Cratylus
{"WorkMasterId":7125,"WpPageId":287660,"ParentWpPageId":189509,"Slug":"cratylus","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/plato/cratylus/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/plato/cratylus/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":391129,"CleanHtmlLength":335019,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"Cratylus","Deck":"Cratylus examines names, convention, nature, correctness, flux, and the relation between language and truth.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to Plato","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/plato/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"Plato","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/plato/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/plato-01-capitoline-bust-7.jpg","ImageAlt":"Plato bust in the Capitoline Museums","FilterTerra":"Eastern Mediterranean","ClickText":"Plato","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/plato/","Copies":["427 BCE – 347 BCE","Athens","Athenian philosopher of Forms, dialectic, recollection, the Good, tripartite soul, philosopher-rule, eros, rhetoric, language, cosmology, theology, the Academy, and the Platonic corpus."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:1","Title":"Ancient History","DateText":"3000 BCE – 499 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-ancient-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:3","Title":"Classical Antiquity","DateText":"500 BCE – 499 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-ancient-history/philosophers-of-classical-antiquity/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"385 BCE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Source-backed approximate date.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:2"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:8"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:GRC:2"}],"OriginalTitle":"Kratylos","Language":"Ancient Greek","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:philosophy-of-language"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:epistemology"}],"Tradition":"Platonism / Ancient Greek philosophy","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #1616 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Cratylus examines names, convention, nature, correctness, flux, and the relation between language and truth."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"Cratylus","KeyConcepts":"Cratylus","Methodology":"Source-backed Direct work entry.","Structure":"Direct Platonic corpus entry"},"Arguments":["Cratylus examines names, convention, nature, correctness, flux, and the relation between language and truth."],"Influence":{"InfluencedBy":"","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Direct Platonic dialogue; date is approximate and no full text is imported.","Cratylus is registered as a source-backed work in the Platonic corpus. The page records dating and authenticity caveats where needed; no full text is imported."],"EvidenceNote":["Direct Platonic dialogue; date is approximate and no full text is imported."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Versions","BodyHtml":"\u003cdiv class=\"dz-philo__full-version-grid\"\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-version-card\"\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-provider\"\u003eProject Gutenberg\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3 class=\"dz-philo__full-version-title\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #1616\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-meta\"\u003eHtmlText · Imported\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ca class=\"dz-philo__full-version-link\" href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1616\"\u003eOpen full version\u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["Cratylus examines names, convention, nature, correctness, flux, and the relation between language and truth."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":"Cratylus"},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"Cratylus"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Source-backed Direct work entry."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"Direct Platonic corpus entry"}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Cratylus examines names, convention, nature, correctness, flux, and the relation between language and truth."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":""},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":""}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Direct Platonic dialogue; date is approximate and no full text is imported.","Cratylus is registered as a source-backed work in the Platonic corpus. The page records dating and authenticity caveats where needed; no full text is imported."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Direct Platonic dialogue; date is approximate and no full text is imported."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003ePublic-domain full text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1616\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #1616\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch1\u003eCRATYLUS\u003c/h1\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2 class=\"no-break\"\u003eBy Plato\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003eContents\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable summary=\"\" style=\"margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap01\"\u003eINTRODUCTION\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap02\"\u003eCRATYLUS\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap01\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eINTRODUCTION\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe Cratylus has always been a source of perplexity to the student of Plato.\r\nWhile in fancy and humour, and perfection of style and metaphysical\r\noriginality, this dialogue may be ranked with the best of the Platonic\r\nwritings, there has been an uncertainty about the motive of the piece, which\r\ninterpreters have hitherto not succeeded in dispelling. We need not suppose\r\nthat Plato used words in order to conceal his thoughts, or that he would have\r\nbeen unintelligible to an educated contemporary. In the Phaedrus and Euthydemus\r\nwe also find a difficulty in determining the precise aim of the author. Plato\r\nwrote satires in the form of dialogues, and his meaning, like that of other\r\nsatirical writers, has often slept in the ear of posterity. Two causes may be\r\nassigned for this obscurity: 1st, the subtlety and allusiveness of this species\r\nof composition; 2nd, the difficulty of reproducing a state of life and\r\nliterature which has passed away. A satire is unmeaning unless we can place\r\nourselves back among the persons and thoughts of the age in which it was\r\nwritten. Had the treatise of Antisthenes upon words, or the speculations of\r\nCratylus, or some other Heracleitean of the fourth century B.C., on the nature\r\nof language been preserved to us; or if we had lived at the time, and been\r\n\u0026ldquo;rich enough to attend the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus,\u0026rdquo; we\r\nshould have understood Plato better, and many points which are now attributed\r\nto the extravagance of Socrates\u0026rsquo; humour would have been found, like the\r\nallusions of Aristophanes in the Clouds, to have gone home to the sophists and\r\ngrammarians of the day.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor the age was very busy with philological speculation; and many questions\r\nwere beginning to be asked about language which were parallel to other\r\nquestions about justice, virtue, knowledge, and were illustrated in a similar\r\nmanner by the analogy of the arts. Was there a correctness in words, and were\r\nthey given by nature or convention? In the presocratic philosophy mankind had\r\nbeen striving to attain an expression of their ideas, and now they were\r\nbeginning to ask themselves whether the expression might not be distinguished\r\nfrom the idea? They were also seeking to distinguish the parts of speech and to\r\nenquire into the relation of subject and predicate. Grammar and logic were\r\nmoving about somewhere in the depths of the human soul, but they were not yet\r\nawakened into consciousness and had not found names for themselves, or terms by\r\nwhich they might be expressed. Of these beginnings of the study of language we\r\nknow little, and there necessarily arises an obscurity when the surroundings of\r\nsuch a work as the Cratylus are taken away. Moreover, in this, as in most of\r\nthe dialogues of Plato, allowance has to be made for the character of Socrates.\r\nFor the theory of language can only be propounded by him in a manner which is\r\nconsistent with his own profession of ignorance. Hence his ridicule of the new\r\nschool of etymology is interspersed with many declarations \u0026ldquo;that he knows\r\nnothing,\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;that he has learned from Euthyphro,\u0026rdquo; and the like.\r\nEven the truest things which he says are depreciated by himself. He professes\r\nto be guessing, but the guesses of Plato are better than all the other theories\r\nof the ancients respecting language put together.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe dialogue hardly derives any light from Plato\u0026rsquo;s other writings, and\r\nstill less from Scholiasts and Neoplatonist writers. Socrates must be\r\ninterpreted from himself, and on first reading we certainly have a difficulty\r\nin understanding his drift, or his relation to the two other interlocutors in\r\nthe dialogue. Does he agree with Cratylus or with Hermogenes, and is he serious\r\nin those fanciful etymologies, extending over more than half the dialogue,\r\nwhich he seems so greatly to relish? Or is he serious in part only; and can we\r\nseparate his jest from his earnest?\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eSunt bona, sunt quaedum mediocria,\r\nsunt mala plura\u003c/i\u003e. Most of them are ridiculously bad, and yet among them are\r\nfound, as if by accident, principles of philology which are unsurpassed in any\r\nancient writer, and even in advance of any philologer of the last century. May\r\nwe suppose that Plato, like Lucian, has been amusing his fancy by writing a\r\ncomedy in the form of a prose dialogue? And what is the final result of the\r\nenquiry? Is Plato an upholder of the conventional theory of language, which he\r\nacknowledges to be imperfect? or does he mean to imply that a perfect language\r\ncan only be based on his own theory of ideas? Or if this latter explanation is\r\nrefuted by his silence, then in what relation does his account of language\r\nstand to the rest of his philosophy? Or may we be so bold as to deny the\r\nconnexion between them? (For the allusion to the ideas at the end of the\r\ndialogue is merely intended to show that we must not put words in the place of\r\nthings or realities, which is a thesis strongly insisted on by Plato in many\r\nother passages)…These are some of the first thoughts which arise in the mind\r\nof the reader of the Cratylus. And the consideration of them may form a\r\nconvenient introduction to the general subject of the dialogue.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe must not expect all the parts of a dialogue of Plato to tend equally to some\r\nclearly-defined end. His idea of literary art is not the absolute proportion of\r\nthe whole, such as we appear to find in a Greek temple or statue; nor should\r\nhis works be tried by any such standard. They have often the beauty of poetry,\r\nbut they have also the freedom of conversation. \u0026ldquo;Words are more plastic\r\nthan wax\u0026rdquo; (Rep.), and may be moulded into any form. He wanders on from\r\none topic to another, careless of the unity of his work, not fearing any\r\n\u0026ldquo;judge, or spectator, who may recall him to the point\u0026rdquo; (Theat.),\r\n\u0026ldquo;whither the argument blows we follow\u0026rdquo; (Rep.). To have determined\r\nbeforehand, as in a modern didactic treatise, the nature and limits of the\r\nsubject, would have been fatal to the spirit of enquiry or discovery, which is\r\nthe soul of the dialogue…These remarks are applicable to nearly all the works\r\nof Plato, but to the Cratylus and Phaedrus more than any others. See Phaedrus,\r\nIntroduction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere is another aspect under which some of the dialogues of Plato may be more\r\ntruly viewed:\u0026mdash;they are dramatic sketches of an argument. We have found\r\nthat in the Lysis, Charmides, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, we arrived at no\r\nconclusion\u0026mdash;the different sides of the argument were personified in the\r\ndifferent speakers; but the victory was not distinctly attributed to any of\r\nthem, nor the truth wholly the property of any. And in the Cratylus we have no\r\nreason to assume that Socrates is either wholly right or wholly wrong, or that\r\nPlato, though he evidently inclines to him, had any other aim than that of\r\npersonifying, in the characters of Hermogenes, Socrates, and Cratylus, the\r\nthree theories of language which are respectively maintained by them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe two subordinate persons of the dialogue, Hermogenes and Cratylus, are at\r\nthe opposite poles of the argument. But after a while the disciple of the\r\nSophist and the follower of Heracleitus are found to be not so far removed from\r\none another as at first sight appeared; and both show an inclination to accept\r\nthe third view which Socrates interposes between them. First, Hermogenes, the\r\npoor brother of the rich Callias, expounds the doctrine that names are\r\nconventional; like the names of slaves, they may be given and altered at\r\npleasure. This is one of those principles which, whether applied to society or\r\nlanguage, explains everything and nothing. For in all things there is an\r\nelement of convention; but the admission of this does not help us to understand\r\nthe rational ground or basis in human nature on which the convention proceeds.\r\nSocrates first of all intimates to Hermogenes that his view of language is only\r\na part of a sophistical whole, and ultimately tends to abolish the distinction\r\nbetween truth and falsehood. Hermogenes is very ready to throw aside the\r\nsophistical tenet, and listens with a sort of half admiration, half belief, to\r\nthe speculations of Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCratylus is of opinion that a name is either a true name or not a name at all.\r\nHe is unable to conceive of degrees of imitation; a word is either the perfect\r\nexpression of a thing, or a mere inarticulate sound (a fallacy which is still\r\nprevalent among theorizers about the origin of language). He is at once a\r\nphilosopher and a sophist; for while wanting to rest language on an immutable\r\nbasis, he would deny the possibility of falsehood. He is inclined to derive all\r\ntruth from language, and in language he sees reflected the philosophy of\r\nHeracleitus. His views are not like those of Hermogenes, hastily taken up, but\r\nare said to be the result of mature consideration, although he is described as\r\nstill a young man. With a tenacity characteristic of the Heracleitean\r\nphilosophers, he clings to the doctrine of the flux. (Compare Theaet.) Of the\r\nreal Cratylus we know nothing, except that he is recorded by Aristotle to have\r\nbeen the friend or teacher of Plato; nor have we any proof that he resembled\r\nthe likeness of him in Plato any more than the Critias of Plato is like the\r\nreal Critias, or the Euthyphro in this dialogue like the other Euthyphro, the\r\ndiviner, in the dialogue which is called after him.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBetween these two extremes, which have both of them a sophistical character,\r\nthe view of Socrates is introduced, which is in a manner the union of the two.\r\nLanguage is conventional and also natural, and the true conventional-natural is\r\nthe rational. It is a work not of chance, but of art; the dialectician is the\r\nartificer of words, and the legislator gives authority to them. They are the\r\nexpressions or imitations in sound of things. In a sense, Cratylus is right in\r\nsaying that things have by nature names; for nature is not opposed either to\r\nart or to law. But vocal imitation, like any other copy, may be imperfectly\r\nexecuted; and in this way an element of chance or convention enters in. There\r\nis much which is accidental or exceptional in language. Some words have had\r\ntheir original meaning so obscured, that they require to be helped out by\r\nconvention. But still the true name is that which has a natural meaning. Thus\r\nnature, art, chance, all combine in the formation of language. And the three\r\nviews respectively propounded by Hermogenes, Socrates, Cratylus, may be\r\ndescribed as the conventional, the artificial or rational, and the natural. The\r\nview of Socrates is the meeting-point of the other two, just as conceptualism\r\nis the meeting-point of nominalism and realism.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe can hardly say that Plato was aware of the truth, that \u0026ldquo;languages are\r\nnot made, but grow.\u0026rdquo; But still, when he says that \u0026ldquo;the legislator\r\nmade language with the dialectician standing on his right hand,\u0026rdquo; we need\r\nnot infer from this that he conceived words, like coins, to be issued from the\r\nmint of the State. The creator of laws and of social life is naturally regarded\r\nas the creator of language, according to Hellenic notions, and the philosopher\r\nis his natural advisor. We are not to suppose that the legislator is performing\r\nany extraordinary function; he is merely the Eponymus of the State, who\r\nprescribes rules for the dialectician and for all other artists. According to a\r\ntruly Platonic mode of approaching the subject, language, like virtue in the\r\nRepublic, is examined by the analogy of the arts. Words are works of art which\r\nmay be equally made in different materials, and are well made when they have a\r\nmeaning. Of the process which he thus describes, Plato had probably no very\r\ndefinite notion. But he means to express generally that language is the product\r\nof intelligence, and that languages belong to States and not to individuals.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA better conception of language could not have been formed in Plato\u0026rsquo;s\r\nage, than that which he attributes to Socrates. Yet many persons have thought\r\nthat the mind of Plato is more truly seen in the vague realism of Cratylus.\r\nThis misconception has probably arisen from two causes: first, the desire to\r\nbring Plato\u0026rsquo;s theory of language into accordance with the received\r\ndoctrine of the Platonic ideas; secondly, the impression created by Socrates\r\nhimself, that he is not in earnest, and is only indulging the fancy of the\r\nhour.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n1. We shall have occasion to show more at length, in the Introduction to future\r\ndialogues, that the so-called Platonic ideas are only a semi-mythical form, in\r\nwhich he attempts to realize abstractions, and that they are replaced in his\r\nlater writings by a rational theory of psychology. (See introductions to the\r\nMeno and the Sophist.) And in the Cratylus he gives a general account of the\r\nnature and origin of language, in which Adam Smith, Rousseau, and other writers\r\nof the last century, would have substantially agreed. At the end of the\r\ndialogue, he speaks as in the Symposium and Republic of absolute beauty and\r\ngood; but he never supposed that they were capable of being embodied in words.\r\nOf the names of the ideas, he would have said, as he says of the names of the\r\nGods, that we know nothing. Even the realism of Cratylus is not based upon the\r\nideas of Plato, but upon the flux of Heracleitus. Here, as in the Sophist and\r\nPoliticus, Plato expressly draws attention to the want of agreement in words\r\nand things. Hence we are led to infer, that the view of Socrates is not the\r\nless Plato\u0026rsquo;s own, because not based upon the ideas; 2nd, that\r\nPlato\u0026rsquo;s theory of language is not inconsistent with the rest of his\r\nphilosophy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n2. We do not deny that Socrates is partly in jest and partly in earnest. He is\r\ndiscoursing in a high-flown vein, which may be compared to the\r\n\u0026ldquo;dithyrambics of the Phaedrus.\u0026rdquo; They are mysteries of which he is\r\nspeaking, and he professes a kind of ludicrous fear of his imaginary wisdom.\r\nWhen he is arguing out of Homer, about the names of Hector\u0026rsquo;s son, or when\r\nhe describes himself as inspired or maddened by Euthyphro, with whom he has\r\nbeen sitting from the early dawn (compare Phaedrus and Lysias; Phaedr.) and\r\nexpresses his intention of yielding to the illusion to-day, and to-morrow he\r\nwill go to a priest and be purified, we easily see that his words are not to be\r\ntaken seriously. In this part of the dialogue his dread of committing impiety,\r\nthe pretended derivation of his wisdom from another, the extravagance of some\r\nof his etymologies, and, in general, the manner in which the fun, fast and\r\nfurious, \u003ci\u003evires acquirit eundo\u003c/i\u003e, remind us strongly of the Phaedrus. The\r\njest is a long one, extending over more than half the dialogue. But then, we\r\nremember that the Euthydemus is a still longer jest, in which the irony is\r\npreserved to the very end. There he is parodying the ingenious follies of early\r\nlogic; in the Cratylus he is ridiculing the fancies of a new school of sophists\r\nand grammarians. The fallacies of the Euthydemus are still retained at the end\r\nof our logic books; and the etymologies of the Cratylus have also found their\r\nway into later writers. Some of these are not much worse than the conjectures\r\nof Hemsterhuis, and other critics of the last century; but this does not prove\r\nthat they are serious. For Plato is in advance of his age in his conception of\r\nlanguage, as much as he is in his conception of mythology. (Compare Phaedrus.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen the fervour of his etymological enthusiasm has abated, Socrates ends, as\r\nhe has begun, with a rational explanation of language. Still he preserves his\r\n\u0026ldquo;know nothing\u0026rdquo; disguise, and himself declares his first notions\r\nabout names to be reckless and ridiculous. Having explained compound words by\r\nresolving them into their original elements, he now proceeds to analyse simple\r\nwords into the letters of which they are composed. The Socrates who\r\n\u0026ldquo;knows nothing,\u0026rdquo; here passes into the teacher, the dialectician,\r\nthe arranger of species. There is nothing in this part of the dialogue which is\r\neither weak or extravagant. Plato is a supporter of the Onomatopoetic theory of\r\nlanguage; that is to say, he supposes words to be formed by the imitation of\r\nideas in sounds; he also recognises the effect of time, the influence of\r\nforeign languages, the desire of euphony, to be formative principles; and he\r\nadmits a certain element of chance. But he gives no imitation in all this that\r\nhe is preparing the way for the construction of an ideal language. Or that he\r\nhas any Eleatic speculation to oppose to the Heracleiteanism of Cratylus.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe theory of language which is propounded in the Cratylus is in accordance\r\nwith the later phase of the philosophy of Plato, and would have been regarded\r\nby him as in the main true. The dialogue is also a satire on the philological\r\nfancies of the day. Socrates in pursuit of his vocation as a detector of false\r\nknowledge, lights by accident on the truth. He is guessing, he is dreaming; he\r\nhas heard, as he says in the Phaedrus, from another: no one is more surprised\r\nthan himself at his own discoveries. And yet some of his best remarks, as for\r\nexample his view of the derivation of Greek words from other languages, or of\r\nthe permutations of letters, or again, his observation that in speaking of the\r\nGods we are only speaking of our names of them, occur among these flights of\r\nhumour.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe can imagine a character having a profound insight into the nature of men and\r\nthings, and yet hardly dwelling upon them seriously; blending inextricably\r\nsense and nonsense; sometimes enveloping in a blaze of jests the most serious\r\nmatters, and then again allowing the truth to peer through; enjoying the flow\r\nof his own humour, and puzzling mankind by an ironical exaggeration of their\r\nabsurdities. Such were Aristophanes and Rabelais; such, in a different style,\r\nwere Sterne, Jean Paul, Hamann,\u0026mdash;writers who sometimes become\r\nunintelligible through the extravagance of their fancies. Such is the character\r\nwhich Plato intends to depict in some of his dialogues as the Silenus Socrates;\r\nand through this medium we have to receive our theory of language.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere remains a difficulty which seems to demand a more exact answer: In what\r\nrelation does the satirical or etymological portion of the dialogue stand to\r\nthe serious? Granting all that can be said about the provoking irony of\r\nSocrates, about the parody of Euthyphro, or Prodicus, or Antisthenes, how does\r\nthe long catalogue of etymologies furnish any answer to the question of\r\nHermogenes, which is evidently the main thesis of the dialogue: What is the\r\ntruth, or correctness, or principle of names?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAfter illustrating the nature of correctness by the analogy of the arts, and\r\nthen, as in the Republic, ironically appealing to the authority of the Homeric\r\npoems, Socrates shows that the truth or correctness of names can only be\r\nascertained by an appeal to etymology. The truth of names is to be found in the\r\nanalysis of their elements. But why does he admit etymologies which are absurd,\r\nbased on Heracleitean fancies, fourfold interpretations of words, impossible\r\nunions and separations of syllables and letters?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n1. The answer to this difficulty has been already anticipated in part: Socrates\r\nis not a dogmatic teacher, and therefore he puts on this wild and fanciful\r\ndisguise, in order that the truth may be permitted to appear: 2. as Benfey\r\nremarks, an erroneous example may illustrate a principle of language as well as\r\na true one: 3. many of these etymologies, as, for example, that of dikaion, are\r\nindicated, by the manner in which Socrates speaks of them, to have been current\r\nin his own age: 4. the philosophy of language had not made such progress as\r\nwould have justified Plato in propounding real derivations. Like his master\r\nSocrates, he saw through the hollowness of the incipient sciences of the day,\r\nand tries to move in a circle apart from them, laying down the conditions under\r\nwhich they are to be pursued, but, as in the Timaeus, cautious and tentative,\r\nwhen he is speaking of actual phenomena. To have made etymologies seriously,\r\nwould have seemed to him like the interpretation of the myths in the Phaedrus,\r\nthe task \u0026ldquo;of a not very fortunate individual, who had a great deal of\r\ntime on his hands.\u0026rdquo; The irony of Socrates places him above and beyond the\r\nerrors of his contemporaries.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe Cratylus is full of humour and satirical touches: the inspiration which\r\ncomes from Euthyphro, and his prancing steeds, the light admixture of\r\nquotations from Homer, and the spurious dialectic which is applied to them; the\r\njest about the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus, which is declared on the best\r\nauthority, viz. his own, to be a complete education in grammar and rhetoric;\r\nthe double explanation of the name Hermogenes, either as \u0026ldquo;not being in\r\nluck,\u0026rdquo; or \u0026ldquo;being no speaker;\u0026rdquo; the dearly-bought wisdom of\r\nCallias, the Lacedaemonian whose name was \u0026ldquo;Rush,\u0026rdquo; and, above all,\r\nthe pleasure which Socrates expresses in his own dangerous discoveries, which\r\n\u0026ldquo;to-morrow he will purge away,\u0026rdquo; are truly humorous. While\r\ndelivering a lecture on the philosophy of language, Socrates is also satirizing\r\nthe endless fertility of the human mind in spinning arguments out of nothing,\r\nand employing the most trifling and fanciful analogies in support of a theory.\r\nEtymology in ancient as in modern times was a favourite recreation; and\r\nSocrates makes merry at the expense of the etymologists. The simplicity of\r\nHermogenes, who is ready to believe anything that he is told, heightens the\r\neffect. Socrates in his genial and ironical mood hits right and left at his\r\nadversaries: Ouranos is so called apo tou oran ta ano, which, as some\r\nphilosophers say, is the way to have a pure mind; the sophists are by a\r\nfanciful explanation converted into heroes; \u0026ldquo;the givers of names were\r\nlike some philosophers who fancy that the earth goes round because their heads\r\nare always going round.\u0026rdquo; There is a great deal of \u0026ldquo;mischief\u0026rdquo;\r\nlurking in the following: \u0026ldquo;I found myself in greater perplexity about\r\njustice than I was before I began to learn;\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;The rho in katoptron\r\nmust be the addition of some one who cares nothing about truth, but thinks only\r\nof putting the mouth into shape;\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;Tales and falsehoods have\r\ngenerally to do with the Tragic and goatish life, and tragedy is the place of\r\nthem.\u0026rdquo; Several philosophers and sophists are mentioned by name: first,\r\nProtagoras and Euthydemus are assailed; then the interpreters of Homer, oi\r\npalaioi Omerikoi (compare Arist. Met.) and the Orphic poets are alluded to by\r\nthe way; then he discovers a hive of wisdom in the philosophy of\r\nHeracleitus;\u0026mdash;the doctrine of the flux is contained in the word ousia (=\r\nosia the pushing principle), an anticipation of Anaxagoras is found in psuche\r\nand selene. Again, he ridicules the arbitrary methods of pulling out and\r\nputting in letters which were in vogue among the philologers of his time; or\r\nslightly scoffs at contemporary religious beliefs. Lastly, he is impatient of\r\nhearing from the half-converted Cratylus the doctrine that falsehood can\r\nneither be spoken, nor uttered, nor addressed; a piece of sophistry attributed\r\nto Gorgias, which reappears in the Sophist. And he proceeds to demolish, with\r\nno less delight than he had set up, the Heracleitean theory of language.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the latter part of the dialogue Socrates becomes more serious, though he\r\ndoes not lay aside but rather aggravates his banter of the Heracleiteans, whom\r\nhere, as in the Theaetetus, he delights to ridicule. What was the origin of\r\nthis enmity we can hardly determine:\u0026mdash;was it due to the natural dislike\r\nwhich may be supposed to exist between the \u0026ldquo;patrons of the flux\u0026rdquo;\r\nand the \u0026ldquo;friends of the ideas\u0026rdquo; (Soph.)? or is it to be attributed\r\nto the indignation which Plato felt at having wasted his time upon\r\n\u0026ldquo;Cratylus and the doctrines of Heracleitus\u0026rdquo; in the days of his\r\nyouth? Socrates, touching on some of the characteristic difficulties of early\r\nGreek philosophy, endeavours to show Cratylus that imitation may be partial or\r\nimperfect, that a knowledge of things is higher than a knowledge of names, and\r\nthat there can be no knowledge if all things are in a state of transition. But\r\nCratylus, who does not easily apprehend the argument from common sense, remains\r\nunconvinced, and on the whole inclines to his former opinion. Some profound\r\nphilosophical remarks are scattered up and down, admitting of an application\r\nnot only to language but to knowledge generally; such as the assertion that\r\n\u0026ldquo;consistency is no test of truth:\u0026rdquo; or again, \u0026ldquo;If we are\r\nover-precise about words, truth will say \u0026lsquo;too late\u0026rsquo; to us as to the\r\nbelated traveller in Aegina.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe place of the dialogue in the series cannot be determined with certainty.\r\nThe style and subject, and the treatment of the character of Socrates, have a\r\nclose resemblance to the earlier dialogues, especially to the Phaedrus and\r\nEuthydemus. The manner in which the ideas are spoken of at the end of the\r\ndialogue, also indicates a comparatively early date. The imaginative element is\r\nstill in full vigour; the Socrates of the Cratylus is the Socrates of the\r\nApology and Symposium, not yet Platonized; and he describes, as in the\r\nTheaetetus, the philosophy of Heracleitus by \u0026ldquo;unsavoury\u0026rdquo;\r\nsimiles\u0026mdash;he cannot believe that the world is like \u0026ldquo;a leaky\r\nvessel,\u0026rdquo; or \u0026ldquo;a man who has a running at the nose\u0026rdquo;; he\r\nattributes the flux of the world to the swimming in some folks\u0026rsquo; heads. On\r\nthe other hand, the relation of thought to language is omitted here, but is\r\ntreated of in the Sophist. These grounds are not sufficient to enable us to\r\narrive at a precise conclusion. But we shall not be far wrong in placing the\r\nCratylus about the middle, or at any rate in the first half, of the series.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCratylus, the Heracleitean philosopher, and Hermogenes, the brother of Callias,\r\nhave been arguing about names; the former maintaining that they are natural,\r\nthe latter that they are conventional. Cratylus affirms that his own is a true\r\nname, but will not allow that the name of Hermogenes is equally true.\r\nHermogenes asks Socrates to explain to him what Cratylus means; or, far rather,\r\nhe would like to know, What Socrates himself thinks about the truth or\r\ncorrectness of names? Socrates replies, that hard is knowledge, and the nature\r\nof names is a considerable part of knowledge: he has never been to hear the\r\nfifty-drachma course of Prodicus; and having only attended the single-drachma\r\ncourse, he is not competent to give an opinion on such matters. When Cratylus\r\ndenies that Hermogenes is a true name, he supposes him to mean that he is not a\r\ntrue son of Hermes, because he is never in luck. But he would like to have an\r\nopen council and to hear both sides.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHermogenes is of opinion that there is no principle in names; they may be\r\nchanged, as we change the names of slaves, whenever we please, and the altered\r\nname is as good as the original one.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nYou mean to say, for instance, rejoins Socrates, that if I agree to call a man\r\na horse, then a man will be rightly called a horse by me, and a man by the rest\r\nof the world? But, surely, there is in words a true and a false, as there are\r\ntrue and false propositions. If a whole proposition be true or false, then the\r\nparts of a proposition may be true or false, and the least parts as well as the\r\ngreatest; and the least parts are names, and therefore names may be true or\r\nfalse. Would Hermogenes maintain that anybody may give a name to anything, and\r\nas many names as he pleases; and would all these names be always true at the\r\ntime of giving them? Hermogenes replies that this is the only way in which he\r\ncan conceive that names are correct; and he appeals to the practice of\r\ndifferent nations, and of the different Hellenic tribes, in confirmation of his\r\nview. Socrates asks, whether the things differ as the words which represent\r\nthem differ:\u0026mdash;Are we to maintain with Protagoras, that what appears is?\r\nHermogenes has always been puzzled about this, but acknowledges, when he is\r\npressed by Socrates, that there are a few very good men in the world, and a\r\ngreat many very bad; and the very good are the wise, and the very bad are the\r\nfoolish; and this is not mere appearance but reality. Nor is he disposed to say\r\nwith Euthydemus, that all things equally and always belong to all men; in that\r\ncase, again, there would be no distinction between bad and good men. But then,\r\nthe only remaining possibility is, that all things have their several distinct\r\nnatures, and are independent of our notions about them. And not only things,\r\nbut actions, have distinct natures, and are done by different processes. There\r\nis a natural way of cutting or burning, and a natural instrument with which men\r\ncut or burn, and any other way will fail;\u0026mdash;this is true of all actions.\r\nAnd speaking is a kind of action, and naming is a kind of speaking, and we must\r\nname according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument. We cut with\r\na knife, we pierce with an awl, we weave with a shuttle, we name with a name.\r\nAnd as a shuttle separates the warp from the woof, so a name distinguishes the\r\nnatures of things. The weaver will use the shuttle well,\u0026mdash;that is, like a\r\nweaver; and the teacher will use the name well,\u0026mdash;that is, like a teacher.\r\nThe shuttle will be made by the carpenter; the awl by the smith or skilled\r\nperson. But who makes a name? Does not the law give names, and does not the\r\nteacher receive them from the legislator? He is the skilled person who makes\r\nthem, and of all skilled workmen he is the rarest. But how does the carpenter\r\nmake or repair the shuttle, and to what will he look? Will he not look at the\r\nideal which he has in his mind? And as the different kinds of work differ, so\r\nought the instruments which make them to differ. The several kinds of shuttles\r\nought to answer in material and form to the several kinds of webs. And the\r\nlegislator ought to know the different materials and forms of which names are\r\nmade in Hellas and other countries. But who is to be the judge of the proper\r\nform? The judge of shuttles is the weaver who uses them; the judge of lyres is\r\nthe player of the lyre; the judge of ships is the pilot. And will not the judge\r\nwho is able to direct the legislator in his work of naming, be he who knows how\r\nto use the names\u0026mdash;he who can ask and answer questions\u0026mdash;in short, the\r\ndialectician? The pilot directs the carpenter how to make the rudder, and the\r\ndialectician directs the legislator how he is to impose names; for to express\r\nthe ideal forms of things in syllables and letters is not the easy task,\r\nHermogenes, which you imagine.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;I should be more readily persuaded, if you would show me this natural\r\ncorrectness of names.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIndeed I cannot; but I see that you have advanced; for you now admit that there\r\nis a correctness of names, and that not every one can give a name. But what is\r\nthe nature of this correctness or truth, you must learn from the Sophists, of\r\nwhom your brother Callias has bought his reputation for wisdom rather dearly;\r\nand since they require to be paid, you, having no money, had better learn from\r\nhim at second-hand. \u0026ldquo;Well, but I have just given up Protagoras, and I\r\nshould be inconsistent in going to learn of him.\u0026rdquo; Then if you reject him\r\nyou may learn of the poets, and in particular of Homer, who distinguishes the\r\nnames given by Gods and men to the same things, as in the verse about the river\r\nGod who fought with Hephaestus, \u0026ldquo;whom the Gods call Xanthus, and men call\r\nScamander;\u0026rdquo; or in the lines in which he mentions the bird which the Gods\r\ncall \u0026ldquo;Chalcis,\u0026rdquo; and men \u0026ldquo;Cymindis;\u0026rdquo; or the hill which\r\nmen call \u0026ldquo;Batieia,\u0026rdquo; and the Gods \u0026ldquo;Myrinna\u0026rsquo;s\r\nTomb.\u0026rdquo; Here is an important lesson; for the Gods must of course be right\r\nin their use of names. And this is not the only truth about philology which may\r\nbe learnt from Homer. Does he not say that Hector\u0026rsquo;s son had two\r\nnames\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Hector called him Scamandrius, but the others Astyanax\u0026rdquo;?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow, if the men called him Astyanax, is it not probable that the other name was\r\nconferred by the women? And which are more likely to be right\u0026mdash;the wiser\r\nor the less wise, the men or the women? Homer evidently agreed with the men:\r\nand of the name given by them he offers an explanation;\u0026mdash;the boy was\r\ncalled Astyanax (\u0026ldquo;king of the city\u0026rdquo;), because his father saved the\r\ncity. The names Astyanax and Hector, moreover, are really the same,\u0026mdash;the\r\none means a king, and the other is \u0026ldquo;a holder or possessor.\u0026rdquo; For as\r\nthe lion\u0026rsquo;s whelp may be called a lion, or the horse\u0026rsquo;s foal a foal,\r\nso the son of a king may be called a king. But if the horse had produced a\r\ncalf, then that would be called a calf. Whether the syllables of a name are the\r\nsame or not makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained. For example;\r\nthe names of letters, whether vowels or consonants, do not correspond to their\r\nsounds, with the exception of epsilon, upsilon, omicron, omega. The name Beta\r\nhas three letters added to the sound\u0026mdash;and yet this does not alter the\r\nsense of the word, or prevent the whole name having the value which the\r\nlegislator intended. And the same may be said of a king and the son of a king,\r\nwho like other animals resemble each other in the course of nature; the words\r\nby which they are signified may be disguised, and yet amid differences of sound\r\nthe etymologist may recognise the same notion, just as the physician recognises\r\nthe power of the same drugs under different disguises of colour and smell.