has been\r\nthe conception of social science by many of those who have endeavoured\r\nto render it positive, particularly by the school of Bentham. M. Comte\r\nconsiders this as an error. We may, he says, draw from the universal\r\nlaws of human nature some conclusions (though even these, we think,\r\nrather precarious) concerning the very earliest stages of human\r\nprogress, of which there are either no, or very imperfect, historical\r\nrecords. But as society proceeds in its development, its phaenomena are\r\ndetermined, more and more, not by the simple tendencies of universal\r\nhuman nature, but by the accumulated influence of past generations over\r\nthe present. The human beings themselves, on the laws of whose nature\r\nthe facts of history depend, are not abstract or universal but\r\nhistorical human beings, already shaped, and made what they are, by\r\nhuman society. This being the case, no powers of deduction could enable\r\nany one, starting from the mere conception of the Being Man, placed in a\r\nworld such as the earth may have been before the commencement of human\r\nagency, to predict and calculate the phaenomena of his development such\r\nas they have in fact proved. If the facts of history, empirically\r\nconsidered, had not given rise to any generalizations, a deductive study\r\nof history could never have reached higher than more or less plausible\r\nconjecture. By good fortune (for the case might easily have been\r\notherwise) the history of our species, looked at as a comprehensive\r\nwhole, does exhibit a determinate course, a certain order of\r\ndevelopment: though history alone cannot prove this to be a necessary\r\nlaw, as distinguished from a temporary accident. Here, therefore, begins\r\nthe office of Biology (or, as we should say, of Psychology) in the\r\nsocial science. The universal laws of human nature are part of the data\r\nof sociology, but in using them we must reverse the method of the\r\ndeductive physical sciences: for while, in these, specific experience\r\ncommonly serves to verify laws arrived at by deduction, in sociology it\r\nis specific experience which suggests the laws, and deduction which\r\nverifies them. If a sociological theory, collected from historical\r\nevidence, contradicts the established general laws of human nature; if\r\n(to use M. Comte\u0027s instances) it implies, in the mass of mankind, any\r\nvery decided natural bent, either in a good or in a bad direction; if it\r\nsupposes that the reason, in average human beings, predominates over the\r\ndesires, or the disinterested desires over the personal; we may know\r\nthat history has been misinterpreted, and that the theory is false. On\r\nthe other hand, if laws of social phaenomena, empirically generalized\r\nfrom history, can when once suggested be affiliated to the known laws of\r\nhuman nature; if the direction actually taken by the developments and\r\nchanges of human society, can be seen to be such as the properties of\r\nman and of his dwelling-place made antecedently probable, the empirical\r\ngeneralizations are raised into positive laws, and Sociology becomes a\r\nscience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMuch has been said and written for centuries past, by the practical or\r\nempirical school of politicians, in condemnation of theories founded on\r\nprinciples of human nature, without an historical basis; and the\r\ntheorists, in their turn, have successfully retaliated on the\r\npracticalists. But we know not any thinker who, before M. Comte, had\r\npenetrated to the philosophy of the matter, and placed the necessity of\r\nhistorical studies as the foundation of sociological speculation on the\r\ntrue footing. From this time any political thinker who fancies himself\r\nable to dispense with a connected view of the great facts of history, as\r\na chain of causes and effects, must be regarded as below the level of\r\nthe age; while the vulgar mode of using history, by looking in it for\r\nparallel cases, as if any cases were parallel, or as if a single\r\ninstance, or even many instances not compared and analysed, could reveal\r\na law, will be more than ever, and irrevocably, discredited.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe inversion of the ordinary relation between Deduction and Induction\r\nis not the only point in which, according to M. Comte, the Method proper\r\nto Sociology differs from that of the sciences of inorganic nature. The\r\ncommon order of science proceeds from the details to the whole. The\r\nmethod of Sociology should proceed from the whole to the details. There\r\nis no universal principle for the order of study, but that of proceeding\r\nfrom the known to the unknown; finding our way to the facts at whatever\r\npoint is most open to our observation. In the phaenomena of the social\r\nstate, the collective phaenomenon is more accessible to us than the\r\nparts of which it is composed. This is already, in a great degree, true\r\nof the mere animal body. It is essential to the idea of an organism, and\r\nit is even more true of the social organism than of the individual. The\r\nstate of every part of the social whole at any time, is intimately\r\nconnected with the contemporaneous state of all the others. Religious\r\nbelief, philosophy, science, the fine arts, the industrial arts,\r\ncommerce, navigation, government, all are in close mutual dependence on\r\none another, insomuch that when any considerable change takes place in\r\none, we may know that a parallel change in all the others has preceded\r\nor will follow it. The progress of society from one general state to\r\nanother is not an aggregate of partial changes, but the product of a\r\nsingle impulse, acting through all the partial agencies, and can\r\ntherefore be most easily traced by studying them together. Could it even\r\nbe detected in them separately, its true nature could not be understood\r\nexcept by examining them in the \u003ci\u003eensemble\u003c/i\u003e. In constructing, therefore,\r\na theory of society, all the different aspects of the social\r\norganization must be taken into consideration at once.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur space is not consistent with inquiring into all the limitations of\r\nthis doctrine. It requires many of which M. Comte\u0027s theory takes no\r\naccount. There is one, in particular, dependent on a scientific artifice\r\nfamiliar to students of science, especially of the applications of\r\nmathematics to the study of nature. When an effect depends on several\r\nvariable conditions, some of which change less, or more slowly, than\r\nothers, we are often able to determine, either by reasoning or by\r\nexperiment, what would be the law of variation of the effect if its\r\nchanges depended only on some of the conditions, the remainder being\r\nsupposed constant. The law so found will be sufficiently near the truth\r\nfor all times and places in which the latter set of conditions do not\r\nvary greatly, and will be a basis to set out from when it becomes\r\nnecessary to allow for the variations of those conditions also. Most of\r\nthe conclusions of social science applicable to practical use are of\r\nthis description. M. Comte\u0027s system makes no room for them. We have seen\r\nhow he deals with the part of them which are the most scientific in\r\ncharacter, the generalizations of political economy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is one more point in the general philosophy of sociology requiring\r\nnotice. Social phaenomena, like all others, present two aspects, the\r\nstatical, and the dynamical; the phaenomena of equilibrium, and those of\r\nmotion. The statical aspect is that of the laws of social existence,\r\nconsidered abstractedly from progress, and confined to what is common to\r\nthe progressive and the stationary state. The dynamical aspect is that\r\nof social progress. The statics of society is the study of the\r\nconditions of existence and permanence of the social state. The dynamics\r\nstudies the laws of its evolution. The first is the theory of the\r\n\u003ci\u003econsensus,\u003c/i\u003e or interdependence of social phaenomena. The second is the\r\ntheory of their filiation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first division M. Comte, in his great work, treats in a much more\r\nsummary manner than the second; and it forms, to our thinking, the\r\nweakest part of the treatise. He can hardly have seemed even to himself\r\nto have originated, in the statics of society, anything new,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_15_15\" id=\"FNanchor_15_15\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_15_15\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[15]\u003c/a\u003e unless\r\nhis revival of the Catholic idea of a Spiritual Power may be so\r\nconsidered. The remainder, with the exception of detached thoughts, in\r\nwhich even his feeblest productions are always rich, is trite, while in\r\nour judgment far from being always true.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHe begins by a statement of the general properties of human nature which\r\nmake social existence possible. Man has a spontaneous propensity to the\r\nsociety of his fellow-beings, and seeks it instinctively, for its own\r\nsake, and not out of regard to the advantages it procures for him,\r\nwhich, in many conditions of humanity, must appear to him very\r\nproblematical. Man has also a certain, though moderate, amount of\r\nnatural benevolence. On the other hand, these social propensities are by\r\nnature weaker than his selfish ones; and the social state, being mainly\r\nkept in existence through the former, involves an habitual antagonism\r\nbetween the two. Further, our wants of all kinds, from the purely\r\norganic upwards, can only be satisfied by means of labour, nor does\r\nbodily labour suffice, without the guidance of intelligence. But labour,\r\nespecially when prolonged and monotonous, is naturally hateful, and\r\nmental labour the most irksome of all; and hence a second antagonism,\r\nwhich must exist in all societies whatever. The character of the society\r\nis principally determined by the degree in which the better incentive,\r\nin each of these cases, makes head against the worse. In both the\r\npoints, human nature is capable of great amelioration. The social\r\ninstincts may approximate much nearer to the strength of the personal\r\nones, though never entirely coming up to it; the aversion to labour in\r\ngeneral, and to intellectual labour in particular, may be much weakened,\r\nand the predominance of the inclinations over the reason greatly\r\ndiminished, though never completely destroyed. The spirit of improvement\r\nresults from the increasing strength of the social instincts, combined\r\nwith the growth of an intellectual activity, which guiding the personal\r\npropensities, inspires each individual with a deliberate desire to\r\nimprove his condition. The personal instincts left to their own\r\nguidance, and the indolence and apathy natural to mankind, are the\r\nsources which mainly feed the spirit of Conservation. The struggle\r\nbetween the two spirits is an universal incident of the social state.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe next of the universal elements in human society is family life;\r\nwhich M. Comte regards as originally the sole, and always the principal,\r\nsource of the social feelings, and the only school open to mankind in\r\ngeneral, in which unselfishness can be learnt, and the feelings and\r\nconduct demanded by social relations be made habitual. M. Comte takes\r\nthis opportunity of declaring his opinions on the proper constitution of\r\nthe family, and in particular of the marriage institution. They are of\r\nthe most orthodox and conservative sort. M. Comte adheres not only to\r\nthe popular Christian, but to the Catholic view of marriage in its\r\nutmost strictness, and rebukes Protestant nations for having tampered\r\nwith the indissolubility of the engagement, by permitting divorce. He\r\nadmits that the marriage institution has been, in various respects,\r\nbeneficially modified with the advance of society, and that we may not\r\nyet have reached the last of these modifications; but strenuously\r\nmaintains that such changes cannot possibly affect what he regards as\r\nthe essential principles of the institution\u0026mdash;the irrevocability of the\r\nengagement, and the complete subordination of the wife to the husband,\r\nand of women generally to men; which are precisely the great vulnerable\r\npoints of the existing constitution of society on this important\r\nsubject. It is unpleasant to have to say it of a philosopher, but the\r\nincidents of his life which have been made public by his biographers\r\nafford an explanation of one of these two opinions: he had quarrelled\r\nwith his wife.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_16_16\" id=\"FNanchor_16_16\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_16_16\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[16]\u003c/a\u003e At a later period, under the influence of\r\ncircumstances equally personal, his opinions and feelings respecting\r\nwomen were very much modified, without becoming more rational: in his\r\nfinal scheme of society, instead of being treated as grown children,\r\nthey were exalted into goddesses: honours, privileges, and immunities,\r\nwere lavished on them, only not simple justice. On the other question,\r\nthe irrevocability of marriage, M. Comte must receive credit for\r\nimpartiality, since the opposite doctrine would have better suited his\r\npersonal convenience: but we can give him no other credit, for his\r\nargument is not only futile but refutes itself. He says that with\r\nliberty of divorce, life would be spent in a constant succession of\r\nexperiments and failures; and in the same breath congratulates himself\r\non the fact, that modern manners and sentiments have in the main\r\nprevented the baneful effects which the toleration of divorce in\r\nProtestant countries might have been expected to produce. He did not\r\nperceive that if modern habits and feelings have successfully resisted\r\nwhat he deems the tendency of a less rigorous marriage law, it must be\r\nbecause modern habits and feelings are inconsistent with the perpetual\r\nseries of new trials which he dreaded. If there are tendencies in human\r\nnature which seek change and variety, there are others which demand\r\nfixity, in matters which touch the daily sources of happiness; and one\r\nwho had studied history as much as M. Comte, ought to have known that\r\never since the nomad mode of life was exchanged for the agricultural,\r\nthe latter tendencies have been always gaining ground on the former. All\r\nexperience testifies that regularity in domestic relations is almost in\r\ndirect proportion to industrial civilization. Idle life, and military\r\nlife with its long intervals of idleness, are the conditions to which,\r\neither sexual profligacy, or prolonged vagaries of imagination on that\r\nsubject, are congenial. Busy men have no time for them, and have too\r\nmuch other occupation for their thoughts: they require that home should\r\nbe a place of rest, not of incessantly renewed excitement and\r\ndisturbance. In the condition, therefore, into which modern society has\r\npassed, there is no probability that marriages would often be contracted\r\nwithout a sincere desire on both sides that they should be permanent.\r\nThat this has been the case hitherto in countries where divorce was\r\npermitted, we have on M. Comte\u0027s own showing: and everything leads us to\r\nbelieve that the power, if granted elsewhere, would in general be used\r\nonly for its legitimate purpose\u0026mdash;for enabling those who, by a blameless\r\nor excusable mistake, have lost their first throw for domestic\r\nhappiness, to free themselves (with due regard for all interests\r\nconcerned) from the burthensome yoke, and try, under more favourable\r\nauspices, another chance. Any further discussion of these great social\r\nquestions would evidently be incompatible with the nature and limits of\r\nthe present paper.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLastly, a phaenomenon universal in all societies, and constantly\r\nassuming a wider extension as they advance in their progress, is the\r\nco-operation of mankind one with another, by the division of employments\r\nand interchange of commodities and services; a communion which extends\r\nto nations as well as individuals. The economic importance of this\r\nspontaneous organization of mankind as joint workers with and for one\r\nanother, has often been illustrated. Its moral effects, in connecting\r\nthem by their interests, and as a more remote consequence, by their\r\nsympathies, are equally salutary. But there are some things to be said\r\non the other side. The increasing specialisation of all employments; the\r\ndivision of mankind into innumerable small fractions, each engrossed by\r\nan extremely minute fragment of the business of society, is not without\r\ninconveniences, as well moral as intellectual, which, if they could not\r\nbe remedied, would be a serious abatement from the benefits of advanced\r\ncivilization. The interests of the whole\u0026mdash;the bearings of things on the\r\nends of the social union\u0026mdash;are less and less present to the minds of men\r\nwho have so contracted a sphere of activity. The insignificant detail\r\nwhich forms their whole occupation\u0026mdash;the infinitely minute wheel they\r\nhelp to turn in the machinery of society\u0026mdash;does not arouse or gratify any\r\nfeeling of public spirit, or unity with their fellow-men. Their work is\r\na mere tribute to physical necessity, not the glad performance of a\r\nsocial office. This lowering effect of the extreme division of labour\r\ntells most of all on those who are set up as the lights and teachers of\r\nthe rest. A man\u0027s mind is as fatally narrowed, and his feelings towards\r\nthe great ends of humanity as miserably stunted, by giving all his\r\nthoughts to the classification of a few insects or the resolution of a\r\nfew equations, as to sharpening the points or putting on the heads of\r\npins. The \"dispersive speciality\" of the present race of scientific men,\r\nwho, unlike their predecessors, have a positive aversion to enlarged\r\nviews, and seldom either know or care for any of the interests of\r\nmankind beyond the narrow limits of their pursuit, is dwelt on by M.\r\nComte as one of the great and growing evils of the time, and the one\r\nwhich most retards moral and intellectual regeneration. To contend\r\nagainst it is one of the main purposes towards which he thinks the\r\nforces of society should be directed. The obvious remedy is a large and\r\nliberal general education, preparatory to all special pursuits: and this\r\nis M. Comte\u0027s opinion: but the education of youth is not in his\r\nestimation enough: he requires an agency set apart for obtruding upon\r\nall classes of persons through the whole of life, the paramount claims\r\nof the general interest, and the comprehensive ideas that demonstrate\r\nthe mode in which human actions promote or impair it. In other words, he\r\ndemands a moral and intellectual authority, charged with the duty of\r\nguiding men\u0027s opinions and enlightening and warning their consciences; a\r\nSpiritual Power, whose judgments on all matters of high moment should\r\ndeserve, and receive, the same universal respect and deference which is\r\npaid to the united judgment of astronomers in matters astronomical. The\r\nvery idea of such an authority implies that an unanimity has been\r\nattained, at least in essentials, among moral and political thinkers,\r\ncorresponding or approaching to that which already exists in the other\r\nsciences. There cannot be this unanimity, until the true methods of\r\npositive science have been applied to all subjects, as completely as\r\nthey have been applied to the study of physical science: to this,\r\nhowever, there is no real obstacle; and when once it is accomplished,\r\nthe same degree of accordance will naturally follow. The undisputed\r\nauthority which astronomers possess in astronomy, will be possessed on\r\nthe great social questions by Positive Philosophers; to whom will belong\r\nthe spiritual government of society, subject to two conditions: that\r\nthey be entirely independent, within their own sphere, of the temporal\r\ngovernment, and that they be peremptorily excluded from all share in it,\r\nreceiving instead the entire conduct of education.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is the leading feature in M. Comte\u0027s conception of a regenerated\r\nsociety; and however much this ideal differs from that which is implied\r\nmore or less confusedly in the negative philosophy of the last three\r\ncenturies, we hold the amount of truth in the two to be about the same.\r\nM. Comte has got hold of half the truth, and the so-called liberal or\r\nrevolutionary school possesses the other half; each sees what the other\r\ndoes not see, and seeing it exclusively, draws consequences from it\r\nwhich to the other appear mischievously absurd. It is, without doubt,\r\nthe necessary condition of mankind to receive most of their opinions on\r\nthe authority of those who have specially studied the matters to which\r\nthey relate. The wisest can act on no other rule, on subjects with which\r\nthey are not themselves thoroughly conversant; and the mass of mankind\r\nhave always done the like on all the great subjects of thought and\r\nconduct, acting with implicit confidence on opinions of which they did\r\nnot know, and were often incapable of understanding, the grounds, but on\r\nwhich as long as their natural guides were unanimous they fully relied,\r\ngrowing uncertain and sceptical only when these became divided, and\r\nteachers who as far as they could judge were equally competent,\r\nprofessed contradictory opinions. Any doctrines which come recommended\r\nby the nearly universal verdict of instructed minds will no doubt\r\ncontinue to be, as they have hitherto been, accepted without misgiving\r\nby the rest. The difference is, that with the wide diffusion of\r\nscientific education among the whole people, demanded by M. Comte, their\r\nfaith, however implicit, would not be that of ignorance: it would not be\r\nthe blind submission of dunces to men of knowledge, but the intelligent\r\ndeference of those who know much, to those who know still more. It is\r\nthose who have some knowledge of astronomy, not those who have none at\r\nall, who best appreciate how prodigiously more Lagrange or Laplace knew\r\nthan themselves. This is what can be said in favour of M. Comte. On the\r\ncontrary side it is to be said, that in order that this salutary\r\nascendancy over opinion should be exercised by the most eminent\r\nthinkers, it is not necessary that they should be associated and\r\norganized. The ascendancy will come of itself when the unanimity is\r\nattained, without which it is neither desirable nor possible. It is\r\nbecause astronomers agree in their teaching that astronomy is trusted,\r\nand not because there is an Academy of Sciences or a Royal Society\r\nissuing decrees or passing resolutions. A constituted moral authority\r\ncan only be required when the object is not merely to promulgate and\r\ndiffuse principles of conduct, but to direct the detail of their\r\napplication; to declare and inculcate, not duties, but each person\u0027s\r\nduty, as was attempted by the spiritual authority of the middle ages.\r\nFrom this extreme application of his principle M. Comte does not shrink.\r\nA function of this sort, no doubt, may often be very usefully discharged\r\nby individual members of the speculative class; but if entrusted to any\r\norganized body, would involve nothing less than a spiritual despotism.\r\nThis however is what M. Comte really contemplated, though it would\r\npractically nullify that peremptory separation of the spiritual from the\r\ntemporal power, which he justly deemed essential to a wholesome state of\r\nsociety. Those whom an irresistible public opinion invested with the\r\nright to dictate or control the acts of rulers, though without the means\r\nof backing their advice by force, would have all the real power of the\r\ntemporal authorities, without their labours or their responsibilities.\r\nM. Comte would probably have answered that the temporal rulers, having\r\nthe whole legal power in their hands, would certainly not pay to the\r\nspiritual authority more than a very limited obedience: which amounts to\r\nsaying that the ideal form of society which he sets up, is only fit to\r\nbe an ideal because it cannot possibly be realized.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat education should be practically directed by the philosophic class,\r\nwhen there is a philosophic class who have made good their claim to the\r\nplace in opinion hitherto filled by the clergy, would be natural and\r\nindispensable. But that all education should be in the hands of a\r\ncentralized authority, whether composed of clergy or of philosophers,\r\nand be consequently all framed on the same model, and directed to the\r\nperpetuation of the same type, is a state of things which instead of\r\nbecoming more acceptable, will assuredly be more repugnant to mankind,\r\nwith every step of their progress in the unfettered exercise of their\r\nhighest faculties. We shall see, in the Second Part, the evils with\r\nwhich the conception of the new Spiritual Power is pregnant, coming out\r\ninto full bloom in the more complete development which M. Comte gave to\r\nthe idea in his later years.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAfter this unsatisfactory attempt to trace the outline of Social\r\nStatics, M. Comte passes to a topic on which he is much more at\r\nhome\u0026mdash;the subject of his most eminent speculations; Social Dynamics, or\r\nthe laws of the evolution of human society.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTwo questions meet us at the outset: Is there a natural evolution in\r\nhuman affairs? and is that evolution an improvement? M. Comte resolves\r\nthem both in the affirmative by the same answer. The natural progress of\r\nsociety consists in the growth of our human attributes, comparatively to\r\nour animal and our purely organic ones: the progress of our humanity\r\ntowards an ascendancy over our animality, ever more nearly approached\r\nthough incapable of being completely realized. This is the character and\r\ntendency of human development, or of what is called civilization; and\r\nthe obligation of seconding this movement\u0026mdash;of working in the direction\r\nof it\u0026mdash;is the nearest approach which M. Comte makes in this treatise to\r\na general principle or standard of morality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut as our more eminent, and peculiarly human, faculties are of various\r\norders, moral, intellectual, and aesthetic, the question presents\r\nitself, is there any one of these whose development is the predominant\r\nagency in the evolution of our species? According to M. Comte, the main\r\nagent in the progress of mankind is their intellectual development.