On a New List of Categories
{"WorkMasterId":5332,"WpPageId":259415,"ParentWpPageId":193820,"Slug":"on-a-new-list-of-categories","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/charles-sanders-peirce/on-a-new-list-of-categories/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/charles-sanders-peirce/on-a-new-list-of-categories/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":101763,"CleanHtmlLength":44422,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"On a New List of Categories","Deck":"Peirce introduces categories that become the basis for his later firstness, secondness, and thirdness.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to Charles Sanders Peirce","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/charles-sanders-peirce/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"Charles Sanders Peirce","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/charles-sanders-peirce/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/charles-sanders-peirce-01-formal-portrait-1.jpg","ImageAlt":"Charles Sanders Peirce formal portrait","FilterTerra":"North America","ClickText":"Charles Sanders Peirce","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/charles-sanders-peirce/","Copies":["1839 CE – 1914 CE","Cambridge, Massachusetts","American logician, scientist, and founder of pragmaticism whose work joined the pragmatic maxim, semiotic theory, fallibilism, abduction, probability, categories, scientific method, and evolutionary metaphysics."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:4","Title":"Modern History","DateText":"1800 CE – 1944 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:11","Title":"Long 19th Century","DateText":"1870 CE – 1913 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/philosophers-of-the-long-19th-century/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"1867 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Displayed year is the 1867 presentation and publication context.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:6"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:25"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:USA:6"}],"OriginalTitle":"","Language":"English","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:metaphysics"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:logic"}],"Tradition":"American pragmatism, pragmaticism, semiotic realism, mathematical logic, scientific inquiry, fallibilism, and evolutionary metaphysics","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Full text from Peirce.org: On a New List of Categories .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Peirce introduces categories that become the basis for his later firstness, secondness, and thirdness."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"","KeyConcepts":"On a New List of Categories; Charles Sanders Peirce; pragmatism; pragmaticism; semiotic; signs; inquiry; abduction; induction; deduction; categories; realism; fallibilism; scientific method","Methodology":"Logical analysis, mathematical notation, semiotic analysis, scientific method, phenomenological categories, abductive reasoning, probabilistic inference, and manuscript-based argument.","Structure":"Accepted direct Peirce work page; edited collections, collected papers, source catalogues, testimonia, later anthologies, and scholarship about Peirce are excluded from direct work rows."},"Arguments":["Connects Peirce\u0027s work in logic, signs, categories, probability, inquiry, scientific method, metaphysics, mind, religion, and pragmaticism."],"Influence":{"InfluencedBy":"Kant, Duns Scotus, Aristotle, George Boole, Augustus De Morgan, Charles Darwin, Benjamin Peirce, William Whewell, and scientific practice.","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Part of the direct Peirce corpus that made him central to logic, pragmatism, semiotics, scientific method, and the history of American philosophy.","Used in debates about inquiry, meaning, scientific method, truth, signs, diagrams, inference to the best explanation, probability, realism, and community-based knowledge."],"EvidenceNote":["Accepted as a central early statement of Peirce\u0027s categorial philosophy."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Versions","BodyHtml":"\u003cdiv class=\"dz-philo__full-version-grid\"\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-version-card\"\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-provider\"\u003ePeirce.org\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3 class=\"dz-philo__full-version-title\"\u003eOn a New List of Categories\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-meta\"\u003eHtmlText · LinkOnlyReady\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ca class=\"dz-philo__full-version-link\" href=\"https://www.peirce.org/writings/p32.html\"\u003eOpen full version\u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["Peirce introduces categories that become the basis for his later firstness, secondness, and thirdness."