\r\nHector and Astyanax have only one letter alike, but they have the same meaning;\r\nand Agis (leader) is altogether different in sound from Polemarchus (chief in\r\nwar), or Eupolemus (good warrior); but the two words present the same idea of\r\nleader or general, like the words Iatrocles and Acesimbrotus, which equally\r\ndenote a physician. The son succeeds the father as the foal succeeds the horse,\r\nbut when, out of the course of nature, a prodigy occurs, and the offspring no\r\nlonger resembles the parent, then the names no longer agree. This may be\r\nillustrated by the case of Agamemnon and his son Orestes, of whom the former\r\nhas a name significant of his patience at the siege of Troy; while the name of\r\nthe latter indicates his savage, man-of-the-mountain nature. Atreus again, for\r\nhis murder of Chrysippus, and his cruelty to Thyestes, is rightly named Atreus,\r\nwhich, to the eye of the etymologist, is ateros (destructive), ateires\r\n(stubborn), atreotos (fearless); and Pelops is o ta pelas oron (he who sees\r\nwhat is near only), because in his eagerness to win Hippodamia, he was\r\nunconscious of the remoter consequences which the murder of Myrtilus would\r\nentail upon his race. The name Tantalus, if slightly changed, offers two\r\netymologies; either apo tes tou lithou talanteias, or apo tou talantaton einai,\r\nsignifying at once the hanging of the stone over his head in the world below,\r\nand the misery which he brought upon his country. And the name of his father,\r\nZeus, Dios, Zenos, has an excellent meaning, though hard to be understood,\r\nbecause really a sentence which is divided into two parts (Zeus, Dios). For he,\r\nbeing the lord and king of all, is the author of our being, and in him all\r\nlive: this is implied in the double form, Dios, Zenos, which being put together\r\nand interpreted is di on ze panta. There may, at first sight, appear to be some\r\nirreverence in calling him the son of Cronos, who is a proverb for stupidity;\r\nbut the meaning is that Zeus himself is the son of a mighty intellect; Kronos,\r\nquasi koros, not in the sense of a youth, but quasi to katharon kai akeraton\r\ntou nou\u0026mdash;the pure and garnished mind, which in turn is begotten of Uranus,\r\nwho is so called apo tou oran ta ano, from looking upwards; which, as\r\nphilosophers say, is the way to have a pure mind. The earlier portion of\r\nHesiod\u0026rsquo;s genealogy has escaped my memory, or I would try more conclusions\r\nof the same sort. \u0026ldquo;You talk like an oracle.\u0026rdquo; I caught the infection\r\nfrom Euthyphro, who gave me a long lecture which began at dawn, and has not\r\nonly entered into my ears, but filled my soul, and my intention is to yield to\r\nthe inspiration to-day; and to-morrow I will be exorcised by some priest or\r\nsophist. \u0026ldquo;Go on; I am anxious to hear the rest.\u0026rdquo; Now that we have a\r\ngeneral notion, how shall we proceed? What names will afford the most crucial\r\ntest of natural fitness? Those of heroes and ordinary men are often deceptive,\r\nbecause they are patronymics or expressions of a wish; let us try gods and\r\ndemi-gods. Gods are so called, apo tou thein, from the verb \u0026ldquo;to\r\nrun;\u0026rdquo; because the sun, moon, and stars run about the heaven; and they\r\nbeing the original gods of the Hellenes, as they still are of the Barbarians,\r\ntheir name is given to all Gods. The demons are the golden race of Hesiod, and\r\nby golden he means not literally golden, but good; and they are called demons,\r\nquasi daemones, which in old Attic was used for daimones\u0026mdash;good men are\r\nwell said to become daimones when they die, because they are knowing. Eros\r\n(with an epsilon) is the same word as eros (with an eta): \u0026ldquo;the sons of\r\nGod saw the daughters of men that they were fair;\u0026rdquo; or perhaps they were a\r\nspecies of sophists or rhetoricians, and so called apo tou erotan, or eirein,\r\nfrom their habit of spinning questions; for eirein is equivalent to legein. I\r\nget all this from Euthyphro; and now a new and ingenious idea comes into my\r\nmind, and, if I am not careful, I shall be wiser than I ought to be by\r\nto-morrow\u0026rsquo;s dawn. My idea is, that we may put in and pull out letters at\r\npleasure and alter the accents (as, for example, Dii philos may be turned into\r\nDiphilos), and we may make words into sentences and sentences into words. The\r\nname anthrotos is a case in point, for a letter has been omitted and the accent\r\nchanged; the original meaning being o anathron a opopen\u0026mdash;he who looks up\r\nat what he sees. Psuche may be thought to be the reviving, or refreshing, or\r\nanimating principle\u0026mdash;e anapsuchousa to soma; but I am afraid that\r\nEuthyphro and his disciples will scorn this derivation, and I must find\r\nanother: shall we identify the soul with the \u0026ldquo;ordering mind\u0026rdquo; of\r\nAnaxagoras, and say that psuche, quasi phuseche = e phusin echei or\r\nochei?\u0026mdash;this might easily be refined into psyche. \u0026ldquo;That is a more\r\nartistic etymology.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAfter psuche follows soma; this, by a slight permutation, may be either = (1)\r\nthe \u0026ldquo;grave\u0026rdquo; of the soul, or (2) may mean \u0026ldquo;that by which the\r\nsoul signifies (semainei) her wishes.\u0026rdquo; But more probably, the word is\r\nOrphic, and simply denotes that the body is the place of ward in which the soul\r\nsuffers the penalty of sin,\u0026mdash;en o sozetai. \u0026ldquo;I should like to hear\r\nsome more explanations of the names of the Gods, like that excellent one of\r\nZeus.\u0026rdquo; The truest names of the Gods are those which they give themselves;\r\nbut these are unknown to us. Less true are those by which we propitiate them,\r\nas men say in prayers, \u0026ldquo;May he graciously receive any name by which I\r\ncall him.\u0026rdquo; And to avoid offence, I should like to let them know\r\nbeforehand that we are not presuming to enquire about them, but only about the\r\nnames which they usually bear. Let us begin with Hestia. What did he mean who\r\ngave the name Hestia? \u0026ldquo;That is a very difficult question.\u0026rdquo; O, my\r\ndear Hermogenes, I believe that there was a power of philosophy and talk among\r\nthe first inventors of names, both in our own and in other languages; for even\r\nin foreign words a principle is discernible. Hestia is the same with esia,\r\nwhich is an old form of ousia, and means the first principle of things: this\r\nagrees with the fact that to Hestia the first sacrifices are offered. There is\r\nalso another reading\u0026mdash;osia, which implies that \u0026ldquo;pushing\u0026rdquo;\r\n(othoun) is the first principle of all things. And here I seem to discover a\r\ndelicate allusion to the flux of Heracleitus\u0026mdash;that antediluvian\r\nphilosopher who cannot walk twice in the same stream; and this flux of his may\r\naccomplish yet greater marvels. For the names Cronos and Rhea cannot have been\r\naccidental; the giver of them must have known something about the doctrine of\r\nHeracleitus. Moreover, there is a remarkable coincidence in the words of\r\nHesiod, when he speaks of Oceanus, \u0026ldquo;the origin of Gods;\u0026rdquo; and in the\r\nverse of Orpheus, in which he describes Oceanus espousing his sister Tethys.\r\nTethys is nothing more than the name of a spring\u0026mdash;to diattomenon kai\r\nethoumenon. Poseidon is posidesmos, the chain of the feet, because you cannot\r\nwalk on the sea\u0026mdash;the epsilon is inserted by way of ornament; or perhaps\r\nthe name may have been originally polleidon, meaning, that the God knew many\r\nthings (polla eidos): he may also be the shaker, apo tou seiein,\u0026mdash;in this\r\ncase, pi and delta have been added. Pluto is connected with ploutos, because\r\nwealth comes out of the earth; or the word may be a euphemism for Hades, which\r\nis usually derived apo tou aeidous, because the God is concerned with the\r\ninvisible. But the name Hades was really given him from his knowing (eidenai)\r\nall good things. Men in general are foolishly afraid of him, and talk with\r\nhorror of the world below from which no one may return. The reason why his\r\nsubjects never wish to come back, even if they could, is that the God enchains\r\nthem by the strongest of spells, namely by the desire of virtue, which they\r\nhope to obtain by constant association with him. He is the perfect and\r\naccomplished Sophist and the great benefactor of the other world; for he has\r\nmuch more than he wants there, and hence he is called Pluto or the rich. He\r\nwill have nothing to do with the souls of men while in the body, because he\r\ncannot work his will with them so long as they are confused and entangled by\r\nfleshly lusts. Demeter is the mother and giver of food\u0026mdash;e didousa meter\r\ntes edodes. Here is erate tis, or perhaps the legislator may have been thinking\r\nof the weather, and has merely transposed the letters of the word aer.\r\nPherephatta, that word of awe, is pheretapha, which is only an euphonious\r\ncontraction of e tou pheromenou ephaptomene,\u0026mdash;all things are in motion,\r\nand she in her wisdom moves with them, and the wise God Hades consorts with\r\nher\u0026mdash;there is nothing very terrible in this, any more than in the her\r\nother appellation Persephone, which is also significant of her wisdom (sophe).\r\nApollo is another name, which is supposed to have some dreadful meaning, but is\r\nsusceptible of at least four perfectly innocent explanations. First, he is the\r\npurifier or purger or absolver (apolouon); secondly, he is the true diviner,\r\nAplos, as he is called in the Thessalian dialect (aplos = aplous, sincere);\r\nthirdly, he is the archer (aei ballon), always shooting; or again, supposing\r\nalpha to mean ama or omou, Apollo becomes equivalent to ama polon, which points\r\nto both his musical and his heavenly attributes; for there is a \u0026ldquo;moving\r\ntogether\u0026rdquo; alike in music and in the harmony of the spheres. The second\r\nlambda is inserted in order to avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction. The\r\nMuses are so called\u0026mdash;apo tou mosthai. The gentle Leto or Letho is named\r\nfrom her willingness (ethelemon), or because she is ready to forgive and forget\r\n(lethe). Artemis is so called from her healthy well-balanced nature, dia to\r\nartemes, or as aretes istor; or as a lover of virginity, aroton misesasa. One\r\nof these explanations is probably true,\u0026mdash;perhaps all of them. Dionysus is\r\no didous ton oinon, and oinos is quasi oionous because wine makes those think\r\n(oiesthai) that they have a mind (nous) who have none. The established\r\nderivation of Aphrodite dia ten tou athrou genesin may be accepted on the\r\nauthority of Hesiod. Again, there is the name of Pallas, or Athene, which we,\r\nwho are Athenians, must not forget. Pallas is derived from armed\r\ndances\u0026mdash;apo tou pallein ta opla. For Athene we must turn to the\r\nallegorical interpreters of Homer, who make the name equivalent to theonoe, or\r\npossibly the word was originally ethonoe and signified moral intelligence (en\r\nethei noesis). Hephaestus, again, is the lord of light\u0026mdash;o tou phaeos\r\nistor. This is a good notion; and, to prevent any other getting into our heads,\r\nlet us go on to Ares. He is the manly one (arren), or the unchangeable one\r\n(arratos). Enough of the Gods; for, by the Gods, I am afraid of them; but if\r\nyou suggest other words, you will see how the horses of Euthyphro prance.\r\n\u0026ldquo;Only one more God; tell me about my godfather Hermes.\u0026rdquo; He is\r\nermeneus, the messenger or cheater or thief or bargainer; or o eirein momenos,\r\nthat is, eiremes or ermes\u0026mdash;the speaker or contriver of speeches.\r\n\u0026ldquo;Well said Cratylus, then, that I am no son of Hermes.\u0026rdquo; Pan, as the\r\nson of Hermes, is speech or the brother of speech, and is called Pan because\r\nspeech indicates everything\u0026mdash;o pan menuon. He has two forms, a true and a\r\nfalse; and is in the upper part smooth, and in the lower part shaggy. He is the\r\ngoat of Tragedy, in which there are plenty of falsehoods.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Will you go on to the elements\u0026mdash;sun, moon, stars, earth, aether,\r\nair, fire, water, seasons, years?\u0026rdquo; Very good: and which shall I take\r\nfirst? Let us begin with elios, or the sun. The Doric form elios helps us to\r\nsee that he is so called because at his rising he gathers (alizei) men\r\ntogether, or because he rolls about (eilei) the earth, or because he variegates\r\n(aiolei = poikillei) the earth. Selene is an anticipation of Anaxagoras, being\r\na contraction of selaenoneoaeia, the light (selas) which is ever old and new,\r\nand which, as Anaxagoras says, is borrowed from the sun; the name was\r\nharmonized into selanaia, a form which is still in use. \u0026ldquo;That is a true\r\ndithyrambic name.\u0026rdquo; Meis is so called apo tou meiousthai, from suffering\r\ndiminution, and astron is from astrape (lightning), which is an improvement of\r\nanastrope, that which turns the eyes inside out. \u0026ldquo;How do you explain pur\r\nn udor?\u0026rdquo; I suspect that pur, which, like udor n kuon, is found in\r\nPhrygian, is a foreign word; for the Hellenes have borrowed much from the\r\nbarbarians, and I always resort to this theory of a foreign origin when I am at\r\na loss. Aer may be explained, oti airei ta apo tes ges; or, oti aei rei; or,\r\noti pneuma ex autou ginetai (compare the poetic word aetai). So aither quasi\r\naeitheer oti aei thei peri ton aera: ge, gaia quasi genneteira (compare the\r\nHomeric form gegaasi); ora (with an omega), or, according to the old Attic form\r\nora (with an omicron), is derived apo tou orizein, because it divides the year;\r\neniautos and etos are the same thought\u0026mdash;o en eauto etazon, cut into two\r\nparts, en eauto and etazon, like di on ze into Dios and Zenos.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;You make surprising progress.\u0026rdquo; True; I am run away with, and am\r\nnot even yet at my utmost speed. \u0026ldquo;I should like very much to hear your\r\naccount of the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in those\r\ncharming words, wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest?\u0026rdquo; To explain\r\nall that will be a serious business; still, as I have put on the lion\u0026rsquo;s\r\nskin, appearances must be maintained. My opinion is, that primitive men were\r\nlike some modern philosophers, who, by always going round in their search after\r\nthe nature of things, become dizzy; and this phenomenon, which was really in\r\nthemselves, they imagined to take place in the external world. You have no\r\ndoubt remarked, that the doctrine of the universal flux, or generation of\r\nthings, is indicated in names. \u0026ldquo;No, I never did.\u0026rdquo; Phronesis is only\r\nphoras kai rou noesis, or perhaps phoras onesis, and in any case is connected\r\nwith pheresthai; gnome is gones skepsis kai nomesis; noesis is neou or\r\ngignomenon esis; the word neos implies that creation is always going\r\non\u0026mdash;the original form was neoesis; sophrosune is soteria phroneseos;\r\nepisteme is e epomene tois pragmasin\u0026mdash;the faculty which keeps close,\r\nneither anticipating nor lagging behind; sunesis is equivalent to sunienai,\r\nsumporeuesthai ten psuche, and is a kind of conclusion\u0026mdash;sullogismos tis,\r\nakin therefore in idea to episteme; sophia is very difficult, and has a foreign\r\nlook\u0026mdash;the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things, and may be\r\nillustrated by the poetical esuthe and the Lacedaemonian proper name Sous, or\r\nRush; agathon is ro agaston en te tachuteti,\u0026mdash;for all things are in\r\nmotion, and some are swifter than others: dikaiosune is clearly e tou dikaiou\r\nsunesis. The word dikaion is more troublesome, and appears to mean the subtle\r\npenetrating power which, as the lovers of motion say, preserves all things, and\r\nis the cause of all things, quasi diaion going through\u0026mdash;the letter kappa\r\nbeing inserted for the sake of euphony. This is a great mystery which has been\r\nconfided to me; but when I ask for an explanation I am thought obtrusive, and\r\nanother derivation is proposed to me. Justice is said to be o kaion, or the\r\nsun; and when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion, I am answered,\r\n\u0026ldquo;What, is there no justice when the sun is down?\u0026rdquo; And when I\r\nentreat my questioner to tell me his own opinion, he replies, that justice is\r\nfire in the abstract, or heat in the abstract; which is not very intelligible.\r\nOthers laugh at such notions, and say with Anaxagoras, that justice is the\r\nordering mind. \u0026ldquo;I think that some one must have told you this.\u0026rdquo; And\r\nnot the rest? Let me proceed then, in the hope of proving to you my\r\noriginality. Andreia is quasi anpeia quasi e ano roe, the stream which flows\r\nupwards, and is opposed to injustice, which clearly hinders the principle of\r\npenetration; arren and aner have a similar derivation; gune is the same as\r\ngone; thelu is derived apo tes theles, because the teat makes things flourish\r\n(tethelenai), and the word thallein itself implies increase of youth, which is\r\nswift and sudden ever (thein and allesthai). I am getting over the ground fast:\r\nbut much has still to be explained. There is techne, for instance. This, by an\r\naphaeresis of tau and an epenthesis of omicron in two places, may be identified\r\nwith echonoe, and signifies \u0026ldquo;that which has mind.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;A very poor etymology.\u0026rdquo; Yes; but you must remember that all\r\nlanguage is in process of change; letters are taken in and put out for the sake\r\nof euphony, and time is also a great alterer of words. For example, what\r\nbusiness has the letter rho in the word katoptron, or the letter sigma in the\r\nword sphigx? The additions are often such that it is impossible to make out the\r\noriginal word; and yet, if you may put in and pull out, as you like, any name\r\nis equally good for any object. The fact is, that great dictators of literature\r\nlike yourself should observe the rules of moderation. \u0026ldquo;I will do my\r\nbest.\u0026rdquo; But do not be too much of a precisian, or you will paralyze me. If\r\nyou will let me add mechane, apo tou mekous, which means polu, and anein, I\r\nshall be at the summit of my powers, from which elevation I will examine the\r\ntwo words kakia and arete. The first is easily explained in accordance with\r\nwhat has preceded; for all things being in a flux, kakia is to kakos ion. This\r\nderivation is illustrated by the word deilia, which ought to have come after\r\nandreia, and may be regarded as o lian desmos tes psuches, just as aporia\r\nsignifies an impediment to motion (from alpha not, and poreuesthai to go), and\r\narete is euporia, which is the opposite of this\u0026mdash;the everflowing (aei\r\nreousa or aeireite), or the eligible, quasi airete. You will think that I am\r\ninventing, but I say that if kakia is right, then arete is also right. But what\r\nis kakon? That is a very obscure word, to which I can only apply my old notion\r\nand declare that kakon is a foreign word. Next, let us proceed to kalon,\r\naischron. The latter is doubtless contracted from aeischoroun, quasi aei ischon\r\nroun. The inventor of words being a patron of the flux, was a great enemy to\r\nstagnation. Kalon is to kaloun ta pragmata\u0026mdash;this is mind (nous or\r\ndianoia); which is also the principle of beauty; and which doing the works of\r\nbeauty, is therefore rightly called the beautiful. The meaning of sumpheron is\r\nexplained by previous examples;\u0026mdash;like episteme, signifying that the soul\r\nmoves in harmony with the world (sumphora, sumpheronta). Kerdos is to pasi\r\nkerannumenon\u0026mdash;that which mingles with all things: lusiteloun is equivalent\r\nto to tes phoras luon to telos, and is not to be taken in the vulgar sense of\r\ngainful, but rather in that of swift, being the principle which makes motion\r\nimmortal and unceasing; ophelimon is apo tou ophellein\u0026mdash;that which gives\r\nincrease: this word, which is Homeric, is of foreign origin. Blaberon is to\r\nblamton or boulomenon aptein tou rou\u0026mdash;that which injures or seeks to bind\r\nthe stream. The proper word would be boulapteroun, but this is too much of a\r\nmouthful\u0026mdash;like a prelude on the flute in honour of Athene. The word\r\nzemiodes is difficult; great changes, as I was saying, have been made in words,\r\nand even a small change will alter their meaning very much. The word deon is\r\none of these disguised words. You know that according to the old pronunciation,\r\nwhich is especially affected by the women, who are great conservatives, iota\r\nand delta were used where we should now use eta and zeta: for example, what we\r\nnow call emera was formerly called imera; and this shows the meaning of the\r\nword to have been \u0026ldquo;the desired one coming after night,\u0026rdquo; and not, as\r\nis often supposed, \u0026ldquo;that which makes things gentle\u0026rdquo; (emera). So\r\nagain, zugon is duogon, quasi desis duein eis agogen\u0026mdash;(the binding of two\r\ntogether for the purpose of drawing.) Deon, as ordinarily written, has an evil\r\nsense, signifying the chain (desmos) or hindrance of motion; but in its ancient\r\nform dion is expressive of good, quasi diion, that which penetrates or goes\r\nthrough all. Zemiodes is really demiodes, and means that which binds motion\r\n(dounti to ion): edone is e pros ten onrsin teinousa praxis\u0026mdash;the delta is\r\nan insertion: lupe is derived apo tes dialuseos tou somatos: ania is from alpha\r\nand ienai, to go: algedon is a foreign word, and is so called apo tou algeinou:\r\nodune is apo tes enduseos tes lupes: achthedon is in its very sound a burden:\r\nchapa expresses the flow of soul: terpsis is apo tou terpnou, and terpnon is\r\nproperly erpnon, because the sensation of pleasure is likened to a breath\r\n(pnoe) which creeps (erpei) through the soul: euphrosune is named from\r\npheresthai, because the soul moves in harmony with nature: epithumia is e epi\r\nton thumon iousa dunamis: thumos is apo tes thuseos tes psuches:\r\nimeros\u0026mdash;oti eimenos pei e psuche: pothos, the desire which is in another\r\nplace, allothi pou: eros was anciently esros, and so called because it flows\r\ninto (esrei) the soul from without: doxa is e dioxis tou eidenai, or expresses\r\nthe shooting from a bow (toxon). The latter etymology is confirmed by the words\r\nboulesthai, boule, aboulia, which all have to do with shooting (bole): and\r\nsimilarly oiesis is nothing but the movement (oisis) of the soul towards\r\nessence. Ekousion is to eikon\u0026mdash;the yielding\u0026mdash;anagke is e an agke\r\niousa, the passage through ravines which impede motion: aletheia is theia ale,\r\ndivine motion. Pseudos is the opposite of this, implying the principle of\r\nconstraint and forced repose, which is expressed under the figure of sleep, to\r\neudon; the psi is an addition. Onoma, a name, affirms the real existence of\r\nthat which is sought after\u0026mdash;on ou masma estin. On and ousia are only ion\r\nwith an iota broken off; and ouk on is ouk ion. \u0026ldquo;And what are ion, reon,\r\ndoun?\u0026rdquo; One way of explaining them has been already suggested\u0026mdash;they\r\nmay be of foreign origin; and possibly this is the true answer. But mere\r\nantiquity may often prevent our recognizing words, after all the complications\r\nwhich they have undergone; and we must remember that however far we carry back\r\nour analysis some ultimate elements or roots will remain which can be no\r\nfurther analyzed. For example; the word agathos was supposed by us to be a\r\ncompound of agastos and thoos, and probably thoos may be further resolvable.\r\nBut if we take a word of which no further resolution seems attainable, we may\r\nfairly conclude that we have reached one of these original elements, and the\r\ntruth of such a word must be tested by some new method. Will you help me in the\r\nsearch?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll names, whether primary or secondary, are intended to show the nature of\r\nthings; and the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance from the\r\nprimary. But then, how do the primary names indicate anything? And let me ask\r\nanother question,\u0026mdash;If we had no faculty of speech, how should we\r\ncommunicate with one another? Should we not use signs, like the deaf and dumb?\r\nThe elevation of our hands would mean lightness\u0026mdash;heaviness would be\r\nexpressed by letting them drop. The running of any animal would be described by\r\na similar movement of our own frames. The body can only express anything by\r\nimitation; and the tongue or mouth can imitate as well as the rest of the body.\r\nBut this imitation of the tongue or voice is not yet a name, because people may\r\nimitate sheep or goats without naming them. What, then, is a name? In the first\r\nplace, a name is not a musical, or, secondly, a pictorial imitation, but an\r\nimitation of that kind which expresses the nature of a thing; and is the\r\ninvention not of a musician, or of a painter, but of a namer.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd now, I think that we may consider the names about which you were asking.\r\nThe way to analyze them will be by going back to the letters, or primary\r\nelements of which they are composed. First, we separate the alphabet into\r\nclasses of letters, distinguishing the consonants, mutes, vowels, and\r\nsemivowels; and when we have learnt them singly, we shall learn to know them in\r\ntheir various combinations of two or more letters; just as the painter knows\r\nhow to use either a single colour, or a combination of colours. And like the\r\npainter, we may apply letters to the expression of objects, and form them into\r\nsyllables; and these again into words, until the picture or figure\u0026mdash;that\r\nis, language\u0026mdash;is completed. Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves,\r\nbut I mean to say that this was the way in which the ancients framed language.\r\nAnd this leads me to consider whether the primary as well as the secondary\r\nelements are rightly given. I may remark, as I was saying about the Gods, that\r\nwe can only attain to conjecture of them. But still we insist that ours is the\r\ntrue and only method of discovery; otherwise we must have recourse, like the\r\ntragic poets, to a Deus ex machina, and say that God gave the first names, and\r\ntherefore they are right; or that the barbarians are older than we are, and\r\nthat we learnt of them; or that antiquity has cast a veil over the truth. Yet\r\nall these are not reasons; they are only ingenious excuses for having no\r\nreasons.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI will freely impart to you my own notions, though they are somewhat\r\ncrude:\u0026mdash;the letter rho appears to me to be the general instrument which\r\nthe legislator has employed to express all motion or kinesis. (I ought to\r\nexplain that kinesis is just iesis (going), for the letter eta was unknown to\r\nthe ancients; and the root, kiein, is a foreign form of ienai: of kinesis or\r\neisis, the opposite is stasis). This use of rho is evident in the words\r\ntremble, break, crush, crumble, and the like; the imposer of names perceived\r\nthat the tongue is most agitated in the pronunciation of this letter, just as\r\nhe used iota to express the subtle power which penetrates through all things.\r\nThe letters phi, psi, sigma, zeta, which require a great deal of wind, are\r\nemployed in the imitation of such notions as shivering, seething, shaking, and\r\nin general of what is windy. The letters delta and tau convey the idea of\r\nbinding and rest in a place: the lambda denotes smoothness, as in the words\r\nslip, sleek, sleep, and the like. But when the slipping tongue is detained by\r\nthe heavier sound of gamma, then arises the notion of a glutinous clammy\r\nnature: nu is sounded from within, and has a notion of inwardness: alpha is the\r\nexpression of size; eta of length; omicron of roundness, and therefore there is\r\nplenty of omicron in the word goggulon. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the\r\ncorrectness of names; and I should like to hear what Cratylus would say.\r\n\u0026ldquo;But, Socrates, as I was telling you, Cratylus mystifies me; I should\r\nlike to ask him, in your presence, what he means by the fitness of\r\nnames?\u0026rdquo; To this appeal, Cratylus replies \u0026ldquo;that he cannot explain so\r\nimportant a subject all in a moment.\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;No, but you may \u0026lsquo;add\r\nlittle to little,\u0026rsquo; as Hesiod says.\u0026rdquo; Socrates here interposes his\r\nown request, that Cratylus will give some account of his theory. Hermogenes and\r\nhimself are mere sciolists, but Cratylus has reflected on these matters, and\r\nhas had teachers. Cratylus replies in the words of Achilles:\r\n\u0026ldquo;\u0026lsquo;Illustrious Ajax, you have spoken in all things much to my\r\nmind,\u0026rsquo; whether Euthyphro, or some Muse inhabiting your own breast, was\r\nthe inspirer.\u0026rdquo; Socrates replies, that he is afraid of being\r\nself-deceived, and therefore he must \u0026ldquo;look fore and aft,\u0026rdquo; as Homer\r\nremarks. Does not Cratylus agree with him that names teach us the nature of\r\nthings? \u0026ldquo;Yes.\u0026rdquo; And naming is an art, and the artists are\r\nlegislators, and like artists in general, some of them are better and some of\r\nthem are worse than others, and give better or worse laws, and make better or\r\nworse names. Cratylus cannot admit that one name is better than another; they\r\nare either true names, or they are not names at all; and when he is asked about\r\nthe name of Hermogenes, who is acknowledged to have no luck in him, he affirms\r\nthis to be the name of somebody else. Socrates supposes him to mean that\r\nfalsehood is impossible, to which his own answer would be, that there has never\r\nbeen a lack of liars. Cratylus presses him with the old sophistical argument,\r\nthat falsehood is saying that which is not, and therefore saying\r\nnothing;\u0026mdash;you cannot utter the word which is not. Socrates complains that\r\nthis argument is too subtle for an old man to understand: Suppose a person\r\naddressing Cratylus were to say, Hail, Athenian Stranger, Hermogenes! would\r\nthese words be true or false? \u0026ldquo;I should say that they would be mere\r\nunmeaning sounds, like the hammering of a brass pot.\u0026rdquo; But you would\r\nacknowledge that names, as well as pictures, are imitations, and also that\r\npictures may give a right or wrong representation of a man or woman:\u0026mdash;why\r\nmay not names then equally give a representation true and right or false and\r\nwrong? Cratylus admits that pictures may give a true or false representation,\r\nbut denies that names can. Socrates argues, that he may go up to a man and say\r\n\u0026ldquo;this is year picture,\u0026rdquo; and again, he may go and say to him\r\n\u0026ldquo;this is your name\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;in the one case appealing to his sense of\r\nsight, and in the other to his sense of hearing;\u0026mdash;may he not?\r\n\u0026ldquo;Yes.\u0026rdquo; Then you will admit that there is a right or a wrong\r\nassignment of names, and if of names, then of verbs and nouns; and if of verbs\r\nand nouns, then of the sentences which are made up of them; and comparing nouns\r\nto pictures, you may give them all the appropriate sounds, or only some of\r\nthem. And as he who gives all the colours makes a good picture, and he who\r\ngives only some of them, a bad or imperfect one, but still a picture; so he who\r\ngives all the sounds makes a good name, and he who gives only some of them, a\r\nbad or imperfect one, but a name still. The artist of names, that is, the\r\nlegislator, may be a good or he may be a bad artist. \u0026ldquo;Yes, Socrates, but\r\nthe cases are not parallel; for if you subtract or misplace a letter, the name\r\nceases to be a name.\u0026rdquo; Socrates admits that the number 10, if an unit is\r\nsubtracted, would cease to be 10, but denies that names are of this purely\r\nquantitative nature. Suppose that there are two objects\u0026mdash;Cratylus and the\r\nimage of Cratylus; and let us imagine that some God makes them perfectly alike,\r\nboth in their outward form and in their inner nature and qualities: then there\r\nwill be two Cratyluses, and not merely Cratylus and the image of Cratylus. But\r\nan image in fact always falls short in some degree of the original, and if\r\nimages are not exact counterparts, why should names be? if they were, they\r\nwould be the doubles of their originals, and indistinguishable from them; and\r\nhow ridiculous would this be! Cratylus admits the truth of Socrates\u0026rsquo;\r\nremark. But then Socrates rejoins, he should have the courage to acknowledge\r\nthat letters may be wrongly inserted in a noun, or a noun in a sentence; and\r\nyet the noun or the sentence may retain a meaning. Better to admit this, that\r\nwe may not be punished like the traveller in Egina who goes about at night, and\r\nthat Truth herself may not say to us, \u0026ldquo;Too late.\u0026rdquo; And, errors\r\nexcepted, we may still affirm that a name to be correct must have proper\r\nletters, which bear a resemblance to the thing signified. I must remind you of\r\nwhat Hermogenes and I were saying about the letter rho accent, which was held\r\nto be expressive of motion and hardness, as lambda is of smoothness;\u0026mdash;and\r\nthis you will admit to be their natural meaning. But then, why do the Eritreans\r\ncall that skleroter which we call sklerotes? We can understand one another,\r\nalthough the letter rho accent is not equivalent to the letter s: why is this?\r\nYou reply, because the two letters are sufficiently alike for the purpose of\r\nexpressing motion. Well, then, there is the letter lambda; what business has\r\nthis in a word meaning hardness? \u0026ldquo;Why, Socrates, I retort upon you, that\r\nwe put in and pull out letters at pleasure.\u0026rdquo; And the explanation of this\r\nis custom or agreement: we have made a convention that the rho shall mean s and\r\na convention may indicate by the unlike as well as by the like. How could there\r\nbe names for all the numbers unless you allow that convention is used?\r\nImitation is a poor thing, and has to be supplemented by convention, which is\r\nanother poor thing; although I agree with you in thinking that the most perfect\r\nform of language is found only where there is a perfect correspondence of sound\r\nand meaning. But let me ask you what is the use and force of names? \u0026ldquo;The\r\nuse of names, Socrates, is to inform, and he who knows names knows\r\nthings.\u0026rdquo; Do you mean that the discovery of names is the same as the\r\ndiscovery of things? \u0026ldquo;Yes.\u0026rdquo; But do you not see that there is a\r\ndegree of deception about names? He who first gave names, gave them according\r\nto his conception, and that may have been erroneous. \u0026ldquo;But then, why,\r\nSocrates, is language so consistent? all words have the same laws.\u0026rdquo; Mere\r\nconsistency is no test of truth. In geometrical problems, for example, there\r\nmay be a flaw at the beginning, and yet the conclusion may follow consistently.\r\nAnd, therefore, a wise man will take especial care of first principles. But are\r\nwords really consistent; are there not as many terms of praise which signify\r\nrest as which signify motion? There is episteme, which is connected with\r\nstasis, as mneme is with meno. Bebaion, again, is the expression of station and\r\nposition; istoria is clearly descriptive of the stopping istanai of the stream;\r\npiston indicates the cessation of motion; and there are many words having a bad\r\nsense, which are connected with ideas of motion, such as sumphora, amartia,\r\netc.: amathia, again, might be explained, as e ama theo iontos poreia, and\r\nakolasia as e akolouthia tois pragmasin. Thus the bad names are framed on the\r\nsame principle as the good, and other examples might be given, which would\r\nfavour a theory of rest rather than of motion. \u0026ldquo;Yes; but the greater\r\nnumber of words express motion.\u0026rdquo; Are we to count them, Cratylus; and is\r\ncorrectness of names to be determined by the voice of a majority?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHere is another point: we were saying that the legislator gives names; and\r\ntherefore we must suppose that he knows the things which he names: but how can\r\nhe have learnt things from names before there were any names? \u0026ldquo;I believe,\r\nSocrates, that some power more than human first gave things their names, and\r\nthat these were necessarily true names.\u0026rdquo; Then how came the giver of names\r\nto contradict himself, and to make some names expressive of rest, and others of\r\nmotion? \u0026ldquo;I do not suppose that he did make them both.\u0026rdquo; Then which\r\ndid he make\u0026mdash;those which are expressive of rest, or those which are\r\nexpressive of motion?…But if some names are true and others false, we can\r\nonly decide between them, not by counting words, but by appealing to things.\r\nAnd, if so, we must allow that things may be known without names; for names, as\r\nwe have several times admitted, are the images of things; and the higher\r\nknowledge is of things, and is not to be derived from names; and though I do\r\nnot doubt that the inventors of language gave names, under the idea that all\r\nthings are in a state of motion and flux, I believe that they were mistaken;\r\nand that having fallen into a whirlpool themselves, they are trying to drag us\r\nafter them. For is there not a true beauty and a true good, which is always\r\nbeautiful and always good? Can the thing beauty be vanishing away from us while\r\nthe words are yet in our mouths? And they could not be known by any one if they\r\nare always passing away\u0026mdash;for if they are always passing away, the observer\r\nhas no opportunity of observing their state. Whether the doctrine of the flux\r\nor of the eternal nature be the truer, is hard to determine. But no man of\r\nsense will put himself, or the education of his mind, in the power of names: he\r\nwill not condemn himself to be an unreal thing, nor will he believe that\r\neverything is in a flux like the water in a leaky vessel, or that the world is\r\na man who has a running at the nose. This doctrine may be true, Cratylus, but\r\nis also very likely to be untrue; and therefore I would have you reflect while\r\nyou are young, and find out the truth, and when you know come and tell me.\r\n\u0026ldquo;I have thought, Socrates, and after a good deal of thinking I incline to\r\nHeracleitus.\u0026rdquo; Then another day, my friend, you shall give me a lesson.\r\n\u0026ldquo;Very good, Socrates, and I hope that you will continue to study these\r\nthings yourself.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe may now consider (I) how far Plato in the Cratylus has discovered the true\r\nprinciples of language, and then (II) proceed to compare modern speculations\r\nrespecting the origin and nature of language with the anticipations of his\r\ngenius.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI. (1) Plato is aware that language is not the work of chance; nor does he deny\r\nthat there is a natural fitness in names. He only insists that this natural\r\nfitness shall be intelligibly explained. But he has no idea that language is a\r\nnatural organism. He would have heard with surprise that languages are the\r\ncommon work of whole nations in a primitive or semi-barbarous age. How, he\r\nwould probably have argued, could men devoid of art have contrived a structure\r\nof such complexity? No answer could have been given to this question, either in\r\nancient or in modern times, until the nature of primitive antiquity had been\r\nthoroughly studied, and the instincts of man had been shown to exist in greater\r\nforce, when his state approaches more nearly to that of children or animals.\r\nThe philosophers of the last century, after their manner, would have vainly\r\nendeavoured to trace the process by which proper names were converted into\r\ncommon, and would have shown how the last effort of abstraction invented\r\nprepositions and auxiliaries. The theologian would have proved that language\r\nmust have had a divine origin, because in childhood, while the organs are\r\npliable, the intelligence is wanting, and when the intelligence is able to\r\nframe conceptions, the organs are no longer able to express them. Or, as others\r\nhave said: Man is man because he has the gift of speech; and he could not have\r\ninvented that which he is. But this would have been an \u0026ldquo;argument too\r\nsubtle\u0026rdquo; for Socrates, who rejects the theological account of the origin\r\nof language \u0026ldquo;as an excuse for not giving a reason,\u0026rdquo; which he\r\ncompares to the introduction of the \u0026ldquo;Deus ex machina\u0026rdquo; by the tragic\r\npoets when they have to solve a difficulty; thus anticipating many modern\r\ncontroversies in which the primary agency of the divine Being is confused with\r\nthe secondary cause; and God is assumed to have worked a miracle in order to\r\nfill up a lacuna in human knowledge. (Compare Timaeus.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNeither is Plato wrong in supposing that an element of design and art enters\r\ninto language. The creative power abating is supplemented by a mechanical\r\nprocess. \u0026ldquo;Languages are not made but grow,\u0026rdquo; but they are made as\r\nwell as grow; bursting into life like a plant or a flower, they are also\r\ncapable of being trained and improved and engrafted upon one another. The\r\nchange in them is effected in earlier ages by musical and euphonic\r\nimprovements, at a later stage by the influence of grammar and logic, and by\r\nthe poetical and literary use of words. They develope rapidly in childhood, and\r\nwhen they are full grown and set they may still put forth intellectual powers,\r\nlike the mind in the body, or rather we may say that the nobler use of language\r\nonly begins when the frame-work is complete. The savage or primitive man, in\r\nwhom the natural instinct is strongest, is also the greatest improver of the\r\nforms of language. He is the poet or maker of words, as in civilised ages the\r\ndialectician is the definer or distinguisher of them. The latter calls the\r\nsecond world of abstract terms into existence, as the former has created the\r\npicture sounds which represent natural objects or processes. Poetry and\r\nphilosophy\u0026mdash;these two, are the two great formative principles of language,\r\nwhen they have passed their first stage, of which, as of the first invention of\r\nthe arts in general, we only entertain conjecture. And mythology is a link\r\nbetween them, connecting the visible and invisible, until at length the\r\nsensuous exterior falls away, and the severance of the inner and outer world,\r\nof the idea and the object of sense, becomes complete. At a later period, logic\r\nand grammar, sister arts, preserve and enlarge the decaying instinct of\r\nlanguage, by rule and method, which they gather from analysis and observation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(2) There is no trace in any of Plato\u0026rsquo;s writings that he was acquainted\r\nwith any language but Greek. Yet he has conceived very truly the relation of\r\nGreek to foreign languages, which he is led to consider, because he finds that\r\nmany Greek words are incapable of explanation. Allowing a good deal for\r\naccident, and also for the fancies of the conditores linguae Graecae, there is\r\nan element of which he is unable to give an account. These unintelligible words\r\nhe supposes to be of foreign origin, and to have been derived from a time when\r\nthe Greeks were either barbarians, or in close relations to the barbarians.\r\nSocrates is aware that this principle is liable to great abuse; and, like the\r\n\u0026ldquo;Deus ex machina,\u0026rdquo; explains nothing. Hence he excuses himself for\r\nthe employment of such a device, and remarks that in foreign words there is\r\nstill a principle of correctness, which applies equally both to Greeks and\r\nbarbarians.