Gorgias
{"WorkMasterId":7121,"WpPageId":287656,"ParentWpPageId":189509,"Slug":"gorgias","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/plato/gorgias/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/plato/gorgias/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":424211,"CleanHtmlLength":368101,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"Gorgias","Deck":"Gorgias opposes rhetoric without justice to philosophical care for the soul and examines power, pleasure, and punishment.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to Plato","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/plato/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"Plato","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/plato/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/plato-01-capitoline-bust-7.jpg","ImageAlt":"Plato bust in the Capitoline Museums","FilterTerra":"Eastern Mediterranean","ClickText":"Plato","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/plato/","Copies":["427 BCE – 347 BCE","Athens","Athenian philosopher of Forms, dialectic, recollection, the Good, tripartite soul, philosopher-rule, eros, rhetoric, language, cosmology, theology, the Academy, and the Platonic corpus."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:1","Title":"Ancient History","DateText":"3000 BCE – 499 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-ancient-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:3","Title":"Classical Antiquity","DateText":"500 BCE – 499 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-ancient-history/philosophers-of-classical-antiquity/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"389 BCE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Source-backed approximate date.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:2"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:8"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:GRC:2"}],"OriginalTitle":"Gorgias","Language":"Ancient Greek","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:rhetoric"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:ethics"}],"Tradition":"Platonism / Ancient Greek philosophy","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #1672 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Gorgias opposes rhetoric without justice to philosophical care for the soul and examines power, pleasure, and punishment."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"Gorgias","KeyConcepts":"Gorgias","Methodology":"Source-backed Direct work entry.","Structure":"Direct Platonic corpus entry"},"Arguments":["Gorgias opposes rhetoric without justice to philosophical care for the soul and examines power, pleasure, and punishment."],"Influence":{"InfluencedBy":"","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Direct Platonic dialogue; date is approximate and no full text is imported.","Gorgias is registered as a source-backed work in the Platonic corpus. The page records dating and authenticity caveats where needed; no full text is imported."],"EvidenceNote":["Direct Platonic dialogue; date is approximate and no full text is imported."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Versions","BodyHtml":"\u003cdiv class=\"dz-philo__full-version-grid\"\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-version-card\"\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-provider\"\u003eProject Gutenberg\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3 class=\"dz-philo__full-version-title\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #1672\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-meta\"\u003eHtmlText · Imported\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ca class=\"dz-philo__full-version-link\" href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1672\"\u003eOpen full version\u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["Gorgias opposes rhetoric without justice to philosophical care for the soul and examines power, pleasure, and punishment."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":"Gorgias"},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"Gorgias"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Source-backed Direct work entry."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"Direct Platonic corpus entry"}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Gorgias opposes rhetoric without justice to philosophical care for the soul and examines power, pleasure, and punishment."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":""},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":""}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Direct Platonic dialogue; date is approximate and no full text is imported.","Gorgias is registered as a source-backed work in the Platonic corpus. The page records dating and authenticity caveats where needed; no full text is imported."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Direct Platonic dialogue; date is approximate and no full text is imported."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003ePublic-domain full text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1672\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #1672\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch1\u003eGORGIAS\u003c/h1\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2 class=\"no-break\"\u003eby Plato\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003eContents\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable summary=\"\" style=\"margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap01\"\u003eINTRODUCTION\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap02\"\u003eGORGIAS\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap01\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eINTRODUCTION\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn several of the dialogues of Plato, doubts have arisen among his interpreters\r\nas to which of the various subjects discussed in them is the main thesis. The\r\nspeakers have the freedom of conversation; no severe rules of art restrict\r\nthem, and sometimes we are inclined to think, with one of the dramatis personae\r\nin the Theaetetus, that the digressions have the greater interest. Yet in the\r\nmost irregular of the dialogues there is also a certain natural growth or\r\nunity; the beginning is not forgotten at the end, and numerous allusions and\r\nreferences are interspersed, which form the loose connecting links of the\r\nwhole. We must not neglect this unity, but neither must we attempt to confine\r\nthe Platonic dialogue on the Procrustean bed of a single idea. (Compare\r\nIntroduction to the Phaedrus.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTwo tendencies seem to have beset the interpreters of Plato in this matter.\r\nFirst, they have endeavoured to hang the dialogues upon one another by the\r\nslightest threads; and have thus been led to opposite and contradictory\r\nassertions respecting their order and sequence. The mantle of Schleiermacher\r\nhas descended upon his successors, who have applied his method with the most\r\nvarious results. The value and use of the method has been hardly, if at all,\r\nexamined either by him or them. Secondly, they have extended almost\r\nindefinitely the scope of each separate dialogue; in this way they think that\r\nthey have escaped all difficulties, not seeing that what they have gained in\r\ngenerality they have lost in truth and distinctness. Metaphysical conceptions\r\neasily pass into one another; and the simpler notions of antiquity, which we\r\ncan only realize by an effort, imperceptibly blend with the more familiar\r\ntheories of modern philosophers. An eye for proportion is needed (his own art\r\nof measuring) in the study of Plato, as well as of other great artists. We may\r\nhardly admit that the moral antithesis of good and pleasure, or the\r\nintellectual antithesis of knowledge and opinion, being and appearance, are\r\nnever far off in a Platonic discussion. But because they are in the background,\r\nwe should not bring them into the foreground, or expect to discern them equally\r\nin all the dialogues.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere may be some advantage in drawing out a little the main outlines of the\r\nbuilding; but the use of this is limited, and may be easily exaggerated. We may\r\ngive Plato too much system, and alter the natural form and connection of his\r\nthoughts. Under the idea that his dialogues are finished works of art, we may\r\nfind a reason for everything, and lose the highest characteristic of art, which\r\nis simplicity. Most great works receive a new light from a new and original\r\nmind. But whether these new lights are true or only suggestive, will depend on\r\ntheir agreement with the spirit of Plato, and the amount of direct evidence\r\nwhich can be urged in support of them. When a theory is running away with us,\r\ncriticism does a friendly office in counselling moderation, and recalling us to\r\nthe indications of the text.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLike the Phaedrus, the Gorgias has puzzled students of Plato by the appearance\r\nof two or more subjects. Under the cover of rhetoric higher themes are\r\nintroduced; the argument expands into a general view of the good and evil of\r\nman. After making an ineffectual attempt to obtain a sound definition of his\r\nart from Gorgias, Socrates assumes the existence of a universal art of flattery\r\nor simulation having several branches:\u0026mdash;this is the genus of which\r\nrhetoric is only one, and not the highest species. To flattery is opposed the\r\ntrue and noble art of life which he who possesses seeks always to impart to\r\nothers, and which at last triumphs, if not here, at any rate in another world.\r\nThese two aspects of life and knowledge appear to be the two leading ideas of\r\nthe dialogue. The true and the false in individuals and states, in the\r\ntreatment of the soul as well as of the body, are conceived under the forms of\r\ntrue and false art. In the development of this opposition there arise various\r\nother questions, such as the two famous paradoxes of Socrates (paradoxes as\r\nthey are to the world in general, ideals as they may be more worthily called):\r\n(1) that to do is worse than to suffer evil; and (2) that when a man has done\r\nevil he had better be punished than unpunished; to which may be added (3) a\r\nthird Socratic paradox or ideal, that bad men do what they think best, but not\r\nwhat they desire, for the desire of all is towards the good. That pleasure is\r\nto be distinguished from good is proved by the simultaneousness of pleasure and\r\npain, and by the possibility of the bad having in certain cases pleasures as\r\ngreat as those of the good, or even greater. Not merely rhetoricians, but\r\npoets, musicians, and other artists, the whole tribe of statesmen, past as well\r\nas present, are included in the class of flatterers. The true and false finally\r\nappear before the judgment-seat of the gods below.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe dialogue naturally falls into three divisions, to which the three\r\ncharacters of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles respectively correspond; and the\r\nform and manner change with the stages of the argument. Socrates is deferential\r\ntowards Gorgias, playful and yet cutting in dealing with the youthful Polus,\r\nironical and sarcastic in his encounter with Callicles. In the first division\r\nthe question is asked\u0026mdash;What is rhetoric? To this there is no answer given,\r\nfor Gorgias is soon made to contradict himself by Socrates, and the argument is\r\ntransferred to the hands of his disciple Polus, who rushes to the defence of\r\nhis master. The answer has at last to be given by Socrates himself, but before\r\nhe can even explain his meaning to Polus, he must enlighten him upon the great\r\nsubject of shams or flatteries. When Polus finds his favourite art reduced to\r\nthe level of cookery, he replies that at any rate rhetoricians, like despots,\r\nhave great power. Socrates denies that they have any real power, and hence\r\narise the three paradoxes already mentioned. Although they are strange to him,\r\nPolus is at last convinced of their truth; at least, they seem to him to follow\r\nlegitimately from the premises. Thus the second act of the dialogue closes.\r\nThen Callicles appears on the scene, at first maintaining that pleasure is\r\ngood, and that might is right, and that law is nothing but the combination of\r\nthe many weak against the few strong. When he is confuted he withdraws from the\r\nargument, and leaves Socrates to arrive at the conclusion by himself. The\r\nconclusion is that there are two kinds of statesmanship, a higher and a\r\nlower\u0026mdash;that which makes the people better, and that which only flatters\r\nthem, and he exhorts Callicles to choose the higher. The dialogue terminates\r\nwith a mythus of a final judgment, in which there will be no more flattery or\r\ndisguise, and no further use for the teaching of rhetoric.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe characters of the three interlocutors also correspond to the parts which\r\nare assigned to them. Gorgias is the great rhetorician, now advanced in years,\r\nwho goes from city to city displaying his talents, and is celebrated throughout\r\nGreece. Like all the Sophists in the dialogues of Plato, he is vain and\r\nboastful, yet he has also a certain dignity, and is treated by Socrates with\r\nconsiderable respect. But he is no match for him in dialectics. Although he has\r\nbeen teaching rhetoric all his life, he is still incapable of defining his own\r\nart. When his ideas begin to clear up, he is unwilling to admit that rhetoric\r\ncan be wholly separated from justice and injustice, and this lingering\r\nsentiment of morality, or regard for public opinion, enables Socrates to detect\r\nhim in a contradiction. Like Protagoras, he is described as of a generous\r\nnature; he expresses his approbation of Socrates\u0026rsquo; manner of approaching a\r\nquestion; he is quite \u0026ldquo;one of Socrates\u0026rsquo; sort, ready to be refuted\r\nas well as to refute,\u0026rdquo; and very eager that Callicles and Socrates should\r\nhave the game out. He knows by experience that rhetoric exercises great\r\ninfluence over other men, but he is unable to explain the puzzle how rhetoric\r\ncan teach everything and know nothing.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPolus is an impetuous youth, a runaway \u0026ldquo;colt,\u0026rdquo; as Socrates\r\ndescribes him, who wanted originally to have taken the place of Gorgias under\r\nthe pretext that the old man was tired, and now avails himself of the earliest\r\nopportunity to enter the lists. He is said to be the author of a work on\r\nrhetoric, and is again mentioned in the Phaedrus, as the inventor of balanced\r\nor double forms of speech (compare Gorg.; Symp.). At first he is violent and\r\nill-mannered, and is angry at seeing his master overthrown. But in the\r\njudicious hands of Socrates he is soon restored to good-humour, and compelled\r\nto assent to the required conclusion. Like Gorgias, he is overthrown because he\r\ncompromises; he is unwilling to say that to do is fairer or more honourable\r\nthan to suffer injustice. Though he is fascinated by the power of rhetoric, and\r\ndazzled by the splendour of success, he is not insensible to higher arguments.\r\nPlato may have felt that there would be an incongruity in a youth maintaining\r\nthe cause of injustice against the world. He has never heard the other side of\r\nthe question, and he listens to the paradoxes, as they appear to him, of\r\nSocrates with evident astonishment. He can hardly understand the meaning of\r\nArchelaus being miserable, or of rhetoric being only useful in self-accusation.\r\nWhen the argument with him has fairly run out.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCallicles, in whose house they are assembled, is introduced on the stage: he is\r\nwith difficulty convinced that Socrates is in earnest; for if these things are\r\ntrue, then, as he says with real emotion, the foundations of society are upside\r\ndown. In him another type of character is represented; he is neither sophist\r\nnor philosopher, but man of the world, and an accomplished Athenian gentleman.\r\nHe might be described in modern language as a cynic or materialist, a lover of\r\npower and also of pleasure, and unscrupulous in his means of attaining both.\r\nThere is no desire on his part to offer any compromise in the interests of\r\nmorality; nor is any concession made by him. Like Thrasymachus in the Republic,\r\nthough he is not of the same weak and vulgar class, he consistently maintains\r\nthat might is right. His great motive of action is political ambition; in this\r\nhe is characteristically Greek. Like Anytus in the Meno, he is the enemy of the\r\nSophists; but favours the new art of rhetoric, which he regards as an excellent\r\nweapon of attack and defence. He is a despiser of mankind as he is of\r\nphilosophy, and sees in the laws of the state only a violation of the order of\r\nnature, which intended that the stronger should govern the weaker (compare\r\nRepublic). Like other men of the world who are of a speculative turn of mind,\r\nhe generalizes the bad side of human nature, and has easily brought down his\r\nprinciples to his practice. Philosophy and poetry alike supply him with\r\ndistinctions suited to his view of human life. He has a good will to Socrates,\r\nwhose talents he evidently admires, while he censures the puerile use which he\r\nmakes of them. He expresses a keen intellectual interest in the argument. Like\r\nAnytus, again, he has a sympathy with other men of the world; the Athenian\r\nstatesmen of a former generation, who showed no weakness and made no mistakes,\r\nsuch as Miltiades, Themistocles, Pericles, are his favourites. His ideal of\r\nhuman character is a man of great passions and great powers, which he has\r\ndeveloped to the utmost, and which he uses in his own enjoyment and in the\r\ngovernment of others. Had Critias been the name instead of Callicles, about\r\nwhom we know nothing from other sources, the opinions of the man would have\r\nseemed to reflect the history of his life.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd now the combat deepens. In Callicles, far more than in any sophist or\r\nrhetorician, is concentrated the spirit of evil against which Socrates is\r\ncontending, the spirit of the world, the spirit of the many contending against\r\nthe one wise man, of which the Sophists, as he describes them in the Republic,\r\nare the imitators rather than the authors, being themselves carried away by the\r\ngreat tide of public opinion. Socrates approaches his antagonist warily from a\r\ndistance, with a sort of irony which touches with a light hand both his\r\npersonal vices (probably in allusion to some scandal of the day) and his\r\nservility to the populace. At the same time, he is in most profound earnest, as\r\nChaerephon remarks. Callicles soon loses his temper, but the more he is\r\nirritated, the more provoking and matter of fact does Socrates become. A\r\nrepartee of his which appears to have been really made to the\r\n\u0026ldquo;omniscient\u0026rdquo; Hippias, according to the testimony of Xenophon\r\n(Mem.), is introduced. He is called by Callicles a popular declaimer, and\r\ncertainly shows that he has the power, in the words of Gorgias, of being\r\n\u0026ldquo;as long as he pleases,\u0026rdquo; or \u0026ldquo;as short as he pleases\u0026rdquo;\r\n(compare Protag.). Callicles exhibits great ability in defending himself and\r\nattacking Socrates, whom he accuses of trifling and word-splitting; he is\r\nscandalized that the legitimate consequences of his own argument should be\r\nstated in plain terms; after the manner of men of the world, he wishes to\r\npreserve the decencies of life. But he cannot consistently maintain the bad\r\nsense of words; and getting confused between the abstract notions of better,\r\nsuperior, stronger, he is easily turned round by Socrates, and only induced to\r\ncontinue the argument by the authority of Gorgias. Once, when Socrates is\r\ndescribing the manner in which the ambitious citizen has to identify himself\r\nwith the people, he partially recognizes the truth of his words.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe Socrates of the Gorgias may be compared with the Socrates of the Protagoras\r\nand Meno. As in other dialogues, he is the enemy of the Sophists and\r\nrhetoricians; and also of the statesmen, whom he regards as another variety of\r\nthe same species. His behaviour is governed by that of his opponents; the least\r\nforwardness or egotism on their part is met by a corresponding irony on the\r\npart of Socrates. He must speak, for philosophy will not allow him to be\r\nsilent. He is indeed more ironical and provoking than in any other of\r\nPlato\u0026rsquo;s writings: for he is \u0026ldquo;fooled to the top of his bent\u0026rdquo;\r\nby the worldliness of Callicles. But he is also more deeply in earnest. He\r\nrises higher than even in the Phaedo and Crito: at first enveloping his moral\r\nconvictions in a cloud of dust and dialectics, he ends by losing his method,\r\nhis life, himself, in them. As in the Protagoras and Phaedrus, throwing aside\r\nthe veil of irony, he makes a speech, but, true to his character, not until his\r\nadversary has refused to answer any more questions. The presentiment of his own\r\nfate is hanging over him. He is aware that Socrates, the single real teacher of\r\npolitics, as he ventures to call himself, cannot safely go to war with the\r\nwhole world, and that in the courts of earth he will be condemned. But he will\r\nbe justified in the world below. Then the position of Socrates and Callicles\r\nwill be reversed; all those things \u0026ldquo;unfit for ears polite\u0026rdquo; which\r\nCallicles has prophesied as likely to happen to him in this life, the insulting\r\nlanguage, the box on the ears, will recoil upon his assailant. (Compare\r\nRepublic, and the similar reversal of the position of the lawyer and the\r\nphilosopher in the Theaetetus).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere is an interesting allusion to his own behaviour at the trial of the\r\ngenerals after the battle of Arginusae, which he ironically attributes to his\r\nignorance of the manner in which a vote of the assembly should be taken. This\r\nis said to have happened \u0026ldquo;last year\u0026rdquo; (B.C. 406), and therefore the\r\nassumed date of the dialogue has been fixed at 405 B.C., when Socrates would\r\nalready have been an old man. The date is clearly marked, but is scarcely\r\nreconcilable with another indication of time, viz. the \u0026ldquo;recent\u0026rdquo;\r\nusurpation of Archelaus, which occurred in the year 413; and still less with\r\nthe \u0026ldquo;recent\u0026rdquo; death of Pericles, who really died twenty-four years\r\npreviously (429 B.C.) and is afterwards reckoned among the statesmen of a past\r\nage; or with the mention of Nicias, who died in 413, and is nevertheless spoken\r\nof as a living witness. But we shall hereafter have reason to observe, that\r\nalthough there is a general consistency of times and persons in the Dialogues\r\nof Plato, a precise dramatic date is an invention of his commentators (Preface\r\nto Republic).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe conclusion of the Dialogue is remarkable, (1) for the truly characteristic\r\ndeclaration of Socrates that he is ignorant of the true nature and bearing of\r\nthese things, while he affirms at the same time that no one can maintain any\r\nother view without being ridiculous. The profession of ignorance reminds us of\r\nthe earlier and more exclusively Socratic Dialogues. But neither in them, nor\r\nin the Apology, nor in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, does Socrates express any\r\ndoubt of the fundamental truths of morality. He evidently regards this\r\n\u0026ldquo;among the multitude of questions\u0026rdquo; which agitate human life\r\n\u0026ldquo;as the principle which alone remains unshaken.\u0026rdquo; He does not insist\r\nhere, any more than in the Phaedo, on the literal truth of the myth, but only\r\non the soundness of the doctrine which is contained in it, that doing wrong is\r\nworse than suffering, and that a man should be rather than seem; for the next\r\nbest thing to a man\u0026rsquo;s being just is that he should be corrected and\r\nbecome just; also that he should avoid all flattery, whether of himself or of\r\nothers; and that rhetoric should be employed for the maintenance of the right\r\nonly. The revelation of another life is a recapitulation of the argument in a\r\nfigure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(2) Socrates makes the singular remark, that he is himself the only true\r\npolitician of his age. In other passages, especially in the Apology, he\r\ndisclaims being a politician at all. There he is convinced that he or any other\r\ngood man who attempted to resist the popular will would be put to death before\r\nhe had done any good to himself or others. Here he anticipates such a fate for\r\nhimself, from the fact that he is \u0026ldquo;the only man of the present day who\r\nperforms his public duties at all.\u0026rdquo; The two points of view are not really\r\ninconsistent, but the difference between them is worth noticing: Socrates is\r\nand is not a public man. Not in the ordinary sense, like Alcibiades or\r\nPericles, but in a higher one; and this will sooner or later entail the same\r\nconsequences on him. He cannot be a private man if he would; neither can he\r\nseparate morals from politics. Nor is he unwilling to be a politician, although\r\nhe foresees the dangers which await him; but he must first become a better and\r\nwiser man, for he as well as Callicles is in a state of perplexity and\r\nuncertainty. And yet there is an inconsistency: for should not Socrates too\r\nhave taught the citizens better than to put him to death?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd now, as he himself says, we will \u0026ldquo;resume the argument from the\r\nbeginning.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSocrates, who is attended by his inseparable disciple, Chaerephon, meets\r\nCallicles in the streets of Athens. He is informed that he has just missed an\r\nexhibition of Gorgias, which he regrets, because he was desirous, not of\r\nhearing Gorgias display his rhetoric, but of interrogating him concerning the\r\nnature of his art. Callicles proposes that they shall go with him to his own\r\nhouse, where Gorgias is staying. There they find the great rhetorician and his\r\nyounger friend and disciple Polus.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Put the question to him, Chaerephon.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCHAEREPHON: What question?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Who is he?\u0026mdash;such a question as would elicit from a man the\r\nanswer, \u0026ldquo;I am a cobbler.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPolus suggests that Gorgias may be tired, and desires to answer for him.\r\n\u0026ldquo;Who is Gorgias?\u0026rdquo; asks Chaerephon, imitating the manner of his\r\nmaster Socrates. \u0026ldquo;One of the best of men, and a proficient in the best\r\nand noblest of experimental arts,\u0026rdquo; etc., replies Polus, in rhetorical and\r\nbalanced phrases. Socrates is dissatisfied at the length and unmeaningness of\r\nthe answer; he tells the disconcerted volunteer that he has mistaken the\r\nquality for the nature of the art, and remarks to Gorgias, that Polus has\r\nlearnt how to make a speech, but not how to answer a question. He wishes that\r\nGorgias would answer him. Gorgias is willing enough, and replies to the\r\nquestion asked by Chaerephon,\u0026mdash;that he is a rhetorician, and in Homeric\r\nlanguage, \u0026ldquo;boasts himself to be a good one.\u0026rdquo; At the request of\r\nSocrates he promises to be brief; for \u0026ldquo;he can be as long as he pleases,\r\nand as short as he pleases.\u0026rdquo; Socrates would have him bestow his length on\r\nothers, and proceeds to ask him a number of questions, which are answered by\r\nhim to his own great satisfaction, and with a brevity which excites the\r\nadmiration of Socrates. The result of the discussion may be summed up as\r\nfollows:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nRhetoric treats of discourse; but music and medicine, and other particular\r\narts, are also concerned with discourse; in what way then does rhetoric differ\r\nfrom them? Gorgias draws a distinction between the arts which deal with words,\r\nand the arts which have to do with external actions. Socrates extends this\r\ndistinction further, and divides all productive arts into two classes: (1) arts\r\nwhich may be carried on in silence; and (2) arts which have to do with words,\r\nor in which words are coextensive with action, such as arithmetic, geometry,\r\nrhetoric. But still Gorgias could hardly have meant to say that arithmetic was\r\nthe same as rhetoric. Even in the arts which are concerned with words there are\r\ndifferences. What then distinguishes rhetoric from the other arts which have to\r\ndo with words? \u0026ldquo;The words which rhetoric uses relate to the best and\r\ngreatest of human things.\u0026rdquo; But tell me, Gorgias, what are the best?\r\n\u0026ldquo;Health first, beauty next, wealth third,\u0026rdquo; in the words of the old\r\nsong, or how would you rank them? The arts will come to you in a body, each\r\nclaiming precedence and saying that her own good is superior to that of the\r\nrest\u0026mdash;How will you choose between them? \u0026ldquo;I should say, Socrates,\r\nthat the art of persuasion, which gives freedom to all men, and to individuals\r\npower in the state, is the greatest good.\u0026rdquo; But what is the exact nature\r\nof this persuasion?\u0026mdash;is the persevering retort: You could not describe\r\nZeuxis as a painter, or even as a painter of figures, if there were other\r\npainters of figures; neither can you define rhetoric simply as an art of\r\npersuasion, because there are other arts which persuade, such as arithmetic,\r\nwhich is an art of persuasion about odd and even numbers. Gorgias is made to\r\nsee the necessity of a further limitation, and he now defines rhetoric as the\r\nart of persuading in the law courts, and in the assembly, about the just and\r\nunjust. But still there are two sorts of persuasion: one which gives knowledge,\r\nand another which gives belief without knowledge; and knowledge is always true,\r\nbut belief may be either true or false,\u0026mdash;there is therefore a further\r\nquestion: which of the two sorts of persuasion does rhetoric effect in courts\r\nof law and assemblies? Plainly that which gives belief and not that which gives\r\nknowledge; for no one can impart a real knowledge of such matters to a crowd of\r\npersons in a few minutes. And there is another point to be\r\nconsidered:\u0026mdash;when the assembly meets to advise about walls or docks or\r\nmilitary expeditions, the rhetorician is not taken into counsel, but the\r\narchitect, or the general. How would Gorgias explain this phenomenon? All who\r\nintend to become disciples, of whom there are several in the company, and not\r\nSocrates only, are eagerly asking:\u0026mdash;About what then will rhetoric teach us\r\nto persuade or advise the state?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGorgias illustrates the nature of rhetoric by adducing the example of\r\nThemistocles, who persuaded the Athenians to build their docks and walls, and\r\nof Pericles, whom Socrates himself has heard speaking about the middle wall of\r\nthe Piraeus. He adds that he has exercised a similar power over the patients of\r\nhis brother Herodicus. He could be chosen a physician by the assembly if he\r\npleased, for no physician could compete with a rhetorician in popularity and\r\ninfluence. He could persuade the multitude of anything by the power of his\r\nrhetoric; not that the rhetorician ought to abuse this power any more than a\r\nboxer should abuse the art of self-defence. Rhetoric is a good thing, but, like\r\nall good things, may be unlawfully used. Neither is the teacher of the art to\r\nbe deemed unjust because his pupils are unjust and make a bad use of the\r\nlessons which they have learned from him.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSocrates would like to know before he replies, whether Gorgias will quarrel\r\nwith him if he points out a slight inconsistency into which he has fallen, or\r\nwhether he, like himself, is one who loves to be refuted. Gorgias declares that\r\nhe is quite one of his sort, but fears that the argument may be tedious to the\r\ncompany. The company cheer, and Chaerephon and Callicles exhort them to\r\nproceed. Socrates gently points out the supposed inconsistency into which\r\nGorgias appears to have fallen, and which he is inclined to think may arise out\r\nof a misapprehension of his own. The rhetorician has been declared by Gorgias\r\nto be more persuasive to the ignorant than the physician, or any other expert.\r\nAnd he is said to be ignorant, and this ignorance of his is regarded by Gorgias\r\nas a happy condition, for he has escaped the trouble of learning. But is he as\r\nignorant of just and unjust as he is of medicine or building? Gorgias is\r\ncompelled to admit that if he did not know them previously he must learn them\r\nfrom his teacher as a part of the art of rhetoric. But he who has learned\r\ncarpentry is a carpenter, and he who has learned music is a musician, and he\r\nwho has learned justice is just. The rhetorician then must be a just man, and\r\nrhetoric is a just thing. But Gorgias has already admitted the opposite of\r\nthis, viz. that rhetoric may be abused, and that the rhetorician may act\r\nunjustly. How is the inconsistency to be explained?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe fallacy of this argument is twofold; for in the first place, a man may know\r\njustice and not be just\u0026mdash;here is the old confusion of the arts and the\r\nvirtues;\u0026mdash;nor can any teacher be expected to counteract wholly the bent of\r\nnatural character; and secondly, a man may have a degree of justice, but not\r\nsufficient to prevent him from ever doing wrong. Polus is naturally exasperated\r\nat the sophism, which he is unable to detect; of course, he says, the\r\nrhetorician, like every one else, will admit that he knows justice (how can he\r\ndo otherwise when pressed by the interrogations of Socrates?), but he thinks\r\nthat great want of manners is shown in bringing the argument to such a pass.\r\nSocrates ironically replies, that when old men trip, the young set them on\r\ntheir legs again; and he is quite willing to retract, if he can be shown to be\r\nin error, but upon one condition, which is that Polus studies brevity. Polus is\r\nin great indignation at not being allowed to use as many words as he pleases in\r\nthe free state of Athens. Socrates retorts, that yet harder will be his own\r\ncase, if he is compelled to stay and listen to them. After some altercation\r\nthey agree (compare Protag.), that Polus shall ask and Socrates answer.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;What is the art of Rhetoric?\u0026rdquo; says Polus. Not an art at all,\r\nreplies Socrates, but a thing which in your book you affirm to have created\r\nart. Polus asks, \u0026ldquo;What thing?\u0026rdquo; and Socrates answers, An experience\r\nor routine of making a sort of delight or gratification. \u0026ldquo;But is not\r\nrhetoric a fine thing?\u0026rdquo; I have not yet told you what rhetoric is. Will\r\nyou ask me another question\u0026mdash;What is cookery? \u0026ldquo;What is\r\ncookery?\u0026rdquo; An experience or routine of making a sort of delight or\r\ngratification. Then they are the same, or rather fall under the same class, and\r\nrhetoric has still to be distinguished from cookery. \u0026ldquo;What is\r\nrhetoric?\u0026rdquo; asks Polus once more. A part of a not very creditable whole,\r\nwhich may be termed flattery, is the reply. \u0026ldquo;But what part?\u0026rdquo; A\r\nshadow of a part of politics. This, as might be expected, is wholly\r\nunintelligible, both to Gorgias and Polus; and, in order to explain his meaning\r\nto them, Socrates draws a distinction between shadows or appearances and\r\nrealities; e.g. there is real health of body or soul, and the appearance of\r\nthem; real arts and sciences, and the simulations of them. Now the soul and\r\nbody have two arts waiting upon them, first the art of politics, which attends\r\non the soul, having a legislative part and a judicial part; and another art\r\nattending on the body, which has no generic name, but may also be described as\r\nhaving two divisions, one of which is medicine and the other gymnastic.\r\nCorresponding with these four arts or sciences there are four shams or\r\nsimulations of them, mere experiences, as they may be termed, because they give\r\nno reason of their own existence. The art of dressing up is the sham or\r\nsimulation of gymnastic, the art of cookery, of medicine; rhetoric is the\r\nsimulation of justice, and sophistic of legislation. They may be summed up in\r\nan arithmetical formula:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTiring: gymnastic:: cookery: medicine:: sophistic: legislation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCookery: medicine:: rhetoric: the art of justice.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd this is the true scheme of them, but when measured only by the\r\ngratification which they procure, they become jumbled together and return to\r\ntheir aboriginal chaos. Socrates apologizes for the length of his speech, which\r\nwas necessary to the explanation of the subject, and begs Polus not\r\nunnecessarily to retaliate on him.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Do you mean to say that the rhetoricians are esteemed flatterers?\u0026rdquo;\r\nThey are not esteemed at all. \u0026ldquo;Why, have they not great power, and can\r\nthey not do whatever they desire?\u0026rdquo; They have no power, and they only do\r\nwhat they think best, and never what they desire; for they never attain the\r\ntrue object of desire, which is the good. \u0026ldquo;As if you, Socrates, would not\r\nenvy the possessor of despotic power, who can imprison, exile, kill any one\r\nwhom he pleases.\u0026rdquo; But Socrates replies that he has no wish to put any one\r\nto death; he who kills another, even justly, is not to be envied, and he who\r\nkills him unjustly is to be pitied; it is better to suffer than to do\r\ninjustice. He does not consider that going about with a dagger and putting men\r\nout of the way, or setting a house on fire, is real power. To this Polus\r\nassents, on the ground that such acts would be punished, but he is still of\r\nopinion that evil-doers, if they are unpunished, may be happy enough. He\r\ninstances Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, the usurper of Macedonia. Does not\r\nSocrates think him happy?\u0026mdash;Socrates would like to know more about him; he\r\ncannot pronounce even the great king to be happy, unless he knows his mental\r\nand moral condition. Polus explains that Archelaus was a slave, being the son\r\nof a woman who was the slave of Alcetas, brother of Perdiccas king of\r\nMacedon\u0026mdash;and he, by every species of crime, first murdering his uncle and\r\nthen his cousin and half-brother, obtained the kingdom. This was very wicked,\r\nand yet all the world, including Socrates, would like to have his place.\r\nSocrates dismisses the appeal to numbers; Polus, if he will, may summon all the\r\nrich men of Athens, Nicias and his brothers, Aristocrates, the house of\r\nPericles, or any other great family\u0026mdash;this is the kind of evidence which is\r\nadduced in courts of justice, where truth depends upon numbers. But Socrates\r\nemploys proof of another sort; his appeal is to one witness only,\u0026mdash;that is\r\nto say, the person with whom he is speaking; him he will convict out of his own\r\nmouth. And he is prepared to show, after his manner, that Archelaus cannot be a\r\nwicked man and yet happy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe evil-doer is deemed happy if he escapes, and miserable if he suffers\r\npunishment; but Socrates thinks him less miserable if he suffers than if he\r\nescapes. Polus is of opinion that such a paradox as this hardly deserves\r\nrefutation, and is at any rate sufficiently refuted by the fact. Socrates has\r\nonly to compare the lot of the successful tyrant who is the envy of the world,\r\nand of the wretch who, having been detected in a criminal attempt against the\r\nstate, is crucified or burnt to death. Socrates replies, that if they are both\r\ncriminal they are both miserable, but that the unpunished is the more miserable\r\nof the two. At this Polus laughs outright, which leads Socrates to remark that\r\nlaughter is a new species of refutation. Polus replies, that he is already\r\nrefuted; for if he will take the votes of the company, he will find that no one\r\nagrees with him. To this Socrates rejoins, that he is not a public man, and\r\n(referring to his own conduct at the trial of the generals after the battle of\r\nArginusae) is unable to take the suffrages of any company, as he had shown on a\r\nrecent occasion; he can only deal with one witness at a time, and that is the\r\nperson with whom he is arguing. But he is certain that in the opinion of any\r\nman to do is worse than to suffer evil.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPolus, though he will not admit this, is ready to acknowledge that to do evil\r\nis considered the more foul or dishonourable of the two. But what is fair and\r\nwhat is foul; whether the terms are applied to bodies, colours, figures, laws,\r\nhabits, studies, must they not be defined with reference to pleasure and\r\nutility? Polus assents to this latter doctrine, and is easily persuaded that\r\nthe fouler of two things must exceed either in pain or in hurt. But the doing\r\ncannot exceed the suffering of evil in pain, and therefore must exceed in hurt.\r\nThus doing is proved by the testimony of Polus himself to be worse or more\r\nhurtful than suffering.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere remains the other question: Is a guilty man better off when he is\r\npunished or when he is unpunished? Socrates replies, that what is done justly\r\nis suffered justly: if the act is just, the effect is just; if to punish is\r\njust, to be punished is just, and therefore fair, and therefore beneficent; and\r\nthe benefit is that the soul is improved. There are three evils from which a\r\nman may suffer, and which affect him in estate, body, and soul;\u0026mdash;these\r\nare, poverty, disease, injustice; and the foulest of these is injustice, the\r\nevil of the soul, because that brings the greatest hurt. And there are three\r\narts which heal these evils\u0026mdash;trading, medicine, justice\u0026mdash;and the\r\nfairest of these is justice. Happy is he who has never committed injustice, and\r\nhappy in the second degree he who has been healed by punishment. And therefore\r\nthe criminal should himself go to the judge as he would to the physician, and\r\npurge away his crime. Rhetoric will enable him to display his guilt in proper\r\ncolours, and to sustain himself and others in enduring the necessary penalty.\r\nAnd similarly if a man has an enemy, he will desire not to punish him, but that\r\nhe shall go unpunished and become worse and worse, taking care only that he\r\ndoes no injury to himself. These are at least conceivable uses of the art, and\r\nno others have been discovered by us.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHere Callicles, who has been listening in silent amazement, asks Chaerephon\r\nwhether Socrates is in earnest, and on receiving the assurance that he is,\r\nproceeds to ask the same question of Socrates himself. For if such doctrines\r\nare true, life must have been turned upside down, and all of us are doing the\r\nopposite of what we ought to be doing.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSocrates replies in a style of playful irony, that before men can understand\r\none another they must have some common feeling. And such a community of feeling\r\nexists between himself and Callicles, for both of them are lovers, and they\r\nhave both a pair of loves; the beloved of Callicles are the Athenian Demos and\r\nDemos the son of Pyrilampes; the beloved of Socrates are Alcibiades and\r\nphilosophy. The peculiarity of Callicles is that he can never contradict his\r\nloves; he changes as his Demos changes in all his opinions; he watches the\r\ncountenance of both his loves, and repeats their sentiments, and if any one is\r\nsurprised at his sayings and doings, the explanation of them is, that he is not\r\na free agent, but must always be imitating his two loves. And this is the\r\nexplanation of Socrates\u0026rsquo; peculiarities also. He is always repeating what\r\nhis mistress, Philosophy, is saying to him, who unlike his other love,\r\nAlcibiades, is ever the same, ever true. Callicles must refute her, or he will\r\nnever be at unity with himself; and discord in life is far worse than the\r\ndiscord of musical sounds.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCallicles answers, that Gorgias was overthrown because, as Polus said, in\r\ncompliance with popular prejudice he had admitted that if his pupil did not\r\nknow justice the rhetorician must teach him; and Polus has been similarly\r\nentangled, because his modesty led him to admit that to suffer is more\r\nhonourable than to do injustice. By custom \u0026ldquo;yes,\u0026rdquo; but not by\r\nnature, says Callicles. And Socrates is always playing between the two points\r\nof view, and putting one in the place of the other. In this very argument, what\r\nPolus only meant in a conventional sense has been affirmed by him to be a law\r\nof nature. For convention says that \u0026ldquo;injustice is dishonourable,\u0026rdquo;\r\nbut nature says that \u0026ldquo;might is right.\u0026rdquo; And we are always taming\r\ndown the nobler spirits among us to the conventional level. But sometimes a\r\ngreat man will rise up and reassert his original rights, trampling under foot\r\nall our formularies, and then the light of natural justice shines forth. Pindar\r\nsays, \u0026ldquo;Law, the king of all, does violence with high hand;\u0026rdquo; as is\r\nindeed proved by the example of Heracles, who drove off the oxen of Geryon and\r\nnever paid for them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis is the truth, Socrates, as you will be convinced, if you leave philosophy\r\nand pass on to the real business of life. A little philosophy is an excellent\r\nthing; too much is the ruin of a man. He who has not \u0026ldquo;passed his\r\nmetaphysics\u0026rdquo; before he has grown up to manhood will never know the world.\r\nPhilosophers are ridiculous when they take to politics, and I dare say that\r\npoliticians are equally ridiculous when they take to philosophy: \u0026ldquo;Every\r\nman,\u0026rdquo; as Euripides says, \u0026ldquo;is fondest of that in which he is\r\nbest.\u0026rdquo; Philosophy is graceful in youth, like the lisp of infancy, and\r\nshould be cultivated as a part of education; but when a grown-up man lisps or\r\nstudies philosophy, I should like to beat him. None of those over-refined\r\nnatures ever come to any good; they avoid the busy haunts of men, and skulk in\r\ncorners, whispering to a few admiring youths, and never giving utterance to any\r\nnoble sentiments.