The Advancement of Learning
{"WorkMasterId":5742,"WpPageId":270346,"ParentWpPageId":193799,"Slug":"the-advancement-of-learning","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/francis-bacon/the-advancement-of-learning/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/francis-bacon/the-advancement-of-learning/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":576969,"CleanHtmlLength":520859,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"The Advancement of Learning","Deck":"Bacon surveys the state of learning and argues for a reformed program that joins knowledge, utility, and discovery.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to Francis Bacon","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/francis-bacon/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"Francis Bacon","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/francis-bacon/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/francis-bacon-01-npg-portrait.jpg","ImageAlt":"Francis Bacon portrait","FilterTerra":"Western Europe","ClickText":"Francis Bacon","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/francis-bacon/","Copies":["1561 CE – 1626 CE","York House, Strand, London","English philosopher-statesman whose reform of learning, critique of idols, and experimental natural history helped shape early modern empiricism and the philosophy of science."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:3","Title":"Early Modern History","DateText":"1500 CE – 1799 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-early-modern-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:8","Title":"Scientific Revolution and State Formation","DateText":"1600 CE – 1699 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-early-modern-history/philosophers-of-the-scientific-revolution-and-state-formation/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"1605 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Published in 1605 CE as an English work later expanded in Latin De augmentis scientiarum; HasFullText remains false.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:2"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:GBR:1"}],"OriginalTitle":"The Twoo Bookes of Francis Bacon, of the Proficience and Advancement of Learning","Language":"English / Latin","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:epistemology"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:philosophy-of-science"}],"Tradition":"Early modern empiricism / Protestant natural philosophy","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #5500 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Bacon surveys the state of learning and argues for a reformed program that joins knowledge, utility, and discovery."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"Advancement of Learning","KeyConcepts":"Francis Bacon; induction; idols of the mind; natural history; experiment; Great Instauration; Novum Organum; aphorism; civil counsel; natural philosophy; scientific reform; knowledge and power","Methodology":"Aphoristic argument, critique of inherited logic, experimental natural history, tables of inquiry, civil-historical analysis, and programmatic reform of learning.","Structure":"The page records an approved Francis Bacon work with visible date, transmission, embedded-part, posthumous, or status notes."},"Arguments":["Bacon surveys the state of learning and argues for a reformed program that joins knowledge, utility, and discovery."],"Influence":{"InfluencedBy":"Aristotle as a critical target, Cicero, Seneca, Niccolo Machiavelli, Bernardino Telesio, and Renaissance natural philosophy.","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Included as one of the direct Bacon work pages approved for the full-process update.","The work documents Bacon\u0027s role in reshaping method, experiment, natural history, political counsel, and the philosophy of science."],"EvidenceNote":["Direct work page approved in the Francis Bacon update. Collected Works, modern editions or translations, individual essay titles, legal tracts unless separately approved, Baconian authorship controversy material, Roger Bacon material, Francis Bacon artist material, catalog rows, and scholarship remain evidence/Other Voices."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Versions","BodyHtml":"\u003cdiv class=\"dz-philo__full-version-grid\"\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-version-card\"\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-provider\"\u003eProject Gutenberg\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3 class=\"dz-philo__full-version-title\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #5500\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-meta\"\u003eHtmlText · Imported\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ca class=\"dz-philo__full-version-link\" href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5500\"\u003eOpen full version\u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["Bacon surveys the state of learning and argues for a reformed program that joins knowledge, utility, and discovery."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":"Advancement of Learning"},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"Francis Bacon; induction; idols of the mind; natural history; experiment; Great Instauration; Novum Organum; aphorism; civil counsel; natural philosophy; scientific reform; knowledge and power"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Aphoristic argument, critique of inherited logic, experimental natural history, tables of inquiry, civil-historical analysis, and programmatic reform of learning."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"The page records an approved Francis Bacon work with visible date, transmission, embedded-part, posthumous, or status notes."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Bacon surveys the state of learning and argues for a reformed program that joins knowledge, utility, and discovery."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"Aristotle as a critical target, Cicero, Seneca, Niccolo Machiavelli, Bernardino Telesio, and Renaissance natural philosophy."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"Thomas Hobbes, Robert Boyle, the Royal Society, John Locke, Diderot and d\u0027Alembert, and modern philosophy of science."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Included as one of the direct Bacon work pages approved for the full-process update.","The work documents Bacon\u0027s role in reshaping method, experiment, natural history, political counsel, and the philosophy of science."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Direct work page approved in the Francis Bacon update. Collected Works, modern editions or translations, individual essay titles, legal tracts unless separately approved, Baconian authorship controversy material, Roger Bacon material, Francis Bacon artist material, catalog rows, and scholarship remain evidence/Other Voices."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003ePublic-domain full text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5500\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #5500\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch1\u003e\u003cspan class=\"GutSmall\"\u003eTHE\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eAdvancement\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"GutSmall\"\u003eOF\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eLearning\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/h1\u003e\r\n\u003cp style=\"text-align: center\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"GutSmall\"\u003eBY\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFRANCIS BACON.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp style=\"text-align: center\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-the-advancement-of-learning-tpb.jpg\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg alt= \"Decorative graphic\" title=\"Decorative graphic\" src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-the-advancement-of-learning-tps.jpg\" /\u003e\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp style=\"text-align: center\"\u003eCASSELL \u0026amp; COMPANY, Limited:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"GutSmall\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eLONDON\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"GutSmall\"\u003e, \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"GutSmall\"\u003e\u003ci\u003ePARIS \u0026amp;\r\nMELBOURNE\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"GutSmall\"\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n1893.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\u0027chapter\u0027 /\u003e\u003ch2\u003eINTRODUCTION.\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e“\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Tvvoo\u003c/span\u003e Bookes of Francis\r\nBacon. Of the proficience and aduancement of Learning,\r\ndivine and humane. To the King. At London.\r\nPrinted for Henrie Tomes, and are to be sould at his shop at\r\nGraies Inne Gate in Holborne. 1605.” That was\r\nthe original title-page of the book now in the reader’s\r\nhand—a living book that led the way to a new world of\r\nthought. It was the book in which Bacon, early in the reign\r\nof James the First, prepared the way for a full setting forth of\r\nhis New Organon, or instrument of knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Organon of Aristotle was a set of treatises in which\r\nAristotle had written the doctrine of propositions. Study\r\nof these treatises was a chief occupation of young men when they\r\npassed from school to college, and proceeded from Grammar to\r\nLogic, the second of the Seven Sciences. Francis Bacon as a\r\nyouth of sixteen, at Trinity College, Cambridge, felt the\r\nunfruitfulness of this method of search after truth. He was\r\nthe son of Sir Nicholas Bacon, Queen Elizabeth’s Lord\r\nKeeper, and was born at York House, in the Strand, on the 22nd of\r\nJanuary, 1561. His mother was the Lord Keeper’s\r\nsecond wife, one of two sisters, of whom the other married Sir\r\nWilliam Cecil, afterwards Lord Burleigh. Sir Nicholas Bacon\r\nhad six children by his former marriage, and by his second wife\r\ntwo sons, Antony and Francis, of whom Antony was about two years\r\nthe elder. The family home was at York Place, and at\r\nGorhambury, near St. Albans, from which town, in its ancient and\r\nits modern style, Bacon afterwards took his titles of Verulam and\r\nSt. Albans.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAntony and Francis Bacon went together to Trinity College,\r\nCambridge, when Antony was fourteen years old and Francis\r\ntwelve. Francis remained at Cambridge only until his\r\nsixteenth year; and Dr. Rawley, his chaplain in after-years,\r\nreports of him that “whilst he was commorant in the\r\nUniversity, about sixteen years of age (as his lordship hath been\r\npleased to impart unto myself), he first fell into dislike of the\r\nphilosophy of Aristotle; not for the worthlessness of the author,\r\nto whom he would ascribe all high attributes, but for the\r\nunfruitfulness of the way, being a philosophy (as his lordship\r\nused to say) only strong for disputatious and contentions, but\r\nbarren of the production of works for the benefit of the life of\r\nman; in which mind he continued to his dying day.”\r\nBacon was sent as a youth of sixteen to Paris with the ambassador\r\nSir Amyas Paulet, to begin his training for the public service;\r\nbut his father’s death, in February, 1579, before he had\r\ncompleted the provision he was making for his youngest children,\r\nobliged him to return to London, and, at the age of eighteen, to\r\nsettle down at Gray’s Inn to the study of law as a\r\nprofession. He was admitted to the outer bar in June, 1582,\r\nand about that time, at the age of twenty-one, wrote a sketch of\r\nhis conception of a New Organon that should lead man to more\r\nfruitful knowledge, in a little Latin tract, which he called\r\n“Temporis Partus Maximus” (“The Greatest Birth\r\nof Time”).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn November, 1584, Bacon took his seat in the House of Commons\r\nas member for Melcombe Regis, in Dorsetshire. In October,\r\n1586, he sat for Taunton. He was member afterwards for\r\nLiverpool; and he was one of those who petitioned for the speedy\r\nexecution of Mary Queen of Scots. In October, 1589, he\r\nobtained the reversion of the office of Clerk of the Council in\r\nthe Star Chamber, which was worth £1,600 or £2,000 a\r\nyear; but for the succession to this office he had to wait until\r\n1608. It had not yet fallen to him when he wrote his\r\n“Two Books of the Advancement of Learning.” In\r\nthe Parliament that met in February, 1593, Bacon sat as member\r\nfor Middlesex. He raised difficulties of procedure in the\r\nway of the grant of a treble subsidy, by just objection to the\r\njoining of the Lords with the Commons in a money grant, and a\r\ndesire to extend the time allowed for payment from three years to\r\nsix; it was, in fact, extended to four years. The Queen was\r\noffended. Francis Bacon and his brother Antony had attached\r\nthemselves to the young Earl of Essex, who was their friend and\r\npatron. The office of Attorney-General became vacant.\r\nEssex asked the Queen to appoint Francis Bacon. The Queen\r\ngave the office to Sir Edward Coke, who was already\r\nSolicitor-General, and by nine years Bacon’s senior.\r\nThe office of Solicitor-General thus became vacant, and that was\r\nsought for Francis Bacon. The Queen, after delay and\r\nhesitation, gave it, in November, 1595, to Serjeant\r\nFleming. The Earl of Essex consoled his friend by giving\r\nhim “a piece of land”—Twickenham\r\nPark—which Bacon afterwards sold for\r\n£1,800—equal, say, to £12,000 in present buying\r\npower. In 1597 Bacon was returned to Parliament as member\r\nfor Ipswich, and in that year he was hoping to marry the rich\r\nwidow of Sir William Hatton, Essex helping; but the lady married,\r\nin the next year, Sir Edward Coke. It was in 1597 that\r\nBacon published the First Edition of his Essays. That was a\r\nlittle book containing only ten essays in English, with twelve\r\n“Meditationes Sacræ,” which were essays in\r\nLatin on religious subjects. From 1597 onward to the end of\r\nhis life, Bacon’s Essays were subject to continuous\r\naddition and revision. The author’s Second Edition,\r\nin which the number of the Essays was increased from ten to\r\nthirty-eight, did not appear until November or December, 1612,\r\nseven years later than these two books on the “Advancement\r\nof Learning;” and the final edition of the Essays, in which\r\ntheir number was increased from thirty-eight to fifty-eight,\r\nappeared only in 1625; and Bacon died on the 9th of April,\r\n1626. The edition of the Essays published in 1597, under\r\nElizabeth, marked only the beginning of a course of thought that\r\nafterwards flowed in one stream with his teachings in\r\nphilosophy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn February, 1601, there was the rebellion of Essex.\r\nFrancis Bacon had separated himself from his patron after giving\r\nhim advice that was disregarded. Bacon, now Queen’s\r\nCounsel, not only appeared against his old friend, but with\r\nexcess of zeal, by which, perhaps, he hoped to win back the\r\nQueen’s favour, he twice obtruded violent attacks upon\r\nEssex when he was not called upon to speak. On the 25th of\r\nFebruary, 1601, Essex was beheaded. The genius of Bacon was\r\nnext employed to justify that act by “A Declaration of the\r\nPractices and Treasons attempted and committed by Robert late\r\nEarle of Essex and his Complices.” But James of\r\nScotland, on whose behalf Essex had intervened, came to the\r\nthrone by the death of Elizabeth on the 24th of March,\r\n1603. Bacon was among the crowd of men who were made\r\nknights by James I., and he had to justify himself under the new\r\norder of things by writing “Sir Francis Bacon his Apologie\r\nin certain Imputations concerning the late Earle of\r\nEssex.” He was returned to the first Parliament of\r\nJames I. by Ipswich and St. Albans, and he was confirmed in his\r\noffice of King’s Counsel in August, 1604; but he was not\r\nappointed to the office of Solicitor-General when it became\r\nvacant in that year.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat was the position of Francis Bacon in 1605, when he\r\npublished this work, where in his First Book he pointed out the\r\ndiscredits of learning from human defects of the learned, and\r\nemptiness of many of the studies chosen, or the way of dealing\r\nwith them. This came, he said, especially by the mistaking\r\nor misplacing of the last or furthest end of knowledge, as if\r\nthere were sought in it “a couch whereupon to rest a\r\nsearching and restless spirit; or a terrace for a wandering and\r\nvariable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect; or a\r\ntower of state for a proud mind to raise itself upon; or a fort\r\nor commanding ground for strife and contention; or a shop for\r\nprofit or sale; and not a rich storehouse for the glory of the\r\nCreator and the relief of man’s estate.” The\r\nrest of the First Book was given to an argument upon the Dignity\r\nof Learning; and the Second Book, on the Advancement of Learning,\r\nis, as Bacon himself described it, “a general and faithful\r\nperambulation of learning, with an inquiry what parts thereof lie\r\nfresh and waste, and not improved and converted by the industry\r\nof man; to the end that such a plot made and recorded to memory\r\nmay both minister light to any public designation and also serve\r\nto excite voluntary endeavours.” Bacon makes, by a\r\nsort of exhaustive analysis, a ground-plan of all subjects of\r\nstudy, as an intellectual map, helping the right inquirer in his\r\nsearch for the right path. The right path is that by which\r\nhe has the best chance of adding to the stock of knowledge in the\r\nworld something worth labouring for; and the true worth is in\r\nlabour for “the glory of the Creator and the relief of\r\nman’s estate.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp style=\"text-align: right\"\u003eH. M.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\u0027chapter\u0027 /\u003e\u003ch2\u003e\u003cspan class=\"GutSmall\"\u003eTHE\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFIRST BOOK OF FRANCIS BACON;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"GutSmall\"\u003eOF THE PROFICIENCE AND\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"GutSmall\"\u003eDIVINE AND HUMAN.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp style=\"text-align: center\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eTo the King\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThere\u003c/span\u003e were under the law, excellent\r\nKing, both daily sacrifices and freewill offerings; the one\r\nproceeding upon ordinary observance, the other upon a devout\r\ncheerfulness: in like manner there belongeth to kings from their\r\nservants both tribute of duty and presents of affection. In\r\nthe former of these I hope I shall not live to be wanting,\r\naccording to my most humble duty and the good pleasure of your\r\nMajesty’s employments: for the latter, I thought it more\r\nrespective to make choice of some oblation which might rather\r\nrefer to the propriety and excellency of your individual person,\r\nthan to the business of your crown and state.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWherefore, representing your Majesty many times unto my mind,\r\nand beholding you not with the inquisitive eye of presumption, to\r\ndiscover that which the Scripture telleth me is inscrutable, but\r\nwith the observant eye of duty and admiration, leaving aside the\r\nother parts of your virtue and fortune, I have been\r\ntouched—yea, and possessed—with an extreme wonder at\r\nthose your virtues and faculties, which the philosophers call\r\nintellectual; the largeness of your capacity, the faithfulness of\r\nyour memory, the swiftness of your apprehension, the penetration\r\nof your judgment, and the facility and order of your elocution:\r\nand I have often thought that of all the persons living that I\r\nhave known, your Majesty were the best instance to make a man of\r\nPlato’s opinion, that all knowledge is but remembrance, and\r\nthat the mind of man by Nature knoweth all things, and hath but\r\nher own native and original notions (which by the strangeness and\r\ndarkness of this tabernacle of the body are sequestered) again\r\nrevived and restored: such a light of Nature I have observed in\r\nyour Majesty, and such a readiness to take flame and blaze from\r\nthe least occasion presented, or the least spark of\r\nanother’s knowledge delivered. And as the Scripture\r\nsaith of the wisest king, “That his heart was as the sands\r\nof the sea;” which, though it be one of the largest bodies,\r\nyet it consisteth of the smallest and finest portions; so hath\r\nGod given your Majesty a composition of understanding admirable,\r\nbeing able to compass and comprehend the greatest matters, and\r\nnevertheless to touch and apprehend the least; whereas it should\r\nseem an impossibility in Nature for the same instrument to make\r\nitself fit for great and small works. And for your gift of\r\nspeech, I call to mind what Cornelius Tacitus saith of Augustus\r\nCæsar: \u003ci\u003eAugusto profluens\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet quæ principem\r\ndeceret\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eeloquentia fuit\u003c/i\u003e. For if we note it\r\nwell, speech that is uttered with labour and difficulty, or\r\nspeech that savoureth of the affectation of art and precepts, or\r\nspeech that is framed after the imitation of some pattern of\r\neloquence, though never so excellent; all this hath somewhat\r\nservile, and holding of the subject. But your\r\nMajesty’s manner of speech is, indeed, prince-like, flowing\r\nas from a fountain, and yet streaming and branching itself into\r\nNature’s order, full of facility and felicity, imitating\r\nnone, and inimitable by any. And as in your civil estate\r\nthere appeareth to be an emulation and contention of your\r\nMajesty’s virtue with your fortune; a virtuous disposition\r\nwith a fortunate regiment; a virtuous expectation (when time was)\r\nof your greater fortune, with a prosperous possession thereof in\r\nthe due time; a virtuous observation of the laws of marriage,\r\nwith most blessed and happy fruit of marriage; a virtuous and\r\nmost Christian desire of peace, with a fortunate inclination in\r\nyour neighbour princes thereunto: so likewise in these\r\nintellectual matters there seemeth to be no less contention\r\nbetween the excellency of your Majesty’s gifts of Nature\r\nand the universality and perfection of your learning. For I\r\nam well assured that this which I shall say is no amplification\r\nat all, but a positive and measured truth; which is, that there\r\nhath not been since Christ’s time any king or temporal\r\nmonarch which hath been so learned in all literature and\r\nerudition, divine and human. For let a man seriously and\r\ndiligently revolve and peruse the succession of the Emperors of\r\nRome, of which Cæsar the Dictator (who lived some years\r\nbefore Christ) and Marcus Antoninus were the best learned, and so\r\ndescend to the Emperors of Græcia, or of the West, and then\r\nto the lines of France, Spain, England, Scotland, and the rest,\r\nand he shall find this judgment is truly made. For it\r\nseemeth much in a king if, by the compendious extractions of\r\nother men’s wits and labours, he can take hold of any\r\nsuperficial ornaments and shows of learning, or if he countenance\r\nand prefer learning and learned men; but to drink, indeed, of the\r\ntrue fountains of learning—nay, to have such a fountain of\r\nlearning in himself, in a king, and in a king born—is\r\nalmost a miracle. And the more, because there is met in\r\nyour Majesty a rare conjunction, as well of divine and sacred\r\nliterature as of profane and human; so as your Majesty standeth\r\ninvested of that triplicity, which in great veneration was\r\nascribed to the ancient Hermes: the power and fortune of a king,\r\nthe knowledge and illumination of a priest, and the learning and\r\nuniversality of a philosopher. This propriety inherent and\r\nindividual attribute in your Majesty deserveth to be expressed\r\nnot only in the fame and admiration of the present time, nor in\r\nthe history or tradition of the ages succeeding, but also in some\r\nsolid work, fixed memorial, and immortal monument, bearing a\r\ncharacter or signature both of the power of a king and the\r\ndifference and perfection of such a king.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTherefore I did conclude with myself that I could not make\r\nunto your Majesty a better oblation than of some treatise tending\r\nto that end, whereof the sum will consist of these two parts: the\r\nformer concerning the excellency of learning and knowledge, and\r\nthe excellency of the merit and true glory in the augmentation\r\nand propagation thereof; the latter, what the particular acts and\r\nworks are which have been embraced and undertaken for the\r\nadvancement of learning; and again, what defects and undervalues\r\nI find in such particular acts: to the end that though I cannot\r\npositively or affirmatively advise your Majesty, or propound unto\r\nyou framed particulars, yet I may excite your princely\r\ncogitations to visit the excellent treasure of your own mind, and\r\nthence to extract particulars for this purpose agreeable to your\r\nmagnanimity and wisdom.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI. (1) In the entrance to the former of these—to clear\r\nthe way and, as it were, to make silence, to have the true\r\ntestimonies concerning the dignity of learning to be better\r\nheard, without the interruption of tacit objections—I think\r\ngood to deliver it from the discredits and disgraces which it\r\nhath received, all from ignorance, but ignorance severally\r\ndisguised; appearing sometimes in the zeal and jealousy of\r\ndivines, sometimes in the severity and arrogancy of politics, and\r\nsometimes in the errors and imperfections of learned men\r\nthemselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) I hear the former sort say that knowledge is of those\r\nthings which are to be accepted of with great limitation and\r\ncaution; that the aspiring to overmuch knowledge was the original\r\ntemptation and sin whereupon ensued the fall of man; that\r\nknowledge hath in it somewhat of the serpent, and, therefore,\r\nwhere it entereth into a man it makes him swell; \u003ci\u003eScientia\r\ninflat\u003c/i\u003e; that Solomon gives a censure, “That there is no\r\nend of making books, and that much reading is weariness of the\r\nflesh;” and again in another place, “That in spacious\r\nknowledge there is much contristation, and that he that\r\nincreaseth knowledge increaseth anxiety;” that Saint Paul\r\ngives a caveat, “That we be not spoiled through vain\r\nphilosophy;” that experience demonstrates how learned men\r\nhave been arch-heretics, how learned times have been inclined to\r\natheism, and how the contemplation of second causes doth derogate\r\nfrom our dependence upon God, who is the first cause.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) To discover, then, the ignorance and error of this\r\nopinion, and the misunderstanding in the grounds thereof, it may\r\nwell appear these men do not observe or consider that it was not\r\nthe pure knowledge of Nature and universality, a knowledge by the\r\nlight whereof man did give names unto other creatures in Paradise\r\nas they were brought before him according unto their proprieties,\r\nwhich gave the occasion to the fall; but it was the proud\r\nknowledge of good and evil, with an intent in man to give law\r\nunto himself, and to depend no more upon God’s\r\ncommandments, which was the form of the temptation. Neither\r\nis it any quantity of knowledge, how great soever, that can make\r\nthe mind of man to swell; for nothing can fill, much less extend\r\nthe soul of man, but God and the contemplation of God; and,\r\ntherefore, Solomon, speaking of the two principal senses of\r\ninquisition, the eye and the ear, affirmeth that the eye is never\r\nsatisfied with seeing, nor the ear with hearing; and if there be\r\nno fulness, then is the continent greater than the content: so of\r\nknowledge itself and the mind of man, whereto the senses are but\r\nreporters, he defineth likewise in these words, placed after that\r\ncalendar or ephemerides which he maketh of the diversities of\r\ntimes and seasons for all actions and purposes, and concludeth\r\nthus: “God hath made all things beautiful, or decent, in\r\nthe true return of their seasons. Also He hath placed the\r\nworld in man’s heart, yet cannot man find out the work\r\nwhich God worketh from the beginning to the\r\nend”—declaring not obscurely that God hath framed the\r\nmind of man as a mirror or glass, capable of the image of the\r\nuniversal world, and joyful to receive the impression thereof, as\r\nthe eye joyeth to receive light; and not only delighted in\r\nbeholding the variety of things and vicissitude of times, but\r\nraised also to find out and discern the ordinances and decrees\r\nwhich throughout all those changes are infallibly observed.\r\nAnd although he doth insinuate that the supreme or summary law of\r\nNature (which he calleth “the work which God worketh from\r\nthe beginning to the end”) is not possible to be found out\r\nby man, yet that doth not derogate from the capacity of the mind;\r\nbut may be referred to the impediments, as of shortness of life,\r\nill conjunction of labours, ill tradition of knowledge over from\r\nhand to hand, and many other inconveniences, whereunto the\r\ncondition of man is subject. For that nothing parcel of the\r\nworld is denied to man’s inquiry and invention, he doth in\r\nanother place rule over, when he saith, “The spirit of man\r\nis as the lamp of God, wherewith He searcheth the inwardness of\r\nall secrets.” If, then, such be the capacity and\r\nreceipt of the mind of man, it is manifest that there is no\r\ndanger at all in the proportion or quantity of knowledge, how\r\nlarge soever, lest it should make it swell or out-compass itself;\r\nno, but it is merely the quality of knowledge, which, be it in\r\nquantity more or less, if it be taken without the true corrective\r\nthereof, hath in it some nature of venom or malignity, and some\r\neffects of that venom, which is ventosity or swelling. This\r\ncorrective spice, the mixture whereof maketh knowledge so\r\nsovereign, is charity, which the Apostle immediately addeth to\r\nthe former clause; for so he saith, “Knowledge bloweth up,\r\nbut charity buildeth up;” not unlike unto that which he\r\ndeilvereth in another place: “If I spake,” saith he,\r\n“with the tongues of men and angels, and had not charity,\r\nit were but as a tinkling cymbal.” Not but that it is\r\nan excellent thing to speak with the tongues of men and angels,\r\nbut because, if it be severed from charity, and not referred to\r\nthe good of men and mankind, it hath rather a sounding and\r\nunworthy glory than a meriting and substantial virtue. And\r\nas for that censure of Solomon concerning the excess of writing\r\nand reading books, and the anxiety of spirit which redoundeth\r\nfrom knowledge, and that admonition of St. Paul, “That we\r\nbe not seduced by vain philosophy,” let those places be\r\nrightly understood; and they do, indeed, excellently set forth\r\nthe true bounds and limitations whereby human knowledge is\r\nconfined and circumscribed, and yet without any such contracting\r\nor coarctation, but that it may comprehend all the universal\r\nnature of things; for these limitations are three: the first,\r\n“That we do not so place our felicity in knowledge, as we\r\nforget our mortality;” the second, “That we make\r\napplication of our knowledge, to give ourselves repose and\r\ncontentment, and not distaste or repining;” the third,\r\n“That we do not presume by the contemplation of Nature to\r\nattain to the mysteries of God.” For as touching the\r\nfirst of these, Solomon doth excellently expound himself in\r\nanother place of the same book, where he saith: “I saw well\r\nthat knowledge recedeth as far from ignorance as light doth from\r\ndarkness; and that the wise man’s eyes keep watch in his\r\nhead, whereas this fool roundeth about in darkness: but withal I\r\nlearned that the same mortality involveth them both.”\r\nAnd for the second, certain it is there is no vexation or anxiety\r\nof mind which resulteth from knowledge otherwise than merely by\r\naccident; for all knowledge and wonder (which is the seed of\r\nknowledge) is an impression of pleasure in itself; but when men\r\nfall to framing conclusions out of their knowledge, applying it\r\nto their particular, and ministering to themselves thereby weak\r\nfears or vast desires, there groweth that carefulness and trouble\r\nof mind which is spoken of; for then knowledge is no more\r\n\u003ci\u003eLumen siccum\u003c/i\u003e, whereof Heraclitus the profound said,\r\n\u003ci\u003eLumen siccum optima anima\u003c/i\u003e; but it becometh \u003ci\u003eLumen\r\nmadidum\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci\u003emaceratum\u003c/i\u003e, being steeped and infused in\r\nthe humours of the affections. And as for the third point,\r\nit deserveth to be a little stood upon, and not to be lightly\r\npassed over; for if any man shall think by view and inquiry into\r\nthese sensible and material things to attain that light, whereby\r\nhe may reveal unto himself the nature or will of God, then,\r\nindeed, is he spoiled by vain philosophy; for the contemplation\r\nof God’s creatures and works produceth (having regard to\r\nthe works and creatures themselves) knowledge, but having regard\r\nto God no perfect knowledge, but wonder, which is broken\r\nknowledge. And, therefore, it was most aptly said by one of\r\nPlato’s school, “That the sense of man carrieth a\r\nresemblance with the sun, which (as we see) openeth and revealeth\r\nall the terrestrial globe; but then, again, it obscureth and\r\nconcealeth the stars and celestial globe: so doth the sense\r\ndiscover natural things, but it darkeneth and shutteth up\r\ndivine.” And hence it is true that it hath proceeded,\r\nthat divers great learned men have been heretical, whilst they\r\nhave sought to fly up to the secrets of the Deity by this waxen\r\nwings of the senses. And as for the conceit that too much\r\nknowledge should incline a man to atheism, and that the ignorance\r\nof second causes should make a more devout dependence upon God,\r\nwhich is the first cause; first, it is good to ask the question\r\nwhich Job asked of his friends: “Will you lie for God, as\r\none man will lie for another, to gratify him?” For\r\ncertain it is that God worketh nothing in Nature but by second\r\ncauses; and if they would have it otherwise believed, it is mere\r\nimposture, as it were in favour towards God, and nothing else but\r\nto offer to the Author of truth the unclean sacrifice of a\r\nlie. But further, it is an assured truth, and a conclusion\r\nof experience, that a little or superficial knowledge of\r\nphilosophy may incline the mind of men to atheism, but a further\r\nproceeding therein doth bring the mind back again to\r\nreligion. For in the entrance of philosophy, when the\r\nsecond causes, which are next unto the senses, do offer\r\nthemselves to the mind of man, if it dwell and stay there it may\r\ninduce some oblivion of the highest cause; but when a man passeth\r\non further and seeth the dependence of causes and the works of\r\nProvidence; then, according to the allegory of the poets, he will\r\neasily believe that the highest link of Nature’s chain must\r\nneeds he tied to the foot of Jupiter’s chair. To\r\nconclude, therefore, let no man upon a weak conceit of sobriety\r\nor an ill-applied moderation think or maintain that a man can\r\nsearch too far, or be too well studied in the book of God’s\r\nword, or in the book of God’s works, divinity or\r\nphilosophy; but rather let men endeavour an endless progress or\r\nproficience in both; only let men beware that they apply both to\r\ncharity, and not to swelling; to use, and not to ostentation; and\r\nagain, that they do not unwisely mingle or confound these\r\nlearnings together.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eII. (1) And as for the disgraces which learning receiveth from\r\npolitics, they be of this nature: that learning doth soften\r\nmen’s minds, and makes them more unapt for the honour and\r\nexercise of arms; that it doth mar and pervert men’s\r\ndispositions for matter of government and policy, in making them\r\ntoo curious and irresolute by variety of reading, or too\r\nperemptory or positive by strictness of rules and axioms, or too\r\nimmoderate and overweening by reason of the greatness of\r\nexamples, or too incompatible and differing from the times by\r\nreason of the dissimilitude of examples; or at least, that it\r\ndoth divert men’s travails from action and business, and\r\nbringeth them to a love of leisure and privateness; and that it\r\ndoth bring into states a relaxation of discipline, whilst every\r\nman is more ready to argue than to obey and execute. Out of\r\nthis conceit Cato, surnamed the Censor, one of the wisest men\r\nindeed that ever lived, when Carneades the philosopher came in\r\nembassage to Rome, and that the young men of Rome began to flock\r\nabout him, being allured with the sweetness and majesty of his\r\neloquence and learning, gave counsel in open senate that they\r\nshould give him his despatch with all speed, lest he should\r\ninfect and enchant the minds and affections of the youth, and at\r\nunawares bring in an alteration of the manners and customs of the\r\nstate. Out of the same conceit or humour did Virgil,\r\nturning his pen to the advantage of his country and the\r\ndisadvantage of his own profession, make a kind of separation\r\nbetween policy and government, and between arts and sciences, in\r\nthe verses so much renowned, attributing and challenging the one\r\nto the Romans, and leaving and yielding the other to the\r\nGrecians: \u003ci\u003eTu regere imperio popules\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eRomane\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003ememento\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eHæ tibi erunt artes\u003c/i\u003e, \u0026amp;c.\r\nSo likewise we see that Anytus, the accuser of Socrates, laid it\r\nas an article of charge and accusation against him, that he did,\r\nwith the variety and power of his discourses and disputatious,\r\nwithdraw young men from due reverence to the laws and customs of\r\ntheir country, and that he did profess a dangerous and pernicious\r\nscience, which was to make the worse matter seem the better, and\r\nto suppress truth by force of eloquence and speech.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) But these and the like imputations have rather a\r\ncountenance of gravity than any ground of justice: for experience\r\ndoth warrant that, both in persons and in times, there hath been\r\na meeting and concurrence in learning and arms, flourishing and\r\nexcelling in the same men and the same ages. For as\r\n‘for men, there cannot be a better nor the hike instance as\r\nof that pair, Alexander the Great and Julius Cæsar, the\r\nDictator; whereof the one was Aristotle’s scholar in\r\nphilosophy, and the other was Cicero’s rival in eloquence;\r\nor if any man had rather call for scholars that were great\r\ngenerals, than generals that were great scholars, let him take\r\nEpaminondas the Theban, or Xenophon the Athenian; whereof the one\r\nwas the first that abated the power of Sparta, and the other was\r\nthe first that made way to the overthrow of the monarchy of\r\nPersia. And this concurrence is yet more visible in times\r\nthan in persons, by how much an age is greater object than a\r\nman. For both in Egypt, Assyria, Persia, Græcia, and\r\nRome, the same times that are most renowned for arms are,\r\nlikewise, most admired for learning, so that the greatest authors\r\nand philosophers, and the greatest captains and governors, have\r\nlived in the same ages. Neither can it otherwise he: for as\r\nin man the ripeness of strength of the body and mind cometh much\r\nabout an age, save that the strength of the body cometh somewhat\r\nthe more early, so in states, arms and learning, whereof the one\r\ncorrespondeth to the body, the other to the soul of man, have a\r\nconcurrence or near sequence in times.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) And for matter of policy and government, that learning,\r\nshould rather hurt, than enable thereunto, is a thing very\r\nimprobable; we see it is accounted an error to commit a natural\r\nbody to empiric physicians, which commonly have a few pleasing\r\nreceipts whereupon they are confident and adventurous, but know\r\nneither the causes of diseases, nor the complexions of patients,\r\nnor peril of accidents, nor the true method of cures; we see it\r\nis a like error to rely upon advocates or lawyers which are only\r\nmen of practice, and not grounded in their books, who are many\r\ntimes easily surprised when matter falleth out besides their\r\nexperience, to the prejudice of the causes they handle: so by\r\nlike reason it cannot be but a matter of doubtful consequence if\r\nstates be managed by empiric statesmen, not well mingled with men\r\ngrounded in learning. But contrariwise, it is almost\r\nwithout instance contradictory that ever any government was\r\ndisastrous that was in the hands of learned governors. For\r\nhowsoever it hath been ordinary with politic men to extenuate and\r\ndisable learned men by the names of \u003ci\u003epedantes\u003c/i\u003e; yet in the\r\nrecords of time it appeareth in many particulars that the\r\ngovernments of princes in minority (notwithstanding the infinite\r\ndisadvantage of that kind of state)—have nevertheless\r\nexcelled the government of princes of mature age, even for that\r\nreason which they seek to traduce, which is that by that occasion\r\nthe state hath been in the hands of \u003ci\u003epedantes\u003c/i\u003e: for so was\r\nthe state of Rome for the first five years, which are so much\r\nmagnified, during the minority of Nero, in the hands of Seneca, a\r\n\u003ci\u003epedenti\u003c/i\u003e; so it was again, for ten years’ space or\r\nmore, during the minority of Gordianus the younger, with great\r\napplause and contentation in the hands of Misitheus, a\r\n\u003ci\u003epedanti\u003c/i\u003e: so was it before that, in the minority of\r\nAlexander Severus, in like happiness, in hands not much unlike,\r\nby reason of the rule of the women, who were aided by the\r\nteachers and preceptors. Nay, let a man look into the\r\ngovernment of the Bishops of Rome, as by name, into the\r\ngovernment of Pius Quintus and Sextus Quintus in our times, who\r\nwere both at their entrance esteemed but as pedantical friars,\r\nand he shall find that such Popes do greater things, and proceed\r\nupon truer principles of state, than those which have ascended to\r\nthe papacy from an education and breeding in affairs of state and\r\ncourts of princes; for although men bred in learning are perhaps\r\nto seek in points of convenience and accommodating for the\r\npresent, which the Italians call \u003ci\u003eragioni di stato\u003c/i\u003e, whereof\r\nthe same Pius Quintus could not hear spoken with patience,\r\nterming them inventions against religion and the moral virtues;\r\nyet on the other side, to recompense that, they are perfect in\r\nthose same plain grounds of religion, justice, honour, and moral\r\nvirtue, which if they be well and watchfully pursued, there will\r\nbe seldom use of those other, no more than of physic in a sound\r\nor well-dieted body. Neither can the experience of one\r\nman’s life furnish examples and precedents for the event of\r\none man’s life. For as it happeneth sometimes that\r\nthe grandchild, or other descendant, resembleth the ancestor more\r\nthan the son; so many times occurrences of present times may sort\r\nbetter with ancient examples than with those of the later or\r\nimmediate times; and lastly, the wit of one man can no more\r\ncountervail learning than one man’s means can hold way with\r\na common purse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) And as for those particular seducements or indispositions\r\nof the mind for policy and government, which learning is\r\npretended to insinuate; if it be granted that any such thing be,\r\nit must be remembered withal that learning ministereth in every\r\nof them greater strength of medicine or remedy than it offereth\r\ncause of indisposition or infirmity. For if by a secret\r\noperation it make men perplexed and irresolute, on the other side\r\nby plain precept it teacheth them when and upon what ground to\r\nresolve; yea, and how to carry things in suspense, without\r\nprejudice, till they resolve. If it make men positive and\r\nregular, it teacheth them what things are in their nature\r\ndemonstrative, and what are conjectural, and as well the use of\r\ndistinctions and exceptions, as the latitude of principles and\r\nrules. If it mislead by disproportion or dissimilitude of\r\nexamples, it teacheth men the force of circumstances, the errors\r\nof comparisons, and all the cautions of application; so that in\r\nall these it doth rectify more effectually than it can\r\npervert. And these medicines it conveyeth into men’s\r\nminds much more forcibly by the quickness and penetration of\r\nexamples. For let a man look into the errors of Clement\r\nVII., so lively described by Guicciardini, who served under him,\r\nor into the errors of Cicero, painted out by his own pencil in\r\nhis Epistles to Atticus, and he will fly apace from being\r\nirresolute. Let him look into the errors of Phocion, and he\r\nwill beware how he be obstinate or inflexible. Let him but\r\nread the fable of Ixion, and it will hold him from being vaporous\r\nor imaginative. Let him look into the errors of Cato II.,\r\nand he will never be one of the Antipodes, to tread opposite to\r\nthe present world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) And for the conceit that learning should dispose men to\r\nleisure and privateness, and make men slothful: it were a strange\r\nthing if that which accustometh the mind to a perpetual motion\r\nand agitation should induce slothfulness, whereas, contrariwise,\r\nit may be truly affirmed that no kind of men love business for\r\nitself but those that are learned; for other persons love it for\r\nprofit, as a hireling that loves the work for the wages; or for\r\nhonour, as because it beareth them up in the eyes of men, and\r\nrefresheth their reputation, which otherwise would wear; or\r\nbecause it putteth them in mind of their fortune, and giveth them\r\noccasion to pleasure and displeasure; or because it exerciseth\r\nsome faculty wherein they take pride, and so entertaineth them in\r\ngood-humour and pleasing conceits towards themselves; or because\r\nit advanceth any other their ends. So that as it is said of\r\nuntrue valours, that some men’s valours are in the eyes of\r\nthem that look on, so such men’s industries are in the eyes\r\nof others, or, at least, in regard of their own designments; only\r\nlearned men love business as an action according to nature, as\r\nagreeable to health of mind as exercise is to health of body,\r\ntaking pleasure in the action itself, and not in the purchase, so\r\nthat of all men they are the most indefatigable, if it be towards\r\nany business which can hold or detain their mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(6) And if any man be laborious in reading and study, and yet\r\nidle in business and action, it groweth from some weakness of\r\nbody or softness of spirit, such as Seneca speaketh of: \u003ci\u003eQuidam\r\ntam sunt umbratiles\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eut putent in turbido esse quicquid in\r\nluce est\u003c/i\u003e; and not of learning: well may it be that such a\r\npoint of a man’s nature may make him give himself to\r\nlearning, but it is not learning that breedeth any such point in\r\nhis nature.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(7) And that learning should take up too much time or leisure:\r\nI answer, the most active or busy man that hath been or can be,\r\nhath (no question) many vacant times of leisure while he\r\nexpecteth the tides and returns of business (except he be either\r\ntedious and of no despatch, or lightly and unworthily ambitious\r\nto meddle in things that may be better done by others), and then\r\nthe question is but how those spaces and times of leisure shall\r\nbe filled and spent; whether in pleasure or in studies; as was\r\nwell answered by Demosthenes to his adversary Æschines,\r\nthat was a man given to pleasure, and told him “That his\r\norations did smell of the lamp.”\r\n“Indeed,” said Demosthenes, “there is a great\r\ndifference between the things that you and I do by\r\nlamp-light.” So as no man need doubt that learning\r\nwill expel business, but rather it will keep and defend the\r\npossession of the mind against idleness and pleasure, which\r\notherwise at unawares may enter to the prejudice of both.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(8) Again, for that other conceit that learning should\r\nundermine the reverence of laws and government, it is assuredly a\r\nmere depravation and calumny, without all shadow of truth.\r\nFor to say that a blind custom of obedience should be a surer\r\nobligation than duty taught and understood, it is to affirm that\r\na blind man may tread surer by a guide than a seeing man can by a\r\nlight. And it is without all controversy that learning doth\r\nmake the minds of men gentle, generous, manageable, and pliant to\r\ngovernment; whereas ignorance makes them churlish, thwart, and\r\nmutinous: and the evidence of time doth clear this assertion,\r\nconsidering that the most barbarous, rude, and unlearned times\r\nhave been most subject to tumults, seditions, and changes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(9) And as to the judgment of Cato the Censor, he was well\r\npunished for his blasphemy against learning, in the same kind\r\nwherein he offended; for when he was past threescore years old,\r\nhe was taken with an extreme desire to go to school again, and to\r\nlearn the Greek tongue, to the end to peruse the Greek authors;\r\nwhich doth well demonstrate that his former censure of the\r\nGrecian learning was rather an affected gravity, than according\r\nto the inward sense of his own opinion. And as for\r\nVirgil’s verses, though it pleased him to brave the world\r\nin taking to the Romans the art of empire, and leaving to others\r\nthe arts of subjects, yet so much is manifest—that the\r\nRomans never ascended to that height of empire till the time they\r\nhad ascended to the height of other arts. For in the time\r\nof the two first Cæsars, which had the art of government in\r\ngreatest perfection, there lived the best poet, Virgilius Maro;\r\nthe best historiographer, Titus Livius; the best antiquary,\r\nMarcus Varro; and the best or second orator, Marcus Cicero, that\r\nto the memory of man are known. As for the accusation of\r\nSocrates, the time must be remembered when it was prosecuted;\r\nwhich was under the Thirty Tyrants, the most base, bloody, and\r\nenvious persons that have governed; which revolution of state was\r\nno sooner over but Socrates, whom they had made a person\r\ncriminal, was made a person heroical, and his memory accumulate\r\nwith honours divine and human; and those discourses of his which\r\nwere then termed corrupting of manners, were after acknowledged\r\nfor sovereign medicines of the mind and manners, and so have been\r\nreceived ever since till this day. Let this, therefore,\r\nserve for answer to politiques, which in their humorous severity,\r\nor in their feigned gravity, have presumed to throw imputations\r\nupon learning; which redargution nevertheless (save that we know\r\nnot whether our labours may extend to other ages) were not\r\nneedful for the present, in regard of the love and reverence\r\ntowards learning which the example and countenance of two so\r\nlearned princes, Queen Elizabeth and your Majesty, being as\r\nCastor and Pollux, \u003ci\u003elucida sidera\u003c/i\u003e, stars of excellent light\r\nand most benign influence, hath wrought in all men of place and\r\nauthority in our nation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIII. (1) Now therefore we come to that third sort of discredit\r\nor diminution of credit that groweth unto learning from learned\r\nmen themselves, which commonly cleaveth fastest: it is either\r\nfrom their fortune, or from their manners, or from the nature of\r\ntheir studies. For the first, it is not in their power; and\r\nthe second is accidental; the third only is proper to be handled:\r\nbut because we are not in hand with true measure, but with\r\npopular estimation and conceit, it is not amiss to speak somewhat\r\nof the two former. The derogations therefore which grow to\r\nlearning from the fortune or condition of learned men, are either\r\nin respect of scarcity of means, or in respect of privateness of\r\nlife and meanness of employments.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) Concerning want, and that it is the case of learned men\r\nusually to begin with little, and not to grow rich so fast as\r\nother men, by reason they convert not their labours chiefly to\r\nlucre and increase, it were good to leave the commonplace in\r\ncommendation of povery to some friar to handle, to whom much was\r\nattributed by Machiavel in this point when he said, “That\r\nthe kingdom of the clergy had been long before at an end, if the\r\nreputation and reverence towards the poverty of friars had not\r\nborne out the scandal of the superfluities and excesses of\r\nbishops and prelates.” So a man might say that the\r\nfelicity and delicacy of princes and great persons had long since\r\nturned to rudeness and barbarism, if the poverty of learning had\r\nnot kept up civility and honour of life; but without any such\r\nadvantages, it is worthy the observation what a reverent and\r\nhonoured thing poverty of fortune was for some ages in the Roman\r\nstate, which nevertheless was a state without paradoxes.\r\nFor we see what Titus Livius saith in his introduction:\r\n\u003ci\u003eCæterum aut me amor negotii suscepti fallit aut nulla\r\nunquam respublica nec major\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enec sanctior\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enec\r\nbonis exemplis ditior fuit\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003enec in quam tam sero avaritia\r\nluxuriaque immigraverint\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003enec ubi tantus ac tam diu\r\npaupertati ac parsimoniæ honos fuerit\u003c/i\u003e. We see\r\nlikewise, after that the state of Rome was not itself, but did\r\ndegenerate, how that person that took upon him to be counsellor\r\nto Julius Cæsar after his victory where to begin his\r\nrestoration of the state, maketh it of all points the most\r\nsummary to take away the estimation of wealth: \u003ci\u003eVerum hæc\r\net omnia mala pariter cum honore pecuniæ desinent\u003c/i\u003e;\r\n\u003ci\u003esi neque magistratus\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eneque alia vulgo cupienda\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003evenalia erunt\u003c/i\u003e. To conclude this point: as it was\r\ntruly said that \u003ci\u003ePaupertas est virtutis fortuna\u003c/i\u003e, though\r\nsometimes it come from vice, so it may be fitly said that, though\r\nsome times it may proceed from misgovernment and accident.\r\nSurely Solomon hath pronounced it both in censure, \u003ci\u003eQui\r\nfestinat ad divitias non erit insons\u003c/i\u003e; and in precept,\r\n“Buy the truth, and sell it not; and so of wisdom and\r\nknowledge;” judging that means were to be spent upon\r\nlearning, and not learning to be applied to means. And as\r\nfor the privateness or obscureness (as it may be in vulgar\r\nestimation accounted) of life of contemplative men, it is a theme\r\nso common to extol a private life, not taxed with sensuality and\r\nsloth, in comparison and to the disadvantage of a civil life, for\r\nsafety, liberty, pleasure, and dignity, or at least freedom from\r\nindignity, as no man handleth it but handleth it well; such a\r\nconsonancy it hath to men’s conceits in the expressing, and\r\nto men’s consents in the allowing. This only I will\r\nadd, that learned men forgotten in states and not living in the\r\neyes of men, are like the images of Cassius and Brutus in the\r\nfuneral of Junia, of which, not being represented as many others\r\nwere, Tacitus saith, \u003ci\u003eEo ipso præfulgebant quod non\r\nvisebantur\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) And for meanness of employment, that which is most\r\ntraduced to contempt is that the government of youth is commonly\r\nallotted to them; which age, because it is the age of least\r\nauthority, it is transferred to the disesteeming of those\r\nemployments wherein youth is conversant, and which are conversant\r\nabout youth. But how unjust this traducement is (if you\r\nwill reduce things from popularity of opinion to measure of\r\nreason) may appear in that we see men are more curious what they\r\nput into a new vessel than into a vessel seasoned; and what mould\r\nthey lay about a young plant than about a plant corroborate; so\r\nas this weakest terms and times of all things use to have the\r\nbest applications and helps. And will you hearken to the\r\nHebrew rabbins? “Your young men shall see visions,\r\nand your old men shall dream dreams:” say they, youth is\r\nthe worthier age, for that visions are nearer apparitions of God\r\nthan dreams? And let it be noted that howsoever the\r\ncondition of life of \u003ci\u003epedantes\u003c/i\u003e hath been scorned upon\r\ntheatres, as the ape of tyranny; and that the modern looseness or\r\nnegligence hath taken no due regard to the choice of\r\nschoolmasters and tutors; yet the ancient wisdom of the best\r\ntimes did always make a just complaint, that states were too busy\r\nwith their laws and too negligent in point of education: which\r\nexcellent part of ancient discipline hath been in some sort\r\nrevived of late times by the colleges of the Jesuits; of whom,\r\nalthough in regard of their superstition I may say, \u003ci\u003eQuo\r\nmeliores\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eeo deteriores\u003c/i\u003e; yet in regard of this, and\r\nsome other points concerning human learning and moral matters, I\r\nmay say, as Agesilaus said to his enemy Pharnabazus, \u003ci\u003eTalis\r\nquum sis\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eutunam noster esses\u003c/i\u003e. And that much\r\ntouching the discredits drawn from the fortunes of learned\r\nmen.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) As touching the manners of learned men, it is a thing\r\npersonal and individual: and no doubt there be amongst them, as\r\nin other professions, of all temperatures: but yet so as it is\r\nnot without truth which is said, that \u003ci\u003eAbeunt studua in\r\nmores\u003c/i\u003e, studies have an influence and operation upon the\r\nmanners of those that are conversant in them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) But upon an attentive and indifferent review, I for my\r\npart cannot find any disgrace to learning can proceed from the\r\nmanners of learned men; not inherent to them as they are learned;\r\nexcept it be a fault (which was the supposed fault of\r\nDemosthenes, Cicero, Cato II., Seneca, and many more) that\r\nbecause the times they read of are commonly better than the times\r\nthey live in, and the duties taught better than the duties\r\npractised, they contend sometimes too far to bring things to\r\nperfection, and to reduce the corruption of manners to honesty of\r\nprecepts or examples of too great height. And yet hereof\r\nthey have caveats enough in their own walks. For Solon,\r\nwhen he was asked whether he had given his citizens the best\r\nlaws, answered wisely, “Yea, of such as they would\r\nreceive:” and Plato, finding that his own heart could not\r\nagree with the corrupt manners of his country, refused to bear\r\nplace or office, saying, “That a man’s country was to\r\nbe used as his parents were, that is, with humble persuasions,\r\nand not with contestations.” And Cæsar’s\r\ncounsellor put in the same caveat, \u003ci\u003eNon ad vetera instituta\r\nrevocans quæ jampridem corruptis moribus ludibrio sunt\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nand Cicero noteth this error directly in Cato II. when he writes\r\nto his friend Atticus, \u003ci\u003eCato optime sentit\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esed nocet\r\ninterdum reipublicæ\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003eloquitur enim tanquam in\r\nrepublicâ Platonis\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enon tanquam in fæce\r\nRomuli\u003c/i\u003e. And the same Cicero doth excuse and expound the\r\nphilosophers for going too far and being too exact in their\r\nprescripts when he saith, \u003ci\u003eIsti ipse præceptores virtutis\r\net magistri videntur fines officiorum paulo longius quam natura\r\nvellet protulisse\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eut cum ad ultimum animo\r\ncontendissemus\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eibi tamen\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eubi oportet\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003econsisteremus\u003c/i\u003e: and yet himself might have said, \u003ci\u003eMonitis\r\nsum minor ipse meis\u003c/i\u003e; for it was his own fault, though not in\r\nso extreme a degree.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(6) Another fault likewise much of this kind hath been\r\nincident to learned men, which is, that they have esteemed the\r\npreservation, good, and honour of their countries or masters\r\nbefore their own fortunes or safeties. For so saith\r\nDemosthenes unto the Athenians: “If it please you to note\r\nit, my counsels unto you are not such whereby I should grow great\r\namongst you, and you become little amongst the Grecians; but they\r\nbe of that nature as they are sometimes not good for me to give,\r\nbut are always good for you to follow.” And so\r\nSeneca, after he had consecrated that \u003ci\u003eQuinquennium Neronis\u003c/i\u003e\r\nto the eternal glory of learned governors, held on his honest and\r\nloyal course of good and free counsel after his master grew\r\nextremely corrupt in his government. Neither can this point\r\notherwise be, for learning endueth men’s minds with a true\r\nsense of the frailty of their persons, the casualty of their\r\nfortunes, and the dignity of their soul and vocation, so that it\r\nis impossible for them to esteem that any greatness of their own\r\nfortune can be a true or worthy end of their being and\r\nordainment, and therefore are desirous to give their account to\r\nGod, and so likewise to their masters under God (as kings and the\r\nstates that they serve) in those words, \u003ci\u003eEcce tibi\r\nlucrefeci\u003c/i\u003e, and not \u003ci\u003eEcce mihi lucrefeci\u003c/i\u003e; whereas the\r\ncorrupter sort of mere politiques, that have not their thoughts\r\nestablished by learning in the love and apprehension of duty, nor\r\nnever look abroad into universality, do refer all things to\r\nthemselves, and thrust themselves into the centre of the world,\r\nas if all lines should meet in them and their fortunes, never\r\ncaring in all tempests what becomes of the ship of state, so they\r\nmay save themselves in the cockboat of their own fortune; whereas\r\nmen that feel the weight of duty and know the limits of self-love\r\nuse to make good their places and duties, though with peril; and\r\nif they stand in seditious and violent alterations, it is rather\r\nthe reverence which many times both adverse parts do give to\r\nhonesty, than any versatile advantage of their own\r\ncarriage. But for this point of tender sense and fast\r\nobligation of duty which learning doth endue the mind withal,\r\nhowsoever fortune may tax it, and many in the depth of their\r\ncorrupt principles may despise it, yet it will receive an open\r\nallowance, and therefore needs the less disproof or excuse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(7) Another fault incident commonly to learned men, which may\r\nbe more properly defended than truly denied, is that they fail\r\nsometimes in applying themselves to particular persons, which\r\nwant of exact application ariseth from two causes—the one,\r\nbecause the largeness of their mind can hardly confine itself to\r\ndwell in the exquisite observation or examination of the nature\r\nand customs of one person, for it is a speech for a lover, and\r\nnot for a wise man, \u003ci\u003eSatis magnum alter alteri theatrum\r\nsumus\u003c/i\u003e. Nevertheless I shall yield that he that cannot\r\ncontract the sight of his mind as well as disperse and dilate it,\r\nwanteth a great faculty. But there is a second cause, which\r\nis no inability, but a rejection upon choice and judgment.\r\nFor the honest and just bounds of observation by one person upon\r\nanother extend no further but to understand him sufficiently,\r\nwhereby not to give him offence, or whereby to be able to give\r\nhim faithful counsel, or whereby to stand upon reasonable guard\r\nand caution in respect of a man’s self. But to be\r\nspeculative into another man to the end to know how to work him,\r\nor wind him, or govern him, proceedeth from a heart that is\r\ndouble and cloven, and not entire and ingenuous; which as in\r\nfriendship it is want of integrity, so towards princes or\r\nsuperiors is want of duty. For the custom of the Levant,\r\nwhich is that subjects do forbear to gaze or fix their eyes upon\r\nprinces, is in the outward ceremony barbarous, but the moral is\r\ngood; for men ought not, by cunning and bent observations, to\r\npierce and penetrate into the hearts of kings, which the\r\nScripture hath declared to be inscrutable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(8) There is yet another fault (with which I will conclude\r\nthis part) which is often noted in learned men, that they do many\r\ntimes fail to observe decency and discretion in their behaviour\r\nand carriage, and commit errors in small and ordinary points of\r\naction, so as the vulgar sort of capacities do make a judgment of\r\nthem in greater matters by that which they find wanting in them\r\nin smaller. But this consequence doth oft deceive men, for\r\nwhich I do refer them over to that which was said by\r\nThemistocles, arrogantly and uncivilly being applied to himself\r\nout of his own mouth, but, being applied to the general state of\r\nthis question, pertinently and justly, when, being invited to\r\ntouch a lute, he said, “He could not fiddle, but he could\r\nmake a small town a great state.” So no doubt many\r\nmay be well seen in the passages of government and policy which\r\nare to seek in little and punctual occasions. I refer them\r\nalso to that which Plato said of his master Socrates, whom he\r\ncompared to the gallipots of apothecaries, which on the outside\r\nhad apes and owls and antiques, but contained within sovereign\r\nand precious liquors and confections; acknowledging that, to an\r\nexternal report, he was not without superficial levities and\r\ndeformities, but was inwardly replenished with excellent virtues\r\nand powers. And so much touching the point of manners of\r\nlearned men.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(9) But in the meantime I have no purpose to give allowance to\r\nsome conditions and courses base and unworthy, wherein divers\r\nprofessors of learning have wronged themselves and gone too far;\r\nsuch as were those trencher philosophers which in the later age\r\nof the Roman state were usually in the houses of great persons,\r\nbeing little better than solemn parasites, of which kind, Lucian\r\nmaketh a merry description of the philosopher that the great lady\r\ntook to ride with her in her coach, and would needs have him\r\ncarry her little dog, which he doing officiously and yet\r\nuncomely, the page scoffed and said, “That he doubted the\r\nphilosopher of a Stoic would turn to be a Cynic.”\r\nBut, above all the rest, this gross and palpable flattery\r\nwhereunto many not unlearned have abased and abused their wits\r\nand pens, turning (as Du Bartas saith) Hecuba into Helena, and\r\nFaustina into Lucretia, hath most diminished the price and\r\nestimation of learning. Neither is the modern dedication of\r\nbooks and writings, as to patrons, to be commended, for that\r\nbooks (such as are worthy the name of books) ought to have no\r\npatrons but truth and reason. And the ancient custom was to\r\ndedicate them only to private and equal friends, or to entitle\r\nthe books with their names; or if to kings and great persons, it\r\nwas to some such as the argument of the book was fit and proper\r\nfor; but these and the like courses may deserve rather\r\nreprehension than defence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(10) Not that I can tax or condemn the morigeration or\r\napplication of learned men to men in fortune. For the\r\nanswer was good that Diogenes made to one that asked him in\r\nmockery, “How it came to pass that philosophers were the\r\nfollowers of rich men, and not rich men of\r\nphilosophers?” He answered soberly, and yet sharply,\r\n“Because the one sort knew what they had need of, and the\r\nother did not.” And of the like nature was the answer\r\nwhich Aristippus made, when having a petition to Dionysius, and\r\nno ear given to him, he fell down at his feet, whereupon\r\nDionysius stayed and gave him the hearing, and granted it; and\r\nafterwards some person, tender on the behalf of philosophy,\r\nreproved Aristippus that he would offer the profession of\r\nphilosophy such an indignity as for a private suit to fall at a\r\ntyrant’s feet; but he answered, “It was not his\r\nfault, but it was the fault of Dionysius, that had his ears in\r\nhis feet.” Neither was it accounted weakness, but\r\ndiscretion, in him that would not dispute his best with Adrianus\r\nCæsar, excusing himself, “That it was reason to yield\r\nto him that commanded thirty legions.” These and the\r\nlike, applications, and stooping to points of necessity and\r\nconvenience, cannot be disallowed; for though they may have some\r\noutward baseness, yet in a judgment truly made they are to be\r\naccounted submissions to the occasion and not to the person.