Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
{"WorkMasterId":5519,"WpPageId":263337,"ParentWpPageId":189587,"Slug":"dialogues-concerning-natural-religion","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/david-hume/dialogues-concerning-natural-religion/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/david-hume/dialogues-concerning-natural-religion/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":294489,"CleanHtmlLength":238379,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion","Deck":"Hume stages arguments over design, evil, analogy, skepticism, and the limits of natural theology through Philo, Cleanthes, and Demea.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to David Hume","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/david-hume/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"David Hume","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/david-hume/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/david-hume-01-ramsay-1754-1.jpg","ImageAlt":"David Hume by Allan Ramsay, 1754","FilterTerra":"Western Europe","ClickText":"David Hume","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/david-hume/","Copies":["1711 CE – 1776 CE","Edinburgh","Scottish Enlightenment philosopher who transformed empiricism, skepticism, moral psychology, aesthetics, political economy, natural religion, and the philosophy of science through a systematic science of human nature."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:3","Title":"Early Modern History","DateText":"1500 CE – 1799 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-early-modern-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:9","Title":"Enlightenment and Proto-Industrial","DateText":"1700 CE – 1799 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-early-modern-history/philosophers-of-the-enlightenment-and-proto-industrial/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"1779 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Displayed year follows the 1779 posthumous publication; composition and revision began much earlier.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:2"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:GBR:1"}],"OriginalTitle":"Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion","Language":"English","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:philosophy-of-religion"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:metaphysics"}],"Tradition":"Scottish Enlightenment","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #4583 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Hume stages arguments over design, evil, analogy, skepticism, and the limits of natural theology through Philo, Cleanthes, and Demea."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"Dialogues on Natural Religion","KeyConcepts":"design argument; natural theology; evil; analogy; skepticism; God; dialogue","Methodology":"Empirical psychology, skeptical argument, historical explanation, literary essay, naturalistic moral analysis, and close attention to how belief, custom, sympathy, language, and institutions work in human life.","Structure":"The public page presents the work title, date note, disciplinary placement, philosophical focus, direct Hume authorship, and an explicit note that public text resources are evidence rather than a full-text badge."},"Arguments":["Hume stages arguments over design, evil, analogy, skepticism, and the limits of natural theology through Philo, Cleanthes, and Demea."],"Influence":{"InfluencedBy":"John Locke, George Berkeley, Isaac Newton, Francis Hutcheson, Pierre Bayle, classical skepticism, British moralists, and early modern natural philosophy.","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Accepted as Hume\u0027s major dialogical work on natural religion, published after his death.","The work remains central because Hume reframes philosophy around human psychology, evidence, probability, social practice, and the limits of reason."],"EvidenceNote":["Accepted as Hume\u0027s major dialogical work on natural religion, published after his death."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Versions","BodyHtml":"\u003cdiv class=\"dz-philo__full-version-grid\"\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-version-card\"\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-provider\"\u003eProject Gutenberg\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3 class=\"dz-philo__full-version-title\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #4583\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-meta\"\u003eHtmlText · Imported\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ca class=\"dz-philo__full-version-link\" href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4583\"\u003eOpen full version\u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["Hume stages arguments over design, evil, analogy, skepticism, and the limits of natural theology through Philo, Cleanthes, and Demea."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":"Dialogues on Natural Religion"},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"design argument; natural theology; evil; analogy; skepticism; God; dialogue"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Empirical psychology, skeptical argument, historical explanation, literary essay, naturalistic moral analysis, and close attention to how belief, custom, sympathy, language, and institutions work in human life."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"The public page presents the work title, date note, disciplinary placement, philosophical focus, direct Hume authorship, and an explicit note that public text resources are evidence rather than a full-text badge."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Hume stages arguments over design, evil, analogy, skepticism, and the limits of natural theology through Philo, Cleanthes, and Demea."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"John Locke, George Berkeley, Isaac Newton, Francis Hutcheson, Pierre Bayle, classical skepticism, British moralists, and early modern natural philosophy."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, J. S. Mill, logical positivism, analytic philosophy, naturalized epistemology, moral sentimentalism, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, and political economy."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Accepted as Hume\u0027s major dialogical work on natural religion, published after his death.","The work remains central because Hume reframes philosophy around human psychology, evidence, probability, social practice, and the limits of reason."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Accepted as Hume\u0027s major dialogical work on natural religion, published after his death."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003ePublic-domain full text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4583\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #4583\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\r\n\u003cH1 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nDialogues Concerning Natural Religion\r\n\u003c/H1\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nby\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH2 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nDavid Hume\r\n\u003c/H2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cTABLE ALIGN=\"center\" WIDTH=\"80%\"\u003e\r\n\u003cTR\u003e\r\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"left\" VALIGN=\"top\" WIDTH=\"25%\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#chap01\"\u003ePART 1\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003c/TD\u003e\r\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"left\" VALIGN=\"top\" WIDTH=\"25%\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#chap02\"\u003ePART 2\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003c/TD\u003e\r\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"left\" VALIGN=\"top\" WIDTH=\"25%\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#chap03\"\u003ePART 3\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003c/TD\u003e\r\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"left\" VALIGN=\"top\" WIDTH=\"25%\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#chap04\"\u003ePART 4\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003c/TD\u003e\r\n\u003c/TR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cTR\u003e\r\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"left\" VALIGN=\"top\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#chap05\"\u003ePART 5\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003c/TD\u003e\r\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"left\" VALIGN=\"top\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#chap06\"\u003ePART 6\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003c/TD\u003e\r\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"left\" VALIGN=\"top\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#chap07\"\u003ePART 7\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003c/TD\u003e\r\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"left\" VALIGN=\"top\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#chap08\"\u003ePART 8\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003c/TD\u003e\r\n\u003c/TR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cTR\u003e\r\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"left\" VALIGN=\"top\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#chap09\"\u003ePART 9\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003c/TD\u003e\r\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"left\" VALIGN=\"top\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#chap10\"\u003ePART 10\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003c/TD\u003e\r\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"left\" VALIGN=\"top\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#chap11\"\u003ePART 11\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003c/TD\u003e\r\n\u003cTD ALIGN=\"left\" VALIGN=\"top\"\u003e\r\n\u003cA HREF=\"#chap12\"\u003ePART 12\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003c/TD\u003e\r\n\u003c/TR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/TABLE\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nPAMPHILUS TO HERMIPPUS\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt has been remarked, my HERMIPPUS, that though the ancient philosophers\r\nconveyed most of their instruction in the form of dialogue, this method\r\nof composition has been little practised in later ages, and has seldom\r\nsucceeded in the hands of those who have attempted it. Accurate and\r\nregular argument, indeed, such as is now expected of philosophical\r\ninquirers, naturally throws a man into the methodical and didactic\r\nmanner; where he can immediately, without preparation, explain the point\r\nat which he aims; and thence proceed, without interruption, to deduce\r\nthe proofs on which it is established. To deliver a SYSTEM in\r\nconversation, scarcely appears natural; and while the dialogue-writer\r\ndesires, by departing from the direct style of composition, to give a\r\nfreer air to his performance, and avoid the appearance of Author and\r\nReader, he is apt to run into a worse inconvenience, and convey the\r\nimage of Pedagogue and Pupil. Or, if he carries on the dispute in the\r\nnatural spirit of good company, by throwing in a variety of topics, and\r\npreserving a proper balance among the speakers, he often loses so much\r\ntime in preparations and transitions, that the reader will scarcely\r\nthink himself compensated, by all the graces of dialogue, for the order,\r\nbrevity, and precision, which are sacrificed to them.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThere are some subjects, however, to which dialogue-writing is peculiarly\r\nadapted, and where it is still preferable to the direct and simple method\r\nof composition.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAny point of doctrine, which is so obvious that it scarcely admits of\r\ndispute, but at the same time so important that it cannot be too often\r\ninculcated, seems to require some such method of handling it; where the\r\nnovelty of the manner may compensate the triteness of the subject; where\r\nthe vivacity of conversation may enforce the precept; and where the\r\nvariety of lights, presented by various personages and characters, may\r\nappear neither tedious nor redundant.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAny question of philosophy, on the other hand, which is so OBSCURE and\r\nUNCERTAIN, that human reason can reach no fixed determination with regard\r\nto it; if it should be treated at all, seems to lead us naturally into\r\nthe style of dialogue and conversation. Reasonable men may be allowed to\r\ndiffer, where no one can reasonably be positive. Opposite sentiments,\r\neven without any decision, afford an agreeable amusement; and if the\r\nsubject be curious and interesting, the book carries us, in a manner,\r\ninto company; and unites the two greatest and purest pleasures of human\r\nlife, study and society.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHappily, these circumstances are all to be found in the subject of\r\nNATURAL RELIGION. What truth so obvious, so certain, as the being of a\r\nGod, which the most ignorant ages have acknowledged, for which the most\r\nrefined geniuses have ambitiously striven to produce new proofs and\r\narguments? What truth so important as this, which is the ground of all\r\nour hopes, the surest foundation of morality, the firmest support of\r\nsociety, and the only principle which ought never to be a moment absent\r\nfrom our thoughts and meditations? But, in treating of this obvious and\r\nimportant truth, what obscure questions occur concerning the nature of\r\nthat Divine Being, his attributes, his decrees, his plan of providence?\r\nThese have been always subjected to the disputations of men; concerning\r\nthese human reason has not reached any certain determination. But these\r\nare topics so interesting, that we cannot restrain our restless inquiry\r\nwith regard to them; though nothing but doubt, uncertainty, and\r\ncontradiction, have as yet been the result of our most accurate\r\nresearches.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThis I had lately occasion to observe, while I passed, as usual, part of\r\nthe summer season with CLEANTHES, and was present at those conversations\r\nof his with PHILO and DEMEA, of which I gave you lately some imperfect\r\naccount. Your curiosity, you then told me, was so excited, that I must,\r\nof necessity, enter into a more exact detail of their reasonings, and\r\ndisplay those various systems which they advanced with regard to so\r\ndelicate a subject as that of natural religion. The remarkable contrast\r\nin their characters still further raised your expectations; while you\r\nopposed the accurate philosophical turn of CLEANTHES to the careless\r\nscepticism of PHILO, or compared either of their dispositions with the\r\nrigid inflexible orthodoxy of DEMEA. My youth rendered me a mere auditor\r\nof their disputes; and that curiosity, natural to the early season of\r\nlife, has so deeply imprinted in my memory the whole chain and connection\r\nof their arguments, that, I hope, I shall not omit or confound any\r\nconsiderable part of them in the recital.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap01\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nPART 1\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAfter I joined the company, whom I found sitting in CLEANTHES\u0027s library,\r\nDEMEA paid CLEANTHES some compliments on the great care which he took of\r\nmy education, and on his unwearied perseverance and constancy in all his\r\nfriendships. The father of PAMPHILUS, said he, was your intimate friend:\r\nThe son is your pupil; and may indeed be regarded as your adopted son,\r\nwere we to judge by the pains which you bestow in conveying to him every\r\nuseful branch of literature and science. You are no more wanting, I am\r\npersuaded, in prudence, than in industry. I shall, therefore, communicate\r\nto you a maxim, which I have observed with regard to my own children,\r\nthat I may learn how far it agrees with your practice. The method I\r\nfollow in their education is founded on the saying of an ancient, \"That\r\nstudents of philosophy ought first to learn logics, then ethics, next\r\nphysics, last of all the nature of the gods.\" [Chrysippus apud Plut: de\r\nrepug: Stoicorum] This science of natural theology, according to him,\r\nbeing the most profound and abstruse of any, required the maturest\r\njudgement in its students; and none but a mind enriched with all the other\r\nsciences, can safely be entrusted with it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAre you so late, says PHILO, in teaching your children the principles of\r\nreligion? Is there no danger of their neglecting, or rejecting altogether\r\nthose opinions of which they have heard so little during the whole course\r\nof their education? It is only as a science, replied DEMEA, subjected to\r\nhuman reasoning and disputation, that I postpone the study of Natural\r\nTheology. To season their minds with early piety, is my chief care; and\r\nby continual precept and instruction, and I hope too by example, I\r\nimprint deeply on their tender minds an habitual reverence for all the\r\nprinciples of religion. While they pass through every other science, I\r\nstill remark the uncertainty of each part; the eternal disputations of\r\nmen; the obscurity of all philosophy; and the strange, ridiculous\r\nconclusions, which some of the greatest geniuses have derived from the\r\nprinciples of mere human reason. Having thus tamed their mind to a proper\r\nsubmission and self-diffidence, I have no longer any scruple of opening\r\nto them the greatest mysteries of religion; nor apprehend any danger from\r\nthat assuming arrogance of philosophy, which may lead them to reject the\r\nmost established doctrines and opinions.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nYour precaution, says PHILO, of seasoning your children\u0027s minds early\r\nwith piety, is certainly very reasonable; and no more than is requisite\r\nin this profane and irreligious age. But what I chiefly admire in your\r\nplan of education, is your method of drawing advantage from the very\r\nprinciples of philosophy and learning, which, by inspiring pride and\r\nself-sufficiency, have commonly, in all ages, been found so destructive\r\nto the principles of religion. The vulgar, indeed, we may remark, who are\r\nunacquainted with science and profound inquiry, observing the endless\r\ndisputes of the learned, have commonly a thorough contempt for\r\nphilosophy; and rivet themselves the faster, by that means, in the great\r\npoints of theology which have been taught them. Those who enter a little\r\ninto study and inquiry, finding many appearances of evidence in\r\ndoctrines the newest and most extraordinary, think nothing too difficult\r\nfor human reason; and, presumptuously breaking through all fences,\r\nprofane the inmost sanctuaries of the temple. But CLEANTHES will, I hope,\r\nagree with me, that, after we have abandoned ignorance, the surest\r\nremedy, there is still one expedient left to prevent this profane\r\nliberty. Let DEMEA\u0027s principles be improved and cultivated: Let us become\r\nthoroughly sensible of the weakness, blindness, and narrow limits of\r\nhuman reason: Let us duly consider its uncertainty and endless\r\ncontrarieties, even in subjects of common life and practice: Let the\r\nerrors and deceits of our very senses be set before us; the insuperable\r\ndifficulties which attend first principles in all systems; the\r\ncontradictions which adhere to the very ideas of matter, cause and\r\neffect, extension, space, time, motion; and in a word, quantity of all\r\nkinds, the object of the only science that can fairly pretend to any\r\ncertainty or evidence. When these topics are displayed in their full\r\nlight, as they are by some philosophers and almost all divines; who can\r\nretain such confidence in this frail faculty of reason as to pay any\r\nregard to its determinations in points so sublime, so abstruse, so remote\r\nfrom common life and experience? When the coherence of the parts of a\r\nstone, or even that composition of parts which renders it extended; when\r\nthese familiar objects, I say, are so inexplicable, and contain\r\ncircumstances so repugnant and contradictory; with what assurance can we\r\ndecide concerning the origin of worlds, or trace their history from\r\neternity to eternity?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhile PHILO pronounced these words, I could observe a smile in the\r\ncountenance both of DEMEA and CLEANTHES. That of DEMEA seemed to imply an\r\nunreserved satisfaction in the doctrines delivered: But, in CLEANTHES\u0027s\r\nfeatures, I could distinguish an air of finesse; as if he perceived some\r\nraillery or artificial malice in the reasonings of PHILO.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nYou propose then, PHILO, said CLEANTHES, to erect religious faith on\r\nphilosophical scepticism; and you think, that if certainty or evidence be\r\nexpelled from every other subject of inquiry, it will all retire to these\r\ntheological doctrines, and there acquire a superior force and authority.\r\nWhether your scepticism be as absolute and sincere as you pretend, we\r\nshall learn by and by, when the company breaks up: We shall then see,\r\nwhether you go out at the door or the window; and whether you really\r\ndoubt if your body has gravity, or can be injured by its fall; according\r\nto popular opinion, derived from our fallacious senses, and more\r\nfallacious experience. And this consideration, DEMEA, may, I think,\r\nfairly serve to abate our ill-will to this humorous sect of the sceptics.\r\nIf they be thoroughly in earnest, they will not long trouble the world\r\nwith their doubts, cavils, and disputes: If they be only in jest, they\r\nare, perhaps, bad raillers; but can never be very dangerous, either to\r\nthe state, to philosophy, or to religion.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn reality, PHILO, continued he, it seems certain, that though a man, in\r\na flush of humour, after intense reflection on the many contradictions\r\nand imperfections of human reason, may entirely renounce all belief and\r\nopinion, it is impossible for him to persevere in this total scepticism,\r\nor make it appear in his conduct for a few hours. External objects press\r\nin upon him; passions solicit him; his philosophical melancholy\r\ndissipates; and even the utmost violence upon his own temper will not be\r\nable, during any time, to preserve the poor appearance of scepticism. And\r\nfor what reason impose on himself such a violence? This is a point in\r\nwhich it will be impossible for him ever to satisfy himself, consistently\r\nwith his sceptical principles. So that, upon the whole, nothing could be\r\nmore ridiculous than the principles of the ancient PYRRHONIANS; if in\r\nreality they endeavoured, as is pretended, to extend, throughout, the\r\nsame scepticism which they had learned from the declamations of their\r\nschools, and which they ought to have confined to them.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn this view, there appears a great resemblance between the sects of the\r\nSTOICS and PYRRHONIANS, though perpetual antagonists; and both of them\r\nseem founded on this erroneous maxim, That what a man can perform\r\nsometimes, and in some dispositions, he can perform always, and in every\r\ndisposition. When the mind, by Stoical reflections, is elevated into a\r\nsublime enthusiasm of virtue, and strongly smit with any species of\r\nhonour or public good, the utmost bodily pain and sufferings will not\r\nprevail over such a high sense of duty; and it is possible, perhaps, by\r\nits means, even to smile and exult in the midst of tortures. If this\r\nsometimes may be the case in fact and reality, much more may a\r\nphilosopher, in his school, or even in his closet, work himself up to\r\nsuch an enthusiasm, and support in imagination the acutest pain or most\r\ncalamitous event which he can possibly conceive. But how shall he support\r\nthis enthusiasm itself? The bent of his mind relaxes, and cannot be\r\nrecalled at pleasure; avocations lead him astray; misfortunes attack him\r\nunawares; and the philosopher sinks by degrees into the plebeian.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI allow of your comparison between the STOICS and SKEPTICS, replied\r\nPHILO. But you may observe, at the same time, that though the mind\r\ncannot, in Stoicism, support the highest flights of philosophy, yet, even\r\nwhen it sinks lower, it still retains somewhat of its former disposition;\r\nand the effects of the Stoic\u0027s reasoning will appear in his conduct in\r\ncommon life, and through the whole tenor of his actions. The ancient\r\nschools, particularly that of ZENO, produced examples of virtue and\r\nconstancy which seem astonishing to present times.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n Vain Wisdom all and false Philosophy.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n Yet with a pleasing sorcery could charm\u003cBR\u003e\r\n Pain, for a while, or anguish; and excite\u003cBR\u003e\r\n Fallacious Hope, or arm the obdurate breast\u003cBR\u003e\r\n With stubborn Patience, as with triple steel.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn like manner, if a man has accustomed himself to sceptical\r\nconsiderations on the uncertainty and narrow limits of reason, he will\r\nnot entirely forget them when he turns his reflection on other subjects;\r\nbut in all his philosophical principles and reasoning, I dare not say in\r\nhis common conduct, he will be found different from those, who either\r\nnever formed any opinions in the case, or have entertained sentiments\r\nmore favourable to human reason.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTo whatever length any one may push his speculative principles of\r\nscepticism, he must act, I own, and live, and converse, like other men;\r\nand for this conduct he is not obliged to give any other reason, than the\r\nabsolute necessity he lies under of so doing. If he ever carries his\r\nspeculations further than this necessity constrains him, and\r\nphilosophises either on natural or moral subjects, he is allured by a\r\ncertain pleasure and satisfaction which he finds in employing himself\r\nafter that manner. He considers besides, that every one, even in common\r\nlife, is constrained to have more or less of this philosophy; that from\r\nour earliest infancy we make continual advances in forming more general\r\nprinciples of conduct and reasoning; that the larger experience we\r\nacquire, and the stronger reason we are endued with, we always render our\r\nprinciples the more general and comprehensive; and that what we call\r\nphilosophy is nothing but a more regular and methodical operation of the\r\nsame kind. To philosophise on such subjects, is nothing essentially\r\ndifferent from reasoning on common life; and we may only expect greater\r\nstability, if not greater truth, from our philosophy, on account of its\r\nexacter and more scrupulous method of proceeding.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut when we look beyond human affairs and the properties of the\r\nsurrounding bodies: when we carry our speculations into the two\r\neternities, before and after the present state of things; into the\r\ncreation and formation of the universe; the existence and properties of\r\nspirits; the powers and operations of one universal Spirit existing\r\nwithout beginning and without end; omnipotent, omniscient, immutable,\r\ninfinite, and incomprehensible: We must be far removed from the smallest\r\ntendency to scepticism not to be apprehensive, that we have here got\r\nquite beyond the reach of our faculties. So long as we confine our\r\nspeculations to trade, or morals, or politics, or criticism, we make\r\nappeals, every moment, to common sense and experience, which strengthen\r\nour philosophical conclusions, and remove, at least in part, the\r\nsuspicion which we so justly entertain with regard to every reasoning\r\nthat is very subtle and refined. But, in theological reasonings, we have\r\nnot this advantage; while, at the same time, we are employed upon\r\nobjects, which, we must be sensible, are too large for our grasp, and of\r\nall others, require most to be familiarised to our apprehension. We are\r\nlike foreigners in a strange country, to whom every thing must seem\r\nsuspicious, and who are in danger every moment of transgressing against\r\nthe laws and customs of the people with whom they live and converse. We\r\nknow not how far we ought to trust our vulgar methods of reasoning in\r\nsuch a subject; since, even in common life, and in that province which is\r\npeculiarly appropriated to them, we cannot account for them, and are\r\nentirely guided by a kind of instinct or necessity in employing them.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAll sceptics pretend, that, if reason be considered in an abstract view,\r\nit furnishes invincible arguments against itself; and that we could never\r\nretain any conviction or assurance, on any subject, were not the\r\nsceptical reasonings so refined and subtle, that they are not able to\r\ncounterpoise the more solid and more natural arguments derived from the\r\nsenses and experience. But it is evident, whenever our arguments lose\r\nthis advantage, and run wide of common life, that the most refined\r\nscepticism comes to be upon a footing with them, and is able to oppose\r\nand counterbalance them. The one has no more weight than the other. The\r\nmind must remain in suspense between them; and it is that very suspense\r\nor balance, which is the triumph of scepticism.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut I observe, says CLEANTHES, with regard to you, PHILO, and all\r\nspeculative sceptics, that your doctrine and practice are as much at\r\nvariance in the most abstruse points of theory as in the conduct of\r\ncommon life. Wherever evidence discovers itself, you adhere to it,\r\nnotwithstanding your pretended scepticism; and I can observe, too, some\r\nof your sect to be as decisive as those who make greater professions of\r\ncertainty and assurance. In reality, would not a man be ridiculous, who\r\npretended to reject NEWTON\u0027s explication of the wonderful phenomenon of\r\nthe rainbow, because that explication gives a minute anatomy of the rays\r\nof light; a subject, forsooth, too refined for human comprehension? And\r\nwhat would you say to one, who, having nothing particular to object to\r\nthe arguments of COPERNICUS and GALILEO for the motion of the earth,\r\nshould withhold his assent, on that general principle, that these\r\nsubjects were too magnificent and remote to be explained by the narrow\r\nand fallacious reason of mankind?