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor you, Socrates, I have a regard, and therefore I say to you, as Zethus says\r\nto Amphion in the play, that you have \u0026ldquo;a noble soul disguised in a\r\npuerile exterior.\u0026rdquo; And I would have you consider the danger which you and\r\nother philosophers incur. For you would not know how to defend yourself if any\r\none accused you in a law-court,\u0026mdash;there you would stand, with gaping mouth\r\nand dizzy brain, and might be murdered, robbed, boxed on the ears with\r\nimpunity. Take my advice, then, and get a little common sense; leave to others\r\nthese frivolities; walk in the ways of the wealthy and be wise.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSocrates professes to have found in Callicles the philosopher\u0026rsquo;s\r\ntouchstone; and he is certain that any opinion in which they both agree must be\r\nthe very truth. Callicles has all the three qualities which are needed in a\r\ncritic\u0026mdash;knowledge, good-will, frankness; Gorgias and Polus, although\r\nlearned men, were too modest, and their modesty made them contradict\r\nthemselves. But Callicles is well-educated; and he is not too modest to speak\r\nout (of this he has already given proof), and his good-will is shown both by\r\nhis own profession and by his giving the same caution against philosophy to\r\nSocrates, which Socrates remembers hearing him give long ago to his own clique\r\nof friends. He will pledge himself to retract any error into which he may have\r\nfallen, and which Callicles may point out. But he would like to know first of\r\nall what he and Pindar mean by natural justice. Do they suppose that the rule\r\nof justice is the rule of the stronger or of the better?\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;There is\r\nno difference.\u0026rdquo; Then are not the many superior to the one, and the\r\nopinions of the many better? And their opinion is that justice is equality, and\r\nthat to do is more dishonourable than to suffer wrong. And as they are the\r\nsuperior or stronger, this opinion of theirs must be in accordance with natural\r\nas well as conventional justice. \u0026ldquo;Why will you continue splitting words?\r\nHave I not told you that the superior is the better?\u0026rdquo; But what do you\r\nmean by the better? Tell me that, and please to be a little milder in your\r\nlanguage, if you do not wish to drive me away. \u0026ldquo;I mean the worthier, the\r\nwiser.\u0026rdquo; You mean to say that one man of sense ought to rule over ten\r\nthousand fools? \u0026ldquo;Yes, that is my meaning.\u0026rdquo; Ought the physician then\r\nto have a larger share of meats and drinks? or the weaver to have more coats,\r\nor the cobbler larger shoes, or the farmer more seed? \u0026ldquo;You are always\r\nsaying the same things, Socrates.\u0026rdquo; Yes, and on the same subjects too; but\r\nyou are never saying the same things. For, first, you defined the superior to\r\nbe the stronger, and then the wiser, and now something else;\u0026mdash;what DO you\r\nmean? \u0026ldquo;I mean men of political ability, who ought to govern and to have\r\nmore than the governed.\u0026rdquo; Than themselves? \u0026ldquo;What do you mean?\u0026rdquo;\r\nI mean to say that every man is his own governor. \u0026ldquo;I see that you mean\r\nthose dolts, the temperate. But my doctrine is, that a man should let his\r\ndesires grow, and take the means of satisfying them. To the many this is\r\nimpossible, and therefore they combine to prevent him. But if he is a king, and\r\nhas power, how base would he be in submitting to them! To invite the common\r\nherd to be lord over him, when he might have the enjoyment of all things! For\r\nthe truth is, Socrates, that luxury and self-indulgence are virtue and\r\nhappiness; all the rest is mere talk.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSocrates compliments Callicles on his frankness in saying what other men only\r\nthink. According to his view, those who want nothing are not happy.\r\n\u0026ldquo;Why,\u0026rdquo; says Callicles, \u0026ldquo;if they were, stones and the dead\r\nwould be happy.\u0026rdquo; Socrates in reply is led into a half-serious, half-comic\r\nvein of reflection. \u0026ldquo;Who knows,\u0026rdquo; as Euripides says, \u0026ldquo;whether\r\nlife may not be death, and death life?\u0026rdquo; Nay, there are philosophers who\r\nmaintain that even in life we are dead, and that the body (soma) is the tomb\r\n(sema) of the soul. And some ingenious Sicilian has made an allegory, in which\r\nhe represents fools as the uninitiated, who are supposed to be carrying water\r\nto a vessel, which is full of holes, in a similarly holey sieve, and this sieve\r\nis their own soul. The idea is fanciful, but nevertheless is a figure of a\r\ntruth which I want to make you acknowledge, viz. that the life of contentment\r\nis better than the life of indulgence. Are you disposed to admit that?\r\n\u0026ldquo;Far otherwise.\u0026rdquo; Then hear another parable. The life of\r\nself-contentment and self-indulgence may be represented respectively by two\r\nmen, who are filling jars with streams of wine, honey, milk,\u0026mdash;the jars of\r\nthe one are sound, and the jars of the other leaky; the first fills his jars,\r\nand has no more trouble with them; the second is always filling them, and would\r\nsuffer extreme misery if he desisted. Are you of the same opinion still?\r\n\u0026ldquo;Yes, Socrates, and the figure expresses what I mean. For true pleasure\r\nis a perpetual stream, flowing in and flowing out. To be hungry and always\r\neating, to be thirsty and always drinking, and to have all the other desires\r\nand to satisfy them, that, as I admit, is my idea of happiness.\u0026rdquo; And to\r\nbe itching and always scratching? \u0026ldquo;I do not deny that there may be\r\nhappiness even in that.\u0026rdquo; And to indulge unnatural desires, if they are\r\nabundantly satisfied? Callicles is indignant at the introduction of such\r\ntopics. But he is reminded by Socrates that they are introduced, not by him,\r\nbut by the maintainer of the identity of pleasure and good. Will Callicles\r\nstill maintain this? \u0026ldquo;Yes, for the sake of consistency, he will.\u0026rdquo;\r\nThe answer does not satisfy Socrates, who fears that he is losing his\r\ntouchstone. A profession of seriousness on the part of Callicles reassures him,\r\nand they proceed with the argument. Pleasure and good are the same, but\r\nknowledge and courage are not the same either with pleasure or good, or with\r\none another. Socrates disproves the first of these statements by showing that\r\ntwo opposites cannot coexist, but must alternate with one another\u0026mdash;to be\r\nwell and ill together is impossible. But pleasure and pain are simultaneous,\r\nand the cessation of them is simultaneous; e.g. in the case of drinking and\r\nthirsting, whereas good and evil are not simultaneous, and do not cease\r\nsimultaneously, and therefore pleasure cannot be the same as good.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCallicles has already lost his temper, and can only be persuaded to go on by\r\nthe interposition of Gorgias. Socrates, having already guarded against\r\nobjections by distinguishing courage and knowledge from pleasure and good,\r\nproceeds:\u0026mdash;The good are good by the presence of good, and the bad are bad\r\nby the presence of evil. And the brave and wise are good, and the cowardly and\r\nfoolish are bad. And he who feels pleasure is good, and he who feels pain is\r\nbad, and both feel pleasure and pain in nearly the same degree, and sometimes\r\nthe bad man or coward in a greater degree. Therefore the bad man or coward is\r\nas good as the brave or may be even better.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCallicles endeavours now to avert the inevitable absurdity by affirming that he\r\nand all mankind admitted some pleasures to be good and others bad. The good are\r\nthe beneficial, and the bad are the hurtful, and we should choose the one and\r\navoid the other. But this, as Socrates observes, is a return to the old\r\ndoctrine of himself and Polus, that all things should be done for the sake of\r\nthe good.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCallicles assents to this, and Socrates, finding that they are agreed in\r\ndistinguishing pleasure from good, returns to his old division of empirical\r\nhabits, or shams, or flatteries, which study pleasure only, and the arts which\r\nare concerned with the higher interests of soul and body. Does Callicles agree\r\nto this division? Callicles will agree to anything, in order that he may get\r\nthrough the argument. Which of the arts then are flatteries? Flute-playing,\r\nharp-playing, choral exhibitions, the dithyrambics of Cinesias are all equally\r\ncondemned on the ground that they give pleasure only; and Meles the\r\nharp-player, who was the father of Cinesias, failed even in that. The stately\r\nmuse of Tragedy is bent upon pleasure, and not upon improvement. Poetry in\r\ngeneral is only a rhetorical address to a mixed audience of men, women, and\r\nchildren. And the orators are very far from speaking with a view to what is\r\nbest; their way is to humour the assembly as if they were children.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCallicles replies, that this is only true of some of them; others have a real\r\nregard for their fellow-citizens. Granted; then there are two species of\r\noratory; the one a flattery, another which has a real regard for the citizens.\r\nBut where are the orators among whom you find the latter? Callicles admits that\r\nthere are none remaining, but there were such in the days when Themistocles,\r\nCimon, Miltiades, and the great Pericles were still alive. Socrates replies\r\nthat none of these were true artists, setting before themselves the duty of\r\nbringing order out of disorder. The good man and true orator has a settled\r\ndesign, running through his life, to which he conforms all his words and\r\nactions; he desires to implant justice and eradicate injustice, to implant all\r\nvirtue and eradicate all vice in the minds of his citizens. He is the physician\r\nwho will not allow the sick man to indulge his appetites with a variety of\r\nmeats and drinks, but insists on his exercising self-restraint. And this is\r\ngood for the soul, and better than the unrestrained indulgence which Callicles\r\nwas recently approving.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHere Callicles, who had been with difficulty brought to this point, turns\r\nrestive, and suggests that Socrates shall answer his own questions.\r\n\u0026ldquo;Then,\u0026rdquo; says Socrates, \u0026ldquo;one man must do for two;\u0026rdquo; and\r\nthough he had hoped to have given Callicles an \u0026ldquo;Amphion\u0026rdquo; in return\r\nfor his \u0026ldquo;Zethus,\u0026rdquo; he is willing to proceed; at the same time, he\r\nhopes that Callicles will correct him, if he falls into error. He recapitulates\r\nthe advantages which he has already won:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe pleasant is not the same as the good\u0026mdash;Callicles and I are agreed about\r\nthat,\u0026mdash;but pleasure is to be pursued for the sake of the good, and the\r\ngood is that of which the presence makes us good; we and all things good have\r\nacquired some virtue or other. And virtue, whether of body or soul, of things\r\nor persons, is not attained by accident, but is due to order and harmonious\r\narrangement. And the soul which has order is better than the soul which is\r\nwithout order, and is therefore temperate and is therefore good, and the\r\nintemperate is bad. And he who is temperate is also just and brave and pious,\r\nand has attained the perfection of goodness and therefore of happiness, and the\r\nintemperate whom you approve is the opposite of all this and is wretched. He\r\ntherefore who would be happy must pursue temperance and avoid intemperance, and\r\nif possible escape the necessity of punishment, but if he have done wrong he\r\nmust endure punishment. In this way states and individuals should seek to\r\nattain harmony, which, as the wise tell us, is the bond of heaven and earth, of\r\ngods and men. Callicles has never discovered the power of geometrical\r\nproportion in both worlds; he would have men aim at disproportion and excess.\r\nBut if he be wrong in this, and if self-control is the true secret of\r\nhappiness, then the paradox is true that the only use of rhetoric is in\r\nself-accusation, and Polus was right in saying that to do wrong is worse than\r\nto suffer wrong, and Gorgias was right in saying that the rhetorician must be a\r\njust man. And you were wrong in taunting me with my defenceless condition, and\r\nin saying that I might be accused or put to death or boxed on the ears with\r\nimpunity. For I may repeat once more, that to strike is worse than to be\r\nstricken\u0026mdash;to do than to suffer. What I said then is now made fast in\r\nadamantine bonds. I myself know not the true nature of these things, but I know\r\nthat no one can deny my words and not be ridiculous. To do wrong is the\r\ngreatest of evils, and to suffer wrong is the next greatest evil. He who would\r\navoid the last must be a ruler, or the friend of a ruler; and to be the friend\r\nhe must be the equal of the ruler, and must also resemble him. Under his\r\nprotection he will suffer no evil, but will he also do no evil? Nay, will he\r\nnot rather do all the evil which he can and escape? And in this way the\r\ngreatest of all evils will befall him. \u0026ldquo;But this imitator of the\r\ntyrant,\u0026rdquo; rejoins Callicles, \u0026ldquo;will kill any one who does not\r\nsimilarly imitate him.\u0026rdquo; Socrates replies that he is not deaf, and that he\r\nhas heard that repeated many times, and can only reply, that a bad man will\r\nkill a good one. \u0026ldquo;Yes, and that is the provoking thing.\u0026rdquo; Not\r\nprovoking to a man of sense who is not studying the arts which will preserve\r\nhim from danger; and this, as you say, is the use of rhetoric in courts of\r\njustice. But how many other arts are there which also save men from death, and\r\nare yet quite humble in their pretensions\u0026mdash;such as the art of swimming, or\r\nthe art of the pilot? Does not the pilot do men at least as much service as the\r\nrhetorician, and yet for the voyage from Aegina to Athens he does not charge\r\nmore than two obols, and when he disembarks is quite unassuming in his\r\ndemeanour? The reason is that he is not certain whether he has done his\r\npassengers any good in saving them from death, if one of them is diseased in\r\nbody, and still more if he is diseased in mind\u0026mdash;who can say? The engineer\r\ntoo will often save whole cities, and yet you despise him, and would not allow\r\nyour son to marry his daughter, or his son to marry yours. But what reason is\r\nthere in this? For if virtue only means the saving of life, whether your own or\r\nanother\u0026rsquo;s, you have no right to despise him or any practiser of saving\r\narts. But is not virtue something different from saving and being saved? I\r\nwould have you rather consider whether you ought not to disregard length of\r\nlife, and think only how you can live best, leaving all besides to the will of\r\nHeaven. For you must not expect to have influence either with the Athenian\r\nDemos or with Demos the son of Pyrilampes, unless you become like them. What do\r\nyou say to this?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;There is some truth in what you are saying, but I do not entirely\r\nbelieve you.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThat is because you are in love with Demos. But let us have a little more\r\nconversation. You remember the two processes\u0026mdash;one which was directed to\r\npleasure, the other which was directed to making men as good as possible. And\r\nthose who have the care of the city should make the citizens as good as\r\npossible. But who would undertake a public building, if he had never had a\r\nteacher of the art of building, and had never constructed a building before? or\r\nwho would undertake the duty of state-physician, if he had never cured either\r\nhimself or any one else? Should we not examine him before we entrusted him with\r\nthe office? And as Callicles is about to enter public life, should we not\r\nexamine him? Whom has he made better? For we have already admitted that this is\r\nthe statesman\u0026rsquo;s proper business. And we must ask the same question about\r\nPericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles. Whom did they make\r\nbetter? Nay, did not Pericles make the citizens worse? For he gave them pay,\r\nand at first he was very popular with them, but at last they condemned him to\r\ndeath. Yet surely he would be a bad tamer of animals who, having received them\r\ngentle, taught them to kick and butt, and man is an animal; and Pericles who\r\nhad the charge of man only made him wilder, and more savage and unjust, and\r\ntherefore he could not have been a good statesman. The same tale might be\r\nrepeated about Cimon, Themistocles, Miltiades. But the charioteer who keeps his\r\nseat at first is not thrown out when he gains greater experience and skill. The\r\ninference is, that the statesman of a past age were no better than those of our\r\nown. They may have been cleverer constructors of docks and harbours, but they\r\ndid not improve the character of the citizens. I have told you again and again\r\n(and I purposely use the same images) that the soul, like the body, may be\r\ntreated in two ways\u0026mdash;there is the meaner and the higher art. You seemed to\r\nunderstand what I said at the time, but when I ask you who were the really good\r\nstatesmen, you answer\u0026mdash;as if I asked you who were the good trainers, and\r\nyou answered, Thearion, the baker, Mithoecus, the author of the Sicilian\r\ncookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner. And you would be affronted if I told you\r\nthat these are a parcel of cooks who make men fat only to make them thin. And\r\nthose whom they have fattened applaud them, instead of finding fault with them,\r\nand lay the blame of their subsequent disorders on their physicians. In this\r\nrespect, Callicles, you are like them; you applaud the statesmen of old, who\r\npandered to the vices of the citizens, and filled the city with docks and\r\nharbours, but neglected virtue and justice. And when the fit of illness comes,\r\nthe citizens who in like manner applauded Themistocles, Pericles, and others,\r\nwill lay hold of you and my friend Alcibiades, and you will suffer for the\r\nmisdeeds of your predecessors. The old story is always being\r\nrepeated\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;after all his services, the ungrateful city banished him,\r\nor condemned him to death.\u0026rdquo; As if the statesman should not have taught\r\nthe city better! He surely cannot blame the state for having unjustly used him,\r\nany more than the sophist or teacher can find fault with his pupils if they\r\ncheat him. And the sophist and orator are in the same case; although you admire\r\nrhetoric and despise sophistic, whereas sophistic is really the higher of the\r\ntwo. The teacher of the arts takes money, but the teacher of virtue or politics\r\ntakes no money, because this is the only kind of service which makes the\r\ndisciple desirous of requiting his teacher.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSocrates concludes by finally asking, to which of the two modes of serving the\r\nstate Callicles invites him:\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;to the inferior and ministerial\r\none,\u0026rdquo; is the ingenuous reply. That is the only way of avoiding death,\r\nreplies Socrates; and he has heard often enough, and would rather not hear\r\nagain, that the bad man will kill the good. But he thinks that such a fate is\r\nvery likely reserved for him, because he remarks that he is the only person who\r\nteaches the true art of politics. And very probably, as in the case which he\r\ndescribed to Polus, he may be the physician who is tried by a jury of children.\r\nHe cannot say that he has procured the citizens any pleasure, and if any one\r\ncharges him with perplexing them, or with reviling their elders, he will not be\r\nable to make them understand that he has only been actuated by a desire for\r\ntheir good. And therefore there is no saying what his fate may be. \u0026ldquo;And\r\ndo you think that a man who is unable to help himself is in a good\r\ncondition?\u0026rdquo; Yes, Callicles, if he have the true self-help, which is never\r\nto have said or done any wrong to himself or others. If I had not this kind of\r\nself-help, I should be ashamed; but if I die for want of your flattering\r\nrhetoric, I shall die in peace. For death is no evil, but to go to the world\r\nbelow laden with offences is the worst of evils. In proof of which I will tell\r\nyou a tale:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nUnder the rule of Cronos, men were judged on the day of their death, and when\r\njudgment had been given upon them they departed\u0026mdash;the good to the islands\r\nof the blest, the bad to the house of vengeance. But as they were still living,\r\nand had their clothes on at the time when they were being judged, there was\r\nfavouritism, and Zeus, when he came to the throne, was obliged to alter the\r\nmode of procedure, and try them after death, having first sent down Prometheus\r\nto take away from them the foreknowledge of death. Minos, Rhadamanthus, and\r\nAeacus were appointed to be the judges; Rhadamanthus for Asia, Aeacus for\r\nEurope, and Minos was to hold the court of appeal. Now death is the separation\r\nof soul and body, but after death soul and body alike retain their\r\ncharacteristics; the fat man, the dandy, the branded slave, are all\r\ndistinguishable. Some prince or potentate, perhaps even the great king himself,\r\nappears before Rhadamanthus, and he instantly detects him, though he knows not\r\nwho he is; he sees the scars of perjury and iniquity, and sends him away to the\r\nhouse of torment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor there are two classes of souls who undergo punishment\u0026mdash;the curable and\r\nthe incurable. The curable are those who are benefited by their punishment; the\r\nincurable are such as Archelaus, who benefit others by becoming a warning to\r\nthem. The latter class are generally kings and potentates; meaner persons,\r\nhappily for themselves, have not the same power of doing injustice. Sisyphus\r\nand Tityus, not Thersites, are supposed by Homer to be undergoing everlasting\r\npunishment. Not that there is anything to prevent a great man from being a good\r\none, as is shown by the famous example of Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus.\r\nBut to Rhadamanthus the souls are only known as good or bad; they are stripped\r\nof their dignities and preferments; he despatches the bad to Tartarus, labelled\r\neither as curable or incurable, and looks with love and admiration on the soul\r\nof some just one, whom he sends to the islands of the blest. Similar is the\r\npractice of Aeacus; and Minos overlooks them, holding a golden sceptre, as\r\nOdysseus in Homer saw him\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Wielding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMy wish for myself and my fellow-men is, that we may present our souls\r\nundefiled to the judge in that day; my desire in life is to be able to meet\r\ndeath. And I exhort you, and retort upon you the reproach which you cast upon\r\nme,\u0026mdash;that you will stand before the judge, gaping, and with dizzy brain,\r\nand any one may box you on the ear, and do you all manner of evil.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPerhaps you think that this is an old wives\u0026rsquo; fable. But you, who are the\r\nthree wisest men in Hellas, have nothing better to say, and no one will ever\r\nshow that to do is better than to suffer evil. A man should study to be, and\r\nnot merely to seem. If he is bad, he should become good, and avoid all\r\nflattery, whether of the many or of the few.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFollow me, then; and if you are looked down upon, that will do you no harm. And\r\nwhen we have practised virtue, we will betake ourselves to politics, but not\r\nuntil we are delivered from the shameful state of ignorance and uncertainty in\r\nwhich we are at present. Let us follow in the way of virtue and justice, and\r\nnot in the way to which you, Callicles, invite us; for that way is nothing\r\nworth.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe will now consider in order some of the principal points of the dialogue.\r\nHaving regard (1) to the age of Plato and the ironical character of his\r\nwritings, we may compare him with himself, and with other great teachers, and\r\nwe may note in passing the objections of his critics. And then (2) casting one\r\neye upon him, we may cast another upon ourselves, and endeavour to draw out the\r\ngreat lessons which he teaches for all time, stripped of the accidental form in\r\nwhich they are enveloped.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(1) In the Gorgias, as in nearly all the other dialogues of Plato, we are made\r\naware that formal logic has as yet no existence. The old difficulty of framing\r\na definition recurs. The illusive analogy of the arts and the virtues also\r\ncontinues. The ambiguity of several words, such as nature, custom, the\r\nhonourable, the good, is not cleared up. The Sophists are still floundering\r\nabout the distinction of the real and seeming. Figures of speech are made the\r\nbasis of arguments. The possibility of conceiving a universal art or science,\r\nwhich admits of application to a particular subject-matter, is a difficulty\r\nwhich remains unsolved, and has not altogether ceased to haunt the world at the\r\npresent day (compare Charmides). The defect of clearness is also apparent in\r\nSocrates himself, unless we suppose him to be practising on the simplicity of\r\nhis opponent, or rather perhaps trying an experiment in dialectics. Nothing can\r\nbe more fallacious than the contradiction which he pretends to have discovered\r\nin the answers of Gorgias (see above). The advantages which he gains over Polus\r\nare also due to a false antithesis of pleasure and good, and to an erroneous\r\nassertion that an agent and a patient may be described by similar\r\npredicates;\u0026mdash;a mistake which Aristotle partly shares and partly corrects\r\nin the Nicomachean Ethics. Traces of a \u0026ldquo;robust sophistry\u0026rdquo; are\r\nlikewise discernible in his argument with Callicles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(2) Although Socrates professes to be convinced by reason only, yet the\r\nargument is often a sort of dialectical fiction, by which he conducts himself\r\nand others to his own ideal of life and action. And we may sometimes wish that\r\nwe could have suggested answers to his antagonists, or pointed out to them the\r\nrocks which lay concealed under the ambiguous terms good, pleasure, and the\r\nlike. But it would be as useless to examine his arguments by the requirements\r\nof modern logic, as to criticise this ideal from a merely utilitarian point of\r\nview. If we say that the ideal is generally regarded as unattainable, and that\r\nmankind will by no means agree in thinking that the criminal is happier when\r\npunished than when unpunished, any more than they would agree to the stoical\r\nparadox that a man may be happy on the rack, Plato has already admitted that\r\nthe world is against him. Neither does he mean to say that Archelaus is\r\ntormented by the stings of conscience; or that the sensations of the impaled\r\ncriminal are more agreeable than those of the tyrant drowned in luxurious\r\nenjoyment. Neither is he speaking, as in the Protagoras, of virtue as a\r\ncalculation of pleasure, an opinion which he afterwards repudiates in the\r\nPhaedo. What then is his meaning? His meaning we shall be able to illustrate\r\nbest by parallel notions, which, whether justifiable by logic or not, have\r\nalways existed among mankind. We must remind the reader that Socrates himself\r\nimplies that he will be understood or appreciated by very few.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHe is speaking not of the consciousness of happiness, but of the idea of\r\nhappiness. When a martyr dies in a good cause, when a soldier falls in battle,\r\nwe do not suppose that death or wounds are without pain, or that their physical\r\nsuffering is always compensated by a mental satisfaction. Still we regard them\r\nas happy, and we would a thousand times rather have their death than a shameful\r\nlife. Nor is this only because we believe that they will obtain an immortality\r\nof fame, or that they will have crowns of glory in another world, when their\r\nenemies and persecutors will be proportionably tormented. Men are found in a\r\nfew instances to do what is right, without reference to public opinion or to\r\nconsequences. And we regard them as happy on this ground only, much as\r\nSocrates\u0026rsquo; friends in the opening of the Phaedo are described as regarding\r\nhim; or as was said of another, \u0026ldquo;they looked upon his face as upon the\r\nface of an angel.\u0026rdquo; We are not concerned to justify this idealism by the\r\nstandard of utility or public opinion, but merely to point out the existence of\r\nsuch a sentiment in the better part of human nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe idealism of Plato is founded upon this sentiment. He would maintain that in\r\nsome sense or other truth and right are alone to be sought, and that all other\r\ngoods are only desirable as means towards these. He is thought to have erred in\r\n\u0026ldquo;considering the agent only, and making no reference to the happiness of\r\nothers, as affected by him.\u0026rdquo; But the happiness of others or of mankind,\r\nif regarded as an end, is really quite as ideal and almost as paradoxical to\r\nthe common understanding as Plato\u0026rsquo;s conception of happiness. For the\r\ngreatest happiness of the greatest number may mean also the greatest pain of\r\nthe individual which will procure the greatest pleasure of the greatest number.\r\nIdeas of utility, like those of duty and right, may be pushed to unpleasant\r\nconsequences. Nor can Plato in the Gorgias be deemed purely self-regarding,\r\nconsidering that Socrates expressly mentions the duty of imparting the truth\r\nwhen discovered to others. Nor must we forget that the side of ethics which\r\nregards others is by the ancients merged in politics. Both in Plato and\r\nAristotle, as well as in the Stoics, the social principle, though taking\r\nanother form, is really far more prominent than in most modern treatises on\r\nethics.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe idealizing of suffering is one of the conceptions which have exercised the\r\ngreatest influence on mankind. Into the theological import of this, or into the\r\nconsideration of the errors to which the idea may have given rise, we need not\r\nnow enter. All will agree that the ideal of the Divine Sufferer, whose words\r\nthe world would not receive, the man of sorrows of whom the Hebrew prophets\r\nspoke, has sunk deep into the heart of the human race. It is a similar picture\r\nof suffering goodness which Plato desires to pourtray, not without an allusion\r\nto the fate of his master Socrates. He is convinced that, somehow or other,\r\nsuch an one must be happy in life or after death. In the Republic, he\r\nendeavours to show that his happiness would be assured here in a well-ordered\r\nstate. But in the actual condition of human things the wise and good are weak\r\nand miserable; such an one is like a man fallen among wild beasts, exposed to\r\nevery sort of wrong and obloquy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPlato, like other philosophers, is thus led on to the conclusion, that if\r\n\u0026ldquo;the ways of God\u0026rdquo; to man are to be \u0026ldquo;justified,\u0026rdquo; the\r\nhopes of another life must be included. If the question could have been put to\r\nhim, whether a man dying in torments was happy still, even if, as he suggests\r\nin the Apology, \u0026ldquo;death be only a long sleep,\u0026rdquo; we can hardly tell\r\nwhat would have been his answer. There have been a few, who, quite\r\nindependently of rewards and punishments or of posthumous reputation, or any\r\nother influence of public opinion, have been willing to sacrifice their lives\r\nfor the good of others. It is difficult to say how far in such cases an\r\nunconscious hope of a future life, or a general faith in the victory of good in\r\nthe world, may have supported the sufferers. But this extreme idealism is not\r\nin accordance with the spirit of Plato. He supposes a day of retribution, in\r\nwhich the good are to be rewarded and the wicked punished. Though, as he says\r\nin the Phaedo, no man of sense will maintain that the details of the stories\r\nabout another world are true, he will insist that something of the kind is\r\ntrue, and will frame his life with a view to this unknown future. Even in the\r\nRepublic he introduces a future life as an afterthought, when the superior\r\nhappiness of the just has been established on what is thought to be an\r\nimmutable foundation. At the same time he makes a point of determining his main\r\nthesis independently of remoter consequences.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(3) Plato\u0026rsquo;s theory of punishment is partly vindictive, partly corrective.\r\nIn the Gorgias, as well as in the Phaedo and Republic, a few great criminals,\r\nchiefly tyrants, are reserved as examples. But most men have never had the\r\nopportunity of attaining this pre-eminence of evil. They are not incurable, and\r\ntheir punishment is intended for their improvement. They are to suffer because\r\nthey have sinned; like sick men, they must go to the physician and be healed.\r\nOn this representation of Plato\u0026rsquo;s the criticism has been made, that the\r\nanalogy of disease and injustice is partial only, and that suffering, instead\r\nof improving men, may have just the opposite effect.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLike the general analogy of the arts and the virtues, the analogy of disease\r\nand injustice, or of medicine and justice, is certainly imperfect. But ideas\r\nmust be given through something; the nature of the mind which is unseen can\r\nonly be represented under figures derived from visible objects. If these\r\nfigures are suggestive of some new aspect under which the mind may be\r\nconsidered, we cannot find fault with them for not exactly coinciding with the\r\nideas represented. They partake of the imperfect nature of language, and must\r\nnot be construed in too strict a manner. That Plato sometimes reasons from them\r\nas if they were not figures but realities, is due to the defective logical\r\nanalysis of his age.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNor does he distinguish between the suffering which improves and the suffering\r\nwhich only punishes and deters. He applies to the sphere of ethics a conception\r\nof punishment which is really derived from criminal law. He does not see that\r\nsuch punishment is only negative, and supplies no principle of moral growth or\r\ndevelopment. He is not far off the higher notion of an education of man to be\r\nbegun in this world, and to be continued in other stages of existence, which is\r\nfurther developed in the Republic. And Christian thinkers, who have ventured\r\nout of the beaten track in their meditations on the \u0026ldquo;last things,\u0026rdquo;\r\nhave found a ray of light in his writings. But he has not explained how or in\r\nwhat way punishment is to contribute to the improvement of mankind. He has not\r\nfollowed out the principle which he affirms in the Republic, that \u0026ldquo;God is\r\nthe author of evil only with a view to good,\u0026rdquo; and that \u0026ldquo;they were\r\nthe better for being punished.\u0026rdquo; Still his doctrine of a future state of\r\nrewards and punishments may be compared favourably with that perversion of\r\nChristian doctrine which makes the everlasting punishment of human beings\r\ndepend on a brief moment of time, or even on the accident of an accident. And\r\nhe has escaped the difficulty which has often beset divines, respecting the\r\nfuture destiny of the meaner sort of men (Thersites and the like), who are\r\nneither very good nor very bad, by not counting them worthy of eternal\r\ndamnation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe do Plato violence in pressing his figures of speech or chains of argument;\r\nand not less so in asking questions which were beyond the horizon of his\r\nvision, or did not come within the scope of his design. The main purpose of the\r\nGorgias is not to answer questions about a future world, but to place in\r\nantagonism the true and false life, and to contrast the judgments and opinions\r\nof men with judgment according to the truth. Plato may be accused of\r\nrepresenting a superhuman or transcendental virtue in the description of the\r\njust man in the Gorgias, or in the companion portrait of the philosopher in the\r\nTheaetetus; and at the same time may be thought to be condemning a state of the\r\nworld which always has existed and always will exist among men. But such ideals\r\nact powerfully on the imagination of mankind. And such condemnations are not\r\nmere paradoxes of philosophers, but the natural rebellion of the higher sense\r\nof right in man against the ordinary conditions of human life. The greatest\r\nstatesmen have fallen very far short of the political ideal, and are therefore\r\njustly involved in the general condemnation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSubordinate to the main purpose of the dialogue are some other questions, which\r\nmay be briefly considered:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\na. The antithesis of good and pleasure, which as in other dialogues is supposed\r\nto consist in the permanent nature of the one compared with the transient and\r\nrelative nature of the other. Good and pleasure, knowledge and sense, truth and\r\nopinion, essence and generation, virtue and pleasure, the real and the\r\napparent, the infinite and finite, harmony or beauty and discord, dialectic and\r\nrhetoric or poetry, are so many pairs of opposites, which in Plato easily pass\r\ninto one another, and are seldom kept perfectly distinct. And we must not\r\nforget that Plato\u0026rsquo;s conception of pleasure is the Heracleitean flux\r\ntransferred to the sphere of human conduct. There is some degree of unfairness\r\nin opposing the principle of good, which is objective, to the principle of\r\npleasure, which is subjective. For the assertion of the permanence of good is\r\nonly based on the assumption of its objective character. Had Plato fixed his\r\nmind, not on the ideal nature of good, but on the subjective consciousness of\r\nhappiness, that would have been found to be as transient and precarious as\r\npleasure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nb. The arts or sciences, when pursued without any view to truth, or the\r\nimprovement of human life, are called flatteries. They are all alike dependent\r\nupon the opinion of mankind, from which they are derived. To Plato the whole\r\nworld appears to be sunk in error, based on self-interest. To this is opposed\r\nthe one wise man hardly professing to have found truth, yet strong in the\r\nconviction that a virtuous life is the only good, whether regarded with\r\nreference to this world or to another. Statesmen, Sophists, rhetoricians,\r\npoets, are alike brought up for judgment. They are the parodies of wise men,\r\nand their arts are the parodies of true arts and sciences. All that they call\r\nscience is merely the result of that study of the tempers of the Great Beast,\r\nwhich he describes in the Republic.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nc. Various other points of contact naturally suggest themselves between the\r\nGorgias and other dialogues, especially the Republic, the Philebus, and the\r\nProtagoras. There are closer resemblances both of spirit and language in the\r\nRepublic than in any other dialogue, the verbal similarity tending to show that\r\nthey were written at the same period of Plato\u0026rsquo;s life. For the Republic\r\nsupplies that education and training of which the Gorgias suggests the\r\nnecessity. The theory of the many weak combining against the few strong in the\r\nformation of society (which is indeed a partial truth), is similar in both of\r\nthem, and is expressed in nearly the same language. The sufferings and fate of\r\nthe just man, the powerlessness of evil, and the reversal of the situation in\r\nanother life, are also points of similarity. The poets, like the rhetoricians,\r\nare condemned because they aim at pleasure only, as in the Republic they are\r\nexpelled by the State, because they are imitators, and minister to the weaker\r\nside of human nature. That poetry is akin to rhetoric may be compared with the\r\nanalogous notion, which occurs in the Protagoras, that the ancient poets were\r\nthe Sophists of their day. In some other respects the Protagoras rather offers\r\na contrast than a parallel. The character of Protagoras may be compared with\r\nthat of Gorgias, but the conception of happiness is different in the two\r\ndialogues; being described in the former, according to the old Socratic notion,\r\nas deferred or accumulated pleasure, while in the Gorgias, and in the Phaedo,\r\npleasure and good are distinctly opposed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis opposition is carried out from a speculative point of view in the\r\nPhilebus. There neither pleasure nor wisdom are allowed to be the chief good,\r\nbut pleasure and good are not so completely opposed as in the Gorgias. For\r\ninnocent pleasures, and such as have no antecedent pains, are allowed to rank\r\nin the class of goods. The allusion to Gorgias\u0026rsquo; definition of rhetoric\r\n(Philebus; compare Gorg.), as the art of persuasion, of all arts the best, for\r\nto it all things submit, not by compulsion, but of their own free\r\nwill\u0026mdash;marks a close and perhaps designed connection between the two\r\ndialogues. In both the ideas of measure, order, harmony, are the connecting\r\nlinks between the beautiful and the good.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn general spirit and character, that is, in irony and antagonism to public\r\nopinion, the Gorgias most nearly resembles the Apology, Crito, and portions of\r\nthe Republic, and like the Philebus, though from another point of view, may be\r\nthought to stand in the same relation to Plato\u0026rsquo;s theory of morals which\r\nthe Theaetetus bears to his theory of knowledge.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nd. A few minor points still remain to be summed up: (1) The extravagant irony\r\nin the reason which is assigned for the pilot\u0026rsquo;s modest charge; and in the\r\nproposed use of rhetoric as an instrument of self-condemnation; and in the\r\nmighty power of geometrical equality in both worlds. (2) The reference of the\r\nmythus to the previous discussion should not be overlooked: the fate reserved\r\nfor incurable criminals such as Archelaus; the retaliation of the box on the\r\nears; the nakedness of the souls and of the judges who are stript of the\r\nclothes or disguises which rhetoric and public opinion have hitherto provided\r\nfor them (compare Swift\u0026rsquo;s notion that the universe is a suit of clothes,\r\nTale of a Tub). The fiction seems to have involved Plato in the necessity of\r\nsupposing that the soul retained a sort of corporeal likeness after death. (3)\r\nThe appeal of the authority of Homer, who says that Odysseus saw Minos in his\r\ncourt \u0026ldquo;holding a golden sceptre,\u0026rdquo; which gives verisimilitude to the\r\ntale.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is scarcely necessary to repeat that Plato is playing \u0026ldquo;both sides of\r\nthe game,\u0026rdquo; and that in criticising the characters of Gorgias and Polus,\r\nwe are not passing any judgment on historical individuals, but only attempting\r\nto analyze the \u0026ldquo;dramatis personae\u0026rsquo; as they were conceived by him.\r\nNeither is it necessary to enlarge upon the obvious fact that Plato is a\r\ndramatic writer, whose real opinions cannot always be assumed to be those which\r\nhe puts into the mouth of Socrates, or any other speaker who appears to have\r\nthe best of the argument; or to repeat the observation that he is a poet as\r\nwell as a philosopher; or to remark that he is not to be tried by a modern\r\nstandard, but interpreted with reference to his place in the history of thought\r\nand the opinion of his time.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt has been said that the most characteristic feature of the Gorgias is the\r\nassertion of the right of dissent, or private judgment. But this mode of\r\nstating the question is really opposed both to the spirit of Plato and of\r\nancient philosophy generally. For Plato is not asserting any abstract right or\r\nduty of toleration, or advantage to be derived from freedom of thought; indeed,\r\nin some other parts of his writings (e.g. Laws), he has fairly laid himself\r\nopen to the charge of intolerance. No speculations had as yet arisen respecting\r\nthe \u0026ldquo;liberty of prophesying;\u0026rsquo; and Plato is not affirming any\r\nabstract right of this nature: but he is asserting the duty and right of the\r\none wise and true man to dissent from the folly and falsehood of the many. At\r\nthe same time he acknowledges the natural result, which he hardly seeks to\r\navert, that he who speaks the truth to a multitude, regardless of consequences,\r\nwill probably share the fate of Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe irony of Plato sometimes veils from us the height of idealism to which he\r\nsoars. When declaring truths which the many will not receive, he puts on an\r\narmour which cannot be pierced by them. The weapons of ridicule are taken out\r\nof their hands and the laugh is turned against themselves. The disguises which\r\nSocrates assumes are like the parables of the New Testament, or the oracles of\r\nthe Delphian God; they half conceal, half reveal, his meaning. The more he is\r\nin earnest, the more ironical he becomes; and he is never more in earnest or\r\nmore ironical than in the Gorgias. He hardly troubles himself to answer\r\nseriously the objections of Gorgias and Polus, and therefore he sometimes\r\nappears to be careless of the ordinary requirements of logic. Yet in the\r\nhighest sense he is always logical and consistent with himself. The form of the\r\nargument may be paradoxical; the substance is an appeal to the higher reason.\r\nHe is uttering truths before they can be understood, as in all ages the words\r\nof philosophers, when they are first uttered, have found the world unprepared\r\nfor them. A further misunderstanding arises out of the wildness of his humour;\r\nhe is supposed not only by Callicles, but by the rest of mankind, to be jesting\r\nwhen he is profoundly serious. At length he makes even Polus in earnest.