The Analysis of Sensations / Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen
{"WorkMasterId":5688,"WpPageId":270001,"ParentWpPageId":193823,"Slug":"analysis-of-sensations","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/ernst-mach/analysis-of-sensations/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/ernst-mach/analysis-of-sensations/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":127854,"CleanHtmlLength":73103,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"The Analysis of Sensations / Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen","Deck":"Mach treats sensations or elements as the neutral basis from which self, body, and world are economically organized.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to Ernst Mach","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/ernst-mach/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"Ernst Mach","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/ernst-mach/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/ernst-mach-01-science-history-institute-portrait.jpg","ImageAlt":"Portrait of Ernst Mach","FilterTerra":"Western Europe","ClickText":"Ernst Mach","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/ernst-mach/","Copies":["1838 CE – 1916 CE","Chrlice / Chirlitz, near Brno","Austrian physicist and philosopher from Moravia whose anti-metaphysical empiricism, analysis of sensations, historical criticism of mechanics, and economy of thought shaped modern philosophy of science."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:4","Title":"Modern History","DateText":"1800 CE – 1944 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:11","Title":"Long 19th Century","DateText":"1870 CE – 1913 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/philosophers-of-the-long-19th-century/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"1886 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Date note: 1886 for the German work. Later translations and editions are edition evidence, not separate direct works; HasFullText remains false.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:3"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:CZE:1"}],"OriginalTitle":"Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen","Language":"German","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:epistemology"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:philosophy-of-mind"}],"Tradition":"Empiricism / philosophy of science","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Full text from Marxists Internet Archive: The Analysis of Sensations .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Mach treats sensations or elements as the neutral basis from which self, body, and world are economically organized."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"The Analysis of Sensations; Contributions to the Analysis of Sensations","KeyConcepts":"Sensation; elements; economy of thought; mechanics; inertia; mass; Mach principle; psychophysics; motion; heat; optics; anti-metaphysics; empiricism; science history; concepts; language; knowledge and error","Methodology":"Historical-critical analysis, experimental physics, psychophysical observation, conceptual economy, anti-metaphysical critique, and reconstruction of scientific concepts from experience.","Structure":"The page records a direct Mach work with visible scientific, lecture-collection, translation, posthumous, or edition status and no imported full-text badge."},"Arguments":["Mach treats sensations or elements as the neutral basis from which self, body, and world are economically organized."],"Influence":{"InfluencedBy":"Kant, Gustav Fechner, Hermann von Helmholtz, Darwinian biology, Hume, Berkeley, and nineteenth-century physics and psychophysics.","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Included as one of the fourteen Ernst Mach work pages approved for the full-process update.","The work remains relevant to empiricism, scientific modeling, concept formation, theory choice, relativity reception, psychophysics, and the relation between physics and experience."],"EvidenceNote":["Direct work page approved in the Ernst Mach update. Collected works, modern translations, textbooks, school manuals, individual lecture fragments, Mach-Zehnder material not authored by Mach, Einstein/Lenin/Carnap works, catalog rows, and scholarship remain evidence/Other Voices unless separately approved."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003eFull text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/mach.htm\"\u003eMarxists Internet Archive: The Analysis of Sensations\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\n\u003ch4\u003eThe Analysis of Sensations\u003cBR\u003e\n\u003cspan\u003eand the Relation of the Physical to the Psychical\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\n\n\u003chr\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u003cspan\u003eSource:\u003c/span\u003e \u003cem\u003eThe Analysis of Sensations\u003c/em\u003e (1897). Dover Edition, 1959;\u003cbr\u003e \u003cspan\u003eTranslation:\u003c/span\u003e by C M Williams and Sydney Waterlow;\u003cbr\u003e\nFirst Chapter reproduced here.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003chr\u003e\n\n\u003ch3\u003eI. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS:\u003cBR\u003e\nANTI METAPHYSICAL.\u003c/h3\u003e\n\n\u003ch5\u003e1.\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nTHE great results achieved by physical science in modern times\n- results not restricted to its own sphere but embracing that\nof other sciences which employ its help – have brought it about\nthat physical ways of thinking and physical modes of procedure\nenjoy on all hands unwonted prominence, and that the greatest\nexpectations are associated with their application. In keeping\nwith this drift of modern inquiry, the physiology of the senses,\ngradually abandoning the method of investigating sensations in\nthemselves followed by men like Goethe, Schopenhauer, and others,\nbut with greatest success by Johannes Muller, has also assumed\nan almost exclusively physical character. This tendency must appear\nto us as not altogether appropriate, when we reflect that physics,\ndespite its considerable development, nevertheless constitutes\nbut a portion of a \u003cem\u003elarger\u003c/em\u003e collective body of knowledge,\nand that it is unable, with its limited intellectual implements,\ncreated for limited and special purposes, to exhaust all the subject-matter\nin question. Without renouncing the support of physics, it is\npossible for the physiology of the senses, not only to pursue\nits own course of development, but also to afford to physical\nscience itself powerful assistance. The following simple considerations\nwill serve to illustrate this relation between the two.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e2.\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nColours, sounds, temperatures, pressures, spaces, times, and so\nforth, are connected with one another in manifold ways; and with\nthem are associated dispositions of mind, feelings, and volitions.\nOut of this fabric, that which is relatively more fixed and permanent\nstands prominently forth, engraves itself on the memory, and expresses\nitself in language. Relatively greater permanency is exhibited,\nfirst, by certain complexes of colours, sounds, pressures, and\nso forth, functionally connected in time and space, which therefore\nreceive special names, and are called bodies. Absolutely permanent\nsuch complexes are not.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nMy table is now brightly, now dimly lighted. Its temperature varies.\nIt may receive an ink stain. One of its legs may be broken. It\nmay be repaired, polished, and replaced part by part. But, for\nme, it remains the table at which I daily write.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nMy friend may put on a different coat. His countenance may assume\na serious or a cheerful expression. His complexion, under the\neffects of light or emotion, may change. His shape may be altered\nby motion, or be definitely changed. Yet the number of the permanent\nfeatures presented, compared with the number of the gradual alterations,\nis always so great, that the latter may be overlooked. It is the\nsame friend with whom I take my daily walk.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nMy coat may receive a stain, a tear. My very manner of expressing\nthis shows that we are concerned here with a sum-total of permanency,\nto which the new element is added and from which that which is\nlacking is subsequently taken away.