On Not Three Gods
{"WorkMasterId":5921,"WpPageId":275892,"ParentWpPageId":193756,"Slug":"on-not-three-gods","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/gregory-of-nyssa/on-not-three-gods/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/gregory-of-nyssa/on-not-three-gods/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":102685,"CleanHtmlLength":47934,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"On Not Three Gods","Deck":"Gregory addresses how Father, Son, and Spirit can be personally distinguished without collapsing into three gods, using a metaphysics of divine unity and common nature.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to Gregory of Nyssa","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/gregory-of-nyssa/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"Gregory of Nyssa","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/gregory-of-nyssa/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gregory-of-nyssa-01-saint-gregory-of-nyssa-menologion-of-basil-ii.jpg","ImageAlt":"Saint Gregory of Nyssa, Menologion of Basil II, 10th century","FilterTerra":"Eastern Mediterranean","ClickText":"Gregory of Nyssa","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/gregory-of-nyssa/","Copies":["335 CE – 395 CE","Nyssa (Cappadocia)","Cappadocian Greek bishop and philosopher-theologian whose accounts of divine infinity, epektasis, apophatic knowledge, soul-body anthropology, creation, and theological language shaped Christian Platonism, philosophy of religion, metaphysics, mind, science, and aesthetics."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:1","Title":"Ancient History","DateText":"3000 BCE – 499 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-ancient-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:3","Title":"Classical Antiquity","DateText":"500 BCE – 499 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-ancient-history/philosophers-of-classical-antiquity/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"381 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Displayed year follows common early-380s Trinitarian controversy context; exact dating varies.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:2"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:9"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:TUR:2"}],"OriginalTitle":"Ad Ablabium quod non sint tres dei","Language":"Greek","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:metaphysics"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:philosophy-of-religion"}],"Tradition":"Patristic philosophy / Cappadocian theology / Christian Platonism","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Full text from Wikisource: On Not Three Gods .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Gregory addresses how Father, Son, and Spirit can be personally distinguished without collapsing into three gods, using a metaphysics of divine unity and common nature."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"On Not Three Gods; To Ablabius: That We Should Not Think of Saying There Are Three Gods","KeyConcepts":"Trinity; three gods; divine unity; hypostasis; ousia; common nature; individuation; person; plurality; metaphysics; divine names; Ablabius","Methodology":"Short doctrinal argument, conceptual distinction, analogy, semantic clarification, and anti-tritheist reasoning.","Structure":"A short Trinitarian treatise represented as one direct work page because it anchors the not-three-gods metaphysical problem."},"Arguments":["Gregory addresses how Father, Son, and Spirit can be personally distinguished without collapsing into three gods, using a metaphysics of divine unity and common nature."],"Influence":{"InfluencedBy":"Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus, Nicene doctrine, Scripture, and Cappadocian distinctions between common nature and particularity.","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Accepted as a classic Gregory text on Trinitarian metaphysics and the logic of divine unity.","Relevant for metaphysics, philosophy of religion, personhood, individuation, unity, plurality, and theological language."],"EvidenceNote":["Approved direct work. Wikisource and SEP context are evidence only; no full text is imported."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003eFull text from \u003ca href=\"https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nicene_and_Post-Nicene_Fathers:_Series_II/Volume_V/Dogmatic_Treatises/On_%27Not_Three_Gods.%27\"\u003eWikisource: On Not Three Gods\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\n\u003c/span\u003e \n\u003cp\u003eOn \u0026#8220;Not Three Gods.\u0026#8221;\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo Ablabius.