Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man
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Charles Sanders Peirce; pragmatism; pragmaticism; semiotic; signs; inquiry; abduction; induction; deduction; categories; realism; fallibilism; scientific method","Methodology":"Logical analysis, mathematical notation, semiotic analysis, scientific method, phenomenological categories, abductive reasoning, probabilistic inference, and manuscript-based argument.","Structure":"Accepted direct Peirce work page; edited collections, collected papers, source catalogues, testimonia, later anthologies, and scholarship about Peirce are excluded from direct work rows."},"Arguments":["Connects Peirce\u0027s work in logic, signs, categories, probability, inquiry, scientific method, metaphysics, mind, religion, and pragmaticism."],"Influence":{"InfluencedBy":"Kant, Duns Scotus, Aristotle, George Boole, Augustus De Morgan, Charles Darwin, Benjamin Peirce, William Whewell, and scientific practice.","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Part of the direct Peirce corpus that made him central to logic, pragmatism, semiotics, scientific method, and the history of American philosophy.","Used in debates about inquiry, meaning, scientific method, truth, signs, diagrams, inference to the best explanation, probability, realism, and community-based knowledge."],"EvidenceNote":["Accepted as a direct paper from the cognition series."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Versions","BodyHtml":"\u003cdiv class=\"dz-philo__full-version-grid\"\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-version-card\"\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-provider\"\u003ePeirce.org\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3 class=\"dz-philo__full-version-title\"\u003eQuestions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-meta\"\u003eHtmlText · LinkOnlyReady\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ca class=\"dz-philo__full-version-link\" href=\"https://www.peirce.org/writings/p26.html\"\u003eOpen full version\u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["Peirce criticizes introspective and intuitive faculties and reframes knowledge through signs and mediated cognition."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":""},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man; Charles Sanders Peirce; pragmatism; pragmaticism; semiotic; signs; inquiry; abduction; induction; deduction; categories; realism; fallibilism; scientific method"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Logical analysis, mathematical notation, semiotic analysis, scientific method, phenomenological categories, abductive reasoning, probabilistic inference, and manuscript-based argument."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"Accepted direct Peirce work page; edited collections, collected papers, source catalogues, testimonia, later anthologies, and scholarship about Peirce are excluded from direct work rows."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Connects Peirce\u0027s work in logic, signs, categories, probability, inquiry, scientific method, metaphysics, mind, religion, and pragmaticism."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"Kant, Duns Scotus, Aristotle, George Boole, Augustus De Morgan, Charles Darwin, Benjamin Peirce, William Whewell, and scientific practice."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"American pragmatism, semiotics, mathematical logic, philosophy of science, abductive reasoning, fallibilism, process metaphysics, analytic philosophy, and inquiry-centered epistemology."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Part of the direct Peirce corpus that made him central to logic, pragmatism, semiotics, scientific method, and the history of American philosophy.","Used in debates about inquiry, meaning, scientific method, truth, signs, diagrams, inference to the best explanation, probability, realism, and community-based knowledge."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct paper from the cognition series."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003eFull text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.peirce.org/writings/p26.html\"\u003ePeirce.org: Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\n\u003cCENTER\u003e\n\u003cH2\u003eQuestions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man\u003c/H2\u003e\n\u003cA HREF=\"http://www.peirce.org/\"\u003e\n\u003cH3\u003eCharles S. Peirce\u003c/H3\u003e\n\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cCITE\u003eJournal of Speculative Philosophy\u003c/CITE\u003e (1868) 2, 103-114.\n\u003c/CENTER\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\u003cHR\u003e\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"W2.193\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"question1\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cB\u003eQUESTION 1.\u003c/B\u003e \u003cI\u003eWhether by the simple contemplation of a cognition,\nindependently of any previous knowledge and without reasoning from\nsigns, we are enabled rightly to judge whether that cognition has\nbeen determined by a previous cognition or whether it refers\nimmediately to its object.\u003c/I\u003e\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.213\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Throughout this paper, the term \u003cA HREF=\"#note1\"\u003e\u003cI\u003eintuition\u003c/I\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003ca name=\"notemark1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e will be taken as\nsignifying a cognition not determined by a previous cognition of\nthe same object, and therefore so determined by something out of\nthe consciousness. Let me request the reader to note this.\n\u003cI\u003eIntuition\u003c/I\u003e here will be nearly the same as \"premiss not itself a\nconclusion\"; the only difference being that premisses and\nconclusions are judgments, whereas an intuition may, as far as its\ndefinition states, be any kind of cognition whatever. But just as\na conclusion (good or bad) is determined in the mind of the\nreasoner by its premiss, so cognitions not judgments may be\ndetermined by previous cognitions; and a cogni\u003cA NAME=\"W2.194\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003etion not so\ndetermined, and therefore determined directly by the\ntranscendental object, is to be termed an \u003cI\u003eintuition\u003c/I\u003e.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.214\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Now, it is plainly one thing to have an intuition and\nanother to know intuitively that it is an intuition, and the\nquestion is whether these two things, distinguishable in thought,\nare, in fact, invariably connected, so that we can always\nintuitively distinguish between an intuition and a cognition\ndetermined by another. Every cognition, as something present, is,\nof course, an intuition of itself. But the determination of a\ncognition by another cognition or by a transcendental object is\nnot, at least so far as appears obviously at first, a part of the\nimmediate content of that cognition, although it would appear to\nbe an element of the action or passion of the transcendental \u003cI\u003eego\u003c/I\u003e,\nwhich is not, perhaps, in consciousness immediately; and yet this\ntranscendental action or passion may invariably determine a\ncognition of itself, so that, in fact, the determination or\nnon-determination of the cognition by another may be a part of the\ncognition. In this case, I should say that we had an intuitive\npower of distinguishing an intuition from another cognition.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n There is no evidence that we have this faculty, except that\nwe seem to \u003cI\u003efeel\u003c/I\u003e that we have it. But the weight of that testimony\ndepends entirely on our being supposed to have the power of\ndistinguishing in this feeling whether the feeling be the result\nof education, old associations, etc., or whether it is an\nintuitive cognition; or, in other words, it depends on\npresupposing the very matter testified to. Is this feeling\ninfallible? And is this judgment concerning it infallible, and so\non, \u003cI\u003ead infinitum\u003c/I\u003e? Supposing that a man really could shut himself\nup in such a faith, he would be, of course, impervious to the\ntruth, \"evidence-proof.