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nOur greater intimacy with this sum-total of permanency, and the\npreponderance of its importance for me as contrasted with the\nchangeable element, impel us to the partly instinctive, partly\nvoluntary and conscious economy of mental presentation and designation,\nas expressed in ordinary thought and speech. That which is presented\nin a single image receives a single designation, a single name.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nFurther, that complex of memories, moods, and feelings, joined\nto a particular body (the human body), which is called the\n\u0026quot;I\u0026quot; or \u0026quot;Ego,\u0026quot; manifests itself as relatively permanent.\nI may be engaged upon this or that subject, I may be quiet and\ncheerful, excited and ill-humoured. Yet, pathological cases\napart, enough durable features remain to identify the ego. Of\ncourse, the ego also is only of relative permanency.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe apparent permanency of the ego consists chiefly in the single\nfact of its continuity, in the slowness of its changes. The many\nthoughts and plans of yesterday that are continued today, and\nof which our environment in waking hours incessantly reminds us\n(whence in dreams the ego can be very indistinct, doubled, or\nentirely wanting), and the little habits that are unconsciously\nand involuntarily kept up for long periods of time, constitute\nthe groundwork of the ego. There can hardly be greater differences\nin the egos of different people, than occur in the course of years\nin one person. When I recall today my early youth, I should take\nthe boy that I then was, with the exception of a few individual\nfeatures, for a different person, were it not for the existence\nof the chain of memories. Many an article that I myself penned\ntwenty years ago impresses me now as something quite foreign to\nmyself. The very gradual character of the changes of the body\nalso contributes to the stability of the ego, but in a much less\ndegree than people imagine. Such things are much less analysed\nand noticed than the intellectual and the moral ego. Personally,\npeople know themselves very poorly. When I wrote these lines in\n1886, Ribot\u0027s admirable little book, \u003cem\u003eThe Diseases of Personality\u003c/em\u003e\n(second edition, Paris, 1888, Chicago, 1895), was unknown to me.\nRibot ascribes the principal role in preserving the continuity\nof the ego to the general sensibility. Generally, I am in perfect\naccord with his views.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe ego is as little absolutely permanent as are bodies. That\nwhich we so much dread in death, the annihilation of our permanency,\nactually occurs in life in abundant measure. That which is most\nvalued by us, remains preserved in countless copies, or, in cases\nof exceptional excellence, is even preserved of itself. In the\nbest human being, however, there are individual traits, the loss\nof which neither he himself nor others need regret. Indeed, at\ntimes, death, viewed as a liberation from individuality, may even\nbecome a pleasant thought. Such reflections of course do not make\nphysiological death any the easier to bear.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nAfter a first survey has been obtained, by the formation of the\nsubstance-concepts \u0026quot; body \u0026quot; and \u0026quot; ego \u0026quot; (matter\nand soul), the will is impelled to a more exact examination of\nthe changes that take place in these relatively permanent existences.\nThe element of change in bodies and the ego, is in fact, exactly\nwhat moves the will I to this examination. Here the component\nparts of the complex are first exhibited as its properties. A\nfruit is sweet; but it can also be bitter. Also, other fruits\nmay be sweet. The red colour we are seeking is found in many bodies.\nThe neighbourhood of some bodies is pleasant; that of others,\nunpleasant. Thus, gradually, different complexes are found to\nbe made up of common elements. The visible, the audible, the tangible,\nare separated from bodies. The visible is analysed into colours\nand into form. In the manifoldness of the colours, again, though\nhere fewer in number, other component parts are discerned – such\nas the primary colours, and so forth. The complexes are disintegrated\ninto elements, that is to say, into their ultimate component parts,\nwhich hitherto we have been unable to subdivide any further. The\nnature of these elements need not be discussed at present; it\nis possible that future investigations may throw light on it.\nWe need not here be disturbed by the fact that it is easier for\nthe scientist to study relations of relations of these elements\nthan the direct relations between them.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e3.\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe useful habit of designating such relatively permanent compounds\nby single names, and of apprehending them by single thoughts,\nwithout going to the trouble each time of an analysis of their\ncomponent parts, is apt to come into strange conflict with the\ntendency to isolate the component parts. The vague image which\nwe have of a given permanent complex, being an image which does\nnot perceptibly change when one or another of the component parts\nis taken away, seems to be something which exists in itself. Inasmuch\nas it is possible to take away singly every constituent part without\ndestroying the capacity of the image to stand for the totality\nand to be recognised again, it is imagined that it is possible\nto subtract\u003cem\u003e all\u003c/em\u003e the parts and to have something still remaining.\nThus naturally arises the philosophical notion, at first impressive,\nbut subsequently recognised as monstrous, of a \u0026quot; thing-in-itself,\u0026quot;\ndifferent from its \u0026quot;appearance,\u0026quot; and unknowable.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nThing, body, matter, are nothing apart from the combinations of\nthe elements, – the colours, sounds, and so forth – nothing apart\nfrom their so-called attributes. That protean pseudo-philosophical\nproblem of the single thing with its many attributes, arises wholly\nfrom a misinterpretation of the fact, that summary comprehension\nand precise analysis, although both are provisionally justifiable\nand for many purposes profitable, cannot be carried on simultaneously.\nA body is one and unchangeable only so long as it is unnecessary\nto consider its details. Thus both the earth and a billiard-ball\nare spheres, if we are willing to neglect all deviations from\nthe spherical form, and if greater precision is not necessary.\nBut when we are obliged to carry on investigations in orography\nor microscopy, both bodies cease to be spheres.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e4.\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nMan is pre-eminently endowed with the power of voluntarily and\nconsciously determining his own point of view. He can at one time\ndisregard the most salient features of an object, and immediately\nthereafter give attention to its smallest details; now consider\na stationary current, without a thought of its contents (whether\nheat, electricity or fluidity), and then measure the width of\na Fraunhofer line in the spectrum; he can rise at will to the\nmost general abstractions or bury himself in the minutest particulars.\nAnimals possess this capacity in a far less degree. They do not\nassume a point of view, but are usually forced to it by their\nsense-impressions. The baby that does not know its father with\nhis hat on, the dog that is perplexed at the new coat of its master,\nhave both succumbed in this conflict of points of view. Who has\nnot been worsted in similar plights ? Even the man of philosophy\nat times succumbs, as the grotesque problem, above referred to,\nshows.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn this last case, the circumstances appear to furnish a real\nground of justification. Colours, sounds, and the odours of bodies\nare evanescent. But their tangibility, as a sort of constant nucleus,\nnot readily susceptible of annihilation, remains behind; appearing\nas the vehicle of the more fugitive properties attached to it.\nHabit, thus, keeps our thought firmly attached to this central\nnucleus, even when we have begun to recognise that seeing hearing,\nsmelling, and touching are intimately akin in character. A further\nconsideration is, that owing to the singularly extensive development\nof mechanical physics a kind of higher reality is ascribed to\nthe spatial and to the temporal than to colours, sounds, and odours;\nagreeably to which, the temporal and spatial links of colours,\nsounds, and odours appear to be more real than the colours, sounds\nand odours themselves. The physiology of the senses, however,\ndemonstrates, that spaces and times may just as appropriately\nbe called sensations as colours and sounds. But of this later.