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThere is indeed a kind of brutish and ignorant scepticism, as you well\r\nobserved, which gives the vulgar a general prejudice against what they do\r\nnot easily understand, and makes them reject every principle which\r\nrequires elaborate reasoning to prove and establish it. This species of\r\nscepticism is fatal to knowledge, not to religion; since we find, that\r\nthose who make greatest profession of it, give often their assent, not\r\nonly to the great truths of Theism and natural theology, but even to the\r\nmost absurd tenets which a traditional superstition has recommended to\r\nthem. They firmly believe in witches, though they will not believe nor\r\nattend to the most simple proposition of Euclid. But the refined and\r\nphilosophical sceptics fall into an inconsistence of an opposite nature.\r\nThey push their researches into the most abstruse corners of science; and\r\ntheir assent attends them in every step, proportioned to the evidence\r\nwhich they meet with. They are even obliged to acknowledge, that the most\r\nabstruse and remote objects are those which are best explained by\r\nphilosophy. Light is in reality anatomised. The true system of the\r\nheavenly bodies is discovered and ascertained. But the nourishment of\r\nbodies by food is still an inexplicable mystery. The cohesion of the\r\nparts of matter is still incomprehensible. These sceptics, therefore, are\r\nobliged, in every question, to consider each particular evidence apart,\r\nand proportion their assent to the precise degree of evidence which\r\noccurs. This is their practice in all natural, mathematical, moral, and\r\npolitical science. And why not the same, I ask, in the theological and\r\nreligious? Why must conclusions of this nature be alone rejected on the\r\ngeneral presumption of the insufficiency of human reason, without any\r\nparticular discussion of the evidence? Is not such an unequal conduct a\r\nplain proof of prejudice and passion?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nOur senses, you say, are fallacious; our understanding erroneous; our\r\nideas, even of the most familiar objects, extension, duration, motion,\r\nfull of absurdities and contradictions. You defy me to solve the\r\ndifficulties, or reconcile the repugnancies which you discover in them. I\r\nhave not capacity for so great an undertaking: I have not leisure for it:\r\nI perceive it to be superfluous. Your own conduct, in every circumstance,\r\nrefutes your principles, and shows the firmest reliance on all the\r\nreceived maxims of science, morals, prudence, and behaviour.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI shall never assent to so harsh an opinion as that of a celebrated\r\nwriter [L\u0027Arte de penser], who says, that the Sceptics are not a sect of\r\nphilosophers: They are only a sect of liars. I may, however, affirm\r\n(I hope without offence), that they are a sect of jesters or raillers.\r\nBut for my part, whenever I find myself disposed to mirth and amusement,\r\nI shall certainly choose my entertainment of a less perplexing and abstruse\r\nnature. A comedy, a novel, or at most a history, seems a more natural\r\nrecreation than such metaphysical subtleties and abstractions.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn vain would the sceptic make a distinction between science and common\r\nlife, or between one science and another. The arguments employed in all,\r\nif just, are of a similar nature, and contain the same force and\r\nevidence. Or if there be any difference among them, the advantage lies\r\nentirely on the side of theology and natural religion. Many principles of\r\nmechanics are founded on very abstruse reasoning; yet no man who has any\r\npretensions to science, even no speculative sceptic, pretends to\r\nentertain the least doubt with regard to them. The COPERNICAN system\r\ncontains the most surprising paradox, and the most contrary to our\r\nnatural conceptions, to appearances, and to our very senses: yet even\r\nmonks and inquisitors are now constrained to withdraw their opposition to\r\nit. And shall PHILO, a man of so liberal a genius and extensive\r\nknowledge, entertain any general undistinguished scruples with regard to\r\nthe religious hypothesis, which is founded on the simplest and most\r\nobvious arguments, and, unless it meets with artificial obstacles, has\r\nsuch easy access and admission into the mind of man?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd here we may observe, continued he, turning himself towards DEMEA, a\r\npretty curious circumstance in the history of the sciences. After the\r\nunion of philosophy with the popular religion, upon the first\r\nestablishment of Christianity, nothing was more usual, among all\r\nreligious teachers, than declamations against reason, against the senses,\r\nagainst every principle derived merely from human research and inquiry.\r\nAll the topics of the ancient academics were adopted by the fathers; and\r\nthence propagated for several ages in every school and pulpit throughout\r\nChristendom. The Reformers embraced the same principles of reasoning, or\r\nrather declamation; and all panegyrics on the excellency of faith, were\r\nsure to be interlarded with some severe strokes of satire against natural\r\nreason. A celebrated prelate [Monsr. Huet] too, of the Romish communion,\r\na man of the most extensive learning, who wrote a demonstration of\r\nChristianity, has also composed a treatise, which contains all the cavils\r\nof the boldest and most determined PYRRHONISM. LOCKE seems to have been the\r\nfirst Christian who ventured openly to assert, that faith was nothing but\r\na species of reason; that religion was only a branch of philosophy; and\r\nthat a chain of arguments, similar to that which established any truth in\r\nmorals, politics, or physics, was always employed in discovering all the\r\nprinciples of theology, natural and revealed. The ill use which BAYLE and\r\nother libertines made of the philosophical scepticism of the fathers and\r\nfirst reformers, still further propagated the judicious sentiment of Mr.\r\nLOCKE: And it is now in a manner avowed, by all pretenders to reasoning\r\nand philosophy, that Atheist and Sceptic are almost synonymous. And as it\r\nis certain that no man is in earnest when he professes the latter\r\nprinciple, I would fain hope that there are as few who seriously maintain\r\nthe former.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nDon\u0027t you remember, said PHILO, the excellent saying of LORD BACON on\r\nthis head? That a little philosophy, replied CLEANTHES, makes a man an\r\nAtheist: A great deal converts him to religion. That is a very judicious\r\nremark too, said PHILO. But what I have in my eye is another passage,\r\nwhere, having mentioned DAVID\u0027s fool, who said in his heart there is no\r\nGod, this great philosopher observes, that the Atheists nowadays have a\r\ndouble share of folly; for they are not contented to say in their hearts\r\nthere is no God, but they also utter that impiety with their lips, and\r\nare thereby guilty of multiplied indiscretion and imprudence. Such\r\npeople, though they were ever so much in earnest, cannot, methinks, be\r\nvery formidable.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut though you should rank me in this class of fools, I cannot forbear\r\ncommunicating a remark that occurs to me, from the history of the\r\nreligious and irreligious scepticism with which you have entertained us.\r\nIt appears to me, that there are strong symptoms of priestcraft in the\r\nwhole progress of this affair. During ignorant ages, such as those which\r\nfollowed the dissolution of the ancient schools, the priests perceived,\r\nthat Atheism, Deism, or heresy of any kind, could only proceed from the\r\npresumptuous questioning of received opinions, and from a belief that\r\nhuman reason was equal to every thing. Education had then a mighty\r\ninfluence over the minds of men, and was almost equal in force to those\r\nsuggestions of the senses and common understanding, by which the most\r\ndetermined sceptic must allow himself to be governed. But at present,\r\nwhen the influence of education is much diminished, and men, from a more\r\nopen commerce of the world, have learned to compare the popular\r\nprinciples of different nations and ages, our sagacious divines have\r\nchanged their whole system of philosophy, and talk the language of\r\nSTOICS, PLATONISTS, and PERIPATETICS, not that of PYRRHONIANS and\r\nACADEMICS. If we distrust human reason, we have now no other principle to\r\nlead us into religion. Thus, sceptics in one age, dogmatists in another;\r\nwhichever system best suits the purpose of these reverend gentlemen, in\r\ngiving them an ascendant over mankind, they are sure to make it their\r\nfavourite principle, and established tenet.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is very natural, said CLEANTHES, for men to embrace those principles,\r\nby which they find they can best defend their doctrines; nor need we have\r\nany recourse to priestcraft to account for so reasonable an expedient.\r\nAnd, surely nothing can afford a stronger presumption, that any set of\r\nprinciples are true, and ought to be embraced, than to observe that they\r\ntend to the confirmation of true religion, and serve to confound the\r\ncavils of Atheists, Libertines, and Freethinkers of all denominations.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap02\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nPART 2\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI must own, CLEANTHES, said DEMEA, that nothing can more surprise me,\r\nthan the light in which you have all along put this argument. By the\r\nwhole tenor of your discourse, one would imagine that you were\r\nmaintaining the Being of a God, against the cavils of Atheists and\r\nInfidels; and were necessitated to become a champion for that fundamental\r\nprinciple of all religion. But this, I hope, is not by any means a\r\nquestion among us. No man, no man at least of common sense, I am\r\npersuaded, ever entertained a serious doubt with regard to a truth so\r\ncertain and self-evident. The question is not concerning the being, but\r\nthe nature of God. This, I affirm, from the infirmities of human\r\nunderstanding, to be altogether incomprehensible and unknown to us. The\r\nessence of that supreme Mind, his attributes, the manner of his\r\nexistence, the very nature of his duration; these, and every particular\r\nwhich regards so divine a Being, are mysterious to men. Finite, weak, and\r\nblind creatures, we ought to humble ourselves in his august presence;\r\nand, conscious of our frailties, adore in silence his infinite\r\nperfections, which eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, neither hath it\r\nentered into the heart of man to conceive. They are covered in a deep\r\ncloud from human curiosity. It is profaneness to attempt penetrating\r\nthrough these sacred obscurities. And, next to the impiety of denying his\r\nexistence, is the temerity of prying into his nature and essence, decrees\r\nand attributes.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut lest you should think that my piety has here got the better of my\r\nphilosophy, I shall support my opinion, if it needs any support, by a very\r\ngreat authority. I might cite all the divines, almost, from the foundation\r\nof Christianity, who have ever treated of this or any other theological\r\nsubject: But I shall confine myself, at present, to one equally celebrated\r\nfor piety and philosophy. It is Father MALEBRANCHE, who, I remember, thus\r\nexpresses himself [Recherche de la Verite. Liv. 3. Chap.9]. \"One ought not\r\nso much,\" says he, \"to call God a spirit, in order to express positively\r\nwhat he is, as in order to signify that he is not matter. He is a Being\r\ninfinitely perfect: Of this we cannot doubt. But in the same manner as\r\nwe ought not to imagine, even supposing him corporeal, that he is clothed\r\nwith a human body, as the ANTHROPOMORPHITES asserted, under colour that\r\nthat figure was the most perfect of any; so, neither ought we to imagine\r\nthat the spirit of God has human ideas, or bears any resemblance to our\r\nspirit, under colour that we know nothing more perfect than a human mind.\r\nWe ought rather to believe, that as he comprehends the perfections of\r\nmatter without being material…. he comprehends also the perfections of\r\ncreated spirits without being spirit, in the manner we conceive spirit:\r\nThat his true name is, He that is; or, in other words, Being without\r\nrestriction, All Being, the Being infinite and universal.\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAfter so great an authority, DEMEA, replied PHILO, as that which you have\r\nproduced, and a thousand more which you might produce, it would appear\r\nridiculous in me to add my sentiment, or express my approbation of your\r\ndoctrine. But surely, where reasonable men treat these subjects, the\r\nquestion can never be concerning the Being, but only the Nature, of the\r\nDeity. The former truth, as you well observe, is unquestionable and\r\nself-evident. Nothing exists without a cause; and the original cause of\r\nthis universe (whatever it be) we call God; and piously ascribe to him\r\nevery species of perfection. Whoever scruples this fundamental truth,\r\ndeserves every punishment which can be inflicted among philosophers, to\r\nwit, the greatest ridicule, contempt, and disapprobation. But as all\r\nperfection is entirely relative, we ought never to imagine that we\r\ncomprehend the attributes of this divine Being, or to suppose that his\r\nperfections have any analogy or likeness to the perfections of a human\r\ncreature. Wisdom, Thought, Design, Knowledge; these we justly ascribe to\r\nhim; because these words are honourable among men, and we have no other\r\nlanguage or other conceptions by which we can express our adoration of\r\nhim. But let us beware, lest we think that our ideas anywise correspond\r\nto his perfections, or that his attributes have any resemblance to these\r\nqualities among men. He is infinitely superior to our limited view and\r\ncomprehension; and is more the object of worship in the temple, than of\r\ndisputation in the schools.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn reality, CLEANTHES, continued he, there is no need of having recourse\r\nto that affected scepticism so displeasing to you, in order to come at\r\nthis determination. Our ideas reach no further than our experience. We\r\nhave no experience of divine attributes and operations. I need not\r\nconclude my syllogism. You can draw the inference yourself. And it is a\r\npleasure to me (and I hope to you too) that just reasoning and sound\r\npiety here concur in the same conclusion, and both of them establish the\r\nadorably mysterious and incomprehensible nature of the Supreme Being.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNot to lose any time in circumlocutions, said CLEANTHES, addressing\r\nhimself to DEMEA, much less in replying to the pious declamations of\r\nPHILO; I shall briefly explain how I conceive this matter. Look round the\r\nworld: contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it to be\r\nnothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of\r\nlesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond\r\nwhat human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various\r\nmachines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other\r\nwith an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever\r\ncontemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all\r\nnature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of\r\nhuman contrivance; of human designs, thought, wisdom, and intelligence.\r\nSince, therefore, the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer,\r\nby all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the\r\nAuthor of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed\r\nof much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which\r\nhe has executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument\r\nalone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity\r\nto human mind and intelligence.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI shall be so free, CLEANTHES, said DEMEA, as to tell you, that from the\r\nbeginning, I could not approve of your conclusion concerning the\r\nsimilarity of the Deity to men; still less can I approve of the mediums\r\nby which you endeavour to establish it. What! No demonstration of the\r\nBeing of God! No abstract arguments! No proofs a priori! Are these, which\r\nhave hitherto been so much insisted on by philosophers, all fallacy, all\r\nsophism? Can we reach no further in this subject than experience and\r\nprobability? I will not say that this is betraying the cause of a Deity:\r\nBut surely, by this affected candour, you give advantages to Atheists,\r\nwhich they never could obtain by the mere dint of argument and reasoning.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhat I chiefly scruple in this subject, said PHILO, is not so much that\r\nall religious arguments are by CLEANTHES reduced to experience, as that\r\nthey appear not to be even the most certain and irrefragable of that\r\ninferior kind. That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, that the\r\nearth has solidity, we have observed a thousand and a thousand times; and\r\nwhen any new instance of this nature is presented, we draw without\r\nhesitation the accustomed inference. The exact similarity of the cases\r\ngives us a perfect assurance of a similar event; and a stronger evidence\r\nis never desired nor sought after. But wherever you depart, in the least,\r\nfrom the similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the\r\nevidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy, which is\r\nconfessedly liable to error and uncertainty. After having experienced the\r\ncirculation of the blood in human creatures, we make no doubt that it\r\ntakes place in TITIUS and MAEVIUS. But from its circulation in frogs and\r\nfishes, it is only a presumption, though a strong one, from analogy, that\r\nit takes place in men and other animals. The analogical reasoning is much\r\nweaker, when we infer the circulation of the sap in vegetables from our\r\nexperience that the blood circulates in animals; and those, who hastily\r\nfollowed that imperfect analogy, are found, by more accurate experiments,\r\nto have been mistaken.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf we see a house, CLEANTHES, we conclude, with the greatest certainty,\r\nthat it had an architect or builder; because this is precisely that\r\nspecies of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species\r\nof cause. But surely you will not affirm, that the universe bears such a\r\nresemblance to a house, that we can with the same certainty infer a\r\nsimilar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The\r\ndissimilitude is so striking, that the utmost you can here pretend to is\r\na guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause; and how\r\nthat pretension will be received in the world, I leave you to consider.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt would surely be very ill received, replied CLEANTHES; and I should be\r\ndeservedly blamed and detested, did I allow, that the proofs of a Deity\r\namounted to no more than a guess or conjecture. But is the whole\r\nadjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a\r\nresemblance? The economy of final causes? The order, proportion, and\r\narrangement of every part? Steps of a stair are plainly contrived, that\r\nhuman legs may use them in mounting; and this inference is certain and\r\ninfallible. Human legs are also contrived for walking and mounting; and\r\nthis inference, I allow, is not altogether so certain, because of the\r\ndissimilarity which you remark; but does it, therefore, deserve the name\r\nonly of presumption or conjecture?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nGood God! cried DEMEA, interrupting him, where are we? Zealous defenders\r\nof religion allow, that the proofs of a Deity fall short of perfect\r\nevidence! And you, PHILO, on whose assistance I depended in proving the\r\nadorable mysteriousness of the Divine Nature, do you assent to all these\r\nextravagant opinions of CLEANTHES? For what other name can I give them?\r\nor, why spare my censure, when such principles are advanced, supported by\r\nsuch an authority, before so young a man as PAMPHILUS?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nYou seem not to apprehend, replied PHILO, that I argue with CLEANTHES in\r\nhis own way; and, by showing him the dangerous consequences of his\r\ntenets, hope at last to reduce him to our opinion. But what sticks most\r\nwith you, I observe, is the representation which CLEANTHES has made of\r\nthe argument a posteriori; and finding that that argument is likely to\r\nescape your hold and vanish into air, you think it so disguised, that you\r\ncan scarcely believe it to be set in its true light. Now, however much I\r\nmay dissent, in other respects, from the dangerous principles of\r\nCLEANTHES, I must allow that he has fairly represented that argument; and\r\nI shall endeavour so to state the matter to you, that you will entertain\r\nno further scruples with regard to it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWere a man to abstract from every thing which he knows or has seen, he\r\nwould be altogether incapable, merely from his own ideas, to determine\r\nwhat kind of scene the universe must be, or to give the preference to one\r\nstate or situation of things above another. For as nothing which he\r\nclearly conceives could be esteemed impossible or implying a contradiction,\r\nevery chimera of his fancy would be upon an equal footing; nor could he\r\nassign any just reason why he adheres to one idea or system, and rejects\r\nthe others which are equally possible.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAgain; after he opens his eyes, and contemplates the world as it really\r\nis, it would be impossible for him at first to assign the cause of any\r\none event, much less of the whole of things, or of the universe. He might\r\nset his fancy a rambling; and she might bring him in an infinite variety\r\nof reports and representations. These would all be possible; but being\r\nall equally possible, he would never of himself give a satisfactory\r\naccount for his preferring one of them to the rest. Experience alone can\r\npoint out to him the true cause of any phenomenon.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, according to this method of reasoning, DEMEA, it follows, (and is,\r\nindeed, tacitly allowed by CLEANTHES himself,) that order, arrangement,\r\nor the adjustment of final causes, is not of itself any proof of design;\r\nbut only so far as it has been experienced to proceed from that\r\nprinciple. For aught we can know a priori, matter may contain the source\r\nor spring of order originally within itself, as well as mind does; and\r\nthere is no more difficulty in conceiving, that the several elements,\r\nfrom an internal unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite\r\narrangement, than to conceive that their ideas, in the great universal\r\nmind, from a like internal unknown cause, fall into that arrangement. The\r\nequal possibility of both these suppositions is allowed. But, by\r\nexperience, we find, (according to CLEANTHES), that there is a difference\r\nbetween them. Throw several pieces of steel together, without shape or\r\nform; they will never arrange themselves so as to compose a watch. Stone,\r\nand mortar, and wood, without an architect, never erect a house. But the\r\nideas in a human mind, we see, by an unknown, inexplicable economy,\r\narrange themselves so as to form the plan of a watch or house.\r\nExperience, therefore, proves, that there is an original principle of\r\norder in mind, not in matter. From similar effects we infer similar\r\ncauses. The adjustment of means to ends is alike in the universe, as in a\r\nmachine of human contrivance. The causes, therefore, must be resembling.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI was from the beginning scandalised, I must own, with this resemblance,\r\nwhich is asserted, between the Deity and human creatures; and must\r\nconceive it to imply such a degradation of the Supreme Being as no sound\r\nTheist could endure. With your assistance, therefore, DEMEA, I shall\r\nendeavour to defend what you justly call the adorable mysteriousness of\r\nthe Divine Nature, and shall refute this reasoning of CLEANTHES, provided\r\nhe allows that I have made a fair representation of it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhen CLEANTHES had assented, PHILO, after a short pause, proceeded in the\r\nfollowing manner.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThat all inferences, CLEANTHES, concerning fact, are founded on\r\nexperience; and that all experimental reasonings are founded on the\r\nsupposition that similar causes prove similar effects, and similar\r\neffects similar causes; I shall not at present much dispute with you. But\r\nobserve, I entreat you, with what extreme caution all just reasoners\r\nproceed in the transferring of experiments to similar cases. Unless the\r\ncases be exactly similar, they repose no perfect confidence in applying\r\ntheir past observation to any particular phenomenon. Every alteration of\r\ncircumstances occasions a doubt concerning the event; and it requires new\r\nexperiments to prove certainly, that the new circumstances are of no\r\nmoment or importance. A change in bulk, situation, arrangement, age,\r\ndisposition of the air, or surrounding bodies; any of these particulars\r\nmay be attended with the most unexpected consequences: And unless the\r\nobjects be quite familiar to us, it is the highest temerity to expect\r\nwith assurance, after any of these changes, an event similar to that\r\nwhich before fell under our observation. The slow and deliberate steps of\r\nphilosophers here, if any where, are distinguished from the precipitate\r\nmarch of the vulgar, who, hurried on by the smallest similitude, are\r\nincapable of all discernment or consideration.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut can you think, CLEANTHES, that your usual phlegm and philosophy have\r\nbeen preserved in so wide a step as you have taken, when you compared to\r\nthe universe houses, ships, furniture, machines, and, from their\r\nsimilarity in some circumstances, inferred a similarity in their causes?\r\nThought, design, intelligence, such as we discover in men and other\r\nanimals, is no more than one of the springs and principles of the\r\nuniverse, as well as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hundred\r\nothers, which fall under daily observation. It is an active cause, by\r\nwhich some particular parts of nature, we find, produce alterations on\r\nother parts. But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred\r\nfrom parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion bar all\r\ncomparison and inference? From observing the growth of a hair, can we\r\nlearn any thing concerning the generation of a man? Would the manner of a\r\nleaf\u0027s blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction\r\nconcerning the vegetation of a tree?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut, allowing that we were to take the operations of one part of nature\r\nupon another, for the foundation of our judgement concerning the origin\r\nof the whole, (which never can be admitted,) yet why select so minute, so\r\nweak, so bounded a principle, as the reason and design of animals is\r\nfound to be upon this planet? What peculiar privilege has this little\r\nagitation of the brain which we call thought, that we must thus make it\r\nthe model of the whole universe? Our partiality in our own favour does\r\nindeed present it on all occasions; but sound philosophy ought carefully\r\nto guard against so natural an illusion.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSo far from admitting, continued PHILO, that the operations of a part can\r\nafford us any just conclusion concerning the origin of the whole, I will\r\nnot allow any one part to form a rule for another part, if the latter be\r\nvery remote from the former. Is there any reasonable ground to conclude,\r\nthat the inhabitants of other planets possess thought, intelligence,\r\nreason, or any thing similar to these faculties in men? When nature has\r\nso extremely diversified her manner of operation in this small globe, can\r\nwe imagine that she incessantly copies herself throughout so immense a\r\nuniverse? And if thought, as we may well suppose, be confined merely to\r\nthis narrow corner, and has even there so limited a sphere of action,\r\nwith what propriety can we assign it for the original cause of all\r\nthings? The narrow views of a peasant, who makes his domestic economy the\r\nrule for the government of kingdoms, is in comparison a pardonable\r\nsophism.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut were we ever so much assured, that a thought and reason, resembling\r\nthe human, were to be found throughout the whole universe, and were its\r\nactivity elsewhere vastly greater and more commanding than it appears in\r\nthis globe; yet I cannot see, why the operations of a world constituted,\r\narranged, adjusted, can with any propriety be extended to a world which\r\nis in its embryo state, and is advancing towards that constitution and\r\narrangement. By observation, we know somewhat of the economy, action, and\r\nnourishment of a finished animal; but we must transfer with great caution\r\nthat observation to the growth of a foetus in the womb, and still more to\r\nthe formation of an animalcule in the loins of its male parent. Nature,\r\nwe find, even from our limited experience, possesses an infinite number\r\nof springs and principles, which incessantly discover themselves on every\r\nchange of her position and situation. And what new and unknown principles\r\nwould actuate her in so new and unknown a situation as that of the\r\nformation of a universe, we cannot, without the utmost temerity, pretend\r\nto determine.