\"\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.215\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e But let us compare the theory with the historic facts. The\npower of intuitively distinguishing intuitions from other\ncognitions has not prevented men from disputing very warmly as to\nwhich cognitions are intuitive. In the middle ages, reason and\nexternal authority were regarded as two co\u0014rdinate sources of\nknowledge, just as reason and the authority of intuition are now;\nonly the happy device of considering the enunciations of authority\nto be essentially indemonstrable had not yet been hit upon. All\nauthorities were not considered as infallible, any more than all\nreasons; but when \u003cA HREF=\"#note2\"\u003eBerengarius\u003c/A\u003e\u003ca name=\"notemark2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e said that the authoritativeness of\nany particular authority must rest upon reason, the proposition\nwas scouted as opinionated, impious, and absurd. Thus, the\ncredibility of authority was regarded by men of that time\n\u003cA NAME=\"W2.195\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003esimply as an ultimate premiss, as a cognition not determined\nby a previous cognition of the same object, or, in our terms, as\nan intuition. It is strange that they should have thought so, if,\nas the theory now under discussion supposes, by merely\ncontemplating the credibility of the authority, as a Fakir does\nhis God, they could have seen that it was not an ultimate premiss!\nNow, what if our \u003cI\u003einternal\u003c/I\u003e authority should meet the same fate, in\nthe history of opinions, as that external authority has met? Can\nthat be said to be absolutely certain which many sane,\nwell-informed, and thoughtful men already doubt?\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.216\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Every lawyer knows how difficult it is for witnesses to\ndistinguish between what they have seen and what they have\ninferred. This is particularly noticeable in the case of a person\nwho is describing the performances of a spiritual medium or of a\nprofessed juggler. The difficulty is so great that the juggler\nhimself is often astonished at the discrepancy between the actual\nfacts and the statement of an intelligent witness who has not\nunderstood the trick. A part of the very complicated trick of the\nChinese rings consists in taking two solid rings linked together,\ntalking about them as though they were sepa\u003cA NAME=\"W2.196\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003erate — taking it\nfor granted, as it were — then pretending to put them together,\nand handing them immediately to the spectator that he may see that\nthey are solid. The art of this consists in raising, at first, the\nstrong suspicion that one is broken. I have seen McAlister do this\nwith such success, that a person sitting close to him, with all\nhis faculties straining to detect the illusion, would have been\nready to swear that he saw the rings put together, and, perhaps,\nif the juggler had not professedly practised deception, would have\nconsidered a doubt of it as a doubt of his own veracity. This\ncertainly seems to show that it is not always very easy to\ndistinguish between a premiss and a conclusion, that we have no\ninfallible power of doing so, and that in fact our only security\nin difficult cases is in some signs from which we can infer that a\ngiven fact must have been seen or must have been inferred. In\ntrying to give an account of a dream, every accurate person must\noften have felt that it was a hopeless undertaking to attempt to\ndisentangle waking interpretations and fillings out from the\nfragmentary images of the dream itself.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.217\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e The mention of dreams suggests another argument. A dream,\nas far as its own content goes, is exactly like an actual\nexperience. It is mistaken for one. And yet all the world believes\nthat dreams are determined, according to the laws of the\nassociation of ideas, etc., by previous cognitions. If it be said\nthat the faculty of intuitively recognizing intuitions is asleep,\nI reply that this is a mere supposition, without other support.\nBesides, even when we wake up, we do not find that the dream\ndiffered from reality, except by certain \u003cI\u003emarks\u003c/I\u003e, darkness and\nfragmentariness. Not unfrequently a dream is so vivid that the\nmemory of it is mistaken for the memory of an actual occurrence.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.218\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e A child has, as far as we know, all the perceptive powers\nof a man. Yet question him a little as to \u003cI\u003ehow\u003c/I\u003e he knows what he\ndoes. In many cases, he will tell you that he never learned his\nmother-tongue; he always knew it, or he knew it as soon as he came\nto have sense. It appears, then, that \u003cI\u003ehe\u003c/I\u003e does not possess the\nfaculty of distinguishing, by simple contemplation, between an\nintuition and a cognition determined by others.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.219\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e There can be no doubt that before the publication of\nBerkeley\u0027s book on Vision, it had generally been believed that the\nthird dimension of space was immediately intuited, although, at\npresent, nearly all admit that it is known by inference. We had\nbeen \u003cI\u003econtemplating\u003c/I\u003e \u003cA NAME=\"W2.197\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe object since the very creation of man,\nbut this discovery was not made until we began to \u003cI\u003ereason\u003c/I\u003e about it.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.220\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Does the reader know of the blind spot on the retina? Take\na number of this journal, turn over the cover so as to expose the\nwhite paper, lay it sideways upon the table before which you must\nsit, and put two cents upon it, one near the left-hand edge, and\nthe other to the right. Put your left hand over your left eye, and\nwith the right eye look \u003cI\u003esteadily\u003c/I\u003e at the left-hand cent. Then, with\nyour right hand, move the right-hand cent (which is now plainly\nseen) \u003cI\u003etowards\u003c/I\u003e the left hand. When it comes to a place near the\nmiddle of the page it will disappear — you cannot see it without\nturning your eye. Bring it nearer to the other cent, or carry it\nfurther away, and it will reappear; but at that particular spot it\ncannot be seen. Thus it appears that there is a blind spot nearly\nin the middle of the retina; and this is confirmed by anatomy. It\nfollows that the space we immediately see (when one eye is closed)\nis not, as we had imagined, a continuous oval, but is a ring, the\nfilling up of which must be the work of the intellect. What more\nstriking example could be desired of the impossibility of\ndistinguishing intellectual results from intuitional data, by mere\ncontemplation?\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.221\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e A man can distinguish different textures of cloth by\nfeeling; but not immediately, for he requires to move his fingers\nover the cloth, which shows that he is obliged to compare the\nsensations of one instant with those of another.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.222\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e The pitch of a tone depends upon the rapidity of the\nsuccession of the vibrations which reach the ear. Each of those\nvibrations produces an impulse upon the ear. Let a single such\nimpulse be made upon the ear, and we know, experimentally, that it\nis perceived. There is, therefore, good reason to believe that\neach of the impulses forming a tone is perceived. Nor is there any\nreason to the contrary. So that this is the only admissible\nsupposition. Therefore, the pitch of a tone depends upon the\nrapidity with which certain impressions are successively conveyed\nto the mind. These impressions must exist previously to any tone;\nhence, the sensation of pitch is determined by previous\ncognitions. Nevertheless, this would never have been discovered by\nthe mere contemplation of that feeling.