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":""},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"On a New List of Categories; Charles Sanders Peirce; pragmatism; pragmaticism; semiotic; signs; inquiry; abduction; induction; deduction; categories; realism; fallibilism; scientific method"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Logical analysis, mathematical notation, semiotic analysis, scientific method, phenomenological categories, abductive reasoning, probabilistic inference, and manuscript-based argument."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"Accepted direct Peirce work page; edited collections, collected papers, source catalogues, testimonia, later anthologies, and scholarship about Peirce are excluded from direct work rows."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Connects Peirce\u0027s work in logic, signs, categories, probability, inquiry, scientific method, metaphysics, mind, religion, and pragmaticism."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"Kant, Duns Scotus, Aristotle, George Boole, Augustus De Morgan, Charles Darwin, Benjamin Peirce, William Whewell, and scientific practice."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"American pragmatism, semiotics, mathematical logic, philosophy of science, abductive reasoning, fallibilism, process metaphysics, analytic philosophy, and inquiry-centered epistemology."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Part of the direct Peirce corpus that made him central to logic, pragmatism, semiotics, scientific method, and the history of American philosophy.","Used in debates about inquiry, meaning, scientific method, truth, signs, diagrams, inference to the best explanation, probability, realism, and community-based knowledge."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a central early statement of Peirce\u0027s categorial philosophy."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003eFull text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.peirce.org/writings/p32.html\"\u003ePeirce.org: On a New List of Categories\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\n\u003cCENTER\u003e\n\u003cH2\u003eOn a New List of Categories\u003c/H2\u003e\n\u003cA HREF=\"http://www.peirce.org/\"\u003e\n\u003cH3\u003eCharles S. Peirce\u003c/H3\u003e\n\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cCITE\u003eProceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences\u003c/CITE\u003e 7 (1868), 287-298.\n\u003c/CENTER\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\u003cHR\u003e\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP1.545\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"W2.49\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"section1\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\nSec. 1. This paper is based upon the theory already\nestablished, that the function of conceptions is to reduce the\nmanifold of sensuous impressions to unity, and that the validity\nof a conception consists in the impossibility of reducing the\ncontent of consciousness to unity without the introduction of it.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP1.546\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"section2\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n Sec. 2. This theory gives rise to a conception of\ngradation among those conceptions which are universal. For one\nsuch conception may unite the manifold of sense and yet another\nmay be required to unite the conception and the manifold to which\nit is applied; and so on.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP1.547\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"section3\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n Sec. 3. That universal conception which is nearest to\nsense is that of \u003cI\u003ethe present, in general\u003c/I\u003e. This is a conception,\nbecause it is universal. But as the act of \u003cI\u003eattention\u003c/I\u003e has no\nconnotation at all, but is the pure denotative power of the mind,\nthat is to say, the power which directs the mind to an object, in\ncontradistinction to the power of thinking any predicate of that\nobject, — so the conception of \u003cI\u003ewhat is present in general\u003c/I\u003e,\nwhich is nothing but the general recognition of what is contained\nin attention, has no connotation, and therefore no proper unity.\nThis conception of the present in general, of IT in general, is\nrendered in philosophical language by the word \"substance\" in one\nof its meanings. Before any comparison or discrimination can be\nmade between what is present, what is present must have been\nrecognized as such, as \u003cI\u003eit\u003c/I\u003e, and subsequently the metaphysical\nparts which are recognized by abstraction are attributed to this\n\u003cI\u003eit\u003c/I\u003e, but the \u003cI\u003eit\u003c/I\u003e cannot itself be made a predicate. This \u003cI\u003eit\u003c/I\u003e is\nthus neither predicated of a subject, nor in a subject, and\naccordingly is identical with the conception of substance.