\r\nFinally, he drops the argument, and heedless any longer of the forms of\r\ndialectic, he loses himself in a sort of triumph, while at the same time he\r\nretaliates upon his adversaries. From this confusion of jest and earnest, we\r\nmay now return to the ideal truth, and draw out in a simple form the main\r\ntheses of the dialogue.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFirst Thesis:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is a greater evil to do than to suffer injustice.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCompare the New Testament\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;It is better to suffer for well doing than for evil\r\ndoing.\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;1 Pet.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd the Sermon on the Mount\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Blessed are they that are persecuted for righteousness\u0026rsquo;\r\nsake.\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;Matt.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe words of Socrates are more abstract than the words of Christ, but they\r\nequally imply that the only real evil is moral evil. The righteous may suffer\r\nor die, but they have their reward; and even if they had no reward, would be\r\nhappier than the wicked. The world, represented by Polus, is ready, when they\r\nare asked, to acknowledge that injustice is dishonourable, and for their own\r\nsakes men are willing to punish the offender (compare Republic). But they are\r\nnot equally willing to acknowledge that injustice, even if successful, is\r\nessentially evil, and has the nature of disease and death. Especially when\r\ncrimes are committed on the great scale\u0026mdash;the crimes of tyrants, ancient or\r\nmodern\u0026mdash;after a while, seeing that they cannot be undone, and have become\r\na part of history, mankind are disposed to forgive them, not from any\r\nmagnanimity or charity, but because their feelings are blunted by time, and\r\n\u0026ldquo;to forgive is convenient to them.\u0026rdquo; The tangle of good and evil can\r\nno longer be unravelled; and although they know that the end cannot justify the\r\nmeans, they feel also that good has often come out of evil. But Socrates would\r\nhave us pass the same judgment on the tyrant now and always; though he is\r\nsurrounded by his satellites, and has the applauses of Europe and Asia ringing\r\nin his ears; though he is the civilizer or liberator of half a continent, he\r\nis, and always will be, the most miserable of men. The greatest consequences\r\nfor good or for evil cannot alter a hair\u0026rsquo;s breadth the morality of\r\nactions which are right or wrong in themselves. This is the standard which\r\nSocrates holds up to us. Because politics, and perhaps human life generally,\r\nare of a mixed nature we must not allow our principles to sink to the level of\r\nour practice.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd so of private individuals\u0026mdash;to them, too, the world occasionally speaks\r\nof the consequences of their actions:\u0026mdash;if they are lovers of pleasure,\r\nthey will ruin their health; if they are false or dishonest, they will lose\r\ntheir character. But Socrates would speak to them, not of what will be, but of\r\nwhat is\u0026mdash;of the present consequence of lowering and degrading the soul.\r\nAnd all higher natures, or perhaps all men everywhere, if they were not tempted\r\nby interest or passion, would agree with him\u0026mdash;they would rather be the\r\nvictims than the perpetrators of an act of treachery or of tyranny. Reason\r\ntells them that death comes sooner or later to all, and is not so great an evil\r\nas an unworthy life, or rather, if rightly regarded, not an evil at all, but to\r\na good man the greatest good. For in all of us there are slumbering ideals of\r\ntruth and right, which may at any time awaken and develop a new life in us.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSecond Thesis:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is better to suffer for wrong doing than not to suffer.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere might have been a condition of human life in which the penalty followed\r\nat once, and was proportioned to the offence. Moral evil would then be scarcely\r\ndistinguishable from physical; mankind would avoid vice as they avoid pain or\r\ndeath. But nature, with a view of deepening and enlarging our characters, has\r\nfor the most part hidden from us the consequences of our actions, and we can\r\nonly foresee them by an effort of reflection. To awaken in us this habit of\r\nreflection is the business of early education, which is continued in maturer\r\nyears by observation and experience. The spoilt child is in later life said to\r\nbe unfortunate\u0026mdash;he had better have suffered when he was young, and been\r\nsaved from suffering afterwards. But is not the sovereign equally unfortunate\r\nwhose education and manner of life are always concealing from him the\r\nconsequences of his own actions, until at length they are revealed to him in\r\nsome terrible downfall, which may, perhaps, have been caused not by his own\r\nfault? Another illustration is afforded by the pauper and criminal classes, who\r\nscarcely reflect at all, except on the means by which they can compass their\r\nimmediate ends. We pity them, and make allowances for them; but we do not\r\nconsider that the same principle applies to human actions generally. Not to\r\nhave been found out in some dishonesty or folly, regarded from a moral or\r\nreligious point of view, is the greatest of misfortunes. The success of our\r\nevil doings is a proof that the gods have ceased to strive with us, and have\r\ngiven us over to ourselves. There is nothing to remind us of our sins, and\r\ntherefore nothing to correct them. Like our sorrows, they are healed by time;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;While rank corruption, mining all within,\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nInfects unseen.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe \u0026ldquo;accustomed irony\u0026rdquo; of Socrates adds a corollary to the\r\nargument:\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;Would you punish your enemy, you should allow him to\r\nescape unpunished\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;this is the true retaliation. (Compare the\r\nobscure verse of Proverbs, \u0026ldquo;Therefore if thine enemy hunger, feed\r\nhim,\u0026rdquo; etc., quoted in Romans.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMen are not in the habit of dwelling upon the dark side of their own lives:\r\nthey do not easily see themselves as others see them. They are very kind and\r\nvery blind to their own faults; the rhetoric of self-love is always pleading\r\nwith them on their own behalf. Adopting a similar figure of speech, Socrates\r\nwould have them use rhetoric, not in defence but in accusation of themselves.\r\nAs they are guided by feeling rather than by reason, to their feelings the\r\nappeal must be made. They must speak to themselves; they must argue with\r\nthemselves; they must paint in eloquent words the character of their own evil\r\ndeeds. To any suffering which they have deserved, they must persuade themselves\r\nto submit. Under the figure there lurks a real thought, which, expressed in\r\nanother form, admits of an easy application to ourselves. For do not we too\r\naccuse as well as excuse ourselves? And we call to our aid the rhetoric of\r\nprayer and preaching, which the mind silently employs while the struggle\r\nbetween the better and the worse is going on within us. And sometimes we are\r\ntoo hard upon ourselves, because we want to restore the balance which self-love\r\nhas overthrown or disturbed; and then again we may hear a voice as of a parent\r\nconsoling us. In religious diaries a sort of drama is often enacted by the\r\nconsciences of men \u0026ldquo;accusing or else excusing them.\u0026rdquo; For all our\r\nlife long we are talking with ourselves:\u0026mdash;What is thought but speech? What\r\nis feeling but rhetoric? And if rhetoric is used on one side only we shall be\r\nalways in danger of being deceived. And so the words of Socrates, which at\r\nfirst sounded paradoxical, come home to the experience of all of us.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThird Thesis:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe do not what we will, but what we wish.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSocrates would teach us a lesson which we are slow to learn\u0026mdash;that good\r\nintentions, and even benevolent actions, when they are not prompted by wisdom,\r\nare of no value. We believe something to be for our good which we afterwards\r\nfind out not to be for our good. The consequences may be inevitable, for they\r\nmay follow an invariable law, yet they may often be the very opposite of what\r\nis expected by us. When we increase pauperism by almsgiving; when we tie up\r\nproperty without regard to changes of circumstances; when we say hastily what\r\nwe deliberately disapprove; when we do in a moment of passion what upon\r\nreflection we regret; when from any want of self-control we give another an\r\nadvantage over us\u0026mdash;we are doing not what we will, but what we wish. All\r\nactions of which the consequences are not weighed and foreseen, are of this\r\nimpotent and paralytic sort; and the author of them has \u0026ldquo;the least\r\npossible power\u0026rdquo; while seeming to have the greatest. For he is actually\r\nbringing about the reverse of what he intended. And yet the book of nature is\r\nopen to him, in which he who runs may read if he will exercise ordinary\r\nattention; every day offers him experiences of his own and of other men\u0026rsquo;s\r\ncharacters, and he passes them unheeded by. The contemplation of the\r\nconsequences of actions, and the ignorance of men in regard to them, seems to\r\nhave led Socrates to his famous thesis:\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;Virtue is\r\nknowledge;\u0026rdquo; which is not so much an error or paradox as a half truth,\r\nseen first in the twilight of ethical philosophy, but also the half of the\r\ntruth which is especially needed in the present age. For as the world has grown\r\nolder men have been too apt to imagine a right and wrong apart from\r\nconsequences; while a few, on the other hand, have sought to resolve them\r\nwholly into their consequences. But Socrates, or Plato for him, neither divides\r\nnor identifies them; though the time has not yet arrived either for utilitarian\r\nor transcendental systems of moral philosophy, he recognizes the two elements\r\nwhich seem to lie at the basis of morality. (Compare the following: \u0026ldquo;Now,\r\nand for us, it is a time to Hellenize and to praise knowing; for we have\r\nHebraized too much and have overvalued doing. But the habits and discipline\r\nreceived from Hebraism remain for our race an eternal possession. And as\r\nhumanity is constituted, one must never assign the second rank to-day without\r\nbeing ready to restore them to the first to-morrow.\u0026rdquo; Sir William W.\r\nHunter, Preface to Orissa.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFourth Thesis:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo be and not to seem is the end of life.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe Greek in the age of Plato admitted praise to be one of the chief incentives\r\nto moral virtue, and to most men the opinion of their fellows is a leading\r\nprinciple of action. Hence a certain element of seeming enters into all things;\r\nall or almost all desire to appear better than they are, that they may win the\r\nesteem or admiration of others. A man of ability can easily feign the language\r\nof piety or virtue; and there is an unconscious as well as a conscious\r\nhypocrisy which, according to Socrates, is the worst of the two. Again, there\r\nis the sophistry of classes and professions. There are the different opinions\r\nabout themselves and one another which prevail in different ranks of society.\r\nThere is the bias given to the mind by the study of one department of human\r\nknowledge to the exclusion of the rest; and stronger far the prejudice\r\nengendered by a pecuniary or party interest in certain tenets. There is the\r\nsophistry of law, the sophistry of medicine, the sophistry of politics, the\r\nsophistry of theology. All of these disguises wear the appearance of the truth;\r\nsome of them are very ancient, and we do not easily disengage ourselves from\r\nthem; for we have inherited them, and they have become a part of us. The\r\nsophistry of an ancient Greek sophist is nothing compared with the sophistry of\r\na religious order, or of a church in which during many ages falsehood has been\r\naccumulating, and everything has been said on one side, and nothing on the\r\nother. The conventions and customs which we observe in conversation, and the\r\nopposition of our interests when we have dealings with one another (\u0026ldquo;the\r\nbuyer saith, it is nought\u0026mdash;it is nought,\u0026rdquo; etc.), are always\r\nobscuring our sense of truth and right. The sophistry of human nature is far\r\nmore subtle than the deceit of any one man. Few persons speak freely from their\r\nown natures, and scarcely any one dares to think for himself: most of us\r\nimperceptibly fall into the opinions of those around us, which we partly help\r\nto make. A man who would shake himself loose from them, requires great force of\r\nmind; he hardly knows where to begin in the search after truth. On every side\r\nhe is met by the world, which is not an abstraction of theologians, but the\r\nmost real of all things, being another name for ourselves when regarded\r\ncollectively and subjected to the influences of society.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThen comes Socrates, impressed as no other man ever was, with the unreality and\r\nuntruthfulness of popular opinion, and tells mankind that they must be and not\r\nseem. How are they to be? At any rate they must have the spirit and desire to\r\nbe. If they are ignorant, they must acknowledge their ignorance to themselves;\r\nif they are conscious of doing evil, they must learn to do well; if they are\r\nweak, and have nothing in them which they can call themselves, they must\r\nacquire firmness and consistency; if they are indifferent, they must begin to\r\ntake an interest in the great questions which surround them. They must try to\r\nbe what they would fain appear in the eyes of their fellow-men. A single\r\nindividual cannot easily change public opinion; but he can be true and\r\ninnocent, simple and independent; he can know what he does, and what he does\r\nnot know; and though not without an effort, he can form a judgment of his own,\r\nat least in common matters. In his most secret actions he can show the same\r\nhigh principle (compare Republic) which he shows when supported and watched by\r\npublic opinion. And on some fitting occasion, on some question of humanity or\r\ntruth or right, even an ordinary man, from the natural rectitude of his\r\ndisposition, may be found to take up arms against a whole tribe of politicians\r\nand lawyers, and be too much for them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWho is the true and who the false statesman?\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe true statesman is he who brings order out of disorder; who first organizes\r\nand then administers the government of his own country; and having made a\r\nnation, seeks to reconcile the national interests with those of Europe and of\r\nmankind. He is not a mere theorist, nor yet a dealer in expedients; the whole\r\nand the parts grow together in his mind; while the head is conceiving, the hand\r\nis executing. Although obliged to descend to the world, he is not of the world.\r\nHis thoughts are fixed not on power or riches or extension of territory, but on\r\nan ideal state, in which all the citizens have an equal chance of health and\r\nlife, and the highest education is within the reach of all, and the moral and\r\nintellectual qualities of every individual are freely developed, and \u0026ldquo;the\r\nidea of good\u0026rdquo; is the animating principle of the whole. Not the attainment\r\nof freedom alone, or of order alone, but how to unite freedom with order is the\r\nproblem which he has to solve.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe statesman who places before himself these lofty aims has undertaken a task\r\nwhich will call forth all his powers. He must control himself before he can\r\ncontrol others; he must know mankind before he can manage them. He has no\r\nprivate likes or dislikes; he does not conceal personal enmity under the\r\ndisguise of moral or political principle: such meannesses, into which men too\r\noften fall unintentionally, are absorbed in the consciousness of his mission,\r\nand in his love for his country and for mankind. He will sometimes ask himself\r\nwhat the next generation will say of him; not because he is careful of\r\nposthumous fame, but because he knows that the result of his life as a whole\r\nwill then be more fairly judged. He will take time for the execution of his\r\nplans; not hurrying them on when the mind of a nation is unprepared for them;\r\nbut like the Ruler of the Universe Himself, working in the appointed time, for\r\nhe knows that human life, \u0026ldquo;if not long in comparison with eternity\u0026rdquo;\r\n(Republic), is sufficient for the fulfilment of many great purposes. He knows,\r\ntoo, that the work will be still going on when he is no longer here; and he\r\nwill sometimes, especially when his powers are failing, think of that other\r\n\u0026ldquo;city of which the pattern is in heaven\u0026rdquo; (Republic).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe false politician is the serving-man of the state. In order to govern men he\r\nbecomes like them; their \u0026ldquo;minds are married in conjunction;\u0026rdquo; they\r\n\u0026ldquo;bear themselves\u0026rdquo; like vulgar and tyrannical masters, and he is\r\ntheir obedient servant. The true politician, if he would rule men, must make\r\nthem like himself; he must \u0026ldquo;educate his party\u0026rdquo; until they cease to\r\nbe a party; he must breathe into them the spirit which will hereafter give form\r\nto their institutions. Politics with him are not a mechanism for seeming what\r\nhe is not, or for carrying out the will of the majority. Himself a\r\nrepresentative man, he is the representative not of the lower but of the higher\r\nelements of the nation. There is a better (as well as a worse) public opinion\r\nof which he seeks to lay hold; as there is also a deeper current of human\r\naffairs in which he is borne up when the waves nearer the shore are threatening\r\nhim. He acknowledges that he cannot take the world by force\u0026mdash;two or three\r\nmoves on the political chess board are all that he can fore see\u0026mdash;two or\r\nthree weeks moves on the political chessboard are all that he can\r\nforesee\u0026mdash;two or three weeks or months are granted to him in which he can\r\nprovide against a coming struggle. But he knows also that there are permanent\r\nprinciples of politics which are always tending to the well-being of\r\nstates\u0026mdash;better administration, better education, the reconciliation of\r\nconflicting elements, increased security against external enemies. These are\r\nnot \u0026ldquo;of to-day or yesterday,\u0026rdquo; but are the same in all times, and\r\nunder all forms of government. Then when the storm descends and the winds blow,\r\nthough he knows not beforehand the hour of danger, the pilot, not like\r\nPlato\u0026rsquo;s captain in the Republic, half-blind and deaf, but with\r\npenetrating eye and quick ear, is ready to take command of the ship and guide\r\nher into port.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe false politician asks not what is true, but what is the opinion of the\r\nworld\u0026mdash;not what is right, but what is expedient. The only measures of\r\nwhich he approves are the measures which will pass. He has no intention of\r\nfighting an uphill battle; he keeps the roadway of politics. He is unwilling to\r\nincur the persecution and enmity which political convictions would entail upon\r\nhim. He begins with popularity, and in fair weather sails gallantly along. But\r\nunpopularity soon follows him. For men expect their leaders to be better and\r\nwiser than themselves: to be their guides in danger, their saviours in\r\nextremity; they do not really desire them to obey all the ignorant impulses of\r\nthe popular mind; and if they fail them in a crisis they are disappointed.\r\nThen, as Socrates says, the cry of ingratitude is heard, which is most\r\nunreasonable; for the people, who have been taught no better, have done what\r\nmight be expected of them, and their statesmen have received justice at their\r\nhands.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe true statesman is aware that he must adapt himself to times and\r\ncircumstances. He must have allies if he is to fight against the world; he must\r\nenlighten public opinion; he must accustom his followers to act together.\r\nAlthough he is not the mere executor of the will of the majority, he must win\r\nover the majority to himself. He is their leader and not their follower, but in\r\norder to lead he must also follow. He will neither exaggerate nor undervalue\r\nthe power of a statesman, neither adopting the \u0026ldquo;laissez faire\u0026rdquo; nor\r\nthe \u0026ldquo;paternal government\u0026rdquo; principle; but he will, whether he is\r\ndealing with children in politics, or with full-grown men, seek to do for the\r\npeople what the government can do for them, and what, from imperfect education\r\nor deficient powers of combination, they cannot do for themselves. He knows\r\nthat if he does too much for them they will do nothing; and that if he does\r\nnothing for them they will in some states of society be utterly helpless. For\r\nthe many cannot exist without the few, if the material force of a country is\r\nfrom below, wisdom and experience are from above. It is not a small part of\r\nhuman evils which kings and governments make or cure. The statesman is well\r\naware that a great purpose carried out consistently during many years will at\r\nlast be executed. He is playing for a stake which may be partly determined by\r\nsome accident, and therefore he will allow largely for the unknown element of\r\npolitics. But the game being one in which chance and skill are combined, if he\r\nplays long enough he is certain of victory. He will not be always consistent,\r\nfor the world is changing; and though he depends upon the support of a party,\r\nhe will remember that he is the minister of the whole. He lives not for the\r\npresent, but for the future, and he is not at all sure that he will be\r\nappreciated either now or then. For he may have the existing order of society\r\nagainst him, and may not be remembered by a distant posterity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere are always discontented idealists in politics who, like Socrates in the\r\nGorgias, find fault with all statesmen past as well as present, not excepting\r\nthe greatest names of history. Mankind have an uneasy feeling that they ought\r\nto be better governed than they are. Just as the actual philosopher falls short\r\nof the one wise man, so does the actual statesman fall short of the ideal. And\r\nso partly from vanity and egotism, but partly also from a true sense of the\r\nfaults of eminent men, a temper of dissatisfaction and criticism springs up\r\namong those who are ready enough to acknowledge the inferiority of their own\r\npowers. No matter whether a statesman makes high professions or none at\r\nall\u0026mdash;they are reduced sooner or later to the same level. And sometimes the\r\nmore unscrupulous man is better esteemed than the more conscientious, because\r\nhe has not equally deceived expectations. Such sentiments may be unjust, but\r\nthey are widely spread; we constantly find them recurring in reviews and\r\nnewspapers, and still oftener in private conversation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe may further observe that the art of government, while in some respects\r\ntending to improve, has in others a tendency to degenerate, as institutions\r\nbecome more popular. Governing for the people cannot easily be combined with\r\ngoverning by the people: the interests of classes are too strong for the ideas\r\nof the statesman who takes a comprehensive view of the whole. According to\r\nSocrates the true governor will find ruin or death staring him in the face, and\r\nwill only be induced to govern from the fear of being governed by a worse man\r\nthan himself (Republic). And in modern times, though the world has grown\r\nmilder, and the terrible consequences which Plato foretells no longer await an\r\nEnglish statesman, any one who is not actuated by a blind ambition will only\r\nundertake from a sense of duty a work in which he is most likely to fail; and\r\neven if he succeed, will rarely be rewarded by the gratitude of his own\r\ngeneration.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSocrates, who is not a politician at all, tells us that he is the only real\r\npolitician of his time. Let us illustrate the meaning of his words by applying\r\nthem to the history of our own country. He would have said that not Pitt or\r\nFox, or Canning or Sir R. Peel, are the real politicians of their time, but\r\nLocke, Hume, Adam Smith, Bentham, Ricardo. These during the greater part of\r\ntheir lives occupied an inconsiderable space in the eyes of the public. They\r\nwere private persons; nevertheless they sowed in the minds of men seeds which\r\nin the next generation have become an irresistible power. \u0026ldquo;Herein is that\r\nsaying true, One soweth and another reapeth.\u0026rdquo; We may imagine with Plato\r\nan ideal statesman in whom practice and speculation are perfectly harmonized;\r\nfor there is no necessary opposition between them. But experience shows that\r\nthey are commonly divorced\u0026mdash;the ordinary politician is the interpreter or\r\nexecutor of the thoughts of others, and hardly ever brings to the birth a new\r\npolitical conception. One or two only in modern times, like the Italian\r\nstatesman Cavour, have created the world in which they moved. The philosopher\r\nis naturally unfitted for political life; his great ideas are not understood by\r\nthe many; he is a thousand miles away from the questions of the day. Yet\r\nperhaps the lives of thinkers, as they are stiller and deeper, are also happier\r\nthan the lives of those who are more in the public eye. They have the promise\r\nof the future, though they are regarded as dreamers and visionaries by their\r\nown contemporaries. And when they are no longer here, those who would have been\r\nashamed of them during their lives claim kindred with them, and are proud to be\r\ncalled by their names. (Compare Thucyd.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWho is the true poet?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPlato expels the poets from his Republic because they are allied to sense;\r\nbecause they stimulate the emotions; because they are thrice removed from the\r\nideal truth. And in a similar spirit he declares in the Gorgias that the\r\nstately muse of tragedy is a votary of pleasure and not of truth. In modern\r\ntimes we almost ridicule the idea of poetry admitting of a moral. The poet and\r\nthe prophet, or preacher, in primitive antiquity are one and the same; but in\r\nlater ages they seem to fall apart. The great art of novel writing, that\r\npeculiar creation of our own and the last century, which, together with the\r\nsister art of review writing, threatens to absorb all literature, has even less\r\nof seriousness in her composition. Do we not often hear the novel writer\r\ncensured for attempting to convey a lesson to the minds of his readers?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nYet the true office of a poet or writer of fiction is not merely to give\r\namusement, or to be the expression of the feelings of mankind, good or bad, or\r\neven to increase our knowledge of human nature. There have been poets in modern\r\ntimes, such as Goethe or Wordsworth, who have not forgotten their high vocation\r\nof teachers; and the two greatest of the Greek dramatists owe their sublimity\r\nto their ethical character. The noblest truths, sung of in the purest and\r\nsweetest language, are still the proper material of poetry. The poet clothes\r\nthem with beauty, and has a power of making them enter into the hearts and\r\nmemories of men. He has not only to speak of themes above the level of ordinary\r\nlife, but to speak of them in a deeper and tenderer way than they are\r\nordinarily felt, so as to awaken the feeling of them in others. The old he\r\nmakes young again; the familiar principle he invests with a new dignity; he\r\nfinds a noble expression for the common-places of morality and politics. He\r\nuses the things of sense so as to indicate what is beyond; he raises us through\r\nearth to heaven. He expresses what the better part of us would fain say, and\r\nthe half-conscious feeling is strengthened by the expression. He is his own\r\ncritic, for the spirit of poetry and of criticism are not divided in him. His\r\nmission is not to disguise men from themselves, but to reveal to them their own\r\nnature, and make them better acquainted with the world around them. True poetry\r\nis the remembrance of youth, of love, the embodiment in words of the happiest\r\nand holiest moments of life, of the noblest thoughts of man, of the greatest\r\ndeeds of the past. The poet of the future may return to his greater calling of\r\nthe prophet or teacher; indeed, we hardly know what may not be effected for the\r\nhuman race by a better use of the poetical and imaginative faculty. The\r\nreconciliation of poetry, as of religion, with truth, may still be possible.\r\nNeither is the element of pleasure to be excluded. For when we substitute a\r\nhigher pleasure for a lower we raise men in the scale of existence. Might not\r\nthe novelist, too, make an ideal, or rather many ideals of social life, better\r\nthan a thousand sermons? Plato, like the Puritans, is too much afraid of poetic\r\nand artistic influences. But he is not without a true sense of the noble\r\npurposes to which art may be applied (Republic).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nModern poetry is often a sort of plaything, or, in Plato\u0026rsquo;s language, a\r\nflattery, a sophistry, or sham, in which, without any serious purpose, the poet\r\nlends wings to his fancy and exhibits his gifts of language and metre. Such an\r\none seeks to gratify the taste of his readers; he has the \u0026ldquo;savoir\r\nfaire,\u0026rdquo; or trick of writing, but he has not the higher spirit of poetry.\r\nHe has no conception that true art should bring order out of disorder; that it\r\nshould make provision for the soul\u0026rsquo;s highest interest; that it should be\r\npursued only with a view to \u0026ldquo;the improvement of the citizens.\u0026rdquo; He\r\nministers to the weaker side of human nature (Republic); he idealizes the\r\nsensual; he sings the strain of love in the latest fashion; instead of raising\r\nmen above themselves he brings them back to the \u0026ldquo;tyranny of the many\r\nmasters,\u0026rdquo; from which all his life long a good man has been praying to be\r\ndelivered. And often, forgetful of measure and order, he will express not that\r\nwhich is truest, but that which is strongest. Instead of a great and\r\nnobly-executed subject, perfect in every part, some fancy of a heated brain is\r\nworked out with the strangest incongruity. He is not the master of his words,\r\nbut his words\u0026mdash;perhaps borrowed from another\u0026mdash;the faded reflection of\r\nsome French or German or Italian writer, have the better of him. Though we are\r\nnot going to banish the poets, how can we suppose that such utterances have any\r\nhealing or life-giving influence on the minds of men?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter:\u0026rdquo; Art then must be\r\ntrue, and politics must be true, and the life of man must be true and not a\r\nseeming or sham. In all of them order has to be brought out of disorder, truth\r\nout of error and falsehood. This is what we mean by the greatest improvement of\r\nman. And so, having considered in what way \u0026ldquo;we can best spend the\r\nappointed time, we leave the result with God.\u0026rdquo; Plato does not say that\r\nGod will order all things for the best (compare Phaedo), but he indirectly\r\nimplies that the evils of this life will be corrected in another. And as we are\r\nvery far from the best imaginable world at present, Plato here, as in the\r\nPhaedo and Republic, supposes a purgatory or place of education for mankind in\r\ngeneral, and for a very few a Tartarus or hell. The myth which terminates the\r\ndialogue is not the revelation, but rather, like all similar descriptions,\r\nwhether in the Bible or Plato, the veil of another life. For no visible thing\r\ncan reveal the invisible. Of this Plato, unlike some commentators on Scripture,\r\nis fully aware. Neither will he dogmatize about the manner in which we are\r\n\u0026ldquo;born again\u0026rdquo; (Republic). Only he is prepared to maintain the\r\nultimate triumph of truth and right, and declares that no one, not even the\r\nwisest of the Greeks, can affirm any other doctrine without being ridiculous.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere is a further paradox of ethics, in which pleasure and pain are held to be\r\nindifferent, and virtue at the time of action and without regard to\r\nconsequences is happiness. From this elevation or exaggeration of feeling Plato\r\nseems to shrink: he leaves it to the Stoics in a later generation to maintain\r\nthat when impaled or on the rack the philosopher may be happy (compare\r\nRepublic). It is observable that in the Republic he raises this question, but\r\nit is not really discussed; the veil of the ideal state, the shadow of another\r\nlife, are allowed to descend upon it and it passes out of sight. The martyr or\r\nsufferer in the cause of right or truth is often supposed to die in raptures,\r\nhaving his eye fixed on a city which is in heaven. But if there were no future,\r\nmight he not still be happy in the performance of an action which was attended\r\nonly by a painful death? He himself may be ready to thank God that he was\r\nthought worthy to do Him the least service, without looking for a reward; the\r\njoys of another life may not have been present to his mind at all. Do we\r\nsuppose that the mediaeval saint, St. Bernard, St. Francis, St. Catharine of\r\nSienna, or the Catholic priest who lately devoted himself to death by a\r\nlingering disease that he might solace and help others, was thinking of the\r\n\u0026ldquo;sweets\u0026rdquo; of heaven? No; the work was already heaven to him and\r\nenough. Much less will the dying patriot be dreaming of the praises of man or\r\nof an immortality of fame: the sense of duty, of right, and trust in God will\r\nbe sufficient, and as far as the mind can reach, in that hour. If he were\r\ncertain that there were no life to come, he would not have wished to speak or\r\nact otherwise than he did in the cause of truth or of humanity. Neither, on the\r\nother hand, will he suppose that God has forsaken him or that the future is to\r\nbe a mere blank to him. The greatest act of faith, the only faith which cannot\r\npass away, is his who has not known, but yet has believed. A very few among the\r\nsons of men have made themselves independent of circumstances, past, present,\r\nor to come. He who has attained to such a temper of mind has already present\r\nwith him eternal life; he needs no arguments to convince him of immortality; he\r\nhas in him already a principle stronger than death. He who serves man without\r\nthe thought of reward is deemed to be a more faithful servant than he who works\r\nfor hire. May not the service of God, which is the more disinterested, be in\r\nlike manner the higher? And although only a very few in the course of the\r\nworld\u0026rsquo;s history\u0026mdash;Christ himself being one of them\u0026mdash;have\r\nattained to such a noble conception of God and of the human soul, yet the ideal\r\nof them may be present to us, and the remembrance of them be an example to us,\r\nand their lives may shed a light on many dark places both of philosophy and\r\ntheology.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTHE MYTHS OF PLATO.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe myths of Plato are a phenomenon unique in literature. There are four longer\r\nones: these occur in the Phaedrus, Phaedo, Gorgias, and Republic. That in the\r\nRepublic is the most elaborate and finished of them. Three of these greater\r\nmyths, namely those contained in the Phaedo, the Gorgias and the Republic,\r\nrelate to the destiny of human souls in a future life. The magnificent myth in\r\nthe Phaedrus treats of the immortality, or rather the eternity of the soul, in\r\nwhich is included a former as well as a future state of existence. To these may\r\nbe added, (1) the myth, or rather fable, occurring in the Statesman, in which\r\nthe life of innocence is contrasted with the ordinary life of man and the\r\nconsciousness of evil: (2) the legend of the Island of Atlantis, an imaginary\r\nhistory, which is a fragment only, commenced in the Timaeus and continued in\r\nthe Critias: (3) the much less artistic fiction of the foundation of the Cretan\r\ncolony which is introduced in the preface to the Laws, but soon falls into the\r\nbackground: (4) the beautiful but rather artificial tale of Prometheus and\r\nEpimetheus narrated in his rhetorical manner by Protagoras in the dialogue\r\ncalled after him: (5) the speech at the beginning of the Phaedrus, which is a\r\nparody of the orator Lysias; the rival speech of Socrates and the recantation\r\nof it. To these may be added (6) the tale of the grasshoppers, and (7) the tale\r\nof Thamus and of Theuth, both in the Phaedrus: (8) the parable of the Cave\r\n(Republic), in which the previous argument is recapitulated, and the nature and\r\ndegrees of knowledge having been previously set forth in the abstract are\r\nrepresented in a picture: (9) the fiction of the earth-born men (Republic;\r\ncompare Laws), in which by the adaptation of an old tradition Plato makes a new\r\nbeginning for his society: (10) the myth of Aristophanes respecting the\r\ndivision of the sexes, Sym.: (11) the parable of the noble captain, the pilot,\r\nand the mutinous sailors (Republic), in which is represented the relation of\r\nthe better part of the world, and of the philosopher, to the mob of\r\npoliticians: (12) the ironical tale of the pilot who plies between Athens and\r\nAegina charging only a small payment for saving men from death, the reason\r\nbeing that he is uncertain whether to live or die is better for them (Gor.):\r\n(13) the treatment of freemen and citizens by physicians and of slaves by their\r\napprentices,\u0026mdash;a somewhat laboured figure of speech intended to illustrate\r\nthe two different ways in which the laws speak to men (Laws). There also occur\r\nin Plato continuous images; some of them extend over several pages, appearing\r\nand reappearing at intervals: such as the bees stinging and stingless (paupers\r\nand thieves) in the Eighth Book of the Republic, who are generated in the\r\ntransition from timocracy to oligarchy: the sun, which is to the visible world\r\nwhat the idea of good is to the intellectual, in the Sixth Book of the\r\nRepublic: the composite animal, having the form of a man, but containing under\r\na human skin a lion and a many-headed monster (Republic): the great beast, i.e.\r\nthe populace: and the wild beast within us, meaning the passions which are\r\nalways liable to break out: the animated comparisons of the degradation of\r\nphilosophy by the arts to the dishonoured maiden, and of the tyrant to the\r\nparricide, who \u0026ldquo;beats his father, having first taken away his\r\narms\u0026rdquo;: the dog, who is your only philosopher: the grotesque and rather\r\npaltry image of the argument wandering about without a head (Laws), which is\r\nrepeated, not improved, from the Gorgias: the argument personified as veiling\r\nher face (Republic), as engaged in a chase, as breaking upon us in a first,\r\nsecond and third wave:\u0026mdash;on these figures of speech the changes are rung\r\nmany times over. It is observable that nearly all these parables or continuous\r\nimages are found in the Republic; that which occurs in the Theaetetus, of the\r\nmidwifery of Socrates, is perhaps the only exception. To make the list\r\ncomplete, the mathematical figure of the number of the state (Republic), or the\r\nnumerical interval which separates king from tyrant, should not be forgotten.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe myth in the Gorgias is one of those descriptions of another life which,\r\nlike the Sixth Aeneid of Virgil, appear to contain reminiscences of the\r\nmysteries. It is a vision of the rewards and punishments which await good and\r\nbad men after death. It supposes the body to continue and to be in another\r\nworld what it has become in this. It includes a Paradiso, Purgatorio, and\r\nInferno, like the sister myths of the Phaedo and the Republic. The Inferno is\r\nreserved for great criminals only. The argument of the dialogue is frequently\r\nreferred to, and the meaning breaks through so as rather to destroy the\r\nliveliness and consistency of the picture. The structure of the fiction is very\r\nslight, the chief point or moral being that in the judgments of another world\r\nthere is no possibility of concealment: Zeus has taken from men the power of\r\nforeseeing death, and brings together the souls both of them and their judges\r\nnaked and undisguised at the judgment-seat. Both are exposed to view, stripped\r\nof the veils and clothes which might prevent them from seeing into or being\r\nseen by one another.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe myth of the Phaedo is of the same type, but it is more cosmological, and\r\nalso more poetical. The beautiful and ingenious fancy occurs to Plato that the\r\nupper atmosphere is an earth and heaven in one, a glorified earth, fairer and\r\npurer than that in which we dwell. As the fishes live in the ocean, mankind are\r\nliving in a lower sphere, out of which they put their heads for a moment or two\r\nand behold a world beyond. The earth which we inhabit is a sediment of the\r\ncoarser particles which drop from the world above, and is to that heavenly\r\nearth what the desert and the shores of the ocean are to us. A part of the myth\r\nconsists of description of the interior of the earth, which gives the\r\nopportunity of introducing several mythological names and of providing places\r\nof torment for the wicked. There is no clear distinction of soul and body; the\r\nspirits beneath the earth are spoken of as souls only, yet they retain a sort\r\nof shadowy form when they cry for mercy on the shores of the lake; and the\r\nphilosopher alone is said to have got rid of the body. All the three myths in\r\nPlato which relate to the world below have a place for repentant sinners, as\r\nwell as other homes or places for the very good and very bad. It is a natural\r\nreflection which is made by Plato elsewhere, that the two extremes of human\r\ncharacter are rarely met with, and that the generality of mankind are between\r\nthem. Hence a place must be found for them. In the myth of the Phaedo they are\r\ncarried down the river Acheron to the Acherusian lake, where they dwell, and\r\nare purified of their evil deeds, and receive the rewards of their good. There\r\nare also incurable sinners, who are cast into Tartarus, there to remain as the\r\npenalty of atrocious crimes; these suffer everlastingly. And there is another\r\nclass of hardly-curable sinners who are allowed from time to time to approach\r\nthe shores of the Acherusian lake, where they cry to their victims for mercy;\r\nwhich if they obtain they come out into the lake and cease from their torments.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNeither this, nor any of the three greater myths of Plato, nor perhaps any\r\nallegory or parable relating to the unseen world, is consistent with itself.\r\nThe language of philosophy mingles with that of mythology; abstract ideas are\r\ntransformed into persons, figures of speech into realities. These myths may be\r\ncompared with the Pilgrim\u0026rsquo;s Progress of Bunyan, in which discussions of\r\ntheology are mixed up with the incidents of travel, and mythological personages\r\nare associated with human beings: they are also garnished with names and\r\nphrases taken out of Homer, and with other fragments of Greek tradition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe myth of the Republic is more subtle and also more consistent than either of\r\nthe two others. It has a greater verisimilitude than they have, and is full of\r\ntouches which recall the experiences of human life. It will be noticed by an\r\nattentive reader that the twelve days during which Er lay in a trance after he\r\nwas slain coincide with the time passed by the spirits in their pilgrimage. It\r\nis a curious observation, not often made, that good men who have lived in a\r\nwell-governed city (shall we say in a religious and respectable society?) are\r\nmore likely to make mistakes in their choice of life than those who have had\r\nmore experience of the world and of evil. It is a more familiar remark that we\r\nconstantly blame others when we have only ourselves to blame; and the\r\nphilosopher must acknowledge, however reluctantly, that there is an element of\r\nchance in human life with which it is sometimes impossible for man to cope.\r\nThat men drink more of the waters of forgetfulness than is good for them is a\r\npoetical description of a familiar truth. We have many of us known men who,\r\nlike Odysseus, have wearied of ambition and have only desired rest. We should\r\nlike to know what became of the infants \u0026ldquo;dying almost as soon as they\r\nwere born,\u0026rdquo; but Plato only raises, without satisfying, our curiosity. The\r\ntwo companies of souls, ascending and descending at either chasm of heaven and\r\nearth, and conversing when they come out into the meadow, the majestic figures\r\nof the judges sitting in heaven, the voice heard by Ardiaeus, are features of\r\nthe great allegory which have an indescribable grandeur and power. The remark\r\nalready made respecting the inconsistency of the two other myths must be\r\nextended also to this: it is at once an orrery, or model of the heavens, and a\r\npicture of the Day of Judgment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe three myths are unlike anything else in Plato. There is an Oriental, or\r\nrather an Egyptian element in them, and they have an affinity to the mysteries\r\nand to the Orphic modes of worship. To a certain extent they are un-Greek; at\r\nany rate there is hardly anything like them in other Greek writings which have\r\na serious purpose; in spirit they are mediaeval. They are akin to what may be\r\ntermed the underground religion in all ages and countries. They are presented\r\nin the most lively and graphic manner, but they are never insisted on as true;\r\nit is only affirmed that nothing better can be said about a future life. Plato\r\nseems to make use of them when he has reached the limits of human knowledge;\r\nor, to borrow an expression of his own, when he is standing on the outside of\r\nthe intellectual world. They are very simple in style; a few touches bring the\r\npicture home to the mind, and make it present to us. They have also a kind of\r\nauthority gained by the employment of sacred and familiar names, just as mere\r\nfragments of the words of Scripture, put together in any form and applied to\r\nany subject, have a power of their own. They are a substitute for poetry and\r\nmythology; and they are also a reform of mythology. The moral of them may be\r\nsummed up in a word or two: After death the Judgment; and \u0026ldquo;there is some\r\nbetter thing remaining for the good than for the evil.