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIV. (1) Now I proceed to those errors and vanities which have\r\nintervened amongst the studies themselves of the learned, which\r\nis that which is principal and proper to the present argument;\r\nwherein my purpose is not to make a justification of the errors,\r\nbut by a censure and separation of the errors to make a\r\njustification of that which is good and sound, and to deliver\r\nthat from the aspersion of the other. For we see that it is\r\nthe manner of men to scandalise and deprave that which retaineth\r\nthe state and virtue, by taking advantage upon that which is\r\ncorrupt and degenerate, as the heathens in the primitive Church\r\nused to blemish and taint the Christians with the faults and\r\ncorruptions of heretics. But nevertheless I have no meaning\r\nat this time to make any exact animadversion of the errors and\r\nimpediments in matters of learning, which are more secret and\r\nremote from vulgar opinion, but only to speak unto such as do\r\nfall under or near unto a popular observation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) There be therefore chiefly three vanities in studies,\r\nwhereby learning hath been most traduced. For those things\r\nwe do esteem vain which are either false or frivolous, those\r\nwhich either have no truth or no use; and those persons we esteem\r\nvain which are either credulous or curious; and curiosity is\r\neither in matter or words: so that in reason as well as in\r\nexperience there fall out to be these three distempers (as I may\r\nterm them) of learning—the first, fantastical learning; the\r\nsecond, contentious learning; and the last, delicate learning;\r\nvain imaginations, vain altercations, and vain affectations; and\r\nwith the last I will begin. Martin Luther, conducted, no\r\ndoubt, by a higher Providence, but in discourse of reason,\r\nfinding what a province he had undertaken against the Bishop of\r\nRome and the degenerate traditions of the Church, and finding his\r\nown solitude, being in nowise aided by the opinions of his own\r\ntime, was enforced to awake all antiquity, and to call former\r\ntimes to his succours to make a party against the present\r\ntime. So that the ancient authors, both in divinity and in\r\nhumanity, which had long time slept in libraries, began generally\r\nto be read and revolved. This, by consequence, did draw on\r\na necessity of a more exquisite travail in the languages\r\noriginal, wherein those authors did write, for the better\r\nunderstanding of those authors, and the better advantage of\r\npressing and applying their words. And thereof grew, again,\r\na delight in their manner of style and phrase, and an admiration\r\nof that kind of writing, which was much furthered and\r\nprecipitated by the enmity and opposition that the propounders of\r\nthose primitive but seeming new opinions had against the\r\nschoolmen, who were generally of the contrary part, and whose\r\nwritings were altogether in a differing style and form; taking\r\nliberty to coin and frame new terms of art to express their own\r\nsense, and to avoid circuit of speech, without regard to the\r\npureness, pleasantness, and (as I may call it) lawfulness of the\r\nphrase or word. And again, because the great labour then\r\nwas with the people (of whom the Pharisees were wont to say,\r\n\u003ci\u003eExecrabilis ista turba\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003equæ non novit legem\u003c/i\u003e),\r\nfor the winning and persuading of them, there grew of necessity\r\nin chief price and request eloquence and variety of discourse, as\r\nthe fittest and forciblest access into the capacity of the vulgar\r\nsort; so that these four causes concurring—the admiration\r\nof ancient authors, the hate of the schoolmen, the exact study of\r\nlanguages, and the efficacy of preaching—did bring in an\r\naffectionate study of eloquence and copy of speech, which then\r\nbegan to flourish. This grew speedily to an excess; for men\r\nbegan to hunt more after words than matter—more after the\r\nchoiceness of the phrase, and the round and clean composition of\r\nthe sentence, and the sweet falling of the clauses, and the\r\nvarying and illustration of their works with tropes and figures,\r\nthan after the weight of matter, worth of subject, soundness of\r\nargument, life of invention, or depth of judgment. Then\r\ngrew the flowing and watery vein of Osorius, the Portugal bishop,\r\nto be in price. Then did Sturmius spend such infinite and\r\ncurious pains upon Cicero the Orator and Hermogenes the\r\nRhetorician, besides his own books of Periods and Imitation, and\r\nthe like. Then did Car of Cambridge and Ascham with their\r\nlectures and writings almost deify Cicero and Demosthenes, and\r\nallure all young men that were studious unto that delicate and\r\npolished kind of learning. Then did Erasmus take occasion\r\nto make the scoffing echo, \u003ci\u003eDecem annos consuumpsi in legendo\r\nCicerone\u003c/i\u003e; and the echo answered in Greek, \u003ci\u003eOne\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003eAsine\u003c/i\u003e. Then grew the learning of the schoolmen to be\r\nutterly despised as barbarous. In sum, the whole\r\ninclination and bent of those times was rather towards copy than\r\nweight.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) Here therefore [is] the first distemper of learning, when\r\nmen study words and not matter; whereof, though I have\r\nrepresented an example of late times, yet it hath been and will\r\nbe \u003ci\u003esecundum majus et minus\u003c/i\u003e in all time. And how is\r\nit possible but this should have an operation to discredit\r\nlearning, even with vulgar capacities, when they see learned\r\nmen’s works like the first letter of a patent or limited\r\nbook, which though it hath large flourishes, yet it is but a\r\nletter? It seems to me that Pygmalion’s frenzy is a\r\ngood emblem or portraiture of this vanity; for words are but the\r\nimages of matter, and except they have life of reason and\r\ninvention, to fall in love with them is all one as to fall in\r\nlove with a picture.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) But yet notwithstanding it is a thing not hastily to be\r\ncondemned, to clothe and adorn the obscurity even of philosophy\r\nitself with sensible and plausible elocution. For hereof we\r\nhave great examples in Xenophon, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and of\r\nPlato also in some degree; and hereof likewise there is great\r\nuse, for surely, to the severe inquisition of truth and the deep\r\nprogress into philosophy, it is some hindrance because it is too\r\nearly satisfactory to the mind of man, and quencheth the desire\r\nof further search before we come to a just period. But then\r\nif a man be to have any use of such knowledge in civil occasions,\r\nof conference, counsel, persuasion, discourse, or the like, then\r\nshall he find it prepared to his hands in those authors which\r\nwrite in that manner. But the excess of this is so justly\r\ncontemptible, that as Hercules, when he saw the image of Adonis,\r\nVenus’ minion, in a temple, said in disdain, \u003ci\u003eNil sacri\r\nes\u003c/i\u003e; so there is none of Hercules’ followers in\r\nlearning—that is, the more severe and laborious sort of\r\ninquirers into truth—but will despise those delicacies and\r\naffectations, as indeed capable of no divineness. And thus\r\nmuch of the first disease or distemper of learning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) The second which followeth is in nature worse than the\r\nformer: for as substance of matter is better than beauty of\r\nwords, so contrariwise vain matter is worse than vain words:\r\nwherein it seemeth the reprehension of St. Paul was not only\r\nproper for those times, but prophetical for the times following;\r\nand not only respective to divinity, but extensive to all\r\nknowledge: \u003ci\u003eDevita profanas vocum novitates\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet\r\noppositiones falsi nominis scientiæ\u003c/i\u003e. For he\r\nassigneth two marks and badges of suspected and falsified\r\nscience: the one, the novelty and strangeness of terms; the\r\nother, the strictness of positions, which of necessity doth\r\ninduce oppositions, and so questions and altercations.\r\nSurely, like as many substances in nature which are solid do\r\nputrefy and corrupt into worms;—so it is the property of\r\ngood and sound knowledge to putrefy and dissolve into a number of\r\nsubtle, idle, unwholesome, and (as I may term them) vermiculate\r\nquestions, which have indeed a kind of quickness and life of\r\nspirit, but no soundness of matter or goodness of quality.\r\nThis kind of degenerate learning did chiefly reign amongst the\r\nschoolmen, who having sharp and strong wits, and abundance of\r\nleisure, and small variety of reading, but their wits being shut\r\nup in the cells of a few authors (chiefly Aristotle their\r\ndictator) as their persons were shut up in the cells of\r\nmonasteries and colleges, and knowing little history, either of\r\nnature or time, did out of no great quantity of matter and\r\ninfinite agitation of wit spin out unto us those laborious webs\r\nof learning which are extant in their books. For the wit\r\nand mind of man, if it work upon matter, which is the\r\ncontemplation of the creatures of God, worketh according to the\r\nstuff and is limited thereby; but if it work upon itself, as the\r\nspider worketh his web, then it is endless, and brings forth\r\nindeed cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness of thread\r\nand work, but of no substance or profit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(6) This same unprofitable subtility or curiosity is of two\r\nsorts: either in the subject itself that they handle, when it is\r\na fruitless speculation or controversy (whereof there are no\r\nsmall number both in divinity and philosophy), or in the manner\r\nor method of handling of a knowledge, which amongst them was\r\nthis—upon every particular position or assertion to frame\r\nobjections, and to those objections, solutions; which solutions\r\nwere for the most part not confutations, but distinctions:\r\nwhereas indeed the strength of all sciences is, as the strength\r\nof the old man’s faggot, in the bond. For the harmony\r\nof a science, supporting each part the other, is and ought to be\r\nthe true and brief confutation and suppression of all the smaller\r\nsort of objections. But, on the other side, if you take out\r\nevery axiom, as the sticks of the faggot, one by one, you may\r\nquarrel with them and bend them and break them at your pleasure:\r\nso that, as was said of Seneca, \u003ci\u003eVerborum minutiis rerum\r\nfrangit pondera\u003c/i\u003e, so a man may truly say of the schoolmen,\r\n\u003ci\u003eQuæstionum minutiis scientiarum frangunt\r\nsoliditatem\u003c/i\u003e. For were it not better for a man in fair\r\nroom to set up one great light, or branching candlestick of\r\nlights, than to go about with a small watch-candle into every\r\ncorner? And such is their method, that rests not so much\r\nupon evidence of truth proved by arguments, authorities,\r\nsimilitudes, examples, as upon particular confutations and\r\nsolutions of every scruple, cavillation, and objection; breeding\r\nfor the most part one question as fast as it solveth another;\r\neven as in the former resemblance, when you carry the light into\r\none corner, you darken the rest; so that the fable and fiction of\r\nScylla seemeth to be a lively image of this kind of philosophy or\r\nknowledge; which was transformed into a comely virgin for the\r\nupper parts; but then \u003ci\u003eCandida succinctam latrantibus inguina\r\nmonstris\u003c/i\u003e: so the generalities of the schoolmen are for a\r\nwhile good and proportionable; but then when you descend into\r\ntheir distinctions and decisions, instead of a fruitful womb for\r\nthe use and benefit of man’s life, they end in monstrous\r\naltercations and barking questions. So as it is not\r\npossible but this quality of knowledge must fall under popular\r\ncontempt, the people being apt to contemn truths upon occasion of\r\ncontroversies and altercations, and to think they are all out of\r\ntheir way which never meet; and when they see such digladiation\r\nabout subtleties, and matters of no use or moment, they easily\r\nfall upon that judgment of Dionysius of Syracusa, \u003ci\u003eVerba ista\r\nsunt senum otiosorum\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(7) Notwithstanding, certain it is that if those schoolmen to\r\ntheir great thirst of truth and unwearied travail of wit had\r\njoined variety and universality of reading and contemplation,\r\nthey had proved excellent lights, to the great advancement of all\r\nlearning and knowledge; but as they are, they are great\r\nundertakers indeed, and fierce with dark keeping. But as in\r\nthe inquiry of the divine truth, their pride inclined to leave\r\nthe oracle of God’s word, and to vanish in the mixture of\r\ntheir own inventions; so in the inquisition of nature, they ever\r\nleft the oracle of God’s works, and adored the deceiving\r\nand deformed images which the unequal mirror of their own minds,\r\nor a few received authors or principles, did represent unto\r\nthem. And thus much for the second disease of learning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(8) For the third vice or disease of learning, which\r\nconcerneth deceit or untruth, it is of all the rest the foulest;\r\nas that which doth destroy the essential form of knowledge, which\r\nis nothing but a representation of truth: for the truth of being\r\nand the truth of knowing are one, differing no more than the\r\ndirect beam and the beam reflected. This vice therefore\r\nbrancheth itself into two sorts; delight in deceiving and aptness\r\nto be deceived; imposture and credulity; which, although they\r\nappear to be of a diverse nature, the one seeming to proceed of\r\ncunning and the other of simplicity, yet certainly they do for\r\nthe most part concur: for, as the verse noteth—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Percontatorem fugito, nam garrulus idem\r\nest,”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ean inquisitive man is a prattler; so upon the like reason a\r\ncredulous man is a deceiver: as we see it in fame, that he that\r\nwill easily believe rumours will as easily augment rumours and\r\nadd somewhat to them of his own; which Tacitus wisely noteth,\r\nwhen he saith, \u003ci\u003eFingunt simul creduntque\u003c/i\u003e: so great an\r\naffinity hath fiction and belief.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(9) This facility of credit and accepting or admitting things\r\nweakly authorised or warranted is of two kinds according to the\r\nsubject: for it is either a belief of history, or, as the lawyers\r\nspeak, matter of fact; or else of matter of art and\r\nopinion. As to the former, we see the experience and\r\ninconvenience of this error in ecclesiastical history; which hath\r\ntoo easily received and registered reports and narrations of\r\nmiracles wrought by martyrs, hermits, or monks of the desert, and\r\nother holy men, and their relics, shrines, chapels and images:\r\nwhich though they had a passage for a time by the ignorance of\r\nthe people, the superstitious simplicity of some and the politic\r\ntoleration of others holding them but as divine poesies, yet\r\nafter a period of time, when the mist began to clear up, they\r\ngrew to be esteemed but as old wives’ fables, impostures of\r\nthe clergy, illusions of spirits, and badges of Antichrist, to\r\nthe great scandal and detriment of religion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(10) So in natural history, we see there hath not been that\r\nchoice and judgment used as ought to have been; as may appear in\r\nthe writings of Plinius, Cardanus, Albertus, and divers of the\r\nArabians, being fraught with much fabulous matter, a great part\r\nnot only untried, but notoriously untrue, to the great derogation\r\nof the credit of natural philosophy with the grave and sober kind\r\nof wits: wherein the wisdom and integrity of Aristotle is worthy\r\nto be observed, that, having made so diligent and exquisite a\r\nhistory of living creatures, hath mingled it sparingly with any\r\nvain or feigned matter; and yet on the other side hath cast all\r\nprodigious narrations, which he thought worthy the recording,\r\ninto one book, excellently discerning that matter of manifest\r\ntruth, such whereupon observation and rule was to be built, was\r\nnot to be mingled or weakened with matter of doubtful credit; and\r\nyet again, that rarities and reports that seem uncredible are not\r\nto be suppressed or denied to the memory of men.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(11) And as for the facility of credit which is yielded to\r\narts and opinions, it is likewise of two kinds; either when too\r\nmuch belief is attributed to the arts themselves, or to certain\r\nauthors in any art. The sciences themselves, which have had\r\nbetter intelligence and confederacy with the imagination of man\r\nthan with his reason, are three in number: astrology, natural\r\nmagic, and alchemy; of which sciences, nevertheless, the ends or\r\npretences are noble. For astrology pretendeth to discover\r\nthat correspondence or concatenation which is between the\r\nsuperior globe and the inferior; natural magic pretendeth to call\r\nand reduce natural philosophy from variety of speculations to the\r\nmagnitude of works; and alchemy pretendeth to make separation of\r\nall the unlike parts of bodies which in mixtures of natures are\r\nincorporate. But the derivations and prosecutions to these\r\nends, both in the theories and in the practices, are full of\r\nerror and vanity; which the great professors themselves have\r\nsought to veil over and conceal by enigmatical writings, and\r\nreferring themselves to auricular traditions and such other\r\ndevices, to save the credit of impostures. And yet surely\r\nto alchemy this right is due, that it may be compared to the\r\nhusbandman whereof Æsop makes the fable; that, when he\r\ndied, told his sons that he had left unto them gold buried\r\nunderground in his vineyard; and they digged over all the ground,\r\nand gold they found none; but by reason of their stirring and\r\ndigging the mould about the roots of their vines, they had a\r\ngreat vintage the year following: so assuredly the search and\r\nstir to make gold hath brought to light a great number of good\r\nand fruitful inventions and experiments, as well for the\r\ndisclosing of nature as for the use of man’s life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(12) And as for the overmuch credit that hath been given unto\r\nauthors in sciences, in making them dictators, that their words\r\nshould stand, and not consuls, to give advice; the damage is\r\ninfinite that sciences have received thereby, as the principal\r\ncause that hath kept them low at a stay without growth or\r\nadvancement. For hence it hath come, that in arts\r\nmechanical the first deviser comes shortest, and time addeth and\r\nperfecteth; but in sciences the first author goeth furthest, and\r\ntime leeseth and corrupteth. So we see artillery, sailing,\r\nprinting, and the like, were grossly managed at the first, and by\r\ntime accommodated and refined; but contrariwise, the philosophies\r\nand sciences of Aristotle, Plato, Democritus, Hippocrates,\r\nEuclides, Archimedes, of most vigour at the first, and by time\r\ndegenerate and imbased: whereof the reason is no other, but that\r\nin the former many wits and industries have contributed in one;\r\nand in the latter many wits and industries have been spent about\r\nthe wit of some one, whom many times they have rather depraved\r\nthan illustrated; for, as water will not ascend higher than the\r\nlevel of the first spring-head from whence it descendeth, so\r\nknowledge derived from Aristotle, and exempted from liberty of\r\nexamination, will not rise again higher than the knowledge of\r\nAristotle. And, therefore, although the position be good,\r\n\u003ci\u003eOportet discentem credere\u003c/i\u003e, yet it must be coupled with\r\nthis, \u003ci\u003eOportet edoctum judicare\u003c/i\u003e; for disciples do owe unto\r\nmasters only a temporary belief and a suspension of their own\r\njudgment till they be fully instructed, and not an absolute\r\nresignation or perpetual captivity; and therefore, to conclude\r\nthis point, I will say no more, but so let great authors have\r\ntheir due, as time, which is the author of authors, be not\r\ndeprived of his due—which is, further and further to\r\ndiscover truth. Thus have I gone over these three diseases\r\nof learning; besides the which there are some other rather\r\npeccant humours than formed diseases, which, nevertheless, are\r\nnot so secret and intrinsic, but that they fall under a popular\r\nobservation and traducement, and, therefore, are not to be passed\r\nover.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eV. (1) The first of these is the extreme affecting of two\r\nextremities: the one antiquity, the other novelty; wherein it\r\nseemeth the children of time do take after the nature and malice\r\nof the father. For as he devoureth his children, so one of\r\nthem seeketh to devour and suppress the other; while antiquity\r\nenvieth there should be new additions, and novelty cannot be\r\ncontent to add but it must deface; surely the advice of the\r\nprophet is the true direction in this matter, \u003ci\u003eState super vias\r\nantiquas\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet videte quænam sit via recta et bona et\r\nambulate in ea\u003c/i\u003e. Antiquity deserveth that reverence,\r\nthat men should make a stand thereupon and discover what is the\r\nbest way; but when the discovery is well taken, then to make\r\nprogression. And to speak truly, \u003ci\u003eAntiquitas sæculi\r\njuventus mundi\u003c/i\u003e. These times are the ancient times, when\r\nthe world is ancient, and not those which we account ancient\r\n\u003ci\u003eordine retrogrado\u003c/i\u003e, by a computation backward from\r\nourselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) Another error induced by the former is a distrust that\r\nanything should be now to be found out, which the world should\r\nhave missed and passed over so long time: as if the same\r\nobjection were to be made to time that Lucian maketh to Jupiter\r\nand other the heathen gods; of which he wondereth that they begot\r\nso many children in old time, and begot none in his time; and\r\nasketh whether they were become septuagenary, or whether the law\r\n\u003ci\u003ePapia\u003c/i\u003e, made against old men’s marriages, had\r\nrestrained them. So it seemeth men doubt lest time is\r\nbecome past children and generation; wherein contrariwise we see\r\ncommonly the levity and unconstancy of men’s judgments,\r\nwhich, till a matter be done, wonder that it can be done; and as\r\nsoon as it is done, wonder again that it was no sooner done: as\r\nwe see in the expedition of Alexander into Asia, which at first\r\nwas prejudged as a vast and impossible enterprise; and yet\r\nafterwards it pleaseth Livy to make no more of it than this,\r\n\u003ci\u003eNil aliud quàm bene ausus vana contemnere\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nAnd the same happened to Columbus in the western\r\nnavigation. But in intellectual matters it is much more\r\ncommon, as may be seen in most of the propositions of Euclid;\r\nwhich till they be demonstrate, they seem strange to our assent;\r\nbut being demonstrate, our mind accepteth of them by a kind of\r\nrelation (as the lawyers speak), as if we had known them\r\nbefore.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) Another error, that hath also some affinity with the\r\nformer, is a conceit that of former opinions or sects after\r\nvariety and examination the best hath still prevailed and\r\nsuppressed the rest; so as if a man should begin the labour of a\r\nnew search, he were but like to light upon somewhat formerly\r\nrejected, and by rejection brought into oblivion; as if the\r\nmultitude, or the wisest for the multitude’s sake, were not\r\nready to give passage rather to that which is popular and\r\nsuperficial than to that which is substantial and profound for\r\nthe truth is, that time seemeth to be of the nature of a river or\r\nstream, which carrieth down to us that which is light and blown\r\nup, and sinketh and drowneth that which is weighty and solid.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) Another error, of a diverse nature from all the former, is\r\nthe over-early and peremptory reduction of knowledge into arts\r\nand methods; from which time commonly sciences receive small or\r\nno augmentation. But as young men, when they knit and shape\r\nperfectly, do seldom grow to a further stature, so knowledge,\r\nwhile it is in aphorisms and observations, it is in growth; but\r\nwhen it once is comprehended in exact methods, it may, perchance,\r\nbe further polished, and illustrate and accommodated for use and\r\npractice, but it increaseth no more in bulk and substance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) Another error which doth succeed that which we last\r\nmentioned is, that after the distribution of particular arts and\r\nsciences, men have abandoned universality, or \u003ci\u003ephilosophia\r\nprima\u003c/i\u003e, which cannot but cease and stop all progression.\r\nFor no perfect discovery can be made upon a flat or a level;\r\nneither is it possible to discover the more remote and deeper\r\nparts of any science if you stand but upon the level of the same\r\nscience, and ascend not to a higher science.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(6) Another error hath proceeded from too great a reverence,\r\nand a kind of adoration of the mind and understanding of man; by\r\nmeans whereof, men have withdrawn themselves too much from the\r\ncontemplation of nature, and the observations of experience, and\r\nhave tumbled up and down in their own reason and conceits.\r\nUpon these intellectualists, which are notwithstanding commonly\r\ntaken for the most sublime and divine philosophers, Heraclitus\r\ngave a just censure, saying:—“Men sought truth in\r\ntheir own little worlds, and not in the great and common\r\nworld;” for they disdain to spell, and so by degrees to\r\nread in the volume of God’s works; and contrariwise by\r\ncontinual meditation and agitation of wit do urge and, as it\r\nwere, invocate their own spirits to divine and give oracles unto\r\nthem, whereby they are deservedly deluded.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(7) Another error that hath some connection with this latter\r\nis, that men have used to infect their meditations, opinions, and\r\ndoctrines with some conceits which they have most admired, or\r\nsome sciences which they have most applied, and given all things\r\nelse a tincture according to them, utterly untrue and\r\nimproper. So hath Plato intermingled his philosophy with\r\ntheology, and Aristotle with logic; and the second school of\r\nPlato, Proclus and the rest, with the mathematics; for these were\r\nthe arts which had a kind of primogeniture with them\r\nseverally. So have the alchemists made a philosophy out of\r\na few experiments of the furnace; and Gilbertus our countryman\r\nhath made a philosophy out of the observations of a\r\nloadstone. So Cicero, when reciting the several opinions of\r\nthe nature of the soul, he found a musician that held the soul\r\nwas but a harmony, saith pleasantly, \u003ci\u003eHic ab arte sua non\r\nrecessit\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003e\u0026amp;c.\u003c/i\u003e But of these conceits\r\nAristotle speaketh seriously and wisely when he saith, \u003ci\u003eQui\r\nrespiciunt ad pauca de facili pronunciant\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(8) Another error is an impatience of doubt, and haste to\r\nassertion without due and mature suspension of judgment.\r\nFor the two ways of contemplation are not unlike the two ways of\r\naction commonly spoken of by the ancients: the one plain and\r\nsmooth in the beginning, and in the end impassable; the other\r\nrough and troublesome in the entrance, but after a while fair and\r\neven. So it is in contemplation: if a man will begin with\r\ncertainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to\r\nbegin with doubts, he shall end in certainties.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(9) Another error is in the manner of the tradition and\r\ndelivery of knowledge, which is for the most part magistral and\r\nperemptory, and not ingenuous and faithful; in a sort as may be\r\nsoonest believed, and not easiest examined. It is true,\r\nthat in compendious treatises for practice that form is not to be\r\ndisallowed; but in the true handling of knowledge men ought not\r\nto fall either on the one side into the vein of Velleius the\r\nEpicurean, \u003ci\u003eNil tam metuens quam ne dubitare aliqua de\r\nrevideretur\u003c/i\u003e: nor, on the other side, into Socrates, his\r\nironical doubting of all things; but to propound things sincerely\r\nwith more or less asseveration, as they stand in a man’s\r\nown judgment proved more or less.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(10) Other errors there are in the scope that men propound to\r\nthemselves, whereunto they bend their endeavours; for, whereas\r\nthe more constant and devote kind of professors of any science\r\nought to propound to themselves to make some additions to their\r\nscience, they convert their labours to aspire to certain second\r\nprizes: as to be a profound interpreter or commentor, to be a\r\nsharp champion or defender, to be a methodical compounder or\r\nabridger, and so the patrimony of knowledge cometh to be\r\nsometimes improved, but seldom augmented.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(11) But the greatest error of all the rest is the mistaking\r\nor misplacing of the last or furthest end of knowledge. For\r\nmen have entered into a desire of learning and knowledge,\r\nsometimes upon a natural curiosity and inquisitive appetite;\r\nsometimes to entertain their minds with variety and delight;\r\nsometimes for ornament and reputation; and sometimes to enable\r\nthem to victory of wit and contradiction; and most times for\r\nlucre and profession; and seldom sincerely to give a true account\r\nof their gift of reason to the benefit and use of men: as if\r\nthere were sought in knowledge a couch whereupon to rest a\r\nsearching and restless spirit; or a terrace for a wandering and\r\nvariable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect; or a\r\ntower of state, for a proud mind to raise itself upon; or a fort\r\nor commanding ground, for strife and contention; or a shop, for\r\nprofit or sale; and not a rich storehouse for the glory of the\r\nCreator and the relief of man’s estate. But this is\r\nthat which will indeed dignify and exalt knowledge, if\r\ncontemplation and action may be more nearly and straitly\r\nconjoined and united together than they have been: a conjunction\r\nlike unto that of the two highest planets, Saturn, the planet of\r\nrest and contemplation; and Jupiter, the planet of civil society\r\nand action, howbeit, I do not mean, when I speak of use and\r\naction, that end before-mentioned of the applying of knowledge to\r\nlucre and profession; for I am not ignorant how much that\r\ndiverteth and interrupteth the prosecution and advancement of\r\nknowledge, like unto the golden ball thrown before Atalanta,\r\nwhich, while she goeth aside and stoopeth to take up, the race is\r\nhindered,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Declinat cursus, aurumque volubile\r\ntollit.” \u003ca name=\"citation39\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#footnote39\" class=\"citation\"\u003e[39]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNeither is my meaning, as was spoken of Socrates, to call\r\nphilosophy down from heaven to converse upon the earth—that\r\nis, to leave natural philosophy aside, and to apply knowledge\r\nonly to manners and policy. But as both heaven and earth do\r\nconspire and contribute to the use and benefit of man, so the end\r\nought to be, from both philosophies to separate and reject vain\r\nspeculations, and whatsoever is empty and void, and to preserve\r\nand augment whatsoever is solid and fruitful; that knowledge may\r\nnot be as a courtesan, for pleasure and vanity only, or as a\r\nbond-woman, to acquire and gain to her master’s use; but as\r\na spouse, for generation, fruit, and comfort.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(12) Thus have I described and opened, as by a kind of\r\ndissection, those peccant humours (the principal of them) which\r\nhave not only given impediment to the proficience of learning,\r\nbut have given also occasion to the traducement thereof: wherein,\r\nif I have been too plain, it must be remembered, \u003ci\u003efidelia\r\nvulnera amantis\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esed dolosa oscula malignantis\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThis I think I have gained, that I ought to be the better\r\nbelieved in that which I shall say pertaining to commendation;\r\nbecause I have proceeded so freely in that which concerneth\r\ncensure. And yet I have no purpose to enter into a\r\nlaudative of learning, or to make a hymn to the Muses (though I\r\nam of opinion that it is long since their rites were duly\r\ncelebrated), but my intent is, without varnish or amplification\r\njustly to weigh the dignity of knowledge in the balance with\r\nother things, and to take the true value thereof by testimonies\r\nand arguments, divine and human.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVI. (1) First, therefore, let us seek the dignity of knowledge\r\nin the archetype or first platform, which is in the attributes\r\nand acts of God, as far as they are revealed to man and may be\r\nobserved with sobriety; wherein we may not seek it by the name of\r\nlearning, for all learning is knowledge acquired, and all\r\nknowledge in God is original, and therefore we must look for it\r\nby another name, that of wisdom or sapience, as the Scriptures\r\ncall it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) It is so, then, that in the work of the creation we see a\r\ndouble emanation of virtue from God; the one referring more\r\nproperly to power, the other to wisdom; the one expressed in\r\nmaking the subsistence of the matter, and the other in disposing\r\nthe beauty of the form. This being supposed, it is to be\r\nobserved that for anything which appeareth in the history of the\r\ncreation, the confused mass and matter of heaven and earth was\r\nmade in a moment, and the order and disposition of that chaos or\r\nmass was the work of six days; such a note of difference it\r\npleased God to put upon the works of power, and the works of\r\nwisdom; wherewith concurreth, that in the former it is not set\r\ndown that God said, “Let there be heaven and earth,”\r\nas it is set down of the works following; but actually, that God\r\nmade heaven and earth: the one carrying the style of a\r\nmanufacture, and the other of a law, decree, or counsel.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) To proceed, to that which is next in order from God, to\r\nspirits: we find, as far as credit is to be given to the\r\ncelestial hierarchy of that supposed Dionysius, the senator of\r\nAthens, the first place or degree is given to the angels of love,\r\nwhich are termed seraphim; the second to the angels of light,\r\nwhich are termed cherubim; and the third, and so following\r\nplaces, to thrones, principalities, and the rest, which are all\r\nangels of power and ministry; so as this angels of knowledge and\r\nillumination are placed before the angels of office and\r\ndomination.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) To descend from spirits and intellectual forms to sensible\r\nand material forms, we read the first form that was created was\r\nlight, which hath a relation and correspondence in nature and\r\ncorporal things to knowledge in spirits and incorporal\r\nthings.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) So in the distribution of days we see the day wherein God\r\ndid rest and contemplate His own works was blessed above all the\r\ndays wherein He did effect and accomplish them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(6) After the creation was finished, it is set down unto us\r\nthat man was placed in the garden to work therein; which work, so\r\nappointed to him, could be no other than work of contemplation;\r\nthat is, when the end of work is but for exercise and experiment,\r\nnot for necessity; for there being then no reluctation of the\r\ncreature, nor sweat of the brow, man’s employment must of\r\nconsequence have been matter of delight in the experiment, and\r\nnot matter of labour for the use. Again, the first acts\r\nwhich man performed in Paradise consisted of the two summary\r\nparts of knowledge; the view of creatures, and the imposition of\r\nnames. As for the knowledge which induced the fall, it was,\r\nas was touched before, not the natural knowledge of creatures,\r\nbut the moral knowledge of good and evil; wherein the supposition\r\nwas, that God’s commandments or prohibitions were not the\r\noriginals of good and evil, but that they had other beginnings,\r\nwhich man aspired to know, to the end to make a total defection\r\nfrom God and to depend wholly upon himself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(7) To pass on: in the first event or occurrence after the\r\nfall of man, we see (as the Scriptures have infinite mysteries,\r\nnot violating at all the truth of this story or letter) an image\r\nof the two estates, the contemplative state and the active state,\r\nfigured in the two persons of Abel and Cain, and in the two\r\nsimplest and most primitive trades of life; that of the shepherd\r\n(who, by reason of his leisure, rest in a place, and lying in\r\nview of heaven, is a lively image of a contemplative life), and\r\nthat of the husbandman, where we see again the favour and\r\nelection of God went to the shepherd, and not to the tiller of\r\nthe ground.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(8) So in the age before the flood, the holy records within\r\nthose few memorials which are there entered and registered have\r\nvouchsafed to mention and honour the name of the inventors and\r\nauthors of music and works in metal. In the age after the\r\nflood, the first great judgment of God upon the ambition of man\r\nwas the confusion of tongues; whereby the open trade and\r\nintercourse of learning and knowledge was chiefly imbarred.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(9) To descend to Moses the lawgiver, and God’s first\r\npen: he is adorned by the Scriptures with this addition and\r\ncommendation, “That he was seen in all the learning of the\r\nEgyptians,” which nation we know was one of the most\r\nancient schools of the world: for so Plato brings in the Egyptian\r\npriest saying unto Solon, “You Grecians are ever children;\r\nyou have no knowledge of antiquity, nor antiquity of\r\nknowledge.” Take a view of the ceremonial law of\r\nMoses; you shall find, besides the prefiguration of Christ, the\r\nbadge or difference of the people of God, the exercise and\r\nimpression of obedience, and other divine uses and fruits\r\nthereof, that some of the most learned Rabbins have travailed\r\nprofitably and profoundly to observe, some of them a natural,\r\nsome of them a moral sense, or reduction of many of the\r\nceremonies and ordinances. As in the law of the leprosy,\r\nwhere it is said, “If the whiteness have overspread the\r\nflesh, the patient may pass abroad for clean; but if there be any\r\nwhole flesh remaining, he is to be shut up for unclean;”\r\none of them noteth a principle of nature, that putrefaction is\r\nmore contagious before maturity than after; and another noteth a\r\nposition of moral philosophy, that men abandoned to vice do not\r\nso much corrupt manners, as those that are half good and half\r\nevil. So in this and very many other places in that law,\r\nthere is to be found, besides the theological sense, much\r\naspersion of philosophy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(10) So likewise in that excellent hook of Job, if it be\r\nrevolved with diligence, it will be found pregnant and swelling\r\nwith natural philosophy; as for example, cosmography, and the\r\nroundness of the world, \u003ci\u003eQui extendit aquilonem super\r\nvacuum\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet appendit terram super nihilum\u003c/i\u003e; wherein the\r\npensileness of the earth, the pole of the north, and the\r\nfiniteness or convexity of heaven are manifestly touched.\r\nSo again, matter of astronomy: \u003ci\u003eSpiritus ejus ornavit\r\ncælos\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet obstetricante manu ejus eductus est\r\nColuber tortuoses\u003c/i\u003e. And in another place, \u003ci\u003eNunquid\r\nconjungere valebis micantes stellas Pleiadas\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eaut gyrum\r\nArcturi poteris dissipare\u003c/i\u003e? Where the fixing of the\r\nstars, ever standing at equal distance, is with great elegancy\r\nnoted. And in another place, \u003ci\u003eQui facit Arcturum\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003eet Oriona\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet Hyadas\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet interiora Austri\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nwhere again he takes knowledge of the depression of the southern\r\npole, calling it the secrets of the south, because the southern\r\nstars were in that climate unseen. Matter of generation:\r\n\u003ci\u003eAnnon sicut lac mulsisti me\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet sicut caseum coagulasti\r\nme\u003c/i\u003e? \u0026amp;c. Matter of minerals: \u003ci\u003eHabet argentum\r\nvenarum suarum principia\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003eet auro locus est in quo\r\nconflatur\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eferrum de terra tollitur\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet lapis\r\nsolutus calore in æs vertitur\u003c/i\u003e; and so forwards in that\r\nchapter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(11) So likewise in the person of Solomon the king, we see the\r\ngift or endowment of wisdom and learning, both in Solomon’s\r\npetition and in God’s assent thereunto, preferred before\r\nall other terrene and temporal felicity. By virtue of which\r\ngrant or donative of God Solomon became enabled not only to write\r\nthose excellent parables or aphorisms concerning divine and moral\r\nphilosophy, but also to compile a natural history of all verdure,\r\nfrom the cedar upon the mountain to the moss upon the wall (which\r\nis but a rudiment between putrefaction and an herb), and also of\r\nall things that breathe or move. Nay, the same Solomon the\r\nking, although he excelled in the glory of treasure and\r\nmagnificent buildings, of shipping and navigation, of service and\r\nattendance, of fame and renown, and the like, yet he maketh no\r\nclaim to any of those glories, but only to the glory of\r\ninquisition of truth; for so he saith expressly, “The glory\r\nof God is to conceal a thing, but the glory of the king is to\r\nfind it out;” as if, according to the innocent play of\r\nchildren, the Divine Majesty took delight to hide His works, to\r\nthe end to have them found out; and as if kings could not obtain\r\na greater honour than to be God’s playfellows in that game;\r\nconsidering the great commandment of wits and means, whereby\r\nnothing needeth to be hidden from them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(12) Neither did the dispensation of God vary in the times\r\nafter our Saviour came into the world; for our Saviour himself\r\ndid first show His power to subdue ignorance, by His conference\r\nwith the priests and doctors of the law, before He showed His\r\npower to subdue nature by His miracles. And the coming of\r\nthis Holy Spirit was chiefly figured and expressed in the\r\nsimilitude and gift of tongues, which are but \u003ci\u003evehicula\r\nscientiæ\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(13) So in the election of those instruments, which it pleased\r\nGod to use for the plantation of the faith, notwithstanding that\r\nat the first He did employ persons altogether unlearned,\r\notherwise than by inspiration, more evidently to declare His\r\nimmediate working, and to abase all human wisdom or knowledge;\r\nyet nevertheless that counsel of His was no sooner performed, but\r\nin the next vicissitude and succession He did send His divine\r\ntruth into the world, waited on with other learnings, as with\r\nservants or handmaids: for so we see St. Paul, who was only\r\nlearned amongst the Apostles, had his pen most used in the\r\nScriptures of the New Testament.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(14) So again we find that many of the ancient bishops and\r\nfathers of the Church were excellently read and studied in all\r\nthe learning of this heathen; insomuch that the edict of the\r\nEmperor Julianus (whereby it was interdicted unto Christians to\r\nbe admitted into schools, lectures, or exercises of learning) was\r\nesteemed and accounted a more pernicious engine and machination\r\nagainst the Christian Faith than were all the sanguinary\r\nprosecutions of his predecessors; neither could the emulation and\r\njealousy of Gregory, the first of that name, Bishop of Rome, ever\r\nobtain the opinion of piety or devotion; but contrariwise\r\nreceived the censure of humour, malignity, and pusillanimity,\r\neven amongst holy men; in that he designed to obliterate and\r\nextinguish the memory of heathen antiquity and authors. But\r\ncontrariwise it was the Christian Church, which, amidst the\r\ninundations of the Scythians on the one side from the north-west,\r\nand the Saracens from the east, did preserve in the sacred lap\r\nand bosom thereof the precious relics even of heathen learning,\r\nwhich otherwise had been extinguished, as if no such thing had\r\never been.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(15) And we see before our eyes, that in the age of ourselves\r\nand our fathers, when it pleased God to call the Church of Rome\r\nto account for their degenerate manners and ceremonies, and\r\nsundry doctrines obnoxious and framed to uphold the same abuses;\r\nat one and the same time it was ordained by the Divine Providence\r\nthat there should attend withal a renovation and new spring of\r\nall other knowledges. And on the other side we see the\r\nJesuits, who partly in themselves, and partly by the emulation\r\nand provocation of their example, have much quickened and\r\nstrengthened the state of learning; we see (I say) what notable\r\nservice and reparation they have done to the Roman see.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(16) Wherefore, to conclude this part, let it be observed,\r\nthat there be two principal duties and services, besides ornament\r\nand illustration, which philosophy and human learning do perform\r\nto faith and religion. The one, because they are an\r\neffectual inducement to the exaltation of the glory of God.\r\nFor as the Psalms and other Scriptures do often invite us to\r\nconsider and magnify the great and wonderful works of God, so if\r\nwe should rest only in the contemplation of the exterior of them\r\nas they first offer themselves to our senses, we should do a like\r\ninjury unto the majesty of God, as if we should judge or construe\r\nof the store of some excellent jeweller by that only which is set\r\nout toward the street in his shop. The other, because they\r\nminister a singular help and preservative against unbelief and\r\nerror. For our Saviour saith, “You err, not knowing\r\nthe Scriptures, nor the power of God;” laying before us two\r\nbooks or volumes to study, if we will be secured from error:\r\nfirst the Scriptures, revealing the will of God, and then the\r\ncreatures expressing His power; whereof the latter is a key unto\r\nthe former: not only opening our understanding to conceive the\r\ntrue sense of the Scriptures by the general notions of reason and\r\nrules of speech, but chiefly opening our belief, in drawing us\r\ninto a due meditation of the omnipotency of God, which is chiefly\r\nsigned and engraven upon His works. Thus much therefore for\r\ndivine testimony and evidence concerning the true dignity and\r\nvalue of learning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVII. (1) As for human proofs, it is so large a field, as in a\r\ndiscourse of this nature and brevity it is fit rather to use\r\nchoice of those things which we shall produce, than to embrace\r\nthe variety of them. First, therefore, in the degrees of\r\nhuman honour amongst the heathen, it was the highest to obtain to\r\na veneration and adoration as a God. This unto the\r\nChristians is as the forbidden fruit. But we speak now\r\nseparately of human testimony, according to which—that\r\nwhich the Grecians call \u003ci\u003eapotheosis\u003c/i\u003e, and the Latins\r\n\u003ci\u003erelatio inter divos\u003c/i\u003e—was the supreme honour which man\r\ncould attribute unto man, specially when it was given, not by a\r\nformal decree or act of state (as it was used among the Roman\r\nEmperors), but by an inward assent and belief. Which\r\nhonour, being so high, had also a degree or middle term; for\r\nthere were reckoned above human honours, honours heroical and\r\ndivine: in the attribution and distribution of which honours we\r\nsee antiquity made this difference; that whereas founders and\r\nuniters of states and cities, lawgivers, extirpers of tyrants,\r\nfathers of the people, and other eminent persons in civil merit,\r\nwere honoured but with the titles of worthies or demigods, such\r\nas were Hercules, Theseus, Minus, Romulus, and the like; on the\r\nother side, such as were inventors and authors of new arts,\r\nendowments, and commodities towards man’s life, were ever\r\nconsecrated amongst the gods themselves, as was Ceres, Bacchus,\r\nMercurius, Apollo, and others. And justly; for the merit of\r\nthe former is confined within the circle of an age or a nation,\r\nand is like fruitful showers, which though they be profitable and\r\ngood, yet serve but for that season, and for a latitude of ground\r\nwhere they fall; but the other is, indeed, like the benefits of\r\nheaven, which are permanent and universal. The former again\r\nis mixed with strife and perturbation, but the latter hath the\r\ntrue character of Divine Presence, coming in \u003ci\u003eaura leni\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nwithout noise or agitation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) Neither is certainly that other merit of learning, in\r\nrepressing the inconveniences which grow from man to man, much\r\ninferior to the former, of relieving the necessities which arise\r\nfrom nature, which merit was lively set forth by the ancients in\r\nthat feigned relation of Orpheus’ theatre, where all beasts\r\nand birds assembled, and, forgetting their several\r\nappetites—some of prey, some of game, some of\r\nquarrel—stood all sociably together listening unto the airs\r\nand accords of the harp, the sound whereof no sooner ceased, or\r\nwas drowned by some louder noise, but every beast returned to his\r\nown nature; wherein is aptly described the nature and condition\r\nof men, who are full of savage and unreclaimed desires, of\r\nprofit, of lust, of revenge; which as long as they give ear to\r\nprecepts, to laws, to religion, sweetly touched with eloquence\r\nand persuasion of books, of sermons, of harangues, so long is\r\nsociety and peace maintained; but if these instruments be silent,\r\nor that sedition and tumult make them not audible, all things\r\ndissolve into anarchy and confusion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) But this appeareth more manifestly when kings themselves,\r\nor persons of authority under them, or other governors in\r\ncommonwealths and popular estates, are endued with\r\nlearning. For although he might be thought partial to his\r\nown profession that said “Then should people and estates be\r\nhappy when either kings were philosophers, or philosophers\r\nkings;” yet so much is verified by experience, that under\r\nlearned princes and governors there have been ever the best\r\ntimes: for howsoever kings may have their imperfections in their\r\npassions and customs, yet, if they be illuminate by learning,\r\nthey have those notions of religion, policy, and morality, which\r\ndo preserve them and refrain them from all ruinous and peremptory\r\nerrors and excesses, whispering evermore in their ears, when\r\ncounsellors and servants stand mute and silent. And\r\nsenators or counsellors, likewise, which be learned, to proceed\r\nupon more safe and substantial principles, than counsellors which\r\nare only men of experience; the one sort keeping dangers afar\r\noff, whereas the other discover them not till they come near\r\nhand, and then trust to the agility of their wit to ward or avoid\r\nthem.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) Which felicity of times under learned princes (to keep\r\nstill the law of brevity, by using the most eminent and selected\r\nexamples) doth best appear in the age which passed from the death\r\nof Domitianus the emperor until the reign of Commodus;\r\ncomprehending a succession of six princes, all learned, or\r\nsingular favourers and advancers of learning, which age for\r\ntemporal respects was the most happy and flourishing that ever\r\nthe Roman Empire (which then was a model of the world)\r\nenjoyed—a matter revealed and prefigured unto Domitian in a\r\ndream the night before he was slain: for he thought there was\r\ngrown behind upon his shoulders a neck and a head of gold, which\r\ncame accordingly to pass in those golden times which succeeded;\r\nof which princes we will make some commemoration; wherein,\r\nalthough the matter will be vulgar, and may be thought fitter for\r\na declamation than agreeable to a treatise infolded as this is,\r\nyet, because it is pertinent to the point in hand—\u003ci\u003eNeque\r\nsemper arcum tendit Apollo\u003c/i\u003e—and to name them only were\r\ntoo naked and cursory, I will not omit it altogether. The\r\nfirst was Nerva, the excellent temper of whose government is by a\r\nglance in Cornelius Tacitus touched to the life: \u003ci\u003ePostquam\r\ndivus Nerva res oluim insociabiles miscuisset\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eimperium et\r\nlibertatem\u003c/i\u003e. And in token of his learning, the last act\r\nof his short reign left to memory was a missive to his adopted\r\nson, Trajan, proceeding upon some inward discontent at the\r\ningratitude of the times, comprehended in a verse of\r\nHomer’s—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Telis, Phœbe, tuis, lacrymas\r\nulciscere nostras.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) Trajan, who succeeded, was for his person not learned; but\r\nif we will hearken to the speech of our Saviour, that saith,\r\n“He that receiveth a prophet in the name of a prophet shall\r\nhave a prophet’s reward,” he deserveth to be placed\r\namongst the most learned princes; for there was not a greater\r\nadmirer of learning or benefactor of learning, a founder of\r\nfamous libraries, a perpetual advancer of learned men to office,\r\nand familiar converser with learned professors and preceptors who\r\nwere noted to have then most credit in court. On the other\r\nside how much Trajan’s virtue and government was admired\r\nand renowned, surely no testimony of grave and faithful history\r\ndoth more lively set forth than that legend tale of Gregorius\r\nMagnum, Bishop of Rome, who was noted for the extreme envy he\r\nbare towards all heathen excellency; and yet he is reported, out\r\nof the love and estimation of Trajan’s moral virtues, to\r\nhave made unto God passionate and fervent prayers for the\r\ndelivery of his soul out of hell, and to have obtained it, with a\r\ncaveat that he should make no more such petitions. In this\r\nprince’s time also the persecutions against the Christians\r\nreceived intermission upon the certificate of Plinius Secundus, a\r\nman of excellent learning and by Trajan advanced.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(6) Adrian, his successor, was the most curious man that\r\nlived, and the most universal inquirer: insomuch as it was noted\r\nfor an error in his mind that he desired to comprehend all\r\nthings, and not to reserve himself for the worthiest things,\r\nfalling into the like humour that was long before noted in Philip\r\nof Macedon, who, when he would needs overrule and put down an\r\nexcellent musician in an argument touching music, was well\r\nanswered by him again—“God forbid, sir,” saith\r\nhe, “that your fortune should be so bad as to know these\r\nthings better than I.” It pleased God likewise to use\r\nthe curiosity of this emperor as an inducement to the peace of\r\nHis Church in those days; for having Christ in veneration, not as\r\na God or Saviour, but as a wonder or novelty, and having his\r\npicture in his gallery matched with Apollonius (with whom in his\r\nvain imagination he thought its had some conformity), yet it\r\nserved the turn to allay the bitter hatred of those times against\r\nthe Christian name, so as the Church had peace during his\r\ntime. And for his government civil, although he did not\r\nattain to that of Trajan’s in glory of arms or perfection\r\nof justice, yet in deserving of the weal of the subject he did\r\nexceed him. For Trajan erected many famous monuments and\r\nbuildings, insomuch as Constantine the Great in emulation was\r\nwont to call him \u003ci\u003eParietaria\u003c/i\u003e, “wall-flower,”\r\nbecause his name was upon so many walls; but his buildings and\r\nworks were more of glory and triumph than use and\r\nnecessity. But Adrian spent his whole reign, which was\r\npeaceable, in a perambulation or survey of the Roman Empire,\r\ngiving order and making assignation where he went for re-edifying\r\nof cities, towns, and forts decayed, and for cutting of rivers\r\nand streams, and for making bridges and passages, and for\r\npolicing of cities and commonalties with new ordinances and\r\nconstitutions, and granting new franchises and incorporations; so\r\nthat his whole time was a very restoration of all the lapses and\r\ndecays of former times.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(7) Antoninus Pius, who succeeded him, was a prince\r\nexcellently learned, and had the patient and subtle wit of a\r\nschoolman, insomuch as in common speech (which leaves no virtue\r\nuntaxed) he was called \u003ci\u003eCymini Sector\u003c/i\u003e, a carver or a\r\ndivider of cummin seed, which is one of the least seeds.\r\nSuch a patience he had and settled spirit to enter into the least\r\nand most exact differences of causes, a fruit no doubt of the\r\nexceeding tranquillity and serenity of his mind, which being no\r\nways charged or encumbered, either with fears, remorses, or\r\nscruples, but having been noted for a man of the purest goodness,\r\nwithout all fiction or affectation, that hath reigned or lived,\r\nmade his mind continually present and entire. He likewise\r\napproached a degree nearer unto Christianity, and became, as\r\nAgrippa said unto St. Paul, “half a Christian,”\r\nholding their religion and law in good opinion, and not only\r\nceasing persecution, but giving way to the advancement of\r\nChristians.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) There succeeded him the first \u003ci\u003eDivi fratres\u003c/i\u003e, the two\r\nadoptive brethren—Lucius Commodus Verus, son to Ælius\r\nVerus, who delighted much in the softer kind of learning, and was\r\nwont to call the poet Martial his Virgil; and Marcus Aurelius\r\nAntoninus: whereof the latter, who obscured his colleague and\r\nsurvived him long, was named the “Philosopher,” who,\r\nas he excelled all the rest in learning, so he excelled them\r\nlikewise in perfection of all royal virtues; insomuch as Julianus\r\nthe emperor, in his book entitled \u003ci\u003eCærsares\u003c/i\u003e, being as\r\na pasquil or satire to deride all his predecessors, feigned that\r\nthey were all invited to a banquet of the gods, and Silenus the\r\njester sat at the nether end of the table and bestowed a scoff on\r\neveryone as they came in; but when Marcus Philosophus came in,\r\nSilenus was gravelled and out of countenance, not knowing where\r\nto carp at him, save at the last he gave a glance at his patience\r\ntowards his wife. And the virtue of this prince, continued\r\nwith that of his predecessor, made the name of Antoninus so\r\nsacred in the world, that though it were extremely dishonoured in\r\nCommodus, Caracalla, and Heliogabalus, who all bare the name,\r\nyet, when Alexander Severus refused the name because he was a\r\nstranger to the family, the Senate with one acclamation said,\r\n\u003ci\u003eQuomodo Augustus\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esic et Antoninus\u003c/i\u003e. In such\r\nrenown and veneration was the name of these two princes in those\r\ndays, that they would have had it as a perpetual addition in all\r\nthe emperors’ style. In this emperor’s time\r\nalso the Church for the most part was in peace; so as in this\r\nsequence of six princes we do see the blessed effects of learning\r\nin sovereignty, painted forth in the greatest table of the\r\nworld.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(9) But for a tablet or picture of smaller volume (not\r\npresuming to speak of your Majesty that liveth), in my judgment\r\nthe most excellent is that of Queen Elizabeth, your immediate\r\npredecessor in this part of Britain; a prince that, if Plutarch\r\nwere now alive to write lives by parallels, would trouble him, I\r\nthink, to find for her a parallel amongst women. This lady\r\nwas endued with learning in her sex singular, and rare even\r\namongst masculine princes—whether we speak of learning, of\r\nlanguage, or of science, modern or ancient, divinity or\r\nhumanity—and unto the very last year of her life she\r\naccustomed to appoint set hours for reading, scarcely any young\r\nstudent in a university more daily or more duly. As for her\r\ngovernment, I assure myself (I shall not exceed if I do affirm)\r\nthat this part of the island never had forty-five years of better\r\ntines, and yet not through the calmness of the season, but\r\nthrough the wisdom of her regiment. For if there be\r\nconsidered, of the one side, the truth of religion established,\r\nthe constant peace and security, the good administration of\r\njustice, the temperate use of the prerogative, not slackened, nor\r\nmuch strained; the flourishing state of learning, sortable to so\r\nexcellent a patroness; the convenient estate of wealth and means,\r\nboth of crown and subject; the habit of obedience, and the\r\nmoderation of discontents; and there be considered, on the other\r\nside, the differences of religion, the troubles of neighbour\r\ncountries, the ambition of Spain, and opposition of Rome, and\r\nthen that she was solitary and of herself; these things, I say,\r\nconsidered, as I could not have chosen an instance so recent and\r\nso proper, so I suppose I could not have chosen one more\r\nremarkable or eminent to the purpose now in hand, which is\r\nconcerning the conjunction of learning in the prince with\r\nfelicity in the people.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(10) Neither hath learning an influence and operation only\r\nupon civil merit and moral virtue, and the arts or temperature of\r\npeace and peaceable government; but likewise it hath no less\r\npower and efficacy in enablement towards martial and military\r\nvirtue and prowess, as may be notably represented in the examples\r\nof Alexander the Great and Cæsar the Dictator (mentioned\r\nbefore, but now in fit place to be resumed), of whose virtues and\r\nacts in war there needs no note or recital, having been the\r\nwonders of time in that kind; but of their affections towards\r\nlearning and perfections in learning it is pertinent to say\r\nsomewhat.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(11) Alexander was bred and taught under Aristotle, the great\r\nphilosopher, who dedicated divers of his books of philosophy unto\r\nhim; he was attended with Callisthenes and divers other learned\r\npersons, that followed him in camp, throughout his journeys and\r\nconquests. What price and estimation he had learning in\r\ndoth notably appear in these three particulars: first, in the\r\nenvy he used to express that he bare towards Achilles, in this,\r\nthat he had so good a trumpet of his praises as Homer’s\r\nverses; secondly, in the judgment or solution he gave touching\r\nthat precious cabinet of Darius, which was found among his jewels\r\n(whereof question was made what thing was worthy to be put into\r\nit, and he gave his opinion for Homer’s works); thirdly, in\r\nhis letter to Aristotle, after he had set forth his books of\r\nnature, wherein he expostulateth with him for publishing the\r\nsecrets or mysteries of philosophy; and gave him to understand\r\nthat himself esteemed it more to excel other men in learning and\r\nknowledge than in power and empire. And what use he had of\r\nlearning doth appear, or rather shine, in all his speeches and\r\nanswers, being full of science and use of science, and that in\r\nall variety.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(12) And herein again it may seem a thing scholastical, and\r\nsomewhat idle to recite things that every man knoweth; but yet,\r\nsince the argument I handle leadeth me thereunto, I am glad that\r\nmen shall perceive I am as willing to flatter (if they will so\r\ncall it) an Alexander, or a Cæsar, or an Antoninus, that\r\nare dead many hundred years since, as any that now liveth; for it\r\nis the displaying of the glory of learning in sovereignty that I\r\npropound to myself, and not a humour of declaiming in any\r\nman’s praises. Observe, then, the speech he used of\r\nDiogenes, and see if it tend not to the true state of one of the\r\ngreatest questions of moral philosophy: whether the enjoying of\r\noutward things, or the contemning of them, be the greatest\r\nhappiness; for when he saw Diogenes so perfectly contented with\r\nso little, he said to those that mocked at his condition,\r\n“were I not Alexander, I would wish to be\r\nDiogenes.” But Seneca inverteth it, and saith,\r\n“\u003ci\u003ePlus erat\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003equod hic nollet accipere\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003equàm quod ille posset dare\u003c/i\u003e.” There were\r\nmore things which Diogenes would have refused than those were\r\nwhich Alexander could have given or enjoyed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(13) Observe, again, that speech which was usual with\r\nhim,—“That he felt his mortality chiefly in two\r\nthings, sleep and lust;” and see if it were not a speech\r\nextracted out of the depth of natural philosophy, and liker to\r\nhave come out of the mouth of Aristotle or Democritus than from\r\nAlexander.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(14) See, again, that speech of humanity and poesy, when, upon\r\nthe bleeding of his wounds, he called unto him one of his\r\nflatterers, that was wont to ascribe to him divine honour, and\r\nsaid, “Look, this is very blood; this is not such a liquor\r\nas Homer speaketh of, which ran from Venus’ hand when it\r\nwas pierced by Diomedes.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(15) See likewise his readiness in reprehension of logic in\r\nthe speech he used to Cassander, upon a complaint that was made\r\nagainst his father Antipater; for when Alexander happened to say,\r\n“Do you think these men would have come from so far to\r\ncomplain except they had just cause of grief?” and\r\nCassander answered, “Yea, that was the matter, because they\r\nthought they should not be disproved;” said Alexander,\r\nlaughing, “See the subtleties of Aristotle, to take a\r\nmatter both ways, \u003ci\u003epro et contra\u003c/i\u003e, \u0026amp;c.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(16) But note, again, how well he could use the same art which\r\nhe reprehended to serve his own humour: when bearing a secret\r\ngrudge to Callisthenes, because he was against the new ceremony\r\nof his adoration, feasting one night where the same Callisthenes\r\nwas at the table, it was moved by some after supper, for\r\nentertainment sake, that Callisthenes, who was an eloquent man,\r\nmight speak of some theme or purpose at his own choice; which\r\nCallisthenes did, choosing the praise of the Macedonian nation\r\nfor his discourse, and performing the same with so good manner as\r\nthe hearers were much ravished; whereupon Alexander, nothing\r\npleased, said, “It was easy to be eloquent upon so good a\r\nsubject; but,” saith he, “turn your style, and let us\r\nhear what you can say against us;” which Callisthenes\r\npresently undertook, and did with that sting and life that\r\nAlexander interrupted him, and said, “The goodness of the\r\ncause made him eloquent before, and despite made him eloquent\r\nthen again.