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNot because the intellectual is the most powerful part of our nature,\r\nfor, limited to its inherent strength, it is one of the weakest: but\r\nbecause it is the guiding part, and acts not with its own strength\r\nalone, but with the united force of all parts of our nature which it can\r\ndraw after it. In a social state the feelings and propensities cannot\r\nact with their full power, in a determinate direction, unless the\r\nspeculative intellect places itself at their head. The passions are, in\r\nthe individual man, a more energetic power than a mere intellectual\r\nconviction; but the passions tend to divide, not to unite, mankind: it\r\nis only by a common belief that passions are brought to work together,\r\nand become a collective force instead of forces neutralizing one\r\nanother. Our intelligence is first awakened by the stimulus of our\r\nanimal wants and of our stronger and coarser desires; and these for a\r\nlong time almost exclusively determine the direction in which our\r\nintelligence shall work: but once roused to activity, it assumes more\r\nand more the management of the operations of which stronger impulses are\r\nthe prompters, and constrains them to follow its lead, not by its own\r\nstrength, but because in the play of antagonistic forces, the path it\r\npoints out is (in scientific phraseology) the direction of least\r\nresistance. Personal interests and feelings, in the social state, can\r\nonly obtain the maximum of satisfaction by means of co-operation, and\r\nthe necessary condition of co-operation is a common belief. All human\r\nsociety, consequently, is grounded on a system of fundamental opinions,\r\nwhich only the speculative faculty can provide, and which when provided,\r\ndirects our other impulses in their mode of seeking their gratification.\r\nAnd hence the history of opinions, and of the speculative faculty, has\r\nalways been the leading element in the history of mankind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis doctrine has been combated by Mr Herbert Spencer, in the pamphlet\r\nalready referred to; and we will quote, in his own words, the theory he\r\npropounds in opposition to it:\u0026mdash;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockquot\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"Ideas do not govern and overthrow the world; the world is governed\r\nor overthrown by feelings, to which ideas serve only as guides. The\r\nsocial mechanism does not rest finally upon opinions, but almost\r\nwholly upon character. Not intellectual anarchy, but moral\r\nantagonism, is the cause of political crises. All social phaenomena\r\nare produced by the totality of human emotions and beliefs, of\r\nwhich the emotions are mainly predetermined, while the beliefs are\r\nmainly post-determined. Men\u0027s desires are chiefly inherited; but\r\ntheir beliefs are chiefly acquired, and depend on surrounding\r\nconditions; and the most important surrounding conditions depend on\r\nthe social state which the prevalent desires have produced. The\r\nsocial state at any time existing, is the resultant of all the\r\nambitions, self-interests, fears, reverences, indignations,\r\nsympathies, \u0026amp;c., of ancestral citizens and existing citizens. The\r\nideas current in this social state must, on the average, lie\r\ncongruous with the feelings of citizens, and therefore, on the\r\naverage, with the social state these feelings have produced. Ideas\r\nwholly foreign to this social state cannot be evolved, and if\r\nintroduced from without, cannot get accepted\u0026mdash;or, if accepted, die\r\nout when the temporary phase of feeling which caused their\r\nacceptance ends. Hence, though advanced ideas, when once\r\nestablished, act upon society and aid its further advance, yet the\r\nestablishment of such ideas depends on the fitness of society for\r\nreceiving them. Practically, the popular character and the social\r\nstate determine what ideas shall be current; instead of the current\r\nideas determining the social state and the character. The\r\nmodification of men\u0027s moral natures, caused by the continuous\r\ndiscipline of social life, which adapts them more and more to\r\nsocial relations, is therefore the chief proximate cause of social\r\nprogress.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_17_17\" id=\"FNanchor_17_17\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_17_17\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[17]\u003c/a\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA great part of these statements would have been acknowledged as true by\r\nM. Comte, and belong as much to his theory as to Mr Spencer\u0027s. The\r\nre-action of all other mental and social elements upon the intellectual\r\nnot only is fully recognized by him, but his philosophy of history makes\r\ngreat use of it, pointing out that the principal intellectual changes\r\ncould not have taken place unless changes in other elements of society\r\nhad preceded; but also showing that these were themselves consequences\r\nof prior intellectual changes. It will not be found, on a fair\r\nexamination of what M. Comte has written, that he has overlooked any of\r\nthe truth that there is in Mr Spencer\u0027s theory. He would not indeed have\r\nsaid (what Mr Spencer apparently wishes us to say) that the effects\r\nwhich can be historically traced, for example to religion, were not\r\nproduced by the belief in God, but by reverence and fear of him. He\r\nwould have said that the reverence and fear presuppose the belief: that\r\na God must be believed in before he can be feared or reverenced. The\r\nwhole influence of the belief in a God upon society and civilization,\r\ndepends on the powerful human sentiments which are ready to attach\r\nthemselves to the belief; and yet the sentiments are only a social force\r\nat all, through the definite direction given to them by that or some\r\nother intellectual conviction; nor did the sentiments spontaneously\r\nthrow up the belief in a God, since in themselves they were equally\r\ncapable of gathering round some other object. Though it is true that\r\nmen\u0027s passions and interests often dictate their opinions, or rather\r\ndecide their choice among the two or three forms of opinion, which the\r\nexisting condition of human intelligence renders possible, this\r\ndisturbing cause is confined to morals, politics, and religion; and it\r\nis the intellectual movement in other regions than these, which is at\r\nthe root of all the great changes in human affairs. It was not human\r\nemotions and passions which discovered the motion of the earth, or\r\ndetected the evidence of its antiquity; which exploded Scholasticism,\r\nand inaugurated the exploration of nature; which invented printing,\r\npaper, and the mariner\u0027s compass. Yet the Reformation, the English and\r\nFrench revolutions, and still greater moral and social changes yet to\r\ncome, are direct consequences of these and similar discoveries. Even\r\nalchemy and astrology were not believed because people thirsted for gold\r\nand were anxious to pry into the future, for these desires are as strong\r\nnow as they were then: but because alchemy and astrology were\r\nconceptions natural to a particular stage in the growth of human\r\nknowledge, and consequently determined during that stage the particular\r\nmeans whereby the passions which always exist, sought their\r\ngratification. To say that men\u0027s intellectual beliefs do not determine\r\ntheir conduct, is like saying that the ship is moved by the steam and\r\nnot by the steersman. The steam indeed is the motive power; the\r\nsteersman, left to himself, could not advance the vessel a single inch;\r\nyet it is the steersman\u0027s will and the steersman\u0027s knowledge which\r\ndecide in what direction it shall move and whither it shall go.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eExamining next what is the natural order of intellectual progress among\r\nmankind, M. Comte observes, that as their general mode of conceiving the\r\nuniverse must give its character to all their conceptions of detail, the\r\ndetermining fact in their intellectual history must be the natural\r\nsuccession of theories of the universe; which, it has been seen,\r\nconsists of three stages, the theological, the metaphysical, and the\r\npositive. The passage of mankind through these stages, including the\r\nsuccessive modifications of the theological conception by the rising\r\ninfluence of the other two, is, to M. Comte\u0027s mind, the most decisive\r\nfact in the evolution of humanity. Simultaneously, however, there has\r\nbeen going on throughout history a parallel movement in the purely\r\ntemporal department of things, consisting of the gradual decline of the\r\nmilitary mode of life (originally the chief occupation of all freemen)\r\nand its replacement by the industrial. M. Comte maintains that there is\r\na necessary connexion and interdependence between this historical\r\nsequence and the other: and he easily shows that the progress of\r\nindustry and that of positive science are correlative; man\u0027s power to\r\nmodify the facts of nature evidently depending on the knowledge he has\r\nacquired of their laws. We do not think him equally successful in\r\nshowing a natural connexion between the theological mode of thought and\r\nthe military system of society: but since they both belong to the same\r\nage of the world\u0026mdash;since each is, in itself, natural and inevitable, and\r\nthey are together modified and together undermined by the same cause,\r\nthe progress of science and industry, M. Comte is justified in\r\nconsidering them as linked together, and the movement by which mankind\r\nemerge from them as a single evolution.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese propositions having been laid down as the first principles of\r\nsocial dynamics, M. Comte proceeds to verify and apply them by a\r\nconnected view of universal history. This survey nearly fills two large\r\nvolumes, above a third of the work, in all of which there is scarcely a\r\nsentence that does not add an idea. We regard it as by far his greatest\r\nachievement, except his review of the sciences, and in some respects\r\nmore striking even than that. We wish it were practicable in the compass\r\nof an essay like the present, to give even a faint conception of the\r\nextraordinary merits of this historical analysis. It must be read to be\r\nappreciated. Whoever disbelieves that the philosophy of history can be\r\nmade a science, should suspend his judgment until he has read these\r\nvolumes of M. Comte. We do not affirm that they would certainly change\r\nhis opinion; but we would strongly advise him to give them a chance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe shall not attempt the vain task of abridgment, a few words are all we\r\ncan give to the subject. M. Comte confines himself to the main stream of\r\nhuman progress, looking only at the races and nations that led the van,\r\nand regarding as the successors of a people not their actual\r\ndescendants, but those who took up the thread of progress after them.\r\nHis object is to characterize truly, though generally, the successive\r\nstates of society through which the advanced guard of our species has\r\npassed, and the filiation of these states on one another\u0026mdash;how each grew\r\nout of the preceding and was the parent of the following state. A more\r\ndetailed explanation, taking into account minute differences and more\r\nspecial and local phaenomena, M. Comte does not aim at, though he does\r\nnot avoid it when it falls in his path. Here, as in all his other\r\nspeculations, we meet occasional misjudgments, and his historical\r\ncorrectness in minor matters is now and then at fault; but we may well\r\nwonder that it is not oftener so, considering the vastness of the field,\r\nand a passage in one of his prefaces in which he says of himself that he\r\n\u003ci\u003erapidly\u003c/i\u003e amassed the materials for his great enterprise (vi. 34). This\r\nexpression in his mouth does not imply what it would in that of the\r\nmajority of men, regard being had to his rare capacity of prolonged and\r\nconcentrated mental labour: and it is wonderful that he so seldom gives\r\ncause to wish that his collection of materials had been less \"rapid.\"\r\nBut (as he himself remarks) in an inquiry of this sort the vulgarest\r\nfacts are the most important. A movement common to all mankind\u0026mdash;to all\r\nof them at least who do move\u0026mdash;must depend on causes affecting them all;\r\nand these, from the scale on which they operate, cannot require abstruse\r\nresearch to bring them to light: they are not only seen, but best seen,\r\nin the most obvious, most universal, and most undisputed phaenomena.\r\nAccordingly M. Comte lays no claim to new views respecting the mere\r\nfacts of history; he takes them as he finds them, builds almost\r\nexclusively on those concerning which there is no dispute, and only\r\ntries what positive results can be obtained by combining them. Among the\r\nvast mass of historical observations which he has grouped and\r\nco-ordinated, if we have found any errors they are in things which do\r\nnot affect his main conclusions. The chain of causation by which he\r\nconnects the spiritual and temporal life of each era with one another\r\nand with the entire series, will be found, we think, in all essentials,\r\nirrefragable. When local or temporary disturbing causes have to be taken\r\ninto the account as modifying the general movement, criticism has more\r\nto say. But this will only become important when the attempt is made to\r\nwrite the history or delineate the character of some given society on M.\r\nComte\u0027s principles.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch doubtful statements, or misappreciations of states of society, as\r\nwe have remarked, are confined to cases which stand more or less apart\r\nfrom the principal line of development of the progressive societies. For\r\ninstance, he makes greatly too much of what, with many other Continental\r\nthinkers, he calls the Theocratic state. He regards this as a natural,\r\nand at one time almost an universal, stage of social progress, though\r\nadmitting that it either never existed or speedily ceased in the two\r\nancient nations to which mankind are chiefly indebted for being\r\npermanently progressive. We hold it doubtful if there ever existed what\r\nM. Comte means by a theocracy. There was indeed no lack of societies in\r\nwhich, the civil and penal law being supposed to have been divinely\r\nrevealed, the priests were its authorized interpreters. But this is the\r\ncase even in Mussulman countries, the extreme opposite of theocracy. By\r\na theocracy we understand to be meant, and we understand M. Comte to\r\nmean, a society founded on caste, and in which the speculative,\r\nnecessarily identical with the priestly caste, has the temporal\r\ngovernment in its hands or under its control. We believe that no such\r\nstate of things ever existed in the societies commonly cited as\r\ntheocratic. There is no reason to think that in any of them, the king,\r\nor chief of the government, was ever, unless by occasional usurpation, a\r\nmember of the priestly caste.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_18_18\" id=\"FNanchor_18_18\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_18_18\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[18]\u003c/a\u003e It was not so in Israel, even in the\r\ntime of the Judges; Jephtha, for example, was a Gileadite, of the tribe\r\nof Manasseh, and a military captain, as all governors in such an age and\r\ncountry needed to be. Priestly rulers only present themselves in two\r\nanomalous cases, of which next to nothing is known: the Mikados of Japan\r\nand the Grand Lamas of Thibet: in neither of which instances was the\r\ngeneral constitution of society one of caste, and in the latter of them\r\nthe priestly sovereignty is as nominal as it has become in the former.\r\nIndia is the typical specimen of the institution of caste\u0026mdash;the only case\r\nin which we are certain that it ever really existed, for its existence\r\nanywhere else is a matter of more or less probable inference in the\r\nremote past. But in India, where the importance of the sacerdotal order\r\nwas greater than in any other recorded state of society, the king not\r\nonly was not a priest, but, consistently with the religious law, could\r\nnot be one: he belonged to a different caste. The Brahmins were invested\r\nwith an exalted character of sanctity, and an enormous amount of civil\r\nprivileges; the king was enjoined to have a council of Brahmin advisers;\r\nbut practically he took their advice or disregarded it exactly as he\r\npleased. As is observed by the historian who first threw the light of\r\nreason on Hindoo society,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_19_19\" id=\"FNanchor_19_19\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_19_19\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[19]\u003c/a\u003e the king, though in dignity, to judge by\r\nthe written code, he seemed vastly inferior to the Brahmins, had always\r\nthe full power of a despotic monarch: the reason being that he had the\r\ncommand of the army, and the control of the public revenue. There is no\r\ncase known to authentic history in which either of these belonged to the\r\nsacerdotal caste. Even in the cases most favourable to them, the\r\npriesthood had no voice in temporal affairs, except the \"consultative\"\r\nvoice which M. Comte\u0027s theory allows to every spiritual power. His\r\ncollection of materials must have been unusually \"rapid\" in this\r\ninstance, for he regards almost all the societies of antiquity, except\r\nthe Greek and Roman, as theocratic, even Gaul under the Druids, and\r\nPersia under Darius; admitting, however, that in these two countries,\r\nwhen they emerge into the light of history, the theocracy had already\r\nbeen much broken down by military usurpation. By what evidence he could\r\nhave proved that it ever existed, we confess ourselves unable to divine.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe only other imperfection worth noticing here, which we find in M.\r\nComte\u0027s view of history, is that he has a very insufficient\r\nunderstanding of the peculiar phaenomena of English development; though\r\nhe recognizes, and on the whole correctly estimates, its exceptional\r\ncharacter in relation to the general European movement. His failure\r\nconsists chiefly in want of appreciation of Protestantism; which, like\r\nalmost all thinkers, even unbelievers, who have lived and thought\r\nexclusively in a Catholic atmosphere, he sees and knows only on its\r\nnegative side, regarding the Reformation as a mere destructive movement,\r\nstopped short in too early a stage. He does not seem to be aware that\r\nProtestantism has any positive influences, other than the general ones\r\nof Christianity; and misses one of the most important facts connected\r\nwith it, its remarkable efficacy, as contrasted with Catholicism, in\r\ncultivating the intelligence and conscience of the individual believer.\r\nProtestantism, when not merely professed but actually taken into the\r\nmind, makes a demand on the intelligence; the mind is expected to be\r\nactive, not passive, in the reception of it. The feeling of a direct\r\nresponsibility of the individual immediately to God, is almost wholly a\r\ncreation of Protestantism. Even when Protestants were nearly as\r\npersecuting as Catholics (quite as much so they never were); even when\r\nthey held as firmly as Catholics that salvation depended on having the\r\ntrue belief, they still maintained that the belief was not to be\r\naccepted from a priest, but to be sought and found by the believer, at\r\nhis eternal peril if he failed; and that no one could answer to God for\r\nhim, but that he had to answer for himself. The avoidance of fatal error\r\nthus became in a great measure a question of culture; and there was the\r\nstrongest inducement to every believer, however humble, to seek culture\r\nand to profit by it. In those Protestant countries, accordingly, whose\r\nChurches were not, as the Church of England always was, principally\r\npolitical institutions\u0026mdash;in Scotland, for instance, and the New England\r\nStates\u0026mdash;an amount of education was carried down to the poorest of the\r\npeople, of which there is no other example; every peasant expounded the\r\nBible to his family (many to their neighbours), and had a mind practised\r\nin meditation and discussion on all the points of his religious creed.\r\nThe food may not have been the most nourishing, but we cannot be blind\r\nto the sharpening and strengthening exercise which such great topics\r\ngave to the understanding\u0026mdash;the discipline in abstraction and reasoning\r\nwhich such mental occupation brought down to the humblest layman, and\r\none of the consequences of which was the privilege long enjoyed by\r\nScotland of supplying the greater part of Europe with professors for its\r\nuniversities, and educated and skilled workmen for its practical arts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis, however, notwithstanding its importance, is, in a comprehensive\r\nview of universal history, only a matter of detail. We find no\r\nfundamental errors in M. Comte\u0027s general conception of history. He is\r\nsingularly exempt from most of the twists and exaggerations which we are\r\nused to find in almost all thinkers who meddle with speculations of this\r\ncharacter. Scarcely any of them is so free (for example) from the\r\nopposite errors of ascribing too much or too little influence to\r\naccident, and to the qualities of individuals. The vulgar mistake of\r\nsupposing that the course of history has no tendencies of its own, and\r\nthat great events usually proceed from small causes, or that kings, or\r\nconquerors, or the founders of philosophies and religions, can do with\r\nsociety what they please, no one has more completely avoided or more\r\ntellingly exposed. But he is equally free from the error of those who\r\nascribe all to general causes, and imagine that neither casual\r\ncircumstances, nor governments by their acts, nor individuals of genius\r\nby their thoughts, materially accelerate or retard human progress. This\r\nis the mistake which pervades the instructive writings of the thinker\r\nwho in England and in our own times bore the nearest, though a very\r\nremote, resemblance to M. Comte\u0026mdash;the lamented Mr Buckle; who, had he not\r\nbeen unhappily cut off in an early stage of his labours, and before the\r\ncomplete maturity of his powers, would probably have thrown off an\r\nerror, the more to be regretted as it gives a colour to the prejudice\r\nwhich regards the doctrine of the invariability of natural laws as\r\nidentical with fatalism. Mr Buckle also fell into another mistake which\r\nM. Comte avoided, that of regarding the intellectual as the only\r\nprogressive element in man, and the moral as too much the same at all\r\ntimes to affect even the annual average of crime. M. Comte shows, on the\r\ncontrary, a most acute sense of the causes which elevate or lower the\r\ngeneral level of moral excellence; and deems intellectual progress in no\r\nother way so beneficial as by creating a standard to guide the moral\r\nsentiments of mankind, and a mode of bringing those sentiments\r\neffectively to bear on conduct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eM. Comte is equally free from the error of considering any practical\r\nrule or doctrine that can be laid down in politics as universal and\r\nabsolute. All political truth he deems strictly relative, implying as\r\nits correlative a given state or situation of society. This conviction\r\nis now common to him with all thinkers who are on a level with the age,\r\nand comes so naturally to any intelligent reader of history, that the\r\nonly wonder is how men could have been prevented from reaching it\r\nsooner. It marks one of the principal differences between the political\r\nphilosophy of the present time and that of the past; but M. Comte\r\nadopted it when the opposite mode of thinking was still general, and\r\nthere are few thinkers to whom the principle owes more in the way of\r\ncomment and illustration.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgain, while he sets forth the historical succession of systems of\r\nbelief and forms of political society, and places in the strongest light\r\nthose imperfections in each which make it impossible that any of them\r\nshould be final, this does not make him for a moment unjust to the men\r\nor the opinions of the past. He accords with generous recognition the\r\ngratitude due to all who, with whatever imperfections of doctrine or\r\neven of conduct, contributed materially to the work of human\r\nimprovement. In all past modes of thought and forms of society he\r\nacknowledged a useful, in many a necessary, office, in carrying mankind\r\nthrough one stage of improvement into a higher. The theological spirit\r\nin its successive forms, the metaphysical in its principal varieties,\r\nare honoured by him for the services they rendered in bringing mankind\r\nout of pristine savagery into a state in which more advanced modes of\r\nbelief became possible. His list of heroes and benefactors of mankind\r\nincludes, not only every important name in the scientific movement, from\r\nThales of Miletus to Fourier the mathematician and Blainville the\r\nbiologist, and in the aesthetic from Homer to Manzoni, but the most\r\nillustrious names in the annals of the various religions and\r\nphilosophies, and the really great politicians in all states of\r\nsociety.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_20_20\" id=\"FNanchor_20_20\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_20_20\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[20]\u003c/a\u003e Above all, he has the most profound admiration for the\r\nservices rendered by Christianity, and by the Church of the middle ages.\r\nHis estimate of the Catholic period is such as the majority of\r\nEnglishmen (from whom we take the liberty to differ) would deem\r\nexaggerated, if not absurd. The great men of Christianity, from St Paul\r\nto St Francis of Assisi, receive his warmest homage: nor does he forget\r\nthe greatness even of those who lived and thought in the centuries in\r\nwhich the Catholic Church, having stopt short while the world had gone\r\non, had become a hindrance to progress instead of a promoter of it; such\r\nmen as F\u0026eacute;n\u0026eacute;lon and St Vincent de Paul, Bossuet and Joseph de Maistre. A\r\nmore comprehensive, and, in the primitive sense of the term, more\r\ncatholic, sympathy and reverence towards real worth, and every kind of\r\nservice to humanity, we have not met with in any thinker. Men who would\r\nhave torn each other in pieces, who even tried to do so, if each\r\nusefully served in his own way the interests of mankind, are all\r\nhallowed to him.