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll literature gathers into itself many elements of the past: for example, the\r\ntale of the earth-born men in the Republic appears at first sight to be an\r\nextravagant fancy, but it is restored to propriety when we remember that it is\r\nbased on a legendary belief. The art of making stories of ghosts and\r\napparitions credible is said to consist in the manner of telling them. The\r\neffect is gained by many literary and conversational devices, such as the\r\nprevious raising of curiosity, the mention of little circumstances, simplicity,\r\npicturesqueness, the naturalness of the occasion, and the like. This art is\r\npossessed by Plato in a degree which has never been equalled.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe myth in the Phaedrus is even greater than the myths which have been already\r\ndescribed, but is of a different character. It treats of a former rather than\r\nof a future life. It represents the conflict of reason aided by passion or\r\nrighteous indignation on the one hand, and of the animal lusts and instincts on\r\nthe other. The soul of man has followed the company of some god, and seen truth\r\nin the form of the universal before it was born in this world. Our present life\r\nis the result of the struggle which was then carried on. This world is relative\r\nto a former world, as it is often projected into a future. We ask the question,\r\nWhere were men before birth? As we likewise enquire, What will become of them\r\nafter death? The first question is unfamiliar to us, and therefore seems to be\r\nunnatural; but if we survey the whole human race, it has been as influential\r\nand as widely spread as the other. In the Phaedrus it is really a figure of\r\nspeech in which the \u0026ldquo;spiritual combat\u0026rdquo; of this life is represented.\r\nThe majesty and power of the whole passage\u0026mdash;especially of what may be\r\ncalled the theme or proem (beginning \u0026ldquo;The mind through all her being is\r\nimmortal\u0026rdquo;)\u0026mdash;can only be rendered very inadequately in another\r\nlanguage.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe myth in the Statesman relates to a former cycle of existence, in which men\r\nwere born of the earth, and by the reversal of the earth\u0026rsquo;s motion had\r\ntheir lives reversed and were restored to youth and beauty: the dead came to\r\nlife, the old grew middle-aged, and the middle-aged young; the youth became a\r\nchild, the child an infant, the infant vanished into the earth. The connection\r\nbetween the reversal of the earth\u0026rsquo;s motion and the reversal of human life\r\nis of course verbal only, yet Plato, like theologians in other ages, argues\r\nfrom the consistency of the tale to its truth. The new order of the world was\r\nimmediately under the government of God; it was a state of innocence in which\r\nmen had neither wants nor cares, in which the earth brought forth all things\r\nspontaneously, and God was to man what man now is to the animals. There were no\r\ngreat estates, or families, or private possessions, nor any traditions of the\r\npast, because men were all born out of the earth. This is what Plato calls the\r\n\u0026ldquo;reign of Cronos;\u0026rdquo; and in like manner he connects the reversal of\r\nthe earth\u0026rsquo;s motion with some legend of which he himself was probably the\r\ninventor.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe question is then asked, under which of these two cycles of existence was\r\nman the happier,\u0026mdash;under that of Cronos, which was a state of innocence, or\r\nthat of Zeus, which is our ordinary life? For a while Plato balances the two\r\nsides of the serious controversy, which he has suggested in a figure. The\r\nanswer depends on another question: What use did the children of Cronos make of\r\ntheir time? They had boundless leisure and the faculty of discoursing, not only\r\nwith one another, but with the animals. Did they employ these advantages with a\r\nview to philosophy, gathering from every nature some addition to their store of\r\nknowledge? or, Did they pass their time in eating and drinking and telling\r\nstories to one another and to the beasts?\u0026mdash;in either case there would be\r\nno difficulty in answering. But then, as Plato rather mischievously adds,\r\n\u0026ldquo;Nobody knows what they did,\u0026rdquo; and therefore the doubt must remain\r\nundetermined.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo the first there succeeds a second epoch. After another natural convulsion,\r\nin which the order of the world and of human life is once more reversed, God\r\nwithdraws his guiding hand, and man is left to the government of himself. The\r\nworld begins again, and arts and laws are slowly and painfully invented. A\r\nsecular age succeeds to a theocratical. In this fanciful tale Plato has\r\ndropped, or almost dropped, the garb of mythology. He suggests several curious\r\nand important thoughts, such as the possibility of a state of innocence, the\r\nexistence of a world without traditions, and the difference between human and\r\ndivine government. He has also carried a step further his speculations\r\nconcerning the abolition of the family and of property, which he supposes to\r\nhave no place among the children of Cronos any more than in the ideal state.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is characteristic of Plato and of his age to pass from the abstract to the\r\nconcrete, from poetry to reality. Language is the expression of the seen, and\r\nalso of the unseen, and moves in a region between them. A great writer knows\r\nhow to strike both these chords, sometimes remaining within the sphere of the\r\nvisible, and then again comprehending a wider range and soaring to the abstract\r\nand universal. Even in the same sentence he may employ both modes of speech not\r\nimproperly or inharmoniously. It is useless to criticise the broken metaphors\r\nof Plato, if the effect of the whole is to create a picture not such as can be\r\npainted on canvas, but which is full of life and meaning to the reader. A poem\r\nmay be contained in a word or two, which may call up not one but many latent\r\nimages; or half reveal to us by a sudden flash the thoughts of many hearts.\r\nOften the rapid transition from one image to another is pleasing to us: on the\r\nother hand, any single figure of speech if too often repeated, or worked out\r\ntoo much at length, becomes prosy and monotonous. In theology and philosophy we\r\nnecessarily include both \u0026ldquo;the moral law within and the starry heaven\r\nabove,\u0026rdquo; and pass from one to the other (compare for examples Psalms\r\nxviii. and xix.). Whether such a use of language is puerile or noble depends\r\nupon the genius of the writer or speaker, and the familiarity of the\r\nassociations employed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the myths and parables of Plato the ease and grace of conversation is not\r\nforgotten: they are spoken, not written words, stories which are told to a\r\nliving audience, and so well told that we are more than half-inclined to\r\nbelieve them (compare Phaedrus). As in conversation too, the striking image or\r\nfigure of speech is not forgotten, but is quickly caught up, and alluded to\r\nagain and again; as it would still be in our own day in a genial and\r\nsympathetic society. The descriptions of Plato have a greater life and reality\r\nthan is to be found in any modern writing. This is due to their homeliness and\r\nsimplicity. Plato can do with words just as he pleases; to him they are indeed\r\n\u0026ldquo;more plastic than wax\u0026rdquo; (Republic). We are in the habit of opposing\r\nspeech and writing, poetry and prose. But he has discovered a use of language\r\nin which they are united; which gives a fitting expression to the highest\r\ntruths; and in which the trifles of courtesy and the familiarities of daily\r\nlife are not overlooked.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap02\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eGORGIAS\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eBy Plato\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Callicles, Socrates, Chaerephon, Gorgias, Polus.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSCENE: The house of Callicles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray, but not for a\r\nfeast.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And are we late for a feast?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes, and a delightful feast; for Gorgias has just been exhibiting to\r\nus many fine things.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: It is not my fault, Callicles; our friend Chaerephon is to blame; for\r\nhe would keep us loitering in the Agora.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCHAEREPHON: Never mind, Socrates; the misfortune of which I have been the cause\r\nI will also repair; for Gorgias is a friend of mine, and I will make him give\r\nthe exhibition again either now, or, if you prefer, at some other time.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: What is the matter, Chaerephon\u0026mdash;does Socrates want to hear\r\nGorgias?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCHAEREPHON: Yes, that was our intention in coming.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Come into my house, then; for Gorgias is staying with me, and he\r\nshall exhibit to you.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I want to\r\nhear from him what is the nature of his art, and what it is which he professes\r\nand teaches; he may, as you (Chaerephon) suggest, defer the exhibition to some\r\nother time.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: There is nothing like asking him, Socrates; and indeed to answer\r\nquestions is a part of his exhibition, for he was saying only just now, that\r\nany one in my house might put any question to him, and that he would answer.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: How fortunate! will you ask him, Chaerephon\u0026mdash;?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCHAEREPHON: What shall I ask him?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Ask him who he is.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCHAEREPHON: What do you mean?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I mean such a question as would elicit from him, if he had been a\r\nmaker of shoes, the answer that he is a cobbler. Do you understand?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCHAEREPHON: I understand, and will ask him: Tell me, Gorgias, is our friend\r\nCallicles right in saying that you undertake to answer any questions which you\r\nare asked?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Quite right, Chaerephon: I was saying as much only just now; and I may\r\nadd, that many years have elapsed since any one has asked me a new one.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCHAEREPHON: Then you must be very ready, Gorgias.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Of that, Chaerephon, you can make trial.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes, indeed, and if you like, Chaerephon, you may make trial of me too,\r\nfor I think that Gorgias, who has been talking a long time, is tired.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCHAEREPHON: And do you, Polus, think that you can answer better than Gorgias?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: What does that matter if I answer well enough for you?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCHAEREPHON: Not at all:\u0026mdash;and you shall answer if you like.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Ask:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCHAEREPHON: My question is this: If Gorgias had the skill of his brother\r\nHerodicus, what ought we to call him? Ought he not to have the name which is\r\ngiven to his brother?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCHAEREPHON: Then we should be right in calling him a physician?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCHAEREPHON: And if he had the skill of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon, or of\r\nhis brother Polygnotus, what ought we to call him?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Clearly, a painter.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCHAEREPHON: But now what shall we call him\u0026mdash;what is the art in which he is\r\nskilled.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind which are experimental,\r\nand have their origin in experience, for experience makes the days of men to\r\nproceed according to art, and inexperience according to chance, and different\r\npersons in different ways are proficient in different arts, and the best\r\npersons in the best arts. And our friend Gorgias is one of the best, and the\r\nart in which he is a proficient is the noblest.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Polus has been taught how to make a capital speech, Gorgias; but he\r\nis not fulfilling the promise which he made to Chaerephon.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: What do you mean, Socrates?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I mean that he has not exactly answered the question which he was\r\nasked.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Then why not ask him yourself?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But I would much rather ask you, if you are disposed to answer: for I\r\nsee, from the few words which Polus has uttered, that he has attended more to\r\nthe art which is called rhetoric than to dialectic.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: What makes you say so, Socrates?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asked you what was the art which\r\nGorgias knows, you praised it as if you were answering some one who found fault\r\nwith it, but you never said what the art was.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Why, did I not say that it was the noblest of arts?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes, indeed, but that was no answer to the question: nobody asked\r\nwhat was the quality, but what was the nature, of the art, and by what name we\r\nwere to describe Gorgias. And I would still beg you briefly and clearly, as you\r\nanswered Chaerephon when he asked you at first, to say what this art is, and\r\nwhat we ought to call Gorgias: Or rather, Gorgias, let me turn to you, and ask\r\nthe same question,\u0026mdash;what are we to call you, and what is the art which you\r\nprofess?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Rhetoric, Socrates, is my art.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then I am to call you a rhetorician?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call me that which, in\r\nHomeric language, \u0026ldquo;I boast myself to be.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I should wish to do so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Then pray do.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And are we to say that you are able to make other men rhetoricians?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes, that is exactly what I profess to make them, not only at Athens,\r\nbut in all places.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And will you continue to ask and answer questions, Gorgias, as we are\r\nat present doing, and reserve for another occasion the longer mode of speech\r\nwhich Polus was attempting? Will you keep your promise, and answer shortly the\r\nquestions which are asked of you?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will do my best\r\nto make them as short as possible; for a part of my profession is that I can be\r\nas short as any one.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method now, and\r\nthe longer one at some other time.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Well, I will; and you will certainly say, that you never heard a man\r\nuse fewer words.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a maker of\r\nrhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: I might ask with\r\nwhat is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would you not?), with the\r\nmaking of garments?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And music is concerned with the composition of melodies?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: It is.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: By Here, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your answers.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, I do think myself good at that.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about rhetoric: with\r\nwhat is rhetoric concerned?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: With discourse.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: What sort of discourse, Gorgias?\u0026mdash;such discourse as would teach\r\nthe sick under what treatment they might get well?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: No.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Certainly not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And to understand that about which they speak?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Of course.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now mentioning,\r\nalso make men able to understand and speak about the sick?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then medicine also treats of discourse?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Of discourse concerning diseases?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Just so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the good or\r\nevil condition of the body?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts:\u0026mdash;all of them\r\ntreat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally have to\r\ndo.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Clearly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of discourse, and\r\nall the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them arts of rhetoric?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to do with\r\nsome sort of external action, as of the hand; but there is no such action of\r\nthe hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only through the medium of\r\ndiscourse. And therefore I am justified in saying that rhetoric treats of\r\ndiscourse.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I am not sure whether I entirely understand you, but I dare say I\r\nshall soon know better; please to answer me a question:\u0026mdash;you would allow\r\nthat there are arts?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: As to the arts generally, they are for the most part concerned with\r\ndoing, and require little or no speaking; in painting, and statuary, and many\r\nother arts, the work may proceed in silence; and of such arts I suppose you\r\nwould say that they do not come within the province of rhetoric.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But there are other arts which work wholly through the medium of\r\nlanguage, and require either no action or very little, as, for example, the\r\narts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of playing draughts; in\r\nsome of these speech is pretty nearly co-extensive with action, but in most of\r\nthem the verbal element is greater\u0026mdash;they depend wholly on words for their\r\nefficacy and power: and I take your meaning to be that rhetoric is an art of\r\nthis latter sort?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Exactly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of these\r\narts rhetoric; although the precise expression which you used was, that\r\nrhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through the medium of\r\ndiscourse; and an adversary who wished to be captious might say, \u0026ldquo;And so,\r\nGorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric.\u0026rdquo; But I do not think that you\r\nreally call arithmetic rhetoric any more than geometry would be so called by\r\nyou.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: You are quite right, Socrates, in your apprehension of my meaning.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, then, let me now have the rest of my answer:\u0026mdash;seeing that\r\nrhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of words, and there\r\nare other arts which also use words, tell me what is that quality in words with\r\nwhich rhetoric is concerned:\u0026mdash;Suppose that a person asks me about some of\r\nthe arts which I was mentioning just now; he might say, \u0026ldquo;Socrates, what\r\nis arithmetic?\u0026rdquo; and I should reply to him, as you replied to me, that\r\narithmetic is one of those arts which take effect through words. And then he\r\nwould proceed to ask: \u0026ldquo;Words about what?\u0026rdquo; and I should reply, Words\r\nabout odd and even numbers, and how many there are of each. And if he asked\r\nagain: \u0026ldquo;What is the art of calculation?\u0026rdquo; I should say, That also is\r\none of the arts which is concerned wholly with words. And if he further said,\r\n\u0026ldquo;Concerned with what?\u0026rdquo; I should say, like the clerks in the\r\nassembly, \u0026ldquo;as aforesaid\u0026rdquo; of arithmetic, but with a difference, the\r\ndifference being that the art of calculation considers not only the quantities\r\nof odd and even numbers, but also their numerical relations to themselves and\r\nto one another. And suppose, again, I were to say that astronomy is only\r\nwords\u0026mdash;he would ask, \u0026ldquo;Words about what, Socrates?\u0026rdquo; and I\r\nshould answer, that astronomy tells us about the motions of the stars and sun\r\nand moon, and their relative swiftness.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: You would be quite right, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about rhetoric:\r\nwhich you would admit (would you not?) to be one of those arts which act always\r\nand fulfil all their ends through the medium of words?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Words which do what? I should ask. To what class of things do the\r\nwords which rhetoric uses relate?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: To the greatest, Socrates, and the best of human things.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That again, Gorgias is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for which\r\nare the greatest and best of human things? I dare say that you have heard men\r\nsinging at feasts the old drinking song, in which the singers enumerate the\r\ngoods of life, first health, beauty next, thirdly, as the writer of the song\r\nsays, wealth honestly obtained.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes, I know the song; but what is your drift?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I mean to say, that the producers of those things which the author of\r\nthe song praises, that is to say, the physician, the trainer, the money-maker,\r\nwill at once come to you, and first the physician will say: \u0026ldquo;O Socrates,\r\nGorgias is deceiving you, for my art is concerned with the greatest good of men\r\nand not his.\u0026rdquo; And when I ask, Who are you? he will reply, \u0026ldquo;I am a\r\nphysician.\u0026rdquo; What do you mean? I shall say. Do you mean that your art\r\nproduces the greatest good? \u0026ldquo;Certainly,\u0026rdquo; he will answer, \u0026ldquo;for\r\nis not health the greatest good? What greater good can men have,\r\nSocrates?\u0026rdquo; And after him the trainer will come and say, \u0026ldquo;I too,\r\nSocrates, shall be greatly surprised if Gorgias can show more good of his art\r\nthan I can show of mine.\u0026rdquo; To him again I shall say, Who are you, honest\r\nfriend, and what is your business? \u0026ldquo;I am a trainer,\u0026rdquo; he will reply,\r\n\u0026ldquo;and my business is to make men beautiful and strong in body.\u0026rdquo; When\r\nI have done with the trainer, there arrives the money-maker, and he, as I\r\nexpect, will utterly despise them all. \u0026ldquo;Consider Socrates,\u0026rdquo; he will\r\nsay, \u0026ldquo;whether Gorgias or any one else can produce any greater good than\r\nwealth.\u0026rdquo; Well, you and I say to him, and are you a creator of wealth?\r\n\u0026ldquo;Yes,\u0026rdquo; he replies. And who are you? \u0026ldquo;A money-maker.\u0026rdquo;\r\nAnd do you consider wealth to be the greatest good of man? \u0026ldquo;Of\r\ncourse,\u0026rdquo; will be his reply. And we shall rejoin: Yes; but our friend\r\nGorgias contends that his art produces a greater good than yours. And then he\r\nwill be sure to go on and ask, \u0026ldquo;What good? Let Gorgias answer.\u0026rdquo; Now\r\nI want you, Gorgias, to imagine that this question is asked of you by them and\r\nby me; What is that which, as you say, is the greatest good of man, and of\r\nwhich you are the creator? Answer us.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being that which\r\ngives to men freedom in their own persons, and to individuals the power of\r\nruling over others in their several states.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And what would you consider this to be?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in the\r\ncourts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or at\r\nany other political meeting?\u0026mdash;if you have the power of uttering this word,\r\nyou will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the\r\nmoney-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treasures, not for\r\nhimself, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained what\r\nyou conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I am not\r\nmistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having this and no\r\nother business, and that this is her crown and end. Do you know any other\r\neffect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for persuasion is\r\nthe chief end of rhetoric.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever was a\r\nman who entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love of knowing the\r\ntruth, I am such a one, and I should say the same of you.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: What is coming, Socrates?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I will tell you: I am very well aware that I do not know what,\r\naccording to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics of that\r\npersuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric; although I have\r\na suspicion about both the one and the other. And I am going to ask\u0026mdash;what\r\nis this power of persuasion which is given by rhetoric, and about what? But\r\nwhy, if I have a suspicion, do I ask instead of telling you? Not for your sake,\r\nbut in order that the argument may proceed in such a manner as is most likely\r\nto set forth the truth. And I would have you observe, that I am right in asking\r\nthis further question: If I asked, \u0026ldquo;What sort of a painter is\r\nZeuxis?\u0026rdquo; and you said, \u0026ldquo;The painter of figures,\u0026rdquo; should I not\r\nbe right in asking, \u0026ldquo;What kind of figures, and where do you find\r\nthem?\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the reason for asking this second question would be, that there\r\nare other painters besides, who paint many other figures?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them, then you\r\nwould have answered very well?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Quite so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way;\u0026mdash;is rhetoric\r\nthe only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same effect? I\r\nmean to say\u0026mdash;Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that which he\r\nteaches or not?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: He persuades, Socrates,\u0026mdash;there can be no mistake about that.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now\r\nspeaking:\u0026mdash;do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the\r\nproperties of number?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And therefore persuade us of them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of persuasion?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Clearly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion, and about\r\nwhat,\u0026mdash;we shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd and\r\neven; and we shall be able to show that all the other arts of which we were\r\njust now speaking are artificers of persuasion, and of what sort, and about\r\nwhat.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by persuasion, but that\r\nother arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a question has arisen\r\nwhich is a very fair one: Of what persuasion is rhetoric the artificer, and\r\nabout what?\u0026mdash;is not that a fair way of putting the question?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: I think so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then, if you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the answer?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in courts\r\nof law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the just and\r\nunjust.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And that, Gorgias, was what I was suspecting to be your notion; yet I\r\nwould not have you wonder if by-and-by I am found repeating a seemingly plain\r\nquestion; for I ask not in order to confute you, but as I was saying that the\r\nargument may proceed consecutively, and that we may not get the habit of\r\nanticipating and suspecting the meaning of one another\u0026rsquo;s words; I would\r\nhave you develope your own views in your own way, whatever may be your\r\nhypothesis.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: I think that you are quite right, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then let me raise another question; there is such a thing as\r\n\u0026ldquo;having learned\u0026rdquo;?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And there is also \u0026ldquo;having believed\u0026rdquo;?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And is the \u0026ldquo;having learned\u0026rdquo; the same as \u0026ldquo;having\r\nbelieved,\u0026rdquo; and are learning and belief the same things?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this\r\nway:\u0026mdash;If a person were to say to you, \u0026ldquo;Is there, Gorgias, a false\r\nbelief as well as a true?\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;you would reply, if I am not mistaken,\r\nthat there is.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: No.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief differ.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And yet those who have learned as well as those who have believed are\r\npersuaded?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Just so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion,\u0026mdash;one which is the\r\nsource of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: By all means.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts of law\r\nand other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of persuasion which\r\ngives belief without knowledge, or that which gives knowledge?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Clearly, Socrates, that which only gives belief.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a persuasion\r\nwhich creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no instruction about\r\nthem?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the rhetorician does not instruct the courts of law or other\r\nassemblies about things just and unjust, but he creates belief about them; for\r\nno one can be supposed to instruct such a vast multitude about such high\r\nmatters in a short time?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Certainly not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Come, then, and let us see what we really mean about rhetoric; for I\r\ndo not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the assembly meets to elect a\r\nphysician or a shipwright or any other craftsman, will the rhetorician be taken\r\ninto counsel? Surely not. For at every election he ought to be chosen who is\r\nmost skilled; and, again, when walls have to be built or harbours or docks to\r\nbe constructed, not the rhetorician but the master workman will advise; or when\r\ngenerals have to be chosen and an order of battle arranged, or a position\r\ntaken, then the military will advise and not the rhetoricians: what do you say,\r\nGorgias? Since you profess to be a rhetorician and a maker of rhetoricians, I\r\ncannot do better than learn the nature of your art from you. And here let me\r\nassure you that I have your interest in view as well as my own. For likely\r\nenough some one or other of the young men present might desire to become your\r\npupil, and in fact I see some, and a good many too, who have this wish, but\r\nthey would be too modest to question you. And therefore when you are\r\ninterrogated by me, I would have you imagine that you are interrogated by them.\r\n\u0026ldquo;What is the use of coming to you, Gorgias?\u0026rdquo; they will\r\nsay\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;about what will you teach us to advise the state?\u0026mdash;about\r\nthe just and unjust only, or about those other things also which Socrates has\r\njust mentioned?\u0026rdquo; How will you answer them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will endeavour to\r\nreveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric. You must have heard, I think, that\r\nthe docks and the walls of the Athenians and the plan of the harbour were\r\ndevised in accordance with the counsels, partly of Themistocles, and partly of\r\nPericles, and not at the suggestion of the builders.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Such is the tradition, Gorgias, about Themistocles; and I myself\r\nheard the speech of Pericles when he advised us about the middle wall.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: And you will observe, Socrates, that when a decision has to be given\r\nin such matters the rhetoricians are the advisers; they are the men who win\r\ntheir point.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked what is the\r\nnature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, when I look at the matter in\r\nthis way, to be a marvel of greatness.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: A marvel, indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how rhetoric comprehends\r\nand holds under her sway all the inferior arts. Let me offer you a striking\r\nexample of this. On several occasions I have been with my brother Herodicus or\r\nsome other physician to see one of his patients, who would not allow the\r\nphysician to give him medicine, or apply the knife or hot iron to him; and I\r\nhave persuaded him to do for me what he would not do for the physician just by\r\nthe use of rhetoric. And I say that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go\r\nto any city, and had there to argue in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as to\r\nwhich of them should be elected state-physician, the physician would have no\r\nchance; but he who could speak would be chosen if he wished; and in a contest\r\nwith a man of any other profession the rhetorician more than any one would have\r\nthe power of getting himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively to the\r\nmultitude than any of them, and on any subject. Such is the nature and power of\r\nthe art of rhetoric! And yet, Socrates, rhetoric should be used like any other\r\ncompetitive art, not against everybody,\u0026mdash;the rhetorician ought not to\r\nabuse his strength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of\r\nfence;\u0026mdash;because he has powers which are more than a match either for\r\nfriend or enemy, he ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his friends.\r\nSuppose a man to have been trained in the palestra and to be a skilful\r\nboxer,\u0026mdash;he in the fulness of his strength goes and strikes his father or\r\nmother or one of his familiars or friends; but that is no reason why the\r\ntrainers or fencing-masters should be held in detestation or banished from the\r\ncity;\u0026mdash;surely not. For they taught their art for a good purpose, to be\r\nused against enemies and evil-doers, in self-defence not in aggression, and\r\nothers have perverted their instructions, and turned to a bad use their own\r\nstrength and skill. But not on this account are the teachers bad, neither is\r\nthe art in fault, or bad in itself; I should rather say that those who make a\r\nbad use of the art are to blame. And the same argument holds good of rhetoric;\r\nfor the rhetorician can speak against all men and upon any subject,\u0026mdash;in\r\nshort, he can persuade the multitude better than any other man of anything\r\nwhich he pleases, but he should not therefore seek to defraud the physician or\r\nany other artist of his reputation merely because he has the power; he ought to\r\nuse rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers. And if after\r\nhaving become a rhetorician he makes a bad use of his strength and skill, his\r\ninstructor surely ought not on that account to be held in detestation or\r\nbanished. For he was intended by his teacher to make a good use of his\r\ninstructions, but he abuses them. And therefore he is the person who ought to\r\nbe held in detestation, banished, and put to death, and not his instructor.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: You, Gorgias, like myself, have had great experience of disputations,\r\nand you must have observed, I think, that they do not always terminate in\r\nmutual edification, or in the definition by either party of the subjects which\r\nthey are discussing; but disagreements are apt to arise\u0026mdash;somebody says\r\nthat another has not spoken truly or clearly; and then they get into a passion\r\nand begin to quarrel, both parties conceiving that their opponents are arguing\r\nfrom personal feeling only and jealousy of themselves, not from any interest in\r\nthe question at issue. And sometimes they will go on abusing one another until\r\nthe company at last are quite vexed at themselves for ever listening to such\r\nfellows. Why do I say this? Why, because I cannot help feeling that you are now\r\nsaying what is not quite consistent or accordant with what you were saying at\r\nfirst about rhetoric. And I am afraid to point this out to you, lest you should\r\nthink that I have some animosity against you, and that I speak, not for the\r\nsake of discovering the truth, but from jealousy of you. Now if you are one of\r\nmy sort, I should like to cross-examine you, but if not I will let you alone.\r\nAnd what is my sort? you will ask. I am one of those who are very willing to be\r\nrefuted if I say anything which is not true, and very willing to refute any one\r\nelse who says what is not true, and quite as ready to be refuted as to refute;\r\nfor I hold that this is the greater gain of the two, just as the gain is\r\ngreater of being cured of a very great evil than of curing another. For I\r\nimagine that there is no evil which a man can endure so great as an erroneous\r\nopinion about the matters of which we are speaking; and if you claim to be one\r\nof my sort, let us have the discussion out, but if you would rather have done,\r\nno matter;\u0026mdash;let us make an end of it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: I should say, Socrates, that I am quite the man whom you indicate;\r\nbut, perhaps, we ought to consider the audience, for, before you came, I had\r\nalready given a long exhibition, and if we proceed the argument may run on to a\r\ngreat length. And therefore I think that we should consider whether we may not\r\nbe detaining some part of the company when they are wanting to do something\r\nelse.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCHAEREPHON: You hear the audience cheering, Gorgias and Socrates, which shows\r\ntheir desire to listen to you; and for myself, Heaven forbid that I should have\r\nany business on hand which would take me away from a discussion so interesting\r\nand so ably maintained.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: By the gods, Chaerephon, although I have been present at many\r\ndiscussions, I doubt whether I was ever so much delighted before, and therefore\r\nif you go on discoursing all day I shall be the better pleased.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I may truly say, Callicles, that I am willing, if Gorgias is.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: After all this, Socrates, I should be disgraced if I refused,\r\nespecially as I have promised to answer all comers; in accordance with the\r\nwishes of the company, then, do you begin, and ask of me any question which you\r\nlike.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Let me tell you then, Gorgias, what surprises me in your words;\r\nthough I dare say that you may be right, and I may have misunderstood your\r\nmeaning. You say that you can make any man, who will learn of you, a\r\nrhetorician?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of the multitude\r\non any subject, and this not by instruction but by persuasion?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Quite so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: You were saying, in fact, that the rhetorician will have greater\r\npowers of persuasion than the physician even in a matter of health?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes, with the multitude,\u0026mdash;that is.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: You mean to say, with the ignorant; for with those who know he cannot\r\nbe supposed to have greater powers of persuasion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But if he is to have more power of persuasion than the physician, he\r\nwill have greater power than he who knows?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Although he is not a physician:\u0026mdash;is he?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: No.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And he who is not a physician must, obviously, be ignorant of what\r\nthe physician knows.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Clearly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the physician, the\r\nignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he who has\r\nknowledge?\u0026mdash;is not that the inference?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: In the case supposed:\u0026mdash;yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other arts;\r\nthe rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he has only to discover\r\nsome way of persuading the ignorant that he has more knowledge than those who\r\nknow?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great comfort?\u0026mdash;not to have\r\nlearned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only, and yet to be in no way\r\ninferior to the professors of them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Whether the rhetorician is or not inferior on this account is a\r\nquestion which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to be of any\r\nservice to us; but I would rather begin by asking, whether he is or is not as\r\nignorant of the just and unjust, base and honourable, good and evil, as he is\r\nof medicine and the other arts; I mean to say, does he really know anything of\r\nwhat is good and evil, base or honourable, just or unjust in them; or has he\r\nonly a way with the ignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be\r\nesteemed to know more about these things than some one else who knows? Or must\r\nthe pupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can acquire\r\nthe art of rhetoric? If he is ignorant, you who are the teacher of rhetoric\r\nwill not teach him\u0026mdash;it is not your business; but you will make him seem to\r\nthe multitude to know them, when he does not know them; and seem to be a good\r\nman, when he is not. Or will you be unable to teach him rhetoric at all, unless\r\nhe knows the truth of these things first? What is to be said about all this? By\r\nheavens, Gorgias, I wish that you would reveal to me the power of rhetoric, as\r\nyou were saying that you would.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Well, Socrates, I suppose that if the pupil does chance not to know\r\nthem, he will have to learn of me these things as well.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Say no more, for there you are right; and so he whom you make a\r\nrhetorician must either know the nature of the just and unjust already, or he\r\nmust be taught by you.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And he who has learned music a musician?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in like manner? He\r\nwho has learned anything whatever is that which his knowledge makes him.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And in the same way, he who has learned what is just is just?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: To be sure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And he who is just may be supposed to do what is just?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And must not the just man always desire to do what is just?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: That is clearly the inference.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Surely, then, the just man will never consent to do injustice?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Certainly not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And according to the argument the rhetorician must be a just man?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And will therefore never be willing to do injustice?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Clearly not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But do you remember saying just now that the trainer is not to be\r\naccused or banished if the pugilist makes a wrong use of his pugilistic art;\r\nand in like manner, if the rhetorician makes a bad and unjust use of his\r\nrhetoric, that is not to be laid to the charge of his teacher, who is not to be\r\nbanished, but the wrong-doer himself who made a bad use of his\r\nrhetoric\u0026mdash;he is to be banished\u0026mdash;was not that said?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes, it was.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But now we are affirming that the aforesaid rhetorician will never\r\nhave done injustice at all?