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e5.\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nNot only the relation of bodies to the ego, but the ego itself\nalso, gives rise to similar pseudo – problems, the character of\nwhich may be briefly indicated as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet us denote the above-mentioned elements by the letters A B\nC . . ., X L M . . ., a, b, c . . . Let those complexes of colours,\nsounds, and so forth, commonly called bodies, be denoted, for\nthe sake of clearness, by A B C . .; the complex, known as our\nown body, which is a part of the former complexes distinguished\nby certain peculiarities, may be called K L M . . .; the complex\ncomposed of volitions, memory-images, and the rest, we shall represent\nby a b c . . . Usually, now, the complex a , c . . . K L M. .\n., as making up the ego, is opposed to the complex A B C . . .,\nas making up the world of physical objects; sometimes also, a\nb c . . . is viewed as ego, and K L M . . . A B C . . . as world\nof physical objects. Now, at first blush, A B C . . . appears\nindependent of the ego, and opposed to it as a separate existence.\nBut this independence is only relative, and gives way upon closer\ninspection. Much, it is true, may change in the complex a b c\n. . . without much perceptible change being induced in A B C .\n. .; and \u003cem\u003evice versa\u003c/em\u003e. But many changes in a b c . . . do\npass, by way of changes in K L M . . ., to A B C . . .; and \u003cem\u003evice\nversa\u003c/em\u003e. (As, for example, when powerful ideas burst forth into\nacts, or when our environment induces noticeable changes in our\nbody.) At the same time the group K L M . . . appears to be more\nintimately connected with a b c . . . and with A B C . . ., than\nthe latter with one another; and their relations find their expression\nin common thought and speech.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nPrecisely viewed, however, it appears that the group A B C . .\n. is always codetermined by K L M. A cube when seen close at hand,\nlooks large; when seen at a distance, small; its appearance to\nthe right eye differs from its appearance to the left; sometimes\nit appears double; with closed eyes it is invisible. The properties\nof one and the same body, therefore, appear modified by our own\nbody; they appear conditioned by it. But where, now, is that \u003cem\u003esame\u003c/em\u003e\nbody, which appears so \u003cem\u003edifferent\u003c/em\u003e? All that can be said\nis, that with different K L M different A B C . . . are associated.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nA common and popular way of thinking and speaking is to contrast\n\u0026quot; appearance \u0026quot; with \u0026quot; reality.\u0026quot; A pencil held\nin front of us in the air is seen by us as straight; dip it into\nthe water, and we see it crooked. In the latter case we say that\nthe pencil \u003cem\u003eappears\u003c/em\u003e crooked, but is in \u003cem\u003ereality\u003c/em\u003e straight.\nBut what justifies us in declaring one fact rather than another\nto be the reality, and degrading the other to the level of appearance\n? In both cases we have to do with facts which present us with\ndifferent combinations of the elements, combinations which in\nthe two cases are differently conditioned. Precisely because of\nits environment the pencil dipped in water is optically crooked;\nbut it is tactually and metrically straight. An image in a concave\nor flat mirror is \u003cem\u003eonly\u003c/em\u003e visible, whereas under other and\nordinary circumstances a tangible body as well corresponds to\nthe visible image. A bright surface is brighter beside a dark\nsurface than beside one brighter than itself. To be sure, our\nexpectation is deceived when, not paying sufficient attention\nto the conditions, and substituting for one another different\ncases of the combination, we fall into the natural error of expecting\nwhat we are accustomed to, although the case may be an unusual\none. The facts are not to blame for that. In these cases, to speak\nof \u0026quot; appearance \u0026quot; may have a practical meaning, but\ncannot have a scientific meaning. Similarly, the question which\nis often asked, whether the world is real or whether we merely\ndream it, is devoid of all scientific meaning. Even the wildest\ndream is a fact as much as any other. If our dreams were more\nregular, more connected, more stable, they would also have more\npractical importance for us. In our waking hours the relations\nof the elements to one another are immensely amplified in comparison\nwith what they were in our dreams. We recognise the dream for\nwhat it is. When the process is reversed, the field of psychic\nvision is narrowed; the contrast is almost entirely lacking. Where\nthere is no contrast, the distinction between dream and waking,\nbetween appearance and reality, is quite otiose and worthless.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe popular notion of an antithesis between appearance and reality\nhas exercised a very powerful influence on scientific and philosophical\nthought. We see this, for example, in Plato\u0027s pregnant and poetical\nfiction of the Cave, in which, with our backs turned towards the\nfire, we observe merely the shadows of what passes (\u003cem\u003eRepublic\u003c/em\u003e,\nvii. 1). But this conception was not thought out to its final\nconsequences, with the result that it has had an unfortunate influence\non our ideas about the universe. The universe, of which nevertheless\nwe are a part, became completely separated from us, and was removed\nan infinite distance away. Similarly, many a young man, hearing\nfor the first time of the refraction of stellar light, has thought\nthat doubt was cast on the whole of astronomy, whereas nothing\nis required but an easily effected and unimportant correction\nto put everything right again.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e6.\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe see an object having a point S. If we touch S, that is, bring\nit into connexion with our body, we receive a prick. We can see\nS, without feeling the prick. But as soon as we feel the prick\nwe find S on the skin. The visible point, therefore, is a permanent\nnucleus, to which the prick is annexed, according to circumstances,\nas something accidental. From the frequency of analogous occurrences\nwe ultimately accustom ourselves to regard all properties of bodies\nas \u0026quot; effects \u0026quot; proceeding from permanent nuclei and\nconveyed to the ego through the medium of the body; which effects\nwe call sensations. By this operation, however, these nuclei are\ndeprived of their entire sensory content, and converted into mere\nmental symbols. The assertion, then, is correct that the world\nconsists only of our sensations. In which case we have knowledge\n\u003cem\u003eonly\u003c/em\u003e of sensations, and the assumption of the nuclei referred\nto, or of a reciprocal action between them, from which sensations\nproceed, turns out to be quite idle and superfluous. Such a view\ncan only suit with a half-hearted realism or a half-hearted philosophical\ncriticism.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e7.\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nOrdinarily the complex a b c . . . K L M . . . is contrasted as\nego with the complex A B C . . . At first only those elements\nof A B C … that more strongly alter a b c …. as a prick, a\npain, are wont to be thought of as comprised in the ego. Afterwards,\nhowever, through observations of the kind just referred to, it\nappears that the right to annex A B C . . . to the ego nowhere\nceases. In conformity with this view the ego can be so extended\nas ultimately to embrace the entire world. The ego is not sharply\nmarked off, its limits are very indefinite and arbitrarily displaceable\nOnly by failing to observe this fact, and by unconsciously narrowing\nthose limits, while at the same time we enlarge them, arise, in\nthe conflict of points of view, the metaphysical difficulties\nmet with in this connexion.