On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
{"WorkMasterId":4993,"WpPageId":243552,"ParentWpPageId":189627,"Slug":"on-the-fourfold-root-of-the-principle-of-sufficient-reason","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/arthur-schopenhauer/on-the-fourfold-root-of-the-principle-of-sufficient-reason/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/arthur-schopenhauer/on-the-fourfold-root-of-the-principle-of-sufficient-reason/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":1121505,"CleanHtmlLength":1065395,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason","Deck":"The principle of sufficient reason has four distinct roots: becoming, knowing, being, and acting.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to Arthur Schopenhauer","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/arthur-schopenhauer/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"Arthur Schopenhauer","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/arthur-schopenhauer/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/arthur-schopenhauer-01-standard-portrait.jpg","ImageAlt":"Arthur Schopenhauer Portrait","FilterTerra":"Western Europe","ClickText":"Arthur Schopenhauer","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/arthur-schopenhauer/","Copies":["1788 CE – 1860 CE","Danzig (now Gdansk)","German philosopher from Danzig whose account of representation, blind will, pessimistic metaphysics, compassion ethics, aesthetics, and music reshaped nineteenth-century and modern philosophy."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:4","Title":"Modern History","DateText":"1800 CE – 1944 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:11","Title":"Long 19th Century","DateText":"1870 CE – 1913 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/philosophers-of-the-long-19th-century/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"1813 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Publication year for the first edition; later revisions are part of the work history and are not separately duplicated here.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:3"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:POL:1"}],"OriginalTitle":"Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde","Language":"German","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:epistemology"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:metaphysics"}],"Tradition":"German post-Kantian philosophy, pessimism, aesthetics, and ethics","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #50966 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["The principle of sufficient reason has four distinct roots: becoming, knowing, being, and acting."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"The Fourfold Root; Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reason","KeyConcepts":"sufficient reason; causality; ground; representation; knowledge; action","Methodology":"Post-Kantian transcendental analysis, metaphysical system-building, aphoristic essay, historical criticism, comparative religion, and psychological observation.","Structure":"Published book, prize essay, edition-level work, posthumous manuscript work, translation/adaptation, or self-contained Parerga and Paralipomena essay accepted under the Max Published policy."},"Arguments":["Connects representation, will, causality, suffering, art, compassion, character, knowledge, and cultural criticism to Schopenhauer\u0027s wider philosophical system."],"Influence":{"InfluencedBy":"Immanuel Kant, Plato, the Upanishads, Buddhism, Goethe, Spinoza, and early modern metaphysics.","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Accepted as part of the user-approved Arthur Schopenhauer Max Published corpus.","Used in metaphysics, aesthetics, music theory, ethics, pessimism, philosophy of mind, comparative philosophy, and critiques of modern optimism."],"EvidenceNote":["Accepted under the user-selected Max Published policy for Schopenhauer\u0027s published books, prize essays, and edition-level works."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Versions","BodyHtml":"\u003cdiv class=\"dz-philo__full-version-grid\"\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-version-card\"\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-provider\"\u003eProject Gutenberg\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3 class=\"dz-philo__full-version-title\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #50966\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-meta\"\u003eHtmlText · Imported\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ca class=\"dz-philo__full-version-link\" href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/50966\"\u003eOpen full version\u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["The principle of sufficient reason has four distinct roots: becoming, knowing, being, and acting."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":"The Fourfold Root; Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reason"},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"sufficient reason; causality; ground; representation; knowledge; action"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Post-Kantian transcendental analysis, metaphysical system-building, aphoristic essay, historical criticism, comparative religion, and psychological observation."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"Published book, prize essay, edition-level work, posthumous manuscript work, translation/adaptation, or self-contained Parerga and Paralipomena essay accepted under the Max Published policy."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Connects representation, will, causality, suffering, art, compassion, character, knowledge, and cultural criticism to Schopenhauer\u0027s wider philosophical system."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"Immanuel Kant, Plato, the Upanishads, Buddhism, Goethe, Spinoza, and early modern metaphysics."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"Nietzsche, Wagner, Freud, Thomas Mann, Wittgenstein, Mainlander, modern pessimism, aesthetics, psychology, and comparative philosophy."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Accepted as part of the user-approved Arthur Schopenhauer Max Published corpus.","Used in metaphysics, aesthetics, music theory, ethics, pessimism, philosophy of mind, comparative philosophy, and critiques of modern optimism."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Accepted under the user-selected Max Published policy for Schopenhauer\u0027s published books, prize essays, and edition-level works."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003ePublic-domain full text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/50966\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #50966\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"xhtml_big\"\u003eTRANSCRIBER\u0027S NOTE:\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eInconsistencies in hyphenation, punctuation, spelling and abbreviations have not been corrected.\r\nA list of other corrections can be found at the \u003ca href=\"#Corrections\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eend\r\nof the document\u003c/a\u003e. The Table of Contents starts \u003ca href=\"#Pgxiii\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ehere\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph1\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eBOHN\u0027S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch1\u003eTWO ESSAYS\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eBY\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\r\nARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.\u003c/h1\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eLONDON: GEORGE BELL AND SONS\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPORTUGAL ST. LINCOLN\u0027S INN, W.C.\u003cbr\u003e\r\nCAMBRIDGE: DEIGHTON, BELL \u0026amp; CO.\u003cbr\u003e\r\nNEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN CO.\u003cbr\u003e\r\nBOMBAY: A. H. WHEELER \u0026amp; CO.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph1 spaced\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003eON\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\nTHE FOURFOLD ROOT OF THE\r\nPRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eAND\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\nON THE WILL IN NATURE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph2\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003eTWO ESSAYS BY\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\nARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph4\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTranslated by Mme. KARL HILLEBRAND.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph4\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eREVISED EDITION.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph3\"\u003eLONDON\u003cbr\u003e\r\nGEORGE BELL AND SONS\u003cbr\u003e\r\n1907\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eCHISWICK PRESS: CHARLES WHITTINGHAM AND CO.\u003cbr\u003e\r\nTOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003eTRANSLATOR\u0027S PREFACE.\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgv\"\u003e[v]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn venturing to lay the present translation\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_1\" title=\"From the fourth edition by Julius Frauenstädt. \u0027Fourfold Root,\u0027 Leipzig, 1875; \u0027Will in Nature,\u0027 Leipzig, 1878.\" id=\"FNanchor_1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e before the\r\npublic, I am aware of the great difficulties of my task,\r\nand indeed can hardly hope to do justice to the Author.\r\nIn fact, had it not been for the considerations I am about\r\nto state, I might probably never have published what had\r\noriginally been undertaken in order to acquire a clearer\r\ncomprehension of these essays, rather than with a view to\r\npublicity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe two treatises which form the contents of the present\r\nvolume have so much importance for a profound and correct\r\nknowledge of Schopenhauer\u0027s philosophy, that it may\r\neven be doubted whether the translation of his chief work,\r\n\"Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,\" can contribute much\r\ntowards the appreciation of his system without the help at\r\nleast of the \"Vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden\r\nGrunde.\" Schopenhauer himself repeatedly and urgently\r\ninsists upon a previous thorough knowledge of Kant\u0027s\r\nphilosophy, as the basis, and of his own \"Fourfold Root,\"\r\nas the key, to his own system, asserting that knowledge to\r\nbe the indispensable condition for a right comprehension\r\nof his meaning. So far as I am aware, neither the \"Fourfold\r\nRoot\" nor the \"Will in Nature\" have as yet found\r\na translator; therefore, considering the dawning interest\r\nwhich has begun to make itself felt for Schopenhauer\u0027s\r\nphilosophy in England and in America, and the fact that\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgvi\"\u003e[vi]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nno more competent scholar has come forward to do the\r\nwork, it may not seem presumptuous to suppose that this\r\nversion may be acceptable to those who wish to acquire\r\na more than superficial knowledge of this remarkable\r\nthinker, yet whose acquaintance with German does not\r\npermit them to read his works in the original.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow although some portions of both the Essays published\r\nin the present volume have of course become antiquated,\r\nowing to the subsequent development of the\r\nempirical sciences, while others—such as, for instance,\r\nSchopenhauer\u0027s denunciation of plagiarism in the cases of\r\nBrandis and Rosas in the beginning of Physiology and\r\nPathology\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_2\" title=\"See \u0027Will in Nature,\u0027 pp. 9-18 of the original; pp. 224-234 of the present translation.\" id=\"FNanchor_2\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e—can have no interest for the reader of the present\r\nday, I have nevertheless given them just as he left\r\nthem and refrained from all suppression or alteration. And\r\nif, on the whole, the \"Will in Nature\" may be less indispensable\r\nfor a right understanding of our philosopher\u0027s\r\nviews than the \"Fourfold Root,\" being merely a record of\r\nthe confirmations which had been contributed during his\r\nlifetime by the various branches of Natural Science to\r\nhis doctrine, that \u003cem\u003ethe thing in itself is the will\u003c/em\u003e, the Second\r\nEssay has nevertheless in its own way quite as much importance\r\nas the First, and is, in a sense, its complement.\r\nFor they both throw light on Schopenhauer\u0027s view of the\r\nUniverse in its double aspect as Will and as Representation,\r\neach being as it were \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003ea résumé\u003c/i\u003e of the exposition of one of\r\nthose aspects. My plea for uniting them in one volume, in\r\nspite of the difference of their contents and the wide lapse\r\nof time (seventeen years) which lies between them, must be,\r\nthat they complete each other, and that their great weight\r\nand intrinsic value seem to point them out as peculiarly\r\nfitted to be introduced to the English thinker.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn endeavouring to convey the Author\u0027s thoughts as he\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgvii\"\u003e[vii]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nexpresses them, I have necessarily encountered many and\r\ngreat difficulties. His meaning, though always clearly expressed,\r\nis not always easy to seize, even for his countrymen;\r\nas a foreigner, therefore, I may often have failed to grasp,\r\nlet alone adequately to render, that meaning. In this case\r\nbesides, the responsibility for any want of perspicuity cannot\r\nbe shifted by the translator on to the Author; since the\r\nconsummate perfection of Schopenhauer\u0027s prose is universally\r\nrecognised, even by those who reject, or at least who do\r\nnot share, his views. An eminent German writer of our time\r\nhas not hesitated to rank him immediately after Lessing\r\nand Göthe as the third greatest German prose-writer, and\r\nonly quite recently a German professor, in a speech delivered\r\nwith the intent of demolishing Schopenhauer\u0027s\r\nphilosophy, was reluctantly obliged to admit that his works\r\nwould remain on account of their literary value. Göthe\r\nhimself expressed admiration for the clearness of exposition\r\nin Schopenhauer\u0027s chief work and for the beauty of his style.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe chief obstacle I have encountered in translating these\r\nEssays, did not therefore consist in the obscurity of the\r\nAuthor\u0027s style, nor even in the difficulty of finding appropriate\r\nterms wherewith to convey his meaning; although at\r\ntimes certainly the want of complete precision in our philosophical\r\nterminology made itself keenly felt and the selection\r\nwas often far from easy: it lay rather in the great difference\r\nin the way of thinking and of expressing their thoughts\r\nwhich lies between the two nations. The regions of German\r\nand English thought are indeed separated by a gulf, which\r\nat first seems impassable, yet which must be bridged over by\r\nsome means or other, if a right comprehension is to be\r\nachieved. The German writer loves to develop synthetically\r\na single thought in a long period consisting of various\r\nmembers; he proceeds steadily to unravel the seemingly\r\ntangled skein, while he keeps the reader ever on the alert,\r\nmaking him assist actively in the process and never letting\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgviii\"\u003e[viii]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhim lose sight of the main thread. The English author,\r\non the contrary, anxious before all things to avoid\r\nconfusion and misunderstanding, and ready for this end\r\nnot only to sacrifice harmony of proportion in construction,\r\nbut to submit to the necessity of occasional artificial joining,\r\nusually adopts the analytical method. He prefers to\r\ndivide the thread of his discourse into several smaller\r\nskeins, easier certainly to handle and thus better suiting\r\nthe convenience of the English thinker, to whom long\r\nperiods are trying and bewildering, and who is not always\r\nwilling to wait half a page or more for the point of a\r\nsentence or the gist of a thought. Wherever it could be\r\ndone without interfering seriously with the spirit of the\r\noriginal, I have broken up the longer periods in these essays\r\ninto smaller sentences, in order to facilitate their comprehension.\r\nAt times however Schopenhauer recapitulates a\r\nwhole side of his view of the Universe in a single period\r\nof what seems intolerable length to the English reader:\r\nas, for instance, the \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003erésumé\u003c/i\u003e contained in the Introduction\r\nto his \"Will in Nature,\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_3\" title=\"Pp. 2 and 3 of the original, and pp. 216 to 218 of the present translation.\" id=\"FNanchor_3\"\u003e[3]\u003c/a\u003e which could not be divided without\r\ndamage to his meaning. Here therefore it did not seem\r\nadvisable to sacrifice the unity and harmony of his design\r\nand to disturb both his form and his meaning, in order to\r\nminister to the reader\u0027s dislike for mental exertion; in\r\nkeeping the period intact I have however endeavoured to\r\nmake it as easy to comprehend as possible by the way in\r\nwhich the single parts are presented to the eye.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs regards the terms chosen to convey the German\r\nmeaning, I can hardly hope to have succeeded in every\r\ncase in adequately rendering it, still less can I expect to\r\nhave satisfied my English readers. Several words of frequent\r\noccurrence and of considerable importance for the\r\nright understanding of the original, have been used at\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgix\"\u003e[ix]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndifferent times by different English philosophers in senses\r\nso various, that, until our philosophical terminology has\r\nby universal consent attained far greater precision than at\r\npresent, it must always be difficult for the writer or translator\r\nto convey to the reader\u0027s mind precisely the same thought\r\nthat was in his own. To prevent unnecessary confusion\r\nhowever, by leaving too much to chance, I will here briefly\r\nstate those terms which give most latitude for misapprehension,\r\nexplaining the sense in which I employ them and\r\nalso the special meaning attached to some of them by\r\nSchopenhauer, who often differs in this from other writers.\r\nThey are as follows.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ea.\u003c/i\u003e) \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eAnschauung\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eanschauen\u003c/i\u003e, literally \u0027to behold\u0027) I\r\nhave rendered differently, according to its double meaning\r\nin German. When used to designate the mental act by\r\nwhich an object is perceived, as the cause of a sensation\r\nreceived, it is rendered by \u003cem\u003eperception\u003c/em\u003e. When used to lay\r\nstress upon \u003cem\u003eimmediate\u003c/em\u003e, as opposed to \u003cem\u003eabstract\u003c/em\u003e representation,\r\nit is rendered by \u003cem\u003eintuition\u003c/em\u003e. This last occurs however\r\nmore often in the adjective form.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eb.\u003c/i\u003e) \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eVorstellung\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003evorstellen\u003c/i\u003e, literally \u0027to place before\u0027) I\r\nrender by \u003cem\u003erepresentation\u003c/em\u003e in spite of its foreign, unwelcome\r\nsound to the English ear, as being the term which nearest\r\napproaches the German meaning. The faculty of representation\r\nis defined by Schopenhauer himself as \"an\r\nexceedingly complicated physiological process in the brain\r\nof an animal, the result of which is the consciousness of a\r\n\u003cem\u003epicture\u003c/em\u003e there.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ec.\u003c/i\u003e) \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eAuffassung\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eauffassen\u003c/i\u003e, literally \u0027to catch up\u0027) has so\r\nmany shades of meaning in German that it has to be\r\ntranslated in many different ways according to the relation\r\nin which it stands in the context. It signifies \u003cem\u003eapprehension\u003c/em\u003e,\r\n\u003cem\u003ecomprehension\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003eperception\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003eviewing\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003egrasping\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e) \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eWahrnehmung\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003ewahrnehmen\u003c/i\u003e, from \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003ewahr\u003c/i\u003e, true, and\r\n\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003enehmen\u003c/i\u003e, to take), is translated by \u003cem\u003eapprehension\u003c/em\u003e or \u003cem\u003eperception\u003c/em\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgx\"\u003e[x]\u003c/span\u003e\r\naccording to the degree of consciousness which accompanies\r\nit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the two words which have proved most difficult to\r\ntranslate, have been \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eVernehmen\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eWillkühr\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ee.\u003c/i\u003e) \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eVernehmen\u003c/i\u003e means, to distinguish by the sense of\r\nhearing. This word conveys a shade of thought which it\r\nis almost impossible to render in English, because we\r\nhave no word by which to distinguish, from mere sensuous\r\nhearing, a sort of hearing which implies more than\r\nhearing and less than comprehension. The French \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eentendre\u003c/i\u003e\r\ncomes nearer to it than our \u003cem\u003ehearing\u003c/em\u003e, but implies\r\nmore comprehension than \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003evernehmen\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ef.\u003c/i\u003e) As to \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eWillkühr\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003earbitrium\u003c/i\u003e, literally \u0027\u003cem\u003ewill-choice\u003c/em\u003e\u0027),\r\nafter a great deal of consideration I have chosen (\u003cem\u003erelative\u003c/em\u003e)\r\n\u003cem\u003efree-will\u003c/em\u003e as the nearest approach to the German sense, or at\r\nany rate, to that in which Schopenhauer uses it. \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eWillkühr\u003c/i\u003e\r\nmeans in fact what is commonly understood as free-will;\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e will with power of choice, will determined by motives\r\nand unimpeded by outward obstacles: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003earbitrium\u003c/i\u003e as opposed\r\nto \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003evoluntas\u003c/i\u003e: conscious will as opposed to blind impulse.\r\nThis relative free-will however is quite distinct from \u003cem\u003eabsolute\r\nfree-will\u003c/em\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eliberum arbitrium indifferentiæ\u003c/i\u003e) in a metaphysical\r\nsense, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e will in its self-dependency. When its arbitrary\r\ncharacter is specially emphasized, we call \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eWillkühr\u003c/i\u003e, \u003cem\u003ecaprice\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nbut this is not the usual meaning given to it by Schopenhauer.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBesides the meaning of these German words, I have still\r\nto define the sense in which I have used the term \u003cem\u003eidea\u003c/em\u003e in\r\nthis translation; for this word has greatly changed its meaning\r\nat different times and with different authors, and is even\r\nnow apt to confuse and mislead. Schopenhauer has himself\r\ncontributed in one way to render its signification less\r\nclear; since, in spite of his declaration in the \"Fourfold\r\nRoot\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_4\" title=\"See p. 113, § 34 of the original, and p. 133 of the present translation.\" id=\"FNanchor_4\"\u003e[4]\u003c/a\u003e to the effect, that he never uses the word \u003cem\u003eidea\u003c/em\u003e in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgxi\"\u003e[xi]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nany other than its original (Platonic) sense, he has himself\r\nemployed it to translate \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eVorstellung\u003c/i\u003e, in a specimen he\r\ngives of a rendering of a passage in Kant\u0027s \"Prolegomena\"\r\nin a letter addressed to Haywood, published in\r\nGwinner\u0027s \"Biography of Schopenhauer.\" This he probably\r\ndid because some eminent English and French philosophers\r\nhad taken the word in this sense, thinking perhaps\r\nthat Kant\u0027s meaning would thus be more readily understood.\r\nAs however he uses the word \u0027\u003cem\u003eidea\u003c/em\u003e\u0027 everywhere\r\nelse exclusively in its original (Platonic) sense, I have preferred\r\nto avoid needless confusion by adhering to his own\r\ndeclaration and definition. Besides, many English writers\r\nof note have protested against any other sense being given\r\nto it, and modern German philosophers have more and\r\nmore returned to the original meaning of the term.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSome readers may take exception at such expressions as\r\n\u003cem\u003eà priority\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003emotivation\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003easeity\u003c/em\u003e; for they are not, strictly\r\nspeaking, English words. These terms however belong to\r\nSchopenhauer\u0027s own characteristic terminology, and have\r\na distinct and clearly defined meaning; therefore they had\r\nto be retained in all cases in which they could not be\r\nevaded, in order not to interfere with the Author\u0027s intention:\r\na necessity which the scholar will not fail to recognise,\r\nespecially when I plead in my defence that fidelity and\r\naccuracy have been my sole aim in this work.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf moreover Carlyle\u0027s words, \"He who imports into his\r\nown country any true delineation, any rationally spoken\r\nword on any subject, has done well,\" are true, I may also be\r\nabsolved from censure, if I lay before the public this version\r\nof some important utterances of a great thinker, in the\r\nhope that it may be an assistance in, and an incitement to,\r\na deeper study of all Schopenhauer\u0027s works.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"right\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Translator.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eMay, 1888.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003eCONTENTS.\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgxiii\"\u003e[xiii]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center ph3\"\u003eON THE FOURFOLD ROOT OF THE PRINCIPLE\u003cbr\u003e\r\nOF SUFFICIENT REASON.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ctable class=\"toc\" data-summary=\"Table of Contents Fourfold Root\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth\u003eCHAP.\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth\u003e \u003c/th\u003e\u003cth class=\"tocpag\"\u003ePAGE\u003c/th\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003eTranslator\u0027s Preface\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pgv\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ev\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003eAuthor\u0027s Preface to the Second Edition\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pgxvii\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003exvii\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003eEditor\u0027s Preface to the Third Edition\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pgxx\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003exx\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003eEditor\u0027s Preface to the Fourth Edition\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pgxxviii\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003exxviii\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocchap\"\u003eI.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003eIntroduction\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg001\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocchap\"\u003eII.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003eGeneral Survey of the most important views hitherto held concerning the Principle of Sufficient Reason\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg006\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e6\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocchap\"\u003eIII.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003eInsufficiency of the Old and outlines of a New Demonstration\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg028\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocchap\"\u003eIV.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003eOn the First Class of Objects for the Subject, and that form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which predominates in it\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg031\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocchap\"\u003eV.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003eOn the Second Class of Objects for the Subject and that form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which predominates in it\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg114\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e114\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocchap\"\u003eVI.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003eOn the Third Class of Objects for the Subject and that form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which predominates in it\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg153\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e153\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocchap\"\u003eVII.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003eOn the Fourth Class of Objects for the Subject, and that form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which predominates in it\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg165\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e165\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocchap\"\u003eVIII.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003eGeneral observations and results\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg177\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e177\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center ph3\"\u003eON THE WILL IN NATURE.\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgxiv\"\u003e[xiv]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ctable class=\"toc\" data-summary=\"Table of Contents Will in Nature\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003ePreface to the Second Edition\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg193\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e193\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003eEditor\u0027s Preface to the Third Edition\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg213\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e213\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003eEditor\u0027s Preface to the Fourth Edition\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg214\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e214\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003eIntroduction\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg215\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e215\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003ePhysiology and Pathology\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg224\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e224\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003eComparative Anatomy\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg252\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e252\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003ePhysiology of Plants\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg281\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e281\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003ePhysical Astronomy\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg305\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e305\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003eLinguistic\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg322\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e322\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003eAnimal Magnetism and Magic\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg326\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e326\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003eSinology\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg359\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e359\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003eReference to Ethics\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg372\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e372\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"toctit\"\u003eConclusion\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tocpag\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg378\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e378\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgxv\"\u003e[xv]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003eON THE FOURFOLD ROOT\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eOF THE\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"xhtml_big\"\u003ePRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph3\"\u003eA PHILOSOPHICAL TREATISE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poetry-container\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eΝαὶ μὰ τὸν ἁμετέρᾳ ψυχᾷ παραδόντα \u003cem class=\"gesperrt\"\u003eτετρακτύν\u003c/em\u003e,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eΠαγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως \u003cem class=\"gesperrt\"\u003eῥιζώματ\u0027\u003c/em\u003e ἔχουσαν.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgxvii\"\u003e[xvii]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eTHE AUTHOR\u0027S PREFACE TO THE\r\nSECOND EDITION.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis treatise on Elementary Philosophy, which first\r\nappeared in the year 1813, when it procured for me\r\nthe degree of doctor, afterwards became the substructure\r\nfor the whole of my system. It cannot, therefore, be\r\nallowed to remain out of print, as has been the case,\r\nwithout my knowledge, for the last four years.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand, to send a juvenile work like this\r\nonce more into the world with all its faults and blemishes,\r\nseemed to me unjustifiable. For I am aware that the\r\ntime cannot be very far off when all correction will be\r\nimpossible; but with that time the period of my real\r\ninfluence will commence, and this period, I trust, will\r\nbe a long one, for I firmly rely upon Seneca\u0027s promise:\r\n\"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eEtiamsi omnibus tecum viventibus silentium livor indixerit;\r\nvenient qui sine offensa, sine gratia judicent.\u003c/i\u003e\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_5\" title=\"Seneca, Ep. 79.\" id=\"FNanchor_5\"\u003e[5]\u003c/a\u003e I\r\nhave done what I could, therefore, to improve this work\r\nof my youth, and, considering the brevity and uncertainty\r\nof life, I must even regard it as an especially fortunate\r\ncircumstance, to have been thus permitted to correct in\r\nmy sixtieth year what I had written in my twenty-sixth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNevertheless, while doing this, I meant to deal leniently\r\nwith my younger self, and to let him discourse, nay, even\r\nspeak his mind freely, wherever it was possible. But\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgxviii\"\u003e[xviii]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwherever he had advanced what was incorrect or superfluous,\r\nor had even left out the best part, I have been\r\nobliged to interrupt the thread of his discourse. And\r\nthis has happened often enough; so often, indeed, that\r\nsome of my readers may perhaps think they hear an old\r\nman reading a young man\u0027s book aloud, while he frequently\r\nlets it drop, in order to indulge in digressions of his own\r\non the same subject.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is easy to see that a work thus corrected after so long\r\nan interval, could never acquire the unity and rounded\r\ncompleteness which only belong to such as are written in\r\none breath. So great a difference will be found even in style\r\nand expression, that no reader of any tact can ever be in\r\ndoubt whether it be the older or younger man who is speaking.\r\nFor the contrast is indeed striking between the mild,\r\nunassuming tone in which the youth—who is still simple\r\nenough to believe quite seriously that for all whose pursuit\r\nis philosophy, truth, and truth alone, can have importance,\r\nand therefore that whoever promotes truth is\r\nsure of a welcome from them—propounds his arguments\r\nwith confidence, and the firm, but also at times somewhat\r\nharsh voice of the old man, who in course of time has\r\nnecessarily discovered the true character and real aims of\r\nthe noble company of mercenary time-servers into which\r\nhe has fallen. Nay, the just reader will hardly find fault\r\nwith him should he occasionally give free vent to his\r\nindignation; since we see what comes of it when people\r\nwho profess to have truth for their sole aim, are always\r\noccupied in studying the purposes of their powerful\r\nsuperiors, and when the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ee quovis ligno fit Mercurius\u003c/i\u003e is\r\nextended even to the greatest philosophers, and a clumsy\r\n\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003echarlatan\u003c/i\u003e, like Hegel, is calmly classed among them?\r\nVerily German Philosophy stands before us loaded with\r\ncontempt, the laughing-stock of other nations, expelled\r\nfrom all honest science—like the prostitute who sells herself\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgxix\"\u003e[xix]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor sordid hire to-day to one, to-morrow to another;\r\nand the brains of the present generation of \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003esavants\u003c/i\u003e are\r\ndisorganised by Hegelian nonsense: incapable of reflection,\r\ncoarse and bewildered, they fall a prey to the low\r\nMaterialism which has crept out of the basilisk\u0027s egg.\r\nGood speed to them. I return to my subject.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMy readers will thus have to get over the difference of\r\ntone in this treatise; for I could not do here what I had\r\ndone in my chief work, that is, give the later additions I\r\nhad made in a separate appendix. Besides, it is of no\r\nconsequence that people should know what I wrote in my\r\ntwenty-sixth and what in my sixtieth year; the only matter\r\nof real importance is, that those who wish to find their way\r\nthrough the fundamental principles of all philosophizing,\r\nto gain a firm footing and a clear insight, should in these\r\nfew sheets receive a little volume by which they may learn\r\nsomething substantial, solid, and true: and this, I hope,\r\nwill be the case. From the expansion now given to some\r\nportions, it has even grown into a compendious theory of\r\nthe entire faculty of knowing, and this theory, by limiting\r\nitself strictly to the research of the Principle of Sufficient\r\nReason, shows the matter from a new and peculiar side;\r\nbut then it finds its completion in the First Book of \"The\r\nWorld as Will and Representation,\" together with those\r\nchapters of the Second Volume which refer to it, and also\r\nin my Critique of Kantian Philosophy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"right\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eArthur Schopenhauer.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"signature\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFrankfurt am Main\u003c/span\u003e,\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pad2\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eSeptember, 1847.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgxx\"\u003e[xx]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eEDITOR\u0027S PREFACE TO THE THIRD\r\nEDITION.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the present volume I lay before the public the Third\r\nEdition of the \"Fourfold Root,\" including the emendations\r\nand additions left by Schopenhauer in his own interleaved\r\ncopy. I have already had occasion elsewhere to\r\nrelate that he left copies of all his works thus interleaved,\r\nand that he was wont to jot down on these fly-leaves\r\nany corrections and additions he might intend inserting in\r\nfuture editions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSchopenhauer himself prepared for the press all that\r\nhas been added in the present edition, for he has indicated,\r\nby signs in the original context corresponding to other\r\nsimilar signs in the MS. passages, the places where he\r\nwished his additions to be inserted. All that was left for\r\nme to do, was to give in extended form a few citations he\r\nhad purposed adding.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo essential corrections and additions, such as might\r\nmodify the fundamental thoughts of the work, will be\r\nfound in this new edition, which simply contains corrections,\r\namplifications, and corroborations, many of them\r\ninteresting and important. Let me take only a single\r\ninstance: § 21, on the \"Intellectual Nature of Empirical\r\nPerception.\" As Schopenhauer attached great importance\r\nto his proof of the \u003cem\u003eintellectual nature\u003c/em\u003e of perception, nay,\r\nbelieved he had made a new discovery by it, he also\r\nworked out with special predilection all that tended to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgxxi\"\u003e[xxi]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsupport, confirm, and strengthen it. Thus we find him in\r\nthis § 21 quoting an interesting fact he had himself observed\r\nin 1815; then the instances of Caspar Hauser and\r\nothers (taken from Franz\u0027s book, \"The Eye,\" \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c.);\r\nand again the case of Joseph Kleinhaus, the blind sculptor;\r\nand finally, the physiological confirmations he has found\r\nin Flourens\u0027 \"De la vie et de l\u0027intelligence des Animaux.\"\r\nAn observation, too, concerning the value of Arithmetic\r\nfor the comprehension of physical processes, which is inserted\r\ninto this same paragraph, will be found very remarkable,\r\nand may be particularly recommended to those\r\nwho are inclined to set too high a value on calculation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMany interesting and important additions will be found\r\nin the other paragraphs also.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne thing I could have wished to see left out of this\r\nThird Edition: his effusions against the \"professors of\r\nphilosophy.\" In a conversation with Schopenhauer in\r\nthe year 1847, when he told me how he intended to\r\n\"chastise the professors of philosophy,\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_6\" title=\"See \u0027Arthur Schopenhauer. Von ihm; über ihn. Ein Wort der Vertheidigung,\u0027 von Ernst Otto Lindner, and \u0027Memorabilien, Briefe und Nachlassstücke,\u0027 von Julius Frauenstädt (Berlin, 1863), pp. 163-165.\" id=\"FNanchor_6\"\u003e[6]\u003c/a\u003e I expressed\r\nmy dissent on this point; for even in the Second Edition\r\nthese passages had interrupted the measured progress of\r\nobjective inquiry. At that time, however, he was not to be\r\npersuaded to strike them out; so they were left to be\r\nagain included in this Third Edition, where the reader\r\nwill accordingly once more find them, although times have\r\nchanged since then.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eUpon another point, more nearly touching the real\r\nissue, I had a controversy with Schopenhauer in the year\r\n1852. In arguing against Fichte\u0027s derivation of the \u003cem\u003eNon-Ego\u003c/em\u003e\r\nfrom the \u003cem\u003eEgo\u003c/em\u003e in his chief work,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_7\" title=\"Schopenhauer, \u0027Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,\u0027 second edition, i., 37 (third edition, i., 39).\" id=\"FNanchor_7\"\u003e[7]\u003c/a\u003e he had said:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgxxii\"\u003e[xxii]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\"Just as if Kant had never existed, the Principle of\r\nSufficient Reason still remains with Fichte what it was with\r\nall the Schoolmen, an \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eœterna veritas\u003c/i\u003e: that is to say, just as\r\nthe Gods of the ancients were still ruled over by eternal\r\nDestiny, so was the God of the Schoolmen still ruled over\r\nby these \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eœterna veritates\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, by the metaphysical, mathematical,\r\nand metalogical truths, and even, according to\r\nsome, by the validity of the moral law. These \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003everitates\u003c/i\u003e\r\nalone were unconditioned by anything, and God, as well\r\nas the world, existed through their necessity. Thus with\r\nFichte the \u003cem\u003eEgo\u003c/em\u003e, according to the Principle of Sufficient\r\nReason, is the reason of the world or of the \u003cem\u003eNon-Ego\u003c/em\u003e, of\r\nthe Object, which is the product or result of the \u003cem\u003eEgo\u003c/em\u003e itself.\r\nHe took good care, therefore, neither to examine nor to\r\ncheck the Principle of Sufficient Reason any farther. But\r\nif I had to indicate the particular form of this principle by\r\nwhich Fichte was guided in making the \u003cem\u003eEgo\u003c/em\u003e spin the \u003cem\u003eNon-Ego\u003c/em\u003e\r\nout of itself, as the spider its web, I should point to\r\nthe Principle of the Sufficient Reason of Being in Space;\r\nfor nothing but a reference to this principle gives any sort\r\nof sense or meaning to his laboured deductions of the way\r\nin which the \u003cem\u003eEgo\u003c/em\u003e produces and manufactures the \u003cem\u003eNon-Ego\u003c/em\u003e\r\nout of itself, which form the contents of the most senseless\r\nand—simply on this account—most tiresome book ever\r\nwritten. The only interest this Fichteian philosophy has\r\nfor us at all—otherwise it would not be worth mentioning—lies\r\nin its being the tardy appearance of the real antithesis\r\nto ancient Materialism, which was the most consistent\r\nstarting from the Object, just as Fichte\u0027s philosophy\r\nwas the most consistent starting from the Subject. As\r\nMaterialism overlooked the fact, that with the simplest\r\nObject it forthwith posited the Subject also; so Fichte\r\nnot only overlooked the fact, that with the Subject (whatever\r\nname he might choose to give it) he had already\r\nposited the Object also, because no Subject can be thought\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgxxiii\"\u003e[xxiii]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwithout it; he likewise overlooked the fact, that all derivation\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e, nay, all demonstration whatsoever, rests\r\nupon a necessity, and that all necessity itself rests entirely\r\nand exclusively on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, because\r\nto be necessary, and to result from a given reason,\r\nare convertible terms; that the Principle of Sufficient\r\nReason is still nothing but the common form of the\r\nObject as such: therefore that it always presupposes the\r\nObject and does not, as valid before and independently of\r\nit, first introduce it, and cannot make the Object arise in\r\nconformity with its own legislation. Thus this starting\r\nfrom the Object and the above-mentioned starting from\r\nthe Subject have in common, that both presuppose what\r\nthey pretend to derive: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, the necessary correlate of their\r\nstarting-point.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis last assertion \"that the Principle of Sufficient Reason\r\n\u003cem\u003ealready presupposes the Object\u003c/em\u003e, but does not, as valid before\r\nand independently of it, first introduce it, and cannot make\r\nthe Object arise in conformity with its own legislation,\"\r\nseemed to me so far to clash with the proof given by\r\nSchopenhauer in § 21 of the \"Fourfold Root,\" as, according\r\nto the latter, it is \u003cem\u003ethe function of the Subject\u0027s understanding\u003c/em\u003e\r\nwhich primarily creates the \u003cem\u003eobjective\u003c/em\u003e world out\r\nof the subjective feelings of the sensuous organs by the\r\napplication of the Principle of Sufficient Reason; so that\r\nall that is Object, as such, after all comes into being only\r\nin conformity with the Principle of Sufficient Reason, consequently\r\nthat this principle cannot, as Schopenhauer asserted\r\nin his polemic against Fichte, already presuppose the Object.\r\nIn 1852, therefore, I wrote as follows to Schopenhauer:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"In your arguments against Fichte, where you say that\r\nthe Principle of Sufficient Reason already presupposes the\r\nObject, and cannot, as valid before and independently of it,\r\nfirst introduce it, the objection occurred to me anew, that\r\nin your \"Fourfold Root\" you had made the Object of perception\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgxxiv\"\u003e[xxiv]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfirst come into being through the application of the\r\nPrinciple of Sufficient Reason, and that you yourself, therefore,\r\nderive the Object from the Subject, as, for instance,\r\np. 73 of the \"Fourfold Root\" (2nd edition). How then can\r\nyou maintain against Fichte that the Object is always pre-supposed\r\nby the Subject? I know of no way of solving\r\nthis difficulty but the following: The Subject only presupposes\r\nin the Object what belongs to the thing in itself,\r\nwhat is inscrutable; but it creates itself the \u003cem\u003erepresentation\u003c/em\u003e of\r\nthe Object, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e that by which the thing in itself becomes\r\n\u003cem\u003ephenomenon\u003c/em\u003e. For instance, when I see a tree, my Subject\r\nassumes the thing in itself of that tree; whereas the \u003cem\u003erepresentation\u003c/em\u003e\r\nof it conversely presupposes the operation of my\r\nSubject, the transition from the effect (in my eye) to its\r\ncause.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo this Schopenhauer replied as follows on the 12th of\r\nJuly, 1852:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Your answers (to the objection in question) are not the\r\nright ones. Here there cannot yet be a question of the\r\nthing in itself, and the distinction between representation\r\nand object is inadmissible: the world is representation.\r\nThe matter stands rather as follows—Fichte\u0027s derivation\r\nof the \u003cem\u003eNon-Ego\u003c/em\u003e from the \u003cem\u003eEgo\u003c/em\u003e, is quite abstract:—A = A,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eergo\u003c/i\u003e, I = I, and so forth. Taken in an abstract sense, the\r\nObject is at once posited with the Subject. For to be\r\nSubject means, to know; and to know means, to have\r\nrepresentations. Object and representation are one and\r\nthe same thing. In the \"Fourfold Root,\" therefore, I\r\nhave divided all objects or representations into four classes,\r\nwithin which the Principle of Sufficient Reason always\r\nreigns, though in each class under a different form; nevertheless,\r\nthe Principle of Sufficient Reason always presupposes\r\nthe class itself, and indeed, properly speaking, they coincide.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_8\" title=\"See \u0027Die Welt a. W. u. V.,\u0027 vol. ii. pp. 17-21, and vol. i. p. 39 of the second edition. (The passages referred to by Schopenhauer in the second edition are in the third edition vol. ii. pp. 18-21, and vol. i. p. 40).\" id=\"FNanchor_8\"\u003e[8]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nNow, in reality, the existence of the Subject of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgxxv\"\u003e[xxv]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nknowing is not an abstract existence. The Subject does not\r\nexist for itself and independently, as if it had dropped\r\nfrom the sky; it appears as the instrument of some individual\r\nphenomenon of the Will (animal, human being),\r\nwhose purposes it is destined to serve, and which thereby\r\nnow receives a consciousness, on the one hand, of itself, on\r\nthe other hand, of everything else. The question next\r\narises, as to how or out of what \u003cem\u003eelements\u003c/em\u003e the representation\r\nof the outer world is brought about within this consciousness.\r\nThis I have already answered in my \"Theory of\r\nColours\" and also in my chief work,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_9\" title=\"Die Welt a. W. u. V., vol. i. p. 22 et seqq., and vol. ii. chap. ii. of the second edition; vol. i. p. 22, § 6, and vol. ii. chap. ii. of the third edition.\" id=\"FNanchor_9\"\u003e[9]\u003c/a\u003e but most thoroughly\r\nand exhaustively of all in the Second Edition of the \"Fourfold\r\nRoot,\" § 21, where it is shown, that all those elements\r\nare of \u003cem\u003esubjective\u003c/em\u003e origin; wherefore attention is especially\r\ndrawn to the great difference between all this and Fichte\u0027s\r\nhumbug. For the whole of my exposition is but the full\r\ncarrying out of Kant\u0027s Transcendental Idealism.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_10\" title=\"The passage I have quoted above from Schopenhauer\u0027s letter is also to be found among the letters published in my book, \u0027Arthur Schopenhauer. Von ihm, über ihn, u. s. w.,\u0027 p. 541 et seqq., and it results from this, as well as from several other letters which likewise deal with important and knotty points in his philosophy, that this correspondence may perhaps not be quite so worthless and unimportant as many–among them Gwinner, in his pamphlet, \u0027Schopenhauer und seine Freunde\u0027 (Leipzig, 1863)–represent it to be….\" id=\"FNanchor_10\"\u003e[10]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have thought it advisable to give this passage of his\r\nletter, as being relevant to the matter in question. As to the\r\ndivision in chapters and paragraphs, it is the same in this\r\nnew edition as in the last. By comparing each single\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgxxvi\"\u003e[xxvi]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nparagraph of the second with the same paragraph of the\r\npresent edition, it will be easy to find out what has been\r\nnewly added. In conclusion, however, I will still add a\r\nshort list of the principal passages which are new.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003eList of Additions to the Third Edition.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 8, p. 13, the passages from \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eNotandum\u003c/i\u003e,\" \u0026amp;c., to \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eEx\r\nnecessitate\u003c/i\u003e,\" and p. 14, from \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eZunächst adoptirt\u003c/i\u003e\" down to\r\nthe end of the page (English version, p. 14, \"\u003ci\u003eNot.\u003c/i\u003e,\" \u0026amp;c., to\r\n\"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eEx nec.\u003c/i\u003e\"; p. 15, from \"First he adopts\" down to the\r\nend of the paragraph, p. 16, \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eest\u003c/i\u003e causa sui\"), in confirmation\r\nof his assertion that Spinoza had interchanged and\r\nconfounded the relation between reason of knowledge and\r\nconsequent, with that between cause and effect.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 9, p. 17, from \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eer proklamirt\u003c/i\u003e\" down to \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003egewusst haben\r\nwird\u003c/i\u003e.\" (E. v., § 9, p. 19, from \"He proclaims it\" down to\r\n\"by others before.\")\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 20, p. 42, in speaking of \u003ci\u003ereciprocity\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eWechselwirkung\u003c/i\u003e),\r\nfrom the words \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eJa, wo einem Schreiber\u003c/i\u003e\" down to \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eins\r\nBodenlose gerathen sei\u003c/i\u003e.\" (E. v., § 20, p. 45, from \"Nay, it is\r\nprecisely\" down to \"his depth.\")\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 21, p. 61, the words at the bottom, \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eund räumlich konstruirt\u003c/i\u003e,\"\r\ndown to p. 62, \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eData erhält\u003c/i\u003e,\" together with the\r\nquotation concerning the blind sculptor, J. Kleinhaus.\r\n(E. v., § 21, p. 67, the words \"and constructs in Space\"\r\ndown to \"of the Understanding,\") and the note.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 21, pp. 67-68, from \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eEin specieller und interessanter\r\nBeleg\u003c/i\u003e\" down to \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003ealbernes Zeug dazu\u003c/i\u003e.\" (E. v., § 21,\r\np. 73, \"I will here add\" down to p. 74, \"followed by\r\ntwaddle.\")\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 21, p. 73, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003esq.\u003c/i\u003e, the instances of Caspar Hauser, \u0026amp;c., from\r\nFranz, \"The Eye,\" \u0026amp;c., and the physiological corroborations\r\nfrom Flourens, \"\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eDe la vie et de l\u0027intelligence\u003c/i\u003e,\" \u0026amp;c.\r\n(E. v., p. 80, and following.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgxxvii\"\u003e[xxvii]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n§ 21, p. 77, the parenthesis on the value of calculation.\r\n(E. v., p. 83, \"All comprehension,\" \u0026amp;c.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 21, p. 83, the words \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eda ferner Substanz\u003c/i\u003e\" down to\r\n\"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003edas Wirken\u003c/i\u003e in concreto.\" (E. v., § 21, p. 90, \"Substance\r\nand Matter\" down to \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein concreto\u003c/i\u003e.\")\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 29, p. 105, the words \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eim Lateinischen\u003c/i\u003e\" down to\r\n\"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eerkannte\u003c/i\u003e.\" (E. v., § 29, p. 116, from \"In Latin\" down\r\nto \"κατ\u0027 \u003cins title=\"ἐζοχήν\" id=\"Cxxvii\"\u003eἐξοχήν\u003c/ins\u003e.\")\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 34, p. 116, the words \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eUeberall ist\u003c/i\u003e\" down to \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003ePraxis\r\nund Theorie\u003c/i\u003e.\" (E. v., § 34, p. 128, the words \"Reasonable\r\nor Rational\" down to \"theory and practice.\")\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 34, p. 121, the verses from Göthe\u0027s \"West-Östlicher\r\nDivan.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 34, p. 125, \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eAnmerkung\u003c/i\u003e, the words \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eAuch ist Brahma\u003c/i\u003e\"\r\ndown to \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003edie erstere\u003c/i\u003e,\" and p. 126, the quotation from I. J.\r\nSchmidt\u0027s \"Forschungen.\" (E. v., § 34, p. 138, note,\r\n\"Brahma is also\" down to \"first of these.\")\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 34, p. 127, the words from \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eAber der naive\u003c/i\u003e\" down to\r\n\"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003ejudaisirten gouverneurs\u003c/i\u003e\" (E. v., § 34, p. 150, sentence beginning\r\n\"But the artless\" down to \"infancy,\" and the\r\nGreek quotation from Plutarch in the note.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 34, p. 128, the words from \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eGanz übereinstimmend\u003c/i\u003e\"\r\ndown to \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eüberflüssige sein soll\u003c/i\u003e.\" (E. v., p. 151, from\r\n\"J. F. Davis\" down to \"superfluous.\")\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 45, p. 147, the words \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eEben daher kommt es\u003c/i\u003e\" down to\r\n\"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003esich erhält\u003c/i\u003e.\" (E. v., § 45, p. 163, \"It is just for this\r\nreason too\" down to \"their possession.\")\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 45, p. 149, the words \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eMan suche Das\u003c/i\u003e,\" \u0026amp;c., down to\r\n\"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003egelesen haben\u003c/i\u003e.\" (E. v., § 45, p. 164, from \"We should\"\r\ndown to \"read in books.\")\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 49, p. 154, the words \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eDer bei den Philosophastern\u003c/i\u003e,\"\r\ndown to \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003ezu kontroliren sind\u003c/i\u003e.\" (E. v., § 49, p. 169, from\r\nthe words \"The conception of our,\" \u0026amp;c., down to \"by perception.\")\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 50, p. 156, the words \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eDenn der Satz vom Grunde\u003c/i\u003e\"\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgxxviii\"\u003e[xxviii]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndown to \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003enur sich selbst nicht\u003c/i\u003e.\" (E. v., § 50, p. 172, from\r\n\"For the Principle of Sufficient Reason,\" \u0026amp;c., down to\r\n\"everything else.\")\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 52, p. 158, the words \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eDer allgemeine Sinn des Satzes\r\nvom Grunde\u003c/i\u003e,\" down to \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eder Kosmologische Beweis ist\u003c/i\u003e.\"\r\n(E. v., § 52, p. 173, from \"The general meaning\" down to\r\n\"the Cosmological Proof.\")\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"right\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJulius Frauenstädt.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBerlin\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eAugust, 1864\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eEDITOR\u0027S PREFACE TO THE FOURTH\r\nEDITION.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe present Fourth Edition is of the same content as\r\nthe Third; therefore it contains the same corrections\r\nand additions which I had already inserted in the Third\r\nEdition from Schopenhauer\u0027s own interleaved copy of this\r\nwork.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"right\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJulius Frauenstädt.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBerlin\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eSeptember, 1877\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg001\"\u003e[1]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph2\"\u003eON THE FOURFOLD ROOT\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eOF THE\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eCHAPTER I.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eINTRODUCTION.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 1. \u003ci\u003eThe Method.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe divine Plato and the marvellous Kant unite their\r\nmighty voices in recommending a rule, to serve as\r\nthe method of all philosophising as well as of all other\r\nscience.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_11\" title=\"Platon, \u0027Phileb.\u0027 pp. 219-223. \u0027Politic.\u0027 62, 63. \u0027Phædr.\u0027 361-363, ed. Bip. Kant, \u0027Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Anhang zur transcend. Dialektik.\u0027 English Translation by F. Max Müller. \u0027Appendix to the Transc. Dialectic.\u0027 pp. 551, and seqq.\" id=\"FNanchor_11\"\u003e[11]\u003c/a\u003e Two laws, they tell us: the law of \u003cem\u003ehomogeneity\u003c/em\u003e\r\nand the law of \u003cem\u003especification\u003c/em\u003e, should be equally observed,\r\nneither to the disadvantage of the other. The law of\r\n\u003cem\u003ehomogeneity\u003c/em\u003e directs us to collect things together into kinds\r\nby observing their resemblances and correspondences, to\r\ncollect kinds again into species, species into genera, and\r\nso on, till at last we come to the highest all-comprehensive\r\nconception. Now this law, being transcendental, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e essential\r\nto our Reason, takes for granted that Nature conforms\r\nwith it: an assumption which is expressed by the\r\nancient formula, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eentia præter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda\u003c/i\u003e.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg002\"\u003e[2]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nAs for the law of \u003cem\u003especification\u003c/em\u003e, Kant expresses\r\nit thus: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eentium varietates non temere esse minuendas\u003c/i\u003e. It\r\nrequires namely, that we should clearly distinguish one\r\nfrom another the different genera collected under one comprehensive\r\nconception; likewise that we should not confound\r\nthe higher and lower species comprised in each\r\ngenus; that we should be careful not to overleap any, and\r\nnever to classify inferior species, let alone individuals,\r\nimmediately under the generic conception: each conception\r\nbeing susceptible of subdivision, and none even\r\ncoming down to mere intuition. Kant teaches that both\r\nlaws are transcendental, fundamental principles of our\r\nReason, which postulate conformity of things with them\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e; and Plato, when he tells us that these rules\r\nwere flung down from the seat of the gods with the Promethean\r\nfire, seems to express the same thought in his\r\nown way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 2. \u003ci\u003eApplication of the Method in the present case.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn spite of the weight of such recommendations, I find\r\nthat the second of these two laws has been far too rarely\r\napplied to a fundamental principle of all knowledge: \u003cem\u003ethe\r\nPrinciple of Sufficient Reason\u003c/em\u003e. For although this principle\r\nhas been often and long ago stated in a general way, still\r\nsufficient distinction has not been made between its extremely\r\ndifferent applications, in each of which it acquires\r\na new meaning; its origin in various mental faculties thus\r\nbecoming evident. If we compare Kant\u0027s philosophy with\r\nall preceding systems, we perceive that, precisely in the\r\nobservation of our mental faculties, many persistent errors\r\nhave been caused by applying the principle of homogeneity,\r\nwhile the opposite principle of specification was neglected;\r\nwhereas the law of specification has led to the greatest and\r\nmost important results. I therefore crave permission to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg003\"\u003e[3]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nquote a passage from Kant, in which the application of\r\nthe law of specification to the sources of our knowledge is\r\nespecially recommended; for it gives countenance to my\r\npresent endeavour:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"It is of the highest importance to \u003cem\u003eisolate\u003c/em\u003e various sorts\r\nof knowledge, which in kind and origin are different from\r\nothers, and to take great care lest they be mixed up with\r\nthose others with which, for practical purposes, they are\r\ngenerally united. What is done by the chemist in the\r\nanalysis of substances, and by the mathematician in pure\r\nmathematics, is far more incumbent on the philosopher,\r\nin order to enable him to define clearly the part which, in\r\nthe promiscuous employment of the understanding, belongs\r\nto a special kind of knowledge, as well as its peculiar value\r\nand influence.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_12\" title=\"Kant, \u0027Krit. d. r. V. Methodenlehre. Drittes Hauptstück,\u0027 p. 842 of the 1st edition. Engl. Tr. by F. M. Müller. \u0027Architectonic of Pure Reason,\u0027 p. 723.\" id=\"FNanchor_12\"\u003e[12]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 3. \u003ci\u003eUtility of this Inquiry.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eShould I succeed in showing that the principle which\r\nforms the subject of the present inquiry does not issue\r\ndirectly from \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e primitive notion of our intellect, but\r\nrather in the first instance from \u003cem\u003evarious\u003c/em\u003e ones, it will then\r\nfollow, that neither can the necessity it brings with it, as a\r\nfirmly established \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e principle, be \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e and the \u003cem\u003esame\u003c/em\u003e\r\nin all cases, but must, on the contrary, be as manifold as\r\nthe sources of the principle itself. Whoever therefore\r\nbases a conclusion upon this principle, incurs the obligation\r\nof clearly specifying on which of its grounds of necessity he\r\nfounds his conclusion and of designating that ground by\r\na special name, such as I am about to suggest. I hope\r\nthat this may be a step towards promoting greater lucidity\r\nand precision in philosophising; for I hold the extreme\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg004\"\u003e[4]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nclearness to be attained by an accurate definition of each\r\nsingle expression to be indispensable to us, as a defence\r\nboth against error and against intentional deception, and\r\nalso as a means of securing to ourselves the permanent,\r\nunalienable possession of each newly acquired notion within\r\nthe sphere of philosophy beyond the fear of losing it\r\nagain on account of any misunderstanding or double\r\nmeaning which might hereafter be detected. The true\r\nphilosopher will indeed always seek after light and perspicuity,\r\nand will endeavour to resemble a Swiss lake—which\r\nthrough its peacefulness is enabled to unite great depth\r\nwith great clearness, the depth revealing itself precisely\r\nby the clearness—rather than a turbid, impetuous mountain\r\ntorrent. \"\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eLa clarté est la bonne foi des philosophes\u003c/i\u003e,\"\r\nsays Vauvenargues. Pseudo-philosophers, on the contrary,\r\nuse speech, not indeed to conceal their thoughts,\r\nas M. de Talleyrand has it, but rather to conceal the\r\nabsence of them, and are apt to make their readers\r\nresponsible for the incomprehensibility of their systems,\r\nwhich really proceeds from their own confused thinking.\r\nThis explains why in certain writers—Schelling, for instance—the\r\ntone of instruction so often passes into that of reproach,\r\nand frequently the reader is even taken to task\r\nbeforehand for his assumed inability to understand.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 4. \u003ci\u003eImportance of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIts importance is indeed very great, since it may truly\r\nbe called the basis of all science. For by \u003cem\u003escience\u003c/em\u003e we understand\r\na \u003cem\u003esystem\u003c/em\u003e of notions, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e a totality of connected,\r\nas opposed to a mere aggregate of disconnected, notions.\r\nBut what is it that binds together the members of a system,\r\nif not the Principle of Sufficient Reason? That which\r\ndistinguishes every science from a mere aggregate is precisely,\r\nthat its notions are derived one from another as from\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg005\"\u003e[5]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntheir reason. So it was long ago observed by Plato: καὶ\r\nγὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις ἀυτὰς\r\nδήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eetiam opiniones veræ non multi pretii\r\nsunt, donec quis illas ratiocinatione a causis ducta liget\u003c/i\u003e).\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_13\" title=\"\u0027Meno.\u0027 p. 385, ed Bip. \u0027Even true opinions are not of much value until somebody binds them down by proof of a cause.\u0027 [Translator\u0027s addition.]\" id=\"FNanchor_13\"\u003e[13]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nNearly every science, moreover, contains notions of causes\r\nfrom which the effects may be deduced, and likewise other\r\nnotions of the necessity of conclusions from reasons, as\r\nwill be seen during the course of this inquiry. Aristotle\r\nhas expressed this as follows: πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη διανοητική, ἢ\r\nκαὶ μετέχουσά τι διανοίας, περὶ αἰτίας καὶ ἀρχάς ἐστι (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eomnis\r\nintellectualis scientia, sive aliquo modo intellectu participans,\r\ncirca causas et principia est\u003c/i\u003e).\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_14\" title=\"Aristot. \u0027Metaph.\u0027 v. 1. \u0027All knowledge which is intellectual or partakes somewhat of intellect, deals with causes and principles.\u0027 [Tr.\u0027s add.]\" id=\"FNanchor_14\"\u003e[14]\u003c/a\u003e Now, as it is this very\r\nassumption \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e that all things must have their\r\nreason, which authorizes us everywhere to search for the\r\n\u003cem\u003ewhy\u003c/em\u003e, we may safely call this \u003cem\u003ewhy\u003c/em\u003e the mother of all science.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 5. \u003ci\u003eThe Principle itself.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe purpose showing further on that the Principle of\r\nSufficient Reason is an expression common to several \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà\r\npriori\u003c/i\u003e notions. Meanwhile, it must be stated under some\r\nformula or other. I choose Wolf\u0027s as being the most\r\ncomprehensive: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eNihil est sine ratione cur potius sit, quam\r\nnon sit.\u003c/i\u003e Nothing is without a reason for its being.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_15\" title=\"Here the translator gives Schopenhauer\u0027s free version of Wolf\u0027s formula.\" id=\"FNanchor_15\"\u003e[15]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg006\"\u003e[6]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eCHAPTER II.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eGENERAL SURVEY OF THE MOST IMPORTANT VIEWS\r\nHITHERTO HELD CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT\r\nREASON.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 6. \u003ci\u003eFirst Statement of the Principle and Distinction between\r\nTwo of its Meanings.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eA more or less accurately defined, abstract expression\r\nfor so fundamental a principle of all knowledge must\r\nhave been found at a very early age; it would, therefore,\r\nbe difficult, and besides of no great interest, to determine\r\nwhere it first appeared. Neither Plato nor Aristotle have\r\nformally stated it as a leading fundamental principle,\r\nalthough both often speak of it as a self-evident truth.\r\nThus, with a \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003enaïveté\u003c/i\u003e which savours of the state of innocence\r\nas opposed to that of the knowledge of good and of evil,\r\nwhen compared with the critical researches of our own\r\ntimes, Plato says: ἀναγκαῖον, πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα διά τινα\r\nαἰτίαν γίγνεσθαι· πῶς γὰρ ἂν χωρὶς τούτων γίγνοιτο;\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_16\" title=\"Platon, \u0027Phileb.\u0027 p. 240, ed Bip. \u0027It is necessary that all which arises, should arise by some cause; for how could it arise otherwise?\u0027 [Tr.\u0027s add.]\" id=\"FNanchor_16\"\u003e[16]\u003c/a\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003enecesse\r\nest, quæcunque fiunt, per aliquam causam fieri: quomodo\r\nenim absque ea fierent?\u003c/i\u003e) and then again: πᾶν δὲ τὸ γιγνόμενον\r\nὑπ\u0027 αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι· παντὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς\r\nαἰτίου γένεσιν σχεῖν\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_17\" title=\"Ibid. \u0027Timæus,\u0027 p. 302. \u0027All that arises, arises necessarily from some cause; for it is impossible for anything to come into being without cause.\u0027 [Tr.\u0027s add.]\" id=\"FNanchor_17\"\u003e[17]\u003c/a\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003equidquid gignitur, ex aliqua causa\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg007\"\u003e[7]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnecessario gignitur: sine causa enim oriri quidquam, impossibile\r\nest\u003c/i\u003e). At the end of his book \"De fato,\" Plutarch\r\ncites the following among the chief propositions of the\r\nStoics: μάλιστα μὲν καὶ πρῶτον εἶναι δόξειε, τὸ μηδὲν ἀναιτίως\r\nγίγνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ προηγουμένας αἰτίας\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_18\" title=\"\u0027This especially would seem to be the first principle: that nothing arises without cause, but [everything] according to preceding causes.\u0027 [Tr.\u0027s add.]\" id=\"FNanchor_18\"\u003e[18]\u003c/a\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003emaxime id primum\r\nesse videbitur, nihil fieri sine causa, sed omnia causis antegressis\u003c/i\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the \"Analyt. post.\" i. 2, Aristotle states the principle\r\nof sufficient reason to a certain degree when he says:\r\nἐπίστασθαι δὲ οἰόμεθα ἕκαστον ἁπλῶς, ὅταν τὴν τ\u0027 αἰτίαν\r\nοἰόμεθα γινώσκειν, δι\u0027 ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἔστιν, ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστίν,\r\nκαὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτο ἄλλως εἶναι. (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eScire autem putamus\r\nunamquamque rem simpliciter, quum putamus causam cognoscere,\r\npropter quum res est, ejusque rei causam esse, nec posse\r\neam aliter se habere.\u003c/i\u003e)\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_19\" title=\"\u0027We think we understand a thing perfectly, whenever we think we know the cause by which the thing is, that it is really the cause of that thing, and that the thing cannot possibly be otherwise.\u0027 [Tr.\u0027s add.]\" id=\"FNanchor_19\"\u003e[19]\u003c/a\u003e In his \"Metaphysics,\" moreover,\r\nhe already divides causes, or rather principles, ἀρχαί, into\r\ndifferent kinds,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_20\" title=\"Lib. iv. c. 1.\" id=\"FNanchor_20\"\u003e[20]\u003c/a\u003e of which he admits eight; but this division\r\nis neither profound nor precise enough. He is, nevertheless,\r\nquite right in saying, πασῶν μὲν οὖν κοινὸν τῶν ἀρχῶν, τὸ\r\nπρῶτον εἶναι, ὅθεν ἢ ἔστιν, ἢ γίνεται, ἢ γιγνώσκεται.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_21\" title=\"\u0027Now it is common to all principles, that they are the first thing through which [anything] is, or arises, or is understood.\u0027 [Tr.\u0027s add.]\" id=\"FNanchor_21\"\u003e[21]\u003c/a\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eOmnibus\r\nigitur principiis commune est, esse primum, unde aut est, aut\r\nfit, aut cognoscitur.\u003c/i\u003e) In the following chapter he distinguishes\r\nseveral kinds of causes, although somewhat superficially\r\nand confusedly. In the \"Analyt. post.\" ii. 11, he\r\nstates four kinds of causes in a more satisfactory manner:\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg008\"\u003e[8]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nαἰτίαι δὲ τέσσαρες· μία μὲν τό τι ἦν εἶναι· μία δὲ τὸ τινῶν ὄντων,\r\nἀνάγκη τοῦτο εἶναι· ἑτέρα δὲ, ἥ τι πρῶτον ἐκίνησε· τετάρτη δὲ,\r\nτὸ τίνος ἕνεκα.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_22\" title=\"\u0027There are four causes: first, the essence of a thing itself; second, the sine qua non of a thing; third, what first put a thing in motion; fourth, to what purpose or end a thing is tending.\u0027 [Tr.\u0027s add.]\" id=\"FNanchor_22\"\u003e[22]\u003c/a\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eCausæ autem quatuor sunt: una quæ\r\nexplicat quid res sit; altera, quam, si quædam sint, necesse\r\nest esse; tertia, quæ quid primum movit; quarta id, cujus\r\ngratia.\u003c/i\u003e) Now this is the origin of the division of the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecausæ\u003c/i\u003e\r\nuniversally adopted by the Scholastic Philosophers, into\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecausæ materiales, formales, efficientes et finales\u003c/i\u003e, as may be\r\nseen in \"Suarii disputationes metaphysicæ\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_23\" title=\"\u0027Suarii disputationes metaph.\u0027 Disp. 12, sect. 2 et 3.\" id=\"FNanchor_23\"\u003e[23]\u003c/a\u003e—a real compendium\r\nof Scholasticism. Even Hobbes still quotes and\r\nexplains this division.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_24\" title=\"Hobbes, \u0027De corpore,\u0027 P. ii. c. 10, § 7.\" id=\"FNanchor_24\"\u003e[24]\u003c/a\u003e It is also to be found in another\r\npassage of Aristotle, this time somewhat more clearly and\r\nfully developed (\"Metaph.\" i. 3.) and it is again briefly\r\nnoticed in the book \"De somno et vigilia,\" c. 2. As for the\r\nvitally important distinction between \u003cem\u003ereason\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nhowever, Aristotle no doubt betrays something like a conception\r\nof it in the \"Analyt. post.\" i. 13, where he shows at\r\nconsiderable length that knowing and proving \u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e a thing\r\nexists is a very different thing from knowing and proving\r\n\u003cem\u003ewhy\u003c/em\u003e it exists: what he represents as the latter, being knowledge\r\nof the \u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e; as the former, knowledge of the \u003cem\u003ereason\u003c/em\u003e.\r\nIf, however, he had quite clearly recognized the difference\r\nbetween them, he would never have lost sight of it, but would\r\nhave adhered to it throughout his writings. Now this is not\r\nthe case; for even when he endeavours to distinguish the\r\nvarious kinds of causes from one another, as in the passages\r\nI have mentioned above, the essential difference mooted in\r\nthe chapter just alluded to, never seems to occur to him\r\nagain. Besides he uses the term αἴτιον indiscriminately\r\nfor every kind of cause, often indeed calling reasons of knowledge,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg009\"\u003e[9]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand sometimes even the premisses of a conclusion,\r\nαἰτίας, as, for instance, in his \"Metaph.\" iv. 18; \"Rhet.\"\r\nii. 2; \"De plantis.\" p. 816 (\u003ccite\u003eed. Berol.\u003c/cite\u003e), but more especially\r\n\"Analyt. post.\" i. 2, where he calls the premisses to a conclusion\r\nsimply αἰτίαι τοῦ συμπεράσματος (causes of the conclusion).\r\nNow, using the same word to express two closely\r\nconnected conceptions, is a sure sign that their difference\r\nhas not been recognised, or at any rate not been firmly\r\ngrasped; for a mere accidental homonymous designation\r\nof two widely differing things is quite another matter.\r\nNowhere, however, does this error appear more conspicuously\r\nthan in his definition of the sophism \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003enon causæ ut causa\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nπαρὰ τὸ μὴ αἴτιον ὡς αἴτιον, (reasoning from what is not cause\r\nas if it were cause), in the book \"De sophisticis elenchis,\" c. 5.\r\nBy αἴτιον he here understands absolutely nothing but the\r\nargument, the premisses, consequently a reason of knowledge;\r\nfor this sophism consists in correctly proving the\r\nimpossibility of something, while the proof has no bearing\r\nwhatever upon the proposition in dispute, which it is nevertheless\r\nsupposed to refute. Here, therefore, there is no question\r\nat all of physical causes. Still the use of the word αἴτιον\r\nhas had so much weight with modern logicians, that they\r\nhold to it exclusively in their accounts of the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003efallacia extra\r\ndictionem\u003c/i\u003e, and explain the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003efallacia non causæ ut causa\u003c/i\u003e as\r\ndesignating a physical cause, which is not the case.\r\nReimarus, for instance, does so, and G. E. Schultze and\r\nFries—all indeed of whom I have any knowledge. The\r\nfirst work in which I find a correct definition of this\r\nsophism, is Twesten\u0027s Logic. Moreover, in all other\r\nscientific works and controversies the charge of a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003efallacia\r\nnon causæ ut causa\u003c/i\u003e usually denotes the interpolation of a\r\nwrong cause.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSextus Empiricus presents another forcible instance of\r\nthe way in which the Ancients were wont universally to confound\r\nthe logical law of the reason of knowledge with the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg010\"\u003e[10]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntranscendental law of cause and effect in Nature, persistently\r\nmistaking one for the other. In the 9th Book \"Adversus\r\nMathematicos,\" that is, the Book \"Adversus Physicos,\" §\r\n204, he undertakes to prove the law of causality, and says:\r\n\"He who asserts that there is no cause (αἰτία), either has\r\nno cause (αἰτία) for his assertion, or has one. In the former\r\ncase there is not more truth in his assertion than in its\r\ncontradiction; in the latter, his assertion itself proves the\r\nexistence of a cause.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy this we see that the Ancients had not yet arrived at\r\na clear distinction between requiring a reason as the ground\r\nof a conclusion, and asking for a cause for the occurrence\r\nof a real event. As for the Scholastic Philosophers of\r\nlater times, the law of causality was in their eyes an\r\naxiom above investigation: \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003enon inquirimus an causa sit,\r\nquia nihil est per se notius\u003c/i\u003e,\" says Suarez.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_25\" title=\"Suarez, \u0027Disp.\u0027 12, sect. 1.\" id=\"FNanchor_25\"\u003e[25]\u003c/a\u003e At the same time\r\nthey held fast to the above quoted Aristotelian classification;\r\nbut, as far as I know at least, they equally failed to arrive\r\nat a clear idea of the necessary distinction of which we are\r\nhere speaking.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 7. \u003ci\u003eDescartes.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor we find even the excellent Descartes, who gave the\r\nfirst impulse to subjective reflection and thereby became\r\nthe father of modern philosophy, still entangled in confusions\r\nfor which it is difficult to account; and we shall\r\nsoon see to what serious and deplorable consequences these\r\nconfusions have led with regard to Metaphysics. In the\r\n\"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eResponsio ad secundas objectiones in meditationes de prima\r\nphilosophia\u003c/i\u003e,\" \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eaxioma i.\u003c/i\u003e he says: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eNulla res existit, de qua non\r\npossit quæri, quænam sit causa, cur existat. Hoc enim de\r\nipso Deo quæri potest, non quod indigeat ulla causa ut existat,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg011\"\u003e[11]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsed quia ipsa ejus naturæ immensitas est\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCAUSA, SIVE RATIO\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003epropter quam nulla causa indiget ad existendum\u003c/i\u003e. He ought\r\nto have said: The immensity of God is a logical reason\r\nfrom which it follows, that God needs no cause; whereas\r\nhe confounds the two together and obviously has no clear\r\nconsciousness of the difference between reason and cause.\r\nProperly speaking however, it is his intention which mars\r\nhis insight. For here, where the law of causality demands\r\na \u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e, he substitutes a \u003cem\u003ereason\u003c/em\u003e instead of it, because the\r\nlatter, unlike the former, does not immediately lead to\r\nsomething beyond it; and thus, by means of this very\r\naxiom, he clears the way to the \u003cem\u003eOntological Proof\u003c/em\u003e of the\r\nexistence of God, which was really his invention, for Anselm\r\nhad only indicated it in a general manner. Immediately\r\nafter these axioms, of which I have just quoted the first,\r\nthere comes a formal, quite serious statement of the Ontological\r\nProof, which, in fact, already lies within that axiom,\r\nas the chicken does within the egg that has been long\r\nbrooded over. Thus, while everything else stands in need\r\nof a cause for its existence, the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eimmensitas\u003c/i\u003e implied in the\r\nconception of the Deity—who is introduced to us upon the\r\nladder of the Cosmological Proof—suffices in lieu of a\r\ncause or, as the proof itself expresses it: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein conceptu entis\r\nsumme perfecti existentia necessaria continetur\u003c/i\u003e. This, then,\r\nis the sleight-of-hand trick, for the sake of which the confusion,\r\nfamiliar even to Aristotle, of the two principal\r\nmeanings of the principle of sufficient reason, has been\r\nused directly \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein majorem Dei gloriam\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eConsidered by daylight, however, and without prejudice,\r\nthis famous Ontological Proof is really a charming joke.\r\nOn some occasion or other, some one excogitates a conception,\r\ncomposed out of all sorts of predicates, among which\r\nhowever he takes care to include the predicate actuality or\r\nexistence, either openly stated or wrapped up for decency\u0027s\r\nsake in some other predicate, such as \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eperfectio\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eimmensitas\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg012\"\u003e[12]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor something of the kind. Now, it is well known,—that,\r\nfrom a given conception, those predicates which are essential\r\nto it—\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, without which it cannot be thought—and likewise\r\nthe predicates which are essential to those predicates\r\nthemselves, may be extracted by means of purely logical\r\nanalyses, and consequently have \u003cem\u003elogical\u003c/em\u003e truth: that is, they\r\nhave their reason of knowledge in the given conception.\r\nAccordingly the predicate reality or existence is now extracted\r\nfrom this arbitrarily thought conception, and an\r\nobject corresponding to it is forthwith presumed to have\r\nreal existence independently of the conception.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poetry-container\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\" lang=\"de\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003e\"Wär\u0027 der Gedank\u0027 nicht so verwünscht gescheut,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eMan wär\u0027 versucht ihn herzlich dumm zu nennen.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_26\" title=\"\u0027Were not the thought so cursedly acute, One might be tempted to declare it silly.\u0027 SCHILLER, \u0027Wallenstein-Trilogie. Piccolomini,\u0027 Act ii. Sc. 7.\" id=\"FNanchor_26\"\u003e[26]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAfter all, the simplest answer to such ontological demonstrations\r\nis: \"All depends upon the source whence you\r\nhave derived your conception: if it be taken from experience,\r\nall well and good, for in this case its object exists\r\nand needs no further proof; if, on the contrary, it has been\r\nhatched in your own \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003esinciput\u003c/i\u003e, all its predicates are of no avail,\r\nfor it is a mere \u003cins title=\"phantasm.\" id=\"C040\"\u003ephantasm.\"\u003c/ins\u003e But we form an unfavourable\r\nprejudice against the pretensions of a theology which needed\r\nto have recourse to such proofs as this in order to gain a\r\nfooting on the territory of philosophy, to which it is quite\r\nforeign, but on which it longs to trespass. But oh! for\r\nthe prophetic wisdom of Aristotle! He had never even\r\nheard of the Ontological Proof; yet as though he could\r\ndetect this piece of scholastic jugglery through the shades\r\nof coming darkness and were anxious to bar the road to it,\r\nhe carefully shows\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_27\" title=\"Aristot., \u0027Analyt. post.\u0027 c. 7.\" id=\"FNanchor_27\"\u003e[27]\u003c/a\u003e that defining a thing and proving its\r\nexistence are two different matters, separate to all eternity;\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg013\"\u003e[13]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsince by the one we learn \u003cem\u003ewhat\u003c/em\u003e it is that is meant, and by\r\nthe other \u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e such a thing exists. Like an oracle of the\r\nfuture, he pronounces the sentence: τὸ δ\u0027 εἶναι οὐκ οὐσία\r\nοὐδενί· οὐ γὰρ γένος τὸ ὄν: (\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eESSE\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eautem nullius rei essentia,\r\nest, quandoquidem ens non est genus\u003c/i\u003e) which means:\r\n\"Existence never can belong to the essence of a thing.\"\r\nOn the other hand, we may see how great was Herr von\r\nSchelling\u0027s veneration for the Ontological Proof in a long\r\nnote, p. 152, of the 1st vol. of his \"Philosophische Schriften\"\r\nof 1809. We may even see in it something still more instructive,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, how easily Germans allow sand to be thrown\r\nin their eyes by impudence and blustering swagger. But for\r\nso thoroughly pitiable a creature as Hegel, whose whole\r\npseudo-philosophy is but a monstrous amplification of the\r\nOntological Proof, to have undertaken its defence against\r\nKant, is indeed an alliance of which the Ontological Proof\r\nitself might be ashamed, however little it may in general\r\nbe given to blushing. How can I be expected to speak with\r\ndeference of men, who have brought philosophy into contempt?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 8. \u003ci\u003eSpinoza.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAlthough Spinoza\u0027s philosophy mainly consists in the\r\nnegation of the double dualism between God and the\r\nworld and between soul and body, which his teacher,\r\nDescartes, had set up, he nevertheless remained true to his\r\nmaster in confounding and interchanging the relation between\r\nreason and consequence with that between cause and\r\neffect; he even endeavoured to draw from it a still greater\r\nadvantage for his own metaphysics than Descartes for his,\r\nfor he made this confusion the foundation of his whole\r\nPantheism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eA conception contains \u003cem\u003eimplicite\u003c/em\u003e all its essential predicates,\r\nso that they may be developed out of it \u003cem\u003eexplicite\u003c/em\u003e by\r\nmeans of mere analytical judgments: the sum total of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg014\"\u003e[14]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthem being its definition. This definition therefore differs\r\nfrom the conception itself merely in form and not in content;\r\nfor it consists of judgments which are all contained\r\nwithin that conception, and therefore have their\r\nreason in it, in as far as they show its essence. We may\r\naccordingly look upon these judgments as the consequences\r\nof that conception, considered as their reason.\r\nNow this relation between a conception and the judgments\r\nfounded upon it and susceptible of being developed\r\nout of it by analysis, is precisely the relation between\r\nSpinoza\u0027s so-called God and the world, or rather between\r\nthe one and only substance and its numberless accidents\r\n(\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eDeus, sive substantia constans infinitis attributis\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_28\" title=\"Spinoza, \u0027Eth.\u0027 i. prop. 11.\" id=\"FNanchor_28\"\u003e[28]\u003c/a\u003e—\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eDeus,\r\nsive omnia Dei attributa\u003c/i\u003e). It is therefore the relation in\r\nknowledge of the \u003cem\u003ereason\u003c/em\u003e to its consequent; whereas true\r\nTheism (Spinoza\u0027s Theism is merely nominal) assumes\r\nthe relation of the \u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e to its effect, in which the cause\r\nremains different and separate from the consequence, not\r\nonly in the way in which we consider them, but really and\r\nessentially, therefore in themselves to all eternity. For\r\nthe word God, honestly used, means a cause such as this\r\nof the world, with the addition of personality. An impersonal\r\nGod is, on the contrary, a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003econtradictio in adjecto\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nNow as nevertheless, even in the case as stated by him,\r\nSpinoza desired to retain the word God to express substance,\r\nand explicitly called this the \u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e of the world, he\r\ncould find no other way to do it than by completely intermingling\r\nthe two relations, and confounding the principle\r\nof the reason of knowledge with the principle of causality.\r\nI call attention to the following passages in corroboration\r\nof this statement. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eNotandum, dari necessario unius cujusque\r\nrei existentis certam aliquam\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCAUSAM\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003epropter quam\r\nexistit. Et notandum, hanc causam, propter quart aliqua res\r\nexistit, vel debere contineri in ipsa natura et\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDEFINITIONE\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg015\"\u003e[15]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003erei existentis\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003enimirum quod ad ipsius naturam pertinet\r\nexistere\u003c/i\u003e), \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003evel debere\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEXTRA\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eipsam dari.\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_29\" title=\"Spinoza, \u0027Eth.\u0027 P. 1. prop. 8, schol. 2.\" id=\"FNanchor_29\"\u003e[29]\u003c/a\u003e In the last case he\r\nmeans an efficient cause, as appears from what follows,\r\nwhereas in the first he means a mere reason of knowledge;\r\nyet he identifies both, and by this means prepares\r\nthe way for identifying God with the world, which is his\r\nintention. This is the artifice of which he always makes\r\nuse, and which he has learnt from Descartes. He substitutes\r\na cause acting from without, for a reason of knowledge\r\nlying within, a given conception. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eEx necessitate\r\ndivinæ naturæ omnia, quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere\r\npossunt, sequi debent.\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_30\" title=\"Ibid. Prop. 16.\" id=\"FNanchor_30\"\u003e[30]\u003c/a\u003e At the same time he calls God\r\neverywhere the cause of the world. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eQuidquid existit Dei\r\npotentiam, quæ omnium rerum\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCAUSA\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eest, exprimit.\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_31\" title=\"Ibid. Prop. 36, demonstr.\" id=\"FNanchor_31\"\u003e[31]\u003c/a\u003e—\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eDeus\r\nest omnium rerum\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCAUSA\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eimmanens, non vero transiens.\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_32\" title=\"Ibid. Prop. 18.\" id=\"FNanchor_32\"\u003e[32]\u003c/a\u003e—\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eDeus\r\nnon tantam est\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCAUSA EFFICIENS\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ererum existentiæ, sed\r\netiam essentiæ.\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_33\" title=\"Ibid. Prop. 25.\" id=\"FNanchor_33\"\u003e[33]\u003c/a\u003e—\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eEx data quacunque\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eIDEA\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ealiquis\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEFFECTUS\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003enecessario sequi debat.\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_34\" title=\"\u0027Eth.\u0027 P. iii. prop. 1, demonstr.\" id=\"FNanchor_34\"\u003e[34]\u003c/a\u003e—And: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eNulla res nisi a causa externa\r\npotest destrui.\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_35\" title=\"Ibid. Prop. 4.\" id=\"FNanchor_35\"\u003e[35]\u003c/a\u003e—Demonstr. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDefinitio\u003c/span\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecujuscunque\r\nrei, ipsius essentiam\u003c/i\u003e (essence, nature, as differing from\r\nexistentia, existence), \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eaffirmat, sed non negat; sive rei essentiam\r\nponit, sed non tollit. Dum itaque ad rem ipsam tantum,\r\nnon autem ad causas externas attendimus, nihil in\r\neadem poterimus invenire, quod ipsam possit destruere.\u003c/i\u003e This\r\nmeans, that as no conception can contain anything which\r\ncontradicts its definition, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, the sum total of its predicates,\r\nneither can an existence contain anything which\r\nmight become a cause of its destruction. This view, however,\r\nis brought to a climax in the somewhat lengthy\r\nsecond demonstration of the 11th Proposition, in which\r\nhe confounds a cause capable of destroying or annihilating\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg016\"\u003e[16]\u003c/span\u003e\r\na being, with a contradiction contained in its\r\ndefinition and therefore destroying that definition. His\r\nneed of confounding cause with reason here becomes so\r\nurgent, that he can never say \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecausa\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eratio\u003c/i\u003e alone, but\r\nalways finds it necessary to put \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eratio seu causa\u003c/i\u003e. Accordingly,\r\nthis occurs as many as eight times in the same page,\r\nin order to conceal the subterfuge. Descartes had done\r\nthe same in the above-mentioned axiom.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus, properly speaking, Spinoza\u0027s Pantheism is merely\r\nthe \u003cem\u003erealisation\u003c/em\u003e of Descartes\u0027 Ontological Proof. First, he\r\nadopts Descartes\u0027 ontotheological proposition, to which we\r\nhave alluded above, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eipsa naturæ Dei immensitas est\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCAUSA\r\nSIVE RATIO\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003epropter quam nulla causa indiget ad existendum\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nalways saying \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003esubstantia\u003c/i\u003e instead of \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eDeus\u003c/i\u003e (in the\r\nbeginning); and then he finishes by \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003esubstantiæ essentia\r\nnecessario involvit existentiam, ergo erit substantia\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCAUSA\r\nSUI\u003c/span\u003e.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_36\" title=\"\u0027Eth.\u0027 P. i. prop. 7.\" id=\"FNanchor_36\"\u003e[36]\u003c/a\u003e Therefore the very same argument which Descartes\r\nhad used to prove the existence of God, is used by Spinoza\r\nto prove the existence of the world,—which consequently\r\nneeds no God. He does this still more distinctly in the\r\n2nd Scholium to the 8th Proposition: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eQuoniam ad naturam\r\nsubstantia pertinet existere, debet ejus definitio necessariam\r\nexistentiam involvere, et consequenter ex sola ejus\r\ndefinitione debet ipsius existentia concludi\u003c/i\u003e. But this substance\r\nis, as we know, the world. The demonstration to\r\nProposition 24 says in the same sense: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eId, cujus natura in\r\nse considerata\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, in its definition) \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003einvolvit existentiam, est\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCAUSA SUI\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor what Descartes had stated in an exclusively \u003cem\u003eideal\u003c/em\u003e\r\nand \u003cem\u003esubjective\u003c/em\u003e sense, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, only for us, for \u003cem\u003ecognitive purposes\u003c/em\u003e—in\r\nthis instance for the sake of proving the existence of\r\nGod—Spinoza took in a \u003cem\u003ereal\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eobjective\u003c/em\u003e sense, as the\r\nactual relation of God to the world. According to Descartes,\r\nthe existence of God is contained in the \u003cem\u003econception\u003c/em\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg017\"\u003e[17]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof God, therefore it becomes an argument for his actual\r\nbeing: according to Spinoza, God is himself contained\r\nin the world. Thus what, with Descartes, was only\r\nreason of knowledge, becomes, with Spinoza, reason of\r\nfact. If the former, in his Ontological Proof, taught\r\nthat the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eexistentia\u003c/i\u003e of God is a consequence of the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eessentia\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof God, the latter turns this into \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecausa sui\u003c/i\u003e, and boldly\r\nopens his Ethics with: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eper causam sui intelligo id, cujus\r\nessentia\u003c/i\u003e (conception) \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003einvolvit existentiam\u003c/i\u003e, remaining deaf\r\nto Aristotle\u0027s warning cry, τὸ δ\u0027 εἶναι οὐκ οὐσία οὐδενί!\r\nNow, this is the most palpable confusion of \u003cem\u003ereason\u003c/em\u003e and\r\n\u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e. And if Neo-Spinozans (Schellingites, Hegelians,\r\n\u0026amp;c.), with whom words are wont to pass for thoughts,\r\noften indulge in pompous, solemn admiration for this\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecausa sui\u003c/i\u003e, for my own part I see nothing but a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003econtradictio\r\nin adjecto\u003c/i\u003e in this same \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecausa sui\u003c/i\u003e, a \u003cem\u003ebefore\u003c/em\u003e that is\r\n\u003cem\u003eafter\u003c/em\u003e, an audacious command to us, to sever arbitrarily the\r\neternal causal chain—something, in short, very like the\r\nproceeding of that Austrian, who finding himself unable\r\nto reach high enough to fasten the clasp on his tightly-strapped\r\nshako, got upon a chair. The right emblem for\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecausa sui\u003c/i\u003e is Baron Münchhausen, sinking on horseback\r\ninto the water, clinging by the legs to his horse and pulling\r\nboth himself and the animal out by his own pigtail,\r\nwith the motto underneath: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eCausa sui\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us finally cast a look at the 16th proposition of the\r\n1st book of the Ethics. Here we find Spinoza concluding\r\nfrom the proposition, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eex data cujuscunque rei definitione\r\nplures proprietates intellectus concludit, quæ revera ex eadem\r\nnecessario sequuntur, that ex necessitate divinæ, naturæ\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e,\r\ntaken as a reality), \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003einfinita infinitis modis sequi debent\u003c/i\u003e:\r\nthis God therefore unquestionably stands in the same\r\nrelation to the world as a conception to its definition. The\r\ncorollary, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eDeum omnium rerum esse\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCAUSAM EFFICIENTEM\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nis nevertheless immediately connected with it. It is impossible\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg018\"\u003e[18]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto carry the confusion between reason and cause\r\nfarther, nor could it lead to graver consequences than here.\r\nBut this shows the importance of the subject of the present\r\ntreatise.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn endeavouring to add a third step to the climax in\r\nquestion, Herr von Schelling has contributed a small afterpiece\r\nto these errors, into which two mighty intellects of\r\nthe past had fallen owing to insufficient clearness in thinking.\r\nIf Descartes met the demands of the inexorable law of\r\ncausality, which reduced his God to the last straits, by substituting\r\na reason instead of the cause required, in order thus\r\nto set the matter at rest; and if Spinoza made a real cause\r\nout of this reason, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecausa sui\u003c/i\u003e, his God thereby becoming\r\nthe world itself: Schelling now made reason and consequent\r\nseparate in God himself.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_37\" title=\"Schelling, \u0027Abhandlung von der menschlichen Freiheit.\u0027\" id=\"FNanchor_37\"\u003e[37]\u003c/a\u003e He thus gave the thing still\r\ngreater consistency by elevating it to a real, substantial\r\nhypostasis of reason and consequent, and introducing us\r\nto something \"in God, which is not himself, but his\r\nreason, as a primary reason, or rather reason beyond reason\r\n(abyss).\" \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eHoc quidem vere palmarium est.\u003c/i\u003e—It is now\r\nknown that Schelling had taken the whole fable from\r\nJacob Böhme\u0027s \"Full account of the terrestrial and celestial\r\nmystery;\" but what appears to me to be less well\r\nknown, is the source from which Jacob Böhme himself\r\nhad taken it, and the real birth-place of this so-called\r\n\u003cem\u003eabyss\u003c/em\u003e, wherefore I now take the liberty to mention it. It\r\nis the βυθός, i.e. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eabyssus, vorago\u003c/i\u003e, bottomless pit, reason\r\nbeyond reason of the Valentinians (a heretical sect of the\r\nsecond century) which, in silence—co-essential with itself—engendered\r\nintelligence and the world, as Irenæus\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_38\" title=\"Irenæus, \u0027Contr. hæres.\u0027 lib. i. c. 1.\" id=\"FNanchor_38\"\u003e[38]\u003c/a\u003e relates\r\nin the following terms: λέγουσι γάρ τινα εἶναι ἐν\r\nἀοράτοις, καὶ ἀκατονομάστοις ὑψώμασι τέλειον Αἰῶνα προόντα·\r\nτοῦτον δὲ καὶ προαρχήν, καὶ προπάτορα, καὶ \u003cem class=\"gesperrt\"\u003eβυθὸν\u003c/em\u003e καλοῦσιν.—Ὑπάρχοντα\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg019\"\u003e[19]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nδὲ αὐτὸν ἀχώρητον καὶ ἀόρατον, ἀΐδιόν τε καὶ\r\nἀγέννητον, ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καὶ ἠρεμίᾳ πολλῇ γεγονέναι ἐν ἀπείροις\r\nαἰῶσι χρόνων. Συνυπάρχειν δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ Ἔννοιαν, ἣν δὲ καὶ\r\nΧάριν, καὶ Σιγὴν ὀνομάζουσι· καὶ ἐννοηθῆναί ποτε ἀφ\u0027 ἑαυτοῦ\r\nπροβαλέσθαι τὸν \u003cem class=\"gesperrt\"\u003eβυθὸν\u003c/em\u003e τοῦτον ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων, καὶ καθάπερ\r\nσπέρμα τὴν προβολὴν ταύτην (ἣν προβαλέσθαι ἐνενοήθη) καθέσθαι,\r\nὡς ἐν μήτρᾳ, τῇ συνυπαρχούσῃ, ἑαυτῷ Σιγῇ. Ταύτην δὲ,\r\nὑποδηξαμένην τὸ σπέρμα τοῦτο, καὶ ἐγκύμονα γενομένην, ἀποκυῆσαι\r\nΝοῦν, ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἴσον τῷ προβαλόντι, καὶ μόνον\r\nχωροῦντα τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ Πατρός. Τὸν δὲ νοῦν τοῦτον καὶ\r\nμονογενῆ καλοῦσι, καὶ ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_39\" title=\"\u0027For they say that in those unseen heights which have no name there is a pre-existing, perfect Æon; this they also call fore-rule, forefather and the depth.–They say, that being incomprehensible and invisible, eternal and unborn, he has existed during endless Æons in the deepest calmness and tranquillity; and that coexisting with him was Thought, which they also call Grace and Silence….\" id=\"FNanchor_39\"\u003e[39]\u003c/a\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eDicunt enim esse\r\nquendam in sublimitatibus illis, quæ nec oculis cerni, nec\r\nnominari possunt, perfectum Æonem præexistentem, quem\r\net proarchen, et propatorem, et\u003c/i\u003e Bythum \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003evocant. Eum\r\nautem, quum incomprehensibilis et invisibilis, sempiternus\r\nidem, et ingenitus esset, infinitis temporum seculis in summa\r\nquiete ac tranquillitate fuisse. Unâ etiam cum eo Cogitationem\r\nexstitisse, quam et Gratiam et Silentium (Sigen) nuncupant.\r\nHunc porro\u003c/i\u003e Bythum \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein animum, aliquando induxisse,\r\nrerum omnium initium proferre, atque hanc, quam\r\nin animum induxerat, productionem, in Sigen (silentium)\r\nquæ unâ cum eo erat, non secus atque in vulvam demisisse.\r\nHanc vero, suscepto hoc semine, prægnantem effectam peperisse\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg020\"\u003e[20]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIntellectum, parenti suo parem et æqualem, atque ita\r\ncomparatum, ut solus paternæ magnitudinis capax esset.\r\nAtque hunc Intellectum et Monogenem et Patrem et principum\r\nomnium rerum appellant.\u003c/i\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSomehow or other this must have come to Jacob Böhme\u0027s\r\nhearing from the History of Heresy, and Herr von Schelling\r\nmust have received it from him in all faith.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 9. \u003ci\u003eLeibnitz.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt was Leibnitz who first formally stated the Principle\r\nof Sufficient Reason as a main principle of all knowledge\r\nand of all science. He proclaims it very pompously in\r\nvarious passages of his works, giving himself great airs,\r\nas though he had been the first to invent it; yet all he\r\nfinds to say about it is, that everything must have a sufficient\r\nreason for being as it is, and not otherwise: and this\r\nthe world had probably found out before him. True, he\r\nmakes casual allusions to the distinction between its two\r\nchief significations, without, however, laying any particular\r\nstress upon it, or explaining it clearly anywhere else. The\r\nprincipal reference to it is in his \"Principia Philosophiæ,\"\r\n§ 32, and a little more satisfactorily in the French version,\r\nentitled \"Monadologie\": \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eEn vertu du principe de la raison\r\nsuffisante, nous considérons qu\u0027aucun fait ne sauroit se\r\ntrouver vrai ou existant, aucune énonciation véritable, sans\r\nqu\u0027il y ait une raison suffisante, pourquoi il en soit ainsi et\r\nnon pas autrement\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_40\" title=\"Compare with this § 44 of his \u0027Theodicée,\u0027 and his 5th letter to Clarke, § 125.\" id=\"FNanchor_40\"\u003e[40]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 10. \u003ci\u003eWolf.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first writer who explicitly separated the two chief\r\nsignifications of our principle, and stated the difference\r\nbetween them in detail, was therefore Wolf. Wolf, however,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg021\"\u003e[21]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndoes not place the principle of sufficient reason in\r\nLogic, as is now the custom, but in Ontology. True, in\r\n§ 71 he urges the necessity of not confounding the principle\r\nof sufficient reason of knowing with that of cause and effect;\r\nstill he does not clearly determine here wherein the difference\r\nconsists. Indeed, he himself mistakes the one for the other;\r\nfor he quotes instances of cause and effect in confirmation\r\nof the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprincipium rationis sufficientis\u003c/i\u003e in this very chapter,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ede ratione sufficiente\u003c/i\u003e, §§ 70, 74, 75, 77, which, had he really\r\nwished to preserve that distinction, ought rather to have\r\nbeen quoted in the chapter \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ede causis\u003c/i\u003e of the same work.\r\nIn said chapter he again brings forward precisely similar\r\ninstances, and once more enunciates the \u003cem\u003eprincipium cognoscendi\u003c/em\u003e\r\n(§ 876), which does not certainly belong to it, having\r\nbeen already discussed, yet which serves to introduce the immediately\r\nfollowing clear and definite distinction between this\r\nprinciple and the law of causality, §§ 881-884. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ePrincipium\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nhe continues, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003edicitur id, quod in se continet rationem alterius\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nand he distinguishes \u003cem\u003ethree\u003c/em\u003e kinds: 1. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePrincipium Fiendi\u003c/span\u003e\r\n(\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecausa\u003c/i\u003e), which he defines as \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eratio actualitatis alterius\u003c/i\u003e, e.g.,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003esi lapis calescit, ignis aut radii solares sunt rationes, cur\r\ncalor lapidi insit\u003c/i\u003e.—2. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePrincipium Essendi\u003c/span\u003e, which he\r\ndefines as \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eratio possibilitatis alterius; in eodem, exemplo,\r\nratio possibilitatis, cur lapis calorem recipere possit, est\r\nin essentia seu modo compositionis lapidis\u003c/i\u003e. This last conception\r\nseems to me inadmissible. If it has any meaning\r\nat all, possibility means correspondence with the\r\ngeneral conditions of experience known to us \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e, as\r\nKant has sufficiently shown. From these conditions we\r\nknow, with respect to Wolf\u0027s instance of the stone, that\r\nchanges are possible as effects proceeding from causes: we\r\nknow, that is, that one state can succeed another, if the\r\nformer contains the conditions for the latter. In this case\r\nwe find, as effect, the state of being warm in the stone;\r\nas cause, the preceding state of a limited capacity for\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg022\"\u003e[22]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwarmth in the stone and its contact with free heat. Now,\r\nWolf\u0027s naming the first mentioned property of this state\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprincipium essendi\u003c/i\u003e, and the second, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprincipium fiendi\u003c/i\u003e, rests\r\nupon a delusion caused by the fact that, so far as the\r\nstone is concerned, the conditions are more lasting and\r\ncan therefore wait longer for the others. That the stone\r\nshould be as it is: that is, that it should be chemically so\r\nconstituted as to bring with it a particular degree of specific\r\nheat, consequently a capacity for heat which stands in inverse\r\nproportion to its specific heat; that besides it should,\r\non the other hand, come into contact with free heat, is\r\nthe consequence of a whole chain of antecedent causes,\r\nall of them \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprincipia fiendi\u003c/i\u003e; but it is the coincidence of\r\ncircumstances on both sides which primarily constitutes\r\nthat condition, upon which, as cause, the becoming warm\r\ndepends, as effect. All this leaves no room for Wolf\u0027s\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprincipium essendi\u003c/i\u003e, which I therefore do not admit, and\r\nconcerning which I have here entered somewhat into detail,\r\npartly because I mean to use the word myself later on in\r\na totally different sense; partly also, because this explanation\r\ncontributes to facilitate the comprehension of the law\r\nof causality.—3. Wolf, as we have said, distinguishes a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePrincipium Cognoscendi\u003c/span\u003e, and refers also under \u003cem\u003ecausa\u003c/em\u003e to\r\na \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecausa impulsiva, sive ratio voluntatem determinans\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 11. \u003ci\u003ePhilosophers between Wolf and Kant.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBaumgarten repeats the Wolfian distinctions in his\r\n\"Metaphysica,\" §§ 20-24, and §§ 306-313.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eReimarus, in his \"Vernunftlehre,\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_41\" title=\"Doctrine of Reason.\" id=\"FNanchor_41\"\u003e[41]\u003c/a\u003e § 81, distinguishes\r\n1. \u003cem\u003eInward reason\u003c/em\u003e, of which his explanation agrees with\r\nWolf\u0027s \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eratio essendi\u003c/i\u003e, and might even be applicable to the\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eratio cognoscendi\u003c/i\u003e, if he did not transfer to things what only\r\napplies to conceptions; 2. \u003cem\u003eOutward reason\u003c/em\u003e, i.e. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecausa\u003c/i\u003e.—§ 120\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg023\"\u003e[23]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eet seqq.\u003c/i\u003e, he rightly defines the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eratio cognoscendi\u003c/i\u003e as a condition\r\nof the proposition; but in an example, § 125, he nevertheless\r\nconfounds it with cause.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLambert, in the new Organon, does not mention Wolf\u0027s\r\ndistinctions; he shows, however, that he recognizes a difference\r\nbetween reason of knowledge and cause;\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_42\" title=\"Lambert, \u0027New Organon,\u0027 vol. i. § 572.\" id=\"FNanchor_42\"\u003e[42]\u003c/a\u003e for he\r\nsays that God is the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprincipium essendi\u003c/i\u003e of truths, and that\r\ntruths are the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprincipia cognoscendi\u003c/i\u003e of God.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ePlattner, in his Aphorisms, § 868, says: \"What is called\r\nreason and conclusion within our knowledge (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprincipium\r\ncognoscendi, ratio—rationatum\u003c/i\u003e), is in reality cause and effect\r\n(\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecausa efficiens—effectus\u003c/i\u003e). Every cause is a reason, every\r\neffect a conclusion.\" He is therefore of opinion that\r\ncause and effect, in reality, correspond to the conceptions\r\nreason and consequence in our thought; that the former\r\nstand in a similar relation with respect to the latter as\r\nsubstance and accident, for instance, to subject and predicate,\r\nor the quality of the object to our sensation of that\r\nquality, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c. I think it useless to refute this opinion,\r\nfor it is easy to see that premisses and conclusion in judgments\r\nstand in an entirely different relation to one another\r\nfrom a knowledge of cause and effect; although in individual\r\ncases even knowledge of a cause, as such, may be\r\nthe reason of a judgment which enunciates the effect.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_43\" title=\"Compare § 36. of this treatise.\" id=\"FNanchor_43\"\u003e[43]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 12. \u003ci\u003eHume.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo one before this serious thinker had ever doubted\r\nwhat follows. First, and before all things in heaven and\r\non earth, is the Principle of Sufficient Reason in the form\r\nof the Law of Causality. For it is a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003everitas æterna\u003c/i\u003e: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e it is\r\nin and by itself above Gods and Fate; whereas everything\r\nelse, the understanding, for instance, which thinks\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg024\"\u003e[24]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat principle, and no less the whole world and whatever\r\nmay be its cause—atoms, motion, a Creator, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eet cætera\u003c/i\u003e—is\r\nwhat it is only in accordance with, and by virtue of, that\r\nprinciple. Hume was the first to whom it occurred to\r\ninquire whence this law of causality derives its authority,\r\nand to demand its credentials. Everyone knows the result\r\nat which he arrives: that causality is nothing beyond the\r\nempirically perceived succession of things and states in\r\nTime, with which habit has made us familiar. The fallacy\r\nof this result is felt at once, nor is it difficult to refute. The\r\nmerit lies in the question itself; for it became the impulse\r\nand starting-point for Kant\u0027s profound researches, and by\r\ntheir means led to an incomparably deeper and more\r\nthorough view of Idealism than the one which had hitherto\r\nexisted, and which was chiefly Berkeley\u0027s. It led to transcendental\r\nIdealism, from which arises the conviction, that the\r\nworld is as dependent upon us, as a whole, as we are dependent\r\nupon it in detail. For, by pointing out the existence of\r\nthose transcendental principles, as such, which enable us to\r\ndetermine \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e before all experience, certain points\r\nconcerning objects and their possibility, he proved that\r\nthese things could not exist, as they present themselves to\r\nus, independently of our knowledge. The resemblance\r\nbetween a world such as this and a dream, is obvious.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 13. \u003ci\u003eKant and his School.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eKant\u0027s chief passage on the Principle of Sufficient Reason\r\nis in a little work entitled \"On a discovery, which is to\r\npermit us to dispense with all Criticism of Pure Reason.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_44\" title=\"\u0027Ueber eine Entdeckung, nach der alle Kritik der reinen Vernunft entbehrlich gemacht werden soll.\u0027\" id=\"FNanchor_44\"\u003e[44]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nSection I., \u003ci\u003elit.\u003c/i\u003e A. Here he strongly urges the distinction\r\nbetween \"the logical (formal) principle of cognition\r\n\u0027every proposition must have its reason,\u0027 and the transcendental\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg025\"\u003e[25]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n(material) principle \u0027every thing must have its\r\ncause,\u0027\" in his controversy with Eberhard, who had identified\r\nthem as one and the same.—I intend myself to criticize\r\nKant\u0027s proof of the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e and consequently transcendental\r\ncharacter of the law of causality further on in a\r\nseparate paragraph, after having given the only true\r\nproof.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith these precedents to guide them, the several writers\r\non Logic belonging to Kant\u0027s school; Hofbauer, Maass,\r\nJakob, Kiesewetter and others, have defined pretty accurately\r\nthe distinction between reason and cause. Kiesewetter,\r\nmore especially, gives it thus quite satisfactorily:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_45\" title=\"Kiesewetter, \u0027Logik,\u0027 vol. i. p. 16.\" id=\"FNanchor_45\"\u003e[45]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\"Reason of knowledge is not to be confounded with reason\r\nof fact (cause). The Principle of Sufficient Reason belongs\r\nto Logic, that of Causality to Metaphysics.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_46\" title=\"Ibid. p. 60.\" id=\"FNanchor_46\"\u003e[46]\u003c/a\u003e The former is\r\nthe fundamental principle of thought; the latter that of\r\nexperience. Cause refers to real things, logical reason has\r\nonly to do with representations.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eKant\u0027s adversaries urge this distinction still more\r\nstrongly. G. E. Schultze\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_47\" title=\"G. E. Schultze, \u0027Logik,\u0027 § 19, Anmerkung 1, und § 63.\" id=\"FNanchor_47\"\u003e[47]\u003c/a\u003e complains that the Principle of\r\nSufficient Reason is confounded with that of Causality.\r\nSalomon Maimon\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_48\" title=\"Sal. Maimon, \u0027Logik,\u0027 p. 20, 21.\" id=\"FNanchor_48\"\u003e[48]\u003c/a\u003e regrets that so much should be said\r\nabout the sufficient reason without an explanation of what\r\nis meant by it, while he blames Kant\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_49\" title=\"Ibid. \u0027Vorrede,\u0027 p. xxiv.\" id=\"FNanchor_49\"\u003e[49]\u003c/a\u003e for deriving the\r\nprinciple of causality from the logical form of hypothetical\r\njudgments.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eF. H. Jacobi\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_50\" title=\"Jacobi, \u0027Briefe über die Lehre des Spinoza,\u0027 Beilage 7, p. 414.\" id=\"FNanchor_50\"\u003e[50]\u003c/a\u003e says, that by the confounding of the two\r\nconceptions, reason and cause, an illusion is produced,\r\nwhich has given rise to various false speculations; and he\r\npoints out the distinction between them after his own\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg026\"\u003e[26]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfashion. Here, however, as is usual with him, we find a\r\ngood deal more of self-complacent phrase-jugglery than of\r\nserious philosophy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHow Herr von Schelling finally distinguishes reason\r\nfrom cause, may be seen in his \"Aphorisms introductory\r\nto the Philosophy of Nature,\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_51\" title=\"\u0027Aphorismen zur Einleitung in die Naturphilosophie.\u0027\" id=\"FNanchor_51\"\u003e[51]\u003c/a\u003e § 184, which open the first\r\nbook of the first volume of Marcus and Schelling\u0027s \"Annals\r\nof Medecine.\" Here we are taught that gravity is the\r\n\u003cem\u003ereason\u003c/em\u003e and light the \u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e of all things. This I merely\r\nquote as a curiosity; for such random talk would not\r\notherwise deserve a place among the opinions of serious\r\nand honest inquirers.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 14. \u003ci\u003eOn the Proofs of the Principle.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have still to record various fruitless attempts which\r\nhave been made to prove the Principle of Sufficient Reason,\r\nmostly without clearly defining in which sense it was\r\ntaken: Wolf\u0027s, for instance, in his Ontology, § 70, repeated\r\nby Baumgarten in his \"Metaphysics,\" § 20. It is useless\r\nto repeat and refute it here, as it obviously rests on a\r\nverbal quibble. Plattner\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_52\" title=\"Plattner, \u0027Aphorismen,\u0027 § 828.\" id=\"FNanchor_52\"\u003e[52]\u003c/a\u003e and Jakob\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_53\" title=\"Jakob, \u0027Logik und Metaphysik,\u0027 p. 38 (1794).\" id=\"FNanchor_53\"\u003e[53]\u003c/a\u003e have tried other\r\nproofs, in which, however, the circle is easily detected. I\r\npurpose dealing with those of Kant further on, as I have\r\nalready said. Since I hope, in the course of this treatise,\r\nto point out the different laws of our cognitive faculties,\r\nof which the principle of sufficient reason is the common\r\nexpression, it will result as a matter of course, that this\r\nprinciple cannot be proved, and that, on the contrary,\r\nAristotle\u0027s remark:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_54\" title=\"Aristotle, \u0027Metaph.\u0027 iii. 6. \u0027They seek a reason for that which has no reason; for the principle of demonstration is not demonstration.\u0027 [Tr.\u0027s add.] Compare with this citation \u0027Analyt. post.\u0027 i. 2.\" id=\"FNanchor_54\"\u003e[54]\u003c/a\u003e λόγον ζητοῦσι ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg027\"\u003e[27]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nἀποδείξεως γὰρ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπόδειξίς ἐστι (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003erationem eorum\r\nquærant, quorum non est ratio: demonstrationis enim principium\r\nnon est demonstratio\u003c/i\u003e) may be applied with equal\r\npropriety to all these proofs. For every proof is a reference\r\nto something already recognised; and if we continue\r\nrequiring a proof again for this something, whatever it be,\r\nwe at last arrive at certain propositions which express the\r\nforms and laws, therefore the conditions, of all thought and\r\nof all knowledge, in the application of which consequently\r\nall thought and all knowledge consists: so that certainty\r\nis nothing but correspondence with those conditions, forms,\r\nand laws, therefore their own certainty cannot again be\r\nascertained by means of other propositions. In the fifth\r\nchapter I mean to discuss the kind of truth which belongs\r\nto propositions such as these.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo seek a proof for the Principle of Sufficient Reason, is,\r\nmoreover, an especially flagrant absurdity, which shows a\r\nwant of reflection. Every proof is a demonstration of the\r\nreason for a judgment which has been pronounced, and\r\nwhich receives the predicate \u003cem\u003etrue\u003c/em\u003e in virtue precisely of that\r\ndemonstration. This necessity for a reason is exactly what\r\nthe Principle of Sufficient Reason expresses. Now if we\r\nrequire a proof of it, or, in other words, a demonstration of\r\nits reason, we thereby already assume it to be true, nay,\r\nwe found our demand precisely upon that assumption, and\r\nthus we find ourselves involved in the circle of exacting a\r\nproof of our right to exact a proof.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg028\"\u003e[28]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eCHAPTER III.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eINSUFFICIENCY OF THE OLD AND OUTLINES OF A NEW\r\nDEMONSTRATION.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 15. \u003ci\u003eCases which are not comprised among the old established\r\nmeanings of the Principle.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom the summary given in the preceding chapter we\r\ngather, that two distinct applications of the principle\r\nof sufficient reason have been recognized, although very\r\ngradually, very tardily, and not without frequent relapses\r\ninto error and confusion: the one being its application to\r\njudgments, which, to be true, must have a reason; the\r\nother, its application to changes in material objects, which\r\nmust always have a cause. In both cases we find the\r\nprinciple of sufficient reason authorizing us to ask \u003cem\u003ewhy?\u003c/em\u003e a\r\nquality which is essential to it. But are all the cases in\r\nwhich it authorizes us to ask \u003cem\u003ewhy\u003c/em\u003e comprised in these two\r\nrelations? If I ask: Why are the three sides of this\r\ntriangle equal? the answer is: Because the three angles\r\nare so. Now, is the equality of the angles the cause of the\r\nequality of the sides? No; for here we have to do with\r\nno change, consequently with no effect which must have a\r\ncause.—Is it merely a logical reason? No; for the equality\r\nof the angle is not only a proof of the equality of the\r\nsides, it is not only the foundation of a judgment: mere\r\nconceptions alone would never suffice to explain why the\r\nsides must be equal, because the angles are so; for the\r\nconception of the equality of the sides is not contained in\r\nthat of the equality of the angles. Here therefore we\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg029\"\u003e[29]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhave no connection between conceptions and judgments,\r\nbut between sides and angles. The equality of the angles\r\nis not the \u003cem\u003edirect\u003c/em\u003e, but the \u003cem\u003eindirect\u003c/em\u003e reason, by which we know\r\nthe equality of the sides; for it is the reason why a thing\r\nis such as it is (in this case, that the sides are equal): the\r\nangles being equal, the sides must therefore be equal.\r\nHere we have a necessary connection between angles and\r\nsides, not a direct, necessary connection between two\r\njudgments.—Or again, if I ask why \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003einfecta facta\u003c/i\u003e, but never\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003efacta infecta fieri possunt\u003c/i\u003e, consequently why the past is\r\nabsolutely irrevocable, the future inevitable, even this does\r\nnot admit of purely logical proof by means of mere abstract\r\nconceptions, nor does it belong either to causality, which\r\nonly rules \u003cem\u003eoccurrences\u003c/em\u003e within Time, not Time itself. The\r\npresent hour hurled the preceding one into the bottomless pit\r\nof the past, not through causality, but immediately, through\r\nits mere existence, which existence was nevertheless inevitable.\r\nIt is impossible to make this comprehensible or even\r\nclearer by means of mere conceptions; we recognise it, on\r\nthe contrary, quite directly and instinctively, just as we\r\nrecognize the difference between right and left and all that\r\ndepends upon it: for instance, that our left glove will not\r\nfit our right hand, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, as all those cases in which the principle of sufficient\r\nreason finds its application cannot therefore be reduced\r\nto logical reason and consequence and to cause and effect,\r\nthe law of specification cannot have been sufficiently attended\r\nto in this classification. The law of homogeneity,\r\nhowever, obliges us to assume, that these cases cannot differ\r\nto infinity, but that they may be reduced to certain species.\r\nNow, before attempting this classification, it will be necessary\r\nto determine what is peculiar to the principle of sufficient\r\nreason in all cases, as its special characteristic; because\r\nthe conception of the genus must always be determined\r\nbefore the conception of the species.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg030\"\u003e[30]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 16. \u003ci\u003eThe Roots of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eOur knowing consciousness, which manifests itself as outer\r\nand inner Sensibility\u003c/em\u003e (or receptivity) \u003cem\u003eand as Understanding\r\nand Reason, subdivides itself into Subject and Object and\r\ncontains nothing else. To be Object for the Subject and to be\r\nour representation, are the same thing. All our representations\r\nstand towards one another in a regulated connection,\r\nwhich may be determined\u003c/em\u003e \u003csmall\u003eÀ PRIORI\u003c/small\u003e, \u003cem\u003eand on account of which,\r\nnothing existing separately and independently, nothing single\r\nor detached, can become an Object for us\u003c/em\u003e. It is this connection\r\nwhich is expressed by the Principle of Sufficient\r\nReason in its generality. Now, although, as may be\r\ngathered from what has gone before, this connection\r\nassumes different forms according to the different kinds of\r\nobjects, which forms are differently expressed by the Principle\r\nof Sufficient Reason; still the connection retains what\r\nis common to all these forms, and this is expressed in a\r\ngeneral and abstract way by our principle. The relations\r\nupon which it is founded, and which will be more closely\r\nindicated in this treatise, are what I call the Root of the\r\nPrinciple of Sufficient Reason. Now, on closer inspection,\r\naccording to the laws of homogeneity and of specification,\r\nthese relations separate into distinct species, which differ\r\nwidely from each other. Their number, however, may be\r\nreduced to \u003cem\u003efour\u003c/em\u003e, according to the \u003cem\u003efour\u003c/em\u003e classes into which\r\neverything that can become an object for us—that is to say,\r\nall our representations—may be divided. These classes will\r\nbe stated and considered in the following four chapters.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe shall see the Principle of Sufficient Reason appear\r\nunder a different form in each of them; but it will also\r\nshow itself under all as the same principle and as derived\r\nfrom the said root, precisely because it admits of being\r\nexpressed as above.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg031\"\u003e[31]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eCHAPTER IV.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eON THE FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT, AND\r\nTHAT FORM OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON\r\nWHICH PREDOMINATES IN IT.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 17. \u003ci\u003eGeneral Account of this Class of Objects.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first class of objects possible to our representative\r\nfaculty, is that of \u003cem\u003eintuitive, complete, empirical\u003c/em\u003e representations.\r\nThey are \u003cem\u003eintuitive\u003c/em\u003e as opposed to mere thoughts,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e abstract conceptions; they are \u003cem\u003ecomplete\u003c/em\u003e, inasmuch as,\r\naccording to Kant\u0027s distinction, they not only contain the\r\nformal, but also the material part of phenomena; and they\r\nare \u003cem\u003eempirical\u003c/em\u003e, partly as proceeding, not from a mere connection\r\nof thoughts, but from an excitation of feeling in\r\nour sensitive organism, as their origin, to which they constantly\r\nrefer for evidence as to their reality: partly also\r\nbecause they are linked together, according to the united\r\nlaws of Space, Time and Causality, in that complex without\r\nbeginning or end which forms our \u003cem\u003eEmpirical Reality\u003c/em\u003e. As,\r\nnevertheless, according to the result of Kant\u0027s teaching,\r\nthis \u003cem\u003eEmpirical Reality\u003c/em\u003e does not annul their \u003cem\u003eTranscendental\r\nIdeality\u003c/em\u003e, we shall consider them here, where we have only\r\nto do with the formal elements of knowledge, merely as\r\nrepresentations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 18. \u003ci\u003eOutline of a Transcendental Analysis of Empirical\r\nReality.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe forms of these representations are those of the inner\r\nand outer sense; namely, \u003cem\u003eTime\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eSpace\u003c/em\u003e. But these are\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg032\"\u003e[32]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nonly \u003cem\u003eperceptible\u003c/em\u003e when \u003cem\u003efilled\u003c/em\u003e. Their \u003cem\u003eperceptibility\u003c/em\u003e is \u003cem\u003eMatter\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nto which I shall return further on, and again in § 21. \u003cem\u003eIf\r\nTime were the only form\u003c/em\u003e of these representations, there\r\ncould be no \u003cem\u003ecoexistence\u003c/em\u003e, therefore nothing \u003cem\u003epermanent\u003c/em\u003e and\r\nno \u003cem\u003eduration\u003c/em\u003e. For \u003cem\u003eTime\u003c/em\u003e is only perceived when filled, and\r\nits course is only perceived by the \u003cem\u003echanges\u003c/em\u003e which take place\r\nin that which fills it. The \u003cem\u003epermanence\u003c/em\u003e of an object is\r\ntherefore only recognized by contrast with the \u003cem\u003echanges\u003c/em\u003e going\r\non in other objects \u003cem\u003ecoexistent\u003c/em\u003e with it. But the representation\r\nof \u003cem\u003ecoexistence\u003c/em\u003e is impossible in Time alone; it depends,\r\nfor its completion, upon the representation of \u003cem\u003eSpace\u003c/em\u003e;\r\nbecause, in mere Time, all things \u003cem\u003efollow one another\u003c/em\u003e, and\r\nin mere Space all things are \u003cem\u003eside by side\u003c/em\u003e; it is accordingly\r\nonly by the combination of Time and Space that the representation\r\nof coexistence arises.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eOn the other hand, were Space the sole form\u003c/em\u003e of this class\r\nof representations, there would be no \u003cem\u003echange\u003c/em\u003e; for change\r\nor alteration is \u003cem\u003esuccession\u003c/em\u003e of states, and \u003cem\u003esuccession\u003c/em\u003e is only\r\npossible in \u003cem\u003eTime\u003c/em\u003e. We may therefore define Time as the\r\npossibility of opposite states in one and the same thing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus we see, that although infinite divisibility and infinite\r\nextension are common to both Time and Space, these\r\ntwo forms of empirical representations differ fundamentally,\r\ninasmuch as what is essential to the \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e is without\r\nany meaning at all for the \u003cem\u003eother\u003c/em\u003e: juxtaposition having no\r\nmeaning in Time, succession no meaning in Space. The\r\nempirical representations which belong to the orderly complex\r\nof reality, appear notwithstanding in both forms together;\r\nnay, the \u003cem\u003eintimate union\u003c/em\u003e of both is the condition of\r\nreality which, in a sense, grows out of them, as a product\r\ngrows out of its factors. Now it is the Understanding\r\nwhich, by means of its own peculiar function, brings about\r\nthis \u003cem\u003eunion\u003c/em\u003e and connects these heterogeneous forms in such\r\na manner, that \u003cem\u003eempirical reality\u003c/em\u003e—albeit only for that\r\nUnderstanding—arises out of their mutual interpenetration,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg033\"\u003e[33]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand arises as a collective representation, forming a\r\ncomplex, held together by the forms of the principle\r\nof sufficient reason, but whose limits are problematical.\r\nEach single representation belonging to this class is a part\r\nof this complex, each one taking its place in it according\r\nto laws known to us \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e; in it therefore countless\r\nobjects \u003cem\u003ecoexist\u003c/em\u003e, because Substance, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e Matter, remains\r\npermanent in spite of the ceaseless flow of Time, and because\r\nits states change in spite of the rigid immobility of\r\nSpace. In this complex, in short, the whole objective, real\r\nworld exists for us. The reader who may be interested in\r\nthis, will find the present rough sketch of the analysis of\r\nempirical reality further worked out in § 4 of the first\r\nvolume of \"Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_55\" title=\"Vol. i. p. 12, and seqq. of the 1st edition; p. 9 of the 3rd edition.\" id=\"FNanchor_55\"\u003e[55]\u003c/a\u003e where\r\na closer explanation is given of the way in which the Understanding\r\neffects this union and thus creates for itself\r\nthe empirical world. He will also find a very important\r\nhelp in the table, \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ePrædicabilia à priori\u003c/i\u003e of Time, Space, and\r\nMatter,\" which is added to the fourth chapter of the second\r\nvolume of the same work, and which I recommend to his\r\nattention, as it especially shows how the contrasts of Time\r\nand Space are equally balanced in Matter, as their product,\r\nunder the form of Causality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe shall now proceed to give a detailed exposition of\r\nthat function of the Understanding which is the basis of\r\nempirical reality; only we must first, by a few incidental\r\nexplanations, remove the more immediate objections which\r\nthe fundamental idealism of the view I have adopted might\r\nencounter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg034\"\u003e[34]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 19. \u003ci\u003eImmediate Presence of Representations.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow as, notwithstanding this union through the Understanding\r\nof the forms of the inner and outer sense in representing\r\nMatter and with it a permanent outer world, all\r\n\u003cem\u003eimmediate\u003c/em\u003e knowledge is nevertheless acquired by the Subject\r\nthrough the \u003cem\u003einner\u003c/em\u003e sense alone—the outer sense being again\r\nObject for the inner, which in its turn perceives the perceptions\r\nof the outer—and as therefore, with respect to the\r\n\u003cem\u003eimmediate presence\u003c/em\u003e of representations in its consciousness,\r\nthe Subject remains under the rule of \u003cem\u003eTime\u003c/em\u003e alone, as the\r\nform of the \u003cem\u003einner sense\u003c/em\u003e:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_56\" title=\"Compare Kant, \u0027Krit. d. r. Vern.\u0027 Elementarlehre. Abschnitt ii. Schlüsse a. d. Begr. b and c. 1st edition, pp. 33 and 34; 5th edition, p. 49. (Transl. M. Müller, p. 29, b and c.)\" id=\"FNanchor_56\"\u003e[56]\u003c/a\u003e it follows, that only one representation\r\ncan be present to it (the Subject) at the same time,\r\nalthough that one may be very complicated. When we\r\nspeak of representations as \u003cem\u003eimmediately present\u003c/em\u003e, we mean,\r\nthat they are not only known in the union of Time and Space\r\neffected by the Understanding—an intuitive faculty, as we\r\nshall soon see—through which the collective representation\r\nof empirical reality arises, but that they are known in\r\nmere Time alone, as representations of the inner sense, and\r\njust at the neutral point at which its two currents separate,\r\ncalled the \u003cem\u003epresent\u003c/em\u003e. The necessary condition mentioned\r\nin the preceding paragraph for the immediate presence\r\nof a representation of this class, is its causal action\r\nupon our senses and consequently upon our organism,\r\nwhich itself belongs to this class of objects, and is therefore\r\nsubject to the causal law which predominates in it\r\nand which we are now about to examine. Now as therefore,\r\non the one hand, according to the laws of the inner and outer\r\nworld, the Subject cannot stop short at that one representation;\r\nbut as, on the other hand, there is no coexistence\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg035\"\u003e[35]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin Time alone: that single representation must always\r\nvanish and be superseded by others, in virtue of a law\r\nwhich we cannot determine \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e, but which depends\r\nupon circumstances soon to be mentioned. It is moreover\r\na well-known fact, that the imagination and dreams reproduce\r\nthe immediate presence of representations; the investigation\r\nof that fact, however, belongs to empirical Psychology.\r\nNow as, notwithstanding the transitory, isolated\r\nnature of our representations with respect to their immediate\r\npresence in our consciousness, the Subject nevertheless\r\nretains the representation of an all-comprehensive complex\r\nof reality, as described above, by means of the function of\r\nthe Understanding; representations have, on the strength\r\nof this antithesis, been viewed, as something quite different\r\nwhen considered as belonging to that complex\r\nthan when considered with reference to their immediate\r\npresence in our consciousness. From the former point\r\nof view they were called \u003cem\u003ereal things\u003c/em\u003e; from the latter\r\nonly, representations κατ\u0027 ἐξοχήν. This view of the matter,\r\nwhich is the ordinary one, is known under the name of\r\n\u003cem\u003eRealism\u003c/em\u003e. On the appearance of modern philosophy,\r\n\u003cem\u003eIdealism\u003c/em\u003e opposed itself to this \u003cem\u003eRealism\u003c/em\u003e and has since been\r\nsteadily gaining ground. Malebranche and Berkeley were\r\nits earliest representatives, and Kant enhanced it to the\r\npower of Transcendental Idealism, by which the co-existence\r\nof the Empirical Reality of things with their Transcendental\r\nIdeality becomes conceivable, and according to\r\nwhich Kant expresses himself as follows:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_57\" title=\"Kant, \u0027Krit. d. r. V.\u0027 Kritik des Vierten Paralogismus der transcendentalen Psychologie, p. 369, 1st edition. (Engl. Transl. by M. Müller, p 320.)\" id=\"FNanchor_57\"\u003e[57]\u003c/a\u003e \"\u003cem\u003eTranscendental\r\nIdealism\u003c/em\u003e teaches that all phenomena are representations\r\nonly, not things by themselves.\" And again:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_58\" title=\"Ibid. 1st edition, pp. 374-375. Note. (Engl. Transl. p. 325. Note.)\" id=\"FNanchor_58\"\u003e[58]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg036\"\u003e[36]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\"Space itself is nothing but mere representation, and whatever\r\nis in it must therefore be contained in that representation.\r\nThere is nothing whatever in Space, except so far\r\nas it is really represented in it.\" Finally he says:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_59\" title=\"Kant, \u0027Krit. d. r. V.\u0027 \u0027Betrachtung über die Summe,\u0027 \u0026amp;c., p. 383 of 1st edition. (Engl. Transl. p. 331.)\" id=\"FNanchor_59\"\u003e[59]\u003c/a\u003e \"If we\r\ntake away the thinking Subject, the whole material world\r\nmust vanish; because it is nothing but a phenomenon in the\r\nsensibility of our own subject and a certain class of its representations.