Some Consequences of Four Incapacities
{"WorkMasterId":5335,"WpPageId":259418,"ParentWpPageId":193820,"Slug":"some-consequences-of-four-incapacities","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/charles-sanders-peirce/some-consequences-of-four-incapacities/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/charles-sanders-peirce/some-consequences-of-four-incapacities/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":159349,"CleanHtmlLength":102008,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"Some Consequences of Four Incapacities","Deck":"Peirce argues from human cognitive incapacities toward a semiotic, anti-Cartesian account of mind, self, and inquiry.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to Charles Sanders Peirce","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/charles-sanders-peirce/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"Charles Sanders Peirce","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/charles-sanders-peirce/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/charles-sanders-peirce-01-formal-portrait-1.jpg","ImageAlt":"Charles Sanders Peirce formal portrait","FilterTerra":"North America","ClickText":"Charles Sanders Peirce","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/charles-sanders-peirce/","Copies":["1839 CE – 1914 CE","Cambridge, Massachusetts","American logician, scientist, and founder of pragmaticism whose work joined the pragmatic maxim, semiotic theory, fallibilism, abduction, probability, categories, scientific method, and evolutionary metaphysics."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:4","Title":"Modern History","DateText":"1800 CE – 1944 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:11","Title":"Long 19th Century","DateText":"1870 CE – 1913 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/philosophers-of-the-long-19th-century/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"1868 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Displayed year is the 1868 publication year.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:6"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:25"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:USA:6"}],"OriginalTitle":"","Language":"English","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:epistemology"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:philosophy-of-mind"}],"Tradition":"American pragmatism, pragmaticism, semiotic realism, mathematical logic, scientific inquiry, fallibilism, and evolutionary metaphysics","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Full text from Peirce.org: Some Consequences of Four Incapacities .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Peirce argues from human cognitive incapacities toward a semiotic, anti-Cartesian account of mind, self, and inquiry."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"","KeyConcepts":"Some Consequences of Four Incapacities; Charles Sanders Peirce; pragmatism; pragmaticism; semiotic; signs; inquiry; abduction; induction; deduction; categories; realism; fallibilism; scientific method","Methodology":"Logical analysis, mathematical notation, semiotic analysis, scientific method, phenomenological categories, abductive reasoning, probabilistic inference, and manuscript-based argument.","Structure":"Accepted direct Peirce work page; edited collections, collected papers, source catalogues, testimonia, later anthologies, and scholarship about Peirce are excluded from direct work rows."},"Arguments":["Connects Peirce\u0027s work in logic, signs, categories, probability, inquiry, scientific method, metaphysics, mind, religion, and pragmaticism."],"Influence":{"InfluencedBy":"Kant, Duns Scotus, Aristotle, George Boole, Augustus De Morgan, Charles Darwin, Benjamin Peirce, William Whewell, and scientific practice.","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Part of the direct Peirce corpus that made him central to logic, pragmatism, semiotics, scientific method, and the history of American philosophy.","Used in debates about inquiry, meaning, scientific method, truth, signs, diagrams, inference to the best explanation, probability, realism, and community-based knowledge."],"EvidenceNote":["Accepted as a direct paper from Peirce\u0027s anti-Cartesian cognition series."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Versions","BodyHtml":"\u003cdiv class=\"dz-philo__full-version-grid\"\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-version-card\"\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-provider\"\u003ePeirce.org\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3 class=\"dz-philo__full-version-title\"\u003eSome Consequences of Four Incapacities\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-meta\"\u003eHtmlText · LinkOnlyReady\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ca class=\"dz-philo__full-version-link\" href=\"https://www.peirce.org/writings/p27.html\"\u003eOpen full version\u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["Peirce argues from human cognitive incapacities toward a semiotic, anti-Cartesian account of mind, self, and inquiry."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":""},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"Some Consequences of Four Incapacities; Charles Sanders Peirce; pragmatism; pragmaticism; semiotic; signs; inquiry; abduction; induction; deduction; categories; realism; fallibilism; scientific method"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Logical analysis, mathematical notation, semiotic analysis, scientific method, phenomenological categories, abductive reasoning, probabilistic inference, and manuscript-based argument."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"Accepted direct Peirce work page; edited collections, collected papers, source catalogues, testimonia, later anthologies, and scholarship about Peirce are excluded from direct work rows."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Connects Peirce\u0027s work in logic, signs, categories, probability, inquiry, scientific method, metaphysics, mind, religion, and pragmaticism."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"Kant, Duns Scotus, Aristotle, George Boole, Augustus De Morgan, Charles Darwin, Benjamin Peirce, William Whewell, and scientific practice."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"American pragmatism, semiotics, mathematical logic, philosophy of science, abductive reasoning, fallibilism, process metaphysics, analytic philosophy, and inquiry-centered epistemology."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Part of the direct Peirce corpus that made him central to logic, pragmatism, semiotics, scientific method, and the history of American philosophy.","Used in debates about inquiry, meaning, scientific method, truth, signs, diagrams, inference to the best explanation, probability, realism, and community-based knowledge."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct paper from Peirce\u0027s anti-Cartesian cognition series."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003eFull text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.peirce.org/writings/p27.html\"\u003ePeirce.org: Some Consequences of Four Incapacities\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\n\u003cCENTER\u003e\n\u003cH2\u003eSome Consequences of Four Incapacities\u003c/H2\u003e\n\u003cA HREF=\"http://www.peirce.org/\"\u003e\n\u003cH3\u003eCharles S. Peirce\u003c/H3\u003e\n\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cCITE\u003eJournal of Speculative Philosophy\u003c/CITE\u003e (1868) 2, 140-157.\n\u003c/CENTER\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\u003cHR\u003e\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.264\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Descartes is the father of modern philosophy, and the spirit of\nCartesianism — that which principally distinguishes it from the scholasticism\nwhich it displaced — may be compendiously stated as follows:\n\u003cP\u003e\n1. It teaches that philosophy must begin with universal doubt; whereas\nscholasticism had never questioned fundamentals.\n\u003cP\u003e\n2. It teaches that the ultimate test of certainty is to be found in the\nindividual consciousness; whereas scholasticism had rested on the testimony of\nsages and of the Catholic Church.\n\u003cP\u003e\n3. The multiform argumentation of the middle ages is replaced by a single thread\nof inference depending often upon inconspicuous premisses.\n\u003cP\u003e\n4. Scholasticism had its mysteries of faith, but undertook to explain all created\nthings. But there are many facts which Cartesianism not only does not explain but\nrenders absolutely inexplicable, unless to say that \"God makes them so\" is to be\nregarded as an explanation.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.265\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e In some, or all of these respects, most modern philosophers have been, in\neffect, Cartesians. Now without wishing to return to scholasticism, it seems to\nme that modern science and modern logic require us to stand upon a very different\nplatform from this.\n\u003cP\u003e\n1. We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices\nwhich we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These\nprejudices are not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does\nnot occur to us \u003cI\u003ecan\u003c/I\u003e be questioned. Hence this initial skepticism will be a mere\nself-deception, and not real doubt; and no one who follows the Cartesian method\nwill ever be satisfied until he has formally recovered all those beliefs which in\nform he has given up. It is, therefore, as useless a preliminary as going to the\nNorth Pole would be in order to get to Constantinople by coming down regularly\nupon a meridian. A person may, it is true, in the course of his studies, find\nreason to doubt what he began by believing; but in that case he doubts because he\nhas a positive reason for it, and not on account of the Cartesian maxim. Let us\nnot pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts.\n\u003cP\u003e\n2. The same formalism appears in the Cartesian criterion, which amounts to this:\n\"Whatever I am clearly convinced of, is true.\" If I were really convinced, I\nshould have done with reasoning and should require no test of certainty. But thus\nto make single individuals absolute judges of truth is most pernicious. The\nresult is that metaphysicians will all agree that metaphysics has reached a pitch\nof certainty far beyond that of the physical sciences; — only they can agree\nupon nothing else. In sciences in which men come to agreement, when a theory has\nbeen broached it is considered to be on probation until this agreement is\nreached. After it is reached, the question of certainty becomes an idle one,\nbecause there is no one left who doubts it. We individually cannot reasonably\nhope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we pursue; we can only seek it,\ntherefore, for the \u003cI\u003ecommunity\u003c/I\u003e of philosophers. Hence, if disciplined and candid\nminds carefully examine a theory and refuse to accept it, this ought to create\ndoubts in the mind of the author of the theory himself.\n\u003cP\u003e\n3. Philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences in its methods, so far as\nto proceed only from tangible premisses which can be subjected to careful\nscrutiny, and to trust rather to the multitude and variety of its arguments than\nto the conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not form a chain which is\nno stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibers may be ever so\nslender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected.\n\u003cP\u003e\n4. Every unidealistic philosophy supposes some absolutely inexplicable,\nunanalyzable ultimate; in short, something resulting from mediation itself not\nsusceptible of mediation. Now that anything is thus inexplicable can only be\nknown by reasoning from signs. But the only justification of an inference from\nsigns is that the conclusion explains the fact. To suppose the fact absolutely\ninexplicable, is not to explain it, and hence this supposition is never\nallowable.\n\u003cP\u003e\nIn the last number of this journal will be found a piece entitled \u003cA HREF=\"p26.html\"\u003e\"Questions\nconcerning certain Faculties claimed for Man,\"\u003c/A\u003e which has been\nwritten in this spirit of opposition to Cartesianism. That criticism of certain\nfaculties resulted in four denials, which for convenience may here be repeated:\n\u003cP\u003e\n1. We have no power of Introspection, but all knowledge of the internal world is\nderived by hypothetical reasoning from our knowledge of external facts.\n\u003cP\u003e\n2. We have no power of Intuition, but every cognition is determined logically by\nprevious cognitions.\n\u003cP\u003e\n3. We have no power of thinking without signs.\n\u003cP\u003e\n4. We have no conception of the absolutely incognizable. These propositions\ncannot be regarded as certain; and, in order to bring them to a further test, it\nis now proposed to trace them out to their consequences. We may first consider\nthe first alone; then trace the consequences of the first and second; then see\nwhat else will result from assuming the third also; and, finally, add the fourth\nto our hypothetical premisses.