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nAs soon as we have perceived that the supposed unities \u0026quot;\nbody \u0026quot; and \u0026quot; ego \u0026quot; are only makeshifts, designed\nfor provisional orientation and for definite practical ends (so\nthat we may take hold of bodies, protect ourselves against pain,\nand so forth), we find ourselves obliged, in many more advanced\nscientific investigations, to abandon them as insufficient and\ninappropriate. The antithesis between ego and world, between sensation\n(appearance) and thing, then vanishes, and we have simply to deal\nwith the connexion of the elements a b c . . . A B C . . . K L\nM . . ., of which this antithesis was only a partially appropriate\nand imperfect expression. This connexion is nothing more or less\nthan the combination of the above-mentioned elements with other\nsimilar elements (time and space). Science has simply to accept\nthis connexion, and to get its bearings in it, without at once\nwanting to explain its existence.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nOn a superficial examination the complex a b c . . . appears to\nbe made up of much more evanescent elements than A B C . . . and\nK L M . . ., in which last the elements seem to be connected with\ngreater stability and in a more permanent manner (being joined\nto solid nuclei as it were). Although on closer inspection the\nelements of all complexes prove to be homogeneous, yet even when\nthis has been recognised, the earlier notion of an antithesis\nof body and spirit easily slips in again. The philosophical spiritualist\nis often sensible of the difficulty of imparting the needed solidity\nto his mind-created world of bodies; the materialist is at a loss\nwhen required to endow the world of matter with sensation. The\nmonistic point of view, which reflexion has evolved, is easily\nclouded by our older and more powerful instinctive notions.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e8.\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe difficulty referred to is particularly felt when we consider\nthe following case. In the complex A B C . . .. which we have\ncalled the world of matter, we find as parts, not only our own\nbody K L M . . ., but also the bodies of other persons (or animals)\nK\u0027 L\u0027 M\u0027 . . , K\u0026quot; L\u0026quot; M\u0026quot; . . .. to which, by analogy,\nwe imagine other a\u0027 b\u0027 c\u0027…, a\u0026quot; b\u0026quot; c\u0026quot;, annexed,\nsimilar to a b c . . . So long as we deal with K\u0027 L\u0027 M\u0027 . . .,\nwe find ourselves in a thoroughly familiar province which is at\nevery point accessible to our senses. When, however, we inquire\nafter the sensations or feelings belonging to the body K\u0027 L\u0027 M\u0027\n. . ., we no longer find these in the province of sense: we add\nthem in thought. Not only is the domain which we now enter far\nless familiar to us, but the transition into it is also relatively\nunsafe. We have the feeling as if we were plunging into an abyss.\nPersons who adopt this way of thinking only, will never thoroughly\nrid themselves of that sense of insecurity, which is a very fertile\nsource of illusory problems.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut we are not restricted to this course. Let us consider, first,\nthe reciprocal relations of the elements of the complex A B C\n. . ., without regarding K L M . . . (our body). All physical\ninvestigations are of this sort. A white ball falls upon a bell;\na sound is heard. The ball turns yellow before a sodium lamp,\nred before a lithium lamp. Here the elements (A B C . . . ) appear\nto be connected only with one another and to be independent of\nour body (K L M . . . ). But if we take santonin, the ball again\nturns yellow. If we press one eye to the side, we see two balls.\nIf we close our eyes entirely, there is no ball there at all.\nIf we sever the auditory nerve, no sound is heard. The elements\n=4 B C . . ., therefore, are not only connected with one another,\nbut also with K L M; To this extent, and to this extent \u003cem\u003eonly\u003c/em\u003e,\ndo we call A B C . . . sensations, and regard A B C as belonging\nto the ego. In what follows, wherever the reader finds the terms\n\u0026quot; Sensation,\u0026quot; \u0026quot; Sensation-complex,\u0026quot; used alongside\nof or instead of the expressions \u0026quot; element,\u0026quot; \u0026quot;\ncomplex of elements,\u0026quot; it must be borne in mind that it is\nonly in the connexion and relation in question, only in their\nfunctional dependence, that the elements are sensations. In another\nfunctional relation they are at the same time physical objects.\nWe only use the additional term \u0026quot; sensations\u0026quot; to describe\nthe elements, because most people are much more familiar with\nthe elements in question as sensations (colours, sounds, pressures,\nspaces, times, etc.), while according to the popular conception\nit is particles of mass that are considered as physical elements,\nto which the elements, in the sense here used, are attached as\n\u0026quot; properties \u0026quot; or \u0026quot; effects.\u0026quot;.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn this way, accordingly, we do not find the gap between bodies\nand sensations above described, between what is without and what\nis within, between the material world and the spiritual world.\nAll elements A B C . . ., K L M. . .. constitute a \u003cem\u003esingle\u003c/em\u003e\ncoherent mass only, in which, when any one element is disturbed,\n\u003cem\u003eall\u003c/em\u003e is put in motion; except that a disturbance in K, L\nM, . . . has a more extensive and profound action than one in\nA B C . . . A magnet in our neighbourhood disturbs the particles\nof iron near it; a falling boulder shakes the earth; but the severing\nof a nerve sets in motion the \u003cem\u003ewhole\u003c/em\u003e system of elements.\nQuite involuntarily does this relation of things suggest the picture\nof a viscous mass, at certain places (as in the ego) more firmly\ncoherent than in others. I have often made use of this image in\nlectures.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e9.\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nThus the great gulf between physical and psychological research\npersists only when we acquiesce in our habitual stereotyped conceptions.\nA colour is a physical object as soon as we consider its dependence,\nfor instance, upon its luminous source, upon other colours, upon\ntemperatures, upon spaces, and so forth. When we consider, however,\nits dependence upon the retina (the elements K L M. . .), it is\na psychological object, a sensation. Not the subject matter, but\nthe direction of our investigation, is different in the two domains.\n(Cp. also Chapter II., pp. 43, 44.)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nBoth in reasoning from the observation of the bodies of other\nmen or animals, to the sensations which they possess, as well\nas in investigating the influence of our own body upon our own\nsensations, we have to complete observed facts by analogy. This\nis accomplished with much greater ease and certainty, when it\nrelates, say, only to nervous processes, which cannot be fully\nobserved in our own bodies – that is, when it is carried out in\nthe more familiar physical domain – than when it is extended\nto the psychical domain, to the sensations and thoughts of other\npeople. Otherwise there is no essential difference.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e10.\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe considerations just advanced, expressed as they have been\nin an abstract form, will gain in strength and vividness if we\nconsider the concrete facts from which they flow. Thus, I lie\nupon my sofa. If I close my right eye, the picture represented\nin the accompanying cut is presented to my left eye In a frame\nformed by the ridge of my eyebrow, by my nose, and by my moustache,\nappears a part of my body, so far as visible, with its environment.\nMy body differs from other human bodies – beyond the fact that\nevery intense motor idea is immediately expressed by a movement\nof it, and that, if it is touched, more striking changes are determined\nthan if other bodies are touched – by the circumstance, that it\nis only seen piecemeal, and, especially, is seen without a head.\nIf I observe an element A within my field of vision, and investigate\nits connexion with another element B within the same field, I\nstep out of the domain of physics into that of physiology or psychology,\nprovided B, to use the apposite expression of a friend of mine\nmade upon seeing this drawing, passes through my skin. Reflexions\nlike that for the field of vision may be made with regard to the\nprovince of touch and the perceptual domains of the other senses.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e11.\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nReference has already been made to the different character of\nthe groups of elements denoted by A B C . . . and a b c . . .