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And at the very outset, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric treated of\r\ndiscourse, not (like arithmetic) about odd and even, but about just and unjust?\r\nWas not this said?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I was thinking at the time, when I heard you saying so, that\r\nrhetoric, which is always discoursing about justice, could not possibly be an\r\nunjust thing. But when you added, shortly afterwards, that the rhetorician\r\nmight make a bad use of rhetoric I noted with surprise the inconsistency into\r\nwhich you had fallen; and I said, that if you thought, as I did, that there was\r\na gain in being refuted, there would be an advantage in going on with the\r\nquestion, but if not, I would leave off. And in the course of our\r\ninvestigations, as you will see yourself, the rhetorician has been acknowledged\r\nto be incapable of making an unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do\r\ninjustice. By the dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of discussion,\r\nbefore we get at the truth of all this.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now saying\r\nabout rhetoric? What! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny that the rhetorician\r\nknew the just and the honourable and the good, and admitted that to any one who\r\ncame to him ignorant of them he could teach them, and then out of this\r\nadmission there arose a contradiction\u0026mdash;the thing which you dearly love,\r\nand to which not he, but you, brought the argument by your captious\r\nquestions\u0026mdash;(do you seriously believe that there is any truth in all this?)\r\nFor will any one ever acknowledge that he does not know, or cannot teach, the\r\nnature of justice? The truth is, that there is great want of manners in\r\nbringing the argument to such a pass.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Illustrious Polus, the reason why we provide ourselves with friends\r\nand children is, that when we get old and stumble, a younger generation may be\r\nat hand to set us on our legs again in our words and in our actions: and now,\r\nif I and Gorgias are stumbling, here are you who should raise us up; and I for\r\nmy part engage to retract any error into which you may think that I have\r\nfallen-upon one condition:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: What condition?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That you contract, Polus, the prolixity of speech in which you\r\nindulged at first.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: What! do you mean that I may not use as many words as I please?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Only to think, my friend, that having come on a visit to Athens,\r\nwhich is the most free-spoken state in Hellas, you when you got there, and you\r\nalone, should be deprived of the power of speech\u0026mdash;that would be hard\r\nindeed. But then consider my case:\u0026mdash;shall not I be very hardly used, if,\r\nwhen you are making a long oration, and refusing to answer what you are asked,\r\nI am compelled to stay and listen to you, and may not go away? I say rather, if\r\nyou have a real interest in the argument, or, to repeat my former expression,\r\nhave any desire to set it on its legs, take back any statement which you\r\nplease; and in your turn ask and answer, like myself and Gorgias\u0026mdash;refute\r\nand be refuted: for I suppose that you would claim to know what Gorgias\r\nknows\u0026mdash;would you not?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And you, like him, invite any one to ask you about anything which he\r\npleases, and you will know how to answer him?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: To be sure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And now, which will you do, ask or answer?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I will ask; and do you answer me, Socrates, the same question which\r\nGorgias, as you suppose, is unable to answer: What is rhetoric?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Do you mean what sort of an art?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: To say the truth, Polus, it is not an art at all, in my opinion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: A thing which, as I was lately reading in a book of yours, you say\r\nthat you have made an art.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: What thing?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I should say a sort of experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That is my view, but you may be of another mind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: An experience in what?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine thing?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: What are you saying, Polus? Why do you ask me whether rhetoric is a\r\nfine thing or not, when I have not as yet told you what rhetoric is?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Did I not hear you say that rhetoric was a sort of experience?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Will you, who are so desirous to gratify others, afford a slight\r\ngratification to me?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I will.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: What sort of an art is cookery?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Not an art at all, Polus.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: What then?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I should say an experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: In what? I wish that you would explain to me.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification,\r\nPolus.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Then are cookery and rhetoric the same?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: No, they are only different parts of the same profession.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Of what profession?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I am afraid that the truth may seem discourteous; and I hesitate to\r\nanswer, lest Gorgias should imagine that I am making fun of his own profession.\r\nFor whether or not this is that art of rhetoric which Gorgias practises I\r\nreally cannot tell:\u0026mdash;from what he was just now saying, nothing appeared of\r\nwhat he thought of his art, but the rhetoric which I mean is a part of a not\r\nvery creditable whole.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: A part of what, Socrates? Say what you mean, and never mind me.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a part is\r\nnot an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which knows how to\r\nmanage mankind: this habit I sum up under the word \u0026ldquo;flattery\u0026rdquo;; and\r\nit appears to me to have many other parts, one of which is cookery, which may\r\nseem to be an art, but, as I maintain, is only an experience or routine and not\r\nan art:\u0026mdash;another part is rhetoric, and the art of attiring and sophistry\r\nare two others: thus there are four branches, and four different things\r\nanswering to them. And Polus may ask, if he likes, for he has not as yet been\r\ninformed, what part of flattery is rhetoric: he did not see that I had not yet\r\nanswered him when he proceeded to ask a further question: Whether I do not\r\nthink rhetoric a fine thing? But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is a\r\nfine thing or not, until I have first answered, \u0026ldquo;What is rhetoric?\u0026rdquo;\r\nFor that would not be right, Polus; but I shall be happy to answer, if you will\r\nask me, What part of flattery is rhetoric?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I will ask and do you answer? What part of flattery is rhetoric?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Will you understand my answer? Rhetoric, according to my view, is the\r\nghost or counterfeit of a part of politics.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: And noble or ignoble?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Ignoble, I should say, if I am compelled to answer, for I call what\r\nis bad ignoble: though I doubt whether you understand what I was saying before.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Indeed, Socrates, I cannot say that I understand myself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I do not wonder, Gorgias; for I have not as yet explained myself, and\r\nour friend Polus, colt by name and colt by nature, is apt to run away. (This is\r\nan untranslatable play on the name \u0026ldquo;Polus,\u0026rdquo; which means \u0026ldquo;a\r\ncolt.\u0026rdquo;)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Never mind him, but explain to me what you mean by saying that\r\nrhetoric is the counterfeit of a part of politics.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I will try, then, to explain my notion of rhetoric, and if I am\r\nmistaken, my friend Polus shall refute me. We may assume the existence of\r\nbodies and of souls?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Of course.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: You would further admit that there is a good condition of either of\r\nthem?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Which condition may not be really good, but good only in appearance?\r\nI mean to say, that there are many persons who appear to be in good health, and\r\nwhom only a physician or trainer will discern at first sight not to be in good\r\nhealth.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And this applies not only to the body, but also to the soul: in\r\neither there may be that which gives the appearance of health and not the\r\nreality?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Yes, certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And now I will endeavour to explain to you more clearly what I mean:\r\nThe soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding to them: there is the\r\nart of politics attending on the soul; and another art attending on the body,\r\nof which I know no single name, but which may be described as having two\r\ndivisions, one of them gymnastic, and the other medicine. And in politics there\r\nis a legislative part, which answers to gymnastic, as justice does to medicine;\r\nand the two parts run into one another, justice having to do with the same\r\nsubject as legislation, and medicine with the same subject as gymnastic, but\r\nwith a difference. Now, seeing that there are these four arts, two attending on\r\nthe body and two on the soul for their highest good; flattery knowing, or\r\nrather guessing their natures, has distributed herself into four shams or\r\nsimulations of them; she puts on the likeness of some one or other of them, and\r\npretends to be that which she simulates, and having no regard for men\u0026rsquo;s\r\nhighest interests, is ever making pleasure the bait of the unwary, and\r\ndeceiving them into the belief that she is of the highest value to them.\r\nCookery simulates the disguise of medicine, and pretends to know what food is\r\nthe best for the body; and if the physician and the cook had to enter into a\r\ncompetition in which children were the judges, or men who had no more sense\r\nthan children, as to which of them best understands the goodness or badness of\r\nfood, the physician would be starved to death. A flattery I deem this to be and\r\nof an ignoble sort, Polus, for to you I am now addressing myself, because it\r\naims at pleasure without any thought of the best. An art I do not call it, but\r\nonly an experience, because it is unable to explain or to give a reason of the\r\nnature of its own applications. And I do not call any irrational thing an art;\r\nbut if you dispute my words, I am prepared to argue in defence of them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCookery, then, I maintain to be a flattery which takes the form of medicine;\r\nand tiring, in like manner, is a flattery which takes the form of gymnastic,\r\nand is knavish, false, ignoble, illiberal, working deceitfully by the help of\r\nlines, and colours, and enamels, and garments, and making men affect a spurious\r\nbeauty to the neglect of the true beauty which is given by gymnastic.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will only say, after the manner\r\nof the geometricians (for I think that by this time you will be able to follow)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nas tiring: gymnastic:: cookery: medicine;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nor rather,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nas tiring: gymnastic:: sophistry: legislation;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nand\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nas cookery: medicine:: rhetoric: justice.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd this, I say, is the natural difference between the rhetorician and the\r\nsophist, but by reason of their near connection, they are apt to be jumbled up\r\ntogether; neither do they know what to make of themselves, nor do other men\r\nknow what to make of them. For if the body presided over itself, and were not\r\nunder the guidance of the soul, and the soul did not discern and discriminate\r\nbetween cookery and medicine, but the body was made the judge of them, and the\r\nrule of judgment was the bodily delight which was given by them, then the word\r\nof Anaxagoras, that word with which you, friend Polus, are so well acquainted,\r\nwould prevail far and wide: \u0026ldquo;Chaos\u0026rdquo; would come again, and cookery,\r\nhealth, and medicine would mingle in an indiscriminate mass. And now I have\r\ntold you my notion of rhetoric, which is, in relation to the soul, what cookery\r\nis to the body. I may have been inconsistent in making a long speech, when I\r\nwould not allow you to discourse at length. But I think that I may be excused,\r\nbecause you did not understand me, and could make no use of my answer when I\r\nspoke shortly, and therefore I had to enter into an explanation. And if I show\r\nan equal inability to make use of yours, I hope that you will speak at equal\r\nlength; but if I am able to understand you, let me have the benefit of your\r\nbrevity, as is only fair: And now you may do what you please with my answer.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: What do you mean? do you think that rhetoric is flattery?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Nay, I said a part of flattery; if at your age, Polus, you cannot\r\nremember, what will you do by-and-by, when you get older?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: And are the good rhetoricians meanly regarded in states, under the idea\r\nthat they are flatterers?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Is that a question or the beginning of a speech?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I am asking a question.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then my answer is, that they are not regarded at all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: How not regarded? Have they not very great power in states?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Not if you mean to say that power is a good to the possessor.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: And that is what I do mean to say.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then, if so, I think that they have the least power of all the\r\ncitizens.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: What! are they not like tyrants? They kill and despoil and exile any one\r\nwhom they please.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: By the dog, Polus, I cannot make out at each deliverance of yours,\r\nwhether you are giving an opinion of your own, or asking a question of me.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I am asking a question of you.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes, my friend, but you ask two questions at once.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: How two questions?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Why, did you not say just now that the rhetoricians are like tyrants,\r\nand that they kill and despoil or exile any one whom they please?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I did.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well then, I say to you that here are two questions in one, and I\r\nwill answer both of them. And I tell you, Polus, that rhetoricians and tyrants\r\nhave the least possible power in states, as I was just now saying; for they do\r\nliterally nothing which they will, but only what they think best.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: And is not that a great power?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Polus has already said the reverse.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Said the reverse! nay, that is what I assert.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: No, by the great\u0026mdash;what do you call him?\u0026mdash;not you, for you\r\nsay that power is a good to him who has the power.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I do.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And would you maintain that if a fool does what he thinks best, this\r\nis a good, and would you call this great power?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I should not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then you must prove that the rhetorician is not a fool, and that\r\nrhetoric is an art and not a flattery\u0026mdash;and so you will have refuted me;\r\nbut if you leave me unrefuted, why, the rhetoricians who do what they think\r\nbest in states, and the tyrants, will have nothing upon which to congratulate\r\nthemselves, if as you say, power be indeed a good, admitting at the same time\r\nthat what is done without sense is an evil.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes; I admit that.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: How then can the rhetoricians or the tyrants have great power in\r\nstates, unless Polus can refute Socrates, and prove to him that they do as they\r\nwill?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: This fellow\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I say that they do not do as they will;\u0026mdash;now refute me.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Why, have you not already said that they do as they think best?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And I say so still.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Then surely they do as they will?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I deny it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: But they do what they think best?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Aye.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: That, Socrates, is monstrous and absurd.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Good words, good Polus, as I may say in your own peculiar style; but\r\nif you have any questions to ask of me, either prove that I am in error or give\r\nthe answer yourself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Very well, I am willing to answer that I may know what you mean.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or to will that\r\nfurther end for the sake of which they do a thing? when they take medicine, for\r\nexample, at the bidding of a physician, do they will the drinking of the\r\nmedicine which is painful, or the health for the sake of which they drink?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Clearly, the health.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And when men go on a voyage or engage in business, they do not will\r\nthat which they are doing at the time; for who would desire to take the risk of\r\na voyage or the trouble of business?\u0026mdash;But they will, to have the wealth\r\nfor the sake of which they go on a voyage.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And is not this universally true? If a man does something for the\r\nsake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but that for the sake\r\nof which he does it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate and\r\nindifferent?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: To be sure, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call goods, and\r\ntheir opposites evils?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I should.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the things which are neither good nor evil, and which partake\r\nsometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil, or of neither, are\r\nsuch as sitting, walking, running, sailing; or, again, wood, stones, and the\r\nlike:\u0026mdash;these are the things which you call neither good nor evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Exactly so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good, or the\r\ngood for the sake of the indifferent?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Clearly, the indifferent for the sake of the good.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the idea\r\nthat it is better to walk, and when we stand we stand equally for the sake of\r\nthe good?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil him of his\r\ngoods, because, as we think, it will conduce to our good?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Men who do any of these things do them for the sake of the good?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And did we not admit that in doing something for the sake of\r\nsomething else, we do not will those things which we do, but that other thing\r\nfor the sake of which we do them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Most true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then we do not will simply to kill a man or to exile him or to\r\ndespoil him of his goods, but we will to do that which conduces to our good,\r\nand if the act is not conducive to our good we do not will it; for we will, as\r\nyou say, that which is our good, but that which is neither good nor evil, or\r\nsimply evil, we do not will. Why are you silent, Polus? Am I not right?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: You are right.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Hence we may infer, that if any one, whether he be a tyrant or a\r\nrhetorician, kills another or exiles another or deprives him of his property,\r\nunder the idea that the act is for his own interests when really not for his\r\nown interests, he may be said to do what seems best to him?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do you not\r\nanswer?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Well, I suppose not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such a one have\r\ngreat power in a state?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: He will not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good to him\r\nin a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of doing what\r\nseemed good to you in the state, rather than not; you would not be jealous when\r\nyou saw any one killing or despoiling or imprisoning whom he pleased, Oh, no!\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Justly or unjustly, do you mean?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: In either case is he not equally to be envied?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Forbear, Polus!\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Why \u0026ldquo;forbear\u0026rdquo;?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Because you ought not to envy wretches who are not to be envied, but\r\nonly to pity them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: And are those of whom I spoke wretches?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes, certainly they are.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and justly\r\nslays him, is pitiable and wretched?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: No, I do not say that of him: but neither do I think that he is to be\r\nenvied.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Were you not saying just now that he is wretched?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly, in which case he is\r\nalso to be pitied; and he is not to be envied if he killed him justly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death is\r\nwretched, and to be pitied?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so much as he who is\r\njustly killed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: How can that be, Socrates?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is the greatest of\r\nevils.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: But is it the greatest? Is not suffering injustice a greater evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Certainly not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Then would you rather suffer than do injustice?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I should not like either, but if I must choose between them, I would\r\nrather suffer than do.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Then you would not wish to be a tyrant?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Not if you mean by tyranny what I mean.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I mean, as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems good to you\r\nin a state, killing, banishing, doing in all things as you like.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well then, illustrious friend, when I have said my say, do you reply\r\nto me. Suppose that I go into a crowded Agora, and take a dagger under my arm.\r\nPolus, I say to you, I have just acquired rare power, and become a tyrant; for\r\nif I think that any of these men whom you see ought to be put to death, the man\r\nwhom I have a mind to kill is as good as dead; and if I am disposed to break\r\nhis head or tear his garment, he will have his head broken or his garment torn\r\nin an instant. Such is my great power in this city. And if you do not believe\r\nme, and I show you the dagger, you would probably reply: Socrates, in that sort\r\nof way any one may have great power\u0026mdash;he may burn any house which he\r\npleases, and the docks and triremes of the Athenians, and all their other\r\nvessels, whether public or private\u0026mdash;but can you believe that this mere\r\ndoing as you think best is great power?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly not such doing as this.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I can.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Why then?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Why, because he who did as you say would be certain to be punished.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And punishment is an evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And you would admit once more, my good sir, that great power is a\r\nbenefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and that this is the\r\nmeaning of great power; and if not, then his power is an evil and is no power.\r\nBut let us look at the matter in another way:\u0026mdash;do we not acknowledge that\r\nthe things of which we were speaking, the infliction of death, and exile, and\r\nthe deprivation of property are sometimes a good and sometimes not a good?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: About that you and I may be supposed to agree?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and when that they\r\nare evil\u0026mdash;what principle do you lay down?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I would rather, Socrates, that you should answer as well as ask that\r\nquestion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, Polus, since you would rather have the answer from me, I say\r\nthat they are good when they are just, and evil when they are unjust.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: You are hard of refutation, Socrates, but might not a child refute that\r\nstatement?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then I shall be very grateful to the child, and equally grateful to\r\nyou if you will refute me and deliver me from my foolishness. And I hope that\r\nrefute me you will, and not weary of doing good to a friend.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes, Socrates, and I need not go far or appeal to antiquity; events\r\nwhich happened only a few days ago are enough to refute you, and to prove that\r\nmany men who do wrong are happy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: What events?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: You see, I presume, that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is now the ruler\r\nof Macedonia?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: At any rate I hear that he is.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: And do you think that he is happy or miserable?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I cannot say, Polus, for I have never had any acquaintance with him.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: And cannot you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance with\r\nhim, whether a man is happy?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Most certainly not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Then clearly, Socrates, you would say that you did not even know whether\r\nthe great king was a happy man?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And I should speak the truth; for I do not know how he stands in the\r\nmatter of education and justice.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: What! and does all happiness consist in this?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes, indeed, Polus, that is my doctrine; the men and women who are\r\ngentle and good are also happy, as I maintain, and the unjust and evil are\r\nmiserable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus is miserable?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes, my friend, if he is wicked.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: That he is wicked I cannot deny; for he had no title at all to the\r\nthrone which he now occupies, he being only the son of a woman who was the\r\nslave of Alcetas the brother of Perdiccas; he himself therefore in strict right\r\nwas the slave of Alcetas; and if he had meant to do rightly he would have\r\nremained his slave, and then, according to your doctrine, he would have been\r\nhappy. But now he is unspeakably miserable, for he has been guilty of the\r\ngreatest crimes: in the first place he invited his uncle and master, Alcetas,\r\nto come to him, under the pretence that he would restore to him the throne\r\nwhich Perdiccas has usurped, and after entertaining him and his son Alexander,\r\nwho was his own cousin, and nearly of an age with him, and making them drunk,\r\nhe threw them into a waggon and carried them off by night, and slew them, and\r\ngot both of them out of the way; and when he had done all this wickedness he\r\nnever discovered that he was the most miserable of all men, and was very far\r\nfrom repenting: shall I tell you how he showed his remorse? he had a younger\r\nbrother, a child of seven years old, who was the legitimate son of Perdiccas,\r\nand to him of right the kingdom belonged; Archelaus, however, had no mind to\r\nbring him up as he ought and restore the kingdom to him; that was not his\r\nnotion of happiness; but not long afterwards he threw him into a well and\r\ndrowned him, and declared to his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in while\r\nrunning after a goose, and had been killed. And now as he is the greatest\r\ncriminal of all the Macedonians, he may be supposed to be the most miserable\r\nand not the happiest of them, and I dare say that there are many Athenians, and\r\nyou would be at the head of them, who would rather be any other Macedonian than\r\nArchelaus!\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I praised you at first, Polus, for being a rhetorician rather than a\r\nreasoner. And this, as I suppose, is the sort of argument with which you fancy\r\nthat a child might refute me, and by which I stand refuted when I say that the\r\nunjust man is not happy. But, my good friend, where is the refutation? I cannot\r\nadmit a word which you have been saying.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: That is because you will not; for you surely must think as I do.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Not so, my simple friend, but because you will refute me after the\r\nmanner which rhetoricians practise in courts of law. For there the one party\r\nthink that they refute the other when they bring forward a number of witnesses\r\nof good repute in proof of their allegations, and their adversary has only a\r\nsingle one or none at all. But this kind of proof is of no value where truth is\r\nthe aim; a man may often be sworn down by a multitude of false witnesses who\r\nhave a great air of respectability. And in this argument nearly every one,\r\nAthenian and stranger alike, would be on your side, if you should bring\r\nwitnesses in disproof of my statement;\u0026mdash;you may, if you will, summon\r\nNicias the son of Niceratus, and let his brothers, who gave the row of tripods\r\nwhich stand in the precincts of Dionysus, come with him; or you may summon\r\nAristocrates, the son of Scellius, who is the giver of that famous offering\r\nwhich is at Delphi; summon, if you will, the whole house of Pericles, or any\r\nother great Athenian family whom you choose;\u0026mdash;they will all agree with\r\nyou: I only am left alone and cannot agree, for you do not convince me;\r\nalthough you produce many false witnesses against me, in the hope of depriving\r\nme of my inheritance, which is the truth. But I consider that nothing worth\r\nspeaking of will have been effected by me unless I make you the one witness of\r\nmy words; nor by you, unless you make me the one witness of yours; no matter\r\nabout the rest of the world. For there are two ways of refutation, one which is\r\nyours and that of the world in general; but mine is of another sort\u0026mdash;let\r\nus compare them, and see in what they differ. For, indeed, we are at issue\r\nabout matters which to know is honourable and not to know disgraceful; to know\r\nor not to know happiness and misery\u0026mdash;that is the chief of them. And what\r\nknowledge can be nobler? or what ignorance more disgraceful than this? And\r\ntherefore I will begin by asking you whether you do not think that a man who is\r\nunjust and doing injustice can be happy, seeing that you think Archelaus\r\nunjust, and yet happy? May I assume this to be your opinion?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But I say that this is an impossibility\u0026mdash;here is one point about\r\nwhich we are at issue:\u0026mdash;very good. And do you mean to say also that if he\r\nmeets with retribution and punishment he will still be happy?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly not; in that case he will be most miserable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then, according to\r\nyou, he will be happy?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust actions is\r\nmiserable in any case,\u0026mdash;more miserable, however, if he be not punished and\r\ndoes not meet with retribution, and less miserable if he be punished and meets\r\nwith retribution at the hands of gods and men.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: You are maintaining a strange doctrine, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I shall try to make you agree with me, O my friend, for as a friend I\r\nregard you. Then these are the points at issue between us\u0026mdash;are they not? I\r\nwas saying that to do is worse than to suffer injustice?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Exactly so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And you said the opposite?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I said also that the wicked are miserable, and you refuted me?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: By Zeus, I did.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: In your own opinion, Polus.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes, and I rather suspect that I was in the right.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: You further said that the wrong-doer is happy if he be unpunished?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And I affirm that he is most miserable, and that those who are\r\npunished are less miserable\u0026mdash;are you going to refute this proposition\r\nalso?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: A proposition which is harder of refutation than the other, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Say rather, Polus, impossible; for who can refute the truth?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: What do you mean? If a man is detected in an unjust attempt to make\r\nhimself a tyrant, and when detected is racked, mutilated, has his eyes burned\r\nout, and after having had all sorts of great injuries inflicted on him, and\r\nhaving seen his wife and children suffer the like, is at last impaled or tarred\r\nand burned alive, will he be happier than if he escape and become a tyrant, and\r\ncontinue all through life doing what he likes and holding the reins of\r\ngovernment, the envy and admiration both of citizens and strangers? Is that the\r\nparadox which, as you say, cannot be refuted?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: There again, noble Polus, you are raising hobgoblins instead of\r\nrefuting me; just now you were calling witnesses against me. But please to\r\nrefresh my memory a little; did you say\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;in an unjust attempt to\r\nmake himself a tyrant\u0026rdquo;?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes, I did.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then I say that neither of them will be happier than the\r\nother,\u0026mdash;neither he who unjustly acquires a tyranny, nor he who suffers in\r\nthe attempt, for of two miserables one cannot be the happier, but that he who\r\nescapes and becomes a tyrant is the more miserable of the two. Do you laugh,\r\nPolus? Well, this is a new kind of refutation,\u0026mdash;when any one says\r\nanything, instead of refuting him to laugh at him.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: But do you not think, Socrates, that you have been sufficiently refuted,\r\nwhen you say that which no human being will allow? Ask the company.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: O Polus, I am not a public man, and only last year, when my tribe\r\nwere serving as Prytanes, and it became my duty as their president to take the\r\nvotes, there was a laugh at me, because I was unable to take them. And as I\r\nfailed then, you must not ask me to count the suffrages of the company now; but\r\nif, as I was saying, you have no better argument than numbers, let me have a\r\nturn, and do you make trial of the sort of proof which, as I think, is\r\nrequired; for I shall produce one witness only of the truth of my words, and he\r\nis the person with whom I am arguing; his suffrage I know how to take; but with\r\nthe many I have nothing to do, and do not even address myself to them. May I\r\nask then whether you will answer in turn and have your words put to the proof?\r\nFor I certainly think that I and you and every man do really believe, that to\r\ndo is a greater evil than to suffer injustice: and not to be punished than to\r\nbe punished.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: And I should say neither I, nor any man: would you yourself, for\r\nexample, suffer rather than do injustice?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes, and you, too; I or any man would.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Quite the reverse; neither you, nor I, nor any man.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But will you answer?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: To be sure, I will; for I am curious to hear what you can have to say.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Tell me, then, and you will know, and let us suppose that I am\r\nbeginning at the beginning: which of the two, Polus, in your opinion, is the\r\nworst?\u0026mdash;to do injustice or to suffer?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I should say that suffering was worst.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And which is the greater disgrace?\u0026mdash;Answer.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: To do.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the greater disgrace is the greater evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I understand you to say, if I am not mistaken, that the honourable is\r\nnot the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Let me ask a question of you: When you speak of beautiful things,\r\nsuch as bodies, colours, figures, sounds, institutions, do you not call them\r\nbeautiful in reference to some standard: bodies, for example, are beautiful in\r\nproportion as they are useful, or as the sight of them gives pleasure to the\r\nspectators; can you give any other account of personal beauty?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I cannot.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And you would say of figures or colours generally that they were\r\nbeautiful, either by reason of the pleasure which they give, or of their use,\r\nor of both?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes, I should.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And you would call sounds and music beautiful for the same reason?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I should.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Laws and institutions also have no beauty in them except in so far as\r\nthey are useful or pleasant or both?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I think not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And may not the same be said of the beauty of knowledge?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: To be sure, Socrates; and I very much approve of your measuring beauty\r\nby the standard of pleasure and utility.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the opposite\r\nstandard of pain and evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then when of two beautiful things one exceeds in beauty, the measure\r\nof the excess is to be taken in one or both of these; that is to say, in\r\npleasure or utility or both?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deformity or\r\ndisgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil\u0026mdash;must it not be so?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But then again, what was the observation which you just now made,\r\nabout doing and suffering wrong? Did you not say, that suffering wrong was more\r\nevil, and doing wrong more disgraceful?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I did.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering, the more\r\ndisgraceful must be more painful and must exceed in pain or in evil or both:\r\ndoes not that also follow?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Of course.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: First, then, let us consider whether the doing of injustice exceeds\r\nthe suffering in the consequent pain: Do the injurers suffer more than the\r\ninjured?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: No, Socrates; certainly not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then they do not exceed in pain?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: No.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But if not in pain, then not in both?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then they can only exceed in the other?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That is to say, in evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil, and will therefore\r\nbe a greater evil than suffering injustice?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Clearly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But have not you and the world already agreed that to do injustice is\r\nmore disgraceful than to suffer?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And that is now discovered to be more evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonour to a less\r\none? Answer, Polus, and fear not; for you will come to no harm if you nobly\r\nresign yourself into the healing hand of the argument as to a physician without\r\nshrinking, and either say \u0026ldquo;Yes\u0026rdquo; or \u0026ldquo;No\u0026rdquo; to me.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I should say \u0026ldquo;No.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: No, not according to this way of putting the case, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then I said truly, Polus, that neither you, nor I, nor any man, would\r\nrather do than suffer injustice; for to do injustice is the greater evil of the\r\ntwo.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: That is the conclusion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: You see, Polus, when you compare the two kinds of refutations, how\r\nunlike they are. All men, with the exception of myself, are of your way of\r\nthinking; but your single assent and witness are enough for me,\u0026mdash;I have no\r\nneed of any other, I take your suffrage, and am regardless of the rest. Enough\r\nof this, and now let us proceed to the next question; which is, Whether the\r\ngreatest of evils to a guilty man is to suffer punishment, as you supposed, or\r\nwhether to escape punishment is not a greater evil, as I supposed.\r\nConsider:\u0026mdash;You would say that to suffer punishment is another name for\r\nbeing justly corrected when you do wrong?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I should.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And would you not allow that all just things are honourable in so far\r\nas they are just? Please to reflect, and tell me your opinion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes, Socrates, I think that they are.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Consider again:\u0026mdash;Where there is an agent, must there not also be\r\na patient?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I should say so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does, and will\r\nnot the suffering have the quality of the action? I mean, for example, that if\r\na man strikes, there must be something which is stricken?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And if the striker strikes violently or quickly, that which is struck\r\nwill be struck violently or quickly?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same nature as the\r\nact of him who strikes?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And if a man burns, there is something which is burned?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And if he burns in excess or so as to cause pain, the thing burned\r\nwill be burned in the same way?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Truly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And if he cuts, the same argument holds\u0026mdash;there will be something\r\ncut?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And if the cutting be great or deep or such as will cause pain, the\r\ncut will be of the same nature?