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP1.548\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"section4\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Sec. 4. The unity to which the understanding reduces\nimpressions is the unity of a proposition. This unity consists in\nthe connection of the predicate with the subject; and, therefore,\nthat which is implied in the copula, or the conception of \u003cI\u003ebeing,\u003c/I\u003e\nis that which completes the \u003cA NAME=\"W2.50\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ework of conceptions of reducing\nthe manifold to unity. The copula (or rather the verb which is\ncopula in one of its senses) means either \u003cI\u003eactually is\u003c/I\u003e or \u003cI\u003ewould\nbe,\u003c/I\u003e as in the two propositions, \"There \u003cI\u003eis\u003c/I\u003e no griffin,\" and \"A\ngriffin \u003cI\u003eis\u003c/I\u003e a winged quadruped.\" The conception of \u003cI\u003ebeing\u003c/I\u003e\ncontains only that junction of predicate to subject wherein these\ntwo verbs agree. The conception of being, therefore, plainly has\nno content.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n If we say \"The stove is black,\" the stove is the substance,\nfrom which its blackness has not been differentiated, and the is,\nwhile it leaves the substance just as it was seen, explains its\nconfusedness, by the application to it of \u003cI\u003eblackness\u003c/I\u003e as a\npredicate.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n Though \u003cI\u003ebeing\u003c/I\u003e does not affect the subject, it implies an\nindefinite determinability of the predicate. For if one could know\nthe copula and predicate of any proposition, as \". . . is a\ntailed-man,\" he would know the predicate to be applicable to\nsomething supposable, at least. Accordingly, we have propositions\nwhose subjects are entirely indefinite, as \"There is a beautiful\nellipse,\" where the subject is merely \u003cI\u003esomething actual or\npotential\u003c/I\u003e; but we have no propositions whose predicate is\nentirely indeterminate, for it would be quite senseless to say,\n\"\u003cI\u003eA\u003c/I\u003e has the common characters of all things,\" inasmuch as there\nare no such common characters.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n Thus substance and being are the beginning and end of all\nconception. Substance is inapplicable to a predicate, and being is\nequally so to a subject.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP1.549\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"section5\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n Sec. 5. The terms \"prescision\" and \"abstraction,\" which\nwere formerly applied to every kind of separation, are now\nlimited, not merely to mental separation, but to that which arises\nfrom \u003cI\u003eattention to\u003c/I\u003e one element and \u003cI\u003eneglect of\u003c/I\u003e the other.\nExclusive attention consists in a definite conception or\n\u003cI\u003esupposition\u003c/I\u003e of one part of an object, without any supposition of\nthe other. Abstraction or prescision ought to be carefully\ndistinguished from two other modes of mental separation, which may\nbe termed \u003cI\u003ediscrimination\u003c/I\u003e and \u003cI\u003edissociation\u003c/I\u003e. Discrimination has\nto do merely with the senses of terms, and only draws a\ndistinction in meaning. Dissociation is that separation which, in\nthe absence of a constant association, is permitted by the law of\nassociation of images. It is the consciousness of one thing,\nwithout the necessary simultaneous consciousness of the other.\nAbstraction or prescision, therefore, supposes a greater\nseparation than discrimination, but a less separation than\ndissociation. Thus I can discriminate red from blue, space from\ncolor, and color from space, but not red \u003cA NAME=\"W2.51\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003efrom color. I can\nprescind red from blue, and space from color (as is manifest from\nthe fact that I actually believe there is an uncolored space\nbetween my face and the wall); but I cannot prescind color from\nspace, nor red from color. I can dissociate red from blue, but not\nspace from color, color from space, nor red from color.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n Prescision is not a reciprocal process. It is frequently the\ncase, that, while A cannot be prescinded from B, B can be\nprescinded from A. This circumstance is accounted for as follows.\nElementary conceptions only arise upon the occasion of experience;\nthat is, they are produced for the first time according to a\ngeneral law, the condition of which is the existence of certain\nimpressions. Now if a conception does not reduce the impressions\nupon which it follows to unity, it is a mere arbitrary addition to\nthese latter; and elementary conceptions do not arise thus\narbitrarily. But if the impressions could be definitely\ncomprehended without the conception, this latter would not reduce\nthem to unity. Hence, the impressions (or more immediate\nconceptions) cannot be definitely conceived or attended to, to the\nneglect of an elementary conception which reduces them to unity.\nOn the other hand, when such a conception has once been obtained,\nthere is, in general, no reason why the premisses which have\noccasioned it should not be neglected, and therefore the\nexplaining conception may frequently be prescinded from the more\nimmediate ones and from the impressions.