\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026#8212;\u0026#8212;\u0026#8212;\u0026#8212;\u0026#8212;\u0026#8212;\u0026#8212;\u0026#8212;\u0026#8212;\u0026#8212;\u0026#8212;\u0026#8212;\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eYe\u003c/span\u003e that\nare strong with all might in the inner man ought by rights to carry on\nthe struggle against the enemies of the truth, and not to shrink from\nthe task, that we fathers may be gladdened by the noble toil of our\nsons; for this is the prompting of the law of nature: but as you turn\nyour ranks, and send against us the assaults of those darts which are\nhurled by the opponents of the truth, and demand that their \u0026#8220;hot\nburning coals\u0026#8221; and their shafts\nsharpened by knowledge falsely so called should be quenched with the\nshield of faith by us old men, we accept your command, and make\nourselves an example of obedience , in order that\nyou may yourself give us the just requital on like commands, Ablabius,\nnoble soldier of Christ, if we should ever summon you to such a\ncontest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn truth, the question you\npropound to us is no small one, nor such that but small harm will\nfollow if it meets with insufficient treatment. For by the force of the\nquestion, we are at first sight compelled to accept one or other of two\nerroneous opinions, and either to say \u0026#8220;there are three\nGods,\u0026#8221; which is unlawful, or not to acknowledge the Godhead of\nthe Son and the Holy Spirit, which is impious and absurd.\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe argument which you state is\nsomething like this:\u0026#8212;Peter, James, and John, being in one human\nnature, are called three men: and there is no absurdity in describing\nthose who are united in nature, if they are more than one, by the\nplural number of the name derived from their nature. If, then, in the\nabove case, custom admits this, and no one forbids us to speak of those\nwho are two as two, or those who are more than two as three, how is it\nthat in the case of our statements of the mysteries of the Faith,\nthough confessing the Three Persons, and acknowledging no difference of\nnature between them, we are in some sense at variance with our\nconfession, when we say that the Godhead of the Father and of the Son\nand of the Holy Ghost is one, and yet forbid men to say \u0026#8220;there\nare three Gods\u0026#8221;? The question is, as I said, very difficult to\ndeal with: yet, if we should be able to find anything that may give\nsupport to the uncertainty of our mind, so that it may no longer totter\nand waver in this monstrous dilemma, it would be well: on the other\nhand, even if our reasoning be found unequal to the problem, we must\nkeep for ever, firm and unmoved, the tradition which we received by\nsuccession from the fathers, and seek from the Lord the reason which is\nthe advocate of our faith: and if this be found by any of those endowed\nwith grace, we must give thanks to Him who bestowed the grace; but if\nnot, we shall none the less, on those points which have been\ndetermined, hold our faith unchangeably.\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhat, then, is the reason that\nwhen we count one by one those who are exhibited to us in one nature,\nwe ordinarily name them in the plural and speak of \u0026#8220;so many\nmen,\u0026#8221; instead of calling them all one: while in the case of the\nDivine nature our doctrinal definition rejects the plurality of Gods,\nat once enumerating the Persons, and at the same time not admitting the\nplural signification? Perhaps one might seem to touch the point if he\nwere to say (speaking offhand to straightforward people), that the\ndefinition refused to reckon Gods in any number to avoid any\nresemblance to the polytheism of the heathen, lest, if we too were to\nenumerate the Deity, not in the singular, but in the plural, as they\nare accustomed to do, there might be supposed to be also some community\nof doctrine. This answer, I say, if made to people of a more guileless\nspirit, might seem to be of some weight: but in the case of the others\nwho require that one of the alternatives they propose should be\nestablished (either that we should not acknowledge the Godhead in Three\nPersons, or that, if we do, we should speak of those who share in the\nsame Godhead as three), this answer is not such as to furnish any\nsolution of the difficulty. And hence we must needs make our reply at\ngreater length, tracing out the truth as best we may; for the question\nis no ordinary one.\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe say, then, to begin with, that the practice of calling those\nwho are not divided in nature by the\nvery name of their common nature in the plural, and saying they are\n\u0026#8220;many men,\u0026#8221; is a customary abuse of language, and that it\nwould be much the same thing to say they are \u0026#8220;many human\nnatures.