\"\r\nIn India, Idealism is even a doctrine of popular\r\nreligion, not only of Brahminism, but of Buddhism; in\r\nEurope alone is it a paradox, in consequence of the essentially\r\nand unavoidably realistic principle of Judaism. But\r\nRealism quite overlooks the fact, that the so-called existence\r\nof these real things is \u003cem\u003eabsolutely nothing but their\r\nbeing represented\u003c/em\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eein Vorgestellt-werden\u003c/i\u003e), or—if it be insisted,\r\nthat only the immediate presence in the consciousness\r\nof the Subject can be called being represented κατ\u0027\r\nἐντελέχειαν—it is even only a possibility of being represented\r\nκατὰ δύναμιν. The realist forgets that the Object ceases to\r\nbe Object apart from its reference to the Subject, and that\r\nif we take away that reference, or think it away, we at\r\nonce do away with all objective existence. Leibnitz, while\r\nhe clearly felt the Subject to be the necessary condition for\r\nthe Object, was nevertheless unable to get rid of the\r\nthought that objects exist by themselves and independently\r\nof all reference whatsoever to the Subject, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e independently\r\nof being represented. He therefore assumed in the\r\nfirst place a world of objects exactly like the world of\r\nrepresentations and running parallel with it, having no\r\ndirect, but only an outward connection with it by means\r\nof a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eharmonia præstabilita\u003c/i\u003e;—obviously the most superfluous\r\nthing possible, for it never comes within perception,\r\nand the precisely similar world of representations which\r\ndoes come within perception, goes its own way regardless\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg037\"\u003e[37]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof it. When, however, he wanted to determine more closely\r\nthe essence of these things existing objectively in themselves,\r\nhe found himself obliged to declare the Objects in\r\nthemselves to be Subjects (\u003cem\u003emonades\u003c/em\u003e), and by doing so he\r\nfurnished the most striking proof of the inability of our\r\nconsciousness, in as far as it is merely cognitive, to find\r\nwithin the limits of the intellect—\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e of the apparatus by\r\nmeans of which we represent the world—anything beyond\r\nSubject and Object; the representer and the represented.\r\nTherefore, if we abstract from the objectivity of an Object,\r\nor in other words, from its being represented (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eVorgestellt-werden\u003c/i\u003e),\r\nif we annul it in its quality as an Object, yet still\r\nwish to retain something, we can meet with nothing but\r\n\u003cem\u003ethe Subject\u003c/em\u003e. Conversely, if we desire to abstract from the\r\nsubjectivity of the Subject, yet to have something over,\r\nthe contrary takes place, and this leads to Materialism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSpinoza, who never thoroughly sifted the matter, and\r\nnever therefore acquired a clear notion of it, nevertheless\r\nquite understood the necessary correlation between Subject\r\nand Object as so essential, that they are inconceivable\r\nwithout it; consequently he defined it as an identity in the\r\nSubstance (which alone exists) of that which knows, with\r\nthat which has extension.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"block\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eObservation.\u003c/span\u003e—With reference to the chief argument of this paragraph,\r\nI take the opportunity to remark that if, in the course of this\r\ntreatise, for the sake of brevity and in order to be more easily understood,\r\nI at any time use the term \u003cem\u003ereal objects\u003c/em\u003e, I mean by it nothing\r\nbut the intuitive representations that are united to form the complex of\r\nempirical reality, which reality in itself always remains ideal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 20. \u003ci\u003ePrinciple of Sufficient Reason of Becoming.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the Class of Objects for the Subject just described, the\r\nprinciple of sufficient reason figures as the \u003cem\u003eLaw of Causality\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nand, as such, I call it the \u003cem\u003ePrinciple of Sufficient Reason\r\nof Becoming, principium rationis sufficientis fiendi\u003c/em\u003e. By it,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg038\"\u003e[38]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nall objects presenting themselves within the entire range\r\nof our representation are linked together, as far as the\r\nappearance and disappearance of their states is concerned,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e in the movement of the current of Time, to form the\r\ncomplex of empirical reality. The law of causality is as\r\nfollows. When one or several real objects pass into any\r\nnew state, some other state must have preceded this one,\r\nupon which the new state regularly follows, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e as often as\r\nthat preceding one occurs. This sort of following we call\r\n\u003cem\u003eresulting\u003c/em\u003e; the first of the states being named a \u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e, the\r\nsecond an \u003cem\u003eeffect\u003c/em\u003e. When a substance takes fire, for instance,\r\nthis state of ignition must have been preceded by a state,\r\n1\u003csup\u003eo\u003c/sup\u003e, of affinity to oxygen; 2\u003csup\u003eo\u003c/sup\u003e, of contact with oxygen;\r\n3\u003csup\u003eo\u003c/sup\u003e, of a given temperature. Now, as ignition must necessarily\r\nfollow immediately upon this state, and as it has\r\nonly just taken place, that state cannot always have been\r\nthere, but must, on the contrary, have only just supervened.\r\nThis supervening is called a \u003cem\u003echange\u003c/em\u003e. It is on this account\r\nthat the law of causality stands in exclusive relation to\r\n\u003cem\u003echanges\u003c/em\u003e and has to do with them alone. Every effect, at the\r\ntime it takes place, is a \u003cem\u003echange\u003c/em\u003e and, precisely by not having\r\noccurred sooner, infallibly indicates some other \u003cem\u003echange\u003c/em\u003e by\r\nwhich it has been preceded. That other \u003cem\u003echange\u003c/em\u003e takes the\r\nname of \u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e, when referred to the following one—of\r\n\u003cem\u003eeffect\u003c/em\u003e, when referred to a third necessarily preceding \u003cem\u003echange\u003c/em\u003e.\r\nThis is the chain of causality. It is necessarily without a\r\nbeginning. By it, each supervening state must have resulted\r\nfrom a preceding change: in the case just mentioned,\r\nfor instance, from the substance being brought into\r\ncontact with free heat, from which necessarily resulted the\r\nheightened temperature; this contact again depended\r\nupon a preceding change, for instance the sun\u0027s rays falling\r\nupon a burning-glass; this again upon the removal of a\r\ncloud from before the sun; this upon the wind; the wind\r\nupon the unequal density of the atmosphere; this upon\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg039\"\u003e[39]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nother conditions, and so forth \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein infinitum\u003c/i\u003e. When a state\r\ncontains all the requisite conditions for bringing about a\r\nnew state excepting \u003cem\u003eone, this one\u003c/em\u003e, when at last it arrives, is,\r\nin a sense, rightly called the cause κατ\u0027 ἐξοχήν, inasmuch\r\nas we here have the final—in this case the decisive—change\r\nespecially in view; but if we leave out this consideration,\r\nno single condition of the causal state has any advantage\r\nover the rest with reference to the determination of the\r\ncausal connection in general, merely because it happens to\r\nbe the last. Thus the removal of the cloud in the above\r\nexample, is in so far the cause of the igniting, as it took\r\nplace later than the direction of the burning-glass towards\r\nthe object; but this might have taken place after the\r\nremoval of the cloud and the addition of oxygen might\r\nhave occurred later still: in this respect therefore it is the\r\naccidental order of things that determines which is the\r\ncause. On closer inspection, however, we find that it is\r\n\u003cem\u003ethe entire state\u003c/em\u003e which is the cause of the ensuing one,\r\nso that the chronological order in which its single conditions\r\nwere brought about, is in all essential respects\r\nindifferent. With reference to a given case therefore, the\r\nlast occurring condition of a state may be called the cause\r\nκατ\u0027 ἐξοχήν, because it completes the measure of the necessary\r\nconditions, and its appearance thus becomes the decisive\r\nchange. For purposes of general consideration, however,\r\nit is only the \u003cem\u003eentire\u003c/em\u003e state which, by bringing about its successor,\r\ncan be regarded as the cause. The single requisites\r\nwhich, added together, complete and constitute the cause\r\nmay be called causal elements (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eursächliche Momente\u003c/i\u003e) or even\r\n\u003cem\u003econditions\u003c/em\u003e, and into these accordingly the cause may be\r\nsubdivided. On the other hand, it is quite wrong to call\r\nthe objects themselves causes, instead of the states: some\r\nwould, for instance, call the burning-glass in the above\r\nexample the cause of the ignition; while others, again,\r\nwould call the cloud the cause; others the sun or the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg040\"\u003e[40]\u003c/span\u003e\r\noxygen, and so on arbitrarily and without order. But it is\r\nabsurd to call an object the cause of another object; first of\r\nall, because objects not only contain form and quality, but\r\n\u003cem\u003eMatter\u003c/em\u003e also, which has neither beginning or end; secondly,\r\nbecause the law of causality refers exclusively to \u003cem\u003echanges\u003c/em\u003e,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e to the entrance and exit of states in Time, wherein it\r\nregulates that special relation, in reference to which the\r\nearlier state is called \u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e, the later \u003cem\u003eeffect\u003c/em\u003e, and the necessary\r\nconnection between both, the \u003cem\u003eresulting\u003c/em\u003e of the one\r\nfrom the other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI here refer the thoughtful reader to the explanations I\r\nhave given in my chief work.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_60\" title=\"\u0027Die Welt a. W. u. V.\u0027 vol. ii. chap. 4, especially p. 42 and seq. of the 2nd edition; p. 46 seq. of the 3rd edition.\" id=\"FNanchor_60\"\u003e[60]\u003c/a\u003e For it is of the highest importance\r\nthat our conception of the true and proper meaning\r\nof the law of causality and the sphere of its validity\r\nshould be perfectly clear and definite: before all things,\r\nthat we should recognize, that this law refers solely and\r\nexclusively to \u003cem\u003echanges\u003c/em\u003e of material states and to nothing\r\nelse whatever; consequently, that it ought not to be\r\nbrought in when \u003cem\u003ethese\u003c/em\u003e are not in question. The law of\r\ncausality is the regulator of the \u003cem\u003echanges\u003c/em\u003e undergone in\r\nTime by objects of our outer \u003cem\u003eexperience\u003c/em\u003e; but these objects\r\nare all material. Each change can only be brought about\r\nby another having preceded it, which is determined by a\r\nrule, and then the new change takes place as being necessarily\r\ninduced by the preceding one. This necessity is the\r\ncausal nexus.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHowever simple therefore the law of causality is, we\r\nnevertheless find it expressed quite differently in all philosophical\r\nmanuals, from the earliest down to the latest\r\nages: namely, in a broader, more abstract, therefore less\r\ndefinite way. We are, for instance, informed, now, that it\r\nis that by which something else comes into being; now,\r\nthat it is what produces another thing or gives it reality,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg041\"\u003e[41]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c. Wolf says: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eCausa est principium, a quo existentia,\r\nsive actualitas, entis alterius dependet\u003c/i\u003e; whereas it is\r\nobvious that in causality we have only to do with changes\r\nin the form of uncreated, indestructible Matter, and that\r\na springing into existence of what did not previously exist\r\nis an impossibility. Want of clearness of thought may, no\r\ndoubt, in most cases have led to these views of the causal\r\nrelation; but surely sometimes an \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003earrière-pensée\u003c/i\u003e lurks in\r\nthe background—a theological intention coqueting with\r\nthe Cosmological Proof, for whose sake it is ready to\r\nfalsify even transcendental, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e truths, the mother\u0027s\r\nmilk of human understanding. We find the clearest\r\ninstance of this in Thomas Brown\u0027s book, \"On the Relation\r\nof Cause and Effect,\" a work of 460 pages, which, in\r\n1835, had already reached its fourth edition, and has probably\r\nsince gone through several more, and which, in spite\r\nof its wearisome, pedantic, rambling prolixity, does not\r\nhandle the subject badly. Now this Englishman rightly\r\nrecognises, that it is invariably with \u003cem\u003echanges\u003c/em\u003e that the\r\ncausal law has to do, and that every effect is accordingly a\r\n\u003cem\u003echange\u003c/em\u003e. Yet, although it can hardly have escaped him, he\r\nis unwilling to admit that every cause is likewise a \u003cem\u003echange\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nand that the whole process is therefore nothing but the\r\nuninterrupted nexus of \u003cem\u003echanges\u003c/em\u003e succeeding one another in\r\nTime. On the contrary, he persists in clumsily calling the\r\ncause an \u003cem\u003eobject\u003c/em\u003e or \u003cem\u003esubstance\u003c/em\u003e, which precedes the change,\r\nand in tormenting himself throughout his tedious book\r\nwith this entirely false expression, which spoils all his\r\nexplanations, notwithstanding his own better knowledge\r\nand against his conscience, simply in order that his definition\r\nmay on no account stand in the way of the Cosmological\r\nProof, which others might hereafter state elsewhere.—But\r\nwhat can a truth be worth which needs devices such\r\nas these to prepare its way?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd what have our own worthy, honest German professors\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg042\"\u003e[42]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof philosophy been doing in behalf of their dearly\r\nbeloved Cosmological Proof, since Kant dealt it the death-blow\r\nin his Critique of Pure Reason?—they, who prize\r\ntruth above everything. They were, indeed, at their wits\u0027\r\nends, for—as these worthies well know, though they do not\r\nsay so—\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecausa prima\u003c/i\u003e is, just as well as \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecausa sui\u003c/i\u003e, a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003econtradictio\r\nin adjecto\u003c/i\u003e, albeit the former expression is more\r\ngenerally used than the latter. It is besides usually\r\npronounced with a very serious, not to say solemn,\r\nair; nay, many people, especially English Reverends, turn\r\nup their eyes in a truly edifying way when they impressively\r\nand emphatically mention that \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003econtradictio in\r\nadjecto\u003c/i\u003e: \u0027the first cause.\u0027 They know that a first cause\r\nis just as inconceivable as the point at which Space\r\nends or the moment when Time first began. For every\r\ncause is a \u003cem\u003echange\u003c/em\u003e, which necessarily obliges us to ask for\r\nthe preceding change that brought it about, and so on \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein\r\ninfinitum, in infinitum\u003c/i\u003e! Even a first state of Matter, from\r\nwhich, as it has ceased to be, all following states could\r\nhave proceeded, is inconceivable. For if this state had in\r\nitself been the cause of the following ones, they must likewise\r\nhave existed from all eternity, and the actual state\r\nexisting at the present moment could not have only just\r\nnow come into being. If, on the other hand, that first\r\nstate only began to be causal at some given period, something\r\nor other must have \u003cem\u003echanged\u003c/em\u003e it, for its inactivity to\r\nhave ceased; but then something must have occurred,\r\nsome change must have taken place; and this again\r\nobliges us to ask for its cause—\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e a change which preceded\r\nit; and here we are once more on the causal ladder,\r\nup which we are whipped step by step, higher and higher,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein infinitum, in infinitum\u003c/i\u003e! (These gentlemen will surely\r\nnot have the face to talk to me of Matter itself arising out\r\nof nothing! If so, they will find corollaries at their service\r\nfurther on.) The causal law therefore is not so accommodating\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg043\"\u003e[43]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas to let itself be used like a hired cab,\r\nwhich we dismiss when we have reached our destination;\r\nrather does it resemble the broom brought to life by the\r\napprentice-wizard in Göthe\u0027s poem,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_61\" title=\"Göthe, \u0027Der Zauberlehrling.\u0027\" id=\"FNanchor_61\"\u003e[61]\u003c/a\u003e which, when once set\r\nin motion, does not leave off running and fetching water\r\nuntil the old master-wizard himself stops it, which he\r\nalone has the power to do. These gentlemen, however,\r\nhave no master-wizards among them. So what did they\r\ndo, these noble, genuine lovers of truth, ever on the alert,\r\nof course, to proclaim the advent of real merit to the\r\nworld as soon as it shows itself in their profession, who\r\nfar from wishing to divert attention from the works of\r\nthose who are really what \u003cem\u003ethey\u003c/em\u003e only seem to be, by craftily\r\nignoring and meanly keeping them dark, are naturally\r\nforemost to acknowledge their worth—aye, surely, as surely\r\nas folly loves wisdom above everything? What did they\r\ndo, I say, to help their old friend, the sorely distressed\r\nCosmological Proof, now at its last gasp? Oh, they hit\r\nupon a shrewd device. \"Friend,\" they said, \"you are in\r\nsorry plight since your fatal encounter with that stubborn\r\nold man in Königsberg, and indeed your brethren, the Ontological\r\nand Physico-theological Proofs are in no better\r\ncondition. Never mind, you shall not be abandoned by\r\nus (that is what we are paid for, you know); only you\r\nmust alter your dress and your name—there is no help\r\nfor it—for if we call you by your right name, everyone\r\nwill take to his heels. Now \u003cem\u003eincognito\u003c/em\u003e, on the contrary,\r\nwe can take you by the arm, and once more lead you into\r\nsociety; only, as we have just said, it must be \u003cem\u003eincognito\u003c/em\u003e!\r\nThat is sure to answer! First of all, your argument must\r\nhenceforth be called \u003cem\u003eThe Absolute\u003c/em\u003e. This has a foreign,\r\ndignified, aristocratic ring; and no one knows better than\r\nwe do all that can be done with Germans by assuming airs\r\nof importance. Of course all know what the real meaning\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg044\"\u003e[44]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis, and pique themselves upon that knowledge. But you\r\nyourself must come forward disguised, in the form of an\r\nenthymeme. Be sure and leave behind you all those prosyllogisms\r\nand premisses, by which you used to drag us\r\nwearily up the long climax, for everyone knows how utterly\r\nuseless they are. Come forward with a bold face and a\r\nself-sufficient, supercilious air, like a man of few words,\r\nand at one bound you will reach the goal. Exclaim (and\r\nwe will chime in), \u0027\u003cem\u003eThe Absolute\u003c/em\u003e, confound it! \u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e must\r\n\u003cem\u003eexist\u003c/em\u003e, or there would be nothing at all!\u0027 Here, strike\r\nthe table with your fist. Whence does the Absolute\r\ncome? \u0027What a silly question! Did not I tell you\r\nit was the Absolute?\u0027—That will do, forsooth! That\r\nwill do! Germans are accustomed to content themselves\r\nwith words instead of thoughts. Do we not train them\r\nto it from their cradle? Only look at Hegelianism!\r\nWhat is it but empty, hollow, nauseous twaddle! Yet\r\nhow brilliant a career was that of this philosophical\r\ntime-server! A few mercenary individuals had only to\r\nstrike up a laudation of this stuff, and they at once\r\nfound an echo to their voices in the empty hollow of a\r\nthousand numskulls—an echo which still continues to resound,\r\nand to extend—and behold! an ordinary intellect,\r\na common impostor soon became a sublime thinker. Take\r\nheart, therefore! Besides, our friend and patron, we will\r\nalso second you in other ways, for how, indeed, are we to\r\nget a living without you? So that carping old faultfinder,\r\nKant, has been criticizing Reason, and clipping her wings,\r\nhas he? Well, then, we will invent a \u003cem\u003enew\u003c/em\u003e sort of Reason,\r\nsuch as has never been heard of—a Reason that does not\r\nthink, but which has direct intuition—a Reason which sees\r\nIdeas (a high-flown word, made to mystify), sees them\r\nbodily; or which apprehends directly that which you and\r\nothers seek to prove; or, again, a Reason which has\r\nforebodings of all this—this last for the benefit of those\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg045\"\u003e[45]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwho do not care to make large concessions, but also are\r\nsatisfied with very little. Let us thus pass off early inculcated,\r\npopular conceptions for direct revelations of this\r\nnew kind of Reason, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e for inspirations from above. As\r\nfor that old-fashioned Reason, which criticism has criticized\r\naway, let us degrade it, call it Understanding, and\r\nsend it about its business. Well, and what is to become\r\nof real, true Understanding?—What in the world have\r\nwe to do with real, true Understanding?—You smile incredulously;\r\nbut we know our listeners, and the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eharum\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ehorum\u003c/i\u003e we see on the students\u0027 benches before us. Bacon\r\nof Verulam already in his time said: \u0027Young men learn to\r\nbelieve at Universities.\u0027 Of this they can learn as much as\r\nthey wish from us; we have a good stock of articles of\r\nfaith on hand. Should any misgivings assail you, remember\r\nthat we are in Germany, where what would have\r\nbeen impossible in any other country, has been found\r\npossible: where a dull-witted, ignorant, pseudo-philosopher,\r\nwhose ineffably hollow verbiage disorganizes peoples\u0027\r\nbrains completely and permanently, a scribbler of nonsense—I\r\nam speaking of our dearly beloved Hegel—has\r\nnot only been actually proclaimed a profound thinker with\r\nimpunity, and even without incurring ridicule, but is\r\nreadily accepted as such: yes, indeed, for this fiction has\r\nfound credence for the last thirty years, and is believed to\r\nthis day!—Once therefore we have this Absolute with\r\nyour help, we are quite safe, in spite of Kant and his\r\nCritique.—We may then philosophise in a lofty tone,\r\nmaking the Universe proceed from \u003cem\u003ethe Absolute\u003c/em\u003e by means\r\nof the most heterogeneous deductions, one more tiresome\r\nthan the other—this, by the way, being their only point of\r\nresemblance. We can call the world the Finite, and the\r\nAbsolute the Infinite—thus giving an agreeable variety to\r\nour nonsense—and talk of nothing but God, explaining\r\nhow, why, wherefore, by what voluntary or involuntary\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg046\"\u003e[46]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nprocess he created or brought forth the world, showing\r\nwhether he be within or without it, and so forth, as if\r\nPhilosophy were Theology, and as if it sought for enlightenment\r\nconcerning God, not concerning the Universe!\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Cosmological Proof, with which we here have to do,\r\nand to which the above apostrophe is addressed, consists\r\nthus, properly speaking, in the assertion, that the principle\r\nof the sufficient reason of \u003cem\u003ebecoming\u003c/em\u003e, or the law of causality,\r\nnecessarily leads to a thought which destroys it and declares\r\nit to be null and void. For the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecausa prima\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eabsolutum\u003c/i\u003e)\r\ncan only be reached by proceeding upwards from consequence\r\nto reason, through a series prolonged \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ead libitum\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nbut it is impossible to stop short at the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecausa prima\u003c/i\u003e without\r\nat once annulling the principle of sufficient reason.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHaving thus briefly and clearly shown the nullity of the\r\nCosmological Proof, as I had in my second chapter already\r\nshown the nullity of the Ontological Proof, the sympathizing\r\nreader may perhaps expect me to do the same with\r\nrespect to the Physico-theological Proof, which is a great\r\ndeal more plausible. As, however, this belongs by its\r\nnature to a different department of philosophy, it would\r\nbe quite out of place here. I therefore refer him to Kant\u0027s\r\nCritique of Pure Reason, as well as to his Critique of\r\nthe Faculty of Judgment, where he treats this subject \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eex\r\nprofesso\u003c/i\u003e; I likewise refer him, as a complement to Kant\u0027s\r\npurely negative procedure, to my own positive one in \"The\r\nWill in Nature,\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_62\" title=\"The translation of which follows the Fourfold Root in the present volume.\" id=\"FNanchor_62\"\u003e[62]\u003c/a\u003e a work which, though small in bulk, is\r\nrich and weighty in content. As for the indifferent reader,\r\nhe is free to let this and indeed all my writings pass down\r\nunread to his descendants. It matters not to me; for I am\r\nhere, not for one generation only, but for many.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, as the law of causality is known to us \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e, and is\r\ntherefore a transcendental law, applicable to every possible\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg047\"\u003e[47]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nexperience and consequently without exception, as will be\r\nshown in § 21; as moreover it decides, that upon a given,\r\ndefinite, relatively first state, a second equally definite one\r\ninevitably ensues by rule, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, always; the relation between\r\ncause and effect is a necessary one, so that the causal law\r\nauthorizes us to form hypothetical judgments, and thereby\r\nshows itself to be a form of the principle of sufficient\r\nreason, upon which principle all judgments must be founded\r\nand, as will be shown further on, all \u003cem\u003enecessity\u003c/em\u003e is based.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis form of our principle I call the \u003cem\u003eprinciple of the\r\nsufficient reason of becoming\u003c/em\u003e, because its application invariably\r\npre-supposes a change, the entering upon a new\r\nstate: consequently a becoming. One of its essential characteristics\r\nis this: that the cause always precedes the effect in\r\nTime (compare § 47), and this alone gives us the original\r\ncriterion by which to distinguish which is cause and which\r\neffect, of two states linked together by the causal nexus.\r\nConversely, in some cases, the causal nexus is known to us\r\nthrough former experience; but the rapidity with which\r\nthe different states follow upon each other is so great, that\r\nthe order in which this happens escapes our perception.\r\nWe then conclude with complete certitude from causality\r\nto succession: thus, for instance, we infer that the igniting\r\nof gunpowder precedes its explosion.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_63\" title=\"Here I refer my readers to \u0027Die Welt als Wills und Vorstellung,\u0027 vol. ii. chap. 4, p. 41 of the 2nd edition, and p. 45 of the 3rd edition.\" id=\"FNanchor_63\"\u003e[63]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom this essential connection between causality and\r\nsuccession it follows, that the conception of reciprocity,\r\nstrictly speaking, has no meaning; for it presumes the\r\neffect to be again the cause of its cause: that is, that\r\nwhat follows is at the same time what precedes. In a\r\n\"Critique of Kantian Philosophy,\" which I have added to\r\nmy chief work, and to which I refer my readers,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_64\" title=\"\u0027Die Welt a. W. u. V.\u0027 vol. i. pp. 517-521 of the 2nd edition, and pp. 544-549 of the 3rd edition.\" id=\"FNanchor_64\"\u003e[64]\u003c/a\u003e I have\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg048\"\u003e[48]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nshown at length that this favourite conception is inadmissible.\r\nIt may be remarked, that authors usually have recourse\r\nto it just when their insight is becoming less clear,\r\nand this accounts for the frequency of its use. Nay, it is\r\nprecisely when a writer comes to the end of his conceptions,\r\nthat the word \u0027\u003cem\u003ereciprocity\u003c/em\u003e\u0027 presents itself more readily\r\nthan any other; it may, in fact, be looked upon as a kind\r\nof alarm-gun, denoting that the author has got out of his\r\ndepth. It is also worthy of remark, that the word \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eWechselwirkung\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nliterally reciprocal action—or, as we have preferred\r\ntranslating it, \u003cem\u003ereciprocity\u003c/em\u003e—is only found in the\r\nGerman language, and that there is no precise equivalent\r\nfor it in daily use in any other tongue.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom the law of causality spring two corollaries which,\r\nin virtue of this origin, are accredited as cognitions \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e,\r\ntherefore as unquestionable and without exception. They\r\nare, \u003cem\u003ethe law of inertia\u003c/em\u003e and that \u003cem\u003eof permanence of substance\u003c/em\u003e.\r\nThe first of these laws avers, that every state in which a\r\nbody can possibly be—consequently that of repose as well\r\nas that of any kind of movement—must last for ever without\r\nchange, diminution, or augmentation, unless some cause\r\nsupervenes to alter or annul it. But the other law, by which\r\nthe eternity of Matter is affirmed, results from the fact, that\r\nthe law of causality is exclusively applicable to \u003cem\u003estates\u003c/em\u003e of\r\nbodies, such as repose, movement, form, and quality, since it\r\npresides over their temporal passing in or out of being; but\r\nthat it is by no means applicable to the existence of \u003cem\u003ethat which\r\nendures\u003c/em\u003e these states, and is called \u003cem\u003eSubstance\u003c/em\u003e, in order precisely\r\nto express its exemption from all arising and perishing.\r\n\u0027\u003cem\u003eSubstance is permanent\u003c/em\u003e\u0027 means, that it can neither pass\r\ninto, nor out of being: so that its quantity existing in the\r\nuniverse can neither be increased nor diminished. That\r\nwe know this \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e, is proved by the consciousness of\r\nunassailable certainty with which, when we see a body disappear—whether\r\nit be by conjuring, by minute subdivision,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg049\"\u003e[49]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nby combustion, volatilisation, or indeed any process whatever—we\r\nall nevertheless firmly assume that its substance,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e its \u003cem\u003ematter\u003c/em\u003e, must still exist somewhere or other\r\nin undiminished quantity, whatever may have become\r\nof its \u003cem\u003eform\u003c/em\u003e; likewise, when we perceive a body suddenly in\r\na place, where it was not before, that it must have been\r\nbrought there or formed by some combination of invisible\r\nparticles—for instance, by precipitation—but that it, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e\r\nits substance, cannot have then started into existence;\r\nfor this implies a total impossibility and is utterly inconceivable.\r\nThe certainty with which we assume this beforehand\r\n(\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e), proceeds from the fact, that our Understanding\r\npossesses absolutely no form under which to conceive\r\nthe beginning and end of Matter. For, as before said, the\r\nlaw of causality—the only form in which we are able to\r\nconceive changes at all—is solely applicable to \u003cem\u003estates\u003c/em\u003e of\r\nbodies, and never under any circumstances to the existence\r\nof \u003cem\u003ethat which undergoes\u003c/em\u003e all changes: \u003cem\u003eMatter\u003c/em\u003e. This is why I\r\nplace the principle of the permanence of Matter among the\r\ncorollaries of the causal law. Moreover, we cannot have\r\nacquired \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà posteriori\u003c/i\u003e the conviction that substance is permanent,\r\npartly because it cannot, in most instances, be\r\nempirically established; partly also, because every empirical\r\nknowledge obtained exclusively by means of induction,\r\nhas only approximate, consequently precarious, never\r\nunconditioned, certainty. The firmness of our persuasion as\r\nto this principle is therefore of a different kind and nature\r\nfrom our security of conviction with regard to the accuracy\r\nof any \u003cem\u003eempirically\u003c/em\u003e discovered law of Nature, since it has an\r\nentirely different, perfectly unshakable, never vacillating\r\nfirmness. The reason of this is, that the principle expresses\r\na \u003cem\u003etranscendental\u003c/em\u003e knowledge, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e one which determines\r\nand fixes, \u003cem\u003eprior\u003c/em\u003e to all experience, what is in any way\r\npossible within the whole range of experience; but, precisely\r\nby this, it reduces the world of experience to a mere\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg050\"\u003e[50]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncerebral phenomenon. Even the most universal among\r\nthe non-transcendental laws of Nature and the one least\r\nliable to exception—the law of gravitation—is of empirical\r\norigin, consequently without guarantee as to its absolute\r\nuniversality; wherefore it is still from time to time called\r\nin question, and doubts occasionally arise as to its validity\r\nbeyond our solar system; and astronomers carefully call\r\nattention to any indications corroborative of its doubtfulness\r\nwith which they may happen to meet, thereby showing\r\nthat they regard it as merely empirical. The question\r\nmay of course be raised, whether gravitation takes effect\r\nbetween bodies which are separated by an \u003cem\u003eabsolute\u003c/em\u003e vacuum,\r\nor whether its action within a solar system may not be\r\nmediated by some sort of ether, and may not cease altogether\r\nbetween fixed stars; but these questions only admit\r\nof an empirical solution, and this proves that here we have\r\nnot to do with a knowledge \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e. If, on the other hand,\r\nwe admit with Kant and Laplace the hypothesis, as the\r\nmost probable one, that each solar system has developed\r\nout of an original \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003enebula\u003c/i\u003e by a gradual process of condensation,\r\nwe still cannot for a moment conceive the possibility\r\nof that original substance having sprung into being\r\nout of \u003cem\u003enothing\u003c/em\u003e: we are forced to assume the anterior\r\nexistence of its particles somewhere or other, as well as\r\ntheir having been brought together somehow or other,\r\nprecisely because of the transcendental nature of the principle\r\nof the permanence of Substance. In my Critique\r\nof Kantian Philosophy,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_65\" title=\"\u0027Die Welt a. W. u. V.\u0027 vol. i. p. 550 of 2nd, and 580 of 3rd edition.\" id=\"FNanchor_65\"\u003e[65]\u003c/a\u003e I have shown at length, that\r\n\u003cem\u003eSubstance\u003c/em\u003e is but another word for \u003cem\u003eMatter\u003c/em\u003e, the conception of\r\nsubstance not being realisable excepting in \u003cem\u003eMatter\u003c/em\u003e, and\r\ntherefore deriving its origin from \u003cem\u003eMatter\u003c/em\u003e, and I have also\r\nspecially pointed out how that conception was formed\r\nsolely to serve a surreptitious purpose. Like many other\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg051\"\u003e[51]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nequally certain truths, this eternity of Matter (called the\r\npermanence of substance) is forbidden fruit for professors\r\nof philosophy; so they slip past it with a bashful, sidelong\r\nglance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy the endless chain of causes and effects which directs\r\nall \u003cem\u003echanges\u003c/em\u003e but never extends beyond them, two existing\r\nthings remain untouched, precisely because of the limited\r\nrange of its action: on the one hand, \u003cem\u003eMatter\u003c/em\u003e, as we have\r\njust shown; on the other hand, the primary \u003cem\u003eforces of\r\nNature\u003c/em\u003e. The first (matter) remains uninfluenced by the\r\ncausal nexus, because it is \u003cem\u003ethat which undergoes\u003c/em\u003e all changes,\r\nor \u003cem\u003eon which\u003c/em\u003e they take place; the second (the primary\r\nforces), because it is they alone \u003cem\u003eby which\u003c/em\u003e changes or effects\r\nbecome possible; for they alone give causality to causes.\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e the faculty of operating, which the causes therefore\r\nhold as mere vassals a fief. Cause and effect are \u003cem\u003echanges\u003c/em\u003e\r\nconnected together to necessary succession in Time;\r\nwhereas the forces of Nature by means of which all causes\r\noperate, are exempt from all change; in this sense therefore\r\nthey are outside Time, but precisely on that account\r\nthey are always and everywhere in reserve, omnipresent\r\nand inexhaustible, ever ready to manifest themselves, as\r\nsoon as an opportunity presents itself in the thread of\r\ncausality. A \u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e, like its \u003cem\u003eeffect\u003c/em\u003e, is invariably something\r\nindividual, a single change; whereas a force of Nature is\r\nsomething universal, unchangeable, present at all times\r\nand in all places. The attraction of a thread by amber,\r\nfor instance, at the present moment, is an effect; its cause\r\nis the preceding friction and actual contact of the amber\r\nwith the thread; and the \u003cem\u003eforce of Nature\u003c/em\u003e which acts in,\r\nand presides over, the process, is Electricity. The explanation\r\nof this matter is to be found in my chief work,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_66\" title=\"See \u0027Die Welt a. W. u. V.\u0027 vol. i. § 26, p. 153 of the 2nd, and p. 160 of the 3rd edition.\" id=\"FNanchor_66\"\u003e[66]\u003c/a\u003e and\r\nthere I have shown in a long chain of causes and effects\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg052\"\u003e[52]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhow the most heterogeneous natural forces successively\r\ncome into play in them. By this explanation the difference\r\nbetween transitory phenomena and permanent forms of\r\noperation, becomes exceedingly clear; and as, moreover, a\r\nwhole section (§ 26) is devoted to the question, it will be\r\nsufficient here to give a brief sketch of it. The \u003cem\u003erule\u003c/em\u003e, by\r\nwhich a force of Nature manifests itself in the chain of\r\ncauses and effects—consequently the link which connects it\r\nwith them—is the law of Nature. But the confusion\r\nbetween forces of Nature and causes is as frequent as it\r\nis detrimental to clearness of thought. It seems indeed\r\nas though no one had accurately defined the difference\r\nbetween these conceptions before me, however great may\r\nhave been the urgency for such a distinction. Not only\r\nare forces of Nature turned into causes by such expressions\r\nas, \u0027Electricity, Gravity, \u0026amp;c., are the \u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e of so-and-so,\u0027\r\nbut they are even often turned into effects by those who\r\nsearch for a cause for Electricity, Gravity, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c., which\r\nis absurd. Diminishing the number of the forces of Nature,\r\nhowever, by reducing one to another, as for instance\r\nMagnetism is in our days reduced to Electricity, is a\r\ntotally different thing. Every \u003cem\u003etrue\u003c/em\u003e, consequently really\r\nprimary force of Nature—and every fundamental chemical\r\nproperty belongs to these forces—is essentially a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003equalitas\r\nocculta\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e it does not admit of physical, but only of\r\nmetaphysical explanation: in other words, of an explanation\r\nwhich transcends the world of phenomena. No one has\r\ncarried this confusion, or rather identification, of causes\r\nwith forces of Nature further than Maine de Biran in his\r\n\"Nouvelles considérations des rapports du physique au\r\nmoral,\" for it is essential to his philosophy. It is besides\r\nremarkable, that when he speaks of causes, he rarely uses\r\nthe word \u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e alone, but almost always speaks of \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003ecause\r\nou force\u003c/i\u003e, just as we have seen Spinoza above (§ 8) write \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eratio\r\nsive causa\u003c/i\u003e no less than eight times in the same page. Both\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg053\"\u003e[53]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwriters are evidently conscious that they are identifying\r\ntwo disparates, in order to be able to make use of the one\r\nor the other, according to circumstances; for this end they\r\nare obliged to keep the identification constantly before their\r\nreaders\u0027 mind.—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow Causality, as the director of each and every change,\r\npresents itself in Nature under \u003cem\u003ethree\u003c/em\u003e distinct forms: as\r\n\u003cem\u003ecauses\u003c/em\u003e in the strictest acceptation of the word, as \u003cem\u003estimuli\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nand as \u003cem\u003emotives\u003c/em\u003e. It is just upon this difference that the\r\nreal, essential distinction between inorganic bodies, plants,\r\nand animals is based, and not upon external, anatomical,\r\nlet alone chemical, distinctions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eA \u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e, in its narrowest sense, is that upon which\r\nchanges in the \u003cem\u003einorganic\u003c/em\u003e kingdom alone ensue: those\r\nchanges, that is to say, which form the theme of Mechanics,\r\nPhysics, and Chemistry. Newton\u0027s third fundamental\r\nlaw, \"Action and reaction are equal to one another,\" applies\r\nexclusively to this cause, and enunciates, that the state\r\nwhich precedes (the cause) undergoes a change equivalent\r\nto that produced by it (the effect). In this form of\r\ncausality alone, moreover, does the degree of the effect\r\nalways exactly correspond to the degree of the cause, so as\r\nto enable us accurately to calculate the one by means of\r\nthe other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe second form of causality is the \u003cem\u003estimulus\u003c/em\u003e; it reigns\r\nover \u003cem\u003eorganic\u003c/em\u003e life, as such, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e over plant life and the vegetative,\r\nthat is, the unconscious, part of animal life. This\r\nsecond form is characterized by the absence of the distinctive\r\nsigns of the first. In it accordingly action and reaction\r\nare not equal, nor does the intensity of the effect by\r\nany means correspond throughout all its degrees to the\r\nintensity of the cause; in fact, the opposite effect may even\r\nbe produced by intensifying the cause.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe third form of causality is the \u003cem\u003emotive\u003c/em\u003e. Under this\r\nform causality rules animal life proper: that is, the exterior,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg054\"\u003e[54]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nconsciously performed actions of all animals. The\r\nmedium for motives is \u003cem\u003eknowledge\u003c/em\u003e: an intellect is accordingly\r\nneeded for susceptibility to motives. The true\r\ncharacteristic of the animal is therefore the faculty of\r\nknowing, of representing (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eDas Vorstellen\u003c/i\u003e). Animals, as\r\nsuch, always move towards some aim and end, which\r\ntherefore must have been \u003cem\u003erecognised\u003c/em\u003e by them: that is to\r\nsay, it must have presented itself to them as something\r\ndifferent from themselves, yet of which they are\r\nconscious. Therefore the proper definition of the animal\r\nwould be: \u0027That which knows;\u0027 for no other definition\r\nquite hits the mark or can even perhaps stand the test of\r\ninvestigation. Movement induced by motives is necessarily\r\nwanting where there is no cognitive faculty, and movement\r\nby stimuli alone remains, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e plant life. Irritability and\r\nsensibility are therefore inseparable. Still motives evidently\r\nact in a different way from stimuli; for the action\r\nof the former may be very brief, nay, need only be\r\nmomentary; since their efficacy, unlike that of stimuli,\r\nstands in no relation whatever to the duration of that\r\naction, to the proximity of the object, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c. A motive\r\nneeds but to be perceived therefore, to take effect; whereas\r\nstimuli always require outward, often even inward, contact\r\nand invariably a certain length of time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis short sketch of the three forms of causality will\r\nsuffice here. They are more fully described in my Prize-essay\r\non Free Will.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_67\" title=\"See \u0027Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik,\u0027 p. 30-34.\" id=\"FNanchor_67\"\u003e[67]\u003c/a\u003e One thing, however, still remains to\r\nbe urged. The difference between cause, stimulus, and\r\nmotive, is obviously only a consequence of the various\r\ndegrees of \u003cem\u003ereceptivity\u003c/em\u003e of beings; the greater their receptivity,\r\nthe feebler may be the nature of the influence: a stone\r\nneeds an impact, while man obeys a look. Nevertheless,\r\nboth are moved by a sufficient cause, therefore with the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg055\"\u003e[55]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsame necessity. For \u0027\u003cem\u003emotivation\u003c/em\u003e\u0027\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_68\" title=\"The word \u0027motivation,\u0027 though it may appear objectionable to the English reader, seemed unavoidable here, as being Schopenhauer\u0027s own term, for which there is no adequate equivalent in general use in our language. [Translator\u0027s note.]\" id=\"FNanchor_68\"\u003e[68]\u003c/a\u003e is only causality passing\r\nthrough knowledge; the intellect is the medium of the\r\nmotives, because it is the highest degree of receptivity. By\r\nthis, however, the law of causality loses nothing whatever\r\nof its rigour and certainty; for motives are causes and\r\noperate with the same necessity which all causes bring\r\nwith them. This necessity is easy to perceive in animals\r\nbecause of the greater simplicity of their intellect, which is\r\nlimited to the perception of what is present. Man\u0027s intellect\r\nis double: for not only has he intuitive, but abstract,\r\nknowledge, which last is not limited to what is present.\r\nMan possesses Reason; he therefore has a power of elective\r\ndecision with clear consciousness: that is, he is able to weigh\r\nagainst one another motives which exclude each other, as\r\nsuch; in other terms, he can let them try their strength on\r\nhis will. The most powerful motive then decides him, and\r\nhis actions ensue with just the same necessity as the rolling\r\nof a ball after it has been struck. Freedom of Will\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_69\" title=\"Here used in the absolute sense of liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ. [Tr.]\" id=\"FNanchor_69\"\u003e[69]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nmeans (not professorial twaddle but) \"\u003cem\u003ethat a given human\r\nbeing, in a given situation, can act in two different ways\u003c/em\u003e.\"\r\nBut the utter absurdity of this assertion is a truth as\r\ncertain and as clearly proved, as any truth can be which\r\npasses the limits of pure mathematics. In my Essay on\r\nFree Will, to which the Norwegian Society awarded the\r\nprize, this truth is demonstrated more clearly, methodically,\r\nand thoroughly than has been done before by anyone\r\nelse, and this moreover with special reference to those\r\nfacts of our consciousness by which ignorant people\r\nimagine that absurdity to be confirmed. In all that is\r\nessential however, Hobbes, Spinoza, Priestley, Voltaire,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg056\"\u003e[56]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand even Kant\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_70\" title=\"\u0027Whatever conception one may form of freedom of the will, for metaphysical purposes, its phenomena, human actions, are nevertheless determined by universal laws of Nature, just as well as every other occurrence in Nature.\u0027 \u0027Ideen zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte.\u0027 Anfang. I. Kant….\" id=\"FNanchor_70\"\u003e[70]\u003c/a\u003e already taught the same doctrine. Our\r\nprofessional philosophers, of course, do not let this interfere\r\nwith their holding forth on Free Will, as if it were an\r\nunderstood thing which had never been questioned. But\r\nwhat do these gentlemen imagine the above-named great\r\nmen to have come into the world for, by the grace of\r\nNature? To enable them (the professors) to earn their\r\nlivelihood by philosophy?—Since I had proved this\r\ntruth in my prize-essay more clearly than had ever been\r\ndone before, and since moreover a Royal Society had\r\nsanctioned that proof by placing my essay among its\r\nmemoranda, it surely behoved these worthies, considering\r\nthe views they held, to make a vigorous attack upon so\r\npernicious a doctrine, so detestable a heresy, and thoroughly\r\nto refute it. Nay, this duty was all the more imperative\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg057\"\u003e[57]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas, in my other essay \"On the Foundation of Morality,\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_71\" title=\"Published in the same volume with the Prize-Essay on \u0027Free Will.\u0027 See \u0027Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik.\u0027\" id=\"FNanchor_71\"\u003e[71]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nI had proved the utter groundlessness of Kant\u0027s practical\r\nReason with its Categorical Imperative which, under the\r\nname of the Moral Law, is still used by these gentlemen as\r\nthe corner-stone of their own shallow systems of morality.\r\nI have shown it to be a futile assumption so clearly and\r\nirrefutably, that no one with a spark of judgment can\r\npossibly believe any longer in this fiction.—\"Well, and so\r\nthey probably did.\"—Oh no! They take good care not to\r\nventure on such slippery ground! Their ability consists in\r\nholding their tongues; silence is all they have to oppose\r\nto intelligence, earnestness, and truth. In not one of the\r\nproducts of their useless scribblings that have appeared\r\nsince 1841, has the slightest notice been taken of my\r\nEthics—undoubtedly the most important work on Moral\r\nPhilosophy that has been published for the last sixty\r\nyears—nay, their terror of me and of my truth is so great,\r\nthat none of the literary journals issued by Academies or\r\nUniversities has so much as mentioned the book. \u003ci lang=\"it\"\u003eZitto,\r\nzitto\u003c/i\u003e, lest the public should perceive anything: in this\r\nconsists the whole of their policy. The instinct of self-preservation\r\nmay, no doubt, be at the bottom of these\r\nartful tactics. For would not a philosophy, whose sole aim\r\nwas truth, and which had no other consideration in view,\r\nbe likely to play the part of the iron pot among the\r\nearthen ones, were it to come in contact with the petty\r\nsystems composed under the influence of a thousand personal\r\nconsiderations by people whose chief qualification is\r\nthe propriety of their sentiments? Their wretched fear of\r\nmy writings is the fear of truth. Nor can it be denied,\r\nthat precisely this very doctrine of the complete necessity\r\nof all acts of the will stands in flagrant contradiction with\r\nall the hypotheses of their favourite old-woman\u0027s philosophy\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg058\"\u003e[58]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncut after the pattern of Judaism. Still, that severely\r\ntested truth, far from being disturbed by all this, as a\r\nsure datum and criterion, as a true δός μοι ποῦ στῶ, proves\r\nthe futility of all that old-woman\u0027s philosophy and the\r\nurgent need of a fundamentally different, incomparably\r\ndeeper view of the Universe and of Man;—no matter\r\nwhether that view be compatible with the official duties\r\nof a professional philosopher or not.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 21. À priori \u003ci\u003echaracter of the conception of Causality.\u003cbr\u003e\r\nIntellectual Character of Empirical Perception.\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\nTHE UNDERSTANDING.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the professorial philosophy of our philosophy-professors\r\nwe are still taught to this day, that perception of the\r\nouter world is a thing of the senses, and then there follows\r\na long dissertation upon each of the five senses:\r\nwhereas no mention whatever is made of the intellectual\r\ncharacter of perception: that is to say, of the fact, that it\r\nis mainly the work of the Understanding, which, by means\r\nof its own peculiar form of Causality, together with the\r\nforms of pure sensibility, Time and Space, which are postulated\r\nby Causality, primarily creates and produces the\r\nobjective, outer world out of the raw material of a few sensations.\r\nAnd yet in its principal features, I had stated\r\nthis matter in the first edition of the present treatise\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_72\" title=\"Anno 1813, pp. 53-55.\" id=\"FNanchor_72\"\u003e[72]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand soon after developed it more fully in my treatise \"On\r\nVision and Colours\" (1816), of which Professor Rosas has\r\nshown his appreciation by allowing it to lead him into\r\nplagiarism.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_73\" title=\"For further details see my \u0027Will in Nature,\u0027 p. 19 of the 1st edition, and p. 14 of the 3rd. (P. 230 et seqq. of the translation of the \u0027Will in Nature,\u0027 which follows the \u0027Fourfold Root\u0027 in the present volume.)\" id=\"FNanchor_73\"\u003e[73]\u003c/a\u003e But our professors of philosophy have not\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg059\"\u003e[59]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthought fit to take the slightest notice either of this, or indeed\r\nof any of the other great and important truths which\r\nit has been the aim and labour of my whole life to set\r\nforth, in order to secure them as a lasting possession to\r\nmankind. It does not suit their tastes, or fit into their\r\nnotions; it leads to no Theology, nor is it even adapted to\r\ndrill students for higher State purposes. In short, professional\r\nphilosophers do not care to learn from me, nor do they\r\neven see how much they might learn from me: that is, all\r\nthat their children and their children\u0027s children will learn\r\nfrom me. They prefer to sit down and spin a long metaphysical\r\nyarn, each out of his own thoughts, for the benefit\r\nof the public; and no doubt, if fingers are a sufficient\r\nqualification, they have it. How right was Macchiavelli\r\nwhen he said, as Hesiod\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_74\" title=\"Hesiod, ἔργα, 293.\" id=\"FNanchor_74\"\u003e[74]\u003c/a\u003e before him: \"There are three\r\nsorts of heads: firstly, those which acquire knowledge of\r\nthings and comprehend them by themselves; secondly,\r\nthose which recognise the truth when it is shown them by\r\nothers; and thirdly, those which can do neither the one\r\nnor the other.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_75\" title=\"Macchiavelli, \u0027Il principe,\u0027 cap. 22.\" id=\"FNanchor_75\"\u003e[75]\u003c/a\u003e—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne must indeed be forsaken by all the gods, to imagine\r\nthat the outer, perceptible world, filling Space in its three\r\ndimensions and moving on in the inexorable flow of Time,\r\ngoverned at every step by the laws of Causality, which is\r\nwithout exception, and in all this merely obeying laws we\r\ncan indicate before all experience of them—that such a\r\nworld as this, we say, can have a real, objective existence\r\noutside us, without any agency of our own, and that it can\r\nthen have found its way into our heads through bare sensation\r\nand thus have a second existence within us like the\r\none outside. For what a miserably poor thing is mere\r\nsensation, after all! Even in the noblest of our organs it\r\nis nothing but a local, specific feeling, susceptible of some\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg060\"\u003e[60]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nslight variation, still in itself always subjective and, as\r\nsuch therefore, incapable of containing anything objective,\r\nanything like perception. For sensation is and remains a\r\nprocess within the organism and is limited, as such, to the\r\nregion within the skin; it cannot therefore contain anything\r\nwhich lies beyond that region, or, in other words,\r\nanything that is outside us. A sensation may be pleasant\r\nor unpleasant—which betokens a relation to the Will—but\r\nnothing objective can ever lie in any sensation. In\r\nthe organs of the senses, sensation is heightened by the confluence\r\nof the nerve-extremities, and can easily be excited\r\nfrom without on account of their extensive distribution\r\nand the delicacy of the envelope which encloses them; it is\r\nbesides specially susceptible to particular influences, such\r\nas light, sound, smell; notwithstanding which it is and remains\r\nmere sensation, like all others within our body,\r\nconsequently something essentially subjective, of whose\r\nchanges we only become immediately conscious in the form\r\nof the \u003cem\u003einner\u003c/em\u003e sense, Time: that is, successively. It is only\r\nwhen the \u003cem\u003eUnderstanding\u003c/em\u003e begins to act—a function, not of\r\nsingle, delicate nerve-extremities, but of that mysterious,\r\ncomplicated structure weighing from five to ten pounds,\r\ncalled the brain—only when it begins to apply its sole form,\r\n\u003cem\u003ethe causal law\u003c/em\u003e, that a powerful transformation takes place,\r\nby which subjective sensation becomes objective perception.\r\nFor, in virtue of its own peculiar form, therefore \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e \u003cem\u003ebefore\u003c/em\u003e all experience (since there could have been none\r\ntill then), the Understanding conceives the given corporeal\r\nsensation as an \u003cem\u003eeffect\u003c/em\u003e (a word which the Understanding\r\nalone comprehends), which \u003cem\u003eeffect\u003c/em\u003e, as such, necessarily\r\nimplies a \u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e. Simultaneously it summons to its assistance\r\n\u003cem\u003eSpace\u003c/em\u003e, the form of the \u003cem\u003eouter\u003c/em\u003e sense, lying likewise\r\nready in the intellect (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e the brain), in order to remove\r\nthat cause \u003cem\u003ebeyond\u003c/em\u003e the organism; for it is by this that the\r\nexternal world first arises, Space alone rendering it possible,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg061\"\u003e[61]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nso that pure intuition \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e has to supply the\r\nfoundation for empirical perception. In this process, as\r\nI shall soon show more clearly, the Understanding avails\r\nitself of all the several data, even the minutest, which are\r\npresented to it by the given sensation, in order to construct\r\nthe cause of it in Space in conformity with them. This intellectual\r\noperation (which is moreover explicitly denied both\r\nby Schelling\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_76\" title=\"Schelling, \u0027Philosophische Schriften\u0027 (1809), vol. i. pp. 237 and 238.\" id=\"FNanchor_76\"\u003e[76]\u003c/a\u003e and by Fries\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_77\" title=\"Fries, \u0027Kritik der Vernunft.\u0027 vol. i. pp. 52-56 and p. 290 of the 1st edition.\" id=\"FNanchor_77\"\u003e[77]\u003c/a\u003e), does not however take place\r\ndiscursively or reflectively, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein abstracto\u003c/i\u003e, by means of conceptions\r\nand words; it is, on the contrary, an intuitive and\r\nquite direct process. For by it alone, therefore exclusively\r\n\u003cem\u003ein\u003c/em\u003e the Understanding and \u003cem\u003efor\u003c/em\u003e the Understanding, does\r\nthe real, objective, corporeal world, filling Space in its\r\nthree dimensions, present itself and further proceed, according\r\nto the same law of causality, to change in Time,\r\nand to move in Space.—It is therefore the Understanding\r\nitself which has to create the objective world; for this\r\nworld cannot walk into our brain from outside all ready\r\ncut and dried through the senses and the openings of their\r\norgans. In fact, the senses supply nothing but the raw\r\nmaterials which the Understanding at once proceeds to\r\nwork up into the objective view of a corporeal world, subject\r\nto regular laws, by means of the simple forms we have\r\nindicated: Space, Time, and Causality. Accordingly our\r\nevery-day \u003cem\u003eempirical perception\u003c/em\u003e is an \u003cem\u003eintellectual\u003c/em\u003e one and has\r\na right to claim this predicate, which German pseudo-philosophers\r\nhave given to a pretended intuition of dream-worlds,\r\nin which their beloved \u003cem\u003eAbsolute\u003c/em\u003e is supposed to perform its\r\nevolutions. And now I will proceed to show how wide is\r\nthe gulf which separates sensation from perception, by\r\npointing out how raw is the material out of which the\r\nbeautiful edifice is constructed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg062\"\u003e[62]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nObjective perception makes use, properly speaking, of\r\nonly two senses; touch and sight. These alone supply the\r\ndata upon which, as its basis, the Understanding constructs\r\nthe objective world by the process just described. The\r\nthree other senses remain on the whole subjective; for\r\ntheir sensations, while pointing to an external cause, still\r\ncontain no data by which its relations \u003cem\u003ein Space\u003c/em\u003e can be determined.\r\nNow \u003cem\u003eSpace\u003c/em\u003e is the form of all perception, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e of\r\n\u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e apprehension, in which alone \u003cem\u003eobjects\u003c/em\u003e can, properly\r\nspeaking, present themselves. Therefore those other three\r\nsenses can no doubt serve to announce the presence of\r\nobjects we already know in some other way; but no construction\r\nin Space, consequently no objective perception, can\r\npossibly be founded on their data. A rose cannot be constructed\r\nfrom its perfume, and a blind man may hear\r\nmusic all his life without having the slightest objective\r\nrepresentation either of the musicians, or of the instruments,\r\nor of the vibrations of the air. On the other hand, the\r\nsense of hearing is of great value as a medium for language,\r\nand through this it is the sense of \u003cem\u003eReason\u003c/em\u003e. It is also valuable\r\nas a medium for music, which is the only way in\r\nwhich we comprehend numerical relations not only \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein\r\nabstracto\u003c/i\u003e, but directly, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein concreto\u003c/i\u003e. A musical sound or\r\ntone, however, gives no clue to spacial relations, therefore\r\nit never helps to bring the nature of its cause nearer to us;\r\nwe stop short at it, so that it is no datum for the Understanding\r\nin its construction of the objective world. The\r\nsensations of touch and sight alone are such data; therefore\r\na blind man without either hands or feet, while able\r\nto construct Space for himself \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e in all its regularity,\r\nwould nevertheless acquire but a very vague representation\r\nof the objective world. Yet what is supplied by touch and\r\nsight is not by any means perception, but merely the raw\r\nmaterial for it. For perception is so far from being contained\r\nin the sensations of touch and sight, that these sensations\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg063\"\u003e[63]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhave not even the faintest resemblance to the\r\nqualities of the things which present themselves to us\r\nthrough them, as I shall presently show. Only what\r\nreally belongs to sensation must first be clearly distinguished\r\nfrom what is added to it by the intellect in perception.\r\nIn the beginning this is not easy, because we are\r\nso accustomed to pass from the sensation at once to its\r\ncause, that the cause presents itself to us without our\r\nnoticing the sensation apart from it, by which, as it were,\r\nthe premisses are supplied to this conclusion drawn by\r\nthe Understanding.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus touch and sight have each their own special advantages,\r\nto begin with; therefore they assist each other\r\nmutually. Sight needs no contact, nor even proximity; its\r\nfield is unbounded and extends to the stars. It is moreover\r\nsensitive to the most delicate degrees of light, shade,\r\ncolour, and transparency; so that it supplies the Understanding\r\nwith a quantity of nicely defined data, out of\r\nwhich, by dint of practice, it becomes able to construct the\r\nshape, size, distance, and nature of bodies, and represents\r\nthem at once perceptibly. On the other hand, touch certainly\r\ndepends upon contact; still its data are so varied\r\nand so trustworthy, that it is the most searching of all the\r\nsenses. Even perception by sight may, in the last resort,\r\nbe referred to touch; nay, sight may be looked upon as\r\nan imperfect touch extending to a great distance, which\r\nuses the rays of light as long feelers; and it is just because\r\nit is limited to those qualities which have light for their\r\nmedium and is therefore one-sided, that it is so liable to\r\ndeception; whereas touch supplies the data for cognising\r\nsize, shape, hardness, softness, roughness, temperature,\r\n\u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c., quite immediately. In this it is assisted, partly\r\nby the shape and mobility of our arms, hands, and fingers,\r\nfrom whose position in feeling objects the Understanding\r\nderives its data for constructing bodies in Space, partly by\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg064\"\u003e[64]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmuscular power, which enables it to know the weight,\r\nsolidity, toughness, or brittleness of bodies: all this with\r\nthe least possible liability to error.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese data nevertheless do not by any means yet give\r\nperception, which is always the work of the Understanding.\r\nThe sensation I have in pressing against a table with my\r\nhand, contains no representation of a firm cohesion of parts\r\nin that object, nor indeed anything at all like it. It is\r\nonly when my Understanding passes from that sensation\r\nto its cause, that the intellect constructs for itself a body\r\nhaving the properties of solidity, impenetrability, and hardness.\r\nIf in the dark, I put my hand upon a flat surface,\r\nor lay hold of a ball of about three inches in diameter,\r\nthe same parts of my hand feel the pressure in both cases;\r\nit is only by the different position which my hand takes\r\nthat, in the one or in the other case, my Understanding\r\nconstructs the shape of the body whose contact is the cause\r\nof the sensation, for which it receives confirmation from the\r\nchanges of position which I make. The sensations in the\r\nhand of a man born blind, on feeling an object of cubic shape,\r\nare quite uniform and the same on all sides and in every\r\ndirection: the edges, it is true, press upon a smaller portion\r\nof his hand, still nothing at all like a cube is contained in\r\nthese sensations. His Understanding, however, draws the\r\nimmediate and intuitive conclusion from the resistance\r\nfelt, that this resistance must have a cause, which then\r\npresents itself through that conclusion as a hard body;\r\nand through the movements of his arms in feeling the\r\nobject, while the hand\u0027s sensation remains unaltered, he\r\nconstructs the cubic shape in Space, which is known to\r\nhim \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e. If the representation of a cause and of\r\nSpace, together with their laws, had not already existed\r\nwithin him, the image of a cube could never have proceeded\r\nfrom those successive sensations in his hand. If a rope be\r\ndrawn through his hand, he will construct, as the cause of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg065\"\u003e[65]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe friction he feels and of its duration, a long cylindrical\r\nbody, moving uniformly in the same direction in that\r\nparticular position of his hand. But the representation of\r\nmovement, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e of change of place in Space by means of\r\nTime, never could arise for him out of the mere sensation\r\nin his hand; for that sensation can neither contain, nor\r\ncan it ever by itself alone produce any such thing. It is his\r\nintellect which must, on the contrary, contain within itself,\r\nbefore all experience, the intuitions of Space, Time, and together\r\nwith them that of the possibility of movement; and it\r\nmust also contain the representation of Causality, in order to\r\npass from sensation—which alone is given by experience—to\r\na cause of that sensation, and to construct that cause as\r\na body having this or that shape, moving in this or that\r\ndirection. For how great is the difference between a mere\r\nsensation in my hand and the representations of causality,\r\nmateriality, and mobility in Space by means of Time!\r\nThe sensation in my hand, even if its position and its\r\npoints of contact are altered, is a thing far too uniform\r\nand far too poor in data, to enable me to construct out of\r\nit the representation of Space, with its three dimensions,\r\nand of the influences of bodies one upon another, together\r\nwith the properties of expansion, impenetrability, cohesion,\r\nshape, hardness, softness, rest, and motion: the\r\nbasis, in short, of the objective world. This is, on the\r\ncontrary, only possible by the intellect containing within\r\nitself, anterior to all experience, Space, as the form of perception;\r\nTime, as the form of change; and the law of\r\nCausality, as the regulator of the passing in and out of\r\nchanges. Now it is precisely the pre-existence before all\r\nexperience of all these forms, which constitutes the Intellect.\r\nPhysiologically, it is a function of the brain, which the\r\nbrain no more learns by experience than the stomach to\r\ndigest, or the liver to secrete bile. Besides, no other explanation\r\ncan be given of the fact, that many who were born\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg066\"\u003e[66]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nblind, acquire a sufficiently complete knowledge of the relations\r\nof Space, to enable them to replace their want of eyesight\r\nby it to a considerable degree, and to perform astonishing\r\nfeats. A hundred years ago Saunderson, for instance,\r\nwho was blind from his birth, lectured on Optics, Mathematics,\r\nand Astronomy at Cambridge.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_78\" title=\"Diderot, in his \u0027Lettre sur les Aveugles,\u0027 gives a detailed account of Saunderson.\" id=\"FNanchor_78\"\u003e[78]\u003c/a\u003e This, too, is the\r\nonly way to explain the exactly opposite case of Eva Lauk,\r\nwho was born without arms or legs, yet acquired an accurate\r\nperception of the outer world by means of sight alone as\r\nrapidly as other children.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_79\" title=\"See \u0027Die Welt a. W. u. V.\u0027 vol. ii. chap. 4.\" id=\"FNanchor_79\"\u003e[79]\u003c/a\u003e All this therefore proves that\r\nTime, Space, and Causality are not conveyed into us by\r\ntouch or by sight, or indeed at all from outside, but that\r\nthey have an internal, consequently not empirical, but\r\nintellectual origin. From this again follows, that the perception\r\nof the bodily world is an essentially intellectual\r\nprocess, a work of the Understanding, to which sensation\r\nmerely gives the opportunity and the data for application\r\nin individual cases.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI shall now prove the same with regard to the sense of\r\nsight. Here the only immediate datum is the sensation\r\nexperienced by the retina, which, though admitting of great\r\nvariety, may still be reduced to the impression of light and\r\ndark with their intermediate gradations and to that of\r\ncolours proper. This sensation is entirely subjective: that\r\nis to say, it only exists within the organism and under the\r\nskin. Without the Understanding, indeed, we should never\r\neven become conscious of these gradations, excepting as of\r\npeculiar, varied modifications of the feeling in our eye,\r\nwhich would bear no resemblance to the shape, situation,\r\nproximity, or distance of objects outside us. For \u003cem\u003esensation\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nin seeing, supplies nothing more than a varied affection of\r\nthe retina, exactly like the spectacle of a painter\u0027s palette\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg067\"\u003e[67]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith divers splashes of colour. Nor would anything more\r\nremain over in our consciousness, were we suddenly deprived\r\nof all our Understanding—let us say by paralysis of the\r\nbrain—at a moment when we were contemplating a rich\r\nand extensive landscape, while the sensation was left unchanged:\r\nfor this was the raw material out of which our\r\nUnderstanding had just before been constructing that\r\nperception.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, that the Understanding should thus be able, from\r\nsuch limited material as light, shade and colour, to produce\r\nthe visible world, inexhaustibly rich in all its different\r\nshapes, by means of the simple function of referring effects\r\nto causes assisted by the intuition of Space, depends before\r\nall things upon the assistance given by the sensation itself,\r\nwhich consists in this: first, that the retina, as a surface,\r\nadmits of a juxtaposition of impressions; secondly, that\r\nlight always acts in straight lines, and that its refraction\r\nin the eye itself is rectilinear; finally, that the retina possesses\r\nthe faculty of immediately feeling from which\r\ndirection the light comes that impinges upon it, and this\r\ncan, perhaps, only be accounted for by the rays of light\r\npenetrating below the surface of the retina. But by this we\r\ngain, that the mere impression at once indicates the direction\r\nof its cause; that is, it points directly to the position of\r\nthe object from which the light proceeds or is reflected.\r\nThe passage to this object as a cause no doubt presupposes\r\nthe knowledge of causal relations, as well as of the laws of\r\nSpace; but this knowledge constitutes precisely the furniture\r\nof the \u003cem\u003eIntellect\u003c/em\u003e, which, here also, has again to create\r\nperception out of mere sensation. Let us now examine its\r\nprocedure in doing so more closely.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first thing it does is to set right the impression of\r\nthe object, which is produced on the retina upside down.\r\nThat original inversion is, as we know, brought about in\r\nthe following manner. As each point of the visible object\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg068\"\u003e[68]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsends forth its rays towards all sides in a rectilinear direction,\r\nthe rays from its upper extremity cross those from its\r\nlower extremity in the narrow aperture of the pupil, by\r\nwhich the former impinge upon the bottom, the latter\r\nupon the top, those projected from the right side upon the\r\nleft, and \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003evice versa\u003c/i\u003e. The refracting apparatus of the eye,\r\nwhich consists of the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ehumor aqueus\u003c/i\u003e, \u003cem\u003elens\u003c/em\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eet corpus vitreum\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nonly serves to concentrate the rays of light proceeding from\r\nthe object, so as to find room for them on the small space\r\nof the retina. Now, if seeing consisted in mere sensation,\r\nwe should perceive the impression of the object turned\r\nupside down, because we receive it thus; but in that case\r\nwe should perceive it as something within our eye, for we\r\nshould stop short at the sensation. In reality, however,\r\nthe Understanding steps in at once with its causal law, and\r\nas it has received from sensation the datum of the direction\r\nin which the ray impinged upon the retina, it pursues\r\nthat direction retrogressively up to the cause on both\r\nlines; so that this time the crossing takes place in the opposite\r\ndirection, and the cause presents itself upright as an\r\nexternal object in Space, \u003cem\u003ei.e.\u003c/em\u003e in the position in which it\r\noriginally sent forth its rays, not that in which they reached\r\nthe retina (see fig. 1).—The purely intellectual nature of\r\nthis process, to the exclusion of all other, more especially of\r\nphysiological, explanations, may also be confirmed by the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg069\"\u003e[69]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfact, that if we put our heads between our legs, or lie down\r\non a hill head downwards, we nevertheless see objects in\r\ntheir right position, and not upside down; although the\r\nportion of the retina, which is usually met by the lower part\r\nof the object is then met by the upper: in fact, everything\r\nis topsy turvy excepting the Understanding.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 450px;\" role=\"figure\" aria-labelledby=\"ebm_caption0\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"rays entering the retina of the eye\" height=\"183\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-on-the-fourfold-root-of-the-principle-of-sufficient-reason-068-f1.png\" width=\"450\" id=\"img_images_068_f1.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\" id=\"ebm_caption0\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eFig. 1.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003cem\u003esecond\u003c/em\u003e thing which the Understanding does in converting\r\nsensation into perception, is to make a single perception\r\nout of a double sensation; for each eye in fact\r\nreceives its own separate impression from the object we are\r\nlooking at; each even in a slightly different direction:\r\nnevertheless that object presents itself as a single one.\r\nThis can only take place in the Understanding, and the\r\nprocess by which it is brought about is the following: Our\r\neyes are never quite parallel, excepting when we look at a\r\ndistant object, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e one which is more than 200 feet from\r\nus. At other times they are both directed towards the\r\nobject we are viewing, whereby they converge, so as to\r\nmake the lines proceeding from each eye to the exact point\r\nof the object on which it is fixed, form an \u003cem\u003eangle\u003c/em\u003e, called the\r\n\u003cem\u003eoptic angle\u003c/em\u003e; the lines themselves are called \u003cem\u003eoptic axes\u003c/em\u003e.\r\nNow, when the object lies straight before us, these lines\r\nexactly impinge upon the centre of each retina, therefore\r\nin two points which correspond exactly to each other in\r\neach eye. The Understanding, whose only business it is\r\nto look for the \u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e of all things, at once recognises\r\nthe impression as coming from a \u003cem\u003esingle\u003c/em\u003e outside point,\r\nalthough here the sensation is double, and attributes it to\r\n\u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e cause, which therefore presents itself as a single\r\nobject. For all that is perceived by us, is perceived as a\r\n\u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e—that is to say, as the cause of an effect we have\r\nexperienced, consequently \u003cem\u003ein the Understanding\u003c/em\u003e. As, nevertheless,\r\nwe take in not only a single point, but a considerable\r\nsurface of the object with both eyes, and yet perceive\r\nit as a single object, it will be necessary to pursue this\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg070\"\u003e[70]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nexplanation still further. All those parts of the object\r\nwhich lie to one side of the vertex of the optic angle no\r\nlonger send their rays straight into the centre, but to the\r\nside, of the retina in each eye; in both sides, however, to the\r\nsame, let us say the left, side. The points therefore\r\nupon which these rays impinge, \u003cem\u003ecorrespond symmetrically to\r\neach other\u003c/em\u003e, as well as the centres—in other words, they are\r\n\u003cem\u003ehomonymous points\u003c/em\u003e. The Understanding soon learns to\r\nknow them, and accordingly extends the above-mentioned\r\nrule of its causal perception to them also; consequently it\r\nnot only refers those rays which impinge upon the centre\r\nof each retina, but those also which impinge upon all the\r\nother symmetrically corresponding places in both retinas,\r\nto a single radiant point in the object viewed: that is, it\r\nsees all these points likewise as single, and the entire\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg071\"\u003e[71]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nobject also. Now, it should be well observed, that in this\r\nprocess it is not the outer side of one retina which corresponds\r\nto the outer side of the other, and the inner to the\r\ninner of each, but the right side of one retina which corresponds\r\nto the right side of the other, and so forth; so that\r\nthis symmetrical correspondence must not be taken in a\r\nphysiological, but in a geometrical sense. Numerous and\r\nvery clear illustrations of this process, and of all the\r\nphenomena which are connected with it, are to be found in\r\nRobert Smith\u0027s \"Optics,\" and partly also in Kästner\u0027s\r\nGerman translation (1755). I only give \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e (fig. 2), which,\r\nproperly speaking, represents a special case, mentioned\r\nfurther on, but which may also serve to illustrate the\r\nwhole, if we leave the point R out of question. According\r\nto this illustration, we invariably direct both eyes\r\nequally towards the object, in order that the symmetrically\r\ncorresponding places on both retinas may catch the rays\r\nprojected from the same points. Now, when we move our\r\neyes upwards and downwards, to the sides, and in all\r\ndirections, the point in the object which first impinged\r\nupon the central point of each retina, strikes a different\r\nplace every time, but in all cases one which, in each eye,\r\ncorresponds to the place bearing the same name in the\r\nother eye. In examining (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eperlustrare\u003c/i\u003e) an object, we let our\r\neyes glide backwards and forwards over it, in order to\r\nbring each point of it successively into contact with the\r\ncentre of the retina, which sees most distinctly: we feel it\r\nall over with our eyes. It is therefore obvious that seeing\r\nsingly with two eyes is in fact the same process as feeling\r\na body with ten fingers, each of which receives a different\r\nimpression, each moreover in a different direction: the\r\ntotality of these impressions being nevertheless recognised\r\nby the Understanding as proceeding from \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e object, whose\r\nshape and size it accordingly apprehends and constructs in\r\nSpace. This is why it is possible for a blind man to become\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg072\"\u003e[72]\u003c/span\u003e\r\na sculptor, as was the case, for instance, with the famous\r\nJoseph Kleinhaus, who died in Tyrol, 1853, having been a\r\nsculptor from his fifth year.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_80\" title=\"The Frankfort \u0027Konversationsblatt,\u0027 July 22, 1853, gives the following account of this sculptor:–\u0027The blind sculptor, Joseph Kleinhaus, died at Nauders, in Tyrol, on the 10th inst. Having lost his eyesight through small-pox when he was five years old, he began to amuse himself with carving and modelling, as a pastime. Prugg gave him some instructions, and supplied him with models, and at the age of twelve he carved a Christ in life-size….\" id=\"FNanchor_80\"\u003e[80]\u003c/a\u003e For, no matter from what\r\ncause it may have derived its data, perception is invariably\r\nan operation of the Understanding.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 250px;\" role=\"figure\" aria-labelledby=\"ebm_caption1\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"the symmetry of the rays\" height=\"437\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-on-the-fourfold-root-of-the-principle-of-sufficient-reason-070-f2.png\" width=\"250\" id=\"img_images_070_f2.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\" id=\"ebm_caption1\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eFig. 2.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut just as a single ball seems to me double, if I touch\r\nit with my fingers crossed—since my Understanding, at once\r\nreverting to the cause and constructing it according to the\r\nlaws of Space, takes for granted that the fingers are in\r\ntheir normal position and of course cannot do otherwise\r\nthan attribute two spherical surfaces, which come in contact\r\nwith the outer sides of the first and middle fingers, to two\r\ndifferent balls—just so also does an object seem double,\r\nif my eyes, instead of converging symmetrically and enclosing\r\nthe optic angle at a single point of the object, each\r\nview it at a different inclination—in other words, if I\r\nsquint. For the rays, which in this case emanate from one\r\npoint of the object, no longer impinge upon those symmetrically\r\ncorresponding points in both retinas with which my\r\nmind has grown familiar by long experience, but upon\r\nother, quite different ones which, in a symmetrical position\r\nof the eyes, could only be affected in this way by different\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg073\"\u003e[73]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbodies; I therefore now see \u003cem\u003etwo\u003c/em\u003e objects, precisely because\r\nperception takes place by means of, and within, the Understanding.—The\r\nsame thing happens without squinting\r\nwhen, for instance, I look fixedly at the furthest of two\r\nobjects placed at unequal distances before me, and complete\r\nthe optic angle at it; for then the rays emanating\r\nfrom the nearer object do not impinge upon symmetrically\r\ncorresponding places in both retinas, wherefore my Understanding\r\nattributes them to two objects, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e I see the\r\nnearer object double (see fig. 2, page 70). If, on the contrary,\r\nI complete the optic angle at the nearer object, by\r\nlooking steadily at it, the further object appears double. It\r\nis easy to test this by holding a pencil two feet from the\r\neyes, and looking alternately at it and at some other more\r\ndistant object behind it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the finest thing of all is, that this experiment may\r\nquite well be reversed: so that, with two real objects\r\nstraight before and close to us, and with our eyes wide\r\nopen, we nevertheless see but \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e. This is the most striking\r\nproof that perception is a work of the Understanding and\r\nby no means contained in sensation. Let two cardboard\r\ntubes, about 8 inches long and 1-1/2 inches in diameter, be\r\nfastened parallel to one another, like those of a binocular\r\ntelescope, and fix a shilling at the end of each tube. On\r\napplying our eyes to the opposite extremity and looking\r\nthrough the tubes, we shall see only \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e shilling surrounded\r\nby \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e tube. For in this case the eyes being forced\r\ninto a completely parallel position, the rays emanating\r\nfrom the coins impinge exactly upon the centres of the two\r\nretinas and those points which immediately surround\r\nthem, therefore upon places which correspond symmetrically\r\nto each other; consequently the Understanding,\r\ntaking for granted the usual convergent position of the\r\noptic axes when objects are near, admits but one object as\r\nthe cause of the reflected rays. In other words, we see but\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg074\"\u003e[74]\u003c/span\u003e\r\none object; so direct is the act of causal apprehension in\r\nthe Understanding.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have not space enough here to refute one by one the\r\nphysiological explanations of single vision which have been\r\nattempted; but their fallacy is shown by the following\r\nconsiderations:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e1\u003csup\u003eo\u003c/sup\u003e. If seeing single were dependent upon an organic\r\nconnection, the corresponding points in both retinas, on\r\nwhich this phenomenon is shown to depend, would correspond\r\n\u003cem\u003eorganically\u003c/em\u003e, whereas they do so in a merely \u003cem\u003egeometrical\u003c/em\u003e\r\nsense, as has already been said. For, organically\r\nspeaking, the two inner and two outer corners of the eyes\r\nare those which correspond, and so it is with the other\r\nparts also; whereas for the purpose of single vision, it is\r\nthe right side of the right retina which corresponds to the\r\nright side of the left retina, and so on, as the phenomena\r\njust described irrefutably show. It is also precisely on\r\naccount of the intellectual character of the process, that\r\nonly the most intelligent animals, such as the higher\r\nmammalia and birds of prey—more especially owls—have\r\ntheir eyes placed so as to enable them to direct both optic\r\naxes to the same point.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e2\u003csup\u003eo\u003c/sup\u003e. The hypothesis of a confluence or partial intersection\r\nof the optic nerves before entering the brain, originated by\r\nNewton,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_81\" title=\"Newton, \u0027Optics.\u0027 Query 15.\" id=\"FNanchor_81\"\u003e[81]\u003c/a\u003e is false, simply because it would then be impossible\r\nto see double by squinting. Vesalius and Cæsalpinus\r\nbesides have already brought forward anatomical\r\ninstances in which subjects saw single, although neither\r\nfusion nor even contact of the optic nerves had taken\r\nplace. A final argument against the hypothesis of a mixed\r\nimpression is supplied by the fact, that on closing our right\r\neye firmly and looking at the sun with our left, the bright\r\nimage which persists for a time is always in the left, never\r\nin the right, eye: and \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003evice versa\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg075\"\u003e[75]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe \u003cem\u003ethird\u003c/em\u003e process by which the Understanding converts\r\nsensation into perception, consists in constructing bodies\r\nout of the simple surfaces hitherto obtained—that is, in\r\nadding the third dimension. This it does by estimating\r\nthe expansion of bodies in this third dimension in Space—which\r\nis known to the Understanding \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e—through\r\nCausality, according to the degree in which the eye is\r\naffected by the objects, and to the gradations of light and\r\nshade. In fact, although objects fill Space in all three\r\ndimensions, they can only produce an impression upon the\r\neye with two; for the nature of that organ is such, that\r\nour sensation, in seeing, is merely planimetrical, not stereometrical.\r\nAll that is stereometrical in our perception is\r\nadded by the Understanding, which has for its sole data\r\nthe direction whence the eye receives its impression, the\r\nlimits of that impression, and the various gradations of light\r\nand dark: these data directly indicate their causes, and\r\nenable us to distinguish whether what we have before us\r\nis a disk or a ball. This mental process, like the preceding\r\nones, takes place so immediately and with such rapidity,\r\nthat we are conscious of nothing but the result. It is this\r\nwhich makes perspective drawing so difficult a problem,\r\nthat it can only be solved by mathematics and has to be\r\nlearnt; although all it has to do, is to represent the sensation\r\nof seeing as it presents itself to our Understanding\r\nas a datum for the third process: that is, visual sensation\r\nin its merely planimetrical extension, to the \u003cem\u003etwo\u003c/em\u003e\r\ndimensions of which extension, together with the said data\r\nin them, the Understanding forthwith adds the \u003cem\u003ethird\u003c/em\u003e, in\r\ncontemplating a drawing as well as in contemplating reality.\r\nPerspective drawing is, in fact, a sort of writing which can\r\nbe read as easily as printed type, but which few are able to\r\nwrite; precisely because our intellect, in perceiving, only\r\napprehends effects with a view to constructing their causes,\r\nimmediately losing sight of the former as soon as it has\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg076\"\u003e[76]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndiscovered the latter. For instance, we instantly recognise\r\na chair, whatever position it may be in; while drawing a\r\nchair in any position belongs to the art which abstracts\r\nfrom this third process of the Understanding, in order to present\r\nthe data alone for the spectator himself to complete.\r\nIn its narrowest acceptation, as we have already seen, this is\r\nthe art of drawing in perspective; in a more comprehensive\r\nsense, it is the whole art of painting. A painting presents\r\nus with outlines drawn according to the rules of perspective;\r\nlighter and darker places proportioned to the effect\r\nof light and shade; finally patches of colouring, which\r\nare determined as to quality and intensity by the teaching\r\nof experience. This the spectator reads and interprets by\r\nreferring similar effects to their accustomed causes. The\r\npainter\u0027s art consists in consciously retaining the data of\r\nvisual sensation in the artist\u0027s memory, as they are \u003cem\u003ebefore\u003c/em\u003e\r\nthis third intellectual process; while we, who are not artists,\r\ncast them aside without retaining them in our memory,\r\nas soon as we have made use of them for the purpose\r\ndescribed above. We shall become still better acquainted\r\nwith this third intellectual process by now passing on to a\r\nfourth, which, from its intimate connection with the third,\r\nserves to elucidate it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis \u003cem\u003efourth\u003c/em\u003e operation of the Understanding consists in\r\nacquiring knowledge of the distance of objects from us:\r\nit is this precisely which constitutes that third dimension\r\nof which we have been speaking. Visual sensation, as we\r\nhave said, gives us the \u003cem\u003edirection\u003c/em\u003e in which objects lie, but\r\nnot their \u003cem\u003edistance\u003c/em\u003e from us: that is, not their \u003cem\u003eposition\u003c/em\u003e. It\r\nis for the \u003cem\u003eUnderstanding\u003c/em\u003e therefore to find out this distance;\r\nor, in other words, the distance must be inferred\r\nfrom purely \u003cem\u003ecausal\u003c/em\u003e determinations. Now the most important\r\nof these is the \u003cem\u003evisual angle\u003c/em\u003e, which objects subtend;\r\nyet even this is quite ambiguous and unable to decide\r\nanything by itself. It is like a word of double meaning:\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg077\"\u003e[77]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe sense, in which it is to be understood, can only be\r\ngathered from its connection with the rest. An object\r\nsubtending the same visual angle may in fact be small\r\nand near, or large and far off; and it is only when we have\r\npreviously ascertained its size, that the visual angle enables\r\nus to recognise its distance: and conversely, its size, when\r\nits distance is known to us. Linear perspective is based\r\nupon the fact that the visual angle diminishes as the distance\r\nincreases, and its principles may here be easily deduced.\r\nAs our sight ranges equally in all directions, we\r\nsee everything in reality as from the interior of a hollow\r\nsphere, of which our eye occupies the centre. Now in the\r\nfirst place, an infinite number of intersecting circles pass\r\nthrough the centre of this sphere in all directions, and\r\nthe angles measured by the divisions of these circles are\r\nthe possible angles of vision. In the second place, the\r\nsphere itself modifies its size according to the length of\r\nradius we give to it; therefore we may also imagine it as\r\nconsisting of an infinity of concentric, transparent spheres.\r\nAs all radii diverge, these concentric spheres augment in\r\nsize in proportion to their distance from us, and the degrees\r\nof their sectional circles increase correspondingly:\r\ntherefore the true size of the objects which occupy them\r\nlikewise increases. Thus objects are larger or smaller according\r\nto the size of the spheres of which they occupy\r\nsimilar portions—say 10°—while their visual angle remains\r\nunchanged in both cases, leaving it therefore undecided,\r\nwhether the 10° occupied by a given object belong\r\nto a sphere of 2 miles, or of 10 feet diameter. Conversely,\r\nif the size of the object has been ascertained, the number\r\nof degrees occupied by it will diminish in proportion to\r\nthe distance and the size of the sphere to which we refer\r\nit, and all its outlines will contract in similar proportion.\r\nFrom this ensues the fundamental law of all perspective;\r\nfor, as objects and the intervals between them must necessarily\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg078\"\u003e[78]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndiminish in constant proportion to their distance\r\nfrom us, all their outlines thereby contracting, the result\r\nwill be, that with increasing distance, what is above us\r\nwill descend, what is below us will ascend, and all that\r\nlies at our sides will come nearer together. This progressive\r\nconvergence, this linear perspective, no doubt\r\nenables us to estimate distances, so far as we have before\r\nus an uninterrupted succession of visibly connected objects;\r\nbut we are not able to do this by means of the visual\r\nangle alone, for here the help of another datum is required\r\nby the Understanding, to act, in a sense, as commentary\r\nto the visual angle, by indicating more precisely the share\r\nwe are to attribute to distance in that angle. Now there\r\nare four principal data of this kind, which I am about to\r\nspecify. Thanks to these data, even where there is no\r\nlinear perspective to guide us, if a man standing at a distance\r\nof 200 feet appears to me subtending a visual angle\r\ntwenty-four times smaller than if he were only 2 feet off,\r\nI can nevertheless in most cases estimate his size correctly.\r\nAll this proves once more that perception is not only a thing\r\nof the senses, but of the intellect also.—I will here add the\r\nfollowing special and interesting fact in corroboration of\r\nwhat I have said about the basis of linear perspective as\r\nwell as about the intellectual nature of all perception.\r\nWhen I have looked steadily at a coloured object with\r\nsharply defined outlines—say a red cross—long enough\r\nfor the physiological image to form in my eye as a green\r\ncross, the further the surface on to which I project it,\r\nthe larger it will appear to me: and \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003evice versa\u003c/i\u003e. For the\r\nimage itself occupies an unvarying portion of my retina,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e the portion originally affected by the red cross; therefore\r\nwhen referred outwards, or, in other words, recognised\r\nas the effect of an external object, it forms an unchanging\r\nvisual angle, say of 2°. Now if, in this case, where all\r\ncommentary to the visual angle is wanting, I remove it to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg079\"\u003e[79]\u003c/span\u003e\r\na distant surface, with which I necessarily identify it as\r\nbelonging to its effect, the cross will occupy 2° of a distant\r\nand therefore larger sphere, and is consequently large.\r\nIf, on the other hand, I project the image on to a nearer\r\nobject, it will occupy 2° of a smaller sphere, and is\r\ntherefore small. The resulting perception is in both cases\r\ncompletely objective, quite like that of an external object;\r\nand as it proceeds from an entirely subjective reason\r\n(from the image having been excited in quite a different\r\nway), it thus confirms the intellectual character of all\r\nobjective perception.—This phenomenon (which I distinctly\r\nremember to have been the first to notice, in\r\n1815) forms the theme of an essay by Séguin, published in\r\nthe \"\u003ccite\u003eComptes rendus\u003c/cite\u003e\" of the 2nd August, 1858, where it\r\nis served up as a new discovery, all sorts of absurd and\r\ndistorted explanations of it being given. \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eMessieurs les\r\nillustres confrères\u003c/i\u003e let pass no opportunity for heaping experiment\r\nupon experiment, the more complicated the\r\nbetter. \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eExpérience!\u003c/i\u003e is their watchword; yet how rarely\r\ndo we meet with any sound, genuine reflection upon the\r\nphenomena observed! \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eExpérience! expérience!\u003c/i\u003e followed\r\nby twaddle.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo return to the subsidiary data which act as commentaries\r\nto a given visual angle, we find foremost among\r\nthem the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003emutationes oculi internæ\u003c/i\u003e, by means of which the\r\neye adapts its refractory apparatus to various distances by\r\nincreasing and diminishing the refraction. In what these\r\nmodifications consist, has not yet been clearly ascertained.\r\nThey have been sought in the increased convexity, now of\r\nthe \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecornea\u003c/i\u003e, now of the crystalline \u003cem\u003elens\u003c/em\u003e; but the latest\r\ntheory seems to me the most probable one, according to\r\nwhich the lens is moved backwards for distant vision and\r\nforwards for near vision, lateral pressure, in the latter\r\ncase, giving it increased protuberance; so that the process\r\nwould exactly resemble the mechanism of an opera-glass.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg080\"\u003e[80]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nKepler, however, had, in the main, already expressed this\r\ntheory, which may be found explained in A. Hueck\u0027s\r\npamphlet, \"Die Bewegung der Krystallinse,\" 1841. If\r\nwe are not clearly conscious of these inner modifications\r\nof the eye, we have at any rate a certain feeling of them,\r\nand of this we immediately avail ourselves to estimate\r\ndistances. As however these modifications are not available\r\nfor the purposes of clear sight beyond the range of\r\nfrom about 7 inches to 16 feet, the Understanding is only\r\nable to apply this datum within those limits.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBeyond them, however, the second datum becomes available:\r\nthat is to say, the \u003cem\u003eoptic angle\u003c/em\u003e, formed by the two\r\noptic axes, which we had occasion to explain when speaking\r\nof single vision. It is obvious that this optic angle becomes\r\nsmaller, the further the object is removed: and \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003evice\r\nversa\u003c/i\u003e. This different direction of the eyes, with respect to\r\neach other, does not take place without producing a slight\r\nsensation, of which we are nevertheless only in so far\r\nconscious as the Understanding makes use of it, as a\r\ndatum, in estimating distances intuitively. By this datum\r\nwe are not only enabled to cognize the distance, but the\r\nprecise position of the object viewed, by means of the\r\nparallax of the eyes, which consists in each eye seeing the\r\nobject in a slightly different direction; so that if we close\r\none eye, the object seems to move. Thus it is not easy to snuff\r\na candle with one eye shut, because this datum is then\r\nwanting. But as the direction of the eyes becomes parallel\r\nas soon as the distance of the object reaches or exceeds\r\n200 feet, and as the optic angle consequently then ceases\r\nto exist, this datum only holds good within the said\r\ndistance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBeyond it, the Understanding has recourse to \u003cem\u003eatmospheric\r\nperspective\u003c/em\u003e, which indicates a greater distance by\r\nmeans of the increasing dimness of all colours, of the\r\nappearance of physical blue in front of all dark objects\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg081\"\u003e[81]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n(according to Göthe\u0027s perfectly correct and true theory of\r\ncolours), and also of the growing indistinctness of all outlines.\r\nIn Italy, where the atmosphere is very transparent,\r\nthis datum loses its power and is apt to mislead: Tivoli,\r\nfor instance, seems to be very near when seen from Frascati.\r\nOn the other hand, all objects appear larger in a mist,\r\nwhich is an abnormal exaggeration of the datum; because\r\nour Understanding assumes them to be further\r\nfrom us.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFinally, there remains the estimation of distance by\r\nmeans of the size (known to us intuitively) of intervening\r\nobjects, such as fields, woods, rivers, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c. This mode\r\nof estimation is only applicable where there is uninterrupted\r\nsuccession: in other words, it can only be applied\r\nto terrestrial, not to celestial objects. Moreover, we have\r\nin general more practice in using it horizontally than vertically:\r\na ball on the top of a tower 200 feet high appears\r\nmuch smaller to us than when lying on the ground 200\r\nfeet from us; because, in the latter case, we estimate the\r\ndistance more accurately. When we see human beings in\r\nsuch a way, that what lies between them and ourselves is\r\nin a great measure hidden from our sight, they always\r\nappear strikingly small.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe fact that our Understanding assumes everything it\r\nperceives in a horizontal direction to be farther off, therefore\r\nlarger, than what is seen in a vertical direction, must partly\r\nbe attributed to this last mode of estimating distances, inasmuch\r\nas it only holds good when applied horizontally and\r\nto terrestrial objects; but partly also to our estimation of\r\ndistances by atmospheric perspective, which is subject to\r\nsimilar conditions. This is why the moon seems so much\r\nlarger on the horizon than at its zenith, although its visual\r\nangle accurately measured—that is, the image projected by\r\nit on to the eye—is not at all larger in one case than in the\r\nother; and this also accounts for the flattened appearance of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg082\"\u003e[82]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe vault of the sky: that is to say, for its appearing to have\r\ngreater horizontal than vertical extension. Both phenomena\r\ntherefore are purely intellectual or cerebral, not optical.\r\nIf it be objected, that even when at its zenith, the moon\r\noccasionally has a hazy appearance without seeming to be\r\nlarger, we answer, that neither does it in that case appear\r\nred; for its haziness proceeds from a greater density of\r\nvapours, and is therefore of a different kind from that\r\nwhich proceeds from atmospheric perspective. To this\r\nmay be added what I have already said: that we only\r\napply this mode of estimating distances in a horizontal,\r\nnot in a perpendicular, direction; besides, in this case,\r\nother correctives come into play. It is related of Saussure\r\nthat, when on the Mont Blanc, he saw so enormous a\r\nmoon rise, that, not recognising what it was, he fainted\r\nwith terror.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe properties of the telescope and magnifying glass,\r\non the other hand, depend upon a separate estimate\r\naccording to the visual angle alone: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, that of size\r\nby distance, and of distance by size; because here the\r\nfour other supplementary means of estimating distances\r\nare excluded. The telescope in reality magnifies objects,\r\nwhile it only seems to bring them nearer; because their\r\nsize being known to us empirically, we here account for\r\nits apparent increase by a diminution of their distance\r\nfrom us. A house seen through a telescope, for instance,\r\nseems to be ten times nearer, not ten times larger, than\r\nseen with the naked eye. The magnifying glass, on the\r\ncontrary, does not really magnify, but merely enables\r\nus to bring the object nearer to our eyes than would\r\notherwise be possible; so that it only appears as large\r\nas it would at that distance even without the magnifying\r\nglass. In fact, we are prevented from seeing objects\r\ndistinctly at less than from eight to ten inches\u0027 distance\r\nfrom our eyes, by the insufficient convexity of the ocular\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg083\"\u003e[83]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlens and cornea; but if we increase the refraction by\r\nsubstituting the convexity of the magnifying glass for\r\nthat of the lens and cornea, we then obtain a clear image\r\nof objects even when they are as near as half an inch from\r\nour eyes. Objects thus seen in close proximity to us and\r\nin the size corresponding to that proximity, are transferred\r\nby our Understanding to the distance at which we naturally\r\nsee distinctly, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e to about eight or ten inches from our\r\neyes, and we then estimate their magnitude according to\r\nthis distance and to the given visual angle.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have entered thus fully into detail concerning all the\r\ndifferent processes by which seeing is accomplished, in\r\norder to show clearly and irrefragably that the predominant\r\nfactor in them is \u003cem\u003ethe Understanding\u003c/em\u003e, which, by conceiving\r\neach change as an \u003cem\u003eeffect\u003c/em\u003e and referring that effect to\r\nits \u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e, produces the cerebral phenomenon of the objective\r\nworld on the basis of the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e fundamental intuitions\r\nof Space and Time, for which it receives merely a\r\nfew data from the senses. And moreover the Understanding\r\neffects this exclusively by means of its own peculiar\r\nform, the law of Causality; therefore quite directly and\r\nintuitively, without any assistance whatever from reflection—that\r\nis, from abstract knowledge by means of conceptions\r\nand of language, which are the materials of \u003cem\u003esecondary\u003c/em\u003e\r\nknowledge, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e of \u003cem\u003ethought\u003c/em\u003e, therefore of \u003cem\u003eReason\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat this knowledge through the Understanding is independent\r\nof Reason\u0027s assistance, is shown even by the\r\nfact, that when, at any time, the Understanding attributes\r\na given effect to a wrong cause, actually perceiving that\r\ncause, whereby \u003cem\u003eillusion\u003c/em\u003e arises, our Reason, however clearly\r\nit may recognise \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein abstracto\u003c/i\u003e the true state of the matter,\r\nis nevertheless unable to assist the Understanding, and\r\nthe illusion persists undisturbed in spite of that better\r\nknowledge. The above-mentioned phenomena of seeing\r\nand feeling double, which result from an abnormal position\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg084\"\u003e[84]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the organs of touch and sight, are instances of such\r\nillusions; likewise the apparently increased size of the\r\nrising moon; the image which forms in the focus of a\r\nconcave mirror and exactly resembles a solid body floating\r\nin space; the painted relievo which we take for real; the\r\napparent motion of a shore or bridge on which we are\r\nstanding, if a ship happens to pass along or beneath it; the\r\nseeming proximity of very lofty mountains, owing to the\r\nabsence of atmospheric perspective, which is the result of\r\nthe purity of the air round their summits. In these and\r\nin a multitude of similar cases, our Understanding takes\r\nfor granted the existence of the usual cause with which it is\r\nconversant and forthwith perceives it, though our Reason\r\nhas arrived at the truth by a different road; for, the\r\nknowledge of the Understanding being anterior to that of\r\nthe Reason, the intellect remains inaccessible to the teaching\r\nof the Reason, and thus the \u003cem\u003eillusion\u003c/em\u003e—that is, the deception of\r\nthe Understanding—remains immovable; albeit \u003cem\u003eerror\u003c/em\u003e—that\r\nis, the deception of the Reason—is obviated.—That which\r\nis correctly known by the Understanding is \u003cem\u003ereality\u003c/em\u003e: that\r\nwhich is correctly known by the Reason is \u003cem\u003etruth\u003c/em\u003e, or in other\r\nterms, a judgment having a sufficient reason; \u003cem\u003eillusion\u003c/em\u003e\r\n(that which is wrongly perceived) we oppose to \u003cem\u003ereality\u003c/em\u003e:\r\n\u003cem\u003eerror\u003c/em\u003e (that which is wrongly thought) to \u003cem\u003etruth\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe purely formal part of empirical perception—that is,\r\nSpace, Time, and the law of Causality—is contained \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà\r\npriori\u003c/i\u003e in the intellect; but this is not the case with the\r\napplication of this formal part to empirical data, which has\r\nto be acquired by the Understanding through practice and\r\nexperience. Therefore new-born infants, though they no\r\ndoubt receive impressions of light and of colour, still do\r\nnot apprehend or indeed, strictly speaking, see objects.\r\nThe first weeks of their existence are rather passed in a\r\nkind of stupor, from which they awaken by degrees when\r\ntheir Understanding begins to apply its function to the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg085\"\u003e[85]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndata supplied by the senses, especially those of touch and\r\nof sight, whereby they gradually gain consciousness of the\r\nobjective world. This newly-arising consciousness may be\r\nclearly recognised by the look of growing intelligence in\r\ntheir eyes and a degree of intention in their movements,\r\nespecially in the smile with which they show for the first\r\ntime recognition of those who take care of them. They\r\nmay even be observed to make experiments for a time\r\nwith their sight and touch, in order to complete their\r\napprehension of objects by different lights, in different\r\ndirections and at different distances: thus pursuing a\r\nsilent, but serious course of study, till they have succeeded\r\nin mastering all the intellectual operations in seeing which\r\nhave been described. The fact of this schooling can be\r\nascertained still more clearly through those who, being\r\nborn blind, have been operated upon late in life, since they\r\nare able to give an account of their impressions. Cheselden\u0027s\r\nblind man\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_82\" title=\"See the original report in vol. 35 of the \u0027Philosophical Transactions\u0027 as to this case.\" id=\"FNanchor_82\"\u003e[82]\u003c/a\u003e was not an isolated instance, and we\r\nfind in all similar cases the fact corroborated, that\r\nthose who obtain their sight late in life, no doubt, see\r\nlight, outlines, and colours, as soon as the operation is\r\nover, but that they have no objective perception of objects\r\nuntil their Understanding has learnt to apply its causal\r\nlaw to data and to changes which are new to it. On first\r\nbeholding his room and the various objects in it, Cheselden\u0027s\r\nblind man did not distinguish one thing from\r\nanother; he simply received the general impression of a\r\ntotality all in one piece, which he took for a smooth,\r\nvariegated surface. It never occurred to him to recognise\r\na number of detached objects, lying one behind the other\r\nat different distances. With blind people of this sort, it\r\nis by the sense of touch, to which objects are already\r\nknown, that they have to be introduced to the sense of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg086\"\u003e[86]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsight. In the beginning, the patient has no appreciation\r\nwhatever of distances and tries to lay hold of everything.\r\nOne, when he first saw his own house from outside, could\r\nnot conceive how so small a thing could contain so many\r\nrooms. Another was highly delighted to find, some weeks\r\nafter the operation, that the engravings hanging on the\r\nwalls of his room represented a variety of objects. The\r\n\"Morgenblatt\" of October 23rd, 1817, contains an account\r\nof a youth who was born blind, and obtained his sight\r\nat the age of seventeen. He had to learn intelligent\r\nperception, for at first sight he did not even recognise\r\nobjects previously known to him through the sense of\r\ntouch. Every object had to be introduced to the sense of\r\nsight by means of the sense of touch. As for the distances\r\nof the objects he saw, he had no appreciation whatever of\r\nthem, and tried to lay hold indiscriminately of everything,\r\nfar or near.—Franz expresses himself as follows:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_83\" title=\"Franz, \u0027The Eye, a treatise on preserving this organ in a healthy state and improving the sight.\u0027 London, Churchill, 1839, pp. 34-36.\" id=\"FNanchor_83\"\u003e[83]\u003c/a\u003e—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"block\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"A definite idea of distance, as well as of form and size, is only obtained\r\nby sight and touch, and by reflecting on the impressions made\r\non both senses; but for this purpose we must take into account the\r\nmuscular motion and voluntary locomotion of the individual.—Caspar\r\nHauser, in a detailed account of his own experience in this respect, states,\r\nthat upon his first liberation from confinement, whenever he looked through\r\nthe window upon external objects, such as the street, garden, \u0026amp;c., it appeared\r\nto him as if there were a shutter quite close to his eye, and covered\r\nwith confused colours of all kinds, in which he could recognise or distinguish\r\nnothing singly. He says farther, that he did not convince himself till\r\nafter some time during his walks out of doors, that what had at first\r\nappeared to him as a shutter of various colours, as well as many other\r\nobjects, were in reality very different things; and that at length the\r\nshutter disappeared, and he saw and recognised all things in their just\r\nproportions. Persons born blind who obtain their sight by an operation\r\nin later years only, sometimes imagine that all objects touch their\r\neyes, and lie so near to them that they are afraid of stumbling against\r\nthem; sometimes they leap towards the moon, supposing that they can\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg087\"\u003e[87]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlay hold of it; at other times they run after the clouds moving along\r\nthe sky, in order to catch them, or commit other such extravagancies.\r\nSince ideas are gained by reflection upon sensation, it is further necessary\r\nin all cases, in order that an accurate idea of objects may be\r\nformed from the sense of sight, that the powers of the mind should be\r\nunimpaired, and undisturbed in their exercise. A proof of this is\r\nafforded in the instance related by Haslam,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_84\" title=\"Haslam\u0027s \u0027Observations on Madness and Melancholy,\u0027 2nd ed. p. 192.\" id=\"FNanchor_84\"\u003e[84]\u003c/a\u003e of a boy who had no\r\ndefect of sight, but was weak in understanding, and who in his seventh\r\nyear was unable to estimate the distances of objects, especially as to\r\nheight; he would extend his hand frequently towards a nail on the\r\nceiling, or towards the moon, to catch it. It is therefore the judgment\r\nwhich corrects and makes clear this idea, or perception of visible\r\nobjects.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe intellectual nature of perception as I have shown it,\r\nis corroborated physiologically by Flourens\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_85\" title=\"Flourens, \u0027De la vie et de l\u0027Intelligence,\u0027 2nd edition, Paris, Garnier Frères, 1852, p. 49.\" id=\"FNanchor_85\"\u003e[85]\u003c/a\u003e as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"block\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp lang=\"fr\"\u003e\"Il faut faire une grand distinction entre les sens et l\u0027intelligence.\r\nL\u0027ablation d\u0027un tubercule détermine la perte de la \u003cem\u003esensation\u003c/em\u003e, du \u003cem\u003esens\u003c/em\u003e de\r\nla vue; la rétine devient insensible, l\u0027iris devient immobile. L\u0027ablation\r\nd\u0027un lobe cérébral laisse la \u003cem\u003esensation\u003c/em\u003e, le \u003cem\u003esens\u003c/em\u003e, la \u003cem\u003esensibilité\u003c/em\u003e de la rétine,\r\nla \u003cem\u003emobilité\u003c/em\u003e de l\u0027iris; elle ne détruit que la \u003cem\u003eperception\u003c/em\u003e seule. Dans un\r\ncas, c\u0027est un fait \u003cem\u003esensorial\u003c/em\u003e; et, dans l\u0027autre, un fait \u003cem\u003ecérébral\u003c/em\u003e; dans un\r\ncas, c\u0027est la perte du \u003cem\u003esens\u003c/em\u003e; dans l\u0027autre, c\u0027est la perte de la \u003cem\u003eperception\u003c/em\u003e.\r\nLa distinction des perceptions et des sensations est encore un grand\r\nrésultat; et it est démontré aux yeux. Il y a deux moyens de faire\r\nperdre la vision par l\u0027encéphale: 1° par les tubercules, c\u0027est la perte du\r\nsens, de la sensation; 2° par les lobes, c\u0027est la perte de la perception, de\r\nl\u0027intelligence. La sensibilité n\u0027est donc pas l\u0027intelligence; penser n\u0027est\r\ndonc pas sentir; et voilà toute une philosophie renversée. L\u0027idée n\u0027est\r\ndonc pas la sensation; et voilà encore une autre preuve du vice radical\r\nde cette philosophie.\" And again, p. 77, under the heading: Séparation\r\nde la Sensibilité et de la Perception:—\"Il y a une de mes \u003cins title=\"expérences\" id=\"C087\"\u003eexpériences\u003c/ins\u003e\r\nqui sépare nettement la \u003cem\u003esensibilité\u003c/em\u003e de la \u003cem\u003eperception\u003c/em\u003e. Quand\r\non enlève le \u003cem\u003ecerveau proprement dit\u003c/em\u003e (\u003cem\u003elobes\u003c/em\u003e ou \u003cem\u003ehémisphères cérébraux\u003c/em\u003e) à un\r\nanimal, l\u0027animal perd la vue. Mais, par rapport a l\u0027œil, rien n\u0027est\r\nchangé: les objets continuent à se peindre sur la rétine; l\u0027\u003cem\u003eiris\u003c/em\u003e reste\r\ncontractile, le \u003cem\u003enerf optique\u003c/em\u003e sensible, parfaitement sensible. Et cependant\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg088\"\u003e[88]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nl\u0027animal ne voit plus; il n\u0027y a plus \u003cem\u003evision\u003c/em\u003e, quoique tout ce qui est\r\n\u003cem\u003esensation\u003c/em\u003e subsiste; il n\u0027y a plus \u003cem\u003evision\u003c/em\u003e, parce qu\u0027il n\u0027y a plus \u003cem\u003eperception\u003c/em\u003e.\r\nLe \u003cem\u003epercevoir\u003c/em\u003e, et non le \u003cem\u003esentir\u003c/em\u003e, est donc le premier élément de l\u0027\u003cem\u003eintelligence\u003c/em\u003e.\r\nLa \u003cem\u003eperception\u003c/em\u003e est partie de l\u0027\u003cem\u003eintelligence\u003c/em\u003e, car elle se perd avec\r\nl\u0027\u003cem\u003eintelligence\u003c/em\u003e, et par l\u0027ablation du même organe, les \u003cem\u003elobes\u003c/em\u003e ou \u003cem\u003ehémisphères\r\ncérébraux\u003c/em\u003e; et la \u003cem\u003esensibilité\u003c/em\u003e n\u0027en est point partie, puisqu\u0027elle subsiste\r\naprès la perte de l\u0027\u003cem\u003eintelligence\u003c/em\u003e et l\u0027ablation des \u003cem\u003elobes\u003c/em\u003e ou \u003cem\u003ehémisphères\u003c/em\u003e.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe following famous verse of the ancient philosopher\r\nEpicharmus, proves that the ancients in general recognized\r\nthe intellectual nature of perception: Νοῦς \u003cins title=\"ὁρῆ\" id=\"C088\"\u003eὁρῇ\u003c/ins\u003e καὶ\r\nνοῦς ἀκούει· τἆλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά. (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eMens videt, mens audit;\r\ncætera surda et cœca.\u003c/i\u003e)\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_86\" title=\"\u0027It is the mind that sees and hears; all besides is deaf and blind.\u0027 (Tr. Ad.)\" id=\"FNanchor_86\"\u003e[86]\u003c/a\u003e Plutarch in quoting this verse,\r\nadds:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_87\" title=\"Plutarch, \u0027De solert. animal.\u0027 c. 3. \u0027For the affection of our eyes and ears does not produce any perception, unless it be accompanied by thought.\u0027 (Tr. Ad.)\" id=\"FNanchor_87\"\u003e[87]\u003c/a\u003e ὡς τοῦ περὶ τὰ ὄμματα καὶ ὦτα πάθους, ἂν μὴ παρῇ τὸ\r\nφρονοῦν, αἴσθησιν οὐ ποιοῦντος (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003equia affectio oculorum et\r\naurium nullum affert sensum, intelligentia absente\u003c/i\u003e). Shortly\r\nbefore too he says: Στράτωνος τοῦ φυσικοῦ λόγος ἐστίν, ἀποδεικνύων\r\nὡς οὐδ\u0027 αἰσθάνεσθαι τοπαράπαν ἄνευ τοῦ νοεῖν ὑπάρχει.\r\n(\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eStratonis physici exstat ratiocinatio, qua \"sine intelligentia\r\nsentiri omnino nihil posse\" demonstrat.\u003c/i\u003e)\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_88\" title=\"\u0027Straton, the physicist, has proved that \u0027without thinking it is quite impossible to perceive.\u0027\u0027 (Tr. Ad.)\" id=\"FNanchor_88\"\u003e[88]\u003c/a\u003e Again shortly\r\nafter he says: ὅθεν ἀνάγκη, πᾶσιν, οἷς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ\r\nτὸ νοεῖν ὑπάρχειν, εἰ τῷ νοεῖν αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφύκαμεν (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003equare\r\nnecesse est, omnia, quæ sentiunt, etiam intelligere, siquidem\r\nintelligendo demum sentiamus\u003c/i\u003e).\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_89\" title=\"\u0027Therefore it is necessary that all who perceive should also think, since we are so constituted as to perceive by means of thinking.\u0027 (Tr. Ad.)\" id=\"FNanchor_89\"\u003e[89]\u003c/a\u003e A second verse of Epicharmus\r\nmight be connected with this, which is quoted\r\nby Diogenes Laertes (iii. 16):\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poetry-container\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eΕὔμαιε, τὸ σοφόν ἐστιν οὐ καθ\u0027 ἓν μόνον,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eἀλλ\u0027 ὅσα περ ζῇ, πάντα καὶ γνώμαν ἔχει.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg089\"\u003e[89]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n(\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eEumaee, sapientia non uni tantum competit, sed quæcunque\r\nvivunt etiam intellectum habent.\u003c/i\u003e) Porphyry likewise endeavours\r\nto show at length that all animals have understanding.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_90\" title=\"Porph. \u0027De abstinentia,\u0027 iii. 21.\" id=\"FNanchor_90\"\u003e[90]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, that it should be so, follows necessarily from the\r\nintellectual character of perception. All animals, even\r\ndown to the very lowest, must have Understanding—that\r\nis, knowledge of the causal law, although they have it in\r\nvery different degrees of delicacy and of clearness; at any\r\nrate they must have as much of it as is required for perception\r\nby their senses; for sensation without Understanding\r\nwould be not only a useless, but a cruel gift of Nature.\r\nNo one, who has himself any intelligence, can doubt the\r\nexistence of it in the higher animals. But at times it even\r\nbecomes undeniably evident that their knowledge of\r\ncausality is actually \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e, and that it does not arise\r\nfrom the habit of seeing one thing follow upon another. A\r\nvery young puppy will not, for instance, jump off a table,\r\nbecause he foresees what would be the consequence. Not\r\nlong ago I had some large curtains put up at my bed-room\r\nwindow, which reached down to the floor, and were\r\ndrawn aside from the centre by means of a string. The\r\nfirst morning they were opened I was surprised to see my\r\ndog, a very intelligent poodle, standing quite perplexed,\r\nand looking upwards and sidewards for the cause of the\r\nphenomenon: that is, he was seeking for the change which\r\nhe knew \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e must have taken place. Next day the\r\nsame thing happened again.—But even the lowest animals\r\nhave perception—consequently Understanding—down to\r\nthe aquatic polypus, which has no distinct organs of sensation,\r\nyet wanders from leaf to leaf on its waterplant, while\r\nclinging to it with its feelers, in search of more light.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNor is there, indeed, any difference, beyond that of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg090\"\u003e[90]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndegree, between this lowest Understanding and that of\r\nman, which we however distinctly separate from his\r\nReason. The intermediate gradations are occupied by the\r\nvarious series of animals, among which the highest, such\r\nas the monkey, the elephant, the dog, astonish us often by\r\ntheir intelligence. But in every case the business of the\r\nUnderstanding is invariably to apprehend directly causal\r\nrelations: first, as we have seen, those between our own\r\nbody and other bodies, whence proceeds objective perception;\r\nthen those between these objectively perceived bodies\r\namong themselves, and here, as has been shown in § 20,\r\nthe causal relation manifests itself in three forms—as\r\ncause, as stimulus, and as motive. All movement in the\r\nworld takes place according to these three forms of the\r\ncausal relation, and through them alone does the intellect\r\ncomprehend it. Now, if, of these three, \u003cem\u003ecauses\u003c/em\u003e, in the narrowest\r\nsense of the word, happen to be the object of \u003cins title=\"invesgation\" id=\"C090\"\u003einvestigation\u003c/ins\u003e\r\nfor the Understanding, it will produce Astronomy,\r\nMechanics, Physics, Chemistry, and will invent machines\r\nfor good and for evil; but in all cases a direct, intuitive\r\napprehension of the causal connection will in the last resort\r\nlie at the bottom of all its discoveries. For the sole form\r\nand function of the Understanding is this apprehension, and\r\nnot by any means the complicated machinery of Kant\u0027s\r\ntwelve Categories, the nullity of which I have proved.—(All\r\ncomprehension is a direct, consequently intuitive,\r\napprehension of the causal connection; although this has\r\nto be reduced at once to abstract conceptions in order to be\r\nfixed. To calculate therefore, is not to understand, and,\r\nin itself, calculation conveys no comprehension of things.\r\nCalculation deals exclusively with abstract conceptions of\r\nmagnitudes, whose mutual relations it determines. By it\r\nwe never attain the slightest comprehension of a physical\r\nprocess, for this requires \u003cem\u003eintuitive\u003c/em\u003e comprehension of\r\nspace-relations, by means of which causes take effect.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg091\"\u003e[91]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nCalculations have merely practical, not theoretical, value.\r\nIt may even be said that \u003cem\u003ewhere calculation begins, comprehension\r\nceases\u003c/em\u003e; for a brain occupied with numbers is, as\r\nlong as it calculates, entirely estranged from the causal\r\nconnection in physical processes, being engrossed in purely\r\nabstract, numerical conceptions. The result, however, only\r\nshows us \u003cem\u003ehow much\u003c/em\u003e, never \u003cem\u003ewhat\u003c/em\u003e. \"\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eL\u0027expérience et le\r\ncalcul\u003c/i\u003e,\" those watchwords of French physicists, are not\r\ntherefore by any means adequate [for thorough insight].)—If,\r\nagain, \u003cem\u003estimuli\u003c/em\u003e are the guides of the Understanding, it\r\nwill produce Physiology of Plants and Animals, Therapeutics,\r\nand Toxicology. Finally, if it devotes itself to\r\nthe study of \u003cem\u003emotives\u003c/em\u003e, the Understanding will use them, on\r\nthe one hand, theoretically, to guide it in producing works\r\non Morality, Jurisprudence, History, Politics, and even\r\nDramatic and Epic Poetry; on the other hand, practically,\r\neither merely to train animals, or for the higher purpose of\r\nmaking human beings dance to its music, when once it has\r\nsucceeded in discovering which particular wire has to be\r\npulled in order to move each puppet at its pleasure. Now,\r\nwith reference to the function which effects this, it is quite\r\nimmaterial whether the intellect turns gravitation ingeniously\r\nto account, and makes it serve its purpose by\r\nstepping in just at the right time, or whether it brings the\r\ncollective or the individual propensities of men into play\r\nfor its own ends. In its practical application we call the\r\nUnderstanding \u003cem\u003eshrewdness\u003c/em\u003e or, when used to outwit others,\r\n\u003cem\u003ecunning\u003c/em\u003e; when its aims are very insignificant, it is called\r\n\u003cem\u003eslyness\u003c/em\u003e and, if combined with injury to others, \u003cem\u003ecraftiness\u003c/em\u003e.\r\nIn its purely theoretical application, we call it simply\r\n\u003cem\u003eUnderstanding\u003c/em\u003e, the higher degrees of which are named\r\n\u003cem\u003eacumen\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003esagacity\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003ediscernment\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003epenetration\u003c/em\u003e, while its lower\r\ndegrees are termed \u003cem\u003edulness\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003estupidity\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003esilliness\u003c/em\u003e, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c.\r\nThese widely differing degrees of sharpness are innate, and\r\ncannot be acquired; although, as I have already shown,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg092\"\u003e[92]\u003c/span\u003e\r\neven in the earliest stages of the application of the Understanding,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e in empirical perception, practice and knowledge\r\nof the material to which it is applied, are needed.\r\nEvery simpleton has Reason—give him the premisses, and\r\nhe will draw the conclusion; whereas \u003cem\u003eprimary\u003c/em\u003e, consequently\r\nintuitive, knowledge is supplied by the Understanding:\r\nherein lies the difference. The pith of every\r\ngreat discovery, of every plan having universal historical\r\nimportance, is accordingly the product of a happy moment\r\nin which, by a favourable coincidence of outer and inner\r\ncircumstances, some complicated causal series, some hidden\r\ncauses of phenomena which had been seen thousands of\r\ntimes before, or some obscure, untrodden paths, suddenly\r\nreveal themselves to the intellect.—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy the preceding explanations of the processes in seeing\r\nand feeling, I have incontestably shown that empirical perception\r\nis essentially the work of \u003cem\u003ethe Understanding\u003c/em\u003e, for\r\nwhich the material only is supplied by the senses in sensation—and\r\na poor material it is, on the whole; so that \u003cem\u003ethe\r\nUnderstanding\u003c/em\u003e is, in fact, the artist, while the senses are\r\nbut the under-workmen who hand it the materials. But\r\nthe process consists throughout in referring from given\r\neffects to their causes, which by this process are enabled to\r\npresent themselves as objects in Space. The very fact that\r\nwe presuppose Causality in this process, proves precisely\r\nthat this law must have been supplied by the Understanding\r\nitself; for it could never have found its way into\r\nthe intellect from outside. It is indeed the first condition\r\nof all empirical perception; but this again is the form in\r\nwhich all external experience presents itself to us; how\r\nthen can this law of Causality be derived from experience,\r\nwhen it is itself essentially presupposed by experience?—It\r\nwas just because of the utter impossibility of this, and\r\nbecause Locke\u0027s philosophy had put an end to all \u003cem\u003eà priority\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nthat Hume denied the whole reality of the conception of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg093\"\u003e[93]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nCausality. He had besides already mentioned two false\r\nhypotheses in the seventh section of his \"Inquiry concerning\r\nthe Human Understanding,\" which recently have again been\r\nadvanced: the one, that the effect of the will upon the\r\nmembers of our body; the other, that the resistance\r\nopposed to our pressure by outward objects, is the origin\r\nand prototype of the conception of Causality. Hume refutes\r\nboth in his own way and according to his own order of\r\nideas. I argue as follows. There is no causal connection\r\nwhatever between acts of the will and actions of the body;\r\non the contrary, both are immediately one and the same\r\nthing, only perceived in a double aspect—that is, on the\r\none hand, in our self-consciousness, or inner sense, as acts\r\nof the will; on the other, simultaneously in exterior,\r\nspacial brain-perception, as actions of the body.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_91\" title=\"Compare \u0027Die Welt a. W. u. V.\u0027 3rd edition, vol. ii. p. 41. [The 3rd edition of \u0027Die Welt a. W. u. V.\u0027 contains at this place a supplement which is wanting in the 2nd edition, vol. ii. p. 38.–Note by the Editor of the 3rd edition.]\" id=\"FNanchor_91\"\u003e[91]\u003c/a\u003e The\r\nsecond hypothesis is false, first because, as I have already\r\nshown at length, a mere sensation of touch does not yet\r\ngive any objective perception whatever, let alone the conception\r\nof Causality, which never can arise from the feeling\r\nof an impeded muscular effort: besides impediments of this\r\nkind often occur without any external cause; secondly,\r\nbecause our pressing against an external object necessarily\r\nhas a motive, and this already presupposes apprehension of\r\nthat object, which again presupposes knowledge of Causality.—But\r\nthe only means of radically proving the conception\r\nof Causality to be independent of all experience was\r\nby showing, as I have done, that the whole possibility of\r\nexperience is conditioned by the conception of Causality.\r\nIn § 23 I intend to show that Kant\u0027s proof, propounded\r\nwith a similar intent, is false.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis is also the proper place for drawing attention to the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg094\"\u003e[94]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfact, that Kant either did not clearly recognise in empirical\r\nperception the mediation of the causal law—which law is\r\nknown to us before all experience—or that he intentionally\r\nevaded mentioning it, because it did not suit his purpose. In\r\nthe \"Critique of Pure Reason,\" for instance, the relation between\r\ncausality and perception is not treated in the \"Doctrine\r\nof Elements,\" but in the chapter on the \"Paralogisms\r\nof Pure Reason,\" where one would hardly expect to find it;\r\nmoreover it appears in his \"Critique of the Fourth Paralogism\r\nof Transcendental Psychology,\" and only in the\r\nfirst edition.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_92\" title=\"Kant, \u0027Krit. d. r. V.\u0027 1st edition, p. 367 sqq. (English translation by M. Müller, p. 318 sqq.)\" id=\"FNanchor_92\"\u003e[92]\u003c/a\u003e The very fact that this place should have\r\nbeen assigned to it, shows that in considering this relation,\r\nhe always had the transition from the phenomenon to the\r\nthing in itself exclusively in view, but not the genesis of perception\r\nitself. Here accordingly he says that the existence\r\nof a real external object is not given directly in perception,\r\nbut can be added to it in thought and thus inferred.\r\nIn Kant\u0027s eyes, however, he who does this is a Transcendental\r\nRealist, and consequently on a wrong road. For by\r\nhis \"outward object\" Kant here means the thing in itself.\r\nThe Transcendental Idealist, on the contrary, stops short\r\nat the perception of something empirically real—that is, of\r\nsomething existing outside us in Space—without needing\r\nthe inference of a cause to give it reality. For \u003cem\u003eperception\u003c/em\u003e,\r\naccording to Kant, is quite directly accomplished without\r\nany assistance from the causal nexus, and consequently\r\nfrom the Understanding: he simply identifies perception\r\nwith sensation. This we find confirmed in the passage\r\nwhich begins, \"With reference to the reality of external\r\nobjects, I need as little trust to inference,\" \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_93\" title=\"Kant, \u0027Krit. d. r. Vern.\u0027 1st edition, p. 371. (English translation, by M. Müller, p. 322.)\" id=\"FNanchor_93\"\u003e[93]\u003c/a\u003e and\r\nagain in the sentence commencing with \"Now we may well\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg095\"\u003e[95]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nadmit,\" \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_94\" title=\"Kant, \u0027Krit. d. r. Vern.\u0027 1st edition, p. 372. (English translation, p. 323.)\" id=\"FNanchor_94\"\u003e[94]\u003c/a\u003e It is quite clear from these passages that\r\nperception of external things in Space, according to Kant,\r\nprecedes all application of the causal law, therefore that\r\nthe causal law does not belong to perception as an element\r\nand condition of it: for him, mere sensation is identical\r\nwith perception. Only in as far as we ask what may, in a\r\n\u003cem\u003etranscendental\u003c/em\u003e sense, exist \u003cem\u003eoutside of us\u003c/em\u003e: that is, when we\r\nask for the thing in itself, is Causality mentioned as connected\r\nwith perception. Moreover Kant admits the existence,\r\nnay, the mere possibility, of causality only in reflection:\r\nthat is, in abstract, distinct knowledge by means of\r\nconceptions; therefore he has no suspicion that its application\r\nis \u003cem\u003eanterior to all reflection\u003c/em\u003e, which is nevertheless evidently\r\nthe case, especially in empirical, sensuous perception\r\nwhich, as I have proved irrefragably in the preceding analysis,\r\ncould never take place otherwise. Kant is therefore\r\nobliged to leave the genesis of empirical perception unexplained.\r\nWith him it is a mere matter of the senses, given\r\nas it were in a miraculous way: that is, it coincides with\r\nsensation. I should very much like my reflective readers\r\nto refer to the passages I have indicated in Kant\u0027s work, in\r\norder to convince themselves of the far greater accuracy of\r\nmy view of the whole process and connection. Kant\u0027s extremely\r\nerroneous view has held its ground till now in\r\nphilosophical literature, simply because no one ventured to\r\nattack it; therefore I have found it necessary to clear the\r\nway in order to throw light upon the mechanism of our\r\nknowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eKant\u0027s fundamental idealistic position loses nothing\r\nwhatever, nay, it even gains by this rectification of mine,\r\nin as far as, with me, the necessity of the causal law is\r\nabsorbed and extinguished in empirical perception as its\r\nproduct and cannot therefore be invoked in behalf of an\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg096\"\u003e[96]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nentirely transcendent question as to the thing in itself.\r\nOn referring to my theory above concerning empirical perception,\r\nwe find that its first datum, sensation, is absolutely\r\nsubjective, being a process within the organism, because it\r\ntakes place beneath the skin. Locke has completely and\r\nexhaustively proved, that the feelings of our senses, even\r\nadmitting them to be roused by external causes, cannot\r\nhave any resemblance whatever to the qualities of those\r\ncauses. Sugar, for instance, bears no resemblance at all to\r\nsweetness, nor a rose to redness. But that they should\r\nneed an external cause at all, is based upon a law whose\r\norigin lies demonstrably within us, in our brain; therefore\r\nthis necessity is not less subjective than the sensations\r\nthemselves. Nay, even \u003cem\u003eTime\u003c/em\u003e—that primary condition\r\nof every possible \u003cem\u003echange\u003c/em\u003e, therefore also of the change\r\nwhich first permits the application of the causal law—and\r\nnot less \u003cem\u003eSpace\u003c/em\u003e—which alone renders the externalisation\r\nof causes possible, after which they present themselves\r\nto us as objects—even Time and Space, we say, are subjective\r\nforms of the intellect, as Kant has conclusively\r\nproved. Accordingly we find all the elements of empirical\r\nperception lying within us, and nothing contained\r\nin them which can give us reliable indications as to anything\r\ndiffering absolutely from ourselves, anything in\r\nitself.—But this is not all. What we think under the conception\r\n\u003cem\u003ematter\u003c/em\u003e, is the residue which remains over after\r\nbodies have been divested of their shape and of all their\r\nspecific qualities: a residue, which precisely on that account\r\nmust be identical in all bodies. Now these shapes and\r\nqualities which have been abstracted by us, are nothing\r\nbut the peculiar, specially defined \u003cem\u003eway in which these bodies\r\nact\u003c/em\u003e, which constitutes precisely their difference. If therefore\r\nwe leave these shapes and qualities out of consideration,\r\nthere remains nothing but \u003cem\u003emere activity in general\u003c/em\u003e,\r\npure action as such, Causality itself, objectively thought—that\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg097\"\u003e[97]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis, the reflection of our own Understanding, the externalised\r\nimage of its sole function; and Matter is throughout\r\npure Causality, its essence is Action in general.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_95\" title=\"Compare \u0027Die Welt a. W. u. V.\u0027 2nd edition; vol. i. sect. 4, p. 9; and vol. ii. pp. 48, 49 (3rd edition, vol. i. p. 10; vol. ii. p. 52). English translation, vol. i. pp. 9-10; vol. ii. p. 218.\" id=\"FNanchor_95\"\u003e[95]\u003c/a\u003e This is\r\nwhy pure Matter cannot be perceived, but can only be\r\nthought: it is a something we add to every reality, as its\r\nbasis, in thinking it. For pure Causality, mere action, without\r\nany defined mode of action, cannot become perceptible,\r\ntherefore it cannot come within any experience.—Thus\r\nMatter is only the objective correlate to pure Understanding;\r\nfor it is Causality in general, and nothing else: just as\r\nthe Understanding itself is direct knowledge of cause and\r\neffect, and nothing else. Now this again is precisely why\r\nthe law of causality is not applicable to Matter itself: that\r\nis to say, Matter has neither beginning nor end, but is and\r\nremains permanent. For as, on the one hand, Causality is\r\nthe indispensable condition of all alternation in the accidents\r\n(forms and qualities) of Matter, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e of all passage in\r\nand out of being; but as, on the other hand, Matter is\r\npure Causality itself, as such, objectively viewed: it is unable\r\nto exercise its own power upon itself, just as the eye\r\ncan see everything but itself. \"Substance\" and Matter\r\nbeing moreover identical, we may call \u003cem\u003eSubstance\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003eaction\u003c/em\u003e\r\nviewed \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein abstracto\u003c/i\u003e: \u003cem\u003eAccidents\u003c/em\u003e, particular modes of action,\r\naction \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein concreto\u003c/i\u003e.—Now these are the results to which true,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e transcendental, Idealism leads. In my chief work I have\r\nshown that the thing in itself—\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e whatever, on the whole,\r\nexists independently of our representation—cannot be got\r\nat by way of representation, but that, to reach it, we must\r\nfollow quite a different path, leading through the inside of\r\nthings, which lets us into the citadel, as it were, by\r\ntreachery.—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut it would be downright chicanery, nothing else, to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg098\"\u003e[98]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntry and compare, let alone identify, such an honest, deep,\r\nthorough analysis of empirical perception as the one I have\r\njust given, which proves all the elements of perception to\r\nbe subjective, with Fichte\u0027s algebraic equations of the \u003cem\u003eEgo\u003c/em\u003e\r\nand the \u003cem\u003eNon-Ego\u003c/em\u003e; with his sophistical pseudo-demonstrations,\r\nwhich in order to be able to deceive his readers had\r\nto be clothed in the obscure, not to say absurd, language\r\nadopted by him; with his explanations of the way in which\r\nthe \u003cem\u003eEgo\u003c/em\u003e spins the \u003cem\u003eNon-Ego\u003c/em\u003e out of itself; in short, with all\r\nthe buffoonery of scientific emptiness.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_96\" title=\"Wissenschaftsleere (literally, emptiness of science), a pun of Schopenhauer\u0027s on the title of Fichte\u0027s Wissenschaftslehre (doctrine of science), which cannot be rendered in English. (Tr.\u0027s Note.)\" id=\"FNanchor_96\"\u003e[96]\u003c/a\u003e Besides, I protest\r\naltogether against any community with this Fichte, as Kant\r\npublicly and emphatically did in a notice \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ead hoc\u003c/i\u003e in the\r\n\"Jenaer Litteratur Zeitung.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_97\" title=\"Kant, \u0027Erklärung über Fichte\u0027s Wissenschaftslehre.\u0027 See the \u0027Intelligenzblatt\u0027 of the Jena Literary Gazette (1799), No. 109.\" id=\"FNanchor_97\"\u003e[97]\u003c/a\u003e Hegelians and similar\r\nignoramuses may continue to hold forth to their heart\u0027s\r\ncontent upon Kant-Fichteian philosophy: there exists a\r\nKantian philosophy and a Fichteian hocus-pocus,—this is\r\nthe true state of the case, and will remain so, in spite of those\r\nwho delight in extolling what is bad and in decrying what\r\nis good, and of these Germany possesses a larger number\r\nthan any other country.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 22. \u003ci\u003eOf the Immediate Object.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus it is from the sensations of our body that we\r\nreceive the data for the very first application of the causal\r\nlaw, and it is precisely by that application that the perception\r\nof this class of objects arises. They therefore have\r\ntheir essence and existence solely in virtue of the intellectual\r\nfunction thus coming into play, and of its\r\nexercise.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg099\"\u003e[99]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nNow, as far as it is the starting-point, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e the mediator,\r\nfor our perception of all other objects, I have called the\r\nbodily organism, in the first edition of the present work,\r\nthe \u003cem\u003eImmediate Object\u003c/em\u003e; this, however, must not be taken\r\nin a strictly literal sense. For although our bodily sensations\r\nare all apprehended directly, still this immediate\r\napprehension does not yet make our body itself perceptible\r\nto us as an object; on the contrary, up to this point all\r\nremains subjective, that is to say, sensation. From this\r\nsensation certainly proceeds the perception of all other\r\nobjects as the causes of such sensations, and these causes\r\nthen present themselves to us as objects; but it is not so\r\nwith the body itself, which only supplies sensations to\r\nconsciousness. It is only \u003cem\u003eindirectly\u003c/em\u003e that we know even\r\nthis body objectively, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e as an object, by its presenting\r\nitself, like all other objects, as the recognised cause of a\r\nsubjectively given effect—and precisely on this account\r\n\u003cem\u003eobjectively\u003c/em\u003e—in our Understanding, or brain (which is the\r\nsame). Now this can only take place when its own senses\r\nare acted upon by its parts: for instance, when the body is\r\nseen by the eye, or felt by the hand, \u0026amp;c., upon which data\r\nthe brain (or understanding) forthwith constructs it as to\r\nshape and quality in space.