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nA very small part of this great system, during a very short time, is very\r\nimperfectly discovered to us; and do we thence pronounce decisively\r\nconcerning the origin of the whole?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAdmirable conclusion! Stone, wood, brick, iron, brass, have not, at this\r\ntime, in this minute globe of earth, an order or arrangement without\r\nhuman art and contrivance; therefore the universe could not originally\r\nattain its order and arrangement, without something similar to human art.\r\nBut is a part of nature a rule for another part very wide of the former?\r\nIs it a rule for the whole? Is a very small part a rule for the universe?\r\nIs nature in one situation, a certain rule for nature in another\r\nsituation vastly different from the former?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd can you blame me, CLEANTHES, if I here imitate the prudent reserve of\r\nSIMONIDES, who, according to the noted story, being asked by HIERO,\r\nWhat God was? desired a day to think of it, and then two days more; and\r\nafter that manner continually prolonged the term, without ever bringing\r\nin his definition or description? Could you even blame me, if I had\r\nanswered at first, that I did not know, and was sensible that this\r\nsubject lay vastly beyond the reach of my faculties? You might cry out\r\nsceptic and railler, as much as you pleased: but having found, in so many\r\nother subjects much more familiar, the imperfections and even\r\ncontradictions of human reason, I never should expect any success from\r\nits feeble conjectures, in a subject so sublime, and so remote from the\r\nsphere of our observation. When two species of objects have always been\r\nobserved to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence\r\nof one wherever I see the existence of the other; and this I call an\r\nargument from experience. But how this argument can have place, where the\r\nobjects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without\r\nparallel, or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain. And will\r\nany man tell me with a serious countenance, that an orderly universe must\r\narise from some thought and art like the human, because we have\r\nexperience of it? To ascertain this reasoning, it were requisite that we\r\nhad experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient, surely,\r\nthat we have seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance…\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPHILO was proceeding in this vehement manner, somewhat between jest and\r\nearnest, as it appeared to me, when he observed some signs of impatience\r\nin CLEANTHES, and then immediately stopped short. What I had to suggest,\r\nsaid CLEANTHES, is only that you would not abuse terms, or make use of\r\npopular expressions to subvert philosophical reasonings. You know, that\r\nthe vulgar often distinguish reason from experience, even where the\r\nquestion relates only to matter of fact and existence; though it is\r\nfound, where that reason is properly analysed, that it is nothing but a\r\nspecies of experience. To prove by experience the origin of the universe\r\nfrom mind, is not more contrary to common speech, than to prove the\r\nmotion of the earth from the same principle. And a caviller might raise\r\nall the same objections to the Copernican system, which you have urged\r\nagainst my reasonings. Have you other earths, might he say, which you\r\nhave seen to move? Have…\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nYes! cried PHILO, interrupting him, we have other earths. Is not the moon\r\nanother earth, which we see to turn round its centre? Is not Venus\r\nanother earth, where we observe the same phenomenon? Are not the\r\nrevolutions of the sun also a confirmation, from analogy, of the same\r\ntheory? All the planets, are they not earths, which revolve about the\r\nsun? Are not the satellites moons, which move round Jupiter and Saturn,\r\nand along with these primary planets round the sun? These analogies and\r\nresemblances, with others which I have not mentioned, are the sole proofs\r\nof the COPERNICAN system; and to you it belongs to consider, whether you\r\nhave any analogies of the same kind to support your theory.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn reality, CLEANTHES, continued he, the modern system of astronomy is\r\nnow so much received by all inquirers, and has become so essential a part\r\neven of our earliest education, that we are not commonly very scrupulous\r\nin examining the reasons upon which it is founded. It is now become a\r\nmatter of mere curiosity to study the first writers on that subject, who\r\nhad the full force of prejudice to encounter, and were obliged to turn\r\ntheir arguments on every side in order to render them popular and\r\nconvincing. But if we peruse GALILEO\u0027s famous Dialogues concerning the\r\nsystem of the world, we shall find, that that great genius, one of the\r\nsublimest that ever existed, first bent all his endeavours to prove, that\r\nthere was no foundation for the distinction commonly made between\r\nelementary and celestial substances. The schools, proceeding from the\r\nillusions of sense, had carried this distinction very far; and had\r\nestablished the latter substances to be ingenerable, incorruptible,\r\nunalterable, impassable; and had assigned all the opposite qualities to\r\nthe former. But GALILEO, beginning with the moon, proved its similarity\r\nin every particular to the earth; its convex figure, its natural darkness\r\nwhen not illuminated, its density, its distinction into solid and liquid,\r\nthe variations of its phases, the mutual illuminations of the earth and\r\nmoon, their mutual eclipses, the inequalities of the lunar surface, \u0026amp;c.\r\nAfter many instances of this kind, with regard to all the planets, men\r\nplainly saw that these bodies became proper objects of experience; and\r\nthat the similarity of their nature enabled us to extend the same\r\narguments and phenomena from one to the other.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn this cautious proceeding of the astronomers, you may read your own\r\ncondemnation, CLEANTHES; or rather may see, that the subject in which you\r\nare engaged exceeds all human reason and inquiry. Can you pretend to show\r\nany such similarity between the fabric of a house, and the generation of\r\na universe? Have you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles\r\nthe first arrangement of the elements? Have worlds ever been formed under\r\nyour eye; and have you had leisure to observe the whole progress of the\r\nphenomenon, from the first appearance of order to its final consummation?\r\nIf you have, then cite your experience, and deliver your theory.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap03\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nPART 3\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHow the most absurd argument, replied CLEANTHES, in the hands of a man of\r\ningenuity and invention, may acquire an air of probability! Are you not\r\naware, PHILO, that it became necessary for Copernicus and his first\r\ndisciples to prove the similarity of the terrestrial and celestial\r\nmatter; because several philosophers, blinded by old systems, and\r\nsupported by some sensible appearances, had denied this similarity? but\r\nthat it is by no means necessary, that Theists should prove the\r\nsimilarity of the works of Nature to those of Art; because this\r\nsimilarity is self-evident and undeniable? The same matter, a like form;\r\nwhat more is requisite to show an analogy between their causes, and to\r\nascertain the origin of all things from a divine purpose and intention?\r\nYour objections, I must freely tell you, are no better than the abstruse\r\ncavils of those philosophers who denied motion; and ought to be refuted\r\nin the same manner, by illustrations, examples, and instances, rather\r\nthan by serious argument and philosophy.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSuppose, therefore, that an articulate voice were heard in the clouds,\r\nmuch louder and more melodious than any which human art could ever reach:\r\nSuppose, that this voice were extended in the same instant over all\r\nnations, and spoke to each nation in its own language and dialect:\r\nSuppose, that the words delivered not only contain a just sense and\r\nmeaning, but convey some instruction altogether worthy of a benevolent\r\nBeing, superior to mankind: Could you possibly hesitate a moment\r\nconcerning the cause of this voice? and must you not instantly ascribe it\r\nto some design or purpose? Yet I cannot see but all the same objections\r\n(if they merit that appellation) which lie against the system of Theism,\r\nmay also be produced against this inference.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nMight you not say, that all conclusions concerning fact were founded on\r\nexperience: that when we hear an articulate voice in the dark, and thence\r\ninfer a man, it is only the resemblance of the effects which leads us to\r\nconclude that there is a like resemblance in the cause: but that this\r\nextraordinary voice, by its loudness, extent, and flexibility to all\r\nlanguages, bears so little analogy to any human voice, that we have no\r\nreason to suppose any analogy in their causes: and consequently, that a\r\nrational, wise, coherent speech proceeded, you know not whence, from some\r\naccidental whistling of the winds, not from any divine reason or\r\nintelligence? You see clearly your own objections in these cavils, and I\r\nhope too you see clearly, that they cannot possibly have more force in\r\nthe one case than in the other.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut to bring the case still nearer the present one of the universe, I\r\nshall make two suppositions, which imply not any absurdity or\r\nimpossibility. Suppose that there is a natural, universal, invariable\r\nlanguage, common to every individual of human race; and that books are\r\nnatural productions, which perpetuate themselves in the same manner with\r\nanimals and vegetables, by descent and propagation. Several expressions\r\nof our passions contain a universal language: all brute animals have a\r\nnatural speech, which, however limited, is very intelligible to their own\r\nspecies. And as there are infinitely fewer parts and less contrivance in\r\nthe finest composition of eloquence, than in the coarsest organised body,\r\nthe propagation of an Iliad or Aeneid is an easier supposition than that\r\nof any plant or animal.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSuppose, therefore, that you enter into your library, thus peopled by\r\nnatural volumes, containing the most refined reason and most exquisite\r\nbeauty; could you possibly open one of them, and doubt, that its original\r\ncause bore the strongest analogy to mind and intelligence? When it\r\nreasons and discourses; when it expostulates, argues, and enforces its\r\nviews and topics; when it applies sometimes to the pure intellect,\r\nsometimes to the affections; when it collects, disposes, and adorns every\r\nconsideration suited to the subject; could you persist in asserting, that\r\nall this, at the bottom, had really no meaning; and that the first\r\nformation of this volume in the loins of its original parent proceeded\r\nnot from thought and design? Your obstinacy, I know, reaches not that\r\ndegree of firmness: even your sceptical play and wantonness would be\r\nabashed at so glaring an absurdity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut if there be any difference, PHILO, between this supposed case and the\r\nreal one of the universe, it is all to the advantage of the latter. The\r\nanatomy of an animal affords many stronger instances of design than the\r\nperusal of LIVY or TACITUS; and any objection which you start in the\r\nformer case, by carrying me back to so unusual and extraordinary a scene\r\nas the first formation of worlds, the same objection has place on the\r\nsupposition of our vegetating library. Choose, then, your party, PHILO,\r\nwithout ambiguity or evasion; assert either that a rational volume is no\r\nproof of a rational cause, or admit of a similar cause to all the works\r\nof nature.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nLet me here observe too, continued CLEANTHES, that this religious\r\nargument, instead of being weakened by that scepticism so much affected\r\nby you, rather acquires force from it, and becomes more firm and\r\nundisputed. To exclude all argument or reasoning of every kind, is either\r\naffectation or madness. The declared profession of every reasonable\r\nsceptic is only to reject abstruse, remote, and refined arguments; to\r\nadhere to common sense and the plain instincts of nature; and to assent,\r\nwherever any reasons strike him with so full a force that he cannot,\r\nwithout the greatest violence, prevent it. Now the arguments for Natural\r\nReligion are plainly of this kind; and nothing but the most perverse,\r\nobstinate metaphysics can reject them. Consider, anatomise the eye;\r\nsurvey its structure and contrivance; and tell me, from your own feeling,\r\nif the idea of a contriver does not immediately flow in upon you with a\r\nforce like that of sensation. The most obvious conclusion, surely, is in\r\nfavour of design; and it requires time, reflection, and study, to summon\r\nup those frivolous, though abstruse objections, which can support\r\nInfidelity. Who can behold the male and female of each species, the\r\ncorrespondence of their parts and instincts, their passions, and whole\r\ncourse of life before and after generation, but must be sensible, that\r\nthe propagation of the species is intended by Nature? Millions and\r\nmillions of such instances present themselves through every part of the\r\nuniverse; and no language can convey a more intelligible irresistible\r\nmeaning, than the curious adjustment of final causes. To what degree,\r\ntherefore, of blind dogmatism must one have attained, to reject such\r\nnatural and such convincing arguments?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSome beauties in writing we may meet with, which seem contrary to rules,\r\nand which gain the affections, and animate the imagination, in opposition\r\nto all the precepts of criticism, and to the authority of the established\r\nmasters of art. And if the argument for Theism be, as you pretend,\r\ncontradictory to the principles of logic; its universal, its irresistible\r\ninfluence proves clearly, that there may be arguments of a like irregular\r\nnature. Whatever cavils may be urged, an orderly world, as well as a\r\ncoherent, articulate speech, will still be received as an incontestable\r\nproof of design and intention.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt sometimes happens, I own, that the religious arguments have not their\r\ndue influence on an ignorant savage and barbarian; not because they are\r\nobscure and difficult, but because he never asks himself any question\r\nwith regard to them. Whence arises the curious structure of an animal?\r\nFrom the copulation of its parents. And these whence? From their parents?\r\nA few removes set the objects at such a distance, that to him they are\r\nlost in darkness and confusion; nor is he actuated by any curiosity to\r\ntrace them further. But this is neither dogmatism nor scepticism, but\r\nstupidity: a state of mind very different from your sifting, inquisitive\r\ndisposition, my ingenious friend. You can trace causes from effects: You\r\ncan compare the most distant and remote objects: and your greatest errors\r\nproceed not from barrenness of thought and invention, but from too\r\nluxuriant a fertility, which suppresses your natural good sense, by a\r\nprofusion of unnecessary scruples and objections.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHere I could observe, HERMIPPUS, that PHILO was a little embarrassed and\r\nconfounded: But while he hesitated in delivering an answer, luckily for\r\nhim, DEMEA broke in upon the discourse, and saved his countenance.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nYour instance, CLEANTHES, said he, drawn from books and language, being\r\nfamiliar, has, I confess, so much more force on that account: but is\r\nthere not some danger too in this very circumstance; and may it not\r\nrender us presumptuous, by making us imagine we comprehend the Deity, and\r\nhave some adequate idea of his nature and attributes? When I read a\r\nvolume, I enter into the mind and intention of the author: I become him,\r\nin a manner, for the instant; and have an immediate feeling and\r\nconception of those ideas which revolved in his imagination while\r\nemployed in that composition. But so near an approach we never surely can\r\nmake to the Deity. His ways are not our ways. His attributes are perfect,\r\nbut incomprehensible. And this volume of nature contains a great and\r\ninexplicable riddle, more than any intelligible discourse or reasoning.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe ancient PLATONISTS, you know, were the most religious and devout of\r\nall the Pagan philosophers; yet many of them, particularly PLOTINUS,\r\nexpressly declare, that intellect or understanding is not to be ascribed\r\nto the Deity; and that our most perfect worship of him consists, not in\r\nacts of veneration, reverence, gratitude, or love; but in a certain\r\nmysterious self-annihilation, or total extinction of all our faculties.\r\nThese ideas are, perhaps, too far stretched; but still it must be\r\nacknowledged, that, by representing the Deity as so intelligible and\r\ncomprehensible, and so similar to a human mind, we are guilty of the\r\ngrossest and most narrow partiality, and make ourselves the model of the\r\nwhole universe.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAll the sentiments of the human mind, gratitude, resentment, love,\r\nfriendship, approbation, blame, pity, emulation, envy, have a plain\r\nreference to the state and situation of man, and are calculated for\r\npreserving the existence and promoting the activity of such a being in\r\nsuch circumstances. It seems, therefore, unreasonable to transfer such\r\nsentiments to a supreme existence, or to suppose him actuated by them;\r\nand the phenomena besides of the universe will not support us in such a\r\ntheory. All our ideas, derived from the senses, are confessedly false and\r\nillusive; and cannot therefore be supposed to have place in a supreme\r\nintelligence: And as the ideas of internal sentiment, added to those of\r\nthe external senses, compose the whole furniture of human understanding,\r\nwe may conclude, that none of the materials of thought are in any respect\r\nsimilar in the human and in the divine intelligence. Now, as to the\r\nmanner of thinking; how can we make any comparison between them, or\r\nsuppose them any wise resembling? Our thought is fluctuating, uncertain,\r\nfleeting, successive, and compounded; and were we to remove these\r\ncircumstances, we absolutely annihilate its essence, and it would in such\r\na case be an abuse of terms to apply to it the name of thought or reason.\r\nAt least if it appear more pious and respectful (as it really is) still\r\nto retain these terms, when we mention the Supreme Being, we ought to\r\nacknowledge, that their meaning, in that case, is totally\r\nincomprehensible; and that the infirmities of our nature do not permit us\r\nto reach any ideas which in the least correspond to the ineffable\r\nsublimity of the Divine attributes.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap04\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nPART 4\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt seems strange to me, said CLEANTHES, that you, DEMEA, who are so\r\nsincere in the cause of religion, should still maintain the mysterious,\r\nincomprehensible nature of the Deity, and should insist so strenuously\r\nthat he has no manner of likeness or resemblance to human creatures. The\r\nDeity, I can readily allow, possesses many powers and attributes of which\r\nwe can have no comprehension: But if our ideas, so far as they go, be not\r\njust, and adequate, and correspondent to his real nature, I know not what\r\nthere is in this subject worth insisting on. Is the name, without any\r\nmeaning, of such mighty importance? Or how do you mystics, who maintain\r\nthe absolute incomprehensibility of the Deity, differ from Sceptics or\r\nAtheists, who assert, that the first cause of all is unknown and\r\nunintelligible? Their temerity must be very great, if, after rejecting\r\nthe production by a mind, I mean a mind resembling the human, (for I know\r\nof no other,) they pretend to assign, with certainty, any other specific\r\nintelligible cause: And their conscience must be very scrupulous indeed,\r\nif they refuse to call the universal unknown cause a God or Deity; and to\r\nbestow on him as many sublime eulogies and unmeaning epithets as you\r\nshall please to require of them.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWho could imagine, replied DEMEA, that CLEANTHES, the calm philosophical\r\nCLEANTHES, would attempt to refute his antagonists by affixing a nickname\r\nto them; and, like the common bigots and inquisitors of the age, have\r\nrecourse to invective and declamation, instead of reasoning? Or does he\r\nnot perceive, that these topics are easily retorted, and that\r\nAnthropomorphite is an appellation as invidious, and implies as dangerous\r\nconsequences, as the epithet of Mystic, with which he has honoured us? In\r\nreality, CLEANTHES, consider what it is you assert when you represent the\r\nDeity as similar to a human mind and understanding. What is the soul of\r\nman? A composition of various faculties, passions, sentiments, ideas;\r\nunited, indeed, into one self or person, but still distinct from each\r\nother. When it reasons, the ideas, which are the parts of its discourse,\r\narrange themselves in a certain form or order; which is not preserved\r\nentire for a moment, but immediately gives place to another arrangement.\r\nNew opinions, new passions, new affections, new feelings arise, which\r\ncontinually diversify the mental scene, and produce in it the greatest\r\nvariety and most rapid succession imaginable. How is this compatible with\r\nthat perfect immutability and simplicity which all true Theists ascribe\r\nto the Deity? By the same act, say they, he sees past, present, and\r\nfuture: His love and hatred, his mercy and justice, are one individual\r\noperation: He is entire in every point of space; and complete in every\r\ninstant of duration. No succession, no change, no acquisition, no\r\ndiminution. What he is implies not in it any shadow of distinction or\r\ndiversity. And what he is this moment he ever has been, and ever will be,\r\nwithout any new judgement, sentiment, or operation. He stands fixed in\r\none simple, perfect state: nor can you ever say, with any propriety, that\r\nthis act of his is different from that other; or that this judgement or\r\nidea has been lately formed, and will give place, by succession, to any\r\ndifferent judgement or idea.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI can readily allow, said CLEANTHES, that those who maintain the perfect\r\nsimplicity of the Supreme Being, to the extent in which you have\r\nexplained it, are complete Mystics, and chargeable with all the\r\nconsequences which I have drawn from their opinion. They are, in a word,\r\nAtheists, without knowing it. For though it be allowed, that the Deity\r\npossesses attributes of which we have no comprehension, yet ought we\r\nnever to ascribe to him any attributes which are absolutely incompatible\r\nwith that intelligent nature essential to him. A mind, whose acts and\r\nsentiments and ideas are not distinct and successive; one, that is wholly\r\nsimple, and totally immutable, is a mind which has no thought, no reason,\r\nno will, no sentiment, no love, no hatred; or, in a word, is no mind at\r\nall. It is an abuse of terms to give it that appellation; and we may as\r\nwell speak of limited extension without figure, or of number without\r\ncomposition.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPray consider, said PHILO, whom you are at present inveighing against.\r\nYou are honouring with the appellation of Atheist all the sound, orthodox\r\ndivines, almost, who have treated of this subject; and you will at last\r\nbe, yourself, found, according to your reckoning, the only sound Theist\r\nin the world. But if idolaters be Atheists, as, I think, may justly be\r\nasserted, and Christian Theologians the same, what becomes of the\r\nargument, so much celebrated, derived from the universal consent of\r\nmankind?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut because I know you are not much swayed by names and authorities, I\r\nshall endeavour to show you, a little more distinctly, the inconveniences\r\nof that Anthropomorphism, which you have embraced; and shall prove, that\r\nthere is no ground to suppose a plan of the world to be formed in the\r\nDivine mind, consisting of distinct ideas, differently arranged, in the\r\nsame manner as an architect forms in his head the plan of a house which\r\nhe intends to execute.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is not easy, I own, to see what is gained by this supposition, whether\r\nwe judge of the matter by Reason or by Experience. We are still obliged\r\nto mount higher, in order to find the cause of this cause, which you had\r\nassigned as satisfactory and conclusive.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf Reason (I mean abstract reason, derived from inquiries a priori) be\r\nnot alike mute with regard to all questions concerning cause and effect,\r\nthis sentence at least it will venture to pronounce, That a mental world,\r\nor universe of ideas, requires a cause as much, as does a material world,\r\nor universe of objects; and, if similar in its arrangement, must require\r\na similar cause. For what is there in this subject, which should occasion\r\na different conclusion or inference? In an abstract view, they are\r\nentirely alike; and no difficulty attends the one supposition, which is\r\nnot common to both of them.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAgain, when we will needs force Experience to pronounce some sentence,\r\neven on these subjects which lie beyond her sphere, neither can she\r\nperceive any material difference in this particular, between these two\r\nkinds of worlds; but finds them to be governed by similar principles, and\r\nto depend upon an equal variety of causes in their operations. We have\r\nspecimens in miniature of both of them. Our own mind resembles the one; a\r\nvegetable or animal body the other. Let experience, therefore, judge from\r\nthese samples. Nothing seems more delicate, with regard to its causes,\r\nthan thought; and as these causes never operate in two persons after the\r\nsame manner, so we never find two persons who think exactly alike. Nor\r\nindeed does the same person think exactly alike at any two different\r\nperiods of time. A difference of age, of the disposition of his body, of\r\nweather, of food, of company, of books, of passions; any of these\r\nparticulars, or others more minute, are sufficient to alter the curious\r\nmachinery of thought, and communicate to it very different movements and\r\noperations. As far as we can judge, vegetables and animal bodies are not\r\nmore delicate in their motions, nor depend upon a greater variety or more\r\ncurious adjustment of springs and principles.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHow, therefore, shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of that\r\nBeing whom you suppose the Author of Nature, or, according to your system\r\nof Anthropomorphism, the ideal world, into which you trace the material?\r\nHave we not the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal\r\nworld, or new intelligent principle? But if we stop, and go no further;\r\nwhy go so far? why not stop at the material world? How can we satisfy\r\nourselves without going on in infinitum? And, after all, what\r\nsatisfaction is there in that infinite progression? Let us remember the\r\nstory of the Indian philosopher and his elephant. It was never more\r\napplicable than to the present subject. If the material world rests upon\r\na similar ideal world, this ideal world must rest upon some other; and so\r\non, without end. It were better, therefore, never to look beyond the\r\npresent material world. By supposing it to contain the principle of its\r\norder within itself, we really assert it to be God; and the sooner we\r\narrive at that Divine Being, so much the better. When you go one step\r\nbeyond the mundane system, you only excite an inquisitive humour which it\r\nis impossible ever to satisfy.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTo say, that the different ideas which compose the reason of the Supreme\r\nBeing, fall into order of themselves, and by their own nature, is really\r\nto talk without any precise meaning. If it has a meaning, I would fain\r\nknow, why it is not as good sense to say, that the parts of the material\r\nworld fall into order of themselves and by their own nature. Can the one\r\nopinion be intelligible, while the other is not so?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWe have, indeed, experience of ideas which fall into order of themselves,\r\nand without any known cause. But, I am sure, we have a much larger\r\nexperience of matter which does the same; as, in all instances of\r\ngeneration and vegetation, where the accurate analysis of the cause\r\nexceeds all human comprehension. We have also experience of particular\r\nsystems of thought and of matter which have no order; of the first in\r\nmadness, of the second in corruption. Why, then, should we think, that\r\norder is more essential to one than the other? And if it requires a cause\r\nin both, what do we gain by your system, in tracing the universe of\r\nobjects into a similar universe of ideas? The first step which we make\r\nleads us on for ever. It were, therefore, wise in us to limit all our\r\ninquiries to the present world, without looking further. No satisfaction\r\ncan ever be attained by these speculations, which so far exceed the\r\nnarrow bounds of human understanding.