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(3) But the greater number of primary words do not admit of derivation from\r\nforeign languages; they must be resolved into the letters out of which they are\r\ncomposed, and therefore the letters must have a meaning. The framers of\r\nlanguage were aware of this; they observed that alpha was adapted to express\r\nsize; eta length; omicron roundness; nu inwardness; rho accent rush or roar;\r\nlambda liquidity; gamma lambda the detention of the liquid or slippery element;\r\ndelta and tau binding; phi, psi, sigma, xi, wind and cold, and so on.\r\nPlato\u0026rsquo;s analysis of the letters of the alphabet shows a wonderful insight\r\ninto the nature of language. He does not expressively distinguish between mere\r\nimitation and the symbolical use of sound to express thought, but he recognises\r\nin the examples which he gives both modes of imitation. Gesture is the mode\r\nwhich a deaf and dumb person would take of indicating his meaning. And language\r\nis the gesture of the tongue; in the use of the letter rho accent, to express a\r\nrushing or roaring, or of omicron to express roundness, there is a direct\r\nimitation; while in the use of the letter alpha to express size, or of eta to\r\nexpress length, the imitation is symbolical. The use of analogous or similar\r\nsounds, in order to express similar analogous ideas, seems to have escaped him.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn passing from the gesture of the body to the movement of the tongue, Plato\r\nmakes a great step in the physiology of language. He was probably the first who\r\nsaid that \u0026ldquo;language is imitative sound,\u0026rdquo; which is the greatest and\r\ndeepest truth of philology; although he is not aware of the laws of euphony and\r\nassociation by which imitation must be regulated. He was probably also the\r\nfirst who made a distinction between simple and compound words, a truth second\r\nonly in importance to that which has just been mentioned. His great insight in\r\none direction curiously contrasts with his blindness in another; for he appears\r\nto be wholly unaware (compare his derivation of agathos from agastos and thoos)\r\nof the difference between the root and termination. But we must recollect that\r\nhe was necessarily more ignorant than any schoolboy of Greek grammar, and had\r\nno table of the inflexions of verbs and nouns before his eyes, which might have\r\nsuggested to him the distinction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(4) Plato distinctly affirms that language is not truth, or \u0026ldquo;philosophie\r\nune langue bien faite.\u0026rdquo; At first, Socrates has delighted himself with\r\ndiscovering the flux of Heracleitus in language. But he is covertly satirising\r\nthe pretence of that or any other age to find philosophy in words; and he\r\nafterwards corrects any erroneous inference which might be gathered from his\r\nexperiment. For he finds as many, or almost as many, words expressive of rest,\r\nas he had previously found expressive of motion. And even if this had been\r\notherwise, who would learn of words when he might learn of things? There is a\r\ngreat controversy and high argument between Heracleiteans and Eleatics, but no\r\nman of sense would commit his soul in such enquiries to the imposers of\r\nnames…In this and other passages Plato shows that he is as completely\r\nemancipated from the influence of \u0026ldquo;Idols of the tribe\u0026rdquo; as Bacon\r\nhimself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe lesson which may be gathered from words is not metaphysical or moral, but\r\nhistorical. They teach us the affinity of races, they tell us something about\r\nthe association of ideas, they occasionally preserve the memory of a disused\r\ncustom; but we cannot safely argue from them about right and wrong, matter and\r\nmind, freedom and necessity, or the other problems of moral and metaphysical\r\nphilosophy. For the use of words on such subjects may often be metaphorical,\r\naccidental, derived from other languages, and may have no relation to the\r\ncontemporary state of thought and feeling. Nor in any case is the invention of\r\nthem the result of philosophical reflection; they have been commonly\r\ntransferred from matter to mind, and their meaning is the very reverse of their\r\netymology. Because there is or is not a name for a thing, we cannot argue that\r\nthe thing has or has not an actual existence; or that the antitheses,\r\nparallels, conjugates, correlatives of language have anything corresponding to\r\nthem in nature. There are too many words as well as too few; and they\r\ngeneralize the objects or ideas which they represent. The greatest lesson which\r\nthe philosophical analysis of language teaches us is, that we should be above\r\nlanguage, making words our servants, and not allowing them to be our masters.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPlato does not add the further observation, that the etymological meaning of\r\nwords is in process of being lost. If at first framed on a principle of\r\nintelligibility, they would gradually cease to be intelligible, like those of a\r\nforeign language, he is willing to admit that they are subject to many changes,\r\nand put on many disguises. He acknowledges that the \u0026ldquo;poor creature\u0026rdquo;\r\nimitation is supplemented by another \u0026ldquo;poor\r\ncreature,\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;convention. But he does not see that \u0026ldquo;habit and\r\nrepute,\u0026rdquo; and their relation to other words, are always exercising an\r\ninfluence over them. Words appear to be isolated, but they are really the parts\r\nof an organism which is always being reproduced. They are refined by\r\ncivilization, harmonized by poetry, emphasized by literature, technically\r\napplied in philosophy and art; they are used as symbols on the border-ground of\r\nhuman knowledge; they receive a fresh impress from individual genius, and come\r\nwith a new force and association to every lively-minded person. They are fixed\r\nby the simultaneous utterance of millions, and yet are always imperceptibly\r\nchanging;\u0026mdash;not the inventors of language, but writing and speaking, and\r\nparticularly great writers, or works which pass into the hearts of nations,\r\nHomer, Shakespear, Dante, the German or English Bible, Kant and Hegel, are the\r\nmakers of them in later ages. They carry with them the faded recollection of\r\ntheir own past history; the use of a word in a striking and familiar passage\r\ngives a complexion to its use everywhere else, and the new use of an old and\r\nfamiliar phrase has also a peculiar power over us. But these and other\r\nsubtleties of language escaped the observation of Plato. He is not aware that\r\nthe languages of the world are organic structures, and that every word in them\r\nis related to every other; nor does he conceive of language as the joint work\r\nof the speaker and the hearer, requiring in man a faculty not only of\r\nexpressing his thoughts but of understanding those of others.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOn the other hand, he cannot be justly charged with a desire to frame language\r\non artificial principles. Philosophers have sometimes dreamed of a technical or\r\nscientific language, in words which should have fixed meanings, and stand in\r\nthe same relation to one another as the substances which they denote. But there\r\nis no more trace of this in Plato than there is of a language corresponding to\r\nthe ideas; nor, indeed, could the want of such a language be felt until the\r\nsciences were far more developed. Those who would extend the use of technical\r\nphraseology beyond the limits of science or of custom, seem to forget that\r\nfreedom and suggestiveness and the play of association are essential\r\ncharacteristics of language. The great master has shown how he regarded\r\npedantic distinctions of words or attempts to confine their meaning in the\r\nsatire on Prodicus in the Protagoras.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(5) In addition to these anticipations of the general principles of philology,\r\nwe may note also a few curious observations on words and sounds. \u0026ldquo;The\r\nEretrians say sklerotes for skleroter;\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;the Thessalians call\r\nApollo Amlos;\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;The Phrygians have the words pur, udor, kunes\r\nslightly changed;\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;there is an old Homeric word emesato, meaning\r\n\u0026lsquo;he contrived\u0026rsquo;;\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;our forefathers, and especially the\r\nwomen, who are most conservative of the ancient language, loved the letters\r\niota and delta; but now iota is changed into eta and epsilon, and delta into\r\nzeta; this is supposed to increase the grandeur of the sound.\u0026rdquo; Plato was\r\nvery willing to use inductive arguments, so far as they were within his reach;\r\nbut he would also have assigned a large influence to chance. Nor indeed is\r\ninduction applicable to philology in the same degree as to most of the physical\r\nsciences. For after we have pushed our researches to the furthest point, in\r\nlanguage as in all the other creations of the human mind, there will always\r\nremain an element of exception or accident or free-will, which cannot be\r\neliminated.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe question, \u0026ldquo;whether falsehood is impossible,\u0026rdquo; which Socrates\r\ncharacteristically sets aside as too subtle for an old man (compare Euthyd.),\r\ncould only have arisen in an age of imperfect consciousness, which had not yet\r\nlearned to distinguish words from things. Socrates replies in effect that words\r\nhave an independent existence; thus anticipating the solution of the mediaeval\r\ncontroversy of Nominalism and Realism. He is aware too that languages exist in\r\nvarious degrees of perfection, and that the analysis of them can only be\r\ncarried to a certain point. \u0026ldquo;If we could always, or almost always, use\r\nlikenesses, which are the appropriate expressions, that would be the most\r\nperfect state of language.\u0026rdquo; These words suggest a question of deeper\r\ninterest than the origin of language; viz. what is the ideal of language, how\r\nfar by any correction of their usages existing languages might become clearer\r\nand more expressive than they are, more poetical, and also more logical; or\r\nwhether they are now finally fixed and have received their last impress from\r\ntime and authority.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOn the whole, the Cratylus seems to contain deeper truths about language than\r\nany other ancient writing. But feeling the uncertain ground upon which he is\r\nwalking, and partly in order to preserve the character of Socrates, Plato\r\nenvelopes the whole subject in a robe of fancy, and allows his principles to\r\ndrop out as if by accident.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nII. What is the result of recent speculations about the origin and nature of\r\nlanguage? Like other modern metaphysical enquiries, they end at last in a\r\nstatement of facts. But, in order to state or understand the facts, a\r\nmetaphysical insight seems to be required. There are more things in language\r\nthan the human mind easily conceives. And many fallacies have to be dispelled,\r\nas well as observations made. The true spirit of philosophy or metaphysics can\r\nalone charm away metaphysical illusions, which are always reappearing, formerly\r\nin the fancies of neoplatonist writers, now in the disguise of experience and\r\ncommon sense. An analogy, a figure of speech, an intelligible theory, a\r\nsuperficial observation of the individual, have often been mistaken for a true\r\naccount of the origin of language.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSpeaking is one of the simplest natural operations, and also the most complex.\r\nNothing would seem to be easier or more trivial than a few words uttered by a\r\nchild in any language. Yet into the formation of those words have entered\r\ncauses which the human mind is not capable of calculating. They are a drop or\r\ntwo of the great stream or ocean of speech which has been flowing in all ages.\r\nThey have been transmitted from one language to another; like the child\r\nhimself, they go back to the beginnings of the human race. How they originated,\r\nwho can tell? Nevertheless we can imagine a stage of human society in which the\r\ncircle of men\u0026rsquo;s minds was narrower and their sympathies and instincts\r\nstronger; in which their organs of speech were more flexible, and the sense of\r\nhearing finer and more discerning; in which they lived more in company, and\r\nafter the manner of children were more given to express their feelings; in\r\nwhich \u0026ldquo;they moved all together,\u0026rdquo; like a herd of wild animals,\r\n\u0026ldquo;when they moved at all.\u0026rdquo; Among them, as in every society, a\r\nparticular person would be more sensitive and intelligent than the rest.\r\nSuddenly, on some occasion of interest (at the approach of a wild beast, shall\r\nwe say?), he first, they following him, utter a cry which resounds through the\r\nforest. The cry is almost or quite involuntary, and may be an imitation of the\r\nroar of the animal. Thus far we have not speech, but only the inarticulate\r\nexpression of feeling or emotion in no respect differing from the cries of\r\nanimals; for they too call to one another and are answered. But now suppose\r\nthat some one at a distance not only hears the sound, but apprehends the\r\nmeaning: or we may imagine that the cry is repeated to a member of the society\r\nwho had been absent; the others act the scene over again when he returns home\r\nin the evening. And so the cry becomes a word. The hearer in turn gives back\r\nthe word to the speaker, who is now aware that he has acquired a new power.\r\nMany thousand times he exercises this power; like a child learning to talk, he\r\nrepeats the same cry again, and again he is answered; he tries experiments with\r\na like result, and the speaker and the hearer rejoice together in their\r\nnewly-discovered faculty. At first there would be few such cries, and little\r\ndanger of mistaking or confusing them. For the mind of primitive man had a\r\nnarrow range of perceptions and feelings; his senses were microscopic; twenty\r\nor thirty sounds or gestures would be enough for him, nor would he have any\r\ndifficulty in finding them. Naturally he broke out into speech\u0026mdash;like the\r\nyoung infant he laughed and babbled; but not until there were hearers as well\r\nas speakers did language begin. Not the interjection or the vocal imitation of\r\nthe object, but the interjection or the vocal imitation of the object\r\nunderstood, is the first rudiment of human speech.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAfter a while the word gathers associations, and has an independent existence.\r\nThe imitation of the lion\u0026rsquo;s roar calls up the fears and hopes of the\r\nchase, which are excited by his appearance. In the moment of hearing the sound,\r\nwithout any appreciable interval, these and other latent experiences wake up in\r\nthe mind of the hearer. Not only does he receive an impression, but he brings\r\nprevious knowledge to bear upon that impression. Necessarily the pictorial\r\nimage becomes less vivid, while the association of the nature and habits of the\r\nanimal is more distinctly perceived. The picture passes into a symbol, for\r\nthere would be too many of them and they would crowd the mind; the vocal\r\nimitation, too, is always in process of being lost and being renewed, just as\r\nthe picture is brought back again in the description of the poet. Words now can\r\nbe used more freely because there are more of them. What was once an\r\ninvoluntary expression becomes voluntary. Not only can men utter a cry or call,\r\nbut they can communicate and converse; they can not only use words, but they\r\ncan even play with them. The word is separated both from the object and from\r\nthe mind; and slowly nations and individuals attain to a fuller consciousness\r\nof themselves.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nParallel with this mental process the articulation of sounds is gradually\r\nbecoming perfected. The finer sense detects the differences of them, and\r\nbegins, first to agglomerate, then to distinguish them. Times, persons, places,\r\nrelations of all kinds, are expressed by modifications of them. The earliest\r\nparts of speech, as we may call them by anticipation, like the first utterances\r\nof children, probably partook of the nature of interjections and nouns; then\r\ncame verbs; at length the whole sentence appeared, and rhythm and metre\r\nfollowed. Each stage in the progress of language was accompanied by some\r\ncorresponding stage in the mind and civilisation of man. In time, when the\r\nfamily became a nation, the wild growth of dialects passed into a language.\r\nThen arose poetry and literature. We can hardly realize to ourselves how much\r\nwith each improvement of language the powers of the human mind were enlarged;\r\nhow the inner world took the place of outer; how the pictorial or symbolical or\r\nanalogical word was refined into a notion; how language, fair and large and\r\nfree, was at last complete.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSo we may imagine the speech of man to have begun as with the cries of animals,\r\nor the stammering lips of children, and to have attained by degrees the\r\nperfection of Homer and Plato. Yet we are far from saying that this or any\r\nother theory of language is proved by facts. It is not difficult to form an\r\nhypothesis which by a series of imaginary transitions will bridge over the\r\nchasm which separates man from the animals. Differences of kind may often be\r\nthus resolved into differences of degree. But we must not assume that we have\r\nin this way discovered the true account of them. Through what struggles the\r\nharmonious use of the organs of speech was acquired; to what extent the\r\nconditions of human life were different; how far the genius of individuals may\r\nhave contributed to the discovery of this as of the other arts, we cannot say:\r\nOnly we seem to see that language is as much the creation of the ear as of the\r\ntongue, and the expression of a movement stirring the hearts not of one man\r\nonly but of many, \u0026ldquo;as the trees of the wood are stirred by the\r\nwind.\u0026rdquo; The theory is consistent or not inconsistent with our own mental\r\nexperience, and throws some degree of light upon a dark corner of the human\r\nmind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the later analysis of language, we trace the opposite and contrasted\r\nelements of the individual and nation, of the past and present, of the inward\r\nand outward, of the subject and object, of the notional and relational, of the\r\nroot or unchanging part of the word and of the changing inflexion, if such a\r\ndistinction be admitted, of the vowel and the consonant, of quantity and\r\naccent, of speech and writing, of poetry and prose. We observe also the\r\nreciprocal influence of sounds and conceptions on each other, like the\r\nconnexion of body and mind; and further remark that although the names of\r\nobjects were originally proper names, as the grammarian or logician might call\r\nthem, yet at a later stage they become universal notions, which combine into\r\nparticulars and individuals, and are taken out of the first rude agglomeration\r\nof sounds that they may be replaced in a higher and more logical order. We see\r\nthat in the simplest sentences are contained grammar and logic\u0026mdash;the parts\r\nof speech, the Eleatic philosophy and the Kantian categories. So complex is\r\nlanguage, and so expressive not only of the meanest wants of man, but of his\r\nhighest thoughts; so various are the aspects in which it is regarded by us.\r\nThen again, when we follow the history of languages, we observe that they are\r\nalways slowly moving, half dead, half alive, half solid, half fluid; the breath\r\nof a moment, yet like the air, continuous in all ages and countries,\u0026mdash;like\r\nthe glacier, too, containing within them a trickling stream which deposits\r\ndebris of the rocks over which it passes. There were happy moments, as we may\r\nconjecture, in the lives of nations, at which they came to the birth\u0026mdash;as\r\nin the golden age of literature, the man and the time seem to conspire; the\r\neloquence of the bard or chief, as in later times the creations of the great\r\nwriter who is the expression of his age, became impressed on the minds of their\r\ncountrymen, perhaps in the hour of some crisis of national development\u0026mdash;a\r\nmigration, a conquest, or the like. The picture of the word which was beginning\r\nto be lost, is now revived; the sound again echoes to the sense; men find\r\nthemselves capable not only of expressing more feelings, and describing more\r\nobjects, but of expressing and describing them better. The world before the\r\nflood, that is to say, the world of ten, twenty, a hundred thousand years ago,\r\nhas passed away and left no sign. But the best conception that we can form of\r\nit, though imperfect and uncertain, is gained from the analogy of causes still\r\nin action, some powerful and sudden, others working slowly in the course of\r\ninfinite ages. Something too may be allowed to \u0026ldquo;the persistency of the\r\nstrongest,\u0026rdquo; to \u0026ldquo;the survival of the fittest,\u0026rdquo; in this as in\r\nthe other realms of nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThese are some of the reflections which the modern philosophy of language\r\nsuggests to us about the powers of the human mind and the forces and influences\r\nby which the efforts of men to utter articulate sounds were inspired. Yet in\r\nmaking these and similar generalizations we may note also dangers to which we\r\nare exposed. (1) There is the confusion of ideas with facts\u0026mdash;of mere\r\npossibilities, and generalities, and modes of conception with actual and\r\ndefinite knowledge. The words \u0026ldquo;evolution,\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;birth,\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u0026ldquo;law,\u0026rdquo; development,\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;instinct,\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u0026ldquo;implicit,\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;explicit,\u0026rdquo; and the like, have a false\r\nclearness or comprehensiveness, which adds nothing to our knowledge. The\r\nmetaphor of a flower or a tree, or some other work of nature or art, is often\r\nin like manner only a pleasing picture. (2) There is the fallacy of resolving\r\nthe languages which we know into their parts, and then imagining that we can\r\ndiscover the nature of language by reconstructing them. (3) There is the danger\r\nof identifying language, not with thoughts but with ideas. (4) There is the\r\nerror of supposing that the analysis of grammar and logic has always existed,\r\nor that their distinctions were familiar to Socrates and Plato. (5) There is\r\nthe fallacy of exaggerating, and also of diminishing the interval which\r\nseparates articulate from inarticulate language\u0026mdash;the cries of animals from\r\nthe speech of man\u0026mdash;the instincts of animals from the reason of man. (6)\r\nThere is the danger which besets all enquiries into the early history of\r\nman\u0026mdash;of interpreting the past by the present, and of substituting the\r\ndefinite and intelligible for the true but dim outline which is the horizon of\r\nhuman knowledge.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe greatest light is thrown upon the nature of language by analogy. We have\r\nthe analogy of the cries of animals, of the songs of birds (\u0026ldquo;man, like\r\nthe nightingale, is a singing bird, but is ever binding up thoughts with\r\nmusical notes\u0026rdquo;), of music, of children learning to speak, of barbarous\r\nnations in which the linguistic instinct is still undecayed, of ourselves\r\nlearning to think and speak a new language, of the deaf and dumb who have words\r\nwithout sounds, of the various disorders of speech; and we have the\r\nafter-growth of mythology, which, like language, is an unconscious creation of\r\nthe human mind. We can observe the social and collective instincts of animals,\r\nand may remark how, when domesticated, they have the power of understanding but\r\nnot of speaking, while on the other hand, some birds which are comparatively\r\ndevoid of intelligence, make a nearer approach to articulate speech. We may\r\nnote how in the animals there is a want of that sympathy with one another which\r\nappears to be the soul of language. We can compare the use of speech with other\r\nmental and bodily operations; for speech too is a kind of gesture, and in the\r\nchild or savage accompanied with gesture. We may observe that the child learns\r\nto speak, as he learns to walk or to eat, by a natural impulse; yet in either\r\ncase not without a power of imitation which is also natural to him\u0026mdash;he is\r\ntaught to read, but he breaks forth spontaneously in speech. We can trace the\r\nimpulse to bind together the world in ideas beginning in the first efforts to\r\nspeak and culminating in philosophy. But there remains an element which cannot\r\nbe explained, or even adequately described. We can understand how man creates\r\nor constructs consciously and by design; and see, if we do not understand, how\r\nnature, by a law, calls into being an organised structure. But the intermediate\r\norganism which stands between man and nature, which is the work of mind yet\r\nunconscious, and in which mind and matter seem to meet, and mind unperceived to\r\nherself is really limited by all other minds, is neither understood nor seen by\r\nus, and is with reluctance admitted to be a fact.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLanguage is an aspect of man, of nature, and of nations, the transfiguration of\r\nthe world in thought, the meeting-point of the physical and mental sciences,\r\nand also the mirror in which they are reflected, present at every moment to the\r\nindividual, and yet having a sort of eternal or universal nature. When we\r\nanalyze our own mental processes, we find words everywhere in every degree of\r\nclearness and consistency, fading away in dreams and more like pictures,\r\nrapidly succeeding one another in our waking thoughts, attaining a greater\r\ndistinctness and consecutiveness in speech, and a greater still in writing,\r\ntaking the place of one another when we try to become emancipated from their\r\ninfluence. For in all processes of the mind which are conscious we are talking\r\nto ourselves; the attempt to think without words is a mere illusion,\u0026mdash;they\r\nare always reappearing when we fix our thoughts. And speech is not a separate\r\nfaculty, but the expression of all our faculties, to which all our other powers\r\nof expression, signs, looks, gestures, lend their aid, of which the instrument\r\nis not the tongue only, but more than half the human frame.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe minds of men are sometimes carried on to think of their lives and of their\r\nactions as links in a chain of causes and effects going back to the beginning\r\nof time. A few have seemed to lose the sense of their own individuality in the\r\nuniversal cause or nature. In like manner we might think of the words which we\r\ndaily use, as derived from the first speech of man, and of all the languages in\r\nthe world, as the expressions or varieties of a single force or life of\r\nlanguage of which the thoughts of men are the accident. Such a conception\r\nenables us to grasp the power and wonder of languages, and is very natural to\r\nthe scientific philologist. For he, like the metaphysician, believes in the\r\nreality of that which absorbs his own mind. Nor do we deny the enormous\r\ninfluence which language has exercised over thought. Fixed words, like fixed\r\nideas, have often governed the world. But in such representations we attribute\r\nto language too much the nature of a cause, and too little of an\r\neffect,\u0026mdash;too much of an absolute, too little of a relative\r\ncharacter,\u0026mdash;too much of an ideal, too little of a matter-of-fact\r\nexistence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOr again, we may frame a single abstract notion of language of which all\r\nexistent languages may be supposed to be the perversion. But we must not\r\nconceive that this logical figment had ever a real existence, or is anything\r\nmore than an effort of the mind to give unity to infinitely various phenomena.\r\nThere is no abstract language \u0026ldquo;in rerum natura,\u0026rdquo; any more than\r\nthere is an abstract tree, but only languages in various stages of growth,\r\nmaturity, and decay. Nor do other logical distinctions or even grammatical\r\nexactly correspond to the facts of language; for they too are attempts to give\r\nunity and regularity to a subject which is partly irregular.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe find, however, that there are distinctions of another kind by which this\r\nvast field of language admits of being mapped out. There is the distinction\r\nbetween biliteral and triliteral roots, and the various inflexions which\r\naccompany them; between the mere mechanical cohesion of sounds or words, and\r\nthe \u0026ldquo;chemical\u0026rdquo; combination of them into a new word; there is the\r\ndistinction between languages which have had a free and full development of\r\ntheir organisms, and languages which have been stunted in their\r\ngrowth,\u0026mdash;lamed in their hands or feet, and never able to acquire\r\nafterwards the powers in which they are deficient; there is the distinction\r\nbetween synthetical languages like Greek and Latin, which have retained their\r\ninflexions, and analytical languages like English or French, which have lost\r\nthem. Innumerable as are the languages and dialects of mankind, there are\r\ncomparatively few classes to which they can be referred.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnother road through this chaos is provided by the physiology of speech. The\r\norgans of language are the same in all mankind, and are only capable of\r\nuttering a certain number of sounds. Every man has tongue, teeth, lips, palate,\r\nthroat, mouth, which he may close or open, and adapt in various ways; making,\r\nfirst, vowels and consonants; and secondly, other classes of letters. The\r\nelements of all speech, like the elements of the musical scale, are few and\r\nsimple, though admitting of infinite gradations and combinations. Whatever\r\nslight differences exist in the use or formation of these organs, owing to\r\nclimate or the sense of euphony or other causes, they are as nothing compared\r\nwith their agreement. Here then is a real basis of unity in the study of\r\nphilology, unlike that imaginary abstract unity of which we were just now\r\nspeaking.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhether we regard language from the psychological, or historical, or\r\nphysiological point of view, the materials of our knowledge are inexhaustible.\r\nThe comparisons of children learning to speak, of barbarous nations, of musical\r\nnotes, of the cries of animals, of the song of birds, increase our insight into\r\nthe nature of human speech. Many observations which would otherwise have\r\nescaped us are suggested by them. But they do not explain why, in man and in\r\nman only, the speaker met with a response from the hearer, and the half\r\narticulate sound gradually developed into Sanscrit and Greek. They hardly\r\nenable us to approach any nearer the secret of the origin of language, which,\r\nlike some of the other great secrets of nature,\u0026mdash;the origin of birth and\r\ndeath, or of animal life,\u0026mdash;remains inviolable. That problem is\r\nindissolubly bound up with the origin of man; and if we ever know more of the\r\none, we may expect to know more of the other.\u003ca href=\"#fn1\" name=\"fnref1\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[1]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nCompare W. Humboldt, \u003ci\u003eUeber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen\r\nSprachbaues\u003c/i\u003e, and M. Müller, \u003ci\u003eLectures on the Science of Language\u003c/i\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is more than sixteen years since the preceding remarks were written, which\r\nwith a few alterations have now been reprinted. During the interval the\r\nprogress of philology has been very great. More languages have been compared;\r\nthe inner structure of language has been laid bare; the relations of sounds\r\nhave been more accurately discriminated; the manner in which dialects affect or\r\nare affected by the literary or principal form of a language is better\r\nunderstood. Many merely verbal questions have been eliminated; the remains of\r\nthe old traditional methods have died away. The study has passed from the\r\nmetaphysical into an historical stage. Grammar is no longer confused with\r\nlanguage, nor the anatomy of words and sentences with their life and use.\r\nFigures of speech, by which the vagueness of theories is often concealed, have\r\nbeen stripped off; and we see language more as it truly was. The immensity of\r\nthe subject is gradually revealed to us, and the reign of law becomes apparent.\r\nYet the law is but partially seen; the traces of it are often lost in the\r\ndistance. For languages have a natural but not a perfect growth; like other\r\ncreations of nature into which the will of man enters, they are full of what we\r\nterm accident and irregularity. And the difficulties of the subject become not\r\nless, but greater, as we proceed\u0026mdash;it is one of those studies in which we\r\nseem to know less as we know more; partly because we are no longer satisfied\r\nwith the vague and superficial ideas of it which prevailed fifty years ago;\r\npartly also because the remains of the languages with which we are acquainted\r\nalways were, and if they are still living, are, in a state of transition; and\r\nthirdly, because there are lacunae in our knowledge of them which can never be\r\nfilled up. Not a tenth, not a hundredth part of them has been preserved. Yet\r\nthe materials at our disposal are far greater than any individual can use. Such\r\nare a few of the general reflections which the present state of philology calls\r\nup.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(1) Language seems to be composite, but into its first elements the philologer\r\nhas never been able to penetrate. However far he goes back, he never arrives at\r\nthe beginning; or rather, as in Geology or in Astronomy, there is no beginning.\r\nHe is too apt to suppose that by breaking up the existing forms of language\r\ninto their parts he will arrive at a previous stage of it, but he is merely\r\nanalyzing what never existed, or is never known to have existed, except in a\r\ncomposite form. He may divide nouns and verbs into roots and inflexions, but he\r\nhas no evidence which will show that the omega of tupto or the mu of tithemi,\r\nthough analogous to ego, me, either became pronouns or were generated out of\r\npronouns. To say that \u0026ldquo;pronouns, like ripe fruit, dropped out of\r\nverbs,\u0026rdquo; is a misleading figure of speech. Although all languages have\r\nsome common principles, there is no primitive form or forms of language known\r\nto us, or to be reasonably imagined, from which they are all descended. No\r\ninference can be drawn from language, either for or against the unity of the\r\nhuman race. Nor is there any proof that words were ever used without any\r\nrelation to each other. Whatever may be the meaning of a sentence or a word\r\nwhen applied to primitive language, it is probable that the sentence is more\r\nakin to the original form than the word, and that the later stage of language\r\nis the result rather of analysis than of synthesis, or possibly is a\r\ncombination of the two. Nor, again, are we sure that the original process of\r\nlearning to speak was the same in different places or among different races of\r\nmen. It may have been slower with some, quicker with others. Some tribes may\r\nhave used shorter, others longer words or cries: they may have been more or\r\nless inclined to agglutinate or to decompose them: they may have modified them\r\nby the use of prefixes, suffixes, infixes; by the lengthening and strengthening\r\nof vowels or by the shortening and weakening of them, by the condensation or\r\nrarefaction of consonants. But who gave to language these primeval laws; or why\r\none race has triliteral, another biliteral roots; or why in some members of a\r\ngroup of languages b becomes p, or d, t, or ch, k; or why two languages\r\nresemble one another in certain parts of their structure and differ in others;\r\nor why in one language there is a greater development of vowels, in another of\r\nconsonants, and the like\u0026mdash;are questions of which we only \u0026ldquo;entertain\r\nconjecture.\u0026rdquo; We must remember the length of time that has elapsed since\r\nman first walked upon the earth, and that in this vast but unknown period every\r\nvariety of language may have been in process of formation and decay, many times\r\nover.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(Compare Plato, Laws):\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;ATHENIAN STRANGER: And what then is to be regarded as the origin of\r\ngovernment? Will not a man be able to judge best from a point of view in which\r\nhe may behold the progress of states and their transitions to good and evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nATHENIAN STRANGER: I mean that he might watch them from the point of view of\r\ntime, and observe the changes which take place in them during infinite ages.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCLEINIAS: How so?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nATHENIAN STRANGER: Why, do you think that you can reckon the time which has\r\nelapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCLEINIAS: Hardly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nATHENIAN STRANGER: But you are quite sure that it must be vast and\r\nincalculable?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCLEINIAS: No doubt.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nATHENIAN STRANGER: And have there not been thousands and thousands of cities\r\nwhich have come into being and perished during this period? And has not every\r\nplace had endless forms of government, and been sometimes rising, and at other\r\ntimes falling, and again improving or waning?\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAristot. Metaph.:\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;And if a person should conceive the tales of mythology to mean only that\r\nmen thought the gods to be the first essences of things, he would deem the\r\nreflection to have been inspired and would consider that, whereas probably\r\nevery art and part of wisdom had been DISCOVERED AND LOST MANY TIMES OVER, such\r\nnotions were but a remnant of the past which has survived to our day.\u0026rdquo;)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt can hardly be supposed that any traces of an original language still\r\nsurvive, any more than of the first huts or buildings which were constructed by\r\nman. Nor are we at all certain of the relation, if any, in which the greater\r\nfamilies of languages stand to each other. The influence of individuals must\r\nalways have been a disturbing element. Like great writers in later times, there\r\nmay have been many a barbaric genius who taught the men of his tribe to sing or\r\nspeak, showing them by example how to continue or divide their words, charming\r\ntheir souls with rhythm and accent and intonation, finding in familiar objects\r\nthe expression of their confused fancies\u0026mdash;to whom the whole of language\r\nmight in truth be said to be a figure of speech. One person may have introduced\r\na new custom into the formation or pronunciation of a word; he may have been\r\nimitated by others, and the custom, or form, or accent, or quantity, or rhyme\r\nwhich he introduced in a single word may have become the type on which many\r\nother words or inflexions of words were framed, and may have quickly ran\r\nthrough a whole language. For like the other gifts which nature has bestowed\r\nupon man, that of speech has been conveyed to him through the medium, not of\r\nthe many, but of the few, who were his\r\n\u0026ldquo;law-givers\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;the legislator with the dialectician\r\nstanding on his right hand,\u0026rdquo; in Plato\u0026rsquo;s striking image, who formed\r\nthe manners of men and gave them customs, whose voice and look and behaviour,\r\nwhose gesticulations and other peculiarities were instinctively imitated by\r\nthem,\u0026mdash;the \u0026ldquo;king of men\u0026rdquo; who was their priest, almost their\r\nGod…But these are conjectures only: so little do we know of the origin of\r\nlanguage that the real scholar is indisposed to touch the subject at all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(2) There are other errors besides the figment of a primitive or original\r\nlanguage which it is time to leave behind us. We no longer divide languages\r\ninto synthetical and analytical, or suppose similarity of structure to be the\r\nsafe or only guide to the affinities of them. We do not confuse the parts of\r\nspeech with the categories of Logic. Nor do we conceive languages any more than\r\ncivilisations to be in a state of dissolution; they do not easily pass away,\r\nbut are far more tenacious of life than the tribes by whom they are spoken.\r\n\u0026ldquo;Where two or three are gathered together,\u0026rdquo; they survive. As in the\r\nhuman frame, as in the state, there is a principle of renovation as well as of\r\ndecay which is at work in all of them. Neither do we suppose them to be\r\ninvented by the wit of man. With few exceptions, e.g. technical words or words\r\nnewly imported from a foreign language, and the like, in which art has imitated\r\nnature, \u0026ldquo;words are not made but grow.\u0026rdquo; Nor do we attribute to them\r\na supernatural origin. The law which regulates them is like the law which\r\ngoverns the circulation of the blood, or the rising of the sap in trees; the\r\naction of it is uniform, but the result, which appears in the superficial forms\r\nof men and animals or in the leaves of trees, is an endless profusion and\r\nvariety. The laws of vegetation are invariable, but no two plants, no two\r\nleaves of the forest are precisely the same. The laws of language are\r\ninvariable, but no two languages are alike, no two words have exactly the same\r\nmeaning. No two sounds are exactly of the same quality, or give precisely the\r\nsame impression.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt would be well if there were a similar consensus about some other points\r\nwhich appear to be still in dispute. Is language conscious or unconscious? In\r\nspeaking or writing have we present to our minds the meaning or the sound or\r\nthe construction of the words which we are using?