—The immediate presence in\r\nour consciousness of representations belonging to this\r\nclass, depends therefore upon the position assigned to them\r\nin the causal chain—by which all things are \u003cem\u003econnected\u003c/em\u003e—relatively\r\nto the body (for the time being) of the Subject—by\r\nwhich (the Subject) all things are \u003cem\u003eknown\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 23. \u003ci\u003eArguments against Kant\u0027s Proof of the\u003c/i\u003e à priority \u003ci\u003eof\r\nthe conception of Causality\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne of the chief objects of the \"Critique of Pure\r\nReason\" is to show the universal validity, for all experience,\r\nof the causal law, its \u003cem\u003eà priority\u003c/em\u003e, and, as a necessary\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg100\"\u003e[100]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nconsequence of this, its restriction to possible experience.\r\nNevertheless, I cannot assent to the proof there given of\r\nthe \u003cem\u003eà priority\u003c/em\u003e of the principle, which is substantially\r\nthis:—\"The \u003cem\u003esynthesis\u003c/em\u003e of the manifold by the imagination,\r\nwhich is necessary for all empirical knowledge,\r\ngives succession, but not yet determinate succession:\r\nthat is, it leaves undetermined which of two states perceived\r\nwas the first, not only in my imagination, but in the\r\nobject itself. But definite order in this succession—through\r\nwhich alone what we perceive becomes experience,\r\nor, in other words, authorizes us to form objectively valid\r\njudgments—is first brought into it by the purely intellectual\r\nconception of cause and effect. Thus the principle\r\nof causal relation is the condition which renders experience\r\npossible, and, as such, it is given us \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_98\" title=\"Kant, \u0027Krit. d. r. Vern.\u0027 1st edition, p. 201; 5th edition, p. 246. (English translation by M. Müller, p. 176.) This is, however, not a literal quotation. (Tr.\u0027s note.)\" id=\"FNanchor_98\"\u003e[98]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAccording to this, the order in which changes succeed\r\neach other in real objects becomes known to us as objective\r\nonly by their causality. This assertion Kant repeats\r\nand explains in the \"Critique of Pure Reason,\" especially\r\nin his \"Second Analogy of Experience,\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_99\" title=\"Ibid. p. 189 of the 1st edition; more fully, p. 232 of the 5th edition. (English translation by M. Müller, p. 166.)\" id=\"FNanchor_99\"\u003e[99]\u003c/a\u003e and again at the\r\nconclusion of his \"Third Analogy,\" and I request every\r\none who desires to understand what I am now about to\r\nsay, to read these passages. In them he affirms everywhere\r\nthat \u003cem\u003ethe objectivity of the succession of representations\u003c/em\u003e—which\r\nhe defines as their correspondence with the\r\nsuccession of real objects—is only known through the\r\nrule by which they follow upon one another: that is,\r\nthrough the law of causality; that my mere apprehension\r\nconsequently leaves the objective relation between phenomena\r\nfollowing one another quite undetermined: since\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg101\"\u003e[101]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nI merely apprehend the succession of my own representations,\r\nbut the succession in my apprehension does not\r\nauthorize me to form any judgment whatever as to the\r\nsuccession in the object, unless that judgment be based\r\nupon causality; and since, besides, I might invert the order\r\nin which these perceptions follow each other in my apprehension,\r\nthere being nothing which determines them as\r\nobjective. To illustrate this assertion, Kant brings forward\r\nthe instance of a house, whose parts we may consider in any\r\norder we like, from top to bottom, or from bottom to top;\r\nthe determination of succession being in this case purely\r\nsubjective and not founded upon an object, because it\r\ndepends upon our pleasure. In opposition to this instance,\r\nhe brings forward the perception of a ship sailing down a\r\nriver, which we see successively lower and lower down the\r\nstream, which perception of the successively varying positions\r\nof the ship cannot be changed by the looker-on. In\r\nthis latter case, therefore, he derives the subjective following\r\nin his own apprehension from the objective following\r\nin the phenomenon, and on this account he calls it an\r\n\u003cem\u003eevent\u003c/em\u003e. Now I maintain, on the contrary, that \u003cem\u003ethere is no\r\ndifference at all between these two cases, that both are events\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nand that our knowledge of both is objective: that is to say,\r\nit is knowledge of changes in real objects recognized as\r\nsuch by the Subject. \u003cem\u003eBoth are changes of relative position\r\nin two bodies.\u003c/em\u003e In the first case, one of these bodies is a\r\npart of the observer\u0027s own organism, the eye, and the other\r\nis the house, with respect to the different parts of which\r\nthe eye successively alters its position. In the second, it\r\nis the ship which alters its position towards the stream;\r\ntherefore the change occurs between two bodies. Both are\r\nevents, the only difference being that, in the first, the\r\nchange has its starting-point in the observer\u0027s own body,\r\nfrom whose sensations undoubtedly all his perceptions\r\noriginally proceed, but which is nevertheless an object\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg102\"\u003e[102]\u003c/span\u003e\r\namong objects, and in consequence obeys the laws of the\r\nobjective, material world. For the observer, as a purely\r\ncognising individual, any movement of his body is simply\r\nan empirically perceived fact. It would be just as possible\r\nin the second as in the first instance, to invert the\r\norder of succession in the change, were it as easy for the\r\nobserver to move the ship up the stream as to alter the\r\ndirection of his own eyes. For Kant infers the successive\r\nperception of different parts of the house to be neither\r\nobjective nor an event, because it depends upon his own\r\nwill. But the movement of his eyes in the direction from\r\nroof to basement is one event, and in the direction from\r\nbasement to roof another event, just as much as the sailing\r\nof the ship. There is no difference whatever here, nor is\r\nthere any difference either, as to their being or not being\r\nevents, between my passing a troop of soldiers and their\r\npassing me. If we fix our eyes on a ship sailing close by\r\nthe shore on which we are standing, it soon seems as if it\r\nwere the ship that stood still and the shore that moved.\r\nNow, in this instance we are mistaken, it is true, as to the\r\ncause of the relative change of position, since we attribute\r\nit to a wrong cause; the real succession in the relative\r\npositions of our body towards the ship is nevertheless quite\r\nrightly and objectively recognised by us. Even Kant himself\r\nwould not have believed that there was any difference,\r\nhad he borne in mind that his own body was an object\r\namong objects, and that the succession in his empirical\r\nperceptions depended upon the succession of the impressions\r\nreceived from other objects by his body, and was\r\ntherefore an objective succession: that is to say, one which\r\ntakes place among objects \u003cem\u003edirectly\u003c/em\u003e (if not indirectly) and\r\nindependently of the will of the Subject, and which may\r\ntherefore be quite well recognised without any causal\r\nconnection between the objects acting successively on his\r\nbody.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg103\"\u003e[103]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nKant says, Time cannot be perceived; therefore no succession\r\nof representations can be empirically perceived as\r\nobjective: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e can be distinguished as changes in phenomena\r\nfrom the changes of mere subjective representations.\r\nThe causal law, being a rule according to which states\r\nfollow one another, is the only means by which the objectivity\r\nof a change can be known. Now, the result of\r\nhis assertion would be, that no succession in Time could\r\nbe perceived by us as objective, excepting that of cause\r\nand effect, and that every other succession of phenomena\r\nwe perceive, would only be determined so, and not otherwise,\r\nby our own will. In contradiction to all this I must\r\nadduce the fact, that it is quite possible for phenomena to\r\n\u003cem\u003efollow upon\u003c/em\u003e one another without \u003cem\u003efollowing from\u003c/em\u003e one another.\r\nNor is the law of causality by any means prejudiced by\r\nthis; for it remains certain that each change is the effect\r\nof another change, this being firmly established \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nonly each change not only follows upon the single one\r\nwhich is its cause, but upon all the other changes which\r\noccur simultaneously with that cause, and with which that\r\ncause stands in no causal connection whatever. It is not\r\nperceived by me exactly in the regular order of causal\r\nsuccession, but in quite a different order, which is, however,\r\nno less objective on that account, and which differs\r\nwidely from any subjective succession depending on my\r\ncaprice, such as, for instance, the pictures of my imagination.\r\nThe succession, in Time, of events which stand in\r\nno causal connection with each other is precisely what we\r\ncall \u003cem\u003econtingency\u003c/em\u003e.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_100\" title=\"In German Zufall, a word derived from the Zusammenfallen (falling together), Zusammentreffen (meeting together), or coinciding of what is unconnected, just as τὸ συμβεβηκός from συμβαίνειν. (Compare Aristotle, \u0027Anal. post.,\u0027 i. 4.)\" id=\"FNanchor_100\"\u003e[100]\u003c/a\u003e Just as I am leaving my house, a tile\r\nhappens to fall from the roof which strikes me; now, there\r\nis no causal connection whatever between my going out and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg104\"\u003e[104]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe falling of the tile; yet the order of their succession—that\r\nis, that my going out preceded the falling of the tile—is\r\nobjectively determined in my apprehension, not subjectively\r\nby my will, by which that order would otherwise\r\nhave most likely been inverted. The order in which tones\r\nfollow each other in a musical composition is likewise\r\nobjectively determined, not subjectively by me, the listener;\r\nyet who would think of asserting that musical\r\ntones follow one another according to the law of cause and\r\neffect? Even the succession of day and night is undoubtedly\r\nknown to us as an objective one, but we as\r\ncertainly do not look upon them as causes and effects of\r\none another; and as to their common cause, the whole\r\nworld was in error till Copernicus came; yet the correct\r\nknowledge of their succession was not in the least disturbed\r\nby that error. Hume\u0027s hypothesis, by the way,\r\nalso finds its refutation through this; since the following\r\nof day and night upon each other—the most ancient of\r\nall successions and the one least liable to exception—has\r\nnever yet misled anyone into taking them for cause and\r\neffect of each other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eElsewhere Kant asserts, that a representation only shows\r\nreality (which, I conclude, means that it is distinguished\r\nfrom a mere mental image) by our recognising its necessary\r\nconnection with other representations subject to rule (the\r\ncausal law) and its place in a determined order of the\r\ntime-relations of our representations. But of how few\r\nrepresentations are we able to know the place assigned to\r\nthem by the law of causality in the chain of causes and\r\neffects! Yet we are never embarrassed to distinguish objective\r\nfrom subjective representations: real, from imaginary\r\nobjects. When asleep, we are unable to make this\r\ndistinction, for our brain is then isolated from the peripherical\r\nnervous system, and thereby from external influences.\r\nIn our dreams therefore, we take imaginary for\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg105\"\u003e[105]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreal things, and it is only when we awaken: that is, when\r\nour nervous sensibility, and through this the outer world,\r\nonce more comes within our consciousness, that we become\r\naware of our mistake; still, even in our dreams, so long\r\nas they last, the causal law holds good, only an impossible\r\nmaterial is often substituted for the usual one. We might\r\nalmost think that Kant was influenced by Leibnitz in\r\nwriting the passage we have quoted, however much he\r\ndiffers from him in all the rest of his philosophy; especially\r\nif we consider that Leibnitz expresses precisely\r\nsimilar views, when, for instance, he says: \"\u003cspan lang=\"fr\"\u003eLa vérité des\r\nchoses sensibles ne consiste que dans la liaison des phénomènes,\r\nqui doit avoir sa raison, et c\u0027est ce qui les distingue\r\ndes songes. —— Le vrai Critérion, en matière des\r\nobjets des sens, est la liaison des phénomènes, qui garantit\r\nles vérités de fait, à l\u0027egard des choses sensibles hors de\r\nnous.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_101\" title=\"Leibnitz, \u0027Nouveaux Essais sur l\u0027Entendement,\u0027 lib. iv. ch. ii. sect. 14.\" id=\"FNanchor_101\"\u003e[101]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is clear that in proving the \u003cem\u003eà priority\u003c/em\u003e and the necessity\r\nof the causal law by the fact that the objective\r\nsuccession of changes is known to us only by means of\r\nthat law, and that, in so far, causality is a condition for\r\nall experience, Kant fell into a very singular error, and\r\none which is indeed so palpable, that the only way we can\r\naccount for it is, by supposing him to have become so\r\nabsorbed in the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e part of our knowledge, that he\r\nlost sight of what would have been evident to anyone else.\r\nThe only correct demonstration of the \u003cem\u003eà priority\u003c/em\u003e of the\r\ncausal law is given by me in § 21 of the present work.\r\nThat \u003cem\u003eà priority\u003c/em\u003e finds its confirmation every moment in the\r\ninfallible security with which we expect experience to tally\r\nwith the causal law: that is to say, in the apodeictic certainty\r\nwe ascribe to it, a certainty which differs from\r\nevery other founded on induction—the certainty, for instance,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg106\"\u003e[106]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof empirically known laws of Nature—in that we\r\ncan conceive no exception to the causal law anywhere\r\nwithin the world of experience. We can, for instance,\r\n\u003cem\u003econceive\u003c/em\u003e that in an exceptional case the law of gravitation\r\nmight cease to act, but not that this could happen without\r\na cause.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eKant and Hume have fallen into opposite errors in their\r\nproofs. Hume asserts that all \u003cem\u003econsequence\u003c/em\u003e is mere \u003cem\u003esequence\u003c/em\u003e;\r\nwhereas Kant affirms that all \u003cem\u003esequence\u003c/em\u003e must necessarily\r\nbe \u003cem\u003econsequence\u003c/em\u003e. Pure Understanding, it is true,\r\ncan only conceive \u003cem\u003econsequence\u003c/em\u003e (causal result), and is no\r\nmore able to conceive mere \u003cem\u003esequence\u003c/em\u003e than to conceive the\r\ndifference between right and left, which, like sequence, is\r\nonly to be grasped by means of pure Sensibility. Empirical\r\nknowledge of the following of events in Time is, indeed,\r\njust as possible as empirical knowledge of juxtaposition of\r\nthings in Space (this Kant denies elsewhere), but \u003cem\u003ethe way\r\nin which\u003c/em\u003e things follow \u003cem\u003eupon\u003c/em\u003e one another in general in Time\r\ncan no more be explained, than the way in which one thing\r\nfollows \u003cem\u003efrom\u003c/em\u003e another (as the effect of a cause): the former\r\nknowledge is given and conditioned by pure Sensibility;\r\nthe latter, by pure Understanding. But in asserting that\r\nknowledge of the objective succession of phenomena can\r\nonly be attained by means of the causal law, Kant commits\r\nthe same error with which he reproaches Leibnitz:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_102\" title=\"Kant, \u0027Kritik d. r. Vern.\u0027 1st edition, p. 275; 5th edition, p. 331. (English translation by M. Müller, p. 236.)\" id=\"FNanchor_102\"\u003e[102]\u003c/a\u003e that\r\nof \"intellectualising the forms of Sensibility.\"—My view\r\nof succession is the following one. We derive our knowledge\r\nof the bare \u003cem\u003epossibility\u003c/em\u003e of succession from the form\r\nof Time, which belongs to pure Sensibility. The succession\r\nof real objects, whose form is precisely Time,\r\nwe know empirically, consequently as \u003cem\u003eactual\u003c/em\u003e. But it is\r\nthrough the Understanding alone, by means of Causality,\r\nthat we gain knowledge of the \u003cem\u003enecessity\u003c/em\u003e of a succession of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg107\"\u003e[107]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntwo states: that is, of a change; and even the fact that we\r\nare able to conceive the necessity of a succession at all,\r\nproves already that the causal law is not known to us\r\nempirically, but given us \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e. The Principle of Sufficient\r\nReason is the general expression for the fundamental\r\nform of the necessary connection between all our objects,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e representations, which lies in the innermost depths of\r\nour cognitive faculty: it is the form common to all representations,\r\nand the only source of the conception of \u003cem\u003enecessity\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nwhich contains absolutely nothing else in it and no\r\nother import, than that of the following of the consequence,\r\nwhen its reason has been established. Now, the reason\r\nwhy this principle determines the order of succession in\r\nTime in the class of representations we are now investigating,\r\nin which it figures as the law of causality, is, that\r\nTime is the form of these representations, therefore the\r\nnecessary connection appears here as the rule of succession.\r\nIn other forms of the principle of sufficient reason, the\r\nnecessary connection it always demands will appear under\r\nquite different forms from that of Time, therefore not as\r\nsuccession; still it always retains the character of a necessary\r\nconnection, by which the identity of the principle\r\nunder all its forms, or rather the unity of the root of all\r\nthe laws of which that principle is the common expression,\r\nreveals itself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf Kant\u0027s assertion were correct, which I dispute, our\r\nonly way of knowing the reality of succession would be\r\nthrough its necessity; but this would presuppose an\r\nUnderstanding that embraced all the series of causes and\r\neffects at once, consequently an omniscient Understanding.\r\nKant has burdened the Understanding with an\r\nimpossibility, merely in order to have less need of\r\nSensibility.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHow can we reconcile Kant\u0027s assertion that our only\r\nmeans of knowing the objective reality of succession is by\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg108\"\u003e[108]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe necessity with which effect follows cause, with his\r\nother assertion\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_103\" title=\"Kant, \u0027Krit. d. r. Vern.\u0027 vol. i. p. 203 of the 1st edition; p. 249 of the 5th edition. (English translation by M. Müller, p. 178.)\" id=\"FNanchor_103\"\u003e[103]\u003c/a\u003e that succession in Time is our only empirical\r\ncriterion for determining which of two states is\r\ncause, and which effect. Who does not see the most\r\nobvious circle here?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we knew objectiveness of succession through Causality,\r\nwe should never be able to think it otherwise than as\r\nCausality, and then it would be nothing else than Causality.\r\nFor, if it were anything else, it would have other distinctive\r\nsigns by which to be recognised; now this is just\r\nwhat Kant denies. Accordingly, if Kant were right, we\r\ncould not say: \"This state is the effect of that one, wherefore\r\nit follows it;\" for following and being an effect,\r\nwould be one and the same thing, and this proposition a\r\ntautology. Besides, if we do away with all distinction\r\nbetween following \u003cem\u003eupon\u003c/em\u003e and following \u003cem\u003efrom\u003c/em\u003e, we once more\r\nyield the point to Hume, who declared all consequence to\r\nbe mere sequence and therefore denied that distinction\r\nlikewise.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eKant\u0027s proof would, consequently, be reduced to this:\r\nthat, empirically, we only know \u003cem\u003eactuality\u003c/em\u003e of succession;\r\nbut as besides we recognise \u003cem\u003enecessity\u003c/em\u003e of succession in\r\ncertain series of occurrences, and even know before all\r\nexperience that every possible occurrence must have a\r\nfixed place in some one of these series, the reality and the\r\n\u003cem\u003eà priority\u003c/em\u003e of the causal law follow as a matter of course,\r\nthe only correct proof of the latter being the one I have\r\ngiven in § 21 of this work.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eParallel with the Kantian theory: that the causal nexus\r\nalone renders objective succession and our knowledge of it\r\npossible, there runs another: that coexistence and our\r\nknowledge of it are only possible through reciprocity. In\r\nthe \"Critique of Pure Reason\" they are presented under\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg109\"\u003e[109]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe title: \"Third Analogy of Experience.\" Here Kant\r\ngoes so far as to say that \"the co-existence of phenomena,\r\nwhich exercise no reciprocal action on one another, but are\r\nseparated by a perfectly empty space, could never become\r\nan object of possible perception\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_104\" title=\"Kant, \u0027Krit. d. r. Vern.\u0027 pp. 212 and 213 of the 1st edition. (English translation, pp. 185 and 186.)\" id=\"FNanchor_104\"\u003e[104]\u003c/a\u003e (which, by the way,\r\nwould be a proof \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e that there is no empty space\r\nbetween the fixed stars), and that \"the light which \u003cem\u003eplays\r\nbetween\u003c/em\u003e our eyes and celestial bodies\"—an expression\r\nconveying surreptitiously the thought, that this starlight\r\nnot only acts upon our eyes, but is acted upon by them\r\nalso—\"produces an intercommunity between us and them,\r\nand proves the co-existence of the latter.\" Now, even\r\nempirically, this last assertion is false; since the sight of a\r\nfixed star by no means proves its coexistence simultaneously\r\nwith its spectator, but, at most, its existence\r\nsome years, nay even some centuries before. Besides, this\r\nsecond Kantian theory stands and falls with the first,\r\nonly it is far more easily detected; and the nullity of\r\nthe whole conception of reciprocity has been shown in\r\n§ 20.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe arguments I have brought forward against Kant\u0027s\r\nproof may be compared with two previous attacks made on\r\nit by Feder,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_105\" title=\"Feder, \u0027Ueber Raum und Causalität.\u0027 sect. 29.\" id=\"FNanchor_105\"\u003e[105]\u003c/a\u003e and by G. E. Schulze.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_106\" title=\"G. E. Schulze, \u0027Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie,\u0027 vol. ii. p. 422 sqq.\" id=\"FNanchor_106\"\u003e[106]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNot without considerable hesitation did I thus venture\r\n(in 1813) to attack a theory which had been universally\r\nreceived as a demonstrated truth, is repeated even now in the\r\nlatest publications,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_107\" title=\"For instance, in Fries\u0027 \u0027Kritik der Vernunft,\u0027 vol. ii. p. 85.\" id=\"FNanchor_107\"\u003e[107]\u003c/a\u003e and forms a chief point in the doctrine\r\nof one for whose profound wisdom I have the greatest\r\nreverence and admiration; one to whom, indeed, I owe so\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg110\"\u003e[110]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmuch, that his spirit might truly say to me, in the words\r\nof Homer:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poetry-container\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eἈχλὺν δ\u0027 αὖ τοι ἀπ\u0027 ὀφθαλμῶν ἕλον, ἣ πρὶν ἐπῆεν.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_108\" title=\"I lifted from thine eyes the darkness which covered them before. (Tr.\u0027s Ad.)\" id=\"FNanchor_108\"\u003e[108]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 24. \u003ci\u003eOf the Misapplication of the Law of Causality.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom the foregoing exposition it follows, that the application\r\nof the causal law to anything but \u003cem\u003echanges\u003c/em\u003e in the\r\nmaterial, empirically given world, is an abuse of it. For\r\ninstance, it is a misapplication to make use of it with reference\r\nto physical forces, without which no changes could\r\ntake place; or to Matter, \u003cem\u003eon\u003c/em\u003e which they take place; or to\r\nthe world, to which we must in that case attribute an\r\nabsolutely objective existence independently of our intellect;\r\nindeed in many other cases besides. I refer the\r\nreader to what I have said on this subject in my chief\r\nwork.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_109\" title=\"\u0027Die Welt a. W. u. V.\u0027 2nd edition, vol. ii. ch. iv. p. 42 et seqq.; 3rd edition, vol. ii. p. 46 et seqq.\" id=\"FNanchor_109\"\u003e[109]\u003c/a\u003e Such misapplications always arise, partly, through\r\nour taking the conception of cause, like many other metaphysical\r\nand ethical conceptions, in far \u003cem\u003etoo wide\u003c/em\u003e a sense;\r\npartly, through our forgetting that the causal law is certainly\r\na presupposition which we bring with us into the\r\nworld, by which the perception of things outside us becomes\r\npossible; but that, just on that account, we are not\r\nauthorized in extending beyond the range and independently\r\nof our cognitive faculty a principle, which has its\r\norigin in the equipment of that faculty, nor in assuming it\r\nto hold good as the everlasting order of the universe and\r\nof all that exists.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg111\"\u003e[111]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 25. \u003ci\u003eThe Time in which a Change takes place.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs the Principle of Sufficient Reason of Becoming is\r\nexclusively applicable to \u003cem\u003echanges\u003c/em\u003e, we must not omit to\r\nmention here, that the ancient philosophers had already\r\nraised the question as to the time in which a change takes\r\nplace, there being no possibility of it taking place during\r\nthe existence of the preceding state nor after the new\r\none has supervened. Yet, if we assign a special time to it\r\nbetween both states, a body would, during this time, be\r\nneither in the first nor in the second state: a dying man,\r\nfor instance, would be neither alive nor dead; a body\r\nneither at rest nor in movement: which would be absurd.\r\nThe scruples and sophistic subtleties which this question\r\nhas evoked, may be found collected together in Sextus\r\nEmpiricus \"Adv. Mathem.\" lib. ix. 267-271, and \"Hypat.\"\r\niii. c. 14; the subject is likewise dealt with by Gellius, l.\r\nvi. c. 13—Plato\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_110\" title=\"Plato, \u0027Parmenides,\u0027 p. 138, ed. Bip.\" id=\"FNanchor_110\"\u003e[110]\u003c/a\u003e had disposed somewhat cavalierly of this\r\nknotty point, by maintaining that changes take place\r\n\u003cem\u003esuddenly\u003c/em\u003e and occupy \u003cem\u003eno time at all\u003c/em\u003e; they occur, he says,\r\nin the ἐξαίφνης (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein repentino\u003c/i\u003e), which he calls an ἄτοπος\r\nφύσις, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν οὖσα; a strange, timeless existence\r\n(which nevertheless comes within Time).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt was accordingly reserved for the perspicacity of Aristotle\r\nto clear up this difficult point, which he has done\r\nprofoundly and exhaustively in the sixth Book of Physics,\r\nchap. i.-viii. His proof that no change takes place suddenly\r\n(in Plato\u0027s ἐξαίφνης), but that each occurs only\r\ngradually and therefore occupies a certain time, is based\r\nentirely upon the pure, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e intuition of Time and of\r\nSpace; but it is also very subtle. The pith of this very\r\nlengthy demonstration may, however, be reduced to the\r\nfollowing propositions. When we say of objects that they\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg112\"\u003e[112]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlimit each other, we mean, that both have their extreme\r\nends in common; therefore only two extended things can\r\nbe conterminous, never two indivisible ones, for then they\r\nwould be \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e—\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e only lines, but not mere points, can be\r\nconterminous. He then transfers this from Space to Time.\r\nAs there always remains a line between two points, so there\r\nalways remains a time between two \u003cem\u003enows\u003c/em\u003e; this is the time\r\nin which a change takes place—\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e when \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e state is in the\r\nfirst, and \u003cem\u003eanother\u003c/em\u003e in the second, \u003cem\u003enow\u003c/em\u003e. This time, like every\r\nother, is divisible to infinity; consequently, whatever is\r\nchanging passes through an infinite number of degrees\r\nwithin that time, through which the second state gradually\r\ngrows out of that \u003cem\u003efirst\u003c/em\u003e one.—The process may perhaps be\r\nmade more intelligible by the following explanation. Between\r\ntwo consecutive states the difference of which is\r\nperceptible to our senses, there are always several intermediate\r\nstates, the difference between which is not perceptible\r\nto us; because, in order to be sensuously perceptible,\r\nthe newly arising state must have reached a\r\ncertain degree of intensity or of magnitude: it is therefore\r\npreceded by degrees of lesser intensity or extension, in\r\npassing through which it gradually arises. Taken collectively,\r\nthese are comprised under the name of \u003cem\u003echange\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nand the time occupied by them is called \u003cem\u003ethe time of change\u003c/em\u003e.\r\nNow, if we apply this to a body being propelled, the first\r\neffect is a certain vibration of its inner parts, which, after\r\ncommunicating the impulse to other parts, breaks out into\r\nexternal motion.—Aristotle infers quite rightly from the\r\ninfinite divisibility of Time, that everything which fills it,\r\ntherefore every change, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e every passage from one state to\r\nanother, must likewise be susceptible of endless subdivision,\r\nso that all that arises, does so in fact by the concourse of\r\nan infinite multitude of parts; accordingly its genesis is\r\nalways gradual, never sudden. From these principles and\r\nthe consequent gradual arising of each movement, he\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg113\"\u003e[113]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndraws the weighty inference in the last chapter of this\r\nBook, that nothing indivisible, no mere \u003cem\u003epoint\u003c/em\u003e can move.\r\nAnd with this conclusion Kant\u0027s definition of Matter, as\r\n\"that which moves in Space,\" completely harmonizes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis law of the continuity and gradual taking place of all\r\nchanges which Aristotle was thus the first to lay down\r\nand prove, we find stated three times by Kant: in his\r\n\"Dissertatio de mundi sensibilis et intelligibilis forma,\"\r\n§ 14, in the \"Critique of Pure Reason,\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_111\" title=\"Kant, \u0027Krit. d. r. Vern.\u0027 1st edition, p. 207; 5th edition, p. 253. (English translation by M. Müller, p. 182.)\" id=\"FNanchor_111\"\u003e[111]\u003c/a\u003e and finally in\r\nhis \"Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_112\" title=\"Kant, \u0027Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft.\u0027 End of the \u0027Allgemeine Anmerkung zur Mechanik.\u0027\" id=\"FNanchor_112\"\u003e[112]\u003c/a\u003e In\r\nall three places his exposition is brief, but also less thorough\r\nthan that of Aristotle; still, in the main, both entirely\r\nagree. We can therefore hardly doubt that, directly or\r\nindirectly, Kant must have derived these ideas from Aristotle,\r\nthough he does not mention him. Aristotle\u0027s proposition—οὐκ\r\nἔστι ἀλλήλων ἐχόμενα τὰ νῦν (\"the moments\r\nof the present are not continuous\")—we here find expressed\r\nas follows: \"between two moments there is always a\r\ntime,\" to which may be objected that \"even between two\r\ncenturies there is none; because in Time as in Space, there\r\nmust always be a pure limit.\"—Thus Kant, instead of mentioning\r\nAristotle, endeavours in the first and earliest of his\r\nthree statements to identify the theory he is advancing\r\nwith Leibnitz\u0027 \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003elex continuitatis\u003c/i\u003e. If they really were the\r\nsame, Leibnitz must have derived his from Aristotle. Now\r\nLeibnitz\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_113\" title=\"According to his own assertion, p. 189 of the \u0027Opera philos.\u0027 ed. Erdmann.\" id=\"FNanchor_113\"\u003e[113]\u003c/a\u003e first stated this \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eLoi de la continuité\u003c/i\u003e in a letter to\r\nBayle.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_114\" title=\"Ibid. p. 104.\" id=\"FNanchor_114\"\u003e[114]\u003c/a\u003e There, however, he calls it \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003ePrincipe de l\u0027ordre\r\ngénéral\u003c/i\u003e, and gives under this name a very general, vague,\r\nchiefly geometrical argumentation, having no direct bearing\r\non the time of change, which he does not even mention.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg114\"\u003e[114]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eCHAPTER V.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eON THE SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT AND\r\nTHE FORM OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON\r\nWHICH PREDOMINATES IN IT.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 26. \u003ci\u003eExplanation of this Class of Objects.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe only essential distinction between the human race\r\nand animals, which from time immemorial has been\r\nattributed to a special cognitive faculty peculiar to mankind,\r\ncalled \u003cem\u003eReason\u003c/em\u003e, is based upon the fact that man owns\r\na class of representations which is not shared by any\r\nanimal. These are \u003cem\u003econceptions\u003c/em\u003e, therefore \u003cem\u003eabstract\u003c/em\u003e, as opposed\r\nto \u003cem\u003eintuitive\u003c/em\u003e, representations, from which they are nevertheless\r\nderived. The immediate consequence of this is, that\r\nanimals can neither speak nor laugh; but indirectly all\r\nthose various, important characteristics which distinguish\r\nhuman from animal life are its consequence. For, through\r\nthe supervention of abstract representation, motivation has\r\nnow changed its character. Although human actions result\r\nwith a necessity no less rigorous than that which rules the\r\nactions of animals, yet through this new kind of motivation—so\r\nfar as here it consists in \u003cem\u003ethoughts\u003c/em\u003e which render\r\nelective decision (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e a conscious conflict of motives) possible—action\r\nwith a purpose, with reflection, according to\r\nplans and principles, in concert with others, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c., now\r\ntakes the place of mere impulse given by present, perceptible\r\nobjects; but by this it gives rise to all that renders human\r\nlife so rich, so artificial, and so terrible, that man, in this\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg115\"\u003e[115]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nWestern Hemisphere, where his skin has become bleached,\r\nand where the primitive, true, profound religions of his\r\nfirst home could not follow him, now no longer recognises\r\nanimals as his brethren, and falsely believes them to\r\ndiffer fundamentally from him, seeking to confirm this\r\nillusion by calling them brutes, giving degrading names to\r\nthe vital functions which they have in common with him,\r\nand proclaiming them outlaws; and thus he hardens his\r\nheart against that identity of being between them and\r\nhimself, which is nevertheless constantly obtruding itself\r\nupon him.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eStill, as we have said, the whole difference lies in this—that,\r\nbesides the intuitive representations examined in the\r\nlast chapter, which are shared by animals, other, abstract\r\nrepresentations derived from these intuitive ones, are lodged\r\nin the human brain, which is chiefly on this account so\r\nmuch larger than that of animals. Representations of this\r\nsort have been called \u003cem\u003econceptions\u003c/em\u003e,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_115\" title=\"Begriff, comprehensive thought, derived from begreifen, to comprehend. [Tr.]\" id=\"FNanchor_115\"\u003e[115]\u003c/a\u003e because each comprehends\r\ninnumerable individual things in, or rather under,\r\nitself, and thus forms a complex.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_116\" title=\"Inbegriff, comprehensive totality. [Tr.]\" id=\"FNanchor_116\"\u003e[116]\u003c/a\u003e We may also define\r\nthem as \u003cem\u003erepresentations drawn from representations\u003c/em\u003e. For, in\r\nforming them, the faculty of abstraction decomposes the\r\ncomplete, intuitive representations described in our last\r\nchapter into their component parts, in order to think each\r\nof these parts separately as the different qualities of, or\r\nrelations between, things. By this process, however, the\r\nrepresentations necessarily forfeit their perceptibility; just\r\nas water, when decomposed, ceases to be fluid and visible.\r\nFor although each quality thus isolated (abstracted) can\r\nquite well be \u003cem\u003ethought\u003c/em\u003e by itself, it does not at all follow that\r\nit can be \u003cem\u003eperceived\u003c/em\u003e by itself. We form conceptions by dropping\r\na good deal of what is given us in perception, in order to be\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg116\"\u003e[116]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nable to think the rest by itself. To conceive therefore, is\r\nto think less than we perceive. If, after considering divers\r\nobjects of perception, we drop something different belonging\r\nto each, yet retain what is the same in all, the result\r\nwill be the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003egenus\u003c/i\u003e of that species. The generic conception\r\nis accordingly always the conception of every species\r\ncomprised under it, after deducting all that does not\r\nbelong to \u003cem\u003eevery\u003c/em\u003e species. Now, as every possible conception\r\nmay be thought as a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003egenus\u003c/i\u003e, a conception is always\r\nsomething general, and as such, not perceptible. Every\r\nconception has on this account also its \u003cem\u003esphere\u003c/em\u003e, as the sum-total\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_117\" title=\"Inbegriff.\" id=\"FNanchor_117\"\u003e[117]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof what may be thought under it. The higher we\r\nascend in abstract thought, the more we deduct, the less\r\ntherefore remains to be thought. The highest, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e the\r\nmost general conceptions, are the emptiest and poorest, and\r\nat last become mere husks, such as, for instance, being,\r\nessence, thing, becoming, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c.—Of what avail, by the\r\nway, can philosophical systems be, which are only spun out\r\nof conceptions of this sort and have for their substance\r\nmere flimsy husks of thoughts like these? They must of\r\nnecessity be exceedingly empty, poor, and therefore also\r\ndreadfully tiresome.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow as representations, thus sublimated and analysed\r\nto form abstract conceptions, have, as we have said, forfeited\r\nall perceptibility, they would entirely escape our consciousness,\r\nand be of no avail to it for the thinking processes to\r\nwhich they are destined, were they not fixed and retained\r\nin our senses by arbitrary signs. These signs are words.\r\nIn as far as they constitute the contents of dictionaries\r\nand therefore of language, words always designate \u003cem\u003egeneral\u003c/em\u003e\r\nrepresentations, conceptions, never perceptible objects;\r\nwhereas a lexicon which enumerates individual things, only\r\ncontains proper names, not words, and is either a geographical\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg117\"\u003e[117]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor historical dictionary: that is to say, it enumerates\r\nwhat is separated either by Time or by Space; for,\r\nas \u003cem\u003emy\u003c/em\u003e readers know, Time and Space are the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprincipium\r\nindividuationis\u003c/i\u003e. It is only because animals are limited to\r\nintuitive representations and incapable of any abstraction—incapable\r\ntherefore of forming conceptions—that they are\r\nwithout language, even when they are able to articulate\r\nwords; whereas they understand proper names. That it\r\nis this same defect which excludes them from laughter, I\r\nhave shown in my theory of the ridiculous.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_118\" title=\"See \u0027Die Welt a. W. u. V.\u0027 vol. i. sect. 13, and vol. ii. ch. 8.\" id=\"FNanchor_118\"\u003e[118]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn analyzing a long, continuous speech made by a man\r\nof no education, we find in it an abundance of logical forms,\r\nclauses, turns of phrase, distinctions, and subtleties of all\r\nsorts, correctly expressed by means of grammatical forms\r\nwith their inflections and constructions, and even with a\r\nfrequent use of the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003esermo obliquus\u003c/i\u003e, of the different moods,\r\n\u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c., all in conformity with rule, which astonishes us,\r\nand in which we are forced to recognise an extensive and\r\nperfectly coherent knowledge. Still this knowledge has been\r\nacquired on the basis of the perceptible world, the reduction\r\nof whose whole essence to abstract conceptions is the fundamental\r\nbusiness of the Reason, and can only take place by\r\nmeans of language. In learning the use of language therefore,\r\nthe whole mechanism of Reason—that is, all that\r\nis essential in Logic—is brought to our consciousness. Now\r\nthis can evidently not take place without considerable\r\nmental effort and fixed attention, for which the desire to\r\nlearn gives children the requisite strength. So long as\r\nthat desire has before it what is really available and necessary,\r\nit is vigorous, and it only appears weak when we try\r\nto force upon children that which is not suited to their\r\ncomprehension. Thus even a coarsely educated child, in\r\nlearning all the turns and subtleties of language, as well\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg118\"\u003e[118]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthrough its own conversation as that of others, accomplishes\r\nthe development of its Reason, and acquires that really\r\nconcrete Logic, which consists less in logical rules than in\r\nthe proper application of them; just as the rules of\r\nharmony are learnt by persons of musical talent simply by\r\nplaying the piano, without reading music or studying\r\nthorough-bass.—The deaf and dumb alone are excluded\r\nfrom the above-mentioned logical training through the\r\nacquirement of speech; therefore they are almost as unreasonable\r\nas animals, when they have not been taught to\r\nread by the very artificial means specially adapted for their\r\nrequirements, which takes the place of the natural schooling\r\nof Reason.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 27. \u003ci\u003eThe Utility of Conceptions.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe fundamental essence of our Reason or thinking\r\nfaculty is, as we have seen, the power of abstraction, or the\r\nfaculty of forming \u003cem\u003econceptions\u003c/em\u003e: it is therefore the presence\r\nof these in our consciousness which produces such amazing\r\nresults. That it should be able to do this, rests mainly on\r\nthe following grounds.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is just because they contain less than the representations\r\nfrom which they are drawn, that conceptions are\r\neasier to deal with than representations; they are, in fact,\r\nto these almost as the formula of higher arithmetic to the\r\nmental operations which give rise to them and which they\r\nrepresent, or as a logarithm to its number. They only\r\ncontain just the part required of the many representations\r\nfrom which they are drawn; if instead we were to try\r\nto recall those representations themselves by means of\r\nthe imagination, we should, as it were, have to lug about\r\na load of unessential lumber, which would only embarrass\r\nus; whereas, by the help of conceptions, we are enabled\r\nto think only those parts and relations of all these representations\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg119\"\u003e[119]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich are wanted for each individual purpose:\r\nso that their employment may be compared to doing\r\naway with superfluous luggage, or to working with extracts\r\ninstead of plants themselves—with quinine, instead of\r\nbark. What is properly called \u003cem\u003ethinking\u003c/em\u003e, in its narrowest\r\nsense, is the occupation of the intellect with conceptions:\r\nthat is, the presence in our consciousness of the class of\r\nrepresentations we now have before us. This is also what we\r\ncall \u003cem\u003ereflection\u003c/em\u003e: a word which, by a figure of speech borrowed\r\nfrom Optics, expresses at once the derivative and the\r\nsecondary character of this kind of knowledge. Now it is\r\nthis thinking, this reflection, which gives man that \u003cem\u003edeliberation\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nwhich is wanting in animals. For, by enabling him\r\nto think many things under one conception, but always\r\nonly the essential part in each of them, it allows him to\r\ndrop at his pleasure every kind of distinction, consequently\r\neven those of Time and of Space, and thus he acquires the\r\npower of embracing in thought, not only the past and the\r\nfuture, but also what is absent; while animals are in\r\nevery respect strictly bound to the present. This deliberative\r\nfaculty again is really the root of all those theoretical\r\nand practical achievements which give man so great a\r\nsuperiority over animals; first and foremost, of his care\r\nfor the future while taking the past into consideration;\r\nthen of his premeditated, systematic, methodical procedure\r\nin all undertakings, and therefore of the co-operation of\r\nmany persons towards a common end, and, by this, of law,\r\norder, the State, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c.—But it is especially in Science\r\nthat the use of conceptions is important; for they are, properly\r\nspeaking, its materials. The aims of all the sciences\r\nmay, indeed, in the last resort, be reduced to knowledge of\r\nthe particular through the general; now this is only\r\npossible by means of the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003edictum de omni et nullo\u003c/i\u003e, and this,\r\nagain, is only possible through the existence of conceptions.\r\nAristotle therefore says: ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τῶν καθόλου οὐκ ἔστιν\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg120\"\u003e[120]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nἐπιστήμην λαβεῖν\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_119\" title=\"Aristot. \u0027Metaph.\u0027 xii. c. 9, \u0027For without universals it is impossible to have knowledge.\u0027 (Tr.\u0027s Add.)\" id=\"FNanchor_119\"\u003e[119]\u003c/a\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eabsque universalibus enim non datur\r\nscientia\u003c/i\u003e). Conceptions are precisely those \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003euniversalia\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nwhose mode of existence formed the argument of the long\r\ncontroversy between the Realists and Nominalists in the\r\nMiddle Ages.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 28. \u003ci\u003eRepresentatives of Conceptions. The Faculty of\r\nJudgment.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eConceptions must not be confounded with pictures of\r\nthe imagination, these being intuitive and complete, therefore\r\nindividual representations, although they are not\r\ncalled forth by sensuous impressions and do not therefore\r\nbelong to the complex of experience. Even when\r\nused to \u003cem\u003erepresent a conception\u003c/em\u003e, a picture of the imagination\r\n(phantasm) ought to be distinguished from a conception.\r\nWe use phantasms as \u003cem\u003erepresentatives of conceptions\u003c/em\u003e when\r\nwe try to grasp the intuitive representation itself that has\r\ngiven rise to the conception and to make it tally with\r\nthat conception, which is in all cases impossible; for\r\nthere is no representation, for instance, of dog in general,\r\ncolour in general, triangle in general, number in general,\r\nnor is there any picture of the imagination which corresponds\r\nto these conceptions. Then we evoke the phantasm\r\nof some dog or other, which, as a representation, must in\r\nall cases be determined: that is, it must have a certain\r\nsize, shape, colour, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c.; even though the conception\r\nrepresented by it has no such determinations. When we\r\nuse such \u003cem\u003erepresentatives of conceptions\u003c/em\u003e however, we are\r\nalways conscious that they are not adequate to the conceptions\r\nthey represent, and that they are full of arbitrary\r\ndeterminations. Towards the end of the first part of his\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg121\"\u003e[121]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nTwelfth Essay on Human Understanding, Hume expresses\r\nhimself in agreement with this view, as also Rousseau in\r\nhis \"Discours sur l\u0027Origine de l\u0027Inégalité.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_120\" title=\"Part the First, in the middle.\" id=\"FNanchor_120\"\u003e[120]\u003c/a\u003e Kant\u0027s doctrine,\r\non the contrary, is a totally different one. The\r\nmatter is one which introspection and clear reflection can\r\nalone decide. Each of us must therefore examine himself\r\nas to whether he is conscious in his own conceptions of a\r\n\"Monogram of Pure Imagination \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e;\" whether, for\r\ninstance, when he thinks dog, he is conscious of something\r\n\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eentre chien et loup\u003c/i\u003e; or whether, as I have here explained\r\nit, he is either thinking an abstract conception through his\r\nReason, or representing some representative of that conception\r\nas a complete picture through his imagination.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll thinking, in a wider sense: that is, all inner activity\r\nof the mind in general, necessitates either words or pictures\r\nof the imagination: without one or other of these it\r\nhas nothing to hold by. They are not, however, both necessary\r\nat the same time, although they may co-operate to\r\ntheir mutual support. Now, thinking in a narrower sense—that\r\nis, abstract reflection by means of words—is either\r\npurely logical reasoning, in which case it keeps strictly to\r\nits own sphere; or it touches upon the limits of perceptible\r\nrepresentations in order to come to an understanding with\r\nthem, so as to bring that which is given by experience and\r\ngrasped by perception into connection with abstract conceptions\r\nresulting from clear reflection, and thus to gain\r\ncomplete possession of it. In thinking therefore, we seek\r\neither for the conception or rule to which a given perception\r\nbelongs, or for the particular case which proves a\r\ngiven conception or rule. In this quality, thinking is an\r\nactivity of the \u003cem\u003efaculty of judgment\u003c/em\u003e, and indeed in the first\r\ncase a reflective, in the second, a subsuming activity. The\r\nfaculty of judgment is accordingly the mediator between\r\nintuitive and abstract knowledge, or between the \u003cins title=\"Underderstanding\" id=\"C121\"\u003eUnderstanding\u003c/ins\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg122\"\u003e[122]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand the Reason. In most men it has merely\r\nrudimentary, often even merely nominal existence;\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_121\" title=\"Let any one to whom this assertion may appear hyperbolical, consider the fate of Göthe\u0027s \u0027Theory of Colours\u0027 (Farbenlehre), and should he wonder at my finding a corroboration for it in that fate, he will himself have corroborated it a second time.\" id=\"FNanchor_121\"\u003e[121]\u003c/a\u003e they\r\nare destined to follow the lead of others, and it is as well\r\nnot to converse with them more than is necessary.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe true kernel of all knowledge is that reflection which\r\nworks with the help of intuitive representations; for it\r\ngoes back to the fountain-head, to the basis of all conceptions.\r\nTherefore it generates all really original thoughts,\r\nall primary and fundamental views and all inventions, so\r\nfar as chance had not the largest share in them. \u003cem\u003eThe\r\nUnderstanding\u003c/em\u003e prevails in this sort of thinking, whilst \u003cem\u003ethe\r\nReason\u003c/em\u003e is the chief factor in purely abstract reflection.\r\nCertain thoughts which wander about for a long time in our\r\nheads, belong to this sort of reflection: thoughts which\r\ncome and go, now clothed in one kind of intuition, now in\r\nanother, until they at last become clear, fix themselves in\r\nconceptions and find words to express them. Some, indeed,\r\nnever find words to express them, and these are,\r\nunfortunately, the best of all: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003equæ voce meliora sunt\u003c/i\u003e, as\r\nApuleius says.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAristotle, however, went too far in thinking that no\r\nreflection is possible without pictures of the imagination.\r\nNevertheless, what he says on this point,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_122\" title=\"Aristot. \u0027De anima,\u0027 iii. c. c. 3, 7, 8.\" id=\"FNanchor_122\"\u003e[122]\u003c/a\u003e οὐδέποτε\r\nνοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eanima sine phantasmate nunquam\r\nintelligit\u003c/i\u003e),\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_123\" title=\"\u0027The mind never thinks without (the aid of) an image.\u0027 [Tr.]\" id=\"FNanchor_123\"\u003e[123]\u003c/a\u003e and ὅταν θεωρῇ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φάντασμά τι\r\nθεωρεῖν (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003equi contemplatur, necesse est, una cum phantasmate\r\ncontempletur\u003c/i\u003e),\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_124\" title=\"\u0027He who observes anything must observe some image along with it.\u0027 [Tr.]\" id=\"FNanchor_124\"\u003e[124]\u003c/a\u003e and again, νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστι ἄνευ φαντάσματος\r\n(\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003efieri non potest, ut sine phantasmate quidquam intelligatur\u003c/i\u003e),\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_125\" title=\"\u0027De Memoria,\u0027 c. 1: \u0027It is impossible to think without (the aid of) an image.\u0027\" id=\"FNanchor_125\"\u003e[125]\u003c/a\u003e—made\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg123\"\u003e[123]\u003c/span\u003e\r\na strong impression upon the thinkers of the\r\nfifteenth and sixteenth centuries, who therefore frequently\r\nand emphatically repeat what he says. Pico della Mirandola,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_126\" title=\"\u0027De imaginatione,\u0027 c. 5.\" id=\"FNanchor_126\"\u003e[126]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nfor instance, says: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eNecesse est, eum, qui ratiocinatur et intelligit,\r\nphantasmata speculari\u003c/i\u003e;—Melanchthon\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_127\" title=\"\u0027De anima,\u0027 p. 130.\" id=\"FNanchor_127\"\u003e[127]\u003c/a\u003e says: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eOportet intelligentem\r\nphantasmata speculari\u003c/i\u003e;—and Jord. Brunus\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_128\" title=\"\u0027De compositione imaginum,\u0027 p. 10.\" id=\"FNanchor_128\"\u003e[128]\u003c/a\u003e says,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003edicit Aristoteles: oportet scire volentem, phantasmata speculari\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nPomponatius\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_129\" title=\"\u0027De immortalitate,\u0027 pp. 54 et 70.\" id=\"FNanchor_129\"\u003e[129]\u003c/a\u003e expresses himself in the same sense.—On\r\nthe whole, all that can be affirmed is, that every true and\r\nprimary notion, every genuine philosophic theorem even,\r\nmust have some sort of intuitive view for its innermost\r\nkernel or root. This, though something momentary\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_130\" title=\"\u0027Ein Momentanes end Einheitliches.\u0027\" id=\"FNanchor_130\"\u003e[130]\u003c/a\u003e and\r\nsingle, subsequently imparts life and spirit to the whole\r\nanalysis, however exhaustive it may be,—just as one drop\r\nof the right reagent suffices to tinge a whole solution\r\nwith the colour of the precipitate which it causes. When\r\nan analysis has a kernel of this sort, it is like a bank note\r\nissued by a firm which has ready money wherewith to back\r\nit; whereas every other analysis proceeding from mere\r\ncombinations of abstract conceptions, resembles a bank\r\nnote which is issued by a firm which has nothing but other\r\npaper obligations to back it with. All mere rational talk\r\nthus renders the result of given conceptions clearer, but\r\ndoes not, strictly speaking, bring anything new to light.\r\nIt might therefore be left to each individual to do himself,\r\ninstead of filling whole volumes every day.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 29. \u003ci\u003ePrinciple of Sufficient Reason of Knowing.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut, even in a narrower sense, thinking does not consist\r\nin the bare presence of abstract conceptions in our consciousness,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg124\"\u003e[124]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbut rather in connecting or separating two or\r\nmore of these conceptions under sundry restrictions and\r\nmodifications which Logic indicates in the Theory of Judgments.\r\nA relation of this sort between conceptions distinctly\r\nthought and expressed we call a \u003cem\u003ejudgment\u003c/em\u003e. Now,\r\nwith reference to these judgments, the Principle of Sufficient\r\nReason here once more holds good, yet in a widely\r\ndifferent form from that which has been explained in the\r\npreceding chapter; for here it appears as the Principle of\r\nSufficient Reason of Knowing, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprincipium rationis sufficientis\r\ncognoscendi\u003c/i\u003e. As such, it asserts that if a \u003cem\u003ejudgment\u003c/em\u003e\r\nis to express \u003cem\u003eknowledge\u003c/em\u003e of any kind, it must have a sufficient\r\nreason: in virtue of which quality it then receives the\r\npredicate \u003cem\u003etrue\u003c/em\u003e. Thus \u003cem\u003etruth\u003c/em\u003e is the reference of a judgment\r\nto something different from itself, called its reason or\r\nground, which reason, as we shall presently see, itself\r\nadmits of a considerable variety of kinds. As, however,\r\nthis reason is invariably a something upon which the\r\njudgment rests, the German term for it, viz., \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eGrund\u003c/i\u003e, is not\r\nill chosen. In Latin, and in all languages of Latin origin,\r\nthe word by which a reason of knowledge is designated, is\r\nthe same as that used for the faculty of Reason (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eratiocinatio\u003c/i\u003e):\r\nboth are called \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eratio\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"it\"\u003ela ragione\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"es\"\u003ela razon\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003ela raison\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003cem\u003ethe reason\u003c/em\u003e. From this it is evident, that attaining knowledge\r\nof the reasons of judgments had been recognised as\r\nReason\u0027s highest function, its business κατ\u0027 ἐξοχήν. Now,\r\nthese grounds upon which a judgment may rest, may be\r\ndivided into \u003cem\u003efour\u003c/em\u003e different kinds, and the truth obtained\r\nby that judgment will correspondingly differ. They are\r\nstated in the following paragraph.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 30. \u003ci\u003eLogical Truth.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eA judgment may have for its reason another judgment;\r\nin this case it has \u003cem\u003elogical\u003c/em\u003e or \u003cem\u003eformal\u003c/em\u003e truth. Whether it has\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg125\"\u003e[125]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmaterial truth also, remains an open question and depends\r\non whether the judgment on which it rests has material\r\ntruth, or whether the series of judgments on which it is\r\nfounded leads to a judgment which has material truth, or\r\nnot. This founding of a judgment upon another judgment\r\nalways originates in a comparison between them which\r\ntakes place either directly, by mere conversion or contraposition,\r\nor by adding a third judgment, and then the truth\r\nof the judgment we are founding becomes evident through\r\ntheir mutual relation. This operation is the complete\r\n\u003cem\u003esyllogism\u003c/em\u003e. It is brought about either by the opposition or\r\nby the subsumption of conceptions. As the syllogism,\r\nwhich is the founding of one judgment upon another by\r\nmeans of a third, never has to do with anything but judgments;\r\nand as judgments are only combinations of conceptions,\r\nand conceptions again are the exclusive object of our\r\nReason: syllogizing has been rightly called Reason\u0027s special\r\nfunction. The whole syllogistic science, in fact, is nothing\r\nbut the sum-total of the rules for applying the principle of\r\nsufficient reason to the mutual relations of judgments;\r\nconsequently it is the canon of \u003cem\u003elogical truth\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eJudgments, whose truth becomes evident through the\r\nfour well-known laws of thinking, must likewise be regarded\r\nas based upon other judgments; for these four laws are\r\nthemselves precisely judgments, from which follows the\r\ntruth of those other judgments. For instance, the judgment:\r\n\"A triangle is a space enclosed within three lines,\"\r\nhas for its last reason the Principle of Identity, that is to\r\nsay, the thought expressed by that principle. The judgment,\r\n\"No body is without extension,\" has for its last\r\nreason the Principle of Contradiction. This again, \"Every\r\njudgment is either true or untrue,\" has for its last reason\r\nthe Principle of the Excluded Middle; and finally, \"No\r\none can admit anything to be true without knowing\r\nwhy,\" has for its last reason the Principle of Sufficient\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg126\"\u003e[126]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nReason of Knowing. In the general employment of our\r\nReason, we do not, it is true, before admitting them to be\r\ntrue, reduce judgments which follow from the four laws of\r\nthinking to their last reasons, as premisses; for most men\r\nare even ignorant of the very existence of these abstract laws.\r\nThe dependence of such judgments upon them, as their\r\npremisses, is however no more diminished by this, than the\r\ndependence of the first judgment upon the second, as its\r\npremiss, is diminished by the fact, that it is not at all necessary\r\nfor the principle, \"all bodies incline towards the\r\ncentre of the earth,\" to be present in the consciousness of\r\nany one who says, \"this body will fall if its support is\r\nremoved.\" That in Logic, therefore, \u003cem\u003eintrinsic truth\u003c/em\u003e should\r\nhitherto have been attributed to all judgments founded\r\nexclusively on the four laws of thinking: that is to say,\r\nthat these judgments should have been pronounced \u003cem\u003edirectly\r\ntrue\u003c/em\u003e, and that this \u003cem\u003eintrinsic logical truth\u003c/em\u003e should have been\r\ndistinguished from \u003cem\u003eextrinsic logical truth\u003c/em\u003e, as attributed\r\nto all judgments which have another judgment for their\r\nreason, I cannot approve. Every truth is the reference of\r\na judgment to something \u003cem\u003eoutside\u003c/em\u003e of it, and the term \u003cem\u003eintrinsic\r\ntruth\u003c/em\u003e is a contradiction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 31. \u003ci\u003eEmpirical Truth.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eA judgment may be founded upon a representation of\r\nthe first class, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e a perception by means of the senses,\r\nconsequently on experience. In this case it has \u003cem\u003ematerial\r\ntruth\u003c/em\u003e, and moreover, if the judgment is founded \u003cem\u003eimmediately\u003c/em\u003e\r\non experience, this truth is \u003cem\u003eempirical truth\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen we say, \"A judgment has \u003cem\u003ematerial truth\u003c/em\u003e,\" we\r\nmean on the whole, that its conceptions are connected,\r\nseparated, limited, according to the requirements of the\r\nintuitive representations through which it is inferred. To\r\nattain knowledge of this, is the direct function of the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg127\"\u003e[127]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cem\u003efaculty of judgment\u003c/em\u003e, as the mediator between the intuitive\r\nand the abstract or discursive faculty of knowing—in\r\nother words, between the Understanding and the Reason.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 32. \u003ci\u003eTranscendental Truth.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003cem\u003eforms\u003c/em\u003e of intuitive, empirical knowledge which lie\r\nwithin the Understanding and pure Sensibility may, as conditions\r\nof all possible experience, be the grounds of a judgment,\r\nwhich is in that case synthetical \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e. As nevertheless\r\nthis kind of judgment has material truth, its truth is\r\n\u003cem\u003etranscendental\u003c/em\u003e; because the judgment is based not only on\r\nexperience, but on the conditions of all possible experience\r\nlying within us. For it is determined precisely by that\r\nwhich determines experience itself: namely, either by the\r\nforms of Space and of Time perceived by us \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e, or by\r\nthe causal law, known to us \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e. Propositions such\r\nas: two straight lines do not include a space; nothing\r\nhappens without a cause; matter can neither come into\r\nbeing nor perish; 3 × 7 = 21, are examples of this kind\r\nof judgment. The whole of pure Mathematics, and no\r\nless my tables of the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ePrædicabilia à priori\u003c/i\u003e,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_131\" title=\"See \u0027Die Welt a. W. u. V.\u0027 3rd edition, vol. ii. ch. iv. p. 55.\" id=\"FNanchor_131\"\u003e[131]\u003c/a\u003e as well as\r\nmost of Kant\u0027s theorems in his \"Metaphysische Anfangsgründe\r\nder Naturwissenschaft,\" may, properly speaking, be\r\nadduced in corroboration of this kind of truth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 33. \u003ci\u003eMetalogical Truth.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLastly, a judgment may be founded on the formal conditions\r\nof all thinking, which are contained in the Reason;\r\nand in this case its truth is of a kind which seems to me best\r\ndefined as \u003cem\u003emetalogical truth\u003c/em\u003e. This expression has nothing\r\nat all to do with the \"Metalogicus\" written by Johannes\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg128\"\u003e[128]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nSarisberriensis in the twelfth century, for he declares in\r\nhis prologue, \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003equia Logicæ suscepi patrocinium, Metalogicus\r\ninscriptus est liber\u003c/i\u003e,\" and never makes use of the word again.\r\nThere are only four metalogically true judgments of this\r\nsort, which were discovered long ago by induction, and\r\ncalled the laws of all thinking; although entire uniformity\r\nof opinion as to their expression and even as to their\r\nnumber has not yet been arrived at, whereas all agree\r\nperfectly as to what they are on the whole meant to indicate.\r\nThey are the following:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. A subject is equal to the sum total of its predicates,\r\nor a = a.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. No predicate can be attributed and denied to a subject\r\nat the same time, or a = -a = o.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. One of two opposite, contradictory predicates must\r\nbelong to every subject.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e4. Truth is the reference of a judgment to something\r\noutside of it, as its sufficient reason.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is by means of a kind of reflection which I am inclined\r\nto call Reason\u0027s self-examination, that we know that\r\nthese judgments express the conditions of all thinking,\r\nand therefore have these conditions for their reason.\r\nFor, by the fruitlessness of its endeavours to think in\r\nopposition to these laws, our Reason acknowledges them\r\nto be the conditions of all possible thinking: we then find\r\nout, that it is just as impossible to think in opposition\r\nto them, as it is to move the members of our body in a\r\ncontrary direction to their joints. If it were possible for\r\nthe subject to know itself, these laws would be known to\r\nus \u003cem\u003eimmediately\u003c/em\u003e, and we should not need to try experiments\r\nwith them on objects, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e representations. In this\r\nrespect it is just the same with the reasons of judgments\r\nwhich have transcendental truth; for they do not either\r\ncome into our consciousness immediately, but only in\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003econcreto\u003c/i\u003e, by means of objects, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e of representations. In\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg129\"\u003e[129]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nendeavouring, for instance, to conceive a change without a\r\npreceding cause, or a passing into or out of being of\r\nMatter, we become aware that it is impossible; moreover\r\nwe recognise this impossibility to be an objective\r\none, although its root lies in our intellect: for we could not\r\notherwise bring it to consciousness in a subjective way.\r\nThere is, on the whole, a strong likeness and connection\r\nbetween transcendental and metalogical truths, which\r\nshows that they spring from a common root. In this\r\nchapter we see the Principle of Sufficient Reason chiefly as\r\nmetalogical truth, whereas in the last it appeared as\r\ntranscendental truth and in the next one it will again be\r\nseen as transcendental truth under another form. In the\r\npresent treatise I am taking special pains, precisely on\r\nthis account, to establish the Principle of Sufficient Reason\r\nas a judgment having a fourfold reason; by which I do\r\nnot mean four different reasons leading contingently to\r\nthe same judgment, but one reason presenting itself under\r\na fourfold aspect: and this is what I call its Fourfold\r\nRoot. The other three metalogical truths so strongly\r\nresemble one another, that in considering them one is\r\nalmost necessarily induced to search for their common\r\nexpression, as I have done in the Ninth Chapter of the\r\nSecond Volume of my chief work. On the other hand, they\r\ndiffer considerably from the Principle of Sufficient Reason.\r\nIf we were to seek an analogue for the three other metalogical\r\ntruths among transcendental truths, the one I should\r\nchoose would be this: Substance, I mean Matter, is permanent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 34. \u003ci\u003eReason.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs the class of representations I have dealt with in\r\nthis chapter belongs exclusively to Man, and as all that\r\ndistinguishes human life so forcibly from that of animals\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg130\"\u003e[130]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand confers so great a superiority on man, is, as we have\r\nshown, based upon his faculty for these representations,\r\nthis faculty evidently and unquestionably constitutes that\r\nReason, which from time immemorial has been reputed\r\nthe prerogative of mankind. Likewise all that has been\r\nconsidered by all nations and in all times explicitly as\r\nthe work or manifestation of the Reason, of the λόγος,\r\nλόγιμον, λογιστικόν, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eratio\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"it\"\u003ela ragione\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"es\"\u003ela razon\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003ela raison\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003cem\u003ereason\u003c/em\u003e, may evidently also be reduced to what is only\r\npossible for abstract, discursive, reflective, mediate knowledge,\r\nconditioned by words, and not for mere intuitive,\r\nimmediate, sensuous knowledge, which belongs to animals\r\nalso. Cicero rightly places \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eratio et oratio\u003c/i\u003e together,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_132\" title=\"Cicer. \u0027De Offic.\u0027 i. 16.\" id=\"FNanchor_132\"\u003e[132]\u003c/a\u003e and describes\r\nthem as \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003equæ docendo, discendo, communicando, disceptando,\r\njudicando, conciliat inter se homines\u003c/i\u003e, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c., and\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_133\" title=\"Idem, \u0027De nat. deor.\u0027 ii. 7.\" id=\"FNanchor_133\"\u003e[133]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003erationem dico, et, si placet, pluribus verbis, mentem, consilium,\r\ncogitationem, prudentiam\u003c/i\u003e. And\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_134\" title=\"Idem, \u0027De Leg.\u0027 i. 10.\" id=\"FNanchor_134\"\u003e[134]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eratio, qua una præstamus\r\nbeluis, per quam conjectura valemus, argumentamur, refellimus,\r\ndisserimus, conficimus aliquid, concludimus\u003c/i\u003e. But, in all\r\nages and countries, philosophers have invariably expressed\r\nthemselves in this sense with respect to the Reason, even to\r\nKant himself, who still defines it as the faculty for principles\r\nand for inference; although it cannot be denied that\r\nhe first gave rise to the distorted views which followed. In\r\nmy principal work,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_135\" title=\"See \u0027Die Welt a. W. u. V.\u0027 2nd edition, vol. i. § 8, and also in the Appendix, pp. 577-585 (3rd edition, pp. 610-620), and again vol. ii. ch. vi.; finally \u0027Die b. G-P. d. Ethik,\u0027 pp. 148-154 (2nd edition, pp. 146-151).\" id=\"FNanchor_135\"\u003e[135]\u003c/a\u003e and also in the Fundamental Problems\r\nof Ethics, I have spoken at great length about the\r\nagreement of all philosophers on this point, as well as\r\nabout the true nature of Reason, as opposed to the distorted\r\nconceptions for which we have to thank the professors\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg131\"\u003e[131]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof philosophy of this century. I need not therefore\r\nrepeat what has already been said there, and shall limit\r\nmyself to the following considerations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur professors of philosophy have thought fit to do away\r\nwith the name which had hitherto been given to that faculty\r\nof thinking and pondering by means of reflection and conceptions,\r\nwhich distinguishes man from animals, which\r\nnecessitates language while it qualifies us for its use,\r\nwith which all human deliberation and all human achievements\r\nhang together, and which had therefore always been\r\nviewed in this light and understood in this sense by all\r\nnations and even by all philosophers. In defiance of all\r\nsound taste and custom, our professors decided that this\r\nfaculty should henceforth be called \u003cem\u003eUnderstanding\u003c/em\u003e instead of\r\n\u003cem\u003eReason\u003c/em\u003e, and that all that is derived from it should be named\r\n\u003cem\u003eintelligent\u003c/em\u003e instead of \u003cem\u003erational\u003c/em\u003e, which, of course, had a strange,\r\nawkward ring about it, like a discordant tone in music.\r\nFor in all ages and countries the words \u003cem\u003eunderstanding\u003c/em\u003e,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eintellectus\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eacumen\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eperspicacia\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003esagacitas\u003c/i\u003e, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c., had been\r\nused to denote the more intuitive faculty described in our\r\nlast chapter; and its results, which differ specifically from\r\nthose of Reason here in question, have always been called\r\n\u003cem\u003eintelligent\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003esagacious\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003eclever\u003c/em\u003e, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c. \u003cem\u003eIntelligent\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003erational\u003c/em\u003e\r\nwere accordingly always distinguished one from the other,\r\nas manifestations of two entirely and widely different mental\r\nfaculties. Our professional philosophers could not, however,\r\ntake this into account; their policy required the\r\nsacrifice, and in such cases the cry is: \"Move on, truth;\r\nfor we have higher, well-defined aims in view! Make way\r\nfor us, truth, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein majorem Dei gloriam\u003c/i\u003e, as thou hast long\r\nago learnt to do! Is it thou who givest fees and pensions?\r\nMove on, truth, move on; betake thyself to merit and\r\ncrouch in the corner!\" The fact was, they wanted Reason\u0027s\r\nplace and name for a faculty of their own creation and\r\nfabrication, or to speak more correctly and honestly, for a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg132\"\u003e[132]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncompletely fictitious faculty, destined to help them out of\r\nthe straits to which Kant had reduced them; a faculty\r\nfor direct, metaphysical knowledge: that is to say, one\r\nwhich transcends all possible experience, is able to grasp\r\nthe world of things in themselves and their relations, and\r\nis therefore, before all, consciousness of God (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eGottesbewusstsein\u003c/i\u003e):\r\nthat is, it knows God the Lord immediately, construes\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e the way in which he has created the Universe,\r\nor, should this sound too trivial, the way in which he has produced\r\nit out of himself, or to a certain degree generated it\r\nby some more or less necessary vital process, or again—as\r\nthe most convenient proceeding, however comical it may\r\nappear—simply \"dismissed\" it, according to the custom\r\nof sovereigns at the end of an audience, and left it to get\r\nupon its legs by itself and walk away wherever it liked.\r\nNothing less than the impudence of a scribbler of nonsense\r\nlike Hegel, could, it is true, be found to venture upon this\r\nlast step. Yet it is tom-foolery like this which, largely\r\namplified, has filled hundreds of volumes for the last fifty\r\nyears under the name of cognitions of Reason (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eVernunfterkenntnisse\u003c/i\u003e),\r\nand forms the argument of so many works\r\ncalled philosophical by their authors, and scientific by others—one\r\nwould think ironically—this expression being even\r\nrepeated to satiety. \u003cem\u003eReason\u003c/em\u003e, to which all this wisdom\r\nis falsely and audaciously imputed, is pronounced to be\r\na \"supersensuous faculty,\" or a faculty \"for ideas;\"\r\nin short, an oracular power lying within us, designed\r\ndirectly for Metaphysics. During the last half-century,\r\nhowever, there has been considerable discrepancy of opinion\r\namong the adepts as to the way in which all these supersensuous\r\nwonders are perceived. According to the most\r\naudacious, Reason has a direct intuition of the Absolute,\r\nor even \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ead libitum\u003c/i\u003e of the Infinite and of its evolutions towards\r\nthe Finite. Others, somewhat less bold, opine that\r\nits mode of receiving this information partakes rather of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg133\"\u003e[133]\u003c/span\u003e\r\naudition than of vision; since it does not exactly see, but\r\nmerely \u003cem\u003ehears\u003c/em\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003evernimmt\u003c/i\u003e), what is going on in \"cloud-cuckoo-land\"\r\n(νεφελοκοκκυγία), and then honestly transmits what\r\nit has thus received to the Understanding, to be worked up\r\ninto text-books. According to a pun of Jacobi\u0027s, even the\r\nGerman name for Reason, \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eVernunft\u003c/i\u003e,\" is derived from\r\nthis pretended \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eVernehmen\u003c/i\u003e;\" whereas it evidently comes\r\nfrom that \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eVernehmen\u003c/i\u003e\" which is conveyed by language\r\nand conditioned by Reason, and by which the distinct perception\r\nof words and their meaning is designated, as opposed\r\nto mere sensuous hearing which animals have also. This\r\nmiserable \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003ejeu de mots\u003c/i\u003e nevertheless continues, after half a\r\ncentury, to find favour; it passes for a serious thought,\r\nnay even for a proof, and has been repeated over and over\r\nagain. The most modest among the adepts again assert,\r\nthat Reason neither sees nor hears, therefore it receives\r\nneither a vision nor a report of all these wonders, and has\r\na mere vague \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eAhndung\u003c/i\u003e, or misgiving of them; but then\r\nthey drop the \u003cem\u003ed\u003c/em\u003e, by which the word (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eAhnung\u003c/i\u003e) acquires a\r\npeculiar touch of silliness, which, backed up as it is by the\r\nsheepish look of the apostle for the time being of this wisdom,\r\ncannot fail to gain it entrance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMy readers know that I only admit the word \u003cem\u003eidea\u003c/em\u003e in its\r\nprimitive, that is Platonic, sense, and that I have treated\r\nthis point at length and exhaustively in the Third Book of\r\nmy chief work. The French and English, on the other\r\nhand, certainly attach a very commonplace, but quite clear\r\nand definite meaning to the word \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eidée\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003cem\u003eidea\u003c/em\u003e; whereas\r\nthe Germans lose their heads as soon as they hear the word\r\n\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eIdeen\u003c/i\u003e;\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_136\" title=\"Here Schopenhauer adds, \u0027especially when pronounced Uedähen.\u0027 [Tr.]\" id=\"FNanchor_136\"\u003e[136]\u003c/a\u003e all presence of mind abandons them, and they feel\r\nas if they were about to ascend in a balloon. Here therefore\r\nwas a field of action for our adepts in intellectual intuition;\r\nso the most impudent of them, the notorious \u003cem\u003echarlatan\u003c/em\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg134\"\u003e[134]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nHegel, without more ado, called his theory of the universe\r\nand of all things \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eDie Idee\u003c/i\u003e,\" and in this of course all\r\nthought that they had something to lay hold of. Still, if\r\nwe inquire into the nature of these \u003cem\u003eideas\u003c/em\u003e for which Reason is\r\npronounced to be the faculty, without letting ourselves be\r\nput out of countenance, the explanation usually given is an\r\nempty, high-flown, confused verbiage, in set periods of such\r\nlength, that if the reader does not fall asleep before he\r\nhas half read it, he will find himself bewildered rather than\r\nenlightened at the end; nay, he may even have a suspicion\r\nthat these ideas are very like chimæras. Meanwhile, should\r\nanyone show a desire to know more about this sort of ideas,\r\nhe will have all kinds of things served up to him. Now it\r\nwill be the chief subjects of the theses of Scholasticism—I\r\nallude here to the representations of God, of an immortal\r\nSoul, of a real, objectively existent World and its laws—which\r\nKant himself has unfortunately called Ideas of\r\nReason, erroneously and unjustifiably, as I have shown in\r\nmy Critique of his philosophy, yet merely with a view to\r\nproving the utter impossibility of demonstrating them and\r\ntheir want of all theoretical authority. Then again it will\r\nbe, as a variation, only God, Freedom, and Immortality; at\r\nother times it will be the Absolute, whose acquaintance we\r\nhave already made in § 20, as the Cosmological Proof, forced\r\nto travel incognito; or the Infinite as opposed to the Finite;\r\nfor, on the whole, the German reader is disposed to content\r\nhimself with such empty talk as this, without perceiving\r\nthat the only clear thought he can get out of it is, \u0027that\r\nwhich has an end\u0027 and \u0027that which has none.\u0027 \u0027The\r\nGood, the True, and the Beautiful,\u0027 moreover, stand high\r\nin favour with the sentimental and tender-hearted as\r\npretended \u003cem\u003eideas\u003c/em\u003e, though they are really only three very wide\r\nand abstract conceptions, because they are extracted from\r\na multitude of things and relations; wherefore, like many\r\nother such \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eabstracta\u003c/i\u003e, they are exceedingly empty. As regards\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg135\"\u003e[135]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntheir contents, I have shown above (§ 29) that Truth is a\r\nquality belonging exclusively to judgments: that is, a logical\r\nquality; and as to the other two \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eabstracta\u003c/i\u003e, I refer my readers\r\npartly to § 65 of the first volume, partly to the entire Third\r\nBook of my chief work. If, nevertheless, a very solemn and\r\nmysterious air is assumed and the eyebrows are raised up\r\nto the wig whenever these three meagre \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eabstracta\u003c/i\u003e are\r\nmentioned, young people may easily be induced to believe\r\nthat something peculiar and inexpressible lies behind them,\r\nwhich entitles them to be called \u003cem\u003eideas\u003c/em\u003e, and harnessed to\r\nthe triumphal car of this would-be metaphysical Reason.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen therefore we are told, that we possess a faculty\r\nfor direct, material (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, not only formal, but substantial),\r\nsupersensuous knowledge, (that is, a knowledge which\r\ntranscends all possible experience), a faculty specially designed\r\nfor metaphysical insight, and inherent in us for\r\nthis purpose—I must take the liberty to call this a downright\r\nlie. For the slightest candid self-examination will\r\nsuffice to convince us that absolutely no such faculty resides\r\nwithin us. The result at which all honest, competent,\r\nauthoritative thinkers have arrived in the course of ages,\r\nmoreover, tallies exactly with my assertion. It is as follows:\r\nAll that is innate in the whole of our cognitive\r\nfaculty, all that is therefore \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e and independent of\r\nexperience, is strictly limited to the \u003cem\u003eformal\u003c/em\u003e part of knowledge:\r\nthat is, to the consciousness of the peculiar functions\r\nof the intellect and of the only way in which they can\r\npossibly act; but in order to give material knowledge,\r\nthese functions one and all require material from outside.\r\nWithin us therefore lie the forms of external, objective\r\nperception: Time and Space, and then the law of\r\nCausality—as a mere form of the Understanding which\r\nenables it to construct the objective, corporeal world—finally,\r\nthe formal part of abstract knowledge: this last is\r\ndeposited and treated of in \u003cem\u003eLogic\u003c/em\u003e, which our forefathers\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg136\"\u003e[136]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntherefore rightly called the \u003cem\u003eTheory of Reason\u003c/em\u003e. But this\r\nvery Logic teaches us also, that the \u003cem\u003econceptions\u003c/em\u003e which constitute\r\nthose judgments and conclusions to which all logical\r\nlaws refer, must look to \u003cem\u003eintuitive\u003c/em\u003e knowledge for their \u003cem\u003ematerial\u003c/em\u003e\r\nand their \u003cem\u003econtent\u003c/em\u003e; just as the Understanding, which creates\r\n\u003cem\u003ethis intuitive knowledge\u003c/em\u003e, looks to sensation for the material\r\nwhich gives content to its \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e forms.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus all that is \u003cem\u003ematerial\u003c/em\u003e in our knowledge: that is to say,\r\nall that cannot be reduced to subjective \u003cem\u003eform\u003c/em\u003e, to individual\r\nmode of activity, to functions of our intellect,—its whole\r\n\u003cem\u003ematerial\u003c/em\u003e therefore,—comes from outside; that is, in the last\r\nresort, from the objective perception of the corporeal world,\r\nwhich has its origin in sensation. Now it is this intuitive\r\nand, so far as material content is concerned, empirical\r\nknowledge, which \u003cem\u003eReason\u003c/em\u003e—\u003cem\u003ereal\u003c/em\u003e Reason—works up into conceptions,\r\nwhich it fixes sensuously by means of words; these\r\nconceptions then supply the materials for its endless combinations\r\nthrough judgments and conclusions, which constitute\r\nthe weft of our thought-world. \u003cem\u003eReason\u003c/em\u003e therefore has absolutely\r\nno \u003cem\u003ematerial\u003c/em\u003e, but merely a \u003cem\u003eformal\u003c/em\u003e, content, and this is\r\nthe object-matter of Logic, which consequently contains only\r\nforms and rules for thinking operations. In reflecting,\r\nReason is absolutely forced to take its material contents\r\nfrom outside, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, from the intuitive representations which\r\nthe Understanding has created. Its functions are exercised\r\non them, first of all, in forming \u003cem\u003econceptions\u003c/em\u003e, by dropping\r\nsome of the various qualities of things while retaining others,\r\nwhich are then connected together to a conception. Representations,\r\nhowever, forfeit their capacity for being intuitively\r\nperceived by this process, while they become easier to\r\ndeal with, as has already been shown. It is therefore in\r\nthis, and in this alone, that the efficiency of Reason consists;\r\nwhereas it can never supply \u003cem\u003ematerial content from its own resources\u003c/em\u003e.—It\r\nhas nothing but forms: its nature is feminine;\r\nit only conceives, but does not generate. It is not by mere\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg137\"\u003e[137]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nchance that the Reason is feminine in all Latin, as well as\r\nTeutonic, languages; whereas the Understanding is invariably\r\nmasculine.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn using such expressions as \u0027sound Reason teaches\r\nthis,\u0027 or \u0027Reason should control passion,\u0027 we by no means\r\nimply that Reason furnishes material knowledge out of its\r\nown resources; but rather do we point to the results of\r\nrational reflection, that is, to logical inference from principles\r\nwhich abstract knowledge has gradually gathered\r\nfrom experience and by which we obtain a clear and comprehensive\r\nview, not only of what is empirically necessary,\r\nand may therefore, the case occurring, be foreseen, but\r\neven of the reasons and consequences of our own deeds also.\r\n\u003cem\u003eReasonable\u003c/em\u003e or \u003cem\u003erational\u003c/em\u003e is everywhere synonymous with \u003cem\u003econsistent\u003c/em\u003e\r\nor \u003cem\u003elogical\u003c/em\u003e, and conversely; for Logic is only Reason\u0027s\r\nnatural procedure itself, expressed in a system of rules;\r\ntherefore these expressions (rational and logical) stand in\r\nthe same relation to one another as theory and practice.\r\nExactly in this same sense too, when we speak of a\r\nreasonable conduct, we mean by it one which is quite consistent,\r\none therefore which proceeds from general conceptions,\r\nand is not determined by the transitory impression\r\nof the moment. By this, however, the morality of\r\nsuch conduct is in no wise determined: it may be good\r\nor bad indifferently. Detailed explanations of all this are\r\nto be found in my \"Critique of Kant\u0027s Philosophy,\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_137\" title=\"\u0027Die Welt a. W. u. V.\u0027 2nd edition, vol. i. p. 576 et seqq.; 3rd edition, p. 610 et seq.\" id=\"FNanchor_137\"\u003e[137]\u003c/a\u003e and\r\nalso in my \"Fundamental Problems of Ethics.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_138\" title=\"Schopenhauer, \u0027Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik,\u0027 p. 152; 2nd edition, p. 149 et seq.\" id=\"FNanchor_138\"\u003e[138]\u003c/a\u003e Notions\r\nderived from \u003cem\u003epure Reason\u003c/em\u003e are, lastly, those which have\r\ntheir source in the \u003cem\u003eformal\u003c/em\u003e part, whether intuitive or reflective,\r\nof our cognitive faculty; those, consequently, which we are\r\nable to bring to our consciousness \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e, that is, without\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg138\"\u003e[138]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe help of experience. They are invariably based upon\r\nprinciples which have transcendental or metalogical truth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eA Reason, on the other hand, which supplies material\r\nknowledge primarily out of its own resources and conveys\r\npositive information transcending the sphere of possible\r\nexperience; a Reason which, in order to do this, must\r\nnecessarily contain \u003cem\u003einnate ideas\u003c/em\u003e, is a pure fiction, invented\r\nby our professional philosophers and a product\r\nof the terror with which Kant\u0027s Critique of Pure Reason\r\nhas inspired them. I wonder now, whether these gentlemen\r\nknow a certain Locke and whether they have ever\r\nread his works? Perhaps they may have done so in\r\ntimes long gone by, cursorily and superficially, while looking\r\ndown complacently on this great thinker from the\r\nheights of their own conscious superiority: may be, too, in\r\nsome inferior German translation; for I do not yet see that\r\nthe knowledge of modern languages has increased in proportion\r\nto the deplorable decrease in that of ancient ones.\r\nHow could time besides be found for such old croakers as\r\nLocke, when even a real, thorough knowledge of Kant\u0027s\r\nPhilosophy at present hardly exists excepting in a very few,\r\nvery old heads? The youth of the generation now at its\r\nmaturity had of course to be spent in the study of\r\n\"Hegel\u0027s gigantic mind,\" of the \"sublime Schleiermacher,\"\r\nand of the \"acute Herbart.\" Alas! alas! the great mischief\r\nin academical hero-worship of this sort, and in the\r\nglorification of university celebrities by worthy colleagues\r\nin office or hopeful aspirants to it, is precisely, that\r\nordinary intellects—Nature\u0027s mere manufactured ware—are\r\npresented to honest credulous youths of immature\r\njudgment, as master minds, exceptions and ornaments of\r\nmankind. The students forthwith throw all their energies\r\ninto the barren study of the endless, insipid scribblings of\r\nsuch mediocrities, thus wasting the short, invaluable period\r\nallotted to them for higher education, instead of using it\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg139\"\u003e[139]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto attain the sound information they might have found in\r\nthe works of those extremely rare, genuine, truly exceptional\r\nthinkers, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003enantes in gurgite vasto\u003c/i\u003e, who only rise to the\r\nsurface every now and then in the course of ages, because\r\nNature produced but one of each kind, and then \"destroyed\r\nthe mould.\" For this generation also those great minds\r\nmight have had life, had our youth not been cheated out\r\nof its share in their wisdom by these exceedingly pernicious\r\nextollers of mediocrity, members of the vast league and\r\nbrotherhood of mediocrities, which is as flourishing to-day\r\nas it ever was and still hoists its flag as high as it can in\r\npersistent antagonism to all that is great and genuine,\r\nas humiliating to its members. Thanks to them, our age\r\nhas declined to so low an ebb, that Kant\u0027s Philosophy,\r\nwhich it took our fathers years of study, of serious application\r\nand of strenuous effort to understand, has again\r\nbecome foreign to the present generation, which stands\r\nbefore it like ὄνος πρὸς λύραν, at times attacking it coarsely\r\nand clumsily—as barbarians throw stones at the statue of\r\nsome Greek god which is foreign to them. Now, as this is\r\nthe case, I feel it incumbent upon me to advise all champions\r\nof a Reason that perceives, comprehends, and knows\r\ndirectly—in short, that supplies material knowledge out of\r\nits own resources—to read, as something new to them, the\r\n\u003cem\u003eFirst Book\u003c/em\u003e of Locke\u0027s work, which has been celebrated\r\nthroughout the world for the last hundred and fifty years,\r\nand in it especially to peruse §§ 21-26 of the Third Chapter,\r\nexpressly directed against all innate notions. For\r\nalthough Locke goes too far in denying all innate truths,\r\ninasmuch as he extends his denial even to our \u003cem\u003eformal\u003c/em\u003e\r\nknowledge—a point in which he has been brilliantly rectified\r\nby Kant—he is nevertheless perfectly and undeniably\r\nright with reference to all \u003cem\u003ematerial\u003c/em\u003e knowledge: that is, all\r\nknowledge which gives substance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have already said in my Ethics what I must nevertheless\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg140\"\u003e[140]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nrepeat here, because, as the Spanish proverb says,\r\n\"\u003ci lang=\"es\"\u003eNo \u003cins title=\"huy\" id=\"C140\"\u003ehay\u003c/ins\u003e peor sordo que quien no quiere oir\u003c/i\u003e\" (None so\r\ndeaf as those who will not hear): namely, that if Reason\r\nwere a faculty specially designed for Metaphysics, a faculty\r\nwhich supplied the material of knowledge and could reveal\r\nthat which transcends all possible experience, the\r\nsame harmony would necessarily reign between men on\r\nmetaphysical and religious subjects—for they are identical—as\r\non mathematical ones, and those who differed in\r\nopinion from the rest would simply be looked upon as not\r\nquite right in their mind. Now exactly the contrary takes\r\nplace, for on no subject are men so completely at variance\r\nwith one another as upon these. Ever since men first\r\nbegan to think, philosophical systems have opposed and\r\ncombated each other everywhere; they are, in fact,\r\noften diametrically contrary to one another. Ever since\r\nmen first began to believe (which is still longer), religions\r\nhave fought against one another with fire and sword, with\r\nexcommunication and cannons. But in times when faith\r\nwas most ardent, it was not the lunatic asylum, but the\r\nInquisition, with all its paraphernalia, which awaited individual\r\nheretics. Here again, therefore, experience flatly\r\nand categorically contradicts the false assertion, that\r\nReason is a faculty for direct metaphysical knowledge, or,\r\nto speak more clearly, of inspiration from above. Surely\r\nit is high time that severe judgment should be passed\r\nupon this Reason, since, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ehorribile dictu\u003c/i\u003e, so lame, so\r\npalpable a falsehood continues after half a century to\r\nbe hawked about all over Germany, wandering year by\r\nyear from the professors\u0027 chair to the students\u0027 bench,\r\nand from bench to chair, and has actually found a few\r\nsimpletons, even in France, willing to believe in it, and\r\ncarry it about in that country also. Here, however, French\r\n\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003ebon-sens\u003c/i\u003e will very soon send \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003ela raison transcendentale\u003c/i\u003e about\r\nits business.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg141\"\u003e[141]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nBut where was this falsehood originally hatched? How\r\ndid the fiction first come into the world? I am bound to\r\nconfess that it was first originated by Kant\u0027s Practical\r\nReason with its Categorical Imperative. For when this\r\nPractical Reason had once been admitted, nothing further\r\nwas needed than the addition of a second, no less sovereign\r\nTheoretical Reason, as its counterpart, or twin-sister:\r\na Reason which proclaims metaphysical truths \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eex tripode\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nI have described the brilliant success of this invention\r\nin my Fundamental Problems of Ethics\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_139\" title=\"Schopenhauer, \u0027Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik,\u0027 p. 148 and sqq. (p. 146 et seq. of 2nd edition.)\" id=\"FNanchor_139\"\u003e[139]\u003c/a\u003e to which\r\nwork I refer my reader. Now, although I grant that\r\nKant first gave rise to this false assumption, I am, nevertheless,\r\nbound to add, that those who want to dance are\r\nnot long in finding a piper. For it is surely as though\r\na curse lay on mankind, causing them, in virtue of a\r\nnatural affinity for all that is corrupt and bad, to prefer\r\nand hold up to admiration the inferior, not to say downright\r\ndefective, portions of the works of eminent minds,\r\nwhile the really admirable parts are tolerated as merely\r\naccessory. Very few in our time know wherein the peculiar\r\ndepth and true grandeur of Kant\u0027s philosophy lies;\r\nfor his works have necessarily ceased to be comprehended\r\nsince they have ceased to be studied. In fact, they are\r\nnow only cursorily read, for historical purposes, by those\r\nwho are under the delusion that philosophy has advanced,\r\nnot to say begun, since Kant. We soon perceive therefore,\r\nthat in spite of all their talk about Kantian philosophy,\r\nthese people really know nothing of it but the husk,\r\nthe mere outer envelope, and that if perchance they may\r\nhere or there have caught up a stray sentence or brought\r\naway a rough sketch of it, they have never penetrated to\r\nthe depths of its meaning and spirit. People of this sort\r\nhave always been chiefly attracted, in Kant\u0027s Philosophy,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg142\"\u003e[142]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfirst of all by the Antinomies, on account of their oddity,\r\nbut still more by his Practical Reason with its Categorical\r\nImperative, nay even by the Moral Theory he placed\r\non the top of it, though with this last he was never in\r\nearnest; for a theoretical dogma which has only practical\r\nvalidity, is very like the wooden guns we allow our children\r\nto handle without fear of danger: properly speaking, it\r\nbelongs to the same category as: \"Wash my skin, but\r\nwithout wetting it.\" Now, as regards the Categorical Imperative,\r\nKant never asserted it as a fact, but, on the contrary,\r\nprotests repeatedly against this being done; he\r\nmerely served it up as the result of an exceedingly curious\r\ncombination of thoughts, because he stood in need of a\r\nsheet-anchor for morality. Our professors of philosophy,\r\nhowever, never sifted the matter to the bottom, so that it\r\nseems as if no one before me had ever thoroughly investigated\r\nit. Instead of this, they made all haste to bring the\r\nCategorical Imperative into credit as a firmly established\r\nfact, calling it in their purism \"the moral law\"—which,\r\nby the way, always reminds me of Bürger\u0027s \"Mam\u0027zelle\r\nLarègle;\" indeed, they have made out of it something as\r\nmassive as the stone tables of Moses, whose place it\r\nentirely takes, for them. Now in my Essay upon the\r\nFundament of Morality, I have brought this same\r\nPractical Reason with its Categorical Imperative under the\r\nanatomical knife, and proved so clearly and conclusively\r\nthat they never had any life or truth, that I should like\r\nto see the man who can refute me with reasons, and so\r\nhelp the Categorical Imperative honestly on its legs again.\r\nMeanwhile, our professors of philosophy do not allow\r\nthemselves to be put out of countenance by this. They\r\ncan no more dispense with their \"moral law of practical\r\nReason,\" as a convenient \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003edeus ex machina\u003c/i\u003e on which to\r\nfound their morality, than with Free Will: both are essential\r\npoints in their old woman\u0027s philosophy. No matter if\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg143\"\u003e[143]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nI have made an end of both, since, for them, both continue\r\nto exist, like deceased sovereigns who for political reasons\r\nare occasionally allowed to continue reigning for a few\r\ndays after their death. These worthies simply pursue\r\ntheir tactics of old against my merciless demolition of those\r\ntwo antiquated fictions: silence, silence; and so they glide\r\npast noiselessly, feigning ignorance, to make the public\r\nbelieve that I and the like of me are not worth listening to.\r\nWell, to be sure, their philosophical calling comes to them\r\nfrom the ministry, while mine only comes from Nature.\r\nTrue, we may at last perhaps discover that these heroes act\r\nupon the same principle as that idealistic bird, the ostrich,\r\nwhich imagines that by closing its eyes it does away with\r\nthe huntsman. Ah well! we must bide our time; if the\r\npublic can only be brought to take up meantime with the\r\nbarren twaddle, the unbearably tiresome repetitions, the\r\narbitrary constructions of the Absolute, and the infant-school\r\nmorality of these gentlemen—say, till I am dead and\r\nthey can trim up my works as they like—we shall then\r\nsee.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poetry-container\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\" lang=\"de\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eMorgen habe denn das Rechte\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eSeine Freunde wohlgesinnet,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eWenn nur heute noch das Schlechte\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eVollen Platz und Gunst gewinnet.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"right\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGöthe\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ci\u003eWest-Oestlicher Divan\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut do these gentlemen know what time of day it is?\r\nA long predicted epoch has set in; the church is beginning\r\nto totter, nay it totters already to such a degree, that it\r\nis doubtful whether it will ever be able to recover its centre\r\nof gravity; for faith is lost. The light of revelation, like\r\nother lights, requires a certain amount of darkness as an\r\nindispensable condition. The number of those who have been\r\nunfitted for belief by a certain degree and extent of knowledge,\r\nis already very large. Of this we have evident signs\r\nin the general diffusion of that shallow Rationalism which\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg144\"\u003e[144]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis showing its bulldog face daily more and more overtly.\r\nIt quietly sets to work to measure those profound mysteries\r\nof Christianity over which centuries have brooded\r\nand disputed with its draper\u0027s ell, and thinks itself\r\nwondrous wise withal. It is, however, the very quintessence\r\nof Christianity, the dogma of Original Sin, which\r\nthese shallow-brained Rationalists have especially singled\r\nout for a laughing-stock; precisely because nothing seems\r\nclearer or more certain to them, than that existence should\r\nbegin for each of us with our birth: nothing therefore so\r\nimpossible as that we can have come into the world already\r\nburdened with guilt. How acute! And just as in times\r\nof prevailing poverty and neglect, wolves begin to make\r\ntheir appearance in villages; so does Materialism, ever\r\nlying in wait, under these circumstances lift up its head\r\nand come to the front hand in hand with Bestialism,\r\nits companion, which some call Humanism. Our thirst\r\nafter knowledge augments with our incapacity for belief.\r\nThere comes a boiling-point in the scale of all intellectual\r\ndevelopment, at which all faith, all revelation, and all\r\nauthority evaporate, and Man claims the right to judge for\r\nhimself; the right, not only to be taught, but to be convinced.\r\nThe leading-strings of his infancy have fallen off, and\r\nhenceforth he demands leave to walk alone. Yet his\r\ncraving for Metaphysics can no more be extinguished than\r\nany physical want. Then it is, that the desire for philosophy\r\nbecomes serious and that mankind invokes the\r\nspirits of all the genuine thinkers who have issued from\r\nits ranks. Then, too, empty verbiage and the impotent\r\nendeavours of emasculated intellects no longer suffice; the\r\nwant of a serious philosophy is felt, having other aims\r\nin view than fees and salaries, and caring little therefore\r\nwhether it meets the approbation of cabinet-ministers, or\r\ncouncillors, whether it serves the purposes of this or that\r\nreligious faction, or not; a philosophy which, on the contrary,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg145\"\u003e[145]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nclearly shows that it has a very different mission in\r\nview from that of procuring a livelihood for the poor in\r\nspirit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut I return to my argument. By means of an amplification\r\nwhich only needed a little audacity, a \u003cem\u003etheoretical\u003c/em\u003e oracle\r\nhad been added to the \u003cem\u003epractical\u003c/em\u003e oracle with which Kant\r\nhad wrongly endowed Reason. The credit of this invention\r\nis no doubt due to F. H. Jacobi, from whom the\r\nprofessional philosophers joyfully and thankfully received\r\nthe precious gift, as a means to help them out of the straits\r\nto which Kant had reduced them. That cool, calm, deliberate\r\nReason, which Kant had criticized so mercilessly,\r\nwas henceforth degraded to \u003cem\u003eUnderstanding\u003c/em\u003e and known by\r\nthis name; while Reason was supposed to denote an\r\nentirely imaginary, fictitious faculty, admitting us, as it\r\nwere, to a little window overlooking the superlunar, nay,\r\nthe supernatural world, through which all those truths\r\nare handed to us ready cut and dried, concerning which\r\nold-fashioned, honest, reflective Reason had for ages\r\nvainly argued and contended. And it is on such a mere\r\nproduct of the imagination, such a completely fictitious\r\nReason as this, that German sham philosophy has been\r\nbased for the last fifty years; first, as the free construction\r\nand projection of the absolute \u003cem\u003eEgo\u003c/em\u003e and the emanation\r\nfrom it of the \u003cem\u003enon-Ego\u003c/em\u003e; then, as the intellectual intuition\r\nof absolute identity or indifference, and its evolutions to\r\nNature; or again, as the arising of God out of his dark\r\ndepths or bottomless pit\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_140\" title=\"\u0027Aus seinem Grund oder Ungrund.\u0027\" id=\"FNanchor_140\"\u003e[140]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eà la\u003c/i\u003e Jakob Böhme; lastly, as the\r\npure, self-thinking, absolute Idea, the scene of the ballet-dance\r\nof the self-moving conceptions—still, at the same\r\ntime, always as immediate apprehension (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eVernehmen\u003c/i\u003e) of the\r\nDivine, the supersensuous, the Deity, verity, beauty and as\r\nmany other \"-ties\" as may be desired, or even as a mere\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg146\"\u003e[146]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nvague presentiment\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_141\" title=\"\u0027Ahnung without the d.\u0027 See above, p. 133. (Tr.\u0027s note.)\" id=\"FNanchor_141\"\u003e[141]\u003c/a\u003e of all these wonders.—So this is Reason,\r\nis it? Oh no, it is simply a farce, of which our professors\r\nof philosophy, who are sorely perplexed by Kant\u0027s serious\r\ncritiques, avail themselves in order to pass off the subjects\r\nof the established religion of their country somehow or\r\nother, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eper fas aut nefas\u003c/i\u003e, for the results of philosophy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor it behoves all professorial philosophy, before all\r\nthings, to establish beyond doubt, and to give a philosophical\r\nbasis to, the doctrine, that there is a God, Creator,\r\nand Ruler of the Universe, a personal, consequently individual,\r\nBeing, endowed with Understanding and Will,\r\nwho has created the world out of nothing, and who rules\r\nit with sublime wisdom, power and goodness. This obligation,\r\nhowever, places our professors of philosophy in\r\nan awkward position with respect to serious philosophy.\r\nFor Kant had appeared and the Critique of Pure Reason,\r\nwas written more than sixty years ago, the result being,\r\nthat of all the proofs of the existence of God which had\r\nbeen brought forward during the Christian ages, and\r\nwhich may be reduced to three which alone are possible,\r\nnone are able to accomplish the desired end. Nay, the\r\n\u003cins title=\"impossibity\" id=\"C146\"\u003eimpossibility\u003c/ins\u003e of any such proof, and with it the impossibility\r\nof all speculative theology, is shown at length \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand not in the empty verbiage or Hegelian jargon now\r\nin fashion, which may be made to mean anything one\r\nlikes, but quite seriously and honestly, in the good old-fashioned\r\nway; wherefore, however little it may have been\r\nto the taste of many people, nothing cogent could be\r\nbrought forward in reply to it for the last sixty years, and\r\nthe proofs of the existence of God have in consequence\r\nlost all credit, and are no longer in use. Our professors of\r\nphilosophy have even begun to look down upon them and\r\ntreat them with decided contempt, as ridiculous and superfluous\r\nattempts to demonstrate what was self-evident.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg147\"\u003e[147]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nHo! ho! what a pity this was not found out sooner! How\r\nmuch trouble might have been spared in searching whole\r\ncenturies for these proofs, and how needless it would have\r\nbeen for Kant to bring the whole weight of his Critique\r\nof Reason to bear upon and crush them! Some folks,\r\nwill no doubt be reminded by this contempt of the\r\nfox with the sour grapes. But those who wish to see a\r\nslight specimen of it will find a particularly characteristic\r\none in Schelling\u0027s \"Philosophische Schriften,\" vol. i., 1809,\r\np. 152. Now, whilst others were consoling themselves with\r\nKant\u0027s assertion, that it is just as impossible to prove the\r\nnon-existence, as the existence, of God—as if, forsooth, the\r\nold wag did not know that \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eaffirmanti incumbit probatio\u003c/i\u003e—Jacobi\u0027s\r\nadmirable invention came to the rescue of our perplexed\r\nprofessors, and granted German \u003cem\u003esavants\u003c/em\u003e of this century\r\na peculiar sort of Reason that had never been known\r\nor heard of before.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet all these artifices were quite unnecessary. For the\r\nimpossibility of proving the existence of God by no means\r\ninterferes with that existence, since it rests in unshakeable\r\nsecurity on a much firmer basis. It is indeed a matter\r\nof revelation, and this is besides all the more certain,\r\nbecause that revelation was exclusively vouchsafed to a\r\nsingle people, called, on this account, the chosen people of\r\nGod. This is made evident by the fact, that the notion\r\nof God, as personal Ruler and Creator of the world, ordaining\r\neverything for the best, is to be found in no other\r\nreligion but the Jewish, and the two faiths derived from\r\nit, which might consequently in a wider sense be called\r\nJewish sects. We find no trace of such a notion in any\r\nother religion, ancient or modern. For surely no one\r\nwould dream of confounding this Creator God Almighty\r\nwith the Hindoo Brahm, which is living in me, in you,\r\nin my horse, in your dog—or even with Brahma, who is\r\nborn and dies to make way for other Brahmas, and to whom\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg148\"\u003e[148]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmoreover the production of the world is imputed as sin and\r\nguilt\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_142\" title=\"\u0027If Brimha be unceasingly employed in the creation of worlds … how can tranquillity be obtained by inferior orders of being?\u0027 Prabodh Chandro Daya, translated by J. Taylor, p. 23.–Brahma is also part of the Trimurti, which is the personification of nature, as procreation, preservation, and death: that is, he represents the first of these.\" id=\"FNanchor_142\"\u003e[142]\u003c/a\u003e—least of all with beguiled Saturn\u0027s voluptuous son,\r\nto whom Prometheus, defiant, prophesies his downfall. But\r\nif we finally direct our attention towards the religion which\r\nnumbers most followers, and in this respect may therefore\r\nbe said to rank foremost: that is, Buddhism, we can\r\nno longer shut our eyes to the fact that it is as decidedly\r\nand explicitly atheistic, as it is idealistic and ascetic; and\r\nthis moreover to such a degree, that its priests express\r\nthe greatest abhorrence of the doctrine of pure Theism\r\nwhenever it is brought to their notice. Therefore, in a\r\ntreatise handed to a Catholic bishop by the High Priest\r\nof the Buddhists at Ava,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_143\" title=\"See \u0027Asiatic Researches,\u0027 vol. vi. p. 268, and Sangermano\u0027s \u0027Description of the Burmese Empire,\u0027 p. 81.\" id=\"FNanchor_143\"\u003e[143]\u003c/a\u003e the doctrine \"that there is a\r\nBeing who has created the world and all things, and who\r\nalone is worthy of worship,\" is counted among the six\r\ndamnable heresies.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_144\" title=\"See I. J. Schmidt, \u0027Forschungen im Gebiete der älteren Bildungsgeschichte Mittelasiens.\u0027 St. Petersburg, 1824, pp. 276, and 180.\" id=\"FNanchor_144\"\u003e[144]\u003c/a\u003e This is entirely corroborated by\r\nI. J. Schmidt, a most excellent and learned authority,\r\nwhom I consider as having undoubtedly the deepest knowledge\r\nof Buddhism of any European \u003cem\u003esavant\u003c/em\u003e, and who, in his\r\nwork \"Upon the connection between Gnostic doctrines and\r\nBuddhism,\" p. 9, says:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"In the writings of the Buddhists not a trace is to be\r\nfound of any positive indication of a Supreme Being as the\r\nprinciple of Creation. Whenever this subject presents\r\nitself consistently in the course of argument, it seems,\r\nindeed, to be intentionally evaded.\" And again: \"The\r\nsystem of Buddhism knows of no eternal, uncreated,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg149\"\u003e[149]\u003c/span\u003e\r\none and only Being, having existed before Time and\r\ncreated all that is visible and invisible. This idea is quite\r\nforeign to Buddhism, and not a trace of it is to be found\r\nin Buddhist works. And just as little mention do we find\r\nof Creation. True, the visible Universe is not without a beginning,\r\nbut it \u003cem\u003earose\u003c/em\u003e out of empty Space, according to consistent,\r\nimmutable, natural laws. We should however err,\r\nwere we to assume that anything—call it Fate or Nature—is\r\nregarded or revered by the Buddhists as a divine principle;\r\non the contrary, it is just this very development of empty\r\nSpace, this precipitate from it or this division into countless\r\nparts, this Matter thus arising, which constitutes the\r\nEvil of \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eJirtintschi\u003c/i\u003e, or of the Universe in its inner and outer\r\nrelations, out of which sprang \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eOrtschilang\u003c/i\u003e, or continuous\r\nchange according to immutable laws, which the same Evil\r\nhad established.\" Then again:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_145\" title=\"I. J. Schmidt, Lecture delivered in the Academy at St. Petersburg on the 15th Sept. 1830, p. 26.\" id=\"FNanchor_145\"\u003e[145]\u003c/a\u003e \"The expression \u003cem\u003eCreation\u003c/em\u003e\r\nis foreign to Buddhism, which only knows \u003cem\u003eCosmogony\u003c/em\u003e;\"\r\nand, \"We must comprehend that no idea of a creation of\r\ndivine origin is compatible with their system.\" I could\r\nbring forward a hundred corroborative passages like these;\r\nbut will limit myself to one more, which I quote on account\r\nof its popular and official character. The third volume of\r\na very instructive Buddhist work, \"Mahavansi, Raja-ratnacari,\r\nand Raja-Vali,\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_146\" title=\"Mahavansi, Raja-ratnacari, and Raja-Vali, from the Singhalese, by E. Upham. London, 1833.\" id=\"FNanchor_146\"\u003e[146]\u003c/a\u003e contains a translation of the\r\ninterrogatories to which the High Priests of the five chief\r\nPagodas were separately and successively subjected by the\r\nDutch Governor of Ceylon about the year 1766. It is\r\nexceedingly amusing to see the contrast between the interlocutors,\r\nwho have the greatest difficulty in understanding\r\none another\u0027s meaning. In conformity with the doctrines\r\nof their faith, these priests, who are penetrated with love\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg150\"\u003e[150]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand compassion for all living beings, not excepting even\r\nDutch Governors, spare no pains to satisfy him by their\r\nanswers. But the artless, naïve Atheism of these priests,\r\nwhose piety extends even to practising continence, soon comes\r\ninto conflict with the deep convictions founded on Judaism,\r\nimbibed by the Governor in his infancy. This faith has\r\nbecome a second nature for him; he cannot in the least\r\nunderstand that these priests are not Theists, therefore\r\nhe constantly returns to his inquiries after a Supreme\r\nBeing, asking them who created the world, and so forth.\r\nWhereupon they answer that there can be no higher\r\nbeing than Buddha Shakia-Muni, the Victorious and\r\nthe Perfect, who, though a king\u0027s son by birth, voluntarily\r\nlived the life of a beggar, and preached to the\r\nend his sublime doctrine, for the Redemption of mankind,\r\nand for our salvation from the misery of constant renascence.\r\nThey hold that the world has not been made by\r\nanyone,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_147\" title=\"Κόσμον τόνδε, φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν. (Neither a God nor a man created this world, says Heraclitus.) Plut. \u0027De animæ procreatione,\u0027 c. 5.\" id=\"FNanchor_147\"\u003e[147]\u003c/a\u003e that it is self-created, that Nature spreads it out,\r\nand draws it in again; but that it is that, which existing,\r\ndoes not exist: that it is the necessary accompaniment of\r\nrenascence, and that renascence is the result of our sinful\r\nconduct, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c. I mention such facts as these chiefly\r\non account of the really scandalous way in which German\r\n\u003cem\u003esavants\u003c/em\u003e still universally persist, even to the present day, in\r\nlooking upon Religion and Theism as identical and synonymous;\r\nwhereas Religion is, in fact, to Theism as the\r\ngenus to the single species, and Judaism and Theism are\r\nalone identical. For this reason we stigmatize as heathen\r\nall nations who are neither Jews, Christians, nor Mahometans.\r\nChristians are even taxed by Mahometans and Jews\r\nwith the impurity of their Theism, because of the dogma\r\nof the Trinity. For, whatever may be said to the contrary,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg151\"\u003e[151]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nChristianity has Indian blood in its veins, therefore it constantly\r\ntends to free itself from Judaism. The Critique\r\nof Pure Reason is the most serious attack that has ever\r\nbeen made upon Theism—and this is why our professors\r\nof philosophy have been in such a hurry to set Kant\r\naside; but had that work appeared in any country where\r\nBuddhism prevailed, it would simply have been regarded\r\nas an edifying treatise intended to refute heresy more\r\nthoroughly by a salutary confirmation of the orthodox doctrine\r\nof Idealism—that is, the doctrine of the merely apparent\r\nexistence of the world, as it presents itself to our\r\nsenses. Even the two other religions which coexist with\r\nBuddhism in China—those of Taotsee and of Confucius—are\r\njust as Atheistic as Buddhism itself; wherefore\r\nthe missionaries have never been able to translate the first\r\nverse of the Pentateuch into Chinese, because there is no\r\nword in the language for God and Creation. Even the\r\nmissionary Gützlaff, in his \"History of the Chinese Empire,\"\r\np. 18, has the honesty to say: \"It is extraordinary that\r\nnone of the (Chinese) philosophers ever soared high enough\r\nto reach the knowledge of a Creator and Lord of the\r\nUniverse, although they possessed the Light of Nature in\r\nfull measure.\" J. F. Davis likewise quotes a passage,\r\nwhich is quite in accordance with this, from Milne\u0027s Preface\r\nto his translation of the Shing-yu, where in speaking\r\nof that work, he says that we may see from it \"that the\r\nbare Light of Nature, as it is called, even when aided by\r\nall the light of Pagan philosophy, is totally incapable of\r\nleading men to the knowledge and worship of the true\r\nGod.\" All this confirms the fact that revelation is the sole\r\nfoundation on which Theism rests; indeed, it must be so,\r\nunless revelation is to be superfluous. This is a good opportunity\r\nfor observing that the word Atheism itself implies a\r\nsurreptitious assumption, since it takes Theism for granted\r\nas a matter of course. It would be more honest to say\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg152\"\u003e[152]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nNon-Judaism instead of Atheism, and Non-Jew instead of\r\nAtheist.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow as, according to the above, the existence of God\r\nbelongs to revelation, by which it is firmly established, it\r\nhas no need whatever of human authentication. Philosophy,\r\nhowever, is properly speaking only an idle, superfluous\r\nattempt to let Reason—that is, the human power of\r\nthinking, reflecting, deliberating—once in a while, try its\r\nown powers unassisted, as a child is now and then allowed\r\nto run alone on a lawn and try its strength without leading-strings,\r\njust to see what will come of it. Tests and experiments\r\nof this kind we call \u003cem\u003especulation\u003c/em\u003e; and it lies in the nature\r\nof the matter that it should, for once, leave all authority,\r\nhuman or divine, out of consideration, ignore it, and go its\r\nown way in search of the most sublime, most important\r\ntruths. Now, if on this basis it should arrive at the very same\r\nresults as those mentioned above, to which Kant had come,\r\nspeculation has no right on that account to cast all honesty\r\nand conscience forthwith aside, and take to by-ways, in\r\norder somehow or other to get back to the domain of\r\nJudaism, as its \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003econditio sine qua non\u003c/i\u003e; it ought rather\r\nhenceforth to seek truth quite honestly and simply by any\r\nroad that may happen to lie open before it, but never to\r\nallow any other light than that of Reason to guide it: thus\r\nadvancing calmly and confidently, like one at work in his\r\nvocation, without concern as to where that road may lead.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf our professors of philosophy put a different construction\r\non the matter, and hold that they cannot eat their\r\nbread in honour, so long as they have not reinstalled God\r\nAlmighty on his throne—as if, forsooth, he stood in need\r\nof \u003cem\u003ethem\u003c/em\u003e—this already accounts for their not relishing my\r\nwritings, and explains why I am not the man for them;\r\nfor I certainly do not deal in this sort of article, nor have\r\nI the newest reports to communicate about the Almighty\r\nevery Leipzig fair-time, as they have.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg153\"\u003e[153]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eCHAPTER VI.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eON THE THIRD CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT AND\r\nTHAT FORM OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON\r\nWHICH PREDOMINATES IN IT.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 35. \u003ci\u003eExplanation of this Class of Objects.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is the formal part of complete representations—that\r\nis to say, the intuitions given us \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e of the forms\r\nof the outer and inner sense, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e of Space and of Time—which\r\nconstitutes the Third Class of Objects for our representative\r\nfaculty.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs pure intuitions, these forms are objects for the\r\nfaculty of representation by themselves and apart from\r\ncomplete representations and from the determinations of\r\nbeing empty or filled which these representations first add to\r\nthem; since even pure points and pure lines cannot be\r\nbrought to sensuous perception, but are only \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e intuitions,\r\njust as the infinite expansion and the infinite\r\ndivisibility of Space and of Time are exclusively objects of\r\npure intuition and foreign to empirical perception. That\r\nwhich distinguishes the third class of representations, in\r\nwhich Space and Time are \u003cem\u003epure intuitions\u003c/em\u003e, from the first\r\nclass, in which they are \u003cem\u003esensuously\u003c/em\u003e (and moreover conjointly)\r\n\u003cem\u003eperceived\u003c/em\u003e, is Matter, which I have therefore defined,\r\non the one hand, as the perceptibility of Space and\r\nTime, on the other, as objectified Causality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe form of Causality, on the contrary, which belongs\r\nto the Understanding, is not separately and by itself\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg154\"\u003e[154]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nan object for our faculty of representation, nor have we\r\nconsciousness of it, until it is connected with what is\r\nmaterial in our knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 36. \u003ci\u003ePrinciple of the Sufficient Reason of Being.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSpace and Time are so constituted, that all their parts\r\nstand in mutual relation, so that each of them conditions\r\nand is conditioned by another. We call this relation in\r\nSpace, \u003cem\u003eposition\u003c/em\u003e; in Time, \u003cem\u003esuccession\u003c/em\u003e. These relations are\r\npeculiar ones, differing entirely from all other possible\r\nrelations of our representations; neither the Understanding\r\nnor the Reason are therefore able to grasp them by\r\nmeans of mere conceptions, and pure intuition \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e\r\nalone makes them intelligible to us; for it is impossible\r\nby mere conceptions to explain clearly what is meant by\r\nabove and below, right and left, behind and before, before\r\nand after. Kant rightly confirms this by the assertion,\r\nthat the distinction between our right and left glove cannot\r\nbe made intelligible in any other way than by intuition.\r\nNow, the law by which the divisions of Space and\r\nof Time determine one another reciprocally with reference\r\nto these relations (position and succession) is what I call\r\nthe \u003cem\u003ePrinciple of the Sufficient Reason of Being, principium\r\nrationis sufficientis essendi\u003c/em\u003e. I have already given an example\r\nof this relation in § 15, by which I have shown, through\r\nthe connection between the sides and angles of a triangle,\r\nthat this relation is not only quite different from that\r\nbetween cause and effect, but also from that between\r\nreason of knowledge and consequent; wherefore here the\r\ncondition may be called \u003cem\u003eReason of Being\u003c/em\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eratio essendi\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThe insight into such a \u003cem\u003ereason of being\u003c/em\u003e can, of course, become\r\na reason of knowing: just as the insight into the law\r\nof causality and its application to a particular case is the\r\nreason of knowledge of the effect; but this in no way\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg155\"\u003e[155]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nannuls the complete distinction between Reason of Being,\r\nReason of Becoming, and Reason of Knowing. It often\r\nhappens, that what according to \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e form of our principle\r\nis \u003cem\u003econsequence\u003c/em\u003e, is, according to another, \u003cem\u003ereason\u003c/em\u003e. The rising\r\nof the quicksilver in a thermometer, for instance, is the\r\n\u003cem\u003econsequence\u003c/em\u003e of increased heat according to the law of\r\ncausality, while according to the principle of the sufficient\r\nreason of knowing it is the \u003cem\u003ereason\u003c/em\u003e, the ground of knowledge,\r\nof the increased heat and also of the judgment by\r\nwhich this is asserted.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 37. \u003ci\u003eReason of Being in Space.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe position of each division of Space towards any\r\nother, say of any given line—and this is equally applicable\r\nto planes, bodies, and points—determines also\r\nabsolutely its totally different position with reference to\r\nany other possible line; so that the latter position stands\r\nto the former in the relation of the consequent to its\r\nreason. As the position of this given line towards any\r\nother possible line likewise determines its position towards\r\nall the others, and as therefore the position of the\r\nfirst two lines is itself determined by all the others, it is\r\nimmaterial which we consider as being first determined\r\nand determining the others, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e which particular one we\r\nregard as \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eratio\u003c/i\u003e and which others as \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003erationata\u003c/i\u003e. This is so,\r\nbecause in Space there is no succession; for it is precisely\r\nby uniting Space and Time to form the collective representation\r\nof the complex of experience, that the representation\r\nof coexistence arises. Thus an analogue to so-called\r\nreciprocity prevails everywhere in the Reason of\r\nBeing in Space, as we shall see in § 48, where I enter\r\nmore fully into the reciprocity of reasons. Now, as every\r\nline is determined by all the others just as much as it determines\r\nthem, it is arbitrary to consider any line merely\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg156\"\u003e[156]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas determining and not as being determined, and the position\r\nof each towards any other admits the question as to\r\nits position with reference to some other line, which second\r\nposition necessarily determines the first and makes it that\r\nwhich it is. It is therefore just as impossible to find an\r\nend \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ea parte ante\u003c/i\u003e in the series of links in the chain of Reasons\r\nof Being as in that of Reasons of Becoming, nor can we find\r\nany \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ea parte post\u003c/i\u003e either, because of the infinity of Space and\r\nof the lines possible within Space. All possible relative\r\nspaces are figures, because they are limited; and all these\r\nfigures have their Reason of Being in one another, because\r\nthey are conterminous. The \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eseries rationum essendi\u003c/i\u003e in\r\nSpace therefore, like the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eseries rationum fiendi\u003c/i\u003e, proceeds \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein\r\ninfinitum\u003c/i\u003e; and moreover not only in a single direction, like\r\nthe latter, but in all directions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNothing of all this can be proved; for the truth of these\r\nprinciples is transcendental, they being directly founded\r\nupon the intuition of Space given us \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 38. \u003ci\u003eReason of being in Time. Arithmetic.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eEvery instant in Time is conditioned by the preceding\r\none. The Sufficient Reason of Being, as the law of consequence,\r\nis so simple here, because Time has only one dimension,\r\ntherefore it admits of no multiplicity of relations.\r\nEach instant is conditioned by its predecessor; we can only\r\nreach it through that predecessor: only so far as this \u003cem\u003ewas\u003c/em\u003e\r\nand has elapsed, does the present one exist. All counting\r\nrests upon this nexus of the divisions of Time, numbers\r\nonly serving to mark the single steps in the succession;\r\nupon it therefore rests all arithmetic likewise, which teaches\r\nabsolutely nothing but methodical abbreviations of numeration.\r\nEach number pre-supposes its predecessors as the\r\nreasons of its being: we can only reach the number \u003cem\u003eten\u003c/em\u003e by\r\npassing through all the preceding numbers, and it is only\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg157\"\u003e[157]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin virtue of this insight that I know, that where ten are,\r\nthere also are eight, six, four.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 39. \u003ci\u003eGeometry.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe whole science of Geometry likewise rests upon the\r\nnexus of the position of the divisions of Space. It would,\r\naccordingly, be an insight into that nexus; only such an\r\ninsight being, as we have already said, impossible by means\r\nof mere conceptions, or indeed in any other way than by intuition,\r\nevery geometrical proposition would have to be\r\nbrought back to sensuous intuition, and the proof would\r\nsimply consist in making the particular nexus in question\r\nclear; nothing more could be done. Nevertheless we\r\nfind Geometry treated quite differently. Euclid\u0027s Twelve\r\nAxioms are alone held to be based upon mere intuition,\r\nand even of these only the Ninth, Eleventh, and Twelfth\r\nare properly speaking admitted to be founded upon different,\r\nseparate intuitions; while the rest are supposed to\r\nbe founded upon the knowledge that in science we do not,\r\nas in experience, deal with real things existing for themselves\r\nside by side, and susceptible of endless variety, but on the\r\ncontrary with conceptions, and in Mathematics with \u003cem\u003enormal\r\nintuitions\u003c/em\u003e, i.e. figures and numbers, whose laws are binding\r\nfor all experience, and which therefore combine the comprehensiveness\r\nof the conception with the complete definiteness\r\nof the single representation. For although, as intuitive\r\nrepresentations, they are throughout determined with complete\r\nprecision—no room being left in \u003cem\u003ethis\u003c/em\u003e way by anything\r\nremaining undetermined—still they are general, because\r\nthey are the bare forms of all phenomena, and, as such,\r\napplicable to all real objects to which such forms belong.\r\nWhat Plato says of his Ideas would therefore, even in\r\nGeometry, hold good of these normal intuitions, just as\r\nwell as of conceptions, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e that two cannot be exactly\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg158\"\u003e[158]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsimilar, for then they would be but one.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_148\" title=\"Platonic ideas may, after all, be described as normal intuitions, which would hold good not only for what is formal, but also for what is material in complete representations–therefore as complete representations which, as such, would be determined throughout, while comprehending many things at once, like conceptions: that is to say, as representatives of conceptions, but which are quite adequate to those conceptions, as I have explained in § 28.\" id=\"FNanchor_148\"\u003e[148]\u003c/a\u003e This would, I\r\nsay, be applicable also to normal intuitions in Geometry,\r\nif it were not that, as exclusively spacial objects, these\r\ndiffer from one another in mere juxtaposition, that is, in\r\nplace. Plato had long ago remarked this, as we are told\r\nby Aristotle:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_149\" title=\"Aristot. \u0027Metaph.\u0027 i. 6, with which compare x. 1. \u0027Further, says he, besides things sensible and the ideas, there are things mathematical coming in between the two, which differ from the things sensible, inasmuch as they are eternal and immovable, and from the ideas, inasmuch as many of them are like each other; but the idea is absolutely and only one.\u0027 (Tr.\u0027s Add.)\" id=\"FNanchor_149\"\u003e[149]\u003c/a\u003e ἔτι δὲ, παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ εἴδη, τὰ μαθηματικὰ\r\nτῶν πραγμάτων εἶναί φησι \u003cins title=\"μεταζύ\" id=\"C158\"\u003eμεταξύ\u003c/ins\u003e, διαφέροντα τῶν μὲν\r\nαἰσθητῶν τῷ ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκίνητα εἶναι, τῶν δὲ εἰδῶν τῷ τὰ μὲν\r\nπόλλ\u0027 ἄττα ὅμοια εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτὸ ἓν ἕκαστον μόνον\r\n(\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eitem, præter sensibilia et species, mathematica rerum ait\r\nmedia esse, a sensibilibus quidem differentia eo, quod perpetua\r\net immobilia sunt, a speciebus vero eo, quod illorum\r\nquidem multa quædam similia sunt, species vero ipsa\r\nunaquæque sola\u003c/i\u003e). Now the mere knowledge that such a\r\ndifference of place does not annul the rest of the identity,\r\nmight surely, it seems to me, supersede the other nine\r\naxioms, and would, I think, be better suited to the nature\r\nof science, whose aim is knowledge of the particular through\r\nthe general, than the statement of nine separate axioms\r\nall based upon the same insight. Moreover, what Aristotle\r\nsays: ἐν τούτοις ἡ ἰσότης ἑνότης (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein illis æqualitas unitas\r\nest\u003c/i\u003e)\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_150\" title=\"\u0027In these it is equality that constitutes unity.\u0027 (Tr.\u0027s Add.)\" id=\"FNanchor_150\"\u003e[150]\u003c/a\u003e then becomes applicable to geometrical figures.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut with reference to the normal intuitions in Time, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg159\"\u003e[159]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto numbers, even this distinction of juxtaposition no longer\r\nexists. Here, as with conceptions, absolutely nothing but the\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eidentitas indiscernibilium\u003c/i\u003e remains: for there is but one five\r\nand one seven. And in this we may perhaps also find a reason\r\nwhy 7 + 5 = 12 is a synthetical proposition \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nfounded upon intuition, as Kant profoundly discovered,\r\nand not an identical one, as it is called by Herder in his\r\n\"Metakritik\". 12 = 12 is an identical proposition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn Geometry, it is therefore only in dealing with axioms\r\nthat we appeal to intuition. All the other theorems are\r\ndemonstrated: that is to say, a reason of knowing is given,\r\nthe truth of which everyone is bound to acknowledge.\r\nThe logical truth of the theorem is thus shown, but not its\r\ntranscendental truth (v. §§ 30 and 32), which, as it lies in\r\nthe reason of \u003cem\u003ebeing\u003c/em\u003e and not in the reason of \u003cem\u003eknowing\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nnever can become evident excepting by means of intuition.\r\nThis explains \u003cem\u003ewhy\u003c/em\u003e this sort of geometrical demonstration,\r\nwhile it no doubt conveys the conviction that the theorem\r\nwhich has been demonstrated is true, nevertheless gives no\r\ninsight as to why that which it asserts is what it is. In\r\nother words, we have not found its Reason of Being; but\r\nthe desire to find it is usually then thoroughly roused.\r\nFor proof by indicating the reason of knowledge only\r\neffects conviction (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003econvictio\u003c/i\u003e), not knowledge (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecognitio\u003c/i\u003e): therefore\r\nit might perhaps be more correctly called \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eelenchus\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthan \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003edemonstratio\u003c/i\u003e. This is why, in most cases, therefore, it\r\nleaves behind it that disagreeable feeling which is given\r\nby all want of insight, when perceived; and here, the\r\nwant of knowledge \u003cem\u003ewhy\u003c/em\u003e a thing is as it is, makes itself all\r\nthe more keenly felt, because of the certainty just attained,\r\n\u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e it is as it is. This impression is very much like the\r\nfeeling we have, when something has been conjured into or\r\nout of our pocket, and we cannot conceive how. The\r\nreason of knowing which, in such demonstrations as\r\nthese, is given without the reason of being, resembles\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg160\"\u003e[160]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncertain physical theories, which present the phenomenon\r\nwithout being able to indicate its cause: for instance,\r\nLeidenfrost\u0027s experiment, inasmuch as it succeeds also in a\r\nplatina crucible; whereas the reason of being of a geometrical\r\nproposition which is discovered by intuition, like\r\nevery knowledge we acquire, produces satisfaction. When\r\nonce the reason of being is found, we base our conviction\r\nof the truth of the theorem upon that reason alone, and no\r\nlonger upon the reason of knowing given us by the demonstration.\r\nLet us, for instance, take the sixth proposition\r\nof the first Book of Euclid:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"If two angles of a triangle are equal, the sides also\r\nwhich subtend, or are opposite to, the equal angles shall\r\nbe equal to one another.\" (See fig. 3.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 450px;\" role=\"figure\" aria-labelledby=\"ebm_caption2\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"three triangles demonstrating the sixth proposition of Euclid\" height=\"148\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-on-the-fourfold-root-of-the-principle-of-sufficient-reason-160-f3.png\" width=\"450\" id=\"img_images_160_f3.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\" id=\"ebm_caption2\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eFig. 3.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhich Euclid demonstrates as follows:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Let \u003ci\u003ea b c\u003c/i\u003e be a triangle having the angle \u003ci\u003ea b c\u003c/i\u003e equal to\r\nthe angle \u003ci\u003ea c b\u003c/i\u003e, then the side \u003ci\u003ea c\u003c/i\u003e must be equal to the side\r\n\u003ci\u003ea b\u003c/i\u003e also.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"For, if side \u003ci\u003ea b\u003c/i\u003e be not equal to side \u003ci\u003ea c\u003c/i\u003e, one of them is\r\ngreater than the other. Let \u003ci\u003ea b\u003c/i\u003e be greater than \u003ci\u003ea c\u003c/i\u003e; and\r\nfrom \u003ci\u003eb a\u003c/i\u003e cut off \u003ci\u003eb d\u003c/i\u003e equal to \u003ci\u003ec a\u003c/i\u003e, and draw \u003ci\u003ed c\u003c/i\u003e. Then, in the\r\ntriangles \u003ci\u003ed b c\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ea b c\u003c/i\u003e, because \u003ci\u003ed b\u003c/i\u003e is equal to \u003ci\u003ea c\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003eb c\u003c/i\u003e is\r\ncommon to both triangles, the two sides \u003ci\u003ed b\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eb c\u003c/i\u003e are\r\nequal to the two sides \u003ci\u003ea c\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ea b\u003c/i\u003e, each to each; and the angle\r\n\u003ci\u003ed b c\u003c/i\u003e is equal to the angle \u003ci\u003ea c b\u003c/i\u003e, therefore the base \u003ci\u003ed c\u003c/i\u003e is\r\nequal to the base \u003ci\u003ea b\u003c/i\u003e, and the triangle \u003ci\u003ed b c\u003c/i\u003e is equal to the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg161\"\u003e[161]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntriangle \u003ci\u003ea b c\u003c/i\u003e, the less triangle equal to the greater,—which\r\nis absurd. Therefore \u003ci\u003ea b\u003c/i\u003e is not unequal to \u003ci\u003ea c\u003c/i\u003e, that is, \u003ci\u003ea b\u003c/i\u003e\r\nis equal to \u003ci\u003ea c\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, in this demonstration we have a reason of knowing\r\nfor the truth of the proposition. But who bases his\r\nconviction of that geometrical truth upon this proof?\r\nDo we not rather base our conviction upon the reason of\r\nbeing, which we know intuitively, and according to which\r\n(by a necessity which admits of no further demonstration,\r\nbut only of evidence through intuition) two lines drawn\r\nfrom both extreme ends of another line, and inclining\r\nequally towards each other, can only meet at a point which\r\nis equally distant from both extremities; since the two\r\narising angles are properly but one, to which the oppositeness\r\nof position gives the appearance of being two; wherefore\r\nthere is no reason why the lines should meet at any\r\npoint nearer to the one end than to the other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is the knowledge of the reason of being which shows\r\nus the necessary consequence of the conditioned from its\r\ncondition—in this instance, the lateral equality from the\r\nangular equality—that is, it shows their connection; whereas\r\nthe reason of knowing only shows their coexistence. Nay,\r\nwe might even maintain that the usual method of proving\r\nmerely convinces us of their coexistence in the actual\r\nfigure given us as an example, but by no means that\r\nthey are always coexistent; for, as the necessary connection\r\nis not shown, the conviction we acquire of this\r\ntruth rests simply upon induction, and is based upon\r\nthe fact, that we find it is so in every figure we make.\r\nThe reason of being is certainly not as evident in all cases\r\nas it is in simple theorems like this 6th one of Euclid;\r\nstill I am persuaded that it might be brought to evidence in\r\nevery theorem, however complicated, and that the proposition\r\ncan always be reduced to some such simple intuition.\r\nBesides, we are all just as conscious \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e of the necessity\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg162\"\u003e[162]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof such a reason of being for each relation of Space, as we are\r\nof the necessity of a cause for each change. In complicated\r\ntheorems it will, of course, be very difficult to show that\r\nreason of being; and this is not the place for difficult geometrical\r\nresearches. Therefore, to make my meaning somewhat\r\nclearer, I will now try to bring back to its reason of\r\nbeing a moderately complicated proposition, in which\r\nnevertheless that reason is not immediately evident.\r\nPassing over the intermediate theorems, I take the 16th:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"In every triangle in which one side has been produced,\r\nthe exterior angle is greater than either of the interior\r\nopposite angles.