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: That is evident.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition which I\r\nwas just now asserting: that the affection of the patient answers to the\r\naffection of the agent?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I agree.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished is\r\nsuffering or acting?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Suffering, Socrates; there can be no doubt of that.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And suffering implies an agent?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly, Socrates; and he is the punisher.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And therefore he acts justly?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Justly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers justly?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: That is evident.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished suffers\r\nwhat is honourable?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And if what is honourable, then what is good, for the honourable is\r\neither pleasant or useful?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then he who is punished suffers what is good?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: That is true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then he is benefited?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term\r\n\u0026ldquo;benefited\u0026rdquo;? I mean, that if he be justly punished his soul is\r\nimproved.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Surely.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his soul?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil? Look at the\r\nmatter in this way:\u0026mdash;In respect of a man\u0026rsquo;s estate, do you see any\r\ngreater evil than poverty?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: There is no greater evil.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Again, in a man\u0026rsquo;s bodily frame, you would say that the evil is\r\nweakness and disease and deformity?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I should.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil of her\r\nown?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Of course.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And this you would call injustice and ignorance and cowardice, and\r\nthe like?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: So then, in mind, body, and estate, which are three, you have pointed\r\nout three corresponding evils\u0026mdash;injustice, disease, poverty?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And which of the evils is the most disgraceful?\u0026mdash;Is not the most\r\ndisgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the soul?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: By far the most.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And if the most disgraceful, then also the worst?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: What do you mean, Socrates?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I mean to say, that is most disgraceful has been already admitted to\r\nbe most painful or hurtful, or both.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted by us to\r\nbe most disgraceful?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: It has been admitted.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing\r\nexcessive pain, or most hurtful, or both?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And therefore to be unjust and intemperate, and cowardly and\r\nignorant, is more painful than to be poor and sick?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Nay, Socrates; the painfulness does not appear to me to follow from your\r\npremises.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then, if, as you would argue, not more painful, the evil of the soul\r\nis of all evils the most disgraceful; and the excess of disgrace must be caused\r\nby some preternatural greatness, or extraordinary hurtfulness of the evil.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Clearly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the greatest of\r\nevils?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity of the\r\nsoul, are the greatest of evils?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: That is evident.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty? Does not the\r\nart of making money?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And what art frees us from disease? Does not the art of medicine?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And what from vice and injustice? If you are not able to answer at\r\nonce, ask yourself whither we go with the sick, and to whom we take them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: To the physicians, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: To the judges, you mean.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: \u0026mdash;Who are to punish them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in accordance\r\nwith a certain rule of justice?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Clearly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then the art of money-making frees a man from poverty; medicine from\r\ndisease; and justice from intemperance and injustice?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: That is evident.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Which, then, is the best of these three?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Will you enumerate them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Money-making, medicine, and justice.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Justice, Socrates, far excels the two others.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or advantage or\r\nboth?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who are being\r\nhealed pleased?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: I think not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: A useful thing, then?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes, because the patient is delivered from a great evil; and this is\r\nthe advantage of enduring the pain\u0026mdash;that you get well?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who is\r\nhealed, or who never was out of health?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Clearly he who was never out of health.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes; for happiness surely does not consist in being delivered from\r\nevils, but in never having had them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And suppose the case of two persons who have some evil in their\r\nbodies, and that one of them is healed and delivered from evil, and another is\r\nnot healed, but retains the evil\u0026mdash;which of them is the most miserable?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Clearly he who is not healed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from the\r\ngreatest of evils, which is vice?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the medicine\r\nof our vice?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness who has never\r\nhad vice in his soul; for this has been shown to be the greatest of evils.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Clearly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And he has the second place, who is delivered from vice?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That is to say, he who receives admonition and rebuke and punishment?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then he lives worst, who, having been unjust, has no deliverance from\r\ninjustice?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That is, he lives worst who commits the greatest crimes, and who,\r\nbeing the most unjust of men, succeeds in escaping rebuke or correction or\r\npunishment; and this, as you say, has been accomplished by Archelaus and other\r\ntyrants and rhetoricians and potentates? (Compare Republic.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: May not their way of proceeding, my friend, be compared to the\r\nconduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases and yet\r\ncontrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins against his\r\nconstitution, and will not be cured, because, like a child, he is afraid of the\r\npain of being burned or cut:\u0026mdash;Is not that a parallel case?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes, truly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: He would seem as if he did not know the nature of health and bodily\r\nvigour; and if we are right, Polus, in our previous conclusions, they are in a\r\nlike case who strive to evade justice, which they see to be painful, but are\r\nblind to the advantage which ensues from it, not knowing how far more miserable\r\na companion a diseased soul is than a diseased body; a soul, I say, which is\r\ncorrupt and unrighteous and unholy. And hence they do all that they can to\r\navoid punishment and to avoid being released from the greatest of evils; they\r\nprovide themselves with money and friends, and cultivate to the utmost their\r\npowers of persuasion. But if we, Polus, are right, do you see what follows, or\r\nshall we draw out the consequences in form?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: If you please.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Is it not a fact that injustice, and the doing of injustice, is the\r\ngreatest of evils?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: That is quite clear.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And further, that to suffer punishment is the way to be released from\r\nthis evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And not to suffer, is to perpetuate the evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of evils; but to do\r\nwrong and not to be punished, is first and greatest of all?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: That is true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend? You deemed\r\nArchelaus happy, because he was a very great criminal and unpunished: I, on the\r\nother hand, maintained that he or any other who like him has done wrong and has\r\nnot been punished, is, and ought to be, the most miserable of all men; and that\r\nthe doer of injustice is more miserable than the sufferer; and he who escapes\r\npunishment, more miserable than he who suffers.\u0026mdash;Was not that what I said?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And it has been proved to be true?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use of rhetoric?\r\nIf we admit what has been just now said, every man ought in every way to guard\r\nhimself against doing wrong, for he will thereby suffer great evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And if he, or any one about whom he cares, does wrong, he ought of\r\nhis own accord to go where he will be immediately punished; he will run to the\r\njudge, as he would to the physician, in order that the disease of injustice may\r\nnot be rendered chronic and become the incurable cancer of the soul; must we\r\nnot allow this consequence, Polus, if our former admissions are to\r\nstand:\u0026mdash;is any other inference consistent with them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: To that, Socrates, there can be but one answer.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a man to excuse\r\nhis own injustice, that of his parents or friends, or children or country; but\r\nmay be of use to any one who holds that instead of excusing he ought to\r\naccuse\u0026mdash;himself above all, and in the next degree his family or any of his\r\nfriends who may be doing wrong; he should bring to light the iniquity and not\r\nconceal it, that so the wrong-doer may suffer and be made whole; and he should\r\neven force himself and others not to shrink, but with closed eyes like brave\r\nmen to let the physician operate with knife or searing iron, not regarding the\r\npain, in the hope of attaining the good and the honourable; let him who has\r\ndone things worthy of stripes, allow himself to be scourged, if of bonds, to be\r\nbound, if of a fine, to be fined, if of exile, to be exiled, if of death, to\r\ndie, himself being the first to accuse himself and his own relations, and using\r\nrhetoric to this end, that his and their unjust actions may be made manifest,\r\nand that they themselves may be delivered from injustice, which is the greatest\r\nevil. Then, Polus, rhetoric would indeed be useful. Do you say\r\n\u0026ldquo;Yes\u0026rdquo; or \u0026ldquo;No\u0026rdquo; to that?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: To me, Socrates, what you are saying appears very strange, though\r\nprobably in agreement with your premises.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Is not this the conclusion, if the premises are not disproven?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPOLUS: Yes; it certainly is.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And from the opposite point of view, if indeed it be our duty to harm\r\nanother, whether an enemy or not\u0026mdash;I except the case of\r\nself-defence\u0026mdash;then I have to be upon my guard\u0026mdash;but if my enemy\r\ninjures a third person, then in every sort of way, by word as well as deed, I\r\nshould try to prevent his being punished, or appearing before the judge; and if\r\nhe appears, I should contrive that he should escape, and not suffer punishment:\r\nif he has stolen a sum of money, let him keep what he has stolen and spend it\r\non him and his, regardless of religion and justice; and if he have done things\r\nworthy of death, let him not die, but rather be immortal in his wickedness; or,\r\nif this is not possible, let him at any rate be allowed to live as long as he\r\ncan. For such purposes, Polus, rhetoric may be useful, but is of small if of\r\nany use to him who is not intending to commit injustice; at least, there was no\r\nsuch use discovered by us in the previous discussion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest, or is he joking?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCHAEREPHON: I should say, Callicles, that he is in most profound earnest; but\r\nyou may well ask him.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: By the gods, and I will. Tell me, Socrates, are you in earnest, or\r\nonly in jest? For if you are in earnest, and what you say is true, is not the\r\nwhole of human life turned upside down; and are we not doing, as would appear,\r\nin everything the opposite of what we ought to be doing?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: O Callicles, if there were not some community of feelings among\r\nmankind, however varying in different persons\u0026mdash;I mean to say, if every\r\nman\u0026rsquo;s feelings were peculiar to himself and were not shared by the rest\r\nof his species\u0026mdash;I do not see how we could ever communicate our impressions\r\nto one another. I make this remark because I perceive that you and I have a\r\ncommon feeling. For we are lovers both, and both of us have two loves\r\napiece:\u0026mdash;I am the lover of Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, and of\r\nphilosophy; and you of the Athenian Demus, and of Demus the son of Pyrilampes.\r\nNow, I observe that you, with all your cleverness, do not venture to contradict\r\nyour favourite in any word or opinion of his; but as he changes you change,\r\nbackwards and forwards. When the Athenian Demus denies anything that you are\r\nsaying in the assembly, you go over to his opinion; and you do the same with\r\nDemus, the fair young son of Pyrilampes. For you have not the power to resist\r\nthe words and ideas of your loves; and if a person were to express surprise at\r\nthe strangeness of what you say from time to time when under their influence,\r\nyou would probably reply to him, if you were honest, that you cannot help\r\nsaying what your loves say unless they are prevented; and that you can only be\r\nsilent when they are. Now you must understand that my words are an echo too,\r\nand therefore you need not wonder at me; but if you want to silence me, silence\r\nphilosophy, who is my love, for she is always telling me what I am now telling\r\nyou, my friend; neither is she capricious like my other love, for the son of\r\nCleinias says one thing to-day and another thing to-morrow, but philosophy is\r\nalways true. She is the teacher at whose words you are now wondering, and you\r\nhave heard her yourself. Her you must refute, and either show, as I was saying,\r\nthat to do injustice and to escape punishment is not the worst of all evils;\r\nor, if you leave her word unrefuted, by the dog the god of Egypt, I declare, O\r\nCallicles, that Callicles will never be at one with himself, but that his whole\r\nlife will be a discord. And yet, my friend, I would rather that my lyre should\r\nbe inharmonious, and that there should be no music in the chorus which I\r\nprovided; aye, or that the whole world should be at odds with me, and oppose\r\nme, rather than that I myself should be at odds with myself, and contradict\r\nmyself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: O Socrates, you are a regular declaimer, and seem to be running riot\r\nin the argument. And now you are declaiming in this way because Polus has\r\nfallen into the same error himself of which he accused Gorgias:\u0026mdash;for he\r\nsaid that when Gorgias was asked by you, whether, if some one came to him who\r\nwanted to learn rhetoric, and did not know justice, he would teach him justice,\r\nGorgias in his modesty replied that he would, because he thought that mankind\r\nin general would be displeased if he answered \u0026ldquo;No\u0026rdquo;; and then in\r\nconsequence of this admission, Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself,\r\nthat being just the sort of thing in which you delight. Whereupon Polus laughed\r\nat you deservedly, as I think; but now he has himself fallen into the same\r\ntrap. I cannot say very much for his wit when he conceded to you that to do is\r\nmore dishonourable than to suffer injustice, for this was the admission which\r\nled to his being entangled by you; and because he was too modest to say what he\r\nthought, he had his mouth stopped. For the truth is, Socrates, that you, who\r\npretend to be engaged in the pursuit of truth, are appealing now to the popular\r\nand vulgar notions of right, which are not natural, but only conventional.\r\nConvention and nature are generally at variance with one another: and hence, if\r\na person is too modest to say what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict\r\nhimself; and you, in your ingenuity perceiving the advantage to be thereby\r\ngained, slyly ask of him who is arguing conventionally a question which is to\r\nbe determined by the rule of nature; and if he is talking of the rule of\r\nnature, you slip away to custom: as, for instance, you did in this very\r\ndiscussion about doing and suffering injustice. When Polus was speaking of the\r\nconventionally dishonourable, you assailed him from the point of view of\r\nnature; for by the rule of nature, to suffer injustice is the greater disgrace\r\nbecause the greater evil; but conventionally, to do evil is the more\r\ndisgraceful. For the suffering of injustice is not the part of a man, but of a\r\nslave, who indeed had better die than live; since when he is wronged and\r\ntrampled upon, he is unable to help himself, or any other about whom he cares.\r\nThe reason, as I conceive, is that the makers of laws are the majority who are\r\nweak; and they make laws and distribute praises and censures with a view to\r\nthemselves and to their own interests; and they terrify the stronger sort of\r\nmen, and those who are able to get the better of them, in order that they may\r\nnot get the better of them; and they say, that dishonesty is shameful and\r\nunjust; meaning, by the word injustice, the desire of a man to have more than\r\nhis neighbours; for knowing their own inferiority, I suspect that they are too\r\nglad of equality. And therefore the endeavour to have more than the many, is\r\nconventionally said to be shameful and unjust, and is called injustice (compare\r\nRepublic), whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the better to\r\nhave more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker; and in many ways\r\nshe shows, among men as well as among animals, and indeed among whole cities\r\nand races, that justice consists in the superior ruling over and having more\r\nthan the inferior. For on what principle of justice did Xerxes invade Hellas,\r\nor his father the Scythians? (not to speak of numberless other examples). Nay,\r\nbut these are the men who act according to nature; yes, by Heaven, and\r\naccording to the law of nature: not, perhaps, according to that artificial law,\r\nwhich we invent and impose upon our fellows, of whom we take the best and\r\nstrongest from their youth upwards, and tame them like young\r\nlions,\u0026mdash;charming them with the sound of the voice, and saying to them,\r\nthat with equality they must be content, and that the equal is the honourable\r\nand the just. But if there were a man who had sufficient force, he would shake\r\noff and break through, and escape from all this; he would trample under foot\r\nall our formulas and spells and charms, and all our laws which are against\r\nnature: the slave would rise in rebellion and be lord over us, and the light of\r\nnatural justice would shine forth. And this I take to be the sentiment of\r\nPindar, when he says in his poem, that\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Law is the king of all, of mortals as well as of immortals;\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nthis, as he says,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Makes might to be right, doing violence with highest hand; as I infer\r\nfrom the deeds of Heracles, for without buying them\u0026mdash;\u0026rdquo; (Fragm.\r\nIncert. 151 (Bockh).) \u0026mdash;I do not remember the exact words, but the meaning\r\nis, that without buying them, and without their being given to him, he carried\r\noff the oxen of Geryon, according to the law of natural right, and that the\r\noxen and other possessions of the weaker and inferior properly belong to the\r\nstronger and superior. And this is true, as you may ascertain, if you will\r\nleave philosophy and go on to higher things: for philosophy, Socrates, if\r\npursued in moderation and at the proper age, is an elegant accomplishment, but\r\ntoo much philosophy is the ruin of human life. Even if a man has good parts,\r\nstill, if he carries philosophy into later life, he is necessarily ignorant of\r\nall those things which a gentleman and a person of honour ought to know; he is\r\ninexperienced in the laws of the State, and in the language which ought to be\r\nused in the dealings of man with man, whether private or public, and utterly\r\nignorant of the pleasures and desires of mankind and of human character in\r\ngeneral. And people of this sort, when they betake themselves to politics or\r\nbusiness, are as ridiculous as I imagine the politicians to be, when they make\r\ntheir appearance in the arena of philosophy. For, as Euripides says,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Every man shines in that and pursues that, and devotes the greatest\r\nportion of the day to that in which he most excels,\u0026rdquo; (Antiope, fragm. 20\r\n(Dindorf).)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nbut anything in which he is inferior, he avoids and depreciates, and praises\r\nthe opposite from partiality to himself, and because he thinks that he will\r\nthus praise himself. The true principle is to unite them. Philosophy, as a part\r\nof education, is an excellent thing, and there is no disgrace to a man while he\r\nis young in pursuing such a study; but when he is more advanced in years, the\r\nthing becomes ridiculous, and I feel towards philosophers as I do towards those\r\nwho lisp and imitate children. For I love to see a little child, who is not of\r\nan age to speak plainly, lisping at his play; there is an appearance of grace\r\nand freedom in his utterance, which is natural to his childish years. But when\r\nI hear some small creature carefully articulating its words, I am offended; the\r\nsound is disagreeable, and has to my ears the twang of slavery. So when I hear\r\na man lisping, or see him playing like a child, his behaviour appears to me\r\nridiculous and unmanly and worthy of stripes. And I have the same feeling about\r\nstudents of philosophy; when I see a youth thus engaged,\u0026mdash;the study\r\nappears to me to be in character, and becoming a man of liberal education, and\r\nhim who neglects philosophy I regard as an inferior man, who will never aspire\r\nto anything great or noble. But if I see him continuing the study in later\r\nlife, and not leaving off, I should like to beat him, Socrates; for, as I was\r\nsaying, such a one, even though he have good natural parts, becomes effeminate.\r\nHe flies from the busy centre and the market-place, in which, as the poet says,\r\nmen become distinguished; he creeps into a corner for the rest of his life, and\r\ntalks in a whisper with three or four admiring youths, but never speaks out\r\nlike a freeman in a satisfactory manner. Now I, Socrates, am very well inclined\r\ntowards you, and my feeling may be compared with that of Zethus towards\r\nAmphion, in the play of Euripides, whom I was mentioning just now: for I am\r\ndisposed to say to you much what Zethus said to his brother, that you,\r\nSocrates, are careless about the things of which you ought to be careful; and\r\nthat you\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Who have a soul so noble, are remarkable for a puerile exterior; Neither\r\nin a court of justice could you state a case, or give any reason or proof, Or\r\noffer valiant counsel on another\u0026rsquo;s behalf.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd you must not be offended, my dear Socrates, for I am speaking out of\r\ngood-will towards you, if I ask whether you are not ashamed of being thus\r\ndefenceless; which I affirm to be the condition not of you only but of all\r\nthose who will carry the study of philosophy too far. For suppose that some one\r\nwere to take you, or any one of your sort, off to prison, declaring that you\r\nhad done wrong when you had done no wrong, you must allow that you would not\r\nknow what to do:\u0026mdash;there you would stand giddy and gaping, and not having a\r\nword to say; and when you went up before the Court, even if the accuser were a\r\npoor creature and not good for much, you would die if he were disposed to claim\r\nthe penalty of death. And yet, Socrates, what is the value of\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;An art which converts a man of sense into a fool,\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nwho is helpless, and has no power to save either himself or others, when he is\r\nin the greatest danger and is going to be despoiled by his enemies of all his\r\ngoods, and has to live, simply deprived of his rights of citizenship?\u0026mdash;he\r\nbeing a man who, if I may use the expression, may be boxed on the ears with\r\nimpunity. Then, my good friend, take my advice, and refute no more:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Learn the philosophy of business, and acquire the reputation of wisdom.\r\nBut leave to others these niceties,\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nwhether they are to be described as follies or absurdities:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;For they will only Give you poverty for the inmate of your\r\ndwelling.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCease, then, emulating these paltry splitters of words, and emulate only the\r\nman of substance and honour, who is well to do.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: If my soul, Callicles, were made of gold, should I not rejoice to\r\ndiscover one of those stones with which they test gold, and the very best\r\npossible one to which I might bring my soul; and if the stone and I agreed in\r\napproving of her training, then I should know that I was in a satisfactory\r\nstate, and that no other test was needed by me.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: What is your meaning, Socrates?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I will tell you; I think that I have found in you the desired\r\ntouchstone.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Why?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Because I am sure that if you agree with me in any of the opinions\r\nwhich my soul forms, I have at last found the truth indeed. For I consider that\r\nif a man is to make a complete trial of the good or evil of the soul, he ought\r\nto have three qualities\u0026mdash;knowledge, good-will, outspokenness, which are\r\nall possessed by you. Many whom I meet are unable to make trial of me, because\r\nthey are not wise as you are; others are wise, but they will not tell me the\r\ntruth, because they have not the same interest in me which you have; and these\r\ntwo strangers, Gorgias and Polus, are undoubtedly wise men and my very good\r\nfriends, but they are not outspoken enough, and they are too modest. Why, their\r\nmodesty is so great that they are driven to contradict themselves, first one\r\nand then the other of them, in the face of a large company, on matters of the\r\nhighest moment. But you have all the qualities in which these others are\r\ndeficient, having received an excellent education; to this many Athenians can\r\ntestify. And you are my friend. Shall I tell you why I think so? I know that\r\nyou, Callicles, and Tisander of Aphidnae, and Andron the son of Androtion, and\r\nNausicydes of the deme of Cholarges, studied together: there were four of you,\r\nand I once heard you advising with one another as to the extent to which the\r\npursuit of philosophy should be carried, and, as I know, you came to the\r\nconclusion that the study should not be pushed too much into detail. You were\r\ncautioning one another not to be overwise; you were afraid that too much wisdom\r\nmight unconsciously to yourselves be the ruin of you. And now when I hear you\r\ngiving the same advice to me which you then gave to your most intimate friends,\r\nI have a sufficient evidence of your real good-will to me. And of the frankness\r\nof your nature and freedom from modesty I am assured by yourself, and the\r\nassurance is confirmed by your last speech. Well then, the inference in the\r\npresent case clearly is, that if you agree with me in an argument about any\r\npoint, that point will have been sufficiently tested by us, and will not\r\nrequire to be submitted to any further test. For you could not have agreed with\r\nme, either from lack of knowledge or from superfluity of modesty, nor yet from\r\na desire to deceive me, for you are my friend, as you tell me yourself. And\r\ntherefore when you and I are agreed, the result will be the attainment of\r\nperfect truth. Now there is no nobler enquiry, Callicles, than that which you\r\ncensure me for making,\u0026mdash;What ought the character of a man to be, and what\r\nhis pursuits, and how far is he to go, both in maturer years and in youth? For\r\nbe assured that if I err in my own conduct I do not err intentionally, but from\r\nignorance. Do not then desist from advising me, now that you have begun, until\r\nI have learned clearly what this is which I am to practise, and how I may\r\nacquire it. And if you find me assenting to your words, and hereafter not doing\r\nthat to which I assented, call me \u0026ldquo;dolt,\u0026rdquo; and deem me unworthy of\r\nreceiving further instruction. Once more, then, tell me what you and Pindar\r\nmean by natural justice: Do you not mean that the superior should take the\r\nproperty of the inferior by force; that the better should rule the worse, the\r\nnoble have more than the mean? Am I not right in my recollection?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes; that is what I was saying, and so I still aver.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And do you mean by the better the same as the superior? for I could\r\nnot make out what you were saying at the time\u0026mdash;whether you meant by the\r\nsuperior the stronger, and that the weaker must obey the stronger, as you\r\nseemed to imply when you said that great cities attack small ones in accordance\r\nwith natural right, because they are superior and stronger, as though the\r\nsuperior and stronger and better were the same; or whether the better may be\r\nalso the inferior and weaker, and the superior the worse, or whether better is\r\nto be defined in the same way as superior:\u0026mdash;this is the point which I want\r\nto have cleared up. Are the superior and better and stronger the same or\r\ndifferent?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I say unequivocally that they are the same.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then the many are by nature superior to the one, against whom, as you\r\nwere saying, they make the laws?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then the laws of the many are the laws of the superior?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then they are the laws of the better; for the superior class are far\r\nbetter, as you were saying?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And since they are superior, the laws which are made by them are by\r\nnature good?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And are not the many of opinion, as you were lately saying, that\r\njustice is equality, and that to do is more disgraceful than to suffer\r\ninjustice?\u0026mdash;is that so or not? Answer, Callicles, and let no modesty be\r\nfound to come in the way; do the many think, or do they not think thus?\u0026mdash;I\r\nmust beg of you to answer, in order that if you agree with me I may fortify\r\nmyself by the assent of so competent an authority.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes; the opinion of the many is what you say.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then not only custom but nature also affirms that to do is more\r\ndisgraceful than to suffer injustice, and that justice is equality; so that you\r\nseem to have been wrong in your former assertion, when accusing me you said\r\nthat nature and custom are opposed, and that I, knowing this, was dishonestly\r\nplaying between them, appealing to custom when the argument is about nature,\r\nand to nature when the argument is about custom?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: This man will never cease talking nonsense. At your age, Socrates,\r\nare you not ashamed to be catching at words and chuckling over some verbal\r\nslip? do you not see\u0026mdash;have I not told you already, that by superior I mean\r\nbetter: do you imagine me to say, that if a rabble of slaves and nondescripts,\r\nwho are of no use except perhaps for their physical strength, get together,\r\ntheir ipsissima verba are laws?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Ho! my philosopher, is that your line?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I was thinking, Callicles, that something of the kind must have been\r\nin your mind, and that is why I repeated the question,\u0026mdash;What is the\r\nsuperior? I wanted to know clearly what you meant; for you surely do not think\r\nthat two men are better than one, or that your slaves are better than you\r\nbecause they are stronger? Then please to begin again, and tell me who the\r\nbetter are, if they are not the stronger; and I will ask you, great Sir, to be\r\na little milder in your instructions, or I shall have to run away from you.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: You are ironical.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: No, by the hero Zethus, Callicles, by whose aid you were just now\r\nsaying many ironical things against me, I am not:\u0026mdash;tell me, then, whom you\r\nmean, by the better?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I mean the more excellent.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Do you not see that you are yourself using words which have no\r\nmeaning and that you are explaining nothing?\u0026mdash;will you tell me whether you\r\nmean by the better and superior the wiser, or if not, whom?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Most assuredly, I do mean the wiser.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then according to you, one wise man may often be superior to ten\r\nthousand fools, and he ought to rule them, and they ought to be his subjects,\r\nand he ought to have more than they should. This is what I believe that you\r\nmean (and you must not suppose that I am word-catching), if you allow that the\r\none is superior to the ten thousand?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes; that is what I mean, and that is what I conceive to be natural\r\njustice\u0026mdash;that the better and wiser should rule and have more than the\r\ninferior.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Stop there, and let me ask you what you would say in this case: Let\r\nus suppose that we are all together as we are now; there are several of us, and\r\nwe have a large common store of meats and drinks, and there are all sorts of\r\npersons in our company having various degrees of strength and weakness, and one\r\nof us, being a physician, is wiser in the matter of food than all the rest, and\r\nhe is probably stronger than some and not so strong as others of us\u0026mdash;will\r\nhe not, being wiser, be also better than we are, and our superior in this\r\nmatter of food?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Either, then, he will have a larger share of the meats and drinks,\r\nbecause he is better, or he will have the distribution of all of them by reason\r\nof his authority, but he will not expend or make use of a larger share of them\r\non his own person, or if he does, he will be punished;\u0026mdash;his share will\r\nexceed that of some, and be less than that of others, and if he be the weakest\r\nof all, he being the best of all will have the smallest share of all,\r\nCallicles:\u0026mdash;am I not right, my friend?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: You talk about meats and drinks and physicians and other nonsense; I\r\nam not speaking of them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, but do you admit that the wiser is the better? Answer\r\n\u0026ldquo;Yes\u0026rdquo; or \u0026ldquo;No.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And ought not the better to have a larger share?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Not of meats and drinks.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I understand: then, perhaps, of coats\u0026mdash;the skilfullest weaver\r\nought to have the largest coat, and the greatest number of them, and go about\r\nclothed in the best and finest of them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Fudge about coats!\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then the skilfullest and best in making shoes ought to have the\r\nadvantage in shoes; the shoemaker, clearly, should walk about in the largest\r\nshoes, and have the greatest number of them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Fudge about shoes! What nonsense are you talking?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Or, if this is not your meaning, perhaps you would say that the wise\r\nand good and true husbandman should actually have a larger share of seeds, and\r\nhave as much seed as possible for his own land?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: How you go on, always talking in the same way, Socrates!\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, and also about the same things.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes, by the Gods, you are literally always talking of cobblers and\r\nfullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with our argument.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But why will you not tell me in what a man must be superior and wiser\r\nin order to claim a larger share; will you neither accept a suggestion, nor\r\noffer one?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I have already told you. In the first place, I mean by superiors not\r\ncobblers or cooks, but wise politicians who understand the administration of a\r\nstate, and who are not only wise, but also valiant and able to carry out their\r\ndesigns, and not the men to faint from want of soul.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: See now, most excellent Callicles, how different my charge against\r\nyou is from that which you bring against me, for you reproach me with always\r\nsaying the same; but I reproach you with never saying the same about the same\r\nthings, for at one time you were defining the better and the superior to be the\r\nstronger, then again as the wiser, and now you bring forward a new notion; the\r\nsuperior and the better are now declared by you to be the more courageous: I\r\nwish, my good friend, that you would tell me, once for all, whom you affirm to\r\nbe the better and superior, and in what they are better?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I have already told you that I mean those who are wise and\r\ncourageous in the administration of a state\u0026mdash;they ought to be the rulers\r\nof their states, and justice consists in their having more than their subjects.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But whether rulers or subjects will they or will they not have more\r\nthan themselves, my friend?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: What do you mean?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I mean that every man is his own ruler; but perhaps you think that\r\nthere is no necessity for him to rule himself; he is only required to rule\r\nothers?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: What do you mean by his \u0026ldquo;ruling over himself\u0026rdquo;?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: A simple thing enough; just what is commonly said, that a man should\r\nbe temperate and master of himself, and ruler of his own pleasures and\r\npassions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: What innocence! you mean those fools,\u0026mdash;the temperate?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Certainly:\u0026mdash;any one may know that to be my meaning.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Quite so, Socrates; and they are really fools, for how can a man be\r\nhappy who is the servant of anything? On the contrary, I plainly assert, that\r\nhe who would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax to the uttermost, and\r\nnot to chastise them; but when they have grown to their greatest he should have\r\ncourage and intelligence to minister to them and to satisfy all his longings.\r\nAnd this I affirm to be natural justice and nobility. To this however the many\r\ncannot attain; and they blame the strong man because they are ashamed of their\r\nown weakness, which they desire to conceal, and hence they say that\r\nintemperance is base. As I have remarked already, they enslave the nobler\r\nnatures, and being unable to satisfy their pleasures, they praise temperance\r\nand justice out of their own cowardice. For if a man had been originally the\r\nson of a king, or had a nature capable of acquiring an empire or a tyranny or\r\nsovereignty, what could be more truly base or evil than temperance\u0026mdash;to a\r\nman like him, I say, who might freely be enjoying every good, and has no one to\r\nstand in his way, and yet has admitted custom and reason and the opinion of\r\nother men to be lords over him?\u0026mdash;must not he be in a miserable plight whom\r\nthe reputation of justice and temperance hinders from giving more to his\r\nfriends than to his enemies, even though he be a ruler in his city? Nay,\r\nSocrates, for you profess to be a votary of the truth, and the truth is\r\nthis:\u0026mdash;that luxury and intemperance and licence, if they be provided with\r\nmeans, are virtue and happiness\u0026mdash;all the rest is a mere bauble, agreements\r\ncontrary to nature, foolish talk of men, nothing worth. (Compare Republic.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: There is a noble freedom, Callicles, in your way of approaching the\r\nargument; for what you say is what the rest of the world think, but do not like\r\nto say. And I must beg of you to persevere, that the true rule of human life\r\nmay become manifest. Tell me, then:\u0026mdash;you say, do you not, that in the\r\nrightly-developed man the passions ought not to be controlled, but that we\r\nshould let them grow to the utmost and somehow or other satisfy them, and that\r\nthis is virtue?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes; I do.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then those who want nothing are not truly said to be happy?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: No indeed, for then stones and dead men would be the happiest of\r\nall.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But surely life according to your view is an awful thing; and indeed\r\nI think that Euripides may have been right in saying,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Who knows if life be not death and death life;\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nand that we are very likely dead; I have heard a philosopher say that at this\r\nmoment we are actually dead, and that the body (soma) is our tomb (sema\r\n(compare Phaedr.)), and that the part of the soul which is the seat of the\r\ndesires is liable to be tossed about by words and blown up and down; and some\r\ningenious person, probably a Sicilian or an Italian, playing with the word,\r\ninvented a tale in which he called the soul\u0026mdash;because of its believing and\r\nmake-believe nature\u0026mdash;a vessel (An untranslatable pun,\u0026mdash;dia to\r\npithanon te kai pistikon onomase pithon.), and the ignorant he called the\r\nuninitiated or leaky, and the place in the souls of the uninitiated in which\r\nthe desires are seated, being the intemperate and incontinent part, he compared\r\nto a vessel full of holes, because it can never be satisfied. He is not of your\r\nway of thinking, Callicles, for he declares, that of all the souls in Hades,\r\nmeaning the invisible world (aeides), these uninitiated or leaky persons are\r\nthe most miserable, and that they pour water into a vessel which is full of\r\nholes out of a colander which is similarly perforated. The colander, as my\r\ninformer assures me, is the soul, and the soul which he compares to a colander\r\nis the soul of the ignorant, which is likewise full of holes, and therefore\r\nincontinent, owing to a bad memory and want of faith. These notions are strange\r\nenough, but they show the principle which, if I can, I would fain prove to you;\r\nthat you should change your mind, and, instead of the intemperate and insatiate\r\nlife, choose that which is orderly and sufficient and has a due provision for\r\ndaily needs. Do I make any impression on you, and are you coming over to the\r\nopinion that the orderly are happier than the intemperate? Or do I fail to\r\npersuade you, and, however many tales I rehearse to you, do you continue of the\r\nsame opinion still?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: The latter, Socrates, is more like the truth.