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP1.550\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"section6\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n Sec. 6. The facts now collected afford the basis for a\nsystematic method of searching out whatever universal elementary\nconceptions there may be intermediate between the manifold of\nsubstance and the unity of being. It has been shown that the\noccasion of the introduction of a universal elementary conception\nis either the reduction of the manifold of substance to unity, or\nelse the conjunction to substance of another conception. And it\nhas further been shown that the elements conjoined cannot be\nsupposed without the conception, whereas the conception can\ngenerally be supposed without these elements. Now, empirical\npsychology discovers the occasion of the introduction of a\nconception, and we have only to ascertain what conception already\nlies in the data which is united to that of substance by the first\nconception, but which cannot be supposed without this first\nconception, to have the next conception in order in passing from\nbeing to substance.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n It may be noticed that, throughout this process,\n\u003cI\u003eintrospection\u003c/I\u003e is not resorted to. Nothing is assumed respecting\nthe subjective ele\u003cA NAME=\"W2.52\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ements of consciousness which cannot be\nsecurely inferred from the objective elements.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP1.551\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"section7\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n Sec. 7. The conception of \u003cI\u003ebeing\u003c/I\u003e arises upon the\nformation of a proposition. A proposition always has, besides a\nterm to express the substance, another to express the quality of\nthat substance; and the function of the conception of being is to\nunite the quality to the substance. Quality, therefore, in its\nvery widest sense, is the first conception in order in passing\nfrom being to substance.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n Quality seems at first sight to be given in the\nimpression. Such results of introspection are untrustworthy. A\nproposition asserts the applicability of a mediate conception to a\nmore immediate one. Since this is \u003cI\u003easserted\u003c/I\u003e, the more mediate\nconception is clearly regarded independently of this circumstance,\nfor otherwise the two conceptions would not be distinguished, but\none would be thought through the other, without this latter being\nan object of thought, at all. The mediate conception, then, in\norder to be \u003cI\u003easserted\u003c/I\u003e to be applicable to the other, must first\nbe considered without regard to this circumstance, and taken\nimmediately. But, taken immediately, it transcends what is given\n(the more immediate conception), and its applicability to the\nlatter is hypothetical. Take, for example, the proposition, \"This\nstove is black.\" Here the conception of \u003cI\u003ethis stove\u003c/I\u003e is the more\nimmediate, that of \u003cI\u003eblack\u003c/I\u003e the more mediate, which latter, to be\npredicated of the former, must be discriminated from it and\nconsidered \u003cI\u003ein itself\u003c/I\u003e, not as applied to an object, but simply as\nembodying a quality, \u003cI\u003eblackness\u003c/I\u003e. Now this \u003cI\u003eblackness\u003c/I\u003e is a pure\nspecies or abstraction, and its application to \u003cI\u003ethis stove\u003c/I\u003e is\nentirely hypothetical. The same thing is meant by \"the stove is\nblack,\" as by \"there is blackness in the stove.\" \u003cI\u003eEmbodying\nblackness\u003c/I\u003e is the equivalent of \u003cI\u003eblack\u003c/I\u003e.\u003cA HREF=\"#note1\"\u003e***\u003c/A\u003e\u003ca name=\"notemark1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The proof is this.\nThese conceptions are applied indifferently to precisely the same\nfacts. If, therefore, they were different, the one which was first\napplied would fulfil every function of the other; so that one of\nthem would be superfluous. Now a superfluous conception is an\narbitrary fiction, whereas elementary conceptions arise only upon\nthe requirement of experience; so that a superfluous elementary\nconception is impossible. Moreover, the conception of a pure\nabstraction is indispensable, because we cannot comprehend an\nagreement of two things, except as an agreement in some \u003cI\u003erespect\u003c/I\u003e,\n\u003cA NAME=\"W2.53\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eand this respect is such a pure abstraction as blackness. Such\na pure abstraction, reference to which constitutes a \u003cI\u003equality\u003c/I\u003e or\ngeneral attribute, may be termed a \u003cI\u003eground\u003c/I\u003e.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n Reference to a ground cannot be prescinded from being, but\nbeing can be prescinded from it.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP1.552\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"section8\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n Sec. 8. Empirical psychology has established the fact that\nwe can know a quality only by means of its contrast with or\nsimilarity to another. By contrast and agreement a thing is\nreferred to a correlate, if this term may be used in a wider sense\nthan usual. The occasion of the introduction of the conception of\nreference to a ground is the reference to a correlate, and this\nis, therefore, the next conception in order.