\nAs a matter of fact, when we see a green tree before us, or remember\na green tree, that is, represent a green tree to ourselves, we\nare perfectly aware of the difference of the two cases. The represented\ntree has a much less determinate, a much more changeable form;\nits green is much paler and more evanescent; and, what is of especial\nnote, it plainly appears in a different domain. A movement that\nwe will to execute is never more than a represented movement,\nand appears in a different domain from that of the executed movement,\nwhich always takes place when the image is vivid enough. Now the\nstatement that the elements A and a appear in different domains,\nmeans, if we go to the bottom of it, simply this, that these elements\nare united with different other elements. Thus far, therefore,\nthe fundamental constituents of A B C . . .. a b c . . . would\nseem to be \u003cem\u003ethe same\u003c/em\u003e (colours, sounds, spaces, times, motor\nsensations . . .), and only the character of their connexion different.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nOrdinarily pleasure and pain are regarded as different from sensations.\nYet not only tactual sensations, but all other kinds of sensations,\nmay pass gradually into pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain also\nmay be justly termed sensations. Only they are not so well analysed\nand so familiar, nor, perhaps, limited to so few organs as the\ncommon sensations. In fact, sensations of pleasure and pain, however\nfaint they may be, really constitute an essential part of the\ncontent of all so-called emotions. Any additional element that\nemerges into consciousness when we are under the- influence of\nemotions may be described as more or less diffused and not sharply\nlocalised sensations. William James, and after him Theodule Ribot,\nhave investigated the physiological mechanism of the emotions:\nthey hold that what is essential is purposive tendencies of the\nbody to action – tendencies which correspond to circumstances\nand are expressed in the organism. Only a part of these emerges\ninto consciousness. We are sad because we shed tears, and not\n\u003cem\u003evice versa\u003c/em\u003e, says James. And Ribot justly observes that\na cause of the backward state of our knowledge of the emotions\nis that we have always confined our observation to so much of\nthese physiological processes as emerges into consciousness. At\nthe same time he goes too far when he maintains that everything\npsychical is merely \u0026quot;\u003cem\u003esurajoute\u003c/em\u003e\u0026quot; to the physical,\nand that it is only the physical that produces effects. For us\nthis distinction is non-existent.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nThus, perceptions, presentations, volitions, and emotions, in\nshort the whole inner and outer world, are put together, in combinations\nof varying evanescence and permanence, out of a small number of\nhomogeneous elements. Usually, these elements are called sensations.\nBut as vestiges of a one-sided theory inhere in that term, we\nprefer to speak simply of elements, as we have already done. The\naim of all research is to ascertain the mode of connexion of these\nelements. If it proves impossible to solve the problem by assuming\n\u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e set of such elements, then more than one will have\nto be assumed. But for the questions under discussion it would\nbe improper to begin by making complicated assumptions in advance.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e12.\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat in this complex of elements, which fundamentally is only\none, the boundaries of bodies and of the ego do not admit of being\nestablished in a manner definite and sufficient for all cases,\nhas already been remarked. To bring together elements that are\nmost intimately connected with pleasure and pain into one ideal\nmental-economical unity, the ego; this is a task of the highest\nimportance for the intellect working in the service of the pain-avoiding,\npleasure-seeking will. The delimitation of the ego, therefore,\nis instinctively effected, is rendered familiar, and possibly\nbecomes fixed through heredity. Owing to their high practical\nimportance, not only for the individual, but for the entire species,\nthe composites \u0026quot; ego \u0026quot; and \u0026quot; body \u0026quot; instinctively\nmake good their claims, and assert themselves with elementary\nforce. In special cases, however, in which practical ends are\nnot concerned, but where knowledge is an end in itself, the delimitation\nin question may prove to be insufficient, obstructive, and untenable.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nSimilarly, class-consciousness, class-prejudice, the feeling of\nnationality, and even the narrowest-minded local patriotism may\nhave a high importance, for certain purposes. But such attitudes\nwill not be shared by the broad-minded investigator, at least\nnot in moments of research. All such egoistic views are adequate\nonly for practical purposes. Of course, even the investigator\nmay succumb to habit. Trifling pedantries and nonsensical discussions;\nthe cunning appropriation of others\u0027 thoughts, with perfidious\nsilence as to the sources; when the word of recognition must be\ngiven, the difficulty of swallowing one\u0027s defeat, and the too\ncommon eagerness at the same time to set the opponent\u0027s achievement\nin a false light: all this abundantly shows that the scientist\nand scholar have also the battle of existence to fight, that the\nways even of science still lead to the mouth, and that the pure\nimpulse towards knowledge is still an ideal in our present social\nconditions.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe primary fact is not the ego, but the elements (sensations).\nWhat was said on p. 21 as to the term \u0026quot; sensation \u0026quot;\nmust be borne in mind. The elements constitute the I. s have the\nsensation green, signifies that the element green occurs in a\ngiven complex of other elements (sensations, memories). When \u003cem\u003eI\u003c/em\u003e\ncease to have the sensation green, when \u003cem\u003eI\u003c/em\u003e die, then the\nelements no longer occur in the ordinary, familiar association.\nThat is all. Only an ideal mental-economical unity, not a real\nunity, has ceased to exist. The ego is not a definite, unalterable,\nsharply bounded unity. None of these attributes are important;\nfor all vary even within the sphere of individual life; in fact\ntheir alteration is even sought after by the individual. \u003cem\u003eContinuity\u003c/em\u003e\nalone is important. This view accords admirably with the position\nwhich Weismann has reached by biological investigations. (\u0026quot;\u003cem\u003eZur\nFrage der Unsterblichkeit der Einzelligen\u003c/em\u003e,\u0026quot; \u003cem\u003eBiolog\nCentralbl\u003c/em\u003e., Vol. IV., Nos. 21, 22; compare especially pages\n654 and 655, where the scission of the individual into two equal\nhalves is spoken of.) But continuity is only a means of preparing\nand conserving what is contained in the ego. This content, and\nnot the ego, is the principal thing. This content, however, is\nnot confined to the individual. With the exception of some insignificant\nand valueless personal memories, it remains presented in others\neven after the death of the individual. The elements that make\nup the consciousness of a given individual are firmly connected\nwith one another, but with those of another individual they are\nonly feebly connected, and the connexion is only casually apparent.\nContents of consciousness, however, that are of universal significance,\nbreak through these limits of the individual, and, attached of\ncourse to individuals again, can enjoy a continued existence of\nan impersonal, superpersonal kind, independently of the personality\nby means of which they were developed. To contribute to this is\nthe greatest happiness of the artist, the scientist, the inventor,\nthe social reformer, etc.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe ego must be given up. It is partly the perception of this\nfact, partly the fear of it, that has given rise to the many extravagances\nof pessimism and optimism, and to numerous religious, ascetic,\nand philosophical absurdities. In the long run we shall not be\nable to close our eyes to this simple truth, which is the immediate\noutcome of psychological analysis. We shall then no longer place\nso high a value upon the ego, which even during the individual\nlife greatly changes, and which, in sleep or during absorption\nin some idea, just in our very happiest moments, may be partially\nor wholly absent. We shall then be willing to renounce individual\nimmortality,\u0027 and not place more value upon the subsidiary elements\nthan upon the principal ones. In this way we shall arrive at a\nfreer and more enlightened view of life, which will preclude the\ndisregard of other egos and the overestimation of our own. The\nethical ideal founded on this view of life will be equally far\nremoved from the ideal of the ascetic, which is not biologically\ntenable for whoever practises it, and vanishes at once with his\ndisappearance, and from the ideal of an overweening Nietzschean\n\u0026quot;superman,\u0026quot; who cannot, and I hope will not be tolerated\nby his fellow-men.