\u0026mdash;No more than the\r\nseparate drops of water with which we quench our thirst are present: the whole\r\ndraught may be conscious, but not the minute particles of which it is made up:\r\nSo the whole sentence may be conscious, but the several words, syllables,\r\nletters are not thought of separately when we are uttering them. Like other\r\nnatural operations, the process of speech, when most perfect, is least observed\r\nby us. We do not pause at each mouthful to dwell upon the taste of it: nor has\r\nthe speaker time to ask himself the comparative merits of different modes of\r\nexpression while he is uttering them. There are many things in the use of\r\nlanguage which may be observed from without, but which cannot be explained from\r\nwithin. Consciousness carries us but a little way in the investigation of the\r\nmind; it is not the faculty of internal observation, but only the dim light\r\nwhich makes such observation possible. What is supposed to be our consciousness\r\nof language is really only the analysis of it, and this analysis admits of\r\ninnumerable degrees. But would it not be better if this term, which is so\r\nmisleading, and yet has played so great a part in mental science, were either\r\nbanished or used only with the distinct meaning of \u0026ldquo;attention to our own\r\nminds,\u0026rdquo; such as is called forth, not by familiar mental processes, but by\r\nthe interruption of them? Now in this sense we may truly say that we are not\r\nconscious of ordinary speech, though we are commonly roused to attention by the\r\nmisuse or mispronunciation of a word. Still less, even in schools and\r\nacademies, do we ever attempt to invent new words or to alter the meaning of\r\nold ones, except in the case, mentioned above, of technical or borrowed words\r\nwhich are artificially made or imported because a need of them is felt. Neither\r\nin our own nor in any other age has the conscious effort of reflection in man\r\ncontributed in an appreciable degree to the formation of language. \u0026ldquo;Which\r\nof us by taking thought\u0026rdquo; can make new words or constructions? Reflection\r\nis the least of the causes by which language is affected, and is likely to have\r\nthe least power, when the linguistic instinct is greatest, as in young children\r\nand in the infancy of nations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA kindred error is the separation of the phonetic from the mental element of\r\nlanguage; they are really inseparable\u0026mdash;no definite line can be drawn\r\nbetween them, any more than in any other common act of mind and body. It is\r\ntrue that within certain limits we possess the power of varying sounds by\r\nopening and closing the mouth, by touching the palate or the teeth with the\r\ntongue, by lengthening or shortening the vocal instrument, by greater or less\r\nstress, by a higher or lower pitch of the voice, and we can substitute one note\r\nor accent for another. But behind the organs of speech and their action there\r\nremains the informing mind, which sets them in motion and works together with\r\nthem. And behind the great structure of human speech and the lesser varieties\r\nof language which arise out of the many degrees and kinds of human intercourse,\r\nthere is also the unknown or over-ruling law of God or nature which gives order\r\nto it in its infinite greatness, and variety in its infinitesimal\r\nminuteness\u0026mdash;both equally inscrutable to us. We need no longer discuss\r\nwhether philology is to be classed with the Natural or the Mental sciences, if\r\nwe frankly recognize that, like all the sciences which are concerned with man,\r\nit has a double aspect,\u0026mdash;inward and outward; and that the inward can only\r\nbe known through the outward. Neither need we raise the question whether the\r\nlaws of language, like the other laws of human action, admit of exceptions. The\r\nanswer in all cases is the same\u0026mdash;that the laws of nature are uniform,\r\nthough the consistency or continuity of them is not always perceptible to us.\r\nThe superficial appearances of language, as of nature, are irregular, but we do\r\nnot therefore deny their deeper uniformity. The comparison of the growth of\r\nlanguage in the individual and in the nation cannot be wholly discarded, for\r\nnations are made up of individuals. But in this, as in the other political\r\nsciences, we must distinguish between collective and individual actions or\r\nprocesses, and not attribute to the one what belongs to the other. Again, when\r\nwe speak of the hereditary or paternity of a language, we must remember that\r\nthe parents are alive as well as the children, and that all the preceding\r\ngenerations survive (after a manner) in the latest form of it. And when, for\r\nthe purposes of comparison, we form into groups the roots or terminations of\r\nwords, we should not forget how casual is the manner in which their\r\nresemblances have arisen\u0026mdash;they were not first written down by a grammarian\r\nin the paradigms of a grammar and learned out of a book, but were due to many\r\nchance attractions of sound or of meaning, or of both combined. So many\r\ncautions have to be borne in mind, and so many first thoughts to be dismissed,\r\nbefore we can proceed safely in the path of philological enquiry. It might be\r\nwell sometimes to lay aside figures of speech, such as the \u0026ldquo;root\u0026rdquo;\r\nand the \u0026ldquo;branches,\u0026rdquo; the \u0026ldquo;stem,\u0026rdquo; the\r\n\u0026ldquo;strata\u0026rdquo; of Geology, the \u0026ldquo;compounds\u0026rdquo; of Chemistry,\r\n\u0026ldquo;the ripe fruit of pronouns dropping from verbs\u0026rdquo; (see above), and\r\nthe like, which are always interesting, but are apt to be delusive. Yet such\r\nfigures of speech are far nearer the truth than the theories which attribute\r\nthe invention and improvement of language to the conscious action of the human\r\nmind…Lastly, it is doubted by recent philologians whether climate can be\r\nsupposed to have exercised any influence worth speaking of on a language: such\r\na view is said to be unproven: it had better therefore not be silently assumed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Natural selection\u0026rdquo; and the \u0026ldquo;survival of the fittest\u0026rdquo;\r\nhave been applied in the field of philology, as well as in the other sciences\r\nwhich are concerned with animal and vegetable life. And a Darwinian school of\r\nphilologists has sprung up, who are sometimes accused of putting words in the\r\nplace of things. It seems to be true, that whether applied to language or to\r\nother branches of knowledge, the Darwinian theory, unless very precisely\r\ndefined, hardly escapes from being a truism. If by \u0026ldquo;the natural\r\nselection\u0026rdquo; of words or meanings of words or by the \u0026ldquo;persistence and\r\nsurvival of the fittest\u0026rdquo; the maintainer of the theory intends to affirm\r\nnothing more than this\u0026mdash;that the word \u0026ldquo;fittest to survive\u0026rdquo;\r\nsurvives, he adds not much to the knowledge of language. But if he means that\r\nthe word or the meaning of the word or some portion of the word which comes\r\ninto use or drops out of use is selected or rejected on the ground of economy\r\nor parsimony or ease to the speaker or clearness or euphony or expressiveness,\r\nor greater or less demand for it, or anything of this sort, he is affirming a\r\nproposition which has several senses, and in none of these senses can be\r\nassisted to be uniformly true. For the laws of language are precarious, and can\r\nonly act uniformly when there is such frequency of intercourse among neighbours\r\nas is sufficient to enforce them. And there are many reasons why a man should\r\nprefer his own way of speaking to that of others, unless by so doing he becomes\r\nunintelligible. The struggle for existence among words is not of that fierce\r\nand irresistible kind in which birds, beasts and fishes devour one another, but\r\nof a milder sort, allowing one usage to be substituted for another, not by\r\nforce, but by the persuasion, or rather by the prevailing habit, of a majority.\r\nThe favourite figure, in this, as in some other uses of it, has tended rather\r\nto obscure than explain the subject to which it has been applied. Nor in any\r\ncase can the struggle for existence be deemed to be the sole or principal cause\r\nof changes in language, but only one among many, and one of which we cannot\r\neasily measure the importance. There is a further objection which may be urged\r\nequally against all applications of the Darwinian theory. As in animal life and\r\nlikewise in vegetable, so in languages, the process of change is said to be\r\ninsensible: sounds, like animals, are supposed to pass into one another by\r\nimperceptible gradation. But in both cases the newly-created forms soon become\r\nfixed; there are few if any vestiges of the intermediate links, and so the\r\nbetter half of the evidence of the change is wanting.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(3) Among the incumbrances or illusions of language may be reckoned many of the\r\nrules and traditions of grammar, whether ancient grammar or the corrections of\r\nit which modern philology has introduced. Grammar, like law, delights in\r\ndefinition: human speech, like human action, though very far from being a mere\r\nchaos, is indefinite, admits of degrees, and is always in a state of change or\r\ntransition. Grammar gives an erroneous conception of language: for it reduces\r\nto a system that which is not a system. Its figures of speech, pleonasms,\r\nellipses, anacolutha, pros to semainomenon, and the like have no reality; they\r\ndo not either make conscious expressions more intelligible or show the way in\r\nwhich they have arisen; they are chiefly designed to bring an earlier use of\r\nlanguage into conformity with the later. Often they seem intended only to\r\nremind us that great poets like Aeschylus or Sophocles or Pindar or a great\r\nprose writer like Thucydides are guilty of taking unwarrantable liberties with\r\ngrammatical rules; it appears never to have occurred to the inventors of them\r\nthat these real \u0026ldquo;conditores linguae Graecae\u0026rdquo; lived in an age before\r\ngrammar, when \u0026ldquo;Greece also was living Greece.\u0026rdquo; It is the anatomy,\r\nnot the physiology of language, which grammar seeks to describe: into the idiom\r\nand higher life of words it does not enter. The ordinary Greek grammar gives a\r\ncomplete paradigm of the verb, without suggesting that the double or treble\r\nforms of Perfects, Aorists, etc. are hardly ever contemporaneous. It\r\ndistinguishes Moods and Tenses, without observing how much of the nature of one\r\npasses into the other. It makes three Voices, Active, Passive, and Middle, but\r\ntakes no notice of the precarious existence and uncertain character of the last\r\nof the three. Language is a thing of degrees and relations and associations and\r\nexceptions: grammar ties it up in fixed rules. Language has many varieties of\r\nusage: grammar tries to reduce them to a single one. Grammar divides verbs into\r\nregular and irregular: it does not recognize that the irregular, equally with\r\nthe regular, are subject to law, and that a language which had no exceptions\r\nwould not be a natural growth: for it could not have been subjected to the\r\ninfluences by which language is ordinarily affected. It is always wanting to\r\ndescribe ancient languages in the terms of a modern one. It has a favourite\r\nfiction that one word is put in the place of another; the truth is that no word\r\nis ever put for another. It has another fiction, that a word has been omitted:\r\nwords are omitted because they are no longer needed; and the omission has\r\nceased to be observed. The common explanation of kata or some other preposition\r\n\u0026ldquo;being understood\u0026rdquo; in a Greek sentence is another fiction of the\r\nsame kind, which tends to disguise the fact that under cases were comprehended\r\noriginally many more relations, and that prepositions are used only to define\r\nthe meaning of them with greater precision. These instances are sufficient to\r\nshow the sort of errors which grammar introduces into language. We are not\r\nconsidering the question of its utility to the beginner in the study. Even to\r\nhim the best grammar is the shortest and that in which he will have least to\r\nunlearn. It may be said that the explanations here referred to are already out\r\nof date, and that the study of Greek grammar has received a new character from\r\ncomparative philology. This is true; but it is also true that the traditional\r\ngrammar has still a great hold on the mind of the student.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMetaphysics are even more troublesome than the figments of grammar, because\r\nthey wear the appearance of philosophy and there is no test to which they can\r\nbe subjected. They are useful in so far as they give us an insight into the\r\nhistory of the human mind and the modes of thought which have existed in former\r\nages; or in so far as they furnish wider conceptions of the different branches\r\nof knowledge and of their relation to one another. But they are worse than\r\nuseless when they outrun experience and abstract the mind from the observation\r\nof facts, only to envelope it in a mist of words. Some philologers, like\r\nSchleicher, have been greatly influenced by the philosophy of Hegel; nearly all\r\nof them to a certain extent have fallen under the dominion of physical science.\r\nEven Kant himself thought that the first principles of philosophy could be\r\nelicited from the analysis of the proposition, in this respect falling short of\r\nPlato. Westphal holds that there are three stages of language: (1) in which\r\nthings were characterized independently, (2) in which they were regarded in\r\nrelation to human thought, and (3) in relation to one another. But are not such\r\ndistinctions an anachronism? for they imply a growth of abstract ideas which\r\nnever existed in early times. Language cannot be explained by Metaphysics; for\r\nit is prior to them and much more nearly allied to sense. It is not likely that\r\nthe meaning of the cases is ultimately resolvable into relations of space and\r\ntime. Nor can we suppose the conception of cause and effect or of the finite\r\nand infinite or of the same and other to be latent in language at a time when\r\nin their abstract form they had never entered into the mind of man…If the\r\nscience of Comparative Philology had possessed \u0026ldquo;enough of Metaphysics to\r\nget rid of Metaphysics,\u0026rdquo; it would have made far greater progress.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(4) Our knowledge of language is almost confined to languages which are fully\r\ndeveloped. They are of several patterns; and these become altered by admixture\r\nin various degrees,\u0026mdash;they may only borrow a few words from one another and\r\nretain their life comparatively unaltered, or they may meet in a struggle for\r\nexistence until one of the two is overpowered and retires from the field. They\r\nattain the full rights and dignity of language when they acquire the use of\r\nwriting and have a literature of their own; they pass into dialects and grow\r\nout of them, in proportion as men are isolated or united by locality or\r\noccupation. The common language sometimes reacts upon the dialects and imparts\r\nto them also a literary character. The laws of language can be best discerned\r\nin the great crises of language, especially in the transitions from ancient to\r\nmodern forms of them, whether in Europe or Asia. Such changes are the silent\r\nnotes of the world\u0026rsquo;s history; they mark periods of unknown length in\r\nwhich war and conquest were running riot over whole continents, times of\r\nsuffering too great to be endured by the human race, in which the masters\r\nbecame subjects and the subject races masters, in which driven by necessity or\r\nimpelled by some instinct, tribes or nations left their original homes and but\r\nslowly found a resting-place. Language would be the greatest of all historical\r\nmonuments, if it could only tell us the history of itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(5) There are many ways in which we may approach this study. The simplest of\r\nall is to observe our own use of language in conversation or in writing, how we\r\nput words together, how we construct and connect sentences, what are the rules\r\nof accent and rhythm in verse or prose, the formation and composition of words,\r\nthe laws of euphony and sound, the affinities of letters, the mistakes to which\r\nwe are ourselves most liable of spelling or pronunciation. We may compare with\r\nour own language some other, even when we have only a slight knowledge of it,\r\nsuch as French or German. Even a little Latin will enable us to appreciate the\r\ngrand difference between ancient and modern European languages. In the child\r\nlearning to speak we may note the inherent strength of language, which like\r\n\u0026ldquo;a mountain river\u0026rdquo; is always forcing its way out. We may witness\r\nthe delight in imitation and repetition, and some of the laws by which sounds\r\npass into one another. We may learn something also from the falterings of old\r\nage, the searching for words, and the confusion of them with one another, the\r\nforgetfulness of proper names (more commonly than of other words because they\r\nare more isolated), aphasia, and the like. There are philological lessons also\r\nto be gathered from nicknames, from provincialisms, from the slang of great\r\ncities, from the argot of Paris (that language of suffering and crime, so\r\npathetically described by Victor Hugo), from the imperfect articulation of the\r\ndeaf and dumb, from the jabbering of animals, from the analysis of sounds in\r\nrelation to the organs of speech. The phonograph affords a visible evidence of\r\nthe nature and divisions of sound; we may be truly said to know what we can\r\nmanufacture. Artificial languages, such as that of Bishop Wilkins, are chiefly\r\nuseful in showing what language is not. The study of any foreign language may\r\nbe made also a study of Comparative Philology. There are several points, such\r\nas the nature of irregular verbs, of indeclinable parts of speech, the\r\ninfluence of euphony, the decay or loss of inflections, the elements of syntax,\r\nwhich may be examined as well in the history of our own language as of any\r\nother. A few well-selected questions may lead the student at once into the\r\nheart of the mystery: such as, Why are the pronouns and the verb of existence\r\ngenerally more irregular than any other parts of speech? Why is the number of\r\nwords so small in which the sound is an echo of the sense? Why does the meaning\r\nof words depart so widely from their etymology? Why do substantives often\r\ndiffer in meaning from the verbs to which they are related, adverbs from\r\nadjectives? Why do words differing in origin coalesce in the same sound though\r\nretaining their differences of meaning? Why are some verbs impersonal? Why are\r\nthere only so many parts of speech, and on what principle are they divided?\r\nThese are a few crucial questions which give us an insight from different\r\npoints of view into the true nature of language.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(6) Thus far we have been endeavouring to strip off from language the false\r\nappearances in which grammar and philology, or the love of system generally,\r\nhave clothed it. We have also sought to indicate the sources of our knowledge\r\nof it and the spirit in which we should approach it, we may now proceed to\r\nconsider some of the principles or natural laws which have created or modified\r\nit.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\ni. The first and simplest of all the principles of language, common also to the\r\nanimals, is imitation. The lion roars, the wolf howls in the solitude of the\r\nforest: they are answered by similar cries heard from a distance. The bird,\r\ntoo, mimics the voice of man and makes answer to him. Man tells to man the\r\nsecret place in which he is hiding himself; he remembers and repeats the sound\r\nwhich he has heard. The love of imitation becomes a passion and an instinct to\r\nhim. Primitive men learnt to speak from one another, like a child from its\r\nmother or nurse. They learnt of course a rudimentary, half-articulate language,\r\nthe cry or song or speech which was the expression of what we now call human\r\nthoughts and feelings. We may still remark how much greater and more natural\r\nthe exercise of the power is in the use of language than in any other process\r\nor action of the human mind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nii. Imitation provided the first material of language: but it was\r\n\u0026ldquo;without form and void.\u0026rdquo; During how many years or hundreds or\r\nthousands of years the imitative or half-articulate stage continued there is no\r\npossibility of determining. But we may reasonably conjecture that there was a\r\ntime when the vocal utterance of man was intermediate between what we now call\r\nlanguage and the cry of a bird or animal. Speech before language was a rudis\r\nindigestaque materies, not yet distributed into words and sentences, in which\r\nthe cry of fear or joy mingled with more definite sounds recognized by custom\r\nas the expressions of things or events. It was the principle of analogy which\r\nintroduced into this \u0026ldquo;indigesta moles\u0026rdquo; order and measure. It was\r\nAnaxagoras\u0026rsquo; omou panta chremata, eita nous elthon diekosmese: the light\r\nof reason lighted up all things and at once began to arrange them. In every\r\nsentence, in every word and every termination of a word, this power of forming\r\nrelations to one another was contained. There was a proportion of sound to\r\nsound, of meaning to meaning, of meaning to sound. The cases and numbers of\r\nnouns, the persons, tenses, numbers of verbs, were generally on the same or\r\nnearly the same pattern and had the same meaning. The sounds by which they were\r\nexpressed were rough-hewn at first; after a while they grew more\r\nrefined\u0026mdash;the natural laws of euphony began to affect them. The rules of\r\nsyntax are likewise based upon analogy. Time has an analogy with space,\r\narithmetic with geometry. Not only in musical notes, but in the quantity,\r\nquality, accent, rhythm of human speech, trivial or serious, there is a law of\r\nproportion. As in things of beauty, as in all nature, in the composition as\r\nwell as in the motion of all things, there is a similarity of relations by\r\nwhich they are held together.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt would be a mistake to suppose that the analogies of language are always\r\nuniform: there may be often a choice between several, and sometimes one and\r\nsometimes another will prevail. In Greek there are three declensions of nouns;\r\nthe forms of cases in one of them may intrude upon another. Similarly verbs in\r\n-omega and -mu iota interchange forms of tenses, and the completed paradigm of\r\nthe verb is often made up of both. The same nouns may be partly declinable and\r\npartly indeclinable, and in some of their cases may have fallen out of use.\r\nHere are rules with exceptions; they are not however really exceptions, but\r\ncontain in themselves indications of other rules. Many of these interruptions\r\nor variations of analogy occur in pronouns or in the verb of existence of which\r\nthe forms were too common and therefore too deeply imbedded in language\r\nentirely to drop out. The same verbs in the same meaning may sometimes take one\r\ncase, sometimes another. The participle may also have the character of an\r\nadjective, the adverb either of an adjective or of a preposition. These\r\nexceptions are as regular as the rules, but the causes of them are seldom known\r\nto us.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLanguage, like the animal and vegetable worlds, is everywhere intersected by\r\nthe lines of analogy. Like number from which it seems to be derived, the\r\nprinciple of analogy opens the eyes of men to discern the similarities and\r\ndifferences of things, and their relations to one another. At first these are\r\nsuch as lie on the surface only; after a time they are seen by men to reach\r\nfarther down into the nature of things. Gradually in language they arrange\r\nthemselves into a sort of imperfect system; groups of personal and case endings\r\nare placed side by side. The fertility of language produces many more than are\r\nwanted; and the superfluous ones are utilized by the assignment to them of new\r\nmeanings. The vacuity and the superfluity are thus partially compensated by\r\neach other. It must be remembered that in all the languages which have a\r\nliterature, certainly in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, we are not at the beginning\r\nbut almost at the end of the linguistic process; we have reached a time when\r\nthe verb and the noun are nearly perfected, though in no language did they\r\ncompletely perfect themselves, because for some unknown reason the motive\r\npowers of languages seem to have ceased when they were on the eve of\r\ncompletion: they became fixed or crystallized in an imperfect form either from\r\nthe influence of writing and literature, or because no further differentiation\r\nof them was required for the intelligibility of language. So not without\r\nadmixture and confusion and displacement and contamination of sounds and the\r\nmeanings of words, a lower stage of language passes into a higher. Thus far we\r\ncan see and no further. When we ask the reason why this principle of analogy\r\nprevails in all the vast domain of language, there is no answer to the\r\nquestion; or no other answer but this, that there are innumerable ways in\r\nwhich, like number, analogy permeates, not only language, but the whole world,\r\nboth visible and intellectual. We know from experience that it does not (a)\r\narise from any conscious act of reflection that the accusative of a Latin noun\r\nin \u0026ldquo;us\u0026rdquo; should end in \u0026ldquo;um;\u0026rdquo; nor (b) from any necessity\r\nof being understood,\u0026mdash;much less articulation would suffice for this; nor\r\n(c) from greater convenience or expressiveness of particular sounds. Such\r\nnotions were certainly far enough away from the mind of primitive man. We may\r\nspeak of a latent instinct, of a survival of the fittest, easiest, most\r\neuphonic, most economical of breath, in the case of one of two competing\r\nsounds; but these expressions do not add anything to our knowledge. We may try\r\nto grasp the infinity of language either under the figure of a limitless plain\r\ndivided into countries and districts by natural boundaries, or of a vast river\r\neternally flowing whose origin is concealed from us; we may apprehend partially\r\nthe laws by which speech is regulated: but we do not know, and we seem as if we\r\nshould never know, any more than in the parallel case of the origin of species,\r\nhow vocal sounds received life and grew, and in the form of languages came to\r\nbe distributed over the earth.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\niii. Next in order to analogy in the formation of language or even prior to it\r\ncomes the principle of onomatopea, which is itself a kind of analogy or\r\nsimilarity of sound and meaning. In by far the greater number of words it has\r\nbecome disguised and has disappeared; but in no stage of language is it\r\nentirely lost. It belongs chiefly to early language, in which words were few;\r\nand its influence grew less and less as time went on. To the ear which had a\r\nsense of harmony it became a barbarism which disturbed the flow and equilibrium\r\nof discourse; it was an excrescence which had to be cut out, a survival which\r\nneeded to be got rid of, because it was out of keeping with the rest. It\r\nremained for the most part only as a formative principle, which used words and\r\nletters not as crude imitations of other natural sounds, but as symbols of\r\nideas which were naturally associated with them. It received in another way a\r\nnew character; it affected not so much single words, as larger portions of\r\nhuman speech. It regulated the juxtaposition of sounds and the cadence of\r\nsentences. It was the music, not of song, but of speech, in prose as well as\r\nverse. The old onomatopea of primitive language was refined into an onomatopea\r\nof a higher kind, in which it is no longer true to say that a particular sound\r\ncorresponds to a motion or action of man or beast or movement of nature, but\r\nthat in all the higher uses of language the sound is the echo of the sense,\r\nespecially in poetry, in which beauty and expressiveness are given to human\r\nthoughts by the harmonious composition of the words, syllables, letters,\r\naccents, quantities, rhythms, rhymes, varieties and contrasts of all sorts. The\r\npoet with his \u0026ldquo;Break, break, break\u0026rdquo; or his e pasin nekuessi\r\nkataphthimenoisin anassein or his \u0026ldquo;longius ex altoque sinum\r\ntrahit,\u0026rdquo; can produce a far finer music than any crude imitations of\r\nthings or actions in sound, although a letter or two having this imitative\r\npower may be a lesser element of beauty in such passages. The same subtle\r\nsensibility, which adapts the word to the thing, adapts the sentence or cadence\r\nto the general meaning or spirit of the passage. This is the higher onomatopea\r\nwhich has banished the cruder sort as unworthy to have a place in great\r\nlanguages and literatures.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe can see clearly enough that letters or collocations of letters do by various\r\ndegrees of strength or weakness, length or shortness, emphasis or pitch, become\r\nthe natural expressions of the finer parts of human feeling or thought. And not\r\nonly so, but letters themselves have a significance; as Plato observes that the\r\nletter rho accent is expressive of motion, the letters delta and tau of binding\r\nand rest, the letter lambda of smoothness, nu of inwardness, the letter eta of\r\nlength, the letter omicron of roundness. These were often combined so as to\r\nform composite notions, as for example in tromos (trembling), trachus (rugged),\r\nthrauein (crush), krouein (strike), thruptein (break), pumbein\r\n(whirl),\u0026mdash;in all which words we notice a parallel composition of sounds in\r\ntheir English equivalents. Plato also remarks, as we remark, that the\r\nonomatopoetic principle is far from prevailing uniformly, and further that no\r\nexplanation of language consistently corresponds with any system of philosophy,\r\nhowever great may be the light which language throws upon the nature of the\r\nmind. Both in Greek and English we find groups of words such as string, swing,\r\nsling, spring, sting, which are parallel to one another and may be said to\r\nderive their vocal effect partly from contrast of letters, but in which it is\r\nimpossible to assign a precise amount of meaning to each of the expressive and\r\nonomatopoetic letters. A few of them are directly imitative, as for example the\r\nomega in oon, which represents the round form of the egg by the figure of the\r\nmouth: or bronte (thunder), in which the fulness of the sound of the word\r\ncorresponds to the thing signified by it; or bombos (buzzing), of which the\r\nfirst syllable, as in its English equivalent, has the meaning of a deep sound.\r\nWe may observe also (as we see in the case of the poor stammerer) that speech\r\nhas the co-operation of the whole body and may be often assisted or half\r\nexpressed by gesticulation. A sound or word is not the work of the vocal organs\r\nonly; nearly the whole of the upper part of the human frame, including head,\r\nchest, lungs, have a share in creating it; and it may be accompanied by a\r\nmovement of the eyes, nose, fingers, hands, feet which contributes to the\r\neffect of it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe principle of onomatopea has fallen into discredit, partly because it has\r\nbeen supposed to imply an actual manufacture of words out of syllables and\r\nletters, like a piece of joiner\u0026rsquo;s work,\u0026mdash;a theory of language which\r\nis more and more refuted by facts, and more and more going out of fashion with\r\nphilologians; and partly also because the traces of onomatopea in separate\r\nwords become almost obliterated in the course of ages. The poet of language\r\ncannot put in and pull out letters, as a painter might insert or blot out a\r\nshade of colour to give effect to his picture. It would be ridiculous for him\r\nto alter any received form of a word in order to render it more expressive of\r\nthe sense. He can only select, perhaps out of some dialect, the form which is\r\nalready best adapted to his purpose. The true onomatopea is not a creative, but\r\na formative principle, which in the later stage of the history of language\r\nceases to act upon individual words; but still works through the collocation of\r\nthem in the sentence or paragraph, and the adaptation of every word, syllable,\r\nletter to one another and to the rhythm of the whole passage.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\niv. Next, under a distinct head, although not separable from the preceding, may\r\nbe considered the differentiation of languages, i.e. the manner in which\r\ndifferences of meaning and form have arisen in them. Into their first creation\r\nwe have ceased to enquire: it is their aftergrowth with which we are now\r\nconcerned. How did the roots or substantial portions of words become modified\r\nor inflected? and how did they receive separate meanings? First we remark that\r\nwords are attracted by the sounds and senses of other words, so that they form\r\ngroups of nouns and verbs analogous in sound and sense to one another, each\r\nnoun or verb putting forth inflexions, generally of two or three patterns, and\r\nwith exceptions. We do not say that we know how sense became first allied to\r\nsound; but we have no difficulty in ascertaining how the sounds and meanings of\r\nwords were in time parted off or differentiated. (1) The chief causes which\r\nregulate the variations of sound are (a) double or differing analogies, which\r\nlead sometimes to one form, sometimes to another (b) euphony, by which is meant\r\nchiefly the greater pleasure to the ear and the greater facility to the organs\r\nof speech which is given by a new formation or pronunciation of a word (c) the\r\nnecessity of finding new expressions for new classes or processes of things. We\r\nare told that changes of sound take place by innumerable gradations until a\r\nwhole tribe or community or society find themselves acquiescing in a new\r\npronunciation or use of language. Yet no one observes the change, or is at all\r\naware that in the course of a lifetime he and his contemporaries have\r\nappreciably varied their intonation or use of words. On the other hand, the\r\nnecessities of language seem to require that the intermediate sounds or\r\nmeanings of words should quickly become fixed or set and not continue in a\r\nstate of transition. The process of settling down is aided by the organs of\r\nspeech and by the use of writing and printing. (2) The meaning of words varies\r\nbecause ideas vary or the number of things which is included under them or with\r\nwhich they are associated is increased. A single word is thus made to do duty\r\nfor many more things than were formerly expressed by it; and it parts into\r\ndifferent senses when the classes of things or ideas which are represented by\r\nit are themselves different and distinct. A figurative use of a word may easily\r\npass into a new sense: a new meaning caught up by association may become more\r\nimportant than all the rest. The good or neutral sense of a word, such as\r\nJesuit, Puritan, Methodist, Heretic, has been often converted into a bad one by\r\nthe malevolence of party spirit. Double forms suggest different meanings and\r\nare often used to express them; and the form or accent of a word has been not\r\nunfrequently altered when there is a difference of meaning. The difference of\r\ngender in nouns is utilized for the same reason. New meanings of words push\r\nthemselves into the vacant spaces of language and retire when they are no\r\nlonger needed. Language equally abhors vacancy and superfluity. But the\r\nremedial measures by which both are eliminated are not due to any conscious\r\naction of the human mind; nor is the force exerted by them constraining or\r\nnecessary.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(7) We have shown that language, although subject to laws, is far from being of\r\nan exact and uniform nature. We may now speak briefly of the faults of\r\nlanguage. They may be compared to the faults of Geology, in which different\r\nstrata cross one another or meet at an angle, or mix with one another either by\r\nslow transitions or by violent convulsions, leaving many lacunae which can be\r\nno longer filled up, and often becoming so complex that no true explanation of\r\nthem can be given. So in language there are the cross influences of meaning and\r\nsound, of logic and grammar, of differing analogies, of words and the\r\ninflexions of words, which often come into conflict with each other. The\r\ngrammarian, if he were to form new words, would make them all of the same\r\npattern according to what he conceives to be the rule, that is, the more common\r\nusage of language. The subtlety of nature goes far beyond art, and it is\r\ncomplicated by irregularity, so that often we can hardly say that there is a\r\nright or wrong in the formation of words. For almost any formation which is not\r\nat variance with the first principles of language is possible and may be\r\ndefended.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe imperfection of language is really due to the formation and correlation of\r\nwords by accident, that is to say, by principles which are unknown to us. Hence\r\nwe see why Plato, like ourselves unable to comprehend the whole of language,\r\nwas constrained to \u0026ldquo;supplement the poor creature imitation by another\r\npoor creature convention.\u0026rdquo; But the poor creature convention in the end\r\nproves too much for all the rest: for we do not ask what is the origin of words\r\nor whether they are formed according to a correct analogy, but what is the\r\nusage of them; and we are compelled to admit with Hermogenes in Plato and with\r\nHorace that usage is the ruling principle, \u0026ldquo;quem penes arbitrium est, et\r\njus et norma loquendi.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(8) There are two ways in which a language may attain permanence or fixity.\r\nFirst, it may have been embodied in poems or hymns or laws, which may be\r\nrepeated for hundreds, perhaps for thousands of years with a religious\r\naccuracy, so that to the priests or rhapsodists of a nation the whole or the\r\ngreater part of a language is literally preserved; secondly, it may be written\r\ndown and in a written form distributed more or less widely among the whole\r\nnation. In either case the language which is familiarly spoken may have grown\r\nup wholly or in a great measure independently of them. (1) The first of these\r\nprocesses has been sometimes attended by the result that the sound of the words\r\nhas been carefully preserved and that the meaning of them has either perished\r\nwholly, or is only doubtfully recovered by the efforts of modern philology. The\r\nverses have been repeated as a chant or part of a ritual, but they have had no\r\nrelation to ordinary life or speech. (2) The invention of writing again is\r\ncommonly attributed to a particular epoch, and we are apt to think that such an\r\ninestimable gift would have immediately been diffused over a whole country. But\r\nit may have taken a long time to perfect the art of writing, and another long\r\nperiod may have elapsed before it came into common use. Its influence on\r\nlanguage has been increased ten, twenty or one hundred fold by the invention of\r\nprinting.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBefore the growth of poetry or the invention of writing, languages were only\r\ndialects. So they continued to be in parts of the country in which writing was\r\nnot used or in which there was no diffusion of literature. In most of the\r\ncounties of England there is still a provincial style, which has been sometimes\r\nmade by a great poet the vehicle of his fancies. When a book sinks into the\r\nmind of a nation, such as Luther\u0026rsquo;s Bible or the Authorized English\r\nTranslation of the Bible, or again great classical works like Shakspere or\r\nMilton, not only have new powers of expression been diffused through a whole\r\nnation, but a great step towards uniformity has been made. The instinct of\r\nlanguage demands regular grammar and correct spelling: these are imprinted\r\ndeeply on the tablets of a nation\u0026rsquo;s memory by a common use of classical\r\nand popular writers. In our own day we have attained to a point at which nearly\r\nevery printed book is spelt correctly and written grammatically.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(9) Proceeding further to trace the influence of literature on language we note\r\nsome other causes which have affected the higher use of it: such as (1) the\r\nnecessity of clearness and connexion; (2) the fear of tautology; (3) the\r\ninfluence of metre, rhythm, rhyme, and of the language of prose and verse upon\r\none another; (4) the power of idiom and quotation; (5) the relativeness of\r\nwords to one another.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt has been usual to depreciate modern languages when compared with ancient.\r\nThe latter are regarded as furnishing a type of excellence to which the former\r\ncannot attain. But the truth seems to be that modern languages, if through the\r\nloss of inflections and genders they lack some power or beauty or\r\nexpressiveness or precision which is possessed by the ancient, are in many\r\nother respects superior to them: the thought is generally clearer, the\r\nconnexion closer, the sentence and paragraph are better distributed. The best\r\nmodern languages, for example English or French, possess as great a power of\r\nself-improvement as the Latin, if not as the Greek. Nor does there seem to be\r\nany reason why they should ever decline or decay. It is a popular remark that\r\nour great writers are beginning to disappear: it may also be remarked that\r\nwhenever a great writer appears in the future he will find the English language\r\nas perfect and as ready for use as in the days of Shakspere or Milton. There is\r\nno reason to suppose that English or French will ever be reduced to the low\r\nlevel of Modern Greek or of Mediaeval Latin. The wide diffusion of great\r\nauthors would make such a decline impossible. Nor will modern languages be\r\neasily broken up by amalgamation with each other. The distance between them is\r\ntoo wide to be spanned, the differences are too great to be overcome, and the\r\nuse of printing makes it impossible that one of them should ever be lost in\r\nanother.