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.266\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e In accepting the first proposition, we must put aside all prejudices derived\nfrom a philosophy which bases our knowledge of the external world on our\nself-consciousness. We can admit no statement concerning what passes within us\nexcept as a hypothesis necessary to explain what takes place in what we commonly\ncall the external world. Moreover when we have upon such grounds assumed one\nfaculty or mode of action of the mind, we cannot, of course, adopt any other\nhypothesis for the purpose of explaining any fact which can be explained by our\nfirst supposition, but must carry the latter as far as it will go. In other\nwords, we must, as far as we can do so without additional hypotheses, reduce all\nkinds of mental action to one general type.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.267\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e The class of modifications of consciousness with which we must commence our\ninquiry must be one whose existence is indubitable, and whose laws are best\nknown, and, therefore (since this knowledge comes from the outside), which most\nclosely follows external facts; that is, it must be some kind of cognition. Here\nwe may hypothetically admit the second proposition of the former paper, according\nto which there is no absolutely first cognition of any object, but cognition\narises by a continuous process. We must begin, then, with a \u003cI\u003eprocess\u003c/I\u003e of cognition,\nand with that process whose laws are best understood and most closely follow\nexternal facts. This is no other than the process of valid inference, which\nproceeds from its premiss, \u003cI\u003eA,\u003c/I\u003e to its conclusion, \u003cI\u003eB,\u003c/I\u003e only if, as a matter of fact,\nsuch a proposition as \u003cI\u003eB\u003c/I\u003e is always or usually true when such a proposition as \u003cI\u003eA\u003c/I\u003e is\ntrue. It is a consequence, then, of the first two principles whose results we are\nto trace out, that we must, as far as we can, without any other supposition than\nthat the mind reasons, reduce all mental action to the formula of valid\nreasoning.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.268\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e But does the mind in fact go through the syllogistic process? It is\ncertainly very doubtful whether a conclusion — as something existing in the mind\nindependently, like an image — suddenly displaces two premisses existing in the\nmind in a similar way. But it is a matter of constant experience, that if a man\nis made to believe in the premisses, in the sense that he will act from them and\nwill say that they are true, under favorable conditions he will also be ready to\nact from the conclusion and to say that that is true. Something, therefore, takes\nplace within the organism which is equivalent to the syllogistic process.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.269\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e A valid inference is either \u003cI\u003ecomplete\u003c/I\u003e or \u003cI\u003eincomplete.\u003c/I\u003e An incomplete\ninference is one whose validity depends upon some matter of fact not contained in\nthe premisses. This implied fact might have been stated as a premiss, and its\nrelation to the conclusion is the same whether it is explicitly posited or not,\nsince it is at least virtually taken for granted; so that every valid incomplete\nargument is virtually complete. Complete arguments are divided into \u003cI\u003esimple\u003c/I\u003e and\n\u003cI\u003ecomplex\u003c/I\u003e. A complex argument is one which from three or more premisses concludes\nwhat might have been concluded by successive steps in reasonings each of which is\nsimple. Thus, a complex inference comes to the same thing in the end as a\nsuccession of simple inferences.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.270\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e A complete, simple, and valid argument, or syllogism, is either \u003cI\u003eapodictic\u003c/I\u003e or\n\u003cI\u003eprobable.\u003c/I\u003e An apodictic or deductive syllogism is one whose validity depends\nunconditionally upon the relation of the fact inferred to the facts posited in\nthe premisses. A syllogism whose validity should depend not merely upon its\npremisses, but upon the existence of some other knowledge, would be impossible;\nfor either this other knowledge would be posited, in which case it would be a\npart of the premisses, or it would be implicitly assumed, in which case the\ninference would be incomplete. But a syllogism whose validity depends partly upon\nthe \u003cI\u003enon-existence\u003c/I\u003e of some other knowledge, is a \u003cI\u003eprobable\u003c/I\u003e syllogism.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.271\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e A few examples will render this plain. The two following arguments are\napodictic or deductive:\n\u003cP\u003e\n1. No series of days of which the first and last are different days of the week\nexceeds by one a multiple of seven days; now the first and last days of any\nleap-year are different days of the week, and therefore no leap-year consists of\na number of days one greater than a multiple of seven.\n\u003cP\u003e\n2. Among the vowels there are no double letters; but one of the double letters\n(\u003cI\u003ew\u003c/I\u003e) is compounded of two vowels: hence, a letter compounded of two vowels is not\nnecessarily itself a vowel.\n\u003cP\u003e\nIn both these cases, it is plain that as long as the premisses are true, however\nother facts may be, the conclusions will be true. On the other hand, suppose that\nwe reason as follows:–\"A certain man had the Asiatic cholera. He was in a state\nof collapse, livid, quite cold, and without perceptible pulse. He was bled\ncopiously. During the process he came out of collapse, and the next morning was\nwell enough to be about. Therefore, bleeding tends to cure the cholera.\" This is\na fair probable inference, provided that the premisses represent our whole\nknowledge of the matter. But if we knew, for example, that recoveries from\ncholera were apt to be sudden, and that the physician who had reported this case\nhad known of a hundred other trials of the remedy without communicating the\nresult, then the inference would lose all its validity.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.272\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e The absence of knowledge which is essential to the validity of any probable\nargument relates to some question which is determined by the argument itself.\nThis question, like every other, is whether certain objects have certain\ncharacters. Hence, the absence of knowledge is either whether besides the objects\nwhich, according to the premisses, possess certain characters, any other objects\npossess them; or, whether besides the characters which, according to the\npremisses, belong to certain objects, any other characters not necessarily\ninvolved in these belong to the same objects. In the former case, the reasoning\nproceeds as though all the objects which have certain characters were known, and\nthis is \u003cI\u003einduction;\u003c/I\u003e in the latter case, the inference proceeds as though all the\ncharacters requisite to the determination of a certain object or class were\nknown, and this is \u003cI\u003ehypothesis.\u003c/I\u003e This distinction, also, may be made more plain by\nexamples.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.273\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Suppose we count the number of occurrences of the different letters in a\ncertain English book, which we may call \u003cI\u003eA.\u003c/I\u003e Of course, every new letter which we\nadd to our count will alter the relative number of occurrences of the different\nletters; but as we proceed with our counting, this change will be less and less.\nSuppose that we find that as we increase the number of letters counted, the\nrelative number of \u003cI\u003ee\u003c/I\u003e\u0027s approaches nearly 11 1/4 \u003cI\u003eper cent\u003c/I\u003e of the whole, that of\nthe \u003cI\u003et\u003c/I\u003e\u0027s 8 1/2 \u003cI\u003eper cent,\u003c/I\u003e that of the \u003cI\u003ea\u003c/I\u003e\u0027s 8 \u003cI\u003eper cent,\u003c/I\u003e that of the \u003cI\u003es\u003c/I\u003e\u0027s 7 1/2 \u003cI\u003eper\ncent,\u003c/I\u003e etc. Suppose we repeat the same observations with half a dozen other\nEnglish writings (which we may designate as \u003cI\u003eB, C, D, E, F, G\u003c/I\u003e) with the like\nresult. Then we may infer that in every English writing of some length, the\ndifferent letters occur with nearly those relative frequencies.\n\u003cP\u003e\nNow this argument depends for its validity upon our not knowing the proportion of\nletters in any English writing besides \u003cI\u003eA, B, C, D, E, F\u003c/I\u003e and \u003cI\u003eG.\u003c/I\u003e For if we know it\nin respect to \u003cI\u003eH,\u003c/I\u003e and it is not nearly the same as in the others, our conclusion\nis destroyed at once; if it is the same, then the legitimate inference is from \u003cI\u003eA,\nB, C, D, E, F, G\u003c/I\u003e and \u003cI\u003eH,\u003c/I\u003e and not from the first seven alone. This, therefore, is\nan induction.\n\u003cP\u003e\nSuppose, next, that a piece of writing in cipher is presented to us, without the\nkey. Suppose we find that it contains something less than 26 characters, one of\nwhich occurs about 11 \u003cI\u003eper cent\u003c/I\u003e of all the times, another 8 1/2 \u003cI\u003eper cent,\u003c/I\u003e\nanother 8 \u003cI\u003eper cent,\u003c/I\u003e and another 7 1/2 \u003cI\u003eper cent.\u003c/I\u003e Suppose that when we substitute\nfor these \u003cI\u003ee, t, a\u003c/I\u003e and\u003cI\u003e s,\u003c/I\u003e respectively, we are able to see how single letters may\nbe substituted for each of the other characters so as to make sense in English,\nprovided, however, that we allow the spelling to be wrong in some cases. If the\nwriting is of any considerable length, we may infer with great probability that\nthis is the meaning of the cipher.\n\u003cP\u003e\nThe validity of this argument depends upon there being no other known characters\nof the writing in cipher which would have any weight in the matter; for if there\nare — if we know, for example, whether or not there is any other solution of it\n– this must be allowed its effect in supporting or weakening the conclusion.\nThis, then, is \u003cI\u003ehypothesis.\u003c/I\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.274\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e All valid reasoning is either deductive, inductive, or hypothetic; or else\nit combines two or more of these characters. Deduction is pretty well treated in\nmost logical textbooks; but it will be necessary to say a few words about\ninduction and hypothesis in order to render what follows more intelligible.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.275\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Induction may be defined as an argument which proceeds upon the assumption\nthat all the members of a class or aggregate have all the characters which are\ncommon to all those members of this class concerning which it is known, whether\nthey have these characters or not; or, in other words, which assumes that that is\ntrue of a whole collection which is true of a number of instances taken from it\nat random. This might be called statistical argument. In the long run, it must\ngenerally afford pretty correct conclusions from true premisses. If we have a bag\nof beans partly black and partly white, by counting the relative proportions of\nthe two colors in several different handfuls, we can approximate more or less to\nthe relative proportions in the whole bag, since a sufficient number of handfuls\nwould constitute all the beans in the bag. The central characteristic and key to\ninduction is, that by taking the conclusion so reached as major premiss of a\nsyllogism, and the proposition stating that such and such objects are taken from\nthe class in question as the minor premiss, the other premiss of the induction\nwill follow from them deductively. Thus, in the above example we concluded that\nall books in English have about 11 1/4 \u003cI\u003eper cent\u003c/I\u003e of their letters \u003cI\u003ee\u003c/I\u003e\u0027s. From that\nas major premiss, together with the proposition that \u003cI\u003eA, B, C, D, E, F\u003c/I\u003e and \u003cI\u003eG\u003c/I\u003e are\nbooks in English, it follows deductively that \u003cI\u003eA, B, C, D, E, F\u003c/I\u003e and \u003cI\u003eG\u003c/I\u003e have about\n11 1/4 \u003cI\u003eper cent\u003c/I\u003e of their letters \u003cI\u003ee\u003c/I\u003e\u0027s. Accordingly, induction has been defined by\nAristotle as the inference of the major premiss of a syllogism from its minor\npremiss and conclusion. The function of an induction is to substitute for a\nseries of many subjects, a single one which embraces them and an indefinite\nnumber of others. Thus it is a species of \"reduction of the manifold to unity.