\u0026#8221; And the truth of this we may see from the following\ninstance. When we address any one, we do not call him by the name of\nhis nature, in order that no confusion may result from the community of\nthe name, as would happen if every one of those who hear it were to\nthink that he himself was the person addressed, because the call is\nmade not by the proper appellation but by the common name of their\nnature: but we separate him from the multitude by using that name which\nbelongs to him as his own;\u0026#8212;that, I mean, which signifies the\nparticular subject. Thus there are many who have shared in the\nnature\u0026#8212;many disciples, say, or apostles, or martyrs\u0026#8212;but the\nman in them all is one; since, as has been said, the term\n\u0026#8220;man\u0026#8221; does not belong to the nature of the individual as\nsuch, but to that which is common. For Luke is a man, or Stephen is a\nman; but it does not follow that if any one is a man he is therefore\nLuke or Stephen: but the idea of the persons admits of that separation\nwhich is made by the peculiar attributes considered in each severally,\nand when they are combined is presented to us by means of number; yet\ntheir nature is one, at union in itself, and an absolutely indivisible\nunit, not capable of increase by addition or of diminution by\nsubtraction, but in its essence being and continually remaining one,\ninseparable even though it appear in plurality, continuous, complete,\nand not divided with the individuals who participate in it. And as we\nspeak of a people, or a mob, or an army, or an assembly in the singular\nin every case, while each of these is conceived as being in plurality,\nso according to the more accurate expression, \u0026#8220;man\u0026#8221; would\nbe said to be one, even though those who are exhibited to us in the\nsame nature make up a plurality. Thus it would be much better to\ncorrect our erroneous habit, so as no longer to extend to a plurality\nthe name of the nature, than by our bondage to habit to transfer to our statements concerning God the error\nwhich exists in the above case. But since the correction of the habit\nis impracticable (for how could you persuade any one not to speak of\nthose who are exhibited in the same nature as \u0026#8220;many\nmen\u0026#8221;?\u0026#8212;indeed, in every case habit is a thing hard to\nchange), we are not so far wrong in not going contrary to the\nprevailing habit in the case of the lower nature, since no harm results\nfrom the mistaken use of the name: but in the case of the statement\nconcerning the Divine nature the various use of\nterms is no longer so free from danger: for that which is of small\naccount is in these subjects no longer a small matter. Therefore we\nmust confess one God, according to the testimony of Scripture,\n\u0026#8220;Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one Lord,\u0026#8221; even though\nthe name of Godhead extends through the Holy Trinity. This I say\naccording to the account we have given in the case of human nature, in\nwhich we have learnt that it is improper to extend the name of the\nnature by the mark of plurality. We must, however, more carefully\nexamine the name of \u0026#8220;Godhead,\u0026#8221; in order to obtain, by means\nof the significance involved in the word, some help towards clearing up\nthe question before us.\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eMost men think that the word\n\u0026#8220;Godhead\u0026#8221; is used in a peculiar degree in respect of\nnature: and just as the heaven, or the sun, or any other of the\nconstituent parts of the universe are denoted by proper names which are\nsignificant of the subjects, so they say that in the case of the\nSupreme and Divine nature, the word \u0026#8220;Godhead\u0026#8221; is fitly\nadapted to that which it represents to us, as a kind of special name.\nWe, on the other hand, following the suggestions of Scripture, have\nlearnt that that nature is unnameable and unspeakable, and we say that\nevery term either invented by the custom of\nmen, or handed down to us by the Scriptures, is indeed explanatory of\nour conceptions of the Divine Nature , but does not\ninclude the signification of that nature itself. And it may be shown\nwithout much difficulty that this is the case. For all other terms\nwhich are used of the creation may be found, even without analysis of\ntheir origin, to be applied to the subjects accidentally, because we\nare content to denote the things in any way by the word applied to them\nso as to avoid confusion in our knowledge of the things signified. But\nall the terms that are employed to lead us to the knowledge of God have\ncomprehended in them each its own meaning, and you cannot find any word\namong the terms especially applied to God which is without a distinct\nsense. Hence it is clear that by any of the terms we use the Divine\nnature itself is not signified, but some one of its surroundings is\nmade known. For we say, it may be, that the Deity is incorruptible, or\npowerful, or whatever else we are accustomed to say of Him. But\nin each of these terms we find a peculiar sense, fit to be understood\nor asserted of the Divine nature, yet not expressing that which that\nnature is in its essence. For the subject, whatever it may be, is\nincorruptible: but our conception of incorruptibility is\nthis,\u0026#8212;that that which is, is not resolved into decay: so, when we\nsay that He is incorruptible, we declare what His nature does not\nsuffer, but we do not