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt was usual with the PERIPATETICS, you know, CLEANTHES, when the cause\r\nof any phenomenon was demanded, to have recourse to their faculties or\r\noccult qualities; and to say, for instance, that bread nourished by its\r\nnutritive faculty, and senna purged by its purgative. But it has been\r\ndiscovered, that this subterfuge was nothing but the disguise of\r\nignorance; and that these philosophers, though less ingenuous, really\r\nsaid the same thing with the sceptics or the vulgar, who fairly confessed\r\nthat they knew not the cause of these phenomena. In like manner, when it\r\nis asked, what cause produces order in the ideas of the Supreme Being;\r\ncan any other reason be assigned by you, Anthropomorphites, than that it\r\nis a rational faculty, and that such is the nature of the Deity? But why\r\na similar answer will not be equally satisfactory in accounting for the\r\norder of the world, without having recourse to any such intelligent\r\ncreator as you insist on, may be difficult to determine. It is only to\r\nsay, that such is the nature of material objects, and that they are all\r\noriginally possessed of a faculty of order and proportion. These are only\r\nmore learned and elaborate ways of confessing our ignorance; nor has the\r\none hypothesis any real advantage above the other, except in its greater\r\nconformity to vulgar prejudices.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nYou have displayed this argument with great emphasis, replied CLEANTHES:\r\nYou seem not sensible how easy it is to answer it. Even in common life,\r\nif I assign a cause for any event, is it any objection, PHILO, that I\r\ncannot assign the cause of that cause, and answer every new question\r\nwhich may incessantly be started? And what philosophers could possibly\r\nsubmit to so rigid a rule? philosophers, who confess ultimate causes to\r\nbe totally unknown; and are sensible, that the most refined principles\r\ninto which they trace the phenomena, are still to them as inexplicable as\r\nthese phenomena themselves are to the vulgar. The order and arrangement\r\nof nature, the curious adjustment of final causes, the plain use and\r\nintention of every part and organ; all these bespeak in the clearest\r\nlanguage an intelligent cause or author. The heavens and the earth join\r\nin the same testimony: The whole chorus of Nature raises one hymn to the\r\npraises of its Creator. You alone, or almost alone, disturb this general\r\nharmony. You start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections: You ask me,\r\nwhat is the cause of this cause? I know not; I care not; that concerns\r\nnot me. I have found a Deity; and here I stop my inquiry. Let those go\r\nfurther, who are wiser or more enterprising.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI pretend to be neither, replied PHILO: And for that very reason, I\r\nshould never perhaps have attempted to go so far; especially when I am\r\nsensible, that I must at last be contented to sit down with the same\r\nanswer, which, without further trouble, might have satisfied me from the\r\nbeginning. If I am still to remain in utter ignorance of causes, and can\r\nabsolutely give an explication of nothing, I shall never esteem it any\r\nadvantage to shove off for a moment a difficulty, which, you acknowledge,\r\nmust immediately, in its full force, recur upon me. Naturalists indeed\r\nvery justly explain particular effects by more general causes, though\r\nthese general causes themselves should remain in the end totally\r\ninexplicable; but they never surely thought it satisfactory to explain a\r\nparticular effect by a particular cause, which was no more to be\r\naccounted for than the effect itself. An ideal system, arranged of\r\nitself, without a precedent design, is not a whit more explicable than a\r\nmaterial one, which attains its order in a like manner; nor is there any\r\nmore difficulty in the latter supposition than in the former.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap05\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nPART 5\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut to show you still more inconveniences, continued PHILO, in your\r\nAnthropomorphism, please to take a new survey of your principles. Like\r\neffects prove like causes. This is the experimental argument; and this,\r\nyou say too, is the sole theological argument. Now, it is certain, that\r\nthe liker the effects are which are seen, and the liker the causes which\r\nare inferred, the stronger is the argument. Every departure on either\r\nside diminishes the probability, and renders the experiment less\r\nconclusive. You cannot doubt of the principle; neither ought you to\r\nreject its consequences.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAll the new discoveries in astronomy, which prove the immense grandeur\r\nand magnificence of the works of Nature, are so many additional arguments\r\nfor a Deity, according to the true system of Theism; but, according to\r\nyour hypothesis of experimental Theism, they become so many objections,\r\nby removing the effect still further from all resemblance to the effects\r\nof human art and contrivance. For, if LUCRETIUS[Lib. II. 1094], even\r\nfollowing the old system of the world, could exclaim,\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi\u003cBR\u003e\r\n Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas?\u003cBR\u003e\r\n Quis pariter coelos omnes convertere? et omnes\u003cBR\u003e\r\n Ignibus aetheriis terras suffire feraces?\u003cBR\u003e\r\n Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore praesto?\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf TULLY [De. nat. Deor. Lib. I] esteemed this reasoning so natural,\r\nas to put it into the mouth of his EPICUREAN:\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\n\"Quibus enim oculis animi intueri potuit vester Plato fabricam illam\r\ntanti operis, qua construi a Deo atque aedificari mundum facit? quae\r\nmolitio? quae ferramenta? qui vectes? quae machinae? qui ministri tanti\r\nmuneris fuerunt? quemadmodum autem obedire et parere voluntati architecti\r\naer, ignis, aqua, terra potuerunt?\"\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf this argument, I say, had any force in former ages, how much greater\r\nmust it have at present, when the bounds of Nature are so infinitely\r\nenlarged, and such a magnificent scene is opened to us? It is still more\r\nunreasonable to form our idea of so unlimited a cause from our experience\r\nof the narrow productions of human design and invention.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe discoveries by microscopes, as they open a new universe in miniature,\r\nare still objections, according to you, arguments, according to me. The\r\nfurther we push our researches of this kind, we are still led to infer\r\nthe universal cause of all to be vastly different from mankind, or from\r\nany object of human experience and observation.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd what say you to the discoveries in anatomy, chemistry, botany?…\r\nThese surely are no objections, replied CLEANTHES; they only discover new\r\ninstances of art and contrivance. It is still the image of mind reflected\r\non us from innumerable objects. Add, a mind like the human, said PHILO. I\r\nknow of no other, replied CLEANTHES. And the liker the better, insisted\r\nPHILO. To be sure, said CLEANTHES.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, CLEANTHES, said PHILO, with an air of alacrity and triumph, mark the\r\nconsequences. First, By this method of reasoning, you renounce all claim\r\nto infinity in any of the attributes of the Deity. For, as the cause\r\nought only to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it\r\nfalls under our cognisance, is not infinite; what pretensions have we,\r\nupon your suppositions, to ascribe that attribute to the Divine Being?\r\nYou will still insist, that, by removing him so much from all similarity\r\nto human creatures, we give in to the most arbitrary hypothesis, and at\r\nthe same time weaken all proofs of his existence.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSecondly, You have no reason, on your theory, for ascribing perfection to\r\nthe Deity, even in his finite capacity, or for supposing him free from\r\nevery error, mistake, or incoherence, in his undertakings. There are many\r\ninexplicable difficulties in the works of Nature, which, if we allow a\r\nperfect author to be proved a priori, are easily solved, and become only\r\nseeming difficulties, from the narrow capacity of man, who cannot trace\r\ninfinite relations. But according to your method of reasoning, these\r\ndifficulties become all real; and perhaps will be insisted on, as new\r\ninstances of likeness to human art and contrivance. At least, you must\r\nacknowledge, that it is impossible for us to tell, from our limited\r\nviews, whether this system contains any great faults, or deserves any\r\nconsiderable praise, if compared to other possible, and even real\r\nsystems. Could a peasant, if the Aeneid were read to him, pronounce that\r\npoem to be absolutely faultless, or even assign to it its proper rank\r\namong the productions of human wit, he, who had never seen any other\r\nproduction?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut were this world ever so perfect a production, it must still remain\r\nuncertain, whether all the excellences of the work can justly be ascribed\r\nto the workman. If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of\r\nthe ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so complicated, useful, and\r\nbeautiful a machine? And what surprise must we feel, when we find him a\r\nstupid mechanic, who imitated others, and copied an art, which, through a\r\nlong succession of ages, after multiplied trials, mistakes, corrections,\r\ndeliberations, and controversies, had been gradually improving? Many\r\nworlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere\r\nthis system was struck out; much labour lost, many fruitless trials made;\r\nand a slow, but continued improvement carried on during infinite ages in\r\nthe art of world-making. In such subjects, who can determine, where the\r\ntruth; nay, who can conjecture where the probability lies, amidst a great\r\nnumber of hypotheses which may be proposed, and a still greater which may\r\nbe imagined?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd what shadow of an argument, continued PHILO, can you produce, from\r\nyour hypothesis, to prove the unity of the Deity? A great number of men\r\njoin in building a house or ship, in rearing a city, in framing a\r\ncommonwealth; why may not several deities combine in contriving and\r\nframing a world? This is only so much greater similarity to human\r\naffairs. By sharing the work among several, we may so much further limit\r\nthe attributes of each, and get rid of that extensive power and\r\nknowledge, which must be supposed in one deity, and which, according to\r\nyou, can only serve to weaken the proof of his existence. And if such\r\nfoolish, such vicious creatures as man, can yet often unite in framing\r\nand executing one plan, how much more those deities or demons, whom we\r\nmay suppose several degrees more perfect!\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTo multiply causes without necessity, is indeed contrary to true\r\nphilosophy: but this principle applies not to the present case. Were one\r\ndeity antecedently proved by your theory, who were possessed of every\r\nattribute requisite to the production of the universe; it would be\r\nneedless, I own, (though not absurd,) to suppose any other deity\r\nexistent. But while it is still a question, Whether all these attributes\r\nare united in one subject, or dispersed among several independent beings,\r\nby what phenomena in nature can we pretend to decide the controversy?\r\nWhere we see a body raised in a scale, we are sure that there is in the\r\nopposite scale, however concealed from sight, some counterpoising weight\r\nequal to it; but it is still allowed to doubt, whether that weight be an\r\naggregate of several distinct bodies, or one uniform united mass. And if\r\nthe weight requisite very much exceeds any thing which we have ever seen\r\nconjoined in any single body, the former supposition becomes still more\r\nprobable and natural. An intelligent being of such vast power and\r\ncapacity as is necessary to produce the universe, or, to speak in the\r\nlanguage of ancient philosophy, so prodigious an animal exceeds all\r\nanalogy, and even comprehension.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut further, CLEANTHES: men are mortal, and renew their species by\r\ngeneration; and this is common to all living creatures. The two great\r\nsexes of male and female, says MILTON, animate the world. Why must this\r\ncircumstance, so universal, so essential, be excluded from those numerous\r\nand limited deities? Behold, then, the theogony of ancient times brought\r\nback upon us.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd why not become a perfect Anthropomorphite? Why not assert the deity\r\nor deities to be corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears, \u0026amp;c.?\r\nEPICURUS maintained, that no man had ever seen reason but in a human\r\nfigure; therefore the gods must have a human figure. And this argument,\r\nwhich is deservedly so much ridiculed by CICERO, becomes, according to\r\nyou, solid and philosophical.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn a word, CLEANTHES, a man who follows your hypothesis is able perhaps\r\nto assert, or conjecture, that the universe, sometime, arose from\r\nsomething like design: but beyond that position he cannot ascertain one\r\nsingle circumstance; and is left afterwards to fix every point of his\r\ntheology by the utmost license of fancy and hypothesis. This world, for\r\naught he knows, is very faulty and imperfect, compared to a superior\r\nstandard; and was only the first rude essay of some infant deity, who\r\nafterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance: it is the work\r\nonly of some dependent, inferior deity; and is the object of derision to\r\nhis superiors: it is the production of old age and dotage in some\r\nsuperannuated deity; and ever since his death, has run on at adventures,\r\nfrom the first impulse and active force which it received from him. You\r\njustly give signs of horror, DEMEA, at these strange suppositions; but\r\nthese, and a thousand more of the same kind, are CLEANTHES\u0027s\r\nsuppositions, not mine. From the moment the attributes of the Deity are\r\nsupposed finite, all these have place. And I cannot, for my part, think\r\nthat so wild and unsettled a system of theology is, in any respect,\r\npreferable to none at all.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThese suppositions I absolutely disown, cried CLEANTHES: they strike me,\r\nhowever, with no horror, especially when proposed in that rambling way in\r\nwhich they drop from you. On the contrary, they give me pleasure, when I\r\nsee, that, by the utmost indulgence of your imagination, you never get\r\nrid of the hypothesis of design in the universe, but are obliged at every\r\nturn to have recourse to it. To this concession I adhere steadily; and\r\nthis I regard as a sufficient foundation for religion.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap06\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nPART 6\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt must be a slight fabric, indeed, said DEMEA, which can be erected on\r\nso tottering a foundation. While we are uncertain whether there is one\r\ndeity or many; whether the deity or deities, to whom we owe our\r\nexistence, be perfect or imperfect, subordinate or supreme, dead or\r\nalive, what trust or confidence can we repose in them? What devotion or\r\nworship address to them? What veneration or obedience pay them? To all\r\nthe purposes of life the theory of religion becomes altogether useless:\r\nand even with regard to speculative consequences, its uncertainty,\r\naccording to you, must render it totally precarious and unsatisfactory.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTo render it still more unsatisfactory, said PHILO, there occurs to me\r\nanother hypothesis, which must acquire an air of probability from the\r\nmethod of reasoning so much insisted on by CLEANTHES. That like effects\r\narise from like causes: this principle he supposes the foundation of all\r\nreligion. But there is another principle of the same kind, no less\r\ncertain, and derived from the same source of experience; that where\r\nseveral known circumstances are observed to be similar, the unknown will\r\nalso be found similar. Thus, if we see the limbs of a human body, we\r\nconclude that it is also attended with a human head, though hid from us.\r\nThus, if we see, through a chink in a wall, a small part of the sun, we\r\nconclude, that, were the wall removed, we should see the whole body. In\r\nshort, this method of reasoning is so obvious and familiar, that no\r\nscruple can ever be made with regard to its solidity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNow, if we survey the universe, so far as it falls under our knowledge,\r\nit bears a great resemblance to an animal or organised body, and seems\r\nactuated with a like principle of life and motion. A continual\r\ncirculation of matter in it produces no disorder: a continual waste in\r\nevery part is incessantly repaired: the closest sympathy is perceived\r\nthroughout the entire system: and each part or member, in performing its\r\nproper offices, operates both to its own preservation and to that of the\r\nwhole. The world, therefore, I infer, is an animal; and the Deity is the\r\nSOUL of the world, actuating it, and actuated by it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nYou have too much learning, CLEANTHES, to be at all surprised at this\r\nopinion, which, you know, was maintained by almost all the Theists of\r\nantiquity, and chiefly prevails in their discourses and reasonings. For\r\nthough, sometimes, the ancient philosophers reason from final causes, as\r\nif they thought the world the workmanship of God; yet it appears rather\r\ntheir favourite notion to consider it as his body, whose organisation\r\nrenders it subservient to him. And it must be confessed, that, as the\r\nuniverse resembles more a human body than it does the works of human art\r\nand contrivance, if our limited analogy could ever, with any propriety,\r\nbe extended to the whole of nature, the inference seems juster in favour\r\nof the ancient than the modern theory.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThere are many other advantages, too, in the former theory, which\r\nrecommended it to the ancient theologians. Nothing more repugnant to all\r\ntheir notions, because nothing more repugnant to common experience, than\r\nmind without body; a mere spiritual substance, which fell not under their\r\nsenses nor comprehension, and of which they had not observed one single\r\ninstance throughout all nature. Mind and body they knew, because they\r\nfelt both: an order, arrangement, organisation, or internal machinery, in\r\nboth, they likewise knew, after the same manner: and it could not but\r\nseem reasonable to transfer this experience to the universe; and to\r\nsuppose the divine mind and body to be also coeval, and to have, both of\r\nthem, order and arrangement naturally inherent in them, and inseparable\r\nfrom them.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHere, therefore, is a new species of Anthropomorphism, CLEANTHES, on\r\nwhich you may deliberate; and a theory which seems not liable to any\r\nconsiderable difficulties. You are too much superior, surely, to\r\nsystematical prejudices, to find any more difficulty in supposing an\r\nanimal body to be, originally, of itself, or from unknown causes,\r\npossessed of order and organisation, than in supposing a similar order to\r\nbelong to mind. But the vulgar prejudice, that body and mind ought always\r\nto accompany each other, ought not, one should think, to be entirely\r\nneglected; since it is founded on vulgar experience, the only guide which\r\nyou profess to follow in all these theological inquiries. And if you\r\nassert, that our limited experience is an unequal standard, by which to\r\njudge of the unlimited extent of nature; you entirely abandon your own\r\nhypothesis, and must thenceforward adopt our Mysticism, as you call it,\r\nand admit of the absolute incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThis theory, I own, replied CLEANTHES, has never before occurred to me,\r\nthough a pretty natural one; and I cannot readily, upon so short an\r\nexamination and reflection, deliver any opinion with regard to it. You\r\nare very scrupulous, indeed, said PHILO: were I to examine any system of\r\nyours, I should not have acted with half that caution and reserve, in\r\nstarting objections and difficulties to it. However, if any thing occur\r\nto you, you will oblige us by proposing it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhy then, replied CLEANTHES, it seems to me, that, though the world does,\r\nin many circumstances, resemble an animal body; yet is the analogy also\r\ndefective in many circumstances the most material: no organs of sense; no\r\nseat of thought or reason; no one precise origin of motion and action. In\r\nshort, it seems to bear a stronger resemblance to a vegetable than to an\r\nanimal, and your inference would be so far inconclusive in favour of the\r\nsoul of the world.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut, in the next place, your theory seems to imply the eternity of the\r\nworld; and that is a principle, which, I think, can be refuted by the\r\nstrongest reasons and probabilities. I shall suggest an argument to this\r\npurpose, which, I believe, has not been insisted on by any writer. Those,\r\nwho reason from the late origin of arts and sciences, though their\r\ninference wants not force, may perhaps be refuted by considerations\r\nderived from the nature of human society, which is in continual\r\nrevolution, between ignorance and knowledge, liberty and slavery, riches\r\nand poverty; so that it is impossible for us, from our limited\r\nexperience, to foretell with assurance what events may or may not be\r\nexpected. Ancient learning and history seem to have been in great danger\r\nof entirely perishing after the inundation of the barbarous nations; and\r\nhad these convulsions continued a little longer, or been a little more\r\nviolent, we should not probably have now known what passed in the world a\r\nfew centuries before us. Nay, were it not for the superstition of the\r\nPopes, who preserved a little jargon of Latin, in order to support the\r\nappearance of an ancient and universal church, that tongue must have been\r\nutterly lost; in which case, the Western world, being totally barbarous,\r\nwould not have been in a fit disposition for receiving the GREEK language\r\nand learning, which was conveyed to them after the sacking of\r\nCONSTANTINOPLE. When learning and books had been extinguished, even the\r\nmechanical arts would have fallen considerably to decay; and it is easily\r\nimagined, that fable or tradition might ascribe to them a much later\r\norigin than the true one. This vulgar argument, therefore, against the\r\neternity of the world, seems a little precarious.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut here appears to be the foundation of a better argument. LUCULLUS was\r\nthe first that brought cherry-trees from ASIA to EUROPE; though that tree\r\nthrives so well in many EUROPEAN climates, that it grows in the woods\r\nwithout any culture. Is it possible, that throughout a whole eternity, no\r\nEUROPEAN had ever passed into ASIA, and thought of transplanting so\r\ndelicious a fruit into his own country? Or if the tree was once\r\ntransplanted and propagated, how could it ever afterwards perish? Empires\r\nmay rise and fall, liberty and slavery succeed alternately, ignorance and\r\nknowledge give place to each other; but the cherry-tree will still remain\r\nin the woods of GREECE, SPAIN, and ITALY, and will never be affected by\r\nthe revolutions of human society.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is not two thousand years since vines were transplanted into FRANCE,\r\nthough there is no climate in the world more favourable to them. It is\r\nnot three centuries since horses, cows, sheep, swine, dogs, corn, were\r\nknown in AMERICA. Is it possible, that during the revolutions of a whole\r\neternity, there never arose a COLUMBUS, who might open the communication\r\nbetween EUROPE and that continent? We may as well imagine, that all men\r\nwould wear stockings for ten thousand years, and never have the sense to\r\nthink of garters to tie them. All these seem convincing proofs of the\r\nyouth, or rather infancy, of the world; as being founded on the operation\r\nof principles more constant and steady than those by which human society\r\nis governed and directed. Nothing less than a total convulsion of the\r\nelements will ever destroy all the EUROPEAN animals and vegetables which\r\nare now to be found in the Western world.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd what argument have you against such convulsions? replied PHILO.\r\nStrong and almost incontestable proofs may be traced over the whole\r\nearth, that every part of this globe has continued for many ages entirely\r\ncovered with water. And though order were supposed inseparable from\r\nmatter, and inherent in it; yet may matter be susceptible of many and\r\ngreat revolutions, through the endless periods of eternal duration. The\r\nincessant changes, to which every part of it is subject, seem to intimate\r\nsome such general transformations; though, at the same time, it is\r\nobservable, that all the changes and corruptions of which we have ever\r\nhad experience, are but passages from one state of order to another; nor\r\ncan matter ever rest in total deformity and confusion. What we see in the\r\nparts, we may infer in the whole; at least, that is the method of\r\nreasoning on which you rest your whole theory. And were I obliged to\r\ndefend any particular system of this nature, which I never willingly\r\nshould do, I esteem none more plausible than that which ascribes an\r\neternal inherent principle of order to the world, though attended with\r\ngreat and continual revolutions and alterations. This at once solves all\r\ndifficulties; and if the solution, by being so general, is not entirely\r\ncomplete and satisfactory, it is at least a theory that we must sooner or\r\nlater have recourse to, whatever system we embrace. How could things have\r\nbeen as they are, were there not an original inherent principle of order\r\nsomewhere, in thought or in matter? And it is very indifferent to which\r\nof these we give the preference. Chance has no place, on any hypothesis,\r\nsceptical or religious. Every thing is surely governed by steady,\r\ninviolable laws. And were the inmost essence of things laid open to us,\r\nwe should then discover a scene, of which, at present, we can have no\r\nidea. Instead of admiring the order of natural beings, we should clearly\r\nsee that it was absolutely impossible for them, in the smallest article,\r\never to admit of any other disposition.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWere any one inclined to revive the ancient Pagan Theology, which\r\nmaintained, as we learn from HESIOD, that this globe was governed by\r\n30,000 deities, who arose from the unknown powers of nature: you would\r\nnaturally object, CLEANTHES, that nothing is gained by this hypothesis;\r\nand that it is as easy to suppose all men animals, beings more numerous,\r\nbut less perfect, to have sprung immediately from a like origin. Push the\r\nsame inference a step further, and you will find a numerous society of\r\ndeities as explicable as one universal deity, who possesses within\r\nhimself the powers and perfections of the whole society. All these\r\nsystems, then, of Scepticism, Polytheism, and Theism, you must allow, on\r\nyour principles, to be on a like footing, and that no one of them has any\r\nadvantage over the others. You may thence learn the fallacy of your\r\nprinciples.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap07\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nPART 7\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut here, continued PHILO, in examining the ancient system of the soul of\r\nthe world, there strikes me, all on a sudden, a new idea, which, if just,\r\nmust go near to subvert all your reasoning, and destroy even your first\r\ninferences, on which you repose such confidence. If the universe bears a\r\ngreater likeness to animal bodies and to vegetables, than to the works of\r\nhuman art, it is more probable that its cause resembles the cause of the\r\nformer than that of the latter, and its origin ought rather to be\r\nascribed to generation or vegetation, than to reason or design. Your\r\nconclusion, even according to your own principles, is therefore lame and\r\ndefective.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nPray open up this argument a little further, said DEMEA, for I do not\r\nrightly apprehend it in that concise manner in which you have expressed\r\nit.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nOur friend CLEANTHES, replied PHILO, as you have heard, asserts, that\r\nsince no question of fact can be proved otherwise than by experience, the\r\nexistence of a Deity admits not of proof from any other medium. The\r\nworld, says he, resembles the works of human contrivance; therefore its\r\ncause must also resemble that of the other. Here we may remark, that the\r\noperation of one very small part of nature, to wit man, upon another very\r\nsmall part, to wit that inanimate matter lying within his reach, is the\r\nrule by which CLEANTHES judges of the origin of the whole; and he\r\nmeasures objects, so widely disproportioned, by the same individual\r\nstandard. But to waive all objections drawn from this topic, I affirm,\r\nthat there are other parts of the universe (besides the machines of human\r\ninvention) which bear still a greater resemblance to the fabric of the\r\nworld, and which, therefore, afford a better conjecture concerning the\r\nuniversal origin of this system. These parts are animals and vegetables.