Crito
{"WorkMasterId":5700,"WpPageId":270062,"ParentWpPageId":193711,"Slug":"crito","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/euclid-of-megara/crito/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/euclid-of-megara/crito/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":108579,"CleanHtmlLength":53828,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"Crito","Deck":"Crito is a lost dialogue attributed to Euclid, distinct from Plato\u0027s Crito and Crito of Alopece work-attribution problems.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to Euclid of Megara","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/euclid-of-megara/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"Euclid of Megara","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/euclid-of-megara/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/euclid-of-megara-01-official-megara-museum-stelae-room.jpg","ImageAlt":"Megara museum stelae room","FilterTerra":"Eastern Mediterranean","ClickText":"Euclid of Megara","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/euclid-of-megara/","Copies":["435 BCE – 365 BCE","Megara","Socratic philosopher from Megara who joined Socratic concern for the good to Eleatic unity and founded the Megarian school of dialectical argument."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:1","Title":"Ancient History","DateText":"3000 BCE – 499 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-ancient-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:3","Title":"Classical Antiquity","DateText":"500 BCE – 499 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-ancient-history/philosophers-of-classical-antiquity/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"387 BCE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Proxy ordering year 387 BCE. Lost dialogue attributed by Diogenes Laertius; no text survives and HasFullText remains false.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:2"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:8"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:GRC:2"}],"OriginalTitle":"Κρίτων","Language":"Ancient Greek","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:ethics"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:philosophy-of-language"}],"Tradition":"Socratic / Megarian school","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Full text from Project Gutenberg: Crito by Plato .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Crito is a lost dialogue attributed to Euclid, distinct from Plato\u0027s Crito and Crito of Alopece work-attribution problems."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"Crito dialogue","KeyConcepts":"Socratic dialogue; Megarian school; the good; unity; Eleatic inheritance; dialectic; question and answer; eristic; argument; analogy; Socratic memory; lost dialogue; ancient testimony","Methodology":"Lost Socratic dialogue known through ancient testimony, treated as attributed and fragmentary evidence rather than a surviving full text.","Structure":"The page records one of the six dialogue titles attributed to Euclid by Diogenes Laertius, with visible lost-work and attribution notes."},"Arguments":["Crito is a lost dialogue attributed to Euclid, distinct from Plato\u0027s Crito and Crito of Alopece work-attribution problems."],"Influence":{"InfluencedBy":"Socrates, Parmenides, Zeno of Elea, Eleatic philosophy, Socratic dialectic, and early fourth-century BCE Socratic dialogue culture.","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Included as one of the six lost or attributed Euclid of Megara dialogue pages approved for the full-process update.","The title is useful for tracking the lost Socratic dialogue tradition and the transmission problems surrounding Euclid, Megarian dialectic, and the minor Socratics."],"EvidenceNote":["Direct work page approved in the Euclid of Megara update on ancient testimony. Euclid of Alexandria, Elements, Megarian-school works by Eubulides/Diodorus/Stilpo, Platonic or Socratic dialogues by other authors, Diogenes source pages, fragment collections, modern translations, catalog rows, and scholarship remain evidence/Other Voices unless separately approved."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003eFull text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1657\"\u003eProject Gutenberg: Crito by Plato\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\n\u003ch2 title=\"\"\u003eThe Project Gutenberg eBook of \u003cspan lang=\"en\"\u003eCrito\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n \r\n \r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n \r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eRelease date\u003c/strong\u003e: March 1, 1999 [eBook #1657]\u003cbr\u003e\r\n Most recently updated: December 31, 2020\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eLanguage\u003c/strong\u003e: English\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eOther information and formats\u003c/strong\u003e: \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1657\"\u003ewww.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1657\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCredits\u003c/strong\u003e: This etext was prepared by Sue Asscher\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cspan\u003e \u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\nThis eBook was converted to HTML, with additional editing, by Jose Menendez\r\nfrom the text edition produced by Sue Asscher.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ca\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003chr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch1\u003eCRITO\u003c/h1\u003e\u003ch3\u003eBY\u003c/h3\u003e\u003ch2\u003ePLATO\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTRANSLATED BY BENJAMIN JOWETT\u003c/h4\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003chr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003eINTRODUCTION\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\nThe \u003ci\u003eCrito\u003c/i\u003e seems intended to exhibit the character of Socrates in one light\r\nonly, not as the philosopher, fulfilling a divine mission and trusting in\r\nthe will of heaven, but simply as the good citizen, who having been\r\nunjustly condemned is willing to give up his life in obedience to the laws\r\nof the state . . .