express what that is which does not suffer\ncorruption. Thus, again, if we say that He is the Giver of life, though\nwe show by that appellation what He gives, we do not by that word\ndeclare what that is which gives it. And by the same reasoning we find\nthat all else which results from the significance involved in the names\nexpressing the Divine attributes either forbids us to conceive what we\nought not to conceive of the Divine nature, or teaches us that which we\nought to conceive of it, but does not include an explanation of the\nnature itself. Since, then, as we perceive the varied operations of the\npower above us, we fashion our appellations from the several operations\nthat are known to us, and as we recognize as one of these that\noperation of surveying and inspection, or, as one might call it,\nbeholding, whereby He surveys all things and overlooks them all,\ndiscerning our thoughts, and even entering by His power of\ncontemplation into those things which are not visible, we suppose that\nGodhead, or \u0026#952;\u0026#949;\u0026#8057;\u0026#964;\u0026#951;\u0026#962;, is\nso called from \u0026#952;\u0026#8051;\u0026#945;, or beholding, and\nthat He who is our \u0026#952;\u0026#949;\u0026#945;\u0026#964;\u0026#8053;\u0026#962; or\nbeholder, by customary use and by the instruction of the Scriptures, is\ncalled \u0026#952;\u0026#949;\u0026#8057;\u0026#962;, or God. Now if\nany one admits that to behold and to discern are the same thing, and\nthat the God Who superintends all things, both is and is called the\nsuperintender of the universe, let him consider this operation, and\njudge whether it belongs to one of the Persons whom we believe in the\nHoly Trinity, or whether the power extends \nthroughout the Three Persons. For if our interpretation of the term\nGodhead, or \u0026#952;\u0026#949;\u0026#8057;\u0026#964;\u0026#951;\u0026#962;, is\na true one, and the things which are seen are said to be beheld,\nor \u0026#952;\u0026#949;\u0026#945;\u0026#964;\u0026#8049;, and that\nwhich beholds them is called \u0026#952;\u0026#949;\u0026#8057;\u0026#962;, or God, no one\nof the Persons in the Trinity could reasonably be excluded from such an\nappellation on the ground of the sense involved in the word. For\nScripture attributes the act of seeing equally to Father, Son, and Holy\nSpirit. David says, \u0026#8220;See, O God our defender \u0026#8221;: and from this we learn that sight is\na proper operation of the idea of God, so far as\nGod is conceived, since he says, \u0026#8220;See, O God.\u0026#8221; But Jesus\nalso sees the thoughts of those who condemn Him, and questions why by\nHis own power He pardons the sins of men? for it says, \u0026#8220;Jesus,\nseeing their thoughts .\u0026#8221; And of the\nHoly Spirit also, Peter says to Ananias, \u0026#8220;Why hath Satan filled\nthine heart, to lie to the Holy Ghost? \u0026#8221; showing that the Holy Spirit was a\ntrue witness, aware of what Ananias had dared to do in secret, and by\nWhom the manifestation of the secret was made to Peter. For Ananias\nbecame a thief of his own goods, secretly, as he thought, from all men,\nand concealing his sin: but the Holy Spirit at the same moment was in\nPeter, and detected his intent, dragged down as it was to avarice, and\ngave to Peter from Himself the power of seeing\nthe secret, while it is clear that He could not have done this had He\nnot been able to behold hidden things.\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBut some one will say that the\nproof of our argument does not yet regard the question. For even if it\nwere granted that the name of \u0026#8220;Godhead\u0026#8221; is a common name of\nthe nature, it would not be established that we should not speak of\n\u0026#8220;Gods\u0026#8221;: but by these arguments, on the contrary, we are\ncompelled to speak of \u0026#8220;Gods\u0026#8221;: for we find in the custom of\nmankind that not only those who are partakers in\nthe same nature, but even any who may be of the same business, are not,\nwhen they are many, spoken of in the singular; as we speak of\n\u0026#8220;many orators,\u0026#8221; or \u0026#8220;surveyors,\u0026#8221; or\n\u0026#8220;farmers,\u0026#8221; or \u0026#8220;shoemakers,\u0026#8221; and so in all other\ncases. If, indeed, Godhead were an appellation of nature, it would be\nmore proper, according to the argument laid down, to include the Three\nPersons in the singular number, and to speak of \u0026#8220;One God,\u0026#8221;\nby reason of the inseparability and indivisibility of the nature: but\nsince it has been established by what has been said, that the term\n\u0026#8220;Godhead\u0026#8221; is significant of operation, and not of nature,\nthe argument from what has been advanced seems to turn to the contrary\nconclusion, that we ought therefore all the more to call those\n\u0026#8220;three Gods\u0026#8221; who are contemplated in the same operation, as\nthey say that one would speak of \u0026#8220;three philosophers\u0026#8221; or\n\u0026#8220;orators,\u0026#8221; or any other name derived from a business when\nthose who take part in the same business are more than one.