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.223\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e A similar argument may be urged in reference to the\nperception of two dimensions of space. This appears to be an\nimmediate intuition. But if we were to see immediately an extended\nsurface, our \u003cA NAME=\"W2.198\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eretinas must be spread out in an extended\nsurface. Instead of that, the retina consists of innumerable\nneedles pointing towards the light, and whose distances from one\nanother are decidedly greater than the \u003cI\u003eminimum visibile\u003c/I\u003e. Suppose\neach of those nerve-points conveys the sensation of a little\ncolored surface. Still, what we immediately see must even then be,\nnot a continuous surface, but a collection of spots. Who could\ndiscover this by mere intuition? But all the analogies of the\nnervous system are against the supposition that the excitation of\na single nerve can produce an idea as complicated as that of a\nspace, however small. If the excitation of no one of these nerve\npoints can immediately convey the impression of space, the\nexcitation of all cannot do so. For, the excitation of each\nproduces some impression (according to the analogies of the\nnervous system), hence, the sum of these impressions is a\nnecessary condition of any perception produced by the excitation\nof all; or, in other terms, a perception produced by the\nexcitation of all is determined by the mental impressions produced\nby the excitation of every one. This argument is confirmed by the\nfact that the existence of the perception of space can be fully\naccounted for by the action of faculties known to exist, without\nsupposing it to be an immediate impression. For this purpose, we\nmust bear in mind the following facts of physio-psychology: 1. The\nexcitation of a nerve does not of itself inform us where the\nextremity of it is situated. If, by a surgical operation, certain\nnerves are displaced, our sensations from those nerves do not\ninform us of the displacement. 2. A single sensation does not\ninform us how many nerves or nerve-points are excited. 3. We can\ndistinguish between the impressions produced by the excitations of\ndifferent nerve-points. 4. The differences of impressions produced\nby different excitations of similar nerve-points are similar. Let\na momentary image be made upon the retina. By No. 2, the\nimpression thereby produced will be indistinguishable from what\nmight be produced by the excitation of some conceivable single\nnerve. It is not conceivable that the momentary excitation of a\nsingle nerve should give the sensation of space. Therefore, the\nmomentary excitation of all the nerve-points of the retina cannot,\nimmediately or mediately, produce the sensation of space. The same\nargument would apply to any unchanging image on the retina.\nSuppose, however, that the image moves over the retina. Then the\npeculiar excitation which at one instant affects one nerve-point,\nat a later instant will affect another. These will convey\nimpressions which are very similar by 4, and yet which are\n\u003cA NAME=\"W2.199\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003edistinguishable by 3. Hence, the conditions for the\nrecognition of a relation between these impressions are present.\nThere being, however, a very great number of nerve-points affected\nby a very great number of successive excitations, the relations of\nthe resulting impressions will be almost inconceivably\ncomplicated. Now, it is a known law of mind, that when phenomena\nof an extreme complexity are presented, which yet would be reduced\nto \u003cI\u003eorder\u003c/I\u003e or mediate simplicity by the application of a certain\nconception, that conception sooner or later arises in application\nto those phenomena. In the case under consideration, the\nconception of extension would reduce the phenomena to unity, and,\ntherefore, its genesis is fully accounted for. It remains only to\nexplain why the previous cognitions which determine it are not\nmore clearly apprehended. For this explanation, I shall refer to a\n\u003cA HREF=\"#note3\"\u003epaper\u003c/A\u003e\u003ca name=\"notemark3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e upon a new list of categories, Section 5, merely adding\nthat just as we are able to recognize our friends by certain\nappearances, although we cannot possibly say what those\nappearances are and are quite unconscious of any process of\nreasoning, so in any case when the reasoning is easy and natural\nto us, however complex may be the premisses, they sink into\ninsignificance and oblivion proportionately to the\nsatisfactoriness of the theory based upon them. This theory of\nspace is confirmed by the circumstance that an exactly similar\ntheory is imperatively demanded by the facts in reference to time.\nThat the course of time should be immediately felt is obviously\nimpossible. For, in that case, there must be an element of this\nfeeling at each instant. But in an instant there is no duration\nand hence no immediate feeling of duration. Hence, no one of these\nelementary feelings is an immediate feeling of duration; and,\nhence the sum of all is not. On the other hand, the impressions of\nany moment are very complicated — containing all the images (or\nthe elements of the images) of sense and memory, which complexity\nis reducible to mediate simplicity by means of the conception of\ntime.\u003cA HREF=\"#note4\"\u003e***\u003c/A\u003e\u003ca name=\"notemark4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.224\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e \u003cA NAME=\"W2.200\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eWe have, therefore, a variety of facts, all of which\nare most readily explained on the supposition that we have no\nintuitive faculty of distinguishing intuitive from mediate\ncognitions. Some arbitrary hypothesis may otherwise explain any\none of these facts; this is the only theory which brings them to\nsupport one another. Moreover, no facts require the supposition of\nthe faculty in question. Whoever has studied the nature of proof\nwill see, then, that there are here very strong reasons for\ndisbelieving the existence of this faculty. These will become\nstill stronger when the consequences of rejecting it have, in this\npaper and in a following one, been more fully traced out.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\n\u003ca name=\"question2\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cB\u003eQUESTION 2.\u003c/B\u003e \u003cI\u003eWhether we have an intuitive self-consciousness.\u003c/I\u003e\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.225\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Self-consciousness, as the term is here used, is to be\ndistinguished both from consciousness generally, from the internal\nsense, and from pure apperception. Any cognition is a\nconsciousness of the object as represented; by self-consciousness\nis meant a knowledge of our\u003cA NAME=\"W2.201\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eselves. Not a mere feeling of\nsubjective conditions of consciousness, but of our personal\nselves. Pure apperception is the self-assertion of THE \u003cI\u003eego\u003c/I\u003e; the\nself-consciousness here meant is the recognition of my \u003cI\u003eprivate\u003c/I\u003e\nself. I know that \u003cI\u003eI\u003c/I\u003e (not merely \u003cI\u003ethe\u003c/I\u003e I) exist. The question is, how\ndo I know it; by a special intuitive faculty, or is it determined\nby previous cognitions?\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.226\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Now, it is not self-evident that we have such an intuitive\nfaculty, for it has just been shown that we have no intuitive\npower of distinguishing an intuition from a cognition determined\nby others. Therefore, the existence or non-existence of this power\nis to be determined upon evidence, and the question is whether\nself-consciousness can be explained by the action of known\nfaculties under conditions known to exist, or whether it is\nnecessary to suppose an unknown cause for this cognition, and, in\nthe latter case, whether an intuitive faculty of\nself-consciousness is the most probable cause which can be\nsupposed.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.227\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e It is first to be observed that there is no known\nself-consciousness to be accounted for in extremely young\nchildren. It has already been pointed out by \u003cA HREF=\"#note5\"\u003eKant\u003c/A\u003e\u003ca name=\"notemark5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e that the late\nuse of the very common word \"I\" with children indicates an\nimperfect self-consciousness in them, and that, therefore, so far\nas it is admissible for us to draw any conclusion in regard to the\nmental state of those who are still younger, it must be against\nthe existence of any self-consciousness in them.