\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe days of Socrates are drawing to a close; the fatal ship has been seen\r\noff Sunium, as he is informed by his aged friend and contemporary Crito,\r\nwho visits him before the dawn has broken; he himself has been warned in a\r\ndream that on the third day he must depart. Time is precious, and Crito\r\nhas come early in order to gain his consent to a plan of escape. This can\r\nbe easily accomplished by his friends, who will incur no danger in making\r\nthe attempt to save him, but will be disgraced for ever if they allow him\r\nto perish. He should think of his duty to his children, and not play into\r\nthe hands of his enemies. Money is already provided by Crito as well as by\r\nSimmias and others, and he will have no difficulty in finding friends in\r\nThessaly and other places.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSocrates is afraid that Crito is but pressing upon him the opinions of the\r\nmany; whereas, all his life long he has followed the dictates of reason\r\nonly and the opinion of the one wise or skilled man. There was a time when\r\nCrito himself had allowed the propriety of this. And although someone\r\nwill say ‘the many can kill us,’ that makes no difference; but a good life,\r\nin other words, a just and honourable life, is alone to be valued. All\r\nconsiderations of loss of reputation or injury to his children should be\r\ndismissed: the only question is whether he would be right in attempting to\r\nescape. Crito, who is a disinterested person not having the fear of death\r\nbefore his eyes, shall answer this for him. Before he was condemned they\r\nhad often held discussions, in which they agreed that no man should either\r\ndo evil, or return evil for evil, or betray the right. Are these\r\nprinciples to be altered because the circumstances of Socrates are altered?\r\nCrito admits that they remain the same. Then is his escape consistent with\r\nthe maintenance of them? To this Crito is unable or unwilling to reply.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSocrates proceeds:—Suppose the Laws of Athens to come and remonstrate with\r\nhim: they will ask, ‘Why does he seek to overturn them?’ and if he replies,\r\n‘They have injured him,’ will not the Laws answer, ‘Yes, but was that the\r\nagreement? Has he any objection to make to them which would justify him in\r\noverturning them? Was he not brought into the world and educated by their\r\nhelp, and are they not his parents? He might have left Athens and gone\r\nwhere he pleased, but he has lived there for seventy years more constantly\r\nthan any other citizen.’ Thus he has clearly shown that he acknowledged\r\nthe agreement, which he cannot now break without dishonour to himself and\r\ndanger to his friends. Even in the course of the trial he might have\r\nproposed exile as the penalty, but then he declared that he preferred death\r\nto exile. And whither will he direct his footsteps? In any well-ordered\r\nstate the Laws will consider him as an enemy. Possibly in a land of\r\nmisrule like Thessaly he may be welcomed at first, and the unseemly\r\nnarrative of his escape will be regarded by the inhabitants as an amusing\r\ntale. But if he offends them he will have to learn another sort of lesson.\r\nWill he continue to give lectures in virtue? That would hardly be decent.\r\nAnd how will his children be the gainers if he takes them into Thessaly,\r\nand deprives them of Athenian citizenship? Or if he leaves them behind,\r\ndoes he expect that they will be better taken care of by his friends\r\nbecause he is in Thessaly? Will not true friends care for them equally\r\nwhether he is alive or dead?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nFinally, they exhort him to think of justice first, and of life and\r\nchildren afterwards. He may now depart in peace and innocence, a sufferer\r\nand not a doer of evil. But if he breaks agreements, and returns evil for\r\nevil, they will be angry with him while he lives; and their brethren the\r\nLaws of the world below will receive him as an enemy. Such is the mystic\r\nvoice which is always murmuring in his ears.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nThat Socrates was not a good citizen was a charge made against him during\r\nhis lifetime, which has been often repeated in later ages. The crimes of\r\nAlcibiades, Critias, and Charmides, who had been his pupils, were still\r\nrecent in the memory of the now restored democracy. The fact that he had\r\nbeen neutral in the death-struggle of Athens was not likely to conciliate\r\npopular good-will. Plato, writing probably in the next generation,\r\nundertakes the defence of his friend and master in this particular, not to\r\nthe Athenians of his day, but to posterity and the world at large.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhether such an incident ever really occurred as the visit of Crito and the\r\nproposal of escape is uncertain; Plato could easily have invented far more\r\nthan that; \u003ca href=\"#id_1\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003e\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/a\u003e and in the selection of Crito, the aged friend, as the\r\nfittest person to make the proposal to Socrates, we seem to recognize the\r\nhand of the artist. Whether anyone who has been subjected by the laws of\r\nhis country to an unjust judgment is right in attempting to escape, is a\r\nthesis about which casuists might disagree. Shelley \u003ca href=\"#id_2\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003e\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/a\u003e is of\r\nopinion that Socrates ‘did well to die,’ but not for the ‘sophistical’\r\nreasons which Plato has put into his mouth. And there would be no\r\ndifficulty in arguing that Socrates should have lived and preferred to a\r\nglorious death the good which he might still be able to perform. ‘A\r\nrhetorician would have had much to say upon that point.’ It may be\r\nobserved however that Plato never intended to answer the question of\r\ncasuistry, but only to exhibit the ideal of patient virtue which refuses to\r\ndo the least evil in order to avoid the greatest, and to show his master\r\nmaintaining in death the opinions which he had professed in his life. Not\r\n‘the world,’ but the ‘one wise man,’ is still the paradox of Socrates in\r\nhis last hours. He must be guided by reason, although her conclusions may\r\nbe fatal to him. The remarkable sentiment that the wicked can do neither\r\ngood nor evil is true, if taken in the sense, which he means, of moral\r\nevil; in his own words, ‘they cannot make a man wise or foolish.’