\"\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.276\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Hypothesis may be defined as an argument which proceeds upon the assumption\nthat a character which is known necessarily to involve a certain number of\nothers, may be probably predicated of any object which has all the characters\nwhich this character is known to involve. Just as induction may be regarded as\nthe inference of the major premiss of a syllogism, so hypothesis may be regarded\nas the inference of the minor premiss, from the other two propositions. Thus, the\nexample taken above consists of two such inferences of the minor premisses of the\nfollowing syllogisms:\n\u003cP\u003e\n1. Every English writing of some length in which such and such characters denote\n\u003cI\u003ee, t, a,\u003c/I\u003e and \u003cI\u003es,\u003c/I\u003e has about 11 1/4 \u003cI\u003eper cent\u003c/I\u003e of the first sort of marks, 8 1/2 of\nthe second, 8 of the third, and 7 1/2 of the fourth.\n\u003cBR\u003e\nThis secret writing is an English writing of some length, in which such and such\ncharacters denote \u003cI\u003ee, t, a,\u003c/I\u003e and \u003cI\u003es,\u003c/I\u003e respectively:\n\u003cBR\u003e\n[Ergo,] This secret writing has about 11 1/4 \u003cI\u003eper cent\u003c/I\u003e of its characters of the first\nkind, 8 1/2 of the second, 8 of the third, and 7 1/2 of the fourth.\n\u003cP\u003e\n2. A passage written with such an alphabet makes sense when such and such letters\nare severally substituted for such and such characters.\n\u003cBR\u003e\nThis secret writing is written with such an alphabet.\n\u003cBR\u003e\n[Ergo,] This secret writing makes sense when such and such substitutions are made.\n\u003cP\u003e\nThe function of \u003cA NAME=\"notemark1\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#note1\"\u003ehypothesis\u003c/A\u003e is to substitute for a great series of predicates forming no unity in themselves, a single one (or small number) which involves\nthem all, together (perhaps) with an indefinite number of others. It is,\ntherefore, also a reduction of a manifold to unity. Every deductive syllogism\nmay be put into the form\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cCENTER\u003e\nIf \u003cI\u003eA,\u003c/I\u003e then \u003cI\u003eB;\u003c/I\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\nBut \u003cI\u003eA:\u003c/I\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\n[Ergo,] \u003cI\u003eB.\u003c/I\u003e\n\u003c/CENTER\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\n\nAnd as the minor premiss in this form appears as antecedent or reason of a\nhypothetical proposition, hypothetic inference may be called reasoning from\nconsequent to antecedent.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.277\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e The argument from analogy, which a popular writer upon logic calls\nreasoning from particulars to particulars, derives its validity from its\ncombining the characters of induction and hypothesis, being analyzable either\ninto a deduction or an induction, or a deduction and a hypothesis.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.278\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e But though inference is thus of three essentially different species, it also\nbelongs to one genus. We have seen that no conclusion can be legitimately derived\nwhich could not have been reached by successions of arguments having two\npremisses each, and implying no fact not asserted.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.279\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Either of these premisses is a proposition asserting that certain objects\nhave certain characters. Every term of such a proposition stands either for\ncertain objects or for certain characters. The conclusion may be regarded as a\nproposition substituted in place of either premiss, the substitution being\njustified by the fact stated in the other premiss. The conclusion is accordingly\nderived from either premiss by substituting either a new subject for the subject\nof the premiss, or a new predicate for the predicate of the premiss, or by both\nsubstitutions. Now the substitution of one term for another can be justified only\nso far as the term substituted represents only what is represented in the term\nreplaced. If, therefore, the conclusion be denoted by the formula,\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cCENTER\u003e\n\t\u003cI\u003eS\u003c/I\u003e is \u003cI\u003eP;\u003c/I\u003e\n\u003c/CENTER\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\nand this conclusion be derived, by a change of subject, from a premiss which may\non this account be expressed by the formula,\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cCENTER\u003e\n\t\u003cI\u003eM\u003c/I\u003e is \u003cI\u003eP,\u003c/I\u003e\n\u003c/CENTER\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\nthen the other premiss must assert that whatever thing is represented by S is\nrepresented by M, or that\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cCENTER\u003e\n\tEvery \u003cI\u003eS\u003c/I\u003e is an \u003cI\u003eM;\u003c/I\u003e\n\u003c/CENTER\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\nwhile, if the conclusion, \u003cI\u003eS\u003c/I\u003e is \u003cI\u003eP,\u003c/I\u003e is derived from either premiss by a change of\npredicate, that premiss may be written\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cCENTER\u003e\n\t\u003cI\u003eS\u003c/I\u003e is \u003cI\u003eM;\u003c/I\u003e\n\u003c/CENTER\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\nand the other premiss must assert that whatever characters are implied in \u003cI\u003eP\u003c/I\u003e are\nimplied in \u003cI\u003eM\u003c/I\u003e, or that\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cCENTER\u003e\n\tWhatever is \u003cI\u003eM\u003c/I\u003e is \u003cI\u003eP.\u003c/I\u003e\n\u003c/CENTER\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\nIn either case, therefore, the syllogism must be capable of expression in the\nform,\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cCENTER\u003e\n\u003cI\u003e\tS\u003c/I\u003e is \u003cI\u003eM;\u003c/I\u003e \u003cI\u003eM\u003c/I\u003e is \u003cI\u003eP:\u003c/I\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\n[Ergo,] \u003cI\u003eS\u003c/I\u003e is \u003cI\u003eP.\u003c/I\u003e\n\u003c/CENTER\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\nFinally, if the conclusion differs from either of its premisses, both in subject\nand predicate, the form of statement of conclusion and premiss may be so altered\nthat they shall have a common term. This can always be done, for if \u003cI\u003eP\u003c/I\u003e is the\npremiss and \u003cI\u003eC\u003c/I\u003e the conclusion, they may be stated thus:\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cCENTER\u003e\nThe state of things represented in \u003cI\u003eP\u003c/I\u003e is real,\n\u003cBR\u003eand\u003cBR\u003e\nThe state of things represented in \u003cI\u003eC\u003c/I\u003e is real.\n\u003c/CENTER\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\nIn this case the other premiss must in some form virtually assert that every\nstate of things such as is represented by \u003cI\u003eC\u003c/I\u003e is the state of things represented in\n\u003cI\u003eP.\u003c/I\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\nAll valid reasoning, therefore, is of one general form; and in seeking to reduce\nall mental action to the formul\u0026aelig; of valid inference, we seek to reduce it to one\nsingle type.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.280\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e An apparent obstacle to the reduction of all mental action to the type of\nvalid inferences is the existence of fallacious reasoning. Every argument implies\nthe truth of a general principle of inferential procedure (whether involving some\nmatter of fact concerning the subject of argument, or merely a maxim relating to\na system of signs), according to which it is a valid argument. If this principle\nis false, the argument is a fallacy; but neither a valid argument from false\npremisses, nor an exceedingly weak, but not altogether illegitimate, induction or\nhypothesis, however its force may be over-estimated, however false its\nconclusion, is a fallacy.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.281\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Now words, taken just as they stand, if in the form of an argument, thereby\ndo imply whatever fact may be necessary to make the argument conclusive; so that\nto the formal logician, who has to do only with the meaning of the words\naccording to the proper principles of interpretation, and not with the intention\nof the speaker as guessed at from other indications, the only fallacies should be\nsuch as are simply absurd and contradictory, either because their conclusions are\nabsolutely inconsistent with their premisses, or because they connect\npropositions by a species of illative conjunction, by which they cannot under any\ncircumstances be validly connected.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.282\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e But to the psychologist an argument is valid only if the premisses from\nwhich the mental conclusion is derived would be sufficient, if true, to justify\nit, either by themselves, or by the aid of other propositions which had\npreviously been held for true. But it is easy to show that all inferences made by\nman, which are not valid in this sense, belong to four classes, viz.: 1. Those\nwhose premisses are false; 2. Those which have some little force, though only a\nlittle; 3. Those which result from confusion of one proposition with another; 4.\nThose which result from the indistinct apprehension, wrong application, or\nfalsity, of a rule of inference. For, if a man were to commit a fallacy not of\neither of these classes, he would, from true premisses conceived with perfect\ndistinctness, without being led astray by any prejudice or other judgment serving\nas a rule of inference, draw a conclusion which had really not the least\nrelevancy. If this could happen, calm consideration and care could be of little\nuse in thinking, for caution only serves to insure our taking all the facts into\naccount, and to make those which we do take account of, distinct; nor can\ncoolness do anything more than to enable us to be cautious, and also to prevent\nour being affected by a passion in inferring that to be true which we wish were\ntrue, or which we fear may be true, or in following some other wrong rule of\ninference. But experience shows that the calm and careful consideration of the\nsame distinctly conceived premisses (including prejudices) will insure the\npronouncement of the same judgment by all men. Now if a fallacy belongs to the\nfirst of these four classes and its premisses are false, it is to be presumed\nthat the procedure of the mind from these premisses to the conclusion is either\ncorrect, or errs in one of the other three ways; for it cannot be supposed that\nthe mere falsity of the premisses should affect the procedure of reason when that\nfalsity is not known to reason. If the fallacy belongs to the second class and\nhas some force, however little, it is a legitimate probable argument, and belongs\nto the type of valid inference. If it is of the third class and results from the\nconfusion of one proposition with another, this confusion must be owing to a\nresemblance between the two propositions; that is to say, the person reasoning,\nseeing that one proposition has some of the characters which belong to the other,\nconcludes that it has all the essential characters of the other, and is\nequivalent to it. Now this is a hypothetic inference, which though it may be\nweak, and though its conclusion happens to be false, belongs to the type of valid\ninferences; and, therefore, as the \u003cI\u003enodus\u003c/I\u003e of the fallacy lies in this confusion,\nthe procedure of the mind in these fallacies of the third class conforms to the\nformula of valid inference. If the fallacy belongs to the fourth class, it either\nresults from wrongly applying or misapprehending a rule of inference, and so is a\nfallacy of confusion, or it results from adopting a wrong rule of inference. In\nthis latter case, this rule is in fact taken as a premiss, and therefore the\nfalse conclusion is owing merely to the falsity of a premiss. In every fallacy,\ntherefore, possible to the mind of man, the procedure of the mind conforms to the\nformula of valid inference.\n\n\u003cP\u003e\n\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.283\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e The third principle whose consequences we have to deduce is, that, whenever\nwe think, we have present to the consciousness some feeling, image, conception,\nor other representation, which serves as a sign. But it follows from our own\nexistence (which is proved by the occurrence of ignorance and error) that\neverything which is present to us is a phenomenal manifestation of ourselves.