\r\nThe world plainly resembles more an animal or a vegetable, than it does a\r\nwatch or a knitting-loom. Its cause, therefore, it is more probable,\r\nresembles the cause of the former. The cause of the former is generation\r\nor vegetation. The cause, therefore, of the world, we may infer to be\r\nsomething similar or analogous to generation or vegetation.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut how is it conceivable, said DEMEA, that the world can arise from any\r\nthing similar to vegetation or generation?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nVery easily, replied PHILO. In like manner as a tree sheds its seed into\r\nthe neighbouring fields, and produces other trees; so the great\r\nvegetable, the world, or this planetary system, produces within itself\r\ncertain seeds, which, being scattered into the surrounding chaos,\r\nvegetate into new worlds. A comet, for instance, is the seed of a world;\r\nand after it has been fully ripened, by passing from sun to sun, and star\r\nto star, it is at last tossed into the unformed elements which every\r\nwhere surround this universe, and immediately sprouts up into a new\r\nsystem.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nOr if, for the sake of variety (for I see no other advantage), we should\r\nsuppose this world to be an animal; a comet is the egg of this animal:\r\nand in like manner as an ostrich lays its egg in the sand, which, without\r\nany further care, hatches the egg, and produces a new animal; so…\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI understand you, says DEMEA: But what wild, arbitrary suppositions are\r\nthese! What data have you for such extraordinary conclusions? And is the\r\nslight, imaginary resemblance of the world to a vegetable or an animal\r\nsufficient to establish the same inference with regard to both? Objects,\r\nwhich are in general so widely different, ought they to be a standard for\r\neach other?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nRight, cries PHILO: This is the topic on which I have all along insisted.\r\nI have still asserted, that we have no data to establish any system of\r\ncosmogony. Our experience, so imperfect in itself, and so limited both in\r\nextent and duration, can afford us no probable conjecture concerning the\r\nwhole of things. But if we must needs fix on some hypothesis; by what\r\nrule, pray, ought we to determine our choice? Is there any other rule\r\nthan the greater similarity of the objects compared? And does not a plant\r\nor an animal, which springs from vegetation or generation, bear a\r\nstronger resemblance to the world, than does any artificial machine,\r\nwhich arises from reason and design?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut what is this vegetation and generation of which you talk? said DEMEA.\r\nCan you explain their operations, and anatomise that fine internal\r\nstructure on which they depend?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAs much, at least, replied PHILO, as CLEANTHES can explain the operations\r\nof reason, or anatomise that internal structure on which it depends. But\r\nwithout any such elaborate disquisitions, when I see an animal, I infer,\r\nthat it sprang from generation; and that with as great certainty as you\r\nconclude a house to have been reared by design. These words, generation,\r\nreason, mark only certain powers and energies in nature, whose effects\r\nare known, but whose essence is incomprehensible; and one of these\r\nprinciples, more than the other, has no privilege for being made a\r\nstandard to the whole of nature.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn reality, DEMEA, it may reasonably be expected, that the larger the\r\nviews are which we take of things, the better will they conduct us in our\r\nconclusions concerning such extraordinary and such magnificent subjects.\r\nIn this little corner of the world alone, there are four principles,\r\nreason, instinct, generation, vegetation, which are similar to each\r\nother, and are the causes of similar effects. What a number of other\r\nprinciples may we naturally suppose in the immense extent and variety of\r\nthe universe, could we travel from planet to planet, and from system to\r\nsystem, in order to examine each part of this mighty fabric? Any one of\r\nthese four principles above mentioned, (and a hundred others which lie\r\nopen to our conjecture,) may afford us a theory by which to judge of the\r\norigin of the world; and it is a palpable and egregious partiality to\r\nconfine our view entirely to that principle by which our own minds\r\noperate. Were this principle more intelligible on that account, such a\r\npartiality might be somewhat excusable: But reason, in its internal\r\nfabric and structure, is really as little known to us as instinct or\r\nvegetation; and, perhaps, even that vague, indeterminate word, Nature, to\r\nwhich the vulgar refer every thing, is not at the bottom more\r\ninexplicable. The effects of these principles are all known to us from\r\nexperience; but the principles themselves, and their manner of operation,\r\nare totally unknown; nor is it less intelligible, or less conformable to\r\nexperience, to say, that the world arose by vegetation, from a seed shed\r\nby another world, than to say that it arose from a divine reason or\r\ncontrivance, according to the sense in which CLEANTHES understands it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut methinks, said DEMEA, if the world had a vegetative quality, and\r\ncould sow the seeds of new worlds into the infinite chaos, this power\r\nwould be still an additional argument for design in its author. For\r\nwhence could arise so wonderful a faculty but from design? Or how can\r\norder spring from any thing which perceives not that order which it\r\nbestows?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nYou need only look around you, replied PHILO, to satisfy yourself with\r\nregard to this question. A tree bestows order and organisation on that\r\ntree which springs from it, without knowing the order; an animal in the\r\nsame manner on its offspring; a bird on its nest; and instances of this\r\nkind are even more frequent in the world than those of order, which arise\r\nfrom reason and contrivance. To say, that all this order in animals and\r\nvegetables proceeds ultimately from design, is begging the question; nor\r\ncan that great point be ascertained otherwise than by proving, a priori,\r\nboth that order is, from its nature, inseparably attached to thought; and\r\nthat it can never of itself, or from original unknown principles, belong\r\nto matter.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut further, DEMEA; this objection which you urge can never be made use\r\nof by CLEANTHES, without renouncing a defence which he has already made\r\nagainst one of my objections. When I inquired concerning the cause of\r\nthat supreme reason and intelligence into which he resolves every thing;\r\nhe told me, that the impossibility of satisfying such inquiries could\r\nnever be admitted as an objection in any species of philosophy. \"We must\r\nstop somewhere\", says he; \"nor is it ever within the reach of human\r\ncapacity to explain ultimate causes, or show the last connections of any\r\nobjects. It is sufficient, if any steps, so far as we go, are supported\r\nby experience and observation.\" Now, that vegetation and generation, as\r\nwell as reason, are experienced to be principles of order in nature, is\r\nundeniable. If I rest my system of cosmogony on the former, preferably to\r\nthe latter, it is at my choice. The matter seems entirely arbitrary. And\r\nwhen CLEANTHES asks me what is the cause of my great vegetative or\r\ngenerative faculty, I am equally entitled to ask him the cause of his\r\ngreat reasoning principle. These questions we have agreed to forbear on\r\nboth sides; and it is chiefly his interest on the present occasion to\r\nstick to this agreement. Judging by our limited and imperfect experience,\r\ngeneration has some privileges above reason: for we see every day the\r\nlatter arise from the former, never the former from the latter.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCompare, I beseech you, the consequences on both sides. The world, say I,\r\nresembles an animal; therefore it is an animal, therefore it arose from\r\ngeneration. The steps, I confess, are wide; yet there is some small\r\nappearance of analogy in each step. The world, says CLEANTHES, resembles\r\na machine; therefore it is a machine, therefore it arose from design. The\r\nsteps are here equally wide, and the analogy less striking. And if he\r\npretends to carry on my hypothesis a step further, and to infer design or\r\nreason from the great principle of generation, on which I insist; I may,\r\nwith better authority, use the same freedom to push further his\r\nhypothesis, and infer a divine generation or theogony from his principle\r\nof reason. I have at least some faint shadow of experience, which is the\r\nutmost that can ever be attained in the present subject. Reason, in\r\ninnumerable instances, is observed to arise from the principle of\r\ngeneration, and never to arise from any other principle.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHESIOD, and all the ancient mythologists, were so struck with this\r\nanalogy, that they universally explained the origin of nature from an\r\nanimal birth, and copulation. PLATO too, so far as he is intelligible,\r\nseems to have adopted some such notion in his TIMAEUS.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe BRAHMINS assert, that the world arose from an infinite spider, who\r\nspun this whole complicated mass from his bowels, and annihilates\r\nafterwards the whole or any part of it, by absorbing it again, and\r\nresolving it into his own essence. Here is a species of cosmogony, which\r\nappears to us ridiculous; because a spider is a little contemptible\r\nanimal, whose operations we are never likely to take for a model of the\r\nwhole universe. But still here is a new species of analogy, even in our\r\nglobe. And were there a planet wholly inhabited by spiders, (which is\r\nvery possible,) this inference would there appear as natural and\r\nirrefragable as that which in our planet ascribes the origin of all\r\nthings to design and intelligence, as explained by CLEANTHES. Why an\r\norderly system may not be spun from the belly as well as from the brain,\r\nit will be difficult for him to give a satisfactory reason.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI must confess, PHILO, replied CLEANTHES, that of all men living, the\r\ntask which you have undertaken, of raising doubts and objections, suits\r\nyou best, and seems, in a manner, natural and unavoidable to you. So\r\ngreat is your fertility of invention, that I am not ashamed to\r\nacknowledge myself unable, on a sudden, to solve regularly such\r\nout-of-the-way difficulties as you incessantly start upon me: though I\r\nclearly see, in general, their fallacy and error. And I question not, but\r\nyou are yourself, at present, in the same case, and have not the solution\r\nso ready as the objection: while you must be sensible, that common sense\r\nand reason are entirely against you; and that such whimsies as you have\r\ndelivered, may puzzle, but never can convince us.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap08\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nPART 8\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhat you ascribe to the fertility of my invention, replied PHILO, is\r\nentirely owing to the nature of the subject. In subjects adapted to the\r\nnarrow compass of human reason, there is commonly but one determination,\r\nwhich carries probability or conviction with it; and to a man of sound\r\njudgement, all other suppositions, but that one, appear entirely absurd\r\nand chimerical. But in such questions as the present, a hundred\r\ncontradictory views may preserve a kind of imperfect analogy; and\r\ninvention has here full scope to exert itself. Without any great effort\r\nof thought, I believe that I could, in an instant, propose other systems\r\nof cosmogony, which would have some faint appearance of truth, though it\r\nis a thousand, a million to one, if either yours or any one of mine be\r\nthe true system.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nFor instance, what if I should revive the old EPICUREAN hypothesis? This\r\nis commonly, and I believe justly, esteemed the most absurd system that\r\nhas yet been proposed; yet I know not whether, with a few alterations, it\r\nmight not be brought to bear a faint appearance of probability. Instead\r\nof supposing matter infinite, as EPICURUS did, let us suppose it finite.\r\nA finite number of particles is only susceptible of finite transpositions:\r\nand it must happen, in an eternal duration, that every possible order or\r\nposition must be tried an infinite number of times. This world, therefore,\r\nwith all its events, even the most minute, has before been produced and\r\ndestroyed, and will again be produced and destroyed, without any bounds\r\nand limitations. No one, who has a conception of the powers of infinite,\r\nin comparison of finite, will ever scruple this determination.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut this supposes, said DEMEA, that matter can acquire motion, without\r\nany voluntary agent or first mover.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd where is the difficulty, replied PHILO, of that supposition? Every\r\nevent, before experience, is equally difficult and incomprehensible; and\r\nevery event, after experience, is equally easy and intelligible. Motion,\r\nin many instances, from gravity, from elasticity, from electricity,\r\nbegins in matter, without any known voluntary agent: and to suppose\r\nalways, in these cases, an unknown voluntary agent, is mere hypothesis;\r\nand hypothesis attended with no advantages. The beginning of motion in\r\nmatter itself is as conceivable a priori as its communication from mind\r\nand intelligence.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBesides, why may not motion have been propagated by impulse through all\r\neternity, and the same stock of it, or nearly the same, be still upheld\r\nin the universe? As much is lost by the composition of motion, as much is\r\ngained by its resolution. And whatever the causes are, the fact is\r\ncertain, that matter is, and always has been, in continual agitation, as\r\nfar as human experience or tradition reaches. There is not probably, at\r\npresent, in the whole universe, one particle of matter at absolute rest.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd this very consideration too, continued PHILO, which we have stumbled\r\non in the course of the argument, suggests a new hypothesis of cosmogony,\r\nthat is not absolutely absurd and improbable. Is there a system, an\r\norder, an economy of things, by which matter can preserve that perpetual\r\nagitation which seems essential to it, and yet maintain a constancy in\r\nthe forms which it produces? There certainly is such an economy; for this\r\nis actually the case with the present world. The continual motion of\r\nmatter, therefore, in less than infinite transpositions, must produce\r\nthis economy or order; and by its very nature, that order, when once\r\nestablished, supports itself, for many ages, if not to eternity. But\r\nwherever matter is so poised, arranged, and adjusted, as to continue in\r\nperpetual motion, and yet preserve a constancy in the forms, its\r\nsituation must, of necessity, have all the same appearance of art and\r\ncontrivance which we observe at present. All the parts of each form must\r\nhave a relation to each other, and to the whole; and the whole itself\r\nmust have a relation to the other parts of the universe; to the element\r\nin which the form subsists; to the materials with which it repairs its\r\nwaste and decay; and to every other form which is hostile or friendly. A\r\ndefect in any of these particulars destroys the form; and the matter of\r\nwhich it is composed is again set loose, and is thrown into irregular\r\nmotions and fermentations, till it unite itself to some other regular\r\nform. If no such form be prepared to receive it, and if there be a great\r\nquantity of this corrupted matter in the universe, the universe itself is\r\nentirely disordered; whether it be the feeble embryo of a world in its\r\nfirst beginnings that is thus destroyed, or the rotten carcass of one\r\nlanguishing in old age and infirmity. In either case, a chaos ensues;\r\ntill finite, though innumerable revolutions produce at last some forms,\r\nwhose parts and organs are so adjusted as to support the forms amidst a\r\ncontinued succession of matter.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSuppose (for we shall endeavour to vary the expression), that matter were\r\nthrown into any position, by a blind, unguided force; it is evident that\r\nthis first position must, in all probability, be the most confused and\r\nmost disorderly imaginable, without any resemblance to those works of\r\nhuman contrivance, which, along with a symmetry of parts, discover an\r\nadjustment of means to ends, and a tendency to self-preservation. If the\r\nactuating force cease after this operation, matter must remain for ever\r\nin disorder, and continue an immense chaos, without any proportion or\r\nactivity. But suppose that the actuating force, whatever it be, still\r\ncontinues in matter, this first position will immediately give place to a\r\nsecond, which will likewise in all probability be as disorderly as the\r\nfirst, and so on through many successions of changes and revolutions. No\r\nparticular order or position ever continues a moment unaltered. The\r\noriginal force, still remaining in activity, gives a perpetual\r\nrestlessness to matter. Every possible situation is produced, and\r\ninstantly destroyed. If a glimpse or dawn of order appears for a moment,\r\nit is instantly hurried away, and confounded, by that never-ceasing force\r\nwhich actuates every part of matter.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThus the universe goes on for many ages in a continued succession of\r\nchaos and disorder. But is it not possible that it may settle at last, so\r\nas not to lose its motion and active force (for that we have supposed\r\ninherent in it), yet so as to preserve an uniformity of appearance,\r\namidst the continual motion and fluctuation of its parts? This we find to\r\nbe the case with the universe at present. Every individual is perpetually\r\nchanging, and every part of every individual; and yet the whole remains,\r\nin appearance, the same. May we not hope for such a position, or rather\r\nbe assured of it, from the eternal revolutions of unguided matter; and\r\nmay not this account for all the appearing wisdom and contrivance which\r\nis in the universe? Let us contemplate the subject a little, and we shall\r\nfind, that this adjustment, if attained by matter of a seeming stability\r\nin the forms, with a real and perpetual revolution or motion of parts,\r\naffords a plausible, if not a true solution of the difficulty.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is in vain, therefore, to insist upon the uses of the parts in animals\r\nor vegetables, and their curious adjustment to each other. I would fain\r\nknow, how an animal could subsist, unless its parts were so adjusted? Do\r\nwe not find, that it immediately perishes whenever this adjustment\r\nceases, and that its matter corrupting tries some new form? It happens\r\nindeed, that the parts of the world are so well adjusted, that some\r\nregular form immediately lays claim to this corrupted matter: and if it\r\nwere not so, could the world subsist? Must it not dissolve as well as the\r\nanimal, and pass through new positions and situations, till in great, but\r\nfinite succession, it falls at last into the present or some such order?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is well, replied CLEANTHES, you told us, that this hypothesis was\r\nsuggested on a sudden, in the course of the argument. Had you had leisure\r\nto examine it, you would soon have perceived the insuperable objections\r\nto which it is exposed. No form, you say, can subsist, unless it possess\r\nthose powers and organs requisite for its subsistence: some new order or\r\neconomy must be tried, and so on, without intermission; till at last some\r\norder, which can support and maintain itself, is fallen upon. But\r\naccording to this hypothesis, whence arise the many conveniences and\r\nadvantages which men and all animals possess? Two eyes, two ears, are not\r\nabsolutely necessary for the subsistence of the species. Human race might\r\nhave been propagated and preserved, without horses, dogs, cows, sheep,\r\nand those innumerable fruits and products which serve to our satisfaction\r\nand enjoyment. If no camels had been created for the use of man in the\r\nsandy deserts of AFRICA and ARABIA, would the world have been dissolved?\r\nIf no lodestone had been framed to give that wonderful and useful\r\ndirection to the needle, would human society and the human kind have been\r\nimmediately extinguished? Though the maxims of Nature be in general very\r\nfrugal, yet instances of this kind are far from being rare; and any one\r\nof them is a sufficient proof of design, and of a benevolent design,\r\nwhich gave rise to the order and arrangement of the universe.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAt least, you may safely infer, said PHILO, that the foregoing hypothesis\r\nis so far incomplete and imperfect, which I shall not scruple to allow.\r\nBut can we ever reasonably expect greater success in any attempts of this\r\nnature? Or can we ever hope to erect a system of cosmogony, that will be\r\nliable to no exceptions, and will contain no circumstance repugnant to\r\nour limited and imperfect experience of the analogy of Nature? Your\r\ntheory itself cannot surely pretend to any such advantage, even though\r\nyou have run into Anthropomorphism, the better to preserve a conformity\r\nto common experience. Let us once more put it to trial. In all instances\r\nwhich we have ever seen, ideas are copied from real objects, and are\r\nectypal, not archetypal, to express myself in learned terms: You reverse\r\nthis order, and give thought the precedence. In all instances which we\r\nhave ever seen, thought has no influence upon matter, except where that\r\nmatter is so conjoined with it as to have an equal reciprocal influence\r\nupon it. No animal can move immediately any thing but the members of its\r\nown body; and indeed, the equality of action and reaction seems to be an\r\nuniversal law of nature: But your theory implies a contradiction to this\r\nexperience. These instances, with many more, which it were easy to\r\ncollect, (particularly the supposition of a mind or system of thought\r\nthat is eternal, or, in other words, an animal ingenerable and immortal);\r\nthese instances, I say, may teach all of us sobriety in condemning each\r\nother, and let us see, that as no system of this kind ought ever to be\r\nreceived from a slight analogy, so neither ought any to be rejected on\r\naccount of a small incongruity. For that is an inconvenience from which\r\nwe can justly pronounce no one to be exempted.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAll religious systems, it is confessed, are subject to great and\r\ninsuperable difficulties. Each disputant triumphs in his turn; while he\r\ncarries on an offensive war, and exposes the absurdities, barbarities,\r\nand pernicious tenets of his antagonist. But all of them, on the whole,\r\nprepare a complete triumph for the Sceptic; who tells them, that no\r\nsystem ought ever to be embraced with regard to such subjects: For this\r\nplain reason, that no absurdity ought ever to be assented to with regard\r\nto any subject. A total suspense of judgement is here our only reasonable\r\nresource. And if every attack, as is commonly observed, and no defence,\r\namong Theologians, is successful; how complete must be his victory, who\r\nremains always, with all mankind, on the offensive, and has himself no\r\nfixed station or abiding city, which he is ever, on any occasion, obliged\r\nto defend?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap09\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nPART 9\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut if so many difficulties attend the argument a posteriori, said DEMEA,\r\nhad we not better adhere to that simple and sublime argument a priori,\r\nwhich, by offering to us infallible demonstration, cuts off at once all\r\ndoubt and difficulty? By this argument, too, we may prove the infinity of\r\nthe Divine attributes, which, I am afraid, can never be ascertained with\r\ncertainty from any other topic. For how can an effect, which either is\r\nfinite, or, for aught we know, may be so; how can such an effect, I say,\r\nprove an infinite cause? The unity too of the Divine Nature, it is very\r\ndifficult, if not absolutely impossible, to deduce merely from\r\ncontemplating the works of nature; nor will the uniformity alone of the\r\nplan, even were it allowed, give us any assurance of that attribute.\r\nWhereas the argument a priori …\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nYou seem to reason, DEMEA, interposed CLEANTHES, as if those advantages\r\nand conveniences in the abstract argument were full proofs of its\r\nsolidity. But it is first proper, in my opinion, to determine what\r\nargument of this nature you choose to insist on; and we shall afterwards,\r\nfrom itself, better than from its useful consequences, endeavour to\r\ndetermine what value we ought to put upon it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe argument, replied DEMEA, which I would insist on, is the common one.\r\nWhatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence; it being\r\nabsolutely impossible for any thing to produce itself, or be the cause of\r\nits own existence. In mounting up, therefore, from effects to causes, we\r\nmust either go on in tracing an infinite succession, without any ultimate\r\ncause at all; or must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause, that\r\nis necessarily existent: Now, that the first supposition is absurd, may\r\nbe thus proved. In the infinite chain or succession of causes and\r\neffects, each single effect is determined to exist by the power and\r\nefficacy of that cause which immediately preceded; but the whole eternal\r\nchain or succession, taken together, is not determined or caused by any\r\nthing; and yet it is evident that it requires a cause or reason, as much\r\nas any particular object which begins to exist in time. The question is\r\nstill reasonable, why this particular succession of causes existed from\r\neternity, and not any other succession, or no succession at all. If there\r\nbe no necessarily existent being, any supposition which can be formed is\r\nequally possible; nor is there any more absurdity in Nothing\u0027s having\r\nexisted from eternity, than there is in that succession of causes which\r\nconstitutes the universe. What was it, then, which determined Something\r\nto exist rather than Nothing, and bestowed being on a particular\r\npossibility, exclusive of the rest? External causes, there are supposed\r\nto be none. Chance is a word without a meaning. Was it Nothing? But that\r\ncan never produce any thing. We must, therefore, have recourse to a\r\nnecessarily existent Being, who carries the REASON of his existence in\r\nhimself, and who cannot be supposed not to exist, without an express\r\ncontradiction. There is, consequently, such a Being; that is, there is a\r\nDeity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI shall not leave it to PHILO, said CLEANTHES, though I know that the\r\nstarting objections is his chief delight, to point out the weakness of\r\nthis metaphysical reasoning. It seems to me so obviously ill-grounded,\r\nand at the same time of so little consequence to the cause of true piety\r\nand religion, that I shall myself venture to show the fallacy of it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI shall begin with observing, that there is an evident absurdity in\r\npretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any\r\narguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies\r\na contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a\r\ncontradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as\r\nnon-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a\r\ncontradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is\r\ndemonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am\r\nwilling to rest the whole controversy upon it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is pretended that the Deity is a necessarily existent being; and this\r\nnecessity of his existence is attempted to be explained by asserting,\r\nthat if we knew his whole essence or nature, we should perceive it to be\r\nas impossible for him not to exist, as for twice two not to be four. But\r\nit is evident that this can never happen, while our faculties remain the\r\nsame as at present. It will still be possible for us, at any time, to\r\nconceive the non-existence of what we formerly conceived to exist; nor\r\ncan the mind ever lie under a necessity of supposing any object to remain\r\nalways in being; in the same manner as we lie under a necessity of always\r\nconceiving twice two to be four. The words, therefore, necessary\r\nexistence, have no meaning; or, which is the same thing, none that is\r\nconsistent.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut further, why may not the material universe be the necessarily\r\nexistent Being, according to this pretended explication of necessity? We\r\ndare not affirm that we know all the qualities of matter; and for aught\r\nwe can determine, it may contain some qualities, which, were they known,\r\nwould make its non-existence appear as great a contradiction as that\r\ntwice two is five. I find only one argument employed to prove, that the\r\nmaterial world is not the necessarily existent Being: and this argument\r\nis derived from the contingency both of the matter and the form of the\r\nworld. \"Any particle of matter,\" it is said[]Dr. Clarke, \"may be conceived\r\nto be annihilated; and any form may be conceived to be altered. Such an\r\nannihilation or alteration, therefore, is not impossible.