\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis little dialogue is a perfect piece of dialectic, in which granting the\r\n‘common principle,’ there is no escaping from the conclusion. It is\r\nanticipated at the beginning by the dream of Socrates and the parody of\r\nHomer. The personification of the Laws, and of their brethren the Laws in\r\nthe world below, is one of the noblest and boldest figures of speech which\r\noccur in Plato.\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003chr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003eCRITO\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:\u003cbr\u003e\u003ci\u003eSocrates, Crito.\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\nSCENE: \u003ci\u003eThe Prison of Socrates\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Why have you come at this hour, Crito? it must be quite early?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Yes, certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: What is the exact time?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: The dawn is breaking.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I wonder that the keeper of the prison would let you in.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: He knows me, because I often come, Socrates; moreover, I have done\r\nhim a kindness.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And are you only just arrived?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: No, I came some time ago.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then why did you sit and say nothing, instead of at once\r\nawakening me?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: I should not have liked myself, Socrates, to be in such great\r\ntrouble and unrest as you are—indeed I should not: I have been watching\r\nwith amazement your peaceful slumbers; and for that reason I did not awake\r\nyou, because I wished to minimize the pain. I have always thought you to\r\nbe of a happy disposition; but never did I see anything like the easy,\r\ntranquil manner in which you bear this calamity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Why, Crito, when a man has reached my age he ought not to be\r\nrepining at the approach of death.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: And yet other old men find themselves in similar misfortunes, and\r\nage does not prevent them from repining.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: That is true. But you have not told me why you come at this\r\nearly hour.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: I come to bring you a message which is sad and painful; not, as I\r\nbelieve, to yourself, but to all of us who are your friends, and saddest of\r\nall to me.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: What? Has the ship come from Delos, on the arrival of which I\r\nam to die?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: No, the ship has not actually arrived, but she will probably be\r\nhere to-day, as persons who have come from Sunium tell me that they have\r\nleft her there; and therefore to-morrow, Socrates, will be the last day of\r\nyour life.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Very well, Crito; if such is the will of God, I am willing; but\r\nmy belief is that there will be a delay of a day.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Why do you think so?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I will tell you. I am to die on the day after the arrival of\r\nthe ship?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Yes; that is what the authorities say.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But I do not think that the ship will be here until to-morrow;\r\nthis I infer from a vision which I had last night, or rather only just now,\r\nwhen you fortunately allowed me to sleep.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: And what was the nature of the vision?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: There appeared to me the likeness of a woman, fair and comely,\r\nclothed in bright raiment, who called to me and said: O Socrates,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n‘The third day hence to fertile Phthia shalt thou go.’ \u003ca href=\"#id_3\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003e\u003csup\u003e3\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: What a singular dream, Socrates!\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: There can be no doubt about the meaning, Crito, I think.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Yes; the meaning is only too clear. But, oh! my beloved Socrates,\r\nlet me entreat you once more to take my advice and escape. For if you die\r\nI shall not only lose a friend who can never be replaced, but there is\r\nanother evil: people who do not know you and me will believe that I might\r\nhave saved you if I had been willing to give money, but that I did not\r\ncare. Now, can there be a worse disgrace than this—that I should be\r\nthought to value money more than the life of a friend? For the many will\r\nnot be persuaded that I wanted you to escape, and that you refused.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But why, my dear Crito, should we care about the opinion of the\r\nmany? Good men, and they are the only persons who are worth considering,\r\nwill think of these things truly as they occurred.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: But you see, Socrates, that the opinion of the many must be\r\nregarded, for what is now happening shows that they can do the greatest\r\nevil to anyone who has lost their good opinion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: I only wish it were so, Crito; and that the many could do the\r\ngreatest evil; for then they would also be able to do the greatest good—and\r\nwhat a fine thing this would be! But in reality they can do neither;\r\nfor they cannot make a man either wise or foolish; and whatever they do is\r\nthe result of chance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Well, I will not dispute with you; but please to tell me, Socrates,\r\nwhether you are not acting out of regard to me and your other friends: are\r\nyou not afraid that if you escape from prison we may get into trouble with\r\nthe informers for having stolen you away, and lose either the whole or a\r\ngreat part of our property; or that even a worse evil may happen to us?