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.228\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e On the other hand, children manifest powers of thought much\nearlier. Indeed, it is almost impossible to assign a period at\nwhich children do not already exhibit decided intellectual\nactivity in directions in which thought is indispensable to their\nwell-being. The complicated trigonometry of vision, and the\ndelicate adjustments of coordinated movement, are plainly mastered\nvery early. There is no reason to question a similar degree of\nthought in reference to themselves.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.229\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e A very young child may always be observed to watch its own\nbody with great attention. There is every reason why this should\nbe so, for from the child\u0027s point of view this body is the most\nimportant thing in the universe. Only what it touches has any\nactual and present feeling; only what it faces has any actual\ncolor; only what is on its tongue has any actual taste.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.230\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e No one questions that, when a sound is heard by a child, he\nthinks, not of himself as hearing, but of the bell or other object\nas sounding. \u003cA NAME=\"W2.202\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eHow when he wills to move a table? Does he then\nthink of himself as desiring, or only of the table as fit to be\nmoved? That he has the latter thought, is beyond question; that he\nhas the former, must, until the existence of an intuitive\nself-consciousness is proved, remain an arbitrary and baseless\nsupposition. There is no good reason for thinking that he is less\nignorant of his own peculiar condition than the angry adult who\ndenies that he is in a passion.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.231\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e The child, however, must soon discover by observation that\nthings which are thus fit to be changed are apt actually to\nundergo this change, after a contact with that peculiarly\nimportant body called Willy or Johnny. This consideration makes\nthis body still more important and central, since it establishes a\nconnection between the fitness of a thing to be changed and a\ntendency in this body to touch it before it is changed.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.232\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e The child learns to understand the language; that is to\nsay, a connection between certain sounds and certain facts becomes\nestablished in his mind. He has previously noticed the connection\nbetween these sounds and the motions of the lips of bodies\nsomewhat similar to the central one, and has tried the experiment\nof putting his hand on those lips and has found the sound in that\ncase to be smothered. He thus connects that language with bodies\nsomewhat similar to the central one. By efforts, so unenergetic\nthat they should be called rather instinctive, perhaps, than\ntentative, he learns to produce those sounds. So he begins to\nconverse.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.233\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e It must be about this time that he begins to find that what\nthese people about him say is the very best evidence of fact. So\nmuch so, that testimony is even a stronger mark of fact than \u003cI\u003ethe\nfacts themselves\u003c/I\u003e, or rather than what must now be thought of as\nthe \u003cI\u003eappearances\u003c/I\u003e themselves. (I may remark, by the way, that this\nremains so through life; testimony will convince a man that he\nhimself is mad.) A child hears it said that the stove is hot. But\nit is not, he says; and, indeed, that central body is not touching\nit, and only what that touches is hot or cold. But he touches it,\nand finds the testimony confirmed in a striking way. Thus, he\nbecomes aware of ignorance, and it is necessary to suppose a \u003cI\u003eself\u003c/I\u003e\nin which this ignorance can inhere. So testimony gives the first\ndawning of self-consciousness.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.234\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e But, further, although usually appearances are either only\nconfirmed or merely supplemented by testimony, yet there is a\ncertain remarkable class of appearances which are continually con-\n\u003cA NAME=\"W2.203\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003etradicted by testimony. These are those predicates which \u003cI\u003ewe\u003c/I\u003e\nknow to be emotional, but which \u003cI\u003ehe\u003c/I\u003e distinguishes by their\nconnection with the movements of that central person, himself\n(that the table wants moving, etc.) These judgments are generally\ndenied by others. Moreover, he has reason to think that others,\nalso, have such judgments which are quite denied by all the rest.\nThus, he adds to the conception of appearance as the actualization\nof fact, the conception of it as something \u003cI\u003eprivate\u003c/I\u003e and valid only\nfor one body. In short, \u003cI\u003eerror\u003c/I\u003e appears, and it can be explained\nonly by supposing a \u003cI\u003eself\u003c/I\u003e which is fallible.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.235\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Ignorance and error are all that distinguish our private\nselves from the absolute \u003cI\u003eego\u003c/I\u003e of pure apperception.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.236\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Now, the theory which, for the sake of perspicuity, has\nthus been stated in a specific form, may be summed up as follows:\nAt the age at which we know children to be self-conscious, we know\nthat they have been made aware of ignorance and error; and we know\nthem to possess at that age powers of understanding sufficient to\nenable them to infer from ignorance and error their own existence.\nThus we find that known faculties, acting under conditions known\nto exist, would rise to self-consciousness. The only essential\ndefect in this account of the matter is, that while we know that\nchildren exercise \u003cI\u003eas much\u003c/I\u003e understanding as is here supposed, we do\nnot know that they exercise it in precisely this way. Still the\nsupposition that they do so is infinitely more supported by facts,\nthan the supposition of a wholly peculiar faculty of the mind.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.237\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e The only argument worth noticing for the existence of an\nintuitive self-consciousness is this. We are more certain of our\nown existence than of any other fact; a premiss cannot determine a\nconclusion to be more certain than it is itself; hence, our own\nexistence cannot have been inferred from any other fact. The first\npremiss must be admitted, but the second premiss is founded on an\nexploded theory of logic. A conclusion cannot be more certain than\nthat some one of the facts which support it is true, but it may\neasily be more certain than any one of those facts. Let us\nsuppose, for example, that a dozen witnesses testify to an\noccurrence. Then my belief in that occurrence rests on the belief\nthat each of those men is generally to be believed upon oath. Yet\nthe fact testified to is made more certain than that any one of\nthose men is generally to be believed. In the same way, to the\ndeveloped mind of man, his own existence is sup\u003cA NAME=\"W2.204\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eported by\n\u003cI\u003eevery other fact\u003c/I\u003e, and is, therefore, incomparably more certain\nthan any one of these facts. But it cannot be said to be more\ncertain than that there is another fact, since there is no doubt\nperceptible in either case.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n It is to be concluded, then, that there is no necessity of\nsupposing an intuitive self-consciousness, since\nself-consciousness may easily be the result of inference.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\n\u003ca name=\"question3\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cB\u003eQUESTION 3.