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(17) Consider further, for tropes of rhetoric, that excellent\r\nuse of a metaphor or translation, wherewith he taxeth Antipater,\r\nwho was an imperious and tyrannous governor; for when one of\r\nAntipater’s friends commended him to Alexander for his\r\nmoderation, that he did not degenerate as his other lieutenants\r\ndid into the Persian pride, in uses of purple, but kept the\r\nancient habit of Macedon, of black. “True,”\r\nsaith Alexander; “but Antipater is all purple\r\nwithin.” Or that other, when Parmenio came to him in\r\nthe plain of Arbela and showed him the innumerable multitude of\r\nhis enemies, specially as they appeared by the infinite number of\r\nlights as it had been a new firmament of stars, and thereupon\r\nadvised him to assail them by night; whereupon he answered,\r\n“That he would not steal the victory.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(18) For matter of policy, weigh that significant distinction,\r\nso much in all ages embraced, that he made between his two\r\nfriends Hephæstion and Craterus, when he said, “That\r\nthe one loved Alexander, and the other loved the king:”\r\ndescribing the principal difference of princes’ best\r\nservants, that some in affection love their person, and other in\r\nduty love their crown.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(19) Weigh also that excellent taxation of an error, ordinary\r\nwith counsellors of princes, that they counsel their masters\r\naccording to the model of their own mind and fortune, and not of\r\ntheir masters. When upon Darius’ great offers\r\nParmenio had said, “Surely I would accept these offers were\r\nI as Alexander;” saith Alexander, “So would I were I\r\nas Parmenio.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(20) Lastly, weigh that quick and acute reply which he made\r\nwhen he gave so large gifts to his friends and servants, and was\r\nasked what he did reserve for himself, and he answered,\r\n“Hope.” Weigh, I say, whether he had not cast\r\nup his account aright, because \u003ci\u003ehope\u003c/i\u003e must be the portion of\r\nall that resolve upon great enterprises; for this was\r\nCæsar’s portion when he went first into Gaul, his\r\nestate being then utterly overthrown with largesses. And\r\nthis was likewise the portion of that noble prince, howsoever\r\ntransported with ambition, Henry Duke of Guise, of whom it was\r\nusually said that he was the greatest usurer in France, because\r\nhe had turned all his estate into obligations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(21) To conclude, therefore, as certain critics are used to\r\nsay hyperbolically, “That if all sciences were lost they\r\nmight be found in Virgil,” so certainly this may be said\r\ntruly, there are the prints and footsteps of learning in those\r\nfew speeches which are reported of this prince, the admiration of\r\nwhom, when I consider him not as Alexander the Great, but as\r\nAristotle’s scholar, hath carried me too far.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(22) As for Julius Cæsar, the excellency of his learning\r\nneedeth not to be argued from his education, or his company, or\r\nhis speeches; but in a further degree doth declare itself in his\r\nwritings and works: whereof some are extant and permanent, and\r\nsome unfortunately perished. For first, we see there is\r\nleft unto us that excellent history of his own wars, which he\r\nentitled only a Commentary, wherein all succeeding times have\r\nadmired the solid weight of matter, and the real passages and\r\nlively images of actions and persons, expressed in the greatest\r\npropriety of words and perspicuity of narration that ever was;\r\nwhich that it was not the effect of a natural gift, but of\r\nlearning and precept, is well witnessed by that work of his\r\nentitled \u003ci\u003eDe Analogia\u003c/i\u003e, being a grammatical philosophy,\r\nwherein he did labour to make this same \u003ci\u003eVox ad placitum\u003c/i\u003e to\r\nbecome \u003ci\u003eVox ad licitum\u003c/i\u003e, and to reduce custom of speech to\r\ncongruity of speech; and took as it were the pictures of words\r\nfrom the life of reason.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(23) So we receive from him, as a monument both of his power\r\nand learning, the then reformed computation of the year; well\r\nexpressing that he took it to be as great a glory to himself to\r\nobserve and know the law of the heavens, as to give law to men\r\nupon the earth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(24) So likewise in that book of his, \u003ci\u003eAnti-Cato\u003c/i\u003e, it may\r\neasily appear that he did aspire as well to victory of wit as\r\nvictory of war: undertaking therein a conflict against the\r\ngreatest champion with the pen that then lived, Cicero the\r\norator.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(25) So, again, in his book of Apophthegms, which he\r\ncollected, we see that he esteemed it more honour to make himself\r\nbut a pair of tables, to take the wise and pithy words of others,\r\nthan to have every word of his own to be made an apophthegm or an\r\noracle, as vain princes, by custom of flattery, pretend to\r\ndo. And yet if I should enumerate divers of his speeches,\r\nas I did those of Alexander, they are truly such as Solomon\r\nnoteth, when he saith, \u003ci\u003eVerba sapientum tanquam aculei\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003eet tanquam clavi in altum defixi\u003c/i\u003e: whereof I will only\r\nrecite three, not so delectable for elegancy, but admirable for\r\nvigour and efficacy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(26) As first, it is reason he be thought a master of words,\r\nthat could with one word appease a mutiny in his army, which was\r\nthus: The Romans, when their generals did speak to their army,\r\ndid use the word \u003ci\u003eMilites\u003c/i\u003e, but when the magistrates spake\r\nto the people they did use the word \u003ci\u003eQuirites\u003c/i\u003e. The\r\nsoldiers were in tumult, and seditiously prayed to be cashiered;\r\nnot that they so meant, but by expostulation thereof to draw\r\nCæsar to other conditions; wherein he being resolute not to\r\ngive way, after some silence, he began his speech, \u003ci\u003eEgo\r\nQuirites\u003c/i\u003e, which did admit them already\r\ncashiered—wherewith they were so surprised, crossed, and\r\nconfused, as they would not suffer him to go on in his speech,\r\nbut relinquished their demands, and made it their suit to be\r\nagain called by the name of \u003ci\u003eMilites\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(27) The second speech was thus: Cæsar did extremely\r\naffect the name of king; and some were set on as he passed by in\r\npopular acclamation to salute him king. Whereupon, finding\r\nthe cry weak and poor, he put it off thus, in a kind of jest, as\r\nif they had mistaken his surname: \u003ci\u003eNon Rex sum\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esed\r\nCæsar\u003c/i\u003e; a speech that, if it be searched, the life and\r\nfulness of it can scarce be expressed. For, first, it was a\r\nrefusal of the name, but yet not serious; again, it did signify\r\nan infinite confidence and magnanimity, as if he presumed\r\nCæsar was the greater title, as by his worthiness it is\r\ncome to pass till this day. But chiefly it was a speech of\r\ngreat allurement toward his own purpose, as if the state did\r\nstrive with him but for a name, whereof mean families were\r\nvested; for \u003ci\u003eRex\u003c/i\u003e was a surname with the Romans, as well as\r\n\u003ci\u003eKing\u003c/i\u003e is with us.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(28) The last speech which I will mention was used to\r\nMetellus, when Cæsar, after war declared, did possess\r\nhimself of this city of Rome; at which time, entering into the\r\ninner treasury to take the money there accumulate, Metellus,\r\nbeing tribune, forbade him. Whereto Cæsar said,\r\n“That if he did not desist, he would lay him dead in the\r\nplace.” And presently taking himself up, he added,\r\n“Young man, it is harder for me to speak it than to do\r\nit—\u003ci\u003eAdolescens\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003edurius est mihi hoc dicere\r\nquàm facere\u003c/i\u003e.” A speech compounded of the\r\ngreatest terror and greatest clemency that could proceed out of\r\nthe mouth of man.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(29) But to return and conclude with him, it is evident\r\nhimself knew well his own perfection in learning, and took it\r\nupon him, as appeared when upon occasion that some spake what a\r\nstrange resolution it was in Lucius Sylla to resign his\r\ndictators, he, scoffing at him to his own advantage, answered,\r\n“That Sylla could not skill of letters, and therefore knew\r\nnot how to dictate.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(30) And here it were fit to leave this point, touching the\r\nconcurrence of military virtue and learning (for what example\r\nshould come with any grace after those two of Alexander and\r\nCæsar?), were it not in regard of the rareness of\r\ncircumstance, that I find in one other particular, as that which\r\ndid so suddenly pass from extreme scorn to extreme wonder: and it\r\nis of Xenophon the philosopher, who went from Socrates’\r\nschool into Asia in the expedition of Cyrus the younger against\r\nKing Artaxerxes. This Xenophon at that time was very young,\r\nand never had seen the wars before, neither had any command in\r\nthe army, but only followed the war as a voluntary, for the love\r\nand conversation of Proxenus, his friend. He was present\r\nwhen Falinus came in message from the great king to the Grecians,\r\nafter that Cyrus was slain in the field, and they, a handful of\r\nmen, left to themselves in the midst of the king’s\r\nterritories, cut off from their country by many navigable rivers\r\nand many hundred miles. The message imported that they\r\nshould deliver up their arms and submit themselves to the\r\nking’s mercy. To which message, before answer was\r\nmade, divers of the army conferred familiarly with Falinus; and\r\namongst the rest Xenophon happened to say, “Why, Falinus,\r\nwe have now but these two things left, our arms and our virtue;\r\nand if we yield up our arms, how shall we make use of our\r\nvirtue?” Whereto Falinus, smiling on him, said,\r\n“If I be not deceived, young gentleman, you are an\r\nAthenian, and I believe you study philosophy, and it is pretty\r\nthat you say; but you are much abused if you think your virtue\r\ncan withstand the king’s power.” Here was the\r\nscorn; the wonder followed: which was that this young scholar or\r\nphilosopher, after all the captains were murdered in parley by\r\ntreason, conducted those ten thousand foot, through the heart of\r\nall the king’s high countries, from Babylon to Græcia\r\nin safety, in despite of all the king’s forces, to the\r\nastonishment of the world, and the encouragement of the Grecians\r\nin times succeeding to make invasion upon the kings of Persia, as\r\nwas after purposed by Jason the Thessalian, attempted by\r\nAgesilaus the Spartan, and achieved by Alexander the Macedonian,\r\nall upon the ground of the act of that young scholar.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVIII. (1) To proceed now from imperial and military virtue to\r\nmoral and private virtue; first, it is an assured truth, which is\r\ncontained in the verses:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Scilicet ingenuas didicisse fideliter\r\nartes\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEmollit mores nec sinit esse feros.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt taketh away the wildness and barbarism and fierceness of\r\nmen’s minds; but indeed the accent had need be upon\r\n\u003ci\u003efideliter\u003c/i\u003e; for a little superficial learning doth rather\r\nwork a contrary effect. It taketh away all levity,\r\ntemerity, and insolency, by copious suggestion of all doubts and\r\ndifficulties, and acquainting the mind to balance reasons on both\r\nsides, and to turn back the first offers and conceits of the\r\nmind, and to accept of nothing but examined and tried. It\r\ntaketh away vain admiration of anything, which is the root of all\r\nweakness. For all things are admired, either because they\r\nare new, or because they are great. For novelty, no man\r\nthat wadeth in learning or contemplation thoroughly but will find\r\nthat printed in his heart, \u003ci\u003eNil novi super terram\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nNeither can any man marvel at the play of puppets, that goeth\r\nbehind the curtain, and adviseth well of the motion. And\r\nfor magnitude, as Alexander the Great, after that he was used to\r\ngreat armies, and the great conquests of the spacious provinces\r\nin Asia, when he received letters out of Greece, of some fights\r\nand services there, which were commonly for a passage or a fort,\r\nor some walled town at the most, he said:—“It seemed\r\nto him that he was advertised of the battles of the frogs and the\r\nmice, that the old tales went of.” So certainly, if a\r\nman meditate much upon the universal frame of nature, the earth\r\nwith men upon it (the divineness of souls except) will not seem\r\nmuch other than an ant-hill, whereas some ants carry corn, and\r\nsome carry their young, and some go empty, and all to and fro a\r\nlittle heap of dust. It taketh away or mitigateth fear of\r\ndeath or adverse fortune, which is one of the greatest\r\nimpediments of virtue and imperfections of manners. For if\r\na man’s mind be deeply seasoned with the consideration of\r\nthe mortality and corruptible nature of things, he will easily\r\nconcur with Epictetus, who went forth one day and saw a woman\r\nweeping for her pitcher of earth that was broken, and went forth\r\nthe next day and saw a woman weeping for her son that was dead,\r\nand thereupon said, “\u003ci\u003eHeri vidi fragilem frangi\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003ehodie vidi mortalem mori\u003c/i\u003e.” And, therefore,\r\nVirgil did excellently and profoundly couple the knowledge of\r\ncauses and the conquest of all fears together, as\r\n\u003ci\u003econcomitantia\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere\r\ncausas,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nQuique metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSubjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) It were too long to go over the particular remedies which\r\nlearning doth minister to all the diseases of the mind: sometimes\r\npurging the ill humours, sometimes opening the obstructions,\r\nsometimes helping digestion, sometimes increasing appetite,\r\nsometimes healing the wounds and exulcerations thereof, and the\r\nlike; and, therefore, I will conclude with that which hath\r\n\u003ci\u003erationem totius\u003c/i\u003e—which is, that it disposeth the\r\nconstitution of the mind not to be fixed or settled in the\r\ndefects thereof, but still to be capable and susceptible of\r\ngrowth and reformation. For the unlearned man knows not\r\nwhat it is to descend into himself, or to call himself to\r\naccount, nor the pleasure of that \u003ci\u003esuavissima vita\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003eindies sentire se fieri meliorem\u003c/i\u003e. The good parts he\r\nhath he will learn to show to the full, and use them dexterously,\r\nbut not much to increase them. The faults he hath he will\r\nlearn how to hide and colour them, but not much to amend them;\r\nlike an ill mower, that mows on still, and never whets his\r\nscythe. Whereas with the learned man it fares otherwise,\r\nthat he doth ever intermix the correction and amendment of his\r\nmind with the use and employment thereof. Nay, further, in\r\ngeneral and in sum, certain it is that \u003ci\u003eVeritas\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci\u003eBonitas\u003c/i\u003e differ but as the seal and the print; for truth\r\nprints goodness, and they be the clouds of error which descend in\r\nthe storms of passions and perturbations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) From moral virtue let us pass on to matter of power and\r\ncommandment, and consider whether in right reason there be any\r\ncomparable with that wherewith knowledge investeth and crowneth\r\nman’s nature. We see the dignity of the commandment\r\nis according to the dignity of the commanded; to have commandment\r\nover beasts as herdmen have, is a thing contemptible; to have\r\ncommandment over children as schoolmasters have, is a matter of\r\nsmall honour; to have commandment over galley-slaves is a\r\ndisparagement rather than an honour. Neither is the\r\ncommandment of tyrants much better, over people which have put\r\noff the generosity of their minds; and, therefore, it was ever\r\nholden that honours in free monarchies and commonwealths had a\r\nsweetness more than in tyrannies, because the commandment\r\nextendeth more over the wills of men, and not only over their\r\ndeeds and services. And therefore, when Virgil putteth\r\nhimself forth to attribute to Augustus Cæsar the best of\r\nhuman honours, he doth it in these words:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e “Victorque\r\nvolentes\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPer populos dat jura, viamque affectat Olympo.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut yet the commandment of knowledge is yet higher than the\r\ncommandment over the will; for it is a commandment over the\r\nreason, belief, and understanding of man, which is the highest\r\npart of the mind, and giveth law to the will itself. For\r\nthere is no power on earth which setteth up a throne or chair of\r\nestate in the spirits and souls of men, and in their cogitations,\r\nimaginations, opinions, and beliefs, but knowledge and\r\nlearning. And therefore we see the detestable and extreme\r\npleasure that arch-heretics, and false prophets, and impostors\r\nare transported with, when they once find in themselves that they\r\nhave a superiority in the faith and conscience of men; so great\r\nas if they have once tasted of it, it is seldom seen that any\r\ntorture or persecution can make them relinquish or abandon\r\nit. But as this is that which the author of the Revelation\r\ncalleth the depth or profoundness of Satan, so by argument of\r\ncontraries, the just and lawful sovereignty over men’s\r\nunderstanding, by force of truth rightly interpreted, is that\r\nwhich approacheth nearest to the similitude of the divine\r\nrule.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) As for fortune and advancement, the beneficence of\r\nlearning is not so confined to give fortune only to states and\r\ncommonwealths, as it doth not likewise give fortune to particular\r\npersons. For it was well noted long ago, that Homer hath\r\ngiven more men their livings, than either Sylla, or Cæsar,\r\nor Augustus ever did, notwithstanding their great largesses and\r\ndonatives, and distributions of lands to so many legions.\r\nAnd no doubt it is hard to say whether arms or learning have\r\nadvanced greater numbers. And in case of sovereignty we\r\nsee, that if arms or descent have carried away the kingdom, yet\r\nlearning hath carried the priesthood, which ever hath been in\r\nsome competition with empire.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) Again, for the pleasure and delight of knowledge and\r\nlearning, it far surpasseth all other in nature. For, shall\r\nthe pleasures of the affections so exceed the pleasure of the\r\nsense, as much as the obtaining of desire or victory exceedeth a\r\nsong or a dinner? and must not of consequence the pleasures of\r\nthe intellect or understanding exceed the pleasures of the\r\naffections? We see in all other pleasures there is satiety,\r\nand after they be used, their verdure departeth, which showeth\r\nwell they be but deceits of pleasure, and not pleasures; and that\r\nit was the novelty which pleased, and not the quality. And,\r\ntherefore, we see that voluptuous men turn friars, and ambitions\r\nprinces turn melancholy. But of knowledge there is no\r\nsatiety, but satisfaction and appetite are perpetually\r\ninterchangeable; and, therefore, appeareth to be good in itself\r\nsimply, without fallacy or accident. Neither is that\r\npleasure of small efficacy and contentment to the mind of man,\r\nwhich the poet Lucretius describeth elegantly:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Suave mari magno, turbantibus æquora\r\nventis, \u0026amp;c.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e“It is a view of delight,” saith he, “to\r\nstand or walk upon the shore side, and to see a ship tossed with\r\ntempest upon the sea; or to be in a fortified tower, and to see\r\ntwo battles join upon a plain. But it is a pleasure\r\nincomparable, for the mind of man to be settled, landed, and\r\nfortified in the certainty of truth; and from thence to descry\r\nand behold the errors, perturbations, labours, and wanderings up\r\nand down of other men.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(6) Lastly, leaving the vulgar arguments, that by learning man\r\nexcelleth man in that wherein man excelleth beasts; that by\r\nlearning man ascendeth to the heavens and their motions, where in\r\nbody he cannot come; and the like: let us conclude with the\r\ndignity and excellency of knowledge and learning in that\r\nwhereunto man’s nature doth most aspire, which is\r\nimmortality, or continuance; for to this tendeth generation, and\r\nraising of houses and families; to this tend buildings,\r\nfoundations, and monuments; to this tendeth the desire of memory,\r\nfame, and celebration; and in effect the strength of all other\r\nhuman desires. We see then how far the monuments of wit and\r\nlearning are more durable than the monuments of power or of the\r\nhands. For have not the verses of Homer continued\r\ntwenty-five hundred years, or more, without the loss of a\r\nsyllable or letter; during which the infinite palaces, temples,\r\ncastles, cities, have been decayed and demolished? It is\r\nnot possible to have the true pictures or statues of Cyrus,\r\nAlexander, Cæsar, no nor of the kings or great personages\r\nof much later years; for the originals cannot last, and the\r\ncopies cannot but leese of the life and truth. But the\r\nimages of men’s wits and knowledges remain in books,\r\nexempted from the wrong of time and capable of perpetual\r\nrenovation. Neither are they fitly to be called images,\r\nbecause they generate still, and cast their seeds in the minds of\r\nothers, provoking and causing infinite actions and opinions in\r\nsucceeding ages. So that if the invention of the ship was\r\nthought so noble, which carrieth riches and commodities from\r\nplace to place, and consociateth the most remote regions in\r\nparticipation of their fruits, how much more are letters to be\r\nmagnified, which as ships pass through the vast seas of time, and\r\nmake ages so distant to participate of the wisdom, illuminations,\r\nand inventions, the one of the other? Nay, further, we see\r\nsome of the philosophers which were least divine, and most\r\nimmersed in the senses, and denied generally the immortality of\r\nthe soul, yet came to this point, that whatsoever motions the\r\nspirit of man could act and perform without the organs of the\r\nbody, they thought might remain after death, which were only\r\nthose of the understanding and not of the affection; so immortal\r\nand incorruptible a thing did knowledge seem unto them to\r\nbe. But we, that know by divine revelation that not only\r\nthe understanding but the affections purified, not only the\r\nspirit but the body changed, shall be advanced to immortality, do\r\ndisclaim in these rudiments of the senses. But it must be\r\nremembered, both in this last point, and so it may likewise be\r\nneedful in other places, that in probation of the dignity of\r\nknowledge or learning, I did in the beginning separate divine\r\ntestimony from human, which method I have pursued, and so handled\r\nthem both apart.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(7) Nevertheless I do not pretend, and I know it will be\r\nimpossible for me, by any pleading of mine, to reverse the\r\njudgment, either of Æsop’s cock, that preferred the\r\nbarleycorn before the gem; or of Midas, that being chosen judge\r\nbetween Apollo, president of the Muses, and Pan, god of the\r\nflocks, judged for plenty; or of Paris, that judged for beauty\r\nand love against wisdom and power; or of Agrippina, \u003ci\u003eoccidat\r\nmatrem\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003emodo imperet\u003c/i\u003e, that preferred empire with any\r\ncondition never so detestable; or of Ulysses, \u003ci\u003equi vetulam\r\nprætulit immortalitati\u003c/i\u003e, being a figure of those which\r\nprefer custom and habit before all excellency, or of a number of\r\nthe like popular judgments. For these things must continue\r\nas they have been; but so will that also continue whereupon\r\nlearning hath ever relied, and which faileth not: \u003ci\u003eJustificata\r\nest sapientia a filiis suis\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\u0027chapter\u0027 /\u003e\u003ch2\u003eTHE SECOND BOOK.\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp style=\"text-align: center\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eTo the King\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eIt\u003c/span\u003e might seem to have more\r\nconvenience, though it come often otherwise to pass (excellent\r\nKing), that those which are fruitful in their generations, and\r\nhave in themselves the foresight of immortality in their\r\ndescendants, should likewise be more careful of the good estate\r\nof future times, unto which they know they must transmit and\r\ncommend over their dearest pledges. Queen Elizabeth was a\r\nsojourner in the world in respect of her unmarried life, and was\r\na blessing to her own times; and yet so as the impression of her\r\ngood government, besides her happy memory, is not without some\r\neffect which doth survive her. But to your Majesty, whom\r\nGod hath already blessed with so much royal issue, worthy to\r\ncontinue and represent you for ever, and whose youthful and\r\nfruitful bed doth yet promise many the like renovations, it is\r\nproper and agreeable to be conversant not only in the transitory\r\nparts of good government, but in those acts also which are in\r\ntheir nature permanent and perpetual. Amongst the which (if\r\naffection do not transport me) there is not any more worthy than\r\nthe further endowment of the world with sound and fruitful\r\nknowledge. For why should a few received authors stand up\r\nlike Hercules’ columns, beyond which there should be no\r\nsailing or discovering, since we have so bright and benign a star\r\nas your Majesty to conduct and prosper us? To return\r\ntherefore where we left, it remaineth to consider of what kind\r\nthose acts are which have been undertaken and performed by kings\r\nand others for the increase and advancement of learning, wherein\r\nI purpose to speak actively, without digressing or dilating.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. Let this ground therefore be laid, that all works are\r\nover common by amplitude of reward, by soundness of direction,\r\nand by the conjunction of labours. The first multiplieth\r\nendeavour, the second preventeth error, and the third supplieth\r\nthe frailty of man. But the principal of these is\r\ndirection, for \u003ci\u003eclaudus in via antevertit cursorem extra\r\nviam\u003c/i\u003e; and Solomon excellently setteth it down, “If the\r\niron be not sharp, it requireth more strength, but wisdom is that\r\nwhich prevaileth,” signifying that the invention or\r\nelection of the mean is more effectual than any enforcement or\r\naccumulation of endeavours. This I am induced to speak, for\r\nthat (not derogating from the noble intention of any that have\r\nbeen deservers towards the state of learning), I do observe\r\nnevertheless that their works and acts are rather matters of\r\nmagnificence and memory than of progression and proficience, and\r\ntend rather to augment the mass of learning in the multitude of\r\nlearned men than to rectify or raise the sciences themselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. The works or acts of merit towards learning are\r\nconversant about three objects—the places of learning, the\r\nbooks of learning, and the persons of the learned. For as\r\nwater, whether it be the dew of heaven or the springs of the\r\nearth, doth scatter and leese itself in the ground, except it be\r\ncollected into some receptacle where it may by union comfort and\r\nsustain itself; and for that cause the industry of man hath made\r\nand framed springheads, conduits, cisterns, and pools, which men\r\nhave accustomed likewise to beautify and adorn with\r\naccomplishments of magnificence and state, as well as of use and\r\nnecessity; so this excellent liquor of knowledge, whether it\r\ndescend from divine inspiration, or spring from human sense,\r\nwould soon perish and vanish to oblivion, if it were not\r\npreserved in books, traditions, conferences, and places\r\nappointed, as universities, colleges, and schools, for the\r\nreceipt and comforting of the same.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e4. The works which concern the seats and places of\r\nlearning are four—foundations and buildings, endowments\r\nwith revenues, endowments with franchises and privileges,\r\ninstitutions and ordinances for government—all tending to\r\nquietness and privateness of life, and discharge of cares and\r\ntroubles; much like the stations which Virgil prescribeth for the\r\nhiving of bees:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Principio sedes apibus statioque\r\npetenda,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nQuo neque sit ventis aditus, \u0026amp;c.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e5. The works touching books are two—first,\r\nlibraries, which are as the shrines where all the relics of the\r\nancient saints, full of true virtue, and that without delusion or\r\nimposture, are preserved and reposed; secondly, new editions of\r\nauthors, with more correct impressions, more faithful\r\ntranslations, more profitable glosses, more diligent annotations,\r\nand the like.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e6. The works pertaining to the persons of learned men\r\n(besides the advancement and countenancing of them in general)\r\nare two—the reward and designation of readers in sciences\r\nalready extant and invented; and the reward and designation of\r\nwriters and inquirers concerning any parts of learning not\r\nsufficiently laboured and prosecuted.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e7. These are summarily the works and acts wherein the\r\nmerits of many excellent princes and other worthy personages,\r\nhave been conversant. As for any particular commemorations,\r\nI call to mind what Cicero said when he gave general thanks,\r\n\u003ci\u003eDifficile non aliquem\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eingratum quenquam\r\npræterire\u003c/i\u003e. Let us rather, according to the\r\nScriptures, look unto that part of the race which is before us,\r\nthan look back to that which is already attained.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e8. First, therefore, amongst so many great foundations\r\nof colleges in Europe, I find strange that they are all dedicated\r\nto professions, and none left free to arts and sciences at\r\nlarge. For if men judge that learning should be referred to\r\naction, they judge well; but in this they fall into the error\r\ndescribed in the ancient fable, in which the other parts of the\r\nbody did suppose the stomach had been idle, because it neither\r\nperformed the office of motion, as the limbs do, nor of sense, as\r\nthe head doth; but yet notwithstanding it is the stomach that\r\ndigesteth and distributeth to all the rest. So if any man\r\nthink philosophy and universality to be idle studies, he doth not\r\nconsider that all professions are from thence served and\r\nsupplied. And this I take to be a great cause that hath\r\nhindered the progression of learning, because these fundamental\r\nknowledges have been studied but in passage. For if you\r\nwill have a tree bear more fruit than it hath used to do, it is\r\nnot anything you can do to the boughs, but it is the stirring of\r\nthe earth and putting new mould about thee roots that must work\r\nit. Neither is it to be forgotten, that this dedicating of\r\nfoundations and dotations to professory learning hath not only\r\nhad a malign aspect and influence upon the growth of sciences,\r\nbut hath also been prejudicial to states, and governments.\r\nFor hence it proceedeth that princes find a solitude in regard of\r\nable men to serve them in causes of estate, because there is no\r\neducation collegiate which is free, where such as were so\r\ndisposed might give themselves in histories, modern languages,\r\nbooks of policy and civil discourse, and other the like\r\nenablements unto service of estate.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e9. And because founders of colleges do plant, and\r\nfounders of lectures do water, it followeth well in order to\r\nspeak of the defect which is in public lectures; namely, in the\r\nsmallness, and meanness of the salary or reward which in most\r\nplaces is assigned unto them, whether they be lectures of arts,\r\nor of professions. For it is necessary to the progression\r\nof sciences that readers be of the most able and sufficient men;\r\nas those which are ordained for generating and propagating of\r\nsciences, and not for transitory use. This cannot be,\r\nexcept their condition and endowment be such as may content the\r\nablest man to appropriate his whole labour and continue his whole\r\nage in that function and attendance; and therefore must have a\r\nproportion answerable to that mediocrity or competency of\r\nadvancement, which may be expected from a profession or the\r\npractice of a profession. So as, if you will have sciences\r\nflourish, you must observe David’s military law, which was,\r\n“That those which stayed with the carriage should have\r\nequal part with those which were in the action;” else will\r\nthe carriages be ill attended. So readers in sciences are\r\nindeed the guardians of the stores and provisions of sciences,\r\nwhence men in active courses are furnished, and therefore ought\r\nto have equal entertainment with them; otherwise if the fathers\r\nin sciences be of the weakest sort or be ill maintained,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Et patrum invalidi referent jejunia\r\nnati.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e10. Another defect I note, wherein I shall need some\r\nalchemist to help me, who call upon men to sell their books, and\r\nto build furnaces; quitting and forsaking Minerva and the Muses\r\nas barren virgins, and relying upon Vulcan. But certain it\r\nis, that unto the deep, fruitful, and operative study of many\r\nsciences, specialty natural philosophy and physic, books be not\r\nonly the instrumentals; wherein also the beneficence of men hath\r\nnot been altogether wanting. For we see spheres, globes,\r\nastrolabes, maps, and the like, have been provided as\r\nappurtenances to astronomy and cosmography, as well as\r\nbooks. We see likewise that some places instituted for\r\nphysic have annexed the commodity of gardens for simples of all\r\nsorts, and do likewise command the use of dead bodies for\r\nanatomies. But these do respect but a few things. In\r\ngeneral, there will hardly be any main proficience in the\r\ndisclosing of nature, except there be some allowance for expenses\r\nabout experiments; whether they be experiments appertaining to\r\nVulcanus or Dædalus, furnace or engine, or any other\r\nkind. And therefore as secretaries and spials of princes\r\nand states bring in bills for intelligence, so you must allow the\r\nspials and intelligencers of nature to bring in their bills; or\r\nelse you shall be ill advertised.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e11. And if Alexander made such a liberal assignation to\r\nAristotle of treasure for the allowance of hunters, fowlers,\r\nfishers, and the like, that he might compile a history of nature,\r\nmuch better do they deserve it that travail in arts of\r\nnature.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e12. Another defect which I note is an intermission or\r\nneglect in those which are governors in universities, of\r\nconsultation, and in princes or superior persons, of visitation:\r\nto enter into account and consideration, whether the readings,\r\nexercises, and other customs appertaining unto learning,\r\nanciently begun and since continued, be well instituted or no;\r\nand thereupon to ground an amendment or reformation in that which\r\nshall be found inconvenient. For it is one of your\r\nMajesty’s own most wise and princely maxims, “That in\r\nall usages and precedents, the times be considered wherein they\r\nfirst began; which if they were weak or ignorant, it derogateth\r\nfrom the authority of the usage, and leaveth it for\r\nsuspect.” And therefore inasmuch as most of the\r\nusages and orders of the universities were derived from more\r\nobscure times, it is the more requisite they be\r\nre-examined. In this kind I will give an instance or two,\r\nfor example sake, of things that are the most obvious and\r\nfamiliar. The one is a matter, which though it be ancient\r\nand general, yet I hold to be an error; which is, that scholars\r\nin universities come too soon and too unripe to logic and\r\nrhetoric, arts fitter for graduates than children and\r\nnovices. For these two, rightly taken, are the gravest of\r\nsciences, being the arts of arts; the one for judgment, the other\r\nfor ornament. And they be the rules and directions how to\r\nset forth and dispose matter: and therefore for minds empty and\r\nunfraught with matter, and which have not gathered that which\r\nCicero calleth \u003ci\u003esylva\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003esupellex\u003c/i\u003e, stuff and\r\nvariety, to begin with those arts (as if one should learn to\r\nweigh, or to measure, or to paint the wind) doth work but this\r\neffect, that the wisdom of those arts, which is great and\r\nuniversal, is almost made contemptible, and is degenerate into\r\nchildish sophistry and ridiculous affectation. And further,\r\nthe untimely learning of them hath drawn on by consequence the\r\nsuperficial and unprofitable teaching and writing of them, as\r\nfitteth indeed to the capacity of children. Another is a\r\nlack I find in the exercises used in the universities, which do\r\nsnake too great a divorce between invention and memory. For\r\ntheir speeches are either premeditate, in \u003ci\u003everbis\r\nconceptis\u003c/i\u003e, where nothing is left to invention, or merely\r\nextemporal, where little is left to memory. Whereas in life\r\nand action there is least use of either of these, but rather of\r\nintermixtures of premeditation and invention, notes and\r\nmemory. So as the exercise fitteth not the practice, nor\r\nthe image the life; and it is ever a true rule in exercises, that\r\nthey be framed as near as may be to the life of practice; for\r\notherwise they do pervert the motions and faculties of the mind,\r\nand not prepare them. The truth whereof is not obscure,\r\nwhen scholars come to the practices of professions, or other\r\nactions of civil life; which when they set into, this want is\r\nsoon found by themselves, and sooner by others. But this\r\npart, touching the amendment of the institutions and orders of\r\nuniversities, I will conclude with the clause of\r\nCæsar’s letter to Oppius and Balbes, \u003ci\u003eHoc\r\nquemadmodum fieri possit\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enonnulla mihi in mentem\r\nveniunt\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet multa reperiri possunt\u003c/i\u003e: \u003ci\u003ede iis rebus\r\nrgo vos ut cogitationem suscipiatis\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e13. Another defect which I note ascendeth a little\r\nhigher than the precedent. For as the proficience of\r\nlearning consisteth much in the orders and institutions of\r\nuniversities in the same states and kingdoms, so it would be yet\r\nmore advanced, if there were more intelligence mutual between the\r\nuniversities of Europe than now there is. We see there be\r\nmany orders and foundations, which though they be divided under\r\nseveral sovereignties and territories, yet they take themselves\r\nto have a kind of contract, fraternity, and correspondence one\r\nwith the other, insomuch as they have provincials and\r\ngenerals. And surely as nature createth brotherhood in\r\nfamilies, and arts mechanical contract brotherhoods in\r\ncommunalties, and the anointment of God superinduceth a\r\nbrotherhood in kings and bishops, so in like manner there cannot\r\nbut be a fraternity in learning and illumination, relating to\r\nthat paternity which is attributed to God, who is called the\r\nFather of illuminations or lights.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e14. The last defect which I will note is, that there\r\nhath not been, or very rarely been, any public designation of\r\nwriters or inquirers concerning such parts of knowledge as may\r\nappear not to have been already sufficiently laboured or\r\nundertaken; unto which point it is an inducement to enter into a\r\nview and examination what parts of learning have been prosecuted,\r\nand what omitted. For the opinion of plenty is amongst the\r\ncauses of want, and the great quantity of books maketh a show\r\nrather of superfluity than lack; which surcharge nevertheless is\r\nnot to be remedied by making no more books, but by making more\r\ngood books, which, as the serpent of Moses, might devour the\r\nserpents of the enchanters.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e15. The removing of all the defects formerly enumerate,\r\nexcept the last, and of the active part also of the last (which\r\nis the designation of writers), are \u003ci\u003eopera basilica\u003c/i\u003e;\r\ntowards which the endeavours of a private man may be but as an\r\nimage in a crossway, that may point at the way, but cannot go\r\nit. But the inducing part of the latter (which is the\r\nsurvey of learning) may be set forward by private travail.\r\nWherefore I will now attempt to make a general and faithful\r\nperambulation of learning, with an inquiry what parts thereof lie\r\nfresh and waste, and not improved and converted by the industry\r\nof man, to the end that such a plot made and recorded to memory\r\nmay both minister light to any public designation, and, also\r\nserve to excite voluntary endeavours. Wherein,\r\nnevertheless, my purpose is at this time to note only omissions\r\nand deficiences, and not to make any redargution of errors or\r\nincomplete prosecutions. For it is one thing to set forth\r\nwhat ground lieth unmanured, and another thing to correct ill\r\nhusbandry in that which is manured.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the handling and undertaking of which work I am not\r\nignorant what it is that I do now move and attempt, nor\r\ninsensible of mine own weakness to sustain my purpose. But\r\nmy hope is, that if my extreme love to learning carry me too far,\r\nI may obtain the excuse of affection; for that “It is not\r\ngranted to man to love and to be wise.” But I know\r\nwell I can use no other liberty of judgment than I must leave to\r\nothers; and I for my part shall be indifferently glad either to\r\nperform myself, or accept from another, that duty of\r\nhumanity—\u003ci\u003eNam qui erranti comiter monstrat viam\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u0026amp;c. I do foresee likewise that of those things which I\r\nshall enter and register as deficiences and omissions, many will\r\nconceive and censure that some of them are already done and\r\nextant; others to be but curiosities, and things of no great use;\r\nand others to be of too great difficulty, and almost\r\nimpossibility to be compassed and effected. But for the two\r\nfirst, I refer myself to the particulars. For the last,\r\ntouching impossibility, I take it those things are to be held\r\npossible which may be done by some person, though not by every\r\none; and which may be done by many, though not by any one; and\r\nwhich may be done in the succession of ages, though not within\r\nthe hourglass of one man’s life; and which may be done by\r\npublic designation, though not by private endeavour. But,\r\nnotwithstanding, if any man will take to himself rather that of\r\nSolomon, “\u003ci\u003eDicit piger\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eLeo est in via\u003c/i\u003e,”\r\nthan that of Virgil, “\u003ci\u003ePossunt quia posse\r\nvidentur\u003c/i\u003e,” I shall be content that my labours be\r\nesteemed but as the better sort of wishes; for as it asketh some\r\nknowledge to demand a question not impertinent, so it requireth\r\nsome sense to make a wish not absurd.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eI. (1) The parts of human learning have reference to the three\r\nparts of man’s understanding, which is the seat of\r\nlearning: history to his memory, poesy to his imagination, and\r\nphilosophy to his reason. Divine learning receiveth the\r\nsame distribution; for, the spirit of man is the same, though the\r\nrevelation of oracle and sense be diverse. So as theology\r\nconsisteth also of history of the Church; of parables, which is\r\ndivine poesy; and of holy doctrine or precept. For as for\r\nthat part which seemeth supernumerary, which is prophecy, it is\r\nbut divine history, which hath that prerogative over human, as\r\nthe narration may be before the fact as well as after.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) History is natural, civil, ecclesiastical, and literary;\r\nwhereof the first three I allow as extant, the fourth I note as\r\ndeficient. For no man hath propounded to himself the\r\ngeneral state of learning to be described and represented from\r\nage to age, as many have done the works of Nature, and the state,\r\ncivil and ecclesiastical; without which the history of the world\r\nseemeth to me to be as the statue of Polyphemus with his eye out,\r\nthat part being wanting which doth most show the spirit and life\r\nof the person. And yet I am not ignorant that in divers\r\nparticular sciences, as of the jurisconsults, the mathematicians,\r\nthe rhetoricians, the philosophers, there are set down some small\r\nmemorials of the schools, authors, and books; and so likewise\r\nsome barren relations touching the invention of arts or\r\nusages. But a just story of learning, containing the\r\nantiquities and originals of knowledges and their sects, their\r\ninventions, their traditions, their diverse administrations and\r\nmanagings, their flourishings, their oppositions, decays,\r\ndepressions, oblivions, removes, with the causes and occasions of\r\nthem, and all other events concerning learning, throughout the\r\nages of the world, I may truly affirm to be wanting; the use and\r\nend of which work I do not so much design for curiosity or\r\nsatisfaction of those that are the lovers of learning, but\r\nchiefly for a more serious and grave purpose, which is this in\r\nfew words, that it will make learned men wise in the use and\r\nadministration of learning. For it is not Saint\r\nAugustine’s nor Saint Ambrose’s works that will make\r\nso wise a divine as ecclesiastical history thoroughly read and\r\nobserved, and the same reason is of learning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) History of Nature is of three sorts; of Nature in course,\r\nof Nature erring or varying, and of Nature altered or wrought;\r\nthat is, history of creatures, history of marvels, and history of\r\narts. The first of these no doubt is extant, and that in\r\ngood perfection; the two latter are bandied so weakly and\r\nunprofitably as I am moved to note them as deficient. For I\r\nfind no sufficient or competent collection of the works of Nature\r\nwhich have a digression and deflexion from the ordinary course of\r\ngenerations, productions, and motions; whether they be\r\nsingularities of place and region, or the strange events of time\r\nand chance, or the effects of yet unknown properties, or the\r\ninstances of exception to general kinds. It is true I find\r\na number of books of fabulous experiments and secrets, and\r\nfrivolous impostures for pleasure and strangeness; but a\r\nsubstantial and severe collection of the heteroclites or\r\nirregulars of Nature, well examined and described, I find not,\r\nspecially not with due rejection of fables and popular\r\nerrors. For as things now are, if an untruth in Nature be\r\nonce on foot, what by reason of the neglect of examination, and\r\ncountenance of antiquity, and what by reason of the use of the\r\nopinion in similitudes and ornaments of speech, it is never\r\ncalled down.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) The use of this work, honoured with a precedent in\r\nAristotle, is nothing less than to give contentment to the\r\nappetite of curious and vain wits, as the manner of Mirabilaries\r\nis to do; but for two reasons, both of great weight: the one to\r\ncorrect the partiality of axioms and opinions, which are commonly\r\nframed only upon common and familiar examples; the other because\r\nfrom the wonders of Nature is the nearest intelligence and\r\npassage towards the wonders of art, for it is no more but by\r\nfollowing and, as it were, hounding Nature in her wanderings, to\r\nbe able to lead her afterwards to the same place again.\r\nNeither am I of opinion, in this history of marvels, that\r\nsuperstitious narrations of sorceries, witchcrafts, dreams,\r\ndivinations, and the like, where there is an assurance and clear\r\nevidence of the fact, be altogether excluded. For it is not\r\nyet known in what cases and how far effects attributed to\r\nsuperstition do participate of natural causes; and, therefore,\r\nhowsoever the practice of such things is to be condemned, yet\r\nfrom the speculation and consideration of them light may be\r\ntaken, not only for the discerning of the offences, but for the\r\nfurther disclosing of Nature. Neither ought a man to make\r\nscruple of entering into these things for inquisition of truth,\r\nas your Majesty hath showed in your own example, who, with the\r\ntwo clear eyes of religion and natural philosophy, have looked\r\ndeeply and wisely into these shadows, and yet proved yourself to\r\nbe of the nature of the sun, which passeth through pollutions and\r\nitself remains as pure as before. But this I hold fit, that\r\nthese narrations, which have mixture with superstition, be sorted\r\nby themselves, and not to be mingled with the narrations which\r\nare merely and sincerely natural. But as for the narrations\r\ntouching the prodigies and miracles of religions, they are either\r\nnot true or not natural; and, therefore, impertinent for the\r\nstory of Nature.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) For history of Nature, wrought or mechanical, I find some\r\ncollections made of agriculture, and likewise of manual arts; but\r\ncommonly with a rejection of experiments familiar and vulgar; for\r\nit is esteemed a kind of dishonour unto learning to descend to\r\ninquiry or meditation upon matters mechanical, except they be\r\nsuch as may be thought secrets, rarities, and special subtleties;\r\nwhich humour of vain and supercilious arrogancy is justly derided\r\nin Plato, where he brings in Hippias, a vaunting sophist,\r\ndisputing with Socrates, a true and unfeigned inquisitor of\r\ntruth; where, the subject being touching beauty, Socrates, after\r\nhis wandering manner of inductions, put first an example of a\r\nfair virgin, and then of a fair horse, and then of a fair pot\r\nwell glazed, whereat Hippias was offended, and said, “More\r\nthan for courtesy’s sake, he did think much to dispute with\r\nany that did allege such base and sordid instances.”\r\nWhereunto Socrates answereth, “You have reason, and it\r\nbecomes you well, being a man so trim in your vestments,”\r\n\u0026amp;c., and so goeth on in an irony. But the truth is,\r\nthey be not the highest instances that give the securest\r\ninformation, as may be well expressed in the tale so common of\r\nthe philosopher that, while he gazed upwards to the stars, fell\r\ninto the water; for if he had looked down he might have seen the\r\nstars in the water, but looking aloft he could not see the water\r\nin the stars. So it cometh often to pass that mean and\r\nsmall things discover great, better than great can discover the\r\nsmall; and therefore Aristotle noteth well, “That the\r\nnature of everything is best seen in his smallest\r\nportions.” And for that cause he inquireth the nature\r\nof a commonwealth, first in a family, and the simple conjugations\r\nof man and wife, parent and child, master and servant, which are\r\nin every cottage. Even so likewise the nature of this great\r\ncity of the world, and the policy thereof, must be first sought\r\nin mean concordances and small portions. So we see how that\r\nsecret of Nature, of the turning of iron touched with the\r\nloadstone towards the north, was found out in needles of iron,\r\nnot in bars of iron.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(6) But if my judgment be of any weight, the use of history\r\nmechanical is of all others the most radical and fundamental\r\ntowards natural philosophy; such natural philosophy as shall not\r\nvanish in the fume of subtle, sublime, or delectable speculation,\r\nbut such as shall be operative to the endowment and benefit of\r\nman’s life. For it will not only minister and suggest\r\nfor the present many ingenious practices in all trades, by a\r\nconnection and transferring of the observations of one art to the\r\nuse of another, when the experiences of several mysteries shall\r\nfall under the consideration of one man’s mind; but\r\nfurther, it will give a more true and real illumination\r\nconcerning causes and axioms than is hitherto attained. For\r\nlike as a man’s disposition is never well known till he be\r\ncrossed, nor Proteus ever changed shapes till he was straitened\r\nand held fast; so the passages and variations of nature cannot\r\nappear so fully in the liberty of nature as in the trials and\r\nvexations of art.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eII. (1) For civil history, it is of three kinds; not unfitly\r\nto be compared with the three kinds of pictures or images.\r\nFor of pictures or images we see some are unfinished, some are\r\nperfect, and some are defaced. So of histories we may find\r\nthree kinds: memorials, perfect histories, and antiquities; for\r\nmemorials are history unfinished, or the first or rough drafts of\r\nhistory; and antiquities are history defaced, or some remnants of\r\nhistory which have casually escaped the shipwreck of time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) Memorials, or preparatory history, are of two sorts;\r\nwhereof the one may be termed commentaries, and the other\r\nregisters. Commentaries are they which set down a\r\ncontinuance of the naked events and actions, without the motives\r\nor designs, the counsels, the speeches, the pretexts, the\r\noccasions, and other passages of action. For this is the\r\ntrue nature of a commentary (though Cæsar, in modesty mixed\r\nwith greatness, did for his pleasure apply the name of a\r\ncommentary to the best history of the world). Registers are\r\ncollections of public acts, as decrees of council, judicial\r\nproceedings, declarations and letters of estate, orations, and\r\nthe like, without a perfect continuance or contexture of the\r\nthread of the narration.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) Antiquities, or remnants of history, are, as was said,\r\n\u003ci\u003etanquam tabula naufragii\u003c/i\u003e: when industrious persons, by an\r\nexact and scrupulous diligence and observation, out of monuments,\r\nnames, words, proverbs, traditions, private records and\r\nevidences, fragments of stories, passages of books that concern\r\nnot story, and the like, do save and recover somewhat from the\r\ndeluge of time.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) In these kinds of unperfect histories I do assign no\r\ndeficience, for they are \u003ci\u003etanquam imperfecte mista\u003c/i\u003e; and\r\ntherefore any deficience in them is but their nature. As\r\nfor the corruptions and moths of history, which are epitomes, the\r\nuse of them deserveth to be banished, as all men of sound\r\njudgment have confessed, as those that have fretted and corroded\r\nthe sound bodies of many excellent histories, and wrought them\r\ninto base and unprofitable dregs.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) History, which may be called just and perfect history, is\r\nof three kinds, according to the object which it propoundeth, or\r\npretendeth to represent: for it either representeth a time, or a\r\nperson, or an action. The first we call chronicles, the\r\nsecond lives, and the third narrations or relations. Of\r\nthese, although the first be the most complete and absolute kind\r\nof history, and hath most estimation and glory, yet the second\r\nexcelleth it in profit and use, and the third in verity and\r\nsincerity. For history of times representeth the magnitude\r\nof actions, and the public faces and deportments of persons, and\r\npasseth over in silence the smaller passages and motions of men\r\nand matters. But such being the workmanship of God, as He\r\ndoth hang the greatest weight upon the smallest wires, \u003ci\u003emaxima\r\nè minimis\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esuspendens\u003c/i\u003e, it comes therefore to\r\npass, that such histories do rather set forth the pomp of\r\nbusiness than the true and inward resorts thereof. But\r\nlives, if they be well written, propounding to themselves a\r\nperson to represent, in whom actions, both greater and smaller,\r\npublic and private, have a commixture, must of necessity contain\r\na more true, native, and lively representation. So again\r\nnarrations and relations of actions, as the war of Peloponnesus,\r\nthe expedition of Cyrus Minor, the conspiracy of Catiline, cannot\r\nbut be more purely and exactly true than histories of times,\r\nbecause they may choose an argument comprehensible within the\r\nnotice and instructions of the writer: whereas he that\r\nundertaketh the story of a time, specially of any length, cannot\r\nbut meet with many blanks and spaces, which he must be forced to\r\nfill up out of his own wit and conjecture.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(6) For the history of times, I mean of civil history, the\r\nprovidence of God hath made the distribution. For it hath\r\npleased God to ordain and illustrate two exemplar states of the\r\nworld for arms, learning, moral virtue, policy, and laws; the\r\nstate of Græcia and the state of Rome; the histories\r\nwhereof occupying the middle part of time, have more ancient to\r\nthem histories which may by one common name be termed the\r\nantiquities of the world; and after them, histories which may be\r\nlikewise called by the name of modern history.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(7) Now to speak of the deficiences. As to the heathen\r\nantiquities of the world it is in vain to note them for\r\ndeficient. Deficient they are no doubt, consisting most of\r\nfables and fragments; but the deficience cannot be holpen; for\r\nantiquity is like fame, \u003ci\u003ecaput inter nubila condit\u003c/i\u003e, her\r\nhead is muffled from our sight. For the history of the\r\nexemplar states, it is extant in good perfection. Not but I\r\ncould wish there were a perfect course of history for\r\nGræcia, from Theseus to Philopœmen (what time the\r\naffairs of Græcia drowned and extinguished in the affairs\r\nof Rome), and for Rome from Romulus to Justinianus, who may be\r\ntruly said to be \u003ci\u003eultimus Romanorum\u003c/i\u003e. In which\r\nsequences of story the text of Thucydides and Xenophon in the\r\none, and the texts of Livius, Polybius, Sallustius, Cæsar,\r\nAppianus, Tacitus, Herodianus in the other, to be kept entire,\r\nwithout any diminution at all, and only to be supplied and\r\ncontinued. But this is a matter of magnificence, rather to\r\nbe commended than required; and we speak now of parts of learning\r\nsupplemental, and not of supererogation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(8) But for modern histories, whereof there are some few very\r\nworthy, but the greater part beneath mediocrity, leaving the care\r\nof foreign stories to foreign states, because I will not be\r\n\u003ci\u003ecuriosus in aliena republica\u003c/i\u003e, I cannot fail to represent\r\nto your Majesty the unworthiness of the history of England in the\r\nmain continuance thereof, and the partiality and obliquity of\r\nthat of Scotland in the latest and largest author that I have\r\nseen: supposing that it would be honour for your Majesty, and a\r\nwork very memorable, if this island of Great Britain, as it is\r\nnow joined in monarchy for the ages to come, so were joined in\r\none history for the times passed, after the manner of the sacred\r\nhistory, which draweth down the story of the ten tribes and of\r\nthe two tribes as twins together. And if it shall seem that\r\nthe greatness of this work may make it less exactly performed,\r\nthere is an excellent period of a much smaller compass of time,\r\nas to the story of England; that is to say, from the uniting of\r\nthe Roses to the uniting of the kingdoms; a portion of time\r\nwherein, to my understanding, there hath been the rarest\r\nvarieties that in like number of successions of any hereditary\r\nmonarchy hath been known. For it beginneth with the mixed\r\nadoption of a crown by arms and title; an entry by battle, an\r\nestablishment by marriage; and therefore times answerable, like\r\nwaters after a tempest, full of working and swelling, though\r\nwithout extremity of storm; but well passed through by the wisdom\r\nof the pilot, being one of the most sufficient kings of all the\r\nnumber. Then followeth the reign of a king, whose actions,\r\nhowsoever conducted, had much intermixture with the affairs of\r\nEurope, balancing and inclining them variably; in whose time also\r\nbegan that great alteration in the state ecclesiastical, an\r\naction which seldom cometh upon the stage. Then the reign\r\nof a minor; then an offer of a usurpation (though it was but as\r\n\u003ci\u003efebris ephemera\u003c/i\u003e). Then the reign of a queen matched\r\nwith a foreigner; then of a queen that lived solitary and\r\nunmarried, and yet her government so masculine, as it had greater\r\nimpression and operation upon the states abroad than it any ways\r\nreceived from thence. And now last, this most happy and\r\nglorious event, that this island of Britain, divided from all the\r\nworld, should be united in itself, and that oracle of rest given\r\nto ÆNeas, \u003ci\u003eantiquam exquirite matrem\u003c/i\u003e, should now be\r\nperformed and fulfilled upon the nations of England and Scotland,\r\nbeing now reunited in the ancient mother name of Britain, as a\r\nfull period of all instability and peregrinations. So that\r\nas it cometh to pass in massive bodies, that they have certain\r\ntrepidations and waverings before they fix and settle, so it\r\nseemeth that by the providence of God this monarchy, before it\r\nwas to settle in your majesty and your generations (in which I\r\nhope it is now established for ever), it had these prelusive\r\nchanges and varieties.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(9) For lives, I do find strange that these times have so\r\nlittle esteemed the virtues of the times, as that the writings of\r\nlives should be no more frequent. For although there be not\r\nmany sovereign princes or absolute commanders, and that states\r\nare most collected into monarchies, yet are there many worthy\r\npersonages that deserve better than dispersed report or barren\r\neulogies. For herein the invention of one of the late poets\r\nis proper, and doth well enrich the ancient fiction. For he\r\nfeigneth that at the end of the thread or web of every\r\nman’s life there was a little medal containing the\r\nperson’s name, and that Time waited upon the shears, and as\r\nsoon as the thread was cut caught the medals, and carried them to\r\nthe river of Lathe; and about the bank there were many birds\r\nflying up and down, that would get the medals and carry them in\r\ntheir beak a little while, and then let them fall into the\r\nriver. Only there were a few swans, which if they got a\r\nname would carry it to a temple where it was consecrate.\r\nAnd although many men, more mortal in their affections than in\r\ntheir bodies, do esteem desire of name and memory but as a vanity\r\nand ventosity,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Animi nil magnæ laudis\r\negentes;”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ewhich opinion cometh from that root, \u003ci\u003eNon prius laudes\r\ncontempsimus\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003equam laudanda facere desivimus\u003c/i\u003e: yet that\r\nwill not alter Solomon’s judgment, \u003ci\u003eMemoria justi cum\r\nlaudibus\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eat impiorum nomen putrescet\u003c/i\u003e: the one\r\nflourisheth, the other either consumeth to present oblivion, or\r\nturneth to an ill odour. And therefore in that style or\r\naddition, which is and hath been long well received and brought\r\nin use, \u003ci\u003efelicis memoriæ\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003epiæ\r\nmemoriæ\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ebonæ memoriæ\u003c/i\u003e, we do\r\nacknowledge that which Cicero saith, borrowing it from\r\nDemosthenes, that \u003ci\u003ebona fama propria possessio defunctorum\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nwhich possession I cannot but note that in our times it lieth\r\nmuch waste, and that therein there is a deficience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(10) For narrations and relations of particular actions, there\r\nwere also to be wished a greater diligence therein; for there is\r\nno great action but hath some good pen which attends it.\r\nAnd because it is an ability not common to write a good history,\r\nas may well appear by the small number of them; yet if\r\nparticularity of actions memorable were but tolerably reported as\r\nthey pass, the compiling of a complete history of times might be\r\nthe better expected, when a writer should arise that were fit for\r\nit: for the collection of such relations might be as a nursery\r\ngarden, whereby to plant a fair and stately garden when time\r\nshould serve.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(11) There is yet another partition of history which Cornelius\r\nTacitus maketh, which is not to be forgotten, specially with that\r\napplication which he accoupleth it withal, annals and journals:\r\nappropriating to the former matters of estate, and to the latter\r\nacts and accidents of a meaner nature. For giving but a\r\ntouch of certain magnificent buildings, he addeth, \u003ci\u003eCum ex\r\ndignitate populi Romani repertum sit\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eres illustres\r\nannalibus\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003etalia diurnis urbis actis mandare\u003c/i\u003e. So\r\nas there is a kind of contemplative heraldry, as well as\r\ncivil. And as nothing doth derogate from the dignity of a\r\nstate more than confusion of degrees, so it doth not a little\r\nimbase the authority of a history to intermingle matters of\r\ntriumph, or matters of ceremony, or matters of novelty, with\r\nmatters of state. But the use of a journal hath not only\r\nbeen in the history of time, but likewise in the history of\r\npersons, and chiefly of actions; for princes in ancient time had,\r\nupon point of honour and policy both, journals kept, what passed\r\nday by day. For we see the chronicle which was read before\r\nAhasuerus, when he could not take rest, contained matter of\r\naffairs, indeed, but such as had passed in his own time and very\r\nlately before. But the journal of Alexander’s house\r\nexpressed every small particularity, even concerning his person\r\nand court; and it is yet a use well received in enterprises\r\nmemorable, as expeditions of war, navigations, and the like, to\r\nkeep diaries of that which passeth continually.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(12) I cannot likewise be ignorant of a form of writing which\r\nsome grave and wise men have used, containing a scattered history\r\nof those actions which they have thought worthy of memory, with\r\npolitic discourse and observation thereupon: not incorporate into\r\nthe history, but separately, and as the more principal in their\r\nintention; which kind of ruminated history I think more fit to\r\nplace amongst books of policy, whereof we shall hereafter speak,\r\nthan amongst books of history. For it is the true office of\r\nhistory to represent the events themselves together with the\r\ncounsels, and to leave the observations and conclusions thereupon\r\nto the liberty and faculty of every man’s judgment.\r\nBut mixtures are things irregular, whereof no man can define.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(13) So also is there another kind of history manifoldly\r\nmixed, and that is history of cosmography: being compounded of\r\nnatural history, in respect of the regions themselves; of history\r\ncivil, in respect of the habitations, regiments, and manners of\r\nthe people; and the mathematics, in respect of the climates and\r\nconfigurations towards the heavens: which part of learning of all\r\nothers in this latter time hath obtained most proficience.\r\nFor it may be truly affirmed to the honour of these times, and in\r\na virtuous emulation with antiquity, that this great building of\r\nthe world had never through-lights made in it, till the age of us\r\nand our fathers. For although they had knowledge of the\r\nantipodes,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Nosque ubi primus equis Oriens afflavit\r\nanhelis,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nIllic sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper,”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eyet that might be by demonstration, and not in fact; and if by\r\ntravel, it requireth the voyage but of half the globe. But\r\nto circle the earth, as the heavenly bodies do, was not done nor\r\nenterprised till these later times: and therefore these times may\r\njustly bear in their word, not only \u003ci\u003eplus ultra\u003c/i\u003e, in\r\nprecedence of the ancient \u003ci\u003enon ultra\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003eimitabile\r\nfulmen\u003c/i\u003e, in precedence of the ancient \u003ci\u003enon imitabile\r\nfulmen\u003c/i\u003e,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Demens qui nimbos et non imitabile\r\nfulmen,” \u0026amp;c.