Interaction specifies the structural conditions governing interdependent decision-making among multiple agents. The assumptions at this level explain how outcomes arise when individual choices are linked through incentives, beliefs about others, institutional rules, uncertainty, and time.
Interaction is treated as a decentralized, emergent process rather than a centrally coordinated one. Prices, quantities, allocations, and coordination patterns arise from structured interdependence, not equilibrium by assumption. These commitments define how strategic behavior, exchange, bargaining, and coordination become possible without yet invoking system-level regularities.
Science Analysis Template
These are the structural patterns found across all Scientific Disciplines
The table records the structural commitments governing multi-agent interaction, where individual choices become interdependent. Each assumption specifies how agents relate to one another through incentives, beliefs, institutions, time, and uncertainty, while making explicit which interaction structures are excluded and which forms of reasoning are enabled.
The purpose of the table is to distinguish emergent interaction structure from equilibrium claims or centralized control. It makes explicit how prices, quantities, allocations, coordination patterns, and strategic outcomes can arise from decentralized interaction without assuming balance, optimality, or convergence in advance.
SAT – Domain – Structural Assumptions – Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms)
| Science | Assumption | Theme | Scope | Structural Claim | Exclusion | Inferential Role |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interacting agents compete or coordinate over scarce resources. | Order, Naturalism, and Lawfulness of the Universe | Interactions among multiple agents involving resource use or exchange. | Scarcity structures interactions such that agents must either compete or coordinate. | Interactions where resources are non-scarce or irrelevant. | Enables analysis of conflict, cooperation, and coordination under scarcity. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interactions allocate scarce resources such that gains for some imply foregone alternatives for others. | Order, Naturalism, and Lawfulness of the Universe | Multi-agent allocation contexts. | Allocation outcomes impose trade-offs across agents. | Situations where all agents can simultaneously realize all gains. | Enables zero-sum, positive-sum, and trade-off analysis in interaction outcomes. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction outcomes arise from multiple agents making interdependent choices. | Reductionism and Emergence | Systems of interacting agents. | Outcomes emerge from the interdependence of individual choices. | Outcomes determined by a single agent or centralized decision-maker. | Enables derivation of interaction outcomes from micro-level choice interdependence. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interactions occur among agents with heterogeneous constraints that shape feasible exchanges. | Reductionism and Emergence | Interactions among diverse agents. | Differences in constraints structurally shape interaction possibilities. | Homogeneous-agent interaction structures. | Enables explanation of bargaining power, specialization, and exchange asymmetries. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction can be modeled as a system of mutually constrained choices across agents. | Reductionism and Emergence | Formal representations of multi-agent interaction. | Interaction structure is representable as coupled choice sets. | Representations requiring irreducible macro interaction primitives. | Enables game-theoretic and strategic interaction modeling. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction outcomes depend on the preference profiles of participating agents. | Rational Agents and Social Structures | Multi-agent interactions with evaluative differences. | Preferences of agents jointly determine interaction outcomes. | Outcomes independent of agent preferences. | Enables preference-based analysis of bargaining and coordination. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Agents can evaluate interaction outcomes relative to alternatives. | Rational Agents and Social Structures | Agents participating in interaction. | Interaction outcomes are assessed against alternative possible outcomes. | Inability to compare realized outcomes to alternatives. | Enables surplus comparison and acceptability analysis. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Agents can compare alternative interaction outcomes or exchange possibilities. | Rational Agents and Social Structures | Agents choosing among interaction possibilities. | Interaction options admit comparative evaluation. | Indeterminate or incomparable interaction outcomes. | Enables selection among exchanges and strategic options. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Consistent preferences allow stable interaction patterns and predictable responses. | Linearity, Chaos, and Predictability | Repeated or structured interactions. | Preference consistency stabilizes interaction dynamics. | Unstable or contradictory preferences producing chaotic interaction patterns. | Enables prediction of interaction equilibria and response stability. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Stable preferences permit interaction outcomes to be attributed to incentives and structure rather than preference drift. | Linearity, Chaos, and Predictability | Analysis of interaction outcomes over time. | Outcome variation is driven by incentives or structure when preferences are stable. | Explanations relying on endogenous preference drift. | Enables causal attribution in interaction analysis. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction outcomes adjust predictably to changes in shared incentives (prices, rules, payoffs). | Linearity, Chaos, and Predictability | Multi-agent interactions subject to shared incentive changes. | Interaction outcomes vary systematically with incentive changes. | Chaotic or incentive-insensitive interaction responses. | Enables comparative statics and prediction of interaction responses. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Agents engage in interaction to advance perceived objectives relative to others. | Rational Agents and Social Structures | Agents participating in strategic interaction. | Interaction behavior is purposive and relative to others’ positions. | Non-goal-directed or non-relational interaction behavior. | Enables strategic and competitive/cooperative analysis. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction outcomes depend on agents’ beliefs about others’ actions and responses. | Rational Agents and Social Structures | Strategic interactions under uncertainty about others. | Beliefs about others’ behavior shape interaction outcomes. | Outcomes independent of beliefs about others. | Enables belief-dependent and expectation-based strategic reasoning. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interactions are bounded by the joint constraints of participating agents. | Reductionism and Emergence | Multi-agent interactions with heterogeneous constraints. | Joint feasibility sets constrain possible interaction outcomes. | Interaction outcomes unconstrained by agent-level limits. | Enables derivation of feasible interaction sets from agent constraints. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction patterns can emerge from boundedly rational agents without global optimization. | Reductionism and Emergence | Systems of interacting boundedly rational agents. | Coherent interaction patterns do not require globally optimizing agents. | Requirement of full rationality or centralized optimization. | Enables emergent-order explanations of interaction outcomes. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Changes in interaction costs alter participation, terms of exchange, and strategic behavior. | Linearity, Chaos, and Predictability | Interactions subject to cost variation. | Interaction behavior responds monotonically to cost changes. | Cost-insensitive participation or exchange terms. | Enables marginal and sensitivity analysis in interaction settings. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Changes in interaction payoffs alter bargaining positions and exchange patterns. | Linearity, Chaos, and Predictability | Bargaining and exchange interactions. | Payoff variation shifts relative positions and outcomes. | Bargaining outcomes invariant to payoff changes. | Enables bargaining-power and surplus-distribution inference. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Prices coordinate interactions by summarizing relative costs and benefits across agents. | Reductionism and Emergence | Price-mediated interactions. | Scalar price signals compress distributed information into coordination devices. | Coordination requiring full bilateral information exchange. | Enables decentralized coordination analysis. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Markets structure interaction through exchange, price formation, and coordination rules. | Rational Agents and Social Structures | Market-based interaction environments. | Markets impose institutional rules that structure interaction. | Interaction absent institutional structure or rules. | Enables institutional analysis of market coordination. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Agents interact through multiple mechanisms beyond markets (e.g., bargaining, hierarchy, norms, networks). | Rational Agents and Social Structures | Non-market and mixed interaction settings. | Multiple institutional forms structure interaction behavior. | Exclusively market-based interaction mechanisms. | Enables comparative institutional analysis of interaction forms. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Prices are generated through decentralized interaction among agents rather than imposed by a single decision-maker. | Reductionism and Emergence | Price formation in multi-agent interaction systems. | Prices emerge endogenously from decentralized interactions. | Centrally imposed or exogenously fixed prices. | Enables emergent-price and decentralized coordination analysis. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Traded quantities result from mutually agreed interactions among agents. | Reductionism and Emergence | Exchange interactions involving quantities. | Quantities are jointly determined through agreement among interacting agents. | Quantities dictated unilaterally or centrally. | Enables bilateral and multilateral exchange modeling. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Resource allocations arise from the pattern of interactions among agents. | Reductionism and Emergence | Allocation outcomes in interacting systems. | Allocation is an emergent property of interaction structure. | Allocation imposed independently of interaction patterns. | Enables analysis of allocation as emergent from interaction networks. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction effects can be analyzed by varying one interaction margin while holding others fixed. | Linearity, Chaos, and Predictability | Local analysis of interaction responses. | Interaction dimensions are locally separable for analysis. | Necessity of fully entangled multi-margin variation. | Enables marginal and comparative-statics analysis in interaction settings. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | It is valid to analyze a specific interaction channel while abstracting from others. | Linearity, Chaos, and Predictability | Analysis of multi-channel interaction systems. | Individual interaction channels can be isolated analytically. | Requirement to model all interaction channels simultaneously. | Enables focused analysis of specific coordination mechanisms. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction structures may be intentionally simplified to isolate core coordination mechanisms. | Reductionism and Emergence | Representations of interaction systems. | Simplified structures can stand in for full interaction complexity. | Requirement of fully detailed interaction representation. | Enables tractable modeling of coordination mechanisms. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Simplified interaction models are provisional and can be enriched. | Reductionism and Emergence | Modeling of interaction systems over time. | Simplified interaction representations are revisable approximations. | Assumption that simplified models are final or exhaustive. | Enables iterative refinement of interaction models. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Repeated interactions among agents generate stable coordination patterns. | Linearity, Chaos, and Predictability | Recurrent interaction settings. | Repetition stabilizes coordination outcomes. | Persistent instability despite repeated interaction. | Enables prediction of long-run interaction patterns. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Recurrent interaction outcomes produce statistically observable regularities. | Reductionism and Emergence | Observed interaction outcomes across repetitions. | Statistical regularities emerge from repeated interactions. | Absence of detectable pattern across repetitions. | Enables statistical inference about interaction behavior. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction outcomes may vary across instances while retaining stable structure. | Linearity, Chaos, and Predictability | Interaction outcomes over multiple instances. | Structural stability persists despite instance-level variation. | Either complete invariance or complete randomness. | Enables stochastic interaction modeling with stable structure. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Legal rules structure permissible interactions and enforceable exchanges. | Rational Agents and Social Structures | Interactions occurring within legal systems. | Legal rules define admissible interactions and enforceable commitments. | Interactions unconstrained by law or enforcement. | Enables analysis of legality, compliance, and enforceability in interaction outcomes. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Social norms influence acceptable interaction strategies and outcomes. | Rational Agents and Social Structures | Interactions embedded in social contexts. | Normative expectations shape admissible strategies and outcomes. | Interaction behavior independent of social norms. | Enables explanation of norm-consistent and norm-deviant interaction patterns. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Defined property rights structure who may interact over which resources. | Rational Agents and Social Structures | Interactions involving resources or assets. | Property rights delimit participation and control in interactions. | Interactions unrestricted by ownership or control rights. | Enables rights-based analysis of exchange and exclusion. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Money facilitates interaction by standardizing exchange and settlement across agents. | Rational Agents and Social Structures | Monetary interaction environments. | Monetary units standardize valuation, exchange, and settlement. | Non-monetary or non-standardized interaction mechanisms. | Enables analysis of monetary coordination and reduced transaction costs. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interactions occur within a fixed set of institutional rules and enforcement structures during the analysis period. | Rational Agents and Social Structures | Interactions analyzed over a bounded institutional horizon. | Institutional rules are treated as fixed parameters locally. | Endogenous institutional change within the same interaction interval. | Enables conditional interaction analysis given institutional context. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interactions unfold over time rather than instantaneously. | Continuity vs. Discreteness | Temporal structure of interactions. | Interaction processes extend across time. | Instantaneous or atemporal interaction realization. | Enables sequencing, timing, and dynamic interaction analysis. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction outcomes depend on past interactions, present actions, and anticipated future responses. | Continuity vs. Discreteness | Dynamic interaction systems. | Interaction outcomes are temporally interdependent across stages. | Outcomes determined solely by present actions. | Enables dynamic and path-dependent interaction modeling. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction behavior depends on agents’ expectations about others’ future actions. | Linearity, Chaos, and Predictability | Strategic interactions under uncertainty. | Expectations systematically shape interaction strategies. | Interaction independent of expectations about others. | Enables anticipatory and strategic-response analysis. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Timing frictions affect coordination, exchange, and strategic interaction. | Continuity vs. Discreteness | Interactions with temporal frictions. | Delays and timing constraints shape interaction outcomes. | Frictionless timing with no delays. | Enables analysis of coordination failure and delay effects. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction outcomes reflect trade-offs between present and future gains across agents. | Continuity vs. Discreteness | Interactions involving intertemporal considerations. | Present and future payoffs are jointly evaluated in interaction. | Isolation of payoffs by time with no cross-temporal trade-offs. | Enables intertemporal bargaining and dynamic coordination analysis. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interactions occur under uncertainty about future actions and states. | Determinism vs. Indeterminism | Strategic interactions with forward-looking components. | Future actions and states are not fully determined at interaction time. | Perfect foresight or fully determined interaction paths. | Enables uncertainty-aware and stochastic interaction analysis. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction strategies are shaped by uncertainty about others’ behavior and outcomes. | Determinism vs. Indeterminism | Strategic interactions under uncertainty. | Strategy selection depends on uncertain beliefs about others. | Strategies independent of uncertainty about others. | Enables analysis of strategic behavior under uncertainty. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction outcomes can be analyzed using probabilistic risk over possible joint actions. | Determinism vs. Indeterminism | Outcome analysis in multi-agent interactions. | Joint action outcomes admit probabilistic representation. | Deterministic mapping from joint actions to outcomes. | Enables risk-based and stochastic game analysis. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Agents assign probabilities to others’ actions and interaction outcomes. | Determinism vs. Indeterminism | Belief formation in strategic interaction. | Beliefs over others’ actions are probabilistically represented. | Non-probabilistic or purely qualitative belief representation. | Enables Bayesian and expectation-based strategic inference. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction depends on agents’ beliefs about others’ strategies. | Rational Agents and Social Structures | Strategic interaction contexts. | Beliefs about others’ strategies structurally affect interaction outcomes. | Interaction independent of beliefs about others. | Enables belief-dependent equilibrium and strategic reasoning. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction outcomes depend on expected payoffs from others’ responses. | Linearity, Chaos, and Predictability | Strategic evaluation of interaction outcomes. | Expected-response structure governs interaction choices. | Choices independent of expected responses. | Enables expected-payoff and best-response analysis. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interactions occur under asymmetric or incomplete information among agents. | Reductionism and Emergence | Interactions with information asymmetries. | Information is unevenly distributed across interacting agents. | Fully symmetric or complete information environments. | Enables analysis of signaling, screening, and informational frictions. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction strategies trade off information gathering against participation and delay. | Rational Agents and Social Structures | Strategic interaction with costly information. | Information acquisition competes with other interaction objectives. | Costless or irrelevant information acquisition. | Enables analysis of search, signaling effort, and participation timing. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction outcomes may reflect miscoordination due to incorrect beliefs. | Determinism vs. Indeterminism | Interaction outcomes under belief error. | Incorrect beliefs can lead to suboptimal or failed coordination. | Guaranteed correct beliefs or perfect coordination. | Enables explanation of coordination failure and inefficiency. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Firms participate in interaction as coordinated decision-making units. | Reductionism and Emergence | Interactions involving firms. | Firms act as internally coordinated agents in interaction systems. | Necessity of modeling firms only as collections of individuals. | Enables firm-level strategic interaction analysis. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Governments interact strategically with other agents via policy, enforcement, and exchange. | Rational Agents and Social Structures | Interactions involving governmental actors. | Governments participate as strategic agents affecting interaction outcomes. | Governments acting only as exogenous background conditions. | Enables strategic and policy-based interaction analysis. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Institutions shape and participate in interactions through rule-setting and enforcement. | Rational Agents and Social Structures | Interactions structured by institutional frameworks. | Institutions actively structure and participate in interaction dynamics. | Institutions as passive or irrelevant to interaction outcomes. | Enables institutional interaction analysis. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Agents engaged in interaction can evaluate alternative interaction paths that did not occur. | Rational Agents and Social Structures | Participants in strategic interaction. | Counterfactual interaction paths are cognitively representable and comparable. | Evaluation restricted only to realized interaction paths. | Enables counterfactual and opportunity-cost reasoning in interaction. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction participants can reason about alternative strategic responses and outcomes. | Rational Agents and Social Structures | Strategic interaction contexts. | Hypothetical strategic responses can be internally represented. | Inability to reason beyond realized strategies. | Enables strategic foresight and equilibrium reasoning. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction outcomes (prices, quantities, payoffs) can be represented numerically. | Reductionism and Emergence | Representation of interaction outcomes. | Interaction results admit numerical representation. | Exclusively qualitative or non-comparable outcome representation. | Enables quantitative modeling of interaction outcomes. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Observed interaction outcomes may be measured with noise or error. | Determinism vs. Indeterminism | Observation of interaction results. | Measurement is an imperfect signal of true outcomes. | Assumption of perfectly accurate observation. | Enables noise-aware inference from interaction data. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction patterns remain analyzable despite noisy observation. | Linearity, Chaos, and Predictability | Analysis of interaction data under noise. | Structural patterns persist under measurement noise. | Noise fully obscuring interaction structure. | Enables robust inference of interaction regularities. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction requires a shared unit of account to compare exchange terms. | Symmetry and Conservation Principles | Exchange-based interactions. | Comparability requires a common unit across agents. | Exchange without any shared unit of comparison. | Enables consistent comparison of exchange terms. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interactions adopt a reference unit to coordinate valuation and exchange. | Symmetry and Conservation Principles | Coordination of valuation in interaction. | A reference unit anchors valuation across agents. | Absence of any coordinating reference unit. | Enables coordinated valuation and exchange analysis. |
| Interaction (Markets, Strategy & Mechanisms) | Interaction outcomes reflect internally consistent relative valuations across agents. | Symmetry and Conservation Principles | Relative valuation in interaction outcomes. | Relative valuations satisfy internal consistency constraints. | Contradictory or cyclic relative valuation across agents. | Enables stable comparison and aggregation of interaction outcomes. |
Order, Naturalism, and Lawfulness
At the interaction level, economics assumes that multi-agent outcomes are governed by lawful structural constraints, not arbitrary coordination. This is expressed through the assumptions that interacting agents compete or coordinate over scarce resources and that interactions allocate scarcity such that gains for some imply foregone alternatives for others. Scarcity therefore structures interaction in a determinate way: interaction outcomes necessarily reflect trade-offs imposed by limited resources. These assumptions rule out interaction environments in which resources are irrelevant or universally abundant and establish that conflict, cooperation, bargaining, and coordination are not optional features of interaction but structurally induced responses to scarcity.
Determinism vs. Indeterminism
Interaction theory explicitly rejects the idea that strategic outcomes are fully determined or perfectly foreseen. This is formalized in assumptions that interactions occur under uncertainty about future actions and states, that strategies are shaped by uncertainty about others’ behavior, and that beliefs about others’ actions may be incorrect. Interaction outcomes are therefore not fixed at interaction time; they admit probabilistic representation over possible joint actions, with agents assigning probabilities to others’ behavior. This indeterminism is structural rather than epistemic failure: even well-defined interactions can produce miscoordination and inefficiency due to belief error. These assumptions exclude perfect foresight and deterministic interaction paths while enabling stochastic, Bayesian, and expectation-based analysis of strategic behavior.
Linearity, Chaos, and Predictability
At the interaction level, economics assumes conditional predictability without global stability. When preferences are consistent and incentives are stable, interaction patterns become predictable: outcomes adjust systematically to changes in shared incentives, costs, and payoffs, and repeated interactions generate stable coordination patterns. This supports assumptions that interaction effects can be analyzed by varying one interaction margin while holding others fixed and that specific interaction channels can be isolated analytically. At the same time, interaction outcomes may vary across instances while retaining stable structure, and noisy observation does not erase underlying patterns. These assumptions rule out both chaotic interaction insensitive to incentives and rigid determinism, positioning interaction as locally analyzable, marginally responsive, and statistically regular.