\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eI have taken some pains, in\nsetting forth this view, to bring forward the reasoning on behalf of\nthe adversaries, that our decision may be the more firmly fixed, being\nstrengthened by the more elaborate contradictions. Let us now resume\nour argument.\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAs we have to a certain extent\nshown by our statement that the word \u0026#8220;Godhead\u0026#8221; is not significant\nof nature but of operation, perhaps one might reasonably allege as a\ncause why, in the case of men, those who share with one another in the\nsame pursuits are enumerated and spoken of in the plural, while on the\nother hand the Deity is spoken of in the singular as one God and one\nGodhead, even though the Three Persons are not separated from the\nsignificance expressed by the term \u0026#8220;Godhead,\u0026#8221;\u0026#8212;one\nmight allege, I say, the fact that men, even if several are engaged in\nthe same form of action, work separately each by himself at the task he\nhas undertaken, having no participation in his individual action with\nothers who are engaged in the same occupation. For instance, supposing\nthe case of several rhetoricians, their pursuit, being one, has the\nsame name in the numerous cases: but each of those who follow it works\nby himself, this one pleading on his own account, and that on his own\naccount. Thus, since among men the action of each in the same pursuits\nis discriminated, they are properly called many, since each of them is\nseparated from the others within his own environment, according to the\nspecial character of his operation. But in the case of the Divine\nnature we do not similarly learn that the Father does anything by\nHimself in which the Son does not work conjointly, or again that the\nSon has any special operation apart from the Holy Spirit; but every\noperation which extends from God to the Creation, and is named\naccording to our variable conceptions of it, has its origin from the\nFather, and proceeds through the Son, and is perfected in the Holy\nSpirit. For this reason the name derived from the operation is not\ndivided with regard to the number of those who fulfil it, because the\naction of each concerning anything is not separate and peculiar, but\nwhatever comes to pass, in reference either to the acts of His\nprovidence for us, or to the government and constitution of the\nuniverse, comes to pass by the action of the Three, yet what does come\nto pass is not three things. We may understand the meaning of this from\none single instance. From Him, I say, Who is the chief source of gifts,\nall things which have shared in this grace have obtained their life.\nWhen we inquire, then, whence this good gift came to us, we find by the\nguidance of the Scriptures that it was from the Father, Son, and Holy\nSpirit. Yet although we set forth Three Persons and three names, we do\nnot consider that we have had bestowed upon us three lives, one from\neach Person separately; but the same life is wrought in us by the\nFather, and prepared by the Son, and depends on the will of the Holy\nSpirit. Since then the Holy Trinity fulfils every operation in a manner\nsimilar to that of which I have spoken, not by separate action\naccording to the number of the Persons, but so that there is one motion\nand disposition of the good will which is communicated from the Father\nthrough the Son to the Spirit (for as we do not call those whose\noperation gives one life three Givers of life, neither do we call those\nwho are contemplated in one goodness three Good beings, nor speak of\nthem in the plural by any of their other attributes); so neither can we\ncall those who exercise this Divine and superintending power and\noperation towards ourselves and all creation, conjointly and\ninseparably, by their mutual action, three Gods. For as when we learn\nconcerning the God of the universe, from the words of Scripture, that\nHe judges all the earth , we say that He is\nthe Judge of all things through the Son: and again, when we hear that\nthe Father judgeth no man , we do not think\nthat the Scripture is at variance with itself,\u0026#8212;(for He Who judges\nall the earth does this by His Son to Whom He has committed all\njudgment; and everything which is done by the Only-begotten has its\nreference to the Father, so that He Himself is at once the Judge of all\nthings and judges no man, by reason of His having, as we said,\ncommitted all judgment to the Son, while all the judgment of the Son is\nconformable to the will of the Father; and one could not properly say\neither that They are two judges, or that one of Them is excluded from\nthe authority and power implied in judgment);\u0026#8212;so also in the case\nof the word \u0026#8220;Godhead,\u0026#8221; Christ is the power of God and the\nwisdom of God, and that very power of superintendence and beholding\nwhich we call Godhead, the Father exercises through the Only-begotten,\nwhile the Son perfects every power by the Holy Spirit, judging, as\nIsaiah says, by the Spirit of judgment and the Spirit of burning , and acting by Him also, according to the\nsaying in the Gospel which was spoken to the Jews. For He says,\n\u0026#8220;If I by the Spirit of God cast out devils \u0026#8221;; where He includes every form of\ndoing good in a partial description, by reason of the unity of action:\nfor the name derived from operation cannot be divided among many where\nthe result of their mutual operation is one.