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf a knowledge of the connexion of the elements (sensations) does\nnot suffice us, and we ask, \u003cem\u003eWho\u003c/em\u003e possesses this connexion\nof sensations, \u003cem\u003eWho\u003c/em\u003e experiences it ? then we have succumbed\nto the old habit of subsuming every element (every sensation)\nunder some unanalysed complex, and we are falling back imperceptibly\nupon an older, lower, and more limited point of view. It is often\npointed out, that a psychical experience which is not the experience\nof a determinate subject is unthinkable, and it is held that in\nthis way the essential part played by the unity of consciousness\nhas been demonstrated. But the Ego-consciousness can be of many\ndifferent degrees and composed of a multiplicity of chance memories.\nOne might just as well say that a physical process which does\nnot take place in some environment or other, or at least somewhere\nin the universe, is unthinkable. In both cases, in order to make\na beginning with our investigation, we must be allowed to abstract\nfrom the environment, which, as regards its influence, may be\nvery different in different cases, and in special cases may shrink\nto a minimum. Consider the sensations of the lower animals, to\nwhich a subject with definite features can hardly be ascribed.\nIt is out of sensations that the subject is built up, and, once\nbuilt up, no doubt the subject reacts in turn on the sensations.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe habit of treating the unanalysed ego complex as an indiscerptible\nunity frequently assumes in science remarkable forms. First, the\nnervous system is separated from the body as the seat of the sensations.\nIn the nervous system again, the brain is selected as the organ\nbest fitted for this end, and finally, to save the supposed psychical\nunity, a \u003cem\u003epoint\u003c/em\u003e is sought in the brain as the seat of the\nsoul. But such crude conceptions are hardly fit even to foreshadow\nthe roughest outlines of what future research will do for the\nconnexion of the physical and the psychical. The fact that the\ndifferent organs and parts of the nervous system are physically\nconnected with, and can be readily excited by, one another, is\nprobably at the bottom of the notion of \u0026quot;psychical unity.\u0026quot;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nI once heard the question seriously discussed, \u0026quot;How the perception\nof a large tree could find room in the little head of a man?)\u0027\nNow, although this \u0026quot;problem \u0026quot; is no problem, yet it\nrenders us vividly sensible of the absurdity that can be committed\nby thinking sensations spatially into the brain. When I speak\nof the sensations of another person, those sensations are, of\ncourse, not exhibited in my optical or physical space; they are\nmentally added, and I conceive them causally, not spatially, attached\nto the brain observed, or rather, functionally presented. When\nI speak of my own sensations, these sensations do not exist spatially\nin my head, but rather my \u0026quot;head\u0026quot; shares with them the\nsame spatial field, as was explained above. (Compare the remarks\non Fig. I on pp. I7-I9 above.).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe unity of consciousness is not an argument in point. Since\nthe apparent antithesis between the real world and the world given\nthrough the senses lies entirely in our mode of view, and no actual\ngulf exists between them, a complicated and variously interconnected\ncontent of consciousness is no more difficult to understand than\nis the complicated interconnection of the world.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf we regard the ego as a real unity, we become involved in the\nfollowing dilemma: either we must set over against the ego a world\nof unknowable entities (which would be quite idle and purposeless),\nor we must regard the whole world, the egos of other people included,\nas comprised in our own ego (a proposition to which it is difficult\nto yield serious assent).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut if we take the ego simply as a practical unity, put together\nfor purposes of provisional survey, or as a more strongly cohering\ngroup of elements, less strongly connected with other groups of\nthis kind, questions like those above discussed will not arise,\nand research will have an unobstructed future.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn his philosophical notes Lichtenberg says: \u0026quot; We become\nconscious of certain presentations that are not dependent upon\nus; of others that we at least think are dependent upon us. Where\nis the border-line? We know only the existence of our sensations,\npresentations, and thoughts. We should say, \u003cem\u003eIt thinks\u003c/em\u003e,\njust as we say, \u003cem\u003eIt lightens\u003c/em\u003e. It is going too far to say\n\u003cem\u003ecogito\u003c/em\u003e, if we translate \u003cem\u003ecogito \u003c/em\u003eby \u003cem\u003eI think\u003c/em\u003e.\nThe assumption, or postulation, of the ego is a mere practical\nnecessity.\u0026quot; Though the method by which Lichtenberg arrived\nat this result is somewhat different from ours, we must nevertheless\ngive our full assent to his conclusion.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e13.\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nBodies do not produce sensations, but complexes of elements (complexes\nof sensations) make up bodies. If, to the physicist, bodies appear\nthe real, abiding existences, whilst the \u0026quot; elements \u0026quot;\nare regarded merely as their evanescent, transitory appearance,\nthe physicist forgets, in the assumption of such a view, that\nall bodies are but thought-symbols for complexes of elements (complexes\nof sensations). Here, too, the elements in question form the real,\nimmediate, and ultimate foundation, which it is the task of physiologico-physical\nresearch to investigate. By the recognition of this fact, many\npoints of physiology and physics assume more distinct and more\neconomical forms, and many spurious problems are disposed of.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nFor us, therefore, the world does not consist of mysterious entities,\nwhich by their interaction with another, equally mysterious entity,\nthe ego, produce sensations, which alone are accessible. For us,\ncolours, sounds, spaces, times, . . . are provisionally the ultimate\nelements, whose given connexion it is our business to investigate.\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n[I have always felt it as a stroke of special good fortune, that\nearly in life, at about the age of fifteen, I lighted, in the\nlibrary of my father, on a copy of \u003cem\u003eKant\u0027s Prolegomena to any\nFuture Metaphysics\u003c/em\u003e. The book made at the time a powerful and\nineffaceable impression upon me, the like of which I never afterwards\nexperienced in any of my philosophical reading. Some two or three\nyears later the superfluity of the role played by \u0026quot;the thing\nin itself\u0026quot; abruptly dawned upon me. On a bright summer day\nin the open air, the world with my ego suddenly appeared to me\nas \u003cem\u003eone\u003c/em\u003e coherent mass of sensations, only more strongly\ncoherent in the ego. Although the actual working out of this thought\ndid not occur until a later period, yet this moment was decisive\nfor my whole view. I had still to struggle long and hard before\nI was able to retain the new conception in my special subject.\nWith the valuable parts of physical theories we necessarily absorb\na good dose of false metaphysics, which it is very difficult to\nsift out from what deserves to be preserved, especially when those\ntheories have become very familiar to us. At times, too, the traditional,\ninstinctive views would arise with great power and place impediments\nin my way. Only by alternate studies in physics and in the physiology\nof the senses, and by historico-physical investigations (since\nabout 1863), and after having endeavoured in vain to settle the\nconflict by a physico-psychological monadology (in my lectures\non psycho-physics, in the \u003cem\u003eZeitschrift fur praktische Heilkunde\u003c/em\u003e,\nVienna, 1863, p. 364), have I attained to any considerable stability\nin my views. I make no pretensions to the title of philosopher.