Continuity vs. Discreteness
Interaction theory assumes that strategic processes unfold over time, not instantaneously. Interactions extend across temporal stages, with outcomes depending on past interactions, present actions, and anticipated future responses. Timing frictions—delays, sequencing, and coordination lags—materially affect exchange, bargaining, and strategic behavior. Interaction outcomes reflect intertemporal trade-offs between present and future gains across agents, rather than isolated, time-independent payoffs. These assumptions rule out atemporal or frictionless interaction and make dynamic coordination, path dependence, delay effects, and intertemporal bargaining well-defined objects of analysis.
Symmetry and Conservation Principles
At the interaction level, symmetry appears as commensurability and consistency across agents, not as physical invariance. This is captured by the assumptions that interaction requires a shared unit of account, that interactions adopt a reference unit to coordinate valuation and exchange, and that interaction outcomes reflect internally consistent relative valuations across agents. Together, these assumptions assert that multi-agent exchange is only intelligible if agents can compare terms of trade using a common evaluative frame. They rule out interaction environments in which exchanges lack commensuration or where relative valuations are cyclic or contradictory across agents. This symmetry enables consistent comparison of exchange terms, coordinated valuation, and the aggregation of interaction outcomes without collapsing into incoherence.
Equilibrium and Steady-State Assumptions
Why there are none
As at the choice level, there are no equilibrium or steady-state assumptions at the interaction level, and this absence is again structural.
All interaction assumptions you formalized describe:
- how outcomes are generated (emergence from interdependent choices),
- how agents coordinate or miscoordinate (beliefs, incentives, institutions, timing),
- how interaction responds to change (costs, payoffs, uncertainty),
- and how patterns may stabilize locally or statistically.
None of them assert that:
- interactions converge to a fixed point,
- bargaining settles into a stable balance,
- prices or quantities necessarily clear markets,
- or that interaction dynamics terminate in a steady configuration.
Even repeated interaction assumptions stop at pattern stability, not convergence. Stability here means predictable structure under repetition, not equilibrium in the sense of balance, rest, or attractor. Equilibrium only becomes meaningful when interaction outcomes are aggregated across populations or time horizons, which is why it appears first in Aggregation & Dynamics, not here.
Reductionism and Emergence
Reductionism and emergence dominate the interaction layer. The core commitment is that interaction outcomes are not primitives but arise from the structured interdependence of agent-level choices.
This is expressed in assumptions that:
- interaction outcomes arise from multiple agents making interdependent choices,
- agents face heterogeneous constraints shaping feasible exchanges,
- interaction can be modeled as mutually constrained choice sets,
- joint feasibility bounds interaction outcomes,
- prices, quantities, and allocations emerge from decentralized interaction,
- and coherent interaction patterns can arise without global optimization.
At the same time, emergence is explicit: interaction outcomes are not reducible to any single agent’s choice, nor imposed centrally. Simplified interaction structures are allowed as provisional representations, and repeated interactions generate statistically observable regularities. These assumptions rule out explanations requiring irreducible macro interaction primitives while preserving the reality of higher-level structure produced by interaction itself.
Rational Agents and Social Structures (Assumptions in Social Sciences)
At the interaction level, rationality is relational and institutional, not individualistic. The assumptions here specify how agents, firms, governments, and institutions participate as structured actors within interaction systems.
Interaction outcomes depend on:
- agents’ preference profiles,
- beliefs about others’ actions and strategies,
- purposive behavior relative to others,
- legal rules, social norms, property rights, and monetary systems,
- and fixed institutional frameworks over the interaction horizon.
These assumptions explicitly reject interaction models in which agents act in isolation, institutions are irrelevant, or coordination occurs without rule-governed structure. Rationality here means that interaction is intelligible as belief-conditioned, goal-directed, and institutionally embedded behavior, even under uncertainty, bounded rationality, and information asymmetry. This category defines who and what can act in interaction, and under which social constraints.