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ebut likewise \u003ci\u003eimitabile cælum\u003c/i\u003e; in respect of the\r\nmany memorable voyages after the manner of heaven about the globe\r\nof the earth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(14) And this proficience in navigation and discoveries may\r\nplant also an expectation of the further proficience and\r\naugmentation of all sciences; because it may seem they are\r\nordained by God to be coevals, that is, to meet in one age.\r\nFor so the prophet Daniel speaking of the latter times\r\nforetelleth, \u003ci\u003ePlurimi pertransibunt\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet multiplex erit\r\nscientia\u003c/i\u003e: as if the openness and through-passage of the world\r\nand the increase of knowledge were appointed to be in the same\r\nages; as we see it is already performed in great part: the\r\nlearning of these later times not much giving place to the former\r\ntwo periods or returns of learning, the one of the Grecians, the\r\nother of the Romans.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIII. (1) History ecclesiastical receiveth the same divisions\r\nwith history civil: but further in the propriety thereof may be\r\ndivided into the history of the Church, by a general name;\r\nhistory of prophecy; and history of providence. The first\r\ndescribeth the times of the militant Church, whether it be\r\nfluctuant, as the ark of Noah, or movable, as the ark in the\r\nwilderness, or at rest, as the ark in the Temple: that is, the\r\nstate of the Church in persecution, in remove, and in\r\npeace. This part I ought in no sort to note as deficient;\r\nonly I would that the virtue and sincerity of it were according\r\nto the mass and quantity. But I am not now in hand with\r\ncensures, but with omissions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) The second, which is history of prophecy, consisteth of\r\ntwo relatives—the prophecy and the accomplishment; and,\r\ntherefore, the nature of such a work ought to be, that every\r\nprophecy of the Scripture be sorted with the event fulfilling the\r\nsame throughout the ages of the world, both for the better\r\nconfirmation of faith and for the better illumination of the\r\nChurch touching those parts of prophecies which are yet\r\nunfulfilled: allowing, nevertheless, that latitude which is\r\nagreeable and familiar unto divine prophecies, being of the\r\nnature of their Author, with whom a thousand years are but as one\r\nday, and therefore are not fulfilled punctually at once, but have\r\nspringing and germinant accomplishment throughout many ages,\r\nthough the height or fulness of them may refer to some one\r\nage. This is a work which I find deficient, but is to be\r\ndone with wisdom, sobriety, and reverence, or not at all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) The third, which is history of Providence, containeth that\r\nexcellent correspondence which is between God’s revealed\r\nwill and His secret will; which though it be so obscure, as for\r\nthe most part it is not legible to the natural man—no, nor\r\nmany times to those that behold it from the tabernacle—yet,\r\nat some times it pleaseth God, for our better establishment and\r\nthe confuting of those which are as without God in the world, to\r\nwrite it in such text and capital letters, that, as the prophet\r\nsaith, “He that runneth by may read it”—that\r\nis, mere sensual persons, which hasten by God’s judgments,\r\nand never bend or fix their cogitations upon them, are\r\nnevertheless in their passage and race urged to discern it.\r\nSuch are the notable events and examples of God’s\r\njudgments, chastisements, deliverances, and blessings; and this\r\nis a work which has passed through the labour of many, and\r\ntherefore I cannot present as omitted.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) There are also other parts of learning which are\r\nappendices to history. For all the exterior proceedings of\r\nman consist of words and deeds, whereof history doth properly\r\nreceive and retain in memory the deeds; and if words, yet but as\r\ninducements and passages to deeds; so are there other books and\r\nwritings which are appropriate to the custody and receipt of\r\nwords only, which likewise are of three sorts—orations,\r\nletters, and brief speeches or sayings. Orations are\r\npleadings, speeches of counsel, laudatives, invectives,\r\napologies, reprehensions, orations of formality or ceremony, and\r\nthe like. Letters are according to all the variety of\r\noccasions, advertisements, advises, directions, propositions,\r\npetitions, commendatory, expostulatory, satisfactory, of\r\ncompliment, of pleasure, of discourse, and all other passages of\r\naction. And such as are written from wise men, are of all\r\nthe words of man, in my judgment, the best; for they are more\r\nnatural than orations and public speeches, and more advised than\r\nconferences or present speeches. So again letters of\r\naffairs from such as manage them, or are privy to them, are of\r\nall others the best instructions for history, and to a diligent\r\nreader the best histories in themselves. For apophthegms,\r\nit is a great loss of that book of Cæsar’s; for as\r\nhis history, and those few letters of his which we have, and\r\nthose apophthegms which were of his own, excel all men’s\r\nelse, so I suppose would his collection of apophthegms have done;\r\nfor as for those which are collected by others, either I have no\r\ntaste in such matters or else their choice hath not been\r\nhappy. But upon these three kinds of writings I do not\r\ninsist, because I have no deficiences to propound concerning\r\nthem.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) Thus much therefore concerning history, which is that part\r\nof learning which answereth to one of the cells, domiciles, or\r\noffices of the mind of man, which is that of the memory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIV. (1) Poesy is a part of learning in measure of words, for\r\nthe most part restrained, but in all other points extremely\r\nlicensed, and doth truly refer to the imagination; which, being\r\nnot tied to the laws of matter, may at pleasure join that which\r\nnature hath severed, and sever that which nature hath joined, and\r\nso make unlawful matches and divorces of\r\nthings—\u003ci\u003ePictoribus atque poetis\u003c/i\u003e, \u0026amp;c. It is\r\ntaken in two senses in respect of words or matter. In the\r\nfirst sense, it is but a character of style, and belongeth to\r\narts of speech, and is not pertinent for the present. In\r\nthe latter, it is—as hath been said—one of the\r\nprincipal portions of learning, and is nothing else but feigned\r\nhistory, which may be styled as well in prose as in verse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) The use of this feigned history hath been to give some\r\nshadow of satisfaction to the mind of man in those points wherein\r\nthe nature of things doth deny it, the world being in proportion\r\ninferior to the soul; by reason whereof there is, agreeable to\r\nthe spirit of man, a more ample greatness, a more exact goodness,\r\nand a more absolute variety, than can be found in the nature of\r\nthings. Therefore, because the acts or events of true\r\nhistory have not that magnitude which satisfieth the mind of man,\r\npoesy feigneth acts and events greater and more heroical.\r\nBecause true history propoundeth the successes and issues of\r\nactions not so agreeable to the merits of virtue and vice,\r\ntherefore poesy feigns them more just in retribution, and more\r\naccording to revealed Providence. Because true history\r\nrepresenteth actions and events more ordinary and less\r\ninterchanged, therefore poesy endueth them with more rareness and\r\nmore unexpected and alternative variations. So as it\r\nappeareth that poesy serveth and conferreth to magnanimity,\r\nmorality and to delectation. And therefore, it was ever\r\nthought to have some participation of divineness, because it doth\r\nraise and erect the mind, by submitting the shows of things to\r\nthe desires of the mind; whereas reason doth buckle and bow the\r\nmind unto the nature of things. And we see that by these\r\ninsinuations and congruities with man’s nature and\r\npleasure, joined also with the agreement and consort it hath with\r\nmusic, it hath had access and estimation in rude times and\r\nbarbarous regions, where other learning stood excluded.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) The division of poesy which is aptest in the propriety\r\nthereof (besides those divisions which are common unto it with\r\nhistory, as feigned chronicles, feigned lives, and the appendices\r\nof history, as feigned epistles, feigned orations, and the rest)\r\nis into poesy narrative, representative, and allusive. The\r\nnarrative is a mere imitation of history, with the excesses\r\nbefore remembered, choosing for subjects commonly wars and love,\r\nrarely state, and sometimes pleasure or mirth.\r\nRepresentative is as a visible history, and is an image of\r\nactions as if they were present, as history is of actions in\r\nnature as they are (that is) past. Allusive, or\r\nparabolical, is a narration applied only to express some special\r\npurpose or conceit; which latter kind of parabolical wisdom was\r\nmuch more in use in the ancient times, as by the fables of\r\nÆsop, and the brief sentences of the seven, and the use of\r\nhieroglyphics may appear. And the cause was (for that it\r\nwas then of necessity to express any point of reason which was\r\nmore sharp or subtle than the vulgar in that manner) because men\r\nin those times wanted both variety of examples and subtlety of\r\nconceit. And as hieroglyphics were before letters, so\r\nparables were before arguments; and nevertheless now and at all\r\ntimes they do retain much life and rigour, because reason cannot\r\nbe so sensible nor examples so fit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) But there remaineth yet another use of poesy parabolical,\r\nopposite to that which we last mentioned; for that tendeth to\r\ndemonstrate and illustrate that which is taught or delivered, and\r\nthis other to retire and obscure it—that is, when the\r\nsecrets and mysteries of religion, policy, or philosophy, are\r\ninvolved in fables or parables. Of this in divine poesy we\r\nsee the use is authorised. In heathen poesy we see the\r\nexposition of fables doth fall out sometimes with great felicity:\r\nas in the fable that the giants being overthrown in their war\r\nagainst the gods, the earth their mother in revenge thereof\r\nbrought forth Fame:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Illam terra parens, ira irritat Deorum,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nExtremam, ut perhibent, Cœo Enceladoque soroem,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nProgenuit.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eExpounded that when princes and monarchs have suppressed\r\nactual and open rebels, then the malignity of people (which is\r\nthe mother of rebellion) doth bring forth libels and slanders,\r\nand taxations of the states, which is of the same kind with\r\nrebellion but more feminine. So in the fable that the rest\r\nof the gods having conspired to bind Jupiter, Pallas called\r\nBriareus with his hundred hands to his aid: expounded that\r\nmonarchies need not fear any curbing of their absoluteness by\r\nmighty subjects, as long as by wisdom they keep the hearts of the\r\npeople, who will be sure to come in on their side. So in\r\nthe fable that Achilles was brought up under Chiron, the centaur,\r\nwho was part a man and part a beast, expounded ingeniously but\r\ncorruptly by Machiavel, that it belongeth to the education and\r\ndiscipline of princes to know as well how to play the part of a\r\nlion in violence, and the fox in guile, as of the man in virtue\r\nand justice. Nevertheless, in many the like encounters, I\r\ndo rather think that the fable was first, and the exposition\r\ndevised, than that the moral was first, and thereupon the fable\r\nframed; for I find it was an ancient vanity in Chrysippus, that\r\ntroubled himself with great contention to fasten the assertions\r\nof the Stoics upon the fictions of the ancient poets; but yet\r\nthat all the fables and fictions of the poets were but pleasure\r\nand not figure, I interpose no opinion. Surely of these\r\npoets which are now extant, even Homer himself (notwithstanding\r\nhe was made a kind of scripture by the later schools of the\r\nGrecians), yet I should without any difficulty pronounce that his\r\nfables had no such inwardness in his own meaning. But what\r\nthey might have upon a more original tradition is not easy to\r\naffirm, for he was not the inventor of many of them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) In this third part of learning, which is poesy, I can\r\nreport no deficience; for being as a plant that cometh of the\r\nlust of the earth, without a formal seed, it hath sprung up and\r\nspread abroad more than any other kind. But to ascribe unto\r\nit that which is due, for the expressing of affections, passions,\r\ncorruptions, and customs, we are beholding to poets more than to\r\nthe philosophers’ works; and for wit and eloquence, not\r\nmuch less than to orators’ harangues. But it is not\r\ngood to stay too long in the theatre. Let us now pass on to\r\nthe judicial place or palace of the mind, which we are to\r\napproach and view with more reverence and attention.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eV. (1) The knowledge of man is as the waters, some descending\r\nfrom above, and some springing from beneath: the one informed by\r\nthe light of nature, the other inspired by divine\r\nrevelation. The light of nature consisteth in the notions\r\nof the mind and the reports of the senses; for as for knowledge\r\nwhich man receiveth by teaching, it is cumulative and not\r\noriginal, as in a water that besides his own spring-head is fed\r\nwith other springs and streams. So then, according to these\r\ntwo differing illuminations or originals, knowledge is first of\r\nall divided into divinity and philosophy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) In philosophy the contemplations of man do either\r\npenetrate unto God, or are circumferred to nature, or are\r\nreflected or reverted upon himself. Out of which several\r\ninquiries there do arise three knowledges—divine\r\nphilosophy, natural philosophy, and human philosophy or\r\nhumanity. For all things are marked and stamped with this\r\ntriple character—the power of God, the difference of nature\r\nand the use of man. But because the distributions and\r\npartitions of knowledge are not like several lines that meet in\r\none angle, and so touch but in a point, but are like branches of\r\na tree that meet in a stem, which hath a dimension and quantity\r\nof entireness and continuance before it come to discontinue and\r\nbreak itself into arms and boughs; therefore it is good, before\r\nwe enter into the former distribution, to erect and constitute\r\none universal science, by the name of \u003ci\u003ephilosophia prima\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nprimitive or summary philosophy, as the main and common way,\r\nbefore we come where the ways part and divide themselves; which\r\nscience whether I should report as deficient or no, I stand\r\ndoubtful. For I find a certain rhapsody of natural\r\ntheology, and of divers parts of logic; and of that part of\r\nnatural philosophy which concerneth the principles, and of that\r\nother part of natural philosophy which concerneth the soul or\r\nspirit—all these strangely commixed and confused; but being\r\nexamined, it seemeth to me rather a depredation of other\r\nsciences, advanced and exalted unto some height of terms, than\r\nanything solid or substantive of itself. Nevertheless I\r\ncannot be ignorant of the distinction which is current, that the\r\nsame things are handled but in several respects. As for\r\nexample, that logic considereth of many things as they are in\r\nnotion, and this philosophy as they are in nature—the one\r\nin appearance, the other in existence; but I find this difference\r\nbetter made than pursued. For if they had considered\r\nquantity, similitude, diversity, and the rest of those extern\r\ncharacters of things, as philosophers, and in nature, their\r\ninquiries must of force have been of a far other kind than they\r\nare. For doth any of them, in handling quantity, speak of\r\nthe force of union, how and how far it multiplieth virtue?\r\nDoth any give the reason why some things in nature are so common,\r\nand in so great mass, and others so rare, and in so small\r\nquantity? Doth any, in handling similitude and diversity,\r\nassign the cause why iron should not move to iron, which is more\r\nlike, but move to the loadstone, which is less like? Why in\r\nall diversities of things there should be certain participles in\r\nnature which are almost ambiguous to which kind they should be\r\nreferred? But there is a mere and deep silence touching the\r\nnature and operation of those common adjuncts of things, as in\r\nnature; and only a resuming and repeating of the force and use of\r\nthem in speech or argument. Therefore, because in a writing\r\nof this nature I avoid all subtlety, my meaning touching this\r\noriginal or universal philosophy is thus, in a plain and gross\r\ndescription by negative: “That it be a receptacle for all\r\nsuch profitable observations and axioms as fall not within the\r\ncompass of any of the special parts of philosophy or sciences,\r\nbut are more common and of a higher stage.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) Now that there are many of that kind need not be\r\ndoubted. For example: Is not the rule, \u003ci\u003eSi\r\ninœqualibus æqualia addas\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eomnia erunt\r\ninæqualia\u003c/i\u003e, an axiom as well of justice as of the\r\nmathematics? and is there not a true coincidence between\r\ncommutative and distributive justice, and arithmetical and\r\ngeometrical proportion? Is not that other rule,\r\n\u003ci\u003eQuæ in eodem tertio conveniunt\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet inter se\r\nconveniunt\u003c/i\u003e, a rule taken from the mathematics, but so potent\r\nin logic as all syllogisms are built upon it? Is not the\r\nobservation, \u003ci\u003eOmnia mutantur\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enil interit\u003c/i\u003e, a\r\ncontemplation in philosophy thus, that the \u003ci\u003equantum\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nnature is eternal? in natural theology thus, that it requireth\r\nthe same omnipotency to make somewhat nothing, which at the first\r\nmade nothing somewhat? according to the Scripture, \u003ci\u003eDidici quod\r\nomnia opera\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003equœ fecit Deus\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eperseverent in\r\nperpetuum\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003enon possumus eis quicquam addere nec\r\nauferre\u003c/i\u003e. Is not the ground, which Machiavel wisely and\r\nlargely discourseth concerning governments, that the way to\r\nestablish and preserve them is to reduce them \u003ci\u003ead\r\nprincipia\u003c/i\u003e—a rule in religion and nature, as well as in\r\ncivil administration? Was not the Persian magic a reduction\r\nor correspondence of the principles and architectures of nature\r\nto the rules and policy of governments? Is not the precept\r\nof a musician, to fall from a discord or harsh accord upon a\r\nconcord or sweet accord, alike true in affection? Is not\r\nthe trope of music, to avoid or slide from the close or cadence,\r\ncommon with the trope of rhetoric of deceiving expectation?\r\nIs not the delight of the quavering upon a stop in music the same\r\nwith the playing of light upon the water?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Splendet tremulo sub lumine\r\npontus.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAre not the organs of the senses of one kind with the organs\r\nof reflection, the eye with a glass, the ear with a cave or\r\nstrait, determined and bounded? Neither are these only\r\nsimilitudes, as men of narrow observation may conceive them to\r\nbe, but the same footsteps of nature, treading or printing upon\r\nseveral subjects or matters. This science therefore (as I\r\nunderstand it) I may justly report as deficient; for I see\r\nsometimes the profounder sort of wits, in handling some\r\nparticular argument, will now and then draw a bucket of water out\r\nof this well for their present use; but the spring-head thereof\r\nseemeth to me not to have been visited, being of so excellent use\r\nboth for the disclosing of nature and the abridgment of art.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVI. (1) This science being therefore first placed as a common\r\nparent like unto Berecynthia, which had so much heavenly issue,\r\n\u003ci\u003eomnes cœlicolas\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eomnes supera alta tenetes\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nwe may return to the former distribution of the three\r\nphilosophies—divine, natural, and human. And as\r\nconcerning divine philosophy or natural theology, it is that\r\nknowledge or rudiment of knowledge concerning God which may be\r\nobtained by the contemplation of His creatures; which knowledge\r\nmay be truly termed divine in respect of the object, and natural\r\nin respect of the light. The bounds of this knowledge are,\r\nthat it sufficeth to convince atheism, but not to inform\r\nreligion; and therefore there was never miracle wrought by God to\r\nconvert an atheist, because the light of nature might have led\r\nhim to confess a God; but miracles have been wrought to convert\r\nidolaters and the superstitious, because no light of nature\r\nextendeth to declare the will and true worship of God. For\r\nas all works do show forth the power and skill of the workman,\r\nand not his image, so it is of the works of God, which do show\r\nthe omnipotency and wisdom of the Maker, but not His image.\r\nAnd therefore therein the heathen opinion differeth from the\r\nsacred truth: for they supposed the world to be the image of God,\r\nand man to be an extract or compendious image of the world; but\r\nthe Scriptures never vouchsafe to attribute to the world that\r\nhonour, as to be the image of God, but only \u003ci\u003ethe work of His\r\nhands\u003c/i\u003e; neither do they speak of any other image of God but\r\nman. Wherefore by the contemplation of nature to induce and\r\nenforce the acknowledgment of God, and to demonstrate His power,\r\nprovidence, and goodness, is an excellent argument, and hath been\r\nexcellently handled by divers, but on the other side, out of the\r\ncontemplation of nature, or ground of human knowledges, to induce\r\nany verity or persuasion concerning the points of faith, is in my\r\njudgment not safe; \u003ci\u003eDa fidei quæ fidei sunt\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nFor the heathen themselves conclude as much in that excellent and\r\ndivine fable of the golden chain, “That men and gods were\r\nnot able to draw Jupiter down to the earth; but, contrariwise,\r\nJupiter was able to draw them up to heaven.” So as we\r\nought not to attempt to draw down or submit the mysteries of God\r\nto our reason, but contrariwise to raise and advance our reason\r\nto the divine truth. So as in this part of knowledge,\r\ntouching divine philosophy, I am so far from noting any\r\ndeficience, as I rather note an excess; whereunto I have\r\ndigressed because of the extreme prejudice which both religion\r\nand philosophy hath received and may receive by being commixed\r\ntogether; as that which undoubtedly will make an heretical\r\nreligion, and an imaginary and fabulous philosophy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) Otherwise it is of the nature of angels and spirits, which\r\nis an appendix of theology, both divine and natural, and is\r\nneither inscrutable nor interdicted. For although the\r\nScripture saith, “Let no man deceive you in sublime\r\ndiscourse touching the worship of angels, pressing into that he\r\nknoweth not,” \u0026amp;c., yet notwithstanding if you observe\r\nwell that precept, it may appear thereby that there be two things\r\nonly forbidden—adoration of them, and opinion fantastical\r\nof them, either to extol them further than appertaineth to the\r\ndegree of a creature, or to extol a man’s knowledge of them\r\nfurther than he hath ground. But the sober and grounded\r\ninquiry, which may arise out of the passages of Holy Scriptures,\r\nor out of the gradations of nature, is not restrained. So\r\nof degenerate and revolted spirits, the conversing with them or\r\nthe employment of them is prohibited, much more any veneration\r\ntowards them; but the contemplation or science of their nature,\r\ntheir power, their illusions, either by Scripture or reason, is a\r\npart of spiritual wisdom. For so the apostle saith,\r\n“We are not ignorant of his stratagems.” And it\r\nis no more unlawful to inquire the nature of evil spirits, than\r\nto inquire the force of poisons in nature, or the nature of sin\r\nand vice in morality. But this part touching angels and\r\nspirits I cannot note as deficient, for many have occupied\r\nthemselves in it; I may rather challenge it, in many of the\r\nwriters thereof, as fabulous and fantastical.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVII. (1) Leaving therefore divine philosophy or natural\r\ntheology (not divinity or inspired theology, which we reserve for\r\nthe last of all as the haven and sabbath of all man’s\r\ncontemplations) we will now proceed to natural philosophy.\r\nIf then it be true that Democritus said, “That the truth of\r\nnature lieth hid in certain deep mines and caves;” and if\r\nit be true likewise that the alchemists do so much inculcate,\r\nthat Vulcan is a second nature, and imitateth that dexterously\r\nand compendiously, which nature worketh by ambages and length of\r\ntime, it were good to divide natural philosophy into the mine and\r\nthe furnace, and to make two professions or occupations of\r\nnatural philosophers—some to be pioneers and some smiths;\r\nsome to dig, and some to refine and hammer. And surely I do\r\nbest allow of a division of that kind, though in more familiar\r\nand scholastical terms: namely, that these be the two parts of\r\nnatural philosophy—the inquisition of causes, and the\r\nproduction of effects; speculative and operative; natural\r\nscience, and natural prudence. For as in civil matters\r\nthere is a wisdom of discourse, and a wisdom of direction; so is\r\nit in natural. And here I will make a request, that for the\r\nlatter (or at least for a part thereof) I may revive and\r\nreintegrate the misapplied and abused name of natural magic,\r\nwhich in the true sense is but natural wisdom, or natural\r\nprudence; taken according to the ancient acception, purged from\r\nvanity and superstition. Now although it be true, and I\r\nknow it well, that there is an intercourse between causes and\r\neffects, so as both these knowledges, speculative and operative,\r\nhave a great connection between themselves; yet because all true\r\nand fruitful natural philosophy hath a double scale or ladder,\r\nascendent and descendent, ascending from experiments to the\r\ninvention of causes, and descending from causes to the invention\r\nof new experiments; therefore I judge it most requisite that\r\nthese two parts be severally considered and handled.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) Natural science or theory is divided into physic and\r\nmetaphysic; wherein I desire it may be conceived that I use the\r\nword metaphysic in a differing sense from that that is\r\nreceived. And in like manner, I doubt not but it will\r\neasily appear to men of judgment, that in this and other\r\nparticulars, wheresoever my conception and notion may differ from\r\nthe ancient, yet I am studious to keep the ancient terms.\r\nFor hoping well to deliver myself from mistaking, by the order\r\nand perspicuous expressing of that I do propound, I am otherwise\r\nzealous and affectionate to recede as little from antiquity,\r\neither in terms or opinions, as may stand with truth and the\r\nproficience of knowledge. And herein I cannot a little\r\nmarvel at the philosopher Aristotle, that did proceed in such a\r\nspirit of difference and contradiction towards all antiquity;\r\nundertaking not only to frame new words of science at pleasure,\r\nbut to confound and extinguish all ancient wisdom; insomuch as he\r\nnever nameth or mentioneth an ancient author or opinion, but to\r\nconfute and reprove; wherein for glory, and drawing followers and\r\ndisciples, he took the right course. For certainly there\r\ncometh to pass, and hath place in human truth, that which was\r\nnoted and pronounced in the highest truth:—\u003ci\u003eVeni in\r\nnomine partis\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enec recipits me\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003esi quis venerit in\r\nnomine suo eum recipietis\u003c/i\u003e. But in this divine aphorism\r\n(considering to whom it was applied, namely, to antichrist, the\r\nhighest deceiver), we may discern well that the coming in a\r\nman’s own name, without regard of antiquity or paternity,\r\nis no good sign of truth, although it be joined with the fortune\r\nand success of an \u003ci\u003eeum recipietis\u003c/i\u003e. But for this\r\nexcellent person Aristotle, I will think of him that he learned\r\nthat humour of his scholar, with whom it seemeth he did emulate;\r\nthe one to conquer all opinions, as the other to conquer all\r\nnations. Wherein, nevertheless, it may be, he may at some\r\nmen’s hands, that are of a bitter disposition, get a like\r\ntitle as his scholar did:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Felix terrarum prædo, non utile\r\nmundo\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEditus exemplum, \u0026amp;c.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Felix doctrinæ\r\nprædo.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut to me, on the other side, that do desire as much as lieth\r\nin my pen to ground a sociable intercourse between antiquity and\r\nproficience, it seemeth best to keep way with antiquity \u003ci\u003eusque\r\nad aras\u003c/i\u003e; and, therefore, to retain the ancient terms, though\r\nI sometimes alter the uses and definitions, according to the\r\nmoderate proceeding in civil government; where, although there be\r\nsome alteration, yet that holdeth which Tacitus wisely noteth,\r\n\u003ci\u003eeadem magistratuum vocabula\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) To return, therefore, to the use and acception of the term\r\nmetaphysic as I do now understand the word; it appeareth, by that\r\nwhich hath been already said, that I intend \u003ci\u003ephilosophia\r\nprima\u003c/i\u003e, summary philosophy and metaphysic, which heretofore\r\nhave been confounded as one, to be two distinct things. For\r\nthe one I have made as a parent or common ancestor to all\r\nknowledge; and the other I have now brought in as a branch or\r\ndescendant of natural science. It appeareth likewise that I\r\nhave assigned to summary philosophy the common principles and\r\naxioms which are promiscuous and indifferent to several sciences;\r\nI have assigned unto it likewise the inquiry touching the\r\noperation or the relative and adventive characters of essences,\r\nas quantity, similitude, diversity, possibility, and the rest,\r\nwith this distinction and provision; that they be handled as they\r\nhave efficacy in nature, and not logically. It appeareth\r\nlikewise that natural theology, which heretofore hath been\r\nhandled confusedly with metaphysic, I have enclosed and bounded\r\nby itself. It is therefore now a question what is left\r\nremaining for metaphysic; wherein I may without prejudice\r\npreserve thus much of the conceit of antiquity, that physic\r\nshould contemplate that which is inherent in matter, and\r\ntherefore transitory; and metaphysic that which is abstracted and\r\nfixed. And again, that physic should handle that which\r\nsupposeth in nature only a being and moving; and metaphysic\r\nshould handle that which supposeth further in nature a reason,\r\nunderstanding, and platform. But the difference,\r\nperspicuously expressed, is most familiar and sensible. For\r\nas we divided natural philosophy in general into the inquiry of\r\ncauses and productions of effects, so that part which concerneth\r\nthe inquiry of causes we do subdivide according to the received\r\nand sound division of causes. The one part, which is\r\nphysic, inquireth and handleth the material and efficient causes;\r\nand the other, which is metaphysic, handleth the formal and final\r\ncauses.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) Physic (taking it according to the derivation, and not\r\naccording to our idiom for medicine) is situate in a middle term\r\nor distance between natural history and metaphysic. For\r\nnatural history describeth the variety of things; physic the\r\ncauses, but variable or respective causes; and metaphysic the\r\nfixed and constant causes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Limus ut hic durescit, et hæc ut cera\r\nliquescit,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nUno eodemque igni.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFire is the cause of induration, but respective to clay; fire\r\nis the cause of colliquation, but respective to wax. But\r\nfire is no constant cause either of induration or colliquation;\r\nso then the physical causes are but the efficient and the\r\nmatter. Physic hath three parts, whereof two respect nature\r\nunited or collected, the third contemplateth nature diffused or\r\ndistributed. Nature is collected either into one entire\r\ntotal, or else into the same principles or seeds. So as the\r\nfirst doctrine is touching the contexture or configuration of\r\nthings, as \u003ci\u003ede mundo\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ede universitate rerum\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThe second is the doctrine concerning the principles or originals\r\nof things. The third is the doctrine concerning all variety\r\nand particularity of things; whether it be of the differing\r\nsubstances, or their differing qualities and natures; whereof\r\nthere needeth no enumeration, this part being but as a gloss or\r\nparaphrase that attendeth upon the text of natural history.\r\nOf these three I cannot report any as deficient. In what\r\ntruth or perfection they are handled, I make not now any\r\njudgment; but they are parts of knowledge not deserted by the\r\nlabour of man.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) For metaphysic, we have assigned unto it the inquiry of\r\nformal and final causes; which assignation, as to the former of\r\nthem, may seem to be nugatory and void, because of the received\r\nand inveterate opinion, that the inquisition of man is not\r\ncompetent to find out essential forms or true differences; of\r\nwhich opinion we will take this hold, that the invention of forms\r\nis of all other parts of knowledge the worthiest to be sought, if\r\nit be possible to be found. As for the possibility, they\r\nare ill discoverers that think there is no land, when they can\r\nsee nothing but sea. But it is manifest that Plato, in his\r\nopinion of ideas, as one that had a wit of elevation situate as\r\nupon a cliff, did descry that forms were the true object of\r\nknowledge; but lost the real fruit of his opinion, by considering\r\nof forms as absolutely abstracted from matter, and not confined\r\nand determined by matter; and so turning his opinion upon\r\ntheology, wherewith all his natural philosophy is infected.\r\nBut if any man shall keep a continual watchful and severe eye\r\nupon action, operation, and the use of knowledge, he may advise\r\nand take notice what are the forms, the disclosures whereof are\r\nfruitful and important to the state of man. For as to the\r\nforms of substances (man only except, of whom it is said,\r\n\u003ci\u003eFormavit hominem de limo terræ\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet spiravit in\r\nfaciem ejus spiraculum vitæ\u003c/i\u003e, and not as of all other\r\ncreatures, \u003ci\u003eProducant aquæ\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eproducat terra\u003c/i\u003e),\r\nthe forms of substances I say (as they are now by compounding and\r\ntransplanting multiplied) are so perplexed, as they are not to be\r\ninquired; no more than it were either possible or to purpose to\r\nseek in gross the forms of those sounds which make words, which\r\nby composition and transposition of letters are infinite.\r\nBut, on the other side, to inquire the form of those sounds or\r\nvoices which make simple letters is easily comprehensible; and\r\nbeing known induceth and manifesteth the forms of all words,\r\nwhich consist and are compounded of them. In the same\r\nmanner to inquire the form of a lion, of an oak, of gold; nay, of\r\nwater, of air, is a vain pursuit; but to inquire the forms of\r\nsense, of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, of gravity\r\nand levity, of density, of tenuity, of heat, of cold, and all\r\nother natures and qualities, which, like an alphabet, are not\r\nmany, and of which the essences (upheld by matter) of all\r\ncreatures do consist; to inquire, I say, the true forms of these,\r\nis that part of metaphysic which we now define of. Not but\r\nthat physic doth make inquiry and take consideration of the same\r\nnatures; but how? Only as to the material and efficient\r\ncauses of them, and not as to the forms. For example, if\r\nthe cause of whiteness in snow or froth be inquired, and it be\r\nrendered thus, that the subtle intermixture of air and water is\r\nthe cause, it is well rendered; but, nevertheless, is this the\r\nform of whiteness? No; but it is the efficient, which is\r\never but \u003ci\u003evehiculum formæ\u003c/i\u003e. This part of\r\nmetaphysic I do not find laboured and performed; whereat I marvel\r\nnot; because I hold it not possible to be invented by that course\r\nof invention which hath been used; in regard that men (which is\r\nthe root of all error) have made too untimely a departure, and\r\ntoo remote a recess from particulars.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(6) But the use of this part of metaphysic, which I report as\r\ndeficient, is of the rest the most excellent in two respects: the\r\none, because it is the duty and virtue of all knowledge to\r\nabridge the infinity of individual experience, as much as the\r\nconception of truth will permit, and to remedy the complaint of\r\n\u003ci\u003evita brevis\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ears longa\u003c/i\u003e; which is performed by\r\nuniting the notions and conceptions of sciences. For\r\nknowledges are as pyramids, whereof history is the basis.\r\nSo of natural philosophy, the basis is natural history; the stage\r\nnext the basis is physic; the stage next the vertical point is\r\nmetaphysic. As for the vertical point, \u003ci\u003eopus quod\r\noperatur Deus à principio usque ad finem\u003c/i\u003e, the summary\r\nlaw of nature, we know not whether man’s inquiry can attain\r\nunto it. But these three be the true stages of knowledge,\r\nand are to them that are depraved no better than the\r\ngiants’ hills:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Ter sunt conati imponere Pelio Ossam,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nScilicet atque Ossæ frondsum involvere Olympum.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut to those which refer all things to the glory of God, they\r\nare as the three acclamations, \u003ci\u003eSante\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esancte\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003esancte\u003c/i\u003e! holy in the description or dilatation of His\r\nworks; holy in the connection or concatenation of them; and holy\r\nin the union of them in a perpetual and uniform law. And,\r\ntherefore, the speculation was excellent in Parmenides and Plato,\r\nalthough but a speculation in them, that all things by scale did\r\nascend to unity. So then always that knowledge is worthiest\r\nwhich is charged with least multiplicity, which appeareth to be\r\nmetaphysic; as that which considereth the simple forms or\r\ndifferences of things, which are few in number, and the degrees\r\nand co-ordinations whereof make all this variety. The\r\nsecond respect, which valueth and commendeth this part of\r\nmetaphysic, is that it doth enfranchise the power of man unto the\r\ngreatest liberty and possibility of works and effects. For\r\nphysic carrieth men in narrow and restrained ways, subject to\r\nmany accidents and impediments, imitating the ordinary flexuous\r\ncourses of nature. But \u003ci\u003elatæ undique sunt\r\nsapientibus viæ\u003c/i\u003e; to sapience (which was anciently\r\ndefined to be \u003ci\u003ererum divinarum et humanarum scientia\u003c/i\u003e) there\r\nis ever a choice of means. For physical causes give light\r\nto new invention in \u003ci\u003esimili materia\u003c/i\u003e. But whosoever\r\nknoweth any form, knoweth the utmost possibility of superinducing\r\nthat nature upon any variety of matter; and so is less restrained\r\nin operation, either to the basis of the matter, or the condition\r\nof the efficient; which kind of knowledge Solomon likewise,\r\nthough in a more divine sense, elegantly describeth: \u003ci\u003enon\r\narctabuntur gressus tui\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet currens non habebis\r\noffendiculum\u003c/i\u003e. The ways of sapience are not much liable\r\neither to particularity or chance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(7) The second part of metaphysic is the inquiry of final\r\ncauses, which I am moved to report not as omitted, but as\r\nmisplaced. And yet if it were but a fault in order, I would\r\nnot speak of it; for order is matter of illustration, but\r\npertaineth not to the substance of sciences. But this\r\nmisplacing hath caused a deficience, or at least a great\r\nimproficience in the sciences themselves. For the handling\r\nof final causes, mixed with the rest in physical inquiries, hath\r\nintercepted the severe and diligent inquiry of all real and\r\nphysical causes, and given men the occasion to stay upon these\r\nsatisfactory and specious causes, to the great arrest and\r\nprejudice of further discovery. For this I find done not\r\nonly by Plato, who ever anchoreth upon that shore, but by\r\nAristotle, Galen, and others which do usually likewise fall upon\r\nthese flats of discoursing causes. For to say that\r\n“the hairs of the eyelids are for a quickset and fence\r\nabout the sight;” or that “the firmness of the skins\r\nand hides of living creatures is to defend them from the\r\nextremities of heat or cold;” or that “the bones are\r\nfor the columns or beams, whereupon the frames of the bodies of\r\nliving creatures are built;” or that “the leaves of\r\ntrees are for protecting of the fruit;” or that “the\r\nclouds are for watering of the earth;” or that “the\r\nsolidness of the earth is for the station and mansion of living\r\ncreatures;” and the like, is well inquired and collected in\r\nmetaphysic, but in physic they are impertinent. Nay, they\r\nare, indeed, but \u003ci\u003eremoras\u003c/i\u003e and hindrances to stay and slug\r\nthe ship from further sailing; and have brought this to pass,\r\nthat the search of the physical causes hath been neglected and\r\npassed in silence. And, therefore, the natural philosophy\r\nof Democritus and some others, who did not suppose a mind or\r\nreason in the frame of things, but attributed the form thereof\r\nable to maintain itself to infinite essays or proofs of Nature,\r\nwhich they term fortune, seemeth to me (as far as I can judge by\r\nthe recital and fragments which remain unto us) in\r\nparticularities of physical causes more real and better inquired\r\nthan that of Aristotle and Plato; whereof both intermingled final\r\ncauses, the one as a part of theology, and the other as a part of\r\nlogic, which were the favourite studies respectively of both\r\nthose persons; not because those final causes are not true and\r\nworthy to be inquired, being kept within their own province, but\r\nbecause their excursions into the limits of physical causes hath\r\nbred a vastness and solitude in that tract. For otherwise,\r\nkeeping their precincts and borders, men are extremely deceived\r\nif they think there is an enmity or repugnancy at all between\r\nthem. For the cause rendered, that “the hairs about\r\nthe eyelids are for the safeguard of the sight,” doth not\r\nimpugn the cause rendered, that “pilosity is incident to\r\norifices of moisture—\u003ci\u003emuscosi fontes\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u0026amp;c.” Nor the cause rendered, that “the\r\nfirmness of hides is for the armour of the body against\r\nextremities of heat or cold,” doth not impugn the cause\r\nrendered, that “contraction of pores is incident to the\r\noutwardest parts, in regard of their adjacence to foreign or\r\nunlike bodies;” and so of the rest, both causes being true\r\nand compatible, the one declaring an intention, the other a\r\nconsequence only. Neither doth this call in question or\r\nderogate from Divine Providence, but highly confirm and exalt\r\nit. For as in civil actions he is the greater and deeper\r\npolitique that can make other men the instruments of his will and\r\nends, and yet never acquaint them with his purpose, so as they\r\nshall do it and yet not know what they do, than he that imparteth\r\nhis meaning to those he employeth; so is the wisdom of God more\r\nadmirable, when Nature intendeth one thing and Providence draweth\r\nforth another, than if He had communicated to particular\r\ncreatures and motions the characters and impressions of His\r\nProvidence. And thus much for metaphysic; the latter part\r\nwhereof I allow as extant, but wish it confined to his proper\r\nplace.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eVIII. (1) Nevertheless, there remaineth yet another part of\r\nnatural philosophy, which is commonly made a principal part, and\r\nholdeth rank with physic special and metaphysic, which is\r\nmathematic; but I think it more agreeable to the nature of\r\nthings, and to the light of order, to place it as a branch of\r\nmetaphysic. For the subject of it being quantity, not\r\nquantity indefinite, which is but a relative, and belongeth to\r\n\u003ci\u003ephilosophia prima\u003c/i\u003e (as hath been said), but quantity\r\ndetermined or proportionable, it appeareth to be one of the\r\nessential forms of things, as that that is causative in Nature of\r\na number of effects; insomuch as we see in the schools both of\r\nDemocritus and of Pythagoras that the one did ascribe figure to\r\nthe first seeds of things, and the other did suppose numbers to\r\nbe the principles and originals of things. And it is true\r\nalso that of all other forms (as we understand forms) it is the\r\nmost abstracted and separable from matter, and therefore most\r\nproper to metaphysic; which hath likewise been the cause why it\r\nhath been better laboured and inquired than any of the other\r\nforms, which are more immersed in matter. For it being the\r\nnature of the mind of man (to the extreme prejudice of knowledge)\r\nto delight in the spacious liberty of generalities, as in a\r\nchampaign region, and not in the inclosures of particularity, the\r\nmathematics of all other knowledge were the goodliest fields to\r\nsatisfy that appetite. But for the placing of this science,\r\nit is not much material: only we have endeavoured in these our\r\npartitions to observe a kind of perspective, that one part may\r\ncast light upon another.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) The mathematics are either pure or mixed. To the\r\npure mathematics are those sciences belonging which handle\r\nquantity determinate, merely severed from any axioms of natural\r\nphilosophy; and these are two, geometry and arithmetic, the one\r\nhandling quantity continued, and the other dissevered.\r\nMixed hath for subject some axioms or parts of natural\r\nphilosophy, and considereth quantity determined, as it is\r\nauxiliary and incident unto them. For many parts of Nature\r\ncan neither be invented with sufficient subtlety, nor\r\ndemonstrated with sufficient perspicuity, nor accommodated unto\r\nuse with sufficient dexterity, without the aid and intervening of\r\nthe mathematics, of which sort are perspective, music, astronomy,\r\ncosmography, architecture, engineery, and divers others. In\r\nthe mathematics I can report no deficience, except it be that men\r\ndo not sufficiently understand this excellent use of the pure\r\nmathematics, in that they do remedy and cure many defects in the\r\nwit and faculties intellectual. For if the wit be too dull,\r\nthey sharpen it; if too wandering, they fix it; if too inherent\r\nin the sense, they abstract it. So that as tennis is a game\r\nof no use in itself, but of great use in respect it maketh a\r\nquick eye and a body ready to put itself into all postures, so in\r\nthe mathematics that use which is collateral and intervenient is\r\nno less worthy than that which is principal and intended.\r\nAnd as for the mixed mathematics, I may only make this\r\nprediction, that there cannot fail to be more kinds of them as\r\nNature grows further disclosed. Thus much of natural\r\nscience, or the part of Nature speculative.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) For natural prudence, or the part operative of natural\r\nphilosophy, we will divide it into three\r\nparts—experimental, philosophical, and magical; which three\r\nparts active have a correspondence and analogy with the three\r\nparts speculative, natural history, physic, and metaphysic.\r\nFor many operations have been invented, sometimes by a casual\r\nincidence and occurrence, sometimes by a purposed experiment; and\r\nof those which have been found by an intentional experiment, some\r\nhave been found out by varying or extending the same experiment,\r\nsome by transferring and compounding divers experiments the one\r\ninto the other, which kind of invention an empiric may\r\nmanage. Again, by the knowledge of physical causes there\r\ncannot fail to follow many indications and designations of new\r\nparticulars, if men in their speculation will keep one eye upon\r\nuse and practice. But these are but coastings along the\r\nshore, \u003ci\u003epremendo littus iniquum\u003c/i\u003e; for it seemeth to me there\r\ncan hardly be discovered any radical or fundamental alterations\r\nand innovations in Nature, either by the fortune and essays of\r\nexperiments, or by the light and direction of physical\r\ncauses. If, therefore, we have reported metaphysic\r\ndeficient, it must follow that we do the like of natural magic,\r\nwhich hath relation thereunto. For as for the natural magic\r\nwhereof now there is mention in books, containing certain\r\ncredulous and superstitious conceits and observations of\r\nsympathies and antipathies, and hidden proprieties, and some\r\nfrivolous experiments, strange rather by disguisement than in\r\nthemselves, it is as far differing in truth of Nature from such a\r\nknowledge as we require as the story of King Arthur of Britain,\r\nor Hugh of Bourdeaux, differs from Cæsar’s\r\nCommentaries in truth of story; for it is manifest that\r\nCæsar did greater things \u003ci\u003ede vero\u003c/i\u003e than those\r\nimaginary heroes were feigned to do. But he did them not in\r\nthat fabulous manner. Of this kind of learning the fable of\r\nIxion was a figure, who designed to enjoy Juno, the goddess of\r\npower, and instead of her had copulation with a cloud, of which\r\nmixture were begotten centaurs and chimeras. So whosoever\r\nshall entertain high and vaporous imaginations, instead of a\r\nlaborious and sober inquiry of truth, shall beget hopes and\r\nbeliefs of strange and impossible shapes. And, therefore,\r\nwe may note in these sciences which hold so much of imagination\r\nand belief, as this degenerate natural magic, alchemy, astrology,\r\nand the like, that in their propositions the description of the\r\nmeans is ever more monstrous than the pretence or end. For\r\nit is a thing more probable that he that knoweth well the natures\r\nof weight, of colour, of pliant and fragile in respect of the\r\nhammer, of volatile and fixed in respect of the fire, and the\r\nrest, may superinduce upon some metal the nature and form of gold\r\nby such mechanic as longeth to the production of the natures\r\nafore rehearsed, than that some grains of the medicine projected\r\nshould in a few moments of time turn a sea of quicksilver or\r\nother material into gold. So it is more probable that he\r\nthat knoweth the nature of arefaction, the nature of assimilation\r\nof nourishment to the thing nourished, the manner of increase and\r\nclearing of spirits, the manner of the depredations which spirits\r\nmake upon the humours and solid parts, shall by ambages of diets,\r\nbathings, anointings, medicines, motions, and the like, prolong\r\nlife, or restore some degree of youth or vivacity, than that it\r\ncan be done with the use of a few drops or scruples of a liquor\r\nor receipt. To conclude, therefore, the true natural magic,\r\nwhich is that great liberty and latitude of operation which\r\ndependeth upon the knowledge of forms, I may report deficient, as\r\nthe relative thereof is. To which part, if we be serious\r\nand incline not to vanities and plausible discourse, besides the\r\nderiving and deducing the operations themselves from metaphysic,\r\nthere are pertinent two points of much purpose, the one by way of\r\npreparation, the other by way of caution. The first is,\r\nthat there be made a calendar, resembling an inventory of the\r\nestate of man, containing all the inventions (being the works or\r\nfruits of Nature or art) which are now extant, and whereof man is\r\nalready possessed; out of which doth naturally result a note what\r\nthings are yet held impossible, or not invented, which calendar\r\nwill be the more artificial and serviceable if to every reputed\r\nimpossibility you add what thing is extant which cometh the\r\nnearest in degree to that impossibility; to the end that by these\r\noptatives and potentials man’s inquiry may be the more\r\nawake in deducing direction of works from the speculation of\r\ncauses. And secondly, that these experiments be not only\r\nesteemed which have an immediate and present use, but those\r\nprincipally which are of most universal consequence for invention\r\nof other experiments, and those which give most light to the\r\ninvention of causes; for the invention of the mariner’s\r\nneedle, which giveth the direction, is of no less benefit for\r\nnavigation than the invention of the sails which give the\r\nmotion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) Thus have I passed through natural philosophy and the\r\ndeficiences thereof; wherein if I have differed from the ancient\r\nand received doctrines, and thereby shall move contradiction, for\r\nmy part, as I affect not to dissent, so I purpose not to\r\ncontend. If it be truth,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Non canimus surdis, respondent omnia\r\nsylvæ,”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ethe voice of Nature will consent, whether the voice of man do\r\nor no. And as Alexander Borgia was wont to say of the\r\nexpedition of the French for Naples, that they came with chalk in\r\ntheir hands to mark up their lodgings, and not with weapons to\r\nfight; so I like better that entry of truth which cometh\r\npeaceably with chalk to mark up those minds which are capable to\r\nlodge and harbour it, than that which cometh with pugnacity and\r\ncontention.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) But there remaineth a division of natural philosophy\r\naccording to the report of the inquiry, and nothing concerning\r\nthe matter or subject: and that is positive and considerative,\r\nwhen the inquiry reporteth either an assertion or a doubt.\r\nThese doubts or \u003ci\u003enon liquets\u003c/i\u003e are of two sorts, particular\r\nand total. For the first, we see a good example thereof in\r\nAristotle’s Problems which deserved to have had a better\r\ncontinuance; but so nevertheless as there is one point whereof\r\nwarning is to be given and taken. The registering of doubts\r\nhath two excellent uses: the one, that it saveth philosophy from\r\nerrors and falsehoods; when that which is not fully appearing is\r\nnot collected into assertion, whereby error might draw error, but\r\nreserved in doubt; the other, that the entry of doubts are as so\r\nmany suckers or sponges to draw use of knowledge; insomuch as\r\nthat which if doubts had not preceded, a man should never have\r\nadvised, but passed it over without note, by the suggestion and\r\nsolicitation of doubts is made to be attended and applied.\r\nBut both these commodities do scarcely countervail and\r\ninconvenience, which will intrude itself if it be not debarred;\r\nwhich is, that when a doubt is once received, men labour rather\r\nhow to keep it a doubt still, than how to solve it, and\r\naccordingly bend their wits. Of this we see the familiar\r\nexample in lawyers and scholars, both which, if they have once\r\nadmitted a doubt, it goeth ever after authorised for a\r\ndoubt. But that use of wit and knowledge is to be allowed,\r\nwhich laboureth to make doubtful things certain, and not those\r\nwhich labour to make certain things doubtful. Therefore\r\nthese calendars of doubts I commend as excellent things; so that\r\nthere he this caution used, that when they be thoroughly sifted\r\nand brought to resolution, they be from thenceforth omitted,\r\ndiscarded, and not continued to cherish and encourage men in\r\ndoubting. To which calendar of doubts or problems I advise\r\nbe annexed another calendar, as much or more material which is a\r\ncalendar of popular errors: I mean chiefly in natural history,\r\nsuch as pass in speech and conceit, and are nevertheless\r\napparently detected and convicted of untruth, that man’s\r\nknowledge be not weakened nor embased by such dross and\r\nvanity. As for the doubts or \u003ci\u003enon liquets\u003c/i\u003e general or\r\nin total, I understand those differences of opinions touching the\r\nprinciples of nature, and the fundamental points of the same,\r\nwhich have caused the diversity of sects, schools, and\r\nphilosophies, as that of Empedocles, Pythagoras, Democritus,\r\nParmenides, and the rest. For although Aristotle, as though\r\nhe had been of the race of the Ottomans, thought he could not\r\nreign except the first thing he did he killed all his brethren;\r\nyet to those that seek truth and not magistrality, it cannot but\r\nseem a matter of great profit, to see before them the several\r\nopinions touching the foundations of nature. Not for any\r\nexact truth that can be expected in those theories; for as the\r\nsame phenomena in astronomy are satisfied by this received\r\nastronomy of the diurnal motion, and the proper motions of the\r\nplanets, with their eccentrics and epicycles, and likewise by the\r\ntheory of Copernicus, who supposed the earth to move, and the\r\ncalculations are indifferently agreeable to both, so the ordinary\r\nface and view of experience is many times satisfied by several\r\ntheories and philosophies; whereas to find the real truth\r\nrequireth another manner of severity and attention. For as\r\nAristotle saith, that children at the first will call every woman\r\nmother, but afterward they come to distinguish according to\r\ntruth, so experience, if it be in childhood, will call every\r\nphilosophy mother, but when it cometh to ripeness it will discern\r\nthe true mother. So as in the meantime it is good to see\r\nthe several glosses and opinions upon Nature, whereof it may be\r\neveryone in some one point hath seen clearer than his fellows,\r\ntherefore I wish some collection to be made painfully and\r\nunderstandingly \u003ci\u003ede antiquis philosophiis\u003c/i\u003e, out of all the\r\npossible light which remaineth to us of them: which kind of work\r\nI find deficient. But here I must give warning, that it be\r\ndone distinctly and severedly; the philosophies of everyone\r\nthroughout by themselves, and not by titles packed and faggoted\r\nup together, as hath been done by Plutarch. For it is the\r\nharmony of a philosophy in itself, which giveth it light and\r\ncredence; whereas if it be singled and broken, it will seem more\r\nforeign and dissonant. For as when I read in Tacitus the\r\nactions of Nero or Claudius, with circumstances of times,\r\ninducements, and occasions, I find them not so strange; but when\r\nI read them in Suetonius Tranquillus, gathered into titles and\r\nbundles and not in order of time, they seem more monstrous and\r\nincredible: so is it of any philosophy reported entire, and\r\ndismembered by articles. Neither do I exclude opinions of\r\nlatter times to be likewise represented in this calendar of sects\r\nof philosophy, as that of Theophrastus Paracelsus, eloquently\r\nreduced into an harmony by the pen of Severinus the Dane; and\r\nthat of Tilesius, and his scholar Donius, being as a pastoral\r\nphilosophy, full of sense, but of no great depth; and that of\r\nFracastorius, who, though he pretended not to make any new\r\nphilosophy, yet did use the absoluteness of his own sense upon\r\nthe old; and that of Gilbertus our countryman, who revived, with\r\nsome alterations and demonstrations, the opinions of Xenophanes;\r\nand any other worthy to be admitted.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(6) Thus have we now dealt with two of the three beams of\r\nman’s knowledge; that is \u003ci\u003eradius directus\u003c/i\u003e, which is\r\nreferred to nature, \u003ci\u003eradius refractus\u003c/i\u003e, which is referred to\r\nGod, and cannot report truly because of the inequality of the\r\nmedium. There resteth \u003ci\u003eradius reflexus\u003c/i\u003e, whereby man\r\nbeholdeth and contemplateth himself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIX. (1) We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the\r\nancient oracle directeth us, which is the knowledge of ourselves;\r\nwhich deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it\r\ntoucheth us more nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end\r\nand term of natural philosophy in the intention of man, so\r\nnotwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the\r\ncontinent of Nature. And generally let this be a rule, that\r\nall partitions of knowledges be accepted rather for lines and\r\nveins than for sections and separations; and that the continuance\r\nand entireness of knowledge be preserved. For the contrary\r\nhereof hath made particular sciences to become barren, shallow,\r\nand erroneous, while they have not been nourished and maintained\r\nfrom the common fountain. So we see Cicero, the orator,\r\ncomplained of Socrates and his school, that he was the first that\r\nseparated philosophy and rhetoric; whereupon rhetoric became an\r\nempty and verbal art. So we may see that the opinion of\r\nCopernicus, touching the rotation of the earth, which astronomy\r\nitself cannot correct, because it is not repugnant to any of the\r\n\u003ci\u003ephenomena\u003c/i\u003e, yet natural philosophy may correct. So we\r\nsee also that the science of medicine if it be destituted and\r\nforsaken by natural philosophy, it is not much better than an\r\nempirical practice. With this reservation, therefore, we\r\nproceed to human philosophy or humanity, which hath two parts:\r\nthe one considereth man segregate or distributively, the other\r\ncongregate or in society; so as human philosophy is either simple\r\nand particular, or conjugate and civil. Humanity particular\r\nconsisteth of the same parts whereof man consisteth: that is, of\r\nknowledges which respect the body, and of knowledges that respect\r\nthe mind. But before we distribute so far, it is good to\r\nconstitute. For I do take the consideration in general, and\r\nat large, of human nature to be fit to be emancipate and made a\r\nknowledge by itself, not so much in regard of those delightful\r\nand elegant discourses which have been made of the dignity of\r\nman, of his miseries, of his state and life, and the like\r\nadjuncts of his common and undivided nature; but chiefly in\r\nregard of the knowledge concerning the sympathies and\r\nconcordances between the mind and body, which being mixed cannot\r\nbe properly assigned to the sciences of either.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) This knowledge hath two branches: for as all leagues and\r\namities consist of mutual intelligence and mutual offices, so\r\nthis league of mind and body hath these two parts: how the one\r\ndiscloseth the other, and how the one worketh upon the other;\r\ndiscovery and impression. The former of these hath begotten\r\ntwo arts, both of prediction or prenotion; whereof the one is\r\nhonoured with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other of\r\nHippocrates. And although they have of later time been used\r\nto be coupled with superstitions and fantastical arts, yet being\r\npurged and restored to their true state, they have both of them a\r\nsolid ground in Nature, and a profitable use in life. The\r\nfirst is physiognomy, which discovereth the disposition of the\r\nmind by the lineaments of the body. The second is the\r\nexposition of natural dreams, which discovereth the state of the\r\nbody by the imaginations of the mind. In the former of\r\nthese I note a deficience. For Aristotle hath very\r\ningeniously and diligently handled the factures of the body, but\r\nnot the gestures of the body, which are no less comprehensible by\r\nart, and of greater use and advantage. For the lineaments\r\nof the body do disclose the disposition and inclination of the\r\nmind in general; but the motions of the countenance and parts do\r\nnot only so, but do further disclose the present humour and state\r\nof the mind and will. For as your majesty saith most aptly\r\nand elegantly, “As the tongue speaketh to the ear so the\r\ngesture speaketh to the eye.” And, therefore, a\r\nnumber of subtle persons, whose eyes do dwell upon the faces and\r\nfashions of men, do well know the advantage of this observation,\r\nas being most part of their ability; neither can it be denied,\r\nbut that it is a great discovery of dissimulations, and a great\r\ndirection in business.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) The latter branch, touching impression, hath not been\r\ncollected into art, but hath been handled dispersedly; and it\r\nhath the same relation or \u003ci\u003eantistrophe\u003c/i\u003e that the former\r\nhath. For the consideration is double—either how and\r\nhow far the humours and affects of the body do alter or work upon\r\nthe mind, or, again, how and how far the passions or\r\napprehensions of the mind do alter or work upon the body.\r\nThe former of these hath been inquired and considered as a part\r\nand appendix of medicine, but much more as a part of religion or\r\nsuperstition. For the physician prescribeth cures of the\r\nmind in frenzies and melancholy passions, and pretendeth also to\r\nexhibit medicines to exhilarate the mind, to control the courage,\r\nto clarify the wits, to corroborate the memory, and the like; but\r\nthe scruples and superstitions of diet and other regiment of the\r\nbody in the sect of the Pythagoreans, in the heresy of the\r\nManichees, and in the law of Mahomet, do exceed. So\r\nlikewise the ordinances in the ceremonial law, interdicting the\r\neating of the blood and the fat, distinguishing between beasts\r\nclean and unclean for meat, are many and strict; nay, the faith\r\nitself being clear and serene from all clouds of ceremony, yet\r\nretaineth the use of fastlings, abstinences, and other\r\nmacerations and humiliations of the body, as things real, and not\r\nfigurative. The root and life of all which prescripts is\r\n(besides the ceremony) the consideration of that dependency which\r\nthe affections of the mind are submitted unto upon the state and\r\ndisposition of the body. And if any man of weak judgment do\r\nconceive that this suffering of the mind from the body doth\r\neither question the immortality, or derogate from the sovereignty\r\nof the soul, he may be taught, in easy instances, that the infant\r\nin the mother’s womb is compatible with the mother, and yet\r\nseparable; and the most absolute monarch is sometimes led by his\r\nservants, and yet without subjection. As for the reciprocal\r\nknowledge, which is the operation of the conceits and passions of\r\nthe mind upon the body, we see all wise physicians, in the\r\nprescriptions of their regiments to their patients, do ever\r\nconsider \u003ci\u003eaccidentia animi\u003c/i\u003e, as of great force to further or\r\nhinder remedies or recoveries: and more specially it is an\r\ninquiry of great depth and worth concerning imagination, how and\r\nhow far it altereth the body proper of the imaginant; for\r\nalthough it hath a manifest power to hurt, it followeth not it\r\nhath the same degree of power to help. No more than a man\r\ncan conclude, that because there be pestilent airs, able suddenly\r\nto kill a man in health, therefore there should be sovereign\r\nairs, able suddenly to cure a man in sickness. But the\r\ninquisition of this part is of great use, though it needeth, as\r\nSocrates said, “a Delian diver,” being difficult and\r\nprofound. But unto all this knowledge \u003ci\u003ede communi\r\nvinculo\u003c/i\u003e, of the concordances between the mind and the body,\r\nthat part of inquiry is most necessary which considereth of the\r\nseats and domiciles which the several faculties of the mind do\r\ntake and occupate in the organs of the body; which knowledge hath\r\nbeen attempted, and is controverted, and deserveth to be much\r\nbetter inquired. For the opinion of Plato, who placed the\r\nunderstanding in the brain, animosity (which he did unfitly call\r\nanger, having a greater mixture with pride) in the heart, and\r\nconcupiscence or sensuality in the liver, deserveth not to be\r\ndespised, but much less to be allowed. So, then, we have\r\nconstituted (as in our own wish and advice) the inquiry touching\r\nhuman nature entire, as a just portion of knowledge to be handled\r\napart.