\u003c/B\u003e \u003cI\u003eWhether we have an intuitive power of\ndistinguishing between the subjective elements of different kinds\nof cognitions.\u003c/I\u003e\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.238\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Every cognition involves something represented, or that of\nwhich we are conscious, and some action or passion of the self\nwhereby it becomes represented. The former shall be termed the\nobjective, the latter the subjective, element of the cognition.\nThe cognition itself is an intuition of its objective element,\nwhich may therefore be called, also, the immediate object. The\nsubjective element is not necessarily immediately known, but it is\npossible that such an intuition of the subjective element of a\ncognition of its character, whether that of dreaming, imagining,\nconceiving, believing, etc., should accompany every cognition. The\nquestion is whether this is so.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.239\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e It would appear, at first sight, that there is an\noverwhelming array of evidence in favor of the existence of such a\npower. The difference between seeing a color and imagining it is\nimmense. There is a vast difference between the most vivid dream\nand reality. And if we had no intuitive power of distinguishing\nbetween what we believe and what we merely conceive, we never, it\nwould seem, could in any way distinguish them; since if we did so\nby reasoning, the question would arise whether the argument itself\nwas believed or conceived, and this must be answered before the\nconclusion could have any force. And thus there would be a\n\u003cI\u003eregressus ad infinitum\u003c/I\u003e. Besides, if we do not know that we\nbelieve, then, from the nature of the case, we do not believe.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.240\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e But be it noted that we do not intuitively know the\nexistence of this faculty. For it is an intuitive one, and we\ncannot intuitively know that a cognition is intuitive. The\nquestion is, therefore, whether it is necessary to suppose the\nexistence of this faculty, or whether then the facts can be\nexplained without this supposition.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.241\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e In the first place, then, the difference between what is\nimagined or dreamed and what is actually experienced, is no\nargument in favor of the existence of such a faculty. For it is\nnot questioned that there are distinctions \u003cA NAME=\"W2.205\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ein what is present\nto the mind, but the question is, whether independently of any\nsuch distinctions in the immediate \u003cI\u003eobjects\u003c/I\u003e of consciousness, we\nhave any immediate power of distinguishing different modes of\nconsciousness. Now, the very fact of the immense difference in the\nimmediate objects of sense and imagination, sufficiently accounts\nfor our distinguishing those faculties; and instead of being an\nargument in favor of the existence of an intuitive power of\ndistinguishing the subjective elements of consciousness, it is a\npowerful reply to any such argument, so far as the distinction of\nsense and imagination is concerned.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.242\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Passing to the distinction of belief and conception, we\nmeet the statement that the knowledge of belief is essential to\nits existence. Now, we can unquestionably distinguish a belief\nfrom a conception, in most cases, by means of a peculiar feeling\nof conviction; and it is a mere question of words whether we\ndefine belief as that judgment which is accompanied by this\nfeeling, or as that judgment from which a man will act. We may\nconveniently call the former \u003cI\u003esensational\u003c/I\u003e, the latter \u003cI\u003eactive\u003c/I\u003e,\nbelief. That neither of these necessarily involves the other, will\nsurely be admitted without any recital of facts. Taking belief in\nthe sensational sense, the intuitive power of reorganizing it will\namount simply to the capacity for the sensation which accompanies\nthe judgment. This sensation, like any other, is an object of\nconsciousness; and therefore the capacity for it implies no\nintuitive recognition of subjective elements of consciousness. If\nbelief is taken in the active sense, it may be discovered by the\nobservation of external facts and by inference from the sensation\nof conviction which usually accompanies it.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.243\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Thus, the arguments in favor of this peculiar power of\nconsciousness disappear, and the presumption is again against such\na hypothesis. Moreover, as the immediate objects of any two\nfaculties must be admitted to be different, the facts do not\nrender such a supposition in any degree necessary.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\n\u003ca name=\"question4\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cB\u003eQUESTION 4.\u003c/B\u003e \u003cI\u003eWhether we have any power of introspection, or whether\nour whole knowledge of the internal world is derived from the\nobservation of external facts.\u003c/I\u003e\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.244\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e It is not intended here to assume the reality of the\nexternal world. Only, there is a certain set of facts which are\nordinarily regarded as external, while others are regarded as\ninternal. The question is whether the latter are known otherwise\nthan by inference from the \u003cA NAME=\"W2.206\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eformer. By introspection, I mean a\ndirect perception of the internal world, but not necessarily a\nperception of it \u003cI\u003eas\u003c/I\u003e internal. Nor do I mean to limit the\nsignification of the word to intuition, but would extend it to any\nknowledge of the internal world not derived from external\nobservation.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.245\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e. There is one sense in which any perception has an internal\nobject, namely, that every sensation is partly determined by\ninternal conditions. Thus, the sensation of redness is as it is,\nowing to the constitution of the mind; and in this sense it is a\nsensation of something internal. Hence, we may derive a knowledge\nof the mind from a consideration of this sensation, but that\nknowledge would, in fact, be an inference from redness as a\npredicate of something external. On the other hand, there are\ncertain other feelings — the emotions, for example — which\nappear to arise in the first place, not as predicates at all, and\nto be referable to the mind alone. It would seem, then, that by\nmeans of these, a knowledge of the mind may be obtained, which is\nnot inferred from any character of outward things. The question is\nwhether this is really so.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.246\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e. Although introspection is not necessarily intuitive, it is\nnot self-evident that we possess this capacity; for we have no\nintuitive faculty of distinguishing different subjective modes of\nconsciousness. The power, if it exists, must be known by the\ncircumstance that the facts cannot be explained without it.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.247\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e In reference to the above argument from the emotions, it\nmust be admitted that if a man is angry, his anger implies, in\ngeneral, no determinate and constant character in its object. But,\non the other hand, it can hardly be questioned that there is some\nrelative character in the outward thing which makes him angry, and\na little reflection will serve to show that his anger consists in\nhis saying to himself, \"this thing is vile, abominable, etc.\" and\nthat it is rather a mark of returning reason to say, \"I am angry.