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n Reference to a correlate cannot be prescinded from reference\nto a ground; but reference to a ground may be prescinded from\nreference to a correlate.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP1.553\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"section9\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n Sec. 9. The occasion of reference to a correlate is\nobviously by comparison. This act has not been sufficiently\nstudied by the psychologists, and it will, therefore, be necessary\nto adduce some examples to show in what it consists. Suppose we\nwish to compare the letters p and b. We may imagine one of them to\nbe turned over on the line of writing as an axis, then laid upon\nthe other, and finally to become transparent so that the other can\nbe seen through it. In this way we shall form a new image which\nmediates between the images of the two letters, inasmuch as it\nrepresents one of them to be (when turned over) he likeness of the\nother. Again, suppose we think of a murderer as being in relation\nto a murdered person; in this case we conceive the act of the\nmurder, and in this conception it is represented that\ncorresponding to every murderer (as well as to every murder) there\nis a murdered person; and thus we resort again to a mediating\nrepresentation which represents the relate as standing for a\ncorrelate with which the mediating representation is itself in\nrelation. Again, suppose we look up the word \u003cI\u003ehomme\u003c/I\u003e in a French\ndictionary; we shall find opposite to it the word \u003cI\u003eman\u003c/I\u003e, which, so\nplaced, represents \u003cI\u003ehomme\u003c/I\u003e as representing the same two-legged\ncreature which \u003cI\u003eman\u003c/I\u003e itself represents. By a further accumulation\nof instances, it would be found that every comparison requires,\nbesides the related thing, the ground, and the correlate, also \u003cI\u003ea\nmediating representation which represents the relate to be a\nrepresentation of the same correlate which this mediating\nrepresentation itself represents\u003c/I\u003e. Such a mediating representation\nmay be termed an \u003cI\u003einterpretant\u003c/I\u003e, \u003cA NAME=\"W2.54\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ebecause it fulfils the office\nof an interpreter, who says that a foreigner says the same thing\nwhich he himself says. The term \"representation\" is here to be\nunderstood in a very extended sense, which can be explained by\ninstances better than by a definition. In this sense, a word\nrepresents a thing to the conception in the mind of the hearer, a\nportrait represents the person for whom it is intended to the\nconception of recognition, a weathercock represents the direction\nof the wind to the conception of him who understands it, a\nbarrister represents his client to the judge and jury whom he\ninfluences.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n Every reference to a correlate, then, conjoins to the\nsubstance the conception of a reference to an interpretant; and\nthis is, therefore, the next conception in order in passing from\nbeing to substance.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n Reference to an interpretant cannot be prescinded from\nreference to a correlate; but the latter can be prescinded from\nthe former.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP1.554\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"section10\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n Sec. 10. Reference to an interpretant is rendered possible\nand justified by that which renders possible and justifies\ncomparison. But that is clearly the diversity of impressions. If\nwe had but one impression, it would not require to be reduced to\nunity, and would therefore not need to be thought of as referred\nto an interpretant, and the conception of reference to an\ninterpretant would not arise. But since there is a manifold of\nimpressions, we have a feeling of complication or confusion, which\nleads us to differentiate this impression from that, and then,\nhaving been differentiated, they require to be brought to unity.\nNow they are not brought to unity until we conceive them together\nas being \u003cI\u003eours\u003c/I\u003e, that is, until we refer them to a conception as\ntheir interpretant. Thus, the reference to an interpretant arises\nupon the holding together of diverse impressions, and therefore it\ndoes not join a conception to the substance, as the other two\nreferences do, but unites directly the manifold of the substance\nitself. It is, therefore, the last conception in order in passing\nfrom being to substance.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP1.555\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"section11\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n Sec. 11. The five conceptions thus obtained, for reasons\nwhich will be sufficiently obvious, may be termed \u003cI\u003ecategories\u003c/I\u003e.