\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSince, then, the character of\nthe superintending and beholding power is one, in Father, Son, and Holy\nSpirit, as has been said in our previous argument, issuing from the\nFather as from a spring, brought into operation by the Son, and\nperfecting its grace by the power of the Spirit; and since no operation\nis separated in respect of the Persons, being fulfilled by each\nindividually apart from that which is joined with Him in our contemplation, but\nall providence, care, and superintendence of all, alike of things in\nthe sensible creation and of those of supramundane nature, and that\npower which preserves the things which are, and corrects those which\nare amiss, and instructs those which are ordered aright, is one, and\nnot three, being, indeed, directed by the Holy Trinity, yet not severed\nby a threefold division according to the number of the Persons\ncontemplated in the Faith, so that each of the acts, contemplated by\nitself, should be the work of the Father alone, or of the Son\npeculiarly, or of the Holy Spirit separately,\nbut while, as the Apostle says, the one and the selfsame Spirit divides\nHis good gifts to every man severally ,\nthe motion of good proceeding from the Spirit is not without\nbeginning;\u0026#8212;we find that the power which we conceive as preceding\nthis motion, which is the Only-begotten God, is the maker of all\nthings; without Him no existent thing attains to the beginning of its\nbeing: and, again, this same source of good issues from the will of the\nFather.\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIf, then, every good thing and\nevery good name, depending on that power and purpose which is without\nbeginning, is brought to perfection in the power of the Spirit through\nthe Only-begotten God, without mark of time or distinction (since there\nis no delay, existent or conceived, in the motion of the Divine will\nfrom the Father, through the Son, to the Spirit): and if Godhead also\nis one of the good names and concepts, it would not be proper to divide\nthe name into a plurality, since the unity existing in the action\nprevents plural enumeration. And as the Saviour of all men, specially\nof them that believe , is spoken of by\nthe Apostle as one, and no one from this phrase argues either that the\nSon does not save them who believe, or that salvation is given to those\nwho receive it without the intervention of the Spirit; but God who is\nover all, is the Saviour of all, while the Son works salvation by means\nof the grace of the Spirit, and yet they are not on this account called\nin Scripture three Saviours (although salvation is confessed to proceed\nfrom the Holy Trinity): so neither are they called three Gods,\naccording to the signification assigned to the term\n\u0026#8220;Godhead,\u0026#8221; even though the aforesaid appellation attaches\nto the Holy Trinity.\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIt does not seem to me\nabsolutely necessary, with a view to the present proof of our argument,\nto contend against those who oppose us with the assertion that we are\nnot to conceive \u0026#8220;Godhead\u0026#8221; as an operation. For we,\nbelieving the Divine nature to be unlimited and incomprehensible,\nconceive no comprehension of it, but declare that the nature is to be\nconceived in all respects as infinite: and that which is absolutely\ninfinite is not limited in one respect while it is left unlimited in\nanother, but infinity is free from limitation altogether. That\ntherefore which is without limit is surely not limited even by name. In\norder then to mark the constancy of our conception of infinity in the\ncase of the Divine nature, we say that the Deity is above every name:\nand \u0026#8220;Godhead\u0026#8221; is a name. Now it cannot be that the same\nthing should at once be a name and be accounted as above every\nname.