Goal Alignment

In a fully cooperative interaction, the agents’ goals are completely aligned: both evaluate outcomes using the same success criteria and seek the same end state. Any improvement in the system’s outcome is beneficial to both agents simultaneously, and no action that advances one agent’s objective can undermine the other’s. There is no incentive to withhold effort, deceive, or defect on motivational grounds, because success is jointly defined. At the level of goals, the agents function as a single evaluative unit rather than competing decision-makers.

Structural Symmetry

In a fully cooperative interaction, structural symmetry means that both agents occupy equivalent positions within the system. Each has access to the same set of actions, operates under the same constraints, and possesses comparable capacity to influence outcomes. No agent is assigned a privileged role or a dependent function; in principle, either could substitute for the other without altering the structure of the interaction. Any differences in behavior arise from choice or coordination, not from built-in asymmetries of role or capability. Structure does not impose hierarchy, delegation, or dependence.


In a fully cooperative dyad, both agents pursue the same objective and evaluate outcomes identically, while operating from structurally equivalent positions within the system. Their goals are aligned, and neither agent possesses a role-based advantage over the other: both have access to the same actions, information, and strategic possibilities. Because incentives are shared and structure is symmetric, the interaction contains no inherent conflict, hierarchy, or bargaining pressure. Strategic behavior in this category is therefore centered on coordination and joint optimization rather than persuasion, competition, or control. Success or failure emerges from how effectively the agents synchronize their actions, not from opposing interests or unequal footing.

Information Relationship

Both agents pursue the same objective and occupy equivalent strategic positions. Neither benefits from the other’s failure, and neither holds inherent structural advantage. All failure in this scenario is unintentional: it arises from information, timing, or design—not adversarial strategy.

What changes across cases is how coordination succeeds or fails depending on the information regime.


1) Pure Coordination

Fully Cooperative × Perfect + Symmetric

Pure Coordination describes interactions in which agents share identical goals, occupy equivalent structural positions, and possess complete, mutually known information about the relevant state of the world. Nothing is hidden, nothing is unequal, and nothing is adversarial. All agents see the same situation, know that the other sees it, and understand that success or failure is shared. In this regime, disagreement is not strategic—it is purely operational.

Both agents see all decision-relevant state, and both know that both see it.
Nothing important is hidden, delayed, or privately held.

Examples:

If failure occurs here, it is a coordination or execution error, not a strategic one.


2) Guided Coordination

Fully Cooperative × Perfect + Asymmetric

Guided Coordination occurs when agents share goals and equivalent formal standing, but differ in their access to information. The world itself is fully knowable, yet one agent observes more clearly, sooner, or from a superior vantage point. Cooperation remains intact, but coordination is no longer purely mutual; it becomes mediated through the better-informed agent.

All relevant state is observable in principle, but access is unequal.
One agent sees earlier, clearer, or more directly.

Examples:

Cooperation succeeds only if asymmetry is actively integrated rather than allowed to harden into control.


3) Joint Sensemaking

Fully Cooperative × Imperfect + Symmetric

Joint Sensemaking describes cooperative interactions in which agents share goals and structural standing but face a world that is partially unknown, noisy, or unfolding. Neither agent has privileged access to the truth; uncertainty is shared, and both know that it is shared. Cooperation is intact, but certainty is not.

Some relevant state is hidden or uncertain, and both agents face the same uncertainty.
Neither has privileged access.

Examples:

Trust exists, but certainty does not. Success depends on how well uncertainty is managed together.


4) Trust-Mediated Cooperation

Fully Cooperative × Imperfect + Asymmetric

Trust-Mediated Cooperation occurs when agents share goals and formal standing, but uncertainty is unevenly distributed. Some relevant state is hidden or unclear, and one agent possesses superior knowledge, expertise, or insight into that uncertainty. Cooperation remains genuine, but it is filtered through reliance rather than mutual visibility.

Relevant state is uncertain, and one agent knows more or knows sooner.
Uncertainty exists, but it is unevenly distributed.

Examples:

This is the most dangerous cooperative regime: shared goals coexist with the capacity for unintentional dominance.


Structural takeaway (for Fully Cooperative)

All four are cooperative.
Only the last two can feel adversarial—without actually being so.