\nThis does not prevent its being a phenomenon of something without us, just as a\nrainbow is at once a manifestation both of the sun and of the rain. When we\nthink, then, we ourselves, as we are at that moment, appear as a sign. Now a sign\nhas, as such, three references: first, it is a sign \u003cI\u003eto\u003c/I\u003e some thought which\ninterprets it; second, it is a sign \u003cI\u003efor\u003c/I\u003e some object to which in that thought it\nis equivalent; third, it is a sign, \u003cI\u003ein\u003c/I\u003e some respect or quality, which brings it\ninto connection with its object. Let us ask what the three correlates are to\nwhich a thought-sign refers.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.284\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e (1) When we think, to what thought does that thought-sign which is ourself\naddress itself? It may, through the medium of outward expression, which it\nreaches perhaps only after considerable internal development, come to address\nitself to thought of another person. But whether this happens or not, it is\nalways interpreted by a subsequent thought of our own. If, after any thought, the\ncurrent of ideas flows on freely, it follows the law of mental association. In\nthat case, each former thought suggests something to the thought which follows\nit, i.e., is the sign of something to this latter. Our train of thought may, it\nis true, be interrupted. But we must remember that, in addition to the principal\nelement of thought at any moment, there are a hundred things in our mind to which\nbut a small fraction of attention or consciousness is conceded. It does not,\ntherefore, follow, because a new constituent of thought gets the uppermost that\nthe train of thought which it displaces is broken off altogether. On the\ncontrary, from our second principle, that there is no intuition or cognition not\ndetermined by previous cognitions, it follows that the striking in of a new\nexperience is never an instantaneous affair, but is an \u003cI\u003eevent\u003c/I\u003e occupying time, and\ncoming to pass by a continuous process. Its prominence in consciousness,\ntherefore, must probably be the consummation of a growing process; and if so,\nthere is no sufficient cause for the thought which had been the leading one just\nbefore, to cease abruptly and instantaneously. But if a train of thought ceases\nby gradually dying out, it freely follows its own law of association as long as\nit lasts, and there is no moment at which there is a thought belonging to this\nseries, subsequently to which there is not a thought which interprets or repeats\nit. There is no exception, therefore, to the law that every thought-sign is\ntranslated or interpreted in a subsequent one, unless it be that all thought\ncomes to an abrupt and final end in death.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.285\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e (2) The next question is: For what does the thought-sign stand — what does\nit name — what is its \u003cI\u003esuppositum?\u003c/I\u003e The outward thing, undoubtedly, when a real\noutward thing is thought of. But still, as the thought is determined by a\nprevious thought of the same object, it only refers to the thing through denoting\nthis previous thought. Let us suppose, for example, that Toussaint is thought of,\nand first thought of as a \u003cI\u003eNegro,\u003c/I\u003e but not distinctly as a man. If this\ndistinctness is afterwards added, it is through the thought that a \u003cI\u003eNegro\u003c/I\u003e is a\n\u003cI\u003eman;\u003c/I\u003e that is to say, the subsequent thought, \u003cI\u003eman,\u003c/I\u003e refers to the outward thing by\nbeing predicated of that previous thought, \u003cI\u003eNegro,\u003c/I\u003e which has been had of that\nthing. If we afterwards think of Toussaint as a general, then we think that this\nnegro, this man, was a general. And so in every case the subsequent thought\ndenotes what was thought in the previous thought.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.286\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e (3) The thought-sign stands for its object in the respect which is thought;\nthat is to say, this respect is the immediate object of consciousness in the\nthought, or, in other words, it is the thought itself, or at least what the\nthought is thought to be in the subsequent thought to which it is a sign.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.287\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e We must now consider two other properties of signs which are of great\nimportance in the theory of cognition. Since a sign is not identical with the\nthing signified, but differs from the latter in some respects, it must plainly\nhave some characters which belong to it in itself, and have nothing to do with\nits representative function. These I call the \u003cI\u003ematerial\u003c/I\u003e qualities of the sign. As\nexamples of such qualities, take in the word \"man,\" its consisting of three\nletters — in a picture, its being flat and without relief. In the second place,\na sign must be capable of being connected (not in the reason but really) with\nanother sign of the same object, or with the object itself. Thus, words would be\nof no value at all unless they could be connected into sentences by means of a\nreal copula which joins signs of the same thing. The usefulness of some signs –\nas a weathercock, a tally, \u0026c. — consists wholly in their being really\nconnected with the very things they signify. In the case of a picture such a\nconnection is not evident, but it exists in the power of association which\nconnects the picture with the brain-sign which labels it. This real, physical\nconnection of a sign with its object, either immediately or by its connection\nwith another sign, I call the \u003cI\u003epure demonstrative application\u003c/I\u003e of the sign. Now the\nrepresentative function of a sign lies neither in its material quality nor in its\npure demonstrative application; because it is something which the sign is, not in\nitself or in a real relation to its object, but which it is \u003cI\u003eto a thought,\u003c/I\u003e while\nboth of the characters just defined belong to the sign independently of its\naddressing any thought. And yet if I take all the things which have certain\nqualities and physically connect them with another series of things, each to\neach, they become fit to be signs. If they are not regarded as such they are not\nactually signs, but they are so in the same sense, for example, in which an\nunseen flower can be said to be red, this being also a term relative to a mental\naffection.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.288\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Consider a state of mind which is a conception. It is a conception by virtue\nof having a \u003cI\u003emeaning,\u003c/I\u003e a logical comprehension; and if it is applicable to any\nobject, it is because that object has the characters contained in the\ncomprehension of this conception. Now the logical comprehension of a thought is\nusually said to consist of the thoughts contained in it; but thoughts are events,\nacts of the mind. Two thoughts are two events separated in time, and one cannot\nliterally be contained in the other. It may be said that all thoughts exactly\nsimilar are regarded as one; and that to say that one thought contains another,\nmeans that it contains one exactly similar to that other. But how can two\nthoughts be similar? Two objects can only be \u003cI\u003eregarded\u003c/I\u003e as similar if they are\ncompared and brought together in the mind. Thoughts have no existence except in\nthe mind; only as they are regarded do they exist. Hence, two thoughts cannot \u003cI\u003ebe\u003c/I\u003e\nsimilar unless they are brought together in the mind. But, as to their existence,\ntwo thoughts are separated by an interval of time. We are too apt to imagine that\nwe can frame a thought similar to a past thought, by matching it with the latter,\nas though this past thought were still present to us. But it is plain that the\nknowledge that one thought is similar to or in any way truly representative of\nanother, cannot be derived from immediate perception, but must be an hypothesis\n(unquestionably fully justifiable by facts), and that therefore the formation of\nsuch a representing thought must be dependent upon a real effective force behind\nconsciousness, and not merely upon a mental comparison. What we must mean,\ntherefore, by saying that one concept is contained in another, is that we\nnormally represent one to be in the other; that is, that we form a particular\nkind of \u003cA NAME=\"notemark2\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#note2\"\u003ejudgment\u003c/A\u003e of\nwhich the subject signifies one concept and the predicate the other.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.289\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e No thought in itself, then, no feeling in itself, contains any others, but\nis absolutely simple and unanalyzable; and to say that it is composed of other\nthoughts and feelings, is like saying that a movement upon a straight line is\ncomposed of the two movements of which it is the resultant; that is to say, it is\na metaphor, or fiction, parallel to the truth. Every thought, however artificial\nand complex, is, so far as it is immediately present, a mere sensation without\nparts, and therefore, \u003cA NAME=\"notemark3\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#note3\"\u003ein\nitself,\u003c/A\u003e without similarity to any other, but incomparable with any other and absolutely \u003cI\u003esui generis.\u003c/I\u003e Whatever is wholly\nincomparable with anything else is wholly inexplicable, because explanation\nconsists in bringing things under general laws or under natural classes. Hence\nevery thought, in so far as it is a feeling of a peculiar sort, is simply an\nultimate, inexplicable fact. Yet this does not conflict with my postulate that\nthat fact should be allowed to stand as inexplicable; for, on the one hand, we\nnever can think, \"This is present to me,\" since, before we have time to make the\nreflection, the sensation is past, and, on the other hand, when once past, we can\nnever bring back the quality of the feeling as it was \u003cI\u003ein and for itself,\u003c/I\u003e or know\nwhat it was like \u003cI\u003ein itself,\u003c/I\u003e or even discover the existence of this quality except\nby a corollary from our general theory of ourselves, and then not in its\nidiosyncrasy, but only as something present. But, as something present, feelings\nare all alike and require no explanation, since they contain only what is\nuniversal. So that nothing which we can truly predicate of feelings is left\ninexplicable, but only something which we cannot reflectively know. So that we do\nnot fall into the contradiction of making the Mediate immediable. Finally, no\npresent actual thought (which is a mere feeling) has any meaning, any\nintellectual value; for this lies not in what is actually thought, but in what\nthis thought may be connected with in representation by subsequent thoughts; so\nthat the meaning of a thought is altogether something virtual. It may be\nobjected, that if no thought has any meaning, all thought is without meaning. But\nthis is a fallacy similar to saying, that, if in no one of the successive spaces\nwhich a body fills there is room for motion, there is no room for motion\nthroughout the whole. \u003cA NAME=\"notemark4\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#note4\"\u003eAt\nno one instant in my state of mind is there cognition or representation, but in the relation of my states of mind at different instants\nthere is.\u003c/A\u003e In short, the Immediate (and therefore in itself unsusceptible of\nmediation — the Unanalyzable, the Inexplicable, the Unintellectual) runs in a\ncontinuous stream through our lives; it is the sum total of consciousness, whose\nmediation, which is the continuity of it, is brought about by a real effective\nforce behind consciousness.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.290\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Thus, we have in thought three elements:\nfirst, the representative function which makes it a \u003cI\u003e\u003cA\nNAME=\"notemark5\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#note5\"\u003erepresentation;\u003c/A\u003e\u003c/I\u003e\nsecond, the pure denotative application, or real connection, which\nbrings one thought into \u003cI\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#note5\"\u003erelation\u003c/A\u003e\u003c/I\u003e with\nanother; and third, the material quality, or how it feels, which\ngives thought its \u003cI\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#note5\"\u003equality\u003c/A\u003e.