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNeither is his a cramped and contracted notion of human excellence,\r\nwhich cares only for certain forms of development. He not only\r\npersonally appreciates, but rates high in moral value, the creations of\r\npoets and artists in all departments, deeming them, by their mixed\r\nappeal to the sentiments and the understanding, admirably fitted to\r\neducate the feelings of abstract thinkers, and enlarge the intellectual\r\nhorizon of people of the world.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_21_21\" id=\"FNanchor_21_21\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_21_21\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[21]\u003c/a\u003e He regards the law of progress as\r\napplicable, in spite of appearances, to poetry and art as much as to\r\nscience and politics. The common impression to the contrary he ascribes\r\nsolely to the fact, that the perfection of aesthetic creation requires\r\nas its condition a consentaneousness in the feelings of mankind, which\r\ndepends for its existence on a fixed and settled state of opinions:\r\nwhile the last five centuries have been a period not of settling, but of\r\nunsettling and decomposing, the most general beliefs and sentiments of\r\nmankind. The numerous monuments of poetic and artistic genius which the\r\nmodern mind has produced even under this great disadvantage, are (he\r\nmaintains) sufficient proof what great productions it will be capable\r\nof, when one harmonious vein of sentiment shall once more thrill through\r\nthe whole of society, as in the days of Homer, of Aeschylus, of Phidias,\r\nand even of Dante.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAfter so profound and comprehensive a view of the progress of human\r\nsociety in the past, of which the future can only be a prolongation, it\r\nis natural to ask, to what use does he put this survey as a basis of\r\npractical recommendations? Such recommendations he certainly makes,\r\nthough, in the present Treatise, they are of a much less definite\r\ncharacter than in his later writings. But we miss a necessary link;\r\nthere is a break in the otherwise close concatenation of his\r\nspeculations. We fail to see any scientific connexion between his\r\ntheoretical explanation of the past progress of society, and his\r\nproposals for future improvement. The proposals are not, as we might\r\nexpect, recommended as that towards which human society has been tending\r\nand working through the whole of history. It is thus that thinkers have\r\nusually proceeded, who formed theories for the future, grounded on\r\nhistorical analysis of the past. Tocqueville, for example, and others,\r\nfinding, as they thought, through all history, a steady progress in the\r\ndirection of social and political equality, argued that to smooth this\r\ntransition, and make the best of what is certainly coming, is the proper\r\nemployment of political foresight. We do not find M. Comte supporting\r\nhis recommendations by a similar line of argument. They rest as\r\ncompletely, each on its separate reasons of supposed utility, as with\r\nphilosophers who, like Bentham, theorize on politics without any\r\nhistorical basis at all. The only bridge of connexion which leads from\r\nhis historical speculations to his practical conclusions, is the\r\ninference, that since the old powers of society, both in the region of\r\nthought and of action, are declining and destined to disappear, leaving\r\nonly the two rising powers, positive thinkers on the one hand, leaders\r\nof industry on the other, the future necessarily belongs to these:\r\nspiritual power to the former, temporal to the latter. As a specimen of\r\nhistorical forecast this is very deficient; for are there not the masses\r\nas well as the leaders of industry? and is not theirs also a growing\r\npower? Be this as it may, M. Comte\u0027s conceptions of the mode in which\r\nthese growing powers should be organized and used, are grounded on\r\nanything rather than on history. And we cannot but remark a singular\r\nanomaly in a thinker of M. Comte\u0027s calibre. After the ample evidence he\r\nhas brought forward of the slow growth of the sciences, all of which\r\nexcept the mathematico-astronomical couple are still, as he justly\r\nthinks, in a very early stage, it yet appears as if, to his mind, the\r\nmere institution of a positive science of sociology were tantamount to\r\nits completion; as if all the diversities of opinion on the subject,\r\nwhich set mankind at variance, were solely owing to its having been\r\nstudied in the theological or the metaphysical manner, and as if when\r\nthe positive method which has raised up real sciences on other subjects\r\nof knowledge, is similarly employed on this, divergence would at once\r\ncease, and the entire body of positive social inquirers would exhibit as\r\nmuch agreement in their doctrines as those who cultivate any of the\r\nsciences of inorganic life. Happy would be the prospects of mankind if\r\nthis were so. A time such as M. Comte reckoned upon may come; unless\r\nsomething stops the progress of human improvement, it is sure to come:\r\nbut after an unknown duration of hard thought and violent controversy.\r\nThe period of decomposition, which has lasted, on his own computation,\r\nfrom the beginning of the fourteenth century to the present, is not yet\r\nterminated: the shell of the old edifice will remain standing until\r\nthere is another ready to replace it; and the new synthesis is barely\r\nbegun, nor is even the preparatory analysis completely finished. On\r\nother occasions M. Comte is very well aware that the Method of a science\r\nis not the science itself, and that when the difficulty of discovering\r\nthe right processes has been overcome, there remains a still greater\r\ndifficulty, that of applying them. This, which is true of all sciences,\r\nis truest of all in Sociology. The facts being more complicated, and\r\ndepending on a greater concurrence of forces, than in any other science,\r\nthe difficulty of treating them deductively is proportionally increased,\r\nwhile the wide difference between any one case and every other in some\r\nof the circumstances which affect the result, makes the pretence of\r\ndirect induction usually no better than empiricism. It is therefore, out\r\nof all proportion, more uncertain than in any other science, whether two\r\ninquirers equally competent and equally disinterested will take the same\r\nview of the evidence, or arrive at the same conclusion. When to this\r\nintrinsic difficulty is added the infinitely greater extent to which\r\npersonal or class interests and predilections interfere with impartial\r\njudgment, the hope of such accordance of opinion among sociological\r\ninquirers as would obtain, in mere deference to their authority, the\r\nuniversal assent which M. Comte\u0027s scheme of society requires, must be\r\nadjourned to an indefinite distance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eM. Comte\u0027s own theory is an apt illustration of these difficulties,\r\nsince, though prepared for these speculations as no one had ever been\r\nprepared before, his views of social regeneration even in the\r\nrudimentary form in which they appear above-ground in this treatise (not\r\nto speak of the singular system into which he afterwards enlarged them)\r\nare such as perhaps no other person of equal knowledge and capacity\r\nwould agree in. Were those views as true as they are questionable, they\r\ncould not take effect until the unanimity among positive thinkers, to\r\nwhich he looked forward, shall have been attained; since the mainspring\r\nof his system is a Spiritual Power composed of positive philosophers,\r\nwhich only the previous attainment of the unanimity in question could\r\ncall into existence. A few words will sufficiently express the outline\r\nof his scheme. A corporation of philosophers, receiving a modest support\r\nfrom the state, surrounded by reverence, but peremptorily excluded not\r\nonly from all political power or employment, but from all riches, and\r\nall occupations except their own, are to have the entire direction of\r\neducation: together with, not only the right and duty of advising and\r\nreproving all persons respecting both their public and their private\r\nlife, but also a control (whether authoritative or only moral is not\r\ndefined) over the speculative class itself, to prevent them from wasting\r\ntime and ingenuity on inquiries and speculations of no value to mankind\r\n(among which he includes many now in high estimation), and compel them\r\nto employ all their powers on the investigations which may be judged, at\r\nthe time, to be the most urgently important to the general welfare. The\r\ntemporal government which is to coexist with this spiritual authority,\r\nconsists of an aristocracy of capitalists, whose dignity and authority\r\nare to be in the ratio of the degree of generality of their conceptions\r\nand operations\u0026mdash;bankers at the summit, merchants next, then\r\nmanufacturers, and agriculturists at the bottom of the scale. No\r\nrepresentative system, or other popular organization, by way of\r\ncounterpoise to this governing power, is ever contemplated. The checks\r\nrelied upon for preventing its abuse, are the counsels and remonstrances\r\nof the Spiritual Power, and unlimited liberty of discussion and comment\r\nby all classes of inferiors. Of the mode in which either set of\r\nauthorities should fulfil the office assigned to it, little is said in\r\nthis treatise: but the general idea is, while regulating as little as\r\npossible by law, to make the pressure of opinion, directed by the\r\nSpiritual Power, so heavy on every individual, from the humblest to the\r\nmost powerful, as to render legal obligation, in as many cases as\r\npossible, needless. Liberty and spontaneity on the part of individuals\r\nform no part of the scheme. M. Comte looks on them with as great\r\njealousy as any scholastic pedagogue, or ecclesiastical director of\r\nconsciences. Every particular of conduct, public or private, is to be\r\nopen to the public eye, and to be kept, by the power of opinion, in the\r\ncourse which the Spiritual corporation shall judge to be the most right.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is not a sufficiently tempting picture to have much chance of\r\nmaking converts rapidly, and the objections to the scheme are too\r\nobvious to need stating. Indeed, it is only thoughtful persons to whom\r\nit will be credible, that speculations leading to this result can\r\ndeserve the attention necessary for understanding them. We propose in\r\nthe next Essay to examine them as part of the elaborate and coherent\r\nsystem of doctrine, which M. Comte afterwards put together for the\r\nreconstruction of society. Meanwhile the reader will gather, from what\r\nhas been said, that M. Comte has not, in our opinion, created Sociology.\r\nExcept his analysis of history, to which there is much to be added, but\r\nwhich we do not think likely to be ever, in its general features,\r\nsuperseded, he has done nothing in Sociology which does not require to\r\nbe done over again, and better. Nevertheless, he has greatly advanced\r\nthe study. Besides the great stores of thought, of various and often of\r\neminent merit, with which he has enriched the subject, his conception of\r\nits method is so much truer and more profound than that of any one who\r\npreceded him, as to constitute an era in its cultivation. If it cannot\r\nbe said of him that he has created a science, it may be said truly that\r\nhe has, for the first time, made the creation possible. This is a great\r\nachievement, and, with the extraordinary merit of his historical\r\nanalysis, and of his philosophy of the physical sciences, is enough to\r\nimmortalize his name. But his renown with posterity would probably have\r\nbeen greater than it is now likely to be, if after showing the way in\r\nwhich the social science should be formed, he had not flattered himself\r\nthat he had formed it, and that it was already sufficiently solid for\r\nattempting to build upon its foundation the entire fabric of the\r\nPolitical Art.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\u0027width: 45%;\u0027 /\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003ePART II.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003eTHE LATER SPECULATIONS OF M. COMTE.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_22_22\" id=\"FNanchor_22_22\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_22_22\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[22]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe appended list of publications contain the materials for knowing and\r\nestimating what M. Comte termed his second career, in which the\r\n\u003ci\u003esavant\u003c/i\u003e, historian, and philosopher of his fundamental treatise, came\r\nforth transfigured as the High Priest of the Religion of Humanity. They\r\ninclude all his writings except the Cours de Philosophic Positive: for\r\nhis early productions, and the occasional publications of his later life,\r\nare reprinted as Preludes or Appendices to the treatises here enumerated,\r\nor in Dr Robinet\u0027s volume, which, as well as that of M. Littr\u0026eacute;,\r\nalso contains copious extracts from his correspondence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the concluding pages of his great systematic work, M. Comte had\r\nannounced four other treatises as in contemplation: on Politics; on the\r\nPhilosophy of Mathematics; on Education, a project subsequently enlarged\r\nto include the systematization of Morals; and on Industry, or the action\r\nof man upon external nature. Our list comprises the only two of these\r\nwhich he lived to execute. It further contains a brief exposition of his\r\nfinal doctrines, in the form of a Dialogue, or, as he terms it, a\r\nCatechism, of which a translation has been published by his principal\r\nEnglish adherent, Mr Congreve. There has also appeared very recently,\r\nunder the title of \"A General View of Positivism,\" a translation by Dr\r\nBridges, of the Preliminary Discourse in six chapters, prefixed to the\r\nSyst\u0026egrave;me de Politique Positive. The remaining three books on our list are\r\nthe productions of disciples in different degrees. M. Littr\u0026eacute;, the only\r\nthinker of established reputation who accepts that character, is a\r\ndisciple only of the Cours de Philosophie Positive, and can see the weak\r\npoints even in that. Some of them he has discriminated and discussed\r\nwith great judgment: and the merits of his volume, both as a sketch of\r\nM. Comte\u0027s life and an appreciation of his doctrines, would well deserve\r\na fuller notice than we are able to give it here. M. de Bligni\u0026egrave;res is a\r\nfar more thorough adherent; so much so, that the reader of his\r\nsingularly well and attractively written condensation and popularization\r\nof his master\u0027s doctrines, does not easily discover in what it falls\r\nshort of that unqualified acceptance which alone, it would seem, could\r\nfind favour with M. Comte. For he ended by casting off M. de Bligni\u0026egrave;res,\r\nas he had previously cast off M. Littr\u0026eacute;, and every other person who,\r\nhaving gone with him a certain length, refused to follow him to the end.\r\nThe author of the last work in our enumeration, Dr Robinet, is a\r\ndisciple after M. Comte\u0027s own heart; one whom no difficulty stops, and\r\nno absurdity startles. But it is far from our disposition to speak\r\notherwise than respectfully of Dr Robinet and the other earnest men, who\r\nmaintain round the tomb of their master an organized co-operation for\r\nthe diffusion of doctrines which they believe destined to regenerate the\r\nhuman race. Their enthusiastic veneration for him, and devotion to the\r\nends he pursued, do honour alike to them and to their teacher, and are\r\nan evidence of the personal ascendancy he exercised over those who\r\napproached him; an ascendancy which for a time carried away even M.\r\nLittr\u0026eacute;, as he confesses, to a length which his calmer judgment does not\r\nnow approve.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese various writings raise many points of interest regarding M.\r\nComte\u0027s personal history, and some, not without philosophic bearings,\r\nrespecting his mental habits: from all which matters we shall abstain,\r\nwith the exception of two, which he himself proclaimed with great\r\nemphasis, and a knowledge of which is almost indispensable to an\r\napprehension of the characteristic difference between his second career\r\nand his first. It should be known that during his later life, and even\r\nbefore completing his first great treatise, M. Comte adopted a rule, to\r\nwhich he very rarely made any exception: to abstain systematically, not\r\nonly from newspapers or periodical publications, even scientific, but\r\nfrom all reading whatever, except a few favourite poets in the ancient\r\nand modern European languages. This abstinence he practised for the sake\r\nof mental health; by way, as he said, of \"\u003ci\u003ehygi\u0026egrave;ne c\u0026eacute;r\u0026eacute;brale\u003c/i\u003e.\" We are\r\nfar from thinking that the practice has nothing whatever to recommend\r\nit. For most thinkers, doubtless, it would be a very unwise one; but we\r\nwill not affirm that it may not sometimes be advantageous to a mind of\r\nthe peculiar quality of M. Comte\u0027s\u0026mdash;one that can usefully devote itself\r\nto following out to the remotest developments a particular line of\r\nmeditations, of so arduous a kind that the complete concentration of the\r\nintellect upon its own thoughts is almost a necessary condition of\r\nsuccess. When a mind of this character has laboriously and\r\nconscientiously laid in beforehand, as M. Comte had done, an ample stock\r\nof materials, he may be justified in thinking that he will contribute\r\nmost to the mental wealth of mankind by occupying himself solely in\r\nworking upon these, without distracting his attention by continually\r\ntaking in more matter, or keeping a communication open with other\r\nindependent intellects. The practice, therefore, may be legitimate; but\r\nno one should adopt it without being aware of what he loses by it. He\r\nmust resign the pretension of arriving at the whole truth on the\r\nsubject, whatever it be, of his meditations. That he should effect this,\r\neven on a narrow subject, by the mere force of his own mind, building on\r\nthe foundations of his predecessors, without aid or correction from his\r\ncontemporaries, is simply impossible. He may do eminent service by\r\nelaborating certain sides of the truth, but he must expect to find that\r\nthere are other sides which have wholly escaped his attention. However\r\ngreat his powers, everything that he can do without the aid of incessant\r\nremindings from other thinkers, is merely provisional, and will require\r\na thorough revision. He ought to be aware of this, and accept it with\r\nhis eyes open, regarding himself as a pioneer, not a constructor. If he\r\nthinks that he can contribute most towards the elements of the final\r\nsynthesis by following out his own original thoughts as far as they will\r\ngo, leaving to other thinkers, or to himself at a subsequent time, the\r\nbusiness of adjusting them to the thoughts by which they ought to be\r\naccompanied, he is right in doing so. But he deludes himself if he\r\nimagines that any conclusions he can arrive at, while he practises M.\r\nComte\u0027s rule of \u003ci\u003ehygi\u0026egrave;ne c\u0026eacute;r\u0026eacute;brale\u003c/i\u003e, can possibly be definitive.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNeither is such a practice, in a hygienic point of view, free from the\r\ngravest dangers to the philosopher\u0027s own mind. When once he has\r\npersuaded himself that he can work out the final truth on any subject,\r\nexclusively from his own sources, he is apt to lose all measure or\r\nstandard by which to be apprized when he is departing from common sense.\r\nLiving only with his own thoughts, he gradually forgets the aspect they\r\npresent to minds of a different mould from his own; he looks at his\r\nconclusions only from the point of view which suggested them, and from\r\nwhich they naturally appear perfect; and every consideration which from\r\nother points of view might present itself, either as an objection or as\r\na necessary modification, is to him as if it did not exist. When his\r\nmerits come to be recognised and appreciated, and especially if he\r\nobtains disciples, the intellectual infirmity soon becomes complicated\r\nwith a moral one. The natural result of the position is a gigantic\r\nself-confidence, not to say self-conceit. That of M. Comte is colossal.\r\nExcept here and there in an entirely self-taught thinker, who has no\r\nhigh standard with which to compare himself, we have met with nothing\r\napproaching to it. As his thoughts grew more extravagant, his\r\nself-confidence grew more outrageous. The height it ultimately attained\r\nmust be seen, in his writings, to be believed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe other circumstance of a personal nature which it is impossible not\r\nto notice, because M. Comte is perpetually referring to it as the origin\r\nof the great superiority which he ascribes to his later as compared with\r\nhis earlier speculations, is the \"moral regeneration\" which he underwent\r\nfrom \"une ang\u0026eacute;lique influence\" and \"une incomparable passion priv\u0026eacute;e.\" He\r\nformed a passionate attachment to a lady whom he describes as uniting\r\neverything which is morally with much that is intellectually admirable,\r\nand his relation to whom, besides the direct influence of her character\r\nupon his own, gave him an insight into the true sources of human\r\nhappiness, which changed his whole conception of life. This attachment,\r\nwhich always remained pure, gave him but one year of passionate\r\nenjoyment, the lady having been cut off by death at the end of that\r\nshort period; but the adoration of her memory survived, and became, as\r\nwe shall see, the type of his conception of the sympathetic culture\r\nproper for all human beings. The change thus effected in his personal\r\ncharacter and sentiments, manifested itself at once in his speculations;\r\nwhich, from having been only a philosophy, now aspired to become a\r\nreligion; and from having been as purely, and almost rudely, scientific\r\nand intellectual, as was compatible with a character always enthusiastic\r\nin its admirations and in its ardour for improvement, became from this\r\ntime what, for want of a better name, may be called sentimental; but\r\nsentimental in a way of its own, very curious to contemplate. In\r\nconsidering the system of religion, politics, and morals, which in his\r\nlater writings M. Comte constructed, it is not unimportant to bear in\r\nmind the nature of the personal experience and inspiration to which he\r\nhimself constantly attributed this phasis of his philosophy. But as we\r\nshall have much more to say against, than in favour of, the conclusions\r\nto which he was in this manner conducted, it is right to declare that,\r\nfrom the evidence of his writings, we really believe the moral influence\r\nof Madame Clotilde de Vaux upon his character to have been of the\r\nennobling as well as softening character which he ascribes to it. Making\r\nallowance for the effects of his exuberant growth in self-conceit, we\r\nperceive almost as much improvement in his feelings, as deterioration in\r\nhis speculations, compared with those of the Philosophie Positive. Even\r\nthe speculations are, in some secondary aspects, improved through the\r\nbeneficial effect of the improved feelings; and might have been more so,\r\nif, by a rare good fortune, the object of his attachment had been\r\nqualified to exercise as improving an influence over him intellectually\r\nas morally, and if he could have been contented with something less\r\nambitious than being the supreme moral legislator and religious pontiff\r\nof the human race.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen we say that M. Comte has erected his philosophy into a religion,\r\nthe word religion must not be understood in its ordinary sense. He made\r\nno change in the purely negative attitude which he maintained towards\r\ntheology: his religion is without a God. In saying this, we have done\r\nenough to induce nine-tenths of all readers, at least in our own\r\ncountry, to avert their faces and close their ears. To have no religion,\r\nthough scandalous enough, is an idea they are partly used to: but to\r\nhave no God, and to talk of religion, is to their feelings at once an\r\nabsurdity and an impiety. Of the remaining tenth, a great proportion,\r\nperhaps, will turn away from anything which calls itself by the name of\r\nreligion at all. Between the two, it is difficult to find an audience\r\nwho can be induced to listen to M. Comte without an insurmountable\r\nprejudice. But, to be just to any opinion, it ought to be considered,\r\nnot exclusively from an opponent\u0027s point of view, but from that of the\r\nmind which propounds it. Though conscious of being in an extremely small\r\nminority, we venture to think that a religion may exist without belief\r\nin a God, and that a religion without a God may be, even to Christians,\r\nan instructive and profitable object of contemplation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat, in truth, are the conditions necessary to constitute a religion?\r\nThere must be a creed, or conviction, claiming authority over the whole\r\nof human life; a belief, or set of beliefs, deliberately adopted,\r\nrespecting human destiny and duty, to which the believer inwardly\r\nacknowledges that all his actions ought to be subordinate. Moreover,\r\nthere must be a sentiment connected with this creed, or capable of being\r\ninvoked by it, sufficiently powerful to give it in fact, the authority\r\nover human conduct to which it lays claim in theory. It is a great\r\nadvantage (though not absolutely indispensable) that this sentiment\r\nshould crystallize, as it were, round a concrete object; if possible a\r\nreally existing one, though, in all the more important cases, only\r\nideally present. Such an object Theism and Christianity offer to the\r\nbeliever: but the condition may be fulfilled, if not in a manner\r\nstrictly equivalent, by another object. It has been said that whoever\r\nbelieves in \"the Infinite nature of Duty,\" even if he believe in nothing\r\nelse, is religious. M. Comte believes in what is meant by the infinite\r\nnature of duty, but ho refers the obligations of duty, as well as all\r\nsentiments of devotion, to a concrete object, at once ideal and real;\r\nthe Human Race, conceived as a continuous whole, including the past, the\r\npresent, and the future. This great collective existence, this \"Grand\r\nEtre,\" as he terms it, though the feelings it can excite are necessarily\r\nvery different from those which direct themselves towards an ideally\r\nperfect Being, has, as he forcibly urges, this advantage in respect to\r\nus, that it really needs our services, which Omnipotence cannot, in any\r\ngenuine sense of the term, be supposed to do: and M. Comte says, that\r\nassuming the existence of a Supreme Providence (which he is as far from\r\ndenying as from affirming), the best, and even the only, way in which we\r\ncan rightly worship or serve Him, is by doing our utmost to love and\r\nserve that other Great Being, whose inferior Providence has bestowed on\r\nus all the benefits that we owe to the labours and virtues of former\r\ngenerations. It may not be consonant to usage to call this a religion;\r\nbut the term so applied has a meaning, and one which is not adequately\r\nexpressed by any other word. Candid persons of all creeds may be willing\r\nto admit, that if a person has an ideal object, his attachment and sense\r\nof duty towards which are able to control and discipline all his other\r\nsentiments and propensities, and prescribe to him a rule of life, that\r\nperson has a religion: and though everyone naturally prefers his own\r\nreligion to any other, all must admit that if the object of this\r\nattachment, and of this feeling of duty, is the aggregate of our\r\nfellow-creatures, this Religion of the Infidel cannot, in honesty and\r\nconscience, be called an intrinsically bad one. Many, indeed, may be\r\nunable to believe that this object is capable of gathering round it\r\nfeelings sufficiently strong: but this is exactly the point on which a\r\ndoubt can hardly remain in an intelligent reader of M. Comte: and we\r\njoin with him in contemning, as equally irrational and mean, the\r\nconception of human nature as incapable of giving its love and devoting\r\nits existence to any object which cannot afford in exchange an eternity\r\nof personal enjoyment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe power which may be acquired over the mind by the idea of the general\r\ninterest of the human race, both as a source of emotion and as a motive\r\nto conduct, many have perceived; but we know not if any one, before M.