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, I will tell you another image, which comes out of the same\r\nschool:\u0026mdash;Let me request you to consider how far you would accept this as\r\nan account of the two lives of the temperate and intemperate in a\r\nfigure:\u0026mdash;There are two men, both of whom have a number of casks; the one\r\nman has his casks sound and full, one of wine, another of honey, and a third of\r\nmilk, besides others filled with other liquids, and the streams which fill them\r\nare few and scanty, and he can only obtain them with a great deal of toil and\r\ndifficulty; but when his casks are once filled he has no need to feed them any\r\nmore, and has no further trouble with them or care about them. The other, in\r\nlike manner, can procure streams, though not without difficulty; but his\r\nvessels are leaky and unsound, and night and day he is compelled to be filling\r\nthem, and if he pauses for a moment, he is in an agony of pain. Such are their\r\nrespective lives:\u0026mdash;And now would you say that the life of the intemperate\r\nis happier than that of the temperate? Do I not convince you that the opposite\r\nis the truth?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: You do not convince me, Socrates, for the one who has filled himself\r\nhas no longer any pleasure left; and this, as I was just now saying, is the\r\nlife of a stone: he has neither joy nor sorrow after he is once filled; but the\r\npleasure depends on the superabundance of the influx.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But the more you pour in, the greater the waste; and the holes must\r\nbe large for the liquid to escape.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The life which you are now depicting is not that of a dead man, or of\r\na stone, but of a cormorant; you mean that he is to be hungering and eating?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And he is to be thirsting and drinking?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes, that is what I mean; he is to have all his desires about him,\r\nand to be able to live happily in the gratification of them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Capital, excellent; go on as you have begun, and have no shame; I,\r\ntoo, must disencumber myself of shame: and first, will you tell me whether you\r\ninclude itching and scratching, provided you have enough of them and pass your\r\nlife in scratching, in your notion of happiness?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: What a strange being you are, Socrates! a regular mob-orator.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That was the reason, Callicles, why I scared Polus and Gorgias, until\r\nthey were too modest to say what they thought; but you will not be too modest\r\nand will not be scared, for you are a brave man. And now, answer my question.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I answer, that even the scratcher would live pleasantly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And if pleasantly, then also happily?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: To be sure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But what if the itching is not confined to the head? Shall I pursue\r\nthe question? And here, Callicles, I would have you consider how you would\r\nreply if consequences are pressed upon you, especially if in the last resort\r\nyou are asked, whether the life of a catamite is not terrible, foul, miserable?\r\nOr would you venture to say, that they too are happy, if they only get enough\r\nof what they want?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics into the\r\nargument?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, my fine friend, but am I the introducer of these topics, or he\r\nwho says without any qualification that all who feel pleasure in whatever\r\nmanner are happy, and who admits of no distinction between good and bad\r\npleasures? And I would still ask, whether you say that pleasure and good are\r\nthe same, or whether there is some pleasure which is not a good?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Well, then, for the sake of consistency, I will say that they are\r\nthe same.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: You are breaking the original agreement, Callicles, and will no\r\nlonger be a satisfactory companion in the search after truth, if you say what\r\nis contrary to your real opinion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Why, that is what you are doing too, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then we are both doing wrong. Still, my dear friend, I would ask you\r\nto consider whether pleasure, from whatever source derived, is the good; for,\r\nif this be true, then the disagreeable consequences which have been darkly\r\nintimated must follow, and many others.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: That, Socrates, is only your opinion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are saying?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Indeed I do.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then, as you are in earnest, shall we proceed with the argument?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: By all means. (Or, \u0026ldquo;I am in profound earnest.\u0026rdquo;)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question for\r\nme:\u0026mdash;There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: There is.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied\r\nknowledge?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I was.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things\r\ndifferent from one another?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Certainly I was.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same, or not\r\nthe same?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Not the same, O man of wisdom.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And would you say that courage differed from pleasure?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian, says that\r\npleasure and good are the same; but that knowledge and courage are not the\r\nsame, either with one another, or with the good.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: And what does our friend Socrates, of Foxton, say\u0026mdash;does he\r\nassent to this, or not?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: He does not assent; neither will Callicles, when he sees himself\r\ntruly. You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune are opposed to\r\neach other?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And if they are opposed to each other, then, like health and disease,\r\nthey exclude one another; a man cannot have them both, or be without them both,\r\nat the same time?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: What do you mean?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Take the case of any bodily affection:\u0026mdash;a man may have the\r\ncomplaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: To be sure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But he surely cannot have the same eyes well and sound at the same\r\ntime?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Certainly not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of the\r\nhealth of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of them both\r\ntogether?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Certainly not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That would surely be marvellous and absurd?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Very.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I suppose that he is affected by them, and gets rid of them in turns?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by fits?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Or swiftness and slowness?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And does he have and not have good and happiness, and their\r\nopposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation? (Compare Republic.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Certainly he has.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the same\r\ntime, clearly that cannot be good and evil\u0026mdash;do we agree? Please not to\r\nanswer without consideration.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I entirely agree.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Go back now to our former admissions.\u0026mdash;Did you say that to\r\nhunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry is pleasant.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not right?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And thirst, too, is painful?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes, very.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Need I adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all wants\r\nor desires are painful?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I agree, and therefore you need not adduce any more instances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Very good. And you would admit that to drink, when you are thirsty,\r\nis pleasant?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word\r\n\u0026ldquo;thirsty\u0026rdquo; implies pain?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the word \u0026ldquo;drinking\u0026rdquo; is expressive of pleasure, and of\r\nthe satisfaction of the want?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: There is pleasure in drinking?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: When you are thirsty?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And in pain?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Do you see the inference:\u0026mdash;that pleasure and pain are\r\nsimultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they not\r\nsimultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same part, whether of\r\nthe soul or the body?\u0026mdash;which of them is affected cannot be supposed to be\r\nof any consequence: Is not this true?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: It is.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at the\r\nsame time?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes, I did.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have pleasure?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Clearly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same as\r\nevil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Well, get on, and don\u0026rsquo;t keep fooling: then you will know what\r\na wiseacre you are in your admonition of me.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in\r\ndrinking at the same time?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I do not understand what you are saying.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes;\u0026mdash;we should like to\r\nhear the argument out.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling of\r\nSocrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let Socrates\r\nargue in his own fashion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little peddling questions,\r\nsince Gorgias wishes to have them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the great\r\nmysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought that this was\r\nnot allowable. But to return to our argument:\u0026mdash;Does not a man cease from\r\nthirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the same moment?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not cease from\r\nthe desire and the pleasure at the same moment?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as you\r\nhave admitted: do you still adhere to what you said?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes, I do; but what is the inference?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the same as the\r\npleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a cessation of pleasure\r\nand pain at the same moment; but not of good and evil, for they are different.\r\nHow then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil? And I would have\r\nyou look at the matter in another light, which could hardly, I think, have been\r\nconsidered by you when you identified them: Are not the good good because they\r\nhave good present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present\r\nwith them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were saying\r\njust now that the courageous and the wise are the good\u0026mdash;would you not say\r\nso?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes, I have.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And a foolish man too?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes, certainly; but what is your drift?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Nothing particular, if you will only answer.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes, I have.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Which rejoice and sorrow most\u0026mdash;the wise or the foolish?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: To be sure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the coward or\r\nthe brave?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I should say \u0026ldquo;most\u0026rdquo; of both; or at any rate, they\r\nrejoiced about equally.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: No matter; then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Greatly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the foolish; so it would seem?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their enemies, or\r\nare the brave also pained?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Both are pained.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And are they equally pained?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I should imagine that the cowards are more pained.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And are they not better pleased at the enemy\u0026rsquo;s departure?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I dare say.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the brave all\r\npleased and pained, as you were saying, in nearly equal degree; but are the\r\ncowards more pleased and pained than the brave?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and the\r\ncowardly are the bad?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly equal\r\ndegree?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal degree, or\r\nhave the bad the advantage both in good and evil? (i.e. in having more pleasure\r\nand more pain.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I really do not know what you mean.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good because good\r\nwas present with them, and the evil because evil; and that pleasures were goods\r\nand pains evils?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes, I remember.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who\r\nrejoice\u0026mdash;if they do rejoice?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of the\r\npresence of evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I should.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of pleasure and of\r\npain?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy and\r\npain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has more?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I should say that he has.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from our\r\nadmissions; for it is good to repeat and review what is good twice and thrice\r\nover, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we allow to be good?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the foolish man and the coward to be evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And he who has joy is good?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And he who is in pain is evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the evil has\r\nmore of them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad as the\r\ngood, or, perhaps, even better?\u0026mdash;is not this a further inference which\r\nfollows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the good and the\r\npleasant are the same:\u0026mdash;can this be denied, Callicles?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I have been listening and making admissions to you, Socrates; and I\r\nremark that if a person grants you anything in play, you, like a child, want to\r\nkeep hold and will not give it back. But do you really suppose that I or any\r\nother human being denies that some pleasures are good and others bad?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me as if I\r\nwere a child, sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as if you were\r\nmeaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you were my friend, and\r\nwould not have deceived me if you could have helped. But I see that I was\r\nmistaken; and now I suppose that I must make the best of a bad business, as\r\nthey said of old, and take what I can get out of you.\u0026mdash;Well, then, as I\r\nunderstand you to say, I may assume that some pleasures are good and others\r\nevil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: To be sure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the hurtful are\r\nthose which do some evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and drinking, which\r\nwe were just now mentioning\u0026mdash;you mean to say that those which promote\r\nhealth, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and their opposites evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil pains?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: To be sure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and pains?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But not the evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Clearly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Because, if you remember, Polus and I have agreed that all our\r\nactions are to be done for the sake of the good;\u0026mdash;and will you agree with\r\nus in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions, and that all our\r\nactions are to be done for the sake of the good, and not the good for the sake\r\nof them?\u0026mdash;will you add a third vote to our two?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I will.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then pleasure, like everything else, is to be sought for the sake of\r\nthat which is good, and not that which is good for the sake of pleasure?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: To be sure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are evil,\r\nor must he have art or knowledge of them in detail?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: He must have art.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Let me now remind you of what I was saying to Gorgias and Polus; I\r\nwas saying, as you will not have forgotten, that there were some processes\r\nwhich aim only at pleasure, and know nothing of a better and worse, and there\r\nare other processes which know good and evil. And I considered that cookery,\r\nwhich I do not call an art, but only an experience, was of the former class,\r\nwhich is concerned with pleasure, and that the art of medicine was of the class\r\nwhich is concerned with the good. And now, by the god of friendship, I must beg\r\nyou, Callicles, not to jest, or to imagine that I am jesting with you; do not\r\nanswer at random and contrary to your real opinion\u0026mdash;for you will observe\r\nthat we are arguing about the way of human life; and to a man who has any sense\r\nat all, what question can be more serious than this?\u0026mdash;whether he should\r\nfollow after that way of life to which you exhort me, and act what you call the\r\nmanly part of speaking in the assembly, and cultivating rhetoric, and engaging\r\nin public affairs, according to the principles now in vogue; or whether he\r\nshould pursue the life of philosophy;\u0026mdash;and in what the latter way differs\r\nfrom the former. But perhaps we had better first try to distinguish them, as I\r\ndid before, and when we have come to an agreement that they are distinct, we\r\nmay proceed to consider in what they differ from one another, and which of them\r\nwe should choose. Perhaps, however, you do not even now understand what I mean?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: No, I do not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then I will explain myself more clearly: seeing that you and I have\r\nagreed that there is such a thing as good, and that there is such a thing as\r\npleasure, and that pleasure is not the same as good, and that the pursuit and\r\nprocess of acquisition of the one, that is pleasure, is different from the\r\npursuit and process of acquisition of the other, which is good\u0026mdash;I wish\r\nthat you would tell me whether you agree with me thus far or not\u0026mdash;do you\r\nagree?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I do.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree with me, and\r\nwhether you think that I spoke the truth when I further said to Gorgias and\r\nPolus that cookery in my opinion is only an experience, and not an art at all;\r\nand that whereas medicine is an art, and attends to the nature and constitution\r\nof the patient, and has principles of action and reason in each case, cookery\r\nin attending upon pleasure never regards either the nature or reason of that\r\npleasure to which she devotes herself, but goes straight to her end, nor ever\r\nconsiders or calculates anything, but works by experience and routine, and just\r\npreserves the recollection of what she has usually done when producing\r\npleasure. And first, I would have you consider whether I have proved what I was\r\nsaying, and then whether there are not other similar processes which have to do\r\nwith the soul\u0026mdash;some of them processes of art, making a provision for the\r\nsoul\u0026rsquo;s highest interest\u0026mdash;others despising the interest, and, as in\r\nthe previous case, considering only the pleasure of the soul, and how this may\r\nbe acquired, but not considering what pleasures are good or bad, and having no\r\nother aim but to afford gratification, whether good or bad. In my opinion,\r\nCallicles, there are such processes, and this is the sort of thing which I term\r\nflattery, whether concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed\r\nwith a view to pleasure and without any consideration of good and evil. And now\r\nI wish that you would tell me whether you agree with us in this notion, or\r\nwhether you differ.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I do not differ; on the contrary, I agree; for in that way I shall\r\nsoonest bring the argument to an end, and shall oblige my friend Gorgias.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And is this notion true of one soul, or of two or more?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Equally true of two or more.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then a man may delight a whole assembly, and yet have no regard for\r\ntheir true interests?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Can you tell me the pursuits which delight mankind\u0026mdash;or rather,\r\nif you would prefer, let me ask, and do you answer, which of them belong to the\r\npleasurable class, and which of them not? In the first place, what say you of\r\nflute-playing? Does not that appear to be an art which seeks only pleasure,\r\nCallicles, and thinks of nothing else?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I assent.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for example, the\r\nart of playing the lyre at festivals?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic\r\npoetry?\u0026mdash;are not they of the same nature? Do you imagine that Cinesias the\r\nson of Meles cares about what will tend to the moral improvement of his\r\nhearers, or about what will give pleasure to the multitude?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: There can be no mistake about Cinesias, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And what do you say of his father, Meles the harp-player? Did he\r\nperform with any view to the good of his hearers? Could he be said to regard\r\neven their pleasure? For his singing was an infliction to his audience. And of\r\nharp-playing and dithyrambic poetry in general, what would you say? Have they\r\nnot been invented wholly for the sake of pleasure?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: That is my notion of them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And as for the Muse of Tragedy, that solemn and august\r\npersonage\u0026mdash;what are her aspirations? Is all her aim and desire only to\r\ngive pleasure to the spectators, or does she fight against them and refuse to\r\nspeak of their pleasant vices, and willingly proclaim in word and song truths\r\nwelcome and unwelcome?\u0026mdash;which in your judgment is her character?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: There can be no doubt, Socrates, that Tragedy has her face turned\r\ntowards pleasure and the gratification of the audience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And is not that the sort of thing, Callicles, which we were just now\r\ndescribing as flattery?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Quite true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well now, suppose that we strip all poetry of song and rhythm and\r\nmetre, there will remain speech? (Compare Republic.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: To be sure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And this speech is addressed to a crowd of people?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then poetry is a sort of rhetoric?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be rhetoricians?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then now we have discovered a sort of rhetoric which is addressed to\r\na crowd of men, women, and children, freemen and slaves. And this is not much\r\nto our taste, for we have described it as having the nature of flattery.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Quite true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Very good. And what do you say of that other rhetoric which addresses\r\nthe Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other states? Do the\r\nrhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is best, and do they seek to\r\nimprove the citizens by their speeches, or are they too, like the rest of\r\nmankind, bent upon giving them pleasure, forgetting the public good in the\r\nthought of their own interest, playing with the people as with children, and\r\ntrying to amuse them, but never considering whether they are better or worse\r\nfor this?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I must distinguish. There are some who have a real care of the\r\npublic in what they say, while others are such as you describe.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two sorts; one,\r\nwhich is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation; the other, which is noble\r\nand aims at the training and improvement of the souls of the citizens, and\r\nstrives to say what is best, whether welcome or unwelcome, to the audience; but\r\nhave you ever known such a rhetoric; or if you have, and can point out any\r\nrhetorician who is of this stamp, who is he?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any such among\r\nthe orators who are at present living.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, then, can you mention any one of a former generation, who may\r\nbe said to have improved the Athenians, who found them worse and made them\r\nbetter, from the day that he began to make speeches? for, indeed, I do not know\r\nof such a man.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: What! did you never hear that Themistocles was a good man, and Cimon\r\nand Miltiades and Pericles, who is just lately dead, and whom you heard\r\nyourself?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, they were good men, if, as you said at first, true\r\nvirtue consists only in the satisfaction of our own desires and those of\r\nothers; but if not, and if, as we were afterwards compelled to acknowledge, the\r\nsatisfaction of some desires makes us better, and of others, worse, and we\r\nought to gratify the one and not the other, and there is an art in\r\ndistinguishing them,\u0026mdash;can you tell me of any of these statesmen who did\r\ndistinguish them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: No, indeed, I cannot.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yet, surely, Callicles, if you look you will find such a one. Suppose\r\nthat we just calmly consider whether any of these was such as I have described.\r\nWill not the good man, who says whatever he says with a view to the best, speak\r\nwith a reference to some standard and not at random; just as all other artists,\r\nwhether the painter, the builder, the shipwright, or any other look all of them\r\nto their own work, and do not select and apply at random what they apply, but\r\nstrive to give a definite form to it? The artist disposes all things in order,\r\nand compels the one part to harmonize and accord with the other part, until he\r\nhas constructed a regular and systematic whole; and this is true of all\r\nartists, and in the same way the trainers and physicians, of whom we spoke\r\nbefore, give order and regularity to the body: do you deny this?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: No; I am ready to admit it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then the house in which order and regularity prevail is good; that in\r\nwhich there is disorder, evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the same is true of a ship?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the same may be said of the human body?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And what would you say of the soul? Will the good soul be that in\r\nwhich disorder is prevalent, or that in which there is harmony and order?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: The latter follows from our previous admissions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: What is the name which is given to the effect of harmony and order in\r\nthe body?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I suppose that you mean health and strength?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name which you would give to the effect of\r\nharmony and order in the soul? Try and discover a name for this as well as for\r\nthe other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Why not give the name yourself, Socrates?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, if you had rather that I should, I will; and you shall say\r\nwhether you agree with me, and if not, you shall refute and answer me.\r\n\u0026ldquo;Healthy,\u0026rdquo; as I conceive, is the name which is given to the regular\r\norder of the body, whence comes health and every other bodily excellence: is\r\nthat true or not?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And \u0026ldquo;lawful\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;law\u0026rdquo; are the names which\r\nare given to the regular order and action of the soul, and these make men\r\nlawful and orderly:\u0026mdash;and so we have temperance and justice: have we not?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Granted.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And will not the true rhetorician who is honest and understands his\r\nart have his eye fixed upon these, in all the words which he addresses to the\r\nsouls of men, and in all his actions, both in what he gives and in what he\r\ntakes away? Will not his aim be to implant justice in the souls of his citizens\r\nand take away injustice, to implant temperance and take away intemperance, to\r\nimplant every virtue and take away every vice? Do you not agree?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I agree.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: For what use is there, Callicles, in giving to the body of a sick man\r\nwho is in a bad state of health a quantity of the most delightful food or drink\r\nor any other pleasant thing, which may be really as bad for him as if you gave\r\nhim nothing, or even worse if rightly estimated. Is not that true?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I will not say No to it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: For in my opinion there is no profit in a man\u0026rsquo;s life if his\r\nbody is in an evil plight\u0026mdash;in that case his life also is evil: am I not\r\nright?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: When a man is in health the physicians will generally allow him to\r\neat when he is hungry and drink when he is thirsty, and to satisfy his desires\r\nas he likes, but when he is sick they hardly suffer him to satisfy his desires\r\nat all: even you will admit that?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And does not the same argument hold of the soul, my good sir? While\r\nshe is in a bad state and is senseless and intemperate and unjust and unholy,\r\nher desires ought to be controlled, and she ought to be prevented from doing\r\nanything which does not tend to her own improvement.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Such treatment will be better for the soul herself?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: To be sure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And to restrain her from her appetites is to chastise her?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then restraint or chastisement is better for the soul than\r\nintemperance or the absence of control, which you were just now preferring?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I do not understand you, Socrates, and I wish that you would ask\r\nsome one who does.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Here is a gentleman who cannot endure to be improved or to subject\r\nhimself to that very chastisement of which the argument speaks!\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I do not heed a word of what you are saying, and have only answered\r\nhitherto out of civility to Gorgias.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: What are we to do, then? Shall we break off in the middle?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: You shall judge for yourself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, but people say that \u0026ldquo;a tale should have a head and not\r\nbreak off in the middle,\u0026rdquo; and I should not like to have the argument\r\ngoing about without a head (compare Laws); please then to go on a little\r\nlonger, and put the head on.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: How tyrannical you are, Socrates! I wish that you and your argument\r\nwould rest, or that you would get some one else to argue with you.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But who else is willing?\u0026mdash;I want to finish the argument.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Cannot you finish without my help, either talking straight on, or\r\nquestioning and answering yourself?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Must I then say with Epicharmus, \u0026ldquo;Two men spoke before, but now\r\none shall be enough\u0026rdquo;? I suppose that there is absolutely no help. And if\r\nI am to carry on the enquiry by myself, I will first of all remark that not\r\nonly I but all of us should have an ambition to know what is true and what is\r\nfalse in this matter, for the discovery of the truth is a common good. And now\r\nI will proceed to argue according to my own notion. But if any of you think\r\nthat I arrive at conclusions which are untrue you must interpose and refute me,\r\nfor I do not speak from any knowledge of what I am saying; I am an enquirer\r\nlike yourselves, and therefore, if my opponent says anything which is of force,\r\nI shall be the first to agree with him. I am speaking on the supposition that\r\nthe argument ought to be completed; but if you think otherwise let us leave off\r\nand go our ways.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGORGIAS: I think, Socrates, that we should not go our ways until you have\r\ncompleted the argument; and this appears to me to be the wish of the rest of\r\nthe company; I myself should very much like to hear what more you have to say.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I too, Gorgias, should have liked to continue the argument with\r\nCallicles, and then I might have given him an \u0026ldquo;Amphion\u0026rdquo; in return\r\nfor his \u0026ldquo;Zethus\u0026rdquo;; but since you, Callicles, are unwilling to\r\ncontinue, I hope that you will listen, and interrupt me if I seem to you to be\r\nin error. And if you refute me, I shall not be angry with you as you are with\r\nme, but I shall inscribe you as the greatest of benefactors on the tablets of\r\nmy soul.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: My good fellow, never mind me, but get on.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument:\u0026mdash;Is the\r\npleasant the same as the good? Not the same. Callicles and I are agreed about\r\nthat. And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of the good? or the good\r\nfor the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant is to be pursued for the sake of the\r\ngood. And that is pleasant at the presence of which we are pleased, and that is\r\ngood at the presence of which we are good? To be sure. And we are good, and all\r\ngood things whatever are good when some virtue is present in us or them? That,\r\nCallicles, is my conviction. But the virtue of each thing, whether body or\r\nsoul, instrument or creature, when given to them in the best way comes to them\r\nnot by chance but as the result of the order and truth and art which are\r\nimparted to them: Am I not right? I maintain that I am. And is not the virtue\r\nof each thing dependent on order or arrangement? Yes, I say. And that which\r\nmakes a thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing? Such is my view.\r\nAnd is not the soul which has an order of her own better than that which has no\r\norder? Certainly. And the soul which has order is orderly? Of course. And that\r\nwhich is orderly is temperate? Assuredly. And the temperate soul is good? No\r\nother answer can I give, Callicles dear; have you any?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Go on, my good fellow.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then I shall proceed to add, that if the temperate soul is the good\r\nsoul, the soul which is in the opposite condition, that is, the foolish and\r\nintemperate, is the bad soul. Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation to the gods\r\nand to men;\u0026mdash;for he would not be temperate if he did not? Certainly he\r\nwill do what is proper. In his relation to other men he will do what is just;\r\nand in his relation to the gods he will do what is holy; and he who does what\r\nis just and holy must be just and holy? Very true. And must he not be\r\ncourageous? for the duty of a temperate man is not to follow or to avoid what\r\nhe ought not, but what he ought, whether things or men or pleasures or pains,\r\nand patiently to endure when he ought; and therefore, Callicles, the temperate\r\nman, being, as we have described, also just and courageous and holy, cannot be\r\nother than a perfectly good man, nor can the good man do otherwise than well\r\nand perfectly whatever he does; and he who does well must of necessity be happy\r\nand blessed, and the evil man who does evil, miserable: now this latter is he\r\nwhom you were applauding\u0026mdash;the intemperate who is the opposite of the\r\ntemperate. Such is my position, and these things I affirm to be true. And if\r\nthey are true, then I further affirm that he who desires to be happy must\r\npursue and practise temperance and run away from intemperance as fast as his\r\nlegs will carry him: he had better order his life so as not to need punishment;\r\nbut if either he or any of his friends, whether private individual or city, are\r\nin need of punishment, then justice must be done and he must suffer punishment,\r\nif he would be happy. This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought to\r\nhave, and towards which he ought to direct all the energies both of himself and\r\nof the state, acting so that he may have temperance and justice present with\r\nhim and be happy, not suffering his lusts to be unrestrained, and in the\r\nnever-ending desire satisfy them leading a robber\u0026rsquo;s life. Such a one is\r\nthe friend neither of God nor man, for he is incapable of communion, and he who\r\nis incapable of communion is also incapable of friendship. And philosophers\r\ntell us, Callicles, that communion and friendship and orderliness and\r\ntemperance and justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and men, and\r\nthat this universe is therefore called Cosmos or order, not disorder or\r\nmisrule, my friend. But although you are a philosopher you seem to me never to\r\nhave observed that geometrical equality is mighty, both among gods and men; you\r\nthink that you ought to cultivate inequality or excess, and do not care about\r\ngeometry.\u0026mdash;Well, then, either the principle that the happy are made happy\r\nby the possession of justice and temperance, and the miserable miserable by the\r\npossession of vice, must be refuted, or, if it is granted, what will be the\r\nconsequences? All the consequences which I drew before, Callicles, and about\r\nwhich you asked me whether I was in earnest when I said that a man ought to\r\naccuse himself and his son and his friend if he did anything wrong, and that to\r\nthis end he should use his rhetoric\u0026mdash;all those consequences are true. And\r\nthat which you thought that Polus was led to admit out of modesty is true,\r\nviz., that, to do injustice, if more disgraceful than to suffer, is in that\r\ndegree worse; and the other position, which, according to Polus, Gorgias\r\nadmitted out of modesty, that he who would truly be a rhetorician ought to be\r\njust and have a knowledge of justice, has also turned out to be true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd now, these things being as we have said, let us proceed in the next place\r\nto consider whether you are right in throwing in my teeth that I am unable to\r\nhelp myself or any of my friends or kinsmen, or to save them in the extremity\r\nof danger, and that I am in the power of another like an outlaw to whom any one\r\nmay do what he likes,\u0026mdash;he may box my ears, which was a brave saying of\r\nyours; or take away my goods or banish me, or even do his worst and kill me; a\r\ncondition which, as you say, is the height of disgrace. My answer to you is one\r\nwhich has been already often repeated, but may as well be repeated once more. I\r\ntell you, Callicles, that to be boxed on the ears wrongfully is not the worst\r\nevil which can befall a man, nor to have my purse or my body cut open, but that\r\nto smite and slay me and mine wrongfully is far more disgraceful and more evil;\r\naye, and to despoil and enslave and pillage, or in any way at all to wrong me\r\nand mine, is far more disgraceful and evil to the doer of the wrong than to me\r\nwho am the sufferer. These truths, which have been already set forth as I state\r\nthem in the previous discussion, would seem now to have been fixed and riveted\r\nby us, if I may use an expression which is certainly bold, in words which are\r\nlike bonds of iron and adamant; and unless you or some other still more\r\nenterprising hero shall break them, there is no possibility of denying what I\r\nsay. For my position has always been, that I myself am ignorant how these\r\nthings are, but that I have never met any one who could say otherwise, any more\r\nthan you can, and not appear ridiculous. This is my position still, and if what\r\nI am saying is true, and injustice is the greatest of evils to the doer of\r\ninjustice, and yet there is if possible a greater than this greatest of evils\r\n(compare Republic), in an unjust man not suffering retribution, what is that\r\ndefence of which the want will make a man truly ridiculous? Must not the\r\ndefence be one which will avert the greatest of human evils? And will not the\r\nworst of all defences be that with which a man is unable to defend himself or\r\nhis family or his friends?\u0026mdash;and next will come that which is unable to\r\navert the next greatest evil; thirdly that which is unable to avert the third\r\ngreatest evil; and so of other evils. As is the greatness of evil so is the\r\nhonour of being able to avert them in their several degrees, and the disgrace\r\nof not being able to avert them. Am I not right Callicles?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes, quite right.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Seeing then that there are these two evils, the doing injustice and\r\nthe suffering injustice\u0026mdash;and we affirm that to do injustice is a greater,\r\nand to suffer injustice a lesser evil\u0026mdash;by what devices can a man succeed\r\nin obtaining the two advantages, the one of not doing and the other of not\r\nsuffering injustice? must he have the power, or only the will to obtain them? I\r\nmean to ask whether a man will escape injustice if he has only the will to\r\nescape, or must he have provided himself with the power?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: He must have provided himself with the power; that is clear.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And what do you say of doing injustice? Is the will only sufficient,\r\nand will that prevent him from doing injustice, or must he have provided\r\nhimself with power and art; and if he have not studied and practised, will he\r\nbe unjust still? Surely you might say, Callicles, whether you think that Polus\r\nand I were right in admitting the conclusion that no one does wrong\r\nvoluntarily, but that all do wrong against their will?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Granted, Socrates, if you will only have done.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in order\r\nthat we may do no injustice?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And what art will protect us from suffering injustice, if not wholly,\r\nyet as far as possible? I want to know whether you agree with me; for I think\r\nthat such an art is the art of one who is either a ruler or even tyrant\r\nhimself, or the equal and companion of the ruling power.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Well said, Socrates; and please to observe how ready I am to praise\r\nyou when you talk sense.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Think and tell me whether you would approve of another view of mine:\r\nTo me every man appears to be most the friend of him who is most like to\r\nhim\u0026mdash;like to like, as ancient sages say: Would you not agree to this?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I should.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But when the tyrant is rude and uneducated, he may be expected to\r\nfear any one who is his superior in virtue, and will never be able to be\r\nperfectly friendly with him.