\u003c/I\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.291\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e That a sensation is not necessarily an intuition, or first impression of\nsense, is very evident in the case of the sense of beauty; and has been shown, \u003cA HREF=\"p26.html#CP5.222\"\u003eelsewhere\u003c/A\u003e, in the case of sound. When the sensation beautiful is determined by\nprevious cognitions, it always arises as a predicate; that is, we think that\nsomething is beautiful. Whenever a sensation thus arises in consequence of\nothers, induction shows that those others are more or less complicated. Thus, the\nsensation of a particular kind of sound arises in consequence of impressions upon\nthe various nerves of the ear being combined in a particular way, and following\none another with a certain rapidity. A sensation of color depends upon\nimpressions upon the eye following one another in a regular manner, and with a\ncertain rapidity. The sensation of beauty arises upon a manifold of other\nimpressions. And this will be found to hold good in all cases. Secondly, all\nthese sensations are in themselves simple, or more so than the sensations which\ngive rise to them. Accordingly, a sensation is a simple predicate taken in place\nof a complex predicate; in other words, it fulfills the function of an\nhypothesis. But the general principle that every thing to which such and such a\nsensation belongs, has such and such a complicated series of predicates, is not\none determined by reason (as we have seen), but is of an arbitrary nature. Hence,\nthe class of hypothetic inferences which the arising of a sensation resembles, is\nthat of reasoning from definition to definitum, in which the major premiss is of\nan arbitrary nature. Only in this mode of reasoning, this premiss is determined\nby the conventions of language, and expresses the occasion upon which a word is\nto be used; and in the formation of a sensation, it is determined by the\nconstitution of our nature, and expresses the occasions upon which sensation, or\na natural mental sign, arises. Thus, the sensation, so far as it represents\nsomething, is determined, according to a logical law, by previous cognitions;\nthat is to say, these cognitions determine that there shall be a sensation. But\nso far as the sensation is a mere feeling of a particular sort, it is determined\nonly by an inexplicable, occult power; and so far, it is not a representation,\nbut only the material quality of a representation. For just as in reasoning from\ndefinition to definitum, it is indifferent to the logician how the defined word\nshall sound, or how many letters it shall contain, so in the case of this\nconstitutional word, it is not determined by an inward law how it shall feel in\nitself. A feeling, therefore, as a feeling, is merely the \u003cI\u003ematerial quality\u003c/I\u003e of a\nmental sign.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.292\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e But there is no feeling which is not also a representation, a predicate of\nsomething determined logically by the feelings which precede it. For if there are\nany such feelings not predicates, they are the emotions. Now every emotion has a\nsubject. If a man is angry, he is saying to himself that this or that is vile and\noutrageous. If he is in joy, he is saying \"this is delicious.\" If he is\nwondering, he is saying \"this is strange.\" In short, whenever a man feels, he is\n\nthinking of \u003cI\u003esomething.\u003c/I\u003e Even those passions which have no definite object — as\nmelancholy — only come to consciousness through tinging \u003cI\u003ethe objects of thought.\u003c/I\u003e\nThat which makes us look upon the emotions more as affections of self than other\ncognitions, is that we have found them more dependent upon our accidental\nsituation at the moment than other cognitions; but that is only to say that they\nare cognitions too narrow to be useful. The emotions, as a little observation\nwill show, arise when our attention is strongly drawn to complex and\ninconceivable circumstances. Fear arises when we cannot predict our fate; joy, in\nthe case of certain indescribable and peculiarly complex sensations. If there are\nsome indications that something greatly for my interest, and which I have\nanticipated would happen, may not happen; and if, after weighing probabilities,\nand inventing safeguards, and straining for further information, I find myself\nunable to come to any fixed conclusion in reference to the future, in the place\nof that intellectual hypothetic inference which I seek, the feeling of \u003cI\u003eanxiety\u003c/I\u003e\narises. When something happens for which I cannot account, I \u003cI\u003ewonder.\u003c/I\u003e When I\nendeavor to realize to myself what I never can do, a pleasure in the future, I\n\u003cI\u003ehope.\u003c/I\u003e \"I do not understand you,\" is the phrase of an angry man. The\nindescribable, the ineffable, the incomprehensible, commonly excite emotion; but\nnothing is so chilling as a scientific explanation. Thus an emotion is always a\nsimple predicate substituted by an operation of the mind for a highly complicated\npredicate. Now if we consider that a very complex predicate demands explanation\nby means of an hypothesis, that that hypothesis must be a simpler predicate\nsubstituted for that complex one; and that when we have an emotion, an\nhypothesis, strictly speaking, is hardly possible — the analogy of the parts\nplayed by emotion and hypothesis is very striking. There is, it is true, this\ndifference between an emotion and an intellectual hypothesis, that we have reason\nto say in the case of the latter, that to whatever the simple hypothetic\npredicate can be applied, of that the complex predicate is true; whereas, in the\ncase of an emotion this is a proposition for which no reason can be given, but\nwhich is determined merely by our emotional constitution. But this corresponds\nprecisely to the difference between hypothesis and reasoning from definition to\ndefinitum, and thus it would appear that emotion is nothing but sensation. There\nappears to be a difference, however, between emotion and sensation, and I would\nstate it as follows:\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.293\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e There is some reason to think that, corresponding to every feeling within\nus, some motion takes place in our bodies. This property of the thought-sign,\nsince it has no rational dependence upon the meaning of the sign, may be compared\nwith what I have called the material quality of the sign; but it differs from the\nlatter inasmuch as it is not essentially necessary that it should be felt in\norder that there should be any thought-sign. In the case of a sensation, the\nmanifold of impressions which precede and determine it are not of a kind, the\nbodily motion corresponding to which comes from any large ganglion or from the\nbrain, and probably for this reason the sensation produces no great commotion in\nthe bodily organism; and the sensation itself is not a thought which has a very\nstrong influence upon the current of thought except by virtue of the information\nit may serve to afford. An emotion, on the other hand, comes much later in the\ndevelopment of thought — I mean, further from the first beginning of the\ncognition of its object — and the thoughts which determine it already have\nmotions corresponding to them in the brain, or the chief ganglion; consequently,\nit produces large movements in the body, and independently of its representative\nvalue, strongly affects the current of thought. The animal motions to which I\nallude, are, in the first place and obviously, blushing, blenching, staring,\nsmiling, scowling, pouting, laughing, weeping, sobbing, wriggling, flinching,\ntrembling, being petrified, sighing, sniffing, shrugging, groaning, heartsinking,\ntrepidation, swelling of the heart, etc., etc. To these may, perhaps, be added,\nin the second place, other more complicated actions, which nevertheless spring\nfrom a direct impulse and not from deliberation.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.294\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e That which distinguishes both sensations proper and emotions from the\nfeeling of a thought, is that in the case of the two former the material quality\nis made prominent, because the thought has no relation of reason to the thoughts\nwhich determine it, which exists in the last case and detracts from the attention\ngiven to the mere feeling. By there being no relation of reason to the\ndetermining thoughts, I mean that there is nothing in the content of the thought\nwhich explains why it should arise only on occasion of these determining\nthoughts. If there is such a relation of reason, if the thought is essentially\nlimited in its application to these objects, then the thought comprehends a\nthought other than itself; in other words, it is then a complex thought. An\nincomplex thought can, therefore, be nothing but a sensation or emotion, having\nno rational character. This is very different from the ordinary doctrine,\naccording to which the very highest and most metaphysical conceptions are\nabsolutely simple. I shall be asked how such a conception of a \u003cI\u003ebeing\u003c/I\u003e is to be\nanalyzed, or whether I can ever define \u003cI\u003eone, two,\u003c/I\u003e and \u003cI\u003ethree,\u003c/I\u003e without a diallelon.\nNow I shall admit at once that neither of these conceptions can be separated into\ntwo others higher than itself; and in that sense, therefore, I fully admit that\ncertain very metaphysical and eminently intellectual notions are absolutely\nsimple. But though these concepts cannot be defined by genus and difference,\nthere is another way in which they can be defined. All determination is by\nnegation; we can first recognize any character only by putting an object which\npossesses it into comparison with an object which possesses it not. A conception,\ntherefore, which was quite universal in every respect would be unrecognizable and\nimpossible. We do not obtain the conception of Being, in the sense implied in the\ncopula, by observing that all the things which we can think of have something in\ncommon, for there is no such thing to be observed. We get it by reflecting upon\nsigns — words or thoughts; we observe that different predicates may be attached\nto the same subject, and that each makes some conception applicable to the\nsubject; then we imagine that a subject has something true of it merely because a\npredicate (no matter what) is attached to it — and that we call Being. The\nconception of being is, therefore, a conception about a sign — a thought, or\nword; and since it is not applicable to every sign, it is not primarily\nuniversal, although it is so in its mediate application to things. Being,\ntherefore, may be defined; it may be defined, for example, as that which is\ncommon to the objects included in any class, and to the objects not included in\nthe same class. But it is nothing new to say that metaphysical conceptions are\nprimarily and at bottom thoughts about words, or thoughts about thoughts; it is\nthe doctrine both of Aristotle (whose categories are parts of speech) and of Kant\n(whose categories are the characters of different kinds of propositions).\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.295\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Sensation and the power of abstraction or attention may be regarded as, in\none sense, the sole constituents of all thought. Having considered the former,\nlet us now attempt some analysis of the latter. By the force of attention, an\nemphasis is put upon one of the objective elements of consciousness. This\nemphasis is, therefore, not itself an object of immediate consciousness; and in\nthis respect it differs entirely from a feeling. Therefore, since the emphasis,\nnevertheless, consists in some effect upon consciousness, and so can exist only\nso far as it affects our knowledge; and since an act cannot be supposed to\ndetermine that which precedes it in time, this act can consist only in the\ncapacity which the cognition emphasized has for producing an effect upon memory,\nor otherwise influencing subsequent thought. This is confirmed by the fact that\nattention is a matter of continuous quantity; for continuous quantity, so far as\nwe know it, reduces itself in the last analysis to time. Accordingly, we find\nthat attention does, in fact, produce a very great effect upon subsequent\nthought. In the first place, it strongly affects memory, a thought being\nremembered for a longer time the greater the attention originally paid to it. In\nthe second place, the greater the attention, the closer the connection and the\nmore accurate the logical sequence of thought. In the third place, by attention a\nthought may be recovered which has been forgotten. From these facts, we gather\nthat attention is the power by which thought at one time is connected with and\nmade to relate to thought at another time; or, to apply the conception of thought\nas a sign, that it is the \u003cI\u003epure demonstrative application\u003c/I\u003e of a thought-sign.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.296\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Attention is roused when the same phenomenon presents itself repeatedly on\ndifferent occasions, or the same predicate in different subjects. We see that \u003cI\u003eA\u003c/I\u003e\nhas a certain character, that \u003cI\u003eB\u003c/I\u003e has the same, \u003cI\u003eC\u003c/I\u003e has the same; and this excites\nour attention, so that we say, \"\u003cI\u003eThese\u003c/I\u003e have this character.\" Thus attention is an\nact of induction; but it is an induction which does not increase our knowledge,\nbecause our \"these\" covers nothing but the instances experienced. It is, in\nshort, an argument from enumeration.