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis Euclid demonstrates in the following manner (see\r\nfig. 4):—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 250px;\" role=\"figure\" aria-labelledby=\"ebm_caption3\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"triangles and lines demonstrating the 16th theorem of Euclid\" height=\"196\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-on-the-fourfold-root-of-the-principle-of-sufficient-reason-162-f4.png\" width=\"250\" id=\"img_images_162_f4.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\" id=\"ebm_caption3\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eFig. 4.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Let \u003ci\u003ea b c\u003c/i\u003e be a triangle; and let the side \u003ci\u003eb c\u003c/i\u003e be produced\r\nto \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e; then the exterior angle \u003ci\u003ea c d\u003c/i\u003e shall be greater than\r\neither of the interior opposite angles \u003ci\u003eb a c\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003ec b a\u003c/i\u003e. Bisect the\r\nside \u003ci\u003ea c\u003c/i\u003e at \u003ci\u003ee\u003c/i\u003e, and join \u003ci\u003eb e\u003c/i\u003e; produce \u003ci\u003eb e\u003c/i\u003e to \u003ci\u003ef\u003c/i\u003e, making \u003ci\u003ee f\u003c/i\u003e\r\nequal to \u003ci\u003ee b\u003c/i\u003e, and join \u003ci\u003ef c\u003c/i\u003e. Produce \u003ci\u003ea c\u003c/i\u003e to \u003ci\u003eg\u003c/i\u003e. Because \u003ci\u003ea e\u003c/i\u003e\r\nis equal to \u003ci\u003ee c\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003eb e\u003c/i\u003e to \u003ci\u003ee f\u003c/i\u003e; the two sides \u003ci\u003ea e\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ee b\u003c/i\u003e, are\r\nequal to the two sides \u003ci\u003ec e\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ee f\u003c/i\u003e, each to each; and the angle\r\n\u003ci\u003ea e b\u003c/i\u003e is equal to the angle \u003ci\u003ec e f\u003c/i\u003e, because they are opposite\r\nvertical angles; therefore the base \u003ci\u003ea b\u003c/i\u003e is equal to the base\r\n\u003ci\u003ec f\u003c/i\u003e, and the triangle \u003ci\u003ea e b\u003c/i\u003e is equal to the triangle \u003ci\u003ec e f\u003c/i\u003e, and\r\nthe remaining angles of one triangle to the remaining angles\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg163\"\u003e[163]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the other, each to each, to which the equal sides are\r\nopposite; therefore the angle \u003ci\u003eb a e\u003c/i\u003e is equal to the angle\r\n\u003ci\u003ee c f\u003c/i\u003e. But the angle \u003ci\u003ee c d\u003c/i\u003e is greater than the angle \u003ci\u003ee c f\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nTherefore the angle \u003ci\u003ea c d\u003c/i\u003e is greater than the angle \u003ci\u003ea b c\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"In the same manner, if the side \u003ci\u003eb c\u003c/i\u003e be bisected, and the\r\nside \u003ci\u003ea c\u003c/i\u003e be produced to \u003ci\u003eg\u003c/i\u003e, it may be demonstrated that the\r\nangle \u003ci\u003eb c g\u003c/i\u003e, that is, the opposite vertical angle \u003ci\u003ea c d\u003c/i\u003e is\r\ngreater than the angle \u003ci\u003ea b c\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMy demonstration of the same proposition would be as\r\nfollows (see fig. 5):—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 250px;\" role=\"figure\" aria-labelledby=\"ebm_caption4\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"triangle with extended line\" height=\"143\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-on-the-fourfold-root-of-the-principle-of-sufficient-reason-163-f5.png\" width=\"250\" id=\"img_images_163_f5.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\" id=\"ebm_caption4\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eFig. 5.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the angle \u003ci\u003eb a c\u003c/i\u003e to be even equal to, let alone greater\r\nthan, the angle \u003ci\u003ea c d\u003c/i\u003e, the line \u003ci\u003eb a\u003c/i\u003e toward \u003ci\u003ec a\u003c/i\u003e would have to\r\nlie in the same direction as \u003ci\u003eb d\u003c/i\u003e (for this is precisely what\r\nis meant by equality of the angles), \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, it must be parallel\r\nwith \u003ci\u003eb d\u003c/i\u003e; that is to say, \u003ci\u003eb a\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eb d\u003c/i\u003e must never meet; but\r\nin order to form a triangle they must meet (reason of\r\nbeing), and must thus do the contrary of that which would\r\nbe required for the angle \u003ci\u003eb a c\u003c/i\u003e to be of the same size as\r\nthe angle \u003ci\u003ea c d\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the angle \u003ci\u003ea b c\u003c/i\u003e to be even equal to, let alone greater\r\nthan, the angle \u003ci\u003ea c d\u003c/i\u003e, line \u003ci\u003eb a\u003c/i\u003e must lie in the same direction\r\ntowards \u003ci\u003eb d\u003c/i\u003e as \u003ci\u003ea c\u003c/i\u003e (for this is what is meant by equality of\r\nthe angles), \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, it must be parallel with \u003ci\u003ea c\u003c/i\u003e, that is to say,\r\n\u003ci\u003eb a\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ea c\u003c/i\u003e must never meet; but in order to form a triangle\r\n\u003ci\u003eb a\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ea c\u003c/i\u003e must meet and must thus do the contrary of\r\nthat which would be required for the angle \u003ci\u003ea b c\u003c/i\u003e to be\r\nof the same size as \u003ci\u003ea c d\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy all this I do not mean to suggest the introduction of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg164\"\u003e[164]\u003c/span\u003e\r\na new method of mathematical demonstration, nor the\r\nsubstitution of my own proof for that of Euclid, for which\r\nits whole nature unfits it, as well as the fact that it presupposes\r\nthe conception of parallel lines, which in Euclid\r\ncomes much later. I merely wished to show what the\r\nreason of being is, and wherein lies the difference between\r\nit and the reason of knowing, which latter only effects \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003econvictio\u003c/i\u003e,\r\na thing that differs entirely from insight into the\r\nreason of being. The fact that Geometry only aims at\r\neffecting \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003econvictio\u003c/i\u003e, and that this, as I have said, leaves\r\nbehind it a disagreeable impression, but gives no insight\r\ninto the reason of being—which insight, like all knowledge,\r\nis satisfactory and pleasing—may perhaps be one of the\r\nreasons for the great dislike which many otherwise eminent\r\nheads have for mathematics.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI cannot resist again giving fig. 6, although it has already\r\nbeen presented elsewhere; because the mere sight of it\r\nwithout words conveys ten times more persuasion of the\r\ntruth of the Pythagorean theorem than Euclid\u0027s mouse-trap\r\ndemonstration.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 350px;\" role=\"figure\" aria-labelledby=\"ebm_caption5\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt=\"a square divided into 4 triangles, with two equal triangles added to the side\" height=\"197\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-on-the-fourfold-root-of-the-principle-of-sufficient-reason-164-f6.png\" width=\"350\" id=\"img_images_164_f6.png\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"caption\" id=\"ebm_caption5\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eFig. 6.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThose readers for whom this chapter may have a special\r\ninterest will find the subject of it more fully treated in my\r\nchief work, \"Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,\" vol. i.\r\n§ 15; vol. ii. chap. 13.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg165\"\u003e[165]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eCHAPTER VII.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eON THE FOURTH CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT,\r\nAND THE FORM OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT\r\nREASON WHICH PREDOMINATES IN IT.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 40. \u003ci\u003eGeneral Explanation.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe last Class of Objects for our representative faculty\r\nwhich remains to be examined is a peculiar but\r\nhighly important one. It comprises but \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e object for\r\neach individual: that is, the immediate object of the inner\r\nsense, the \u003cem\u003eSubject in volition\u003c/em\u003e, which is Object for the Knowing\r\nSubject; wherefore it manifests itself in Time alone,\r\nnever in Space, and as we shall see, even in Time under an\r\nimportant restriction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 41. \u003ci\u003eSubject of Knowledge and Object.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll knowledge presupposes Subject and Object. Even\r\nself-consciousness (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eSelbstbewusstsein\u003c/i\u003e) therefore is not absolutely\r\nsimple, but, like our consciousness of all other\r\nthings (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, the faculty of perception), it is subdivided into\r\nthat which is known and that which knows. Now, that\r\nwhich is known manifests itself absolutely and exclusively\r\nas \u003cem\u003eWill\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Subject accordingly knows itself exclusively as\r\n\u003cem\u003ewilling\u003c/em\u003e, but not as \u003cem\u003eknowing\u003c/em\u003e. For the \u003cem\u003eego\u003c/em\u003e which represents,\r\nnever can itself become representation or Object,\r\nsince it conditions all representations as their necessary\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg166\"\u003e[166]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncorrelate; rather may the following beautiful passage\r\nfrom the Sacred Upanishad be applied to it: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eId videndum\r\nnon est: omnia videt; et id audiendum non est: omnia\r\naudit; sciendum non est: omnia scit: et intelligendum, non\r\nest: omnia intelligit. Præter id, videns, et sciens, et\r\naudiens, et intelligens ens aliud non est.\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_151\" title=\"\u0027Oupnekhat,\u0027 vol. i. p. 202.\" id=\"FNanchor_151\"\u003e[151]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere can therefore be no \u003cem\u003eknowledge of knowing\u003c/em\u003e, because\r\nthis would imply separation of the Subject from knowing,\r\nwhile it nevertheless knew that knowing—which is impossible.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMy answer to the objection, \"I not only know, but\r\nknow also that I know,\" would be, \"Your knowing that\r\nyou know only differs in words from your knowing. \u0027I\r\nknow that I know\u0027 means nothing more than \u0027I know,\u0027\r\nand this again, unless it is further determined, means\r\nnothing more than \u0027\u003cem\u003eego\u003c/em\u003e.\u0027 If your knowing and your\r\nknowing that you know are two different things, just try\r\nto separate them, and first to know without knowing that\r\nyou know, then to know that you know without this\r\nknowledge being at the same time knowing.\" No doubt,\r\nby leaving all \u003cem\u003especial\u003c/em\u003e knowing out of the question, we may\r\nat last arrive at the proposition \"\u003cem\u003eI know\u003c/em\u003e\"—the last abstraction\r\nwe are able to make; but this proposition is\r\nidentical with \"\u003cem\u003eObjects exist for me\u003c/em\u003e,\" and this again is\r\nidentical with \"\u003cem\u003eI am Subject\u003c/em\u003e,\" in which nothing more is\r\ncontained than in the bare word \"\u003cem\u003eI\u003c/em\u003e.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, it may still be asked how the various cognitive\r\nfaculties belonging to the Subject, such as Sensibility,\r\nUnderstanding, Reason, are known to us, if we do not\r\nknow the Subject. It is not through our knowing having\r\nbecome an Object for us that these faculties are known to\r\nus, for then there would not be so many conflicting judgments\r\nconcerning them; they are inferred rather, or\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg167\"\u003e[167]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmore correctly, they are general expressions for the established\r\nclasses of representations which, at all times, have\r\nbeen more or less clearly distinguished in those cognitive\r\nfaculties. But, with reference to the necessary correlate\r\nof these representations as their condition, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, the Subject,\r\nthese faculties are abstracted from them (the representations),\r\nand stand consequently towards the classes\r\nof representations in precisely the same relation as the\r\nSubject in general towards the Object in general. Now,\r\njust as the Object is at once posited with the Subject (for\r\nthe word itself would otherwise have no meaning), and\r\nconversely, as the Subject is at once posited with the\r\nObject—so that being the Subject means exactly as much\r\nas having an Object, and being an Object means the same\r\nthing as being known by the Subject—so likewise, when\r\nan Object is assumed as being determined \u003cem\u003ein any particular\r\nway\u003c/em\u003e, do we also assume that the Subject \u003cem\u003eknows\r\nprecisely in that particular way\u003c/em\u003e. So far therefore it is\r\nimmaterial whether we say that Objects have such and\r\nsuch peculiar inherent determinations, or that the Subject\r\nknows in such and such ways. It is indifferent whether\r\nwe say that Objects are divided into such and such classes,\r\nor that such and such different cognitive faculties are\r\npeculiar to the Subject. In that singular compound of\r\ndepth and superficiality, Aristotle, are to be found traces\r\neven of insight into this truth, and indeed the critical\r\nphilosophy lies in embryo in his works. He says:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_152\" title=\"Aristot., \u0027De anima,\u0027 iii. 8. \u0027In a certain sense the intellect is all that exists.\u0027 (Tr.\u0027s Add.)\" id=\"FNanchor_152\"\u003e[152]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα (anima quammodo est universa,\r\nquæ sunt). And again: ὁ νοῦς ἐστι εἶδος εἰδῶν, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthe understanding is the form of forms, καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις\r\nεἶδος αἰσθητῶν, and sensibility the form of sensuous\r\nobjects. Accordingly, it is all one whether we say, \"sensibility\r\nand understanding are no more;\" or, \"the world is\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg168\"\u003e[168]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nat an end.\" It comes to the same thing whether we say,\r\n\"There are no conceptions,\" or \"Reason is gone and\r\nanimals alone remain.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe dispute between Realism and Idealism, which appeared\r\nfor the last time in the dispute between the Dogmatists\r\nand Kantians, or between Ontology and Metaphysics\r\non the one hand and Transcendental Æsthetic\r\nand Transcendental Logic on the other, arose out of the\r\nmisapprehension of this relation and was based upon its\r\nmisapprehension with reference to the First and Third\r\nClasses of representations as established by me, just as\r\nthe mediæval dispute between Realists and Nominalists\r\nrested upon the misapprehension of this relation with\r\nreference to the Second Class.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 42. \u003ci\u003eThe Subject of Volition.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAccording to what has preceded, the Subject of knowledge\r\ncan never be known; it can never become Object or\r\nrepresentation. Nevertheless, as we have not only an\r\nouter self-knowledge (in sensuous perception), but an inner\r\none also; and as, on the other hand, every knowledge, by\r\nits very nature, presupposes a knower and a known, what\r\nis known within us as such, is not the knower, but the\r\nwiller, the Subject of Volition: the Will. Starting from\r\nknowledge, we may assert that \"I know\" is an analytical,\r\n\"I will,\" on the contrary, a synthetical, and moreover an\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà posteriori\u003c/i\u003e proposition, that is, it is given by experience—in\r\nthis case by inner experience (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, in Time alone). In\r\nso far therefore the Subject of volition would be an\r\nObject for us. Introspection always shows us to ourselves\r\nas \u003cem\u003ewilling\u003c/em\u003e. In this \u003cem\u003ewilling\u003c/em\u003e, however, there are numerous\r\ndegrees, from the faintest wish to passion, and I have\r\noften shown\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_153\" title=\"See \u0027Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik,\u0027 p. 11, and in several other places.\" id=\"FNanchor_153\"\u003e[153]\u003c/a\u003e that not only all our emotions, but even all\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg169\"\u003e[169]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthose movements of our inner man, which are subsumed\r\nunder the wide conception of feeling, are states of the\r\nwill.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, the identity of the willing with the knowing Subject,\r\nin virtue of which the word \"I\" includes and designates\r\nboth, is the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003enodus\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_154\" title=\"Weltknoten.\" id=\"FNanchor_154\"\u003e[154]\u003c/a\u003e of the Universe, and therefore\r\ninexplicable. For we can only comprehend relations between\r\nObjects; but two Objects never can be one, excepting\r\nas parts of a whole. Here, where the Subject is in\r\nquestion, the rules by which we know Objects are no longer\r\napplicable, and actual identity of the knower with what is\r\nknown as willing—that is, of Subject and Object—is \u003cem\u003eimmediately\r\ngiven\u003c/em\u003e. Now, whoever has clearly realized the utter\r\nimpossibility of explaining this identity, will surely concur\r\nwith me in calling it the miracle κατ\u0027 \u003cins title=\"ἐζοχήν\" id=\"C169\"\u003eἐξοχήν\u003c/ins\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eJust as the Understanding is the subjective correlate\r\nto our First Class of representations, the Reason to the\r\nSecond, and pure Sensibility to the Third, so do we find\r\nthat the correlate to this Fourth Class is the inner sense,\r\nor Self-consciousness in general.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 43. \u003ci\u003eWilling. The Law of Motives (Motivation).\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is just because the willing Subject is immediately\r\ngiven in self-consciousness, that we are unable further to\r\ndefine or to describe what willing is; properly speaking, it\r\nis the most direct knowledge we have, nay, one whose immediateness\r\nmust finally throw light upon every other\r\nknowledge, as being very mediate.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAt every resolution that we take ourselves, or that we\r\nsee others take, we deem ourselves justified in asking,\r\nwhy? That is, we assume that something must have previously\r\noccurred, from which this resolution has resulted,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg170\"\u003e[170]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand we call this something its reason, or, more correctly, the\r\nmotive of the action which now follows. Without such a\r\nreason or motive, the action is just as inconceivable for us,\r\nas the movement of a lifeless body without being pushed or\r\npulled. Motives therefore belong to causes, and have also\r\nbeen already numbered and characterized among them in\r\n§ 20, as the third form of Causality. But all Causality\r\nis only the form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in\r\nthe First Class of Objects: that is, in the corporeal world\r\ngiven us in external perception. There it forms the link\r\nwhich connects changes one with another, the cause\r\nbeing that which, coming from outside, conditions each\r\noccurrence. The inner nature of such occurrences on the\r\ncontrary continues to be a mystery for us: for we always\r\nremain on the outside. We certainly see this cause necessarily\r\nproduce that effect; but we do not learn how it is\r\nactually enabled to do so, or what is going on inside.\r\nThus we see mechanical, physical, chemical effects, as\r\nwell as those brought about by \u003cem\u003estimuli\u003c/em\u003e, in each instance\r\nfollow from their respective causes without on\r\nthat account ever completely understanding the process,\r\nthe essential part of which remains a mystery for us;\r\nso we attribute it to qualities of bodies, to forces of\r\nNature, or to vital energy, which, however, are all \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003equalitates\r\noccultæ\u003c/i\u003e. Nor should we be at all better off as to\r\ncomprehension of the movements and actions of animals\r\nand of human beings, which would also appear to us\r\nas induced in some unaccountable way by their causes\r\n(motives), were it not that here we are granted an insight\r\ninto the inward part of the process; we know, that is, by\r\nour own inward experience, that this is an act of the will\r\ncalled forth by the motive, which consists in a mere representation.\r\nThus the effect produced by the motive, unlike\r\nthat produced by all other causes, is not only known\r\nby us from outside, in a merely indirect way, but at the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg171\"\u003e[171]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsame time from inside, quite directly, and therefore according\r\nto its whole mode of action. Here we stand as it were\r\nbehind the scenes, and learn the secret of the process by\r\nwhich cause produces effect in its most inward nature; for\r\nhere our knowledge comes to us through a totally different\r\nchannel and in a totally different way. From this results\r\nthe important proposition: \u003cem\u003eThe action of motives (motivation)\r\nis causality seen from within\u003c/em\u003e. Here accordingly\r\ncausality presents itself in quite a different way, in quite\r\na different medium, and for quite another kind of knowledge;\r\ntherefore it must now be exhibited as a special and\r\npeculiar form of our principle, which consequently here\r\npresents itself as the Principle of the Sufficient Reason of\r\nActing, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprincipium rationis sufficientis agendi\u003c/i\u003e, or, more\r\nbriefly, as the \u003cem\u003eLaw of Motives (Law of Motivation)\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs a clue to my philosophy in general, I here add, that\r\nthis Fourth Class of Objects for the Subject, that is, the\r\none object contained in it, the \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e which we apprehend\r\nwithin us, stands in the same relation towards the First\r\nClass as the law of motives towards the law of causality, as\r\nI have established it in § 20. This truth is the corner-stone\r\nof my whole Metaphysic.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs to the way in which, and the necessity with which,\r\nmotives act, and as to the dependence of their action upon\r\nempirical, individual character, and even upon individual\r\ncapacity for knowledge, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c., I refer my readers to my\r\nPrize-essay on the Freedom of the Will, in which I have\r\ntreated all this more fully.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 44. \u003ci\u003eInfluence of the Will over the Intellect.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is not upon causality proper, but upon the identity of\r\nthe knowing with the willing Subject, as shown in § 42,\r\nthat the influence is based, which the will exercises over\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg172\"\u003e[172]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe intellect, when it obliges it to repeat representations\r\nthat have once been present to it, and in general to turn\r\nits attention in this or that direction and evoke at pleasure\r\nany particular series of thoughts. And even in this,\r\nthe will is determined by the law of motives, in accordance\r\nwith which it also secretly rules what is called the association\r\nof ideas, to which I have devoted a separate chapter\r\n(the 14th) in the second volume of my chief work. This\r\nassociation of ideas is itself nothing but the application of\r\nthe Principle of Sufficient Reason in its four forms to the\r\nsubjective train of thought; that is, to the presence of representations\r\nin our consciousness. But it is the will of\r\nthe individual that sets the whole mechanism in motion,\r\nby urging the intellect, in accordance with the interest, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthe individual aims, of the person, to recall, together with\r\nits present representations, those which either logically or\r\nanalogically, or by proximity in Time or Space, are nearly\r\nrelated to them. The will\u0027s activity in this, however, is so\r\nimmediate, that in most cases we have no clear consciousness\r\nof it; and so rapid, that we are at times even unconscious\r\nof the occasion which has thus called forth a representation.\r\nIn such cases, it appears as if something had\r\ncome into our consciousness quite independently of all connection\r\nwith anything else; that this, however, is impossible,\r\nis precisely the Root of the Principle of Sufficient\r\nReason, which has been fully explained in the above-mentioned\r\nchapter of my chief work.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_155\" title=\"See \u0027Die Welt, a. W. u. V.\u0027 vol. ii. ch. xiv.\" id=\"FNanchor_155\"\u003e[155]\u003c/a\u003e Every picture which\r\nsuddenly presents itself to our imagination, every judgment\r\neven that does not follow its previously present\r\nreason, must be called forth by an act of volition having a\r\nmotive; although that motive may often escape our perception\r\nowing to its insignificance, and although such acts of\r\nvolition are often in like manner unperceived, because they\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg173\"\u003e[173]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntake place so easily, that wish and fulfilment are simultaneous.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 45. \u003ci\u003eMemory.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat peculiar faculty of the knowing Subject which\r\nenables it to obey the will the more readily in repeating\r\nrepresentations, the oftener they have already been present\r\nto it—in other words, its capacity for being exercised—is\r\nwhat we call \u003cem\u003eMemory\u003c/em\u003e. I cannot agree with the customary\r\nview, by which it is looked upon as a sort of store-house\r\nin which we keep a stock of ready-made representations\r\nalways at our disposal, only without being always conscious\r\nof their possession. The voluntary repetition of representations\r\nwhich have once been present becomes so\r\neasy through practice, that one link in a series of representations\r\nno sooner becomes present to us, than we at once\r\nevoke all the rest, often even, as it were, involuntarily. If\r\nwe were to look for a metaphor for this characteristic\r\nquality of our representative faculty (such as that of Plato,\r\nwho compared it with a soft mass that receives and retains\r\nimpressions), I think the best would be that of a piece of\r\ndrapery, which, after having been repeatedly folded in the\r\nsame folds, at last falls into them, as it were, of its own\r\naccord. The body learns by practice to obey the will, and\r\nthe faculty of representing does precisely the same. A remembrance\r\nis not by any means, as the usual view supposes,\r\nalways the same representation which is, as it were,\r\nfetched over and over again from its store-house; a new\r\none, on the contrary, arises each time, only practice makes\r\nthis especially easy. Thus it comes to pass that pictures\r\nof our imagination, which we fancy we have stowed away\r\nin our memory, become imperceptibly modified: a thing\r\nwhich we realize when we see some familiar object again\r\nafter a long time, and find that it no longer completely\r\ncorresponds to the image we bring with us. This could\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg174\"\u003e[174]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnot be if we retained ready-made representations. It is\r\njust for this reason too, that acquired knowledge, if left\r\nunexercised, gradually fades from our memory, precisely\r\nbecause it was the result of practice coming from habit\r\nand knack; thus most scholars, for instance, forget their\r\nGreek, and most artists their Italian on their return from\r\nItaly. This is also why we find so much difficulty in recalling\r\nto mind a name or a line of poetry formerly familiar\r\nto us, when we have ceased to think of it for several years;\r\nwhereas when once we succeed in remembering it, we have\r\nit again at our disposal for some time, because the practice\r\nhas been renewed. Everyone therefore who knows several\r\nlanguages, will do well to make a point of reading occasionally\r\nin each, that he may ensure to himself their\r\npossession.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis likewise explains why the surroundings and events\r\nof our childhood impress themselves so deeply on our\r\nmemory; it is because, in childhood we have but few, and\r\nthose chiefly intuitive, representations: so that we are induced\r\nto repeat them constantly for the sake of occupation.\r\nPeople who have little capability for original thought do\r\nthis all their lives (and moreover not only with intuitive\r\nrepresentations, but with conceptions and words also);\r\nsometimes therefore they have remarkably good memories,\r\nwhen obtuseness and sluggishness of intellect do not act as\r\nimpediments. Men of genius, on the contrary, are not\r\nalways endowed with the best of memories, as, for instance,\r\nRousseau has told us of himself. Perhaps this may be\r\naccounted for by their great abundance of new thoughts\r\nand combinations, which leaves them no time for frequent\r\nrepetition. Still, on the whole, genius is seldom found\r\nwith a very bad memory; because here a greater energy\r\nand mobility of the whole thinking faculty makes up for\r\nthe want of constant practice. Nor must we forget that\r\nMnemosyne was the mother of the Muses. We may accordingly\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg175\"\u003e[175]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsay, that our memory stands under two contending\r\ninfluences, that of the energy of the representative\r\nfaculty on the one hand, and that of the quantity of representations\r\noccupying that faculty on the other. The less\r\nenergy there is in the faculty, the fewer must be the representations,\r\nand conversely. This explains the impaired\r\nmemory of habitual novel-readers, for it is with them as\r\nwith men of genius: the multitude of representations following\r\nrapidly upon each other, leaves no time or patience\r\nfor repetition and practice; only, in novels, these representations\r\nare not the readers\u0027 own, but other people\u0027s\r\nthoughts and combinations quickly succeeding each other,\r\nand the readers themselves are wanting in that which, in\r\ngenius, counterbalances repetition. The whole thing besides\r\nis subject to the corrective, that we all have most\r\nmemory for that which interests us, and least for that which\r\ndoes not. Great minds therefore are apt to forget in an\r\nincredibly short time the petty affairs and trifling occurrences\r\nof daily life and the commonplace people with whom\r\nthey come in contact, whereas they have a wonderful recollection\r\nof those things which have importance in themselves\r\nand for them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is, however, on the whole, easy to understand that\r\nwe should more readily remember such series of representations\r\nas are connected together by the thread of one\r\nor more of the above-mentioned species of reasons and\r\nconsequences, than such as have no connection with one\r\nanother, but only with our will according to the law of\r\nmotives; that is to say, those which are arbitrarily\r\ngrouped. For, in the former, the fact that we know the\r\nformal part \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e, saves us half the trouble; and this\r\nprobably gave rise to Plato\u0027s doctrine, that all learning is\r\nmere remembering.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs far as possible we ought to try and reduce all that we\r\nwish to incorporate in our memory to a perceptible image,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg176\"\u003e[176]\u003c/span\u003e\r\neither directly, or as an example, a mere simile, or an analogue,\r\nor indeed in any other way; because intuitive perceptions\r\ntake a far firmer hold than any abstract thoughts,\r\nlet alone mere words. This is why we remember things we\r\nhave ourselves experienced so much better than those of\r\nwhich we read.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg177\"\u003e[177]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eCHAPTER VIII.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eGENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND RESULTS.\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 46. \u003ci\u003eThe Systematic Order.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe order of succession in which I have stated the\r\nvarious forms of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in\r\nthis treatise, is not systematic; it has been chosen for the\r\nsake of greater clearness, in order first to present what is\r\nbetter known and least presupposes the rest. In this I\r\nhave followed Aristotle\u0027s rule: καὶ μαθήσεως οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ\r\nπρώτου, καὶ τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρχῆς ἐνίοτε ἀρκτέον, ἀλλ\u0027 ὅθεν\r\nῥᾷστ\u0027 ἂν μάθοι (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eet doctrina non a primo, ac rei principio aliquando\r\ninchoanda est, sed unde quis facilius discat\u003c/i\u003e).\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_156\" title=\"Aristot. \u0027Metaph.\u0027 iv. 1. \u0027Sometimes too, learning must start, not from what is really first and with the actual beginning of the thing concerned, but from where it is easiest to learn.\u0027 [Tr.\u0027s add.]\" id=\"FNanchor_156\"\u003e[156]\u003c/a\u003e But\r\nthe systematic order in which the different classes of reasons\r\nought to follow one another is the following. First of all\r\nshould come The Principle of Sufficient Reason of Being;\r\nand in this again first its application to Time, as being the\r\nsimple schema containing only what is essential in all the\r\nother forms of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, nay, as\r\nbeing the prototype of all finitude. The Reason of Being\r\nin Space having next been stated, the Law of Causality\r\nwould then follow; after which would come the Law of\r\nMotives, and last of all the Principle of Sufficient Reason\r\nof Knowing; for the other classes of reasons refer to immediate\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg178\"\u003e[178]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nrepresentations, whereas this last class refers to\r\nrepresentations derived from other representations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe truth expressed above, that Time is the simple schema\r\nwhich merely contains the essential part of all the forms of\r\nthe Principle of Sufficient Reason, explains the absolutely\r\nperfect clearness and precision of Arithmetic, a point in\r\nwhich no other science can compete with it. For all sciences,\r\nbeing throughout combinations of reasons and consequences,\r\nare based upon the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Now, the\r\nseries of numbers is the simple and only series of reasons\r\nand consequences of Being in Time; on account of this\r\nperfect simplicity—nothing being omitted, no indefinite\r\nrelations left—this series leaves nothing to be desired as regards\r\naccuracy, apodeictic certainty and clearness. All the\r\nother sciences yield precedence in this respect to Arithmetic;\r\neven Geometry: because so many relations arise out of the\r\nthree dimensions of Space, that a comprehensive synopsis\r\nof them becomes too difficult, not only for pure, but even\r\nfor empirical intuition; complicated geometrical problems\r\nare therefore only solved by calculation; that is, Geometry\r\nis quick to resolve itself into Arithmetic. It is not\r\nnecessary to point out the existence of sundry elements of\r\nobscurity in the other sciences.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 47. \u003ci\u003eRelation in Time between Reason and Consequence.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAccording to the laws of causality and of motivation, a\r\nreason must precede its consequence in Time. That this is\r\nabsolutely essential, I have shown in my chief work, to\r\nwhich I here refer my readers\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_157\" title=\"See \u0027Die Welt a. W. u. V.,\u0027 vol. ii. ch. iv. p. 41, 42 of the 2nd edition, and p. 44 of the 3rd.\" id=\"FNanchor_157\"\u003e[157]\u003c/a\u003e in order to avoid repeating\r\nmyself. Therefore, if we only bear in mind that it is\r\nnot one thing which is the cause of another thing, but\r\none state which is the cause of another state, we shall not\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg179\"\u003e[179]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nallow ourselves to be misled by examples like that given\r\nby Kant,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_158\" title=\"Kant, \u0027Krit. d. r. Vern.,\u0027 1st edition, p. 202; 5th edition, p. 248 (English translation by M. Müller, p. 177.)\" id=\"FNanchor_158\"\u003e[158]\u003c/a\u003e that the stove, which is the cause of the\r\nwarmth of the room, is simultaneous with its effect. The\r\nstate of the stove: that is, its being warmer than its surrounding\r\nmedium, must precede the communication of its\r\nsurplus caloric to that medium; now, as each layer of air\r\non becoming warm makes way for a cooler layer rushing\r\nin, the first state, the cause, and consequently also the\r\nsecond, the effect, are renewed until at last the temperature\r\nof stove and room become equalized. Here therefore we\r\nhave no permanent cause (the stove) and permanent effect\r\n(the warmth of the room) as simultaneous things, but a\r\nchain of changes; that is, a constant renewing of two states,\r\none of which is the effect of the other. From this example,\r\nhowever, it is obvious that even Kant\u0027s conception of\r\nCausality was far from clear.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand, the Principle of Sufficient Reason of\r\nKnowing conveys with it no relation in Time, but merely\r\na relation for our Reason: here therefore, \u003cem\u003ebefore\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eafter\u003c/em\u003e\r\nhave no meaning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the Principle of Sufficient Reason of Being, so far\r\nas it is valid in Geometry, there is likewise no relation in\r\nTime, but only a relation in Space, of which we might say\r\nthat all things were co-existent, if here the words co-existence\r\nand succession had any meaning. In Arithmetic,\r\non the contrary, the Reason of Being is nothing else but\r\nprecisely the relation of Time itself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 48. \u003ci\u003eReciprocity of Reasons.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHypothetical judgments may be founded upon the\r\nPrinciple of Sufficient Reason in each of its significations, as\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg180\"\u003e[180]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nindeed every hypothetical judgment is ultimately based\r\nupon that principle, and here the laws of hypothetical\r\nconclusions always hold good: that is to say, it is right\r\nto infer the existence of the consequence from the existence\r\nof the reason, and the non-existence of the reason from\r\nthe non-existence of the consequence; but it is wrong to\r\ninfer the non-existence of the consequence from the non-existence\r\nof the reason, and the existence of the reason\r\nfrom the existence of the consequence. Now it is singular\r\nthat in Geometry we are nevertheless nearly always able\r\nto infer the existence of the reason from the existence\r\nof the consequence, and the non-existence of the consequence\r\nfrom the non-existence of the reason. This proceeds,\r\nas I have shown in § 37, from the fact that, as each\r\nline determines the position of the rest, it is quite indifferent\r\nwhich we begin at: that is, which we consider as the\r\nreason, and which as the consequence. We may easily\r\nconvince ourselves of this by going through the whole of\r\nthe geometrical theorems. It is only where we have to do\r\nnot only with figures, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, with the positions of lines, but\r\nwith planes independently of figures, that we find it in\r\nmost cases impossible to infer the existence of the reason\r\nfrom the existence of the consequence, or, in other words,\r\nto convert the propositions by making the condition the\r\nconditioned. The following theorem gives an instance of\r\nthis: Triangles whose lengths and bases are equal, include\r\nequal areas. This cannot be converted as follows: Triangles\r\nwhose areas are equal, have likewise equal bases and\r\nlengths; for the lengths may stand in inverse proportion\r\nto the bases.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn § 20 it has already been shown, that the law of\r\ncausality does not admit of reciprocity, since the effect\r\nnever can be the cause of its cause; therefore the conception\r\nof reciprocity is, in its right sense, inadmissible.\r\nReciprocity, according to the Principle of Sufficient Reason\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg181\"\u003e[181]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof knowing, would only be possible between equivalent\r\nconceptions, since the spheres of these alone cover each\r\nother mutually. Apart from these, it only gives rise to a\r\nvicious circle.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 49. \u003ci\u003eNecessity.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Principle of Sufficient Reason in all its forms is the\r\nsole principle and the sole support of all necessity. For\r\n\u003cem\u003enecessity\u003c/em\u003e has no other true and distinct meaning than that\r\nof the infallibility of the consequence when the reason is\r\nposited. Accordingly every necessity is \u003cem\u003econditioned\u003c/em\u003e: absolute,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, unconditioned, necessity therefore is a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003econtradicto\r\nin adjecto\u003c/i\u003e. For \u003cem\u003eto be necessary\u003c/em\u003e can never mean anything\r\nbut to result from a given reason. By defining it as\r\n\"what cannot not be,\" on the other hand, we give a mere\r\nverbal definition, and screen ourselves behind an extremely\r\nabstract conception to avoid giving a definition of the\r\nthing. But it is not difficult to drive us from this refuge\r\nby inquiring how the non-existence of anything can be\r\npossible or even conceivable, since all existence is only\r\ngiven empirically. It then comes out, that it is only\r\npossible so far as some \u003cem\u003ereason\u003c/em\u003e or other is posited or present,\r\nfrom which it follows. To be necessary and to follow from\r\na given reason, are thus convertible conceptions, and may\r\nalways, as such, be substituted one for the other. The\r\nconception of an \"\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eABSOLUTELY\u003c/span\u003e \u003cem\u003enecessary Being\u003c/em\u003e\" which\r\nfinds so much favour with pseudo-philosophers, contains\r\ntherefore a contradiction: it annuls by the predicate\r\n\"\u003cem\u003eabsolute\u003c/em\u003e\" (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, \"unconditioned by anything else\") the\r\nonly determination which makes the \"\u003cem\u003enecessary\u003c/em\u003e\" conceivable.\r\nHere again we have an instance of the \u003cem\u003eimproper use\r\nof abstract conceptions\u003c/em\u003e to play off a metaphysical artifice such\r\nas those I have already pointed out in the conceptions \"\u003cem\u003eimmaterial\r\nsubstance\u003c/em\u003e,\" \"\u003cem\u003ecause in general\u003c/em\u003e,\" \"\u003cem\u003eabsolute reason\u003c/em\u003e,\"\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg182\"\u003e[182]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_159\" title=\"Compare \u0027Die Welt a. W. u. V.,\u0027 vol. i. p. 551 et seq. of the 2nd edition (i. p. 582 et seq. of 3rd edition) as to \u0027immaterial substance,\u0027 and § 52 of the present work as to \u0027reason in general.\u0027 (Editor\u0027s note.)\" id=\"FNanchor_159\"\u003e[159]\u003c/a\u003e I can never insist too much upon all abstract\r\nconceptions being checked by \u003cem\u003eperception\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere exists accordingly a \u003cem\u003efourfold\u003c/em\u003e necessity, in conformity\r\nwith the \u003cem\u003efour\u003c/em\u003e forms of the Principle of Sufficient\r\nReason:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e1\u003csup\u003eo\u003c/sup\u003e. \u003cem\u003eLogical necessity\u003c/em\u003e, according to the principle of sufficient\r\nreason of knowing, in virtue of which, when once we have\r\nadmitted the premisses, we must absolutely admit the\r\nconclusion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e2\u003csup\u003eo\u003c/sup\u003e. \u003cem\u003ePhysical necessity\u003c/em\u003e, according to the law of causality,\r\nin virtue of which, as soon as the cause presents itself, the\r\neffect must infallibly follow.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e3\u003csup\u003eo\u003c/sup\u003e. \u003cem\u003eMathematical necessity\u003c/em\u003e, according to the principle of\r\nsufficient reason of being, in virtue of which, every relation\r\nwhich is stated in a true geometrical theorem, is as that\r\ntheorem affirms it to be, and every correct calculation\r\nremains irrefutable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e4\u003csup\u003eo\u003c/sup\u003e. \u003cem\u003eMoral necessity\u003c/em\u003e, in virtue of which, every human\r\nbeing, every animal even, is \u003cem\u003ecompelled\u003c/em\u003e, as soon as a motive\r\npresents itself, to do that which alone is in accordance\r\nwith the inborn and immutable character of the individual.\r\nThis action now follows its cause therefore as infallibly as\r\nevery other effect, though it is less easy here to predict\r\nwhat that effect will be than in other cases, because of the\r\ndifficulty we have in fathoming and completely knowing\r\nthe individual empirical character and its allotted sphere\r\nof knowledge, which is indeed a very different thing from\r\nascertaining the chemical properties of a neutral salt and\r\npredicting its reaction. I must repeat this again and\r\nagain on account of the dunces and blockheads who, in\r\ndefiance of the unanimous authority of so many great\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg183\"\u003e[183]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthinkers, still persist in audaciously maintaining the contrary,\r\nfor the benefit of their old woman\u0027s philosophy. I\r\nam not a professor of philosophy, forsooth, that I need\r\nbow to the folly of others.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 50. \u003ci\u003eSeries of Reasons and Consequences.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAccording to the law of causality, the condition is itself\r\nalways conditioned, and, moreover, conditioned in the same\r\nway; therefore, there arises a series \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein infinitum a parte\r\nante\u003c/i\u003e. It is just the same with the Reason of Being in\r\nSpace: each relative space is a figure; it has its limits,\r\nby which it is connected with another relative space, and\r\nwhich themselves condition the figure of this other, and so\r\non throughout all dimensions \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein infinitum\u003c/i\u003e. But when we\r\nexamine a single figure in itself, the series of reasons of\r\nbeing has an end, because we start from a given relation,\r\njust as the series of causes comes to an end if we stop at\r\npleasure at any particular cause. In Time, the series of\r\nreasons of being has infinite extension both \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ea parte ante\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ea parte post\u003c/i\u003e, since each moment is conditioned by a\r\npreceding one, and necessarily gives rise to the following.\r\nTime has therefore neither beginning nor end. On the\r\nother hand, the series of reasons of knowledge—that\r\nis, a series of judgments, each of which gives logical\r\ntruth to the other—always ends somewhere, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, either in\r\nan empirical, a transcendental, or a metalogical truth. If\r\nthe reason of the major to which we have been led is an\r\nempirical truth, and we still continue asking \u003cem\u003ewhy\u003c/em\u003e, it is no\r\nlonger a reason of knowledge that is asked for, but a\r\ncause—in other words, the series of reasons of knowing\r\npasses over into the series of reasons of becoming. But if\r\nwe do the contrary, that is, if we allow the series of reasons\r\nof becoming to pass over into the series of reasons of\r\nknowing, in order to bring it to an end, this is never brought\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg184\"\u003e[184]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nabout by the nature of the thing, but always by a special\r\npurpose: it is therefore a trick, and this is the sophism known\r\nby the name of the Ontological Proof. For when a cause, at\r\nwhich it seems desirable to stop short in order to make it\r\nthe \u003cem\u003efirst\u003c/em\u003e cause, has been reached by means of the Cosmological\r\nProof, we find out that the law of causality is not\r\nso easily brought to a standstill, and still persists in asking\r\n\u003cem\u003ewhy\u003c/em\u003e: so it is simply set aside and the principle of sufficient\r\nreason of knowing, which from a distance resembles it,\r\nis substituted in its stead; and thus a reason of knowledge\r\nis given in the place of the cause which had been\r\nasked for—a reason of knowledge derived from the conception\r\nitself which has to be demonstrated, the reality of\r\nwhich is therefore still problematical: and this reason, as\r\nafter all it is one, now has to figure as a cause. Of course\r\nthe conception itself has been previously arranged for this\r\npurpose, and reality slightly covered with a few husks just\r\nfor decency\u0027s sake has been placed within it, so as to give\r\nthe delightful surprise of finding it there—as has been\r\nshown in Section 7. On the other hand, if a chain of\r\njudgments ultimately rests upon a principle of transcendental\r\nor of metalogical truth, and we still continue to ask\r\n\u003cem\u003ewhy\u003c/em\u003e, we receive no answer at all, because the question has\r\nno meaning, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, it does not know what kind of reason it\r\nis asking for.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the Principle of Sufficient Reason is the \u003cem\u003eprinciple of\r\nall explanation: to explain a thing\u003c/em\u003e means, to reduce its\r\ngiven existence or connection to some form or other of\r\nthe Principle of Sufficient Reason, in accordance with which\r\nform that existence or connection necessarily is that which\r\nit is. The Principle of Sufficient Reason itself, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, the\r\nconnection expressed by it in any of its forms, cannot\r\ntherefore be further explained; because there exists no\r\nprinciple by which to explain the source of all explanation:\r\njust as the eye is unable to see itself, though it sees everything\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg185\"\u003e[185]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nelse. There are of course series of motives, since\r\nthe resolve to attain an end becomes the motive for the\r\nresolve to use a whole series of means; still this series\r\ninvariably ends \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà parte priori\u003c/i\u003e in a representation belonging\r\nto one of our two first classes, in which lies the motive\r\nwhich originally had the power to set this individual will\r\nin motion. The fact that it was able to do this, is a\r\ndatum for knowing the empirical character here given, but\r\nit is impossible to answer the question why that particular\r\nmotive acts upon that particular character; because the\r\nintelligible character lies outside Time and never becomes\r\nan Object. Therefore the series of motives, as such, finds its\r\ntermination in some such final motive and, according to the\r\nnature of its last link, passes into the series of causes, or\r\nthat of reasons of knowledge: that is to say, into the\r\nformer, when that last link is a real object; into the\r\nlatter, when it is a mere conception.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 51. \u003ci\u003eEach Science has for its Guiding Thread one of the\r\nForms of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in preference\r\nto the others.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs the question \u003cem\u003ewhy\u003c/em\u003e always demands a sufficient reason,\r\nand as it is the connection of its notions according to the\r\nprinciple of sufficient reason which distinguishes science\r\nfrom a mere aggregate of notions, we have called that\r\n\u003cem\u003ewhy\u003c/em\u003e the parent of all science (§ 4). In each science,\r\nmoreover, we find one of the forms of that principle\r\npredominating over the others as its guiding-thread.\r\nThus in pure Mathematics the reason of being is the\r\nchief guiding-thread (although the exposition of the\r\nproofs proceeds according to the reason of knowing only);\r\nin applied Mathematics the law of causality appears\r\ntogether with it, but in Physics, Chemistry, Geology, \u0026amp;c.,\r\nthat law entirely predominates. The principle of sufficient\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg186\"\u003e[186]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreason in knowing finds vigorous application throughout\r\nall the sciences, for in all of them the particular is known\r\nthrough the general; but in Botany, Zoology, Mineralogy,\r\nand other classifying sciences, it is the chief guide and\r\npredominates absolutely. The law of motives (\u003cem\u003emotivation\u003c/em\u003e)\r\nis the chief guide in History, Politics, Pragmatic\r\nPsychology, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c., when we consider all motives and\r\nmaxims, whatever they may be, as data for explaining\r\nactions—but when we make those motives and maxims the\r\nobject-matter of investigation from the point of view of\r\ntheir value and origin, the law of motives becomes the\r\nguide to Ethics. In my chief work will be found the\r\nhighest classification of the sciences according to this\r\nprinciple.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_160\" title=\"\u0027Die Welt a. W. u. V.,\u0027 vol. ii. ch. 12, p. 126 of the 2nd edition (p. 139 of the 3rd edition).\" id=\"FNanchor_160\"\u003e[160]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003e§ 52. \u003ci\u003eTwo principal Results.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have endeavoured in this treatise to show that the\r\nPrinciple of Sufficient Reason is a common expression for\r\nfour completely different relations, each of which is founded\r\nupon a particular law given \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e (the principle of sufficient\r\nreason being a synthetical \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e principle). Now,\r\naccording to the principle of \u003cem\u003ehomogeneity\u003c/em\u003e, we are compelled\r\nto assume that these four laws, discovered according to the\r\nprinciple of specification, as they agree in being expressed\r\nby one and the same term, must necessarily spring from\r\none and the same original quality of our whole cognitive\r\nfaculty as their common root, which we should accordingly\r\nhave to look upon as the innermost germ of all dependence,\r\nrelativeness, instability and limitation of the objects of our\r\nconsciousness—itself limited to Sensibility, Understanding,\r\nReason, Subject and Object—or of that world, which the\r\ndivine Plato repeatedly degrades to the ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον μὲν\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg187\"\u003e[187]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nκαὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν (ever arising and\r\nperishing, but in fact never existing), the knowledge of\r\nwhich is merely a δόξα μετ\u0027 αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου, and which\r\nChristendom, with a correct instinct, calls \u003cem\u003etemporal\u003c/em\u003e, after\r\nthat form of our principle (Time) which I have defined as\r\nits simplest schema and the prototype of all limitation.\r\nThe general meaning of the Principle of Sufficient Reason\r\nmay, in the main, be brought back to this: that every\r\nthing existing no matter when or where, exists \u003cem\u003eby reason of\r\nsomething else\u003c/em\u003e. Now, the Principle of Sufficient Reason is\r\nnevertheless \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e in all its forms: that is, it has its root\r\nin our intellect, therefore it must not be applied to the\r\ntotality of existent things, the Universe, including that intellect\r\nin which it presents itself. For a world like this,\r\nwhich presents itself in virtue of \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e forms, is just on\r\nthat account mere phenomenon; consequently that which\r\nholds good with reference to it as the result of these forms,\r\ncannot be applied to the world itself, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e to the thing in\r\nitself, representing itself in that world. Therefore we cannot\r\nsay, \"the world and all things in it exist by reason of\r\nsomething else;\" and this proposition is precisely the Cosmological\r\nProof.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf, by the present treatise, I have succeeded in deducing\r\nthe result just expressed, it seems to me that every speculative\r\nphilosopher who founds a conclusion upon the Principle\r\nof Sufficient Reason or indeed talks of a reason at all,\r\nis bound to specify which kind of reason he means. One\r\nmight suppose that wherever there was any question of a\r\nreason, this would be done as a matter of course, and that\r\nall confusion would thus be impossible. Only too often,\r\nhowever, do we still find either the terms reason and cause\r\nconfounded in indiscriminate use; or do we hear basis and\r\nwhat is based, condition and what is conditioned, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprincipia\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprincipiata\u003c/i\u003e talked about in quite a \u003cem\u003egeneral\u003c/em\u003e way without\r\nany nearer determination, perhaps because there is a secret\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg188\"\u003e[188]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nconsciousness that these conceptions are being used in an\r\nunauthorized way. Thus even Kant speaks of the thing\r\nin itself as the \u003cem\u003ereason\u003c/em\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_161\" title=\"Or ground.\" id=\"FNanchor_161\"\u003e[161]\u003c/a\u003e of the phenomenon, and also of a\r\n\u003cem\u003eground\u003c/em\u003e of the \u003cem\u003epossibility\u003c/em\u003e of all phenomena,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_162\" title=\"Kant, \u0027Krit. d. r. Vern.,\u0027 1st edition, pp. 561, 562, 564; p. 590 of the 5th edition. (Pp. 483 to 486 of the English translation by M. Müller.)\" id=\"FNanchor_162\"\u003e[162]\u003c/a\u003e of an \u003cem\u003eintelligible\r\ncause\u003c/em\u003e of phenomena, of an \u003cem\u003eunknown ground\u003c/em\u003e of the possibility\r\nof the sensuous series in general, of a \u003cem\u003etranscendental\r\nobject\u003c/em\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_163\" title=\"Ibid. p. 540 of 1st edition, and 641 of 5th edition. (P. 466 of English translation.)\" id=\"FNanchor_163\"\u003e[163]\u003c/a\u003e as the \u003cem\u003eground\u003c/em\u003e of all phenomena and of the \u003cem\u003ereason\u003c/em\u003e\r\nwhy our sensibility should have this rather than all other\r\nsupreme conditions, and so on in several places. Now all\r\nthis does not seem to me to tally with those weighty, profound,\r\nnay immortal words of his,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_164\" title=\"Ibid. p. 563 of the 1st and 591 of the 5th edition. (P. 485 of English translation.)\" id=\"FNanchor_164\"\u003e[164]\u003c/a\u003e \"the contingency\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_165\" title=\"Empirical contingency is meant, which, with Kant, signifies as much as dependence upon other things. As to this, I refer my readers to my censure in my \u0027Critique of Kantian Philosophy,\u0027 p. 524 of the 2nd, and p. 552 of the 3rd edition.\" id=\"FNanchor_165\"\u003e[165]\u003c/a\u003e of\r\nthings is itself mere phenomenon, and can lead to no other\r\nthan the empirical regressus which determines phenomena.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat since Kant the conceptions reason and consequence,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprincipium\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprincipiatum\u003c/i\u003e, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c., have been\r\nand still are used in a yet more indefinite and even quite\r\ntranscendent sense, everyone must know who is acquainted\r\nwith the more recent works on philosophy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe following is my objection against this promiscuous\r\nemployment of the word \u003cem\u003eground\u003c/em\u003e (reason) and, with it, of the\r\nPrinciple of Sufficient Reason in general; it is likewise the\r\nsecond result, intimately connected with the first, which the\r\npresent treatise gives concerning its subject-matter proper.\r\nThe four laws of our cognitive faculty, of which the Principle\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg189\"\u003e[189]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof Sufficient Reason is the common expression, by\r\ntheir common character as well as by the fact that all\r\nObjects for the Subject are divided amongst them, proclaim\r\nthemselves to be posited by one and the same primary\r\nquality and inner peculiarity of our knowing faculty, which\r\nfaculty manifests itself as Sensibility, Understanding, and\r\nReason. Therefore, even if we imagined it to be possible\r\nfor a new Fifth Class of Objects to come about, we should\r\nin that case likewise have to assume that the Principle of\r\nSufficient Reason would appear in this class also under a\r\ndifferent form. Notwithstanding all this, we still have no\r\nright to talk of an \u003cem\u003eabsolute reason\u003c/em\u003e (ground), nor does a\r\n\u003cem\u003ereason in general\u003c/em\u003e, any more than a \u003cem\u003etriangle in general\u003c/em\u003e, exist\r\notherwise than as a conception derived by means of discursive\r\nreflection, nor is this conception, as a representation\r\ndrawn from other representations, anything more than a\r\nmeans of thinking several things in one. Now, just as\r\nevery triangle must be either acute-angled, right-angled,\r\nor obtuse-angled, and either equilateral, isosceles or scalene,\r\nso also must every reason belong to one or other of the\r\nfour possible kinds of reasons I have pointed out. Moreover,\r\nsince we have only four well-distinguished Classes of\r\nObjects, every reason must also belong to one or other of\r\nthese four, and no further Class being possible, Reason\r\nitself is forced to rank it within them; for as soon as we\r\nemploy a reason, we presuppose the Four Classes as well\r\nas the faculty of representing (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e the whole world), and\r\nmust hold ourselves within these bounds, never transcending\r\nthem. Should others, however, see this in a different\r\nlight and opine that a \u003cem\u003ereason in general\u003c/em\u003e is anything but a\r\nconception, derived from the four kinds of reasons, which\r\nexpresses what they all have in common, we might revive\r\nthe controversy of the Realists and Nominalists, and then\r\nI should side with the latter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003eON THE WILL IN NATURE.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg190\"\u003e[190]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph3 spaced\"\u003eAN ACCOUNT OF THE CORROBORATIONS\r\nRECEIVED BY THE AUTHOR\u0027S\r\nPHILOSOPHY\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eSINCE ITS FIRST APPEARANCE\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\nFROM THE EMPIRICAL SCIENCES.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph4\"\u003eBY\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph3\"\u003eARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eTranslated from the Fourth Edition published by\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJulius Frauenstädt\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poetry-container\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eΤοιαῦτ\u0027 ἐμοῦ λόγοισιν ἐξηγουμένου,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eΟὐκ ἠξίωσαν οὐδὲ προσβλέψαι τὸ πᾶν·\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eἈλλ\u0027 ἐκδιδάσκει πάνθ\u0027 ὁ γηράσκων χρόνος.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"right\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eÆsch.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg193\"\u003e[193]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003ePREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo my great joy I have lived to revise even this little\r\nwork, after a lapse of nineteen years, and that joy is\r\nenhanced by the special importance of this treatise for my\r\nphilosophy. For, starting from the purely empirical, from\r\nthe observations of unbiassed physical investigators—themselves\r\nfollowing the clue of their own special sciences—I\r\nhere immediately arrive at the very kernel of my Metaphysic;\r\nI establish its points of contact with the physical\r\nsciences and thus corroborate my fundamental dogma, in\r\na sense, as the arithmetician proves a sum: for by this I\r\nnot only confirm it more closely and specially, but even\r\nmake it more clearly, easily, and rightly understood than\r\nanywhere else.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe improvements in this new edition are confined almost\r\nentirely to the Additions; for scarcely anything that is\r\nworth mentioning in the First Edition has been left out,\r\nwhile I have inserted many and, in some cases, important\r\nnew passages.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut, even in a general sense, it may be looked upon as a\r\ngood sign, that a new edition of the present treatise should\r\nhave been found necessary; since it shows that there is an\r\ninterest in serious philosophy and confirms the fact that\r\nthe necessity for real progress in this direction is now more\r\nstrongly felt than ever. This is based upon two circumstances.\r\nThe first is the unparalleled zeal and activity\r\ndisplayed in every branch of Natural Science which, as\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg194\"\u003e[194]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthis pursuit is mostly in the hands of people who have\r\nlearned nothing else, threatens to lead to a gross, stupid\r\nMaterialism, the \u003cem\u003emore immediately\u003c/em\u003e offensive side of which\r\nis less the moral bestiality of its ultimate results, than the\r\nincredible absurdity of its first principles; for by it even\r\nvital force is denied, and organic Nature is degraded to a\r\nmere chance play of chemical forces.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_166\" title=\"And this infatuation has reached such a point, that people seriously imagine themselves to have found the key to the mystery of the essence and existence of this wonderful and mysterious world in wretched chemical affinities! Compared with this illusion of our physiological chemists, that of the alchymists who sought after the philosopher\u0027s stone, and only hoped to find out the secret of making gold, was indeed a mere trifle. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_166\"\u003e[166]\u003c/a\u003e These knights of\r\nthe crucible and retort should be made to understand, that\r\nthe mere study of Chemistry qualifies a man to become an\r\napothecary, but not a philosopher. Certain other like-minded\r\ninvestigators of Nature, too, must be taught, that\r\na man may be an accomplished zoologist and have the\r\nsixty species of monkeys at his fingers\u0027 ends, yet on the\r\nwhole be an ignoramus to be classed with the vulgar, if he\r\nhas learnt nothing else, save perhaps his school-catechism.\r\nBut in our time this frequently happens. Men set themselves\r\nup for enlighteners of mankind, who have studied\r\nChemistry, or Physics, or Mineralogy and nothing else\r\nunder the sun; to this they add their only knowledge of\r\nany other kind, that is to say, the little they may remember\r\nof the doctrines of the school-catechism, and when they\r\nfind that these two elements will not harmonize, they\r\nstraightway turn scoffers at religion and soon become\r\nshallow and absurd materialists.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_167\" title=\"\u0027Aut catechismus, aut materialismus,\u0027 is their watchword. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_167\"\u003e[167]\u003c/a\u003e They may perhaps have\r\nheard at college of the existence of a Plato and an Aristotle,\r\nof a Locke, and especially of a Kant; but as these folk\r\nnever handled crucibles and retorts or even stuffed a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg195\"\u003e[195]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmonkey, they do not esteem them worthy of further acquaintance.\r\nThey prefer calmly to toss out of the window the\r\nintellectual labour of two thousand years and treat the\r\npublic to a philosophy concocted out of their own rich\r\nmental resources, on the basis of the catechism on the one\r\nhand, and on that of crucibles and retorts or the catalogue\r\nof monkeys on the other. They ought to be told in plain\r\nlanguage that they are ignoramuses, who have much to\r\nlearn before they can be allowed to have any voice in the\r\nmatter. Everyone, in fact, who dogmatizes at random,\r\nwith the \u003cem\u003enaïve\u003c/em\u003e realism of a child on such arguments as\r\nGod, the soul, the world\u0027s origin, atoms, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c., as if\r\nthe Critique of Pure Reason had been written in the moon\r\nand no copy had found its way to our planet—is simply one\r\nof the vulgar. Send him into the servants\u0027 hall, where his\r\nwisdom will best find a market.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_168\" title=\"There too he will meet with people who fling about words of foreign origin, which they have caught up without understanding them, just as readily as he does himself, when he talks about \u0027Idealism\u0027 without knowing what it means, mostly therefore using the word instead of Spiritualism (which being Realism, is the opposite to Idealism). Hundreds of examples of this kind besides other quid pro quos are to be found in books, and critical periodicals. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_168\"\u003e[168]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe other circumstance which calls for a real progress\r\nin philosophy, is the steady growth of unbelief in the face\r\nof all the hypocritical dissembling and the outward conformity\r\nto the Church. This unbelief necessarily and unavoidably\r\ngoes hand in hand with the growing expansion\r\nof empirical and historical knowledge. It threatens to\r\ndestroy not only the form, but even the spirit of Christianity\r\n(a spirit which has a much wider reach than Christianity\r\nitself), and to deliver up mankind to \u003cem\u003emoral\u003c/em\u003e materialism—a\r\nthing even more dangerous than the chemical materialism\r\nalready mentioned. And nothing plays more into the\r\nhands of this unbelief, than the Tartuffianism \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003ede rigueur\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg196\"\u003e[196]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nimpudently flaunting itself everywhere just now, whose\r\nclumsy disciples, fee in hand, hold forth with such unction\r\nand emphasis, that their voices penetrate even into learned,\r\ncritical reviews issued by Academies and Universities, and\r\ninto physiological as well as philosophical books, where\r\nhowever, being quite in their wrong place, they only damage\r\ntheir own cause by rousing indignation.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_169\" title=\"They ought everywhere to be shown that their belief is not believed in. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_169\"\u003e[169]\u003c/a\u003e Under such circumstances\r\nas these, it is gratifying to see the public betray\r\nan interest in philosophy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have nevertheless one sad piece of news to communicate\r\nto our professors of philosophy. Their Caspar Hauser\r\n(according to Dorguth) whom they had so carefully\r\nsecreted, so securely walled up for nearly forty years, that\r\nno sound could betray his existence to the world—their\r\nCaspar Hauser—I say, has escaped! He has escaped and\r\nis running about in the world;—some even say he is\r\na prince. In plain language, the misfortune they feared\r\nmore than anything has come to pass after all. In spite of\r\ntheir having done their best to prevent it for more than a\r\ngeneration by acting with united force, with rare constancy,\r\nsecreting and ignoring to a degree that is without example,\r\nmy books are beginning and henceforth will continue to be\r\nread. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eLegor et legar\u003c/i\u003e: there is no help for it. This is\r\nreally dreadful and most inopportune; nay, it is a positive\r\nfatality, not to say calamity. Is this the recompense for\r\nall their faithful, snug secrecy; for having held so firmly\r\nand unitedly together? Poor time-servers! What becomes\r\nof Horace\u0027s assurance:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poetry-container\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\" lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003e\"Est et fideli tuta silentio\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eMerces,——?\"\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor verily they have not been deficient in faithful reticence;\r\nrather do they excel in this quality wherever they scent\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg197\"\u003e[197]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmerit. And, after all, it is no doubt the cleverest artifice;\r\nfor what no one knows, is as though it did not exist.\r\nWhether the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003emerces\u003c/i\u003e will remain quite so \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003etuta\u003c/i\u003e, seems rather\r\ndoubtful—unless we are to take \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003emerces\u003c/i\u003e in a \u003cem\u003ebad\u003c/em\u003e sense; and\r\nfor this the support of many a classical authority might\r\ncertainly be found. These gentlemen had seen quite rightly\r\nthat the only means to be used against my writings, was\r\nto secrete them from the public by maintaining profound\r\nsilence concerning them, while they kept up a loud noise at\r\nthe birth of every misshapen offspring of professorial\r\nphilosophy; as the voice of the new-born Zeus was drowned\r\nin days of yore by the clashing of the cymbals of the\r\nCorybantes. But this expedient is now used up; the\r\nsecret is out—the public has discovered me. The rage of\r\nour professors of philosophy at this is great, but powerless;\r\nfor their only effective resource, so long successfully employed,\r\nbeing exhausted, no snarling can avail any longer\r\nagainst my influence, and in vain do they now take this, or\r\nthat, or the other attitude. They have certainly succeeded,\r\nso far as the generation which was properly speaking contemporaneous\r\nwith my philosophy, went to the grave in\r\nignorance of it. But this was a mere postponement, and\r\nTime has kept its word, as it always does.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow there are two reasons why these gentlemen \"in\r\nthe philosophical trade\"—as they call themselves with\r\nincredible \u003cem\u003enaïveté\u003c/em\u003e—hate my philosophy. The first of\r\nthem is, that my writings spoil the taste of the public for\r\ntissues of empty phrases, for accumulations of unmeaning\r\nwords piled one upon another, for hollow, superficial,\r\nbrain-racking twaddle, for Christian dogmatics under the\r\ndisguise of the most wearisome Metaphysics, for systematized\r\nPhilistinism of the flattest kind made to represent\r\nEthics and even accompanied by instructions for\r\ncard-playing and dancing—in short, they unfit my readers\r\nfor the whole method of philosophising \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eà la vieille femme\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg198\"\u003e[198]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich has scared so many for ever from the pursuit of\r\nphilosophy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe second reason is, that our gentlemen \"in the trade\"\r\nare absolutely bound in conscience not to let my philosophy\r\npass and are therefore debarred from using it for the\r\nbenefit of \"the trade;\"—and this they even heartily regret;\r\nfor my abundance might have been admirably turned to\r\naccount for the benefit of their own needy poverty. But\r\neven if it contained the greatest hoards of human wisdom\r\never unearthed, my doctrine could never find favour with\r\nthem either now or in the future; for it is absolutely\r\nwanting in all Speculative Theology and Rational Psychology,\r\nand these, just these, are the very breath of life to\r\nthese gentlemen, the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003esine qua non\u003c/i\u003e of their existence. For\r\nthey are anxious before all things in heaven and on earth,\r\nto hold their official appointments, and these appointments\r\ndemand before all things in heaven and on earth a Speculative\r\nTheology and a Rational Psychology: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eextra hæc non\r\ndatur salus\u003c/i\u003e. Theology there must and shall be, no matter\r\nwhence it come; Moses and the Prophets must be made\r\nout to be in the right: this is the highest principle in\r\nphilosophy; and there must be Rational Psychology to\r\nboot, as is proper. Now there is nothing of the sort to be\r\nfound either in Kant\u0027s philosophy or in mine. For, as\r\nwe all know, the most cogent theological argumentation\r\nshivers to atoms like a glass thrown at a wall, when it is\r\nbrought into contact with Kant\u0027s Critique of all Speculative\r\nTheology, and under his hands not a shred remains\r\nentire of the whole tissue of Rational Psychology! As to\r\nmyself, being the bold continuer of Kant\u0027s philosophy, I\r\nhave entirely done away with all Speculative Theology and\r\nall Rational Psychology, as is only consistent and honest.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_170\" title=\"For revelation goes for nothing in philosophy; therefore a philosopher must before all things be an unbeliever. [Add. to 3rd ed.].\" id=\"FNanchor_170\"\u003e[170]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nOn the other hand, the task incumbent upon University\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg199\"\u003e[199]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nPhilosophy is at bottom this: to set forth the chief fundamental\r\ntruths belonging to the Catechism under the veil\r\nof some very abstract, abstruse and difficult, therefore\r\npainfully wearisome formulas and sentences; wherefore,\r\nhowever confused, intricate, strange and eccentric the\r\nmatter may seem at first sight, these truths invariably\r\nreveal themselves as its kernel. This proceeding may be\r\nuseful, though to me it is unknown. All I know is, that\r\nphilosophy, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e the search after truth—I mean the truth\r\nκατ\u0027 \u003cins title=\"εζοχήν\" id=\"C199\"\u003eἐξοχήν\u003c/ins\u003e, by which the most sublime and important disclosures,\r\nmore precious than anything else to the human\r\nrace, are understood—will never advance a step, nay, an\r\ninch, by means of such manœuvring, by which its course\r\nis on the contrary impeded; therefore I found out long\r\nago that University philosophy is the enemy of all genuine\r\nphilosophy. Now, this being the state of the case, when a\r\nreally honest philosophy arises, which seriously has truth\r\nfor its sole aim, must not these gentlemen \"of the philosophical\r\ntrade\" feel as might stage-knights in paste-board\r\narmour, were a knight suddenly to appear in the midst of\r\nthem clad in real armour, who made the stage-floor creak\r\nunder his ponderous tread? Such philosophy as this \u003cem\u003emust\u003c/em\u003e\r\ntherefore be bad and false and consequently places these\r\ngentlemen \"of the trade\" under the painful obligation of\r\nplaying the part of him who, in order to appear what he\r\nis not, cannot allow others to pass for what they really are.\r\nOut of all this however there unrolls itself the amusing\r\nspectacle we enjoy, when these gentlemen, now that ignoring\r\nhas unfortunately come to an end, after forty years, at\r\nlast begin to measure me by their own puny standard and\r\npass judgment upon me from the heights of their wisdom,\r\nas though they were amply qualified to do so by their\r\noffice; but they are most amusing of all when they assume\r\nairs of superiority towards me.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTheir abhorrence of Kant, though less openly expressed,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg200\"\u003e[200]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis scarcely less great than their hatred of me; precisely\r\nbecause all speculative Theology and all Rational Psychology—the\r\nbread-winners of these gentlemen—have been\r\nundermined, not to say irrevocably ruined, by him in the\r\neyes of all serious thinkers. What! Not hate him? him,\r\nwho has made their \"trade in philosophy\" so difficult to\r\nthem, that they hardly see how to pull through honourably!\r\nSo Kant and I are accordingly both bad, and these gentlemen\r\nquite overlook us. For nearly forty years they have\r\nnot deigned to cast a glance upon me, and now they look\r\ndown condescendingly upon Kant from the heights of their\r\nwisdom, smiling in pity at his errors. This policy is both\r\nvery wise and very profitable; since they are thus able to\r\nhold forth at their ease volume after volume upon God\r\nand the soul, as if these were personalities with whom\r\nthey were intimately acquainted, and to discourse upon the\r\nrelation in which the former stands to the world and the\r\nlatter to the body, just as if there had never been such a\r\nthing as a Critique of Pure Reason. When once the\r\nCritique of Pure Reason is done away with, all will go on\r\nsplendidly! Now it is for this end that they have been\r\nendeavouring for many years quietly and gradually to set\r\nKant aside, to make him obsolete, nay, to turn up their\r\nnoses at him, and one being encouraged by the other in\r\nthis, they are becoming bolder every day.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_171\" title=\"One always says the other is right, so that the public in its simplicity at last imagines them really to be right. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_171\"\u003e[171]\u003c/a\u003e They have no\r\nopposition to fear from their own colleagues, since they all\r\nhave the same aims and the same mission and all together\r\nform a numerous \u003cem\u003ecoterie\u003c/em\u003e, the brilliant members of which,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecoram populo\u003c/i\u003e, bow and scrape to each other on all sides.\r\nThus by degrees things have come to such a point, that\r\nthe wretchedest compilers of manuals have the presumption\r\nto treat Kant\u0027s grand, immortal discoveries as antiquated\r\nerrors, nay, calmly to set them aside with the most\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg201\"\u003e[201]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nludicrous arrogance and most impudent dicta of their own,\r\nwhich they nevertheless lay down under the disguise of\r\nargumentation, because they know they may count upon a\r\ncredulous public, to whom Kant\u0027s writings are not known.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_172\" title=\"Here it is especially Ernst Reinhold\u0027s \u0027System of Metaphysics\u0027 (3rd edition, 1854) that I have in my eye. In my \u0027Parerga\u0027 I have explained how it comes, that brain-perverting books like this go through several editions. See \u0027Parerga,\u0027 vol. i. p. 171 (2nd edition, vol. i. p. 194).\" id=\"FNanchor_172\"\u003e[172]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nAnd this is what happens to Kant on the part of writers,\r\nwhose total incapacity strikes us in every page, not to\r\nsay every line, we read of their unmeaning, stupefying\r\nverbiage! Were this to go on much longer, Kant would\r\npresent the spectacle of the dead lion being kicked by the\r\ndonkey. Even in France there is no lack of fellow-workers\r\ninspired by a similar orthodoxy, who are labouring towards\r\nthe same end. A certain M. Barthélemy de St. Hilaire,\r\nfor instance, in a lecture delivered in the \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eAcadémie des\r\nSciences Morales\u003c/i\u003e in April, 1850, has presumed to criticize\r\nKant with an air of condescension and to use most improper\r\nlanguage in speaking of him; luckily however in\r\nsuch a way, that no one could fail to see the underlying\r\npurpose.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_173\" title=\"Nevertheless, by Zeus, all such gentlemen, in France as well as Germany, should be taught that Philosophy has a different mission from that of playing into the hands of the clergy. We must let them clearly see before all things that we have no faith in their faith–from this follows what we think of them. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_173\"\u003e[173]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow others among our German \"traders in philosophy\"\r\nagain try to get rid of the obnoxious Kant in a different\r\nway: instead of attacking his philosophy point-blank, they\r\nrather seek to undermine the foundations on which it is\r\nbuilt. These people however are so utterly forsaken by all\r\nthe gods and by all power of judgment, that they attack\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e truths: that is to say, truths as old as the human\r\nunderstanding, nay, which constitute that understanding\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg202\"\u003e[202]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nitself, and which it is therefore impossible to contradict\r\nwithout declaring war against that understanding also.\r\nSo great however is the courage of these gentlemen. I am\r\nsorry to say I know of three,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_174\" title=\"(a) Rosenkranz, \u0027Meine Reform der Hegelschen Philosophie,\u0027 1852, especially p. 41, in a pompous, dictatorial tone: \u0027I have explicitly said, that Space and Time would not exist if Matter did not exist. Æther spread out within itself first constitutes real Space, and the movement of this æther and consequent real genesis of everything individual and separate, constitutes real Time.\u0027…\" id=\"FNanchor_174\"\u003e[174]\u003c/a\u003e and I am afraid there are a\r\ngood many more at work at this undermining process,\r\nwho have the incredible presumption to maintain the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà\r\nposteriori\u003c/i\u003e origin of Space as a consequence, a mere relation,\r\nof the objects \u003cem\u003ewithin it\u003c/em\u003e; for they assert that Space\r\nand Time are of empirical origin and attached to those\r\nbodies, so that [according to them] Space first arises\r\nthrough our perception of the juxtaposition of bodies and\r\nTime likewise through our perception of the succession of\r\nchanges (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003esancta simplicitas!\u003c/i\u003e as if the words \"collateral\"\r\nand \"successive\" would have any sense for us without the\r\nantecedent intuitions of Space and of Time to give them a\r\nmeaning); consequently, that if there were no bodies, there\r\nwould be no Space, therefore if they disappeared Space\r\nalso must lapse, and that if all changes were to stop, Time\r\nalso would stop.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_175\" title=\"Time is the condition of the possibility of succession, which could neither take place, nor be understood by us and expressed in words, without Time. And Space is likewise the condition of the possibility of juxtaposition, and Transcendental Æsthetic is the proof that these conditions have their seat in the constitution of our head. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_175\"\u003e[175]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd such stuff as this is gravely taught fifty years after\r\nKant\u0027s death! The aim of it is, as we know, to undermine\r\nKantian philosophy, and certainly if these propositions\r\nwere true, \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e stroke would suffice to overthrow it. Fortunately\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg203\"\u003e[203]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhowever these assertions are of a kind which is\r\nmet by derision rather than by serious refutation. For, in\r\nthem, the question is one of heresy, not so much against\r\nKantian philosophy, as against common sense; and they\r\nare not so much an attack upon any particular philosophical\r\ndogma, as upon an \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e truth which, as such,\r\nconstitutes human understanding itself, and therefore\r\nmust be instantaneously evident to every one who is in his\r\nsenses, just as much as that 2 × 2 = 4. Fetch me a peasant\r\nfrom the plough; make the question intelligible to him;\r\nand he will tell you, that even if all things in Heaven and\r\non Earth were to vanish, Space would nevertheless remain,\r\nand that if all changes in Heaven and on Earth were to\r\ncease, Time would nevertheless flow on. Compared with\r\nGerman pseudo-philosophers like these, how estimable\r\ndoes a man like the French physicist Pouillet appear, who,\r\nthough he never troubles his head about Metaphysics, is\r\ncareful to incorporate two long paragraphs, one on \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003el\u0027Espace\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthe other on \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003ele Temps\u003c/i\u003e, in the first chapter of his well-known\r\nManual, on which public instruction in France is\r\nbased, where he shows that if all Matter were annihilated,\r\nSpace would still remain, and that Space is infinite;\r\nand that if all changes ceased, Time would still pursue its\r\ncourse without end. Now here he does not appeal, as in\r\nall other cases, to experience, because in this case experience\r\nis not possible; yet he speaks with apodeictic certainty.\r\nFor, as a physicist, professing a science which is\r\nabsolutely immanent—\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e limited to the reality that is\r\nempirically given—it never comes into his head to inquire\r\nwhence he knows all this. It \u003cem\u003edid\u003c/em\u003e come into Kant\u0027s head,\r\nand it was this very problem, clothed by him in the severe\r\nform of an inquiry as to the possibility of synthetical \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà\r\npriori\u003c/i\u003e judgments, that became the starting-point and the\r\ncorner-stone of his immortal discoveries, or in other words,\r\nof Transcendental Philosophy which, precisely by answering\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg204\"\u003e[204]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthis question and others related to it, shows what is the\r\nnature of that empirical reality itself.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_176\" title=\"In the Scholium to the eighth of the definitions he has placed at the top of his \u0027Principia,\u0027 Newton quite rightly distinguishes absolute, that is, empty, from relative, or filled Time, and likewise absolute from relative Space. He says, p. 11: Tempus, spatium, locum, motum, ut omnibus notissima, non definio. Notandum tamen quod VULGUS (that is, professors like those I have been mentioning) quantitates hasce non aliter quam ex relatione ad sensibilia concipiat….\" id=\"FNanchor_176\"\u003e[176]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd seventy years after the Critique of Pure Reason\r\nhad appeared and filled the world with its fame, these\r\ngentlemen dare to serve up such gross absurdities, which\r\nwere done away with long ago, and to return to former\r\nbarbarism. If Kant were to come back and see all this\r\nmischief, he would feel like Moses on returning from\r\nMount Sinai, when he found his people worshipping the\r\ngolden calf, and dashed the Tables to pieces in his anger.\r\nBut if Kant were to take things as tragically as Moses, I\r\nshould console him with the words of Jesus Sirach:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_177\" title=\"Ecclesiasticus xxii. 8.\" id=\"FNanchor_177\"\u003e[177]\u003c/a\u003e \"He\r\nthat telleth a tale to a fool speaketh to one in a slumber;\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg205\"\u003e[205]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhen he hath told his tale, he will say, \u0027What is the\r\nmatter?\u0027\" For that diamond in Kant\u0027s crown, Transcendental\r\nÆsthetic, never has existed for these gentlemen—it\r\nis tacitly set aside, as \u003cem\u003enon-avenue\u003c/em\u003e. I wonder what they\r\nthink Nature means by producing the rarest of all her\r\nworks, a great mind, one among so many hundreds of millions,\r\nif the worshipful company of numskulls are to be\r\nable at their pleasure and by their mere counter-assertion\r\nto annul the weightiest doctrines emanating from that\r\nmind, let alone to treat them with disregard and do as if\r\nthey did not exist.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut this degenerate, barbarous state of philosophy which,\r\nin the present day, emboldens every tyro to hold forth at\r\nrandom upon subjects that have puzzled the greatest\r\nminds, is precisely a consequence still remaining of the\r\nimpunity with which—thanks to the connivance of our professors\r\nof philosophy—that audacious scribbler, Hegel, has\r\nbeen allowed to flood the market with his monstrous\r\nvagaries and so to pass for the greatest of all philosophers\r\nfor the last thirty years in Germany. Every one of course\r\nnow thinks himself entitled to serve up confidently anything\r\nthat may happen to come into his sparrow\u0027s\r\nbrain.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTherefore, as I have said, the gentlemen of the \u0027philosophical\r\ntrade\u0027 are anxious before all things to obliterate\r\nKant\u0027s philosophy, in order to be able to return to the\r\nmuddy canal of the old dogmatism and to talk at random\r\nto their heart\u0027s content upon the favourite subjects which\r\nare specially recommended to them: just as if nothing had\r\nhappened and neither a Kant nor a Critical Philosophy\r\nhad ever come into the world.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_178\" title=\"For Kant has disclosed the dreadful truth, that philosophy must be quite a different thing from Jewish mythology. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_178\"\u003e[178]\u003c/a\u003e The affected veneration\r\nfor, and laudation of, Leibnitz too, which has been showing\r\nitself everywhere for some years, proceed from the same\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg206\"\u003e[206]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsource. They like to place him in a line with, nay above,\r\nKant, having at times the assurance to call him the\r\ngreatest of all German philosophers. Now, compared with\r\nKant, Leibnitz is a poor rushlight. Kant is a master-mind,\r\nto whom mankind is indebted for the discovery of\r\nnever-to-be-forgotten truths. One of his chief merits is\r\nprecisely, to have delivered us from Leibnitz and his subtleties:\r\nfrom pre-established harmonies, monads and \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eidentitas\r\nindiscernibilium\u003c/i\u003e. Kant has made philosophy serious and I\r\nam keeping it so. That these gentlemen should think differently\r\nis easily explained; for has not Leibnitz a central\r\nMonad and a \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eTheodicée\u003c/i\u003e also, with which to deck it out?\r\nNow this is quite to the taste of my gentlemen \u0027of the\r\nphilosophical trade.\u0027 It does not stand in the way of\r\nearning a honest livelihood; it allows one to subsist;\r\nwhereas such a thing as Kant\u0027s \"Critique of all Speculative\r\nTheology,\" makes one\u0027s hair stand on end. Kant is consequently\r\na wrong-headed man and one to be set aside.\r\nVivat Leibnitz! Vivat the \u0027philosophical trade!\u0027 Vivat\r\nold woman\u0027s philosophy! These gentlemen really imagine\r\nthat, according to the standard of their own petty aims, they\r\ncan obscure what is good, disparage what is great, and\r\naccredit what is false. They may perhaps succeed in\r\ndoing so for a time, but certainly not in the long run, nor\r\nwith impunity. Notwithstanding all their machinations\r\nand spiteful ignoring of me for forty years, have not\r\neven I at last made my way? During those forty years\r\nhowever I have learnt to appreciate Chamfort\u0027s words:\r\n\"\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eEn examinant la ligue des sots contre les gens d\u0027esprit, on\r\ncroirait voir une conspiration de valets pour écarter les\r\nmaîtres.\u003c/i\u003e\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe do not care to have much to do with those whom we\r\ndislike. One of the consequences of this antipathy for\r\nKant, therefore, has been an incredible ignorance of his\r\ndoctrines. I can scarcely believe my eyes at times, when\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg207\"\u003e[207]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nI see certain proofs of this ignorance, and must here support\r\nmy assertion by a few examples. First let me present\r\na very singular specimen, though it is now some years old.\r\nIn Professor Michelet\u0027s \"Anthropology and Psychology\"\r\n(p. 444), he states Kant\u0027s Categorical Imperative in the\r\nfollowing words: \"thou must, for thou canst\" (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003edu sollst,\r\ndenn du kannst\u003c/i\u003e). This cannot be a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003elapsus calami\u003c/i\u003e, for he\r\nagain states it in the same words in his \"History of the\r\nDevelopment of Modern German Philosophy\" (p. 38),\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_179\" title=\"Another instance of Michelet\u0027s ignorance is to be found in Schopenhauer\u0027s posthumous writings, see \u0027Aus Arthur Schopenhauer\u0027s handschriftlichem Nachlass,\u0027 Leipzig, A. Brockhaus, 1864, p. 327. [Editor\u0027s note.]\" id=\"FNanchor_179\"\u003e[179]\u003c/a\u003e\r\npublished three years later. Letting alone the fact that he\r\nappears to have studied Kantian philosophy in Schiller\u0027s\r\nepigrams, he has thus turned the thing upside down, and\r\nexpressed exactly the opposite of Kant\u0027s argument; evidently\r\nwithout having the slightest inkling of what Kant meant\r\nby that postulate of Freedom on the basis of his Categorical\r\nImperative. None of Professor Michelet\u0027s colleagues, to\r\nmy knowledge, have pointed out this mistake, but \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ehanc\r\nveniam damus, petimusque vicissim\u003c/i\u003e.\"—Another more recent\r\ninstance. The above mentioned reviewer of Oersted\u0027s book\r\n(see \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_174\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003enote 1\u003c/a\u003e (\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e), p. 202), to whose title the present treatise unfortunately\r\nhad to stand godfather, comes in that work on\r\nthe sentence that \"bodies are spaces filled with force\"\r\n(\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003ekrafterfüllte Räume\u003c/i\u003e). This is new to him; so without\r\nthe faintest suspicion that he has to do with a far-famed\r\nKantian dogma, and taking this for a paradoxical opinion\r\nof Oersted\u0027s, he attacks it and argues against it bravely,\r\npersistently and repeatedly in both his reviews, which appeared\r\nat an interval of three years from one another,\r\nusing arguments like these: \"Force cannot fill Space without\r\nsomething substantial, Matter;\" then again three years\r\nlater: \"Force in Space does not yet constitute any thing.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg208\"\u003e[208]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nFor Force to fill Space, there must be Substance, Matter. A\r\nmere force can never fill. Matter must be there for it to\r\nfill.\"—Bravo! my cobbler would use just such arguments\r\nas these.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_180\" title=\"The same reviewer (Von Reuchlin-Meldegg) when be expounds the doctrines of the philosophers concerning God in the August number of the Heidelberg Annals (1855), p. 579, says: \u0027In Kant, God is a thing in itself which cannot be known.\u0027 In his review of Frauenstädt\u0027s \u0027Letters\u0027 in the Heidelberg Annals of May and June (1855) he says that there is no knowledge à priori. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_180\"\u003e[180]\u003c/a\u003e—When I see \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003especimina eruditionis\u003c/i\u003e of this sort, I\r\nbegin to have my misgivings whether I did not do the man\r\ninjustice by naming him among those who endeavour to\r\nundermine Kant; but in this, to be sure, I had in view his\r\nassertions that \"Space is but the relation, the juxtaposition\r\nof things,\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_181\" title=\"C. 1. p. 899.\" id=\"FNanchor_181\"\u003e[181]\u003c/a\u003e and that \"Space is a relation in which things\r\nstand, a juxtaposition of things. This juxtaposition ceases\r\nto be a conception as soon as the conception of Matter\r\nceases.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_182\" title=\"p. 908.\" id=\"FNanchor_182\"\u003e[182]\u003c/a\u003e For he might possibly have penned these sentences\r\nin sheer innocence, since he may have known no more\r\nof the \"Transcendental Æsthetic\" than of the \"Metaphysical\r\nFirst Principles of Natural Science;\" though to\r\nbe sure, this would be rather extraordinary for a professor of\r\nphilosophy. Now-a-days however we must not be surprised\r\nat anything. For all knowledge of Critical Philosophy has\r\ndied out, in spite of its being the latest true philosophy that\r\nhas appeared, and a doctrine withal, that has made a revolution\r\nand epoch in human knowledge and thought. Now\r\ntherefore, since it has overthrown all previous systems, and\r\nsince the knowledge of it has died out, philosophising no\r\nlonger proceeds on the basis of any of the doctrines propounded\r\nby the great minds of the past, but becomes a\r\nmere random untutored process, having an ordinary education\r\nand the catechism for its foundation. Now that I have\r\nstartled them however, our professors may perhaps take to\r\nstudying Kant\u0027s works again. Still Lichtenberg says:\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg209\"\u003e[209]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\"Past a certain age, I think it as impossible to learn\r\nKantian Philosophy as to learn rope-dancing.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI should certainly not have condescended to record the\r\nsins of these sinners had not the interests of truth\r\nrequired that I should do so, in order to show the state\r\nof degradation at which German Philosophy has arrived\r\nfifty years after Kant\u0027s death in consequence of the\r\nmachinations of the gentlemen \u0027of the trade,\u0027 and also to\r\nshow what would result, if these puny minds, who know\r\nnothing but their own ends, were to be suffered without\r\nhindrance to check the influence of the great geniuses who\r\nhave illumined the world. I cannot look on at this in\r\nsilence; it is rather a case to which Göthe\u0027s exhortation\r\napplies:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poetry-container\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\" lang=\"de\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003e\"Du Kräftiger, sei nicht so still,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse indent2\"\u003eWenn auch sich Andre scheuen:\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eWer den Teufel erschrecken will,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse indent2\"\u003eDer muss laut schreien.\"\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eDr. Martin Luther thought so also.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHatred against Kant, hatred against me, hatred against\r\ntruth, all however \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein majorem Dei gloriam\u003c/i\u003e, is what inspires\r\nthese worthies who live on philosophy. Who can be so\r\nblind as not to see that University philosophy is the enemy\r\nof all true, serious philosophy, whose progress it feels\r\nbound to withstand? For a philosophy which deserves the\r\nname, is pure service of truth, therefore the most sublime\r\nof all human endeavours; but, as such, it is not\r\nadapted for a trade. Least of all can it have its seat in\r\nUniversities, where a theological Faculty predominates\r\nand things are irrevocably decided beforehand ere philosophy\r\ncomes to them. With Scholasticism, from which\r\nUniversity philosophy descends, it was quite a different\r\nthing. Scholasticism was avowedly the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eancilla theologiæ\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nso that here the name corresponded to the thing. Our\r\nUniversity philosophy of to-day, on the contrary, disclaims\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg210\"\u003e[210]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe connection, and professes independent research; yet in\r\nreality it is only the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eancilla\u003c/i\u003e disguised, and it is intended no\r\nless than its predecessor to be the servant of Theology.\r\nThus genuine, sincerely meant philosophy has an adversary\r\nunder the guise of an ally in University philosophy. Therefore\r\nI said long ago, that nothing would be of greater benefit\r\nto philosophy than for it to cease altogether to be taught\r\nat Universities; and if at that time I still admitted the\r\npropriety of a brief, quite succinct course of History of\r\nPhilosophy accompanying Logic—which undoubtedly ought\r\nto be taught at Universities—I have since withdrawn that\r\nhasty concession in consequence of the following disclosure\r\nmade to us in the \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eGöttingischen Gelehrten Anzeigen\u003c/i\u003e of the\r\n1st January, 1853, p. 8, by the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eOrdinarius loci\u003c/i\u003e (one who\r\nwrites History of Philosophy in thick volumes): \"It could\r\nnot be mistaken that Kant\u0027s doctrine is ordinary Theism,\r\nand that it has contributed little or nothing towards transforming\r\nthe current views on God and his relation to the\r\nworld.\"—If this is the state of the case, Universities are in\r\nmy opinion no longer the right place even for teaching\r\nHistory of Philosophy. There designs and intentions reign\r\nparamount. I had indeed long ago begun to suspect, that\r\nHistory of Philosophy was taught at our Universities in\r\nthe same spirit and with the same \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003egranum salis\u003c/i\u003e as Philosophy\r\nitself, and it needed but very little to make my suspicions\r\ncertainty. Accordingly it is my wish to see both\r\nPhilosophy and its History disappear from the lecture-list,\r\nbecause I desire to rescue them from the tender mercies of\r\nour court-councillors.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_183\" title=\"Hofräthe. A title of honour often given for literary and scientific merit in Germany, and common among University professors. [Tr.\u0027s note.]\" id=\"FNanchor_183\"\u003e[183]\u003c/a\u003e But far be it from me, to wish to see\r\nour professors of philosophy removed from their thriving\r\nbusiness at our Universities. On the contrary, what I\r\nshould like would be, to see them promoted three degrees\r\nhigher in dignity and raised to the highest faculty, as professors\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg211\"\u003e[211]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof Theology. For at the bottom they have really\r\nbeen this for some time already, and have served quite\r\nlong enough as volunteers.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMeanwhile my honest and kindly advice to the young\r\ngeneration is, not to waste any time with University\r\nphilosophy, but to study Kant\u0027s works and my own\r\ninstead. I promise them that there they will learn something\r\nsubstantial, that will bring light and order into their\r\nbrains: so far at least as they may be capable of receiving\r\nthem. It is not good to crowd round a wretched farthing\r\nrushlight when brilliant torches are close by; still less\r\nto run after will o\u0027 the wisps. Above all, my truth-seeking\r\nyoung friends, beware of letting our professors\r\ntell you what is contained in the Critique of Pure Reason.\r\nRead it yourselves, and you will find in it something\r\nvery different from what they deem it advisable for you\r\nto know.—In our time a great deal too much study is\r\ngenerally devoted to the History of Philosophy; for this\r\nstudy, being adapted by its very nature to substitute knowledge\r\nfor reflection, is just now cultivated downright with\r\na view to making philosophy consist in its own history. It\r\nis not only of doubtful necessity, but even of questionable\r\nprofit, to acquire a superficial half-knowledge of the\r\nopinions and systems of all the philosophers who have\r\ntaught for 2,500 years; yet what more does the most\r\nhonest history of philosophy give? A real knowledge of\r\nphilosophers can only be acquired from their own works,\r\nand not from the distorted image of their doctrines as it is\r\nfound in the commonplace head.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_184\" title=\"\u0027Potius de rebus ipsis judicare debemus, quam pro magno habere, de hominibus quid quisque senserit scire,\u0027 says St. Augustine (\u0027De civ. Dei,\u0027 l. 19, c. 3). Under the present mode of proceeding, however, the philosophical lecture-room becomes a sort of rag-fair for old worn out, cast-off opinions, which are brought there every six months to be aired and beaten. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_184\"\u003e[184]\u003c/a\u003e But it is really urgent\r\nthat order should be brought into our heads by some sort\r\nof philosophy, and that we should at the same time learn\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg212\"\u003e[212]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto look at the world with a really unbiassed eye. Now\r\nno philosophy is so near to us, both as regards time and\r\nlanguage, as that of Kant, and it is at the same time a\r\nphilosophy, compared with which all those which went\r\nbefore are superficial. On this account it is unhesitatingly\r\nto be preferred to all others.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut I perceive that the news of Caspar Hauser\u0027s escape\r\nhas already spread among our professors of philosophy;\r\nfor I see that some of them have already given vent to\r\ntheir feelings in bitter and venomous abuse of me in\r\nvarious periodicals, making up by falsehoods for their\r\ndeficiency of wit.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_185\" title=\"I take this opportunity urgently to request that the public will not believe unconditionally any accounts of what I am supposed to have said, even when they are given as quotations; but will first verify the existence of these quotations in my works. In this way many a falsehood will be detected, which can however only be stamped as a direct forgery when accompanied by quotation marks (\u0027 \u0027). [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_185\"\u003e[185]\u003c/a\u003e Nevertheless I do not complain of all\r\nthis, because I am rejoiced at the cause and amused by\r\nthe effect of it, as illustrative of Göthe\u0027s verse:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poetry-container\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\" lang=\"de\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003e\"Es will der Spitz aus unserm Stall\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse indent2\"\u003eUns immerfort begleiten:\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eDoch seines Bellens lauter Schall\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse indent2\"\u003eBeweist nur, dass wir reiten.\"\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"right\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eArthur Schopenhauer.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"signature\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFrankfurt am Mein\u003c/span\u003e,\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pad2\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eAugust, 1854\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg213\"\u003e[213]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eEDITOR\u0027S PREFACE TO THE THIRD\r\nEDITION.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSchopenhauer has left an interleaved copy of his\r\nwork \"On the Will in Nature,\" as well as of his\r\nother writings, and has inserted in it those Corrections\r\nand Additions which he intended to use for the Third\r\nEdition. I have therefore included them in this Third\r\nEdition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Corrections chiefly concern the style, here and\r\nthere an expression being changed, and a word inserted or\r\nomitted. The Additions, on the contrary, concern the\r\n\u003cem\u003ematter\u003c/em\u003e of the book; they amplify it more or less considerably,\r\nand are tolerably numerous.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Corrections are incorporated by Schopenhauer with\r\nthe text; whereas the Additions are designated by him as\r\n\"Notes\" (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eAnmerkungen\u003c/i\u003e) to be placed at the foot of the\r\npages with the words, \"added to the third edition.\"\r\nThey will therefore be found at the places indicated by\r\nhim for them, as foot-notes; and thus the reader will be\r\nenabled easily to discern how much has been added in this\r\nedition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs to the value of the present work, Schopenhauer has\r\nexpressed himself as follows in the \"World as Will and\r\nRepresentation:\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"It would be a great mistake to consider the foreign\r\ndeliverances with which I have connected my own exposition\r\nthere (in the work \"On the Will in Nature\") as the\r\nreal substance and argument of that work which, though\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg214\"\u003e[214]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsmall in size, is weighty in import. They are rather a\r\nmere occasion which I take as my starting-point in order\r\nto expound the fundamental truth of my doctrine more\r\nclearly there than has been done anywhere else, and to\r\napply it all the way down even to the empirical knowledge\r\nof Nature. This I have done most exhaustively and\r\nstringently under the heading \"Physical Astronomy,\" nor\r\ncan I ever hope to find a more correct or accurate expression\r\nfor the kernel of my doctrine than the one given\r\nthere.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_186\" title=\"\u0027Die Welt a. W. u. V.,\u0027 vol. ii., c. 18, p. 213.\" id=\"FNanchor_186\"\u003e[186]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have nothing to add to testimony thus given by\r\nSchopenhauer himself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"right\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJulius Frauenstädt.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBerlin, \u003ci\u003eMarch, 1867\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eEDITOR\u0027S PREFACE TO THE FOURTH\r\nEDITION.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe present Fourth Edition is an identical reprint of\r\nthe Third: it therefore contains the same Corrections\r\nand Additions which I had already inserted in the Third\r\nEdition from Schopenhauer\u0027s own manuscript.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"right\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJulius Frauenstädt.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBerlin, \u003ci\u003eSeptember, 1877\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg215\"\u003e[215]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph2\"\u003eTHE WILL IN NATURE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eINTRODUCTION.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI break silence after seventeen years,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_187\" title=\"So had I written in 1835, when the present treatise was first composed, having published nothing since 1818, before the close of which year \u0027Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung\u0027 had appeared. For a Latin version, which I had added to the third volume of \u0027Scriptores ophthalmologici minores,\u0027 edente J. Radio, in 1830, for the benefit of my foreign readers, of my treatise \u0027On Vision and Colours\u0027 (published in 1816), can hardly be said to break the silence of that pause.\" id=\"FNanchor_187\"\u003e[187]\u003c/a\u003e in order to\r\npoint out to the few who, in advance of the age, may\r\nhave given their attention to my philosophy, sundry corroborations\r\nwhich have been contributed to it by unbiassed\r\nempiricists, unacquainted with my writings, who, in pursuing\r\ntheir own road in search of merely empirical knowledge,\r\ndiscovered at its extreme end what my doctrine has\r\npropounded as the Metaphysical (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003edas Metaphysische\u003c/i\u003e), from\r\nwhich the explanation of experience as a whole must come.\r\nThis circumstance is the more encouraging, as it confers\r\nupon my system a distinction over all hitherto existing\r\nones; for all the other systems, even the latest—that of\r\nKant—still leave a wide gap between their results and\r\nexperience, and are far from coming down directly to, and\r\ninto contact with, experience. By this my Metaphysic\r\nproves itself to be the only one having an extreme point\r\nin common with the physical sciences: a point up to which\r\nthese sciences come to meet it by their own paths, so as\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg216\"\u003e[216]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreally to connect themselves and to harmonize with it.\r\nMoreover this is not brought about by twisting and straining\r\nthe empirical sciences in order to adapt them to Metaphysic,\r\nnor by Metaphysic having been secretly abstracted\r\nfrom them beforehand and then, \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eà la\u003c/i\u003e Schelling, finding\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e what it had learnt \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà posteriori\u003c/i\u003e. On the contrary,\r\nboth meet at the same point of their own accord, yet without\r\ncollusion. My system therefore, far from soaring above\r\nall reality and all experience, descends to the firm ground\r\nof actuality, where its lessons are continued by the Physical\r\nSciences.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow the extraneous and empirical corroborations I am\r\nabout to bring forward, all concern the kernel and chief\r\npoint of my doctrine, its Metaphysic proper. They concern,\r\nthat is, the paradoxical fundamental truth,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"blockindent\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e what Kant opposed as \u003cem\u003ething in itself\u003c/em\u003e to mere \u003cem\u003ephenomenon\u003c/em\u003e—called\r\nmore decidedly by me \u003cem\u003erepresentation\u003c/em\u003e—and\r\nwhat he held to be absolutely unknowable, that\r\nthis \u003cem\u003ething in itself\u003c/em\u003e, this substratum of all phenomena,\r\nand therefore of the whole of Nature, is nothing but\r\nwhat we know directly and intimately and find within\r\nourselves as \u003cem\u003ethe will\u003c/em\u003e;\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_188\" title=\"As will be seen by the following detailed exposition, Schopenhauer attaches a far wider meaning to the word than is usually given, and regards the will, not merely as conscious volition enlightened by Reason and determined by motives, but as the fundamental essence of all that occurs, even where there is no choice. [Tr.]\" id=\"FNanchor_188\"\u003e[188]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e accordingly, this \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e, far from being inseparable from,\r\nand even a mere result of, \u003cem\u003eknowledge\u003c/em\u003e, differs radically\r\nand entirely from, and is quite independent of, knowledge,\r\nwhich is secondary and of later origin; and can\r\nconsequently subsist and manifest itself without knowledge:\r\na thing which actually takes place throughout the\r\nwhole of Nature, from the animal kingdom downwards;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e this \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e, being the one and only thing in itself, the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg217\"\u003e[217]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsole truly real, primary, metaphysical thing in a world\r\nin which everything else is only phenomenon—\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e mere\r\nrepresentation—gives all things, whatever they may\r\nbe, the power to exist and to act;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e accordingly, not only the voluntary actions of animals,\r\nbut the organic mechanism, nay even the shape and\r\nquality of their living body, the vegetation of plants\r\nand finally, even in inorganic Nature, crystallization,\r\nand in general every primary force which manifests\r\nitself in physical and chemical phenomena, not excepting\r\nGravity,—that all this, I say, in itself, \u003cem\u003ei.e.\u003c/em\u003e\r\nindependently of phenomenon (which only means,\r\nindependently of our brain and its representations),\r\nis absolutely identical with the \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e we find within\r\nus and know as intimately as we can know anything;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e further, the individual manifestations of the will are\r\nset in motion by \u003cem\u003emotives\u003c/em\u003e in beings gifted with an\r\nintellect, but no less by \u003cem\u003estimuli\u003c/em\u003e in the organic life of\r\nanimals and of plants, and finally in all inorganic\r\nNature, by \u003cem\u003ecauses\u003c/em\u003e in the narrowest sense of the word—these\r\ndistinctions applying exclusively to phenomena;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e, on the other hand, knowledge with its substratum,\r\nthe intellect, is a merely secondary phenomenon, differing\r\ncompletely from the will, only accompanying\r\nits higher degrees of objectification and not essential\r\nto it; which, as it depends upon the manifestations of\r\nthe will in the animal organism, is therefore physical,\r\nand not, like the will, metaphysical;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e we are never able therefore to infer absence of will\r\nfrom absence of knowledge; for the will may be\r\npointed out even in all phenomena of unconscious\r\nNature, whether in plants or in inorganic bodies; in\r\nshort,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg218\"\u003e[218]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e the will is not conditioned by knowledge, as has\r\nhitherto been universally assumed, although knowledge\r\n\u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e conditioned by the will.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow this fundamental truth, which even to-day sounds\r\nso like a paradox, is the part of my doctrine to which, in\r\nall its chief points, the empirical sciences—themselves ever\r\neager to steer clear of all Metaphysic—have contributed\r\njust as many confirmations forcibly elicited by the irresistible\r\ncogency of truth, but which are most surprising on\r\naccount of the quarter whence they proceed; and although\r\nthey have certainly come to light since the publication of\r\nmy chief work, it has been quite independently of it and as\r\nthe years went on. Now, that it should be precisely this\r\nfundamental doctrine of mine which has thus met with\r\nconfirmation, is advantageous in two respects. First,\r\nbecause it is the main thought upon which my system is\r\nfounded; secondly, because it is the only part of my philosophy\r\nthat admits of confirmation through sciences which\r\nare alien to, and independent of, it. For although the last\r\nseventeen years, during which I have been constantly\r\noccupied with this subject, have, it is true, brought me\r\nmany corroborations as to other parts, such as Ethics,\r\nÆsthetics, Dianoiology; still these, by their very nature,\r\npass at once from the sphere of actuality, whence they\r\narise, to that of philosophy itself: so they cannot claim\r\nto be extraneous evidence, nor can they, as collected by\r\nme, have the same irrefragable, unequivocal cogency as\r\nthose concerning \u003cem\u003eMetaphysics\u003c/em\u003e proper which are given\r\nby its correlate \u003cem\u003ePhysics\u003c/em\u003e (in the wide sense of the word\r\nwhich the Ancients gave it). For, in pursuing its own\r\nroad, Physics, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, Natural Science as a whole, must in\r\nall its branches finally come to a point where physical explanation\r\nceases. Now this is precisely the \u003cem\u003eMetaphysical\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nwhich Natural Science only apprehends as the impassable\r\nbarrier at which it stops short and henceforth abandons its\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg219\"\u003e[219]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsubject to Metaphysics. Kant therefore was quite right\r\nin saying: \"It is evident, that the primary sources of\r\nNature\u0027s agency must absolutely belong to the sphere of\r\nMetaphysics.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_189\" title=\"Kant, \u0027Von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte,\u0027 § 51.\" id=\"FNanchor_189\"\u003e[189]\u003c/a\u003e Physical science is wont to designate this\r\nunknown, inaccessible something, at which its investigations\r\nstop short and which is taken for granted in all its explanations,\r\nby such terms as physical force, vital force, formative\r\nprinciple, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c., which in fact mean no more than\r\n\u003ci\u003ex, y, z\u003c/i\u003e. Now if nevertheless, in single, propitious instances,\r\nspecially acute and observant investigators succeed in\r\ncasting as it were a furtive glance behind the curtain\r\nwhich bounds off the domain of Natural Science, and\r\nare able not only to feel it is a barrier but, in a sense, to\r\nobtain a view of its nature and thus to peep into the metaphysical\r\nregion beyond; if moreover, having acquired this\r\nprivilege, they explicitly designate the limit thus explored\r\ndownright as that which is stated to be the true inner\r\nessence and final principle of all things by a system of\r\nMetaphysics unknown to them, which takes its reasons from\r\na totally different sphere and, in every other respect, recognises\r\nall things merely as phenomena, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, as representation—then\r\nindeed the two bodies of investigators must\r\nfeel like two mining engineers driving a gallery, who,\r\nhaving started from two points far apart and worked for\r\nsome time in subterranean darkness, trusting exclusively\r\nto compass and spirit-level, suddenly to their great joy\r\ncatch the sound of each other\u0027s hammers. For now indeed\r\nthese investigators know, that the point so long vainly\r\nsought for has at last been reached at which Metaphysics\r\nand Physics meet—they, who were as hard to bring together\r\nas Heaven and Earth—that a reconciliation has\r\nbeen initiated and a connection found between these two\r\nsciences. But the philosophical system which has witnessed\r\nthis triumph receives by it the strongest and most\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg220\"\u003e[220]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsatisfactory proof possible of its own truth and accuracy.\r\nCompared with such a confirmation as this, which may, in\r\nfact, be looked upon as equivalent to proving a sum in\r\narithmetic, the regard or disregard of a given period of\r\ntime loses all importance, especially when we consider what\r\nhas been the subject of interest meanwhile and find it to\r\nbe—the sort of philosophy we have been treated to since\r\nKant. The eyes of the public are gradually opening to\r\nthe mystification by which it has been duped for the last\r\nforty years under the name of philosophy, and this will be\r\nmore and more the case. The day of reckoning is at hand,\r\nwhen it will see whether all this endless scribbling and\r\nquibbling since Kant has brought to light a single truth of\r\nany kind. I may thus be dispensed from the obligation of\r\nentering here into subjects so unworthy; the more so, as I\r\ncan accomplish my purpose more briefly and agreeably by\r\nnarrating the following anecdote. During the carnival,\r\nDante having lost himself in a crowd of masks, the Duke\r\nof Medici ordered him to be sought for. Those commissioned\r\nto look for him, being doubtful whether they\r\nwould be able to find him, as he was himself masked, the\r\nDuke gave them a question to put to every mask they\r\nmight meet who resembled Dante. It was this: \"Who\r\nknows what is good?\" After receiving several foolish\r\nanswers, they finally met with a mask who replied: \"He\r\nthat knows what is bad,\" by which Dante was immediately\r\nrecognised.\u003cins title=\"footnote anchor missing\" id=\"C220\"\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_190\" title=\"Baltazar Gracian, \u0027El Criticon,\u0027 iii. 90, to whom I leave the responsibility for the anachronism.\" id=\"FNanchor_190\"\u003e[190]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/ins\u003e What is meant by this here is, that I have\r\nseen no reason to be disheartened on account of the want\r\nof sympathy of my contemporaries, since I had at the same\r\ntime before my eyes the objects of their sympathy. What\r\nthose authors were, posterity will see by their works; what\r\nthe contemporaries were, will be seen by the reception they\r\ngave to those works. My doctrine lays no claim whatever\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg221\"\u003e[221]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto the name \"Philosophy of the present time\" which was\r\ndisputed to the amusing adepts of Hegel\u0027s mystification;\r\nbut it certainly does claim the title of \"Philosophy of\r\ntime to come:\" that is, of a time when people will no\r\nlonger content themselves with a mere jingle of words\r\nwithout meaning, with empty phrases and trivial parallelisms,\r\nbut will exact real contents and serious disclosures\r\nfrom philosophy, while, on the other hand, they will exempt it\r\nfrom the unjust and preposterous obligation of paraphrasing\r\nthe national religion for the time being. \"For it is an\r\nextremely absurd thing,\" says Kant,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_191\" title=\"Kant, \u0027Krit. d. r. V.\u0027 5th edition, p. 755. (English translation by M. Müller, p. 640.)\" id=\"FNanchor_191\"\u003e[191]\u003c/a\u003e \"to expect to be enlightened\r\nby Reason and yet to prescribe to her beforehand\r\non which side she must incline.\"—It is indeed sad to live\r\nin an age so degenerate, that it should be necessary to\r\nappeal to the authority of a great man to attest so obvious\r\na truth. But it is absurd to expect marvels from a philosophy\r\nthat is chained up, and particularly amusing to\r\nwatch the solemn gravity with which it sets to work to\r\naccomplish great things, when we all know beforehand\r\n\"the short meaning of the long speech.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_192\" title=\"Schiller, \u0027der langen Rede kurzer Sinn.\u0027 [Tr.]\" id=\"FNanchor_192\"\u003e[192]\u003c/a\u003e However the\r\nkeen-sighted assert that under the cloak of philosophy they\r\ncan mostly detect theology holding forth for the edification\r\nof students thirsting after truth, and instructing them\r\nafter its own fashion;—and this again reminds us forcibly\r\nof a certain favourite scene in Faust. Others, who think\r\nthat they see still further into the matter, maintain that\r\nwhat is thus disguised is neither theology nor philosophy,\r\nbut simply a poor devil who, while solemnly protesting\r\nthat he has lofty, sublime truth for his aim, is in fact only\r\nstriving to get bread for himself and for his future young\r\nfamily. This he might no doubt obtain by other means\r\nwith less labour and more dignity; meanwhile however for\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg222\"\u003e[222]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthis price he is ready to do anything he is asked to do,\r\neven to deduce \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e, nay, should it come to the worst,\r\nto perceive, the \u0027Devil and his dam,\u0027 by intellectual intuition—and\r\nhere indeed the exceedingly comical effect is\r\nbrought to a climax by the contrast between the sublimity\r\nof the ostensible, and the lowliness of the real, aim. It\r\nremains nevertheless desirable, that the pure, sacred precincts\r\nof philosophy should be cleansed of all such traders,\r\nas was the temple of Jerusalem in former times of the\r\nbuyers and sellers.—Biding such better times therefore,\r\nmay our philosophical public bestow its attention and\r\ninterest as it has done hitherto. May it continue as before\r\ninvariably naming Fichte as an obligato accompaniment to,\r\nand in the same breath with, Kant—that great mind, produced\r\nbut once by Nature, which has illumined its own depth—as\r\nif forsooth they were of the same kind; and this without\r\na single voice being heard to exclaim in protest Ἡρακλῆς\r\nκαὶ πίθηκος! May Hegel\u0027s philosophy of absolute nonsense—three-fourths\r\ncash and one-fourth crazy fancies—continue\r\nto pass for unfathomable wisdom without anyone\r\nsuggesting as an appropriate motto for his writings Shakespeare\u0027s\r\nwords: \"Such stuff as madmen tongue and brain\r\nnot,\" or, as an emblematical vignette, the cuttle-fish with\r\nits ink-bag, creating a cloud of darkness around it to prevent\r\npeople from seeing what it is, with the device: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003emea\r\ncaligine tutus\u003c/i\u003e.—May each day bring us, as hitherto, new\r\nsystems adapted for University purposes, entirely made up\r\nof words and phrases and in a learned jargon besides,\r\nwhich allows people to talk whole days without saying\r\nanything; and may these delights never be disturbed by\r\nthe Arabian proverb: \"I hear the clappering of the mill,\r\nbut I see no flour.\"—For all this is in accordance with the\r\nage and must have its course. In all times some such thing\r\noccupies the contemporary public more or less noisily; then\r\nit dies off so completely, vanishes so entirely, without\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg223\"\u003e[223]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nleaving a trace behind, that the next generation no longer\r\nknows what it was. Truth can bide its time, for it has a\r\nlong life before it. Whatever is genuine and seriously\r\nmeant, is always slow to make its way and certainly\r\nattains its end almost miraculously; for on its first appearance\r\nit as a rule meets with a cool, if not ungracious, reception:\r\nand this for exactly the same reason that, when\r\nonce it is fully recognised and has passed on to posterity,\r\nthe immense majority of men take it on credit,\r\nin order to avoid compromising themselves, whereas the\r\nnumber of genuine appreciators remains nearly as small\r\nas it was at first. These few nevertheless suffice to make\r\nthe truth respected, for they are themselves respected.\r\nAnd thus it is passed from hand to hand through centuries\r\nover the heads of the inept multitude: so hard is the\r\nexistence of mankind\u0027s best inheritance!—On the other\r\nhand, if truth had to crave permission to be true from\r\nsuch as have quite different aims at heart, its cause might\r\nindeed be given up for lost; for then it might often be\r\ndismissed with the witches\u0027 watch-word: \"fair is foul,\r\nand foul is fair.\" Luckily however this is not the case.\r\nTruth depends upon no one\u0027s favour or disfavour, nor\r\ndoes it ask anyone\u0027s leave: it stands upon its own feet, and\r\nhas Time for its ally; its power is irresistible, its life indestructible.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg224\"\u003e[224]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003ePHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn classifying the above-mentioned empirical corroborations\r\nof my doctrine according to the sciences from\r\nwhich they come, while I take the graduated order of\r\nNature from the highest to the lowest degree as a guiding-thread\r\nto my expositions, I must first mention a very\r\nstriking confirmation lately received by my chief dogma in\r\nthe physiological and pathological views of Dr. J. D.\r\nBrandis, private physician to the King of Denmark, a\r\nveteran in science, whose \"Essay on Vital Force\" (1795)\r\nhad received Reil\u0027s hearty commendation. In his two\r\nlatest writings: \"Experiences in the Application of Cold in\r\nDisease\" (Berlin, 1833), and \"Nosology and Therapeutics\r\nof Cachexiæ\" (1834), we find him in the most emphatic\r\nand striking manner stating the primary source of all vital\r\nfunctions to be an \u003cem\u003eunconscious will\u003c/em\u003e, from which he derives\r\nall processes in the machinery of the organism, in health as\r\nwell as in disease, and which he represents as the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprimum\r\nmobile\u003c/i\u003e of life. I must support this by literal quotations\r\nfrom these essays, since few save medical readers are\r\nlikely to have them at hand.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the first of them, p. viii., we find: \"The essence of\r\nevery living organism consists in the will to maintain its\r\nown existence as much as possible over against the\r\nmacrocosm;\"—p. x.: \"Only \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e living entity, \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e will can\r\nbe in an organ at the same time; therefore if there is a\r\ndiseased \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e in disagreement with the rest of the body in\r\nthe organ of the skin, we may hold it in check by applying\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg225\"\u003e[225]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncold as long as the generation of warmth, a normal \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e,\r\ncan be induced by it.\" P. 1: \"If we are forced to the conviction\r\nthat there must be a \u003cem\u003edetermining principle\u003c/em\u003e—a \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nin every vital action, by which the development suited to\r\nthe whole organism is occasioned, and each metamorphosis\r\nof the parts conditioned, in harmony with the whole individuality,\r\nand likewise that there is a something capable\r\nof being determined and developed,\" \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c.—P. 11: \"With\r\nrespect to individual life, the element which determines,\r\nthe organic \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e, if it is to rest satisfied, must be able to\r\nattain what it wants from that which has to be determined.\r\nThis occurs even when the vital movements are over-excited,\r\nas in inflammation: something new is formed, the\r\nnoxious element is expelled; new plastic materials are\r\nmeanwhile conveyed through the arteries, more venous\r\nblood is carried off, until the process of inflammation is\r\nfinished and the organic \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e satisfied. It is however\r\npossible to excite this \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e to such a degree, as to make\r\nsatisfaction impossible. This exciting cause (or stimulus)\r\neither acts directly upon the particular organ (poison, contagion)\r\nor it affects the whole life; and this life then begins\r\nto make the most strenuous efforts to rid itself of the\r\nnoxious element or to modify the disposition of the organic\r\n\u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e, and provokes critical vital activity in particular\r\nparts (inflammations) or yields to the unappeased \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e.\"—P.\r\n12: \"The insatiable \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e acts destructively upon the\r\norganism unless either (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) the whole life, in its efforts to\r\nattain unity (tendency to adapt means to end), produces\r\nother activities requiring satisfaction (\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003ecrises et lyses\u003c/i\u003e) which\r\nhold that \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e in check—called decisive (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecrises completæ\u003c/i\u003e)\r\nwhen quite successful; \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecrises incompletæ\u003c/i\u003e, when only partially\r\nso—or (\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) some other stimulus (medicine) produces another\r\n\u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e which represses the diseased one. If we place this in\r\none and the same category with the \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e of which we have\r\nbecome conscious through our own representations, and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg226\"\u003e[226]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbear in mind that here there can be no question of more or\r\nless distant resemblance, we gain the conviction that we have\r\ngrasped the fundamental conception of the \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e unlimited,\r\ntherefore indivisible, life which, according to its different\r\nmanifestations in various more or less endowed and exercised\r\norgans, is just as able to make hair grow on the\r\nhuman body as to combine the most sublime representations.\r\nWe see that the most violent passion—unsatisfied\r\n\u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e—may be checked by more or less strong excitement,\"\r\n\u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c.—P. 18: \"The determining element—\u003cem\u003ethis organic\r\nwill without representation\u003c/em\u003e, this tendency to preserve the\r\norganism as a unity—is induced by outward temperature\r\nto modify its activity now in the same, now in a remoter\r\norgan. Every manifestation of life, however, whether in\r\nhealth or in disease, is a manifestation of the \u003cem\u003eorganic\r\nwill: this will determines vegetation:\u003c/em\u003e in a healthy condition,\r\nin harmony with the unity of the whole; in an unhealthy\r\none … it is induced \u003cem\u003enot to will\u003c/em\u003e in harmony\r\nwith that unity\" …—P. 23: \"Cold suddenly applied\r\nto the skin suppresses its function (chill); cold drinks\r\ncheck the \u003cem\u003eorganic will\u003c/em\u003e in the digestive organs and thereby\r\nintensify that of the skin and produce perspiration; just\r\nso with the diseased \u003cem\u003eorganic will\u003c/em\u003e: cold checks cutaneous\r\neruptions,\" \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c.—P. 33: \"Fever is the complete participation\r\nof the whole vital process in a diseased \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e it\r\nis to the entire vital process what inflammation is to\r\nparticular organs—the effort of our vitality to form something\r\ndefinite, in order to content the diseased \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e and\r\nremove the noxious element.—We call this process of formation\r\n\u003cem\u003ecrisis\u003c/em\u003e or \u003cem\u003elysis\u003c/em\u003e (turning-point or release). The first perception\r\nof the pernicious element which causes the diseased\r\n\u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e, affects the individuality just in the same way as a\r\nnoxious element apprehended by our senses, before we\r\nhave brought to clear representation the entire relation\r\nin which it stands to our individuality and the means of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg227\"\u003e[227]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nremoving it. It creates terror and its consequences, a\r\nstandstill of the vital process in the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eparenchyma\u003c/i\u003e, especially\r\nin the parts directed towards the outer world; in the skin,\r\nand in all the motor muscles belonging to the entire\r\nindividuality (outer body): shuddering, chills, trembling,\r\npains in the limbs, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c. The difference between them\r\nis, that in the latter case the noxious element, either at\r\nonce or gradually, becomes clear representation, because it\r\nis compared with the individuality by means of all the\r\nsenses, so that its relation to that individuality can be\r\ndetermined, and the means of protection against it (disregard,\r\nflight, warding off, defence, \u0026amp;c.) be brought to\r\na \u003cem\u003econscious will\u003c/em\u003e; whereas, in the former case, we remain\r\nunconscious of that noxious element, and it is life alone\r\n(or Nature\u0027s curative power) which is striving to remove\r\nthe noxious element and thereby to content the diseased\r\n\u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e. Nor must this be taken for a simile; it is, on\r\nthe contrary, a true description of the manifestation of\r\nlife.\"—P. 58: \"We must however always bear in mind,\r\nthat cold acts here as a powerful stimulus to check or\r\nmoderate the diseased \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e and to rouse in its place a\r\nnatural \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e, accompanied by general warmth.\"—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn almost every page of this book similar expressions are\r\nto be found. In the second of the Essays I have named,\r\nBrandis no longer combines the explanation by the will\r\nso universally with each separate analysis, probably in\r\nconsideration that this explanation is properly speaking, a\r\nmetaphysical one. Nevertheless he maintains it entirely\r\nand completely, giving it even all the more distinct and\r\ndecided expression, wherever he states it. Thus, for instance,\r\nin § 68 \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eet seq.\u003c/i\u003e he speaks of an \"\u003cem\u003eunconscious will\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nwhich cannot be separated from the conscious one,\" and is\r\nthe \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprimum mobile\u003c/i\u003e of all life, as well in plants as in\r\nanimals; for, in these, it is a desire and aversion manifesting\r\nitself in all the organs which determines all their vital\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg228\"\u003e[228]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nprocesses, secretions, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c.—§. 71: \"All convulsions\r\nprove that the manifestation of the will can take place\r\nwithout distinct power of representation.\"—§. 72: \"Everywhere\r\ndo we meet with a spontaneous, uncommunicated\r\nactivity, now determined by the sublimest human free\r\nwill, now by animal desire and aversion, now again by\r\nsimple, more vegetative requirements; which activity, in\r\norder to maintain itself, calls forth several other kinds of\r\nactivity in the unity of the individual.\"—P. 96: \"A\r\ncreative, spontaneous, uncommunicated activity shows itself\r\nin every vital manifestation.\" …—\"The third factor in\r\nthis individual creation is the \u003cem\u003ewill, the individual\u0027s life\r\nitself\u003c/em\u003e.\" …—\"The nerves are the conductors of this individual\r\ncreation: by their means form and mixture are\r\nvaried according to desire and aversion.\"—P. 97: \"Assimilation\r\nof foreign substance … makes the blood….\r\nIt is not an absorption or an exudation of organic matter;\r\n… on the contrary, here the sole factor of the phenomenon\r\nis in all cases \u003cem\u003ethe creative will\u003c/em\u003e, a life which\r\ncannot be brought back to any sort of imparted \u003cins title=\"movement.\" id=\"C256\"\u003emovement.\"\u003c/ins\u003e—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen I wrote this (1835) I was still \u003cem\u003enaïf\u003c/em\u003e enough\r\nseriously to believe that Brandis was unacquainted with\r\nmy work, or I should not allude here to his writings; for\r\nthey would then be merely a repetition, application and\r\ncarrying out of my own doctrine on this point, not a corroboration\r\nof it. But I thought I might safely assume that\r\nhe did not know me, because he has not mentioned me\r\nanywhere and because if he had known me, literary honesty\r\nwould have made it his imperative duty not to remain\r\nsilent concerning the man from whom he had borrowed his\r\nchief fundamental thought, the more so as he saw that man\r\nthen enduring unmerited neglect, by his writings being\r\ngenerally ignored—a circumstance which might be construed\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg229\"\u003e[229]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas favourable to fraud. Add to this, that it lay in\r\nBrandis\u0027 own interest as a writer, and would therefore have\r\nshown sagacity on his part, to have appealed to me as an\r\nauthority. For the fundamental doctrine propounded by\r\nhim is so striking and paradoxical, that even his Göttingen\r\nreviewer is amazed and hardly knows what to think of it;\r\nyet such a doctrine as this was left without foundation\r\neither through proof or induction, nor did Dr. Brandis\r\nestablish its relation to the whole of our knowledge of\r\nNature: he simply asserted it. I imagined therefore that\r\nit was by the peculiar gift of divination, which enables eminent\r\nphysicians to see and do the right thing in cases of\r\nillness, that he had been led to this view, without being able\r\nto give a strict and methodical account of the grounds\r\nof this really metaphysical truth, although he must have\r\nseen how greatly it is opposed to the generally received\r\nviews. Had he, thought I, been acquainted with my\r\nphilosophy, which gives far greater extension to this truth,\r\nmakes it valid for the whole of Nature and founds it both\r\nby proof and induction in close connection with Kant\u0027s\r\nteaching, from which it proceeds as a final result of excogitation—how\r\ngladly must he have availed himself of such\r\nconfirmation and support, rather than to stand alone by an\r\nunheard-of assertion which was never further carried out\r\nand, with him, never went beyond bare assertion. Such\r\nwere the reasons that led me to believe myself entitled to\r\ntake for granted Dr. Brandis\u0027 ignorance of my book.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSince then however I have become better acquainted\r\nwith German scientists and Copenhagen Academicians,\r\nto which body Dr. Brandis belonged, and have gained\r\nthe conviction that he knew me very well indeed. I stated\r\nmy reasons for arriving at this conviction already in 1844\r\nin the 2nd vol. of \"Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_193\" title=\"Chapter 20, p. 263; p. 295 of the 3rd edition.\" id=\"FNanchor_193\"\u003e[193]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nso that, as the subject is by no means edifying, it is needless\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg230\"\u003e[230]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto repeat them here; I will merely add that I have\r\nsince been assured on trustworthy authority that Dr.\r\nBrandis not only knew my work but even possessed it, as\r\nit was found among his property after his death.—The unmerited\r\nobscurity to which writers like myself are long\r\ncondemned, encourages such people to appropriate their\r\nthoughts without so much as naming them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnother medical authority has carried this even farther;\r\nfor, not content with the thought alone, he has appropriated\r\nto himself the expression of it also. I allude to Professor\r\nAnton Rosas of the University of Vienna, whose entire\r\n§ 507 in the 1st vol. of his Textbook of Ophthalmology\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_194\" title=\"Rosas, \u0027Handbuch der Augenheilkunde\u0027 (1830).\" id=\"FNanchor_194\"\u003e[194]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n(1830) is copied word for word from pp. 14-16 of my\r\ntreatise \"On Vision and Colours\" (1816) without any\r\nmention whatever of me, or even the slightest hint that he\r\nis using the words of another. This sufficiently accounts\r\nfor the care he has taken not to mention my treatise among\r\nthe lists of twenty-one writings on Colours and forty on the\r\nPhysiology of the Eye, which he gives in §§ 542 and 567;\r\na caution which was however all the more advisable, as he\r\nhad appropriated to himself a good deal more out of that\r\npamphlet without mentioning me. All that is referred, for\r\ninstance, in § 526 to \u0027them\u0027 (\u003cem\u003eman\u003c/em\u003e), is only applicable to me.\r\nHis entire § 527 is copied almost literally from my pp. 59\r\nand 60. The theory which he introduces without further ceremony\r\nin § 535 by the word \"evidently\": that is, that yellow\r\nis 3/4 and violet 1/4 of the eye\u0027s activity, never was \u0027evident\u0027\r\nto anyone until I made it so; even to this day it is a truth\r\nknown to few and acknowledged by fewer still, and much is\r\nyet wanting—for example, that I should be dead and\r\nburied—ere it be possible to call it \u0027evident\u0027 without\r\nfurther ceremony. The matter will even have to wait till\r\nafter my death to be seriously sifted, since a close investigation\r\nmight easily bring to \u0027evidence\u0027 the real difference\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg231\"\u003e[231]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbetween Newton\u0027s theory of colours and my own, which is\r\nsimply that his is false, and mine true: a discovery which\r\ncould not fail to mortify my contemporaries. Wherefore,\r\naccording to ancient custom, all serious examination into\r\nthe question is wisely postponed for these few years. Professor\r\nRosas knew no such policy as this and, as the matter\r\nwas not alluded to anywhere, thought himself entitled, like\r\nthe Danish Academician, to claim it as lawful prey (\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003ede bonne\r\nprise\u003c/i\u003e). Evidently North and South German honesty had\r\nnot yet come to a satisfactory understanding.