\r\nComte, realized so fully as he has done, all the majesty of which that\r\nidea is susceptible. It ascends into the unknown recesses of the past,\r\nembraces the manifold present, and descends into the indefinite and\r\nunforeseeable future, forming a collective Existence without assignable\r\nbeginning or end, it appeals to that feeling of the Infinite, which is\r\ndeeply rooted in human nature, and which seems necessary to the\r\nimposingness of all our highest conceptions. Of the vast unrolling web\r\nof human life, the part best known to us is irrevocably past; this we\r\ncan no longer serve, but can still love: it comprises for most of us the\r\nfar greater number of those who have loved us, or from whom we have\r\nreceived benefits, as well as the long series of those who, by their\r\nlabours and sacrifices for mankind, have deserved to be held in\r\neverlasting and grateful remembrance. As M. Comte truly says, the\r\nhighest minds, even now, live in thought with the great dead, far more\r\nthan with the living; and, next to the dead, with those ideal human\r\nbeings yet to come, whom they are never destined to see. If we honour as\r\nwe ought those who have served mankind in the past, we shall feel that\r\nwe are also working for those benefactors by serving that to which their\r\nlives were devoted. And when reflection, guided by history, has taught\r\nus the intimacy of the connexion of every age of humanity with every\r\nother, making us see in the earthly destiny of mankind the playing out\r\nof a great drama, or the action of a prolonged epic, all the generations\r\nof mankind become indissolubly united into a single image, combining all\r\nthe power over the mind of the idea of Posterity, with our best feelings\r\ntowards the living world which surrounds us, and towards the\r\npredecessors who have made us what we are. That the ennobling power of\r\nthis grand conception may have its full efficacy, we should, with M.\r\nComte, regard the Grand Etre, Humanity, or Mankind, as composed, in the\r\npast, solely of those who, in every age and variety of position, have\r\nplayed their part worthily in life. It is only as thus restricted that\r\nthe aggregate of our species becomes an object deserving our veneration.\r\nThe unworthy members of it are best dismissed from our habitual\r\nthoughts; and the imperfections which adhered through life, even to\r\nthose of the dead who deserve honourable remembrance, should be no\r\nfurther borne in mind than is necessary not to falsify our conception of\r\nfacts. On the other hand, the Grand Etre in its completeness ought to\r\ninclude not only all whom we venerate, but all sentient beings to which\r\nwe owe duties, and which have a claim on our attachment. M. Comte,\r\ntherefore, incorporates into the ideal object whose service is to be the\r\nlaw of our life, not our own species exclusively, but, in a subordinate\r\ndegree, our humble auxiliaries, those animal races which enter into real\r\nsociety with man, which attach themselves to him, and voluntarily\r\nco-operate with him, like the noble dog who gives his life for his human\r\nfriend and benefactor. For this M. Comte has been subjected to unworthy\r\nridicule, but there is nothing truer or more honourable to him in the\r\nwhole body of his doctrines. The strong sense he always shows of the\r\nworth of the inferior animals, and of the duties of mankind towards\r\nthem, is one of the very finest traits of his character.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe, therefore, not only hold that M. Comte was justified in the attempt\r\nto develope his philosophy into a religion, and had realized the\r\nessential conditions of one, but that all other religions are made\r\nbetter in proportion as, in their practical result, they are brought to\r\ncoincide with that which he aimed at constructing. But, unhappily, the\r\nnext thing we are obliged to do, is to charge him with making a complete\r\nmistake at the very outset of his operations\u0026mdash;with fundamentally\r\nmisconceiving the proper office of a rule of life. He committed the\r\nerror which is often, but falsely, charged against the whole class of\r\nutilitarian moralists; he required that the test of conduct should also\r\nbe the exclusive motive to it. Because the good of the human race is the\r\nultimate standard of right and wrong, and because moral discipline\r\nconsists in cultivating the utmost possible repugnance to all conduct\r\ninjurious to the general good, M. Comte infers that the good of others\r\nis the only inducement on which we should allow ourselves to act; and\r\nthat we should endeavour to starve the whole of the desires which point\r\nto our personal satisfaction, by denying them all gratification not\r\nstrictly required by physical necessities. The golden rule of morality,\r\nin M. Comte\u0027s religion, is to live for others, \"vivre pour autrui.\" To\r\ndo as we would be done by, and to love our neighbour as ourself, are not\r\nsufficient for him: they partake, he thinks, of the nature of personal\r\ncalculations. We should endeavour not to love ourselves at all. We shall\r\nnot succeed in it, but we should make the nearest approach to it\r\npossible. Nothing less will satisfy him, as towards humanity, than the\r\nsentiment which one of his favourite writers, Thomas \u0026agrave; Kempis, addresses\r\nto God: Amem te plus quam me, nec me nisi propter te. All education and\r\nall moral discipline should have but one object, to make altruism (a\r\nword of his own coming) predominate over egoism. If by this were only\r\nmeant that egoism is bound, and should be taught, always to give way to\r\nthe well-understood interests of enlarged altruism, no one who\r\nacknowledges any morality at all would object to the proposition. But M.\r\nComte, taking his stand on the biological fact that organs are\r\nstrengthened by exercise and atrophied by disuse, and firmly convinced\r\nthat each of our elementary inclinations has its distinct cerebral\r\norgan, thinks it the grand duty of life not only to strengthen the\r\nsocial affections by constant habit and by referring all our actions to\r\nthem, but, as far as possible, to deaden the personal passions and\r\npropensities by desuetude. Even the exercise of the intellect is\r\nrequired to obey as an authoritative rule the dominion of the social\r\nfeelings over the intelligence (du coeur sur l\u0027esprit). The physical and\r\nother personal instincts are to be mortified far beyond the demands of\r\nbodily health, which indeed the morality of the future is not to insist\r\nmuch upon, for fear of encouraging \"les calculs personnels.\" M. Comte\r\ncondemns only such austerities as, by diminishing the vigour of the\r\nconstitution, make us less capable of being useful to others. Any\r\nindulgence, even in food, not necessary to health and strength, he\r\ncondemns as immoral. All gratifications except those of the affections,\r\nare to be tolerated only as \"inevitable infirmities.\" Novalis said of\r\nSpinoza that he was a God-intoxicated man: M. Comte is a\r\nmorality-intoxicated man. Every question with him is one of morality,\r\nand no motive but that of morality is permitted.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe explanation of this we find in an original mental twist, very common\r\nin French thinkers, and by which M. Comte was distinguished beyond them\r\nall. He could not dispense with what he called \"unity.\" It was for the\r\nsake of Unity that a religion was, in his eyes, desirable. Not in the\r\nmere sense of Unanimity, but in a far wider one. A religion must be\r\nsomething by which to \"systematize\" human life. His definition of it, in\r\nthe \"Cat\u0026eacute;chisme,\" is \"the state of complete unity which distinguishes\r\nour existence, at once personal and social, when all its parts, both\r\nmoral and physical, converge habitually to a common destination…. Such\r\na harmony, individual and collective, being incapable of complete\r\nrealization in an existence so complicated as ours, this definition of\r\nreligion characterizes the immovable type towards which tends more and\r\nmore the aggregate of human efforts. Our happiness and our merit consist\r\nespecially in approaching as near as possible to this unity, of which\r\nthe gradual increase constitutes the best measure of real improvement,\r\npersonal or social.\" To this theme he continually returns, and argues\r\nthat this unity or harmony among all the elements of our life is not\r\nconsistent with the predominance of the personal propensities, since\r\nthese drag us in different directions; it can only result from the\r\nsubordination of them all to the social icelings, which may be made to\r\nact in a uniform direction by a common system of convictions, and which\r\ndiffer from the personal inclinations in this, that we all naturally\r\nencourage them in one another, while, on the contrary, social life is a\r\nperpetual restraint upon the selfish propensities.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003efons errorum\u003c/i\u003e in M. Comte\u0027s later speculations is this inordinate\r\ndemand for \"unity\" and \"systematization.\" This is the reason why it does\r\nnot suffice to him that all should be ready, in case of need, to\r\npostpone their personal interests and inclinations to the requirements\r\nof the general good: he demands that each should regard as vicious any\r\ncare at all for his personal interests, except as a means to the good of\r\nothers\u0026mdash;should be ashamed of it, should strive to cure himself of it,\r\nbecause his existence is not \"systematized,\" is not in \"complete unity,\"\r\nas long as he cares for more than one thing. The strangest part of the\r\nmatter is, that this doctrine seems to M. Comte to be axiomatic. That\r\nall perfection consists in unity, he apparently considers to be a maxim\r\nwhich no sane man thinks of questioning. It never seems to enter into\r\nhis conceptions that any one could object \u003ci\u003eab initio\u003c/i\u003e, and ask, why this\r\nuniversal systematizing, systematizing, systematizing? Why is it\r\nnecessary that all human life should point but to one object, and be\r\ncultivated into a system of means to a single end? May it not be the\r\nfact that mankind, who after all are made up of single human beings,\r\nobtain a greater sum of happiness when each pursues his own, under the\r\nrules and conditions required by the good of the rest, than when each\r\nmakes the good of the rest his only subject, and allows himself no\r\npersonal pleasures not indispensable to the preservation of his\r\nfaculties? The regimen of a blockaded town should be cheerfully\r\nsubmitted to when high purposes require it, but is it the ideal\r\nperfection of human existence? M. Comte sees none of these difficulties.\r\nThe only true happiness, he affirms, is in the exercise of the\r\naffections. He had found it so for a whole year, which was enough to\r\nenable him to get to the bottom of the question, and to judge whether he\r\ncould do without everything else. Of course the supposition was not to\r\nbe heard of that any other person could require, or be the better for,\r\nwhat M. Comte did not value. \"Unity\" and \"systematization\" absolutely\r\ndemanded that all other people should model themselves after M. Comte.\r\nIt would never do to suppose that there could be more than one road to\r\nhuman happiness, or more than one ingredient in it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe most prejudiced must admit that this religion without theology is\r\nnot chargeable with relaxation of moral restraints. On the contrary, it\r\nprodigiously exaggerates them. It makes the same ethical mistake as the\r\ntheory of Calvinism, that every act in life should be done for the glory\r\nof God, and that whatever is not a duty is a sin. It does not perceive\r\nthat between the region of duty and that of sin there is an intermediate\r\nspace, the region of positive worthiness. It is not good that persons\r\nshould be bound, by other people\u0027s opinion, to do everything that they\r\nwould deserve praise for doing. There is a standard of altruism to which\r\nall should be required to come up, and a degree beyond it which is not\r\nobligatory, but meritorious. It is incumbent on every one to restrain\r\nthe pursuit of his personal objects within the limits consistent with\r\nthe essential interests of others. What those limits are, it is the\r\nprovince of ethical science to determine; and to keep all individuals\r\nand aggregations of individuals within them, is the proper office of\r\npunishment and of moral blame. If in addition to fulfilling this\r\nobligation, persons make the good of others a direct object of\r\ndisinterested exertions, postponing or sacrificing to it even innocent\r\npersonal indulgences, they deserve gratitude and honour, and are fit\r\nobjects of moral praise. So long as they are in no way compelled to this\r\nconduct by any external pressure, there cannot be too much of it; but a\r\nnecessary condition is its spontaneity; since the notion of a happiness\r\nfor all, procured by the self-sacrifice of each, if the abnegation is\r\nreally felt to be a sacrifice, is a contradiction. Such spontaneity by\r\nno means excludes sympathetic encouragement; but the encouragement\r\nshould take the form of making self-devotion pleasant, not that of\r\nmaking everything else painful. The object should be to stimulate\r\nservices to humanity by their natural rewards; not to render the pursuit\r\nof our own good in any other manner impossible, by visiting it with the\r\nreproaches of other and of our own conscience. The proper office of\r\nthose sanctions is to enforce upon every one, the conduct necessary to\r\ngive all other persons their fair chance: conduct which chiefly consists\r\nin not doing them harm, and not impeding them in anything which without\r\nharming others does good to themselves. To this must of course be added,\r\nthat when we either expressly or tacitly undertake to do more, we are\r\nbound to keep our promise. And inasmuch as every one, who avails himself\r\nof the advantages of society, leads others to expect from him all such\r\npositive good offices and disinterested services as the moral\r\nimprovement attained by mankind has rendered customary, he deserves\r\nmoral blame if, without just cause, he disappoints that expectation.\r\nThrough this principle the domain of moral duty is always widening. When\r\nwhat once was uncommon virtue becomes common virtue, it comes to be\r\nnumbered among obligations, while a degree exceeding what has grown\r\ncommon, remains simply meritorious.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eM. Comte is accustomed to draw most of his ideas of moral cultivation\r\nfrom the discipline of the Catholic Church. Had he followed that\r\nguidance in the present case, he would have been less wide of the mark.\r\nFor the distinction which we have drawn was fully recognized by the\r\nsagacious and far-sighted men who created the Catholic ethics. It is\r\neven one of the stock reproaches against Catholicism, that it has two\r\nstandards of morality, and does not make obligatory on all Christians\r\nthe highest rule of Christian perfection. It has one standard which,\r\nfaithfully acted up to, suffices for salvation, another and a higher\r\nwhich when realized constitutes a saint. M. Comte, perhaps\r\nunconsciously, for there is nothing that he would have been more\r\nunlikely to do if he had been aware of it, has taken a leaf out of the\r\nbook of the despised Protestantism. Like the extreme Calvinists, he\r\nrequires that all believers shall be saints, and damns then (after his\r\nown fashion) if they are not.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur conception of human life is different. We do not conceive life to be\r\nso rich in enjoyments, that it can afford to forego the cultivation of\r\nall those which address themselves to what M. Comte terms the egoistic\r\npropensities. On the contrary, we believe that a sufficient\r\ngratification of these, short of excess, but up to the measure which\r\nrenders the enjoyment greatest, is almost always favourable to the\r\nbenevolent affections. The moralization of the personal enjoyments we\r\ndeem to consist, not in reducing them to the smallest possible amount,\r\nbut in cultivating the habitual wish to share them with others, and with\r\nall others, and scorning to desire anything for oneself which is\r\nincapable of being so shared. There is only one passion or inclination\r\nwhich is permanently incompatible with this condition\u0026mdash;the love of\r\ndomination, or superiority, for its own sake; which implies, and is\r\ngrounded on, the equivalent depression of other people. As a rule of\r\nconduct, to be enforced by moral sanctions, we think no more should be\r\nattempted than to prevent people from doing harm to others, or omitting\r\nto do such good as they have undertaken. Demanding no more than this,\r\nsociety, in any tolerable circumstances, obtains much more; for the\r\nnatural activity of human nature, shut out from all noxious directions,\r\nwill expand itself in useful ones. This is our conception of the moral\r\nrule prescribed by the religion of Humanity. But above this standard\r\nthere is an unlimited range of moral worth, up to the most exalted\r\nheroism, which should be fostered by every positive encouragement,\r\nthough not converted into an obligation. It is as much a part of our\r\nscheme as of M. Comte\u0027s, that the direct cultivation of altruism, and\r\nthe subordination of egoism to it, far beyond the point of absolute\r\nmoral duty, should be one of the chief aims of education, both\r\nindividual and collective. We even recognize the value, for this end, of\r\nascetic discipline, in the original Greek sense of the word. We think\r\nwith Dr Johnson, that he who has never denied himself anything which is\r\nnot wrong, cannot be fully trusted for denying himself everything which\r\nis so. We do not doubt that children and young persons will one day be\r\nagain systematically disciplined in self-mortification; that they will\r\nbe taught, as in antiquity, to control their appetites, to brave\r\ndangers, and submit voluntarily to pain, as simple exercises in\r\neducation. Something has been lost as well as gained by no longer giving\r\nto every citizen the training necessary for a soldier. Nor can any pains\r\ntaken be too great, to form the habit, and develop the desire, of being\r\nuseful to others and to the world, by the practice, independently of\r\nreward and of every personal consideration, of positive virtue beyond\r\nthe bounds of prescribed duty. No efforts should be spared to associate\r\nthe pupil\u0027s self-respect, and his desire of the respect of others, with\r\nservice rendered to Humanity; when possible, collectively, but at all\r\nevents, what is always possible, in the persons of its individual\r\nmembers. There are many remarks and precepts in M. Comte\u0027s volumes,\r\nwhich, as no less pertinent to our conception of morality than to his,\r\nwe fully accept. For example; without admitting that to make \"calculs\r\npersonnels\" is contrary to morality, we agree with him in the opinion,\r\nthat the principal hygienic precepts should be inculcated, not solely or\r\nprincipally as maxims of prudence, but as a matter of duty to others,\r\nsince by squandering our health we disable ourselves from rendering to\r\nour fellow-creatures the services to which they are entitled. As M.\r\nComte truly says, the prudential motive is by no means fully sufficient\r\nfor the purpose, even physicians often disregarding their own precepts.\r\nThe personal penalties of neglect of health are commonly distant, as\r\nwell as more or less uncertain, and require the additional and more\r\nimmediate sanction of moral responsibility. M. Comte, therefore, in this\r\ninstance, is, we conceive, right in principle; though we have not the\r\nsmallest doubt that he would have gone into extreme exaggeration in\r\npractice, and would have wholly ignored the legitimate liberty of the\r\nindividual to judge for himself respecting his own bodily conditions,\r\nwith due relation to the sufficiency of his means of knowledge, and\r\ntaking the responsibility of the result.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eConnected with the same considerations is another idea of M. Comte,\r\nwhich has great beauty and grandeur in it, and the realization of which,\r\nwithin the bounds of possibility, would be a cultivation of the social\r\nfeelings on a most essential point. It is, that every person who lives\r\nby any useful work, should be habituated to regard himself not as an\r\nindividual working for his private benefit, but as a public functionary;\r\nand his wages, of whatever sort, as not the remuneration or\r\npurchase-money of his labour, which should be given freely, but as the\r\nprovision made by society to enable him to carry it on, and to replace\r\nthe materials and products which have been consumed in the process. M.\r\nComte observes, that in modern industry every one in fact works much\r\nmore for others than for himself, since his productions are to be\r\nconsumed by others, and it is only necessary that his thoughts and\r\nimagination should adapt themselves to the real state of the fact. The\r\npractical problem, however, is not quite so simple, for a strong sense\r\nthat he is working for others may lead to nothing better than feeling\r\nhimself necessary to them, and instead of freely giving his commodity,\r\nmay only encourage him to put a high price upon it. What M. Comte really\r\nmeans is that we should regard working for the benefit of others as a\r\ngood in itself; that we should desire it for its own sake, and not for\r\nthe sake of remuneration, which cannot justly be claimed for doing what\r\nwe like: that the proper return for a service to society is the\r\ngratitude of society: and that the moral claim of any one in regard to\r\nthe provision for his personal wants, is not a question of \u003ci\u003equid pro\r\nquo\u003c/i\u003e in respect to his co-operation, but of how much the circumstances\r\nof society permit to be assigned to him, consistently with the just\r\nclaims of others. To this opinion we entirely subscribe. The rough\r\nmethod of settling the labourer\u0027s share of the produce, the competition\r\nof the market, may represent a practical necessity, but certainly not a\r\nmoral ideal. Its defence is, that civilization has not hitherto been\r\nequal to organizing anything better than this first rude approach to an\r\nequitable distribution. Rude as it is, we for the present go less wrong\r\nby leaving the thing to settle itself, than by settling it artificially\r\nin any mode which has yet been tried. But in whatever manner that\r\nquestion may ultimately be decided, the true moral and social idea of\r\nLabour is in no way affected by it. Until labourers and employers\r\nperform the work of industry in the spirit in which soldiers perform\r\nthat of an army, industry will never be moralized, and military life\r\nwill remain, what, in spite of the anti-social character of its direct\r\nobject, it has hitherto been\u0026mdash;the chief school of moral co-operation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus far of the general idea of M. Comte\u0027s ethics and religion. We must\r\nnow say something of the details. Here we approach the ludicrous side of\r\nthe subject: but we shall unfortunately have to relate other things far\r\nmore really ridiculous.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere cannot be a religion without a \u003ci\u003ecultus.\u003c/i\u003e We use this term for want\r\nof any other, for its nearest equivalent, worship, suggests a different\r\norder of ideas. We mean by it, a set of systematic observances, intended\r\nto cultivate and maintain the religious sentiment. Though M. Comte\r\njustly appreciates the superior efficacy of acts, in keeping up and\r\nstrengthening the feeling which prompts them, over any mode whatever of\r\nmere expression, he takes pains to organize the latter also with great\r\nminuteness. He provides an equivalent both for the private devotions,\r\nand for the public ceremonies, of other faiths. The reader will be\r\nsurprised to learn, that the former consists of prayer. But prayer, as\r\nunderstood by M. Comte, does not mean asking; it is a mere outpouring of\r\nfeeling; and for this view of it he claims the authority of the\r\nChristian mystics. It is not to be addressed to the Grand Etre, to\r\ncollective Humanity; though he occasionally carries metaphor so far as\r\nto style this a goddess. The honours to collective Humanity are reserved\r\nfor the public celebrations. Private adoration is to be addressed to it\r\nin the persons of worthy individual representatives, who may be either\r\nliving or dead, but must in all cases be women; for women, being the\r\n\u003ci\u003esexe aimant\u003c/i\u003e, represent the best attribute of humanity, that which\r\nought to regulate all human life, nor can Humanity possibly be\r\nsymbolized in any form but that of a woman. The objects of private\r\nadoration are the mother, the wife, and the daughter, representing\r\nseverally the past, the present, and the future, and calling into active\r\nexercise the three social sentiments, veneration, attachment, and\r\nkindness. We are to regard them, whether dead or alive, as our guardian\r\nangels, \"les vrais anges gardiens.