\r\nNow, if you fear on our account, be at ease; for in order to save you, we\r\nought surely to run this, or even a greater risk; be persuaded, then, and\r\ndo as I say.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Yes, Crito, that is one fear which you mention, but by no means\r\nthe only one.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Fear not—there are persons who are willing to get you out of\r\nprison at no great cost; and as for the informers, they are far from being\r\nexorbitant in their demands—a little money will satisfy them. My means,\r\nwhich are certainly ample, are at your service, and if you have a scruple\r\nabout spending all mine, here are strangers who will give you the use of\r\ntheirs; and one of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought a large sum of\r\nmoney for this very purpose; and Cebes and many others are prepared to\r\nspend their money in helping you to escape. I say, therefore, do not\r\nhesitate on our account, and do not say, as you did in the court \u003ca href=\"#id_4\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003e\u003csup\u003e4\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthat you will have a difficulty in knowing what to do with yourself\r\nanywhere else. For men will love you in other places to which you may go,\r\nand not in Athens only; there are friends of mine in Thessaly, if you like\r\nto go to them, who will value and protect you, and no Thessalian will give\r\nyou any trouble. Nor can I think that you are at all justified, Socrates,\r\nin betraying your own life when you might be saved; in acting thus you are\r\nplaying into the hands of your enemies, who are hurrying on your\r\ndestruction. And further I should say that you are deserting your own\r\nchildren; for you might bring them up and educate them; instead of which\r\nyou go away and leave them, and they will have to take their chance; and if\r\nthey do not meet with the usual fate of orphans, there will be small thanks\r\nto you. No man should bring children into the world who is unwilling to\r\npersevere to the end in their nurture and education. But you appear to be\r\nchoosing the easier part, not the better and manlier, which would have been\r\nmore becoming in one who professes to care for virtue in all his actions,\r\nlike yourself. And indeed, I am ashamed not only of you, but of us who are\r\nyour friends, when I reflect that the whole business will be attributed\r\nentirely to our want of courage. The trial need never have come on, or\r\nmight have been managed differently; and this last act, or crowning folly,\r\nwill seem to have occurred through our negligence and cowardice, who might\r\nhave saved you, if we had been good for anything; and you might have saved\r\nyourself, for there was no difficulty at all. See now, Socrates, how sad\r\nand discreditable are the consequences, both to us and you. Make up your\r\nmind then, or rather have your mind already made up, for the time of\r\ndeliberation is over, and there is only one thing to be done, which must be\r\ndone this very night, and, if we delay at all, will be no longer practicable\r\nor possible; I beseech you therefore, Socrates, be persuaded by me, and do\r\nas I say.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Dear Crito, your zeal is invaluable, if a right one; but if\r\nwrong, the greater the zeal the greater the danger; and therefore we ought\r\nto consider whether I shall or shall not do as you say. For I am and\r\nalways have been one of those natures who must be guided by reason,\r\nwhatever the reason may be which upon reflection appears to me to be the\r\nbest; and now that this chance has befallen me, I cannot repudiate my own\r\nwords: the principles which I have hitherto honoured and revered I still\r\nhonour, and unless we can at once find other and better principles, I am\r\ncertain not to agree with you; no, not even if the power of the multitude\r\ncould inflict many more imprisonments, confiscations, deaths, frightening\r\nus like children with hobgoblin terrors. \u003ca href=\"#id_5\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003e\u003csup\u003e5\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/a\u003e What will be the\r\nfairest way of considering the question? Shall I return to your old\r\nargument about the opinions of men?—we were saying that some of them are\r\nto be regarded, and others not. Now were we right in maintaining this\r\nbefore I was condemned? And has the argument which was once good now\r\nproved to be talk for the sake of talking—mere childish nonsense? That is\r\nwhat I want to consider with your help, Crito:—whether, under my present\r\ncircumstances, the argument appears to be in any way different or not; and\r\nis to be allowed by me or disallowed. That argument, which, as I believe,\r\nis maintained by many persons of authority, was to the effect, as I was\r\nsaying, that the opinions of some men are to be regarded, and of other men\r\nnot to be regarded. Now you, Crito, are not going to die to-morrow—at\r\nleast, there is no human probability of this—and therefore you are\r\ndisinterested and not liable to be deceived by the circumstances in which\r\nyou are placed. Tell me then, whether I am right in saying that some\r\nopinions, and the opinions of some men only, are to be valued, and that\r\nother opinions, and the opinions of other men, are not to be valued. I ask\r\nyou whether I was right in maintaining this?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: The good are to be regarded, and not the bad?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And the opinions of the wise are good, and the opinions of the\r\nunwise are evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Certainly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And what was said about another matter? Is the pupil who\r\ndevotes himself to the practice of gymnastics supposed to attend to the\r\npraise and blame and opinion of every man, or of one man only—his\r\nphysician or trainer, whoever he may be?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Of one man only.