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.297\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Attention produces effects upon the nervous system. These effects are\nhabits, or nervous associations. A habit arises, when, having had the sensation\nof performing a certain act, \u003cI\u003em,\u003c/I\u003e on several occasions \u003cI\u003ea, b, c,\u003c/I\u003e we come to do it\nupon every occurrence of the general event, \u003cI\u003el,\u003c/I\u003e of which \u003cI\u003ea, b\u003c/I\u003e and \u003cI\u003ec\u003c/I\u003e are special\ncases. That is to say, by the cognition that\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cCENTER\u003e\nEvery case of \u003cI\u003ea, b,\u003c/I\u003e or \u003cI\u003ec,\u003c/I\u003e is a case of \u003cI\u003em,\u003c/I\u003e\n\u003c/CENTER\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\nis determined the cognition that\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cCENTER\u003e\nEvery case of \u003cI\u003el\u003c/I\u003e is a case of \u003cI\u003em.\u003c/I\u003e\n\u003c/CENTER\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\nThus the formation of a habit is an induction, and is therefore necessarily\nconnected with attention or abstraction. Voluntary actions result from the\nsensations produced by habits, as instinctive actions result from our original\nnature.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.298\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e We have thus seen that every sort of modification of consciousness –\nAttention, Sensation, and Understanding — is an inference. But the objection may\nbe made that inference deals only with general terms, and that an image, or\nabsolutely singular representation, cannot therefore be inferred.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.299\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e \"Singular\" and \"individual\" are equivocal terms. A singular may mean that\nwhich can be but in one place at one time. In this sense it is not opposed to\ngeneral. \u003cI\u003eThe sun\u003c/I\u003e is a singular in this sense, but, as is explained in every good\ntreatise on logic, it is a general term. I may have a very general conception of\nHermolaus Barbarus, but still I conceive him only as able to be in one place at\none time. When an image is said to be singular, it is meant that it is absolutely\ndeterminate in all respects. Every possible character, or the negative thereof,\nmust be true of such an image. In the words of the most eminent expounder of the\ndoctrine, the image of a man \"must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny;\na straight or a crooked; a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man.\" It must be\nof a man with his mouth open or his mouth shut, whose hair is precisely of such\nand such a shade, and whose figure has precisely such and such proportions. No\nstatement of Locke has been so scouted by all friends of images as his denial\nthat the \"idea\" of a triangle must be either of an obtuse-angled, right-angled,\nor acute-angled triangle. In fact, the image of a triangle must be of one, each\nof whose angles is of a certain number of degrees, minutes, and seconds.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.300\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e This being so, it is apparent that no man has a \u003cI\u003etrue\u003c/I\u003e image of the road to\nhis office, or of any other real thing. Indeed he has no image of it at all\nunless he can not only recognize it, but imagines it (truly or falsely) in all\nits infinite details. This being the case, it becomes very doubtful whether we\never have any such thing as an image in our imagination. Please, reader, to look\nat a bright red book, or other brightly colored object, and then to shut your\neyes and say whether you see that color, whether brightly or faintly — whether,\nindeed, there is anything like sight there. Hume and the other followers of\nBerkeley maintain that there is no difference between the sight and the memory of\nthe red book except in \"their different degrees of force and vivacity.\" \"The\ncolors which the memory employs,\" says Hume, \"are faint and dull compared with\nthose in which our original perceptions are clothed.\" If this were a correct\nstatement of the difference, we should remember the book as being less red than\nit is; whereas, in fact, we remember the color with very great precision for a\nfew moments (please to test this point, reader), although we do not see anything\nlike it. We carry away absolutely nothing of the color except the \u003cI\u003econsciousness\nthat we could recognize it.\u003c/I\u003e As a further proof of this, I will request the reader\nto try a little experiment. Let him call up, if he can, the image of a horse –\nnot of one which he has ever seen, but of an imaginary one — and before reading\nfurther let him by \u003cA NAME=\"notemark6\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA\nHREF=\"#note6\"\u003econtemplation\u003c/A\u003e fix the image in his memory . . . . Has the reader done as requested? for I protest that it is not fair play to read\nfurther without doing so. — Now, the reader can say in general of what color\nthat horse was, whether grey, bay, or black. But he probably cannot say \u003cI\u003eprecisely\u003c/I\u003e\nof what shade it was. He cannot state this as exactly as he could just after\nhaving \u003cI\u003eseen\u003c/I\u003e such a horse. But why, if he had an image in his mind which no more\nhad the general color than it had the particular shade, has the latter vanished\nso instantaneously from his memory while the former still remains? It may be\nreplied, that we always forget the details before we do the more general\ncharacters; but that this answer is insufficient is, I think, shown by the\nextreme disproportion between the length of time that the exact shade of\nsomething looked at is remembered as compared with that instantaneous oblivion to\nthe exact shade of the thing imagined, and the but slightly superior vividness of\nthe memory of the thing seen as compared with the memory of the thing imagined.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.301\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e The nominalists, I suspect, confound together thinking a triangle without\nthinking that it is either equilateral, isosceles, or scalene, and thinking a\ntriangle without thinking whether it is equilateral, isosceles, or scalene.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.302\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e It is important to remember that we have no intuitive power of\ndistinguishing between one subjective mode of cognition and another; and hence\noften think that something is presented to us as a picture, while it is really\nconstructed from slight data by the understanding. This is the case with dreams,\nas is shown by the frequent impossibility of giving an intelligible account of\none without adding something which we feel was not in the dream itself. Many\ndreams, of which the waking memory makes elaborate and consistent stories, must\nprobably have been in fact mere jumbles of these feelings of the ability to\nrecognize this and that which I have just alluded to.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.303\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e I will now go so far as to say that we have no images even in actual\nperception. It will be sufficient to prove this in the case of vision; for if no\npicture is seen when we look at an object, it will not be claimed that hearing,\ntouch, and the other senses, are superior to sight in this respect. That the\npicture is not painted on the nerves of the retina is absolutely certain, if, as\nphysiologists inform us, these nerves are needlepoints pointing to the light and\nat distances considerably greater than the \u003cI\u003eminimum visibile.\u003c/I\u003e The same thing is\nshown by our not being able to perceive that there is a large blind spot near the\nmiddle of the retina. If, then, we have a picture before us when we see, it is\none constructed by the mind at the suggestion of previous sensations. Supposing\nthese sensations to be signs, the understanding by reasoning from them could\nattain all the knowledge of outward things which we derive from sight, while the\nsensations are quite inadequate to forming an image or representation absolutely\ndeterminate. If we have such an image or picture, we must have in our minds a\nrepresentation of a surface which is only a part of every surface we see, and we\nmust see that each part, however small, has such and such a color. If we look\nfrom some distance at a speckled surface, it seems as if we did not see whether\nit were speckled or not; but if we have an image before us, it must appear to us\neither as speckled, or as not speckled. Again, the eye by education comes to\ndistinguish minute differences of color; but if we see only absolutely\ndeterminate images, we must, no less before our eyes are trained than afterwards,\nsee each color as particularly such and such a shade. Thus to suppose that we\nhave an image before us when we see, is not only a hypothesis which explains\nnothing whatever, but is one which actually creates difficulties which require\nnew hypotheses in order to explain them away.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.304\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e One of these difficulties arises from the fact that the details are less\neasily distinguished than, and forgotten before, the general circumstances. Upon\nthis theory, the general features exist in the details: the details are, in fact,\nthe whole picture. It seems, then, very strange that that which exists only\nsecondarily in the picture should make more impression than the picture itself.\nIt is true that in an old painting the details are not easily made out; but this\nis because we know that the blackness is the result of time, and is no part of\nthe picture itself. There is no difficulty in making out the details of the\npicture as it looks at present; the only difficulty is in guessing what it used\nto be. But if we have a picture on the retina, the minutest details are there as\nmuch as, nay, more than, the general outline and significancy of it. Yet that\nwhich must actually be seen, it is extremely difficult to recognize; while that\nwhich is only abstracted from what is seen is very obvious.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.305\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e But the conclusive argument against our having any images, or absolutely\ndeterminate representations in perception, is that in that case we have the\nmaterials in each such representation for an infinite amount of conscious\ncognition, which we yet never become aware of. Now there is no meaning in saying\nthat we have something in our minds which never has the least effect on what we\nare conscious of knowing. The most that can be said is, that when we see we are\nput in a condition in which we are able to get a very large and perhaps\nindefinitely great amount of knowledge of the visible qualities of objects.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.306\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Moreover, that perceptions are not absolutely determinate and singular is\nobvious from the fact that each sense is an abstracting mechanism. Sight by\nitself informs us only of colors and forms. No one can pretend that the images of\nsight are determinate in reference to taste. They are, therefore, so far general\nthat they are neither sweet nor non-sweet, bitter nor non-bitter, having savor\nnor insipid.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.307\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e The next question is whether we have any general conceptions except in\n\njudgments. In perception, where we know a thing as existing, it is plain that\nthere is a judgment that the thing exists, since a mere general concept of a\nthing is in no case a cognition of it as existing. It has usually been said,\nhowever, that we can call up any concept without making any judgment; but it\nseems that in this case we only arbitrarily suppose ourselves to have an\nexperience. In order to conceive the number 7, I suppose, that is, I arbitrarily\nmake the hypothesis or judgment, that there are certain points before my eyes,\nand I judge that these are seven. This seems to be the most simple and rational\nview of the matter, and I may add that it is the one which has been adopted by\nthe best logicians. If this be the case, what goes by the name of the association\nof images is in reality an association of judgments. The association of ideas is\nsaid to proceed according to three principles — those of resemblance, of\ncontiguity, and of causality. But it would be equally true to say that signs\ndenote what they do on the three principles of resemblance, contiguity, and\ncausality. There can be no question that anything \u003cI\u003eis\u003c/I\u003e a sign of whatever is\nassociated with it by resemblance, by contiguity, or by causality: nor can there\nbe any doubt that any sign recalls the thing signified. So, then, the association\nof ideas consists in this, that a judgment occasions another judgment, of which\nit is the sign. Now this is nothing less nor more than inference.