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe structure of the English language differs greatly from that of either Latin\r\nor Greek. In the two latter, especially in Greek, sentences are joined together\r\nby connecting particles. They are distributed on the right hand and on the left\r\nby men, de, alla, kaitoi, kai de and the like, or deduced from one another by\r\nara, de, oun, toinun and the like. In English the majority of sentences are\r\nindependent and in apposition to one another; they are laid side by side or\r\nslightly connected by the copula. But within the sentence the expression of the\r\nlogical relations of the clauses is closer and more exact: there is less of\r\napposition and participial structure. The sentences thus laid side by side are\r\nalso constructed into paragraphs; these again are less distinctly marked in\r\nGreek and Latin than in English. Generally French, German, and English have an\r\nadvantage over the classical languages in point of accuracy. The three concords\r\nare more accurately observed in English than in either Greek or Latin. On the\r\nother hand, the extension of the familiar use of the masculine and feminine\r\ngender to objects of sense and abstract ideas as well as to men and animals no\r\ndoubt lends a nameless grace to style which we have a difficulty in\r\nappreciating, and the possible variety in the order of words gives more\r\nflexibility and also a kind of dignity to the period. Of the comparative effect\r\nof accent and quantity and of the relation between them in ancient and modern\r\nlanguages we are not able to judge.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnother quality in which modern are superior to ancient languages is freedom\r\nfrom tautology. No English style is thought tolerable in which, except for the\r\nsake of emphasis, the same words are repeated at short intervals. Of course the\r\nlength of the interval must depend on the character of the word. Striking words\r\nand expressions cannot be allowed to reappear, if at all, except at the\r\ndistance of a page or more. Pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions may or rather\r\nmust recur in successive lines. It seems to be a kind of impertinence to the\r\nreader and strikes unpleasantly both on the mind and on the ear that the same\r\nsounds should be used twice over, when another word or turn of expression would\r\nhave given a new shade of meaning to the thought and would have added a\r\npleasing variety to the sound. And the mind equally rejects the repetition of\r\nthe word and the use of a mere synonym for it,\u0026mdash;e.g. felicity and\r\nhappiness. The cultivated mind desires something more, which a skilful writer\r\nis easily able to supply out of his treasure-house.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe fear of tautology has doubtless led to the multiplications of words and the\r\nmeanings of words, and generally to an enlargement of the vocabulary. It is a\r\nvery early instinct of language; for ancient poetry is almost as free from\r\ntautology as the best modern writings. The speech of young children, except in\r\nso far as they are compelled to repeat themselves by the fewness of their\r\nwords, also escapes from it. When they grow up and have ideas which are beyond\r\ntheir powers of expression, especially in writing, tautology begins to appear.\r\nIn like manner when language is \u0026ldquo;contaminated\u0026rdquo; by philosophy it is\r\napt to become awkward, to stammer and repeat itself, to lose its flow and\r\nfreedom. No philosophical writer with the exception of Plato, who is himself\r\nnot free from tautology, and perhaps Bacon, has attained to any high degree of\r\nliterary excellence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo poetry the form and polish of language is chiefly to be attributed; and the\r\nmost critical period in the history of language is the transition from verse to\r\nprose. At first mankind were contented to express their thoughts in a set form\r\nof words having a kind of rhythm; to which regularity was given by accent and\r\nquantity. But after a time they demanded a greater degree of freedom, and to\r\nthose who had all their life been hearing poetry the first introduction of\r\nprose had the charm of novelty. The prose romances into which the Homeric Poems\r\nwere converted, for a while probably gave more delight to the hearers or\r\nreaders of them than the Poems themselves, and in time the relation of the two\r\nwas reversed: the poems which had once been a necessity of the human mind\r\nbecame a luxury: they were now superseded by prose, which in all succeeding\r\nages became the natural vehicle of expression to all mankind. Henceforward\r\nprose and poetry formed each other. A comparatively slender link between them\r\nwas also furnished by proverbs. We may trace in poetry how the simple\r\nsuccession of lines, not without monotony, has passed into a complicated\r\nperiod, and how in prose, rhythm and accent and the order of words and the\r\nbalance of clauses, sometimes not without a slight admixture of rhyme, make up\r\na new kind of harmony, swelling into strains not less majestic than those of\r\nHomer, Virgil, or Dante.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOne of the most curious and characteristic features of language, affecting both\r\nsyntax and style, is idiom. The meaning of the word \u0026ldquo;idiom\u0026rdquo; is that\r\nwhich is peculiar, that which is familiar, the word or expression which strikes\r\nus or comes home to us, which is more readily understood or more easily\r\nremembered. It is a quality which really exists in infinite degrees, which we\r\nturn into differences of kind by applying the term only to conspicuous and\r\nstriking examples of words or phrases which have this quality. It often\r\nsupersedes the laws of language or the rules of grammar, or rather is to be\r\nregarded as another law of language which is natural and necessary. The word or\r\nphrase which has been repeated many times over is more intelligible and\r\nfamiliar to us than one which is rare, and our familiarity with it more than\r\ncompensates for incorrectness or inaccuracy in the use of it. Striking\r\nexpressions also which have moved the hearts of nations or are the precious\r\nstones and jewels of great authors partake of the nature of idioms: they are\r\ntaken out of the sphere of grammar and are exempt from the proprieties of\r\nlanguage. Every one knows that we often put words together in a manner which\r\nwould be intolerable if it were not idiomatic. We cannot argue either about the\r\nmeaning of words or the use of constructions that because they are used in one\r\nconnexion they will be legitimate in another, unless we allow for this\r\nprinciple. We can bear to have words and sentences used in new senses or in a\r\nnew order or even a little perverted in meaning when we are quite familiar with\r\nthem. Quotations are as often applied in a sense which the author did not\r\nintend as in that which he did. The parody of the words of Shakspere or of the\r\nBible, which has in it something of the nature of a lie, is far from unpleasing\r\nto us. The better known words, even if their meaning be perverted, are more\r\nagreeable to us and have a greater power over us. Most of us have experienced a\r\nsort of delight and feeling of curiosity when we first came across or when we\r\nfirst used for ourselves a new word or phrase or figure of speech.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere are associations of sound and of sense by which every word is linked to\r\nevery other. One letter harmonizes with another; every verb or noun derives its\r\nmeaning, not only from itself, but from the words with which it is associated.\r\nSome reflection of them near or distant is embodied in it. In any new use of a\r\nword all the existing uses of it have to be considered. Upon these depends the\r\nquestion whether it will bear the proposed extension of meaning or not.\r\nAccording to the famous expression of Luther, \u0026ldquo;Words are living\r\ncreatures, having hands and feet.\u0026rdquo; When they cease to retain this living\r\npower of adaptation, when they are only put together like the parts of a piece\r\nof furniture, language becomes unpoetical, inexpressive, dead.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGrammars would lead us to suppose that words have a fixed form and sound.\r\nLexicons assign to each word a definite meaning or meanings. They both tend to\r\nobscure the fact that the sentence precedes the word and that all language is\r\nrelative. (1) It is relative to its own context. Its meaning is modified by\r\nwhat has been said before and after in the same or in some other passage:\r\nwithout comparing the context we are not sure whether it is used in the same\r\nsense even in two successive sentences. (2) It is relative to facts, to time,\r\nplace, and occasion: when they are already known to the hearer or reader, they\r\nmay be presupposed; there is no need to allude to them further. (3) It is\r\nrelative to the knowledge of the writer and reader or of the speaker and\r\nhearer. Except for the sake of order and consecutiveness nothing ought to be\r\nexpressed which is already commonly or universally known. A word or two may be\r\nsufficient to give an intimation to a friend; a long or elaborate speech or\r\ncomposition is required to explain some new idea to a popular audience or to\r\nthe ordinary reader or to a young pupil. Grammars and dictionaries are not to\r\nbe despised; for in teaching we need clearness rather than subtlety. But we\r\nmust not therefore forget that there is also a higher ideal of language in\r\nwhich all is relative\u0026mdash;sounds to sounds, words to words, the parts to the\r\nwhole\u0026mdash;in which besides the lesser context of the book or speech, there is\r\nalso the larger context of history and circumstances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe study of Comparative Philology has introduced into the world a new science\r\nwhich more than any other binds up man with nature, and distant ages and\r\ncountries with one another. It may be said to have thrown a light upon all\r\nother sciences and upon the nature of the human mind itself. The true\r\nconception of it dispels many errors, not only of metaphysics and theology, but\r\nalso of natural knowledge. Yet it is far from certain that this newly-found\r\nscience will continue to progress in the same surprising manner as heretofore;\r\nor that even if our materials are largely increased, we shall arrive at much\r\nmore definite conclusions than at present. Like some other branches of\r\nknowledge, it may be approaching a point at which it can no longer be\r\nprofitably studied. But at any rate it has brought back the philosophy of\r\nlanguage from theory to fact; it has passed out of the region of guesses and\r\nhypotheses, and has attained the dignity of an Inductive Science. And it is not\r\nwithout practical and political importance. It gives a new interest to distant\r\nand subject countries; it brings back the dawning light from one end of the\r\nearth to the other. Nations, like individuals, are better understood by us when\r\nwe know something of their early life; and when they are better understood by\r\nus, we feel more kindly towards them. Lastly, we may remember that all\r\nknowledge is valuable for its own sake; and we may also hope that a deeper\r\ninsight into the nature of human speech will give us a greater command of it\r\nand enable us to make a nobler use of it.\u003ca href=\"#fn2\" name=\"fnref2\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[2]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref2\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nCompare again W. Humboldt, \u003ci\u003eUeber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen\r\nSprachbaues\u003c/i\u003e; M. Müller, \u003ci\u003eLectures on the Science of Language\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nSteinthal, \u003ci\u003eEinleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft\u003c/i\u003e: and for\r\nthe latter part of the Essay, Delbruck, \u003ci\u003eStudy of Language\u003c/i\u003e; Paul\u0026rsquo;s\r\n\u003ci\u003ePrinciples of the History of Language\u003c/i\u003e: to the latter work the author of\r\nthis Essay is largely indebted.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap02\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCRATYLUS\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eBy Plato\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\nTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Hermogenes, Cratylus.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Suppose that we make Socrates a party to the argument?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: If you please.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I should explain to you, Socrates, that our friend Cratylus has\r\nbeen arguing about names; he says that they are natural and not conventional;\r\nnot a portion of the human voice which men agree to use; but that there is a\r\ntruth or correctness in them, which is the same for Hellenes as for barbarians.\r\nWhereupon I ask him, whether his own name of Cratylus is a true name or not,\r\nand he answers \u0026ldquo;Yes.\u0026rdquo; And Socrates? \u0026ldquo;Yes.\u0026rdquo; Then every\r\nman\u0026rsquo;s name, as I tell him, is that which he is called. To this he\r\nreplies\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;If all the world were to call you Hermogenes, that would\r\nnot be your name.\u0026rdquo; And when I am anxious to have a further explanation he\r\nis ironical and mysterious, and seems to imply that he has a notion of his own\r\nabout the matter, if he would only tell, and could entirely convince me, if he\r\nchose to be intelligible. Tell me, Socrates, what this oracle means; or rather\r\ntell me, if you will be so good, what is your own view of the truth or\r\ncorrectness of names, which I would far sooner hear.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying, that \u0026ldquo;hard is\r\nthe knowledge of the good.\u0026rdquo; And the knowledge of names is a great part of\r\nknowledge. If I had not been poor, I might have heard the fifty-drachma course\r\nof the great Prodicus, which is a complete education in grammar and\r\nlanguage\u0026mdash;these are his own words\u0026mdash;and then I should have been at\r\nonce able to answer your question about the correctness of names. But, indeed,\r\nI have only heard the single-drachma course, and therefore, I do not know the\r\ntruth about such matters; I will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus in\r\nthe investigation of them. When he declares that your name is not really\r\nHermogenes, I suspect that he is only making fun of you;\u0026mdash;he means to say\r\nthat you are no true son of Hermes, because you are always looking after a\r\nfortune and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a good deal of\r\ndifficulty in this sort of knowledge, and therefore we had better leave the\r\nquestion open until we have heard both sides.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus and\r\nothers, and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of correctness\r\nin names other than convention and agreement; any name which you give, in my\r\nopinion, is the right one, and if you change that and give another, the new\r\nname is as correct as the old\u0026mdash;we frequently change the names of our\r\nslaves, and the newly-imposed name is as good as the old: for there is no name\r\ngiven to anything by nature; all is convention and habit of the\r\nusers;\u0026mdash;such is my view. But if I am mistaken I shall be happy to hear and\r\nlearn of Cratylus, or of any one else.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I dare say that you may be right, Hermogenes: let us see;\u0026mdash;Your\r\nmeaning is, that the name of each thing is only that which anybody agrees to\r\ncall it?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That is my notion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, now, let me take an instance;\u0026mdash;suppose that I call a man a\r\nhorse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man will be rightly called a\r\nhorse by me individually, and rightly called a man by the rest of the world;\r\nand a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and a horse by the\r\nworld:\u0026mdash;that is your meaning?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: He would, according to my view.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But how about truth, then? you would acknowledge that there is in\r\nwords a true and a false?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And there are true and false propositions?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: To be sure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And a true proposition says that which is, and a false proposition\r\nsays that which is not?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes; what other answer is possible?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then in a proposition there is a true and false?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts untrue?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: No; the parts are true as well as the whole.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or every\r\npart?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I should say that every part is true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: No; that is the smallest.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then the name is a part of the true proposition?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes, and a true part, as you say.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be true and\r\nfalse?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: So we must infer.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be the\r\nname?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says that\r\nthere are? and will they be true names at the time of uttering them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates, I can conceive no correctness of names other than\r\nthis; you give one name, and I another; and in different cities and countries\r\nthere are different names for the same things; Hellenes differ from barbarians\r\nin their use of names, and the several Hellenic tribes from one another.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ as the names\r\ndiffer? and are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells us? For he\r\nsays that man is the measure of all things, and that things are to me as they\r\nappear to me, and that they are to you as they appear to you. Do you agree with\r\nhim, or would you say that things have a permanent essence of their own?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in my\r\nperplexity to take refuge with Protagoras; not that I agree with him at all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: What! have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such thing\r\nas a bad man?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: No, indeed; but I have often had reason to think that there are\r\nvery bad men, and a good many of them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, and have you ever found any very good ones?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Not many.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Still you have found them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and the\r\nvery evil very foolish? Would that be your view?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: It would.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are as they\r\nappear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Impossible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And if, on the other hand, wisdom and folly are really\r\ndistinguishable, you will allow, I think, that the assertion of Protagoras can\r\nhardly be correct. For if what appears to each man is true to him, one man\r\ncannot in reality be wiser than another.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: He cannot.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all things\r\nequally belong to all men at the same moment and always; for neither on his\r\nview can there be some good and others bad, if virtue and vice are always\r\nequally to be attributed to all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: There cannot.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But if neither is right, and things are not relative to individuals,\r\nand all things do not equally belong to all at the same moment and always, they\r\nmust be supposed to have their own proper and permanent essence: they are not\r\nin relation to us, or influenced by us, fluctuating according to our fancy, but\r\nthey are independent, and maintain to their own essence the relation prescribed\r\nby nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or equally\r\nto the actions which proceed from them? Are not actions also a class of being?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes, the actions are real as well as the things.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature, and\r\nnot according to our opinion of them? In cutting, for example, we do not cut as\r\nwe please, and with any chance instrument; but we cut with the proper\r\ninstrument only, and according to the natural process of cutting; and the\r\nnatural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail and be of no\r\nuse at all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I should say that the natural way is the right way.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Again, in burning, not every way is the right way; but the right way\r\nis the natural way, and the right instrument the natural instrument.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And this holds good of all actions?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And speech is a kind of action?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will not the\r\nsuccessful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural way of speaking, and\r\nas things ought to be spoken, and with the natural instrument? Any other mode\r\nof speaking will result in error and failure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I quite agree with you.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And is not naming a part of speaking? for in giving names men speak.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That is true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts, is\r\nnot naming also a sort of action?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had a\r\nspecial nature of their own?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Precisely.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to be given\r\naccording to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, and not at our\r\npleasure: in this and no other way shall we name with success.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I agree.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with something?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or pierced\r\nwith something?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And that which has to be named has to be named with something?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: What is that with which we pierce?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: An awl.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And with which we weave?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: A shuttle.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And with which we name?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: A name.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Very good: then a name is an instrument?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Suppose that I ask, \u0026ldquo;What sort of instrument is a\r\nshuttle?\u0026rdquo; And you answer, \u0026ldquo;A weaving instrument.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Well.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And I ask again, \u0026ldquo;What do we do when we weave?\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;The\r\nanswer is, that we separate or disengage the warp from the woof.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of\r\ninstruments in general?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: To be sure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names: will you\r\nanswer me? Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we name?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I cannot say.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish things\r\naccording to their natures?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Certainly we do.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of distinguishing\r\nnatures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads of the web.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Assuredly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then the weaver will use the shuttle well\u0026mdash;and well means like a\r\nweaver? and the teacher will use the name well\u0026mdash;and well means like a\r\nteacher?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be using\r\nwell?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That of the carpenter.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Only the skilled.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be using well?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That of the smith.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And is every man a smith, or only the skilled?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: The skilled only.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be using?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: There again I am puzzled.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Cannot you at least say who gives us the names which we use?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Does not the law seem to you to give us them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes, I suppose so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of the\r\nlegislator?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I agree.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: The skilled only.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to give a name, but only a\r\nmaker of names; and this is the legislator, who of all skilled artisans in the\r\nworld is the rarest.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And how does the legislator make names? and to what does he look?\r\nConsider this in the light of the previous instances: to what does the\r\ncarpenter look in making the shuttle? Does he not look to that which is\r\nnaturally fitted to act as a shuttle?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he make another,\r\nlooking to the broken one? or will he look to the form according to which he\r\nmade the other?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: To the latter, I should imagine.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I think so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of garments,\r\nthin or thick, of flaxen, woollen, or other material, ought all of them to have\r\nthe true form of the shuttle; and whatever is the shuttle best adapted to each\r\nkind of work, that ought to be the form which the maker produces in each case.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the same holds of other instruments: when a man has discovered\r\nthe instrument which is naturally adapted to each work, he must express this\r\nnatural form, and not others which he fancies, in the material, whatever it may\r\nbe, which he employs; for example, he ought to know how to put into iron the\r\nforms of awls adapted by nature to their several uses?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature to their\r\nuses?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: For the several forms of shuttles naturally answer to the several\r\nkinds of webs; and this is true of instruments in general.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then, as to names: ought not our legislator also to know how to put\r\nthe true natural name of each thing into sounds and syllables, and to make and\r\ngive all names with a view to the ideal name, if he is to be a namer in any\r\ntrue sense? And we must remember that different legislators will not use the\r\nsame syllables. For neither does every smith, although he may be making the\r\nsame instrument for the same purpose, make them all of the same iron. The form\r\nmust be the same, but the material may vary, and still the instrument may be\r\nequally good of whatever iron made, whether in Hellas or in a foreign\r\ncountry;\u0026mdash;there is no difference.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the legislator, whether he be Hellene or barbarian, is not\r\ntherefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator, provided he gives the true\r\nand proper form of the name in whatever syllables; this or that country makes\r\nno matter.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Quite true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given to the\r\nshuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used? the carpenter who makes, or the\r\nweaver who is to use them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I should say, he who is to use them, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And who uses the work of the lyre-maker? Will not he be the man who\r\nknows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also whether the work\r\nis being well done or not?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And who is he?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: The player of the lyre.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And who will direct the shipwright?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: The pilot.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his work, and\r\nwill know whether the work is well done, in this or any other country? Will not\r\nthe user be the man?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And this is he who knows how to ask questions?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And how to answer them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And him who knows how to ask and answer you would call a\r\ndialectician?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes; that would be his name.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then the work of the carpenter is to make a rudder, and the pilot has\r\nto direct him, if the rudder is to be well made.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the work of the legislator is to give names, and the dialectician\r\nmust be his director if the names are to be rightly given?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That is true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, I should say that this giving of names can be no\r\nsuch light matter as you fancy, or the work of light or chance persons; and\r\nCratylus is right in saying that things have names by nature, and that not\r\nevery man is an artificer of names, but he only who looks to the name which\r\neach thing by nature has, and is able to express the true forms of things in\r\nletters and syllables.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I cannot answer you, Socrates; but I find a difficulty in changing\r\nmy opinion all in a moment, and I think that I should be more readily\r\npersuaded, if you would show me what this is which you term the natural fitness\r\nof names.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: My good Hermogenes, I have none to show. Was I not telling you just\r\nnow (but you have forgotten), that I knew nothing, and proposing to share the\r\nenquiry with you? But now that you and I have talked over the matter, a step\r\nhas been gained; for we have discovered that names have by nature a truth, and\r\nthat not every man knows how to give a thing a name.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Very good.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names? That,\r\nif you care to know, is the next question.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Certainly, I care to know.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then reflect.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: How shall I reflect?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The true way is to have the assistance of those who know, and you\r\nmust pay them well both in money and in thanks; these are the Sophists, of whom\r\nyour brother, Callias, has\u0026mdash;rather dearly\u0026mdash;bought the reputation of\r\nwisdom. But you have not yet come into your inheritance, and therefore you had\r\nbetter go to him, and beg and entreat him to tell you what he has learnt from\r\nProtagoras about the fitness of names.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: But how inconsistent should I be, if, whilst repudiating Protagoras\r\nand his truth (\u0026ldquo;Truth\u0026rdquo; was the title of the book of Protagoras;\r\ncompare Theaet.), I were to attach any value to what he and his book affirm!\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then if you despise him, you must learn of Homer and the poets.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: And where does Homer say anything about names, and what does he\r\nsay?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: He often speaks of them; notably and nobly in the places where he\r\ndistinguishes the different names which Gods and men give to the same things.\r\nDoes he not in these passages make a remarkable statement about the correctness\r\nof names? For the Gods must clearly be supposed to call things by their right\r\nand natural names; do you not think so?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Why, of course they call them rightly, if they call them at all.\r\nBut to what are you referring?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Do you not know what he says about the river in Troy who had a single\r\ncombat with Hephaestus?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Whom,\u0026rdquo; as he says, \u0026ldquo;the Gods call Xanthus, and men call\r\nScamander.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I remember.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, and about this river\u0026mdash;to know that he ought to be called\r\nXanthus and not Scamander\u0026mdash;is not that a solemn lesson? Or about the bird\r\nwhich, as he says,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;The Gods call Chalcis, and men Cymindis:\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nto be taught how much more correct the name Chalcis is than the name\r\nCymindis\u0026mdash;do you deem that a light matter? Or about Batieia and Myrina?\r\n(Compare Il. \u0026ldquo;The hill which men call Batieia and the immortals the tomb\r\nof the sportive Myrina.\u0026rdquo;) And there are many other observations of the\r\nsame kind in Homer and other poets. Now, I think that this is beyond the\r\nunderstanding of you and me; but the names of Scamandrius and Astyanax, which\r\nhe affirms to have been the names of Hector\u0026rsquo;s son, are more within the\r\nrange of human faculties, as I am disposed to think; and what the poet means by\r\ncorrectness may be more readily apprehended in that instance: you will remember\r\nI dare say the lines to which I refer? (Il.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I do.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct of the\r\nnames given to Hector\u0026rsquo;s son\u0026mdash;Astyanax or Scamandrius?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I do not know.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: How would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or the\r\nunwise are more likely to give correct names?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I should say the wise, of course.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And are the men or the women of a city, taken as a class, the wiser?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I should say, the men.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And Homer, as you know, says that the Trojan men called him Astyanax\r\n(king of the city); but if the men called him Astyanax, the other name of\r\nScamandrius could only have been given to him by the women.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That may be inferred.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than their\r\nwives?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: To be sure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then he must have thought Astyanax to be a more correct name for the\r\nboy than Scamandrius?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Clearly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And what is the reason of this? Let us consider:\u0026mdash;does he not\r\nhimself suggest a very good reason, when he says,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;For he alone defended their city and long walls\u0026rdquo;?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis appears to be a good reason for calling the son of the saviour king of the\r\ncity which his father was saving, as Homer observes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I see.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Why, Hermogenes, I do not as yet see myself; and do you?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: No, indeed; not I.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But tell me, friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector his name?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: What of that?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The name appears to me to be very nearly the same as the name of\r\nAstyanax\u0026mdash;both are Hellenic; and a king (anax) and a holder (ektor) have\r\nnearly the same meaning, and are both descriptive of a king; for a man is\r\nclearly the holder of that of which he is king; he rules, and owns, and holds\r\nit. But, perhaps, you may think that I am talking nonsense; and indeed I\r\nbelieve that I myself did not know what I meant when I imagined that I had\r\nfound some indication of the opinion of Homer about the correctness of names.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I assure you that I think otherwise, and I believe you to be on the\r\nright track.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: There is reason, I think, in calling the lion\u0026rsquo;s whelp a lion,\r\nand the foal of a horse a horse; I am speaking only of the ordinary course of\r\nnature, when an animal produces after his kind, and not of extraordinary\r\nbirths;\u0026mdash;if contrary to nature a horse have a calf, then I should not call\r\nthat a foal but a calf; nor do I call any inhuman birth a man, but only a\r\nnatural birth. And the same may be said of trees and other things. Do you agree\r\nwith me?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes, I agree.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Very good. But you had better watch me and see that I do not play\r\ntricks with you. For on the same principle the son of a king is to be called a\r\nking. And whether the syllables of the name are the same or not the same, makes\r\nno difference, provided the meaning is retained; nor does the addition or\r\nsubtraction of a letter make any difference so long as the essence of the thing\r\nremains in possession of the name and appears in it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: What do you mean?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: A very simple matter. I may illustrate my meaning by the names of\r\nletters, which you know are not the same as the letters themselves with the\r\nexception of the four epsilon, upsilon, omicron, omega; the names of the rest,\r\nwhether vowels or consonants, are made up of other letters which we add to\r\nthem; but so long as we introduce the meaning, and there can be no mistake, the\r\nname of the letter is quite correct. Take, for example, the letter\r\nbeta\u0026mdash;the addition of eta, tau, alpha, gives no offence, and does not\r\nprevent the whole name from having the value which the legislator\r\nintended\u0026mdash;so well did he know how to give the letters names.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I believe you are right.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And may not the same be said of a king? a king will often be the son\r\nof a king, the good son or the noble son of a good or noble sire; and similarly\r\nthe offspring of every kind, in the regular course of nature, is like the\r\nparent, and therefore has the same name. Yet the syllables may be disguised\r\nuntil they appear different to the ignorant person, and he may not recognize\r\nthem, although they are the same, just as any one of us would not recognize the\r\nsame drugs under different disguises of colour and smell, although to the\r\nphysician, who regards the power of them, they are the same, and he is not put\r\nout by the addition; and in like manner the etymologist is not put out by the\r\naddition or transposition or subtraction of a letter or two, or indeed by the\r\nchange of all the letters, for this need not interfere with the meaning. As was\r\njust now said, the names of Hector and Astyanax have only one letter alike,\r\nwhich is tau, and yet they have the same meaning. And how little in common with\r\nthe letters of their names has Archepolis (ruler of the city)\u0026mdash;and yet the\r\nmeaning is the same. And there are many other names which just mean\r\n\u0026ldquo;king.\u0026rdquo; Again, there are several names for a general, as, for\r\nexample, Agis (leader) and Polemarchus (chief in war) and Eupolemus (good\r\nwarrior); and others which denote a physician, as Iatrocles (famous healer) and\r\nAcesimbrotus (curer of mortals); and there are many others which might be\r\ncited, differing in their syllables and letters, but having the same meaning.\r\nWould you not say so?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who follow in the\r\ncourse of nature?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And what of those who follow out of the course of nature, and are\r\nprodigies? for example, when a good and religious man has an irreligious son,\r\nhe ought to bear the name not of his father, but of the class to which he\r\nbelongs, just as in the case which was before supposed of a horse foaling a\r\ncalf.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Quite true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then the irreligious son of a religious father should be called\r\nirreligious?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: He should not be called Theophilus (beloved of God) or Mnesitheus\r\n(mindful of God), or any of these names: if names are correctly given, his\r\nshould have an opposite meaning.