\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBut if it pleases our\nadversaries to say that the significance of the term is not operation,\nbut nature, we shall fall back upon our original argument, that custom\napplies the name of a nature to denote multitude erroneously: since\naccording to true reasoning neither diminution nor increase attaches to\nany nature, when it is contemplated in a larger or smaller number. For\nit is only those things which are contemplated in their individual\ncircumscription which are enumerated by way of addition. Now this\ncircumscription is noted by bodily appearance, and size, and place, and\ndifference figure and colour, and that which is contemplated apart from\nthese conditions is free from the circumscription which is formed by\nsuch categories. That which is not thus circumscribed is not\nenumerated, and that which is not enumerated cannot be contemplated in\nmultitude. For we say that gold, even though it be cut into many\nfigures, is one, and is so spoken of, but we speak of many coins or\nmany staters, without finding any multiplication of the nature of gold\nby the number of staters; and for this reason we speak of gold, when it\nis contemplated in greater bulk, either in plate or in coin, as\n\u0026#8220;much,\u0026#8221; but we do not speak of it as \u0026#8220;many\ngolds\u0026#8221; on account of the multitude of the material,\u0026#8212;except\nwhen one says there are \u0026#8220;many gold pieces\u0026#8221; (Darics, for\ninstance, or staters), in which case it is not the material, but the\npieces of money to which the significance of number applies: indeed,\nproperly, we should not call them \u0026#8220;gold\u0026#8221; but\n\u0026#8220;golden.\u0026#8221;\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAs, then, the golden staters are\nmany, but the gold is one, so too those who are exhibited to us\nseverally in the nature of man, as Peter, James, and John, are many,\nyet the man in them is one. And although Scripture extends the word\naccording to the plural significance, where it says \u0026#8220;men swear by\nthe greater ,\u0026#8221; and \u0026#8220;sons of men,\u0026#8221;\nand in other phrases of the like sort, we must recognize that in using\nthe custom of the prevailing form of speech, it does not lay down a law\nas to the propriety of using the words in one way or another,\nnor does it say these things by way of giving us instruction about\nphrases, but uses the word according to the prevailing custom, with a\nview only to this, that the word may be profitable to those who receive\nit, taking no minute care in its manner of speech about points where no\nharm can result from the phrases in respect of the way they are\nunderstood.\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIndeed, it would be a lengthy\ntask to set out in detail from the Scriptures those constructions which\nare inexactly expressed, in order to prove the statement I have made;\nwhere, however, there is a risk of injury to any part of the truth, we\nno longer find in Scriptural phrases any indiscriminate or indifferent\nuse of words. For this reason Scripture admits the naming of\n\u0026#8220;men\u0026#8221; in the plural, because no one is by such a figure of\nspeech led astray in his conceptions to imagine a multitude of\nhumanities, or supposes that many human natures are indicated by the\nfact that the name expressive of that nature is used in the plural. But\nthe word \u0026#8220;God\u0026#8221; it employs studiously in the singular form\nonly, guarding against introducing the idea of different natures in the\nDivine essence by the plural signification of \u0026#8220;Gods.\u0026#8221; This\nis the cause why it says, \u0026#8220;the Lord our God is one Lord ,\u0026#8221; and also proclaims the Only-begotten\nGod by the name of Godhead, without dividing the Unity into a dual\nsignification, so as to call the Father and the Son two Gods, although\neach is proclaimed by the holy writers as God. The Father is God: the\nSon is God: and yet by the same proclamation God is One, because no\ndifference either of nature or of operation is contemplated in the\nGodhead. For if (according to the idea of those who have been led\nastray) the nature of the Holy Trinity were diverse, the number would\nby consequence be extended to a plurality of Gods, being divided\naccording to the diversity of essence in the subjects. But since the\nDivine, single, and unchanging nature, that it may be one, rejects all\ndiversity in essence, it does not admit in its own case the\nsignification of multitude; but as it is called one nature, so it is\ncalled in the singular by all its other names, \u0026#8220;God,\u0026#8221;\n\u0026#8220;Good,\u0026#8221; \u0026#8220;Holy,\u0026#8221; \u0026#8220;Saviour,\u0026#8221;\n\u0026#8220;Just,\u0026#8221; \u0026#8220;Judge,\u0026#8221; and every other Divine name\nconceivable: whether one says that the names refer to nature or to\noperation, we shall not dispute the point.\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIf, however, any one cavils at\nour argument, on the ground that by not admitting the difference of\nnature it leads to a mixture and confusion of the Persons, we shall\nmake to such a charge this answer;\u0026#8212;that while we confess the\ninvariable character of the nature, we do not deny the difference in\nrespect of cause, and that which is caused, by which alone we apprehend\nthat one Person is distinguished from another;\u0026#8212;by our belief,\nthat is, that one is the Cause, and another is of the Cause; and again\nin that which is of the Cause we recognize another distinction. For one\nis directly from the first Cause, and another by that which is directly\nfrom the first Cause; so that the attribute of being Only-begotten\nabides without doubt in the Son, and the interposition of the Son,\nwhile it guards His attribute of being Only-begotten, does not shut out\nthe Spirit from His relation by way of nature to the Father.