\" If the last two have never existed,\r\nor if, in the particular case, any of the three types is too faulty for\r\nthe office assigned to it, their place may be supplied by some other\r\ntype of womanly excellence, even by one merely historical. Be the object\r\nliving or dead, the adoration (as we understand it) is to be addressed\r\nonly to the idea. The prayer consists of two parts; a commemoration,\r\nfollowed by an effusion. By a commemoration M. Comte means an effort of\r\nmemory and imagination, summoning up with the utmost possible vividness\r\nthe image of the object: and every artifice is exhausted to render the\r\nimage as life-like, as close to the reality, as near an approach to\r\nactual hallucination, as is consistent with sanity. This degree of\r\nintensity having been, as far as practicable, attained, the effusion\r\nfollows. Every person should compose his own form of prayer, which\r\nshould be repeated not mentally only, but orally, and may be added to or\r\nvaried for sufficient cause, but never arbitrarily. It may be\r\ninterspersed with passages from the best poets, when they present\r\nthemselves spontaneously, as giving a felicitous expression to the\r\nadorer\u0027s own feeling. These observances M. Comte practised to the memory\r\nof his Clotilde, and he enjoins them on all true believers. They are to\r\noccupy two hours of every day, divided into three parts; at rising, in\r\nthe middle of the working hours, and in bed at night. The first, which\r\nshould be in a kneeling attitude, will commonly be the longest, and the\r\nsecond the shortest. The third is to be extended as nearly as possible\r\nto the moment of falling asleep, that its effect may be felt in\r\ndisciplining even the dreams.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe public \u003ci\u003ecultus\u003c/i\u003e consists of a series of celebrations or festivals,\r\neighty-four in the year, so arranged that at least one occurs in every\r\nweek. They are devoted to the successive glorification of Humanity\r\nitself; of the various ties, political and domestic, among mankind; of\r\nthe successive stages in the past evolution of our species; and of the\r\nseveral classes into which M. Comte\u0027s polity divides mankind. M. Comte\u0027s\r\nreligion has, moreover, nine Sacraments; consisting in the solemn\r\nconsecration, by the priests of Humanity, with appropriate exhortations,\r\nof all the great transitions in life; the entry into life itself, and\r\ninto each of its successive stages: education, marriage, the choice of a\r\nprofession, and so forth. Among these is death, which receives the name\r\nof transformation, and is considered as a passage from objective\r\nexistence to subjective\u0026mdash;to living in the memory of our\r\nfellow-creatures. Having no eternity of objective existence to offer, M.\r\nComte\u0027s religion gives it all he can, by holding out the hope of\r\nsubjective immortality\u0026mdash;of existing in the remembrance and in the\r\nposthumous adoration of mankind at large, if we have done anything to\r\ndeserve remembrance from them; at all events, of those whom we loved\r\nduring life; and when they too are gone, of being included in the\r\ncollective adoration paid to the Grand Etre. People are to be taught to\r\nlook forward to this as a sufficient recompense for the devotion of a\r\nwhole life to the service of Humanity. Seven years after death, comes\r\nthe last Sacrament: a public judgment, by the priesthood, on the memory\r\nof the defunct. This is not designed for purposes of reprobation, but of\r\nhonour, and any one may, by declaration during life, exempt himself from\r\nit. If judged, and found worthy, he is solemnly incorporated with the\r\nGrand Etre, and his remains are transferred from the civil to the\r\nreligious place of sepulture: \"le bois sacr\u0026eacute;\" qui doit entourer chaque\r\ntemple de l\u0027Humanit\u0026eacute;.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis brief abstract gives no idea of the minuteness of M. Comte\u0027s\r\nprescriptions, and the extraordinary height to which he carries the\r\nmania for regulation by which Frenchmen are distinguished among\r\nEuropeans, and M. Comte among Frenchmen. It is this which throws an\r\nirresistible air of ridicule over the whole subject. There is nothing\r\nreally ridiculous in the devotional practices which M. Comte recommends\r\ntowards a cherished memory or an ennobling ideal, when they come\r\nunprompted from the depths of the individual feeling; but there is\r\nsomething ineffably ludicrous in enjoining that everybody shall practise\r\nthem three times daily for a period of two hours, not because his\r\nfeelings require them, but for the premeditated, purpose of getting his\r\nfeelings up. The ludicrous, however, in any of its shapes, is a\r\nphaenomenon with which M. Comte seems to have been totally unacquainted.\r\nThere is nothing in his writings from which it could be inferred that he\r\nknew of the existence of such things as wit and humour. The only writer\r\ndistinguished for either, of whom he shows any admiration, is Moli\u0026egrave;re,\r\nand him he admires not for his wit but for his wisdom. We notice this\r\nwithout intending any reflection on M. Comte; for a profound conviction\r\nraises a person above the feeling of ridicule. But there are passages in\r\nhis writings which, it really seems to us, could have been written by no\r\nman who had ever laughed. We will give one of these instances. Besides\r\nthe regular prayers, M. Comte\u0027s religion, like the Catholic, has need of\r\nforms which can be applied to casual and unforeseen occasions. These, he\r\nsays, must in general be left to the believer\u0027s own choice; but he\r\nsuggests as a very suitable one the repetition of \"the fundamental\r\nformula of Positivism,\" viz., \"l\u0027amour pour principe, l\u0027ordre pour base,\r\net le progr\u0026egrave;s pour but.\" Not content, however, with an equivalent for\r\nthe Paters and Aves of Catholicism, he must have one for the sign of the\r\ncross also; and he thus delivers himself:\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_23_23\" id=\"FNanchor_23_23\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_23_23\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[23]\u003c/a\u003e \"Cette expansion peut \u0026ecirc;tre\r\nperfectionn\u0026eacute;e par des signes universels…. Afin de mieux d\u0026eacute;velopper\r\nl\u0027aptitude n\u0026eacute;cessaire de la formule positiviste \u0026agrave; repr\u0026eacute;senter toujours\r\nla condition humaine, il convient ordinairement de l\u0027\u0026eacute;noncer en touchant\r\nsuccessivement les principaux organes que la th\u0026eacute;orie c\u0026eacute;r\u0026eacute;brale assigne \u0026agrave;\r\nses trois \u0026eacute;l\u0026eacute;ments.\" This \u003ci\u003emay\u003c/i\u003e be a very appropriate mode of expressing\r\none\u0027s devotion to the Grand Etre: but any one who had appreciated its\r\neffect on the profane reader, would have thought it judicious to keep it\r\nback till a considerably more advanced stage in the propagation of the\r\nPositive Religion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs M. Comte\u0027s religion has a \u003ci\u003ecultus\u003c/i\u003e, so also it has a clergy, who are\r\nthe pivot of his entire social and political system. Their nature and\r\noffice will be best shown by describing his ideal of political society\r\nin its normal state, with the various classes of which it is composed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe necessity of a Spiritual Power, distinct and separate from the\r\ntemporal government, is the essential principle of M. Comte\u0027s political\r\nscheme; as it may well be, since the Spiritual Power is the only\r\ncounterpoise he provides or tolerates, to the absolute dominion of the\r\ncivil rulers. Nothing can exceed his combined detestation and contempt\r\nfor government by assemblies, and for parliamentary or representative\r\ninstitutions in any form. They are an expedient, in his opinion, only\r\nsuited to a state of transition, and even that nowhere but in England.\r\nThe attempt to naturalize them in France, or any Continental nation, he\r\nregards as mischievous quackery. Louis Napoleon\u0027s usurpation is\r\nabsolved, is made laudable to him, because it overthrew a representative\r\ngovernment. Election of superiors by inferiors, except as a\r\nrevolutionary expedient, is an abomination in his sight. Public\r\nfunctionaries of all kinds should name their successors, subject to the\r\napprobation of their own superiors, and giving public notice of the\r\nnomination so long beforehand as to admit of discussion, and the timely\r\nrevocation of a wrong choice. But, by the side of the temporal rulers,\r\nhe places another authority, with no power to command, but only to\r\nadvise and remonstrate. The family being, in his mind as in that of\r\nFrenchmen generally, the foundation and essential type of all society,\r\nthe separation of the two powers commences there. The spiritual, or\r\nmoral and religious power, in a family, is the women of it. The\r\npositivist family is composed of the \"fundamental couple,\" their\r\nchildren, and the parents of the man, if alive. The whole government of\r\nthe household, except as regards the education of the children, resides\r\nin the man; and even over that he has complete power, but should forbear\r\nto exert it. The part assigned to the women is to improve the man\r\nthrough his affections, and to bring up the children, who, until the age\r\nof fourteen, at which scientific instruction begins, are to be educated\r\nwholly by their mother. That women may be better fitted for these\r\nfunctions, they are peremptorily excluded from all others. No woman is\r\nto work for her living. Every woman is to be supported by her husband or\r\nher male relations, and if she has none of these, by the State. She is\r\nto have no powers of government, even domestic, and no property. Her\r\nlegal rights of inheritance are preserved to her, that her feelings of\r\nduty may make her voluntarily forego them. There are to be no marriage\r\nportions, that women may no longer be sought in marriage from interested\r\nmotives. Marriages are to be rigidly indissoluble, except for a single\r\ncause. It is remarkable that the bitterest enemy of divorce among all\r\nphilosophers, nevertheless allows it, in a case which the laws of\r\nEngland, and of other countries reproached by him with tolerating\r\ndivorce, do not admit: namely, when one of the parties has been\r\nsentenced to an infamizing punishment, involving loss of civil rights.\r\nIt is monstrous that condemnation, even for life, to a felon\u0027s\r\npunishment, should leave an unhappy victim bound to, and in the wife\u0027s\r\ncase under the legal authority of, the culprit. M. Comte could feel for\r\nthe injustice in this special case, because it chanced to be the\r\nunfortunate situation of his Clotilde. Minor degrees of unworthiness may\r\nentitle the innocent party to a legal separation, but without the power\r\nof re-marriage. Second marriages, indeed, are not permitted by the\r\nPositive Religion. There is to be no impediment to them by law, but\r\nmorality is to condemn them, and every couple who are married\r\nreligiously as well as civilly are to make a vow of eternal widowhood,\r\n\"le veuvage \u0026eacute;ternel.\" This absolute monogamy is, in M. Comte\u0027s opinion,\r\nessential to the complete fusion between two beings, which is the\r\nessence of marriage; and moreover, eternal constancy is required by the\r\nposthumous adoration, which is to be continuously paid by the survivor\r\nto one who, though objectively dead, still lives \"subjectively.\" The\r\ndomestic spiritual power, which resides in the women of the family, is\r\nchiefly concentrated in the most venerable of them, the husband\u0027s\r\nmother, while alive. It has an auxiliary in the influence of age,\r\nrepresented by the husband\u0027s father, who is supposed to have passed the\r\nperiod of retirement from active life, fixed by M. Comte (for he fixes\r\neverything) at sixty-three; at which age the head of the family gives up\r\nthe reins of authority to his son, retaining only a consultative voice.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis domestic Spiritual Power, being principally moral, and confined to\r\na private life, requires the support and guidance of an intellectual\r\npower exterior to it, the sphere of which will naturally be wider,\r\nextending also to public life. This consists of the clergy, or\r\npriesthood, for M. Comte is fond of borrowing the consecrated\r\nexpressions of Catholicism to denote the nearest equivalents which his\r\nown system affords. The clergy are the theoretic or philosophical class,\r\nand are supported by an endowment from the State, voted periodically,\r\nbut administered by themselves. Like women, they are to be excluded from\r\nall riches, and from all participation in power (except the absolute\r\npower of each over his own household). They are neither to inherit, nor\r\nto receive emolument from any of their functions, or from their writings\r\nor teachings of any description, but are to live solely on their small\r\nsalaries. This M. Comte deems necessary to the complete\r\ndisinterestedness of their counsel. To have the confidence of the\r\nmasses, they must, like the masses, be poor. Their exclusion from\r\npolitical and from all other practical occupations is indispensable for\r\nthe same reason, and for others equally peremptory. Those occupations\r\nare, he contends, incompatible with the habits of mind necessary to\r\nphilosophers. A practical position, either private or public, chains the\r\nmind to specialities and details, while a philosopher\u0027s business is with\r\ngeneral truths and connected views (vues d\u0027ensemble). These, again,\r\nrequire an habitual abstraction from details, which unfits the mind for\r\njudging well and rapidly of individual cases. The same person cannot be\r\nboth a good theorist and a good practitioner or ruler, though\r\npractitioners and rulers ought to have a solid theoretic education. The\r\ntwo kinds of function must be absolutely exclusive of one another: to\r\nattempt them both, is inconsistent with fitness for either. But as men\r\nmay mistake their vocation, up to the age of thirty-five they are\r\nallowed to change their career.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo the clergy is entrusted the theoretic or scientific instruction of\r\nyouth. The medical art also is to be in their hands, since no one is fit\r\nto be a physician who does not study and understand the whole man, moral\r\nas well as physical. M. Comte has a contemptuous opinion of the existing\r\nrace of physicians, who, he says, deserve no higher name than that of\r\nveterinaires, since they concern themselves with man only in his animal,\r\nand not in his human character. In his last years, M. Comte (as we learn\r\nfrom Dr Robinet\u0027s volume) indulged in the wildest speculations on\r\nmedical science, declaring all maladies to be one and the same disease,\r\nthe disturbance or destruction of \"l\u0027unit\u0026eacute; c\u0026eacute;r\u0026eacute;brale.\" The other\r\nfunctions of the clergy are moral, much more than intellectual. They are\r\nthe spiritual directors, and venerated advisers, of the active or\r\npractical classes, including the political. They are the mediators in\r\nall social differences; between the labourers, for instance, and their\r\nemployers. They are to advise and admonish on all important violations\r\nof the moral law. Especially, it devolves on them to keep the rich and\r\npowerful to the performance of their moral duties towards their\r\ninferiors. If private remonstrance fails, public denunciation is to\r\nfollow: in extreme cases they may proceed to the length of\r\nexcommunication, which, though it only operates through opinion, yet if\r\nit carries opinion with it, may, as M. Comte complacently observes, be\r\nof such powerful efficacy, that the richest man may be driven to produce\r\nhis subsistence by his own manual labour, through the impossibility of\r\ninducing any other person to work for him. In this as in all other\r\ncases, the priesthood depends for its authority on carrying with it the\r\nmass of the people\u0026mdash;those who, possessing no accumulations, live on the\r\nwages of daily labour; popularly but incorrectly termed the working\r\nclasses, and by French writers, in their Roman law phraseology,\r\nproletaires. These, therefore, who are not allowed the smallest\r\npolitical rights, are incorporated into the Spiritual Power, of which\r\nthey form, after women and the clergy, the third element.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt remains to give an account of the Temporal Power, composed of the\r\nrich and the employers of labour, two classes who in M. Comte\u0027s system\r\nare reduced to one, for he allows of no idle rich. A life made up of\r\nmere amusement and self-indulgence, though not interdicted by law, is to\r\nbe deemed so disgraceful, that nobody with the smallest sense of shame\r\nwould choose to be guilty of it. Here, we think, M. Comte has lighted on\r\na true principle, towards which the tone of opinion in modern Europe is\r\nmore and more tending, and which is destined to be one of the\r\nconstitutive principles of regenerated society. We believe, for example,\r\nwith him, that in the future there will be no class of landlords living\r\nat ease on their rents, but every landlord will be a capitalist trained\r\nto agriculture, himself superintending and directing the cultivation of\r\nhis estate. No one but he who guides the work, should have the control\r\nof the tools. In M. Comte\u0027s system, the rich, as a rule, consist of the\r\n\"captains of industry:\" but the rule is not entirely without exception,\r\nfor M. Comte recognizes other useful modes of employing riches. In\r\nparticular, one of his favourite ideas is that of an order of Chivalry,\r\ncomposed of the most generous and self-devoted of the rich, voluntarily\r\ndedicating themselves, like knights-errant of old, to the redressing of\r\nwrongs, and the protection of the weak and oppressed. He remarks, that\r\noppression, in modern life, can seldom reach, or even venture to attack,\r\nthe life or liberty of its victims (he forgets the case of domestic\r\ntyranny), but only their pecuniary means, and it is therefore by the\r\npurse chiefly that individuals can usefully interpose, as they formerly\r\ndid by the sword. The occupation, however, of nearly all the rich, will\r\nbe the direction of labour, and for this work they will be educated.\r\nReciprocally, it is in M. Comte\u0027s opinion essential, that all directors\r\nof labour should be rich. Capital (in which he includes land) should be\r\nconcentrated in a few holders, so that every capitalist may conduct the\r\nmost extensive operations which one mind is capable of superintending.\r\nThis is not only demanded by good economy, in order to take the utmost\r\nadvantage of a rare kind of practical ability, but it necessarily\r\nfollows from the principle of M. Comte\u0027s scheme, which regards a\r\ncapitalist as a public functionary. M. Comte\u0027s conception of the\r\nrelation of capital to society is essentially that of Socialists, but he\r\nwould bring about by education and opinion, what they aim at effecting\r\nby positive institution. The owner of capital is by no means to consider\r\nhimself its absolute proprietor. Legally he is not to be controlled in\r\nhis dealings with it, for power should be in proportion to\r\nresponsibility: but it does not belong to him for his own use; he is\r\nmerely entrusted by society with a portion of the accumulations made by\r\nthe past providence of mankind, to be administered for the benefit of\r\nthe present generation and of posterity, under the obligation of\r\npreserving them unimpaired, and handing them down, more or less\r\naugmented, to our successors. He is not entitled to dissipate them, or\r\ndivert them from the service of Humanity to his own pleasures. Nor has\r\nhe a moral right to consume on himself the whole even of his profits. He\r\nis bound in conscience, if they exceed his reasonable wants, to employ\r\nthe surplus in improving either the efficiency of his operations, or the\r\nphysical and mental condition of his labourers. The portion of his gains\r\nwhich he may appropriate to his own use, must be decided by himself,\r\nunder accountability to opinion; and opinion ought not to look very\r\nnarrowly into the matter, nor hold him to a rigid reckoning for any\r\nmoderate indulgence of luxury or ostentation; since under the great\r\nresponsibilities that will be imposed on him, the position of an\r\nemployer of labour will be so much less desirable, to any one in whom\r\nthe instincts of pride and vanity are not strong, than the \"heureuse\r\ninsouciance\" of a labourer, that those instincts must be to a certain\r\ndegree indulged, or no one would undertake the office. With this\r\nlimitation, every employer is a mere administrator of his possessions,\r\nfor his work-people and for society at large. If he indulges himself\r\nlavishly, without reserving an ample remuneration for all who are\r\nemployed under him, he is morally culpable, and will incur sacerdotal\r\nadmonition. This state of things necessarily implies that capital should\r\nbe in few hands, because, as M. Comte observes, without great riches,\r\nthe obligations which society ought to impose, could not be fulfilled\r\nwithout an amount of personal abnegation that it would be hopeless to\r\nexpect. If a person is conspicuously qualified for the conduct of an\r\nindustrial enterprise, but destitute of the fortune necessary for\r\nundertaking it, M. Comte recommends that he should be enriched by\r\nsubscription, or, in cases of sufficient importance, by the State. Small\r\nlanded proprietors and capitalists, and the middle classes altogether,\r\nhe regards as a parasitic growth, destined to disappear, the best of the\r\nbody becoming large capitalists, and the remainder proletaires. Society\r\nwill consist only of rich and poor, and it will be the business of the\r\nrich to make the best possible lot for the poor. The remuneration of the\r\nlabourers will continue, as at present, to be a matter of voluntary\r\narrangement between them and their employers, the last resort on either\r\nside being refusal of co-operation, \"refus de concours,\" in other words,\r\na strike or a lock-out; with the sacerdotal order for mediators in case\r\nof need. But though wages are to be an affair of free contract, their\r\nstandard is not to be the competition of the market, but the application\r\nof the products in equitable proportion between the wants of the\r\nlabourers and the wants and dignity of the employer. As it is one of M.\r\nComte\u0027s principles that a question cannot be usefully proposed without\r\nan attempt at a solution, he gives his ideas from the beginning as to\r\nwhat the normal income of a labouring family should be. They are on such\r\na scale, that until some great extension shall have taken place in the\r\nscientific resources of mankind, it is no wonder he thinks it necessary\r\nto limit as much as possible the number of those who are to be supported\r\nby what is left of the produce. In the first place the labourer\u0027s\r\ndwelling, which is to consist of seven rooms, is, with all that it\r\ncontains, to be his own property: it is the only landed property he is\r\nallowed to possess, but every family should be the absolute owner of all\r\nthings which are destined for its exclusive use. Lodging being thus\r\nindependently provided for, and education and medical attendance being\r\nsecured gratuitously by the general arrangements of society, the pay of\r\nthe labourer is to consist of two portions, the one monthly, and of\r\nfixed amount, the other weekly, and proportioned to the produce of his\r\nlabour. The former M. Comte fixes at 100 francs (\u0026pound;4) for a month of 28\r\ndays; being \u0026pound;52 a year: and the rate of piece-work should be such as to\r\nmake the other part amount to an average of seven francs (5\u003ci\u003es\u003c/i\u003e. \u003ci\u003e6d\u003c/i\u003e.)\r\nper working day.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgreeably to M. Comte\u0027s rule, that every public functionary should\r\nappoint his successor, the capitalist has unlimited power of\r\ntransmitting his capital by gift or bequest, after his own death or\r\nretirement. In general it will be best bestowed entire upon one person,\r\nunless the business will advantageously admit of subdivision. He will\r\nnaturally leave it to one or more of his sons, if sufficiently\r\nqualified; and rightly so, hereditary being, in M. Comte\u0027s opinion,\r\npreferable to acquired wealth, as being usually more generously\r\nadministered. But, merely as his sons, they have no moral right to it.\r\nM. Comte here recognizes another of the principles, on which we believe\r\nthat the constitution of regenerated society will rest. He maintains (as\r\nothers in the present generation have done) that the father owes nothing\r\nto his son, except a good education, and pecuniary aid sufficient for an\r\nadvantageous start in life: that he is entitled, and may be morally\r\nbound, to leave the bulk of his fortune to some other properly selected\r\nperson or persons, whom he judges likely to make a more beneficial use\r\nof it. This is the first of three important points, in which M. Comte\u0027s\r\ntheory of the family, wrong as we deem it in its foundations, is in\r\nadvance of prevailing theories and existing institutions. The second is\r\nthe re-introduction of adoption, not only in default of children, but to\r\nfulfil the purposes, and satisfy the sympathetic wants, to which such\r\nchildren as there are may happen to be inadequate. The third is a most\r\nimportant point\u0026mdash;the incorporation of domestics as substantive members\r\nof the family. There is hardly any part of the present constitution of\r\nsociety more essentially vicious, and morally injurious to both parties,\r\nthan the relation between masters and servants. To make this a really\r\nhuman and a moral relation, is one of the principal desiderata in social\r\nimprovement. The feeling of the vulgar of all classes, that domestic\r\nservice has anything in it peculiarly mean, is a feeling than which\r\nthere is none meaner. In the feudal ages, youthful nobles of the highest\r\nrank thought themselves honoured by officiating in what is now called a\r\nmenial capacity, about the persons of superiors of both sexes, for whom\r\nthey felt respect: and, as M. Comte observes, there are many families\r\nwho can in no other way so usefully serve Humanity, as by ministering to\r\nthe bodily wants of other families, called to functions which require\r\nthe devotion of all their thoughts. \"We will add, by way of supplement\r\nto M. Comte\u0027s doctrine, that much of the daily physical work of a\r\nhousehold, even in opulent families, if silly notions of degradation,\r\ncommon to all ranks, did not interfere, might very advantageously be\r\nperformed by the family itself, at least by its younger members; to whom\r\nit would give healthful exercise of the bodily powers, which has now to\r\nbe sought in modes far less useful, and also a familiar acquaintance\r\nwith the real work of the world, and a moral willingness to take their\r\nshare of its burthens, which, in the great majority of the better-off\r\nclasses, do not now get cultivated at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have still to speak of the directly political functions of the rich,\r\nor, as M. Comte terms them, the patriciate. The entire political\r\ngovernment is to be in their hands. First, however, the existing nations\r\nare to be broken up into small republics, the largest not exceeding the\r\nsize of Belgium, Portugal, or Tuscany; any larger nationalities being\r\nincompatible with the unity of wants and feelings, which is required,\r\nnot only to give due strength to the sentiment of patriotism (always\r\nstrongest in small states), but to prevent undue compression; for no\r\nterritory, M. Comte thinks, can without oppression be governed from a\r\ndistant centre. Algeria, therefore, is to be given up to the Arabs,\r\nCorsica to its inhabitants, and France proper is to be, before the end\r\nof the century, divided into seventeen republics, corresponding to the\r\nnumber of considerable towns: Paris, however, (need it be said?)