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: That is true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Neither will he be the friend of any one who is greatly his inferior,\r\nfor the tyrant will despise him, and will never seriously regard him as a\r\nfriend.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: That again is true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then the only friend worth mentioning, whom the tyrant can have, will\r\nbe one who is of the same character, and has the same likes and dislikes, and\r\nis at the same time willing to be subject and subservient to him; he is the man\r\nwho will have power in the state, and no one will injure him with\r\nimpunity:\u0026mdash;is not that so?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And if a young man begins to ask how he may become great and\r\nformidable, this would seem to be the way\u0026mdash;he will accustom himself, from\r\nhis youth upward, to feel sorrow and joy on the same occasions as his master,\r\nand will contrive to be as like him as possible?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And in this way he will have accomplished, as you and your friends\r\nwould say, the end of becoming a great man and not suffering injury?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But will he also escape from doing injury? Must not the very opposite\r\nbe true,\u0026mdash;if he is to be like the tyrant in his injustice, and to have\r\ninfluence with him? Will he not rather contrive to do as much wrong as\r\npossible, and not be punished?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And by the imitation of his master and by the power which he thus\r\nacquires will not his soul become bad and corrupted, and will not this be the\r\ngreatest evil to him?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: You always contrive somehow or other, Socrates, to invert\r\neverything: do you not know that he who imitates the tyrant will, if he has a\r\nmind, kill him who does not imitate him and take away his goods?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Excellent Callicles, I am not deaf, and I have heard that a great\r\nmany times from you and from Polus and from nearly every man in the city, but I\r\nwish that you would hear me too. I dare say that he will kill him if he has a\r\nmind\u0026mdash;the bad man will kill the good and true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: And is not that just the provoking thing?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Nay, not to a man of sense, as the argument shows: do you think that\r\nall our cares should be directed to prolonging life to the uttermost, and to\r\nthe study of those arts which secure us from danger always; like that art of\r\nrhetoric which saves men in courts of law, and which you advise me to\r\ncultivate?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes, truly, and very good advice too.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, my friend, but what do you think of swimming; is that an art of\r\nany great pretensions?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: No, indeed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And yet surely swimming saves a man from death, and there are\r\noccasions on which he must know how to swim. And if you despise the swimmers, I\r\nwill tell you of another and greater art, the art of the pilot, who not only\r\nsaves the souls of men, but also their bodies and properties from the extremity\r\nof danger, just like rhetoric. Yet his art is modest and unpresuming: it has no\r\nairs or pretences of doing anything extraordinary, and, in return for the same\r\nsalvation which is given by the pleader, demands only two obols, if he brings\r\nus from Aegina to Athens, or for the longer voyage from Pontus or Egypt, at the\r\nutmost two drachmae, when he has saved, as I was just now saying, the passenger\r\nand his wife and children and goods, and safely disembarked them at the\r\nPiraeus,\u0026mdash;this is the payment which he asks in return for so great a boon;\r\nand he who is the master of the art, and has done all this, gets out and walks\r\nabout on the sea-shore by his ship in an unassuming way. For he is able to\r\nreflect and is aware that he cannot tell which of his fellow-passengers he has\r\nbenefited, and which of them he has injured in not allowing them to be drowned.\r\nHe knows that they are just the same when he has disembarked them as when they\r\nembarked, and not a whit better either in their bodies or in their souls; and\r\nhe considers that if a man who is afflicted by great and incurable bodily\r\ndiseases is only to be pitied for having escaped, and is in no way benefited by\r\nhim in having been saved from drowning, much less he who has great and\r\nincurable diseases, not of the body, but of the soul, which is the more\r\nvaluable part of him; neither is life worth having nor of any profit to the bad\r\nman, whether he be delivered from the sea, or the law-courts, or any other\r\ndevourer;\u0026mdash;and so he reflects that such a one had better not live, for he\r\ncannot live well. (Compare Republic.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd this is the reason why the pilot, although he is our saviour, is not\r\nusually conceited, any more than the engineer, who is not at all behind either\r\nthe general, or the pilot, or any one else, in his saving power, for he\r\nsometimes saves whole cities. Is there any comparison between him and the\r\npleader? And if he were to talk, Callicles, in your grandiose style, he would\r\nbury you under a mountain of words, declaring and insisting that we ought all\r\nof us to be engine-makers, and that no other profession is worth thinking\r\nabout; he would have plenty to say. Nevertheless you despise him and his art,\r\nand sneeringly call him an engine-maker, and you will not allow your daughters\r\nto marry his son, or marry your son to his daughters. And yet, on your\r\nprinciple, what justice or reason is there in your refusal? What right have you\r\nto despise the engine-maker, and the others whom I was just now mentioning? I\r\nknow that you will say, \u0026ldquo;I am better, and better born.\u0026rdquo; But if the\r\nbetter is not what I say, and virtue consists only in a man saving himself and\r\nhis, whatever may be his character, then your censure of the engine-maker, and\r\nof the physician, and of the other arts of salvation, is ridiculous. O my\r\nfriend! I want you to see that the noble and the good may possibly be something\r\ndifferent from saving and being saved:\u0026mdash;May not he who is truly a man\r\ncease to care about living a certain time?\u0026mdash;he knows, as women say, that\r\nno man can escape fate, and therefore he is not fond of life; he leaves all\r\nthat with God, and considers in what way he can best spend his appointed\r\nterm;\u0026mdash;whether by assimilating himself to the constitution under which he\r\nlives, as you at this moment have to consider how you may become as like as\r\npossible to the Athenian people, if you mean to be in their good graces, and to\r\nhave power in the state; whereas I want you to think and see whether this is\r\nfor the interest of either of us;\u0026mdash;I would not have us risk that which is\r\ndearest on the acquisition of this power, like the Thessalian enchantresses,\r\nwho, as they say, bring down the moon from heaven at the risk of their own\r\nperdition. But if you suppose that any man will show you the art of becoming\r\ngreat in the city, and yet not conforming yourself to the ways of the city,\r\nwhether for better or worse, then I can only say that you are mistaken,\r\nCallides; for he who would deserve to be the true natural friend of the\r\nAthenian Demus, aye, or of Pyrilampes\u0026rsquo; darling who is called after them,\r\nmust be by nature like them, and not an imitator only. He, then, who will make\r\nyou most like them, will make you as you desire, a statesman and orator: for\r\nevery man is pleased when he is spoken to in his own language and spirit, and\r\ndislikes any other. But perhaps you, sweet Callicles, may be of another mind.\r\nWhat do you say?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Somehow or other your words, Socrates, always appear to me to be\r\ngood words; and yet, like the rest of the world, I am not quite convinced by\r\nthem. (Compare Symp.: 1 Alcib.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The reason is, Callicles, that the love of Demus which abides in your\r\nsoul is an adversary to me; but I dare say that if we recur to these same\r\nmatters, and consider them more thoroughly, you may be convinced for all that.\r\nPlease, then, to remember that there are two processes of training all things,\r\nincluding body and soul; in the one, as we said, we treat them with a view to\r\npleasure, and in the other with a view to the highest good, and then we do not\r\nindulge but resist them: was not that the distinction which we drew?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the one which had pleasure in view was just a vulgar\r\nflattery:\u0026mdash;was not that another of our conclusions?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Be it so, if you will have it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the other had in view the greatest improvement of that which was\r\nministered to, whether body or soul?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Quite true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And must we not have the same end in view in the treatment of our\r\ncity and citizens? Must we not try and make them as good as possible? For we\r\nhave already discovered that there is no use in imparting to them any other\r\ngood, unless the mind of those who are to have the good, whether money, or\r\noffice, or any other sort of power, be gentle and good. Shall we say that?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes, certainly, if you like.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, then, if you and I, Callicles, were intending to set about some\r\npublic business, and were advising one another to undertake buildings, such as\r\nwalls, docks or temples of the largest size, ought we not to examine ourselves,\r\nfirst, as to whether we know or do not know the art of building, and who taught\r\nus?\u0026mdash;would not that be necessary, Callicles?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: In the second place, we should have to consider whether we had ever\r\nconstructed any private house, either of our own or for our friends, and\r\nwhether this building of ours was a success or not; and if upon consideration\r\nwe found that we had had good and eminent masters, and had been successful in\r\nconstructing many fine buildings, not only with their assistance, but without\r\nthem, by our own unaided skill\u0026mdash;in that case prudence would not dissuade\r\nus from proceeding to the construction of public works. But if we had no master\r\nto show, and only a number of worthless buildings or none at all, then, surely,\r\nit would be ridiculous in us to attempt public works, or to advise one another\r\nto undertake them. Is not this true?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And does not the same hold in all other cases? If you and I were\r\nphysicians, and were advising one another that we were competent to practise as\r\nstate-physicians, should I not ask about you, and would you not ask about me,\r\nWell, but how about Socrates himself, has he good health? and was any one else\r\never known to be cured by him, whether slave or freeman? And I should make the\r\nsame enquiries about you. And if we arrived at the conclusion that no one,\r\nwhether citizen or stranger, man or woman, had ever been any the better for the\r\nmedical skill of either of us, then, by Heaven, Callicles, what an absurdity to\r\nthink that we or any human being should be so silly as to set up as\r\nstate-physicians and advise others like ourselves to do the same, without\r\nhaving first practised in private, whether successfully or not, and acquired\r\nexperience of the art! Is not this, as they say, to begin with the big jar when\r\nyou are learning the potter\u0026rsquo;s art; which is a foolish thing?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And now, my friend, as you are already beginning to be a public\r\ncharacter, and are admonishing and reproaching me for not being one, suppose\r\nthat we ask a few questions of one another. Tell me, then, Callicles, how about\r\nmaking any of the citizens better? Was there ever a man who was once vicious,\r\nor unjust, or intemperate, or foolish, and became by the help of Callicles good\r\nand noble? Was there ever such a man, whether citizen or stranger, slave or\r\nfreeman? Tell me, Callicles, if a person were to ask these questions of you,\r\nwhat would you answer? Whom would you say that you had improved by your\r\nconversation? There may have been good deeds of this sort which were done by\r\nyou as a private person, before you came forward in public. Why will you not\r\nanswer?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: You are contentious, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Nay, I ask you, not from a love of contention, but because I really\r\nwant to know in what way you think that affairs should be administered among\r\nus\u0026mdash;whether, when you come to the administration of them, you have any\r\nother aim but the improvement of the citizens? Have we not already admitted\r\nmany times over that such is the duty of a public man? Nay, we have surely said\r\nso; for if you will not answer for yourself I must answer for you. But if this\r\nis what the good man ought to effect for the benefit of his own state, allow me\r\nto recall to you the names of those whom you were just now mentioning,\r\nPericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles, and ask whether you still\r\nthink that they were good citizens.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I do.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But if they were good, then clearly each of them must have made the\r\ncitizens better instead of worse?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And, therefore, when Pericles first began to speak in the assembly,\r\nthe Athenians were not so good as when he spoke last?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Very likely.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Nay, my friend, \u0026ldquo;likely\u0026rdquo; is not the word; for if he was a\r\ngood citizen, the inference is certain.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: And what difference does that make?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: None; only I should like further to know whether the Athenians are\r\nsupposed to have been made better by Pericles, or, on the contrary, to have\r\nbeen corrupted by him; for I hear that he was the first who gave the people\r\npay, and made them idle and cowardly, and encouraged them in the love of talk\r\nand money.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: You heard that, Socrates, from the laconising set who bruise their\r\nears.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But what I am going to tell you now is not mere hearsay, but well\r\nknown both to you and me: that at first, Pericles was glorious and his\r\ncharacter unimpeached by any verdict of the Athenians\u0026mdash;this was during the\r\ntime when they were not so good\u0026mdash;yet afterwards, when they had been made\r\ngood and gentle by him, at the very end of his life they convicted him of\r\ntheft, and almost put him to death, clearly under the notion that he was a\r\nmalefactor.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Well, but how does that prove Pericles\u0026rsquo; badness?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Why, surely you would say that he was a bad manager of asses or\r\nhorses or oxen, who had received them originally neither kicking nor butting\r\nnor biting him, and implanted in them all these savage tricks? Would he not be\r\na bad manager of any animals who received them gentle, and made them fiercer\r\nthan they were when he received them? What do you say?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I will do you the favour of saying \u0026ldquo;yes.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And will you also do me the favour of saying whether man is an\r\nanimal?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Certainly he is.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And was not Pericles a shepherd of men?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And if he was a good political shepherd, ought not the animals who\r\nwere his subjects, as we were just now acknowledging, to have become more just,\r\nand not more unjust?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Quite true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And are not just men gentle, as Homer says?\u0026mdash;or are you of\r\nanother mind?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I agree.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And yet he really did make them more savage than he received them,\r\nand their savageness was shown towards himself; which he must have been very\r\nfar from desiring.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Do you want me to agree with you?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes, if I seem to you to speak the truth.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Granted then.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And if they were more savage, must they not have been more unjust and\r\ninferior?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Granted again.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then upon this view, Pericles was not a good statesman?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: That is, upon your view.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Nay, the view is yours, after what you have admitted. Take the case\r\nof Cimon again. Did not the very persons whom he was serving ostracize him, in\r\norder that they might not hear his voice for ten years? and they did just the\r\nsame to Themistocles, adding the penalty of exile; and they voted that\r\nMiltiades, the hero of Marathon, should be thrown into the pit of death, and he\r\nwas only saved by the Prytanis. And yet, if they had been really good men, as\r\nyou say, these things would never have happened to them. For the good\r\ncharioteers are not those who at first keep their place, and then, when they\r\nhave broken-in their horses, and themselves become better charioteers, are\r\nthrown out\u0026mdash;that is not the way either in charioteering or in any\r\nprofession.\u0026mdash;What do you think?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I should think not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, but if so, the truth is as I have said already, that in the\r\nAthenian State no one has ever shown himself to be a good statesman\u0026mdash;you\r\nadmitted that this was true of our present statesmen, but not true of former\r\nones, and you preferred them to the others; yet they have turned out to be no\r\nbetter than our present ones; and therefore, if they were rhetoricians, they\r\ndid not use the true art of rhetoric or of flattery, or they would not have\r\nfallen out of favour.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: But surely, Socrates, no living man ever came near any one of them\r\nin his performances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: O, my dear friend, I say nothing against them regarded as the\r\nserving-men of the State; and I do think that they were certainly more\r\nserviceable than those who are living now, and better able to gratify the\r\nwishes of the State; but as to transforming those desires and not allowing them\r\nto have their way, and using the powers which they had, whether of persuasion\r\nor of force, in the improvement of their fellow citizens, which is the prime\r\nobject of the truly good citizen, I do not see that in these respects they were\r\na whit superior to our present statesmen, although I do admit that they were\r\nmore clever at providing ships and walls and docks, and all that. You and I\r\nhave a ridiculous way, for during the whole time that we are arguing, we are\r\nalways going round and round to the same point, and constantly misunderstanding\r\none another. If I am not mistaken, you have admitted and acknowledged more than\r\nonce, that there are two kinds of operations which have to do with the body,\r\nand two which have to do with the soul: one of the two is ministerial, and if\r\nour bodies are hungry provides food for them, and if they are thirsty gives\r\nthem drink, or if they are cold supplies them with garments, blankets, shoes,\r\nand all that they crave. I use the same images as before intentionally, in\r\norder that you may understand me the better. The purveyor of the articles may\r\nprovide them either wholesale or retail, or he may be the maker of any of\r\nthem,\u0026mdash;the baker, or the cook, or the weaver, or the shoemaker, or the\r\ncurrier; and in so doing, being such as he is, he is naturally supposed by\r\nhimself and every one to minister to the body. For none of them know that there\r\nis another art\u0026mdash;an art of gymnastic and medicine which is the true\r\nminister of the body, and ought to be the mistress of all the rest, and to use\r\ntheir results according to the knowledge which she has and they have not, of\r\nthe real good or bad effects of meats and drinks on the body. All other arts\r\nwhich have to do with the body are servile and menial and illiberal; and\r\ngymnastic and medicine are, as they ought to be, their mistresses. Now, when I\r\nsay that all this is equally true of the soul, you seem at first to know and\r\nunderstand and assent to my words, and then a little while afterwards you come\r\nrepeating, Has not the State had good and noble citizens? and when I ask you\r\nwho they are, you reply, seemingly quite in earnest, as if I had asked, Who are\r\nor have been good trainers?\u0026mdash;and you had replied, Thearion, the baker,\r\nMithoecus, who wrote the Sicilian cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner: these\r\nare ministers of the body, first-rate in their art; for the first makes\r\nadmirable loaves, the second excellent dishes, and the third capital\r\nwine;\u0026mdash;to me these appear to be the exact parallel of the statesmen whom\r\nyou mention. Now you would not be altogether pleased if I said to you, My\r\nfriend, you know nothing of gymnastics; those of whom you are speaking to me\r\nare only the ministers and purveyors of luxury, who have no good or noble\r\nnotions of their art, and may very likely be filling and fattening men\u0026rsquo;s\r\nbodies and gaining their approval, although the result is that they lose their\r\noriginal flesh in the long run, and become thinner than they were before; and\r\nyet they, in their simplicity, will not attribute their diseases and loss of\r\nflesh to their entertainers; but when in after years the unhealthy surfeit\r\nbrings the attendant penalty of disease, he who happens to be near them at the\r\ntime, and offers them advice, is accused and blamed by them, and if they could\r\nthey would do him some harm; while they proceed to eulogize the men who have\r\nbeen the real authors of the mischief. And that, Callicles, is just what you\r\nare now doing. You praise the men who feasted the citizens and satisfied their\r\ndesires, and people say that they have made the city great, not seeing that the\r\nswollen and ulcerated condition of the State is to be attributed to these elder\r\nstatesmen; for they have filled the city full of harbours and docks and walls\r\nand revenues and all that, and have left no room for justice and temperance.\r\nAnd when the crisis of the disorder comes, the people will blame the advisers\r\nof the hour, and applaud Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, who are the real\r\nauthors of their calamities; and if you are not careful they may assail you and\r\nmy friend Alcibiades, when they are losing not only their new acquisitions, but\r\nalso their original possessions; not that you are the authors of these\r\nmisfortunes of theirs, although you may perhaps be accessories to them. A great\r\npiece of work is always being made, as I see and am told, now as of old; about\r\nour statesmen. When the State treats any of them as malefactors, I observe that\r\nthere is a great uproar and indignation at the supposed wrong which is done to\r\nthem; \u0026ldquo;after all their many services to the State, that they should\r\nunjustly perish,\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;so the tale runs. But the cry is all a lie; for\r\nno statesman ever could be unjustly put to death by the city of which he is the\r\nhead. The case of the professed statesman is, I believe, very much like that of\r\nthe professed sophist; for the sophists, although they are wise men, are\r\nnevertheless guilty of a strange piece of folly; professing to be teachers of\r\nvirtue, they will often accuse their disciples of wronging them, and defrauding\r\nthem of their pay, and showing no gratitude for their services. Yet what can be\r\nmore absurd than that men who have become just and good, and whose injustice\r\nhas been taken away from them, and who have had justice implanted in them by\r\ntheir teachers, should act unjustly by reason of the injustice which is not in\r\nthem? Can anything be more irrational, my friends, than this? You, Callicles,\r\ncompel me to be a mob-orator, because you will not answer.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: And you are the man who cannot speak unless there is some one to\r\nanswer?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I suppose that I can; just now, at any rate, the speeches which I am\r\nmaking are long enough because you refuse to answer me. But I adjure you by the\r\ngod of friendship, my good sir, do tell me whether there does not appear to you\r\nto be a great inconsistency in saying that you have made a man good, and then\r\nblaming him for being bad?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes, it appears so to me.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Do you never hear our professors of education speaking in this\r\ninconsistent manner?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes, but why talk of men who are good for nothing?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I would rather say, why talk of men who profess to be rulers, and\r\ndeclare that they are devoted to the improvement of the city, and nevertheless\r\nupon occasion declaim against the utter vileness of the city:\u0026mdash;do you\r\nthink that there is any difference between one and the other? My good friend,\r\nthe sophist and the rhetorician, as I was saying to Polus, are the same, or\r\nnearly the same; but you ignorantly fancy that rhetoric is a perfect thing, and\r\nsophistry a thing to be despised; whereas the truth is, that sophistry is as\r\nmuch superior to rhetoric as legislation is to the practice of law, or\r\ngymnastic to medicine. The orators and sophists, as I am inclined to think, are\r\nthe only class who cannot complain of the mischief ensuing to themselves from\r\nthat which they teach others, without in the same breath accusing themselves of\r\nhaving done no good to those whom they profess to benefit. Is not this a fact?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Certainly it is.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: If they were right in saying that they make men better, then they are\r\nthe only class who can afford to leave their remuneration to those who have\r\nbeen benefited by them. Whereas if a man has been benefited in any other way,\r\nif, for example, he has been taught to run by a trainer, he might possibly\r\ndefraud him of his pay, if the trainer left the matter to him, and made no\r\nagreement with him that he should receive money as soon as he had given him the\r\nutmost speed; for not because of any deficiency of speed do men act unjustly,\r\nbut by reason of injustice.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And he who removes injustice can be in no danger of being treated\r\nunjustly: he alone can safely leave the honorarium to his pupils, if he be\r\nreally able to make them good\u0026mdash;am I not right? (Compare Protag.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then we have found the reason why there is no dishonour in a man\r\nreceiving pay who is called in to advise about building or any other art?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Yes, we have found the reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But when the point is, how a man may become best himself, and best\r\ngovern his family and state, then to say that you will give no advice gratis is\r\nheld to be dishonourable?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And why? Because only such benefits call forth a desire to requite\r\nthem, and there is evidence that a benefit has been conferred when the\r\nbenefactor receives a return; otherwise not. Is this true?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: It is.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then to which service of the State do you invite me? determine for\r\nme. Am I to be the physician of the State who will strive and struggle to make\r\nthe Athenians as good as possible; or am I to be the servant and flatterer of\r\nthe State? Speak out, my good friend, freely and fairly as you did at first and\r\nought to do again, and tell me your entire mind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I say then that you should be the servant of the State.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The flatterer? well, sir, that is a noble invitation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: The Mysian, Socrates, or what you please. For if you refuse, the\r\nconsequences will be\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Do not repeat the old story\u0026mdash;that he who likes will kill me and\r\nget my money; for then I shall have to repeat the old answer, that he will be a\r\nbad man and will kill the good, and that the money will be of no use to him,\r\nbut that he will wrongly use that which he wrongly took, and if wrongly,\r\nbasely, and if basely, hurtfully.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: How confident you are, Socrates, that you will never come to harm!\r\nyou seem to think that you are living in another country, and can never be\r\nbrought into a court of justice, as you very likely may be brought by some\r\nmiserable and mean person.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then I must indeed be a fool, Callicles, if I do not know that in the\r\nAthenian State any man may suffer anything. And if I am brought to trial and\r\nincur the dangers of which you speak, he will be a villain who brings me to\r\ntrial\u0026mdash;of that I am very sure, for no good man would accuse the innocent.\r\nNor shall I be surprised if I am put to death. Shall I tell you why I\r\nanticipate this?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: By all means.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I think that I am the only or almost the only Athenian living who\r\npractises the true art of politics; I am the only politician of my time. Now,\r\nseeing that when I speak my words are not uttered with any view of gaining\r\nfavour, and that I look to what is best and not to what is most pleasant,\r\nhaving no mind to use those arts and graces which you recommend, I shall have\r\nnothing to say in the justice court. And you might argue with me, as I was\r\narguing with Polus:\u0026mdash;I shall be tried just as a physician would be tried\r\nin a court of little boys at the indictment of the cook. What would he reply\r\nunder such circumstances, if some one were to accuse him, saying, \u0026ldquo;O my\r\nboys, many evil things has this man done to you: he is the death of you,\r\nespecially of the younger ones among you, cutting and burning and starving and\r\nsuffocating you, until you know not what to do; he gives you the bitterest\r\npotions, and compels you to hunger and thirst. How unlike the variety of meats\r\nand sweets on which I feasted you!\u0026rdquo; What do you suppose that the\r\nphysician would be able to reply when he found himself in such a predicament?\r\nIf he told the truth he could only say, \u0026ldquo;All these evil things, my boys,\r\nI did for your health,\u0026rdquo; and then would there not just be a clamour among\r\na jury like that? How they would cry out!\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: I dare say.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Would he not be utterly at a loss for a reply?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: He certainly would.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And I too shall be treated in the same way, as I well know, if I am\r\nbrought before the court. For I shall not be able to rehearse to the people the\r\npleasures which I have procured for them, and which, although I am not disposed\r\nto envy either the procurers or enjoyers of them, are deemed by them to be\r\nbenefits and advantages. And if any one says that I corrupt young men, and\r\nperplex their minds, or that I speak evil of old men, and use bitter words\r\ntowards them, whether in private or public, it is useless for me to reply, as I\r\ntruly might:\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;All this I do for the sake of justice, and with a\r\nview to your interest, my judges, and to nothing else.\u0026rdquo; And therefore\r\nthere is no saying what may happen to me.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: And do you think, Socrates, that a man who is thus defenceless is in\r\na good position?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, if he have that defence, which as you have often\r\nacknowledged he should have\u0026mdash;if he be his own defence, and have never said\r\nor done anything wrong, either in respect of gods or men; and this has been\r\nrepeatedly acknowledged by us to be the best sort of defence. And if any one\r\ncould convict me of inability to defend myself or others after this sort, I\r\nshould blush for shame, whether I was convicted before many, or before a few,\r\nor by myself alone; and if I died from want of ability to do so, that would\r\nindeed grieve me. But if I died because I have no powers of flattery or\r\nrhetoric, I am very sure that you would not find me repining at death. For no\r\nman who is not an utter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is\r\nafraid of doing wrong. For to go to the world below having one\u0026rsquo;s soul\r\nfull of injustice is the last and worst of all evils. And in proof of what I\r\nsay, if you have no objection, I should like to tell you a story.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCALLICLES: Very well, proceed; and then we shall have done.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Listen, then, as story-tellers say, to a very pretty tale, which I\r\ndare say that you may be disposed to regard as a fable only, but which, as I\r\nbelieve, is a true tale, for I mean to speak the truth. Homer tells us (Il.),\r\nhow Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto divided the empire which they inherited from\r\ntheir father. Now in the days of Cronos there existed a law respecting the\r\ndestiny of man, which has always been, and still continues to be in\r\nHeaven,\u0026mdash;that he who has lived all his life in justice and holiness shall\r\ngo, when he is dead, to the Islands of the Blessed, and dwell there in perfect\r\nhappiness out of the reach of evil; but that he who has lived unjustly and\r\nimpiously shall go to the house of vengeance and punishment, which is called\r\nTartarus. And in the time of Cronos, and even quite lately in the reign of\r\nZeus, the judgment was given on the very day on which the men were to die; the\r\njudges were alive, and the men were alive; and the consequence was that the\r\njudgments were not well given. Then Pluto and the authorities from the Islands\r\nof the Blessed came to Zeus, and said that the souls found their way to the\r\nwrong places. Zeus said: \u0026ldquo;I shall put a stop to this; the judgments are\r\nnot well given, because the persons who are judged have their clothes on, for\r\nthey are alive; and there are many who, having evil souls, are apparelled in\r\nfair bodies, or encased in wealth or rank, and, when the day of judgment\r\narrives, numerous witnesses come forward and testify on their behalf that they\r\nhave lived righteously. The judges are awed by them, and they themselves too\r\nhave their clothes on when judging; their eyes and ears and their whole bodies\r\nare interposed as a veil before their own souls. All this is a hindrance to\r\nthem; there are the clothes of the judges and the clothes of the\r\njudged.\u0026mdash;What is to be done? I will tell you:\u0026mdash;In the first place, I\r\nwill deprive men of the foreknowledge of death, which they possess at present:\r\nthis power which they have Prometheus has already received my orders to take\r\nfrom them: in the second place, they shall be entirely stripped before they are\r\njudged, for they shall be judged when they are dead; and the judge too shall be\r\nnaked, that is to say, dead\u0026mdash;he with his naked soul shall pierce into the\r\nother naked souls; and they shall die suddenly and be deprived of all their\r\nkindred, and leave their brave attire strewn upon the earth\u0026mdash;conducted in\r\nthis manner, the judgment will be just. I knew all about the matter before any\r\nof you, and therefore I have made my sons judges; two from Asia, Minos and\r\nRhadamanthus, and one from Europe, Aeacus. And these, when they are dead, shall\r\ngive judgment in the meadow at the parting of the ways, whence the two roads\r\nlead, one to the Islands of the Blessed, and the other to Tartarus.\r\nRhadamanthus shall judge those who come from Asia, and Aeacus those who come\r\nfrom Europe. And to Minos I shall give the primacy, and he shall hold a court\r\nof appeal, in case either of the two others are in any doubt:\u0026mdash;then the\r\njudgment respecting the last journey of men will be as just as possible.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFrom this tale, Callicles, which I have heard and believe, I draw the following\r\ninferences:\u0026mdash;Death, if I am right, is in the first place the separation\r\nfrom one another of two things, soul and body; nothing else. And after they are\r\nseparated they retain their several natures, as in life; the body keeps the\r\nsame habit, and the results of treatment or accident are distinctly visible in\r\nit: for example, he who by nature or training or both, was a tall man while he\r\nwas alive, will remain as he was, after he is dead; and the fat man will remain\r\nfat; and so on; and the dead man, who in life had a fancy to have flowing hair,\r\nwill have flowing hair. And if he was marked with the whip and had the prints\r\nof the scourge, or of wounds in him when he was alive, you might see the same\r\nin the dead body; and if his limbs were broken or misshapen when he was alive,\r\nthe same appearance would be visible in the dead. And in a word, whatever was\r\nthe habit of the body during life would be distinguishable after death, either\r\nperfectly, or in a great measure and for a certain time. And I should imagine\r\nthat this is equally true of the soul, Callicles; when a man is stripped of the\r\nbody, all the natural or acquired affections of the soul are laid open to\r\nview.\u0026mdash;And when they come to the judge, as those from Asia come to\r\nRhadamanthus, he places them near him and inspects them quite impartially, not\r\nknowing whose the soul is: perhaps he may lay hands on the soul of the great\r\nking, or of some other king or potentate, who has no soundness in him, but his\r\nsoul is marked with the whip, and is full of the prints and scars of perjuries\r\nand crimes with which each action has stained him, and he is all crooked with\r\nfalsehood and imposture, and has no straightness, because he has lived without\r\ntruth. Him Rhadamanthus beholds, full of all deformity and disproportion, which\r\nis caused by licence and luxury and insolence and incontinence, and despatches\r\nhim ignominiously to his prison, and there he undergoes the punishment which he\r\ndeserves.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow the proper office of punishment is twofold: he who is rightly punished\r\nought either to become better and profit by it, or he ought to be made an\r\nexample to his fellows, that they may see what he suffers, and fear and become\r\nbetter. Those who are improved when they are punished by gods and men, are\r\nthose whose sins are curable; and they are improved, as in this world so also\r\nin another, by pain and suffering; for there is no other way in which they can\r\nbe delivered from their evil. But they who have been guilty of the worst\r\ncrimes, and are incurable by reason of their crimes, are made examples; for, as\r\nthey are incurable, the time has passed at which they can receive any benefit.\r\nThey get no good themselves, but others get good when they behold them enduring\r\nfor ever the most terrible and painful and fearful sufferings as the penalty of\r\ntheir sins\u0026mdash;there they are, hanging up as examples, in the prison-house of\r\nthe world below, a spectacle and a warning to all unrighteous men who come\r\nthither. And among them, as I confidently affirm, will be found Archelaus, if\r\nPolus truly reports of him, and any other tyrant who is like him. Of these\r\nfearful examples, most, as I believe, are taken from the class of tyrants and\r\nkings and potentates and public men, for they are the authors of the greatest\r\nand most impious crimes, because they have the power. And Homer witnesses to\r\nthe truth of this; for they are always kings and potentates whom he has\r\ndescribed as suffering everlasting punishment in the world below: such were\r\nTantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus. But no one ever described Thersites, or any\r\nprivate person who was a villain, as suffering everlasting punishment, or as\r\nincurable. For to commit the worst crimes, as I am inclined to think, was not\r\nin his power, and he was happier than those who had the power. No, Callicles,\r\nthe very bad men come from the class of those who have power (compare\r\nRepublic). And yet in that very class there may arise good men, and worthy of\r\nall admiration they are, for where there is great power to do wrong, to live\r\nand to die justly is a hard thing, and greatly to be praised, and few there are\r\nwho attain to this. Such good and true men, however, there have been, and will\r\nbe again, at Athens and in other states, who have fulfilled their trust\r\nrighteously; and there is one who is quite famous all over Hellas, Aristeides,\r\nthe son of Lysimachus. But, in general, great men are also bad, my friend.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAs I was saying, Rhadamanthus, when he gets a soul of the bad kind, knows\r\nnothing about him, neither who he is, nor who his parents are; he knows only\r\nthat he has got hold of a villain; and seeing this, he stamps him as curable or\r\nincurable, and sends him away to Tartarus, whither he goes and receives his\r\nproper recompense. Or, again, he looks with admiration on the soul of some just\r\none who has lived in holiness and truth; he may have been a private man or not;\r\nand I should say, Callicles, that he is most likely to have been a philosopher\r\nwho has done his own work, and not troubled himself with the doings of other\r\nmen in his lifetime; him Rhadamanthus sends to the Islands of the Blessed.\r\nAeacus does the same; and they both have sceptres, and judge; but Minos alone\r\nhas a golden sceptre and is seated looking on, as Odysseus in Homer declares\r\nthat he saw him:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Holding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow I, Callicles, am persuaded of the truth of these things, and I consider how\r\nI shall present my soul whole and undefiled before the judge in that day.\r\nRenouncing the honours at which the world aims, I desire only to know the\r\ntruth, and to live as well as I can, and, when I die, to die as well as I can.\r\nAnd, to the utmost of my power, I exhort all other men to do the same. And, in\r\nreturn for your exhortation of me, I exhort you also to take part in the great\r\ncombat, which is the combat of life, and greater than every other earthly\r\nconflict. And I retort your reproach of me, and say, that you will not be able\r\nto help yourself when the day of trial and judgment, of which I was speaking,\r\ncomes upon you; you will go before the judge, the son of Aegina, and, when he\r\nhas got you in his grip and is carrying you off, you will gape and your head\r\nwill swim round, just as mine would in the courts of this world, and very\r\nlikely some one will shamefully box you on the ears, and put upon you any sort\r\nof insult.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPerhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wife\u0026rsquo;s tale, which you\r\nwill contemn. And there might be reason in your contemning such tales, if by\r\nsearching we could find out anything better or truer: but now you see that you\r\nand Polus and Gorgias, who are the three wisest of the Greeks of our day, are\r\nnot able to show that we ought to live any life which does not profit in\r\nanother world as well as in this. And of all that has been said, nothing\r\nremains unshaken but the saying, that to do injustice is more to be avoided\r\nthan to suffer injustice, and that the reality and not the appearance of virtue\r\nis to be followed above all things, as well in public as in private life; and\r\nthat when any one has been wrong in anything, he is to be chastised, and that\r\nthe next best thing to a man being just is that he should become just, and be\r\nchastised and punished; also that he should avoid all flattery of himself as\r\nwell as of others, of the few or of the many: and rhetoric and any other art\r\nshould be used by him, and all his actions should be done always, with a view\r\nto justice.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFollow me then, and I will lead you where you will be happy in life and after\r\ndeath, as the argument shows. And never mind if some one despises you as a\r\nfool, and insults you, if he has a mind; let him strike you, by Zeus, and do\r\nyou be of good cheer, and do not mind the insulting blow, for you will never\r\ncome to any harm in the practice of virtue, if you are a really good and true\r\nman. When we have practised virtue together, we will apply ourselves to\r\npolitics, if that seems desirable, or we will advise about whatever else may\r\nseem good to us, for we shall be better able to judge then. In our present\r\ncondition we ought not to give ourselves airs, for even on the most important\r\nsubjects we are always changing our minds; so utterly stupid are we! Let us,\r\nthen, take the argument as our guide, which has revealed to us that the best\r\nway of life is to practise justice and every virtue in life and death. This way\r\nlet us go; and in this exhort all men to follow, not in the way to which you\r\ntrust and in which you exhort me to follow you; for that way, Callicles, is\r\nnothing worth.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}