\nThat is,\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cBLOCKQUOTE\u003e\n BEING\u003cBR\u003e\n \n\u003cBLOCKQUOTE\u003e\n Quality (Reference to a Ground),\u003cBR\u003e\n \n Relation (Reference to a Correlate),\u003cBR\u003e\n \n Representation (Reference to an Interpretant),\u003cBR\u003e\n \n\u003c/BLOCKQUOTE\u003e \n SUBSTANCE\n\u003c/BLOCKQUOTE\u003e \n \n \u003cP\u003e\n\n \u003cA NAME=\"W2.55\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eThe three intermediate conceptions may be termed\naccidents.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP1.556\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"section12\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n Sec. 12. This passage from the many to the one is\nnumerical. The conception of a \u003cI\u003ethird\u003c/I\u003e is that of an object which\nis so related to two others, that one of these must be related to\nthe other in the same way in which the third is related to that\nother. Now this coincides with the conception of an interpretant.\nAn \u003cI\u003eother\u003c/I\u003e is plainly equivalent to a \u003cI\u003ecorrelate\u003c/I\u003e. The conception\nof second differs from that of other, in implying the possibility\nof a third. In the same way, the conception of \u003cI\u003eself\u003c/I\u003e implies the\npossibility of an \u003cI\u003eother\u003c/I\u003e. The \u003cI\u003eGround\u003c/I\u003e is the self abstracted\nfrom the concreteness which implies the possibility of an other.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP1.557\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"section13\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n Sec. 13. Since no one of the categories can be prescinded\nfrom those above it, the list of supposable objects which they\nafford is,\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cBLOCKQUOTE\u003e\n What is.\u003cBR\u003e\n \n\u003cBLOCKQUOTE\u003e\n Quale–that which refers to a ground,\u003cBR\u003e\n \n Relate–that which refers to ground and correlate,\u003cBR\u003e\n \n Representamen–that which refers to ground, correlate,\n and interpretant.\u003cBR\u003e\n \n\u003c/BLOCKQUOTE\u003e \n It.\n\u003c/BLOCKQUOTE\u003e \n \n \u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP1.558\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"section14\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n Sec. 14. A quality may have a special determination which\nprevents its being prescinded from reference to a correlate. Hence\nthere are two kinds of relation.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n First. That of relates whose reference to a ground is a\nprescindible or internal quality.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n Second. That of relates whose reference to a ground is an\nunprescindible or relative quality.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n In the former case, the relation is a mere \u003cI\u003econcurrence\u003c/I\u003e of\nthe correlates in one character, and the relate and correlate are\nnot distinguished. In the latter case the correlate is set over\nagainst the relate, and there is in some sense an \u003cI\u003eopposition\u003c/I\u003e.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n Relates of the first kind are brought into relation simply\nby their agreement. But mere disagreement (unrecognized) does not\nconstitute relation, and therefore relates of the second kind are\nonly brought into relation by correspondence in fact.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n A reference to a ground may also be such that it cannot be\nprescinded from a reference to an interpretant. In this case it\nmay be termed an \u003cI\u003eimputed\u003c/I\u003e quality. If the reference of a relate\nto its ground \u003cA NAME=\"W2.56\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ecan be prescinded from reference to an\ninterpretant, its relation to its correlate is a mere concurrence\nor community in the possession of a quality, and therefore the\nreference to a correlate can be prescinded from reference to an\ninterpretant. It follows that there are three kinds of\nrepresentations.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n First. Those whose relation to their objects is a mere\ncommunity in some quality, and these representations may be termed\n\u003cI\u003eLikenesses\u003c/I\u003e.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n Second. Those whose relation to their objects consists in a\ncorrespondence in fact, and these may be termed \u003cI\u003eIndices\u003c/I\u003e or\n\u003cI\u003eSigns\u003c/I\u003e.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n Third. Those the ground of whose relation to their objects\nis an imputed character, which are the same as \u003cI\u003egeneral signs\u003c/I\u003e,\nand these may be termed \u003cI\u003eSymbols\u003c/I\u003e.