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Again, Hermogenes, there is Orestes (the man of the mountains) who\r\nappears to be rightly called; whether chance gave the name, or perhaps some\r\npoet who meant to express the brutality and fierceness and mountain wildness of\r\nhis hero\u0026rsquo;s nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That is very likely, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And his father\u0026rsquo;s name is also according to nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Clearly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes, for as his name, so also is his nature; Agamemnon (admirable for\r\nremaining) is one who is patient and persevering in the accomplishment of his\r\nresolves, and by his virtue crowns them; and his continuance at Troy with all\r\nthe vast army is a proof of that admirable endurance in him which is signified\r\nby the name Agamemnon. I also think that Atreus is rightly called; for his\r\nmurder of Chrysippus and his exceeding cruelty to Thyestes are damaging and\r\ndestructive to his reputation\u0026mdash;the name is a little altered and disguised\r\nso as not to be intelligible to every one, but to the etymologist there is no\r\ndifficulty in seeing the meaning, for whether you think of him as ateires the\r\nstubborn, or as atrestos the fearless, or as ateros the destructive one, the\r\nname is perfectly correct in every point of view. And I think that Pelops is\r\nalso named appropriately; for, as the name implies, he is rightly called Pelops\r\nwho sees what is near only (o ta pelas oron).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: How so?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Because, according to the tradition, he had no forethought or\r\nforesight of all the evil which the murder of Myrtilus would entail upon his\r\nwhole race in remote ages; he saw only what was at hand and immediate,\u0026mdash;or\r\nin other words, pelas (near), in his eagerness to win Hippodamia by all means\r\nfor his bride. Every one would agree that the name of Tantalus is rightly given\r\nand in accordance with nature, if the traditions about him are true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: And what are the traditions?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Many terrible misfortunes are said to have happened to him in his\r\nlife\u0026mdash;last of all, came the utter ruin of his country; and after his death\r\nhe had the stone suspended (talanteia) over his head in the world\r\nbelow\u0026mdash;all this agrees wonderfully well with his name. You might imagine\r\nthat some person who wanted to call him Talantatos (the most weighted down by\r\nmisfortune), disguised the name by altering it into Tantalus; and into this\r\nform, by some accident of tradition, it has actually been transmuted. The name\r\nof Zeus, who is his alleged father, has also an excellent meaning, although\r\nhard to be understood, because really like a sentence, which is divided into\r\ntwo parts, for some call him Zena, and use the one half, and others who use the\r\nother half call him Dia; the two together signify the nature of the God, and\r\nthe business of a name, as we were saying, is to express the nature. For there\r\nis none who is more the author of life to us and to all, than the lord and king\r\nof all. Wherefore we are right in calling him Zena and Dia, which are one name,\r\nalthough divided, meaning the God through whom all creatures always have life\r\n(di on zen aei pasi tois zosin uparchei). There is an irreverence, at first\r\nsight, in calling him son of Cronos (who is a proverb for stupidity), and we\r\nmight rather expect Zeus to be the child of a mighty intellect. Which is the\r\nfact; for this is the meaning of his father\u0026rsquo;s name: Kronos quasi Koros\r\n(Choreo, to sweep), not in the sense of a youth, but signifying to chatharon\r\nchai acheraton tou nou, the pure and garnished mind (sc. apo tou chorein). He,\r\nas we are informed by tradition, was begotten of Uranus, rightly so called (apo\r\ntou oran ta ano) from looking upwards; which, as philosophers tell us, is the\r\nway to have a pure mind, and the name Uranus is therefore correct. If I could\r\nremember the genealogy of Hesiod, I would have gone on and tried more\r\nconclusions of the same sort on the remoter ancestors of the Gods,\u0026mdash;then I\r\nmight have seen whether this wisdom, which has come to me all in an instant, I\r\nknow not whence, will or will not hold good to the end.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: You seem to me, Socrates, to be quite like a prophet newly\r\ninspired, and to be uttering oracles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes, Hermogenes, and I believe that I caught the inspiration from the\r\ngreat Euthyphro of the Prospaltian deme, who gave me a long lecture which\r\ncommenced at dawn: he talked and I listened, and his wisdom and enchanting\r\nravishment has not only filled my ears but taken possession of my soul, and\r\nto-day I shall let his superhuman power work and finish the investigation of\r\nnames\u0026mdash;that will be the way; but to-morrow, if you are so disposed, we\r\nwill conjure him away, and make a purgation of him, if we can only find some\r\npriest or sophist who is skilled in purifications of this sort.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: With all my heart; for am very curious to hear the rest of the\r\nenquiry about names.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then let us proceed; and where would you have us begin, now that we\r\nhave got a sort of outline of the enquiry? Are there any names which witness of\r\nthemselves that they are not given arbitrarily, but have a natural fitness? The\r\nnames of heroes and of men in general are apt to be deceptive because they are\r\noften called after ancestors with whose names, as we were saying, they may have\r\nno business; or they are the expression of a wish like Eutychides (the son of\r\ngood fortune), or Sosias (the Saviour), or Theophilus (the beloved of God), and\r\nothers. But I think that we had better leave these, for there will be more\r\nchance of finding correctness in the names of immutable essences;\u0026mdash;there\r\nought to have been more care taken about them when they were named, and perhaps\r\nthere may have been some more than human power at work occasionally in giving\r\nthem names.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I think so, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Ought we not to begin with the consideration of the Gods, and show\r\nthat they are rightly named Gods?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes, that will be well.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: My notion would be something of this sort:\u0026mdash;I suspect that the\r\nsun, moon, earth, stars, and heaven, which are still the Gods of many\r\nbarbarians, were the only Gods known to the aboriginal Hellenes. Seeing that\r\nthey were always moving and running, from their running nature they were called\r\nGods or runners (Theous, Theontas); and when men became acquainted with the\r\nother Gods, they proceeded to apply the same name to them all. Do you think\r\nthat likely?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I think it very likely indeed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: What shall follow the Gods?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Must not demons and heroes and men come next?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Demons! And what do you consider to be the meaning of this word? Tell\r\nme if my view is right.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Let me hear.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: You know how Hesiod uses the word?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I do not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Do you not remember that he speaks of a golden race of men who came\r\nfirst?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes, I do.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: He says of them\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;But now that fate has closed over this race They are holy demons upon\r\nthe earth, Beneficent, averters of ills, guardians of mortal men.\u0026rdquo;\r\n(Hesiod, Works and Days.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: What is the inference?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: What is the inference! Why, I suppose that he means by the golden\r\nmen, not men literally made of gold, but good and noble; and I am convinced of\r\nthis, because he further says that we are the iron race.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That is true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And do you not suppose that good men of our own day would by him be\r\nsaid to be of golden race?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Very likely.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And are not the good wise?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes, they are wise.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And therefore I have the most entire conviction that he called them\r\ndemons, because they were daemones (knowing or wise), and in our older Attic\r\ndialect the word itself occurs. Now he and other poets say truly, that when a\r\ngood man dies he has honour and a mighty portion among the dead, and becomes a\r\ndemon; which is a name given to him signifying wisdom. And I say too, that\r\nevery wise man who happens to be a good man is more than human (daimonion) both\r\nin life and death, and is rightly called a demon.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Then I rather think that I am of one mind with you; but what is the\r\nmeaning of the word \u0026ldquo;hero\u0026rdquo;? (Eros with an eta, in the old writing\r\neros with an epsilon.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I think that there is no difficulty in explaining, for the name is\r\nnot much altered, and signifies that they were born of love.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: What do you mean?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Do you not know that the heroes are demigods?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: What then?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: All of them sprang either from the love of a God for a mortal woman,\r\nor of a mortal man for a Goddess; think of the word in the old Attic, and you\r\nwill see better that the name heros is only a slight alteration of Eros, from\r\nwhom the heroes sprang: either this is the meaning, or, if not this, then they\r\nmust have been skilful as rhetoricians and dialecticians, and able to put the\r\nquestion (erotan), for eirein is equivalent to legein. And therefore, as I was\r\nsaying, in the Attic dialect the heroes turn out to be rhetoricians and\r\nquestioners. All this is easy enough; the noble breed of heroes are a tribe of\r\nsophists and rhetors. But can you tell me why men are called\r\nanthropoi?\u0026mdash;that is more difficult.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: No, I cannot; and I would not try even if I could, because I think\r\nthat you are the more likely to succeed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That is to say, you trust to the inspiration of Euthyphro.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Of course.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Your faith is not vain; for at this very moment a new and ingenious\r\nthought strikes me, and, if I am not careful, before to-morrow\u0026rsquo;s dawn I\r\nshall be wiser than I ought to be. Now, attend to me; and first, remember that\r\nwe often put in and pull out letters in words, and give names as we please and\r\nchange the accents. Take, for example, the word Dii Philos; in order to convert\r\nthis from a sentence into a noun, we omit one of the iotas and sound the middle\r\nsyllable grave instead of acute; as, on the other hand, letters are sometimes\r\ninserted in words instead of being omitted, and the acute takes the place of\r\nthe grave.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That is true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The name anthropos, which was once a sentence, and is now a noun,\r\nappears to be a case just of this sort, for one letter, which is the alpha, has\r\nbeen omitted, and the acute on the last syllable has been changed to a grave.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: What do you mean?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I mean to say that the word \u0026ldquo;man\u0026rdquo; implies that other\r\nanimals never examine, or consider, or look up at what they see, but that man\r\nnot only sees (opope) but considers and looks up at that which he sees, and\r\nhence he alone of all animals is rightly anthropos, meaning anathron a opopen.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: May I ask you to examine another word about which I am curious?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I will take that which appears to me to follow next in order. You\r\nknow the distinction of soul and body?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Of course.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Let us endeavour to analyze them like the previous words.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: You want me first of all to examine the natural fitness of the word\r\npsuche (soul), and then of the word soma (body)?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: If I am to say what occurs to me at the moment, I should imagine that\r\nthose who first used the name psuche meant to express that the soul when in the\r\nbody is the source of life, and gives the power of breath and revival\r\n(anapsuchon), and when this reviving power fails then the body perishes and\r\ndies, and this, if I am not mistaken, they called psyche. But please stay a\r\nmoment; I fancy that I can discover something which will be more acceptable to\r\nthe disciples of Euthyphro, for I am afraid that they will scorn this\r\nexplanation. What do you say to another?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Let me hear.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: What is that which holds and carries and gives life and motion to the\r\nentire nature of the body? What else but the soul?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Just that.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or soul is the\r\nordering and containing principle of all things?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes; I do.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then you may well call that power phuseche which carries and holds\r\nnature (e phusin okei, kai ekei), and this may be refined away into psuche.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Certainly; and this derivation is, I think, more scientific than\r\nthe other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: It is so; but I cannot help laughing, if I am to suppose that this\r\nwas the true meaning of the name.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: But what shall we say of the next word?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: You mean soma (the body).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That may be variously interpreted; and yet more variously if a little\r\npermutation is allowed. For some say that the body is the grave (sema) of the\r\nsoul which may be thought to be buried in our present life; or again the index\r\nof the soul, because the soul gives indications to (semainei) the body;\r\nprobably the Orphic poets were the inventors of the name, and they were under\r\nthe impression that the soul is suffering the punishment of sin, and that the\r\nbody is an enclosure or prison in which the soul is incarcerated, kept safe\r\n(soma, sozetai), as the name soma implies, until the penalty is paid; according\r\nto this view, not even a letter of the word need be changed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that we have said enough of this class of words.\r\nBut have we any more explanations of the names of the Gods, like that which you\r\nwere giving of Zeus? I should like to know whether any similar principle of\r\ncorrectness is to be applied to them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes, indeed, Hermogenes; and there is one excellent principle which,\r\nas men of sense, we must acknowledge,\u0026mdash;that of the Gods we know nothing,\r\neither of their natures or of the names which they give themselves; but we are\r\nsure that the names by which they call themselves, whatever they may be, are\r\ntrue. And this is the best of all principles; and the next best is to say, as\r\nin prayers, that we will call them by any sort or kind of names or patronymics\r\nwhich they like, because we do not know of any other. That also, I think, is a\r\nvery good custom, and one which I should much wish to observe. Let us, then, if\r\nyou please, in the first place announce to them that we are not enquiring about\r\nthem; we do not presume that we are able to do so; but we are enquiring about\r\nthe meaning of men in giving them these names,\u0026mdash;in this there can be small\r\nblame.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you are quite right, and I would like to do\r\nas you say.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Shall we begin, then, with Hestia, according to custom?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes, that will be very proper.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: What may we suppose him to have meant who gave the name Hestia?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That is another and certainly a most difficult question.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: My dear Hermogenes, the first imposers of names must surely have been\r\nconsiderable persons; they were philosophers, and had a good deal to say.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Well, and what of them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: They are the men to whom I should attribute the imposition of names.\r\nEven in foreign names, if you analyze them, a meaning is still discernible. For\r\nexample, that which we term ousia is by some called esia, and by others again\r\nosia. Now that the essence of things should be called estia, which is akin to\r\nthe first of these (esia = estia), is rational enough. And there is reason in\r\nthe Athenians calling that estia which participates in ousia. For in ancient\r\ntimes we too seem to have said esia for ousia, and this you may note to have\r\nbeen the idea of those who appointed that sacrifices should be first offered to\r\nestia, which was natural enough if they meant that estia was the essence of\r\nthings. Those again who read osia seem to have inclined to the opinion of\r\nHeracleitus, that all things flow and nothing stands; with them the pushing\r\nprinciple (othoun) is the cause and ruling power of all things, and is\r\ntherefore rightly called osia. Enough of this, which is all that we who know\r\nnothing can affirm. Next in order after Hestia we ought to consider Rhea and\r\nCronos, although the name of Cronos has been already discussed. But I dare say\r\nthat I am talking great nonsense.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Why, Socrates?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: My good friend, I have discovered a hive of wisdom.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Of what nature?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, rather ridiculous, and yet plausible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: How plausible?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I fancy to myself Heracleitus repeating wise traditions of antiquity\r\nas old as the days of Cronos and Rhea, and of which Homer also spoke.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: How do you mean?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Heracleitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion and\r\nnothing at rest; he compares them to the stream of a river, and says that you\r\ncannot go into the same water twice.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That is true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, then, how can we avoid inferring that he who gave the names of\r\nCronos and Rhea to the ancestors of the Gods, agreed pretty much in the\r\ndoctrine of Heracleitus? Is the giving of the names of streams to both of them\r\npurely accidental? Compare the line in which Homer, and, as I believe, Hesiod\r\nalso, tells of\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Ocean, the origin of Gods, and mother Tethys (Il.\u0026mdash;the line is not\r\nfound in the extant works of Hesiod.).\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd again, Orpheus says, that\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;The fair river of Ocean was the first to marry, and he espoused his\r\nsister Tethys, who was his mother\u0026rsquo;s daughter.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nYou see that this is a remarkable coincidence, and all in the direction of\r\nHeracleitus.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I think that there is something in what you say, Socrates; but I do\r\nnot understand the meaning of the name Tethys.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, that is almost self-explained, being only the name of a spring,\r\na little disguised; for that which is strained and filtered (diattomenon,\r\nethoumenon) may be likened to a spring, and the name Tethys is made up of these\r\ntwo words.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: The idea is ingenious, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: To be sure. But what comes next?\u0026mdash;of Zeus we have spoken.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then let us next take his two brothers, Poseidon and Pluto, whether\r\nthe latter is called by that or by his other name.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: By all means.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Poseidon is Posidesmos, the chain of the feet; the original inventor\r\nof the name had been stopped by the watery element in his walks, and not\r\nallowed to go on, and therefore he called the ruler of this element Poseidon;\r\nthe epsilon was probably inserted as an ornament. Yet, perhaps, not so; but the\r\nname may have been originally written with a double lamda and not with a sigma,\r\nmeaning that the God knew many things (Polla eidos). And perhaps also he being\r\nthe shaker of the earth, has been named from shaking (seiein), and then pi and\r\ndelta have been added. Pluto gives wealth (Ploutos), and his name means the\r\ngiver of wealth, which comes out of the earth beneath. People in general appear\r\nto imagine that the term Hades is connected with the invisible (aeides) and so\r\nthey are led by their fears to call the God Pluto instead.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: And what is the true derivation?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: In spite of the mistakes which are made about the power of this\r\ndeity, and the foolish fears which people have of him, such as the fear of\r\nalways being with him after death, and of the soul denuded of the body going to\r\nhim (compare Rep.), my belief is that all is quite consistent, and that the\r\noffice and name of the God really correspond.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Why, how is that?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I will tell you my own opinion; but first, I should like to ask you\r\nwhich chain does any animal feel to be the stronger? and which confines him\r\nmore to the same spot,\u0026mdash;desire or necessity?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Desire, Socrates, is stronger far.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And do you not think that many a one would escape from Hades, if he\r\ndid not bind those who depart to him by the strongest of chains?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Assuredly they would.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And if by the greatest of chains, then by some desire, as I should\r\ncertainly infer, and not by necessity?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That is clear.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And there are many desires?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And therefore by the greatest desire, if the chain is to be the\r\ngreatest?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And is any desire stronger than the thought that you will be made\r\nbetter by associating with another?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Certainly not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And is not that the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has been to\r\nhim, is willing to come back to us? Even the Sirens, like all the rest of the\r\nworld, have been laid under his spells. Such a charm, as I imagine, is the God\r\nable to infuse into his words. And, according to this view, he is the perfect\r\nand accomplished Sophist, and the great benefactor of the inhabitants of the\r\nother world; and even to us who are upon earth he sends from below exceeding\r\nblessings. For he has much more than he wants down there; wherefore he is\r\ncalled Pluto (or the rich). Note also, that he will have nothing to do with men\r\nwhile they are in the body, but only when the soul is liberated from the\r\ndesires and evils of the body. Now there is a great deal of philosophy and\r\nreflection in that; for in their liberated state he can bind them with the\r\ndesire of virtue, but while they are flustered and maddened by the body, not\r\neven father Cronos himself would suffice to keep them with him in his own\r\nfar-famed chains.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: There is a deal of truth in what you say.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes, Hermogenes, and the legislator called him Hades, not from the\r\nunseen (aeides)\u0026mdash;far otherwise, but from his knowledge (eidenai) of all\r\nnoble things.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Very good; and what do we say of Demeter, and Here, and Apollo, and\r\nAthene, and Hephaestus, and Ares, and the other deities?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Demeter is e didousa meter, who gives food like a mother; Here is the\r\nlovely one (erate)\u0026mdash;for Zeus, according to tradition, loved and married\r\nher; possibly also the name may have been given when the legislator was\r\nthinking of the heavens, and may be only a disguise of the air (aer), putting\r\nthe end in the place of the beginning. You will recognize the truth of this if\r\nyou repeat the letters of Here several times over. People dread the name of\r\nPherephatta as they dread the name of Apollo,\u0026mdash;and with as little reason;\r\nthe fear, if I am not mistaken, only arises from their ignorance of the nature\r\nof names. But they go changing the name into Phersephone, and they are\r\nterrified at this; whereas the new name means only that the Goddess is wise\r\n(sophe); for seeing that all things in the world are in motion (pheromenon),\r\nthat principle which embraces and touches and is able to follow them, is\r\nwisdom. And therefore the Goddess may be truly called Pherepaphe (Pherepapha),\r\nor some name like it, because she touches that which is in motion (tou\r\npheromenon ephaptomene), herein showing her wisdom. And Hades, who is wise,\r\nconsorts with her, because she is wise. They alter her name into Pherephatta\r\nnow-a-days, because the present generation care for euphony more than truth.\r\nThere is the other name, Apollo, which, as I was saying, is generally supposed\r\nto have some terrible signification. Have you remarked this fact?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: To be sure I have, and what you say is true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But the name, in my opinion, is really most expressive of the power\r\nof the God.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: How so?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain, for I do not believe that any single\r\nname could have been better adapted to express the attributes of the God,\r\nembracing and in a manner signifying all four of them,\u0026mdash;music, and\r\nprophecy, and medicine, and archery.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That must be a strange name, and I should like to hear the\r\nexplanation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Say rather an harmonious name, as beseems the God of Harmony. In the\r\nfirst place, the purgations and purifications which doctors and diviners use,\r\nand their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, as well as their\r\nwashings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the same object, which is to\r\nmake a man pure both in body and soul.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And is not Apollo the purifier, and the washer, and the absolver from\r\nall impurities?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then in reference to his ablutions and absolutions, as being the\r\nphysician who orders them, he may be rightly called Apolouon (purifier); or in\r\nrespect of his powers of divination, and his truth and sincerity, which is the\r\nsame as truth, he may be most fitly called Aplos, from aplous (sincere), as in\r\nthe Thessalian dialect, for all the Thessalians call him Aplos; also he is aei\r\nBallon (always shooting), because he is a master archer who never misses; or\r\nagain, the name may refer to his musical attributes, and then, as in\r\nakolouthos, and akoitis, and in many other words the alpha is supposed to mean\r\n\u0026ldquo;together,\u0026rdquo; so the meaning of the name Apollo will be \u0026ldquo;moving\r\ntogether,\u0026rdquo; whether in the poles of heaven as they are called, or in the\r\nharmony of song, which is termed concord, because he moves all together by an\r\nharmonious power, as astronomers and musicians ingeniously declare. And he is\r\nthe God who presides over harmony, and makes all things move together, both\r\namong Gods and among men. And as in the words akolouthos and akoitis the alpha\r\nis substituted for an omicron, so the name Apollon is equivalent to omopolon;\r\nonly the second lambda is added in order to avoid the ill-omened sound of\r\ndestruction (apolon). Now the suspicion of this destructive power still haunts\r\nthe minds of some who do not consider the true value of the name, which, as I\r\nwas saying just now, has reference to all the powers of the God, who is the\r\nsingle one, the everdarting, the purifier, the mover together (aplous, aei\r\nBallon, apolouon, omopolon). The name of the Muses and of music would seem to\r\nbe derived from their making philosophical enquiries (mosthai); and Leto is\r\ncalled by this name, because she is such a gentle Goddess, and so willing\r\n(ethelemon) to grant our requests; or her name may be Letho, as she is often\r\ncalled by strangers\u0026mdash;they seem to imply by it her amiability, and her\r\nsmooth and easy-going way of behaving. Artemis is named from her healthy\r\n(artemes), well-ordered nature, and because of her love of virginity, perhaps\r\nbecause she is a proficient in virtue (arete), and perhaps also as hating\r\nintercourse of the sexes (ton aroton misesasa). He who gave the Goddess her\r\nname may have had any or all of these reasons.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: What is the meaning of Dionysus and Aphrodite?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, you ask a solemn question; there is a serious and\r\nalso a facetious explanation of both these names; the serious explanation is\r\nnot to be had from me, but there is no objection to your hearing the facetious\r\none; for the Gods too love a joke. Dionusos is simply didous oinon (giver of\r\nwine), Didoinusos, as he might be called in fun,\u0026mdash;and oinos is properly\r\noionous, because wine makes those who drink, think (oiesthai) that they have a\r\nmind (noun) when they have none. The derivation of Aphrodite, born of the foam\r\n(aphros), may be fairly accepted on the authority of Hesiod.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Still there remains Athene, whom you, Socrates, as an Athenian,\r\nwill surely not forget; there are also Hephaestus and Ares.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I am not likely to forget them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: No, indeed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: There is no difficulty in explaining the other appellation of Athene.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: What other appellation?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: We call her Pallas.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: To be sure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And we cannot be wrong in supposing that this is derived from armed\r\ndances. For the elevation of oneself or anything else above the earth, or by\r\nthe use of the hands, we call shaking (pallein), or dancing.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That is quite true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then that is the explanation of the name Pallas?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes; but what do you say of the other name?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Athene?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That is a graver matter, and there, my friend, the modern\r\ninterpreters of Homer may, I think, assist in explaining the view of the\r\nancients. For most of these in their explanations of the poet, assert that he\r\nmeant by Athene \u0026ldquo;mind\u0026rdquo; (nous) and \u0026ldquo;intelligence\u0026rdquo;\r\n(dianoia), and the maker of names appears to have had a singular notion about\r\nher; and indeed calls her by a still higher title, \u0026ldquo;divine\r\nintelligence\u0026rdquo; (Thou noesis), as though he would say: This is she who has\r\nthe mind of God (Theonoa);\u0026mdash;using alpha as a dialectical variety for eta,\r\nand taking away iota and sigma (There seems to be some error in the MSS. The\r\nmeaning is that the word theonoa = theounoa is a curtailed form of theou\r\nnoesis, but the omitted letters do not agree.). Perhaps, however, the name\r\nTheonoe may mean \u0026ldquo;she who knows divine things\u0026rdquo; (Theia noousa)\r\nbetter than others. Nor shall we be far wrong in supposing that the author of\r\nit wished to identify this Goddess with moral intelligence (en ethei noesin),\r\nand therefore gave her the name ethonoe; which, however, either he or his\r\nsuccessors have altered into what they thought a nicer form, and called her\r\nAthene.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: But what do you say of Hephaestus?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Speak you of the princely lord of light (Phaeos istora)?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Surely.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Ephaistos is Phaistos, and has added the eta by attraction; that is\r\nobvious to anybody.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That is very probable, until some more probable notion gets into\r\nyour head.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: To prevent that, you had better ask what is the derivation of Ares.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: What is Ares?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Ares may be called, if you will, from his manhood (arren) and\r\nmanliness, or if you please, from his hard and unchangeable nature, which is\r\nthe meaning of arratos: the latter is a derivation in every way appropriate to\r\nthe God of war.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And now, by the Gods, let us have no more of the Gods, for I am\r\nafraid of them; ask about anything but them, and thou shalt see how the steeds\r\nof Euthyphro can prance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Only one more God! I should like to know about Hermes, of whom I am\r\nsaid not to be a true son. Let us make him out, and then I shall know whether\r\nthere is any meaning in what Cratylus says.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I should imagine that the name Hermes has to do with speech, and\r\nsignifies that he is the interpreter (ermeneus), or messenger, or thief, or\r\nliar, or bargainer; all that sort of thing has a great deal to do with\r\nlanguage; as I was telling you, the word eirein is expressive of the use of\r\nspeech, and there is an often-recurring Homeric word emesato, which means\r\n\u0026ldquo;he contrived\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;out of these two words, eirein and mesasthai,\r\nthe legislator formed the name of the God who invented language and speech; and\r\nwe may imagine him dictating to us the use of this name: \u0026ldquo;O my\r\nfriends,\u0026rdquo; says he to us, \u0026ldquo;seeing that he is the contriver of tales\r\nor speeches, you may rightly call him Eirhemes.\u0026rdquo; And this has been\r\nimproved by us, as we think, into Hermes. Iris also appears to have been called\r\nfrom the verb \u0026ldquo;to tell\u0026rdquo; (eirein), because she was a messenger.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Then I am very sure that Cratylus was quite right in saying that I\r\nwas no true son of Hermes (Ermogenes), for I am not a good hand at speeches.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: There is also reason, my friend, in Pan being the double-formed son\r\nof Hermes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: How do you make that out?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: You are aware that speech signifies all things (pan), and is always\r\nturning them round and round, and has two forms, true and false?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Is not the truth that is in him the smooth or sacred form which\r\ndwells above among the Gods, whereas falsehood dwells among men below, and is\r\nrough like the goat of tragedy; for tales and falsehoods have generally to do\r\nwith the tragic or goatish life, and tragedy is the place of them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then surely Pan, who is the declarer of all things (pan) and the\r\nperpetual mover (aei polon) of all things, is rightly called aipolos\r\n(goat-herd), he being the two-formed son of Hermes, smooth in his upper part,\r\nand rough and goatlike in his lower regions. And, as the son of Hermes, he is\r\nspeech or the brother of speech, and that brother should be like brother is no\r\nmarvel. But, as I was saying, my dear Hermogenes, let us get away from the\r\nGods.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: From these sort of Gods, by all means, Socrates. But why should we\r\nnot discuss another kind of Gods\u0026mdash;the sun, moon, stars, earth, aether,\r\nair, fire, water, the seasons, and the year?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: You impose a great many tasks upon me. Still, if you wish, I will not\r\nrefuse.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: You will oblige me.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: How would you have me begin? Shall I take first of all him whom you\r\nmentioned first\u0026mdash;the sun?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Very good.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The origin of the sun will probably be clearer in the Doric form, for\r\nthe Dorians call him alios, and this name is given to him because when he rises\r\nhe gathers (alizoi) men together or because he is always rolling in his course\r\n(aei eilein ion) about the earth; or from aiolein, of which the meaning is the\r\nsame as poikillein (to variegate), because he variegates the productions of the\r\nearth.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: But what is selene (the moon)?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That name is rather unfortunate for Anaxagoras.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: How so?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The word seems to forestall his recent discovery, that the moon\r\nreceives her light from the sun.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Why do you say so?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The two words selas (brightness) and phos (light) have much the same\r\nmeaning?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: This light about the moon is always new (neon) and always old (enon),\r\nif the disciples of Anaxagoras say truly. For the sun in his revolution always\r\nadds new light, and there is the old light of the previous month.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The moon is not unfrequently called selanaia.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And as she has a light which is always old and always new (enon neon\r\naei) she may very properly have the name selaenoneoaeia; and this when hammered\r\ninto shape becomes selanaia.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: A real dithyrambic sort of name that, Socrates. But what do you say\r\nof the month and the stars?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Meis (month) is called from meiousthai (to lessen), because suffering\r\ndiminution; the name of astra (stars) seems to be derived from astrape, which\r\nis an improvement on anastrope, signifying the upsetting of the eyes\r\n(anastrephein opa).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: What do you say of pur (fire) and udor (water)?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I am at a loss how to explain pur; either the muse of Euthyphro has\r\ndeserted me, or there is some very great difficulty in the word. Please,\r\nhowever, to note the contrivance which I adopt whenever I am in a difficulty of\r\nthis sort.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: What is it?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I will tell you; but I should like to know first whether you can tell\r\nme what is the meaning of the pur?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Shall I tell you what I suspect to be the true explanation of this\r\nand several other words?\u0026mdash;My belief is that they are of foreign origin.\r\nFor the Hellenes, especially those who were under the dominion of the\r\nbarbarians, often borrowed from them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: What is the inference?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Why, you know that any one who seeks to demonstrate the fitness of\r\nthese names according to the Hellenic language, and not according to the\r\nlanguage from which the words are derived, is rather likely to be at fault.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes, certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well then, consider whether this pur is not foreign; for the word is\r\nnot easily brought into relation with the Hellenic tongue, and the Phrygians\r\nmay be observed to have the same word slightly changed, just as they have udor\r\n(water) and kunes (dogs), and many other words.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That is true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Any violent interpretations of the words should be avoided; for\r\nsomething to say about them may easily be found. And thus I get rid of pur and\r\nudor. Aer (air), Hermogenes, may be explained as the element which raises\r\n(airei) things from the earth, or as ever flowing (aei rei), or because the\r\nflux of the air is wind, and the poets call the winds \u0026ldquo;air-blasts,\u0026rdquo;\r\n(aetai); he who uses the term may mean, so to speak, air-flux (aetorroun), in\r\nthe sense of wind-flux (pneumatorroun); and because this moving wind may be\r\nexpressed by either term he employs the word air (aer = aetes rheo). Aither\r\n(aether) I should interpret as aeitheer; this may be correctly said, because\r\nthis element is always running in a flux about the air (aei thei peri tou aera\r\nreon). The meaning of the word ge (earth) comes out better when in the form of\r\ngaia, for the earth may be truly called \u0026ldquo;mother\u0026rdquo; (gaia,\r\ngenneteira), as in the language of Homer (Od.) gegaasi means gegennesthai.