\nI only seek to adopt in physics a point of view that need not\nbe changed the moment our glance is carried over into the domain\nof another science; for, ultimately, all must form one whole.\nThe molecular physics of today certainly does not meet this requirement.\nWhat I say I have probably not been the first to say. I also do\nnot wish to offer this exposition of mine as a special achievement.\nIt is rather my belief that every one will be led to a similar\nview, who makes a careful survey of any extensive body of knowledge.\nAvenarius, with whose works I became acquainted in 1883, approaches\nmy point of view (\u003cem\u003ePhilosophie als Denken des Welt nach dem\nPrincip des kleinsten Kraftmasses\u003c/em\u003e, 1876). Also Hering, in\nhis paper on Memory (\u003cem\u003eAlmanach der Wiener Akademie\u003c/em\u003e, 1870,\np. 258; English translation, O. C. Pub. Co., Chicago, 4th edition,\nenlarged, 1913), and J. Popper in his beautiful book, \u003cem\u003eDas Rechte\nzu leben und die Pflicht zu sterben\u003c/em\u003e (Leipzig, 1878, p. 62),\nhave advanced allied thoughts. Compare also my paper \u003cem\u003eUeber\ndie okonomische Natur der physikalis der Forschung\u003c/em\u003e (\u003cem\u003eAlmanach\nder WienerAkadernie\u003c/em\u003e, 1882, p. 179, note; English translation\nin my \u003cem\u003ePopular Scientific Lectures\u003c/em\u003e, Chicago, 1894). Finally\nlet me also refer here to the introduction to W. Preyer\u0027s \u003cem\u003eReine\nEmpfindungslehres\u003c/em\u003e to Riehl\u0027s \u003cem\u003eFreibrurger Antrittsrede\u003c/em\u003e,\np. 40, and to R. Wahle\u0027s \u003cem\u003eGehirn und Bewusstsein\u003c/em\u003e, 1884.\nMy views were indicated briefly in 1872 and 1875, and not expounded\nat length until 1882 and 1883. I should probably have much additional\nmatter to cite as more or less allied to this line of thought,\nif my knowledge of the literature were more extensive.]\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt is precisely in this that the exploration of reality consists.\nIn this investigation we must not allow ourselves to be impeded\nby such abridgments and delimitations as body, ego, matter, spirit,\netc., which have been formed for special, practical purposes and\nwith wholly provisional and limited ends in view. On the contrary,\nthe fittest forms of thought must be created in and by that research\nitself, just as is done in every special science. In place of\nthe traditional, instinctive ways of thought, a freer, fresher\nview, conforming to developed experience, and reaching out beyond\nthe requirements of practical life, must be substituted throughout.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch5\u003e14.\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nScience always has its origin in the adaptation of thought to\nsome definite field of experience. The results of the adaptation\nare thought-elements, which are able to represent the whole field.\nThe outcome, of course, is different, according to the character\nand extent of the field. If the field of experience is enlarged,\nor if several fields heretofore disconnected are united, the traditional,\nfamiliar thought-elements no longer suffice for the extended field.\nIn the struggle of acquired habit with the effort after adaptation,\nproblems arise, which disappear when the adaptation is perfected,\nto make room for others which have arisen meanwhile. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo the physicist, \u003cem\u003equa\u003c/em\u003e physicist, the idea of \u0026quot;body\u0026quot;\nis productive of a real facilitation of view, and is not the cause\nof disturbance. So, also, the person with purely practical aims,\nis materially supported by the idea of the \u003cem\u003eI\u003c/em\u003e or ego. For,\nunquestionably, every form of thought that has been designedly\nor undesignedly constructed for a given purpose, possesses for\nthat purpose a \u003cem\u003epermanent\u003c/em\u003e value. When, however, physics\nand psychology meet, the ideas held in the one domain prove to\nbe untenable in the other. From the attempt at mutual adaptation\narise the various atomic and monadistic theories – which, however,\nnever attain their end. If we regard sensations, in the sense\nabove defined (p. 13), as the elements of the world, the problems\nreferred to appear to be disposed of in all essentials, and the\nfirst and most important adaptation to be consequently effected.\nThis fundamental view (without any pretension to being a philosophy\nfor all eternity) can at present be adhered to in all fields of\nexperience; it is consequently the one that accommodates itself\nwith the least expenditure of energy, that is, more economically\nthan any other, to the present temporary collective state of knowledge\nFurthermore, in the consciousness of its purely economical function,\nthis fundamental view is eminently tolerant. It does not obtrude\nitself into fields in which the current conceptions are still\nadequate. It is also ever ready, upon subsequent extensions of\nthe field of experience, to give way before a better conception.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe presentations and conceptions of the average man of the world\nare formed and dominated, not by the full and pure desire for\nknowledge as an end in itself, but by the struggle to adapt himself\nfavourably to the conditions of life. Consequently they are less\nexact, but at the same time also they are preserved from the monstrosities\nwhich easily result from a one-sided and impassioned pursuit of\na scientific or philosophical point of view. The unprejudiced\nman of normal psychological development takes the elements which\nwe have called A B C . . . to be spatially contiguous and external\nto the elements K L M. . .. and he holds this view\u003cem\u003e immediately\u003c/em\u003e,\nand not by any process of psychological projection or logical\ninference or construction; even were such a process to exist,\nhe would certainly not be conscious of it. He sees, then, an \u0026quot;\nexternal world \u0026quot; A B C . . . different from his body K L\nM . and existing outside it. As he does not observe at first the\ndependence of the A B C\u0027s . . . on the K L M\u0027s . . . (which are\nalways repeating themselves in the same way and consequently receive\nlittle attention), but is always dwelling upon the fixed connexion\nof the A B C\u0027s . . . with one another, there appears to him a\nworld of things independent of his Ego. This Ego is formed by\nthe observation of the special properties of the particular thing\nK L M . . . with which pain, pleasure, feeling, will, etc., are\nintimately connected. Further, he notices things K\u0027 L\u0027 M\u0027, K\u0026quot;\nL\u0026quot; M\u0026quot;, which behave in a manner perfectly analogous\nto K L M, and whose behaviour he thoroughly understands as soon\nas he has thought of analogous feelings, sensations, etc., as\nattached to them in the same way as he observed these feelings,\nsensations, etc., to be attached to himself. The analogy impelling\nhim to this result is the same as determines him, when he has\nobserved that a wire possesses \u003cem\u003eall\u003c/em\u003e the properties of a\nconductor charged with an electric current, except one which has\nnot yet been directly demonstrated, to conclude that the wire\npossesses this one property as well. Thus, since he does not perceive\nthe sensations of his fellowmen or of animals but only supplies\nthem by analogy, while he infers from the behaviour of his fellow-men\nthat they are in the same position over against himself, he is\nled to ascribe to the sensations, memories, etc., a particular\nA B C . . . K L M . . . of a different nature, always differently\nconceived according to the degree of civilisation he has reached;\nbut this process, as was shown above, is unnecessary, and in science\nleads into a maze of error, although the falsification is of small\nsignificance for practical life.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nThese factors, determining as they do the intellectual outlook\nof the plain man, make their appearance alternately in him according\nto the requirements of practical life for the time being, and\npersist in a state of nearly stable equilibrium. The scientific\nconception of the world, however, puts the emphasis now upon one,\nnow upon the other factor, makes sometimes one and sometimes the\nother its starting-point, and, in its struggle for greater precision,\nunity and consistency, tries, so far as seems possible, to thrust\ninto the background all but the most indispensable conceptions.