\" But it seems\r\na great partiality not to perceive, that the same argument extends\r\nequally to the Deity, so far as we have any conception of him; and that\r\nthe mind can at least imagine him to be non-existent, or his attributes\r\nto be altered. It must be some unknown, inconceivable qualities, which\r\ncan make his non-existence appear impossible, or his attributes\r\nunalterable: And no reason can be assigned, why these qualities may not\r\nbelong to matter. As they are altogether unknown and inconceivable, they\r\ncan never be proved incompatible with it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAdd to this, that in tracing an eternal succession of objects, it seems\r\nabsurd to inquire for a general cause or first author. How can any thing,\r\nthat exists from eternity, have a cause, since that relation implies a\r\npriority in time, and a beginning of existence?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn such a chain, too, or succession of objects, each part is caused by\r\nthat which preceded it, and causes that which succeeds it. Where then is\r\nthe difficulty? But the whole, you say, wants a cause. I answer, that the\r\nuniting of these parts into a whole, like the uniting of several distinct\r\ncountries into one kingdom, or several distinct members into one body, is\r\nperformed merely by an arbitrary act of the mind, and has no influence on\r\nthe nature of things. Did I show you the particular causes of each\r\nindividual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think\r\nit very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was the cause of\r\nthe whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause\r\nof the parts.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThough the reasonings which you have urged, CLEANTHES, may well excuse\r\nme, said PHILO, from starting any further difficulties, yet I cannot\r\nforbear insisting still upon another topic. It is observed by\r\narithmeticians, that the products of 9, compose always either 9, or some\r\nlesser product of 9, if you add together all the characters of which any\r\nof the former products is composed. Thus, of 18, 27, 36, which are\r\nproducts of 9, you make 9 by adding 1 to 8, 2 to 7, 3 to 6. Thus, 369 is\r\na product also of 9; and if you add 3, 6, and 9, you make 18, a lesser\r\nproduct of 9. To a superficial observer, so wonderful a regularity may\r\nbe admired as the effect either of chance or design: but a skilful\r\nalgebraist immediately concludes it to be the work of necessity, and\r\ndemonstrates, that it must for ever result from the nature of these\r\nnumbers. Is it not probable, I ask, that the whole economy of the\r\nuniverse is conducted by a like necessity, though no human algebra can\r\nfurnish a key which solves the difficulty? And instead of admiring the\r\norder of natural beings, may it not happen, that, could we penetrate into\r\nthe intimate nature of bodies, we should clearly see why it was\r\nabsolutely impossible they could ever admit of any other disposition? So\r\ndangerous is it to introduce this idea of necessity into the present\r\nquestion! and so naturally does it afford an inference directly opposite\r\nto the religious hypothesis!\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut dropping all these abstractions, continued PHILO, and confining\r\nourselves to more familiar topics, I shall venture to add an observation,\r\nthat the argument a priori has seldom been found very convincing, except\r\nto people of a metaphysical head, who have accustomed themselves to\r\nabstract reasoning, and who, finding from mathematics, that the\r\nunderstanding frequently leads to truth through obscurity, and, contrary\r\nto first appearances, have transferred the same habit of thinking to\r\nsubjects where it ought not to have place. Other people, even of good\r\nsense and the best inclined to religion, feel always some deficiency in\r\nsuch arguments, though they are not perhaps able to explain distinctly\r\nwhere it lies; a certain proof that men ever did, and ever will derive\r\ntheir religion from other sources than from this species of reasoning.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap10\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nPART 10\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is my opinion, I own, replied DEMEA, that each man feels, in a manner,\r\nthe truth of religion within his own breast, and, from a consciousness of\r\nhis imbecility and misery, rather than from any reasoning, is led to seek\r\nprotection from that Being, on whom he and all nature is dependent. So\r\nanxious or so tedious are even the best scenes of life, that futurity is\r\nstill the object of all our hopes and fears. We incessantly look forward,\r\nand endeavour, by prayers, adoration, and sacrifice, to appease those\r\nunknown powers, whom we find, by experience, so able to afflict and\r\noppress us. Wretched creatures that we are! what resource for us amidst\r\nthe innumerable ills of life, did not religion suggest some methods of\r\natonement, and appease those terrors with which we are incessantly\r\nagitated and tormented?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI am indeed persuaded, said PHILO, that the best, and indeed the only\r\nmethod of bringing every one to a due sense of religion, is by just\r\nrepresentations of the misery and wickedness of men. And for that purpose\r\na talent of eloquence and strong imagery is more requisite than that of\r\nreasoning and argument. For is it necessary to prove what every one feels\r\nwithin himself? It is only necessary to make us feel it, if possible,\r\nmore intimately and sensibly.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe people, indeed, replied DEMEA, are sufficiently convinced of this\r\ngreat and melancholy truth. The miseries of life; the unhappiness of man;\r\nthe general corruptions of our nature; the unsatisfactory enjoyment of\r\npleasures, riches, honours; these phrases have become almost proverbial\r\nin all languages. And who can doubt of what all men declare from their\r\nown immediate feeling and experience?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn this point, said PHILO, the learned are perfectly agreed with the\r\nvulgar; and in all letters, sacred and profane, the topic of human misery\r\nhas been insisted on with the most pathetic eloquence that sorrow and\r\nmelancholy could inspire. The poets, who speak from sentiment, without a\r\nsystem, and whose testimony has therefore the more authority, abound in\r\nimages of this nature. From Homer down to Dr. Young, the whole inspired\r\ntribe have ever been sensible, that no other representation of things\r\nwould suit the feeling and observation of each individual.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAs to authorities, replied DEMEA, you need not seek them. Look round this\r\nlibrary of CLEANTHES. I shall venture to affirm, that, except authors of\r\nparticular sciences, such as chemistry or botany, who have no occasion to\r\ntreat of human life, there is scarce one of those innumerable writers,\r\nfrom whom the sense of human misery has not, in some passage or other,\r\nextorted a complaint and confession of it. At least, the chance is\r\nentirely on that side; and no one author has ever, so far as I can\r\nrecollect, been so extravagant as to deny it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThere you must excuse me, said PHILO: LEIBNIZ has denied it; and is\r\nperhaps the first [That sentiment had been maintained by Dr. King and some\r\nfew others before Leibniz; though by none of so great a fame as that\r\nGerman philosopher] who ventured upon so bold and paradoxical an opinion;\r\nat least, the first who made it essential to his philosophical system.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd by being the first, replied DEMEA, might he not have been sensible of\r\nhis error? For is this a subject in which philosophers can propose to\r\nmake discoveries especially in so late an age? And can any man hope by a\r\nsimple denial (for the subject scarcely admits of reasoning), to bear\r\ndown the united testimony of mankind, founded on sense and consciousness?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd why should man, added he, pretend to an exemption from the lot of all\r\nother animals? The whole earth, believe me, PHILO, is cursed and\r\npolluted. A perpetual war is kindled amongst all living creatures.\r\nNecessity, hunger, want, stimulate the strong and courageous: Fear,\r\nanxiety, terror, agitate the weak and infirm. The first entrance into\r\nlife gives anguish to the new-born infant and to its wretched parent:\r\nWeakness, impotence, distress, attend each stage of that life: and it is\r\nat last finished in agony and horror.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nObserve too, says PHILO, the curious artifices of Nature, in order to\r\nembitter the life of every living being. The stronger prey upon the\r\nweaker, and keep them in perpetual terror and anxiety. The weaker too, in\r\ntheir turn, often prey upon the stronger, and vex and molest them without\r\nrelaxation. Consider that innumerable race of insects, which either are\r\nbred on the body of each animal, or, flying about, infix their stings in\r\nhim. These insects have others still less than themselves, which torment\r\nthem. And thus on each hand, before and behind, above and below, every\r\nanimal is surrounded with enemies, which incessantly seek his misery and\r\ndestruction.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nMan alone, said DEMEA, seems to be, in part, an exception to this rule.\r\nFor by combination in society, he can easily master lions, tigers, and\r\nbears, whose greater strength and agility naturally enable them to prey\r\nupon him.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nOn the contrary, it is here chiefly, cried PHILO, that the uniform and\r\nequal maxims of Nature are most apparent. Man, it is true, can, by\r\ncombination, surmount all his real enemies, and become master of the\r\nwhole animal creation: but does he not immediately raise up to himself\r\nimaginary enemies, the demons of his fancy, who haunt him with\r\nsuperstitious terrors, and blast every enjoyment of life? His pleasure,\r\nas he imagines, becomes, in their eyes, a crime: his food and repose give\r\nthem umbrage and offence: his very sleep and dreams furnish new materials\r\nto anxious fear: and even death, his refuge from every other ill,\r\npresents only the dread of endless and innumerable woes. Nor does the\r\nwolf molest more the timid flock, than superstition does the anxious\r\nbreast of wretched mortals.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBesides, consider, DEMEA: This very society, by which we surmount those\r\nwild beasts, our natural enemies; what new enemies does it not raise to\r\nus? What woe and misery does it not occasion? Man is the greatest enemy\r\nof man. Oppression, injustice, contempt, contumely, violence, sedition,\r\nwar, calumny, treachery, fraud; by these they mutually torment each\r\nother; and they would soon dissolve that society which they had formed,\r\nwere it not for the dread of still greater ills, which must attend their\r\nseparation.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut though these external insults, said DEMEA, from animals, from men,\r\nfrom all the elements, which assault us, form a frightful catalogue of\r\nwoes, they are nothing in comparison of those which arise within\r\nourselves, from the distempered condition of our mind and body. How many\r\nlie under the lingering torment of diseases? Hear the pathetic\r\nenumeration of the great poet.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n Intestine stone and ulcer, colic-pangs,\u003cBR\u003e\r\n Demoniac frenzy, moping melancholy,\u003cBR\u003e\r\n And moon-struck madness, pining atrophy,\u003cBR\u003e\r\n Marasmus, and wide-wasting pestilence.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n Dire was the tossing, deep the groans: despair\u003cBR\u003e\r\n Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n And over them triumphant death his dart\u003cBR\u003e\r\n Shook: but delay\u0027d to strike, though oft invok\u0027d\u003cBR\u003e\r\n With vows, as their chief good and final hope.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe disorders of the mind, continued DEMEA, though more secret, are not\r\nperhaps less dismal and vexatious. Remorse, shame, anguish, rage,\r\ndisappointment, anxiety, fear, dejection, despair; who has ever passed\r\nthrough life without cruel inroads from these tormentors? How many have\r\nscarcely ever felt any better sensations? Labour and poverty, so abhorred\r\nby every one, are the certain lot of the far greater number; and those\r\nfew privileged persons, who enjoy ease and opulence, never reach\r\ncontentment or true felicity. All the goods of life united would not make\r\na very happy man; but all the ills united would make a wretch indeed; and\r\nany one of them almost (and who can be free from every one?) nay often\r\nthe absence of one good (and who can possess all?) is sufficient to\r\nrender life ineligible.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWere a stranger to drop on a sudden into this world, I would show him, as\r\na specimen of its ills, a hospital full of diseases, a prison crowded\r\nwith malefactors and debtors, a field of battle strewed with carcasses, a\r\nfleet foundering in the ocean, a nation languishing under tyranny,\r\nfamine, or pestilence. To turn the gay side of life to him, and give him\r\na notion of its pleasures; whither should I conduct him? to a ball, to an\r\nopera, to court? He might justly think, that I was only showing him a\r\ndiversity of distress and sorrow.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThere is no evading such striking instances, said PHILO, but by\r\napologies, which still further aggravate the charge. Why have all men, I\r\nask, in all ages, complained incessantly of the miseries of life?…\r\nThey have no just reason, says one: these complaints proceed only from\r\ntheir discontented, repining, anxious disposition…And can there\r\npossibly, I reply, be a more certain foundation of misery, than such a\r\nwretched temper?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut if they were really as unhappy as they pretend, says my antagonist,\r\nwhy do they remain in life?…\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n Not satisfied with life, afraid of death.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThis is the secret chain, say I, that holds us. We are terrified, not\r\nbribed to the continuance of our existence.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is only a false delicacy, he may insist, which a few refined spirits\r\nindulge, and which has spread these complaints among the whole race of\r\nmankind. . . . And what is this delicacy, I ask, which you blame? Is it\r\nany thing but a greater sensibility to all the pleasures and pains of\r\nlife? and if the man of a delicate, refined temper, by being so much more\r\nalive than the rest of the world, is only so much more unhappy, what\r\njudgement must we form in general of human life?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nLet men remain at rest, says our adversary, and they will be easy. They\r\nare willing artificers of their own misery. . . . No! reply I: an anxious\r\nlanguor follows their repose; disappointment, vexation, trouble, their\r\nactivity and ambition.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI can observe something like what you mention in some others, replied\r\nCLEANTHES: but I confess I feel little or nothing of it in myself, and\r\nhope that it is not so common as you represent it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf you feel not human misery yourself, cried DEMEA, I congratulate you on\r\nso happy a singularity. Others, seemingly the most prosperous, have not\r\nbeen ashamed to vent their complaints in the most melancholy strains. Let\r\nus attend to the great, the fortunate emperor, CHARLES V, when, tired\r\nwith human grandeur, he resigned all his extensive dominions into the\r\nhands of his son. In the last harangue which he made on that memorable\r\noccasion, he publicly avowed, that the greatest prosperities which he had\r\never enjoyed, had been mixed with so many adversities, that he might\r\ntruly say he had never enjoyed any satisfaction or contentment. But did\r\nthe retired life, in which he sought for shelter, afford him any greater\r\nhappiness? If we may credit his son\u0027s account, his repentance commenced\r\nthe very day of his resignation.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCICERO\u0027s fortune, from small beginnings, rose to the greatest lustre and\r\nrenown; yet what pathetic complaints of the ills of life do his familiar\r\nletters, as well as philosophical discourses, contain? And suitably to\r\nhis own experience, he introduces CATO, the great, the fortunate CATO,\r\nprotesting in his old age, that had he a new life in his offer, he would\r\nreject the present.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAsk yourself, ask any of your acquaintance, whether they would live over\r\nagain the last ten or twenty years of their life. No! but the next\r\ntwenty, they say, will be better:\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP CLASS=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n And from the dregs of life, hope to receive\u003cBR\u003e\r\n What the first sprightly running could not give.\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThus at last they find (such is the greatness of human misery, it\r\nreconciles even contradictions), that they complain at once of the\r\nshortness of life, and of its vanity and sorrow.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd is it possible, CLEANTHES, said PHILO, that after all these\r\nreflections, and infinitely more, which might be suggested, you can still\r\npersevere in your Anthropomorphism, and assert the moral attributes of\r\nthe Deity, his justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude, to be of the\r\nsame nature with these virtues in human creatures? His power we allow is\r\ninfinite: whatever he wills is executed: but neither man nor any other\r\nanimal is happy: therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom\r\nis infinite: He is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end: But\r\nthe course of Nature tends not to human or animal felicity: therefore it\r\nis not established for that purpose. Through the whole compass of human\r\nknowledge, there are no inferences more certain and infallible than\r\nthese. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the\r\nbenevolence and mercy of men?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nEPICURUS\u0027s old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil,\r\nbut not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he\r\nmalevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nYou ascribe, CLEANTHES (and I believe justly), a purpose and intention to\r\nNature. But what, I beseech you, is the object of that curious artifice\r\nand machinery, which she has displayed in all animals? The preservation\r\nalone of individuals, and propagation of the species. It seems enough for\r\nher purpose, if such a rank be barely upheld in the universe, without any\r\ncare or concern for the happiness of the members that compose it. No\r\nresource for this purpose: no machinery, in order merely to give pleasure\r\nor ease: no fund of pure joy and contentment: no indulgence, without some\r\nwant or necessity accompanying it. At least, the few phenomena of this\r\nnature are overbalanced by opposite phenomena of still greater importance.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nOur sense of music, harmony, and indeed beauty of all kinds, gives\r\nsatisfaction, without being absolutely necessary to the preservation and\r\npropagation of the species. But what racking pains, on the other hand,\r\narise from gouts, gravels, megrims, toothaches, rheumatisms, where the\r\ninjury to the animal machinery is either small or incurable? Mirth,\r\nlaughter, play, frolic, seem gratuitous satisfactions, which have no\r\nfurther tendency: spleen, melancholy, discontent, superstition, are pains\r\nof the same nature. How then does the Divine benevolence display itself,\r\nin the sense of you Anthropomorphites? None but we Mystics, as you were\r\npleased to call us, can account for this strange mixture of phenomena, by\r\nderiving it from attributes, infinitely perfect, but incomprehensible.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd have you at last, said CLEANTHES smiling, betrayed your intentions,\r\nPHILO? Your long agreement with DEMEA did indeed a little surprise me;\r\nbut I find you were all the while erecting a concealed battery against\r\nme. And I must confess, that you have now fallen upon a subject worthy of\r\nyour noble spirit of opposition and controversy. If you can make out the\r\npresent point, and prove mankind to be unhappy or corrupted, there is an\r\nend at once of all religion. For to what purpose establish the natural\r\nattributes of the Deity, while the moral are still doubtful and\r\nuncertain?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nYou take umbrage very easily, replied DEMEA, at opinions the most\r\ninnocent, and the most generally received, even amongst the religious and\r\ndevout themselves: and nothing can be more surprising than to find a\r\ntopic like this, concerning the wickedness and misery of man, charged\r\nwith no less than Atheism and profaneness. Have not all pious divines and\r\npreachers, who have indulged their rhetoric on so fertile a subject; have\r\nthey not easily, I say, given a solution of any difficulties which may\r\nattend it? This world is but a point in comparison of the universe; this\r\nlife but a moment in comparison of eternity. The present evil phenomena,\r\ntherefore, are rectified in other regions, and in some future period of\r\nexistence. And the eyes of men, being then opened to larger views of\r\nthings, see the whole connection of general laws; and trace with\r\nadoration, the benevolence and rectitude of the Deity, through all the\r\nmazes and intricacies of his providence.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNo! replied CLEANTHES, No! These arbitrary suppositions can never be\r\nadmitted, contrary to matter of fact, visible and uncontroverted. Whence\r\ncan any cause be known but from its known effects? Whence can any\r\nhypothesis be proved but from the apparent phenomena? To establish one\r\nhypothesis upon another, is building entirely in the air; and the utmost\r\nwe ever attain, by these conjectures and fictions, is to ascertain the\r\nbare possibility of our opinion; but never can we, upon such terms,\r\nestablish its reality.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe only method of supporting Divine benevolence, and it is what I\r\nwillingly embrace, is to deny absolutely the misery and wickedness of\r\nman. Your representations are exaggerated; your melancholy views mostly\r\nfictitious; your inferences contrary to fact and experience. Health is\r\nmore common than sickness; pleasure than pain; happiness than misery. And\r\nfor one vexation which we meet with, we attain, upon computation, a\r\nhundred enjoyments.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAdmitting your position, replied PHILO, which yet is extremely doubtful,\r\nyou must at the same time allow, that if pain be less frequent than\r\npleasure, it is infinitely more violent and durable. One hour of it is\r\noften able to outweigh a day, a week, a month of our common insipid\r\nenjoyments; and how many days, weeks, and months, are passed by several\r\nin the most acute torments? Pleasure, scarcely in one instance, is ever\r\nable to reach ecstasy and rapture; and in no one instance can it continue\r\nfor any time at its highest pitch and altitude. The spirits evaporate,\r\nthe nerves relax, the fabric is disordered, and the enjoyment quickly\r\ndegenerates into fatigue and uneasiness. But pain often, good God, how\r\noften! rises to torture and agony; and the longer it continues, it\r\nbecomes still more genuine agony and torture. Patience is exhausted,\r\ncourage languishes, melancholy seizes us, and nothing terminates our\r\nmisery but the removal of its cause, or another event, which is the sole\r\ncure of all evil, but which, from our natural folly, we regard with still\r\ngreater horror and consternation.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut not to insist upon these topics, continued PHILO, though most\r\nobvious, certain, and important; I must use the freedom to admonish you,\r\nCLEANTHES, that you have put the controversy upon a most dangerous issue,\r\nand are unawares introducing a total scepticism into the most essential\r\narticles of natural and revealed theology. What! no method of fixing a\r\njust foundation for religion, unless we allow the happiness of human\r\nlife, and maintain a continued existence even in this world, with all our\r\npresent pains, infirmities, vexations, and follies, to be eligible and\r\ndesirable! But this is contrary to every one\u0027s feeling and experience: It\r\nis contrary to an authority so established as nothing can subvert. No\r\ndecisive proofs can ever be produced against this authority; nor is it\r\npossible for you to compute, estimate, and compare, all the pains and all\r\nthe pleasures in the lives of all men and of all animals: And thus, by\r\nyour resting the whole system of religion on a point, which, from its\r\nvery nature, must for ever be uncertain, you tacitly confess, that that\r\nsystem is equally uncertain.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut allowing you what never will be believed, at least what you never\r\npossibly can prove, that animal, or at least human happiness, in this\r\nlife, exceeds its misery, you have yet done nothing: For this is not, by\r\nany means, what we expect from infinite power, infinite wisdom, and\r\ninfinite goodness. Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by\r\nchance surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the\r\nDeity? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention?\r\nBut he is almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so\r\nshort, so clear, so decisive; except we assert, that these subjects\r\nexceed all human capacity, and that our common measures of truth and\r\nfalsehood are not applicable to them; a topic which I have all along\r\ninsisted on, but which you have, from the beginning, rejected with scorn\r\nand indignation.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut I will be contented to retire still from this entrenchment, for I\r\ndeny that you can ever force me in it. I will allow, that pain or misery\r\nin man is compatible with infinite power and goodness in the Deity, even\r\nin your sense of these attributes: What are you advanced by all these\r\nconcessions? A mere possible compatibility is not sufficient. You must\r\nprove these pure, unmixed, and uncontrollable attributes from the present\r\nmixed and confused phenomena, and from these alone. A hopeful\r\nundertaking! Were the phenomena ever so pure and unmixed, yet being\r\nfinite, they would be insufficient for that purpose. How much more, where\r\nthey are also so jarring and discordant!\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHere, CLEANTHES, I find myself at ease in my argument. Here I triumph.\r\nFormerly, when we argued concerning the natural attributes of\r\nintelligence and design, I needed all my sceptical and metaphysical\r\nsubtlety to elude your grasp. In many views of the universe, and of its\r\nparts, particularly the latter, the beauty and fitness of final causes\r\nstrike us with such irresistible force, that all objections appear (what\r\nI believe they really are) mere cavils and sophisms; nor can we then\r\nimagine how it was ever possible for us to repose any weight on them. But\r\nthere is no view of human life, or of the condition of mankind, from\r\nwhich, without the greatest violence, we can infer the moral attributes,\r\nor learn that infinite benevolence, conjoined with infinite power and\r\ninfinite wisdom, which we must discover by the eyes of faith alone. It is\r\nyour turn now to tug the labouring oar, and to support your philosophical\r\nsubtleties against the dictates of plain reason and experience.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap11\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nPART 11\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI scruple not to allow, said CLEANTHES, that I have been apt to suspect\r\nthe frequent repetition of the word infinite, which we meet with in all\r\ntheological writers, to savour more of panegyric than of philosophy; and\r\nthat any purposes of reasoning, and even of religion, would be better\r\nserved, were we to rest contented with more accurate and more moderate\r\nexpressions. The terms, admirable, excellent, superlatively great, wise,\r\nand holy; these sufficiently fill the imaginations of men; and any thing\r\nbeyond, besides that it leads into absurdities, has no influence on the\r\naffections or sentiments. Thus, in the present subject, if we abandon all\r\nhuman analogy, as seems your intention, DEMEA, I am afraid we abandon all\r\nreligion, and retain no conception of the great object of our adoration.\r\nIf we preserve human analogy, we must for ever find it impossible to\r\nreconcile any mixture of evil in the universe with infinite attributes;\r\nmuch less can we ever prove the latter from the former. But supposing the\r\nAuthor of Nature to be finitely perfect, though far exceeding mankind, a\r\nsatisfactory account may then be given of natural and moral evil, and\r\nevery untoward phenomenon be explained and adjusted. A less evil may then\r\nbe chosen, in order to avoid a greater; inconveniences be submitted to,\r\nin order to reach a desirable end; and in a word, benevolence, regulated\r\nby wisdom, and limited by necessity, may produce just such a world as the\r\npresent. You, PHILO, who are so prompt at starting views, and\r\nreflections, and analogies, I would gladly hear, at length, without\r\ninterruption, your opinion of this new theory; and if it deserve our\r\nattention, we may afterwards, at more leisure, reduce it into form.