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eX. (1) The knowledge that concerneth man’s body is\r\ndivided as the good of man’s body is divided, unto which it\r\nreferreth. The good of man’s body is of four\r\nkinds—health, beauty, strength, and pleasure: so the\r\nknowledges are medicine, or art of cure; art of decoration, which\r\nis called cosmetic; art of activity, which is called athletic;\r\nand art voluptuary, which Tacitus truly calleth \u003ci\u003eeruditus\r\nluxus\u003c/i\u003e. This subject of man’s body is, of all\r\nother things in nature, most susceptible of remedy; but then that\r\nremedy is most susceptible of error; for the same subtlety of the\r\nsubject doth cause large possibility and easy failing, and\r\ntherefore the inquiry ought to be the more exact.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) To speak, therefore, of medicine, and to resume that we\r\nhave said, ascending a little higher: the ancient opinion that\r\nman was \u003ci\u003emicrocosmus\u003c/i\u003e—an abstract or model of the\r\nworld—hath been fantastically strained by Paracelsus and\r\nthe alchemists, as if there were to be found in man’s body\r\ncertain correspondences and parallels, which should have respect\r\nto all varieties of things, as stars, planets, minerals, which\r\nare extant in the great world. But thus much is evidently\r\ntrue, that of all substances which nature hath produced,\r\nman’s body is the most extremely compounded. For we\r\nsee herbs and plants are nourished by earth and water; beasts for\r\nthe most part by herbs and fruits; man by the flesh of beasts,\r\nbirds, fishes, herbs, grains, fruits, water, and the manifold\r\nalterations, dressings, and preparations of these several bodies\r\nbefore they come to be his food and aliment. Add hereunto\r\nthat beasts have a more simple order of life, and less change of\r\naffections to work upon their bodies, whereas man in his mansion,\r\nsleep, exercise, passions, hath infinite variations: and it\r\ncannot be denied but that the body of man of all other things is\r\nof the most compounded mass. The soul, on the other side,\r\nis the simplest of substances, as is well expressed:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e “Purumque\r\nreliquit\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nÆthereum sensum atque auraï simplicis\r\nignem.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo that it is no marvel though the soul so placed enjoy no\r\nrest, if that principle be true, that \u003ci\u003eMotus rerum est rapidus\r\nextra locum\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eplacidus in loco\u003c/i\u003e. But to the\r\npurpose. This variable composition of man’s body hath\r\nmade it as an instrument easy to distemper; and, therefore, the\r\npoets did well to conjoin music and medicine in Apollo, because\r\nthe office of medicine is but to tune this curious harp of\r\nman’s body and to reduce it to harmony. So, then, the\r\nsubject being so variable hath made the art by consequent more\r\nconjectural; and the art being conjectural hath made so much the\r\nmore place to be left for imposture. For almost all other\r\narts and sciences are judged by acts or masterpieces, as I may\r\nterm them, and not by the successes and events. The lawyer\r\nis judged by the virtue of his pleading, and not by the issue of\r\nthe cause; this master in this ship is judged by the directing\r\nhis course aright, and not by the fortune of the voyage; but the\r\nphysician, and perhaps this politique, hath no particular acts\r\ndemonstrative of his ability, but is judged most by the event,\r\nwhich is ever but as it is taken: for who can tell, if a patient\r\ndie or recover, or if a state be preserved or ruined, whether it\r\nbe art or accident? And therefore many times the impostor\r\nis prized, and the man of virtue taxed. Nay, we see [the]\r\nweakness and credulity of men is such, as they will often refer a\r\nmountebank or witch before a learned physician. And\r\ntherefore the poets were clear-sighted in discerning this extreme\r\nfolly when they made Æsculapius and Circe, brother and\r\nsister, both children of the sun, as in the verses—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Ipse repertorem medicinæ talis et\r\nartis\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFulmine Phœbigenam Stygias detrusit ad undas.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd again—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Dives inaccessos ubi Solis filia\r\nlucos,” \u0026amp;c.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor in all times, in the opinion of the multitude, witches and\r\nold women and impostors, have had a competition with\r\nphysicians. And what followeth? Even this, that\r\nphysicians say to themselves, as Solomon expresseth it upon a\r\nhigher occasion, “If it befall to me as befalleth to the\r\nfools, why should I labour to be more wise?” And\r\ntherefore I cannot much blame physicians that they use commonly\r\nto intend some other art or practice, which they fancy more than\r\ntheir profession; for you shall have of them antiquaries, poets,\r\nhumanists, statesmen, merchants, divines, and in every of these\r\nbetter seen than in their profession; and no doubt upon this\r\nground that they find that mediocrity and excellency in their art\r\nmaketh no difference in profit or reputation towards their\r\nfortune: for the weakness of patients, and sweetness of life, and\r\nnature of hope, maketh men depend upon physicians with all their\r\ndefects. But, nevertheless, these things which we have\r\nspoken of are courses begotten between a little occasion and a\r\ngreat deal of sloth and default; for if we will excite and awake\r\nour observation, we shall see in familiar instances what a\r\npredominant faculty the subtlety of spirit hath over the variety\r\nof matter or form. Nothing more variable than faces and\r\ncountenances, yet men can bear in memory the infinite\r\ndistinctions of them; nay, a painter, with a few shells of\r\ncolours, and the benefit of his eye, and habit of his\r\nimagination, can imitate them all that ever have been, are, or\r\nmay be, if they were brought before him. Nothing more\r\nvariable than voices, yet men can likewise discern them\r\npersonally: nay, you shall have a \u003ci\u003ebuffon\u003c/i\u003e or\r\n\u003ci\u003epantomimus\u003c/i\u003e will express as many as he pleaseth.\r\nNothing more variable than the differing sounds of words; yet men\r\nhave found the way to reduce them to a few simple letters.\r\nSo that it is not the insufficiency or incapacity of man’s\r\nmind, but it is the remote standing or placing thereof that\r\nbreedeth these mazes and incomprehensions; for as the sense afar\r\noff is full of mistaking, but is exact at hand, so is it of the\r\nunderstanding, the remedy whereof is, not to quicken or\r\nstrengthen the organ, but to go nearer to the object; and\r\ntherefore there is no doubt but if the physicians will learn and\r\nuse the true approaches and avenues of nature, they may assume as\r\nmuch as the poet saith:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Et quoniam variant morbi, variabimus\r\nartes;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMille mali species, mille salutis erunt.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhich that they should do, the nobleness of their art doth\r\ndeserve: well shadowed by the poets, in that they made\r\nÆsculapius to be the son of [the] sun, the one being the\r\nfountain of life, the other as the second-stream; but infinitely\r\nmore honoured by the example of our Saviour, who made the body of\r\nman the object of His miracles, as the soul was the object of His\r\ndoctrine. For we read not that ever He vouchsafed to do any\r\nmiracle about honour or money (except that one for giving tribute\r\nto Cæsar), but only about the preserving, sustaining, and\r\nhealing the body of man.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) Medicine is a science which hath been (as we have said)\r\nmore professed than laboured, and yet more laboured than\r\nadvanced; the labour having been, in my judgment, rather in\r\ncircle than in progression. For I find much iteration, but\r\nsmall addition. It considereth causes of diseases, with the\r\noccasions or impulsions; the diseases themselves, with the\r\naccidents; and the cures, with the preservations. The\r\ndeficiences which I think good to note, being a few of many, and\r\nthose such as are of a more open and manifest nature, I will\r\nenumerate and not place.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) The first is the discontinuance of the ancient and serious\r\ndiligence of Hippocrates, which used to set down a narrative of\r\nthe special cases of his patients, and how they proceeded, and\r\nhow they were judged by recovery or death. Therefore having\r\nan example proper in the father of the art, I shall not need to\r\nallege an example foreign, of the wisdom of the lawyers, who are\r\ncareful to report new cases and decisions, for the direction of\r\nfuture judgments. This continuance of medicinal history I\r\nfind deficient; which I understand neither to be so infinite as\r\nto extend to every common case, nor so reserved as to admit none\r\nbut wonders: for many things are new in this manner, which are\r\nnot new in the kind; and if men will intend to observe, they\r\nshall find much worthy to observe.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) In the inquiry which is made by anatomy, I find much\r\ndeficience: for they inquire of the parts, and their substances,\r\nfigures, and collocations; but they inquire not of the\r\ndiversities of the parts, the secrecies of the passages, and the\r\nseats or nestling of the humours, nor much of the footsteps and\r\nimpressions of diseases. The reason of which omission I\r\nsuppose to be, because the first inquiry may be satisfied in the\r\nview of one or a few anatomies; but the latter, being comparative\r\nand casual, must arise from the view of many. And as to the\r\ndiversity of parts, there is no doubt but the facture or framing\r\nof the inward parts is as full of difference as the outward, and\r\nin that is the cause continent of many diseases; which not being\r\nobserved, they quarrel many times with the humours, which are not\r\nin fault; the fault being in the very frame and mechanic of the\r\npart, which cannot be removed by medicine alterative, but must be\r\naccommodated and palliated by diets and medicines familiar.\r\nAnd for the passages and pores, it is true which was anciently\r\nnoted, that the more subtle of them appear not in anatomies,\r\nbecause they are shut and latent in dead bodies, though they be\r\nopen and manifest in life: which being supposed, though the\r\ninhumanity of \u003ci\u003eanatomia vivorum\u003c/i\u003e was by Celsus justly\r\nreproved; yet in regard of the great use of this observation, the\r\ninquiry needed not by him so slightly to have been relinquished\r\naltogether, or referred to the casual practices of surgery; but\r\nmight have been well diverted upon the dissection of beasts\r\nalive, which notwithstanding the dissimilitude of their parts may\r\nsufficiently satisfy this inquiry. And for the humours,\r\nthey are commonly passed over in anatomies as purgaments; whereas\r\nit is most necessary to observe, what cavities, nests, and\r\nreceptacles the humours do find in the parts, with the differing\r\nkind of the humour so lodged and received. And as for the\r\nfootsteps of diseases, and their devastations of the inward\r\nparts, impostumations, exulcerations, discontinuations,\r\nputrefactions, consumptions, contractions, extensions,\r\nconvulsions, dislocations, obstructions, repletions, together\r\nwith all preternatural substances, as stones, carnosities,\r\nexcrescences, worms, and the like; they ought to have been\r\nexactly observed by multitude of anatomies, and the contribution\r\nof men’s several experiences, and carefully set down both\r\nhistorically according to the appearances, and artificially with\r\na reference to the diseases and symptoms which resulted from\r\nthem, in case where the anatomy is of a defunct patient; whereas\r\nnow upon opening of bodies they are passed over slightly and in\r\nsilence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(6) In the inquiry of diseases, they do abandon the cures of\r\nmany, some as in their nature incurable, and others as past the\r\nperiod of cure; so that Sylla and the Triumvirs never proscribed\r\nso many men to die, as they do by their ignorant edicts: whereof\r\nnumbers do escape with less difficulty than they did in the Roman\r\nprescriptions. Therefore I will not doubt to note as a\r\ndeficience, that they inquire not the perfect cures of many\r\ndiseases, or extremities of diseases; but pronouncing them\r\nincurable do enact a law of neglect, and exempt ignorance from\r\ndiscredit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(7) Nay further, I esteem it the office of a physician not\r\nonly to restore health, but to mitigate pain and dolors; and not\r\nonly when such mitigation may conduce to recovery, but when it\r\nmay serve to make a fair and easy passage. For it is no\r\nsmall felicity which Augustus Cæsar was wont to wish to\r\nhimself, that same \u003ci\u003eEuthanasia\u003c/i\u003e; and which was specially\r\nnoted in the death of Antoninus Pius, whose death was after the\r\nfashion, and semblance of a kindly and pleasant sheep. So\r\nit is written of Epicurus, that after his disease was judged\r\ndesperate, he drowned his stomach and senses with a large draught\r\nand ingurgitation of wine; whereupon the epigram was made,\r\n\u003ci\u003eHinc Stygias ebrius hausit aquas\u003c/i\u003e; he was not sober enough\r\nto taste any bitterness of the Stygian water. But the\r\nphysicians contrariwise do make a kind of scruple and religion to\r\nstay with the patient after the disease is deplored; whereas in\r\nmy judgment they ought both to inquire the skill, and to give the\r\nattendances, for the facilitating and assuaging of the pains and\r\nagonies of death.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) In the consideration of the cures of diseases, I find a\r\ndeficience in the receipts of propriety, respecting the\r\nparticular cures of diseases: for the physicians have frustrated\r\nthe fruit of tradition and experience by their magistralities, in\r\nadding and taking out and changing \u003ci\u003equid pro qua\u003c/i\u003e in their\r\nreceipts, at their pleasures; commanding so over the medicine, as\r\nthe medicine cannot command over the disease. For except it\r\nbe treacle and \u003ci\u003emithridatum\u003c/i\u003e, and of late\r\n\u003ci\u003ediascordium\u003c/i\u003e, and a few more, they tie themselves to no\r\nreceipts severely and religiously. For as to the\r\nconfections of sale which are in the shops, they are for\r\nreadiness and not for propriety. For they are upon general\r\nintentions of purging, opening, comforting, altering, and not\r\nmuch appropriate to particular diseases. And this is the\r\ncause why empirics and old women are more happy many times in\r\ntheir cures than learned physicians, because they are more\r\nreligious in holding their medicines. Therefore here is the\r\ndeficience which I find, that physicians have not, partly out of\r\ntheir own practice, partly out of the constant probations\r\nreported in books, and partly out of the traditions of empirics,\r\nset down and delivered over certain experimental medicines for\r\nthe cure of particular diseases, besides their own conjectural\r\nand magistral descriptions. For as they were the men of the\r\nbest composition in the state of Rome, which either being consuls\r\ninclined to the people, or being tribunes inclined to the senate;\r\nso in the matter we now handle, they be the best physicians,\r\nwhich being learned incline to the traditions of experience, or\r\nbeing empirics incline to the methods of learning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(9) In preparation of medicines I do find strange, specially\r\nconsidering how mineral medicines have been extolled, and that\r\nthey are safer for the outward than inward parts, that no man\r\nhath sought to make an imitation by art of natural baths and\r\nmedicinable fountains: which nevertheless are confessed to\r\nreceive their virtues from minerals; and not so only, but\r\ndiscerned and distinguished from what particular mineral they\r\nreceive tincture, as sulphur, vitriol, steel, or the like; which\r\nnature, if it may be reduced to compositions of art, both the\r\nvariety of them will be increased, and the temper of them will be\r\nmore commanded.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(10) But lest I grow to be more particular than is agreeable\r\neither to my intention or to proportion, I will conclude this\r\npart with the note of one deficience more, which seemeth to me of\r\ngreatest consequence: which is, that the prescripts in use are\r\ntoo compendious to attain their end; for, to my understanding, it\r\nis a vain and flattering opinion to think any medicine can be so\r\nsovereign or so happy, as that the receipt or miss of it can work\r\nany great effect upon the body of man. It were a strange\r\nspeech which spoken, or spoken oft, should reclaim a man from a\r\nvice to which he were by nature subject. It is order,\r\npursuit, sequence, and interchange of application, which is\r\nmighty in nature; which although it require more exact knowledge\r\nin prescribing, and more precise obedience in observing, yet is\r\nrecompensed with the magnitude of effects. And although a\r\nman would think, by the daily visitations of the physicians, that\r\nthere were a pursuance in the cure, yet let a man look into their\r\nprescripts and ministrations, and he shall find them but\r\ninconstancies and every day’s devices, without any settled\r\nprovidence or project. Not that every scrupulous or\r\nsuperstitious prescript is effectual, no more than every straight\r\nway is the way to heaven; but the truth of the direction must\r\nprecede severity of observance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(11) For cosmetic, it hath parts civil, and parts effeminate:\r\nfor cleanness of body was ever esteemed to proceed from a due\r\nreverence to God, to society, and to ourselves. As for\r\nartificial decoration, it is well worthy of the deficiences which\r\nit hath; being neither fine enough to deceive, nor handsome to\r\nuse, nor wholesome to please.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(12) For athletic, I take the subject of it largely, that is\r\nto say, for any point of ability whereunto the body of man may be\r\nbrought, whether it be of activity, or of patience; whereof\r\nactivity hath two parts, strength and swiftness; and patience\r\nlikewise hath two parts, hardness against wants and extremities,\r\nand endurance of pain or torment; whereof we see the practices in\r\ntumblers, in savages, and in those that suffer punishment.\r\nNay, if there be any other faculty which falls not within any of\r\nthe former divisions, as in those that dive, that obtain a\r\nstrange power of containing respiration, and the like, I refer it\r\nto this part. Of these things the practices are known, but\r\nthe philosophy that concerneth them is not much inquired; the\r\nrather, I think, because they are supposed to be obtained, either\r\nby an aptness of nature, which cannot be taught, or only by\r\ncontinual custom, which is soon prescribed which though it be not\r\ntrue, yet I forbear to note any deficiences; for the Olympian\r\ngames are down long since, and the mediocrity of these things is\r\nfor use; as for the excellency of them it serveth for the most\r\npart but for mercenary ostentation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(13) For arts of pleasure sensual, the chief deficience in\r\nthem is of laws to repress them. For as it hath been well\r\nobserved, that the arts which flourish in times while virtue is\r\nin growth, are military; and while virtue is in state, are\r\nliberal; and while virtue is in declination, are voluptuary: so I\r\ndoubt that this age of the world is somewhat upon the descent of\r\nthe wheel. With arts voluptuary I couple practices\r\njoculary; for the deceiving of the senses is one of the pleasures\r\nof the senses. As for games of recreation, I hold them to\r\nbelong to civil life and education. And thus much of that\r\nparticular human philosophy which concerns the body, which is but\r\nthe tabernacle of the mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXI. (1) For human knowledge which concerns the mind, it hath\r\ntwo parts; the one that inquireth of the substance or nature of\r\nthe soul or mind, the other that inquireth of the faculties or\r\nfunctions thereof. Unto the first of these, the\r\nconsiderations of the original of the soul, whether it be native\r\nor adventive, and how far it is exempted from laws of matter, and\r\nof the immortality thereof, and many other points, do appertain:\r\nwhich have been not more laboriously inquired than variously\r\nreported; so as the travail therein taken seemeth to have been\r\nrather in a maze than in a way. But although I am of\r\nopinion that this knowledge may be more really and soundly\r\ninquired, even in nature, than it hath been, yet I hold that in\r\nthe end it must be hounded by religion, or else it will be\r\nsubject to deceit and delusion. For as the substance of the\r\nsoul in the creation was not extracted out of the mass of heaven\r\nand earth by the benediction of a \u003ci\u003eproducat\u003c/i\u003e, but was\r\nimmediately inspired from God, so it is not possible that it\r\nshould be (otherwise than by accident) subject to the laws of\r\nheaven and earth, which are the subject of philosophy; and\r\ntherefore the true knowledge of the nature and state of the soul\r\nmust come by the same inspiration that gave the substance.\r\nUnto this part of knowledge touching the soul there be two\r\nappendices; which, as they have been handled, have rather\r\nvapoured forth fables than kindled truth: divination and\r\nfascination.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) Divination hath been anciently and fitly divided into\r\nartificial and natural: whereof artificial is, when the mind\r\nmaketh a prediction by argument, concluding upon signs and\r\ntokens; natural is, when the mind hath a presention by an\r\ninternal power, without the inducement of a sign.\r\nArtificial is of two sorts: either when the argument is coupled\r\nwith a derivation of causes, which is rational; or when it is\r\nonly grounded upon a coincidence of the effect, which is\r\nexperimental: whereof the latter for the most part is\r\nsuperstitious, such as were the heathen observations upon the\r\ninspection of sacrifices, the flights of birds, the swarming of\r\nbees; and such as was the Chaldean astrology, and the like.\r\nFor artificial divination, the several kinds thereof are\r\ndistributed amongst particular knowledges. The astronomer\r\nhath his predictions, as of conjunctions, aspects, eclipses, and\r\nthe like. The physician hath his predictions, of death, of\r\nrecovery, of the accidents and issues of diseases. The\r\npolitique hath his predictions; \u003ci\u003eO urbem venalem\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet\r\ncito perituram\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esi emptorem invenerit\u003c/i\u003e! which stayed\r\nnot long to be performed, in Sylla first, and after in\r\nCæsar: so as these predictions are now impertinent, and to\r\nbe referred over. But the divination which springeth from\r\nthe internal nature of the soul is that which we now speak of;\r\nwhich hath been made to be of two sorts, primitive and by\r\ninfluxion. Primitive is grounded upon the supposition that\r\nthe mind, when it is withdrawn and collected into itself, and not\r\ndiffused into the organs of the body, hath some extent and\r\nlatitude of prenotion; which therefore appeareth most in sleep,\r\nin ecstasies, and near death, and more rarely in waking\r\napprehensions; and is induced and furthered by those abstinences\r\nand observances which make the mind most to consist in\r\nitself. By influxion, is grounded upon the conceit that the\r\nmind, as a mirror or glass, should take illumination from the\r\nforeknowledge of God and spirits: unto which the same regiment\r\ndoth likewise conduce. For the retiring of the mind within\r\nitself is the state which is most susceptible of divine\r\ninfluxions; save that it is accompanied in this case with a\r\nfervency and elevation (which the ancients noted by fury), and\r\nnot with a repose and quiet, as it is in the other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) Fascination is the power and act of imagination intensive\r\nupon other bodies than the body of the imaginant, for of that we\r\nspake in the proper place. Wherein the school of\r\nParacelsus, and the disciples of pretended natural magic, have\r\nbeen so intemperate, as they have exalted the power of the\r\nimagination to be much one with the power of miracle-working\r\nfaith. Others, that draw nearer to probability, calling to\r\ntheir view the secret passages of things, and specially of the\r\ncontagion that passeth from body to body, do conceive it should\r\nlikewise be agreeable to nature that there should be some\r\ntransmissions and operations from spirit to spirit without the\r\nmediation of the senses; whence the conceits have grown (now\r\nalmost made civil) of the mastering spirit, and the force of\r\nconfidence, and the like. Incident unto this is the inquiry\r\nhow to raise and fortify the imagination; for if the imagination\r\nfortified have power, then it is material to know how to fortify\r\nand exalt it. And herein comes in crookedly and dangerously\r\na palliation of a great part of ceremonial magic. For it\r\nmay be pretended that ceremonies, characters, and charms do work,\r\nnot by any tacit or sacramental contract with evil spirits, but\r\nserve only to strengthen the imagination of him that useth it; as\r\nimages are said by the Roman Church to fix the cogitations and\r\nraise the devotions of them that pray before them. But for\r\nmine own judgment, if it be admitted that imagination hath power,\r\nand that ceremonies fortify imagination, and that they be used\r\nsincerely and intentionally for that purpose; yet I should hold\r\nthem unlawful, as opposing to that first edict which God gave\r\nunto man, \u003ci\u003eIn sudore vultus comedes panem tuum\u003c/i\u003e. For\r\nthey propound those noble effects, which God hath set forth unto\r\nman to be bought at the price of labour, to be attained by a few\r\neasy and slothful observances. Deficiences in these\r\nknowledges I will report none, other than the general deficience,\r\nthat it is not known how much of them is verity, and how much\r\nvanity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXII. (1) The knowledge which respecteth the faculties of the\r\nmind of man is of two kinds—the one respecting his\r\nunderstanding and reason, and the other his will, appetite, and\r\naffection; whereof the former produceth position or decree, the\r\nlatter action or execution. It is true that the imagination\r\nis an agent or \u003ci\u003enuncius\u003c/i\u003e in both provinces, both the\r\njudicial and the ministerial. For sense sendeth over to\r\nimagination before reason have judged, and reason sendeth over to\r\nimagination before the decree can be acted. For imagination\r\never precedeth voluntary motion. Saving that this Janus of\r\nimagination hath differing faces: for the face towards reason\r\nhath the print of truth, but the face towards action hath the\r\nprint of good; which nevertheless are faces,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Quales decet esse sororum.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNeither is the imagination simply and only a messenger; but is\r\ninvested with, or at least wise usurpeth no small authority in\r\nitself, besides the duty of the message. For it was well\r\nsaid by Aristotle, “That the mind hath over the body that\r\ncommandment, which the lord hath over a bondman; but that reason\r\nhath over the imagination that commandment which a magistrate\r\nhath over a free citizen,” who may come also to rule in his\r\nturn. For we see that, in matters of faith and religion, we\r\nraise our imagination above our reason, which is the cause why\r\nreligion sought ever access to the mind by similitudes, types,\r\nparables, visions, dreams. And again, in all persuasions\r\nthat are wrought by eloquence, and other impressions of like\r\nnature, which do paint and disguise the true appearance of\r\nthings, the chief recommendation unto reason is from the\r\nimagination. Nevertheless, because I find not any science\r\nthat doth properly or fitly pertain to the imagination, I see no\r\ncause to alter the former division. For as for poesy, it is\r\nrather a pleasure or play of imagination than a work or duty\r\nthereof. And if it be a work, we speak not now of such\r\nparts of learning as the imagination produceth, but of such\r\nsciences as handle and consider of the imagination. No more\r\nthan we shall speak now of such knowledges as reason produceth\r\n(for that extendeth to all philosophy), but of such knowledges as\r\ndo handle and inquire of the faculty of reason: so as poesy had\r\nhis true place. As for the power of the imagination in\r\nnature, and the manner of fortifying the same, we have mentioned\r\nit in the doctrine \u003ci\u003eDe Anima\u003c/i\u003e, whereunto most fitly it\r\nbelongeth. And lastly, for imaginative or insinuative\r\nreason, which is the subject of rhetoric, we think it best to\r\nrefer it to the arts of reason. So therefore we content\r\nourselves with the former division, that human philosophy, which\r\nrespecteth the faculties of the mind of man, hath two parts,\r\nrational and moral.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) The part of human philosophy which is rational is of all\r\nknowledges, to the most wits, the least delightful, and seemeth\r\nbut a net of subtlety and spinosity. For as it was truly\r\nsaid, that knowledge is \u003ci\u003epabulum animi\u003c/i\u003e; so in the nature of\r\nmen’s appetite to this food most men are of the taste and\r\nstomach of the Israelites in the desert, that would fain have\r\nreturned \u003ci\u003ead ollas carnium\u003c/i\u003e, and were weary of manna; which,\r\nthough it were celestial, yet seemed less nutritive and\r\ncomfortable. So generally men taste well knowledges that\r\nare drenched in flesh and blood, civil history, morality, policy,\r\nabout the which men’s affections, praises, fortunes do turn\r\nand are conversant. But this same \u003ci\u003elumen siccum\u003c/i\u003e doth\r\nparch and offend most men’s watery and soft natures.\r\nBut to speak truly of things as they are in worth, rational\r\nknowledges are the keys of all other arts, for as Aristotle saith\r\naptly and elegantly, “That the hand is the instrument of\r\ninstruments, and the mind is the form of forms;” so these\r\nbe truly said to be the art of arts. Neither do they only\r\ndirect, but likewise confirm and strengthen; even as the habit of\r\nshooting doth not only enable to shoot a nearer shoot, but also\r\nto draw a stronger bow.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) The arts intellectual are four in number, divided\r\naccording to the ends whereunto they are referred—for\r\nman’s labour is to invent that which is sought or\r\npropounded; or to judge that which is invented; or to retain that\r\nwhich is judged; or to deliver over that which is retained.\r\nSo as the arts must be four—art of inquiry or invention;\r\nart of examination or judgment; art of custody or memory; and art\r\nof elocution or tradition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXIII. (1) Invention is of two kinds much differing—the\r\none of arts and sciences, and the other of speech and\r\narguments. The former of these I do report deficient; which\r\nseemeth to me to be such a deficience as if, in the making of an\r\ninventory touching the state of a defunct, it should be set down\r\nthat there is no ready money. For as money will fetch all\r\nother commodities, so this knowledge is that which should\r\npurchase all the rest. And like as the West Indies had\r\nnever been discovered if the use of the mariner’s needle\r\nhad not been first discovered, though the one be vast regions,\r\nand the other a small motion; so it cannot be found strange if\r\nsciences be no further discovered, if the art itself of invention\r\nand discovery hath been passed over.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my judgment\r\nstandeth plainly confessed; for first, logic doth not pretend to\r\ninvent sciences, or the axioms of sciences, but passeth it over\r\nwith a \u003ci\u003ecuique in sua arte credendum\u003c/i\u003e. And Celsus\r\nacknowledgeth it gravely, speaking of the empirical and\r\ndogmatical sects of physicians, “That medicines and cures\r\nwere first found out, and then after the reasons and causes were\r\ndiscoursed; and not the causes first found out, and by light from\r\nthem the medicines and cures discovered.” And Plato\r\nin his “Theætetus” noteth well, “That\r\nparticulars are infinite, and the higher generalities give no\r\nsufficient direction; and that the pith of all sciences, which\r\nmaketh the artsman differ from the inexpert, is in the middle\r\npropositions, which in every particular knowledge are taken from\r\ntradition and experience.” And therefore we see, that\r\nthey which discourse of the inventions and originals of things\r\nrefer them rather to chance than to art, and rather to beasts,\r\nbirds, fishes, serpents, than to men.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Dictamnum genetrix Cretæa carpit ab\r\nIda,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPuberibus caulem foliis et flore camantem\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPurpureo; non illa feris incognita capris\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGramina, cum tergo volucres hæsere\r\nsagittæ.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo that it was no marvel (the manner of antiquity being to\r\nconsecrate inventors) that the Egyptians had so few human idols\r\nin their temples, but almost all brute:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Omnigenumque Deum monstra, et latrator\r\nAnubis,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nContra Neptunum, et Venerem, contraque Minervam,\r\n\u0026amp;c.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, and\r\nascribe the first inventions to men, yet you will rather believe\r\nthat Prometheus first stroke the flints, and marvelled at the\r\nspark, than that when he first stroke the flints he expected the\r\nspark; and therefore we see the West Indian Prometheus had no\r\nintelligence with the European, because of the rareness with them\r\nof flint, that gave the first occasion. So as it should\r\nseem, that hitherto men are rather beholden to a wild goat for\r\nsurgery, or to a nightingale for music, or to the ibis for some\r\npart of physic, or to the pot-lid that flew open for artillery,\r\nor generally to chance or anything else than to logic for the\r\ninvention of arts and sciences. Neither is the form of\r\ninvention which Virgil describeth much other:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Ut varias usus meditande extunderet\r\nartes\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPaulatim.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor if you observe the words well, it is no other method than\r\nthat which brute beasts are capable of, and do put in ure; which\r\nis a perpetual intending or practising some one thing, urged and\r\nimposed by an absolute necessity of conservation of being.\r\nFor so Cicero saith very truly, \u003ci\u003eUsus uni rei deditus et\r\nnaturam et artem sæpe vincit\u003c/i\u003e. And therefore if it\r\nbe said of men,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e “Labor\r\nomnia vincit\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nImprobus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas,”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eit is likewise said of beasts, \u003ci\u003eQuis psittaco docuit suum\r\nχαιρε\u003c/i\u003e? Who taught the raven\r\nin a drought to throw pebbles into a hollow tree, where she spied\r\nwater, that the water might rise so as she might come to\r\nit? Who taught the bee to sail through such a vast sea or\r\nair, and to find the way from a field in a flower a great way off\r\nto her hive? Who taught the ant to bite every grain of corn\r\nthat she burieth in her hill, lest it should take root and\r\ngrow? Add then the word \u003ci\u003eextundere\u003c/i\u003e, which importeth\r\nthe extreme difficulty, and the word \u003ci\u003epaulatim\u003c/i\u003e, which\r\nimporteth the extreme slowness, and we are where we were, even\r\namongst the Egyptians’ gods; there being little left to the\r\nfaculty of reason, and nothing to the duty or art, for matter of\r\ninvention.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) Secondly, the induction which the logicians speak of, and\r\nwhich seemeth familiar with Plato, whereby the principles of\r\nsciences may be pretended to be invented, and so the middle\r\npropositions by derivation from the principles; their form of\r\ninduction, I say, is utterly vicious and incompetent; wherein\r\ntheir error is the fouler, because it is the duty of art to\r\nperfect and exalt nature; but they contrariwise have wronged,\r\nabused, and traduced nature. For he that shall attentively\r\nobserve how the mind doth gather this excellent dew of knowledge,\r\nlike unto that which the poet speaketh of, \u003ci\u003eAërei mellis\r\ncælestia dona\u003c/i\u003e, distilling and contriving it out of\r\nparticulars natural and artificial, as the flowers of the field\r\nand garden, shall find that the mind of herself by nature doth\r\nmanage and act an induction much better than they describe\r\nit. For to conclude upon an enumeration of particulars,\r\nwithout instance contradictory, is no conclusion, but a\r\nconjecture; for who can assure (in many subjects) upon those\r\nparticulars which appear of a side, that there are not other on\r\nthe contrary side which appear not? As if Samuel should\r\nhave rested upon those sons of Jesse which were brought before\r\nhim, and failed of David which was in the field. And this\r\nform (to say truth), is so gross, as it had not been possible for\r\nwits so subtle as have managed these things to have offered it to\r\nthe world, but that they hasted to their theories and\r\ndogmaticals, and were imperious and scornful toward particulars;\r\nwhich their manner was to use but as \u003ci\u003elictores\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci\u003eviatores\u003c/i\u003e, for sergeants and whifflers, \u003ci\u003ead summovendam\r\nturbam\u003c/i\u003e, to make way and make room for their opinions, rather\r\nthan in their true use and service. Certainly it is a thing\r\nmay touch a man with a religious wonder, to see how the footsteps\r\nof seducement are the very same in divine and human truth; for,\r\nas in divine truth man cannot endure to become as a child, so in\r\nhuman, they reputed the attending the inductions (whereof we\r\nspeak), as if it were a second infancy or childhood.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) Thirdly, allow some principles or axioms were rightly\r\ninduced, yet, nevertheless, certain it is that middle\r\npropositions cannot be deduced from them in subject of nature by\r\nsyllogism—that is, by touch and reduction of them to\r\nprinciples in a middle term. It is true that in sciences\r\npopular, as moralities, laws, and the like, yea, and divinity\r\n(because it pleaseth God to apply Himself to the capacity of the\r\nsimplest), that form may have use; and in natural philosophy\r\nlikewise, by way of argument or satisfactory reason, \u003ci\u003eQuæ\r\nassensum parit operis effæta est\u003c/i\u003e; but the subtlety of\r\nnature and operations will not be enchained in those bonds.\r\nFor arguments consist of propositions, and propositions of words,\r\nand words are but the current tokens or marks of popular notions\r\nof things; which notions, if they be grossly and variably\r\ncollected out of particulars, it is not the laborious examination\r\neither of consequences of arguments, or of the truth of\r\npropositions, that can ever correct that error, being (as the\r\nphysicians speak) in the first digestion. And, therefore,\r\nit was not without cause, that so many excellent philosophers\r\nbecame sceptics and academics, and denied any certainty of\r\nknowledge or comprehension; and held opinion that the knowledge\r\nof man extended only to appearances and probabilities. It\r\nis true that in Socrates it was supposed to be but a form of\r\nirony, \u003ci\u003eScientiam dissimulando simulavit\u003c/i\u003e; for he used to\r\ndisable his knowledge, to the end to enhance his knowledge; like\r\nthe humour of Tiberius in his beginnings, that would reign, but\r\nwould not acknowledge so much. And in the later academy,\r\nwhich Cicero embraced, this opinion also of \u003ci\u003eacatalepsia\u003c/i\u003e (I\r\ndoubt) was not held sincerely; for that all those which excelled\r\nin copy of speech seem to have chosen that sect, as that which\r\nwas fittest to give glory to their eloquence and variable\r\ndiscourses; being rather like progresses of pleasure than\r\njourneys to an end. But assuredly many scattered in both\r\nacademies did hold it in subtlety and integrity. But here\r\nwas their chief error: they charged the deceit upon the senses;\r\nwhich in my judgment (notwithstanding all their cavillations) are\r\nvery sufficient to certify and report truth, though not always\r\nimmediately, yet by comparison, by help of instrument, and by\r\nproducing and urging such things as are too subtle for the sense\r\nto some effect comprehensible by the sense, and other like\r\nassistance. But they ought to have charged the deceit upon\r\nthe weakness of the intellectual powers, and upon the manner of\r\ncollecting and concluding upon the reports of the senses.\r\nThis I speak, not to disable the mind of man, but to stir it up\r\nto seek help; for no man, be he never so cunning or practised,\r\ncan make a straight line or perfect circle by steadiness of hand,\r\nwhich may be easily done by help of a ruler or compass.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) This part of invention, concerning the invention of\r\nsciences, I purpose (if God give me leave) hereafter to propound,\r\nhaving digested it into two parts: whereof the one I term\r\n\u003ci\u003eexperientia literata\u003c/i\u003e, and the other \u003ci\u003einterpretatio\r\nnaturæ\u003c/i\u003e; the former being but a degree and rudiment of\r\nthe latter. But I will not dwell too long, nor speak too\r\ngreat upon a promise.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(6) The invention of speech or argument is not properly an\r\ninvention; for to invent is to discover that we know not, and not\r\nto recover or resummon that which we already know; and the use of\r\nthis invention is no other but, out of the knowledge whereof our\r\nmind is already possessed to draw forth or call before us that\r\nwhich may be pertinent to the purpose which we take into our\r\nconsideration. So as to speak truly, it is no invention,\r\nbut a remembrance or suggestion, with an application; which is\r\nthe cause why the schools do place it after judgment, as\r\nsubsequent and not precedent. Nevertheless, because we do\r\naccount it a chase as well of deer in an enclosed park as in a\r\nforest at large, and that it hath already obtained the name, let\r\nit be called invention; so as it be perceived and discerned, that\r\nthe scope and end of this invention is readiness and present use\r\nof our knowledge, and not addition or amplification thereof.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(7) To procure this ready use of knowledge there are two\r\ncourses, preparation and suggestion. The former of these\r\nseemeth scarcely a part of knowledge, consisting rather of\r\ndiligence than of any artificial erudition. And herein\r\nAristotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the sophists near\r\nhis time, saying, “They did as if one that professed the\r\nart of shoemaking should not teach how to make up a shoe, but\r\nonly exhibit in a readiness a number of shoes of all fashions and\r\nsizes.” But yet a man might reply, that if a\r\nshoemaker should have no shoes in his shop, but only work as he\r\nis bespoken, he should be weakly customed. But our Saviour,\r\nspeaking of divine knowledge, saith, “That the kingdom of\r\nheaven is like a good householder, that bringeth forth both new\r\nand old store;” and we see the ancient writers of rhetoric\r\ndo give it in precept, that pleaders should have the places,\r\nwhereof they have most continual use, ready handled in all the\r\nvariety that may be; as that, to speak for the literal\r\ninterpretation of the law against equity, and contrary; and to\r\nspeak for presumptions and inferences against testimony, and\r\ncontrary. And Cicero himself, being broken unto it by great\r\nexperience, delivereth it plainly, that whatsoever a man shall\r\nhave occasion to speak of (if he will take the pains), he may\r\nhave it in effect premeditate and handled \u003ci\u003ein thesi\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nSo that when he cometh to a particular he shall have nothing to\r\ndo, but to put to names, and times, and places, and such other\r\ncircumstances of individuals. We see likewise the exact\r\ndiligence of Demosthenes; who, in regard of the great force that\r\nthe entrance and access into causes hath to make a good\r\nimpression, had ready framed a number of prefaces for orations\r\nand speeches. All which authorities and precedents may\r\noverweigh Aristotle’s opinion, that would have us change a\r\nrich wardrobe for a pair of shears.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(8) But the nature of the collection of this provision or\r\npreparatory store, though it be common both to logic and\r\nrhetoric, yet having made an entry of it here, where it came\r\nfirst to be spoken of, I think fit to refer over the further\r\nhandling of it to rhetoric.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(9) The other part of invention, which I term suggestion, doth\r\nassign and direct us to certain marks, or places, which may\r\nexcite our mind to return and produce such knowledge as it hath\r\nformerly collected, to the end we may make use thereof.\r\nNeither is this use (truly taken) only to furnish argument to\r\ndispute, probably with others, but likewise to minister unto our\r\njudgment to conclude aright within ourselves. Neither may\r\nthese places serve only to apprompt our invention, but also to\r\ndirect our inquiry. For a faculty of wise interrogating is\r\nhalf a knowledge. For as Plato saith, “Whosoever\r\nseeketh, knoweth that which he seeketh for in a general notion;\r\nelse how shall he know it when he hath found it?”\r\nAnd, therefore, the larger your anticipation is, the more direct\r\nand compendious is your search. But the same places which\r\nwill help us what to produce of that which we know already, will\r\nalso help us, if a man of experience were before us, what\r\nquestions to ask; or, if we have books and authors to instruct\r\nus, what points to search and revolve; so as I cannot report that\r\nthis part of invention, which is that which the schools call\r\ntopics, is deficient.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(10) Nevertheless, topics are of two sorts, general and\r\nspecial. The general we have spoken to; but the particular\r\nhath been touched by some, but rejected generally as inartificial\r\nand variable. But leaving the humour which hath reigned too\r\nmuch in the schools (which is, to be vainly subtle in a few\r\nthings which are within their command, and to reject the rest), I\r\ndo receive particular topics; that is, places or directions of\r\ninvention and inquiry in every particular knowledge, as things of\r\ngreat use, being mixtures of logic with the matter of\r\nsciences. For in these it holdeth \u003ci\u003ears inveniendi\r\nadolescit cum inventis\u003c/i\u003e; for as in going of a way, we do not\r\nonly gain that part of the way which is passed, but we gain the\r\nbetter sight of that part of the way which remaineth, so every\r\ndegree of proceeding in a science giveth a light to that which\r\nfolloweth; which light, if we strengthen by drawing it forth into\r\nquestions or places of inquiry, we do greatly advance our\r\npursuit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXIV. (1) Now we pass unto the arts of judgment, which handle\r\nthe natures of proofs and demonstrations, which as to induction\r\nhath a coincidence with invention; for all inductions, whether in\r\ngood or vicious form, the same action of the mind which\r\ninventeth, judgeth—all one as in the sense. But\r\notherwise it is in proof by syllogism, for the proof being not\r\nimmediate, but by mean, the invention of the mean is one thing,\r\nand the judgment of the consequence is another; the one exciting\r\nonly, the other examining. Therefore, for the real and\r\nexact form of judgment, we refer ourselves to that which we have\r\nspoken of interpretation of Nature.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) For the other judgment by syllogism, as it is a thing most\r\nagreeable to the mind of man, so it hath been vehemently end\r\nexcellently laboured. For the nature of man doth extremely\r\ncovet to have somewhat in his understanding fixed and unmovable,\r\nand as a rest and support of the mind. And, therefore, as\r\nAristotle endeavoureth to prove, that in all motion there is some\r\npoint quiescent; and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable\r\nof Atlas (that stood fixed, and bare up the heaven from falling)\r\nto be meant of the poles or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the\r\nconversion is accomplished, so assuredly men have a desire to\r\nhave an Atlas or axle-tree within to keep them from fluctuation,\r\nwhich is like to a perpetual peril of falling. Therefore\r\nmen did hasten to set down some principles about which the\r\nvariety of their disputatious might turn.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) So, then, this art of judgment is but the reduction of\r\npropositions to principles in a middle term. The principles\r\nto be agreed by all and exempted from argument; the middle term\r\nto be elected at the liberty of every man’s invention; the\r\nreduction to be of two kinds, direct and inverted: the one when\r\nthe proposition is reduced to the principle, which they term a\r\nprobation ostensive; the other, when the contradictory of the\r\nproposition is reduced to the contradictory of the principle,\r\nwhich is that which they call \u003ci\u003eper incommodum\u003c/i\u003e, or pressing\r\nan absurdity; the number of middle terms to be as the proposition\r\nstandeth degrees more or less removed from the principle.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) But this art hath two several methods of doctrine, the one\r\nby way of direction, the other by way of caution: the former\r\nframeth and setteth down a true form of consequence, by the\r\nvariations and deflections from which errors and inconsequences\r\nmay be exactly judged. Toward the composition and structure\r\nof which form it is incident to handle the parts thereof, which\r\nare propositions, and the parts of propositions, which are simple\r\nwords. And this is that part of logic which is comprehended\r\nin the Analytics.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) The second method of doctrine was introduced for expedite\r\nuse and assurance sake, discovering the more subtle forms of\r\nsophisms and illaqueations with their redargutions, which is that\r\nwhich is termed \u003ci\u003eelenches\u003c/i\u003e. For although in the more\r\ngross sorts of fallacies it happeneth (as Seneca maketh the\r\ncomparison well) as in juggling feats, which, though we know not\r\nhow they are done, yet we know well it is not as it seemeth to\r\nbe; yet the more subtle sort of them doth not only put a man\r\nbesides his answer, but doth many times abuse his judgment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(6) This part concerning \u003ci\u003eelenches\u003c/i\u003e is excellently\r\nhandled by Aristotle in precept, but more excellently by Plato in\r\nexample; not only in the persons of the sophists, but even in\r\nSocrates himself, who, professing to affirm nothing, but to\r\ninfirm that which was affirmed by another, hath exactly expressed\r\nall the forms of objection, fallace, and redargution. And\r\nalthough we have said that the use of this doctrine is for\r\nredargution, yet it is manifest the degenerate and corrupt use is\r\nfor caption and contradiction, which passeth for a great faculty,\r\nand no doubt is of very great advantage, though the difference be\r\ngood which was made between orators and sophisters, that the one\r\nis as the greyhound, which hath his advantage in the race, and\r\nthe other as the hare, which hath her advantage in the turn, so\r\nas it is the advantage of the weaker creature.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(7) But yet further, this doctrine of elenches hath a more\r\nample latitude and extent than is perceived; namely, unto divers\r\nparts of knowledge, whereof some are laboured and other\r\nomitted. For first, I conceive (though it may seem at first\r\nsomewhat strange) that that part which is variably referred,\r\nsometimes to logic, sometimes to metaphysic, touching the common\r\nadjuncts of essences, is but an \u003ci\u003eelenche\u003c/i\u003e; for the great\r\nsophism of all sophisms being equivocation or ambiguity of words\r\nand phrase, specially of such words as are most general and\r\nintervene in every inquiry, it seemeth to me that the true and\r\nfruitful use (leaving vain subtleties and speculations) of the\r\ninquiry of majority, minority, priority, posteriority, identity,\r\ndiversity, possibility, act, totality, parts, existence,\r\nprivation, and the like, are but wise cautions against\r\nambiguities of speech. So, again, the distribution of\r\nthings into certain tribes, which we call categories or\r\npredicaments, are but cautions against the confusion of\r\ndefinitions and divisions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(8) Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by the\r\nstrength of the impression, and not by the subtlety of the\r\nillaqueation—not so much perplexing the reason, as\r\noverruling it by power of the imagination. But this part I\r\nthink more proper to handle when I shall speak of rhetoric.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(9) But lastly, there is yet a much more important and\r\nprofound kind of fallacies in the mind of man, which I find not\r\nobserved or inquired at all, and think good to place here, as\r\nthat which of all others appertaineth most to rectify judgment,\r\nthe force whereof is such as it doth not dazzle or snare the\r\nunderstanding in some particulars, but doth more generally and\r\ninwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. For the mind\r\nof man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein\r\nthe beams of things should reflect according to their true\r\nincidence; nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full of\r\nsuperstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and\r\nreduced. For this purpose, let us consider the false\r\nappearances that are imposed upon us by the general nature of the\r\nmind, beholding them in an example or two; as first, in that\r\ninstance which is the root of all superstition, namely, that to\r\nthe nature of the mind of all men it is consonant for the\r\naffirmative or active to affect more than the negative or\r\nprivative. So that a few times hitting or presence\r\ncountervails ofttimes failing or absence, as was well answered by\r\nDiagoras to him that showed him in Neptune’s temple the\r\ngreat number of pictures of such as had escaped shipwreck, and\r\nhad paid their vows to Neptune, saying, “Advise now, you\r\nthat think it folly to invocate Neptune in tempest.”\r\n“Yea, but,” saith Diagoras, “where are they\r\npainted that are drowned?” Let us behold it in\r\nanother instance, namely, that the spirit of man, being of an\r\nequal and uniform substance, doth usually suppose and feign in\r\nnature a greater equality and uniformity than is in truth.\r\nHence it cometh that the mathematicians cannot satisfy themselves\r\nexcept they reduce the motions of the celestial bodies to perfect\r\ncircles, rejecting spiral lines, and labouring to be discharged\r\nof eccentrics. Hence it cometh that whereas there are many\r\nthings in Nature as it were \u003ci\u003emonodica\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esui juris\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nyet the cogitations of man do feign unto them relatives,\r\nparallels, and conjugates, whereas no such thing is; as they have\r\nfeigned an element of fire to keep square with earth, water, and\r\nair, and the like. Nay, it is not credible, till it be\r\nopened, what a number of fictions and fantasies the similitude of\r\nhuman actions and arts, together with the making of man\r\n\u003ci\u003ecommunis mensura\u003c/i\u003e, have brought into natural philosophy;\r\nnot much better than the heresy of the Anthropomorphites, bred in\r\nthe cells of gross and solitary monks, and the opinion of\r\nEpicurus, answerable to the same in heathenism, who supposed the\r\ngods to be of human shape. And, therefore, Velleius the\r\nEpicurean needed not to have asked why God should have adorned\r\nthe heavens with stars, as if He had been an \u003ci\u003eædilis\u003c/i\u003e,\r\none that should have set forth some magnificent shows or\r\nplays. For if that great Work-master had been of a human\r\ndisposition, He would have cast the stars into some pleasant and\r\nbeautiful works and orders like the frets in the roofs of houses;\r\nwhereas one can scarce find a posture in square, or triangle, or\r\nstraight line, amongst such an infinite number, so differing a\r\nharmony there is between the spirit of man and the spirit of\r\nNature.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(10) Let us consider again the false appearances imposed upon\r\nus by every man’s own individual nature and custom in that\r\nfeigned supposition that Plato maketh of the cave; for certainly\r\nif a child were continued in a grot or cave under the earth until\r\nmaturity of age, and came suddenly abroad, he would have strange\r\nand absurd imaginations. So, in like manner, although our\r\npersons live in the view of heaven, yet our spirits are included\r\nin the caves of our own complexions and customs, which minister\r\nunto us infinite errors and vain opinions if they be not recalled\r\nto examination. But hereof we have given many examples in\r\none of the errors, or peccant humours, which we ran briefly over\r\nin our first book.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(11) And lastly, let us consider the false appearances that\r\nare imposed upon us by words, which are framed and applied\r\naccording to the conceit and capacities of the vulgar sort; and\r\nalthough we think we govern our words, and prescribe it well\r\n\u003ci\u003eloquendum ut vulgus sentiendum ut sapientes\u003c/i\u003e, yet certain\r\nit is that words, as a Tartar’s bow, do shoot back upon the\r\nunderstanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert\r\nthe judgment. So as it is almost necessary in all\r\ncontroversies and disputations to imitate the wisdom of the\r\nmathematicians, in setting down in the very beginning the\r\ndefinitions of our words and terms, that others may know how we\r\naccept and understand them, and whether they concur with us or\r\nno. For it cometh to pass, for want of this, that we are\r\nsure to end there where we ought to have begun, which is, in\r\nquestions and differences about words. To conclude,\r\ntherefore, it must be confessed that it is not possible to\r\ndivorce ourselves from these fallacies and false appearances\r\nbecause they are inseparable from our nature and condition of\r\nlife; so yet, nevertheless, the caution of them (for all\r\nelenches, as was said, are but cautions) doth extremely import\r\nthe true conduct of human judgment. The particular elenches\r\nor cautions against these three false appearances I find\r\naltogether deficient.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(12) There remaineth one part of judgment of great excellency\r\nwhich to mine understanding is so slightly touched, as I may\r\nreport that also deficient; which is the application of the\r\ndiffering kinds of proofs to the differing kinds of\r\nsubjects. For there being but four kinds of demonstrations,\r\nthat is, by the immediate consent of the mind or sense, by\r\ninduction, by syllogism, and by congruity, which is that which\r\nAristotle calleth demonstration in orb or circle, and not \u003ci\u003ea\r\nnotioribus\u003c/i\u003e, every of these hath certain subjects in the\r\nmatter of sciences, in which respectively they have chiefest use;\r\nand certain others, from which respectively they ought to be\r\nexcluded; and the rigour and curiosity in requiring the more\r\nsevere proofs in some things, and chiefly the facility in\r\ncontenting ourselves with the more remiss proofs in others, hath\r\nbeen amongst the greatest causes of detriment and hindrance to\r\nknowledge. The distributions and assignations of\r\ndemonstrations according to the analogy of sciences I note as\r\ndeficient.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXV. (1) The custody or retaining of knowledge is either in\r\nwriting or memory; whereof writing hath two parts, the nature of\r\nthe character and the order of the entry. For the art of\r\ncharacters, or other visible notes of words or things, it hath\r\nnearest conjugation with grammar, and, therefore, I refer it to\r\nthe due place; for the disposition and collocation of that\r\nknowledge which we preserve in writing, it consisteth in a good\r\ndigest of common-places, wherein I am not ignorant of the\r\nprejudice imputed to the use of common-place books, as causing a\r\nretardation of reading, and some sloth or relaxation of\r\nmemory. But because it is but a counterfeit thing in\r\nknowledges to be forward and pregnant, except a man be deep and\r\nfull, I hold the entry of common-places to be a matter of great\r\nuse and essence in studying, as that which assureth copy of\r\ninvention, and contracteth judgment to a strength. But this\r\nis true, that of the methods of common-places that I have seen,\r\nthere is none of any sufficient worth, all of them carrying\r\nmerely the face of a school and not of a world; and referring to\r\nvulgar matters and pedantical divisions, without all life or\r\nrespect to action.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) For the other principal part of the custody of knowledge,\r\nwhich is memory, I find that faculty in my judgment weakly\r\ninquired of. An art there is extant of it; but it seemeth\r\nto me that there are better precepts than that art, and better\r\npractices of that art than those received. It is certain\r\nthe art (as it is) may be raised to points of ostentation\r\nprodigious; but in use (as is now managed) it is barren, not\r\nburdensome, nor dangerous to natural memory, as is imagined, but\r\nbarren, that is, not dexterous to be applied to the serious use\r\nof business and occasions. And, therefore, I make no more\r\nestimation of repeating a great number of names or words upon\r\nonce hearing, or the pouring forth of a number of verses or\r\nrhymes \u003ci\u003eextempore\u003c/i\u003e, or the making of a satirical simile of\r\neverything, or the turning of everything to a jest, or the\r\nfalsifying or contradicting of everything by cavil, or the like\r\n(whereof in the faculties of the mind there is great copy, and\r\nsuch as by device and practice may be exalted to an extreme\r\ndegree of wonder), than I do of the tricks of tumblers,\r\nfunambuloes, baladines; the one being the same in the mind that\r\nthe other is in the body, matters of strangeness without\r\nworthiness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) This art of memory is but built upon two intentions; the\r\none prenotion, the other emblem. Prenotion dischargeth the\r\nindefinite seeking of that we would remember, and directeth us to\r\nseek in a narrow compass, that is, somewhat that hath congruity\r\nwith our place of memory. Emblem reduceth conceits\r\nintellectual to images sensible, which strike the memory more;\r\nout of which axioms may be drawn much better practice than that\r\nin use; and besides which axioms, there are divers more touching\r\nhelp of memory not inferior to them. But I did in the\r\nbeginning distinguish, not to report those things deficient,\r\nwhich are but only ill managed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXVI. (1) There remaineth the fourth kind of rational\r\nknowledge, which is transitive, concerning the expressing or\r\ntransferring our knowledge to others, which I will term by the\r\ngeneral name of tradition or delivery. Tradition hath three\r\nparts: the first concerning the organ of tradition; the second\r\nconcerning the method of tradition; and the third concerning the\r\nillustration of tradition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) For the organ of tradition, it is either speech or\r\nwriting; for Aristotle saith well, “Words are the images of\r\ncogitations, and letters are the images of words.”\r\nBut yet it is not of necessity that cogitations be expressed by\r\nthe medium of words. For whatsoever is capable of\r\nsufficient differences, and those perceptible by the sense, is in\r\nnature competent to express cogitations. And, therefore, we\r\nsee in the commerce of barbarous people that understand not one\r\nanother’s language, and in the practice of divers that are\r\ndumb and deaf, that men’s minds are expressed in gestures,\r\nthough not exactly, yet to serve the turn. And we\r\nunderstand further, that it is the use of China and the kingdoms\r\nof the High Levant to write in characters real, which express\r\nneither letters nor words in gross, but things or notions;\r\ninsomuch as countries and provinces which understand not one\r\nanother’s language can nevertheless read one\r\nanother’s writings, because the characters are accepted\r\nmore generally than the languages do extend; and, therefore, they\r\nhave a vast multitude of characters, as many, I suppose, as\r\nradical words.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) These notes of cogitations are of two sorts: the one when\r\nthe note hath some similitude or congruity with the notion; the\r\nother \u003ci\u003ead placitum\u003c/i\u003e, having force only by contract or\r\nacceptation. Of the former sort are hieroglyphics and\r\ngestures. For as to hieroglyphics (things of ancient use\r\nand embraced chiefly by the Egyptians, one of the most ancient\r\nnations), they are but as continued impresses and emblems.\r\nAnd as for gestures, they are as transitory hieroglyphics, and\r\nare to hieroglyphics as words spoken are to words written, in\r\nthat they abide not; but they have evermore, as well as the\r\nother, an affinity with the things signified. As Periander,\r\nbeing consulted with how to preserve a tyranny newly usurped, bid\r\nthe messenger attend and report what he saw him do; and went into\r\nhis garden and topped all the highest flowers, signifying that it\r\nconsisted in the cutting off and keeping low of the nobility and\r\ngrandees. \u003ci\u003eAd placitum\u003c/i\u003e, are the characters real\r\nbefore mentioned, and words: although some have been willing by\r\ncurious inquiry, or rather by apt feigning, to have derived\r\nimposition of names from reason and intendment; a speculation\r\nelegant, and, by reason it searcheth into antiquity, reverent,\r\nbut sparingly mixed with truth, and of small fruit. This\r\nportion of knowledge touching the notes of things and cogitations\r\nin general, I find not inquired, but deficient. And\r\nalthough it may seem of no great use, considering that words and\r\nwritings by letters do far excel all the other ways; yet because\r\nthis part concerneth, as it were, the mint of knowledge (for\r\nwords are the tokens current and accepted for conceits, as moneys\r\nare for values, and that it is fit men be not ignorant that\r\nmoneys may be of another kind than gold and silver), I thought\r\ngood to propound it to better inquiry.