—Moreover\r\nthe whole contents of §§ 538, 539 and 540 in Professor\r\nRosas\u0027 book are taken from my pamphlet, nay even in\r\ngreat part copied word for word from my § 13. Still\r\nonce, where he stands in need of a voucher for a fact,\r\nhe finds himself obliged to refer to my treatise: that is,\r\nin his § 531; and it is most amusing to see the way in\r\nwhich he even brings in the numerical fractions used by\r\nme, as a result of my theory, to express all colours. It had\r\nprobably occurred to him, that appropriating them quite\r\n\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003esans façon\u003c/i\u003e might be a delicate matter, so he says, p. 308:\r\n\"\u003cem\u003eIf we wished\u003c/em\u003e to express in numbers the first-mentioned\r\nrelation in which colours stand to white, assuming white to\r\nbe = 1, the following scale of proportion might \u003cem\u003eby the way\u003c/em\u003e\r\nbe adopted (as has already been done by Schopenhauer):\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ctable style=\"border-spacing: 0px;padding: 2px;border-width: 0px;\" data-summary=\"color scale\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003eyellow\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e= 3/4\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003eorange\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e= 2/3\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003ered\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e= 1/2\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003egreen\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e= 1/2\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003eblue\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e= 1/3\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003eviolet\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e= 1/4\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003eblack\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e= \u003cins title=\"0\" id=\"C259\"\u003e0\"\u003c/ins\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow I should like to know how anyone could do this \u003cem\u003eby\r\nthe way\u003c/em\u003e, without having first thought out my whole colour-theory,\r\nto which alone these numbers refer, and apart\r\nfrom which they are mere abstract numbers without\r\nmeaning; above all, how anyone could do it who, like\r\nProfessor Rosas, professes to be a follower of Newton\u0027s\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg232\"\u003e[232]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncolour-theory, with which these numbers are in direct contradiction?\r\nFinally, I should like to know how it came,\r\nthat during the thousands of years in which men have\r\nthought and written, no one but myself and Professor\r\nRosas should ever have thought of using just these particular\r\nfractions to denote colours? For the words I have\r\nquoted above tell us, that he would have stated those fractions\r\nprecisely as he has done, even had I not chanced to\r\ndo it \u0027already\u0027 fourteen years before and thus needlessly\r\nanticipated his statement; they also tell us, that all that is\r\nrequired is \u0027\u003cem\u003eto wish\u003c/em\u003e,\u0027 in order to do so. Now it is precisely\r\nin these numerical fractions that the secret of colours\r\nlies: by them alone can we rightly solve the mystery of\r\ntheir nature and of their difference from one another.—I\r\nshould however be heartily glad, were plagiarism the\r\nworst kind of dishonesty that defiled German literature;\r\nthere are others far more mischievous, which penetrate\r\nmore deeply, and to which plagiarism bears the same proportion\r\nas picking pockets in a mild way to capital crime.\r\nI allude to that mean, despicable spirit, whose loadstar is\r\npersonal interest, when it ought to be truth, and in which\r\nthe voice of intention makes itself heard beneath the mask\r\nof insight. Double-dealing and time-serving are the order of\r\nthe day. Tartuffe comedies are performed without \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003erouge\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nnay, Capuchin sermons are preached in halls consecrated\r\nto Science; enlightenment, that once revered word, has\r\nbecome a term of opprobrium; the greatest thinkers of\r\nthe past century, Voltaire, Rousseau, Locke, Hume, are\r\nslandered—those heroes, ornaments and benefactors of\r\nmankind, whose fame, diffused throughout both hemispheres,\r\ncan only be increased, if by anything, by the fact\r\nthat wherever and whenever obscurantists show themselves,\r\nit is as their bitterest enemies—and with good reason.\r\nLiterary \u003cem\u003ecoteries\u003c/em\u003e and associations are formed to deal\r\nout praise and blame, and spurious merit is then trumpeted\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg233\"\u003e[233]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nforth and extolled, while sterling merit is slandered or, as\r\nGöthe says, \"\u003ccite\u003esecreted, by means of an inviolable silence, in\r\nwhich sort of inquisitorial censure the Germans have attained\r\ngreat proficiency\u003c/cite\u003e.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_195\" title=\"Göthe, \u0027Tag und Jahreshefte,\u0027 1812.\" id=\"FNanchor_195\"\u003e[195]\u003c/a\u003e The motives and considerations however\r\nfrom which all this proceeds, are of too low a nature\r\nfor me to care to enumerate them in detail. But what a\r\ndifference there is between periodicals such as the \"Edinburgh\r\nReview,\" in which gentlemen of independent means\r\nare induced to write by a genuine interest in the subjects\r\ntreated, and which honourably upholds its noble motto taken\r\nfrom Publius Syrus: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eJudex damnnatur cum nocens absolvitur\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand our mean-spirited, disingenuous, German literary journals,\r\nfull of considerations and intentions, that are mostly\r\ncompiled for the sake of pay by hired editors, and ought\r\nproperly to have for their motto: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eAccedas socius laudes,\r\nlauderis, ut absens\u003c/i\u003e.\u003cins title=\"footnote anchor missing\" id=\"C233\"\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_196\" title=\"This I wrote in 1836. The \u0027Edinburgh Review\u0027 has since however greatly deteriorated, and is no longer its old self. I have even seen clerical time-serving in its pages, written down to the level of the mob.\" id=\"FNanchor_196\"\u003e[196]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/ins\u003e Now, after twenty years, do I understand\r\nwhat Göthe said to me at Berka in 1814. As I found him\r\nreading Madame de Staël\u0027s \"\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eDe l\u0027Allemagne\u003c/i\u003e,\" I remarked\r\nin course of conversation that she had given too exaggerated\r\na description of German honesty and one that\r\nmight mislead foreigners. He laughed and said: \"Yes,\r\nto be sure, they will not secure their baggage behind and\r\nwill have it cut off.\" He then added in a graver tone:\r\n\"But one has to know German literature in order to realise\r\nthe full extent of German dishonesty.\"—All well and\r\ngood! But the most revolting kind of dishonesty in German\r\nliterature is that of the time-servers, who pass themselves\r\noff for philosophers, while in reality they are obscurantists.\r\nThe word \u0027time-serving\u0027 no more needs explanation\r\nthan the thing needs a proof; for anyone who had the\r\nface to deny it would furnish strong evidence in support of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg234\"\u003e[234]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmy present argument. Kant taught, that man ought to\r\nuse his fellow-man only as an end, never as a means: he\r\ndid not think it necessary to say, that philosophy ought\r\nonly to be dealt with as an end, never as a means. Time-serving\r\nmay after all be excused under every garb, the\r\ncowl as well as the ermine, save only the philosopher\u0027s\r\ncloak (\u003ci\u003eTribonion\u003c/i\u003e); for he who has once assumed this, has\r\nsworn allegiance to truth, and from that moment every\r\nother consideration, no matter of what kind, becomes base\r\ntreachery. Therefore it was that Socrates did not shun\r\nthe hemlock, nor Bruno the stake, while \u0027for a piece of\r\nbread these men will transgress.\u0027 Are they too short-sighted\r\nto see posterity close at hand, with the history of\r\nphilosophy at its side, recording two lines of bitter condemnation\r\nwith unflinching hand and iron pen in its immortal\r\npages? Or has this no sting for them?—Well to\r\nbe sure, if it comes to the worst, \u0027\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eaprès moi le déluge\u003c/i\u003e\u0027 may be\r\npronounced; but as to \u0027\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eaprès moi le mépris\u003c/i\u003e,\u0027 that is a more\r\ndifficult matter. Therefore I fancy they will answer that\r\naustere judge as follows: \"Ah, dear posterity and history\r\nof philosophy! you are quite wrong to take us in earnest; we\r\nare not philosophers at all, Heaven forbid! No, we are only\r\nprofessors of philosophy, mere servants of the state, mere\r\nphilosophers in jest. You might as well drag puppet-knights\r\nin pasteboard armour into a real tournament.\" Then the\r\njudge will most likely see how matters stand, erase all their\r\nnames, and confer upon them the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ebeneficium perpetui silentii\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom this digression—to which I had been led away\r\neighteen years ago, by the cant and time-serving I then\r\nwitnessed, though they were not nearly as flourishing then\r\nas they are now—I return to that part of my doctrine which\r\nDr. Brandis has confirmed, though he did not originate\r\nit, in order to add a few explanations with which I shall\r\nthen connect some further corroborations it has since\r\nreceived from Physiology.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg235\"\u003e[235]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe three assumptions which are criticised by Kant in his\r\nTranscendental Dialectic under the names of Ideas of\r\nReason, and have in consequence since been set aside in\r\ntheoretical philosophy, had always stood in the way of a\r\ndeeper insight into Nature, until that great thinker brought\r\nabout a complete transformation in philosophy. That supposed\r\nIdea of Reason, the soul: that metaphysical being, in it\r\nwhose absolute singleness knowing and willing were knit\r\nand blended together to eternal, inseparable unity, was an\r\nimpediment of this sort for the subject-matter of this\r\nchapter. As long as it lasted, no philosophical Physiology\r\nwas possible: the less so, as its correlate, real, purely passive\r\nMatter, had necessarily also to be assumed together\r\nwith it, as the substance of the body.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_197\" title=\"As a being existing by itself, a thing in itself. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_197\"\u003e[197]\u003c/a\u003e It was this Idea\r\nof Reason, the soul, therefore, that caused the celebrated\r\nchemist and physiologist, George Ernest Stahl, at the\r\nbeginning of the last century to miss the discovery of\r\nthe truth he so nearly approached and would have quite\r\nreached, had he been able to put that which is alone metaphysical,\r\nthe bare \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e—as yet without intellect—in the place\r\nof the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eanima rationalis\u003c/i\u003e. Under the influence of this Idea\r\nof Reason however, he could not teach anything but that\r\nit is this simple, rational soul which builds itself a body, all\r\nwhose inner organic functions it directs and performs, yet\r\nhas no knowledge or consciousness of all this, although\r\nknowledge is the fundamental destination and, as it were,\r\nthe substance, of its being. There was something absurd in\r\nthis doctrine which made it utterly untenable. It was superseded\r\nby Haller\u0027s Irritability and Sensibility, which, to be\r\nsure, are taken in a purely \u003cins title=\"empircial\" id=\"C235\"\u003eempirical\u003c/ins\u003e sense, but, to make\r\nup for this, are also two \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003equalitates occultæ\u003c/i\u003e, at which all explanation\r\nceases. The movement of the heart and of the\r\nintestines was now attributed to Irritability. But the\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eanima rationalis\u003c/i\u003e still remained in undiminished honour\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg236\"\u003e[236]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand dignity as a visitor at the house of the body.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_198\" title=\"In which it is lodged in the garret. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_198\"\u003e[198]\u003c/a\u003e—\"Truth\r\nlies at the bottom of a well,\" said Democritus; and the\r\ncenturies with a sigh, have repeated his words. But small\r\nwonder, if it gets a rap on the knuckles as soon as it tries\r\nto come out!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe fundamental truth of my doctrine, which places\r\nthat doctrine in opposition with all others that have ever\r\nexisted, is the complete separation between the will and\r\nthe intellect, which all philosophers before me had looked\r\nupon as inseparable; or rather, I ought to say that they\r\nhad regarded the will as conditioned by, nay, mostly even\r\nas a mere function of, the intellect, assumed by them to be\r\nthe fundamental substance of our spiritual being. But this\r\nseparation, this analysis into two heterogeneous elements,\r\nof the \u003cem\u003eego\u003c/em\u003e or \u003cem\u003esoul\u003c/em\u003e, which had so long been deemed an indivisible\r\nunity, is, for philosophy, what the analysis of water\r\nhas been for chemistry, though it may take time to be acknowledged.\r\nWith me, that which is eternal and indestructible\r\nin man, therefore, that which constitutes his vital\r\nprinciple, is not \u003cem\u003ethe soul\u003c/em\u003e, but—if I may use a chemical term—its\r\nradical: and this is \u003cem\u003ethe will\u003c/em\u003e. The so-called soul is\r\nalready a compound: it is the union of the will and the\r\nintellect (νούς). This intellect is the secondary element, the\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eposterius\u003c/i\u003e of the organism and, as a mere cerebral function,\r\nis conditioned by the organism; whereas the will is what is\r\nprimary, the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprius\u003c/i\u003e of the organism, which is conditioned\r\nby it. For the will is that thing in itself, which only becomes\r\napparent as an organic body in our representation\r\n(that mere function of the brain): it is only through the\r\nforms of knowledge (or cerebral function), that is, only in\r\nour representation—not apart from that representation, not\r\nimmediately in our self-consciousness—that our body is\r\ngiven to each of us as a thing which has extension, limbs\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg237\"\u003e[237]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand organs. As the actions of our body are only acts\r\nof volition portraying themselves in representation, so\r\nlikewise is their substratum, the shape of that body, in the\r\nmain the portrait of the will: so that, in all the organic\r\nfunctions of our body, the will is just as much the \u003cem\u003eagent\u003c/em\u003e\r\nas in its external actions. True Physiology, at its highest,\r\nshows the spiritual (the intellectual) in man to be the\r\nproduct of the physical in him, and no one has done this\r\nso thoroughly as Cabanis; but true Metaphysic teaches\r\nus, that the physical in man is itself mere product, or\r\nrather phenomenon, of a spiritual (the will); nay, that\r\nMatter itself is conditioned by representation, in which\r\nalone it exists. Perception and reflection will more and\r\nmore find their explanation through the organism; but\r\nnot the will, by which conversely the organism is explained,\r\nas I shall show in the following chapter. First\r\nof all therefore I place \u003cem\u003ethe will, as thing in itself\u003c/em\u003e and quite\r\nprimary; secondly, its mere visibility, its objectification:\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e the \u003cem\u003ebody\u003c/em\u003e; thirdly, the \u003cem\u003eintellect\u003c/em\u003e, as a mere function of\r\none part of that body. This part is itself the objectified\r\nwill to know (the will to know having entered into representation),\r\nsince the will needs knowledge to attain its\r\nown ends. Now the entire world as representation, together\r\nwith the body itself therefore, inasmuch as it is a\r\nperceptible object, nay, Matter in general as existing only\r\nin representation,—all this, I say, is again conditioned by\r\nthat function; for, duly considered, we cannot possibly\r\nconceive an objective world without a Subject, in whose\r\nconsciousness it is present. Thus knowledge and matter\r\n(Subject and Object) exist only relatively one for the\r\nother and constitute \u003cem\u003ephenomenon\u003c/em\u003e. The whole thing therefore,\r\nowing to the radical change made by me, stands in a\r\ndifferent light from that in which it has hitherto been\r\nregarded.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs soon as it is directed outwardly and acts upon a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg238\"\u003e[238]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nrecognised object, as soon therefore as it has passed\r\nthrough the medium of knowledge, we all recognise the\r\n\u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e at once to be the active principle, and call it by its\r\nright name. Yet it is no less active in those inner processes\r\nwhich have preceded such outward actions as their\r\nconditions: in those, for instance, which create and maintain\r\norganic life and its substratum; and the circulation\r\nof the blood, secretion, digestion, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c., are its work\r\nlikewise. But just because the will was only recognised\r\nas the active principle in those cases in which it abandons\r\nthe individual whence it proceeds, in order to direct itself\r\ntowards the outer world—now presenting itself precisely\r\nfor this end, as perception—knowledge has been\r\ntaken for its essential condition, its sole element, nay,\r\nas the substance of which it consists: and hereby was\r\nperpetrated the greatest ὕστερον πρότερον that has ever\r\nbeen.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut before all things we must learn to distinguish will\r\n[\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eWille\u003c/i\u003e] (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003evoluntas\u003c/i\u003e) from free-will [\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eWillkühr\u003c/i\u003e] (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003earbitrium\u003c/i\u003e)\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_199\" title=\"By this Schopenhauer means the distinction between the will in its widest sense, regarded as the fundamental essence of all that happens,–even where there is no choice, even where it is unconscious,–and conscious will, implying deliberation and choice, commonly called free-will….\" id=\"FNanchor_199\"\u003e[199]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand to understand that the former can subsist without the\r\nlatter; this however presupposes my whole philosophy.\r\nThe will is called free-will when it is illumined by knowledge,\r\ntherefore when the causes which move it are motives:\r\nthat is, representations. Objectively speaking this means:\r\nwhen the influence from outside which causes the act,\r\nhas a \u003cem\u003ebrain\u003c/em\u003e for its mediator. A motive may be defined\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg239\"\u003e[239]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas an external stimulus, whose action first of all causes\r\nan \u003cem\u003eimage\u003c/em\u003e to arise in the \u003cem\u003ebrain\u003c/em\u003e, through the medium of\r\nwhich the will carries out the effect proper—an outward\r\naction of the body. Now, in the human species however,\r\nthe place of such an image as this may be taken by a\r\nconception drawn from former images of this kind by\r\ndropping their differences, which conception consequently\r\nis no longer perceptible, but merely denoted and fixed by\r\nwords. As the action of motives accordingly does not\r\ndepend upon contact, they can try their power on the will\r\nagainst each other: in other words, they permit a certain\r\nchoice which, in animals, is limited to the narrow sphere\r\nof that which has \u003cem\u003eperceptible\u003c/em\u003e existence for them; whereas,\r\nin man, its range comprises the vast extent of all that is\r\n\u003cem\u003ethinkable\u003c/em\u003e: that is, of his conceptions. Accordingly we\r\ndesignate as \u003cem\u003evoluntary\u003c/em\u003e those movements which are occasioned,\r\nnot by \u003cem\u003ecauses\u003c/em\u003e in the narrowest sense of the word,\r\nas in inorganic bodies, nor even by \u003cem\u003emere stimuli\u003c/em\u003e, as in\r\nplants, but by \u003cem\u003emotives\u003c/em\u003e.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_200\" title=\"I have shown the difference between cause in its narrowest sense, stimulus, and motive, at length in my \u0027Grund-probleme der Ethik\u0027 p. 29 et seq.\" id=\"FNanchor_200\"\u003e[200]\u003c/a\u003e These motives however presuppose\r\nan \u003cem\u003eintellect\u003c/em\u003e as \u003cem\u003etheir mediator\u003c/em\u003e, through which\r\ncausality here acts, without prejudice to its entire necessity\r\nin all other respects. Physiologically, the difference\r\nbetween stimulus and motive admits also of the\r\nfollowing definition. The stimulus provokes \u003cem\u003eimmediate\u003c/em\u003e\r\nreaction, which proceeds from the very part on which\r\nthe stimulus has acted; whereas the motive is a stimulus\r\nthat has to go a roundabout way through the brain,\r\nwhere its action first causes an image to arise, which\r\nthen, but not till then, provokes the consequent reaction,\r\nwhich is now called an act of volition, and \u003cem\u003evoluntary\u003c/em\u003e. The\r\ndistinction between voluntary and involuntary movement\r\ndoes not therefore concern what is essential and primary—for\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg240\"\u003e[240]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthis is in both cases the will—but only what is secondary,\r\nthe rousing of the will\u0027s manifestation: it has to\r\ndo with the determination whether \u003cem\u003ecauses\u003c/em\u003e proper, \u003cem\u003estimuli\u003c/em\u003e\r\nor \u003cem\u003emotives\u003c/em\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e causes having passed through the medium\r\nof knowledge) are the guidance under which that manifestation\r\ntakes place. It is in human consciousness,—differing\r\nfrom that of animals by not only containing perceptible\r\nrepresentations but also abstract conceptions independent\r\nof time-distinctions, which act simultaneously and collaterally,\r\nwhereby deliberation, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e a conflict of motives,\r\nbecomes possible—it is in human consciousness, I say, that\r\nfree-will (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003earbitrium\u003c/i\u003e) in its narrowest sense first makes its\r\nappearance; and this I have called elective decision. It\r\nnevertheless merely consists in the \u003cem\u003estrongest\u003c/em\u003e motive for a\r\ngiven individual character overcoming the others and thus\r\ndetermining the act, just as an impact is overcome by a\r\nstronger counter-impact, the result thus ensuing with\r\nprecisely the same necessity as the movement of a stone\r\nthat has been struck. That all great thinkers in all\r\nages were decided and at one on this point, is just\r\nas certain, as that the multitude will never understand,\r\nnever grasp, the important truth, that the work of our\r\nfreedom must not be sought in our individual actions but\r\nin our very existence and nature itself. In my prize-essay\r\non Freedom of the Will, I have shown this as\r\nclearly as possible. The \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eliberum arbitrium indifferentiæ\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwhich is assumed to be the distinctive characteristic of\r\nmovements proceeding from \u003cem\u003ethe will\u003c/em\u003e, is accordingly quite\r\ninadmissible: for it asserts that effects are possible without\r\ncauses.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs soon therefore as we have got so far as to distinguish\r\n\u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e [\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eWille\u003c/i\u003e] from \u003cem\u003efree-will\u003c/em\u003e [\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eWillkühr\u003c/i\u003e], and to consider\r\nthe latter as a particular kind or particular phenomenon\r\nof the former, we shall find no difficulty in recognising the\r\nwill, even in unconscious processes. Thus the assertion,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg241\"\u003e[241]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat all bodily movements, even those which are purely\r\nvegetative and organic, proceed from \u003cem\u003ethe will\u003c/em\u003e, by no means\r\nimplies that they are voluntary. For that would mean\r\nthat they were occasioned by motives; but motives are\r\nrepresentations, and their seat is the brain: only those\r\nparts of our body which communicate with the brain by\r\nmeans of the nerves, can be put in movement by the brain,\r\nconsequently by motives, and this movement alone is what\r\nis called voluntary. The movement of the inner economy\r\nof the organism, on the contrary, is directed, as in plant-life,\r\nby \u003cem\u003estimuli\u003c/em\u003e; only as, on the one hand, the complex\r\nnature of the animal organism necessitated an outer sensorium\r\nfor the apprehension of the outer world and the\r\nwill\u0027s reaction on that outer world, so, on the other hand,\r\ndid it necessitate a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecerebrum abdominale\u003c/i\u003e, the sympathetic\r\nnervous system, in order to direct the will\u0027s reaction upon\r\ninner stimuli likewise. We may compare the former to a\r\nHome Ministry, the latter to a Foreign Office; but the\r\nwill remains the omnipresent Autocrat.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe progress made in Physiology since Haller has placed\r\nbeyond doubt, that not only those actions which are consciously\r\nperformed (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003efunctiones animales\u003c/i\u003e), but even vital\r\nprocesses that take place quite unconsciously (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003efunctiones\r\nvitales et naturales\u003c/i\u003e), are directed throughout by the \u003cem\u003enervous\r\nsystem\u003c/em\u003e. Likewise that their only difference, as far as\r\nour consciousness of them is concerned, consists in\r\nthe former being directed by nerves proceeding from the\r\nbrain, the latter by nerves that do not directly communicate\r\nwith that chief centre of the nervous system—mainly\r\ndirected towards the outside—but with subordinate,\r\nminor centres, with the nerve-knots, the ganglia\r\nand their net-work, which preside as it were like vice-gerents\r\nover the various departments of the nervous\r\nsystem, directing those internal processes that follow upon\r\ninternal stimuli, just as the brain directs the external\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg242\"\u003e[242]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nactions that follow upon external motives, and thus receiving\r\nimpressions from inside upon which they react correspondingly,\r\njust as the brain receives representations\r\non the strength of which it forms resolutions; only each\r\nof these minor centres is confined to a narrower sphere of\r\naction. Upon this rests the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003evita propria\u003c/i\u003e of each system,\r\nin referring to which Van Helmont said that each organ\r\nhas, as it were, its own \u003cem\u003eego\u003c/em\u003e. It accounts also for life continuing\r\nin parts which have been cut off the bodies of\r\ninsects, reptiles, and other inferior animals, whose brain has\r\nno marked preponderance over the ganglia of single parts;\r\nand it likewise explains how many reptiles are able to live\r\nfor weeks, nay even months, after their brain has been removed.\r\nNow, if our surest experience teaches us that \u003cem\u003ethe\r\nwill\u003c/em\u003e, which is known to us in most immediate consciousness\r\nand in a totally different way from the outer world, is\r\nthe real agent in actions attended by consciousness and\r\ndirected by the chief centre of the nervous system; how\r\ncan we help admitting that those other actions which, proceeding\r\nfrom that nervous system but obeying the direction\r\nof its subordinate centres, keep the vital processes\r\nconstantly going, must also be manifestations of \u003cem\u003ethe will\u003c/em\u003e?\r\nEspecially as we know perfectly well the cause because of\r\nwhich they are not, like the others, attended by consciousness:\r\nwe know, that is to say, that all consciousness\r\nresides in the brain and therefore is limited to such parts\r\nas have nerves which communicate directly with the brain;\r\nand we know also that, even in these, consciousness ceases\r\nwhen those nerves are severed. By this the difference\r\nbetween all that is conscious and unconscious and together\r\nwith it the difference between all that is voluntary and involuntary\r\nin the movements of the body is perfectly explained,\r\nand no reason remains for assuming two entirely\r\ndifferent primary sources of movement: especially as \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprincipia\r\npræter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda\u003c/i\u003e. All this is\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg243\"\u003e[243]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nso obvious, that, on impartial reflection from this standpoint,\r\nit seems almost absurd to persist in making the body serve\r\ntwo masters by deriving its actions from two radically different\r\norigins and then ascribing on the one hand the\r\nmovements of our arms and legs, of our eyes, lips, throat,\r\ntongue and lungs, of the facial and abdominal muscles, to\r\nthe will; while on the other hand the action of the heart,\r\nthe movements of the veins, the peristaltic movements of\r\nthe intestines, the absorption by the intestinal villi and\r\nglands and all those movements which accompany secretion,\r\nare supposed to proceed from a totally different, ever\r\nmysterious principle of which we have no knowledge, and\r\nwhich is designated by names such as vitality, archeus,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003espiritus animales\u003c/i\u003e, vital energy, instinct, all of which mean\r\nno more than \u003ci\u003ex\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_201\" title=\"It is especially in secretive processes that we cannot avoid recognising a certain selection of the materials fitted for each purpose, consequently a free will in the secretive organs, which must even be assisted by a certain dull sensation, and in virtue of which each secreting organ only extracts from the same blood that particular secretion which suits it and no others: for instance, the liver only absorbs bile from the blood flowing through it, sending the rest of the blood on, and likewise the salivary glands and the pancreas only secrete saliva, the kidneys only urine, etc. etc….\" id=\"FNanchor_201\"\u003e[201]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is curious and instructive to see the trouble that\r\nexcellent writer, Treviranus\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_202\" title=\"Treviranus, \u0027Die Erscheinungen und Gesetze des Organischen Lebens,\u0027 vol. i. pp. 178-185.\" id=\"FNanchor_202\"\u003e[202]\u003c/a\u003e takes, to find out in the\r\nlower animals, such as \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003einfusoria\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ezoophyta\u003c/i\u003e, which\r\nmovements are voluntary, and which are what he calls automatic\r\nor physical, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e merely vital. He founds his inquiry\r\nupon the assumption that he has to do with two primarily\r\ndifferent sources of movement; whereas in truth they all\r\nproceed from the will, and the whole difference consists in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg244\"\u003e[244]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntheir being occasioned by stimuli or by motives, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e in their\r\nhaving a brain for their medium or not; and the stimulus\r\nmay again be merely interior or exterior. In several\r\nanimals of a higher order—crustaceans and even fishes—he\r\nfinds that the voluntary and vital movements, for instance\r\nlocomotion and respiration, entirely coincide: a\r\nclear proof that their origin and essence are identical.\r\nHe says p. 188: \"In the family of the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eactinia\u003c/i\u003e, star-fishes,\r\nsea-urchins, and \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eholothuriæ\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eechinodermata pedata\r\nCuv.\u003c/i\u003e), it is evident that the movement of the fluids depends\r\nupon the will of the animals and that it is a\r\nmeans of locomotion.\" Then again p. 288: \"The gullet\r\nof mammals has at its upper end the pharynx, which\r\nexpands and contracts by means of muscles resembling\r\nvoluntary muscles in their formation, yet which do not\r\nobey the will.\" Here we see how the limits of the movements\r\nproceeding from the will and of those assumed\r\nto be foreign to it, merge into one another. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 293:\r\n\"Thus movements having all the appearance of being\r\nvoluntary, take place in the stomachs of ruminants. They\r\ndo not however always stand in connection with the ruminating\r\nprocess only. Even the simpler human stomach\r\nand that of many animals only allows free passage to what\r\nis digestible through its lower orifice, and rejects what is\r\nindigestible by vomiting.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is moreover special evidence that the movements\r\ninduced by stimuli (involuntary movements) proceed from\r\nthe will just as well as those occasioned by motives\r\n(voluntary movements): for instance, when the same\r\nmovement follows now upon a stimulus, now again\r\nupon a motive, as is the case when the pupil of the\r\neye is contracted. This movement, when caused by increased\r\nlight, follows upon a stimulus; whereas, when\r\noccasioned by the wish to examine a very small object\r\nminutely in close proximity, it follows upon a motive; because\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg245\"\u003e[245]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncontracting the pupil enables us to see things distinctly\r\neven when quite near to us, and this distinctness\r\nmay be increased by our looking through a hole pierced\r\nin a card with a pin; conversely, the pupil is dilated when\r\nwe look at distant objects. Surely the same movement of\r\nthe same organ is not likely to proceed alternately from\r\ntwo fundamentally different sources.—E. H. Weber\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_203\" title=\"E. H. Weber, \u0027Additamenta ad E. H. Weberi tractatum de motu iridis.\u0027 Lipsia, 1823.\" id=\"FNanchor_203\"\u003e[203]\u003c/a\u003e relates\r\nthat he discovered in himself the power of dilating\r\nand contracting at will the pupil of one of his eyes, while\r\nlooking at the same object, so as to make that object\r\nappear now distinct, now indistinct, while the other eye\r\nremained closed.—Joh. Müller\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_204\" title=\"Joh. Müller, \u0027Handbuch der Physiologie,\u0027 p. 764.\" id=\"FNanchor_204\"\u003e[204]\u003c/a\u003e also tries to prove that the\r\nwill acts upon the pupil.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe truth that the innermost mainspring of unconsciously\r\nperformed vital and vegetative functions is the\r\nwill, we find moreover confirmed by the consideration, that\r\neven the movement of a limb recognised as voluntary, is\r\nonly the ultimate result of a multitude of preceding changes\r\nwhich have taken place inside that limb and which no more\r\nenter into our consciousness than those organic functions.\r\nYet these changes are evidently that which was first set\r\nin motion by the will, the movement of the limb being merely\r\ntheir remote consequence; nevertheless this remains so\r\nforeign to our consciousness that physiologists try to reach it\r\nby means of such hypotheses as these: that the sinews and\r\nmuscular fibre are contracted by a change in the cellular\r\ntissue wrought by a precipitation of the blood-vapour in\r\nthat tissue to serum; but that this change is brought\r\nabout by the nerve\u0027s action, and this—by \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ethe will\u003c/i\u003e. Thus,\r\neven here, it is not the change which proceeded originally\r\nfrom the will which comes into consciousness, but only its\r\nremote result; and even this, properly speaking, only through\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg246\"\u003e[246]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe special perception of the brain in which it presents\r\nitself together with the whole organism. Now by following\r\nthe path of experimental research and hypotheses physiologists\r\nwould never have arrived at the truth, that the\r\nlast link in this ascending causal series is \u003cem\u003ethe will\u003c/em\u003e; it is\r\nknown to them, on the contrary, in quite a different way.\r\nThe solution of the enigma comes to them in a whisper\r\nfrom outside the investigation, owing to the fortunate circumstance\r\nthat the investigator is in this case at the same\r\ntime himself the object of the investigation and by this\r\nlearns the secret of the inward process, his explanation of\r\nwhich would otherwise, like that of every other phenomenon,\r\nbe brought to a standstill by an inscrutable force. And\r\nconversely, if we stood in the same inward relation towards\r\nevery natural phenomenon as towards our own organism,\r\nthe explanation of every natural phenomenon, as well as of\r\nall the properties of every body, would likewise ultimately\r\nbe reduced to a will manifesting itself in them. For the\r\ndifference does not reside in the thing itself, but in our relation\r\nto the thing. Wherever explanation of the physical\r\ncomes to an end, it is met by the metaphysical; and wherever\r\nthis last is accessible to immediate knowledge, the\r\nresult will be, as here, the will. That even those parts of\r\nthe body whose movements do not proceed from the brain,\r\ndo not follow upon motives, and are not voluntary, are\r\nnevertheless ruled and animated by the will, is also shown\r\nby their participation in all unusually violent movements of\r\nthe will, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e emotions and passions. We see, for instance,\r\nthe quickened pulse in joy or alarm, the blush in \u003cins title=\"embarassment\" id=\"C246\"\u003eembarrassment\u003c/ins\u003e,\r\nthe cheek\u0027s pallor in terror or in suppressed anger,\r\nthe tears of sorrow, the difficult breathing and increased\r\nactivity of the intestines in terror, watering of the mouth\r\nat the sight of dainties, nausea occasioned by that of loathsome\r\nobjects, strongly accelerated circulation of the blood\r\nand even altered quality of bile through wrath, and of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg247\"\u003e[247]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsaliva through violent rage: this last even to the degree,\r\nthat an excessively irritated dog may communicate hydrophobia\r\nby its bite without being itself affected with rabies,\r\nor even then contracting the disease—and the same is also\r\nasserted of cats and of cocks. The organism is further\r\ndeeply undermined by lasting grief, and may be mortally\r\naffected by fright as well as by sudden joy. On the other\r\nhand, all those inner processes and changes which only\r\nhave to do with the intellect and do not concern the will,\r\nhowever great may be their importance, remain without\r\ninfluence upon the machinery of the organism, with the\r\none exception, that mental activity, prolonged to excess,\r\nfatigues and gradually exhausts the brain and finally undermines\r\nthe organism. This again confirms the fact that the\r\nintellect is of a secondary character, and merely the organic\r\nfunction of a single part, a product of life; not the innermost\r\nkernel of our being, not the thing in itself, not metaphysical,\r\nincorporeal, eternal, like the will: the will never\r\ntires, never grows old, never learns, never improves by\r\npractice, is in infancy what it is in old age, eternally one\r\nand the same, and its character in each individual is unchangeable.\r\nBeing essential moreover, it is likewise immutable,\r\nand therefore exists in animals as it does in us;\r\nfor it does not, like the intellect, depend upon the perfection\r\nof the organization, but is in every essential respect in\r\nall animals the same thing which we know so intimately.\r\nAccordingly animals have all the feelings which belong to\r\nman: joy, grief, fear, anger, love, hate, desire, envy, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c.\r\nThe great difference between man and the brute creation\r\nconsists exclusively in the degrees of perfection of the intellect.\r\nThis however is leading us too far from our subject,\r\nso I refer my readers to my chief work, vol. ii. chap.\r\n19, \u003ci\u003esub.\u003c/i\u003e 2.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAfter the cogent reasons just given in favour of the\r\nprimary \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eagens\u003c/i\u003e in the inward machinery of the organism\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg248\"\u003e[248]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbeing the very same will which rules the outward actions\r\nof the body and only reveals itself as the will in this\r\npassage through consciousness because here it needs the\r\nmediation of outwardly directed knowledge, we shall not\r\nbe astonished to find that other physiologists besides\r\nBrandis had, by means of strictly empirical research, also\r\nrecognised this truth more or less clearly. Meckel,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_205\" title=\"Meckel, \u0027A. f. d. P.\u0027 vol. 5, pp. 195-198.\" id=\"FNanchor_205\"\u003e[205]\u003c/a\u003e in\r\nhis \"Archiv für die Physiologie,\" arrives quite empirically\r\nand impartially at the conclusion, that vegetative\r\nexistence [in animals], the first growth of the embryo, the\r\nassimilation of nourishment and plant-life, ought properly\r\nto be considered as manifestations of the will, nay, that\r\neven the inclination of the magnetic needle seems to be\r\nsomething of the same kind. \"The assumption,\" he says,\r\n\"of a certain free will in every vital movement may perhaps\r\nbe justified.\" \"Plants appear to seek light voluntarily,\"\r\n\u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c. This book is dated 1819 just after the\r\nappearance of my work; and as, to say the least, it is doubtful\r\nwhether it had any influence upon him or whether he\r\nwas even aware of its existence, I class these utterances\r\namong the independent empirical confirmations of my doctrine.\r\nBurdach also,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_206\" title=\"Burdach, \u0027Physiologie,\u0027 vol. i. § 259, p. 388.\" id=\"FNanchor_206\"\u003e[206]\u003c/a\u003e in his great work on Physiology,\r\narrives by a completely empirical road at the conclusion,\r\nthat \"self-love is a force belonging to all things indiscriminately.\"\r\nHe points it out, first in animals, then in plants,\r\nand lastly in inanimate bodies. But what is self-love after\r\nall, if not the will to preserve our existence, the will to\r\nlive? Under the heading \"Comparative Anatomy,\" I shall\r\nquote a passage from the same book, which confirms my\r\nview still more decidedly. That the doctrine, which teaches\r\nthat the will is the vital principle, has begun to spread even\r\nto the wider circles of medical science and to meet with a\r\nfavourable reception from its younger representatives, I\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg249\"\u003e[249]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnotice with particular pleasure in the theses sustained by\r\nDr. Von Sigriz on taking his degree at Munich (August,\r\n1835), which commence as follows: 1. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eSanguis est determinans\r\nformam organismi se evolventis.\u003c/i\u003e 2. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eEvolutio organica\r\ndeterminatur vitæ internæ actione et\u003c/i\u003e voluntate.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLastly, a very remarkable and unexpected corroboration\r\nof this part of my doctrine has to be mentioned, which has\r\nrecently been communicated from ancient Hindoo philosophy\r\nby Colebrook. In his exposition of the philosophical\r\nschools of the Hindoos,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_207\" title=\"\u0027Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Great Britain,\u0027 1824, p. 110.\" id=\"FNanchor_207\"\u003e[207]\u003c/a\u003e he quotes the following as the\r\ndoctrine of the Nyaga school: \"Volition, Yatna, effort or\r\nmanifestation of the Will, is a self-determination to act\r\nwhich gives satisfaction. Desire is its occasion, perception\r\nits motive. Two kinds of perceptible effort of the will\r\nare distinguished: that which springs from desire which\r\nseeks the agreeable, and that which springs from aversion\r\nwhich shuns the repulsive. Another species, which escapes\r\nsensation and perception, but is inferred from analogy of\r\nspontaneous acts, comprises animal functions, having for\r\na cause the vital, unseen power.\" Here the words \"animal\r\nfunctions\" are evidently used, not in a physiological,\r\nbut in a popular sense: so that here organic life is unquestionably\r\nderived from the will. We find a similar\r\nstatement in Colebrook\u0027s Report on the Vedas\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_208\" title=\"\u0027Asiatic Researches,\u0027 vol. 8, p. 426.\" id=\"FNanchor_208\"\u003e[208]\u003c/a\u003e where he\r\nsays: \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eAsu is unconscious volition\u003c/i\u003e, which occasions an act\r\nnecessary to the support of life, as breathing, \u0026amp;c.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMoreover my reduction of vital energy to the will by no\r\nmeans interferes with the old division of its functions into\r\nreproductive force, irritability and sensibility. This division\r\nremains a deep view of their difference, and gives\r\noccasion for interesting observations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eThe faculty of reproduction\u003c/em\u003e, objectified in the cellular\r\ntissue of plants, constitutes the chief characteristic of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg250\"\u003e[250]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nplants and the vegetative element in Man. Where we find\r\nit predominant to excess in human beings, we assume them\r\nto be phlegmatic, dull, indolent, obtuse (Bœotians); though\r\nthis assumption does not always meet with confirmation.\r\n\u003cem\u003eIrritability\u003c/em\u003e, objectified in the muscular tissue, constitutes\r\nthe chief characteristic of Animals and the animal element\r\nin Man. Where it predominates to excess, dexterity,\r\nstrength, bravery, that is, fitness for bodily exertion and\r\nfor war, is usually to be found (Spartans). Nearly all\r\nwarm-blooded animals and even insects far surpass Man\r\nin irritability. It is by irritability that animals are most\r\nvividly conscious of their existence; wherefore they exult\r\nin manifesting it. There is even still a trace of that exultation\r\nperceptible in Man, in dancing. \u003cem\u003eSensibility\u003c/em\u003e, objectified\r\nin the nerves, is Man\u0027s chief characteristic, and constitutes\r\nwhat is properly human in him. In this no animal\r\ncan in the remotest degree compare with Man. Where it\r\npredominates to excess, it produces \u003cem\u003egenius\u003c/em\u003e (Athenians).\r\nAccordingly a man of genius is in a higher degree a \u003cem\u003eman\u003c/em\u003e.\r\nThis explains why some men of genius have been unwilling\r\nto recognise other men, with their monotonous physiognomies\r\nand universal stamp of commonplace mediocrity,\r\nas human beings: for in them they did not find their\r\nequals and naturally came to the erroneous conclusion\r\nthat their own was the normal standard. Diogenes\r\nsought for men with a lantern in this sense;—in that work\r\nof genius, the Koheleth (Ecclesiastes) it is said:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_209\" title=\"Ecclesiastes, ch. 7, v. 28.\" id=\"FNanchor_209\"\u003e[209]\u003c/a\u003e \"\u003cem\u003eOne\u003c/em\u003e\r\nman among a thousand have I found, but one woman\r\namong all those have I not found;\" and Gracian in his\r\nCriticon—perhaps the grandest and most beautiful allegory\r\never written—says: \"But what was strangest of\r\nall, in the whole country, even in the most populous cities,\r\nthey did not meet with a single \u003cem\u003eman\u003c/em\u003e; on the contrary these\r\ncities were inhabited by lions, tigers, leopards, wolves,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg251\"\u003e[251]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfoxes, apes, oxen, asses, pigs,—nowhere was there a man!\r\nThey only made out after a time that the few existing\r\nhuman beings, in order to hide themselves and not to witness\r\nwhat was going on, had retired to those desert places\r\nwhich ought to have been the dwellings of wild beasts.\"\r\nThe same reason indeed accounts for the peculiar inclination\r\nof all men of genius for solitude, to which they are\r\ndriven by their difference from the rest, and for which their\r\nown inner wealth qualifies them. For, with humanity it\r\nis as with diamonds, the extraordinarily great ones alone\r\nare fitted to be \u003cem\u003esolitaires\u003c/em\u003e, while those of ordinary size have\r\nto be set in clusters to produce any effect.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eEven the three \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eGunas\u003c/i\u003e, or fundamental qualities of the\r\nHindoos, tally with the three physiological fundamental\r\nforces. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eTamas-Guna\u003c/i\u003e, obtuseness, stupidity, corresponds\r\nto reproductive power; \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eRajas-Guna\u003c/i\u003e, passionateness, to\r\nirritability; and \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eSattwa-Guna\u003c/i\u003e, wisdom and virtue, to sensibility.\r\nWhen however they add to this, that Tamas-Guna\r\nis the fate of animals, Rajas-Guna the fate of man,\r\nand Sattwa-Guna that of the Gods, this is to be taken in a\r\nmythological, rather than physiological sense.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn Chapter 20th of the 2nd Vol. of my chief work entitled\r\n\"Objectification of the Will in the Animal Organism,\"\r\nI have likewise treated the argument of the present\r\nchapter; therefore I advise my readers to read it after this,\r\nas a complement to what is here given.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_210\" title=\"In my \u0027Parerga,\u0027 § 94 of the 2nd vol. (§ 96 in the 2nd edition) belongs also to the above.\" id=\"FNanchor_210\"\u003e[210]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI may observe, that the passages I have quoted from\r\npp. 14 and 15 of my Essay on Colours, refer to the first\r\nedition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg252\"\u003e[252]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eCOMPARATIVE ANATOMY.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, from my proposition: that the Will is what\r\nKant calls the \"thing in itself\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_211\" title=\"Ding an sich.\" id=\"FNanchor_211\"\u003e[211]\u003c/a\u003e or the ultimate\r\nsubstratum of every phenomenon, I had however not\r\nonly deduced that the will is the agent in all inner, unconscious\r\nfunctions of the body, but also that the organism\r\nitself is nothing but the will which has entered the\r\nregion of representation, the will itself, perceived in the\r\ncognitive form of Space. I had accordingly said that, just\r\nas each single momentary act of willing presents itself\r\nat once directly and infallibly in the outer perception of\r\nthe body as one of its actions, so also must the collective\r\nvolition of each animal, the totality\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_212\" title=\"Inbegriff.\" id=\"FNanchor_212\"\u003e[212]\u003c/a\u003e of its efforts, be faithfully\r\nportrayed in its whole body, in the constitution of its\r\norganism; and that the means supplied by its organisation\r\nfor attaining the aims of its will must as a whole\r\nexactly correspond to those aims—in short, that the same\r\nrelation must exist between the whole character of its\r\nvolition and the shape and nature of its body, as between\r\neach single act of its will and the single bodily action\r\nwhich carries it out. Even this too has recently been\r\nrecognised as a fact, and accordingly been confirmed \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà\r\nposteriori\u003c/i\u003e, by thoughtful zootomists and physiologists from\r\ntheir own point of view and independently of my doctrine:\r\ntheir judgments on this point make Nature testify even\r\nhere to the truth of my theory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg253\"\u003e[253]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIn Pander and d\u0027Alton\u0027s admirable illustrated work\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_213\" title=\"Pander and d\u0027Alton, \u0027Ueber die Skelette der Raubthiere,\u0027 1822, p. 7.\" id=\"FNanchor_213\"\u003e[213]\u003c/a\u003e we\r\nfind: \"Just as all that is characteristic in the formation of\r\nbones springs from the \u003cem\u003echaracter\u003c/em\u003e of the animals, so does\r\nthat character, on the other hand, develop out of their\r\n\u003cem\u003etendencies and desires\u003c/em\u003e. These \u003cem\u003etendencies and desires\u003c/em\u003e\r\nof animals, which are \u003cem\u003eso vividly expressed\u003c/em\u003e in their whole\r\norganisation and of which that organisation only appears\r\nto be the medium, cannot be explained by special primary\r\nforces, since we can only deduce their inner reason from\r\nthe general life of Nature.\" By this last turn the author\r\nshows indeed that he has arrived at the point where, like\r\nall other investigators of Nature, he is brought to a standstill\r\nby the metaphysical; but he also shows, that up\r\nto this point beyond which Nature eludes investigation,\r\n\u003cem\u003etendencies and desires\u003c/em\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e will) were the utmost\r\nthing knowable. The shortest expression for his last\r\nconclusion about animals would be \"As they will, so they\r\nare.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe learned and thoughtful Burdach,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_214\" title=\"Burdach, \u0027Physiologie,\u0027 vol. 2, § 474.\" id=\"FNanchor_214\"\u003e[214]\u003c/a\u003e when treating of\r\nthe ultimate reason of the genesis of the embryo in his\r\ngreat work on Physiology, bears witness no less explicitly\r\nto the truth of my view. I must not, unfortunately, conceal\r\nthe fact that in a weak moment, misled Heaven knows\r\nby what or how, this otherwise excellent man brings in\r\njust here a few sentences taken from that utterly worthless,\r\ntyrannically imposed pseudo-philosophy, about \u0027thought\u0027\r\nbeing what is primary (it is just what is last and most\r\nconditioned of all) yet \u0027no representation\u0027 (that is to say,\r\na wooden iron). Immediately after however, under the\r\nreturning influence of his own better self, he proclaims the\r\nreal truth (p. 710): \"The brain curves itself outwards to\r\nthe retina, because the central part of the embryo \u003cem\u003edesires\u003c/em\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg254\"\u003e[254]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto take in the impressions of the activity of the world; the\r\nmucous membrane of the intestinal canal develops into the\r\nlung, because the organic body \u003cem\u003edesires\u003c/em\u003e to enter into relation\r\nwith the elementary substances of the universe; organs of\r\ngeneration spring from the vascular system, because the\r\nindividual only lives in the species, and because the life\r\nwhich has commenced in the individual \u003cem\u003edesires\u003c/em\u003e to multiply.\"\r\nThis assertion of Burdach\u0027s, which so entirely agrees\r\nwith my doctrine, reminds me of a passage in the ancient\r\nMahabharata, which it is really difficult not to regard as a\r\nmythical version of the same truth. It is in the third\r\nCanto of \"Sundas and Upasunda\" in Bopp\u0027s \"Ardschuna\u0027s\r\nReise zu Indra\u0027s Himmel\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_215\" title=\"Bopp, \u0027Ardschuna\u0027s Reise zu Indra\u0027s Himmel, nebst anderen Episoden des Mahabharata\u0027 (Ardshuna\u0027s Journey to Indra\u0027s Heaven together with other episodes from the Mahabharata), 1824.\" id=\"FNanchor_215\"\u003e[215]\u003c/a\u003e (1824); Brahma has just\r\ncreated Tilottama, the fairest of women, who is walking\r\nround the circle of the assembled gods. Shiva conceives\r\nso violent a longing to gaze at her as she turns successively\r\nround the circle, that four faces arise in him according to\r\nher different positions, that is, according to the four\r\ncardinal points. This may account for Shiva being represented\r\nwith five heads, as Pansh Mukhti Shiva. Countless\r\neyes arise on every part of Indra\u0027s body likewise\r\non the same occasion.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_216\" title=\"The Matsya Parana attributes a similar origin to Brahma\u0027s four countenances. It relates that, having fallen in love with his daughter Satarupa, and gazed fixedly at her, she stepped aside to avoid his eye; he being ashamed, would not follow her movement; whereupon a new face arose on him directed towards the side where she was and, on her once more moving, the same thing occurred, and was repeated, until at last he had four faces. (\u0027Asiatic Researches,\u0027 vol. 6, p. 473.) [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_216\"\u003e[216]\u003c/a\u003e In fact, every organ must be\r\nlooked upon as the expression of a universal manifestation\r\nof the will, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e of one made once for all, of a\r\nfixed longing, of an act of volition proceeding, not from\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg255\"\u003e[255]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe individual, but from the species. Every animal form\r\nis a longing of the will to live which is roused by circumstances;\r\nfor instance, the will is seized with a longing to\r\nlive on trees, to hang on their branches, to devour their\r\nleaves, without contention with other animals and without\r\never touching the ground: this longing presents itself\r\nthroughout endless time in the form (or Platonic Idea) of\r\nthe sloth. It can hardly walk at all, being only adapted\r\nfor climbing; helpless on the ground, it is agile on\r\ntrees and looks itself like a moss-clad bough in order to\r\nescape the notice of its pursuers. But now let us consider\r\nthe matter from a somewhat more methodical and less\r\npoetical point of view.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe manifest adaptation of each animal for its mode of\r\nlife and outward means of subsistence, even down to the\r\nsmallest detail, together with the exceeding perfection of its\r\norganisation, form abundant material for teleological contemplation,\r\nwhich has always been a favourite occupation\r\nof the human mind, and which, extended even to inanimate\r\nNature, has become the argument of the Physico-theological\r\nProof. The universal fitness for their ends, the obviously\r\nintentional design in all the parts of the organism of the\r\nlower animals without exception, proclaim too distinctly\r\nfor it ever to have been seriously questioned, that here no\r\nforces of Nature acting by chance and without plan have\r\nbeen at work, but a will. Now, that a will should act\r\notherwise than under the guidance of knowledge was inconceivable,\r\naccording to empirical science and views. For,\r\nup to my time, as has been shown in the last chapter, \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e\r\nand \u003cem\u003eintellect\u003c/em\u003e had been regarded as absolutely inseparable,\r\nnay, the will was looked upon as a mere operation of the\r\nintellect, that presumptive basis of all that is spiritual.\r\nAccordingly wherever the will acted, knowledge must have\r\nbeen its guide; consequently it must have been its guide here\r\nalso. But the mediation of knowledge, which, as such, is\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg256\"\u003e[256]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nexclusively directed towards the outside, brings with it, that\r\na will acting by means of it, can only act outwardly, that\r\nis, only from \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e being upon \u003cem\u003eanother\u003c/em\u003e. Therefore the will,\r\nof which unmistakable traces had been found, was not\r\nsought for where these were discovered, but was removed\r\nto the outside, and the animal became the product of a\r\nwill foreign to it, guided by knowledge, which must\r\nhave been very clear knowledge indeed, nay, the deeply excogitated\r\nconception of a purpose; and this purpose must\r\nhave preceded the animal\u0027s existence, and, together with\r\nthe will, whose product the animal is, have lain outside that\r\nanimal. According to this, the animal would have existed\r\nin representation before existing in reality. This is the\r\nbasis of the train of thought on which the Physico-theological\r\nProof is founded. But this proof is no mere\r\nscholastic sophism, like the Ontological Proof: nor does it\r\ncontain an untiring natural opponent within itself, like the\r\nCosmological Proof, in that very same law of causality to\r\nwhich it owes its existence. On the contrary, it is, in\r\nreality, for the educated, what the Keraunological Proof\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_217\" title=\"I should like under this name to add a fourth to the three proofs brought forward by Kant, i.e. the proof a terrore, which the ancient saying of Petronius: primus in orbe Deos fecit timor, designates and of which Hume\u0027s incomparable \u0027Natural History of Religion\u0027 may be considered as the critique. Understood in this sense, even the theologist Schleiermacher\u0027s attempted proof might have its truth from the feeling of dependence, though perhaps not exactly that truth which its originator imagined it to have.\" id=\"FNanchor_217\"\u003e[217]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nis for the vulgar,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_218\" title=\"Socrates propounded it already in detail in Xenophon. (\u0027Mem.\u0027 i. 4.) [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_218\"\u003e[218]\u003c/a\u003e and its plausibility is so great, so potent,\r\nthat the most eminent and at the same time least prejudiced\r\nminds have been deeply entangled in it. Voltaire,\r\nfor instance, who, after all sorts of other doubts, always\r\ncomes back to it, sees no possibility of getting over it and\r\neven places its evidence almost on a level with that of a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg257\"\u003e[257]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmathematical demonstration. Even Priestley too declares it\r\nto be irrefutable.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_219\" title=\"Priestley, \u0027Disqu. on Matter and Spirit,\u0027 sect. 16, p. 188.\" id=\"FNanchor_219\"\u003e[219]\u003c/a\u003e Hume\u0027s reflection and acumen alone stood\r\nthe test, even in this case; in his \"Dialogues on Natural\r\nReligion,\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_220\" title=\"Part 7, and in other places.\" id=\"FNanchor_220\"\u003e[220]\u003c/a\u003e which are so well worth reading, this true precursor\r\nof Kant calls attention to the fact, that there is no\r\nresemblance at all between the works of Nature and those\r\nof an Art which proceeds according to a design. Now it\r\nis precisely where he cuts asunder the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003enervus probandi\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nthis extremely insidious proof, as well as that of the two\r\nothers—in his Critique of Judgment and in his Critique of\r\nPure Reason—that Kant\u0027s merit shines most brilliantly.\r\nA very brief summary of this Kantian refutation of the\r\nPhysico-theological Proof may be found in my chief work.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_221\" title=\"See \u0027Die Welt als W. u. V.\u0027 vol. i. p. 597. (Vol. i. p. 631 of the 3rd ed.)\" id=\"FNanchor_221\"\u003e[221]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nKant has earned for himself great merit by it; for nothing\r\nstands so much in the way of a correct insight into Nature\r\nand into the essence of things as this view, by which they\r\nare looked upon as having been made according to a preconceived\r\nplan. Therefore, if a Duke of Bridgewater offers\r\na prize of high value for the confirmation and perpetuation\r\nof such fundamental errors, let it be our task, following in\r\nthe footsteps of Hume and Kant, to work undauntedly at\r\ntheir destruction, without any other reward than truth.\r\nTruth deserves respect: not what is opposed to it. Nevertheless\r\nhere, as elsewhere, Kant has confined himself to\r\nnegation; but a negation only takes full effect when it has\r\nbeen completed by a correct affirmation, this alone giving\r\nentire satisfaction and in itself dislodging and superseding\r\nerror, according to the words of Spinoza: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eSicut lux se ipsa\r\net tenebras manifestat, sic veritas norma sui et falsi est\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nFirst of all therefore we say: the world is not made with\r\nthe help of knowledge, consequently also not from the outside,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg258\"\u003e[258]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbut from the inside; and next we endeavour to point\r\nout the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003epunctum saliens\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_222\" title=\"The point at which the life-spark is kindled. [Tr.]\" id=\"FNanchor_222\"\u003e[222]\u003c/a\u003e of the world-egg. The physico-theological\r\nthought, that Nature must have been regulated\r\nand fashioned by an intellect, however well it may\r\nsuit the untutored mind, is nevertheless fundamentally\r\nwrong. For the intellect is only known to us in animal\r\nnature, consequently as an absolutely secondary and\r\nsubordinate principle in the world, a product of the latest\r\norigin; it can never therefore have been the condition of\r\nthe existence of that world.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_223\" title=\"Nor can a mundus intelligibilis precede a mundus sensibilis; since it receives its material from the latter alone. It is not an intellect which has brought forth Nature; it is, on the contrary, Nature which has brought forth the intellect. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_223\"\u003e[223]\u003c/a\u003e Now the will on the contrary,\r\nbeing that which fills every thing and manifests itself\r\nimmediately in each—thus showing each thing to be its\r\nphenomenon—appears everywhere as that which is primary.\r\nIt is just for this reason, that the explanation of all teleological\r\nfacts is to be found in the will of the being itself in\r\nwhich they are observed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBesides, the Physico-theological Proof may be simply\r\ninvalidated by the empirical observation, that works produced\r\nby animal instinct, such as the spider\u0027s web, the bee\u0027s\r\nhoneycomb and its cells, the white ant\u0027s constructions, \u0026amp;c.\r\n\u0026amp;c., are throughout constituted as if they were the result\r\nof an intentional conception, of a wide-reaching providence\r\nand of rational deliberation; whereas they are evidently\r\nthe work of a blind impulse, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e of a will not guided by\r\nknowledge. From this it follows, that the conclusion from\r\nsuch and such a nature to such and such a mode of coming\r\ninto being, has not the same certainty as the conclusion\r\nfrom a consequent to its reason, which is in all cases a\r\nsure one. I have devoted the twenty-seventh chapter of the\r\nsecond volume of my chief work to a detailed consideration\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg259\"\u003e[259]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the mechanical instincts of animals, which may be used,\r\ntogether with the preceding one on Teleology, to complete\r\nthe whole examination of this subject in the present chapter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, if we enter more closely into the above-mentioned\r\nfitness of every animal\u0027s organisation for its mode of life\r\nand means of subsistence, the question that first presents\r\nitself is, whether that mode of life has been adapted to the\r\norganisation, or \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003evice versa\u003c/i\u003e. At first sight, the former assumption\r\nwould seem to be the more correct one; since,\r\nin Time, the organisation precedes the mode of life, and\r\nthe animal is thought to have adopted the mode of\r\nexistence for which its structure was best suited, making\r\nthe best use of the organs it found within itself: thus, for\r\ninstance, we think that the bird flies because it has wings,\r\nand that the ox butts because it has horns; not conversely.\r\nThis view is shared by Lucretius, (always an ominous sign\r\nfor an opinion):\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poetry-container\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003e\"Nil ideo quoniam natum est in corpore, ut uti\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003ePossemus; sed, quod natum est, id procreat usum.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_224\" title=\"This is expanded, vol. iv. pp. 825-843.\" id=\"FNanchor_224\"\u003e[224]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOnly this assumption does not explain how, collectively, the\r\nquite different parts of an animal\u0027s organism so exactly\r\ncorrespond to its way of life; how no organ interferes with\r\nanother, each rather assisting the others and none remaining\r\nunemployed; also that no subordinate organ\r\nwould be better suited to another mode of existence, while\r\nthe life which the animal really leads is determined by the\r\nprincipal organs alone, but, on the contrary, each part of\r\nthe animal not only corresponds to every other part, but\r\nalso to its mode of life: its claws, for instance, are invariably\r\nadapted for seizing the prey which its teeth are\r\nsuited to tear and break, and its intestinal canal to digest:\r\nits limbs are constructed to convey it where that prey is to\r\nbe found, and no organ ever remains unemployed. The\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg260\"\u003e[260]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nant-bear, for instance, is not only armed with long claws\r\non its fore-feet, in order to break into the nests of the\r\nwhite ant, but also with a prolonged cylindrical muzzle,\r\nin order to penetrate into them, with a small mouth and a\r\nlong, threadlike tongue, covered with a glutinous slime,\r\nwhich it inserts into the white ants\u0027 nests and then withdraws\r\ncovered with the insects that adhere to it: on the\r\nother hand it has no teeth, because it does not want them.\r\nWho can fail to see that the ant-bear\u0027s form stands in the\r\nsame relation to the white ants, as an act of the will to its\r\nmotive? The contradiction between the powerful fore-feet\r\nand long, strong, curved claws of the ant-bear and its complete\r\nlack of teeth, is at the same time so extraordinary,\r\nthat if the earth ever undergoes a fresh transformation,\r\nthe newly arising race of rational beings will find it an\r\ninsoluble enigma, if white ants are unknown to them.\r\nThe necks of birds, as of quadrupeds, are generally as\r\nlong as their legs, to enable them to reach down to the\r\nground where they pick up their food; but those of aquatic\r\nbirds are often a good deal longer, because they have to\r\nfetch up their nourishment from under the water while\r\nswimming.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_225\" title=\"I have seen (Zooplast. Cab. 1860) a humming-bird (colibri) with a beak as long as the whole bird, head and tail included. This bird must certainly have had to fetch out its food from a considerable depth, were it only from the calyx of a flower (Cuvier, \u0027Anat. Comp.\u0027 vol. iv. p. 374); otherwise it would not have given itself the luxury, or submitted to the encumbrance, of such a beak.\" id=\"FNanchor_225\"\u003e[225]\u003c/a\u003e Moor-fowl have exceedingly long legs, to\r\nenable them to wade without drowning or wetting their\r\nbodies, and a correspondingly long neck and beak, this last\r\nbeing more or less strong, according to the things (reptiles,\r\nfishes or worms) which have to be crushed; and the\r\nintestines of these animals are invariably adapted likewise\r\nto this end. On the other hand, moor-fowl are provided\r\nneither with talons, like birds of prey, nor with web-feet,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg261\"\u003e[261]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlike ducks: for the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003elex parsimoniæ naturæ\u003c/i\u003e admits of no\r\nsuperfluous organ. Now, it is precisely this very law,\r\nadded to the circumstance, that no organ required for its\r\nmode of life is ever wanting in any animal, and that\r\nall, even the most heterogeneous, harmonize together and\r\nare, as it were, calculated for a quite specially determined\r\nway of life, for the element in which the prey dwells, for\r\nthe pursuit, the overcoming, the crushing and digesting of\r\nthat prey,—all this, we say, proves, that the animal\u0027s\r\nstructure has been determined by the mode of life by\r\nwhich the animal desired to find its sustenance, and not\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003evice versa\u003c/i\u003e. It also proves, that the result is exactly the\r\nsame as if a knowledge of that mode of life and of its\r\noutward conditions had preceded the structure, and as if\r\ntherefore each animal had chosen its equipment before it\r\nassumed a body; just as a sportsman before starting\r\nchooses his whole equipment, gun, powder, shot, pouch,\r\nhunting-knife and dress, according to the game he intends\r\nchasing. The latter does not take aim at the wild boar\r\nbecause he happens to have a rifle: he took the rifle with\r\nhim and not a fowling-piece, because he intended to hunt\r\nthe wild boar; and the ox does not butt because it happens\r\nto have horns: it has horns because it intends to butt.\r\nNow, to render this proof complete, we have the additional\r\ncircumstance, that in many animals, during the time they\r\nare growing, the effort of the will to which a limb is\r\ndestined to minister, manifests itself before the existence\r\nof the limb itself, its employment thus anticipating its\r\nexistence. Young he-goats, rams, calves, for instance,\r\nbutt with their bare polls before they have any horns;\r\nthe young boar tries to gore on either side, before its\r\ntusks are fully developed which would respond to the\r\nintended effect, while on the other hand, it neglects to use\r\nthe smaller teeth it already has in its mouth and with\r\nwhich it might really bite. Thus its mode of defending\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg262\"\u003e[262]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nitself does not adapt itself to the existing weapons, but\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003evice versa\u003c/i\u003e. This had already been noticed by Galenus\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_226\" title=\"Galenus, \u0027De Usu Partium Anim.,\u0027 i. 1.\" id=\"FNanchor_226\"\u003e[226]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand by Lucretius\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_227\" title=\"Lucretius, v. pp. 1032-1039.\" id=\"FNanchor_227\"\u003e[227]\u003c/a\u003e before him. All these circumstances\r\ngive us complete certainty, that the will does not, as a\r\nsupplementary thing proceeding from the intellect, employ\r\nthose instruments which it may happen to find, or use the\r\nparts because just they and no others chance to be there;\r\nbut that what is primary and original, is the endeavour to\r\nlive in this particular way, to contend in this manner, an\r\nendeavour which manifests itself not only in the employment,\r\nbut even in the existence of the weapon: so much\r\nso indeed, that the use of the weapon frequently precedes\r\nits existence, thus denoting that it is the weapon which\r\narises out of the existence of the endeavour, not, conversely,\r\nthe desire to use it out of the existence of the\r\nweapon. Aristotle expressed this long ago, when he said,\r\nwith reference to insects armed with stings:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_228\" title=\"Aristot., \u0027De Part. Animal.,\u0027 iv. 6: \u0027They have a weapon because they have passion.\u0027 [Tr.]\" id=\"FNanchor_228\"\u003e[228]\u003c/a\u003e διὰ τὸ θυμὸν\r\nἔχειν ὅπλον ἔχει (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003equia iram habent, arma habent\u003c/i\u003e), and further\r\non, generally speaking:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_229\" title=\"Ibid. c. 12: \u0027Nature makes the tools for the work, not the work for the tools.\u0027 [Tr.]\" id=\"FNanchor_229\"\u003e[229]\u003c/a\u003e Τὰ δ\u0027 ὄργανα πρὸς τὸ ἔργον ἡ φύσις\r\nποιεῖ, ἀλλ\u0027 οὐ τὸ ἔργον πρὸς τὰ ὄργανα (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eNatura enim instrumenta\r\nad officium, non officium ad instrumenta accommodat\u003c/i\u003e).\r\nFrom which it follows, that the structure of each animal\r\nis adapted to its will.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis truth forces itself upon thoughtful zoologists and\r\nzootomists with such cogency, that unless their mind is at\r\nthe same time purified by a deeper philosophy, it may lead\r\nthem into strange errors. Now this actually happened to\r\na very eminent zoologist, the immortal De Lamarck, who\r\nhas acquired everlasting fame by his discovery of the classification\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg263\"\u003e[263]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof animals in \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003evertebrata\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003enon-vertebrata\u003c/i\u003e, so\r\nadmirable in depth of view. For he quite seriously maintains\r\nand tries to prove\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_230\" title=\"De Lamarck, \u0027Philosophie Zoologique,\u0027 vol. i. c. 7, and \u0027Histoire Naturelle des Animaux sans Vertèbres,\u0027 vol. i. Introd. pp. 180-212.\" id=\"FNanchor_230\"\u003e[230]\u003c/a\u003e at length, that the shape of each\r\nanimal species, the weapons peculiar to it, and its organs\r\nof every sort destined for outward use, were by no means\r\npresent at the origin of that species, but have on the\r\ncontrary \u003cem\u003ecome into being\u003c/em\u003e gradually \u003cem\u003ein the course of time\u003c/em\u003e\r\nand through continued generation, in consequence of the\r\nexertions of the animal\u0027s will, evoked by the nature\r\nof its position and surroundings, through its own repeated\r\nefforts and the habits to which these gave rise.\r\nAquatic birds and mammalia that swim, he says, have\r\nonly become web-footed through stretching their toes\r\nasunder in swimming; moor-fowl acquired their long legs\r\nand necks by wading; horned cattle only gradually acquired\r\nhorns because as they had no proper teeth for combating,\r\nthey fought with their heads, and this combative propensity\r\nin course of time produced horns or antlers; the snail\r\nwas originally, like other \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003emollusca\u003c/i\u003e, without feelers; but\r\nout of the desire to feel the objects lying before it, these\r\ngradually arose; the whole feline species acquired claws\r\nonly in course of time, from their desire to tear the flesh\r\nof their prey, and the moveable coverings of those claws,\r\nfrom the necessity of protecting them in walking without\r\nbeing prevented from using them when they wished; the\r\ngiraffe, in the barren, grassless African deserts, being reduced\r\nfor its food to the leaves of lofty trees, stretched\r\nout its neck and forelegs until at last it acquired its singular\r\nshape, with a height in front of twenty feet, and thus\r\nDe Lamarck goes on describing a multitude of animal\r\nspecies as arising according to the same principle, in doing\r\nwhich he overlooks the obvious objection which may be\r\nmade, that long before the organs necessary for its preservation\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg264\"\u003e[264]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncould have been produced by means of such endeavours\r\nas these through countless generations, the whole\r\nspecies must have died out from the want of them. To\r\nsuch a degree may we be blinded by a hypothesis which\r\nhas once laid hold of us! Nevertheless in this instance the\r\nhypothesis arose out of a very correct and profound view\r\nof Nature: it is an error of genius, which in spite of all\r\nthe absurdity it contains, still does honour to its originator.\r\nThe true part of it belongs to De Lamarck, as an investigator\r\nof Nature; he saw rightly that the primary element\r\nwhich has determined the animal\u0027s organisation, is the will\r\nof that animal itself. The false part must be laid to the\r\naccount of the backward state of Metaphysics in France,\r\nwhere the views of Locke and of his feeble follower, Condillac,\r\nin fact still hold their ground and therefore bodies\r\nare held to be things in themselves, Time and Space qualities\r\nof things in themselves; and where the great doctrine\r\nof the Ideal nature of Space and of Time and of all that\r\nis represented in them, which has been so extremely fertile\r\nin its results, has not yet penetrated. De Lamarck therefore\r\ncould not conceive his construction of living beings\r\notherwise than in Time, through succession. Errors of\r\nthis sort, as well as the gross, absurd, atomic theory of the\r\nFrench and the edifying physico-theological considerations\r\nof the English, have been banished for ever from Germany\r\nby Kant\u0027s profound influence. So salutary was the effect\r\nproduced by this great mind, even upon a nation capable of\r\nsubsequently forsaking him to run after charlatanism and\r\nempty bombast. But the thought could never enter into\r\nDe Lamarck\u0027s head, that the animal\u0027s will, as a thing in\r\nitself, might lie outside Time, and in this sense be prior to\r\nthe animal itself. Therefore he assumes the animal to\r\nhave first been without any clearly defined organs, but also\r\nwithout any clearly defined tendencies, and to have been\r\nequipped only with perception. Through this it learns to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg265\"\u003e[265]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nknow the circumstances in which it has to live and from\r\nthat knowledge arise its desires, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e its will, from which\r\nagain spring its organs or definite embodiment; this last\r\nindeed with the help of generation and therefore in boundless\r\nTime. If De Lamarck had had the courage to carry\r\nout his theory fully, he ought to have assumed a primary\r\nanimal\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_231\" title=\"Urthier.\" id=\"FNanchor_231\"\u003e[231]\u003c/a\u003e which, to be consistent, must have originally had\r\nneither shape nor organs, and then proceeded to transform\r\nitself according to climate and local conditions into\r\nmyriads of animal shapes of all sorts, from the gnat to\r\nthe elephant.—But this primary animal is in truth the\r\n\u003cem\u003ewill to live\u003c/em\u003e; as such however, it is metaphysical, not physical.\r\nMost certainly the shape and organisation of each\r\nanimal species has been determined by its own will according\r\nto the circumstances in which it wished to live; not\r\nhowever as a thing physical in Time, but on the contrary\r\nas a thing metaphysical outside Time. The will did not\r\nproceed from the intellect, nor did the intellect exist,\r\ntogether with the animal, before the will made its appearance\r\nas a mere accident, a secondary, or rather tertiary,\r\nthing. It is on the contrary the will which is the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprius\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthe thing in itself: its phenomenon (mere representation\r\nin the cognitive intellect and its forms of Space and Time)\r\nis the animal, fully equipped with all its organs which\r\nrepresent the will to live in those particular circumstances.\r\nAmong these organs is the intellect also—knowledge itself—which,\r\nlike the rest of those organs, is exactly adapted to\r\nthe mode of life of each animal; whereas, according to\r\nDe Lamarck, it is the will which arises out of knowledge.\r\nBehold the countless varieties of animal shapes; how entirely\r\nis each of them the mere image of its volition, the\r\nevident expression of the strivings of the will which constitute\r\nits character! Their difference in shape is only the\r\nportrait of their difference in character. Ferocious animals,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg266\"\u003e[266]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndestined for combat and rapine, appear armed with formidable\r\nteeth and claws and strong muscles; their sight\r\nis adapted for great distances, especially when they have\r\nto mark their prey from a dizzy height, as is the case with\r\neagles and condors. Timid animals, whose will it is to\r\nseek their safety in flight instead of contest, present themselves\r\nwith light, nimble legs and sharp hearing in lieu of\r\nall weapons; a circumstance which has even necessitated a\r\nstriking prolongation of the outer ear in the most timid of\r\nthem all, the hare. The interior corresponds to the exterior:\r\ncarnivorous animals have short intestines; herbivorous\r\nanimals long ones, suited to a protracted assimilation.\r\nVigorous respiration and rapid circulation of the blood,\r\nrepresented by appropriate organs, always accompany\r\ngreat muscular strength and irritability as their necessary\r\nconditions, and nowhere is contradiction possible. Each\r\nparticular striving of the will presents itself in a particular\r\nmodification of shape. The abode of the prey therefore\r\nhas determined the shape of its pursuer: if that prey takes\r\nrefuge in regions difficult of access, in remote hiding\r\nplaces, in night or darkness, the pursuer assumes the form\r\nbest suited to those circumstances, and no shape is rejected\r\nas too grotesque by the will to live, in order to attain its\r\nends. The cross-bill (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eloxia curvirostra\u003c/i\u003e) presents itself with\r\nthis abnormal form of its organ of nutrition, in order to\r\nbe able to extract the seeds out of the scales of the fir-cone.\r\nMoor-fowls appear equipped with extra long legs,\r\nextra long necks and extra long beaks, in short, the\r\nstrangest shapes, in order to seek out reptiles in their\r\nmarshes. Then we have the ant-bear with its body four\r\nfeet long, its short legs, its strong claws, and its long,\r\nnarrow, toothless muzzle provided with a threadlike, glutinous\r\ntongue for the purpose of digging out the white ants\r\nfrom their nests. The pelican goes fishing with a huge\r\npouch under its beak in which to pack its fish, when\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg267\"\u003e[267]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncaught. In order to surprise their prey while asleep in\r\nthe night, owls fly out provided with enormous pupils\r\nwhich enable them to see in the dark, and with very soft\r\nfeathers to make their flight noiseless and thus permit\r\nthem to fall unawares upon their sleeping prey without\r\nawakening it by their movements. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eSilurus\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003egymnotus\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003etorpedo\u003c/i\u003e bring a complete electric apparatus into the world\r\nwith them, in order to stun their prey before they can\r\nreach it; and also as a defence against \u003cem\u003etheir own\u003c/em\u003e pursuers.\r\nFor wherever anything living breathed, there immediately\r\ncame another to devour it,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_232\" title=\"Animated by the feeling of this truth, Robert Owen, after passing in review the numerous and often very large Australian fossile marsupialia–sometimes as big as the rhinoceros–came as early as 1842 to the conclusion, that a large beast of prey must have contemporaneously existed. This conclusion was afterwards confirmed, for in 1846 he received part of the fossile skull of a beast of prey of the size of the lion, which he named thylacoleo, i.e. lion with a pouch, since it is also a marsupial….\" id=\"FNanchor_232\"\u003e[232]\u003c/a\u003e and every animal is in a way\r\ndesigned and calculated throughout, down to the minutest\r\ndetail, for the purpose of destroying some other animal.\r\nIchneumons, for instance, among insects, lay their eggs in\r\nthe bodies of certain caterpillars and similar \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003elarvæ\u003c/i\u003e, in\r\nwhich they bore holes with their stings, in order to ensure\r\nnourishment for their future brood. Now those kinds which\r\nfeed on \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003elarvæ\u003c/i\u003e that crawl about freely, have short stings not\r\nmore than about one-third of an inch long, whereas \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003epimpla\r\nmanifestator\u003c/i\u003e, which feeds upon \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003echelostoma maxillosa\u003c/i\u003e, whose\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003elarvæ\u003c/i\u003e lie hidden in old trees at great depth and are not\r\naccessible to it, has a sting two inches long; and the sting\r\nof the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eichneumon strobillæ\u003c/i\u003e which lays its eggs in \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003elarvæ\u003c/i\u003e\r\ndwelling in fir-cones, is nearly as long. With these stings\r\nthey penetrate to the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003elarva\u003c/i\u003e in which they bore a hole\r\nand deposit one egg, whose product subsequently devours\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg268\"\u003e[268]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthis \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003elarva\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_233\" title=\"Kirby and Spence, \u0027Introduction to Entomology,\u0027 vol. i. p. 355. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_233\"\u003e[233]\u003c/a\u003e Just as clearly does the will to escape\r\ntheir enemies manifest itself in the defensive equipment\r\nof animals that are the objects of pursuit. Hedgehogs\r\nand porcupines raise up a forest of spears; armadillos,\r\nscaly ant-eaters and tortoises appear cased from head to\r\nfoot in armour which is inaccessible to tooth, beak or\r\nclaw; and so it is, on a smaller scale, with the whole class\r\nof \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecrustacea\u003c/i\u003e. Others again seek protection by deceiving\r\ntheir pursuers rather than by resisting them physically:\r\nthus the sepia has provided itself with materials for\r\nsurrounding itself with a dark cloud on the approach of\r\ndanger. The sloth is deceptively like its moss-clad bough,\r\nand the frog its leaf; and many insects resemble their\r\ndwelling-places. The negro\u0027s louse is black;\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_234\" title=\"Blumenbach, \u0027De hum. gen. variet. nat.\u0027 p. 50. Sömmering, \u0027On the Negro,\u0027 p. 8.\" id=\"FNanchor_234\"\u003e[234]\u003c/a\u003e so, to be\r\nsure, is our flea also; but the latter, in providing itself\r\nwith an extremely powerful apparatus for making irregular\r\njumps to a considerable distance, trusted to these for protection.—We\r\ncan however make the anticipation in all\r\nthese arrangements more intelligible to ourselves by the\r\nsame anticipation which shows itself in the mechanical\r\ninstincts of animals. Neither the young spider nor the\r\nant-lion know the prey for which they lay traps, when\r\nthey do it for the first time. And it is the same when\r\nthey are on the defensive. According to Latreille, the\r\ninsect \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ebombex\u003c/i\u003e kills the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eparnope\u003c/i\u003e with its sting, although it\r\nneither eats it nor is attacked by it, simply because the\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eparnope\u003c/i\u003e will lay its eggs in the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ebombex\u0027s\u003c/i\u003e nest, and by\r\ndoing this will interfere with the development of its eggs;\r\nyet it does not know this. Anticipations of this kind once\r\nmore confirm the ideal nature of Time, which indeed\r\nalways becomes manifest as soon as the will as thing\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg269\"\u003e[269]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin itself is in question. Not only with respect to the\r\npoints here mentioned, but to many others besides, the\r\nmechanical instincts and physiological functions of animals\r\nserve to explain each other mutually, because the will\r\nwithout knowledge is the agent in both.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs the will has equipped itself with every organ and\r\nevery weapon, offensive as well as defensive, so has it likewise\r\nprovided itself in every animal shape with an \u003cem\u003eintellect\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nas a means of preservation for the individual and the\r\nspecies. It was precisely in this account that the ancients\r\ncalled the intellect the ἡγεμονικόν, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e the guide and leader.\r\nAccordingly the intellect, being exclusively destined to\r\nserve the will, always exactly corresponds to it. Beasts\r\nof prey stood in greater need of intellect, and in fact\r\nhave more intelligence, than herbivorous animals. The\r\nelephant certainly forms an exception, and so does even\r\nthe horse to a certain extent; but the admirable intelligence\r\nof the elephant was necessary on account of the\r\nlength of its life (200 years) and of the scantiness of its\r\nprogeny, which obliged it to provide for a longer and surer\r\npreservation of the individual: and this moreover in countries\r\nteeming with the most rapacious, the strongest and\r\nthe nimblest beasts of prey. The horse too has a longer life\r\nand a scantier progeny than the ruminants, and as it has\r\nneither horns, tusks, trunk, nor indeed any weapon save\r\nperhaps its hoofs, it needed greater intelligence and swiftness\r\nin order to elude pursuit. Monkeys needed their extraordinary\r\nintelligence, partly because of the length of their\r\nlife, which even in the moderate-sized animal extends to\r\nfifty years; partly also because of their scanty progeny,\r\nwhich is limited to one at a time, but especially because of\r\ntheir \u003cem\u003ehands\u003c/em\u003e, which, to be properly used, required the direction\r\nof an understanding. For monkeys depend upon\r\ntheir hands, not only for their defence by means of outer\r\nweapons such as sticks and stones, but also for their\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg270\"\u003e[270]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnourishment, this last necessitating a variety of artificial\r\nmeans and a social and artificial system of rapine in general,\r\nthe passing from hand to hand of stolen fruit, the placing\r\nof sentinels, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c. Add to this, that it is especially in\r\ntheir youth, before they have attained their full muscular\r\ndevelopment, that this intelligence is most prominent. In\r\nthe \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003epongo\u003c/i\u003e or ourang-outang for instance, the brain plays\r\na far more important part and the understanding is much\r\ngreater during its youth than at its maturity, when the\r\nmuscular powers having attained full development, they\r\ntake the place of the proportionately declining intellect.\r\nThis holds good of all sorts of monkeys, so that here therefore\r\nthe intellect acts for a time vicariously for the yet undeveloped\r\nmuscular strength. We find this process discussed\r\nat length in the \"Résumé des Observations de Fr.\r\nCuvier sur l\u0027instinct et l\u0027intelligence des animaux,\" par\r\nFlourens (1841), from which I have quoted the whole passage\r\nreferring to this question in the second volume of my\r\nchief work, at the end of the thirty-first chapter, and this is\r\nmy only reason for not repeating it here. On the whole, intelligence\r\ngradually increases from the rodents\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_235\" title=\"That the lowest place should be given to the rodents, seems however to proceed from à priori rather than from à posteriori considerations: that is to say, from the circumstance, that their brain has extremely faint or small convolutions; so that too much weight may have been given to this point. In sheep and calves the convolutions are numerous and deep, yet how is it with their intelligence?…\" id=\"FNanchor_235\"\u003e[235]\u003c/a\u003e to the ruminants,\r\nfrom the ruminants to the pachyderms, and from\r\nthese again to the beasts of prey and finally to the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003equadrumana\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand anatomy shows a gradual development of the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg271\"\u003e[271]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbrain in similar order which corresponds to this result of\r\nexternal observation. (According to Flourens and Fr.\r\nCuvier.)\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_236\" title=\" The most intelligent birds are also birds of prey, wherefore many of them, especially falcons, are highly susceptible of training. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_236\"\u003e[236]\u003c/a\u003e Among the reptiles, serpents are the most intelligent,\r\nfor they may even be trained; this is so, because they\r\nare beasts of prey and propagate more slowly than the rest—especially\r\nthe venomous ones. And here also, as with the\r\nphysical weapons, we find the will everywhere as the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprius\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nits equipment, the intellect, as the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eposterius\u003c/i\u003e. Beasts of prey\r\ndo not hunt, nor do foxes thieve, because they have more\r\nintelligence; on the contrary, they have more intelligence,\r\njust as they have stronger teeth and claws too, because\r\nthey wished to live by hunting and thieving. The fox even\r\nmade up at once for his inferiority in muscular power and\r\nstrength of teeth by the extraordinary subtility of his understanding.\r\nOur thesis is singularly illustrated by the case\r\nof the bird \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003edodo\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003edronte\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003edidus ineptus\u003c/i\u003e) on the island\r\nof Mauritius, whose species, it is well known, has died out,\r\nand which, as its Latin name denotes, was exceedingly\r\nstupid, and this explains its disappearance; so that here\r\nit seems indeed as if Nature had for once gone too far\r\nin her \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003elex parsimoniæ\u003c/i\u003e and thereby in a sense brought\r\nforth an abortion in the species, as she so often does in the\r\nindividual, which was unable to subsist, precisely because\r\nit was an abortion. If, on this occasion, anyone were to\r\nraise the question as to whether Nature ought not to have\r\nprovided insects with at least sufficient intelligence to prevent\r\nthem from flying into the flame of a candle, our\r\nanswer would be: most certainly; only she did not know\r\nthat men would make candles and light them, and \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003enatura\r\nnihil agit frustra\u003c/i\u003e. Insect intelligence is therefore only insufficient\r\nwhere the surroundings are artificial.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_237\" title=\"That the negroes should have become the special victims of the slave-trade, is evidently a consequence of the inferiority of their intelligence compared with that of other human races; though this by no means justifies the fact. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_237\"\u003e[237]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg272\"\u003e[272]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nEverywhere indeed intelligence depends in the first instance\r\nupon the cerebral system, and this stands in a necessary\r\nrelation to the rest of the organism; therefore cold-blooded\r\nanimals are greatly inferior to warm-blooded ones,\r\nand invertebrate animals to \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003evertebrata\u003c/i\u003e. But the organism is\r\nprecisely nothing but the will become visible, to which, as\r\nthat which is absolutely \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprius\u003c/i\u003e, everything constantly refers.\r\nThe needs and aims of that will give in each phenomenon\r\nthe rule for the means to be employed, and these means\r\nmust harmonize with one another. Plants have no self-consciousness\r\nbecause they have no power of locomotion;\r\nfor of what use would self-consciousness be to them unless\r\nit enabled them to seek what was salutary and flee what\r\nwas noxious to them? And conversely, of what use could\r\npower of locomotion be to them, as they have no self-consciousness\r\nwith which to guide it. The inseparable duality\r\nof Sensibility and Irritability does not yet appear therefore\r\nin the plant; they continue slumbering in the reproductive\r\nforce which is their fundament, and in which alone\r\nthe will here objectifies itself. The sun-flower, and every\r\nother plant, wills for light; but as yet their movement towards\r\nlight is not separate from their apprehension of it,\r\nand both coincide with their growth.—Human understanding,\r\nwhich is so superior to that of all other beings, and is\r\nassisted by Reason (the faculty for non-perceptible representations,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e for conceptions; reflection, thinking faculty),\r\nis nevertheless only just proportionate, partly to Man\u0027s\r\nrequirements, which greatly surpass those of animals and\r\nmultiply to infinity; partly to his entire lack of all natural\r\nweapons and covering, and to his relatively weaker muscular\r\nstrength, which is greatly inferior to that of monkeys\r\nof his own size;\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_238\" title=\"As is likewise his capacity for escaping from his pursuers; for in this respect all the four-footed mammalia surpass him. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_238\"\u003e[238]\u003c/a\u003e lastly also, to the slowness with which his\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg273\"\u003e[273]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nrace multiplies and the length of his childhood and life,\r\nwhich demand secure preservation of the individual. All\r\nthese great requirements had to be satisfied by means of\r\nintellectual powers, which, for this reason, predominate in\r\nhim. But we find the intellect secondary and subordinate\r\neverywhere, and destined exclusively to serve the purposes\r\nof the will. As a rule too, it always remains true to its\r\ndestiny and subservient to the will. How nevertheless,\r\nit frees itself in particular instances from this bondage\r\nthrough an abnormal preponderance of cerebral life, whereby\r\npurely objective cognition becomes possible which may be\r\nenhanced to genius, I have shown at length in the æsthetic\r\npart of my chief work.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_239\" title=\"[See Third Book of the W. a. W. u. V.; later also, in my \u0027Parerga,\u0027 vol. ii. §§ 50-57 and § 206. (§§ 51-58, and § 210 of the 2nd edition.)]\" id=\"FNanchor_239\"\u003e[239]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, after all these reflections upon the precise agreement\r\nbetween the will and the organisation of each animal,\r\nif we inspect a well-arranged osteological collection from\r\nthis point of view, it will certainly seem to us as if we\r\nsaw one and the same being (De Lamarck\u0027s primary\r\nanimal, or, more properly, \u003cem\u003ethe will to live\u003c/em\u003e) changing its\r\nshape according to circumstances, and thus producing all\r\nthis multiplicity of forms out of the same number and\r\narrangement of its bones, by prolonging and curtailing,\r\nstrengthening and weakening them. This number and\r\narrangement of the bones, which Geoffroy de St. Hilaire\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_240\" title=\"\u0027Principes de Philosophie Zoologique,\u0027 1830.\" id=\"FNanchor_240\"\u003e[240]\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncalled the anatomical element, continues, as he has thoroughly\r\nshown, in all essential points unchanged: it\r\nis a constant magnitude, something which is absolutely\r\ngiven beforehand, irrevocably fixed by an unfathomable\r\nnecessity—an immutability which I should compare with\r\nthe permanence of matter in all physical and chemical\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg274\"\u003e[274]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nchanges: but to this I shall soon return. Conjointly with\r\nthis immutability of the anatomical element, we have the\r\ngreatest susceptibility to modification, the greatest plasticity\r\nand flexibility of these same bones with reference\r\nto size, shape and adaptation to different purposes, all\r\nwhich we see determined by the will with primary\r\nstrength and freedom according to the aims prescribed\r\nto it by external circumstances: it makes out of these\r\nmaterials whatever its necessity for the time being requires.\r\nIf it desires to climb about in trees, it catches at the\r\nboughs at once with four hands, while it stretches the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eulva\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eradius\u003c/i\u003e to an excessive length and immediately prolongs\r\nthe \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eos coccygis\u003c/i\u003e to a curly tail, a yard long, in order to hang\r\nby it to the boughs and swing itself from one branch to\r\nanother. If, on the other hand, it desires to crawl in the\r\nmud as a crocodile, to swim as a seal, or to burrow as a\r\nmole, these same arm-bones are shortened till they are no\r\nlonger recognisable; in the last case the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003emetacarpus\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ephalanges\u003c/i\u003e are enlarged to disproportionately large shovel-paws,\r\nto the prejudice of the other bones. But if it wishes\r\nto fly through the air as a bat, not only are the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eos humeri\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eradius\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ealnus\u003c/i\u003e prolonged in an incredible manner, but\r\nthe usually small and subordinate \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecarpus\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003emetacarpus\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ephalanges digitorum\u003c/i\u003e expand to an immense length, as in\r\nSt. Anthony\u0027s vision, outmeasuring the length of the\r\nanimal\u0027s body, in order to spread out the wing-membrane.\r\nIf, in order to browse upon the tops of very tall African\r\ntrees, it has, as a giraffe, placed itself upon extraordinarily\r\nhigh fore-legs, the same seven \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003evertebræ\u003c/i\u003e of the neck, which\r\nnever vary as to number and which, in the mole, were contracted\r\nso as to be no longer recognisable, are now prolonged\r\nto such a degree, that here, as everywhere else, the\r\nneck acquires the same length as the fore-legs, in order to\r\nenable the head to reach down to drinking-water. But where,\r\nas is the case when it appears as the elephant, a long neck\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg275\"\u003e[275]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncould not have borne the weight of the enormous, unwieldy\r\nhead—a weight increased moreover by tusks a yard long—the\r\nneck remains short, as an exception, and a trunk\r\nis let down as an expedient, to lift up food and draw\r\nwater from below and also to reach up to the tops of\r\ntrees. In accordance with these transformations, we see\r\nin all of them the skull, the receptacle containing the\r\nunderstanding, at the same time proportionately expand,\r\ndevelop, curve itself, as the mode of procuring nourishment\r\nbecomes more or less difficult and requires more\r\nor less intelligence; and the different degrees of the understanding\r\nmanifest themselves clearly to the practised eye\r\nin the curves of the skull.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, in all this, that \u003cem\u003eanatomical element\u003c/em\u003e we have mentioned\r\nabove as fixed and invariable, certainly remains in\r\nso far an enigma, as it does not come within the teleological\r\nexplanation, which only begins after the assumption\r\nof that element; since the intended organ might\r\nin many cases have been rendered equally suitable for its\r\npurpose even with a different number and disposition of\r\nbones. It is easy to understand, for instance, why the\r\nhuman skull should be formed out of eight bones: that\r\nis, to enable them to be drawn together by the fontanels\r\nduring birth; but we do not see why a chicken which\r\nbreaks through its egg-shell should necessarily have the\r\nsame number of skull-bones. We must therefore assume\r\nthis anatomical element to be based, partly on the unity\r\nand identity of the will to live in general, partly on the\r\ncircumstance, that the archetypal forms of animals have\r\nproceeded one from the other,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_241\" title=\"\u0027Parerga,\u0027 vol. ii. § 91; § 93 of the 2nd edition.\" id=\"FNanchor_241\"\u003e[241]\u003c/a\u003e wherefore the fundamental\r\ntype of the whole race was preserved. It is this anatomical\r\nelement which Aristotle means by his ἀναγκαία\r\nφύσις, and the mutability of its shapes according to different\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg276\"\u003e[276]\u003c/span\u003e\r\npurposes he calls τὴν κατὰ λόγον φύσιν,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_242\" title=\"See Aristotle, \u0027De Partibus Animalium,\u0027 iii. c. 2 sub finem: πῶς δὲ τῆς αναγκαίας φύσεως κ. τ. λ.\" id=\"FNanchor_242\"\u003e[242]\u003c/a\u003e and explains\r\nby it how the material for upper incisors has been employed\r\nfor horns in horned cattle. Quite rightly: since the only\r\nruminants which have no horns, the camel and the musk-ox,\r\nhave upper incisors, and these are wanting in all\r\nhorned ruminants.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo other explanation or assumption enables us nearly as\r\nwell to understand either the complete suitableness to\r\npurpose and to the external conditions of existence I have\r\nhere shown in the skeleton, or the admirable harmony and\r\nfitness of internal mechanism in the structure of each\r\nanimal, as the truth I have elsewhere firmly established:\r\nthat the body of an animal is precisely nothing but the \u003cem\u003ewill\r\nitself\u003c/em\u003e of that animal brought to cerebral perception as\r\nrepresentation—through the forms of Space, Time and\r\nCausality—in other words, the mere visibility, objectivity\r\nof Will. For, if this is once pre-supposed, everything\r\nin and belonging to that body must conspire towards the\r\nfinal end: the life of this animal. Nothing superfluous,\r\nnothing deficient, nothing inappropriate, nothing insufficient\r\nor incomplete of its kind, can therefore be found in\r\nit; on the contrary, all that is required must be there,\r\nand just in the proportion needed, never more. For\r\nhere artist, work and materials are one and the same.\r\nEach organism is therefore a consummate master-piece of\r\nexceeding perfection. Here the will did not first cherish\r\nthe intention, first recognise the end and then adapt the\r\nmeans to it and conquer the material; its willing was\r\nrather immediately the aim and immediately the attainment\r\nof that aim; no foreign appliances needing to be\r\novercome were wanted—willing, doing and attaining were\r\nhere one and the same. Thus the organism presents itself\r\nas a miracle which admits of no comparison with any work\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg277\"\u003e[277]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof human artifice wrought by the lamplight of knowledge.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_243\" title=\"The appearance of every animal therefore presents a totality, a unity, a perfection and a rigidly carried out harmony in all its parts which is so entirely based upon a single fundamental thought, that even the strangest animal shape seems to the attentive observer as if it were the only right, nay, only possible form of existence, and as if there could be no other than just this very one….\" id=\"FNanchor_243\"\u003e[243]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur admiration for the consummate perfection and fitness\r\nfor their ends in all the works of Nature, is at the\r\nbottom based upon our viewing them in the same light as\r\nwe do our own works. In these, in the first place, the will\r\nto do the work and the work are two different things;\r\nthen again two other things lie between these two: firstly,\r\nthe medium of representation, which, taken by itself, is\r\nforeign to the will, through which the will must pass\r\nbefore it realizes itself here; and secondly the material\r\nforeign to the will here at work, on which a form foreign\r\nto it has to be forced, which it resists, because the\r\nmaterial already belongs to another will, that is to say,\r\nto its own nature, its \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eforma substantialis\u003c/i\u003e, the (Platonic)\r\nidea, expressed by it: therefore this material has first\r\nto be overcome, and however deeply the artificial form\r\nmay have penetrated, will always continue inwardly resisting.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg278\"\u003e[278]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIt is quite a different thing with Nature\u0027s works,\r\nwhich are not, like our own, indirect, but on the contrary,\r\ndirect manifestations of the will. Here the will acts in its\r\nprimordial nature, that is, unconsciously. No mediating\r\nrepresentation here separates the will and the work: they\r\nare one. And even the material is one with them: for\r\nmatter is the mere visibility of the will. Therefore here\r\nwe find Matter completely permeated by Form; or, better\r\nstill, they are of quite the same origin, only existing\r\nmutually one for the other; and in so far they are\r\none. That we separate them in works of Nature as\r\nwell as in works of Art, is a mere abstraction. Pure\r\nMatter, absolutely without Form or quality, which we\r\nthink as the material of a product of Nature, is merely\r\nan \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eens rationis\u003c/i\u003e and cannot enter into any experience:\r\nwhereas the material of a work of Art is empirical\r\nMatter, consequently already has a Form. The [distinctive]\r\ncharacter of Nature\u0027s products is the identity of form\r\nand substance; that of products of Art the diversity of\r\nthese two.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_244\" title=\"It is a great truth which Bruno expresses (\u0027De Immenso et Innumerabili,\u0027 8, 10): \u0027Ars tractat materiam alienam: natura materiam propriam. Ars circa materiam est; natura interior materiæ.\u0027 He treats this subject much more fully, \u0027Della Causa,\u0027 Dial. 3, p. 252 et seqq. Page 255 he declares the forma substantialis to be the form of every product of Nature, which is the same as the soul. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_244\"\u003e[244]\u003c/a\u003e It is because Matter is the mere visibility of\r\nForm in Nature\u0027s products, that, even empirically, we see\r\nForm appear as a mere production of Matter, bursting\r\nforth from its inside in crystallisation, in vegetable and\r\nanimal \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003egeneratio æquivoca\u003c/i\u003e, which last cannot be doubted,\r\nat any rate in the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eepizoa\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_245\" title=\"Thus the saying of the Schoolmen is verified: \u0027Materia appetit formam.\u0027 See \u0027Die Welt a. W. u. V.\u0027 3rd edition, vol. ii. p. 352. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_245\"\u003e[245]\u003c/a\u003e—For this reason we may even\r\nassume that nowhere, either on any planet or satellite, will\r\nMatter come to a state of endless repose, but rather that\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg279\"\u003e[279]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nits inherent forces (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e the will, whose mere visibility it\r\nis) will always put an end again to the repose which has\r\ncommenced, always awaking again from their sleep, to\r\nresume their activity as mechanical, physical, chemical,\r\norganic forces; since at all times they only wait for the\r\nopportunity to do so.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut if we want to understand Nature\u0027s proceeding, we\r\nmust not try to do it by comparing her works with our\r\nown. The real essence of every animal form, is an act of\r\nthe will outside representation, consequently outside its\r\nforms of Space and Time also; which act, just on that\r\naccount, knows neither sequence nor juxtaposition, but has,\r\non the contrary, the most indivisible unity. But when our\r\ncerebral perception comprehends that form, and still more\r\nwhen its inside is dissected by the anatomical knife, then\r\nthat which originally and in itself was foreign to knowledge\r\nand its laws, is brought under the light of knowledge;\r\nbut then also, it has to present itself in conformity\r\nwith the laws and forms of knowledge. The original unity\r\nand indivisibility of that act of the will, of that truly\r\nmetaphysical being, then appears divided into parts lying\r\nside by side and functions following one upon another,\r\nwhich all nevertheless present themselves as connected together\r\nin closest relationship one to another for mutual\r\nhelp and support, as means and ends one to the other.\r\nThe understanding, in thus apprehending these things, now\r\nperceives the original unity re-establishing itself out of a multiplicity\r\nwhich its own form of knowledge had first brought\r\nabout, and involuntarily taking for granted that its own\r\nway of perceiving this is the way in which this animal form\r\ncomes into being, it is now struck with admiration for the\r\nprofound wisdom with which those parts are arranged,\r\nthose functions combined. This is the meaning of Kant\u0027s\r\ngreat doctrine, that Teleology is brought into Nature by\r\nour own understanding, which accordingly wonders at a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg280\"\u003e[280]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmiracle of its own creation.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_246\" title=\"Compare \u0027Die Welt a. W. u. V.\u0027 3rd edition, vol. II. p. 375. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_246\"\u003e[246]\u003c/a\u003e If I may use a trivial simile\r\nto elucidate so sublime a matter, this astonishment very\r\nmuch resembles that of our understanding when it discovers\r\nthat all multiples of 9, when their single figures are added\r\ntogether, give as their product either the number 9 or one\r\nwhose single figures again make 9; yet it is that very\r\nunderstanding itself which has prepared for itself this surprise\r\nin the decimal system. According to the Physico-theological\r\nargument, the actual existence of the world has\r\nbeen preceded by its existence in an intellect: if the world\r\nis designed for an end, it must have existed as representation\r\nbefore it came into being. Now I say, on the contrary,\r\nin Kant\u0027s sense: if the world is to be representation,\r\nit must present itself as designed for an end; and this\r\nonly takes place in an intellect.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt undoubtedly follows from my doctrine, that every\r\nbeing is its own work. Nature, which is incapable of falsehood\r\nand is as \u003cem\u003enaïve\u003c/em\u003e as genius, asserts the same thing downright;\r\nsince each being merely kindles the spark of life at\r\nanother exactly similar being, and then makes itself before\r\nour eyes, taking the materials for this from outside, form\r\nand movement from its own self: this process we call\r\ngrowth and development. Thus, even empirically, each\r\nbeing stands before us as its own work. But Nature\u0027s\r\nlanguage is not understood because it is too simple.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg281\"\u003e[281]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003ePHYSIOLOGY OF PLANTS.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe corroborations I am now about to bring forward\r\nof the phenomenon of the will in plants, proceed\r\nchiefly from French sources, from a nation whose tendencies\r\nare decidedly empirical and which is reluctant to\r\ngo a step beyond what is immediately given. The informant\r\nmoreover is Cuvier, whose rigid adherence to the\r\npurely empirical gave rise to the famous dispute between\r\nhim and Geoffroy de St. Hilaire. So we must not be astonished\r\nif the language we meet with here is less decided\r\nthan in the preceding German corroborations and if we find\r\neach concession made with cautious reserve.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn his \"Histoire des Progrès des Sciences Naturelles\r\ndepuis 1789 jusqu\u0027á ce jour,\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_247\" title=\"Vol. i. p. 245. 1826.\" id=\"FNanchor_247\"\u003e[247]\u003c/a\u003e Cuvier says: \"Plants have\r\ncertain apparently spontaneous movements, which they\r\nshow under certain circumstances and which at times so\r\nclosely resemble those of animals, that a sort of feeling\r\nand \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e might almost be attributed to plants on this\r\naccount, especially by those who think they can perceive\r\nsomething of the same kind in the movements of the\r\n\u003cem\u003einward\u003c/em\u003e parts of animals. Thus the tops of trees always\r\nhave a vertical tendency, excepting when they incline\r\ntowards the light. Their roots seek out good earth\r\nand moisture and, in order to attain these, deviate from\r\nthe straight course. Yet these different tendencies cannot\r\nbe explained by the influence of external causes,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg282\"\u003e[282]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nunless we also assume the existence of an inner natural\r\ndisposition, susceptible of being roused, which differs from\r\nthe mere mechanical force in inorganic bodies….\r\nDecandolle made some remarkable experiments that proved\r\nto him the existence of a sort of habit in plants which\r\nmay be overcome by artificial light, but only after a certain\r\ntime. Plants that had been shut up in a cellar which was\r\ncontinually lit by lamps, did not on this account leave off\r\nclosing in the evening and opening again in the morning\r\nfor several days. And there are other habits besides which\r\nplants are able to adopt and to abandon. Flowers that\r\nhabitually close in wet weather, finish by remaining open\r\nif the wet weather lasts too long. When M. Desfontaines\r\ntook a sensitive plant with him in his carriage, the jolting\r\nmovement at first caused it to contract, but at last it expanded\r\nagain as when in complete repose. Therefore\r\neven in these cases, light, moisture, \u0026amp;c., \u0026amp;c., only act in\r\nvirtue of an inner disposition, which may be neutralized or\r\nmodified by the continuation of that very activity itself;\r\nand the vital energy of plants, like that of animals, is subject\r\nto fatigue and exhaustion. The \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ehedysarum gyrans\u003c/i\u003e is\r\nsingularly characterized by the movements of its leaves\r\nwhich continue day and night without needing any sort of\r\nstimulus. Surely, if any phenomenon can cause illusion\r\nand remind us of the voluntary movements of animals, it\r\nis this. Broussonet, Silvestre, Cels and Halle have fully\r\ndescribed it, and have shown that the plant\u0027s action depends\r\nentirely upon its own healthy condition.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgain, in the third volume of the same work, p. 166\r\n(1828), Cuvier says: \"M. Dutrochet adds some physiological\r\nconsiderations to which his own experiments had led\r\nhim, and which in his opinion prove that the movements of\r\nplants are \u003cem\u003espontaneous\u003c/em\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e that they depend upon an inner\r\nprinciple which immediately receives the influence of outer\r\nagencies. As he is however reluctant to admit that plants\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg283\"\u003e[283]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhave feeling, he makes use of the word \u0027\u003cem\u003enervimotilité\u003c/em\u003e.\u0027\"—Here\r\nI must observe, that when we come to examine it\r\nclosely, what we think to ourselves in the conception of\r\n\u003cem\u003espontaneity\u003c/em\u003e, is in the end always the same thing as manifestation\r\nof will, with which spontaneity would therefore be\r\nsimply synonymous. The only difference between them\r\nconsists in the conception of spontaneity being derived from\r\nouter perception, while that of manifestation of will is\r\ndrawn from our own consciousness.—I find a remarkable\r\ninstance of the impetuous violence of this spontaneity, even\r\nin plants, in the following communication contained in the\r\n\"Cheltenham Examiner:\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_248\" title=\"Repeated in the \u0027Times\u0027 of June 2nd, 1841.\" id=\"FNanchor_248\"\u003e[248]\u003c/a\u003e \"Last Thursday four enormous\r\nmushrooms performed a heroic feat of a new kind, in\r\none of our most crowded streets, by lifting up a huge block\r\nof stone in their strenuous effort to make their way into\r\nthe visible world.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the \"Mém. de l\u0027Acad. d. Sciences de l\u0027année\" (1821),\r\nCuvier says\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_249\" title=\"Vol. v. p. 171. Paris, 1826.\" id=\"FNanchor_249\"\u003e[249]\u003c/a\u003e:—\"For centuries botanists have been searching\r\nfor the reason why in a seed which is germinating the\r\nroot invariably grows downwards, while the stalk as\r\ninvariably grows upwards, no matter what be the position\r\nin which the seed is placed. M. Dutrochet put some\r\nseeds into holes bored in the bottom of a vessel filled\r\nwith damp mould, which he hung up to a beam in his\r\nroom. Now, in this case, the stem might have been\r\nexpected to grow downwards. Not at all: the roots found\r\ntheir way to the air below, and the stems were prolonged\r\nso as to traverse the damp mould until they reached its\r\nupper surface. According to M. Dutrochet, the direction\r\nin which plants grow, is determined by an inner principle\r\nand not at all by the attraction of the bodies towards\r\nwhich they direct themselves. A mistletoe seed that was\r\nfastened to the point of a perfectly moveable needle fixed\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg284\"\u003e[284]\u003c/span\u003e\r\non a peg, with a small plank placed near it, was induced\r\nto germinate. It soon began to send out shoots towards\r\nthe plank, which it reached in five days without having\r\ncommunicated the slightest movement to the needle. The\r\nstems of onions and leeks with their bulbs, deposited in\r\ndark places, grow upwards, although more slowly than in\r\nlight ones; they grow upwards even if placed in water: a\r\nfact which suffices to prove that neither light nor moisture\r\ndetermines the direction of their growth.\"—Still C. H.\r\nSchultz asserts\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_250\" title=\"C. H. Schultz, \u0027Sur la Circulation dans les Plantes,\u0027 a prize-essay, 1839.\" id=\"FNanchor_250\"\u003e[250]\u003c/a\u003e that he made seeds germinate in a dark\r\nbox with holes bored in the bottom, and succeeded in\r\ninducing the plants to grow upside down, by means of\r\na mirror fastened to the box, which reflected the sunlight.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the \"Dictionnaire des Sciences Naturelles\" (article\r\n\u003cem\u003eAnimal\u003c/em\u003e) we find: \"If, on the one hand, animals show\r\navidity in their search after nourishment as well as power\r\nof discrimination in the selection of it, roots of plants may,\r\non the other hand, be observed to direct themselves\r\ntowards the side where the soil contains most nourishment,\r\nnay, even to seek out the smallest crevices in rocks\r\nwhich may contain any food. If we twist a bough so as\r\nto make the upper surface of its leaves the under one,\r\nthese leaves even will twist their stems in order to regain\r\nthe position best suited for the exercise of their functions\r\n(\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e so as to have the smooth side uppermost). Is it quite\r\ncertain that this takes place unconsciously?\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eF. J. Meyen has devoted a chapter, entitled \"Of the\r\nmovements and sensations of plants,\" to a full investigation\r\nof the subject now before us. In this he says\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_251\" title=\"F. J. Meyen, \u0027Neues System der Pflanzenphysiologe\u0027 (1839), vol. iii. p. 585.\" id=\"FNanchor_251\"\u003e[251]\u003c/a\u003e:\r\n\"Not unfrequently potatoes, stored in deep, dark cellars,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg285\"\u003e[285]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmay be observed towards summer to shoot forth stems\r\nwhich invariably grow in the direction of the chinks\r\nthrough which the light comes into the cellar, and to continue\r\nthus growing until they at last reach the aperture\r\nwhich receives the light directly. In such cases potato-stalks\r\nhave been known to reach a length of twenty feet;\r\nwhereas under ordinary circumstances, even such as are\r\nmost favourable to the growth of the potato, the stalk is\r\nseldom longer than from three to four feet. It is interesting\r\nto watch closely the course taken by a potato-stalk\r\nthus growing in darkness, in its endeavours to reach\r\nthe light. It tries to do so by the shortest road, but not\r\nbeing firm enough to grow straight across through the air\r\nwithout support, it lets itself drop on to the floor, and\r\nthus creeps along the ground till it reaches the nearest\r\nwall, up which it then climbs.\" Even this botanist too is\r\nled by his facts to the following assertion (p. 576): \"On\r\nobserving the freedom of movement of \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eoscillatoria\u003c/i\u003e and\r\nother inferior plants, we may perhaps have no alternative\r\nbut to attribute a species of \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e to these beings.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCreepers bear distinct evidence as to manifestation of\r\nwill in plants; for, when they find no support near\r\nenough for their tendrils to cling to, they invariably direct\r\ntheir growth towards the shadiest place, or even towards a\r\npiece of dark-coloured paper, wherever it may be placed;\r\nwhereas they avoid glass, on account of its glitter. In the\r\n\"Philosophical Transactions\" of 1812, Th. Andrew Knight\r\nrelates some very pleasing experiments on this subject\r\n(especially with \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eampelopsis quinquefolia\u003c/i\u003e,)\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_252\" title=\"These have been translated for the \u0027Bibliothèque Britannique, Section des Sciences et Arts,\u0027 vol. lii.\" id=\"FNanchor_252\"\u003e[252]\u003c/a\u003e although he\r\nstrives hard to explain the matter mechanically, and will\r\nnot admit that it is a manifestation of will. I appeal to his\r\nexperiments, not to the conclusions he draws from them.\r\nA good test might be, to plant several free creepers in a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg286\"\u003e[286]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncircle round a tree-trunk and to observe whether they all\r\ncrept towards the trunk centripetally. On the 6th Nov.\r\n1843, Dutrochet read a treatise on this subject in the\r\n\"Acad. de Sciences\" called \"Sur les Mouvements Révolutifs\r\nspontanés chez les Végétaux,\" which, notwithstanding its\r\ngreat length, is well worth reading, and is published\r\namong the \"Comptes rendus des Séances de l\u0027Académie\r\ndes Sciences\" for Nov. 1843. The result is, that in \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003episum\r\nsativum\u003c/i\u003e (green pea), in \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ebryonia alba\u003c/i\u003e (wild bryony) and in\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecucumis sativus\u003c/i\u003e (cucumber) the stems of those leaves\r\nwhich bear the tendrils, describe a very slow circular\r\nmovement in the air, the time in which they complete an\r\nellipsis varying from one to three hours according to temperature.\r\nBy this movement they seek at random for\r\nsolid bodies round which, when found, they twine their\r\ntendrils; these then support the plant, it being unable to\r\nstand by itself without help. That is, they do the same\r\nthing as the eyeless caterpillar, which when seeking a leaf\r\ndescribes circles in the air with the upper part of its body.\r\nDutrochet contributes a good deal of information too concerning\r\nother movements in plants in this treatise: for\r\ninstance, that \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003estylidium graminifolium\u003c/i\u003e in New Holland,\r\nhas a column in the middle of its \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecorolla\u003c/i\u003e which bears the\r\nanthers and \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003estigma\u003c/i\u003e and alternately folds up and unfolds\r\nagain. What Treviranus adduces is to the same effect:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_253\" title=\"Treviranus, \u0027Die Erscheinungen und Gesetze des Organischen Lebens\u0027 (Phenomena and Laws of Organic Life), vol. i. p. 173.\" id=\"FNanchor_253\"\u003e[253]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cins title=\"In\" id=\"C286\"\u003e\"In\u003c/ins\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eparnassia palustris\u003c/i\u003e and in \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eruta graveolens\u003c/i\u003e, the stamina\r\nincline one after the other, in \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003esaxifraga tridactylites\u003c/i\u003e in\r\npairs, towards the stigma, and erect themselves again in\r\nthe same order.\"—Shortly before however, we read in\r\nTreviranus with reference to this subject: \"Of all apparently\r\nvoluntary movements of plants, the direction of\r\ntheir boughs and of the upper surface of their leaves\r\ntowards the light and towards moist heat, and the twining\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg287\"\u003e[287]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmovements of creepers round their supports, are the most\r\nuniversal. In this last phenomenon especially there is\r\nsomething which resembles animal movements. While\r\ngrowing, creepers, it is true, if left to themselves, describe\r\ncircles with their tips and by this means reach an object\r\nnear at hand. But it is no merely mechanical cause that\r\ninduces them to adapt their growth to the form of the\r\nobject they have thus reached. The \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecuscuta\u003c/i\u003e does not\r\ntwine round every kind of support: for instance, limbs of\r\nanimals, dead vegetable matter, metals and inorganic substances\r\nare not used for this purpose, but only living\r\nplants, and not even all kinds—not mosses, for instance—only\r\nthose from which it can extract nourishment by its\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003epapillæ\u003c/i\u003e; and these attract it from a considerable distance.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_254\" title=\"Brandis, \u0027On Life and Polarity,\u0027 1836, p. 88, says: \u0027The roots of rock-plants seek nourishing mould in the most delicate crevices of rocks. These roots cling to a nourishing bone in dense clusters. I saw a root whose growth was intercepted by the sole of an old shoe: it divided itself into as many fibres as the shoe-sole had holes–those by which it had been stitched together–but as soon as these fibres had overcome the obstruction and grown through the holes, they united again to a common stem.\u0027 …\" id=\"FNanchor_254\"\u003e[254]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe following special observation, communicated to the\r\n\"Farmer\u0027s Magazine,\" and reproduced by the \"Times\"\r\n(13th July 1848) under the title \"Vegetable Instinct,\" is\r\nhowever still more to the point: \"If a basin of water be\r\nplaced within six inches of a young pumpkin-stalk, or of a\r\nstem of the large garden pea, no matter on what side, the\r\nstalk will approach the basin during the night and it will be\r\nfound next morning with one of its leaves floating on the\r\nwater. This experiment may be renewed every night till\r\nthe plant begins to fructify.—Even if its position be\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg288\"\u003e[288]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nchanged every day, a stick fixed upright within six inches\r\nof a young convolvulus is sure to be found by the plant.\r\nIf, after having wound itself for a certain distance round\r\nthe stick, it is unwound and wound round again in the\r\nopposite direction, it will return to its original position\r\nor lose its life in the endeavour to do so. Nevertheless,\r\nif two such plants grow close to one another without\r\nhaving any stick near enough for them to cling to it,\r\none of them will change the direction of its winding and\r\nthey will twine round each other. Duhamel placed some\r\nItalian beans in a cylinder filled with moist earth; after a\r\nlittle while they began to germinate and naturally sent\r\ntheir \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eplumula\u003c/i\u003e upwards in the direction of the light and\r\ntheir \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eradicula\u003c/i\u003e downwards into the mould. After a few\r\ndays the cylinder was turned round to the extent of a\r\nquarter of its circumference and the same process was\r\nrepeated until it had been turned completely round. The\r\nbeans were then removed from the earth, when it was\r\nfound that both \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eplumula\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eradicula\u003c/i\u003e had twisted at\r\neach turn that had been given, in order to adapt themselves\r\nto it, the one endeavouring to rise perpendicularly,\r\nthe other to descend, so that they had formed a complete\r\nspiral. Yet, notwithstanding this natural tendency to\r\ndescend, when the soil below is too dry, roots will grow\r\nupwards in order to reach any moist substance which may\r\nbe lying higher than themselves.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn Froriep\u0027s \"Memoranda\" for 1833 (No. 832) there is\r\na short article upon the locomotivity of plants: in poor\r\nsoil, where good mould lies near at hand, many plants will\r\nsend out a shoot into the good mould; after a time the\r\noriginal plant then withers, but the offshoot prospers and\r\nitself becomes the plant. By means of this process, a\r\nplant has been known to climb down from a wall.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the same periodical (1835, No. 981) is to be found a\r\ncommunication from Professor Daubeny, of Oxford (taken\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg289\"\u003e[289]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfrom the \"Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal,\" April-July,\r\n1835), in which he shows with certainty, by means of\r\nnew and very careful experiments, that roots of plants\r\nhave, at any rate to a certain degree, the power to make\r\nchoice from those substances in the soil which present\r\nthemselves to their surface.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_255\" title=\"In this connection I may mention an analysis of an entirely different kind, given by the French Academician Babinet in an article in which he treats of the seasons on the planets. It is contained in the No. of the 15th January, 1856, of the \u0027Revue des Deux Mondes,\u0027 and I will give the chief substance of it here in translation. The object of it is to refer to its direct cause the well-known fact, that cereals only thrive in temperate climates. …\" id=\"FNanchor_255\"\u003e[255]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg290\"\u003e[290]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nFinally I will not omit to observe, that even so early an\r\nauthority as Plato\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_256\" title=\"Plat. \u0027Tim.\u0027 p. 403. Bip.\" id=\"FNanchor_256\"\u003e[256]\u003c/a\u003e had attributed desires, ἐπιθυμίας, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e, to plants. In my chief work,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_257\" title=\"\u0027Die Welt a. W. u. V.\u0027 vol. ii. chap. 23.\" id=\"FNanchor_257\"\u003e[257]\u003c/a\u003e however, I have entered\r\ninto the doctrines of the Ancients on this point, and the\r\nchapter there which treats of this subject may on the\r\nwhole serve to complete the present one.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe reluctance and reserve with which we see the\r\nauthors here quoted make up their minds to acknowledge\r\nthe will, which nevertheless undoubtedly manifests itself\r\nin plants, comes from their being still hampered by the\r\nold opinion, that consciousness is a requisite and condition\r\nof the will: now it is evident that plants have\r\nno consciousness. The thought never entered into the\r\nheads of these naturalists, that the will might be the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprius\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand therefore independent of the intellect, with which,\r\nas the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eposterius\u003c/i\u003e, consciousness first makes its appearance.\r\nAs for knowledge or representation, plants have\r\nsomething merely analogous to it, a mere substitute for it;\r\nwhereas they really have the will itself quite directly: for,\r\nas the thing in itself, it is the substratum of their phenomenal\r\nbeing as well as of every other. Taking a realistic\r\nview, starting accordingly from the objective, the\r\nmatter might even be stated as follows: That which lives\r\nand moves in plant-nature and in the animal organism,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg291\"\u003e[291]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhen it has gradually enhanced itself in the scale of beings\r\nsufficiently for the light of knowledge to fall directly upon\r\nit, presents itself in this newly arising consciousness as\r\n\u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e, and is here more immediately, consequently better,\r\nknown than anywhere else. This knowledge therefore\r\nmust supply the key for the comprehension of all that is\r\nlower in the scale. For in this knowledge the thing in\r\nitself is no longer veiled by any other form than that of the\r\nmost immediate apprehension. It is this immediate apprehension\r\nof one\u0027s own volition which has been called the\r\ninner sense. In itself the will is without apprehension, and\r\nremains so in the inorganic and vegetable kingdoms. Just\r\nas the world would remain in darkness, in spite of the sun,\r\nif there were no bodies to reflect its light; or as the mere\r\nvibration of a string can never become a sound without air\r\nor even without some sort of sounding-board: so likewise\r\ndoes the will first become conscious of itself when knowledge\r\nis added to it. Knowledge is, as it were, the\r\nsounding-board of the will, and consciousness the tone it\r\nproduces. This becoming conscious of itself on the part of\r\nthe will, was attributed to a supposed inner sense, because\r\nit is the first and most direct knowledge we have. The\r\nvarious emotions of our own will can alone be the object of\r\nthis inner sense; for the process of representation itself\r\ncannot over again be perceived, but, at the very utmost,\r\nonly be once more brought to consciousness in rational\r\nreflection, that second power of representing: that is, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein\r\nabstracto\u003c/i\u003e. Therefore also, simple representation (intuition)\r\nis to thinking proper—that is, to knowing by\r\nmeans of abstract conceptions—what willing in itself is to\r\nbecoming aware of that willing, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e to consciousness. For\r\nthis reason, a perfectly clear and distinct consciousness, not\r\nonly of our own existence but also of the existence of\r\nothers, only arises with the advent of Reason (the faculty\r\nfor conceptions), which raises Man as far above the brute,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg292\"\u003e[292]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas the merely intuitive faculty of representation raises the\r\nbrute above the plant. Now beings which, like plants,\r\nhave no faculty for representation, are called unconscious,\r\nand we conceive this condition as only slightly differing\r\nfrom non-existence; since the only existence such beings\r\nhave, is in the consciousness of others, as the representation\r\nof those others. They are nevertheless not wanting in\r\nwhat is primary in existence, the will, but only in what is\r\nsecondary; still, what is primary—and this is after all the\r\nexistence of the thing in itself—appears to us, without\r\nthat secondary element, to pass over into nullity. We are\r\nunable directly and clearly to distinguish unconscious existence\r\nfrom non-existence, although we have our own experience\r\nof it in deep sleep.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBearing in mind, according to the contents of the last\r\nchapter, that the faculty of knowing, like every other organ,\r\nhas only arisen for the purpose of self-preservation, and\r\nthat it therefore stands in a precise relation, admitting\r\nof countless gradations, to the requirements of each\r\nanimal species; we shall understand that plants, having\r\nso very much fewer requirements than animals, no\r\nlonger need any knowledge at all. On this account precisely,\r\nas I have often said, knowledge is the true characteristic\r\nwhich denotes the limits of animality, because of the\r\nmovement induced by motives which it conditions. Where\r\nanimal life ceases, there knowledge proper, with whose\r\nessence our own experience has made us familiar, disappears;\r\nand henceforth analogy is our only way of making\r\nthat which mediates between the influence of the outer world\r\nand the movements of beings intelligible to us. The will,\r\non the other hand, which we have recognised as being the\r\nbasis and kernel of every existing thing, remains one and\r\nthe same at all times and in all places. Now, in the lower\r\ndegree occupied by plant-life and by the vegetative life of\r\nanimal organisms, it is the \u003cem\u003estimulus\u003c/em\u003e which takes the place\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg293\"\u003e[293]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof knowledge as a means of determining the individual\r\nmanifestations of this omnipresent will and as a mediator\r\nbetween the outer world and the changes of such a being;\r\nfinally, in inorganic Nature, it is \u003cem\u003ephysical agency in general\u003c/em\u003e;\r\nand when, as here, observation takes place from a higher\r\nto a lower degree, both stimulus and physical agency\r\npresent themselves as substitutes for knowledge, therefore\r\nas mere analogues to it. Plants cannot properly be said\r\nto perceive light and the sun; yet we see them sensitive\r\nin various ways to the presence or absence of both. We\r\nsee them incline and turn towards the light; and though\r\nthis movement no doubt generally coincides with their\r\ngrowth, just as the moon\u0027s rotation on its axis coincides\r\nwith its movement round the earth, it nevertheless exists,\r\nas well as that of the moon, and the direction of that\r\ngrowth is determined and systematically modified by\r\nlight, just as an action is determined by a motive, and\r\nas the direction of the growth of creeping and clinging\r\nplants is determined by the shape and position of the supports\r\nthey may chance to find. Thus because plants on\r\nthe whole, still have wants, though not such wants as\r\ndemand the luxury of a sensorium and an intellect, something\r\nanalogous has to take the place of these, in order to\r\nenable the will to lay hold of, if not to seek out, the satisfactions\r\nwhich offer themselves to it. Now, this analogous\r\nsubstitute is susceptibility for stimuli, and I would express\r\nthe difference between knowledge and this susceptibility\r\nas follows: in knowledge, the motive which presents itself\r\nas representation and the act of volition which follows from\r\nit, \u003cem\u003eremain distinctly separate one from the other\u003c/em\u003e, this separation\r\nmoreover being the more distinct, the greater the perfection\r\nof the intellect;—whereas, in mere susceptibility\r\nfor stimuli, the feeling of the stimulus can no longer be\r\ndistinguished from the volition it occasions, and they\r\ncoalesce. In inorganic nature finally, even susceptibility\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg294\"\u003e[294]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor stimuli, the analogy of which to knowledge is unmistakable,\r\nceases, but the diversity of reaction of each body\r\nupon divers kinds of action remains; now, when the matter\r\nis considered, as we are doing, in the descending scale,\r\nthis reaction still presents itself, even here, as a substitute\r\nfor knowledge. If a body reacts differently, it must have\r\nbeen acted upon differently and that action must have\r\nroused a different sensation in it, which with all its dullness\r\nhas nevertheless a distant analogy to knowledge.\r\nThus when water that is shut up finds an outlet of which\r\nit eagerly avails itself, rushing vehemently in that direction,\r\nit certainly does not recognise that outlet any more than the\r\nacid perceives the alkali approaching it which will induce\r\nit to abandon its combination with a metal, or than the\r\nstrip of paper perceives the amber which attracts it after\r\nbeing rubbed; yet we cannot help admitting that what\r\nbrings about such sudden changes in all these bodies, bears\r\na certain resemblance to that which takes place within us,\r\nwhen an unexpected motive presents itself. In former\r\ntimes I have availed myself of such considerations as these\r\nin order to point out the will in all things; I now employ\r\nthem to indicate the sphere to which knowledge\r\npresents itself as belonging, when considered, not as is\r\nusual from the inside, but realistically, from a standpoint\r\noutside itself, as if it were something foreign: that is, when\r\nwe gain the objective point of view for it, which is so\r\nextremely important in order to complete the subjective\r\none.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_258\" title=\"Compare \u0027Die Welt a. W. u. V.\u0027 vol. ii. chap. 22: \u0027Objective View of the Intellect.\u0027\" id=\"FNanchor_258\"\u003e[258]\u003c/a\u003e We find that knowledge then presents itself as the\r\n\u003cem\u003emediator of motives\u003c/em\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e of the action of causality upon beings\r\nendowed with intellect—in other words, as that which\r\nreceives the changes from outside upon which those in the\r\ninside must follow, as that which acts as mediator between\r\nboth. Now upon this narrow line hovers \u003cem\u003ethe world as\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg295\"\u003e[295]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nrepresentation\u003c/em\u003e—that is to say, the whole corporeal world,\r\nstretched out in Space and Time, which \u003cem\u003eas such\u003c/em\u003e can\r\nnever exist anywhere but in the brain any more than\r\ndreams, which, as long as they last, exist in the same way.\r\nWhat the intellect does for animals and for man, as the\r\nmediator of motives, susceptibility for stimuli does for\r\nplants, and susceptibility for every sort of cause for inorganic\r\nbodies: and strictly speaking, all this differs merely\r\nin degree. For, exclusively as a consequence of this susceptibility\r\nto outward impressions having enhanced itself in\r\nanimals proportionately to their requirements till it has\r\nreached the point where a nervous system and a brain become\r\nnecessary, does consciousness arise as a function of that\r\nbrain, and in it the objective world, whose forms (Time,\r\nSpace, Causality) are the way in which that function is performed.\r\nTherefore we find the intellect originally laid out\r\nentirely with a view to subjectivity, destined merely to serve\r\nthe purposes of the will, consequently as something quite\r\nsecondary and subordinate; nay, in a sense, as something\r\nwhich appears only \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eper accidens\u003c/i\u003e; as a condition of the action\r\nof mere motives, instead of stimuli, which has become necessary\r\nin the higher degree of animal existence. The image\r\nof the world in Space and Time, which thus arises, is only\r\nthe map\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_259\" title=\"Plan.