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nMy sentiments, replied PHILO, are not worth being made a mystery of; and\r\ntherefore, without any ceremony, I shall deliver what occurs to me with\r\nregard to the present subject. It must, I think, be allowed, that if a\r\nvery limited intelligence, whom we shall suppose utterly unacquainted\r\nwith the universe, were assured, that it were the production of a very\r\ngood, wise, and powerful Being, however finite, he would, from his\r\nconjectures, form beforehand a different notion of it from what we find\r\nit to be by experience; nor would he ever imagine, merely from these\r\nattributes of the cause, of which he is informed, that the effect could\r\nbe so full of vice and misery and disorder, as it appears in this life.\r\nSupposing now, that this person were brought into the world, still\r\nassured that it was the workmanship of such a sublime and benevolent\r\nBeing; he might, perhaps, be surprised at the disappointment; but would\r\nnever retract his former belief, if founded on any very solid argument;\r\nsince such a limited intelligence must be sensible of his own blindness\r\nand ignorance, and must allow, that there may be many solutions of those\r\nphenomena, which will for ever escape his comprehension. But supposing,\r\nwhich is the real case with regard to man, that this creature is not\r\nantecedently convinced of a supreme intelligence, benevolent, and\r\npowerful, but is left to gather such a belief from the appearances of\r\nthings; this entirely alters the case, nor will he ever find any reason\r\nfor such a conclusion. He may be fully convinced of the narrow limits of\r\nhis understanding; but this will not help him in forming an inference\r\nconcerning the goodness of superior powers, since he must form that\r\ninference from what he knows, not from what he is ignorant of. The more\r\nyou exaggerate his weakness and ignorance, the more diffident you render\r\nhim, and give him the greater suspicion that such subjects are beyond the\r\nreach of his faculties. You are obliged, therefore, to reason with him\r\nmerely from the known phenomena, and to drop every arbitrary supposition\r\nor conjecture.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nDid I show you a house or palace, where there was not one apartment\r\nconvenient or agreeable; where the windows, doors, fires, passages,\r\nstairs, and the whole economy of the building, were the source of noise,\r\nconfusion, fatigue, darkness, and the extremes of heat and cold; you\r\nwould certainly blame the contrivance, without any further examination.\r\nThe architect would in vain display his subtlety, and prove to you, that\r\nif this door or that window were altered, greater ills would ensue. What\r\nhe says may be strictly true: The alteration of one particular, while the\r\nother parts of the building remain, may only augment the inconveniences.\r\nBut still you would assert in general, that, if the architect had had\r\nskill and good intentions, he might have formed such a plan of the whole,\r\nand might have adjusted the parts in such a manner, as would have\r\nremedied all or most of these inconveniences. His ignorance, or even your\r\nown ignorance of such a plan, will never convince you of the\r\nimpossibility of it. If you find any inconveniences and deformities in\r\nthe building, you will always, without entering into any detail, condemn\r\nthe architect.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn short, I repeat the question: Is the world, considered in general, and\r\nas it appears to us in this life, different from what a man, or such a\r\nlimited being, would, beforehand, expect from a very powerful, wise, and\r\nbenevolent Deity? It must be strange prejudice to assert the contrary.\r\nAnd from thence I conclude, that however consistent the world may be,\r\nallowing certain suppositions and conjectures, with the idea of such a\r\nDeity, it can never afford us an inference concerning his existence. The\r\nconsistence is not absolutely denied, only the inference. Conjectures,\r\nespecially where infinity is excluded from the Divine attributes, may\r\nperhaps be sufficient to prove a consistence, but can never be\r\nfoundations for any inference.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThere seem to be four circumstances, on which depend all, or the greatest\r\npart of the ills, that molest sensible creatures; and it is not\r\nimpossible but all these circumstances may be necessary and unavoidable.\r\nWe know so little beyond common life, or even of common life, that, with\r\nregard to the economy of a universe, there is no conjecture, however\r\nwild, which may not be just; nor any one, however plausible, which may\r\nnot be erroneous. All that belongs to human understanding, in this deep\r\nignorance and obscurity, is to be sceptical, or at least cautious, and\r\nnot to admit of any hypothesis whatever, much less of any which is\r\nsupported by no appearance of probability. Now, this I assert to be the\r\ncase with regard to all the causes of evil, and the circumstances on\r\nwhich it depends. None of them appear to human reason in the least degree\r\nnecessary or unavoidable; nor can we suppose them such, without the\r\nutmost license of imagination.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe first circumstance which introduces evil, is that contrivance or\r\neconomy of the animal creation, by which pains, as well as pleasures, are\r\nemployed to excite all creatures to action, and make them vigilant in the\r\ngreat work of self-preservation. Now pleasure alone, in its various\r\ndegrees, seems to human understanding sufficient for this purpose. All\r\nanimals might be constantly in a state of enjoyment: but when urged by\r\nany of the necessities of nature, such as thirst, hunger, weariness;\r\ninstead of pain, they might feel a diminution of pleasure, by which they\r\nmight be prompted to seek that object which is necessary to their\r\nsubsistence. Men pursue pleasure as eagerly as they avoid pain; at least\r\nthey might have been so constituted. It seems, therefore, plainly\r\npossible to carry on the business of life without any pain. Why then is\r\nany animal ever rendered susceptible of such a sensation? If animals can\r\nbe free from it an hour, they might enjoy a perpetual exemption from it;\r\nand it required as particular a contrivance of their organs to produce\r\nthat feeling, as to endow them with sight, hearing, or any of the senses.\r\nShall we conjecture, that such a contrivance was necessary, without any\r\nappearance of reason? and shall we build on that conjecture as on the\r\nmost certain truth?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut a capacity of pain would not alone produce pain, were it not for the\r\nsecond circumstance, viz. the conducting of the world by general laws;\r\nand this seems nowise necessary to a very perfect Being. It is true, if\r\neverything were conducted by particular volitions, the course of nature\r\nwould be perpetually broken, and no man could employ his reason in the\r\nconduct of life. But might not other particular volitions remedy this\r\ninconvenience? In short, might not the Deity exterminate all ill,\r\nwherever it were to be found; and produce all good, without any\r\npreparation, or long progress of causes and effects?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBesides, we must consider, that, according to the present economy of the\r\nworld, the course of nature, though supposed exactly regular, yet to us\r\nappears not so, and many events are uncertain, and many disappoint our\r\nexpectations. Health and sickness, calm and tempest, with an infinite\r\nnumber of other accidents, whose causes are unknown and variable, have a\r\ngreat influence both on the fortunes of particular persons and on the\r\nprosperity of public societies; and indeed all human life, in a manner,\r\ndepends on such accidents. A being, therefore, who knows the secret\r\nsprings of the universe, might easily, by particular volitions, turn all\r\nthese accidents to the good of mankind, and render the whole world happy,\r\nwithout discovering himself in any operation. A fleet, whose purposes\r\nwere salutary to society, might always meet with a fair wind. Good\r\nprinces enjoy sound health and long life. Persons born to power and\r\nauthority, be framed with good tempers and virtuous dispositions. A few\r\nsuch events as these, regularly and wisely conducted, would change the\r\nface of the world; and yet would no more seem to disturb the course of\r\nnature, or confound human conduct, than the present economy of things,\r\nwhere the causes are secret, and variable, and compounded. Some small\r\ntouches given to CALIGULA\u0027s brain in his infancy, might have converted\r\nhim into a TRAJAN. One wave, a little higher than the rest, by burying\r\nCAESAR and his fortune in the bottom of the ocean, might have restored\r\nliberty to a considerable part of mankind. There may, for aught we know,\r\nbe good reasons why Providence interposes not in this manner; but they\r\nare unknown to us; and though the mere supposition, that such reasons\r\nexist, may be sufficient to save the conclusion concerning the Divine\r\nattributes, yet surely it can never be sufficient to establish that\r\nconclusion.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf every thing in the universe be conducted by general laws, and if\r\nanimals be rendered susceptible of pain, it scarcely seems possible but\r\nsome ill must arise in the various shocks of matter, and the various\r\nconcurrence and opposition of general laws; but this ill would be very\r\nrare, were it not for the third circumstance, which I proposed to\r\nmention, viz. the great frugality with which all powers and faculties are\r\ndistributed to every particular being. So well adjusted are the organs\r\nand capacities of all animals, and so well fitted to their preservation,\r\nthat, as far as history or tradition reaches, there appears not to be any\r\nsingle species which has yet been extinguished in the universe. Every\r\nanimal has the requisite endowments; but these endowments are bestowed\r\nwith so scrupulous an economy, that any considerable diminution must\r\nentirely destroy the creature. Wherever one power is increased, there is\r\na proportional abatement in the others. Animals which excel in swiftness\r\nare commonly defective in force. Those which possess both are either\r\nimperfect in some of their senses, or are oppressed with the most craving\r\nwants. The human species, whose chief excellency is reason and sagacity,\r\nis of all others the most necessitous, and the most deficient in bodily\r\nadvantages; without clothes, without arms, without food, without lodging,\r\nwithout any convenience of life, except what they owe to their own skill\r\nand industry. In short, nature seems to have formed an exact calculation\r\nof the necessities of her creatures; and, like a rigid master, has\r\nafforded them little more powers or endowments than what are strictly\r\nsufficient to supply those necessities. An indulgent parent would have\r\nbestowed a large stock, in order to guard against accidents, and secure\r\nthe happiness and welfare of the creature in the most unfortunate\r\nconcurrence of circumstances. Every course of life would not have been so\r\nsurrounded with precipices, that the least departure from the true path,\r\nby mistake or necessity, must involve us in misery and ruin. Some\r\nreserve, some fund, would have been provided to ensure happiness; nor\r\nwould the powers and the necessities have been adjusted with so rigid an\r\neconomy. The Author of Nature is inconceivably powerful: his force is\r\nsupposed great, if not altogether inexhaustible: nor is there any reason,\r\nas far as we can judge, to make him observe this strict frugality in his\r\ndealings with his creatures. It would have been better, were his power\r\nextremely limited, to have created fewer animals, and to have endowed\r\nthese with more faculties for their happiness and preservation. A builder\r\nis never esteemed prudent, who undertakes a plan beyond what his stock\r\nwill enable him to finish.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIn order to cure most of the ills of human life, I require not that man\r\nshould have the wings of the eagle, the swiftness of the stag, the force\r\nof the ox, the arms of the lion, the scales of the crocodile or\r\nrhinoceros; much less do I demand the sagacity of an angel or cherubim. I\r\nam contented to take an increase in one single power or faculty of his\r\nsoul. Let him be endowed with a greater propensity to industry and\r\nlabour; a more vigorous spring and activity of mind; a more constant bent\r\nto business and application. Let the whole species possess naturally an\r\nequal diligence with that which many individuals are able to attain by\r\nhabit and reflection; and the most beneficial consequences, without any\r\nallay of ill, is the immediate and necessary result of this endowment.\r\nAlmost all the moral, as well as natural evils of human life, arise from\r\nidleness; and were our species, by the original constitution of their\r\nframe, exempt from this vice or infirmity, the perfect cultivation of\r\nland, the improvement of arts and manufactures, the exact execution of\r\nevery office and duty, immediately follow; and men at once may fully\r\nreach that state of society, which is so imperfectly attained by the best\r\nregulated government. But as industry is a power, and the most valuable\r\nof any, Nature seems determined, suitably to her usual maxims, to bestow\r\nit on men with a very sparing hand; and rather to punish him severely for\r\nhis deficiency in it, than to reward him for his attainments. She has so\r\ncontrived his frame, that nothing but the most violent necessity can\r\noblige him to labour; and she employs all his other wants to overcome, at\r\nleast in part, the want of diligence, and to endow him with some share of\r\na faculty of which she has thought fit naturally to bereave him. Here our\r\ndemands may be allowed very humble, and therefore the more reasonable. If\r\nwe required the endowments of superior penetration and judgement, of a\r\nmore delicate taste of beauty, of a nicer sensibility to benevolence and\r\nfriendship; we might be told, that we impiously pretend to break the\r\norder of Nature; that we want to exalt ourselves into a higher rank of\r\nbeing; that the presents which we require, not being suitable to our\r\nstate and condition, would only be pernicious to us. But it is hard; I\r\ndare to repeat it, it is hard, that being placed in a world so full of\r\nwants and necessities, where almost every being and element is either our\r\nfoe or refuses its assistance … we should also have our own temper to\r\nstruggle with, and should be deprived of that faculty which can alone\r\nfence against these multiplied evils.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe fourth circumstance, whence arises the misery and ill of the\r\nuniverse, is the inaccurate workmanship of all the springs and principles\r\nof the great machine of nature. It must be acknowledged, that there are\r\nfew parts of the universe, which seem not to serve some purpose, and\r\nwhose removal would not produce a visible defect and disorder in the\r\nwhole. The parts hang all together; nor can one be touched without\r\naffecting the rest, in a greater or less degree. But at the same time, it\r\nmust be observed, that none of these parts or principles, however useful,\r\nare so accurately adjusted, as to keep precisely within those bounds in\r\nwhich their utility consists; but they are, all of them, apt, on every\r\noccasion, to run into the one extreme or the other. One would imagine,\r\nthat this grand production had not received the last hand of the maker;\r\nso little finished is every part, and so coarse are the strokes with\r\nwhich it is executed. Thus, the winds are requisite to convey the vapours\r\nalong the surface of the globe, and to assist men in navigation: but how\r\noft, rising up to tempests and hurricanes, do they become pernicious?\r\nRains are necessary to nourish all the plants and animals of the earth:\r\nbut how often are they defective? how often excessive? Heat is requisite\r\nto all life and vegetation; but is not always found in the due\r\nproportion. On the mixture and secretion of the humours and juices of the\r\nbody depend the health and prosperity of the animal: but the parts\r\nperform not regularly their proper function. What more useful than all\r\nthe passions of the mind, ambition, vanity, love, anger? But how oft do\r\nthey break their bounds, and cause the greatest convulsions in society?\r\nThere is nothing so advantageous in the universe, but what frequently\r\nbecomes pernicious, by its excess or defect; nor has Nature guarded, with\r\nthe requisite accuracy, against all disorder or confusion. The\r\nirregularity is never perhaps so great as to destroy any species; but is\r\noften sufficient to involve the individuals in ruin and misery.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nOn the concurrence, then, of these four circumstances, does all or the\r\ngreatest part of natural evil depend. Were all living creatures incapable\r\nof pain, or were the world administered by particular volitions, evil\r\nnever could have found access into the universe: and were animals endowed\r\nwith a large stock of powers and faculties, beyond what strict necessity\r\nrequires; or were the several springs and principles of the universe so\r\naccurately framed as to preserve always the just temperament and medium;\r\nthere must have been very little ill in comparison of what we feel at\r\npresent. What then shall we pronounce on this occasion? Shall we say that\r\nthese circumstances are not necessary, and that they might easily have\r\nbeen altered in the contrivance of the universe? This decision seems too\r\npresumptuous for creatures so blind and ignorant. Let us be more modest\r\nin our conclusions. Let us allow, that, if the goodness of the Deity (I\r\nmean a goodness like the human) could be established on any tolerable\r\nreasons a priori, these phenomena, however untoward, would not be\r\nsufficient to subvert that principle; but might easily, in some unknown\r\nmanner, be reconcilable to it. But let us still assert, that as this\r\ngoodness is not antecedently established, but must be inferred from the\r\nphenomena, there can be no grounds for such an inference, while there are\r\nso many ills in the universe, and while these ills might so easily have\r\nbeen remedied, as far as human understanding can be allowed to judge on\r\nsuch a subject. I am Sceptic enough to allow, that the bad appearances,\r\nnotwithstanding all my reasonings, may be compatible with such attributes\r\nas you suppose; but surely they can never prove these attributes. Such a\r\nconclusion cannot result from Scepticism, but must arise from the\r\nphenomena, and from our confidence in the reasonings which we deduce from\r\nthese phenomena.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nLook round this universe. What an immense profusion of beings, animated\r\nand organised, sensible and active! You admire this prodigious variety\r\nand fecundity. But inspect a little more narrowly these living\r\nexistences, the only beings worth regarding. How hostile and destructive\r\nto each other! How insufficient all of them for their own happiness! How\r\ncontemptible or odious to the spectator! The whole presents nothing but\r\nthe idea of a blind Nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle,\r\nand pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her\r\nmaimed and abortive children!\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHere the MANICHAEAN system occurs as a proper hypothesis to solve the\r\ndifficulty: and no doubt, in some respects, it is very specious, and has\r\nmore probability than the common hypothesis, by giving a plausible\r\naccount of the strange mixture of good and ill which appears in life. But\r\nif we consider, on the other hand, the perfect uniformity and agreement\r\nof the parts of the universe, we shall not discover in it any marks of\r\nthe combat of a malevolent with a benevolent being. There is indeed an\r\nopposition of pains and pleasures in the feelings of sensible creatures:\r\nbut are not all the operations of Nature carried on by an opposition of\r\nprinciples, of hot and cold, moist and dry, light and heavy? The true\r\nconclusion is, that the original Source of all things is entirely\r\nindifferent to all these principles; and has no more regard to good above\r\nill, than to heat above cold, or to drought above moisture, or to light\r\nabove heavy.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThere may four hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes of the\r\nuniverse: that they are endowed with perfect goodness; that they have\r\nperfect malice; that they are opposite, and have both goodness and\r\nmalice; that they have neither goodness nor malice. Mixed phenomena can\r\nnever prove the two former unmixed principles; and the uniformity and\r\nsteadiness of general laws seem to oppose the third. The fourth,\r\ntherefore, seems by far the most probable.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWhat I have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little\r\nor no variation; and we have no more reason to infer, that the rectitude\r\nof the Supreme Being resembles human rectitude, than that his benevolence\r\nresembles the human. Nay, it will be thought, that we have still greater\r\ncause to exclude from him moral sentiments, such as we feel them; since\r\nmoral evil, in the opinion of many, is much more predominant above moral\r\ngood than natural evil above natural good.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut even though this should not be allowed, and though the virtue which\r\nis in mankind should be acknowledged much superior to the vice, yet so\r\nlong as there is any vice at all in the universe, it will very much\r\npuzzle you Anthropomorphites, how to account for it. You must assign a\r\ncause for it, without having recourse to the first cause. But as every\r\neffect must have a cause, and that cause another, you must either carry\r\non the progression in infinitum, or rest on that original principle, who\r\nis the ultimate cause of all things…\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHold! hold! cried DEMEA: Whither does your imagination hurry you? I\r\njoined in alliance with you, in order to prove the incomprehensible\r\nnature of the Divine Being, and refute the principles of CLEANTHES, who\r\nwould measure every thing by human rule and standard. But I now find you\r\nrunning into all the topics of the greatest libertines and infidels, and\r\nbetraying that holy cause which you seemingly espoused. Are you secretly,\r\nthen, a more dangerous enemy than CLEANTHES himself?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd are you so late in perceiving it? replied CLEANTHES. Believe me,\r\nDEMEA, your friend PHILO, from the beginning, has been amusing himself at\r\nboth our expense; and it must be confessed, that the injudicious\r\nreasoning of our vulgar theology has given him but too just a handle of\r\nridicule. The total infirmity of human reason, the absolute\r\nincomprehensibility of the Divine Nature, the great and universal misery,\r\nand still greater wickedness of men; these are strange topics, surely, to\r\nbe so fondly cherished by orthodox divines and doctors. In ages of\r\nstupidity and ignorance, indeed, these principles may safely be espoused;\r\nand perhaps no views of things are more proper to promote superstition,\r\nthan such as encourage the blind amazement, the diffidence, and\r\nmelancholy of mankind. But at present…\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBlame not so much, interposed PHILO, the ignorance of these reverend\r\ngentlemen. They know how to change their style with the times. Formerly\r\nit was a most popular theological topic to maintain, that human life was\r\nvanity and misery, and to exaggerate all the ills and pains which are\r\nincident to men. But of late years, divines, we find, begin to retract\r\nthis position; and maintain, though still with some hesitation, that\r\nthere are more goods than evils, more pleasures than pains, even in this\r\nlife. When religion stood entirely upon temper and education, it was\r\nthought proper to encourage melancholy; as indeed mankind never have\r\nrecourse to superior powers so readily as in that disposition. But as men\r\nhave now learned to form principles, and to draw consequences, it is\r\nnecessary to change the batteries, and to make use of such arguments as\r\nwill endure at least some scrutiny and examination. This variation is the\r\nsame (and from the same causes) with that which I formerly remarked with\r\nregard to Scepticism.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThus PHILO continued to the last his spirit of opposition, and his censure\r\nof established opinions. But I could observe that DEMEA did not at all\r\nrelish the latter part of the discourse; and he took occasion soon after,\r\non some pretence or other, to leave the company.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cA NAME=\"chap12\"\u003e\u003c/A\u003e\r\n\u003cH3 ALIGN=\"center\"\u003e\r\nPART 12\r\n\u003c/H3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAfter DEMEA\u0027s departure, CLEANTHES and PHILO continued the conversation\r\nin the following manner. Our friend, I am afraid, said CLEANTHES, will\r\nhave little inclination to revive this topic of discourse, while you are\r\nin company; and to tell truth, PHILO, I should rather wish to reason with\r\neither of you apart on a subject so sublime and interesting. Your spirit\r\nof controversy, joined to your abhorrence of vulgar superstition, carries\r\nyou strange lengths, when engaged in an argument; and there is nothing so\r\nsacred and venerable, even in your own eyes, which you spare on that\r\noccasion.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI must confess, replied PHILO, that I am less cautious on the subject of\r\nNatural Religion than on any other; both because I know that I can never,\r\non that head, corrupt the principles of any man of common sense; and\r\nbecause no one, I am confident, in whose eyes I appear a man of common\r\nsense, will ever mistake my intentions. You, in particular, CLEANTHES,\r\nwith whom I live in unreserved intimacy; you are sensible, that\r\nnotwithstanding the freedom of my conversation, and my love of singular\r\narguments, no one has a deeper sense of religion impressed on his mind,\r\nor pays more profound adoration to the Divine Being, as he discovers\r\nhimself to reason, in the inexplicable contrivance and artifice of\r\nnature. A purpose, an intention, a design, strikes every where the most\r\ncareless, the most stupid thinker; and no man can be so hardened in\r\nabsurd systems, as at all times to reject it. That Nature does nothing in\r\nvain, is a maxim established in all the schools, merely from the\r\ncontemplation of the works of Nature, without any religious purpose; and,\r\nfrom a firm conviction of its truth, an anatomist, who had observed a new\r\norgan or canal, would never be satisfied till he had also discovered its\r\nuse and intention. One great foundation of the Copernican system is the\r\nmaxim, That Nature acts by the simplest methods, and chooses the most\r\nproper means to any end; and astronomers often, without thinking of it,\r\nlay this strong foundation of piety and religion. The same thing is\r\nobservable in other parts of philosophy: And thus all the sciences almost\r\nlead us insensibly to acknowledge a first intelligent Author; and their\r\nauthority is often so much the greater, as they do not directly profess\r\nthat intention.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is with pleasure I hear GALEN reason concerning the structure of the\r\nhuman body. The anatomy of a man, says he [De formatione foetus], discovers\r\nabove 600 different muscles; and whoever duly considers these, will find,\r\nthat, in each of them, Nature must have adjusted at least ten different\r\ncircumstances, in order to attain the end which she proposed; proper\r\nfigure, just magnitude, right disposition of the several ends, upper and\r\nlower position of the whole, the due insertion of the several nerves,\r\nveins, and arteries: So that, in the muscles alone, above 6000 several\r\nviews and intentions must have been formed and executed. The bones he\r\ncalculates to be 284: The distinct purposes aimed at in the structure of\r\neach, above forty. What a prodigious display of artifice, even in these\r\nsimple and homogeneous parts! But if we consider the skin, ligaments,\r\nvessels, glandules, humours, the several limbs and members of the body;\r\nhow must our astonishment rise upon us, in proportion to the number and\r\nintricacy of the parts so artificially adjusted! The further we advance\r\nin these researches, we discover new scenes of art and wisdom: But descry\r\nstill, at a distance, further scenes beyond our reach; in the fine\r\ninternal structure of the parts, in the economy of the brain, in the\r\nfabric of the seminal vessels. All these artifices are repeated in every\r\ndifferent species of animal, with wonderful variety, and with exact\r\npropriety, suited to the different intentions of Nature in framing each\r\nspecies. And if the infidelity of GALEN, even when these natural sciences\r\nwere still imperfect, could not withstand such striking appearances, to\r\nwhat pitch of pertinacious obstinacy must a philosopher in this age have\r\nattained, who can now doubt of a Supreme Intelligence!\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCould I meet with one of this species (who, I thank God, are very rare),\r\nI would ask him: Supposing there were a God, who did not discover himself\r\nimmediately to our senses, were it possible for him to give stronger\r\nproofs of his existence, than what appear on the whole face of Nature?\r\nWhat indeed could such a Divine Being do, but copy the present economy of\r\nthings; render many of his artifices so plain, that no stupidity could\r\nmistake them; afford glimpses of still greater artifices, which\r\ndemonstrate his prodigious superiority above our narrow apprehensions;\r\nand conceal altogether a great many from such imperfect creatures? Now,\r\naccording to all rules of just reasoning, every fact must pass for\r\nundisputed, when it is supported by all the arguments which its nature\r\nadmits of; even though these arguments be not, in themselves, very\r\nnumerous or forcible: How much more, in the present case, where no human\r\nimagination can compute their number, and no understanding estimate their\r\ncogency!