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And he ought to fear the censure and welcome the praise of that\r\none only, and not of the many?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Clearly so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And he ought to act and train, and eat and drink in the way\r\nwhich seems good to his single master who has understanding, rather than\r\naccording to the opinion of all other men put together?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: True.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And if he disobeys and disregards the opinion and approval of\r\nthe one, and regards the opinion of the many who have no understanding,\r\nwill he not suffer evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Certainly he will.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And what will the evil be, whither tending and what affecting,\r\nin the disobedient person?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Clearly, affecting the body; that is what is destroyed by the evil.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Very good; and is not this true, Crito, of other things which we\r\nneed not separately enumerate? In questions of just and unjust, fair and\r\nfoul, good and evil, which are the subjects of our present consultation,\r\nought we to follow the opinion of the many and to fear them; or the opinion\r\nof the one man who has understanding? ought we not to fear and reverence\r\nhim more than all the rest of the world: and if we desert him shall we not\r\ndestroy and injure that principle in us which may be assumed to be improved\r\nby justice and deteriorated by injustice—there is such a principle?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Certainly there is, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Take a parallel instance:—if, acting under the advice of those\r\nwho have no understanding, we destroy that which is improved by health and\r\nis deteriorated by disease, would life be worth having? And that which has\r\nbeen destroyed is—the body?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Could we live, having an evil and corrupted body?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Certainly not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And will life be worth having, if that higher part of man be\r\ndestroyed, which is improved by justice and depraved by injustice? Do we\r\nsuppose that principle, whatever it may be in man, which has to do with\r\njustice and injustice, to be inferior to the body?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Certainly not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: More honourable than the body?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Far more.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many say of us;\r\nbut what he, the one man who has understanding of just and unjust, will\r\nsay, and what the truth will say. And therefore you begin in error when\r\nyou advise that we should regard the opinion of the many about just and\r\nunjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable.—‘Well,’ someone will\r\nsay, ‘but the many can kill us.’\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Yes, Socrates; that will clearly be the answer.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And it is true; but still I find with surprise that the old\r\nargument is unshaken as ever. And I should like to know whether I may say\r\nthe same of another proposition—that not life, but a good life, is to be\r\nchiefly valued?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Yes, that also remains unshaken.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And a good life is equivalent to a just and honourable one—that\r\nholds also?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Yes, it does.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: From these premises I proceed to argue the question whether I\r\nought or ought not to try and escape without the consent of the Athenians:\r\nand if I am clearly right in escaping, then I will make the attempt; but if\r\nnot, I will abstain. The other considerations which you mention, of money\r\nand loss of character and the duty of educating one’s children, are, I\r\nfear, only the doctrines of the multitude, who would be as ready to restore\r\npeople to life, if they were able, as they are to put them to death—and\r\nwith as little reason. But now, since the argument has thus far prevailed,\r\nthe only question which remains to be considered is whether we shall do\r\nrightly either in escaping or in suffering others to aid in our escape and\r\npaying them in money and thanks, or whether in reality we shall not do\r\nrightly; and if the latter, then death or any other calamity which may\r\nensue on my remaining here must not be allowed to enter into the\r\ncalculation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: I think that you are right, Socrates; how then shall we proceed?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Let us consider the matter together, and do you either refute me\r\nif you can, and I will be convinced; or else cease, my dear friend, from\r\nrepeating to me that I ought to escape against the wishes of the Athenians:\r\nfor I highly value your attempts to persuade me to do so, but I may not be\r\npersuaded against my own better judgment. And now please to consider my\r\nfirst position, and try how you can best answer me.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: I will.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Are we to say that we are never intentionally to do wrong, or\r\nthat in one way we ought and in another way we ought not to do wrong, or is\r\ndoing wrong always evil and dishonourable, as I was just now saying, and as\r\nhas been already acknowledged by us? Are all our former admissions which\r\nwere made within a few days to be thrown away? And have we, at our age,\r\nbeen earnestly discoursing with one another all our life long only to\r\ndiscover that we are no better than children? Or, in spite of the opinion\r\nof the many, and in spite of consequences whether better or worse, shall we\r\ninsist on the truth of what was then said, that injustice is always an evil\r\nand dishonour to him who acts unjustly? Shall we say so or not?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Yes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then we must do no wrong?