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) Concerning speech and words, the consideration of them\r\nhath produced the science of grammar. For man still\r\nstriveth to reintegrate himself in those benedictions, from which\r\nby his fault he hath been deprived; and as he hath striven\r\nagainst the first general curse by the invention of all other\r\narts, so hath he sought to come forth of the second general curse\r\n(which was the confusion of tongues) by the art of grammar;\r\nwhereof the use in a mother tongue is small, in a foreign tongue\r\nmore; but most in such foreign tongues as have ceased to be\r\nvulgar tongues, and are turned only to learned tongues. The\r\nduty of it is of two natures: the one popular, which is for the\r\nspeedy and perfect attaining languages, as well for intercourse\r\nof speech as for understanding of authors; the other\r\nphilosophical, examining the power and nature of words, as they\r\nare the footsteps and prints of reason: which kind of analogy\r\nbetween words and reason is handled \u003ci\u003esparsim\u003c/i\u003e, brokenly\r\nthough not entirely; and, therefore, I cannot report it\r\ndeficient, though I think it very worthy to be reduced into a\r\nscience by itself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) Unto grammar also belongeth, as an appendix, the\r\nconsideration of the accidents of words; which are measure,\r\nsound, and elevation or accent, and the sweetness and harshness\r\nof them: whence hath issued some curious observations in\r\nrhetoric, but chiefly poesy, as we consider it, in respect of the\r\nverse and not of the argument. Wherein though men in\r\nlearned tongues do tie themselves to the ancient measures, yet in\r\nmodern languages it seemeth to me as free to make new measures of\r\nverses as of dances; for a dance is a measured pace, as a verse\r\nis a measured speech. In these things this sense is better\r\njudge than the art:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e “Cœnæ fercula\r\nnostræ\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMallem convivis quam placuisse cocis.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd of the servile expressing antiquity in an unlike and an\r\nunfit subject, it is well said, “\u003ci\u003eQuod tempore antiquum\r\nvidetur\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eid incongruitate est maxime novum\u003c/i\u003e.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(6) For ciphers, they are commonly in letters or alphabets,\r\nbut may be in words. The kinds of ciphers (besides the\r\nsimple ciphers, with changes, and intermixtures of nulls and\r\nnon-significants) are many, according to the nature or rule of\r\nthe infolding, wheel-ciphers, key-ciphers, doubles, \u0026amp;c.\r\nBut the virtues of them, whereby they are to be preferred, are\r\nthree; that they be not laborious to write and read; that they be\r\nimpossible to decipher; and, in some cases, that they be without\r\nsuspicion. The highest degree whereof is to write \u003ci\u003eomnia\r\nper omnia\u003c/i\u003e; which is undoubtedly possible, with a proportion\r\nquintuple at most of the writing infolding to the writing\r\ninfolded, and no other restraint whatsoever. This art of\r\nciphering hath for relative an art of deciphering, by supposition\r\nunprofitable, but, as things are, of great use. For suppose\r\nthat ciphers were well managed, there be multitudes of them which\r\nexclude the decipherer. But in regard of the rawness and\r\nunskilfulness of the hands through which they pass, the greatest\r\nmatters are many times carried in the weakest ciphers.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(7) In the enumeration of these private and retired arts it\r\nmay be thought I seek to make a great muster-roll of sciences,\r\nnaming them for show and ostentation, and to little other\r\npurpose. But let those, which are skilful in them, judge\r\nwhether I bring them in only for appearance, or whether in that\r\nwhich I speak of them (though in few words) there be not some\r\nseed of proficience. And this must be remembered, that as\r\nthere be many of great account in their countries and provinces,\r\nwhich, when they come up to the seat of the estate, are but of\r\nmean rank and scarcely regarded; so these arts, being here placed\r\nwith the principal and supreme sciences, seem petty things: yet\r\nto such as have chosen them to spend their labours and studies in\r\nthem, they seem great matters.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXVII. (1) For the method of tradition, I see it hath moved a\r\ncontroversy in our time. But as in civil business, if there\r\nbe a meeting, and men fall at words, there is commonly an end of\r\nthe matter for that time, and no proceeding at all; so in\r\nlearning, where there is much controversy, there is many times\r\nlittle inquiry. For this part of knowledge of method\r\nseemeth to me so weakly inquired as I shall report it\r\ndeficient.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) Method hath been placed, and that not amiss, in logic, as\r\na part of judgment. For as the doctrine of syllogisms\r\ncomprehendeth the rules of judgment upon that which is invented,\r\nso the doctrine of method containeth the rules of judgment upon\r\nthat which is to be delivered; for judgment precedeth delivery,\r\nas it followeth invention. Neither is the method or the\r\nnature of the tradition material only to the use of knowledge,\r\nbut likewise to the progression of knowledge: for since the\r\nlabour and life of one man cannot attain to perfection of\r\nknowledge, the wisdom of the tradition is that which inspireth\r\nthe felicity of continuance and proceeding. And therefore\r\nthe most real diversity of method is of method referred to use,\r\nand method referred to progression: whereof the one may be termed\r\nmagistral, and the other of probation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) The latter whereof seemeth to be \u003ci\u003evia deserta et\r\ninterclusa\u003c/i\u003e. For as knowledges are now delivered, there\r\nis a kind of contract of error between the deliverer and the\r\nreceiver. For he that delivereth knowledge desireth to\r\ndeliver it in such form as may be best believed, and not as may\r\nbe best examined; and he that receiveth knowledge desireth rather\r\npresent satisfaction than expectant inquiry; and so rather not to\r\ndoubt, than not to err: glory making the author not to lay open\r\nhis weakness, and sloth making the disciple not to know his\r\nstrength.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) But knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be spun on\r\nought to be delivered and intimated, if it were possible, in the\r\nsame method wherein it was invented: and so is it possible of\r\nknowledge induced. But in this same anticipated and\r\nprevented knowledge, no man knoweth how he came to the knowledge\r\nwhich he hath obtained. But yet, nevertheless, \u003ci\u003esecundum\r\nmajus et minus\u003c/i\u003e, a man may revisit and descend unto the\r\nfoundations of his knowledge and consent; and so transplant it\r\ninto another, as it grew in his own mind. For it is in\r\nknowledges as it is in plants: if you mean to use the plant, it\r\nis no matter for the roots—but if you mean to remove it to\r\ngrow, then it is more assured to rest upon roots than slips: so\r\nthe delivery of knowledges (as it is now used) is as of fair\r\nbodies of trees without the roots; good for the carpenter, but\r\nnot for the planter. But if you will have sciences grow, it\r\nis less matter for the shaft or body of the tree, so you look\r\nwell to the taking up of the roots. Of which kind of\r\ndelivery the method of the mathematics, in that subject, hath\r\nsome shadow: but generally I see it neither put in use nor put in\r\ninquisition, and therefore note it for deficient.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) Another diversity of method there is, which hath some\r\naffinity with the former, used in some cases by the discretion of\r\nthe ancients, but disgraced since by the impostures of many vain\r\npersons, who have made it as a false light for their counterfeit\r\nmerchandises; and that is enigmatical and disclosed. The\r\npretence whereof is, to remove the vulgar capacities from being\r\nadmitted to the secrets of knowledges, and to reserve them to\r\nselected auditors, or wits of such sharpness as can pierce the\r\nveil.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(6) Another diversity of method, whereof the consequence is\r\ngreat, is the delivery of knowledge in aphorisms, or in methods;\r\nwherein we may observe that it hath been too much taken into\r\ncustom, out of a few axioms or observations upon any subject, to\r\nmake a solemn and formal art, filling it with some discourses,\r\nand illustrating it with examples, and digesting it into a\r\nsensible method. But the writing in aphorisms hath many\r\nexcellent virtues, whereto the writing in method doth not\r\napproach.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(7) For first, it trieth the writer, whether he be superficial\r\nor solid: for aphorisms, except they should be ridiculous, cannot\r\nbe made but of the pith and heart of sciences; for discourse of\r\nillustration is cut off; recitals of examples are cut off;\r\ndiscourse of connection and order is cut off; descriptions of\r\npractice are cut off. So there remaineth nothing to fill\r\nthe aphorisms but some good quantity of observation; and\r\ntherefore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt, to\r\nwrite aphorisms, but he that is sound and grounded. But in\r\nmethods,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e “Tantum series juncturaque\r\npollet,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris,”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eas a man shall make a great show of an art, which, if it were\r\ndisjointed, would come to little. Secondly, methods are\r\nmore fit to win consent or belief, but less fit to point to\r\naction; for they carry a kind of demonstration in orb or circle,\r\none part illuminating another, and therefore satisfy. But\r\nparticulars being dispersed do best agree with dispersed\r\ndirections. And lastly, aphorisms, representing a knowledge\r\nbroken, do invite men to inquire further; whereas methods,\r\ncarrying the show of a total, do secure men, as if they were at\r\nfurthest.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(8) Another diversity of method, which is likewise of great\r\nweight, is the handling of knowledge by assertions and their\r\nproofs, or by questions and their determinations. The\r\nlatter kind whereof, if it be immoderately followed, is as\r\nprejudicial to the proceeding of learning as it is to the\r\nproceeding of an army to go about to besiege every little fort or\r\nhold. For if the field be kept, and the sum of the\r\nenterprise pursued, those smaller things will come in of\r\nthemselves: indeed a man would not leave some important piece\r\nenemy at his back. In like manner, the use of confutation\r\nin the delivery of sciences ought to be very sparing; and to\r\nserve to remove strong preoccupations and prejudgments, and not\r\nto minister and excite disputatious and doubts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(9) Another diversity of method is, according to the subject\r\nor matter which is handled. For there is a great difference\r\nin delivery of the mathematics, which are the most abstracted of\r\nknowledges, and policy, which is the most immersed. And\r\nhowsoever contention hath been moved, touching a uniformity of\r\nmethod in multiformity of matter, yet we see how that opinion,\r\nbesides the weakness of it, hath been of ill desert towards\r\nlearning, as that which taketh the way to reduce learning to\r\ncertain empty and barren generalities; being but the very husks\r\nand shells of sciences, all the kernel being forced out and\r\nexpulsed with the torture and press of the method. And,\r\ntherefore, as I did allow well of particular topics for\r\ninvention, so I do allow likewise of particular methods of\r\ntradition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(10) Another diversity of judgment in the delivery and\r\nteaching of knowledge is, according unto the light and\r\npresuppositions of that which is delivered. For that\r\nknowledge which is new, and foreign from opinions received, is to\r\nbe delivered in another form than that that is agreeable and\r\nfamiliar; and therefore Aristotle, when he thinks to tax\r\nDemocritus, doth in truth commend him, where he saith “If\r\nwe shall indeed dispute, and not follow after similitudes,”\r\n\u0026amp;c. For those whose conceits are seated in popular\r\nopinions need only but to prove or dispute; but those whose\r\nconceits are beyond popular opinions, have a double labour; the\r\none to make themselves conceived, and the other to prove and\r\ndemonstrate. So that it is of necessity with them to have\r\nrecourse to similitudes and translations to express\r\nthemselves. And therefore in the infancy of learning, and\r\nin rude times when those conceits which are now trivial were then\r\nnew, the world was full of parables and similitudes; for else\r\nwould men either have passed over without mark, or else rejected\r\nfor paradoxes that which was offered, before they had understood\r\nor judged. So in divine learning, we see how frequent\r\nparables and tropes are, for it is a rule, that whatsoever\r\nscience is not consonant to presuppositions must pray in aid of\r\nsimilitudes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(11) There be also other diversities of methods vulgar and\r\nreceived: as that of resolution or analysis, of constitution or\r\nsystasis, of concealment or cryptic, \u0026amp;c., which I do allow\r\nwell of, though I have stood upon those which are least handled\r\nand observed. All which I have remembered to this purpose,\r\nbecause I would erect and constitute one general inquiry (which\r\nseems to me deficient) touching the wisdom of tradition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(12) But unto this part of knowledge, concerning method, doth\r\nfurther belong not only the architecture of the whole frame of a\r\nwork, but also the several beams and columns thereof; not as to\r\ntheir stuff, but as to their quantity and figure. And\r\ntherefore method considereth not only the disposition of the\r\nargument or subject, but likewise the propositions: not as to\r\ntheir truth or matter, but as to their limitation and\r\nmanner. For herein Ramus merited better a great deal in\r\nreviving the good rules of\r\npropositions—Καθολον\r\nπρωτον, κυτα\r\nπαντος \u0026amp;c.—than he did\r\nin introducing the canker of epitomes; and yet (as it is the\r\ncondition of human things that, according to the ancient fables,\r\n“the most precious things have the most pernicious\r\nkeepers”) it was so, that the attempt of the one made him\r\nfall upon the other. For he had need be well conducted that\r\nshould design to make axioms convertible, if he make them not\r\nwithal circular, and non-promovent, or incurring into themselves;\r\nbut yet the intention was excellent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(13) The other considerations of method, concerning\r\npropositions, are chiefly touching the utmost propositions, which\r\nlimit the dimensions of sciences: for every knowledge may be\r\nfitly said, besides the profundity (which is the truth and\r\nsubstance of it, that makes it solid), to have a longitude and a\r\nlatitude; accounting the latitude towards other sciences, and the\r\nlongitude towards action; that is, from the greatest generality\r\nto the most particular precept. The one giveth rule how far\r\none knowledge ought to intermeddle within the province of\r\nanother, which is the rule they call\r\nΚαθαυτο; the other\r\ngiveth rule unto what degree of particularity a knowledge should\r\ndescend: which latter I find passed over in silence, being in my\r\njudgment the more material. For certainty there must be\r\nsomewhat left to practice; but how much is worthy the\r\ninquiry? We see remote and superficial generalities do but\r\noffer knowledge to scorn of practical men; and are no more aiding\r\nto practice than an Ortelius’ universal map is to direct\r\nthe way between London and York. The better sort of rules\r\nhave been not unfitly compared to glasses of steel unpolished,\r\nwhere you may see the images of things, but first they must be\r\nfiled: so the rules will help if they be laboured and polished by\r\npractice. But how crystalline they may be made at the\r\nfirst, and how far forth they may be polished aforehand, is the\r\nquestion, the inquiry whereof seemeth to me deficient.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(14) There hath been also laboured and put in practice a\r\nmethod, which is not a lawful method, but a method of imposture:\r\nwhich is, to deliver knowledges in such manner as men may\r\nspeedily come to make a show of learning, who have it not.\r\nSuch was the travail of Raymundus Lullius in making that art\r\nwhich bears his name; not unlike to some books of typocosmy,\r\nwhich have been made since; being nothing but a mass of words of\r\nall arts, to give men countenance, that those which use the terms\r\nmight be thought to understand the art; which collections are\r\nmuch like a fripper’s or broker’s shop, that hath\r\nends of everything, but nothing of worth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXVIII. (1) Now we descend to that part which concerneth the\r\nillustration of tradition, comprehended in that science which we\r\ncall rhetoric, or art of eloquence, a science excellent, and\r\nexcellently well laboured. For although in true value it is\r\ninferior to wisdom (as it is said by God to Moses, when he\r\ndisabled himself for want of this faculty, “Aaron shall be\r\nthy speaker, and thou shalt be to him as God”), yet with\r\npeople it is the more mighty; for so Solomon saith, \u003ci\u003eSapiens\r\ncorde appellabitur prudens\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esed dulcis eloquio majora\r\nreperiet\u003c/i\u003e, signifying that profoundness of wisdom will help a\r\nman to a name or admiration, but that it is eloquence that\r\nprevaileth in an active life. And as to the labouring of\r\nit, the emulation of Aristotle with the rhetoricians of his time,\r\nand the experience of Cicero, hath made them in their works of\r\nrhetoric exceed themselves. Again, the excellency of\r\nexamples of eloquence in the orations of Demosthenes and Cicero,\r\nadded to the perfection of the precepts of eloquence, hath\r\ndoubled the progression in this art; and therefore the\r\ndeficiences which I shall note will rather be in some\r\ncollections, which may as handmaids attend the art, than in the\r\nrules or use of the art itself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about\r\nthe roots of this science, as we have done of the rest, the duty\r\nand office of rhetoric is to apply reason to imagination for the\r\nbetter moving of the will. For we see reason is disturbed\r\nin the administration thereof by three means—by\r\nillaqueation or sophism, which pertains to logic; by imagination\r\nor impression, which pertains to rhetoric; and by passion or\r\naffection, which pertains to morality. And as in\r\nnegotiation with others, men are wrought by cunning, by\r\nimportunity, and by vehemency; so in this negotiation within\r\nourselves, men are undermined by inconsequences, solicited and\r\nimportuned by impressions or observations, and transported by\r\npassions. Neither is the nature of man so unfortunately\r\nbuilt, as that those powers and arts should have force to disturb\r\nreason, and not to establish and advance it. For the end of\r\nlogic is to teach a form of argument to secure reason, and not to\r\nentrap it; the end of morality is to procure the affections to\r\nobey reason, and not to invade it; the end of rhetoric is to fill\r\nthe imagination to second reason, and not to oppress it; for\r\nthese abuses of arts come in but \u003ci\u003eex oblique\u003c/i\u003e, for\r\ncaution.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, though\r\nspringing out of a just hatred to the rhetoricians of his time,\r\nto esteem of rhetoric but as a voluptuary art, resembling it to\r\ncookery, that did mar wholesome meats, and help unwholesome by\r\nvariety of sauces to the pleasure of the taste. For we see\r\nthat speech is much more conversant in adorning that which is\r\ngood than in colouring that which is evil; for there is no man\r\nbut speaketh more honestly than he can do or think; and it was\r\nexcellently noted by Thucydides, in Cleon, that because he used\r\nto hold on the bad side in causes of estate, therefore he was\r\never inveighing against eloquence and good speech, knowing that\r\nno man can speak fair of courses sordid and base. And\r\ntherefore, as Plato said elegantly, “That virtue, if she\r\ncould be seen, would move great love and affection;” so\r\nseeing that she cannot be showed to the sense by corporal shape,\r\nthe next degree is to show her to the imagination in lively\r\nrepresentation; for to show her to reason only in subtlety of\r\nargument was a thing ever derided in Chrysippus and many of the\r\nStoics, who thought to thrust virtue upon men by sharp\r\ndisputations and conclusions, which have no sympathy with the\r\nwill of man.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and\r\nobedient to reason, it were true there should be no great use of\r\npersuasions and insinuations to the will, more than of naked\r\nproposition and proofs; but in regard of the continual mutinies\r\nand seditious of the affections—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e “Video meliora,\r\nproboque,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDeteriora sequor,”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ereason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of\r\npersuasions did not practise and win the imagination from the\r\naffections’ part, and contract a confederacy between the\r\nreason and imagination against the affections; for the affections\r\nthemselves carry ever an appetite to good, as reason doth.\r\nThe difference is, that the affection beholdeth merely the\r\npresent; reason beholdeth the future and sum of time. And,\r\ntherefore, the present filling the imagination more, reason is\r\ncommonly vanquished; but after that force of eloquence and\r\npersuasion hath made things future and remote appear as present,\r\nthen upon the revolt of the imagination reason prevaileth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) We conclude, therefore, that rhetoric can be no more\r\ncharged with the colouring of the worst part, than logic with\r\nsophistry, or morality with vice; for we know the doctrines of\r\ncontraries are the same, though the use be opposite. It\r\nappeareth also that logic differeth from rhetoric, not only as\r\nthe fist from the palm—the one close, the other at\r\nlarge—but much more in this, that logic handleth reason\r\nexact and in truth, and rhetoric handleth it as it is planted in\r\npopular opinions and manners. And therefore Aristotle doth\r\nwisely place rhetoric as between logic on the one side, and moral\r\nor civil knowledge on the other, as participating of both; for\r\nthe proofs and demonstrations of logic are toward all men\r\nindifferent and the same, but the proofs and persuasions of\r\nrhetoric ought to differ according to the auditors:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas\r\nArion.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhich application in perfection of idea ought to extend so far\r\nthat if a man should speak of the same thing to several persons,\r\nhe should speak to them all respectively and several ways; though\r\nthis politic part of eloquence in private speech it is easy for\r\nthe greatest orators to want: whilst, by the observing their\r\nwell-graced forms of speech, they leese the volubility of\r\napplication; and therefore it shall not be amiss to recommend\r\nthis to better inquiry, not being curious whether we place it\r\nhere or in that part which concerneth policy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(6) Now therefore will I descend to the deficiences, which, as\r\nI said, are but attendances; and first, I do not find the wisdom\r\nand diligence of Aristotle well pursued, who began to make a\r\ncollection of the popular signs and colours of good and evil,\r\nboth simple and comparative, which are as the sophisms of\r\nrhetoric (as I touched before). For example—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e “Sophisma.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eQuod laudatur, bonum: quod vituperatur, malum.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e Redargutio.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eLaudat venales qui vult extrudere merces.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eMalum est\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003emalum est\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci\u003einquit emptor\u003c/i\u003e):\r\n\u003ci\u003esed cum recesserit\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003etum gloriabitur\u003c/i\u003e! The\r\ndefects in the labour of Aristotle are three—one, that\r\nthere be but a few of many; another, that there elenches are not\r\nannexed; and the third, that he conceived but a part of the use\r\nof them: for their use is not only in probation, but much more in\r\nimpression. For many forms are equal in signification which\r\nare differing in impression, as the difference is great in the\r\npiercing of that which is sharp and that which is flat, though\r\nthe strength of the percussion be the same. For there is no\r\nman but will be a little more raised by hearing it said,\r\n“Your enemies will be glad of this”—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur\r\nAtridæ.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003ethan by hearing it said only, “This is evil for\r\nyou.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(7) Secondly, I do resume also that which I mentioned before,\r\ntouching provision or preparatory store for the furniture of\r\nspeech and readiness of invention, which appeareth to be of two\r\nsorts: the one in resemblance to a shop of pieces unmade up, the\r\nother to a shop of things ready made up; both to be applied to\r\nthat which is frequent and most in request. The former of\r\nthese I will call \u003ci\u003eantitheta\u003c/i\u003e, and the latter\r\n\u003ci\u003eformulæ\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(8) \u003ci\u003eAntitheta\u003c/i\u003e are theses argued \u003ci\u003epro et contra\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nwherein men may be more large and laborious; but (in such as are\r\nable to do it) to avoid prolixity of entry, I wish the seeds of\r\nthe several arguments to be cast up into some brief and acute\r\nsentences, not to be cited, but to be as skeins or bottoms of\r\nthread, to be unwinded at large when they come to be used;\r\nsupplying authorities and examples by reference.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e “\u003ci\u003ePro verbis\r\nlegis\u003c/i\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNon est interpretatio, sed divinatio, quæ recedit a\r\nlitera:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCum receditur a litera, judex transit in legislatorem.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e \u003ci\u003ePro sententia legis\u003c/i\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEx omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus qui interpretatur\r\nsingula.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(9) \u003ci\u003eFormulæ\u003c/i\u003e are but decent and apt passages or\r\nconveyances of speech, which may serve indifferently for\r\ndiffering subjects; as of preface, conclusion, digression,\r\ntransition, excusation, \u0026amp;c. For as in buildings there\r\nis great pleasure and use in the well casting of the staircases,\r\nentries, doors, windows, and the like; so in speech, the\r\nconveyances and passages are of special ornament and effect.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“\u003ci\u003eA conclusion in a deliberative\u003c/i\u003e.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSo may we redeem the faults passed, and prevent the\r\ninconveniences future.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXIX. (1) There remain two appendices touching the tradition of\r\nknowledge, the one critical, the other pedantical. For all\r\nknowledge is either delivered by teachers, or attained by\r\nmen’s proper endeavours: and therefore as the principal\r\npart of tradition of knowledge concerneth chiefly writing of\r\nbooks, so the relative part thereof concerneth reading of books;\r\nwhereunto appertain incidently these considerations. The\r\nfirst is concerning the true correction and edition of authors;\r\nwherein nevertheless rash diligence hath done great\r\nprejudice. For these critics have often presumed that that\r\nwhich they understand not is false set down: as the priest that,\r\nwhere he found it written of St. Paul \u003ci\u003eDemissus est per\r\nsportam\u003c/i\u003e, mended his book, and made it \u003ci\u003eDemissus est per\r\nportam\u003c/i\u003e; because \u003ci\u003esporta\u003c/i\u003e was a hard word, and out of his\r\nreading: and surely their errors, though they be not so palpable\r\nand ridiculous, yet are of the same kind. And therefore, as\r\nit hath been wisely noted, the most corrected copies are commonly\r\nthe least correct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe second is concerning the exposition and explication of\r\nauthors, which resteth in annotations and commentaries: wherein\r\nit is over usual to blanch the obscure places and discourse upon\r\nthe plain.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe third is concerning the times, which in many cases give\r\ngreat light to true interpretations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe fourth is concerning some brief censure and judgment of\r\nthe authors; that men thereby may make some election unto\r\nthemselves what books to read.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd the fifth is concerning the syntax and disposition of\r\nstudies; that men may know in what order or pursuit to read.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) For pedantical knowledge, it containeth that difference of\r\ntradition which is proper for youth; whereunto appertain divers\r\nconsiderations of great fruit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs first, the timing and seasoning of knowledges; as with what\r\nto initiate them, and from what for a time to refrain them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSecondly, the consideration where to begin with the easiest,\r\nand so proceed to the more difficult; and in what courses to\r\npress the more difficult, and then to turn them to the more easy;\r\nfor it is one method to practise swimming with bladders, and\r\nanother to practise dancing with heavy shoes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eA third is the application of learning according unto the\r\npropriety of the wits; for there is no defect in the faculties\r\nintellectual, but seemeth to have a proper cure contained in some\r\nstudies: as, for example, if a child be bird-witted, that is,\r\nhath not the faculty of attention, the mathematics giveth a\r\nremedy thereunto; for in them, if the wit be caught away but a\r\nmoment, one is new to begin. And as sciences have a\r\npropriety towards faculties for cure and help, so faculties or\r\npowers have a sympathy towards sciences for excellency or speedy\r\nprofiting: and therefore it is an inquiry of great wisdom, what\r\nkinds of wits and natures are most apt and proper for what\r\nsciences.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFourthly, the ordering of exercises is matter of great\r\nconsequence to hurt or help: for, as is well observed by Cicero,\r\nmen in exercising their faculties, if they be not well advised,\r\ndo exercise their faults and get ill habits as well as good; so\r\nas there is a great judgment to be had in the continuance and\r\nintermission of exercises. It were too long to\r\nparticularise a number of other considerations of this nature,\r\nthings but of mean appearance, but of singular efficacy.\r\nFor as the wronging or cherishing of seeds or young plants is\r\nthat that is most important to their thriving, and as it was\r\nnoted that the first six kings being in truth as tutors of the\r\nstate of Rome in the infancy thereof was the principal cause of\r\nthe immense greatness of that state which followed, so the\r\nculture and manurance of minds in youth hath such a forcible\r\n(though unseen) operation, as hardly any length of time or\r\ncontention of labour can countervail it afterwards. And it\r\nis not amiss to observe also how small and mean faculties gotten\r\nby education, yet when they fall into great men or great matters,\r\ndo work great and important effects: whereof we see a notable\r\nexample in Tacitus of two stage players, Percennius and\r\nVibulenus, who by their faculty of playing put the Pannonian\r\narmies into an extreme tumult and combustion. For there\r\narising a mutiny amongst them upon the death of Augustus\r\nCæsar, Blæsus the lieutenant had committed some of\r\nthe mutineers, which were suddenly rescued; whereupon Vibulenus\r\ngot to be heard speak, which he did in this\r\nmanner:—“These poor innocent wretches appointed to\r\ncruel death, you have restored to behold the light; but who shall\r\nrestore my brother to me, or life unto my brother, that was sent\r\nhither in message from the legions of Germany, to treat of the\r\ncommon cause? and he hath murdered him this last night by some of\r\nhis fencers and ruffians, that he hath about him for his\r\nexecutioners upon soldiers. Answer, Blæsus, what is\r\ndone with his body? The mortalest enemies do not deny\r\nburial. When I have performed my last duties to the corpse\r\nwith kisses, with tears, command me to be slain besides him; so\r\nthat these my fellows, for our good meaning and our true hearts\r\nto the legions, may have leave to bury us.” With\r\nwhich speech he put the army into an infinite fury and uproar:\r\nwhereas truth was he had no brother, neither was there any such\r\nmatter; but he played it merely as if he had been upon the\r\nstage.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) But to return: we are now come to a period of rational\r\nknowledges; wherein if I have made the divisions other than those\r\nthat are received, yet would I not be thought to disallow all\r\nthose divisions which I do not use. For there is a double\r\nnecessity imposed upon me of altering the divisions. The\r\none, because it differeth in end and purpose, to sort together\r\nthose things which are next in nature, and those things which are\r\nnext in use. For if a secretary of estate should sort his\r\npapers, it is like in his study or general cabinet he would sort\r\ntogether things of a nature, as treaties, instructions,\r\n\u0026amp;c. But in his boxes or particular cabinet he would\r\nsort together those that he were like to use together, though of\r\nseveral natures. So in this general cabinet of knowledge it\r\nwas necessary for me to follow the divisions of the nature of\r\nthings; whereas if myself had been to handle any particular\r\nknowledge, I would have respected the divisions fittest for\r\nuse. The other, because the bringing in of the deficiences\r\ndid by consequence alter the partitions of the rest. For\r\nlet the knowledge extant (for demonstration sake) be\r\nfifteen. Let the knowledge with the deficiences be twenty;\r\nthe parts of fifteen are not the parts of twenty; for the parts\r\nof fifteen are three and five; the parts of twenty are two, four,\r\nfive, and ten. So as these things are without\r\ncontradiction, and could not otherwise be.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXX. (1) We proceed now to that knowledge which considereth of\r\nthe appetite and will of man: whereof Solomon saith, \u003ci\u003eAnte\r\nomnia\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003efili\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ecustodi cor tuum\u003c/i\u003e: \u003ci\u003enam inde\r\nprocedunt actiones vitæ\u003c/i\u003e. In the handling of this\r\nscience, those which have written seem to me to have done as if a\r\nman, that professed to teach to write, did only exhibit fair\r\ncopies of alphabets and letters joined, without giving any\r\nprecepts or directions for the carriage of the hand and framing\r\nof the letters. So have they made good and fair exemplars\r\nand copies, carrying the draughts and portraitures of good,\r\nvirtue, duty, felicity; propounding them well described as the\r\ntrue objects and scopes of man’s will and desires.\r\nBut how to attain these excellent marks, and how to frame and\r\nsubdue the will of man to become true and conformable to these\r\npursuits, they pass it over altogether, or slightly and\r\nunprofitably. For it is not the disputing that moral\r\nvirtues are in the mind of man by habit and not by nature, or the\r\ndistinguishing that generous spirits are won by doctrines and\r\npersuasions, and the vulgar sort by reward and punishment, and\r\nthe like scattered glances and touches, that can excuse the\r\nabsence of this part.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) The reason of this omission I suppose to be that hidden\r\nrock whereupon both this and many other barks of knowledge have\r\nbeen cast away; which is, that men have despised to be conversant\r\nin ordinary and common matters, the judicious direction whereof\r\nnevertheless is the wisest doctrine (for life consisteth not in\r\nnovelties nor subtleties), but contrariwise they have compounded\r\nsciences chiefly of a certain resplendent or lustrous mass of\r\nmatter, chosen to give glory either to the subtlety of\r\ndisputatious, or to the eloquence of discourses. But Seneca\r\ngiveth an excellent check to eloquence, \u003ci\u003eNocet illis\r\neloquentia\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003equibus non rerum cupiditatem facit\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esed\r\nsui\u003c/i\u003e. Doctrine should be such as should make men in love\r\nwith the lesson, and not with the teacher; being directed to the\r\nauditor’s benefit, and not to the author’s\r\ncommendation. And therefore those are of the right kind\r\nwhich may be concluded as Demosthenes concludes his counsel,\r\n\u003ci\u003eQuæ si feceritis\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enon oratorem dumtaxat in\r\npræsentia laudabitis\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esed vosmetipsos etiam non ita\r\nmulto post statu rerum vestraram meliore\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) Neither needed men of so excellent parts to have despaired\r\nof a fortune, which the poet Virgil promised himself, and indeed\r\nobtained, who got as much glory of eloquence, wit, and learning\r\nin the expressing of the observations of husbandry, as of the\r\nheroical acts of Æneas:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Nec sum animi dubius, verbis ea vincere\r\nmagnum\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nQuam sit, et angustis his addere rebus honorem.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd surely, if the purpose be in good earnest, not to write at\r\nleisure that which men may read at leisure, but really to\r\ninstruct and suborn action and active life, these Georgics of the\r\nmind, concerning the husbandry and tillage thereof, are no less\r\nworthy than the heroical descriptions of virtue, duty, and\r\nfelicity. Wherefore the main and primitive division of\r\nmoral knowledge seemeth to be into the exemplar or platform of\r\ngood, and the regiment or culture of the mind: the one describing\r\nthe nature of good, the other prescribing rules how to subdue,\r\napply, and accommodate the will of man thereunto.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) The doctrine touching the platform or nature of good\r\nconsidereth it either simple or compared; either the kinds of\r\ngood, or the degrees of good; in the latter whereof those\r\ninfinite disputatious which were touching the supreme degree\r\nthereof, which they term felicity, beatitude, or the highest\r\ngood, the doctrines concerning which were as the heathen\r\ndivinity, are by the Christian faith discharged. And as\r\nAristotle saith, “That young men may be happy, but not\r\notherwise but by hope;” so we must all acknowledge our\r\nminority, and embrace the felicity which is by hope of the future\r\nworld.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) Freed therefore and delivered from this doctrine of the\r\nphilosopher’s heaven, whereby they feigned a higher\r\nelevation of man’s nature than was (for we see in what\r\nheight of style Seneca writeth, \u003ci\u003eVere magnum\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ehabere\r\nfragilitatem hominis\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esecuritatem Dei\u003c/i\u003e), we may with\r\nmore sobriety and truth receive the rest of their inquiries and\r\nlabours. Wherein for the nature of good positive or simple,\r\nthey have set it down excellently in describing the forms of\r\nvirtue and duty, with their situations and postures; in\r\ndistributing them into their kinds, parts, provinces, actions,\r\nand administrations, and the like: nay further, they have\r\ncommended them to man’s nature and spirit with great\r\nquickness of argument and beauty of persuasions; yea, and\r\nfortified and entrenched them (as much as discourse can do)\r\nagainst corrupt and popular opinions. Again, for the\r\ndegrees and comparative nature of good, they have also\r\nexcellently handled it in their triplicity of good, in the\r\ncomparisons between a contemplative and an active life, in the\r\ndistinction between virtue with reluctation and virtue secured,\r\nin their encounters between honesty and profit, in their\r\nbalancing of virtue with virtue, and the like; so as this part\r\ndeserveth to be reported for excellently laboured.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(6) Notwithstanding, if before they had come to the popular\r\nand received notions of virtue and vice, pleasure and pain, and\r\nthe rest, they had stayed a little longer upon the inquiry\r\nconcerning the roots of good and evil, and the strings of those\r\nroots, they had given, in my opinion, a great light to that which\r\nfollowed; and specially if they had consulted with nature, they\r\nhad made their doctrines less prolix and more profound: which\r\nbeing by them in part omitted and in part handled with much\r\nconfusion, we will endeavour to resume and open in a more clear\r\nmanner.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(7) There is formed in everything a double nature of\r\ngood—the one, as everything is a total or substantive in\r\nitself; the other, as it is a part or member of a greater body;\r\nwhereof the latter is in degree the greater and the worthier,\r\nbecause it tendeth to the conservation of a more general\r\nform. Therefore we see the iron in particular sympathy\r\nmoveth to the loadstone; but yet if it exceed a certain quantity,\r\nit forsaketh the affection to the loadstone, and like a good\r\npatriot moveth to the earth, which is the region and country of\r\nmassy bodies; so may we go forward, and see that water and massy\r\nbodies move to the centre of the earth; but rather than to suffer\r\na divulsion in the continuance of nature, they will move upwards\r\nfrom the centre of the earth, forsaking their duty to the earth\r\nin regard of their duty to the world. This double nature of\r\ngood, and the comparative thereof, is much more engraven upon\r\nman, if he degenerate not, unto whom the conservation of duty to\r\nthe public ought to be much more precious than the conservation\r\nof life and being; according to that memorable speech of Pompeius\r\nMagnus, when being in commission of purveyance for a famine at\r\nRome, and being dissuaded with great vehemency and instance by\r\nhis friends about him, that he should not hazard himself to sea\r\nin an extremity of weather, he said only to them, \u003ci\u003eNecesse est\r\nut eam\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enon ut vivam\u003c/i\u003e. But it may be truly\r\naffirmed that there was never any philosophy, religion, or other\r\ndiscipline, which did so plainly and highly exalt the good which\r\nis communicative, and depress the good which is private and\r\nparticular, as the Holy Faith; well declaring that it was the\r\nsame God that gave the Christian law to men, who gave those laws\r\nof nature to inanimate creatures that we spake of before; for we\r\nread that the elected saints of God have wished themselves\r\nanathematised and razed out of the book of life, in an ecstasy of\r\ncharity and infinite feeling of communion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(8) This being set down and strongly planted, doth judge and\r\ndetermine most of the controversies wherein moral philosophy is\r\nconversant. For first, it decideth the question touching\r\nthe preferment of the contemplative or active life, and decideth\r\nit against Aristotle. For all the reasons which he bringeth\r\nfor the contemplative are private, and respecting the pleasure\r\nand dignity of a man’s self (in which respects no question\r\nthe contemplative life hath the pre-eminence), not much unlike to\r\nthat comparison which Pythagoras made for the gracing and\r\nmagnifying of philosophy and contemplation, who being asked what\r\nhe was, answered, “That if Hiero were ever at the Olympian\r\ngames, he knew the manner, that some came to try their fortune\r\nfor the prizes, and some came as merchants to utter their\r\ncommodities, and some came to make good cheer and meet their\r\nfriends, and some came to look on; and that he was one of them\r\nthat came to look on.” But men must know, that in\r\nthis theatre of man’s life it is reserved only for God and\r\nangels to be lookers on. Neither could the like question\r\never have been received in the Church, notwithstanding their\r\n\u003ci\u003ePretiosa in oculis Domini mors sanctorum ejus\u003c/i\u003e, by which\r\nplace they would exalt their civil death and regular professions,\r\nbut upon this defence, that the monastical life is not simple\r\ncontemplative, but performeth the duty either of incessant\r\nprayers and supplications, which hath been truly esteemed as an\r\noffice in the Church, or else of writing or taking instructions\r\nfor writing concerning the law of God, as Moses did when he abode\r\nso long in the mount. And so we see Enoch, the seventh from\r\nAdam, who was the first contemplative and walked with God, yet\r\ndid also endow the Church with prophecy, which Saint Jude\r\nciteth. But for contemplation which should be finished in\r\nitself, without casting beams upon society, assuredly divinity\r\nknoweth it not.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(9) It decideth also the controversies between Zeno and\r\nSocrates, and their schools and successions, on the one side, who\r\nplaced felicity in virtue simply or attended, the actions and\r\nexercises whereof do chiefly embrace and concern society; and on\r\nthe other side, the Cyrenaics and Epicureans, who placed it in\r\npleasure, and made virtue (as it is used in some comedies of\r\nerrors, wherein the mistress and the maid change habits) to be\r\nbut as a servant, without which pleasure cannot be served and\r\nattended; and the reformed school of the Epicureans, which placed\r\nit in serenity of mind and freedom from perturbation; as if they\r\nwould have deposed Jupiter again, and restored Saturn and the\r\nfirst age, when there was no summer nor winter, spring nor\r\nautumn, but all after one air and season; and Herillus, which\r\nplaced felicity in extinguishment of the disputes of the mind,\r\nmaking no fixed nature of good and evil, esteeming things\r\naccording to the clearness of the desires, or the reluctation;\r\nwhich opinion was revived in the heresy of the Anabaptists,\r\nmeasuring things according to the motions of the spirit, and the\r\nconstancy or wavering of belief; all which are manifest to tend\r\nto private repose and contentment, and not to point of\r\nsociety.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(10) It censureth also the philosophy of Epictetus, which\r\npresupposeth that felicity must be placed in those things which\r\nare in our power, lest we be liable to fortune and disturbance;\r\nas if it were not a thing much more happy to fail in good and\r\nvirtuous ends for the public, than to obtain all that we can wish\r\nto ourselves in our proper fortune: as Consalvo said to his\r\nsoldiers, showing them Naples, and protesting he had rather die\r\none foot forwards, than to have his life secured for long by one\r\nfoot of retreat. Whereunto the wisdom of that heavenly\r\nleader hath signed, who hath affirmed that “a good\r\nconscience is a continual feast;” showing plainly that the\r\nconscience of good intentions, howsoever succeeding, is a more\r\ncontinual joy to nature than all the provision which can be made\r\nfor security and repose.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(11) It censureth likewise that abuse of philosophy which grew\r\ngeneral about the time of Epictetus, in converting it into an\r\noccupation or profession; as if the purpose had been, not to\r\nresist and extinguish perturbations, but to fly and avoid the\r\ncauses of them, and to shape a particular kind and course of life\r\nto that end; introducing such a health of mind, as was that\r\nhealth of body of which Aristotle speaketh of Herodicus, who did\r\nnothing all his life long but intend his health; whereas if men\r\nrefer themselves to duties of society, as that health of body is\r\nbest which is ablest to endure all alterations and extremities,\r\nso likewise that health of mind is most proper which can go\r\nthrough the greatest temptations and perturbations. So as\r\nDiogenes’ opinion is to be accepted, who commended not them\r\nwhich abstained, but them which sustained, and could refrain\r\ntheir mind \u003ci\u003ein præcipitio\u003c/i\u003e, and could give unto the\r\nmind (as is used in horsemanship) the shortest stop or turn.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(12) Lastly, it censureth the tenderness and want of\r\napplication in some of the most ancient and reverend philosophers\r\nand philosophical men, that did retire too easily from civil\r\nbusiness, for avoiding of indignities and perturbations; whereas\r\nthe resolution of men truly moral ought to be such as the same\r\nConsalvo said the honour of a soldier should be, \u003ci\u003ee telâ\r\ncrassiore\u003c/i\u003e, and not so fine as that everything should catch in\r\nit and endanger it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXXI. (1) To resume private or particular good, it falleth into\r\nthe division of good active and passive; for this difference of\r\ngood (not unlike to that which amongst the Romans was expressed\r\nin the familiar or household terms of \u003ci\u003epromus\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci\u003econdus\u003c/i\u003e) is formed also in all things, and is best\r\ndisclosed in the two several appetites in creatures; the one to\r\npreserve or continue themselves, and the other to dilate or\r\nmultiply themselves, whereof the latter seemeth to be the\r\nworthier; for in nature the heavens, which are the more worthy,\r\nare the agent, and the earth, which is the less worthy, is the\r\npatient. In the pleasures of living creatures, that of\r\ngeneration is greater than that of food. In divine\r\ndoctrine, \u003ci\u003ebeatius est dare quam accipere\u003c/i\u003e. And in\r\nlife, there is no man’s spirit so soft, but esteemeth the\r\neffecting of somewhat that he hath fixed in his desire, more than\r\nsensuality, which priority of the active good is much upheld by\r\nthe consideration of our estate to be mortal and exposed to\r\nfortune. For if we might have a perpetuity and certainty in\r\nour pleasures, the state of them would advance their price.\r\nBut when we see it is but \u003ci\u003emagni æstimamus mori\r\ntardius\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003ene glorieris de crastino\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enescis\r\npartum diei\u003c/i\u003e, it maketh us to desire to have somewhat secured\r\nand exempted from time, which are only our deeds and works; as it\r\nis said, \u003ci\u003eOpera eorum sequuntur eos\u003c/i\u003e. The pre-eminence\r\nlikewise of this active good is upheld by the affection which is\r\nnatural in man towards variety and proceeding, which in the\r\npleasures of the sense, which is the principal part of passive\r\ngood, can have no great latitude. \u003ci\u003eCogita quamdiu eadem\r\nfeceris\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003ecibus\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esomnus\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eludus per hunc\r\ncirculum curritur\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003emori velle non tantum fortis\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003eaut miser\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eaut prudens\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esed etiam fastidiosus\r\npotest\u003c/i\u003e. But in enterprises, pursuits, and purposes of\r\nlife, there is much variety; whereof men are sensible with\r\npleasure in their inceptions, progressions, recoils,\r\nreintegrations, approaches and attainings to their ends. So\r\nas it was well said, \u003ci\u003eVita sine proposito languida et vaga\r\nest\u003c/i\u003e. Neither hath this active good an identity with the\r\ngood of society, though in some cases it hath an incidence into\r\nit. For although it do many times bring forth acts of\r\nbeneficence, yet it is with a respect private to a man’s\r\nown power, glory, amplification, continuance; as appeareth\r\nplainly, when it findeth a contrary subject. For that\r\ngigantine state of mind which possesseth the troublers of the\r\nworld, such as was Lucius Sylla and infinite other in smaller\r\nmodel, who would have all men happy or unhappy as they were their\r\nfriends or enemies, and would give form to the world, according\r\nto their own humours (which is the true theomachy), pretendeth\r\nand aspireth to active good, though it recedeth furthest from\r\ngood of society, which we have determined to be the greater.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) To resume passive good, it receiveth a subdivision of\r\nconservative and effective. For let us take a brief review\r\nof that which we have said: we have spoken first of the good of\r\nsociety, the intention whereof embraceth the form of human\r\nnature, whereof we are members and portions, and not our own\r\nproper and individual form; we have spoken of active good, and\r\nsupposed it as a part of private and particular good. And\r\nrightly, for there is impressed upon all things a triple desire\r\nor appetite proceeding from love to themselves: one of preserving\r\nand continuing their form; another of advancing and perfecting\r\ntheir form; and a third of multiplying and extending their form\r\nupon other things: whereof the multiplying, or signature of it\r\nupon other things, is that which we handled by the name of active\r\ngood. So as there remaineth the conserving of it, and\r\nperfecting or raising of it, which latter is the highest degree\r\nof passive good. For to preserve in state is the less, to\r\npreserve with advancement is the greater. So in man,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Igneus est ollis vigor, et cælestis\r\norigo.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eHis approach or assumption to divine or angelical nature is\r\nthe perfection of his form; the error or false imitation of which\r\ngood is that which is the tempest of human life; while man, upon\r\nthe instinct of an advancement, formal and essential, is carried\r\nto seek an advancement local. For as those which are sick,\r\nand find no remedy, do tumble up and down and change place, as if\r\nby a remove local they could obtain a remove internal, so is it\r\nwith men in ambition, when failing of the mean to exalt their\r\nnature, they are in a perpetual estuation to exalt their\r\nplace. So then passive good is, as was said, either\r\nconservative or perfective.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) To resume the good of conservation or comfort, which\r\nconsisteth in the fruition of that which is agreeable to our\r\nnatures; it seemeth to be most pure and natural of pleasures, but\r\nyet the softest and lowest. And this also receiveth a\r\ndifference, which hath neither been well judged of, nor well\r\ninquired; for the good of fruition or contentment is placed\r\neither in the sincereness of the fruition, or in the quickness\r\nand vigour of it; the one superinduced by equality, the other by\r\nvicissitude; the one having less mixture of evil, the other more\r\nimpression of good. Whether of these is the greater good is\r\na question controverted; but whether man’s nature may not\r\nbe capable of both is a question not inquired.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) The former question being debated between Socrates and a\r\nsophist, Socrates placing felicity in an equal and constant peace\r\nof mind, and the sophist in much desiring and much enjoying, they\r\nfell from argument to ill words: the sophist saying that\r\nSocrates’ felicity was the felicity of a block or stone;\r\nand Socrates saying that the sophist’s felicity was the\r\nfelicity of one that had the itch, who did nothing but itch and\r\nscratch. And both these opinions do not want their\r\nsupports. For the opinion of Socrates is much upheld by the\r\ngeneral consent even of the epicures themselves, that virtue\r\nbeareth a great part in felicity; and if so, certain it is, that\r\nvirtue hath more use in clearing perturbations then in compassing\r\ndesires. The sophist’s opinion is much favoured by\r\nthe assertion we last spake of, that good of advancement is\r\ngreater than good of simple preservation; because every obtaining\r\na desire hath a show of advancement, as motion though in a circle\r\nhath a show of progression.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) But the second question, decided the true way, maketh the\r\nformer superfluous. For can it be doubted, but that there\r\nare some who take more pleasure in enjoying pleasures than some\r\nother, and yet, nevertheless, are less troubled with the loss or\r\nleaving of them? So as this same, \u003ci\u003eNon uti ut non\r\nappetas\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enon appetere ut non metuas\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esunt animi\r\npusilli et diffidentis\u003c/i\u003e. And it seemeth to me that most\r\nof the doctrines of the philosophers are more fearful and\r\ncautious than the nature of things requireth. So have they\r\nincreased the fear of death in offering to cure it. For\r\nwhen they would have a man’s whole life to be but a\r\ndiscipline or preparation to die, they must needs make men think\r\nthat it is a terrible enemy, against whom there is no end of\r\npreparing. Better saith the poet:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Qui finem vitæ extremum inter munera\r\nponat\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNaturæ.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo have they sought to make men’s minds too uniform and\r\nharmonical, by not breaking them sufficiently to contrary\r\nmotions; the reasons whereof I suppose to be, because they\r\nthemselves were men dedicated to a private, free, and unapplied\r\ncourse of life. For as we see, upon the lute or like\r\ninstrument, a ground, though it be sweet and have show of many\r\nchanges, yet breaketh not the hand to such strange and hard stops\r\nand passages, as a set song or voluntary; much after the same\r\nmanner was the diversity between a philosophical and civil\r\nlife. And, therefore, men are to imitate the wisdom of\r\njewellers: who, if there be a grain, or a cloud, or an ice which\r\nmay be ground forth without taking too much of the stone, they\r\nhelp it; but if it should lessen and abate the stone too much,\r\nthey will not meddle with it: so ought men so to procure serenity\r\nas they destroy not magnanimity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(6) Having therefore deduced the good of man which is private\r\nand particular, as far as seemeth fit, we will now return to that\r\ngood of man which respecteth and beholdeth society, which we may\r\nterm duty; because the term of duty is more proper to a mind well\r\nframed and disposed towards others, as the term of virtue is\r\napplied to a mind well formed and composed in itself; though\r\nneither can a man understand virtue without some relation to\r\nsociety, nor duty without an inward disposition. This part\r\nmay seem at first to pertain to science civil and politic; but\r\nnot if it be well observed. For it concerneth the regiment\r\nand government of every man over himself, and not over\r\nothers. And as in architecture the direction of framing the\r\nposts, beams, and other parts of building, is not the same with\r\nthe manner of joining them and erecting the building; and in\r\nmechanicals, the direction how to frame an instrument or engine\r\nis not the same with the manner of setting it on work and\r\nemploying it; and yet, nevertheless, in expressing of the one you\r\nincidently express the aptness towards the other; so the doctrine\r\nof conjugation of men in society differeth from that of their\r\nconformity thereunto.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(7) This part of duty is subdivided into two parts: the common\r\nduty of every man, as a man or member of a state; the other, the\r\nrespective or special duty of every man in his profession,\r\nvocation, and place. The first of these is extant and well\r\nlaboured, as hath been said. The second likewise I may\r\nreport rather dispersed than deficient; which manner of dispersed\r\nwriting in this kind of argument I acknowledge to be best.\r\nFor who can take upon him to write of the proper duty, virtue,\r\nchallenge, and right of every several vocation, profession, and\r\nplace? For although sometimes a looker on may see more than\r\na gamester, and there be a proverb more arrogant than sound,\r\n“That the vale best discovereth the hill;” yet there\r\nis small doubt but that men can write best and most really and\r\nmaterially in their own professions; and that the writing of\r\nspeculative men of active matter for the most part doth seem to\r\nmen of experience, as Phormio’s argument of the wars seemed\r\nto Hannibal, to be but dreams and dotage. Only there is one\r\nvice which accompanieth them that write in their own professions,\r\nthat they magnify them in excess. But generally it were to\r\nbe wished (as that which would make learning indeed solid and\r\nfruitful) that active men would or could become writers.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(8) In which kind I cannot but mention, \u003ci\u003ehonoris causa\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nyour Majesty’s excellent book touching the duty of a king;\r\na work richly compounded of divinity, morality, and policy, with\r\ngreat aspersion of all other arts; and being in some opinion one\r\nof the most sound and healthful writings that I have read: not\r\ndistempered in the heat of invention, nor in the coldness of\r\nnegligence; not sick of dizziness, as those are who leese\r\nthemselves in their order, nor of convulsions, as those which\r\ncramp in matters impertinent; not savouring of perfumes and\r\npaintings, as those do who seek to please the reader more than\r\nnature beareth; and chiefly well disposed in the spirits thereof,\r\nbeing agreeable to truth and apt for action; and far removed from\r\nthat natural infirmity, whereunto I noted those that write in\r\ntheir own professions to be subject—which is, that they\r\nexalt it above measure. For your Majesty hath truly\r\ndescribed, not a king of Assyria or Persia in their extern glory,\r\nbut a Moses or a David, pastors of their people. Neither\r\ncan I ever leese out of my remembrance what I heard your Majesty\r\nin the same sacred spirit of government deliver in a great cause\r\nof judicature, which was, “That kings ruled by their laws,\r\nas God did by the laws of nature; and ought as rarely to put in\r\nuse their supreme prerogative as God doth His power of working\r\nmiracles.” And yet notwithstanding in your book of a\r\nfree monarchy, you do well give men to understand, that you know\r\nthe plenitude of the power and right of a king, as well as the\r\ncircle of his office and duty. Thus have I presumed to\r\nallege this excellent writing of your Majesty, as a prime or\r\neminent example of tractates concerning special and respective\r\nduties; wherein I should have said as much, if it had been\r\nwritten a thousand years since. Neither am I moved with\r\ncertain courtly decencies, which esteem it flattery to praise in\r\npresence. No, it is flattery to praise in\r\nabsence—that is, when either the virtue is absent, or the\r\noccasion is absent; and so the praise is not natural, but forced,\r\neither in truth or in time. But let Cicero be read in his\r\noration \u003ci\u003epro Marcello\u003c/i\u003e, which is nothing but an excellent\r\ntable of Cæsar’s virtue, and made to his face;\r\nbesides the example of many other excellent persons, wiser a\r\ngreat deal than such observers; and we will never doubt, upon a\r\nfull occasion, to give just praises to present or absent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(9) But to return; there belongeth further to the handling of\r\nthis part, touching the duties of professions and vocations, a\r\nrelative or opposite, touching the frauds, cautels, impostures,\r\nand vices of every profession, which hath been likewise handled;\r\nbut how? rather in a satire and cynically, than seriously and\r\nwisely; for men have rather sought by wit to deride and traduce\r\nmuch of that which is good in professions, than with judgment to\r\ndiscover and sever that which is corrupt. For, as Solomon\r\nsaith, he that cometh to seek after knowledge with a mind to\r\nscorn and censure shall be sure to find matter for his humour,\r\nbut no matter for his instruction: \u003ci\u003eQuærenti derisori\r\nscientiam ipsa se abscondit\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003esed studioso fit\r\nobviam\u003c/i\u003e. But the managing of this argument with\r\nintegrity and truth, which I note as deficient, seemeth to me to\r\nbe one of the best fortifications for honesty and virtue that can\r\nbe planted. For, as the fable goeth of the\r\nbasilisk—that if he see you first, you die for it; but if\r\nyou see him first, he dieth—so is it with deceits and evil\r\narts, which, if they be first espied they leese their life; but\r\nif they prevent, they endanger. So that we are much\r\nbeholden to Machiavel and others, that write what men do, and not\r\nwhat they ought to do. For it is not possible to join\r\nserpentine wisdom with the columbine innocency, except men know\r\nexactly all the conditions of the serpent; his baseness and going\r\nupon his belly, his volubility and lubricity, his envy and sting,\r\nand the rest—that is, all forms and natures of evil.\r\nFor without this, virtue lieth open and unfenced. Nay, an\r\nhonest man can do no good upon those that are wicked, to reclaim\r\nthem, without the help of the knowledge of evil. For men of\r\ncorrupted minds presuppose that honesty groweth out of simplicity\r\nof manners, and believing of preachers, schoolmasters, and\r\nmen’s exterior language. So as, except you can make\r\nthem perceive that you know the utmost reaches of their own\r\ncorrupt opinions, they despise all morality. \u003ci\u003eNon recipit\r\nstultus verba prudentiæ\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enisi ea dixeris\r\nquæ\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eversantur in corde ejus\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(10) Unto this part, touching respective duty, doth also\r\nappertain the duties between husband and wife, parent and child,\r\nmaster and servant. So likewise the laws of friendship and\r\ngratitude, the civil bond of companies, colleges, and politic\r\nbodies, of neighbourhood, and all other proportionate duties; not\r\nas they are parts of government and society, but as to the\r\nframing of the mind of particular persons.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(11) The knowledge concerning good respecting society doth\r\nhandle it also, not simply alone, but comparatively; whereunto\r\nbelongeth the weighing of duties between person and person, case\r\nand case, particular and public. As we see in the\r\nproceeding of Lucius Brutus against his own sons, which was so\r\nmuch extolled, yet what was said?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Infelix, utcunque ferent ea fata\r\nminores.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both sides.\r\nAgain, we see when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper\r\ncertain whose opinions they meant to feel, whether they were fit\r\nto be made their associates, and cast forth the question touching\r\nthe killing of a tyrant being a usurper, they were divided in\r\nopinion; some holding that servitude was the extreme of evils,\r\nand others that tyranny was better than a civil war: and a number\r\nof the like cases there are of comparative duty. Amongst\r\nwhich that of all others is the most frequent, where the question\r\nis of a great deal of good to ensue of a small injustice.\r\nWhich Jason of Thessalia determined against the truth: \u003ci\u003eAliqua\r\nsunt injuste facienda\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eut multa juste fieri\r\npossint\u003c/i\u003e. But the reply is good: \u003ci\u003eAuctorem\r\npræsentis justitiæ habes\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esponsorem\r\nfuturæ non habes\u003c/i\u003e. Men must pursue things which\r\nare just in present, and leave the future to the Divine\r\nProvidence. So then we pass on from this general part\r\ntouching the exemplar and description of good.