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Good.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: What shall we take next?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: There are orai (the seasons), and the two names of the year,\r\neniautos and etos.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The orai should be spelt in the old Attic way, if you desire to know\r\nthe probable truth about them; they are rightly called the orai because they\r\ndivide (orizousin) the summers and winters and winds and the fruits of the\r\nearth. The words eniautos and etos appear to be the same,\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;that\r\nwhich brings to light the plants and growths of the earth in their turn, and\r\npasses them in review within itself (en eauto exetazei)\u0026rdquo;: this is broken\r\nup into two words, eniautos from en eauto, and etos from etazei, just as the\r\noriginal name of Zeus was divided into Zena and Dia; and the whole proposition\r\nmeans that his power of reviewing from within is one, but has two names, two\r\nwords etos and eniautos being thus formed out of a single proposition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Indeed, Socrates, you make surprising progress.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I am run away with.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But am not yet at my utmost speed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I should like very much to know, in the next place, how you would\r\nexplain the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in those charming\r\nwords\u0026mdash;wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That is a tremendous class of names which you are disinterring;\r\nstill, as I have put on the lion\u0026rsquo;s skin, I must not be faint of heart;\r\nand I suppose that I must consider the meaning of wisdom (phronesis) and\r\nunderstanding (sunesis), and judgment (gnome), and knowledge (episteme), and\r\nall those other charming words, as you call them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Surely, we must not leave off until we find out their meaning.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: By the dog of Egypt I have a not bad notion which came into my head\r\nonly this moment: I believe that the primeval givers of names were undoubtedly\r\nlike too many of our modern philosophers, who, in their search after the nature\r\nof things, are always getting dizzy from constantly going round and round, and\r\nthen they imagine that the world is going round and round and moving in all\r\ndirections; and this appearance, which arises out of their own internal\r\ncondition, they suppose to be a reality of nature; they think that there is\r\nnothing stable or permanent, but only flux and motion, and that the world is\r\nalways full of every sort of motion and change. The consideration of the names\r\nwhich I mentioned has led me into making this reflection.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: How is that, Socrates?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Perhaps you did not observe that in the names which have been just\r\ncited, the motion or flux or generation of things is most surely indicated.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: No, indeed, I never thought of it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Take the first of those which you mentioned; clearly that is a name\r\nindicative of motion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: What was the name?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Phronesis (wisdom), which may signify phoras kai rhou noesis\r\n(perception of motion and flux), or perhaps phoras onesis (the blessing of\r\nmotion), but is at any rate connected with pheresthai (motion); gnome\r\n(judgment), again, certainly implies the ponderation or consideration (nomesis)\r\nof generation, for to ponder is the same as to consider; or, if you would\r\nrather, here is noesis, the very word just now mentioned, which is neou esis\r\n(the desire of the new); the word neos implies that the world is always in\r\nprocess of creation. The giver of the name wanted to express this longing of\r\nthe soul, for the original name was neoesis, and not noesis; but eta took the\r\nplace of a double epsilon. The word sophrosune is the salvation (soteria) of\r\nthat wisdom (phronesis) which we were just now considering. Epioteme\r\n(knowledge) is akin to this, and indicates that the soul which is good for\r\nanything follows (epetai) the motion of things, neither anticipating them nor\r\nfalling behind them; wherefore the word should rather be read as epistemene,\r\ninserting epsilon nu. Sunesis (understanding) may be regarded in like manner as\r\na kind of conclusion; the word is derived from sunienai (to go along with),\r\nand, like epistasthai (to know), implies the progression of the soul in company\r\nwith the nature of things. Sophia (wisdom) is very dark, and appears not to be\r\nof native growth; the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things. You\r\nmust remember that the poets, when they speak of the commencement of any rapid\r\nmotion, often use the word esuthe (he rushed); and there was a famous\r\nLacedaemonian who was named Sous (Rush), for by this word the Lacedaemonians\r\nsignify rapid motion, and the touching (epaphe) of motion is expressed by\r\nsophia, for all things are supposed to be in motion. Good (agathon) is the name\r\nwhich is given to the admirable (agasto) in nature; for, although all things\r\nmove, still there are degrees of motion; some are swifter, some slower; but\r\nthere are some things which are admirable for their swiftness, and this\r\nadmirable part of nature is called agathon. Dikaiosune (justice) is clearly\r\ndikaiou sunesis (understanding of the just); but the actual word dikaion is\r\nmore difficult: men are only agreed to a certain extent about justice, and then\r\nthey begin to disagree. For those who suppose all things to be in motion\r\nconceive the greater part of nature to be a mere receptacle; and they say that\r\nthere is a penetrating power which passes through all this, and is the\r\ninstrument of creation in all, and is the subtlest and swiftest element; for if\r\nit were not the subtlest, and a power which none can keep out, and also the\r\nswiftest, passing by other things as if they were standing still, it could not\r\npenetrate through the moving universe. And this element, which superintends all\r\nthings and pierces (diaion) all, is rightly called dikaion; the letter k is\r\nonly added for the sake of euphony. Thus far, as I was saying, there is a\r\ngeneral agreement about the nature of justice; but I, Hermogenes, being an\r\nenthusiastic disciple, have been told in a mystery that the justice of which I\r\nam speaking is also the cause of the world: now a cause is that because of\r\nwhich anything is created; and some one comes and whispers in my ear that\r\njustice is rightly so called because partaking of the nature of the cause, and\r\nI begin, after hearing what he has said, to interrogate him gently:\r\n\u0026ldquo;Well, my excellent friend,\u0026rdquo; say I, \u0026ldquo;but if all this be true,\r\nI still want to know what is justice.\u0026rdquo; Thereupon they think that I ask\r\ntiresome questions, and am leaping over the barriers, and have been already\r\nsufficiently answered, and they try to satisfy me with one derivation after\r\nanother, and at length they quarrel. For one of them says that justice is the\r\nsun, and that he only is the piercing (diaionta) and burning (kaonta) element\r\nwhich is the guardian of nature. And when I joyfully repeat this beautiful\r\nnotion, I am answered by the satirical remark, \u0026ldquo;What, is there no justice\r\nin the world when the sun is down?\u0026rdquo; And when I earnestly beg my\r\nquestioner to tell me his own honest opinion, he says, \u0026ldquo;Fire in the\r\nabstract\u0026rdquo;; but this is not very intelligible. Another says, \u0026ldquo;No,\r\nnot fire in the abstract, but the abstraction of heat in the fire.\u0026rdquo;\r\nAnother man professes to laugh at all this, and says, as Anaxagoras says, that\r\njustice is mind, for mind, as they say, has absolute power, and mixes with\r\nnothing, and orders all things, and passes through all things. At last, my\r\nfriend, I find myself in far greater perplexity about the nature of justice\r\nthan I was before I began to learn. But still I am of opinion that the name,\r\nwhich has led me into this digression, was given to justice for the reasons\r\nwhich I have mentioned.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you are not improvising now; you must have\r\nheard this from some one else.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And not the rest?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Hardly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, then, let me go on in the hope of making you believe in the\r\noriginality of the rest. What remains after justice? I do not think that we\r\nhave as yet discussed courage (andreia),\u0026mdash;injustice (adikia), which is\r\nobviously nothing more than a hindrance to the penetrating principle\r\n(diaiontos), need not be considered. Well, then, the name of andreia seems to\r\nimply a battle;\u0026mdash;this battle is in the world of existence, and according\r\nto the doctrine of flux is only the counterflux (enantia rhon): if you extract\r\nthe delta from andreia, the name at once signifies the thing, and you may\r\nclearly understand that andreia is not the stream opposed to every stream, but\r\nonly to that which is contrary to justice, for otherwise courage would not have\r\nbeen praised. The words arren (male) and aner (man) also contain a similar\r\nallusion to the same principle of the upward flux (te ano rhon). Gune (woman) I\r\nsuspect to be the same word as goun (birth): thelu (female) appears to be\r\npartly derived from thele (the teat), because the teat is like rain, and makes\r\nthings flourish (tethelenai).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That is surely probable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes; and the very word thallein (to flourish) seems to figure the\r\ngrowth of youth, which is swift and sudden ever. And this is expressed by the\r\nlegislator in the name, which is a compound of thein (running), and allesthai\r\n(leaping). Pray observe how I gallop away when I get on smooth ground. There\r\nare a good many names generally thought to be of importance, which have still\r\nto be explained.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: There is the meaning of the word techne (art), for example.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That may be identified with echonoe, and expresses the possession of\r\nmind: you have only to take away the tau and insert two omichrons, one between\r\nthe chi and nu, and another between the nu and eta.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That is a very shabby etymology.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes, my dear friend; but then you know that the original names have\r\nbeen long ago buried and disguised by people sticking on and stripping off\r\nletters for the sake of euphony, and twisting and bedizening them in all sorts\r\nof ways: and time too may have had a share in the change. Take, for example,\r\nthe word katoptron; why is the letter rho inserted? This must surely be the\r\naddition of some one who cares nothing about the truth, but thinks only of\r\nputting the mouth into shape. And the additions are often such that at last no\r\nhuman being can possibly make out the original meaning of the word. Another\r\nexample is the word sphigx, sphiggos, which ought properly to be phigx,\r\nphiggos, and there are other examples.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That is quite true, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And yet, if you are permitted to put in and pull out any letters\r\nwhich you please, names will be too easily made, and any name may be adapted to\r\nany object.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes, that is true. And therefore a wise dictator, like yourself,\r\nshould observe the laws of moderation and probability.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Such is my desire.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And mine, too, Hermogenes. But do not be too much of a precisian, or\r\n\u0026ldquo;you will unnerve me of my strength (Iliad.).\u0026rdquo; When you have\r\nallowed me to add mechane (contrivance) to techne (art) I shall be at the top\r\nof my bent, for I conceive mechane to be a sign of great\r\naccomplishment\u0026mdash;anein; for mekos has the meaning of greatness, and these\r\ntwo, mekos and anein, make up the word mechane. But, as I was saying, being now\r\nat the top of my bent, I should like to consider the meaning of the two words\r\narete (virtue) and kakia (vice); arete I do not as yet understand, but kakia is\r\ntransparent, and agrees with the principles which preceded, for all things\r\nbeing in a flux (ionton), kakia is kakos ion (going badly); and this evil\r\nmotion when existing in the soul has the general name of kakia, or vice,\r\nspecially appropriated to it. The meaning of kakos ienai may be further\r\nillustrated by the use of deilia (cowardice), which ought to have come after\r\nandreia, but was forgotten, and, as I fear, is not the only word which has been\r\npassed over. Deilia signifies that the soul is bound with a strong chain\r\n(desmos), for lian means strength, and therefore deilia expresses the greatest\r\nand strongest bond of the soul; and aporia (difficulty) is an evil of the same\r\nnature (from a (alpha) not, and poreuesthai to go), like anything else which is\r\nan impediment to motion and movement. Then the word kakia appears to mean kakos\r\nienai, or going badly, or limping and halting; of which the consequence is,\r\nthat the soul becomes filled with vice. And if kakia is the name of this sort\r\nof thing, arete will be the opposite of it, signifying in the first place ease\r\nof motion, then that the stream of the good soul is unimpeded, and has\r\ntherefore the attribute of ever flowing without let or hindrance, and is\r\ntherefore called arete, or, more correctly, aeireite (ever-flowing), and may\r\nperhaps have had another form, airete (eligible), indicating that nothing is\r\nmore eligible than virtue, and this has been hammered into arete. I daresay\r\nthat you will deem this to be another invention of mine, but I think that if\r\nthe previous word kakia was right, then arete is also right.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: But what is the meaning of kakon, which has played so great a part\r\nin your previous discourse?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That is a very singular word about which I can hardly form an\r\nopinion, and therefore I must have recourse to my ingenious device.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: What device?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The device of a foreign origin, which I shall give to this word also.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Very likely you are right; but suppose that we leave these words\r\nand endeavour to see the rationale of kalon and aischron.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The meaning of aischron is evident, being only aei ischon roes\r\n(always preventing from flowing), and this is in accordance with our former\r\nderivations. For the name-giver was a great enemy to stagnation of all sorts,\r\nand hence he gave the name aeischoroun to that which hindered the flux (aei\r\nischon roun), and that is now beaten together into aischron.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: But what do you say of kalon?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That is more obscure; yet the form is only due to the quantity, and\r\nhas been changed by altering omicron upsilon into omicron.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: What do you mean?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: This name appears to denote mind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: How so?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Let me ask you what is the cause why anything has a name; is not the\r\nprinciple which imposes the name the cause?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And must not this be the mind of Gods, or of men, or of both?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Is not mind that which called (kalesan) things by their names, and is\r\nnot mind the beautiful (kalon)?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That is evident.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And are not the works of intelligence and mind worthy of praise, and\r\nare not other works worthy of blame?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Physic does the work of a physician, and carpentering does the works\r\nof a carpenter?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Exactly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the principle of beauty does the works of beauty?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Of course.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And that principle we affirm to be mind?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then mind is rightly called beauty because she does the works which\r\nwe recognize and speak of as the beautiful?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That is evident.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: What more names remain to us?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: There are the words which are connected with agathon and kalon,\r\nsuch as sumpheron and lusiteloun, ophelimon, kerdaleon, and their opposites.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The meaning of sumpheron (expedient) I think that you may discover\r\nfor yourself by the light of the previous examples,\u0026mdash;for it is a sister\r\nword to episteme, meaning just the motion (pora) of the soul accompanying the\r\nworld, and things which are done upon this principle are called sumphora or\r\nsumpheronta, because they are carried round with the world.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That is probable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Again, cherdaleon (gainful) is called from cherdos (gain), but you\r\nmust alter the delta into nu if you want to get at the meaning; for this word\r\nalso signifies good, but in another way; he who gave the name intended to\r\nexpress the power of admixture (kerannumenon) and universal penetration in the\r\ngood; in forming the word, however, he inserted a delta instead of a nu, and so\r\nmade kerdos.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Well, but what is lusiteloun (profitable)?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I suppose, Hermogenes, that people do not mean by the profitable the\r\ngainful or that which pays (luei) the retailer, but they use the word in the\r\nsense of swift. You regard the profitable (lusiteloun), as that which being the\r\nswiftest thing in existence, allows of no stay in things and no pause or end of\r\nmotion, but always, if there begins to be any end, lets things go again (luei),\r\nand makes motion immortal and unceasing: and in this point of view, as appears\r\nto me, the good is happily denominated lusiteloun\u0026mdash;being that which looses\r\n(luon) the end (telos) of motion. Ophelimon (the advantageous) is derived from\r\nophellein, meaning that which creates and increases; this latter is a common\r\nHomeric word, and has a foreign character.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: And what do you say of their opposites?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Of such as are mere negatives I hardly think that I need speak.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Which are they?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The words axumphoron (inexpedient), anopheles (unprofitable),\r\nalusiteles (unadvantageous), akerdes (ungainful).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I would rather take the words blaberon (harmful), zemiodes (hurtful).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Good.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The word blaberon is that which is said to hinder or harm (blaptein)\r\nthe stream (roun); blapton is boulomenon aptein (seeking to hold or bind); for\r\naptein is the same as dein, and dein is always a term of censure; boulomenon\r\naptein roun (wanting to bind the stream) would properly be boulapteroun, and\r\nthis, as I imagine, is improved into blaberon.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: You bring out curious results, Socrates, in the use of names; and\r\nwhen I hear the word boulapteroun I cannot help imagining that you are making\r\nyour mouth into a flute, and puffing away at some prelude to Athene.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That is the fault of the makers of the name, Hermogenes; not mine.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Very true; but what is the derivation of zemiodes?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: What is the meaning of zemiodes?\u0026mdash;let me remark, Hermogenes, how\r\nright I was in saying that great changes are made in the meaning of words by\r\nputting in and pulling out letters; even a very slight permutation will\r\nsometimes give an entirely opposite sense; I may instance the word deon, which\r\noccurs to me at the moment, and reminds me of what I was going to say to you,\r\nthat the fine fashionable language of modern times has twisted and disguised\r\nand entirely altered the original meaning both of deon, and also of zemiodes,\r\nwhich in the old language is clearly indicated.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: What do you mean?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I will try to explain. You are aware that our forefathers loved the\r\nsounds iota and delta, especially the women, who are most conservative of the\r\nancient language, but now they change iota into eta or epsilon, and delta into\r\nzeta; this is supposed to increase the grandeur of the sound.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: How do you mean?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: For example, in very ancient times they called the day either imera\r\nor emera (short e), which is called by us emera (long e).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That is true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Do you observe that only the ancient form shows the intention of the\r\ngiver of the name? of which the reason is, that men long for (imeirousi) and\r\nlove the light which comes after the darkness, and is therefore called imera,\r\nfrom imeros, desire.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Clearly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But now the name is so travestied that you cannot tell the meaning,\r\nalthough there are some who imagine the day to be called emera because it makes\r\nthings gentle (emera different accents).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Such is my view.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And do you know that the ancients said duogon and not zugon?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: They did so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And zugon (yoke) has no meaning,\u0026mdash;it ought to be duogon, which\r\nword expresses the binding of two together (duein agoge) for the purpose of\r\ndrawing;\u0026mdash;this has been changed into zugon, and there are many other\r\nexamples of similar changes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: There are.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Proceeding in the same train of thought I may remark that the word\r\ndeon (obligation) has a meaning which is the opposite of all the other\r\nappellations of good; for deon is here a species of good, and is, nevertheless,\r\nthe chain (desmos) or hinderer of motion, and therefore own brother of\r\nblaberon.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates; that is quite plain.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Not if you restore the ancient form, which is more likely to be the\r\ncorrect one, and read dion instead of deon; if you convert the epsilon into an\r\niota after the old fashion, this word will then agree with other words meaning\r\ngood; for dion, not deon, signifies the good, and is a term of praise; and the\r\nauthor of names has not contradicted himself, but in all these various\r\nappellations, deon (obligatory), ophelimon (advantageous), lusiteloun\r\n(profitable), kerdaleon (gainful), agathon (good), sumpheron (expedient),\r\neuporon (plenteous), the same conception is implied of the ordering or\r\nall-pervading principle which is praised, and the restraining and binding\r\nprinciple which is censured. And this is further illustrated by the word\r\nzemiodes (hurtful), which if the zeta is only changed into delta as in the\r\nancient language, becomes demiodes; and this name, as you will perceive, is\r\ngiven to that which binds motion (dounti ion).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: What do you say of edone (pleasure), lupe (pain), epithumia\r\n(desire), and the like, Socrates?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I do not think, Hermogenes, that there is any great difficulty about\r\nthem\u0026mdash;edone is e (eta) onesis, the action which tends to advantage; and\r\nthe original form may be supposed to have been eone, but this has been altered\r\nby the insertion of the delta. Lupe appears to be derived from the relaxation\r\n(luein) which the body feels when in sorrow; ania (trouble) is the hindrance of\r\nmotion (alpha and ienai); algedon (distress), if I am not mistaken, is a\r\nforeign word, which is derived from aleinos (grievous); odune (grief) is called\r\nfrom the putting on (endusis) sorrow; in achthedon (vexation) \u0026ldquo;the word\r\ntoo labours,\u0026rdquo; as any one may see; chara (joy) is the very expression of\r\nthe fluency and diffusion of the soul (cheo); terpsis (delight) is so called\r\nfrom the pleasure creeping (erpon) through the soul, which may be likened to a\r\nbreath (pnoe) and is properly erpnoun, but has been altered by time into\r\nterpnon; eupherosune (cheerfulness) and epithumia explain themselves; the\r\nformer, which ought to be eupherosune and has been changed euphrosune, is\r\nnamed, as every one may see, from the soul moving (pheresthai) in harmony with\r\nnature; epithumia is really e epi ton thumon iousa dunamis, the power which\r\nenters into the soul; thumos (passion) is called from the rushing (thuseos) and\r\nboiling of the soul; imeros (desire) denotes the stream (rous) which most draws\r\nthe soul dia ten esin tes roes\u0026mdash;because flowing with desire (iemenos), and\r\nexpresses a longing after things and violent attraction of the soul to them,\r\nand is termed imeros from possessing this power; pothos (longing) is expressive\r\nof the desire of that which is not present but absent, and in another place\r\n(pou); this is the reason why the name pothos is applied to things absent, as\r\nimeros is to things present; eros (love) is so called because flowing in\r\n(esron) from without; the stream is not inherent, but is an influence\r\nintroduced through the eyes, and from flowing in was called esros (influx) in\r\nthe old time when they used omicron for omega, and is called eros, now that\r\nomega is substituted for omicron. But why do you not give me another word?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: What do you think of doxa (opinion), and that class of words?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Doxa is either derived from dioxis (pursuit), and expresses the march\r\nof the soul in the pursuit of knowledge, or from the shooting of a bow (toxon);\r\nthe latter is more likely, and is confirmed by oiesis (thinking), which is only\r\noisis (moving), and implies the movement of the soul to the essential nature of\r\neach thing\u0026mdash;just as boule (counsel) has to do with shooting (bole); and\r\nboulesthai (to wish) combines the notion of aiming and deliberating\u0026mdash;all\r\nthese words seem to follow doxa, and all involve the idea of shooting, just as\r\naboulia, absence of counsel, on the other hand, is a mishap, or missing, or\r\nmistaking of the mark, or aim, or proposal, or object.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: You are quickening your pace now, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Why yes, the end I now dedicate to God, not, however, until I have\r\nexplained anagke (necessity), which ought to come next, and ekousion (the\r\nvoluntary). Ekousion is certainly the yielding (eikon) and\r\nunresisting\u0026mdash;the notion implied is yielding and not opposing, yielding, as\r\nI was just now saying, to that motion which is in accordance with our will; but\r\nthe necessary and resistant being contrary to our will, implies error and\r\nignorance; the idea is taken from walking through a ravine which is impassable,\r\nand rugged, and overgrown, and impedes motion\u0026mdash;and this is the derivation\r\nof the word anagkaion (necessary) an agke ion, going through a ravine. But\r\nwhile my strength lasts let us persevere, and I hope that you will persevere\r\nwith your questions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Well, then, let me ask about the greatest and noblest, such as\r\naletheia (truth) and pseudos (falsehood) and on (being), not forgetting to\r\nenquire why the word onoma (name), which is the theme of our discussion, has\r\nthis name of onoma.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: You know the word maiesthai (to seek)?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes;\u0026mdash;meaning the same as zetein (to enquire).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The word onoma seems to be a compressed sentence, signifying on ou\r\nzetema (being for which there is a search); as is still more obvious in\r\nonomaston (notable), which states in so many words that real existence is that\r\nfor which there is a seeking (on ou masma); aletheia is also an agglomeration\r\nof theia ale (divine wandering), implying the divine motion of existence;\r\npseudos (falsehood) is the opposite of motion; here is another ill name given\r\nby the legislator to stagnation and forced inaction, which he compares to sleep\r\n(eudein); but the original meaning of the word is disguised by the addition of\r\npsi; on and ousia are ion with an iota broken off; this agrees with the true\r\nprinciple, for being (on) is also moving (ion), and the same may be said of not\r\nbeing, which is likewise called not going (oukion or ouki on = ouk ion).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: You have hammered away at them manfully; but suppose that some one\r\nwere to say to you, what is the word ion, and what are reon and\r\ndoun?\u0026mdash;show me their fitness.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: You mean to say, how should I answer him?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: One way of giving the appearance of an answer has been already\r\nsuggested.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: What way?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: To say that names which we do not understand are of foreign origin;\r\nand this is very likely the right answer, and something of this kind may be\r\ntrue of them; but also the original forms of words may have been lost in the\r\nlapse of ages; names have been so twisted in all manner of ways, that I should\r\nnot be surprised if the old language when compared with that now in use would\r\nappear to us to be a barbarous tongue.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Very likely.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes, very likely. But still the enquiry demands our earnest attention\r\nand we must not flinch. For we should remember, that if a person go on\r\nanalysing names into words, and enquiring also into the elements out of which\r\nthe words are formed, and keeps on always repeating this process, he who has to\r\nanswer him must at last give up the enquiry in despair.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And at what point ought he to lose heart and give up the enquiry?\r\nMust he not stop when he comes to the names which are the elements of all other\r\nnames and sentences; for these cannot be supposed to be made up of other names?\r\nThe word agathon (good), for example, is, as we were saying, a compound of\r\nagastos (admirable) and thoos (swift). And probably thoos is made up of other\r\nelements, and these again of others. But if we take a word which is incapable\r\nof further resolution, then we shall be right in saying that we have at last\r\nreached a primary element, which need not be resolved any further.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I believe you to be in the right.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And suppose the names about which you are now asking should turn out\r\nto be primary elements, must not their truth or law be examined according to\r\nsome new method?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Very likely.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Quite so, Hermogenes; all that has preceded would lead to this\r\nconclusion. And if, as I think, the conclusion is true, then I shall again say\r\nto you, come and help me, that I may not fall into some absurdity in stating\r\nthe principle of primary names.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Let me hear, and I will do my best to assist you.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I think that you will acknowledge with me, that one principle is\r\napplicable to all names, primary as well as secondary\u0026mdash;when they are\r\nregarded simply as names, there is no difference in them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Certainly not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: All the names that we have been explaining were intended to indicate\r\nthe nature of things.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Of course.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And that this is true of the primary quite as much as of the\r\nsecondary names, is implied in their being names.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Surely.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance from the\r\nprimary.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That is evident.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Very good; but then how do the primary names which precede analysis\r\nshow the natures of things, as far as they can be shown; which they must do, if\r\nthey are to be real names? And here I will ask you a question: Suppose that we\r\nhad no voice or tongue, and wanted to communicate with one another, should we\r\nnot, like the deaf and dumb, make signs with the hands and head and the rest of\r\nthe body?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: There would be no choice, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: We should imitate the nature of the thing; the elevation of our hands\r\nto heaven would mean lightness and upwardness; heaviness and downwardness would\r\nbe expressed by letting them drop to the ground; if we were describing the\r\nrunning of a horse, or any other animal, we should make our bodies and their\r\ngestures as like as we could to them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I do not see that we could do anything else.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: We could not; for by bodily imitation only can the body ever express\r\nanything.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And when we want to express ourselves, either with the voice, or\r\ntongue, or mouth, the expression is simply their imitation of that which we\r\nwant to express.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: It must be so, I think.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then a name is a vocal imitation of that which the vocal imitator\r\nnames or imitates?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I think so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Nay, my friend, I am disposed to think that we have not reached the\r\ntruth as yet.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Why not?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Because if we have we shall be obliged to admit that the people who\r\nimitate sheep, or cocks, or other animals, name that which they imitate.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Quite true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then could I have been right in what I was saying?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: In my opinion, no. But I wish that you would tell me, Socrates,\r\nwhat sort of an imitation is a name?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: In the first place, I should reply, not a musical imitation, although\r\nthat is also vocal; nor, again, an imitation of what music imitates; these, in\r\nmy judgment, would not be naming. Let me put the matter as follows: All objects\r\nhave sound and figure, and many have colour?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But the art of naming appears not to be concerned with imitations of\r\nthis kind; the arts which have to do with them are music and drawing?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Again, is there not an essence of each thing, just as there is a\r\ncolour, or sound? And is there not an essence of colour and sound as well as of\r\nanything else which may be said to have an essence?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I should think so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, and if any one could express the essence of each thing in\r\nletters and syllables, would he not express the nature of each thing?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Quite so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The musician and the painter were the two names which you gave to the\r\ntwo other imitators. What will this imitator be called?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I imagine, Socrates, that he must be the namer, or name-giver, of\r\nwhom we are in search.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: If this is true, then I think that we are in a condition to consider\r\nthe names ron (stream), ienai (to go), schesis (retention), about which you\r\nwere asking; and we may see whether the namer has grasped the nature of them in\r\nletters and syllables in such a manner as to imitate the essence or not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Very good.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But are these the only primary names, or are there others?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: There must be others.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: So I should expect. But how shall we further analyse them, and where\r\ndoes the imitator begin? Imitation of the essence is made by syllables and\r\nletters; ought we not, therefore, first to separate the letters, just as those\r\nwho are beginning rhythm first distinguish the powers of elementary, and then\r\nof compound sounds, and when they have done so, but not before, they proceed to\r\nthe consideration of rhythms?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Must we not begin in the same way with letters; first separating the\r\nvowels, and then the consonants and mutes (letters which are neither vowels nor\r\nsemivowels), into classes, according to the received distinctions of the\r\nlearned; also the semivowels, which are neither vowels, nor yet mutes; and\r\ndistinguishing into classes the vowels themselves? And when we have perfected\r\nthe classification of things, we shall give them names, and see whether, as in\r\nthe case of letters, there are any classes to which they may be all referred\r\n(cf. Phaedrus); and hence we shall see their natures, and see, too, whether\r\nthey have in them classes as there are in the letters; and when we have well\r\nconsidered all this, we shall know how to apply them to what they\r\nresemble\u0026mdash;whether one letter is used to denote one thing, or whether there\r\nis to be an admixture of several of them; just, as in painting, the painter who\r\nwants to depict anything sometimes uses purple only, or any other colour, and\r\nsometimes mixes up several colours, as his method is when he has to paint flesh\r\ncolour or anything of that kind\u0026mdash;he uses his colours as his figures appear\r\nto require them; and so, too, we shall apply letters to the expression of\r\nobjects, either single letters when required, or several letters; and so we\r\nshall form syllables, as they are called, and from syllables make nouns and\r\nverbs; and thus, at last, from the combinations of nouns and verbs arrive at\r\nlanguage, large and fair and whole; and as the painter made a figure, even so\r\nshall we make speech by the art of the namer or the rhetorician, or by some\r\nother art. Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves, but I was carried\r\naway\u0026mdash;meaning to say that this was the way in which (not we but) the\r\nancients formed language, and what they put together we must take to pieces in\r\nlike manner, if we are to attain a scientific view of the whole subject, and we\r\nmust see whether the primary, and also whether the secondary elements are\r\nrightly given or not, for if they are not, the composition of them, my dear\r\nHermogenes, will be a sorry piece of work, and in the wrong direction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: That, Socrates, I can quite believe.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse them in\r\nthis way? for I am certain that I should not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Much less am I likely to be able.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Shall we leave them, then? or shall we seek to discover, if we can,\r\nsomething about them, according to the measure of our ability, saying by way of\r\npreface, as I said before of the Gods, that of the truth about them we know\r\nnothing, and do but entertain human notions of them. And in this present\r\nenquiry, let us say to ourselves, before we proceed, that the higher method is\r\nthe one which we or others who would analyse language to any good purpose must\r\nfollow; but under the circumstances, as men say, we must do as well as we can.\r\nWhat do you think?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: I very much approve.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That objects should be imitated in letters and syllables, and so find\r\nexpression, may appear ridiculous, Hermogenes, but it cannot be\r\navoided\u0026mdash;there is no better principle to which we can look for the truth\r\nof first names. Deprived of this, we must have recourse to divine help, like\r\nthe tragic poets, who in any perplexity have their gods waiting in the air; and\r\nmust get out of our difficulty in like fashion, by saying that \u0026ldquo;the Gods\r\ngave the first names, and therefore they are right.