\nIn this way dualistic and monistic systems arise.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe plain man is familiar with blindness and deafness, and knows\nfrom his everyday experience that the look of things is influenced\nby his senses; but it never occurs to him to regard the whole\nworld as the creation of his senses. He would find an idealistic\nsystem, or such a monstrosity as solipsism, intolerable in practice.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt may easily become a disturbing element in unprejudiced scientific\ntheorising when a conception which is adapted to a particular\nand strictly limited purpose is promoted in advance to be the\nfoundation of \u003cem\u003eall\u003c/em\u003e investigation. This happens, for example,\nwhen all experiences are regarded as \u0026quot; effects \u0026quot; of\nan external world extending into consciousness. This conception\ngives us a tangle of metaphysical difficulties which it seems\nimpossible to unravel. But the spectre vanishes at once when we\nlook at the matter as it were in a mathematical light, and make\nit clear to ourselves that all that is valuable to us is the discovery\nof \u003cem\u003efunctional relations\u003c/em\u003e, and that what we want to know\nis merely the dependence of experiences or one another. It then\nbecomes obvious that the reference to unknown fundamental variables\nwhich are not given (things-in-themselves) is purely fictitious\nand superfluous. But even when we allow this fiction, uneconomical\nthough it be, to stand at first, we can still easily distinguish\ndifferent classes of the mutual dependence of the elements of\n\u0026quot; the facts of consciousness \u0026quot;; and this alone is important\nfor us.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nA B C . . . K L M a b c . . . \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\n K\u0027 L\u0027 M\u0027 … a\u0027 b\u0027 c\u0027 ..\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\n K\u0026quot; L\u0026quot; M\u0026quot;… a\u0026quot; B\u0026quot; C\u0026quot;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe system of the elements is indicated in the above scheme. Within\nthe space surrounded by a single line lie the elements which belong\nto the sensible world, – the elements whose regular connexion\nand peculiar dependence on one another represent both physical\n(lifeless) bodies and the bodies of men, animals and plants. All\nthese elements, again, stand in a relation of quite peculiar dependence\nto certain of the elements K L M – the nerves of our body, namely\n- by which the facts of sense-physiology are expressed. The space\nsurrounded by a double line contains the elements belonging to\nthe higher psychic life, memory-images and presentations, including\nthose which we form of the psychic life of our fellow-men. These\nmay be distinguished by accents. These presentations, again, are\nconnected with one another in a different way (association, fancy)\nfrom the sensational elements A B C . . . K L M; but it cannot\nbe doubted that they are very closely allied to the latter, and\nthat in the last resort their behaviour is determined by A B C\n. . . K L M (the totality of the physical world), and especially\nby our body and nervous system. The presentations a\u0027 b\u0027 c\u0027 of\nthe contents of the consciousness of our fellow-men play for us\nthe part of intermediate substitutions, by means of which the\nbehaviour of our fellow-men, – the functional relation of K\u0027 L\u0027\nM\u0027 to A B C – becomes intelligible, in so far as in and for itself\n(physically) it would remain unexplained.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt is therefore important for us to recognise that in all questions\nin this connexion, which can be intelligibly asked and which can\ninterest us, everything turns on taking into consideration different\n\u003cem\u003eultimate variables\u003c/em\u003e and different \u003cem\u003erelations of dependence\u003c/em\u003e.\nThat is the main point. Nothing will be changed in the actual\nfacts or in the functional relations, whether we regard all the\ndata as contents of consciousness, or as partially so, or as completely\nphysical.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe biological task of science is to provide the fully developed\nhuman individual with as perfect a means of orientating himself\nas possible. No other scientific ideal can be realised, and any\nother must be meaningless.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe philosophical point of view of the average man – if that term\nmay be applied to his naive realism – has a claim to the highest\nconsideration. It has arisen in the process of immeasurable time\nwithout the intentional assistance of man. It is a product of\nnature, and is preserved by nature. Everything that philosophy\nhas accomplished – though we may admit the biological justification\nof every advance, nay, of every error – is, as compared with it,\nbut an insignificant and ephemeral product of art. The fact is,\nevery thinker, every philosopher, the moment he is forced to abandon\nhis one-sided intellectual occupation by practical necessity,\nimmediately returns to the general point of view of mankind. Professor\nX., who theoretically believes himself to be a solipsist, is certainly\nnot one in practice when he has to thank a Minister of State for\na decoration conferred upon him, or when he lectures to an audience.\nThe Pyrrhonist who is cudgelled in Moliere\u0027s \u003cem\u003eLe Mariage force\u003c/em\u003e,\ndoes not go on saying \u0026quot;\u003cem\u003e Il me semble que vous me battez\u003c/em\u003e,\u0026quot;\nbut takes his beating as really received.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\nNor is it the purpose of these \u0026quot; introductory remarks \u0026quot;\nto discredit the standpoint of the plain man. The task which we\nhave set ourselves is simply to show why and for what purpose\nwe hold that standpoint during most of our lives, and why and\nfor what purpose we are provisionally obliged to abandon it. No\npoint of view has absolute, permanent validity. Each has importance\nonly for some given end.\n…\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003chr\u003e\r\n\n \u003c/article\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["Mach treats sensations or elements as the neutral basis from which self, body, and world are economically organized."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":"The Analysis of Sensations; Contributions to the Analysis of Sensations"},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"Sensation; elements; economy of thought; mechanics; inertia; mass; Mach principle; psychophysics; motion; heat; optics; anti-metaphysics; empiricism; science history; concepts; language; knowledge and error"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Historical-critical analysis, experimental physics, psychophysical observation, conceptual economy, anti-metaphysical critique, and reconstruction of scientific concepts from experience."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"The page records a direct Mach work with visible scientific, lecture-collection, translation, posthumous, or edition status and no imported full-text badge."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Mach treats sensations or elements as the neutral basis from which self, body, and world are economically organized."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"Kant, Gustav Fechner, Hermann von Helmholtz, Darwinian biology, Hume, Berkeley, and nineteenth-century physics and psychophysics."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"Albert Einstein, Vienna Circle, Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Philipp Frank, logical empiricism, operationalist debates, and later philosophy of science."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Included as one of the fourteen Ernst Mach work pages approved for the full-process update.","The work remains relevant to empiricism, scientific modeling, concept formation, theory choice, relativity reception, psychophysics, and the relation between physics and experience."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Direct work page approved in the Ernst Mach update. Collected works, modern translations, textbooks, school manuals, individual lecture fragments, Mach-Zehnder material not authored by Mach, Einstein/Lenin/Carnap works, catalog rows, and scholarship remain evidence/Other Voices unless separately approved."]}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Text","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":24,"Styles":2,"Scripts":1}}