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP1.559\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"section15\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n Sec. 15. I shall now show how the three conceptions of\nreference to a ground, reference to an object, and reference to an\ninterpretant are the fundamental ones of at least one universal\nscience, that of logic. Logic is said to treat of second\nintentions as applied to first. It would lead me too far away from\nthe matter in hand to discuss the truth of this statement; I shall\nsimply adopt it as one which seems to me to afford a good\ndefinition of the subject-genus of this science. Now, second\nintentions are the objects of the understanding considered as\nrepresentations, and the first intentions to which they apply are\nthe objects of those representations. The objects of the\nunderstanding, considered as representations, are symbols, that\nis, signs which are at least potentially general. But the rules of\nlogic hold good of any symbols, of those which are written or\nspoken as well as of those which are thought. They have no\nimmediate application to likenesses or indices, because no\narguments can be constructed of these alone, but do apply to all\nsymbols. All symbols, indeed, are in one sense relative to the\nunderstanding, but only in the sense in which also all things are\nrelative to the understanding. On this account, therefore, the\nrelation to the understanding need not be expressed in the\ndefinition of the sphere of logic, since it determines no\nlimitation of that sphere. But a distinction can be made between\nconcepts which are supposed to have no existence except so far as\nthey are actually present to the understanding, and external\nsymbols which still retain their character of symbols so long as\nthey are only \u003cI\u003ecapable\u003c/I\u003e of being understood. And as the rules of\nlogic apply to these latter as much as to the former (and though\nonly through the former, yet this character, since it belongs to\nall things, is no limitation), it follows that logic has for its\nsubject-genus all symbols and not merely con\u003cA NAME=\"W2.57\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ecepts.\u003cA HREF=\"#note2\"\u003e***\u003c/A\u003e\u003ca name=\"notemark2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e We\ncome, therefore, to this, that logic treats of the reference of\nsymbols in general to their objects. In this view it is one of a\ntrivium of conceivable sciences. The first would treat of the\nformal conditions of symbols having meaning, that is of the\nreference of symbols in general to their grounds or imputed\ncharacters, and this might be called formal grammar; the second,\nlogic, would treat of the formal conditions of the truth of\nsymbols; and the third would treat of the formal conditions of the\nforce of symbols, or their power of appealing to a mind, that is,\nof their reference in general to interpretants, and this might be\ncalled formal rhetoric.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n There would be a general division of symbols, common to all\nthese sciences; namely, into,\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n 1) Symbols which directly determine only their \u003cI\u003egrounds\u003c/I\u003e or\nimputed qualities, and are thus but sums of marks or \u003cI\u003eterms\u003c/I\u003e;\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n 2) Symbols which also independently determine their\n\u003cI\u003eobjects\u003c/I\u003e by means of other term or terms, and thus, expressing\ntheir own objective validity, become capable of truth or\nfalsehood, that is, are \u003cI\u003epropositions\u003c/I\u003e; and,\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n 3) Symbols which also independently determine their\n\u003cI\u003einterpretants\u003c/I\u003e, and thus the minds to which they appeal, by\npremissing a proposition or propositions which such a mind is to\nadmit. These are \u003cI\u003earguments\u003c/I\u003e.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n And it is remarkable that, among all the definitions of the\nproposition, for example, as the \u003cI\u003eoratio indicativa\u003c/I\u003e, as the\nsubsumption of an object under a concept, as the expression of the\nrelation of two concepts, and as the indication of the mutable\nground of appearance, there is, perhaps, not one in which the\nconception of reference to an object or correlate is not the\nimportant one. In the same way, the conception of reference to an\ninterpretant or third, is always prominent in the definitions of\nargument.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n In a proposition, the term which separately indicates the\nobject of the symbol is termed the subject, and that which\nindicates the ground is termed the predicate. The objects\nindicated by the subject (which are always potentially a plurality\n– at least, of phases or \u003cA NAME=\"W2.58\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eappearances) are therefore stated by\nthe proposition to be related to one another on the ground of the\ncharacter indicated by the predicate. Now this relation may be\neither a concurrence or an opposition. Propositions of concurrence\nare those which are usually considered in logic; but I have shown\nin a paper upon the classification of arguments that it is also\nnecessary to consider separately propositions of opposition, if we\nare to take account of such arguments as the following: –\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n Whatever is the half of anything is less than that of which\nit is the half:\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cCENTER\u003e\n\n A is half of B:\u003cBR\u003e\n \n A is less than B.