\" id=\"FNanchor_259\"\u003e[259]\u003c/a\u003e on which the motives present themselves as\r\nends. It also conditions the spacial and causal connection\r\nin which the objects perceived stand to one another; nevertheless\r\nit is only the mediating link between the motive\r\nand the act of volition. Now, to take such an image as\r\nthis of the world, arising in this manner, accidentally, in\r\nthe intellect, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e in the cerebral function of animal beings,\r\nthrough the means to their ends being represented and the\r\npath of these ephemera on their planet being thus illumined—to\r\ntake this image, we say, this mere cerebral phenomenon,\r\nfor the true, ultimate essence of things (thing in itself),\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg296\"\u003e[296]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto take the concatenation of its parts for the absolute order\r\nof the Universe (relations between things in themselves),\r\nand to assume all this to exist even independently of the\r\nbrain, would indeed be a leap! Here in fact, an assumption\r\nsuch as this must appear to us as the height of rashness\r\nand presumption; yet it is the foundation upon which all the\r\nsystems of pre-Kantian \u003cem\u003edogmatism\u003c/em\u003e have been built up; for\r\nit is tacitly pre-supposed in all their Ontology, Cosmology\r\nand Theology, as well as in the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eæternæ veritates\u003c/i\u003e to which\r\nthey appeal. But that leap had always been made tacitly\r\nand unconsciously, and it is precisely Kant\u0027s immortal\r\nachievement, to have brought it to our consciousness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy our present realistic way of considering the matter\r\ntherefore, we unexpectedly gain the \u003cem\u003eobjective stand-point\u003c/em\u003e for\r\nKant\u0027s great discoveries; and, by the road of empirico-physiological\r\ncontemplation, we arrive at the point whence his transcendental-critical\r\nview starts. For Kant\u0027s view takes the\r\nsubjective for its standpoint and considers consciousness as\r\ngiven. But from consciousness itself and its law and\r\norder, given \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e, that view arrives at the conclusion,\r\nthat all which appears in that consciousness can be nothing\r\nmore than mere phenomenon. From our realistic, exterior\r\nstandpoint, on the contrary, which assumes the \u003cem\u003eobjective\u003c/em\u003e—all\r\nthat exists in Nature—to be absolutely given, we see\r\nwhat the intellect is, as to its aim and origin, and to\r\nwhich class of phenomena it belongs, and we recognise (so\r\nfar \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e) that it \u003cem\u003emust\u003c/em\u003e be limited to mere phenomena.\r\nWe see too, that what presents itself in the intellect can at\r\nall times only be conditioned—chiefly \u003cem\u003esubjectively\u003c/em\u003e—that\r\nis, can, together with the order of the nexus of its parts,\r\nonly be a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003emundus phenomenon\u003c/i\u003e, which is likewise subjectively\r\nconditioned; but that it can never be a knowledge of things\r\nas they may be in themselves, or as they may be connected\r\nin themselves. For, in the nexus of Nature, we have\r\nfound the faculty of knowing as a conditioned faculty,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg297\"\u003e[297]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhose assertions, precisely on that account, cannot claim\r\nunconditioned validity. To anyone who has studied and\r\nunderstood the Critique of Pure Reason—to which our\r\nstandpoint is essentially foreign—it must nevertheless still\r\nappear as if Nature had intended the intellect for a puzzle-glass\r\nto mislead us and were playing at hide-and-seek with\r\nus. But by our realistic objective road, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e by starting\r\nfrom the objective world as given, we have now come to\r\nthe very same result at which Kant had arrived by the\r\nidealistic, subjective road, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e by examining the intellect\r\nitself and the way in which it constitutes consciousness.\r\nWe now see that the world as representation hovers on the\r\nnarrow line between the external cause (motive) and the\r\neffect evoked (act of the will), in beings having knowledge\r\n(animals), in which beings for the first time there occurs a\r\ndistinct separation between motive and voluntary act.\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIta res accendent lumina rebus.\u003c/i\u003e It is only when it is\r\nreached by two quite opposite roads, that the great result\r\nattained by Kant is distinctly seen; and when light is thus\r\nthrown upon it from both sides, his whole meaning becomes\r\nclear. Our objective standpoint is realistic and\r\ntherefore conditioned, so far as, in taking for granted the\r\nexistence of beings in Nature, it abstracts from the fact\r\nthat their objective existence postulates an intellect, which\r\ncontains them as its representation; but Kant\u0027s subjective\r\nand idealistic standpoint is likewise conditioned, inasmuch\r\nas he starts from the intelligence, which itself, however,\r\npresupposes Nature, in consequence of whose development\r\nas far as animal life that intelligence is for the first time\r\nenabled to make its appearance.—Keeping steadily to this\r\nrealistic, objective standpoint of ours, we may also define\r\nKant\u0027s theory as follows: After Locke, in order to know\r\nthings in themselves, had abstracted the share of sensuous\r\nfunctions—called by him secondary qualities—from\r\nthings as they appear, Kant with infinitely greater depth\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg298\"\u003e[298]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndeducted from them the incomparably larger share of the\r\ncerebral function, which includes precisely what Locke\r\ncalls primary qualities. But all I have done here has\r\nbeen to show why all this must necessarily be as it is,\r\nby indicating the place occupied by the intellect in the\r\nnexus of Nature, when we start realistically from the\r\nobjective as given, but, in doing so, take the only thing of\r\nwhich we are quite directly conscious, the \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e—that true\r\nποῦ στῶ of Metaphysics—for our support, as being what\r\nis primarily real, everything else being merely its phenomenon.\r\nWhat now follows serves to complete this.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have mentioned already, that where knowledge takes\r\nplace, the motive which appears as representation and the\r\nact of volition resulting from it, remain \u003cem\u003ethe more clearly\r\nseparated one from the other\u003c/em\u003e, the more perfect the intellect;\r\nthat is, the higher we ascend in the scale of beings. This\r\ncalls for fuller explanation. As long as the will\u0027s activity\r\nis roused by stimuli alone, and no representation as yet\r\ntakes place—that is, in plants—there is no separation at\r\nall between the receiving of impressions and the being\r\ndetermined by them. In the lowest order of animal intelligence,\r\nsuch as we find it in \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eradiaria\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eacalepha\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eacephala\u003c/i\u003e, \u0026amp;c., the difference is still small; a feeling of\r\nhunger, a watchfulness roused by this, an apprehending\r\nand snapping at their prey, still constitute the whole content\r\nof their consciousness; nevertheless this is the first\r\ntwilight of the dawning world as representation, the background\r\nof which—that is to say, everything excepting the\r\nmotive which acts each time—still remains shrouded in\r\nimpenetrable darkness. Here moreover the organs of the\r\nsenses are correspondingly imperfect and incomplete, having\r\nexceedingly few data for perception to bring to an understanding\r\nyet in embryo. Nevertheless wherever there is\r\nsensibility, it is always accompanied by understanding,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e with the faculty for referring effects experienced to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg299\"\u003e[299]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nexternal causes; without this, sensibility would be superfluous\r\nand a mere source of aimless suffering. The higher\r\nwe ascend in the scale of animals, the greater number and\r\nperfection of the senses we find, till at last we have all\r\nfive; these are found in a small number of invertebrate\r\nanimals, but they only become universal in the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003evertebrata\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThe brain and its function, the understanding, develop proportionately,\r\nand the object now gradually presents itself\r\nmore and more distinctly and completely and even already\r\nin connection with other objects; because the service of\r\nthe will requires apprehension of the mutual relations of\r\nobjects. By this the world of representation acquires\r\nsome extent and background. Still that apprehension\r\nnever goes beyond what is required for the will\u0027s service:\r\nthe apprehending and the being roused to reaction by\r\nwhat is apprehended, are not clearly held asunder: the\r\nobject is only perceived in as much as it is a motive.\r\nEven the more sagacious animals only see in objects what\r\nconcerns themselves, what has reference to their will or, at\r\nthe utmost, what may have reference to it in future: of\r\nthis last we have an instance in cats, who take pains to\r\nacquire an accurate knowledge of localities, and in foxes,\r\nwho endeavour to find hiding-places for their future prey.\r\nBut they are insensible towards everything else; no\r\nanimal has perhaps ever yet seen the starry sky: my dog\r\nstarted in terror when for the first time he accidentally\r\ncaught sight of the sun. A first faint sign of a disinterested\r\nperception of their surroundings may at times be\r\nobserved in the most intelligent animals, especially when\r\nthey have been trained by taming. Dogs go so far as to\r\nstare at things; we may often see them sit down at the\r\nwindow and attentively watch all that passes. Monkeys\r\nlook about them at times, as if trying to make up their\r\nmind about their surroundings. It is in Man that the\r\nseparation between motive and action, between representation\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg300\"\u003e[300]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand will, first becomes quite distinct. But this does\r\nnot immediately put an end to the subservience of the\r\nintellect to the will. Ordinary human beings after all only\r\ncomprehend quite clearly that which, in some way or\r\nother, refers directly or indirectly to their own selves (has\r\nan interest for them); with respect to everything else,\r\ntheir understanding continues to be unconquerably inert;\r\nthe rest therefore remains in the back-ground and does\r\nnot come into consciousness under the radiant light of\r\ncomplete distinctness. Philosophical astonishment and\r\nartistic emotion occasioned by the contemplation of\r\nphenomena, remain eternally foreign to them, whatever\r\nthey may do; for at the bottom, everything appears to\r\nthem to be a matter of course. Complete liberation and\r\nseparation of the intellect from the will and its bondage is\r\nthe prerogative of genius, as I have fully shown in the\r\næsthetic part of my chief work. Genius is objectivity. The\r\npure objectivity and distinctness with which things present\r\nthemselves in intuitive perception—that fundamental and\r\nmost substantial source of knowledge—actually stands\r\nevery moment in inverse proportion to the interest which\r\nthe will has in those things; and knowing without willing\r\nis the condition, not to say the essence, of all gifts of\r\næsthetic intelligence. Why does an ordinary artist produce\r\nso bad a painting of yonder landscape, notwithstanding all\r\nthe pains he has taken? Because he sees it so. And why\r\ndoes he see so little beauty in it? Because his intellect has\r\nnot freed itself sufficiently from his will. The degrees of\r\nthis separation give rise to great intellectual distinctions\r\nbetween men; for the more knowledge has freed itself\r\nfrom the will, the purer, consequently the more objective\r\nand correct, it is; just as that fruit is best, which has no\r\nafter-taste of the soil on which it has grown.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis relation, as important as it is interesting, deserves\r\nsurely to be made still clearer by a retrospective view of the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg301\"\u003e[301]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhole scale of beings, and by recalling the gradual transition\r\nfrom absolute subjectivity to the highest degrees of objectivity\r\nin the intellect. Inorganic Nature namely, is absolutely\r\nsubjective, no trace whatever of consciousness of an\r\nouter world being found in it. Stones, boulders, ice-blocks,\r\neven when they fall upon one another, or knock or rub\r\nagainst one another, have no consciousness of each other\r\nand of an outer world. Still even these are susceptible to\r\nexternal influence, which causes their position and movement\r\nto change and may therefore be considered as a first\r\nstep towards consciousness. Now, although plants also\r\nhave no consciousness of the outer world, and although the\r\nmere analogue of a consciousness which exists in them\r\nmust, on the contrary, be conceived as a dull self-enjoyment;\r\nyet we see that they all seek light, and that many of them\r\nturn their flowers or leaves daily towards the sun, while\r\ncreepers find their way to supports with which they are\r\nnot in contact; and finally we see individual kinds of\r\nplants show even a sort of irritability. Unquestionably\r\ntherefore, there is a connection and relation between their\r\nmovements and surroundings, even those with which they\r\nare not in immediate contact; and this connection we must\r\naccordingly recognise as a faint analogue to perception.\r\nWith animal life first appears decided perception—that\r\nis, consciousness of other things, as opposed to that clear\r\nconsciousness of ourselves to which that consciousness of\r\nother things first gives rise. This constitutes precisely\r\nthe true character of animal-nature, as opposed to plant-nature.\r\nIn the lowest animals, consciousness of the outer\r\nworld is very limited and dim: each increasing degree of\r\nunderstanding extends it and makes it clearer, and this\r\ngradual increase of the understanding again adapts itself\r\nto the gradually increasing requirements of the animal, and\r\nthus the process continues through the whole long ascending\r\nscale of the animal series up to Man, in whom consciousness\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg302\"\u003e[302]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the outer world reaches its acme, and in whom the\r\nworld accordingly presents itself more distinctly and completely\r\nthan in any other being. Still, even here, there are\r\n\u003cins title=\"innummerable\" id=\"C302\"\u003einnumerable\u003c/ins\u003e degrees in the clearness of consciousness,\r\nfrom the dullest blockhead to genius. Even in normal\r\nheads there still remains a considerable tinge of subjectivity\r\nin their objective perception of external objects,\r\nknowledge still bearing throughout the character of existing\r\nmerely for the ends of the will. The more eminent the\r\nhead, the less prominent is this character, and the more\r\npurely objective does the representation of the outer world\r\nbecome; till in genius finally it attains completely objectivity,\r\nby which the Platonic ideas detach themselves from\r\nthe individual things, because the mind which comprehends\r\nthem enhances itself to the pure subject of knowledge.\r\nNow, as perception is the basis of all knowledge, all thinking\r\nand all insight must be influenced by this fundamental\r\ndifference in the quality of it, from which arises that complete\r\ndifference between the ordinary and the superior\r\nmind in their whole way of viewing things, which may\r\nbe noticed on all occasions. From this also proceeds the\r\ndull gravity, nearly resembling that of animals, which\r\ncharacterizes common-place heads whose knowledge is\r\nacquired solely for the benefit of the will, as opposed to\r\nthe constant play of exuberant intellect which brightens\r\nthe consciousness of the superior mind. The consideration\r\nof the two extremes in the great scale which we have here\r\nexhibited, seems to have given rise to the German hyperbolical\r\nexpression \"\u003cem\u003eBlock\u003c/em\u003e\" (\u003cem\u003eKlotz\u003c/em\u003e), as applied to human\r\nbeings, and to the English \"blockhead.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut another different consequence of the clear separation\r\nof the will from the intellect—therefore of the motive\r\nfrom the action,—which first appears in the human\r\nrace, is the deceptive illusion of freedom in our individual\r\nactions. Where, as in inorganic nature, causes, or, as in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg303\"\u003e[303]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe vegetable kingdom, stimuli, call forth the effect, the\r\ncausal connection is so simple, that there is not even the\r\nslightest semblance of freedom. But already in animal\r\nlife, where that which till then had manifested itself as\r\ncause or as stimulus, now appears as a \u003cem\u003emotive\u003c/em\u003e—and a new\r\nworld, that of representation, consequently presents itself,\r\nand cause and effect lie in different spheres—the causal\r\nconnection between both, and with it the necessity, are less\r\nevident than they were in plants and in inorganic Nature.\r\nNevertheless they are still unmistakable in animals, whose\r\nmerely intuitive representation stands midway between\r\norganic functions induced by stimuli and the deliberate acts\r\nof Man. The animal\u0027s actions infallibly follow as soon\r\nas the perceptible motive is present, unless counter-acted\r\nby some equally perceptible counter-motive or by\r\ntraining; yet here representation is already distinct from\r\nthe act of volition and comes separately into consciousness.\r\nBut in Man—whose representation has enhanced itself even\r\nto abstract conception and who now derives motives and\r\ncounter-motives for his actions from a whole invisible\r\nthought-world which he carries about with him in his\r\nbrain and which makes him independent of presence and of\r\nperceptible surroundings—this connection no longer exists\r\nat all for observation from outside, and even for inward\r\nobservation it is only knowable through abstract and\r\nmature reflection. For these abstract motives, when observed\r\nfrom outside, give an impress of deliberation to all\r\nhis movements, by which they acquire a semblance of independence\r\nthat manifestly distinguishes them from those of\r\nanimals, yet which after all only bears evidence to the fact,\r\nthat Man is actuated by a class of representations in which\r\nanimals do not share. Then again, in self-consciousness,\r\nthe act of volition is known to us in the most immediate\r\nway, but the motive in most cases very indirectly, being\r\noften even intentionally veiled, out of consideration for\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg304\"\u003e[304]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nour self-knowledge. This process therefore, in coincidence\r\nwith the consciousness of that true freedom which belongs\r\nto the will, as thing in itself outside phenomenon, produces\r\nthe deceptive illusion that even the single act of volition\r\nis unconditioned and free: that is, without a reason;\r\nwhereas, when the character is given and the motive recognised,\r\nevery act of volition really follows with the same\r\nstrict necessity as the changes of which mechanics teach us\r\nthe laws, and, to use Kant\u0027s words, were character and\r\nmotive exactly known, might be calculated with precisely\r\nthe same certainty as an eclipse of the moon; or again, to\r\nplace a very heterogeneous authority by the side of Kant,\r\nas Dante says, who is older than Buridan:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poetry-container\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\" lang=\"it\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003e\"Intra duo cibi distanti e moventi\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eD\u0027un modo, prima si morria di fame\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eChe liber\u0027 uomo l\u0027un recasse a\u0027 denti.\"\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse right\"\u003e\u003ccite\u003eParadiso\u003c/cite\u003e, iv. 1.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_260\" title=\"Between two kinds of food, both equally Remote and tempting, first a man might die Of hunger, ere he one could freely chuse. (Cary\u0027s Tr.)\" id=\"FNanchor_260\"\u003e[260]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg305\"\u003e[305]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003ePHYSICAL ASTRONOMY.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo part of my doctrine could I have less hoped to see\r\ncorroborated by empirical science than that, in which\r\nthe fundamental truth, that Kant\u0027s thing in itself (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eDing an\r\nsich\u003c/i\u003e) is the Will, is applied by me even to inorganic Nature,\r\nand in which I show the active principle in all fundamental\r\nforces of Nature to be absolutely identical with what is\r\nknown to us within ourselves as the Will.—It has therefore\r\nbeen particularly gratifying to me to have found that an\r\neminent empiricist, yielding to the force of truth, had\r\ngone so far as to express this paradox in the exposition of\r\nhis scientific doctrine. I allude to Sir John Herschel and\r\nto his \"Treatise on Astronomy,\" the first edition of which\r\nappeared in 1833, and a second enlarged one in 1849,\r\nunder the title \"Outlines of Astronomy.\" Herschel,—who,\r\nas an astronomer, was acquainted with gravity, not only in\r\nthe one-sided and really coarse part which it acts on earth,\r\nbut also in the nobler one performed by it in universal\r\nSpace, where the celestial bodies play with each other,\r\nbetray mutual inclination, exchange as it were amorous\r\nglances, yet never allow themselves to come into rude contact,\r\nand thus continue dancing their dignified minuet to\r\nthe music of the spheres, while they keep at a respectful\r\ndistance from one another—when he comes to the statement\r\nof the law of gravitation in the seventh chapter,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_261\" title=\"Herschel, \u0027Treatise on Astronomy,\u0027 chap. 7, § 371 of the 1st edition, 1833.\" id=\"FNanchor_261\"\u003e[261]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nexpresses himself as follows:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg306\"\u003e[306]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\"All bodies with which we are acquainted, when raised\r\ninto the air and quietly abandoned, descend to the earth\u0027s\r\nsurface in lines perpendicular to it. They are therefore\r\nurged thereto by a force or effort, the direct or indirect\r\nresult of a consciousness and a will existing somewhere,\r\nthough beyond our power to trace, which force we term\r\n\u003cem\u003egravity\u003c/em\u003e.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_262\" title=\"Even Copernicus had said the same thing long before \u0027Equidem existimo Gravitatem non aliud esse quam appetentiam quandam naturalem, partibus inditam a divina providentia opificis universorum, ut in unitatem integritatemque suam se conferant, in formam Globi coeuntes. Quam affectionem credibile est etiam Soli, Lunæ cæterisque errantium fulgoribus, inesse, ut ejus efficacia, in ea qua se repraesentant rotunditate permaneant; quæ nihilominus multis modis suos efficiunt circuitus\u0027 …\" id=\"FNanchor_262\"\u003e[262]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe writer who reviewed Herschel\u0027s book in the October\r\nnumber of the \"Edinburgh Review\" of 1833, anxious, as a\r\ntrue Englishman, before all things to prevent the Mosaic\r\nrecord\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_263\" title=\"Which he has more at heart than all the wisdom and truth in the world. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_263\"\u003e[263]\u003c/a\u003e from being imperilled, takes great umbrage at this\r\npassage, rightly observing that it cannot refer to the will\r\nof God Almighty, who has called Matter and all its properties\r\ninto being; he utterly refuses to recognise the validity of\r\nthe proposition itself, and denies that it follows consistently\r\nfrom the preceding § upon which Herschel wishes to found\r\nit. My opinion is, that it undoubtedly would logically\r\nfollow from that § (because the contents of a conception\r\nare determined by its origin), but that the antecedent\r\nitself is false. It asserts namely, that the origin of the\r\nconception of causality is experience, more especially such\r\nexperience as we ourselves make in acting by means of our\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg307\"\u003e[307]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nown efforts upon bodies belonging to the outer world. It\r\nis only in countries like England, where the light of\r\nKantian philosophy has not yet begun to dawn, that the\r\nconception of causality can be thought of as originating in\r\nexperience (professors of philosophy who pooh-pooh Kant\u0027s\r\ndoctrines and think me beneath their notice being left out\r\nof the question); least of all can it be thought of by those\r\nwho are acquainted with my proof of the \u003cem\u003eà priority\u003c/em\u003e of that\r\nconception, which differs completely from Kant\u0027s proof\r\nand rests upon the fact, that knowledge of causality must\r\nnecessarily precede all perception of the outer world itself\r\nas its condition; since perception is only brought about\r\nthrough the \u003cem\u003etransition\u003c/em\u003e—effected by the understanding—from\r\nthe sensation in the organ of sense to its \u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e, which\r\ncause now presents itself as an \u003cem\u003eobject\u003c/em\u003e in Space, itself likewise\r\nan \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e intuition. Now, as the perception of objects\r\nmust be anterior to our conscious action upon them, the experience\r\nof that conscious action cannot be the origin of the\r\nconception of causality; for, before I can act upon things,\r\nthey must first have acted upon me as motives. I have\r\nentered fully into all that has to do with this in my chief\r\nwork,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_264\" title=\"See \u0027Die Welt a. W, u. V.\u0027 vol. ii. ch. 4, pp. 38-42 (3rd edition, pp. 41-46).\" id=\"FNanchor_264\"\u003e[264]\u003c/a\u003e and in the second edition of my treatise on the\r\nPrinciple of Sufficient Reason, § 21,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_265\" title=\"P. 74 (3rd edition, p. 79), p. 92 of the translation in the present volume.\" id=\"FNanchor_265\"\u003e[265]\u003c/a\u003e where the assumption\r\nadopted by Herschel finds special refutation; it is therefore\r\nuseless to enter into it once more here. But it would be\r\neven quite possible to refute this assumption empirically,\r\nsince it would necessarily follow from it, that a man who\r\ncame into the world without arms or legs, could never\r\nattain any knowledge of causality or perception of the\r\nouter world. Now Nature has effectually disproved this\r\nby a case, of which I have reproduced the account from its\r\noriginal source in the above-mentioned chapter of my chief\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg308\"\u003e[308]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwork, p. 40.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_266\" title=\"3rd edition, p. 44.\" id=\"FNanchor_266\"\u003e[266]\u003c/a\u003e—In this assertion of Herschel\u0027s therefore, we\r\nhave another instance of a right conclusion drawn from\r\nwrong premisses. Now this always happens when we\r\nhave obtained immediate insight into a truth by a right\r\n\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eaperçu\u003c/i\u003e but are at a loss to find out and clearly define our\r\nreasons for knowing it, owing to our inability to bring\r\nthem to clear consciousness. For, in all original insight,\r\nconviction exists before proof: the proof being invariably\r\nexcogitated afterwards.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe immediate manifestation of gravity is more evident\r\nin each part of liquid, than of solid, matter, owing to the\r\nperfect freedom of motion of the parts among each other.\r\nIn order therefore to penetrate into this \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eaperçu\u003c/i\u003e, which is\r\nthe true source of Herschel\u0027s assertion, let us look attentively\r\nat a torrent dashing headlong over rocks and ask\r\nourselves whether so determined an impetus, so boisterous\r\na vehemence, can arise without an exertion of strength, and\r\nwhether an exertion of strength is conceivable without\r\nwill. And so it is precisely in every case in which we\r\nbecome aware of anything moving spontaneously, of any\r\nprimary, uncommunicated force: we are constrained to\r\nthink its innermost essence as will.—This much at any\r\nrate is certain, that Herschel, like all the empiricists in so\r\nmany different branches of science whose evidence I have\r\nquoted above, had arrived here at the limit where nothing\r\nmore is left behind the Physical but the Metaphysical;\r\nthat this had brought him to a standstill, and that he, as\r\nwell as the rest of them, was unable to find anything\r\nbeyond that limit, but the \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHerschel moreover, like most of these empiricists, is\r\nhere still hampered by the opinion that will is inseparable\r\nfrom \u003cins title=\"conciousness\" id=\"C308\"\u003econsciousness\u003c/ins\u003e. As I have expatiated enough above\r\nupon this fallacy, and its correction through my doctrine,\r\nit is needless for me to enter into it here again.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg309\"\u003e[309]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe attempt has repeatedly been made, since the beginning\r\nof this century, to ascribe \u003cem\u003evitality\u003c/em\u003e to the inorganic world.\r\nQuite wrongly: for living and inorganic are convertible\r\nconceptions, and with death the organic ceases to be\r\norganic. But no limit in the whole of Nature is so sharply\r\ndrawn as the line which separates the organic from the inorganic:\r\nthat is to say, the line between the region in which\r\nForm is the essential and permanent, Matter the accidental\r\nand changing,—and the region in which this relation is\r\nentirely reversed. This is no vacillating boundary like\r\nthat perhaps between animals and plants, between solid\r\nand liquid, between gas and steam: to endeavour to\r\ndestroy it therefore, is intentionally to bring confusion into\r\nour ideas. On the other hand, I am the first who has\r\nasserted that a \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e must be attributed to all that is lifeless\r\nand inorganic. For, with me, the will is not, as has\r\nhitherto been assumed, an accident of cognition and therefore\r\nof life: but life itself is manifestation of will.\r\nKnowledge, on the contrary, is really an accident of life,\r\nand life of Matter. But Matter itself is only the perceptibility\r\nof the phenomena of the will. Therefore we are\r\ncompelled to recognise \u003cem\u003evolition\u003c/em\u003e in every effort or tendency\r\nwhich proceeds from the nature of a material body, and\r\nproperly speaking constitutes that nature, or manifests\r\nitself as phenomenon by means of that nature; and there\r\ncan consequently be no Matter without manifestation of\r\nwill. The lowest and on that account most universal\r\nmanifestation of will is \u003cem\u003egravity\u003c/em\u003e, wherefore it has been\r\ncalled a primary and essential property of Matter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe usual view of Nature assumes \u003cem\u003etwo\u003c/em\u003e fundamentally\r\ndifferent principles of motion, therefore it supposes that\r\nthe movement of a body may have \u003cem\u003etwo different origins\u003c/em\u003e:\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, that it proceeds either from the inside, in which\r\ncase it is attributed to the \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e; or from the outside,\r\nand then it is occasioned by \u003cem\u003ecauses\u003c/em\u003e. This principle is generally\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg310\"\u003e[310]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntaken for granted as a matter of course and only\r\noccasionally brought explicitly into prominence; nevertheless,\r\nin order to make the case quite certain, I will point\r\nout a few passages from the earliest to the latest authors\r\nin which it is specially stated. In Phædrus,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_267\" title=\"Plato, \u0027Phæd.\u0027 p. 319 Bip.\" id=\"FNanchor_267\"\u003e[267]\u003c/a\u003e Plato makes\r\nthe distinction between that which moves spontaneously\r\nfrom inside (\u003cem\u003esoul\u003c/em\u003e) and that which receives movement only\r\nfrom outside (\u003cem\u003ebody\u003c/em\u003e)—τὸ ὑφ\u0027 ἑαυτοῦ κινούμενον καὶ τό, ᾧ\r\nἔξωθεν τὸ κινεῖσθαι.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_268\" title=\"\u0027That which is moved by itself and that which is moved from outside.\u0027 [Tr.] And we find the same distinction again in the 10th Book \u0027De Legibus,\u0027 p. 85. [After him Cicero repeats it in the two last chapters of his \u0027Somnium Scipionis.\u0027 Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_268\"\u003e[268]\u003c/a\u003e—Aristotle establishes the principle\r\nin precisely the same way: ἅπαν τὸ φερόμενον ἢ ὑφ\u0027 ἑαυτοῦ\r\nκινεῖται, ἢ ὐπ\u0027 ἄλλου (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003equidquid fertur a se movetur, aut\r\nab alio\u003c/i\u003e).\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_269\" title=\"\u0027All that is moved, is moved either by itself or by something else.\u0027 [Tr.] Aristotle, \u0027Phys.\u0027 vii. 2.\" id=\"FNanchor_269\"\u003e[269]\u003c/a\u003e He returns to the subject in the next Book,\r\nchap. 4 and 5, and connects it with some explanatory details\r\nwhich lead him into considerable perplexity, on account\r\nprecisely of the fallacy of the antithesis.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_270\" title=\"Maclaurin, too, in his account of Newton\u0027s discoveries, p. 102, lays down this principle as his starting-point. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_270\"\u003e[270]\u003c/a\u003e—In more\r\nrecent times again J. J. Rousseau brings forward the same\r\nantithesis with great \u003cem\u003enaïveté\u003c/em\u003e and candour in his famous\r\n\"Profession de foi du vicaire Savoyard:\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_271\" title=\"Émile, iv. p. 27. Bip.\" id=\"FNanchor_271\"\u003e[271]\u003c/a\u003e \"\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eJ\u0027aperçois\r\ndans les corps deux sortes de mouvement, savoir: mouvement\r\ncommuniqué et mouvement spontané ou volontaire: dans le\r\npremier la cause motrice est étrangère au corps mû; et dans\r\nle second elle est en lui-même.\u003c/i\u003e\"—But even in our time and\r\nin the stilted, puffed-up style which is peculiar to it, Burdach\r\nholds forth as follows:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_272\" title=\"Burdach, \u0027Physiologie,\u0027 vol. iv. p. 323.\" id=\"FNanchor_272\"\u003e[272]\u003c/a\u003e \"The cause that determines\r\na movement lies either inside or outside of that which\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg311\"\u003e[311]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmoves. Matter is external existence; it has powers of\r\nmotion, but it only brings them into play under certain\r\nspacial conditions and external oppositions: the soul alone\r\nis an ever active and internal thing, and only those bodies\r\nwhich have souls find within themselves inducement to\r\nmove, and move of their own free will, independently of\r\nouter mechanical circumstances.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow here however I must say, as Abélard once did: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003esi\r\nomnes patres sic, at ego non sic\u003c/i\u003e: for, in opposition to this principle,\r\nhowever great may be its antiquity and universality,\r\nmy doctrine maintains, that there are \u003cem\u003enot\u003c/em\u003e two origins of\r\nmovement differing fundamentally from one another; that\r\nmovement does \u003cem\u003enot\u003c/em\u003e proceed either from inside, when it is\r\nascribed to the will, or from outside, when it is brought\r\nabout by causes; but that both things are inseparable and\r\ntake place simultaneously with every movement made by\r\na body. For movement which is admitted to arise from\r\nthe \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e, always presupposes a \u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e also: this cause, in\r\nbeings that have knowledge, is a \u003cem\u003emotive\u003c/em\u003e; but without it,\r\neven in these beings, movement is impossible. On the\r\nother hand, the movement of a body which is admitted to\r\nhave been brought about by an outward \u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e, is nevertheless\r\nin itself a manifestation of the \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e of that body\r\nwhich has only been evoked by that cause. Accordingly\r\nthere is only one, uniform, universal and exceptionless\r\nprinciple of all movement, whose inner condition is \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e\r\nand whose outer occasion is \u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e, which latter may also\r\ntake the form of a \u003cem\u003estimulus\u003c/em\u003e or of a \u003cem\u003emotive\u003c/em\u003e, according to\r\nthe nature of the thing moved.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll that is known to us of things in a merely empirical\r\nor \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà posteriori\u003c/i\u003e, way, is in itself \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e; whereas, so far\r\nas they can be determined \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e, things belong exclusively\r\nto \u003cem\u003erepresentation\u003c/em\u003e, to mere phenomenon. Natural\r\nphenomena therefore become proportionately less easy to\r\ncomprehend, the more distinctly the will manifests itself\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg312\"\u003e[312]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin them, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e the higher they stand on the scale of beings;\r\nwhereas, they become more and more comprehensible\r\nthe smaller the amount of their empirical content, because\r\nthey remain more and more within the sphere of\r\nmere representation, the forms of which, known to us \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà\r\npriori\u003c/i\u003e, are the principle of comprehensibility. Accordingly,\r\nit is only so long as we limit ourselves to this sphere—that\r\nis to say, only when we have before us mere representation,\r\nmere form without empirical content—that our\r\ncomprehension is complete and thorough: that is, in the\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e sciences, Arithmetic, Geometry, Phoronomy and\r\nLogic. Here everything is in the highest degree comprehensible;\r\nour insight is quite clear and satisfactory: it\r\nleaves nothing to be desired, since we are even unable to\r\nconceive that anything could be otherwise than it is. This\r\ncomes from our having here exclusively to do with the\r\nforms of our own intellect. Thus the more we are able to\r\ncomprehend in a relation, the more it consists of mere\r\nphenomenon and the less it has to do with the thing in\r\nitself. Applied Mathematics, Mechanics, Hydraulics, \u0026amp;c.\r\n\u0026amp;c., deal with the lowest degrees of objectification of the\r\nwill, in which the largest part still remains within the\r\nsphere of mere representation; nevertheless even here there\r\nis already an empirical element which stands in the way of\r\nentire comprehension, which makes the transparency less\r\ncomplete, and in which the inexplicable shows itself. For\r\nthe same reason, only few departments of Physics and of\r\nChemistry continue to admit of a mathematical treatment;\r\nwhereas higher up in the scale of beings this has to\r\nbe entirely done away with, precisely because of the preponderance\r\nof content over form in these phenomena. This\r\ncontent is will, the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà posteriori\u003c/i\u003e, the thing in itself, the free,\r\nthe causeless. Under the heading \"Physiology of Plants,\" I\r\nhave shown how—in beings that live and have knowledge—motive\r\nand act of will, representation and volition, separate\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg313\"\u003e[313]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand detach themselves more and more distinctly one from\r\nthe other, the higher we ascend in the scale of beings.\r\nNow, in inorganic Nature also, the cause separates itself\r\nfrom the effect in just the same proportion, and the\r\npurely empirical—which is precisely phenomenon of the\r\nwill—detaches itself more and more prominently; but, just\r\nwith this, comprehensibility diminishes. This point merits\r\nfuller investigation, and I request my readers to give their\r\nwhole and undivided attention to what I am about to say,\r\nas it is calculated to place the leading thought of my\r\ndoctrine in the strongest possible light, both as to comprehensibility\r\nand cogency. But this is all I can do; for\r\nit is beyond my power to induce my contemporaries to\r\nprefer thoughts to verbiage; I can only console myself for\r\nnot being the man of the age.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the lowest step of the scale of Nature, cause and\r\neffect are quite homogeneous and quite equivalent. Here\r\ntherefore we have perfect comprehension of the causal connection:\r\nfor instance, the cause of the movement of one\r\nball propelled by impact, is the movement of another,\r\nwhich loses just as much movement as the first one\r\nreceives. Here causality is in the highest degree intelligible.\r\nWhat notwithstanding still remains mysterious, is\r\nrestricted to the possibility of the passage of movement—of\r\na thing incorporeal—from one body to another.\r\nThe receptivity of bodies in this mode is so slight, that the\r\neffect to be produced has to pass over completely from its\r\ncause. The same holds good of all purely mechanical\r\ninfluences; and if they are not all just as instantaneously\r\nunderstood, it is either because they are hidden from us by\r\naccessory circumstances, or because we are confused by the\r\ncomplicated connection of many causes and effects. In\r\nitself, mechanical causality is everywhere equally, that is,\r\nin the highest degree, comprehensible; because cause and\r\neffect do not differ here as to \u003cem\u003equality\u003c/em\u003e, and because where\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg314\"\u003e[314]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthey differ as to \u003cem\u003equantity\u003c/em\u003e, as in the lever, mere Space and\r\nTime relations suffice to make the thing clear. But as\r\nsoon as weights come also into play, a second mysterious\r\nelement supervenes, \u003cem\u003egravity\u003c/em\u003e: and, where elastic bodies are\r\nconcerned, \u003cem\u003eelasticity\u003c/em\u003e also.—Things change as soon as we\r\nbegin to ascend in the scale of phenomena. Heat, considered\r\nas cause, and expansion, liquefaction, volatilization\r\nor crystallization, as effects, are not homogeneous; therefore\r\ntheir causal connection is not intelligible. The comprehensibility\r\nof causality has diminished: what a lower\r\ndegree of heat caused to liquefy, a higher degree makes\r\nevaporate: that which crystallizes with less heat, melts\r\nwhen the heat is augmented. Warmth softens wax and\r\nhardens clay; light whitens wax and blackens chloride of\r\nsilver. And, to go still further, when two salts are seen to\r\ndecompose each other mutually and to form two new ones,\r\nelective affinity presents itself to us as an impenetrable\r\nmystery, and the properties of the two new bodies are not\r\na combination of the properties of their separate elements.\r\nNevertheless we are still able to follow the process and\r\nto indicate the elements out of which the new bodies are\r\nformed; we can even separate what has been united and\r\nrestore the original quantities. Thus noticeable heterogeneousness\r\nand incommensurability between cause and\r\neffect have here made their appearance: causality has\r\nbecome more mysterious. And this becomes still more\r\napparent when we compare the effects of electricity or of\r\nthe Voltaic pile with their causes, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e with the friction of\r\nglass, or the piling and oxidation of the plates. Here all\r\nsimilarity between cause and effect at once vanishes;\r\ncausality becomes shrouded in a thick veil, which men like\r\nDavy, Faraday and Ampère have strenuously endeavoured\r\nto lift. The only thing now discernible through that veil,\r\nare the laws ruling its mode of action, which may be\r\nbrought into a schema such as + E – E, communication,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg315\"\u003e[315]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndistribution, shock, ignition, analysis, charging,\r\nisolation, discharging, electric current, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c., to this\r\nschema we are able to reduce and even to direct the effect;\r\nbut of the process itself we know nothing: that remains\r\nan \u003ci\u003ex\u003c/i\u003e. Here therefore cause and effect are completely\r\nheterogeneous, their connection is unintelligible, and we\r\nsee bodies show great \u003cins title=\"susceptibity\" id=\"C315\"\u003esusceptibility\u003c/ins\u003e to causal influences, the\r\nnature of which remains a secret for us. Moreover in proportion\r\nas we mount higher in the scale, the effect seems\r\nto contain more, the cause less. When we reach organic\r\nNature therefore, in which the phenomenon of life presents\r\nitself, this is the case in a far higher degree still. If, as is\r\ndone in China, we fill a pit with decaying wood, cover it\r\nwith leaves from the same tree as the wood, and pour a\r\nsolution of sulphur repeatedly over it, an abundant crop of\r\nedible mushrooms will spring up. A world of rapidly\r\nmoving \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003einfusoria\u003c/i\u003e will arise from a little hay well watered.\r\nWhat a difference lies here between effect and cause!\r\nHow much more does the former seem to contain than the\r\nlatter! When we compare the seed, sometimes centuries,\r\nnay even thousands of years old, with the tree, or the soil\r\nwith the specifically and strikingly different juices of innumerable\r\nplants—some healthy, some poisonous, some\r\nagain nutritious—which spring from the same earth, upon\r\nwhich the same sun shines and the same rain falls, all\r\nresemblance ceases, and with it all comprehensibility for\r\nus. For here causality already appears in increased\r\npotency: that is, as stimulus and as susceptibility for\r\nstimulus. The schema of cause and effect alone has remained;\r\nwe know that this is cause, that effect; but we\r\nknow nothing whatever of the nature and disposition of\r\ncausality. Between cause and effect there is not only no\r\nqualitative resemblance, but no quantitative relation: the\r\nrelatively greater importance of the effect as compared with\r\nits cause increases more and more; the effect of the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg316\"\u003e[316]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nstimulus too does not augment in proportion with the enhancement\r\nof that stimulus; in fact just the contrary often\r\ntakes place. Finally, when we come to the sphere of beings\r\nwhich have knowledge, there is no longer any sort of resemblance\r\nor relation between the action performed and\r\nthe object which, as representation, evokes it. Animals,\r\nhowever, as they are restricted to \u003cem\u003eperceptible\u003c/em\u003e representations,\r\nstill need the \u003cem\u003epresence\u003c/em\u003e of the object acting as a\r\nmotive, which action is then immediate and infallible (if\r\nwe leave training, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e habit enforced by fear, out of the\r\nquestion). For animals are unable to carry about with\r\nthem conceptions that might render them independent\r\nof present impressions, enable them to reflect, and qualify\r\nthem for deliberate action. Man can do this. Therefore\r\nwhen at last we come to rational beings, the motive is\r\neven no longer a present, perceptible, actually existing, real\r\nthing, but a mere conception having its present existence\r\nonly in the brain of the person who acts, but which is\r\nextracted from many multifarious perceptions, from the\r\nexperience of former years, or has been handed down in\r\nwords. Here the separation between cause and effect is so\r\nwide, the effect has grown so much stronger as compared\r\nwith the cause, that the vulgar mind no longer perceives\r\nthe existence of a cause at all, and the acts of the will\r\nappear to it to be unconditioned, causeless: that is to say,\r\nfree. This is just why, when we reflect upon them from\r\noutside, the movements of our own body present themselves\r\nas if they took place without cause, or to speak more\r\nproperly, by a miracle. Experience and reflection alone\r\nteach us that these movements, like all others, are only\r\npossible as the effects of causes, here called motives, and that,\r\non this ascending scale, it is only as to material reality that\r\nthe cause has failed to keep pace with the effect; whereas it\r\nhas kept pace with it as to dynamical reality, energy.—At\r\nthis degree of the scale therefore—the highest in Nature—causality\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg317\"\u003e[317]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhas become less intelligible to us than ever.\r\nNothing but the bare schema, taken in a quite general\r\nsense, now remains, and the ripest reflection is needed to\r\nrecognise its applicability and the necessity that schema\r\nbrings with it everywhere.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the Grotto of Pausilippo, darkness continues to augment\r\nas we advance towards the interior; but when once\r\nwe have passed the middle, day-light again appears at the\r\nother end and shows us the way; so also in this case: just\r\nat the point where the outwardly directed light of the\r\nunderstanding with its form of causality, gradually yielding\r\nto increasing darkness, had been reduced to a feeble,\r\nflickering glimmer, behold! we are met by a totally different\r\nlight proceeding from quite another quarter, from\r\nour own inner self, through the chance circumstance, that\r\nwe, the judges, happen here to be the very objects that are\r\nto be judged. The growing difficulty of the comprehension\r\nof the causal nexus, at first so clear, had now become\r\nso great for perception and for the understanding—the\r\nagent in it—that, in animal actions, the very existence\r\nof that nexus seemed almost doubtful and those actions\r\nappeared to be a sort of miracle. But, just at this point,\r\nthe observer receives from his own inner self the direct information\r\nthat the agent in them is the will—that very\r\nwill, which he knows better and more intimately than anything\r\nthat external perception can ever supply. This\r\nknowledge alone must be the philosopher\u0027s key to an\r\ninsight into the heart of all those processes in unconscious\r\nNature, concerning which causal explanation—although,\r\nhere, to be sure, more satisfactory than in the processes\r\nlast considered, and the clearer, the farther those processes\r\nwere removed from these—nevertheless had still\r\nleft an unknown \u003ci\u003ex\u003c/i\u003e, and could never quite illumine the\r\ninside of the process, even in a body propelled by impact or\r\nattracted by gravity. This \u003ci\u003ex\u003c/i\u003e had continued expanding till\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg318\"\u003e[318]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfinally, on the highest degrees of the scale, it had wholly\r\nrepelled causal explanation. But then, just when the\r\npower of causal explanation had been reduced to a minimum,\r\nthat \u003ci\u003ex\u003c/i\u003e revealed itself as \u003cem\u003ethe will\u003c/em\u003e—reminding us of\r\nMephistopheles when, yielding to Faust\u0027s learned exorcisms,\r\nhe steps forth out of the huge grown poodle whose\r\nkernel he was. In consequence of the considerations I\r\nhave here set forth at length, we can surely hardly avoid\r\nrecognising \u003cem\u003ethe identity of this x\u003c/em\u003e, even on the lowest\r\ndegrees of the scale, where it was but faintly perceptible;\r\nthen higher up, where it extended its obscurity more and\r\nmore; and finally on the highest degrees, where it cast a\r\nshadow upon all things—till, at the very top, it reveals itself\r\nto our consciousness in our own phenomenal being, as \u003cem\u003ethe\r\nwill\u003c/em\u003e. The two primarily different sources of our knowledge,\r\nthat is to say the inward and the outward source, have to\r\nbe connected together at this point by reflection. It is\r\nquite exclusively out of this connection that our comprehension\r\nof Nature, and of our own selves arises; but then\r\nthe inner side of Nature is disclosed to our intellect, which\r\nby itself alone can never reach further than to the\r\nmere outside; and the mystery which philosophy has so\r\nlong tried to solve, lies open before us. For then indeed\r\nwe clearly see what the Real and the Ideal (the thing in\r\nitself and the phenomenon) properly are; and this settles\r\nthe principal question which has engaged the attention\r\nof philosophers since Descartes: that is to say, the\r\nquestion as to the relation between these two, whose complete\r\ndiversity Kant had shown most thoroughly and with\r\nunexampled depth, yet whose absolute identity was immediately\r\nafterwards proclaimed by humbugs on the credit of\r\nintellectual intuition. But if we decline to avail ourselves\r\nof this insight, which is really the one strait gate to truth,\r\nwe can never acquire comprehension of the intrinsic\r\nessence of Nature, to which absolutely no other road leads;\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg319\"\u003e[319]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor then indeed we fall into an irremovable error. Then,\r\nas I have already said, we maintain the view, that motion\r\nhas two radically different primary principles with a solid\r\npartition-wall between them: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e movement by means of\r\ncauses, and movement by means of the will. The first of\r\nthese must then remain for ever incomprehensible as to its\r\ninnermost essence, because, after all its explanations, there\r\nis still left that unknown \u003ci\u003ex\u003c/i\u003e which contains the more, the\r\nhigher the object under consideration stands in the scale of\r\nbeings; while the second, movement by the will, presents\r\nitself as entirely disconnected from the principle of\r\ncausality; as without reason; as freedom in individual\r\nactions: in other words, as completely opposed to Nature\r\nand utterly unexplainable. On the other hand, if the\r\nabove-mentioned union of our external and internal knowledge\r\nhas once been accomplished at the point where both\r\nmeet, we then recognise two identities in spite of all\r\naccidental differences. That is to say, we recognise the\r\nidentity of causality with itself on every degree of the\r\nscale of beings, and the identity of the \u003ci\u003ex\u003c/i\u003e, which at\r\nfirst was unknown (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e of physical forces and vital phenomena),\r\nwith the will which is within us. We recognise,\r\nI say, firstly the essential identity of causality under\r\nthe various forms it is forced to assume on the different\r\ndegrees of the scale, as it may manifest itself, now as a\r\nmechanical, chemical, or physical cause, now as a stimulus,\r\nand again as a perceptible or an abstract motive: we\r\nknow it to be one and the same, not only when a propelling\r\nbody loses as much movement as it imparts by impact,\r\nbut also when in the combats of thought against\r\nthought, the victorious one, as the more powerful motive,\r\nsets Man in motion, a motion which follows with no less\r\nnecessity than that of the ball which is struck. Where we\r\nourselves are the things set in motion, where therefore the\r\nkernel of the process is well and intimately known to us,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg320\"\u003e[320]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninstead of allowing ourselves to be dazzled and confused by\r\nthis light and thereby losing sight of the causal connection\r\nas it lies before us everywhere else in the whole of\r\nNature; instead of shutting out this insight for ever, we now\r\napply the new knowledge we have acquired from within\r\nas a key to the knowledge of things outside us, and then\r\nwe recognise the second identity, that of our will with the\r\nhitherto mysterious \u003ci\u003ex\u003c/i\u003e that remains over after all causal\r\nexplanation as an insoluble residue. Consequently we\r\nthen say: even in cases in which the effect is brought\r\nabout by the most palpable cause, the mysterious \u003ci\u003ex\u003c/i\u003e in the\r\nprocess, the real innermost core of it, the true agent, the\r\n\u003cem\u003ein-itself\u003c/em\u003e of all phenomena—which, after all, is only given\r\nus as representation and according to the forms and laws\r\nof representation—is essentially one and the same with\r\nwhat is known to us immediately and intimately as \u003cem\u003ethe\r\nwill\u003c/em\u003e in the actions of our own body, which body is likewise\r\ngiven us as intuition and representation.—This is (say\r\nwhat you will) the basis of true philosophy, and if the\r\npresent age does not see this, many following ages\r\nwill. \u003ci lang=\"it\"\u003eTempo è galant\u0027 uomo!\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ese nessun altro\u003c/i\u003e).—Thus,\r\njust as, on the one hand, the essence of causality, which\r\nappears most clearly only on the lowest degree of the\r\nobjectification of the will, is recognised by us again at\r\nevery ascending step, even at the highest; so also, on\r\nthe other hand, is the essence of the will recognised by us\r\nat every descending step in that ladder, even at the lowest,\r\nalthough this knowledge is only immediately acquired\r\nat the very highest. The old error asserts, that where\r\nthere is will, there is no causality; and that where there\r\nis causality, there is no will. But we say: everywhere\r\nwhere there is causality, there is will; and no will acts\r\nwithout causality. The \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003epunctum controversiæ\u003c/i\u003e therefore, is,\r\nwhether will and causality can and must subsist together\r\nin one and the same process at the same time. What\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg321\"\u003e[321]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmakes the knowledge, that this is indeed the case, so difficult,\r\nis the circumstance, that we know causality and will\r\nin two fundamentally different ways: causality entirely\r\nfrom outside, quite indirectly, quite through the understanding;\r\nwill entirely from inside, quite directly; and that\r\naccordingly the clearer the knowledge of the one in each\r\ngiven instance, the less clear is the knowledge of the other.\r\nTherefore we recognise the essence of the will least readily,\r\nwhere causality is most intelligible; and, where the will is\r\nmost unmistakably evident, causality becomes so obscured,\r\nthat the vulgar mind could venture to deny its existence\r\naltogether.—Now, as Kant has taught us, causality is\r\nnothing but the form of the understanding itself, knowable\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e: that is, the essence of \u003cem\u003erepresentation\u003c/em\u003e, as such,\r\nwhich is one side of the world; the other side is \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e:\r\nwhich is the thing in itself. That relative increase and\r\ndecrease of clearness in inverse proportion of causality and\r\nof the will, that mutual advancing and receding of both,\r\ndepends consequently upon the fact, that the more a thing\r\nis given us as mere phenomenon, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e as representation, the\r\nmore clearly does the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e form of representation, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e\r\ncausality, manifest itself: this is the case in inanimate\r\nNature; conversely, the more immediate our knowledge of\r\nthe will, the more does the form of representation recede\r\ninto the background: this is the case with ourselves.\r\nThat is: the nearer one side of the world approaches to\r\nus, the more do we lose sight of the other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg322\"\u003e[322]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eLINGUISTIC.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll that I have to record under this head is an observation\r\nof my own, made within the last few years,\r\nwhich seems hitherto to have escaped notice. Yet, that it\r\nis worthy of consideration, is attested by Seneca\u0027s utterance:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_273\" title=\"Seneca, \u0027Epist.\u0027 81.\" id=\"FNanchor_273\"\u003e[273]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eMira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est, et\r\nconsuetudo sermonis antiqui quædam efficacissimis notis\r\nsignat.\u003c/i\u003e Lichtenberg too says: \"If one thinks much oneself,\r\none finds a good deal of wisdom deposited in language.\r\nIt is hardly likely that we have laid it all there\r\nourselves, but rather that a great deal of wisdom really\r\nlies there.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn many, perhaps in all, languages, the action even of\r\nthose bodies which are without intellect, nay of inanimate\r\nbodies, is expressed by the words \u003cem\u003eto will\u003c/em\u003e, so that the existence\r\nof a will in these bodies is thus taken for granted;\r\nbut they are never credited with a faculty for knowing,\r\nrepresenting, perceiving or thinking: I know of no expression\r\nwhich conveys this.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSeneca, when speaking of lightning shot down from\r\nheaven, says:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_274\" title=\"Ibid. \u0027Quæst. nat.\u0027 ii. 24.\" id=\"FNanchor_274\"\u003e[274]\u003c/a\u003e \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIn his, ignibus accidit, quod arboribus:\r\nquarum cacumina, si tenera sunt, ita deorsum trahi possunt,\r\nut etiam terram attingant; sed quum permiseris, in\r\nlocum suum exsilient. Itaque non est quod eum spectes\r\ncujusque rei habitum, qui illi non\u003c/i\u003e ex voluntate \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eest. Si\r\nignem permittis ire quo velit, cœlum repetet.\u003c/i\u003e\" In a more\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg323\"\u003e[323]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ngeneral sense Pliny says: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003enec quærenda in ulla parte naturæ\r\nratio, sed voluntas\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_275\" title=\"Plin. \u0027Hist. nat.\u0027 37, 15.\" id=\"FNanchor_275\"\u003e[275]\u003c/a\u003e Nor do we find Greek less fertile in\r\ninstances. Aristotle, when explaining gravity, says: μικρὸν\r\nμὲν μόριον τῆς γῆς, ἐὰν μετεωρισθὲν ἀφεθῇ, φέρεται, καὶ μένειν\r\nοὐκ ἐθέλει (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eparva quædam terræ pars, si elevata dimittitur,\r\nneque vult manere\u003c/i\u003e).\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_276\" title=\"Aristot. \u0027De Cœlo.\u0027 ii. c. 13, \u0027If a small particle of earth is lifted and let loose, it is carried away and will not rest.\u0027 [Tr.\u0027s add.]\" id=\"FNanchor_276\"\u003e[276]\u003c/a\u003e And: Δεῖ δὲ ἕκαστον λέγειν τοιοῦτον\r\nεἶναι, ὃ φύσει \u003cem class=\"gesperrt\"\u003eβούλεται\u003c/em\u003e εἶναι, καὶ ὃ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὃ βίᾳ καὶ\r\nπαρὰ φύσιν (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eunumquodque autem tale dicere oportet, quale\r\nnaturâ suâ esse vult, et quod est; sed non id quod violentiâ\r\net præter naturam est\u003c/i\u003e).\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_277\" title=\"Ibid. c. 14, \u0027But each thing ought to be named as it wills to be and really is according to its nature, not as it is by force and contrary to its nature.\u0027 [Tr.\u0027s add.]\" id=\"FNanchor_277\"\u003e[277]\u003c/a\u003e Of great and more than merely\r\nlinguistic importance is what Aristotle says in his \"Ethica\r\nmagna,\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_278\" title=\"Arist. \u0027Eth. Mag.\u0027 i. c. 14.\" id=\"FNanchor_278\"\u003e[278]\u003c/a\u003e where not only animals, but inanimate beings (fire\r\nstriving upwards and earth downwards) are explicitly in\r\nquestion, and he asserts that they may be obliged to do\r\nsomething contrary to their nature or their will: παρὰ\r\nφύσιν τι, ἢ παρ\u0027 ἃ \u003cem class=\"gesperrt\"\u003eβούλονται\u003c/em\u003e ποιεῖν,—and therefore rightly\r\nplaces παρ\u0027 ἃ βούλονται as a paraphrase of παρὰ φύσιν.—Anacreon,\r\nin his 29th Ode, εἰς Βάθυλλον, in ordering the\r\nportrait of his lady-love, says of her hair: Ἕλικας δ\u0027 ἐλευθέρους\r\nμοι πλοκάμων, ἄτακτα συνθείς, ἄφες, ὡς \u003cem class=\"gesperrt\"\u003eθέλωσι\u003c/em\u003e, κεῖσθαι\r\n(\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecapillorum cirros incomposite jungens, sine utut volunt\r\njacere\u003c/i\u003e).\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_279\" title=\"\u0027Let the freely curling locks fall unarranged as they will [like].\u0027 [Tr.\u0027s add.]\" id=\"FNanchor_279\"\u003e[279]\u003c/a\u003e In German, Bürger says: \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003ehinab\u003c/i\u003e will \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eder Bach,\r\nnicht hinan\u003c/i\u003e\" (the brook \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e go downwards not upwards).\r\nIn daily life we constantly hear: \"the water boils, it \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e\r\nrun over,\"—\"the glass \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e break,\"—\"the ladder \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e not\r\nstand;\"—\"\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003ele feu ne\u003c/i\u003e veut \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003epas brûler\u003c/i\u003e.\"—\"\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003ela corde, une fois\r\ntordue\u003c/i\u003e, veut \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003etoujours se retordre\u003c/i\u003e.\"—In English, the verb \u0027\u003cem\u003eto\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg324\"\u003e[324]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwill\u003c/em\u003e\u0027 is even the auxiliary of the future of all the other\r\nverbs, thus expressing the notion, that there lies a will at\r\nthe bottom of every action. In English moreover, the endeavours\r\nof all inanimate and unconscious things, are expressly\r\ndesignated by the word \u003cem\u003ewant\u003c/em\u003e, which denotes every\r\nsort of human desire or endeavour: \"the water \u003cem\u003ewants\u003c/em\u003e to\r\nget out,\"—\"the steam \u003cem\u003ewants\u003c/em\u003e to find an issue.\"—In Italian\r\ntoo we have \"vuol \u003ci lang=\"it\"\u003epiovere\u003c/i\u003e;\" \"\u003ci lang=\"it\"\u003equest\u0027 orologio non\u003c/i\u003e vuol\r\n\u003ci lang=\"it\"\u003eandare\u003c/i\u003e.\"—The conception of willing is besides so deeply\r\nrooted in this last language, that it seems to indicate everything\r\nthat is requisite or necessary: \"\u003ci lang=\"it\"\u003eci\u003c/i\u003e vuol \u003ci lang=\"it\"\u003eun contrappeso\u003c/i\u003e;\"\r\n\"\u003ci lang=\"it\"\u003eci\u003c/i\u003e vuol \u003ci lang=\"it\"\u003epazienza\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eA very striking instance of this is to be found even in\r\nChinese—a language which differs fundamentally from all\r\nthose belonging to the Sanskrit family—it is in the commentary\r\nto the Y-King,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_280\" title=\"Y-King,\u0027 ed. J. Mohl, vol. i. p. 341.\" id=\"FNanchor_280\"\u003e[280]\u003c/a\u003e accurately rendered by Peter Regis as\r\nfollows: \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eYang, seu materia cœlestis\u003c/i\u003e, vult \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003erursus ingredi, vel\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eut verbis doctoris Tsching-tse utar\u003c/i\u003e) vult \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003erursus esse in superiore\r\nloco; scilicet illius naturæ ratio ita fert, seu innata\u003c/i\u003e \u003cins title=\"lex.\" id=\"C324\"\u003e\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003elex\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003c/ins\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe following passage from Liebig\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_281\" title=\"Liebig, \u0027Die Chemie in ihrer Anwendung auf Agrikultur,\u0027 p. 394.\" id=\"FNanchor_281\"\u003e[281]\u003c/a\u003e has decidedly much\r\nmore than a linguistic signification, for it expresses an intimate\r\nfeeling and comprehension of the way in which a\r\nchemical process takes place. \"Aldehyd arises, which with\r\nthe same \u003cem\u003eavidity\u003c/em\u003e as sulphurous acid, combines directly with\r\noxygen to form acetic acid.\"—And again:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_282\" title=\"Ibid. \u0027Die Chemie in Anwendung auf Physiologie.\u0027\" id=\"FNanchor_282\"\u003e[282]\u003c/a\u003e \"Aldehyd,\r\nwhich absorbs oxygen from the air with \u003cem\u003egreat avidity\u003c/em\u003e.\"\r\nAs Liebig uses this expression twice in speaking of the\r\nsame phenomenon, it can hardly be by chance, but rather\r\nbecause it was the only adequate expression for the thing.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_283\" title=\"French chemists likewise say: \u0027Il est évident que les métaux ne sont pas tous également avides d\u0027oxygène.\u0027 … \u0027La difficulté de la réduction devait correspondre nécessairement à une avidité fort grande du métal pour l\u0027oxygène.\u0027–(See Paul de Rémusat, \u0027La Chimie à l\u0027Exposition.\u0027 \u0027L\u0027Aluminium,\u0027 \u0027Revue des Deux Mondes,\u0027 1855, p. 649)….\" id=\"FNanchor_283\"\u003e[283]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg325\"\u003e[325]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThat most immediate stamp of our thoughts, language,\r\nshows us therefore, that every inward impulse must necessarily\r\nbe conceived as volition; but it by no means ascribes\r\nknowledge to things as well. The agreement on this point\r\nbetween all languages, perhaps without a single exception,\r\nproves that here we have to do with no mere figure of\r\nspeech, but that the verbal expression is determined by a\r\ndeeply-rooted feeling of the inner nature of things.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg326\"\u003e[326]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn 1818, when my chief work first appeared, Animal\r\nMagnetism had only begun to struggle into existence.\r\nBut, as to its explanation—although, to be sure, some light\r\nhad been thrown upon the passive side of it, that is, upon\r\nwhat goes on within the patient, by the contrast between\r\nthe cerebral and the ganglionic systems, to which Reil had\r\ndrawn attention, having been taken for the principle of\r\nexplanation—the active side, the agent proper by means of\r\nwhich the magnetiser evokes all these phenomena, was\r\nstill completely shrouded in darkness. People groped\r\nabout among all sorts of material principles of explanation,\r\nsuch as Mesmer\u0027s all-permeating ether, or the exhalations\r\nfrom the magnetiser\u0027s skin, assumed by Stieglitz to be\r\nthe cause, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c. At the utmost a nerve-spirit had been\r\nrecognised and, after all, this was but a word for an unknown\r\nthing. The truth had scarcely begun to dawn upon\r\na few persons, whom practice had more deeply initiated.\r\nBut I was still far from hoping for any direct corroboration\r\nof my doctrine from Magnetism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eDies diem docet\u003c/i\u003e however, and the great teacher, experience,\r\nhas since brought to light an important fact concerning\r\nthis deep-reaching agent which, proceeding from\r\nthe magnetiser, produces effects apparently so contrary to\r\nthe regular course of Nature that the long lasting doubt as\r\nto their existence, the stiff-necked incredulity, the condemnation\r\nof a Committee of which Lavoisier and Franklin were\r\nmembers, in short, the whole opposition that Magnetism\r\nencountered both in its first and second period (with the sole\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg327\"\u003e[327]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nexception of the coarse, unintelligent condemnation without\r\ninquiry, which till very lately, prevailed in England) is quite\r\nexcusable. The fact I allude to is, that this agent is nothing\r\nbut the \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e of the magnetiser. To-day not a doubt exists\r\non this point, I believe, among those who combine practice\r\nwith insight; therefore I think it superfluous to quote the\r\nnumerous assertions of magnetisers in corroboration of it.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_284\" title=\"I only mention one work which has recently appeared, the explicit object of which is to show that the magnetiser\u0027s will is the real agent: \u0027Qu\u0027est ce que le Magnétisme?\u0027 par E. Gromier. (Lyon, 1850.)\" id=\"FNanchor_284\"\u003e[284]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nTime has thus not only verified Puységur\u0027s watchword and\r\nthat of the older French magnetisers: \"\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eVeuillez et croyez!\u003c/i\u003e\"\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e \"Will with belief!\" but this very watchword has even\r\ndeveloped into a correct insight of the process itself.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_285\" title=\"Puységur himself says in the year 1784: \u0027Lorsque vous avez magnétisé le malade, votre but était de l\u0027endormir, et vous y avez réussi par le seul acte de votre volonté; c\u0027est de même par un autre acte de volonté que vous le réveillez.\u0027 (Puységur, \u0027Magnét. Anim.\u0027 2me édit. 1820, \u0027Catéchisme Magnétique,\u0027 p. 150-171.) [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_285\"\u003e[285]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nFrom Kieser\u0027s \"Tellurismus,\" still probably the most\r\nthorough and detailed text book of Animal Magnetism we\r\nhave, it clearly results, that no act of Magnetism can take\r\neffect without the will; on the other hand the bare will, without\r\nany outward action, is able to produce every magnetic\r\neffect. Manipulation seems to be only a means of fixing,\r\nand so to say incorporating, the will and its direction. In\r\nthis sense Kieser says: \"Inasmuch as the human hand—being\r\nthe organ by which Man\u0027s outward activity is most\r\nvisibly expressed—is the efficient organ in magnetising,\r\nmanipulation arises.\" De Lausanne, a French magnetiser,\r\npronounces himself with still greater precision on this\r\npoint in the Fourth Book of his \"Annales du Magnétisme\r\nAnimal\" (1814-1816), where he says: \"\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eL\u0027action du magnétisme\r\ndépend de la seule volonté, il est vrai; mais l\u0027homme\r\nayant une forme\u003c/i\u003e extérieure et sensible, \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003etout ce qui est à\r\nson usage, tout ce qui doit agir sur lui, doit nécéssairement\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg328\"\u003e[328]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nen avoir une, et pour que la volonté agisse, il faut qu\u0027elle employe\r\nun mode d\u0027action.\u003c/i\u003e\" As, according to my doctrine, the\r\norganism is but the mere phenomenon, the visibility, the\r\nobjectivity of the will; nay, as it is properly speaking\r\nonly the will itself, viewed as representation in the brain:\r\nso also does the outward act of manipulation coincide with\r\nthe inward act of the will. But where magnetic effects\r\nare produced without manipulation, they take place as it\r\nwere artificially, in a roundabout way, the imagination\r\ntaking the place of the outer act and even occasionally that\r\nof personal presence: wherefore it is much more difficult\r\nand succeeds less frequently. Kieser accordingly\r\nalleges that the word \"Sleep!\" or \"You must!\" said\r\naloud, has a more powerful effect upon a \u003cins title=\"somnabulist\" id=\"C328\"\u003esomnambulist\u003c/ins\u003e than\r\nthe mere inward willing of the magnetiser.—On the other\r\nhand manipulation, and in general outward action, is\r\nreally an infallible means of fixing the magnetiser\u0027s will\r\nand promoting its activity; precisely because outward acts\r\nare quite impossible apart from all will, the body and\r\nits organs being nothing but the visibility of the will\r\nitself. This explains the fact, that magnetisers at\r\ntimes magnetise without any conscious effort of volition\r\nand almost without thinking, and yet produce the desired\r\neffect. On the whole, it is not the consciousness of\r\nvolition, reflection upon it, that acts magnetically, but pure\r\nvolition itself, as detached as possible from all representation.\r\nIn Kieser\u0027s directions to magnetisers therefore,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_286\" title=\"Kieser, \u0027Tellur.\u0027 vol. i. p. 400, et seqq.\" id=\"FNanchor_286\"\u003e[286]\u003c/a\u003e we\r\nfind all thinking and reflecting upon their respective doing\r\nand suffering, all conversation between them, forbidden\r\nboth to physician and patient; also all outward impressions\r\nwhich arouse representations, the presence of strangers,\r\nand even daylight. He advises that everything should\r\nproceed as unconsciously as possible, as is likewise recommended\r\nin charm-cures. The true reason of all this is, that\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg329\"\u003e[329]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhere the will operates in its primariness, as thing in itself;\r\nand this demands the exclusion, as far as possible, of representation,\r\nas a different sphere, as secondary to the will.\r\nFacts to prove that the real agent in magnetising is the\r\nwill and each outward act only its vehicle, may be found\r\nin all the more recent and more trustworthy writings upon\r\nMagnetism, and it would be needless prolixity to repeat\r\nthem here. Nevertheless I will quote \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e case, not as\r\nbeing especially striking, but as furnished by a remarkable\r\nperson and having a peculiar interest as his testimony.\r\nJean Paul says in a letter:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_287\" title=\"See \u0027Wahrheit aus Jean Paul\u0027s Leben,\u0027 vol. viii. p. 120.\" id=\"FNanchor_287\"\u003e[287]\u003c/a\u003e \"Twice in a large company I\r\nhave made Frau von K. nearly go to sleep by merely looking\r\nat her with a \u003cem\u003efirm will\u003c/em\u003e, no one else knowing anything\r\nabout it, and before that, I had brought on palpitation of\r\nthe heart and pallor to such a degree that Dr. S. had to\r\nbe summoned to her assistance.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_288\" title=\"I had the good fortune in the year 1854 myself to witness some extraordinary feats of this kind, performed here by Signor Regazzoni from Bergamo, in which the immediate, i.e. magical, power of his will over other persons was unmistakeable, and of which no one, excepting perhaps those to whom Nature has denied all capacity for apprehending pathological conditions, could doubt the genuineness. There are nevertheless such persons: they ought to become lawyers, clergymen, merchants or soldiers, but in heaven\u0027s name not doctors; for the result would be homicidal, diagnosis being the principal thing in medicine.–…\" id=\"FNanchor_288\"\u003e[288]\u003c/a\u003e Nowadays too, merely\r\nlaying and keeping hold of the patient\u0027s hands while fixing\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg330\"\u003e[330]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe eye steadily upon him, is frequently substituted with\r\ncomplete success for the customary manipulation; precisely\r\nbecause even this outward act is suited to fix the will in a\r\ndetermined direction. But this immediate power which\r\nthe will can exercise over other persons, is brought to light\r\nbest of all by the admirable experiments made, even in\r\npublic, by M. Dupotet and his pupils in Paris, in which\r\na stranger is guided and determined at pleasure by the\r\nmagnetiser\u0027s mere will, aided by a few gestures, and is\r\neven forced into the most extraordinary contortions. An\r\napparently quite honestly written pamphlet, entitled \"First\r\nglance into the wonder-world of Magnetism,\" by Karl\r\nScholl (1853), contains a brief account of this.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the \"Communications concerning the somnambulist,\r\nAuguste K. in Dresden\" (1843), we find the truth in question\r\nconfirmed in another way by what the somnambulist\r\nherself says, p. 53: \"I was half asleep and my brother\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg331\"\u003e[331]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwished to play a piece he knew. As I did not like it, I requested\r\nhim not to play it; nevertheless he tried to\r\ndo so and then, by means of my firm will that he\r\nshould not, I succeeded in making him unable to remember\r\nthe piece, in spite of all his endeavours.\"—The thing\r\nis however brought to a climax when this immediate\r\npower of the will is extended even to inanimate bodies.\r\nHowever incredible this may appear, we have nevertheless\r\ntwo accounts of it coming from entirely different quarters.\r\nIn the book just mentioned,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_289\" title=\"\u0027Mittheilungen über die Somnambüle, Auguste K., in Dresden.\u0027 1845, pp. 115, 116, and 318.\" id=\"FNanchor_289\"\u003e[289]\u003c/a\u003e it is related and testified by\r\nwitnesses, that Auguste K. caused the needle of the compass\r\nto deviate at one time 7° and at another 4°, this experiment\r\nmoreover being repeated four times. She did\r\nthis moreover without any use of her hands, through her\r\nmere will, by looking steadily at it.—The Parisian somnambulist,\r\nPrudence Bernard, again in a public \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eséance\u003c/i\u003e in\r\nLondon, at which Mr. Brewster, the physicist\u0027s son and\r\ntwo other gentlemen from among the spectators acted as\r\njurors, made the compass needle deviate and follow her\r\nmovements by simply turning her head round.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_290\" title=\"See extract from the English periodical \u0027Britannia,\u0027 in \u0027Galignani\u0027s Messenger,\u0027 of the 23rd October, 1851.\" id=\"FNanchor_290\"\u003e[290]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, if we thus see the will—stated by me to be the\r\nthing in itself, the only real thing in all existence, the\r\nkernel of Nature—accomplish through the human individual,\r\nin Animal Magnetism and even beyond it, things\r\nwhich cannot be explained according to the causal nexus,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e in the regular course of Nature; if we find it in a\r\nsense even annulling Nature\u0027s laws and actually performing\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eactio in distans\u003c/i\u003e, consequently manifesting a supernatural,\r\nthat is, metaphysical, mastery over Nature—what\r\ncorroboration better founded on fact could I desire\r\nfor my doctrine? Was not even Count Szapary, a magnetiser\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg332\"\u003e[332]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwho certainly did not know my philosophy, led by\r\nthe results of his own experience, after writing the title\r\nof his book: \"A word about Animal Magnetism, soul-bodies\r\nand vital essence,\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_291\" title=\"Szapary, \u0027Ein Wort über Animalischen Magnetismus, Seelenkörper and Lebensessenz\u0027 (1840).\" id=\"FNanchor_291\"\u003e[291]\u003c/a\u003e to add the following remarkable\r\nexplanatory words: \"or physical proofs that the\r\ncurrent of Animal Magnetism is the element, and \u003cem\u003ethe\r\nwill the principle of all spiritual and corporeal life\u003c/em\u003e?\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_292\" title=\"\u0027Oder physische Beweise, dass der Animalisch-magnetische Strom das Element, and der Wille das Princip alles geistigen und Körperlichen Lebens sei.\u0027\" id=\"FNanchor_292\"\u003e[292]\u003c/a\u003e—According\r\nto this, Animal Magnetism presents itself\r\ndirectly as \u003cem\u003epractical Metaphysic\u003c/em\u003e, which was the term used\r\nby Bacon of Verulam\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_293\" title=\"Bacon, \u0027Instaur. Magna,\u0027 L. III.\" id=\"FNanchor_293\"\u003e[293]\u003c/a\u003e to define Magic in his classification\r\nof the sciences: it is empirical or experimental\r\nMetaphysic.—Further, because the will manifests itself\r\nin Animal Magnetism downright as the thing in itself,\r\nwe see the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprincipium individuationis\u003c/i\u003e (Space and Time),\r\nwhich belongs to mere phenomenon, at once annulled:\r\nits limits which separate individuals from one another,\r\nare destroyed; Space no longer separates magnetiser\r\nand somnambulist; community of thoughts and of motions\r\nof the will appears; the state of \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eclairvoyance\u003c/i\u003e overleaps\r\nthe relations belonging to mere phenomenon and conditioned\r\nby Time and Space, such as proximity and distance,\r\nthe present and the future.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn consequence of these facts, notwithstanding many\r\nreasons and prejudices to the contrary, the opinion has\r\ngradually gained ground, nay almost raised itself to certainty,\r\nthat Animal Magnetism and its phenomena are\r\nidentical with part of the Magic of former times, of that\r\nill-famed occult art, of whose reality not only the Christian\r\nages by which it was so cruelly persecuted, but all, not\r\nexcepting even savage, nations on the whole of the earth,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg333\"\u003e[333]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhave been equally convinced throughout all ages. The\r\nTwelve Tables of the Romans,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_294\" title=\"Plin. hist. nat. L. 30, c. 3. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_294\"\u003e[294]\u003c/a\u003e the Books of Moses, and\r\neven Plato\u0027s Eleventh Book on Laws, already made its\r\npractice punishable by death, and Apuleius\u0027 beautiful\r\nspeech\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_295\" title=\"Apuleius, \u0027Oratio de Magia,\u0027 p. 104. Bip.\" id=\"FNanchor_295\"\u003e[295]\u003c/a\u003e before the court of justice, when defending himself\r\nagainst the charge of practising magic by which his life\r\nwas menaced, proves how seriously this matter was taken\r\neven in the most enlightened Roman period, under the\r\nAntonines; since he merely tries to clear himself personally\r\nfrom the charge in question, but by no means contests\r\nthe possibility of witchcraft and even enters into a host of\r\nabsurd details such as are wont to figure in all the mediæval\r\ntrials for witchcraft. The eighteenth century\r\nmakes an exception as regards this belief in Magic, and this\r\nis mainly because Balthasar Becker, Thomasius and some\r\nothers, with the good intention of putting an end once for\r\nall to the cruel trials for witchcraft, declared all magic to\r\nbe impossible. Favoured by the philosophy of the age,\r\nthis opinion soon gained the upper hand, although only\r\namong the learned and educated classes. The common\r\npeople have never ceased to believe in witchcraft, even in\r\nEngland; though here the educated classes contrive to\r\nunite a degrading religious bigotry with the firm incredulity\r\nof a Saint Thomas (or of a Thomasius) as to all facts\r\ntranscending the laws of impact and counter-impact, acids\r\nand alkalis, and refuse to lend an ear to their great countryman,\r\nwhen he tells them that \u0027there are more things in\r\nheaven and earth than are dreamt of in their philosophy.\u0027\r\nOne branch of Magic is still notoriously preserved and practised\r\namong the lower orders, being tolerated on account\r\nof its beneficent purpose. This is \u003cem\u003ecuring by charms\u003c/em\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003esympathetische\r\nKuren\u003c/i\u003e, as they are called in German), the reality\r\nof which can hardly be doubted. Charming away warts,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg334\"\u003e[334]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis one of the commonest forms of this practice, and of this\r\nBacon of Verulam, cautious and empirical though he was,\r\nattests the efficacy from personal experience.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_296\" title=\"Bacon, \u0027Silva Silvarum,\u0027 § 997.\" id=\"FNanchor_296\"\u003e[296]\u003c/a\u003e The charming\r\naway of erisypelas in the face by a spell, is another\r\ninstance, and so often succeeds, that it is easy to convince\r\noneself of its existence. Fever too is often successfully\r\ncombated by spells, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_297\" title=\"In the \u0027Times\u0027 of June the 12th, 1855, we find, p. 10, the following:– \u0027A Horse-charmer. \u0027On the voyage to England the ship \u0027Simla\u0027 experienced some heavy weather in the Bay of Biscay, in which the horses suffered severely, and some, including a charger of General Scarlett, became unmanageable….\" id=\"FNanchor_297\"\u003e[297]\u003c/a\u003e—That, in all this, the\r\nreal agents are not the meaningless words and ceremonies,\r\nbut that it is the will of the operator which acts, as in\r\nAnimal Magnetism, needs no further explanation after\r\nwhat has been said above. For such as are still unacquainted\r\nwith charm-cures, instances may be found in\r\nKieser.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_298\" title=\"Kieser, \u0027Archiv, für den thierischen Magnetismus,\u0027 vol. v. heft 3, p. 106; vol. viii. heft 3, p. 145; vol. ix. heft 2, p. 172; and vol. ix. heft 1, p. 128; Dr. Most\u0027s book likewise: \u0027Über Sympathetische Mittel und Kuren,\u0027 1842, may be used as an introduction to this matter. (And even Pliny indicates a number of charm-cures in the 28th Book, chaps. 6 to 17. [Add. to 3rd ed.])\" id=\"FNanchor_298\"\u003e[298]\u003c/a\u003e—These two facts therefore, Animal Magnetism and\r\nCharm-curing, bear empirical evidence to the possibility of\r\nmagical, as opposed to physical, influence, which possibility\r\nhad been so peremptorily rejected by the past century;\r\nsince it refused to recognise as possible any other\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg335\"\u003e[335]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthan physical influences brought about in the way of the\r\nintelligible nexus of causality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is a fortunate circumstance, that the rectification of\r\nthis view in our time should have come from medical science;\r\nbecause it ensures us at the same time against the danger\r\nof the pendulum of opinion receiving too strong an impulse\r\nin the contrary direction, and thus carrying us back to\r\nthe superstition of ruder ages. Besides, as I have said,\r\nAnimal Magnetism and Charm-curing only save the reality\r\nof a part of Magic, which included a good deal more, a\r\nconsiderable portion of which must, for the present at\r\nleast, remain under the old sentence of condemnation or be\r\nleft in uncertainty; whereas another portion will at any\r\nrate have to be conceived as possible, through its analogy\r\nto Animal Magnetism. For Animal Magnetism and\r\nCharm-cures are but salutary influences exercised for curative\r\npurposes, like those recorded in the \"History of\r\nMagic\" as practised by the so-called (Spanish) \u003ci lang=\"es\"\u003eSaludadores\u003c/i\u003e,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_299\" title=\"Delrio. \u0027Disqu. Mag.\u0027 L. III. P. 2, q. 4. 4, s. 7–and Bodinus, \u0027Mag. Dæmon,\u0027 iii. 2.\" id=\"FNanchor_299\"\u003e[299]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwho nevertheless were also condemned by the\r\nChurch; whereas Magic was far oftener practised with an\r\nevil intent. Nevertheless, to judge by analogy, it is more\r\nthan probable, that the same inherent force which, by\r\nacting directly upon another individuality, can exercise a\r\nsalutary influence, will be at least as powerful to exercise\r\na prejudicial and pernicious one. If therefore there was\r\nreality in any part of ancient Magic beyond what may be\r\nreferred to Animal Magnetism and curing by charms, it\r\nmust assuredly have been in that which is called \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003emaleficium\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003efascinatio\u003c/i\u003e, the very thing that gave rise to\r\nmost of the trials for witchcraft. In Most\u0027s book, too,\r\nalready mentioned,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_300\" title=\"See note 2, p. 334, especially pp. 40, 41, and Nos. 89, 91, and 97 of Most\u0027s book.\" id=\"FNanchor_300\"\u003e[300]\u003c/a\u003e a few facts are related which must\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg336\"\u003e[336]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nundoubtedly be ascribed to \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003emaleficium\u003c/i\u003e; in Kieser,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_301\" title=\"Kieser, \u0027Archiv. f. t. M.\u0027 See the account of Bende Bensen\u0027s illness, vol. ix. to vol. xii.\" id=\"FNanchor_301\"\u003e[301]\u003c/a\u003e also\r\nwe find instances of diseases which had been transmitted,\r\nespecially to dogs, who died of them. In Plutarch\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_302\" title=\"Plutarch, \u0027Symposiacæ quæstionis,\u0027 qu. v. 7. 6.\" id=\"FNanchor_302\"\u003e[302]\u003c/a\u003e we\r\nfind that \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003efascinatio\u003c/i\u003e was already known to Democritus,\r\nwho tried to explain it as a fact. Now admitting these\r\nstories to be true, they give us the key to the crime of\r\nwitchcraft, the zealous persecution of which would therefore\r\nnot have been quite without reason. For even if in\r\nmost cases it may have been founded upon error and\r\nabuse, we are still not authorized to look upon our forefathers\r\nas having been so utterly benighted, as to persecute\r\nwith the utmost vigour and cruelty for so many ages an absolutely\r\nimpossible crime. From this point of view moreover,\r\nwe can also understand that the common people should\r\nstill even to the present day persist in attributing certain\r\ncases of illness to a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003emaleficium\u003c/i\u003e, and are not to be dissuaded\r\nfrom this conviction. Now if we are thus induced by the\r\nprogress of the age to modify the extreme view adopted by\r\nthe last century concerning the absolute nullity of this ill-famed\r\nart—at any rate with respect to some part of it—still\r\nnowhere is caution more necessary than here, in order\r\nto fish out from the chaos of fraud, falsehood and absurdity\r\ncontained in the writings of Agrippa von Nettesheim,\r\nWierus, Bodinus, Delrio, Bindsfeldt, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c., the few\r\nisolated truths that may lie in them. For, frequent\r\nthough they may be throughout the world, nowhere have\r\nlies and deceit freer play than where Nature\u0027s laws are\r\navowedly set aside, nay declared invalid. Here therefore\r\nwe find the wildest fictions, the strangest freaks of the\r\nimagination worked up into an edifice, lofty as the skies,\r\non the narrow foundation of the slight particle of truth there\r\nmay have been in Magic, and in consequence of this, the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg337\"\u003e[337]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmost sanguinary atrocities perpetrated age after age. In\r\ncontemplating such things, the psychological reflection on\r\nthe unlimited capability of the human intellect for accepting\r\nthe most incredible absurdities and the readiness of\r\nthe human heart to set its seal to them by cruelty, prevails\r\nover every other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet the modification which has taken place of late in the\r\nviews of German \u003cem\u003esavants\u003c/em\u003e respecting magic, is not due\r\nexclusively to Animal Magnetism. The deep foundations\r\nof it had already been laid by the change in philosophy\r\nwrought by Kant, which makes German culture differ\r\nfundamentally from that of the rest of Europe, with\r\nrespect to philosophy as well as to other branches of\r\nknowledge.—For a man to be able to smile beforehand at\r\nall occult sympathies, let alone magical influences, he must\r\nfind the world very, nay completely, intelligible. But this\r\nis only possible if he looks at it with the utterly superficial\r\nglance which puts away from it all suspicion that we\r\nhuman beings are immersed in a sea of riddles and mysteries\r\nand have no exhaustive knowledge or understanding\r\neither of things or of ourselves in any direct way. Nearly\r\nall great men have been of the opposite frame of mind\r\nand therefore, whatever age or nation they belonged to,\r\nhave always betrayed a slight tinge of superstition. If\r\nour natural mode of knowing were one that handed over\r\nto us things in themselves immediately and consequently\r\ngave us the absolutely true relations and connections of\r\nthings, we might then, no doubt, be justified in rejecting \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà\r\npriori\u003c/i\u003e, therefore unconditionally, all prescience of future\r\nevents, all apparitions of absent, of dying, let alone of\r\ndeceased persons, and all magical influence. But if all\r\nthat we know is, as Kant teaches, mere phenomenon, the\r\nforms and laws of which do not extend to things in themselves,\r\nit must be obviously premature to reject all foreknowledge,\r\nall apparitions and all magic; since that\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg338\"\u003e[338]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nrejection is based upon laws, whose \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e character precisely\r\nrestricts them to phenomena; whereas things in\r\nthemselves, to which even our own inner self must belong,\r\nremain untouched by them. But it is quite possible for\r\nthese very things in themselves to have relations with us\r\nfrom which the above-mentioned occurrences may have\r\narisen, concerning which accordingly we have to wait for the\r\ndecision \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà posteriori\u003c/i\u003e, and must not forestall it. That the\r\nEnglish and French should persist in denying \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e all\r\nsuch occurrences, comes at the bottom from the influence\r\nof Locke\u0027s philosophy, under which these nations still\r\nstand as to all essential points, and by which we are taught\r\nthat, after merely subtracting sensation, we know things\r\nin themselves. According to this view therefore, the\r\nlaws of the material world are held to be ultimate, and\r\nno other influence than \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003einfluxus physicus\u003c/i\u003e is admitted.\r\nConsequently these nations believe, it is true, in a physical,\r\nbut not in a metaphysical, science, and therefore\r\nreject all other than so-called \"Natural Magic:\"\r\na term which contains the same \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003econtradictio in adjecto\u003c/i\u003e as\r\n\"Supernatural Physics,\" but is nevertheless constantly\r\nused quite seriously, while the latter was used but once,\r\nand then in joke, by Lichtenberg. On the other hand, the\r\ncommon people, with their universal readiness to give\r\ncredit to supernatural influences, express by it in their own\r\nway the conviction, that all things which we perceive and\r\ncomprehend are mere phenomena, not things in themselves;\r\nalthough, with them, conviction is only felt. I quote the\r\nfollowing passage from Kant\u0027s \"Grundlegung zur Metaphysik\r\nder Sitten,\" as a proof that this is not saying too\r\nmuch: \"There is an observation requiring no great subtlety\r\nof reflection, which we may on the contrary suppose the most\r\nordinary understanding capable of making, albeit in its\r\nown way and by an obscure distinction of the faculty of\r\njudgment, which it calls feeling. It is this: that all our\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg339\"\u003e[339]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninvoluntary representations (such as those of the senses)\r\ngive us no further knowledge of objects than as they affect\r\nus, whereby we are left in ignorance as to what those\r\nobjects may be in themselves; that, as far as this sort of\r\nrepresentation is concerned therefore, we are still only\r\nable by this means to attain knowledge of phenomena, but\r\nnever of \u003cem\u003ethings in themselves\u003c/em\u003e, even by dint of the utmost\r\nclearness and the most strenuous attention the understanding\r\nis able to give to this point. When once this\r\ndistinction is made, however, it stands to reason, that the\r\nexistence of something else behind these phenomena,\r\nsomething which is not phenomenon, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e the thing in\r\nitself, has still to be admitted and assumed.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_303\" title=\"Kant, \u0027First Principles of Ethical Metaphysic,\u0027 3rd edition, p. 105.\" id=\"FNanchor_303\"\u003e[303]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen we read D. Tiedemann\u0027s \"History of Magic,\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_304\" title=\"D. Tiedemann, \u0027Disputatio de quæstione, quæ fuerit artum magicarum origo.\u0027 Marb. 1787. A prize-essay written for the Göttingen Society.\" id=\"FNanchor_304\"\u003e[304]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwe are astonished at the persistency with which mankind\r\nhave clung to the thought of Magic in all places and at all\r\ntimes, notwithstanding frequent failure; and we come to\r\nthe conclusion, that this thought must, to say the least, be\r\ndeeply rooted in human nature, if not in things in general,\r\nand cannot be a mere arbitrary creation of the fancy. Although\r\nMagic is differently defined by the various authors\r\nwho have treated of it, the fundamental thought which\r\npredominates in all its definitions is nevertheless unmistakeable.\r\nFor the opinion, that there must be another quite\r\ndifferent way of producing changes in the world besides\r\nthe regular one through the causal nexus between bodies,\r\nand one moreover which is not founded at all upon that\r\nnexus, has found favour in all ages and countries. Therefore\r\nalso the means belonging to this second way appeared\r\nabsurd, when they were viewed in the same light as the\r\nfirst; since the cause applied was obviously not suited\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg340\"\u003e[340]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto the effect intended and a causal nexus between them\r\nwas impossible. But here it was assumed, that apart\r\nfrom the outer connection between the phenomena of\r\nthis world on which the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003enexus physicus\u003c/i\u003e is founded, there\r\nmust exist another besides, passing through the very\r\nessence in itself of all things: a subterranean connection as\r\nit were, by means of which immediate action was possible\r\nfrom \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e point of the phenomenon on to every other point,\r\nthrough a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003enexus metaphysicus\u003c/i\u003e;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e accordingly, it must be possible to act upon things\r\nfrom inside, instead of from outside, as is usual;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e it must be possible for phenomenon to act upon\r\nphenomenon by means of that being in itself, which is one\r\nand the same in all phenomena;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e, just as we act causally as \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003enatura naturata\u003c/i\u003e, we\r\nmight probably be able to act also as \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003enatura naturans\u003c/i\u003e, and\r\nmomentarily to enable the microcosm to play the part of\r\nthe macrocosm;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e, however firm the partition walls of individuation\r\nand separation might be, they might nevertheless occasionally\r\npermit a communication to take place as it were behind\r\nthe scenes, or like a secret game under the table; and\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e, just as a neutralisation of individual isolation takes\r\nplace in somnambulistic \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eclairvoyance\u003c/i\u003e, so likewise might a\r\nneutralisation of the will in the individual be possible. Such\r\na thought as this cannot have arisen empirically, nor can\r\nit have been confirmation through experience that has preserved\r\nit throughout all ages and in all countries: for in\r\nthe majority of cases experience must result downright unfavourably\r\nto it. I opine therefore, that the origin of this\r\nthought, which has universally held its ground with the\r\nwhole of mankind and, in spite of so much conflicting\r\nexperience, in defiance of common sense, has never been\r\neradicated, must be sought at great depth: namely in the\r\ninward feeling of the omnipotence of the will in itself—of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg341\"\u003e[341]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat will, which constitutes at once the inner essence of\r\nMan and of the whole of Nature—and in the assumption\r\nconnected with it that, somehow or other, this omnipotence\r\nmight possibly for once make itself felt, even when proceeding\r\nfrom the individual. People were unable to investigate\r\nand distinguish the difference between the capabilities\r\nof the will as thing in itself and the same will in its\r\nindividual manifestation; but they assumed without further\r\nado, that under certain circumstances, the will might\r\nbe enabled to break through the barriers of individuation.\r\nFor the above-mentioned feeling rebelled obstinately\r\nagainst the knowledge forced upon it by experience, that\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poetry-container\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003e\"Der Gott der mir im Busen wohnt,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse indent2\"\u003eKann tief mein Innerstes erregen,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eDer über allen meinen Kräften thront,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse indent2\"\u003eEr kann nach Aussen nichts bewegen.\"\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAccording to the fundamental thought just expounded, we\r\nfind that the physical medium used in all attempts at\r\nmagic, never was regarded in any other light than in that\r\nof a vehicle for a thing metaphysical; otherwise it could\r\nevidently stand in no relation whatever to the effect contemplated.\r\nThese media consisted in cabalistic words, symbolical\r\nactions, traced figures, wax images, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c. We see\r\ntoo that, according to the original feeling, what this vehicle\r\nconveyed, was in the last resort always an act of \u003cem\u003evolition\u003c/em\u003e\r\nthat had been connected with it. The very natural inducement\r\nto do this, was the observation, that every moment men\r\nbecame aware of a completely unaccountable, that is, evidently\r\nmetaphysical, agency of the will, in the movements\r\nof their own bodies. Might not this agency, they thought,\r\nbe extended to other bodies also? To find out a way to\r\nannul the isolation in which the will finds itself in each individual,\r\nand to extend the immediate sphere of the will\u0027s\r\naction beyond the organism of the person willing, was the\r\naim of Magic.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg342\"\u003e[342]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nA great deal was nevertheless still wanting ere this fundamental\r\nthought, from which Magic seems properly to\r\nhave sprung, could pass over at once into distinct consciousness\r\nand be recognised \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ein abstracto\u003c/i\u003e, and ere Magic\r\ncould at once understand itself. Only a few thoughtful\r\nand learned writers of former ages—as I mean soon to prove\r\nby quotations—express the distinct thought, that it is in \u003cem\u003ethe\r\nwill\u003c/em\u003e itself that the magic power lies, and that the strange\r\nsigns and acts together with the senseless words that\r\naccompanied them, which passed for the means of exorcising\r\nand the connecting link with demons, are in fact merely\r\nvehicles and means for fixing \u003cem\u003ethe will\u003c/em\u003e, by which the act of\r\nvolition, which is to act magically, ceases to be mere wish\r\nand becomes deed, or, to use the language of Paracelsus,\r\n\"receives a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecorpus\u003c/i\u003e,\" and the individual will in a sense distinctly\r\nproclaims that it is now acting as general will, as\r\nwill in itself. For in every act of Magic—charm-cure or\r\nwhatever else it may be—the outward action (the connecting\r\nlink) is exactly what the passes are in magnetising:\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e not what is really essential, but the mere vehicle,\r\nthat by which the will, the only real agent, is directed and\r\nfixed in the material world and enters into reality. As a\r\nrule therefore, it is indispensable.—From the rest of the\r\nwriters of those times we gather that, in conformity with\r\nthat fundamental thought of Magic, their only aim was to\r\nobtain absolute, arbitrary power over Nature. But they\r\nwere unable to elevate themselves to the thought that this\r\npower must be a \u003cem\u003edirect\u003c/em\u003e one; they conceived it, on the contrary,\r\nabsolutely as an \u003cem\u003eindirect\u003c/em\u003e one. For all religions in\r\nall countries had placed Nature under the dominion of\r\ngods and of demons. Now, it was the magician\u0027s endeavour\r\nto subject these gods and demons to his will, to induce,\r\nnay, to force them to serve him; and he attributed\r\nall that he succeeded in achieving to their agency, just as\r\nMesmer attributed the success of his Magnetism to the magnetic\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg343\"\u003e[343]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nrods he held in his hands, instead of to his will which\r\nwas the real agent. It was in this sense that all polytheistic\r\nnations took the matter, and even Plotinus,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_305\" title=\"Here and there, Plotinus betrays a more correct knowledge, for instance, \u0027Enn.\u0027 ii. lib. iii. c. 7; \u0027Enn.\u0027 iv. lib. iii. c. 12, et lib. ix. c. 3.\" id=\"FNanchor_305\"\u003e[305]\u003c/a\u003e but\r\nmore especially Iamblichus, understood Magic: that is, as\r\n\u003cem\u003eTheurgy\u003c/em\u003e, an expression which Porphyry was the first to\r\nuse. That divine aristocracy, Pantheism, was favourable to\r\nthis interpretation, since it distributed the dominion over\r\nthe different forces of Nature among as many gods and\r\ndemons—mostly mere personifications of natural forces—and\r\nthe magician, by persuasion or by force, subjected now\r\none, now the other of these divinities to his power and\r\nmade them do his bidding. But in a Divine Monarchy,\r\nwhere all Nature obeys a single ruler, the thought of contracting\r\na private alliance with the Almighty, let alone of\r\nexercising sovereignty over him, would have been too audacious.\r\nTherefore where Judaism, Christianity or Islam\r\nprevailed, the omnipotence of the one God stood in the\r\nway of this interpretation of Magic: an omnipotence which\r\nthe magician could not venture to attack. He had no\r\nalternative therefore, but to take refuge with the Devil,\r\nand with this rebellious spirit—perhaps even direct descendant\r\nof Ahriman—to whom some power over Nature\r\nwas still attributed, he now entered into a compact, by\r\nwhich he ensured to himself his assistance. This was\r\n\"necromancy\" (the \u0027black art\u0027). Its antithesis, \u0027white\r\nMagic,\u0027 was opposed to it by the circumstance that, in it,\r\nthe magician did not make friends with the Devil, but\r\nrather solicited the permission, not to say co-operation,\r\nof the Almighty himself, to intercede with the angels;\r\noftener still, he invoked devils by pronouncing the rarer\r\nHebrew names and titles of the One God, such as Adon-Ai,\r\n\u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c., and compelled them to obey him, without promising\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg344\"\u003e[344]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthem anything in return for their services, in a hell-compulsion\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_306\" title=\"Delrio, \u0027Disq. mag.\u0027 L. ii. qu. 2. Agrippa a Nettesheym, \u0027De Vanit. Scient.\u0027 c. 45.\" id=\"FNanchor_306\"\u003e[306]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n(\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eHöllenzwang\u003c/i\u003e).—But all these mere interpretations\r\nand outward trappings of the thing were received so\r\nentirely as its essence and as objective processes, that\r\nwriters like Bodinus, Delrio, Bindsfeldt, \u0026amp;c., whose knowledge\r\nof magic was second-hand and not derived from personal\r\nexperience, all assert the essential characteristic of\r\nMagic to be, that it does not act either through forces of\r\nNature or in a natural way, but through the assistance of\r\nthe Devil. This view was, and long remained, current\r\neverywhere, locally modified according to the religions\r\nwhich prevailed in different countries. The laws against\r\nsorcery and the trials for witchcraft were based upon it;\r\nlikewise, wherever the possibility of Magic was contested,\r\nthe attacks were generally directed against this opinion.\r\nAn objective view, such as this, was an inevitable consequence\r\nof the decided Realism which prevailed throughout\r\nancient and mediæval Europe and which Descartes was the\r\nfirst to disturb. Till then, Man had not learnt to direct\r\nthe light of speculative thought towards the mysterious\r\ndepths of his own inner self, but, on the contrary, had\r\nsought everything outside himself. Above all the thought\r\nof making the will he found within him rule over Nature,\r\nwas so bold, that people would have been alarmed by it:\r\ntherefore it was made to rule over fictitious beings, supposed\r\nby the prevailing superstition to have command over\r\nNature, in order through them to obtain at least indirect\r\nmastery over Nature. Every sort of god or demon moreover,\r\nis always a hypostasis, by which believers of all sects\r\nand colours bring to their own comprehension the \u003cem\u003eMetaphysical\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nthat which lies \u003cem\u003ebehind\u003c/em\u003e Nature, that which gives her\r\nexistence and consistence and consequently rules over her.\r\nThus, when it is said, that Magic acts by the help of demons,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg345\"\u003e[345]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe meaning which lies at the bottom of this thought still\r\nis, that it is an agency which is not physically, but \u003cem\u003emetaphysically\u003c/em\u003e\r\nexercised: that it is not a natural, but a supernatural,\r\nagency. Now if, in the small amount of fact which speaks\r\nin favour of the reality of Magic: that is, in Animal Magnetism\r\nand charm-cures, we still do not recognise anything\r\nbut an immediate action of the will which here manifests its\r\ndirect power outside, instead of inside, the individual; if\r\nmoreover, as I am about to show and to substantiate by decisive,\r\nunequivocal citations, those who are more deeply\r\ninitiated into ancient Magic, derive all its effects from the\r\nmagician\u0027s will alone: this is surely strong empirical evidence\r\nin support of my doctrine, that the Metaphysical in\r\ngeneral, that which alone exists apart from representation,\r\nthe \u003cem\u003ething in itself\u003c/em\u003e of the universe—is nothing but what is\r\nknown to us within ourselves as \u003cem\u003ethe will\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, if the direct power which may occasionally be\r\nexercised over Nature by the will, was conceived by those\r\nmagicians as a merely indirect one, acquired by the help of\r\ndemons, this still could not prevent its efficiency wherever\r\nand whenever it may have taken place. For, precisely\r\nbecause, in things of this kind, the will acts in itself, in\r\nits primariness, therefore apart from representation, its\r\nefficiency cannot be frustrated by erroneous conceptions of\r\nthe intellect; on the contrary, the distance here is a wide\r\none between theory and practice: the errors of the former\r\ndo not stand in the way of the latter, nor does a correct\r\ntheory qualify for practice. Mesmer, in the beginning,\r\nattributed his agency to the magnetic rods he held in his\r\nhands and later on explained the wonders of Animal\r\nMagnetism by a materialistic theory of a subtle, all-permeating\r\nfluid; nevertheless he produced wonderfully\r\npowerful effects. I once myself knew the proprietor of an\r\nestate, whose peasants were wont by tradition to have their\r\nfeverish attacks dispelled by a spell of their master\u0027s. Now,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg346\"\u003e[346]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nalthough he believed he had convinced himself of the impossibility\r\nof all such things, yet he continued good-naturedly\r\nto comply with their wish as usual, and indeed\r\noften succeeded in relieving them. This success he ascribed\r\nto his peasants\u0027 firm belief, forgetting that a similar faith\r\nought also to bring success to the medical treatment which\r\nis so often applied with complete inefficacy to believing\r\npatients.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, if Theurgy and Demonomagic, as described above,\r\nwere but the mere interpretation and outward trappings of\r\nthe thing, the mere husk, at which the majority were content\r\nto stop short: there were nevertheless some, who went\r\nbelow the surface and quite recognised that the agent in\r\ninfluences supposed to proceed from magic, was absolutely\r\nnothing but \u003cem\u003ethe will\u003c/em\u003e. We must not however look for such\r\ndeeper observers as these among the discountenancers and\r\nantagonists of Magic, and the majority of the writers on\r\nthis subject belong precisely to these: they derived their\r\nknowledge exclusively from Courts of Justice and from\r\nthe examination of witnesses, so that they merely describe\r\nthe outside of the matter; and, if at any time they chanced,\r\nthrough confessions, to gain an insight into the inner\r\nprocesses they took good care not to betray that knowledge,\r\nlest, by doing so, they should contribute to diffuse the\r\nterrible vice of sorcery. To this class belong Bodinus,\r\nDelrio, Bindsfeldt, and others. For information as to the\r\nreal nature of the thing, we must on the contrary go to\r\nphilosophers and investigators of Nature, who wrote in\r\nthose times of prevailing superstition. Now, from what\r\nthey say, it clearly follows, that the real agent in Magic,\r\njust as in Animal Magnetism, is nothing but \u003cem\u003ethe will\u003c/em\u003e.\r\nHere I must quote some passages in support of this\r\nassertion.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_307\" title=\"Roger Bacon already in the thirteenth century said: … \u0027Quod si ulterius aliqua anima maligna cogitat fertiter de infectione alterius atque ardenter desideret et certitudinaliter intendat, atque vehementer consideret se posse nocere, non est dubium quin natura obediet cogitationibus animæ.\u0027 (See Rogeri Bacon, \u0027Opus Majus,\u0027 Londini, 1733, p. 252.)\" id=\"FNanchor_307\"\u003e[307]\u003c/a\u003e Theophrastus Paracelsus especially disclosed\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg347\"\u003e[347]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nperhaps more concerning the inner nature of Magic than\r\nany other writer, and does not even hesitate to give a\r\nminute description of the processes used in it.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_308\" title=\"Theophrastus Paracelsus, Strassburg edition in two folio vols., vol. i, pp. 91, 353, et seqq. and p. 789; vol. ii. pp. 362, 496.\" id=\"FNanchor_308\"\u003e[308]\u003c/a\u003e—He says:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_309\" title=\"Vol. i. p. 19.\" id=\"FNanchor_309\"\u003e[309]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\"To be observed concerning wax images: if I bear malice\r\nin my will against anyone, that malice must be carried out\r\nby some medium or \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecorpus\u003c/i\u003e. Thus it is possible for my\r\nspirit to stab or wound another person without help from\r\nmy body in using a sword, merely by my \u003cem\u003efervent desire\u003c/em\u003e.\r\nTherefore it is also possible for me to convey my opponent\u0027s\r\nspirit into the image by my \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e and then to deform\r\nor paralyze it at pleasure.—You must know, that the\r\ninfluence of the \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e is a great point in medicine. For if a\r\nman hate another and begrudge him anything good, it is\r\npossible that if he curse him, that curse may take effect.—This\r\noccurs also with animals and more easily than with\r\nmen; for the spirit of man has far greater power of resistance\r\nthan that of animals.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd p. 375: \"It follows from this, that one image has\r\nmagic power over another, not by virtue of the characters\r\nor anything of that kind impressed on the virgin wax;\r\nbut the imagination overcomes its own constellation, so as\r\nto become a means for fulfilling the will of its heaven, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof its man.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ep. 334: \"All the imagining of man comes from his\r\nheart. The heart is the sun of the microcosm. And all\r\nthe imagining of man passes from the small sun of the\r\nmicrocosm into the sun of the great Universe, into the heart\r\nof the macrocosm. Thus the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eimaginatio\u003c/i\u003e of the microcosm\r\nis a seed which becomes material,\" \u0026amp;c.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg348\"\u003e[348]\u003c/span\u003e\r\np. 364: \"It suffices for you to know what rigorous\r\nimagination does, which is the beginning of all magical\r\nworks.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ep. 789: \"Even my thought therefore is a looking at a\r\nmark. Now I must not turn my eye with my hands in\r\nthis or that direction; but my imagination turns it as I\r\nwish. And this is also to be understood of walking: I\r\ndesire, I propose to myself, therefore my body moves, and\r\nthe firmer my thoughts, the more sure it is that I shall run.\r\nThus \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eimaginatio\u003c/i\u003e alone is an impulse for my running.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ep. 837: \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eImaginatio\u003c/i\u003e used against me may be employed\r\nwith such rigour, that I may be killed by the\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eimaginatio\u003c/i\u003e of another person.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVol. ii. p. 274: \"Imagination comes from longing\r\nand desire: envy, hatred, proceed from longing, for they\r\ndo not arise unless you long for them. As soon as you\r\nwish, the act of the imagination follows. This longing\r\nmust be quick, ardent, lively, as that of a pregnant\r\nwoman, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c.—A general curse is commonly verified.\r\nWhy? It comes from the heart, and the seed lies and is\r\nborn in that coming from the heart. Thus parents\u0027 curses\r\nalso come from the heart. The curse of the poor is likewise\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eimaginatio\u003c/i\u003e. The prisoner\u0027s curse, also mere \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eimaginatio\u003c/i\u003e,\r\ncomes from the heart…. Thus too, when one\r\nman wishes to stab or paralyze, \u0026amp;c., another by means of\r\nhis \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eimaginatio\u003c/i\u003e, he must first attract the thing and instrument\r\nto himself and then he can impress it (with his\r\nwish): for whatever enters into it, may also go out of it\r\nagain by the medium of thought as well as by that of the\r\nhands…. In such imagining, women outdo men …\r\nfor they are more ardent in revenge.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ep. 298: \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eMagica\u003c/i\u003e is a great occult wisdom; just as\r\nReason is a great, open folly…. No armour avails\r\nagainst sorcery, for it wounds the inner man, the vital\r\nspirit…. Some magicians make an image in the shape\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg349\"\u003e[349]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof a man they intend [to harm], knock a nail into the sole\r\nof its foot, and the man is invisibly struck with lameness,\r\nuntil the nail is removed.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ep. 307: \"We ought to know, that we may convey the\r\nspirit of any man into an image, solely by faith and by our\r\nstrong imagination.—No incantation is needed, and the\r\nceremonies, drawing of circles, fumigations, seals, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c.\r\nare mere humbug to mislead.—\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eHomunculi\u003c/i\u003e and images are\r\nmade, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c. … by which all the operations, powers\r\nand will of man are carried out…. The human heart\r\nis indeed so great a thing, that no one can express it: as\r\nGod is eternal and imperishable, so also is the heart of\r\nman. If we men thoroughly recognised our heart, nothing\r\nwould be impossible for us on earth…. Perfect imagination,\r\ncoming from the stars (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eastris\u003c/i\u003e) arises from the heart.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ep. 513: \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eImaginatio\u003c/i\u003e is confirmed and rendered perfect\r\nby the belief that it really takes place: for every doubt\r\ninjures the effect. Faith must confirm the imagination,\r\nfor faith decides the will…. But just the fact that\r\nman does not always perfectly imagine, perfectly \u003cem\u003ebelieve\u003c/em\u003e,\r\ncauses acts to be called uncertain, which nevertheless may\r\ncertainly and quite well exist.\" A passage from Campanella\u0027s\r\nbook, \"De sensu rerum et magia,\" may serve to\r\nelucidate this last sentence. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eEfficiunt alii ne homo possi\r\nfutuere, si tantum credat: non enim potest facere quod non\r\ncredit posse facere\u003c/i\u003e (l. iv. c. 18).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgrippa von Nettesheim\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_310\" title=\"\u0027De occulta philosophia,\u0027 lib. 1, c. 66.\" id=\"FNanchor_310\"\u003e[310]\u003c/a\u003e speaks in the same sense.\r\n\"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eNon minus subjicitur corpus alieno animo, quam alieno\r\ncorpori\u003c/i\u003e;\" and:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_311\" title=\"Ibid. c. 67.\" id=\"FNanchor_311\"\u003e[311]\u003c/a\u003e \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eQuidquid dictat animus fortissime odientis\r\nhabet efficaciam nocendi et destruendi; similiter in ceteris,\r\nquæ affectat animus fortissimo desiderio. Omnia enim quæ\r\ntunc agit et dictat ex characteribus, figuris, verbis, gestibus\r\net ejusmodi, omnia sunt adjuvantia appetitum animæ et\r\nacquirunt mirabiles quasdam virtutes, tum ab anima laborantis\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg350\"\u003e[350]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin illa hora, quando ipsum appetitus ejusmodi\r\nmaxime invadit, tum ab influxa cœlesti animum tunc\r\ntaliter movente.\"\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_312\" title=\"\u0027De occulta philosophia,\u0027 lib. 1, cc. 66, 67 et 68.\" id=\"FNanchor_312\"\u003e[312]\u003c/a\u003e\u003ci\u003e—\"Inest hominum animis virtus quædam\r\nimmutandi et ligandi res et homines ad id quod desiderat,\r\net omnes res obediunt illi, quando fertur in magnum excessum\r\nalicujus passionis, vel virtutis, in tantum, ut superet\r\neos, quos ligat. Radix ejusmodi ligationis ipsa est affectio\r\nanimæ vehemens et exterminata.\"\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd likewise Jul. Cæs. Vanninus, \"De admir. naturæ\r\narcan.\" L. iv. dial. 5, § 435: \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eVehementem imaginationem,\r\ncui spiritus et sanguis obediunt, rem mente conceptam\r\nrealiter efficere, non solum intra, sed et extra\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_313\" title=\"Ibid. p. 440: Addunt Avicennæ dictum: \u0027Ad validam alicujus imaginationem cadit camelus.\u0027 Ibid. p. 478, speaking of charms: fascinatio ne quis cum muliere coeat, he says: Equidem in Germania complures allocutus sum vulgari cognomento Necromantistas, qui ingenue confessi sunt, se firme satis credere, meras fabulas esse opiniones, quæ de dæmonibus vulgo circumferuntur, aliquid tamen ipsos operari, vel vi herbarum commovendo phantasiam,…\" id=\"FNanchor_313\"\u003e[313]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eJust so Joh. Bapt. Van Helmont, who takes great\r\npains to explain away as much as possible of the Devil\u0027s\r\ninfluence, in order to attribute it to the will. I quote a\r\nfew passages from the voluminous collection of his works,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eOrtus Medicinæ\u003c/i\u003e:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eRecepta injecta\u003c/i\u003e. § 12. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eQuum hostis naturæ (diabolus)\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg351\"\u003e[351]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nipsam applicationem complere ex se nequeat, suscitat ideam\r\nfortis desiderii et odii in saga, ut, mutuatis istis mentalibus\r\net liberis mediis, transferat suum velle per quod quodque\r\nafficere intendit.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_315\" title=\"\u0027Der Teufel hat sie\u0027s zwar gelehrt; Allein der Teufel kann\u0027s nicht machen.\u0027–Faust. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_315\"\u003e[315]\u003c/a\u003e Quorsum imprimis etiam execrationes,\r\ncum idea desiderii et terroris, odiosissimis suis scrofis præscribit.\u003c/i\u003e—§\r\n13. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eQuippe desiderium istud, ut est passio imaginantis,\r\nita quoque creat ideam, non quidem inanem, sed executivam\r\natque incantamenti motivam.\u003c/i\u003e—§ 19. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprout jam\r\ndemonstravi, quod vis incantamenti potissima pendeat ab idea\r\nnaturali sagæ.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cem class=\"gesperrt\"\u003eDe injectis materialibus.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/i\u003e § 15. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eSaga, per ens naturale,\r\nimaginative format ideam liberam, naturalem et nocuam….\r\nSagæ operantur virtute naturali…. Homo etiam\r\ndimittit medium aliud executivum, emanativum et mandativum\r\nad incantandum hominem; quod medium est Idea fortis\r\ndesiderii. Est nempe desiderio inseparabile ferri circa optata.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cem class=\"gesperrt\"\u003eDe sympatheticis mediis.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/i\u003e § 2. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIdeæ scilicet desiderii,\r\nper modum influentiarum cœlestium, jaciuntur in proprium\r\nobjectum, utcunque localiter remotum. Diriguntur nempe a\r\ndesiderio objectum sibi specificante.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cem class=\"gesperrt\"\u003eDe magnetica vulnerum curatione.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/i\u003e § 76. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIgitur\r\nin sanguine est quædam potestas exstatica, quæ, si quando\r\nardenti desiderio excita fuerit, etiam ad absens aliquod objectum,\r\nexterioris hominis spiritu deducenda sit: ea autem\r\npotestas in exteriori homine latet, velut in potentia; nec\r\nducitur ad actum, nisi excitetur, accensa imaginatione ferventi\r\ndesiderio, vel arte aliqua pari.\u003c/i\u003e—§ 98. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eAnima, prorsum\r\nspiritus, nequaquam posset spiritum vitalem (corporeum equidem),\r\nmulto minus carnem et ossa movere aut concitare, nisi\r\nvis illi quæpiam naturalis, magica tamen et spiritualis, ex\r\nanima in spiritum et corpus descenderet. Cedo, quo pacto\r\nobediret spiritus corporeus jussui animæ, nisi jussus spiritum,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg352\"\u003e[352]\u003c/span\u003e\r\net deinceps corpus movendo foret? At extemplo contra hanc\r\nmagicam motricem objicies, istam esse intra concretum sibi,\r\nsuumque hospitium naturale, idcirco hanc etsi magam vocitemus,\r\ntantum erit nominis detorsio et abusus, siquidem vera\r\net superstitiosa magica non ex anima basin desumit; cum\r\neadem hæc nil quidquam valeat, extra corpus suum movere,\r\nalterare aut ciere. Respondeo, vim et magicam illam naturalem\r\nanimæ, quæ extra se agat, virtute imaginis Dei, latere\r\njam obscuram in homine, velut obdormire (post prævaricationem),\r\nexcitationisque indigam: quæ eadem, utut somnolenta,\r\nac velut ebria, alioqui sit in nobis quotidie: sufficit\r\ntamen ad obeunda munia in corpore suo: dormit itaque\r\nscientia et potestas magica, et solo nutu actrix in homine.\u003c/i\u003e—§\r\n102. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eSatan itaque vim magicam hanc excitat (secus dormientem\r\net scientia exterioris hominis impeditam) in suis\r\nmancipiis, et inservit eadem illis, ensis vice in manu potentis,\r\nid est sagæ. Nec aliud prorsus Satan ad homicidium affert,\r\npræter excitationem dictæ potestatis somnolentæ.\u003c/i\u003e—§ 106.\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eSaga in stabulo absente occidit equum: virtus quædam naturalis\r\na spiritu sagæ, et non a Satana, derivatur, quæ opprimat\r\nvel strangulet spiritum vitalem equi.\u003c/i\u003e—§ 139. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eSpiritus voco\r\nmagnetismi patronos, non qui ex cœlo demittuntur, multoque\r\nminus de infernalibus sermo est; sed de iis, qui fiunt in ipso\r\nhomine, sicut ex silice ignis; ex voluntate hominis nempe\r\naliquantillum spiritus vitalis influentis desumitur, et id\r\nipsum assumit idealem entitatem, tanquam formam ad\r\ncomplementum. Qua nacta perfectione, spiritus mediam\r\nsortem inter corpora et non corpora assumit. Mittitur\r\nautem eo, quo voluntas ipsum dirigit; idealis igitur entitas\r\n… nullis stringitur locorum, temporum aut dimensionum\r\nimperiis, ea nec dæmon est, nec ejus ullus effectus;\r\nsed spiritualis quædam est actio illius, nobis plane naturalis\r\net vernacula.\u003c/i\u003e—§ 168. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIngens mysterium propalare\r\nhactenus distuli, ostendere videlicet, ad manum in homine\r\nsitam esse energiam, qua, solo nutu et phantasia sua, queat\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg353\"\u003e[353]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nagere extra se et imprimere virtutem aliquam, influentiam\r\ndeinceps perseverantem, et agentem in objectum longissime\r\nabsens.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eP. Pomponatius also says: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eSic contigit, tales esse homines,\r\nqui habeant ejusmodi vires in potentia, et per vim imaginativam\r\net desiderativam cum actu operantur, tales virtus exit\r\nad actum, et afficit sanguinem et spiritum, quæ per evaporationem\r\npetunt ad extra et producunt tales effectus\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_316\" title=\"De incantationibus. Opera Basil. 1567, p. 44.\" id=\"FNanchor_316\"\u003e[316]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eJane Leade, an English mystic visionary of Cromwell\u0027s\r\ntime and pupil of Pordage, has given us some very curious\r\ndisclosures of this kind. She is led to Magic in a very\r\nsingular way. For, as the doctrine of their becoming one\r\nwith the God of their religion is a fundamental characteristic\r\nof all Mystics, so is it with Jane Leade also.\r\nNow, with her however, the human will has its share in the\r\nomnipotence of the Divine will as a consequence of the\r\ntwo having become one, and accordingly acquires magic\r\npower. What other magicians therefore believe to be due\r\nto a compact with the Devil, she attributes to her becoming\r\none with her God. Her Magic is therefore in the\r\nhighest sense \u0027white Magic.\u0027 Besides, this alters nothing\r\nas to the practice and results. She is reserved and mysterious,\r\nas people had to be in those times; still it is\r\neasy to see that the thing is not a mere theoretical corollary,\r\nbut that it has sprung from knowledge and experience\r\nobtained in another way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is in her \"Revelation of Revelations\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_317\" title=\"German translation, Amsterdam, 1695, pp. 126 to 151, especially the pages headed \u0027the power of calm will.\u0027\" id=\"FNanchor_317\"\u003e[317]\u003c/a\u003e that we find\r\nthe chief passage; but the following one, which is rather\r\nan abridgment than a literal quotation and is contained\r\nin Horst\u0027s \"Zauberbibliothek,\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_318\" title=\"Horst, \u0027Zauberbibliothek\u0027 (Library of Magic), vol. i. p. 325.\" id=\"FNanchor_318\"\u003e[318]\u003c/a\u003e comes from the same\r\nbook: \"Magic power enables its possessor to rule over\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg354\"\u003e[354]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand to renew the creation—\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e the animal, vegetable and\r\nmineral kingdoms—so that, were \u003cem\u003emany\u003c/em\u003e to co-operate in \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e\r\nmagical power, Nature might be created anew as a paradise….\r\nHow is this magic power to be acquired? By renascence\r\nthrough faith: that is, by our \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e harmonizing with\r\nthe divine \u003cins title=\"will.\u0027\u0027\" id=\"C354\"\u003e\u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/ins\u003e For faith subjects the world to us, inasmuch\r\nas our own \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e, when it is in harmony with the divine\r\n\u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e, results, as St. Paul tells us, in making everything\r\nsubmit to and obey us.\" Thus far Horst.—p. 131 of the\r\n\"Revelation, \u0026amp;c.,\" Jane Leade shows that it was by the\r\nforce of his will that Christ worked miracles, as, for instance,\r\nwhen he said to the leper: \"I \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e; be thou\r\nclean.\" Sometimes however he left it to the will of those\r\nwho, he saw, believed in him, saying to them: \"\u0027What\r\n\u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e ye that I shall do unto you?\u0027 in which cases no\r\nless was done for them than they had desired in their\r\nwill that the Lord should do. These words of our\r\nSaviour\u0027s are well deserving of notice, since the \u003cem\u003ehighest\r\nMagia lies in the will\u003c/em\u003e, so far as it is in union with the will\r\nof the Almighty: when these two wheels fit into each\r\nother, becoming in a sense \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e, they are, \u0026amp;c.\"—Again,\r\np. 132, she says: \"For what could resist that which is\r\nunited with the will of God? The power of such a will is\r\nso great, that it always achieves its end. It is no \u003cem\u003enaked\r\nwill\u003c/em\u003e deprived of its clothing, or power; on the contrary, it\r\nbrings with it an irresistible omnipotence, which enables it\r\nto uproot, to plant, to put to death and to bring to life, to\r\nbind and to loose, to heal and to injure, which power will\r\nbe collected and concentrated in its entirety in the royal,\r\nfree-born will. Of this power we shall attain knowledge,\r\nwhen we shall have been made one with the Holy Ghost.\r\nor when we shall be united in one spirit and being.\"—Again,\r\np. 133: \"We must quench or drown altogether the\r\nmany multifarious wills which arise out of the mixed\r\nessence of souls, and they must lose themselves in the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg355\"\u003e[355]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nabysmal depth from which there will then arise and present\r\nitself the \u003cem\u003evirgin will\u003c/em\u003e, which was never the slave of\r\nanything belonging to degenerate man; on the contrary,\r\nit stands in connection with the Almighty Power, quite free\r\nand pure, and will infallibly produce fruits and results\r\nquite similar to those of the divine will … wherefrom\r\nthe burning oil of the Holy Ghost flows up in Magic, as it\r\nemits its fiery sparks.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eJacob Böhme too\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_319\" title=\"J. Böhme, \u0027Erklärung von sechs Punkten,\u0027 under Punkt v.\" id=\"FNanchor_319\"\u003e[319]\u003c/a\u003e speaks of Magic precisely in the sense\r\nhere described. Among other things he says: \"Magic is\r\nthe mother of the essence of all beings: for it creates itself\r\nand is understood in \u003cem\u003edesire\u003c/em\u003e…. True Magic is not a\r\nbeing, but the \u003cem\u003edesiring spirit\u003c/em\u003e of the being.—In fine: Magic\r\nis action in the \u003cem\u003ewill\u0027s spirit\u003c/em\u003e.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn corroboration, or at any rate in explanation, of the\r\nabove view of the will as the real agent in magic, a curious\r\nand interesting anecdote, related by Campanella, from\r\nAvicenna, may here find its place.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_320\" title=\"Campanella, \u0027De sensu rerum et magia,\u0027 l. iv. c. 18.\" id=\"FNanchor_320\"\u003e[320]\u003c/a\u003e \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eMulieres quædam\r\ncondixerunt, ut irent animi gratia in viridarium. Una\r\nearum non ivit. Ceteræ colludentes arangium acceperunt\r\net perforabant eum stilis acutis, dicentes: ita perforamus\r\nmulierem talem, quæ nobiscum venire detrectavit, et, projecto\r\narangio intra fontem, abierunt. Postmodum mulierem\r\nillam dolentem invenerunt, quod se transfigi quasi clavis\r\nacutis sentiret, ab ea hora, qua arangium ceteræ; perforarunt:\r\net cruciata est valde donec arangii clavos extraxerunt imprecantes\r\nbona et salutem.\u003c/i\u003e\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eKrusenstern\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_321\" title=\"Krusenstern\u0027s words are: \u0027A universal belief in witchcraft, which is held to be very important by all islanders, seems to me to be connected with their religion; for they assert that the priests alone possess magic power, although some of the common people also, it is said, profess to have the secret, probably in order to make themselves feared, and to exact presents. This sorcery, which they call Kaha, consists in inflicting a lingering death upon those to whom they bear a grudge, twenty days being however fixed as the term for this….\" id=\"FNanchor_321\"\u003e[321]\u003c/a\u003e gives a very curious and minute description\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg356\"\u003e[356]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof maleficent sorcery as practised, it is said successfully,\r\nby the priests of the savage tribes on the island of\r\nNukahiva, the procedure in which is exactly similar to that\r\nof our cures by charms.—This fact is especially remarkable\r\non account of the identity of the thing, notwithstanding\r\nthe distance from all European tradition. With it\r\nought to be compared Bende Bendsen\u0027s account of a headache\r\nhe caused in another person by sorcery, through the\r\nmedium of some of that person\u0027s hair which had been cut\r\noff. He concludes with the following words: \"As far as\r\nI can learn, what is called witchcraft consists simply in\r\npreparing and applying noxious magnetic charms combined\r\nwith a \u003cem\u003emaleficent influence of the will\u003c/em\u003e: this is the\r\ndetestable league with Satan.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_322\" title=\"Kieser, \u0027Archiv für thierischen Magnetismus,\u0027 vol. ix. s. i. in the note, pp. 128-132.\" id=\"FNanchor_322\"\u003e[322]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe agreement of all these writers, not only among\r\nthemselves, but with the convictions to which Animal\r\nMagnetism has led in latter years, and finally even with\r\nwhat might be concluded from my speculative doctrine on\r\nthis point, is surely a most remarkable phenomenon. This\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg357\"\u003e[357]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmuch is at any rate certain, that at the bottom of all the\r\nexperiments, successful or unsuccessful, which have ever\r\nbeen made in Magic, there lies an anticipation of my Metaphysic.\r\nFor in them is expressed the consciousness, that\r\nthe causal law only connects phenomena, while the inner\r\nnature of things remains independent of it; and also,\r\nthat if any \u003cem\u003edirect\u003c/em\u003e influence on Nature be possible from\r\nwithin, it can only take place through the \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e itself. But\r\neven if Magic were to be ranked as practical Metaphysic,\r\naccording to Bacon\u0027s classification, it is certain that no\r\nother theoretical Metaphysic would stand in the right\r\nrelation to it but mine, by which the world is resolved into\r\nWill and Representation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe zealous cruelty with which Magic has always been\r\npersecuted by the Church and to which the papal \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003emalleus\r\nmaleficarum\u003c/i\u003e bears terrible evidence, seems not to have for\r\nits sole basis the criminal purposes often associated with\r\nthe practice of Magic or the part assumed to be played\r\nby the Devil, but rather to proceed partly from a vague\r\nforeboding and fear lest Magic should trace back its\r\noriginal power to its true source; whereas the Church has\r\nassigned to it a place outside Nature.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_323\" title=\"They scent something of the \u0027Nos habitat, non tartara sed nec sidera cœli: Spiritus in nobis qui viget, illa facit.\u0027 (Not in the heavens it lives, nor yet in hell; The spirit that does it all, doth in us dwell.) Compare Johann Beaumont, \u0027Historisch-Physiologisch-und Theologischer Tractat von Geistern, Erscheinungen, Hexereyen und andern Zauber-Händeln, Halle im Magdeburgischen, 1721,\u0027 p. 281. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_323\"\u003e[323]\u003c/a\u003e The detestation\r\nshown by the cautious clergy of England towards Animal\r\nMagnetism\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_324\" title=\"Compare Parerga, vol. i. p. 257 (2nd ed. vol. i. p. 286).\" id=\"FNanchor_324\"\u003e[324]\u003c/a\u003e tends to confirm this supposition, and also\r\nthe active zeal with which they oppose table-turning,\r\nwhich at any rate is harmless, yet which, for the same\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg358\"\u003e[358]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreason, has been violently assailed by the anathemas of the\r\nFrench, and even of the German, clergy.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_325\" title=\"On the 4th of August, 1856, the Roman Inquisition issued a circular to all the bishops, in which it called upon them in the name of the Church to use their utmost influence against the practice of Animal Magnetism. The reasons for this are given with striking want of lucidity and great vagueness, and even here and there are not unmixed with falsehood; and it is easy to see that the Church is reluctant to own the real reason. This circular is published in the \u0027Turin Journal\u0027 of December, 1856, and again in the French \u0027Univers,\u0027 and reprinted from this in the \u0027Journal des Débats\u0027 of January 3rd, 1857. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_325\"\u003e[325]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg359\"\u003e[359]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eSINOLOGY.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNothing perhaps points more directly to a high\r\ndegree of civilization in China than the almost incredible\r\ndensity of its population, now rated, according\r\nto Gützlaff, at 367 millions of inhabitants.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_326\" title=\"According to a Chinese official Report on the census, printed in Pekin, and found by the English in the Chinese Governor\u0027s palace on entering Canton, China had 396 millions of inhabitants in 1852, and allowing for a constant increase, may now have 400 millions. (\u0027Moniteur de la Flotte,\u0027 end of May, 1857.)…\" id=\"FNanchor_326\"\u003e[326]\u003c/a\u003e For whether\r\nwe compare countries or ages, we find on the whole that\r\ncivilization keeps pace with population.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe pertinacious zeal with which the Jesuit missionaries\r\nof the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries strove to inculcate\r\ntheir own relatively new doctrines into the minds\r\nof this very ancient nation, and their futile endeavours to\r\ndiscover early traces of their own faith in that country,\r\nleft them no time for a profound study of the belief which\r\nprevails there. Therefore Europe has only lately obtained\r\nsome slight knowledge of the religious state of the Chinese.\r\nWe now know, that is to say, that in China there exists\r\nfirst of all a worship of Nature, which is universally\r\nprofessed, and dates from the earliest times, even, it\r\nis alleged, from before the discovery of fire, wherefore\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg360\"\u003e[360]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nanimals were sacrificed raw. The sacrifices offered up\r\npublicly at certain seasons or after great events by the\r\nChinese Emperor and the chief dignitaries of the Empire,\r\nbelong to this worship. These sacrifices are dedicated\r\nfirst and foremost to the blue sky and to the earth—to the\r\nblue sky in the winter solstice, to the earth in the summer\r\nsolstice—and, after these, to every possible power of Nature:\r\nthe sea, mountains, rivers, winds, thunder, rain, fire, \u0026amp;c.\r\n\u0026amp;c. A genius presides over each of these, and each genius\r\nhas several temples. On the other hand, each genius presiding\r\nover every single province, town, village, or street,\r\nnay over family funerals and even sometimes over a merchant\u0027s\r\nwarehouse, has also temples; only, in the two\r\nlast cases they are destined exclusively for private worship.\r\nBut public worship is besides offered up to former\r\nillustrious Emperors, founders of dynasties and to heroes,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e to all such as have benefited (Chinese) mankind by\r\nword or deed. Even these have their temples: Confucius\r\nalone having no less than 1,650 dedicated to him. This\r\ntherefore accounts for the great number of small temples\r\nfound throughout the Empire. With this hero-worship\r\ntoo, is associated the private worship offered up by every\r\nrespectable family on the tombs of their ancestors.—Now\r\nbesides this worship of Nature and of heroes, which is\r\nuniversal, there are three other prevailing religious doctrines\r\nin China, more with a dogmatical intent. First\r\namong these is the doctrine of Taossee, founded by Laotse,\r\nan older contemporary of Confucius. This is the doctrine\r\nof Reason, as the inner order of the Universe or inherent\r\nprinciple of all things, of the great One, the sublime\r\nGable-Beam (Taiki) which supports all the Rafters, yet is\r\nabove them (properly the all-pervading Soul of the World)\r\nand of Tao, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e the \u003cem\u003eWay\u003c/em\u003e, namely to salvation: that is, to\r\nredemption from the world and its misery. We have an\r\nexposition of this doctrine taken from the fountain-head in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg361\"\u003e[361]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nStanislas Julien\u0027s translation (1842) of Laotse\u0027s Taoteking,\r\nin which we find that the Tao-doctrine completely harmonizes\r\nwith Buddhism both in meaning and in spirit. This sect\r\nhowever seems to have fallen very much into the background,\r\nand its teachers to be now looked down upon.—Secondly, we\r\nfind the wisdom of Confucius, which has special attractions\r\nfor Chinese \u003cem\u003esavants\u003c/em\u003e and statesmen. Judging from translations,\r\nit is a rambling, commonplace, predominantly\r\npolitical, moral philosophy, without any metaphysical\r\nsupport, which has something peculiarly insipid and tiresome\r\nabout it.—Finally, there exists for the bulk of the\r\nnation Buddha\u0027s sublime doctrine full of love. The name,\r\nor rather title, of Buddha in China is \u003cem\u003eFo\u003c/em\u003e or \u003cem\u003eFhu\u003c/em\u003e, whilst in\r\nTartary the \"Victoriously-Perfect\" is more frequently\r\ncalled by his family-name, \u003cem\u003eShakia-Muni\u003c/em\u003e, and also \u003cem\u003eBurkhan-Bakshi\u003c/em\u003e;\r\nin Birma and Ceylon, he is generally called\r\n\u003cem\u003eGótama\u003c/em\u003e or \u003cem\u003eTagátata\u003c/em\u003e, but his original name was Prince\r\n\u003cem\u003eSiddharta\u003c/em\u003e.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_327\" title=\"For the benefit of those who wish to acquire a fuller knowledge of Buddhism, I here note down those works belonging to its literature, and written in European languages, which I can really recommend, for I possess them and know them well; the omission of a few others, for instance of Hodgson\u0027s and A. Rémusat\u0027s books, is intentional….