\u0026rdquo; This will be the\r\nbest contrivance, or perhaps that other notion may be even better still, of\r\nderiving them from some barbarous people, for the barbarians are older than we\r\nare; or we may say that antiquity has cast a veil over them, which is the same\r\nsort of excuse as the last; for all these are not reasons but only ingenious\r\nexcuses for having no reasons concerning the truth of words. And yet any sort\r\nof ignorance of first or primitive names involves an ignorance of secondary\r\nwords; for they can only be explained by the primary. Clearly then the\r\nprofessor of languages should be able to give a very lucid explanation of first\r\nnames, or let him be assured he will only talk nonsense about the rest. Do you\r\nnot suppose this to be true?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: My first notions of original names are truly wild and ridiculous,\r\nthough I have no objection to impart them to you if you desire, and I hope that\r\nyou will communicate to me in return anything better which you may have.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: Fear not; I will do my best.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: In the first place, the letter rho appears to me to be the general\r\ninstrument expressing all motion (kinesis). But I have not yet explained the\r\nmeaning of this latter word, which is just iesis (going); for the letter eta\r\nwas not in use among the ancients, who only employed epsilon; and the root is\r\nkiein, which is a foreign form, the same as ienai. And the old word kinesis\r\nwill be correctly given as iesis in corresponding modern letters. Assuming this\r\nforeign root kiein, and allowing for the change of the eta and the insertion of\r\nthe nu, we have kinesis, which should have been kieinsis or eisis; and stasis\r\nis the negative of ienai (or eisis), and has been improved into stasis. Now the\r\nletter rho, as I was saying, appeared to the imposer of names an excellent\r\ninstrument for the expression of motion; and he frequently uses the letter for\r\nthis purpose: for example, in the actual words rein and roe he represents\r\nmotion by rho; also in the words tromos (trembling), trachus (rugged); and\r\nagain, in words such as krouein (strike), thrauein (crush), ereikein (bruise),\r\nthruptein (break), kermatixein (crumble), rumbein (whirl): of all these sorts\r\nof movements he generally finds an expression in the letter R, because, as I\r\nimagine, he had observed that the tongue was most agitated and least at rest in\r\nthe pronunciation of this letter, which he therefore used in order to express\r\nmotion, just as by the letter iota he expresses the subtle elements which pass\r\nthrough all things. This is why he uses the letter iota as imitative of motion,\r\nienai, iesthai. And there is another class of letters, phi, psi, sigma, and xi,\r\nof which the pronunciation is accompanied by great expenditure of breath; these\r\nare used in the imitation of such notions as psuchron (shivering), xeon\r\n(seething), seiesthai, (to be shaken), seismos (shock), and are always\r\nintroduced by the giver of names when he wants to imitate what is phusodes\r\n(windy). He seems to have thought that the closing and pressure of the tongue\r\nin the utterance of delta and tau was expressive of binding and rest in a\r\nplace: he further observed the liquid movement of lambda, in the pronunciation\r\nof which the tongue slips, and in this he found the expression of smoothness,\r\nas in leios (level), and in the word oliothanein (to slip) itself, liparon\r\n(sleek), in the word kollodes (gluey), and the like: the heavier sound of gamma\r\ndetained the slipping tongue, and the union of the two gave the notion of a\r\nglutinous clammy nature, as in glischros, glukus, gloiodes. The nu he observed\r\nto be sounded from within, and therefore to have a notion of inwardness; hence\r\nhe introduced the sound in endos and entos: alpha he assigned to the expression\r\nof size, and nu of length, because they are great letters: omicron was the sign\r\nof roundness, and therefore there is plenty of omicron mixed up in the word\r\ngoggulon (round). Thus did the legislator, reducing all things into letters and\r\nsyllables, and impressing on them names and signs, and out of them by imitation\r\ncompounding other signs. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the truth of names;\r\nbut I should like to hear what Cratylus has more to say.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: But, Socrates, as I was telling you before, Cratylus mystifies me;\r\nhe says that there is a fitness of names, but he never explains what is this\r\nfitness, so that I cannot tell whether his obscurity is intended or not. Tell\r\nme now, Cratylus, here in the presence of Socrates, do you agree in what\r\nSocrates has been saying about names, or have you something better of your own?\r\nand if you have, tell me what your view is, and then you will either learn of\r\nSocrates, or Socrates and I will learn of you.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Well, but surely, Hermogenes, you do not suppose that you can learn,\r\nor I explain, any subject of importance all in a moment; at any rate, not such\r\na subject as language, which is, perhaps, the very greatest of all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHERMOGENES: No, indeed; but, as Hesiod says, and I agree with him, \u0026ldquo;to\r\nadd little to little\u0026rdquo; is worth while. And, therefore, if you think that\r\nyou can add anything at all, however small, to our knowledge, take a little\r\ntrouble and oblige Socrates, and me too, who certainly have a claim upon you.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I am by no means positive, Cratylus, in the view which Hermogenes and\r\nmyself have worked out; and therefore do not hesitate to say what you think,\r\nwhich if it be better than my own view I shall gladly accept. And I should not\r\nbe at all surprized to find that you have found some better notion. For you\r\nhave evidently reflected on these matters and have had teachers, and if you\r\nhave really a better theory of the truth of names, you may count me in the\r\nnumber of your disciples.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: You are right, Socrates, in saying that I have made a study of these\r\nmatters, and I might possibly convert you into a disciple. But I fear that the\r\nopposite is more probable, and I already find myself moved to say to you what\r\nAchilles in the \u0026ldquo;Prayers\u0026rdquo; says to Ajax,\u0026mdash;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Illustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, lord of the people, You appear to have\r\nspoken in all things much to my mind.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd you, Socrates, appear to me to be an oracle, and to give answers much to my\r\nmind, whether you are inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some Muse may have long\r\nbeen an inhabitant of your breast, unconsciously to yourself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Excellent Cratylus, I have long been wondering at my own wisdom; I\r\ncannot trust myself. And I think that I ought to stop and ask myself What am I\r\nsaying? for there is nothing worse than self-deception\u0026mdash;when the deceiver\r\nis always at home and always with you\u0026mdash;it is quite terrible, and therefore\r\nI ought often to retrace my steps and endeavour to \u0026ldquo;look fore and\r\naft,\u0026rdquo; in the words of the aforesaid Homer. And now let me see; where are\r\nwe? Have we not been saying that the correct name indicates the nature of the\r\nthing:\u0026mdash;has this proposition been sufficiently proven?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, what you say, as I am disposed to think, is quite\r\ntrue.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Names, then, are given in order to instruct?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And naming is an art, and has artificers?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And who are they?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: The legislators, of whom you spoke at first.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And does this art grow up among men like other arts? Let me explain\r\nwhat I mean: of painters, some are better and some worse?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The better painters execute their works, I mean their figures,\r\nbetter, and the worse execute them worse; and of builders also, the better sort\r\nbuild fairer houses, and the worse build them worse.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And among legislators, there are some who do their work better and\r\nsome worse?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: No; there I do not agree with you.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then you do not think that some laws are better and others worse?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: No, indeed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Or that one name is better than another?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Certainly not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then all names are rightly imposed?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Yes, if they are names at all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, what do you say to the name of our friend Hermogenes, which was\r\nmentioned before:\u0026mdash;assuming that he has nothing of the nature of Hermes in\r\nhim, shall we say that this is a wrong name, or not his name at all?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: I should reply that Hermogenes is not his name at all, but only\r\nappears to be his, and is really the name of somebody else, who has the nature\r\nwhich corresponds to it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be even\r\nspeaking falsely? For there may be a doubt whether you can call him Hermogenes,\r\nif he is not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: What do you mean?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible? For if this is your\r\nmeaning I should answer, that there have been plenty of liars in all ages.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not?\u0026mdash;say\r\nsomething and yet say nothing? For is not falsehood saying the thing which is\r\nnot?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Your argument, friend, is too subtle for a man of my age. But I\r\nshould like to know whether you are one of those philosophers who think that\r\nfalsehood may be spoken but not said?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Neither spoken nor said.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Nor uttered nor addressed? For example: If a person, saluting you in\r\na foreign country, were to take your hand and say: \u0026ldquo;Hail, Athenian\r\nstranger, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;these words, whether spoken,\r\nsaid, uttered, or addressed, would have no application to you but only to our\r\nfriend Hermogenes, or perhaps to nobody at all?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: In my opinion, Socrates, the speaker would only be talking nonsense.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, but that will be quite enough for me, if you will tell me\r\nwhether the nonsense would be true or false, or partly true and partly\r\nfalse:\u0026mdash;which is all that I want to know.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: I should say that he would be putting himself in motion to no\r\npurpose; and that his words would be an unmeaning sound like the noise of\r\nhammering at a brazen pot.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But let us see, Cratylus, whether we cannot find a meeting-point, for\r\nyou would admit that the name is not the same with the thing named?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: I should.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And would you further acknowledge that the name is an imitation of\r\nthe thing?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And you would say that pictures are also imitations of things, but in\r\nanother way?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I believe you may be right, but I do not rightly understand you.\r\nPlease to say, then, whether both sorts of imitation (I mean both pictures or\r\nwords) are not equally attributable and applicable to the things of which they\r\nare the imitation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: They are.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: First look at the matter thus: you may attribute the likeness of the\r\nman to the man, and of the woman to the woman; and so on?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And conversely you may attribute the likeness of the man to the\r\nwoman, and of the woman to the man?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And are both modes of assigning them right, or only the first?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Only the first.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That is to say, the mode of assignment which attributes to each that\r\nwhich belongs to them and is like them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: That is my view.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Now then, as I am desirous that we being friends should have a good\r\nunderstanding about the argument, let me state my view to you: the first mode\r\nof assignment, whether applied to figures or to names, I call right, and when\r\napplied to names only, true as well as right; and the other mode of giving and\r\nassigning the name which is unlike, I call wrong, and in the case of names,\r\nfalse as well as wrong.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: That may be true, Socrates, in the case of pictures; they may be\r\nwrongly assigned; but not in the case of names\u0026mdash;they must be always right.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Why, what is the difference? May I not go to a man and say to him,\r\n\u0026ldquo;This is your picture,\u0026rdquo; showing him his own likeness, or perhaps\r\nthe likeness of a woman; and when I say \u0026ldquo;show,\u0026rdquo; I mean bring before\r\nthe sense of sight.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And may I not go to him again, and say, \u0026ldquo;This is your\r\nname\u0026rdquo;?\u0026mdash;for the name, like the picture, is an imitation. May I not\r\nsay to him\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;This is your name\u0026rdquo;? and may I not then bring to\r\nhis sense of hearing the imitation of himself, when I say, \u0026ldquo;This is a\r\nman\u0026rdquo;; or of a female of the human species, when I say, \u0026ldquo;This is a\r\nwoman,\u0026rdquo; as the case may be? Is not all that quite possible?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: I would fain agree with you, Socrates; and therefore I say, Granted.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That is very good of you, if I am right, which need hardly be\r\ndisputed at present. But if I can assign names as well as pictures to objects,\r\nthe right assignment of them we may call truth, and the wrong assignment of\r\nthem falsehood. Now if there be such a wrong assignment of names, there may\r\nalso be a wrong or inappropriate assignment of verbs; and if of names and verbs\r\nthen of the sentences, which are made up of them. What do you say, Cratylus?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: I agree; and think that what you say is very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And further, primitive nouns may be compared to pictures, and in\r\npictures you may either give all the appropriate colours and figures, or you\r\nmay not give them all\u0026mdash;some may be wanting; or there may be too many or\r\ntoo much of them\u0026mdash;may there not?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And he who gives all gives a perfect picture or figure; and he who\r\ntakes away or adds also gives a picture or figure, but not a good one.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: In like manner, he who by syllables and letters imitates the nature\r\nof things, if he gives all that is appropriate will produce a good image, or in\r\nother words a name; but if he subtracts or perhaps adds a little, he will make\r\nan image but not a good one; whence I infer that some names are well and others\r\nill made.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: That is true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then the artist of names may be sometimes good, or he may be bad?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And this artist of names is called the legislator?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then like other artists the legislator may be good or he may be bad;\r\nit must surely be so if our former admissions hold good?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Very true, Socrates; but the case of language, you see, is different;\r\nfor when by the help of grammar we assign the letters alpha or beta, or any\r\nother letters to a certain name, then, if we add, or subtract, or misplace a\r\nletter, the name which is written is not only written wrongly, but not written\r\nat all; and in any of these cases becomes other than a name.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But I doubt whether your view is altogether correct, Cratylus.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: How so?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I believe that what you say may be true about numbers, which must be\r\njust what they are, or not be at all; for example, the number ten at once\r\nbecomes other than ten if a unit be added or subtracted, and so of any other\r\nnumber: but this does not apply to that which is qualitative or to anything\r\nwhich is represented under an image. I should say rather that the image, if\r\nexpressing in every point the entire reality, would no longer be an image. Let\r\nus suppose the existence of two objects: one of them shall be Cratylus, and the\r\nother the image of Cratylus; and we will suppose, further, that some God makes\r\nnot only a representation such as a painter would make of your outward form and\r\ncolour, but also creates an inward organization like yours, having the same\r\nwarmth and softness; and into this infuses motion, and soul, and mind, such as\r\nyou have, and in a word copies all your qualities, and places them by you in\r\nanother form; would you say that this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus,\r\nor that there were two Cratyluses?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: I should say that there were two Cratyluses.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then you see, my friend, that we must find some other principle of\r\ntruth in images, and also in names; and not insist that an image is no longer\r\nan image when something is added or subtracted. Do you not perceive that images\r\nare very far from having qualities which are the exact counterpart of the\r\nrealities which they represent?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Yes, I see.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on things, if\r\nthey were exactly the same with them! For they would be the doubles of them,\r\nand no one would be able to determine which were the names and which were the\r\nrealities.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Quite true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then fear not, but have the courage to admit that one name may be\r\ncorrectly and another incorrectly given; and do not insist that the name shall\r\nbe exactly the same with the thing; but allow the occasional substitution of a\r\nwrong letter, and if of a letter also of a noun in a sentence, and if of a noun\r\nin a sentence also of a sentence which is not appropriate to the matter, and\r\nacknowledge that the thing may be named, and described, so long as the general\r\ncharacter of the thing which you are describing is retained; and this, as you\r\nwill remember, was remarked by Hermogenes and myself in the particular instance\r\nof the names of the letters.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Yes, I remember.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Good; and when the general character is preserved, even if some of\r\nthe proper letters are wanting, still the thing is signified;\u0026mdash;well, if\r\nall the letters are given; not well, when only a few of them are given. I think\r\nthat we had better admit this, lest we be punished like travellers in Aegina\r\nwho wander about the street late at night: and be likewise told by truth\r\nherself that we have arrived too late; or if not, you must find out some new\r\nnotion of correctness of names, and no longer maintain that a name is the\r\nexpression of a thing in letters or syllables; for if you say both, you will be\r\ninconsistent with yourself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: I quite acknowledge, Socrates, what you say to be very reasonable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then as we are agreed thus far, let us ask ourselves whether a name\r\nrightly imposed ought not to have the proper letters.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the proper letters are those which are like the things?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Enough then of names which are rightly given. And in names which are\r\nincorrectly given, the greater part may be supposed to be made up of proper and\r\nsimilar letters, or there would be no likeness; but there will be likewise a\r\npart which is improper and spoils the beauty and formation of the word: you\r\nwould admit that?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: There would be no use, Socrates, in my quarrelling with you, since I\r\ncannot be satisfied that a name which is incorrectly given is a name at all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Do you admit a name to be the representation of a thing?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Yes, I do.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive, and some derived?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Yes, I do.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then if you admit that primitive or first nouns are representations\r\nof things, is there any better way of framing representations than by\r\nassimilating them to the objects as much as you can; or do you prefer the\r\nnotion of Hermogenes and of many others, who say that names are conventional,\r\nand have a meaning to those who have agreed about them, and who have previous\r\nknowledge of the things intended by them, and that convention is the only\r\nprinciple; and whether you abide by our present convention, or make a new and\r\nopposite one, according to which you call small great and great\r\nsmall\u0026mdash;that, they would say, makes no difference, if you are only agreed.\r\nWhich of these two notions do you prefer?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Representation by likeness, Socrates, is infinitely better than\r\nrepresentation by any chance sign.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Very good: but if the name is to be like the thing, the letters out\r\nof which the first names are composed must also be like things. Returning to\r\nthe image of the picture, I would ask, How could any one ever compose a picture\r\nwhich would be like anything at all, if there were not pigments in nature which\r\nresembled the things imitated, and out of which the picture is composed?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Impossible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: No more could names ever resemble any actually existing thing, unless\r\nthe original elements of which they are compounded bore some degree of\r\nresemblance to the objects of which the names are the imitation: And the\r\noriginal elements are letters?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Let me now invite you to consider what Hermogenes and I were saying\r\nabout sounds. Do you agree with me that the letter rho is expressive of\r\nrapidity, motion, and hardness? Were we right or wrong in saying so?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: I should say that you were right.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And that lamda was expressive of smoothness, and softness, and the\r\nlike?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: There again you were right.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And yet, as you are aware, that which is called by us sklerotes, is\r\nby the Eretrians called skleroter.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But are the letters rho and sigma equivalents; and is there the same\r\nsignificance to them in the termination rho, which there is to us in sigma, or\r\nis there no significance to one of us?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Nay, surely there is a significance to both of us.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: In as far as they are like, or in as far as they are unlike?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: In as far as they are like.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Are they altogether alike?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Yes; for the purpose of expressing motion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And what do you say of the insertion of the lamda? for that is\r\nexpressive not of hardness but of softness.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Why, perhaps the letter lamda is wrongly inserted, Socrates, and\r\nshould be altered into rho, as you were saying to Hermogenes and in my opinion\r\nrightly, when you spoke of adding and subtracting letters upon occasion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Good. But still the word is intelligible to both of us; when I say\r\nskleros (hard), you know what I mean.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Yes, my dear friend, and the explanation of that is custom.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And what is custom but convention? I utter a sound which I\r\nunderstand, and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound: this is\r\nwhat you are saying?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And if when I speak you know my meaning, there is an indication given\r\nby me to you?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: This indication of my meaning may proceed from unlike as well as from\r\nlike, for example in the lamda of sklerotes. But if this is true, then you have\r\nmade a convention with yourself, and the correctness of a name turns out to be\r\nconvention, since letters which are unlike are indicative equally with those\r\nwhich are like, if they are sanctioned by custom and convention. And even\r\nsupposing that you distinguish custom from convention ever so much, still you\r\nmust say that the signification of words is given by custom and not by\r\nlikeness, for custom may indicate by the unlike as well as by the like. But as\r\nwe are agreed thus far, Cratylus (for I shall assume that your silence gives\r\nconsent), then custom and convention must be supposed to contribute to the\r\nindication of our thoughts; for suppose we take the instance of number, how can\r\nyou ever imagine, my good friend, that you will find names resembling every\r\nindividual number, unless you allow that which you term convention and\r\nagreement to have authority in determining the correctness of names? I quite\r\nagree with you that words should as far as possible resemble things; but I fear\r\nthat this dragging in of resemblance, as Hermogenes says, is a shabby thing,\r\nwhich has to be supplemented by the mechanical aid of convention with a view to\r\ncorrectness; for I believe that if we could always, or almost always, use\r\nlikenesses, which are perfectly appropriate, this would be the most perfect\r\nstate of language; as the opposite is the most imperfect. But let me ask you,\r\nwhat is the force of names, and what is the use of them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: The use of names, Socrates, as I should imagine, is to inform: the\r\nsimple truth is, that he who knows names knows also the things which are\r\nexpressed by them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I suppose you mean to say, Cratylus, that as the name is, so also is\r\nthe thing; and that he who knows the one will also know the other, because they\r\nare similars, and all similars fall under the same art or science; and\r\ntherefore you would say that he who knows names will also know things.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: That is precisely what I mean.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But let us consider what is the nature of this information about\r\nthings which, according to you, is given us by names. Is it the best sort of\r\ninformation? or is there any other? What do you say?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: I believe that to be both the only and the best sort of information\r\nabout them; there can be no other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But do you believe that in the discovery of them, he who discovers\r\nthe names discovers also the things; or is this only the method of instruction,\r\nand is there some other method of enquiry and discovery.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: I certainly believe that the methods of enquiry and discovery are of\r\nthe same nature as instruction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names in the\r\nsearch after things, and analyses their meaning, is in great danger of being\r\ndeceived?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: How so?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his\r\nconception of the things which they signified\u0026mdash;did he not?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And if his conception was erroneous, and he gave names according to\r\nhis conception, in what position shall we who are his followers find ourselves?\r\nShall we not be deceived by him?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: But, Socrates, am I not right in thinking that he must surely have\r\nknown; or else, as I was saying, his names would not be names at all? And you\r\nhave a clear proof that he has not missed the truth, and the proof\r\nis\u0026mdash;that he is perfectly consistent. Did you ever observe in speaking that\r\nall the words which you utter have a common character and purpose?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But that, friend Cratylus, is no answer. For if he did begin in\r\nerror, he may have forced the remainder into agreement with the original error\r\nand with himself; there would be nothing strange in this, any more than in\r\ngeometrical diagrams, which have often a slight and invisible flaw in the first\r\npart of the process, and are consistently mistaken in the long deductions which\r\nfollow. And this is the reason why every man should expend his chief thought\r\nand attention on the consideration of his first principles:\u0026mdash;are they or\r\nare they not rightly laid down? and when he has duly sifted them, all the rest\r\nwill follow. Now I should be astonished to find that names are really\r\nconsistent. And here let us revert to our former discussion: Were we not saying\r\nthat all things are in motion and progress and flux, and that this idea of\r\nmotion is expressed by names? Do you not conceive that to be the meaning of\r\nthem?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Yes; that is assuredly their meaning, and the true meaning.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Let us revert to episteme (knowledge) and observe how ambiguous this\r\nword is, seeming rather to signify stopping the soul at things than going round\r\nwith them; and therefore we should leave the beginning as at present, and not\r\nreject the epsilon, but make an insertion of an iota instead of an epsilon (not\r\npioteme, but epiisteme). Take another example: bebaion (sure) is clearly the\r\nexpression of station and position, and not of motion. Again, the word istoria\r\n(enquiry) bears upon the face of it the stopping (istanai) of the stream; and\r\nthe word piston (faithful) certainly indicates cessation of motion; then,\r\nagain, mneme (memory), as any one may see, expresses rest in the soul, and not\r\nmotion. Moreover, words such as amartia and sumphora, which have a bad sense,\r\nviewed in the light of their etymologies will be the same as sunesis and\r\nepisteme and other words which have a good sense (compare omartein, sunienai,\r\nepesthai, sumpheresthai); and much the same may be said of amathia and\r\nakolasia, for amathia may be explained as e ama theo iontos poreia, and\r\nakolasia as e akolouthia tois pragmasin. Thus the names which in these\r\ninstances we find to have the worst sense, will turn out to be framed on the\r\nsame principle as those which have the best. And any one I believe who would\r\ntake the trouble might find many other examples in which the giver of names\r\nindicates, not that things are in motion or progress, but that they are at\r\nrest; which is the opposite of motion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, but observe; the greater number express motion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: What of that, Cratylus? Are we to count them like votes? and is\r\ncorrectness of names the voice of the majority? Are we to say of whichever sort\r\nthere are most, those are the true ones?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: No; that is not reasonable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Certainly not. But let us have done with this question and proceed to\r\nanother, about which I should like to know whether you think with me. Were we\r\nnot lately acknowledging that the first givers of names in states, both\r\nHellenic and barbarous, were the legislators, and that the art which gave names\r\nwas the art of the legislator?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Quite true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Tell me, then, did the first legislators, who were the givers of the\r\nfirst names, know or not know the things which they named?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: They must have known, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Why, yes, friend Cratylus, they could hardly have been ignorant.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: I should say not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Let us return to the point from which we digressed. You were saying,\r\nif you remember, that he who gave names must have known the things which he\r\nnamed; are you still of that opinion?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: I am.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And would you say that the giver of the first names had also a\r\nknowledge of the things which he named?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: I should.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But how could he have learned or discovered things from names if the\r\nprimitive names were not yet given? For, if we are correct in our view, the\r\nonly way of learning and discovering things, is either to discover names for\r\nourselves or to learn them from others.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: I think that there is a good deal in what you say, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But if things are only to be known through names, how can we suppose\r\nthat the givers of names had knowledge, or were legislators before there were\r\nnames at all, and therefore before they could have known them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: I believe, Socrates, the true account of the matter to be, that a\r\npower more than human gave things their first names, and that the names which\r\nare thus given are necessarily their true names.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then how came the giver of the names, if he was an inspired being or\r\nGod, to contradict himself? For were we not saying just now that he made some\r\nnames expressive of rest and others of motion? Were we mistaken?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: But I suppose one of the two not to be names at all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And which, then, did he make, my good friend; those which are\r\nexpressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion? This is a point\r\nwhich, as I said before, cannot be determined by counting them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: No; not in that way, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But if this is a battle of names, some of them asserting that they\r\nare like the truth, others contending that THEY are, how or by what criterion\r\nare we to decide between them? For there are no other names to which appeal can\r\nbe made, but obviously recourse must be had to another standard which, without\r\nemploying names, will make clear which of the two are right; and this must be a\r\nstandard which shows the truth of things.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: I agree.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But if that is true, Cratylus, then I suppose that things may be\r\nknown without names?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Clearly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But how would you expect to know them? What other way can there be of\r\nknowing them, except the true and natural way, through their affinities, when\r\nthey are akin to each other, and through themselves? For that which is other\r\nand different from them must signify something other and different from them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: What you are saying is, I think, true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Well, but reflect; have we not several times acknowledged that names\r\nrightly given are the likenesses and images of the things which they name?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Let us suppose that to any extent you please you can learn things\r\nthrough the medium of names, and suppose also that you can learn them from the\r\nthings themselves\u0026mdash;which is likely to be the nobler and clearer way; to\r\nlearn of the image, whether the image and the truth of which the image is the\r\nexpression have been rightly conceived, or to learn of the truth whether the\r\ntruth and the image of it have been duly executed?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: I should say that we must learn of the truth.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: How real existence is to be studied or discovered is, I suspect,\r\nbeyond you and me. But we may admit so much, that the knowledge of things is\r\nnot to be derived from names. No; they must be studied and investigated in\r\nthemselves.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Clearly, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: There is another point. I should not like us to be imposed upon by\r\nthe appearance of such a multitude of names, all tending in the same direction.\r\nI myself do not deny that the givers of names did really give them under the\r\nidea that all things were in motion and flux; which was their sincere but, I\r\nthink, mistaken opinion. And having fallen into a kind of whirlpool themselves,\r\nthey are carried round, and want to drag us in after them. There is a matter,\r\nmaster Cratylus, about which I often dream, and should like to ask your\r\nopinion: Tell me, whether there is or is not any absolute beauty or good, or\r\nany other absolute existence?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Certainly, Socrates, I think so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then let us seek the true beauty: not asking whether a face is fair,\r\nor anything of that sort, for all such things appear to be in a flux; but let\r\nus ask whether the true beauty is not always beautiful.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And can we rightly speak of a beauty which is always passing away,\r\nand is first this and then that; must not the same thing be born and retire and\r\nvanish while the word is in our mouths?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Undoubtedly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then how can that be a real thing which is never in the same state?\r\nfor obviously things which are the same cannot change while they remain the\r\nsame; and if they are always the same and in the same state, and never depart\r\nfrom their original form, they can never change or be moved.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Certainly they cannot.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Nor yet can they be known by any one; for at the moment that the\r\nobserver approaches, then they become other and of another nature, so that you\r\ncannot get any further in knowing their nature or state, for you cannot know\r\nthat which has no state.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Nor can we reasonably say, Cratylus, that there is knowledge at all,\r\nif everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding; for\r\nknowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge unless continuing always to abide\r\nand exist. But if the very nature of knowledge changes, at the time when the\r\nchange occurs there will be no knowledge; and if the transition is always going\r\non, there will always be no knowledge, and, according to this view, there will\r\nbe no one to know and nothing to be known: but if that which knows and that\r\nwhich is known exists ever, and the beautiful and the good and every other\r\nthing also exist, then I do not think that they can resemble a process or flux,\r\nas we were just now supposing. Whether there is this eternal nature in things,\r\nor whether the truth is what Heracleitus and his followers and many others say,\r\nis a question hard to determine; and no man of sense will like to put himself\r\nor the education of his mind in the power of names: neither will he so far\r\ntrust names or the givers of names as to be confident in any knowledge which\r\ncondemns himself and other existences to an unhealthy state of unreality; he\r\nwill not believe that all things leak like a pot, or imagine that the world is\r\na man who has a running at the nose. This may be true, Cratylus, but is also\r\nvery likely to be untrue; and therefore I would not have you be too easily\r\npersuaded of it. Reflect well and like a man, and do not easily accept such a\r\ndoctrine; for you are young and of an age to learn. And when you have found the\r\ntruth, come and tell me.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: I will do as you say, though I can assure you, Socrates, that I have\r\nbeen considering the matter already, and the result of a great deal of trouble\r\nand consideration is that I incline to Heracleitus.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then, another day, my friend, when you come back, you shall give me a\r\nlesson; but at present, go into the country, as you are intending, and\r\nHermogenes shall set you on your way.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRATYLUS: Very good, Socrates; I hope, however, that you will continue to think\r\nabout these things yourself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}