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXXII. (1) Now, therefore, that we have spoken of this fruit of\r\nlife, it remaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth\r\nthereunto, without which part the former seemeth to be no better\r\nthan a fair image or statue, which is beautiful to contemplate,\r\nbut is without life and motion; whereunto Aristotle himself\r\nsubscribeth in these words: \u003ci\u003eNecesse est scilicet de virtute\r\ndicere\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet quid sit\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet ex quibus\r\ngignatur\u003c/i\u003e. \u003ci\u003eInutile enum fere fuerit virtutem quidem\r\nnosse\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eacquirendæ autem ejus modos et vias\r\nignorare\u003c/i\u003e. \u003ci\u003eNon enum de virtute tantum\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003equa\r\nspecie sit\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003equærendum est\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esed et quomodo sui\r\ncopiam faciat\u003c/i\u003e: \u003ci\u003eutrumque enum volumeus\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet rem ipsam\r\nnosse\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet ejus compotes fieri\u003c/i\u003e: \u003ci\u003ehoc autem ex voto\r\nnon succedet\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enisi sciamus et ex quibus et\r\nquomodo\u003c/i\u003e. In such full words and with such iteration\r\ndoth he inculcate this part. So saith Cicero in great\r\ncommendation of Cato the second, that he had applied himself to\r\nphilosophy, \u003ci\u003eNon ita disputandi causa\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esed ita\r\nvivendi\u003c/i\u003e. And although the neglect of our times, wherein\r\nfew men do hold any consultations touching the reformation of\r\ntheir life (as Seneca excellently saith, \u003ci\u003eDe partibus\r\nvitæ quisque deliberat\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ede summa nemo\u003c/i\u003e), may make\r\nthis part seem superfluous; yet I must conclude with that\r\naphorism of Hippocrates, \u003ci\u003eQui gravi morbo correpti dolores non\r\nsentiunt\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eiis mens ægrotat\u003c/i\u003e. They need\r\nmedicine, not only to assuage the disease, but to awake the\r\nsense. And if it be said that the cure of men’s minds\r\nbelongeth to sacred divinity, it is most true; but yet moral\r\nphilosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise servant and humble\r\nhandmaid. For as the Psalm saith, “That the eyes of\r\nthe handmaid look perpetually towards the mistress,” and\r\nyet no doubt many things are left to the discretion of the\r\nhandmaid to discern of the mistress’ will; so ought moral\r\nphilosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines of\r\ndivinity, and yet so as it may yield of herself (within due\r\nlimits) many sound and profitable directions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) This part, therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I\r\ncannot but find exceeding strange that it is not reduced to\r\nwritten inquiry; the rather, because it consisteth of much\r\nmatter, wherein both speech and action is often conversant; and\r\nsuch wherein the common talk of men (which is rare, but yet\r\ncometh sometimes to pass) is wiser than their books. It is\r\nreasonable, therefore, that we propound it in the more\r\nparticularity, both for the worthiness, and because we may acquit\r\nourselves for reporting it deficient, which seemeth almost\r\nincredible, and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those\r\nthemselves that have written. We will, therefore, enumerate\r\nsome heads or points thereof, that it may appear the better what\r\nit is, and whether it be extant.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) First, therefore, in this, as in all things which are\r\npractical we ought to cast up our account, what is in our power,\r\nand what not; for the one may be dealt with by way of alteration,\r\nbut the other by way of application only. The husbandman\r\ncannot command neither the nature of the earth nor the seasons of\r\nthe weather; no more can the physician the constitution of the\r\npatient nor the variety of accidents. So in the culture and\r\ncure of the mind of man, two things are without our command:\r\npoints of Nature, and points of fortune. For to the basis\r\nof the one, and the conditions of the other, our work is limited\r\nand tied. In these things, therefore, it is left unto us to\r\nproceed by application:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Vincenda est omnis fertuna\r\nferendo:”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eand so likewise,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Vincenda est omnis Natura\r\nferendo.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull\r\nand neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering,\r\nwhich draweth and contriveth use and advantage out of that which\r\nseemeth adverse and contrary; which is that properly which we\r\ncall accommodating or applying. Now the wisdom of\r\napplication resteth principally in the exact and distinct\r\nknowledge of the precedent state or disposition, unto which we do\r\napply; for we cannot fit a garment except we first take measure\r\nof the body.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) So, then, the first article of this knowledge is to set\r\ndown sound and true distributions and descriptions of the several\r\ncharacters and tempers of men’s natures and dispositions,\r\nspecially having regard to those differences which are most\r\nradical in being the fountains and causes of the rest, or most\r\nfrequent in concurrence or commixture; wherein it is not the\r\nhandling of a few of them in passage, the better to describe the\r\nmediocrities of virtues, that can satisfy this intention.\r\nFor if it deserve to be considered, that there are minds which\r\nare proportioned to great matters, and others to small (which\r\nAristotle handleth, or ought to have bandied, by the name of\r\nmagnanimity), doth it not deserve as well to be considered that\r\nthere are minds proportioned to intend many matters, and others\r\nto few? So that some can divide themselves: others can\r\nperchance do exactly well, but it must be but in few things at\r\nonce; and so there cometh to be a narrowness of mind, as well as\r\na pusillanimity. And again, that some minds are\r\nproportioned to that which may be dispatched at once, or within a\r\nshort return of time; others to that which begins afar off, and\r\nis to be won with length of pursuit:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Jam tum tenditqus fovetque.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is\r\ncommonly also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So further\r\ndeserved it to be considered by Aristotle, “That there is a\r\ndisposition in conversation (supposing it in things which do in\r\nno sort touch or concern a man’s self) to soothe and\r\nplease, and a disposition contrary to contradict and\r\ncross;” and deserveth it not much better to be\r\nconsidered. “That there is a disposition, not in\r\nconversation or talk, but in matter of more serious nature (and\r\nsupposing it still in things merely indifferent), to take\r\npleasure in the good of another; and a disposition contrariwise,\r\nto take distaste at the good of another?” which is that\r\nproperly which we call good nature or ill nature, benignity or\r\nmalignity; and, therefore, I cannot sufficiently marvel that this\r\npart of knowledge, touching the several characters of natures and\r\ndispositions, should be omitted both in morality and policy,\r\nconsidering it is of so great ministry and suppeditation to them\r\nboth. A man shall find in the traditions of astrology some\r\npretty and apt divisions of men’s natures, according to the\r\npredominances of the planets: lovers of quiet, lovers of action,\r\nlovers of victory, lovers of honour, lovers of pleasure, lovers\r\nof arts, lovers of change, and so forth. A man shall find\r\nin the wisest sort of these relations which the Italians make\r\ntouching conclaves, the natures of the several cardinals\r\nhandsomely and lively painted forth. A man shall meet with\r\nin every day’s conference the denominations of sensitive,\r\ndry, formal, real, humorous, certain, \u003ci\u003ehuomo di prima\r\nimpressione\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ehuomo di ultima impressione\u003c/i\u003e, and the\r\nlike; and yet, nevertheless, this kind of observations wandereth\r\nin words, but is not fixed in inquiry. For the distinctions\r\nare found (many of them), but we conclude no precepts upon them:\r\nwherein our fault is the greater, because both history, poesy,\r\nand daily experience are as goodly fields where these\r\nobservations grow; whereof we make a few posies to hold in our\r\nhands, but no man bringeth them to the confectionary that\r\nreceipts might be made of them for use of life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) Of much like kind are those impressions of Nature, which\r\nare imposed upon the mind by the sex, by the age, by the region,\r\nby health and sickness, by beauty and deformity, and the like,\r\nwhich are inherent and not extern; and again, those which are\r\ncaused by extern fortune, as sovereignty, nobility, obscure\r\nbirth, riches, want, magistracy, privateness, prosperity,\r\nadversity, constant fortune, variable fortune, rising \u003ci\u003eper\r\nsaltum\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eper gradus\u003c/i\u003e, and the like. And,\r\ntherefore, we see that Plautus maketh it a wonder to see an old\r\nman beneficent, \u003ci\u003ebenignitas hujis ut adolescentuli\r\nest\u003c/i\u003e. Saint Paul concludeth that severity of discipline\r\nwas to be used to the Cretans, \u003ci\u003eincrepa eos dure\u003c/i\u003e, upon the\r\ndisposition of their country, \u003ci\u003eCretensus semper mendaces\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003emalæ bestiæ\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eventres\u003c/i\u003e. Sallust\r\nnoteth that it is usual with kings to desire contradictories:\r\n\u003ci\u003eSed plerumque regiæ voluntates\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eut vehementes\r\nsunt\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esic mobiles\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esæpeque ipsæ sibi\r\nadvers\u003c/i\u003e. Tacitus observeth how rarely raising of the\r\nfortune mendeth the disposition: \u003ci\u003esolus Vespasianus mutatus in\r\nmelius\u003c/i\u003e. Pindarus maketh an observation, that great and\r\nsudden fortune for the most part defeateth men \u003ci\u003equi magnam\r\nfelicitatem concoquere non possunt\u003c/i\u003e. So the Psalm\r\nshoweth it is more easy to keep a measure in the enjoying of\r\nfortune, than in the increase of fortune; \u003ci\u003eDivitiæ si\r\naffluant\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enolite cor apponere\u003c/i\u003e. These\r\nobservations and the like I deny not but are touched a little by\r\nAristotle as in passage in his Rhetorics, and are handled in some\r\nscattered discourses; but they were never incorporate into moral\r\nphilosophy, to which they do essentially appertain; as the\r\nknowledge of this diversity of grounds and moulds doth to\r\nagriculture, and the knowledge of the diversity of complexions\r\nand constitutions doth to the physician, except we mean to follow\r\nthe indiscretion of empirics, which minister the same medicines\r\nto all patients.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(6) Another article of this knowledge is the inquiry touching\r\nthe affections; for as in medicining of the body, it is in order\r\nfirst to know the divers complexions and constitutions; secondly,\r\nthe diseases; and lastly, the cures: so in medicining of the\r\nmind, after knowledge of the divers characters of men’s\r\nnatures, it followeth in order to know the diseases and\r\ninfirmities of the mind, which are no other than the\r\nperturbations and distempars of the affections. For as the\r\nancient politiques in popular estates were wont to compare the\r\npeople to the sea, and the orators to the winds; because as the\r\nsea would of itself be calm and quiet, if the winds did not move\r\nand trouble it; so the people would be peaceable and tractable if\r\nthe seditious orators did not set them in working and agitation:\r\nso it may be fitly said, that the mind in the nature thereof\r\nwould be temperate and stayed, if the affections, as winds, did\r\nnot put it into tumult and perturbation. And here again I\r\nfind strange, as before, that Aristotle should have written\r\ndivers volumes of Ethics, and never handled the affections which\r\nis the principal subject thereof; and yet in his Rhetorics, where\r\nthey are considered but collaterally and in a second degree (as\r\nthey may be moved by speech), he findeth place for them, and\r\nhandleth them well for the quantity; but where their true place\r\nis he pretermitteth them. For it is not his disputations\r\nabout pleasure and pain that can satisfy this inquiry, no more\r\nthan he that should generally handle the nature of light can be\r\nsaid to handle the nature of colours; for pleasure and pain are\r\nto the particular affections as light is to particular\r\ncolours. Better travails, I suppose, had the Stoics taken\r\nin this argument, as far as I can gather by that which we have at\r\nsecond hand. But yet it is like it was after their manner,\r\nrather in subtlety of definitions (which in a subject of this\r\nnature are but curiosities), than in active and ample\r\ndescriptions and observations. So likewise I find some\r\nparticular writings of an elegant nature, touching some of the\r\naffections: as of anger, of comfort upon adverse accidents, of\r\ntenderness of countenance, and other. But the poets and\r\nwriters of histories are the best doctors of this knowledge;\r\nwhere we may find painted forth, with great life, how affections\r\nare kindled and incited; and how pacified and refrained; and how\r\nagain contained from act and further degree; how they disclose\r\nthemselves; how they work; how they vary; how they gather and\r\nfortify: how they are enwrapped one within another; and how they\r\ndo fight and encounter one with another; and other the like\r\nparticularities. Amongst the which this last is of special\r\nuse in moral and civil matters; how, I say, to set affection\r\nagainst affection, and to master one by another; even as we used\r\nto hunt beast with beast, and fly bird with bird, which otherwise\r\npercase we could not so easily recover: upon which foundation is\r\nerected that excellent use of \u003ci\u003epræmium\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci\u003epæna\u003c/i\u003e, whereby civil states consist: employing the\r\npredominant affections of fear and hope, for the suppressing and\r\nbridling the rest. For as in the government of states it is\r\nsometimes necessary to bridle one faction with another, so it is\r\nin the government within.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(7) Now come we to those points which are within our own\r\ncommand, and have force and operation upon the mind, to affect\r\nthe will and appetite, and to alter manners: wherein they ought\r\nto have handled custom, exercise, habit, education, example,\r\nimitation, emulation, company, friends, praise, reproof,\r\nexhortation, fame, laws, books, studies: these as they have\r\ndeterminate use in moralities, from these the mind suffereth, and\r\nof these are such receipts and regiments compounded and\r\ndescribed, as may serve to recover or preserve the health and\r\ngood estate of the mind, as far as pertaineth to human medicine:\r\nof which number we will insist upon some one or two, as an\r\nexample of the rest, because it were too long to prosecute all;\r\nand therefore we do resume custom and habit to speak of.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(8) The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent\r\nopinion, that of those things which consist by Nature, nothing\r\ncan be changed by custom; using for example, that if a stone be\r\nthrown ten thousand times up it will not learn to ascend; and\r\nthat by often seeing or hearing we do not learn to see or hear\r\nthe better. For though this principle be true in things\r\nwherein Nature is peremptory (the reason whereof we cannot now\r\nstand to discuss), yet it is otherwise in things wherein Nature\r\nadmitteth a latitude. For he might see that a strait glove\r\nwill come more easily on with use; and that a wand will by use\r\nbend otherwise than it grew; and that by use of the voice we\r\nspeak louder and stronger; and that by use of enduring heat or\r\ncold we endure it the better, and the like: which latter sort\r\nhave a nearer resemblance unto that subject of manners he\r\nhandleth, than those instances which he allegeth. But\r\nallowing his conclusion, that virtues and vices consist in habit,\r\nhe ought so much the more to have taught the manner of\r\nsuperinducing that habit: for there be many precepts of the wise\r\nordering the exercises of the mind, as there is of ordering the\r\nexercises of the body, whereof we will recite a few.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(9) The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the\r\nfirst either too high a strain or too weak: for if too high, in a\r\ndiffident nature you discourage, in a confident nature you breed\r\nan opinion of facility, and so a sloth; and in all natures you\r\nbreed a further expectation than can hold out, and so an\r\ninsatisfaction in the end: if too weak, of the other side, you\r\nmay not look to perform and overcome any great task.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(10) Another precept is to practise all things chiefly at two\r\nseveral times, the one when the mind is best disposed, the other\r\nwhen it is worst disposed; that by the one you may gain a great\r\nstep, by the other you may work out the knots and stonds of the\r\nmind, and make the middle times the more easy and pleasant.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(11) Another precept is that which Aristotle mentioneth by the\r\nway, which is to bear ever towards the contrary extreme of that\r\nwhereunto we are by nature inclined; like unto the rowing against\r\nthe stream, or making a wand straight by bending him contrary to\r\nhis natural crookedness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(12) Another precept is that the mind is brought to anything\r\nbetter, and with more sweetness and happiness, if that whereunto\r\nyou pretend be not first in the intention, but \u003ci\u003etanquam aliud\r\nagendo\u003c/i\u003e, because of the natural hatred of the mind against\r\nnecessity and constraint. Many other axioms there are\r\ntouching the managing of exercise and custom, which being so\r\nconducted doth prove indeed another nature; but, being governed\r\nby chance, doth commonly prove but an ape of Nature, and bringeth\r\nforth that which is lame and counterfeit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(13) So if we should handle books and studies, and what\r\ninfluence and operation they have upon manners, are there not\r\ndivers precepts of great caution and direction appertaining\r\nthereunto? Did not one of the fathers in great indignation\r\ncall poesy \u003ci\u003evinum dæmonum\u003c/i\u003e, because it increaseth\r\ntemptations, perturbations, and vain opinions? Is not the\r\nopinion of Aristotle worthy to be regarded, wherein he saith,\r\n“That young men are no fit auditors of moral philosophy,\r\nbecause they are not settled from the boiling heat of their\r\naffections, nor attempered with time and experience”?\r\nAnd doth it not hereof come, that those excellent books and\r\ndiscourses of the ancient writers (whereby they have persuaded\r\nunto virtue most effectually, by representing her in state and\r\nmajesty, and popular opinions against virtue in their\r\nparasites’ coats fit to be scorned and derided), are of so\r\nlittle effect towards honesty of life, because they are not read\r\nand revolved by men in their mature and settled years, but\r\nconfined almost to boys and beginners? But is it not true\r\nalso, that much less young men are fit auditors of matters of\r\npolicy, till they have been thoroughly seasoned in religion and\r\nmorality; lest their judgments be corrupted, and made apt to\r\nthink that there are no true differences of things, but according\r\nto utility and fortune, as the verse describes it, \u003ci\u003eProsperum\r\net felix scelus virtus vocatur\u003c/i\u003e; and again, \u003ci\u003eIlle crucem\r\npretium sceleris tulit\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ehic diadema\u003c/i\u003e: which the poets\r\ndo speak satirically and in indignation on virtue’s behalf;\r\nbut books of policy do speak it seriously and positively; for so\r\nit pleaseth Machiavel to say, “That if Cæsar had been\r\noverthrown, he would have been more odious than ever was\r\nCatiline;” as if there had been no difference, but in\r\nfortune, between a very fury of lust and blood, and the most\r\nexcellent spirit (his ambition reserved) of the world?\r\nAgain, is there not a caution likewise to be given of the\r\ndoctrines of moralities themselves (some kinds of them), lest\r\nthey make men too precise, arrogant, incompatible; as Cicero\r\nsaith of Cato, \u003ci\u003eIn Marco Catone hæc bona quæ\r\nvidemus divina et egregia\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eipsius scitote esse\r\npropria\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003equæ nonunquam requirimus ea sunt omnia non\r\na natura\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esed a magistro\u003c/i\u003e? Many other axioms and\r\nadvices there are touching those proprieties and effects, which\r\nstudies do infuse and instil into manners. And so,\r\nlikewise, is there touching the use of all those other points, of\r\ncompany, fame, laws, and the rest, which we recited in the\r\nbeginning in the doctrine of morality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(14) But there is a kind of culture of the mind that seemeth\r\nyet more accurate and elaborate than the rest, and is built upon\r\nthis ground; that the minds of all men are at some times in a\r\nstate more perfect, and at other times in a state more\r\ndepraved. The purpose, therefore, of this practice is to\r\nfix and cherish the good hours of the mind, and to obliterate and\r\ntake forth the evil. The fixing of the good hath been\r\npractised by two means, vows or constant resolutions, and\r\nobservances or exercises; which are not to be regarded so much in\r\nthemselves, as because they keep the mind in continual\r\nobedience. The obliteration of the evil hath been practised\r\nby two means, some kind of redemption or expiation of that which\r\nis past, and an inception or account \u003ci\u003ede novo\u003c/i\u003e for the time\r\nto come. But this part seemeth sacred and religious, and\r\njustly; for all good moral philosophy (as was said) is but a\r\nhandmaid to religion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(15) Wherefore we will conclude with that last point, which is\r\nof all other means the most compendious and summary, and again,\r\nthe most noble and effectual to the reducing of the mind unto\r\nvirtue and good estate; which is, the electing and propounding\r\nunto a man’s self good and virtuous ends of his life, such\r\nas may be in a reasonable sort within his compass to\r\nattain. For if these two things be supposed, that a man set\r\nbefore him honest and good ends, and again, that he be resolute,\r\nconstant, and true unto them; it will follow that he shall mould\r\nhimself into all virtue at once. And this indeed is like\r\nthe work of nature; whereas the other course is like the work of\r\nthe hand. For as when a carver makes an image, he shapes\r\nonly that part whereupon he worketh; as if he be upon the face,\r\nthat part which shall be the body is but a rude stone still, till\r\nsuch times as he comes to it. But contrariwise when nature\r\nmakes a flower or living creature, she formeth rudiments of all\r\nthe parts at one time. So in obtaining virtue by habit,\r\nwhile a man practiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to\r\nfortitude, nor the like but when he dedicateth and applieth\r\nhimself to good ends, look, what virtue soever the pursuit and\r\npassage towards those ends doth commend unto him, he is invested\r\nof a precedent disposition to conform himself thereunto.\r\nWhich state of mind Aristotle doth excellently express himself,\r\nthat it ought not to be called virtuous, but divine. His\r\nwords are these: \u003ci\u003eImmanitati autem consentaneum est opponere\r\neam\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003equæ supra humanitatem est\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eheroicam sive\r\ndivinam virtutem\u003c/i\u003e; and a little after, \u003ci\u003eNam ut feræ\r\nneque vitium neque virtus est\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eswic neque Dei\u003c/i\u003e: \u003ci\u003esed\r\nhic quidem status altius quiddam virtute est\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eille aluid\r\nquiddam a vitio\u003c/i\u003e. And therefore we may see what\r\ncelsitude of honour Plinius Secundus attributeth to Trajan in his\r\nfuneral oration, where he said, “That men needed to make no\r\nother prayers to the gods, but that they would continue as good\r\nlords to them as Trajan had been;” as if he had not been\r\nonly an imitation of divine nature, but a pattern of it.\r\nBut these be heathen and profane passages, having but a shadow of\r\nthat divine state of mind, which religion and the holy faith doth\r\nconduct men unto, by imprinting upon their souls charity, which\r\nis excellently called the bond of perfection, because it\r\ncomprehendeth and fasteneth all virtues together. And as it\r\nis elegantly said by Menander of vain love, which is but a false\r\nimitation of divine love, \u003ci\u003eAmor melior Sophista lœvo ad\r\nhumanam vitam\u003c/i\u003e—that love teacheth a man to carry himself\r\nbetter than the sophist or preceptor; which he calleth\r\nleft-handed, because, with all his rules and preceptions, he\r\ncannot form a man so dexterously, nor with that facility to prize\r\nhimself and govern himself, as love can do: so certainly, if a\r\nman’s mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work him\r\nsuddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrine of\r\nmorality can do, which is but a sophist in comparison of the\r\nother. Nay, further, as Xenophon observed truly, that all\r\nother affections, though they raise the mind, yet they do it by\r\ndistorting and uncomeliness of ecstasies or excesses; but only\r\nlove doth exalt the mind, and nevertheless at the same instant\r\ndoth settle and compose it: so in all other excellences, though\r\nthey advance nature, yet they are subject to excess. Only\r\ncharity admitteth no excess. For so we see, aspiring to be\r\nlike God in power, the angels transgressed and fell;\r\n\u003ci\u003eAscendam\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet ero similis altissimo\u003c/i\u003e: by aspiring to\r\nbe like God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell; \u003ci\u003eEritis\r\nsicut Dii\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003escientes bonum et malum\u003c/i\u003e: but by aspiring to\r\na similitude of God in goodness or love, neither man nor angel\r\never transgressed, or shall transgress. For unto that\r\nimitation we are called: \u003ci\u003eDiligite inimicos vestros\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003ebenefacite eis qui oderunt vos\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet orate pro\r\npersequentibus et calumniantibus vos\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eut sitis filii\r\nPatris vestri qui in cœlis est\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003equi solem suum oriri\r\nfacit super bonos et malos\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet pluit super justos et\r\ninjustos\u003c/i\u003e. So in the first platform of the divine nature\r\nitself, the heathen religion speaketh thus, \u003ci\u003eOptimus\r\nMaximus\u003c/i\u003e: and the sacred Scriptures thus, \u003ci\u003eMiscericordia\r\nejus super omnia opera ejus\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(16) Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral knowledge,\r\nconcerning the culture and regiment of the mind; wherein if any\r\nman, considering the arts thereof which I have enumerated, do\r\njudge that my labour is but to collect into an art or science\r\nthat which hath been pretermitted by others, as matter of common\r\nsense and experience, he judgeth well. But as Philocrates\r\nsported with Demosthenes, “You may not marvel (Athenians)\r\nthat Demosthenes and I do differ; for he drinketh water, and I\r\ndrink wine;” and like as we read of an ancient parable of\r\nthe two gates of sleep—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Sunt geminæ somni portæ: quarum\r\naltera fertur\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAltera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSed falsa ad cœlum mittunt insomnia manes:”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eso if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a\r\nsure maxim in knowledge, that the more pleasant liquor (“of\r\nwine”) is the more vaporous, and the braver gate (“of\r\nivory”) sendeth forth the falser dreams.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(17) But we have now concluded that general part of human\r\nphilosophy, which contemplateth man segregate, and as he\r\nconsisteth of body and spirit. Wherein we may further note,\r\nthat there seemeth to be a relation or conformity between the\r\ngood of the mind and the good of the body. For as we\r\ndivided the good of the body into health, beauty, strength, and\r\npleasure, so the good of the mind, inquired in rational and moral\r\nknowledges, tendeth to this, to make the mind sound, and without\r\nperturbation; beautiful, and graced with decency; and strong and\r\nagile for all duties of life. These three, as in the body,\r\nso in the mind, seldom meet, and commonly sever. For it is\r\neasy to observe, that many have strength of wit and courage, but\r\nhave neither health from perturbations, nor any beauty or decency\r\nin their doings; some again have an elegancy and fineness of\r\ncarriage which have neither soundness of honesty nor substance of\r\nsufficiency; and some again have honest and reformed minds, that\r\ncan neither become themselves nor manage business; and sometimes\r\ntwo of them meet, and rarely all three. As for pleasure, we\r\nhave likewise determined that the mind ought not to be reduced to\r\nstupid, but to retain pleasure; confined rather in the subject of\r\nit, than in the strength and vigour of it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXXIII. (1) Civil knowledge is conversant about a subject which\r\nof all others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced\r\nto axiom. Nevertheless, as Cato the Censor said,\r\n“That the Romans were like sheep, for that a man were\r\nbetter drive a flock of them, than one of them; for in a flock,\r\nif you could get but some few go right, the rest would\r\nfollow:” so in that respect moral philosophy is more\r\ndifficile than policy. Again, moral philosophy propoundeth\r\nto itself the framing of internal goodness; but civil knowledge\r\nrequireth only an external goodness; for that as to society\r\nsufficeth. And therefore it cometh oft to pass that there\r\nbe evil times in good governments: for so we find in the Holy\r\nstory, when the kings were good, yet it is added, \u003ci\u003eSed adhuc\r\npoulus non direxerat cor suum ad Dominum Deum patrum\r\nsuorum\u003c/i\u003e. Again, states, as great engines, move slowly,\r\nand are not so soon put out of frame: for as in Egypt the seven\r\ngood years sustained the seven bad, so governments for a time\r\nwell grounded do bear out errors following; but the resolution of\r\nparticular persons is more suddenly subverted. These\r\nrespects do somewhat qualify the extreme difficulty of civil\r\nknowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three\r\nsummary actions of society; which are conversation, negotiation,\r\nand government. For man seeketh in society comfort, use,\r\nand protection; and they be three wisdoms of divers natures which\r\ndo often sever—wisdom of the behaviour, wisdom of business,\r\nand wisdom of state.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) The wisdom of conversation ought not to be over much\r\naffected, but much less despised; for it hath not only an honour\r\nin itself, but an influence also into business and\r\ngovernment. The poet saith, \u003ci\u003eNec vultu destrue verba\r\ntuo\u003c/i\u003e: a man may destroy the force of his words with his\r\ncountenance; so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero, recommending\r\nto his brother affability and easy access; \u003ci\u003eNil interest habere\r\nostium apertum\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003evultum clausum\u003c/i\u003e: it is nothing won to\r\nadmit men with an open door, and to receive them with a shut and\r\nreserved countenance. So we see Atticus, before the first\r\ninterview between Cæsar and Cicero, the war depending, did\r\nseriously advise Cicero touching the composing and ordering of\r\nhis countenance and gesture. And if the government of the\r\ncountenance be of such effect, much more is that of the speech,\r\nand other carriage appertaining to conversation; the true model\r\nwhereof seemeth to me well expressed by Livy, though not meant\r\nfor this purpose: \u003ci\u003eNe aut arrogans videar\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eaut\r\nobnoxius\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003equorum alterum est àlienæ\r\nlibertatis obliti\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ealterum suæ\u003c/i\u003e: the sum of\r\nbehaviour is to retain a man’s own dignity, without\r\nintruding upon the liberty of others. On the other side, if\r\nbehaviour and outward carriage be intended too much, first it may\r\npass into affectation, and then \u003ci\u003eQuid deformius quam scenam in\r\nvitam transferre\u003c/i\u003e—to act a man’s life? But\r\nalthough it proceed not to that extreme, yet it consumeth time,\r\nand employeth the mind too much. And therefore as we use to\r\nadvise young students from company keeping, by saying, \u003ci\u003eAmici\r\nfures temporis\u003c/i\u003e: so certainly the intending of the discretion\r\nof behaviour is a great thief of meditation. Again, such as\r\nare accomplished in that form of urbanity please themselves in\r\nit, and seldom aspire to higher virtue; whereas those that have\r\ndefect in it do seek comeliness by reputation; for where\r\nreputation is, almost everything becometh; but where that is not,\r\nit must be supplied by \u003ci\u003epuntos\u003c/i\u003e and compliments.\r\nAgain, there is no greater impediment of action than an\r\nover-curious observance of decency, and the guide of decency,\r\nwhich is time and season. For as Solomon saith, \u003ci\u003eQui\r\nrespicit ad ventos\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enon seminat\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003eet qui respicit ad\r\nnubes\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enon metet\u003c/i\u003e: a man must make his opportunity, as\r\noft as find it. To conclude, behaviour seemeth to me as a\r\ngarment of the mind, and to have the conditions of a\r\ngarment. For it ought to be made in fashion; it ought not\r\nto be too curious; it ought to be shaped so as to set forth any\r\ngood making of the mind and hide any deformity; and above all, it\r\nought not to be too strait or restrained for exercise or\r\nmotion. But this part of civil knowledge hath been\r\nelegantly handled, and therefore I cannot report it for\r\ndeficient.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) The wisdom touching negotiation or business hath not been\r\nhitherto collected into writing, to the great derogation of\r\nlearning and the professors of learning. For from this root\r\nspringeth chiefly that note or opinion, which by us is expressed\r\nin adage to this effect, that there is no great concurrence\r\nbetween learning and wisdom. For of the three wisdoms which\r\nwe have set down to pertain to civil life, for wisdom of\r\nbehaviour, it is by learned men for the most part despised, as an\r\ninferior to virtue and an enemy to meditation; for wisdom of\r\ngovernment, they acquit themselves well when they are called to\r\nit, but that happeneth to few; but for the wisdom of business,\r\nwherein man’s life is most conversant, there be no books of\r\nit, except some few scattered advertisements, that have no\r\nproportion to the magnitude of this subject. For if books\r\nwere written of this as the other, I doubt not but learned men\r\nwith mean experience would far excel men of long experience\r\nwithout learning, and outshoot them in their own bow.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this\r\nknowledge should be so variable as it falleth not under precept;\r\nfor it is much less infinite than science of government, which we\r\nsee is laboured and in some part reduced. Of this wisdom it\r\nseemeth some of the ancient Romans in the saddest and wisest\r\ntimes were professors; for Cicero reporteth, that it was then in\r\nuse for senators that had name and opinion for general wise men,\r\nas Coruncanius, Curius, Lælius, and many others, to walk at\r\ncertain hours in the Place, and to give audience to those that\r\nwould use their advice; and that the particular citizens would\r\nresort unto them, and consult with them of the marriage of a\r\ndaughter, or of the employing of a son, or of a purchase or\r\nbargain, or of an accusation, and every other occasion incident\r\nto man’s life. So as there is a wisdom of counsel and\r\nadvice even in private causes, arising out of a universal insight\r\ninto the affairs of the world; which is used indeed upon\r\nparticular causes propounded, but is gathered by general\r\nobservation of causes of like nature. For so we see in the\r\nbook which Q. Cicero writeth to his brother, \u003ci\u003eDe petitione\r\nconsulatus\u003c/i\u003e (being the only book of business that I know\r\nwritten by the ancients), although it concerned a particular\r\naction then on foot, yet the substance thereof consisteth of many\r\nwise and politic axioms, which contain not a temporary, but a\r\nperpetual direction in the case of popular elections. But\r\nchiefly we may see in those aphorisms which have place amongst\r\ndivine writings, composed by Solomon the king, of whom the\r\nScriptures testify that his heart was as the sands of the sea,\r\nencompassing the world and all worldly matters, we see, I say,\r\nnot a few profound and excellent cautions, precepts, positions,\r\nextending to much variety of occasions; whereupon we will stay a\r\nwhile, offering to consideration some number of examples.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(6) \u003ci\u003eSed et cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur ne accommodes\r\naurem tuam\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ene forte audias servum tuum maledicentem\r\ntibi\u003c/i\u003e. Here is commended the provident stay of inquiry\r\nof that which we would be loth to find: as it was judged great\r\nwisdom in Pompeius Magnus that he burned Sertorius’ papers\r\nunperused.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eVir sapiens\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esi cum stulto contenderit\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esive\r\nirascatur\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esive rideat\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enon inveniet\r\nrequiem\u003c/i\u003e. Here is described the great disadvantage which\r\na wise man hath in undertaking a lighter person than himself;\r\nwhich is such an engagement as, whether a man turn the matter to\r\njest, or turn it to heat, or howsoever he change copy, he can no\r\nways quit himself well of it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eQui delicate a pueritia nutrit servum suum\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003epostea\r\nsentiet eum contumacem\u003c/i\u003e. Here is signified, that if a\r\nman begin too high a pitch in his favours, it doth commonly end\r\nin unkindness and unthankfulness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eVidisti virum velocem in opere suo\u003c/i\u003e? \u003ci\u003ecoram regibus\r\nstabit\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enec erit inter ignobiles\u003c/i\u003e. Here is\r\nobserved, that of all virtues for rising to honour, quickness of\r\ndespatch is the best; for superiors many times love not to have\r\nthose they employ too deep or too sufficient, but ready and\r\ndiligent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eVidi cunctos viventes qui ambulant sub sole\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ecum\r\nadolescente secundo qui consurgit pro eo\u003c/i\u003e. Here is\r\nexpressed that which was noted by Sylla first, and after him by\r\nTiberius. \u003ci\u003ePlures adorant solem orientem quam occidentem\r\nvel meridianum\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eSi spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003elocum tuum ne demiseris\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003equia curatio faciet cessare\r\npeccata maxima\u003c/i\u003e. Here caution is given, that upon\r\ndispleasure, retiring is of all courses the unfittest; for a man\r\nleaveth things at worst, and depriveth himself of means to make\r\nthem better.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eErat civitas parva\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet pauci in ea viri\u003c/i\u003e:\r\n\u003ci\u003evenit contra eam rex magnus\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet vallavit eam\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003einstruxitque munitones per gyrum\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet perfecta est\r\nobsidio\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003einventusque est in ea vir pauper et sapiens\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003eet liberavit eam per sapientiam suam\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003eet nullus\r\ndeinceps recordatus est huminis illius pauperis\u003c/i\u003e. Here\r\nthe corruption of states is set forth, that esteem not virtue or\r\nmerit longer than they have use of it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eMillis responsio frangit iram\u003c/i\u003e. Here is noted that\r\nsilence or rough answer exasperateth; but an answer present and\r\ntemperate pacifieth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eIter pigrorum quasi sepes spinarum\u003c/i\u003e. Here is\r\nlively represented how laborious sloth proveth in the end; for\r\nwhen things are deferred till the last instant, and nothing\r\nprepared beforehand, every step findeth a briar or impediment,\r\nwhich catcheth or stoppeth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eMelior est finis orationis quam principium\u003c/i\u003e. Here\r\nis taxed the vanity of formal speakers, that study more about\r\nprefaces and inducements, than upon the conclusions and issues of\r\nspeech.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eQui cognoscit in judicio faciem\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enon bene facit\u003c/i\u003e;\r\n\u003ci\u003eiste et pro buccella panis deseret veritatem\u003c/i\u003e. Here\r\nis noted, that a judge were better be a briber than a respecter\r\nof persons; for a corrupt judge offendeth not so lightly as a\r\nfacile.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eVir pauper calumnians pauperes simils est imbri\r\nvehementi\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ein quo paratur fames\u003c/i\u003e. Here is\r\nexpressed the extremity of necessitous extortions, figured in the\r\nancient fable of the full and the hungry horseleech.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eFons turbatus pede\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet vena corrupta\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eest\r\njustus cadens coram impio\u003c/i\u003e. Here is noted, that one\r\njudicial and exemplar iniquity in the face of the world doth\r\ntrouble the fountains of justice more than many particular\r\ninjuries passed over by connivance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eQui subtrahit aliquid a patre et a matre\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet dicit\r\nhoc non esse peccatum\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eparticeps est homicidii\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nHere is noted that, whereas men in wronging their best friends\r\nuse to extenuate their fault, as if they might presume or be bold\r\nupon them, it doth contrariwise indeed aggravate their fault, and\r\nturneth it from injury to impiety.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eNoli esse amicus homini iracundo\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enec ambulato cum\r\nhomine furioso\u003c/i\u003e. Here caution is given, that in the\r\nelection of our friends we do principally avoid those which are\r\nimpatient, as those that will espouse us to many factions and\r\nquarrels.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eQui conturbat domum suam\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003epossidebit\r\nventum\u003c/i\u003e. Here is noted, that in domestical separations\r\nand breaches men do promise to themselves quieting of their mind\r\nand contentment; but still they are deceived of their\r\nexpectation, and it turneth to wind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eFilius sapiens lætificat patrem\u003c/i\u003e: \u003ci\u003efilius vero\r\nstultus mæstitia est matri suæ\u003c/i\u003e. Here is\r\ndistinguished, that fathers have most comfort of the good proof\r\nof their sons; but mothers have most discomfort of their ill\r\nproof, because women have little discerning of virtue, but of\r\nfortune.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eQui celat delictum\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003equærit amicitiam\u003c/i\u003e;\r\n\u003ci\u003esed qui altero sermone repetit\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eseparat\r\nfæderatos\u003c/i\u003e. Here caution is given, that\r\nreconcilement is better managed by an amnesty, and passing over\r\nthat which is past, than by apologies and excuses.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eIn omni opere bono erit abundantia\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003eubi autem verba\r\nsunt plurima\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eibi frequenter egestas\u003c/i\u003e. Here is\r\nnoted, that words and discourse aboundeth most where there is\r\nidleness and want.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ePrimus in sua causa justus\u003c/i\u003e: \u003ci\u003esed venit altera\r\npars\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet inquiret in eum\u003c/i\u003e. Here is observed, that\r\nin all causes the first tale possesseth much; in sort, that the\r\nprejudice thereby wrought will be hardly removed, except some\r\nabuse or falsity in the information be detected.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eVerba bilinguis quasi simplicia\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet ipsa perveniunt\r\nad interiora ventris\u003c/i\u003e. Here is distinguished, that\r\nflattery and insinuation, which seemeth set and artificial,\r\nsinketh not far; but that entereth deep which hath show of\r\nnature, liberty, and simplicity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eQui erudit derisorem\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eipse sibi injuriam facit\u003c/i\u003e;\r\n\u003ci\u003eet qui arguit impium\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esibi maculam generat\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nHere caution is given how we tender reprehension to arrogant and\r\nscornful natures, whose manner is to esteem it for contumely, and\r\naccordingly to return it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eDa sapienti occasionem\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet addetur ei\r\nsapientia\u003c/i\u003e. Here is distinguished the wisdom brought\r\ninto habit, and that which is but verbal and swimming only in\r\nconceit; for the one upon the occasion presented is quickened and\r\nredoubled, the other is amazed and confused.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eQuomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003esic corda hominum manifesta sunt prudentibus\u003c/i\u003e. Here\r\nthe mind of a wise man is compared to a glass, wherein the images\r\nof all diversity of natures and customs are represented; from\r\nwhich representation proceedeth that application,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Qui sapit, innumeris moribus aptus\r\nerit.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(7) Thus have I stayed somewhat longer upon these sentences\r\npolitic of Solomon than is agreeable to the proportion of an\r\nexample; led with a desire to give authority to this part of\r\nknowledge, which I noted as deficient, by so excellent a\r\nprecedent; and have also attended them with brief observations,\r\nsuch as to my understanding offer no violence to the sense,\r\nthough I know they may be applied to a more divine use: but it is\r\nallowed, even in divinity, that some interpretations, yea, and\r\nsome writings, have more of the eagle than others; but taking\r\nthem as instructions for life, they might have received large\r\ndiscourse, if I would have broken them and illustrated them by\r\ndeducements and examples.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(8) Neither was this in use only with the Hebrews, but it is\r\ngenerally to be found in the wisdom of the more ancient times;\r\nthat as men found out any observation that they thought was good\r\nfor life, they would gather it and express it in parable or\r\naphorism or fable. But for fables, they were vicegerents\r\nand supplies where examples failed: now that the times abound\r\nwith history, the aim is better when the mark is alive. And\r\ntherefore the form of writing which of all others is fittest for\r\nthis variable argument of negotiation and occasions is that which\r\nMachiavel chose wisely and aptly for government; namely,\r\ndiscourse upon histories or examples. For knowledge drawn\r\nfreshly and in our view out of particulars, knoweth the way best\r\nto particulars again. And it hath much greater life for\r\npractice when the discourse attendeth upon the example, than when\r\nthe example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no\r\npoint of order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance.\r\nFor when the example is the ground, being set down in a history\r\nat large, it is set down with all circumstances, which may\r\nsometimes control the discourse thereupon made, and sometimes\r\nsupply it, as a very pattern for action; whereas the examples\r\nalleged for the discourse’s sake are cited succinctly, and\r\nwithout particularity, and carry a servile aspect towards the\r\ndiscourse which they are brought in to make good.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(9) But this difference is not amiss to be remembered, that as\r\nhistory of times is the best ground for discourse of government,\r\nsuch as Machiavel handleth, so histories of lives is the most\r\npopular for discourse of business, because it is more conversant\r\nin private actions. Nay, there is a ground of discourse for\r\nthis purpose fitter than them both, which is discourse upon\r\nletters, such as are wise and weighty, as many are of Cicero\r\n\u003ci\u003ead Atticum\u003c/i\u003e, and others. For letters have a great and\r\nmore particular representation of business than either chronicles\r\nor lives. Thus have we spoken both of the matter and form\r\nof this part of civil knowledge, touching negotiation, which we\r\nnote to be deficient.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(10) But yet there is another part of this part, which\r\ndiffereth as much from that whereof we have spoken as\r\n\u003ci\u003esapere\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003esibi sapere\u003c/i\u003e, the one moving as it were\r\nto the circumference, the other to the centre. For there is\r\na wisdom of counsel, and again there is a wisdom of pressing a\r\nman’s own fortune; and they do sometimes meet, and often\r\nsever. For many are wise in their own ways that are weak\r\nfor government or counsel; like ants, which is a wise creature\r\nfor itself, but very hurtful for the garden. This wisdom\r\nthe Romans did take much knowledge of: \u003ci\u003eNam pol sapiens\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(saith the comical poet) \u003ci\u003efingit fortunam sibi\u003c/i\u003e; and it grew\r\nto an adage, \u003ci\u003eFaber quisque fortunæ propriæ\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nand Livy attributed it to Cato the first, \u003ci\u003eIn hoc viro tanta\r\nvis animi et ingenii inerat\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eut quocunque loco natus esset\r\nsibi ipse fortunam facturus videretur\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(11) This conceit or position, if it be too much declared and\r\nprofessed, hath been thought a thing impolitic and unlucky, as\r\nwas observed in Timotheus the Athenian, who, having done many\r\ngreat services to the state in his government, and giving an\r\naccount thereof to the people as the manner was, did conclude\r\nevery particular with this clause, “And in this fortune had\r\nno part.” And it came so to pass, that he never\r\nprospered in anything he took in hand afterwards. For this\r\nis too high and too arrogant, savouring of that which Ezekiel\r\nsaith of Pharaoh, \u003ci\u003eDicis\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eFluvius est neus et ego feci\r\nmemet ipsum\u003c/i\u003e; or of that which another prophet speaketh, that\r\nmen offer sacrifices to their nets and snares; and that which the\r\npoet expresseth,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Dextra mihi Deus, et telum quod missile\r\nlibro,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNunc adsint!”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor these confidences were ever unhallowed, and unblessed;\r\nand, therefore, those that were great politiques indeed ever\r\nascribed their successes to their felicity and not to their skill\r\nor virtue. For so Sylla surnamed himself Felix, not\r\nMagnus. So Cæsar said to the master of the ship,\r\n\u003ci\u003eCæsarem portas et fortunam ejus\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(12) But yet, nevertheless, these positions, \u003ci\u003eFaber quisque\r\nfortunæ suæ\u003c/i\u003e: \u003ci\u003eSapiens dominabitur astris\u003c/i\u003e:\r\n\u003ci\u003eInvia virtuti null est via\u003c/i\u003e, and the like, being taken and\r\nused as spurs to industry, and not as stirrups to insolency,\r\nrather for resolution than for the presumption or outward\r\ndeclaration, have been ever thought sound and good; and are no\r\nquestion imprinted in the greatest minds, who are so sensible of\r\nthis opinion as they can scarce contain it within. As we\r\nsee in Augustus Cæsar (who was rather diverse from his\r\nuncle than inferior in virtue), how when he died he desired his\r\nfriends about him to give him a \u003ci\u003eplaudite\u003c/i\u003e, as if he were\r\nconscious to himself that he had played his part well upon the\r\nstage. This part of knowledge we do report also as\r\ndeficient; not but that it is practised too much, but it hath not\r\nbeen reduced to writing. And, therefore, lest it should\r\nseem to any that it is not comprehensible by axiom, it is\r\nrequisite, as we did in the former, that we set down some heads\r\nor passages of it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(13) Wherein it may appear at the first a new and unwonted\r\nargument to teach men how to raise and make their fortune; a\r\ndoctrine wherein every man perchance will be ready to yield\r\nhimself a disciple, till he see the difficulty: for fortune\r\nlayeth as heavy impositions as virtue; and it is as hard and\r\nsevere a thing to be a true politique, as to be truly\r\nmoral. But the handling hereof concerneth learning greatly,\r\nboth in honour and in substance. In honour, because\r\npragmatical men may not go away with an opinion that learning is\r\nlike a lark, that can mount and sing, and please herself, and\r\nnothing else; but may know that she holdeth as well of the hawk,\r\nthat can soar aloft, and can also descend and strike upon the\r\nprey. In substance, because it is the perfect law of\r\ninquiry of truth, that nothing be in the globe of matter, which\r\nshould not be likewise in the globe of crystal or form; that is,\r\nthat there be not anything in being and action which should not\r\nbe drawn and collected into contemplation and doctrine.\r\nNeither doth learning admire or esteem of this architecture of\r\nfortune otherwise than as of an inferior work, for no man’s\r\nfortune can be an end worthy of his being, and many times the\r\nworthiest men do abandon their fortune willingly for better\r\nrespects: but nevertheless fortune as an organ of virtue and\r\nmerit deserveth the consideration.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(14) First, therefore, the precept which I conceive to be most\r\nsummary towards the prevailing in fortune, is to obtain that\r\nwindow which Momus did require; who seeing in the frame of\r\nman’s heart such angles and recesses, found fault there was\r\nnot a window to look into them; that is, to procure good\r\ninformations of particulars touching persons, their natures,\r\ntheir desires and ends, their customs and fashions, their helps\r\nand advantages, and whereby they chiefly stand, so again their\r\nweaknesses and disadvantages, and where they lie most open and\r\nobnoxious, their friends, factions, dependences; and again their\r\nopposites, enviers, competitors, their moods and times, \u003ci\u003eSola\r\nviri molles aditus et tempora noras\u003c/i\u003e; their principles, rules,\r\nand observations, and the like: and this not only of persons but\r\nof actions; what are on foot from time to time, and how they are\r\nconducted, favoured, opposed, and how they import, and the\r\nlike. For the knowledge of present actions is not only\r\nmaterial in itself, but without it also the knowledge of persons\r\nis very erroneous: for men change with the actions; and whilst\r\nthey are in pursuit they are one, and when they return to their\r\nnature they are another. These informations of particulars,\r\ntouching persons and actions, are as the minor propositions in\r\nevery active syllogism; for no excellency of observations (which\r\nare as the major propositions) can suffice to ground a\r\nconclusion, if there be error and mistaking in the minors.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(15) That this knowledge is possible, Solomon is our surety,\r\nwho saith, \u003ci\u003eConsilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda\u003c/i\u003e;\r\n\u003ci\u003esed vir prudens exhauriet illud\u003c/i\u003e. And although the\r\nknowledge itself falleth not under precept because it is of\r\nindividuals, yet the instructions for the obtaining of it\r\nmay.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(16) We will begin, therefore, with this precept, according to\r\nthe ancient opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are slowness of\r\nbelief and distrust; that more trust be given to countenances and\r\ndeeds than to words; and in words rather to sudden passages and\r\nsurprised words than to set and purposed words. Neither let\r\nthat be feared which is said, \u003ci\u003eFronti nulla fides\u003c/i\u003e, which is\r\nmeant of a general outward behaviour, and not of the private and\r\nsubtle motions and labours of the countenance and gesture; which,\r\nas Q. Cicero elegantly saith, is \u003ci\u003eAnimi janua\u003c/i\u003e, “the\r\ngate of the mind.” None more close than Tiberius, and\r\nyet Tacitus saith of Gallus, \u003ci\u003eEtenim vultu offensionem\r\nconjectaverat\u003c/i\u003e. So again, noting the differing character\r\nand manner of his commending Germanicus and Drusus in the Senate,\r\nhe saith, touching his fashion wherein he carried his speech of\r\nGermanicus, thus: \u003ci\u003eMagis in speciem adornatis verbis\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003equam ut penitus sentire crederetur\u003c/i\u003e; but of Drusus thus:\r\n\u003ci\u003ePaucioribus sed intentior\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet fida oratione\u003c/i\u003e; and in\r\nanother place, speaking of his character of speech when he did\r\nanything that was gracious and popular, he saith, “That in\r\nother things he was \u003ci\u003evelut eluctantium verborum\u003c/i\u003e;” but\r\nthen again, \u003ci\u003esolutius loquebatur quando subveniret\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nSo that there is no such artificer of dissimulation, nor no such\r\ncommanded countenance (\u003ci\u003evultus jussus\u003c/i\u003e), that can sever from\r\na feigned tale some of these fashions, either a more slight and\r\ncareless fashion, or more set and formal, or more tedious and\r\nwandering, or coming from a man more drily and hardly.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(17) Neither are deeds such assured pledges as that they may\r\nbe trusted without a judicious consideration of their magnitude\r\nand nature: \u003ci\u003eFraus sibi in parvis fidem præstruit ut\r\nmajore emolumento fallat\u003c/i\u003e; and the Italian thinketh himself\r\nupon the point to be bought and sold, when he is better used than\r\nhe was wont to be without manifest cause. For small\r\nfavours, they do but lull men to sleep, both as to caution and as\r\nto industry; and are, as Demosthenes calleth them, \u003ci\u003eAlimenta\r\nsocordiæ\u003c/i\u003e. So again we see how false the nature of\r\nsome deeds are, in that particular which Mutianus practised upon\r\nAntonius Primus, upon that hollow and unfaithful reconcilement\r\nwhich was made between them; whereupon Mutianus advanced many of\r\nthe friends of Antonius, \u003ci\u003eSimul amicis ejus præfecturas\r\net tribunatus largitur\u003c/i\u003e: wherein, under pretence to strengthen\r\nhim, he did desolate him, and won from him his dependents.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(18) As for words, though they be like waters to physicians,\r\nfull of flattery and uncertainty, yet they are not to be despised\r\nspecially with the advantage of passion and affection. For\r\nso we see Tiberius, upon a stinging and incensing speech of\r\nAgrippina, came a step forth of his dissimulation when he said,\r\n“You are hurt because you do not reign;” of which\r\nTacitus saith, \u003ci\u003eAudita hæc raram occulti pectoris vocem\r\nelicuere\u003c/i\u003e: \u003ci\u003ecorreptamque Græco versu admonuit\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003eideo lædi quia non regnaret\u003c/i\u003e. And, therefore,\r\nthe poet doth elegantly call passions tortures that urge men to\r\nconfess their secrets:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Vino torus et ira.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd experience showeth there are few men so true to themselves\r\nand so settled but that, sometimes upon heat, sometimes upon\r\nbravery, sometimes upon kindness, sometimes upon trouble of mind\r\nand weakness, they open themselves; specially if they be put to\r\nit with a counter-dissimulation, according to the proverb of\r\nSpain, \u003ci\u003eDi mentira\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ey sacar as verdad\u003c/i\u003e: “Tell a\r\nlie and find a truth.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(19) As for the knowing of men which is at second hand from\r\nreports: men’s weaknesses and faults are best known from\r\ntheir enemies, their virtues and abilities from their friends,\r\ntheir customs and times from their servants, their conceits and\r\nopinions from their familiar friends, with whom they discourse\r\nmost. General fame is light, and the opinions conceived by\r\nsuperiors or equals are deceitful; for to such men are more\r\nmasked: \u003ci\u003eVerior fama e domesticis emanat\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(20) But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is by\r\ntheir natures and ends, wherein the weakest sort of men are best\r\ninterpreted by their natures, and the wisest by their ends.\r\nFor it was both pleasantly and wisely said (though I think very\r\nuntruly) by a nuncio of the Pope, returning from a certain nation\r\nwhere he served as lidger; whose opinion being asked touching the\r\nappointment of one to go in his place, he wished that in any case\r\nthey did not send one that was too wise; because no very wise man\r\nwould ever imagine what they in that country were like to\r\ndo. And certainly it is an error frequent for men to shoot\r\nover, and to suppose deeper ends and more compass reaches than\r\nare: the Italian proverb being elegant, and for the most part\r\ntrue:—\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Di danari, di senno, e di fede,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nC’è ne manco che non credi.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e“There is commonly less money, less wisdom, and less\r\ngood faith than men do account upon.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(21) But princes, upon a far other reason, are best\r\ninterpreted by their natures, and private persons by their\r\nends. For princes being at the top of human desires, they\r\nhave for the most part no particular ends whereto they aspire, by\r\ndistance from which a man might take measure and scale of the\r\nrest of their actions and desires; which is one of the causes\r\nthat maketh their hearts more inscrutable. Neither is it\r\nsufficient to inform ourselves in men’s ends and natures of\r\nthe variety of them only, but also of the predominancy, what\r\nhumour reigneth most, and what end is principally sought.\r\nFor so we see, when Tigellinus saw himself outstripped by\r\nPetronius Turpilianus in Nero’s humours of pleasures,\r\n\u003ci\u003emetus ejus rimatur\u003c/i\u003e, he wrought upon Nero’s fears,\r\nwhereby he broke the other’s neck.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(22) But to all this part of inquiry the most compendious way\r\nresteth in three things; the first, to have general acquaintance\r\nand inwardness with those which have general acquaintance and\r\nlook most into the world; and specially according to the\r\ndiversity of business, and the diversity of persons, to have\r\nprivacy and conversation with some one friend at least which is\r\nperfect and well-intelligenced in every several kind. The\r\nsecond is to keep a good mediocrity in liberty of speech and\r\nsecrecy; in most things liberty; secrecy where it importeth; for\r\nliberty of speech inviteth and provoketh liberty to be used\r\nagain, and so bringeth much to a man’s knowledge; and\r\nsecrecy on the other side induceth trust and inwardness.\r\nThe last is the reducing of a man’s self to this watchful\r\nand serene habit, as to make account and purpose, in every\r\nconference and action, as well to observe as to act. For as\r\nEpictetus would have a philosopher in every particular action to\r\nsay to himself, \u003ci\u003eEt hoc volo\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet etiam institutum\r\nservare\u003c/i\u003e; so a politic man in everything should say to\r\nhimself, \u003ci\u003eEt hoc volo\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eac etiam aliquid\r\naddiscere\u003c/i\u003e. I have stayed the longer upon this precept\r\nof obtaining good information because it is a main part by\r\nitself, which answereth to all the rest. But, above all\r\nthings, caution must be taken that men have a good stay and hold\r\nof themselves, and that this much knowing do not draw on much\r\nmeddling; for nothing is more unfortunate than light and rash\r\nintermeddling in many matters. So that this variety of\r\nknowledge tendeth in conclusion but only to this, to make a\r\nbetter and freer choice of those actions which may concern us,\r\nand to conduct them with the less error and the more\r\ndexterity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(23) The second precept concerning this knowledge is, for men\r\nto take good information touching their own person, and well to\r\nunderstand themselves; knowing that, as St. James saith, though\r\nmen look oft in a glass, yet they do suddenly forget themselves;\r\nwherein as the divine glass is the Word of God, so the politic\r\nglass is the state of the world, or times wherein we live, in the\r\nwhich we are to behold ourselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(24) For men ought to take an impartial view of their own\r\nabilities and virtues; and again of their wants and impediments;\r\naccounting these with the most, and those other with the least;\r\nand from this view and examination to frame the considerations\r\nfollowing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(25) First, to consider how the constitution of their nature\r\nsorteth with the general state of the times; which if they find\r\nagreeable and fit, then in all things to give themselves more\r\nscope and liberty; but if differing and dissonant, then in the\r\nwhole course of their life to be more close retired, and\r\nreserved; as we see in Tiberius, who was never seen at a play,\r\nand came not into the senate in twelve of his last years; whereas\r\nAugustus Cæsar lived ever in men’s eyes, which\r\nTacitus observeth, \u003ci\u003ealia Tiberio morum via\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(26) Secondly, to consider how their nature sorteth with\r\nprofessions and courses of life, and accordingly to make\r\nelection, if they be free; and, if engaged, to make the departure\r\nat the first opportunity; as we see was done by Duke Valentine,\r\nthat was designed by his father to a sacerdotal profession, but\r\nquitted it soon after in regard of his parts and inclination;\r\nbeing such, nevertheless, as a man cannot tell well whether they\r\nwere worse for a prince or for a priest.