\" id=\"FNanchor_327\"\u003e[327]\u003c/a\u003e This religion which, on account of its intrinsic\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg362\"\u003e[362]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nexcellence and truth, as well as of the great number of its\r\nfollowers, may be considered as ranking highest among all\r\nreligions on earth, prevails throughout the greater part of\r\nAsia, and according to the latest investigator, Spence\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg363\"\u003e[363]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nHardy, numbers 369 millions of believers: that is, far\r\nmore than any other.—These three religions, the most\r\nwidely diffused of which, Buddhism, subsists without any\r\nprotection whatever from the State, by its own power\r\nalone—a circumstance which speaks greatly in its favour—are\r\nfar from being hostile to one another, and exist quietly\r\nside by side, nay, harmonize even to a certain extent,\r\nperhaps by reciprocal influence, so that the sentence:\r\n\"The three doctrines are only one\", has become proverbial.\r\nThe Emperor, as such, professes all three; still many of\r\nthe Emperors, even up to the most recent times, have been\r\nespecially devoted to Buddhism. This is shown by their\r\nprofound respect for the Dalaï-Lama, nay, even for the\r\nTeshoo-Lama, to whom they unhesitatingly yield precedence.—These\r\nthree religions are neither monotheistic nor\r\npolytheistic, nor are they even pantheistic—Buddhism, at\r\nany rate, is not; since Buddha did not look upon a world\r\nsunk in sin and suffering, whose tenants, all subject to\r\ndeath, only subsist for a short time by devouring each\r\nother, as a manifestation of God. Moreover the word\r\nPantheism, properly speaking, contains a contradiction; for\r\nit denotes a self-destroying conception, and has therefore\r\nnever been understood otherwise than as a polite term of\r\nexpression by those who know what seriousness means.\r\nIt accordingly never entered into the heads of the clever,\r\nacute philosophers of the eighteenth century, not to take\r\nSpinoza for an Atheist, on account of his having called the\r\nworld Deus; on the contrary, this discovery was reserved for\r\nthe sham philosophers of our own times, who know nothing\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg364\"\u003e[364]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbut words: they even pique themselves on the achievement\r\nand accordingly talk about Acomism, the wags!\r\nBut I would humbly suggest leaving their meanings to\r\nwords—in short, calling the world, the world; and gods\r\ngods.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn their endeavours to acquire knowledge of the state of\r\nReligion in China, Europeans began as usual, and as the\r\nGreeks and Romans under similar circumstances had done,\r\nby first searching for points of contact with their own\r\nbelief. Now as, in their own way of thinking, the conceptions\r\nof Religion and of Theism were almost identified, or\r\nat any rate had grown together so closely, that they\r\ncould only be separated with great difficulty; as moreover,\r\ntill a more accurate knowledge of Asia had reached\r\nEurope, the very erroneous opinion had been disseminated—for\r\nthe purpose of argument \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ee consensu gentium\u003c/i\u003e—that all\r\nnations on earth worship a single, or at any rate a highest,\r\nGod, Creator of the Universe:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_328\" title=\"This is equivalent to imputing to the Chinese the thought, that all princes on earth are tributary to their Emperor. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_328\"\u003e[328]\u003c/a\u003e when they found themselves\r\nin a country where temples, priests and monasteries\r\nabounded, they started from the firm assumption that\r\nTheism would also be found there, though in some very unusual\r\nform. On seeing these expectations disappointed\r\nhowever, and on finding that the very conceptions of\r\nsuch things, let alone the words to express them, were\r\nunknown, it was but natural, considering the spirit in\r\nwhich their inquiries were made, that their first reports of\r\nthese religions should refer rather to what they did not,\r\nthan to what they did, contain. Besides, for many reasons,\r\nit can be no easy task for European heads to enter fully\r\ninto the sense of these faiths. In the first place, they\r\nare brought up in Optimism, whereas in Asia, existence\r\nitself is looked upon as an evil and the world as a scene of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg365\"\u003e[365]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmisery, where it were better not to find oneself. Another\r\nreason is to be found in the decided Idealism which is\r\nessential to Buddhism and to Hindooism: a view only\r\nknown in Europe as a paradox hardly worth a serious\r\nthought, advanced by certain eccentric philosophers; whereas\r\nin Asia it is even embodied in popular belief. For in Hindoostan\r\nit prevails universally as the doctrine of \u003cem\u003eMaja\u003c/em\u003e, and\r\nin Thibet, the chief seat of the Buddhist Church, it is\r\ntaught in an extremely popular way, a religious comedy\r\nbeing performed on occasions of special solemnity, in which\r\nthe Dalaï-Lama is represented arguing with the Arch-fiend.\r\nThe former defends Idealism, the latter Realism, and\r\namong other things the Devil says: \"What is perceived\r\nthrough the five sources of all knowledge (the senses), is\r\nno deception, and what you teach is not true.\" After a\r\nlong argumentation the matter is decided by a throw of\r\nthe dice: the Realist (the Devil) loses, and is dismissed\r\namid general jeering.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_329\" title=\"\u0027Description du Tubet,\u0027 traduite du Chinois en Russe par Bitchourin, et du Russe en Français par Klaproth, Paris, 1831, p. 65. Also in the \u0027Asiatic Journal\u0027 new series, vol. i. p. 15. [Köppen, \u0027Die Lamaische Hierarchie,\u0027 p. 315.–Add. to 3rd ed.]\" id=\"FNanchor_329\"\u003e[329]\u003c/a\u003e Keeping this fundamental difference\r\nin the whole way of thinking steadily in view, we\r\nshall find it not only excusable, but even natural, that in\r\ntheir investigation of the Asiatic religions Europeans\r\nshould at first have stopped short at the negative stand-point;\r\nthough, properly speaking, it has nothing to do\r\nwith the matter. We therefore find a great deal referring\r\nto this negative stand-point which in no way advances\r\nour positive knowledge; it all however amounts\r\nto this: that Monotheism—an exclusively Jewish doctrine,\r\nto be sure—is alien to Buddhists and in general to\r\nthe Chinese. For instance, in the \"Lettres Édifiantes\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_330\" title=\"\u0027Lettres édifiantes,\u0027 édit. de 1819, vol. viii. p. 46.\" id=\"FNanchor_330\"\u003e[330]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwe find: \"The Buddhists, whose views on the migration of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg366\"\u003e[366]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsouls are universally adopted, are accused of Atheism.\"\r\nIn the \"Asiatic Researches\" (vol. vi. p. 255) we find:\r\n\"The religion of the Birmans (Buddhism) shows them to\r\nbe a nation far advanced beyond the barbarism of a\r\nwild state and greatly influenced by religious opinions,\r\nbut which nevertheless has no knowledge of a Supreme\r\nBeing, Creator and Preserver of the world. Yet the system\r\nof morality recommended in their fables is perhaps\r\nas good as any other taught by the religious doctrines\r\nwhich prevail among \u003cins title=\"mankind.\" id=\"C366\"\u003emankind.\"\u003c/ins\u003e—And again, p. 258: \"The\r\nfollowers of Gótama (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e of Buddha) are strictly speaking\r\nAtheists.\"—\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 258: \"Gótama\u0027s sect consider the\r\nbelief in a divine Being, Creator of the world, to be highly\r\nimpious.\"—\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e, p. 268, Buchanan relates, that Atuli, the\r\nZarado or High-Priest of the Buddhists at Ava, in an\r\narticle upon his religion which he presented to a Catholic\r\nbishop, \"counted the doctrine, that there is a Being who\r\nhas created the world and all things in it and is alone\r\nworthy of adoration, among the six damnable heresies.\"\r\nSangermano relates precisely the same thing,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_331\" title=\"\u0027Description of the Burman Empire,\u0027 Rome. 1833. p. 81.\" id=\"FNanchor_331\"\u003e[331]\u003c/a\u003e and closes\r\nthe list of the six grave heresies with the words: \"The last\r\nof these impostors taught, that there is a Supreme Being,\r\nthe Creator of the world and of all things in it, and that he\r\nalone is worthy of adoration.\" Colebrooke too says:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_332\" title=\"Colebrooke, \u0027Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society,\u0027 vol. i.; \u0027Essay on the Philosophy of the Hindoos,\u0027 published also among his \u0027Miscellaneous Essays,\u0027 p. 236.\" id=\"FNanchor_332\"\u003e[332]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\"The sects of Jaina, and Buddha are really atheistic, for\r\nthey acknowledge no Creator of the world, nor any\r\nSupreme ruling Providence.\"—I. J. Schmidt\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_333\" title=\"\u0027Investigations concerning the Tibetans and Mongols,\u0027 p. 180.\" id=\"FNanchor_333\"\u003e[333]\u003c/a\u003e likewise\r\nsays: \"The system of Buddhism knows no eternal, uncreated,\r\nsingle, divine Being, having existed before all\r\nTime, who has created all that is visible and invisible.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg367\"\u003e[367]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThis idea is quite foreign to Buddhism and there is not the\r\nslightest trace of it anywhere in Buddhistic books.\"—We\r\nfind the learned sinologist Morrison too\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_334\" title=\"Morrison, \u0027Chinese Dictionary,\u0027 Macao, 1815, and following years, vol. i. p. 217.\" id=\"FNanchor_334\"\u003e[334]\u003c/a\u003e not less desirous\r\nto discover traces of a God in the Chinese dogmas and\r\nready to put the most favourable construction upon everything\r\nwhich seems to point in that direction; yet he is\r\nfinally obliged to own that nothing of the kind can be\r\nclearly discovered. Where he explains the words \u003cem\u003eThung\u003c/em\u003e and\r\n\u003cem\u003eTsing\u003c/em\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e repose and movement, as that on which Chinese\r\ncosmogony is based, he renews this inquiry and concludes\r\nit with the words: \"It is perhaps impossible to acquit\r\nthis system of the accusation of Atheism.\"—And even\r\nrecently Upham\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_335\" title=\"Upham, \u0027History and Doctrine of Buddhism,\u0027 London, 1829, p. 102.\" id=\"FNanchor_335\"\u003e[335]\u003c/a\u003e says: \"Buddhism presents to us a world\r\nwithout a moral ruler, guide or creator.\" The German\r\nsinologist Neumann too, says in his treatise\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_336\" title=\"Neumann, \u0027Die Natur-und Religions-Philosophie der Chinesen, nach den Werken des Tehu-hi,\u0027 pp. 10, 11.\" id=\"FNanchor_336\"\u003e[336]\u003c/a\u003e mentioned\r\nfurther on: \"In China, where neither Mahometans nor\r\nChristians found a Chinese word to express the theological\r\nconception of the Deity…. The words God, soul,\r\nspirit, as independent of Matter and ruling it arbitrarily,\r\nare utterly unknown in the Chinese language…. This\r\nrange of ideas has become so completely one with the language\r\nitself, that the first verse of the book of Genesis\r\ncannot without considerable circumlocution be translated\r\ninto genuine Chinese.\"—It was this very thing that led Sir\r\nGeorge Staunton to publish a book in 1848 entitled: \"An\r\nInquiry into the proper mode of rendering the word God\r\nin translating the Sacred Scriptures into the Chinese language.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_337\" title=\"The following account given by an American sea-captain, who had come to Japan, is very amusing from the naïveté with which he assumes that mankind consists exclusively of Jews. For the \u0027Times\u0027 of the 18th October, 1854, relates that an American ship, under command of Captain Burr, had arrived in Jeddo Bay, and gives his account of the favourable reception he met with there, at the end of which we find:…\" id=\"FNanchor_337\"\u003e[337]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg368\"\u003e[368]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nMy intention in giving the above quotations and explanations,\r\nis merely to prepare the way for the extremely remarkable\r\npassage, which it is the object of the present\r\nchapter to communicate, and to render that passage more\r\nintelligible to the reader by first making him realize the\r\nstandpoint from which these investigations were made, and\r\nthus throwing light upon the relation between them and\r\ntheir subject. For Europeans, when investigating this\r\nmatter in China in the way and in the spirit described,\r\nalways inquiring for the supreme principle of all things,\r\nthe power that rules the world, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c., had often been referred\r\nto that which is designated by the word Tien (Engl.\r\nT\u0027hëen). Now, the more usual meaning of this word is\r\n\"Heaven,\" as Morrison also says in his dictionary; still it\r\nis a well-known thing that Tien is used in a figurative\r\nsense also, and then has a metaphysical signification. In\r\nthe \"Lettres Édifiantes\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_338\" title=\"Édition de, 1819, vol. xi. p. 461.\" id=\"FNanchor_338\"\u003e[338]\u003c/a\u003e we find the following explanation:\r\n\"\u003cem\u003eHing-tien\u003c/em\u003e is the material, visible heaven; \u003cem\u003eChin-tien\u003c/em\u003e\r\nthe spiritual and invisible \u003cins title=\"heaven.\" id=\"C396\"\u003eheaven.\"\u003c/ins\u003e Sonnerat too,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_339\" title=\"Book iv. ch. i.\" id=\"FNanchor_339\"\u003e[339]\u003c/a\u003e in his\r\ntravels in East-India and China, says: \"When the Jesuits\r\ndisputed with the rest of the missionaries as to the meaning\r\nof the word Tien, whether it was Heaven or God, the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg369\"\u003e[369]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nChinese looked upon these foreigners as restless folk and\r\ndrove them away to Macao.\" It was at any rate through\r\nthis word that Europeans could first hope to find the track\r\nof that Analogy of Chinese Metaphysic with their own\r\nfaith, which had been so persistently sought for; and it was\r\ndoubtless owing to investigations of this kind that the\r\nresults we find communicated in an Essay entitled \"Chinese\r\nTheory of the Creation\" were attained.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_340\" title=\"To be found in the \u0027Asiatic Journal,\u0027 vol. xxii. anno 1826, pp. 41 and 42.\" id=\"FNanchor_340\"\u003e[340]\u003c/a\u003e As to \u003cem\u003eChoo-foo-tze\u003c/em\u003e,\r\ncalled also \u003cem\u003eChoo-hi\u003c/em\u003e, who is mentioned in it, I observe\r\nthat he lived in the twelfth century according to our\r\nchronology, and that he is the most celebrated of all the\r\nChinese men of learning; because he has collected together\r\nall the wisdom of his predecessors and reduced\r\nit to a system. His work is in our days the basis of\r\nall Chinese instruction, and his authority of the greatest\r\nweight. In the passage I allude to, we find: \"The word\r\n\u003cem\u003eTeen\u003c/em\u003e, would seem to denote \u0027the highest among the great\u0027\r\nor \u0027above all what is great on earth:\u0027 but in practice its\r\nvagueness of signification is beyond all comparison greater,\r\nthan that of the term \u003cem\u003eHeaven\u003c/em\u003e in European languages…. Choo-foo-tze\r\ntells us that \u0027to affirm, that heaven has a \u003cem\u003eman\u003c/em\u003e\r\n(\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e a sapient being) there to judge and determine crimes,\r\nshould not by any means be said; nor, on the other hand,\r\nmust it be affirmed, that there is nothing at all to exercise\r\na supreme control over these things.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"The same author being asked about the \u003cem\u003eheart of heaven\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nwhether it was intelligent or not, answered: it must not be\r\nsaid that the mind of nature is unintelligent, but it does\r\nnot resemble the cogitations of man….\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"According to one of their authorities, \u003cem\u003eTeen\u003c/em\u003e is call\u0027d\r\nruler or sovereign (Choo), from the idea of the supreme\r\ncontrol, and another expresses himself thus: Had heaven\r\n(Teen) no designing mind, then it must happen, that the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg370\"\u003e[370]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncow might bring forth a horse, and on the peach-tree be\r\nproduced the blossom of the pear.\u0027 On the other hand it\r\nis said, that \u003cem\u003ethe mind of Heaven is deducible from what is\r\nthe Will of mankind\u003c/em\u003e!\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe agreement between this last sentence and my doctrine\r\nis so striking and so astonishing, that if this passage\r\nhad not been printed full eight years after my own work\r\nhad appeared, I should no doubt have been accused of\r\nhaving taken my fundamental thought from it. For there\r\nare three well-known modes of repelling the attack of new\r\nthoughts: firstly, by ignoring them, secondly by denying\r\nthem, and lastly by asserting that they are not new, but\r\nwere known long before. But the fact that my fundamental\r\nthought was formed quite independently of this\r\nChinese authority, is firmly established by the reasons I\r\nhave given; for I may hope to be believed when I affirm,\r\nthat I am unacquainted with the Chinese language and\r\nconsequently unable to derive thoughts for my own use\r\nfrom original Chinese sources unknown to others. On\r\nfurther investigation I have elicited the fact, that the\r\npassage I have quoted, was most probably, nay almost\r\ncertainly, taken from Morrison\u0027s \"Chinese Dictionary,\"\r\nwhere it may be found under the sign \u003cem\u003eTëen:\u003c/em\u003e only I have\r\nno opportunity of verifying it.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_341\" title=\"A note of Schopenhauer\u0027s referring to this says:–\u0027According to letters from Doss\u0027 (a friend of S.\u0027s), \u0027dated 26th February and 8th June, 1857, the passages I have here quoted are to be found in Morrison\u0027s Chinese Dictionary, Macao, 1815, vol. i. p. 576. under 天 Tëen, although in a slightly different order, in nearly the same words. The important passage at the end alone differs and is as follows:…\" id=\"FNanchor_341\"\u003e[341]\u003c/a\u003e—In an article by Neumann\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_342\" title=\"Neumann, \u0027Die Natur-und Religions-Philosophie der Chinesen, nach dem Werke des Tschu-hi,\u0027 an article in Illgen\u0027s \u0027Periodical for Historical Theology,\u0027 vol. vii. 1837, from pp. 60 to 63.\" id=\"FNanchor_342\"\u003e[342]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg371\"\u003e[371]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthere are some passages which have evidently a common\r\nsource with those here quoted from the \"Asiatic Journal.\"\r\nBut they are written with the vagueness of expression which\r\nis so frequent in Germany, and excludes clear comprehension.\r\nBesides, this translator of Choo-hi evidently did not\r\nhimself quite understand the original; though by this no\r\nblame need be implied, when we consider the enormous difficulty\r\nof the Chinese language for Europeans, and the\r\ninsufficiency of the means for studying it. Meanwhile\r\nit does not give us the enlightenment desired. We must\r\ntherefore console ourselves with the hope, that as a\r\nfreer intercourse with China has now been established,\r\nsome Englishman may one day give us more minute and\r\nthorough information concerning the above-mentioned\r\ndogma, of which we have hitherto received such deplorably\r\nimperfect accounts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg372\"\u003e[372]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eREFERENCE TO ETHICS.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor reasons I have stated in the beginning, \u003cins title=\"confirmamations\" id=\"C372\"\u003econfirmations\u003c/ins\u003e\r\nof the rest of my doctrine are excluded from\r\nmy present task. Still, in concluding, I may perhaps be\r\nallowed to make a general reference to Ethics.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom time immemorial, all nations have acknowledged\r\nthat the world has a moral, as well as a physical, import.\r\nEverywhere nevertheless the matter was only brought to\r\nan indistinct consciousness, which, in seeking for its adequate\r\nexpression, has clothed itself in various images and\r\nmyths. These are the different Religions. Philosophers,\r\non their side, have at all times endeavoured to attain clear\r\ncomprehension of the thing and, notwithstanding their\r\ndifferences in other respects, all, excepting the strictly\r\nmaterialistic, philosophical systems, agree in this one point:\r\nthat what is most important, nay, alone essential, in our\r\nwhole existence, that on which everything depends, the real\r\nmeaning, pivot or point (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003esit venia verbo\u003c/i\u003e) of it, lies in the\r\nmorality of human actions. But as to the sense of this, as to\r\nthe ways and means, as to the possibility of the thing, they\r\nall again quite disagree, and find themselves before an abyss\r\nof obscurity. Thus it follows, that it is easy to preach,\r\nbut difficult to found, morality. It is just because that\r\npoint is determined by our conscience, that it becomes the\r\ntouchstone of all systems; since we demand, and rightly\r\ndemand, that Metaphysic should give support to Ethics:\r\nand now arises the difficult problem to show that, contrary\r\nto all experience, the physical order of things\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg373\"\u003e[373]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndepends upon a moral one, and to find out a connection\r\nbetween the force which, by acting according to eternal\r\nlaws of Nature, gives the world stability, and the morality\r\nwhich has its seat in the human breast. This is therefore\r\nthe rock on which the best thinkers have foundered.\r\nSpinoza occasionally tacks a moral theory on to his Pantheistic\r\nFatalism by means of sophisms, but more often\r\nleaves morality terribly in the lurch. Kant, when theoretical\r\nReason is exhausted, sends his Categorical Imperative,\r\nlaboriously worked out of mere conceptions,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_343\" title=\"See my prize-essay \u0027On the Fundament of Morality,\u0027 § 6.\" id=\"FNanchor_343\"\u003e[343]\u003c/a\u003e on\r\nthe stage, as \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003edeus ex machina\u003c/i\u003e, with an absolute \u003cem\u003eought\u003c/em\u003e. But\r\nthe mistake he made by it only became quite clear when\r\nFichte, who always took outbidding for outdoing, had spun\r\nit out with Christian Wolfian prolixity and wearisomeness\r\nto a complete system of \u003cem\u003emoral fatalism\u003c/em\u003e in his \"System of\r\nMoral Doctrine,\" and subsequently presented it more\r\nbriefly in his last pamphlet.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_344\" title=\"\u0027Die Wissenschaftslehre in allgemeinen Umrisse\u0027 (The Doctrine of Science in a general outline), 18, 10.\" id=\"FNanchor_344\"\u003e[344]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, from this point of view, a system which places the\r\nreality of all existence and the root of the whole of Nature\r\nin \u003cem\u003ethe Will\u003c/em\u003e, and in this will places the root of the\r\nworld, must undeniably carry with it, to say the least, a\r\nstrong prejudice in its favour. For, by a direct and\r\nsimple way, it reaches, nay, already holds in its hand\r\nbefore coming to Ethics, what other systems try to reach\r\nby roundabout, ever dubious by-paths. Nor indeed can\r\nany other road ever lead to this but the insight, that the\r\nactive and impulsive force in Nature which presents this\r\nperceptible world to our intellect, is identical with the\r\nwill within us. The only Metaphysic which really and\r\nimmediately supports Ethics, is that one which is itself\r\nprimarily ethical and constituted out of the material of\r\nEthics. Therefore I had a far greater right to call my\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg374\"\u003e[374]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nMetaphysic \"Ethics,\" than Spinoza, with whom the word\r\nsounds almost like irony, and whose \"Ethics\" might be\r\nsaid to bear the name like \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003elucus a non lucendo\u003c/i\u003e; since it is\r\nonly by means of sophistry that he has been able to tack his\r\nmorality on to a system, from which it would never logically\r\nproceed. In general, moreover, he disavows it downright\r\nwith revolting assurance.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_345\" title=\"For instance, \u0027Eth.\u0027 iv. prop. 37, Schol. 2.\" id=\"FNanchor_345\"\u003e[345]\u003c/a\u003e On the whole, I can\r\nconfidently assert, that there has never yet been a philosophical\r\nsystem so entirely cut out of one piece, so completely\r\nwithout any joins or patches, as mine. As I have\r\nsaid in my preface, it is the unfolding of a single thought,\r\nby which the ancient ἁπλοῦς ὁ μῦθος τῆς ἀληθείας ἔφυ\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_346\" title=\"The language of truth is simple. [Tr.\u0027s add.]\" id=\"FNanchor_346\"\u003e[346]\u003c/a\u003e is again\r\nconfirmed. Then we must still take into consideration here,\r\nthat freedom and responsibility—those pillars on which all\r\nmorality rests—can certainly be asserted in words without\r\nthe assumption of the aseity\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_347\" title=\"Self-existence; self-dependence.\" id=\"FNanchor_347\"\u003e[347]\u003c/a\u003e of the will; but that it is\r\nabsolutely impossible to think them without it. Whoever\r\nwishes to dispute this, must first invalidate the axiom,\r\nstated long ago by the Schoolmen: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eoperari sequitur esse\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e the acts of each being follow from the nature of that\r\nbeing), or we must demonstrate the fallacy of the inference\r\nto be drawn from it: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eunde esse, inde operari\u003c/i\u003e. Responsibility\r\nhas for its condition freedom; but freedom has for\r\nits condition primariness. For I \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e according to what I\r\n\u003cem\u003eam\u003c/em\u003e; therefore I must \u003cem\u003ebe\u003c/em\u003e according to what I \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e. Aseity\r\nof the will is therefore the first condition of any Ethics\r\nbased on serious thought, and Spinoza is right when he says:\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eEa res libera dicetur, quæ ex sola suæ naturæ necessitate\u003c/i\u003e existit,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eet a se sola ad agendum determinatur\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_348\" title=\"\u0027Eth.\u0027 i. def. 7. [Tr.]\" id=\"FNanchor_348\"\u003e[348]\u003c/a\u003e Dependence,\r\nas to existence and nature, united with freedom as to action,\r\nis a contradiction. Were Prometheus to call the creatures\r\nof his making to account for their actions, they would be\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg375\"\u003e[375]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nquite justified in answering: \"We could only act according\r\nto our being: for actions arise from nature. If our actions\r\nwere bad, the fault lay in our nature: this is thine own\r\nwork; punish thyself.\"\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_349\" title=\"Compare \u0027Parerga,\u0027 i. p. 115, et seqq. (p. 133 of 2nd ed.).\" id=\"FNanchor_349\"\u003e[349]\u003c/a\u003e And it is just the same with\r\nthe imperishableness of our true being in death; for this\r\ncannot be seriously thought without the aseity of that\r\nbeing, and can even hardly be conceived without a fundamental\r\nseparation of the will from the intellect. This last\r\npoint is peculiar to my philosophy; but Aristotle had\r\nalready proved the first thoroughly, by showing at length\r\nhow that alone can be imperishable which has not arisen,\r\nand that the two conceptions condition each other:\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_350\" title=\"Aristot. \u0027De Cœlo,\u0027 i. 12.\" id=\"FNanchor_350\"\u003e[350]\u003c/a\u003e Ταῦτα\r\nἀλλήλοις ἀκολουθεῖ, καὶ τό τε ἀγένητον ἄφθαρτον, καὶ τὸ\r\nἄφθαρτον ἀγένητον…. τὸ γὰρ γενητὸν καὶ τὸ φθαρτὸν\r\nἀκολουθοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις.—εἰ γενητόν τι, φθαρτὸν ἀνάγκη\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_351\" title=\"\u0027These two go together, the uncreated is imperishable, and the imperishable is uncreated…. For the created and the perishable go together…. If a thing is created it is necessarily perishable.\u0027 [Tr.]\" id=\"FNanchor_351\"\u003e[351]\u003c/a\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ehæc\r\nmutuo se sequuntur, atque ingenerabile est incorruptibile, et\r\nincorruptibile ingenerabile…. generabile enim et corruptibile\r\nmutuo se sequuntur.—si generabile est, et corruptibile esse\r\nnecesse est\u003c/i\u003e). All those among the ancient philosophers who\r\ntaught an immortality of the soul, understood it in this\r\nway; nor did it enter into the head of any of them to assign\r\ninfinite permanence to a being \u003cem\u003ehaving arisen\u003c/em\u003e in any way.\r\nWe have evidence of the embarrassment to which the contrary\r\nassumption leads, in the ecclesiastical controversy\r\nbetween the advocates of Pre-existence, Creation and Traduction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Optimism moreover of all philosophical systems is\r\na point closely allied to Ethics which must never fail in\r\nany of them, as in duty bound: for the world likes to hear\r\nthat it is commendable and excellent, and philosophers like\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg376\"\u003e[376]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto please the world. With me it is different: I have seen\r\nwhat pleases the world, and therefore shall not swerve a\r\nstep from the path of truth in order to please it. Thus\r\nin this point also my system varies from all the others\r\nand stands by itself. But when all the others have completed\r\ntheir demonstrations to the song of the best of\r\nworlds, quite at the last, at the background of the system,\r\nlike a tardy avenger of the monster, like a spirit from\r\nthe tomb, like the statue in Don Juan, there comes the\r\nquestion as to the origin of evil, of the monstrous, nameless\r\nevil, of the awful, heartrending misery in the world:—and\r\nhere they are speechless, or can only find words, empty,\r\nsonorous words, with which to settle this heavy reckoning.\r\nOn the other hand, a system, in whose basis already the\r\nexistence of evil is interwoven with the existence of the\r\nworld, need not fear that apparition any more than a\r\nvaccinated child need fear the smallpox. Now this is\r\nthe case when freedom is placed in the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eesse\u003c/i\u003e instead of in\r\nthe \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eoperari\u003c/i\u003e and sin, evil and the world then proceed from\r\nthat \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eesse\u003c/i\u003e.—Moreover it is fair to let me, as a serious\r\nman, only speak of things which I really know and only\r\nmake use of words to which I attach a quite definite\r\nmeaning; since this alone can be communicated with security\r\nto others, and Vauvenargues is quite right in\r\nsaying: \"\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003ela clarté est la bonne foi des philosophes\u003c/i\u003e.\" Therefore\r\nif I use the words \u0027Will, Will to live,\u0027 this is no\r\nmere \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eens rationis\u003c/i\u003e, no hypostasis set up by me, nor is it a\r\nterm of vague, uncertain meaning; on the contrary, I\r\nrefer him, who asks what it is, to his own inner self,\r\nwhere he will find it entire, nay, in colossal dimensions, as\r\na true \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eens realissimum\u003c/i\u003e. I have accordingly not explained\r\nthe world out of the unknown, but rather out of that\r\nwhich is better known than anything, and known to us\r\nmoreover in quite a different way from all the rest. As\r\nto the paradoxical character finally, with which the ascetic\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg377\"\u003e[377]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nresults of my Ethics have been reproached, these results\r\nhad given umbrage even to Jean Paul, otherwise so\r\nfavourably disposed towards me, and had induced Herr\r\nRätze also (not knowing that the only course to be\r\nadopted against me was silence) to write a book against\r\nme in 1820, with the best intentions. They have since\r\nbecome the standing rock of offence in my philosophy;\r\nbut I beg my readers to take into consideration, that it is\r\nonly in this north-western portion of the ancient continent,\r\nand even here only in Protestant countries, that the\r\nterm paradoxical can be applied to such things; whereas\r\nthroughout the whole of vast Asia—everywhere indeed,\r\nwhere the detestable doctrine of Islam has not prevailed\r\nover the ancient and profound Religions of mankind by dint\r\nof fire and sword—they would rather have to fear the reproach\r\nof being commonplace. I console myself therefore\r\nwith the thought that, when referred to the Upanishads\r\nof the Sacred Vedas, my Ethics are quite orthodox,\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_352\" title=\"I refer those who may wish to be briefly, yet thoroughly, informed on this point, to the late Pasteur Bochinger\u0027s work: \u0027La vie contemplative, ascétique et monastique chez les peuples Bouddhistes,\u0027 Strasbourg, 1831.\" id=\"FNanchor_352\"\u003e[352]\u003c/a\u003e and\r\nthat even with primitive, genuine Christianity they stand\r\nin no contradiction. As to all other accusations of heresy,\r\nI am well armoured and my breast is fortified with triple\r\nsteel.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg378\"\u003e[378]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eCONCLUSION.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe undoubtedly striking confirmations recorded in\r\nthis treatise, which have been contributed to my\r\ndoctrine by the Empirical Sciences since its first appearance,\r\nbut independently of it, will unquestionably have been\r\nfollowed by many more: for how small is the portion\r\nwhich the individual can find time, opportunity and\r\npatience to become acquainted with, of the branch of literature\r\ndedicated to Natural Science which is so actively cultivated\r\nin all languages! Even what I have here mentioned\r\nhowever, inspires me with confidence that the time for my\r\nphilosophy is ripening; and it is with heartfelt joy that I\r\nsee the Empirical Sciences gradually come forward in the\r\ncourse of time, as witnesses above suspicion, to testify to\r\nthe truth of a doctrine, concerning which a politic, inviolable\r\nsilence has been maintained for seventeen years by our\r\n\"philosophers by profession\" (some of them give themselves\r\nthis characteristic name, nay even that of \"philosophers\r\nby trade\"); so that it had been left to Jean Paul, who\r\nwas ignorant of their tactics, to draw attention to it. For\r\nit may have appeared to them a delicate matter to praise\r\nit, and, on due consideration, they may have thought it not\r\naltogether safe to blame it either, and may have judged it\r\nunnecessary besides to show the public, as belonging neither\r\nto the profession nor to the trade, that it is quite possible\r\nto philosophize very seriously without being either unintelligible\r\nor wearisome. Why compromise themselves therefore\r\nwith it, since no one betrays himself by silence and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg379\"\u003e[379]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe favourite secretive method was ready at hand, the approved\r\nspecific against merit; this much was besides soon\r\nagreed upon: that, considering the circumstances of the\r\ntimes, my philosophy did not possess the right qualifications\r\nfor being taught professionally. Now the true, ultimate\r\naim of all philosophy, with them, is to be taught\r\nprofessionally,—so much and so truly is it so, that were\r\nTruth to come down stark naked from lofty Olympus, but\r\nwere what she brought with her not found to correspond\r\nto the requirements called for by the circumstances of the\r\ntimes, or to the purposes of their mighty superiors, these\r\ngentlemen \"of the profession and trade\" would verily\r\nwaste no time with the indecent nymph, but would hasten\r\nto bow her out again to her Olympus, then place three\r\nfingers on their lips and return quietly to their compendia.\r\nFor assuredly he who makes love to this nude beauty, to\r\nthis fascinating syren, to this portionless bride, will have\r\nto forego the good fortune of becoming a Government and\r\nUniversity professor. He may even congratulate himself\r\nif he becomes a garret-philosopher. On the other hand,\r\nhis audience will consist, not of hungry undergraduates\r\nanxious to turn their learning to account, but rather of\r\nthose rare, select thinkers, thinly sprinkled among the\r\ncountless multitude, who arise from time to time, almost as\r\na freak of Nature. And a grateful posterity is beckoning\r\nfrom afar. But they can have no idea of the beauty and\r\nloveliness of Truth, of the delight there is in pursuing her\r\ntrack, of the rapture in possessing her, who can imagine\r\nthat anyone who has once looked her in the face can ever\r\ndesert, deny, or distort her for the sake of the venal\r\napproval, of the offices, of the money or the titles of such\r\npeople. Better to grind spectacle-glasses like Spinoza or\r\ndraw water like Cleanthes. Henceforth they may take\r\nwhatever course they like: Truth will not change her nature\r\nto accommodate \"the trade.\" Serious philosophy has now\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg380\"\u003e[380]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreally outgrown Universities, where Science stands under\r\nState-guardianship. It may however some day perhaps come\r\nto be counted among the occult sciences; while the spurious\r\nkind, that \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eancilla theologiæ\u003c/i\u003e in Universities, that inferior\r\ncounterfeit of Scholasticism, for which the highest criterion\r\nof philosophical truth lies in the country catechism, will\r\nmake our Lecture-halls doubly re-echo.—\"You, that way:\r\nwe, this way.\"—\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_353\" title=\"Shakespeare, \u0027Love\u0027s Labour\u0027s Lost.\u0027\" id=\"FNanchor_353\"\u003e[353]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\nCHISWICK PRESS:—C. WHITTINGHAM AND CO., TOOKS COURT,\u003cbr\u003e\r\nCHANCERY LANE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A001\"\u003e[1]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph2\"\u003eAN\u003cbr\u003e\r\nALPHABETICAL LIST\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eOF BOOKS CONTAINED IN\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\nBOHN\u0027S LIBRARIES.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eDetailed Catalogue, arranged according to the various\r\nLibraries, will be sent on application.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"add\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eADDISON\u0027S Works\u003c/b\u003e. With the\r\nNotes of Bishop Hurd, Portrait,\r\nand 8 Plates of Medals and Coins.\r\nEdited by H. G. Bohn. 6 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eÆSCHYLUS, The Dramas of.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated into English Verse by\r\nAnna Swanwick. 4th Edition,\r\nrevised. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— The Tragedies of.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\ninto Prose by T. A. Buckley,\r\nB.A. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eALLEN\u0027S (Joseph, R. N.) Battles\r\nof the British Navy\u003c/b\u003e. Revised\r\nEdition, with 57 Steel Engravings.\r\n2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAMMIANUS MARCELLINUS.\r\nHistory of Rome\u003c/b\u003e during the\r\nReigns of Constantius, Julian,\r\nJovianus, Valentinian, and Valens.\r\nTranslated by Prof. C. D. Yonge,\r\nM.A. 7\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eANDERSEN\u0027S Danish Legends\r\nand Fairy Tales.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby Caroline Peachey. With 120\r\nWood Engravings. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eANTONINUS (M. Aurelius), The\r\nThoughts of.\u003c/b\u003e Trans. literally,\r\nwith Notes and Introduction by\r\nGeorge Long, M.A. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAPOLLONIUS RHODIUS.\r\n\u0027The Argonautica.\u0027\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby E. P. Coleridge, B.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAPPIAN\u0027S Roman History.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated by Horace White,\r\nM.A., LL.D. With Maps and\r\nIllustrations. 2 vols. 6\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAPULEIUS, The Works of.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nComprising the Golden Ass, God\r\nof Socrates, Florida, and Discourse\r\nof Magic. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eARIOSTO\u0027S Orlando Furioso.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated into English Verse by\r\nW. S. Rose. With Portrait, and 24\r\nSteel Engravings. 2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eARISTOPHANES\u0027 Comedies.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated by W. J. Hickie. 2\r\nvols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eARISTOTLE\u0027S Nicomachean\r\nEthics.\u003c/b\u003e Translated, with Introduction\r\nand Notes, by the Venerable\r\nArchdeacon Browne. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Politics and Economics.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated by E. Walford, M.A.,\r\nwith Introduction by Dr. Gillies.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A002\"\u003e[2]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cb\u003eARISTOTLE\u0027S Metaphysics\u003c/b\u003e.\r\nTranslated by the Rev. John H.\r\nM\u0027Mahon, M.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— History of Animals\u003c/b\u003e. Trans.\r\nby Richard Cresswell, M.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Organon\u003c/b\u003e; or, Logical Treatises,\r\nand the Introduction of\r\nPorphyry. Translated by the\r\nRev. O. F. Owen, M.A. 2 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Rhetoric and Poetics\u003c/b\u003e.\r\nTrans. by T. Buckley, B.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eARRIAN\u0027S Anabasis of Alexander\u003c/b\u003e,\r\ntogether with the \u003cb\u003eIndica\u003c/b\u003e.\r\nTranslated by E. J. Chinnock,\r\nM.A., LL.D. With Maps and\r\nPlans. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eATHENÆUS. The Deipnosophists\u003c/b\u003e;\r\nor, the Banquet of the\r\nLearned. Trans. by Prof. C. D.\r\nYonge, M.A. 3 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBACON\u0027S Moral and Historical\r\nWorks\u003c/b\u003e, including the Essays,\r\nApophthegms, Wisdom of the\r\nAncients, New Atlantis, Henry\r\nVII., Henry VIII., Elizabeth,\r\nHenry Prince of Wales, History\r\nof Great Britain, Julius Cæsar,\r\nand Augustus Cæsar. Edited by\r\nJ. Devey, M.A. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Novum Organum\u003c/b\u003e and \u003cb\u003eAdvancement\r\nof Learning\u003c/b\u003e. Edited\r\nby J. Devey, M.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBASS\u0027S Lexicon to the Greek\r\nTestament\u003c/b\u003e. 2\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBAX\u0027S Manual of the History\r\nof Philosophy\u003c/b\u003e, for the use of\r\nStudents. By E. Belfort Bax. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBEAUMONT and FLETCHER\u003c/b\u003e,\r\ntheir finest Scenes, Lyrics, and\r\nother Beauties, selected from the\r\nwhole of their works, and edited\r\nby Leigh Hunt. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBECHSTEIN\u0027S Cage and\r\nChamber Birds\u003c/b\u003e, their Natural\r\nHistory, Habits, Food, Diseases,\r\nand Modes of Capture. Translated,\r\nwith considerable additions on\r\nStructure, Migration, and Economy,\r\nby H. G. Adams. Together\r\nwith \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSweet British Warblers\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nWith 43 coloured Plates and\r\nWoodcut Illustrations. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBEDE\u0027S (Venerable) Ecclesiastical\r\nHistory of England\u003c/b\u003e. Together\r\nwith the \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAnglo-Saxon\r\nChronicle\u003c/span\u003e. Edited by J. A.\r\nGiles, D.C.L. With Map. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBELL (Sir Charles). The Anatomy\r\nand Philosophy of Expression,\r\nas connected with\r\nthe Fine Arts.\u003c/b\u003e By Sir Charles\r\nBell, K.H. 7th edition, revised.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBERKELEY (George), Bishop\r\nof Cloyne, The Works of.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nEdited by George Sampson. With\r\nBiographical Introduction by the\r\nRight Hon. A. J. Balfour, M.P.\r\n3 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBION.\u003c/b\u003e \u003ci\u003eSee\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Theo\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eTheocritus\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBJÖRNSON\u0027S Arne and the\r\nFisher Lassie.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by\r\nW. H. Low, M.A. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBLAIR\u0027S Chronological Tables\u003c/b\u003e\r\nRevised and Enlarged. Comprehending\r\nthe Chronology and History\r\nof the World, from the Earliest\r\nTimes to the Russian Treaty of\r\nPeace, April 1856. By J. Willoughby\r\nRosse. Double vol. 10\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Index of Dates\u003c/b\u003e. Comprehending\r\nthe principal Facts in\r\nthe Chronology and History of\r\nthe World, alphabetically arranged;\r\nbeing a complete Index\r\nto Blair\u0027s Chronological Tables.\r\nBy J. W. Rosse. 2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A003\"\u003e[3]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cb\u003eBLEEK, Introduction to the\r\nOld Testament.\u003c/b\u003e By Friedrich\r\nBleek. Edited by Johann Bleek\r\nand Adolf Kamphausen. Translated\r\nby G. H. Venables, under\r\nthe supervision of the Rev. Canon\r\nVenables. 2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBOETHIUS\u0027S Consolation of\r\nPhilosophy.\u003c/b\u003e King Alfred\u0027s Anglo-Saxon\r\nVersion of. With a literal\r\nEnglish Translation on opposite\r\npages, Notes, Introduction, and\r\nGlossary, by Rev. S. Fox, M.A.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBOHN\u0027S Dictionary of Poetical\r\nQuotations.\u003c/b\u003e 4th edition. 6\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBOHN\u0027S Handbooks of Games.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nNew edition. In 2 vols., with\r\nnumerous Illustrations 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\r\neach.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addp\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVol. I.—\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTable Games\u003c/span\u003e:—Billiards,\r\nChess, Draughts, Backgammon,\r\nDominoes, Solitaire,\r\nReversi, Go-Bang, Rouge et Noir,\r\nRoulette, E.O., Hazard, Faro.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVol. II.—\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCard Games\u003c/span\u003e:—Whist,\r\nSolo Whist, Poker, Piquet,\r\nEcarté, Euchre, Bézique, Cribbage,\r\nLoo, Vingt-et-un, Napoleon,\r\nNewmarket, Pope Joan, Speculation,\r\n\u0026amp;c., \u0026amp;c.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBOND\u0027S A Handy Book of Rules\r\nand Tables\u003c/b\u003e for verifying Dates\r\nwith the Christian Era, \u0026amp;c. Giving\r\nan account of the Chief Eras and\r\nSystems used by various Nations;\r\nwith the easy Methods for determining\r\nthe Corresponding Dates.\r\nBy J. J. Bond. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBONOMI\u0027S Nineveh and its\r\nPalaces.\u003c/b\u003e 7 Plates and 294 Woodcut\r\nIllustrations. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBOSWELL\u0027S Life of Johnson\u003c/b\u003e,\r\nwith the \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTour in the Hebrides\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJohnsoniana\u003c/span\u003e. Edited by\r\nthe Rev. A. Napier, M.A. With\r\nFrontispiece to each vol. 6 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBRAND\u0027S Popular Antiquities\r\nof England, Scotland, and Ireland.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nArranged, revised, and\r\ngreatly enlarged, by Sir Henry\r\nEllis, K.H., F.R.S., \u0026amp;c., \u0026amp;c. 3\r\nvols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBREMER\u0027S (Frederika) Works.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated by Mary Howitt. 4\r\nvols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBRIDGWATER TREATISES.\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addind\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBell (Sir Charles) on the Hand.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nWith numerous Woodcuts. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eKirby on the History, Habits,\r\nand Instincts of Animals.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nEdited by T. Rymer Jones.\r\nWith upwards of 100 Woodcuts.\r\n2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eKidd on the Adaptation of External\r\nNature to the Physical\r\nCondition of Man.\u003c/b\u003e 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChalmers on the Adaptation\r\nof External Nature to the\r\nMoral and Intellectual Constitution\r\nof Man.\u003c/b\u003e 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003ca id=\"Brin\"\u003eBRINK\u003c/a\u003e (B. ten) Early English\r\nLiterature.\u003c/b\u003e By Bernhard ten\r\nBrink. Vol. I. To Wyclif. Translated\r\nby Horace M. Kennedy.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addp\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVol. II. Wyclif, Chaucer, Earliest\r\nDrama Renaissance. Translated\r\nby W. Clarke Robinson,\r\nPh.D. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVol. III. From the Fourteenth\r\nCentury to the Death of Surrey.\r\nEdited by Dr. Alois Brandl.\r\nTrans. by L. Dora Schmitz.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Five Lectures on Shakespeare.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTrans. by Julia Franklin.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBROWNE\u0027S (Sir Thomas) Works.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nEdited by Simon Wilkin. 3 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A004\"\u003e[4]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cb\u003eBURKE\u0027S Works.\u003c/b\u003e 8 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\r\neach.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addind2\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI.—Vindication of Natural Society—Essay\r\non the Sublime\r\nand Beautiful, and\r\nvarious Political Miscellanies.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eII.—Reflections on the French\r\nRevolution—Letters relating\r\nto the Bristol Election—Speech\r\non Fox\u0027s\r\nEast India Bill, \u0026amp;c.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIII.—Appeal from the New to the\r\nOld Whigs—On the Nabob\r\nof Arcot\u0027s Debts—The\r\nCatholic Claims, \u0026amp;c.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIV.—Report on the Affairs of\r\nIndia, and Articles of\r\nCharge against Warren\r\nHastings.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eV.—Conclusion of the Articles of\r\nCharge against Warren\r\nHastings—Political Letters\r\non the American War,\r\non a Regicide Peace, to\r\nthe Empress of Russia.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVI.—Miscellaneous Speeches—Letters\r\nand Fragments—Abridgments\r\nof English\r\nHistory, \u0026amp;c. With a\r\nGeneral Index.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVII. \u0026amp; VIII.—Speeches on the Impeachment\r\nof Warren\r\nHastings; and Letters.\r\nWith Index. 2 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Life.\u003c/b\u003e By Sir J. Prior. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBURNEY\u0027S Evelina.\u003c/b\u003e By Frances\r\nBurney (Mme. D\u0027Arblay). With\r\nan Introduction and Notes by\r\nA. R. Ellis. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Cecilia.\u003c/b\u003e With an Introduction\r\nand Notes by A. R. Ellis.\r\n2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003ca id=\"Burn\"\u003eBURN\u003c/a\u003e (R.) Ancient Rome and\r\nits Neighbourhood.\u003c/b\u003e An Illustrated\r\nHandbook to the Ruins in\r\nthe City and the Campagna, for\r\nthe use of Travellers. By Robert\r\nBurn, M.A. With numerous\r\nIllustrations, Maps, and Plans.\r\n7\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003ca id=\"Burns\"\u003eBURNS\u003c/a\u003e (Robert), Life of.\u003c/b\u003e By\r\nJ. G. Lockhart, D.C.L. A\r\nnew and enlarged Edition. Revised\r\nby William Scott Douglas.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBURTON\u0027S (Robert) Anatomy of\r\nMelancholy.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by the Rev.\r\nA. R. Shilleto, M.A. With Introduction\r\nby A. H. Bullen, and\r\nfull Index. 3 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBURTON (Sir R. F.) Personal\r\nNarrative of a Pilgrimage to\r\nAl-Madinah and Meccah.\u003c/b\u003e By\r\nCaptain Sir Richard F. Burton,\r\nK.C.M.G. With an Introduction\r\nby Stanley Lane-Poole, and all\r\nthe original Illustrations. 2 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addp\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e⁂ This is the copyright edition,\r\ncontaining the author\u0027s latest\r\nnotes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBUTLER\u0027S (Bishop) Analogy of\r\nReligion\u003c/b\u003e, Natural and Revealed,\r\nto the Constitution and Course of\r\nNature; together with two Dissertations\r\non Personal Identity and\r\non the Nature of Virtue, and\r\nFifteen Sermons. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBUTLER\u0027S (Samuel) Hudibras.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nWith Variorum Notes, a Biography,\r\nPortrait, and 28 Illustrations.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e——\u003c/b\u003e or, further Illustrated with 60\r\nOutline Portraits. 2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCÆSAR. Commentaries on the\r\nGallic and Civil Wars.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby W. A. McDevitte, B.A.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A005\"\u003e[5]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cb\u003eCAMOENS\u0027 Lusiad\u003c/b\u003e; or, the Discovery\r\nof India. An Epic Poem.\r\nTranslated by W. J. Mickle. 5th\r\nEdition, revised by E. R. Hodges,\r\nM.C.P. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCARAFAS (The) of Maddaloni.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nNaples under Spanish Dominion.\r\nTranslated from the German of\r\nAlfred de Reumont. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCARLYLE\u0027S French Revolution.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nEdited by J. Holland Rose,\r\nLitt.D. Illus. 3 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Sartor Resartus.\u003c/b\u003e With 75\r\nIllustrations by Edmund J. Sullivan.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCARPENTER\u0027S (Dr. W. B.)\r\nZoology.\u003c/b\u003e Revised Edition, by\r\nW. S. Dallas, F.L.S. With very\r\nnumerous Woodcuts. Vol. I. 6\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"right\"\u003e[\u003ci\u003eVol. II. out of print.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCARPENTER\u0027S Mechanical\r\nPhilosophy, Astronomy and\r\nHorology.\u003c/b\u003e 181 Woodcuts. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Vegetable Physiology and\r\nSystematic Botany.\u003c/b\u003e Revised\r\nEdition, by E. Lankester M.D.,\r\n\u0026amp;c. With very numerous Woodcuts.\r\n6\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Animal Physiology.\u003c/b\u003e Revised\r\nEdition. With upwards of 300\r\nWoodcuts. 6\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCASTLE (E.) Schools and\r\nMasters of Fence\u003c/b\u003e, from the\r\nMiddle Ages to the End of the\r\nEighteenth Century. By Egerton\r\nCastle, M.A., F.S.A. With a\r\nComplete Bibliography. Illustrated\r\nwith 140 Reproductions of\r\nOld Engravings and 6 Plates of\r\nSwords, showing 114 Examples.\r\n6\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCATTERMOLE\u0027S Evenings at\r\nHaddon Hall.\u003c/b\u003e With 24 Engravings\r\non Steel from designs by\r\nCattermole, the Letterpress by the\r\nBaroness de Carabella. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCATULLUS, Tibullus, and the\r\nVigil of Venus.\u003c/b\u003e A Literal Prose\r\nTranslation. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCELLINI (Benvenuto). Memoirs\r\nof\u003c/b\u003e, written by Himself.\r\nTranslated by Thomas Roscoe.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCERVANTES\u0027 Don Quixote de\r\nla Mancha.\u003c/b\u003e Motteaux\u0027s Translation\r\nrevised. 2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\r\neach.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Galatea.\u003c/b\u003e A Pastoral Romance.\r\nTranslated by G. W. J.\r\nGyll. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Exemplary Novels.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby Walter K. Kelly. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHAUCER\u0027S Poetical Works.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nEdited by Robert Bell. Revised\r\nEdition, with a Preliminary Essay\r\nby Prof. W. W. Skeat, M.A. 4\r\nvols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHESS CONGRESS of 1862.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nA Collection of the Games played.\r\nEdited by J. Löwenthal. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHEVREUL on Colour.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nfrom the French by Charles\r\nMartel. Third Edition, with\r\nPlates, 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e; or with an additional\r\nseries of 16 Plates in Colours,\r\n7\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHILLINGWORTH\u0027S Religion\r\nof Protestants.\u003c/b\u003e A Safe Way to\r\nSalvation. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHINA\u003c/b\u003e, Pictorial, Descriptive,\r\nand Historical. With Map and\r\nnearly 100 Illustrations. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCHRONICLES OF THE CRUSADES.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nContemporary Narratives\r\nof the Crusade of Richard\r\nCœur de Lion, by Richard of\r\nDevizes and Geoffrey de Vinsauf;\r\nand of the Crusade at St. Louis,\r\nby Lord John de Joinville. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCICERO\u0027S Orations.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby Prof. C. D. Yonge, M.A. 4\r\nvols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A006\"\u003e[6]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cb\u003e—— Letters.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by\r\nEvelyn S. Shuckburgh. 4 vols.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— On Oratory and Orators.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nWith Letters to Quintus and\r\nBrutus. Translated by the Rev.\r\nJ. S. Watson, M.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— On the Nature of the Gods\u003c/b\u003e,\r\nDivination, Fate, Laws, a Republic,\r\nConsulship. Translated\r\nby Prof. C. D. Yonge, M.A., and\r\nFrancis Barham. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Academics\u003c/b\u003e, De Finibus, and\r\nTusculan Questions. By Prof.\r\nC. D. Yonge, M.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Offices\u003c/b\u003e; or, Moral Duties.\r\nCato Major, an Essay on Old\r\nAge; Lælius, an Essay on Friendship;\r\nScipio\u0027s Dream; Paradoxes;\r\nLetter to Quintus on Magistrates.\r\nTranslated by C. R. Edmonds.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCORNELIUS NEPOS.\u003c/b\u003e—\u003ci\u003eSee\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Jus\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eJustin\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCLARK\u0027S (Hugh) Introduction\r\nto Heraldry.\u003c/b\u003e 18th Edition, Revised\r\nand Enlarged by J. R.\r\nPlanché, Rouge Croix. With\r\nnearly 1000 Illustrations. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e Or\r\nwith the Illustrations Coloured,\r\n15\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCLASSIC TALES\u003c/b\u003e, containing\r\nRasselas, Vicar of Wakefield,\r\nGulliver\u0027s Travels, and The Sentimental\r\nJourney. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCOLERIDGE\u0027S (S. T.) Friend.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nA Series of Essays on Morals,\r\nPolitics, and Religion. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Aids to Reflection\u003c/b\u003e, and the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eConfessions of an Inquiring\r\nSpirit\u003c/span\u003e, to which are added the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEssays on Faith\u003c/span\u003e and the \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBook\r\nof Common Prayer\u003c/span\u003e. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Lectures and Notes on\r\nShakespeare and other English\r\nPoets.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by T. Ashe. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Biographia Literaria\u003c/b\u003e;\r\ntogether with Two Lay\r\nSermons. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Table-Talk and Omniana.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nEdited by T. Ashe, B.A. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Miscellanies, Æsthetic and\r\nLiterary\u003c/b\u003e; to which is added,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Theory of Life\u003c/span\u003e. Collected\r\nand arranged by T. Ashe,\r\nB.A. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003ca id=\"Com\"\u003eCOMTE\u0027S\u003c/a\u003e Positive Philosophy.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated and condensed by\r\nHarriet Martineau. With Introduction\r\nby Frederic Harrison.\r\n3 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCOMTE\u0027S Philosophy of the\r\nSciences\u003c/b\u003e, being an Exposition of\r\nthe Principles of the \u003ci\u003eCours de\r\nPhilosophie Positive.\u003c/i\u003e By G. H.\r\nLewes. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCONDÉ\u0027S History of the Dominion\r\nof the Arabs in Spain.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated by Mrs. Foster. 3\r\nvols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCOOPER\u0027S Biographical Dictionary.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nContaining Concise\r\nNotices (upwards of 15,000) of\r\nEminent Persons of all Ages and\r\nCountries. By Thompson Cooper,\r\nF.S.A. With a Supplement,\r\nbringing the work down to 1883.\r\n2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCOXE\u0027S Memoirs of the Duke of\r\nMarlborough.\u003c/b\u003e With his original\r\nCorrespondence. By W. Coxe,\r\nM.A., F.R.S. Revised edition\r\nby John Wade. 3 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\r\neach.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addp\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e⁂ An Atlas of the plans of\r\nMarlborough\u0027s campaigns, 4to.\r\n10\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— History of the House of\r\nAustria\u003c/b\u003e (1218-1792). With a\r\nContinuation from the Accession\r\nof Francis I. to the Revolution of\r\n1848. 4 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A007\"\u003e[7]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cb\u003eCRAIK\u0027S (G. L.) Pursuit of Knowledge\r\nunder Difficulties.\u003c/b\u003e Illustrated\r\nby Anecdotes and Memoirs.\r\nRevised edition, with numerous\r\nWoodcut Portraits and Plates. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCRUIKSHANK\u0027S Punch and\r\nJudy.\u003c/b\u003e The Dialogue of the\r\nPuppet Show; an Account of its\r\nOrigin, \u0026amp;c. With 24 Illustrations,\r\nand Coloured Plates, designed\r\nand engraved by G. Cruikshank.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCUNNINGHAM\u0027S Lives of the\r\nMost Eminent British Painters.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nA New Edition, with Notes and\r\nSixteen fresh Lives. By Mrs.\r\nHeaton. 3 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDANTE. Divine Comedy.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby the Rev. H. F. Cary,\r\nM.A. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Translated into English Verse\u003c/b\u003e\r\nby I. C. Wright, M.A. 3rd Edition,\r\nrevised. With Portrait, and\r\n34 Illustrations on Steel, after\r\nFlaxman.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— The Inferno.\u003c/b\u003e A Literal\r\nProse Translation, with the Text\r\nof the Original printed on the same\r\npage. By John A. Carlyle, M.D.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— The Purgatorio.\u003c/b\u003e A Literal\r\nProse Translation, with the Text\r\nprinted on the same page. By\r\nW. S. Dugdale. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDE COMMINES (Philip), Memoirs\r\nof.\u003c/b\u003e Containing the Histories\r\nof Louis XI. and Charles VIII.,\r\nKings of France, and Charles\r\nthe Bold, Duke of Burgundy.\r\nTogether with the Scandalous\r\nChronicle, or Secret History of\r\nLouis XI., by Jean de Troyes.\r\nTranslated by Andrew R. Scoble.\r\nWith Portraits, 2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\r\neach.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDEFOE\u0027S Novels and Miscellaneous\r\nWorks.\u003c/b\u003e With Prefaces\r\nand Notes, including those attributed\r\nto Sir W. Scott. 7 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addind2\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI.—Captain Singleton, and\r\nColonel Jack.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eII.—Memoirs of a Cavalier,\r\nCaptain Carleton,\r\nDickory Cronke, \u0026amp;c.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIII.—Moll Flanders, and the\r\nHistory of the Devil.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIV.—Roxana, and Life of Mrs.\r\nChristian Davies.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eV.—History of the Great Plague\r\nof London, 1665; The\r\nStorm (1703); and the\r\nTrue-born Englishman.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVI.—Duncan Campbell, New\r\nVoyage round the\r\nWorld, and Political\r\nTracts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVII.—Robinson Crusoe.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDEMMIN\u0027S History of Arms\r\nand Armour\u003c/b\u003e, from the Earliest\r\nPeriod. By Auguste Demmin.\r\nTranslated by C. C. Black, M.A.\r\nWith nearly 2000 Illustrations.\r\n7\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDEMOSTHENES\u0027 Orations.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated by C. Rann Kennedy.\r\n5 vols. Vol. I., 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e; Vols.\r\nII.-V., 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDE STAËL\u0027S Corinne or Italy.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nBy Madame de Staël. Translated\r\nby Emily Baldwin and\r\nPaulina Driver. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDEVEY\u0027S Logic\u003c/b\u003e, or the Science\r\nof Inference. A Popular Manual.\r\nBy J. Devey. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDICTIONARY of Latin and\r\nGreek Quotations\u003c/b\u003e; including\r\nProverbs, Maxims, Mottoes, Law\r\nTerms and Phrases. With all the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A008\"\u003e[8]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nQuantities marked, and English\r\nTranslations. With Index Verborum\r\n(622 pages). 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDICTIONARY of Obsolete and\r\nProvincial English.\u003c/b\u003e Compiled\r\nby Thomas Wright, M.A., F.S.A.,\r\n\u0026amp;c. 2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDIDRON\u0027S Christian Iconography\u003c/b\u003e:\r\na History of Christian\r\nArt in the Middle Ages. Translated\r\nby E. J. Millington and\r\ncompleted by Margaret Stokes.\r\nWith 240 Illustrations. 2 vols.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDIOGENES LAERTIUS. Lives\r\nand Opinions of the Ancient\r\nPhilosophers.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by\r\nProf. C. D. Yonge, M.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDOBREE\u0027S Adversaria.\u003c/b\u003e Edited\r\nby the late Prof. Wagner. 2 vols.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDODD\u0027S Epigrammatists.\u003c/b\u003e A\r\nSelection from the Epigrammatic\r\nLiterature of Ancient, Mediæval,\r\nand Modern Times. By the Rev.\r\nHenry Philip Dodd, M.A. Oxford.\r\n2nd Edition, revised and\r\nenlarged. 6\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDONALDSON\u0027S The Theatre of\r\nthe Greeks.\u003c/b\u003e A Treatise on the\r\nHistory and Exhibition of the\r\nGreek Drama. With numerous\r\nIllustrations and 3 Plans. By John\r\nWilliam Donaldson, D.D. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDRAPER\u0027S History of the\r\nIntellectual Development of\r\nEurope.\u003c/b\u003e By John William Draper,\r\nM.D., LL.D. 2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDUNLOP\u0027S History of Fiction.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nA new Edition. Revised by\r\nHenry Wilson. 2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003ca id=\"Dyer\"\u003eDYER\u003c/a\u003e (Dr. T. H.). Pompeii\u003c/b\u003e: its\r\nBuildings and Antiquities. By\r\nT. H. Dyer, LL.D. With nearly\r\n300 Wood Engravings, a large\r\nMap, and a Plan of the Forum.\r\n7\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— The City of Rome\u003c/b\u003e: its History\r\nand Monuments. With Illustrations.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDYER (T. F. T.) British Popular\r\nCustoms. Present and Past.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nAn Account of the various Games\r\nand Customs associated with Different\r\nDays of the Year in the\r\nBritish Isles, arranged according\r\nto the Calendar. By the Rev.\r\nT. F. Thiselton Dyer, M.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEBERS\u0027 Egyptian Princess.\u003c/b\u003e An\r\nHistorical Novel. By George\r\nEbers. Translated by E. S.\r\nBuchheim. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEDGEWORTH\u0027S Stories for\r\nChildren.\u003c/b\u003e With 8 Illustrations\r\nby L. Speed. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eELZE\u0027S William Shakespeare.\u003c/b\u003e—\u003ci\u003eSee\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Shak\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eShakespeare\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEMERSON\u0027S Works.\u003c/b\u003e 5 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addind2\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI.—Essays and Representative\r\nMen.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eII.—English Traits, Nature, and\r\nConduct of Life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIII.—Society and Solitude—Letters\r\nand Social Aims—Addresses.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIV.—Miscellaneous Pieces.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eV.—Poems.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eENNEMOSER\u0027S History of\r\nMagic.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by William\r\nHowitt. 2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEPICTETUS, The Discourses of.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nWith the \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEncheiridion\u003c/span\u003e and\r\nFragments. Translated by George\r\nLong, M.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEURIPIDES.\u003c/b\u003e A New Literal\r\nTranslation in Prose. By E. P.\r\nColeridge, M.A. 2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A009\"\u003e[9]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cb\u003eEUTROPIUS.\u003c/b\u003e—\u003ci\u003eSee\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Jus\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eJustin\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEUSEBIUS PAMPHILUS,\r\nEcclesiastical History of.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby Rev. C. F. Cruse, M.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEVELYN\u0027S Diary and Correspondence.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nEdited from the\r\nOriginal MSS. by W. Bray,\r\nF.A.S. With 45 engravings. 4\r\nvols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFAIRHOLT\u0027S Costume in England.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nA History of Dress to the\r\nend of the Eighteenth Century.\r\n3rd Edition, revised, by Viscount\r\nDillon, V.P.S.A. Illustrated with\r\nabove 700 Engravings. 2 vols.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFIELDING\u0027S Adventures of\r\nJoseph Andrews and his Friend\r\nMr. Abraham Adams.\u003c/b\u003e With\r\nCruikshank\u0027s Illustrations. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— History of Tom Jones, a\r\nFoundling.\u003c/b\u003e With Cruikshank\u0027s\r\nIllustrations. 2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Amelia.\u003c/b\u003e With Cruikshank\u0027s\r\nIllustrations. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFLAXMAN\u0027S Lectures on Sculpture.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nBy John Flaxman, R.A.\r\nWith Portrait and 53 Plates. 6\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFOSTER\u0027S (John) Life and Correspondence.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nEdited by J. E.\r\nRyland. 2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Critical Essays.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by\r\nJ. E. Ryland. 2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\r\neach.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Essays\u003c/b\u003e: on Decision of Character;\r\non a Man\u0027s writing Memoirs\r\nof Himself; on the epithet\r\nRomantic; on the aversion of\r\nMen of Taste to Evangelical Religion.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Essays\u003c/b\u003e on the Evils of Popular\r\nIgnorance; to which is added, a\r\nDiscourse on the Propagation of\r\nChristianity in India. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFOSTER\u0027S Essays\u003c/b\u003e on the Improvement\r\nof Time. With \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eNotes\r\nof Sermons\u003c/span\u003e and other Pieces.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGASPARY\u0027S History of Italian\r\nLiterature.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by Herman\r\nOelsner, M.A., Ph.D.\r\nVol. I. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGEOFFREY OF MONMOUTH,\r\nChronicle of.\u003c/b\u003e—\u003ci\u003eSee \u003ca href=\"#Old\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eOld English\r\nChronicles\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGESTA ROMANORUM\u003c/b\u003e, or Entertaining\r\nMoral Stories invented\r\nby the Monks. Translated by the\r\nRev. Charles Swan. Revised\r\nEdition, by Wynnard Hooper,\r\nB.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGILDAS, Chronicles of.\u003c/b\u003e—\u003ci\u003eSee \u003ca href=\"#Old\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eOld\r\nEnglish Chronicles\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGIBBON\u0027S Decline and Fall of\r\nthe Roman Empire.\u003c/b\u003e Complete\r\nand Unabridged, with Variorum\r\nNotes. Edited by an English\r\nChurchman. With 2 Maps and\r\nPortrait. 7 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGILBART\u0027S History, Principles,\r\nand Practice of Banking.\u003c/b\u003e By\r\nthe late J. W. Gilbart, F.R.S.\r\nNew Edition, revised by A. S.\r\nMichie. 2 vols. 10\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGIL BLAS, The Adventures of.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated from the French of\r\nLesage by Smollett. With 24\r\nEngravings on Steel, after Smirke,\r\nand 10 Etchings by George Cruikshank.\r\n6\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGIRALDUS CAMBRENSIS\u0027\r\nHistorical Works.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby Th. Forester, M.A., and Sir\r\nR. Colt Hoare. Revised Edition,\r\nEdited by Thomas Wright, M.A.,\r\nF.S.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGOETHE\u0027S Faust.\u003c/b\u003e Part I. German\r\nText with Hayward\u0027s Prose\r\nTranslation and Notes. Revised\r\nby C. A. Buchheim, Ph.D. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A010\"\u003e[10]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cb\u003eGOETHE\u0027S Works.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\ninto English by various hands.\r\n14 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addind2\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI. and II.—Autobiography and\r\nAnnals.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIII.—Faust. Two Parts, complete.\r\n(Swanwick.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIV.—Novels and Tales.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eV.—Wilhelm Meister\u0027s Apprenticeship.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVI.—Conversations with Eckermann\r\nand Soret.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVIII.—Dramatic Works.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIX.—Wilhelm Meister\u0027s Travels.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eX.—Tour in Italy, and Second\r\nResidence in Rome.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXI.—Miscellaneous Travels.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXII.—Early and Miscellaneous\r\nLetters.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXIV.—Reineke Fox, West-Eastern\r\nDivan and Achilleid.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGOLDSMITH\u0027S Works.\u003c/b\u003e A new\r\nEdition, by J. W. M. Gibbs. 5\r\nvols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGRAMMONT\u0027S Memoirs of the\r\nCourt of Charles II.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by\r\nSir Walter Scott. Together with\r\nthe \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBoscobel Tracts\u003c/span\u003e, including\r\ntwo not before published, \u0026amp;c.\r\nNew Edition. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGRAY\u0027S Letters.\u003c/b\u003e Including the\r\nCorrespondence of Gray and\r\nMason. Edited by the Rev.\r\nD. C. Tovey, M.A. Vols. I.\r\nand II. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGREEK ANTHOLOGY.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby George Burges, M.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003ca id=\"Greek\"\u003eGREEK\u003c/a\u003e ROMANCES of Heliodorus,\r\nLongus, and Achilles\r\nTatius—viz.\u003c/b\u003e, The Adventures of\r\nTheagenes \u0026amp; Chariclea; Amours\r\nof Daphnis and Chloe; and Loves\r\nof Clitopho and Leucippe. Translated\r\nby Rev. R. Smith, M.A.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGREGORY\u0027S Letters on the\r\nEvidences, Doctrines, \u0026amp; Duties\r\nof the Christian Religion.\u003c/b\u003e By\r\nDr. Olinthus Gregory. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGREENE, MARLOWE, and\r\nBEN JONSON.\u003c/b\u003e Poems of.\r\nEdited by Robert Bell. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGRIMM\u0027S TALES.\u003c/b\u003e With the\r\nNotes of the Original. Translated\r\nby Mrs. A. Hunt. With Introduction\r\nby Andrew Lang, M.A.\r\n2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Gammer Grethel\u003c/b\u003e; or, German\r\nFairy Tales and Popular\r\nStories. Containing 42 Fairy\r\nTales. Trans. by Edgar Taylor.\r\nWith numerous Woodcuts after\r\nGeorge Cruikshank and Ludwig\r\nGrimm. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGROSSI\u0027S Marco Visconti.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated by A. F. D. The\r\nBallads rendered into English\r\nVerse by C. M. P. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGUIZOT\u0027S History of the\r\nEnglish Revolution of 1640.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nFrom the Accession of Charles\r\nI. to his Death. Translated by\r\nWilliam Hazlitt. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— History of Civilisation\u003c/b\u003e, from\r\nthe Fall of the Roman Empire to\r\nthe French Revolution. Translated\r\nby William Hazlitt. 3 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHALL\u0027S (Rev. Robert) Miscellaneous\r\nWorks and Remains.\u003c/b\u003e\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHAMPTON COURT: A Short\r\nHistory of the Manor and\r\nPalace.\u003c/b\u003e By Ernest Law, B.A.\r\nWith numerous Illustrations. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHARDWICK\u0027S History of the\r\nArticles of Religion.\u003c/b\u003e By the late\r\nC. Hardwick. Revised by the\r\nRev. Francis Procter, M.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A011\"\u003e[11]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cb\u003eHAUFF\u0027S Tales.\u003c/b\u003e The Caravan—The\r\nSheik of Alexandria—The\r\nInn in the Spessart. Trans. from\r\nthe German by S. Mendel. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHAWTHORNE\u0027S Tales.\u003c/b\u003e 4 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addind2\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI.—Twice-told Tales, and the\r\nSnow Image.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eII.—Scarlet Letter, and the House\r\nwith the Seven Gables.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIII.—Transformation [The Marble\r\nFaun], and Blithedale Romance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIV.—Mosses from an Old Manse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHAZLITT\u0027S Table-talk.\u003c/b\u003e Essays\r\non Men and Manners. By W.\r\nHazlitt. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Lectures on the Literature\r\nof the Age of Elizabeth\u003c/b\u003e and on\r\nCharacters of Shakespeare\u0027s Plays.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Lectures on the English\r\nPoets\u003c/b\u003e, and on the English Comic\r\nWriters. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— The Plain Speaker.\u003c/b\u003e Opinions\r\non Books, Men, and Things. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Round Table.\u003c/b\u003e 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Sketches and Essays.\u003c/b\u003e\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— The Spirit of the Age\u003c/b\u003e; or,\r\nContemporary Portraits. Edited\r\nby W. Carew Hazlitt. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— View of the English Stage.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nEdited by W. Spencer Jackson.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHEATON\u0027S Concise History of\r\nPainting.\u003c/b\u003e New Edition, revised\r\nby Cosmo Monkhouse. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHEGEL\u0027S Lectures on the Philosophy\r\nof History.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by\r\nJ. Sibree, M.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHEINE\u0027S Poems\u003c/b\u003e, Complete.\r\nTranslated by Edgar A. Bowring,\r\nC.B. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Travel-Pictures\u003c/b\u003e, including the\r\nTour in the Harz, Norderney, and\r\nBook of Ideas, together with the\r\nRomantic School. Translated by\r\nFrancis Storr. A New Edition,\r\nrevised throughout. With Appendices\r\nand Maps. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHELIODORUS. Theagenes and\r\nChariclea.\u003c/b\u003e—\u003ci\u003eSee\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Greek\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eGreek Romances\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHELP\u0027S Life of Christopher\r\nColumbus\u003c/b\u003e, the Discoverer of\r\nAmerica. By Sir Arthur Helps,\r\nK.C.B. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Life of Hernando Cortes\u003c/b\u003e,\r\nand the Conquest of Mexico. 2\r\nvols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Life of Pizarro.\u003c/b\u003e 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Life of Las Casas\u003c/b\u003e the Apostle\r\nof the Indies. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHENDERSON (E.) Select Historical\r\nDocuments of the Middle\r\nAges\u003c/b\u003e, including the most famous\r\nCharters relating to England, the\r\nEmpire, the Church, \u0026amp;c., from\r\nthe 6th to the 14th Centuries.\r\nTranslated from the Latin and\r\nedited by Ernest F. Henderson,\r\nA.B., A.M., Ph.D. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHENFREY\u0027S Guide to English\r\nCoins\u003c/b\u003e, from the Conquest to the\r\npresent time. New and revised\r\nEdition by C. F. Keary, M.A.,\r\nF.S.A. 6\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHENRY OF HUNTINGDON\u0027S\r\nHistory of the English.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby T. Forester, M.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHENRY\u0027S (Matthew) Exposition\r\nof the Book of the Psalms.\u003c/b\u003e 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHERODOTUS.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by the\r\nRev. Henry Cary, M.A. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Notes on\u003c/b\u003e, Original and Selected\r\nfrom the best Commentators.\r\nBy D. W. Turner, M.A.\r\nWith Coloured Map. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Analysis and Summary of.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nBy J. T. Wheeler. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A012\"\u003e[12]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cb\u003eHESIOD, CALLIMACHUS, and\r\nTHEOGNIS.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by the\r\nRev. J. Banks, M.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHOFFMANN\u0027S (E. T. W.) The\r\nSerapion Brethren.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nfrom the German by Lt.-Col. Alex.\r\nEwing. 2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHOLBEIN\u0027S Dance of Death\r\nand Bible Cuts.\u003c/b\u003e Upwards of 150\r\nSubjects, engraved in facsimile,\r\nwith Introduction and Descriptions\r\nby Francis Douce and Dr.\r\nThomas Frognall Dibden. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHOMER\u0027S Iliad.\u003c/b\u003e Translated into\r\nEnglish Prose by T. A. Buckley,\r\nB.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Odyssey.\u003c/b\u003e Hymns, Epigrams,\r\nand Battle of the Frogs and Mice.\r\nTranslated into English Prose by\r\nT. A. Buckley, B.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e——\u003c/b\u003e \u003ci\u003eSee also\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pope\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ePope\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHOOPER\u0027S (G.) Waterloo: The\r\nDownfall of the First Napoleon\u003c/b\u003e:\r\na History of the Campaign\r\nof 1815. By George Hooper.\r\nWith Maps and Plans. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— The Campaign of Sedan\u003c/b\u003e:\r\nThe Downfall of the Second Empire,\r\nAugust-September, 1870.\r\nWith General Map and Six Plans\r\nof Battle. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHORACE.\u003c/b\u003e A new literal Prose\r\ntranslation, by A. Hamilton Bryce,\r\nLL.D. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHUGO\u0027S (Victor) Dramatic\r\nWorks.\u003c/b\u003e Hernani—Ruy Blas—The\r\nKing\u0027s Diversion. Translated\r\nby Mrs. Newton Crosland and\r\nF. L. Slous. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Poems, chiefly Lyrical.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby various Writers, now first\r\ncollected by J. H. L. Williams.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHUMBOLDT\u0027S Cosmos.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby E. C. Otté, B. H. Paul,\r\nand W. S. Dallas, F.L.S. 5 Vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each, excepting Vol. V. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHUMBOLDT\u0027S Personal Narrative\u003c/b\u003e\r\nof his Travels to the Equinoctial\r\nRegions of America during\r\nthe years 1799-1804. Translated\r\nby T. Ross. 3 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Views of Nature.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby E. C. Otté and H. G. Bohn.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHUMPHREYS\u0027 Coin Collector\u0027s\r\nManual.\u003c/b\u003e By H. N. Humphreys,\r\nwith upwards of 140 Illustrations\r\non Wood and Steel. 2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\r\neach.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHUNGARY\u003c/b\u003e: its History and Revolution,\r\ntogether with a copious\r\nMemoir of Kossuth. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHUTCHINSON (Colonel). Memoirs\r\nof the Life of.\u003c/b\u003e By his\r\nWidow, Lucy: together with her\r\nAutobiography, and an Account\r\nof the Siege of Lathom House.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHUNT\u0027S Poetry of Science.\u003c/b\u003e By\r\nRichard Hunt. 3rd Edition, revised\r\nand enlarged. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eINGULPH\u0027S Chronicles of the\r\nAbbey of Croyland\u003c/b\u003e, with the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eContinuation\u003c/span\u003e by Peter of Blois\r\nand other Writers. Translated by\r\nH. T. Riley, M.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIRVING\u0027S (Washington) Complete\r\nWorks.\u003c/b\u003e 15 vols. With Portraits,\r\n\u0026amp;c. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addind2\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI.—Salmagundi, Knickerbocker\u0027s\r\nHistory of New\r\nYork.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eII.—The Sketch-Book, and the\r\nLife of Oliver Goldsmith.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIII.—Bracebridge Hall, Abbotsford\r\nand Newstead Abbey.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIV.—The Alhambra, Tales of a\r\nTraveller.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eV.—Chronicle of the Conquest\r\nof Granada, Legends of\r\nthe Conquest of Spain.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A013\"\u003e[13]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nVI. \u0026amp; VII.—Life and Voyages of\r\nColumbus, together with\r\nthe Voyages of his Companions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVIII.—Astoria, A Tour on the\r\nPrairies.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIX.—Life of Mahomet, Lives of the\r\nSuccessors of Mahomet.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eX.—Adventures of Captain Bonneville,\r\nU.S.A., Wolfert\u0027s\r\nRoost.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXI.—Biographies and Miscellaneous\r\nPapers.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXII.-XV.—Life of George Washington.\r\n4 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Life and Letters.\u003c/b\u003e By his\r\nNephew, Pierre E. Irving. 2 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eISOCRATES, The Orations of.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated by J. H. Freese, M.A.\r\nVol. I. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eJAMES\u0027S (G. P. R.) Life of\r\nRichard Cœur de Lion.\u003c/b\u003e 2 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eJAMESON\u0027S (Mrs.) Shakespeare\u0027s\r\nHeroines.\u003c/b\u003e Characteristics\r\nof Women: Moral, Poetical,\r\nand Historical. By Mrs. Jameson.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eJESSE\u0027S (E.) Anecdotes of Dogs.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nWith 40 Woodcuts and 34 Steel\r\nEngravings. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eJESSE\u0027S (J. H.) Memoirs of the\r\nCourt of England during the\r\nReign of the Stuarts\u003c/b\u003e, including\r\nthe Protectorate. 3 vols. With\r\n42 Portraits. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Memoirs of the Pretenders\r\nand their Adherents.\u003c/b\u003e With 6\r\nPortraits. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eJOHNSON\u0027S Lives of the Poets.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nEdited by Mrs. Alexander Napier,\r\nwith Introduction by Professor\r\nHales. 3 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eJOSEPHUS (Flavius), The Works\r\nof.\u003c/b\u003e Whiston\u0027s Translation, revised\r\nby Rev. A. R. Shilleto, M.A.\r\nWith Topographical and Geographical\r\nNotes by Colonel Sir\r\nC. W. Wilson, K.C.B. 5 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eJOYCE\u0027S Scientific Dialogues.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nWith numerous Woodcuts. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eJUKES-BROWNE (A. J.), The\r\nBuilding of the British Isles\u003c/b\u003e:\r\na Study in Geographical Evolution.\r\nIllustrated by numerous\r\nMaps and Woodcuts. 2nd Edition,\r\nrevised, 7\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eJULIAN, the Emperor.\u003c/b\u003e Containing\r\nGregory Nazianzen\u0027s Two Invectives\r\nand Libanus\u0027 Monody,\r\nwith Julian\u0027s extant Theosophical\r\nWorks. Translated by C. W.\r\nKing, M.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eJUNIUS\u0027S Letters.\u003c/b\u003e With all the\r\nNotes of Woodfall\u0027s Edition, and\r\nimportant Additions. 2 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003ca id=\"Jus\"\u003eJUSTIN\u003c/a\u003e CORNELIUS NEPOS,\r\nand EUTROPIUS.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby the Rev. J. S. Watson, M.A.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003ca id=\"Juv\"\u003eJUVENAL\u003c/a\u003e, PERSIUS. SULPICIA\r\nand LUCILIUS.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby L. Evans, M.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eKANT\u0027S Critique of Pure Reason.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Prolegomena and Metaphysical\r\nFoundations of Natural\r\nScience.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by E. Belfort\r\nBax. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eKEIGHTLEY\u0027S (Thomas) Mythology\r\nof Ancient Greece and\r\nItaly.\u003c/b\u003e 4th Edition, revised by\r\nLeonard Schmitz, Ph.D., LL.D.\r\nWith 12 Plates from the Antique.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A014\"\u003e[14]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cb\u003eKEIGHTLEY\u0027S Fairy Mythology\u003c/b\u003e,\r\nillustrative of the Romance\r\nand Superstition of Various Countries.\r\nRevised Edition, with\r\nFrontispiece by Cruikshank. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLA FONTAINE\u0027S Fables.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\ninto English Verse by Elizur\r\nWright. New Edition, with Notes\r\nby J. W. M. Gibbs. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLAMARTINE\u0027S History of the\r\nGirondists.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by H. T.\r\nRyde. 3 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— History of the Restoration\r\nof Monarchy in France\u003c/b\u003e (a Sequel\r\nto the History of the Girondists).\r\n4 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— History of the French Revolution\r\nof 1848.\u003c/b\u003e 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLAMB\u0027S (Charles) Essays of Elia\r\nand Eliana.\u003c/b\u003e Complete Edition.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Specimens of English Dramatic\r\nPoets of the Time of\r\nElizabeth.\u003c/b\u003e 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Memorials and Letters of\r\nCharles Lamb.\u003c/b\u003e By Serjeant\r\nTalfourd. New Edition, revised,\r\nby W. Carew Hazlitt. 2 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Tales from Shakespeare.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nWith Illustrations by Byam Shaw.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLANE\u0027S Arabian Nights\u0027 Entertainments.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nEdited by Stanley\r\nLane-Poole, M.A., Litt.D. 4\r\nvols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLANZI\u0027S History of Painting in\r\nItaly\u003c/b\u003e, from the Period of the\r\nRevival of the Fine Arts to the\r\nEnd of the Eighteenth Century,\r\nTranslated by Thomas Roscoe.\r\n3 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLAPPENBERG\u0027S History of\r\nEngland under the Anglo-Saxon\r\nKings.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by\r\nB. Thorpe, F.S.A. New edition,\r\nrevised by E. C. Otté. 2 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLECTURES ON PAINTING\u003c/b\u003e,\r\nby Barry, Opie, Fuseli. Edited\r\nby R. Wornum. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLEONARDO DA VINCI\u0027S\r\nTreatise on Painting.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby J. F. Rigaud, R.A.,\r\nWith a Life of Leonardo by John\r\nWilliam Brown. With numerous\r\nPlates. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLEPSIUS\u0027S Letters from Egypt,\r\nEthiopia, and the Peninsula of\r\nSinai.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by L. and\r\nJ. B. Horner. With Maps. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLESSING\u0027S Dramatic Works\u003c/b\u003e,\r\nComplete. Edited by Ernest Bell,\r\nM.A. With Memoir of Lessing\r\nby Helen Zimmern. 2 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Laokoon, Dramatic Notes,\r\nand the Representation of\r\nDeath by the Ancients.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby E. C. Beasley and Helen\r\nZimmern. Edited by Edward\r\nBell, M.A. With a Frontispiece\r\nof the Laokoon group. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLILLY\u0027S Introduction to Astrology.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nWith a \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGrammar of\r\nAstrology\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTables\u003c/span\u003e for Calculating\r\nNativities, by Zadkiel. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLIVY\u0027S History of Rome.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby Dr. Spillan, C. Edmonds,\r\nand others. 4 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLOCKE\u0027S Philosophical Works.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nEdited by J. A. St. John. 2 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Life and Letters\u003c/b\u003e: By Lord\r\nKing. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLOCKHART (J. G.)\u003c/b\u003e—\u003ci\u003eSee\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Burns\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eBurns\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A015\"\u003e[15]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cb\u003eLODGE\u0027S Portraits of Illustrious\r\nPersonages of Great Britain\u003c/b\u003e,\r\nwith Biographical and Historical\r\nMemoirs. 240 Portraits engraved\r\non Steel, with the respective Biographies\r\nunabridged. 8 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\r\neach.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLONGFELLOW\u0027S Prose\r\nWorks.\u003c/b\u003e With 16 full-page Wood\r\nEngravings. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLOUDON\u0027S (Mrs.) Natural\r\nHistory.\u003c/b\u003e Revised edition, by\r\nW. S. Dallas, F.L.S. With\r\nnumerous Woodcut Illus. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLOWNDES\u0027 Bibliographer\u0027s\r\nManual of English Literature.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nEnlarged Edition. By H. G.\r\nBohn. 6 vols. cloth, 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\r\nOr 4 vols. half morocco, 2\u003ci\u003el.\u003c/i\u003e 2\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLONGUS. Daphnis and Chloe.\u003c/b\u003e—\u003ci\u003eSee\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Greek\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eGreek Romances\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLUCAN\u0027S Pharsalia.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby H. T. Riley, M.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLUCIAN\u0027S Dialogues of the\r\nGods, of the Sea Gods, and\r\nof the Dead.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by\r\nHoward Williams, M.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLUCRETIUS.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by the\r\nRev. J. S. Watson, M.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLUTHER\u0027S Table-Talk.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nand Edited by William\r\nHazlitt. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Autobiography.\u003c/b\u003e—\u003ci\u003eSee\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Mic\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eMichelet\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMACHIAVELLI\u0027S History of\r\nFlorence\u003c/b\u003e, together with the\r\nPrince, Savonarola, various Historical\r\nTracts, and a Memoir of\r\nMachiavelli. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMALLET\u0027S Northern Antiquities\u003c/b\u003e,\r\nor an Historical Account of\r\nthe Manners, Customs, Religions\r\nand Laws, Maritime Expeditions\r\nand Discoveries, Language and\r\nLiterature, of the Ancient Scandinavians.\r\nTranslated by Bishop\r\nPercy. Revised and Enlarged\r\nEdition, with a Translation of the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eProse Edda\u003c/span\u003e, by J. A. Blackwell.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMANTELL\u0027S (Dr.) Petrifactions\r\nand their Teachings.\u003c/b\u003e With numerous\r\nillustrative Woodcuts. 6\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Wonders of Geology.\u003c/b\u003e 8th\r\nEdition, revised by T. Rupert\r\nJones, F.G.S. With a coloured\r\nGeological Map of England,\r\nPlates, and upwards of 200\r\nWoodcuts. 2 vols. 7\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMANZONI. The Betrothed\u003c/b\u003e:\r\nbeing a Translation of \u0027I Promessi\r\nSposi.\u0027 By Alessandro\r\nManzoni. With numerous Woodcuts.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMARCO POLO\u0027S Travels\u003c/b\u003e; the\r\nTranslation of Marsden revised\r\nby T. Wright, M.A., F.S.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMARRYAT\u0027S (Capt. R.N.)\r\nMasterman Ready.\u003c/b\u003e With 93\r\nWoodcuts. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Mission\u003c/b\u003e; \u003cb\u003eor, Scenes in Africa.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nIllustrated by Gilbert and Dalziel.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Pirate and Three Cutters.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nWith 8 Steel Engravings, from\r\nDrawings by Clarkson Stanfield,\r\nR.A. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Privateersman.\u003c/b\u003e 8 Engravings\r\non Steel. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Settlers in Canada.\u003c/b\u003e 10 Engravings\r\nby Gilbert and Dalziel.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Poor Jack.\u003c/b\u003e With 16 Illustrations\r\nafter Clarkson Stansfield,\r\nR.A. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Peter Simple.\u003c/b\u003e With 8 full-page\r\nIllustrations. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Midshipman Easy.\u003c/b\u003e With 8\r\nfull-page Illustrations. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMARTIAL\u0027S Epigrams\u003c/b\u003e, complete.\r\nTranslated into Prose, each accompanied\r\nby one or more Verse\r\nTranslations selected from the\r\nWorks of English Poets, and\r\nother sources. 7\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A016\"\u003e[16]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cb\u003eMARTINEAU\u0027S (Harriet) History\r\nof England\u003c/b\u003e, from 1800-1815.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— History of the Thirty Years\u0027\r\nPeace\u003c/b\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA.D.\u003c/span\u003e 1815-46. 4 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e——\u003c/b\u003e \u003ci\u003eSee \u003ca href=\"#Com\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eComte\u0027s Positive Philosophy\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMATTHEW PARIS\u0027S English\r\nHistory\u003c/b\u003e, from the Year 1235 to\r\n1273. Translated by Rev. J. A.\r\nGiles, D.C.L. 3 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMATTHEW OF WESTMINSTER\u0027S\r\nFlowers of History\u003c/b\u003e,\r\nfrom the beginning of the World\r\nto \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA.D.\u003c/span\u003e 1307. Translated by C. D.\r\nYonge, M.A. 2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003ca id=\"Max\"\u003eMAXWELL\u0027S\u003c/a\u003e Victories of Wellington\r\nand the British Armies.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nFrontispiece and 5 Portraits. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMENZEL\u0027S History of Germany\u003c/b\u003e,\r\nfrom the Earliest Period to 1842.\r\n3 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMICHAEL ANGELO AND\r\nRAPHAEL, their Lives and\r\nWorks\u003c/b\u003e. By Duppa and Quatremere\r\nde Quincy. With Portraits,\r\nand Engravings on Steel. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003ca id=\"Mic\"\u003eMICHELET\u0027S\u003c/a\u003e Luther\u0027s Autobiography.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTrans. by William\r\nHazlitt. With an Appendix (110\r\npages) of Notes. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— History of the French Revolution\r\nfrom\u003c/b\u003e its earliest indications\r\nto the flight of the King in 1791.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMIGNET\u0027S History of the French\r\nRevolution\u003c/b\u003e, from 1789 to 1814.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMILL (J. S.). Early Essays by\r\nJohn Stuart Mill\u003c/b\u003e. Collected from\r\nvarious sources by J. W. M. Gibbs.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMILLER (Professor). History\r\nPhilosophically Illustrated\u003c/b\u003e, from\r\nthe Fall of the Roman Empire to\r\nthe French Revolution. 4 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMILTON\u0027S Prose Works\u003c/b\u003e. Edited\r\nby J. A. St. John. 5 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\r\neach.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Poetical Works\u003c/b\u003e, with a Memoir\r\nand Critical Remarks by\r\nJames Montgomery, an Index to\r\nParadise Lost, Todd\u0027s Verbal Index\r\nto all the Poems, and a Selection\r\nof Explanatory Notes by Henry\r\nG. Bohn. Illustrated with 120\r\nWood Engravings from Drawings\r\nby W. Harvey. 2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\r\neach.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMITFORD\u0027S (Miss) Our Village\u003c/b\u003e,\r\nSketches of Rural Character and\r\nScenery. With 2 Engravings on\r\nSteel. 2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMOLIÈRE\u0027S Dramatic Works\u003c/b\u003e.\r\nA new Translation in English\r\nProse, by C. H. Wall. 3 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMONTAGU. The Letters and\r\nWorks of Lady Mary Wortley\r\nMontagu.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by her great-grandson,\r\nLord Wharncliffe\u0027s Edition,\r\nand revised by W. Moy\r\nThomas. New Edition, revised,\r\nwith 5 Portraits. 2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMONTAIGNE\u0027S Essays.\u003c/b\u003e Cotton\u0027s\r\nTranslation, revised by W. C.\r\nHazlitt. New Edition. 3 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMONTESQUIEU\u0027S Spirit of\r\nLaws.\u003c/b\u003e New Edition, revised and\r\ncorrected. By J. V. Pritchard,\r\nA.M. 2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMORPHY\u0027S Games of Chess.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nBeing the Matches and best Games\r\nplayed by the American Champion,\r\nwith Explanatory and Analytical\r\nNotes by J. Löwenthal. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMOTLEY (J. L.). The Rise of\r\nthe Dutch Republic\u003c/b\u003e. A History.\r\nBy John Lothrop Motley. New\r\nEdition, with Biographical Introduction\r\nby Moncure D. Conway.\r\n3 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A017\"\u003e[17]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cb\u003eMUDIE\u0027S British Birds\u003c/b\u003e; or, History\r\nof the Feathered Tribes of the\r\nBritish Islands. Revised by W.\r\nC. L. Martin. With 52 Figures\r\nof Birds and 7 Coloured Plates of\r\nEggs. 2 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eNEANDER (Dr. A.). History\r\nof the Christian Religion and\r\nChurch.\u003c/b\u003e Trans. from the German\r\nby J. Torrey. 10 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Life of Jesus Christ.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby J. McClintock and C.\r\nBlumenthal. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— History of the Planting and\r\nTraining of the Christian\r\nChurch by the Apostles.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated by J. E. Ryland.\r\n2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Memorials of Christian Life\r\nin the Early and Middle Ages\u003c/b\u003e;\r\nincluding Light in Dark Places.\r\nTrans. by J. E. Ryland. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eNIBELUNGEN LIED. The\r\nLay of the Nibelungs\u003c/b\u003e, metrically\r\ntranslated from the old German\r\ntext by Alice Horton, and edited\r\nby Edward Bell, M.A. To which\r\nis prefixed the Essay on the Nibelungen\r\nLied by Thomas Carlyle.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eNEW TESTAMENT (The) in\r\nGreek.\u003c/b\u003e Griesbach\u0027s Text, with\r\nvarious Readings at the foot of\r\nthe page, and Parallel References\r\nin the margin; also a Critical\r\nIntroduction and Chronological\r\nTables. By an eminent Scholar,\r\nwith a Greek and English Lexicon.\r\n3rd Edition, revised and corrected.\r\nTwo Facsimiles of Greek Manuscripts.\r\n900 pages. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addp\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Lexicon may be had separately,\r\nprice 2\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eNICOLINI\u0027S History of the\r\nJesuits\u003c/b\u003e: their Origin, Progress,\r\nDoctrines, and Designs. With 8\r\nPortraits. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eNORTH (R.) Lives\u003c/b\u003e of the Right\r\nHon. Francis North, Baron Guildford,\r\nthe Hon. Sir Dudley North,\r\nand the Hon. and Rev. Dr. John\r\nNorth. By the Hon. Roger\r\nNorth. Together with the Autobiography\r\nof the Author. Edited\r\nby Augustus Jessopp, D.D. 3 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eNUGENT\u0027S (Lord) Memorials\r\nof Hampden, his Party and\r\nTimes.\u003c/b\u003e With a Memoir of the\r\nAuthor, an Autograph Letter, and\r\nPortrait. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003ca id=\"Old\"\u003eOLD ENGLISH CHRONICLES\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/b\u003e,\r\nincluding Ethelwerd\u0027s\r\nChronicle, Asser\u0027s Life of Alfred,\r\nGeoffrey of Monmouth\u0027s British\r\nHistory, Gildas, Nennius, and the\r\nspurious chronicle of Richard of\r\nCirencester. Edited by J. A.\r\nGiles, D.C.L. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eOMAN (J. C.) The Great Indian\r\nEpics\u003c/b\u003e: the Stories of the \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRamayana\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand the \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMahabharata\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nBy John Campbell Oman, Principal\r\nof Khalsa College, Amritsar.\r\nWith Notes, Appendices, and\r\nIllustrations. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eORDERICUS VITALIS\u0027 Ecclesiastical\r\nHistory of England\r\nand Normandy.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by\r\nT. Forester, M.A. To which is\r\nadded the \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eChronicle of St.\r\nEvroult\u003c/span\u003e. 4 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eOVID\u0027S Works\u003c/b\u003e, complete. Literally\r\ntranslated into Prose. 3 vols.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePASCAL\u0027S Thoughts\u003c/b\u003e. Translated\r\nfrom the Text of M. Auguste\r\nMolinier by C. Kegan Paul. 3rd\r\nEdition. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePAULI\u0027S (Dr. R.) Life of Alfred\r\nthe Great.\u003c/b\u003e Translated from the\r\nGerman. To which is appended\r\nAlfred\u0027s \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAnglo-Saxon Version\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A018\"\u003e[18]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof Orosius.\u003c/span\u003e With a literal\r\nTranslation interpaged, Notes,\r\nand an \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAnglo-Saxon Grammar\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGlossary\u003c/span\u003e, by B. Thorpe. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePAUSANIAS\u0027 Description of\r\nGreece.\u003c/b\u003e Newly translated by A. R.\r\nShilleto, M.A. 2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePEARSON\u0027S Exposition of the\r\nCreed.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by E. Walford,\r\nM.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePEPYS\u0027 Diary and Correspondence.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nDeciphered by the Rev.\r\nJ. Smith, M.A., from the original\r\nShorthand MS. in the Pepysian\r\nLibrary. Edited by Lord Braybrooke.\r\n4 vols. With 31 Engravings.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePERCY\u0027S Reliques of Ancient\r\nEnglish Poetry.\u003c/b\u003e With an Essay\r\non Ancient Minstrels and a Glossary.\r\nEdited by J. V. Pritchard,\r\nA.M. 2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePERSIUS.\u003c/b\u003e—\u003ci\u003eSee\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Juv\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eJuvenal\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePETRARCH\u0027S Sonnets, Triumphs,\r\nand other Poems.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated into English Verse by\r\nvarious Hands. With a Life of\r\nthe Poet by Thomas Campbell.\r\nWith Portrait and 15 Steel Engravings.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePHILO-JUDÆUS, Works of.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated by Prof. C. D. Yonge,\r\nM.A. 4 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePICKERING\u0027S History of the\r\nRaces of Man\u003c/b\u003e, and their Geographical\r\nDistribution. With \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAn\r\nAnalytical Synopsis of the\r\nNatural History of Man\u003c/span\u003e by\r\nDr. Hall. With a Map of the\r\nWorld and 12 coloured Plates. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePINDAR.\u003c/b\u003e Translated into Prose\r\nby Dawson W. Turner. To which\r\nis added the Metrical Version by\r\nAbraham Moore. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePLANCHÉ. History of British\r\nCostume\u003c/b\u003e, from the Earliest Time\r\nto the Close of the Eighteenth\r\nCentury. By J. R. Planché,\r\nSomerset Herald. With upwards\r\nof 400 Illustrations. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePLATO\u0027S Works.\u003c/b\u003e Literally translated,\r\nwith Introduction and\r\nNotes. 6 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addind2\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI.—The Apology of Socrates,\r\nCrito, Phædo, Gorgias, Protagoras,\r\nPhædrus, Theætetus,\r\nEuthyphron, Lysis. Translated\r\nby the Rev. H. Carey.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eII.—The Republic, Timæus, and\r\nCritias. Translated by Henry\r\nDavis.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIII.—Meno, Euthydemus, The\r\nSophist, Statesman, Cratylus,\r\nParmenides, and the Banquet.\r\nTranslated by G. Burges.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIV.—Philebus, Charmides, Laches,\r\nMenexenus, Hippias, Ion,\r\nThe Two Alcibiades, Theages,\r\nRivals, Hipparchus,\r\nMinos, Clitopho, Epistles.\r\nTranslated by G. Burges.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eV.—The Laws. Translated by\r\nG. Burges.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVI.—The Doubtful Works. Translated\r\nby G. Burges.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Summary and Analysis of\r\nthe Dialogues.\u003c/b\u003e With Analytical\r\nIndex. By A. Day, LL.D. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePLAUTUS\u0027S Comedies.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby H. T. Riley, M.A. 2\r\nvols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePLINY\u0027S Natural History.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated by the late John\r\nBostock, M.D., F.R.S., and H. T.\r\nRiley, M.A. 6 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePLINY.\u003c/b\u003e \u003cb\u003eThe Letters of Pliny\r\nthe Younger.\u003c/b\u003e Melmoth\u0027s translation,\r\nrevised by the Rev. F. C.\r\nT. Bosanquet, M.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePLOTINUS, Select Works of.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated by Thomas Taylor.\r\nWith an Introduction containing\r\nthe substance of Porphyry\u0027s Plotinus.\r\nEdited by G. R. S. Mead,\r\nB.A., M.R.A.S. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A019\"\u003e[19]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cb\u003ePLUTARCH\u0027S Lives.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby A. Stewart, M.A., and George\r\nLong, M.A. 4 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Morals.\u003c/b\u003e Theosophical Essays.\r\nTranslated by C. W. King, M.A.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Morals.\u003c/b\u003e Ethical Essays.\r\nTranslated by the Rev. A. R.\r\nShilleto, M.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePOETRY OF AMERICA. Selections\u003c/b\u003e\r\nfrom One Hundred\r\nAmerican Poets, from 1776 to\r\n1876. By W. J. Linton. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePOLITICAL CYCLOPÆDIA.\r\nA Dictionary\u003c/b\u003e of Political, Constitutional,\r\nStatistical, and Forensic\r\nKnowledge; forming a\r\nWork of Reference on subjects of\r\nCivil Administration, Political\r\nEconomy, Finance, Commerce,\r\nLaws, and Social Relations. 4\r\nvols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003ca id=\"Pope\"\u003ePOPE\u0027S\u003c/a\u003e Poetical Works.\u003c/b\u003e Edited,\r\nwith copious Notes, by Robert\r\nCarruthers. With numerous Illustrations.\r\n2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Homer\u0027s Iliad.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by\r\nthe Rev. J. S. Watson, M.A.\r\nIllustrated by the entire Series of\r\nFlaxman\u0027s Designs. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Homer\u0027s Odyssey\u003c/b\u003e, with the\r\nBattle of Frogs and Mice, Hymns,\r\n\u0026amp;c., by other translators. Edited\r\nby the Rev. J. S. Watson, M.A.\r\nWith the entire Series of Flaxman\u0027s\r\nDesigns. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Life\u003c/b\u003e, including many of his\r\nLetters. By Robert Carruthers.\r\nWith numerous Illustrations. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePOUSHKIN\u0027S Prose Tales\u003c/b\u003e: The\r\nCaptain\u0027s Daughter—Doubrovsky—The\r\nQueen of Spades—An\r\nAmateur Peasant Girl—The Shot—The\r\nSnow Storm—The Postmaster—The\r\nCoffin Maker—Kirdjali—The\r\nEgyptian Nights—Peter\r\nthe Great\u0027s Negro. Translated\r\nby T. Keane. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePRESCOTT\u0027S Conquest of\r\nMexico.\u003c/b\u003e Copyright edition, with\r\nthe notes by John Foster Kirk,\r\nand an introduction by G. P.\r\nWinship. 3 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Conquest of Peru.\u003c/b\u003e Copyright\r\nedition, with the notes of John\r\nFoster Kirk. 2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Reign of Ferdinand and\r\nIsabella.\u003c/b\u003e Copyright edition,\r\nwith the notes of John Foster\r\nKirk. 3 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePROPERTIUS.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by\r\nRev. P. J. F. Gantillon, M.A.,\r\nand accompanied by Poetical\r\nVersions, from various sources.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePROVERBS, Handbook of.\u003c/b\u003e Containing\r\nan entire Republication\r\nof Ray\u0027s Collection of English\r\nProverbs, with his additions from\r\nForeign Languages and a complete\r\nAlphabetical Index; in which\r\nare introduced large additions as\r\nwell of Proverbs as of Sayings,\r\nSentences, Maxims, and Phrases,\r\ncollected by H. G. Bohn. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePROVERBS, A Polyglot of\r\nForeign.\u003c/b\u003e Comprising French,\r\nItalian, German, Dutch, Spanish,\r\nPortuguese, and Danish. With\r\nEnglish Translations \u0026amp; a General\r\nIndex by H. G. Bohn. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePOTTERY AND PORCELAIN\u003c/b\u003e,\r\nand other Objects of Vertu. Comprising\r\nan Illustrated Catalogue of\r\nthe Bernal Collection of Works\r\nof Art, with the prices at which\r\nthey were sold by auction, and\r\nnames of the possessors. To which\r\nare added, an Introductory Lecture\r\non Pottery and Porcelain, and an\r\nEngraved List of all the known\r\nMarks and Monograms. By Henry\r\nG. Bohn. With numerous Wood\r\nEngravings, 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e; or with Coloured\r\nIllustrations, 10\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePROUT\u0027S (Father) Reliques.\u003c/b\u003e Collected\r\nand arranged by Rev. F.\r\nMahony. New issue, with 21\r\nEtchings by D. Maclise, R.A.\r\nNearly 600 pages. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A020\"\u003e[20]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cb\u003eQUINTILIAN\u0027S Institutes of\r\nOratory\u003c/b\u003e, or Education of an\r\nOrator. Translated by the Rev.\r\nJ. S. Watson, M.A. 2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\r\neach.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRACINE\u0027S (Jean) Dramatic\r\nWorks.\u003c/b\u003e A metrical English version.\r\nBy R. Bruce Boswell, M.A.\r\nOxon. 2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRANKE\u0027S History of the Popes\u003c/b\u003e,\r\ntheir Church and State, and especially\r\nof their Conflicts with Protestantism\r\nin the 16th and 17th\r\ncenturies. Translated by E.\r\nFoster. 3 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— History of Servia and the\r\nServian Revolution.\u003c/b\u003e With an\r\nAccount of the Insurrection in\r\nBosnia. Translated by Mrs. Kerr.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRECREATIONS in SHOOTING.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nBy \u0027Craven.\u0027 With 62 Engravings\r\non Wood after Harvey, and 9\r\nEngravings on Steel, chiefly after\r\nA. Cooper, R.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRENNIE\u0027S Insect Architecture.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nRevised and enlarged by Rev.\r\nJ. G. Wood, M.A. With 186\r\nWoodcut Illustrations. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eREYNOLD\u0027S (Sir J.) Literary\r\nWorks.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by H. W. Beechy.\r\n2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRICARDO on the Principles of\r\nPolitical Economy and Taxation.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nEdited by E. C. K. Gonner,\r\nM.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRICHTER (Jean Paul Friedrich).\r\nLevana, a Treatise on Education:\u003c/b\u003e\r\ntogether with the Autobiography\r\n(a Fragment), and a short Prefatory\r\nMemoir. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Flower, Fruit, and Thorn\r\nPieces\u003c/b\u003e, or the Wedded Life, Death,\r\nand Marriage of Firmian Stanislaus\r\nSiebenkaes, Parish Advocate\r\nin the Parish of Kuhschnapptel.\r\nNewly translated by Lt. Col. Alex.\r\nEwing. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eROGER DE HOVEDEN\u0027S Annals\r\nof English History\u003c/b\u003e, comprising\r\nthe History of England\r\nand of other Countries of Europe\r\nfrom \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA.D.\u003c/span\u003e 732 to \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA.D.\u003c/span\u003e 1201.\r\nTranslated by H. T. Riley, M.A.\r\n2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eROGER OF WENDOVER\u0027S\r\nFlowers of History\u003c/b\u003e, comprising\r\nthe History of England from the\r\nDescent of the Saxons to \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA.D.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n1235, formerly ascribed to Matthew\r\nParis. Translated by J. A. Giles,\r\nD.C.L. 2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eROME in the NINETEENTH\r\nCENTURY.\u003c/b\u003e Containing a complete\r\nAccount of the Ruins of the\r\nAncient City, the Remains of the\r\nMiddle Ages, and the Monuments\r\nof Modern Times. By C. A. Eaton.\r\nWith 34 Steel Engravings. 2 vols.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e——\u003c/b\u003e \u003ci\u003eSee\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Burn\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eBurn\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Dyer\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eDyer\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eROSCOE\u0027S (W.) Life and Pontificate\r\nof Leo X.\u003c/b\u003e Final edition,\r\nrevised by Thomas Roscoe. 2\r\nvols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Life of Lorenzo de\u0027 Medici\u003c/b\u003e,\r\ncalled \u0027the Magnificent.\u0027 With\r\nhis poems, letters, \u0026amp;c. 10th\r\nEdition, revised, with Memoir of\r\nRoscoe by his Son. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRUSSIA. History of\u003c/b\u003e, from the\r\nearliest Period, compiled from\r\nthe most authentic sources by\r\nWalter K. Kelly. With Portraits.\r\n2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSALLUST, FLORUS, and VELLEIUS\r\nPATERCULUS.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated by J. S. Watson, M.A.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSCHILLER\u0027S Works.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby various hands. 7 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\r\neach:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addind2\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI.—History of the Thirty Years\u0027\r\nWar.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A021\"\u003e[21]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nII.—History of the Revolt in the\r\nNetherlands, the Trials of\r\nCounts Egmont and Horn,\r\nthe Siege of Antwerp, and\r\nthe Disturbances in France\r\npreceding the Reign of\r\nHenry IV.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIII.—Don Carlos, Mary Stuart,\r\nMaid of Orleans, Bride of\r\nMessina, together with the\r\nUse of the Chorus in\r\nTragedy (a short Essay).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addp\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese Dramas are all\r\ntranslated in metre.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIV.—Robbers (with Schiller\u0027s\r\noriginal Preface), Fiesco,\r\nLove and Intrigue, Demetrius,\r\nGhost Seer, Sport\r\nof Divinity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addp\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Dramas in this\r\nvolume are translated into\r\nProse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eV.—Poems.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVI.—Essays, Æsthetical and Philosophical.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVII.—Wallenstein\u0027s Camp, Piccolomini\r\nand Death of\r\nWallenstein, William Tell.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSCHILLER and GOETHE.\r\nCorrespondence between\u003c/b\u003e, from\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA.D.\u003c/span\u003e 1794-1805. Translated by\r\nL. Dora Schmitz. 2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\r\neach.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSCHLEGEL\u0027S (F.) Lectures on\r\nthe Philosophy of Life and the\r\nPhilosophy of Language.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby the Rev. A. J. W. Morrison,\r\nM.A. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Lectures on the History of\r\nLiterature, Ancient and Modern.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated from the German. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Lectures on the Philosophy\r\nof History.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by J. B.\r\nRobertson. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSCHLEGEL\u0027S Lectures on\r\nModern History\u003c/b\u003e, together with\r\nthe Lectures entitled Cæsar and\r\nAlexander, and The Beginning of\r\nour History. Translated by L.\r\nPurcell and R. H. Whitetock.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Æsthetic and Miscellaneous\r\nWorks.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by E. J.\r\nMillington. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSCHLEGEL (A. W.) Lectures\r\non Dramatic Art and Literature.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated by J. Black. Revised\r\nEdition, by the Rev. A. J. W.\r\nMorrison, M.A. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSCHOPENHAUER on the Fourfold\r\nRoot of the Principle of\r\nSufficient Reason\u003c/b\u003e, and \u003cb\u003eOn the\r\nWill in Nature\u003c/b\u003e. Translated by\r\nMadame Hillebrand. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Essays.\u003c/b\u003e Selected and Translated.\r\nWith a Biographical Introduction\r\nand Sketch of his Philosophy,\r\nby E. Belfort Bax. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSCHOUW\u0027S Earth, Plants, and\r\nMan.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by A. Henfrey.\r\nWith coloured Map of the Geography\r\nof Plants. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSCHUMANN (Robert).\u003c/b\u003e His Life\r\nand Works, by August Reissmann.\r\nTranslated by A. L. Alger. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Early Letters.\u003c/b\u003e Originally published\r\nby his Wife. Translated\r\nby May Herbert. With a Preface\r\nby Sir George Grove, D.C.L.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSENECA on Benefits.\u003c/b\u003e Newly\r\ntranslated by A. Stewart, M.A.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Minor Essays and On Clemency.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated by A. Stewart,\r\nM.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSHAKESPEARE DOCUMENTS.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nArranged by D. H.\r\nLambert, B.A. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSHAKESPEARE\u0027S Dramatic\r\nArt.\u003c/b\u003e The History and Character\r\nof Shakespeare\u0027s Plays. By Dr.\r\nHermann Ulrici. Translated by\r\nL. Dora Schmitz. 2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\r\neach.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A022\"\u003e[22]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cb\u003e\u003ca id=\"Shak\"\u003eSHAKESPEARE\u003c/a\u003e (William).\u003c/b\u003e A\r\nLiterary Biography by Karl Elze,\r\nPh.D., LL.D. Translated by\r\nL. Dora Schmitz. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSHARPE (S.) The History of\r\nEgypt\u003c/b\u003e, from the Earliest Times\r\ntill the Conquest by the Arabs,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA.D.\u003c/span\u003e 640. By Samuel Sharpe.\r\n2 Maps and upwards of 400 Illustrative\r\nWoodcuts. 2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSHERIDAN\u0027S Dramatic Works\u003c/b\u003e,\r\nComplete. With Life by G. G. S.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSISMONDI\u0027S History of the\r\nLiterature of the South of\r\nEurope.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by Thomas\r\nRoscoe. 2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSMITH\u0027S Synonyms and Antonyms,\r\nor Kindred Words\u003c/b\u003e and\r\ntheir \u003cb\u003eOpposites\u003c/b\u003e. Revised Edition.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Synonyms Discriminated.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nA Dictionary of Synonymous\r\nWords in the English Language,\r\nshowing the Accurate signification\r\nof words of similar meaning.\r\nEdited by the Rev. H. Percy\r\nSmith, M.A. 6\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSMITH\u0027S (Adam) The Wealth of\r\nNations.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by E. Belfort\r\nBax. 2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Theory of Moral Sentiments.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nWith a Memoir of the Author by\r\nDugald Stewart. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSMYTH\u0027S (Professor) Lectures\r\non Modern History.\u003c/b\u003e 2 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSMYTH\u0027S (Professor) Lectures\r\non the French Revolution.\u003c/b\u003e\r\n2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSMITH\u0027S (Pye) Geology and\r\nScripture.\u003c/b\u003e 2nd Edition. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSMOLLETT\u0027S Adventures of\r\nRoderick Random.\u003c/b\u003e With short\r\nMemoir and Bibliography, and\r\nCruikshank\u0027s Illustrations. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSMOLLETT\u0027S Adventures of\r\nPeregrine Pickle.\u003c/b\u003e With Bibliography\r\nand Cruikshank\u0027s Illustrations.\r\n2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— The Expedition of Humphry\r\nClinker.\u003c/b\u003e With Bibliography\r\nand Cruikshank\u0027s Illustrations.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSOCRATES (surnamed Scholasticus\u0027).\r\nThe Ecclesiastical History\r\nof (\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA.D.\u003c/span\u003e 305-445).\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nfrom the Greek. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSOPHOCLES, The Tragedies of.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nA New Prose Translation, with\r\nMemoir, Notes, \u0026amp;c., by E. P.\r\nColeridge, M.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSOUTHEY\u0027S Life of Nelson.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nWith Portraits, Plans, and upwards\r\nof 50 Engravings on Steel\r\nand Wood. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Life of Wesley\u003c/b\u003e, and the Rise\r\nand Progress of Methodism. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Robert Southey.\u003c/b\u003e The Story\r\nof his Life written in his Letters.\r\nEdited by John Dennis. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSOZOMEN\u0027S Ecclesiastical History.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated from the Greek.\r\nTogether with the \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEcclesiastical\r\nHistory of Philostorgius\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nas epitomised by Photius.\r\nTranslated by Rev. E. Walford,\r\nM.A. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSPINOZA\u0027S Chief Works.\u003c/b\u003e Translated,\r\nwith Introduction, by R. H. M.\r\nElwes. 2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSTANLEY\u0027S Classified Synopsis\r\nof the Principal Painters of the\r\nDutch and Flemish Schools.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nBy George Stanley. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSTARLING\u0027S (Miss) Noble Deeds\r\nof Women.\u003c/b\u003e With 14 Steel Engravings.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSTAUNTON\u0027S Chess-Player\u0027s\r\nHandbook.\u003c/b\u003e 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Chess Praxis.\u003c/b\u003e A Supplement\r\nto the Chess-player\u0027s Handbook.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A023\"\u003e[23]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cb\u003e—— Chess-player\u0027s\r\nCompanion.\u003c/b\u003e Comprising a Treatise\r\non Odds, Collection of Match\r\nGames, and a Selection of Original\r\nProblems. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Chess Tournament of 1851.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nWith Introduction and Notes. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSTOCKHARDT\u0027S Experimental\r\nChemistry.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by C. W.\r\nHeaton, F.C.S. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSTOWE (Mrs. H. B.) Uncle Tom\u0027s\r\nCabin.\u003c/b\u003e Illustrated. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSTRABO\u0027S Geography.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby W. Falconer, M.A.,\r\nand H. C. Hamilton. 3 vols.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSTRICKLAND\u0027S (Agnes) Lives\r\nof the Queens of England\u003c/b\u003e, from\r\nthe Norman Conquest. Revised\r\nEdition. With 6 Portraits. 6 vols.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Life of Mary Queen of Scots.\u003c/b\u003e\r\n2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Lives of the Tudor and Stuart\r\nPrincesses.\u003c/b\u003e With Portraits. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSTUART and REVETT\u0027S Antiquities\r\nof Athens\u003c/b\u003e, and other\r\nMonuments of Greece. With 71\r\nPlates engraved on Steel, and\r\nnumerous Woodcut Capitals. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSUETONIUS\u0027 Lives of the Twelve\r\nCæsars\u003c/b\u003e and \u003cb\u003eLives of the Grammarians\u003c/b\u003e.\r\nThomson\u0027s translation,\r\nrevised by T. Forester. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSWIFT\u0027S Prose Works.\u003c/b\u003e Edited\r\nby Temple Scott. With a Biographical\r\nIntroduction by the Right\r\nHon. W. E. H. Lecky, M.P.\r\nWith Portraits and Facsimiles.\r\n12 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"right\"\u003e[\u003ci\u003eVols. I.-X. ready.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addind2\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI.—A Tale of a Tub, The Battle\r\nof the Books, and other\r\nearly works. Edited by\r\nTemple Scott. With a\r\nBiographical Introduction\r\nby W. E. H. Lecky.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eII.—The Journal to Stella. Edited\r\nby Frederick Ryland, M.A.\r\nWith 2 Portraits and Facsimile.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIII. \u0026amp; IV.—Writings on Religion and\r\nthe Church.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eV.—Historical and Political\r\nTracts (English).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVI.—The Drapier\u0027s Letters.\r\nWith facsimiles of Wood\u0027s\r\nCoinage, \u0026amp;c.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVII.—Historical and Political\r\nTracts (Irish).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVIII.—Gulliver\u0027s Travels. Edited\r\nby G. R. Dennis. With\r\nPortrait and Maps.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIX.—Contributions to Periodicals.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eX.—Historical Writings.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXI.—Literary Essays.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"right\"\u003e[\u003ci\u003eIn preparation.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXII.—Index and Bibliography.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"right\"\u003e[\u003ci\u003eIn preparation.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTACITUS. The Works of.\u003c/b\u003e Literally\r\ntranslated. 2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTALES OF THE GENII.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nfrom the Persian by Sir\r\nCharles Morell. Numerous Woodcuts\r\nand 12 Steel Engravings. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTASSO\u0027S Jerusalem Delivered.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated into English Spenserian\r\nVerse by J. H. Wiffen. With 8\r\nEngravings on Steel and 24 Woodcuts\r\nby Thurston. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTAYLOR\u0027S (Bishop Jeremy)\r\nHoly Living and Dying.\u003c/b\u003e 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTEN BRINK.\u003c/b\u003e—\u003ci\u003eSee\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Brin\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eBrink\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTERENCE and PHÆDRUS.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nLiterally translated by H. T. Riley,\r\nM.A. To which is added, Smart\u0027s\r\nMetrical Version of Phædrus. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003ca id=\"Theo\"\u003eTHEOCRITUS\u003c/a\u003e, BION, MOSCHUS,\r\nand TYRTÆUS.\u003c/b\u003e Literally\r\ntranslated by the Rev. J.\r\nBanks, M.A. To which are appended\r\nthe Metrical Versions of\r\nChapman. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A024\"\u003e[24]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cb\u003eTHEODORET and EVAGRIUS.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nHistories of the Church from \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA.D.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n332 to \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA.D.\u003c/span\u003e 427; and from \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA.D.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n431 to \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA.D.\u003c/span\u003e 544. Translated. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTHIERRY\u0027S History of the\r\nConquest of England by the\r\nNormans.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by William\r\nHazlitt. 2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTHUCYDIDES. The Peloponnesian\r\nWar.\u003c/b\u003e Literally translated\r\nby the Rev. H. Dale. 2 vols.\r\n3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— An Analysis and Summary\r\nof.\u003c/b\u003e By J. T. Wheeler. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTHUDICHUM (J. L. W.) A Treatise\r\non Wines.\u003c/b\u003e Illustrated. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eURE\u0027S (Dr. A.) Cotton Manufacture\r\nof Great Britain.\u003c/b\u003e Edited\r\nby P. L. Simmonds. 2 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\r\neach.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Philosophy of Manufactures.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nEdited by P. L. Simmonds. 7\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eVASARI\u0027S Lives of the most\r\nEminent Painters, Sculptors,\r\nand Architects.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by\r\nMrs. J. Foster, with a Commentary\r\nby J. P. Richter, Ph.D. 6\r\nvols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eVIRGIL.\u003c/b\u003e A Literal Prose Translation\r\nby A. Hamilton Bryce,\r\nLL.D. With Portrait. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eVOLTAIRE\u0027S Tales.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby R. B. Boswell. Containing\r\nBebouc, Memnon, Candide, L\u0027Ingénu,\r\nand other Tales. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWALTON\u0027S Complete Angler.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nEdited by Edward Jesse. With\r\nPortrait and 203 Engravings on\r\nWood and 26 Engravings on\r\nSteel. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Lives of Donne, Hooker, \u0026amp;c.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nNew Edition revised by A. H.\r\nBullen, with a Memoir of Izaak\r\nWalton by Wm. Dowling. With\r\nnumerous Illustrations. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWELLINGTON, Life of.\u003c/b\u003e By \u0027An\r\nOld Soldier.\u0027 From the materials\r\nof Maxwell. With Index and 18\r\nSteel Engravings. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWELLINGTON, Victories of.\u003c/b\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eSee\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Max\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eMaxwell\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWERNER\u0027S Templars in\r\nCyprus.\u003c/b\u003e Translated by E. A. M.\r\nLewis. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWESTROPP (H. M.) A Handbook\r\nof Archæology, Egyptian,\r\nGreek, Etruscan, Roman.\u003c/b\u003e Illustrated.\r\n5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWHITE\u0027S Natural History of\r\nSelborne.\u003c/b\u003e With Notes by Sir\r\nWilliam Jardine. Edited by Edward\r\nJesse. With 40 Portraits\r\nand coloured Plates. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWHEATLEY\u0027S A Rational Illustration\r\nof the Book of Common\r\nPrayer.\u003c/b\u003e 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWHEELER\u0027S Noted Names of\r\nFiction, Dictionary of.\u003c/b\u003e 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWIESELER\u0027S Chronological\r\nSynopsis of the Four Gospels.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated by the Rev. Canon\r\nVenables. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWILLIAM of MALMESBURY\u0027S\r\nChronicle of the Kings of England.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nTranslated by the Rev. J.\r\nSharpe. Edited by J. A. Giles,\r\nD.C.L. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eXENOPHON\u0027S Works.\u003c/b\u003e Translated\r\nby the Rev. J. S. Watson,\r\nM.A., and the Rev. H. Dale. In\r\n3 vols. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eYOUNG (Arthur). Travels in\r\nFrance during the years 1787,\r\n1788, and 1789.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by\r\nM. Betham Edwards. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e—— Tour in Ireland\u003c/b\u003e, with\r\nGeneral Observations on the state\r\nof the country during the years\r\n1776-79. Edited by A. W.\r\nHutton. With Complete Bibliography\r\nby J. P. Anderson, and\r\nMap. 2 vols. 3\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eYULE-TIDE STORIES.\u003c/b\u003e A Collection\r\nof Scandinavian and North-German\r\nPopular Tales and Traditions.\r\nEdited by B. Thorpe. 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A025\"\u003e[25]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph2\"\u003eTHE YORK LIBRARY\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph4\"\u003eA NEW SERIES OF REPRINTS ON THIN PAPER.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eThe volumes are printed in a handy size (6-1/2 × 4-1/4 in.), on\r\nthin but opaque paper, and are simply and\r\nattractively bound.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003ePrice, in cloth, 2s. net; in leather, 3s. net.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addp\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0027The York Library is noticeable by reason of the wisdom and intelligence\r\ndisplayed in the choice of unhackneyed classics…. A most\r\nattractive series of reprints…. The size and style of the volumes are\r\nexactly what they should be.\u0027—\u003ci\u003eBookman.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0027These books should find their way to every home that owns any\r\ncultivation.\u0027—\u003ci\u003eNotes and Queries.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe following volumes are now ready:\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"add\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCHARLOTTE BRONTË\u0027S JANE EYRE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBURNEY\u0027S EVELINA. Edited, with an Introduction and\r\nNotes, by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAnnie Raine Ellis\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBURNEY\u0027S CECILIA. Edited by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAnnie Raine Ellis\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n2 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBURTON\u0027S ANATOMY OF MELANCHOLY. Edited by the\r\nRev. A\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e. R. Shilleto\u003c/span\u003e, M.A., with Introduction by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA. H. Bullen\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n3 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBURTON\u0027S (SIR RICHARD) PILGRIMAGE TO ALMADINAH\r\nAND MECCAH. With Introduction by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eStanley Lane-Poole\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n2 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCERVANTES\u0027 DON QUIXOTE. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMotteux\u0027s\u003c/span\u003e Translation, revised.\r\nWith \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLockhart\u0027s\u003c/span\u003e Life and Notes. 2 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCLASSIC TALES: \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJohnson\u0027s Rasselas\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGoldsmith\u0027s Vicar\r\nof Wakefield\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSterne\u0027s Sentimental Journey\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWalpole\u0027s\r\nCastle of Otranto\u003c/span\u003e. With Introduction by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eC. S. Fearenside\u003c/span\u003e, M.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCOLERIDGE\u0027S AIDS TO REFLECTION, and the Confessions\r\nof an Inquiring Spirit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCOLERIDGE\u0027S FRIEND. A series of Essays on Morals,\r\nPolitics, and Religion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCOLERIDGE\u0027S TABLE TALK AND OMNIANA. Arranged\r\nand Edited by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eT. Ashe\u003c/span\u003e, B.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eDRAPER\u0027S HISTORY OF THE INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT\r\nOF EUROPE. 2 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eGEORGE ELIOT\u0027S ADAM BEDE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eEMERSON\u0027S WORKS. A new edition in 5 volumes, with the\r\nText edited and collated by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGeorge Sampson\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFIELDING\u0027S TOM JONES. 2 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eGASKELL\u0027S SYLVIA\u0027S LOVERS.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A026\"\u003e[26]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nGESTA ROMANORUM, or Entertaining Moral Stories invented\r\nby the Monks. Translated from the Latin by the Rev. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCharles\r\nSwan\u003c/span\u003e. Revised edition, by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWynnard Hooper\u003c/span\u003e, M.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eGOETHE\u0027S FAUST. Translated by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAnna Swanwick\u003c/span\u003e, LL.D.\r\nRevised edition, with an Introduction and Bibliography by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eKarl Breul\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nLitt.D., Ph.D.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHAWTHORNE\u0027S TRANSFORMATION (\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Marble Faun\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIRVING\u0027S SKETCH BOOK.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eJAMESON\u0027S SHAKESPEARE\u0027S HEROINES. Characteristics\r\nof Women: Moral, Poetical, and Historical.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLAMB\u0027S ESSAYS, Including the Essays of Elia, Last Essays\r\nof Elia, and Eliana.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS, THE THOUGHTS\r\nOF. Translated by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGeorge Long\u003c/span\u003e, M.A. With an Essay on Marcus\r\nAurelius by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMatthew Arnold\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMARRYAT\u0027S MR. MIDSHIPMAN EASY. With 8 Illustrations\r\nby \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eE. T. Wheeler\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMARRYAT\u0027S PETER SIMPLE. With 8 Illustrations by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eF. A.\r\nFraser\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMONTAIGNE\u0027S ESSAYS. Cotton\u0027s translation. Revised by\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eW. C. Hazlitt\u003c/span\u003e. 3 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMORE\u0027S UTOPIA. With the Life of Sir Thomas More, by\r\nWilliam Roper, and his Letters to Margaret Roper and others. Edited,\r\nwith Introduction and Notes, by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGeorge Sampson\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"right\"\u003e[\u003ci\u003eIn the Press\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMOTLEY\u0027S RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. With a\r\nBiographical Introduction by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMoncure D. Conway\u003c/span\u003e. 3 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ePASCAL\u0027S THOUGHTS. Translated from the Text of \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eM.\r\nAuguste Molinier\u003c/span\u003e by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eC. Kegan Paul\u003c/span\u003e. Third edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ePLUTARCH\u0027S LIVES. Translated, with Notes and a Life by\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAubrey Stewart\u003c/span\u003e, M.A., and \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGeorge Long\u003c/span\u003e, M.A. 4 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSWIFT\u0027S GULLIVER\u0027S TRAVELS. Edited, with Introduction\r\nand Notes, by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eG. R. Dennis\u003c/span\u003e, with facsimiles of the original illustrations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSWIFT\u0027S JOURNAL TO STELLA. Edited, with Introduction\r\nand Notes, by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eF. Ryland\u003c/span\u003e, M.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTROLLOPE\u0027S THE WARDEN. With an Introduction by\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFrederic Harrison\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTROLLOPE\u0027S BARCHESTER TOWERS.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTROLLOPE\u0027S DR. THORNE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTROLLOPE\u0027S FRAMLEY PARSONAGE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTROLLOPE\u0027S SMALL HOUSE AT ALLINGTON. 2 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTROLLOPE\u0027S LAST CHRONICLE OF BARSET. 2 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eARTHUR YOUNG\u0027S TRAVELS IN FRANCE, during the\r\nyears 1787, 1788, and 1789. Edited with Introduction and Notes, by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eM.\r\nBetham Edwards\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eOther Volumes are in Preparation.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A027\"\u003e[27]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph2\"\u003eBELL\u0027S HANDBOOKS\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eOF\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"xhtml_big\"\u003eTHE GREAT MASTERS\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\nIN PAINTING AND SCULPTURE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph4\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEDITED by G. C. WILLIAMSON, Litt.D.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003ePost 8vo. With 40 Illustrations and Photogravure Frontispiece. 5\u003ci\u003es\u003c/i\u003e. net each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe following Volumes have been issued:\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"add\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBOTTICELLI. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA. Streeter\u003c/span\u003e. 2nd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBRUNELLESCHI. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLeader Scott\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCORREGGIO. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSelwyn Brinton\u003c/span\u003e, M.A. 2nd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCARLO CRIVELLI. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eG. Mcneil Rushforth\u003c/span\u003e, M.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eDELLA ROBBIA. By the \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMarchesa Burlamacchi\u003c/span\u003e. 2nd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eANDREA DEL SARTO. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eH. Guinness\u003c/span\u003e. 2nd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eDONATELLO. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHope Rea\u003c/span\u003e. 2nd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eGERARD DOU. By Dr. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eW. Martin\u003c/span\u003e. Translated by Clara Bell.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eGAUDENZIO FERRARI. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEthel Halsey\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFRANCIA. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGeorge C. Williamson\u003c/span\u003e, Litt.D.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eGIORGIONE. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHerbert Cook\u003c/span\u003e, M.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eGIOTTO. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eF. Mason Perkins\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFRANS HALS. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGerald S. Davies\u003c/span\u003e, M.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBERNARDINO LUINI. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGeorge C. Williamson\u003c/span\u003e, Litt.D. 3rd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLEONARDO DA VINCI. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEdward Mccurdy\u003c/span\u003e, M.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMANTEGNA. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMaud Cruttwell\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMEMLINC. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eW. H. James Weale\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMICHEL ANGELO. By Lord \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRonald Sutherland Gower\u003c/span\u003e, M.A., F.S.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ePERUGINO. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eG. C. Williamson\u003c/span\u003e, Litt.D. 2nd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ePIERO DELLA FRANCESCA. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eW. G. Waters\u003c/span\u003e, M.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ePINTORICCHIO. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEvelyn March Phillipps\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eRAPHAEL. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eH. Strachey\u003c/span\u003e. 2nd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eREMBRANDT. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMalcolm Bell\u003c/span\u003e. 2nd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eRUBENS. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHope Rea\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLUCA SIGNORELLI. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMaud Cruttwell\u003c/span\u003e. 2nd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSODOMA. By the \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eContessa Lorenzo Priuli-Bon\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTINTORETTO. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJ. B. Stoughton Holborn\u003c/span\u003e, M.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVAN DYCK. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLionel Cust\u003c/span\u003e, M.V.O., F.S.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVELASQUEZ. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eR. A. M. Stevenson\u003c/span\u003e. 3rd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWATTEAU. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEdgcumbe Staley\u003c/span\u003e, B.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWILKIE. By Lord \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRonald Sutherland Gower\u003c/span\u003e, M.A., F.S.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eOthers to follow.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A028\"\u003e[28]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph2\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003eTHE\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\nCHISWICK SHAKESPEARE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eIllustrated by BYAM SHAW\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eWith Introductions and Glossaries by JOHN DENNIS.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ePrinted at the Chiswick Press, pott 8vo., price 1\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e net per volume;\r\nalso a cheaper edition, 1\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e net per volume; or 2\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e net in limp leather; also\r\na few copies, on Japanese vellum, to be sold only in sets, price 5\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e net per\r\nvolume.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eNow Complete in 39 Volumes.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"add\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eALL\u0027S WELL THAT ENDS WELL.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eANTONY AND CLEOPATRA.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAS YOU LIKE IT.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCOMEDY OF ERRORS.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCORIOLANUS.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCYMBELINE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHAMLET.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eJULIUS CÆSAR.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eKING HENRY IV. Part I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eKING HENRY IV. Part II.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eKING HENRY V.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eKING HENRY VI. Part I.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eKING HENRY VI. Part II.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eKING HENRY VI. Part III.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eKING HENRY VIII.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eKING JOHN.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eKING LEAR.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eKING RICHARD II.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eKING RICHARD III.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLOVE\u0027S LABOUR\u0027S LOST.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMACBETH.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMEASURE FOR MEASURE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMERCHANT OF VENICE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMERRY WIVES OF WINDSOR.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMIDSUMMER-NIGHT\u0027S DREAM.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOTHELLO.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ePERICLES.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eROMEO AND JULIET.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTHE TAMING OF THE SHREW.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTHE TEMPEST.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTIMON OF ATHENS.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTITUS ANDRONICUS.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTROILUS AND CRESSIDA.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTWELFTH NIGHT.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTWO GENTLEMEN OF VERONA.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWINTER\u0027S TALE.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ePOEMS.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSONNETS.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addp\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0027A fascinating little edition.\u0027—\u003ccite\u003eNotes and Queries.\u003c/cite\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0027A cheap, very comely, and altogether desirable edition.\u0027—\u003ccite\u003eWestminster Gazette.\u003c/cite\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0027But a few years ago such volumes would have been deemed worthy to be considered\r\n\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eéditions de luxe\u003c/i\u003e. To-day, the low price at which they are offered to the public alone\r\nprevents them being so regarded.\u0027—\u003ccite\u003eStudio.\u003c/cite\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0027Handy in shape and size, wonderfully cheap, beautifully printed from the Cambridge\r\ntext, and illustrated quaintly yet admirably by Mr. Byam Shaw, we have nothing\r\nbut praise for it. No one who wants a good and convenient Shakespeare—without\r\nexcursuses, discursuses, or even too many notes—can do better, in our opinion, than\r\nsubscribe to this issue: which is saying a good deal in these days of cheap reprints.\u0027—\u003ccite\u003eVanity\r\nFair.\u003c/cite\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0027What we like about these elegant booklets is the attention that has been paid to the\r\npaper, as well as to the print and decoration; such stout laid paper will last for ages.\r\nOn this account alone, the \u0027Chiswick\u0027 \u003cem\u003eshould easily be first\u003c/em\u003e among pocket Shakespeares.\u0027—\u003ccite\u003ePall\r\nMall Gazette.\u003c/cite\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e⁂ \u003ci\u003eThe Chiswick Shakespeare may also be had bound in 12 volumes,\r\nfull gilt back, price 36s. net.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A029\"\u003e[29]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eNew Editions, fcap. 8vo. 2\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e 6\u003ci\u003ed.\u003c/i\u003e each net.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph2\"\u003eTHE ALDINE EDITION\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eOF THE\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\nBRITISH POETS.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addp\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0027This excellent edition of the English classics, with their complete texts and\r\nscholarly introductions, are something very different from the cheap volumes of\r\nextracts which are just now so much too common.\u0027—\u003ccite\u003eSt. James\u0027s Gazette.\u003c/cite\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0027An excellent series. Small, handy, and complete.\u0027—\u003ccite\u003eSaturday Review.\u003c/cite\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"add\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAkenside.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by Rev. A. Dyce.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBeattie.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by Rev. A. Dyce.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBlake.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by W. M. Rossetti.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBurns.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by G. A. Aitken.\r\n3 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eButler.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by R. B. Johnson.\r\n2 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCampbell.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by His Son-in-law,\r\nthe Rev. A. W. Hill. With\r\nMemoir by W. Allingham.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChatterton.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by the Rev.\r\nW. W. Skeat, M.A. 2 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChaucer.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by Dr. R. Morris,\r\nwith Memoir by Sir Nicolas. 6 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChurchill.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by Jas. Hannay.\r\n2 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eColeridge.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by T. Ashe,\r\nB.A. 2 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCollins.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by W. Moy\r\nThomas.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCowper.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by John Bruce,\r\nF.S.A. 3 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDryden.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by the Rev. R.\r\nHooper, M.A. 5 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGoldsmith.\u003c/b\u003e Revised Edition by\r\nAustin Dobson. With Portrait.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGray.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by J. Bradshaw,\r\nLL.D.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHerbert.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by the Rev. A. B.\r\nGrosart.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHerrick.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by George\r\nSaintsbury. 2 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eKeats.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by the late Lord\r\nHoughton.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eKirke White.\u003c/b\u003e Edited, with a\r\nMemoir, by Sir H. Nicolas.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMilton.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by Dr. Bradshaw.\r\n2 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eParnell.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by G. A. Aitken.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePope.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by G. R. Dennis.\r\nWith Memoir by John Dennis. 3 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePrior.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by R. B. Johnson.\r\n2 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRaleigh and Wotton.\u003c/b\u003e With Selections\r\nfrom the Writings of other\r\nCOURTLY POETS from 1540 to 1650.\r\nEdited by Ven. Archdeacon Hannah,\r\nD.C.L.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRogers.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by Edward Bell,\r\nM.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eScott.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by John Dennis.\r\n5 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eShakespeare\u0027s Poems.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by\r\nRev. A. Dyce.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eShelley.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by H. Buxton\r\nForman. 5 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSpenser.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by J. Payne Collier.\r\n5 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSurrey.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by J. Yeowell.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSwift.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by the Rev. J.\r\nMitford. 3 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThomson.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by the Rev. D.\r\nC. Tovey. 2 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eVaughan. Sacred Poems and\r\nPious Ejaculations.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by the\r\nRev. H. Lyte.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWordsworth.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by Prof.\r\nDowden. 7 vols.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWyatt.\u003c/b\u003e Edited by J. Yeowell.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eYoung.\u003c/b\u003e 2 vols. Edited by the\r\nRev. J. Mitford.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A030\"\u003e[30]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph2\"\u003eTHE ALL-ENGLAND SERIES.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph4\"\u003eHANDBOOKS OF ATHLETIC GAMES.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eThe only Series issued at a moderate price, by Writers who are\r\nthe first rank in their respective departments.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addp\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0027The best instruction on games and sports by the best authorities, at the lowest\r\nprices.\u0027—\u003ccite\u003eOxford Magazine.\u003c/cite\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eSmall 8vo. cloth, Illustrated. Price 1\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"add\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCricket.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eFred C. Holland\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCricket.\u003c/b\u003e By the Hon. and Rev.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eE. Littelton\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCroquet.\u003c/b\u003e By Lieut.-Col. the Hon.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eH. O. Needham\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLawn Tennis.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eH. W. W.\r\nWilberforce\u003c/span\u003e. With a Chapter for\r\nLadies, by Mrs. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHillyard\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSquash Tennis.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEustace H.\r\nMiles\u003c/span\u003e. Double vol. 2\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTennis and Rackets and Fives.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJulian Marshall\u003c/span\u003e, Major \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJ. Spens\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nand Rev. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJ. A. Arnan Tait\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGolf.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eH. S. C. Everard\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nDouble vol. 2\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRowing and Sculling.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGuy\r\nRixon\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRowing and Sculling.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eW. B.\r\nWoodgate\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSailing.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eE. F. Knight\u003c/span\u003e, dbl. vol. 2\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSwimming.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMartin\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJ.\r\nRacster Cobbett\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCamping out.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA. A. Macdonell\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nDouble vol. 2\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCanoeing.\u003c/b\u003e By Dr. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJ. D. Hayward\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nDouble vol. 2\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMountaineering.\u003c/b\u003e By Dr. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eClaude\r\nWilson\u003c/span\u003e. Double vol. 2\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAthletics.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eH. H. Griffin\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRiding.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eW. A. Kerr\u003c/span\u003e, V.C.\r\nDouble vol. 2\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLadies\u0027 Riding.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eW. A. Kerr\u003c/span\u003e, V.C.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBoxing.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eR. G. Allanson-Winn\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nWith Prefatory Note by Bat Mullins.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFencing.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eH. A. Colmore Dunn\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCycling.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eH. H. Griffin\u003c/span\u003e, L.A.C.,\r\nN.C.U., C.T.C. With a Chapter for\r\nLadies, by Miss \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAgnes Wood\u003c/span\u003e. Double\r\nvol. 2\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWrestling.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWalter Armstrong\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nNew Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBroadsword and Singlestick.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eR. G. Allanson-Winn\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eC. Phillipps-Wolley\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGymnastics.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA. F. Jenkin\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nDouble vol. 2\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGymnastic Competition and Display\r\nExercises.\u003c/b\u003e Compiled by\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eF. Graf\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIndian Clubs.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eG. T. B. Cobbett\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA. F. Jenkin\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDumb-bells.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eF. Graf\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFootball—Rugby Game.\u003c/b\u003e By\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHarry Vassall\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFootball—Association Game.\u003c/b\u003e By\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eC. W. Alcock\u003c/span\u003e. Revised Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHockey.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eF. S. Creswell\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nNew Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSkating.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDouglas Adams\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nWith a Chapter for ladies, by Miss \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eL.\r\nCheetham\u003c/span\u003e, and a Chapter on Speed\r\nSkating, by a Fen Skater. Dbl. vol. 2\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBaseball.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eNewton Crane\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRounders, Fieldball, Bowls,\r\nQuoits, Curling, Skittles, \u0026amp;c.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJ. M. Walker\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eC. C. Mott\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDancing.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eEdward Scott\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nDouble vol. 2\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph4\"\u003eTHE CLUB SERIES OF CARD AND TABLE GAMES.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addp\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0027No well-regulated club or country house should be without this useful series of books.\u0027\r\n\u003ci\u003eGlobe.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eSmall 8vo. cloth, Illustrated. Price 1\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e each.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"add\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBridge.\u003c/b\u003e By \u0027\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eTemplar\u003c/span\u003e.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWhist.\u003c/b\u003e By Dr. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eWm. Pole\u003c/span\u003e, F.R.S.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSolo Whist.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRobert F. Green\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBilliards.\u003c/b\u003e By Major-Gen. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA. W.\r\nDrayson\u003c/span\u003e, F.R.A.S. With a Preface\r\nby W. J. Peall.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHints on Billiards.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJ. P.\r\nBuchanan\u003c/span\u003e. Double vol. 2\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChess.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eRobert F. Green\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Two-Move Chess Problem.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nBy \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eB. G. Laws\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eChess Openings.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eI. Gunsberg\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDraughts and Backgammon.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nBy \u0027\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBerkeley\u003c/span\u003e.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eReversi and Go Bang.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nBy \u0027\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBerkeley\u003c/span\u003e.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDominoes and Solitaire.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nBy \u0027\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBerkeley\u003c/span\u003e.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBézique and Cribbage.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nBy \u0027\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBerkeley\u003c/span\u003e.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eÉcarté and Euchre.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nBy \u0027\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBerkeley\u003c/span\u003e.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePiquet and Rubicon Piquet.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nBy \u0027\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBerkeley\u003c/span\u003e.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSkat.\u003c/b\u003e By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLouis Diehl\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addp\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e⁂ A Skat Scoring-book. 1\u003ci\u003es.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRound Games, including Poker,\r\nNapoleon, Loo, Vingt-et-un, \u0026amp;c.\u003c/b\u003e By\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBaxter-Wray\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eParlour and Playground Games.\u003c/b\u003e\r\nBy Mrs. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLaurence Gomme\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A031\"\u003e[31]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph2\"\u003eBELL\u0027S CATHEDRAL SERIES.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eProfusely Illustrated, cloth, crown 8vo. 1s. 6d. net each.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"add\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eENGLISH CATHEDRALS. An Itinerary and Description. Compiled by \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJames G.\r\nGilchrist\u003c/span\u003e, A.M., M.D. Revised and edited with an Introduction on Cathedral\r\nArchitecture by the Rev. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eT. Perkins\u003c/span\u003e, M.A., F.R.A.S.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addind\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBANGOR. By P. B. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eIronside Bax\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBRISTOL. By H. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJ. L. J. Massé\u003c/span\u003e, M.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCANTERBURY. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHartley Withers\u003c/span\u003e. 5th Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCARLISLE. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eC. King Eley\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCHESTER. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCharles Hiatt\u003c/span\u003e. 3rd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCHICHESTER. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eH. C. Corlette\u003c/span\u003e, A.R.I.B.A. 2nd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eDURHAM. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJ. E. Bygate\u003c/span\u003e, A.R.C.A. 3rd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eELY. By Rev. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eW. D. Sweeting\u003c/span\u003e, M.A. 2nd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eEXETER. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePercy Addleshaw\u003c/span\u003e, B.A. 2nd Edition, revised.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eGLOUCESTER. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eH. J. L. J. Massé\u003c/span\u003e, M.A. 3rd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHEREFORD. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA. Hugh Fisher\u003c/span\u003e, A.R.E. 2nd Edition, revised.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLICHFIELD. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA. B. Clifton\u003c/span\u003e. 2nd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLINCOLN. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA. F. Kendrick\u003c/span\u003e, B.A. 3rd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMANCHESTER. By Rev. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eT. Perkins\u003c/span\u003e, M.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNORWICH. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eC. H. B. Quennell\u003c/span\u003e. 2nd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eOXFORD. By Rev. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePercy Dearmer\u003c/span\u003e, M.A. 2nd Edition, revised.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ePETERBOROUGH. By Rev. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eW. D. Sweeting\u003c/span\u003e. 2nd Edition, revised.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eRIPON. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCecil Hallett\u003c/span\u003e, B.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eROCHESTER. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eG. H. Palmer\u003c/span\u003e, B.A. 2nd Edition, revised.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eST. ALBANS. By Rev. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eT. Perkins\u003c/span\u003e, M.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eST. ASAPH. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eP. B. Ironside Bax\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eST. DAVID\u0027S. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePhilip Robson\u003c/span\u003e, A.R.I.B.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eST. PATRICK\u0027S, DUBLIN. By Rev. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJ. H. Bernard\u003c/span\u003e, M.A., D.D. 2nd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eST. PAUL\u0027S. By Rev. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eArthur Dimock\u003c/span\u003e, M.A. 3rd Edition, revised.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eST. SAVIOUR\u0027S, SOUTHWARK. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGeorge Worley\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSALISBURY. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eGleeson White\u003c/span\u003e. 3rd Edition, revised.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSOUTHWELL. By Rev. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eArthur Dimock\u003c/span\u003e, M.A. 2nd Edition, revised.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWELLS. By Rev. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003ePercy Dearmer\u003c/span\u003e, M.A. 3rd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWINCHESTER. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eP. W. Sergeant\u003c/span\u003e. 3rd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWORCESTER. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eE. F. Strange\u003c/span\u003e. 2nd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eYORK. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA. Clutton-Brock\u003c/span\u003e, M.A. 3rd Edition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eUniform with above Series. Now ready. 1s. 6d. net each.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eST. MARTIN\u0027S CHURCH, CANTERBURY. By the Rev. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCanon Routledge\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nM.A., F.S.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBEVERLEY MINSTER. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCharles Hiatt\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWIMBORNE MINSTER and CHRISTCHURCH PRIORY. By the Rev. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eT.\r\nPerkins\u003c/span\u003e, M.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTEWKESBURY ABBEY AND DEERHURST PRIORY. By H. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJ. L. J. Massé\u003c/span\u003e, M.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBATH ABBEY, MALMESBURY ABBEY, and BRADFORD-ON-AVON CHURCH.\r\nBy Rev. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eT. Perkins\u003c/span\u003e, M.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWESTMINSTER ABBEY. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCharles Hiatt\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSTRATFORD-ON-AVON CHURCH. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eHarold Baker\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph4\"\u003eBELL\u0027S HANDBOOKS TO CONTINENTAL CHURCHES.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eProfusely Illustrated. Crown 8vo, cloth, 2s. 6d. net each.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"add\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAMIENS. By the Rev. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eT. Perkins\u003c/span\u003e, M.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBAYEUX. By the Rev. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eR. S. Mylne\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCHARTRES: The Cathedral and Other Churches. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eH. J. L. J. Massé\u003c/span\u003e, M.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMONT ST. MICHEL. By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eH. J. L. J. Massé\u003c/span\u003e, M.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ePARIS (NOTRE-DAME). By \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCharles Hiatt\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eROUEN: The Cathedral and Other Churches. By the Rev. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eT. Perkins\u003c/span\u003e, M.A.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"A032\"\u003e[32]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph4\"\u003eThe Best Practical Working Dictionary of the\r\nEnglish Language.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph2\"\u003eWEBSTER\u0027S\u003cbr\u003e\r\nINTERNATIONAL\u003cbr\u003e\r\nDICTIONARY.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e2348 PAGES. 5000 ILLUSTRATIONS.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eNEW EDITION, REVISED THROUGHOUT WITH A\r\nNEW SUPPLEMENT OF 25,000 ADDITIONAL\r\nWORDS AND PHRASES.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addp\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Appendices comprise a Pronouncing Gazetteer of the World,\r\nVocabularies of Scripture, Greek, Latin, and English Proper Names,\r\na Dictionary of the Noted Names of Fiction, a Brief History of the\r\nEnglish Language, a Dictionary of Foreign Quotations, Words, Phrases,\r\nProverbs, \u0026amp;c., a Biographical Dictionary with 10,000 names, \u0026amp;c., \u0026amp;c.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"addp\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDr. MURRAY\u003c/b\u003e, \u003ci\u003eEditor of the\u003c/i\u003e \u0027\u003ccite\u003eOxford English Dictionary\u003c/cite\u003e,\u0027 says:—\u0027In this its\r\nlatest form, and with its large Supplement and numerous appendices, it is a wonderful\r\nvolume, which well maintains its ground against all rivals on its own lines. The \u0027definitions,\u0027\r\nor more properly, \u0027explanations of meaning\u0027 in \u0027Webster\u0027 have always struck me\r\nas particularly terse and well-put; and it is hard to see how anything better could be\r\ndone within the limits.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eProfessor JOSEPH WRIGHT, M.A., Ph.D., D.C.L., LL.D.\u003c/b\u003e, \u003ci\u003eEditor of\r\nthe \u0027English Dialect Dictionary,\u0027\u003c/i\u003e says:—\u0027The new edition of \"Webster\u0027s International\r\nDictionary\" is undoubtedly the most useful and reliable work of its kind in any country.\r\nNo one who has not examined the work carefully would believe that such a vast amount\r\nof lexicographical information could possibly be found within so small a compass.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eProfessor A. H. SAYCE, LL.D., D.D.\u003c/b\u003e, says:—\u0027It is indeed a marvellous\r\nwork; it is difficult to conceive of a Dictionary more exhaustive and complete. Everything\r\nis in it—not only what we might expect to find in such a work, but also what few\r\nof us would ever have thought of looking for.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRev. JOSEPH WOOD, D.D.\u003c/b\u003e, \u003ci\u003eHead Master of Harrow\u003c/i\u003e, says:—\u0027I have always\r\nthought very highly of its merits. Indeed, I consider it to be far the most accurate\r\nEnglish Dictionary in existence, and much more reliable than the \"Century.\" For\r\ndaily and hourly reference, \"Webster\" seems to me unrivalled.\u0027\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eProspectuses, with Prices and Specimen Pages, on Application.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"tb\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eLONDON: GEORGE BELL \u0026amp; SONS, YORK HOUSE,\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPORTUGAL STREET, W.C.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"ph2\"\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_1\" id=\"Footnote_1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e From the fourth edition by Julius Frauenstädt. \"Fourfold Root,\"\r\nLeipzig, 1875; \"Will in Nature,\" Leipzig, 1878.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_2\" id=\"Footnote_2\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e See \"Will in Nature,\" pp. 9-18 of the original; \u003ca href=\"#Pg224\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 224-234\u003c/a\u003e of the\r\npresent translation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_3\" id=\"Footnote_3\"\u003e[3]\u003c/a\u003e Pp. 2 and 3 of the original, and \u003ca href=\"#Pg216\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003epp. 216 to 218\u003c/a\u003e of the present\r\ntranslation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_4\" id=\"Footnote_4\"\u003e[4]\u003c/a\u003e See p. 113, § 34 of the original, and \u003ca href=\"#Pg133\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 133\u003c/a\u003e of the present translation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_5\" id=\"Footnote_5\"\u003e[5]\u003c/a\u003e Seneca, Ep. 79.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_6\" id=\"Footnote_6\"\u003e[6]\u003c/a\u003e See \"Arthur Schopenhauer. Von ihm; über ihn. Ein Wort der\r\nVertheidigung,\" von Ernst Otto Lindner, and \"Memorabilien, Briefe und\r\nNachlassstücke,\" von Julius Frauenstädt (Berlin, 1863), pp. 163-165.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_7\" id=\"Footnote_7\"\u003e[7]\u003c/a\u003e Schopenhauer, \"Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,\" second\r\nedition, i., 37 (third edition, i., 39).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_8\" id=\"Footnote_8\"\u003e[8]\u003c/a\u003e See \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.,\" vol. ii. pp. 17-21, and vol. i. p. 39 of\r\nthe second edition. (The passages referred to by Schopenhauer in the\r\nsecond edition are in the third edition vol. ii. pp. 18-21, and vol. i. p. 40).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_9\" id=\"Footnote_9\"\u003e[9]\u003c/a\u003e Die Welt a. W. u. V., vol. i. p. 22 \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eet seqq.\u003c/i\u003e, and vol. ii. chap. ii. of the\r\nsecond edition; vol. i. p. 22, § 6, and vol. ii. chap. ii. of the third edition.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_10\" id=\"Footnote_10\"\u003e[10]\u003c/a\u003e The passage I have quoted above from Schopenhauer\u0027s letter is also\r\nto be found among the letters published in my book, \"Arthur Schopenhauer.\r\nVon ihm, über ihn, u. s. w.,\" p. 541 \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eet seqq.\u003c/i\u003e, and it results from\r\nthis, as well as from several other letters which likewise deal with\r\nimportant and knotty points in his philosophy, that this correspondence\r\nmay perhaps not be quite so worthless and unimportant as many—among\r\nthem Gwinner, in his pamphlet, \"Schopenhauer und seine\r\nFreunde\" (Leipzig, 1863)—represent it to be. This pamphlet of Gwinner\u0027s,\r\nby the way, has met with the treatment it deserves in the Preface\r\nto the collection, \"Aus Arthur Schopenhauer\u0027s handschriftlichen\r\nAphorismen und Nachlass. Abhandlungen, Anmerkungen, Fragmente.\"\r\n(Leipzig, 1864).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_11\" id=\"Footnote_11\"\u003e[11]\u003c/a\u003e Platon, \"Phileb.\" pp. 219-223. \"Politic.\" 62, 63. \"Phædr.\"\r\n361-363, ed. Bip. Kant, \"Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Anhang zur\r\ntranscend. Dialektik.\" English Translation by F. Max Müller. \"Appendix\r\nto the Transc. Dialectic.\" pp. 551, and \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eseqq.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_12\" id=\"Footnote_12\"\u003e[12]\u003c/a\u003e Kant, \"Krit. d. r. V. Methodenlehre. Drittes Hauptstück,\" p. 842\r\nof the 1st edition. Engl. Tr. by F. M. Müller. \"Architectonic of Pure\r\nReason,\" p. 723.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_13\" id=\"Footnote_13\"\u003e[13]\u003c/a\u003e \"Meno.\" p. 385, ed Bip. \"Even true opinions are not of much\r\nvalue until somebody binds them down by proof of a cause.\" [Translator\u0027s\r\naddition.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_14\" id=\"Footnote_14\"\u003e[14]\u003c/a\u003e Aristot. \"Metaph.\" v. 1. \"All knowledge which is intellectual or\r\npartakes somewhat of intellect, deals with causes and principles.\"\r\n[Tr.\u0027s add.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_15\" id=\"Footnote_15\"\u003e[15]\u003c/a\u003e Here the translator gives Schopenhauer\u0027s free version of Wolf\u0027s\r\nformula.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_16\" id=\"Footnote_16\"\u003e[16]\u003c/a\u003e Platon, \"Phileb.\" p. 240, ed Bip. \"It is necessary that all which\r\narises, should arise by some cause; for how could it arise otherwise?\"\r\n[Tr.\u0027s add.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_17\" id=\"Footnote_17\"\u003e[17]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e \"Timæus,\" p. 302. \"All that arises, arises necessarily from\r\nsome cause; for it is impossible for anything to come into being without\r\ncause.\" [Tr.\u0027s add.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_18\" id=\"Footnote_18\"\u003e[18]\u003c/a\u003e \"This especially would seem to be the first principle: that nothing\r\narises without cause, but [everything] according to preceding causes.\"\r\n[Tr.\u0027s add.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_19\" id=\"Footnote_19\"\u003e[19]\u003c/a\u003e \"We think we understand a thing perfectly, whenever we think we\r\nknow the cause by which the thing is, that it is really the cause of\r\nthat thing, and that the thing cannot possibly be otherwise.\" [Tr.\u0027s\r\nadd.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_20\" id=\"Footnote_20\"\u003e[20]\u003c/a\u003e Lib. iv. c. 1.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_21\" id=\"Footnote_21\"\u003e[21]\u003c/a\u003e \"Now it is common to all principles, that they are the first thing\r\nthrough which [anything] is, or arises, or is understood.\" [Tr.\u0027s\r\nadd.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_22\" id=\"Footnote_22\"\u003e[22]\u003c/a\u003e \"There are four causes: first, the essence of a thing itself; second,\r\nthe \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003esine qua non\u003c/i\u003e of a thing; third, what first put a thing in motion;\r\nfourth, to what purpose or end a thing is tending.\" [Tr.\u0027s add.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_23\" id=\"Footnote_23\"\u003e[23]\u003c/a\u003e \"Suarii disputationes metaph.\" Disp. 12, sect. 2 et 3.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_24\" id=\"Footnote_24\"\u003e[24]\u003c/a\u003e Hobbes, \"De corpore,\" P. ii. c. 10, § 7.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_25\" id=\"Footnote_25\"\u003e[25]\u003c/a\u003e Suarez, \"Disp.\" 12, sect. 1.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_26\" id=\"Footnote_26\"\u003e[26]\u003c/a\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"poetry-container\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003e\"Were not the thought so cursedly acute,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eOne might be tempted to declare it silly.\"\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSchiller\u003c/span\u003e, \"Wallenstein-Trilogie. Piccolomini,\" Act ii. Sc. 7.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_27\" id=\"Footnote_27\"\u003e[27]\u003c/a\u003e Aristot., \"Analyt. post.\" c. 7.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_28\" id=\"Footnote_28\"\u003e[28]\u003c/a\u003e Spinoza, \"Eth.\" i. prop. 11.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_29\" id=\"Footnote_29\"\u003e[29]\u003c/a\u003e Spinoza, \"Eth.\" P. 1. prop. 8, schol. 2.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_30\" id=\"Footnote_30\"\u003e[30]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e Prop. 16.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_31\" id=\"Footnote_31\"\u003e[31]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e Prop. 36, demonstr.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_32\" id=\"Footnote_32\"\u003e[32]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e Prop. 18.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_33\" id=\"Footnote_33\"\u003e[33]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e Prop. 25.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_34\" id=\"Footnote_34\"\u003e[34]\u003c/a\u003e \"Eth.\" P. iii. prop. 1, demonstr.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_35\" id=\"Footnote_35\"\u003e[35]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e Prop. 4.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_36\" id=\"Footnote_36\"\u003e[36]\u003c/a\u003e \"Eth.\" P. i. prop. 7.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_37\" id=\"Footnote_37\"\u003e[37]\u003c/a\u003e Schelling, \"Abhandlung von der menschlichen Freiheit.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_38\" id=\"Footnote_38\"\u003e[38]\u003c/a\u003e Irenæus, \"Contr. hæres.\" lib. i. c. 1.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_39\" id=\"Footnote_39\"\u003e[39]\u003c/a\u003e \"For they say that in those unseen heights which have no name\r\nthere is a pre-existing, perfect Æon; this they also call fore-rule, forefather\r\nand the depth.—They say, that being incomprehensible and invisible,\r\neternal and unborn, he has existed during endless Æons in the\r\ndeepest calmness and tranquillity; and that coexisting with him was\r\nThought, which they also call Grace and Silence. This Depth once bethought\r\nhim to put forth from himself the beginning of all things and to\r\nlay that offshoot—which he had resolved to put forth—like a sperm into\r\nthe coexisting Silence, as it were into a womb. Now this Silence, being\r\nthus impregnated and having conceived, gave birth to Intellect, a being\r\nwhich was like and equal to its Creator, and alone able to comprehend\r\nthe greatness of its father. This Intellect also they call the Only-begotten\r\nand the Beginning of all things.\" [Tr.\u0027s add.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_40\" id=\"Footnote_40\"\u003e[40]\u003c/a\u003e Compare with this § 44 of his \"Theodicée,\" and his 5th letter to\r\nClarke, § 125.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_41\" id=\"Footnote_41\"\u003e[41]\u003c/a\u003e Doctrine of Reason.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_42\" id=\"Footnote_42\"\u003e[42]\u003c/a\u003e Lambert, \"New Organon,\" vol. i. § 572.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_43\" id=\"Footnote_43\"\u003e[43]\u003c/a\u003e Compare § 36. of this treatise.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_44\" id=\"Footnote_44\"\u003e[44]\u003c/a\u003e \"Ueber eine Entdeckung, nach der alle Kritik der reinen Vernunft\r\nentbehrlich gemacht werden soll.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_45\" id=\"Footnote_45\"\u003e[45]\u003c/a\u003e Kiesewetter, \"Logik,\" vol. i. p. 16.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_46\" id=\"Footnote_46\"\u003e[46]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e p. 60.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_47\" id=\"Footnote_47\"\u003e[47]\u003c/a\u003e G. E. Schultze, \"Logik,\" § 19, Anmerkung 1, und § 63.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_48\" id=\"Footnote_48\"\u003e[48]\u003c/a\u003e Sal. Maimon, \"Logik,\" p. 20, 21.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_49\" id=\"Footnote_49\"\u003e[49]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e \"Vorrede,\" p. xxiv.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_50\" id=\"Footnote_50\"\u003e[50]\u003c/a\u003e Jacobi, \"Briefe über die Lehre des Spinoza,\" Beilage 7, p. 414.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_51\" id=\"Footnote_51\"\u003e[51]\u003c/a\u003e \"Aphorismen zur Einleitung in die Naturphilosophie.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_52\" id=\"Footnote_52\"\u003e[52]\u003c/a\u003e Plattner, \"Aphorismen,\" § 828.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_53\" id=\"Footnote_53\"\u003e[53]\u003c/a\u003e Jakob, \"Logik und Metaphysik,\" p. 38 (1794).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_54\" id=\"Footnote_54\"\u003e[54]\u003c/a\u003e Aristotle, \"Metaph.\" iii. 6. \"They seek a reason for that which\r\nhas no reason; for the principle of demonstration is not demonstration.\"\r\n[Tr.\u0027s add.] Compare with this citation \"Analyt. post.\" i. 2.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_55\" id=\"Footnote_55\"\u003e[55]\u003c/a\u003e Vol. i. p. 12, and \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eseqq.\u003c/i\u003e of the 1st edition; p. 9 of the 3rd edition.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_56\" id=\"Footnote_56\"\u003e[56]\u003c/a\u003e Compare Kant, \"Krit. d. r. Vern.\" Elementarlehre. Abschnitt ii.\r\nSchlüsse a. d. Begr. \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e. 1st edition, pp. 33 and 34; 5th edition,\r\np. 49. (Transl. M. Müller, p. 29, \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_57\" id=\"Footnote_57\"\u003e[57]\u003c/a\u003e Kant, \"Krit. d. r. V.\" Kritik des Vierten Paralogismus der transcendentalen\r\nPsychologie, p. 369, 1st edition. (Engl. Transl. by M. Müller,\r\np 320.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_58\" id=\"Footnote_58\"\u003e[58]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e 1st edition, pp. 374-375. Note. (Engl. Transl. p. 325.\r\nNote.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_59\" id=\"Footnote_59\"\u003e[59]\u003c/a\u003e Kant, \"Krit. d. r. V.\" \"Betrachtung über die Summe,\" \u0026amp;c., p. 383\r\nof 1st edition. (Engl. Transl. p. 331.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_60\" id=\"Footnote_60\"\u003e[60]\u003c/a\u003e \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" vol. ii. chap. 4, especially p. 42 and \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eseq.\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nthe 2nd edition; p. 46 \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eseq.\u003c/i\u003e of the 3rd edition.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_61\" id=\"Footnote_61\"\u003e[61]\u003c/a\u003e Göthe, \"Der Zauberlehrling.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_62\" id=\"Footnote_62\"\u003e[62]\u003c/a\u003e The translation of which follows the Fourfold Root in the present\r\nvolume.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_63\" id=\"Footnote_63\"\u003e[63]\u003c/a\u003e Here I refer my readers to \"Die Welt als Wills und Vorstellung,\"\r\nvol. ii. chap. 4, p. 41 of the 2nd edition, and p. 45 of the 3rd edition.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_64\" id=\"Footnote_64\"\u003e[64]\u003c/a\u003e \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" vol. i. pp. 517-521 of the 2nd edition, and\r\npp. 544-549 of the 3rd edition.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_65\" id=\"Footnote_65\"\u003e[65]\u003c/a\u003e \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" vol. i. p. 550 of 2nd, and 580 of 3rd\r\nedition.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_66\" id=\"Footnote_66\"\u003e[66]\u003c/a\u003e See \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" vol. i. § 26, p. 153 of the 2nd, and\r\np. 160 of the 3rd edition.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_67\" id=\"Footnote_67\"\u003e[67]\u003c/a\u003e See \"Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik,\" p. 30-34.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_68\" id=\"Footnote_68\"\u003e[68]\u003c/a\u003e The word \"motivation,\" though it may appear objectionable to the\r\nEnglish reader, seemed unavoidable here, as being Schopenhauer\u0027s own\r\nterm, for which there is no adequate equivalent in general use in our\r\nlanguage. [Translator\u0027s note.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_69\" id=\"Footnote_69\"\u003e[69]\u003c/a\u003e Here used in the absolute sense of \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eliberum arbitrium indifferentiæ\u003c/i\u003e. [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_70\" id=\"Footnote_70\"\u003e[70]\u003c/a\u003e \"Whatever conception one may form of freedom of the will, for\r\nmetaphysical purposes, its phenomena, human actions, are nevertheless\r\ndetermined by universal laws of Nature, just as well as every other\r\noccurrence in Nature.\" \"Ideen zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte.\"\r\nAnfang. I. Kant. \"All the acts of a man, so far as they are phenomena,\r\nare determined from his empirical character and from the other concomitant\r\ncauses, according to the order of Nature; and if we could investigate\r\nall the manifestations of his will to the very bottom, there would be\r\nnot a single human action which we could not predict with certainty and\r\nrecognize from its preceding conditions as necessary. There is no freedom\r\ntherefore with reference to this empirical character, and yet it is\r\nonly with reference to it that we can consider man, when we are merely\r\nobserving, and, as is the case in anthropology, trying to investigate the\r\nmotive causes of his actions physiologically.\"—\"Kritik. d. r. Vern.\"\r\np. 549 of the 1st edition, and p. 577 of the 5th edition. (Engl. Transl.\r\nby M. Müller, p. 474.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\"It may therefore be taken for granted, that if we could see far\r\nenough into a man\u0027s mode of thinking, as it manifests itself in his inner,\r\nas well as outer actions, for us to know every, even the faintest motive,\r\nand in like manner all the other causes which act upon these, it would\r\nbe possible to calculate his conduct in future with the same certainty as\r\nan eclipse of the sun or moon.\"—\"Kritik der praktischen Vernunft\" ed.\r\nRosenkranz, p. 230 and p. 177 of the 4th edition.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_71\" id=\"Footnote_71\"\u003e[71]\u003c/a\u003e Published in the same volume with the Prize-Essay on \"Free\r\nWill.\" See \"Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_72\" id=\"Footnote_72\"\u003e[72]\u003c/a\u003e Anno 1813, pp. 53-55.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_73\" id=\"Footnote_73\"\u003e[73]\u003c/a\u003e For further details see my \"Will in Nature,\" p. 19 of the 1st edition,\r\nand p. 14 of the 3rd. (\u003ca href=\"#Pg230\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003eP. 230 \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eet seqq.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/a\u003e of the translation of the \"Will in\r\nNature,\" which follows the \"Fourfold Root\" in the present volume.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_74\" id=\"Footnote_74\"\u003e[74]\u003c/a\u003e Hesiod, ἔργα, 293.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_75\" id=\"Footnote_75\"\u003e[75]\u003c/a\u003e Macchiavelli, \"Il principe,\" cap. 22.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_76\" id=\"Footnote_76\"\u003e[76]\u003c/a\u003e Schelling, \"Philosophische Schriften\" (1809), vol. i. pp. 237 and 238.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_77\" id=\"Footnote_77\"\u003e[77]\u003c/a\u003e Fries, \"Kritik der Vernunft.\" vol. i. pp. 52-56 and p. 290 of the 1st\r\nedition.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_78\" id=\"Footnote_78\"\u003e[78]\u003c/a\u003e Diderot, in his \"Lettre sur les Aveugles,\" gives a detailed account\r\nof Saunderson.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_79\" id=\"Footnote_79\"\u003e[79]\u003c/a\u003e See \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" vol. ii. chap. 4.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_80\" id=\"Footnote_80\"\u003e[80]\u003c/a\u003e The Frankfort \"Konversationsblatt,\" July 22, 1853, gives the\r\nfollowing account of this sculptor:—\"The blind sculptor, Joseph\r\nKleinhaus, died at Nauders, in Tyrol, on the 10th inst. Having lost\r\nhis eyesight through small-pox when he was five years old, he began to\r\namuse himself with carving and modelling, as a pastime. Prugg gave\r\nhim some instructions, and supplied him with models, and at the age of\r\ntwelve he carved a Christ in life-size. During a short stay in Nissl\u0027s\r\nworkshop at Fügen, his progress was so rapid, that, thanks to his good\r\ncapacities and talents, his fame as the blind sculptor soon spread far and\r\nwide. His works are numerous and of various kinds. His Christs\r\nalone, of which there are about four hundred, bear special witness to his\r\nproficiency, particularly if his blindness is taken into consideration. He\r\nsculptured many other objects besides, and, but two months ago, he\r\nmodelled a bust of the Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria which has\r\nbeen sent to Vienna.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_81\" id=\"Footnote_81\"\u003e[81]\u003c/a\u003e Newton, \"Optics.\" Query 15.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_82\" id=\"Footnote_82\"\u003e[82]\u003c/a\u003e See the original report in vol. 35 of the \"Philosophical Transactions\"\r\nas to this case.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_83\" id=\"Footnote_83\"\u003e[83]\u003c/a\u003e Franz, \"The Eye, a treatise on preserving this organ in a healthy\r\nstate and improving the sight.\" London, Churchill, 1839, pp. 34-36.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_84\" id=\"Footnote_84\"\u003e[84]\u003c/a\u003e Haslam\u0027s \"Observations on Madness and Melancholy,\" 2nd ed.\r\np. 192.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_85\" id=\"Footnote_85\"\u003e[85]\u003c/a\u003e Flourens, \"De la vie et de l\u0027Intelligence,\" 2nd edition, Paris,\r\nGarnier Frères, 1852, p. 49.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_86\" id=\"Footnote_86\"\u003e[86]\u003c/a\u003e \"It is the mind that sees and hears; all besides is deaf and\r\nblind.\" (Tr. Ad.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_87\" id=\"Footnote_87\"\u003e[87]\u003c/a\u003e Plutarch, \"De solert. animal.\" c. 3. \"For the affection of our\r\neyes and ears does not produce any perception, unless it be accompanied\r\nby thought.\" (Tr. Ad.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_88\" id=\"Footnote_88\"\u003e[88]\u003c/a\u003e \"Straton, the physicist, has proved that \u0027without thinking it is\r\nquite impossible to perceive.\u0027\" (Tr. Ad.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_89\" id=\"Footnote_89\"\u003e[89]\u003c/a\u003e \"Therefore it is necessary that all who perceive should also think,\r\nsince we are so constituted as to perceive by means of thinking.\"\r\n(Tr. Ad.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_90\" id=\"Footnote_90\"\u003e[90]\u003c/a\u003e Porph. \"De abstinentia,\" iii. 21.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_91\" id=\"Footnote_91\"\u003e[91]\u003c/a\u003e Compare \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" 3rd edition, vol. ii. p. 41.\r\n[The 3rd edition of \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" contains at this place a\r\nsupplement which is wanting in the 2nd edition, vol. ii. p. 38.—Note by\r\nthe Editor of the 3rd edition.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_92\" id=\"Footnote_92\"\u003e[92]\u003c/a\u003e Kant, \"Krit. d. r. V.\" 1st edition, p. 367 \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003esqq.\u003c/i\u003e (English translation\r\nby M. Müller, p. 318 \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003esqq.\u003c/i\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_93\" id=\"Footnote_93\"\u003e[93]\u003c/a\u003e Kant, \"Krit. d. r. Vern.\" 1st edition, p. 371. (English translation,\r\nby M. Müller, p. 322.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_94\" id=\"Footnote_94\"\u003e[94]\u003c/a\u003e Kant, \"Krit. d. r. Vern.\" 1st edition, p. 372. (English translation,\r\np. 323.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_95\" id=\"Footnote_95\"\u003e[95]\u003c/a\u003e Compare \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" 2nd edition; vol. i. sect. 4, p. 9;\r\nand vol. ii. pp. 48, 49 (3rd edition, vol. i. p. 10; vol. ii. p. 52). English\r\ntranslation, vol. i. pp. 9-10; vol. ii. p. 218.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_96\" id=\"Footnote_96\"\u003e[96]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eWissenschaftsleere\u003c/i\u003e (literally, \u003cem\u003eemptiness of science\u003c/em\u003e), a pun of Schopenhauer\u0027s\r\non the title of Fichte\u0027s \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eWissenschaftslehre\u003c/i\u003e (\u003cem\u003edoctrine of science\u003c/em\u003e),\r\nwhich cannot be rendered in English. (Tr.\u0027s Note.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_97\" id=\"Footnote_97\"\u003e[97]\u003c/a\u003e Kant, \"Erklärung über Fichte\u0027s Wissenschaftslehre.\" See the\r\n\"Intelligenzblatt\" of the Jena Literary Gazette (1799), No. 109.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_98\" id=\"Footnote_98\"\u003e[98]\u003c/a\u003e Kant, \"Krit. d. r. Vern.\" 1st edition, p. 201; 5th edition, p. 246.\r\n(English translation by M. Müller, p. 176.) This is, however, not a\r\nliteral quotation. (Tr.\u0027s note.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_99\" id=\"Footnote_99\"\u003e[99]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e p. 189 of the 1st edition; more fully, p. 232 of the 5th\r\nedition. (English translation by M. Müller, p. 166.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_100\" id=\"Footnote_100\"\u003e[100]\u003c/a\u003e In German \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eZufall\u003c/i\u003e, a word derived from the \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eZusammenfallen\u003c/i\u003e (falling\r\ntogether), \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eZusammentreffen\u003c/i\u003e (meeting together), or coinciding of what is\r\nunconnected, just as τὸ συμβεβηκός from συμβαίνειν. (Compare Aristotle,\r\n\"Anal. post.,\" i. 4.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_101\" id=\"Footnote_101\"\u003e[101]\u003c/a\u003e Leibnitz, \"Nouveaux Essais sur l\u0027Entendement,\" lib. iv. ch. ii.\r\nsect. 14.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_102\" id=\"Footnote_102\"\u003e[102]\u003c/a\u003e Kant, \"Kritik d. r. Vern.\" 1st edition, p. 275; 5th edition, p. 331.\r\n(English translation by M. Müller, p. 236.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_103\" id=\"Footnote_103\"\u003e[103]\u003c/a\u003e Kant, \"Krit. d. r. Vern.\" vol. i. p. 203 of the 1st edition; p. 249 of\r\nthe 5th edition. (English translation by M. Müller, p. 178.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_104\" id=\"Footnote_104\"\u003e[104]\u003c/a\u003e Kant, \"Krit. d. r. Vern.\" pp. 212 and 213 of the 1st edition. (English\r\ntranslation, pp. 185 and 186.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_105\" id=\"Footnote_105\"\u003e[105]\u003c/a\u003e Feder, \"Ueber Raum und Causalität.\" sect. 29.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_106\" id=\"Footnote_106\"\u003e[106]\u003c/a\u003e G. E. Schulze, \"Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie,\" vol. ii.\r\np. 422 \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003esqq.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_107\" id=\"Footnote_107\"\u003e[107]\u003c/a\u003e For instance, in Fries\u0027 \"Kritik der Vernunft,\" vol. ii. p. 85.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_108\" id=\"Footnote_108\"\u003e[108]\u003c/a\u003e I lifted from thine eyes the darkness which covered them before.\r\n(Tr.\u0027s Ad.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_109\" id=\"Footnote_109\"\u003e[109]\u003c/a\u003e \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" 2nd edition, vol. ii. ch. iv. p. 42 \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eet seqq.\u003c/i\u003e;\r\n3rd edition, vol. ii. p. 46 \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eet seqq.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_110\" id=\"Footnote_110\"\u003e[110]\u003c/a\u003e Plato, \"Parmenides,\" p. 138, ed. Bip.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_111\" id=\"Footnote_111\"\u003e[111]\u003c/a\u003e Kant, \"Krit. d. r. Vern.\" 1st edition, p. 207; 5th edition, p. 253.\r\n(English translation by M. Müller, p. 182.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_112\" id=\"Footnote_112\"\u003e[112]\u003c/a\u003e Kant, \"Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft.\"\r\nEnd of the \"Allgemeine Anmerkung zur Mechanik.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_113\" id=\"Footnote_113\"\u003e[113]\u003c/a\u003e According to his own assertion, p. 189 of the \"Opera philos.\" ed.\r\nErdmann.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_114\" id=\"Footnote_114\"\u003e[114]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e p. 104.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_115\" id=\"Footnote_115\"\u003e[115]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eBegriff\u003c/i\u003e, \u003cem\u003ecomprehensive\u003c/em\u003e thought, derived from \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003ebegreifen\u003c/i\u003e, to comprehend.\r\n[Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_116\" id=\"Footnote_116\"\u003e[116]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eInbegriff\u003c/i\u003e, comprehensive totality. [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_117\" id=\"Footnote_117\"\u003e[117]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eInbegriff.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_118\" id=\"Footnote_118\"\u003e[118]\u003c/a\u003e See \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" vol. i. sect. 13, and vol. ii. ch. 8.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_119\" id=\"Footnote_119\"\u003e[119]\u003c/a\u003e Aristot. \"Metaph.\" xii. c. 9, \"For without universals it is impossible\r\nto have knowledge.\" (Tr.\u0027s Add.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_120\" id=\"Footnote_120\"\u003e[120]\u003c/a\u003e Part the First, in the middle.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_121\" id=\"Footnote_121\"\u003e[121]\u003c/a\u003e Let any one to whom this assertion may appear hyperbolical, consider\r\nthe fate of Göthe\u0027s \"Theory of Colours\" (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eFarbenlehre\u003c/i\u003e), and\r\nshould he wonder at my finding a corroboration for it in that fate, he\r\nwill himself have corroborated it a second time.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_122\" id=\"Footnote_122\"\u003e[122]\u003c/a\u003e Aristot. \"De anima,\" iii. c. c. 3, 7, 8.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_123\" id=\"Footnote_123\"\u003e[123]\u003c/a\u003e \"The mind never thinks without (the aid of) an image.\" [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_124\" id=\"Footnote_124\"\u003e[124]\u003c/a\u003e \"He who observes anything must observe some image along\r\nwith it.\" [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_125\" id=\"Footnote_125\"\u003e[125]\u003c/a\u003e \"De Memoria,\" c. 1: \"It is impossible to think without (the aid\r\nof) an image.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_126\" id=\"Footnote_126\"\u003e[126]\u003c/a\u003e \"De imaginatione,\" c. 5.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_127\" id=\"Footnote_127\"\u003e[127]\u003c/a\u003e \"De anima,\" p. 130.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_128\" id=\"Footnote_128\"\u003e[128]\u003c/a\u003e \"De compositione imaginum,\" p. 10.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_129\" id=\"Footnote_129\"\u003e[129]\u003c/a\u003e \"De immortalitate,\" pp. 54 et 70.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_130\" id=\"Footnote_130\"\u003e[130]\u003c/a\u003e \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eEin Momentanes end Einheitliches.\u003c/i\u003e\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_131\" id=\"Footnote_131\"\u003e[131]\u003c/a\u003e See \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" 3rd edition, vol. ii. ch. iv. p. 55.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_132\" id=\"Footnote_132\"\u003e[132]\u003c/a\u003e Cicer. \"De Offic.\" i. 16.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_133\" id=\"Footnote_133\"\u003e[133]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIdem\u003c/i\u003e, \"De nat. deor.\" ii. 7.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_134\" id=\"Footnote_134\"\u003e[134]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIdem\u003c/i\u003e, \"De Leg.\" i. 10.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_135\" id=\"Footnote_135\"\u003e[135]\u003c/a\u003e See \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" 2nd edition, vol. i. § 8, and also in\r\nthe Appendix, pp. 577-585 (3rd edition, pp. 610-620), and again vol. ii.\r\nch. vi.; finally \"Die b. G-P. d. Ethik,\" pp. 148-154 (2nd edition,\r\npp. 146-151).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_136\" id=\"Footnote_136\"\u003e[136]\u003c/a\u003e Here Schopenhauer adds, \"especially when pronounced \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eUedähen\u003c/i\u003e.\"\r\n[Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_137\" id=\"Footnote_137\"\u003e[137]\u003c/a\u003e \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" 2nd edition, vol. i. p. 576 \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eet seqq.\u003c/i\u003e; 3rd\r\nedition, p. 610 \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eet seq.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_138\" id=\"Footnote_138\"\u003e[138]\u003c/a\u003e Schopenhauer, \"Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik,\" p. 152;\r\n2nd edition, p. 149 \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eet seq.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_139\" id=\"Footnote_139\"\u003e[139]\u003c/a\u003e Schopenhauer, \"Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik,\" p. 148\r\nand \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003esqq.\u003c/i\u003e (p. 146 \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eet seq.\u003c/i\u003e of 2nd edition.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_140\" id=\"Footnote_140\"\u003e[140]\u003c/a\u003e \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eAus seinem Grund oder Ungrund.\u003c/i\u003e\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_141\" id=\"Footnote_141\"\u003e[141]\u003c/a\u003e \"\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eAhnung\u003c/i\u003e without the \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e.\" See above, p. 133. (Tr.\u0027s note.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_142\" id=\"Footnote_142\"\u003e[142]\u003c/a\u003e \"If Brimha be unceasingly employed in the creation of worlds …\r\nhow can tranquillity be obtained by inferior orders of being?\" Prabodh\r\nChandro Daya, translated by J. Taylor, p. 23.—Brahma is also part of\r\nthe Trimurti, which is the personification of nature, as procreation,\r\npreservation, and death: that is, he represents the first of these.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_143\" id=\"Footnote_143\"\u003e[143]\u003c/a\u003e See \"Asiatic Researches,\" vol. vi. p. 268, and Sangermano\u0027s \"Description\r\nof the Burmese Empire,\" p. 81.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_144\" id=\"Footnote_144\"\u003e[144]\u003c/a\u003e See I. J. Schmidt, \"Forschungen im Gebiete der älteren Bildungsgeschichte\r\nMittelasiens.\" St. Petersburg, 1824, pp. 276, and 180.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_145\" id=\"Footnote_145\"\u003e[145]\u003c/a\u003e I. J. Schmidt, Lecture delivered in the Academy at St. Petersburg\r\non the 15th Sept. 1830, p. 26.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_146\" id=\"Footnote_146\"\u003e[146]\u003c/a\u003e Mahavansi, Raja-ratnacari, and Raja-Vali, from the Singhalese, by\r\nE. Upham. London, 1833.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_147\" id=\"Footnote_147\"\u003e[147]\u003c/a\u003e Κόσμον τόνδε, φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων\r\nἐποίησεν. (Neither a God nor a man created this world, says Heraclitus.)\r\nPlut. \"De animæ procreatione,\" c. 5.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_148\" id=\"Footnote_148\"\u003e[148]\u003c/a\u003e Platonic ideas may, after all, be described as normal intuitions,\r\nwhich would hold good not only for what is formal, but also for what is\r\nmaterial in complete representations—therefore as complete representations\r\nwhich, as such, would be determined throughout, while comprehending\r\nmany things at once, like conceptions: that is to say, as representatives\r\nof conceptions, but which are quite adequate to those\r\nconceptions, as I have explained in § 28.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_149\" id=\"Footnote_149\"\u003e[149]\u003c/a\u003e Aristot. \"Metaph.\" i. 6, with which compare x. 1. \"Further, says\r\nhe, besides things sensible and the ideas, there are things mathematical\r\ncoming in between the two, which differ from the things sensible, inasmuch\r\nas they are eternal and immovable, and from the ideas, inasmuch\r\nas many of them are like each other; but the idea is absolutely and\r\nonly one.\" (Tr.\u0027s Add.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_150\" id=\"Footnote_150\"\u003e[150]\u003c/a\u003e \"In these it is equality that constitutes unity.\" (Tr.\u0027s Add.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_151\" id=\"Footnote_151\"\u003e[151]\u003c/a\u003e \"Oupnekhat,\" vol. i. p. 202.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_152\" id=\"Footnote_152\"\u003e[152]\u003c/a\u003e Aristot., \"De anima,\" iii. 8. \"In a certain sense the intellect is all\r\nthat exists.\" (Tr.\u0027s Add.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_153\" id=\"Footnote_153\"\u003e[153]\u003c/a\u003e See \"Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik,\" p. 11, and in several\r\nother places.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_154\" id=\"Footnote_154\"\u003e[154]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eWeltknoten.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_155\" id=\"Footnote_155\"\u003e[155]\u003c/a\u003e See \"Die Welt, a. W. u. V.\" vol. ii. ch. xiv.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_156\" id=\"Footnote_156\"\u003e[156]\u003c/a\u003e Aristot. \"Metaph.\" iv. 1. \"Sometimes too, learning must start,\r\nnot from what is really first and with the actual beginning of the thing\r\nconcerned, but from where it is easiest to learn.\" [Tr.\u0027s add.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_157\" id=\"Footnote_157\"\u003e[157]\u003c/a\u003e See \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.,\" vol. ii. ch. iv. p. 41, 42 of the 2nd\r\nedition, and p. 44 of the 3rd.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_158\" id=\"Footnote_158\"\u003e[158]\u003c/a\u003e Kant, \"Krit. d. r. Vern.,\" 1st edition, p. 202; 5th edition, p. 248\r\n(English translation by M. Müller, p. 177.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_159\" id=\"Footnote_159\"\u003e[159]\u003c/a\u003e Compare \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.,\" vol. i. p. 551 \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eet seq.\u003c/i\u003e of the 2nd\r\nedition (i. p. 582 \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eet seq.\u003c/i\u003e of 3rd edition) as to \"immaterial substance,\"\r\nand § 52 of the present work as to \"reason in general.\" (Editor\u0027s\r\nnote.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_160\" id=\"Footnote_160\"\u003e[160]\u003c/a\u003e \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.,\" vol. ii. ch. 12, p. 126 of the 2nd edition\r\n(p. 139 of the 3rd edition).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_161\" id=\"Footnote_161\"\u003e[161]\u003c/a\u003e Or \u003cem\u003eground\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_162\" id=\"Footnote_162\"\u003e[162]\u003c/a\u003e Kant, \"Krit. d. r. Vern.,\" 1st edition, pp. 561, 562, 564; p. 590 of\r\nthe 5th edition. (Pp. 483 to 486 of the English translation by M.\r\nMüller.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_163\" id=\"Footnote_163\"\u003e[163]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e p. 540 of 1st edition, and 641 of 5th edition. (P. 466 of\r\nEnglish translation.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_164\" id=\"Footnote_164\"\u003e[164]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e p. 563 of the 1st and 591 of the 5th edition. (P. 485 of\r\nEnglish translation.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_165\" id=\"Footnote_165\"\u003e[165]\u003c/a\u003e Empirical contingency is meant, which, with Kant, signifies as much\r\nas dependence upon other things. As to this, I refer my readers to my\r\ncensure in my \"Critique of Kantian Philosophy,\" p. 524 of the 2nd,\r\nand p. 552 of the 3rd edition.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_166\" id=\"Footnote_166\"\u003e[166]\u003c/a\u003e And this infatuation has reached such a point, that people seriously\r\nimagine themselves to have found the key to the mystery of the essence\r\nand existence of this wonderful and mysterious world in wretched\r\n\u003cem\u003echemical affinities\u003c/em\u003e! Compared with this illusion of our physiological\r\nchemists, that of the alchymists who sought after the philosopher\u0027s stone,\r\nand only hoped to find out the secret of making gold, was indeed a mere\r\ntrifle. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_167\" id=\"Footnote_167\"\u003e[167]\u003c/a\u003e \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eAut catechismus, aut materialismus\u003c/i\u003e,\" is their watchword. [Add. to\r\n3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_168\" id=\"Footnote_168\"\u003e[168]\u003c/a\u003e There too he will meet with people who fling about words of foreign\r\norigin, which they have caught up without understanding them, just as\r\nreadily as he does himself, when he talks about \"\u003cem\u003eIdealism\u003c/em\u003e\" without\r\nknowing what it means, mostly therefore using the word instead of\r\nSpiritualism (which being Realism, is the opposite to Idealism). Hundreds\r\nof examples of this kind besides other \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003equid pro quos\u003c/i\u003e are to be found\r\nin books, and critical periodicals. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_169\" id=\"Footnote_169\"\u003e[169]\u003c/a\u003e They ought everywhere to be shown that their belief is not believed\r\nin. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_170\" id=\"Footnote_170\"\u003e[170]\u003c/a\u003e For revelation goes for nothing in philosophy; therefore a philosopher\r\nmust before all things be an unbeliever. [Add. to 3rd ed.].\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_171\" id=\"Footnote_171\"\u003e[171]\u003c/a\u003e One always says the other is right, so that the public in its simplicity\r\nat last imagines them really to be right. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_172\" id=\"Footnote_172\"\u003e[172]\u003c/a\u003e Here it is especially Ernst Reinhold\u0027s \"System of Metaphysics\"\r\n(3rd edition, 1854) that I have in my eye. In my \"Parerga\" I have\r\nexplained how it comes, that brain-perverting books like this go through\r\nseveral editions. See \"Parerga,\" vol. i. p. 171 (2nd edition, vol. i.\r\np. 194).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_173\" id=\"Footnote_173\"\u003e[173]\u003c/a\u003e Nevertheless, by Zeus, all such gentlemen, in France as well as\r\nGermany, should be taught that Philosophy has a different mission from\r\nthat of playing into the hands of the clergy. We must let them clearly\r\nsee before all things that we have no faith in their faith—from this\r\nfollows what we think of them. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_174\" id=\"Footnote_174\"\u003e[174]\u003c/a\u003e (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) Rosenkranz, \"Meine Reform der Hegelschen Philosophie,\" 1852,\r\nespecially p. 41, in a pompous, dictatorial tone: \"I have explicitly said,\r\nthat Space and Time would not exist if Matter did not exist. Æther\r\nspread out within itself first constitutes real Space, and the movement\r\nof this æther and consequent real genesis of everything individual and\r\nseparate, constitutes real Time.\" (\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) L. Noack, \"Die Theologie als\r\nReligionsphilosophie,\" 1853, pp. 8, 9. (\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) V. Reuchlin-Meldegg,\r\nTwo reviews of Oersted\u0027s \"Geist in der Natur\" in the Heidelberg\r\nAnnals, Nov.-Dec., 1850, and May-June, 1854.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_175\" id=\"Footnote_175\"\u003e[175]\u003c/a\u003e Time is the condition of the \u003cem\u003epossibility\u003c/em\u003e of succession, which could\r\nneither take place, nor be understood by us and expressed in words,\r\nwithout Time. And Space is likewise the condition of the \u003cem\u003epossibility\u003c/em\u003e of\r\njuxtaposition, and Transcendental Æsthetic is the proof that these conditions\r\nhave their seat in the constitution of our head. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_176\" id=\"Footnote_176\"\u003e[176]\u003c/a\u003e In the Scholium to the eighth of the definitions he has placed at the\r\ntop of his \"Principia,\" Newton quite rightly distinguishes \u003cem\u003eabsolute\u003c/em\u003e, that\r\nis, \u003cem\u003eempty\u003c/em\u003e, from relative, or filled Time, and likewise absolute from relative\r\nSpace. He says, p. 11: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eTempus, spatium, locum, motum, ut omnibus\r\nnotissima, non definio. Notandum tamen quod\u003c/i\u003e \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eVULGUS\u003c/span\u003e (that is, professors\r\nlike those I have been mentioning) \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003equantitates hasce non aliter quam ex\r\nrelatione ad sensibilia concipiat. Et inde oriuntur præjudicia quædam,\r\nquibus tollendis convenit easdem in absolutas et relativas, veras et apparentes,\r\nmathematicas et vulgares distingui.\u003c/i\u003e And again (p. 12):\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eTempus absolutum, verum et mathematicum, in se et natura sua\r\nsine relatione ad externum quodvis, æquabiliter fluit, alioque nomine\r\ndicitur Duratio: relativum, apparens et vulgare est sensibilis et externa\r\nquævis Durationis per motum mensura (seu accurata seu inæquabilis)\r\nquâ vulgus vice veri temporis utitur; ut Hora, Dies, Mensis, Annus.\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nII. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eSpatiam absolutum, natura sua sine relatione ad externum quodvis,\r\nsemper manet similare et immobile: relativum est spatii hujus mensura\r\nseu dimensio quælibet mobilis, quæ a sensibus nostris per situm\r\nsuum ad corpora definitur, et a vulgo pro spatio immobili usurpatur:\r\nuti dimensio spatii subterranei, ærei vel coelestis definita per situm suum\r\nad terram.\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut even Newton never dreamt of asking how we know these two\r\ninfinite entities, Space and Time; since, as he here impresses on us, they\r\ndo not fall within the range of the senses; and how we know them moreover\r\nso intimately, that we are able to indicate their whole nature and\r\nrule down to the minutest detail. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_177\" id=\"Footnote_177\"\u003e[177]\u003c/a\u003e Ecclesiasticus xxii. 8.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_178\" id=\"Footnote_178\"\u003e[178]\u003c/a\u003e For Kant has disclosed the dreadful truth, that philosophy must be\r\nquite a different thing from Jewish mythology. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_179\" id=\"Footnote_179\"\u003e[179]\u003c/a\u003e Another instance of Michelet\u0027s ignorance is to be found in Schopenhauer\u0027s\r\nposthumous writings, see \"Aus Arthur Schopenhauer\u0027s handschriftlichem\r\nNachlass,\" Leipzig, A. Brockhaus, 1864, p. 327. [Editor\u0027s\r\nnote.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_180\" id=\"Footnote_180\"\u003e[180]\u003c/a\u003e The same reviewer (Von Reuchlin-Meldegg) when be expounds the\r\ndoctrines of the philosophers concerning God in the August number of\r\nthe Heidelberg Annals (1855), p. 579, says: \"In Kant, God is a thing\r\nin itself which cannot be known.\" In his review of Frauenstädt\u0027s\r\n\"Letters\" in the Heidelberg Annals of May and June (1855) he says that\r\nthere is no knowledge \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_181\" id=\"Footnote_181\"\u003e[181]\u003c/a\u003e C. 1. p. 899.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_182\" id=\"Footnote_182\"\u003e[182]\u003c/a\u003e p. 908.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_183\" id=\"Footnote_183\"\u003e[183]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eHofräthe.\u003c/i\u003e A title of honour often given for literary and scientific\r\nmerit in Germany, and common among University professors. [Tr.\u0027s note.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_184\" id=\"Footnote_184\"\u003e[184]\u003c/a\u003e \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ePotius de rebus ipsis judicare debemus, quam pro magno habere,\r\nde hominibus quid quisque senserit scire\u003c/i\u003e,\" says St. Augustine (\"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eDe civ.\r\nDei\u003c/i\u003e,\" l. 19, c. 3). Under the present mode of proceeding, however, the\r\nphilosophical lecture-room becomes a sort of rag-fair for old worn out,\r\ncast-off opinions, which are brought there every six months to be aired\r\nand beaten. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_185\" id=\"Footnote_185\"\u003e[185]\u003c/a\u003e I take this opportunity urgently to request that the public will not\r\nbelieve unconditionally any accounts of what I am supposed to have said,\r\neven when they are given as quotations; but will first verify the existence\r\nof these quotations in my works. In this way many a falsehood will be\r\ndetected, which can however only be stamped as a direct forgery when\r\naccompanied by quotation marks (\" \"). [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_186\" id=\"Footnote_186\"\u003e[186]\u003c/a\u003e \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.,\" vol. ii., c. 18, p. 213.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_187\" id=\"Footnote_187\"\u003e[187]\u003c/a\u003e So had I written in 1835, when the present treatise was first composed,\r\nhaving published nothing since 1818, before the close of which\r\nyear \"Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung\" had appeared. For a Latin\r\nversion, which I had added to the third volume of \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eScriptores ophthalmologici\r\nminores\u003c/i\u003e,\" \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eedente\u003c/i\u003e J. Radio, in 1830, for the benefit of my foreign\r\nreaders, of my treatise \"On Vision and Colours\" (published in 1816),\r\ncan hardly be said to break the silence of that pause.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_188\" id=\"Footnote_188\"\u003e[188]\u003c/a\u003e As will be seen by the following detailed exposition, Schopenhauer\r\nattaches a far wider meaning to the word than is usually given, and\r\nregards the \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e, not merely as \u003cem\u003econscious volition\u003c/em\u003e enlightened by Reason\r\nand determined by motives, but as the fundamental essence of all that\r\noccurs, even where there is no choice. [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_189\" id=\"Footnote_189\"\u003e[189]\u003c/a\u003e Kant, \"Von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte,\" § 51.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_190\" id=\"Footnote_190\"\u003e[190]\u003c/a\u003e Baltazar Gracian, \"\u003ci lang=\"es\"\u003eEl Criticon\u003c/i\u003e,\" iii. 90, to whom I leave the\r\nresponsibility for the anachronism.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_191\" id=\"Footnote_191\"\u003e[191]\u003c/a\u003e Kant, \"Krit. d. r. V.\" 5th edition, p. 755. (English translation by\r\nM. Müller, p. 640.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_192\" id=\"Footnote_192\"\u003e[192]\u003c/a\u003e Schiller, \"der langen Rede kurzer Sinn.\" [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_193\" id=\"Footnote_193\"\u003e[193]\u003c/a\u003e Chapter 20, p. 263; p. 295 of the 3rd edition.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_194\" id=\"Footnote_194\"\u003e[194]\u003c/a\u003e Rosas, \"Handbuch der Augenheilkunde\" (1830).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_195\" id=\"Footnote_195\"\u003e[195]\u003c/a\u003e Göthe, \"Tag und Jahreshefte,\" 1812.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_196\" id=\"Footnote_196\"\u003e[196]\u003c/a\u003e This I wrote in 1836. The \"Edinburgh Review\" has since however\r\ngreatly deteriorated, and is no longer its old self. I have even seen\r\nclerical time-serving in its pages, written down to the level of the mob.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_197\" id=\"Footnote_197\"\u003e[197]\u003c/a\u003e As a being existing by itself, a thing in itself. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_198\" id=\"Footnote_198\"\u003e[198]\u003c/a\u003e In which it is lodged in the garret. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_199\" id=\"Footnote_199\"\u003e[199]\u003c/a\u003e By this Schopenhauer means the distinction between \u003cem\u003ethe will\u003c/em\u003e in its\r\nwidest sense, regarded as the fundamental essence of all that happens,—even\r\nwhere there is no choice, even where it is \u003cem\u003eunconscious\u003c/em\u003e,—and\r\n\u003cem\u003econscious will\u003c/em\u003e, implying deliberation and choice, commonly called \u003cem\u003efree-will\u003c/em\u003e.\r\nWe must however carefully guard against confounding this \u003cem\u003erelative\u003c/em\u003e\r\nfree-will, with \u003cem\u003eabsolute\u003c/em\u003e free-will (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eliberum arbitrium indifferentiæ\u003c/i\u003e), which\r\nSchopenhauer declares to be inadmissible. The sense in which I have\r\nused the expression \u0027\u003cem\u003efree-will\u003c/em\u003e\u0027 throughout this treatise, is that of \u003cem\u003erelative\u003c/em\u003e\r\nfreedom, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e power to choose between different motives, free of all\r\noutward restraint (\u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eWillkühr\u003c/i\u003e). (Tr.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_200\" id=\"Footnote_200\"\u003e[200]\u003c/a\u003e I have shown the difference between \u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e in its narrowest sense,\r\n\u003cem\u003estimulus\u003c/em\u003e, and \u003cem\u003emotive\u003c/em\u003e, at length in my \"Grund-probleme der Ethik\"\r\np. 29 \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eet seq.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_201\" id=\"Footnote_201\"\u003e[201]\u003c/a\u003e It is especially in secretive processes that we cannot avoid recognising\r\na certain selection of the materials fitted for each purpose,\r\nconsequently a \u003cem\u003efree will\u003c/em\u003e in the secretive organs, which must even be\r\nassisted by a certain dull sensation, and in virtue of which each secreting\r\norgan only extracts from the same blood that particular secretion which\r\nsuits it and no others: for instance, the liver only absorbs bile from the\r\nblood flowing through it, sending the rest of the blood on, and likewise\r\nthe salivary glands and the pancreas only secrete saliva, the kidneys\r\nonly urine, \u0026amp;c. \u0026amp;c. We may therefore compare the organs of secretion\r\nto different kinds of cattle grazing on one and the same pasture-land,\r\neach of which only browses upon the one sort of herb which suits its own\r\nparticular appetite. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_202\" id=\"Footnote_202\"\u003e[202]\u003c/a\u003e Treviranus, \"Die Erscheinungen und Gesetze des Organischen\r\nLebens,\" vol. i. pp. 178-185.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_203\" id=\"Footnote_203\"\u003e[203]\u003c/a\u003e E. H. Weber, \"Additamenta ad E. H. Weberi tractatum de motu\r\niridis.\" Lipsia, 1823.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_204\" id=\"Footnote_204\"\u003e[204]\u003c/a\u003e Joh. Müller, \"Handbuch der Physiologie,\" p. 764.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_205\" id=\"Footnote_205\"\u003e[205]\u003c/a\u003e Meckel, \"A. f. d. P.\" vol. 5, pp. 195-198.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_206\" id=\"Footnote_206\"\u003e[206]\u003c/a\u003e Burdach, \"Physiologie,\" vol. i. § 259, p. 388.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_207\" id=\"Footnote_207\"\u003e[207]\u003c/a\u003e \"Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Great Britain,\" 1824, p. 110.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_208\" id=\"Footnote_208\"\u003e[208]\u003c/a\u003e \"Asiatic Researches,\" vol. 8, p. 426.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_209\" id=\"Footnote_209\"\u003e[209]\u003c/a\u003e Ecclesiastes, ch. 7, v. 28.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_210\" id=\"Footnote_210\"\u003e[210]\u003c/a\u003e In my \"Parerga,\" § 94 of the 2nd vol. (§ 96 in the 2nd edition)\r\nbelongs also to the above.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_211\" id=\"Footnote_211\"\u003e[211]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eDing an sich.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_212\" id=\"Footnote_212\"\u003e[212]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eInbegriff.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_213\" id=\"Footnote_213\"\u003e[213]\u003c/a\u003e Pander and d\u0027Alton, \"Ueber die Skelette der Raubthiere,\" 1822,\r\np. 7.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_214\" id=\"Footnote_214\"\u003e[214]\u003c/a\u003e Burdach, \"Physiologie,\" vol. 2, § 474.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_215\" id=\"Footnote_215\"\u003e[215]\u003c/a\u003e Bopp, \"Ardschuna\u0027s Reise zu Indra\u0027s Himmel, nebst anderen\r\nEpisoden des Mahabharata\" (Ardshuna\u0027s Journey to Indra\u0027s Heaven\r\ntogether with other episodes from the Mahabharata), 1824.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_216\" id=\"Footnote_216\"\u003e[216]\u003c/a\u003e The Matsya Parana attributes a similar origin to Brahma\u0027s four\r\ncountenances. It relates that, having fallen in love with his daughter\r\nSatarupa, and gazed fixedly at her, she stepped aside to avoid his eye;\r\nhe being ashamed, would not follow her movement; whereupon a new\r\nface arose on him directed towards the side where she was and, on her\r\nonce more moving, the same thing occurred, and was repeated, until at\r\nlast he had four faces. (\"Asiatic Researches,\" vol. 6, p. 473.) [Add. to\r\n3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_217\" id=\"Footnote_217\"\u003e[217]\u003c/a\u003e I should like under this name to add a fourth to the three proofs\r\nbrought forward by Kant, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e the proof \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ea terrore\u003c/i\u003e, which the ancient\r\nsaying of Petronius: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eprimus in orbe Deos fecit timor\u003c/i\u003e, designates and of\r\nwhich Hume\u0027s incomparable \"Natural History of Religion\" may be\r\nconsidered as the critique. Understood in this sense, even the theologist\r\nSchleiermacher\u0027s attempted proof might have its truth from the feeling\r\nof dependence, though perhaps not exactly that truth which its originator\r\nimagined it to have.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_218\" id=\"Footnote_218\"\u003e[218]\u003c/a\u003e Socrates propounded it already in detail in Xenophon. (\"Mem.\"\r\ni. 4.) [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_219\" id=\"Footnote_219\"\u003e[219]\u003c/a\u003e Priestley, \"Disqu. on Matter and Spirit,\" sect. 16, p. 188.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_220\" id=\"Footnote_220\"\u003e[220]\u003c/a\u003e Part 7, and in other places.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_221\" id=\"Footnote_221\"\u003e[221]\u003c/a\u003e See \"Die Welt als W. u. V.\" vol. i. p. 597. (Vol. i. p. 631 of the\r\n3rd ed.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_222\" id=\"Footnote_222\"\u003e[222]\u003c/a\u003e The point at which the life-spark is kindled. [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_223\" id=\"Footnote_223\"\u003e[223]\u003c/a\u003e Nor can a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003emundus intelligibilis\u003c/i\u003e precede a \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003emundus sensibilis\u003c/i\u003e; since it\r\nreceives its material from the latter alone. It is not an intellect which\r\nhas brought forth Nature; it is, on the contrary, Nature which has\r\nbrought forth the intellect. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_224\" id=\"Footnote_224\"\u003e[224]\u003c/a\u003e This is expanded, vol. iv. pp. 825-843.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_225\" id=\"Footnote_225\"\u003e[225]\u003c/a\u003e I have seen (Zooplast. Cab. 1860) a humming-bird (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ecolibri\u003c/i\u003e) with a\r\nbeak as long as the whole bird, head and tail included. This bird must\r\ncertainly have had to fetch out its food from a considerable depth, were\r\nit only from the calyx of a flower (Cuvier, \"Anat. Comp.\" vol. iv.\r\np. 374); otherwise it would not have given itself the luxury, or submitted\r\nto the encumbrance, of such a beak.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_226\" id=\"Footnote_226\"\u003e[226]\u003c/a\u003e Galenus, \"De Usu Partium Anim.,\" i. 1.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_227\" id=\"Footnote_227\"\u003e[227]\u003c/a\u003e Lucretius, v. pp. 1032-1039.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_228\" id=\"Footnote_228\"\u003e[228]\u003c/a\u003e Aristot., \"De Part. Animal.,\" iv. 6: \"They have a weapon because\r\nthey have passion.\" [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_229\" id=\"Footnote_229\"\u003e[229]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e c. 12: \"Nature makes the tools for the work, not the work\r\nfor the tools.\" [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_230\" id=\"Footnote_230\"\u003e[230]\u003c/a\u003e De Lamarck, \"Philosophie Zoologique,\" vol. i. c. 7, and \"Histoire\r\nNaturelle des Animaux sans Vertèbres,\" vol. i. Introd. pp. 180-212.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_231\" id=\"Footnote_231\"\u003e[231]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eUrthier.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_232\" id=\"Footnote_232\"\u003e[232]\u003c/a\u003e Animated by the feeling of this truth, Robert Owen, after passing\r\nin review the numerous and often very large Australian fossile \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003emarsupialia\u003c/i\u003e—sometimes\r\nas big as the rhinoceros—came as early as 1842 to the\r\nconclusion, that a large beast of prey must have contemporaneously\r\nexisted. This conclusion was afterwards confirmed, for in 1846 he\r\nreceived part of the fossile skull of a beast of prey of the size of the lion,\r\nwhich he named \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ethylacoleo\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e lion with a pouch, since it is also a\r\nmarsupial. (See the \"Times\" of the 19th of May, 1866, where there\r\nis an article on \"Palæontology,\" with an account of Owen\u0027s lecture\r\nat the Government School of Mines.) [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_233\" id=\"Footnote_233\"\u003e[233]\u003c/a\u003e Kirby and Spence, \"Introduction to Entomology,\" vol. i. p. 355.\r\n[Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_234\" id=\"Footnote_234\"\u003e[234]\u003c/a\u003e Blumenbach, \"De hum. gen. variet. nat.\" p. 50. Sömmering,\r\n\"On the Negro,\" p. 8.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_235\" id=\"Footnote_235\"\u003e[235]\u003c/a\u003e That the lowest place should be given to the rodents, seems however\r\nto proceed from \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e rather than from \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eà posteriori\u003c/i\u003e considerations:\r\nthat is to say, from the circumstance, that their brain has extremely\r\nfaint or small convolutions; so that too much weight may have been\r\ngiven to this point. In sheep and calves the convolutions are numerous\r\nand deep, yet how is it with their intelligence? The mechanical instincts\r\nof the beaver are again greatly assisted by its understanding, and even\r\nrabbits show remarkable intelligence (see Leroy\u0027s beautiful work:\r\n\"\u003cins title=\"Letters\" id=\"C271\"\u003eLettres\u003c/ins\u003e Philosophiques sur l\u0027Intelligence des Animaux,\" lettre 3, p.\r\n149). Even rats give proof of quite uncommon intelligence, of which\r\nsome remarkable instances may be found in the \"Quarterly Review,\"\r\nNo. 201, Jan.-March, 1857, in a special article entitled \"Rats.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_236\" id=\"Footnote_236\"\u003e[236]\u003c/a\u003e The most intelligent birds are also birds of prey, wherefore many of\r\nthem, especially falcons, are highly susceptible of training. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_237\" id=\"Footnote_237\"\u003e[237]\u003c/a\u003e That the negroes should have become the special victims of the\r\nslave-trade, is evidently a consequence of the inferiority of their intelligence\r\ncompared with that of other human races; though this by no means\r\njustifies the fact. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_238\" id=\"Footnote_238\"\u003e[238]\u003c/a\u003e As is likewise his capacity for escaping from his pursuers; for in\r\nthis respect all the four-footed mammalia surpass him. [Add. to\r\n3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_239\" id=\"Footnote_239\"\u003e[239]\u003c/a\u003e [See Third Book of the W. a. W. u. V.; later also, in my \"Parerga,\"\r\nvol. ii. §§ 50-57 and § 206. (§§ 51-58, and § 210 of the 2nd edition.)]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_240\" id=\"Footnote_240\"\u003e[240]\u003c/a\u003e \"Principes de Philosophie Zoologique,\" 1830.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_241\" id=\"Footnote_241\"\u003e[241]\u003c/a\u003e \"Parerga,\" vol. ii. § 91; § 93 of the 2nd edition.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_242\" id=\"Footnote_242\"\u003e[242]\u003c/a\u003e See Aristotle, \"De Partibus Animalium,\" iii. c. 2 \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003esub finem\u003c/i\u003e: πῶς\r\nδὲ τῆς αναγκαίας φύσεως κ. τ. λ.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_243\" id=\"Footnote_243\"\u003e[243]\u003c/a\u003e The appearance of every animal therefore presents a totality, a\r\nunity, a perfection and a rigidly carried out harmony in all its parts\r\nwhich is so entirely based upon a single fundamental thought, that even\r\nthe strangest animal shape seems to the attentive observer as if it were\r\nthe only right, nay, only possible form of existence, and as if there\r\ncould be no other than just this very one. The expression \"natural\"\r\nused to denote that a thing is a matter of course, and that it cannot be\r\notherwise, is in its deepest foundation based upon this. Göthe himself\r\nwas struck by this unity when contemplating whelks and crabs at Venice,\r\nand it caused him to exclaim: \"How delightful, how glorious is a living\r\nthing! how well adapted for its condition; how true, how real!\"\r\n(\"Life,\" vol. iv. p. 223). No artist therefore, who has not made it his\r\nbusiness to study such forms for years and to penetrate into their meaning\r\nand comprehension, can rightly imitate them. Without this study his\r\nwork will seem as if it were pasted together: the parts no doubt will be\r\nthere, but the bond which unites them and gives them cohesion, the\r\nspirit, the idea, which is the objectivity of the primary act of the will\r\npresenting itself as this or that particular species, will be wanting.\r\n[Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_244\" id=\"Footnote_244\"\u003e[244]\u003c/a\u003e It is a great truth which Bruno expresses (\"De Immenso et Innumerabili,\"\r\n8, 10): \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eArs tractat materiam alienam: natura materiam\r\npropriam. Ars circa materiam est; natura interior materiæ.\u003c/i\u003e\" He treats\r\nthis subject much more fully, \"Della Causa,\" Dial. 3, p. 252 \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eet seqq.\u003c/i\u003e Page\r\n255 he declares the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eforma substantialis\u003c/i\u003e to be the form of every product\r\nof Nature, which is the same as the \u003cem\u003esoul\u003c/em\u003e. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_245\" id=\"Footnote_245\"\u003e[245]\u003c/a\u003e Thus the saying of the Schoolmen is verified: \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eMateria appetit\r\nformam.\u003c/i\u003e\" See \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" 3rd edition, vol. ii. p. 352.\r\n[Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_246\" id=\"Footnote_246\"\u003e[246]\u003c/a\u003e Compare \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" 3rd edition, vol. II. p. 375.\r\n[Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_247\" id=\"Footnote_247\"\u003e[247]\u003c/a\u003e Vol. i. p. 245. 1826.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_248\" id=\"Footnote_248\"\u003e[248]\u003c/a\u003e Repeated in the \"Times\" of June 2nd, 1841.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_249\" id=\"Footnote_249\"\u003e[249]\u003c/a\u003e Vol. v. p. 171. Paris, 1826.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_250\" id=\"Footnote_250\"\u003e[250]\u003c/a\u003e C. H. Schultz, \"Sur la Circulation dans les Plantes,\" a prize-essay,\r\n1839.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_251\" id=\"Footnote_251\"\u003e[251]\u003c/a\u003e F. J. Meyen, \"Neues System der Pflanzenphysiologe\" (1839), vol. iii.\r\np. 585.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_252\" id=\"Footnote_252\"\u003e[252]\u003c/a\u003e These have been translated for the \"Bibliothèque Britannique,\r\nSection des Sciences et Arts,\" vol. lii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_253\" id=\"Footnote_253\"\u003e[253]\u003c/a\u003e Treviranus, \"Die Erscheinungen und Gesetze des Organischen\r\nLebens\" (Phenomena and Laws of Organic Life), vol. i. p. 173.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_254\" id=\"Footnote_254\"\u003e[254]\u003c/a\u003e Brandis, \"On Life and Polarity,\" 1836, p. 88, says: \"The roots\r\nof rock-plants seek nourishing mould in the most delicate crevices of\r\nrocks. These roots cling to a nourishing bone in dense clusters. I saw\r\na root whose growth was intercepted by the sole of an old shoe: it\r\ndivided itself into as many fibres as the shoe-sole had holes—those by\r\nwhich it had been stitched together—but as soon as these fibres had\r\novercome the obstruction and grown through the holes, they united\r\nagain to a common stem.\" And p. 87: \"If Sprengel\u0027s observations are\r\nconfirmed, even mediate relations are perceived (by plants) in order to\r\nobtain this end (fructification): that is to say, the anthers of the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003enigella\u003c/i\u003e\r\nbend down in order to put the pollen on the bees\u0027 backs, and the pistils\r\nbend in like manner to receive it from the bees.\" [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_255\" id=\"Footnote_255\"\u003e[255]\u003c/a\u003e In this connection I may mention an analysis of an entirely different\r\nkind, given by the French Academician Babinet in an article in which\r\nhe treats of the seasons on the planets. It is contained in the No. of\r\nthe 15th January, 1856, of the \"Revue des Deux Mondes,\" and I will\r\ngive the chief substance of it here in translation. The object of it is to\r\nrefer to its direct cause the well-known fact, that cereals only thrive in\r\ntemperate climates. \"If grain did not necessarily perish in winter, if it\r\nwere perennial, it would not bear ears, and there would be no harvest.\r\nIn the hotter portions of Africa, Asia and America, where no winter\r\nkills the grain, these plants grow like grass with us: they multiply by\r\nmeans of shoots, remain always green, and neither form ears nor run to\r\nseed. In cold climates, on the contrary, the organism of these plants\r\nseems by some inconceivable miracle to feel, as it were by anticipation,\r\nthe necessity of passing through the seed-phase in order to escape dying\r\noff in the winter \u003cins title=\"season\" id=\"C289\"\u003eseason\"\u003c/ins\u003e (\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eL\u0027organisme de la plante\u003c/i\u003e, par un inconcevable\r\nmiracle, \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003esemble préssentir la \u003cins title=\"necessité\" id=\"C289a\"\u003enécessité\u003c/ins\u003e de passer par l\u0027état de graine, pour\r\nne pas périr complètement pendant la saison rigoureuse\u003c/i\u003e). In a similar\r\nway, districts which have a \"droughty season,\"—that is to say a season\r\nin which all plants are parched up with drought—\"tropical countries, for\r\ninstance Jamaica, produce grain; because there the plant, moved by the\r\nsame organic presentiment (\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003epar le même\u003c/i\u003e pressentiment organique), in\r\norder to multiply, hastens to bear seed at the approach of the season in\r\nwhich it would have to dry up.\" In the fact which this author describes\r\nas an inconceivable miracle, we recognise a manifestation of the plant\u0027s\r\nwill in increased potency, since here it appears as the will of the species,\r\nand makes preparations for the future in a similar way to animal instinct,\r\nwithout being guided by knowledge of that future in doing so. Here\r\nwe see plants in warmer climates dispensing with a complicated process\r\nto which a cold climate alone had obliged them. In similar instances\r\nanimals do precisely the same thing, especially bees. Leroy in his\r\nadmirable work \"Lettres Philosophiques sur l\u0027Intelligence des Animaux\"\r\n(3rd letter, p. 231) relates, that some bees which had been taken to\r\nSouth America continued at first to gather honey as usual and to build\r\ntheir cells just as when they were at home; but that when they gradually\r\nbecame aware that plants blossom there all the year round, they left off\r\nworking. The animal world supplies a fact analogous to the above\r\nmentioned change in the mode of multiplying in cereals. This is the\r\nabnormal mode of propagation for which the \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eaphides\u003c/i\u003e have long been\r\nnoted. The female \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eaphide\u003c/i\u003e, as is well known, propagates for 10-12\r\ngenerations without any pairing with the male, and by a variety of the\r\novoviviparous process. This goes on all summer; but in autumn the\r\nmales appear, impregnation takes place, and eggs are laid as winter\r\nquarters for the whole species, since it is only in this shape that it is\r\nable to outlive the winter. (Add. to 3rd ed.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_256\" id=\"Footnote_256\"\u003e[256]\u003c/a\u003e Plat. \"Tim.\" p. 403. Bip.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_257\" id=\"Footnote_257\"\u003e[257]\u003c/a\u003e \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" vol. ii. chap. 23.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_258\" id=\"Footnote_258\"\u003e[258]\u003c/a\u003e Compare \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" vol. ii. chap. 22: \"Objective\r\nView of the Intellect.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_259\" id=\"Footnote_259\"\u003e[259]\u003c/a\u003e \u003cem\u003ePlan.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_260\" id=\"Footnote_260\"\u003e[260]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"poetry-container\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eBetween two kinds of food, both equally\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eRemote and tempting, first a man might die\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eOf hunger, ere he one could freely chuse. (\u003ccite\u003eCary\u0027s Tr.\u003c/cite\u003e)\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_261\" id=\"Footnote_261\"\u003e[261]\u003c/a\u003e Herschel, \"Treatise on Astronomy,\" chap. 7, § 371 of the 1st edition,\r\n1833.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_262\" id=\"Footnote_262\"\u003e[262]\u003c/a\u003e Even Copernicus had said the same thing long before \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eEquidem\r\nexistimo Gravitatem non aliud esse quam appetentiam quandam naturalem,\r\npartibus inditam a divina providentia opificis universorum, ut in\r\nunitatem integritatemque suam se conferant, in formam Globi coeuntes.\r\nQuam affectionem credibile est etiam Soli, Lunæ cæterisque errantium\r\nfulgoribus, inesse, ut ejus efficacia, in ea qua se repraesentant rotunditate\r\npermaneant; quæ nihilominus multis modis suos efficiunt circuitus\u003c/i\u003e\"\r\n(\"Nicol. Copernici revol.\" Lib. I, Cap. IX. Compare \"Exposition des\r\nDécouvertes de M. le Chevalier Newton par M. Maclaurin; traduit de\r\nl\u0027Anglois par M. Lavirotte,\" Paris, 1749, p. 45). Herschel evidently saw,\r\nthat if we hesitate to explain gravity, as Descartes did, by an impulse\r\nfrom outside, we are absolutely driven to admit a will inherent in bodies,\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eNon datur tertium\u003c/i\u003e. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_263\" id=\"Footnote_263\"\u003e[263]\u003c/a\u003e Which he has more at heart than all the wisdom and truth in the\r\nworld. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_264\" id=\"Footnote_264\"\u003e[264]\u003c/a\u003e See \"Die Welt a. W, u. V.\" vol. ii. ch. 4, pp. 38-42 (3rd edition,\r\npp. 41-46).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_265\" id=\"Footnote_265\"\u003e[265]\u003c/a\u003e P. 74 (3rd edition, p. 79), \u003ca href=\"#Pg092\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003ep. 92\u003c/a\u003e of the translation in the present volume.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_266\" id=\"Footnote_266\"\u003e[266]\u003c/a\u003e 3rd edition, p. 44.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_267\" id=\"Footnote_267\"\u003e[267]\u003c/a\u003e Plato, \"Phæd.\" p. 319 Bip.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_268\" id=\"Footnote_268\"\u003e[268]\u003c/a\u003e \"That which is moved by itself and that which is moved from outside.\"\r\n[Tr.] And we find the same distinction again in the 10th Book \"De\r\nLegibus,\" p. 85. [After him Cicero repeats it in the two last chapters\r\nof his \"Somnium Scipionis.\" Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_269\" id=\"Footnote_269\"\u003e[269]\u003c/a\u003e \"All that is moved, is moved either by itself or by something else.\"\r\n[Tr.] Aristotle, \"Phys.\" vii. 2.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_270\" id=\"Footnote_270\"\u003e[270]\u003c/a\u003e Maclaurin, too, in his account of Newton\u0027s discoveries, p. 102, lays\r\ndown this principle as his starting-point. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_271\" id=\"Footnote_271\"\u003e[271]\u003c/a\u003e Émile, iv. p. 27. Bip.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_272\" id=\"Footnote_272\"\u003e[272]\u003c/a\u003e Burdach, \"Physiologie,\" vol. iv. p. 323.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_273\" id=\"Footnote_273\"\u003e[273]\u003c/a\u003e Seneca, \"Epist.\" 81.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_274\" id=\"Footnote_274\"\u003e[274]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e \"Quæst. nat.\" ii. 24.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_275\" id=\"Footnote_275\"\u003e[275]\u003c/a\u003e Plin. \"Hist. nat.\" 37, 15.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_276\" id=\"Footnote_276\"\u003e[276]\u003c/a\u003e Aristot. \"De Cœlo.\" ii. c. 13, \"If a small particle of earth is lifted\r\nand let loose, it is carried away and will not rest.\" [Tr.\u0027s add.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_277\" id=\"Footnote_277\"\u003e[277]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e c. 14, \"But each thing ought to be named as it wills to be and\r\nreally is according to its nature, not as it is by force and contrary to its\r\nnature.\" [Tr.\u0027s add.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_278\" id=\"Footnote_278\"\u003e[278]\u003c/a\u003e Arist. \"Eth. Mag.\" i. c. 14.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_279\" id=\"Footnote_279\"\u003e[279]\u003c/a\u003e \"Let the freely curling locks fall unarranged as they \u003cem\u003ewill\u003c/em\u003e [\u003cem\u003elike\u003c/em\u003e].\"\r\n[Tr.\u0027s add.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_280\" id=\"Footnote_280\"\u003e[280]\u003c/a\u003e \"Y-King,\" ed. J. Mohl, vol. i. p. 341.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_281\" id=\"Footnote_281\"\u003e[281]\u003c/a\u003e Liebig, \"Die Chemie in ihrer Anwendung auf Agrikultur,\" p. 394.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_282\" id=\"Footnote_282\"\u003e[282]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e \"Die Chemie in Anwendung auf Physiologie.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_283\" id=\"Footnote_283\"\u003e[283]\u003c/a\u003e French chemists likewise say: \"\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eIl est évident que les métaux ne\r\nsont pas tous également\u003c/i\u003e avides \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003ed\u0027oxygène\u003c/i\u003e.\" … \"\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eLa difficulté de la\r\nréduction devait correspondre nécessairement à une\u003c/i\u003e avidité \u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003efort grande\r\ndu métal pour l\u0027oxygène\u003c/i\u003e.\"—(See Paul de Rémusat, \"La Chimie à l\u0027Exposition.\"\r\n\"L\u0027Aluminium,\" \"Revue des Deux Mondes,\" 1855, p. 649).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nVaninus (\"De Amirandis Naturæ Arcanis,\" p. 170) had said:\r\n\"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eArgentum vivum etiam in aqua conglobatur, quemadmodum et in\r\nplumbi scobe etiam: at a scobe non refugit\u003c/i\u003e (this is directed against an\r\nopinion expressed by Cardanus) \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eimo ex ea quantum potest colligit:\r\nquod nequit (scil. colligere), ut censeo\u003c/i\u003e, invitum \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003erelinquit\u003c/i\u003e: natura enim\r\net sua appetit, et vorat.\" This is evidently more than a form of words.\r\nHe here quite decidedly attributes a will to quicksilver. And thus it\r\nwill invariably be found that where, in physical and chemical processes,\r\nthere is a reference to elementary forces of Nature and to the primary\r\nqualities of bodies which cannot be further deduced, these are always\r\nexpressed by words which belong to the will and its manifestations.\r\n[Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_284\" id=\"Footnote_284\"\u003e[284]\u003c/a\u003e I only mention \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e work which has recently appeared, the explicit\r\nobject of which is to show that the magnetiser\u0027s will is the real agent:\r\n\"Qu\u0027est ce que le Magnétisme?\" par E. Gromier. (Lyon, 1850.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_285\" id=\"Footnote_285\"\u003e[285]\u003c/a\u003e Puységur himself says in the year 1784: \"\u003ci lang=\"fr\"\u003eLorsque vous avez\r\nmagnétisé le malade, votre but était de l\u0027endormir, et vous y avez réussi\r\npar le seul acte de votre volonté; c\u0027est de même par un autre acte de volonté\r\nque vous le réveillez.\u003c/i\u003e\" (Puységur, \"Magnét. Anim.\" 2me édit. 1820,\r\n\"Catéchisme Magnétique,\" p. 150-171.) [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_286\" id=\"Footnote_286\"\u003e[286]\u003c/a\u003e Kieser, \"Tellur.\" vol. i. p. 400, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eet seqq.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_287\" id=\"Footnote_287\"\u003e[287]\u003c/a\u003e See \"Wahrheit aus Jean Paul\u0027s Leben,\" vol. viii. p. 120.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_288\" id=\"Footnote_288\"\u003e[288]\u003c/a\u003e I had the good fortune in the year 1854 myself to witness some\r\nextraordinary feats of this kind, performed here by Signor Regazzoni\r\nfrom Bergamo, in which the immediate, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e magical, power of his\r\nwill over other persons was unmistakeable, and of which no one,\r\nexcepting perhaps those to whom Nature has denied all capacity for apprehending\r\npathological conditions, could doubt the genuineness. There\r\nare nevertheless such persons: they ought to become lawyers, clergymen,\r\nmerchants or soldiers, but in heaven\u0027s name not doctors; for the result\r\nwould be homicidal, diagnosis being the principal thing in medicine.—Regazzoni\r\nwas able at will to throw the somnambulist who was under\r\nhis influence into a state of complete catalepsy, nay, he could make her\r\nfall down backwards, when he stood behind her and she was walking\r\nbefore him, by his mere will, without any gestures. He could paralyze\r\nher, give her \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003etetanos\u003c/i\u003e, with the dilated pupils, the complete insensibility,\r\nand in short, all the unmistakeable symptoms of complete\r\ncatalepsy. He made one of the lady spectators first play the piano; then\r\nstanding fifteen paces behind her, he so completely paralyzed her by his\r\nwill and gestures, that she was unable to continue playing. He next\r\nplaced her against a column and charmed her to the spot, so that she\r\nwas unable to move in spite of the strongest efforts.—\u003cem\u003eAccording to my\r\nown observation\u003c/em\u003e, nearly all his feats are to be explained by his \u003cem\u003eisolating\r\nthe brain from the spinal marrow\u003c/em\u003e, either completely, in which case the\r\nsensible and motor nerves become paralyzed, and total catalepsy ensues;\r\nor partially, by the paralysis only affecting the \u003cem\u003emotor\u003c/em\u003e nerves while\r\nsensibility remains—in other words, the head keeps its consciousness,\r\nwhile the body is apparently lifeless. This is precisely the effect of\r\nstrychnine: it paralyzes the motor nerves only, even to complete \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003etetanos\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nwhich induces death by \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003easphyxia\u003c/i\u003e; but it leaves the sensible nerves, and\r\nwith them consciousness, intact. Regazzoni does this same thing by the\r\nmagic influence of his will. The moment at which this isolation takes\r\nplace is distinctly visible in a peculiar trembling of the patient. I\r\nrecommend a small French publication entitled \"Antoine Regazzoni de\r\nBergame à Francfort sur Mein,\" by L. A. V. Dubourg (Frankfurt,\r\nNov. 1854, 31 pages in 8vo.) on Regazzoni\u0027s feats and the unmistakeably\r\ngenuine character they bear for everyone who is not entirely devoid of\r\nall sense for organic Nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the \"Journal du Magnétisme,\" edit. Dupotet, of the 15th August,\r\n1856, in criticizing a treatise: \"De la Catalepsie, mémoire couronné,\"\r\n1856, in 4to, the reviewer, Morin, says: \"La plupart des caractères qui\r\ndistinguent la catalepsie, peuvent être obtenus artificiellement et sans\r\ndanger sur les sujets magnétiques, et c\u0027est même là une des expériences\r\nles plus ordinaires des séances magnétiques.\" [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_289\" id=\"Footnote_289\"\u003e[289]\u003c/a\u003e \"Mittheilungen über die Somnambüle, Auguste K., in Dresden.\"\r\n1845, pp. 115, 116, and 318.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_290\" id=\"Footnote_290\"\u003e[290]\u003c/a\u003e See extract from the English periodical \"Britannia,\" in \"Galignani\u0027s\r\nMessenger,\" of the 23rd October, 1851.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_291\" id=\"Footnote_291\"\u003e[291]\u003c/a\u003e Szapary, \"Ein Wort über Animalischen Magnetismus, Seelenkörper\r\nand Lebensessenz\" (1840).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_292\" id=\"Footnote_292\"\u003e[292]\u003c/a\u003e \"Oder physische Beweise, dass der Animalisch-magnetische Strom\r\ndas Element, and \u003ci lang=\"de\"\u003eder Wille das Princip alles geistigen und Körperlichen\r\nLebens sei\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_293\" id=\"Footnote_293\"\u003e[293]\u003c/a\u003e Bacon, \"Instaur. Magna,\" L. III.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_294\" id=\"Footnote_294\"\u003e[294]\u003c/a\u003e Plin. hist. nat. L. 30, c. 3. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_295\" id=\"Footnote_295\"\u003e[295]\u003c/a\u003e Apuleius, \"Oratio de Magia,\" p. 104. Bip.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_296\" id=\"Footnote_296\"\u003e[296]\u003c/a\u003e Bacon, \"Silva Silvarum,\" § 997.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_297\" id=\"Footnote_297\"\u003e[297]\u003c/a\u003e In the \"Times\" of June the 12th, 1855, we find, p. 10, the following:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\"A Horse-charmer.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"On the voyage to England the ship \u0027Simla\u0027 experienced some heavy\r\nweather in the Bay of Biscay, in which the horses suffered severely, and\r\nsome, including a charger of General Scarlett, became unmanageable.\r\nA valuable mare was so very bad, that a pistol was got ready to shoot\r\nher and to end her misery; when a Russian officer recommended a\r\nCossak prisoner to be sent for, as he was a \u0027juggler\u0027 and could, by\r\ncharms, cure any malady in a horse. He was sent for, and immediately\r\nsaid he could cure it at once. He was closely watched, but the only\r\nthing they could observe him do was to take his sash off and tie a knot\r\nin it three several times. However the mare, in a few minutes, got on her\r\nfeet and began to eat heartily, and rapidly recovered.\" [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_298\" id=\"Footnote_298\"\u003e[298]\u003c/a\u003e Kieser, \"Archiv, für den thierischen Magnetismus,\" vol. v. heft 3,\r\np. 106; vol. viii. heft 3, p. 145; vol. ix. heft 2, p. 172; and vol. ix. heft\r\n1, p. 128; Dr. Most\u0027s book likewise: \"Über Sympathetische Mittel\r\nund Kuren,\" 1842, may be used as an introduction to this matter. (And\r\neven Pliny indicates a number of charm-cures in the 28th Book, chaps.\r\n6 to 17. [Add. to 3rd ed.])\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_299\" id=\"Footnote_299\"\u003e[299]\u003c/a\u003e Delrio. \"Disqu. Mag.\" L. III. P. 2, q. 4. 4, s. 7—and Bodinus, \"Mag.\r\nDæmon,\" iii. 2.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_300\" id=\"Footnote_300\"\u003e[300]\u003c/a\u003e See \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_298\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003enote 2\u003c/a\u003e, p. 334, especially pp. 40, 41, and Nos. 89, 91, and\r\n97 of Most\u0027s book.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_301\" id=\"Footnote_301\"\u003e[301]\u003c/a\u003e Kieser, \"Archiv. f. t. M.\" See the account of Bende Bensen\u0027s\r\nillness, vol. ix. to vol. xii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_302\" id=\"Footnote_302\"\u003e[302]\u003c/a\u003e Plutarch, \"Symposiacæ quæstionis,\" qu. v. 7. 6.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_303\" id=\"Footnote_303\"\u003e[303]\u003c/a\u003e Kant, \"First Principles of Ethical Metaphysic,\" 3rd edition, p. 105.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_304\" id=\"Footnote_304\"\u003e[304]\u003c/a\u003e D. Tiedemann, \"Disputatio de quæstione, quæ fuerit artum magicarum\r\norigo.\" Marb. 1787. A prize-essay written for the Göttingen\r\nSociety.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_305\" id=\"Footnote_305\"\u003e[305]\u003c/a\u003e Here and there, Plotinus betrays a more correct knowledge, for\r\ninstance, \"Enn.\" ii. lib. iii. c. 7; \"Enn.\" iv. lib. iii. c. 12, et lib. ix.\r\nc. 3.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_306\" id=\"Footnote_306\"\u003e[306]\u003c/a\u003e Delrio, \"Disq. mag.\" L. ii. qu. 2. Agrippa a Nettesheym, \"De\r\nVanit. Scient.\" c. 45.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_307\" id=\"Footnote_307\"\u003e[307]\u003c/a\u003e Roger Bacon already in the thirteenth century said: … \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eQuod si\r\nulterius aliqua anima maligna cogitat fertiter de infectione alterius\r\natque ardenter desideret et certitudinaliter intendat, atque vehementer consideret\r\nse posse nocere, non est dubium quin natura obediet cogitationibus\r\nanimæ\u003c/i\u003e.\" (See Rogeri Bacon, \"Opus Majus,\" Londini, 1733, p. 252.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_308\" id=\"Footnote_308\"\u003e[308]\u003c/a\u003e Theophrastus Paracelsus, Strassburg edition in two folio vols., vol. i,\r\npp. 91, 353, et seqq. and p. 789; vol. ii. pp. 362, 496.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_309\" id=\"Footnote_309\"\u003e[309]\u003c/a\u003e Vol. i. p. 19.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_310\" id=\"Footnote_310\"\u003e[310]\u003c/a\u003e \"De occulta philosophia,\" lib. 1, c. 66.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_311\" id=\"Footnote_311\"\u003e[311]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e c. 67.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_312\" id=\"Footnote_312\"\u003e[312]\u003c/a\u003e \"De occulta philosophia,\" lib. 1, cc. 66, 67 et 68.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_313\" id=\"Footnote_313\"\u003e[313]\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid\u003c/i\u003e. p. 440: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eAddunt Avicennæ dictum\u003c/i\u003e: \"\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eAd validam alicujus imaginationem\r\ncadit camelus\u003c/i\u003e.\" \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/i\u003e p. 478, speaking of charms: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003efascinatio ne\r\nquis cum muliere coeat\u003c/i\u003e, he says: \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eEquidem in Germania complures allocutus\r\nsum vulgari cognomento Necromantistas, qui ingenue confessi sunt,\r\nse firme satis credere, meras fabulas esse opiniones, quæ de dæmonibus\r\nvulgo circumferuntur, aliquid tamen ipsos operari, vel vi herbarum commovendo\r\nphantasiam, vel vi imaginationis et fidei vehementissimæ, quam\r\nipsorum nugacissimis confictis excantationibus adhibent ignaræ mulieres,\r\nquibus persuadent, recitatis magna cum devotione aliquibus preculis,\r\nstatim effici fascinum, quare credulæ ex intimo cordis effundunt excantationes,\r\natque ita, non vi verborum, neque caracterum, ut ipsæ existimant, sed\r\nspiritibus\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca class=\"fnanchor pginternal\" href=\"#Footnote_314\" title=\"Schopenhauer has added to spiritibus in parenthesis (sc. vitalibus et animalibus).\" id=\"FNanchor_314\"\u003e[314]\u003c/a\u003e\u003ci\u003e, fascini inferendi percupidis exsufflatis proximos effascinant.\r\nHinc fit, ut ipsi Necromantici, in causa propria, vel aliena, si soli sint\r\noperarii, nihil unquam mirabile præstiterint: carent enim fide, quæ cuncta\r\noperatur\u003c/i\u003e. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_314\" id=\"Footnote_314\"\u003e[314]\u003c/a\u003e Schopenhauer has added to \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003espiritibus\u003c/i\u003e in parenthesis (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003esc. vitalibus et\r\nanimalibus\u003c/i\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_315\" id=\"Footnote_315\"\u003e[315]\u003c/a\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"poetry-container\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003e\"Der Teufel hat sie\u0027s zwar gelehrt;\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eAllein der Teufel kann\u0027s nicht machen.\"—Faust.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse right\"\u003e[Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_316\" id=\"Footnote_316\"\u003e[316]\u003c/a\u003e De incantationibus. Opera Basil. 1567, p. 44.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_317\" id=\"Footnote_317\"\u003e[317]\u003c/a\u003e German translation, Amsterdam, 1695, pp. 126 to 151, especially\r\nthe pages headed \"the power of calm will.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_318\" id=\"Footnote_318\"\u003e[318]\u003c/a\u003e Horst, \"Zauberbibliothek\" (Library of Magic), vol. i. p. 325.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_319\" id=\"Footnote_319\"\u003e[319]\u003c/a\u003e J. Böhme, \"Erklärung von sechs Punkten,\" under Punkt v.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_320\" id=\"Footnote_320\"\u003e[320]\u003c/a\u003e Campanella, \"De sensu rerum et magia,\" l. iv. c. 18.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_321\" id=\"Footnote_321\"\u003e[321]\u003c/a\u003e Krusenstern\u0027s words are: \"A universal belief in witchcraft, which\r\nis held to be very important by all islanders, seems to me to be connected\r\nwith their religion; for they assert that the priests alone possess magic\r\npower, although some of the common people also, it is said, profess to have\r\nthe secret, probably in order to make themselves feared, and to exact presents.\r\nThis sorcery, which they call \u003cem\u003eKaha\u003c/em\u003e, consists in inflicting a lingering\r\ndeath upon those to whom they bear a grudge, twenty days being however\r\nfixed as the term for this. They go to work as follows. Whoever wishes\r\nto practise revenge by means of sorcery, seeks to procure either saliva\r\nor urine or excrements of his enemy in some way or other. These he\r\nmixes with a powder, lays the compound in a bag which is woven in a\r\nspecial manner, and buries it. The most important secret is in the art\r\nof weaving the bag in the right way and of preparing the powder. As\r\nsoon as it is buried, the effects show themselves in the person who is the\r\nobject of this witchcraft. He sickens, becomes daily weaker, loses at\r\nlast all his strength, and in twenty days is sure to die. If, on the other\r\nhand, he attempts to divert his enemy\u0027s revenge from himself by offering\r\nup a pig, or making some other valuable present in order to save his\r\nlife, he may yet be saved, even on the nineteenth day, and no sooner is\r\nthe bag unburied, than the attacks of illness cease. He recovers gradually,\r\nand after a few days is quite restored to health.\"—\"Reise um die\r\nWelt.\" Ed. in 12mo, 1812, Part i., p. 249 \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eet seq.\u003c/i\u003e [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_322\" id=\"Footnote_322\"\u003e[322]\u003c/a\u003e Kieser, \"Archiv für thierischen Magnetismus,\" vol. ix. s. i. in the\r\nnote, pp. 128-132.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_323\" id=\"Footnote_323\"\u003e[323]\u003c/a\u003e They scent something of the\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poetry-container\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003e\"Nos habitat, non tartara sed nec sidera cœli:\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eSpiritus in nobis qui viget, illa facit.\"\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003e(Not in the heavens it lives, nor yet in hell;\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"verse\"\u003eThe spirit that does it all, doth in us dwell.)\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCompare Johann Beaumont, \"Historisch-Physiologisch-und Theologischer\r\nTractat von Geistern, Erscheinungen, Hexereyen und andern\r\nZauber-Händeln, Halle im Magdeburgischen, 1721,\" p. 281. [Add. to\r\n3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_324\" id=\"Footnote_324\"\u003e[324]\u003c/a\u003e Compare Parerga, vol. i. p. 257 (2nd ed. vol. i. p. 286).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_325\" id=\"Footnote_325\"\u003e[325]\u003c/a\u003e On the 4th of August, 1856, the Roman Inquisition issued a circular\r\nto all the bishops, in which it called upon them in the name of the\r\nChurch to use their utmost influence against the practice of Animal\r\nMagnetism. The reasons for this are given with striking want of lucidity\r\nand great vagueness, and even here and there are not unmixed with\r\nfalsehood; and it is easy to see that the Church is reluctant to own the\r\nreal reason. This circular is published in the \"Turin Journal\" of\r\nDecember, 1856, and again in the French \"Univers,\" and reprinted from\r\nthis in the \"Journal des Débats\" of January 3rd, 1857. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_326\" id=\"Footnote_326\"\u003e[326]\u003c/a\u003e According to a Chinese official Report on the census, printed in\r\nPekin, and found by the English in the Chinese Governor\u0027s palace on\r\nentering Canton, China had 396 millions of inhabitants in 1852, and\r\nallowing for a constant increase, may now have 400 millions. (\"Moniteur\r\nde la Flotte,\" end of May, 1857.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe Reports of the Russian Clerical Mission in Pekin give the returns\r\nof 1842 as 414,687,000.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAccording to the tables published by the Russian Embassy at Pekin,\r\nthe population, in 1849, amounted to 415 millions. (\"Post-Zeitung,\"\r\n1858.) [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_327\" id=\"Footnote_327\"\u003e[327]\u003c/a\u003e For the benefit of those who wish to acquire a fuller knowledge of\r\nBuddhism, I here note down those works belonging to its literature, and\r\nwritten in European languages, which I can really recommend, for I\r\npossess them and know them well; the omission of a few others, for\r\ninstance of Hodgson\u0027s and A. Rémusat\u0027s books, is intentional.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n1. \"Dsanglun, or the Sage and the Fool,\" in Tibetan and German,\r\nby I. J. Schmidt, Petersburg, 1843, 2 vols. in 4to, contains in the preface\r\nto vol. i. (\u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e the Tibetan volume), from pp. xxxi to xxxviii, a very brief,\r\nbut excellent, sketch of the whole doctrine, admirably calculated for a\r\nfirst introduction to the knowledge of it: the whole book even, as a part\r\nof the Kandshur (canonical books), may be recommended.—2. In the\r\nMemoranda of the Academy of St. Petersburg are to be found several\r\nlectures by the same excellent author (I. J. Schmidt), which were\r\ndelivered in German in that Academy in 1829-1832. As they are of\r\nvery great value for the knowledge of this religion, it is to be hoped\r\nthat they will be collected and published all together in Germany.—3. By\r\nthe same writer: \"Forschungen über die Tibeter und\r\nMongolen.\" Petersb. 1829, in 4to. (Investigations concerning the\r\nTibetans and Mongols).—4. By the same writer: \"Über die Verwandtschaft\r\nder gnostisch-theosophischen Lehren mit dem Buddhaismus,\"\r\n1828. (On the relation between the Gnostic-Theosophic Doctrines and\r\nBuddhism.)—5. By the same: \"Geschichte der Ost-Mongolen,\" Petersb.\r\n1829, in 4to. (History of the Eastern Mongols.) [This is very instructive,\r\nespecially the explanations and appendix, which give long extracts from\r\nwritings on Religion, in which many passages clearly show the deep\r\nmeaning and breathe the genuine spirit of Buddhism.—Add. to 3rd ed.]—6.\r\nTwo treatises by Schiefner in German, in the \"Mélanges Asiatiques\r\ntirés du Bulletin Historico-Philol. de l\u0027Acad. d. St. Pétersburg,\" Tome 1,\r\n1851.—7. \"Samuel Turner\u0027s journey to the Court of the Teshoo-Lama\"\r\n(at the end), 1801.—8. Bochinger, \"La Vie ascétique chez les\r\nIndous et les Bouddhistes,\" Strasbourg, 1831.—9. In the 7th vol. of\r\nthe \"Journal Asiatique,\" 1825, an extremely beautiful biography of\r\nBuddha by Deshauterayes.—10. Bournouf, \"Introd, à l\u0027Hist, d. Bouddhisme,\"\r\nvol. i. in 4to, 1844.—11. \"Rgya Tsher Rolpa,\" traduit du\r\nTibétain, par Foucaux, 1848, in 4to. This is the \"Lalita Vistara,\" \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e\r\nlife of Buddha, the gospel of the Buddhists.—12. \"Foe Koue Ki, relation\r\ndes royaumes Bouddhiques,\" traduit du Chinois par Abel Rémusat, 1836,\r\nin 4to.—13. \"Description du Tubet,\" traduit du Chinois en Russe par\r\nBitchourin, et du Russe en Français par Klaproth, 1831.—14. Klaproth,\r\n\"Fragments Bouddhiques,\" printed separately from the \"Nouveau\r\nJournal Asiatique,\" Mars, 1831.—15. Spiegel, \"De officiis sacerdotum\r\nBuddhicorum,\" Palice et Latine, 1841.—16. The same author\u0027s \"Anecdota\r\nPalica,\" 1845.—[17. \"Dhammapadam,\" palice edidet et latine vertit\r\nFausböll, Hovniæ, 1855.—Add. to 3rd ed.]—18. Asiatic Researches,\r\nvol. vi. Buchanan, \"On the Religion of the Burmas,\" and vol. xx.\r\n(Calcutta, 1839), Part 2, contains three important articles by Csoma\r\nKörösi, including Analyses of the Books of the Kandshur.—19.\r\nSangermano, \"The Burmese Empire,\" Rome, 1833.—20. Turnour,\r\n\"The Mahawanzo,\" Ceylon, 1836.—21. Upham, \"The Mahavansi,\r\nRaja Ratnacari et Rajavali,\" 3 vols. 1833.—22. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eejusd.\u003c/i\u003e \"Doctrine of\r\nBuddhism,\" 1839, fol.—23. Spence Hardy, \"Eastern Monachism,\"\r\n1850.—24. \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eejusd.\u003c/i\u003e \"Manual of Buddhism,\" 1853. The two last books,\r\nwritten after a twenty years\u0027 stay in Ceylon and from oral information\r\nsupplied by the priests there, have given me a deeper insight into the\r\nessence of the Buddhist dogma than any other work. They deserve to\r\nbe translated into German, but without abridgement, for otherwise the\r\nbest part might be left out.—[25. C. F. Köppen, \"Die Religion des\r\nBuddha,\" 1857, a complete compendium of Buddhism, compiled not only\r\nwith great erudition and serious industry but also with intelligence and\r\ninsight from all the other works I have mentioned above and from many\r\nmore besides, which contains all that is essential on the subject.—26.\r\n\"The Life of Buddha,\" from the Chinese of Palladji, in the \"Archiv\r\nfür wissenschaftliche Kunde von Russland,\" edited by Erman, vol. xv.\r\nHeft 1, 1856.—Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_328\" id=\"Footnote_328\"\u003e[328]\u003c/a\u003e This is equivalent to imputing to the Chinese the thought, that\r\nall princes on earth are tributary to their Emperor. [Add. to 3rd\r\ned.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_329\" id=\"Footnote_329\"\u003e[329]\u003c/a\u003e \"Description du Tubet,\" traduite du Chinois en Russe par Bitchourin,\r\net du Russe en Français par Klaproth, Paris, 1831, p. 65. Also in the\r\n\"Asiatic Journal\" new series, vol. i. p. 15. [Köppen, \"Die\r\nLamaische Hierarchie,\" p. 315.—Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_330\" id=\"Footnote_330\"\u003e[330]\u003c/a\u003e \"Lettres édifiantes,\" édit. de 1819, vol. viii. p. 46.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_331\" id=\"Footnote_331\"\u003e[331]\u003c/a\u003e \"Description of the Burman Empire,\" Rome. 1833. p. 81.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_332\" id=\"Footnote_332\"\u003e[332]\u003c/a\u003e Colebrooke, \"Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society,\" vol. i.;\r\n\"Essay on the Philosophy of the Hindoos,\" published also among his\r\n\"Miscellaneous Essays,\" p. 236.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_333\" id=\"Footnote_333\"\u003e[333]\u003c/a\u003e \"Investigations concerning the Tibetans and Mongols,\" p. 180.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_334\" id=\"Footnote_334\"\u003e[334]\u003c/a\u003e Morrison, \"Chinese Dictionary,\" Macao, 1815, and following years,\r\nvol. i. p. 217.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_335\" id=\"Footnote_335\"\u003e[335]\u003c/a\u003e Upham, \"History and Doctrine of Buddhism,\" London, 1829,\r\np. 102.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_336\" id=\"Footnote_336\"\u003e[336]\u003c/a\u003e Neumann, \"Die Natur-und Religions-Philosophie der Chinesen, nach\r\nden Werken des Tehu-hi,\" pp. 10, 11.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_337\" id=\"Footnote_337\"\u003e[337]\u003c/a\u003e The following account given by an American sea-captain, who had\r\ncome to Japan, is very amusing from the \u003cem\u003enaïveté\u003c/em\u003e with which he assumes\r\nthat mankind consists exclusively of Jews. For the \"Times\" of the\r\n18th October, 1854, relates that an American ship, under command of\r\nCaptain Burr, had arrived in Jeddo Bay, and gives his account of the\r\nfavourable reception he met with there, at the end of which we find:\r\n\"He likewise asserts the Japanese to be a nation of Atheists, denying\r\nthe existence of a God and selecting as an object of worship either the\r\nspiritual Emperor at Meaco, or any other Japanese. He was told by\r\nthe interpreters that formerly their religion was similar to that of\r\nChina, but that the belief in a supreme Being has latterly been entirely\r\ndiscarded—(this is a mistake)—and he professed to be much shocked at\r\nDeejunoskee (a slightly Americanised Japanese), declaring his belief in\r\nthe \u003cins title=\"Deity.\" id=\"C395\"\u003eDeity.\"\u003c/ins\u003e [Add. to 3rd ed.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_338\" id=\"Footnote_338\"\u003e[338]\u003c/a\u003e Édition de, 1819, vol. xi. p. 461.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_339\" id=\"Footnote_339\"\u003e[339]\u003c/a\u003e Book iv. ch. i.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_340\" id=\"Footnote_340\"\u003e[340]\u003c/a\u003e To be found in the \"Asiatic Journal,\" vol. xxii. anno 1826, pp. 41\r\nand 42.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_341\" id=\"Footnote_341\"\u003e[341]\u003c/a\u003e A note of Schopenhauer\u0027s referring to this says:—\"According\r\nto letters from Doss\" (a friend of S.\u0027s), \"dated 26th February and\r\n8th June, 1857, the passages I have here quoted are to be found in\r\nMorrison\u0027s Chinese Dictionary, Macao, 1815, vol. i. p. 576, under 天\r\nTëen, although in a slightly different order, in nearly the same words.\r\nThe important passage at the end alone differs and is as follows:\r\n\u0027Heaven makes the mind of mankind its mind: in most ancient discussions\r\nrespecting Heaven, its mind, or will, was \u003cem\u003edivined\u003c/em\u003e (it stands\r\nthus, and not \u003cem\u003ederived\u003c/em\u003e) from what was the will of mankind.\u0027—Neumann\r\ntranslated this passage for Doss, independently of Morrison\u0027s rendering,\r\nand the end was: \u0027Through the heart of the people Heaven is usually\r\nrevealed.\u0027\" [\u003ci\u003eEditor\u0027s Note.\u003c/i\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_342\" id=\"Footnote_342\"\u003e[342]\u003c/a\u003e Neumann, \"Die Natur-und Religions-Philosophie der Chinesen,\r\nnach dem Werke des Tschu-hi,\" an article in Illgen\u0027s \"Periodical\r\nfor Historical Theology,\" vol. vii. 1837, from pp. 60 to 63.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_343\" id=\"Footnote_343\"\u003e[343]\u003c/a\u003e See my prize-essay \"On the Fundament of Morality,\" § 6.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_344\" id=\"Footnote_344\"\u003e[344]\u003c/a\u003e \"Die Wissenschaftslehre in allgemeinen Umrisse\" (The Doctrine\r\nof Science in a general outline), 18, 10.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_345\" id=\"Footnote_345\"\u003e[345]\u003c/a\u003e For instance, \"Eth.\" iv. prop. 37, Schol. 2.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_346\" id=\"Footnote_346\"\u003e[346]\u003c/a\u003e The language of truth is simple. [Tr.\u0027s add.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_347\" id=\"Footnote_347\"\u003e[347]\u003c/a\u003e Self-existence; self-dependence.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_348\" id=\"Footnote_348\"\u003e[348]\u003c/a\u003e \"Eth.\" i. def. 7. [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_349\" id=\"Footnote_349\"\u003e[349]\u003c/a\u003e Compare \"Parerga,\" i. p. 115, \u003ci lang=\"la\"\u003eet seqq.\u003c/i\u003e (p. 133 of 2nd ed.).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_350\" id=\"Footnote_350\"\u003e[350]\u003c/a\u003e Aristot. \"De Cœlo,\" i. 12.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_351\" id=\"Footnote_351\"\u003e[351]\u003c/a\u003e \"These two go together, the uncreated is imperishable, and the\r\nimperishable is uncreated…. For the created and the perishable go\r\ntogether…. If a thing is created it is necessarily perishable.\" [Tr.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_352\" id=\"Footnote_352\"\u003e[352]\u003c/a\u003e I refer those who may wish to be briefly, yet thoroughly, informed\r\non this point, to the late Pasteur Bochinger\u0027s work: \"La vie contemplative,\r\nascétique et monastique chez les peuples Bouddhistes,\" Strasbourg,\r\n1831.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca class=\"label pginternal\" href=\"#FNanchor_353\" id=\"Footnote_353\"\u003e[353]\u003c/a\u003e Shakespeare, \"Love\u0027s Labour\u0027s Lost.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\" id=\"Corrections\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"xhtml_big\"\u003eTranscriber\u0027s Corrections:\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ctable style=\"border-spacing: 0px;padding: 4px;border-width: 0px;\" data-summary=\"corrections\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003epage\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eoriginal text\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003ecorrection\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Cxxvii\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003exxvii\u003c/a\u003e,\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#C169\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e169\u003c/a\u003e,\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#C199\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e199\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eἐζοχήν\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eἐξοχήν\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#C040\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e040\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003ephantasm.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003ephantasm.\"\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#C087\" 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class=\"pginternal\"\u003e271\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eLetters\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eLettres\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#C286\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e286\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eIn\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\"In\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#C289\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e289\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eseason\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eseason\"\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#C289a\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e289\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003enecessité\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003enécessité\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#C302\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e302\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003einnummerable\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003einnumerable\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#C308\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e308\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003econciousness\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003econsciousness\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#C315\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e315\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003esusceptibity\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003esusceptibility\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#C324\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e324\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ci\u003elex\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ci\u003elex\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#C328\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e328\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003esomnabulist\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003esomnambulist\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#C354\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e354\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ci\u003ewill\u003c/i\u003e.\"\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ci\u003ewill\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#C366\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e366\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003emankind.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003emankind.\"\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#C395\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e395\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eDeity.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eDeity.\"\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#C396\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e396\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eheaven.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eheaven.\"\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#C372\" class=\"pginternal\"\u003e372\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003econfirmamations\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003econfirmations\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}