\r\nsucceeding to Rome as the religious metropolis of the world. Ireland,\r\nScotland, and Wales, are to be separated from England, which is of\r\ncourse to detach itself from all its transmarine dependencies. In each\r\nstate thus constituted, the powers of government are to be vested in a\r\ntriumvirate of the three principal bankers, who are to take the foreign,\r\nhome, and financial departments respectively. How they are to conduct\r\nthe government and remain bankers, does not clearly appear; but it must\r\nbe intended that they should combine both offices, for they are to\r\nreceive no pecuniary remuneration for the political one. Their power is\r\nto amount to a dictatorship (M. Comte\u0027s own word): and he is hardly\r\njustified in saying that he gives political power to the rich, since he\r\ngives it over the rich and every one else, to three individuals of the\r\nnumber, not even chosen by the rest, but named by their predecessors. As\r\na check on the dictators, there is to be complete freedom of speech,\r\nwriting, printing, and voluntary association; and all important acts of\r\nthe government, except in cases of emergency, are to be announced\r\nsufficiently long beforehand to ensure ample discussion. This, and the\r\ninfluences of the Spiritual Power, are the only guarantees provided\r\nagainst misgovernment. When we consider that the complete dominion of\r\nevery nation of mankind is thus handed over to only four men\u0026mdash;for the\r\nSpiritual Power is to be under the absolute and undivided control of a\r\nsingle Pontiff for the whole human race\u0026mdash;one is appalled at the picture\r\nof entire subjugation and slavery, which is recommended to us as the\r\nlast and highest result of the evolution of Humanity. But the conception\r\nrises to the terrific, when we are told the mode in which the single\r\nHigh Priest of Humanity is intended to use his authority. It is the most\r\nwarning example we know, into what frightful aberrations a powerful and\r\ncomprehensive mind may be led by the exclusive following out of a single\r\nidea.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe single idea of M. Comte, on this subject, is that the intellect\r\nshould be wholly subordinated to the feelings; or, to translate the\r\nmeaning out of sentimental into logical language, that the exercise of\r\nthe intellect, as of all our other faculties, should have for its sole\r\nobject the general good. Every other employment of it should be\r\naccounted not only idle and frivolous, but morally culpable. Being\r\nindebted wholly to Humanity for the cultivation to which we owe our\r\nmental powers, we are bound in return to consecrate them wholly to her\r\nservice. Having made up his mind that this ought to be, there is with M.\r\nComte but one step to concluding that the Grand Pontiff of Humanity must\r\ntake care that it shall be; and on this foundation he organizes an\r\nelaborate system for the total suppression of all independent thought.\r\nHe does not, indeed, invoke the arm of the law, or call for any\r\nprohibitions. The clergy are to have no monopoly. Any one else may\r\ncultivate science if he can, may write and publish if he can find\r\nreaders, may give private instruction if anybody consents to receive it.\r\nBut since the sacerdotal body will absorb into itself all but those whom\r\nit deems either intellectually or morally unequal to the vocation, all\r\nrival teachers will, as he calculates, be so discredited beforehand,\r\nthat their competition will not be formidable. Within the body itself,\r\nthe High Priest has it in his power to make sure that there shall be no\r\nopinions, and no exercise of mind, but such as he approves; for he alone\r\ndecides the duties and local residence of all its members, and can even\r\neject them from the body. Before electing to be under this rule, we feel\r\na natural curiosity to know in what manner it is to be exercised.\r\nHumanity has only yet had one Pontiff, whose mental qualifications for\r\nthe post are not likely to be often surpassed, M. Comte himself. It is\r\nof some importance to know what are the ideas of this High Priest,\r\nconcerning the moral and religious government of the human intellect.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne of the doctrines which M. Comte most strenuously enforces in his\r\nlater writings is, that during the preliminary evolution of humanity,\r\nterminated by the foundation of Positivism, the free development of our\r\nforces of all kinds was the important matter, but that from this time\r\nforward the principal need is to regulate them. Formerly the danger was\r\nof their being insufficient, but henceforth, of their being abused. Let\r\nus express, in passing, our entire dissent from this doctrine. Whoever\r\nthinks that the wretched education which mankind as yet receive, calls\r\nforth their mental powers (except those of a select few) in a sufficient\r\nor even tolerable degree, must be very easily satisfied: and the abuse\r\nof them, far from becoming proportionally greater as knowledge and\r\nmental capacity increase, becomes rapidly less, provided always that the\r\ndiffusion of those qualities keeps pace with their growth. The abuse of\r\nintellectual power is only to be dreaded, when society is divided\r\nbetween a few highly cultivated intellects and an ignorant and stupid\r\nmultitude. But mental power is a thing which M. Comte does not want\u0026mdash;or\r\nwants infinitely less than he wants submission and obedience. Of all the\r\ningredients of human nature, he continually says, the intellect most\r\nneeds to be disciplined and reined-in. It is the most turbulent \"le plus\r\nperturbateur,\" of all the mental elements; more so than even the selfish\r\ninstincts. Throughout the whole modern transition, beginning with\r\nancient Greece (for M. Comte tells us that we have always been in a\r\nstate of revolutionary transition since then), the intellect has been in\r\na state of systematic insurrection against \"le coeur.\" The\r\nmetaphysicians and literati (lettr\u0026eacute;s), after helping to pull down the\r\nold religion and social order, are rootedly hostile to the construction\r\nof the new, and desiring only to prolong the existing scepticism and\r\nintellectual anarchy, which secure to them a cheap social ascendancy,\r\nwithout the labour of earning it by solid scientific preparation. The\r\nscientific class, from whom better might have been expected, are, if\r\npossible, worse. Void of enlarged views, despising all that is too large\r\nfor their comprehension, devoted exclusively each to his special\r\nscience, contemptuously indifferent to moral and political interests,\r\ntheir sole aim is to acquire an easy reputation, and in France (through\r\npaid Academies and professorships) personal lucre, by pushing their\r\nsciences into idle and useless inquiries (speculations oiseuses), of no\r\nvalue to the real interests of mankind, and tending to divert the\r\nthoughts from them. One of the duties most incumbent on opinion and on\r\nthe Spiritual Power, is to stigmatize as immoral, and effectually\r\nsuppress, these useless employments of the speculative faculties. All\r\nexercise of thought should be abstained from, which has not some\r\nbeneficial tendency, some actual utility to mankind. M. Comte, of\r\ncourse, is not the man to say that it must be a merely material utility.\r\nIf a speculation, though it has no doctrinal, has a logical value\u0026mdash;if it\r\nthrows any light on universal Method\u0026mdash;it is still more deserving of\r\ncultivation than if its usefulness was merely practical: but, either as\r\nmethod or as doctrine, it must bring forth fruits to Humanity, otherwise\r\nit is not only contemptible, but criminal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat there is a portion of truth at the bottom of all this, we should be\r\nthe last to deny. No respect is due to any employment of the intellect\r\nwhich does not tend to the good of mankind. It is precisely on a level\r\nwith any idle amusement, and should be condemned as waste of time, if\r\ncarried beyond the limit within which amusement is permissible. And\r\nwhoever devotes powers of thought which could render to Humanity\r\nservices it urgently needs, to speculations and studies which it could\r\ndispense with, is liable to the discredit attaching to a well-grounded\r\nsuspicion of caring little for Humanity. But who can affirm positively\r\nof any speculations, guided by right scientific methods, on subjects\r\nreally accessible to the human faculties, that they are incapable of\r\nbeing of any use? Nobody knows what knowledge will prove to be of use,\r\nand what is destined to be useless. The most that can be said is that\r\nsome kinds are of more certain, and above all, of more present utility\r\nthan others. How often the most important practical results have been\r\nthe remote consequence of studies which no one would have expected to\r\nlead to them! Could the mathematicians, who, in the schools of\r\nAlexandria, investigated the properties of the ellipse, have foreseen\r\nthat nearly two thousand years afterwards their speculations would\r\nexplain the solar system, and a little later would enable ships safely\r\nto circumnavigate the earth? Even in M. Comte\u0027s opinion, it is well for\r\nmankind that, in those early days, knowledge was thought worth pursuing\r\nfor its own sake. Nor has the \"foundation of Positivism,\" we imagine, so\r\nfar changed the conditions of human existence, that it should now be\r\ncriminal to acquire, by observation and reasoning, a knowledge of the\r\nfacts of the universe, leaving to posterity to find a use for it. Even\r\nin the last two or three years, has not the discovery of new metals,\r\nwhich may prove important even in the practical arts, arisen from one of\r\nthe investigations which M. Comte most unequivocally condemns as idle,\r\nthe research into the internal constitution of the sun? How few,\r\nmoreover, of the discoveries which have changed the face of the world,\r\neither were or could have been arrived at by investigations aiming\r\ndirectly at the object! Would the mariner\u0027s compass ever have been found\r\nby direct efforts for the improvement of navigation? Should we have\r\nreached the electric telegraph by any amount of striving for a means of\r\ninstantaneous communication, if Franklin had not identified electricity\r\nwith lightning, and Amp\u0026egrave;re with magnetism? The most apparently\r\ninsignificant archaeological or geological fact, is often found to throw\r\na light on human history, which M. Comte, the basis of whose social\r\nphilosophy is history, should be the last person to disparage. The\r\ndirection of the entrance to the three great Pyramids of Ghizeh, by\r\nshowing the position of the circumpolar stars at the time when they were\r\nbuilt, is the best evidence we even now have of the immense antiquity of\r\nEgyptian civilization.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_24_24\" id=\"FNanchor_24_24\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_24_24\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[24]\u003c/a\u003e The one point on which M. Comte\u0027s doctrine\r\nhas some colour of reason, is the case of sidereal astronomy: so little\r\nknowledge of it being really accessible to us, and the connexion of that\r\nlittle with any terrestrial interests being, according to all our means\r\nof judgment, infinitesimal. It is certainly difficult to imagine how any\r\nconsiderable benefit to humanity can be derived from a knowledge of the\r\nmotions of the double stars: should these ever become important to us it\r\nwill be in so prodigiously remote an age, that we can afford to remain\r\nignorant of them until, at least, all our moral, political, and social\r\ndifficulties have been settled. Yet the discovery that gravitation\r\nextends even to those remote regions, gives some additional strength to\r\nthe conviction of the universality of natural laws; and the habitual\r\nmeditation on such vast objects and distances is not without an\r\naesthetic usefulness, by kindling and exalting the imagination, the\r\nworth of which in itself, and even its re-action on the intellect, M.\r\nComte is quite capable of appreciating. He would reply, however, that\r\nthere are better means of accomplishing these purposes. In the same\r\nspirit he condemns the study even of the solar system, when extended to\r\nany planets but those which are visible to the naked eye, and which\r\nalone exert an appreciable gravitative influence on the earth. Even the\r\nperturbations he thinks it idle to study, beyond a mere general\r\nconception of them, and thinks that astronomy may well limit its domain\r\nto the motions and mutual action of the earth, sun, and moon. He looks\r\nfor a similar expurgation of all the other sciences. In one passage he\r\nexpressly says that the greater part of the researches which are really\r\naccessible to us are idle and useless. He would pare down the dimensions\r\nof all the sciences as narrowly as possible. He is continually repeating\r\nthat no science, as an abstract study, should be carried further than is\r\nnecessary to lay the foundation for the science next above it, and so\r\nultimately for moral science, the principal purpose of them all. Any\r\nfurther extension of the mathematical and physical sciences should be\r\nmerely \"episodic;\" limited to what may from time to time be demanded by\r\nthe requirements of industry and the arts; and should be left to the\r\nindustrial classes, except when they find it necessary to apply to the\r\nsacerdotal order for some additional development of scientific theory.\r\nThis, he evidently thinks, would be a rare contingency, most physical\r\ntruths sufficiently concrete and real for practice being empirical.\r\nAccordingly in estimating the number of clergy necessary for France,\r\nEurope, and our entire planet (for his forethought extends thus far),\r\nhe proportions it solely to their moral and religious attributions\r\n(overlooking, by the way, even their medical); and leaves nobody with\r\nany time to cultivate the sciences, except abortive candidates for the\r\npriestly office, who having been refused admittance into it for\r\ninsufficiency in moral excellence or in strength of character, may be\r\nthought worth retaining as \"pensioners\" of the sacerdotal order, on\r\naccount of their theoretic abilities.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is no exaggeration to say, that M. Comte gradually acquired a real\r\nhatred for scientific and all purely intellectual pursuits, and was bent\r\non retaining no more of them than was strictly indispensable. The\r\ngreatest of his anxieties is lest people should reason, and seek to\r\nknow, more than enough. He regards all abstraction and all reasoning as\r\nmorally dangerous, by developing an inordinate pride (orgueil), and\r\nstill more, by producing dryness (scheresse). Abstract thought, he says,\r\nis not a wholesome occupation for more than a small number of human\r\nbeings, nor of them for more than a small part of their time. Art, which\r\ncalls the emotions into play along with and more than the reason, is the\r\nonly intellectual exercise really adapted to human nature. It is\r\nnevertheless indispensable that the chief theories of the various\r\nabstract sciences, together with the modes in which those theories were\r\nhistorically and logically arrived at, should form a part of universal\r\neducation: for, first, it is only thus that the methods can be learnt,\r\nby which to attain the results sought by the moral and social sciences:\r\nthough we cannot perceive that M. Comte got at his own moral and social\r\nresults by those processes. Secondly, the principal truths of the\r\nsubordinate sciences are necessary to the systematization (still\r\nsystematization!) of our conceptions, by binding together our notions of\r\nthe world in a set of propositions, which are coherent, and are a\r\nsufficiently correct representation of fact for our practical wants.\r\nThirdly, a familiar knowledge of the invariable laws of natural\r\nphaenomena is a great elementary lesson of submission, which, he is\r\nnever weary of saying, is the first condition both of morality and of\r\nhappiness. For these reasons, he would cause to be taught, from the age\r\nof fourteen to that of twenty-one, to all persons, rich and poor, girls\r\nor youths, a knowledge of the whole series of abstract sciences, such as\r\nnone but the most highly instructed persons now possess, and of a far\r\nmore systematic and philosophical character than is usually possessed\r\neven by them. (N.B.\u0026mdash;They are to learn, during the same years, Greek and\r\nLatin, having previously, between the ages of seven and fourteen, learnt\r\nthe five principal modern languages, to the degree necessary for\r\nreading, with due appreciation, the chief poetical compositions in\r\neach.) But they are to be taught all this, not only without encouraging,\r\nbut stifling as much as possible, the examining and questioning spirit.\r\nThe disposition which should be encouraged is that of receiving all on\r\nthe authority of the teacher. The Positivist faith, even in its\r\nscientific part, is \u003ci\u003ela foi d\u0026eacute;montrable\u003c/i\u003e, but ought by no means to be\r\n\u003ci\u003ela foi toujours d\u0026eacute;montr\u0026eacute;e\u003c/i\u003e. The pupils have no business to be\r\nover-solicitous about proof. The teacher should not even present the\r\nproofs to them in a complete form, or as proofs. The object of\r\ninstruction is to make them understand the doctrines themselves,\r\nperceive their mutual connexion, and form by means of them a consistent\r\nand \u003ci\u003esystematized\u003c/i\u003e conception of nature. As for the demonstrations, it\r\nis rather desirable than otherwise that even theorists should forget\r\nthem, retaining only the results. Among all the aberrations of\r\nscientific men, M. Comte thinks none greater than the pedantic anxiety\r\nthey show for complete proof, and perfect rationalization of scientific\r\nprocesses. It ought to be enough that the doctrines afford an\r\nexplanation of phaenomena, consistent with itself and with known facts,\r\nand that the processes are justified by their fruits. This over-anxiety\r\nfor proof, he complains, is breaking down, by vain scruples, the\r\nknowledge which seemed to have been attained; witness the present state\r\nof chemistry. The demand of proof for what has been accepted by\r\nHumanity, is itself a mark of \"distrust, if not hostility, to the\r\nsacerdotal order\" (the na\u0026iuml;vet\u0026eacute; of this would be charming, if it were not\r\ndeplorable), and is a revolt against the traditions of the human race.\r\nSo early had the new High Priest adopted the feelings and taken up the\r\ninheritance of the old. One of his favourite aphorisms is the strange\r\none, that the living are more and more governed by the dead. As is not\r\nuncommon with him, he introduces the dictum in one sense, and uses it in\r\nanother. What he at first means by it, is that as civilization advances,\r\nthe sum of our possessions, physical and intellectual, is due in a\r\ndecreasing proportion to ourselves, and in an increasing one to our\r\nprogenitors. The use he makes of it is, that we should submit ourselves\r\nmore and more implicitly to the authority of previous generations, and\r\nsuffer ourselves less and less to doubt their judgment, or test by our\r\nown reason the grounds of their opinions. The unwillingness of the human\r\nintellect and conscience, in their present state of \"anarchy,\" to sign\r\ntheir own abdication, lie calls \"the insurrection of the living against\r\nthe dead.\" To this complexion has Positive Philosophy come at last!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWorse, however, remains to be told. M. Comte selects a hundred volumes\r\nof science, philosophy, poetry, history, and general knowledge, which he\r\ndeems a sufficient library for every positivist, even of the theoretic\r\norder, and actually proposes a systematic holocaust of books in\r\ngeneral\u0026mdash;it would almost seem of all books except these. Even that to\r\nwhich he shows most indulgence, poetry, except the very best, is to\r\nundergo a similar fate, with the reservation of select passages, on the\r\nground that, poetry being intended to cultivate our instinct of ideal\r\nperfection, any kind of it that is less than the best is worse than\r\nnone. This imitation of the error, we will call it the crime, of the\r\nearly Christians\u0026mdash;and in an exaggerated form, for even they destroyed\r\nonly those writings of pagans or heretics which were directed against\r\nthemselves\u0026mdash;is the one thing in M. Comte\u0027s projects which merits real\r\nindignation. When once M. Comte has decided, all evidence on the other\r\nside, nay, the very historical evidence on which he grounded his\r\ndecision, had better perish. When mankind have enlisted under his\r\nbanner, they must burn their ships. There is, though in a less offensive\r\nform, the same overweening presumption in a suggestion he makes, that\r\nall species of animals and plants which are useless to man should be\r\nsystematically rooted out. As if any one could presume to assert that\r\nthe smallest weed may not, as knowledge advances, be found to have some\r\nproperty serviceable to man. When we consider that the united power of\r\nthe whole human race cannot reproduce a species once eradicated\u0026mdash;that\r\nwhat is once done, in the extirpation of races, can never be repaired;\r\none can only be thankful that amidst all which the past rulers of\r\nmankind have to answer for, they have never come up to the measure of\r\nthe great regenerator of Humanity; mankind have not yet been under the\r\nrule of one who assumes that he knows all there is to be known, and that\r\nwhen he has put himself at the head of humanity, the book of human\r\nknowledge may be closed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf course M. Comte does not make this assumption consistently. He does\r\nnot imagine that he actually possesses all knowledge, but only that he\r\nis an infallible judge what knowledge is worth possessing. He does not\r\nbelieve that mankind have reached in all directions the extreme limits\r\nof useful and laudable scientific inquiry. He thinks there is a large\r\nscope for it still, in adding to our power over the external world, but\r\nchiefly in perfecting our own physical, intellectual, and moral nature.\r\nHe holds that all our mental strength should be economized, for the\r\npursuit of this object in the mode leading most directly to the end.\r\nWith this view, some one problem should always be selected, the solution\r\nof which would be more important than any other to the interests of\r\nhumanity, and upon this the entire intellectual resources of the\r\ntheoretic mind should be concentrated, until it is either resolved, or\r\nhas to be given up as insoluble: after which mankind should go on to\r\nanother, to be pursued with similar exclusiveness. The selection of this\r\nproblem of course rests with the sacerdotal order, or in other words,\r\nwith the High Priest. We should then see the whole speculative intellect\r\nof the human race simultaneously at work on one question, by orders from\r\nabove, as a French minister of public instruction once boasted that a\r\nmillion of boys were saying the same lesson during the same half-hour in\r\nevery town and village of France. The reader will be anxious to know,\r\nhow much better and more wisely the human intellect will be applied\r\nunder this absolute monarchy, and to what degree this system of\r\ngovernment will be preferable to the present anarchy, in which every\r\ntheorist does what is intellectually right in his own eyes. M. Comte has\r\nnot left us in ignorance on this point. He gives us ample means of\r\njudging. The Pontiff of Positivism informs us what problem, in his\r\nopinion, should be selected before all others for this united pursuit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat this problem is, we must leave those who are curious on the subject\r\nto learn from the treatise itself. When they have done so, they will be\r\nqualified to form their own opinion of the amount of advantage which the\r\ngeneral good of mankind would be likely to derive, from exchanging the\r\npresent \"dispersive speciality\" and \"intellectual anarchy\" for the\r\nsubordination of the intellect to the \u003ci\u003ecoeur\u003c/i\u003e, personified in a High\r\nPriest, prescribing a single problem for the undivided study of the\r\ntheoretic mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have given a sufficient general idea of M. Comte\u0027s plan for the\r\nregeneration of human society, by putting an end to anarchy, and\r\n\"systematizing\" human thought and conduct under the direction of\r\nfeeling. But an adequate conception will not have been formed of the\r\nheight of his self-confidence, until something more has been told. Be it\r\nknown, then, that M. Comte by no means proposes this new constitution of\r\nsociety for realization in the remote future. A complete plan of\r\nmeasures of transition is ready prepared, and he determines the year,\r\nbefore the end of the present century, in which the new spiritual and\r\ntemporal powers will be installed, and the regime of our maturity will\r\nbegin. He did not indeed calculate on converting to Positivism, within\r\nthat time, more than a thousandth part of all the heads of families in\r\nWestern Europe and its offshoots beyond the Atlantic. But he fixes the\r\ntime necessary for the complete political establishment of Positivism at\r\nthirty-three years, divided into three periods, of seven, five, and\r\ntwenty-one years respectively. At the expiration of seven, the direction\r\nof public education in France would be placed in M. Comte\u0027s hands. In\r\nfive years more, the Emperor Napoleon, or his successor, will resign his\r\npower to a provisional triumvirate, composed of three eminent\r\nproletaires of the positivist faith; for proletaires, though not fit for\r\npermanent rule, are the best agents of the transition, being the most\r\nfree from the prejudices which are the chief obstacle to it. These\r\nrulers will employ the remaining twenty-one years in preparing society\r\nfor its final constitution; and after duly installing the Spiritual\r\nPower, and effecting the decomposition of France into the seventeen\r\nrepublics before mentioned, will give over the temporal government of\r\neach to the normal dictatorship of the three bankers. A man may be\r\ndeemed happy, but scarcely modest, who had such boundless confidence in\r\nhis own powers of foresight, and expected so complete a triumph of his\r\nown ideas on the reconstitution of society within the possible limits of\r\nhis lifetime. If he could live (he said) to the age of Pontenelle, or of\r\nHobbes, or even of Voltaire, he should see all this realized, or as good\r\nas realized. He died, however, at sixty, without leaving any disciple\r\nsufficiently advanced to be appointed his successor. There is now a\r\nCollege, and a Director, of Positivism; but Humanity no longer possesses\r\na High Priest.