\"\nIn the same way any emotion is a predication concerning some\nobject, and the chief difference between this and an objective\nintellectual judgment is that while the latter is relative to\nhuman nature or to mind in general, the former is relative to the\nparticular circumstances and disposition of a particular man at a\nparticular time. What is here said of emotions in general, is true\nin particular of the sense of beauty and of the moral sense. Good\nand bad are feelings which first arise as predicates, and\ntherefore are either predicates of the not-I, or are determined by\nprevious \u003cA NAME=\"W2.207\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ecognitions (there being no intuitive power of\ndistinguishing subjective elements of consciousness).\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.248\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e It remains, then, only to inquire whether it is necessary\nto suppose a particular power of introspection for the sake of\naccounting for the sense of willing. Now, volition, as\ndistinguished from desire, is nothing but the power of\nconcentrating the attention, of abstracting. Hence, the knowledge\nof the power of abstracting may be inferred from abstract objects,\njust as the knowledge of the power of seeing is inferred from\ncolored objects.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.249\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e It appears, there\u003cA NAME=\"W2.208\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003efore, that there is no reason for\nsupposing a power of introspection; and, consequently, the only\nway of investigating a psychological question is by inference from\nexternal facts.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\n\u003ca name=\"question5\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cB\u003eQUESTION 5.\u003c/B\u003e \u003cI\u003eWhether we can think without signs.\u003c/I\u003e\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.250\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e This is a familiar question, but there is, to this day, no\nbetter argument in the affirmative than that thought must precede\nevery sign. This assumes the impossibility of an infinite series.\nBut Achilles, as a fact, will overtake the tortoise. \u003cI\u003eHow\u003c/I\u003e this\nhappens, is a question not necessary to be answered at present, as\nlong as it certainly does happen.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.251\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e. If we seek the light of external facts, the only cases of\nthought which we can find are of thought in signs. Plainly, no\nother thought can be evidenced by external facts. But we have seen\nthat only by external facts can thought be known at all. The only\nthought, then, which can possibly be cognized is thought in signs.\nBut thought which cannot be cognized does not exist. All thought,\ntherefore, must necessarily be in signs.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.252\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e A man says to himself, \"Aristotle is a man; \u003cI\u003etherefore\u003c/I\u003e, he\nis fallible.\" Has he not, then, thought what he has not said to\nhimself, that all men are fallible? The answer is, that he has\ndone so, so far as this is said in his \u003cI\u003etherefore\u003c/I\u003e. According to\nthis, our question does not relate to \u003cI\u003efact\u003c/I\u003e, but is a mere asking\nfor distinctness of thought.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.253\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e From the proposition that every thought is a sign, it\nfollows that every thought must address itself to some other, must\ndetermine some other, since that is the essence of a sign. This,\nafter all, is but another form of the familiar axiom, that in\nintuition, i.e., in the immediate present, there is no thought,\nor, that all which is reflected upon has past. \u003cI\u003eHinc loquor inde\nest.\u003c/I\u003e That, since any thought, there must have been a thought, has\nits analogue in the fact that, since any past time, there must\nhave been an infinite series of times. To say, therefore, that\nthought cannot happen in an instant, but requires a time, is but\nanother way of saying that every thought must be interpreted in\nanother, or that all thought is in signs.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\n\u003ca name=\"question6\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cB\u003eQUESTION 6.\u003c/B\u003e \u003cI\u003eWhether a sign can have any meaning, if by its\ndefinition it is the sign of something absolutely incognizable.\u003c/I\u003e\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.254\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e It would seem that it can, and that universal and\nhypothetical propositions are instances of it. Thus, the universal\nproposition, \"all ruminants are cloven-hoofed,\" speaks of a\npossible infinity of animals, and no matter how many ruminants may\nhave been examined, the possibility must remain that there are\nothers which have not been examined. In the case of a hypothetical\nproposition, the same thing is still more manifest; for such a\nproposition speaks not merely of the actual state of things, but\nof every possible state of things, all of which are not knowable,\ninasmuch as only one can so much as exist.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.255\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e On the other hand, all our conceptions are obtained by\nabstractions and combinations of cognitions first occurring in\njudgments of experience. Accordingly, there can be no conception\nof the absolutely incognizable, since nothing of that sort occurs\nin experience. But the meaning of a term is the conception which\nit conveys. Hence, a term can have no such meaning.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.256\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e If it be said that the incognizable is a concept compounded\nof the concept \u003cI\u003enot\u003c/I\u003e and \u003cI\u003ecognizable\u003c/I\u003e, it may be replied that \u003cI\u003enot\u003c/I\u003e is a\nmere syncategorematic term and not a concept by itself.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.257\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e If I think \"white,\" I will not go so far as Berkeley and\nsay that I think of a person seeing, but I will say that what I\nthink is of the nature of a cognition, and so of anything else\nwhich can be experienced. Consequently, the highest concept which\ncan be reached by abstractions from judgments of experience — and\ntherefore, the highest concept which can be reached at all — is\nthe concept of something of the nature of a cognition. \u003cI\u003eNot\u003c/I\u003e, then,\nor \u003cI\u003ewhat is other than\u003c/I\u003e, if a concept, is a concept of the\ncognizable. Hence, not-cognizable, if a concept, is a concept of\nthe form \"A, not-A,\" and is, at least, self-contradictory. Thus,\nignorance and error can only be conceived as correlative to a real\nknowledge and truth, which latter are of the nature of cognitions.\nOver against any cognition, there is an unknown but knowable\nreality; but over against all possible cognition, there is only\nthe self-contradictory. In short, \u003cI\u003ecognizability\u003c/I\u003e (in its widest\nsense) and \u003cI\u003ebeing\u003c/I\u003e are not merely metaphysically the same, but are\nsynonymous terms.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.258\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e To the argument from universal and hypothetical\npropositions, \u003cA NAME=\"W2.209\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ethe reply is, that though their truth cannot be\ncognized with absolute certainty, it may be probably known by\ninduction.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\n\u003ca name=\"question7\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cB\u003eQUESTION 7.\u003c/B\u003e \u003cI\u003eWhether there is any cognition not determined by\na previous cognition.\u003c/I\u003e\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.259\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e It would seem that there is or has been; for since we are\nin possession of cognitions, which are all determined by previous\nones, and these by cognitions earlier still, there must have been\na \u003cI\u003efirst\u003c/I\u003e in this series or else our state of cognition at any time\nis completely determined, according to logical laws, by our state\nat any previous time. But there are many facts against the last\nsupposition, and therefore in favor of intuitive cognitions.