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.308\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Everything in which we take the least interest creates in us its own\nparticular emotion, however slight this may be. This emotion is a sign and a\npredicate of the thing. Now, when a thing resembling this thing is presented to\nus, a similar emotion arises; hence, we immediately infer that the latter is like\nthe former. A formal logician of the old school may say, that in logic no term\ncan enter into the conclusion which had not been contained in the premisses, and\nthat therefore the suggestion of something new must be essentially different from\ninference. But I reply that that rule of logic applies only to those arguments\nwhich are technically called completed. We can and do reason –\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cCENTER\u003e\nElias was a man;\u003cBR\u003e\n[Ergo,].\tHe was mortal.\n\u003c/CENTER\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\nAnd this argument is just as valid as the full syllogism, although it is so only\nbecause the major premiss of the latter happens to be true. If to pass from the\njudgment \"Elias was a man\" to the judgment \"Elias was mortal,\" without actually\nsaying to one\u0027s self that \"All men are mortal,\" is not inference, then the term\n\"inference\" is used in so restricted a sense that inferences hardly occur outside\nof a logic-book.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.309\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e What is here said of association by resemblance is true of all association.\nAll association is by signs. Everything has its subjective or emotional\nqualities, which are attributed either absolutely or relatively, or by\nconventional imputation to anything which is a sign of it. And so we reason,\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cCENTER\u003e\n The sign is such and such;\u003cBR\u003e\n[Ergo,]\tThe sign is that thing.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003c/CENTER\u003e\nThis conclusion receiving, however, a modification, owing to other\nconsiderations, so as to become –\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cCENTER\u003e\nThe sign is almost (is representative of) that thing.\n\u003c/CENTER\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.310\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e We come now to the consideration of the last of the four principles whose\nconsequences we were to trace; namely, that the absolutely incognizable is\nabsolutely inconceivable. That upon Cartesian principles the very realities of\nthings can never be known in the least, most competent persons must long ago have\nbeen convinced. Hence the breaking forth of idealism, which is essentially\nanti-Cartesian, in every direction, whether among empiricists (Berkeley, Hume),\nor among noologists (Hegel, Fichte). The principle now brought under discussion\nis directly idealistic; for, since the meaning of a word is the conception it\nconveys, the absolutely incognizable has no meaning because no conception\nattaches to it. It is, therefore, a meaningless word; and, consequently, whatever\nis meant by any term as \"the real\" is cognizable in some degree, and so is of the\nnature of a cognition, in the objective sense of that term.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.311\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e At any moment we are in possession of certain information, that is, of\ncognitions which have been logically derived by induction and hypothesis from\nprevious cognitions which are less general, less distinct, and of which we have a\nless lively consciousness. These in their turn have been derived from others\nstill less general, less distinct, and less vivid; and so on back\nto the \u003cA NAME=\"notemark7\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#note7\"\u003eideal\u003c/A\u003e first, which is quite singular, and quite out of consciousness. This ideal\nfirst is the particular thing-in-itself. It does not exist \u003cI\u003eas such.\u003c/I\u003e That is,\nthere is no thing which is in-itself in the sense of not being relative to the\nmind, though things which are relative to the mind doubtless are, apart from that\nrelation. The cognitions which thus reach us by this infinite series of\ninductions and hypotheses (which though infinite \u003cI\u003ea parte ante logice,\u003c/I\u003e is yet as\none continuous process not without a beginning \u003cI\u003ein time\u003c/I\u003e) are of two kinds, the\ntrue and the untrue, or cognitions whose objects are \u003cI\u003ereal\u003c/I\u003e and those whose objects\nare \u003cI\u003eunreal.\u003c/I\u003e And what do we mean by the real? It is a conception which we must\nfirst have had when we discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion; that is,\nwhen we first corrected ourselves. Now the distinction for which alone this fact\nlogically called, was between an \u003cI\u003eens\u003c/I\u003e relative to private inward determinations,\nto the negations belonging to idiosyncrasy, and an \u003cI\u003eens\u003c/I\u003e such as would stand in the\nlong run. The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and\nreasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the\nvagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows\nthat this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without\ndefinite limits, and capable of a definite increase of knowledge. And so those\ntwo series of cognition — the real and the unreal — consist of those which, at\na time sufficiently future, the community will always continue to re-affirm; and\nof those which, under the same conditions, will ever after be denied. Now, a\nproposition whose falsity can never be discovered, and the error of which\ntherefore is absolutely incognizable, contains, upon our principle, absolutely no\nerror. Consequently, that which is thought in these cognitions is the real, as it\nreally is. There is nothing, then, to prevent our knowing outward things as they\nreally are, and it is most likely that we do thus know them in numberless cases,\nalthough we can never be absolutely certain of doing so in any special case.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.312\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e But it follows that since no cognition of ours is absolutely determinate,\ngenerals must have a real existence. Now this scholastic realism is usually set\ndown as a belief in metaphysical fictions. But, in fact, a realist is simply one\nwho knows no more recondite reality than that which is represented in a true\nrepresentation. Since, therefore, the word \"man\" is true of something, that which\n\"man\" means is real. The nominalist must admit that man is truly applicable to\nsomething; but he believes that there is beneath this a thing in itself, an\nincognizable reality. His is the metaphysical figment. Modern nominalists are\nmostly superficial men, who do not know, as the more thorough Roscellinus and\nOccam did, that a reality which has no representation is one which has no\nrelation and no quality. The great argument for nominalism is that there is no\nman unless there is some particular man. That, however, does not affect the\nrealism of Scotus; for although there is no man of whom all further determination\ncan be denied, yet there is a man, abstraction being made of all further\ndetermination. There is a real difference between man irrespective of what the\nother determinations may be, and man with this or that particular series of\ndeterminations, although undoubtedly this difference is only relative to the mind\nand not \u003cI\u003ein re.\u003c/I\u003e Such is the position of \u003cA NAME=\"notemark8\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA\nHREF=\"#note8\"\u003eScotus\u003c/A\u003e. \u003cA NAME=\"notemark9\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\u003cA\nHREF=\"#note9\"\u003eOccam\u0027s great objection\u003c/A\u003e is, there can be no real distinction which is not \u003cI\u003ein re,\u003c/I\u003e in the thing-in-itself; but this begs the question for it is itself based only on the notion that reality is\nsomething independent of representative relation.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.313\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Such being the nature of reality in general, in what does the reality of\nthe mind consist? We have seen that the content of consciousness, the entire\nphenomenal manifestation of mind, is a sign resulting from inference. Upon our\nprinciple, therefore, that the absolutely incognizable does not exist, so that\nthe phenomenal manifestation of a substance is the substance, we must conclude\nthat the mind is a sign developing according to the laws of inference. What\ndistinguishes a man from a word? There is a distinction doubtless. The material\nqualities, the forces which constitute the pure denotative application, and the\nmeaning of the human sign, are all exceedingly complicated in comparison with\nthose of the word. But these differences are only relative. What other is there?\nIt may be said that man is conscious, while a word is not. But consciousness is a\nvery vague term. It may mean that emotion which accompanies the reflection that\nwe have animal life. This is a consciousness which is dimmed when animal life is\nat its ebb in old age, or sleep, but which is not dimmed when the spiritual life\nis at its ebb; which is the more lively the better \u003cI\u003eanimal\u003c/I\u003e a man is, but which is\nnot so, the better \u003cI\u003eman\u003c/I\u003e he is. We do not attribute this sensation to words,\nbecause we have reason to believe that it is dependent upon the possession of an\nanimal body. But this consciousness, being a mere sensation, is only a part of\nthe \u003cI\u003ematerial quality\u003c/I\u003e of the man-sign. Again, consciousness is sometimes used to\nsignify the \u003cI\u003eI think,\u003c/I\u003e or unity in thought; but the unity is nothing but\nconsistency, or the recognition of it. Consistency belongs to every sign, so far\nas it is a sign; and therefore every sign, since it signifies primarily that it\nis a sign, signifies its own consistency. The man-sign acquires information, and\ncomes to mean more than he did before. But so do words. Does not electricity mean\nmore now than it did in the days of Franklin? Man makes the word, and the word\nmeans nothing which the man has not made it mean, and that only to some man. But\nsince man can think only by means of words or other external symbols, these might\nturn round and say: \"You mean nothing which we have not taught you, and then only\nso far as you address some word as the interpretant of your thought.\" In fact,\ntherefore, men and words reciprocally educate each other; each increase of a\nman\u0027s information involves and is involved by, a corresponding increase of a\nword\u0027s information.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.314\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Without fatiguing the reader by stretching this parallelism too far, it is\nsufficient to say that there is no element whatever of man\u0027s consciousness which\nhas not something corresponding to it in the word; and the reason is obvious. It\nis that the word or sign which man uses is the man himself. For, as the fact that\nevery thought is a sign, taken in conjunction with the fact that life is a train\nof thought, proves that man is a sign; so, that every thought is an \u003cI\u003eexternal\u003c/I\u003e\nsign, proves that man is an external sign. That is to say, the man and the\nexternal sign are identical, in the same sense in which the words \u003cI\u003ehomo\u003c/I\u003e and \u003cI\u003eman\u003c/I\u003e\nare identical. Thus my language is the sum total of myself; for the man is the\nthought.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.315\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e It is hard for man to understand this, because he persists in identifying\nhimself with his will, his power over the animal organism, with brute force. Now\nthe organism is only an instrument of thought. But the identity of a man consists\nin the consistency of what he does and thinks, and \u003cI\u003econsistency\u003c/I\u003e is the\nintellectual character of a thing; that is, is its expressing something.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.316\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e Finally, as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to be known\nto be in the ideal state of complete information, so that reality depends on the\nultimate decision of the community; so thought is what it is, only by virtue of\nits addressing a future thought which is in its value as thought identical with\nit, though more developed. In this way, the existence of thought now depends on\nwhat is to be hereafter; so that it has only a potential existence, dependent on\nthe future thought of the community.