\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBut in speaking of\n\u0026#8220;cause,\u0026#8221; and \u0026#8220;of the cause,\u0026#8221; we do not by these\nwords denote nature (for no one would give the same definition of\n\u0026#8220;cause\u0026#8221; and of \u0026#8220;nature\u0026#8221;), but we indicate the\ndifference in manner of existence. For when we say that one is\n\u0026#8220;caused,\u0026#8221; and that the other is \u0026#8220;without\ncause,\u0026#8221; we do not divide the nature by the word \u0026#8220;cause \u0026#8221;, but only indicate the fact that the\nSon does not exist without generation, nor the Father by generation:\nbut we must needs in the first place believe that something exists, and\nthen scrutinize the manner of existence of the object of our belief:\nthus the question of existence is one, and that of the mode of\nexistence is another. To say that anything exists without generation\nsets forth the mode of its existence, but what exists is not indicated\nby this phrase. If one were to ask a husbandman about a tree, whether\nit were planted or had grown of itself, and he were to answer either\nthat the tree had not been planted or that it was the result of\nplanting, would he by that answer declare the nature of the tree?\nSurely not; but while saying how it exists he would leave the question\nof its nature obscure and unexplained. So, in the other case, when we\nlearn that He is unbegotten, we are taught in what mode He exists, and\nhow it is fit that we should conceive Him as existing, but \u003ci\u003ewhat\u003c/i\u003e\nHe is we do not hear in that phrase. When, therefore, we acknowledge\nsuch a distinction in the case of the Holy Trinity, as to believe that\none Person is the Cause, and another is of the Cause, we can no longer\nbe accused of confounding the definition of the Persons by the\ncommunity of nature.\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThus, since on the one hand the\nidea of cause differentiates the Persons of the Holy Trinity, declaring\nthat one exists without a Cause, and another is of the Cause; and since\non the one hand the Divine nature is apprehended by every conception as\nunchangeable and undivided, for these reasons we properly declare the\nGodhead to be one, and God to be one, and employ in the singular all\nother names which express Divine attributes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eFootnotes\u003c/h2\u003e \u003ca href=\"/w/index.php?title=Nicene_and_Post-Nicene_Fathers:_Series_II/Volume_V/Dogmatic_Treatises/On_%27Not_Three_Gods.%27\u0026amp;action=edit\u0026amp;section=1\" title=\"Edit section: Footnotes\"\u003e\u003cspan\u003eedit\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003c/span\u003e\r\n\n \u003c/article\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["Gregory addresses how Father, Son, and Spirit can be personally distinguished without collapsing into three gods, using a metaphysics of divine unity and common nature."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":"On Not Three Gods; To Ablabius: That We Should Not Think of Saying There Are Three Gods"},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"Trinity; three gods; divine unity; hypostasis; ousia; common nature; individuation; person; plurality; metaphysics; divine names; Ablabius"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Short doctrinal argument, conceptual distinction, analogy, semantic clarification, and anti-tritheist reasoning."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"A short Trinitarian treatise represented as one direct work page because it anchors the not-three-gods metaphysical problem."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Gregory addresses how Father, Son, and Spirit can be personally distinguished without collapsing into three gods, using a metaphysics of divine unity and common nature."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus, Nicene doctrine, Scripture, and Cappadocian distinctions between common nature and particularity."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"Maximus Confessor, Pseudo-Dionysius, John of Damascus, Eastern Orthodox theology, Christian mystical theology, medieval accounts of divine infinity, apophatic theology, deification, and modern scholarship on Christian Platonism."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a classic Gregory text on Trinitarian metaphysics and the logic of divine unity.","Relevant for metaphysics, philosophy of religion, personhood, individuation, unity, plurality, and theological language."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Approved direct work. Wikisource and SEP context are evidence only; no full text is imported."]}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Text","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":24,"Styles":2,"Scripts":1}}