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.260\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e On the other hand, since it is impossible to know\nintuitively that a given cognition is not determined by a previous\none, the only way in which this can be known is by hypothetic\ninference from observed facts. But to adduce the cognition by\nwhich a given cognition has been determined is to explain the\ndeterminations of that cognition. And it is the only way of\nexplaining them. For something entirely out of consciousness which\nmay be supposed to determine it, can, as such, only be known and\nonly adduced in the determinate cognition in question. So, that to\nsuppose that a cognition is determined solely by something\nabsolutely external, is to suppose its determinations incapable of\nexplanation. Now, this is a hypothesis which is warranted under no\ncircumstances, inasmuch as the only possible justification for a\nhypothesis is that it explains the facts, and to say that they are\nexplained and at the same time to suppose them inexplicable is\nself-contradictory.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.261\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e If it be objected that the peculiar character of \u003cI\u003ered\u003c/I\u003e is not\ndetermined by any previous cognition, I reply that that character\nis not a character of red as a cognition; for if there be a man to\nwhom red things look as blue ones do to me and \u003cI\u003evice versa\u003c/I\u003e, that\nman\u0027s eyes teach him the same facts that they would if he were\nlike me.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.262\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Moreover, we know of no power by which an intuition could\nbe known. For, as the cognition is beginning, and therefore in a\nstate of change, at only the first instant would it be intuition.\nAnd, therefore, the apprehension of it must take place in no time\nand be an event occupying no time.\u003cA HREF=\"#note6\"\u003e***\u003c/A\u003e\u003ca name=\"notemark6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Besides, all the cognitive\nfaculties we know of are relative, and consequently their products\nare relations. But the \u003cA NAME=\"W2.210\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003ecognition of a relation is determined\nby previous cognitions. No cognition not determined by a previous\ncognition, then, can be known. It does not exist, then, first,\nbecause it is absolutely incognizable, and second, because a\ncognition only exists so far as it is known.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.263\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e The reply to the argument that there must be a first is as\nfollows: In retracing our way from conclusions to premisses, or\nfrom determined cognitions to those which determine them, we\nfinally reach, in all cases, a point beyond which the\nconsciousness in the determined cognition is more lively than in\nthe cognition which determines it. We have a less lively\nconsciousness in the cognition which determines our cognition of\nthe third dimension than in the latter cognition itself; a less\nlively consciousness in the cognition which determines our\ncognition of a continuous surface (without a blind spot) than in\nthis latter cognition itself; and a less lively consciousness of\nthe impressions which determine the sensation of tone than of that\nsensation itself. Indeed, when we get near enough to the external\nthis is the universal rule. Now let any horizontal line represent\na cognition, and let the length of the line serve to measure (so\nto speak) the liveliness of consciousness in that cognition. A\npoint, having no length, will, on this principle, represent an\nobject quite out of consciousness. Let one horizontal line below\nanother represent a cognition which determines the cognition\nrepresented by that other and which has the same object as the\nlatter. Let the finite distance between two such lines represent\nthat they are two different cognitions. With this aid to thinking,\nlet us see whether \"there must be a first.\" Suppose an inverted\ntriangle to be gradually dipped into water. At any date or\ninstant, the surface of the water makes a horizontal line across\nthat triangle. This line represents a cognition. At a subsequent\ndate, there is a sectional line so made, higher upon the triangle.\nThis represents another cognition of the same object determined by\nthe former, and having a livelier consciousness. The apex of the\ntriangle represents the object external to the mind which\ndetermines both these cognitions. The state of the triangle before\nit reaches the water, represents a state of cognition which\ncontains nothing which determines these subsequent cognitions. To\nsay, then, that if there be a state of cognition by which all\nsubsequent cognitions of a certain object are not determined,\nthere must subsequently be some cognition of that object not\ndetermined by previous cognitions of the same object, is to say\nthat when that triangle is dipped into the water there must be a\nsectional line made by the surface of the water lower than which\nno surface line had been made in that \u003cA NAME=\"W2.211\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003eway. But draw the\nhorizontal line where you will, as many horizontal lines as you\nplease can be assigned at finite distances below it and below one\nanother. For any such section is at some distance above the apex,\notherwise it is not a line. Let this distance be \u003cI\u003ea\u003c/I\u003e. Then there\nhave been similar sections at the distances 1/2\u003cI\u003ea\u003c/I\u003e, 1/4\u003cI\u003ea\u003c/I\u003e, 1/8\u003cI\u003ea\u003c/I\u003e,\n1/16\u003cI\u003ea\u003c/I\u003e, above the apex, and so on as far as you please. So that it\nis not true that there must be a first. Explicate the logical\ndifficulties of this paradox (they are identical with those of the\nAchilles) in whatever way you may. I am content with the result,\nas long as your principles are fully applied to the particular\ncase of cognitions determining one another. Deny motion, if it\nseems proper to do so; only then deny the process of determination\nof one cognition by another. Say that instants and lines are\nfictions; only say, also, that states of cognition and judgments\nare fictions. The point here insisted on is not this or that\nlogical solution of the difficulty, but merely that cognition\narises by a \u003cI\u003eprocess\u003c/I\u003e of beginning, as any other change comes to\npass.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n In a subsequent paper, I shall trace the consequences of\nthese principles, in reference to the questions of reality, of\nindividuality, and of the validity of the laws of logic.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cHR\u003e\n\u003cCENTER\u003e\n\u003cH2\u003eNotes\u003c/H2\u003e\n\u003c/CENTER\u003e\n\u003ca name=\"note1\"\u003e1.\u003c/a\u003e The word \u003cI\u003eintuitus\u003c/I\u003e first occurs as a technical term in\nSt. Anselm\u0027s \u003cCITE\u003eMonologium\u003c/CITE\u003e. [\u003cCITE\u003eMonologium\u003c/CITE\u003e, LXVI; Cf. Prantl, III, S.\n332, 746n.] He wished to distinguish between our knowledge of God\nand our knowledge of finite things (and in the next world, of God,\nalso); and thinking of the saying of St. Paul, \u003cI\u003eVidemus nunc per\nspeculum in aenigmate: tunc autem facie ad faciem\u003c/I\u003e, [LXX], he called\nthe former \u003cI\u003especulation\u003c/I\u003e and the latter \u003cI\u003eintuition\u003c/I\u003e. This use of\n\"speculation\" did not take root, because that word already had\nanother exact and widely different meaning. In the middle ages,\nthe term \"intuitive cognition\" had two principal senses; 1st, as\nopposed to abstractive cognition, it meant the knowledge of the\npresent as present, and this is its meaning in Anselm; but 2d, as\nno intuitive cognition was allowed to be determined by a previous\ncognition, it came to be used as the opposite of discursive\ncognition (see Scotus, \u003cCITE\u003eIn sentent.\u003c/CITE\u003e, lib. 2, dist. 3, qu. 9), and\nthis is nearly the sense in which I employ it. This is also nearly\nthe sense in which Kant uses it, the former distinction being\nexpressed by his \u003cI\u003esensuous\u003c/I\u003e and \u003cI\u003enon-sensuous\u003c/I\u003e. (See \u003cCITE\u003eWerke\u003c/CITE\u003e, herausg.\nRosenkranz, Thl. 2, S. 713, 31, 41, 100, u.s.w.) An enumeration of\nsix meanings of intuition may be found in Hamilton\u0027s \u003cCITE\u003eReid\u003c/CITE\u003e, p. 759.