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cA NAME=\"CP5.317\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e The individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by\nignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, and from\nwhat he and they are to be, is only a negation. This is man,\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cBLOCKQUOTE\u003e\n\t\". . . proud man,\u003cBR\u003e\n\tMost ignorant of what he\u0027s most assured,\u003cBR\u003e\n\tHis glassy essence.\"\n\u003c/BLOCKQUOTE\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cHR\u003e\n\u003cCENTER\u003e\n\u003cH2\u003eNotes\u003c/H2\u003e\n\u003c/CENTER\u003e\n\u003ca name=\"note1\"\u003e1.\u003c/a\u003e Several persons versed in logic have objected that I have here quite misapplied the term \u003cI\u003ehypothesis,\u003c/I\u003e and that what I so designate is an argument from \u003cI\u003eanalogy.\u003c/I\u003e It is a sufficient reply to say that the example of the cipher has been given as an apt illustration of hypothesis by Descartes (Rule 10, \u003cCITE\u003eOeuvres choisies:\u003c/CITE\u003e Paris, 1865, page 334), by Leibniz (\u003cCITE\u003eNouveaux Essais,\u003c/CITE\u003e lib. 4, ch. 12, \u0026sect;13, Ed. Erdmann, p. 383 \u003cI\u003eb\u003c/I\u003e), and (as I learn from D. Stewart; \u003cCITE\u003eWorks,\u003c/CITE\u003e vol. 3, pp. 305 et seqq.) by Gravesande, Boscovich, Hartley, and G.L. Le Sage. The term \u003cI\u003eHypothesis\u003c/I\u003e has been used in the following senses: 1. For the theme or proposition forming the subject of discourse. 2. For an assumption. Aristotle divides \u003cI\u003etheses\u003c/I\u003e or propositions adopted without any reason into definitions and hypotheses. The latter are propositions stating the existence of something. Thus the geometer says, \"Let there be a triangle.\" 3. For a condition in a general sense. We are said to seek other things than happiness \u003cI\u003eex hypotheseos,\u003c/I\u003e conditionally. The best republic is the ideally perfect, the second the best on earth, the third the best \u003cI\u003eex hypotheseos,\u003c/I\u003e under the circumstances. Freedom is the \u003cI\u003ehypothesis\u003c/I\u003e or condition of democracy. 4. For the antecedent of a hypothetical proposition. 5. For an oratorical question which assumes facts. 6. In the \u003cCITE\u003eSynopsis\u003c/CITE\u003e of Psellus, for the reference of a subject to the things it denotes. 7. Most commonly in modern times, for the conclusion of an argument from consequence and consequent to antecedent. This is my use of the term. 8. For such a conclusion when too weak to be a theory accepted into the body of a science.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\tI give a few authorities to support the seventh use:\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cCITE\u003eChauvin. — Lexicon Rationale,\u003c/CITE\u003e 1st Ed. — \"Hypothesis est propositio, qu\u0026aelig; assumitur ad probandum aliam veritatem incognitam. Requirunt multi, ut h\u0026aelig;c hypothesis vera esse cognoscatur, etiam antequam appareat, an alia ex ea deduci possint. Verum aiunt alii, hoc unum desiderari, ut hypothesis pro vera admittatur, quod nempe ex hac talia deducitur, qu\u0026aelig; respondent ph\u0026aelig;nomenis, et satisfaciunt omnibus difficultatibus, qu\u0026aelig; hac parte in re, et in iis qu\u0026aelig; de ea apparent, occurrebant.\" \n\u003cP\u003e\n\t\u003cCITE\u003eNewton.\u003c/CITE\u003e — \"Hactenus ph\u0026aelig;nomena coelorum et maris nostri per vim gravitatis exposui, sed causam gravitatis nondum assignavi . . . Rationem vero harum gravitatis proprietatum ex ph\u0026aelig;nomenis nondum potui deducere, et hypotheses non fingo. Quicquid enim ex ph\u0026aelig;nomenis non deducitur, \u003cI\u003ehypothesis\u003c/I\u003e vocanda est . . . In hac Philosophi\u0026acirc; Propositiones deducuntur ex ph\u0026aelig;nomenis, et redduntur generales per inductionem.\" \u003cCITE\u003ePrincipia.\u003c/CITE\u003e \u003cI\u003eAd fin.\u003c/I\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cCITE\u003e\tSir Wm. Hamilton.\u003c/CITE\u003e — \"Hypotheses, that is, propositions which\nare assumed with probability, in order to explain or prove something else which cannot otherwise be explained or proved.\" — \u003cCITE\u003eLectures on Logic\u003c/CITE\u003e (Am. Ed.), p. 188.\n\u003cBR\u003e\n\t\"The name of \u003cI\u003ehypothesis\u003c/I\u003e is more emphatically given to provisory\n\tsuppositions, which serve to explain the phenomena in so far as observed, but which are only asserted to be true, if ultimately confirmed by a complete induction.\" — Ibid., p. 364. \n\u003cBR\u003e\n\t\"When a phenomenon is presented which can be explained by no\nprinciple afforded through experience, we feel discontented and uneasy; and there arises an effort to discover some cause which may, at least provisionally, account for the outstanding phenomenon; and this cause is finally recognized as valid and true, if, through it, the given phenomenon is found to obtain a full and perfect explanation. The judgment in which a phenomenon is referred to such a problematic cause, is called a \u003cI\u003eHypothesis.\"\u003c/I\u003e — Ibid., pp. 449, 450. See also \u003cCITE\u003eLectures on Metaphysics,\u003c/CITE\u003e p. 117. \n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cCITE\u003e\tJ.S. Mill.\u003c/CITE\u003e — \"An hypothesis is any supposition which we make\n\t(either without actual evidence, or on evidence avowedly insufficient), in order to endeavor to deduce from it conclusions in accordance with facts which are known to be real; under the idea that if the conclusions to which the hypothesis leads are known truths, the hypothesis itself either must be, or at least is likely to be true.\" — \u003cCITE\u003eLogic\u003c/CITE\u003e (6th Ed.), vol. 2, p. 8.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cCITE\u003e\tKant.\u003c/CITE\u003e — \"\u003cI\u003eIf all the consequents of a cognition are true, the\ncognition itself is true.\u003c/I\u003e . . . It is allowable, therefore, to conclude from consequent to a reason, but without being able to determine this reason. From the complexus of all consequents alone can we conclude the truth of a determinate reason . . . The difficulty with this \u003cI\u003epositive\u003c/I\u003e and \u003cI\u003edirect\u003c/I\u003e mode of inference \u003cI\u003e(modus ponens)\u003c/I\u003e is that the totality of the consequents cannot be apodeictically recognized, and that we are therefore led by this mode of inference only to a probable and \u003cI\u003ehypothetically\u003c/I\u003e true cognition \u003cI\u003e(Hypotheses).\u003c/I\u003e\" — \u003cCITE\u003eLogik\u003c/CITE\u003e by J\u0026auml;sche; \u003cCITE\u003eWerke,\u003c/CITE\u003e Ed. Rosenk. and Sch., vol. 3, p. 221.\n\n\u003cBR\u003e\n\t\"A hypothesis is the judgment of the truth of a reason on\n\taccount of the sufficiency of the consequents.\" — Ibid., p. 262.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cCITE\u003e\tHerbart.\u003c/CITE\u003e — \"We can make hypotheses, thence deduce consequents,\n\tand afterwards see whether the latter accord with experience. Such suppositions are termed hypotheses.\" — \u003cCITE\u003eEinleitung; Werke,\u003c/CITE\u003e vol. 1, p. 53.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003cCITE\u003eBeneke.\u003c/CITE\u003e — \"Affirmative inferences from consequent to\n\tantecedent, or hypotheses.\" — \u003cCITE\u003eSystem der Logik,\u003c/CITE\u003e vol. 2, p.\n\t103.\n\u003cP\u003e\n\tThere would be no difficulty in greatly multiplying\n\tthese citations.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#notemark1\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eReturn to text.\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003ca name=\"note2\"\u003e2.\u003c/a\u003e A judgment concerning a minimum of\ninformation, for the theory of which see my paper on Comprehension and Extension, in the \u003cA HREF=\"p34.html\"\u003e\u003cCITE\u003eProceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences,\u003c/CITE\u003e vol. 7, p. 426\u003c/A\u003e.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#notemark2\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eReturn to text.\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003ca name=\"note3\"\u003e3.\u003c/a\u003e Observe that I say \u003cI\u003ein itself.\u003c/I\u003e I am not\nso wild as to deny that my sensation of red today is like my\nsensation of red yesterday. I only say that the similarity can\n\u003cI\u003econsist\u003c/I\u003e only in the physiological force behind consciousness\n– which leads me to say, I recognize this feeling the same as the former one, and so does not consist in a community of sensation. \u003cBR\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#notemark3\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eReturn to text.\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003ca name=\"note4\"\u003e4.\u003c/a\u003e Accordingly, just as we say that a body is\nin motion, and not that motion is in a body we ought to say that\nwe are in thought and not that thoughts are in us.\u003cBR\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#notemark4\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eReturn to text.\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003ca name=\"note5\"\u003e5.\u003c/a\u003e On quality, relation, and representation,\nsee \u003cA HREF=\"p32.html\"\u003e\u003cCITE\u003eProceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences,\u003c/CITE\u003e vol. 7, p. 293\u003c/A\u003e.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#notemark5\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eReturn to text.\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003ca name=\"note6\"\u003e6.\u003c/a\u003e No person whose native tongue is English will\nneed to be informed that contemplation is essentially (1) protracted,\n(2) voluntary, and (3) an action, and that it is never used for that\nwhich is set forth to the mind in this act. A foreigner can convince\nhimself of this by the proper study of English writers. Thus, Locke\n(\u003cCITE\u003eEssay concerning Human Understanding,\u003c/CITE\u003e Book II, chap. 19, \u0026sect; 1) says,\n\"If it [an idea] be held there [in view] long under attentive\nconsideration, \u0027tis \u003cI\u003eContemplation\";\u003c/I\u003e and again (\u003cI\u003eIbid.,\u003c/I\u003e Book II, chap.\n10, \u0026sect; 1) \"keeping the \u003cI\u003eIdea\u003c/I\u003e which is brought into it [the mind] for\nsome time actually in view, which is called \u003cI\u003eContemplation.\"\u003c/I\u003e This term\nis therefore unfitted to translate \u003cI\u003eAnschauung;\u003c/I\u003e for this latter does\nnot imply an act which is necessarily protracted or voluntary, and\ndenotes most usually a mental presentation, sometimes a faculty, less\noften the reception of an impression in the mind, and seldom, if\never, an action. To the translation of \u003cI\u003eAnschauung\u003c/I\u003e by intuition, there\nis, at least, no such insufferable objection. Etymologically, the two\nwords precisely correspond. The original philosophical meaning of\nintuition was a cognition of the present manifold in that character;\nand it is now commonly used, as a modern writer says, \"to include all\nthe products of the perceptive (external or internal) and imaginative\nfaculties; every act of consciousness, in short, of which the\nimmediate object is an \u003cI\u003eindividual,\u003c/I\u003e thing, act, or state of mind,\npresented under the condition of distinct existence in space and\ntime.\" Finally, we have the authority of Kant\u0027s own example for\ntranslating his \u003cI\u003eAnschauung\u003c/I\u003e by \u003cI\u003eIntuitus;\u003c/I\u003e and indeed this is the common\nusage of Germans writing Latin. Moreover, \u003cI\u003eintuitiv\u003c/I\u003e frequently\nreplaces \u003cI\u003eanschauend\u003c/I\u003e or \u003cI\u003eanschaulich.\u003c/I\u003e If this constitutes a\nmisunderstanding of Kant, it is one which is shared by himself and\nnearly all his countrymen.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#notemark6\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eReturn to text.\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003ca name=\"note7\"\u003e7.\u003c/a\u003e By an ideal, I mean the limit which the\npossible cannot attain.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#notemark7\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eReturn to text.\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003ca name=\"note8\"\u003e8.\u003c/a\u003e \"Eadem natura est, qu\u0026aelig; in existentia per\ngradum singularitatis est determinata, et in intellectu, hoc est ut habet relationem ad intellectum ut cognitum ad cognoscens, est indeterminata.\" — \u003cCITE\u003eQuaestiones Subtillissimae,\u003c/CITE\u003e lib. 7, qu. 18.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#notemark8\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eReturn to text.\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n\u003cP\u003e\n\u003ca name=\"note9\"\u003e9.\u003c/a\u003e See his argument \u003cI\u003eSumma logices,\u003c/I\u003e part. 1,\ncap. 16.\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cA HREF=\"#notemark9\"\u003e\u003cB\u003eReturn to text.\u003c/B\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}