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(27) Thirdly, to consider how they sort with those whom they\r\nare like to have competitors and concurrents; and to take that\r\ncourse wherein there is most solitude, and themselves like to be\r\nmost eminent; as Cæsar Julius did, who at first was an\r\norator or pleader; but when he saw the excellency of Cicero,\r\nHortensius, Catulus, and others for eloquence, and saw there was\r\nno man of reputation for the wars but Pompeius, upon whom the\r\nstate was forced to rely, he forsook his course begun towards a\r\ncivil and popular greatness, and transferred his designs to a\r\nmartial greatness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(28) Fourthly, in the choice of their friends and dependents,\r\nto proceed according to the composition of their own nature; as\r\nwe may see in Cæsar, all whose friends and followers were\r\nmen active and effectual, but not solemn, or of reputation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(29) Fifthly, to take special heed how they guide themselves\r\nby examples, in thinking they can do as they see others do;\r\nwhereas perhaps their natures and carriages are far\r\ndiffering. In which error it seemeth Pompey was, of whom\r\nCicero saith that he was wont often to say, \u003ci\u003eSylla potuit\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003eego non potero\u003c/i\u003e? Wherein he was much abused, the\r\nnatures and proceedings of himself and his example being the\r\nunlikest in the world; the one being fierce, violent, and\r\npressing the fact; the other solemn, and full of majesty and\r\ncircumstance, and therefore the less effectual.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut this precept touching the politic knowledge of ourselves\r\nhath many other branches, whereupon we cannot insist.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(30) Next to the well understanding and discerning of a\r\nman’s self, there followeth the well opening and revealing\r\na man’s self; wherein we see nothing more usual than for\r\nthe more able man to make the less show. For there is a\r\ngreat advantage in the well setting forth of a man’s\r\nvirtues, fortunes, merits; and again, in the artificial covering\r\nof a man’s weaknesses, defects, disgraces; staying upon the\r\none, sliding from the other; cherishing the one by circumstances,\r\ngracing the other by exposition, and the like. Wherein we\r\nsee what Tacitus saith of Mutianus, who was the greatest\r\npolitique of his time, \u003ci\u003eOmnium quæ dixerat feceratque\r\narte quadam ostentator\u003c/i\u003e, which requireth indeed some art, lest\r\nit turn tedious and arrogant; but yet so, as ostentation (though\r\nit be to the first degree of vanity) seemeth to me rather a vice\r\nin manners than in policy; for as it is said, \u003ci\u003eAudacter\r\ncalumniare\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esemper aliquid hæret\u003c/i\u003e; so, except it\r\nbe in a ridiculous degree of deformity, \u003ci\u003eAudacter te\r\nvendita\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esemper aluquid hæret\u003c/i\u003e. For it will\r\nstick with the more ignorant and inferior sort of men, though men\r\nof wisdom and rank do smile at it and despise it; and yet the\r\nauthority won with many doth countervail the disdain of a\r\nfew. But if it be carried with decency and government, as\r\nwith a natural, pleasant, and ingenious fashion; or at times when\r\nit is mixed with some peril and unsafety (as in military\r\npersons); or at times when others are most envied; or with easy\r\nand careless passage to it and from it, without dwelling too\r\nlong, or being too serious; or with an equal freedom of taxing a\r\nman’s self, as well as gracing himself; or by occasion of\r\nrepelling or putting down others’ injury or insolency; it\r\ndoth greatly add to reputation: and surely not a few solid\r\nnatures, that want this ventosity and cannot sail in the height\r\nof the winds, are not without some prejudice and disadvantage by\r\ntheir moderation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(31) But for these flourishes and enhancements of virtue, as\r\nthey are not perchance unnecessary, so it is at least necessary\r\nthat virtue be not disvalued and embased under the just price,\r\nwhich is done in three manners—by offering and obtruding a\r\nman’s self, wherein men think he is rewarded when he is\r\naccepted; by doing too much, which will not give that which is\r\nwell done leave to settle, and in the end induceth satiety; and\r\nby finding too soon the fruit of a man’s virtue, in\r\ncommendation, applause, honour, favour; wherein if a man be\r\npleased with a little, let him hear what is truly said: \u003ci\u003eCave\r\nne insuetus rebus majoribus videaris\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esi hæc te res\r\nparva sicuti magna delectat\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(32) But the covering of defects is of no less importance than\r\nthe valuing of good parts; which may be done likewise in three\r\nmanners—by caution, by colour, and by confidence.\r\nCaution is when men do ingeniously and discreetly avoid to be put\r\ninto those things for which they are not proper; whereas\r\ncontrariwise bold and unquiet spirits will thrust themselves into\r\nmatters without difference, and so publish and proclaim all their\r\nwants. Colour is when men make a way for themselves to have\r\na construction made of their faults or wants, as proceeding from\r\na better cause or intended for some other purpose. For of\r\nthe one it is well said,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Sæpe latet vitium proximitate\r\nboni,”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eand therefore whatsoever want a man hath, he must see that he\r\npretend the virtue that shadoweth it; as if he be dull, he must\r\naffect gravity; if a coward, mildness; and so the rest. For\r\nthe second, a man must frame some probable cause why he should\r\nnot do his best, and why he should dissemble his abilities; and\r\nfor that purpose must use to dissemble those abilities which are\r\nnotorious in him, to give colour that his true wants are but\r\nindustries and dissimulations. For confidence, it is the\r\nlast but the surest remedy—namely, to depress and seem to\r\ndespise whatsoever a man cannot attain; observing the good\r\nprinciple of the merchants, who endeavour to raise the price of\r\ntheir own commodities, and to beat down the price of\r\nothers. But there is a confidence that passeth this other,\r\nwhich is to face out a man’s own defects, in seeming to\r\nconceive that he is best in those things wherein he is failing;\r\nand, to help that again, to seem on the other side that he hath\r\nleast opinion of himself in those things wherein he is best: like\r\nas we shall see it commonly in poets, that if they show their\r\nverses, and you except to any, they will say, “That that\r\nline cost them more labour than any of the rest;” and\r\npresently will seem to disable and suspect rather some other\r\nline, which they know well enough to be the best in the\r\nnumber. But above all, in this righting and helping of a\r\nman’s self in his own carriage, he must take heed he show\r\nnot himself dismantled and exposed to scorn and injury, by too\r\nmuch dulceness, goodness, and facility of nature; but show some\r\nsparkles of liberty, spirit, and edge. Which kind of\r\nfortified carriage, with a ready rescussing of a man’s self\r\nfrom scorns, is sometimes of necessity imposed upon men by\r\nsomewhat in their person or fortune; but it ever succeedeth with\r\ngood felicity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(33) Another precept of this knowledge is by all possible\r\nendeavour to frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to\r\noccasion; for nothing hindereth men’s fortunes so much as\r\nthis: \u003ci\u003eIdem manebat\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eneque idem decebat\u003c/i\u003e—men\r\nare where they were, when occasions turn: and therefore to Cato,\r\nwhom Livy maketh such an architect of fortune, he addeth that he\r\nhad \u003ci\u003eversatile ingenium\u003c/i\u003e. And thereof it cometh that\r\nthese grave solemn wits, which must be like themselves and cannot\r\nmake departures, have more dignity than felicity. But in\r\nsome it is nature to be somewhat vicious and enwrapped, and not\r\neasy to turn. In some it is a conceit that is almost a\r\nnature, which is, that men can hardly make themselves believe\r\nthat they ought to change their course, when they have found good\r\nby it in former experience. For Machiavel noted wisely how\r\nFabius Maximus would have been temporising still, according to\r\nhis old bias, when the nature of the war was altered and required\r\nhot pursuit. In some other it is want of point and\r\npenetration in their judgment, that they do not discern when\r\nthings have a period, but come in too late after the occasion; as\r\nDemosthenes compareth the people of Athens to country fellows,\r\nwhen they play in a fence school, that if they have a blow, then\r\nthey remove their weapon to that ward, and not before. In\r\nsome other it is a lothness to lose labours passed, and a conceit\r\nthat they can bring about occasions to their ply; and yet in the\r\nend, when they see no other remedy, then they come to it with\r\ndisadvantage; as Tarquinius, that gave for the third part of\r\nSibylla’s books the treble price, when he might at first\r\nhave had all three for the simple. But from whatsoever root\r\nor cause this restiveness of mind proceedeth, it is a thing most\r\nprejudicial; and nothing is more politic than to make the wheels\r\nof our mind concentric and voluble with the wheels of\r\nfortune.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(34) Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some\r\naffinity with that we last spoke of, but with difference, is that\r\nwhich is well expressed, \u003ci\u003eFatis accede deisque\u003c/i\u003e, that men do\r\nnot only turn with the occasions, but also run with the\r\noccasions, and not strain their credit or strength to over-hard\r\nor extreme points; but choose in their actions that which is most\r\npassable: for this will preserve men from foil, not occupy them\r\ntoo much about one matter, win opinion of moderation, please the\r\nmost, and make a show of a perpetual felicity in all they\r\nundertake: which cannot but mightily increase reputation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(35) Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have some\r\nrepugnancy with the former two, but not as I understand it; and\r\nit is that which Demosthenes uttereth in high terms: \u003ci\u003eEt\r\nquemadmodum receptum est\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eut exercitum ducat\r\nimperator\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esic et a cordatis viris res ipsæ\r\nducendæ\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003eut quæipsis videntur\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eea\r\ngerantur\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet non ipsi eventus persequi cogantur\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nFor if we observe we shall find two differing kinds of\r\nsufficiency in managing of business: some can make use of\r\noccasions aptly and dexterously, but plot little; some can urge\r\nand pursue their own plots well, but cannot accommodate nor take\r\nin; either of which is very imperfect without the other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(36) Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good\r\nmediocrity in the declaring or not declaring a man’s self:\r\nfor although depth of secrecy, and making way (\u003ci\u003equalis est via\r\nnavis in mari\u003c/i\u003e, which the French calleth \u003ci\u003esourdes\r\nmenées\u003c/i\u003e, when men set things in work without opening\r\nthemselves at all), be sometimes both prosperous and admirable;\r\nyet many times \u003ci\u003edissimulatio errores parit\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003equi\r\ndissimulatorem ipsum illaqueant\u003c/i\u003e. And therefore we see\r\nthe greatest politiques have in a natural and free manner\r\nprofessed their desires, rather than been reserved and disguised\r\nin them. For so we see that Lucius Sylla made a kind of\r\nprofession, “that he wished all men happy or unhappy, as\r\nthey stood his friends or enemies.” So Cæsar,\r\nwhen he went first into Gaul, made no scruple to profess\r\n“that he had rather be first in a village than second at\r\nRome.” So again, as soon as he had begun the war, we\r\nsee what Cicero saith of him, \u003ci\u003eAlter\u003c/i\u003e (meaning of\r\nCæsar) \u003ci\u003enon recusat\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esed quodammodo postulat\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003eut\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci\u003eut est\u003c/i\u003e) \u003ci\u003esic appelletur tyrannus\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nSo we may see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus\r\nCæsar, in his very entrance into affairs, when he was a\r\ndarling of the senate, yet in his harangues to the people would\r\nswear, \u003ci\u003eIta parentis honores consequi liceat\u003c/i\u003e (which was no\r\nless than the tyranny), save that, to help it, he would stretch\r\nforth his hand towards a statue of Cæsar’s that was\r\nerected in the place: and men laughed and wondered, and said,\r\n“Is it possible?” or, “Did you ever hear the\r\nlike?” and yet thought he meant no hurt; he did it so\r\nhandsomely and ingenuously. And all these were prosperous:\r\nwhereas Pompey, who tended to the same ends, but in a more dark\r\nand dissembling manner as Tacitus saith of him, \u003ci\u003eOccultior non\r\nmelior\u003c/i\u003e, wherein Sallust concurreth, \u003ci\u003eOre probo\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003eanimo inverecundo\u003c/i\u003e, made it his design, by infinite secret\r\nengines, to cast the state into an absolute anarchy and\r\nconfusion, that the state might cast itself into his arms for\r\nnecessity and protection, and so the sovereign power be put upon\r\nhim, and he never seen in it: and when he had brought it (as he\r\nthought) to that point when he was chosen consul alone, as never\r\nany was, yet he could make no great matter of it, because men\r\nunderstood him not; but was fain in the end to go the beaten\r\ntrack of getting arms into his hands, by colour of the doubt of\r\nCæsar’s designs: so tedious, casual, and unfortunate\r\nare these deep dissimulations: whereof it seemeth Tacitus made\r\nthis judgment, that they were a cunning of an inferior form in\r\nregard of true policy; attributing the one to Augustus, the other\r\nto Tiberius; where, speaking of Livia, he saith, \u003ci\u003eEt cum\r\nartibus mariti simulatione filii bene compostia\u003c/i\u003e: for surely\r\nthe continual habit of dissimulation is but a weak and sluggish\r\ncunning, and not greatly politic.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(37) Another precept of this architecture of fortune is to\r\naccustom our minds to judge of the proportion or value of things,\r\nas they conduce and are material to our particular ends; and that\r\nto do substantially and not superficially. For we shall\r\nfind the logical part (as I may term it) of some men’s\r\nminds good, but the mathematical part erroneous; that is, they\r\ncan well judge of consequences, but not of proportions and\r\ncomparison, preferring things of show and sense before things of\r\nsubstance and effect. So some fall in love with access to\r\nprinces, others with popular fame and applause, supposing they\r\nare things of great purchase, when in many cases they are but\r\nmatters of envy, peril, and impediment. So some measure\r\nthings according to the labour and difficulty or assiduity which\r\nare spent about them; and think, if they be ever moving, that\r\nthey must needs advance and proceed; as Cæsar saith in a\r\ndespising manner of Cato the second, when he describeth how\r\nlaborious and indefatigable he was to no great purpose,\r\n\u003ci\u003eHæc omnia magno studio agebat\u003c/i\u003e. So in most\r\nthings men are ready to abuse themselves in thinking the greatest\r\nmeans to be best, when it should be the fittest.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(38) As for the true marshalling of men’s pursuits\r\ntowards their fortune, as they are more or less material, I hold\r\nthem to stand thus. First the amendment of their own\r\nminds. For the removal of the impediments of the mind will\r\nsooner clear the passages of fortune than the obtaining fortune\r\nwill remove the impediments of the mind. In the second\r\nplace I set down wealth and means; which I know most men would\r\nhave placed first, because of the general use which it beareth\r\ntowards all variety of occasions. But that opinion I may\r\ncondemn with like reason as Machiavel doth that other, that\r\nmoneys were the sinews of the wars; whereas (saith he) the true\r\nsinews of the wars are the sinews of men’s arms, that is, a\r\nvaliant, populous, and military nation: and he voucheth aptly the\r\nauthority of Solon, who, when Crœsus showed him his\r\ntreasury of gold, said to him, that if another came that had\r\nbetter iron, he would be master of his gold. In like manner\r\nit may be truly affirmed that it is not moneys that are the\r\nsinews of fortune, but it is the sinews and steel of men’s\r\nminds, wit, courage, audacity, resolution, temper, industry, and\r\nthe like. In the third place I set down reputation, because\r\nof the peremptory tides and currents it hath; which, if they be\r\nnot taken in their due time, are seldom recovered, it being\r\nextreme hard to play an after-game of reputation. And\r\nlastly I place honour, which is more easily won by any of the\r\nother three, much more by all, than any of them can be purchased\r\nby honour. To conclude this precept, as there is order and\r\npriority in matter, so is there in time, the preposterous placing\r\nwhereof is one of the commonest errors: while men fly to their\r\nends when they should intend their beginnings, and do not take\r\nthings in order of time as they come on, but marshal them\r\naccording to greatness and not according to instance; not\r\nobserving the good precept, \u003ci\u003eQuod nunc instat agamus\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(39) Another precept of this knowledge is not to embrace any\r\nmatters which do occupy too great a quantity of time, but to have\r\nthat sounding in a man’s ears, \u003ci\u003eSed fugit interea fugit\r\nirreparabile tempus\u003c/i\u003e: and that is the cause why those which\r\ntake their course of rising by professions of burden, as lawyers,\r\norators, painful divines, and the like, are not commonly so\r\npolitic for their own fortune, otherwise than in their ordinary\r\nway, because they want time to learn particulars, to wait\r\noccasions, and to devise plots.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(40) Another precept of this knowledge is to imitate nature,\r\nwhich doth nothing in vain; which surely a man may do if he do\r\nwell interlace his business, and bend not his mind too much upon\r\nthat which he principally intendeth. For a man ought in\r\nevery particular action so to carry the motions of his mind, and\r\nso to have one thing under another, as if he cannot have that he\r\nseeketh in the best degree, yet to have it in a second, or so in\r\na third; and if he can have no part of that which he purposed,\r\nyet to turn the use of it to somewhat else; and if he cannot make\r\nanything of it for the present, yet to make it as a seed of\r\nsomewhat in time to come; and if he can contrive no effect or\r\nsubstance from it, yet to win some good opinion by it, or the\r\nlike. So that he should exact an account of himself of\r\nevery action, to reap somewhat, and not to stand amazed and\r\nconfused if he fail of that he chiefly meant: for nothing is more\r\nimpolitic than to mind actions wholly one by one. For he\r\nthat doth so loseth infinite occasions which intervene, and are\r\nmany times more proper and propitious for somewhat that he shall\r\nneed afterwards, than for that which he urgeth for the present;\r\nand therefore men must be perfect in that rule, \u003ci\u003eHæc\r\noportet facere\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet illa non imittere\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(41) Another precept of this knowledge is, not to engage a\r\nman’s self peremptorily in anything, though it seem not\r\nliable to accident; but ever to have a window to fly out at, or a\r\nway to retire: following the wisdom in the ancient fable of the\r\ntwo frogs, which consulted when their plash was dry whither they\r\nshould go; and the one moved to go down into a pit, because it\r\nwas not likely the water would dry there; but the other answered,\r\n“True, but if it do, how shall we get out again?”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(42) Another precept of this knowledge is that ancient precept\r\nof Bias, construed not to any point of perfidiousness, but to\r\ncaution and moderation, \u003ci\u003eEt ama tanquam inimicus futurus et odi\r\ntanquam amaturus\u003c/i\u003e. For it utterly betrayeth all utility\r\nfor men to embark themselves too far into unfortunate\r\nfriendships, troublesome spleens, and childish and humorous\r\nenvies or emulations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(43) But I continue this beyond the measure of an example;\r\nled, because I would not have such knowledges, which I note as\r\ndeficient, to be thought things imaginative or in the air, or an\r\nobservation or two much made of, but things of bulk and mass,\r\nwhereof an end is more hardly made than a beginning. It\r\nmust be likewise conceived, that in these points which I mention\r\nand set down, they are far from complete tractates of them, but\r\nonly as small pieces for patterns. And lastly, no man I\r\nsuppose will think that I mean fortunes are not obtained without\r\nall this ado; for I know they come tumbling into some men’s\r\nlaps; and a number obtain good fortunes by diligence in a plain\r\nway, little intermeddling, and keeping themselves from gross\r\nerrors.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(44) But as Cicero, when he setteth down an idea of a perfect\r\norator, doth not mean that every pleader should be such; and so\r\nlikewise, when a prince or a courtier hath been described by such\r\nas have handled those subjects, the mould hath used to be made\r\naccording to the perfection of the art, and not according to\r\ncommon practice: so I understand it, that it ought to be done in\r\nthe description of a politic man, I mean politic for his own\r\nfortune.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(45) But it must be remembered all this while, that the\r\nprecepts which we have set down are of that kind which may be\r\ncounted and called \u003ci\u003eBonæ Artes\u003c/i\u003e. As for evil\r\narts, if a man would set down for himself that principle of\r\nMachiavel, “That a man seek not to attain virtue itself,\r\nbut the appearance only thereof; because the credit of virtue is\r\na help, but the use of it is cumber:” or that other of his\r\nprinciples, “That he presuppose that men are not fitly to\r\nbe wrought otherwise but by fear; and therefore that he seek to\r\nhave every man obnoxious, low, and in straits,” which the\r\nItalians call \u003ci\u003eseminar spine\u003c/i\u003e, to sow thorns: or that other\r\nprinciple, contained in the verse which Cicero citeth, \u003ci\u003eCadant\r\namici\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003edummodo inimici intercidant\u003c/i\u003e, as the triumvirs,\r\nwhich sold every one to other the lives of their friends for the\r\ndeaths of their enemies: or that other protestation of L.\r\nCatilina, to set on fire and trouble states, to the end to fish\r\nin droumy waters, and to unwrap their fortunes, \u003ci\u003eEgo si quid in\r\nfortunis meis excitatum sit incendium\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eid non aqua sed\r\nruina restinguam\u003c/i\u003e: or that other principle of Lysander,\r\n“That children are to be deceived with comfits, and men\r\nwith oaths:” and the like evil and corrupt positions,\r\nwhereof (as in all things) there are more in number than of the\r\ngood: certainly with these dispensations from the laws of charity\r\nand integrity, the pressing of a man’s fortune may be more\r\nhasty and compendious. But it is in life as it is in ways,\r\nthe shortest way is commonly the foulest, and surely the fairer\r\nway is not much about.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(46) But men, if they be in their own power, and do bear and\r\nsustain themselves, and be not carried away with a whirlwind or\r\ntempest of ambition, ought in the pursuit of their own fortune to\r\nset before their eyes not only that general map of the world,\r\n“That all things are vanity and vexation of spirit,”\r\nbut many other more particular cards and directions: chiefly\r\nthat, that being without well-being is a curse, and the greater\r\nbeing the greater curse; and that all virtue is most rewarded and\r\nall wickedness most punished in itself: according as the poet\r\nsaith excellently:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Quæ vobis, quæ digna, viri pro\r\nlaudibus istis\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPræmia posse rear solvi? pulcherrima primum\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDii \u003ci\u003emoresque\u003c/i\u003e dabunt vestri.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd so of the contrary. And secondly they ought to look\r\nup to the Eternal Providence and Divine Judgment, which often\r\nsubverteth the wisdom of evil plots and imaginations, according\r\nto that scripture, “He hath conceived mischief, and shall\r\nbring forth a vain thing.” And although men should\r\nrefrain themselves from injury and evil arts, yet this incessant\r\nand Sabbathless pursuit of a man’s fortune leaveth not\r\ntribute which we owe to God of our time; who (we see) demandeth a\r\ntenth of our substance, and a seventh, which is more strict, of\r\nour time: and it is to small purpose to have an erected face\r\ntowards heaven, and a perpetual grovelling spirit upon earth,\r\neating dust as doth the serpent, \u003ci\u003eAtque affigit humo\r\ndivinæ particulam auræ\u003c/i\u003e. And if any man\r\nflatter himself that he will employ his fortune well, though he\r\nshould obtain it ill, as was said concerning Augustus\r\nCæsar, and after of Septimius Severus, “That either\r\nthey should never have been born, or else they should never have\r\ndied,” they did so much mischief in the pursuit and ascent\r\nof their greatness, and so much good when they were established;\r\nyet these compensations and satisfactions are good to be used,\r\nbut never good to be purposed. And lastly, it is not amiss\r\nfor men, in their race towards their fortune, to cool themselves\r\na little with that conceit which is elegantly expressed by the\r\nEmperor Charles V., in his instructions to the king his son,\r\n“That fortune hath somewhat of the nature of a woman, that\r\nif she he too much wooed she is the farther off.” But\r\nthis last is but a remedy for those whose tastes are corrupted:\r\nlet men rather build upon that foundation which is as a\r\ncorner-stone of divinity and philosophy, wherein they join close,\r\nnamely that same \u003ci\u003ePrimum quærite\u003c/i\u003e. For divinity\r\nsaith, \u003ci\u003ePrimum quærite regnum Dei\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet ista omnia\r\nadjicientur vobis\u003c/i\u003e: and philosophy saith, \u003ci\u003ePrimum\r\nquærite bona animi\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003ecætera aut aderunt\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003eaut non oberunt\u003c/i\u003e. And although the human foundation\r\nhath somewhat of the sands, as we see in M. Brutus, when he broke\r\nforth into that speech,\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e“Te colui (Virtus) ut rem; ast tu nomen\r\ninane es;”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eyet the divine foundation is upon the rock. But this may\r\nserve for a taste of that knowledge which I noted as\r\ndeficient.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(47) Concerning government, it is a part of knowledge secret\r\nand retired in both these respects in which things are deemed\r\nsecret; for some things are secret because they are hard to know,\r\nand some because they are not fit to utter. We see all\r\ngovernments are obscure and invisible:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e “Totamque infusa per\r\nartus\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch is the description of governments. We see the\r\ngovernment of God over the world is hidden, insomuch as it\r\nseemeth to participate of much irregularity and confusion.\r\nThe government of the soul in moving the body is inward and\r\nprofound, and the passages thereof hardly to be reduced to\r\ndemonstration. Again, the wisdom of antiquity (the shadows\r\nwhereof are in the poets) in the description of torments and\r\npains, next unto the crime of rebellion, which was the\r\ngiants’ offence, doth detest the offence of futility, as in\r\nSisyphus and Tantalus. But this was meant of particulars:\r\nnevertheless even unto the general rules and discourses of policy\r\nand government there is due a reverent and reserved handling.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(48) But contrariwise in the governors towards the governed,\r\nall things ought as far as the frailty of man permitteth to be\r\nmanifest and revealed. For so it is expressed in the\r\nScriptures touching the government of God, that this globe, which\r\nseemeth to us a dark and shady body, is in the view of God as\r\ncrystal: \u003ci\u003eEt in conspectu sedis tanquam mare vitreum simile\r\ncrystallo\u003c/i\u003e. So unto princes and states, and specially\r\ntowards wise senates and councils, the natures and dispositions\r\nof the people, their conditions and necessities, their factions\r\nand combinations, their animosities and discontents, ought to be,\r\nin regard of the variety of their intelligences, the wisdom of\r\ntheir observations, and the height of their station where they\r\nkeep sentinel, in great part clear and transparent.\r\nWherefore, considering that I write to a king that is a master of\r\nthis science, and is so well assisted, I think it decent to pass\r\nover this part in silence, as willing to obtain the certificate\r\nwhich one of the ancient philosophers aspired unto; who being\r\nsilent, when others contended to make demonstration of their\r\nabilities by speech, desired it might be certified for his part,\r\n“That there was one that knew how to hold his\r\npeace.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(49) Notwithstanding, for the more public part of government,\r\nwhich is laws, I think good to note only one deficiency; which\r\nis, that all those which have written of laws have written either\r\nas philosophers or as lawyers, and none as statesmen. As\r\nfor the philosophers, they make imaginary laws for imaginary\r\ncommonwealths, and their discourses are as the stars, which give\r\nlittle light because they are so high. For the lawyers,\r\nthey write according to the states where they live what is\r\nreceived law, and not what ought to be law; for the wisdom of a\r\nlaw-maker is one, and of a lawyer is another. For there are\r\nin nature certain fountains of justice whence all civil laws are\r\nderived but as streams; and like as waters do take tinctures and\r\ntastes from the soils through which they run, so do civil laws\r\nvary according to the regions and governments where they are\r\nplanted, though they proceed from the same fountains.\r\nAgain, the wisdom of a law-maker consisteth not only in a\r\nplatform of justice, but in the application thereof; taking into\r\nconsideration by what means laws may be made certain, and what\r\nare the causes and remedies of the doubtfulness and uncertainty\r\nof law; by what means laws may be made apt and easy to be\r\nexecuted, and what are the impediments and remedies in the\r\nexecution of laws; what influence laws touching private right of\r\n\u003ci\u003emeum\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003etuum\u003c/i\u003e have into the public state, and how\r\nthey may be made apt and agreeable; how laws are to be penned and\r\ndelivered, whether in texts or in Acts, brief or large, with\r\npreambles or without; how they are to be pruned and reformed from\r\ntime to time, and what is the best means to keep them from being\r\ntoo vast in volume, or too full of multiplicity and crossness;\r\nhow they are to be expounded, when upon causes emergent and\r\njudicially discussed, and when upon responses and conferences\r\ntouching general points or questions; how they are to be pressed,\r\nrigorously or tenderly; how they are to be mitigated by equity\r\nand good conscience, and whether discretion and strict law are to\r\nbe mingled in the same courts, or kept apart in several courts;\r\nagain, how the practice, profession, and erudition of law is to\r\nbe censured and governed; and many other points touching the\r\nadministration and (as I may term it) animation of laws.\r\nUpon which I insist the less, because I purpose (if God give me\r\nleave), having begun a work of this nature in aphorisms, to\r\npropound it hereafter, noting it in the meantime for\r\ndeficient.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(50) And for your Majesty’s laws of England, I could say\r\nmuch of their dignity, and somewhat of their defect; but they\r\ncannot but excel the civil laws in fitness for the government,\r\nfor the civil law was \u003ci\u003enonhos quæsitum munus in usus\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nit was not made for the countries which it governeth.\r\nHereof I cease to speak because I will not intermingle matter of\r\naction with matter of general learning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXXIV. Thus have I concluded this portion of learning\r\ntouching civil knowledge; and with civil knowledge have concluded\r\nhuman philosophy; and with human philosophy, philosophy in\r\ngeneral. And being now at some pause, looking back into\r\nthat I have passed through, this writing seemeth to me (\u003ci\u003esi\r\nnunquam fallit imago\u003c/i\u003e), as far as a man can judge of his own\r\nwork, not much better than that noise or sound which musicians\r\nmake while they are in tuning their instruments, which is nothing\r\npleasant to hear, but yet is a cause why the music is sweeter\r\nafterwards. So have I been content to tune the instruments\r\nof the Muses, that they may play that have better hands.\r\nAnd surely, when I set before me the condition of these times, in\r\nwhich learning hath made her third visitation or circuit in all\r\nthe qualities thereof; as the excellency and vivacity of the wits\r\nof this age; the noble helps and lights which we have by the\r\ntravails of ancient writers; the art of printing, which\r\ncommunicateth books to men of all fortunes; the openness of the\r\nworld by navigation, which hath disclosed multitudes of\r\nexperiments, and a mass of natural history; the leisure wherewith\r\nthese times abound, not employing men so generally in civil\r\nbusiness, as the states of Græcia did, in respect of their\r\npopularity, and the state of Rome, in respect of the greatness of\r\ntheir monarchy; the present disposition of these times at this\r\ninstant to peace; the consumption of all that ever can be said in\r\ncontroversies of religion, which have so much diverted men from\r\nother sciences; the perfection of your Majesty’s learning,\r\nwhich as a phœnix may call whole volleys of wits to follow\r\nyou; and the inseparable propriety of time, which is ever more\r\nand more to disclose truth; I cannot but be raised to this\r\npersuasion, that this third period of time will far surpass that\r\nof the Grecian and Roman learning; only if men will know their\r\nown strength and their own weakness both; and take, one from the\r\nother, light of invention, and not fire of contradiction; and\r\nesteem of the inquisition of truth as of an enterprise, and not\r\nas of a quality or ornament; and employ wit and magnificence to\r\nthings of worth and excellency, and not to things vulgar and of\r\npopular estimation. As for my labours, if any man shall\r\nplease himself or others in the reprehension of them, they shall\r\nmake that ancient and patient request, \u003ci\u003eVerbera\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esed\r\naudi\u003c/i\u003e: let men reprehend them, so they observe and weigh\r\nthem. For the appeal is lawful (though it may be it shall\r\nnot be needful) from the first cogitations of men to their\r\nsecond, and from the nearer times to the times further off.\r\nNow let us come to that learning, which both the former times\r\nwere not so blessed as to know, sacred and inspired divinity, the\r\nSabbath and port of all men’s labours and\r\nperegrinations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXXV. (1) The prerogative of God extendeth as well to the\r\nreason as to the will of man: so that as we are to obey His law,\r\nthough we find a reluctation in our will, so we are to believe\r\nHis word, though we find a reluctation in our reason. For\r\nif we believe only that which is agreeable to our sense we give\r\nconsent to the matter, and not to the author; which is no more\r\nthan we would do towards a suspected and discredited witness; but\r\nthat faith which was accounted to Abraham for righteousness was\r\nof such a point as whereat Sarah laughed, who therein was an\r\nimage of natural reason.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) Howbeit (if we will truly consider of it) more worthy it\r\nis to believe than to know as we now know. For in knowledge\r\nman’s mind suffereth from sense: but in belief it suffereth\r\nfrom spirit, such one as it holdeth for more authorised than\r\nitself and so suffereth from the worthier agent. Otherwise\r\nit is of the state of man glorified; for then faith shall cease,\r\nand we shall know as we are known.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(3) Wherefore we conclude that sacred theology (which in our\r\nidiom we call divinity) is grounded only upon the word and oracle\r\nof God, and not upon the light of nature: for it is written,\r\n\u003ci\u003eCæli enarrant gloriam Dei\u003c/i\u003e; but it is not written,\r\n\u003ci\u003eCæli enarrant voluntatem Dei\u003c/i\u003e: but of that it is\r\nsaid, \u003ci\u003eAd legem et testimonium\u003c/i\u003e: \u003ci\u003esi non fecerint secundum\r\nverbum istud\u003c/i\u003e, \u0026amp;c. This holdeth not only in those\r\npoints of faith which concern the great mysteries of the Deity,\r\nof the creation, of the redemption, but likewise those which\r\nconcern the law moral, truly interpreted: “Love your\r\nenemies: do good to them that hate you; be like to your heavenly\r\nFather, that suffereth His rain to fall upon the just and\r\nunjust.” To this it ought to be applauded, \u003ci\u003eNec vox\r\nhominem sonat\u003c/i\u003e: it is a voice beyond the light of\r\nnature. So we see the heathen poets, when they fall upon a\r\nlibertine passion, do still expostulate with laws and moralities,\r\nas if they were opposite and malignant to nature: \u003ci\u003eEt quod\r\nnatura remittit\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003einvida jura negant\u003c/i\u003e. So said\r\nDendamis the Indian unto Alexander’s messengers, that he\r\nhad heard somewhat of Pythagoras, and some other of the wise men\r\nof Græcia, and that he held them for excellent men: but\r\nthat they had a fault, which was that they had in too great\r\nreverence and veneration a thing they called law and\r\nmanners. So it must be confessed that a great part of the\r\nlaw moral is of that perfection whereunto the light of nature\r\ncannot aspire: how then is it that man is said to have, by the\r\nlight and law of nature, some notions and conceits of virtue and\r\nvice, justice and wrong, good and evil? Thus, because the\r\nlight of nature is used in two several senses: the one, that\r\nwhich springeth from reason, sense, induction, argument,\r\naccording to the laws of heaven and earth; the other, that which\r\nis imprinted upon the spirit of man by an inward instinct,\r\naccording to the law of conscience, which is a sparkle of the\r\npurity of his first estate: in which latter sense only he is\r\nparticipant of some light and discerning touching the perfection\r\nof the moral law; but how? sufficient to check the vice but not\r\nto inform the duty. So then the doctrine of religion, as\r\nwell moral as mystical, is not to be attained but by inspiration\r\nand revelation from God.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(4) The use notwithstanding of reason in spiritual things, and\r\nthe latitude thereof, is very great and general: for it is not\r\nfor nothing that the apostle calleth religion “our\r\nreasonable service of God;” insomuch as the very ceremonies\r\nand figures of the old law were full of reason and signification,\r\nmuch more than the ceremonies of idolatry and magic, that are\r\nfull of non-significants and surd characters. But most\r\nspecially the Christian faith, as in all things so in this,\r\ndeserveth to be highly magnified; holding and preserving the\r\ngolden mediocrity in this point between the law of the heathen\r\nand the law of Mahomet, which have embraced the two\r\nextremes. For the religion of the heathen had no constant\r\nbelief or confession, but left all to the liberty of agent; and\r\nthe religion of Mahomet on the other side interdicteth argument\r\naltogether: the one having the very face of error, and the other\r\nof imposture; whereas the Faith doth both admit and reject\r\ndisputation with difference.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(5) The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts: the\r\nformer, in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of\r\nGod to us revealed; the other, in the inferring and deriving of\r\ndoctrine and direction thereupon. The former extendeth to\r\nthe mysteries themselves; but how? by way of illustration, and\r\nnot by way of argument. The latter consisteth indeed of\r\nprobation and argument. In the former we see God\r\nvouchsafeth to descend to our capacity, in the expressing of His\r\nmysteries in sort as may be sensible unto us; and doth graft His\r\nrevelations and holy doctrine upon the notions of our reason, and\r\napplieth His inspirations to open our understanding, as the form\r\nof the key to the ward of the lock. For the latter there is\r\nallowed us a use of reason and argument, secondary and\r\nrespective, although not original and absolute. For after\r\nthe articles and principles of religion are placed and exempted\r\nfrom examination of reason, it is then permitted unto us to make\r\nderivations and inferences from and according to the analogy of\r\nthem, for our better direction. In nature this holdeth not;\r\nfor both the principles are examinable by induction, though not\r\nby a medium or syllogism; and besides, those principles or first\r\npositions have no discordance with that reason which draweth down\r\nand deduceth the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth not\r\nin religion alone, but in many knowledges, both of greater and\r\nsmaller nature, namely, wherein there are not only \u003ci\u003eposita\u003c/i\u003e\r\nbut \u003ci\u003eplacita\u003c/i\u003e; for in such there can be no use of absolute\r\nreason. We see it familiarly in games of wit, as chess, or\r\nthe like. The draughts and first laws of the game are\r\npositive, but how? merely \u003ci\u003ead placitum\u003c/i\u003e, and not examinable\r\nby reason; but then how to direct our play thereupon with best\r\nadvantage to win the game is artificial and rational. So in\r\nhuman laws there be many grounds and maxims which are \u003ci\u003eplacita\r\njuris\u003c/i\u003e, positive upon authority, and not upon reason, and\r\ntherefore not to be disputed: but what is most just, not\r\nabsolutely but relatively, and according to those maxims, that\r\naffordeth a long field of disputation. Such therefore is\r\nthat secondary reason, which hath place in divinity, which is\r\ngrounded upon the \u003ci\u003eplacets\u003c/i\u003e of God.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(6) Here therefore I note this deficiency, that there hath not\r\nbeen, to my understanding, sufficiently inquired and handled the\r\ntrue limits and use of reason in spiritual things, as a kind of\r\ndivine dialectic: which for that it is not done, it seemeth to me\r\na thing usual, by pretext of true conceiving that which is\r\nrevealed, to search and mine into that which is not revealed; and\r\nby pretext of enucleating inferences and contradictories, to\r\nexamine that which is positive. The one sort falling into\r\nthe error of Nicodemus, demanding to have things made more\r\nsensible than it pleaseth God to reveal them, \u003ci\u003eQuomodo possit\r\nhomo nasci cum sit senex\u003c/i\u003e? The other sort into the error\r\nof the disciples, which were scandalised at a show of\r\ncontradiction, \u003ci\u003eQuid est hoc quod dicit nobis\u003c/i\u003e?\r\n\u003ci\u003eModicum et non videbitis me\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003eet iterum\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003emodicum\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet videbitis me\u003c/i\u003e, \u0026amp;c.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(7) Upon this I have insisted the more, in regard of the great\r\nand blessed use thereof; for this point well laboured and defined\r\nof would in my judgment be an opiate to stay and bridle not only\r\nthe vanity of curious speculations, wherewith the schools labour,\r\nbut the fury of controversies, wherewith the Church\r\nlaboureth. For it cannot but open men’s eyes to see\r\nthat many controversies do merely pertain to that which is either\r\nnot revealed or positive; and that many others do grow upon weak\r\nand obscure inferences or derivations: which latter sort, if men\r\nwould revive the blessed style of that great doctor of the\r\nGentiles, would be carried thus, \u003ci\u003eego\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enon dominus\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nand again, \u003ci\u003esecundum consilium meum\u003c/i\u003e, in opinions and\r\ncounsels, and not in positions and oppositions. But men are\r\nnow over-ready to usurp the style, \u003ci\u003enon ego\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esed\r\ndominus\u003c/i\u003e; and not so only, but to bind it with the thunder and\r\ndenunciation of curses and anathemas, to the terror of those\r\nwhich have not sufficiently learned out of Solomon that\r\n“The causeless curse shall not come.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(8) Divinity hath two principal parts: the matter informed or\r\nrevealed, and the nature of the information or revelation; and\r\nwith the latter we will begin, because it hath most coherence\r\nwith that which we have now last handled. The nature of the\r\ninformation consisteth of three branches: the limits of the\r\ninformation, the sufficiency of the information, and the\r\nacquiring or obtaining the information. Unto the limits of\r\nthe information belong these considerations: how far forth\r\nparticular persons continue to be inspired; how far forth the\r\nChurch is inspired; and how far forth reason may be used; the\r\nlast point whereof I have noted as deficient. Unto the\r\nsufficiency of the information belong two considerations: what\r\npoints of religion are fundamental, and what perfective, being\r\nmatter of further building and perfection upon one and the same\r\nfoundation; and again, how the gradations of light according to\r\nthe dispensation of times are material to the sufficiency of\r\nbelief.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(9) Here again I may rather give it in advice than note it as\r\ndeficient, that the points fundamental, and the points of further\r\nperfection only, ought to be with piety and wisdom distinguished;\r\na subject tending to much like end as that I noted before; for as\r\nthat other were likely to abate the number of controversies, so\r\nthis is likely to abate the heat of many of them. We see\r\nMoses when he saw the Israelite and the Egyptian fight, he did\r\nnot say, “Why strive you?” but drew his sword and\r\nslew the Egyptian; but when he saw the two Israelites fight, he\r\nsaid, “You are brethren, why strive you?” If\r\nthe point of doctrine be an Egyptian, it must be slain by the\r\nsword of the Spirit, and not reconciled; but if it be an\r\nIsraelite, though in the wrong, then, “Why strive\r\nyou?” We see of the fundamental points, our Saviour\r\npenneth the league thus, “He that is not with us is against\r\nus;” but of points not fundamental, thus, “He that is\r\nnot against us is with us.” So we see the coat of our\r\nSaviour was entire without seam, and so is the doctrine of the\r\nScriptures in itself; but the garment of the Church was of divers\r\ncolours and yet not divided. We see the chaff may and ought\r\nto be severed from the corn in the ear, but the tares may not be\r\npulled up from the corn in the field. So as it is a thing\r\nof great use well to define what, and of what latitude, those\r\npoints are which do make men mere aliens and disincorporate from\r\nthe Church of God.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(10) For the obtaining of the information, it resteth upon the\r\ntrue and sound interpretation of the Scriptures, which are the\r\nfountains of the water of life. The interpretations of the\r\nScriptures are of two sorts: methodical, and solute or at\r\nlarge. For this divine water, which excelleth so much that\r\nof Jacob’s well, is drawn forth much in the same kind as\r\nnatural water useth to be out of wells and fountains; either it\r\nis first forced up into a cistern, and from thence fetched and\r\nderived for use; or else it is drawn and received in buckets and\r\nvessels immediately where it springeth. The former sort\r\nwhereof, though it seem to be the more ready, yet in my judgment\r\nis more subject to corrupt. This is that method which hath\r\nexhibited unto us the scholastical divinity; whereby divinity\r\nhath been reduced into an art, as into a cistern, and the streams\r\nof doctrine or positions fetched and derived from thence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(11) In this men have sought three things, a summary brevity,\r\na compacted strength, and a complete perfection; whereof the two\r\nfirst they fail to find, and the last they ought not to\r\nseek. For as to brevity, we see in all summary methods,\r\nwhile men purpose to abridge, they give cause to dilate.\r\nFor the sum or abridgment by contraction becometh obscure; the\r\nobscurity requireth exposition, and the exposition is deduced\r\ninto large commentaries, or into commonplaces and titles, which\r\ngrow to be more vast than the original writings, whence the sum\r\nwas at first extracted. So we see the volumes of the\r\nschoolmen are greater much than the first writings of the\r\nfathers, whence the master of the sentences made his sum or\r\ncollection. So in like manner the volumes of the modern\r\ndoctors of the civil law exceed those of the ancient\r\njurisconsults, of which Tribonian compiled the digest. So\r\nas this course of sums and commentaries is that which doth\r\ninfallibly make the body of sciences more immense in quantity,\r\nand more base in substance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(12) And for strength, it is true that knowledges reduced into\r\nexact methods have a show of strength, in that each part seemeth\r\nto support and sustain the other; but this is more satisfactory\r\nthan substantial, like unto buildings which stand by architecture\r\nand compaction, which are more subject to ruin than those that\r\nare built more strong in their several parts, though less\r\ncompacted. But it is plain that the more you recede from\r\nyour grounds, the weaker do you conclude; and as in nature, the\r\nmore you remove yourself from particulars, the greater peril of\r\nerror you do incur; so much more in divinity, the more you recede\r\nfrom the Scriptures by inferences and consequences, the more weak\r\nand dilute are your positions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(13) And as for perfection or completeness in divinity, it is\r\nnot to be sought, which makes this course of artificial divinity\r\nthe more suspect. For he that will reduce a knowledge into\r\nan art will make it round and uniform; but in divinity many\r\nthings must be left abrupt, and concluded with this: \u003ci\u003eO\r\naltitudo sapientiæ et scientiæ Dei\u003c/i\u003e! \u003ci\u003equam\r\nincomprehensibilia sunt juducua ejus\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet non\r\ninvestigabiles viæ ejus\u003c/i\u003e. So again the apostle\r\nsaith, \u003ci\u003eEx parte scimus\u003c/i\u003e: and to have the form of a total,\r\nwhere there is but matter for a part, cannot be without supplies\r\nby supposition and presumption. And therefore I conclude\r\nthat the true use of these sums and methods hath place in\r\ninstitutions or introductions preparatory unto knowledge; but in\r\nthem, or by deducement from them, to handle the main body and\r\nsubstance of a knowledge is in all sciences prejudicial, and in\r\ndivinity dangerous.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(14) As to the interpretation of the Scriptures solute and at\r\nlarge, there have been divers kinds introduced and devised; some\r\nof them rather curious and unsafe than sober and warranted.\r\nNotwithstanding, thus much must be confessed, that the\r\nScriptures, being given by inspiration and not by human reason,\r\ndo differ from all other books in the Author, which by\r\nconsequence doth draw on some difference to be used by the\r\nexpositor. For the Inditer of them did know four things\r\nwhich no man attains to know; which are—the mysteries of\r\nthe kingdom of glory, the perfection of the laws of nature, the\r\nsecrets of the heart of man, and the future succession of all\r\nages. For as to the first it is said, “He that\r\npresseth into the light shall be oppressed of the\r\nglory.” And again, “No man shall see My face\r\nand live.” To the second, “When He prepared the\r\nheavens I was present, when by law and compass He enclosed the\r\ndeep.” To the third, “Neither was it needful\r\nthat any should bear witness to Him of man, for He knew well what\r\nwas in man.” And to the last, “From the\r\nbeginning are known to the Lord all His works.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(15) From the former two of these have been drawn certain\r\nsenses and expositions of Scriptures, which had need be contained\r\nwithin the bounds of sobriety—the one anagogical, and the\r\nother philosophical. But as to the former, man is not to\r\nprevent his time: \u003ci\u003eVidemus nunc per speculum in\r\nænigmate\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003etunc autem facie ad faciem\u003c/i\u003e; wherein\r\nnevertheless there seemeth to be a liberty granted, as far forth\r\nas the polishing of this glass, or some moderate explication of\r\nthis enigma. But to press too far into it cannot but cause\r\na dissolution and overthrow of the spirit of man. For in\r\nthe body there are three degrees of that we receive into\r\nit—aliment, medicine, and poison; whereof aliment is that\r\nwhich the nature of man can perfectly alter and overcome;\r\nmedicine is that which is partly converted by nature, and partly\r\nconverteth nature; and poison is that which worketh wholly upon\r\nnature, without that nature can in any part work upon it.\r\nSo in the mind, whatsoever knowledge reason cannot at all work\r\nupon and convert is a mere intoxication, and endangereth a\r\ndissolution of the mind and understanding.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(16) But for the latter, it hath been extremely set on foot of\r\nlate time by the school of Paracelsus, and some others, that have\r\npretended to find the truth of all natural philosophy in the\r\nScriptures; scandalising and traducing all other philosophy as\r\nheathenish and profane. But there is no such enmity between\r\nGod’s Word and His works; neither do they give honour to\r\nthe Scriptures, as they suppose, but much embase them. For\r\nto seek heaven and earth in the Word of God, whereof it is said,\r\n“Heaven and earth shall pass, but My word shall not\r\npass,” is to seek temporary things amongst eternal: and as\r\nto seek divinity in philosophy is to seek the living amongst the\r\ndead, so to seek philosophy in divinity is to seek the dead\r\namongst the living: neither are the pots or lavers, whose place\r\nwas in the outward part of the temple, to be sought in the\r\nholiest place of all where the ark of the testimony was\r\nseated. And again, the scope or purpose of the Spirit of\r\nGod is not to express matters of nature in the Scriptures,\r\notherwise than in passage, and for application to man’s\r\ncapacity and to matters moral or divine. And it is a true\r\nrule, \u003ci\u003eAuctoris aliud agentis parva auctoritas\u003c/i\u003e. For\r\nit were a strange conclusion, if a man should use a similitude\r\nfor ornament or illustration sake, borrowed from nature or\r\nhistory according to vulgar conceit, as of a basilisk, a unicorn,\r\na centaur, a Briareus, a hydra, or the like, that therefore he\r\nmust needs be thought to affirm the matter thereof positively to\r\nbe true. To conclude therefore these two interpretations,\r\nthe one by reduction or enigmatical, the other philosophical or\r\nphysical, which have been received and pursued in imitation of\r\nthe rabbins and cabalists, are to be confined with a \u003ci\u003ea noli\r\nakryn sapere\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esed time\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(17) But the two latter points, known to God and unknown to\r\nman, touching the secrets of the heart and the successions of\r\ntime, doth make a just and sound difference between the manner of\r\nthe exposition of the Scriptures and all other books. For\r\nit is an excellent observation which hath been made upon the\r\nanswers of our Saviour Christ to many of the questions which were\r\npropounded to Him, how that they are impertinent to the state of\r\nthe question demanded: the reason whereof is, because not being\r\nlike man, which knows man’s thoughts by his words, but\r\nknowing man’s thoughts immediately, He never answered their\r\nwords, but their thoughts. Much in the like manner it is\r\nwith the Scriptures, which being written to the thoughts of men,\r\nand to the succession of all ages, with a foresight of all\r\nheresies, contradictions, differing estates of the Church, yea,\r\nand particularly of the elect, are not to be interpreted only\r\naccording to the latitude of the proper sense of the place, and\r\nrespectively towards that present occasion whereupon the words\r\nwere uttered, or in precise congruity or contexture with the\r\nwords before or after, or in contemplation of the principal scope\r\nof the place; but have in themselves, not only totally or\r\ncollectively, but distributively in clauses and words, infinite\r\nsprings and streams of doctrine to water the Church in every\r\npart. And therefore as the literal sense is, as it were,\r\nthe main stream or river, so the moral sense chiefly, and\r\nsometimes the allegorical or typical, are they whereof the Church\r\nhath most use; not that I wish men to be bold in allegories, or\r\nindulgent or light in allusions: but that I do much condemn that\r\ninterpretation of the Scripture which is only after the manner as\r\nmen use to interpret a profane book.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(18) In this part touching the exposition of the Scriptures, I\r\ncan report no deficiency; but by way of remembrance this I will\r\nadd. In perusing books of divinity I find many books of\r\ncontroversies, and many of commonplaces and treatises, a mass of\r\npositive divinity, as it is made an art: a number of sermons and\r\nlectures, and many prolix commentaries upon the Scriptures, with\r\nharmonies and concordances. But that form of writing in\r\ndivinity which in my judgment is of all others most rich and\r\nprecious is positive divinity, collected upon particular texts of\r\nScriptures in brief observations; not dilated into commonplaces,\r\nnot chasing after controversies, not reduced into method of art;\r\na thing abounding in sermons, which will vanish, but defective in\r\nbooks which will remain, and a thing wherein this age\r\nexcelleth. For I am persuaded, and I may speak it with an\r\n\u003ci\u003eabsit invidia verbo\u003c/i\u003e, and nowise in derogation of\r\nantiquity, but as in a good emulation between the vine and the\r\nolive, that if the choice and best of those observations upon\r\ntexts of Scriptures which have been made dispersedly in sermons\r\nwithin this your Majesty’s Island of Brittany by the space\r\nof these forty years and more (leaving out the largeness of\r\nexhortations and applications thereupon) had been set down in a\r\ncontinuance, it had been the best work in divinity which had been\r\nwritten since the Apostles’ times.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(19) The matter informed by divinity is of two kinds: matter\r\nof belief and truth of opinion, and matter of service and\r\nadoration; which is also judged and directed by the\r\nformer—the one being as the internal soul of religion, and\r\nthe other as the external body thereof. And, therefore, the\r\nheathen religion was not only a worship of idols, but the whole\r\nreligion was an idol in itself; for it had no soul; that is, no\r\ncertainty of belief or confession: as a man may well think,\r\nconsidering the chief doctors of their church were the poets; and\r\nthe reason was because the heathen gods were no jealous gods, but\r\nwere glad to be admitted into part, as they had reason.\r\nNeither did they respect the pureness of heart, so they might\r\nhave external honour and rites.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(20) But out of these two do result and issue four main\r\nbranches of divinity: faith, manners, liturgy, and\r\ngovernment. Faith containeth the doctrine of the nature of\r\nGod, of the attributes of God, and of the works of God. The\r\nnature of God consisteth of three persons in unity of\r\nGodhead. The attributes of God are either common to the\r\nDeity, or respective to the persons. The works of God\r\nsummary are two, that of the creation and that of the redemption;\r\nand both these works, as in total they appertain to the unity of\r\nthe Godhead, so in their parts they refer to the three persons:\r\nthat of the creation, in the mass of the matter, to the Father;\r\nin the disposition of the form, to the Son; and in the\r\ncontinuance and conservation of the being, to the Holy\r\nSpirit. So that of the redemption, in the election and\r\ncounsel, to the Father; in the whole act and consummation, to the\r\nSon; and in the application, to the Holy Spirit; for by the Holy\r\nGhost was Christ conceived in flesh, and by the Holy Ghost are\r\nthe elect regenerate in spirit. This work likewise we\r\nconsider either effectually, in the elect; or privately, in the\r\nreprobate; or according to appearance, in the visible Church.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(21) For manners, the doctrine thereof is contained in the\r\nlaw, which discloseth sin. The law itself is divided,\r\naccording to the edition thereof, into the law of nature, the law\r\nmoral, and the law positive; and according to the style, into\r\nnegative and affirmative, prohibitions and commandments.\r\nSin, in the matter and subject thereof, is divided according to\r\nthe commandments; in the form thereof it referreth to the three\r\npersons in Deity: sins of infirmity against the Father, whose\r\nmore special attribute is power; sins of ignorance against the\r\nSon, whose attribute is wisdom; and sins of malice against the\r\nHoly Ghost, whose attribute is grace or love. In the\r\nmotions of it, it either moveth to the right hand or to the left;\r\neither to blind devotion or to profane and libertine\r\ntransgression; either in imposing restraint where God granteth\r\nliberty, or in taking liberty where God imposeth restraint.\r\nIn the degrees and progress of it, it divideth itself into\r\nthought, word, or act. And in this part I commend much the\r\ndeducing of the law of God to cases of conscience; for that I\r\ntake indeed to be a breaking, and not exhibiting whole of the\r\nbread of life. But that which quickeneth both these\r\ndoctrines of faith and manners is the elevation and consent of\r\nthe heart; whereunto appertain books of exhortation, holy\r\nmeditation, Christian resolution, and the like.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(22) For the liturgy or service, it consisteth of the\r\nreciprocal acts between God and man; which, on the part of God,\r\nare the preaching of the word, and the sacraments, which are\r\nseals to the covenant, or as the visible word; and on the part of\r\nman, invocation of the name of God; and under the law,\r\nsacrifices; which were as visible prayers or confessions: but now\r\nthe adoration being \u003ci\u003ein spiritu et veritate\u003c/i\u003e, there\r\nremaineth only \u003ci\u003evituli labiorum\u003c/i\u003e; although the use of holy\r\nvows of thankfulness and retribution may be accounted also as\r\nsealed petitions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(23) And for the government of the Church, it consisteth of\r\nthe patrimony of the Church, the franchises of the Church, and\r\nthe offices and jurisdictions of the Church, and the laws of the\r\nChurch directing the whole; all which have two considerations,\r\nthe one in themselves, the other how they stand compatible and\r\nagreeable to the civil estate.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(24) This matter of divinity is handled either in form of\r\ninstruction of truth, or in form of confutation of\r\nfalsehood. The declinations from religion, besides the\r\nprivative, which is atheism and the branches thereof, are\r\nthree—heresies, idolatry, and witchcraft: heresies, when we\r\nserve the true God with a false worship; idolatry, when we\r\nworship false gods, supposing them to be true; and witchcraft,\r\nwhen we adore false gods, knowing them to be wicked and\r\nfalse. For so your Majesty doth excellently well observe,\r\nthat witchcraft is the height of idolatry. And yet we see\r\nthough these be true degrees, Samuel teacheth us that they are\r\nall of a nature, when there is once a receding from the Word of\r\nGod; for so he saith, \u003ci\u003eQuasi peccatum ariolandi est\r\nrepugnare\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eet quasi scelus idololatriæ nolle\r\nacquiescere\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e(25) These things I have passed over so briefly because I can\r\nreport no deficiency concerning them: for I can find no space or\r\nground that lieth vacant and unsown in the matter of divinity, so\r\ndiligent have men been either in sowing of good seed, or in\r\nsowing of tares.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"gapspace\"\u003e \u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus have I made as it were a small globe of the intellectual\r\nworld, as truly and faithfully as I could discover; with a note\r\nand description of those parts which seem to me not constantly\r\noccupate, or not well converted by the labour of man. In\r\nwhich, if I have in any point receded from that which is commonly\r\nreceived, it hath been with a purpose of proceeding in\r\n\u003ci\u003emelius\u003c/i\u003e, and not \u003ci\u003ein aliud\u003c/i\u003e; a mind of amendment and\r\nproficiency, and not of change and difference. For I could\r\nnot be true and constant to the argument I handle if I were not\r\nwilling to go beyond others; but yet not more willing than to\r\nhave others go beyond me again: which may the better appear by\r\nthis, that I have propounded my opinions naked and unarmed, not\r\nseeking to preoccupate the liberty of men’s judgments by\r\nconfutations. For in anything which is well set down, I am\r\nin good hope that if the first reading move an objection, the\r\nsecond reading will make an answer. And in those things\r\nwherein I have erred, I am sure I have not prejudiced the right\r\nby litigious arguments; which certainly have this contrary effect\r\nand operation, that they add authority to error, and destroy the\r\nauthority of that which is well invented. For question is\r\nan honour and preferment to falsehood, as on the other side it is\r\na repulse to truth. But the errors I claim and challenge to\r\nmyself as mine own. The good, it any be, is due \u003ci\u003etanquam\r\nadeps sacrificii\u003c/i\u003e, to be incensed to the honour, first of the\r\nDivine Majesty, and next of your Majesty, to whom on earth I am\r\nmost bounden.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\u0027chapter\u0027 /\u003e\u003ch2\u003eFOOTNOTES.\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"footnote39\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#citation39\" class=\"footnote\"\u003e[39]\u003c/a\u003e Stoops in the rice and takes the\r\nspeeding gold. Ovid. Metam, x. 667.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}