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#notemark1\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eReturn to text.\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003ca name=\"note2\"\u003e2.\u003c/a\u003e The proposition of Berengarius is contained in the\nfollowing quotation from his \u003cCITE\u003eDe Sacra Coena\u003c/CITE\u003e: \"\u003cI\u003eMaximi plane cordis\nest, per omnia ad dialecticam confugere, quia confugere ad eam ad\nrationem est confugere, quo qui non confugit, cum secundum\nrationem sit factus ad imaginem dei, suum honorem reliquit, nec\npotest renovari de die in diem ad imaginem dei.\u003c/I\u003e\" The most striking\ncharacteristic of medieval reasoning, in general, is the perpetual\nresort to authority. When Fredigisus and others wish to prove that\ndarkness is a thing, although they have evidently derived the\nopinion from nominalistic-Platonistic meditations, they argue the\nmatter thus: \"God called the darkness, night;\" then, certainly, it\nis a thing, for otherwise before it had a name, there would have\nbeen nothing, not even a fiction to name. [See Prantl, II, 19f.]\nAbelard [\u003cCITE\u003eOuvrages\u003c/CITE\u003e, p. 179] thinks it worth while to cite Boethius,\nwhen he says that space has three dimensions, and when he says\nthat an individual cannot be in two places at once. The author of\n\u003cCITE\u003eDe Generibus et Speciebus\u003c/CITE\u003e [ibid., p. 517], a work of a superior\norder, in arguing against a Platonic doctrine, says that if\nwhatever is universal is eternal, the \u003cI\u003eform\u003c/I\u003e and matter of Socrates,\nbeing severally universal, are both eternal, and that, therefore,\nSocrates was not created by God, but only put together, \"\u003cI\u003equod\nquantum a vero deviet, palam est.\u003c/I\u003e\" The authority is the final\ncourt of appeal. The same author, where in one place he doubts a\nstatement of Boethius [ibid., p. 535f], finds it necessary to\nassign a special reason why in this case it is not absurd to do\nso. \u003cI\u003eExceptio probat regulam in casibus non exceptis.\u003c/I\u003e Recognized\nauthorities were certainly sometimes disputed in the twelfth\ncentury; their mutual contradictions insured that; and the\nauthority of philosophers was regarded as inferior to that of\ntheologians. Still, it would be impossible to find a passage where\nthe authority of Aristotle is directly denied upon any logical\nquestion. \"\u003cI\u003eSunt et multi errores eius\u003c/I\u003e,\" says John of Salisbury\n[\u003cCITE\u003eMetalogicon\u003c/CITE\u003e, Lib. IV, cap. XXVIII], \"\u003cI\u003equi in scripturis tam\nethnicis, quam fidelibus poterunt inveniri; verum in logica parem\nhabuisse non legitur\u003c/I\u003e.\" \"\u003cI\u003eSed nihil adversus Aristotelem\u003c/I\u003e,\" says\nAbelard, and in another place, \"\u003cI\u003eSed si Aristotelem Peripateticorum\nprincipem culpare possumus, quam amplius in hacarte recepimus?\u003c/I\u003e\"\nThe idea of going without an authority, or of subordinating\nauthority to reason, does not occur to him.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#notemark2\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eReturn to text.\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003ca name=\"note3\"\u003e3.\u003c/a\u003e \u003cA HREF=\"p32.html#section5\"\u003e\u003cCITE\u003eProceedings of the American Academy\u003c/CITE\u003e, May 14, 1867.\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#notemark3\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eReturn to text.\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003ca name=\"note4\"\u003e4.\u003c/a\u003e The above theory of space and time does not conflict\nwith that of Kant so much as it appears to do. They are in fact\nthe solutions of different questions. Kant, it is true, makes\nspace and time intuitions, or rather forms of intuition, but it is\nnot essential to his theory that intuition should mean more than\n\"individual representation.\" The apprehension of space and time\nresults, according to him, from a mental \u003cI\u003eprocess\u003c/I\u003e — the \"Synthesis\nder Apprehension in der Anschauung.\" (See \u003cA HREF=\"http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4280/4280-h/4280-h.htm\"\u003e\u003cCITE\u003eCritik d. reinen\nVernunft\u003c/CITE\u003e\u003c/A\u003e. Ed. 1781, pp. 98 et seq.) My theory is merely an account\nof this synthesis.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n The gist of Kant\u0027s Transcendental Aesthetic is contained in\ntwo principles. First, that universal and necessary propositions\nare not given in experience. Second, that universal and necessary\nfacts are determined by the conditions of experience in general.\nBy a universal proposition is meant merely, one which asserts\nsomething of \u003cI\u003eall\u003c/I\u003e of a sphere — not necessarily one which all men\nbelieve. By a necessary proposition, is meant one which asserts\nwhat it does, not merely of the actual condition of things, but of\nevery possible state of things; it is not meant that the\nproposition is one which we cannot help believing. Experience, in\nKant\u0027s first principle, cannot be used for a product of the\nobjective understanding, but must be taken for the first\nimpressions of sense with consciousness conjoined and worked up by\nthe imagination into images, together with all which is logically\ndeducible therefrom. In this sense, it may be admitted that\nuniversal and necessary propositions are not given in experience.\nBut, in that case, neither are any inductive conclusions which\nmight be drawn from experience, given in it. In fact, it is the\npeculiar function of induction to produce universal and necessary\npropositions. Kant points out, indeed, that the universality and\nnecessity of scientific inductions are but the analogues of\nphilosophic universality and necessity; and this is true, in so\nfar as it is never allowable to accept a scientific conclusion\nwithout a certain indefinite drawback. But this is owing to the\ninsufficiency in the number of the instances; and whenever\ninstances may be had in as large numbers as we please, \u003cI\u003ead\ninfinitum\u003c/I\u003e, a truly universal and necessary proposition is\ninferable. As for Kant\u0027s second principle, that the truth of\nuniversal and necessary propositions is dependent upon the\nconditions of the general experience, it is no more nor less than\nthe principle of Induction. I go to a fair and draw from the\n\"grab-bag\" twelve packages. Upon opening them, I find that every\none contains a red ball. Here is a universal fact. It depends,\nthen, on the condition of the experience. What is the condition of\nthe experience? It is solely that the balls are the contents of\npackages drawn from that bag, that is, the only thing which\ndetermined the experience, was the drawing from the bag. I infer,\nthen, according to the principle of Kant, that what is drawn from\nthe bag will contain a red ball. This is induction. Apply\ninduction not to any limited experience but to all human\nexperience and you have the Kantian philosophy, so far as it is\ncorrectly developed.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n Kant\u0027s successors, however, have not been content with his\ndoctrine. Nor ought they to have been. For, there is this third\nprinciple: \"Absolutely universal propositions must be analytic.\"\nFor whatever is absolutely universal is devoid of all content or\ndetermination, for all determination is by negation. The problem,\ntherefore, is not how universal propositions can be synthetical,\nbut how universal propositions appearing to be synthetical can be\nevolved by thought alone from the purely indeterminate.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#notemark4\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eReturn to text.\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003ca name=\"note5\"\u003e5.\u003c/a\u003e \u003cCITE\u003eWerke\u003c/CITE\u003e, vii (2), 11.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#notemark5\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eReturn to text.\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003ca name=\"note6\"\u003e6.\u003c/a\u003e This argument, however, only covers a part of the\nquestion. It does not go to show that there is no cognition\nundetermined except by another like it.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#notemark6\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eReturn to text.\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}