\n\u003c/CENTER\u003e\n \n \u003cP\u003e\n\n The subject of such a proposition is separated into two\nterms, a \"subject nominative\" and an \"object accusative.\"\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n In an argument, the premisses form a representation of the\nconclusion, because they indicate the interpretant of the\nargument, or representation representing it to represent its\nobject. The premisses may afford a likeness, index, or symbol of\nthe conclusion. In deductive argument, the conclusion is\nrepresented by the premisses as by a general sign under which it\nis contained. In hypotheses, something like the conclusion is\nproved, that is, the premisses form a likeness of the conclusion.\nTake, for example, the following argument:\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cCENTER\u003e\n\n M is, for instance, P\u0027, P\u0027\u0027, P\u0027\u0027\u0027, and P\u0027\u0027\u0027\u0027;\u003cBR\u003e\n \n S is P\u0027, P\u0027\u0027, P\u0027\u0027\u0027, and P\u0027\u0027\u0027\u0027:\u003cBR\u003e\n \n [Ergo,] S is M.\n\u003c/CENTER\u003e \n \u003cP\u003e\n\n Here the first premiss amounts to this, that \"P\u0027, P\u0027\u0027, P\u0027\u0027\u0027,\nand P\u0027\u0027\u0027\u0027\" is a likeness of M, and thus the premisses are or\nrepresent a likeness of the conclusion. That it is different with\ninduction another example will show.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cCENTER\u003e\n S\u0027, S\u0027\u0027, S\u0027\u0027\u0027, and S\u0027\u0027\u0027\u0027 are taken as samples of the\n collection M;\u003cBR\u003e\n \n S\u0027, S\u0027\u0027, S\u0027\u0027\u0027, and S\u0027\u0027\u0027\u0027 are P:\u003cBR\u003e\n \n [Ergo,] All M is P.\n\u003c/CENTER\u003e \n \u003cP\u003e\n\n Hence the first premiss amounts to saying that \"S\u0027, S\u0027\u0027,\nS\u0027\u0027\u0027, and S\u0027\u0027\u0027\u0027\" is an index of M. Hence the premisses are an\nindex of the conclusion.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n The other divisions of terms, propositions, and arguments\narise \u003cA NAME=\"W2.59\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003efrom the distinction of extension and comprehension. I\npropose to treat this subject in a subsequent paper. But I will so\nfar anticipate that as to say that there is, first, the direct\nreference of a symbol to its objects, or its denotation; second,\nthe reference of the symbol to its ground, through its object,\nthat is, its reference to the common characters of its objects, or\nits connotation; and third, its reference to its interpretants\nthrough its object, that is, its reference to all the synthetical\npropositions in which its objects in common are subject or\npredicate, and this I term the information it embodies. And as\nevery addition to what it denotes, or to what it connotes, is\neffected by means of a distinct proposition of this kind, it\nfollows that the extension and comprehension of a term are in an\ninverse relation, as long as the information remains the same, and\nthat every increase of information is accompanied by an increase\nof one or other of these two quantities. It may be observed that\nextension and comprehension are very often taken in other senses\nin which this last proposition is not true.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n This is an imperfect view of the application which the\nconceptions which, according to our analysis, are the most\nfundamental ones find in the sphere of logic. It is believed,\nhowever, that it is sufficient to show that at least something may\nbe usefully suggested by considering this science in this light.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cHR\u003e\n\u003cCENTER\u003e\n\u003cH2\u003eNotes\u003c/H2\u003e\n\u003c/CENTER\u003e\n\u003ca name=\"note1\"\u003e1.\u003c/a\u003e This agrees with the author of \u003cCITE\u003eDe Generibus et Speciebus,\nOuvrages Inedits d\u0027Abelard\u003c/CITE\u003e, p. 528.\u003cBR\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#notemark1\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eReturn to text.\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003ca name=\"note2\"\u003e2.\u003c/a\u003e Herbart says: \"Unsre saemmtlichen Gedanken lassen sich von\nzwei Seiten betrachten; theils als Thaetigkeiten unseres Geistes,\ntheils in Hinsicht dessen, \u003cI\u003ewas\u003c/I\u003e durch sie gedacht wird. In\nletzterer Beziehung heissen sie \u003cI\u003eBegriffe\u003c/I\u003e, welches Wort, indem es\ndas \u003cI\u003eBegriffene\u003c/I\u003e bezeichnet, zu abstrahiren gebieted von der Art\nund Weise, wie wir den Gedanken empfangen, produciren, oder\nreproduciren moegen.\" But the whole difference between a concept\nand an external sign lies in these respects which logic ought,\naccording to Herbart, to abstract from.\u003cBR\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#notemark2\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eReturn to text.\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}