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Certainly not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Nor, when injured, injure in return, as the many imagine; for we\r\nmust injure no one at all? \u003ca href=\"#id_6\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003e\u003csup\u003e6\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Clearly not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Again, Crito, may we do evil?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Surely not, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: And what of doing evil in return for evil, which is the morality\r\nof the many—is that just or not?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Not just.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: For doing evil to another is the same as injuring him?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Very true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to\r\nanyone, whatever evil we may have suffered from him. But I would have you\r\nconsider, Crito, whether you really mean what you are saying. For this\r\nopinion has never been held, and never will be held, by any considerable\r\nnumber of persons; and those who are agreed and those who are not agreed\r\nupon this point have no common ground, and can only despise one another\r\nwhen they see how widely they differ. Tell me, then, whether you agree\r\nwith and assent to my first principle, that neither injury nor retaliation\r\nnor warding off evil by evil is ever right. And shall that be the premise\r\nof our argument? Or do you decline and dissent from this? For so I have\r\never thought, and continue to think; but, if you are of another opinion,\r\nlet me hear what you have to say. If, however, you remain of the same mind\r\nas formerly, I will proceed to the next step.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: You may proceed, for I have not changed my mind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then I will go on to the next point, which may be put in the\r\nform of a question:—Ought a man to do what he admits to be right, or ought\r\nhe to betray the right?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: He ought to do what he thinks right.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: But if this is true, what is the application? In leaving the\r\nprison against the will of the Athenians, do I wrong any? or rather do I\r\nnot wrong those whom I ought least to wrong? Do I not desert the\r\nprinciples which were acknowledged by us to be just—what do you say?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: I cannot tell, Socrates; for I do not know.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then consider the matter in this way:—Imagine that I am about\r\nto play truant (you may call the proceeding by any name which you like),\r\nand the laws and the government come and interrogate me: ‘Tell us,\r\nSocrates,’ they say; ‘what are you about? are you not going by an act of\r\nyours to overturn us—the laws, and the whole state, as far as in you lies?\r\nDo you imagine that a state can subsist and not be overthrown, in which the\r\ndecisions of law have no power, but are set aside and trampled upon by\r\nindividuals?’ What will be our answer, Crito, to these and the like words?\r\nAnyone, and especially a rhetorician, will have a good deal to say on\r\nbehalf of the law which requires a sentence to be carried out. He will\r\nargue that this law should not be set aside; and shall we reply, ‘Yes; but\r\nthe state has injured us and given an unjust sentence.’ Suppose I say\r\nthat?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: Very good, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: ‘And was that our agreement with you?’ the law would answer; ‘or\r\nwere you to abide by the sentence of the state?’ And if I were to express\r\nmy astonishment at their words, the law would probably add: ‘Answer,\r\nSocrates, instead of opening your eyes—you are in the habit of asking and\r\nanswering questions. Tell us,—What complaint have you to make against us\r\nwhich justifies you in attempting to destroy us and the state? In the\r\nfirst place did we not bring you into existence? Your father married your\r\nmother by our aid and begat you. Say whether you have any objection to\r\nurge against those of us who regulate marriage?’ None, I should reply.\r\n‘Or against those of us who after birth regulate the nurture and education\r\nof children, in which you also were trained? Were not the laws, which have\r\nthe charge of education, right in commanding your father to train you in\r\nmusic and gymnastic?’ Right, I should reply. ‘Well then, since you were\r\nbrought into the world and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the\r\nfirst place that you are our child and slave, as your fathers were before\r\nyou? And if this is true you are not on equal terms with us; nor can you\r\nthink that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. Would\r\nyou have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to your father\r\nor your master, if you had one, because you have been struck or reviled by\r\nhim, or received some other evil at his hands? You would not say this.\r\nAnd because we think right to destroy you, do you think that you have any\r\nright to destroy us in return, and your country as far as in you lies?\r\nWill you, O professor of true virtue, pretend that you are justified in\r\nthis? Has a philosopher like you failed to discover that our country is\r\nmore to be valued and higher and holier far than mother or father or any\r\nancestor, and more to be regarded in the eyes of the gods and of men of\r\nunderstanding? also to be soothed, and gently and reverently entreated when\r\nangry, even more than a father, and either to be persuaded, or if not\r\npersuaded, to be obeyed? And when we are punished by her, whether with\r\nimprisonment or stripes, the punishment is to be endured in silence; and if\r\nshe lead us to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as is right;\r\nneither may anyone yield or retreat or leave his rank, but whether in\r\nbattle or in a court of law, or in any other place, he must do what his\r\ncity and his country order him; or he must change their view of what is\r\njust: and if he may do no violence to his father or mother, much less may\r\nhe do violence to his country.’ What answer shall we make to this, Crito?\r\nDo the laws speak truly, or do they not?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: I think that they do.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then the laws will say: ‘Consider, Socrates, if we are speaking\r\ntruly that in your present attempt you are going to do us an injury. For,\r\nhaving brought you into the world, and nurtured and educated you, and given\r\nyou and every other citizen a share in every good which we had to give, we\r\nfurther proclaim to any Athenian by the liberty which we allow him, that if\r\nhe does not like us when he has become of age and has seen the ways of the\r\ncity, and made our acquaintance, he may go where he pleases and take his\r\ngoods with him. None of us laws will forbid him or interfere with him.\r\nAnyone who does not like us and the city, and who wants to emigrate to a\r\ncolony or to any other city, may go where he likes, retaining his property.\r\nBut he who has experience of the manner in which we order justice and\r\nadminister the state, and still remains, has entered into an implied\r\ncontract that he will do as we command him. And he who disobeys us is, as\r\nwe maintain, thrice wrong; first, because in disobeying us he is\r\ndisobeying his parents; secondly, because we are the authors of his\r\neducation; thirdly, because he has made an agreement with us that he will\r\nduly obey our commands; and he neither obeys them nor convinces us that our\r\ncommands are unjust; and we do not rudely impose them, but give him the\r\nalternative of obeying or convincing us;—that is what we offer, and he\r\ndoes neither. These are the sort of accusations to which, as we were saying, you,\r\nSocrates, will be exposed if you accomplish your intentions; you, above all\r\nother Athenians.’\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSuppose now I ask, why I rather than anybody else? they\r\nwill justly retort upon me that I above all other men have acknowledged the\r\nagreement. ‘There is clear proof,’ they will say, ‘Socrates, that we and\r\nthe city were not displeasing to you. Of all Athenians you have been the\r\nmost constant resident in the city, which, as you never leave, you may be\r\nsupposed to love. \u003ca href=\"#id_7\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003e\u003csup\u003e7\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For you never went out of the city\r\neither to see the games, except once when you went to the Isthmus, or to\r\nany other place unless when you were on military service; nor did you\r\ntravel as other men do. Nor had you any curiosity to know other states or\r\ntheir laws: your affections did not go beyond us and our state; we were\r\nyour especial favourites, and you acquiesced in our government of you; and\r\nhere in this city you begat your children, which is a proof of your\r\nsatisfaction. Moreover, you might in the course of the trial, if you had\r\nliked, have fixed the penalty at banishment; the state which refuses to let\r\nyou go now would have let you go then. But you pretended that you\r\npreferred death to exile, \u003ca href=\"#id_8\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003e\u003csup\u003e8\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/a\u003e and that you were not unwilling\r\nto die. And now you have forgotten these fine sentiments, and pay no\r\nrespect to us the laws, of whom you are the destroyer; and are doing what\r\nonly a miserable slave would do, running away and turning your back upon\r\nthe compacts and agreements which you made as a citizen. And first of all\r\nanswer this very question: Are we right in saying that you agreed to be\r\ngoverned according to us in deed, and not in word only? Is that true or\r\nnot?’ How shall we answer, Crito? Must we not assent?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: We cannot help it, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Then will they not say: ‘You, Socrates, are breaking the\r\ncovenants and agreements which you made with us at your leisure, not in any\r\nhaste or under any compulsion or deception, but after you have had seventy\r\nyears to think of them, during which time you were at liberty to leave the\r\ncity, if we were not to your mind, or if our covenants appeared to you to\r\nbe unfair. You had your choice, and might have gone either to Lacedaemon\r\nor Crete, both which states are often praised by you for their good\r\ngovernment, or to some other Hellenic or foreign state. Whereas you, above\r\nall other Athenians, seemed to be so fond of the state, or, in other words,\r\nof us, her laws (and who would care about a state which has no laws?), that\r\nyou never stirred out of her; the halt, the blind, the maimed were not\r\nmore stationary in her than you were. And now you run away and forsake\r\nyour agreements. Not so, Socrates, if you will take our advice; do not\r\nmake yourself ridiculous by escaping out of the city.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n‘For just consider, if you transgress and err in this sort of way, what\r\ngood will you do either to yourself or to your friends? That your friends\r\nwill be driven into exile and deprived of citizenship, or will lose their\r\nproperty, is tolerably certain; and you yourself, if you fly to one of the\r\nneighbouring cities, as, for example, Thebes or Megara, both of which are\r\nwell governed, will come to them as an enemy, Socrates, and their\r\ngovernment will be against you, and all patriotic citizens will cast an\r\nevil eye upon you as a subverter of the laws, and you will confirm in the\r\nminds of the judges the justice of their own condemnation of you. For he\r\nwho is a corrupter of the laws is more than likely to be a corrupter of the\r\nyoung and foolish portion of mankind. Will you then flee from well-ordered\r\ncities and virtuous men? and is existence worth having on these terms? Or\r\nwill you go to them without shame, and talk to them, Socrates? And what\r\nwill you say to them? What you say here about virtue and justice and\r\ninstitutions and laws being the best things among men? Would that be\r\ndecent of you? Surely not. But if you go away from well-governed states\r\nto Crito’s friends in Thessaly, where there is great disorder and licence,\r\nthey will be charmed to hear the tale of your escape from prison, set off\r\nwith ludicrous particulars of the manner in which you were wrapped in a\r\ngoatskin or some other disguise, and metamorphosed as the manner is of\r\nrunaways; but will there be no one to remind you that in your old age you\r\nwere not ashamed to violate the most sacred laws from a miserable desire of\r\na little more life? Perhaps not, if you keep them in a good temper; but if\r\nthey are out of temper you will hear many degrading things; you will live,\r\nbut how?