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat more remains to be said may be despatched more summarily. Its\r\ninterest is philosophic rather than practical. In his four volumes of\r\n\"Politique Positive,\" M. Comte revises and reelaborates the scientific\r\nand historical expositions of his first treatise. His object is to\r\nsystematize (again to systematize) knowledge from the human or\r\nsubjective point of view, the only one, he contends, from which a real\r\nsynthesis is possible. For (he says) the knowledge attainable by us of\r\nthe laws of the universe is at best fragmentary, and incapable of\r\nreduction to a real unity. An objective synthesis, the dream of\r\nDescartes and the best thinkers of old, is impossible. The laws of the\r\nreal world are too numerous, and the manner of their working into one\r\nanother too intricate, to be, as a general rule, correctly traced and\r\nrepresented by our reason. The only connecting principle in our\r\nknowledge is its relation to our wants, and it is upon that we must\r\nfound our systematization. The answer to this is, first, that there is\r\nno necessity for an universal synthesis; and secondly, that the same\r\narguments may be used against the possibility of a complete subjective,\r\nas of a complete objective systematization. A subjective synthesis must\r\nconsist in the arrangement and co-ordination of all useful knowledge, on\r\nthe basis of its relation to human wants and interests. But those wants\r\nand interests are, like the laws of the universe, extremely\r\nmultifarious, and the order of preference among them in all their\r\ndifferent gradations (for it varies according to the degree of each)\r\ncannot be cast into precise general propositions. M. Comte\u0027s subjective\r\nsynthesis consists only in eliminating from the sciences everything that\r\nhe deems useless, and presenting as far as possible every theoretical\r\ninvestigation as the solution of a practical problem. To this, however,\r\nhe cannot consistently adhere; for, in every science, the theoretic\r\ntruths are much more closely connected with one another than with the\r\nhuman purposes which they eventually serve, and can only be made to\r\ncohere in the intellect by being, to a great degree, presented as if\r\nthey were truths of pure reason, irrespective of any practical\r\napplication.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are many things eminently characteristic of M. Comte\u0027s second\r\ncareer, in this revision of the results of his first. Under the head of\r\nBiology, and for the better combination of that science with Sociology\r\nand Ethics, he found that he required a new system of Phrenology, being\r\njustly dissatisfied with that of Gall and his successors. Accordingly he\r\nset about constructing one \u003ci\u003e\u0026egrave; priori\u003c/i\u003e, grounded on the best enumeration\r\nand classification he could make of the elementary faculties of our\r\nintellectual, moral, and animal nature; to each of which he assigned an\r\nhypothetical place in the skull, the most conformable that he could to\r\nthe few positive facts on the subject which he considered as\r\nestablished, and to the general presumption that functions which react\r\nstrongly on one another must have their organs adjacent: leaving the\r\nlocalities avowedly to be hereafter verified, by anatomical and\r\ninductive investigation. There is considerable merit in this attempt,\r\nthough it is liable to obvious criticisms, of the same nature as his own\r\nupon Gall. But the characteristic thing is, that while presenting all\r\nthis as hypothesis waiting for verification, he could not have taken its\r\ntruth more completely for granted if the verification had been made. In\r\nall that he afterwards wrote, every detail of his theory of the brain is\r\nas unhesitatingly asserted, and as confidently built upon, as any other\r\ndoctrine of science. This is his first great attempt in the \"Subjective\r\nMethod,\" which, originally meaning only the subordination of the pursuit\r\nof truth to human uses, had already come to mean drawing truth itself\r\nfrom the fountain of his own mind. He had become, on the one hand,\r\nalmost indifferent to proof, provided he attained theoretic coherency,\r\nand on the other, serenely confident that even the guesses which\r\noriginated with himself could not but come out true.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is one point in his later view of the sciences, which appears to\r\nus a decided improvement on his earlier. He adds to the six fundamental\r\nsciences of his original scale, a seventh under the name of Morals,\r\nforming the highest step of the ladder, immediately after Sociology:\r\nremarking that it might, with still greater propriety, be termed\r\nAnthropology, being the science of individual human nature, a study,\r\nwhen rightly understood, more special and complicated than even that of\r\nSociety. For it is obliged to take into consideration the diversities of\r\nconstitution and temperament (la r\u0026eacute;action c\u0026eacute;r\u0026eacute;brale des visc\u0026egrave;res\r\nv\u0026eacute;g\u0026eacute;tatifs) the effects of which, still very imperfectly understood, are\r\nhighly important in the individual, but in the theory of society may be\r\nneglected, because, differing in different persons, they neutralize one\r\nanother on the large scale. This is a remark worthy of M. Comte in his\r\nbest days; and the science thus conceived is, as he says, the true\r\nscientific foundation of the art of Morals (and indeed of the art of\r\nhuman life), which, therefore, may, both philosophically and\r\ndidactically, be properly combined with it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHis philosophy of general history is recast, and in many respects\r\nchanged; we cannot but say, greatly for the worse. He gives much greater\r\ndevelopment than before to the Fetishistic, and to what he terms the\r\nTheocratic, periods. To the Fetishistic view of nature he evinces a\r\npartiality, which appears strange in a Positive philosopher. But the\r\nreason is that Fetish-worship is a religion of the feelings, and not at\r\nall of the intelligence. He regards it as cultivating universal love: as\r\na practical fact it cultivates much rather universal fear. He looks upon\r\nFetishism as much more akin to Positivism than any of the forms of\r\nTheology, inasmuch as these consider matter as inert, and moved only by\r\nforces, natural and supernatural, exterior to itself: while Fetishism\r\nresembles Positivism in conceiving matter as spontaneously active, and\r\nerrs only by not distinguishing activity from life. As if the\r\nsuperstition of the Fetishist consisted only in believing that the\r\nobjects which produce the phaenomena of nature involuntarily, produce\r\nthem voluntarily. The Fetishist thinks not merely that his Fetish is\r\nalive, but that it can help him in war, can cure him of diseases, can\r\ngrant him prosperity, or afflict him with all the contrary evils.\r\nTherein consists the lamentable effect of Fetishism\u0026mdash;its degrading and\r\nprostrating influence on the feelings and conduct, its conflict with all\r\ngenuine experience, and antagonism to all real knowledge of nature.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eM. Comte had also no small sympathy with the Oriental theocracies, as he\r\ncalls the sacerdotal castes, who indeed often deserved it by their early\r\nservices to intellect and civilization; by the aid they gave to the\r\nestablishment of regular government, the valuable though empirical\r\nknowledge they accumulated, and the height to which they helped to carry\r\nsome of the useful arts. M. Comte admits that they became oppressive,\r\nand that the prolongation of their ascendancy came to be incompatible\r\nwith further improvement. But he ascribes this to their having arrogated\r\nto themselves the temporal government, which, so far as we have any\r\nauthentic information, they never did. The reason why the sacerdotal\r\ncorporations became oppressive, was because they were organized: because\r\nthey attempted the \"unity\" and \"systematization\" so dear to M. Comte,\r\nand allowed no science and no speculation, except with their leave and\r\nunder their direction. M. Comte\u0027s sacerdotal order, which, in his\r\nsystem, has all the power that ever they had, would be oppressive in the\r\nsame manner; with no variation but that which arises from the altered\r\nstate of society and of the human mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eM. Comte\u0027s partiality to the theocracies is strikingly contrasted with\r\nhis dislike of the Greeks, whom as a people he thoroughly detests, for\r\ntheir undue addiction to intellectual speculation, and considers to have\r\nbeen, by an inevitable fatality, morally sacrificed to the formation of\r\na few great scientific intellects,\u0026mdash;principally Aristotle, Archimedes,\r\nApollonius, and Hipparchus. Any one who knows Grecian history as it can\r\nnow be known, will be amazed at M. Comte\u0027s travestie of it, in which the\r\nvulgarest historical prejudices are accepted and exaggerated, to\r\nillustrate the mischiefs of intellectual culture left to its own\r\nguidance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is no need to analyze further M. Comte\u0027s second view of universal\r\nhistory. The best chapter is that on the Romans, to whom, because they\r\nwere greater in practice than in theory, and for centuries worked\r\ntogether in obedience to a social sentiment (though only that of their\r\ncountry\u0027s aggrandizement), M. Comte is as favourably affected, as he is\r\ninimical to all but a small selection of eminent thinkers among the\r\nGreeks. The greatest blemish in this chapter is the idolatry of Julius\r\nCaesar, whom M. Comte regards as one of the most illustrious characters\r\nin history, and of the greatest practical benefactors of mankind. Caesar\r\nhad many eminent qualities, but what he did to deserve such praise we\r\nare at a loss to discover, except subverting a free government: that\r\nmerit, however, with M. Comte, goes a great way. It did not, in his\r\nformer days, suffice to rehabilitate Napoleon, whose name and memory he\r\nregarded with a bitterness highly honourable to himself, and whose\r\ncareer he deemed one of the greatest calamities in modern history. But\r\nin his later writings these sentiments are considerably mitigated: he\r\nregards Napoleon as a more estimable \"dictator\" than Louis Philippe, and\r\nthinks that his greatest error was re-establishing the Academy of\r\nSciences! That this should be said by M. Comte, and said of Napoleon,\r\nmeasures the depth to which his moral standard had fallen.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe last volume which he published, that on the Philosophy of\r\nMathematics, is in some respects a still sadder picture of intellectual\r\ndegeneracy than those which preceded it. After the admirable r\u0026eacute;sum\u0026eacute; of\r\nthe subject in the first volume of his first great work, we expected\r\nsomething of the very highest order when he returned to the subject for\r\na more thorough treatment of it. But, being the commencement of a\r\nSynth\u0026egrave;se Subjective, it contains, as might be expected, a great deal\r\nthat is much more subjective than mathematical. Nor of this do we\r\ncomplain: but we little imagined of what nature this subjective matter\r\nwas to be. M. Comte here joins together the two ideas, which, of all\r\nthat he has put forth, are the most repugnant to the fundamental\r\nprinciples of Positive Philosophy. One of them is that on which we have\r\njust commented, the assimilation between Positivism and Fetishism. The\r\nother, of which we took notice in a former article, was the \"libert\u0026eacute;\r\nfacultative\" of shaping our scientific conceptions to gratify the\r\ndemands not solely of objective truth, but of intellectual and aesthetic\r\nsuitability. It would be an excellent thing, M. Comte thinks, if science\r\ncould be deprived of its \u003ci\u003es\u0026eacute;cheresse\u003c/i\u003e, and directly associated with\r\nsentiment. Now it is impossible to prove that the external world, and\r\nthe bodies composing it, are not endowed with feeling, and voluntary\r\nagency. It is therefore highly desirable that we should educate\r\nourselves into imagining that they are. Intelligence it will not do to\r\ninvest them with, for some distinction must be maintained between simple\r\nactivity and life. But we may suppose that they feel what is done to\r\nthem, and desire and will what they themselves do. Even intelligence,\r\nwhich we must deny to them in the present, may be attributed to them in\r\nthe past. Before man existed, the earth, at that time an intelligent\r\nbeing, may have exerted \"its physico-chemical activity so as to improve\r\nthe astronomical order by changing its principal coefficients. Our\r\nplanet may be supposed to have rendered its orbit less excentric, and\r\nthereby more habitable, by planning a long series of explosions,\r\nanalogous to those from which, according to the best hypotheses, comets\r\nproceed. Judiciously reproduced, similar shocks may have rendered the\r\ninclination of the earth\u0027s axis better adapted to the future wants of\r\nthe Grand Etre. \u003ci\u003eA fortiori\u003c/i\u003e the Earth may have modified its own figure,\r\nwhich is only beyond our intervention because our spiritual ascendancy\r\nhas not at its disposal a sufficient material force.\" The like may be\r\nconceived as having been done by each of the other planets, in concert,\r\npossibly, with the Earth and with one another. \"In proportion as each\r\nplanet improved its own condition, its life exhausted itself by excess\r\nof innervation; but with the consolation of rendering its self-devotion\r\nmore efficacious, when the extinction of its special functions, first\r\nanimal, and finally vegetative, reduced it to the universal attributes\r\nof feeling and activity.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_25_25\" id=\"FNanchor_25_25\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_25_25\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[25]\u003c/a\u003e This stuff, though he calls it fiction, he\r\nsoon after speaks of as belief (croyance), to be greatly recommended, as\r\nat once satisfying our natural curiosity, and \"perfecting our unity\"\r\n(again unity!) \"by supplying the gaps in our scientific notions with\r\npoetic fictions, and developing sympathetic emotions and aesthetic\r\ninspirations: the world being conceived as aspiring to second mankind in\r\nameliorating the universal order under the impulse of the Grand Etre.\"\r\nAnd he obviously intends that we should be trained to make these\r\nfantastical inventions permeate all our associations, until we are\r\nincapable of conceiving the world and Nature apart from them, and they\r\nbecome equivalent to, and are in fact transformed into, real beliefs.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWretched as this is, it is singularly characteristic of M. Comte\u0027s later\r\nmode of thought. A writer might be excused for introducing into an\r\navowed work of fancy this dance of the planets, and conception of an\r\nanimated Earth. If finely executed, he might even be admired for it. No\r\none blames a poet for ascribing feelings, purposes, and human\r\npropensities to flowers. Because a conception might be interesting, and\r\nperhaps edifying, in a poem, M. Comte would have it imprinted on the\r\ninmost texture of every human mind in ordinary prose. If the imagination\r\nwere not taught its prescribed lesson equally with the reason, where\r\nwould be Unity? \"It is important that the domain of fiction should\r\nbecome as \u003ci\u003esystematic\u003c/i\u003e as that of demonstration, in order that their\r\nmutual harmony may be conformable to their respective destinations, both\r\nequally directed towards the continual increase of \u003ci\u003eunity\u003c/i\u003e, personal and\r\nsocial.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_26_26\" id=\"FNanchor_26_26\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_26_26\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[26]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNor is it enough to have created the Grand F\u0026eacute;tiche (so he actually\r\nproposes to call the Earth), and to be able to include it and all\r\nconcrete existence in our adoration along with the Grand Etre. It is\r\nnecessary also to extend Positivist Fetishism to purely abstract\r\nexistence; to \"animate\" the laws as well as the facts of nature. It is\r\nnot sufficient to have made physics sentimental, mathematics must be\r\nmade so too. This does not at first seem easy; but M. Comte finds the\r\nmeans of accomplishing it. His plan is, to make Space also an object of\r\nadoration, under the name of the Grand Milieu, and consider it as the\r\nrepresentative of Fatality in general. \"The final \u003ci\u003eunity\u003c/i\u003e disposes us to\r\ncultivate sympathy by developing our gratitude to whatever serves the\r\nGrand Etre. It must dispose us to venerate the Fatality on which reposes\r\nthe whole aggregate of our existence.\" We should conceive this Fatality\r\nas having a fixed seat, and that seat must be considered to be Space,\r\nwhich should be conceived as possessing feeling, but not activity or\r\nintelligence. And in our abstract speculations we should imagine all our\r\nconceptions as located in free Space. Our images of all sorts, down to\r\nour geometrical diagrams, and even our ciphers and algebraic symbols,\r\nshould always be figured to ourselves as written in space, and not on\r\npaper or any other material substance. M. Comte adds that they should be\r\nconceived as green on a white ground.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe cannot go on any longer with this. In spite of it all, the volume on\r\nmathematics is full of profound thoughts, and will be very suggestive to\r\nthose who take up the subject after M. Comte. What deep meaning there\r\nis, for example, in the idea that the infinitesimal calculus is a\r\nconception analogous to the corpuscular hypothesis in physics; which\r\nlast M. Comte has always considered as a logical artifice; not an\r\nopinion respecting matters of fact. The assimilation, as it seems to us,\r\nthrows a flood of light on both conceptions; on the physical one still\r\nmore than the mathematical. We might extract many ideas of similar,\r\nthough none perhaps of equal, suggestiveness. But mixed with these, what\r\npitiable \u003ci\u003eniaiseries\u003c/i\u003e! One of his great points is the importance of the\r\n\"moral and intellectual properties of numbers.\" He cultivates a\r\nsuperstitious reverence for some of them. The first three are sacred,\r\n\u003ci\u003eles nombres sacr\u0026eacute;s\u003c/i\u003e: One being the type of all Synthesis, Two of all\r\nCombination, which he now says \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e always binary (in his first treatise\r\nhe only said that we may usefully represent it to ourselves as being\r\nso), and Three of all Progression, which not only requires three terms,\r\nbut as he now maintains, never ought to have any more. To these sacred\r\nnumbers all our mental operations must be made, as far as possible, to\r\nadjust themselves. Next to them, he has a great partiality for the\r\nnumber seven; for these whimsical reasons: \"Composed of two progressions\r\nfollowed by a synthesis, or of one progression between two couples, the\r\nnumber seven, coming next after the sum of the three sacred numbers,\r\ndetermines the largest group which we can distinctly imagine.\r\nReciprocally, it marks the limit of the divisions which we can directly\r\nconceive in a magnitude of any kind.\" The number seven, therefore, must\r\nbe foisted in wherever possible, and among other things, is to be made\r\nthe basis of numeration, which is hereafter to be septimal instead of\r\ndecimal: producing all the inconvenience of a change of system, not only\r\nwithout getting rid of, but greatly aggravating, the disadvantages of\r\nthe existing one. But then, he says, it is absolutely necessary that the\r\nbasis of numeration should be a prime number. All other people think it\r\nabsolutely necessary that it should not, and regard the present basis as\r\nonly objectionable in not being divisible enough. But M. Comte\u0027s puerile\r\npredilection for prime numbers almost passes belief. His reason is that\r\nthey are the type of irreductibility: each of them is a kind of ultimate\r\narithmetical fact. This, to any one who knows M. Comte in his later\r\naspects, is amply sufficient. Nothing can exceed his delight in anything\r\nwhich says to the human mind, Thus far shalt thou go and no farther. If\r\nprime numbers are precious, doubly prime numbers are doubly so; meaning\r\nthose which are not only themselves prime numbers, but the number which\r\nmarks their place in the series of prime numbers is a prime number.\r\nStill greater is the dignity of trebly prime numbers; when the number\r\nmarking the place of this second number is also prime. The number\r\nthirteen fulfils these conditions: it is a prime number, it is the\r\nseventh prime number, and seven is the fifth prime number. Accordingly\r\nhe has an outrageous partiality to the number thirteen. Though one of\r\nthe most inconvenient of all small numbers, he insists on introducing it\r\neverywhere.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese strange conceits are connected with a highly characteristic\r\nexample of M. Comte\u0027s frenzy for regulation. He cannot bear that\r\nanything should be left unregulated: there ought to be no such thing as\r\nhesitation; nothing should remain arbitrary, for \u003ci\u003el\u0027arbitraire\u003c/i\u003e is\r\nalways favourable to egoism. Submission to artificial prescriptions is\r\nas indispensable as to natural laws, and he boasts that under the reign\r\nof sentiment, human life may be made equally, and even more, regular\r\nthan the courses of the stars. But the great instrument of exact\r\nregulation for the details of life is numbers: fixed numbers, therefore,\r\nshould be introduced into all our conduct. M. Comte\u0027s first application\r\nof this system was to the correction of his own literary style.\r\nComplaint had been made, not undeservedly, that in his first great work,\r\nespecially in the latter part of it, the sentences and paragraphs were\r\nlong, clumsy, and involved. To correct this fault, of which he was\r\naware, he imposed on himself the following rules. No sentence was to\r\nexceed two lines of his manuscript, equivalent to five of print. No\r\nparagraph was to consist of more than seven sentences. He further\r\napplied to his prose writing the rule of French versification which\r\nforbids a \u003ci\u003ehiatus\u003c/i\u003e(the concourse of two vowels), not allowing it to\r\nhimself even at the break between two sentences or two paragraphs; nor\r\ndid he permit himself ever to use the same word twice, either in the\r\nsame sentence or in two consecutive sentences, though belonging to\r\ndifferent paragraphs: with the exception of the monosyllabic\r\nauxiliaries.[27] All this is well enough, especially the first two\r\nprecepts, and a good way of breaking through a bad habit. But M. Comte\r\npersuaded himself that any arbitrary restriction, though in no way\r\nemanating from, and therefore necessarily disturbing, the natural order\r\nand proportion of the thoughts, is a benefit in itself, and tends to\r\nimprove style. If it renders composition vastly more difficult, he\r\nrejoices at it, as tending to confine writing to superior minds.\r\nAccordingly, in the Synth\u0026egrave;se Subjective, he institutes the\r\nfollowing \"plan for all compositions of importance.\" \"Every volume\r\nreally capable of forming a distinct treatise\" should consist of \"seven\r\nchapters, besides the introduction and the conclusion; and each of these\r\nshould be composed of three parts.\" Each third part of a chapter should\r\nbe divided into \"seven sections, each composed of seven groups of\r\nsentences, separated by the usual break of line. Normally formed, the\r\nsection offers a central group of seven sentences, preceded and followed\r\nby three groups of five: the first section of each part reduces to three\r\nsentences three of its groups, symmetrically placed; the last section\r\ngives seven sentences to each of its extreme groups. These rules of\r\ncomposition make prose approach to the regularity of poetry, when\r\ncombined with my previous reduction of the maximum length of a sentence\r\nto two manuscript or five printed lines, that is, 250 letters.\"\r\n\"Normally constructed, great poems consist of thirteen cantos,\r\ndecomposed into parts, sections, and groups like my chapters, saving the\r\ncomplete equality of the groups and of the sections.\" \"This difference\r\nof structure between volumes of poetry and of philosophy is more\r\napparent than real, for the introduction and the conclusion of a poem\r\nshould comprehend six of its thirteen cantos,\" leaving, therefore, the\r\ncabalistic numeber seven for the body of the poem. And all this\r\nregulation not being sufficiently meaningless, fantastic, and\r\noppressive, he invents an elaborate system for compelling each of his\r\nsections and groups to begin with a letter of the alphabet, determined\r\nbeforehand, the letters being selected so as to compose words having\r\n\"a synthetic or sympathetic signification,\" and as close a relation as\r\npossible to the section or part to which they are appropriated.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOthers may laugh, but we could far rather weep at this melancholy\r\ndecadence of a great intellect. M. Comte used to reproach his early\r\nEnglish admirers with maintaining the \"conspiracy of silence\" concerning\r\nhis later performances. The reader can now judge whether such reticence\r\nis not more than sufficiently explained by tenderness for his fame, and\r\na conscientious fear of bringing undeserved discredit on the noble\r\nspeculations of his early career.