\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI shall further add, said CLEANTHES, to what you have so well urged, that\r\none great advantage of the principle of Theism, is, that it is the only\r\nsystem of cosmogony which can be rendered intelligible and complete, and\r\nyet can throughout preserve a strong analogy to what we every day see and\r\nexperience in the world. The comparison of the universe to a machine of\r\nhuman contrivance, is so obvious and natural, and is justified by so many\r\ninstances of order and design in Nature, that it must immediately strike\r\nall unprejudiced apprehensions, and procure universal approbation.\r\nWhoever attempts to weaken this theory, cannot pretend to succeed by\r\nestablishing in its place any other that is precise and determinate: It\r\nis sufficient for him if he start doubts and difficulties; and by remote\r\nand abstract views of things, reach that suspense of judgement, which is\r\nhere the utmost boundary of his wishes. But, besides that this state of\r\nmind is in itself unsatisfactory, it can never be steadily maintained\r\nagainst such striking appearances as continually engage us into the\r\nreligious hypothesis. A false, absurd system, human nature, from the\r\nforce of prejudice, is capable of adhering to with obstinacy and\r\nperseverance: But no system at all, in opposition to a theory supported\r\nby strong and obvious reason, by natural propensity, and by early\r\neducation, I think it absolutely impossible to maintain or defend.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSo little, replied PHILO, do I esteem this suspense of judgement in the\r\npresent case to be possible, that I am apt to suspect there enters\r\nsomewhat of a dispute of words into this controversy, more than is\r\nusually imagined. That the works of Nature bear a great analogy to the\r\nproductions of art, is evident; and according to all the rules of good\r\nreasoning, we ought to infer, if we argue at all concerning them, that\r\ntheir causes have a proportional analogy. But as there are also\r\nconsiderable differences, we have reason to suppose a proportional\r\ndifference in the causes; and in particular, ought to attribute a much\r\nhigher degree of power and energy to the supreme cause, than any we have\r\never observed in mankind. Here then the existence of a DEITY is plainly\r\nascertained by reason: and if we make it a question, whether, on account\r\nof these analogies, we can properly call him a mind or intelligence,\r\nnotwithstanding the vast difference which may reasonably be supposed\r\nbetween him and human minds; what is this but a mere verbal controversy?\r\nNo man can deny the analogies between the effects: To restrain ourselves\r\nfrom inquiring concerning the causes is scarcely possible. From this\r\ninquiry, the legitimate conclusion is, that the causes have also an\r\nanalogy: And if we are not contented with calling the first and supreme\r\ncause a GOD or DEITY, but desire to vary the expression; what can we call\r\nhim but MIND or THOUGHT, to which he is justly supposed to bear a\r\nconsiderable resemblance?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAll men of sound reason are disgusted with verbal disputes, which abound\r\nso much in philosophical and theological inquiries; and it is found, that\r\nthe only remedy for this abuse must arise from clear definitions, from\r\nthe precision of those ideas which enter into any argument, and from the\r\nstrict and uniform use of those terms which are employed. But there is a\r\nspecies of controversy, which, from the very nature of language and of\r\nhuman ideas, is involved in perpetual ambiguity, and can never, by any\r\nprecaution or any definitions, be able to reach a reasonable certainty or\r\nprecision. These are the controversies concerning the degrees of any\r\nquality or circumstance. Men may argue to all eternity, whether HANNIBAL\r\nbe a great, or a very great, or a superlatively great man, what degree of\r\nbeauty CLEOPATRA possessed, what epithet of praise LIVY or THUCYDIDES is\r\nentitled to, without bringing the controversy to any determination. The\r\ndisputants may here agree in their sense, and differ in the terms, or\r\nvice versa; yet never be able to define their terms, so as to enter into\r\neach other\u0027s meaning: Because the degrees of these qualities are not,\r\nlike quantity or number, susceptible of any exact mensuration, which\r\nmay be the standard in the controversy. That the dispute concerning\r\nTheism is of this nature, and consequently is merely verbal, or perhaps,\r\nif possible, still more incurably ambiguous, will appear upon the\r\nslightest inquiry. I ask the Theist, if he does not allow, that there is\r\na great and immeasurable, because incomprehensible difference between the\r\nhuman and the divine mind: The more pious he is, the more readily will he\r\nassent to the affirmative, and the more will he be disposed to magnify\r\nthe difference: He will even assert, that the difference is of a nature\r\nwhich cannot be too much magnified. I next turn to the Atheist, who, I\r\nassert, is only nominally so, and can never possibly be in earnest; and I\r\nask him, whether, from the coherence and apparent sympathy in all the\r\nparts of this world, there be not a certain degree of analogy among all\r\nthe operations of Nature, in every situation and in every age; whether\r\nthe rotting of a turnip, the generation of an animal, and the structure\r\nof human thought, be not energies that probably bear some remote analogy\r\nto each other: It is impossible he can deny it: He will readily\r\nacknowledge it. Having obtained this concession, I push him still further\r\nin his retreat; and I ask him, if it be not probable, that the principle\r\nwhich first arranged, and still maintains order in this universe, bears\r\nnot also some remote inconceivable analogy to the other operations of\r\nnature, and, among the rest, to the economy of human mind and thought.\r\nHowever reluctant, he must give his assent. Where then, cry I to both\r\nthese antagonists, is the subject of your dispute? The Theist allows,\r\nthat the original intelligence is very different from human reason: The\r\nAtheist allows, that the original principle of order bears some remote\r\nanalogy to it. Will you quarrel, Gentlemen, about the degrees, and enter\r\ninto a controversy, which admits not of any precise meaning, nor\r\nconsequently of any determination? If you should be so obstinate, I\r\nshould not be surprised to find you insensibly change sides; while the\r\nTheist, on the one hand, exaggerates the dissimilarity between the\r\nSupreme Being, and frail, imperfect, variable, fleeting, and mortal\r\ncreatures; and the Atheist, on the other, magnifies the analogy among all\r\nthe operations of Nature, in every period, every situation, and every\r\nposition. Consider then, where the real point of controversy lies; and if\r\nyou cannot lay aside your disputes, endeavour, at least, to cure\r\nyourselves of your animosity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd here I must also acknowledge, CLEANTHES, that as the works of Nature\r\nhave a much greater analogy to the effects of our art and contrivance,\r\nthan to those of our benevolence and justice, we have reason to infer,\r\nthat the natural attributes of the Deity have a greater resemblance to\r\nthose of men, than his moral have to human virtues. But what is the\r\nconsequence? Nothing but this, that the moral qualities of man are more\r\ndefective in their kind than his natural abilities. For, as the Supreme\r\nBeing is allowed to be absolutely and entirely perfect, whatever differs\r\nmost from him, departs the furthest from the supreme standard of\r\nrectitude and perfection.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt seems evident that the dispute between the Skeptics and Dogmatists\r\nis entirely verbal, or at least regards only the degrees of doubt and\r\nassurance which we ought to indulge with regard to all reasoning; and such\r\ndisputes are commonly, at the bottom, verbal, and admit not of any precise\r\ndetermination. No philosophical Dogmatist denies that there are\r\ndifficulties both with regard to the senses and to all science, and that\r\nthese difficulties are in a regular, logical method, absolutely\r\ninsolvable. No Skeptic denies that we lie under an absolute necessity,\r\nnotwithstanding these difficulties, of thinking, and believing, and\r\nreasoning, with regard to all kinds of subjects, and even of frequently\r\nassenting with confidence and security. The only difference, then, between\r\nthese sects, if they merit that name, is, that the Sceptic, from habit,\r\ncaprice, or inclination, insists most on the difficulties; the Dogmatist,\r\nfor like reasons, on the necessity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThese, CLEANTHES, are my unfeigned sentiments on this subject; and these\r\nsentiments, you know, I have ever cherished and maintained. But in\r\nproportion to my veneration for true religion, is my abhorrence of vulgar\r\nsuperstitions; and I indulge a peculiar pleasure, I confess, in pushing\r\nsuch principles, sometimes into absurdity, sometimes into impiety. And\r\nyou are sensible, that all bigots, notwithstanding their great aversion\r\nto the latter above the former, are commonly equally guilty of both.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nMy inclination, replied CLEANTHES, lies, I own, a contrary way. Religion,\r\nhowever corrupted, is still better than no religion at all. The doctrine\r\nof a future state is so strong and necessary a security to morals, that\r\nwe never ought to abandon or neglect it. For if finite and temporary\r\nrewards and punishments have so great an effect, as we daily find; how\r\nmuch greater must be expected from such as are infinite and eternal?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nHow happens it then, said PHILO, if vulgar superstition be so salutary to\r\nsociety, that all history abounds so much with accounts of its pernicious\r\nconsequences on public affairs? Factions, civil wars, persecutions,\r\nsubversions of government, oppression, slavery; these are the dismal\r\nconsequences which always attend its prevalency over the minds of men. If\r\nthe religious spirit be ever mentioned in any historical narration, we\r\nare sure to meet afterwards with a detail of the miseries which attend\r\nit. And no period of time can be happier or more prosperous, than those\r\nin which it is never regarded or heard of.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe reason of this observation, replied CLEANTHES, is obvious. The proper\r\noffice of religion is to regulate the heart of men, humanise their\r\nconduct, infuse the spirit of temperance, order, and obedience; and as\r\nits operation is silent, and only enforces the motives of morality and\r\njustice, it is in danger of being overlooked, and confounded with these\r\nother motives. When it distinguishes itself, and acts as a separate\r\nprinciple over men, it has departed from its proper sphere, and has\r\nbecome only a cover to faction and ambition.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnd so will all religion, said PHILO, except the philosophical and\r\nrational kind. Your reasonings are more easily eluded than my facts. The\r\ninference is not just, because finite and temporary rewards and\r\npunishments have so great influence, that therefore such as are infinite\r\nand eternal must have so much greater. Consider, I beseech you, the\r\nattachment which we have to present things, and the little concern which\r\nwe discover for objects so remote and uncertain. When divines are\r\ndeclaiming against the common behaviour and conduct of the world, they\r\nalways represent this principle as the strongest imaginable (which indeed\r\nit is); and describe almost all human kind as lying under the influence\r\nof it, and sunk into the deepest lethargy and unconcern about their\r\nreligious interests. Yet these same divines, when they refute their\r\nspeculative antagonists, suppose the motives of religion to be so\r\npowerful, that, without them, it were impossible for civil society to\r\nsubsist; nor are they ashamed of so palpable a contradiction. It is\r\ncertain, from experience, that the smallest grain of natural honesty and\r\nbenevolence has more effect on men\u0027s conduct, than the most pompous views\r\nsuggested by theological theories and systems. A man\u0027s natural\r\ninclination works incessantly upon him; it is for ever present to the\r\nmind, and mingles itself with every view and consideration: whereas\r\nreligious motives, where they act at all, operate only by starts and\r\nbounds; and it is scarcely possible for them to become altogether\r\nhabitual to the mind. The force of the greatest gravity, say the\r\nphilosophers, is infinitely small, in comparison of that of the least\r\nimpulse: yet it is certain, that the smallest gravity will, in the end,\r\nprevail above a great impulse; because no strokes or blows can be\r\nrepeated with such constancy as attraction and gravitation.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nAnother advantage of inclination: It engages on its side all the wit and\r\ningenuity of the mind; and when set in opposition to religious\r\nprinciples, seeks every method and art of eluding them: In which it is\r\nalmost always successful. Who can explain the heart of man, or account\r\nfor those strange salvos and excuses, with which people satisfy\r\nthemselves, when they follow their inclinations in opposition to their\r\nreligious duty? This is well understood in the world; and none but fools\r\never repose less trust in a man, because they hear, that from study and\r\nphilosophy, he has entertained some speculative doubts with regard to\r\ntheological subjects. And when we have to do with a man, who makes a\r\ngreat profession of religion and devotion, has this any other effect upon\r\nseveral, who pass for prudent, than to put them on their guard, lest they\r\nbe cheated and deceived by him?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nWe must further consider, that philosophers, who cultivate reason and\r\nreflection, stand less in need of such motives to keep them under the\r\nrestraint of morals; and that the vulgar, who alone may need them, are\r\nutterly incapable of so pure a religion as represents the Deity to be\r\npleased with nothing but virtue in human behaviour. The recommendations\r\nto the Divinity are generally supposed to be either frivolous\r\nobservances, or rapturous ecstasies, or a bigoted credulity. We need not\r\nrun back into antiquity, or wander into remote regions, to find instances\r\nof this degeneracy. Amongst ourselves, some have been guilty of that\r\natrociousness, unknown to the Egyptian and Grecian superstitions, of\r\ndeclaiming in express terms, against morality; and representing it as a\r\nsure forfeiture of the Divine favour, if the least trust or reliance be\r\nlaid upon it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut even though superstition or enthusiasm should not put itself in\r\ndirect opposition to morality; the very diverting of the attention, the\r\nraising up a new and frivolous species of merit, the preposterous\r\ndistribution which it makes of praise and blame, must have the most\r\npernicious consequences, and weaken extremely men\u0027s attachment to the\r\nnatural motives of justice and humanity.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nSuch a principle of action likewise, not being any of the familiar\r\nmotives of human conduct, acts only by intervals on the temper; and must\r\nbe roused by continual efforts, in order to render the pious zealot\r\nsatisfied with his own conduct, and make him fulfil his devotional task.\r\nMany religious exercises are entered into with seeming fervour, where the\r\nheart, at the time, feels cold and languid: A habit of dissimulation is\r\nby degrees contracted; and fraud and falsehood become the predominant\r\nprinciple. Hence the reason of that vulgar observation, that the highest\r\nzeal in religion and the deepest hypocrisy, so far from being\r\ninconsistent, are often or commonly united in the same individual\r\ncharacter.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe bad effects of such habits, even in common life, are easily imagined;\r\nbut where the interests of religion are concerned, no morality can be\r\nforcible enough to bind the enthusiastic zealot. The sacredness of the\r\ncause sanctifies every measure which can be made use of to promote it.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThe steady attention alone to so important an interest as that of eternal\r\nsalvation, is apt to extinguish the benevolent affections, and beget a\r\nnarrow, contracted selfishness. And when such a temper is encouraged, it\r\neasily eludes all the general precepts of charity and benevolence.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThus, the motives of vulgar superstition have no great influence on\r\ngeneral conduct; nor is their operation favourable to morality, in the\r\ninstances where they predominate.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIs there any maxim in politics more certain and infallible, than that\r\nboth the number and authority of priests should be confined within very\r\nnarrow limits; and that the civil magistrate ought, for ever, to keep his\r\nfasces and axes from such dangerous hands? But if the spirit of popular\r\nreligion were so salutary to society, a contrary maxim ought to prevail.\r\nThe greater number of priests, and their greater authority and riches,\r\nwill always augment the religious spirit. And though the priests have the\r\nguidance of this spirit, why may we not expect a superior sanctity of\r\nlife, and greater benevolence and moderation, from persons who are set\r\napart for religion, who are continually inculcating it upon others, and\r\nwho must themselves imbibe a greater share of it? Whence comes it then,\r\nthat, in fact, the utmost a wise magistrate can propose with regard to\r\npopular religions, is, as far as possible, to make a saving game of it,\r\nand to prevent their pernicious consequences with regard to society?\r\nEvery expedient which he tries for so humble a purpose is surrounded with\r\ninconveniences. If he admits only one religion among his subjects, he\r\nmust sacrifice, to an uncertain prospect of tranquillity, every\r\nconsideration of public liberty, science, reason, industry, and even his\r\nown independency. If he gives indulgence to several sects, which is the\r\nwiser maxim, he must preserve a very philosophical indifference to all of\r\nthem, and carefully restrain the pretensions of the prevailing sect;\r\notherwise he can expect nothing but endless disputes, quarrels, factions,\r\npersecutions, and civil commotions.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTrue religion, I allow, has no such pernicious consequences: but we must\r\ntreat of religion, as it has commonly been found in the world; nor have I\r\nany thing to do with that speculative tenet of Theism, which, as it is a\r\nspecies of philosophy, must partake of the beneficial influence of that\r\nprinciple, and at the same time must lie under a like inconvenience, of\r\nbeing always confined to very few persons.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nOaths are requisite in all courts of judicature; but it is a question\r\nwhether their authority arises from any popular religion. It is the\r\nsolemnity and importance of the occasion, the regard to reputation, and\r\nthe reflecting on the general interests of society, which are the chief\r\nrestraints upon mankind. Custom-house oaths and political oaths are but\r\nlittle regarded even by some who pretend to principles of honesty and\r\nreligion; and a Quaker\u0027s asseveration is with us justly put upon the same\r\nfooting with the oath of any other person. I know, that POLYBIUS\r\n[Lib. vi. cap. 54.] ascribes the infamy of GREEK faith to the prevalency of\r\nthe EPICUREAN philosophy: but I know also, that Punic faith had as bad a\r\nreputation in ancient times as Irish evidence has in modern; though we\r\ncannot account for these vulgar observations by the same reason. Not to\r\nmention that Greek faith was infamous before the rise of the Epicurean\r\nphilosophy; and EURIPIDES [Iphigenia in Tauride], in a passage which I\r\nshall point out to you, has glanced a remarkable stroke of satire against\r\nhis nation, with regard to this circumstance.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTake care, PHILO, replied CLEANTHES, take care: push not matters too far:\r\nallow not your zeal against false religion to undermine your veneration\r\nfor the true. Forfeit not this principle, the chief, the only great\r\ncomfort in life; and our principal support amidst all the attacks of\r\nadverse fortune. The most agreeable reflection, which it is possible for\r\nhuman imagination to suggest, is that of genuine Theism, which represents\r\nus as the workmanship of a Being perfectly good, wise, and powerful; who\r\ncreated us for happiness; and who, having implanted in us immeasurable\r\ndesires of good, will prolong our existence to all eternity, and will\r\ntransfer us into an infinite variety of scenes, in order to satisfy those\r\ndesires, and render our felicity complete and durable. Next to such a\r\nBeing himself (if the comparison be allowed), the happiest lot which we\r\ncan imagine, is that of being under his guardianship and protection.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nThese appearances, said PHILO, are most engaging and alluring; and with\r\nregard to the true philosopher, they are more than appearances. But it\r\nhappens here, as in the former case, that, with regard to the greater\r\npart of mankind, the appearances are deceitful, and that the terrors of\r\nreligion commonly prevail above its comforts.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is allowed, that men never have recourse to devotion so readily as\r\nwhen dejected with grief or depressed with sickness. Is not this a proof,\r\nthat the religious spirit is not so nearly allied to joy as to sorrow?\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nBut men, when afflicted, find consolation in religion, replied CLEANTHES.\r\nSometimes, said PHILO: but it is natural to imagine, that they will form\r\na notion of those unknown beings, suitably to the present gloom and\r\nmelancholy of their temper, when they betake themselves to the\r\ncontemplation of them. Accordingly, we find the tremendous images to\r\npredominate in all religions; and we ourselves, after having employed the\r\nmost exalted expression in our descriptions of the Deity, fall into the\r\nflattest contradiction in affirming that the damned are infinitely\r\nsuperior in number to the elect.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nI shall venture to affirm, that there never was a popular religion, which\r\nrepresented the state of departed souls in such a light, as would render\r\nit eligible for human kind that there should be such a state. These fine\r\nmodels of religion are the mere product of philosophy. For as death lies\r\nbetween the eye and the prospect of futurity, that event is so shocking\r\nto Nature, that it must throw a gloom on all the regions which lie beyond\r\nit; and suggest to the generality of mankind the idea of CERBERUS and\r\nFURIES; devils, and torrents of fire and brimstone.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is true, both fear and hope enter into religion; because both these\r\npassions, at different times, agitate the human mind, and each of them\r\nforms a species of divinity suitable to itself. But when a man is in a\r\ncheerful disposition, he is fit for business, or company, or\r\nentertainment of any kind; and he naturally applies himself to these, and\r\nthinks not of religion. When melancholy and dejected, he has nothing to\r\ndo but brood upon the terrors of the invisible world, and to plunge\r\nhimself still deeper in affliction. It may indeed happen, that after he\r\nhas, in this manner, engraved the religious opinions deep into his\r\nthought and imagination, there may arrive a change of health or\r\ncircumstances, which may restore his good humour, and raising cheerful\r\nprospects of futurity, make him run into the other extreme of joy and\r\ntriumph. But still it must be acknowledged, that, as terror is the\r\nprimary principle of religion, it is the passion which always\r\npredominates in it, and admits but of short intervals of pleasure.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nNot to mention, that these fits of excessive, enthusiastic joy, by\r\nexhausting the spirits, always prepare the way for equal fits of\r\nsuperstitious terror and dejection; nor is there any state of mind so\r\nhappy as the calm and equable. But this state it is impossible to\r\nsupport, where a man thinks that he lies in such profound darkness and\r\nuncertainty, between an eternity of happiness and an eternity of misery.\r\nNo wonder that such an opinion disjoints the ordinary frame of the mind,\r\nand throws it into the utmost confusion. And though that opinion is\r\nseldom so steady in its operation as to influence all the actions; yet it\r\nis apt to make a considerable breach in the temper, and to produce that\r\ngloom and melancholy so remarkable in all devout people.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIt is contrary to common sense to entertain apprehensions or terrors upon\r\naccount of any opinion whatsoever, or to imagine that we run any risk\r\nhereafter, by the freest use of our reason. Such a sentiment implies both\r\nan absurdity and an inconsistency. It is an absurdity to believe that the\r\nDeity has human passions, and one of the lowest of human passions, a\r\nrestless appetite for applause. It is an inconsistency to believe, that,\r\nsince the Deity has this human passion, he has not others also; and, in\r\nparticular, a disregard to the opinions of creatures so much inferior.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nTo know God, says SENECA, is to worship him. All other worship is indeed\r\nabsurd, superstitious, and even impious. It degrades him to the low\r\ncondition of mankind, who are delighted with entreaty, solicitation,\r\npresents, and flattery. Yet is this impiety the smallest of which\r\nsuperstition is guilty. Commonly, it depresses the Deity far below the\r\ncondition of mankind; and represents him as a capricious DEMON, who\r\nexercises his power without reason and without humanity! And were that\r\nDivine Being disposed to be offended at the vices and follies of silly\r\nmortals, who are his own workmanship, ill would it surely fare with the\r\nvotaries of most popular superstitions. Nor would any of human race merit\r\nhis favour, but a very few, the philosophical Theists, who entertain, or\r\nrather indeed endeavour to entertain, suitable notions of his Divine\r\nperfections: As the only persons entitled to his compassion and\r\nindulgence would be the philosophical Sceptics, a sect almost equally\r\nrare, who, from a natural diffidence of their own capacity, suspend, or\r\nendeavour to suspend, all judgement with regard to such sublime and such\r\nextraordinary subjects.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nIf the whole of Natural Theology, as some people seem to maintain,\r\nresolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least\r\nundefined proposition, That the cause or causes of order in the universe\r\nprobably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence: If this\r\nproposition be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular\r\nexplication: If it affords no inference that affects human life, or can\r\nbe the source of any action or forbearance: And if the analogy, imperfect\r\nas it is, can be carried no further than to the human intelligence, and\r\ncannot be transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other\r\nqualities of the mind; if this really be the case, what can the most\r\ninquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than give a plain,\r\nphilosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs, and\r\nbelieve that the arguments on which it is established exceed the\r\nobjections which lie against it? Some astonishment, indeed, will\r\nnaturally arise from the greatness of the object; some melancholy from\r\nits obscurity; some contempt of human reason, that it can give no\r\nsolution more satisfactory with regard to so extraordinary and\r\nmagnificent a question. But believe me, CLEANTHES, the most natural\r\nsentiment which a well-disposed mind will feel on this occasion, is a\r\nlonging desire and expectation that Heaven would be pleased to dissipate,\r\nat least alleviate, this profound ignorance, by affording some more\r\nparticular revelation to mankind, and making discoveries of the nature,\r\nattributes, and operations of the Divine object of our faith. A person,\r\nseasoned with a just sense of the imperfections of natural reason, will\r\nfly to revealed truth with the greatest avidity: While the haughty\r\nDogmatist, persuaded that he can erect a complete system of Theology by\r\nthe mere help of philosophy, disdains any further aid, and rejects this\r\nadventitious instructor. To be a philosophical Sceptic is, in a man of\r\nletters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound,\r\nbelieving Christian; a proposition which I would willingly recommend to\r\nthe attention of PAMPHILUS: And I hope CLEANTHES will forgive me for\r\ninterposing so far in the education and instruction of his pupil.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cP\u003e\r\nCLEANTHES and PHILO pursued not this conversation much further: and as\r\nnothing ever made greater impression on me, than all the reasonings of\r\nthat day, so I confess, that, upon a serious review of the whole, I\r\ncannot but think, that PHILO\u0027s principles are more probable than DEMEA\u0027s;\r\nbut that those of CLEANTHES approach still nearer to the truth.\r\n\u003c/P\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\u003cBR\u003e\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}