—as the flatterer of all men, and the servant of all men; and\r\ndoing what?—eating and drinking in Thessaly, having gone abroad in order\r\nthat you may get a dinner. And where will be your fine sentiments about\r\njustice and virtue? Say that you wish to live for the sake of your\r\nchildren—you want to bring them up and educate them—will you take them\r\ninto Thessaly and deprive them of Athenian citizenship? Is this the\r\nbenefit which you will confer upon them? Or are you under the impression\r\nthat they will be better cared for and educated here if you are still\r\nalive, although absent from them; for your friends will take care of them?\r\nDo you fancy that if you are an inhabitant of Thessaly they will take care\r\nof them, and if you are an inhabitant of the other world that they will not\r\ntake care of them? Nay; but if they who call themselves friends are good\r\nfor anything, they will—to be sure they will.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\n‘Listen, then, Socrates, to us who have brought you up. Think not of life\r\nand children first, and of justice afterwards, but of justice first, that\r\nyou may be justified before the princes of the world below. For neither\r\nwill you nor any that belong to you be happier or holier or juster in this\r\nlife, or happier in another, if you do as Crito bids. Now you depart in\r\ninnocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil; a victim, not of the laws,\r\nbut of men. But if you go forth, returning evil for evil, and injury for\r\ninjury, breaking the covenants and agreements which you have made with us,\r\nand wronging those whom you ought least of all to wrong, that is to say,\r\nyourself, your friends, your country, and us, we shall be angry with you\r\nwhile you live, and our brethren, the laws in the world below, will receive\r\nyou as an enemy; for they will know that you have done your best to destroy\r\nus. Listen, then, to us and not to Crito.’\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis, dear Crito, is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in my ears,\r\nlike the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic; that voice, I say,\r\nis humming in my ears, and prevents me from hearing any other. And I know\r\nthat anything more which you may say will be vain. Yet speak, if you have\r\nanything to say.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nCRITO: I have nothing to say, Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\r\nSOCRATES: Leave me then, Crito, to fulfil the will of God, and to follow\r\nwhither he leads.\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003chr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca\u003e1.\u003c/a\u003e See \u003ci\u003ePhaedrus\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca\u003e2.\u003c/a\u003e See \u003ci\u003eProse Works\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca\u003e3.\u003c/a\u003e Homer, \u003ci\u003eIliad\u003c/i\u003e, IX\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca\u003e4.\u003c/a\u003e Cp. \u003ci\u003eApology\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca\u003e5.\u003c/a\u003e Cp. \u003ci\u003eApology\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca\u003e6.\u003c/a\u003e Cp. \u003ci\u003eRepublic\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca\u003e7.\u003c/a\u003e Cp. \u003ci\u003ePhaedrus\u003c/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca\u003e8.\u003c/a\u003e Cp. \u003ci\u003eApology\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003chr\u003e\r\n\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan\u003e\r\n\n \u003c/article\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["Crito is a lost dialogue attributed to Euclid, distinct from Plato\u0027s Crito and Crito of Alopece work-attribution problems."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":"Crito dialogue"},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"Socratic dialogue; Megarian school; the good; unity; Eleatic inheritance; dialectic; question and answer; eristic; argument; analogy; Socratic memory; lost dialogue; ancient testimony"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Lost Socratic dialogue known through ancient testimony, treated as attributed and fragmentary evidence rather than a surviving full text."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"The page records one of the six dialogue titles attributed to Euclid by Diogenes Laertius, with visible lost-work and attribution notes."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Crito is a lost dialogue attributed to Euclid, distinct from Plato\u0027s Crito and Crito of Alopece work-attribution problems."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"Socrates, Parmenides, Zeno of Elea, Eleatic philosophy, Socratic dialectic, and early fourth-century BCE Socratic dialogue culture."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"Eubulides, Diodorus Cronus, Stilpo, Clinomachus, Megarian and Dialectical school traditions, Stoic logic reception, and modern studies of minor Socratics."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Included as one of the six lost or attributed Euclid of Megara dialogue pages approved for the full-process update.","The title is useful for tracking the lost Socratic dialogue tradition and the transmission problems surrounding Euclid, Megarian dialectic, and the minor Socratics."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Direct work page approved in the Euclid of Megara update on ancient testimony. Euclid of Alexandria, Elements, Megarian-school works by Eubulides/Diodorus/Stilpo, Platonic or Socratic dialogues by other authors, Diogenes source pages, fragment collections, modern translations, catalog rows, and scholarship remain evidence/Other Voices unless separately approved."]}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Text","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":24,"Styles":2,"Scripts":1}}