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eM. Comte was accustomed to consider Descartes and Leibnitz as his\r\nprincipal precursors, and the only great philosophers (among many\r\nthinkers of high philosophic capacity) in modern times. It was to their\r\nminds that he considered his own to bear the nearest resemblance. Though\r\nwe have not so lofty an opinion of any of the three as M. Comte had, we\r\nthink the assimilation just: thes were, of all recorded thinkers, the\r\ntwo who bore most resemblance to M. Comte. They were\r\nlike him in earnestness, like him, though scarcely equal to him, in\r\nconfidence in themselves; they had the same extraordinary power of\r\nconcatenation and co-ordination; they enriched human knowledge with\r\ngreat truths and great conceptions of method; they were, of all great\r\nscientific thinkers, the most consistent, and for that reason often the\r\nmost absurd, because they shrank from no consequences, however contrary\r\nto common sense, to which their premises appeared to lead. Accordingly\r\ntheir names have come down to us associated with grand thoughts, with\r\nmost important discoveries, and also with some of the most extravagantly\r\nwild and ludicrously absurd conceptions and theories which ever were\r\nsolemnly propounded by thoughtful men. \"We think M. Comte as great as\r\neither of these philosophers, and hardly more extravagant. Were we to\r\nspeak our whole mind, we should call him superior to them: though not\r\nintrinsically, yet by the exertion of equal intellectual power in a more\r\nadvanced state of human preparation; but also in an age less tolerant of\r\npalpable absurdities, and to which those he has committed, if not in\r\nthemselves greater, at least appear more ridiculous.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTHE END.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\u003ch3\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_1_1\" id=\"Footnote_1_1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_1_1\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[1]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See the Chapter on Efficient Causes in Reid\u0027s \"Essays on\r\nthe Active Powers,\" which is avowedly grounded on Newton\u0027s ideas.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_2_2\" id=\"Footnote_2_2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_2_2\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[2]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mr Herbert Spencer, who also distinguishes between abstract\r\nand concrete sciences, employs the terms in a different sense from that\r\nexplained above. He calls a science abstract when its truths are merely\r\nideal; when, like the truths of geometry, they are not exactly true of\r\nreal things\u0026mdash;or, like the so-called law of inertia (the persistence in\r\ndirection and velocity of a motion once impressed) are \"involved\" in\r\nexperience but never actually seen in it, being always more or less\r\ncompletely frustrated. Chemistry and biology he includes, on the\r\ncontrary, among concrete sciences, because chemical combinations and\r\ndecompositions, and the physiological action of tissues, do actually\r\ntake place (as our senses testify) in the manner in which the scientific\r\npropositions state them to take place. We will not discuss the logical\r\nor philological propriety of either use of the terms abstract and\r\nconcrete, in which twofold point of view very few of the numerous\r\nacceptations of these words are entirely defensible: but of the two\r\ndistinctions M. Comte\u0027s answers to by far the deepest and most vital\r\ndifference. Mr Spencer\u0027s is open to the radical objection, that it\r\nclassifies truths not according to their subject-matter or their mutual\r\nrelations, but according to an unimportant difference in the manner in\r\nwhich we come to know them. Of what consequence is it that the law of\r\ninertia (considered as an exact truth) is not generalized from our\r\ndirect perceptions, but inferred by combining with the movements which\r\nwe see, those which we should see if it were not for the disturbing\r\ncauses? In either case we are equally certain that it \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e an exact\r\ntruth: for every dynamical law is perfectly fulfilled even when it seems\r\nto be counteracted. There must, we should think, be many truths in\r\nphysiology (for example) which are only known by a similar indirect\r\nprocess; and Mr Spencer would hardly detach these from the body of the\r\nscience, and call them abstract and the remainder concrete.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_3_3\" id=\"Footnote_3_3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_3_3\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[3]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Syst\u0026egrave;me de Politique Positive, ii. 36.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_4_4\" id=\"Footnote_4_4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_4_4\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[4]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The strongest case which Mr Spencer produces of a\r\nscientifically ascertained law, which, though belonging to a later\r\nscience, was necessary to the scientific formation of one occupying an\r\nearlier place in M. Comte\u0027s series, is the law of the accelerating force\r\nof gravity; which M. Comte places in Physics, but without which the\r\nNewtonian theory of the celestial motions could not have been\r\ndiscovered, nor could even now be proved. This fact, as is judiciously\r\nremarked by M. Littr\u0026eacute;, is not valid against the plan of M. Comte\u0027s\r\nclassification, but discloses a slight error in the detail. M. Comte\r\nshould not have placed the laws of terrestrial gravity under Physics.\r\nThey are part of the general theory of gravitation, and belong to\r\nastronomy. Mr Spencer has hit one of the weak points in M. Comte\u0027s\r\nscientific scale; weak however only because left unguarded. Astronomy,\r\nthe second of M. Comte\u0027s abstract sciences, answers to his own\r\ndefinition of a concrete science. M. Comte however was only wrong in\r\noverlooking a distinction. There \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e an abstract science of astronomy,\r\nnamely, the theory of gravitation, which would equally agree with and\r\nexplain the facts of a totally different solar system from the one of\r\nwhich our earth forms a part. The actual facts of our own system, the\r\ndimensions, distances, velocities, temperatures, physical constitution,\r\n\u0026amp;c., of the sun, earth, and planets, are properly the subject of a\r\nconcrete science, similar to natural history; but the concrete is more\r\ninseparably united to the abstract science than in any other case, since\r\nthe few celestial facts really accessible to us are nearly all required\r\nfor discovering and proving the law of gravitation as an universal\r\nproperty of bodies, and have therefore an indispensable place in the\r\nabstract science as its fundamental data.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_5_5\" id=\"Footnote_5_5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_5_5\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[5]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The only point at which the general principle of the series\r\nfails in its application, is the subdivision of Physics; and there, as\r\nthe subordination of the different branches scarcely exists, their order\r\nis of little consequence. Thermology, indeed, is altogether an exception\r\nto the principle of decreasing generality, heat, as Mr Spencer truly\r\nsays being as universal as gravitation. But the place of Thermology is\r\nmarked out, within certain narrow limits, by the ends of the\r\nclassification, though not by its principle. The desideratum is, that\r\nevery science should precede those which cannot be scientifically\r\nconstitute or rationally studied until it is known. It is as a means to\r\nthis end, that the arrangement of the phaenomena in the order of their\r\ndependence on one another is important. Now, though heat is as universal\r\na phaenomenon as any which external nature presents, its laws do not\r\naffect, in any manner important to us, the phaenomena of Astronomy, and\r\noperate in the other branches of Physics only as slight modifying\r\nagencies, the consideration of which may be postponed to a rather\r\nadvanced stage. But the phaenomena of Chemistry and Biology depend on\r\nthem often for their very existence. The ends of the classification\r\nrequire therefore that Thermology should precede Chemistry and Biology,\r\nbut do not demand that it should be thrown farther back. On the other\r\nhand, those same ends, in another point of view, require that it should\r\nbe subsequent to Astronomy, for reasons not of doctrine but of method:\r\nAstronomy being the best school of the true art of interpreting Nature,\r\nby which Thermology profits like other sciences, but which it was ill\r\nadapted to originate.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_6_6\" id=\"Footnote_6_6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_6_6\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[6]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The philosophy of the subject is perhaps nowhere so well\r\nexpressed as in the \"Syst\u0026egrave;me de Politique Positive\" (iii. 41). \"Con\u0026ccedil;u\r\nlogiquement, l\u0027ordre suivant lequel nos principales th\u0026eacute;ories\r\naccomplissent l\u0027\u0026eacute;volution fondamentale r\u0026eacute;sulte n\u0026eacute;cessairement de leur\r\nd\u0026eacute;pendence mutuelle. Toutes les sciences peuvent, sans doute, \u0026ecirc;tre\r\n\u0026eacute;bauch\u0026eacute;es \u0026agrave; la fois: leur usage pratique exige m\u0026ecirc;me cette culture\r\nsimultan\u0026eacute;e. Mais elle ne peut concerner que les inductions propres \u0026agrave;\r\nchaque classe de sp\u0026eacute;culations. Or cet essor inductif ne saurait fournir\r\ndes principes suffisants qu\u0027envers les plus simples \u0026eacute;tudes. Partout\r\nailleurs, ils ne peuvent \u0026ecirc;tre \u0026eacute;tablis qu\u0027en subordonnant chaque genre\r\nd\u0027inductions scientifiques \u0026agrave; l\u0027ensemble des d\u0026eacute;ductions eman\u0026eacute;es des\r\ndomaines moins compliqu\u0026eacute;s, et d\u0026egrave;s-lors moins d\u0026eacute;pendants. Ainsi nos\r\ndiverses th\u0026eacute;ories reposent dogmatiquement les unes sur les autres,\r\nsuivant un ordre invariable, qui doit r\u0026eacute;gler historiquement leur\r\nav\u0026eacute;nement d\u0026eacute;cisif, les plus ind\u0026eacute;pendantes ayant toujours d\u0026ucirc; se\r\nd\u0026eacute;velopper plus t\u0026ocirc;t.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_7_7\" id=\"Footnote_7_7\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_7_7\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[7]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"Science,\" says Mr Spencer in his \"Genesis,\" \"while purely\r\ninductive is purely qualitative…. All quantitative prevision is\r\nreached deductively; induction can achieve only qualitative prevision.\"\r\nNow, if we remember that the very first accurate quantitative law of\r\nphysical phaenomena ever established, the law of the accelerating force\r\nof gravity, was discovered and proved by Galileo partly at least by\r\nexperiment; that the quantitative laws on which the whole theory of the\r\ncelestial motions is grounded, were generalized by Kepler from direct\r\ncomparison of observations; that the quantitative law of the\r\ncondensation of gases by pressure, the law of Boyle and Mariotte, was\r\narrived at by direct experiment; that the proportional quantities in\r\nwhich every known substance combines chemically with every other, were\r\nascertained by innumerable experiments, from which the general law of\r\nchemical equivalents, now the ground of the most exact quantitative\r\nprevisions, was an inductive generalization; we must conclude that Mr\r\nSpencer has committed himself to a general proposition, which a very\r\nslight consideration of truths perfectly known to him would have shown\r\nto be unsustainable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nAgain, in the very pamphlet in which Mr Spencer defends himself against\r\nthe supposition of being a disciple of M. Comte (\"The Classification of\r\nthe Sciences,\" p. 37), he speaks of \"M. Comte\u0027s adherent, Mr Buckle.\"\r\nNow, except in the opinion common to both, that history may be made a\r\nsubject of science, the speculations of these two thinkers are not only\r\ndifferent, but run in different channels, M. Comte applying himself\r\nprincipally to the laws of evolution common to all mankind, Mr Buckle\r\nalmost exclusively to the diversities: and it may be affirmed without\r\npresumption, that they neither saw the same truths, nor fell into the\r\nsame errors, nor defended their opinions, either true or erroneous, by\r\nthe same arguments. Indeed, it is one of the surprising things in the\r\ncase of Mr Buckle as of Mr Spencer, that being a man of kindred genius,\r\nof the same wide range of knowledge, and devoting himself to\r\nspeculations of the same kind, he profited so little by M. Comte.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nThese oversights prove nothing against the general accuracy of Mr\r\nSpencer\u0027s acquirements. They are mere lapses of inattention, such as\r\nthinkers who attempt speculations requiring that vast multitudes of\r\nfacts should be kept in recollection at once, can scarcely hope always\r\nto avoid.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_8_8\" id=\"Footnote_8_8\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_8_8\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[8]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e We refer particularly to the mystical metaphysics connected\r\nwith the negative sign, imaginary quantities, infinity and\r\ninfinitesimals, \u0026amp;c., all cleared up and put on a rational footing in the\r\nhighly philosophical treatises of Professor De Morgan.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_9_9\" id=\"Footnote_9_9\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_9_9\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[9]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Those who wish to see this idea followed out, are referred\r\nto \"A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive.\" It is not\r\nirrelevant to state that M. Comte, soon after the publication of that\r\nwork, expressed, both in a letter (published in M. Littr\u0026eacute;\u0027s volume) and\r\nin print, his high approval of it (especially of the Inductive part) as\r\na real contribution to the construction of the Positive Method. But we\r\ncannot discover that he was indebted to it for a single idea, or that it\r\ninfluenced, in the smallest particular, the course of his subsequent\r\nspeculations.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_10_10\" id=\"Footnote_10_10\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_10_10\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[10]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The force, however, of this last consideration has been\r\nmuch weakened by the progress of discovery since M. Comte left off\r\nstudying chemistry; it being now probable that most if not all\r\nsubstances, even elementary, are susceptible of \u003ci\u003eallotropic\u003c/i\u003e forms; as\r\nin the case of oxygen and ozone, the two forms of phosphorus, \u0026amp;c.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_11_11\" id=\"Footnote_11_11\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_11_11\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[11]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Thus; by considering prussic acid as a compound of\r\nhydrogen and cyanogen rather than of hydrogen and the elements of\r\ncyanogen (carbon and nitrogen), it is assimilated to a whole class of\r\nacid compounds between hydrogen and other substances, and a reason is\r\nthus found for its agreeing in their acid properties.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_12_12\" id=\"Footnote_12_12\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_12_12\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[12]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e According to Sir William Hamilton, as many as six; but\r\nnumerical precision in such matters is out of the question, and it is\r\nprobable that different minds have the power in different degrees.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_13_13\" id=\"Footnote_13_13\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_13_13\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[13]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Or, as afterwards corrected by him, the appetites and\r\nemotions, the active capacities, and the intellectual faculties; \"le\r\ncoeur,\" \"le caract\u0026egrave;re,\" and \"l\u0027esprit.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_14_14\" id=\"Footnote_14_14\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_14_14\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[14]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e M. Littr\u0026eacute;, who, though a warm admirer, and accepting the\r\nposition of a disciple of M. Comte, is singularly free from his errors,\r\nmakes the equally ingenious and just remark, that Political Economy\r\ncorresponds in social science to the theory of the nutritive functions\r\nin biology, which M. Comte, with all good physiologists, thinks it not\r\nonly permissible but a great and fundamental improvement to treat, in\r\nthe first place, separately, as the necessary basis of the higher\r\nbranches of the science: although the nutritive functions can no more be\r\nwithdrawn \u003ci\u003ein fact\u003c/i\u003e from the influence of the animal and human\r\nattributes, than the economical phaenomena of society from that of the\r\npolitical and moral.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_15_15\" id=\"Footnote_15_15\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_15_15\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[15]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Indeed his claim to be the creator of Sociology does not\r\nextend to this branch of the science; on the contrary, he, in a\r\nsubsequent work, expressly declares that the real founder of it was\r\nAristotle, by whom the theory of the conditions of social existence was\r\ncarried as far towards perfection as was possible in the absence of any\r\ntheory of Progress. Without going quite this length, we think it hardly\r\npossible to appreciate too highly the merit of those early efforts,\r\nbeyond which little progress had been made, until a very recent period,\r\neither in ethical or in political science.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_16_16\" id=\"Footnote_16_16\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_16_16\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[16]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It is due to them both to say, that he continued to\r\nexpress, in letters which have been published, a high opinion of her,\r\nboth morally and intellectually; and her persistent and strong concern\r\nfor his interests and his fame is attested both by M. Littr\u0026eacute; and by his\r\nown correspondence.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_17_17\" id=\"Footnote_17_17\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_17_17\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[17]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \"Of the Classification of the Sciences,\" pp. 37, 38.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_18_18\" id=\"Footnote_18_18\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_18_18\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[18]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In the case of Egypt we admit that there may be cited\r\nagainst us the authority of Plato, in whose Politicus it is said that\r\nthe king of Egypt must be a member of the priestly caste, or if by\r\nusurpation a member of any other caste acquired the sovereignty he must\r\nbe initiated with the sacerdotal order. But Plato was writing of a state\r\nof things which already belonged to the past; nor have we any assurance\r\nthat his information on Egyptian institutions was authentic and\r\naccurate. Had the king been necessarily or commonly a member of the\r\npriestly order, it is most improbable that the careful Herodotus, of\r\nwhose comprehensive work an entire book was devoted to a minute account\r\nof Egypt and its institutions, and who collected his information from\r\nEgyptian priests in the country itself, would have been ignorant of a\r\npart so important, and tending so much to exalt the dignity of the\r\npriesthood, who were much more likely to affirm it falsely to Plato than\r\nto withhold the knowledge of it if true from Heredotus. Not only is\r\nHerodotus silent respecting any such law or custom, but he thinks it\r\nneedful to mention that in one particular instance the king (by name\r\nSeth\u0026ocirc;s) was a priest, which he would scarcely have done if this had been\r\nother than an exceptional case. It is likely enough that a king of Egypt\r\nwould learn the hieratic character, and would not suffer any of the\r\nmysteries of law or religion which were in the keeping of the priests to\r\nbe withheld from him; and this was very probably all the foundation\r\nwhich existed for the assertion of the Eleatic stranger in Plato\u0027s\r\ndialogue.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_19_19\" id=\"Footnote_19_19\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_19_19\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[19]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mill, History of British India, book ii. chap. iii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_20_20\" id=\"Footnote_20_20\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_20_20\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[20]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e At a somewhat later period M. Comte drew up what he termed\r\na Positivist Calendar, in which every day was dedicated to some\r\nbenefactor of humanity (generally with the addition of a similar but\r\nminor luminary, to be celebrated in the room of his principal each\r\nbissextile year). In this no kind of human eminence, really useful, is\r\nomitted, except that which is merely negative and destructive. On this\r\nprinciple (which is avowed) the French \u003ci\u003ephilosophes\u003c/i\u003e as such are\r\nexcluded, those only among them being admitted who, like Voltaire and\r\nDiderot, had claims to admission on other grounds: and the Protestant\r\nreligious reformers are left out entirely, with the curious exception of\r\nGeorge Fox\u0026mdash;who is included, we presume, in consideration of his Peace\r\nprinciples.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_21_21\" id=\"Footnote_21_21\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_21_21\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[21]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e He goes still further and deeper in a subsequent work.\r\n\"L\u0027art ram\u0026egrave;ne doucement \u0026agrave; la r\u0026eacute;alite les contemplations trop abstraites\r\ndu th\u0026eacute;oricien, tandis qu\u0027il pousse noblement le praticien aux\r\nspeculations d\u0026eacute;sinteress\u0026eacute;es.\" Syst\u0026egrave;me de Politique Positive, i. 287.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_22_22\" id=\"Footnote_22_22\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_22_22\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[22]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e 1. \u003ci\u003eSyst\u0026egrave;me de Politique Positive, ou Trait\u0026eacute; de\r\nSociologie, instituant la Religion de l\u0027Humanit\u0026eacute;\u003c/i\u003e. 4 vols. 8vo. Paris:\r\n1851\u0026mdash;1854.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n2. \u003ci\u003eCat\u0026eacute;chisme Positiviste, ou Sommaire Exposition de la Religion\r\nUniverselle, en onze Entretiens Syst\u0026eacute;matiques entre une Femme et un\r\nPr\u0026ecirc;tre de l\u0027Humanit\u0026eacute;\u003c/i\u003e. 1 vol. 12mo. Paris: 1852.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n3. \u003ci\u003eAppel aux Conservateurs\u003c/i\u003e. Paris: 1855 (brochure).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n4. \u003ci\u003eSynth\u0026egrave;se Subjective, ou Syst\u0026egrave;me Universel des Conceptions propres \u0026agrave;\r\nl\u0027Etat Normal de l\u0027Humanit\u0026eacute;\u003c/i\u003e. Tome Premier, contenant le Syst\u0026egrave;me de\r\nLogique Positive, ou Trait\u0026eacute; de Philosophie Math\u0026eacute;matique. 8vo. Paris:\r\n1856.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n5. \u003ci\u003eAuguste Comte et la Philosophie Positive\u003c/i\u003e. Par E. LITTRE. 1 vol.\r\n8vo. Paris: 1863.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n6. \u003ci\u003eExposition Abr\u0026eacute;g\u0026eacute;e et Populaire de la Philosophie et de la Religion\r\nPositives\u003c/i\u003e. PAR C\u0026Eacute;LESTIN DE BLIGNI\u0026Egrave;RES, ancien \u0026eacute;l\u0026egrave;ve de l\u0027Ecole\r\nPolytechnique. 1 vol. 12mo. Paris: 1857.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n7. \u003ci\u003eNotice sur l\u0027Oeuvre et sur la Vie d\u0027Auguste Comte\u003c/i\u003e. Par le DOCTEUR\r\nROBINET, son M\u0026eacute;decin, et l\u0027un de ses treize Ex\u0026eacute;cuteurs Testamentaires. 1\r\nvol. 8vo. Paris: 1860.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_23_23\" id=\"Footnote_23_23\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_23_23\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[23]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Syst\u0026egrave;me de Politique Positive, iv. 100.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_24_24\" id=\"Footnote_24_24\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_24_24\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[24]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See Sir John Herschel\u0027s Outlines of Astronomy, \u0026sect; 319.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_25_25\" id=\"Footnote_25_25\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_25_25\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[25]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Synth\u0026egrave;se Subjective, pp. 10, 11.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_26_26\" id=\"Footnote_26_26\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_26_26\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[26]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Synth\u0026egrave;se Subjective, pp. 11, 12.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\nEnd of Project Gutenberg\u0027s August Comte and Positivism, by John-Stuart Mill\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}